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THE FOREIGN POLICY OF  
THEODORE ROOSEVELT.  
1901-1909

THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF M. A.  
La Dore Irland  
1930





**"The Foreign Policy of Theodore Roosevelt, 1901 - 1909"**

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**-1930-**

**Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of Master of  
Arts in the Graduate School of Michigan  
State College of Agriculture and Applied  
Science.**

**Approved for the Department of History  
and Political Science:**

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.....*May 30, 1930*.....

### **Acknowledgment**

**The writer wishes to acknowledge her extreme indebtedness to Professor E. B. Lyon under whose direction this study has been made. He offered constructive criticism and gave much invaluable advice besides placing his personal library at her disposal.**

**-OUTLINE-**

**I. Introduction.**

- A. Purpose of this study.**
- B. The United States a world power after 1900.**
- C. Chief features of American foreign policy during the McKinley Administration under Secretary of State John Hay.**
- D. The Rooseveltian Period.**
  - 1. Under John Hay as Secretary of State.**
  - 2. Roosevelt as his own Secretary of State.**
  - 3. Under Elihu Root as Secretary of State.**

**II. The Three Aspects of American Foreign Affairs during the Roosevelt Period.**

**a. The American Aspect.**

- 1. The Panama Canal Diplomacy.**
  - a. Early treaties.**
    - 1. Treaty with New Granada, 1846.**
    - 2. Clayton - Bulwer Treaty, 1850.**
  - b. The Hay - Pauncefote Negotiations and Treaty, 1901.**
  - c. The Canal Act of June 28, 1902.**
  - d. Purchase of the French Canal Company's rights.**
  - e. The Hay - Herran Treaty, 1903.**
    - 1. Provisions.**
    - 2. Rejection by Colombia.**
  - f. The Panama Revolution, 1903.**
    - 1. Nature of it.**
    - 2. United States' part in the episode.**
    - 3. Recognition of the Republic of Panama.**
  - g. The Hay - Bunau - Varilla Treaty, 1903.**

- h. The Canal Zone Act of April 28, 1904.
- i. The influence of Canal ownership on other foreign relations.
- 2. The Venezuela Affair, 1901-1905.
  - a. European claims against Venezuela.
  - b. Roosevelt's message - the limits of the Monroe Doctrine.
  - c. The Drago Doctrine.
  - d. Blockade of Venezuela by the European states.
  - e. Diplomatic intervention of the European states -----  
Roosevelt and the German Kaiser.
  - f. Submission to the Hague Tribunal, 1903.
- 3. The Santo Domingo Episode of 1904.
  - a. Santo Domingo's debt.
  - b. Roosevelt's message of December 6 - "international police  
power".
  - c. Dominican Protocol, February 4, 1905.
    - 1. Senate's opposition.
    - 2. "Modus vivendi".
  - d. Ratification of the revised treaty by the Senate,  
February 25, 1907.
- 4. Cuba.
  - a. American occupation of Cuba after the War of 1898.
  - b. The Platt Amendment of 1901.
  - c. Recognition of the Cuban Republic, 1902.
  - d. The Reciprocity Treaty.
  - e. Insurrection of 1906 - the American provisional govern-  
ment.
- 5. Dispute with Mexico over the "Pious Fund of the Californias".
  - a. Origin and nature of the "Fund".



- b. Character of the dispute with Mexico.
- c. Submission to the Hague Tribunal and the settlement of it.
- 6. The Panama Congresses and the Arbitration Treaty.
  - a. Congress of 1901 at Mexico City.
  - b. Arbitration Treaty.
  - c. Congress of 1906 at Rio de Janeiro.
- 7. The Alaskan Boundary Dispute.
  - a. Nature of it.
  - b. Arbitration treaties.
- 8. The Bryce - Root Treaty on North Atlantic Coast Fisheries,  
January 27, 1909.

**B. The European Aspect.**

- 1. The Hague Conference, 1907.
  - a. Circumstances giving rise to it.
  - b. Roosevelt's connection with it.
  - c. The "Fourteen Conventions".
- 2. The Algeiras Conference, 1906.
  - a. Nature of the Moroccan Crisis.
  - b. Roosevelt's share in the conference.

**C. The Oriental Aspect.**

- 1. The Japanese - Russian War, 1904 - 1905.
  - a. The war situation.
  - b. Roosevelt and Mediation.
  - c. Peace of Portsmouth.
- 2. The "Gentlemen's Agreement" with Japan, 1907.
  - a. Japanese difficulties in California.
  - b. Compromise Immigrant Act of 1907.
  - c. Roosevelt's solution.
- 3. Cruise of the American Fleet in the Pacific.

**III, Analysis and Conclusions.**

## I

One of the traditions of American History is that the United States has no foreign policy; or to put the statement in a milder form, that there is no continuity in American foreign policy. This is a wrong notion for which historians are probably much to blame inasmuch as they have persisted in writing American history largely from the standpoint of isolated and unrelated events rather than from the view point of ideas, policies, or movements. It is probably true that the United States has placed less emphasis upon basic principles of policy than some European powers, but the real difference resides in the relative stress rather than an absence of policy. In fact there are few nations which have held more tenaciously to a line of policy than the United States has held to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.

Even in a democratic state while a reversal of public policy in domestic questions is quite possible and even likely; yet to make a radical change in the direction of foreign affairs is most frequently impossible. One of the basic principles of international law is that the obligations assumed by one administration or government are binding upon its successors. In United States every incoming administration, whether Republican or Democratic, finds itself bound to follow the program of its predecessors to a considerable extent. Probably this is truer in all routine matters and on matters of continued national concern. When new developments arise the administration is forced to deal with them largely in the light of existing precedents, obligations, and commitments. National interests change slowly and foreign policies coming out of them naturally indicate only a gradual modification. The Roosevelt administration, coming at a period when our political and economic interests had reached for new objectives, made possible by an imperialistic program,

was bound to modify and add to our foreign policy in order to meet the new demands and changing conditions at home and abroad. In the analysis of the foreign affairs during the Roosevelt period it is the purpose of this thesis to show which of the older principles of American foreign policy were continued or modified, as well as to indicate the new principles brought forth or precedents established.

"We have no choice, we people of the United States, as to whether we shall play a great part in the affairs of the world. They have been decided for us by fate, by the march of events"<sup>1</sup>.

At the beginning of the twentieth century the United States found itself on the verge of becoming a world power. Several factors had brought us to this favorable position. We had just successfully concluded a war with Spain which had added greatly to our prestige. Our recently acquired colonial possessions because of their wide geographical distribution, had made the peoples of America and Europe alive to the fact that we were no longer an isolated nation. Our rapid industrial expansion had resulted in our invading of world markets; so that the name "Standard Oil" was almost as well known in China as in the United States, while many a European house wife used an American made sewing machine; and the clatter of the harvesting machines on our western plains was echoed in far off Argentine.

Roosevelt as President "inherited two great secretaries and a group of well established principles to which he gave consistent support"<sup>2</sup>. Secretary of State Hay and Secretary of War Root were in office during the McKinley administration and remained in office to carry out their policies after Roosevelt's succession. The new imperialistic policy of the United States was actively inaugurated when in the first few weeks of Hay's term as Sec-

1. C. Seymour, "Woodrow Wilson and the World War", p. 34.

2. F. L. Paxson, "Recent History of United States", p. 285.

retary of State the decision was made to retain the Philippines. The "Open Door" policy which had been established in China after the Boxer Rebellion was instituted largely as a result of Secretary Hay's influence. Negotiations toward abrogating the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty had been conducted by Secretary Hay and Lord Pauncefote, but had not been successfully concluded because of adverse action by the United States Senate. Arbitration as a means of settling national disputes had been advocated at the First Hague Conference in 1899.

John Hay was Secretary of State from September 1898 to June 1905. "His knowledge of international law, of historic tendencies, and of men was unsurpassed in his day". Under McKinley he was allowed every freedom in handling his department, and under Roosevelt the general policy remained Hay's although Roosevelt's vigorous personality asserted itself on certain questions - particularly in the Panama affair. Here the President directed and Hay obeyed. The Alaskan boundary settlement was also Roosevelt's contribution, for Hay could not possibly have assumed "so high a tone toward his beloved England."

As Secretary Hay's health began to fail the President began to enjoy his own grip on international affairs so that the foreign policy of the United States became a more personal one.

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3. Ibid, p. 282

4. B. H. Williams, "Economic Foreign Policy of United States" p. 315.

5. F. L. Paxson, "Recent History of United States" p. 283

6. D. S. Mussey, "The United States of America" Vol. II p. 337.

7. C. R. Fish, "American Diplomacy" p. 429

8. L. M. Sears, "A History of American Foreign Relations" p. 462.

9. Ibid, p. 477

10. A. L. P. Dennis, "Adventures In American Diplomacy" p. 361.

Elihu Root succeeded John Hay in 1905 and served until January 1909.

In general he did much to further the interests of international peace.

He conducted the Department of State so well that many competent authorities regard him as the ablest of all the Secretaries of that Department. Roose-

velt said of him, "Root is the greatest intellectual force in American public life since Lincoln".<sup>11</sup>

II

American Aspect

Roosevelt regarded the construction of the Panama Canal as one of his greatest accomplishments as President of United States.<sup>12</sup> Its influence on the later foreign policy of Roosevelt and his successors gives it a place of prime importance in any consideration of foreign policy.

Roosevelt's interest in such a canal began before the Spanish-American War and was shown in a letter to Senator Lodge written on October 27, 1894:

"I do wish our Republicans would go in avowedly to annex Hawaii and build an oceanic canal."<sup>13</sup> Always having had an interest in the navy, the voyage that the "Oregon" had to make around the Horn during the Spanish American War in order to be available for service brought to him a deeper realization of the need for a canal.

The idea of a canal across Panama was not new at this time. American interests had constructed a rail road across the Isthmus of Panama at the time of the California gold rush and a canal was discussed at that time. In 1846 United States induced New Granada, Panama being a part of that country, to make a treaty granting free right of way across the Isthmus in return for which, "the United States would guarantee . . . . the perfect neutrality of the Isthmus, with a view that the free transit from the one to the other sea, may not be interrupted or embarrassed at any future time while the treaty exists".<sup>14</sup>

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11. W. R. Thayer, "Theodore Roosevelt", p. 514.  
 12. J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and His Time", Vol. I, p. 270, also cf. T. Roosevelt, "Autobiography", p. 512.  
 13. H. G. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean", p. 51.  
 14. R. G. Adams, "A History of the Foreign Policy of United States", p. 204.

This was interpreted as giving United States the right to intervene for the protection of an American Railroad or canal built either by the United States Government or by her citizens.

England also was interested, and succeeded in negotiating the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, in which Great Britain and the United States "promised never to obtain or maintain any exclusive control over the proposed Nicaragua canal; they would neither erect fortifications commanding the canal, nor occupy, colonize, or exercise dominion over any part of Central America; the two powers agreed to guard the safety and neutrality of the canal and to invite other nations to join them in doing the same; they promised to support any company that would construct the canal in accordance with the spirit of the convention; and finally, in order to establish a general principle, they agreed to extend their protection to any other practicable communication, whether by canal or railway across the isthmus, and particularly to the proposed interoceanic communication through Panama".<sup>15</sup>

The Civil War distracted attention from any canal project and later, because of transcontinental railroads, less need was felt for a canal.

DeLesseps, who had built the Suez Canal, thought to repeat his triumph in Panama. In 1883 a French company began to dig the canal under the direction of Philippe Bunau-Varilla. As a result of the climatic conditions and of gross mismanagement in the company the work was never finished.

The "Oregon" experience and the new possessions in the Pacific having once more awakened our interest in a canal, negotiations were started by the Secretary of State John Hay to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Public opinion favored a canal built, owned, and protected by the United States - a program which this treaty forbade. The Senate refused to accept the first Hay-Pauncefote treaty negotiated in 1900 unless three amendments were added. Great Britain objected to the amendments and the matter was dropped.

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In April 1901 negotiations were renewed and Roosevelt, after becoming President that year, took a keen interest in them. Great Britain's friendly attitude toward United States in the Spanish American War, her own rather isolated position in Europe at the beginning of the Boer War in Africa, and the fact that John Hay who had so recently and acceptably served at the Court of St. James was now Secretary of State, all combined to facilitate the revision of the treaty. The second Hay-Pauncefote treaty, ratified by the Senate on December 16, 1901, provided for a canal, "by whatever route may be expedient", to be constructed by the United States who was to have "exclusive right to provide for regulation and management of the canal".<sup>16</sup>

The Walker Commission had been appointed by the Senate on March 3, 1899, to investigate routes for the proposed canal. Two days before the Hay-Pauncefote treaty was signed the Commission reported in favor of a Nicaraguan route stating the belief that it would be cheaper, since the French holdings in Panama had been estimated at forty million dollars by the Commission, while the French had asked \$109,141,500 for them.<sup>17</sup> The Hepburn Bill, January 20, 1902, providing for the Nicaraguan route passed the House almost unanimously. Whereupon the French company offered to sell for forty millions of dollars rather than lose the sale of their holdings. As a result of this offer the Commission filed a supplementary report favoring the Panama route.<sup>18</sup> Senator Spooner of Wisconsin added an amendment to the Hepburn Bill "authorizing the President to purchase the rights and property of the Panama for not more than forty millions of dollars and to secure the necessary rights from Colombia (formerly part of New Granada) for the construction of the canal, with the provision that, if a satisfactory arrangement could not be made with both the French company and Colombia within a reasonable time, he should proceed with the construction of the Nicaraguan route".<sup>19</sup> Bunau-Varilla who was vitally interested in the choosing

16. A. L. P. Dennis, "Adventures In American Diplomacy", p. 164.

17. Ibid, p. 311

18. J. H. Latane, "American Foreign Policy", p. 550.

19. G. H. Stuart, "Latin America and United States", p. 91.

of the route is said to have persuaded Senator Spooner to amend the bill and  
 20  
 then to have won over Marcus Hanna and the President to his cause.

Secretary Hay next negotiated with Colombia in 1903 the Hay-Harran treaty. By the provisions of this treaty Colombia was to receive ten millions of dollars outright and two hundred fifty thousand dollars a year rental from the right of way. The Colombian Senate refused to ratify this treaty. Roosevelt believed they were waiting for their agreement with the French Company to lapse in order  
 21  
 that they might collect the extra forty million. As a consequence of their refusal there seemed to be nothing to do but use the Nicaragua route. Hay, how-  
 22  
 ever, advised inactivity for a few weeks.

Immediately on the refusal of the Colombian Senate to ratify the treaty plans for an insurrection in Panama began. The chief instigators were W. N. Cromwell of New York who was attorney for the New Panama Canal Company; Philip Bunau-Varilla; and Dr. Amador, who afterwards became the first President of the  
 23  
 Republic of Panama.

In the meantime Bunau-Varilla in New York and in Paris discussed the duties and rights of the United States in Panama under the 1846 treaty if an insurrection should break out. He borrowed money in Paris to promote a revolution  
 24  
 in Panama and with Dr. Amador plotted the outbreak. Revolutions were not uncommon in Panama: there had been fifty-three revolutions or near revolutions in fifty-  
 25  
 three years. In the United States, when it was rumored in August of 1903 that Panama was about to revolt, no action was taken.

20. R. G. Adams, "A History of the Foreign Policy of the United States," p. 287

21. T. Roosevelt, "Autobiography", p. 565.

22. H. C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean", p. 57.

23. Ibid, p. 55.

24. A. L. P. Dennis, "Adventures in American Diplomacy", p. 327.

25. R. G. Adams, "A History of the Foreign Policy of United States", p. 288.



On October 10, 1903, President Roosevelt wrote to Dr. Albert Shaw, editor of the "Review of Reviews": "I enclose you, purely for your own information, a copy of a letter of September 5 from our minister to Colombia. I think it might interest you to see that there was absolutely not the slightest chance of securing by treaty any more than we endeavored to secure. The alternatives were to go to Nicaragua . . . . or else take the territory by force without any attempt at getting a treaty. I cast aside the proposition made at this time to prevent the secession of Panama. Whatever other governments can do the United States cannot go into securing by such underhand means the secession. Privately, I freely say to you that I should be delighted if Panama were an independent state; or if it made itself so at this moment; but for me to say so publicly would amount to an instigation of a revolt and therefore I cannot say it".

The revolution occurred November 3, 1903, in Panama City. Colombian officials were bribed or arrested; and by six o'clock at night the revolution was over as far as the city of Panama was concerned. Dr. Amador sent this telegram to Secretary Hay: "Isthmus independence proclaimed without bloodshed. Canal treaty saved".<sup>27</sup> Another telegram from Ehrman, Consul General at Panama, to Secretary Hay on November 3 stated, that the uprising in Panama began at six o'clock in the morning and a provisional government would be organized that night.<sup>28</sup>

On the next day the United States landed troops at Colon and they prevented Colombian military forces from landing and squelching the revolution. The reason given for this intervention was, that fighting would endanger the railroad, therefore the United States had a right and a duty to protect it by the Treaty of 1846.<sup>29</sup> The revolution was thus peacefully and quickly carried out.

26. J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and His Time", Vol. I, p. 279.

27. A. L. P. Dennis, "Adventures in American Diplomacy", p. 331.

28. 58 Cong. 1st Sess. House Docs. I, No. 8 part 1 and 2.

29. J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and His time", Vol. I, p. 282.

Mr. Hay telegraphed to Mr. Ehrman on November 6, 1903: "The people of Panama have, by an apparently unanimous movement, dissolved their political connection with the Republic of Colombia and resumed their independence. When you are satisfied that a de facto government, republican in form, and without substantial opposition from its own people, has been established in the State of Panama, you will enter into relations with it as the responsible government of the territory and look to it for all due action to protect the persons and property of citizens of the United States and to keep open the isthmian transit in accordance with the obligations of existing treaties governing the relation of the United States to that territory".

Dr. Amador as President of the Republic of Panama next appointed Bunau-Varilla as Minister to Washington. Roosevelt recognized the new Republic within a week of its revolt. This quick recognition of a new republic was contrary to all precedent in our history.

A treaty was drawn up and signed by Secretary Hay and Bunau-Varilla on November 18, 1903. It provided for the grant of a zone ten miles wide across Panama for which ten million of dollars was to be paid and an annual rental of two hundred fifty thousand dollars beginning nine years later. The Senate ratified the treaty on February 23, 1904.

On April 23, 1904, an act was passed authorizing the President, upon acquisition of the property of the New Panama Canal Company and the payment of ten millions of dollars to Panama, to take possession of land granted by the treaty. This land should be called the Canal Zone and should be temporarily governed by the President or by person or persons appointed by him.

30. J. D. Richardson, "Messages and Papers of the Presidents", Vol. X, p. 556.

31. R. G. Adams, "A History of Foreign Policy of United States", p. 208

32. J. H. Latane, "American Foreign Policy", p. 536.

33. "United States Statutes at Large", 58 Cong. Vol. 33, Part I, No. 190.

The Panama Canal has changed the entire foreign policy of the United States in the Caribbean. The control of the Caribbean became a matter of national defense. From now on no foreign power should be allowed to gain a foothold near the Canal; hence the later interest of United States in the foreign debts of Venezuela and Santa Domingo. During the World War period it was imperative that Germany be prevented from gaining possession of the Danish West Indies for a naval base; therefore the United States purchased them in 1917 in order to protect the Canal. This new foreign policy involved new relations with the Latin American countries and brought forth serious questions to be settled with them. Its effects were far reaching in distance and in time.

The undeveloped Republic of Venezuela attracted foreign capital because of its rich natural resources. The government was not stable; one revolution succeeded another, until Cipriano Castro made himself virtual dictator in the year of 1899. As a result of this unsettled condition neither interest nor principal could be paid on the foreign debt. Much damage had been done to the property of aliens during the civil wars and demands for settlement were being made. The German demands included payment of back dividends on a railroad built with German capital, interest on the government bonds, and reparations to German civilians for damages incurred during the civil wars. England and Italy had similar grievances. Finally England and Germany agreed to unite in order to coerce Venezuela by means of a blockade. United States was interested in the situation because of our most cherished foreign policy as expressed in the Monroe Doctrine. At first President Roosevelt thought that the United States would not be involved in the quarrel. His message to Congress on De-

34. J. K. Latane, "American Foreign Policy", p. 557.

35. H. C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean", p. 108.

36. H. C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean", p. 109.

ember 5, 1901, stated: "This doctrine (Monroe) has nothing to do with the commercial relations of any American power, save that it in truth allows each of them to form such as it desires. In other words, it is really a guarantee of the commercial independence of the Americas. We do not ask under this doctrine for any exclusive commercial dealings with any other American state. We do not guarantee any state against punishment if it misconducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power".<sup>37</sup>

The Venezuelan dispute made prominent the theories of two South Americans on debt collection. Calvo, an Argentine jurist, advocated that a state had no right to make the pecuniary claims of its citizens, against another state, the subject of public action. Luis Drago, the Argentine minister of foreign affairs, adopted this theory with modifications. He presented to United States the view that, "the public debt cannot occasion armed intervention nor even the actual occupation of the territory of American nations by a European power."<sup>38</sup> This was not recognized as established international law and could not be enforced.

On December 29, 1902, a regular blockade was established by England and Germany. Even before this action was taken four Venezuelan gunboats had been seized and several ports had been blockaded.<sup>39</sup>

On December 11, 1902, Venezuela had made a formal request for arbitration which had been transmitted to England and Germany by the United States. Germany at first refused to agree to arbitration, while in England the whole affair seemed to be unpopular. In the United States a decided anti-German feeling, which

37. I. H. Latane, "American Foreign Policy", p. 490.

38. C. R. Fish, "American Diplomacy", p. 446.

39. H. C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean", p. 117, 119.

40. A. L. P. Dennis, "Adventures in American Diplomacy", p. 287.

41. Ibid, p. 288.

was likely to affect German business, was being aroused. When this situation became evident the countries agreed to arbitrate. President Roosevelt was suggested as arbitrator by Germany but he declined in favor of the Hague Tribunal. The blockade was continued until February 14, 1903.

As to President Roosevelt's part in the affair authorities differ. The only sources of material are identical letters sent by Roosevelt to Reid, White, and Thayer. There are no official papers or letters in regard to the affair. As with so many other affairs the President seems to have handled it as a private matter. "When Germany declined to arbitrate the question at issue between her and Venezuela, and declined to say she would not take possession of Venezuelan territory . . . . I took action accordingly."

The American naval fleet was assembled near Porto Rico ready to sail at an hour's notice. Ambassador Von Holleben was notified that if Germany did not agree to arbitrate in a specified number of days Admiral Dewey would be ordered to Venezuela. A few days later when no answer had been received Roosevelt told Von Holleben that Dewey would be ordered to sail sooner than the original time set. Then the Kaiser consented to arbitrate and asked President Roosevelt to undertake the arbitration. In the letters previously mentioned Roosevelt took all of the credit for this decision and ignored the great pressure brought to bear on Germany by England and by commercial and financial interests in Germany itself.

The Hague Tribunal heard the case, and in February of 1904 the final allotments of all claims were made, whereby Venezuela agreed to set aside thirty per cent of her customs receipts for the satisfaction of the claims.

The same principle of debt collection was involved in the Santo Domingo episode. Successive revolutionary governments had contracted a large foreign debt by the year of 1904. The money had been used for developing the natural

43. J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and His Time", Vol. II, p. 222.

44. Ibid, Vol. II, p. 224.

45. D. S. Mussey, "The United States of America", Vol. II, p. 392.

resources, the building of railroads, the conducting of civil war, and for gratifying the desires of numerous presidents. By 1904 the public debt was over, thirty two millions of dollars; twenty two millions of this obligation was held  
46  
by Europeans. The revenue of Santo Domingo showed a surplus, over current expenses, of less than one-third of the interest charges on the debt. The country was bankrupt and in 1904 several European nations threatened forcible collection  
47  
of debt unless its payment was guaranteed by the United States.

This suggestion coincided with President Roosevelt's idea that the police power of the United States might be forcefully used in upholding the Monroe Doctrine. In his message to Congress on December 6, 1904, he brought out this  
48  
policy.

Secretary of State John Hay instructed our minister to ask President Morales to invite the United States to take over the collection of the Dominican customs  
49  
and pay the debts of the country. Fear that the United States wished to annex them created a popular hostility to the plan in Santo Domingo. President Morales finally consented to the request.

A treaty was signed on February 4, 1905, making the United States the receiver for the bankrupt country. Fifty-five per cent of the customs was to be used  
50  
in liquidating the debt and forty-five percent for current expenses. The Senate because of opposition of the Democrats and some Republicans refused to ratify the treaty.

The Senate adjourned without positive action on the treaty. With the rumor of a revolution chaos seemed about to descend on the island. An Italian cruiser arrived in the harbor, and the other nations were threatening the use of force to collect the amounts due them. Under these conditions the Dominican minister

46. H. C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean", p. 152.

47. L. M. Sears, "American Foreign Relations", p. 472.

48. L. M. Sears, "A History of American Foreign Relations", p. 472.

49. H. C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean", p. 156.

50. 59 Cong. 1st Sess. House Docs. pp. 313-324.

suggested the adoption of a practical "modus vivendi" until the treaty was  
 51  
 ratified. Under an executive agreement with the island President Roosevelt  
 appointed a confidential agent to collect the customs, forty-five percent of  
 which was to be given to the Dominican Government; the rest was to be deposited  
 in a New York bank until the treaty was ratified by the Senate, at which time  
 52  
 it would be pre-rated among the creditors.

Under the receivership plan the Dominican Treasury received more money  
 from the forty-five percent of the customs than it had formerly received from  
 53  
 its own corrupt officials when they had collected all of the revenue. The interest  
 on the debt was promptly paid and a fund, to pay the principal, was accumulated.  
 This remarkable success finally led the Senate to adopt a slightly altered treaty  
 on February 25, 1907. The president by this treaty was to appoint a General  
 54  
 Receiver of Dominican customs to carry out the plan.

Our declaration of war with Spain in 1898 pledged us to exercise only such  
 sovereignty over the Island of Cuba as was necessary to establish peace, and  
 55  
 we promised to leave the island when this had been accomplished. The Treaty of  
 Paris, concluded on December 10, 1898, provided; "As the island is upon its  
 evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will  
 so long as such occupation shall last assume and discharge the obligations that  
 may under international law result from the facts of its occupation, for the  
 56  
 protection of life and property".

When General Leonard Wood became Military Governor of Cuba on December 20,  
1899, the task facing him was enormous. Food for starving people was an immedi-

51. H. C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean, p. 160.

52. T. R. Roosevelt, "Autobiography", pp510.

53. R. G. Adams, "A History of the Foreign Policy of the United States", p. 300.

54. B. H. Williams, "Economic Foreign Policy of United States", p. 180.

55. Cong. Record, Vol. 31, 55 Cong. 2nd Sess. p. 3954.

56. Statutes At Large, 55 Cong. Vol. 30, p. 1754.

ate necessity; civil disputes had to be checked; an educational system had to be organized; health conditions needed improving; and a census had to be taken as a basis for a new form of government.

A constitutional Convention met in Havana on November 5, 1900 to frame the new government. It adopted one similar to that of the United States but no provision was made for the future relations of the two nations. As a recognition of our special interests and responsibilities in the island the United States felt that some definite stipulations should have been made. To the Army Appropriation Act of the United States Congress dated March 2, 1901, was affixed the Platt Amendment. This authorized the President to remove the troops from Cuba and give her independence as soon as a constitution should be adopted containing the provisions: (1) the Government of Cuba should make no treaties impairing its independence or granting any rights or concessions to foreign powers without the consent of the United States; (2) that it should not contract any debt whose interest could not be met out of the current revenues; (3) that it should consent to intervention of the United States if necessary to preserve the independence or the stability of the government; (4) the government of Cuba to sell or lease coaling or naval stations to the United States.

Cuba protested against the Platt Amendment but was obliged to add it as an appendix to its constitution on June 12, 1901. Two years later the amendment was adopted as a convention between Cuba and the United States.

Elections having been held as provided for in the constitution, on May 20, 1902, the government was handed over to the new officials and General Wood with his American forces withdrew.

Our economic aid was still needed. Secretary Hay in 1901 had recommended commercial agreements with Cuba which would help their sugar and tobacco inter-

57. Statutes at Large, Vol. 31, p. 897.

58. L. H. Jenks, "Our Cuban Colony", p. 78.

59. H. C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean", p. 77.



60

ests. President Roosevelt in his first annual message to Congress on December 3, 1901, urged a tariff reduction on Cuban imports to the United States. This received favorable attention in the House but was defeated by the "Sugar Senators" in the Senate. Roosevelt renewed his suggestion at the next session of Congress but an extra session was necessary before votes enough for a reciprocal treaty could be obtained. This treaty gave American shippers a cut of twenty-five to forty percent on Cuban tariff, and Cuban reductions of twenty to forty percent of the Dingley rates on sugar, tobacco, and other agricultural products.

The third article of the Platt Amendment providing for intervention by the United States to maintain a stable government had to be invoked in 1906. A revolution broke out over claims of fraud in the reelection of President Palma. President Palma decided he was unable to quell the revolution and secretly ask Roosevelt to intervene. Two battleships were sent to Cuban waters to watch developments. Property of American citizens was being destroyed and American lives were in danger. President Roosevelt was opposed to intervention but on September 15, when news came that President Palma was going to resign he decided that intervention was preferable to chaos. In a letter to the Cuban minister on September 14, he warned Cuba of intervention if hostilities did not cease at once. To aid in securing peace Secretary of War Taft and Assistant Secretary of War Bacon were sent to Cuba. Mr. Taft acted as provisional Governor until Mr. Magoon from Panama arrived to take over the duties which lasted three years. American marines in the island assured peace.

60. Ibid, p. 80.

61. J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and His Time", Vol. I. p. 189.

62. H. C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean", p. 88

63. L. H. Jenks, "Our Cuban Colony", p. 89.

64. L. H. Jenks, "Our Cuban Colony", p. 41.

65. H. C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean", pp. 104-5.

General Gomez was peacefully elected President under a new set of election laws and in January 1909 American intervention ceased. President Roosevelt in February 1907 said: "I am doing my best to persuade the Cubans that if only they will be good they will be happy; I am seeking the very minimum of interference necessary to make them good."<sup>66</sup>

The dispute with Mexico over the "Pious Fund" was settled during Roosevelt's administration. The Jesuits during early Spanish control of California accumulated a large fund for the conversion of the Indians. This fund after the expulsion of the Jesuits from Mexico, was administered by the Mexican Government.<sup>68</sup> After the cession of California to the United States in 1848 Mexico refused to give any part of the fund or the accumulated interest to the Roman Catholic priests of that state; whereupon the priests sued Mexico for accumulated interest and won their case. Mexico paid the back interest, but then let it lapse again.<sup>69</sup> In 1891 the United States made an issue of this lapse and finally in 1908 Mexico agreed to submit the case for arbitration at the Hague Tribunal. The court decided in favor of California and Mexico was obliged to pay all the arrears of interest and a sum of \$45,050.99 annually thereafter. This case is significant in that it was the first dispute to be brought before the newly established tribunal.<sup>70</sup>

The second International American Conference was held in Mexico City in 1901. Delegates from seventeen states signed treaty agreeing "to submit to arbitration all claims for pecuniary loss or damage which may be presented by respective citizens and which cannot be amicably adjusted through diplomatic channels and when said claims are of sufficient importance to warrant the expenses of arbitration."<sup>71</sup> This was ratified by the United States Senate on January 8, 1906.

66. "Foreign Relations 1908", p. 251.

67. A. L. P. Dennis, "Adventures in American Diplomacy", p. 270.

68. L. M. Sears, "A History of American Foreign Relations", p. 475.

69. Ibid, p. 476.

70. Ibid, p. 476. 71. "Statutes at Large", 59 Cong. Vol. 34, p. 2947.

The third Pan American Congress was held in Rio de Janeiro in 1906. The "pecuniary claims convention" was extended for another five years. The Congress recommended that at the next Hague Conference (called for 1907) the question of forcible collection of public debts and arbitration of pecuniary disputes should be raised.

72

Secretary of State Elihu Root attended the meeting at Rio de Janeiro and later made visits to other South American countries where he was most cordially received. Both of these Congresses had a large share in drawing the two Americas closer together politically and commercially, and tended to make for a sentiment of solidarity against outside aggression.

It was during this period that the scope of the International Bureau of American Republics (1890) was enlarged to make possible legal and commercial information.

73

Another dispute of long standing was that of the Alaskan boundary. The United States purchased Alaska from Russia in 1867 with the boundaries which had been agreed upon by Russia and Great Britain in 1825. The wording of this treaty was indefinite. The treaty declared that the southern coastal boundary, which had never been surveyed, should follow the crests of the mountains in such a fashion that Russia retained a strip thirty miles wide. There was in reality no well defined mountain range such as the early maps had shown. In measuring inland, the question arose whether the line ran across the mouths of the inlets or around the shores. Canada claimed that the line followed the headlands of all inlets and channels, because this gave her the Lynn Canal and access to the sea by several bays and estuaries. United States thought the line should follow the indentations of the coast, which kept the boundary well inland.

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Because of conflicts over authority to collect custom duties the boundary

72. W. F. Johnson, "America's Foreign Relations", p. 210.

73. P. L. Hawerth, "The United States in Our Own Time", p. 325.

74. C. E. Hill, "Leading American Treaties", p. 272.

75. A. L. P. Dennis, "Adventures in American Diplomacy", p. 155.

dispute was referred to a joint commission in 1898 for the purpose of arranging fishery and commercial reciprocity treaties. Little progress was accomplished.  
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In 1899 Secretary of State John Hay agreed to a "modus vivendi" which gave the Canadians temporary possession of several points claimed by the United States.  
77

When Roosevelt became President he wished to have the matter definitely settled. Secretary Hay arranged for the reference of the dispute to a board of arbitration consisting of three Americans and three British subjects, two Canadians, and Lord Alverstone, Lord, Chief Justice of England. This arrangement left the decision to Lord Alverstone as neither the Americans nor the Canadians would yield. The choice of Lord Alverstone was really a concession to Roosevelt, who made it known in advance that if this commission failed he would not refer

the issue to neutral arbitration. Expressing it in his usual forceful way he wrote: "I shall take a position which will prevent any possibility of arbitration hereafter, a position . . . . which will render it necessary for Congress to give me the authority to run the line as we claim it, by our own people, without any further regard to the attitude of England and Canada. If I paid any attention to abstract rights, that is the position I ought to take anyhow. I have not taken it because I wish to exhaust every effort to have the affair settled peacefully and with due regard to England's honor".  
78

The commission met in London in September of 1905. In all the important points of contention the United States was upheld by a vote of four to two. The Russian treaty was construed to mean the exclusion of Great Britain from the coast. Canada was given two small islands at the entrance of Portland Channel.  
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76. L. M. Sears, "A History of American Foreign Relations", p. 466.

77. J. H. Latane, "A History of American Foreign Policy", p. 474.

78. W. R. Thayer, "Theodore Roosevelt", p. 176.

79. W. R. Thayer, "Theodore Roosevelt", p. 176.

80. L. M. Sears, "A History of American Foreign Relations", p. 469.

John Bassett Moore sums up the problem with these words: "In reality, the Canadian contentions in regard to the Alaskan boundary fundamentally lacked merit, and . . . . derived color chiefly from the fact that a government was willing to take the chance of presenting them".<sup>81</sup>

The Alaskan settlement determined the last of our disputed boundaries with Great Britain. It is significant also that the precedent of resorting to arbitration was followed.

The dispute over fishing privileges on the North Atlantic coast was more than a century old. It had been a leading issue in the Revolutionary War settlement, and again at the end of the War of 1812, and had been the special subject of a treaty in 1818. In spite of this treaty the question continued to be a source of friction and controversy.

In 1906 Newfoundland enacted a measure intended to impose upon American fishermen conditions and disabilities which were held by the United States to be contrary to the treaty of 1818. To settle the difficulty, until the matter could be brought before the Hague, a "modus vivendi" was arranged by Ambassador Reid and Sir Edward Grey. This had to be renewed three times before a final settlement was made.<sup>82</sup>

The American Secretary of State Elihu Root and the British Ambassador James Bryce in the meantime negotiated a treaty for submission of the interpretation of the Fisheries Treaty of 1818 to arbitration. It was signed on January 27, 1909, and ratified by the Senate on February 18.<sup>83</sup> A final settlement was effected in 1910 by the Hague Tribunal.

### The European Aspect

On April 23, 1904, the Congress of the United States adopted a resolution

81. J. B. Moore, "Principles of American Diplomacy", p. 320.

82. C. R. Fish, "American Diplomacy", p. 455.

83. "Statutes at Large", 61 Cong. Vol. 36, p. 2141.

in which it recommended that the President should endeavor to bring about an understanding with the principal maritime powers for the incorporation of the "principle of the exemption of all private property at sea, not contraband of war, from capture or destruction by belligerents" into international law. At President Roosevelt's instigation Secretary Hay sent a circular note on October 21, 1904, in which after quoting the resolution, he suggested the calling of a Second Hague Conference.

The Japanese-Russian War caused this invitation to be postponed for a time. In 1906 Russia and Holland raised the question again of a second conference. President Roosevelt, who had been working earnestly toward that very end thought the opportune moment for calling such a conference was now on hand. He, however, yielded to the Tsar of Russia the honor of issuing the formal invitation. The conference finally opened at the Hague on June 15, 1907, with the representatives of forty-seven states in attendance, and it adjourned on October 18, 1907.

President Roosevelt who was interested chiefly in the limitation of armaments notified Russia that the United States would bring that problem up at the conference. He also discussed the subject in correspondence with Sir Edward Grey.

The South American delegations were pledged to a discussion of the Drago Doctrine—the essence of which is that the forcible collection by nations of private international debts must be forbidden.

The "Fourteen Conventions", which constituted the work of the conference, dealt with the pacific settlement of international disputes, with the regulation

84. J. E. Moore, "Principles of American Diplomacy", p. 63.

85. A. L. P. Dennis, "Adventures in American Diplomacy", p. 473.

86. Ibid, p. 473.

87. Robinson and Beard, "Development of Modern Europe", Vol. II, p. 371.

88. A. L. P. Dennis, "Adventures in American Diplomacy", p. 482.

89. F. L. Paxson, "Recent History of the United States", p. 349.

of explosives in war, with the rights of neutrals in war periods, and with  
 the creation of an International Prize Court. No agreement, however, could  
 be reached on the limitation of naval armaments at this time.

The Moroccan crisis which might have led to a world war was due to the  
 "Entente Cordiale" established between England and France in 1904. France  
 recognized England's predominant interests in Egypt and England left France  
 unopposed in Morocco. Secret parts of the agreement provided for Spanish  
 interests. Germany was ignored.

William II, cruising in the Mediterranean, landed at Tangier on March 31,  
 1905 and delivered a speech in which he announced his intention of protecting  
 German interests in Morocco. He stated that he would cooperate with the Sultan  
 when he regarded as entirely independent.

Chancellor Von Bulow wished to force the holding of an international con-  
 ference on the Moroccan question, hoping by that means to restore German prestige.  
 Ambassador Sternberg in speaking to President Roosevelt said Germany wanted no  
 gains in Morocco, but "she is bound to think of her national dignity. This  
 makes it necessary to point out to France that her national interests cannot  
 be disposed of without asking her consent and cooperation".

Kaiser William communicated with President Roosevelt asking him to use his  
 influence with France for the holding of a conference. Roosevelt considered it  
 his duty to work for world peace. He preferred to act directly through Ambass-  
 ador Jusserand of France and Ambassador Speck von Sternburg of Germany. Through  
 Jusserand he influenced the French to consent to a conference. The French having  
 consented to the conference Roosevelt did his utmost to satisfy the Kaiser that

90. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Division of International Law  
 (1914-1916) Pamphlets 3-20

91. S. B. Fay, "The Origins of the World War," Vol. I, p. 162.

92. Ibid, p. 184.

93. J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and His Time", p. 468.

94. Ibid, p. 470.

he had won a great diplomatic triumph, and that he could now afford to be contented with moderate demands on France. His letter to Von Sternburg expressed this thought: "You know," he wrote, "that I am not merely a sincere admirer and well wisher of Germany, but also of His Majesty. I feel that he stands as the leader among the sovereigns of to-day who have their faces set toward the future, and that it is not only of the utmost importance for all mankind that his leadership for good should be unimpaired. I feel that now, having obtained what he asks, it would be most unfortunate even to seem to raise questions about minor details, for if under such circumstances the dreadful calamity of war should happen I fear that his high and honorable fame might be clouded. He has won a great triumph. He has obtained what his opponents in England and France said he never would obtain. The result is a striking tribute to him personally no less than to his nation, and I earnestly hope that he can see his way clear to accept it as the triumph it is".

95

There was considerable debate over the agenda of the conference and Roosevelt made a penciled memorandum which was adopted. He explained to both Jusserand and Von Sternburg however that he "did not care to appear in the matter, and that no publicity whatever should be given to me".

96

The conference met at Algeiras, Spain in January of 1906. Mr. Henry White and Mr. Gummere represented the United States. Their influence was unimportant but Roosevelt continued personally to wield authority. Agreement over police in Morocco was one of the stumbling blocks until the President interferred. He instructed Secretary Root to propose a possible compromise and when Germany refused part of it Root sent to Von Sternburg a letter in which Roosevelt informed the Kaiser that he would not ask France to make any more concessions. He also reminded him of his promise that "he (Kaiser) in every case will be ready to back up the decision which you (Roosevelt) should consider to be most fair and

95. Ibid, pp. 484-485.

96. Ibid, p. 485.



97

practicable". Roosevelt also informed the German Ambassador that if Germany persisted in refusing the compromise proposals and the conference broke up, all the correspondence regarding it would be published. This would discredit Germany. However, if Germany agreed all credit would be given her for the settlement. Two or three days later the Kaiser cabled his submission to the request. The treaty was signed on April 6, 1906. In it the interests of Spain and France obtained international recognition but all decisions were adverse to Germany whose only victory was in the calling of the conference.

President Roosevelt wrote an account of his part in the affair to Meyer, White and Reid and concluded with -"None of the documents are to be published in the Blue Book; and I need hardly say that it is to be considered as of the most strictly confidential character".

### The Oriental Aspect

Japan declared war against Russia in February of 1904. From the beginning of the war Japan not only demonstrated the superiority of her military and naval forces, but also gave the world a lesson in health protection for soldiers. Two factors combined to place Russia at a disadvantage: the corruption of her officials, and the immense distances over which her operations had to be conducted. and of these, distance was the greater enemy; to transport troops across Siberia took time; and the larger part of her fleet had to make the long trip from the Baltic to the Orient, where they arrived only to be completely destroyed by Admiral Togo. But in spite of the fact that Russia was obviously inferior the war was exhausting and the losses on both sides were appalling.

President Roosevelt with his interest in promoting world peace had personally advised Russia to come to terms. She refused. Japan made the first peace

97. A. L. P. Dennis, "Adventures in American Diplomacy", p. 505.

98. J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and His Time", Vol. I, p. 500.

99. Ibid, p. 467.

100. D. S. Munsey, "The United States of America", Vol. II, p. 418.

101

evertures by inviting Roosevelt to take the initiative. Acting upon this invitation Roosevelt had the American Ambassador at St. Petersburg inform the Tsar that, "If Russia will consent to such a meeting, the President will try to get Japan's consent, acting simply on his own initiative and not saying that Russia has consented, and the President believes he will succeed".<sup>102</sup>

Kaiser William II greatly aided Roosevelt in his endeavors to mediate by influencing his cousin, Tsar Alexander, to submit to Roosevelt's plan.<sup>103</sup>

On June 8, 1905 the President sent to each belligerent an identical note stating that he thought it time "to see if it is not possible to bring to an end the terrible and lamentable conflict now being waged." Japan consented on condition that the negotiations be conducted in the United States. Numerous minor diplomatic difficulties, as to time and place of meeting and the rank of delegates had still to be adjusted.<sup>104</sup>

President Roosevelt was conducting affairs of the State Department in place of Secretary Hay, who had been in Europe because of poor health. On June 16 Secretary Hay wrote this note of congratulation to Roosevelt: "But the big news was of your success in bringing Russia and Japan into conference. It was a great stroke of that good luck which belongs to those who 'knew how' and are not afraid".<sup>105</sup>

Portsmouth, New Hampshire, was chosen as the seat of the negotiations. Here the President kept intimately informed as to the proceedings. His special "task was to convince the Russians that they were the vanquished party and to urge the Japanese to magnanimity". The Tsar reluctant to bring home his defeated army because of the effect it would have on Russian politics, nearly  
101. Ibid, p. 418.

102. J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and His Time", Vol. I p. 385.

103. W. R. Thayer, "Theodore Roosevelt", p. 226

104. J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and His Time", Vol. I, p. 385

105. D. S. Munsey, "The United States of America", Vol. II, p. 480

106. A. L. P. Dennis, "Adventures in American Diplomacy", p. 405.

107. L. H. Sears, "A History of American Foreign Relations", p. 481.

108

wrecked the conference. Neither side would yield. On August 27, 1905 the crisis was reached. Roosevelt communicated with the Kaiser in regard to the minimum Japan would accept, adding that: "As this situation is exceedingly strained and the relations between the plenipotentiaries critical to a degree, immediate action is necessary. Can you take the initiative by presenting these terms at once to him? Your success in the matter will make the entire civilized world your debtor".

109

The Conference was a success and on September 5, 1905 the Peace of Portsmouth was signed. Frederic de Martins, counselor of the Russian delegation wrote: "The treaty would never have been concluded had it been negotiated anywhere else than at Portsmouth and if the influence of President Roosevelt had not been exercised all along in the cause of peace, with a persistence which commanded the admiration of us all. The man who had been represented to us as impetuous to the point of rudeness displayed a gentleness, a kindness, and a tactfulness, mixed with self control, that only a truly great man can command".

In recognition of his efforts for international peace the Nobel Peace

Prize was awarded to President Roosevelt in 1907.

As a result of the economic hardships of the Japanese-Russian war emigration of Japanese to our Pacific coast was greatly stimulated. There were fewer than twenty-five thousand Japanese here in 1900 while in 1907 there were seventy-five thousand, most of them in California. The hostility of the Californians was aroused. The labor element opposed the Japanese because their low standard of living allowed them to work for lower wages. Landowners were aroused because the Japanese were aggressive in buying land for farming and

108. Ibid, p. 482.

109. J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and His Time", Vol. I, p. 411.

110. D. S. Mussey, "The United States of America", Vol. II, p. 422.

111. Ibid, p. 458.

112

Americans could not successfully compete with them. The school situation, developing from the fact that Japanese adults were entering the public schools with native children precipitated a crisis.

113

In October of 1906 the San Francisco school board ordered that thereafter Chinese, Korean, and Japanese young people should attend a separate school for Orientals. Immediately the Japanese Ambassador at Washington protested against the violation of the "most favored nation" treaty of 1894. President Roosevelt upheld him in his position. He made it clear that the national and not the state government should deal with a situation involving international relations.

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As the school question was only a part of the larger question of immigration Congress tried to remove the source of the difficulty. On February 20, 1907 they adopted a compromise immigration act excluding persons who possessed a passport from their native country to other countries than the United States but who instead preferred to come to us. The President supplemented this on March 14, 1907 with an executive order excluding from the mainland of the United States all Japanese laborers from Mexico, Canada, or Hawaii. After these sessions California reopened her schools with minor restrictions to orientals.

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Through Secretary Root and Ambassador Takahira, President Roosevelt reached a compromise with Japan on the Immigration question, commonly known as the "Gentlemen's Agreement". Japan undertook to check the emigration of its la-

112. Ibid, p. 438.

113. Ibid, p. 438.

114. L. M. Sears, "A History of American Foreign Relations", p. 488.

115. J. H. Latane, "A History of American Foreign Policy", p. 190.

116. Ibid, p. 190.

117. Ibid, p. 574.

118. D. S. Muzzey, "The United States of America", p. 459.

barers to the United States by refusing to grant passports to any laborer except (1) to emigrants who had come to Japan from the United States on a visit and were returning. (2) to parents, wives, and children of the Japanese immigrants already in America. (3) and to "settled agriculturists". Similar  
119  
restrictions were placed on emigration to Hawaii. The results were the same as would be obtained by an exclusion act; and at the same time Japanese pride was not injured. He also warned California that any legislation hostile to the provisions of the treaty would be brought before a federal court to test its validity.

President Roosevelt had assumed a friendly attitude toward the Japanese in the Oriental situation in California but he did not want them to think he was fearful of Japan. To show Japan that the United States desired peace, but was likewise prepared for war he decided to send the battle fleet around the world.

In a letter written to Secretary Root on July 15 he said: "I am more concerned over the Jap situation than almost any other. Thank heaven we have the navy in good shape. It is high time, however, that it should go on a cruise around the world. In the first place I think it will have a pacific effect to show that it can be done; and in the next place after talking thoroughly over the situation with the Naval Board I became convinced that it was absolutely necessary for us to try in time of peace to see just what we could do in the way of putting a big fleet in the Pacific and not make the experiment in time  
180  
of war".

His plan was opposed by many people, some of whom feared it would arouse a hostile attitude in Japan, while others thought it endangered the United States to have the fleet so far away from home. The Chairman of the Committee on

119. I. Tokutomi, "Japanese-American Relations", p. 75.

180. J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and His Time", Vol. II, p. 64.

Naval Affairs in the Senate opposed it so strongly that Congress made no appropriation. Whereupon Roosevelt informed Congress that he had money enough to send the fleet to the Pacific coast and that it could remain there if no appropriation were made. "There was no further difficulty about the money" was his laconic comment.<sup>121</sup>

On December 16, 1907 the fleet left Hampton Roads and after several stops at South American ports went through the Strait of Magellan and north to San Francisco. The trip to Hawaii, New Zealand, Australia, China, Japan, through the Suez Canal and Mediterranean demonstrated an efficiency which astonished the world. The fleet returned to Hampton Roads a few days before the President left office in 1909. In his "Autobiography" he said, "In my own judgment the most important service that I rendered to peace was the voyage of the battle fleet around the world."<sup>122</sup>

### III

An analysis of the foreign affairs of Roosevelt's period will permit the following deductions as to the policy he pursued from 1901 to 1909, namely:

(1) Roosevelt's foreign policy was the "big stick policy". Quite early in his first administration he had remarked that for himself the sum of wisdom in international affairs was "to speak softly and carry the big stick". Briefly, his policy was to deal courteously with other powers; but at the same time he thought the United States should be well prepared to defend our interests, so that no one would consider it safe to disregard them or give scant consideration to them. During the period when the State Department was in the control of Hay and Root Americans travelling abroad were given the assurance that they could rely upon the agencies of the United States Government for the protection of their interests and life. A good illustration of this occurred in 1904

121. T. R. Roosevelt, "Autobiography", p. 598.

122. T. R. Roosevelt, "Autobiography", p. 592.

when a Moroccan chief, Raizuli, kidnapped Ion R. Pardicaris, an American citizen, and held him for ransom. John Hay, Secretary of State, resorted to every possible means of negotiation, but failed to get a response. Finally he cabled this ultimatum: "We want Pardicaris alive or Raizuli dead". In two days Pardicaris was free. To President Roosevelt such a policy was the only one a self-respecting nation could follow, and at the same time he believed it was the far safer one to pursue. A government, he thought, must do the utmost to protect and further the interests of its citizens abroad, if that government was to retain the confidence and respect of its people at home. To him the very acquiescence to encroachments by a foreign citizen or nation meant a likely repetition of the offensive act in some other form, and therefore made possible in the end a greater danger of war.

(2) In international dealings Roosevelt stressed the necessity of preparedness. He did not believe the millennium of peace was at hand, and he felt that wars were still likely and even necessary at times. Therefore, throughout his two terms of office he pursued the policy of "steady preparedness" and insisted upon a program of "two battleships a year". He had, as a recent historian has said, no wish that the United States should become another China—"the helpless prey of outsiders because it does not possess the right to fight".<sup>123</sup> In his Autobiography, 1913, he wrote: "It is folly to try to abolish our navy, and at the same time to insist that we have a right to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, that we have a right to control the Panama Canal which we ourselves have dug, that we have a right to retain Hawaii and prevent foreign nations from taking Cuba, and a right to determine what immigrants, Asiatic or European, shall come to our shores, and the terms on which they shall be naturalized and shall hold land and exercise other privileges. We are a rich people and

123. P. L. Haworth, "The United States in Our Own Times", p. 319.

124. Ibid, p. 320.

an un military people. But I know my countrymen. Down at bottom their temper is such that they will not permanently tolerate injustice done to them. In the long run they will no more permit affronts to their national honor than injuries to their national interest. Such being the case, they will do well to remember that the surest of all ways to invite disasters is to be <sup>125</sup>opulent, aggressive and unarmed". The cruise of the fleet in the Pacific was a demonstration before the world of preparedness. Because of his insistence on preparedness some thought him a jingoist in spite of his interest and effort to maintain international peace and goodwill.

(5) Roosevelt's international dealings were marked by what he fondly called "the peace of righteousness". Therefore, his foreign policy was characterized to a great degree by its purpose to maintain such a peace between the United States and the world powers. His means of realizing the objective was largely by arbitration and compromise. Here he was following a policy which had by his time become a tradition in so far as it concerned the international problems of Great Britain and the United States. His chief contribution in reference to this policy is to be found in his desire to give it wider latitude. In the discussion of the foreign affairs during his administration the emphasis that he placed on arbitration has been repeatedly brought out. It will only be necessary at this time to state again the occasions wherein arbitration was resorted to or compromise used as a way out of the problem, namely: the Venezuela Affair, the Dispute with Mexico over the "Pious Fund of the Californias", the Pan-American Arbitration Treaty of 1906, the Bryce-Root Treaty of 1907, the Alaskan Boundary Dispute, the Hague Conference of 1907, Roosevelt's services in terminating the Russo-Japanese War and his part in bringing about the Algeiras Conference; besides the important Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908 (the "Gentlemen's Agreement"). The futile efforts of John Hay in negotiating compulsory arbitration treaties of a limited scope with France.



Great Britain and a few other countries, only to have them rejected by a hostile Senate, were likewise a part of this same program of a "righteous peace".

Roosevelt's relation to the Algeiras Conference, 1905-1906, calls for comment here. While it is still a highly controversial point as to whether Roosevelt was actually responsible in helping to prevent a war in 1905-1906, yet it is significant to note that "even if the part played by the President was not the determinative part the Algeiras Conference and the events which led up to it demonstrate that in world affairs the United States was virtually forced to assume a responsibility which would have been undreamed of a dozen, <sup>126</sup> or even half that number, of years before".

(4) In Latin American Affairs Roosevelt made two new departures. In dealing with the Venezuela Affair Roosevelt introduced for the first time "the precautionary interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine". His policy in reference to interference by European states in Latin American affairs was best stated in a speech which he delivered at Chicago on April 2, 1903 wherein he said: "The concern of our government was . . . to keep an attitude of watchful vigilance and see that there was no infringement on the Monroe Doctrine, no acquisition of territorial rights by a European power at the expense of a weaker sister republic - whether this acquisition might take the shape of outright and armed seizure of territory, or the exercise of the control which would in effect be equivalent to such a seizure . . . Both powers (Great Britain and Germany) assured us in explicit terms that there was not the slightest intention on their part to violate the principles of the Monroe Doctrine . . . at the same time the existence of hostilities so near to our borders was fraught with such possibilities of danger in the future that it was obviously no less a duty to ourselves than our duty to humanity to endeavor to put an end to that". <sup>127</sup>

Then too in the Venezuela Affair as well as in the Santo Domingo Episode

126. L. B. Shippee, "Recent American History", p. 317-footnote.

127. Chicago Tribune, April 2, 1903.

he laid down the principle which is commonly known as the "Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine". This principle was first enunciated as a part of his foreign policy in a message to Congress on December 3, 1901 at the inception of the Venezuela Affair. At this time he claimed that the coercion of an American state did not violate the Monroe Doctrine provided the action did not "take the form of the acquisition of territory by any non-American power".<sup>128</sup> This point of view was not held by either the Calvo or Drago Doctrines previously discussed. Furthermore, Roosevelt held that the United States could not undertake to protect delinquent American states from punishment for non performance of their duties unless we would also undertake to make them perform their duties. He expressed himself definitely on this point in his message to Congress, December 6, 1904, when he stated: "Chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the western hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrong-doing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police force".<sup>129</sup> Thereby Roosevelt added the principle that the United States may exercise "an international police power" in order to act as an agent in the collection of debts from irresponsible Latin American States. The United States in more recent years has exercised this right with somewhat amazing frequency, especially in the Caribbean Zone.

(5) His Panama diplomacy or policy, if he had one, aroused considerable criticism. It is interesting to note that the criticism was confined not merely to the opposition party. His critics accused him of taking advantage of a weaker power by violating, to all purposes, the principles of international

128. Richardson, "Papers and Messages of Presidents, Vol. X, p. 417

129. H. C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean", p. 149.

morality. There were many who could see in his early recognition of the Panama Republic the part that he must have played in fomenting the revolution which made independence possible. Roosevelt denied having had any part in the affair and went on to justify his recognition of Panama and the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty on the attitude of Colombia in her greedy conduct and inability to maintain order. He further justified his procedure by stating that "intervention was justified by the Treaty of 1846, by our national interests, and by the interests of civilization at large." His diplomacy, however, was acceptable because, as Hawerth states, "a canal would greatly benefit the South, most Democratic Senators voted for the treaty, though some criticized the way in which it was obtained".<sup>130</sup> It is likely that in the Panama situation Roosevelt had largely played the role of the opportunist and had profited handsomely. At any rate documentary sources reveal the fact that there was no conspiracy. The question, however, as to whether it would have been possible to take the steps making possible a canal, if the government of the United States had absolutely refrained from interfering on the Isthmus lies within the realm of prophecy according to a recent authority.<sup>131</sup> Roosevelt never uttered a word of apology or repentance for his action in Panama; in fact, quite to the contrary he stated in a speech at Berkeley, California, in March of 1911: "I took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate".<sup>132</sup> Again in an address, about a year previous to his death, before the National Press Club at Washington he declared: "I might have taken the matter under advisement and put it before the Senate, in which case we should have had a number of most able speeches on the subject . . . . They would have been going on now, and the Panama Canal would be in the dim future yet. We would have had a half century of discussion and perhaps the Panama Canal. I pre-

130. P. L. Hawerth, "United States History in Our Own Times", p. 307.

131. L. B. Shippee, "Recent American History", p. 307.

132. J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and His Time", Vol. I, p. 308.

ferred that we should have the Panama Canal and half a century of discussion  
135  
afterward . . . a discussion which I regard with keen interest". These re-  
marks, made long after the incident, were delivered with the usual egotism,  
boastfulness and Dantesque oratory that frequently seized this colorful  
personality, and must be considered more as rhetoric rather than as authentic  
statements of the real circumstances under which the Panama Canal Zone was  
made possible.

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135. Ibid, p. 549.

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