DOGMATISM, RELIGIOUS BELIEF, AND
RELIGIOUS ETHNIZICENTRISM AND
THEIR RESPONSE TO PERSUASIVE

COMMUNICATION

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
JOHN M. PHILLIPS
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ABSTRACT

DOGMATISM, RELIGIOUS BELIEF, AND RELIGIOUS
ETHNOCENTRISM.AND THEIR RESPONSE TO
PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION

by John M. Phillips

This study involved construction of a Religious
Belief Scale (RBS) and a Religious Ethnocentrism Scale
(RES) and exploration of the relationships of the scales
to each other and to Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale. The
effects of a derogatory communication concerning dogma—
tism on the three scales were also investigated.

The Dogmatism Scale, RBS, and RES were combined
into one "Attitude Inventory" and administered to 132
Introductory Psychology students at Michigan State Uni—
versity. Four weeks later an Experimental group consist-
ing of 51 of the subjects who had taken the Attitude In-
ventory listened to a tape recording of the communication
and then were readministered the three scales of the
study. A Control group of 22 subjects retook the scales
prior to hearing the communication.

1

John M. Phillips

The results of the study indicated positive rela-
tionships between religious belief and dogmatism, between
religious ethnocentrism and dogmatism, and between reli—
gious belief and religious ethnocentrism, as defined by
the scales of the study. The communication, however, had
no significant effect on dogmatism, religious belief, or
religious ethnocentrism scores. Also high dogmatics did
not lower their scores on the three scales appreciably
more than low dogmatics in response to the communication.
No age or class status differences were found on the three
scales, but it was found that females obtained higher RBS
scores than males. Religious affiliational differences
were found on both the RBS and the RES.

Investigation of the data revealed the RBS to have
an adequate variance, as well as high test-retest relia-
bility and high internal consistency. The Shorter RES had
a lower variance and a somewhat lower reliability and
lower internal consistency.

Possible causes for the failure of hypotheses con-
cerning the effects of the communication were discussed,

along with implications involving the adequacy, accuracy,

John M. Phillips

and validity of the religious scales as measuring devices.

Possibilities for further research were also mentioned.

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Thesis Committee:

Dr. Norman Abeles, Chairman
Dr. Terrence Allen
Dr. Milton Rokeach

DOGMATISM, RELIGIOUS BELIEF, AND RELIGIOUS
ETHNOCENTRISM AND THEIR RESPONSE TO

PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION

BY

John M. Phillips

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Psychology

1968

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply grateful to all who assisted in this
study. I especially want to thank the chairman of my.
committee, Dr. Norman Abeles, for his patience, guidance,
and encouragement during the more trying moments of the
project. I also want to express my appreciation to
Dr. Terrence Allen for his cogent criticism concerning
crucial aspects of data collection and analysis, and to
Dr. Milton Rokeach, whose previous work on dogmatism
helped make the present research possible. My thanks
goes also to Mr. Michael Figler for his cooperation in
the collection of data for this study. The insights of
two of my colleagues, Bernard Silverman and Peter Hampton,

were also appreciated.

ii

TABLE OF

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . .
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . .

LIST OF APPENDICES . . . . .

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . .
Dogmatism. . . . . . . .
Religious Belief . . . .

Religious Ethnocentrism.

Relationships Among Dogmatism, Religious

CONTENTS

Belief, and Religious Ethnocentrism.

Religious Attitudes, Dogmatism, and Attitude

Change . . . . . . . .
Hypotheses to be Tested.
METHOD . . . . . . . . . . .
Subjects . . . . . . . .

The Instruments. . . . .
The Communication. . . .

Procedure. . . . . . . .

iii

Page

ii

vii

12
l7
l9
19
21
29

3O

Table of Contents (Cont.)

Page

RESULTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Intercorrelations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Experimental Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Scale Reliabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Demographic Variables. . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Intercorrelations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Experimental Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
The Scales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Future Research. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

iv

Table

LIST OF TABLES

Demographic Information on Total, Experi-
mental, and Control Groups of Subjects .

Results by Religious Affiliation of
Preliminary Pilot Study on Religious
Belief Scale . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Results of Pilot Study Involving Dogmatism,
Religious Belief, and Religious Ethnocen—
trism Scales (N = 80). . . . . . . . . .

Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coeffi-
cients among D—Scale, RBS, and RES Scores
on the First Administration for 132
Subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Comparison of Intercorrelations among First
Administration Scores of the D-Scale, RBS
and RES (N = 132). . . . . . . . . . . .

Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coeffi—
cients among First and Second Administra-
tion D—Scale, RBS, and RES Scores for
Control Subjects (N = 22). . . . . . . .

Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coeffi-
cients among First and Second Administra—
tion D-Scale, RBS, and RES Scores for
Experimental Subjects (N = 51) . . . . .

Comparison of Differences Between First and
Second Administration D-Scale, RBS, and
RES Scores for Experimental and Control
Subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Page

20

23

25

33

34

35

36

37

List of Tables (Cont.)

Table

9. Comparison of Correlation Coefficients
Between First Administration D—Scale
Scores and the Amount of Lowering of
D—Scale, RBS, and RES Scores Between
the First and Second Administration
for Experimental and Control Subjects. . .

10. Results of the First Administration of the
Dogmatism, Religious Belief, and Reli-
gious Ethnocentrism Scales (N = 132) . . .

11. Comparison of Test-Retest Reliability Coef-
ficients for D-Scale, RBS, and RES Scores
Between Experimental and Control Groups. .

12. Test-Retest Reliability Coefficients for
D—Scale, RBS, and RES Scores for Experi—
mental and Control Groups Combined
(N = 73) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13. Coefficient Alpha Correlations for First
Administration D-Scale, RBS, and RES
Scores (N = 132) . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14. Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Between
Class Status and Age and First Administra-
tion D—Scale, RBS, and RES Scores (N = 132)

15. Sex Differences on First Administration
D-Scale, RBS, and RBS Scores . . . . . . .

16. Religious Affiliational Differences on First
Administration D—Scale, RBS, and RES
Scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17. One—Way Analyses of Variance Across Reli-
gious Affiliations for Results of the
First Administration of the D—Scale, the
RBS, and the RES . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vi

Page

38

4O

41

42

43

44

45

46

47

LIST OF APPENDICES

Appendix Page
A. DOGMATISM SCALE (FORM E) . . . . . . . . . 80
B. RELIGIOUS BELIEF SCALE . . . . . . . . . . 84
C. RELIGIOUS ETHNOCENTRISM SCALE. . . . . . . 87
D. ATTITUDE INVENTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
E. ATTITUDE SCALE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

vii

DOGMATISM, RELIGIOUS BELIEF, AND RELIGIOUS
ETHNOCENTRISM AND THEIR RESPONSE TO

PERSUASIVE COMMUNICATION

By John M. Phillips

INTRODUCTION

The present study represents an investigation of
the relationships among dogmatism, religious belief, and
religious ethnocentrism, as well as the possibility of
alterations in these constructs subsequent to the presen—
tation of feedback information regarding the nature of

and personality correlates of dogmatism.

Dogmatism

 

In his book, The Open and Closed Mind (1960),

 

Rokeach, employing a general description of the indi-
vidual's belief-disbelief continuum, delineates formal
definitions of Open- and closed-mindedness and presents
an analysis distinguishing the two. He actually presents

l

two definitions of dogmatism--one based on the defining
characteristics of open-closed systems and a second,
simpler definition based on a more intuitive approach to
the concept.

In the first definition he states that a closed
system may be distinguished along three dimensions: (a)
With respect to organization along the belief—disbelief
continuum a closed system may be characterized by a high
rejection of disbelief systems, isolation within and be—
tween belief and disbelief systems, a greater degree of
differentiation within the belief system than within the
disbelief systems, and little differentiation within the
disbelief system. (b) In regard to organization along
the central—peripheral belief dimension, dogmatism is
characterized by a feeling that the world is a threaten-
ing one to live in, a belief that "authority is absolute
and that people are to be accepted and rejected according
to their agreement or disagreement with such authority"
(p. 56), and the fact that beliefs and disbeliefs per-
ceived to emanate from authority are in relative isolation
with each other. And finally (c) with respect to organ-

ization along the time-perspective dimension, the closed

system involves a "relatively narrow, future—oriented
time perspective" (p. 56).
As a more basic definition, Rokeach offers the

following: The degree to which an individual's system
is open or closed may be gauged by

the extent to which the person can receive,

evaluate, and act on information received

from the outside on its own intrinsic merits,

unencumbered by irrelevant factors in the

situation arising from within the person or

from the outside
and, in particular, those irrelevant external pressures
of "reward and punishment arising from external authority"
(p. 57). Thus "the more closed the belief system, the
more difficult it should be to distinguish between infor—
mation received about the world and information received
about the source" (p. 58). In an effort to obtain an
objective measure of this Open-closed mindedness variable,

Rokeach has devised the Dogmatism Scale (D-Scale), em-

ployed in this study.

Religious Belief

 

One important belief-disbelief subsystem is that
of religion. Investigators have made numerous attempts

at measuring the totality or selected aspects of the

religious values and attitudes which the individual enter-
tains. One such significant attempt, purporting to mea-
sure what prominence among several which an individual
affords religious values, is the Allport-Vernon-Lindzey
Study of Values (3rd ed., 1960). Researchers have also
attempted to devise measures of various aspects of the
individual's total religious commitments. One of these

is the "intrinsic/extrinsic" dimension (Allport, 1959),
measured by a 21-item scale. Two basic limitations of
this instrument, however, are that it assumes the subject
has a moderately religious attitude and that its validity
may be compromised by a tendency to assume a globally
positive response set toward religion (Allport and Ross,
1967). Nevertheless, the scale does provide a differen—
tiation on one continuum among more religious individuals.
Hogge and Friedman (1967) have devised a Scriptural Liter-
alism Scale, which measures the extent to which the indi-
vidual accepts Biblical Scripture as literally true and
which was found to differentiate between Unitarians,
Methodists, and Southern Baptists, between Freshmen and
Seniors, and between males and females. The scale is
limited, though, in that it taps only one basic area of

religious experience. Some attempts have been made to

measure fundamentalism (Dynes, 1955; Stanley, 1963, 1964;

Feagin, 1964), but the scales devised have also suffered

from a bias toward more religious individuals.
Accordingly, the present study incorporates a

Religious Belief Scale (RBS) which attempts to measure

the extent to which an individual accepts as true or false

the basic beliefs of traditional Christianity and which

is applicable to persons having few religious convictions

as well as those of a more religious bent.

Religious Ethnocentrism

 

Some research has been done in connection with
religious ethnocentrism (Adorno, gt 31., 1950: Rokeach and
Jensen, 1956; Davis, 1958; and Maryo, l958)——the convic-
tion that one's own religious group or belief system is
superior to any other and that certain religious groups
are inferior or should be avoided strictly on grounds of
differences in religious ideology. However, the general
question of measurement has heretofore been approached
obliquely, as in the measurement of prejudice against
specific outgroups, in the measurement of the frequency

of certain prejudicial or non—prejudicial behaviors such

as interfaith marriages, or in the measurement of the de-
gree of rejection of specific religious disbelief systems.

Prior to the present research the problem of de—
termining the extent of the individual's overall religious
ethnocentrism had not been approached, although Allport
(1966) delineates two existent theological contexts for
prejudice which are particularly applicable to religious
ethnocentrism: (a) the doctrine of revelation, leading
a religion to "claim exclusive possession of final truth
concerning the destiny of man, as well as sole authority
and means for interpreting that end" (p. 449); and (b) the
doctrine of election, which divides the ins from the outs
with surgical precision . . .-—a divinely sanctioned
ethnocentrism" (p. 450).

Considering the paucity of cogent research con-
ducted in this area, a Religious Ethnocentrism Scale (RES)
was devised for the study. The instrument consists of 12
statements concerning the superiority of one's own reli-
gious beliefs and/or group and the need for isolation or
at least separation from "inferior" religious groups on

such matters as marriage, friendship, and ideology.

Relationships Among Dogmatism,
Religious Belief, and
Religious Ethnocentrism

 

 

 

The relationship between religious belief and

dogmatism has been approached by Rokeach in The Open and

 

Closed Mind (1960). He discovered that, in general,

 

Catholics were more dogmatic than Protestants, who, in
turn, were more dogmatic than nonbelievers. Feather
(1967) found that there was increased dogmatism among
members of religious societies which require subscription
to "a set of basic beliefs about which there can be little
argument . . . and which depend upon the authority of the
Church and/or the Scriptures" (p. 10). Stanley (1963)
also found a sizable correlation (+ .58) between dogma—
tism and fundamentalism--that Protestantism emphasizing
as fundamental the literal inerrancy of the Scriptures,
the second coming of Jesus Christ, the virgin birth,
physical resurrection, and substitutionary atonement—-
among a group of theological students. His measure of
fundamentalism consisted of a single question concerning
the inspiration and veracity of the Bible. Stanley con-
cluded that fundamentalism might be considered thg_dog-

matic factor in religious belief.

While these researchers have tackled the problem
of the relationship between dogmatism and religious belief
through analysis of the content of the beliefs, they have
not approached the question of whether and to what extent
a general relationship exists between the two constructs.
Yet, while it is undoubtedly true that many individuals
hold deep religious convictions while remaining relatively
open-minded, it seems probable that, in general, the
greater the number of traditional religious beliefs a
person agrees to, the more likely he is to accept, to one
degree or another, his church and/or the Bible as being
authoritative. Following this reasoning one step further,
the greater is one's acceptance of an authoritarian atti-
tude toward religious belief, the greater should be the
extent to which his total belief-disbelief system is in-
fluenced or governed by religious doctrine, and thus the
higher his level of dogmatism. Hence it appears that, in
general, the more religious beliefs an individual accepts,
as well as the greater the degree of his acceptance of
them, the higher should be his level of dogmatism. The
present study is concerned with determining the extent of

such a relationship, if indeed it exists.

There is theoretical argument as well as some
experimental evidence supporting a connection between
strength of religious ethnocentrism and degree of dogma-
tism. Rokeach (1960) has hypothesized that certain re-
ligious groups, due to their organizational structure,
tend to coerce each member to

commit himself in advance to the group's ide-

ology and to reject in advance alternative

ideologies. Such social pressures should,

over time, leave their mark on the adherent's

belief system—-that is, his belief system

should increasingly betray the defining

characteristics of the closed mind (p. 118).
Feather (1967) suggests that while high dogmatic indi-
viduals are more apt to join religious societies which
incorporate

a firm doctrinal basis to which they can sub—

scribe, commitments to the ideologies of these

societies and rejection of alternative ideol-

ogies may then tend to reinforce dogmatism

(p. 10).
He concludes that perhaps subscription to such belief
systems and the concomitant dogmatism aid and abet one
another.

Concerning the instruments employed in the present
study, implicit in the content of each of the items of the

RES, although more or less apparent and stated positively

in some, negatively in others, is the concept that one

10

certain religious faith or one church (namely, one's own)
has more truth than any other. And to the extent that
one is certain of the truth of a particular belief sub-
system, he may be said to have adopted an authoritarian
point of view--precise1y what the D-Scale is designed to
measure. Thus the individual's degree of religious eth-
nocentrism should correlate positively with his level of
dogmatism.

A number of investigators have found indications
of such a relationship. Rokeach (1960), employing subjects
from six religious denominations, including Catholic, re—
ported that in 46 out of 48 comparisons the high dogmatics
of each sect rejected other disbelief subsystems to a
greater extent than did the low dogmatics of that sect.
Maryo (1958), using subjects from the same six denomina-
tions, found that high dogmatics in five of the six groups
consistently rejected other denominations to a greater
extent than did their low dogmatic brethren. David (1958)
and Rokeach and Jensen (1956), employing subjects from two
denominational groups (Catholics and Methodists), reported
similar findings; the latter researchers also concluded
that an increase in an individual's dogmatism had the

effect of increasing his faith in his own position.

11

In view of the foregoing, one of the objectives
of the present research is to substantiate, formalize,
and generalize the relationship between dogmatism and
religious ethnocentrism.

According to Festinger (1957), it would be cog-
nitively dissonant for an individual to subscribe firmly
to a set of religious beliefs and yet not feel that his
beliefs are superior to any others. In order to reduce
this dissonance he must either give up his beliefs or
adopt the position that they are indeed superior or even
represent "the Truth." To carry this reasoning one step
further, an individual initially subscribing to a certain
religious group's beliefs will either tend to support that
group as being superior or will tend to reject the group's
beliefs. In either instance the result is a positive
relationship between religious belief and religious ethno—
centrism. This relationship is lessened somewhat, of
course, by the existence of religious groups who subscribe
to few traditional Christian beliefs, although these groups
form a minority of religious sects in the United States.

The relationship between religious belief and re-
ligious ethnocentrism is further complicated by a response

set noted by Allport and Ross (1967), who observed that

12

some individuals responding to religious questionnaires
formed a positive response set, answering ubiquitously
affirmatively toward religion, almost without regard to
the specific content of the items. This phenomenon also
would tend to increase the measured correlation between
the two constructs.

An objective of this study was to determine the
existence and extent of a positive correlation between
religious belief as measured by the RBS and religious

ethnocentrism as measured by the RES.

Religious Attitudes, Dogmatism,
and Attitude Change

Attitude has been defined as the manner of think-
ing, feeling, and reacting to people, groups, social
issues, or, in general, to any event in one's environment
which one learns and develops in the process of coping
with and adjusting to his social milieu (Lambert and Lam—
bert, 1964). Attitude organization can become

inflexible and stereotyped, especially for those
persons who have been encouraged over long
periods of time to react in standard or "accept—
able" ways to particular events or groups. If a
person's attitudes become firmly set, he is then
too ready to categorize people or events into

one of his emotionally toned patterns of thought
(Lambert and Lambert, 1964, p. 51).

13

Perhaps these latter statements could be rephrased as
follows: Attitude organization (belief system) can be—
come rigid and closed for those individuals who have been
encouraged (by some authority) over long periods of time
to react in standard or "acceptable" ways to particular
groups, events, and beliefs.
While a vast and continuously eXpanding amount

of work has been conducted in the area of attitude change,
lasting (or even transitory) changes in some attitudes
remain exotic in occurrence; and while numerous experi—
mental changes in "attitudes" have been reported, Rokeach
(1966) has argued that many reported changes in attitude
actually represent changes only in expressed opinion.
One method he proposes for assessing attitude change more
adequately is to

test for other behavioral changes accompanying

a given opinion change. If a single expressed

Opinion change truly represents a change in

underlying attitude, it is reasonable to expect

that such a change will be accompanied by other

changes-~cognitive, affective, or behavioral--

which theoretically should be related to the

change in attitude (p. 547).

In line with the above discussion, one approach to

the measurement of change in attitude is the following:

By sensitizing the individual's awareness of and altering

14

his attitude toward dogmatism, a lowering may be induced
in his level of dogmatism; and with this reduction, other
attitudes and beliefs would theoretically become more
accessible to change. And if, further, the attitudes in
question were intrinsically associated with the individual's
conception of and attitude toward dogmatism, then a lower-
ing in dogmatism might lead automatically to a correspond—
ing lowering in those attitudes (Cf. McGuire, 1960). More
specifically, if the strength and extent of a person's
religious belief and/or ethnocentrism is indeed positively
correlated with his level of dogmatism, then a change in
dogmatism might consequently result in an alteration of
religious attitudes.

If through persuasive communication a certain atti—
tude or belief is presented as socially and personally
undesirable and if subsequently those individuals receiving
the communication are placed in a situation where normally
they would respond in accordance with that undesirable
attitude, then, according to Festinger (1957), those indi—
viduals are in a position of cognitive dissonance. They
may resolve this dilemma by

1. . . . changing one or more of the elements
involved in the dissonant relations.

15

2. . . . adding new cognitive elements that are
consonant with already existing cognition.

3. . . . decreasing the importance of the ele—
ment involved in the dissonant relations
(p. 264).
In brief,

when some of the cognitive elements involved in

a dissonance are cognitions about one's own

behavior, the dissonance can be reduced by

changing the behavior, thus directly changing

the cognitive elements (pp. 264, 265),
as well as possibly closely related ones. In particular,
a persuasive communication explaining the meaning of dog—
matism, as well as portraying the concept as being soci-
ally and personally undesirable, might result not only in
a lowering of dogmatism but also in an altering of reli-
gious attitudes.

Wolfer (1967) did in fact hypothesize that lower
dogmatism scores would be obtained by subjects who were
informed as to what the D-Scale was designed to measure.
However, in his study he found that subjects did not obtain
appreciably lower scores when informed as to the purpose
of the scale. Nevertheless, it may have been that the
informative instructions were insufficient to arouse a

socially desirable response set (as Wolfer hypothesizes),

that, rather, the students retained a response set of

16

compliance to what they felt the experimenter wished of
them (possibly a high reliability score with the same
scale administered 10 weeks previously). In the same
study, Wolfer showed that students could easily fake the
scale in either an open— or closed—minded direction if
explicitly instructed to do so.

This study includes an attempt to induce a lower—
ing of dogmatism in a group of subjects by means of a per—
suasive communication on the nature of dogmatism, empha-
sizing the more socially unacceptable aspects of the con—
cept (Rokeach, 1960; Zagona and Zurcher, 1965: Vacchiano,
§E_§l., 1968). Further, the subjects are not to be advised
as to the nature and purpose of the instruments they are
to be subsequently re-administered. It is thus hOped that
their perception of the relationship between the communi-
cation and the following inventories will be an indirect
one, and hence, a decline not only in dogmatism but also
in strength of religious belief and ethnocentrism might be
obtained.

In accordance with Rokeach's (1960) second defini-
tion of dogmatism, a closed-minded individual will be more
influenced by the irrelevant aspects of a situation, for

example, his own ego involvement and dissonance reduction.

17

This has been substantiated in part, at least, by Fillen-
baum (1964), who found a significant correlation between
dogmatism and amount of dissonance reduction. Hehce more
dogmatic individuals, when placed in a dissonant situation,
wherein there is threat to self-esteem, are apt to respond
more to the threat and to their ego involvement than to
the reality of the situation. Thus following a disparag-
ing communication concerning dogmatism, closed—minded
subjects would be more likely to seek dissonance reduction
by the various means outlined by Festinger (1957), includ-
ing, in this instance, lowering their D—Scale scores, as

well as lowering their RBS, and RES scores.

Hypotheses to be Tested

 

In light of the preceding discussion, five major

predictions were investigated:

Hypothesis 1: There is a significant positive correlation
between degree of dogmatism as measured by
the D-Scale and strength of religious belief
as measured by the RBS.

Hypothesis 2: There is a significant positive correlation
between degree of dogmatism as measured by
the D—Scale and amount of religious ethno-
centrism as measured by the RES.

18

Hypothesis 3: There is a significant positive correlation
between strength of religious belief as
measured by the RBS and amount of religious
ethnocentrism as measured by the RES.

Hypothesis 4: Following the derogatory communication
concerning dogmatism, there will be a sig-
nificant lowering in levels of dogmatism,
religious belief, and religious ethnocen-
trism as measured by the three scales in-
volved in the study.

Hypothesis 5: Following the communication there will be a
significant positive correlation between
degree of dogmatism as measured by the first
administration of the D-Scale and amount of
lowering of dogmatism, religious belief,
and religious ethnocentrism as measured by
the differences in scores between the first
and second administration of the three scales
involved in the study.

In addition, test—retest and internal consistency
measurements of scale reliabilities were obtained. Also,
sex, age, and religious affiliational differences in de—

gree of dogmatism, religious belief, and religious ethno-

centrism were explored.

MET HOD

Subjects

 

The subjects first administered the experimental
scales were 57 male and 75 female undergraduate students
enrolled in Introductory Psychology classes at Michigan
State University during the summer of 1968. The age range
for the group was from 17 to 29 years, with a mean of 18.9
years. Ninety—seven were Freshmen, 17 were Sophomores,

9 were Juniors, and 9 were Seniors. The subjects reported
their religious affiliations as follows: 64 Protestant,
40 Catholic, 11 Jewish, 6 Other, and 11 None.

Selection of subjects for the experiment was not
made on a volunteer basis; rather all students present at
the seven recitation sessions of the psychology class were
requested to participate in an experiment. None declined.
Following the first administration the subjects were told
that another segment of the experiment would be adminis-
tered "some time in the future." The subjects were not
advised as to the intent of the experiment until all data

had been collected.
19

20

Four weeks following the first administration, 73
of the original subjects retook the three scales. At that
time the students were separated into Experimental and Con-
trol groups. The EXperimental group, consisting of 51 stu-
dents, listened to a communication concerning dogmatism
prior to retaking the three scales, whereas the Control
group responded to the inventories the second time before
listening to the communication. Table 1 summarizes by

groups the demographic information concerning the subjects.

TABLE 1

Demographic Information on Total, Experimental,
and Control Groups of Subjects

 

 

 

Factor Subject Total Experimental Control
(N=132) (N:51) (N222)
Sex Male 57 28 10
Female 75 23 12
A e Range 17-29 17—29 17—26
9 Mean 18.9 19.1 18.1
Frosh. 97 41 19
Soph. l7 7 1
Class Status Junior 9 2 1
Senior 9 l 1
Prot. 64 29 10
Reli ious Cath. 40 14 9
Afgiliat ion JeWiSh ll 3 2
Other 6 l 1
None 11 4 0

 

21

In general, the sample can be considered represen-
tative of the principally lower biennium students enrolled

in Introductory Psychology at Michigan State University.

The Instruments

 

As mentioned previously, three scales were employed
in the study——the Dogmatism Scale, a Religious Belief Scale,
and a Religious Ethnocentrism Scale.

Dggmatism Scale.——Form E of the D—Scale* is a 40-

 

item inventory of statements asserting beliefs concerning
personal and social issues. The statements are to be rated
by the subject according to a six point Likert scale, rang—
ing from -3 (strongly disagree) to +3 (strongly agree).

All items of the scale are positively (non-democratically)
worded, and thus the higher an individual's total score is,
the greater his degree of dogmatism is said to be. In
scoring, four points are added to each item response, in—
suring a positive total score for each individual. Theo-
retically, scores may range from 40 to 280. Reported test—
retest and split-half reliabilities of the scale have

ranged from .68 to .93 (Rokeach, 1960; Ehrlich, 1961;

 

*See Appendix A.

22

Zagona and Zurcher, 1965). Rokeach (1960) failed to find
any significant correlation between dogmatism and intel-
ligence, although Ehrlich (1961) reported a significant
negative correlation (-.28) between dogmatism and scores
on the Ohio State Psychological Examination, and Zagona
and Zurcher (1965) found a correlation of -.18 between

the D-Scale and the Verbal subtest of the College Quali—
fication Test. Alter and White (1966), using a very large
student sample, found statistically significant but very
small differences between male and female mean scores.
Research has shown that the D-Scale appears to reliably
gauge the extent to which an individual orders his belief-
disbelief continuum according to the dictates of an au—
thority, i.e. the extent to which his belief-disbelief
system may be said to be closed.

Religious Belief Scale.--Initia11y a means was

 

sought for determining the degree of an individual's per-
sonal investment in religious beliefs; and the inventory
presented by Allport, Gillespe, and Young (1948) seemed
to provide a means of tapping some of the variables in
religious thinking which were to be investigated in the
present study. However, the inventory was somewhat dated

and was arranged in a cumbersome format, not readily

23

translatable into a quantitative measure of overall reli-
gious belief. Accordingly, the inventory was reworked:
Items were discarded, others added; some questions were
expanded into two or three items; and all items were couched
in a language which all persons, regardless of their orien-
tation, could answer. Finally, the format of the scale

was altered so that the subject responded to the items by
use of a six point Likert scale.

In a preliminary pilot study, the 30-item scale was
administered to 19 Introductory Psychology students and 5
graduate students. Analysis revealed a sample range of 62
to 195 (possible range was 30 to 210), a mean of 130, and
a standard deviation of 30.8. An analysis of the data

according to religious affiliation is shown in Table 2.

TABLE 2

Results by Religious Affiliation of Preliminary Pilot
Study on Religious Belief Scale

 

 

 

Religion N Mean S.D.
Protestant 13 130
Catholic 5 158
Jewish 3 118
Agnostic 3 93

 

TOTALS 24 130 30.8

 

24

Subsequently, the scale was analyzed and revised:
a few items were added; those items which did not correlate
highly with the scale as a whole were either revised or
discarded, and other items which were judged to be measures
of religious ethnocentricity rather than simply religious
belief were included as part of a separate Religious Ethno—
centrism Scale, to be discussed below.

The RBS was thus reduced to a 25-item instrument
and administered as part of a pilot study to a group of
40 male and 40 female Seventh—day Adventist students en—
rolled in Introductory Psychology classes at Andrews Uni-
versity, a religiously affiliated college with an under—
graduate enrollment of approximately 1500. The age range
for the group was from 17 to 24 years, with a mean of 19.0
years. Of the 80 students, 59 were Freshmen, 18 were Soph—
omores, 3 were Juniors, and none were Seniors. Results of
the study, summarized in Table 3, show that scores on the
RBS ranged from 91 to 173, with a mean of 152.5. Inasmuch
as the subjects tested were all from a conservative reli—
gious background, the skewed distribution found was ex-
pected and could be interpreted as providing some further

validation for the scale.

25

TABLE 3

Results of Pilot Study Involving Dogmatism,
Religious Belief, and Religious
Ethnocentrism Scales (N = 80)

 

 

 

Possible Obtained
Scales Mean S.D.
Range Range
Dogmatism 40—280 129—217 170.2 18.15
Religious Belief 25—175 91-173 152.5 14.43
Religious
Ethnocentrism 8—56 20-55 43.7 8.70

 

Following the pilot study, additional minor revi—
sions of the scale were made. In its final form, the RBS*
consists of 24 statements covering such issues as the ex-
istence of God, the veracity of the scriptures, the divinity
of Christ, and the relevance and importance of religious
sentiments, rites, and organizations. The scale has been
balanced with 12 positively and 12 negatively worded state-
ments in an effort to eliminate any corresponding biasing
factors arising from response style, although Rorer (1965)
and Rokeach (1967) contend that there is no real evidence

for a major effect due to response style. It was also felt

 

*See Appendix B.

26

that reversal of 12 of the items did not result in any
major alteration in the content of those items (Cf. Rok-
each, 1963; Rorer, 1965). Finally, it was anticipated
that the items were not so specific as to favor or dis—
criminate against any particular sect, nor so general as
to preclude understanding or identification by the sub-
ject.

As with the D—scale, each item on the RBS was
rated by the subject according to a Likert scale, ranging
from —3 (disagree very much) to +3 (agree very much). In
scoring, the signs (+ or -) of the values assigned to
reversed items by the subject were changed; thus, the
final score for any item was always in terms of increasing
values for more "religious" responses. Following these
conversions, four points were added to each of the items,
insuring that all total scores would be positive.

Religious Ethnocentrism Scale.—-As mentioned pre—

 

viously, certain items in the version of the RBS employed
in the preliminary pilot study were felt to be measures
of religious ethnocentrism rather than religious belief.
Subsequently, these items formed the nucleus of an 8—item
RES used in the Andrews University pilot study, the re-

sults of which are summarized in Table 3. The findings

27

show that, as with the RBS, the distribution was skewed
toward the upper end of the range continuum. This also
was expected, as the Seventh—day Adventist Church is a
proselytization-oriented sect which instills a firm con—
viction in its membership that the church is in possession

of a major portion of the "Truth" (ggestions on Doctrine,

 

1957).

Analysis of the eight items resulted in revision
and expansion of the scale. The final version of the RES*
consists of 7 positively and 5 negatively worded statements
concerning the superiority of one's own religious beliefs
and group and the need for separation from other religious
groups on such matters as marriage, friendship, and ide-
ology. Thus as with the RBS, the RES is relatively bal-
anced with positively and negatively worded statements
purportedly based on the same construct of religious eth-
nocentricity. The individual items present a relatively
large number of situations involving religious ethnocen-
trism, as well as a variety of intensities of the construct.
Also the prejudicial content of the statements is not

directed in favor of or against any particular religious

 

*See Appendix C.

28

group; yet the statements are not so vague as to eliminate
all notion of discrimination. It was thereby anticipated

that the scale would prove applicable to all individuals,

regardless of their orientation toward religion.

Each item on the RES, as with the D-Scale and the
RBS, was rated by the subject according to a Likert scale
ranging from +3 (strongly agree) to -3 (strongly disagree).
A similar scoring method to that employed with the RBS was
utilized with the RES; i.e., the signs of the responses to
negatively worded items were reversed, and then four points
were added to each of the responses on the scale to insure
all total scores would be positive.

For purposes of the study and because they are
similar in design the three instruments, D—Scale, RBS, and
RES, were combined into one large, 76-item inventory, the
items from each scale being randomly mixed in the combined
questionnaire. Two forms of the combined inventory were
constructed*, the "Attitude Inventory," employed in the
first administration, and the "Attitude Scale," adminis—
tered four weeks later. The only differences were that

demographic information was requested only on the

 

*See Appendices D and E.

29

Attitude Inventory, and in the Attitude Scale the items
were presented in reverse order to that of the Attitude

Inventory.

The Communication

Prior to the second administration of the three
scales, the EXperimental group was presented a communi-
cation which concerned the meaning of dogmatism as well
as some of its socially undesirable correlates. The
communication was adapted from statements and findings in

The Open and Closed Mind, from the findings of Vacchiano,

 

Strauss, and Schiffman (1968), and from a communication
formulated by Wolfer for use in his 1967 study (Personal
communication from the author, 1968).

The communication was presented as follows:

Dr. Rokeach, a professor in Social Psychology
here at Michigan State University has devised
some good definitions of dogmatism. He defines
it in terms of belief systems. A person with an
open belief system is open-minded and non—
dogmatic. He holds many of his beliefs tenta-
tively and often has doubts and questions about
them. Such a person is receptive to and tolerant
of opinions and ideas that differ from his own.
He evaluates ideas on the basis of their own
merits rather than on the basis of authority.

A person with a closed belief system, on the
other hand, is considered closed-minded or dog—
matic. He seldom has doubts and questions about

30

his beliefs. Such an individual is unreceptive
to and intolerant of Opinions and ideas that
differ from his own. He evaluates ideas on the
basis of their own merits. Thus he tends to
accept or reject ideas solely on the basis of
authority.

Rokeach as well as others have found that
communists, fascists, and racial bigots are
highly dogmatic on the whole. And recently
others have found that highly dogmatic people
in general also lack self-esteem, are doubtful
about their own self—worth, are anxious, lack
confidence in themselves, are frustrated by
changeable conditions, are submissive and con—
forming, and are restrained, diffident, timid,
tense, impatient, and conservative. They con—
clude that personality maladjustment and insta—
bility appear to underlie dogmatism, thus sub-
stantiating Rokeach's earlier hypothesis that a
dogmatic attitude is sometimes a defense mechan—
ism employed as sort of a shield by a basically
maladjusted or neurotic individual.

Procedure

 

1. The D-Scale, the RBS, and the RES were randomly
mixed in a combined inventory designated the Atti—
tude Inventory. The order of the items on this
inventory was reversed to produce the Attitude

Scale.

2. The Attitude Inventory was administered to 132 stu-
dents enrolled in Introductory Psychology at Mich-

igan State University during the summer of 1968.

31

Of the seven recitation sections of Introductory
Psychology, four were designated Experimental and

three Control.

Four weeks after the administration of the Attitude
Inventory the Control sections were administered

the Attitude Scale. Twenty—two of the subjects who
took the first inventory were present in the Control

sections on the date the second inventory was given.

At the same time, the instructor of the Experimental
sections recorded on tape the communication con~
cerning dogmatism and used the tape as an integral
part of a lecture on the psychology of conformity.
(This instructor frequently taped sections of his
lectures, and hence, this procedure did not appear
artificial to the students.) The instructor told
them they would be required to write and hand in a
statement on the content of the recording immed-
iately following their listening to it. These
procedures thus insured uniformity in the presenta-
tion of the communication, attentiveness to its
content by the students, yet also their naivete

concerning its purpose.

32

Immediately after the presentation of the communi-
cation to the Experimental subjects (and after they
had handed in their statements concerning its con-
tent) they were administered the Attitude Scale.
Fifty-one of the subjects who took the first inven—
tory were present in the Experimental sections on

the date the second inventory was given.

RESULTS

Intercorrelations

 

Table 4, showing the Pearson product—moment corre—
lation coefficients among D—Scale, RBS, and RES scores on
the first administration among the total group of 132 sub—
jects, reveals that there is a small, positive correlation
between D-Scale scores and RBS scores and that the RES
correlates moderately and in a positive direction with
both the D—Scale and the RBS. All three correlations were
significant at the .05 level or beyond. Thus Hypotheses

1, 2, and 3 were confirmed.

TABLE 4

Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients
among D—Scale, RBS, and RES Scores on the First
Administration for 132 Subjects

 

 

 

Scale RBS RES
D-Scale .17a .31C
RBS .37C

 

ap < .05, one-tailed test.
Cp < .001, one-tailed test.
33

34

Tests of significance for r differences of depen-
dent samples (Peatman, 1963) were computed for the corre-
lations among the three scales of the study. Results of
those tests, summarized in Table 5, reveal that the corre-
lation between the D—Scale scores and the RES scores were
significantly higher than the correlation between the D-
Scale and the RBS. Further, the correlation between the
RES and the RBS was significantly higher than the correla—

tion between the D—Scale and the RBS.

TABLE 5

Comparison of Intercorrelations among First Administration
Scores of the D-Scale, RBS, and RES (N = 132)*

 

 

 

 

Correlation r Correlation r Correlation r
D—Scale D—Scale D—Scale
vs. RBS .17 vs. RBS .17 vs. RES .31
D-Scale RBS RBS
vs. RES .31 vs. RES .37 vs. RES .37
t 3.23b t 4.70c t 1.44ns

 

 

 

*two-tailed directional test of significance for r differ—
ences of dependent samples.

nsp > .05

bp < .01

Cp < .001

35

Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients

were also computed for correlations among the three scales

for Control and Experimental groups separately.

The inter—

correlations of the three scales for Control subjects on

the first and second administrations are presented in Table

6. The table reveals that all correlations were positive.

TABLE 6

Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients

among First and Second Administration D-Scale,
RBS, and RES Scores for Control Subjects

 

 

 

(N = 22)
Scale RBS RES
First Administration D—Scale .19 .67c
RBS .25
. . . a b
Second Administration D-Scale .37 .54
RBS .34

 

ap < .05, one—tailed test.

bp < .01, one—tailed test.

Cp < .001, one-tailed test.

The first and second administration correlations between

D-Scale and RBS scores and the second administration cor—

relation between D—Scale and RBS scores were significant

36

at the .05 level or beyond. The intercorrelation of the
three scales for Experimental subjects on the first and
second administrations are presented in Table 7 showing
all correlations to be in a positive direction, and all
were significantly so, except the second administration

correlation between D-Scale and RBS scores.

TABLE 7

Pearson Product-Moment Correlation Coefficients
among First and Second Administration D—Scale,
RBS, and RES Scores for Experimental Subjects

 

 

 

(N = 51)
Scale RBS RES
First Administration D-Scale .42C .32
RBS .56
Second Administration D—Scale .13 .37
RBS .71

 

ap < .05, one-tailed test.

bp < .01, one-tailed test.

Cp < .001, one-tailed test.

37

Experimental Effects

 

The mean amount of change between the first and

second administration scores on the D-Scale, RBS, and RES
were determined for both Experimental and Control Subjects.
Table 8 reveals that differences in amount of change be—

tween the two groups were not significant at the .05 level

for any of the scales. Thus Hypothesis 4 was not confirmed.

TABLE 8

Comparison of Differences Between First and Second
Administration D—Scale, RBS, and RES Scores for
Experimental and Control Subjects

 

 

 

 

 

 

Experi- Control t
mental
N
51 22
First Administration 149.57 150.00
D—Scale Second Administration 146.71 149.36 ns
Mean Change —2.86 -0.64 0.54
SD of change 16.12 15.54
First Administration 114.53 121.45
RBS Second Administration 108.25 113.59 ns
Mean Change —6.28 -7.86 —0.52
SD of change 12.98 8.63
First Administration 41.53 41.27
RES Second Administration 41.59 42.18 ns
Mean Change 0.06 0.91 0.50
SD of change 6.00 7.55
n

Sp > .10, one-tailed test.

38

Correlations between the first administration D-
Scale scores and the amount of lowering of D—Scale, RBS,
and RES scores between the first and second administrations
were derived for both Experimental and Control subjects.
Table 9 reveals that differences in the correlation coef-
ficients between the two groups were not significant at

the .05 level; Hypothesis 5 was not confirmed.

TABLE 9

Comparison of Correlation Coefficients Between First
Administration D—Scale Scores and the Amount of
Lowering of D-Scale, RBS, and RES Scores Between
the First and Second Administration for
Experimental and Control Subjects

 

 

 

 

 

Correlation Coefficients
Grou N D-Scale D-Scale D—Scale
p vs. Change vs. Change vs. Change
in D-Scale in RBS in RES
Experimental 51 .45 .17 .00
Control 22 .39 -.10 .23
z 0.25ns 1.02nS -o.85nS

 

 

nsTest of Significance for r Differences of Independent
Samples, p > .10.

39

Scale Reliabilities

 

Because the study includes two entirely new scales,
in addition to the D—Scale, it was felt that measures of
the scales' reliabilities should be obtained. Accordingly,
test-retest reliabilities and internal consistency scores
for each of the scales were obtained.

Table 10 compares the first administration means,
standard deviations, and ranges of the Dogmatism, Religious
Belief, and Religious Ethnocentrism Scales on a total of
132 subjects. The mean on the D-Scale was 150.95 and the
range was 92 to 212; whereas the possible range on the
scale is 40 to 280, with a theoretical mean of 160. Like-
wise, the mean on the RBS was 113.20, with scores ranging
from 42 to 158, in comparison to a possible range of 24 to
168 and a theoretical mean of 96. Finally, the mean and
range on the RES were 40.36 and 19 to 61; whereas the pos-
sible range is 12 to 84 and the theoretical mean is 48.

In general, then, scores on the D-Scale and the RES were
lower than might be predicted from inspection of the scales'
construction, while RBS scores were above the predicted
level. The standard deviation for the RBS was higher than

that of the D—Scale, even though the latter possessed a

40

TABLE 10

Results of the First Administration of the Dogmatism,
Religious Belief, and Religious Ethnocentrism
Scales (N = 132)

 

 

 

Scale M SD Range
Dogmatism 150.95 22.04 92 - 212
Religious Belief 113.20 25.07 42 - 158
Religious Ethnocentrism 40.36 9.41 19 - 61

 

greater possible range. The standard deviation of the RBS
was lower than that of the other two scales, as was to be
expected in light of the scale's length.

Three sets of test-retest reliability coefficients
were obtained for the three scales. Table 11 compares test-
retest reliabilities of the D-Scale, RBS, and RES for Ex-
perimental and Control subjects separately. All reliability
coefficients were significant at the .001 level with the
exception of the RES scores among control subjects. A test
of significance for r differences of independent samples
revealed that none of the differences in reliability be—
tween the Experimental and Control groups was significant

at the .05 level.

41

TABLE 11

Comparison of Test-Retest Reliability Coefficients
for D-Scale, RBS, and RES Scores Between
EXperimental and Control Groups

 

 

 

 

Group N D—Scale RBS RES
Experimental 51 .68C .84C .81c
Control 22 .76c .91C .57b

2 0.59nS 1.16nS 1.74nS

 

nSp > .05, two-tailed test of significance for r differ—

ences of independent samples.
b .
p < .01, one—tailed test.

Cp < .001, one-tailed test.

Since the experimental communication concerning
dogmatism had no significant effect on the scores of the
Experimental subjects, the scores of the Control and Ex-
perimental groups were combined to obtain overall test—
retest reliability coefficients on the three scales.
Table 12 reveals that the overall reliabilities of the
D—Scale, the RBS, and the RES for a total of 73 subjects
were .71, .86, and .74, respectively. All three relia-

bilities were significant well beyond the .001 level.

42

TABLE 12

Test-Retest Reliability Coefficients for D—Scale,
RBS, and RES Scores for EXperimental and Control
Groups Combined (N = 73)

 

 

 

Scale 52:22221231’
Dogmatism .71C
Religious Belief .86C
Religious Ethnocentrism .74C

 

Cp < .001, one—tailed test.

It was felt that since the study included two
newly devised scales, a measure of the scales' internal
consistencies should be obtained as an additional check
on the scales' reliabilities. Because of the short length
of the RBS and particularly the RES, simple split-half
reliability ratings were deemed inappropriate and likely
unreliable; and since the subjects responded to the scales
through use of a six-point Lickert scale rather than simply
dichotomously, the Kuder—Richardson test was also inappro-
priate. The Coefficient Alpha test, equivalent to the
Kuder—Richardson, but applicable to scales in which more

than two responses to the items are available, does provide

43

an average of all split-half correlations of a scale, thus
yielding an index of common factor concentration (Cronbach,
1967). As such, the Coefficient Alpha represents an esti-
mate of a scale's internal consistency. Table 13 shows
that the Coefficient Alpha correlations for the D—Scale,

the RBS, and the RES were .75, .91, and .57, respectively.

TABLE 13

Coefficient Alpha Correlations for First
Administration D-Scale, RBS, and RES
Scores (N = 132)

 

 

 

Scale Coefficient
Alpha
Dogmatism .75
Religious Belief .91
Religious Ethnocentrism .57

 

Demographic Variables

 

At the first administration of the three scales,
the subjects were requested information regarding their
sex, age, class status, and religious affiliation. The
numbers of students in each of the demographic categories

were summarized in Table l.

44

Pearson product-moment correlations between the
variables of class status and age and scores on the first
administration of the D—Scale, RBS, and RES are presented
in Table 14. Age and class status correlated negatively
with D—Scale and RBS scores and positively with RES scores.
However, all of the correlations were small and statis-
tically non—significant. Thus neither age nor class status
was a significant determinant of D—Scale, RBS, or RES
scores among individuals in the preponderantly lower bien-

nial college population involved in the study.

TABLE 14

Pearson Product—Moment Correlations Between Class
Status and Age and First Administration
D—Scale, RBS, and RES Scores (N = 132)

 

 

 

 

D-Scale RBS RES
Age -.06ns -.06nS .03ns
Class Status —.09nS —.10nS .02nS
nsp > .05

Comparisons of mean scores obtained by males and
females on the three scales are presented in Table 15. No

significant differences were found between scores of males

45

and females on the D-Scale and the RES. On the RBS, how-
ever, the difference between mean male and mean female

scores was significant at the .05 level, females scoring

 

 

 

 

higher.
TABLE 1 5
Sex Differences on First Administration
D-Scale, RBS, and RES Scores
D-Scale RBS RES
N
M SD M SD M SD

Males 57 149.54 20.42 108.00 24.31 40.32 8.11

Females 75 162.03 23.09 117.16 24.88 40.40 10.26

 

t 0.64ns 2.08a 0.05nS

 

 

s .
n p > .05, two-tailed test.

ap < .05, two-tailed test.

An analysis of the results of the first administra—
tion of the D-Scale, RBS, and RES by religious affiliational
categories is summarized in Table 16 showing that Protes-
tants scored highest on the D-Scale and the RES, whereas
Catholics were highest on the RBS. Simple one-way analyses

of variance were carried out across religious affiliations

46

TABLE 16

Religious Affiliational Differences on First
Administration D-Scale, RBS, and RES Scores

 

 

. . D-Scale RBS RES
Religious

Affiliation

 

M SD M SD M SD

 

Protestant 64 151.89 23.7 111.52 37.8 42.05 10.7

Catholic 40 141.75 19.7 127.45 21.9 40.98 10.1
Jewish 11 149.64 21.6 97.09 24.0 39.09 7.3
Other 6 146.67 20.7 102.33 29.6 33.17 12.4
None 11 146.27 19.9 93.27 16.4 33.55 6.8

 

 

for the three scales. Table 1? reveals that the F value
for the D-Scale analysis of variance was 0.23, not signif—
icant at the .05 level. The values of F for the RBS and
RES analyses of variance were 7.74 (p < .01) and 3.10

(p < .05), respectively.

Since the latter two F values were statistically
significant, post—hoc individual t—tests for differences
between affiliational groups on the RBS and the RES were
made. For the RBS significant differences were found be—
tween the means for Protestants vs. Catholics (t = 2.60,

p < .01), Protestants vs. None (t = 2.59, p < .05),

47

Catholics vs. Jews (t = 3.63, p < .01), and Catholics vs.
None (t = 5.45, p < .001). For the RES, significant dif—
ferences were found between the means for Protestants vs.
None (t = 3.35, p < .01) and Catholics vs. None (t = 2.76,

p < .01).

TABLE 17

One-Way Analyses of Variance across Religious
Affiliations for Results of the First
Administration of the D-Scale, the RBS,
and the RES

 

 

 

 

Scale Source of Variation df MS F
. . . . . ns

Religious Affiliation 4 112.98 0.23
D-Scale Error 127 500.12

Total 131

Religious Affiliation 4 4058.79 7.74b
RBS Error 127 524.46

Total 131

Religious Affiliation 4 259.06 3.10a
RES Error 127 83.61

Total 131
nSp > .05
ap < .05
b

p < .01

DISCUSS ION

Intercorrelations

 

Table 4 reveals that Hypothesis 1 was confirmed;
dogmatism was significantly positively related to reli-
gious belief for the population sampled. Nevertheless,
the correlation was small (.17) and indicates that less
than three percent of the variance in religious belief
might be attributable to dogmatism, and vice—versa. In
regard to the extent of the relationship, Rokeach (1960)
has emphasized that beliefs are not necessarily dogmatic
in and of themselves; only when they dictate how the be-
liever will perceive other information do they contribute
to an overall closed-minded attitude.

For example, consider the two statements, "Man has
the possibility of eternal life," and "A11 Scripture is
given by inspiration of God." Affirmation of the first
item says little about the respondent's degree of adoption
of an authoritarian attitude, but simply indicates a basic—
ally religious orientation. However, a person who strongly

48

49

endorses the statement that all Scripture is God—inspired
is more liable to accept those same Scriptures as guide-
lines for his behavior, thereby adopting a dogmatic atti-
tude. In point of fact, the correlation between the former
item and the D-Scale was found to be —.02, whereas the
latter items correlated .31 with dogmatism. As mentioned
previously, Stanley (1963) found a positive correlation

of .58 between scores on the D—Scale and response to the
single question, "All the Bible is divinely inspired and
literally true," among a group of theology students. Ap-
parently, then, some aspects of religious belief incorporate
a dogmatic element, while others do not.

Hypothesis 2 was also confirmed; dogmatism was
positively related to degree of religious ethnocentrism.
In this case the correlation was moderate (.31); indicat-
ing that about 10 percent of the variance in RES scores
could be attributed to degree of dogmatism. The results
seem to confirm the notion, espoused by Allport (1966),
that certain aspects of religious feeling, namely the doc—
trines of election and revelation, provide their adherents
with a justification for an exclusive, and at the same

time, closed—minded stance toward their beliefs.

50

It would be interesting and worthwhile to determine
whether the preponderance of the relationship between dog-
matism and religious ethnocentrism is due to the influence
of certain religious groups on their followers or to the
gravitating of dogmatic individuals toward religious organ—
izations which condone a religiously ethnocentric attitude.
Rokeach (1960) has posited that there is a compounding
interaction between the two mechanisms. The design of the
present study, unfortunately, did not allow for investiga—
tion of this interactional effect.

Table 5 reveals that the extent of the relation—
ship between dogmatism and religious ethnocentrism is
greater than that between dogmatism and religious belief,
the difference between the two correlations being signif—
icant at the .01 level. Apparently, while both the RBS
and the RES measure varieties of religious attitudes, the
RES includes more elements of dogmatic thinking than does
the RBS. In fact, inspection of the RES reveals that sev—
eral of the items parallel in intent, if not in wording,
the content of corresponding D—Scale items. It might even
be proposed that the RES represents an approach to the

measurement of religious dogmatism. Ideally, then, the

 

RBS would be interpreted as a relatively pure measure of

51

the strength of an individual's religious beliefs, and the
RES a measure of how dogmatically he holds those beliefs.
Such an interpretation would require that the RBS correlate
little if at all with the D-Scale, whereas there would need
to be a sizable correlation between the RES and the D-Scale.
The foregoing situation, however, is not necessarily ad-
visable, nor is it feasible, as certain fundamental reli-
gious doctrines require an authoritarian (dogmatic) stance
of their advocates.

The finding that the correlation between religious

belief and religious ethnocentrism was moderately positive

 

(thus confirming Hypothesis 3) is not surprising. Both the
RBS and the RES are ostensibly religious scales; indeed,
both were originally included in one scale of religious
belief. Yet the correlation between the two was only .37.
(It may appear inconsistent to emphasize the correlation
between the D-Scale and the RBS, while de-emphasizing the
slightly higher correlation between the RBS and the RES;
but it must be pointed out that while the D—Scale and the
RES are generically different scales, the RES and RBS both
are scales concerned with religious attitudes and thus
would be expected to be related.) One may thus conclude

- that while there is a positive relationship between

52

religious belief and religious ethnocentrism, the RBS and
RES measure primarily different variables. Table 5 shows
that there was no significant difference between the cor—
relation of dogmatism with religious ethnocentrism and the
correlation of religious belief with religious ethnocen-
trism. It might be implied from this that dogmatism and
religious belief provide fairly equal proportions of the
variance in religious ethnocentrism.

Tables 6 and 7 present intercorrelations among the
three scales for Control and Experimental Subjects separ-
ately for both the first and second administrations. While
all correlations were positive andlxnmmly comparable to the
correlations among the scales on the first administration
for the total group of 132 subjects, some differences be-
tween EXperimental and Control groups are evident. Never-
theless, no theoretical notions may be evoked to explain
these differences, as the Experimental-Control designation
was basically a random procedure. It may be observed,
though, that whereas the correlation between dogmatism and
religious belief declined between the first and second
administration among Experimental subjects, it rose among
Control subjects. It could be deduced from this that the

derrogatory communication regarding dogmatism led to a

53

weakening of the relationship between dogmatism and reli-
gious belief; but a more plausible explanation is that the
correlational variations are due primarily to chance ef-
fects. This interpretation is the more reasonable in light
of the small size of the Control group (N = 22), as well

as the otherwise negligible effects of the experimental

communication, discussed below.

Experimental Effects

 

It is apparent from Table 8, that the derogatory
communication regarding dogmatism did not produce signif-
icant effects on the D-Scale, RBS, or RES scores. In fact,
while scores on the RBS dropped among Experimental subjects
at the second administration, the RBS scores of the Control
group drOpped even more. It may be interesting to note,
though, that in both scales which contain significant ele—
ments of dogmatism, i.e. the D—Scale and RES, the Experi-
mental group "lowered" their scores more than the Control.
Neither of the differences, however, approached signifi-
cance.

Several precautions were taken to insure and pre-

serve the naivete of the subjects concerning the purposes

54

of the experiment. Prior to completion of data collection,
the subjects were told only that the questionnaire was
"part of an experiment." As part of the instructions on
the Attitude Inventory and the Attitude Scale, the subjects
were advised that "the following is a study of what the
general public thinks and feels about a number of important
religious, social, and personal questions." Items from the
three scales were presented in a mixed order in the ques—
tionnaires, giving the subject the impression that just one
conglomerate scale was being employed and preventing him
from realizing that scores for the three scales would be
compared. Also, by changing the title from "Attitude In—
ventory" to "Attitude Scale," by omitting the demographic
items, and by reversing the order of the scale items, it
was hoped the subjects would not perceive the second ad-
ministration as a reliability check on their first admin—
istration performance. Even so, several subjects revealed
an experimental sophistication through knowing glances at
the instructor.

In regard to the experimental communication, the
instructor presented a lecture on "Conformity" during the
first half of the class period and, in the case of the

Experimental group, finished it by presenting a tape

55

recording of the communication on dogmatism. (As mentioned
previously, it was not uncommon for this instructor to tape
portions of his lecture.) To sustain their attention while
listening to the communication, the students were advised
that immediately after hearing the tape, they were to write
for class credit a short paragraph concerning the message
on the tape. No mention was made of any connection between
the tape recording and the ensuing administration of the
three scales. As a final check, when a majority of the
students had completed the Attitude Scale, the instructor
told them that if they had an idea as to the purpose of

the experiment, they could write it on the back of the
questionnaire. None of the handful of responses mentioned
anything about "dogmatism" or "closed—mindedness."

In light of the above, the failure to obtain lowered
D—Scale, RBS, and RES scores as a result of the presentation
of the communication regarding dogmatism apparently cannot
be directly attributed to either knowledge of the intent of
the communication or inattention to it on the part of the
Experimental subjects; nor can the failure be attributed to
inconsistencies in the presentation of the communication.
There are three other general factors which may have con-

tributed to the negative findings: (a) the relative

56

imperviousness of dogmatism, religious belief, and reli-
gious ethnocentrism, (b) the subjects' perception of their
task on the second administration, and (c) the subjects'
perception of the communication.

It is a well—established fact that attitudes and
patterns of behavior formulated early in life and
strengthened and elaborated over a period of years are
rarely altered in a short length of time. It thus seems
highly doubtful whether lasting changes in dogmatism,
religious belief, or religious ethnocentrism could be
effected by presenting a five minute tape—recorded speech.
The most that could reasonably be expected by such a pro-
cedure would be a transitory lowering of dogmatism and
possibly religious belief and ethnocentrism. That such
was not the case is evident from the results presented in
Table 8.

Despite the precautions taken to prevent the sub-
jects' perception of the second administration as simply a
re—presentation of the first inventory, the instructor re-
ported that many of the subjects revealed their awareness
of the equivalence of the two questionnaires through know-
ing glances and smiles. Further, since a number of the

items on the scales are somewhat striking in content, it

57

is likely that individuals taking the scales would recog—
nize many of these items after four weeks. The subjects
then might have perceived their task as one of providing
the eXperimenter with a high test—retest reliability for
his instrument. Such a perception would dampen the effect
of a communication on the responses to the items of the
scales.

The subjects may have perceived the communication
simply as a piece of factual information to be momentarily
stored and subsequently regurgitated; that is, they may
not have identified with the content of the message on a
personal level. Perhaps the communication should have been
longer and more comprehensive. Or perhaps the instructor
should have placed the communication on a more personal
basis by requesting the subjects to ask themselves how
Open or closed-minded they were by noting how closely their
own attitudes corresponded to the defining characteristics
of the dogmatism construct. A short discussion following
the presentation of the communication might have assisted
this process (although uniformity of experimental condi—
tions would have been lost, of course). In such a manner
the Experimental subjects might have more readily recog-

nized the extent to which their belief systems were

58

closed—minded, and then the dissonance effect delineated
by Festinger (1957) might have led to a lowering of dogma—
tism and possibly religious belief and religious ethnocen-
trism scores.

Hites (1965) as well as others have shown that
religiosity among college students drOps appreciably be-
tween their Freshman and Senior years. Plant (1965) has
reported a similar situation in the case of dogmatism.
Inspection of Table 8 reveals that for both Experimental
and Control subjects RBS scores dropped appreciably between
the first and second administrations. The mean drop in
RBS scores for both groups combined was 6.85 points. A
t—test of significance revealed the difference to be sig-
nificant at the .05 level for a one-tailed test (t = 1.82,
df = 72). Thus an individual's religious attitudes and
degree of dogmatism ggg susceptible to change. The prob-
lem becomes one of determining the causal mechanism at
work in such alterations.

Table 9 shows that high dogmatics did not lower
their D-Scale, RBS, or RES scores significantly more than
did low dogmatics; Hypothesis 5 was not confirmed. Accord—
ing to Festinger's dissonance theory (1957), when in a

condition of dissonance, an individual has several

59

alternatives, two of which are: (a) he may alter his
behavior so as to eliminate the dissonant situation, or
(b) he may discount the dissonant information or its
source. If a high dogmatic accepts the source of a dis-
sonant cognition as an authority, he may alter his be-
havior in what he feels is a more socially approved way.
If such an individual's belief system is too closed-minded,
however, he may discredit the source of the dissonant cog-
nition rather than abandon his beliefs and ultimately his
behaviors. This latter hypothesized mechanism could have
masked the effects of the former, the end-product being a
lack of confirmation of Hypothesis 5. However, consider-
ing the negligible effect the communication had on the
EXperimental group as a whole, a more plausible explana-
tion for the lack of confirmation of the fifth hypothesis
is that none (or few) of the subjects (either high or low
in dogmatism) considered the communication as one to re-

late to themselves in a personal manner.

The Scales

The present study incorporated two newly devised

scales in addition to Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale. Thus, in

60

part, the study represents the formulation, construction,
and administration, as well as the determination of the
reliability, consistency, and validity of two scales of
religious attitudes.

Possibly the most significant finding presented
in Table 10 is the tabulation of the standard deviations
of the scales. In devising a psychological scale, it
seems advisable to construct one which, while maintaining
adequate reliability, will provide as large a differentia—
tion between individuals as is commensurate with the scale's
length. That is, it is desirable to have as large a pro-
portion between scale's standard deviation and its total
length as is possible. Table 10 shows that despite its
shorter length, the RBS had a larger standard deviation
than the D-Scale. Also, the standard deviation for the
RES was proportionally greater than that for the D-Scale.
(While it may be deemed misleading or inappropriate to
employ the D—Scale as a standard in this situation, it has
been found to be an adequate measuring device and was the
only scale available for comparison with the two religious
scales for the student group tested.) It may thus be de—
duced that, in general, for the sample there was more dis-

agreement concerning the religious items than concerning

61

the items of the D-Scale. Perhaps the difference is due
to the degree of controversy in the content of the reli-
gious notions as presented in the RBS and RES Specifically,
or perhaps religious attitudes are simply inherently more
controversial than the sorts of "social and personal ques-
tions" contained in the D—Scale. In any case, one may
conclude from Table 10 that the RBS and RBS provide a
relatively adequate differentiation between individuals

on the variables which the scales in fact measure.

As shown in Table 11, the test—retest reliability
for the D—Scale among Experimental subjects was lower than
among Control subjects. This difference may be an indica-
tion that the communication on dogmatism did tend to lower
the subjects' certainty of their attitudes in regard to
the Open closed-minded continuum. Nevertheless, the dif-
ference was slight, did not approach statistical signifi—
cance, and thus was probably caused by other more random
factors. The fact that for the RBS the test—rest relia—
bility was higher for the Control than for the Experimental
group, whereas for the RES the reliability of the Experi-
mental group was higher, and the fact that neither of the
differences between reliability coefficients was signifi-

cant is further evidence that the Experimental—Control

62

D-Scale reliability difference as well as differences on
the RBS and RBS were due to random effects.

Because of the absence of any significant effect
brought about by the communication, reliabilities for the
Experimental and Control groups were combined to provide
overall test-retest reliabilities for the scales (Table 12).
Whereas the reliability coefficient for the D-Scale (.71)
appeared adequate and was comparable to those reported
previously (Rokeach, 1960; Ehrlich, 1961; Zagona and
Zurcher, 1965), the reliabilities on the religious scales
were even greater. The RBS reliability (.86) was parti-
cularly high, while the lower reliability for the RES may
be accounted for by the scale's shorter length. From the
comparatively high reliabilities, coupled with relatively
large variances for the religious scales it may be con—
cluded that, whereas there is considerable disagreement
between individuals on religious issues, each individual
is fairly certain of and quite consistent in his own reli-
gious views.

This conclusion is not surprising. Many religious
sects maintain and propagate definite and rigid, although
frequently differing, stands on religious issues. These

doctrines are transmitted to the child and subsequently

63

assimilated into his belief system at an early age. The
individual is thus provided with numerous ready-made
opinions on religious topics-—opinions which are fre—
quently not attacked prior to college. Such is not the
case with the sorts of attitudes tapped by the D—Scale.
In those areas, the individual's primary sources of opin-
ion are the not infrequently ambiguous and contradictory
directives of his parents and revelations of his own ex-
perience. Thus it might be theorized that most individuals
come to college with religious beliefs which are definite
and consistent, yet at the same time rigid, in comparison
to their attitudes toward the "social and personal ques-
tions" involved in dogmatism. If such be the case, the
college Freshman's religious beliefs should undergo a more
rapid change (i.e. lowering) than his authoritarian atti-
tudes. The fact that in the present study there was a
significant drop in religious belief among the predominantly
Freshman subjects during the four weeks between the first
and second administrations of the scales, whereas the drop
in dogmatism was insignificant statistically, substantiates
the above contentions.

The Coefficient Alpha value obtained for the RBS

was exceptionally high (.91) indicating the scale has good

64

internal consistency. With one exception, all of the
scale's items were moderately (.33) to highly (.72) cor—
related with the scale as a whole, most of the items cor-
relating better than .50. The one exception was, "The
foremost reason for church attendance should be the fel-
lowship of friends." Upon close scrutiny it may be seen
that this reversed and admittedly subtle item is not
actually applicable to those more anti-religious indi-
viduals who see no value in church attendance whatsoever.
In fact, the item more closely represents an approach to
the measurement of Allport's (1959) intrinsic/extrinsic
factor, rather than the measurement of religious belief,
pg; £3. The remainder of the scale's items, however,
appear to be adequate devices for measuring the various
facets of the same general factor.

The internal consistency rating for the D-Scale
was nominal (.75) and individual item correlations with
the scale as a whole ranged from .12 to .51. One might
deduce that the D-Scale involves several factors, all con-

tributing to the dogmatism construct. Rokeach in The Open

 

and Closed Mind (1960) has indicated that, in fact, the
D-Scale was so constructed to tap several contributory

variables.

65

Two factors may be posited for the lower internal
consistency rating obtained for the RES. First, although
the Coefficient Alpha test includes a correction factor
for scale size, shorter scales still tend to have lower
internal consistencies. Secondly, the range of correla-
tions was .23 to .56, and there is some indication the
scale may be tapping more than one factor. Perhaps, as
was hinted at earlier, and as further perusal of the scale
items suggests, the RES is measuring both religious ethno—
centrism and religious dogmatism. As defined earlier,
religious ethnocentrism is the belief that one's own reli—
gious group or beliefs are superior and that other persons
or groups may be considered inferior because of their
religious beliefs. Religious dogmatism, on the other hand,
may be conceived as an intolerance for religious views
Opposed to one's own, as well as a reliance on religious
leaders or doctrines as authoritative. Further research
would be required to accurately and more fully differen-
tiate between these two constructs.

The adequacy of the D-Scale's validity has been
shown by Rokeach (1960), Zagona and Zurcher (1965), as
well as many others; nor was it a major objective of this

study to further directly substantiate that validity. It

66

might be observed in passing, however, that the D—Scale
did not correlate significantly with age, class status,
sex, or religious affiliation, although previous work has
shown significant relationships between dogmatism and each
of these variables. Such statistically significant rela-
tionships, however, were generally not great, and were ob-
tained with large samples. In the present study D-Scale
scores tended to be related negatively with both age and
class status, as would be expected among college students.
Also females tended to score higher than males. Finally,
there was a tendency for Catholics and Protestants to
obtain higher D—Scale scores than individuals who marked
Jewish, Other, or None as their religious affiliation.

The present study does involve the construction of
two new scales, and thus some argument should be advanced
for their validity. First in regard to the RBS, a simple
inspection of the scale's items easily verifies that the
scale is dealing with religious variables; the scale does
have some construct validity. Also the preliminary pilot
study conducted with the first form of the RBS revealed
(in Table 2) the order of increasing religiosity to be
Agnostic, Jewish, Protestant, and Catholic, as would be

expected. Further, results of the pilot study (Table 3)

67

conducted among Seventh—Day Adventist students at Andrews
University show that the distribution of RBS scores was
very definitely negatively skewed in comparison to the
minor negative skewness obtained with M.S.U. students em—
ploying an only slightly differing scale. This result
also was expected in light of the strong, conservative,
religious stance of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church.
Finally, Table 16 reveals that for the M.S.U; subjects,
the order of increasing religious belief among different
religious affiliations was None, Jewish, Protestant, and
Catholic, as would be predicted. (Because of its "catch—
all" designation and because only six subjects described
themselves as such, the placing of the category of Other
on a continuum with the other affiliations did not appear
warranted.) Individual t-tests revealed that Catholics
scored significantly higher on the RBS than any other af-
filiational group (excluding Other), while those designat-
ing their affiliation as None scored significantly lower
than either Protestants or Catholics. It might also be
pointed out that while no significant relationships were
found between RBS scores and age or class status (due
probably to the skewness in the distributions of the latter

variables), females did score significantly higher on the

68

scale than did males, as would be expected if the RBS were,
in fact, measuring strength of religious belief (Cf. Hogge
and Friedman, 1967). One may conclude from the above, then,
that the RBS has substantial concurrent validity in addi—
tion to its face validity.

The RES does not present as clear a picture.
Though, after some thought, items of the RES may be quite
easily differentiated from those of the RBS, one cannot
be so certain that the individual items are indeed tapping
the various aspects of religious ethnocentrism, as the
construct has not been previously extensively delineated.
Nevertheless, in accordance with the definition of reli-
gious ethnocentrism stated in the Introduction, the scale
does appear to have some construct validity. In addition,
the results of the pilot study show that among the Adven-
tist subjects, the distribution of scores on the original
eight—item RES was, like the RBS, substantially negatively
skewed. Some feel for the difference between the Andrews
University and Michigan State University samples may be
gained by a comparison of the average response to the items
of the two versions of the scale. The mean response among
Adventist subjects was 5.4 (or between +1 and +2 on the

six—point Likert scale), while the mean response for M.S.U.

69

subjects was 3.4 (between -1 and neutral on the Likert
scale). This difference is in keeping with the strong
belief in special revelation and need for separateness
from the world advocated by the Seventh—Day Adventist

Church (Questions on Doctrine, 1957). Although no sig-

 

nificant age, class status, or sex differences were found
among M.S.U. students, some religious affiliational dif-
ferences were detected by the scale. Individuals who
marked None as their religious affiliation scored signif-
icantly lower than either Protestants or Catholics. And
it does seem reasonable that individuals who have no
commitments to any particular church would be more accept-
ing of and receptive to the religious beliefs of others
than would persons who are committed to defending a cer—
tain church's creeds. The RES, then, appears to possess
some concurrent validity also.

Some conclusions can be drawn concerning the two
new scales. The large variance, combined with a high test-
retest reliability and a high internal consistency reveals
the RBS to be an adequate measuring device, particularly
for its size. Some concurrent validity, in addition to
the scale's construct validity was shown. However, further

research would be required to further substantiate that

70

validity. In comparison, the RES did not fare so well.
Its variance, test—retest reliability, and internal con-
sistency were all lower, and the scale's validity was not
so evident. Nevertheless, the RBS did prove to be basic—
ally separate from the RBS, and it did correlate more
highly with dogmatism, as would be eXpected for a scale
measuring ethnocentric attitudes. The concept of reli—
gious ethnocentrism seems worthy of measurement. The
present study represents a first attempt at quantifying
the construct, and the task of more precisely defining

religious ethnocentrism remains for future work.

Future Research

 

Hites (1965) and Plant (1965), as well as many
others, have shown that authoritarian and religious atti-
tudes do indeed change among college students. This study
represented one attempt at evoking that change. The
attempt failed; the mechanisms of change remain unrevealed.
It would appear worthwhile, however, to determine what
some of those factors are. The design of the present study
might have proved more productive if a more extended,

authoritative, and personally oriented communiqué had been

71

presented. Or perhaps retesting after a period of weeks
following the communication might have revealed the in-
volvement of a time-delay factor.

The present research also involved the construc-
tion of two new religious scales. The RBS proved to be
a precise, reliable tool, and by obtaining normative data
for the scale with different populations (different age,
educational, socio—economic, and religious groups), and
by employing it in conjunction with various other behav-
ioral as well as verba1-—paper and pencil and interview-
measures of religious belief, further substantiation of
the scale's validity could be obtained.

The shorter RES, in defining a relatively novel
concept, failed to achieve as adequate internal consistency
or validity. Many more religious ethnocentrism items should
be devised. The expanded scale might then be administered
to a heterogeneous population. Those items which would
subsequently be found to correlate most highly with the
scale as a whole and which provided an adequate variance
for the scale would be retained, while those items which
were found to be ambiguous, which did not correlate highly
with the RES as a whole, or which did not, upon closer

scrutiny, appear to be measures of religious ethnocentrism

72

would be discarded. Factor analysis might then reveal
which and how many variables are involved in the con-
struct. Subsequently, the revised RES could be admin-
istered to various population samples and in conjunc—
tion with other appropriate measuring devices to better

ascertain the extent of the instrument's validity.

SUMMARY

This study involved construction of a Religious
Belief Scale (RBS) and a Religious Ethnocentrism Scale
(RES) and exploration of the relationships of the scales
to each other and to Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale. The ef—
fects of a derogatory communication concerning dogmatism
on the three scales were also investigated.

The Dogmatism Scale, RBS, and RES were combined
into one "Attitude Inventory" and administered to 132
Introductory Psychology students at Michigan State Uni-
versity. Four weeks later an Experimental group consist-
ing of 51 of the subjects who had taken the Attitude In-
ventory listened to a tape recording of the communication
and then were readministered the three scales of the study.
A Control group of 22 subjects retook the scales prior to
hearing the communication.

The results of the study indicated positive rela-
tionships between religious belief and dogmatism, between
religious ethnocentrism and dogmatism, and between reli—
gious belief and religious ethnocentrism, as defined by

73

74

the scales of the study. The communication, however, had
no significant effect on dogmatism, religious belief, or
religious ethnocentrism scores. Also high dogmatics did
not lower their scores on the three scales appreciably
more than low dogmatics in response to the communication.
No age or class status differences were found on the
three scales, but it was found that females obtained
higher RBS scores than males. Religious affiliational
differences were found on both the RBS and the RES.

Investigation of the data revealed the RBS to
have an adequate variance, as well as high test-retest
reliability and high internal consistency. The shorter
RES had a lower variance and a somewhat lower reliability
and lower internal consistency.

Possible causes for the failure of hypotheses
concerning the effects of the communication were discussed,
along with implications involving the adequacy, accuracy,
and validity of the religious scales as measuring devices.

Possibilities for further research were also mentioned.

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_§§, 51—63.

 

Hogge, J. H. and Friedman, S. T. The Scriptural Literal-
ism Scale: A preliminary report. Journal of
Psychology, 1967, 66, 275—279.

 

 

Lambert, W. W. and Lambert, W. E. Social Psychology.
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice—Hall, 1964.

 

Maryo, J. S. Factors related to similarity, rejection
and religious affiliations. Unpublished M.A.
Thesis. Michigan State University, 1958.

McGuire, W. J. Cognitive consistency and attitude change.
Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1960,
.QQ, 345-353.

Peatman, J. G. Introduction to Applied Statistics. New
York: Harper and Row, 1963.

 

77

Plant, W. T. Longitudinal changes in intolerance and au-
thoritarianism for subjects differing in amount
of college education over four years. Genetic
Psychology Monographs, 1965, 13, 247-287.

Rokeach, M. The Open and Closed Mind. New York: Basic
Books, 1960.

Rokeach, M. The double agreement phenomenon: Three hy-
potheses. Psychological Review, 1963, 29, 304-309.

 

Rokeach, M. Attitude and behavioral change. The Public
Qpinion Quarterly, 1966, l9, 529—550.

 

Rokeach, M. Authoritarianism scales and response bias:
Comment on Peabody's paper. Psychological Bulle—
tin, 1967, p], 349-355.

Rokeach, M. and Jensen, P. K. The disbelief gradients of
religious conviction measured by rejection: A
comparison of high and low dogmatics. Unpublished
manuscript, 1956.

Rorer, L. G. The great response-style myth. Psycholog-
ical Bulletin, 1965, p}, 129-156.

 

Seventh—day Adventists Answer Questions on Doctrine: An
Explanation of Certain ngor Aspects of Seventh-
day Adventist Belief. A representative group of
Seventh-day Adventist leaders, Bible teachers,
and editors (ed.). Washington: Review and Herald
Publishing Association, 1957.

 

Stanley, G. Personality and attitude characteristics of
fundamentalist theological students. Australian
Journal of Psychology, 1963, lg, 121-123.

 

Stanley, G. Personality and attitude correlates of reli-
gious conversion. Journal for the Scientific
Study of Religion, 1964, 4, 60—63.

 

 

Vacchiano, R. B., Strauss, P. S., and Schiffman, D. C.
Personality correlates of dogmatism. Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1968, ll,
83—85.

 

 

U—

78

Wolfer, J. A. Changes in dogmatism scores of high and low
dogmatics as a function of instructions. Psycho-
logical Repprts, 1967, pp, 947-950.

 

Wolfer, J. A. Personal communication to the author, 1968.

Zagona, S. V. and Zurcher, L. A., Jr. Notes on the reli—
ability and validity of the Dogmatism Scale. Ps -
chological Reports, 1965, lp, 1234-1236.

 

APPENDICES

 

APPENDIX A

DOGMATISM SCALE (FORM E)

The following is a study of what the general public
thinks and feels about a number of important social and
personal questions. The best answer to each statement
below is your personal gpinion. We have tried to cover
many different and opposing points of view; you may find
yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements,
disagreeing just as strongly with others, and perhaps un-
certain about others; whether you agree or disagree with
any statement, you can be sure that many people feel the
same as you do.

 

Mark each statement in the left margin according
to how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark
every one. Write +1, +2, +3, or -1, —2, —3, depending
on how you feel in each case:

+1 : I AGREE A LITTLE -1 : I DISAGREE A LITTLE

+2 : I AGREE ON THE WHOLE -2 : I DISAGREE ON THE
WHOLE

+3 : I AGREE VERY MUCH -3 : I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

l. The main thing in life is for a person to want to do
something important.

2. Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty lone-
some place.

3. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a
worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to re-

strict the freedom of certain political groups.

4. It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal
or cause that life becomes meaningful.

80

81

Appendix A (Cont.)

5.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

Most people just don't know what's good for them.

When it comes to differences of opinion in religion
we must be careful not to compromise with those who
believe differently from the way we do.

It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's
going on until one has had a chance to hear the Opinion
of those one reSpects.

In the history of mankind there have probably been
just a handful of really great thinkers.

In a heated discussion I generally become so absorbed
in what I am going to say that I forget to listen to
what the others are saying.

I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me
how to solve my personal problems.

If given the chance I would do something of great
benefit to the world.

The present is all too often full of unhappiness.
It is only the future that counts.

A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness is
beneath contempt.

The worst crime a person could commit is to attack
publicly the people who believe in the same thing he
does.

Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have
discussed important social and moral problems don't
really understand what is going on.

The highest form of government is a democracy.and the
highest form of democracy is a government run by those
who are most intelligent.

'dmeo bursoddo aqg ur esoqg Kq uqu dmeo umo s.euo
u: sdnoxb IO etdoed Kq gno gnd seep; gsurebe p1en6 uo
axom eq 01 Alessaoeu ueggo S; 3: esqu SHIT semi: u: '68

'uo pagurxd age Kaqg Jaded egg quom
g.ue1e sAepemou pegurid gab qorqm seep: qu go gsow ’82

'10; puegs Aaqg sburqg egg go asneo
-aq ageq og emoo aAeq I etdoed go Jeqmnu e age SJGQL 'LZ

°aprs
umo 100 go Iefieigaq egg on speet Attensn gr esneoeq

snOJabuep s; squeuoddo Ieorgrtod ino qng asrmoxdmoo om '93

'peAII Atteag
gou seq esneo geeib emos ur SASIISq gou seop oqm uem v '93

‘uommoo ur
burqgou gnoqe gsnf eAeq erssnu pue segegs pegrun aqi °vz

°uos19d go gios “AqseM-Aqsrmu Aggegd e aq on 513311 sr
sesneo Kuem oog gnoqe orgseranque 5435 oqm UOSJed V '82

°sgquo Jog uumepu e enrb g.u0p gsnf etdoed gsow °zz

°sseurddeq umo srq Ktrxemrxd sxeprsuoo sq
gr qsrgtes Aggegd eq gsnm uosgad e 'esqu exit semrg uI ’TZ

°dogs
g.ueo gsnf I uorssnosrp pageeq e U: dn punom gab I eouo 'oz

'poogsxepun bureq me I sins sxem on semrg IEJSASS gIesAm
needs: on Alessaoeu gr purg ueggo I uorssnosrp e uI '6T

'1331103 st qorqm euo Atuo AtqerJd sr agaqg pIJOM
srqg u: gsrxe qorqm sarqdosotrqd guaiaggrp aqg TIE go ’81

'umo s.euo
se ames egg axe sgarteq pue sagseg esoqm sageroosse pue
spuergg xord og sr eArI on Ken gseq qu uni 6uoI aqg uI 'LT

('guoa) v xrpueddv

28

83

Appendix A (Cont.)

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live
coward.

There is so much to be done and so little time to do
it in.

Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

If man is to accomplish his mission in life it is some-
times necessary to gamble "all or nothing at all."

It is only natural for a person to be rather fearful
of the future.

There are two kinds of people in this world: those
who are for the truth and those who are against the
truth.

My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses
to admit he's wrong.

While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my
secret ambition is to become a great man, like Ein—
stein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.

In this complicated world of ours the only way we can
know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts
who can be trusted.

A group which tolerates too much differences of opinion
among its own members cannot exist for long.

It is only natural that a person would have a much
better acquaintance with ideas he believes in than
with ideas he opposes.

APPENDIX B

RELIGIOUS BELIEF SCALE

The following is a study of what the general public
thinks and feels about a number of important religious
questions. The best answer to each statement below is your
personal opinion. We have tried to cover many different
and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing
strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as
strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others;
whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can
be sure that many people feel the same as you do.

 

Mark each statement in the left margin according
to how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark
every one. Write +1, +2, +3, or -1, —2, -3, depending on
how you feel in each case:

+1 : I AGREE A LITTLE -1 : I DISAGREE A LITTLE

+2 : I AGREE ON THE WHOLE -2 : I DISAGREE ON THE
WHOLE

+3 : I AGREE VERY MUCH -3 : I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

1. The foremost reason for church attendance should be
the fellowship of friends.*

2. All Scripture is given by inspiration of God.
3. A truly self-fulfilling life includes a distinct reli-
gious experience resulting in a definite deepening of

religious feelings.

4. Man's history and present situation demonstrate that
reliance on any divine Being for guidance is folly.*

*Reversed items.

84

85
Appendix B (Cont.)
5. Personal immortality is an outmoded concept having no

basis in reality.*

6. Some form of religious orientation or belief is vital
in order to achieve a fully mature philosophy of life.

7. The Bible is not inspired by any Supreme Being and
cannot be accepted as entirely true in any literal

sense.*

8. Such concepts as miracles and divinely inspired visions
have little or no value.*

9. Religion is little more than an opiate which drugs
and deludes the masses.*

10. Religion should play a key role in one's unbringing.

11. Considering the present condition of the world, it
would be foolish to doubt the existence of God.

12. Christ should be regarded solely as a great teacher,
not as being divine.*

13. There is neither a personal Creator nor an infinite
intelligent being.*

14. My religious beliefs are as firm as or firmer than
the beliefs of my parents.

15. One of the greatest powers available to man is the
gift of prayer.

16. Man has the possibility of eternal life.

17. The conflict between science and religion is in all
likelihood irreconcilable.*

18. Man's primary goal in life should be his and others'
personal salvation.

*Reversed items.

86
Appendix B (Cont.)
19. Such rituals as baptism or special annual religious
celebrations have little or no real value.*
20. There is an infinitely wise, omnipotent Creator of the
universe and of natural laws whose protection and favor

may be obtained through worship and prayer.

21. True psychological health definitely includes certain
religious sentiments and needs.

22. On the whole the influence of religion is probably
harmful.*

23. Christ as the gospels state, should be regarded as
divine--as the human incarnation of God.

24. Beyond the personal peace of mind an individual might
obtain through it, prayer has little real value.*

*Reversed items.

APPENDIX C

RELIGIOUS ETHNOCENTRISM SCALE

The following is a study of what the general public
thinks and feels about a number of important religious -,4
questions. The best answer to each statement below is your
personal opinion. We have tried to cover many different
and opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing
strongly with some of the statements, disagreeing just as
strongly with others, and perhaps uncertain about others;
whether you agree or disagree with any statement, you can
be sure that many people feel the same as you do.

 

Mark each statement in the left margin according to
how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every
one. Write +1, +2, +3, or -1, -2, -3, depending on how you
feel in each case:

+1 : I AGREE A LITTLE -1 : I DISAGREE A LITTLE

+2 : I AGREE ON THE WHOLE -2 : I DISAGREE ON THE
WHOLE

+3 : I AGREE VERY MUCH -3 : I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

1. In general, it is wiser to form friends among those
with similar beliefs concerning religious issues.

2. Within a certain religion are to be found the founda-
tions for the most rewarding life.

3. Religious orientation should play little if any role
in one's choice of a marriage partner.*

4. If all men could be converted to God's Truth, the world
would certainly be a happier place in which to live.

*Reversed items.

87

88

Appendix C (Cont.)

5. At the present time I am not in agreement with the
beliefs of any one particular church.*

6. Distinctions between religious denominations are out—
dated and should be eliminated.*

7. The true intentions of certain religious groups are
definitely not to be trusted.

8. In these troublous times, a truly conscientious person,
because of his religious beliefs, should consider him-
self separate from the rest of society in some respects.

9. Although there are minor variations among churches,
any talk about one religion having substantially more
truth than another is simply not true.*

10. Since one's knowledge will at best remain imperfect,
extensive studying of other religious beliefs would
probably result in greater confusion.

11. I must admit I feel a greater bond with those of my
own religious orientation than with those having dif-

ferent beliefs.

12. A person's religious background in no way affects my
basic attitude toward him as an individual.*

*Reversed items.

APPENDIX D

ATTITUDE INVENTORY

 

Number:
1. Age:
2. Sex:
3. Class Status: Fr.____; So.____, Jr.____, Sr. _____
4. Religious Affiliation: (check one)

a. Protestant
b. Catholic
c. Jewish

d. Other: Specify

 

e. None

The following is a study of what the general public
thinks and feels about a number of important religious,
social, and personal questions. The best answer to each
statement below is your personal opinion. We have tried to
cover many different and opposing points of view; you may
find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements,
disagreeing just as strongly with others, and perhaps un-
certain about others; whether you agree or disagree with
any statement, you can be sure that many people feel the
same as you do.

 

Mark each statement in the left margin according to
how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every

89

90

Appendix D (Cont.)

one. Write +1, +2, +3, or —1, —2, -3, depending on how you
feel in each case:

+1

+2 .

+3 .

I AGREE A LITTLE -1 : I DISAGREE A LITTLE

I AGREE ON THE WHOLE -2 : I DISAGREE ON THE
WHOLE

I AGREE VERY MUCH -3 : I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

Thank you for your cooperation.

Most people just don't know what's good for them.

When it comes to differences of opinion in reli-
gion we must be careful not to compromise with
those who believe differently from the way we do.

It is often desirable to reserve judgment about
what's going on until one has had a chance to hear
the opinion of those one respects.

All Scripture is given by inspiration of God.

In general, it is wiser to form friends among
those with similar beliefs concerning religious
issues.

There are two kinds of people in this world:
those who are for the truth and those who are
against the truth.

A truly self-fulfilling life includes a distinct
religious experience resulting in a definite deep-
ening of religious feelings.

Man's history and present situation demonstrate
that reliance on any divine Being for guidance is
folly.

91

Appendix D (Cont.)

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

A man who does not believe in some great cause
has not really lived.

Within a certain religion are to be found the
foundations for the most rewarding life.

Personal immortality is an outmoded concept having
no basis in reality.

While I don't like to admit this even to myself,
my secret ambition is to become a great man, like
Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.

Some form of religious orientation or belief is
vital in order to achieve a fully mature philosophy
of life.

It is only natural for a person to be rather fear-
ful of the future.

Religious orientation should play little if any
role in one's choice of a marriage partner.

The Bible is not inspired by any Supreme Being
and cannot be accepted as entirely true in any
literal sense.

Man on his own is a helpless and miserable crea—
ture.

The foremost reason for church attendance should
be the fellowship of friends.

Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have
discussed important social and moral problems
don't really understand what is going on.

Such concepts as miracles and divinely inspired
visions have little or no value.

In this complicated world of ours the only way
we can know what's going on is to realy on leaders
or experts who can be trusted.

92

Appendix D (Cont.)

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

If all men could be converted to God's Truth, the
world would certainly be a happier place in which
to live.

A group which tolerates too much differences of
opinion among its own members cannot exist for
long.

Religion is little more than an opiate which drugs
and deludes the masses.

To compromise with our political opponents is
dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal
of our own side.

There are a number of people I have come to hate
because of the things they stand for.

Religion should play a key role in one's unbring-
ing.

Considering the present condition of the world,
it would be foolish to doubt the existence of God.

It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live
coward.

There is so much to be done and so little time
to do it in.

At the present time I am not in agreement with
the beliefs of any one particular church.

It is only natural that a person would have a
much better acquaintance with ideas he believes
in than with ideas he opposes.

Christ should be regarded solely as a great
teacher, not as being divine.

If man is to accomplish his mission in life it is
sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing at
all."

93

Appendix D (Cont.)

35. Distinctions between religious denominations are
out—dated and should be eliminated.

36. Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't
worth the paper they are printed on.

37. In times like these it is often necessary to be
more on guard against ideas put out by people or
groups in one's own camp than by those in the
opposing camp.

 

38. There is neither a personal Creator nor an in—
finite intelligent being.

39. A person who gets enthusiastic about too many
causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy"
sort of person.

40. My religious beliefs are as firm as or firmer
than the beliefs of my parents.

41. In the history of mankind there have probably been
just a handful of really great thinkers.

42. In a heated discussion I generally become so ab-
sorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to
listen to what the others are saying.

43. I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell
me how to solve my personal problems.

44. One of the greatest powers available to man is
the gift of prayer.

45. Man has the possibility of eternal life.
46. Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a
worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to

restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

47. The true intentions of certain religious groups
are definitely not to be trusted.

94

Appendix D (Cont.)

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

The conflict between science and religion is in
all likelihood irreconcilable.

The present is all too often full of unhappiness.
It is only the future that counts.

A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness
is beneath contempt.

The worst crime a person could commit is to attack
publicly the people who believe in the same thing
he does.

In these troublous times, a truly conscientious
person, because of his religious beliefs, should
consider himself separate from the rest of so-
ciety in some respects.

Of all the different philosophies which exist in
this world there is probably only one which is
correct.

Man's primary goal in life should be his and
others' personal salvation.

If given the chance I would do something of great
benefit to the world.

Although there are minor variations among churches,
any talk about one religion having substantially
more truth than another is simply not true.

In a discussion I often find it necessary to re-
peat myself several times to make sure I am being

understood.

Such rituals as baptism or special annual reli-
gious celebrations have little or no real value.

Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.

95

Appendix D (Cont.)

60.

61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

66.

67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

Since one's knowledge will at best remain imper-
fect, extensive studying of other religious be-
liefs would probably result in greater confusion.

The highest form of government is a democracy and
the highest form of democracy is a government run
by those who are most intelligent.

In the long run the best way to live is to pick
friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs
are the same as one's own.

Christ, as the gOSpels state, should be regarded
as divine--as the human incarnation of God.

My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly re—
fuses to admit he's wrong.

There is an infinitely wise, omnipotent Creator
of the universe and of natural laws whose protec-
tion and favor may be obtained through worship
and prayer.

In times like these, a person must be pretty self-
ish if he considers primarily his own happiness.

I must admit I feel a greater bond with those of
my own religious orientation than with those hav-
ing different beliefs.

It is only when a person devotes himself to an
ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.

True psychological health definitely includes
certain religious sentiments and needs.

Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just
can't stop.

A person's religious background in no way affects
my basic attitude toward him as an individual.

96

Appendix D (Cont.)

m

72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty
lonesome place.

On the whole the influence of religion is prob-
ably harmful.

The United States and Russia have just about noth—
ing in common.

Beyond the personal peace of mind an individual
might obtain through it, prayer has little real
value.

The main thing in life is for a person to what
to do something important.

APPENDIX E

ATTITUDE SCALE

Student Number:

 

The following is a study of what the general public
thinks and feels about a number of important religious,
social and personal questions. The best answer to each
statement below is your_pgrsona1 opinion. We have tried to
cover many different and opposing points of view; you may
find yourself agreeing strongly with some of the statements,
disagreeing just as strongly with others, and perhaps un-
certain about others; whether you agree or disagree with any
statement, you can be sure that many people feel the same
as you do.

Mark each statement in the left margin according to
how much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every
one. Write +1, +2, +3, or -1, -2, -3, depending on how you
feel in each case:

+1 : I AGREE A LITTLE -1 : I DISAGREE A LITTLE

+2 : I AGREE ON THE WHOLE -2 : I DISAGREE ON THE
WHOLE

+3 : I AGREE VERY MUCH -3 : I DISAGREE VERY MUCH

Thank you for your cooperation.

l. The main thing in life is for a person to want to
do something important.

2. Beyond the personal peace of mind an individual
might obtain through it, prayer has little real
value.

97

98

Appendix E (Cont.)

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

The United States and Russia have just about
nothing in common.

On the whole the influence of religion is prob-
ably harmful.

Fundamentally, the world we live in is a pretty
lonesome place.

A person's religious background in no way affects
my basic attitude toward him as an individual.

Once I get wound up in a heated discussion I just
can't stop.

True psychological health definitely includes
certain religious sentiments and needs.

It is only when a person devotes himself to an
ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.

I must admit I feel a greater bond with those of
my own religious orientation than with those
having different beliefs.

In times like these, a person must be pretty self-
ish if he considers primarily his own happiness.

There is an infinitely wise, omnipotent Creator
of the universe and of natural laws whose protec-
tion and favor may be obtained through worship
and prayer.

My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly re-
fuses to admit he's wrong.

Christ, as the gospels state, should be regarded
as divine--as the human incarnation of God.

In the long run the best way to live is to pick
friends and associates whose tastes and beliefs
are the same as one's own.

99

Appendix E (Cont.)

l6.

17.

18.

19.

20.

 

21.

 

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

The highest form of government is a democracy
and the highest form of democracy is a government
run by those who are most intelligent.

Since one's knowledge will at best remain imper-
fect, extensive studying of other religious beliefs
would probably result in greater confusion.

Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.

Such rituals as baptism or special annual reli—
gious celebrations have little or no real value.

In a discussion I often find it necessary to re-
peat myself several times to make sure I am being
understood.

Although there are minor variations among churches,
any talk about one religion having substantially
more truth than another is simply not true.

If given the chance I would do something of great
benefit to the world.

Man's primary goal in life should be his and
others' personal salvation.

Of all the different philosophies which exist in
this world there is probably only one which is
correct.

In these troublous times, a truly conscientious
person, because of his religious beliefs, should
consider himself separate from the rest of so—
ciety in some respects.

The worst crime a person could commit is to attack
publicly the people who believe in the same thing
he does.

A person who thinks primarily of his own happiness
is beneath contempt.

100

Appendix E (Cont.)

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

The present is all too often full of unhappiness.
It is only the future that counts.

The conflict between science and religion is in
all likelihood irreconcilable.

The true intentions of certain religious groups
are definitely not to be trusted.

Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a
worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to
restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

Man has the possibility of eternal life.

One of the greatest powers available to man is
the gift of prayer.

I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell
me how to solve my personal problems.

In a heated discussion I generally become so ab-
sorbed in what I am going to say that I forget to
listen to what the others are saying.

In the history of mankind there have probably been
just a handful of really great thinkers.

My religious beliefs are as firm as or firmer than
the beliefs of my parents.

A person who gets enthusiastic about too many
causes is likely to be a pretty "wishy-washy" sort
of person.

There is neither a personal Creator nor an infi-
nite intelligent being.

In times like these it is often necessary to be
more on guard against ideas put out by people or
groups in one's own camp than by those in the
opposing camp.

101

Appendix E (Cont.)

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays
aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

Distinctions between religious denominations are
out-dated and should be eliminated.

If man is to accomplish his mission in life it
is sometimes necessary to gamble "all or nothing
at all."

Christ should be regarded solely as a great
teacher, not as being divine.

It is only natural that a person would have a
much better acquaintance with ideas he believes
in than with ideas he opposes.

At the present time I am not in agreement with
the beliefs of any one particular church.

There is so much to be done and so little time
to do it in.

It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live
coward.

Considering the present condition of the world,
it would be foolish to doubt the existence of God.

Religion should play a key role in one's unbring-
ing.

There are a number of peOple I have come to hate
because of the things they stand for.

To compromise with our political opponents is
dangerous because it usually leads to the be-
trayal of our own side.

Religion is little more than an opiate which
drugs and deludes the masses.

102

Appendix E (Cont.)

54.

55.

56.

57.

58.

59.

60.

61.

62.

63.

64.

65.

A group which tolerates too much differences of
opinion among its own members cannot exist for
long.

If all men could be converted to God's Truth, the
world would certainly be a happier place in which
to live.

In this complicated world of ours the only way we
can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or
experts who can be trusted.

Such concepts as miracles and divinely inspired
visions have little or no value.

Unfortunately, a good many people with whom I have
discussed important social and moral problems
don't really understand what is going on.

The foremost reason for church attendance should
be the fellowship of friends.

Man on his own is a helpless and miserable crea-
ture.

The Bible is not inspired by any Supreme Being and
cannot be accepted as entirely true in any literal
sense.

Religious orientation should play little if any
role in one's choice of a marriage partner.

It is only natural for a person to be rather fear-
ful of the future.

Some form of religious orientation or belief is
vital in order to achieve a fully mature philosophy
of life.

While I don't like to admit this even to myself,
my secret ambition is to become a great man, like
Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.

103

Appendix E (Cont.)

66.

67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

76.

Personal immortality is an out moded concept hav-
ing no basis in reality.

Within a certain religion are to be found the
foundations for the most rewarding life.

A man who does not believe in some great cause has
not really lived.

Man's history and present situation demonstrate
that reliance on any divine Being for guidance is
folly.

A truly self-fulfilling life includes a distinct
religious eXperience resulting in a definite deep-
ening of religious feelings.

There are two kinds of people in this world; those
who are for the truth and those who are against
the truth.

In general, it is wiser to form friends among
those with similar beliefs concerning religious
issues.

All Scripture is given by inspiration of God.

It is often desirable to reserve judgment about
what's going on until one has had a chance to hear
the opinion of those one respects.

When it come to differences of opinion in religion
we must be careful not to compromise with those

who believe differently from the way we do.

Most people just don't know what's good for them.

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