HO HELfiIEU IU inc. UHDNV FLNVHIHU FHUVEOD Thesis for the Degree ofM. U. P. MICHtGAN STATE UNIVERSiTY JAMES RICHARD MALONE 1 9 6 5 THESIS LIBRARY Michigan State University ABSTRACT PLANNING AND MEANING: SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF VALVE THEORY AS RELATED TO THE URBAN PLANNlNG PROCESS by James Richard Malone The rapid rate oi urban development in the United States and the relative long life of urban struetures have led to major urban problems. Traditional planning eoneepts have held that the solution of these problems would be aehieved by controlling the development of urlxni areas, thimnudiilhnitations on ilu'ennount+;iuul types of stimu‘turwns, and lax removilug”blighttxh' stlnu‘hlres auul replzu'ing 'th(m1\vith inuxr0V(ml stlwurturwus. lluis, b}! hnprtulhig tluillhysitwrl llrlxni (leilTfllm(Wlt, it \wis iknlt tlult tile (filtltT) uilniu niilicnl “mulld l)(‘ u[)li it(xl, (inLl allJari 1)rcd)](nns \voirld lJC ssolwuetl. llnls, {lilnln })l{Ulnlllg 1)];ured_‘th(3 anfllflFLlS ()f .its artttnititin Lu)olx the development of methodology for "solving" urban problems; but it did so without first developing, a sound basis in the. theory oi' urbani- zation. Sinee the city is a human artifact, we must, first of all, understand humans ~— how and why they aet —- then we may attempt to analyze the produets of their aetion. Sinee human beings are the only animals eapable oi planned, rational aetion, the study of this rationality is a logieal point of beginning for this understanding of human activity. The primary purpose of national- human behavior is to fulfill hunuui needs :uulcflesires, leinunxl‘to as valiuusu Thus the sigaiitieanee cn"value and value assignment in individual humans is neeessary to uruietwetandiin; hununl aeticni. lluj‘relatfi(n1ships;()f "\ulhle" (Hui "[quIjty" must be understood as well as gaining a clear conception of the total range of human values. Through this discussion of value and value assignment it can be seen that human artifacts are irstilled with indi- vidual and social meanings by the people who create them. Human beings, their meanings, and their artiiacts are the compon- ents of our sociocultural systems. All social activity and organi- zation is structured by these three components. As social organization becomes formalized, institutions develop as the manifestations of the meanings involved. Social groups and institutions may be in harmony or they may be in conflict; it is through this dialogue that we develop a culture. Culture is the product of Eli realms oi social meaning; thus, a "high" culture is one that has all meaning in balance -- each one operating within its socially assigned parameters. When individuals, groups, or institutions mix meanings of one system with the artifacts of another the culture is disorganized; or when one of a few realms of meaning dom inate social considerations the culture .is disbalaneed. The physical pattern of the city, because it is a human artifact, will reflect the culture of its builders. it the physical pattern is inadequate or malformed it is because its culture is inadequate or nuilfkirnuxl. (kirtwnitl}/, (nlr (alltlirc :is (lislnilaxu'ecl tcnwarxl thi‘ recihns of economic and scientific meanings. We tend to place these above all other social considerations (ethical, philosophical, aesthetic, commu- ni ty, etc.) leading to a "short-term" mentality which is mainly, if not solely concerned with economy and efficiency to the near complete disregard of beauty, livability, social welfare, peace ol' mind, and other considerations. The results of this disbalance of concern is reflected in the vast, bland sprawl of homogeneous urban forms over the countryside. The urban planner occupies a unique role in the urban social Sitl‘U('tllF(3, llf? ai‘tse E18 tlie liiik ‘b(:t\ve(in tllC‘ l)r;uiilics: (it fg()V(‘Vlhh(dll' act the given level, the levels oi.’ government in the hierarchy, the gov- ernmental and the private aspects of the society, and the myriad interest groups of the city. if we are to operate cl'l'ectivel y within this unique role, we must fully comprehend that \xltll which we are (THHfGFH(ml. We nnu+t und(ww¥tand tflur'vari(wl soci(1l interwusts (unllncanilugs nuniifesttml hi the ”Hun; social irrn:ihltions. lie must lH‘iUJlU to thWl-- tiif/ arKl iirtciq)ret:'tr£uuls ill tlunstyin(uuiiru;s ens tluay (hfiV(d()p lH)t {itt(W' they are institutional ized. We must act as the catalyst ol~ these many and varied interests and meanings bringing them to eilectivc action. lll orwhnr it) full ill {lurse ilnlcti(n1s “1‘, UllAUl pleuuieiws, nuuat diwuzlop [use contwqits and Iuwvinethcuhs of uilnui studi(w;‘that rw'tlect the full range of social meanings. We must recognize the city as more than the physical pattern of artifacts. We must recognise the rnaliy lh(%ln inggs aiid irit('rtnst+: (uninid_ic(l ill tflit‘ [Hiyasii'al i oiwn (Jl‘ ifllt' (Fit)/. llelXJrC'xve (ittanpt:'to (ilttu‘ oi‘rno(lify (uiy alrttifzn't, \ve nulst: hl‘ iul ly aware. oi" its values to the individuals and groups who created it, use it, or even view it. Once we have gained some understanding oi these concepts, we must use our social role to develop more under- standing of the entire range of meanings within the society. The orderly growth and development of new urban areas, and the successful redevelopment of older, inadequate ones will only be accomplished tlirculgll tlur airti(n1 (it .iniliviihialss, 5grcnlpss, EHld lHSthtlltiCHlS cnlelwitiiig within a complete and balanced system of social meanings and values. lf the planner is to be advisor and coordinator of these groups and indi\/uhials, lug, above all, nnaet possemasii sound inuhrrstandilug(it their values and meanings. I‘IANNTNG AND l‘ll-lANlNli: SUM) CONS]llEl‘TA'l'IONS ()l' VALlIll 'l‘llliORY AS RllLATlIIJ TO THE URBAN l’IANNlNl; l’RflClISS by James Richard Malone A 'l‘llllSlS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial- ‘l'ull'illment ol' the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF URBAN I’ll/\I‘JNING School of Urban Planning and Landscape Architecture 1008 [\(T thlWl ,llllfilirlll‘i'l‘S The author is deeply gratcl'ul for the thoughtful criticisms and suggestions received From Professor Sanford S. tarncss ot the School ol‘ l‘rban Planning and Landscape Architecture, .‘lichigan State tniversi y. TABLE Ol.‘ (i ON TllN TS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS INTRODUCTION Chapter I. The Need for More Meaningful Planning Studies II. The Concepts of Value Theory Defining Value Value and Reality Realms of Value Value Assignment III. The Meaning Component in Social Systems Value as a Component 01‘ Social Systems SOClill (hwler (nul SLM‘lUl (Hnnige lnstitartions The Role of Meaning IV. Meaning in the Urban Form The Man-Community Relationship Values Reflected in Urban Forms The Development of Sociocultural Meanings in the West Economic Meaning Scientific Meaning The Cultural Development of the United States The City as a System of Cultural Symbols Winds of Change V. Urban Planning and Social. Responsibility Toward More Mcaninglul Planning Studies The Planner’s Role Research and Analysis Coal Formation Plan-Mak ing Assistance and Coordination Information and Interpretation Toward the "Good City" SELECTED BI BLI (XJRAPI w iii 27 27 ill) ‘l‘l 38 H2 HS ”7 HR 52 5” 30. (l) ‘3 7t 71 ”‘f‘ /3 75 7b 77 7H 70 82 8‘) 'N TR Olll 1C Tl UN The traditional emphasis in urban planning, upon the physical elements of the urban form, has resulted in too many gaps in the planner's fund of knowledge about the city. The city is much more tfluni the sunicn’_its physiiwfl IMlPtS; tfina streets, laiildings, znul utilities merely comprise the surface of the city -- the visible city. Underlying the surface are the myriad interests,.ideas, desires, and values of the people who constructed it —— the "invisible city." This thesis submits that this "invisible city” is the essence of the city as a whole, and, that in order to comprehend the total City, we must first understand these underlying aspects of it. The first and foremost function of the city as an arena for social acti- vity. The city is the place where men fulfill their interests and desires beyond mere subsistence. Thus, in order to understand the city, we must understand the interests and desires of men. This thesis, then, is an el‘l‘ort to expand the planner's know- ledge of the city. its ideas are not revolutionary; in tact, many may appear quite commonplace. The author feels, however, that through this discussion of“ the "invisible city" urban planners may develop a much broader conception of just what the city is. The primary purpose of this thesis is to probe into the vast area of human acti— vity as nuwniingful_eurtivity, znul to reltnxz this nuwniingiul :nrtivity to the development ol.‘ urban forms. Through such a discussion it is felt that our knowledge of the city will be expanded beyond its present perimeters and thus allow us to develop more signiticant urban planning studies. This thesis should not be construed as an attack on urban plan— nirug edu('(311 iv l(l(‘l )1 (I lt%(‘ll§$$€(‘tl , llll t l i'xv >%()_li: — tions have been tendered. in an el‘l‘ort to assign blame l'or these lilllUlW‘S, Lirbaii plEHHlUITi haxm~ UtTWlH(Kl pol iticiznis {Hld lnxsilu'ssnuui ol' shortsightedness; auwliitccts, site planners, and land diwud(nn'rs ol eccnumnii‘(let(uaniirisng sclun)ls, ('huiwlics, (nid ()thtu‘ s(n'ial histilaitiinis ol' lailu re to educate; and even the urban citizenry in general 01' hedonism. The time has long since passed when we, as urban planners, should hesitate in our thrust to alter the city and take stock of ourselves and our methods. ll. City planning, as we know it today, was recognized as a pos- sible means of solving urban problems during the last decade of the nineteenth century. The World's Columbian Exhibition of 180%, at Chicago, presented the "city beautiful" to the American public -— and they liked it. This was a perspective of the city as seen by the architects and landscape architects of that period, strongly influenced by the neoclass'icism ol' the llcaux Arts School of Design. The emphasis was placed entirely upon visual design as a menas of "twiisiin; nuni's tlun1ghtn¥’ triliighiu* ld(KllS. bssanitizrlly, ‘todaQJ's philosophy of urban planning is still strongly based upon the sen~ sual (lairactcn‘istiiw;(3f the (‘ity. 'To bi!:a1re, nuire enqnuusis is lieiiu; pltured l1p(ni ttu) nrni-stwuaial (isp(w'ts (H' ter('it}', SlH‘h ilH natural resource capabilities, so called social and economic factors, arnl ()ttuérss; lnit, lll gLWiciuil, 'tcula}"s iirlnin [ilzninin‘s (lP(l UllHUtit (d1l:ir(rly (‘Lnl(?£3111(ltl vvil_l1 tilt: 19l13's_it‘ail (‘lLHTKPIlLfS ()l' lflii: ('i ty' ill()ll(?. lliii‘iiigg tilt) past dtawuh: there has lunniai substantial amunuit of reseaimliinul'tcs— ting of new methods and new applications of older methods of meeting urban needs, but still the emphasis is almost entirely upon the physi- cal uilnni fornu 'Thc lllihlrcs (d 'this [nirely 'finiysicwil” inniroacli to urban planning were passionately and emphatically presented by a) .lane Jiuxnis iII’The lhuith ainl Lili‘()f Ureat:/bneri(1ui(“ities. lihtni MK} CXEUHlHL? UUI‘ urliaii stiuliius, it .is Iuit irmn(wliati'ly'zlpyn1r(w1t where they are deficient. Certainly there are ample statistical data; numbers of persons, miles of streets, acres of land, dollars of sales, amounts of housing, birth rates, death rates, crime rates, utility rates, etc. Neither can it be said that our studies are lacwing in the number of different items they include; streets, parks, schools, :— u 0 houses, garages, office buildings, stores, warehouses, men, women, the old, the young, playgrounds, slums, country clubs, buses, auto- mobiles, trains, etc. One may find anything and everything in these urban studies except the one most important thing -- the essence of the city itself. "One is reminded of Pirandello’s Six Characters in Search of an Author, everything is present except the one precise v (2) essential that gives life to the whole.‘ The concentration upon merely the physical aspects of the urban environment has resulted in urban planning practices that range from inadequate to complete failure. The methods of master planning seldom, if ever, result in the orderly growth pattern that is pre— (ll(‘t(Kl tht‘ingg tlic'ir [)r(1)arWit'ioii. (nir' zcniiiu; (Hltl l;in(l U(?V(‘lUIIlH§§ concepts have resulted in vast areas of homogeneous land uses and lnlililini; tyq)cs= tlnit (irt'inoiw' 01 tel] blanid ilHLl Ulllnrfllll‘ng;'th{Hl talc)! are exciting and interesting to live in, pass through, and use. The (ittenurts zit uiluni rcwuwval luive srtraycml far llxnn tlu‘ oiflighial concepts of improving the living conditions of the lower income segs mcnts of the ety. We seem to be trapped in our present pattern of action with no alctetfllalflVEB lnit ‘tC) llirtdiei‘ ccnnpl.iiuit(? plWJS(dlt frlillir(u% lJy iluILlii‘at:ini; tluan. llieiwa lrls l)0(Wl a (lll‘tll ol‘ lllV(Wltl(JH (inil ntwv saililtiinis in tirlnin plininiiig. Tln: tyq)icarl aiuirinu'h lnis l)c(u1 tL) "sailVLV' tiiiflii‘ crn1g(u+ti;t(‘t‘, ll] ll(?l‘ i-(iiiti‘il)iitfi(311 ti) liliitlji lor Ameidiwnns titled "lramcwork lln‘anilhdxui Society," states tlml: the roles of natural resources. the rural environment, and mass pro— dLHTtl(Hl tJJUlUllithWS lNlV(“ linig l”0(%)lV(Kl Htflnl(HlS.iltt(Wltll)n in tht‘ hiiitiul States, and their places in the economy are fairly well understood. The metropolitan conununil’y, however —- a l'ar more complex set ol‘ institutions —- is still only superlieially explored even though it (liirn iIiLitgt’s; ()llI‘ Si()(3_lill., (‘('()Il(nlll(‘ , illlil ])()l i t ii'iil l il (i. "lV(' llil\/(‘ iii) clear i nuge of its purpose and requirements, and how best to guide its destiny.” (0) This thesis submits that as long as urban planning methods con- tinue to be merely superl'ieial quantitative studies ol" the physical iirbari forni, as; th(2 PGtflllt (3t (1 lcnv SP(K‘lflL§lleiHl tuin~ticnis, thin]: urban planning, as a system of knowledge, will not comprehend its 8. object of study; urban planning, as a source of information and interpretation of events to the urban decision—making apparatus, will not fulfill its social role; urban planners will not gain the iw3s1)e(‘t aiid tlie taiitli (il' tlie iiiliari {iulilii'. lii ()rd(~r tC) filli‘il l ;it:< sociarl rolt‘, urinal plalnihig nuust dtwa'lop Innvlnctlunls ainl ntnv‘tech- niques for determining the many functions and purposes of the city —— esn)ecilill}"thirlnorwe intinigilile iiuu‘ti(nis anal piu1)osiu4. Z\s allian planners, we must broaden our basis 01' theory so as to gain as com— plete an understanding of the city as possible. 'YhL3‘trznliticnial pliUlHlIHg (TM)C(1)tS lnistml UIHJH (d1VlIW)Hanlldl dLfitUlWhlllenlllUVHJ itiiltwl pirhnai‘ily l)ea* tlicy‘iverm‘ H()t luistwl uingn a sound knowledge of the city. The city is much more than the sum of its physical parts, The people and their artifacts are only the SUI“ffl(TP olf tlu: (“it}', tlnfl \Iisilile C‘ltY. Tln‘ h(TlPt ilHtl tlH} (w:scinfe of the city is invisible and intangible, and yet it is the primary (xnlsal. fdt"t01‘()l idle \Iisilile 1n1tt¢n11. UUI"tP£Hllll(HHll (aintwqits and rnethMls (3f Lirbzni planiniiig lunvc'igiV(wi us; stnne lllfillflll tn) tlu* hidi~ its oi tfluéi‘ity's inanile; lnrt this urnhgrstandiin; is ordailantmml bet— ween detailed knowledge ol personal habits and their etlects on econo- mic markets and almost total ignorance of the attitudes and values which develop these personal habits and their cultural implications. (7) For many years, the science of archeology has been studying and describing ancient civilizations, human lite, and human activities through the analysis oF their cultural remains, their artifacts. During the last few decades there has been a new approach to the entire study of human nature based upon the concepts of archeology. o. it aims to know man by shifting the focus, but not the whole, of study away from the "sell” to the objective cultural artifacts, which , (8) are the creation of the 'self.’ Since we, urban planners, are concerned with the most complex system of cultural artifacts yet produced by man, it is logical that we must understand the nature oi man and his artifacts before we can presume to improve upon the system. Man creates his artifacts to help fulfill his needs and desires: the house to provide shelter, roads and streets to provide access and communication, markets and stores to provide foods and other goods. Thus it we are to Fully comprehend what a house is, what a street is, what a market is, we must comprehend their underlying meanings as aids in the l'nl l'illment of man's needs and desires. l‘or example, the idea of the railroad and the automobile as the reasons for sub- iulxniization overlooks the tart that the people wuudxwl to leave the (Dity, tlnjznito :nul thl‘lWllltWHKl werm:(nily tin) meaiuatif Fullill_hig ' must recognize this desire. The methodology of "policies planning' tinit politxies a1w: StIWH’tUPOd Luigi tranuwwirk oi (wiltuiull intermnats. II" we are to fully understand human activity we must trace back the meanings installed in the activity from the overt expression, in action or artifact, to the root need or desire. Such an under— standing would eneompass the studies of value theory, social systems analysis, institutional organization, history, and symbols and sym— bolizationc This then is no small task; but the comprehension oi the city demands its undertaking. lOO The entire range of values held by individuals and manilfested in their institutions is important. We, in the tnited States, are operating under a disbalanced value system. We tend to overemphasize 'f economic and technological considerations to the near disregard ol' SOcial, aesthetic, religious, ethical, moral, and philosophical realms of consideration. We are overly concerned with the "concrete” and V the tangible aspects of life, that we like to cal l. "practical"; and tend ixiiaverlook tflur'hitangihl(g lnrt none tin: less real :uquwrts oi l il'(‘, 'tllilt' xvi? l ll\(‘ 't() (‘Lll_l "tli(w)i'(rt ii-iil" ()r‘ "iin1)iuii't l(‘ili ." l‘rban planning, in the l‘nited States, has been overly concerned with the sensual aspects ol’ the city. l‘or too long. we have been relatively contend to accept a master plan and a zoning ordinance as the products of planning. lt urban planning is going to produce some measure of success, we must elevate our goals [or making the city a better place in which to live lt‘Ulll mere statement of intent to posi- ‘tiverrnetluxls (if (u'tion. As lilflHIH“PS, \ve lu1Vt'lietuitaon(wuw1ed \vith llie values of beauty, practicality, and well'are; and they have not been (numlgh. lie n(mml'to (WMIUCIWI OUITH“1VUSS\vlth tlu' entirw* r;nuge ol'lnunan values if we are to make the city a successful environment ior human experience. Through an understanding of value theory, we can gain an insight to the organization of urban society as a system oi groups and iisti— tutions constituted as means of i‘ull'ill‘ing human purposes. 'I,‘he urban pattern, it may be seen, is the manifest expression of those values. a Urban history has only dealt with the very surface oi the city; we need much more study in order to understand the underlying meanings in the urban form. l l . In the final analysis, successl'ul- urban planning is not a ques— tion of what the "planner” thinks the city should be. rather it is a question 01? what the urban population needs and demands in order to fulfill its interests. The genius of urban planning is not to employ planners who can create grand schemes, but rather to employ planners who can discover the most lundatmental desires and hopes oi the many urban publics and transl ate them into plans and programs. "We should not allow the egomania oi" the planner to be inposed on the city, but rather the planner should give form and design to the needs and aspire— . - . . . i) tions ol a varied publ 1c. ' l ) "it we wish to make lumlamental changes in institu— tions, we may well concern ourselves, l'irst oi all, with the hierarchy ol‘ l'ecl irgs. The world ol‘ values is, as it were, the invisible workshOp wherein are prepared the changes 01' scene for the visible world." (Ill) The urban form, the pattern ol' artil‘acts and activities on the Earth, is no more than the visible aspects ol' a whole range ol‘ human interests, values, and meanings. it we urban planners are to understand the l'unctions ol‘ the city, we must ‘l'irst concern ourselves with the "invisible world" that shapes the. urban l‘orm. l’ill l'l‘.\'( )'l‘l‘.S (1) (New York: Random House, ‘lnc., 1901) (2) lion Martindale, "Prel'atory Remarks: The Theory of the City," Max Weber, The City (New York: (Irowell-(Toll ier Publishing C0,, l‘l()2), pp. lll—ll-. (5) Percival (ioodman and Paul Goodman, (ionununities (New York: Random House, Inc., 100”), p.(l. (H) Lewis Mimiford, "What is a City," Architectural Record, iX‘Cll, (November, l‘li7) . (5) Jacobs, p.8 (0) President’s Commission on National (loals (New York: Prentice Hall, lnc., lQbH), p. 227. (7) Anthony N.B. (iarvan, "(Tultural Change and the Planner," 'l'he Angcls oi" the American AcadenLv of Political and Social Science, “(1111 l , (nlarch. .l (lllll) , p. "5'5, (8) l‘.S.C. Northrop, :‘lanLNatnre and (Tod (New York: Simon k Schustcr, 1902), p.ill. (0) Webb S. l'iser, Mastery of" the \letrmil is (linglewood (Tl ill‘s, X.\‘.: Prentice Hall. lnc., l'lli'a), p. lol. (lU) C.C.S. Bougle, Evolution of Values, H.S. Sellars, Trans. (New York: Henry Holt a (30., l‘l2h), p. ll), 12. Chapter if. The foneepts of Value Theory H I. lleiiiniry; lilu(”' The problem with attempting to define "value" is that there seems to be no established, universal meaning. The term ”value" is historieally assoeiated with eeonomies. Une of the favorite pro— blems of the eeonomist is explaining how priee is established on the HKIPKJEt. Ir] ormler‘ t() d() tliis, llC lflUS€t (lei int: tin! \uilut2 oli tliiiugs, that is, assign them a worth. "He estimates what, in the eonstitu— tion of value, is due to raw material, to human labor, to the rela- tion between supply and demand." l/ in eeonomies, value is most often stated in monetary terms. The term value goes far beyond this eeonomie meaning however. We speak of value in art, in reli- gitni, i1] 5(rielu~e, i1] nu)ral_it '; tflicwse eirw: lKlIKll)’ ecw1ncnnit‘, ilH(l etu‘- tainly not monetary realms, rather they are realms ol thought and soeial aetion -— eultural realms. Value is not eontined to any one of' tlH38(‘ PCHllHE§. ’"lt .is, ill tiwitli, £1 urli\w9rsail (wit(13013/, (nipzdile of the most varied applieations. We ean pass judgments of value on a ehair as well as on an art, on a rite as well. as on a poem." 2/ Webster's defines value as "the quality or tart of being exeellent, useful, or desirable." 3/ Philip Wiener states, "... values are felt desires or needs -- good it satisfied, bad if not..." H/ Bougle sees value as the attitude of the subjeet toward an obieet. 5/ The problems of defining "value" is not solved, however, by merely reiterating these many meanings. it is better served by attempting to develop a preferred meaning, either by seleeting from its existing meanings, or by ereating a new meaning. For the purposes I”. of this thesis then, "value" will earry the meaning assigned to it b Ral h Barton Perr : "a thin*--anv thinr--has value or is valu- Y P y g - E ! ble, in the original and generic sense. when it is the ()l)_'l(’(‘t of an I interest--any interest." Perry goes on to define "interest" as, "a train of events determined by expeetation of its outeome. Ur, a thing is an objeet of interest when its being expeeted induees aetions looking to its realization or non-realization." b/ lliis (lei initfioii S£KNHS nu)st (weiwn)t;d)l(¥ siliet3 it LlllCHNS thc' ttwvn valu(3'to lKBIJSQd :hi its;l)roathdst suaise. Sail) ttwwns (us "eIul," 'figoali’ Y "puzquase," "nuitiV(f haxu: bimni a\«3idtxl be(%nis(? in LHfilgt' th(3/ ttuul to eonnote eausation -— "the view that faetors in the tuture, not yet a o ' 7 ‘ \ - actualized, ll! some manner pull. events toward them." / (me lallure of many definitions oi value is that they are sometimes taken to refer‘(nily t1) "good"(ir "ifiidit,” and to exelude the opposites "bad" H H 8/ "° ' ‘ TY' ° YT ‘ of wrong , delined "111 terms oi. interest-~any mterest this tendeney is avoided. Finally, it is felt that Perry's delinition tends to simplify the diseussion of value by avoiding the esoterie pitfalls of most other delinitions. Value and Reality The use of the word "valiuf’ans representing something that de- maiuls tflie {itt(u1titn1 oi’ stn'ial_ seituitiiwts, lleiHl plEUlHLHfH, (Hid ()tlH?PH has been objected to on the grounds that it has no eoneeptual meaning, but only a so-ealled "emotive” meaning. in other words, statements that use the word "value" are not statements at all; they have no objectivity, but merely express an attitude. in faet, many of those who actually study the theory of value eonelude that it is some "non-natural" eharaeteristie that cannot be empirieally observed, but can be "seen by the eye of the mend, and, when so seen, it is . 0/ . . . seen to be unique and unanalyzable." Sueh mystieism does little to further knowledge however. lt may be helpful to first differentiate between judgments of reality and judgments of value, and then analyze them in terms of each other. Judgments of reality "assign eertain properties to persons or things, taking no aeeount of our desires, our dislikes, /,/ ’Yl or our sympathies. They aim at objectivity." This street is fifty feet in width,” or "Seven families live in that house," are judgments of reality. Judgments of value take into aeeount "the desire or aversion, the sympathy or repugnanee whieh sueh an (objeei) arouses in men. They do not express purely and simply the properties of an object, but set over against these properties the attitude of Of the. Sllhjcetz” ‘] 1/ n. lliis :strmxit is at pl(u1siuit ()H(‘()H \vhiill tn) li\w’." "l umnild Ia)t l.ik(2'li\iiig iii tlnit lunlse.” (Hijtu‘ts Lire (issigniecl valiie vvl1(*ii ii S;ill);](3('1: (l(?\’(’l_()[)§i i lllf(‘l‘(‘$§lf iii t‘liti:+(* ()l)_l('(‘ trs . l‘lii >5 i >% ll()t t‘ii imply that the interest from whieh the value is derived is only the lllt(3P(BSl: ()l' tlie Stlb_l0(“t ()r ,iu(lea'. \Qilii(' lnis b(>e11 liei‘e (lid iiieil ill tcnwns ()f LEEL ll]t(%135t, thins ii' tlur sidijtw-t (HJSPIWKJS iHl)(NlO (‘l8(‘(fx- pressing interest in the objeet then he must .‘iudge it as valuable. "The evidence of its (value) is the observable fact of interest, whieh is just as objeetive, and just as open to agreement, as any other l'aet of life or history." 12/ .lli. Values are more than attitudes or preterenres of an indivi- dual whieh would vary aeeording to his needs and his mood. Values rest upon "habits". "rules", Hideal forms" whieh are not an indivi- dual aehievement,, but those of the society in whieh he lives". "They are facts. Values present themselves...as given realities, - H 13/ \ . as thingso Moral values make themselves real through many a father's frown, ete.; the value of the econo- lU/ means -- the police '1 mic "market” is a very ”resistant reality." Nietzsche has said that "to break the table ol‘ values and reverse the seale ol' prefer- ence is no easy assignment. These are realities which resist mani- 15/ pulirtion." lawnliticnnnlly, (Mir tcmflunieallg/(iondiuited (wilturm‘ has propagated the eoneept of reality as meaning tangible, physieal objects. Certainly, values do not fullill sneh a eoneept. When values are discussed as realities a different kind of reality is being eonsidered. The soeiologist, Emile Durkheim, handles this diseussion most ably by stressing the eolleetive aspect of values, "Neither the properties of things nor the capacities of individuals would sufl'iee to aeeount for them. in short, values are ob jeetive ., lb/ l)(?('(]i1&$(3 lln£)(}1‘£llil \r(2, (iritl iiiii)('i'iit‘i V’E) lic'C‘aiiis:(3 (‘()l l (‘t‘lfl \/(?, ‘ 'Fll'lt% collective View of value is shared by Wiener; he states, "Historieal (ilenunits (utter llltO lurth (nir xuihie-jiulgnunits :nnl ttu‘ir (dijeet14, tht‘ felt needs and aspirations motivating ideas and aetions, individual and eolleetive, in the history of civilization. ()ur value-jailmnents are conditioned by our lite history or habits and assoeiations with other human beings, over a period 0F time," "0 Values, as kinds ol' reality, represent a eolleetive attribute and appreeiation at the same time. They express an interest inde~ pendent of individual momentary impressions, in i'aet, dominating individual. prel'erenees. ll values, as reality, supereede the indi- vidual- they must then be shared, and this implies eommunieation. But sharing or eoimininieating l'irst of all requires pereeiving or eonsejit.)usness. (Ionseiousness is most personal, "Sensations and . , . .lS/ ideas, desires and volitions are related to a 'me'." lut indi- viduals do not exist in isolation. Beeause men live in soeial groups—-pereeive the same surroundings, share the same hopes and l'ears-—they tend to develop eommon ideas. When men eome together not only do they reeogniye eommon conscious elements, but also .. l.‘) , . ‘/ “us develop new soeial produets, a "eol_leetive eonseiousness. "eolleetive eonseiousness", however, is more than the sum 01' the individual. eonseiousnesses, it is a new force eapable ol' exereising pressure as well- as attracting. ”To speak of society is to speak not only of exehange ol' serviees or collaboration of" l'orees, but also a eonmmieation ol' sentiments. “len are intimately assoeiated . . . . 2U," only when they have a number ol things to respeet in eommon.’ Values, then, are real. in that they are part ol' the "eolleetive eon— ‘Y seiousness ol‘ soeieties. In this sense, they extend beyond the individual, they are a eomponent of his soeiety and its systems. Realms of Value Although value ”exists" only in the individual, the human ability to communieate allows individuals to "share" values, Through eonumnieation individuals may express interests, in objeets, l-‘i. with which other individuals may or may not agree. When agreement of such interest forms a consensus in a society, the shared interest may be termed a societal value. When societies share similar inter-— ests, they may be termed universal values. lniversal values are the ordered preferences, assigned to objects of interest, that are shared, in common, by all men. Such universal values are, most often, assigned to objects fundamental to human existanee, e.g. food, shelter, sur- vival, perpetuation, etc. Societal values are the prevailing consen- sus of preferences assigned to objects of interest in a society by its members, e.g. democracy, success, status, etc. The rules by which we live under universal and societal values are called norms, mores, laws, etc., these rules are applied to all social activity. Personal values are the ordered preferences assigned, by the indi- vidual, to objects of interest which are most directly relevant to his own behavior, e.g. occupation, style of dress, particular foods, etc. These personal values are often referred to as tastes, they are (If ] ittile ssigaiil'iezu1c(' tL) tliis (lisiiiss;i011; lnit, it is _an)Ul“t{Hlt ‘to remember that the individual's value hierarchy includes societal and universal values as well as personal values. All three categories of value are interdeterminant; thus personal values are, to a great extxnit, ilet(wnnin(xl byiiinixaérsarl aiul scn‘ietxil \uiluiw<. aiml sru-ieted and universal values are determined by a consensus of personal values. Research into values soon leads to the conclusion that the H "boundaries between the various kinds are, more or less, clearly defined. With value defined as synonomous with interest, it is agn9arwnit tfliatf ec(niontbn liltUlK‘St :is (listilunt l roni rel igiinis HICtWK‘Sl, l‘). aidtistii"hitctmw4t is (listinld. ironiinilitical hiteimn4t. llunnas CLHVUIl, ll] liis; J(?UlllIW‘ "S(nrizrl lilti'r(n5t&; aiul \Hilu(i," sHHIS(H lNSTlll“PlUNS URJlX”F (SociaLl lnttwwusts) (Soidzil C(HNW?PHH) Religion man-God, morality Aesthetics form, design, art Ptiilcnsoldiy inaIi-lnitiirch-rinil it)/ Society l‘am‘il y , kinship, conunun i ty Linv iiist‘ic(', (‘QlHli it)! Politics government, nationalization l-Zeonomies utility, property , exchange Sl1hnscll§ ’Hiis ordtn‘hn; is influ(uuwml by the individual himself, his temperrmmt and character; by his society, its problems and traditions; and by the individual’s roles, within that society, which may vary with time. While the field of events, personal and social, is infinite, certain events or certain human pursuits claim special attention because of their universality or importance. The theory of value may be tested against these events or pursuits by its providing a systematic description of morality, conscience, politics, law, eiwnncnny, . fll"t, st'iexnhe, Ulhlciltirnl aiul t%?ll3§ltnl. lvhiui tlui nulSti‘F concept of such a description is given the name of YValue", then tlHDSif nuriox‘ 113alrns ()F luinuui l.iFL: 811: sqiei'itii‘al ly (lcea'rilialile (is realms of value. in their aggregate these realms constitute what 25/ Y may properly be given the name of 'civilization." The relationship ot value to institutions will be discussed in detail in Chapter lll, sulfice it to say that value is the under- lying meaning ot all social institutions. In other words, our social institutions are the embodiments oi our values. "If we wish. to make l‘undamenta'l changes in institutions, we may well concern ourselves, first of all, with the hier- arehy (n .feeliinrs. llurxwvrld (d?\uihies is, an; it thw~, the llU/lSjlllE ivorisit:ive (n‘ negative values respeetivelyu It should be noted here that the entire diseas- sion of value has been kept in terms of the subieet. One of the most(unwmnlndsmnderstandings of value theory is that many people tend to instill value in the objeet. Value is strietly a human eoneept; nothing has interior or intrinsie value. The value of gold lies in the human beings that have an inter— est in gokland not in gollitself. hqlCIl arm olxjcnft liass P£“t(llH(Kl luinuni iiitcn‘esst ()vc‘r (l 143nig pi'riiid of tinu‘, as luus gold iiwr exanuxle, irulivithuils shalxhig tfliis intxnwast may tend to reify the objeet with valueo Thus the possession of the ohjeet beeomes an end in itsell‘, to these individuals, This reifi'ation is espeeially true of obieets of eeonomie interest; and. leads to a mixing of the eoneepts, "value” and "utility," Under this miseoneeption, valuable is eoneeived as synonomous with Lnseflilp 131u54 ali OlliC(“t iss twinsridiirtml VillUiH)l(‘ oiily \vhcui it ziplu'aiw4 to lJe Lisellil iii rcwfiliziJu; scnne'lnid," lhnveuuir, (lel'hwed ais iJIterwgst, value beeomes, basically an alteetivity "oeeurring in a relational eontexture determined by the relation of (a human being) to a stimu— lous objeet. But utility, though ultimately dependent on some al- feetivities, is not itself an atFeetivity. It follows that utility 27/ 18 not value." Value is assigned to objeets of interest by an individual or soeitrty {wan many'clifferwnit pcfiirts of \wiew. 'Thes('[n3ints cH' view are the various institutions whieh Form a soeiety, and the roles within those institutions whieh the individual plays. Beeause an individual plays many soeial roles his "view" or perspeetive of his / 2i. obieets 01' interest vary with respeetive roles. At times, "the interests ol‘ partieular soeial roles held by an individual may aetually be in eonl‘liet. Thus the individual who is lather in the institutions ol' l'amily may plaee high value on exeellenee in edueation regardless ol' eost; while the same individual as taxpayer in the institution ol~ government may be very mueh against raising teaehers' salaries. Sueh a eonl'liet is resolved only when the individual examines the obieet of interest l'rom his respeetive points of view and makes a judgment as to whieh he deems more important. The dil'l'ieulty ol‘ value or role eoni‘l iet is that the individual fills many roles in his eulture, not merely two or even a l'ew. He may be l'ather in the institution ol‘ l'amily, voter in the institution oi government, eonsumer in the institu- tion ol' eeonomy, laborer in the institution ol' industry, parish- ioner in the institution oi ehureh, eonunuter in the institution of transportation, eaeh role has many dil’l'erent obieets ol‘ i nter— ests, and eaeh role demands a dillerent point oi view lrom whieh to make judgments. "Not to mix things, to be able to plaee oneself at d il'i'erent points ol' view, to respeet, without eon- losing them, the various rules of the dil’l‘erent orders of aetivity in whieh one partieipates is, inlailibly a sign 01' high eultnre. To prevent our l'eel ings l‘rom overflowing from one line to another requires a eer- tain eapaeity of inhibition and of speeil'ieation whieh implies a pretty eomplex mental lil’e." 28/ This diseussion of value assignment, in [art most of the dis- euss ion in this ehapter, has been held to the level. ol' the individual. This is not to imply that all value assignment and value eonl'l ieL‘ takes plaee at this level. Quite to the eontrary, the greatest amount Z”. of value assignment takes plaee at the soeietal level; and, as urban planners, we are much more eoneerned with value eonfliet among individual soeial roles. The diseussion in this ehapter hen; btwui ktuit at: th(‘ louuu' lLWM'l ll] UIKHJP ti)(le\%*lop il thcw)ry'()r value that is relative simple and easily understood. The following ehapter will attempt to esealate this theory to the soeietal plane, and relate value theory to the workings or our soeial systems. l/ 2/ 3/ u/ 5/ 6/ 7/ 8/ o/ lH/ ll/ l2/ 13/ ]H/ 15/ 16/ 17/ 18/ 19/ 20/ N J l o l‘(l(ll'?§(ll‘l3§i C.C.S. Bougle, Evolution of Value, H.M. Sellars, trans., (New York: Henry Holt & Co., lUZO), pp. 5—H. Ibid., p. 7. lfilisttn"s Coll(1;iate llhrtionargg (Spriiuilield, ibiss., (3.& C. lderriani(h3., lUH7), 1). llUS. Philip P. Wiener, "Values in the History of ldeas," Aspeets of‘ Value, li'rederiek C. (Iruber, ed. (l‘hila., Univ. of lleru1a. Prwgss;, lllStl), 1). 1+0. Bungle, p. ll. llzil})l1 liiir"t(1r1 l’t'rW‘)/, llf'a‘lnis ()i' \la lll('Z /\ (Tr it ltlllt‘ (il‘ llUln(lll Civilization (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 10514) pp. 2-l. A.l” lltlliard, llu’lkimrs ol‘\HM1u', (New \Rnl\(?ity: C(ULHMJia Univ, Press, 103“), p. lo. Perry, p. 5. ll)id. , p_ ‘l. Bougle, p. l“. 'lbitl., 1). .ll. Perry, p. l3. Bougle, p. 15. lbid. lbid, pp. 16. lbid., pp. lb~l7 Wiener, p. 80. Bougle, p. 28. Emile Durkheim, theory of "eolleetive eonseiousness," diseussed by Dongle, pp. 27—37. lbid., p. 38, 21/ 2 2/ 28/ 2U/ 20/ 27/ 28/ Thomas A. (iowan, "Soeial interest and Value," pp. 50-00. Rougle, p. 7. Perry, p. l”. Bougle, p. 10. lbid., [). S7. B(uijanniri PL, Alulvlfiinll, Jr',, S(M~ierl \HllU()S, Fli l'l 1 ill (it). , 'l‘ll l ) , [)1). l'l()-7 . Hilliard, p, iUS. Bungle, p. 57. (lhiston: Uruber, (see no- Hough ton ”l, 27. Chapter Ill, The Meaning Component in Social. Systems Value as a Component of Social Systems The term "society" denotes the social order, or the set oi social l) relationships -~ a system of social iIWeraetion. Professor Pitirim A. Sorokin secs society as being constituted by a set of sociocultural systemso ' He defines a soeioeultural system as "any process oi mean— ingful human interaction." Soeioeultural systems, in Sorokids terms, are composed of three components: (l) human component, human beings as sutthrts of~ hiteraetfl(ni; (2) ineaniiu; eonqnnient, tflu‘ineanirnis, valiuus or interests tor the sake of which the individuals interact, real i,'/.ing arul exclunigiiu; tluwn iii tht’})POfTH48; (5) \udiie11§ conunnient, ‘the (nvert actions and material phenomena through whieh the meanings, values or interests are objeetified. A relatively simple sociocultural system would be greeting -- the components -- two individuals: the meaning component -- their shared interest in one another; the vehicle components -- the nod, the bow, the handshake, the exchange of formalities. A more eomplex sociocul— turwrl systtmi is anyrggiven iwrligicni. Heim'zill tluiinompcnuuits arwriwmnpli- (wrtcwl iii ttunns (if lunnbcn‘s auid hi tKJPHHi ol' th('ir iiitiué-rwrlaltnlniwas. llie human components are greatly multiplied as compared to the systmi of greeting. The meaning components are greatly complicated. including sucdi Virlucu; alul llltOlT’StF; a>s "tlie Eled {intl tin: e\ril,” stluar 1‘0(it (it saoihi0(uiltnirtil (italigt‘ is: tlu' (disciliusc(uis(* (3f id(wu5. Siruw: HOClill coniwqits aiwn d(wnfilop(xl at rmVlati\a~ly given points in time, it follows that they may very well become outmoded as new developments occur over time. Thus the sct of customs, laws, rules, etc. that composed the society ol' the paleo- lithic food—gatl’icrers became outmoded as food surplus l'rccd some numbers for other social roles. Likewise, the society 01' mcdicval Europe became outmoded with the occurance of the Crusades, the discovery of the "New World," and other developments which broadcuuwlinarl’s perspective of his world. More recently, the tremendous increase in interaction, at all levels, among the societies on Earth has brought the iI'lterdep(.'ndcncc of all socictics to the conscious attention of men. Thus the society of the nine- teenth century, with its political isolationism, laissez—taire economics, and rigid class distinctions, has become outmoded. The obsolescense ol' these societies is not the important consideration of this discussion. Rather, the l‘act that these societies have been altered or reformed so as to "l’all in l inc" with the new social developments reflects the non-rigidity of society. .Rel‘ering back to the definitions cstabl ishcd at the beginning ol' this capter, society is constituted by the set ol‘ Socio-(i'ultural systems, and these, in turn, are composed 01' three components, all either human or humanly conceived. Thus, although it does possess capabil itics beyond those of the individual -— such as collective action. social structure, and historic lite -- society is conceived by individuals; and, thcrel'ore. it may be changed by individuals. 'l‘ruc, its c(_)llm.‘tivencss tends to make it conservative, thus resistant to change; but it is also true that societies are changed, and the change originates in the individual. ? ’...l\l_l social relations and activities are percscuted for man not as natural happenings that obey causal laws but as problems or how to seek values, how to choose when values compete or conil ict with one another in a given social Situation, how to choose mcans ot value I'ull'illmcnt evaluated by society as desirable or undesirable, whether to conform to or deviate from social norms, how to augment, discard or modify some values accord ing to the demands olf the situation...ll' men and their behavior are regamlcd as a part of the system of nature with its laws and crmliorm, the system of values represents such coniormities that have their antecedent causes, and that in their turn serve as causes moulding and guiding human behavior.’T (7) Community of objects plus interaction develops shared inter— ests, which, in turn, are dependent upon comiminication, which leads to language, l‘rom these common bases spring interdependcnce, agreement and c00peration, and conflict and opposition, and thus the development of a system of values representine the goals of 1" x}. J- O the individuals constituting a society. This set of values has the needs, desires, and anxieties of their constituents as their antcwwulent (THJSCS, anal it, uh) turn, irs‘the (wuisc of tin? esta» lilishment'cfl? the nozmr4. rules, lLHW$ of thtesan‘iety. 'Hnis the set of values held by a social group is the basis of its social organization. According to Bougle, the history of society is the history of the differentiation of values contributing to the differentia— V tion of "human souls.’ The human mind has gradually developed flexibility and the capacity for abstraction that has enabled it to distinguish between various experiences, and their meaning or (8) VGlJPS, Mukerjee sees man developing this mental flexibility Y through the aid of 'group orientation;" that is. be develops vciricnis "s(Hriail HC?lV(‘S" frwnn (I [)ai‘ti(WJl;ir ggrrnip (Jr ilSFH)Vliltl()lL (l)) Iri oui‘ ccnnpl5 7 3 m fill. all alnujst (Jonuiletti eiul ti) ctnmn(wx'c. Tile 'R'ivi lizcwl" \wwrltl MKIS, thereby forced to return to a rural orientation as each area was compel] ed to grow its own l‘ood. The ruling social strada became the rural aristocracy who gradually developed the l‘cudal system. llxcept in ltaly, the culture of the Middle Ages was rural and aristocratic rather than urban and commercial. This rural char- acter was prevailing in most oi" llurope until "quite recent times." ('17) Because economics and urbanism are closely associated, there has arisen, among urban people, a tendency to assign powers to the economic institution which it simply does not hold. This is institutional fallacy, as discussed in the previous chaptcr, where thll.lOSK3 slidit (it tlu“ lknht tluit (TTHIOnlth, llh(‘ all OllHEP s(u‘ial activities, is constituted by men. lt is through institutional Y fallacy that the theories of economics become "laws' demanding certain relationships to exist between man, his fellows, and his artifacts. Locational theory, price theory, supply and demand theory become instilled with the powers ol' absolutism by people who do not understand the role of institutions in society. Economy is not an autonomous institution; no more than any other social institution. The "law" of supply and demand, for example, pre- supposes, in order to produce its el’t‘ects, the existence of cer- tain other social institutions. Economic matters are always built upon juridical form. "The economic act must come, first and tore- most, under the category of lawful acts, (since) the economic act par excxfldxnuu: is theft." (1%” ID) his excellxu1t work Luminnlitical economy, Benjamin Anderson states, "The 'economic motive', ... if 31. I left free to work 'in vacuo, would lead to anarchy. But it doesn’t ( . . . . " " (1)) Leonomie aetLv1ty is but one ol many areas work 'in vacuo.’ of social activity, much of social activity is non—economic in character. Ethical, religious, legal, or aesthetic values may motivate economic activity by entering into economic value, or they may be in conflict with economic value by constraining the participants to "lines" that are not conducive to maximizing gains . . (2“) at minimum expense. "Modern views as to the relation of economic [acts to general culture have been profoundly affected by the theory, first explicitly stated by Marx, that the mode of production of an age (and to a lesser degree the mode of exchange) is the ultimate cause of the character of its politics, laws, literature, philosophy, and reli- gion." (2]) There are many persons today who, while denouncing Marx's theories, are pitsuliing C(WHKHHH‘ determdrihan. This ltilNlt to sany that economic reasoning has no place in our society. On the contrary, it has a very dcl'inite and important place here. However, it must l)(' nuiiritziixitwl ill 'W)zilzu1i‘e" xvi.tl1 idl(‘ L)tllUl‘ r‘eailnr;()t s<)('i(1l IH(uiliiIuis;, that is we must not mix meanings from one sociocultural system with the vehicles from another. Tht‘liasiif eccnunnit't'on(wq)ti(n1 ol'lnaxilmlm lltll ity. [noti\uit(ml by personal interest, is far too narrow. Sale—guarding the material interests of a complex urban society calls For special measures. A lljrest:.is nan: explciited hi tin: SUHKTTlHShlLM] lOI‘IH'lVHtL? inttuwssts eis tit ;is :tor‘ pid)lii'.intx'rtwsts. llie Iiciw:s&;ity'()r 1)ut%3 um1t(Wf if] tlun city dtmuuuls operatitnu313f far greatIW‘ («Misequenct'tfluui those whitli (22) personal interest would demand. The sociocultural system ol 52. economics is composed of human components and meaning and vehicle components which are humanly constituted. The "laws” of economies, like the laws, norms, or rules of all otherinstitutions, may be relatively compulsive but they are not absolute. Economics is a part of the plexus of social institutions, it is not outside of that plexuso Neither is it in control of the plexus. unless the people constituting the society will it 80. Scientific Meaning The institutionalizing of science, including technology, has probably been the most impressive social event in the history of man. if we assume 5001) years as the span of historic time, we see that for nearly 2000 of those years man was rather contentedly esta- blished on Earth, life was relatively simple with God the "master" of it. Growth and change were slow processes allowing man to ob— serve and adapt to alterations in his social interaction. in the last century, however, profound changes have taken place ~— Darwin's evolution, llinstcin's relativism, quantum theory, artificial insemina— tion, the isolation of the amino—acid molecule. to name merely a few of the scientific break-throughs -— industrialization, railroads, automobiles, electricity, radio, television to name merely a few of the technological inventions. The social problems that these advancements have created are manifold. These problems are not due so much to the events themselves as to the short period of time in which all of this has taken place. The social structure has not been able to keep pace with these improvements because iistitutional change requires time in order to develop a consensus for change among [l )1“ itrs iixli\ridilal (u)1u%t‘it1|e11ts:. llle 'lagg i)UlflV(1’H tlu' l irwst Inauiil'eesttl- t'i(n19; ()f all Ell ttérxll:i()11 (if s()L-iliiwnlgtiirall Iatsaliilii; (UHlng; ilid lb’l(lUill s and its reflection in the social institutions has been longer than tlie tirn(- b(:tvu‘e11 idl£ds(’ prw)ltn11ul (:V(u1tss (if tlui larst ('OIItUl“y. [\Utlllhi to this problem is the fact that many of these events have had a pOrK%fl)tubl{‘iifoCt tuna] thiélnunan (an/ironnunit. In (nxler t()I)PUde(‘ (1 n1C’iir1i11g; i ()r‘ tilt‘filCY Il(3\v ('\’€dl t:s , llllll \’l(llliil s; llLl\’(' tl‘lltlt‘tl 't() i115 (nil tiirzil llt‘vt-lcqinieiit (ll. llll‘ lWll ttxl 5%t;it(‘s A historical review of the underlying philosophies of the culture of the l'nited States of America is necessary in order to understand its urban development according to this thesis. The historical review undertaken here is, predominately, based upon the work The Meetingl of East and West, by l'.S.(‘.. Northrop, . . (3”) esq7et'lalfily tht‘ (llalitei‘ "llie l‘rtm3 Cllltiirt‘ ol tlu* U11ita~ t() th(‘ innlivi- dual rather than to the social, economic or political circumstances (Jf liis lJirtli. \fh(u1 tliis (THIU(11t is ;joi11ed \vitli tin) Imx'ktwui tlie94is of politics it becomes "Sclf—contrad.ietory and hence unconstitutional for'£:V(w1 a \Hlt(‘ ol‘ tlu' natiorfiity to 1)l;u'e lunnaii riidits (dioxw) pix)— . . . ,, (27) perty rights in any issue between the two. The agrarian Whigs, notably Jefferson, saw that unless the majority of the people constituting a democratic government were property owners, democratic government would fall; in fact, the preeonditions for democratic government under these two philosophies, would not exist. "...Sinee the preservation of private property is the sole justification for free individuals, consent to create or remain in any government, it follows that unless a majority of them possess private property they will not be justified in giving their consent to govern- ment, even democratic government." (28) 5h. Joining these two philosophies in the l‘nited States, and creating the unique basis for American "democracy," was the economic philosophy of Adam Smith. Mercantilism developed, with the decay of the feudal system, as a result of social needs and changing times. In the 18th Century, the french physiocrats developed an economic philosophy, based upon Locke's doctrine of the ”State of Mature," which rejected all national. controls of early mercantilism in favor of a basis in ”natural supremacy." This economic system regarded govermnent control of business practices and economic transactions as phil(_)sophica_lly and scientifieal Iy unsound. fol-- lowing this line, Smith published Wealth of Nations, in l77b, based upon the same Lockean assumptions. Wealth of Nations developed in detail a complete economic science treating labor, capital, pro- duetion, and exchange upon the basis of Loekean .laisseV. faire. Thus the underlying philosophical assumptions of the culture of the l‘nited States are joined” They are: (l) the egocentric religious doctrine of (falvin, (2) the individualistic political doctrine of Locke, (l) the laissez faire economic theory formulated by the physiocrats and Adam Smith. '“Hie laxitestanit fat11)r ((hilviriisnd ‘tendtwl t()lnflkl}'th0 individual the sol e cause of any unfortunate economic or social circumstances in which he found himself. Locke's political philosophy made the preservation of private pro- perty the sole justification for the existence of govern- ment, thereby rendering unconstitutional any majority legis- lation which curbed working conditions or business practices iii tlufi ixrterwast'cif lnunaii riidits ()r san'iafl ntwnlst Siniilaifly, the laissez faire economic theory prescribed it to be an- scnuul to prawnnit iri;niy way t1u::free play/(H‘ indivithnflistic eu'tiLNi rtmyirdlxass (7f tlu' sotyhil (THTS(KfllPHthR, zuul r(wniired tluit'.lzd)otw'r&s b(F trw'attxl, Iiot: fruin1'thti Stinldlnllllt (Jl' tht‘lP value as human beings, but from the standpoint of the ex- elunige \uilue CH" thClt‘lJHJUP iiizi conuu-titi\w* free nuirketg" (20) S7. lt is important to note that the underlying individualism of thtwn! thr fuin'ticni of the symbol as a representation of the abstract principles, valutws, aiKl sols (If tflie (lOHIlHiUlt ”e(WJn(nni(‘ twitii)nzile." 'Th(’ tiu'tcn"y was built not as architecture, expressing the inner l'ramework ol‘ a social concern, but as machine, a mechanical contrivancc to pro- duce Imndnunan output} "lhtlik(2 the) tcnqile anal tin! tluuntcn),,ttu'liousa! an(l the market place, the factory was built, not out of love and the commerce of society but out of calculation and economic necessities." (U2) (ill. The dominance of "economic rationale" in the complex system of sociocultural literaction in the Pnitcd States is plainly evident in the vast formlessness and spreading blandness of our modern cities. 'kannmnh? rationale" stresses the least'nannrhiry expenditure for the maximum monetary gain. The precludes considerations of beauty, ethics, and the many other social meanings traditionally expressed in our artifacts. The rise of "technical reasoning," which was nearly coincident with the rise of economic rationale in the bnitcd Stxrtcs. 'tendtml to ilirtluAr tin? redtu tion (if our‘ socitnw1lturutl syn»- bols by emphasizing the most efficient use of material and energy in a mechanistic sense. As economic and technical reasoning has grown to become the dominant interests of our society, their expression in the urban form has also become more dominant. Production and consumption have become the goals for.much of contemporary American society. As this has permeated the entire culture it has "tended to pro: ducmzxnore {nullnore iinstitutitnis, (mull one EHWW/hlg a nun4t natwwnv inetniingg. thirC? ilustitniticnis, i1] turni, telul tt) fur'thtu- stman(41t lflie F01(?(If the iJnlividtntl. lluis, in) los(wszi sptm'ific ixrle fixmitvithin which he can identify his function within the total culture as he gains many new but partial roles which are merely parts of a large saxxhil "machiner3u" iAs the total eax:iety becona+;nunx’ complex, its totality becomes more difficult to conceptualize. The city itself, under these conditions, becomes more machine— like as the total- efficiency of its many components, human and vehicle, takes precedence over its service to any individual or group. Neighborhoods are wiped out in the name of more eflicient traflie flow “util litthPCH‘lHJ regard ltn'zuthlsting tC)lflur socicxwiltural meanings ol.‘ the displaced individuals. Many such programs are well intentioned in concept, but falter because they are applied as Laiiverwaal "(nires" lRJr spcmrific anul UHllfllC "il ls." The philosopher—critic, Lewis Mumlord, has stated,"...Thc city in its complete sense, then, is a geographic plexus, an. econo- mic o rganization, an institutional process, a theater of social ,. (‘4 '5 l action, and a aesthetic symbol of" collective unity. And goes on to state that the purpose of the city is, lirst of all, to serve as the framework lor the pursuit of social opportunities, Thus. the "social facts”- ol' the city are primary, with the physical origaliizzlticni s1d3s(u‘vitait t1) tlunn, "()ne f‘urthcr conclusion follows ‘l'rom this concept oi' tln? ('ity: scx‘ial_ fgn'ts (ire [)riinargi, HIKl tlu* plnysi<111 or ganization ot a city. its industries and its markets, its lives of communication and traffic, must be subser- vient to its social needs. Whereas in the development of the city during the last century we expressed the physical plant recklesslv and treated the essential social nucleus, the organs of government and education and social service, as mere afterthought, today we must tlwwlt ‘th(3 scxaial- ninsltuls (l9 idle (wsstwitizil (Ilenuait .in every valid city plan..." (NU) Winds of Changg Although institutions do have implicit super-human capabilities, i.e. historical continuity, collective action, etc., they are consti- tuted by individuals and, therefore can be altered or modil'ied by iiKlivichialji,. llistxar§I is i! c(n1tilnial_ setpieru'e (if .hist'itutrioiuil tdlUiuLC. The first half ol' this century has been the scene of some tremendous alterations of institutional meaning. (ll), As the growth of American cities il("(_‘(_)ill[)illll(‘(l the growth of American 'imlustrial.'i_;'.ation, the tremendous numbers of people, attracted to the cities by the availability of work, created tre- mendous urban problems, physical and social- problems. The condi— tions in the cities at this period are well documented and do not need reiteration here, sul‘fice it to say that they were (US) . deplorable. There were during the entire development ol' these conditions, constant dwnands l'or rel'orm l‘rom some indivi~ duals; however, the vast majority ol' people in the society were able to pacily their consciences within the col lectivity ol' the institutions. That is to say that the conditithls were accepted as a "way ol‘ life" by the majority of people 'in the society. Not all ol‘ the people in society reasoned in this manner ? however; a few, at first, the reformers, the "do- goodcrs,’ etc. refused to allow these conditions to continue. They kept them visible by constant propaganda about them and against them. liventually, other individuals, groups, and institutions became involved and new institutions were formed with the expressed pur- poses oF reform. As popular concern developed into "political pressure" the policy making bodies of government took action through rel‘orm legislation, theitcnements laws, labor controls, antitrust legislation, etc. More important than the legislation, from a sociocultural point ol' view, was the developmdnt and ac- ceptance of new sociocultural meanings and their embodiment in new institutions. Through the incessant cl'l‘orts oi" individuals who felt conl'lict between their ideals and those expressed by b7. the society. the concepts of Lockean pol ities and laissez faire economies became suspect. It was the economic disaster of 102‘), however, that brought many people to realize that the individual was not wholly responsible for his social and economic circum— stances. This realization led to the rejection, by many. of the doc~ trines of Luke, Smith and (falvin which had formed the nucleus ol' American social values and led to a much greater l‘cderalization of many social and economic concerns. The Lockcan principle of extremely limited government was replaced by a new principle of government responsibility for the areas of social concern that private institutions either could not or would not provide, i.e., housing and health protection for lower income segments 01" the population, control of resource allocation, including l and, etc. The laissez l'a ire economic of Smith was replaced by the Keynesian economic of government stimulus to the general economy. And, the Calvinist concept of egocentric individual ism was replaced by a much more humanitarian concern tor the victims of economic cir— cumstances. ()fcourse, there remains a healthy conservatism that tends to check the pace ol' this reordering of val ucs and insti- tutions; but the general direction has been toward more liberal social policies as reflected in the voting pattern of the last thirty years. People, then, are aware of the wide range of meanings within which they structure their values and institutions. The problem is one of understanding. Since teehnol-ogi('~al and economic concerns m1 till 2.. . I - f, ()8. tend to manifest tangible results, they are easily pereeived and aeeepted. The other realms of soeioeultural meaning manifest mueh more intangible results, less easily pereeived and, therefore, more diffieult to eoneeptualize. These more intangible realms are, nevertheless, equally important 'in the development of a romplete and balaneed culture. The soeial. failures of a disbalanee of interest toward the "tangible" values of eeonomies and techniques are readily apparent in our contemporary society. Needed is a restoration of balanee among the realms of soeial interest with the more intangible values beeomingr the objee't of greater eoneern. The study 01' values, interests and meanings then is the basis l'or understanding: their role ‘in eulture and eultural expression. Since the urban planner deals with probably the most eomprehensive system of eultural expression, the eity, be, above all. should have a thorough understanding (it soeioeultural phenomena, and its eom- ponents. Any attempts to alter the pattern and l’orm ol‘ these vehiele eomponents without understanding their relations to the eomponents is destined to be less than sueeessl‘ul. human and meanixr ~T ('1 FOOTNOTES (l) F.S.C. Northrop, "Man's Relation to the Earth in its Hearing on His Aesthetie, lithieal, and Legal Values," Van's l{()l(i iii (iliariggiiiég ‘fllf’ l'ar‘ei (it tll(’ [3;1r'tli, VVni. 1,. llicniui>:, (ml. (Chicago: University of Chieago Press, lOSb), p. lOSZ. (3) lbid., pp. 1052-65. (3) Robt. M. Adams, "The Origin of Cities, "Seientitie Ameriean, Stqrt., l‘HiO, ld’- i—ll). (U) Kingsley Davis, "The Origin and Crowth ol Crbanization in the lVCilrl Ll ," 'rl1(‘ 1\ih(‘l‘ l(‘(!11 .l31