THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, AND JAPAN'S "SPECIAL INTERESTS" IN MANCHURIA 1917-1922

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ABSTRACT

THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, AND JAPAN'S
'SPECIAL INTERESTS' IN MANCHURIA,
1917-1922

By

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A major issue in Japan's relations with the West after the First World War was her status in Manchuria. Japan's claim to "special interests" there was the focus of considerable debate from 1917 to 1922. Beginning with the Lansing-Ishii discussions of 1917, the United States and Japan attempted to reach an understanding which would establish the relationship between "special interests" and the "Open Door," the traditional American objective in China. The urgency of the European war prevented any real settlement, but the issue was reintroduced during the negotiations for the Second China Consortium in 1919 and 1920. Japan, the United States, Great Britain, and France spent nearly a year in protracted debate over Japan's desire to exclude Manchuria and Mongolia from the scope of the Consortium's activities. A settlement was finally reached, but the issue was raised again at the Washington Conference of 1921-22--this time by the Chinese. This study examines the understandings reached on Japan's "special interests," with an attempt to analyze the extent and meaning of those understandings.

Use of State Department and British Foreign Office primary sources, as well as important secondary studies on Japanese foreign policy, reveals that the crucial agreement between Japan and the West resulted from the Consortium negotiations, and was not altered at the Washington Conference. The United States and Great Britain successfully resisted Japan's claim to a political sphere-of-influence in Manchuria, although the Consortium agreement did exclude Japan's major economic developments there from the scope of its operations. Despite the fact that the powers spent over a year discussing the issue, there were varying interpretations of what the final arrangement had meant. At the Washington Conference, Japan sought a more explicit acknowledgment of her "special position," and the U.S. State Department envisaged a revision of the Consortium agreement as well. This agreement was not altered, however, by the Nine-Power treaty which concerned China and the Open Door.

Examination of the Consortium negotiations reveals the important role of the British as a mediating and destabilizing influence in Japanese-American relations. The Chinese, whose territory was at stake, were given almost no attention, and this ultimately proved to be the weakness of the "arrangement" on Manchuria. The West did not challenge Japan's economic interests there; and neither did it offer any support to China in her attempt to regain control of the area at the Washington Conference.

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INTRODUCTION

A major issue in Japanese-American relations from the Taft Administration to Pearl Harbor was the status of Japan's interests in Manchuria. Following her defeat of Russia in 1905, Japan was able to consolidate her position in South Manchuria. These inroads into what was nominally Chinese territory did not disturb Theodore Roosevelt, but the Taft Administration made concerted efforts to force American capital into Manchuria. These activities were a major source of tension between the United States and Japan, and the two countries, first in the Lansing-Ishii discussions of 1917 and then during the Consortium negotiations in 1919-1920, attempted to reach an understanding on the problem of Japan's "special interests" in Manchuria. At the Washington Conference, the issue was raised again, as the United States attempted to incorporate its conception of the Open Door, which was contradictory to "special interests," into the Nine-Power treaty.

The Nine-Power treaty was hailed as a major step forward for China, for the signatories agreed to abide by the Open Door and to respect China's territorial and administrative integrity. The new order for the Far East established at Washington dissolved, however, when Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931. Outrage at Japanese aggression, especially in the United States, was expressed in terms of Japan's violation of the Nine-Power pact; but the Japanese maintained that they

had not reneged on the agreement they had signed. Sadao Asada, in an article published in the American Historical Review, "Japan's Special Interests and the Washington Conference, 1921-22," argues that the Japanese signed the Nine-Power pact with the understanding that it did not compromise their "special position" in Manchuria. Japanese acceptance of the Open Door and China's territorial integrity was qualified indeed; and when Chinese nationalism threatened Japan's position in Manchuria, she felt justified in protecting her "vital interests" by use of force.[1]

Another scholar, Thomas Buckley, challenges Asada's interpretation of the Nine-Power treaty. In his The United States and the Washington Conference, Buckley argues that there is little evidence to support Asada's contention that Japan understood that the Nine-Power treaty excluded Manchuria; moreover, Buckley disputes Asada's argument that the American delegation (specifically Elihu Root) deliberately allowed the Japanese to draw this conclusion. Conceding that the Nine-Power treaty was the "weakest link" in the chain forged at Washington, Buckley nonetheless contends that Japan had no justification for believing that the United States had sanctioned the exclusion of Manchuria from the Open Door.[2]

What, then, did the Nine-Power treaty mean? Manchuria, in terms of vital interests, was insignificant to the United States and Great Britain; Japan, on the other hand, had been responsible for developing the area and considered it crucial to her national security. Despite this disparity of concern, the issue of Japan's "special interests" had been the focus of a protracted debate among the three powers during the negotiations for forming a new China Consortium in 1919-1920.

The meaning of the Nine-Power treaty, as defined by the issue between Asada and Buckley, must be examined in light of the final agreement on Manchuria which was reached during the Consortium negotiations. This study concludes that the Nine-Power treaty did not alter that agreement; and that the Consortium arrangement represented a compromise between Japan's desire for a territorial exclusion (sphere-of-influence) of Manchuria from the scope of the Consortium's activities, and the resolve of the United States to unconditionally end exclusive economic and political policies in China.

Although the role of the British in Far Eastern matters during this period is often minimized as being that of an echo of the United States, an examination of the Consortium negotiations reveals the importance of Great Britain as a mediating--and destabilizing--influence. British diplomats demonstrated a greater sophistication in their dealings with Japan than did Americans; they were also more willing to compromise. The growing dislike of the State Department for the Anglo-Japanese alliance stemmed largely from the conviction that the alliance restricted Britain's ability (and desire) to endorse wholeheartedly America's conception for a new order in the Pacific. The conversion of Great Britain to the Open Door was equally important to American officials as that of Japan.

The study of Japan's "special interests" in Manchuria is essentially one of Anglo-American-Japanese diplomacy, for the views of the Chinese, whose territory was at stake, were neither solicited nor taken seriously. As Japan's demands for the exclusion of Manchuria and Mongolia from the Consortium rested on their interpretation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, this study begins with a brief examination of the background

and results of those talks. The Consortium negotiations are examined in detail, with an attempt to answer two questions: why did the West consider Manchuria so important as to challenge Japan's position there, and what did the British, Americans, and Japanese understand the final agreement to mean? Finally, the Nine-Power treaty is considered: what was its relationship to the Consortium agreement, and how do the interpretations of Asada and Buckley stand up?

NOTES

[1]Sadao Asada, "Japan's Special Interests and the Washington Conference, 1921-22," American Historical Review, LXII (1961), 62-70.

[2]Thomas F. Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970), pp. 152-54.

CHAPTER I

TO THE LANSING-ISHII AGREEMENT

Japan's "special position" in Manchuria can be dated most conveniently from her victory over Russia in 1905. The Treaty of Portsmouth granted Japan virtual control of the southern part of Manchuria, which even the Chinese were formally obliged to recognize. Although concrete Japanese interests in Manchuria had legal sanction, and approval from Great Britain, discussion of the position in the years that followed assumed more patriotic tones: the Empire had gained control over this vital area only at the cost of blood and great sacrifice. As Korea had been considered the lifeline of Japanese survival, worth a war with Russia, so did the rights in Manchuria assume paramount importance. What had been part of the fruits of victory, the buffer zone to the Korean protectorate, became in itself territory worth fighting for.[1]

In 1905, the control of Chinese territory by foreign powers was hardly unusual. Although an American Secretary of State, John Hay, had proclaimed that the United States would follow a policy respecting China's territorial and administrative integrity, Theodore Roosevelt, who presided over the peace negotiations at Portsmouth, expressed no interest in challenging Japan in Manchuria. With his Secretary of State, Elihu Root, Roosevelt shared the belief that American interests in China were simply too unimportant to risk discord with Japan.[2]

Armed with an ambitious plan for "dollar diplomacy" which stretched from Mexico to Turkey, the Taft Administration reversed Roosevelt's

policy of disinterest. Taft's attempts to force American capital into Manchuria, notably the Knox neutralization fiasco, alarmed Japan. The Knox scheme, which would have internationalized the South Manchuria railway, laid the basis for Japan's desire to gain international recognition of her "special position" in Manchuria.[3] The change of American administrations in 1913 had little impact on the fear that the United States was intent on opposing Japan's bid for leadership in East Asia; despite the unwillingness of Woodrow Wilson to defend the Open Door by taking a firm stand on Manchuria, the American minister to China, Paul Reinsch, actively tried to get American capitalists to dislodge Japan from her preferential position.[4]

The European war exacerbated rather than eased the tensions between the United States and Japan, for Japan did not shirk the opportunities in China which the absence of the European powers provided her. She was able to consolidate her gains in Manchuria, and, using the position of "defender of the Far East" bestowed upon her by virtue of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, made economic inroads into China Proper. In exchange for supplying a destroyer flotilla for use in the Mediterranean, Japan received the sanction of Britain and France for the transfer of the German-owned concession of Shantung to Japanese control.[5] Most damaging to Japan's prestige, however, was the imposition of the famous "Twenty One Demands" on China. Though Japan quickly withdrew the most far-reaching group of demands in the face of Western opposition, suspicion of her intentions had reached a high point.

By 1917, Japanese officials had realized that the policy of brute force in China had yielded little to Japan, either internationally or in her relationship with the Chinese. The Terauchi cabinet resolved to

ease the tensions engendered by the forceful policies by attempting to reach understandings with both the United States and China. Expansion into China was not to be discontinued, but it seemed likely that Japan would encounter less opposition if that expansion focused on Manchuria and Mongolia, and away from China Proper.[6] Still, to assure that her gains during the war would not be snatched away at the peace table, it was important for Japan to receive acknowledgment from the West of her "special position." Such acknowledgment was obtained without difficulty from the British; but the entry of the United States into the war posed problems.[7] Given the tensions between the United States and Japan over the preceding few years, the perceived attempts of the United States to deprive Japan of her leadership in East Asia, the Terauchi cabinet especially wanted to reach an understanding with the Americans.

The Wilson Administration was equally anxious to arrange a settlement with Japan, for Wilson had been so concerned about Japanese aggression in China that he had even toyed with the idea of doing nothing with regard to Germany in order "to keep part of the white race . . . strong to meet the yellow race."[8] Despite this concern, Wilson's policy toward China had been flaccid; the realities of American priorities placed the Far East well after Latin America and Europe, and Wilson did not display Taft's affinity for dollar diplomacy. Nonetheless, in Wilson's grand scheme for the postwar world, China's development played an important role. When the Japanese requested permission to send an Imperial Mission to discuss wartime cooperation, the United States, seeing this as an opportunity to ease tensions with Japan, readily accepted.

Viscount Ishii Kikujiro and his entourage arrived in San Francisco in the fall of 1917, replete with silver bowls and other tokens to acknowledge American hospitality.[9] But in addition to bearing gifts, Ishii also bore instructions from his superiors to obtain from the United States the much-sought recognition of Japan's leadership in East Asia, her "special position" in Manchuria.[10] For this purpose, the Ishii Mission could not have been more ill-timed. The Americans were in a temporizing mood, and unwilling to commit themselves to anything before the peace conference. And a "Monroe Doctrine for East Asia," as the Japanese liked to call their objective, was not part of Wilson's design for the New Order which he hoped to be instrumental in creating.

Ishii's discussions with Robert Lansing, as the diplomatic history texts make clear, ended in stalemate. In particular, the two powers were unable to agree on a definition of "special interests." Some State Department officials who discussed Japan's interests in Manchuria before the arrival of the Ishii Mission had considered the possibility of angling for a bargain with Japan which would trade a "hands-off" policy in China Proper, evacuation of the South Sea islands occupied by Japan, and other concessions, for a recognition by the United States of Japan's political position in South Manchuria. Despite the fact that even those who advocated this policy considered it a last resort, there had been sharp disagreement over the wisdom of <u>any</u> acknowledgment by the United States that Japan had a "special position" in China. Breckinridge Long, Third Assistant Secretary of State, was the most vehement in his opposition; as a result, the Far Eastern Division's recommendations to Lansing on Manchuria advised "evasion and postponement."[11]

Lansing evinced a certain amount of sympathy for Japan's position in Manchuria, which he told Ishii he understood had been developed because of "unavoidable necessity." Several months previously, when Reinsch's attempts to open South Manchuria to American capital had caused the Japanese ambassador in Washington to approach Lansing in alarm, the Secretary of State--disavowing knowledge of Reinsch's actions--had told the ambassador that "the United States recognized that Japan had special interests in Manchuria."[12] To Ishii, Lansing made no statements which could be construed as a threat to Japan's position there. Nonetheless, the United States had an interest in the Open Door, and Lansing sought a guarantee from Japan that there would be no repetition of the Twenty One Demands.

Historians have pondered, probably needlessly, the vague and unspecific clauses of the Lansing-Ishii exchange, which reaffirmed the "so-called" Open Door, recognized that Japan had "special interests in China, especially in the part to which her territories are contiguous," and relegated to a secret protocol the promise of the two signatories "not to take advantage of the present situation in China to gain special privileges" counter to the Open Door.[13] Japan was unsuccessful in her attempt to gain clear American recognition of her leadership in East Asia, her "paramount position" relative to China, but the acknowledgment of "special interests"--an oblique reference to Manchuria and whatever other territories Japan considered contiguous--left the meanings of the phrases up to the signatories.

The Japanese found the Lansing-Ishii agreement useful, since its vagueness, plus the confidentiality of the promise "not to take advantage of the present situation in China," allowed them to add the

exchange to the list of acknowledgments of their "special position." The "temporary agreement" proved most embarrassing to the United States, however, and became a source of endless grief during the Consortium negotiations. Although Lansing defended the agreement to the United States Senate, believing the secret protocol would prove useful as a future bargaining point with Japan, the reaction the notes received was negative. The Chinese were understandably upset, since the agreement over their territory had been negotiated without their consent.[14] The British Foreign Office viewed the exchange with derision, an example of naive American diplomacy. Foreshadowing the trouble the exchange would cause, Sir Conyngham Greene, the British ambassador in Japan, reported that "asked by one of my colleagues . . . what would happen if neither party could agree as to the interpretation of any 'special interest,' Viscount Motono laconically replied, 'ce sera le plus fort qui aura le dessus.'" It was evident who the British believed would be the "top dog" in such a case. To American suggestions that Britain conclude a similar agreement with Japan (undoubtedly to pin both countries to the Open Door), the Foreign Office was decidedly cool.[15]

Even within the State Department, there was some opposition to the exchange. Breckinridge Long had fought long and hard to delete <u>any</u> reference to "special interests" from the agreement; now he worried that China might have concluded a secret treaty with Japan, transferring Manchuria, and "we may have unwittingly recognized her special interests in the territory adjoining Manchuria."[16] These fears were groundless, but the new agreement was clearly disturbing to the Chinese, and it was

soon evident that the exchange would cause more tensions than it been designed to erase. British apprehensions about the failure to define "special interests" were justified, as the Japanese publication of the Lansing-Ishii exchange in China translated "special interests" to mean "paramount interests."[17]

The Ishii mission had not resulted in any understanding between the United States and Japan on Japan's "special interests," but the Lansing-Ishii notes were significant in terms of the events that followed. The way in which Japan turned the document to her advantage, especially during the Consortium negotiations, convinced the State Department and even Robert Lansing that any acknowledgment of Japan's position--however vague--caused misunderstandings. Japan obviously interpreted "special interests" to mean a sphere-of-influence; this became increasingly unacceptable to Washington as the changing balance of power in the Far East afforded the United States an opportunity to abolish spheres-of-influence. Although American officials were cognizant of Japan's exclusive developments in Manchuria and the extent to which these challenged their conception of the Open Door, "evasion and postponement" indeed summed up the way in which these contradictions were handled during the Ishii mission. Still, the admission of "special interests" proved damaging to American efforts to abolish spheres-of-influence, and it was an admission that the State Department tried vigorously to reverse.

NOTES--CHAPTER I

[1]Richard Storry, A History of Modern Japan (Baltimore: Penguin, 1960), pp. 142-43; F.O. 371/5345/31, "Recognition by His Majesty's Government of Japan's Special Position in China," memorandum by C.H. Bentinck, 22 October 1920; Akira Iriye, Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1879-1911 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 73-74.

[2]Warren I. Cohen, America's Response to China (New York: John Wiley, 1971), pp. 76-77; Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, pp. 205-08.

[3]Iriye, Pacific Estrangement, p. 208.

[4]Noel Pugach, "Making the Open Door Work: Paul S. Reinsch in China, 1913-19," Pacific Historical Review, 38 (May 1969): 157-75.

[5]M. Tate and F. Foy, "More Light on the Abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," Political Science Quarterly, 74/4 (1959): 532.

[6]John William Young, "The Japanese Military and the China Policy of the Hara Cabinet, 1918-21" (Doctoral dissertation, University of Washington, 1972), pp. 24-25, 27.

[7]F.O. 371/5345/31, "Recognition. . . of Japan's Special Position"; Hugh Borton, Japan's Modern Century (New York: Ronald Press, 1955), p. 283.

[8]Outten Jones Clinard, Japan's Influence on American Naval Power (University of California Press, 1947), p. 165.

[9]Breckinridge Long diary, entry for 10 September 1917, Long Papers, Library of Congress. Long as Third Assistant Secretary of State was sent to meet the Mission.

[10]At the time of Ishii's arrival, he had no specific instructions, and in fact initiated the talks with Lansing on his own. Although the Japanese government had not formulated a specific legal definition of "special interests" at the time of Ishii's departure for the United States, Tokyo subsequently made clear to the ambassador the need for an acknowledgment from the Americans. Burton F. Beers, Vain Endeavor: Robert Lansing's Attempts to End the American-Japanese Rivalry (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1962), p. 111; Sadao Asada, "Japan and the United States, 1915-25" (Doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1962), p. 42.

[11]Long to Polk, 1 August 1917, Long Papers; Long diary, entry for 27 July 1917.

[12]Reinsch had suggested that the United States and Japan cooperate in building railways in Manchuria, overruling Japanese objections that this conflicted with their "special position" by informing the Japanese minister in China that "the so-called 'special position' of Japan in Manchuria has not been recognized beyond the specific grants and concessions, the sum total of which makes up. . .the legal position of Japan in that area." The Japanese did not agree with this definition; Lansing did, but displayed great reluctance to challenge Japan in Manchuria by approving Reinsch's schemes. Reinsch to Lansing, 22 January 1917; Lansing to Guthrie, 25 January 1917; Lansing to Reinsch, 16 April 1917 (with note by E.T. Williams, Far Eastern Division, 25 January 1917); Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919), pp. 170, 171, 187.

[13]The public paragraphs of the Lansing-Ishii exchange can be found in FRUS 1917, p. 265; the secret protocol is in The Lansing Papers, Vol. II (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1940), p. 450-51.

[14]Lansing Papers, II, p. 452.

[15]F.O. 405/222/237, Balfour to Cambon, 7 December 1917; F.O. 405/224/8, Greene to Balfour, 26 November 1917.

[16]Long to Lansing, file for 1917, Long Papers.

[17]Roy F. Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, 1913-21 (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), p. 182.

CHAPTER II

THE CONSORTIUM

The Lansing-Ishii agreement was a temporary expedient, at least from the American point of view. Preoccupied with European affairs, anxious to make no commitments prior to the Peace Conference, the Wilson Administration negotiated with the Ishii Mission as a way of keeping the lines of communication open. Although Lansing and Ishii both made serious attempts to bridge the gaps between their two nations, the "agreement" did little more than table the issues, chief of which was the nature of Japan's "special interests" in China as a whole and Manchuria in particular.

Japan had sought recognition of her special position in Manchuria and her leadership in East Asia. The agreement with the United States, particularly the part which acknowledged Japan's "special interests," was useful, even though Tokyo regarded the secret protocol as a "temporary promise."[1] Although Lansing had tried to emphasize that Japan's "special interests" arose from "geographical propinquity" and did not differ in any other way from the interests of other powers in China, the document itself was imprecise and failed to define what each country <u>did</u> mean by "special interests."

Problems with Japan increased in the years following the end of the war. The Siberian intervention and the subsequent delay in the withdrawal of Japanese troops, and the Shantung issue which was discussed at the Paris Peace Conference but not really settled until the Washington Conference, were the chief irritants. In addition to these problems,

the issue of Japan's "special interests" in Manchuria arose during the negotiations for forming a new international financial consortium in 1919-1920.

The question of "special interests" had been raised during the negotiations for including Japan and Russia in the first China Consortium in 1912. These countries insisted that they could not join the organization unless they could be sure it would not countenance any activities in their respective spheres-of-influence in Manchuria which would be inimical to their national interests. After considerable haggling, some lip service to the Open Door, and an agreement that was confined to the banking groups and did not express the political views of the governments, Japan and Russia agreed to join.[2] The Consortium soon developed a poor reputation; it monopolized loans, excluded the interests of bankers outside its preserve, and generally operated as an exploiter of China rather than as a stimulus to Chinese development.[3] One of Woodrow Wilson's first acts upon coming to office in 1913 was to withdraw support of the United States government from the American group. The Wilson Administration thereafter pursued what Wilson believed to be the traditional policy of friendship to China--a policy untainted by collusion with either Western or Japanese imperialists.

By 1915 and the Twenty One Demands, it was clear that Japan was intent on increasing her sphere-of-influence in China, on using the opportunities provided her by the European war and Chinese weakness. Hence, by late 1916 and throughout 1917, the British began urging the Wilson Administration to resume its support of the American group, presumably as a way of restraining Japan.[4] The Japanese also requested American reinvolvement. The motives of neither country were entirely

above board--for the Consortium offered a way to control and channel the torrent of American capital anticipated to flood China after the war. For Japan, this was quite obviously a good way to protect her "special interests," since American participation in an organization that Japan controlled posed little threat.[5]

Until November 1917, after the signing of the Lansing-Ishii notes, the Wilson Administration remained cool to these overtures. Then, Lansing announced that the American government was favorably considering resumption of American participation and would begin taking steps to organize a new group. In part this change of policy stemmed from the failure of the United States to restrain Japan through an "independent policy" toward China, and was as well prompted by the imminent possibility that the Chinese government would negotiate a major loan with the Japanese. Experience had shown that a Japanese loan was seldom just a business enterprise, and it was evident that the Wilson Administration would be unable to convince American bankers to invest in China unless it was prepared to back them up.[6] The urgings of the British became more frequent, as the European war weakened their ability to devote attention and money to China, and as the Consortium became increasingly a Japanese operation. Additionally, Wilson felt that re-entering the Consortium was justifiable as a war measure, to provide a loan to the Chinese government for currency reform.[7]

Pressure to renew American participation was also coming from the State Department. Paul Reinsch repeatedly wired the wishes of the Chinese that the United States rejoin the Consortium, and he added his own feelings that this would serve American as well as Chinese interests. In Washington, Breckinridge Long, the Third Assistant Secretary

of State, had been at work at plans to renew American support and to reorganize the American group.[9] Members of the State Department, particularly those in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, shared Wilson's hope that the new postwar order would provide China with a real chance to modernize. They wanted to end spheres-of-influence and make the Open Door more than just empty rhetoric, and the Consortium, properly organized, seemed the ideal instrument to achieve this end. The role of the State Department would not be routinely or disinterestedly to protect American investment abroad, but to work with American capitalists and tailor their investments to political goals. The State Department agreed with Wilson that renewed American participation would have to be accompanied by a complete overhauling of the existing Consortium: larger and more representative banking groups, and guarantees that the new Consortium would work to assist and not to hinder China's development.[10]

The United States also saw the Consortium as a way to "reform" the other powers--Japan particularly, but Britain and France as well. American capital, working with European interests, might conceivably "drive Japan out of China."[11] Robert Lansing, trying to persuade President Wilson to sanction American reparticipation, stressed the positive effects it would have on the British and French, "who would be likely to withdraw their claims to spheres-of-influence in the areas affected." By June of 1918, Wilson had been brought around to the idea of renewing American involvement in the Consortium--but only with the firm assurance that it would be consistent with his high-minded aspirations for China and would not revert to the predatory organization from which he had withdrawn support in 1913.[12]

British and Japanese reveries about controlling American capital and maintaining their spheres-of-influence in the "predatory organization" were rudely halted when the United States announced that it wanted to include industrial as well as administrative loans within the scope of the new Consortium's activities.[13] The existing Consortium had excluded industrial loans, thus preserving for the participants sole option on developments within their spheres. The desire of the State Department to open the Consortium to all major developments was consistent with the Wilson Administration's policy to end particularistic policies in China--although it was hardly consistent with Japan's desire to retain leadership and control of the Consortium's activities.

The prospect of including industrial enterprises posed a dilemma for the Japanese, who realized that if the Consortium were opened to non-administrative loans, their veto power and perhaps their "special interests" in Manchuria might be jeopardized. Japan's leaders did not readily abandon the old policies, and although they accepted the rhetoric of the Open Door, of Wilsonian internationalism, they were to continue to distinguish between the "apparent" and "hidden" meanings of these phrases.[14] Although some Japanese officials (notably Baron Makino Shinken and Prince Saionji Kimmochi who represented Japan at the Paris Peace Conference) advocated policies consistent with Wilsonian liberalism, urging "peaceful expansion" rather than militarism, there was little disagreement on the vital importance of retaining exclusive Japanese rights in Manchuria.[15] Given the growing power of American capital, however, and perhaps also the fear of Anglo-American collusion, participation in the Consortium was seen as a convenient way to gain goodwill and to check the excesses of Western capital. The cabinet of

Prime Minister Hara Kei (who had long advocated a policy of cooperation with the U.S. and who had as well opposed Japanese militarism in Siberia) agreed to join the Consortium on the American terms, although not without dragging its feet.[16] Despite this willingness, the possibility of conflict between the new Consortium and the "special position" in Manchuria did not go unnoticed.

The extent to which the United States had to "reform" both Great Britain and France as well as Japan was emphasized by the British reaction to widening the scope of the Consortium. (The views of the French were almost as unimportant as those of the Chinese; getting the French to "fall in line" with American proposals was a task left largely to the British Foreign Office.) Like the Japanese, the British held out nearly nine months after the initial American proposal before finally agreeing to the inclusion of industrial loans.[17] Although the State Department realized that this intransigence resulted partly from the Foreign Office's fear that the British bankers would not give up their free hand in China and might even refuse to support the Consortium, suspicion of the British indicated that there were obvious limits to Anglo-American cooperation. A memorandum prepared in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs in November 1918 on Anglo-American policy in China noted several areas in which "Great Britain appears to be working at cross purposes with us."[18] American policy toward Japan was tempered by awareness of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, and by uncertainty as to how far the British had come in espousing American goals. Although one State Department official was later to speak of Great Britain's "loyal and close cooperation" during the Consortium negotiations, this was almost certainly an "historical" rather than a

"contemporary" analysis.[19] By the signing of the final agreement on the Consortium, however, many of the strains between the two countries had been relaxed.

British policy was still in a fluid state in 1918, and American suspicions--more pronounced among Lansing, Breckinridge Long, and J.V.A. MacMurray (the new Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs) than among men in the field such as Roland Morris in Tokyo and Reinsch in China--perhaps reflected a certain amount of tension and inconsistency in British policy.[20] Although the British certainly desired to retain their position in China, by late 1918 the Foreign Office had begun to realize the necessity for pulling in the reins, for finding a policy which would safeguard the most important British interests without sacrificing good relations with the United States or Japan. Sir John Jordan, Reinsch's British (and ideological) counterpart in China, wrote in December 1918 that "the admission of American enterprise in China will demand the abandonment of established British interests and of our claim to a special sphere of influence."[21] Realization of the increasing limitations of British power and capital and the rise of American influence was a bitter pill to swallow, however, and Jordan's views were held in abeyance as the Foreign Office continued to press for exemption of industrial enterprises from the Consortium. By March 1919, however, the Foreign Office agreed to accept the American conditions, and had persuaded the French to accept as well.[22]

The way was now paved for negotiations among the four banking groups, which met in Paris in May 1919 to work out the terms of the new agreement. The negotiations proceeded smoothly, and by 20 May the American ambassador in Paris, Henry Wallace, was able to report the

resolutions of the groups as communicated to him by Thomas Lamont, chief negotiator from the American Group. All that remained was for the respective governments to ratify the agreement.[23]

In Japan, the question of ratifying the agreement centered on the issue of Japan's "special interests" in Manchuria. The basic dilemma surfaced as the Diplomatic Advisory Council[24] voted to allow the Japanese banking group to join, but to insist on the reservation of Manchuria and Mongolia from the scope of the Consortium's activities. Viscount Itō Miyoji, who expressed the widespread fear that America intended to use the Open Door policy to establish her own leadership in East Asia, felt that the Japanese reservation might receive approval because Great Britain would want to preserve her own sphere in the Yangtze Valley. Inukai Ki, another member of the Council, agreed, but raised the issue of a negative Western response--what then? What if the Western powers decided to form a three-power consortium and leave Japan isolated? Japan would then have to make concessions. This possibility was agreed upon, but at this meeting, the issue of a back-up policy was tabled.[25] Gotō Shimpei, a member of the Council from the Home Office, shared Itō's belief that the West would accept the reservation, basing his optimism, in the case of the United States, on American recognition of Japan's "special interests" in the Lansing-Ishii exchange.[26]

Notification of the Japanese reservations, which came from the Japanese banking group in June 1919, was foreshadowed by consular reports from Tokyo. The press was highly critical of the Consortium, and Japanese officials were doing their best to assure the public that Japan's participation in the Consortium would not affect, as one

leader put it, "Japan's special political position . . . in Manchuria."[27] On 17 June, M. Odagiri, the Japanese banking group's chief representative in Paris, informed Thomas Lamont of the American Group that the Japanese government "desired to reserve from the scope of the agreement Eastern Mongolia and Southern Manchuria," citing the Lansing-Ishii agreement as an example of the wide recognition of Japan's "special position" in those areas.[28]

Such a blatant call for a return to spheres-of-influence was totally unacceptable to the United States, and the British and French opposed the new conditions as well. Breckinridge Long wrote gloomily in his diary that the Japanese reservation "threatens the whole structure of the Consortium," and he cursed the Lansing-Ishii agreement.[29] Long was certainly accurate in his perception that the reservations posed a direct challenge to the new order the United States hoped to create in the Far East, for the State Department had planned the new Consortium to abolish spheres-of-influence and make the Open Door more than just empty rhetoric. The citation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement, so bitterly denounced by the Chinese and apparently regretted at this time even by Lansing,[30] indicated that the Japanese were indeed turning the document to their advantage. In the months that followed, there were few references to the economic impact that exclusion of Manchuria and Mongolia would have on the Consortium, or on the West's interests there. But it was fully realized that Japan's economic control of Manchuria had decidedly political overtones, and behind the desire to include the Japanese preserves within the scope of the international agreement apparently lay the hope that, even if Japan could not be "smoked out" of Manchuria, her control there could at least be neutralized.

There was optimism in all three Western capitals that Japan could be brought around. The Japanese banking group, eager to participate in the Consortium and anxious for a friendly relationship with the West, soon made it known that it opposed the reservations but had been obliged by its government to present them.[31] Thomas Lamont, along with the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, agreed that the reservations were probably, as Curzon called it, a "ballon d'essai," and would not be maintained in the face of firm Western opposition.[32] In the State Department, Breckinridge Long drafted a harsh note, informing Japan of the American position and making use of "the opportunity I have been living for--to kick over the Lansing-Ishii agreement."[33] Long's draft hinted that the West might form a three-power consortium if Japan did not withdraw the reservations.

In the face of opposition from Britain and France, the response to the Japanese reservations was considerably less harsh than Long and the State Department had envisaged, and the American note did not even make reference to the Lansing-Ishii agreement.[34] Even in this form, however, the negative Western response forced the Diplomatic Advisory Council to reconsider. In early August, Viscount Uchida, the Foreign Minister, presented the Council with two alternative policies. One was to continue to demand a territorial exclusion of Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia--"generalism." The other was to ask exclusion only of the specific rights which Japan had received under treaties concluded with China--"enumerationism."[35] Uchida and Tanaka, Minister of War, favored "generalism," but the Council was unable at this time to reach any decision. In part this was because Prime Minister Hara's political opposition on the Council

desired to make hay out of the Consortium dilemma, and advocated that Japan enter the Consortium without any reservation at all.[36] This view, which was totally unacceptable to those other members of the Council who favored accomodation with the West, paralyzed the Council. A policy which risked the complete opening of Manchuria and Mongolia to what Uchida and Tanaka termed "Japan's principal enemies" would undoubtedly have meant the fall of the Hara cabinet; for the military opposed even "enumerationism." As a delaying tactic, Hara suggested that an attempt should be made to explain the importance of the "special position" to the West, in the hope that the powers could be persuaded to accept Japan's reservation.[37]

The stroke which Woodrow Wilson suffered while trying desperately to secure public approval for American participation in the League of Nations had an equally paralyzing effect on the American government in the fall of 1919. Negotiations with Japan over the reservations were left largely to middle-echelon State Department officials such as MacMurray and Long, who were notoriously anti-Japanese and who displayed little sympathy for Japan's concerns in Manchuria. Long's meeting in late August with Debuchi Katsuji, the Japanese charge d'affaires in Washington, was an example of the way in the State Department dealt with Japan. Long, who had been frustrated in his earlier attempts to put Japan in her place and "kick over" the Lansing-Ishii agreement, was angered by Debuchi's attempts to generate sympathy for the Japanese position by linking Japan's concerns in Manchuria to those of the United States in Mexico. The usual American response to the shopworn Japanese effort to compare the Monroe Doctrine to Japan's designs in

Asia was ire, and Debuchi was not spared a detailed explanation of the difference between the way in which the United States handled "geographical propinquity" and Japan's predatory tactics in Manchuria and in China as a whole. Anything which suggested colonialism, a repetition of Korea, did not equate to America's position in the Western Hemisphere. Long's conversation with Debuchi revealed how far apart the two countries were in the late summer of 1919--and how totally unable they were to discuss calmly the issues between them.[38]

Other than responding to the Japanese government's official reservation of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, which was relayed to the Japanese ambassador on 29 October, the State Department did little to explore compromises with Japan. To be sure, the rejection of the reservations included an assurance by Lansing that the United States did not desire to infringe on legitimate Japanese rights--the South Manchuria railway was named as an example.[39] But in general the State Department explored everything but a compromise, instead preferring to push the idea of threatening a three-power consortium down the throats of the British and French, and even trying to float an <u>independent</u> loan to China.[40] Both of these tactics failed, but suggest that the American government felt that Japan dreaded isolation more than she dreaded the inclusion of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia in the Consortium, and that she would yield if the fangs of the tiger of Western capital were bared.

The fall of 1919 was certainly the high point of American resistance to Japan's claims for exclusion of Manchuria, and the adamance of the State Department that there should be <u>no</u> acknowledgment of a "special

position" in Manchuria and/or Mongolia stemmed in part from the burning experience of the Lansing-Ishii agreement.[41] While the assurance on the South Manchuria railway was tantamount to a tacit admission that American policy was not a repetition of the Knox neutralization scheme, a blatant exclusion of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia threatened to rent a large tear in the fabric of the "new order." (And it could hardly be denied that the original conception of the Consortium and its role had envisaged, one day, the turning over of foreign-built railroads to Chinese control.) American idealism, having suffered setbacks at Paris only a few months before, had found a new cause. In the fall of 1919, at least, the State Department clung tenaciously to its refusal to discuss any compromise with Japan or jeopardize its hopes for what the Consortium could be.

The inherent dangers in the policy were underlined by uncertainty of the British position. J.V.A. MacMurray, whose suspicion of Great Britain was pronounced, spoke of the need "to tread carefully to get England to adopt a more liberal China policy," referring here to a rejection of the British proposal to advance a small loan to the Chinese "without prejudice to the Consortium negotiations." MacMurray feared that if the door were completely closed to Britain, it would force her to side with Japan, and this would mean that the "U.S. will not just lose the Consortium game, but precipitate a new policy of spheres-of-influence underwritten by Britain and Japan."[42] The Anglo-Japanese alliance lurked like a black cloud over the State Department, which could never be sure how far the British had come in accepting American goals. It was evident from the absolute refusal

of the British Foreign Office to countenance any threat of a three-power consortium that American attempts to pressure Japan had limits. And the need to compromise with Japan was brought home, not only by the refusal of the British to join in an overt bludgeoning of their ally, but as well by the justified fear that the Foreign Office was considering "selling-out" on South Manchuria.

The Foreign Office was no less concerned than the State Department about the future of China, and was serious in its abandonment of spheres-of-influence, which seemed the most realistic policy under the new circumstances. Having abandoned the old policies, however, in which they had invested no small stakes, the British desired to replace them with something equally practical. As disturbed as the United States by Japan's aggressive tactics in China, the Foreign Office was nonetheless appreciative of the vital importance of Manchuria to the Japanese and feared that threatening a three-power agreement would force their sensitive ally into a corner. Lord Curzon, moreover, was not above a little hard bargaining. The Consortium was not the only problem between Japan and Great Britain; the Foreign Office was equally concerned about alleged Japanese interference in its negotiations with the intractable Tibetans, whose cooperation was necessary in safeguarding India, the jewel of the British Empire. There were disturbing reports of Japanese atrocities in Korea and interference with British shipping in Tsingtao, as well as the Siberian fracus. From Beilby Alston in Tokyo, Curzon received word of the adamance of the Japanese on excluding South Manchuria in particular; Alston, who felt that the Americans were "counsels of perfection," believed that it was much more important for China to regain control over Shantung than it

was for the Consortium to include Manchuria--couldn't a deal be made?[43] Curzon was reluctant to recognize a political sphere-of-influence, which he realized was inconsistent with the "new policy," but felt that the Japanese would drop their claim to Eastern Inner Mongolia if an "arrangement" could be made on South Manchuria; and he hinted to the Japanese that Great Britain was willing to consider this.[44] In response to American urging that the "last stand of the West" should be the threat of a three-power consortium (the State Department saw this only as a threat), Curzon responded with the idea of conceding South Manchuria as the "crux" of Japan's desire.[45] Neither government was willing to even consider the suggestion of the other.

If Curzon waffled on South Manchuria, he did so because he felt that Japan already controlled the area, anyway, and that little could be gained from refusing to acknowledge that control.[46] Some sort of recognition might, however, be traded for a Japanese concession elsewhere. In early September of 1919, Curzon began holding a series of interviews with Viscount Chinda, the Japanese ambassador in London. The discussions concerned Anglo-Japanese cooperation generally, but Curzon devoted much time to trying to arrange a settlement on the Consortium.

Curzon spoke as harshly as representatives of the State Department about Japan's tactics in China, calling on the Japanese to realize that the days of the old policies of "divide and rule" had passed. However stridently he spoke to Chinda, Curzon also left room for the Japanese to compromise without losing face. After requesting and receiving from the Japanese ambassador a specific delineation of the desired exclusion, Curzon declared that it "appeared to conflict with the principle of the Consortium" and stated that "His Majesty's Government could not

accept the Japanese reservation if it were intended as a territorial claim." However, Curzon did not close the discussion entirely. After listening to Chinda's expressions of fear that the opening of Manchuria and Mongolia would threaten the national security of the Empire, Curzon proposed that Chinda have his government supply a definite formula which would guard against this contingency. Curzon promised nothing; but Chinda did not go away empty-handed.[47]

Chinda's interpretation of his conversation with Curzon was that England viewed sympathetically a broad interpretation of Japan's rights in South Manchuria, although it was "easy to imagine" that the Foreign Office would merely parrot the State Department.[48] Much to the annoyance of the British, Chinda did not bother to mention the idea of a general formula to his superiors until the middle of December--and then only when he had been prodded by Alston. Alston reported that the Minister of Foreign Affairs was "much struck" by the idea and appeared to be giving it serious consideration.[49] Although the Hara government was in no hurry to settle the issue as late as December[50] (perhaps wanting to hold out until the Chinese government, already in dire straits, weakened still further), Hara did tell the press that Japan sought to safeguard her "special interests" in Manchuria but that she did not propose to exclude these regions entirely from the scope of the Consortium.[51] Within the Japanese government, a slow drift began away from "generalism" and toward "enumerationism." To what extent this drift was a product of negotiations with the West is unclear. What is clear is that the British proposal for a general formula later emerged as the nucleus of the final agreement.

In the closing months of 1919, the State Department moved toward the British proposals, aware of the futility of trying to get Britain and France to agree to threaten a three-power agreement, and aware also of the failure of the independent loan. Perhaps in response to conversations with his British counterpart, which appear to have been frequent, Roland Morris in Tokyo began suggesting in the middle of November that a possible area of compromise lay in defining specifically the interests represented in South Manchuria. Morris believed that the Japanese might accept such a definition which would safeguard their vested interests but would not concede a political sphere-of-influence. An advantage to this, Morris pointed out, would be to illustrate "in a practical way what we mean by special interests due to geographical propinquity."[52] This was certainly consistent with Lansing's assurance to the Japanese in October that the United States would not infringe on Japan's vital interests, and coincided as well with the Department of State's discussion of a possible recognition of "vested interests." The failure of American policy had struck even Breckinridge Long; forced to choose between the possibility that Japan would go her own way if no agreement could be reached and admitting to her "special interests" in Manchuria, Long discussed the latter with Thomas Lamont. Long had come to believe that some recognition of this sort was necessary in order to get Japan to join the Consortium, and he informed Lamont that the Department was prepared to admit "that Japan has certain specified vested interests in Manchuria, and that these be excepted from the operations of the Consortium. Such an admission would secure to Japan the economic and industrial privileges in those regions which she now has and would save

this government from admitting her claims to any political interests. . ." Keenly aware of the limitations of diplomatic notes in breaking the impasse, Long pleaded with Lamont to go to Japan and negotiate a settlement.[53]

In early February, Thomas Lamont departed for the Far East. Although he technically represented the American Group and not the State Department, Lamont kept in constant contact with the British and American ambassadors in Tokyo. With Lamont's arrival in Tokyo, the burden for reaching an agreement with Japan shifted more fully to the United States. Anglo-American relations had improved since the fall, and the British soon came to share the State Department's high regard for Thomas Lamont.

In mid-January 1920, the Hara Government decided to "compromise slightly," and the Cabinet decided in favor of "enumerationism" as a way of settling the differences with the West. It was obvious that neither Britain nor America would support a territorial exclusion, but the idea of the general formula had some promise. Supported even by the military, the Hara cabinet had resolved its division; the basic reservation of Manchuria and Mongolia remained untouched, but was to be expressed in specific rather than general terms.[54]

Coincident with Lamont's arrival in Tokyo, the Japanese Foreign Office sent its reply to the State Department's rejection of late October, outlining the "new position" on the reservations and providing the formula suggested by Curzon:

> The Japanese Government accept and confirm the resolutions passed at the conference of the representatives of the banking groups. . .

> for the purpose of organizing a new Consortium. In matters, however, relating to loans affecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, which in their opinion are calculated to create a serious impediment to the security of the economic life and national defense of Japan, the Japanese government reserve the right to take the necessary steps to guarantee such security."

There followed a list of railroads and related mining enterprises, including, of course, the South Manchuria railway, which were to be excluded.[55]

Predictably, the Japanese note was considered "unacceptable" by the State Department. John V.A. MacMurray felt that it was "too blandly innocuous and plausible" and that the Department might well look to "what happened in Korea" and to the 1909 Chinchow-Aigun railway project "for the practical effect of any formal acknowledgment of Japan's special position ."[56] In Tokyo, Alston, Lamont and Morris agreed that the memo was probably not "a final expression but a position from which to retreat if necessary." Lamont recommended an immediate acknowledgment expressing "grave disappointment" that the formula was so vague, and the Foreign Office echoed Washington in finding the Japanese formula "generally unacceptable."[57]

Following Lamont's suggestion, the British, French, and American governments promptly responded to the Japanese note. On 16 March, the State Department sent its reply, recording with "hearty gratification the disavowal by Japan of any claim to exclusive economic or political rights with respect to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia." Rejecting the general formula as "ambiguous," the note expressed the hope that Japan would be willing to rely on the "good faith" of her partners in the Consortium not to infringe on her vital interests.[58] The British went a step further: they would be willing to give

written assurance that the Consortium would not affect Japan's security.[59] And if these notes proved ineffective, Lansing even secured Wilson's permission to authorize Morris to threaten to reveal the secret protocol to the Lansing-Ishii agreement.[60]

Recognizing Japan's need for what Morris termed an "Asian life-line," Lamont now proposed that the banking groups should agree on the scope of the Consortium and which Japanese interests would be excluded. Such an agreement would not involve the governments and so would technically avoid the Japanese from concluding that their "special interests" had been recognized. It would, Lamont wired J.P. Morgan, "appease public sentiment in Japan, abolish formal reservations, and wipe out any suggestion of political sovereignty in Manchuria and Mongolia." Lamont added what the British had concluded all along--that Japan had Manchuria sewn up, anyway, and that "there is nothing there which would lead us to want to put money there unless Japan goes along."[61] Lamont did not fear any economic threat to the United States from Japan; privately he told Alston that he was amazed that Japan was treated like a first-class power, given the "unbusinesslike methods" of the official classes. Alston, who agreed, spoke in typically Edwardian fashion of Japan's "inadequate attention to efficiency."[77] Significantly, Lamont was closer to the positions of Alston and Morris in his willingness to compromise with Japan than he was to Long and MacMurray. Aware that the Department of State wished above all things to avoid an agreement with Japan which would recognize her political and/or economic position in Manchuria, Lamont was nonetheless aware of that position. No diplomatic agreement could dislodge Japan from Manchuria; and Lamont displayed no interest in using American capital for that purpose.

Upon receiving Lamont's proposed exchange, the Department of State hesitated. Displeased that Lamont's draft "gives the impression that the American Group is totally uninterested in Manchuria and Mongolia," the Department balked at the suggestion that the Consortium was merely a business deal among international bankers. Fearing that the Lamont proposal came too close to a territorial exclusion, the Department wanted a less damaging acknowledgment of Japan's position. Frank Polk, Acting Secretary of State, wired that the Department would accept a specific list of enterprises to be exempt, if no territorial area were mentioned.[63] This was consistent with Long's earlier directive that the Department was willing to recognize Japan's vested interests, but did not want another Lansing-Ishii exchange which left the door open for further Japanese encroachment.

The Department's hesitancy was echoed by Sir Charles Addis of the British banking group, who felt that any mention of Manchuria or Mongolia in the compromise "might imply a tacit assent on the part of the groups to a partial survival of the old policy of spheres-of influence."[64] From Peking, Miles Lampson, the British ambassador, wryly observed that Lamont's proposal would not be likely to find much favor with the Chinese, "who after all count for something."[65] Lampson shared Jordan's sympathy for China; Addis's adamance can perhaps be explained by the fact that, having seen a commitment by his government to give up the old policy, Addis was unwilling to watch the powers let Japan "get away" with anything.

Conceding to the opposition, Lamont proceeded to reach an agreement with the Japanese government and banking group to exclude specific enterprises rather than general areas. This proposal corresponded to

"enumerationism," by which the Diplomatic Advisory Council had agreed to define the "reservation" in specific terms. On 26 March, Morris wired that Lamont had obtained assurances that the Japanese Group would now enter the Consortium without reservations, and that the government would accept the guarantee of the other powers not to countenance activities which would threaten Japan's national life. Morris sent the text of the proposed American note, warning that his conversations with Foreign Minister Uchida indicated that the Japanese "may endeavor to frame their answers so as to include some general phrases" on Manchuria and Mongolia which would be for home consumption. Meanwhile, Lamont sailed for China to clear the way for the Consortium's work.[66]

On 30 March Morris received the draft of the Japanese memorandum which would be sent to Washington and London, "withdrawing" the reservations of nearly a year before. Morris termed the note a "clear and explicit denial" of a general reservation, which seemed to include phrases corresponding to the Department's interpretation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement. Morris noted with annoyance two provisions which excluded from the scope of the Consortium the Taonanfu-Jehol railway (which was projected to run from the extreme western portion of Manchuria to Jehol, shortly north of the Chinese capital in Peking), and any railway which competed with the South Manchuria railway. Morris concluded, however, that these provisions were best let by, even though Japan "was being unreasonable."[67]

The reaction in Washington was quite different; and the Department, fearing that Japan had injected into the agreement provisions which were inconsistent with the understanding reached with Lamont, wired the

American Group representative immediately. Lamont was incensed. "I deem it poor policy to give the Japanese government any further leeway in this matter. In my judgment they ought to be down on their knees in gratitude. . ." He advised that the "general expression" of the note should be accepted, but that the American Group should "reject the veto power over railway construction" which the Japanese provision seemed to give. And he urged that if this provision were not withdrawn, the three-power organization should be formed immediately.[68]

Lamont's annoyance with the Japanese attempt to broaden the agreement after it appeared that everything had been settled was shared by the American Group and the British Foreign Office, but they resisted the extreme measures he suggested. Morris, aware of the time that Lamont had devoted to reaching an agreement with the Japanese, counseled patience, feeling that the new conditions were probably a last-ditch effort by the military to assert a measure of control. A firm stand by the other powers would strengthen the positions of the banking group and the liberals in the Hara Cabinet.[69] Lamont's distress, and that of the State Department, perhaps reflected the frustration with which Americans had come to associate with dealings with Japan. Lamont, certainly, had been sympathetic to Japan's interests in Manchuria, and his initial suggestion for a compromise revealed the lack of interest with which he viewed the area as a field for American and British investment. The Department of State, moreover, had already compromised more than it had intended. It had been no accident that the proposal for a "general formula" had not come from the United States, which had already learned enough about vague guarantees from the Lansing-Ishii notes.

The United States and Great Britain sent nearly identical, negative replies to Tokyo on 28 and 29 April, 1920. The American government hoped Japan would reconsider; the Foreign Office expressed the fervent desire that Japan would participate in the "new era about to dawn" in international relations.[69] (Wilsonian rhetoric was apparently infectious.) In less than a week Morris had the Japanese response, which implied that the United States and Great Britain had misinterpreted Japan's intentions:

> The Americans seem to think that this is a new proposition. . . tantamount to a veto power and therefore contrary to the fundamental principles of the Consortium. . .It was simply to avoid future misunderstandings as one of the actual examples which formed the subject matter of the general assurances given by the American government. The Japanese Government does not demand explicit assurances on these points. Their idea is simply to bring the powers concerned to an understanding of their interpretation in these respects."

Morris was "sure Lamont will approve."[70]

Lamont did approve: "it clears up the whole difficulty."[71] Wires of congratulation crossed the Atlantic and Pacific, for the major obstacle to the Consortium's formation had been removed. On 11 May 1920, notes were exchanged between the Japanese Group and Lamont, and although Lamont warned that the difficulties were not over, that the Western powers would still have to teach Japan "table manners," the impasse appeared to be resolved.

But what did the latest Japanese note mean? In Washington, J.V.A. MacMurray alone found no cause for rejoicing. In a memorandum to Long on 6 May, he wrote that "the note retracts nothing; it reemphasizes Japan's claim to a veto on railway construction. . . The fact that they profess themselves willing to 'refrain from

further discussion of these points' is equivalent to saying that they will no longer argue with us but will tell us where they stand on the question of their pretensions in Manchuria." MacMurray went on to warn that if this note were accepted, "I do not see how we can ever dispute their right to forbid undertakings which might come into competition with any existing railway in Manchuria." He urged Long to act--to meet with Shidehara, the Japanese ambassador in Washington, to wire Morris, before it was too late.[72]

MacMurray's warning went unheeded and there is no record of a response from Long. Of anyone in the State Department, Long, who had drafted all the major documents, had been responsible for Lamont's mission to Tokyo, and had consistently opposed any recognition of Japan's "special interests," would have been most likely to agree with MacMurray. Yet on 7 May, Long wrote in his diary, "The Consortium is agreed to. . . I am highly pleased!! It is my 'child.' I have nursed it since its conception two years ago."[73] Hardly the words of a man who felt that he had given birth to a defective baby. Perhaps Long felt that an agreement which did not mention "special interests" was better than no agreement at all; and Long's concern had been Japan's <u>political</u> pretensions in Manchuria whereas MacMurray was clearly discussing her <u>economic</u> rights there.

MacMurray's response was significant precisely because it went unheeded, and because the State Department, under MacMurray's aegis, would attempt to raise these same questions at the Washington Conference. In fact, his interpretation was probably closest to the mark. Certainly the debate in the Diplomatic Advisory Council had not been over whether Manchuria and Mongolia were to be reserved, but whether the protection

of Japan's "special interests" would take specific or general form. It can be argued with justification that there was little practical difference between excluding specific enterprises and granting a formal reservation, if it was the good will of the Chinese that was the object, or an end to Japan's political position in Manchuria. Jordan had observed at the time of the Paris Peace Conference when the Shantung issue was at stake that

> "we are asked to believe . . . that a railway running for two hundred and forty-five miles from a principle point in China to the capital of one of the most important provinces, owned, financed, policed and controlled by the Japanese government is a mere economic privilege which does not involve interference with China's sovereign rights. . ." [74]

Surely this analysis could apply equally well to the South Manchuria railway.

The simple but painful fact was that China did not control Manchuria, nor did it look likely that she would for many years to come--if ever. An equally painful fact was that the Japanese had effectively acted to exclude non-Japanese enterprise, particularly in South Manchuria. No agreement would change these facts to the contrary; and they were certainly the objective realities of the situation the powers had spent over a year discussing. What had the West gained? What had Japan lost?

Unfortunately, there was no one interpretation of what the final agreement over Manchuria had been. MacMurray obviously read it as a concession by the West, a concession he would try to reverse. To Lamont, to the British Foreign Office, perhaps to the majority of those concerned in the State Department, South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as areas for the Consortium's activities were tacitly

excepted, but the end to spheres-of-influence, the principle of Chinese sovereignty, had been affirmed. Certainly the Americans and British generally saw the agreement as a "victory" for their side. The matter of interpretation on the American side, however, was clouded by the fact that most of those responsible for the negotiations soon moved on to other things--Long, Lansing, Morris, Lamont. Virtually no one was left in a position of authority--save MacMurray--who could interpret the agreement to anyone who subsequently asked about it.

The Japanese interpreted the agreement essentially as MacMurray predicted. Hara wrote in his diary that the final Japanese note to the powers did not signify withdrawal of the conditions Japan attached to the Consortium, and felt that Japan's position had been clearly recognized.[75] One Japanese historian has written that

> "The Tokyo government, regarding the 'assurance' given in the 16 March note as of central importance, felt that it conferred on Japan essentially what she had sought to achieve by excluding Manchuria and Mongolia from the scope of the Consortium."[76]

Discussion of "special interests" and "spheres-of-influence" had been avoided, it was true, but Japan's vital interests in Manchuria and Mongolia had emerged intact. The muddy interpretation of the agreement with Japan was emphasized in the long delay in relaying the documents to the Chinese government, in part because Japan insisted on a statement which would make clear to the Chinese what Japanese rights in Manchuria and Mongolia were.[77]

It would be a mistake to see hidden meanings in the nebulous discussions which led to the final "agreement," for it is clear that

there was no one interpretation as to what that agreement entailed. The Consortium negotiations had, however, attempted to define "special interests," even though the use of that term was avoided. The open-ended acknowledgment of the Lansing-Ishii exchange that Japan had "special interests in China" was substituted by a practical definition of that position. Furthermore, the Japanese were called upon to define their "national life and economic existence" in any future disputes; the burden of proof was laid at Tokyo's door, and further claims in Manchuria and Mongolia were open to the scrutiny of the Consortium. While this did nothing to assert Chinese control over the areas, nothing to disturb the powers of the South Manchuria railway, the Japanese had to answer to the West if they wanted to change the status quo. In the era of the Twenty One Demands, the Nishihara loans, this was no small accomplishment.

The disparity of concern between the West and Japan over Manchuria is important to an understanding of the final arrangement on the Consortium. The interests of the United States, particularly, were abstract--those of Japan were concrete. Having committed itself to a new order, a position of leadership which envisaged the conversion of the European powers and Japan to the Open Door, the State Department could not sanction a territorial exclusion of Manchuria--even though its policy, with the exception of the Taft years, had been one of essential disinterest. As the first opportunity for the United States to demonstrate what it meant by the "new order" in the Far East, to have acknowledged Japan's claim for a sphere-of-influence would have been to sell out the ideals to which the United States hoped to convert the other powers, including Japan. However, the reality of Japan's

interests in Manchuria could not be ignored, and the determination with which the Japanese tried to safeguard their position demanded accommodation. The practical exclusion of Japan's vital interests, however, was as far as the West would go.

Despite the initial hopes of the State Department that the Japanese could be persuaded to withdraw their reservations completely, this proved not to be the case. In the first place, Japan's leaders sought an extension of the Lansing-Ishii agreement (their interpretation of it) to the Consortium--a concrete acknowledgment of their sphere. Moreover, there would have been no popular support for any agreement which did not make some provision for Japan's "special interests," however that agreement were worded. Some sort of positive assurance was necessary, not just to appease the military and public opinion, but because Japan wanted Western acknowledgment that her interests in Manchuria were vital, that they were worth special mention in any agreements concluded about China.

American attempts to get the Japanese to withdraw their territorial reservation were matched by Japanese willingness to settle for "enumerationism" rather than the original demand of "generalism." In addition, the firm and belligerent stand of the State Department was compromised by the role of the British, whose cooperation in China, given the greater preponderance of their interests there, was essential. Although it became increasingly clear that the British Foreign Office had quite genuinely renounced spheres-of-influence, the tendency toward balance-of-power politics remained. The reality of British policy was not nearly as important as the Americans' often occluded

perception of it, and this was emphasized by the State Department's nervousness over the effects of the Anglo-Japanese alliance on British policy, as well as uncertainty as to whether Britain had really renounced spheres-of-influence. Beyond this, the British role during the Consortium negotiations was clearly a mediating one; the idea of the general formula, incorporated into the final agreement, was a British invention. Given the fact that the Japanese had traditionally viewed their alliance with England as the cornerstone of their foreign policy toward the West, the British influence should not be underestimated.

The role of the Chinese in these diplomatic machinations was pitiably minor. None of the powers had taken Chinese demands, Chinese nationalism, seriously, and the United States had been more interested in finding a solution which would help create America's rather than China's China. This set of circumstances did not much change in the years that followed, even though the issue of Japan's "special interests" did not completely die with the Consortium agreement. At the Washington Conference, both the State Department and the Japanese Foreign Office envisaged a reopening of the issue--as did the discontented Chinese.

CHAPTER II--NOTES

[1]Sadao Asada, "Japan and the United States, 1915-25" (Doctoral Dissertation, Yale University, 1962), p. 49.

[2]See S.D. 893.51/931-960. The 1912 agreement went a long way toward recognizing Japanese and Russian claims of "special interests" in Manchuria. What is surprising is the equanimity with which the State Department accepted the Japanese and Russian conditions.

[3]Roy F. Curry, Woodrow Wilson and Far Eastern Policy, 1913-21 (New York: Bookman Associates, 1957), pp. 24-26.

[4]Frederick Field, American Participation in the China Consortiums (American Council for Institute of Pacific Relations, 1931), p. 132; A contrary view is found in the Foreign Office Confidential Print 405/222/63 Sir Edward Grey to Sir Conyngham Greene, 14 July 1916: "It would be well to let it be known that there would be no question of reconstituting the consortium, except in agreement with Japan. . . . If American capital wishes to interest itself in Chinese enterprises, the Powers of the Consortium . . . will have to decide whether American capital is to be their colleague or their competitor. . . .I am content if Japan wishes to leave the matter alone until it is raised by the Americans, and in any case the motive for discussing admission of America to the Consortium would not be a design to check Japan." Dr. Donald Lammers has suggested that it is likely that this policy was reversed after Grey's resignation as Foreign Secretary in December 1916.

[5]Asada, "Japan and the U.S.," pp. 84-86; John William Young, "The Japanese Military and the China Policy of the Hara Cabinet, 1918-21" (Doctoral dissertation, University of Washington, 1972), p. 115; Mitani Taiichirō, Nihon Seito Seiji no Keisei (The Development of Japanese Party Politics) (Tokyo: Tokyo University Press, 1967), p. 288, translated for Warren I. Cohen by Hiramatsu Tetsuji; Curry, Woodrow Wilson and FE Policy, p. 189.

[6]Field, China Consortiums, p. 137; Lansing to Reinsch, 9 Nov 1917, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1919), p. 153; Curry, Woodrow Wilson and FE Policy, p. 190.

[7]Breckinridge Long diary, entry for 9 Nov 1917, Breckinridge Long Papers, Library of Congress.

[8]Reinsch to Lansing, 6 August 1917, 2 November 1917, 20 November 1917; FRUS 1917, pp. 135, 152, 155.

[9]"Memoranda on Japanese Mission," Long Papers, B183 F1. Long advised withholding any mention of possible renewed American participation to the Ishii Mission.

[10]Field, China Consortiums, pp. 111-13; Long diary, entries for 1 and 9 July, 1919.

[11]Curry, Woodrow Wilson and FE Policy, p. 194.

[12]Lansing to Wilson, 20 June 1918, and Wilson to Lansing, 21 June 1918, FRUS 1918, pp. 169-71.

[13]Lansing to British ambassador (Reading), 26 July 1918; Polk to MacMurray, 10 August 1918; Page to Lansing, 16 August 1918; FRUS 1918, pp. 181, 188-90.

[14]James Morley, The Japanese Thrust into Siberia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), p. 301.

[15]Kato Suichi, "Taishō Democracy as the Prestage for Japanese Militarism," in Japan in Crisis, edited by Bernard Silberman and Harry Harootunian (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 221; Akira Iriye, "The Failure of Economic Expansionism, 1918-31," in ibid., pp. 241-43; Frank Langdon, "The Japanese Policy of Expansion in China, 1917-28" (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, 1953), p. 96; Mitani, Party Politics, pp. 286-95.

[16]The inclusion of industrial loans, of course, also meant that Japan could expect to participate in developments in China previously closed to her. John William Young, "Japanese Military," pp. 113; 116; Morley, Japanese Thrust, p. 273; Mitani, Party Politics, p. 286; MacMurray (Japan) to Polk, 16 February 1919, FRUS 1919, pp. 426-28.

[17]Davis (London) to Lansing, 19 March 1919, FRUS 1919, pp. 426-28.

[18]S.D. 711.41/24, "Points of Contact with Great Britain in the Far East," State Department memorandum, 29 November 1918. (Probably written by Ramsford Miller, Chief of the Far Eastern Division.)

[19]S.D. 741.9411/27, "Memorandum on the Question of the Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance," 29 April 1920, J.V.A. MacMurray.

[20]One should note, for example, the difference in attitudes between the Foreign and Colonial Offices on matters related to China. Since one of the preserves of the Colonial Office was Hongkong, it was less interested in finding areas of cooperation with the U.S. than it was in safeguarding the "lifeline" of Hongkong which was the Yangtze Valley.

[21]Jordan to Balfour, 23 December 1918, Documents on British Foreign Policy, First Series, VI, ed. E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1955), p. 566.

[22]Davis to Lansing, 19 March 1919, FRUS 1919, pp. 426-28.

[23]Wallace to Long, 20 May 1919, ibid., pp. 435-36.

[24]The Diplomatic Advisory Council was formed in 1917 and was composed of the prime minister, foreign minister, home minister, one privy councillor, two members of the House of Peers, and the presidents of the two political parties. In part the Council was designed to place foreign policy decision-making in a bipartisan frame, although it did not always have this effect. The practical result of the establishment of the Council, which was abolished in 1922, was to reduce the importance of the Foreign Office. Tekeuchi Tatsuji, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire (New York: Russell and Russell, 1935) pp. 43-48.

[25]Young, "Japanese Military," p. 117.

[26]Asada, "Japan and the U.S.," pp. 86-87.

[27]S.D. 893.51/2280, Morris to Lansing, 3 June 1919.

[28]S.D. 893.51/2267, Davis to Long, 17 June 1919; Davis to Polk, 18 January 1919, FRUS 1919, pp. 451-53.

[29]Long diary, entry for 23 June 1919.

[30]Long diary, entries for 24 July and 11 August 1919. Long had lunch with Lansing on 24 July and reported his changed attitude toward Japan since the Paris Peace Conference, Lansing's admission that he had been "deceived" by Ishii during the Mission, especially with regard to Shantung. Lansing had been "brutally frank" with Japan in Paris: "I do not trust Japan. You must put it in writing or in action."

[31]Long diary, entry for 11 August 1919; Commission to Negotiate Peace to Lansing, 28 June 1919, FRUS 1919, pp. 459-61.

[32]Curzon to Cambon (French ambassador), 29 July 1919, DBFP, VI, p. 650.

[33]Long diary, entries for 1 and 9 July 1919.

[34]Department of State to Imperial Japanese Embassy, 30 July 1919, FRUS 1919, pp. 471-73.

[35]Mitani, Party Politics, p. 292; Young,"Japanese Military," pp. 118-20.

[36]Asada, "Japan and the U.S.," p. 89.

[37]Young, "Japanese Military," pp. 121-22.

[38]S.D. 893.51/2413, Memo of conversation between Long and Debuchi, 27 August 1919; Long diary, entry for 11 August 1919.

[39]Lansing to Imperial Japanese Embassy, 29 October 1919, FRUS 1919, pp. 497-99.

[40]Suffice to say that the "autumn maneuvers" were extremely complex. While it would be unfair to claim that the State Department had no contact with Japan at all on the reservations, in general the British were relied upon to communicate American proposals, and to exert a "reassuring influence" on their ally. The assurance given in the October rejection of the Japanese reservations, that the United States would not infringe upon Japan's vested interests, was largely overshadowed by the attempts to negotiate an independent loan and by efforts to persuade the British and French to join in threatening to conclude a three-power consortium. See Lloyd Griffiths Fulton, "Japanese-American Relations, 1918-22: Attempts to Nail Down the Swinging Open Door" (Doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, 1975), pp. 176-238, for a detailed description.

[41]Lansing to Davis for Foreign Office, 11 October 1919, FRUS 1919, pp. 493-96; S.D. 893.51/2481, MacMurray memorandum, 11 October 1919. The careless abandon with which the British and Japanese Foreign Offices referred the Lansing-Ishii agreement as a recognition of "special interests" raised the shackles of MacMurray and Long; this dispatch to the British, rejecting the Foreign Office's proposal for a temporary four-power loan to China, began with an exhaustive explanation of what the Lansing-Ishii agreement did not mean. (MacMurray wisely felt it judicious to avoid attempting to explain what it did mean.)

[42]S.D. 893.51/2481, MacMurray memorandum, 11 October 1919.

[43]F.O. 405/222/85, Alston to Curzon, 22 August 1919; Alston to Curzon, 30 August 1919, DBFP, VI, pp. 697-98.

[44]F.O. 405/227/90, Curzon to Alston, 1 September 1919.

[45]Davis to Lansing, 2 October 1919, FRUS 1919, pp. 491-92

[46]Curzon had written the area off for British interests as early as 1917; and prior to the Washington Conference he would try to persuade the Chinese that an acknowledgment of Japan's position was a useful bargaining point in trying to regain Shantung.

[47]Curzon to Alston, 25 September 1919, DBFP, VI, pp. 734-36; Curzon to Alston, 20 November 1919, ibid., pp. 839-43; Davis to Lansing, 25 November 1919, FRUS 1919, p. 502.

[48]Young, "Japanese Military," p. 138.

[49]Ibid.; Alston to Curzon, 18 December 1919, DBFP, VI, p. 894.

[50]Young, "Japanese Military," p. 137.

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[51]Alston to Tilley, 30 December 1919, DBFP, VI, p. 914.

[52]Morris to Lansing, 15 November 1919, FRUS 1919, p. 502.

[53]Breckinridge Long to Thomas W. Lamont, 20 December 1919, Lamont Papers, B185 F15; lent me by Warren I. Cohen.

[54]Mitani, Party Politics, p. 294; Young, "Japanese Military," p. 138.

[55]Imperial Japanese Embassy to the Department of State, 2 March 1920, FRUS 1920, pp. 500-03.

[56]S.D. 893.51/2705a, MacMurray to Wright, 6 March 1920.

[57]Alston to Curzon, 6 March and 9 March 1920, DBFP, VI, pp. 1025-27; Memorandum by Clive and Butler Wright, 11 March 1920, ibid., pp. 1029-32; S.D. 893.51/2703, Morris to Lansing, 8 March 1920.

[58]Department of State to Imperial Japanese Embassy, 16 March 1920, FRUS 1920, pp. 512-13.

[59]Curzon to Alston, 19 March 1920, DBFP, VI, p. 1045; 893.51/2725, Wallace to Lansing, 22 March 1920.

[60]S.D. 893.51/2856a and b, Lansing to Morris, 9 March 1920.

[61]S.D. 893.51/2718, Morris to Lansing, enclosing Lamont to Department and J.P. Morgan, 18 March 1920.

[62]Alston to Curzon, 28 and 29 March 1920, DBFP, VI, pp. 1059-60.

[63]S.D. 893.51/2736, Polk to Lamont, 16 March 1920.

[64]S.D. 893.51/2737, Addis to Morgan to Polk, 26 March 1920.

[65]Lampson to Curzon, 8 April 1920, DBFP, IX, p. 6.

[66]S.D. 893.51/2739, Morris to Polk, 26 March 1920; S.D. 893.51/2725, Wright to Polk, 22 March 1920.

[67]S.D. 893.51/2743, Morris to Polk, 30 March 1920; Alston to Curzon, 31 March 1920, DBFP, VI, pp. 1069-70.

[68]S.D. 893.51/2765, Morris to Colby repeating Lamont, 8 April 1920; S.D. 893.51/2766, Tenney to Colby, 11 April 1920.

[69]S.D. 893.51/2788, J.P. Morgan to Colby for Lamont, 21 April 1920; S.D. 893.51/2801, Davis to Colby enclosing Foreign Office memo, 28 April 1920; S.D. 893.51/2785, Morris to Colby, 19 April 1920; Department of State to Imperial Japanese Embassy, 28 April 1920, FRUS 1920, pp. 536-37.

[70]S.D. 893.51/2815, Morris to Colby, 5 May 1920.

[71]S.D. 893.51/2816, Morris to Colby, 7 May 1920.

[72]S.D. 893.51/2815, MacMurray to Long, 6 May 1920.

[73]Long diary, entry for 7 May 1920.

[74]Jordan to Curzon, 4 August 1919, DBFP, VI, p. 657.

[75]Young, "Japanese Military," pp. 139-40; Asada, "Japan and the U.S.," p. 107.

[76]Asada, "Japan and the U.S.," p. 107.

[77]Japanese Embassy to the Department of State, 8 July 1920; Davis to Crane, 9 December 1920, FRUS 1920, pp. 547, 599; also, "The China Consortium," Nation, 111:468, 27 October 1920 for indication that "Japan maintains in 'press propaganda' in China that reservations were accepted."

CHAPTER III

THE NINE-POWER TREATY

In Washington, London, and Tokyo, planning for the Washington Conference, which resulted from the failure of the Paris Peace Conference to deal adequately with Far Eastern problems and disarmament, took the Consortium agreement into consideration. The Washington Conference, in addition to providing for naval disarmament and rendering the Anglo-Japanese alliance meaningless, also codified the Open Door and committed the signatories of the Nine-Power treaty to respect China's territorial and administrative integrity. It was the Nine-Power pact which again involved the United States, Great Britain and Japan in a consideration of Japan's "special interests" in Manchuria.

In Washington, J.V.A. MacMurray, Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, displayed his concern about the Consortium agreement by warning Charles Evans Hughes, the new Secretary of State, about Japan's pretensions in Manchuria:

> ". . . the present ruling class in Japan desire access to the raw products available in Manchuria and perhaps other parts of China. . . Japan in control of the mineral resources of China, with outside contact cut off, and with unimpeded access on her own part to the mainland, would be in a position to cause serious trouble to almost any power."

Clearly warning Hughes of the importance of Manchuria to the Chinese, MacMurray stressed that the Japanese were up to no good--and that the Consortium agreement was not an adequate restraint.[1] In addition,

MacMurray feared that the British planned to compromise the agreement (which MacMurray already had viewed as too much of a concession to Japan) by trying to propose an arrangement which would concede South Manchuria in exchange for a "hands-off" policy by Japan toward the rest of China.[2] MacMurray's suspicion of both Japan and Great Britain set the tone for the recommendations to the American delegation at the Conference which were prepared by the State Department; these memoranda generally envisaged the Conference as a forum for reopening the issue of Japan's policy in China.[3] The agenda which was sent to the other powers made it clear that the United States viewed the upcoming conference as one which would deal equally with disarmament and Pacific affairs.

The British Foreign Office, which had originally suggested the idea of a disarmament conference as a way of preventing a naval race between the United States and Great Britain, became disillusioned very early with the American proposals. Disgusted that the United States apparently wanted the conference to be a catch-all for the rag-ends of Paris, the British feared that it would turn into a cockfight between the United States and Japan over Japan's policy in China. Above all, the Foreign Office wanted to avoid having to choose sides between the United States and Japan, and did not imagine Britain's role at such a "cockfight" to be an enviable one; the imminent expiration of the Anglo-Japanese alliance promised to cause enough problems.[4]

The Foreign Office was indeed exploring the idea of a compromise with Japan on South Manchuria, as MacMurray feared. British officials reasoned that the return of Shantung to Chinese sovereignty was crucial

to China, and that Japan might be more amenable to giving up the "cradle of Chinese civilization" if a more clear recognition of her position in South Manchuria were offered.[5] Despite the fact that most officials agreed that "Japan's position in Manchuria . . . appears to deserve a certain measure of sympathetic consideration," the idea of any further British statement on the issue was rejected by Victor Wellesley, Superintendent of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office. Wellesley felt that any further recognition of Japan's position would be inconsistent with the Consortium agreement, and would be "more likely to precipitate than prevent a crisis."[6] When Lord Curzon sounded out the Chinese ambassador in London, Wellington Koo, on the idea of "trading" Manchuria for Shantung, he found Koo equally opposed.[7] The issue was dropped; and the British stood on the Consortium agreement. Conversely, little support was lent to the Chinese in their desire to regain control over Manchuria, a desire they expressed many times at the conference in Washington.

The British played a secondary role at the Conference, particularly when it became clear that the attempts of the United States to break up the Anglo-Japanese alliance would be successful. But the apprehension with which Great Britain approached the Conference was certainly shared by its soon-erstwhile ally; the Japanese Cabinet viewed the agenda proposed by the United States as foretelling the "greatest national crisis since the Russo-Japanese war."[8] "Pacific affairs" was a euphemism for Sino-Japanese problems, and Japanese leaders feared that the Conference would turn into a tribunal indicting Japan's policy toward China. After some delay, the agenda was accepted, with the proviso that matters of "sole concern" to China and Japan

would not be discussed. As this proviso seemed to be ignored, the Cabinet adopted a policy which would instruct the delegates to discuss items of "general principle" while avoiding any discussion of "established facts" (i.e. Manchuria). If the Conference meddled in Japan's spheres in Manchuria and Mongolia, the delegates were to introduce a whole host of topics--immigration, racial equality, economic barriers in European colonies in the Far East--with which to "restrain" the Conference.[9] The delegates were also instructed to get a more specific recognition of Japan's preferential position in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia than had been given in the Consortium agreement. Armed with a defense in case the Conference challenged Japan's policy in China, the Japanese delegates had clear directions for achieving Japanese gains.[10] Distrustful of the British, who it was feared were in collusion with the United States, Japan approached the Washington Conference with apprehension.[11]

The three major powers attending the Conference had considered various schemes for "improving" the Consortium agreement; despite these plans, that agreement emerged from the Washington Conference unchanged. Recent historical debate, however, has raised questions about the relationship of the Nine-Power treaty to Japan's "special interests," centering on the importance of the so-called "Root resolutions." Specifically, two historians have disagreed as to whether the fourth and final resolution was a tacit concession of Japan's "special position" in Manchuria, and they disagree as well on how the resolution was interpreted in the United States and Japan.

The Root resolutions were the indirect result of a Chinese overture. At the opening session of the Committee on Pacific and Far Eastern Affairs, Alfred Sze, the chief Chinese delegate, presented ten principles which he asked be applied to questions relating to China. Extremely broad in scope, the thrust of the principles pointed toward the end of extraterritoriality, leaseholds, control of the customs revenue, tariff restrictions--and Japan's special rights in Manchuria.[12] The Japanese were sure that the principles were not the work of the Chinese at all, but had been drafted by Paul Reinsch and Robert Lansing, who were at the time acting as legal advisors to the Chinese delegation.[13] If Japanese suspicions indicated a scant regard for the intensity of Chinese nationalism, this was a regard not limited to the Japanese. None of the powers, Great Britain least of all, was prepared to pull out of China completely at a time when the Chinese government had less authority than it had ever had. Indeed, Sun Yat-sen had been elected president of the "Republic of China" in Canton only the previous April. With one capital in Canton, the warlords playing musical chairs in the recognized capital of Peking, and no one having real authority over the entire country, it was difficult for the powers to take the proposals seriously.

The Japanese spoke first, agreeing to the ten points only as a guide for <u>future</u> action. This was well in line with the Cabinet's directive to limit discussion to "general principles."[14] One by one, the Western powers offered sympathy but expressed unwillingness to accept the proposals in their entirety. Finally Elihu Root of the American delegation spoke, making two points: that the resolutions

could not deal with existing treaties or interfere with valid agreements; and that it "was desirable to distinguish between China Proper and the territories over which China excercised suzerainty," suggesting that the Conference deal with these areas separately.[15] These were important points. The first basically acknowledged Japan's desire not to deal with "established facts"; the second indicated that Root was unwilling to extend broad statements on the Open Door and Chinese sovereignty to areas China did not control--Mongolia, Tibet, and perhaps Manchuria.[16] A sharp exchange followed between Wellington Koo and Root, with Koo unwilling to distinguish between "China" and "China Proper," deferring to the Chinese constitution as a guide. Both the American and British delegations were disgusted with Chinese intransigence (Root said angrily he was "trying to help China"), but it is certainly significant that in drafting his famous resolutions, which were designed as a compromise of the Chinese points, Root ignored the issue and settled on "China," which the Committee had failed to define. The Root resolutions were adopted at the third meeting of the Committee with almost no debate, and the nine powers agreed

> To respect the sovereignty, independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China;
>
> (2) to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government;
>
> (3) to use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the territory of China;
>
> (4) to refrain from taking advantage of the present conditions in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of friendly states and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states.[17] (underlining added)

The first part of Clause 4 incorporated verbatim the "secret protocol" of the Lansing-Ishii agreement. Concerned about the interpretation given that document by Japan, Charles Evans Hughes had instructed Root to include the protocol in his resolutions. The Japanese could not object--they had, after all, agreed to the exchange--and publication of the protocol would erase the notion that Japan had "special rights in China, but simply that by reason of geographical location she had special opportunities there."[18]

Sadao Asada, in his doctoral dissertation "Japan and the United States, 1915-25" (Yale, 1962) , and in an article published in the American Historical Review, "Japan's Special Interests and the Washington Conference, 1921-22," maintains that Root seriously compromised Hughes "skillful diplomatic triumph" with regard to the secret protocol by adding--on his own--the phrase underlined in Clause 4. He further contends that not only did Root understand that this exempted Mongolia, Siberia, and perhaps Manchuria from the resolution, but that in his friendly relationship with the Japanese diplomats at the Conference he made it known that the United States did not intend to challenge the status quo in Manchuria. Acting without the knowledge of the State Department, Root's activities as a go-between led the Japanese to believe that the Root resolutions sanctioned their own interpretation of the Open Door, i.e., that it did not apply to Manchuria. Although the Japanese Cabinet still desired an explicit assurance that the Open Door excluded Manchuria, delegate Shidehara Kijurō, convinced that such a demand would break the Conference wide open, persuaded the Tokyo government to accept the Root resolution as a substitute. Though Shidehara realized the significance of the codification of the Open Door, and was "tortured"

by the contradiction in Japanese policy, Asada maintains that in accepting the new order for the Far East, Japan privately "reserved" Manchuria from the Open Door.[19]

Asada's analysis of both the American and Japanese interpretations of the Root resolution is challenged by Thomas Buckley in The United States and the Washington Conference. Buckley maintains that neither the Americans nor the British understood the Root resolution in the manner in which Asada suggests: "if the agreement existed at all, it existed in the minds of the Japanese, and even that is questionable." Citing a report from General Tanaka, in which Tanaka expresses the sentiment that "Japan gave up all she had in China," Buckley asserts that the ex-War Minister would not have made this comment had he felt Japan had received recognition of her position in Manchuria. The dangers of "proof through negative evidence" are always great, but Buckley's argument falls apart when he qualifies the Tanaka statement with the note that "he may have been referring only to China Proper." [20]

Without access to Japanese documents, Asada's account of the Japanese interpretation of the Nine-Power treaty stands, and in fact corresponds to earlier Japanese "understandings" of the Lansing-Ishii and Consortium agreements. His interpretation of the role of Elihu Root, however, is open to question. In acknowledging that the qualifying clause of the fourth Root resolution was "lifted" from the American guarantee of 16 March 1920 to Japan on the Consortium, Asada is correct. It was not, however, Elihu Root--Japanophile, overly sympathetic to Japan's pretensions in Manchuria and skeptical of China's ability to modernize--who lifted it. Root was specifically directed by

Charles Evans Hughes to add the clause to the secret protocol. Hughes reasoned that the Japanese would raise objections to the protocol if it stood alone, and felt that adding the guarantee would bring the resolution "in line with the Consortium agreement." This would do no harm, and would forestall Japan from making any further claims.[21] Addition of the phrase was therefore a conscious act of American policy, and not a coup de theatre struck by Root.

That the United States and Great Britain were unwilling to help China in her attempt to regain Manchuria, to cancel the Twenty One Demands (which, as Arthur Balfour had explained to Curzon, "has resolved itself practically into the question of the Japanese established position in South Manchuria")[22] is made clear by the Western response to Chinese demands after the adoption of the Root principles. When the Committee tabled the Chinese resolution calling for the removal of unauthorized troops, police, and foreign communications from Chinese soil, the Chinese turned to foreign leaseholds. This concerned France and Great Britain as well as Japan, but the Western leaseholds were insignificant compared to Dairen and Port Arthur, the linchpins of Japan's "special position" in Manchuria.[23] The Japanese stated their position clearly:

> Japan has no intention at present to relinquish the important rights she has lawfully acquired and at no small sacrifice. The territory in question [Dairen and Port Arthur] forms a part of Manchuria--where . . . she has vital interests . . .which relate to her national safety and economic life. This fact was recognized and assurance given by the American, British and French governments at the time of the formation of the International Consortium, that these vital interests of Japan . . . shall be safeguarded.[24]

No challenge to this statement ensued from the Americans or British; Balfour tried to appease the Chinese by offering to give up the British leasehold of Wei-Hai-wei (which the Foreign Office had already concluded was dead weight). The U.S. delegation remained silent, "since the United States has no leased territory in China, its attitude is one of benevolent disinterestedness."[25] It was evident that the Chinese delegation was leading up to a full-scale discussion of the Twenty One Demands, and Root privately assured the Japanese that the American delegation would treat the problem "as an 'historical fact' and pass over it lightly."[26] Though the State Department was bothered by the reference to the Consortium agreement, by continued Japanese statements that the agreement recognized Japan's "paramount position in South Manchuria," a memorandum calling for a clear statement of what the guarantee to Japan meant was ignored.[27]

Unsatisfied by the return of Wei-Hai-wei, the Chinese directly introduced the Twenty One Demands on 14 December 1921. They presented the Committee with a detailed list of the treaties and demands; as one historian has put it, "the atmosphere of the Far Eastern Committee was now growing warm."[28] Ostensibly to permit all sides to study the treaties, Chairman Hughes promptly adjourned the meeting.[29] The Committee did not meet again until January; and then Hughes deftly postponed further discussion of the Demands until after final settlement of the Shantung issue.

These manuevers suggest that the American and British delegations were reluctant to discuss the Manchurian issue and certainly had no intention of supporting the Chinese against the Japanese. This stemmed in part from the awareness that if the Shantung problem was to be

solved in China's favor--if real gains for China were to be made--the cooperation of Japan was essential, and it would not do to put the Japanese on the defensive by challenging them in Manchuria.

By the time the Twenty One Demands were finally discussed again, everyone was ready to go home. At the next-to-last meeting of the Far Eastern Committee, however, the Japanese offered three "concessions" to China. The most interesting one dealt with the Consortium:

> Japan is ready to throw open to the joint activity of the international financial consortium recently organized, the right of option granted exclusively in favor of Japanese capital, with regard, first, to loans for the construction of railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; and second, to loans to be secured on taxes in that region; it being understood that nothing in the present declaration shall be held to imply any modification or annulment of the understanding. . . composing the Consortium.[30]

What did this mean? It is clear that the Japanese delegates had clear instructions to strengthen, not weaken, the assurance given in the Consortium agreement. On those occasions when the delegates had appeared to compromise Japan's "special position," they were brought sharply into line by their superiors in Tokyo.[31] Although the British and American delegations had been surprisingly friendly, leaving Japan's interests in Manchuria unchallenged, the clauses on the Open Door which Hughes had added to the Root resolutions to form the Nine-Power treaty had met with Japanese resistance. Hughes' attempts to broaden the Open Door, to hold Japan to a policy effectively abandoning spheres-of-influence, conflicted with the Japanese understanding of the fourth Root

resolution, which they felt excepted Manchuria.[32] Why then did Tokyo sanction any statement on the Consortium---especially since it had been unable to get a stronger guarantee than the one contained in the Consortium agreement?

Asada suggests that the "nominal concessions" on the Twenty One Demands were merely gestures to appease the Chinese, and that they sprang from Japan's confidence that an understanding had been reached with the United States.[33] It is also possible that the Japanese, having seen the Consortium in operation for nearly two years without advancing a loan, felt that opening their "sphere" up to further loans was a cheap concession. Still, this gesture did indicate a certain measure of confidence in the West that had not existed at the outset of the Conference; and undoubtedly the role of Shidehara, who was committed to a policy of detente with the West and with China, was crucial. The "reservation" of Manchuria existed only as threats were perceived to the vital Japanese position there, and there were few threats in 1921.[34]

A careful check of State Department documents reveals "no comment" on the Japanese concessions. E.H. Carr of the British Foreign Office admitted that the Japanese statement on the Consortium "adds up to little," but "it is useful to have this definite renunciation in favor of the Consortium of all Japanese preferential rights in Manchuria and Inner Mongolia other than those definitely laid down in the correspondence of 1920."[35] The crucial guarantee that the powers would not infringe on Japan's "vital interests," however, remained intact, but this statement, when taken with the Japanese signatures on the Nine-Power treaty, did not result in diplomatic triumphs for Tokyo. The status quo in Manchuria was unchallenged; the rest of the treaty pinned Japan to the

Open Door in China Proper.

The lack of comment on the American side indicates that for Hughes and the American delegation, the question of Japan's "special interests" had been settled during the Consortium negotiations. Hughes had told Balfour that he "was prepared to recognize existing facts, e.g., in Manchuria . . . [but] he could not agree to the use of railroads as a means of political penetration, as had occurred in Manchuria."[36] (This suggested a recent discussion with MacMurray, who obviously did understand that economic and political penetration were synonymous.) Hughes had concluded, with the British, that Manchuria was beyond hope, and at Washington he simply sidestepped the issue. The status quo was unchallenged there, but neither did Hughes reverse the policies of his predecessors by recognizing a political or economic sphere of influence in Manchuria. Hughes, who was optimistic that China could modernize itself, entertained no illusions about Manchuria; on the other hand, he felt that the Nine-Power treaty and the return of Shantung meant definite gains for China. Certainly the Chinese had not gotten all they had hoped--or even most of what they had hoped--but for perhaps the first time, they had not left with <u>less</u> than they had come with.

NOTES--CHAPTER III

[1]S.D. 500.A41a/169, MacMurray to Hughes, 20 October 1921.

[2]S.D. 500.A41a/159, MacMurray to Hughes, 14 October 1921.

[3]"Some Basic Elements of the Far Eastern Problem," memorandum by J. Reuben Clark, 29 September 1921, General Correspondence, Washington Conference Papers, B290 F58, National Archives; "Japanese Interpretation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement," memorandum by Nelson T. Johnson, Confidential Memoranda, Washington Conference Papers, B283 F16; Sadao Asada, "Japan's Special Interests and the Washington Conference, 1921-22," American Historical Review, LXII (1961), 65.

[4]William Roger Louis, British Strategy in the Far East, 1919-1939 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 85-91.

[5]F.O. 405/233/44, "Memorandum respecting Japan and the Open Door," F. Ashton-Gwatkin, 10 October 1921; F.O. 371/6660/704, Board of Trade to the Foreign Office, 26 September 1921.

[6]F.O. 405/233/36, "Memorandum respecting the Japanese Sphere-of-influence," Victor Wellesley, 10 October 1921; "General Survey of Political Situation in the Pacific and Far East with reference to the forthcoming Washington Conference," Victor Wellesley, 20 October 1921, DBFP, XIV, pp. 434-48.

[7]Curzon to Alston, 24 October 1921, DBFP, XIV, p. 451.

[8]John William Young, "The Japanese Military and the China Policy of the Hara Cabinet, 1918-21" (Doctoral dissertation, University of Washington, 1972), p. 219.

[9]Asada, "Japan's Special Interests," 64-65.

[10]Herbert O. Yardley, The American Black Chamber (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1931), pp. 291, 297-98; Asada, "Japan and the United States, 1915-25" (Doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1962), p. 283; Young, "Japanese Military," p. 220.

[11]Yardley, American Black Chamber, pp. 297-98.

[12]Conference on the Limitation of Armament (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1922), pp. 866-68.

[13]Asada, "Japan and the U.S.," p. 264.

[14]CLA, pp. 874-76; Raymond Leslie Buell, The Washington Conference (New York: Appleton, 1922), p. 248.

[15]CLA, pp. 880-82.

[16]Asada, "Japan and the U.S.," pp. 274-75, indicates that Root told Chandler Anderson (a legal advisor to the American delegation) that he intended his own resolutions to apply to China Proper, not including Mongolia or Tibet, and circumventing Manchuria.

[17]CLA, pp. 900-02.

[18]Beerits memorandum (n.d.), Charles Evans Hughes Papers, B171 F19, Library of Congress; Asada, "Japan and the U.S.," pp. 277-78; Thomas F. Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970), p. 152.

[19]Asada, "Japan and the U.S." pp. 277-365; "Japan's Special Interests," 62-70.

[20]Buckley, US and the Washington Conference, pp. 152-54.

[21]S.D. 893.51/3902a, Hughes to Root, 19 November 1921.

[22]F.O. 405/236/68, Balfour to Curzon, memorandum on "The Twenty One Demands and the Sino-Japanese Treaties of 1915," 14 January 1922.

[23]CLA, pp. 986-998; Buell, Washington Conference, pp. 264-67.

[24]CLA, p. 1064

[25]CLA, p. 1068.

[26]Asada, "Japan and the U.S.," p. 337.

[27]Ibid., p. 294; S.D. 893.51/3731, "The New Consortium and Loans to China," H.D. Marshall, 14 January 1922.

[28]Buell, Washington Conference, p. 269.

[29]CLA, p. 1160.

[30]CLA, pp. 1510-12.

[31]Asada, "Japan and the U.S.," pp. 284-85.

[32]Asada, "Japan's Special Interests," 70.

[33]Asada, "Japan and the U.S.," p. 338.

[34]Dr. Warren I. Cohen has suggested that Japanese willingness to open up South Manchuria to Western capital sprang from Japan's desperate need for that capital, which Lamont had seen when he talked with Japanese bankers during the Consortium negotiations.

[35]F.O. 405/238/35, "Memorandum by Mr. Carr respecting Manchuria, Mongolia and the Consortium," 4 April 1922.

[36]"Memorandum by Sir M. Hankey respecting Mr. Balfour's interview with Mr. Hughes on Friday, November 11, 1921," DBFP, XIV, pp. 470-71.

CONCLUSIONS

The agreements between Japan and the West on Japan's "special interests" in Manchuria were consistently interpreted differently by each side. Attempts by the United States and Great Britain to obtain assurances from Japan that her interests in China were no different from their own met with rebuff, and the Japanese were equally unsuccessful in their efforts to gain recognition of a sphere-of-influence in Manchuria and Mongolia. Japan's support of the Open Door policy was always qualified by the fear that the Open Door meant a challenge to her "special position," which the Empire considered vital.

The Lansing-Ishii agreement clouded rather than clarified the issue of "special interests," and the confusion and misunderstanding of American intentions in signing the exchange led to the State Department's resolve to avoid future reference to that ambiguous term. During the Consortium negotiations, Japan tried to protect her exclusive rights in Manchuria and Mongolia by attempting to reserve those areas from the scope of the Consortium's operations. In Japan, there was universal acceptance of the importance of these rights, but difference on how they should be protected. The military and more conservative elements sought the traditional acknowledgment of spheres-of-influence, the security of a territorial exclusion. Liberals were content with "enumerationism," the recognition of Japan's

interests by the exclusion of specific, crucial developments. The final agreement corresponded to "enumerationism," but included a guarantee that Japan's vital interests (i.e., Manchuria) would not be infringed upon by the other powers. It basically conceded an economic, but not a political, sphere-of-influence to Japan, since her extensive developments in Manchuria remained exclusive. The West agreed not to challenge Japan's economic control over Manchuria, but no provision was made for Chinese nationalism and the impact this might have on Japan's willingness to be content with "informal empire."

In the West, there was no clear understanding of what the Consortium agreement meant, but a general sense of optimism prevailed that Japan had moved closer to the Wilsonian conception of a new order in East Asia. Although there was some concern expressed that Japan felt the agreement gave her veto power over the Consortium's activities in Manchuria and Mongolia, the fact that she had renounced a political sphere-of-influence seemed a clear victory for the West. The Consortium agreement admittedly did little to assert Chinese control over Manchuria, but Japan's willingness to enter into a cooperative arrangement with the West represented a great advance from what they had come to expect from her--the Twenty One Demands, the Nishihara loans, the aggressive policy in Siberia.

At the Washington Conference, the three major powers sought, but did not achieve, revisions of the Consortium arrangement on Manchuria. The British considered and rejected an arrangement which would have assisted the Chinese in regaining control of Shantung through a further British recognition of Japan's position in Manchuria. The American

delegation, although warned by the State Department of Japan's pretensions in Manchuria, worked to obtain Japan's adherence to the Open Door in China Proper by not challenging her on Manchuria. The Japanese government desired a more explict acknowledgment of the "special position" there, but the Japanese delegation, like the American, essentially avoided the issue at Washington.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

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Primary sources proved most useful in the preparation of this study, although for analysis of Japanese policy the language barrier made it necessary to rely on the work of other scholars. Fortunately, the Department of State decimal files which comprise Record Group 59 are available on microfilm. Of the series consulted, by far the richest was the Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of China (National Archives and Records Service, GSA, 1960). These records contain all of the diplomatic correspondence relating to the Consortium. Less useful for the purposes of this study were three other series in Record Group 59, Internal Affairs of Japan, Political Relations with Great Britain, and Political Relations of Great Britain with Other States. The volumes from Foreign Relations of the United States (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office) for the years 1917-23 proved helpful, but must be supplemented by the decimal file materials. The "Washington Conference Papers" at the National Archives, particularly Record Group 43, "Confidential Memoranda for the Use of the American Delegation," were important for determining State Department attitudes toward Japan and Great Britain. The offical record of the proceedings, Conference on the Limitation of Armament (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1922), although admittedly selective, was indispensable.

The Library of Congress retains the manuscript collections of many of the individuals who participated in the events described in this study. The Breckinridge Long Papers were especially rich on the Lansing-Ishii agreement and the Consortium negotiations. As Third Assistant Secretary of State, Long took an active part in formulating Far Eastern policy and was faithful in keeping his diary. The Robert Lansing Papers are poorly indexed; like the Papers of Chandler Anderson, they have been used effectively by other scholars. The Papers of Charles Evans Hughes were helpful for the Washington Conference and the cancellation of the Lansing-Ishii agreement; the Elihu Root Papers contained almost nothing on the Conference.

Primary British documents are found in Volumes VI and XIV of Documents on British Foreign Policy, First Series, edited by E.L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956). These volumes contain most of the important memoranda; also useful was the Foreign Office Confidential Print: China: Correspondence, available on microfilm (London, n.d.). The Public Record Office sent some additional documents, descriptions of which were found in the Index to General Correspondence (Kraus-Thomson Organization, Ltd., 1969). It is likely that the most telling sources, as on the American side, are the papers of participants.

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contained can be found in the Foreign Relations series. Raymond Buell, The Washington Conference (New York: Appleton, 1922) is the standard contemporary account; Buell interprets the Conference, especially the Nine-Power treaty, as a victory for Japan, and is critical of American and British policies. Thomas Buckley, The U.S. and the Washington Conference (Knoxville, Tenn.: University of Tennessee Press, 1970) is a well-researched work using American, British, and Japanese primary sources, but the section on the Nine-Power treaty is weak. John Chalmers Vinson, The Parchment Peace (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1955) underlines the restraining influence of Congress on makers of American foreign policy during this period; his main concern, however, is the Senate and the Four-Power treaty. A fascinating book is Herbert O. Yardley, The American Black Chamber (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1931). Yardley broke the Japanese code and was able to provide the State Department with Japanese communications during the Washington Conference, some of which are included in his volume.

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