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ABSTRACT
THE ROAD TO REFORM AND THE EMANCIPATION
OF THE SERFS IN HUNGARY
1767-1867

by Imre Tibor Jarmy

Custom, tradition, law, peculiar feudal institutions,
the personality of Habsburg sovereigns, economic social and
political conditions were the main factors that determined
the course of reform and the emancipation of the serfs in

Hungary. The county system, the Tripartitum and Maria

 

Theresia's urbarial reforms enhanced the privileged position
of the nobility, while the high handed methods of Joseph II
ushered in an era of reaction that lasted until the 1830's.
By this time there emerged a new social and political current,
noble liberalism, and a new class, an intelligentsia. In
combination these two laid groundwork for a profound change
in the world of the serf. During a brief reform period
(1832-1847), a minority of liberal minded Magyar aristocrats,
wealthy middle nobility and landless intelligentsia of noble
birth successfully breached the walls of feudalism. Three
consecutive Diets passed some of the most urgent reforms, and
by the second half of the 1840's Hungary was well on the way
to gradual change.

The revolutions of 1848 accelerated this process to
such an extent that feudalism, and with it serfdom, was abol—
ished practically overnight. The Magyars were unable to

implement their "April Laws" due to their military and

Imre Tibor Jarmy

political demise in 1849. An absolutistic Habsburg re—
gime thereupon tried to save as much of feudalism (at least
in its political and social aspects) as possible, and
initiated reforms on its own terms. Vienna delayed until
1853 in announcing the terms of emancipation and until 1856
in providing a judicial machinery for the implementation of
this monumental task.

Austria's emancipation of the serfs was inadequate in
several respects but it was almost radical in others. It
was inadequate in that the Patent of 1853 made peasant owner—
ship of land dependent on the types of land a serf tilled
prior to emancipation, using as a guideline the antiquated
1767 urbarial registers of Maria Theresia. Consequently only
forty per cent of the former serfs became landowners, while
the rest became seasonal agricultural workers who were un—
able to leave for the cities (as they did in the West and
other Austrian provinces) due to Hungary's industrial back—
wardness. The delays in implementation wrought a great
hardship on the landed peasantry mainly because they were
required to continue delivery of socage dues on certain
(albeit smaller) portion of their lands until they could
redeem them from their former lords. It was radical, however,
in that Vienna assumed redemption payments on the major
(urbarial) portion of serf lands and also enabled the peasants
to acquire additional lands despite the stiff opposition of

their former lords. In addition Vienna abolished the personal

Imre Tibor Jarmy
relationship between serf and lord as well as the age old
distinctions between former serf, noble and other types of
land which the Russian or Rumanian emancipations failed to
accomplish. By 1867 the majority of the peasants were freed.

Austria went further than the Magyar nobility was
willing to go, yet the reforms were not much more than half
measures. Both the nobility and the peasantry were unpre-
pared for competition in a capitalistic economic system.

Both were ignorant of modern, efficient methods of farming,
in addition the government failed to provide them with vital
credit facilities. The vestiges of feudalism continued to
linger on: the nobility retained political control and after
1867 even the archaic county system was restored, while vital
farm legislation was repeatedly defeated in Parliament. The
reforms fizzled out into a procession of government half
measures, endless court proceedings and a forest of legal

technicalities.

THE ROAD TO REFORM AND THE EMANCIPATION
OF THE SERFS IN HUNGARY

1767-1867

BY

Imre Tibor Jarmy

A THESIS

Submitted-to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1967

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My heartfelt thanks to my mother and father, Maria and
Tibor, whose love and devotion to self betterment instilled
in me the desire to know. To my teachers at the Gimnazium
of Sérospatak, Hungary who guided me to broad horizons in
the humanities and sciences. To professor William O. McCagg,
jr. whose infinite patience and invaluable comments helped
make order out of these chapters. To Professors Arthur E.
Adams, Madison Kuhn, Norman R. Rich and George W. Radimersky
for their helpful suggestions. And to my wife, Marian, who
not only typed the manuscript but whose tenacious insistence

made me grasp the finer points of English phraseology.

ii

CONTENTS

Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V
ILLUSTRATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vi
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Chapter
I. FEUDALISM IN HUNGARY . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

State Organization
The Tripartitum of Istvén Werboczy
The Urbarium of Maria Theresia

 

II. REFORMERS, REACTIONARIES AND REFORMS,
1780-1844 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

The Reformers
Joseph II
Count Istvén Széchenyi
Lajos Kossuth
Ferencz Deék

The Antagonists of Reform
Francis I
Prince Metternich
Count Kollowrat
Count Aurél Dessewffy

The Reform Period, 1832—1847

III. REVOLUTION AND THE EMANCIPATION LAW,
1847—1849 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Declaration of the Opposition, 1847
Elections to the 1847 Diet
Stalemate Between Crown and Diet
April Laws, 1848

Revolutionary Government, 1848-1849

iii

CONTENTS-—Continued

IV. ABSOLUTISM AND PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION,
1849—1867 . .

6O
Reign of Terror

Bach System

Patent of 1853

Land Disputes — Partial Emancipation

Categories and Consolidation of Land

Progress of Implementation

V. BALANCE SHEET AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . 102

Resistance to Change

Inept Agriculture

Debt

Taxes and Financial Crisis
Inadequate Land Distribution
Half Measures

GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . 109

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . 111

iv

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page
1. Pasture and Forest Allotments, 1853—1867 . . . . 84
2. Average Size and Dispersement of Peasant

Lands, 1866 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3. Land Surveys and Adjustments, 1850 . . . . . . . 92
4. Urbarial Settlements, 1848-1865 . . . . . . . . 97
5. Size and Dispersement of Peasant Farms at the

Beginning of the Twentieth Century . . . . . . . 101

ILLUSTRATION

Page
Map of Hungary During the Bach Period . . . . . . . . . 61

vi

INTRODUCTION

The emancipation of serfs in Europe was initiated and
carried out by the ruling classes. It was a revolution from
the top down which tried to remedy economic and social ills
and at the same time preserve the status quo; that is, in—
sure the continuity of political power in traditional hands
—— that of the nobility. An exception to this is of course
France. On the other hand, Prussia, the Habsburg Empire and
Russia did manage to preserve the rule of their nobility
while making their serfs "equal before the law."

Custom, tradition and law influenced to such an ex—
tent the way serfdom was abolished and reforms implemented
that I found it necessary to reach far into the past and
expose the roots of the troubles ahead. Moreover, as the
work progressed, I found it imperative to dwell at consider—
able length on the nature of the reformers since their desire
for change was of such varied character according to their
station in life. But for the same reasons I could not ig-
nore the antagonists of reform either. Finally I had to
examine briefly the reform legislation of the 1830‘s and
1840's in order to show how feudalism in Hungary tried to
remedy its own ills.

The liberalism of Hungary's nobility was not unlike,
in essence, that of its neighbors; but the circumstances
under which serf emancipation and its implementation came

1

2
about was different indeed. While Hungary was part of the
Habsburg Empire, its Diet brought about emancipation on its
own volition without imperial sanction from Vienna. At first
the Crown Council even refused to consider the matter, and
only under the threat of popular uprising and violence did
it finally acquiesce. To complicate matters, the inept
Emperor Ferdinand was forced to abdicate in favor of his
nephew Franz Joseph, then barely eighteen years of age. This
enabled the military to assume a major role in the affairs
of state. Prince Felix Schwarzenberg maintained that the
young Emperor was not legally bound by any of the promises
of his predecessor and persuaded Franz Joseph to sanction
military action against "rebellious" Hungary.

At first Hungarian nationalism overshadowed the prob—
lems of reform in that it directed public attention toward
"a common enemy" the alien Habsburgs. But this nationalism
permeated only the middle classes. The peasantry was in—
terested almost exclusively in the terms of its emancipation.
The peasant wanted title to the land he tilled and cared
little for “the affairs of nobles." In order to insure a
peaceful hinterland, the revolutionary government found it
mandatory to implement the laws of the Diet of 1847. By
1849 the language of the Hungarian government's decrees was
reminiscent of those of the Jacobins of the French Revolution,
but it came too late for implementation. The peasants still

refused to flock under the national tricolor. In addition,

imperial Habsburg and Russian troops overwhelmed the Hun—
garians in the field.

In the.wake.of the Revolution a strong, centralized,
alien government from Vienna tried to rescue as much of
feudalism (at least in its political and social aSpects) as
possible. Vienna promptly voided the radical measures of
the revolutionary government, but it upheld the emanicpation
law of the Diet of 1847. By 1850 the reform zeal of the
Hungarians gave way to obstructionism against foreign rule
and stagnation —— a "let us muddle through" attitude. It
was not until 1853 that the Emperor issued the patent by
which the emancipation of the serfs was to be implemented.
This order remained the basis for the emancipation of the
serfs in Hungary. The peculiarity here is that it was an
alien government that carried out the liquidation of feudal—
ism in Hungary and we could say almost against the wishes of
the Hungarians.

In the urbarial courts, established to adjudicate
disputes between former landlord and former serf, the nobil-
ity on the whole displayed great reluctance to part with its
lands in favor of the freed peasants. The serfs, on the other
hand, were equally unwilling to allow their lands surveyed
and consolidated due to their traditional distrust of the
nobility. The freed serfs received enough land to insure
survival but far from enough to become successfully competi—

tive in the new capitalistic system.

Vienna, while politically oppressing the Hungarians
by suspending their constitution and ruling by decree,
steered a careful.course. It.assured.the loyalty of the
nobility by not taking too much land away and simultaneously
encouraged the peasantry to blame the nobles for not get—
ting enough land. Grossly oversimplified, this is the old
Habsburg principle of "divide et impera."

The emancipation of the serfs in Hungary is unique
for these reasons and worth an investigation. I spent my
youth in Hungary and perhaps this might lead me to some
insights concerning the Hungarian outlook on life and
society which might escape the eye of a westerner. I also
profess a fondness for the ”budos paraszt" (stinking peasant)
as he was called by his lords. He is a fascinating mixture
of rebelliousness and reaction; of land hunger and social-
ism; of diligence and stupor; of poeticism and brutality;

of fierce pride and servile veneration of authority.

CHAPTER I
FEUDALISM IN HUNGARY

The Hungarian feudal system rested on three main pil—
lars, namely the political state organization, the Triparti-

tum, or code, of Istvan Werboczy, and the Urbarium of Maria

 

Theresia. Within these three institutions also lay the
beginnings of the peasant problem which resulted in a revolu—
tion and the abolishment of feudalism in 1848.

The state organization in Hungary, based on the
county system, was the most unique political institution in
EurOpean history.

He, and he alone, who fully grasps the significance
and purport of the Hungarian county will also fully
grasp the main features of Hungarian history.1

Quite unlike the formation of other European nation
states, Hungary owed its existence exclusively to war. This
right by conquest became so ingrained in the nation‘s soul
that it became the main force in the develOpment and ad—
herence to the myth of the indivisibility of "the lands of
the Crown of St. Stephen."

The first written record, now lost, on reorganizing

the counties dates from the reign of Charles I of Anjou

(1308-1342), great-grandson of Istvén V (1270—1272) of the

 

1Emil Reich, "The Magyar County,“ Publications of
the Royal Historical Society (New Series, London, 1893),
VII, p. 38. Hereafter referred to as Reich, County.

5

House of Arpad. There were few officials. At the head of
the county (megye) was the foispanz appointed by the Crown.
Next in rank came the alispén appointed by the fOispén. The
head of each district (jérés) usually four in each county,
was the szolgabird, and under him two assessors (eskfidts).
The office of the foispan soon became hereditary and
lost much of its importance. By the beginning of the eight—
eenth century office of the foispén was hereditary in twenty—
eight, or half of all the counties.3 The office of the
alispan increased its influence rapidly. It became elective
after 1504, the tenure of office usually being one year; and
most significantly it was from among these officers that
deputations were sent to the palatine, the king, or in case
of war to the enemy. The office of the szolgabir6 carried
the same weight in the district as that of the alispén in the
county. In addition, he was quite independent of the aliSpan
and only in a limited sense his bureaucratic subordinate.
And, moreover, his office was not only administrative but
judicial and that of police magistracy as well. In other words

all power in the district was concentrated in his hands.4

 

2For the detailed meaning of this and similar techni—
cal terms below, see Glossary, p.109.

3Reich, County, p. 46.

4Strangely enough, on the local level (the villages)
there was considerable autonomy. The landlords nominated
the bird (mayor), but the peasants elected him; however, at
times the peasants elected their own nominee. An excellent
portrayal of local conditions is Baron szsef Eotvos' A falu
jegyzoje (The Village Notary), (Pest, 1845).

7

The county system guarded the Estates from royal en-
croachments upon their historic privileges. The counties
had the right, firstly, to contest in writing or ignore royal
decrees;5 secondly, a right to judicial autonomy; thirdly, a
right to openly debate political matters; fourthly, and
lastly, a right to deny collection of taxes and recruits for
the central government. The tenacity with which the nobility
clung to these rights can best be illustrated by the fact
that the reforms of Parliament in 1848—1849 and 1869—1870
managed to bring about only the separation of the judicial
and administrative branches of county government while prac—
tically leaving everything else unchanged.6

Elections in the counties were public, usually by
voice, at the frequently called meetings. Only the nobility
and a few privileged non—nobles (honorationes) could attend.
Only the nobles could vote. Irregularities were commonplace:
votes were bought quite openly by distributing free barrels

of wine making the electors drunk.’7 Opposition candidates

 

5This right was first established by the Aranybulla
(Golden Bull) of 1222 and in numerous subsequent laws: 1291-
17; 1298 — 7, 20, 21, 23, 41; 1444 - 33; 1471 — 12; etc. See
Hungary, Corpus_juris hungarici, 1000—1895, milleniumi
emlékkiadés (Millenial Memorial Edition), Eds. Dezso Markus
et al. (Budapest: Franklin Tarsulat, 1896—1901), I. This
series consists of twenty volumes containing all the laws of
historic Hungary. Hereafter referred to as Corpus juris.

6Law of 1869, Article IV, as quoted in Gusztév Gratz,
A dualizmus kora (The Era of Dualism), (Budapest: Magyar
Szemle Térsasag, 1934), I, p. 93. Hereafter referred to as
Grétz, Dualizmus. See also Corpus juris, IX.

 

 

 

7Typical of county electioneering was the 1839 case
of Deputy Pulszky from Séros county. This man was then a

8
were often beaten. Intimidations by show of force (kortes-
kedés), the silencing of unpopular speakers by generating
loud enough and long enough noise, the inept and corrupt
handling of county government, were all good reasons why in
the Lower House of Parliament Deputy Agoston Trefort as late
as 1866 called the counties “the refuge of medieval barbar—
ism;" while in the Upper House in 1875 Baron Pal Sennyei
talked about ”Asiatic conditions“ in reference to county
administration.8

The nobility was the county. Through it the nobles
presented a solid and formidable wall to the monarch if they
felt that the royal power aimed to jeopardize their ancient
privileges. Yet this nobility was caleidoscopic in its com-
position. A large number of them lived like peasants, on
less than a serf's plot of land.9 The gentry, or middle

nobility, owned estates of moderate size (this was the second

largest group); while only a handful, the "historic" families

 

political unknown who was elected over the well known but
poor County Aurél Dessewffy because Pulszky's wealthy uncle,
a certain Fejérvéry, had him elected to honor a bet. Bélint
Hdman and Gyula Szekffi, Magyar torténet (Hungarian History),
(Budapest: Magyar Kirélyi egyetemi nyomda, 1932—36), V, p.
386. Hereafter referred to as Homan and Szekffi, Torténet.

 

8Grétz, Dualizmus, I, p. 92.

 

9These “seven-plum—tree,” petty, or “moccasin“ nobles
lived in "noble" (i.e. tax free) villages. In 1858 of a
total of 9,246 villages 906 (nearly 10%) were "noble.“
Budapesti Hirlap, February, 13, 1858.

 

(about 160), owned estates of gigantic proportions.10 The
nobility's lands were tax free and “entailed" (aviticitas),
that is to say not transferable from the family trust.11
Ironically this privileged Estates Hungary had more franchised
voters in 1830 than France off“liberal" England.12 Living
proof that numbers alone do not make for better government.

An additional feature of the counties was to elect
and send deputies to the national Diet instructing them how
to vote on each issue. These instructions were absolutely
binding on the deputies which not only promoted decentrali—
zation and local patriotism but also retarded the develop-
ment of political parties.

The Diet consisted of two bodies: the Upper and Lower
Houses, quite similar in its composition to that of England.
Members of the Upper House were the aristocrats, the "his—
toric" families of Hungary, (their seats were assured them
by virtue of birth); and the princes of the Catholic Church
also with permanent seats, of course not by birth but by
virtue of their office. They could veto any legislation

passed by the Lower House and were loyal to the Crown. The

 

1°1n 1347 there were 617,521 nobles (130,000 families)
in Hungary, or 5.2% of the population. Of these only 30,000
families were owners of large and medium sized estates.
Elek Féhyes, Magyarorszag leirasa (A Description of Hungary),
(Budapest: Beimel Jozsef, 1847), II, p. 46. Hereafter
referred to as Fényes, Leirés.

 

11Taxation, however, was based on the person and not
on the land owned. This ancient privilege, (established in
the Golden Bull in 1222), was renewed by the Diet of 1741
(Article VIII) For the text of the law see Corpus juris, V.

 

12There were approximately 260,000 voters in Hungary
according to Lajos Kossuth; while France had no more than
200,000; and England had "even less", according to Jeno
Horvath, Torténelmi tanulményok (Essays in History), Second
edition (Budapest: publ. by the author, 1936) pp. 38—39.

 

Lower House consisted of elected deputies,

10

as mentioned be-

fore; but members of the aristocracy could become delegates

in it as well if duly elected,

resulting in the strange

phenomena that from time to time one person held a seat in

both Houses.
casional brawls in the Diet,
over some finer point of law.
quently by acclamation, thus a
carry an issue.

As a rule the Crown had
new legislation in the form of
gates, for the most part, were
the Crown a list of grievances

"unconstitutional" acts.

Just as at the county meetings there were oc-

especially in the Lower House,

Voting was by voice and fre-

vociferous minority could

the initiative in proposing
a royal rescript. The dele-
satisfied in submitting to

accusing the government of

Organized political parties were

non—existent, but the government usually had the votes of a

majority of delegates.

What is unique, however,

is the fact that while vari-

ous monarchs were forced to rule Hungary by decree due to

obstinate county resistance in
except Joseph II, attempted to
underlying reason was that the
not, was able to influence the
fdispans (thus assuring itself

Lower House); and also because

nobility strove to maintain a political status quo.

the Diets, not one of them,

crush the county system. The
government, more often than
county elections through the
a majority of votes in the

both the government and the

The serf

had little if any redress aside from periodical localized

riots.

11
The Habsburgs were successful in administering Hungary
through loyal Hungarian officials and were careful not to
antagonize the Magyars' (i.e. the nobility's) patriotism.13
An exception again was Joseph II.
The second main pillar of feudalism in Hungary was

the Tripartitum, or code, of Istvan Werboczy.14 The Tri—

 

partitum was the result of a bloody and large scale peasant
revolution in 1514. It finalized the subjugation of the
peasantry by the nobility; it prohibited free migration and

extended the nobles' ius gladii (right of life or death) over

 

them.15 So strong was this stranglehold, codified by
Werboczy, that it endured practically unaltered until the
revolution of 1848—1849.

The one hundred and fifty years of Turkish occupation,
following the Hungarians' defeat at Mohacs in 1526, helped
enhance the power of the nobility (on the basis of the T2};

partitum) over the serfs and vis—a—vis the monarch. It also

 

disrupted economic development. The many campaigns of the

Magyars (the "shield of Christianity”) against the Turks

 

13Article X of the Law of 1790 illustrates this point
best. It reiterated the independence of Hungary within the
bounds established in the Pragmatic Sanction of Charles VI
as adopted by the Diet of 1723. See Corpus juris, V.

14For a complete text see Corpus juris, VII.

15Great Britain, Parliamentary Papers, The Royal
Commission on Labour, Foreign Reports, XI, (1893—1894),
pp. 72, 173-74, as quoted by Hans Kohn, The Habsburg Empire,
1804—1918 (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand, 1959), p. 128.

 

12
resulted in severe depOpulation of some areas of Hungary,
especially in the Great Plain region. These factors, Turkish
occupation and depopulation, were the main reasons for the
steadily worsening condition of the serf. Vienna was power—
less to check the excesses of the nobels and the Turks did
not care to do so.

For two hundred and fifty years after the battle of
Mohacs, the landlord was virtually free to dictate to his
peasants as he saw fit; and with the passage of time in
many localities working conditions deteriorated far below

those stipulated in the Tripartitum. To give a comprehensive

 

picture on this matter is nearly impossible because conditions
were different in each locality. We find, however, that in
the trans—Danube region (Dunantdl) it was not uncommon to
find estates where the serf had to robot (forced labor) six
days a week for his landlord as for example on the estates
of the Counts of Batthyany; while on some estates of the
Great Plain only one day a week robot was required as on the
holdings of the Grassalkovich family.16 In Transylvania
(Erdély) conditions were more unfavorable to the serfs,
especially in regions where the majority was of Rumanian
extraction; but were favorable toward the German (Szasz)
settlements and of course towards the Székelys, a Hungarian
speaking minority fiercely independent and peculiar in their

customs. Then again, along the Tisza river the serfs had

 

1eHoman and Szekffi, Tbrténet, IV, p. 538.

13
an easier life as for example on the Dessewffy and Apponyi
estates.17

There were regions where local contracts, called
urbariums, existed between landlord and a body of serfs, as
for example in the case of various towns (mezbvarosok) of
the Great Plain and along the Tisza river and on some church
lands in the Highlands (now Slovakia). These urbariums were
relatively reasonable and favorable to the serfs and free
peasants. But in general, it is quite safe to say that the
landlord was reluctant to ease the burden of his serfs, and
he did so only when forced by the monarch.

The serf learned to distrust and hate his landlords
so much that he attributed any improvement of his lot (even
when brought about by the landlord without royal command)
to the good will and generosity of the king and looked to
the Crown for protection.

Robot on the lord's allodial lands was but one of the
many duties of the serf. He was also obliged to furnish the
lord with transportation (forspont) and to considerable dis—
tances, such as to the frequent meetings at the county seat.
He had to bring to market the produce of both urbarial and
allodial lands —— all this over roads that were nothing but
an impassable quagmire during most of spring and fall and a
choking dustbowl in the summer. In some western counties,

where the produce of Hungarian lands was marketed ir1

 

17H6man and Szekfu, Tarténet, IV, p. 540.

14

Austria, the serf was even forced to pay the various and num—

erous customs duties imposed on these products, without com-
pensation from his lord. He had to furnish his own food and
fodder for the draft animals as well. From the produce of the
urbarial lands the landlord was entitled to a ninth while the
church laid claims to a tithe. The serf was also responsible
for furnishing recruits to the army, although in this respect
he enjoyed the protection of the counties to some extent since
they were often reluctant to execute royal demands made upon
them. The reason for this was mainly that the nobility, who
comprised the county, was anxious to have a maximum number of
serfs on their lands to insure income. The serf had to house
and feed troops stationed in the locality.18 They were also
responsible for the expenses of the deputies to the Diet.

The enumerated obligations bound those serfs with a
claim to a plot or a fraction thereof. There were many serfs
with no, or very little, urbarial land. Often they only
occupied a house in urbarial rent, and at times not even
that. These were the zsellérs (cotters) who performed the
duties in the manorial vineyards and orchards; who tended

the herds of horses, cattle, and sheep; and the inner duties
of the manor. They depended solely on the landlord for their

livelihood and multiplied fastest among the serfs.19 In the

 

18Exceptions were the military districts on the
Turkish border. See map, p. 61.

19The cotters increased in number dramatically between
1767 and 1846. There were forty—six cotters in 1767 to one
hundred serfs. In 1828 the ratio was one hundred four to one
hundred; while in 1846 it was one hundred forty—seven to one
hundred according to Gyula Mérei and Gyorgy Spira (eds.),

15
rigid class structure of peasant life they were looked upon
with contempt by the landed serfs who in turn were detested
by the free landholding peasantry.

All of the serfs (landed and landless alike) shared
the protection of the lord in that he was responsible to
provide them with shelter, food, and at least the minimum
necessities of life no matter how inadequate these seem by
today's standards. They were entitled or allowed to keep
cattle and other domestic animals on the communal. pastures,
and there was no evidence of remuneration to the lord for
this. The woodlands, which by the first half of the nine—
teenth century were all considered manorial lands, offered
free fuel to the serfs who were allowed to gather the dry
branches and the overseers (ispan) readily overlooked the
occasional felling of a live tree as well, especially in
heavily wooded areas or those remote. The serfs' hogs could
feed freely on the fallen acorns in these woods. On the
waterfront the serf had free access to gather reeds used for
a variety of purposes such as thatch roof, fuel, manufactur—
ing of peasant crafts, etc. Fishing was good and also free.

If all these extra benefits, as they could be called,

are considered, the lot of the serfs was not so miserable

 

Magyarorszégtbrténete, 1790—1848 (The History of Hungary,
1790—1848), (Budapest: Tankbnkaiadd, 1961), 111. pp. 7-8.
Hereafter referred to as Mérei and Spira, Tdrtéhet. In 1847
the number of cotter families was estimated at 911,744 or
about 60% of all serfs according to Fényes, Leirés, I,

pp. 47-49.

 

 

16
since they enjoyed a relatively high degree of economic
security.2

It is also true that if a serf became involved in a
dispute with his lord, his only redress was before the lord's
court (uriszék) composed solely of nobles who were apt to
hand down a biased judgment in favor of the lord, regardless
of the facts since it was an unwritten rule not to let the
“stinking peasant" think that he is a somebody in order to
prevent his becoming unduly greedy. The serf, or for that
matter all non-nobles, were barred from holding office on
any higher level than a village bird (mayor).

Besides the political and judicial control which the
nobility exercised over the serfs, there were economic
monOpolies as well that benefited the landlords. Such ex—
amples were the right of innkeeping which was usually leased
to local Jews, a sizeable minority without any political or
legal rights; the right to operate flour mills; and the right
to hold weekly fairs on local and county levels that were
frequently coupled with religious festivals and pilgrimages.
Economic mobility and, coupled with it, social mobility was
at a minimum7and it was a society that on the whole followed

the motto: “Let the shoemaker stick to his last.“

 

20Delgates to the 1825- 27 Diet used these arguments
as justification for the status quo. Their superficiality
prompted Count Istvan Szechenyi to write in his diary: "We
see 400, 000 souls who want to maintain their prerogatives
and exclusive privileges against 10, 000, 000 people about
whom at the Diet nobody says a word" according to Merei and
Spira, Torténet, III, p. 195.

17

Maria Theresia's survey, or Urbarium of 1767 (the

 

third pillar of Hungarian feudalism), was the first effective
reform regulating in an orderly fashion the peasant-lord
relationship both in social and economic matters.21 The
Urbarium aimed at eliminating the excesses of the landlords
which went unchecked for the previous two hundred fifty years.
Where conditions were better than those minimum norms set
down in the Urbarium, the queen did not want to interfere

to avoid peasant antagonism. She made change mandatory only
in regions where the serf carried an excessive burden.

Since taxation was based not on the land but on the
person, and since the nobility was exempt from taxation, the
queen was quite anxious to uphold the right of the serf to
a parcel of land. By doing so she followed the precedent

established in the Tripartitum to this effect. To insure

 

the flow of revenues to Vienna, Maria Theresia ordered the
survey of non-noble lands. For the first time jobbagy lands
were surveyed and their size determined. Due to the differ—
ences in fertility and according to its geographical location,
a serf plot differed in size. For example in Arva county,

it varied between sixteen acres for the prime available land
and forty acres on the least fertile land; while meadow al—

lotments deviated between six and twenty-two acres.22 Due

 

21For a complete text see Corpus juris, V.

 

22For tax purposes and to insure equity, the urbarial
registers classified the lands into three categories accord—
ing to fertility.

18
to the devastations of the Turkish wars there were regions
vfliere great tracts of land were depopulated. The Urbarium
clrdered the nobles to settle serfs on these "remainder lands."
TTnair classification was ”urbarial" which meant that taxes
were collected on them.

The regulations of the Urbarium were precise concern-
ing; the meadows and arable lands of a serf plot, the main
souurce of revenue for Vienna; but they left much to be de-
siread.in the chaos surrounding other types of lands. Thus
allcacation of pastures was made dependent on the geography
Of ‘the region resulting in their continued communal ownership.
The: (:otters'inner lands (belsoségek) were regulated according
to seize. However, the nature of the land -— whether it was
IHflDErrial, rented to the serf, or allodial belonging to the
lanCilcmd.—- was left undetermined. Since these inner lands
OftHEII consisted of vineyards, they caused bitter disputes
at tflae time of the emancipation. The status of the sizeable
Cleétred.lands was not determined either, which also became
a maijjor source of friction between serf and landlord after
emancipation.

The serf plot remained the basis on which taxes were
Collected for the state and the landlord received services
fronl the peasant; but while taxes increased, the Urbarium
Clrcnlnlscribed the serf's socage obligations and checked the
lamdlord's excessive demands. At the same time the serf was
prohibited to subdivide his urbarial lands; a prudent move

by tide Crown aimed to insure the collection of taxes on them.

19

Robot was drastically reduced from the customary three
to six days per week to two days —— or one day if the peasant
used his own livestock. In order to throw further light on
the peasant’s plight, it should be noted that the one hundred
four days of robot per year ordered in Maria Theresia's
Urbarium was hailed as a great humanistic gesture and achieve—
ment. This same number of days was fixed in Werboczy's‘lri-
partitum as very heavy punishment!23 This indicates the
extent to which the condition of the serf deteriorated during
the previous two hundred fifty years.24

Maria Theresia was far from introducing radical meas-
ures into Hungary, even if the nobility thought so at the
time. In Bohemia and Moravia she went much further by
abolishing serfdom on the crown lands and dividing it among
the peasantry making them free landholders.

The counties resisted reforms, especially since the
Urbarium curtailed their indiscriminate and unchecked levy—
ing of taxes. Even the allotments for county deputies to the
national Diet were reduced so that they would not be able to
“live in too much pomp."25

Some counties refused to submit the results of the
various lawsuits concerning serf properties for revision to

the viceroyal councils and even opposed the urbarial land

23Homan and Szekfu, Tbrténet, IV, p. 543.

 

24Flogging of the serf was reduced to a maximum of
twenty strokes, also on humanitarian grounds.

25Homan and Szekffi, Torténet, IV, p. 540.

 

20
surveys in the villages. But the queen stood fast. She sent
royal commissioners to the recalcitrant counties (Pozsony,
for instance) to force the foispahs to implement reforms.

The Urbarium improved the peasants' condition only
temporarily. By the end of the eighteenth century the serf
was sinking fast for several reasons. First, because the
Crown and the nobility came to terms, due to the Napoleonic
wars; secondly, because a changing economic situation in
EurOpe (fluctuating and declining grain prices and the like);
thirdly, because of the influences of the French Revolution
and Austria's desperate attempt to halt the incursions of

French ideas; and fourthly, because the Tripartitum was still

 

in effect.

Thus, while Maria Theresia instituted reforms in the
“spirit" of enlightenment her Urbarium (like the Werboczy
code) became an economic and political tool in the hands of
the nobility against the serfs for whose protection it was

issued.

CHAPTER II

REFORMERS, REACTIONARIES AND REFORMS, 1780-1844

The pattern of reform from the tOp down did not last
for more than a decade following Maria Theresia's death.
Her successor, Joseph II, was the last Habsburg who tried
to modernize feudal Hungary. His efforts, however, came to
naught upon the stubborn resistance of the Magyar nobility

who thought that Werboczy's Tripartitum and Maria Theresia's

 

Urbarium needed no ammendments. Emperor Francis 126 shared
the nobles' views and until 1830 his main concern was to
hold down the lid on all political ferment and to suppress
the ideas of the French Revolution in the Habsburg dominions.
But the monarch and his government were unable to prevent
the emergence in Hungary of a new social and political cur—
rent, noble liberalism, and a new class, an intelligentsia.
In combination these two laid the groundwork for a profound
change in the world of the serf.

By 1830 reforms were proposed not by the government
but by a handful of men in the Diet who managed to overcome
the narrow mentality of their class and opposed the reac—
tionary domestic policies of the monarch. For fifteen years

(1832-1847) this minority of liberal minded Magyar

 

26Francis I (1792-1835) was Holy Roman Emperor as
Francis II until 1806 when he abdicated under pressure from
Napoleon Bonaparte. He assumed the title Emperor of Austria
as Francis I in 1804.

21

22
aristocrats, wealthy middle nobility and intelligentsia of
noble birth tried to bring about reforms in all phases of
life through parliamentary procedures. They managed to
breach the walls of feudalism. Yet in three consecutive
Diets only some of the most urgent reforms passed, the major-
ity were rejected.

The road to reform was long and frustrating at best,
although the start was spectacular. If the cautious and con—
servative Maria Theresia instituted reforms out of necessity
against her political and moral beliefs then her successor,
Joseph 11 (1780-1790), made them because of his political
and moral convictions. Frederick the Great of Prussia ap-
praised him the following way:

He was born in a bigott court but overcame superstition;
he was reared in pomp but leads a simple life; they
flatter him, still he is modest; the thirst for glory
drives him, still he sacrifices his ambitions and carries
out his duties as an obediant son, quite conscientiously;
his teachers were pedantic yet he reads Voltaire and is
able to appreciate him fully to his merit.27

How well Joseph II appreciated Voltaire and the philo—
sophs became evident when as one of his first acts as Emperor
he abolished serfdom. To the great consternation of high
and low nobility alike he introduced general taxation as well
and then proceeded to alleviate the conditions of the serfs.
He allowed them free migration, gave royal permission to

marry, attend school, acquire a profession or trade and enter

upon it. With a single decree he abolished precedent, custom,

 

27Letter to Voltaire, September 16, 1770, as quoted by
Henrik Marczali, Az abszolutizmus kora (The Age of Absolutism),
(Budapest: RéVai kbnyvkiado, 1906), p. 637.

23
and law which required the serf to obtain his lord's permis-
sion to do any one of these. The serfs completely misunder—
stood the monarch's motives and in several localities went
into open rebellion against the nobles. The intensity of
peasant resentment is best illustrated by the rebellion in
Transylvania under the leadership of Hora and Kloska which
was put down at the cost of approximately four thousand lives
with one hundred villages destroyed. It is little wonder
the peasants went to such excesses; in ignorance they inter—
preted the decree as a license to “get even" with the hated
landlords. Traditionally the peasants considered the nobility

and their Diet as the main obstacle which prevented the

monarch from improving their lot. And there was much truth
in this. By removing the obstacle permanently they intended
to do the king, and themselves, a service -— the establish—

ment of a new order of things.28

Joseph II was resolved to accomplish just that; and
in the process he managed to set in motion the forces of
reaction which in the end destroyed all he hoped to attain.
He refused to be crowned Hungarian king; refused to convoke
the Diet; ordered the Crown of St. Stephen to be brought to

Vienna and deposited in the state treasury among some other

 

28The Emperor intended to accomplish his reforms with-
out the "assistance" of the Hungarian Diet which he considered
an anachronistic relic. He feared (and not without reason)

that the nobility would not abdicate its historic privileges.
He also scorned the legislative machinery of the Diet where
only ten of the five hundred members had an active role in
legislation, thus rendering the constitutional process point-
less, according to Ignéc Acsédy, A_magyar birodalom torténte

(History of the Hungarian Empire), (Budapest: Révai Kbnyvkiado,
1903), II, pp. 545-46.

24

old relics. He proclaimed the so called "ius placenti" (right

to acquiesce) in making Papal decrees public in his lands

which.bmought the POpe hurriedly to Vienna —— in vain. He

cnxuited a lesser nobility loyal to him of shopkeepers, mer-

charH:s, innkeepers and the like. He introduced religious

tolen:ance to the great relief of the large and persecuted

proteastant minority in Hungary. He curtailed ecclesiastical

holCtings and taxed them. He abolished scores of monasteries.

He iiitroduced imperial officials at the head of the Hungarian
courrties and declared German the mandatory official language.
But lie was unable to overcome the resistance of the Estates

and on his deathbed revoked all his decrees except those

emarlcipating the serfs and on religious freedom. The Estates

quiCikly regained their former power under Joseph's II brother,

jLeOLDold II (1790-1792). The emancipation proclamation was

SOOrl annulled too.

Joseph's high-handed methods achieved the opposite

Of'Mflaat he hoped to accomplish. Instead of a centralized

statee, separatist aspirations came to the fore, especially

in ITCungary. Instead of a modern economy, old and inefficient

“Btllcxis prevailed, especially in agriculture. The lot of the

Serf Tbecame steadily worse; first due to the increased tax

burdfin and inflation during the Napoleonic wars, and later

becallse of boom in the wool industry. The power of the

EStEHZes was not borken and remained virtually unaltered until
If”.

the revolution of 1848-49.

25

With the death of Joseph II attempts at serious and
fundamental reform on the part of a Habsburg monarch came to
an end. Leopold II (1790—92) and Francis I (1792-1835) were
both outright reactionaries. Ferdinand's I (1835-1848) sig-
nature on the reforms of 1848 meant little, because he was
a mere figurehead, an imbecile and epileptic.29 It is said
that his only sensible utterance after ascending the throne
was, "I'm the Emperor and I want noodles'."30

After nearly forty years of silence there appeared a
man in Hungary whose political, literary and economic activi-
ties contributed more to the rekindling of the reform move-
ment and its acceptance by a portion of the nobility than
decades of dreary debates in the Diet or royal fiats ever
hOped to accomplish. This man was Count Istvan Szechenyi,
a magnate of immense wealth and a loyal monarchist. He saw
Hungary's only salvation in a close alliance with Vienna and
the Habsburgs. Eventually he blamed himself so much for the
revolution of 1848—49 that he ended his own life while in an
insane asylum. His bitterest enemy Lajos Kossuth called him
"the greatest Hungarian" (a legnagyobb Magyar); and he is

remembered bythat epitaph to this day.

 

29A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchyj 1809—1918,
Revised ed. (London: Hamilton, 1948), p. 47.

30Gordon A. Craig, Europe Since 1815, (New York: Holt.
Reinhart and Winston, 1962), p. 58. The term "Knodel" is
untranslatable into English; for this reason I used Mr. Craig's
transliteration of it as ”noodles“.

 

26

Szechenyi attacked his own privileged class with biting
irony in a book entitled Hitel (Credit) published in 1830,
just five years after he founded the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences at the Diet of 1825 by donating one year's total
income from his estates of about sixty thousand gold florins.31
He lashed out at the aristocracy for their conceit and for
their oppression of the peasantry. He proved on economic
grounds the uselessness of robot, the ninth, the obligatory
use of peasant livestock for transportation of the aristoc-
racy (forspont), and also the wastefulness of the forced
road building in the counties. The holy of holies of Estates
Hungary, tax exemption, was also not immune from his biting
sarcasm; neither was Werboczy's Tripartitum, the code of
vested noble interests.

The effect was electrifying —— it stirred the aristoc-
racy and peasantry as well. In the name of the aristocracy,
Count szsef Dessewffy replied with great indignation and
consternation in a work entitled Taglalat (Analysis) defend-
ing the status quo. The serfs had different views from those
of Dessewffy. Although it is quite difficult to imagine how
these uneducated people could glean the essence of Szechenyi's
message from the pages of this dry, technical and impassionate

book; but glean they did as this 1831 report of the overseer

 

31Ignatius Acsady, "The History of Hungary," The Mil-
lenium of Hungary and Its Pegple, Ed. szsef Jekelfalussy,
(Budapest: Kosmos, 1897), p. 63. This gallant offer from
the young and yet unknown "captain of the cavalry" was enacted
into law mainly through the patronage of Archduke Joseph,
Hungary's Palatine (nador).

27
of the estate of Dorgicse attests:
In the trans-Danube region [of western Hungary] the poi-
son of Hitel caused overseer and landlord alike to sit
back; to what did this book,praised to the skies by
mature minds, give birth; this is the book which should
have been burned together with its publisher and press.
Yes, one has to handle the serfs delicately. A little
cholera [epidemic] would not hurt at all.32
When a cholera epidemic actually swept this very region in
1831 the peasants said that this was not true, that the
quarantine was imposed only to prevent "the Count from Pest"
from bringing in the truth. But Estates Hungary quieted the
serfs with ease and it took another twenty years before re-
forms were enacted into law and implemented mostly by aliens.
Szechenyi tried to instill into the nobility a sense
of obligation toward Hungary which he scornfully called
“The Great Waste" (nagy parlag). He met with much hostility.
In some localities volumes of Hitel were publicly burned.
ESpecially the middle nobility was hostile because it feared
the loss of its ancient privileges that kept them above the
peasantry. They were too narrow minded to grasp the signif-

33 This message in essence

. I . .

1cance of Szecheny1‘s message.
called for the economic regeneration of Estates Hungary. It
necessarily meant the termination of the old feudal rights.

In his subsequent books all through the 1830's Szechenyi re-

stated this theme. He tried to do away with an outmoded and'

 

32H6man and Szekffi, TOrténet, V, p. 267.

33Dominic Koséry, A History of Hungary, (Cleveland:
The Benjamin Franklin Bibliophile Society, 1941), pp. 194-5.
Hereafter referred to as Kosary, History.

 

28
inept feudal institution and replace it with a modern,
western capitalistic system.34

All through his life Szechenyi remained an aristocrat
at heart. He was a true champion of liberty and economic
as well as social progress, but his arguments were coldly
logical - appealing to reason, not to the hearts of men. He
demanded from the nation and the individual a high degree of
discipline. He stayed aloof from the public in that he
”despised all demagoguery, mistrusted popular enthusiasm."35
For these traits he was admired and respected, but not loved.
As an aristocrat he tried to preserve the ties with Vienna
and the House of Habsburg. He feared revolution and vio-
lence and wanted the reforms to come about through the co-
operation of Diet and Monarch. This middle—of—the—road at-
titude finally caused him to turn against the Opposition and
join the government forces in the mid 1840's. Even so he
did not abandon his reform aspirations. He sided with Vienna
in the hope to persuade the government to bring about the
much needed changes.36

If we label Count Szechenyi as a reformer of the right,
then we have to call Lajos Kossuth a reformer of the radical

left. Kossuth, a petty noble or gentry, was a Magyarized

 

34B. G. Ivanyi, "From Feudalism to Capitalism, The
Economic Background to Széchenyi's Reform in Hungary," Jour-
nal of Central European Affairs, 1960, XX, pp. 287-88. Here-
after referred to as Ivgnyi, Szechenyi.

 

 

35George Barany, "The Szechenyi Problem," Journal of
Central European Affairs, 1960, XX, p. 261.

 

 

36Me’rei and Spira, Torténet, III, p. 271.

29
Slovak; and as is the case with converts in general, he
tried to be a better Magyar than all the rest put together.
In this he succeeded exceedingly well. He became a fierce
and very eloquent partisan of the greatest of nineteenth
century maladies, nationalism; and strongly opposed
Széchenyi's monarchist tendencies by advocating virtual in—
dependence from Austria. When in the mid 1830's Vienna
tried to terrorize the radicals into silence, Kossuth was
one of those arrested and imprisoned (1837-40). His seat
in the Lower House (won first in 1832 as a proxy for three
absent aristocrats, and again in 1847 as a delegate from
Pest county) and his ambition finally made him head of the
Opposition in 1847. Without rhyme or reason, he advocated
practically every conceivable reform such as compulsory
education, establishment of various industries, planting of
trees on the Great Hungarian Plain, abolishment of corporal
punishment for the peasant, etc.; but he failed to propose
concrete methods to implement these reforms. He was an
idealistic publicist and orator of whom Széchenyi remarked
that he spoke to the heart and not to the intellect.

Especially through his newspaper Pesti Hirlap (1840)

 

Kossuth helped to instill in the Hungarian public the neces—
sity for reform -- any reform:

We mentioned how teachers drive knowledge into the heads
of children with stick and whip; how with a stick loyalty
is instilled into the heart of the servant by the lord

of the house to whom the farmhand (béres szolga) is still
subjected in many places like a slave in unbridled
tyranny...how we saw the village birds, the cornerstones
of executive power, put on the whipping post in an entire

30

district for uncollected taxes...we remember those
virtuozos of beating who...from the coachman...to the
freight wagon driver...up to and including the village

biros beat everything and beat eternally;...[or] the
policemen in Pest who beat up those involved in a street
brawl because brawling was prohibited.

After reading articles such as this, it is easy to see how

the contemporary reader could not help but ball up his fist
and decide that no matter what, this awful thing had to

come to an end.

Széchenyi hated him for this passionate, irresponsible

sensationalism and feared that Kossuth was leading the nation
to the abyss of disaster: revolution. To Archduke Ludwig
he proposed to either ”utilize or string up" Kossuth.37

In his book Kelet Népe (People of the East, published

 

in 1841) Szechenyi savagely attacked him for instigating
revolution. This was unfortunate, unwise, and unjust.
Kossuth replied accusing Szechenyi of paranoia since he,
Kossuth, did not want revolution.38 But Kossuth's liberal
naivité was quite apparent. He advocated the same things
as Széchenyi when he said:
Law is the most effective educator, law is one of the
richest sources of a nation's moral state. It is a
memorable phenomenon in the annals of history that the
taming of morals goes everywhere hand in hand with the

taming of laws.39

Széchenyi's reactionary stand divided the reform movement;

 

 

37Hdman and Szekfu, Torténet, V, p. 325.
38Me’rei and Spira, Tbrténet, III, p. 271.

39Homan and Szekfu, T6rténet, V, p. 314.

31
he seemed to have abandoned reform and people turned away
from him. The personal antagonism of these two men, their
distrust of each other, was tragically a prime factor in
shaping the future course of reform.

Between the reformers of the right (the wealthy
aristocrats) and the left (the landless intelligentsia)
represented by Széchenyi and Kossuth was another group, which
perhaps could best be described as the fence-straddlers.
Their representative was Ferencz Deak, another country squire.
like Kossuth but with the notable difference that while
Kossuth was a petty noble without land and the bourgeois pro—
fession of a lawyer and publicist, Deék was a gentry who
tended his small estate and came to Budapest only on official
business soon to return again to his country home.

His thinking was perhaps the most realistic among his
contemporaries. During the 1832 Diet, where he was a dele-
gate from Zala county, he scolded "those young hotheads“ who
talked loudly of change and reform on the French model but
were most unprepared for it:

You imagine you live in those days; each one of you
chooses a favorite hero among the participants of the
tragedy of the French Revolution and believes that he
shall play that role. Lamartine's book is dangerous
reading; it is neither a history nor a novel; but least

of all is it a bible which you make it to be.40

He wanted them to learn the practical side of politics and

 

 

4OHoman and Szekffi, Tdrténet, V, pp. 310—11. In Spite
01? strict censureethe ideas of the French Revolution found
their way into Hungary.

32
instead of an idealized hero cult learn to be satisfied with
small but practical gains.

Deak opposed Kossuth's radicalism and sympathized more
with a faction commonly called the Centralists whose members
were the young opposition in the Upper House (Baron szsef
Eotvos, Baron Miklos Wesselényi, Count Lajos Batthyany, etc.).
He fought for the taxation of the nobility. As a result
bloody riots and deaths occurred in his county where the
electioneering petty nobility opposed it (1839). At the
same time he exhibited traits which could be labled arch
conservative. He supported the nationalism of Kossuth on
the grounds of the ancient Hungarian constitution; he also
advocated an independent Hungary tied to Vienna and the
Habsburgs but with a responsible national government. When
matters did not go his way, he went into "passive resistance"
(withdrawing from public life) stubbornly maintaining, with
quite some naivité, the ”rights" of the Hungarians through
their constitution. During the period of absolutism he in-
sisted on the lawfulness of the far reaching resolutions of
the Diet of 1847—48; this was nothing but stubbornness.
Historians such as Gyula Szekffi, Gyula Mérei and others con—
sider Deak wise in his restraint and prudent in his demands.41
This is true but only to a limited degree. The victory of
tflle Prussians in 1866 at Koniggratz over the Austrians was

”RJCh more instrumental in Deék's ultimate success in the

.- 41Deak is called ”the sage of the fatherland" (a haza
bolcse) .

33
Ausgleich of 1867 than his prudence and restraint. After
all, it took the Hungarians almost twenty years after the
revolution of 1848-49 to reach a compromise with Vienna.
A contemporary, Baron szsef Eotvos, gives us per-
haps the best summary on Deak, Kossuth, and their times:
One thing I have learned from my experiences, and
that is that men of superior intellect and knowledge
never exercise great influence in the field of politics.
The first minute belongs always to those who, like
Kossuth, carried away by their own oratory, influences
and passions of the people and bring it into motion; or
those who, like Deak, are narrow minded enough to cling
stubbornly to their views even to the last detail and
who can make the people persist the same way. Only
passion and immobility does influence the people.42
In Deak we see the gentry reformer who was willing
to part with the most antiquated forms of Hungarian social

and political life by supporting the April Laws of 1848, but

who also wanted to insure the nobility retained and even

_._—~

expanded its political power at the expense of the Austrians.
The economic and social aspects of the reform movement gave
way to political goals: based on the separatist desires of
the Hungarian nobility.

Let us now turn to those men who stood for the "anci-
ent regime," the reactionaries.

With the accession to the throne of Francis I an era

of reaction set in that restored all the privileges of the

 

42Baron Jozsef Eotvos, Naplojegyzetek, gondolatok,
1864-1868 (Notes and Reflections, 1864-1868), Ed. Lukinich
Imre (Budapest: Magyar Tudomanyos Akadémia,1941), p. 153.
Baron Edtvos was President of the Hungarian Academy of
Sciences, a philOSOpher and scholar who, as a member of
the Diet, supported and often was the author of Deék's reform
proposals.

 

34

Hungarian aristocracy. The unfortunate Martinovics conspir—
acy against the throne in 1794 was quickly quelled in blood
and the nobility manifested their loyalty to the house of
Habsburngorraine by rising against Napoleon. But their
traditional ”valiance and chivalry" proved no match against
the disciplined French troops. The Hungarians were dealt

a disasterous defeat at Gyor in 1809.

Due to the Napoleonic wars Francis I made two major
demands in each consecutive Diet, namely, money and men. In
general the emperor had his way; yet the nobility success-
fully resisted census taking of its members, and allowed
only the non—nobles to be counted. In order to increase the
treasury (during these years the devaluation of currency was
enormous) the Diet voted to raise taxes on commodities such
as salt, which of course placed the greatest burden on the
poor. In addition, increasing numbers of peasants were
pressed into military service (for life) quite unlike the
voluntary enlistments of previous years. The reign of
Joseph II was well forgotten.

These Diets resqunded with arguments regarding the
value of the currency, especially the introduction of paper
money. The wealthy creditor nobility demanded the return to
the use of silver. The money issue finally forced Francis I
to govern by decree without convening the Diet (1811-1825).
The counties went quickly into passive resistance.

While this was clearly a quarrel between the Estates

and the monarch for political power, after 1815 Francis I

35
was so preoccupied, as the gendarme of Europe, with the

”demon of revolution” that he made no serious attempt to
curb the county resistance movement. The Estates entrenched
themselves behind their Constitution. There was little con—
cern for social reform. Even at the 1825—27 Diet not one
county deemed it necessary to speak in the interest of the
serfs during its 271 sessions.43

While Francis I was his own Minister of Interior, he
had two able aristocrats as his Ministers of Foreign Affairs
and Finance. These were Prince Metternich and Count
Kollowrat, whose names became synonyms for reaction.

Metternich was the chief architect of the system of

reaction which lasted from the fall of Napoleon to the

Revolution of 1848. His theme was that of his master's,
Francis I, "rule and change nothing." His own words best
express his position.44

Austria is a saturated power. She is big enough, she

has enough to do to preserve what she already possesses.
The Emperor Francis often used to say: 'If anyone were
to suggest that I should add so much as a village to

our Austrian possessions, I would show him the door, for
he would be either mad or endeavouring to sap our
strength.‘ (to L. Veuillot, Ouvres Completes, XXXII,

p. 346.

Being a saturated power and having no outside ter-

ritorial ambitions, the main task of the Austrian Empire was

43Ho’man and Szekffi, Torténet, V., p. 194; See also foot-
note 20.

44The following quotes were taken from G. de Bertier de
Sauvigny, Metternich and His Times, translated by Peter Ryde,
(London: Longman and Todd, 1962), pp. 166-68.

36
to provide Europe with a shield against the revolutions that
aimed to overthrow the existing social order:

We present a solid mass, compact, not easily overturned
or even shaken, and this alone must get in the liberals'
way a good deal. From the first day of the French Revo-
lution until now, Austria has always stood ready to
thwart the organizers of destruction. In twenty campaigns
our power could be seen on the battlefield fighting
against revolution, and in the midst of political peace
it was, again, on our frontiers that the revolutionary
torches died out, unless our armies salied forth to ex—
tinguish them on the spot where the fire had broken out.
(to Esterhazy, December 13, 1828).

The maintenance of the status quo was primary in his
thoughts. He belittled the value of the Magyars' political
ability believing that "the Hungarian character was strongly
attracted to Utopia” and that "short of getting involved in
long drawn out struggles, Hungary is incapable of setting
up an independent state...” He defended the historic rights

of the Hungarian nobility:

From every point of view I recognize the preservation
of the Hungarian Constitution as so stern a duty for the
servant of the State, and yet as so formal an act of
justice, that I would have to deny my whole political
life should I so much as feel inclined to listen to a
proposal to the contrary. (Memoires, IV, November,
1825, p. 254).

The fear of the increasing crescendo of liberal and
nationalistic demands, which went hand in hand, and the
radical aspirations of all Europe were the principle reasons
for his support of the Hungarian nobility's privileges.
Metternich even refused Count Istvan Szechenyi's appeal for
the government Sponsorship of necessary reforms; and one

could not find a more loyal Habsburg subject than Széchenyi.

While refusing to endorse reform, Metternich was not blind

37
to the problems of his day and was convinced that Szechenyi
was right. He attributed, and correctly so, Hungary's back—
wardness to the long Turkish occupation.45 However, reform
meant the abandonment of the status quo and this Metternich
was unable and unwilling to do.

with the accession of the feeble minded Ferdinand I,
a Council of State governed the Empire. Its three permanent
members were the ungifted brother of the Emperor, Archduke
Francis Charles; Metternich; and Kollowrat. At the incep-
tion of this Council (1836) Metternich attempted to edge
Kollowrat, the all too powerful Minister of Internal Af—
fairs, out of power. Archduke Ludwig prevented this and
Metternich had to remain the malnstay of foreign policy alone.

Kollowrat continued the inflexible internal policies
of Emperor Francis I. Although he was a Czech magnate it
is difficult to find the “Slav nationalism" of which he is
accused by various Hungarian historians, especially Gyula
Szekfu. His foremost concern was the protection of the
Empire and viewed the Hungarian reform movements of the
183095 and 1840's as a direct threat. He vehemently opposed
the introduction of the local language into parliamentary
procedures and defended the Croat delegates to the Diet who
continued to present their addresses in Latin. In an effort
to keep the Hungarians in check, he supported the separatist

(Illyr) movement of the Kingdom of Croatia which according

 

45Hdman and Szekffi, Tbrténet, V., p. 318.

38
to the Hungarians was an integral part of "the lands of the
crown of St. Stephen” -- and for which the Hungarians never
forgave him.

Strangely enough the Hungarians blamed Kollowrat al—
most exclusively for Vienna's “anti—Magyar" position although
Metternich was responsible for much of the government's per-
secution and prosecution of the intelligentsia. Yet Kollowrat
was an outstanding, very capable imperial official who saw,
and correctly so, that to give in to the Hungarian demands
(on "independence”) was tantamount to a license of secession
not only to the Magyars, but also to the various other
nationalities of the Habsburg realm.

With few exceptions the Hungarian aristocracy re-
mained loyal to the government in Vienna throughout the re—
form period of the 1830's and 1840's. A characteristic
representative of these magnates was Count Aurél Dessewffy,

son of Jozsef Dessewffy [Taglalat] who until his death at

 

the age of thirty—four (1842) was an eloquent opponent of
the reform minded gentry and intelligentsia:

I say it directly that, yes indeed, I am a government
man. And in such a meaning of the word am I a govern-
ment man who condemns all activity, all ideas which
make lawful and effective government impossible. Be-
cause, according to my convictions, nations are in need
of an effective and not a normal government in order to
flourish, of men of stature and not shysters (prokator),
to be great and strong. But before and above all, I

am a Hungarian...utmost in importance to me is this
country's happiness and the development of its interests
on the basis of nationality and constitution.46

46Jozsef Ferenczy, ed. Grof Dessewffy Aurél bsszes
mfivei (The Complete Works of Count Aurél Dessewffy),(Buda-
pest: Mehner Vilmos, 1887), pp. XLIL—L. Hereafter referred
to as Ferenczy, Dessewffy.

 

 

39

Of course, "effective and not a normal government"
meant to Dessewffy the continuation of the status quo. He
was reluctant to admit that the reformers (Kossuth, Deak,
Szechenyi, etc.) were right. While he gave lip-service to
the idea of Hungarian constitutionalism, he assailed the
counties for their obstructionism in sabotaging the dictates
of Vienna. Even Dessewffy saw that county opposition, the
ancient constitutional right of the nobility, was a serious
detriment to the central government.

Dessewffy was a good orator and wrote with an elo—
quent pen. For a period (1841-1842) he edited the newspaper
Vilag (light) in an effort to counterbalance the great popu—

larity and influence of Kossuth's Pesti Hirlap. This opposi—

 

tion to liberalism did not award him a great popular fol—
lowing. He was cold and logical, quite like Széchenyi, in
accusing the liberals and especially Kossuth for having
their "heads in the clouds” without considering the dis—
asterous results their ”irresponsibility" might bring.

He mirrored the aristocracy's fear of social upheaval
which would cause their loss of political and economic
power. For this reason he bitterly criticized Kossuth for
advocating the distribution of free land to the serfs.47
The very term "free land” was misleading, argued Dessewffy,
because it gave the impression this was land on which there

were to be no taxes. But, even if the socage dues to the

 

47Ferenczy, Dessewffy, pp. 6—13.

 

4O

landlords were abolished, the government taxes were still
to be collected. He then gave able arguments against this

kind of agitation. If the peasants received free land, the
population increase and the laws prohibiting subdivision of
peasant holdings would create a new landless class without
a livelihood. There would be new demands for free land.
Rent costs on these lands would increase. The peasant most
likely would rent his free land for half the crop to an un-
lucky sharecropper, instead of the ninth he now pays to the
landlord, ”might we then,[indignantlyj,write books against
all such rent?” Logical as it appeared, such arguments
against reform were not popular especially signe reforms

were gradually being passed into law.

The reform legislation of the 1830's and 1840's owed
much of its success to the individual efforts of the few

liberal minded nobles who, outside any political party, ad—

vocated the urgent need for change. Since in the Diet the

government was the only major organized political force,

in the beginning it was fairly successful in thwarting most
of the reform proposals. During the mid 1830's Vienna did
not hesitate to silence the reformers by arresting them and
bringing them to trial on charges of high treason (Kossuth

for one). In the early 1840's the government tried a dif—

ferent tack, that of packing the Diet with delegates loyal
to the Crown. This attempt met with considerable success.
The liberals, however, were outspoken and enjoyed the sup—

port of the public.

41

Although the reformers were motivated by some social
considerations, domestic economic problems such as land
disputes between nobles and serfs were more pressing. The
main reason for these disputes wastfle economic boom in the
wool industry, especially in the 1820's. Landowners in-
creasingly found it profitable to raise sheep which required
a proportionate increase in pastures. As we saw in Chapter I
due to the vague wording in Maria Theresia's Urbarium, the
serfs were not alloted a prescribed acreage of pastures.
The Urbarium merely required that where the terrain permit-
ted, the serfs should be given "adequate" pastures. The
landlords followed advantage and often forcefully ejected
the serf from pasture lands that were either held communal
or were thought to be the property of the peasant. Often
the serf was ejected even from his meadows adjacent to the
pastures.48 These evictions caused much resentment among
the peasantry since the pastures and meadows were an inte-
gral part of the serf economy; in fact, on it "depended the
peasants' animal husbandry and through it their whole farm

economy.“4'9

Moreoven Széghnyi's thesis of feudalism's bankruptcy

was irrefutable. The institution of entail prohibited the

 

48Ivanyi, Szechenyi, p. 280. Ivanyi claims that the
landlord had no legal basis for the enclosure of the pastures.
This is a misleading statement because technically, he was
within his rights in most cases, depending how the Urbarium
was interpreted.

 

49Pesti Napld, February 29, 1856.

 

42
sale of noble lands; and often the owners of the big estates
defaulted on their huge credit obligations to foreign bankers,
knowing well that the Hungarian laws would protect them.

Under these circumstances credit was increasingly difficult
to obtain. Landlords enlarged their sheep and cattle herds
to augment income especially since the price of grain was
steadily declining. The financial insolvency, of the large
estates in particular, was so acute that these foreign out-
standing obligations reached overwhelming proportions.50

By 1848 the total debt on noble lands was estimated at
300,000,000 silver florins with a staggering 18,000,000
florins interest, the latter alone was almost equal to the
nations's annual tax revenue.51

and after con—

Undoubtedly there was much to be done,

siderable debate the Diet of 1832—36 enacted laws that

aimed to settle the question of disputed lands, spelling out

 

50The following sample illustrates the point. Note
especially the disparity between amounts borrowed and the
market value of the notes. Adapted from Ivanyi, Széchenyi,

 

 

 

 

 

p. 283. Values in silver florins.
Face Value Market Value
Year Borrower Amount of Each of Each
Note‘__‘ Note

1825 Prince Grassalkovich 2,000,000 1,000 150-200
1827 Count Hadik 1,000,000 1,000 5
1828 Count Festetich 2,000,000 1,000 2
1828 Count Festetich 900,000 1,000 2
1828 Count Festetich 600,000 1,000 2
1828 Count Hadik 500,000 1,000 20

 

 

 

 

 

51Hdman and Szekffi, Torténet, V,

p. 341.

 

43
the amount of pasture to which a serf was entitled. The
limits were set rather loosely between four and twenty-two
acres. Enclosures became lawful but not mandatory, conse—
quently prior to 1848 relatively little headway was made.52
More importantly, the Diet made payment of taxes mandatory
for those moccasin nobles who owned no more than one serf
plot thereby technically voiding the ancient noble privilege
of non-taxation. This privilege was further curtailed by
assessing a toll on all persons crossing the permanent bridge
to be built on the Danube connecting Buda and Pest
(Széchenyi's pet project). The nobility also assumed the
expenses of future Diets which previously had been assessed
on the peasantry. An ambitious railroad building program
was initiated with special rights and protection for the
enterpreneurs. Finally, the reformers were allowed to pre—
sent their program in concert on future Diets which in
essence meant the legalization of an opposition party. Yet
the important issue of credit was shelved.

As we have mentioned before, the government attempted
to Silence the cries for reform by imprisonments; but these
acts achieved the opposite result. Consequently, Vienna

tried to win over the more cautious reform minded nobles to

 

52Law of 1836, Article VI, Section 3. There were
sporadic settlements on enclosures between landlord and serf
prior to 1836 in several localities according to Ldrinc
Tdth, Elméleti és gyakorlati utmutatd urbéri fiqyekben
(Theoretical and Practical Guide for Urbarial Matters),
([Buda]Pest: Heckenast Gusztav, 1857), pp. 106-109. Here—
after referred to as Tdth, Utmutatd.

 

44
make the Opposition ineffective. Count Aurél Dessewffy
championed the government cause. In his program for the
1839-40 Diet he proposed the establishment of a national
credit institution with a capital of 10,000,000 florins —-
an Open overture to the indebted nobles. For the serfs, he
advocated a fee absolute on the urbarial portion of their
lands. Dessewffy called his party "the ones who proceed
with caution.” While he was successful in establishing a
government bloc in the Upper House, his efforts to organize
the Lower House failed because he could not win a seat there
(See footnote 7, p. 7). The mere fact that Dessewffy or-
ganized for Vienna indicates that the Opposition began to
present a dangerous force. This danger was somewhat over-
rated at the time because the reformers were few in number
and far from united. Kossuth and Széchenyi were "at each
other throats" while Deék counseled caution, as usual, fear—
ful of antagonizing Vienna.

Despite the liberals' quarrelings, the Diet of 1839—40
managed to enact a law allowing the sale of noble lands.
This act was the first successful attempt to eliminate the
entail on these lands.53 It reflected the mood of the Diet
Since the Lower House refused to even consider any of the
royal proposals until the imprisoned liberals were released,

54

which took almost a year. The Opposition managed to pass

 

. 53Deék fought for the abolishment of entail even in
the previous Diet. Hdman and Szekffi, Tbrtenet, V, p. 295.

54Mérei and Spira, Torténeg, III, p. 240-

45
legislation that finally allowed the serfs to redeem their
lands but only on a voluntary basis that included a settle-
ment with the landlord. To the pennyless peasant this was
of little comfort, but the larger peasant villages of the
Great Plain were able to settle Since they were more af—
fluent and bargained with the landlord collectively. The
Diet also passed its first law on credit which meant in
essence that Hungarian landowners were held liable under
the judgment of Austrian courts. Another infringement on
the institution of entail.

No sooner did the Diet adjourn when the Opposition
issued its first platform in the form of the Twelve Points
of [the county of] Szatmér in February, 1841. This docu-
ment summarized all the liberal and radical demands such as
the abolishment of entail, completion of the credit law of
1840, establishment of a hypothec bank, mandatory fee abso—
lute for the serfs, abolishment of guilds, monopolies, road
tolls, etc., universal right to own land and hold political
office, universal household tax, popular educational system,
freedom of the press, voting right in the Diet for towns
and reorganization of town governments, new penal and civil
codes, separation of administrative and judicial authority,
and popular suffrage. Needless to say, the reformers and
the "ones who progress with caution" (the conservatives)
locked horns immediately. The focal point of the battle was
centered around universal taxation. The newspapers in gen—

eral sided with the government,forcing the liberals to resort

46
to pamphleteering. Vienna managed to defeat the issue of
universal taxation at the county elections to the 1843—44
Diet. Political tempers were so hot that on occasion there
was bloodshed at the county meetings.55

When the Diet of 1843—44 opened, the government at—
tempted to thwart the liberals' designs by advancing its own
set of proposals, many of which were the same as those in
the Twelve Points of Szatmar. Since the crown rescript
avoided the main issue of universal taxation and any men—
tion of national constitutional independence, the Opposition
rejected the proposals. In the debates and subsequent roll
calls that followed the initial encounter between "the forces
of darkness and the forces of light" the liberal demands
were one by one defeated on the stubborn Opposition of the
Upper House. Some of the reforms still managed to thread
a path through (such as the right of non-nobles to political
office and to own land). The principle achievement for
this Diet was the legalization of Magyar as the official
language, a victory for the radical "independence" movement.
Once more the forces of inertia succeeded in blocking the
path of liberal reforms. But the manner in which Vienna
tried to woo the undecided, by including the least offensive
of the liberal demands in its proposals, gave indication
that the reformers could not be ignored and that, short of

brute force, only deft parliamentary maneuvering was able

 

55Mérei and Spira, Torténet, III, p. 275.

 

47

to hold them in check.

To sum up, we saw how the dreams of Joseph II were
shattered on the resistance of the nobility. Instead of
a unified and centralized empire Joseph's II reforms upset
the balance between monarch and the nobility bringing to
fore the dormant hatred for the Habsburgs. It became the
vogue in Hungary to speak the Magyar tongue and dress in
Magyar costume. The nobility, fearful of what might have
happened had Joseph II had his way, clung even more ten—
aciously to its ancient constitution and, through it, their
privileges. The Hungarian reformers, aristocrat and gentry
alike, were divided on what form reforms should take; and
for the most part were unable (and reluctant) to envisage a
Hungary without its outmoded feudal system. The antagonists
of reform seemed determined to stop all reform at first and
only when they failed in this attempt did they propose a
series of half measures to take the place of fundamental
reforms. While Vienna was always happy to increase its
revenues, the government opposed the idea of universal taxa—
tion mainly because it needed the loyalty of the nobility
and because of its fear of a social upheaval. Tragically
both the reformers and the reactionaries were basically right
in their position, that is, that on the one hand Hungary was
in dire need of modernization economically and socially;
while on the other hand the empire of the Habsburgs needed
cohesion and unity in order not to crumble before the aggres—

siveness of the Prussians or the ever hungry Russian bear

-- or both.

11!

CHAPTER III
REVOLUTION AND THE EMANCIPATION LAW, 1847-1849

It appears that as the decade of the 1840's progressed,
Estates Hungary was well on the way to reform —— despite
herself. By 1847 the clamour for reform increased especi—
ally among the lesser nobility and intelligentsia. But four
factors prevented the orderly passage and implementation of
reform laws: first, Vienna's scheming against the liberals;
second, the disunity and lack of direction of the Opposition;
third, the Paris and Vienna revolutions; and fourth, the
revolution and military campaigns in Hungary.

Vienna continued its drastic measures against the
liberals. Chancellor Gybrgy Apponyi began as early as
1844 the systematic dismissal of weak, lazy, or liberal
leaning foispans from several counties replacing them with
loyal administrators. Kossuth promptly labeled them "Kreis-
hauptmanner” (district constables) thus calling attention
to the arbitrariness of these actions. The new foispans
attempted to force the county electorate to vote for con—
servative delegates. In 1845 in Bihar county Foispén Lajos
Tisza tried to influence the outcome of the election by
force and bloodshed. He ordered the county constables
(hajduk) into the meeting hall with swords drawn and during

the ensuing melee several deputies were wounded. In Hont

48

 

49
county when it became apparent to Foispan Sandor Luka that
the Government party was in a minority, he summarily dis-
solved the county assembly and closed the assembly hall.56

Actions of this nature caused considerable furor
nationwide so Vienna tried more subtle means. In 1846 the
Government party began to advocate as its platform such
planks as freedom of the press, reorganization of the Diet,
reorganization of socage, a revision of entailed lands
(aviticitas); almost the whole liberal program. Conse—
quently many of the would be reformers had a change of
heart and the already fractionalized liberal groups suffered
a serious setback. It was not until the summer of 1847 that
Deék was able to put together a Declaration of the Opposi—
tion after prolonged consultation with the various disor-
ganized liberal factions. This Declaration enumerated the
injuries caused by the Crown to the Constitution, demanded
equal taxation for all, the lightening of the tax burden on
the peasantry, parliamentary representation for the cities,
equality before the law, the liquidation of robot with com-
pensation, and the liquidation of entail. The union with
Austria would be preserved in the spirit of Article X of
the Law of 1790 (see footnote 13) but with a more direct
influence on the country's finances through the Diet. The

liberals considered these demands to be reasonable and their

 

56Homan and Szeka, Térgénet, V, p. 384.

50
execution possible within the contemporary framework of the
Empire.

The battle lines were drawn now on both sides and
the fight was joined for the election of delegates to the
Lower House. Electioneering proceeded in the conventional
manner of the times as described in Chapter I. The first
round was fired by the king who gave Chancellor Apponyi
200,000 florins for election purposes. Actually this was a
relatively small sum for such a high official because it
cost Count Lajos Batthyany 100,000 florins alone to have
Kossuth elected as a delegate from Pest county. Elsewhere
election of delegates was considered to be a personal
feud between the families of the wealthier lower nobility
and a local magnate.

The outcome of the elections was in favor of the Govern—
ment party but the liberals had a vocal minority. The
Opposition’s mainstay, Deak, was unable to become a dele-
gate due to ill health and Kossuth, winning a seat in the
Lower House, became the undisputed leader. He tried to
block debate on the reform prOposals submitted by the govern—
ment because he feared that even if adopted they would be
only half measures. His oratorical skill won him a numerous
following, especially on the issue of independence in ac—
cordance with Article X of the Law of 1790. For this
Vienna had no taste at all, but neither did many of the

liberals who feared that an open break between the Diet and

government would thwart all efforts at reform, even the

 

51
half measures.57 Kossuth had to be isolated and Szechenyi
accomplished this through a parliamentary maneuver by having
the Lower House adopt a proposal for an ambitious railroad
building program over a much more modest plan submitted by
Kossuth. The counties in the supplementary instructions to
their delegates sided with Széchenyi on this issue. By the
end of February, 1848, it looked as if Kossuth, the agitator
and orator, was finally sidetracked and the moderates would
have their way. Events in Paris decided otherwise.

News of the Paris revolution reached Pozsony (the
town where the Diet met) early in March, 1848. On March 3
Kossuth in a fiery speech demanded a modern constitution,
not only for Hungary but for all the hereditary lands of the
Empire. A resolution to this effect was passed by the Lower
House. The Paris revolution brought Kossuth out of poli—
tical oblivion and he became the champion of an age—old
Hungarian dream —- independence.58 The Table of Magnates
did nothing; indeed most of its members were in conference
with the State Council in Vienna.

Ensuing events outraced parliamentary procedure and

as a result all the vital reform measures passed in a day's

 

57As late as December 1847 the majority of the Op-
position wanted only to enforce the VII Act of 1840, i.e.
to prevent the landlords from obstructing the process of
voluntary land redemption, according to Ervin Szabo, Térsa-
dalmi és_partharcok a 48-49—es magyar forradalomban (Social
and Party Strife in the 1848—49 Hungarian Revolution), (Buda—
pest: Szikra, 1949), p. 171. Hereafter referred to as Szabd,
Partharcok. Undoubtedly Mr. Szabo misunderstood the Opposi—
tion's motives.

 

58Homan and Szekffi, Torténet, V, p. 391.

 

52
time. Vienna rose in bloody revolution on March 13 forcing
Metternich to resign and flee the city. The people took to
the streets in Budapest too on March 15. Rumors circulated
in Pozsony that Petofi, a popular poet, was heading an in-
surgent peasant army of several thousand. Kossuth had the
March 3 resolution amended by the Lower House adopting all
the reform proposals of the Opposition. The Table of
Magnates at last in session passed the amended resolution
unaltered on March 18.

Royal sanction, however, was not forthcoming. Through-
out the remalnder of March and well into April the State
Council refused to allow the Emperor to Sign the laws. Hun-
garian deputations were not permitted to see the easily
swayed monarch. The State Council,with Metternich in exile
and Kollowrat in control, tried to save the old system first
by a delaying action, later by force of arms, and when that
also seemed to fail, by a direct appeal for Russian military
intervention. On April 11 Emperor Ferdinand signed into
law what in effect was the abolition of Estates rule. Hun—
gary gained virtual independence with the establishment of
a limited constitutional monarchy on a western parliamentary
basis, modeled on that of Belgium. The Diet hastily dis-
solved itself leaving the burden of interpretation and im-
plementation of the far reaching reforms it passed to the
subsequent popularly elected Parliament which was to meet

yearly in Budapest, the capital city.

53

The laws were of monumental Significance. Article
IX abolished socage and all feudal dues connected with it
such as robot, monetary payments and the like; and it "placed
compensation of all private landlords under the shield of
national honor.” The Church voluntarily renounced claims
for compensation for the loss of the tithe. Article XI
abolished all manorial authority (fbldesfiri hatoség) over
the peasant. Article XII set the capital for the reimburse—
ment of urbarial lands at twenty times its value to be fi-
nanced by the issuance of state bonds. Article XV abolished
the entail on noble lands. Here ended the disposition of
matters of social and economic nature. Article XVI insured
the operation of the county system on its traditional basis
as "the protective bastion of constitutionality." Instead
of referring to Articles IV and V on the matter of franchise,
Article XVI extended it on the county level to those "whom
the county residents in each community designate as delek
gates to these public [county] meetings."59

What is so striking about these laws is the vague-
ness of their wording. One cannot help but receive the im—
pression they were written in a hurry without careful thought
to the matters with which they were intended to deal. The
legal chaos that surrounded the nature of urbarial and
allodial lands as well as other categories of land was

certainly well known to all, especially to those who clamored

 

59For a complete text of these laws see Corpus juris,
VIII, pp. 215-255.

54
for reform. The many volumes of parliamentary debate in
1832—36 and 1839—40 are ample proof of this. Yet there were
no Specific guidelines provided to aid the implementation
of these "April Laws”. A hasty supplement brought by the
last Diet a few days after passage of the laws tried to
specify the nature of urbarial lands. This only helped to
confuse the already complicated problem even more.

In order to clarify the frugal wording of the April

Laws Ferencz Deak, now Minister of Justice, introduced a
bill in September, 1848. The new popularly elected Parlia—
ment began debate promptly on this comprehensive measure
but military events prevented its completion. So the ques-
tion of indemnifying the former landlords and an accurate
disposition of urbarial lands had to await the outcome of
a military conflict that was directed from Vienna against
Hungary.60 On December 30, 1848 Deak asked to have the bill
taken off the agenda because:

....due to the present state of the country a thorough

discussion of such matters is impossible,...let us not
soil the pages of history by bringing up a subject that

 

60With Metternich gone, Kollowrat was free to thwart
Magyar ambitions of home government. He set about to di—
vert these energies toward the Croats and save Austria from
internal chaos. Upon his suggestion Baron Jellaéié, an
officer of the Imperial army with pronounced anti—Hungarian
leanings, was appointed governor of Croatia. Under Jellaéic's
command an army entered Hungary and met disaster at Ozora
(See p. 57). A The sending of an Imperial army into Hun-
gary under the command of a Croat could perhaps be considered
Vienna‘s biggest single blunder. Through the person of
Kollowrat, a Czech, it not only discredited Vienna in the
eyes of the Magyars, but also laid the foundation for a radi-
cal nationalistic policy leading to the eventual breakup
of the Empire.

55
is of special interest to the representatives, because
there is something offensive in discussing our pockets
now.61

The subject was tabled and for the time the nobility re-
linquished actual reimbursement on its urbarial lands.
Kossuth's revolutionary government attempted later
to solve the problem of land redemption by a decree on
April 19, 1849; but there was no time left for implementa-
tion. Another bill was under preparation at the end of
the military conflict which was the most radical of all.
There is no complete text available; however, sources in-
dicate it proposed to emancipate the whole body of the
peasantry by ridding it of all vestiges of socage with the
total burden of redemption assumed by the state.62 At the
collapse of the revolutionary war, in the fall of 1849, im—
plementation of the emancipation laws was still not begun.
The peasantry, shortly after the enactment of the
April Laws, began to take possession of the urbarial lands.
There were occasional disturbances in regions where land-
lord and serf differed on the interpretation of what con—

stituted urbarial land. The most severe of these occurred

in the eastern part of the Great Plain in the vicinity of

 

61Hc5man and Szekfu, Torténet, V, p. 395.

62Istvan Barta, "A kormany parasztolitikaja 1849—
ben" (The Government's Peasant Policy in 1849), Szazadok,
Part 2, XC, (1956), pp. 4-64; and Vukovics Sebb emlékiratai
Magyarorszégon valo bujdosésa és szamuzetSSének idejgrol
(The Memoirs of Sebb Vukovics During his Exile and Hiding
in Hungary), ed. Ferenc Bessenyei, (Budapest: Athenaeum,
1894), pp. 505—506.

 

56
the frequently restive peasant towns of Oroshaza and Mezo-
berény. Here one of the peasant agitators, Istvan Olah,
was summarily hanged by the authorities and order was re—
stored.63 On the whole, the process was a peaceful one.
The peasant's only concern was possession of land.

The liberal and nationalistic enthusiasm that en—
gulfed the gentry, the intelligentsia, and the handful of
bourgeoisie did not filter down to the tillers of the soil.
The peasant continued to work in the fields with stoic
indifference and, as usual, attributed the reforms to the
monarch, or was in considerable ignorance about them. He
did not care for, neither did he understand the essence of,
nationalism and was generally reluctant to defend the home-
land in which he had no say until the day previous. The
enthusiastic propaganda of the patriots calling on the
peasant to rise in armed insurrection fell mostly on deaf
ears. This was especially true in the case of the cotters
who were left out of the emancipation laws:

My paternal grandfather..spent two winters in the
forest [with others of his kind], which two he can-
not remember, because he had no idea when freedom

started, he did not even know that it started at all.
...It did not occur to him that during one part of his

hiding —- when the Kossuth forces recruited —— he was
a coward, while in the other half -- when the imperial
forces did the enlisting -- he was a hero. The mili—

tary recruiters for the antagonistic armies were prac—
tically on each other's heels in the villages, the
condition of hero or coward changed almost weekly.

 

63Homan and Szekffi,Torténet, V, p. 396. Olah's activi—
ties were one of the earliest manifestations of agrarian
socialism.

57
Granfather sat in the forest, he did not ponder upon
the matter, he considered the whole situation as the
nobles' business.64
This peasant apathy caused Kossuth's revolutionary govern-
ment great headaches. It was one of the reasons for the
failure of the military campaigns in 1849 because peasant
enlistment in the Honvéd (national) armies virtually ceased.
The destruction, and often vandalism, of the imperial
troops and marauding bands of minority nationalities (Serbs,
Croats, Rumanians) was far better persuasion for the pea-
sants to fight than the patriotic appeals of Kossuth's
recruiting agents (verbuvaldk). In those regions they en-
listed under the national tricolor in considerable numbers.
More often they rose in armed insurrection and assisted
the regular Hungarian troops with their sheer numbers and
their makeshift weapons of sticks and scythes. A good
example of the latter is the springing of the trap at Ozora
on Jelaéié's Croat troops in October, 1848:
The heights on my left all the way down to the Sid
River were occupied since last night by the popular
insurrection. The commander of this insurrectionary
group has without doubt the lion's share in the suc-
cessful conclusion of this campaign.65

But, on the whole, the peasant resisted conscription. There

is ample evidenceto indicate that the peasantry thought that

 

64Gyula Illyés, Pusztak Népe (People of the Hamlets),
(Budapest: Szépirodalmi konyvkiadd, 1955), pp. 52—3. From
here on referred to as Illyés, Pusztak.

 

65Arthur Gorgey, Memoirs, quoted in Illyés, Pusztak,
pp. 24-5. Gorgey, later commander in chief of the Revolu-
tionary Army, disliked irregular troops.

58
emancipation was made dependent on military service, and
they were reluctant to protect the nobility.66

The peculiar nature of the emancipation of the serfs in
Hungary becomes more evident now. The reform period of the
1830's and 1840's culminated in the hastily constructed and
vaguely worded April Laws. There can be no doubt that the
majority of the Diet voted for these laws because of a
genuine fear, especially the Table of Magnates, of a social
upheaval that would have permanently unseated them from
their position of power. However, we also have to recognize
the vocal liberal minority in both Houses that pushed for
reforms on different grounds. They believed that Hungary
had to be revitalized by drastic measures. To them it was
evident that feudalism had to be replaced by an economy
modeled on that of the West in order to forestall an economic
collapse. They proved time and again the inefficiency of
robot and the low productivity in agriculture that it en-
tailed. Their liberalism was genuine and in keeping with
the times: to them equality before the law for all men was
not an excessive demand. The injustice of corporal punish—
ment and the concern for the baseness and brutality of the
serfs was, in the liberal mind, directly attributed to
poverty and the ills of socage. But no matter what the

reasons were that insured the passage of the April Laws, the

 

66Szabo’, Partharcok, pp. 291—314.

 

59
wording of the statutes was obscure and far from adequate
by any standard.

The Revolutionary Government of 1848—49 made repeated
attempts to solve the unfinished business in a series of
comprehensive measures. First through Deak's bill, then
through Kossuth's decree, and finally just before the mili-
tary collapse in the summer of 1849 through an even more
radical solution. But all of these attempts remained un-
finished. Meanwhile the peasantry, under the assumption
that freedom at long last arrived, proceeded to take posses-
sion of the land and refused further delivery of socage
dues to the landlords. It is impossible to determine how
much land changed hands this way, but there is no evidence
to indicate that the peasants were prevented from occupying
the urbarial portion of their holdings. Due to the state
of war, conditions varied considerably in the different
regions of the country. Prince Windischgratz, the Commander
in Chief of the Imperial armies, in his many proclamations
ignored the April Laws and what they entailed in an attempt
to establish the old order. How successful he was is not
certain. At any rate, for the Hungarians there was no time
left to implement their laws or even pass them in Parliament.

Implementation had to wait. It did, for almost a decade.

CHAPTER IV

ABSOLUTISM AND PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION, 1849-1867

On August 12, 1849 the Hungarian Revolutionary Army
surrendered to the Russian general Rfidiger at the village
of Vilagos, not far from the town of Arad. This act re-
duced the Hungarians to mere "rebels," defeated ones at
that. The Austrian military, under the command of Baron
Haynau, instituted a harsh dictatorship, executed those
leading revolutionaries who did not go into exile, and was
determined to pacify Hungary for a hundred years. Politi-
cally the demise of the Magyars looked equally final.
Their Constitution was suspended, the "lands of the crown
of St. Stephen” (Transylvania, the Serb Voivodina or temesi
bansag, the Military Frontier, and Croatia-Slavonia) were
severed, while Hungary proper was divided into five adminis—
trative districts (see map, p. 61). All acts of the "rebel"
government and Parliament were declared null and void save
the emancipation of the serfs. All matters had to await
the "gracious disposition” of Emperor Franz Joseph. Vienna
did not permit the Magyars to carry out their reforms, in-
stead, Habsburg absolutism shouldered the task alone. This
was an open invitation to obstructionism at which the Hun—

garians were past masters.

60

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Military and political subjugation did not mean that
Vienna altogether disregarded the reform legislation of 1848.
Even Prince Windischgratz made allusions to it in his many
proclamations while Commander in Chief of the Habsburg
armies during the Revolution. It was not until 1853, how—
ever, that the imperial edict was issued acknowledging the
April Laws as valid and ordering the implementation of the
emancipation of the serfs. The central government waited
another three years to set up the system of urbarial courts
whose task implementation bacame (1856). This tardiness
was typical of Vienna where "Gemfitlichkeit und Schlamperei"
(geniality and remissness) was practically the official
slogan. Accordingly, the land surveys (begun in 1850) and
court processes dragged on endlessly. While awaiting
final settlement the serf was forced to continue delivery
of socage dues as before on everything except his urbarial
lands. This Habsburg policy of cautious indecision and pro~
crastination had a most harmful effect on peasants and hobles
alike. Its study is our objective in this chapter.

After the military reign of terror ran its course a
civilian administration took control. This new political
order of centralized absolutism lasted with some variations
until the Ausgleich of 1867. The architect of the system,
Alexander Bach, Minister of Interior, was a radical in the
first quarter of 1848 but quickly switched Sides becoming
the most loyal servant of the counterrevolution. This is

how a former revolutionary friend, Adolf Fischhof, described

63
Bach's system:
A standing army of soldiers; a sitting army of officials;
a kneeling army of priests and a creeping army of in-
formers.67
Hardly a compliment —- but basically accurate. The task
that Bach shouldered was immense, and in essence it was the
last attempt of the Habsburgs to centralize their sprawling
lands into a homogeneous administrative whole. Bach insti-
tuted a more efficient regional administration which, even
with its many shortcomings, was far better than the anti-
quated Hungarian county system. The five districts were
governed by only 1,765 civil servants.68 This number did
not include, however, the agents of the extensive police-
Spy network who continued zealously for years after 1849
the ferreting out and arresting of "rebels."
The innovations of Bach and the persecutions cone

ducted by his police did not favorably impress the gentry

and intelligentsia. Following Deak's example they countered

 

67As quoted by Emil Lengyel, 1000 Years of Hungary,
(New York; J. Day Co., 1958), p. 141.

 

68Gusztav Beksics, “Ferencz szsef és kora" (Franz

Joseph and His Times), in A magyar nemzet t6rténete (History
of the Hungarian Nation), X, ed. Sandor Szilagyi, (Budapest:
Atheneaum, 1897), p. 430. Hereafter referred to as Beksics,
Nemzet. Ironically, the new district officials were given
the old historic Hungarian titles of fdispan, alispan, etc.
Their jurisdictions were, however, altered and the whole of
the civil service was centrally appointed, disregarding old
elective customs. During the middle 1850's the civil service
in Hungary became predominantly Czech. These new officials
were ordered to wear traditional Hungarian costumes, much to
the chagrin of the Magyars who labeled them "Bach Hussars."

 

64

Bach's move with the often tried formula of "passive resis-
tance." But this time the nobility failed to present a
united front. The aristocracy was considered politically
"safe“ by Vienna (and rightly so), while the lesser nobility
was fast in putting pride and principle aside for a position
of prestige and power in the ”hated“ alien regime. As early
as 1850 many of the administrative offices were filled by
Hungarians.69 Their names appear with regularity in the
various districts as foispéns, alispéns and szolgabiros; we
also find them in the gendarmerie, the police, and even in
high political positions.70

From the outset a major flaw became incorporated into
the higher strata of the new administration. The authority
of the Ministry of Interior in Vienna was augmented by the
Viceregency Council (Helytartotanécs) in Budapest. It was
never made clear which one of these administrative organs
had the final say on matters under their joint jurisdiction.
Due to this dual authority, contradictory orders were often
sent to the district foispéns who, usually unwilling to
stick their necks out needlessly, sent both versions on to
their szolgabirds. The smart szolgabirds in turn forwarded
them, without decision, to the village birds. The confused

birds thereupon turned for help to the local landlord

 

69A Count Forgach in the Kassa district, a Ddry in
the Kolozsvar district. Homan and Szekffi, Tbrténet, V, p.
443.

70For a detailed list see footnote in Beksics, Nemggg,
pp. 472-76.

65
or priest, their traditional advisors, and frequently were
told to forget about both orders. Consequently, most of the
new regulations were deposited in the cellar of the bird or
the notary never to be heard of again. The novice szolga~
birds, on the other hand, made a decision on which one of
the orders to transmit to the village authorities only to
be fined fifteen to twenty florins by the slighted high
authority either in Vienna or Budapest.71

The old idea of a unified language for the whole em-
pire was given another try too. This was a dismal failure
in Joseph's 11 time and it became a major source of irrita-
tion during the Bach Period. Vienna introduced the German
language into Hungary gradually. It was used by the mili—
tary dictatorship of 1849-50, its language of command always
being German. Then it was made mandatory for the civil ser—
v1ce. Later Thun extended it to the gimndziums and colleges.
Finally in the 1860's Schmerling introduced German in the
judiciary while Taaffe made it mandatory for the Hungarian
Supreme Court (Hétszemélyes birdség).72 Bach excused the
Germanization attempts by alleging that the German language
had the richest literary heritage, that it was written and

spoken almost everywhere as Latin was formerly in Hungary, and

 

71Beksics, Nemzet, p. 430. A szolgabird's salary was
eight to nine hundred florins. These fines were not causing
financial hardships, but still a cry of indignation arose
against the new practice of expecting officials to be respon-
sible. In Estates Hungary one became an official because of
birth and connections and not because of competence.

72Beksics, Nemzet, p. 454.

66
thus became the logical choice. Logical or not, Germaniza-
tion only fanned the smoldering fire of separatist aspira-
tions.

The sanctioned April Laws, brought by the Diet in

1848, were not revoked however. Instead, Vienna attempted
to limit the reforms within the bounds of these laws ignor-
ing everything done by the Revolutionary Government and
Parliament in 1848-49. Evidence of this limiting trend is
the various imperial orders during the winter of 1848-49
concerning the continuance of payments by the former serfs
of those feudal dues that were not included in the April
Laws. The order of Royal Commissioner Ignéc Rohonczy made
it clear, for example, to the residents of SOpron and Vas
counties that

with the exceptions of the tithe to the Church and

dues after the urbarial lands,everything else will

remain in its former condition until according to his

majesty's latest and gracious orders disposition of

them will be made in the future with reimbursement to

the former ownersfi’3
This and similar other orders meant that the former serfs
were obliged to continue payments on vineyards, allodial
plots, cotter's houses and cleared lands. The former socage

dues were also enforced regarding wood cutting, grazing,

reed cutting and the like.

 

73Oszkér Sashegyi,(ed.), Munkésok ésyparasztok mozgalmai
Magyarorszégon, 1849-1867 (Worker and Peasant Movements in
Hungary, 1849-1867), (Budapest: Akadémiai kiadd, 1959), p. 78.
Hereafter referred to as Sashegyi, Mozgalmak.

 

 

67

It was not until March 2, 1853 that the royal Patent
was issued ordering the final disposition of all feudal dues
and state redemption of urbarial lands.74 At last the in-
efficiencies of Article IX of the April Laws were corrected.
The nature of urbarial lands was delineated in exact terms.
Although intensive study75 preceded the Patent, and the
government officials were aware of the immensely complicated
nature of the land question, yet the basis for determining
the urbarial nature of serf lands was designated as the
almost hundred year old registers of Maria Theresia's Urbar-
ium, The serfs were allowed to keep their allodial lands
(vineyards, inner, cleared and remainder lands)grovided
they could prove with written contracts that they possessed
them ”in perpetuity," and whether they paid for them or not.
The state did not assume the debt on allodial lands. The
Patent ordered the mandatory allocation and enclosure of
communal pastures and woodlands. It even provided for the
reimbursement of those communities, few as they were, which

paid their fee absolute prior to 1848. Implementation of

 

74For a complete text see Gesetze und Verordungen
Franz Josefs, 1856—1860, I, The Royal Ministry of Justice,
(Wien: S. Manz, 18567?

 

 

75In January, 1852 Bach ordered a statistical survey
in the five districts of Hungary of all of the urbarial lands
according to the peasants' allegations, to the landlords'
allegations and what the estimate of the szolgabiro was con-
cerning the real number of urbarial plots. He also ordered
a detailed account on the progress of land reform: whether
it was yet begun, under adjudication, or completed. The
district foispans reported the completion of these surveys
in March, 1852.

68
the emancipation of the serfs in the five districts was car-
ried out according to the dictates of this single imperial
order.

Theoretically the Patent of 1853 abolished serfdom,
but practically we can consider only those serfs emancipated
which received clear title to their lands. The remainder
of the serfs had to pay for their freedom and possession
of land and often had to continue delivery of former socage
dues until the debts were paid. Quite obviously, therefore,
the peasants' overriding concern became the nature of their
lands. Urbarial or allodial land classification determined
who got emancipated and who did not. Equally important to
them was the size of the allotments, that is, how much of
the land was awarded them.

According to the Patent of 1853 the peasants' title
to their lands was a simple matter because the adjudicating
courts only had to check the urbarial registers of Maria
Theresia and award land accordingly. But conditions had
changed during the preceding century. Quite often, a vil-
lage did not have an urbarium and thus did not have urbarial
registers either. Then there were some villages who had an
urbarial contract With the local landlord which predated
that of Maria Theresia. In these cases there was mention of
urbarial serfs, but often it was impossible to trace the
origin of their holdings due to the long lapse of time.
Thirdly, there were villages which had no urbarium because

in 1767 they were considered to be inhabited by nobles

69
exclusively. Fourthly, there were some villages especially
in the Great Plain region that had no urbarium because they
were settled on manorial lands (so called "settler villages").
To further complicate matters, there were villages that had
what was called "supplemental" urbarial contracts where
large segments of the land were of shady origin and disputed
by lord and serf alike.

Disputes before the urbarial courts invariably re—
volved around the question of whether the land was allodial,
belonging to the landlord, or urbarial, belonging to the
serf. Often the peasants maintained that the land in ques-
tion was urbarial and that the landlord used trickery to
have it reclassified. There is evidence that conscious ef-
fort was made on the part of the landlord to have some of
the arable lands reclassified, especially after the laws of
1832-36.76 There were several reasons for this. Firstly,
during the urbarial census of 1767 the serfs gave false
figures to the census takers, usually claiming less land
under cultivation (to evade taxes) than they really used.
Secondly, the landlords often "allodialized" former urbarial
lands without compensating the serf with another urbarial

plot as was required both by Werboczy's Tripartitum and Maria

 

Theresia's Urbarium. The 1832-36 laws tried to correct

 

76Ferenc Bay, A birtokrendezési perek rovid vazlata
(A Short Outline of the Legal Process in Land Adjudication
Suits), (Debrecen: Telegdi K. Lajos, 1856), pp. 31—33. Here-
after referred to as Bay, Perek.

 

70
these illegal possessions of land, but in most cases the
serf was unable to prove through a written contract that the
land was originally urbarial in nature.77 Neither could the
landlord, however his word was frequently given more weight
before the courts than that of the serf. Thirdly, in cases
of cleared lands, the laws clearly gave them an allodial
status; and again, in several instances the landlord took
advantage of the serf's ignorance and claimed portions of
lands that the serf thought urbarial to be actually allodial
with the excuse that these were cleared lands.

As an example of these claims and counterclaims there
was the case of the village Szoce in Vas county. The urbar—
ial census of 1768 showed 35 urbarial plots worked by 26
serfs. The census of 1862 counted only 24 urbarial plots
worked by 58 peasants. In 1763 the total acreage was 983
while in 1862 only 878 acres were shown. Even so, the former
serfs had to redeem out of their own pocket 192 acres and
only 696 acres were classified urbarial on which the state
paid the redemption. Thus, in Szoce the number of urbarial

plots decreased by almost one—third.78

 

77Bay, Perek, p. 40.

78Lajos Fur, "Jobbagyfold-Parasztfold” (Serf Land-
Peasant Land), in Istvan Szabd, ed., A parasztség Magyaror-
szagon a kapitalizmus koréban, 1848-1914 (The Peasantry in
Hungary During the Era of Capitalism, 1848-1914), (Budapest:
Akadémiai kiado, 1965) I, p. 63. Hereafter referred to as
Szabd, Parasztség. Ffir gives as his source the State Archives
of Szombathely, Urbarial Court Files, 1858—f—129, 391.

 

 

71

There were instances, however, when the landlord
actually increased the acreage of a serf plot. In Vas county
a few nobles outrightly gave some of their allodial plough
lands to the adjacent urbarial serf plots, and it happened
that a serf's holdings were increased to 100 to 130 acres
as for instance in Sopron county.79 In Fejér and Bihar
counties a few landlords even forgave the redemption pay-
ments on meadows and cleared lands.80 It is questionable
whether the landlords were solely guided by magnanimity as
the contemporary press reports. Rather, we can assume that
in the majority of cases the position of the landlord vis—
a'vis his former serfs was hopeless if brought to adjudi-
cation. He would have been unable to have these lands tilled
due to inaccessability, or the productivity of the soil was
inferior, or he had no allodial lands in the vicinity. He
might also have been unable to prove the allodial status
of the lands.

The government resisted attempts on the part of the
landlords to have the number of urbarial plots increased.
The reason for this was twofold. First, due to the intro—
duction of universal taxation Vienna no longer was anxious
to extricate more lands from manorial classification into

urbarial categories. Let us remember that noble, that is

 

79Budapesti Hirlap, October 28, 1857.

 

80Budapesti Hirlap, February 27, 1858.

72
to say allodial, lands were tax free prior to emancipation.
Second, the guidelines through which the government reim-
bursed the former landlords were established according to
the 1852 census (see footnote 75). In other words the cen-
sus determining the nature of a village's lands, and the
number of urbarial serf and cotter plots was concluded before
the Patent of 1853 was issued. During the second census,
in 1854-55, the figures were markedly different indicating
that both serf and landlord had the Patent of 1853 in mind
when registering their lands.

Furthermore, the urbarial courts in their awards
often increased the number of urbarial plots anyway. A case
in point is the village of stjér in Szepes county (see
Table 1, p. 86) where in 1868 the State Foundation for Land
Redemption filed a complaint with the Ministry of Interior.
It seemed that the urbarial court awarded the village re—
demption payments according to 57-3/8 serf plots whereas
the census tables showed only 17—1/2 urbarial plots the
rest being classified as cleared lands and therefore the
landlord had no right for a redemption payment after them.
The court held that the government had to pay because the
peasants already received their allotments of woodlands and
pastures according to the 57—3/8 plots; and, Szepes county
reasoned, it would be foolish to reopen the case, since
the matter was previously settled and it would be disaster-

ous for the serfs to have their lands taken away or have

73
them pay redemption.81 On the whole, however, the state
quite rigidly adhered to urbarial registers of Maria Theresia
and Bach's census of 1852.

In the case of the urbarial cotter holdings, for
those less than 1/8 of a serf plot, as mentioned in Chapter
II, the Law of 1836 allowed free settlement between cotter
and landlord, yet not many settlements were made before
emancipation (see footnote 52). The Patent of 1853 prer
scribed that previous laws regarding urbarial lands had to
be considered; and in this light the courts in all of Hun—
gary classified all cotter holdings, with the exception
of their minute inner lands as cleared lands. This meant
that these poorest and most numerous of Hungary's serfs
were forced to redeem their lands without state support.
Their holdings were at the most six to eight acres, but even
so they had no money to redeem them. There were instances
where a landlord did not demand payment, but generally this
was more the exception than the rule. Yet it was not until
1871 that this matter was brought up in Parliament for
debatel

There were no problems as far as the landless and
houseless cotters were concerned. The Patent of 1853 abol—
ished all their debts, since they had nothing, they also

received nothing. The most the state could have done for

 

81Szabo’, Parasztség, I, p. 67. Source: Hungarian
National Archives, Papers of the Ministry of Interior; 1868,
No. 17867.

 

74
their former landlords was the reimbursement for the twelve
days of robot they lost after each one of these have-nots.
This the state did not do, however. Occasionally a landlord
gave enough land to these people to allow them the erection
of a tiny hut as did the Counts Karolyi who gave 347 of their
former cotters each a 1/10 acre plot.82

The greatest controversy and the most heated and
drawn out court battles raged around the manorial, or rather
allodial, serfs. The problem here did not concern whether
or not they were emancipated (clearly they were not). The
issue was whether the lands they cultivated were of urbarial
or of allodial nature. Their insistence in maintaining
that all their lands were urbarial must be considered in the
light that to them this meant that either they became eman—
cipated free landholders or they had to bear the burden of
redemption themselves. The allodial serfs were given plots
of allodial land in return for different socage dues, usu-
ally a certain number of days robot per year. What compli-
cated this issue was the fact that there were a considerable
number of serfs who, during the years, lost their urbarial
lands or became reclassified as allodial serfs. Furthermore,
after 1848 the term “allodial serf" became a sort of "catch—
all" for those people whose relationship to their former
landlords was different from a relatively simple urbarial
one. Needless to say that these relationships often were,

and still are, confusing and most complicated to understand.

 

82Budapesti Hirlap, March 30, 1858.

 

75
VFor example, besides the "real" allodial serfs, were serfs
who rented allodial lands by contract from the landlord.
Their designation varied by region, such as "censualists,"
"taxalists," "terragialists,” and the like. Even inhabit—
ants of large villages (mezovarosok) who were not peasants
by trade but rented from the local landlords for other
purposes were in this category, even if they rented property
of industrial nature.

After 1848 the allodial serfs often refused to con-
tinue to pay their feudal dues. The landlords insisted on
their continued service and incidents where armed interven-
tion was necessary to put down local riots, as in the
Oroshéza and Mezoberény cases, did occur (seegxi 55—56).

The Patent of 1853, made the final disposition on these
lands and categorized the allodial serf holdings into two
parts. Those which were rented or given by the landlord

"in perpetuity" became redeemable by the serf; but those
rented ”provisionally” were clearly allodial lands belong—
ing to the landlord. The hardship that this ruling caused
the serfs was aggravated by two factors. The serf was sel—
dom in the position to be able to prove the perpetual nature
of his lands since he seldom had a written contract to this
effect. Even if he had one, the landlord tried to prove
that the lands in question were of allodial nature as it was
quite common practice after 1836 to have the serfs sign a
“provisional" contract. Also, there was the ever present

problem of poverty. As the years passed the serf became

76
more and more delinquent in payments. The Parliamentary de-
bates of 1871 give revealing statistics on the amount the
serfs owed on their few acres.

The lawsuits on the allodial-urbarial land question
were numerous and the bitterness that was engendered is
worth the illustration through specific instances. In the
village of Ofalu in Szepes county the allodial serfs proved
before the court that their lands were registered as urbar—
ial in the registers of the 1767 Urbarium and in several
subsequent regional registers. The court, however, refused
to classify them as urbarial on grounds that the serfs had
paid their dues uninterrupted between 1848 and 1867 and be—
cause the landlord was not reimbursed for these lands by
the government. The village of Boroszlo in Saros county in
an 1860 lawsuit charged that the landlord had classified
eight 2/8 plots of urbarial land as allodial unlawfully be-
cause in the 1767 register they were listed as urbarial.

The landlord admitted this, but argued that in 1833 he was
forced to "adjust" these serf holdings because the allodial
serfs became so numerous that they were unable to live up

to their responsibilities and so he gave them allodial lands
instead. The "reclassification" of these lands was upheld
by the court and the village lost the case.

In other instances the allodial serfs interpreted the
1848 April Laws as total emancipation and stubbornly main—
tained before the court that "they are not going to work be—

cause they got emancipated.“ There were other instances

77

where the serfs asked only to have the feudal dues abolished
on the allodial lands they tilled. In the village of Girolt
in Belso—Szolnok county the court complied with this request
but the landlord appealed the ruling in 1865. Three years
later when the case came up before the appeals court it was
set aside pending the enactment of laws on the matter. These
laws, however, failed to pass.83

Quite similar were the arguments concerning the dis—
position of remainder lands. The Patent of 1853 only re-
iterated the wording of the Article X, Law of 1836 and
classified them as those lands not listed in the various
census registers but still leased to peasants. The landlords
tried to "prove" that these lands were actually allodial in
nature on grounds of "reclassification," but the Vice—regency
Council firmly resisted such allegations. The Council main-
tained that these lands were classified as "remainders" only
because of the landlords'negligence to comply with the
orders of the 1767 Urbarium in settling new serfs on the
vacated plots. The several reclassifications that actually
did occur during the previous century made matters only
worse. In essence the former serfs maintained that the re-
mainder lands were of urbarial nature while the former land-
lords argued for their allodial classification. In the

majority of the cases the Patent of 1853 was taken as a

 

f

83Szabo, Parasztsag, I, pp. 77-78. Source: Hungarian
National Archives, Documents, Ministry of Interior, 1869, No.
7160; 1868, NO. 520; 1869, NO. 13035; and 1869, NO. 9217.

 

78
guideline which, as stated, classified them as redeemable
by the serfs if owned in perpetuity.84

The Patent also provided for the nature of redemption
by ordering the former serfs to redeem their lands through
cash payments. The manner in which the fee absolute was
calculated varied from county to county —— and was a most
complicated process. It was not uncommon for the serfs to
pay with land for redemption instead of with the prescribed
cash.85 In Zala county twelve of the fifty villages re—
deemed their lands "in kind" but the amount of land "traded"
varied widely. On the whole, roughly one—third to one-half
of the disputed remainder plots were "paid" as a redemption
fee to the landlord, while approximately 20—25% of the
total number of remainder plots in Hungary were redeemed
by this barter method.86

A sizeable portion of the serf's livelihood depended
on his cleared lands. This comprised those arable lands
and pastures that the peasants cleared of brush, timber and
marshes with or without the consent of the landlord. This

land acquisition was as important to the welfare and

 

84Patent of 1853, Section 8. There was no doubt that
these were peasant lands; Tdth, Utmutato, p. 71.

8“Budapesti Hirlap, September 17, 1858.

86Determining the nature and exact amount of the re—
mainder lands was a near unsurmountable task, according to
Toth, fitmutato, p. 189; and since there are no complete
statistics available today, we can only hazard a guess.
Lajos Fur, maintains in Szabd, Parasztsag, I, pp. 84—85, that
20-25% is not a risky guess.

 

79
prosperity of the serfs alleged a writer in the contemporary
press, as in previous times the land grants were "to
our nobility for martial valor or the occupation of the
country by our ancestors."87 As discussed in Chapter II the
landlords had a right to redeem them and in the decade before
1848 some did so. Emancipation still found the serfs
possessing or using the majority of these lands. The Patent
of 1853, ignoring the radical reform trend of the 1848—49
Revolutionary Government, did not assume the burden of re—
demption but at least it allowed the former serfs to redeem
cleared lands thus extricating these holdings from the al—
lodial domain.88

The Patent of 1853 not only neglected to make redemp-
tion of cleared lands mandatory, but also failed to solve
the entangled legal questions concerning their nature.
Naturally, the peasants maintained that these lands were
urbarial since in most instances it was given to them to
insure their "survival" and given in "perpetuity." The
Patent categorized cleared lands into three classes trying
to satisfy both landlord and peasant. If they were already
attached to the serfEs urbarial holdings, it was considered
urbarial. If the cleared lands were given to "insure sur-

vival" or in ”perpetuity,“ they were redeemable by the serf.

If however, the landlord had "a right to redeem" these lands

 

87Budapesti Hirlap, April 24, 1858.

 

88Law of 1840..Section XII made redemption possible.
The Patent of 1853, Section 9, ordered redemption through
cash payments.

80
they were considered allodial. In most cases the peasant
could not prove the ”perpetual” nature of his cleared lands,
the agreement between he and the landlord being a verbal one
at best. He therefore contested the lord's right to any
portion of the land. The landlord had a difficult time too
proving the temporary nature of the lease or disproving its
perpetual nature. There are abundant law suits proving this
point.89 As a result former landlord and former serf di—
vided these disputed lands among themselves and although
information concerning the whole of Hungary is unavailable
and settlements in an out of court varied a great deal, it
seems that approximately forty to sixty per cent of the
cleared lands were classified by the courts as either ur-
barial or allodial but redeemable by the serfs (See p.106;
footnote 118).

During the revolutionary period of 1848—49 the prob—
lem regarding the feudal dues on vineyards was solved. In
September, 1848 Parliament in a resolution abolished them
even before Deak's bill of September, 1848 was debated. The
attack of Jellacié at that time had much to do with the pas-
sage of the measure because the law makers were anxious to
have a trouble free hinterland during the military emergency.
Trouble was indicated by the serfs who were unwilling to

deliver the customary tithe and the various "hill duties"

 

89Szabd, Parasztsag, I, pp. 96—7; Source: State
Archives of Szombathely, Urbarial Court Files, 1857. See
also Tdth, Utmutato.

 

81
(hegyvémok) on that year‘s harvest which was about to begin.
Of course, this Parliamentary resolution with all the others
was declared null and void by Vienna after the military col—
lapse, but still in several instances the peasants refused
to pay.90

The Patent of 1853 awarded the former serfs their

vineyards, classifying them as urbarial and thus assuming
the debt for them. But it restricted the redemption of all
other allodial rented vineyards by allowing redemption on
only those plots that were not leased to the peasants on a
"temporary" basis. Again the peasants were unable, for the
most part, to prove in writing a "perpetual" nature on their
allodial vineyards. The contemporary press picked up the
argument and alively debate developed on the nature of re—
demption. In the end the vineyards had to be redeemed with—
out state support and the dues were collected by the former
landlords until redemption was completed. This too became
a lengthy,drawn out process due to the reluctance at first
and later the inability of the peasants to meet the payments.
It lasted for decades during which time an accrued interest

was added to the original redemption fee.91

 

9°Sashegyi, Mozgalmak, p. 96.

 

91The practice of adding the interest to the capital
was later prohibited by law (1868) but in the meanwhile
twenty years elapsed and accrued interest calculations were
not countermanded for the decade prior to 1859 even by this
law. Those debts were considered lapsed but by 1868 most
vineyard owners either paid their debt or signed redemption
contracts.

82

The immense and often hopeless task of implementing
the reforms is further illustrated by the manner in which
former lord and former serf locked horns on the allotments
of pastures, meadows and forests. As we have seen in Chap—
ter II the separation of pastures and meadows, as provided
by the 1836 laws, was not made mandatory, consequently
until 1848 there was but little progress. The Patent of
1853 made separation mandatory, but confirmed only the
upper and lower limits of allotments provided by the 1836
laws. These were twenty-two and four acres reSpectively
per one urbarial plot of arable land. A major source of
irritation and resentment was the fact that only the urbarial
serfs and cotters were allowed to share in pasture and meadow
allotments. Even these people were denied allotment for
their cleared and remainder lands. This was another reason
why the allodial serfs, the ones without any land, or at
least without any urbarial land, maintained so stubbornly
that the cleared and remainder lands they tilled were ur—
barial in nature.

Although the Patent of 1853 ordered the separation
of the pastures and meadows, the peasants were reluctant
to have these fields divided. This reluctance, and often
outright resistance was caused by several factors. In vil-
lages where the majority of the peasants were former cotters
who had no urbarial lands, they feared that if the orders
were implemented they would lose the pastures. Until then

these lands were in communal ownership where landlord,

83

urbarial, and allodial serf alike kept their cattle. Since
only urbarial lands were allotted pastures and meadows, the
fear of those peasants who ”possess disputed and question-
able lands” was well founded.92 But those serfs who, besides
their urbarial land, had cleared and remainder lands were
similarly reluctant to have the common pastures broken up
for fear of being short-changed. So, in regions without
allodial lands the peasants claimed right to all the avail-
able pastures. Also the tremendous variety of the quality
of pastures and meadows caused the peasants anxiety especi-
ally because of the Patent's extremely liberal provisions
for upper and lower limits.

In this light it is quite understandable why there
was so much bitterness concerning adjudication of the size
of pasture allotments. In the available statistics the
peasants usually asked for the maximum of twenty-two acres
while the landlords “offered" in settlement less than half
of that. The courts either accepted the landlords' offer,
or as in most cases, added a few acres to it. Seldom did
it happen that the serf was awarded the full allowable
twenty-two acres. The cases where the allotment exceeded
twenty—two acres (and there were such even as high as 42.5
acres) were few and restricted to the counties of the Great

Plain (See Table 1, p. 84).

 

92Budapesti Hirlapj March 14, 1858.

 

 

 

 

84

 

 

TABLE 1
PASTURE AND FOREST ALLOTMENTS, 1853-1867
No . of No 3? Pastures Forests
. Serf Cot— axes total acres
County Community Plots ters 'per in per
plot com- plot
Hmnfly
Great
Plain
Counties
Arad Jérkos 22 6
Lugozo 22 6
Békés Gyula 22
Kétegyhéza 113 7/8( 10 2,235
K6r6s1adény 115 1/8 31 8,656
K6r6stércsa 133 3/8h 28 10,262
Oroshéza 255 6/8 730 18
Szarvas 32
Szentandrés 25
Csongrad Horgos 13.5
Hodmezovasarhely 28
Szegvér 123 3/4 22
Szentes 32
Bihar Kisfirdgd 8
Kokad 10
Szakél 7
Tepe 12
Pest Alsonémedi 100 179 16 2,717
Duka 12 10 10
Izsak 54 1/2 392 14
Kalocsa 215 5/8 804 42.5 18,000
Lorinckata 10
Rékés 76 281 8 1,251
Tass 77 7
Tapiobicske 12
Szolnok Cibakhéza 31 5/8 266 22
Felsdmezdtur 315 547 31
Kenderes 76 5/8 280 14
TiszabeB 54 2/8 151 8
Tiszabura 14
Tiszaors 84 3/4 61 10
Tiszaorvény 17 3/4 16 12
Tiszaroff 28 236 16
Tiszasas 16 3/8 140 25
Tiszaszentimre 34 116 14
Tiszavarkony 24 163 8
Torbkszentmiklos 218 666 14

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

85

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 1 - Continued
NSTEE7WEFTSEVTEEEEEEET_‘Forests
. Serf Cot— acres total acres
County Community Plots ters *per in. per
plot ~com- plot
munity
Trans
Danube
Counties
Fejér Alcsut 4o 63 7
Boglar 12
Cece 3/8 2
Csékvér 102 1/4 240 1,479
Enying 12
Etyek 101 9
Kozma 9 7/8 7 13 5
Magyaralmas 15 5
Martonvasar 39 7.5
Nadap 11 215 + 392 forest
Soponya 51 4/8 67 14
Soskut 40 126 16
Sukoro 11 6/8 107 21
Seregélyes 80 3/4 125 14 12
Szar 12
Tabajd 58 4/8 73 8
Vajta 25 14
Gydr Nagybarét 5
Somogy Bogyoszld 94 43 8
Jéd 12 4
Kecdl 8 4
Vica 4
Sopron Acsalag 10 9 22
Arpés 8
Kisfalud 6
Magloca 18 3
Mihélyi 6
Pali 10 4
Vas Alsdészko 18 4/8 12
Doborhegy 30 6/8 13 1,759
Dfiréske 23 13 1,759
FelsBszeleste 18 14 376
Gerse 22 12 764
Gy6rvér 23 2/8 14 958
Hodész 19 1/8 14 855
Ikervér 60 3/ 10 10
Katafa 20 2/8 9 369

 

86

 

 

 

 

 

TABLE 1 - Continued
No. of N3. ofr Pastures Forests
. Serf Cot- acres total acres
County Community Plots ters per in per
plot com- plot
munit
Vas Kisfalud 2 15
Kismakfa 10 5/8 12
Nagykokeld 8 7/8 16 1,100
Petbmihélyfa 30 4/8 12 3,198
Petbolaszka 4 2/8 14 275
Széce 24 20 7 9
VeSZprém Kadarta 41 2/8 14 2.2
Kiliti 61 7/8 3.2
Highland
Counties .
Borsod Tiszatarjan 20 2,950
Gomar Also- és Felsb
Hangony 23 7 5
Markuska 12 all
Méhi 16 1/2 5 5 144 + 77 forest
Heves Egerszalok 6-12
Ffizesabony 6—12
Kerecsend 75 1/4 21 6
Mez6térkany 6
Nagytallya 6-12
Onod 5
Szelefarmos 16 1,600
Tarnaszentmiklds 14
Tofalu 6—12
Nyitra Brogya 12 19
Komjét 104 1/4 54 6 1,054
séros Ujlak 17 32(all)
Szepes Dravecz 10
Kacse 12
Lucsivna 4
Mnyise 12
stjar 57 3/8 15 10
Ung Gajdos 4
Ruszkoc 5

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Adapted from Lajos Ffir,

"Jobbagyfbld - Paraszthld" (Serf

Land-Peasant Land), in Szabd, Parasztség, I, pp. 120-122.
According to Fur the above are representative samples.

 

87

The Patent of 1853 also regulated the allotment of
forests setting upper and lower limits for each urbarial
serf plot at eight and two acres respectively.93 It allowed
further subdivisions, below two acres, to the cotters with
urbarial land allowing a full allotment for every eight cot-
ters. This was an effort on the part of the government to
secure an ample supply of fuel for the poorer serfs, but
again the problem was too complex and the Patent was far
from being able to provide for all contingencies. The main
trouble was that in the majority of cases the serf's wood
allotment for a year was not proportionate to his arable
lands whether urbarial or of other nature. In most regions
the serf received from his landlord enough wood to see him
through the winter regardless of the size of his lands. For
this he was obliged to deliver a variety of payments, mostly
a determined number of days robot per year.

Allocation by size of arable lands meant disaster
to the pOOr and the landless serfs. Since the Patent did
not make the allotments of forests mandatory the landlords
often kept them and furnished only the allotted cut wood to
the peasant. Occasionally the peasants were excluded from
the exercise of their woodcutting rights by reasons some—

times valid - sometimes fabricated.94

 

93About 28% of Hungary - not including Transylvania
- was forest, according to Gazdasagi Lapok, June 28, 1855.
It was estimated at 8,437,788 acres; Budapesti Hirlap, July 12,
1857.

 

94Szabo, Parasztsag, I, pp. 128-32. Sources: Hun-
garian National Archives, Papers of the Ministry of Interior,

 

88

The complications that arose out of the efforts of
pasture and forest allotments were further intensified by
the fact that in many localities the clearings in the forests
served as grazing grounds for both serf and manorial live-
stock. Or, the pastures had trees which gave them a "quasi-
forest” classification. Or the serfs wanted to have their
allotments close or adjacent to their holdings which was
nearly impossible because of the scattered nature of their
lands (See Table 2, p. 89)..'Then there were regions where,
because of lack of woodlands,the serfs received their fuel
allotments in reed instead of wood. But part of these
materials also served as thatching for roofs, handicrafts,
and,in the case of wood,as farm implements...a hopeless
task to try to untangle. There was also the problem of
grazing rights on the allodial stubble fields after harvest
time (not to be confused with pasture grazing). How does
one convert these rights into arable land or pastures? Was
it to be the size of his urbarial holdings, or the number
of his cattle or perhaps the extent of his grazing rights?
Since there are no statistics available we do not know. I

In the case of the so-called ”settler villages“
the Patent of 1853 had little effect. It made a distinction

between those communities whose relationships to their

 

1867, Nos. 112, 1136; 1868, Nos. 1880, 4680, 6306, 11469,
12583, 14734, 19165, 23707; 1869, Nos. 1871, 11837; 1864,
No. 1178; and State Archives, Szombathely, Urbarial Court
Files, 1856, Nos. 442, 683; 1857, Nos. 332, 439, and 452.

89

TABLE 2

AVERAGE SIZE AND DISPERSEMENT OF PEASANT LANDS, 1866

 

 

 

 

District giggegfiy Number Of giiieE:
(in acres Parcels (in acres)
Buda 20.2 8.5 2.37
Kassa 26.0 14.8 1.76
Nagyvarad 21.9 7.3 3.01
Pozsony 19.2 19.8 0.97
SOpron 16.3 11.1 1.47
Bénség of Temes 20.4 7.6 2.70
Total Average 20.7 11.5 2.05

 

 

 

 

Adapted from Heinrich Ditz, Die Ungarische Landwirtschaft,
(A Re ort to the Royal Bavarian Ministry of Commerce and
Labor?, (Leipzig: O. Wigand, 1867), pp. 72—73. Hereafter
referred to as Ditz, Landwirtschaft.

 

 

90
landlords were of an urbarial nature but the settler vil-
lages,that were clearly on a provisional contractual basis,
were outside its jurisdiction. Being in the domain of civil
law these villages had to abide by the contracts they peri-
odically signed with the landlord, and it was not until
1871 that Parliament began debate on the matter.

In view of the foregoing it is evident that the na—
ture of the former feudal lands (whether it was classified
allodial or urbarial) determined who became emancipated.
This was an intricately interrelated problem, whose outcome
was vitally important for the former serfs. Equal in im—
portance was the size of the allotments. It was only natural
that both serf and landlord tried to obtain for himself the
bigger and better share. The location of peasant and
allodial lands surrounding the villages played a major part
in how well, or how badly, lord and peasant fared in ob—
taining their choice of lands. Let us examine it.

As a characteristic feature of feudalism, developed
over centuries in Hungary as well as the rest of Europe,
peasant and allodial lands were scattered throughout the
countryside in relatively small isolated plots. The cause
was a variety of factors such as geography of the land, the
system of agriculture, wars, settlement and depopulation,
inheritance, clearing of new lands, relocation and redistri—
bution of lands, barter, etc. In England and in other
Eur0pean countries the consolidation of lands began as

early as the sixteenth century. This process did not develop

91
in Hungary. It was estimated that at the time of emancipa-
tion the serf's tenure was strewn on an average of ten to
sixteen plots.95 The holdings of the lesser nobility were
even more fragmented.96 During the two decades preceding
emancipation,laws were passed to cope with this problem
but the consolidation of lands was not mandatory.97 As a
result we find that by 1850 only 15.1% of those lands on
which statistics are available were consolidated (See
Table 3, p. 92 ).

During the Bach Period the process of land consoli-
dation became an integral part of the emancipation process.
The government established a series of commissions in 1850
whose chief task was to evaluate the fertility of the land,
categorize it, and assign a fee absolute of not less than
three hundred and not more than seven hundred florins per
one whole serf plot. Engineers were sent out to conduct a
cadastral survey of the land. On the basis of these surveys
the commissions set out to consolidate the land. Their

work was augmented by the urbarial courts.98

 

95Ditz, Landwdrtschaft, p. 74. For a statistical
breakdown in the five administrative districts in Hungary
and the Bénség of Temes see Table 2, p. 89.

 

96Istvan Szabo, ed., Agrartbrténeti tanulményok (Studies
in Agrarian History), (Budapest: TankOnyvkiadd, 1960), p. 172.
Hereafter referred to as Szabd, Agrértbrténet.

97Law of 1836, Articles X and XII; Law of 1840,
Articles XXX and XXXI.

98Beksics, Nemzet, p. 446.

92

TABLE 3

LAND SURVEYS AND ADJUSTMENTS, 1850

 

 

Communities in which

 

 

 

 

adjustments
Area Unsurveyed
have been are not yet communities
approved approved

No. % No. % No. %
Right bank of Danube 452 10.2 487 11.0 3,497 78.8
Left bank of Danube 69 2.0 139 4.0 3,270 94.0
Danube—Tisza enclosure 14 1.6 82 9.7 751 88.7
Right bank of Tisza 64 2.1 412 13.6 2,560 84.3
Left bank of Tisza 153 7.6 210 10.4 1,658 82.0
Total 752 5.5 1,330 9.6 11,736 84.9

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Adapted from Gazdaségi Lapok, 1850, pp. 28-29. There
is a numerical discrepancy between Table 3 and Table 4 in
the total number of communities listed. There are several
reasons for this. Table 4 includes only those communities
which were within the five administrative districts of Hun—
gary during the Era of the AbSolutism and were subject to
urbarial settlements. Table 3, on the other hand, encompasses
the total length of the Danube and Tisza rivers, and the
area between them, within historic Hungary; and accounts for
all the communities adjacent to these rivers including the
ones outside the five administrative districts (especially
in the Danube-Tisza enclosure), But even so,a study of
Table 3 reveals that by 1850 land surveys, on which hinged
the settlement of land disputes between former lord and
jobbégy, were only 5.5% completed, 9.6% pending and 84.9%
not even begun.

 

93

We can distinguish three different ways in which con—
solidation was achieved.99 The simplest method was the re-
location of all of the separate parcels of land into one
contiguous area. This was accomplished mainly on the larger
estates of the aristocracy and the wealthier gentry. Another
method aimed at consolidating the land according to the
system of agriculture; that is, the two and three rotational
systems of the day. This way the owner had his arable lands
concentrated in two or three regions within the boundaries
of a community's land area. This system was more widespread
and popular with the lesser nobility and wealthier peasants.
It brought about a drastic reduction of the minute land
parcels making farming more productive. The third method,
devised to help the poor peasants, consisted in distributing
land according to the fertility of the soil, the nature of
agricultural production, and proximity to the village. Thus
a peasant was assigned strips of land in every conceivable
region around his village. While this method somewhat re-
duced fragmentation, one can easily see that a judicious
distirubtion was difficult at best, the peasant resented it,
and the land remained in numerous small plots (See Table
2, p. 89).

The main obstacle to the reforms was the peasantry
itself. Peasant resentment was due to a variety of factors.

First, due to ignorance and plain stupidity they resisted

 

99Emil Simonffy, ”Parasztfold és tagosités" (Peasant
Land and Consolidation), in Szabo, Parasztsag, I, pp. 226—
235.

94
innovations. Secondly, they feared that with Kossuth in
exile the nobility surely would succeed in turning the im-
perial edict to its own advantage. For this reason they did
not even trust the ”Bach Hussars” who were considered par—
tial to the peasant and the prime movers in carrying out
the reforms.

Sadly enough, there was considerable validity in the
peasants' suspicions. The land surveys alone involved a
complicated system of assessment ostensibly devised to in-
sure a fair amount of equity between fertile and poor soil
varieties.100 One needs little imagination to conclude that
acres of land that varied in size (the main feature of the
new cadastral surveys), no mater what the intent was, would
be less than pOpular. The peasant did not understand, nor
believe, that he was intended to be the beneficiary of it

all and feared that he would be cheated by the surveyors.101

 

100The unit of measurement used in determining the
size of an acre was one 61, or 38.43 square feet. The sur-
veyors used three different size acres of 1,100; 1,200; and
1,300 ols, called "estimate acres" (becsholdak). But on
occasion we find a 1,400 61 acre and another 1,588 51 acre,
the latter being called "cadastral acret" Often there are
references to yet another "Hungarian acre" of 1,200 615.
Whenever possible I converted the data used to the Hungarian
acre for clarity's sake.

101Janos Balashézy, A tagosztalyban vald zavarok
tisztéba hozatalérol (On Clearing Up the Confusion Concern—
ing Land Categories), ([Buda]Pest: Trattner-Karolyi, 1857),
pp. 58-60; and Istvan Nagy, A Mezbgazdasag Magyarorszégon az
abszolutizmus koréban, 1849-1867(Agriculture in Hungary
During the Age of Absolutism, 1849—1867), (Budapest, 1944),
pp. 70-73.

 

 

 

95
There were instances where this fear was not without founda-
tion.102 Always prone to believe unfounded rumors over of—
ficial statements (especially when such rumors were in their
favor) the peasants, in at least one instance, hoped that

I

all the noble lands were about to be divided among them with

outside help.103

Whatever the motive, the peasants quite
successfully resisted the relocation and consolidation of
their holdings thereby propagating the inept methods of
agriculture. Even at the beginning of the twentieth century
land fragmentation of peasant farms was so acute as to vir—
tually exclude modern farming methods (See Table 5, p. 101).
Obstructions and shortcomings notwithstanding the
Patent of 1853 remained the basis on which the reforms were
carried out. The lack of data for a number of areas in
Hungary (due to incomplete contemporary statistics and later

ravages of war) makes it nearly impossible to determine the

extent and true nature of serf emancipation in all its

 

1°21n the village of Rada in Zala county the land had

to be re—distributed because the engineers were bribed ac-
cording to Szabd,.Agrértorténet, p. 395. In the village of
Tabajd in Fejér county the peasants lodged a complaint al—
leging that the surveyors not only favored the landlord but
also the wealthier peasants to the detriment of the impover—
ished according to Emil Simonffy "A parasztfold és tagosités"
(Peasant Land and ConsolidationL in Szabd, Parasztsag, I,

234. Simonffy quotes as his source the State Archives,
Székesfehérvar, Urbarial Trial Documents, Tabajd.

 

 

103As late as 1858 there was the fantastic rumor in
Békés county that Kossuth married the sister of the Russian
tsar and would soon return with a Russian army to Hungary
and proceed to distribute the nobles' lands among the peasants
according to SashegyL Mozgalmak, p. 235.

 

96
details. Although the commissions established in 1850 ceased
to function in 1861, the judicial process in the urbarial
courts extended for decades to come. The system of adjudica-
tion, begun in 1856 and reorganized several times, remained
the arbiter even after 1867. Yet, by the end of the absolu—
tistic period not more than half of the courts' dockets
were cleared. Up to 1865 in 3,752 villages, out of a total
of 8,159, settlements were reached. This equaled 47.2% of
the total number of suits before the courts. In 31.9% of
the concluded cases settlement was reached by agreement;
while 15.3% of the cases were settled by adjudication. In
47.8% of the cases there was yet no disposition —- a good
indication of the intensity of peasant—landlord disagreements.
In 3.4% of the villages implementation was not even begun.104

To sum up briefly, the implementation of Hungarian
serf emancipation had both beneficial and harmful effects.
First, the military dictatorship of Austria goaded the
Magyar middle and small nobility into an obstructionist
posture once again, at a time when their c00peration with
the Crown was essential. Secondly, the delays of the cen-
tral government wrought hardships on the peasantry. Thirdly,
the Patent of 1853 ignored a great part of the changes that
occurred in lord—serf relationship in the previous hundred
years. Fourthly, once implementation got under way Vienna

assumed a mildly sympathetic attitude toward the peasant

 

104For a detailed statistical analysis of the process
of urbarial settlements see Table 4, pp. 97-99.

97

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99

TABLE 4-—Continued

 

Adapted from Menyhért Lonyai, "Az urbéri rendezés és
tagositas figyének allasa Magyarorszagon" (The Present Status
of Urbarial Reorganization and Land Consolidation in Hungary),
in Statisztikai és nemzetgazdasagi kozlemények (Statistical
and National Economical Journall I, 1865; and Lajos Ffir,
“Jobbagyfold—Parasztfold" (Serf Land-Peasant Land), in Szabd,
Parasztség, I, pp. 140-143.

Both Far and Lonyay list the counties of Kovér-
vidék, Kozép-szolnok, Krasso, Kraszna, Temes, Torontal, and
Zarénd, which were during the absolutistic period either
under the Bansag of Temes or under Transylvanian adminis-
tration. These counties came under the jurisdiction of the
Hungarian urbarial courts in the early 1860's. Until the
mid 1860's the judicial process was at a near standstill
there. For this reason they are not included.

For clarity's sake I divided Hungary into three re-
gions. This grouping did not alter to any appreciable degree
the statistical picture obtained by a more fractionalized
breakdown of geographical areas, i.e., "Little Plain,"
"Nyirség," "Hajduség," "Kunség," "Bodrogkoz," etc.

 

 

100
which was more than he could have expected from his Magyar
lords. Fifthly, the landed peasant was hopeful of his mak-
ing a go of it as a free landholder —— as indicated by his
fight for land in the courts. Lastly, emancipation created
a confused and apprehensive middle and small nobility who

knew or cared little about free enterprise.

TABLE 5

SIZE AND DISPERSEMENT OF PEASANT FARMS AT THE BEGINNING OF
TWENTIETH CENTURY

101

Number of Farms and Average Number of Parcels

 

 

Size of Property

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1-5 #4 5—10 10-25 25—50 50—100 100-
_ m m m m m m a) to m m m m
Region tum UNI-II—Iu-Immu-IHu-Imow-II-Humow-IHIHmonHHH-Ith—IH
.ogroomoEmomoamomOEmowOEmooOEwOw
H H (J H34 0 L1H o HII 0 H54 0 #4H 0
mum-II-Mm-LIwum-H-mm wH-mm-H -mm-H
om>0!!!Om>omotu>omom>omocu>omocu>om
z IczsaIz HIZCHES :cznhz 4gzanz 2: sizzm
'Great Plain 55 6.0 20 12.4 45 15.5 40 29.2 26 39 2 14 66.9
Little Plain 22 5.8 6 12.2 17 16.9 13 22.6 12 38.9 10 96.9
Trans-Danube 15 10.3 7 30.9 11 29.9 6 38.5 5 55.4 2 322.5
Highlands 11 13.5 8 24.0 7 38.0 4 41.3 1.EKLO 3 31.0
Total 103 8.9 41 19.9 80 25.1 63 32.9 44 63.4 29 122.4
Maximum and Minimum Number of Parcels per Farm
Size of property
1—5 5-10 10—25 25-50 50-100 100-
R . No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of
egion Parcels Parcels Parcels Parcels Parcels Parcels
MaxLMin Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min Max Min
Great Plain 16 2 55 5 65 5 67 5 90 9 201 20
Little Plain 12 1 18 6 30 5 47 6 60 14 337 4
Trans-Danube 26 2 63 11 74 13 51 27 76 43 331 413
Highlands 32 2 68 11 123 12 90 4 120 120 84 4
Total 21.5 1.8 51 8.3 73 8.8 63.8 10.5 86.5 465 238 85.5

 

 

 

Adapted from Emil Simonffy,
(Peasant Land and Consolidation), in Szabd, Parasztsag, I, pp.

260-262.

"A parasztfold és tagositas"

 

Simonffy used several sources as the basis of these sta—

tistics.

He points out that it is possible that these sources

did not alwasy use as an example the most characteristic farms
for a region although they attempted to do so.
son and because of the highly selective nature of his data
extreme caution must be used in interpreting these figures.
(Only 360 farms were used for the 50 counties of Hungary; 7.2
farms per county.)

For this rea-

CHAPTER V

BALANCE SHEET AND CONCLUSIONS

In view of the foregoing, one cannot help but wonder
what happened to the members of the Opposition of the late
1840's. Where did all the liberal Hungarian nobles go?
Certainly not all of them went into exile following the col—
lapse of the Revolution. Yet it seems that the landlords
who contested the former serf's right to the land before
the urbarial courts had little, if any, liberal traits left.
They seemed archreactionary with little or no understand-
ing of what the system of "laissez-faire" meant or how it
worked. Judging from the evidence in Chapter IV we can
assuredly conclude that it was a blessing in disguise that
the emancipation of the serfs was carried out by aliens
rather than Hungarians. It is impossible to conclude that
the blame lies wholly with Vienna.

If the Jacobinism of the Revolutionary Government
was anything more than the will of a handful of radicals
then the majority of the nobility would have manifested it
in court, where the nature of emancipation was decided, and
would have tried to help the peasants to more land instead
of taking it away from them.

Along with its traditional resistance to change, the

nobility in general knew little about modern agriculture.

102

103
How unprepared they were for competitive farming at the mid—
dle of the nineteenth century can be established readily:
Hungarian society is not yet (1908) conscious of the
fact that a successful carrying on of farming demands
a special professional training: hence the overwhelm-
ing majority of the owners of "intermediate" (100—1,000
acres) and "large" (over 1,000 acres) landed properties
do not attend agricultural colleges, but for the most
part are content to obtain the legal qualifications of-
fered by universities and colleges of law.105
At the time of emancipation there were only two agricultural
schools in all of Hungary. The one at Keszthely graduated
1,444 students between 1797 and 1848 who, for the most part,
found employment on the numerous estates of the school's
founder, Count Gyorgy Festetich.106 The other school at
Magyarovar graduated 1,534 students between 1818 and 1855,
the majority of which were employed on the estates of the
aristocracy and wealthier middle nobility.1°7
Due to inept agriculture and the inefficient feudal
system, the debt on noble land reached staggering propor—
tions by 1848.108 There were no credit facilities and the

burning of 70,000,000 florins of the revolutionary paper

money of 1848—49 (called Kossuth banko) by Bach caused the

 

105Julius de Vargha, Hungary, (Budapest: Athenaeum,
1908), p. 43.

106Jerome Blum, "Noble Landowners and Agriculture in
Austria, 1815—1848," John Hopkins University Studies in His-
torical and Political Science, Series LXV, No. 2, (Balti-
more: John Hopkins Press, 1948), p. 128.

 

107Homan and Szekffi, Tbrténet, VI P- 517-

108See Page 42.

104

demise of many noble families.109

To a limited extent the nobility's financial crisis
was Vienna's doing because not only were the "Kossuth bankos"
burned, but the state—assumed redemption payments for the
urbarial lands were not forthcoming either.110 Indeed, re-
demption payments by the state continued to trickle down
until the turn of the century. The final sum, 424,216,524
florins, was substantial;111 but due to the delays it was
of little consequence--especially when we consider that
the total value of urbarial lands by that time was estimated
at 700,000,000 florins.112

Despite increased tax revenues, centralized absolutism
was wrought with financial problems throughout its duration.
In 1848 direct (military) taxes, not including Transylvania,
amounted to 4,280,000 florins while indirect taxes were
5,300,000 florins. Due to the introduction of universal
taxation, by 1850 these taxes increased to 13,800,000 and

25,500,000 florins respectively (an increase of more than

 

109Koséry, History, p. 254. In 1867 there was only
one land bank; Grétz, Dualizmus, I, p. 259.

 

110A royal decree in 1850 ordered an advance payment
of 6,700,000 florins on the urbarial lands but due to a com-
plicated bureaucratic procedure and "loyality tests" only
3,000,000 florins were actually paid by 1852. Only in 1857
were the loyality tests terminated and payments begun in
earnest.

111Beksics, Nemzet, p. 450. This figure does not in—
clude Transylvania. There is an error in addition in Beksics'
final sum.

112Homan and Szekffi, Torténet, V, p. 447.

105

fourfold); while by 1857 taxes increased eleven fold:
41,500,000 florins in direct taxes and 65,600,000 florins
in indirect taxes.113 Yet by 1859 the state had a yearly
deficit of 238,000,000 florins with the public debt at a
staggering 230,060,000,000 florins'.114

The peasants' condition was a direct result of
Vienna's unsound fiscal policy. The increased tax burden
wrought a much greater hardship on the former serf than on
his former landlord mainly because of the small size of his
farm. In addition to taxes, he had to pay the redemption
fees on his allodial lands awarded him by the courts. Soc-
age dues had to be met also until redemption was paid. Even
so, the government seemed content to collect taxes and do
almost nothing to help the fledgling peasant farms become
productive and financially solvent. Cooperatives and cred—
it facilities were not introduced until after 1867.115

The peasant was at least as ignorant of efficient
agriculture as his former lord. An investigation in 1910
showed that on the Great Plain, the "bread basket“ of Hun—
gary, farmers did not bother to stock supplies for lean years.

When drought caused crop failures there was famine while an

 

113Homan and Szekffi, Torténet, V, p. 447.
114Kosary, History, pp. 276-77.

115Kosary, History, p. 254.

106
abundant harvest called for senseless waste and a life of
opulence.116

Since the Second World War Hungarian historiography
began a series of studies on the problem of whether the
urbarial serfs actually were awarded more than their urbarial
lands. In Chapter IV, based on this evidence, we saw how
tenaciously the serfs contested their former lords for the
possession of allodial lands. Still we have no way to de-
termine the exact size of peasant farms. Not only did they
vary in size by region, but the haphazard and inaccurate
cadastral surveys of the 1850's give us a distorted picture.
Contemporary statistics (such as Fényes Leiras) based their
figures on these surveys and on the incomplete censuses
which were begun in 1857. We can estimate, however, that
on a national average, a serf received between sixteen and
twenty acres of urbarial land.117 This was hardly enough
for efficient capitalistic production, but even so only 40%
of the serfs had land; the rest were cotters who either had
no land at all or their holdings were so minute that they

could not subsist on it.118

 

115Bermrud H. Lederer, Agrarstatistische Beitrage und
Studien zur alfolder Landarbeiterfrage, (Doctoral disserta-
tion), Halle, 1910.

 

 

117Istvan Orosz, "Differencialodas és kisajétités"
(Differentiation and Expropriation), in Szabo, Parasztség,
II, p. 76, estimates the size of peasant farms at sixteen
acres. Compare with Table 2, p. 89.

 

118550,000 of the serfs had urbarial serf plots; of
these 17,000 had more than one; 93,000 had between one—half
and one; and 434,000 had less than one-half, according to

107

What exmxgpmtkn of a peasant's hokfings consisted of

allodial lands (cleared, remainder, forest, etc.) probably
will remain a mystery to us. It seems that the urbarial
courts awarded all the remainder and approximately one—
third to one—half of other types of lands, depending on how
much the peasant claimed. Basing our calculations on the
fact that these plots were often equal to or in excess of
the size of the serf's urbarial holdings, we can say with
some assurance that he probably received between four and
ten acres additional land.

The first complete statistical survey of arable land
distribution was made by the government in 1895. Even this
statistic left out those farms engaged exclusively in for—
estry and grazing. According to it, 53% of the 2,388,000
peasant homesteads had less then seven acres of land which
was even then insufficient in supporting a family's live—
lihood. They had to live on 5.7% of all arable lands.119
But even the larger peasant farms were incapable of achiev—
ing a competitive degree of efficiency because of fragmenta—

tion (See Table 5, FL 101).

 

Homan and Szekffi, T5rténet, V, p. 537. In addition, in 1847
there were 911,744 cotter heads of households, or 59.5% of
all serfs, according to Fényes, Leirés, II, p. 46.

119Homan and Szekffi, TOrténet, V, pp. 537-38; the
2,388,000 homesteads were on 45,000,000 acres. Out of these
there were 562,000 with less than one acre; 716,000 with 1
to 7 acres; 458,000 with 7-14 acres; 385,000 with 14—26 acres;
and 205,000 with 26-66 acres.

108

The efficiency of a western capitalistic economy that
the reformers of the 1830's and 1840's dreamed of did not
materialize. The large estates that could have produced
and competed most successfully were, in the majority of
cases, mismanaged while the peasant farms were inefficient
because they were small. The cotters became seasonal agri—
cultural workers for whom work was difficult to find.
Moreover, the industrial backwardness of Hungary prevented
these poorest of the poor to find employment in the cities
as they did in the West, and other provinces of Austria.

Even so, the emancipation of the serfs in Hungary
was more progressive, almost radical, compared to other
Eastern European states, because it abolished the personal
relationship between serf and lord and the age old distinc—
tions between noble, urbarial and rented lands, which the
Russian or Rumanian emancipation failed to accomplish.120

Yet the vestiges of feudalism lingered on. The no-
bility retained political control. After 1867 even the old
county system was restored. In Parliament urgent farm legis—
lation was repeatedly defeated. The reform from the top
down fizzled out into a procession of government half—measures,
endless court proceedings, and a forest of legal technicali-

ties.

 

120Emil Niederhauser, A Jobbagyfelszabadités Kelet-
EurOpaban (The Emancipation of the Serfs in Eastern EurOpe),
(Budapest: Akademiai kiado, 1962), p. 302. Also see Corpus
juris, Law of 1871, Article LIII.

 

 

GLOSSARY

Alispan County official. A rough equivalent to the

the Sheriff of a shire in England. Ap—
pointed by the f6iSpan. The administrative head of a county.
His influence in county administration depended on the
foiSpan.

Belsoségek Small tracts of land, less than one acre,

adjacent to a serf's cottage. Usually not
considered part of the urbarial lands held by the serf. In
most cases the serf had to redeem them without state support.
Some vineyards came under this heading too.

 

Biro (falusi) Village mayor and justice of the peace.

Elective office. Elected by the peasants
of a community; usually a prosperous serf or peasant. Nom—
inations influenced at times by the local landlord. Ap-
pointed by the central government during the absolutistic
period.

FOiSEén A rough English equivalent to the Lord
Lieutenant of a shire. Head of the county.

Appointed by the Crown. Office of varying importance, often

became hereditary, held exclusively by the aristocracy.

Foszolgabirdr An EngliSh equivalent to the Chief Con-

stable of a shire. Elective office by the
county electorate. Head of several administrative districts
in a county. A subordinate of the alispan.

 

Irtvany Cleared land. Lands serfs made arable by
clearing of brush, forest and drainage of

marshes. Such lands often exceeded in size the serf's ur—

barial holdings. Subject of bitter controversy during, and

often after, the absolutistic period. The landlord claimed
them as allodial lands, the serf insisted on their urbarial
nature.

Jobbagy Serf. One who holds urbarial land. Also
used as an all-inclusive term meaning all
the serfs. After emancipation the word becomes obsolete.

Jobbagytelek Serf's plot (urbarial). Held in perpetuity
(urbéres) by the serf. The urbarial part of the lord's
land. Size varied by region. Roughly be—
tween twenty and sixty acres. Often only a fraction of a
whole plot was held by a serf, seldom he had more than one
plot.

109

110

 

 

Majorségi, The allodial part of the lord's lands.

curialis fold Retained by him after emancipation. In-
cluded lands that were in communal use be—

fore emancipation, such as pastures and forests. The small

plots of the moccasin nobilityVfire considered allodial too
regardless of their size.

Maradvényfbld Remainder lands. 1. Lands that were left

out of the urbarial registers because the
serfs, in order to evade taxes, did not have them registered.
2. Lands vacated at the death of a serf on which the land—
lord failed to settle another peasant family. 3. 'Lands
vacated because of war; especially numerous in the former
Turkish occupied areas of the Great Plain.

 

Paraszt Peasant. A non-noble engaged in agriculture.

A term used concurrently with that of serf.
After emancipation the only word used to describe former
serfs and former free peasants as well.

Robot Statute labor required of all serfs. The

number of days per year a serf worked on
the allodial portion of the lord's lands in exchange for
the use of the urbarial portion. The serf furnished his
own draft animals or worked double the number of required
days.

Szolgabiro A rough equivalent to the Sheriff of an
English shire. Not the same as the
alispan. Elective office by the county electorate. Head
of an administrative district in a county. “Quite indepen—
dent jurisdiction with broad juridical and administrative
powers. A subordinate to a limited degree of the fbszol-
gabiro. The’domain of the gentry or middle nobility.

 

Zsellér Cotter. The most numerous of the serfs.

1. Serf who holds no more than 1/8 urbar-
ial plot. 2. Serf who has no urbarial lands but may have
cleared lands. 3. Serf who has a cottage and some “inner
lands." 4. Serf who has no cottage or land.

Zsellértelek Cotter's plot. Less than 1/8 of urbarial
land with no lower limit. In cases the
cotter had as little as 1/32 and even 1/64 of a serf plot.

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Documents

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Unpublished Material

Lederer, Bernhard H. "Agrarstatistische Beitrage und
Studien zur alfolder Landarbeiterfrage." Halle,
1910. Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University
of Michigan, Ann Arbor.

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