PERCEPTUAL AND COGNITIVE FACTORS
IN CREATIVITY

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

LORRAINE CAROL LEONOWICH
1972

”C.

Tan-3::

 

 

 

 

g.‘ ' BINDIHGBY "

‘ HOAGSHS C‘I'S I

am emnFIv ‘HcI

Llane‘?‘vF“I rs"I
44:

 

 

IIIIII

 

 

 

ABSTRACT

PERCEPTUAL AND COGNITIVE FACTORS
IN CREATIVITY.

BY

Lorraine Carol Leonowich

This study was undertaken to examine the role of
relational cognition in creative thought and the functioning
of the right hemisphere. Relational thought is defined as
that mode of approach to the world which concerns itself
with the patterned inter-relatedness of things and the
generation of meaning structures based upon the dynamic
patterns of unfolding in the world which serve to define
the perceptual identity and symbolic meaning of objects
and events. This is contrasted with an associational
approach to cognition which emphasizes a link by link
construction of abstracted concepts that is little
dependent upon the direct, broadly ranging perceptual
confrontation with the world which is necessary to the
discernment of relational meaning. These ideas are
discussed in the light of the perceptual theories of

James Gibson and Ernest Schachtel, and the findings of

Lorraine Carol Leonwich

research in the areas of creativity and functional brain
asymmetry.

It was hypothesized that high creatives and right
hemisphere dominant persons, in contrast to low creatives
and left hemisphere dominant persons, would exhibit the
characteristics of relational thinkers. They were
hypothesized to be sensitizers and superior in incidential
learning (measured by means of an anagram solving task)
under conditions in which the incidential cues were
embedded in the environment of the room. They were
expected to perform in a superior fashion on the concealed
figures test and the sub-scales of an original test (the
Word PreferenCe Test) which were designed to reflect the
use of and liking for relational thought styles. Right
hemisphere dominance was expected to correlate with
creativity and relational thought. The Barron Welsh Art
Preference Scale and the Fitzgerald Openness to Experience
Inquiry were used as measures of creativity. Hemisphere
dominance was measured by means of the eye movement
response described by P. Bakan and M. Day. Subjects were
college undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology
courses. t tests, analyses of variance, appropriate
correlation coefficients, the chi square and Fisher's
exact tests were used to test the significance of results

related to the hypotheses.

Lorraine Carol Leonwich

Both high creatives and right hemisphere dominant
(left looking) persons were shown to be superior to low
creatives and left hemisphere dominant (right looking)
persons respectively in their ability to discern the
principles of organization behind the word series in the
word preference test. However, a strong case for the
particularly relational quality of this ability was not
made, except in the case of left lockers, who excelled
specifically on the relational items. (Part of this
failure was attributed to the nature of the word preference
test, which needs further refinement.) High creatives and
right hemisphere dominant persons were superior in their
capacity to discern the existence of order, but again the
relational character of the process was not clearly
demonstrated. Some support for the hypothesized relational
character of creative thought was found in the greater
preference of high creatives for relational and sensory
items (as opposed to associational items) on the word
preference test, and in the ability of this test (a
measure of the capacity to discern the inter-connectedness
of things) to differentiate between high and low scorers
on the Barron Welsh, a largely perceptual measure, and
between left and right hemisphere dominance groups. High
creatives did seem to benefit more than low creatives from
the environmentally embedded incidental cues, and were

significantly higher in sensitization; the predicted

Lorraine Carol Leonwich

differences were not found for the left vs. right looker
comparison. The predicted differences in concealed
figures performance were not found. Even though right
hemisphere dominant persons were not found significantly
superior on the Barron Welsh and Experience Inquiry, their
performance on the word preference test (relative to that
of left hemisphere dominant persons) did resemble that of
high creatives.

Sex differences are discussed.

Approved

 

D. Donelson
1970

PERCEPTUAL AND COGNITIVE FACTORS

IN CREATIVITY

BY

Lorraine Carol Leonowich

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
Department of Psychology

1972

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author would like to acknowledge the patient
guidance of (firstly and most particularly) Elaine
Donelson, Andrew Barclay, and Ellen Strommen in the
completion of this project, and to recognize the inspiring

influence of Paul Bakan upon the initiation of this work.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
INTRODUCTION 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1
THE THEORY AND PROBLEM. . . . . . . . . . . 2
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . 30
subjects. 0 O I O O O O O I O O O O 0 30
Procedure and Instruments . . . . . . . . . 30
Part I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 30
Part II 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O 40
smary O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 46
RESULTS. O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 48
Incidental Learning . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Creativity, DBRS, Depression, Concealed Figures,
and Hemisphere Dominance. . . . . . . . . 51
Word Preference Test and Creativity. . . . . . 53
Word Preference Test and Hemisphere Dominance . . 55
Relationship of Performance on the Word
Preference Test to Anagram Performance . . . . 56
Sex Differences . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Incidental Learning . . . . . . . . . . 57
Word Preference Test . . . . . . . . . . 57
creatiVity I O O O O O O I O O O O O 58
Sex, Hemisphere Dominance, and Environmental
cueing O O O I I O O O O O O O O O 58
Sex, Hemisphere Dominance, and Creativity . . . 59
Sex.and Right Hemisphere Dominance . . . . . 60
SUMMARY OF RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Part I O O O O O O O O O I O O O O O 64
Part II 0 O O O O O O O O I O O O O O 67

iii

Page
DISCUSSION 0 0 O O O O O O 0 O O O O O O 69

The Word Preference Measures in Relation to

creatiVitYo I O I O O O O O O O O O O 69
Preference for Items . . . . . . . . . . 69
Principle Identification . . . . . . . . . 69
Criterion Measures of Creativity . . . . . . . 71
Anagram Performance . . . . . . . . . . . 78

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . 81
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
APPENDICES

Appendix

A. Anagrams: Instructions, Scramble Systems,
Cueing, and Key . . . . . . . . . . 89

B. The Experience Inquiry. . . . . . . . . 91

C. Word Preference Test—-Copies of Forms 1 and 2,
With Keyed Answers . . . . . . . . . 96

D. Tables 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O 106

iv

Table

1.

LIST OF TABLES

Means and Standard Deviations for All Subject

Classifications, All Dependent Variables .

Significant t-Test Comparisons, Differences

in Means. . . . . . . .

Analysis of Variance: Significance Levels
for F Ratios With Probabilities Less Than

P = .1 O O I O O O O 0

Pearson Correlations, All Subjects Who
Attended Part II of the Procedure

Correlations, All Subjects Combined

Correlations Between Strength of
Dominance and Other Variables.

Summary of Significant Four-Fold
Analysis. . . . . . . .

Hemisphere

Frequency

Page

106

107

109

110

111

112

113

INTRODUCT ION

Creation is not the invention of that which was
'ASE; it is the profound discrimination of that which is
but previously went unenunciated. To know a thing
profoundly is to discriminate it in the context of its

world, in the patterns of its becoming, in its reaching

‘abeyond itself into the patterns of things other than/seIf>

4"
.---

It is to confront the other in its transcendence toward

the world, in its existence for itself. To know creatively
is not to know utilitously, to impose preconceived orders
upon things whose weight and boundaries are defined in
terms of goals and ends. It is to affirm a thing as it is;
it is the power to empathically trace the.patterns of being
of the other beyond its physical boundaries and parts into
the dynamic swirl of that which it does, of its becoming,
its melting into the world at large by way of its par-
ticipation in its patterned flows. To know in this way is
to know relationally. The purpose of thi§gghesis.iswto,

“—1— H...—

examine the role of relational perception and cognition

W themes.

THE THEORY AND PROBLEM

Some of the theories that haVe been advanced to
shed light upon the creative process (most notably
Mednick's) have been peculiarly intellectual in cast,
emphasizing cognitive processes which are largely verbal
in character and failing to deal with the perceptual-
imagerial end of the problem. This has been in spite of
the fact that any creative production short of madness
must remain within certain limits of concordance with the
universally experienced world. The most valued products
of creative genius tend to enhance, or point out the
patterns of an order already implicit in the world, rather
than to invent ex nihilo ranges of understanding which
have little resemblance to the experience of ordinary men,
should they be placed in the position to see. Indeed, it
is the very universality of the meaning of a work of art,
the broad ranging sweep of coherence which a scientific
theory makes through the fragments of the world, that
insures the worth of both the creator and the thing which
he makes. The ability to perceive truly and profoundly

and to vividly recall the things learned from these

world immersions must play an important role in the
creative process.

The self reports of many highly gifted scientists
and artists are filled with references to the peculiar
perceptual style of the creative personality. Very
striking in these accounts is the extent to which the
critical elements in these persons' productions are drawn
either from the concrete data of raw experience or from
imagerial reconstructions of that experience. It is as
though for them a thing derives its significance not from
the accretion of associations which could be statically
assigned to it, but from the pattern of its becoming in a
world of other becomings. A thing is known most profoundly
when it is known dynamically, in the shifting contextual
patterns of its perceptual being, and it is from these
resources that the stuff of art and creative scientific
insight springs. Van Gogh observes that

Art demands a persistent work . . . and a continuous
observation. The feeling . . . for reality Is more
important than the feeling for pictures, at least it
is more fertile and more vital . . . there is something
. . . of what wood or shore or figure has told me, and
it is not a tame or conventional language, proceeding
less from nature itself than from a studied manner or
system . . . people who do not in the first place
wrestle with nature never succeed. . . . I think that
if one has tried to follow . . . the masters, one
finds them deep in reality. . . . I mean that their
so-called creations will be seen by one in reality, if
one has the same eyes. . . . It is looking at things

for a long time that ripens you and gives you a deeper
understanding (Van Gogh, 1967).

 

Einstein wrote in one of his letters,
The words of the language, as they are written or
spoken, do not seem to play any role in my mechanism
of thought. The psychical entities which seem to
serve as elements in thought are certain signs and
more or less clear images which can be voluntarily

produced and combined. . . . The above mentioned
elements are in my case of visual and some of muscular

type.

Stephen Spender, the poet, writes: "For writing it would
imply living my way through the imaged experience of all
these ideas, which here are mere abstractions, and such an
effort of imaginative experience requires a lifetime of
patience and watching . . ."; and from D. H._§awrencea—-
.:§£Eii§~3~£SEQ-9f supremely delicate awareness and
atonement--meaning at-oneness, the state of being at one
Nwith the object"; Dorothy Canfield: "I can write nothing
if I cannot achieve these very definite, very complete
visualizations of the scene" (Ghiselin, 1952).

However, the foremost theories of creativity take
little note of this and largely confine their speculations
and research to a verbal sphere which is far removed from
the exigencies of creative perceptual and imagerial
experience. Mednick's theory (Mednick, 1962), dependent 2a
it is upon world-estranged verbal association hierarchies J
(which repeat the conditioned enshrined of the abstractly
known and which link contextless, motionless fragments),
and upon the invention of a principle of utility against

which to judge and determine the creative, is antithetical

in spirit to the position which is outlined in this paper.

This is not to deny that highly creative persons might be
quite adept at producing unusual chains of verbal‘
associations; it is to deny that the process of producing
remote, chained verbal associations has a significant role
to play in creative productions of any greater importance
in the intellectual history of mankind than the activities
of Madison Avenue.

The theoretical formulations with which most of
the ideas in this paper are most closely akin are those of
Schachtel (1959) and Gibson (1959). In his book,
Metamorphosis, Schachtel discusses a style of perception,
th ‘aiiéééakii锧§§21 whighflhe_gh§;acterizes as essential

tg_creative activity. In brief, allocentric perception

 

can be characterized as contextual (relational) and dynamic,
and as enhancing the perceiver's knowledge of the object
taken as a thing which exists in its completeness only

with respect to other things. Because it is open to the
complexity of an object's potentiality for being,
allocentric perception retains the capacity to return

to the object again and again in a fresh discernment of

its meaning. An object which is known allocentrically is
known in its totality, and is affirmed in its independent
being, in the complexity of all of its knowable character-

istics and interactions with other objects. This is in

,fwwarwr’ ‘x\ //r’-\; _l.ur-
contrast with the autocentric mode of know1ng, which

I

"\.~-—-—

 

x

singles out only a limited range of characteristics of

the object, those concerned with its utility as a means of
need fulfillment or those salient sensory characteristics
which produce a feeling of pleasure or pain in the
observor, and uses these to statically define the object
and simplistically, exploitatively fixate its "meaning."
The result is isolation and failure to grasp the complex
web of interactions in which the object may engage. Since
the activity of tracing out the patterns which an object
makes in the world in the process of defining its dynamic
existence, and equating or linking these patterns of
relational movement with the patterns produced by other
superficially distinct objects, appears to be involved in
the creation of symbols, parallels, and allegorical themes
in painting, literature, and even musical composition and
scientific theory, i1.'...c.£:::1n.__be.fassmned—42hzerI:--—relativ:an=nr:rl--w
process; Here, the pattern of an object's becoming and
the significance which it shares with the patterns of
other objects is more crucial in its understanding than
specifying the nature of its usefulness or giving a list
of the sensory characteristics with which it assaults the
observor, so long as this list does not serve to integrate
the object with its surrounding world in a mutual elabo-
ration of meaning. Certainly "usefulness" is no criterion
for discriminating the creative from the mad (Mednick's

claims to the contrary); but the ability to profoundly

discern and relate the fragments of the world, not
associationistically but according to their shared patterns
of unfolding in the world, is.

There is much in this which is similar to the
approach taken in James Gibson's theory of perception.
Gibson (1955) takes direct issue with those theorists
who claim that perceptual learning takes place as the
result of the association of previously meaningless and
isolated fragments into an object whole, and who also
assert that the perceiver becomes less and less involved
with the stimulus field (which is in itself meaningless)
and more dependent upon associational, world estranged,
memory patterns as perceptual learning progresses.

Instead, Gibson holds that the stimulus environment is"
M r M

, ,—.——-——._._- ._.Wi

 

fundamentally meaningful, that perceptual learning takes
,__ __\_‘_» _fl_fi._ii__i

‘Pflflj

 

 

_place as_the_result of a proc ' ' ti ' n
of thsiéWWI—W
j~wisw

and that increased awareness and differentiation of the
stimulus field accompanies perceptual learning. So meaning
is found through a process of continuous reconfrontation
with the stimulus, resulting in an increased ability to
discern the stimulus in the context of its perceptual
field, not in the acquistion of a complex of associations
which abstract the object and make it unnecessary to
confront it in all the detail of its phenomenal reality
again. (According to the associational view, a glancing

superficial look triggers the defining associational

pattern and allows the person to use the object without
confronting it allocentrically.) An object's identity is
established by way of the observed constancies in the
relationships between its parts and in the dynamic patterns
it traces out in the context of its perceptual surroundings.
Previous discrimination of meaningful stimulus patterns
facilitates the active discrimination of that pattern in
future stimulus arrays. Profound awareness of an object is
relational, temporal-dynamic, increasingly stimulus

attuned, and complexly multi-modal.

Indeed, James and Eleanor Gibson (1955) have
provided experimental evidence indicating that, in the
initial stages of perceptual learning, before the object
is adequately known, verbalizations reflect a process of
seeing objects in isolation from one another, with each
one subsumed under an abstract type which classifies its
characteristics. The subjects in this study were given a
sequential array of nonsense shapes from which they were
to select the shapes which matched a stimulus shown to
them at the start of the procedure. They were asked to
verbally describe all the items of the series as they
proceded, and a record was kept of these responses. This
first stage involved the use of naming responses (nouns)
such as "spiral," "figure 8," which seemed to reflect
the incorporation of the experience into the abstractly

associational store of general stimulus types, accompanied

by a lack of attention to the unique characteristics of
the presently whelming perceptual field. However, as
learning progressed and the subjects came to more fully
know the objects, their verbal responses turned to
relational adjectives and adverbs ("thinner," "more
circular") and increased attention was paid to the things
immediately at hand. In this final condition which marked
the point at which the stimulus objects were first known
in their unique identity, the characteristic patterns for
one object were related to those of other objects, and the
increasingly correct differentiation of the identify of
one shape simultaneously implied an increased awareness of
the identity of the other, because each was truly known
only as it was integrated into the context of the rest of
the perceiver's world. This process of increased object
confrontation accompanied by the relational interdependence
of object differentiation and definition appears essential
to a truly accurate, insightful understanding of the
world. Anything less, and particularly the use of hastily
applied verbal categories in an avoidance of genuine
contact with the world, appears to lead to over-
simplification and stereotype. These fail to lead to

a vision of the world in which one part illuminates,
retraces, interacts with another part in a co-dependence
of meaning. Perception in this last mode is auto-centric,

object estranged, and invokes the imposition of

10

pre-established meanings upon a minimally recognized
object. If used habitually, such a style of approach to
the world could hardly be expected to lead to creative
insights about the nature of things.

Evidence for the relevance of a relational style
of perception to creativity and the inadequacies of verbal
association approaches (i.e., Mednick and Guilford's
notions of fluidity and unusualness) appears in several
studies. Riegel, Riegel, and Levine (1966) have found
that the notion that a generalized verbal associational
fluency is the facilitating factor behind the productivity
of HC's as determined by performance on the Fricke Creative
Personality Scale is an over-simplification. Other
organizing processes beyond the mere facile production
of numerous associations appear to be involved, and under
certain conditions, low creatives exhibit the associational
superiority usually attributed to HC's. (The following
abbreviations will be used throughout the text: HC = high
creative: MC = middle creative; LC = low creative.) These
researchers found that high creatives gave a larger number
of different responses when asked to associate to the
stimulus word only when the subject was asked to give
logically related responses: superordinates (for example,
giving a response of "fork" to the stimulus word "utensil"),
coordinates ("train" to "bike"), subordinates ("convertible"

to "car"), similars ("auto" to "car"), and contrasts

11

("foolishness" to "wisdom"). In contrast, low creatives
gave a significantly larger number of associative responses
when they were asked to name functions ("eat" for "fork"),
parts ("handle" or "metal" for "fork") and attributes of
the stimulus words ("maturity" for "wisdom"). The
responses which are closest in spirit to relational
functioning are the logical responses, since these involve
drawing parallels between discrete objects on the basis

of similarities in their patterns of relationship to the
world. In contrast, the LC's were significantly superior
in differentiating the parts of static things taken in
isolation, and in listing them (such responses fell into
the parts and attribute categories). They also were more
adept in naming uses for things, a function which involves
the imposition of a need determined category upon an
object whose unrelated attributes and patterns of
independent existence in the world are ignored. (This
latter response type formed the "functions" category,

and consisted in giving answers like "drive" for the
stimulus "car"). Thus, a simple explanation of creativity
in terms of habit strength and association hierarchies
appears ill-founded; differences between the HC and LC
groups appear to depend upon the type of task and the
relationship between the associated elements. The worlds
of high creative subjects are peopled with objects that

extend beyond themselves and implicate other objects in

12

the definition of their meanings. Things don't stand
alone, but are involved with one another in hierarchies

of relationship and degrees of similar functioning. Such
a world vision would seem to be the necessary precursor

to symbolism and philosophical perspective. The cognitive
style of low creatives seems to be in contrast more
isolating and less integrative; there is some evidence
that they conceive of things in more autocentric, need-
confined terms.

Jacobson, 23.3l' (1968) were unable to demonstrate
any relationship between scores on the Remote Associates
Test and the ability of S's to use the process of mediation
in learning concepts whose solutions were themselves
associations to members of an already memorized list of
paired associates. Mednick had designed the RAT to
reflect his theory of creativity, which was based upon the
hypothesis that high creatives possessed flat verbal
assocation hierarchies and were able to combine ideas into
new forms by using a remote associate commonly appearing
on two discrete hierarchies to combine the central elements
of each into a new synthesis. The fact that high scorers
on the RAT are not more adept at using the process of
mediation in problem solving at least casts doubt upon the
theory which attributes success on the RAT to processes
involving verbal association and mediation. If the RAT
can be assumed to have any correlation with creativity,

such a finding also casts serious doubt upon the validity

13

of the use of theories of verbal association to explain
the cognitive behavior of high creatives.

Using the RAT as a criterion measure for creativity,
Mendelsohn and Griswald (1964) have demonstrated the
superiority of HC's in incidental learning. The task
Mendelsohn and Griswald used to measure incidental learning
was an anagram task, which is peculiar in that the
solution to the task is inherent in the task stimulus
itself, and previous exposure to the stimulus pattern of
the solution words in the incidental learning treatment
could relationally mediate the differentiation of the
anagram words in terms of their correct solution. A
reasonably quickly solved anagram often seems to "spell"
its solution automatically, in the very act in which the
anagram is seen, without need of a laborious cognitive
process in which the anagram is taken apart and re-
synthesized, bit by bit, as the respondent associates to
each pronounceable fragment until a word is formed. The
HC's were superior in their performance on incidentally
cued anagrams even though MC's and LC's were equally as
likely as HC's to recall the incidental cues. Since
verbally reportable memory for the incidental cues does
not seem to be related to this form of learning, it is
possible that the information so acquired is not in the
form of traditional associationistic verbal bonds and is in
fact fundamentally unverbalizable, thus exerting a subtle,

seemingly "unconscious" influence upon behavior.

14

It is possible that this influence is primarily
upon the perceptual process of attending to the stimuli
themselves, determining the way in which the person differ-
entiates his world and selects out patterns of meaning.
For instance, previous incidental exposure to the form
"triangle" might, according to this explanation, provoke a
selective perceptual discrimination of that pattern of
events which produces a notion of triangularity from the
many possible types of sets of relationships between the
parts of the stimulus world. Thus the probability that
the subject would preferentially discriminate those
relationships between parts of his stimulus world which
fulfill the requirements of triangularity would be
increased. If he is attending to verbal stimuli, the
probability that he would discriminate those verbal
elements which are the equivalents of the imaged triangle
would similarly be increased, and he would come to scan
the anagram in just the proper sequencing of letters so
that they would come to spell the concept name. He need
never begin a process of verbal association to the
combinations which result from a conscious disjoining and
joining of letters to solve the problem. Ready accessi-
bility to the relational imagery of the past would aid in
the differentiation of meaning from the present, and the
resulting understanding would not be attenuated through

the imposition of fragmentating verbal encasements upon a

15

reality which ought to be confronted directly as the
fountainhead of all fresh knowledge.

William Paradowski (1967) has demonstrated that a
sense of novelty enhances incidental learning. Contextual
perception and the activation of remembered relational
images, steeped in the varying contexts of past experi-
ences, by an encounter with some pattern in a present
which but partially echoes the past, should enhance the
sense of novelty and hence increase incidental learning.
The pattern of relationships which defines the object in
its world is never completely constant from setting to
setting, and the present never completely duplicates the
past, so the possibility of combination and expansion of
meaning arises. In contrast, an associationistic,
abstracting, primarily verbal non-contextual approach to
the world would be less sensitive to the variations
imposed by time and circumstance, and would result in a
diminished sense of novelty. Past and present would be
collapsed into sameness, while attention was narrowed,
learning reduced.

William C. Ward (1969) has found that highly
creative children use the incidental cues in their
perceptual environment as aids to problem solving; they
do not use associative processes as a source of ideas
nearly as much--almost all of their responses are based

upon discoveries made in the world at hand. In this

16

study, the incidental stimuli consisted of objects and
pictures scattered about the experiment room. The subjects
were asked to name everything they could think of which
would fit in a given descriptive category (for example,
the category of all round objects). The room furnishings
included things which were possible solutions to the task.
Ward's high creative subjects could be described
as scanners, since they obviously explored the environment
more than did the low creatives. Scanners tend to be
Sharpeners, persons sensitive to small differences between
stimulus elements (Klein, 1958). Levelers, on the other
hand, are less sensitive to such differences, and seem to
be collapsing their variable perceptions into a few
limited, abstracted categories (in a process which is
analagous to that which is described in associational
theories of perception and is reminiscent of the verbal
and mathematical processes advocated by those scientific
thinkers who distrust the role of perceptual imagery in
thought and insist upon the natural superiority of
disembodied, "abstract" reason). Now Sharpeners tend to
be sensitizers (Steele, 1961) who tend in turn to be
subject to interference on the Stroop test. One would
expect that people subject to a high degree of inter-
ference in the Stroop situation find themselves so because
they are simultaneously processing several sets of cues,

and are in a position to see several dimensions of order

17

in their mutually relational context. In the Stroop
situation, this tendency would result in seeing a combi-
nation of verbal and color cues in contradictory relation-
ships, creating a tension that would have to be resolved
in favor of one dimension to the exclusion of the other
and that would cause the subject to achieve a poorer time
score as he tried to resolve the conflict. Predictably,
Amster (1965) has found that subjects high in Stroop
interference are also superior in incidental learning.

The very attentiveness to the contextual situation which
facilitates incidental learning and perhaps provides the
raw substance of creative thought is debilatory on a task
such as the Stroop, which requires a ready blocking out of
the "irrelevant" part of the stimulus field.

Amster also found that subjects who were faster
at reading the color words on the Stroop than at naming
colors, and subjects who had a low threshold for
tachistoscopically presented words, were poorer at
incidental learning. This perhaps occurs because both
these groups of subjects use an efficient, abstracting
perceptual style which results in the imposition of prior
established categories upon the world instead of the use
of information which comes from a careful differentiation
from that world. Judgments under such circumstances-
would be rather world-estranged. Such a perceptual—

cognitive style, in its non-relational, contextless

18

focusing, and heavy reliance upon the process of fitting

a stimulus into an abstract and over-learned category,
results in an exaggerated leveling, a neglect of detail,
and a high degree of stereotypy. The individuality of the
object, as well as previously undiscovered patterns of its
relationship to the world, are lost. Even though the
Gibsonian perceiver does learn to differentiate particular
patterns of relationship in the stimulus field with the
aid of past experience, this does not lead to stereotypy
because the patterns are discerned from, not imposed upon,
the stimuli. In other words, the stimulus in its unique
identity is primary.

Epstein and Arlinsky (1965) have found that
syntactical verbal material is easier to learn than
unsyntactical material only under intentional learning
conditions, and not incidental. This finding suggests
that material incidentally learned is not necessarily
collapsed into the patterns of established cognitive
schema, and hence can be absorbed non-prejudicially,
even when it is found to conflict with the demands of old
ideas. (It can be assumed that the unfamiliarity and
unorthodox rule—defying nature of ungrammatical statements
interfere with focal learning. If these characteristics
do not effect incidental learning in a similar way, it can
perhaps be concluded that an increased capacity for

incidental learning would result in an increased capacity

19

for picking up discrepant, unorthodox information from
the stimulus field.) So it appears that a relational,
allocentric, stimulus affirming form of perception and
cognition is more likely to facilitate creative produc-
tivity, and that incidental learning might be a special
example of the results of such an orientation, adding in
its turn to the dimensions in terms of which the world is
subsequently discerned. Indeed, high creatives tend to
produce Rorschach protocals which are rich in context;
parts are integrated into interconnected wholes, and there
is a profuse perception of movement (a capacity which
Rorschach attributes to an ability to empathically identify
with object, i.e., to internally repeat the world relation-
ships of the other) [Rorschach, 1942; Rawls and Slack,
1963].

Since Bakan (1969b) has found that people who
swing their eyes right when shifting from a mode of passive
receptivity to one of active response (as occurs when they
finish listening to a question and ready their reply) are
subject to less interference on the Stroop test, this
brings us to a consideration of the work which has been
done in the field of brain asymmetry. In humans, right
looking under such circumstances has been theoretically
associated with a more rapid activation (hence dominance)
of the left hemisphere of the brain, while left looking

has been held to indicate right hemisphere dominance.

20

(Stimulation of the occipital lobes of either hemisphere
in primates and man is accompanied by a contralateral
swing of the eyes [Wagman, Krieger, and Bender, 1958].)
The two hemispheres have been found to be quite different
in the range and styles of their capacities, and the differ-
ences are directly related to the issues of creativity and
relational cognition and perception discussed earlier.
For instance, left lookers (right hemisphere dominant
persons) have been found to be more susceptible to
hypnosis; those susceptible to hypnosis are more subject
to interference on the Stroop (Bakan, 1969a), and hence
are possibly superior in incidental learning. Persons who
are left lookers have a greater percentage of alpha content
in their brain patterns (Bakan, 1969c); this is also true
of the readily hypotizable and those who engage in medi—
tation, and above average alpha production has recently
been claimed as a phenomenon among artists, musicians
and "introspective and intuitive" persons (Alpha Wave of
the Future, 1971). The mode of consciousness in hypnotic
and meditative states is often profoundly allocentric.
Kasamatsu and Hirai (1969) cite personal reports which
bring to light the object centered, goal suspensive
nature of the meditative experience, to wit:
The Zen masters reported to us that they had more
clearly perceived each stimulus than in their normal
waking state. . . . Each stimulus is accepted as
stimulus itself and treated as such. One Zen master
described such a state of mind as that of noticing

every person on the street but of not looking back
with emotional curiosity.

21

Huxley (Erickson, 1969) describes a state of "deep re-
flection" which he utilized in order to accomplish his
writing and which was characterized by a profound pro-
gressive psychological withdrawal from externalities and

a complete absorption (often accompanied by intense
imagery) in the matter which was the focus of his work.
Alpha waves are more prevalent over the right hemisphere
of the brain than over the left (Bakan, 1969c) and in the
brain wave patterns of practitioners of meditation.
Hypnosis prone persons are characterized by deep imaginative
involvement, rich subjective states, and an interest in
the life of the mind (Bakan, 1969a). (Barron [1968] has
found that high creatives have high intellectual values
and broad, humanistic interests.) Left lookers have more
humanistic interests and better imagery than right lookers
(Bakan, 1971). The right hemisphere, dominant in most
people during sleep (it is most responsive in terms of
evoked potentials during this time [Giannitrapani, 1964]),
has been implicated in the symbolism and imagery of

dreams (Bakan, 1971). Thus, one would expect high
creatives to be scanners, Sharpeners, sensitizers, better
in incidental learning, prone to Stroop interference,
susceptible to hypnosis, left lookers, and to have distinct
humanistic interests and a greater than average ability to

generate alpha activity and hypnagogic imagery.

22

In his brain stimulation studies, Penfield (1963)
has reported the finding that visual illusions of inter-
pretation (involving a change in the intensity, speed,
direction, size, and apparent distances of objects from
the observor); illusions of recognition (a feeling that
what is being observed is familiar, unreal, or strange); and
visual flashbacks (an hallucinatory reliving of some past
part of experience, often involving all the details of
sensory consciousness at the time of the incident) all
occur primarily in association with the electrial stimu-
lation of the right hemisphere. The interpretative cortex
appears to be an area which assists in the interpretation
of present experience by means of a subconscious filtering
through the matrix of past relationships. Penfield thinks
it participates in the elaboration and alteration of
concepts. It is interesting that the flashback experi-
ences elicted from this region only center around what
appears to be acts of allocentric watching and listening,
which involve an active differentiation and accomodation
of the facets of the world. They do not involve auto-
centric, automatic, or over-learned activities such as
eating, sexual excitation, running, writing, or speaking.
Most of these illusional experiences involve a vivid
awareness of the full context of events, and are far more
complete and intense than memory (closely resembling the

imagerial revery experienced by many highly creative

23

people). It is also quite interesting that this hemisphere
is the sole province for the reliving of visual experi-
ence. Schachtel (1959) has pointed out the paramount
importance of vision in the development of allocentricity,
in that vision mediates the ability to select out an
object from the field, concentrate upon it, and explore

it in a manner free of the demands of pleasure or need
fulfillment. It is followed in this effectiveness by
touch, another sense which, in its relational functioning
in spacial perception, is associated with the right
hemisphere. The visual illusions from the right hemisphere
appear to involve alterations in the relationships between
parts of the stimulus field. Thus there are changes in
relative speed, intensity, size--all of which require
comparisons and context. The blurred vision illusion,
thought by Mullan and Penfield (1959) to be an alteration
in the ability to concentrate, and resembling in its
diffuse inability to differentiate objects the autocentric
immersiveness of the new-born (at least as their world
experience is described in psychoanalytic circles), is
also associated with electrical intervention in the normal
functioning of the right hemisphere. Part of the creative
process involves a focusing as well as a free ranging over
the possible dimensions of order (like a kaleidoscopic
shifting of the fragments of the perceptual field), an

intense degree of concentration upon the objects of

24

concern which are played upon from all angles and degrees
of cognitive, sensual, and motor awareness, connected
through the matrix of similar patterns of becoming with
the meanings of other experiences, and so embellished and
intensified. It is the coalescence of unverbalized
patterns of relationship (for pre-mature verbalization,
like pre-mature categorization of perception and untimely
abstraction, dissects, narrows context, and stills the
movement of becoming) that is the source of flexible,
novel orders of meaning.

It is this "unconscious" consciousness that perhaps
provides the content of language before it is spoken. It
is the task of the perceiver then to engage in what
Einstein called the "laborious" business of verbal elabo-
ration to string out the meanings compacted in visual-
spacial or kinesthetic forms which take on symbolic
significance in the light of the remembered images of
other forms which had spun themselves out in patterns which
were similar. Eisensohn (1962) has observed a decrease in
creative writing ability and Benton (1968) in the ability
to interpret proverbs (which take their meanings from the
relationships between their parts rather than from the
strict identity of their parts after right hemisphere
lesions). The ability to use abstract words which describe
patterns of world relationships rather than concrete

objects is also impaired (Eisensohn, 1962).

25

There is an abundance of other data from brain
lesion studies pointing toward the relational activity of
the right hemisphere. Milner (1968) has found that
subjects with lesions in the right temporal lobe have
difficulty remembering complex figures, where an especially
high premium is placed upon discerning the relationship
between the parts and matching this relational template
against subsequent figures. Kimura (1964) has found that
when melodic material is played into both ears, the melody
going into the left ear (right hemisphere) is heard in
preference to that fed into the right ear, and Milner
(1962) has found that lesions in the anterior right
temporal region lead to a loss in the ability to differ-
entiate melodies. (Melodies are defined by the relation-
ships between tones, not the strict identity of the tones
themselves.) Right hemisphere lesioned persons have
difficulty identifying meaningful sounds (a process which
involves placing them in a context of experience to make
them interpretable) even when hearing for pure tones
(which are relationally meaningless) is adequate (Spreen,
Benton, and Fincham, 1965). They have difficulty matching
cubes of various sizes which they are asked to explore by
using the faculty of touch (Weistein, 1962), and have
difficulty performing a formboard after it has been
rotated 180 degrees (Teuber, 1962), indicating that the

forms have been identified in an associationistic, S-R

26

fashion whose image is shattered when the form is moved to
a different orientation which yet retains the relational
correspondence of the parts. Touch is in Schachtel's

view a sense which is only secondary to vision in the
development of object awareness, and matching objects on
the basis of touch of course involves a cognizance of the
relationship between the parts of the objects. A synthesis
of the sequential stimulus inputs achieved by running the
hands over the object into a coherent whole which is
uniquely characterized by the proportion and angular
orientation of its parts (which are relational consider-
ations) provides a means of identifying the objects, and

a comparison between the objects thus known makes possible
an effort to match like with like. Teuber also found that
the double Necker cube reversed itself only with difficulty
for these persons. Both these last findings point to a
disruption in the ability to deal with the relationships
between the parts of a figure. Patients with right sided
lesions copy things in a piecemeal, unplanful manner, as
though the parts formed no overall patterns of coherence.
Proportion, perspective, the arrangement of different
parts of a drawing, are all defective (Hecaen, 1968), but
the indication of a non-relational detail in the drawing
is intact. In contrast, left hemisphere lesioned persons
tend to over-simplify their drawings, losing part of their

complexity, as though an abstracting process gone mad had

27

imposed its killing generalities upon the object. Using
the Rorschach as a testing instrument, Hall, Hall, and
Lavoie (1968) have reported remarkably similar findings;
left hemisphere lesioned persons produce a disproportionate
number of rejection and perplexity responses in an interpre-
tative style which is overly self-critical, arid, and
unimaginative; in contrast, patients with right hemisphere
lesions produce protocols which are exaggeratedly expansive
and undisciplined, achieving unusually high numbers of
responses characterized by movement, color, F minus, and
fabulizing. Hall, gt_gl. conclude that these findings are
the result of a pathological exaggeration of processes
normally found in the respective hemispheres, and that the
left hemisphere is the critic, the judge, the evaluator,
while the right is the innovator, the phantasizer, the
artist.

It has been found that injuries to the right
hemisphere are connected with disturbances of "spacial
thought," resulting in disruption of the ability to
construct designs, to orient with respect to a plan or
geographical map, and to describe and visualize familiar
itineraries and places. Such abilities would require the
relational integration of inputs from several distinct
sensory modalities, for instance visual and kinesthetic
cues. Semmes (1968) has pointed to evidence for a diffuse

physiological organization of the right hemisphere (as

28

opposed to a focal one for the left) leading to a capacity
for heteromodal organization, a convergence of unlike
elements (gravitational cues, touch, kinesthetic and
visual cues) to produce a single supramodal space. The
diffuse organization perhaps plays a facilitating role in
the combination of associationistically "remote" ideas
through a discovery of a pattern of integration with the
world which they share and which points to a common focus
of meaning (just as the evidence from sight and feel can
point to a common slant in the world), a role in the
creative synthesis of a single pattern that subsumes a
large number of previously unrelated observations, or in
the discovery of common patterns of relationship to the
world on the part of objects which are superficially
different. In contrast, the left hemisphere would
specialize in activities requiring the close integration
of like units. Support can be found for this in the
dominance of the left hemisphere in the intricate muscular
coordination needed in active speech, and in the superiority
of coordination for most persons in the right hand, as well
as in the logical and critical faculties (requiring
exacting comparisons against a logical standard) in which
this hemisphere appears to specialize. (It is interesting
to note Rokeach's finding [personal communication] that
artists, while ranking intellectuality high in their

hierarchy of central values, tend to rank logicality low.)

29

On the basis of what has been discussed, it is
hypothesized that creativity is correlated with right
hemisphere dominance. Both high creatives and right
hemisphere dominant people will prefer and use a relational
style of dealing with the world. They will be sensitizers
rather than represssors, and will besuperior in incidental
learning and other measures which tap a relational, world
attuned approach in perception and cognition. Left
hemisphere dominant people, because of the dominance of
that hemisphere in verbal functioning and conventional
logic, and because of the characteristics found true of
right lookers, would be less creative repressors who were
poorer at incidental learning, and who used an associational
approach in problem solving. Conventional tests and
experimental procedures are used in investigating these
hypotheses, as well as an original test designed to
measure relational thinking and preference for the use of
relational principles in cognitive organization. More
specific hypotheses are given following the description of

the procedures.

EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES

Subjects

The subjects were 96 students (46 males and 50
females) recruited from introductory psychology classes
in return for extra credit points in their courses. All
96 participated in Part I of the study outlined below, and
49 of these same subjects (25 males and 24 females)
returned 3-5 days later to complete Part II. Subjects who
participated in Part I of the study were not required to
return for Part II, and credits were awarded separately

for the two parts.

Procedure and Instruments

 

Part I

In several group sessions, all subjects were
administered the Barron Welsh Art Preference Scale, the
Fitzgerald Openness to Experience Inquiry, and one of two
forms of an original verbal test, "The Word Preference
Test," designed to measure preference for and use of
relational patterns in concept formation. Both the Barron
Welsh and the Experience Inquiry have been shown to posi-

tively correlate with traits typical of high creatives.

30

31

Barron (1953b) has found that subjects who score
highly on the Barron-Welsh Art Preference Test are more
resistant to pressures to conform to group opinion, have
wider interests, are more fluent (Barron, 1953a),
impulsive, original, intellectual, artistic, cynical,
esthetic, and feminine (for males) while low scorers are
conforming, rigid, and control impulse by repression. The
Barron Welsh has been found to successfully differentiate
an artist population from a non-artist subject group; a
study using a revised art scale correlating .85 with the
complete Barron Welsh test has found that high scorers
claim to be more complicated, individualistic, and
rebellious, while low scorers are conservative and
conventional; scores on the revised art scale are also
related to recognized creativity in various fields (Barron
and Welsh, 1952; Rosen, 1955). Reliability figures for
the art scale range in the .90's (Welsh, 1959).

High scorers on the Fitzgerald Experience Inquiry
give significantly more original responses than low scorers
on a word association test and object sorting task; they
exhibit a "looseness of repression" (as measured by the R
scale of the MMPI), and describe themselves as artistic,
complicated, individualistic, cynical, imaginative,
impulsive, interests wide, energetic, and unconventional
(for females), in contrast to the conventional, cautious,

inhibited self-descriptions of low scorers (Fitzgerald,

32

1966). High male scorers on the Experience Inquiry had a
sensitive inner life, preferred to*work alone at artistic
activities, and were at odds with their environment, while
high scoring females saw themselves as outgoing, active,
dominant, and Open to new and varied contacts with their
environment. No reliability data is available for the
Fitzgerald test.

Because of their obvious relatedness to traits
associated with creativity (Barron, 1968), both the Barron
Welsh and the Experience Inquiry were selected as criterion
measures of this characteristic. The Barron Welse par-
ticularly contains the kind of items--figura1, perceptual,
composed of patterns of varying degrees of inter-
connectedness and complexity, which can provide a sphere
of exercise for a relational approach to the organization
of perception; the more complicated figures, providing more
extensive opportunities for the operation of this style,
would be expected to be preferred by relational perceivers.
It so happens that preference for the complexity integrated
diagrams on this test also results in a high creativity
score.

The Experience Inquiry was selected for yet
another reason, for it contains a cluster of items which
are strongly flavored with the characteristics of what
might be regarded as right hemisphere functioning. This

cluster includes items such as the following: "At times

33

I have focused on something so hard that I went into kind
of a benumbed state of consciousness, or at other times
into a state of extraordinary clam and serenity"; "I like
to indulge in emotions and sensations with the feeling

of just letting go"; "Sometimes I have had the impression
that the walls or the ceiling were moving and changing
size or state, even though I knew this was impossible";

"I can look at an object . . . for a long time, continuing
to discover different things about it" (this has both
relational significance and significance in light of the
connection between right hemisphere stimulation and
alterations in visual concentration); "I would like to get
beyond the world of logic and reason and experience
something new and different" (formalized, verbal logic has
been associated with the functioning of the left hemisphere.
although the right hemisphere is capable of a logic which
is not dependent upon verbal formulazations); "At times I
have actively stared at something familiar and had it
become very strange before my eyes" (metamorphopsia-like,
and perhaps related to the discovery of different
dimensions of relationship within a fixed cluster of
stimuli); ”While lying in bed or reclining in a chair I
sometimes find myself perceiving faces, objects, etc., in
the shadows of the light or the design of the ceiling,
etc."; "I have experienced moments of inspiration and

creativity, when artistic expression, ideas, or the

34

solution to problems I had struggled with came to me with
a special intensity and clarity"; "Solutions to problems
or ideas for new projects come to me at times 'out of the
blue'" (perhaps from non-verbal, "unconscious" sources);
"I have been so strongly in love with someone that I
somehow felt that my own self was fading and I was at one
with the beloved person" (dissolution of body boundary,
reminiscent of brain stimulation phenomena with the right
hemisphere, traditional concepts of id functioning, as
well as the results of some studies on the Rorschach
protocols of dream deprived subjects (Lerner, 1966) and
the reported experiences of persons in meditative and
creative inspirational states); "It is often better to act
upon one's feelings than upon a logically reasoned plan";
"At times the solution to a problem has suddenly occurred
to me while I was engaged in an activity unrelated to the
problem" (again perhaps the gift of an "unconscious"
consciousness capable of independent styles of action and

resident in the right hemisphere).

Both the Barron Welsh and the Experience Inquiry
were used in this study because there is no satisfactory
unitary measure of so complex and ill-defined a phenomenon
as "creativity"; the contents of these tests are different
in form, and as it turned out, not highly over-lapping in
the area of the phenomenon which they cover (the correlation

between scores on the Barron Welsh and the Experience

35

Inquiry was only .3 for this subject group). So both were
used at once, sometimes singly and sometimes in combination
when analyzing relationships with other data, and their
correlations with other measures were expected to shift in
pattern and elucidate different areas of the central
problem. The Barron Welsh and the Experience Inquiry were
not expected to be redundant, equivalent measures, or to be
equally related to the complex of factors under consider—
ation. The degree to which each would be useful was
unknown, because neither had ever been used in the context
of a theory of relational perception-cognition. However,
no claims will be made about the meaning of their discovered
differences, since the comparative nature of these two tests
is not the focus of the current problem.

The word preference test was administered first
with an open-ended time limit (subjects took from 25
minutes to one hour to complete the test), and was followed
by the Barron Welsh and the Experience Inquiry.

A few words must be said about the word preference
test. This consisted of a series of 81 items, each of
which contained four words; in 63 of the items the first
three words "went together" in some way which was specified
by the fourth word. The remainder of the items were
nonsense combinations. The format was quite similar to
that of the Remote Associates Test with the answers

supplied, and a number of RAT items (15) were incorporated

36

along with the ones which were original with the author.
The remaining 18 items had no underlying principle of
organization apparent to the author and represented
nonsense combinations. The 63 meaningful combinations were
equally divided among three principles of organization:
associational, sensory or shared characteristic, and
relational.

The associational grouping consisted of three
words which were dynamically unrelated; their referents
shared no patterns of interaction with the world, and each
word did little to expand upon the meaning of the next.
They represented disjunct objects, each of whose differ-
entiation in terms of any pattern of interaction with the
world did nothing to clarify the meaning of the other
words. These were selected as a cognitive approximation
to the process of seeing the world in terms of discrete
elements upon which experientially false, verbal organi-
zational principles are imposed with little regard for the
complex identity of the elements themselves. Here the
three words were subsumed under a fourth word which was a
cliche verbal associate to the others, but which did not
serve to unite them in any coherent pattern of meaning.
The words in this grouping were examples of a process
where concepts are united by means of the mediation of a
verbal associate, but with regard to little else, forming

a relatively meaningless combination. This kind of

37

combination would occur with considerable frequency if

the Mednick theory of remote association and verbal
mediation were taken in its pure sense, without the
addition of further concepts. An example of this type of
grouping would be: soda kilt butter Scotch. Scotch is a
remote associate to each of the first three words. The
impression is one of paradoxical combination and senseless
fragmentation. However, a certain degree of associational
fluency would be essential to seeing these words as
constituting a defensible combination, however shallow its
significance.

The second type of grouping, the sensory, was
chosen as a verbal-cognitive analog of the process of
taking objects in isolation from the world, differentiating
their parts, and then combining the objects on the basis
of an identity between one of these parts shared by each
of the objects. No attention is paid to the potential
which the objects have of transcending themselves toward
a supramodal, integrating concept-space in which each
acquires additional meaning because it is seen in the
context of the other. The combination is based upon non-
dynamic sensory characteristics which are separated from
the total identity of the object. This isolated character-
istic is the sole justification for utilizing the object
in the combination, which is otherwise barren in meaning.

An example of this type of grouping would be: frog money

38

lime green. An analagous example from everyday life would
involve the exploitative use of a single characteristic of
an object or person in order to fulfill a need state, in
oblivion to the complex of his other characteristics and
their dynamic interaction with the world. The object
would not be allocentrically perceived but autocentrically
used. The words are superficially related and cannot be
subsumed into the same abstract category or symbolic form;
they share only a common sensory sign, a particular
characteristic which has no meaning other than its
circumscribed identity, and they remain in the end very
unsuccessfully combined. However, the solution of these
items would require an object awareness which is one step
beyond that involved in the associational items, and an
ability to conjure up some imagerial, though non-relational,
representation of the objects would be expected to be an
asset to their solution.

The third type of grouping was the relational
grouping. Here the definition of each word element added
to the significance of the other word elements, and the
elements either interacted in the synthesis of a central
meaning or else repeated a common pattern of dynamic, self-
defining unfolding. The elements form their significance
as complete entities in the context of each other, and
the order in which they participate is one which requires

them to transcend themselves in dynamic interaction with

39

the other elements. The list elements make sense together,
yet the whole of their sense is something more than can be
gotten from a mere differentiation of their isolated parts.
The combination is deeper and more profound than in any

of the previous item types. Examples of relational items
would be: apple innocence estrangement Eden; clocks
mathematics music order.

On the word preference test, the subject was
required to decide whether the words in the list went
together for some reason, to identify the principle of
their combination, and to rate the items on the amount of
appeal they had on a 5 point scale ranging from "pleases
me very much" to "pleases me very little."

This part of the experiment was designed to test
the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: It was expected that high creatives
and left lookers would identify the
principle of organization behind the
lists with more success than low

creatives and right lookers,
respectively.

Hypothesis 2: High creatives and left lookers would
detect the mere presence of order with
greater accuracy than low creatives and
right lookers (i.e., the answer "no
principle exists in the organization of
this list" would be used with greater
discretion and mostly where it was
appropriate.)

40

Hypothesis 3: The differences in the performance of
high and low creatives, left and right
lookers, were expected to be particularly
great on the relational dimension,
followed by the sensory and associational
dimensions.

Hypothesis 4: High creatives and left lookers were
expected to be more tolerant of the
dissonance produced by the no principle
items, expressing this by ranking these
items as being less displeasing than the
low creatives and right lookers found
them.

(To see an object relationally in terms of its continuing
evolution in the context of other objects is to be
continually aware of paradox and dissonance and the
potentiality these possess for expanding understanding.)
They were expected to like the relational items most,
followed by the sensory and associational, and to like

the relational and sensory items significantly more than

did the other subjects.

Part II

Subjects were run individually for this part of
the experiment. The subjects reported to a room arranged
so that the subject sat facing a blank wall and the
experimenter from across an empty, symmetrical table. A
tape recorder was situated above and behind the subject so
that the session could be recorded for a possible analysis
of differences in the grammatical structure of the speech

of each of the subject types (i.e., differences in the

41

frequency of use of relational comparative adjectives,
adverbs, and verbs as opposed to nouns and non-relational
adjectives) without the subject becoming distracted by

the machine. (It was later decided to omit the analysis

of this recorded data.) The subject was asked to interpret
ten proverbs which were read aloud one at a time by the
experimenter. The direction of the subject's eye movement
was noted and recorded immediately after the proverb was
read and before the subject began his interpretative
response. This was done according to a procedure described
by Paul Bakan (1969a) and Merle Day (1964).

Embedded in the proverbs were words which were the
solutions to an anagram task which was to immediately
follow. There were two possible sets of proverbs, only
one of which was read to each subject; the set which was
read was alternated between subjects to control for the
possibility that the words cued by one proverb set were
inherently easier to solve as anagrams than the words
which appeared in the unread "uncued" list. Uncued
anagrams served as a base measure of general anagram
solving ability. Subjects given proverb set A to interpret
were not exposed to proverb set B, so the anagrams made up
from set B were uncued for these subjects and measured
unassisted anagram solving ability. Similarly, subjects
read proverb set B had not heard proverb set A, and the

anagrams derived from set A were uncued for these subjects.

42

An equal number of anagrams was made up from the words in
each proverb set, and anagrams from each set were matched
in number of letters and the scramble formula used to
produce the anagram. This proverb interpreting session
provided incidental cues which could not be differentiated
from the room environment, but which theoretically served
as perceptual system primers, increasing the likelihood
that the anagrams so cued would be solved through the
differentiation of their parts in the same order as they
occurred in the cued words. Alternatively, it can be said
that this type of cueing is dependent for its effect upon
an alteration in verbal association hierarchies, increasing
the probability that the cued words would enter the stream
of association which preceded the solution of the anagram,
if such an associational strategy were used in the solution
of the problem. Superior performance on the proverb cued
anagrams accompanied by non-response to the environmental
cues (described below) would indicate a verbal—
associationistic style in problem solving.

Immediately after the proverb interpreting session,
subjects were asked to go to another room where an experi-
menter's aide administered the anagram test. The anagram
test consisted of 30 items--1O of these had been inci-
dentally cued in the proverb situation; the solutions of
10 others were embedded in the room itself, and the 10

remaining anagrams were uncued. Examples of each of the

43

anagram types appeared in a random order in the test (see
Appendix A for a copy of the anagram test used). The
purpose of this procedure was to determine whether creative
young adults and left lookers exploited the stimulus
situation of the present and used it in relational context
with the task at hand to provide incidental cues for the
solution of the problem. The cues embedded in the room
consisted of an umbrella hanging on a hook on the wall,
the word "stashed" in an announcement written in large
letters on the blackboard, pretzels which the experimenter's
aide munched, a container of coffee yogurt which he
unloaded out of his lunch sack (cueing both "coffee" and
"yogurt"), a ball of string against a blackboard ledge,
one way observation mirrors to one side of the room, a
movie screen hanging from the ceiling, and a stuffed

mouse and jumping rope mixed in a group of toys which
were seemingly casually spilling out of a cardboard box
situated on a table in the corner of the room. The toys
were placed in the same location and position for each
subject, and were in plain view to the right and in front
of him. Anagrams in each group type (proverb cued,
environment cued, and uncued) were matched in that one
member from each (having the same number of letters) was
built on the same scramble system; ten different scramble
systems were used in all (see Appendix A.) (A control

group showed no significant differences in the level of

44

difficulty of any of the resulting sets of anagrams.) The
subject was given eight minutes to solve the anagrams
(preceded by a one minute delay to permit him to orient
himself to the room).

This was followed by an administration of the

Thurstone and Jeffry Closure Flexibility Test (Concealed
Figure Test, chosen because the task involves finding common
relational patterns in the abstract figures) and a 90 item
T-F questionnaire containing the MMPI depression scale and

a list of 40 items from the Byrne sensitizer—repressor

scale, selected on the basis of their ability to discrimi-
nate between high and low scorers for a previous subject
population. (This group had been divided into males and
females; the items which were selected were those with
the highest discrimination index for both sex groups.)
The depression scale and sensitizer-repressor items
appeared in the questionnaire in mixed random order.

There were several expected results from this part

of the experimental procedure:

Hypothesis 5: High creatives and left lookers were
expected to show a greater evidence of
incidental learning. Moreover, they
were expected to be most superior to
low creatives and right and middle

lookers in the environmentally cued
anagrams.

45

This hypothesis is in contradiction to the Mendelsohn and

Griswald contention that incidental learning in high

creatives is mediated by associational processes (the

formation of fluid associational links) and that low

creatives pay more attention to "present environmental

and self-produced stimulus configurations."

Hypothesis 6:

Hypothesis 7:

Hypothesis 8:

High creatives and left lookers were
expected to be superior in the Concealed
Figures Test, since this test can be
viewed as a measure of the ability to
match a perceptual template based upon
the defining relationships between the
parts of the example figure with the
patterns of relationship within the
choice figures. The subject must be
able to discriminate the critical
relationships from the complex of other
potential relationships in each of the
complete figures.

High creatives and left lookers were

expected to be sensitizers, and low
creatives and right lookers repressors.

High creatives and left lookers were
also hypothesized to score higher on
the depression scale. Lesions in right
hemisphere cortical areas have been
associated with an increase in euphoria,
and lesions in the left hemisphere with
increased depression; the cortex has an
inhibitory influence upon processes
(like emotion) mediated by lower brain
centers (Truex and Carpenter, 1969).
Depression has often figured heavily in
the lives of creative people.

46

Summary

It would perhaps be of benefit, in view of the
complexity of this study, to give a summary of the
measures in which a relational style of perception-
cognition is expected to be helpful. People who are
relational perceivers are expected to do better in inci—
dental learning, especially under those conditions in
which the solution to the focal problem task is simul-
taneously present with the problem in the environment of
the room. (The proverb cueing of the anagram task is
expected to have associational rather than relational
characteristics, and is not expected to benefit these
persons significantly more than it does the other subjects.)
They are expected to excel in concealed figures solution
(in so far as the relational aspects of this task can
over-ride the confounding difficulty of ignoring the task-
irrelevant aspects of the stimulus), and on the relational
and sensory sub-tests of the word preference test. They
are expected to prefer the relational and sensory to the
associational items. They are expected to score signifi-
cantly above average on the Barron Welsh and the Experi-
ence Inquiry, and to be more frequently left lookers.
Since sensitization is correlated with incidental learning
and may itself be a measure of the capacity to allow the

current of one's life to be disturbed by and intermingled

47

with external influences, relational perceivers are

expected to be sensitizers.

RESULTS

The following statistical tests were used in
analyzing the data: Fisher's t test, an F ratio for the
analysis of variance, the Pearson product moment and point
biserial correlations, and Fisher's exact test. t tests
were used to compare the hemisphere dominance, creativity,
and sex sub-groups on variables related to the hypotheses.
Where data plots appeared to reveal clusterings of subjects
of the same sex, creativity level, or hemisphere dominance
classification in particular areas of the graph (whose axes
were determined by the mean of the total subject group on
each of the plotted dependent variables), chi square tests
were done to test the significance of the resulting cell
frequencies, except where an expected cell frequency fell
below an N of 5; in the latter case, Fisher's exact test
was used as a more appropriate statistical measure in lieu
of the chi square. The F test was done to test the effect
of creativity (as determined by the Barron Welsh),
hemisphere dominance, and sex upon each of the dependent
variables; the Barron Welsh was chosen as the creativity

criterion for one of the main effects of the F test

48

49

because of its characteristics as a non-verbal, perceptual
measure and because of the suspected popularized content of
the Experience Inquiry. (Students in one of the author's
classes admitted to marking certain Experience Inquiry
items in a positively scored direction solely because they
felt that they "ought" to behave in a manner consistent
with the content of the statements; in the present study,
the Experience Inquiry did prove to be less related to

the other variables than was the Barron Welsh.) The
mechanics of running the computer program for the F-test
were also facilitated by using only one creativity

criterion.

Incidental Learning

Contrary to Hypothesis 5, there were no significant
between group differences on the incidental learning
measures (for either environment or proverb cued anagrams)
when the subjects were divided according to their standing
in either creativity (Barron Welsh and/or Experience
Inquiry) or eye directionality (see Table 2). However,
although they were not significant, between group differ—
ences were in the predicted direction for the high vs. low
creative comparison, with high creatives performing better
on the environment cued and proverb cued anagrams than did
the low creatives.

The situation might be further illuminated if we

look at the preferred styles of utilizing information

50

within each of the subject groups. ("Preference" is
measured by the relative number of correctly solved
anagrams cued by each of the incidental procedures.) This
can be done by examining within group differences in the
use of the proverb (verbal associationistic) as opposed

to the environment (perceptual relational) cues in the
anagram problems. We find that high creatives did
significantly better on the environment cued anagrams than
they did on the uncued anagrams (t test, p<.05). This
significant difference was not found for the proverb cued
vs. uncued anagram comparison among high creatives
(although the difference here was in the same direction),
nor was it found for the low creatives in either the
environment cued vs. uncued, or proverb cued vs. uncued
comparisons. So high creatives did seem to show a prefer-
ence for the use of information gleaned from the sensory
evidence of their phenomenal field, in that they signifi-
cantly benefited from such cues, thus demonstrating what
was suggested to be a relational approach in problem
solving. This could not be said of low creatives.
Hypothesis 5 receives partial support from this within
group analysis for the creativity groups; it is not
confirmed for the eye directionality groups. (The general
tendency for subjects on the whole to perform better on
the environmentally cued anagrams than they did on either

the proverb cued (t test, p<.05) or the uncued anagrams

51

(t test, p<.001; see Table 2) might have been sufficiently
strong to obscure between group differences).
Creativity, DBRSL Depression, Concealed
Figures, and Hemisphere Dominance

As predicted in Hypothesis 7, high creatives (as

determined by both the Experience Inquiry and the sum of
the scores on the Barron Welsh and the Experience Inquiry)
are higher in sensitization as measured by the Byrne
Repression-Sensitization Scale than are low creatives (t
test, p<.05, Table 2; the corresponding F test for the
relationship between creativity and sensitization was not
significant). For males, this relationship is also shown
to be significant by a frequency analysis (chi square,
p<.025; see Table 7); high creative males are more likely
to be those who score higher on the Repression-Sensitization
Scale than are low creative males.

Contrary to prediction (Hypothesis 7), left lookers
are not significantly higher in sensitization than right
or middle lookers. However, it was thought that the degree
to which a subject exhibited either left or right hemi-
sphere dominance might bear some relationship to the other
variables, so a "strength of hemisphere dominance" score
was computed by counting the number of times each subject's
eyes swung in the direction used for determining his
hemisphere dominance classification. This score could vary
from 7 to 10, depending upon the number of times the

subject's eyes moved either left or right in a series of

52

10 proverb interpretation trials. Middle lookers were not
included in this analysis, since the notion of strength

of dominance of a particular hemisphere would be of
ambiguous meaning in their case. Using this procedure, it
was found that there is a significant -.7l4 correlation
between strength of right looking (left hemisphere
dominance) and sensitization for males (p<.05, Table 6).
The correlations for females (r=-.010) and for sexes
combined (r=-.424) were not significant. The comparable
correlations for strength of left looking (right hemisphere
dominance) with sensitization are not significant but are
consistently of opposite sign (r=.466 for males, r=.210

for females, r=.351 for sexes combined). Thus strength of
right hemisphere dominance (left looking) might predispose
one toward sensitization, while strength of left hemisphere
dominance (right looking) is likely to predispose one
toward the use of repression, as predicted, particularly

if one is a male.

Neither high creatives nor left lookers scored
higher than low creatives and right lookers respectively
in depression (Hypothesis 8) or on the concealed figures
test (Hypothesis 6). However, middle lookers of both
sexes do significantly more poorly than left or right
lookers on the concealed figures test (t test, p<.025 and
p<.05; see Table 2. The F test for eye movement as a
main effect was not significant.) The last difference had

not been predicted.

53

Performance on the concealed figures test corre-
lates .476, .300, and .380 with performance on environ-
mental cued, proverb cued, and uncued anagrams respectively
(all correlations are significant at p<.01; see Table 4).
The highest correlation is with the hypothesized relational
measure, the environment cued anagrams.

Word Preference Test
and Creativity

 

 

As predicted in Hypotheses l and 2, high creative
subjects (Barron Welsh) show a generally superior per-
formance on the word preference test; high creative
subjects are significantly superior to low creative
subjects in the total number of correct principle identi-
fications across all item types (p<.05, one tailed t test)
and in their performance in identifying the principle
behind the association items, when these are taken alone
(t test, p<.01, see Table 2). The corresponding F tests
for principle identifications were not significant. The
correlation between the Barron Welsh and correct identifi-
cation of the principle behind the association items was
also significant (p<.05; Table 5).

As predicted in Hypothesis 2, high creatives were
superior in order detection (omitting the "no order"
response where it was inappropriate), specifically in the
case of association, sensory, and relational items (t test,

p<.001, .05, and .05 respectively), and generally across

54

all item types (t test, p<.01). The p level for the F
ratio for creativity as a main effect upon seeing order
in the association items was .053; it was .07 for the total
of all item types). The superiority of high creatives in
seeing order generally across all item types was also
supported by a chi square analysis (p<.025, Table 7), and
by the correlation coefficient between the Barron Welsh
and the tendency to incorrectly use the "no order" response
generally across all item types (r=-.201, p<.05), and
specifically in the case of the assOciation items (r=-.226,
p<.05). Among female subjects, high creatives are less
prone to the error of claiming no principle of organization
behind sensory items (chi square, p<.01, see Table 7).
Interestingly, the word preference test does not
significantly distinguish high and low scorers on the
Fitzgerald Openness to Experience Inquiry, but does
distinguish high and low performers on the Barron Welsh
Art Preference Scale. The Experience Inquiry also
distinguishes less between lookers than does the Barron
Welsh. When these measures are combined, only the differ-
ences between high and low creatives in identifying the
principle behind the association items, and in seeing
order in the association items and across all items
generally are preserved, and these are significant at the

.05 level using a one tailed t test. So the predictive

 

power of the word preference test is weakened when the

55

Experience Inquiry is used as a criterion measure of
creativity.

However, Experience Inquiry scores are associated
with some liking indices. The Experience Inquiry alone
correlates significantly with the tendency to like
associational and relational items (p<.05), and high
creatives defined by the joint criterion like sensory and
relational items significantly more than do low creatives,
as predicted by Hypothesis 4 (t test, p<.05; F test not
significant).

Word Preference Test and
Hemisphere Dominance

 

Hypotheses l and 3 are partially supported in that
left lookers have a higher average number of correct
identifications of the organizational principle behind the
relational items than do right lookers (p<.05, one tailed
t test; F test not significant). This superiority was
specific to relational items and was not shown for other
item types. However, it should be noted that relational
items are those presumed to be most central in the test as
a measure of relational thinking. Since left lookers
were expected to show their greatest superiority on the
relational items, Hypothesis 3 gains some support from
this finding.

Consistently with Hypothesis 2, right lookers

commit a greater number of erroneous "no order"

56

attributions than either left or middle lookers, across

all item types (t test, p<.05, Table 2) and on associational
and relational items each considered separately (p<.05;
p<.01, respectively). The F test for the main effect of

eye movement upon failure to see order in the relational,
associational, and over all item types had p values of

.04, .09, and .07 respectively.

Left and middle lookers do not significantly
differ from each other on any performance measure from
the word preference test.

No evidence was found for the hypothesis dealing
with differences in expressed liking for the word prefer-
ence item types among the eye movement groups.

Relationshi of Performanceron the Word
Preference Test to Anagram Performance

 

Overall performance in principle identification is
correlated with performance on the environment cued and
uncued anagrams (r=.286, p<.05; r=.379, p<.01 respectively;
see Table 4). Ability to identify the principle behind
the association items specifically is also related to
performance on the environment cued (r=.334, p<.01) and
uncued (r=.48l, p<.01) anagrams. The patterns of corre-
lation here are similar to those between performance on
the concealed figures test and the anagrams, except that
the correlation between performance on principle identifi-

cation and the proverb cued anagrams is not significant,

57

whereas the correlation between concealed figures and
proverb cued anagram performance is significant. The
significance which this has for any conclusions concerning
the relational character of the word preference, anagram,

and concealed figures tasks will be discussed below.

Sex Differences

 

Incidental Learning

Female subjects appeared to make more use of the
environmental cues in the incidental learning situation
than did males; females more often fell above the mean in
performance on the environment cued anagrams than did
males (chi square, p<.05). Like high creative subjects,
female subjects also did significantly better on the
environment cued anagrams than they did on the uncued ones
(t test, p<.05); this difference was not significant for

males or for low creatives.

Word Preference Test

Females perform significantly better than males in
correctly identifying the organizational principle behind
the association items (t test, p<.01, see Table 2; the F
test is significant, p<.04, see Table 3), and in the total
number of correct principle identifications across all
item types (p<.001; F test significant at the .02 level).
Females are also less likely to incorrectly claim "no

order" generally in all item types (p<.05; the F ratio

58

approaches significance at p=.06), and in the association
items (p<.01; the F test is significant at the .02 level)

and the sensory items (p<.05, F test not significant).

Creativity
Females scored significantly higher than males on
the Barron Welsh (t test, p<.001).

Sex, Hemisphere Dominance, and
Environmental Cueing

 

There appeared to be some fundamental differences
between the sexes with respect to the effect of hemisphere
dominance that warranted exploration, although no pre-
dictions had been made about such interactions. It seems
that much of the difference between males and females in
the use of environmental cues was due to the performance
of female left lookers. (The hypothesized relational
character of the incidental learning task had led to the
expectancy that left lookers in general would be superior
in the environmentally cued anagrams; this was not found
to be the case.) Female left lookers were significantly
superior to male left lookers in performance on the
environment cued anagrams (t test, p<.01; F test not
significant). A Fisher's exact test also showed a
relationship between sex and performance on the environ-
ment cued anagrams for left lookers, significant at the
.005 level (see Table 7); female left lookers were more

often superior in solving the environment cued anagrams

59

than male left lookers. This sex difference was not

found for either middle or right lookers. There was also
a -.598 point biserial correlation (p<.01) between per-
formance on the environment cued anagrams and sex for left
lookers (where females were coded as ”1," males as "2");
this significant correlation was not found for right
lookers or the combined subject group. Indeed, there was
a -.73 correlation between performance on the environment
cued anagrams and strength of right hemisphere dominance
for male left lookers, significant-at the .05 level (see
Table 6), perhaps indicating a contributing handicapping
factor of right hemisphere dominance to the already
inferior performance of males in the relational use of
environmental cues in problem solving. The corresponding
correlation for female left lookers was -.018. The
combination of maleness and right hemisphere dominance
seems to be particularly handicapping to the relational use

of environmental cues.

 

Sex Hemisphere Dominance,
and Creativity

There does appear to be a positive relationship
between strength of hemisphere dominance and creativity
as measured by the Barron Welsh, particularly for male
left lookers (right hemisphere dominant) and for female
right lookers (left hemisphere dominant). For male left
lookers the correlation between strength of right hemi-

sphere dominance and creativity is .746, p<.05; the

60

correlation for female left lookers (r=.337) is not
significant; however, the correlation for combined sexes
remains significant (r=.493, p<.05). The correlation
between strength of left hemisphere dominance and creativity
is significant for right looking females (r=.738, p<.05),
but the corresponding correlations for males (r=.214) and
combined sexes (r=.453) are not significant.

Sex and Right Hemisphere
Dominance

 

 

Even though male and female right and middle lookers
are not statistically distinguishable on any measure
(except in identifying the principle behind the association
items on the word preference test, in which female right
lookers are superior to male right lookers, t test,
p<.05, F test for effect of eye movement x sex not signifi-
cant; and in depression, in which female middle lookers
score more highly, t test, p<.02, with the F for effect of
sex x eye movement on depression significant at less than
the .05 level, see Table 3), there are widespread differ-
ences between male and female left lookers. Female left
lookers perform better than male left lookers on the
concealed figures test (Fisher's exact test, p<.025, see
Table 7), and in various aspects of the word preference
test. Male left lookers are inferior to female left
lookers in identifying the principle behind the sensory

items (t test, p<.05, see Table 2), and in identifying

61

organizing principles generally (p<.01); they are more prone
to erroneously claiming "no order" generally (p<.05), and
in the association (p<.05) and sensory items (p<.01); the
F ratios for the effect of sex x eye movement upon these
measures were not significant. As mentioned previously,
male left lookers were also inferior to female left
lookers in incidental learning as measured by their per-
formance on the environment cued anagrams, and were
inferior to female left lookers on the Barron Welsh (this
last difference, though a seemingly sizeable 6.25 points,
was not significant).

There is a significant negative correlation between
strength of left looking and the number of erroneous "no
order" attributions in the associational category for left
looking females only (r=—.638, p<.05, compared with

=-.029 for left looking males, see Table 6). The
sizeable, though non-significant for this N (12), negative
correlation between strength of right hemisphere dominance
and the general indiscriminant use of the "no order"
response (r=-.54l), and the erroneous use of "no order"

in the sensory (r=-.3l9) and relational (r=-.489) items
which were found for left looking females, are reversed

in direction for left looking males (r general incorrect
use of "no order" = .242; r incorrect "no order" in
sensory items = .353; r incorrect "no order" in relational

items = .422). Although these correlations are not

62

significant, the pattern is remarkably consistent. The
corresponding correlations for right lookers were
essentially zero (except that strength of right looking
correlated .43 with the erroneous use of "no order" in
the relational category for females), and all were non-
significant.

Since for males strength of left looking is related
in a theoretically consistent manner to "personality"
variables such as creativity measured by use of the Barron
Welsh (r=.746, p<.05), and sensitization (r=.466, not
significant), but is related in a direction opposite to
that which would be expected for performance variables such
as incidental learning and the word preference measures
of the ability to perceive the ordered inter-relatedness
of things, one would suspect that some sort of incom-
patability between what might be biologically determined
personality propensities based upon the organization of
these male left lookers' nervous systems and the charac-
teristics demanded of them by their socially ascribed sex
role might hamper what left looking males creatively do in
the world. The pattern of correlations with strength of
right hemisphere dominance is in a theoretically consistent
direction for female left lookers across all of these
measures (although only one of the correlations, that

between strength of left looking and the number of

63

incorrect "no order" responses to association items,

r=-.638, is significant at the .05 level).

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

The following can be said about the original

hypotheses.

Part I

1. As predicted, both high creative (as determined by
the Barron Welsh) and left looking (right hemisphere
dominant) subjects showed superiority in identifying the
principles behind the word preference lists when compared
with low creatives and right lookers, respectively; this
superiority was significant in the case of the association
items for the high creative vs. low creative comparison,
and in the case of the relational items for the left
looker vs. right looker comparison. Although left lookers
correctly identify more principles than middle lookers, the

differences are not significant.

2. When the Barron Welsh is used as a criterion
measure for creativity, high creatives use the "no order"
response in the word preference test inappropriately
significantly less often than do low creatives; this is

true for all item types in the word preference test. High

64

65

creatives, determined on the basis of a summation of
standard scores from both the Barron Welsh and the Experi-
ence Inquiry, were significantly superior to low creatives
only in their general ability to see order and in their
ability to see order in the association items.

Right lookers were significantly inferior to both
left and middle lookers in their capacity to see order
generally (total erroneous "no order" score) and their
ability to see order in the association and relational
item types. Left lookers use the "no order" response
indiscriminantly less often than do middle lookers, but

the differences are not significant.

3. For all subjects, the sensory items were the
easiest (see Tables 1 and 2). We find this by either
looking at the erroneous "no order" scores or the number of
sensory items for which the subjects were able to come up
with the keyed organizing principle. The sensory items
were followed in difficulty by the association and
relational items (except that in the relational items it
was easier to see order, without specifying the nature of
that order, than it was in the association items). So
the subject groups were not distinguished by their ability
to selectively handle one type of word preference item

over another. Hypothesis 3 was therefore not confirmed.

66

4. High creatives (Experience Inquiry plus the Barron
Welsh) were found to like the relational and sensory items
significantly more than did the low creatives, as predicted.
However, there were no significant differences between
high and low creatives in their preferences for the items
which had no underlying organization. The Experience
Inquiry correlated significantly with liking for BEER
relational and associational items, while for low creatives,
a significant positive correlation was found between liking
the sensory items and scoring well on the Barron Welsh and
in incidental learning as measured by the environment cued
anagrams.

The eye movement groups could not be distinguished
on their relative degree of positive response to any word
preference item type, and they did not show a significant
preference for any of the item types, except that left and
middle lookers significantly preferred sensory to
associational items. Therefore it can be said that none
of the predicted within group differences in liking for
the items were found, except in the case of the predicted
preference for sensory over associational items in the
case of left and middle lookers. Generally, across all
subjects, the sensory items were preferred most, followed
by the relational and the associational, and the subject
groups could not be distinguished on the basis of their

preference rankings of these item types. However, the

67

predicted between group difference for high creative and
low creative subjects in preference for the relational

and sensory items was confirmed.

Part II

1. None of the predicted between group differences in
incidental learning were found. However, high creatives
seemed to display a preference for the use of cues embedded
in the environment of the problem room, in that they
performed in a significantly better fashion on the
environment cued anagrams than they did on the uncued
anagrams, whereas their performance on the proverb cued
anagrams gave no evidence of having benefitted from an
earlier exposure to the solution words in the proverb
session, which would have been expected to have a
facilitory effect upon the availability of associational
cues. The predicted differences in incidental learning

for the eye movement groups were not found.

2. High creatives were not significantly superior to
low creatives on the concealed figures test, nor were
left lookers superior to right lookers. However, left
and right lookers were significantly superior to middle

lookers, an unanticipated result.

3. High creatives are significantly higher in
sensitization than low creatives, as predicted. The
predicted differences in sensitization for eye movement

groups were not found.

68

4. High creatives were not found to be significantly
more depressed than low creatives. There were no signifi-
cant differences in depression between the eye movement

groups.

DISCUSSION

The Word Preference Measures in
Relation to Creativity

Preference for Items

As predicted, high creatives (total score) did
prefer the sensory and relational items significantly more
than did the low creative subjects. The groups did not
differ in their acceptance of the association items, which
were the least liked of all item types for both groups.
It is difficult to believe that high creatives would
primarily use a cognitive strategy in problem solving
which often yielded results which they and their less
creative audience found dissatisfying. In the light of
this finding, the hypothesis that creative insight is
primarily the product of abstracted, verbal-associationistic

processes seems highly implausible.

Principle Identification

High creatives (Barron Welsh and total score) were
superior to low creatives in general principle identifi-
cation on the word preference test and in the simple

capacity to see order. However, the predicted patterns of

69

70

differences between high creatives and low creatives on
the principle identification sub-scales of the word
preference test were not found. Indeed, contrary to
predictions, the principle identification task which most
strongly differentiated between high and low creative
groups was the associational one. Part of the reason for
this might be found in the fact that the association items
were the easiest ones for which to find an organizing
principle (see Tables 1 and 2, Part II). The nature of
the category itself was probably the most easily compre-
hensible. Even though the sensory items were not signifi-
cantly easier than the associational ones, the relational
items were quite difficult, and were solved significantly
less often than either the sensory or associational items.
In future research, item difficulty will be reduced and
greater care taken in equating the difficulty of the kinds
of items. Until this is done, the hypothesized differences
between the cognitive styles of high and low creatives
cannot have a fair test, and high creatives cannot be
directly shown to have a greater facility in relational
thought. On the basis of the present data, there is little
reason to arrive at a conclusion that is anything other
than the conventional assertion that high creatives differ
from low creatives in the flatness of their association
hierarchies, and their ability to associate with rapidity

and fluidity. Perhaps a pictorial form of the test would

71

provide a means for making more elaborate distinctions
between the cognitive functionings of high and low
creatives. The verbal form may be too boring, too
difficult, and too indirectly related to the presumed
underlying phenomena of interest, which are mainly
perceptual and imagerial in nature. This indirectness
would be most acute in effect for the sensory and re-
lational items. Thus, the verbal format may be most
handicapping on those items, and particularly for those
people in which we expect the hypothesized perceptual/
cognitive style to be shown, high creatives. A future
research attempt will be directed toward developing a

pictorial version of the test.

Criterion Measures of Creativity

In the context of evaluating the effectiveness of
the word preference test as a measure of basic variables
related to creativity, one must consider again the problem
of defining a suitable criterion measure of creativity and
the related problem of method variance. More specifically,
we are calling into question the current validity of the
Experience Inquiry as a measure of the openness to experi-
ence assumed necessary for creative production. The items
of this scale, though perhaps suitable for identifying
deviant, "creative" beliefs and practices among the
members of a college population a decade ago, now seem

less capable of performing that function. The phenomena

72

they refer to have become so thoroughly engrained in
current "pop culture" that one wonders about their
suitability for a task of differentiating one group of
the young from another. The range of scores on the
Experience Inquiry (16—54) was noticeably smaller than
that on the Barron Welsh (3-57) for this subject group.

The word preference test did differentiate between
high and low scorers on the Barron Welsh, but not between
high and low scorers on the Experience Inquiry. The
Barron Welsh and the Experience Inquiry were correlated
significantly but minimally, r=.3. When both measures
were combined, the power of differentiation of the word
preference test was reduced, and fewer scales yielded
significant differences between high and low creatives
than when the Barron Welsh was used as the sole criterion
measure; the power of prediction of the capacity to see
order was most effected. Using only the Barron Welsh as
the criterion, every word preference sub-scale, with the
exception of the ability to define the exact principle of
organization behind the sensory and relational items,
successfully differentiated between high and low creatives.
Neither the Experience Inquiry nor the Barron Welsh
significantly correlated with any measure other than the
various sub-scales of the word preference test.

The Experience Inquiry, used alone as a criterion

measure of creativity, was correlated with no word

73

preference measure other than those measuring liking for
associational and relational items. The activity of
approval requires less involvement of one's capacities than
the process of recognizing and identifying the nature of
orders. The Experience Inquiry does not seem to be able
to predict a capacity for seeing and identifying orders,
but merely the readiness to approve of patterned events
whose structure may be only incompletely understood.

Adding the Barron Welsh standard scores to the
Experience Inquiry standard scores and using the sum as an
operational definition of creativity resulted in the
finding that the high creatives liked the sensory and
relational items significantly more than did the low
creatives, as predicted. This prediction was not confirmed
when either the Barron Welsh or the Experience Inquiry
were used alone.

The word preference test can be characterized as
a measure of the ability to relate things, to combine them
in a way which is meaningful, and of the capcity to react
favorably to such combinations. It can be said that
creativity, as best we can define it, is positively
related to both of these capacities. The nature of the
mechanisms behind this ability to view one part of the
world in the light of the other, and to combine the parts
into a mutually illuminating whole and find joy in that,

must go undefined because of the failure to get the

74

predicted within group differences in the number of correct
principle identifications for each of the word preference
test item types. However, the fact that the sub-scales of
the word preference test most effectively predicted per-
formance on the Barron Welsh, a largely perceptual measure
of creativity which seemingly would provide ample oppor—
tunity for the appreciation of the interdependence of forms
and the linking of images, is interesting. It would tend
to leave the conclusion that purely associational factors
were responsible for the creative ability of high per-
forming subjects in doubt.

This capacity to discern a relationship between
things, at least in the verbal tests used, appears to be
present to a lesser degree in low creatives, right lookers,
and males. Right lookers, when compared with left lookers,
appear to have particular difficulty with the associational
and relational items; males, compared with females, tend
to have difficulty with the associational and sensory
items; while low creatives, compared with high creatives,
show inferior performance across all item types. This
becomes theoretically interesting when considered in terms
of the contrasting styles of analytical and relational
thinking discussed in the introduction. We would define
analytical thinking as the tendency to view the world in
discrete parts, non—contextually, so that in problem

solving the cues of the environment and similar patterns

75

in "irrelevant" stores of memory are ignored; intuition
(which is based upon the correlation of unverbalized,
incidentally encountered or remembered cues), is distrusted,
and thought proceeds in a link by link fashion, discrete
unit by discrete unit, like in the weaving of an
associational chain based upon verbal conditioning
rather than a sensory-like feel for the qualities of the
elements or an understanding of the common dynamic form
of inter-relationship with the world that they share. It
is like the process of defining and combining objects
or ideas on the basis of commonly shared static qualities,
a like unit to like unit linking, instead of on the basis
of a commonly held gestalt of interaction with the world.
Analytical thought would be exemplified by an attempt to
define a word such as "game" by enumerating all parts and
types of its instance, relational thought by a realization
of the infinity of the category; analytical thought by an
emphasis upon the size or shape of a thing in classifying
it, relational thought by an emphasis upon its function
(not in terms of its potential for exploitative use but in
terms of its pattern of dynamic unfolding and interaction
with other things in the world).

It was my contention that the left hemisphere
provided the analytical style, the right the relational,
and that the right hemisphere provided the content behind

the word stream generation of the left hemisphere. Words

76

stand for relational categories. A "dog" is a thing which
does in a particular way, has a relationship with other
beings which is quite particular, in addition to consisting
of parts whiCh maintain a particular pattern of relation-
ship with respect to each other. A fifteen foot high dog
is as much a dog as a chilhuahua, a long nosed one as a
short nosed one; if we visited Saturn and found peculiar
beings which in no way resembled earthly dogs but whose
existence unfolded before our observing eyes in a par-
ticular dog-like fashion, we would be tempted to call
these creatures "dogs." To characterize "dog" definitively
in terms of enumerated instances (collie, terrier, beagle)
or lists of discrete, associationistic, non-relational
characteristics which all members of the class allegedly
share (brown, short, big eared) is to engage in a
thoroughly hopeless analytical task.

In light of this, it is peculiarly interesting that
low creatives (Barron, 1968), right lookers (Bakan, 1971),
and males (Bardwick, 1971) are less verbally fluent and
hence perhaps have less access to the content providing
image spinning activities of the right hemisphere. Males
pride themselves on their "analytical" cognitive style and
demonstrate it in their tendency to prefer less complex
perceptual patterns (i.e., they have a tendency to prefer
diagrams which portray an abstracted characteristic of an

isolated object, rather than a complexly intersecting

77

display of many lines, and they have a tendency to respond
less contextually ("field independence") in such tasks

as the rod and frame). The inferiority of right lookers
on association and relational items and of low creatives
on all items is consistent with other data. Low creatives
and males in my population are inferior in incidental
learning; people who are inferior in incidental learning
are less susceptible to interference on the Stroop test
(i.e., they are readily able to "abstract" one character-
istic of the visual display and respond to it alone), both
of which characteristics point toward an "analytical,"
isolating style of perception and cognition where elements
are dealt with per se rather than in the context of their
interactions with things and the similarity of these
patterns of interaction with those of other things.
Because of the biological character of their dominant
hemisphere, right lookers might show this weakness in
relational thought on the relational items of the word
preference test (which require them to extend ties of
connectedness across entire scenes and systems of inter—
action). Males in our culture, taught to be spartan,
single minded, and unfeeling, might demonstrate this
isolating style in the sensory items, but there is some
evidence that the preference for simple, non-contextual
sensory input is evident in males from infancy (Kagan and

Lewis, 1965), and so their thought style might be

78

determined by more than social convention. High creatives,
left lookers, and females (who prefer from infancy more
complex, multi-dimensional forms of sensory input) would
then be expected to be relational thinkers. But again,

the finding that the associational items (which are non-
imagerial and non-relational) also differentiate between
these groups cannot be easily explained within the context

of this theory.

Ansgram Performance

Performance on the anagram task was correlated with
only two other measures, the concealed figures test and
the general ability to identify the principles of organi-
zation behind the items on the word preference test,
particularly the associational items. It was not corre-
lated with creativity as measured by either the Barron
Welsh or the Experience Inquiry, or with sensitization, as
might be expected for an incidental learning task. The
correlations were significant (p<.01) for the relationships
between concealed figures performance and all conditions
of anagram cueing (uncued, proverb cued, and environment
cued). The correlations were also significant (p<.01) for
the relationships between anagram performance and the
above mentioned word preference test measures, but there
were two exceptions--performance on the proverb cued
anagrams did not correlate significantly with either

general principle identification or the specific ability

79

to identify the principle of organization behind the
association items on the word preference test. Clearly
the capacity to pick up and utilize incidental cues from
an immediately whelming perceptual environment and the
ability to bring past learned incidental verbal cues (or
the altered association hierarchies which result from them)
to bear on a present problem situation are not altogether
identical.

It would be convenient if we could ascribe the
same underlying process, a non-verbal process of relational
perception and cognition, to performance on all three of
these measures, anagram solution, concealed figures, and
principle identification. However, there is no significant
correlation between performance on the concealed figures
test and the word preference sub-scales that also correlate
with anagram solution. That is, the measures which are
correlated with anagram performance are not correlated
with each other. A one-factor explanation is particularly
strained in that the only word preference test measures
correlated with anagram solution were the total principle
identification score and the association principle identi-
fication score. The correlation of the association scale
scores with anagram solution suggests a factor of verbal
fluencey based upon the possession of flat association
hieararchies, more than it suggests an underlying expla-

nation built upon relational perception and cognition.

80

Thus, it seems likely that there are two kinds of
factors involved in anagram solution. One factor is that
of associational fluency, which accounts for the corre-
lation between anagram performance and the association
sub-scale, and because of this, perhaps also for the total
principle identification score (to which the association
sub-scale contributes.) The perceptual/relational factor
would then account for the correlatiOn between the
concealed figures scores and anagram performance, as
explained above. However, there remains one inconsistency.
The associational and total principle identification
scores do not correlate with performance on the proverb
cued anagrams. These correlations would be expected if
the relationship between the associational word preference
scale and anagram solution were due to an underlying factor
of associational fluency, and performance on the proverb

cued anagrams were facilitated by that fluency.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

1. High creatives use environmental cues to aid in
problem solving and hence seem to be more attuned to their
current perceptual world. They tend to be sensitizers.
Their performance in principle identification and the
perception of order in the word preference test is
superior to that of low creatives, particularly in general
ability to identify the principles of organization behind
the items, especially the associational items, and in

seeing the existence of order in all item types.

2. Females make greater use of environmental cues in
problem solution than do males. They prefer stimulus
complexity, scoring significantly more highly on the Barron
Welsh than their male counterparts. They are superior to
males in general verbal principle identification, par-
ticularly in the associational items, and in the perception
of order in the word preference test. (The latter is true
in all but the relational items, where the differences were

not significant, though in the same direction.)

81

82

3. Female left lookers are superior to male left
lookers in using environmental cues in problem solving,
identifying the principles of organization in the word
preference test (particularly the sensory items), and
seeing order in the word preference items, particularly in
the association and sensory items. Female left lookers
are more often superior in concealed figures than are male

left lookers.

4. There is a significant correlation between strength
of hemisphere dominance and creativity for combined sexes
among left lookers, and for male left lookers and female
right lookers taken alone. There is a significant negative
correlation between strength of left looking and failure
to see order in the associational items of the word
preference test for females only. There is a significant
negative correlation between strength of left looking and
using environmental cues for males only; male left lookers
perform significantly more poorly on this incidental
learning task than do female left lookers. There is a
significant negative correlation between sensitization and
strength of left hemisphere dominance (right looking) for
males only (perhaps reflecting a harmony between their sex
roles and biological capacities which either results in a
relatively conflict free existence (and low scores in

sensitivation) or in an exaggerated, mutually reinforcing

83

style of insensitivity and defensive denial toward experi-

ence which is emotion ridden and "irrational").

5. One would expect right lookers of both sexes and
left looking males to be the least creative performers.
Left looking tends to be correlated with inferior per-
formance in incidental learning and on the word preference
test for males; right looking is correlated with re—
pression among males. Right lookers in general are
significantly inferior on the word preference test, and
male left lookers score about as poorly as right lookers
on this. Female right lookers are significantly inferior
to female left lookers in the capacity to see order in the
word preference items. Except in the ability to identify
the principle behind the association items (where right
looking females are superior to males) there are no
significant differences between right looking males and
females. Right looking females would be expected to be
less creative performers than left looking females, but
the contradictory relationship between their sex role and
biological capacities, which might be expected to add to
the complexity of their life experience and might mediate
the significant correlation between strength of right
looking and creativity for them, would seem to give them
an edge over right looking males in their potentiality for

creative performance.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

10.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alpha wave of the future. Time, July 19, 1971, 33.

Amster, H. The relation between intentional and
incidental concept learning as a function of
type of multiple stimulation and cognitive
style. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 1965, l, 2I74223.

Bakan, P. Hypnotizability, laterality of eye move-
ments, and functional brin asymmetry.
Perceptual and Motor Skills, 1969, 28, 937-
932 (a).

 

Bakan, P. Lateral eye movement, reading speed, and
visual attention. Psychonomic Science, 1969,
15, 93-94 (b).

 

Bakan, P., and Svorad, D. Resting EEG alpha and
asymmetry of reflective lateral eye movements.
Nature, 1969, 223, 975-976 (c).

Bakan, P. The eyes have it. Psychology Today, Vol. 4,
April, 1971, 64-67.

 

Bardwick, J. Psychology of Women. New York, Harper
and Row, 1971, 109.

Barron, F. Complexity--simp1icity as a personality
dimension. Journal of Abnormal and Social

 

Barron, F. Egeativityand Pe£sonal Freedom. Prince-
ton, D. Van Nostrand Company, 1968.

 

Barron, F. Some personality correlates of inde-
pendence of judgment. Journal of Personality,
1953, 21, 289-297 (b).

84

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

85

Barron, F., and Welsh, G. S. Artistic perception as
a possible factor in personality style: its
measurement by a figure preference test.
Journal of Psychology, 1952, 33, 199-203.

Benton, A. Differential behavioral effects in frontal
lobe disease. Neuropsychologia, 1968, 6,
53-60.

 

Day, M. E. An eye movement phenomenon relating to
attention, thought, and anxiety. Perceptual
and Motor Skills, 1964, 19, 443-446.

 

 

Eisenson, J. Language and intellectual modifications
associated with right cerebral damage.
Language and Speech, 1962, 5, 49-53.

Epstein, W., and Arlinsky, M. The interaction of
syntactic structure and learning instructions.
Psychonomic Science, 1965, 3, 59-60.

Erickson, M. H. A special inquiry with Aldous
Huxley into the nature and character of
various states of consciousness. In Altered
States of Consciousness. Ed. by C. T. Tart,
New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1969, 45-71.

Fitzgerald, E. T. Measurement of openness to experi-
ence: a study of regression in the service

of the ego. Journal of Personalit and
Social Psychology, 1966, 4, 655-663.

Ghiselin, B. (Ed.) The Creative Progess. New York,
The New American Library, 1952.

Giannitrapani, D., Darrow, C. W., and Sorkin, A.
Asleep and awake interhemispheric EEG phase
relationships in left and right handed
subjects. American Psychologist, 1964, 19,
480-481.

Gibson, J. J. Perception as a function of stimu-
lation. In Psycholggy, A Study of a Science,
Vol. 1, by Sigmund Koch, New York, McGraw-
Hill, 1959, 456-501.

Gibson, J. J., and Gibson, E. Perceptual learning:
differentiation or enrichment? Psychological
Review, 1955, 62, 32-40.

 

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

86

Hall, M. M., Hall, G. C., and Lavoie, P. Ideation
in patients with unilateral or bilateral

midline brain lesions. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology, 1968, 73, 526-531.

 

Hecaen, H. Clinical symptomatology in right and left
hemispheric lesions. In Interhemispheric
Relations and Cerebral Dominance. Ed. by
V. B. Mountcastle, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins
Press, 1962, 215-243.

 

 

Jacobson, L. I., Elenewski, J. J., Lordahl, D. S.,
and Liroff, J. H. Role of creativity and
intelligence in conceptualization. Journal
of Personality and Social Psycholong 1968,
7, 431-436.

 

Kagan, J., and Lewis, M. Studies of attention in the
human infant, Mgrrill-Palmer Quarterly, 1965,
Vol. 11., 95-127.

Kasamatsu, A., and Hirai, T. An electroencephalo-
graphic study on Zen meditation (Zazen). In
Altered States of Consgiousness. Ed. by
C. T. Tart, New York, John Wiley and Sons,
1969, 489-501.

 

Kimura, D. Left-right differences in the perception
of melodies. Quarterly Journal of Experi-
mental Psychology, 1964, 16, 355-358.

 

Klein, G. S. Cognitive control and motivation. In
G. Lindzey (Ed.), The Assessment of Human
Motives, New York, Rinehart, I958, I08-112.

 

Lerner, B. Rorschach movement and dreams. Journal
of Abnormal Psychology, 1966, 71, 75-86.

 

Mednick, S. A. The associative basis of the creative
process. Psychological Review, 1962, 69,
220-232.

 

Mendelsohn, G. A., and Griswald, B. B. Differential
use of incidental stimuli in problem solving
as a function of creativity. Journal of
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1964, 68,
431-436.

 

 

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

87.

Milner, B. Laterality effects in audition. In
Interhemispheric Relations and Cerebral
Dominance. Ed. by V. B. Mountcastle,
BaItimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, 177- 195.

 

Milner, B. Visual recognition and recall after right
temporal lobe excision in man. Neuropsycho-
logia, 1968, 6, 191-209.

 

Mullan, S., and Penfield, W. Illusions of comparative
interpretation and emotion. A.M.A. Archives
ggNeurology and Psychiatry, 1 5 , l, 269-

4.

Paradowski, W. Effect of curiosity on incidental
learning. Journal of Educational Psychology,
1967, 58, 50-55.

Penfield, W., and Perot, P. The brain's record of
auditory and visual experience. Brain, 1963,

Rawls, J., and Slack, G. Artists vs. nonartists:
Rorschach determinants and artistic creativity.

Journal of Projective Techni ues and Per-
sonality Assessment, I963, 33, 233-237.
Riegel, K. F., Riegel, R. M., and Levine, R. S.

An analysis of associative behavior and
creativity. Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 19 66, 55-56.

Rosen, J. C. The Barron-Welsh Art Scale as a pedictor
of originality and level among artists.
Journal of Applied Psychology, 1955, 39,
TI

 

 

Rorschach, H. Psychodiagnostics. Berne, Hans Huber,
1942.

 

Schachtel, E. G. Metamorphosis, New York, Basic
Books, 1959;.

Semmes, J. Hemispheric specialization: a possible
clue to mechanism. Neuropsychologia, 1968,
6, 11-26.

 

Spreen, 0., Benton, A. L., and Fincham, R. W.
Auditory agnosia without aphasia. Archives
of Neurology, 1965, 13, 84-92.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

88

Steele, J. R. Personality, defense and task per-
formance. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Uni-
versity of Washington, 1961.

Teuber, H. Effects of brain wounds implicating
right or left hemisphere in man. In
Interhemispheric Relations and Cerebral
Dominance. Ed} by V. B. Mountcastle,
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, 131-157.

 

Truex, R. C., and Carpenter, M. B. Human Neuro-

anatom , Baltimore, Williams andIWiIkins,
1969, 488.

 

Van Gogh, V. The Letters of Vincent Van Gogh. Ed.
by Mark RoSkill, New York, Atheneum, 1967.

Wagman, I. H., Krieger, H. P., and Bender, M. Eye
movements elicited by surface and depth
stimulation of the occipital lobe of macque
mulatta. Journal of Comparative Neurology,
1958, 109, 169-I93.

Ward, W. C. Creativity and environmental cues in
nursery school children. ngelopmental
Psychology, 1969, 1, 543-547.

 

Weinstein, S. Differences in effects of brain wounds
implicating right or left hemispheres. In
Interhemispheric Relations and Cerebral
Dominance. Ed. by V. B. Mountcastle,
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, 159-176.

Welsh, G. Welsh Figgre Preference Test: Preliminary
ManuaI,:§esearch Edition. Palo Alto, Con-
sulting Psychologists Press, Inc., 1959.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

ANAGRAMS: INSTRUCTIONS, SCRAMBLE

SYSTEMS, CUEING, AND KEY

Instructions: Below you will see a series of puzzles called
anagrams. Anagrams are mixed up words. Your job is to
unscramble the words so that they make sense. For example,
enwi can be unscrambled to spell "wine." There are no
contractions, proper names or abbreviations which we wish
you to find in these scrambles. You have 8 minutes for
this.

 

 

Anagrams Scramble Cueing

1. honeug 632145 Proverb (set 1)
2. lepertz 7316245 Environment

3. nofruet 6213574 Proverb (set 2)
4. tbeetr 412536 Proverb (sets 1&2)
5. dsahret 4621357 Proverb (set 1)
6. eawthdc 6213574 Proverb (set 1)
7. fcoefe 412536 Environment

8. eshece 562314 Uncued both groups
9. glrnoli 7316245 Proverb (set 1)
10. snadsed 1624753 Provert (set 2)
ll. setsdha 1624753 Environment
12. hteet 51324 Proverb (set 2)
l3. ecerns 524361 Environment
14. gtinrs 624531 Environment

15. rrimros 4621357 Environment
16. tgoyur 632145 Environment
17. dsnglead 48712635 Proverb (set 2)
18. ralumlbe 48712635 Environment
19. enwsra 524361 Proverb (set 2)
20. khnist 524361 Proverb (set 1)
21. nujmigp 6213574 Environment
22. duceont 7316245 Proverb (set 2)

89

9O

 

 

Anagrams Scramble Cueing

23. rrowke 632145 Proverb (set 2)
24. vtsheeai 48712635 Proverb (set 1)
25. geewihd 4621357 Proverb (set 2)
26. grahset 1624753 Proverb (set 1)
27. emuos 51324 Environment

28. erubrb 562314 Uncued both groups
29. drenif 624531 Proverb (sets 1&2)
30. yhpap 51324 Proverb (set 1)

 

*Anagrams cued by proverb set 1 were automatically uncued

for subjects hearing proverb set 2.

Proverb set 2 anagrams were

likewise uncued for S's exposed to set 1.

Key:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
ll.
12.
13.
14.
15.

enough
pretzel
fortune
better
hardest
watched
coffee
cheese
rolling
saddens
stashed
teeth
screen
string
mirrors

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

yogurt
gladdens
umbrella
answer
thinks
jumping
counted
worker
heaviest
weighed
gathers
mouse
rubber
friend

happy

APPENDIX B

THE EXPERIENCE INQUIRY

APPENDIX B

THE EXPERIENCE INQUIRY

E. T. Fitzgerald
University of California

Directions: This booklet contains 68 numbered statements. Please

 

read each statement and decide whether it is true as applied to you
or false as applied to you.

You are to make your answers on the answer sheets provided. If a
statement is True as applied to you, place a check mark on the lines
in the column headed T. If a statement if False as applied to you,
place a check mark on the lines in the column headed F.

There are no right or wrong answers. The statements are about matters
on which people often differ. The best answer is just your own
opinion. Please answer TRUE or FALSE for every statement, even if you
have to guess at some.

1.

I am regarded by others as a person with a strong sense of humor.

Sometimes I wander off into my own thoughts while doing a routine
task so that I actually forget that I am doing the task, and then
find, a few minutes later, that I have completed it without even

being aware of what I was doing.

At times I have carried on real conversations with another person
while I was asleep (e.g., with someone who walked into my room).

Sometimes I have had the impression that the walls or the ceiling
were moving and changing size or state, even though I knew that
this was impossible.

When I am working, I find it distracting if the TV is on or if
someone is talking in the room.

At times the solution to a problem has suddenly occurred to me
while I was engaged in an activity unrelated to that problem.

91

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

92

At times I have focused on something so hard that I went into a
kind of benumbed state of consciousness, or at other times into a
state of extraordinary calm and serenity.

I can look at an object-~a leaf, a stone, a flower--for a long
time, continuing to discover different things about it.

I prefer Martin Luther King to Jonathan Winters.

I avoid sports and activities that are thrilling but in which
there is some risk of physical injury.

I feel uncomfortable when I cannot make my ideas consistent.

It is possible that there are civilizations on other planets
which are far more advanced than ours.

I avoid "putting people on" or doing things just to see the
reactions of others.

People are intolerable who take "sacred" things in a light and
humorous way.

One should be on guard against obscuring rational thought by
beliefs in mystical experiences.

Sometimes I imagine what it would be like if the world were
different, e.g., if there were no laws, if we could read each

other's minds, etc.

I usually prefer to do things in tried ways rather than new and
different ways.

It is possible that we had a previous existence of which we have
no memory.

I would like to get beyond the world of logic and reason and
experience something new and different.

At times I have actively stared at something familiar and had it
become very strange before my eyes.

Whenever possible I avoid taking risks and experiencing things
that are different from the usual.

While lying in bed or reclining in a chair I sometimes find
myself perceiving faces, objects, etc. in the shadows of the
light or the design of the ceiling, etc.

I think that things should be predictable and certain.

At times I see unusual relations between things.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

93
It is possible that our sense organs (i.e., eyes, ears, etc.) do
not bring us our most important information.
Poetry has little effect on me.
I prefer the standards of the scientist to those of the artist.

I like to indulge in emotions and sensations with the feeling of
just "letting go."

I tend to see humor in awkward situations in which I sometimes
find myself.

I would enjoy a contest in a carnival in which I had to break a
pile of dishes.

I have never had a strange or weird experience.

I have had experiences which inspired me to write a poem or a
story, or make up a humorous tale, or paint a picture.

I have had the experience of being caught up by music or dancing,
becoming enraptured by it, and having it live and express itself
through me so that I seemed to cease to be.

I am quick to see "double meanings" in things people are saying
or in what I am reading.

I think that miracles are possible.

I think that our most intense experiences can be communicated in
words to others.

If one concentrates hard enough, it is possible to influence the
thoughts and behavior of other people.

Some people are capable of extrasensory perception.

I sometimes find myself seeing serious matters or important people
in a comical light.

There have been times when I have been completely immersed in
nature or in art and had a feeling of awe sweep over me so that I
felt as if my whole state of consciousness was somehow temporarily
altered.

I have experienced moments of inspiration and creativity, when
artistic expression, ideas, or the solutions to problems I had
struggled with came to me with a special intensity and clarity.

I prefer people who are predictable and dependable to those who
are impulsive and changeable.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

S3.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

61.

62.

94
At times I have found a sort of fulfillment of myself in creating
something, as in crafts, science, writing, art or music.
I usually try to understand my dreams.
It is not possible literally to read another person's mind.

I think that unidentified flying objects from outer space have in
fact been sighted.

I would like to try parachute jumping.

At amusement parks I usually avoid roller-coasters, ferris wheels
and similar "thrill rides."

I think that many people in our culture have had visions at some
time or another.

There are things and events which cannot ultimately be explained
logically.

Solutions to problems or ideas for new projects come to me at
times "out of the blue.“

Most things people laugh at are not really funny.

I enjoy "wild" parties.

I am often bored when left alone.

It would be fun to throw darts at a picture of someone I dislike.
I have been so strongly in love with someone that I somehow felt
that my own self was fading and I was at one with the beloved
person.

I have had the experience of doing some task in the middle of the
night (e.g., jotting down a note, answering a phone call) with no

memory the next morning of having done so.

If one concentrates hard enough it is possible to influence
objects.

It is possible for the mind to leave the body and experience
things at great distances, even in the past and in the future.

When solving a problem I allow myself to consider all possibilities
even though some are unrealistic or absurd.

I have walked in my sleep at times.

It is sometimes right to hit someone who makes you angry.

63.

64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

95

I would prefer vacationing at a fashionable resort to sailing
around the world, paddling down the Mississippi, or some similar
activity.

It is immature and childish for adult persons to display emotion
and behave impulsively.

Eventually everything will be explained by the laws of science.

It is often better to act upon one's feelings than upon a logically
reasoned plan.

It is possible that the moon influences human behavior.

I find myself uncomfortable in the presence of unconventional or
"peculiar" people.

APPENDIX C

WORD PREFERENCE TEST--COPIES OF

FORMS 1 AND 2, WITH KEYED ANSWERS

APPENDIX C

WORD PREFERENCE TEST--COPIES OF

FORMS 1 AND 2, WITH KEYED ANSWERS

On the next few pages you will see a series of items, each of
which consists of a list of four words. Some of these items contain
words which seem to go with each other. They might go together for a
reason which is different for different items. We think that there
are three possible reasons for putting these words together, and have
explained these below.

1. An associational grogping is one in which the words seem to
share nothing with each other but the fact that each has a verbal
assocation in common with each of the others. Besides the fact that
the list members share a verbal associate, putting them together does
not make much "sense." There is no obviously apparent reason for
combining them for any purpose, and one would not expect to find them
normally occurring together. One of the words in the list might be
this shared associate. An example of this type of grouping would be:
soda kilt butter Scotch.

2. A sensory, or shared characteristic, grouping is one in which
the words seem to go together because their referents share a common
sensory quality. One of the words in the list may state the nature of
the quality or characteristic shared by other items in the list. (The
words may or may not have a common verbal associate.) Otherwise there
is no other meaning which these words share or contribute towards. An
example of this type of grouping would be: frog money lime green

3. A relational grouping is one in which the referents noted by
the stimulus words combine so as to mean something more than any list
member taken alone or combined with any other list member. The meaning
of the total list cannot be pointed to as part of, or completely
included in, any one of the list elements. "The whole is more than
the sum of its parts." The list members seem to "go together" in that
each one adds to the meaning of the other when they are all considered
together in the context of each other. One of the words (the summary
concept) is the focal point in terms of which the other words take on
a collective significance. The summary concept takes into account the
nature of each of the fist elements and meaningfully combines them.

96

97

The separate words "point to" or are integrated by the summary concept.
An example of this type of grouping would be: clocks mathematics
music order

4. It is possible that none of the above principles is involved in
the grouping.

As you are reading the word series on the following pages, decide
whether their members go together (make sense together, or share some-
thing in common), and mark yes or no in the column headed "go together?"
Then indicate if the principle you see in the combination appears among
those listed above. Mark 1 (for associational), 2 (for sensory), 3
(for relational), or 4 (for none of these) under the column which
designates the category principle that you have selected. If you
initially decided that the words did ngt_go together, don't mark any-
thing in the principle column. Next indicate how much you like each
particular list of words by marking in a number in the appropriate box
in the "like" column according to the following scheme.

1 2 3 4 5
If the list If the list If you are If the list If the list
pleases you pleases you completely displeases displeases
very much a little indifferent you a little you very much
to the list

Please take your time and consider your choices carefully.

Go Together? Principle Like

Yes No 1 2 3 4 12345
1. fruit navel licorice Pillsbury No
2. apple innocence estrangement Eden Yes Relational
3. vampire sharks crocodiles teeth Yes Sensory
4. tail arms ape hairy Yes Sensory
5. vampire coal trees airplane No
6. note dive chair high Yes Sensory
7. fruit flower abdomen fertility Yes Relational
8. cabbage Revolution troika Russia Yes Relational
9. bald screech emblem eagle Yes Relational
10. cabbage oil soup engine Yes Association
11. widow bite monkey spider Yes Association

12. sky bald envy sea No

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

98

book bustle dive beans

sweat exhaustion prize race
hand seed brain cage

feet softly guard escape

fire prophecy Wisemen star
monkey daffodil glue truck
sweat sail pretzels royal
stove pepper fire hot

feet skunk armpit smell

sweat shoulder blood cold
class railroad girl working
kill honor regret war

scout witch Nabisco letters
kill kangaroo proof earth
Southern console station comfort
class anxiety hallways school
tail dog house cat

feet eat scare crow

soap shoe tissue soft

bruise violets grapes eggplant
brain seed teaser ball

kill cavity electric-shock pain
lick sprinkle mines salt

bass complex sleep deep

gas house troops station

Go Together?

Yes

NO

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

NO

NO

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

NO

Like
12345

Principle
1 2 3 4

Relational
Association
Relational

Relational

Sensory
Sensory
Association
Association

Relational

Association
Relational
Association
Association
Sensory
Sensory
Relational
Sensory
Relational
Sensory

Association

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

61.

62.

99

plague ship house steam

gish knock-out Irish well

gas pillows aluminum rotate
apple mag sky pie

class audience portrait faces
fire nylon down hose

vampire silence blackness night
hand seed brain bird

class carpeted railroad drawer
cabbage egg oil boiled

fruit candy cake sweet-taste
scout bald eye eagle

apple cherry strawberry red
mouse sharp blue cheese
widow mother bride woman

gas planets fire star

walker main sweeper street
fish deep potatoes fried
fruit crazy bolt nut

feet cobweb breakfast field
widow antiques pyramids old
tail oil wife snow

hand plant gown bird

coconut planets

fish words unconscious poem

Go Together?

Yes

Yes

NO

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

NO

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

NO

Yes

N0

NO

NO

Yes

NO

Like
12345

Principle
1 2 3 4

Relational

Association
Sensory
Association
Relational

Association

Association
Sensory
Association
Sensory
Relational
Relational
Relational
Association
Association

Association

Sensory

Relational

63.

64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

77.

78.

79.

80.

81.

100

cabbage skunk feet smell
widow groceries gown shines
shopping washer picture window
hand pillow petal soft

scout bugle horses calvary
apple geranium shortcake blue
fish chrome dime silver
cabbage skunk green striped
vampire ball man bat

fire salt fools Tarot cards
scout mailman soldier uniform
sweat ocean pretzels salty
bride mother June apple pie
stove pepper iron salt

plague ship tail rat

kill bliss jump joy

stop petty sneak thief

habit pouch road tobacco

lead bricks water heavy

Go Together?
Yes No

Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Yes
Yes
Yea
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Like
12345

Principle
1 2 3 4

Sensory

Association
Sensory

Relational

Sensory
Sensory

Association

Sensory
Sensory
Relational
Sensory
Relational
Association
Relational
Association

Sensory

101

Form 2

On the next few pages you will see a series of items, each of
which consists of a list of four words. Some of these items contain
words which seem to go with each other. They might go together for a
reason which is different for different items. We think that there are
three possible reasons for putting these words together, and have
explained these below.

1. An associational grouping is one in which the words seem to
share nothing with each other pgt the fact that each has a verbal
association in common with each of the others. Besides the fact that
the list members share a verbal associate, putting them together does
not make much "sense." There is no obviously apparent reason for
combining them for any purpose, and one would not expect to find them
normally occurring together. One of the words in thelist might be this
shared associate. An example of this type of grouping would be: soda
kilt butter Scotch

 

2. A sensory, or shared characteristic, grouping is one in which
the words seem to go together because their referents share a common
sensory quality. One of the words in the list may state the nature of
the quality or characteristic shared by other items in the list. (The
words may or may not have a common verbal associate.) Otherwise there
is no other meaning which these words share or contribute towards. An
example of this type of grouping would be: frog money lime green

3. A relational grouping is one in which the referents noted by
the stimulus words combine so as to mean something more than any list
member taken alone or combined with any other list member. The meaning
of the total list cannot be pointed to as part of, or completely
included in, any one of the list elements. "The whole is more than the
sum of its parts." The list members seem to "go together" in that each
one adds to the meaning of the other when they are all considered
together in the context of each other. One of the words (the summary
concept) is the focal point in terms of which the other words take on a
collective significance. The summary concept takes into account the
nature of each of the list elements and meaningfully combines them.

The separate words "point to" or are integrated by the summary concept.
An example of this type of grouping would be: clocks mathematics
music order

4. It is possible that none of the above principles is involved in
the grouping.

As you are reading the word series on the following pages,
decide whether their members go together (make sense together, or share
something in common), and mark yes or no in the column headed "go
together?" Then indicate if the principle you see in the combination
appears among those listed above. Mark 1 (for associational), 2 (for
sensory), 3 (for relational), or 4 (for none of these) under the column
which designates the category principle that you have selected. If

you initially decided that the words did notho together, don't mark
anything in the principle column.
particular list of words by marking in a number in the appropriate box
in the "like" column according to the following scheme.

1 2 3
If the list If the list
pleases you pleases you
very much a little

If you are
completely
indifferent
to the list

4

If the list
displeases
you a little

Next indicate how much you like each

5
If the list
displeases
you very much

Please take your time and consider your choices carefully.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

cheese mountains neutrality
Switzerland

scythe against wood grain
gold super gazer star

gold popsicle telescope paste
cactus sun thirst desert
bruise violets grapes eggplant
scalpel heal hand surgeon
tree column soldiers clothes
chamber staff box music

gold ice jewels glitter

seed brain catalogue teaser
scythe record book lion
buried stake blook vampire
athletes web rabbit foot

tree column building tall
cheese blood music blue
birth camp lucky day

attack pearls chew teeth

Go Together?
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

NO

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Principle Like
1 2 3 4 12345
Relational
Association

Association

Relational
Sensory
Relational
Sensory
Association
Sensory

Association

Relational
Association
Sensory
Association
Association

Relational

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

103

Communist rose sunset red
apple-blossom baby dawn beginning
stars dishes greetings trees
apple-blossom rattle milkman sour
gas feathers aluminum lightness

apple-blossom strawberry-ice-cream
lemonade pink

cheese vomit old-milk sour
tree serpent stump tongue
buried tent hammer basketball
cactus petunia fresh flower
stars seasons leaves time

music apple strawberry-ice-cream
engine

tobacco terry-cloth pass reporter
cheese orchestra bath radish
Communist thoughts China Mao

sea home stomach sick

scalpel bean paste owl

buried chased abandoned afraid
cactus lot hammer red
apple-blossom out part time

King Pope beauty-queen robe

birth apple consumption mortality
cactus rose thorn prick

acorn birthday deep strip

Go Together?

Yes

Yes

Yes

NO

NO

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

NO

Yes

Yes

NO

NO

NO

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

NO

Like
12345

Principle
1 2 3 4

Sensory

Relational

Sensory

Sensory
Sensory

Relational

Association

Relational

Relational

Sensory

Sensory

Association
Sensory
Relational

Sensory

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

66.

104

grapes forgetfulness sparkle wine
cabbage slick year toes

tree knowledge serpent fall

skunk kings boiled cabbage

king stalk trainer lion

tree asparagus column pillows
buried doornail center dead

pot butterflies pump stomach

strawberry-ice-cream lemonade
cold sour

gas bananas pillows metal

room Saturday salts bath

seed brain hand bird
apple-blossom out spring house
chocolate fortune tin cookie
Communish birthday landing party
board magic death black

envy golf beans green

tobacco golf newspaper father
wicked bustle slicker city
scythe sickle plow steel-gray

stars diamonds polished-silver
sparkle

king list pay check
tobacco bacon barbecue smokey

grapes puss spoiled sour

Go Together?

Yes

Yes

NO

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

NO

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

NO

Like
12345

Principle
1 2 3 4

Relational

Relational
Association

Relational

Association

Relational

Sensory

Relational
Association
Association
Relational
Association
Sensory
Sensory
Relational
Relational

Sensory

Sensory
Association
Sensory

Association

67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

77.

78.

79.

80.

81.

105

tobacco gang rail road

tree scaly soldiers office
grapes shy boat cat

king boxing asparagus Vatican
grapes violets bruise purple
cabbage egg oil boiled

birth motor tuberculosis early
tree cat call house

birth blooming awakening emerging
scythe winter corpse death _
brain seed teaser ball

hand seed brain cage

cherry time smell blossom

inch deal peg square

lead bricks water heavy

Go Together?

Yes

Yes

No

No

NO

Yes

,Yes

NO

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

NO

Principle Like
1 2 3 4 12345

Association

Sensory

Association

Association
Sensory
Relational
Relational
Association
Relational
Association

Sensory

APPENDIX D

TABLES

106

EI.§ 31.9300,
33.—I... a:
ggalél Gaul
il.’ 03
8338000I.§ 303003.850
hagglég 31.835
CHI-I... 093030300980
il.0 3;

 

I n
I .3 an— I .ufl
I .38 I. I .4 :1. I I .0.»
I .3 has Ion-Ell I .3.-
I 90.5: I13 v.2 3... IE..- I i.-
I 0.0.0:- 30 I I

I .5680 333:: .3» I .06
I .3 SIP—6 I a

.303; 3 s

.ggfiigl§.§§3

.giuaag
can.50Iagaagrfligsxgae«oi-93333330535105.3153

 

 

 

 

 

00.0 00.3 ...n 00.0 a... an. 0.. an. 030 00in 00.0 30.. 3.. 00..— 004 «0.3 00.3 00.0 «.4. 00.0 00.3 .0...
0.3.. 0.2..0 0.00.0 0.00.3 0.00.0 0.00 a 0.00 n 0.00 n 0.00 3. 0.00 3 0.: a. 0.0. 0 0.00 0 «~00 n 003 n 3:. 0 «~00 n0 3: an aura 3 0.00 3 0.30 3 Jan :3
«0.0 003 00.0 .0.0 3.. 0.. 00. 00. 00.0 003 00.0 2..» 00.. 2.3 00.3 .~.~ 00.3 00.. 00.0 00.0 00.0 6.0
0.4 3... 00.. 3.3 3.0 003 ...~ 2..“ 00.0. 3.3 .004. ~330.0 ~..0..3 3.0 220 2.0 0.6a. 00.00 00.00 00.0. 0.4.0 0.030 :0:—
n. p. h. p. 0. 0. 0. 0. n. n. a pm 3 3 a R n... 0. 0. 3'
00.0 3.0 .08 n0... 3. 0.. 00. 3. 30.0 00." 00.... 3.. 00.0 00.3 «0.— 003 00.3 00.0 3.0 00.0 .003 6.0
0...0 02..“ 000.0 000.3 03.0 0n. n 030 n 0... u 00... 0. 03 3 000 0 03 3 000 h 03 u 000 n 03 n 000 2. 0.. am 000 3 0.. an 000 nm 3.108 .00 .I
00.3 00.3 00.3 0..“ n0. 0.. 0.. 3. 00:. .n.~ .30 00.0 00.0 2.3 .0.“ n..~ .030 3.0 00.. 0..3 30.3 6.0
000.. 000.0 000.. 03.3 000.0 000 n 000 n 000 0 000 n. 03 3 000 0 000 0 000 3 03 0 0n. n 000 n 03 00 000 00 0h. 3 000 an 03.00 3.3 .00 .u
0.13 00.0 00.0 00.. 0.. 0.. «n. 3. 00.0 00.0 3.0 «0.0 00.0 00.0 .0. .03 3.0m 3.0 00.0 00.0 «0.3 6.0
0000 02.0 000.. 000.0 000 n 030 u Q00 0 0:. N 000 A. .3. .3 08 0 one 0 03 0 000 a 0: n 0N3 n 000 0. 03. 03 000 03 000 an 000 ha :03 .00! .t
«0.0 00.3 0..~ 00.0 0.. n0. 00. On. «0.. 00. 00.. 3.0 2... 03.3 .03 .ré 3.3 00.. ha. o~.3 0.... 6.0
000.“ 000.3 000.0 03.0 000.0 000 u 00. n 000 u 03 0. 000 .3 03 0 000 3 03 3 000 3 05 n 00.. n 03 00 03 .~ 050 an 000 00 03 3 38.03 .3: .-
0..n 0..." 00.. 5.3 3.. 0.. 0n. 0.. 3;. 3.. 2..." 3.. 3.. «0. 3.3 «0. 00.3 00.0 .30 3.0 30.3 6.0
000.0 060.0 000.0 03.3 000 n 000 u 030 a 00s a 05 on 000 3 000 0 03 0 000 0 0: a 00.. n 000 m 01. 00 03 0... 00a 3 000 an 00.. am 33.03 Jud .0
an.“ 3.3 2.." 00.0 0.. 0.. «0. en. 00.. n0.» 00.0 3.0 00.0 00.3 3.3 00.3 00.00 3.0 00.0 0..0 00.3 6.0
300.3 3000. 33.0 300 . 33 n 330 u 300 n 300 u 33 0. 300 .3 30a 0 300 3 300 3 300 n .32. ~ 300 n 3-0 2. 33 00 300 3 33 0a 300 00 301039.50 a“
an 9.3 lam
an." 00.0 00.0 00.0 00. 00. 00. On. 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.0 00.3 00.3 m..N 00.: 00.. 00.0 4.3. 00.03 0.0
33.0 300.0 300.0 300 3 .33 n 300 n 300 n 330 n 32. a. 30... 3 2. 0 300 0 33 0 35 n 300 n 3: a 3? up 33 an 300 3 .300 an 35 0a :03 .H
00..— 004 a." 00.. 0.. 0.. 0.. an. .04. 0..“ 3.. 00.0 3.0 00.0 a... .0." 3.3 .... 220 «0.0 no..." 6.0
300.0 300.0 .30“ . 3.3 0 33 n .300 n .300 a .300 n .33 n. 32. .3 .300 0 .33 3 3.0 0 .300 n .30” n 3.... n .10 00 3.3 3 .300 3 .300 .0 .32. «a 33.03 .3.-
00.~ Ohé 03.. 00.0 0.. n.. 0.. 3.. 00.0 «0.0 03.0 2.... '3. ani- 003 u .u 0.0.00 0... 00.0 0.... 00.3 .0...
0000.0 0000.3 0000.. 0~00 0 33 n 0~00 u 00>. u 000» u 000. .. 000.4. .3 0«.00 0 33 3 0~00 3 003 n 30. ~ 300 n 300 n» 000.. 0a 0000 3 0000 00 0~00 a ““13 .03
00.0 003 00.. 8.0 .0. 0.. ... 00. 00.0 «0.0 A..." 00.. 00.. 2..." 3.3 00... 3..~ 0.4 «0.0 00.0 «5.3 6.0
0.00.. 00.0.0 0.00.0 3.0.0.— O.~n n 0.30 n 3N0 u 0.2. n 0.00 an 0.0. 3 0.3 h 0.00 0 0.0. 0 0&3 N 3.. ~ 0n; « 00.0 00 0~.~ ON 0000 0A 0.: 00 0.3 nu 003
0.6 00.3 00.0 00.0 0.. 0.. 50. 0.. «0.0 0..~ 3.0 «0.0 00.0 00.3 00.“ 00.3 3.3 0..0 n30 2.4. .53 6.0
0.....0 0.00.3 0.00.. 0.00.0 0.00 n 002. .4. 0000 a 0000 n 0.8 0. 0.2. 3 003 0 0.3 3 0.00 .3 .Nnn « 30.. u .000 n .000 a... .000 30 .0033 ~305.00 003.3 .3“
00.0 0.." 00.0 54. 0.. ... 30. 0.. 0.4. 2.0 00.0 3.. a... 00.3 3..” 00.." 00..“ 00.. 00.0 00.0 «0.3 6.0
0000.0 000.6 0000.0 0000.3 003 n 0000 n 0000 a 0000 a 0000 a. 0000 3 0000 a 0000 0 0000 0 0..n u 0.00 ~ 0.3 n 0.2. 00 0.00 an 0.00.3 0030.00 0000.3 0 0 .3“
6.10. .0652 .0698 563.18....— JIJ .38... .134 3:4 .08. Icon .3! .33 .51 .268 6.0.5! 6.0.50 63.38 .08 .0.“ .ud .0.-
Iuovuo BI 20 003.3 833330683 040.05.:— 35 00.5.1 056:3». 0603.333 0

 

0.33.30 03

 

I... II 6.66 ...m .333...» i

 

0.0004003 i .34 .08334030 gas A: .08 gala/l,

15.18.00

vac-ill.

a 53

107

 

.30.
3o.
30.

00.
00. 0o.

00.

30.

300.

30.

000.

00.

00.

3o.

38.

000 .

00. I.‘ i
No. 00. n.032 030'.-

00. 3o. I.§ 03.!

000. unoauuus

3o. 38. talk

0.1.333 00.003.30.70 :3

0o. 300. no. -sunaueu Iocuuuunuu .0

4.3.: coauI- .4

3°. 300. 300. no. un-floa nouns. .z
.uOk.u¢OuU..u

.3. no. 38. 38. -JoaJ-Bu...
.3033030

 

CAN...“ l.§ l.8.§ I..I..H.§ 383 .i..— .3.3 .g..3 .h'& 8 .4! .30 .3004 fig 0.0.§h 9.“.5 .u:.§ .B 23.0 .3.“ .3.‘ a

 

lug 8| g”

83.41—

08
.83.

 

0.054 0050.... 0013.30 030.0
. 0>

 

0030.030 300003 03030030.. 03

283.3331... 6.2.6

3003'.» 2006005302: 000500008 960... 600.500 "3 0.30.3

 

.3000 03 0006000330 .3033 «00.7.. usuCEmumuué “300.3

108

cave“: I .0“:

uuua I .uua

HauOH I .099
>ua>wu¢ouo I .uaouu

vac: .ouoom cowunuauauauon cannucwum ”such I .uoum.ua.uoa

uncouuuaax I .Hua

auouaom I .ucom

acauauooaat I .ann:

Ilium-ad v.90 nuo>oum I v.a.>onm

30a I .a aluuuca‘ v.50 uadlaouwbnu I v.0.tcu
now: I .x nousuwh vanaooaoo I .u«h.noo
oddaau I no acauuoumoa I .auu

«ocean-a auuvuo on: I n
uncannsm I n.m uuouuooau I .ucH
usouz I .um oxda I .q

UO 0h. OUEHON CHE

nownuouaquQOfiuauwuwncom I .¢.w

auanucn conduuomum I .H.u

oauom an: dado: cannon I .3.n
uncofiuou>ounn< cu in:

.UOOU BOHHIHIOGOC

 

Ho.

Ho.

Ho.

cmo. do. no. no.

mo. «00. no.

mo. mo. do. goo.

«mo. one.

we.

do.

m0.

no.

no.

mo.

muons.» «xi;
cmo. mo. do. I.:aa< oxwa

dam

Hocofiuodum
So. So. So. £52

Managuaaoa
woo. no. #0. usuoacom

huoacom
a.:mn¢ uoouuooo
:OMuoowuwucouH

Danaucwum

canons

.c.o.>oum

cocoa:

Moo. mo. .o.a.>:u
o.a.>oum

no. uc.a.>:u
nauuudcd

 

.H.fl.d .H.N.m .I.u.A .3.n.= .UQGHU.uOF.A .uoou0.u09.m unmfim OHUGflt uuda u.maa¢ nude: IOHIIOh

 

a» «5.3126 02 gr» non

 

nofinafiuup unconomoo
cowuaofiuuuuaau uuoflnsm

Ana‘s-am unaccoaoov nooaououuao macaw saga“: “a uuam

 

.owacuuc0013.~ mamas

109

831.8002 I .82

uoaauu I .nu Iouuuuu van-quou I .uau.uanu

canon-I: unique as. I - guano-a4 vase nuIIoum I e.g.poaa

v.8. gnaw.— 39. .803 83333503 333.3.— 3 I .ufluméléor 0'; 6090 3.83.95 I 90.5
31.-Idea I .03! 63303308333368 I .¢.m

bug I .3 hug—x: 0060qu I 63.9.8

.Icouuaupaunn: cu nus

 

snoo. node. 2.00. hugauzuo
u unis.
cum I I'm

«000. omvo. via:
5 u non

'20 . hugwugu u a
2.00 . oovo. omvo . 515.305

u ucgot Ohm
acowuoououcn

 

“OH!
.Ouctv
3N0. once. 9900. awno. ammo. onto. 250. I'm

.uqux

.033: .33.

3.5. page:

33. 030. Ohm

.Ioa
.II coax.
ammo. gape. «moooo. auw>wuuouo

 

:60 .60 I60 .00: Ill $3.: .33 .634 .uoua 8.08 .038— .i .5: .0: 308 Pagan 0.0...5 8:00.38 um 433.3

.uIHI- .IaIm .III¢ .uooau Ina; I144 Ina; In“; .ua.uop .ucou Iuoouuu III:

noun-«II: noonnsm

 

I.» no Iao>Ia Ionauuu«ao«m can Ioanuauqa unuuaunua

 

.1: g .03 33.3.3320 nan. gown-u h we as 303393 ”00:35: no 3.32236 3.5.

110

5503.25: an... I m:

uuonlz I a.z
33. I Joe
random I 58....
auaowuaaaa I .uaaaa
down-«coo: I .52

anon. 3.90.: 0300080 I .uwmdcou
cling v9.0 nun-pout I 9058.—
385 60:0 ugnu I 0.0.55

~30“. in; I $09.3
”acowuam>ounn< 3 E

. 3 3:09:03 033 can) gwuauouuoo I...» :02) com: a.z and assume.» luau-l 0.3 no H3303...» on» nodes «nan-Bf
40>: .3. on» an unsound—3a on: 5.033.938 uofiao .11. 30>: no. 05 an 950333?

 

 

aa aa aa av av av av av uuouuoo Hvuoa
aaa. ma ma av av av av av auoacoa
«av. a: ma av av av av av aqcovuvaaa
aaa. m2 a: av av av av av .cuaauuuuuoU¢
mz az az a2 av av av av .aaa.ucou
arm. a: az “av. can. av av av aoaoca
a: a: a: a: can. Adv. av av a.o.>oua
.aaa. a: a: van. aav. ava. aav. Iav a.o.>ca
awn. a: mz aov. aav. aaa. ova. aha. .uoa .aaca
ugh—00 . :wn‘
.uoe .Iaom .uouaa uuouuoua .aaa.u:ou unsung a.a.poua o.o.>nu .uoa .aoca

 

.ousaoooua Isa uo an yuan aoacouua on: Iuoonnam "Ha .Iaoauaaouuoo aoouuoa--.v agave

anon-=2 I v.2

oncomulfl Iuoouo 02: I a
.huonaom I .anom

newuawooant I .cun¢

huwau¢H ouaouuomum I .vcu.axu

”accuuu«>ouna< a» hex

.vonon 0H0 acouuauouuoU on» noun) noun «.2 any ouaquEw Hucomaau

ozu IOHOA anon-52 .Au a.coau~om. unduwuucu«a no: I ma “~o>oH Ho. on» an ucuuwuficowa cud acowucuouuou ucnuo Add «arboA mo. Gnu u- uncuquCUMmc
.uavuo can cu huauomaocq on» nouuoava ououn ImI cow: 4
.xcaan 0009a newuo:u«aou camaunwum on» unw>uod ha UHQMUCHum meauacovuo on can «canon who: a uunu nonhonmd uuonnaa can) conunuoo ouooa In: 4

 

lll

 

.Au n.=0uuaom own «eawuuaouuou uonuo Hun. Huwuomunaucwom and anon uneduaacuuou "own! I ~ .oHnaoh I AM
aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa «a aa aa a aoaavu Hucoquaaaa
aaa. aa aa ma aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa a ooaaau auoauoa
aaa. oaa. aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa ma aa aa a aoaaau .cmna
naa. oaa. aaa. aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa aa a uuouuouca
az a: a: a: aa aa aa ea aa aa aa aa oa Hacoauaaaa oxaa
m2 az a: a: ova. aa aa aa aa ma ma aa aa auoacoa as“;
a: a2 a: a2 oda. Ham. aa aa aa ma ma aa aa .cama oxaq
«0a.- aav.a aHv.u anv.s m2 m2 mz aa aa mm «a aa aa uuouuou Hauoa
v~v.u va~.- .av~.- ava.u .aaa. aon. m2 anv. aa aa ma aa aa Hocoauoaaa
m2 Haa.a a: .ama.u a: a: a: aam. a: aa «a aa aa auoacom
aoa.u aan.u aaa.- ~av.u az a: a: aaa. az m2 «a aa aa .caaa uuouuoa.
a: az a: a: .ao~.+ a2 .aH~.+ a: a: a2 m2 ma ma .acH.mxa
mz m2 cw-.| «Ha~.o m2 m2 m2 m2 m2 m2 chNN. ten. om sage: couuam
m2 .ava. aha. wan. mz a2 a: anm.- a2 az na~.- mm can.u Hxam
a a a «a unscauvaaa auoaaom .can< uuouuou Anabaunaaa auoacom .unu4 .aaH away: now
vodaau voaaoo voaavu uuouuoocn oxaa oxaq oxaa Hvuoa uuouuou .uua aouuqa
anneauaauz .ucow .cau‘ «duck a

 

.aoaqnlou nuuvnnsa «Ha .u:o«uvflauuoouu.a aaaap

112

TABLE 6.--Correlations Between Strength of Hemisphere Dominance and Other Variables.

 

 

Females N Males N Combined Sexes N
Correlation Between Strength of Right
Looking (Left Hemisphere Dominance) and:
Environment Cued Anagrams -.338 6 -.585 9 -.446 15
Sensitization-Repression -.010 6 -.714' 9 -.424 15
Depression +.292 6 +.513 9 +.33l 15
Creativity (Barron Welsh) +.738* 6 +.214 9 +.453 15
Total Number Incorrect B +.093 6 -.080 9
OIncorrect B, Association -.107 6 -.101 9
“Incorrect B, Sensory .000 6 -.118 9
IIncorrect B, Relational +.430 6 +.026 9 +.145 15
Sex +.184 15
Correlation Between Environment Cued
Anagrams and Sex, Right Lookers Only —.075 15
Correlation Between Strength of Left
Looking (Right Hemisphere Dominance) and:
Environment Cued Anagrams -.018 12 -.729* 8 .000 20
Sensitization-Repression +.210 12 +.466 8 +.351 20
Depression +.372 12 +.447 8 +.373 20
Creativity (Barron welsh) +.337 12 +.746* 8 +.493* 20
Total Number Incorrect B -.541 12 +.242 8 -.228 20
“Incorrect B, Association -.638' 12 -.029 8 -.383 20
lIncorrect I, Sensory -.319 12 +.353 8 -.059 20
“Incorrect B, Relational - 489 12 +.422 8 -.125 20
Sex -.231 20
Correlation Between Environment Cued
Anagrams and Sex, Left Lookers Only --.598“ 20

 

*significant at the .05 level.
'*Signi£icant at the .01 level.
Key to Abbreviations:

N I Number (of subjects)
B - “No Order“ Response

113

TABLE 7.--Summary of Significant Four-Fold Frequency Analyses.

 

1 Significance Level
Variables Subjects

 

Chi-Square Test Fisher's Exact Test2 N

 

Creativity and

 

Assn. Cd. B. All ' .025 (x2 = 5.605) 95
Sens. Cd. B. Females .01 (x2 = 7.742) 49
Sensitization-
Repression Males .05 25
Sex and 2

Env.CuedAn. All .05 (x = 4.557) 49
Env.Cued An. Left

Lookers .005 20
Con.Fig. Left

Lookers .025 20

1

All division for continuous variables are at the mean for
the total subject group.

2Fisher's exact test was used whenever an expected cell
frequency fell below acceptable limits (N = 5) for use of the chi-square
test.

Key to Abbreviations:

N 8 Number (of Subjects)

Assn. = Association

Sens. = Sensory

Cd.B = Called "No Order"

Env.CuedAn. = Environment Cued Anagrams
Con.Fig = Concealed Figures Test

‘11111;“111111111s