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II 0 I .I'III. .3 (p I 0 I I . .. .....I L- . ...- .I I .. .... lite}. ......mwsurtr I «RIP gui'vIvia; I II I I III. II o.I. . .I.. .I . I III. I ‘II III'M.IMI§I_I¢0I J‘ “I, A. 0.. IIHIHIIII'".I . I I I I... I I I! ID‘ I I I 9 i‘!‘ . .I‘OII ...;Ifi.‘ Ogil“._r ' I M]1H!!!{Hzllflflllllfillclfllflllzllfllfiffllfllflfl This is to certify that the thesis entitled SOCIAL CLASS PARTICIPATION IN INDONESIAN NATIONALISM presented by Harold Walter Sundstrom has been accepted towards fulfillment of the requirements for M. A. degree in Political Science Wesley R. Fishel Major professor 0 Date November 22, 1,5LL 0—169 SOCIAL CLASS PARTICIPATION IN IND NLSIAN NATIONALISLI BY HAROLD W. SUNDSTROM A THESIS Submitted to the School of Greduate Studies of Michigan State College of Agriculture and Applied Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of I“: o A o Departrent of Political Science Year 1954 The advice and direction rendered by Dr. Wesley R. Fishel and, especially, Dr. Justus E. Van der Kroef is gratefully appreciated by the author. 344510 {:13 TR LCT SOCIAI CLASS FAflmICIPATIOE IL ILDOUZSIAK EATIOEAIISK Fy Harold W. Sundstrom Among the many perplexing problems facing the peoples of Southeast Asia, nationalism, or the desire for national inde- pendence and unity, is probably the problem of paramount im- portance. For the doctrine of nationalism is chorused by the official and unofficial propaganda and leadership of most poli- tical factions above and beyond the impediate concern for real internal difficulties, such as food shortages, excess population over available land, and dollar SUpports. toreover, the masses sometime reflect the same doctrinrire attitude. The author has examined the degree of support for nation- alism among the various social classes in Indonesia. He has attenpted to determine the social and economic interest of In- donesian social classes as they are eXpressed in political parties and platforms. Emphasis has been given to those parties which were or are active in the movement to establish national independence. The author has also examined the rise of new soc- ial classes, such as the rural and urban proletariats, the non- aristocratic intelligentsia, the changing position of the native aristocracy, and the Mislim connercial interests. In examining these social classes an attempt has been made to assess their political outlook and their degree of participation in Indonesian political parties. Use has been made of English, Dutch, and Indonesian primary and secondary sources and of the methodology of sociology in the analysis of class structure. It is heped that this study will contribute to an understanding of one of the important new nations of Southeast Asia. O NATO? 'ROFZSSOR: INTRODUCTION CHAPTER I CHAPTER II -'CHAPTER III CHAPTER IV CHAPTER V CHAPTER VI BI BLI OGRAPHY TABLE OF CONTENTS PRE-WESTERN SOCIETY AND CLASS STRUCTURE The Village and Peasantry The Aristocracy, Kraton and Town The Middle-Men THE IKPACT OF MODERN WESTERN ECONOHY The Peasantry and Dutch Economic and Land Policies The Aristocracy and Dutch Economic Policies The Middlemen and Dutch Economic Policies THE SOCIAL CLASSES AND POLITICAL ORGANh IZATION The Development of Nationalism 1900-1940 Political Organization and Nationalism The Social Classes and Political Organ- ization CONTEMPORARY INDONESIAN NATIONALISM Political DeveIOpments During the Japan- ese Occupation Social Effects of the Occupation The Revolution and Its Social Aftermath Dacoitism POLITICAL PARTIES AND CLASS PARTICIPATION The Muslim, Nationalist-Liberal, and Merxist Political Movements The Labor Movement Social Implications CONCLUSIONS 10 2O 27 33 33 43 46 51 51 59 79 95 95 111 113 121 125 125 135 137 149 161 INTRODUCTION Among the many perplexing problems facing the peoples of Soutkeast Asia, nationalism, or the desire for nation~ al independence and unity, is probably the problem of par- amount importance. For the doctrine of nationalism is chorused by the official and unofficial propaganda and leadership of most political factions above and beyond the immediate concern for real internal difficulties, such as food shortages, excess population over available land, and dollar supports. horeover, the masses sometime reflect the Same doctrinaire attitude. This thesis will examine the degree of support for nationalism among the various social classes in Indonesia. Nationalism through the years has been resolved in several shades of meaning. In the first place, it repre- sents an actual historical process, that of establishing nationalities as political units as the modern institution of the national state. Secondly, the term is indicative of the ideal implicit in the actual process, especially signifi- cant of an intensification of national consciousness and political philosophy of the national state. Thirdly, it may mean in such phrases as "Indonesian nationalism" and Indones— ian freedom" the activities of a particular political party, like the Indonesian Nationalist Party, combidg an historical process and a political theory. The fourth and final use of nationalism is the nationalism which is in wide spread evi- dence today -- it colors thought and conditions action in political, social, and cultural spheres, in domestic politics and foreign relations. This nationalism is best defined, according to Carlton J. H. Hayes, as denoting "...a condition of mind among members of a nationality, perhaps already possessed of a nation state, a condition of mind in which loyalty to the ideal or to the fact of one's national state is superior to all other loy- alties and of which pride in one's national— ity and belief in its intrinsic excellence and in its 'mission' are integral parts." (1) The traditional phenomena of nationality and patriot- ism has given way to a modern emotional fusion and exag- geration called nationalism. Nationalism has been defined by Hans Kohn as a social process demanding popular sovereign— ty, complete revision of the social classes, and the creation of the third estate's power, which is represented as being the universal leader for the masses. It is, furthermore, a process of integrating the masses of people into a common political form towards the realization of common aspirations and needs. Professor Kohn observes that a nationality usually has common descent, language, territory, political entity, customs and traditions, and religion. Other essential ele- ments of nationalism include, especially in Asia, the creation of government as a unifying force for defense against imperial— ism, concentration of power, introduction of modern industrial technology, mass communication, and an ideology. An unfortu- nate feature of present day nationalism is the Fascist tendency in an uncompromising manner to push nationalism to its very limits -- a type of totalitarian nationalism wherein humanity and the individual disappear; they as an end to itself, nothing remains but the nationality, which has become the one and the whole. Commenting on the communal psychological changes in nationalism, Professor Kohn has written "Nationalism is an idea, an idea-force, which fills man's brain and heart with new thoughts and new sentiments, and drives him to translate his conscious- ness into deeds of organized action. Nationality is h) therefore not only a group held together and ani- mated by cotmon consciousness; but it is also a group seeking to find its expression in what it regards as the highest form of organized activity, a sovereign state. As long as a nationality is not able to attain this consummation, it satisfies itself with some form of autonomy or pre—state or- ganization, which, however, always tends at a given moment, the moment of'liberation," to develop into a sovereign state. Nationalism demands the nation- state; the creation of the nation-state strengthens nationalism." (2) An attempt will be made to determine also the social and economic interest of Indonesian social classes as they are expressed in political parties and platforms. Emphasis will be given to those parties which were or are active in the move- ment to establish national independence. Before the advent of Western civilization's discovery and entry into Southeast Asia, and the resultant impact and influence of the West upon the people, society was character- ized by a large peasantry and a relativ-ly small aristocracy, both satisfied with their way of life and dependent upon an agrarian and sometimes maritime economy; in between the peasantry and the aristocracy, a group of middle-men, consisting of traders and creditors, functioned. The basis for society was the tradi- tional and ancient system of mutual assistance and COOperative economy activity, clearly communal in practice. Basically, the communal pattern of life was rooted in the q struggle for existence. u m J 3 T) ’1 it Indonesia as the J C 5.. L54 (I) no ~:,+,, ielefaie while Darsono in 1921 went to Roscow for the Third Congress. The Fourth Congress was attended by Tan La— *4. laka, a party chief, n 1922. Faced with exile to Timor in 1923, Semaoen left the country. and by the end of the year all Dutch leaders of the party were also forced to leave the country. Be— cause of the existing prejudice against the Dutch, the departure ers raised the organination's prestige in the ‘1 Q: of the Dutch le eyes of the masses. During the 1920's and thereafter there was little rapnort with the Netherlands' Communist Party, Semaoen declaring that association with the Dutch group was a liability to the Indonesian Communists. The bitter contest rentioned earlier between Sarekat Islam 68 and the I'rzi t—C o.mu1is t oriented nationalists led to the latter's loss of confidence among religious leaders and the peas_ntry. Althoueh the Sommunists realized their mistake by 1926, they were unable to live down the stigma of anti- religious charces. An attempted strike led by Ealaka, and which embraced all Indonesian labor, was unsuccessful in ear— ly 1922. Given the choice of exile or leaving the archipelago, Tan halaka took refuge in Russia. The next several years were marked by the continued effort of the Comrunists to organize trade unions as the party's mass base for revolutionary action. By 1925, the program drawn up by the party called for the es- tablishment of a Soviet Republic of Indonesia, however, it was far from finding favor with the Comintern, which critized the Indonesian Communists: (17) "The Communist press devotes too little attention to the idea of a united front and to a platform on which all the national-revolutionary elements could be unit- ed. Methods of approach to those masses still under the influence of the reformist leaders have not yet been worked out....The Indonesian Communist Party des- pite all its activity has not yet got properly down to working amone the peasantry and drawing the latter in- to the nationalist n'ovement. The errors of the Indon— esian comrades with respect to the national organiVa— tions are repeated with regard to the peasantry....If the Party does not adopt a correct policy towards the peasantry in time, the political movement of the lat- ter will pass by the Party." The Comintern was concerned that the Indonesian Communist Party become an "indomitable mainstay around which all the active anti-imperialist forces of the Indonesian people will rally." (18) These directions arrived too late to be effective. In any event, the PKI was troubled by internal difficulties; leaders of more extreme elements, like Dahlan and Soekra, refus insto take orders from the regular party leadership, agitated for revolution and dominated the party trhough terroristic methods. Rany strikes 69 and increased violence by small armed bands (and possible knowledge of the long range revolution plans) caused by the PKI extremist element prompted the government to suspend the right of assembly throughout nearly all of Indonesia for the Communist Party, the Sarekat Rakjat, or Red Sarekat Islam, and most of the Communist-controlled labor organizations. The government also suppressed strikes and arrested most of the important labor leaders concerned as well as the few top re— maining Communist leaders still in Indonesia -- Darsono, Ali— archam and Kardjoha. Tan kalaka, in exile in Kanila during this period, was strongly opposed to the PKI leading the revo- lution against the Dutch at this time. He wrote in a booklet entitled Massa Actie "...a successful revolution demanded mass support. A putsch by leaders divorced from the masses would never succeed...If indeed the Communist leaders possessed the necessary mass support, they had already let pass the psychological and practical moment for revolt.... That should have occurred immediately upon the Dutch arrests of PKI and labor leaders and the suspension of the right of assembly at the end of 1925." (19) It was Tan Malaka's concern that if the PKI lacked sufficient mass backing and its workers did not have "Karxist stability land Leninist elasticity" then "...chaos in the whole revolutionary movement in Indonesia. Non-workers will take the helm and lead the party to a putsch or to anarchism, and ultimate- ly it will be completely destroyed. This danger be- comes ;reater and greater as the great revolutionary leaders who have influence over the masses are exiled from Indonesia one after the other..." (20) It is obVious, then, that the leadership of the PKI was not agreed upon the proper time for starting the revolution -against the Dutch. During this period, the Communist Party was forced to Operate underground without its ablest leaders and its activ- ities became less and less coordinated. The extreme elements 70 in the party remained in the acendancy, many uncoordinated sporadic outbreaks of violence in several sections of Java attesting to the breakdown in coordination, agrapid loss of contact with former peasant supporters, and the arrest of more Communist leaders, revealed the poor discipline and preparation for the revolution which finally broke out on the night of November 12, 1926. At that, the revolution be- gan in Batavia whereas it was slated to begin in Padang on Sumatra's west coast. An uprising did occur in Padan two months after the Batavian outbreak had been crushed by the Dutch. (2 ) In any event, swift government action against the small number of insurgents inJava and Sumatra, since the masses of the city workers and plantations laborers adopted an attitude of indif- ference towards the rebel movement, halted the revolution al— most before it had begun. The Communist's organination was crushed with the failure of the 1926-27 rebellions, especially owing to the large—scale arrest aid deportation of Communist leaders still in Indonesia. By now the power of the Communists was clearly broken and remained ineffective for the remainder J of Dutch rule. The leadership of the nationalist movement had (1 definitely passed to the non-Communist leaders and their orean— izations. THE LIBLRAL PARTIES An organization essentially political in nature and com- posed of Indonesian students studying in Hollad was formed there in 1922. This group, the Ierhimpoen n Indonesia, or Indonesian Union, news to flaj a dsiinant role 1: Indonesian nationalism, many of the top nationalist leaders having been members of the organisation in Hollad. Its program by 1923, 71 favored unequivocal independence for Indonesia through the unified base and effirts of all Indonesian groups and classes on the basis c cooperation with each other and non-cooperation with the Dutch. Altheueh the party had strone Harrist orienta- tion, it did not become a doctrinsire Rarxist group; above all, it welcomed support from all anti-colOnial groups and orfanisa- tions, whether they were Communist or not. The leader of t Indonesian Union until his departure in late 1932, was hohammad hatta. With his departure, the organization came increasingly under the control of Setiajit and Abdulmadhid, both having emerg- ed as members of the Communist Party. After 1935, they changed the Unionh policy to one of cooperatinn with the Dutch, in line with Cominterm policy, and criticized other nationalist leaders, such as Hatta and Sjahrir as well as Soekarno. (22) The Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI, or the Indonesian Nationalist Party, was established by members of the Bandung Study Club on June 4, 1927; this was the culmination of efforts by members of the Indonesian Union in Halland and in Indonesia. It is sienificant that the chairmanship of the party was voted to a young engineer, Soekarno, who was not a member of the In? donesian Union Party. Possessed of an engineering degree, a considerable Moslem as well as Western education, Soekarno also had the ability to synthesize Western and Islamic concepts with the ancient though surviving Hindu-Buddhist tempered Javanese mysticism, and translating it in terms which tne peasant under- stood. The PNI aimed for complete economic and political inde- pendence for Indonesia, with a government elected by and respon— sible to the whole Indonesian people. The PHI' primary objectives were unity among and self-reliance by Indonesians with a basis 72 of non-cooperation with the Dutch. Soekarno's strong oppo- sition to an Islamic state helped shape the principle that independence was as much the objective of Indonesian Christians ans, and therefore the party could not have an ()J as of Mohamme Islamic base. It was characteristic of Soekarno's common sense that he stressed in speeches the uselessnes of waiting for help from "an airplance from Moscow or a caliph from Is- tanbul. (23) Among the immediate programs engaged in by the PHI were the building of labor movements through unions, the development of cooperatives, and support of national education. The PNI through the support of Sarekat Islam became the most powerful nationalist organization in Indonesia, being able to gather a loose federation of all the important existing na— tionalist organizations, a unity which had never before been achieved by the nationalist movement. Contributing to the init— ialsuccess of the PNI were the tolerant policies followed by De Graeff, the Dutch Governor-General, however, this attitude of tolerance changed by December 24, 1929, when Soekarno and other leaders of the organization were arrested as a result of their outspoken anti-government and anti-capitalist (non-Commun— ist) criticism. All were sentenced from one to three years, with Soekarno receiving the maximum term. Soekarno was charged with "...having participated in an organi7ation which had as its aim the committing of crimes as well as-..deliber- ately expressing themselves in words wherein the dis- turbance of public order and the overthrow of the es- tablished)Netherlands Indies Authority were recommend— ed. 24 The outlawing of the PNI followed the arrests of its leaders, both factors contributing to a cautious and moderate approach to independence by the nationalist organivations, a period which lasted for a considerable time. Three groups ab- 73 sorbed the PNI's membership: the Partai Rakjat Indonesia (Indonesiam PeOple's party), which desired cooperation with i// the Dutch and eventual independence through parliamentary means; Partai Indonesia, usually referred to as Partindo, was formed in April, 1931, under Sartono, and it amed at independence through non-cooperation, but its advocations were along moderate lines; the Golongan Merdeka, Independent Group, opposed the dissolution of the PNI, maintained sub- stantially the same program as had the PNI, and was successively chaired by two well qualified leaders, Soetan Sjahrir, and Mohammad Hatta. The Golongan Merdeka was changed to Club Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, or the Indonesia Natitnal Educational Club, in 1932. Of the three groups, Partindo attracted thefimgority membership, but it is signigicant that Hatta and Sjahrir allied themselves with the relatively small, and highly politically conscious, nationalists in the Golongan Merkeka. Their threat to Dutch sovereignty is characterized by George McT. Kahin "Both were convinced that such mass parties and the charismaic leadership upon which they depended were unsuited to the effective futherance of the nationa- list movement. The ability of the Dutch 0t Jail at will any leader whose appeal to the masses became dangerous to their interests made reliance on such leadership useless, they felt. A national movement dependent upon a few key men at the top was doomed to failure since the Dutch could be relied upon to remove such leaders from the political scene. Such a movement, they believ- ei would have enduring strength only if a significant number of the Indonesian people were educated to politi- cal maturity and a thorough understanding of nationalist principles. This process of education they conceived of as a long-term, unspectacular operation. The building up of cadres of first-and second-echelon leaders was the necessary first step. These in turn could educate wider circles. Small cadres of self-reliant, strong- ly conscious cationalists would in the long run, they were convicnod, achieve the indpendence that mass su_port 74 of short-careered charismatic leaders could not."(25) The Dutch soon understood the threat to their ascendancy, nad arrested Hatta and Sjahrir in February, 1954; both were exiled without trial to the Tanah Merah concentration camp at Boven Digul, New Guinea, remaining there and on the tiny island of Banda in confinement until the Japanese invasion brought their release in 1942. The arrest of at least four executive boards after the taking of Hatta and Sjahrir attested to the soundness of their organizational idea, moreover, it continued to operate until their return to Java. After a shortened prison sentence, Soekarno returned from exile December 31, 1931, and attempted to unite the Partindo and the Pendidikan “asional Indonesia into one party. He was without sucess, finally joining Partindo in July, 1932 and becoming its chairman by unanimous acclain. Adopting a firmer national- ist line under boekarno, Partindo's growth was accelerated enormously to 50 branches and 20,000 registered members by mid- 1933, with a mass following undoubtedly many times that great.(26) Once again Soekarno's danger to the Dutch goverment--his ability to command respect from intellectuals and maintain rapport with the masses—-was realized by the colonial regime which arressted him, and without trial, exiled him to the islands of Flords and Benculin where he remained until released by the Japanese in 1942. With the arrest of Soekarno, Hatta and Sjahrir and other dynamic nationalist leaders, the Indonesian independence movement adopted a policy of limited co—operation as the only practical way of gaining further political concessions. The general trend towards evolutionary political organi- 75 zations was marked by the rise of a relatively moderate parindra pa:ty, the Partai Indonesia Paja, 0R Greater Indonesia Party, which was either cooperative or non-cooperative as the occasion warranted. As the chief Indonesian political organi- zation, the party was formed in 1935, from a fusion of the Persatoean Bangsa Indonesia (a federarion of moderate study clubs), the Boedi Oetomo, and several non-Javanese nationa- list organizations, with Dr. Raden Soetomo as one of its principal leaders. The Parindra performed valuable work for Indonesian society by establishing retail and peasant co- operatives, a bank granting reasonable credit terms to Indonesians, a hostel for impoverished laborers, and a program to combat illiteracy. Desiting to work through the Dutch spon- sored Volksraa (PeOple's Council) which assembled together Indonesians from various parts of the immense archipelago in an effort to mate them aware ot their common problems and common relationship with the Dutch (and whiCh tended to develop nationalism by providing a more conscious unity), the Parindra accomplished little in the political sphere. The Parindra had joined with other moderate nationalist groups in the Volksraad in a proposal to the Dutch in mid- 1936 asking that a conference be convened to discuss plans for the evolutionary development of Indonesian over a ten-year period toward sdlf-government within the limits of the existing Dutch Constitution. (27) This very moderate proposal was rejected by th Dutch, a fact which gave sobering realization of Dutch intentions to the leaders of the nationalist movement. In April, 1937, many Indonesian intellectuals, recognizing the threat of world Fascism as well as the inadequacies and 76 conservative bent of the nationalist movement, formed the Ferindo, the Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia, or Indonesian People's Movement. 'This was also a result of reaction to the govern- ment's rejection of evolutionary development of Indonesian independence. The party grew rapidly, becoming the powerful left wing of the nationalist movemeh and displaying an inter- national orientation. The party's inherent militant national- ism was relegated to a secondary consideration, as most of its members felt their struggle for national independence was superceeded by the forthcoming fight between the forces of Fascism and anti-Fascism. As such the Gerindo sought solidarity with the Dutch to defend Indonesia against the growing threat of Japanese imperialism. Above all, the Gerinda called for collaboration between Hollandend Indonesia against Fascism the basis of equality. (28) By May, 1939, one large federation of the principal nationalist organizations, the Gapi, Gaboengan Politiek Indonesia, or Federation of Indonesian Political Parties, united eight of the major nationalist organizations. Its triumvirate chairmanship consisted of Amir Sjarifuddin, representing Gerindo; Abikusno, representing the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia; and Thamrin, representing Parindra. The Gapi's common program consisted of "(l)the right of self-determination for *ndonesia, (2) national unity founded upon 'political, economic and social democracy, (3) a democratically elected Indonesian parliament responsible to the people of Indonesia; and (4) solidarityvorder to maintain a strong anti-“F3801 St front 0" (29) A“: ““5 .. a... mos-um» f" «14’. . at 3...?.. and ”a?" l - . _ _. I A ,c I, u; a Mad:- Jam.- An Indonesian Feople's Congress, Kongres Rakjat Indonesia, sponsored by Gapi in “ecember, 1939, gave more definite form 77 to this program . The Congress attracted delegates from ninety different nationalistic political, social, and economic organizations, and stressed the need for unity among the nmionalist organisations. Furthermore, the Congress adopted a national language, the Indonesian language, Bahasa Indonesia, a national red and white flag, and a national anthem, Indonesia Raja, Greater Indonesia. It also adopted a resolution calling for Indonesia berparlemen, a parliament for *ndonesia, which became its chief slogan. The government of the Netherlands refused to grant any degree of independence to J'ndonesia in spite of the accute danger to Dutch national sovereignty in Europe. This attitude was maintained even after the German occupation of Holland, being largely responsible for the rapid decline of Indonesian- Dutch solidarity. The average Indonesian, according to Sjahrir, held secret satisfaction concerning the fall of Holland. "...and it was expected that there would be still more radicial happenings....The consciousness of foreign domination coupled with an intense desire for freedom and independence became increasingly strong. As the war Ch EurOpe) developed in those first years, the people derived a vicarious satisfaction from the misfortunes of their rulers. And this provided a stimulus for further estrangement from the Dutch and for the growth of a national self-consciousness....Thennasses....expressed sympathy for the Axis openly (in part). (30) The coming Japanese attack was lodmd upon as a liberation movement by many Indonesians, and finally, with the advent of Japanese troops in the archipelago, the majority of the Indonesians either anticipatzd better conditions under the Japanese or were apathetic, convinced that things could at least be no worse. 78 .n3 CQIEESE Add EnE- A; NATLQJALISM Political life among the peranakans or Indonesian— born Chinese before World War II was divided into three distinct organizations. One faction closely followed the lead of the Communist-bent Chinese language paper, SinPo, which was composed of an outright core of Chinese nationalists. This organization attracted its largest following among the peranaians and also gathered a large number of followers from the singkehs, ot newcomers, which were usually contract laborers having no great interest in politics at home or abroad. By the early 1930's, the Sin Po group was very sympathetic toward and propagandized for the aspirations of Indonesian nationalists. The second and most democratic of the Chinese political parties, the Partai Tiong Hwa, was founded in 1932, and became oriented almost entirely toward younger peranakan intellectuals. This group was an "assimilation" party which advocated the ulti- mate creation of an independent Indonesia in which the Indo- Chinese would share equal rights with all Indonesian citizens. The Partai Tiong Hwa sought political representation, unlike the Sin Po group, as well as collaboration with Indonesian nationalists groups in the Volksraad. A group of moderates co posed predominantly of conserv- ative Chinese businessmen interested in protection and advance- ment of the interests of the Chinese as a minority formed the third organization, the Chung Hua Hui. They were loyal to he colonial government, performing much useful work, especially in social welfare and educational fields, however, 79 the party remained unpopular among most Chinese through the decades before the war owing to its "old school" character. Its position intthe Volksraad eventually passed by default to the Partai Tiong Hwa Indonesia, the Chung Hua hui lacking popular support and being the least signigicant party among the Chinese.(3l) THE SOCIAL CLASSES IN POLITIC‘L ORGANIZATION (32) Having examined the rise of indonesian political organizations during the period 1900-1940, it is appropriate to inquire into the nature of support manifested by the social classes in the various political parties and their social- political demands. Four major social—political movements developed in *ndonesia, each represented by one or more parties and functioning as a potential oligarchy, The four are (l) the liberal, Westernized-nationalist group, as typified by the Partai Nasional Indonesia; (2) the Marxist-egalitarian movement, as represented by the bocialist and various Communist parties; (d) the conservative-aristocratic division prevalent in the Partai Indonesia Rajah and sometimes found in certain Islamic elements; and (4) the Islamic movement, which is the most comples of the social—political movements. THE LIBERAL-JESTERNIZED MOVLMENT In the development of Indonesian nationalism, the liberal- Westerniaed group has been the most important contributor. It is also characteristic of this group that some of its representa- tives are found in the left wing of the Islamic movements. Essentially, the intellectual elite in the towns provides the leadership for this movement which places positivism and technology, ”esternized education, and the historic liberal 80 traditions of nineteenth-century Europe upon the platfom of its idiological goals. In short it desires to create a hour- geois civilization, based on a substantial middle class, a developed economy, and a stable intrenchment of state control, and it is outwardly impatient of the adat-bound village society. A definite slavish imitation of the outer evidences of Western .1. 1 urban civilization (symphonic orchestras, moving-picture oheaters, art galleries) has been the cultural bent of this movement; furthermore it has an almost exaggerated concern for social freedon as expressed, for example, in the numerous lectures, articles, and books devoted to the J'ndonesian woman of to- day; and it is devoted to the acquisition of psued-sophisticated ocial ways, an attitude popular in the films of the “alay world. U) Typical of the extent to which this movement had influ- enced contemporary Indonesian crlture is the rman pitjisan, or"dimerxvel,” avidly read by the fairly educated younger generation. The problems of *ndonesian life are amply por- trayed in the characters, settings, and dialogues of these books. The chief societal themes used in these books include he problem of the ways of tradition versus the ways of modern, Nesternized society; of the country versus the city, of conservation versus dynamic change through social revolu- tion. The contest between old and new is generally underscored in these books, their universal theme "Political freedom is ' In all of these books the the same as social emancipation.' Nesternization of society is anticipated as the ultimate goal. 81 THE MARXIST-EGALITARIAN MOVEMENT The Marxist-egalitarian wing of Indonesian society is marked by tactical political dissension among its members. However, most see eye to eye with one another on the theoreti- cal premises on which the social order is to be founded. The supposed tenents favored by the left wing are the establishment of the much-heralded "social justice, " the abolition of all social gradations, a maximum of economical equality, and the ultimate creation of a genuine classless society in Indonesia. Aside from their goal of national independence, this movement insists individual independence from class rule, from adat restrictions, and from economic hardship need yet to be establish- ed. Nationalism and theconcept of national citizenship in a modern state is a secondary consideration of the Marxist-egali- tarian movement. The Marxist-egalitarian movement seeks to establish, not necessarily in Indonesia alone, a completely egalitarian social order. In consequence, the interests of this group competes with the rising petit bourgeois in the Westernized-liberal wing, although it, to, looks with favor on Nesternization.(33) Despite the collectivist program ofime Harxist movement in Indonesia, it is not a mass movement, rather it is a small potential oligarchy. The movement is usually outside of the general popular aspirations, except perhaps those of a specific economic nature and amhough its tenets include a broad appeal to the masses. Therefore, the Marxist movement is much smaller and much more dependent on a tight hierar- chical control than the other movements. The Communist party 82 in Indonesia, for example, demands thr ruling position in the national republic as a single concentration of power, so its tactic does not necessarily include a general popular upheaval to bring it to p wer. As such it is dependent on local coup d'etat methods as opposed to a massive attempt to convince growing numbers of people of the validity of Marxist doctrine and thus capture control of the government. THE ARISTOCRATIC-CONSERVATIVE KOVEMENT The remaining Indonesian nobility and the more tradition- bound members of the Westernized-liberal movement who have seceded from it make up the aristocratic-conservative movement. Thepre-eminent place of the adat and the maintenance of the traditional social gradations in Indonesian society are this movement's primary concern. The members of this movement come from the old dass of native regents and aristocrats (priajis) through which the Dutch colonial regime governed the Indies; this group is opposed to a complete Westernization and Islamization of Indonesia, however, most members are not averse to adopting some of the economic and technological advantages offered by Western living. The importance of this group rests on it sposition as the pillar of society, especially in some more isiated places beyond Java and Sumatra. The priajis have since time immemorial been the chief source of political power and thus by itplication the core and centripetal force of the social order. This is particularly true where nationalism, Islam, and Westernization are weak, since the priajis as the old aristocracy is still the pillar of society, indispensable to the maintenanca of 83 order and security.. Although tis group is the lest "Socially conscious," the least concerned with a raped emancipation of the Indonesian along bourgeois-liberal or Marxist-egalitarian lines. Nevertheless, this group is much more a "mass movement" than the Marxist-egalitatian wing in—so—far as it is directed by such purposeful groups as the Partai Indonesia Rajah. This condition exists owning to the still important place of the adat, the presence of aristocratic political control in many areas, and the psychological security stemming from out of a careful dicision of the social order. Indeed, there is evidence that some of those who have lived during the various periods of bersiap or periods of violent destruction, have voiced their wish to return to the times of peace and order, or toto tentrem, and the traditional organization of society to which the aristocratic—conservative element is committed.(34) The three movements discussed—-the liberal-Jesternized, the Marxist-egalitarian, and the Aristocratic-conservative-- are not free from the influence of the others. Separate wings within the parties of each movement tend to touch one another; for example, many tenets of the left wing of the Islamic movement is approximated in the principles of the Socialist party. At he samatime, none of the movements is exclusively concerned with one rationale of party politics alone, since each movement remains essentially a future social power group. None of the movements has succeeded in completely absorbing all political control. TEIE ISLAILIC I-IO EVENT Like the three above-named movements, the Islamic movement in Indonesia essentially attempts to provide a new social basis 84 for the Indonesian state. It is important to note that the Indonesian accords Islam a far greater place in his life culturally than religiously. While he does not know the meaning of thrology and religious duties, he does venerate the Mohammedan faith as tradition and its leaders hold positions of high prestige. Tradition-bound Moslems are interested in continuing their life in the same old way while advanced Moslems are often divided on technical and tactical questions such as the concept of the state, collaboration with non- Moslem groups, and the position of women. As a result the untutored believer lacks clear directions that would give his religion purposeful and continued emphasis in everyday life. The period of the Japanese occupation, which will be discussed in the following chapter, pointed to the socio- logical significance of the kiahih group in Indonesia; this group was deliberately selected by the Japanese as a medium of propaganda. New social and political ideologies were introduced to the Moslem leaders through the Latihan Kiahihs, or "courses for Kiajihs." As a mediator between his people and the occupation authorities, the Kiajih was accorded a new position of significance upon his return to his own community. This new authority also provided a basic cohesion in the disrupted village life in the confusion of the post- World War II revolutionary period. The republican authorities attempted to diminish the independent position of the Kiajih by abosrbing it in the framework of the republican—nationalist government. In most areas, unlike some instances where this absorption occurred without difficulty, the kiajihs stiffly 85 resisted the intoads of secular political idealism. Besides, they used the unsettled times to propagate their own political views using this new relitious orthodoxy. These kiajihs advocated the establishment of the Ummat Islam, the all- Moslem state and society in the new Indonesia. Other Noslem political parties arose at the same time, a few of them being resolutely Opposed to the Westernized—nationalist movement which almost completely dominated political life at the time. Ultimately, all of the major Islamic parties were joined into a single Masjumi party, however, no greater religious unanimity among Indonesia's Moslems developed: close to the position of the Socialists and embracing most of the tenets of Islamic modernism, stands the left wing of this party; envisaging a bourgeois civilization as the groundwork of an orthodox all- hoslem state, the center and right operate. A meeting of minds exist only on the formal, religious questions for the various wings of the Moslem movement.(35) However great their diveggies the, followers of Islam, have constructed a fairly consistent program for the formaion of a Moslem Indonesian state. Re- ligious law and secular law, in the first place, would be welded together in the closest possible connection. The establishment of his own society is the interpretation of the Moslem quest for freedom of religion; it dows not imply intolerance for other faiths. In practice the closed character of such a com— munity would make such tolerance an impossibility; by a purposeful and personal surrender to Allah and his laws one can only enter the community. Western thought and culture would remain outside this society although sore Moslem ranks hold a keen appreciation of Western technology, particularly in economic life. In this community the important pivotal 86 places would be occupied by the religious leaders, schoolmen, and the consecratedsecular leaders hallowed by them. In fact, a democratic state would hardly exist since such an Indonesian would be oriented toward the Ummat Islam, or the world community of Moslems. Those quarters havering a Westernized or modern society, such as the liberal-nationalist group, vehemently denounce this scheme, nevertheless, many Indonesian Moslems support the idea of Ummat Islam. Islamic modernism in Indonesia is generally confined to a number of intellectuals. The extreme left wing of the Islamic movement, which is composed of religious socialists, desires to preserve what is believed to be an essentially religious orthodoxy; this group also manages to give qualified approval to the social and technological immovations of the Western world. The greatest popularity is reserved for the moderate orthodoxy underlying such organizations as Muhammadiyah, which is a missonary-social welfare group having an early history of potent religious-social force in Moslem life in contemporary Indonesia. Thepersistence of religious orthodoxy in Indonesian Islam is caused by the character of bourgeois Moslem society in a colonial environment. Founded at a time when Islam had fallen into disrepute, the Muhammadiyah organization, for example, had to overcome apathy, not only among Indonesian aristocrats, but also among the masses. Nestern ideas and education greatly ingluenced a younger generation of potential Moslems which turned toward a non—Islamic world view. Around the early 1900's Islam began to be regarded as a cultural and religious anachronism unsuited to modern times. The 87 Muhammadiyah attempted to pace new emphasis on the Koran and to purify Islam from its centuries-old contamination. This movement appealed to teason as well as to tradition and authority; it fought supposed harmful superstitions in the realm of marriage and funeral rites, and its ethical emphasis found expression in the creation of many social welfare agencies for the emancipated, individual Moslem. Other organizations reflected this new Islam in the years preceding World War I, add one of these, the Sarekat Islam, became the vanguard of the new Moslem political movement as well. The aspirations of an Islamic bourgeoisie, a rising Moslem middle class, was reflamed in this Islamic reform, especially since the progressive rationalism, the individualism, and the emphasis upon social welfare reform was an ideal adjustment of thought in the rest of the Indonesian world and, moreover, it appeared that Islam had been brought in tune with the changing times.(36) The implications of a bourgeois liberal kind of Islam produced unexpected results for the growing Moslem middle class in the Indonesian towns. An increasing number of peasants, rural workers, and lower-class city dwellers became organization— conscious in the Islamic revival, joining various Moslem associations, notably the Sarekat Islam. This society soon began to assume a militant nationafist tone, its aspirations ranging from views of semi—Jesternized intellectual hoslems, who had become Marxists and political extremists, to the outlook of the original founders of the movement, the middle-class Moslems, whose economic interests often collided with those ,,.g. of European of Chinese business groups. The political CD 0) radicalism of the leaders of Sarekat Islam urged by the pressure of lower class demands and the increasingly leftist sentiments that entered the Moslem novement in general greatly influenced the hostility of the European business groups. The masses began to use Sarekat Islam as a weapon in a class struggle with non-Islamic colonial capitalist groups, and Marxism and nationalism rather than Islam became for them the chief motive factors. Conflict between two schoold of thought was inevitable since the Moslem bourgeoisie regarded the Islamic movement primarily as the expression of group solidarity, with modern Islam's religious-cultural lines providing the integration of ideology. However, the struggle between these two factions produced a loss of solidarity. A nominal victory was scoted by the bourgeois Moslems when they expelled all ot the radical elements form the ranks of the Sarekat Islam. It was only during the revolutionary period that the left-wing elements returned to the presumptive successor of the Sarekat Islam, the Jasjumi; this occured with the understanding that the bourgeois tradition buttressed by a nominal religious orthodoxy of the middle-class Hoslem action would predominate in the movement's program. In order to retain its following ‘J among the masses, however, the Kasjumi was required to fly the radical banner in a short period of time, but the right wing of the party continues its fight with the"religious socialist wing. In all the right wing continues to excerise an uncompromising orthodoxy in their religious convictions. (37) The creation of the mational state, than, means different things LO different kinds of hoslems: it may mean either a religiously oriented middle class culture with certain qualified liberalistic—rationalistic overtones, such as the Muhammadiyah, or an out and out orthodox Moslem state, exemplified by Dar'ul Islam to the Moslem proletariat led by an intellectual elite in so far as it is both politically and religiously Moslem conscious. In such a struggle the traditional religious guiding element, the kiajihs, would seek more support from the bourgeosisie than from the masses, since its own advantageous position rests upon a conservatively integrated Moslem social order. In all, the more fixed delineation of income groups and economic interests tends to reveal that a clash between the right and the left in Indonesian society will begin as a conflict between Islam and Islam, such as Wertheim has suggested. In Indonesia, the preservers of adat and communal tradition, the conservative-aristocratic faction, runs a poor second to the attraction of the Westernized-liberal and the Marxist groups holds on the Moslem movement. A bitter antagonism has existed between the conservative-aristocratic faction and the world of Islam; for instance, in the decades after the first World War, Islam and aiat have often been in sharp conflict. The adat has remained supreme only in those areas with a distinct and unique pattern of live, such as the west coast of Sumatra. Otherwise, and especially in Java, the situation is the reverse, but everywhere in Indonesia the struggle goes on. This conflict has progressed as a major source of social instability in Indonesia today. The adat is important to the tradition-conscious community as an indispensable component of its existence, this communalism being affected by the coming of Islam. In its emphasis upon the private relationship between the believer and God and upon the full equality of all believers in the Islamic world community, Islam appeared to be individualistic. At thesame time, the subordinate, hierarchial, and often auto- cratic nature of the village community was threatened by the personal responsibility to a source outside the traditions of the group. This conflict became even sharper as Islam came to be associated with the budding nationalism of the twenties, for this nationalism was essentially urban-directed and influenced by a distinctly Western positivism and approved of Western techniques and economic organization. Finally, Indonesian Islam, as intro- duced by traders and merchants, brought a disruptive economic element into the picture. As a part of the highly developed commercial capitalist social order of the antique Orient, the Moslem trader came upon a precapitalist if not anticapitalist village entity. Thus the Moslem traders in their missionary activity also brought the essentials of a money economy into the subsistence peasant society, and this tended to enforce the individualistic outlook and the personal independence of the villager who accepted the new faith. An even greater threat to the continued integrated harmony of indigenous society is present in the danger stemming from the conflict between adat jurisprudence and Moslem law. In this respect, the hukum, or legal presceiptions, have made their influence felt on traditional customs wherever Islam has spread in Indonesia. Here, Islam has tried to impose its precepts upon the Indonesian in such matters as inheritance and succession, marriage and divorce, and general family laws. On Sumatra and Java kiajihs have taken issue with the adat chiefs on numerous occasions involving family and blood-relation- 91 ship problems necessitating government interference. On the whole, the adat is supreme in life because of the tendency of Indonesians to favor Islamic rules. As a result of this continued impact of Islam on traditional ways of life many adat associations have been formed, devoted to the rigid preservation of communal law. In some instances, such as in the western and southern parts of Sumatra, the conflict has been measureadly deepened. This struggle has been of lasting importance in particular in the development of nationalism, because Islam quickly allied itself with the independence and emancipation movement. The adat group, slow to grasp the signficance of the nationalist agitation, often resisted the movement, and the Moslem faction became more militantly nationalist with the support of the Westernized-liberal nationalist parties. The adat faction was then relegated to the position of being reactionary and of being a "stooge" of the colonial power. In the middle of this multifarious social struggle stands Indonesian Islam and it is directed against certain elements nominally in its own ranks as well as the adat group and certain liberal-nationalist elements. Further complicating this conflict is the fact that neither the conservative-aristocratic movement, champions of the adat, nor the liberal nationalist movement, advocates of Western bourgeois culture, is homegeneous, since in both these movements there are factions which are not adverse to collaboration with Islam. The Marxist—egalitarian wing, in an attempt to establish a united Communist-Islamic frOnt, has repeated- ly sought the support of Moslem leaders. Owing to its many faceted programs, Islam through the colonial period remained the least successful force as a potential oligarchy, though its nominal importance would be recognized in any social order that would arise in Indonesia. Yet, even when Islam appears to be a unified force, such as in its struggle against the Karxist extremism or the adat, the diversity of its component elements robs it of its strength. (38) \O 10. 12. 13. 14. 15. 15. 17. 19. 20. {'3 C 0 ”UK“, LL . 2?. J 24. 25. 21. 27. 28. go /. 30. Footnotes Jusius h. van er nro f IOTOUE is so: tre EVOth‘On of the Jetherleads Expire" geii. Saieon: Lecetter 1953, rp. 331—332. 1222., rv. 333-378. D- J. Levr'vfi- isi_i 0: ;i;§_fi a§_-: ch:i-:vti_ds-is ger-gemeesletiigeae1_ge1e*te1ijke n_ceg_'g fedenleigegh: Indie 1§;§:;§€7 (The Trojcn Lorre —— Lerly Hi“tory of the nuniclrvl ‘qd ne’ioael C“Vfl“ils ii Ketterlsice-InCia). Costhoe? Uitr. gij, Uirecnt: 1943. L. 1. u. ho~:. 9n ie_:ti;:ié.9€_3‘122“:liiiiiéie Bi: xerinL ii I hdi”:'1“ (For Fretdwru iv» Lu t1015likt i?7{'~7{‘13"i7777771s). J 3" ~ I ‘-:¢v« , Ejik r-': 1C"C, f“. 75 “2:. v ;sr A‘OEI, Cp 3it., 1.. 339—53?: G. don _rijp. Sea:ts "he“ ecciorifc“e res“hiededié v:3 Seder] nos—Indie Crete oi "n heoaomic history of 5e.berlta ‘—In6157. hrvvi -xfi:i. haerlcr: lfisi, 3b:ct€r 7. —eor3: Colurinn Pt‘in. Ittioislis 5;;j Eevqlutio? 32 iiioqcris. Jorneli Uiivzvri’v lrers,_I‘r504:_‘l§;Z, pp. AO—lCO. L. j. Sitorue. itiorv of *Ke I?i03€¢1”“ Tttiuoalitt Love eni. Jfizorcte: 704?, pp. 10-11. E. H. on'lerr. De Iqloidcnbe Fezcrinr on J vs. Vererreide Ceroheifte“, Leife : 1043, i. 540., cit ' in Iahin, On 3it.. rt. 55. "r - B u berrer. Ea vclorfi‘die Tederlrdsch—Iiéie (The Encyclo- pedia of the T nerlai S-Ildlcs). cad Edition, file Harv : e 1919, V31nre I 1 9 w 'CT. Erori‘1_‘_.er-,o-, £2 3 ., 13. 557. Itij. r. 543. hghi Q: Q: Qit., I“. 55-71, lii_2-: tr. 71—73, b1 ”‘er€€r a g: _, p. 952. Sitorue, Cp J:t., p. 19. nrnii Of Qit., pp. 94—95. Ibid-: pp. 74—75. A, The Revolutionary l'iovez‘ne-ii. in 1.16:“ Best" g;__p:i_t Intern at-o:1el. Leningrad 91d London:1925,lumbers 18-19, pp. 113-115; cited by Kahin, pp. 78- -79 Tea halak.. ;:::33“Agtie. ierrtO' 1 Ibid., p. 53. .-in, Op Cit., pp. 83—84. Ibid., pp. 88—90. Ibi"., pr. 90-01; J. h. Plivier Over? 947, pp. 45—50; 56,61. .1 -‘J. -two~ni*<~ i*c*e tr‘e(lrr' I co~ecie in 2ht van be out- ii ‘I film "SH—J Int-4° j J ‘h L_J 0-3. .Nm )"i :C+ ) rii ge HV~_;,,¢‘ -b__.”«*(ourVe] o: in: Levelo it of tne Na neliet imovem fit in Inconesie in the Years 1930 to v()'., Jen Hoeve. The Hague: 1953, pp. 45-69. '2 Ibid., Chapter I. Q 3F"¢W+l Piuvier,“6n g;_., pp. 107-113. Kahin., cg git., p. 97. Sutsn Sjahrir. Out of Ex 1e. John Day, New York: 194;, pp. 21C‘-2190 94 Kroef. "Chinese As:' Justus m. vsn der Elmilstion in Indon sir" 32212113222332h- Winter, 1953, fr. 437-408. Justus n. veo oer hroef. "Boo iety 91o Culture in Indonesiro J:tioiellam” fi;erigg:_goyrg51 of gggiglgrv. Volur e 28, Number 1, July, 1952, or. 11-24. 5. A. van Tiewveiru1tve Lens e1 vriiheid in_Ig§g§§§ie Re. sod Freeoom ii Indonesia}. vei Hoeve, ihe Hague: 1 950, pp. 192-207. . an der Kroef, Op Cit., p.. 11-24. W. F. Mertheim. Effeo1¢ of hes tern iVi1i7atiOi on -___—.——.-————_. .-__._ ._ -..—#—_—.-— .-__..___———._— _ .. __-___ +- —-- - Ioooogfflrq Society. Institute of Is Cific Rel tions, ;\C\‘- “0 10/30, Ifipo 50-30. 21:1“., T12. 59—00. Ibido , T7,“. 50— 50. van der Kroef, Q: Qit., pp. 14-22. CHAPTER IV CONTESBORARY INDONSSIAH NATIONALISH I POLITICAL DEVELOPfliflTS DURING '33 JAPAsta OGJJPATION The advent of the Second world Mar and the subsequent Japanese conquest and occupation of Indonesia had profound and lasting effects upon the people of the Indies, particu- larly in the rise of Indonesian nationalism. Japan came upon an Indonesia which had been under Dutch control since the 1600's, the Japanese having little intercourse with the Indies except for a nominal amount of trade. Above all, relations between Japan and the Netherlands Indies pre— sented no special difficulties until the 1930's. The back- ground of this international friction dated to a law of 1899 which granted the Japanese the same status as Europeans in the Indies, and to'a general trade treaty concluded in 1912 with the Dutch which granted the Japanese the usual most- favored-nation position in regard to trade, shipping, busi- ness, and Lmnigration. The economic crises of world-wide depression in 1929-1932 led to disturbing Japanese activi- ties as their imports to the Netherlands Indies rose from 11 per cent in 1929 to 30 per cent in 1935; meanwhile, a drop from 20 per cent to 13 per cent occurred for the Nether- lands. At the same time Japanfls share of the Indies' exports was only 5 per cent. However, by far the most disturbing problem to the Dutch and the Indonesians was the great in- flux of Japanese nationals--business, middle men, and fisher- men. The Japanese had embarked on an extensive program of acquiring mining, agricultural, and lumber rights, often of doubtful economic value, but which were leased in locali- ties of military importance; in addition, the Japanese accelerated their holdings in coastal shipping and fish- ing industries. Among the protective measures adopted by the Netherlands colonial administration were included licensing for imports and import businesses, a foreign- labor law to protect local labor, immigration quotas, and a law prhibiting foreign fishing in territorial waters. Although these laws were designed to protect the Indies and the Dutch investment in their colonial holding, the Japanese clamored for immediate settlement of what they considered ”discriminatory measures" directed against Japan. Considerable negotiation directed toward the amiable settle- ment of their differences transpired between the Netherlands and Japan, however, the Asiatic plan of conquest envisaged in Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was ex- tended to Indonesia wherein that archipelago became a part of the Japanese Empire. In spite of the heroic defense waged by Dutch air and naval forces against a superior equipped enemy, the capitulation of the Dutch army only eight days after the Japanese invasion of Java (Harch 1, 1912) made a lasting impression on the Indonesians. The defeat of the Netherlands in the light of a very poor military showing caused a great loss of Dutch prestige in the islands and, secondly, many indonesians were convinced that if they had possession of arms they could have done as well as the Japanese. Moreover, many Indonesians among the educated elite were convinced the Dutch surrendered owing \C to their eagerness to make a deal with the Japanese such as Vichy France had done in Indo-China, whereby they would continue to administer the country, but under Japanese super- vision. In all, the Dutch suffered a tremendous loss of confidence among the Indonesian masses. when the Japanese arrived in Java they were greeted as liberators, this popu- lar feeling being reinforced by their immediately allowing the singing of the Indonesia Raja, a nationalist patriotic song which became the national anthem, and the display of the red and white Indonesian national flag. (1) The manner in which the new rulers of Indonesia brought about a socio-econonic status change for the majority of educated Indonesians was of great importance in winning acceotance of the Japanese occupation. Since the Japanese interned in concentration camps within six months of their arrival practically the whole Dutch population, a substantial proportion of the Eurasians, and a number of Christian Indo- nesians whom were suspected of harboring pro—Dutch sympathies, it was necessary toe the Japanese to fill most of the middle and upper-bracket administrative and technical positions with Indonesians; this development was no less caused by the lack of extremely few Japanese military government personnel. Owing to these advancements to one and frequently two or three ranks in the hierarchy in which they had been employed, the Japanese either captured the immediate support or neutralized the antipathy of a very large portion of educated Indonesians. The Japanese for this reason, the welcome from the masses, and a lacx of ooposition from the \0 g) nationalist leaders, concluded an exploitation of Indonesia for the Japanese war effort could be made without any con- cessions to the Indonesian nationalist movement. It was this conviction which led to the launching of the Triple A Movement, or Bergerakan Tiga A, on April 29, 1912, which stood for the slogans introduced and much propa- gandized by the Japanese: ”Japan the Light of Asia, Japan the Protector of Asia, and Japan the Leader of Asia.” Further- mover, the Japanese did not utilize important nationalist leaders to implement their program, the objectives of the movement being dedicated to mobilizing Indonesian support for Japan's was effort and the Greater jast Asia Co-Dros- perity Sphere. However, Indonesians were not conducive to Asian solidirity against the west under Japanese leadership, especially since the economic exploitation of Indoiesia was soon subordinated to the benefit of Japan with no quid pro quo for Indonesia. hus in spite of the high—powered Japanese propaganda the Triple A Movement was a complete bust. The specific grievances which the Indonesiams be- came enamored with against their Japanese occupiers were based in the fact that the archipelago was being drained of quinine, oil, and foodstuffs, while much-needed consumer goods, such as machine parts and cloth, were not coming in. In addition the Japanese insisted that the Japanese language replace Dutch in the secondary and higher schools and as the language of governmental administration, as well as exercising a heavy-handed and harsh control over school curriculum which resulted in sharp negative reactions. More- over, the overbrearing rudeness and frequent brutality on the part of many Japanese in their dealingsvvith Indonesians created a strong antagonism which pervaded almost the entire Indonesian population. Early in the occupation the Japanese realized they no longe. had the confidence of either the masses or the educated Indonesiams, factors punctuated by open small-scale insurrections by the end of 1942. Even secondary-school and college students had become hostile and occasionally defiant, some even joining the recently discovered underground organizations along with.more-seasoned political leaders. The Japanese became alarmed when they comprehended that the Indonesian nationalist movement was a definite force which, if correctly regulated, could assist in realizing the minimum aims of the occupation. .Realization of this brought the Japanese to adopt radically different policies based on the cooperation and use of the nationalist leaders who they felt certain commanded real oooular suoport. (2) Phi NATIONALIST ‘BADERS One of the most popular nationalist leaders, Soekarno, was released by the Japanese shortly after their arrival; he proceeded from his place of detention in Benculen to Java where he quickly contacted Hatta and Sjahrir, both of whom were already in touch with the underground. These nationalist leaders wer agreed that the nationalist struggle could best be conducted at two levels-~legally above ground and covertly underground -- and that Soekarno and Hatta would work above ground through the Japanese while Sjahrir would organize an underground resistance movement, but keep in lCO touch with the other nationalist leaders. Attesting to this agreement after the Second dorld war, Sjahrir, one of the bitterest opoonents of those who collaborated with the Japanese for their own personal ends, remarked about Soekarno and Hatta: Soexarno thought of the Japanese ”as pure fascists, and felt that we must use the most subtle countermethods to get around them, such4as maxing an appear- ance of Collaboration." Both Soekarno and Hatta, according to Sjahrir, agreed to do ”everything legally possible to give the nationalist struggle a broader legal scope, and at the same time secretly support the revolutionary resist- ance." In return for their capitalization on Soekarno's popularity for propaganda purposes, the three were resolved "that political concessions from the Japanese must be pressed for in return.” datta's work in the nationalist movement, although sheltered by the cloaa of his position under the Japanese, served to secure funds and facilitate the travel of the underground group. In fact, Hatta accepted the Japa- nese position at the behest of Sjahrir's group and ”never made comaon cause with those Indonesians who went to work for the Japanese because of either material designs or political sympathies.” Above all Hatta kept the underground informed of anything that took place anong the Japanese and among the collaborating Indonesians. (3) The Japanese promised that self-government would be granted in return for the support of Soexarno, Hatta, and some of the other influential nationalist leaders and on 101 March 9, 1913 allowed the establishment of the Poesat Tenaga Rakjat, or Center of People's Bower, which was an all-inclusive nationalist organization. This organization came to be known as Poetera and it included all of the former Indonesian political and nonpolitical nationalist associa- tions domiciled in Java and.Madura. By June, 1943 the de- cision to allow Indonesians to take part in their own govern- ment was implemented by the appointment of a board of four members consisting of Soekarno as chairman; Hatta as vice- chairman; and including di Hadjar Dewantoro and a prominent Mohammedan leader, iiaji H. M. Mansoer. Hany Indonesians, even from the student group which supported the underground organization, felt that Poetera was a genuinely nationalist organization headed toward self-government, this general conviction being lent support in early Septenber, 19i3, when ancillary to the Poetera, a Central Advisory Board, or an appointed representative council for Indonesia, was created with Soekarno as president. In addition numerous local boards were appointed as consultative groups which passed on the merit of important measures before the Japa- nese authorities. The importance of the Boetera to the nationalist move— ment was the fact that it was used by the Indonesian nationa- list leaders as an instrument to advance the cause of Indo— nesian independence. Although the Japanese used it as a means for rallying Indonesian support behind their war effort, the nationalist leaders used the Boetera to spread and in- tensify nationalist ideas among the masses and forced concessions 102 from the Japanese leading toward self-government; while its subordinate position was dedicated to helping the Japanese war effort, it was only to the minimum extent necessary in order to allow the furtherance of the long-range nationalist plans. As a vehicle for Indo esian independence the Eoetera was an imperfect and imprecise instrument, for in the process of arousing Indonesian nationalisn it beget dangerous conse- quences. It strengthened the Japanese war effort and helped to establish organizations, particularly among the youth who were incalcated with authoritarian mentalities which respected force and exhibited emotional anti—Nesternism. This was particularly true among the youthful and slightly educated members of the military and para~military organi- zations which it sponsored. It is a fact that in the and many of their members emerged anti-Japa-ese and pro-Allied, but these youthful military parrots retained the legacy of uncritical resoonse to Authoritarian command from above and were disassed to rely on violence and brutality to accomplish their aims. However, the tremendous increase in political consciousness of the Indonesian masses and their will to independence stands out as the most important lon3~term result of the activities of the foetera. while the Japanese used the Boetera to indoctrinate the masses to support them, to hate the Allies, to recruit labor battalions and rear- area tPDOpS for the Japanese army, and to mobilize raw- material resources, their goals were never near realization. Using radio propaganda in pirticular, the Boetera under Soekarno's direction actually saturated Indonesia with nationa- list talx which actually flfiie it easier for the peasant to equate ”anti-imperialism” with ”anti-Japanese.” The most important of the foetera-sponsored organiza- tions, the Soexarela Tentara Pembela Tanah air (Volunteer Army of Defenders of the Fataerland), or Peta as it £33 commonly Known, was established in Seotember, 19L3- The Beta was a native Indonesian armed grouq trained by the Japanese but Indonesian officered and charged with the defense of Indonesia against Allied invasion. A continuous indoctrination of the reta's members M.th a pro—Indonesian point of View and only outvardly a pro—Japanese and anti- Allied orientation, was the continuous objective of Seekarno, Hatta, and other Poetera leaders. In this they only partially succeeded, but by lgil the average Peta member was consciously strongly nationalist, anti-Japanese, anti-Dutch, but favor- ably disposed towards the other Allies, particularly the United States. The nationalist leaders were able to maintain control over the Peta's officers since their influence on the Japanese officers naming the selection usually followed the advice of Soexarno and Gatot Magioeoradja, the Indonesian head of Peta. fhey successfully argued that an army dedi- cated to the defense of the fatherland must have strongly nationalist officers and that the rank and file would be a good defensive organization only if it had an aroused national consciousness. fhe nationalist leaders succeeded in their mission and in no time their progagalda helped man Peta members e uate Japan's activities with imperialism by themselves. (1) THE YOUTH GROUPS The Japanese proparanda ssrvice, the Sendenbu, establish— ed several youth orranizations early in the occupation, being aware of the favorable political results that might be realized through organizing the uneducated Indonesian youth. Having little kflOMledge of the West, these youth were often easily and effectively indoctrinated to hate and to fight the Allies. The first youth organization, the Seinendan, was establisaed at the end of 1942, as a mass youth group based particularly on the Villare. A Japanese-trained member of the Village was charged with the mission of training the youth in simple mili— tary exercises, mass drill, and anti-Allied ideas. By 1943, the Gakutotai was orfanized and composed of students from the seventh grade through high school in the cities; its members were given intensive anti-Allied propaganda indoctrination and some military traininf. The most heavily indoctrinated of all youth corps was the Barissn PelOpor, or Pioneer Column, which was established last; its members also were militarily ' trained and their anti-Nestern orientation was considerably stronger than that of any of the others. (5) As might be expected, the Indonesian nationalist under- ground movement infiltrated the ranks of the youth movement. the Perstoean Mahasiswa, or Student Union, was made up of university students in Jakarta who pursued a continuous de- fiant attitude and open and public criticism of the Japanese in the interests of circulating anti-Japanese revolutionary sentiment. This underground group cooperated with other under- fround organi7ations in their tho-fold youth group infiltration pm objectives: 1. To establish as much control as possible within the units of these organizations through reliable men holding .LUl-i key positions and; 2. To influence their membership in an anti—Japanese and pro—Allied direction, specifically to pre- pare them to rise against the Japanese whenever the expected Allied invasion should come. In order to control the increasingly hostile educated youth and especially to keep them from effective participa- tion in uiderground activity, the Japanese established the AngkataiMuda, or Youth Organi7ation, composed of educated young men from about twenty to thirty which they closely con- trolled. Created in mid-1944, this organization was headed at Japanese insistance by Indonesians known or suspected as being active in the underground; they were thus kept out in the open and more directly supervised. The Japanese strategem was only partly successful in that they managed to weaken the undergrounds by restricting the activities of many of their best leaders, however, these men working in the Student Union resulted in making the rank and file members more anti-Japan- ese and more pro-Allied, to the exclusion cf the Dutch. Recognizing that the Poetera was actually accomplishing more for the Indonesian nationalist movement than it was for their war effort, the Japanese in March, 1944, created a new organization, the Perhimpoenan Kabaktian Rakjat, or PeOple's Loyalty Organization. Moreover, the Japanese were concerned that the supporters of the Poetera, especially the educated youth, should change their attitudes that were more anti- Japanese than anti—Allied. Known by its Japanese name, the Djawa Hokokai, the organization helped neutraliye and limit the force of the nationalists since the Japanese required that it represent the Chinese, Arab, and Eurasian community as well as the Indonesian and forced it to submit to a much closer H C) L)\ supervision and control than had been the case with the Poetera. Although chairmaned by Soekarno, the new organization was under the direct control of the Japanese Commander in Chief, the Gun- seikan, and the highly developed Hokokai, with a branch in every village, was compuISOrily maintained and as a consequence did not win popular backing. Clearly the cause of the Indonesian nationalist movement was not advanced greatly. Concurrent with their attempt to win Indonesian support through the Hokokai, the Japanese established one large, all-inclusive Islamic or- ganization which subsumed all existing ones of a non—political nature. The Japanese succeeded in building a spirt of nation- alism among the masses, but they did not infuse much anti~ Allied sentiment. Marked changes in Japanese policy developed in October, 1944, just after the announcment of Premier Koiso that Indonesia would be given independence very shortly. Almost immediately in Java and Madura controls were relaxed over the Hokokai and Soekarno, Hatta, and other speakers were given greater opportun- ity to contact the masses, were allowed to talk unadulterated independence, and obliged to infuse less pro-Japanese content into their talks. The most remarkable new departure was the establishment of a school for semi-educated youths of eighteen to twenty in Jakarta called the Asrama Indonesia Merdeka, or Dormitory for Free Indonesia. This school was given lectures by nationalist leaders on nationalism, economics, politics, sociology, and Marxism. The objectives of this training was to equip students as able nationalist leaders, to make them fully conscious of the fact that the Indonesian independence to which they were to lead their people must have a social content meaningful to all of them, to those of the villages as 107 well as the towns. The Japanese exerted influence on the schools which were recuired to give principal emphasis to the study of cou1unicr of a strongly international type, based on social justice for he world as a whole. Some Indonesian leaders believed the Japanese used this indoctrination for the primary purpose of penetrating and eventually controlling the illegal and underground Com unist Party of Indones sia or the PKI, through the you he trained in the ese schools. Other Indonesian nationalists were of the Opinion that the Japanese were genuinely 91‘3““? in their desire for Indonesian ince- pendence and that t‘iey ar~roact d domestic as well as world- wide social problems in a progressive anner. Another school of thought is coivince ed tl:at the papanese were aware of their defeat and that if a Communist revolution broke out in Indonesia it could conceivably lead to an alliance with Russia for J \. \; per}, so it seemed logical that the Japanese should endeavor to ecuip potential leaders with pro—Communist leanings. In any event, the picture is not clear since the Japanese leaders have never explained their motivations. (6) With the approach of Allied power to Indonesia, the Japan- ese were forced by the resultant anti-Japanese feeling to take further steps towards the establishment of an independent Indon- esian government. Several residents and sub—residents, the political administrators of areas or residencies, were appoint— ed in late l944. On harch l, 1945, the Investigating Committee for the Pre arati 07 of Imi cependence, the Baden Penjelidik Usaha Periapan Kemerdekaan, was created. It was composed of repre— sentatives of the Japanese, all of the principal social and ethnic groups of Java and hadura, and important nationalist leaders, including Soekarno and Hatta. This committee reached 108 basic agreement concerning constitutional and economic ques- tions. Despite the concessions made by the Japanese, the de- mand for self-government increased. Finally, on Junel, 1945, Soekarno delivered a speech before the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence in which he enunicated his five basic principles, or the Pantja Sila, that he felt should guide and serve as the philosophical foundation of an independent Indonesia: nationalism, internationalism or humanitarianism, consent or representative government, social justice or social prosperity, and belief in one God or freedom of worship. The first two principles were reduced by Soekarno to one term, socio-nationalism, the nexttwo principles to socio-democracy, so that three principles remained: socio-nationalism, socio- democracy, and a belief in God. He further reduced these prin- ciples to an Indonesian term, gotong rojong, or mutual coopera- tion, and called for the establishment of a gotong rojong Indonesian state. Because of the capitulation of the Empire of Japan to the Allied Powers in August, 1945, the peaceful transfer of governmental authority from the Japanese armed forces to the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee, established in August, 1945, was not realized. This situa- tion precipitated the Indonesian revolution. (7) PUBLIC OPINION AT THE RICE-ROOT LEVEL The impact of the Japanese occupation upon Indonesian society fostered several significant developments, the most outstanding of which was the tremendous increase in national consciousness and the will to political independence which it sired. In contrast to the moderate and much less felt Dutch rule, the Japanese aroused a consciousness of common suffering and humiliation, and a common resentment owing to the harsh 109 and arbitrariness of the Japanese administrators; this greatly strengthened the already existing national awareness of the Indonesians. In particular, the peasantry suffered a direct and pointed intrusion by the Japanese, which was slightly cushioned by the operation of the Poetera and the Hokokai. The foundations of the rural society was undermined through the three and a half years of Japanese occupation by kidnapping from homes or conscription as laborers abroad or as soldiers, forced regulations, compulsory surrender of harvested crops, and compulsory planting of designated crops, about which Sjahrir has observed, "all imposed with unlimited arbitrariness." (8) The heavy demands on the village labor supply forced the peasantry to re-align their structures since the traditional patterns of work and land apportionment had to be altered. An' intense bitterness against the Japanese was born from the con— dition of repayment for labor and crops with a worthless cur- rency, money which buy almost none of the tradional needs, such as agricultural implements, cloth, etc. As a result, the peas— antry became more politically conscious than it had ever been, and its anti-Japanese feeling is attested to by the widespread and frequent peasant revolts that occured with increasing regu- larity during the last year of the Japanese occupation. Contin- ual propaganda chorused by the nationalist leaders, the under— ground, and even the Japanese encouraged Indonesian nationalism. This was particularly true of the imprint of the Japanese occu— pation left on the Indonesian youth between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five; the propapanda narrowed and intensified their nationalist sentiments and many developed a strong, emotional, anti-Western bias which frequently verged on sheer hatred and often extended itself to antipathy against Eurasians and Indies ‘ Chinese. In spite of this attitude most youths followed the lead of the wiser, saner, nationalists. hany students be- came loath to study under the Japa .ese-controlled school system and were forced into the labor marekt to earn their own way, which was a completely new experience. They found jobs in government and cornerical enterprises because of the absence of educated workers resulting from the incarceration of the European population. Able to support therselves, they found a degree of self-confidence which they had not possessed before. ‘ Another result of the occupation was tne introduction in- to general use of the Relay language, or Bahasa Indonesia, as a sh ort- run expediency lanfauge of administration.' Administra— tors, merchants, students, and teachers were renuired to learn this IndOi es ia n lanruare thereby furthering the cause of nation- al unity. Forced by tre Jaoanese occupation to assume admi;1istra— tive and technical positions which were fornally staffed bv Europeans. ”finally rtch, Indefirsieis became aware that they could operate such establisnnents as railroa s, electric power facilities, communication enterprises, and a new national self- confidence was in consequence instilled in the peonle. This new found pride led to the natural conclusion for most Indon- esians that they were cap able of self-rovernmenL Furthermore, th e socio- econon ic mover eat affected those Indonesians havinf received positons formally occupied or reserved by the Dutch in O (D the colonial hierarchical structure; they were EHLI u to pro- tect their recently won vested interests and not disposed to- ward returninf to a subordinate position after the occupation. Then, too, they wanted higher positions without the incubus of a Japanese adviser or overseer. Perhaps the ultimate despoiler 111 of forner effective and reliable instruments of Dutch rule was the role of the old indigenous aristocracy. They were elevated to positions which they had no hope of attaining un- der the old regime, so that in them, too, was developed a con- viction that they could handle these new positions, that they were entitled to such positions, and that they would be assured them in an independent Indonesia. (0) / II (D OCIAL E fr) FESTS OF THE OTJUEATIOE The Japanese occupation brought a great psychological change to the Indonesian masses, for with the defeat of the Dutch the father inane of colonialism was destroyed. To Indonesians, and especially nationalists, colonialism resembled nothing so much as a father image, respected, fearful, and en- gendering unreasoned hatred. By the end of the Second World War the Dutch colonial aristocrat —- one type being autocratic, arrogant, and alien to Indonesian life, and the other a patern— al colonial emancipator often mistrusted or not appreciated by the native group -- was shed of his traditional cloak of author- ity. In consequence, political disorders and wanton extremism resulted when the pent—up resentment of the natives tas released after the traditional checks or barriers were removed in the un- easy period between the crumbling of the colonial regime, the occupation, and the demise of the Japanese. At this time, the sense of frustration and hate that had lain dormant in colonial times was reawakened and directed against the returnity colon- ial Dutch regime; in this instance, nationalist objectives be- came allied with a new frenzied favor of fanaticism present in Indonesia. The social upheaval of the occupation was great and touch— ed all classes. The village recruitment of labor by the Japan- ese led to social displacement and permanent dislocation of large sections of the village population from its traditional society, which created a mass of rootless and disorganized people who after the occupation did not know where to go. The middle class was brought to the brink of poverty as they were frustrated by Japanese monetary levies; as a result, they turned to ex- tremists and nationalist leaders (who were liberated by the Japanese) for social and political guidance, which in turn strengthened the hand of nationalist leaders following the war. The aristocracy, composed of many former civil servants who were loyal to the Dutch, suffered personal loss of property and some- times prison at the hands of the Japanese. Consequently, faced with a new social stigma, many turned to their own aristocrats, some collaborated with the Japanese, but in general most lost position and face in the community, except in more remote areas. Being taken out of the traditional and paternal setting of the village, the youth groups were organized into nihilistic and super-nihilistic units which eventually supported the efforts of the nationalist leaders after the war. Many of the intellect— uals favored the coming of the Japanese and openly collaborated with the occupation regime. Its chief result for the intellect- uals rests in the fact they were given a chance to govern under Japanese guidance. Some of them went underground but more unit- ed withnationalist leaders working under the Japanese with the ultimate view of Indonesian independence their goal. The Eur- asian and Chinese minority faced imprisonment under the Japanese. Being held up in mockery by the Japanese, the pOpulation was whipped into denouncing these minority groups. After the war, ll} depradations against them occurred by native Indonesians. Thus it was that a social disorganivation and loss of tradtional af- filation produced a still dissatisfied Indonesian society bound over to a tide of fanatical nationalism. But the rootless mass which was created from the break with past traditions sought a dynamic leadershiip, and so they turned to nationalist leaders and political parties for guidance. (10) III THE REVOLUTION AND IT SOCIAL AFTER: TH Rumors of the evident capitulation of the Empire of Japan to the Allies spurred the underground nationalist organi7ations to demand that Soekarno make a public pronouncement of Indonesian independence. As early as August 10, 1945, Sjahrir, having re- ceived radio reports that Japan had or was about to surrender, ennui; urged that Hatta and Soekarnqwimmediately proclaim Indonesian in— dependence. However, Hatta and Soekarno hOped to avoid bloodshed and stalled for more time; in particular, they were concerned that the nationalist movement was not adequately supported by a large military organization. In the final analysis, it was the Peta and the youth groups which furnished the revolution the needed manpower strength. On the night of August 16th both Soekarno and Hatta were kidnapped by Sukarni's underground, which was largely supported by the Student Union. They con- vinced Soekarno and Hatta that the Japanese had really surren- dered and attempted to prevail upon them to make an immediate declaration of independence. These nationalist leaders did not want to risk an open revellion without first having ascertained the attitude of the Japanese military; besides, any declaration, they both felt, must have as its emanasis an all-Indonesian source, ‘1 the Independence Preparatory Committee with its mil—Indonesian 114 reprascstaiion. There-by, they felt, their chances of mobiliz- ing the population against the Japanese, if need be, would be much greater. The leaders of the nationalist :ovement won out 0: an , on his return to Jakarta on the nirht of the sixteenth, iiatta iwneo ia .tely nade contact with the Japanese. He learned that under no circumstance would a declaration'of independence by the Indonesian be countenanced. It was then clear to Hatta and Soekarno that bloodshed would be necessary if independence was to be realized, so on Aufust 17, 1945, Soekarno read the Indonesian declaration of independence to a small group outside his own residence. with Hatta later making a personal staterent to his old nationalist friends. These nessaces were then broad- cast over the Dorei Indonesian radio and telegraph network by Indonesian employees behind locked office doc rs in akarta. The Indonesian in dependence movement was launched. (11) The Japanese promptly rejected the independence declaration and ordered that announcements being posted around the city were to be torn doxn by the Kerpeitai The next day the Peta, Hei Ho, and all other armed Indonesian organizations were official- ly dissolved. The tremendous response and controlled power which Soekarno received from the Jakartans gwre tly impressed the Japa nese so that the le eao ders of the sovereit were allowed their freedom. Where they were not too far outnunbered, Peta units throughout Indonesia kept their arms, clashed with the Japanese, and sometimes even disarned their former masters. Armed Indonesiangroups, the Peta, and units of organized youth groups befan to absorb political power in large areas of the archipelago, EltflOU{h the Japanese still retained control of the larger cities. The Indonesian flag was ordered flown by Soek arno from all public bui ldiirs as he syrbol of the revolu- tion. Under the red and white flag the students became the vanguard of the revolution. They directed the demobilized youth from the Japanese-sponsored youth organizations and with them seized arms from the Japanese, ousted Ja_ S D nese functionaries from government buildings, dragred Japanese officers from their cars, and provided the chief military force for the Soekarno-led bid for independence. The Japan- ese, under orders fron the Allied Southeast Asia Command to maintain the political status quo until Allied troops took over, were aware that the suppression of this independence bid would result in a nieantic and bloody struggle, a fight in which the Japanese might or night not be victorious, so their action until the Allied troops arrived at the end of September, 1945, was uncertain, wavering, and compromising. The Japanese sought to avoid a head—on collision with the Indonesian revolution. (12) The administration of the Republic's governing machinery was nominally in nationalist hands with the advent of British troops in late 1945. At its first meeting on August 18, 1945, the Independence Preparatory Committee elected Soekarno and Hatta respectively president and vice-president of the Republic of Indonesia, and further constitutional revision was made so that within a week the new constitution was promulgated which provided for wide-scale social and economic as well as political change. The egalitarian-fraternal content of the Republic's new revolutionary symbol, the word "Bung," which was introduced by Soekarno, was a synthesis of ideas corresponding roughly to "brother revolutionary," "brother Indonesian nationalist," and "brother Rephblican;' this mode of address, the Bung, was of great significance since young and old, poor and rich, President 116 and peasent could and usually did address each other with this word. As such the Bung was instrumental in bringing about a socio-political unity by reducing all to a commonly associ- ated bond. - An all-Indonesian cabinet of the Republic of Indonesia was announced on August 31,1945, which contained the Indonesian ‘ department heads under the Japanese administration who speedily declared for the new government plus several new appointees of Soekarno and Hatta. After September 1, 1945, the Republican government administered Indonesia although the Japanese still retained military control of the chief urban centers. The Independence Preparatory Committee was abolished on August 29, and replaced by the Central Indonesian National Committee, or the nomite Nasional J'ndonesia Pusat: this body came to be known as KEIP and was composed of Soekarno-Hatta appointed membership whom they deemed were the outstanding Indonesian nationalists and the most important laders of the chief ethnic, religious, social, and economic groups in Indonesia. These men and womenwwre not merely amenable political stooges, but men and women nearly all of whom commanded wide popular sup- port as outstanding leaders of the Indonesian society. Indonesia was likewise divided into eight provinces: Middle :9 4 '74. ci’ (may Java, East Java,voumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, and Sunda-Ketjil, with a governor appointed for each province from among its own population. A new army was established upon the base of the armed and unarmed Peta units and from the ranks of the several youth organizations; this army, the People's Peace Preservation Corps, or the Badan Keamanan Rakjat, was headquartered in Jakarta, but was highly autonomohs and virtually independent since it operated largely in the 117 territorial base of the individual provinces. Begining on October 5, 1945 the name of the army was changed to TKR or Tentara Keamanan Rakjat, or People's Peace Preservation Army, and brought under greater degrees of central control. The TKR hard-pressed the Japanese garrisons until the British relieved them. It was apparent from the beginning that peace and order and the re-establishment of the Netherlands East Indies government was the intent of the victorious Allied Powers in Indonesia. The British used Japanese troops and later landed Dutch forces in the attempt to comply with the orders the British commander had received from the Allied Governments. The attempt to reconstitute Dutch power was systematically challenged by the Indonesian nationalists so that for the first four years of the Republic's existence warfare against powerful adversaries dominated the Indonesian scene--a warfare that its nationalist leaders well knew could determine the very survival of the young Republic.(13) Civil war broke out because of the Dutch inability to arrive at a peaceful modus vivendi with the Indonesians wherein the former had to learn how to give up power and the latter how to exercise it. In the face of action by elusive guerrillas waging the Republican war wherin the Dutch were unable to control capured territory and indonesians and world- wide condemnation of Dutch action, a transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to the Rebublic of the United States of Indonesia occurred on December 27, 1949. Therby was created the Netherlands-Indonesian Union with the Dutch Queen as a -symbolic head. During' the early days of the revolution and the after- mah of the Japanese Occupation certain political parties rose 118 to prominance, some satisfying the demands of the socio- politically conscious masses. The most powerful of the parties launched was the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party), or PNI as it was generally known. The backing for this new PNI came largely from the Republic's professional people and a probable majority of the civil servants who had worked in the prewar colonial administration. It was an older- gereration party since, for the most part, a large number of its intellectuals had been active in the prewar nationalist movement. The PNI's initial mass following was attracted by the fact that it bore the name of Soekarno's prewar massparty as well as that of a short lived goverment-sponsored party; besides a popular fiction held that the PNI was "the paty of Soekarno and Hatta," a fiction not disabused by many Indonesians for over a year after theparty was formed. As part of its mas-support attraction, the PSI was able to enlist the support of the local administrative officers which was a long-term political forte of the PNI since there remained a strong tendency for the peasantry to look for political guidance and directives from its traditional governors, the experience Indoesian administrative class. In aldition the PNI gained the support of most of the mmbers of the tiny Indonesian industrial and commerical middle class. Owing to this fact and the incorporation of the old regime Indonesian bureaucracy, the Phi eventually became referred to as "the middle-class party" of Indonesia. A small minority of non-Communist Marxist intellectuals, some small labor groups and a group of progressively inclined students provided the base for the party's left wing. However the group of prewar nationalist 119 who held the political domination followed neither the right a .-- ' I '? - - {4(155. .‘ 5»‘ ““h" wing old line aristocraticflnofl the left progressivism; they insisted that national independence must precede any basic social reform and as such held its constituent groups together in spte of the wide differences in regard to domestic questions that arose between its factions. The religious tie with the peasantry held by the Masjumi party, or the Council of Indonesian Moslem Associations, with- in a year of its November 5, 1945 founding date was responsible for its rise to the largest political party in the Republic. Though it bore the name of its Japanese predessor, it was a new and distinct organization, enrolling all nonpolitical Islamic organizations subsumed under the Masjumi of the Japanese period, such as the Mohammadijah and Nahdatul Ulama, as well as such prewar Islamic political organizations as the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia. The Masjumi was supported by the large, nonpolitical Moslem social organizations and the important village religious leaders, which accounted for its mass backing. In addition many of the Indonesian commercial and industrial middle class throughout dava, Madura and Sumatra supported the movement. Likewise it attracted the maority of the lager Indonesian landowners. The Masjumi's basic tenets were the attainment of national independence as the chief aim and, next, to organization of the state according to Is- lamic principles. It was the interpretation of what lslamic .social principles were and how they should be appfied in Indonesia that the two chief groups within the party were generally at odds; these groups were the "Religious Socialist" and the conservative, old r-generation religious leaders. (l4) 130 The third political party that was organized and helped dominate the first two year's of the Republic's exixtence was the Socialist Party, or the Partai Sosialis which was established in early Uecember, 1945 as merger of the short- lived Part1 Sosialis Indonesia ad the Partai Rakjat Sosialist. Headed by Sjahrir, this new Socialist Party commanded great strength a ong the younger intellectuals, college and secondary students, includingmuig members of the anti—Japanese Sjahrir under-ground. While the party lacked thelarge, loose mass following of the PNI and the Masjumi it did nommand the respect and support of a more politically conscious, solidly and effectively organized, rank ad.file. Its additional support was obtained from most of the small group of actively pro-Republican Indonesian Chinese. Like theother parties, the Socialist Party was pledged to the acquisition of indonesian Independence and the national unity prerequisite thereto; moreover, its membership believed that social reform could be realized before full indpehdence was obtained. The PIR, or Partai fndonesia Radja, was formed from the remnants of the aristocratic segment of political life with private backing among thecflder civil servants, many of whom were of the colonial administration. Several powerful semi-autonomous irregular military organizatioas held sway in the internal politics of the Republic during the first year of the revolution. These groups were the Pesindo, or Indonesian Socialist Youth; the Hizbullah, or armed Moslem young men; the farisan Danteng, or Buffalo Legion, composed of poorly educated young men initially loyal to the PHI and Soekarno; the Barisan Pemberon- takan Rakjat Indonesia, or Revolutionary Legionoof theIndonesian People; and the Laskar Rakjat, or home guard People's Army. Signigicantly, most of these armed units remained outsiie of politics. Especially important to the Republic's cause in the early days of the revolution, were the bands of dacoits. Because of their later significance for social developments during and after the revolution it is perhaps wise to des- cribe their origins and activities in some detail. DACOITISM The band of dacoits is a very troublesome element in the present Indonesian scene. Dacoitism dates to the pre- Western period, especially in Java, when certain individuals ,on-me’ amazi- ...¢A ....:.'-'_...:‘~d..}c¢.-(~~.;.4 .4494». Hat..- 2““;N" or groupsaconsisted of travelling players and dancers, peddlers and merchants, Journeymen and students searching for a master who could give them instruction in the sacred arts of metallurgy or in mysticism, wandering knights and their followers in search of adventure, and outlaws and bandits. Many of these wanderers became condottieri; some were able to carve out a principality through daring and intrigue (the 17th century slave Ki Untung who ruled an East Javanese principality). Village society, perhaps troubled by the growing population and declining welfare, was also troubled by a group of unemployed, usually single young men, who lived off their families, and acted as rowdies and as "buaja" (sharks) on markets and in the country—side. In any event, as has been demonstrated, there were plenty of people attracted to the dacoit bands or robbers, 'whose depradat ons or "rampok" were usually endured in silence by the village. Part of the attraction for joining a robber band is found in she sense of superiority enjoyed by its member- ship, the air of dashing, romantic adventure and the psycholo- gical, supernatural powers supposedly possessed by the leader of the group (this power was claimed to make the bearer of an amulet or talisman containing the supernatural powers as Lell as his followers invisible and invincible). A "calling," or the special mandate from the spirit world or legendary heros, provides the leader with the right to com- mand even the wildest excesses to be practiced. Sometimes a leader possesses a little education, but his strongest ties with the group are the ritual ties of brotherhood. The appoint- ment for attack was determined by divination, the band then joining in an orgy of common action. Formally rampok activity was notoious and included a simple extortion of villagers, attacks on travellers, larceny of fruits and fish, and simple thefts of grain. During the Japanese occupation the dacoit bands were provided with weapons, and with the occupation' termination and the nationalist revolution these rampok bands became the mainstay of the Republic's power. As part of the Republic's "nationalist" military, the dacoit bands were a major source of strength in their agitation a ainst Dutch security and military measures; as "guerillas" these dacoits could not be controlled by the Dutch, this same factor OperatiOIg against the Republic once independence was achieved. Their depradations and intimidations continue to cause disorder, especially in remote rural areas. (15) Owing to the occupation and the revolution, many persons received training in violence in direct contradiction to the traditional habit. As a result of this displacement many found it easier to live off the countryside. Secondly, political tensions and ideological extremes provided many new members to the bands. This is especially true of the Darul Islam which seeks to establish the traditional throcratic Islamic state. Also belonging to this group are the left wing extremists, such as the Bambu Runtjing group and the "Army of the Sick at Heart" (Earisan Sakit nati). In consequence members of the dacoit bands justify their . existence through the rationale that they are members of a political—ideological movement dedicated to an Islamic or Communistic program. This again is another cycle in the dis- placement of society. (16) m c OKO CDN O\U‘|~P‘ \N [..J FJH RJH O O 13. 14. 15. 12Z Footnotes George McTurnan Kahin. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Cornell University Press, Ithaca: 1952, pp. 101-102; P. M. van Nulfften Palthe. ngchological Aspects of the Indonesiangguestion. Brill,Leyden: 1949, pp- 15’360 Willard Elsbree. Japan's Role in Southeast Asia's Nationalist Movements. Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 1953, Chapter 3. Kahin, Op 913., p. 242; Soetan Sjahrir. Out of Exile. New York: 1949, p. 246. Kahin, 9p Q;§., pp. 105—109. Ibid., pp. 109-110. Ibid., 99. 110-121. Ibid., pp. 121—218. Soetan Sjahrir. ane Strijd (Our Struggle). Vrij Neder- land, Amsterdam: 1946, p. 11. Kanin, Op 913., 128-131 Report of the Parliamentary Commission States-General (Dutch East Indies). No Publisher, Amsterdam: 1948, passim. Kahin, 92 gig., pp. 134-136. Ibid., pp. 136-138; G. de Kadt. De Indonesische Tragedie The Indonesian Tragedy). Hokema, Amsterdam: 1949, Chapter 2. Kahin, Op 913., pp. 138-147. Ibid., Chapter 60 JustimsM; van der Kroef. "Southeast Asia—-Some Antropo- logical Aspects" Human Organization. Volume 10, Number 1, Spring, 1951, pp. 5-15. 125 CHAPTER V POLITICAL PARTIES AND CLASS PARTICIPATION In this chapter the major political parties and programs will he described. In addition to the social origins and class status of their members, the political and economic desires of the membership as related to their present position in Indonesian life, and the use of party machinery to attain their desired position, will be pre- sented. I THE MUSLIM, NATIONALIST-LIBERAL, AND MARXIST POLITICAL MOVEMENTS NUSLIM: THE KASJULI The largest political party in Indonesia, the hasjumi, is a highly complex political organization which was founded on November 7, 1945, as the Council of Indonesia Hoslem Associ- ations. It received initial support from the major non-political Moslem social organizations, and, particularly, from the village religious leaders, so it attracted a huge but unorganized mass backing. It is dominated by the younger generation of Hanarists, usually referred to as the "Religious Socialists," holding views which reflect the impact of the Indonesian revolution upon sin- cere koslems possessed of enlightened minds and a strong sense of duty to society. In addition, the hasjumi attracted the ma- jority of the larger Indonesian landowners and the backing of most of the vestifal Indonesian industrial and commercial mid— dle class. 126 ,. siumi .7 l :b D The Masjuni' s principles, as espoused by the q Party Council in late 1949, appear to be valid to ca 1. Complete independence of Indonesia 2. Followinc of and emphasis upon the principles of social justice and democracy found in Islam. 3. Government of the state- according to the will of the majority with its principal officers being clmo sen throurh direct elections. 4. Opposition to capit_lism in principle, but acknow- ledgment of the necessity for its continuance for some time in certain spheres. 5.. Acceptance of mixed economy-~cooperative, social— istic, and ca pita .listic. 6. Emphasis on tne cooperative sector, with the state advancine credit to develop this. 7. Gradual nationalization of transportation, commun— ications, mining, oil production, la as plantations and any large-scale industry s lone as such nation- alization is in the country' s best interes s. Ha— tionalization should be acconplished throush payment of reasonable compensation to those whose property is expropriated. 8. preement that small— scale economic enterprise on an individual basis -- as long is it is not uncontrolled—- is sociallyr ealtny, in particular, bicause it develops individual initiative and responsibility. 9. Small-scale economic enterprise to renain in the hands of the individual. But only where it caznot be inte- grated into cooperatives should it remain on a purely capitalistic basis. l“ Foreicn capital +3 be vclcc ' a as it is non— a Tolitical and so controlled that is protected and excessive profit of the country. ll. stoiinr of wars: with the social value of the work per- formed. 12. Assurance by the government that owners of capital in 'non-nationnlised economic enterprises do not take ex- cessive profits and that the workers siare in the pro- fits. 13. Absolute neutrality in the "cold war" and alignment with neither the U.S.S.R. nor the U.S. (l) (‘7: WOW the Indonesian worker s are not taken out T} I PARTA I SAR “SEAT ISLAM IIDCTISIA Owing to the increasing dominace of the young Relig. ious Socialists within the Masjumi, the dissatisfaction many of the older prewar PSII leaders held concerning their relatively lower postwar positions in the party, and tneir oppos sition to the Re- ligious Socialists aereerent tith Sjanrir tion with the Dutcn, a schism within the Lasjumi occurred. As 127 a result a small part of its leadership formed a separate party, a new Partai Sarekat Islam ndonesia, or PSII. The party's leaders, in addition to beinf opposed to negotiations with the Dutch, evolved a propram which included: 1. Doxeetic social reform must await the full attain- ment of independence. 2. Opposition to socialism, which is different from Communism. 3. Respect of individual property rirhts and private property. 4. Exports must remain in private hands. 5. The activities of the individual are core intensive than the aovernment's and the individual can be bet- ter relied upon. Aslong as private enterprise is able to meet the needs of the people it is all right; otherwise the government must regulate economic enter- prise. 6. If found to be in the country's interest, nationaliza- tion of transport and key inudstries would be counten- enced. 7. Strict neutrality between the United States and Russia and a refusal to be involved in a fighting or cold war. While attracting no more than a small fraction of the (2) large popular folloving of the hasjumi, the PSII received a greater response elsekhere, particularly in Sumatra and the Celebes. To peOple there, the party recalled the dominant pre- var Islamic political organization; others joined the new party on the basis of habit and tradition alone. Most significantly, the control for Islamic organizations outside of Java began to be vigorously contested by the PSII and the hasjumi, the outcome of which would certainly have a bearing on the future of Indon— esia. DARUL ISLAIV; The influence of old—fashioned Mohammedan leaders, strong— ly opposed to Western ideas and learning, manifested itself in West Java in the late 1940's, in the formulation of the work- in; concept of Darul Islam, or the Islamic State. As a politi- cal organization, Darul Islam had its own government, nilitary 128 force which controlled its territory, and it sought to ex- pand both during the period of the war for independence. In Larch, 1948, the defense organization of Darul Islam was or— ganized along theocratic lines. Its chief civil officers were kiajihs, the Moslem religious teachers, and its laws wereexclusively those of Islam, with a definite anti-colon- ialism and anti-capitalism emphasis, however, its lofty aims were soon relegated to a secondary position as the war for in- dependence progressed. Consequently, four chief factors have generated the Darul Islam movement during the last decade;-— These include: Frustrated nationalism. Exclusive, fanatical Mohammedanism. Over—stimulated personal amibitions. . Agrarian discontent. bkflml—J The motivation of frustrated nationalism has largely been re- moved, as is true of the second, which has given way to the increasingly taneible symptoms of independence. The factor of personal ambition has resulted from the sodial mobility caused by the Indonesianrevolution, a condition walled—up by colonial rule for centuries. Thus it is that ambitions -- personal for power's sake and personal for service to the.new nation -- has led to an intensity of competition which has in- creased with the breaking down of the wall of colonial control and the attendant social mobility of the revdhmionary period. The fourth of the chief factors, aaraian discontent, still re— mains and thereby offcers political capital to those opposed to the covernment until the conditions responsible for it are removed. This is the basic cause of the lack of security in the areas where Darul Islam operates, although the new Indon- esian government is dedicated to bettering these conditions. (3) 129 THE hATIOSAL—LIBLRAL LCVEAEYT THE PAETAI SASIOdAL IJDOKESIA The supposed party of Soekarno, the Partai Nasional Indonesia, the PHI, or Indonesian National Party, is the second largest political orsanization in the country. Al- though Soekarno was not a member of the PNI, he was associated with it since he had led the prewar party of the same nare, and had backed a short-lived government party of that name which had existed from August 22 to 31, 1945. The PNI attracted a large mass backing as a resultrdQWnnaitqortant, the backing of a probable majority of Republican local administrative of- ficers, who were by and large the same men who had made up the old aristocratic Indonesian administrative civil service as well as the non—aristocratic subordinates in the civil service. This factor coupled with the tradional tendency of the peasantry to look for political guidance and directives to its habitual gov- ernors -—the aristocratic Indonesian administrative class —- was the long—term political siren: h of the PEI. In addition, the PHI pained the support of the relatively small but influen- tial prorcssional class and the tiny Indonesian industrial and ) com ercial middle clr s that nad not been attracted to the ranss U of the hasinmi. 3 t L‘: Although strongly backed by the oly-ling aristocratic.civil J r"J ,____. 1. I-.- . , ... 1 ,- .... ° ,2 , ._ ‘.. o“PJ&Jt leader: aii u s 37- It t ting minor.tr 197:, lion LL: 4 T support of sore non-Cor unist Asrxist intellectuals and small labor groups, the leadership of the party remained ii control ‘ of who had held in:ortant m (0 we 3 D .4 H YT r+ ' i O a (D *i ? 5.. '_J (”l *‘S O '5 O H.) 1 (') 3 positions in the prewar nationalist movement. The PNI's social— econogic ideolopy developed a marked tendency to support the 130 party s left wins, however, the uneasy alliance of such hetero- geneous elements reds it difficult for the formation of a clear, consistent, and united prorram. By June, 1048, the political polarization betwern the Right and the Center-Left coalition reduced the Right wing to almost complete impotence in the formulation of policy. The socialist tendendies were reflected in the address delivered by Sujono Hadinoto, party chairman, at its third annual coneress on June 24, 1948. The following lines include some of the more relevant remarks of Hadinoto's Speech. "The social revolution, which is to establish the new society we are strivins for, must be carried out through the national revolution....0ur goal, the establishment of a socialistic society, will never be achieved as long as national freedom and a sovereign national state have not been attained...from the beginning the PHI has declared that nationalism (socio-nationalism but not jinfoistic nationalisc) is the road to a national state; the latter will provide thebridpe which will brine us tothe realiza— tion of a socialist society...socio-nationalism is a kind of nationalism which is based on broad principles and dif- fers entirely from narrow-minded or jinsoistic natiOialism, because socio-nationalism in its relationship to the inter- national world recosnizes the duty of the nations to consti- tute a community of nations, free from domination and op— pression, not only in political, but in an economic and cul— tural sense as well....National freedom is the gate to pros— perity. The social structure and the way of life we seek can only be realised after the achievement of indepen?e;ce. 4 The right wing of the party clearly stood apart from the soc- ialist goal and, moreover, they were fearful of concessions to the Dutch by the Hatta Government, so many of the leaders of the PHI seceded from the party. This resulted in a closer ad- herence by the party as a whole to the social—economic tenets and political orientation of the left wing and a new emphasis on attracting labor support as compensation for the loss of some peasant support. THE PERSATUAN IYBOHESIA RAJA Joining with several prominent persons who had previously 131 belonged to no party, the dissident PHI members launched the new Persatuan Indonesian Rafa, PIR, or the Greater Indonesian Union Iarty. The PIR's founders were, for the most part, older-pen- *Jo eration civil servants with aristocratic backgrounds whose pos tions gave them an excellent opportunity to organize the peasant vote. Their program corresponds to the following pattern. 1. It is a mass-backed party based on the traditional Indonesian political and economic concepts with social implications, modified and adapted to those of the West. 2. The present is a transitional period between the old authoritarian society and the more Western-oriented Indonesian society that is to come. 3. The ballot alone cannot insure the interests of the people will be safeguarded,rather they need and ex— pect guidance from above, as ingrained by acceptance throueh the centuries. 4. Therefore, some means must be found to give real repre- sentation to the agrarian population. 5. The leaders of the government must find some way to ascertain what the people's interests are, so that the Indonesian government's character must allow for "father- ly authority" from above to look after the needs of the peasantry. (5) These ideas, as paraphrased by Kahin, may or may not have been Justified, but they frightened away some of the non-party group that was prepared to support the FIR particularly on the basis of its support of Hatta. Two large older student organizations withdrew their support of the party, for they were apprehensive that an I'overly paternalistic" attitude would develop into an authoritarian political pattern with fascist characteristics bordering on reactionary,social-economic ideas and non-democratic political ideas. THE mamsrr IsCVEX-IE'L‘IT (6) THE PARTAI SCSIALIS IWECNESIA The older Partai Sosialis Indonesia and the Partai Rakjat Sosialis gave way to the formation of the new Socialist Party Ch in December, 1945. Headed by Sjahrir, the party cosmande great strength among the younger intellectuals of secondary and 132 college levels, most of the former members of Sjahrir's anti- Japanese underrround, and a larae percentage of those from that of Sjarifuddin. Although its K898 support was smaller than that of tie PH and the hasjumi, its rembershin was more politically conscious and more solidly and effectively organ- ized behind its leadershin. Since the Sjarifuddin group close- ly adherred to the Stalinist concert of class warfare and align— ment with Russia, they were onrosed by Sjahrir's comr eat which felt t‘nat Iic01rsicn nationalism anteda ted anv Communist as pira- tions and that it was absurd to advocate class war fare in Indon- esia since there was practically no Indonesian bourgeoise, excert« ing the snail group of Dutch and Chinese. Moreover, Sjahrir's cronn advocated a strict and positive neutralitv in world poli— tics. It was inevitable tha_t the S arifud din faction v.1tndrew from the party in February, 1948, so the Sjahrir grown formed themselves into a new nartj,', the Partai Sosialis Indocvaia, PSI, or the Socialist Party of Indonesia, in contradistinction to Sjarifuddin's Partai Sosialis. Thus it is that Sjahrir propa- gates his belief that a third factor in the rattern of inter- national relations can and must be raintnined if world polari- .ation between a RuS3 an and AIRET can bloc is to be averted, so his rartv works toward a condition which will find Indonesia suffi cien tlv independent in rolitical and econo*wi action, therebv not relyinr on either nussia nor the United States. Other specific goals of the PSI include a socialism for D: Indonesia which is adarte to its own reculiar needs and con- ditions, a society based Cl 9 mixed economy, with a substantial sector of ec on.ric life left to nrivate enterrrisr. Considera- min strative rer— r13 {1; OJ ble trainine tine is needs to rrovide the 133 sonnel capable of assuming managerial role: in the economy; to this extcnet cc fitnlisn zs welco e ’n Indo‘Csia s’nce it will help fill T“C CCn in the C30 CVir: life of Indonesia that a soci(li.tic Mly- inclined rovernzent will not have the necessary administratiVC r: rso inel to manaee -- and also provide the Cov- ernment with the personnel necessary to operate the growing Fovernnent-nanaged sectors of the economy. Socialism, Sjahrir believes, m“ct be decentr lined and administered locally as much as possible, for he fears totalitarianism and authoritarianism which might easilr result from stronc centralization of the econ— omy. ie effo ts of the PSI are directed, then, to makine the noones‘an mass es politically conscious and nature, endowed with the capacity for independent analysis and judcment of political issues. In cons ecuence, the PSI does not seek to build up a great mass of blind, uncritical followers, but to build up cadres of enlightened and convinced Indonesians dedicated to serve the best interests of Indonesia. THE PARTAI KOEUWIS I“LOTESIA Th e Partai Komunis Indon€ esia, PKI, or the Indo tme i.n Com- munist Party, was resurrected a few months after the attainment of Indonesian independence, finally obtaining able leadership in 1946 when two of its prewar leaders, Sardfiono and Alimin, returned from the Netherlands. At first, their lar xism con- centrated on what was best to serve the cause of Indonesian nationalism, but by 1948, the party's leaders increased their conformity with Roscow policy. The new program followed empha— sized the division of the world into two blocs -- the "snares- sive" capitalist bloc led br the United States, and the "demo- cratic" bloc led by Russia -- and called on Indonesia to lean closer to Russia in the fieht for inderendence since it anpeared .L 134 that the United States was bachinc the Dutch. With the arrival of the old-line Communist leader, Russo, from Loscow in mid- - r; .2 __ " _‘ "‘1“ ' Aurust, 1948, a plan was formulated un er his lendersnir tricn called for the overthrow of Jhe Indonesian government by build— ins a revolutionary machine based on military backing and a corresrondins munitions build-up: a revolution was begun when it became arrarent that the rarty could not seize the reins of governrent throuCh peaceful infiltration. The premature out- break of the Concunist insurrection resulted in their defeat and within a month the rebellion was crushed. This virtually eliminated any porular support for the PK . The Indonesian government reaffirmed its intentidn' to allow Communism as a doctrine a free rositicn in Indonesian ideolories, but it would not countenance advocates of an ideology which sought to over— throw the lawful rovernment by force. The Republic's srokesnen made it clear that the Communists would have the same freedom .3 Q: as anyone else so long as theyadjure tne use f force and made 0 Indonesia rather than Russia their chief objec H‘ I”) ‘4 o oyalt; . THE PARTAI HURBA The Partai Murba, or Proletarian Party, was established by strongly nationalistic Comnunists as an attempt to concen- trate power and build a wide political front which they might dominate and through which they might capture control of the government. On November 7, 1948, the Partai Murba was created from a fusion of the Partai Rakjat, or Peeple's Party, the Partai Rakjat Djelata, or Poor People's Party, and the Partai Buruh Indonesian herdeka, or Independent Indonesian Labor Party. The executive leadership of the Partai Kurba rested with the followers of Tan haleka, for the most part young men possessed of a militant idealism. A strong potential for a large orsani— zation M88 further advanced with the attraction of a large fringe of sympathizers amongst students and older intellectuals, although they generally have not becone outrisht members. The Partai Rurba is not organized as a dosmatic organization, this factor tending to influence the friendship of the students and older intellectuals. The important provisions of the Partai Eurba's constitution include the following major points. 1. The basis of arty is anti-facism, anti-imrerial- ism, anti—cabi ,m, and it bases its struggle on the orderly acti l of the proletariat. c. To negotiate with the Dutch on the basis of full recog- nition after foreien troops have left the Republic. , Confiscation and exploitation of enemy properties. 2. Nationalization and collectivization of vital economic enterrrises to include plantations, transports, industry, and mining. 5. lo endeavor that Indonesia become a member of the United Nations and other international organizations on the basis of equal status, democracy and with the purpose of establishing a proletarian world government. 6. Crganivation of the Partai Nurba according to the prin- ciples of "Democratic Centralism". 7. The desire that Indonesia be inderendent of the spheres of control of either the United States and Soviet Russia; in this sense the party does not subscribe to orthodox Stalinism. TEE LAECR KOVELEJT F"! ihe Indonesian labor roveient had its beginning with the oreanization of the Union of Rsilraod and Trolley Car Personnel, founded in 1908. Since that date, the labor moveuent has develop— (T3 0: ed several rather unique aspects. Influencing th evelorment of the labor movement has been the factor of nationalism; the 31) rise of labor organivation in the setting of colonial, agrar- ian economy; the great amount of Comrunist-led unions; the tradi- ‘ tional communal society and its host of religious rites and oc— F4 ...!- .‘2 x (D _A. H 'ons; and, finally, the fluidity and extrene instability in its central oreanivatinn which «as been marked by freouent and betilderine chanses in membershir. Adding to this factor is the " ' b, .7 1 . . .3 -. .L - n r. . _i_ i x '3 “ ' -_ .-\ .. speed hit: heist net federations o: un_ons ezyear ant oisarpear. 13$ The I donesian labor sovenent yes charecttrized by a ”rc— cC'i o s “c: ‘ ‘ r taree‘i ’*tn :"‘ '~“l * ' 1 u -1“? ' 3 ' 1 €*’lf“- ist~ic 'u1i t sjo cored strikes, iljxfiitaccureed before the Second World tar. During the fericd of the Jatanese occupa- tion, the Jefanese Labor Cffice forced either the tetal disso- lution of labor tlr ions or else reouired the unions to conhine into a central labor federation, thich chiefly "recruited" Innocesian indenendence by Soeharno, the_labor movement has been marked by reliticel and non-roliticel orfcninations, the latter'c eterory a rlyinf to the most influential Indonesian folitical labor novement, the Partai Euruh. This union denounces carflnlism, fasci ’0 m, and inferiolisr, wishes to be free from Communist influence although it admittedly is a rrOfressive— revolutionary rarty seeking the socialist state by democratic parliamentary means. As such, the Partai Buruh continues to attract an increaéing number of unions and members since it is a non—Sommunist rolitical labor party Ihic h acts as a c‘na"r ion of the rights of labor trrourh the democratic rrocess Other large unions are organised in such fields as estate workers, Ho oil Zrillinf, transnortation,and c0'nunication In tr e ouert for rolitical stability and economic prosperity, the In; o1esian labor noverent's success bay be t asured by the prowinr number of unions which are leaning towards a non—roli- tical orientation in labor affairs, homever, there is extre e danger from the influence of political fanaticism, and self— centered interests. In consesuence, the labor moveaent desires t k. Jo }..Jo a recoin on of its rirhis and is becomine i1creasingly avers of it {D O l: l ’4. dations to the Re1u W11 (7) II SOCIAL IKFLICATICXS In analyzing in Indonesia * :nw °+ % ~ A ("r » LOUL-J l“ 4.: [Iguepppl 37 1 ..n n, ..—A.-" 9.1 ~ -. creed sociti l.V?TZ —iu sec.~, Uri ~L.-\.; (T g U7 {—F O movenir Y" r" ,. r. s . he Luslis sourgeoisie: The Kuslim bourgeoisie are ve ted (I) J in: primer - 'ideration OI") C In \ ‘ 13 1"? .—+ the raditional leaders, inclined tovard opposition to socie s cc Indon»sian vested interest rearect individual nrorertv rishts - ‘. n. y x _ naturally they believe in private enterprise, posed to rovernment refulation of econtsic enterfrise as They 9190 favor nationalivation of transportation and industries if it would be in the country's interests. an isrortant role in Indonesian politics and econcmics. the huslim bourgeoisie factor which promotes the con role in Indonesian life since they sanegerial and technical skills to incone estates, the production and government and economic foundation the significance des interests and rrorertied rights, in their the healthy landlord group, .lisr troun, solidly entrenched in Indonesian societ 137 the political moverents to r‘fer constrn to the ireous of maintaining their these tak— . J-L rotivations jolitlcal aritation. They most and corrunism alike. the huslir bourgeoisie and frivate property. but they are dis— rrivete eniernrise cannot fulfill the needs of the reonle. other key This group , besides, they play ‘4 Lany have received Western education, a existence of their dominant are able to adant Western the Operation of the large therefrom being a necessary surrort. 138 The aspiration of the Islamic bourgeoisie, the rising Muslim middle class, is rooted in a base of Islamic reform which reflects a depend for social welfare, individualism rather than collective group responsibility, and progressive rationalism. This group repards the Islamic movement as the expression of group solidarity integrated along the cultural- relipious lines of modern Islam. Furthermore, the Muslim bourgeoisie are supported by the village social-political leaders, the priajihs, the traditional pace setters and guard- ians of Indonesian culture. As a consequence, the religiously oriented bourgeoisie middle class pursues a culture with qual— ified liberalistic-rationalistic overtones.or, as in the case of Darul Islam, clamors for an outright Kuslim State. The Muslim Intellectuals: A group of younger generation M slims, the educated in- tellectuals, or so-called "Religious Socialists," are Islamic rebels in the sense that they are possessed of enlightened minds and a strong awareness of duty to society. They are sin- cere Muslims devoted to strengthening the bonds of national uni- ty and to the improvement of the social lot of the Indonesian masses. They, too, exert a strong pressure on the Republic's political developments, emphasizing the principles of social justice and democracy found in Islam and acceptin f") the philoso- phy of a mixed economy -- cooperative, socialistic, and capital- istic. Indeed, they are political "realists' in the movement of Sarekat Islam. They are prone to modernism and socialism, remaining firm in their opnositidn to "erotaic' Islam. The Musl m Schoolmen: The "Scholars of Writ," the Muslim schoolmen, or kiajihs, have a vast amount of influence over the masses, since it is 139 their task to educate the youth. Their COOperation is without doubt desire by the government if the goal of modernizing In— donesia is to be realized. They tend to an uncompromising ortho- doxy in their religious convictions, however. Steepted in the traditions of the past and the tenets of orthodox Islam, they are opposed to change, to testern learning and innovations. Since they are the habitual social-relifious education masters in the village they exert a powerful force for retardinp the REpublic's efforts and goals in its attempt to improve the nation's stand— ard of living and, conversely, solve the great problem of agrar- ian unrest. Th' huslim Villafers: The Indonesian villagers, the peasantry, are emersed in centuries of Islam social-religious practices and, therefore, are prone to follow the advice of their religious leaders. There has been no peasant revolution in Indonesia, the villagers preferring to cling to their traditionally closed society, of- ten self-sufficient Mlth its own customs, laws and religious practices. The lore of the past and the dominance of the group right has persisted and dominated villase life. In spite of this opposition, the village has been subjected to change. This may be traced to the willingness of the traditiOIal leaders, the priafiihs, to accept cultural innovations. Islam in Indon— esi (‘3 holds an immense social position amonc the sasses, and it is this factor which, more than religious orthodoxism. controls the destiny of the peasantry. Islam in Indonesia has followed a course of devastating attack on traditional society where it historically has been surer-irrosed on indigenous folkways. The traditional villa:e is a closed and self-sufficient society, having its own relisious 140 practices, laws, and social cl ‘. 0 uses, which is a direct recog- nition of the sacred connection between the land, the villagers, and the crops they cultivate, and the respect due the group of elders. Eeyond the ubsistence rroductinn level of the villare are the regional comuunities and the inter-village federations, Often with their own headmen and their own rifhts. Social class— es are carefully delimited, finding expression in property rishts, the disrosal of the villafe lands, the levying of tribute, and in the corps tence to solve all sorts of disputes. By the sixteenth century, Islam was adopted by various court circles, rrimarily because of rolitical considerations, and it spread fron the courts and cities into the rure 1 areas. Islam throueh the years has becore a matter of natioiality for the Indonesian even in the villages, and with this adherence has cone respect for the nuslim schoolnen, the kiajihs, and the Moscue offcials, the renrulus. The full innact of Islam on In- donesian society has brourht social disors aiization and struct- ural chsnre. Two outstanding e: antle‘ of this contention are the status of women under Islamic influence and the creation of the new social elite —- the kiajihs and pensulus. The former (‘1 rosition of the Indonesian wOW n in tr e trad itioi l i (.‘J ige no is law, or adat, was always s;cure and usually hish, influential, and sonetimes even decisive, as in the case of tne Eataks. The more obvious aspects of Islhaic law whicn have affected the traditional position of the Inrzones ian woman carter ahout the :eriou, divorce, and inheritance. The ra- w - Q g ’ 5 A ternel_rnfiitrol (of Is]: ’ forrnde *‘r‘lic on: i a F 01“ _ — c L . V. .. - , i ...:1 'v . z n . — .. o ., ,1‘. , 4. ., +- . tne Kore T.»nle a? tynearieeo PlTLC rile: oi coszJt, sanction— L ~ 4. ed ty Islam, which reduced the senerally former free stats: of wouen. The divorce code under Islsn, moreover, has re glm. so the 141 ‘ r t o “N‘s... relatively unrestrictive adat law vith the effect c; reducing 0 q the tonan's initiative ri=hts, increasinc the reesibilities for divorce, rerticularly o1 the husband's conrlaint, givine the husband far sreeter"freedon than the wife, and creating the ressibility of divorce tithont the intervention of the tradition— . With retard to the cues- (D 21 villaee authority, the adat chief tion of inheritance, Isla: does not recoenize the equality of the children, the sons receivinf usually twice as much as the dauéhters, while adat entitled the daurhter to the same amount as the sen. examrle of a society where Islam produced a nev social elite -- the eronp of huslim schoolmen, religious officials and judres, Muose activities along nationalistic and communistic lines cr m ated profound social disturbances i :35 the rural community -- is bresent in the Sumatra erour, the Minanfkabau. The individualizine effect of Islam on the village society Jo and its members has been demanded by the "hieher" respon (0 lb“ } bil‘ty to Allah, which is a personal obligation. Thus it is not related to the collective obligation, as in the village adat, nor related to the deified village ancestors as founders of the particular village community. Under the infect of a growinf sense of in- dividualism, the old feeling of being ashamed over rossible brgech- es of adat is rapidly disaprearinc. Islam's Influence on the Rural and Urban Proletariet: The influence of Islam on the rural and urban proletariat has been pronounced. In seneral, lower class city dwellers, peasants, and rural workers have flocked to Sarekat Islam. They use harxisn and nationalism as their main motivators rather than Islam. In their efforts, Sarekat *slam is the chief weapon in 142 *4. a class struggle with the non—Islamic colonial froups. Th 8 de—embhasis of orthodoxism in Islam may be traced to the de- velopment of a kind of "folk" Islam, a religion 0 f so ial O practicallity based on a cultural ideal. It is therefore possible that *slam directed by the kiajihs can rise to con— flict with the adat-conscious aristocracy, the priajihs. ihis gives rise to an adverse social effect on custom and law. A great appeal to the peasantry, to aerarian discontent, ias not as yet been realized, but it remains a prime tareet, as it does in general, for most social-political novements. The peasantry is caught in the web of the various organizations seeking to control the estiny of the Republic. THE KATICJAL-LIEERAL KCVEmEWT The Secular, or Ton—linsli-nL Intellectuals: The secular, or non-Euslim, intellectuals were a product of Western education and influential ideas thich were successive- ly allomed sons of the aristocracy and commoners during the late colonial period. Becoming obsessed with the notion "Indonesia. should be for the Indonesians," they became the independence agitators, the leaders in the opposition to the Japanese occu- pation, and the rallying beacons for the revolutionary period. This constant cry for freedom was based on the unity of Indon- esia and the masses, and the formation of a pOpular, secular, Republic. These intellectuals are, for th: most part, the executive leaders of the government and the cabinet. They espouse the cause of Western education and technology, but are extremely jealous of outside influences from either the United States or the Soviet Union. They are distinguished by a defin— ite "paternal" attitude tomards the tani, or peasant, feeling 1 careful guidance of the masses is tneir obligation and respons - 143 bility -— a factor which often borders on authoritarian patterns. This group further provides a wealth of civil servants to the ads ministrative blood-stream of the government. Of the leader- ship provided the Republic's cause, probably Soekarno and natta are this group s cnief cowtr ibltions. T,1iddle classes: {JO sf .. q The Secular or Ann-“usi The secular, or non—Muslim,middle classes are a relatively small group with certain commercial and trading interes s. It was this group which looked to the nationalist-intellectual leadership for salvation and deliverance from Japanese rule. Under this obligation, they supported Soekarno's bid for inde- pendence and, now that this aim has been achieved, seek to pro- tect their propertied interests. As the capitalist entrepreneur class, they seek free enterprise, but allow for povernmental direction when it will serve the interests of the people. Some suropeans and a significant Chinese minority compose to a large degree this secular mid dle class. The Indonesian middle class today is divided into the following general categorieC l. The group of industrial entrepreneurs is concerned with the hEBVll' and textile industry, native ciearette productiow, (1') manufacturing of sandals dd unbrellas, stone and tile baking, and srall rice h:illinc and snellinr industries. Drawine its labor fro: the rural areas,nuch of this kind of industry is dependent on the consurers in the village society, thoueh sowe depends also on those in towns. The presence of heavv 3 ineee 1 O O and Arab cemtetition fives t_ r-\‘ ’40 n f i 1 N H [...J I I n C.) m r.J m Fl. .3 O: ”E (+ "5 z; 33 ’S (h ’3 (‘0 *‘3 *4 I one existence. 3. 301cern€d in 'th the purchase and resale of eericultural f“ s r‘ : 4- ‘5‘ ‘-.~ -‘ “ r‘ . ‘ n " (W . "‘ ' ‘ : . ' " ' prouucte, or VJLL tfim prelininary proceCSiwg and refining of these rroducts, are the distributing middle class entrepreneurs 144 gore and more Indonesians are actively co‘“etine v.ith the Indo- ~ 1:: -.~-§,.I"31 :‘ n‘imC-n n 1,:x]r\t§~nr« 'T .99 m» fi$1+ a 1x: .~"th""§1 [elixir .. o .L.UL .. *ou.‘ vL‘uui '40 ..--‘ .1 L .' 1’ . '...- \JA u A -. . 1 e. 4- ' - . - .-.: a -, A _ n .L - ,, 2*. M -' ,a P , . .. -.-~- _ s 7, 4-. .. . ”v ,- .‘ i- ... ... W; .2 1 .0. /‘ twp T'fg'r-‘I.-'." “mourn .nr‘w. ‘7': ..~ v,-.r :1. xi : . J A. Jew _, ‘.. .. \31 ..‘_z.,.- - .- .... ., -L . - v . w- :. ~.- : I“ Enssee, crate, or lov-bottoned press, shall fleets of notor- C.) ’4 m r '3 D ,r u , -.. ., z .. 1,. “ " 1i defcerts. These cpeia.ions are not ecneculed ‘ '1‘ - .f .0 r: k r- r: .r) I“ A‘ ,.. {— {I qr f“ ‘ 7-1 5-; , c“; offer Iassen er and cxrgo service. .1:- O :p. H ,—.L. P f m :mn entrepreneurs located in their onn shors serve 1 }_x O ‘J ‘_, 1 J v-<' .) W ‘et fro: sote branch of urhan technical enterprise, neclunived .n no e e_tent. end lar“tl" nwviw~~r a local, ur- () w (0 *1 (7) O I'J. 1'11 , .J F’- J (U I "J oan eroup of ccnsuvers. Included in their fiel’ .le of c neuter (+- [—1. O ._) '77 F‘5 J1 {-‘P- ‘3 M29 D 5.3 i. J. 0 ("fl (“+- } J. r) ) O ‘5 1 ,C. ‘1 4) 3 0 T3 "3 J O *3 (T) l n ”J ‘\ . 1'r' 4 .vv \ . 7‘ ’n " -‘- ". sucn as crooner}, hercvare, saronrs, sandals, hatr, O ‘| nuslin garnents, the'proces Slflf of food, and operation of H) IT) (4 bakeries, H1 ncrerlotse anc dairies. are gold and silver— sriths and furniture nakers. '34 5. The professional Kid is class by virture of its political oriezitaiicn exercises an influence far out of proportion to *Jo H v civ ...). (Ti its numerical strencth, e~recially1in the aduinistrat service which they staff. The Civil Service: The civil service has joined tne Tationalist- Liberal move- fcr their Indonesian CD (+ H. 3 sent over and aboveirranitarian ador- compatriots. Faced with the prospect of losin;(or being demoted to their old Dutch re ins minor) positions, the former colonial civil servants hurried to er list i the onset for national in- dependence under Soekarno's leaders .ip, so that they night pre— serve their new wcn status, as attained under the Japanese, and ultimately epsire to hi gher postions in the young Republic'c Ft) govern ent. As such, they have becone the backbone o the Re- public, especially since they nave tredi tionall y been the go- 145 betweens for the government and the reople, their views being reflected in considerable support bythe latter. On the vhole, tr1e old er aristocratic civil servant tends to be more conser- vative, as in the Persatuan Indonesian Raja, while the younger civil servants are inclined totard radicalism and support of the Partai Hasional Indonesi The Indonesian Proletariat: m H: The Indonesian proletariat, that laboring cla s o wage earners, is attracted to the ranks of the National-Liberal move- ment initially becalse thev identify this "ovenent as being synonymous with Indonesian independence. Since the National— Liberal novement has increasingly given closer adherence to social-economic tents and political oreintation reflected in socialist te nde cie , the rroletarian workers continue to sup— port this novement. TEE MARLIST ICVEL LET Although the huslim and National- Libere 1 moves ents have, generally srcnkinr, captured the confidences of the nasses, .4- T he marxist novenent has many surrorters. its leaders, are for C’- the most part, drawn from the intellectual class and are native Indonesians. Their political orientation is varied and usually divided symrathies predominate their outlook on politics. Some are desireous of establishing a socialist state, such as the Partai Sosialis Indonesia x. hich is organized along intellectual lines, and others lean towards a sort of conbined social-Com— munist state. Of the Communist faction, sore intellectuals are conseicuously devoted t.o an Inocue»'en tyre c rtunism, peculiar to the nation's circumstances, while others are rigid followers 146 of the Loscow party line, like the Partai Komunis Indonesia 1 O which is wholly subservient to the Soviet Union. By far, the greatest percentare of Indonesian Larxists appear to be genu- inely interested in Indonesia for the Indonesians, but they are suspect since harxism to the Mesterner and many Indonesians, such as the Huslim bourfeoisie, smacks of Russian communism and imreria ism. The Urban and Rural Proletariat Influenced by hartism: The immediate ob ectives of the Larxists are the prole— tariat found in urban and rural areas. This rass of estate, mining, commercial,tradins, andindustrial workers are constant- .3 lywooed with the arreali : proraeanda of thhEP was s and social reform which is effectively and continuously chorused by Larx- ist aritators. Loreover, this proletarian froup is urged to band together in Larxist orisinated and controlled unions. These workers are a potentially powerful force to reckon with, however, the Larxist grip Ol this class is somewhat mitigated by the ar- nd the National-Liberal villinetess to *d m *3) H O l *3 (fl *3 *3 m P? L Crf. F m H :1) ’1) The Partai Kurba, as an examrle of the national coamunist infiltration and exransion amons the s es, is oreanized in s: n) nization intthe Indon- .0 the rural proletariat. Economic disorra esian village has led to a proletarisation of the rural workers in particular. The existence of economic dualism has been be— set with disrurtive processes: one system largely the product n in the hcstern world, scientifica ly a...) O }._J '31 c+ ('3 H) i4. ,3 {‘o O (7“ O (‘0 *3 H r... ’1) r-J H {0 based and organized, sensitive to the torld market, and sunnort— ed with adeuate capital reserves; and the other economic system ccmrrisin: the debtqddden small farmer, now heavily subject to money demands, oriented to a local narket and iiven'to the rro- 147 J duction of his own food and modest consumer woods. The capitalist estate economy faces a decline in labor production, i.e. rubber and tin. due senerally to frejuent and hide—scale labor strihes. Jourled with this factor is the delince ll production dessnd by forner heavier rurchasers, (O uch asthe United States. The already weakend Indonesian U) economy is rrorred ur by e tate supports and is further ‘ tronhled by unerrloyment Fnc underesrloyment of torkers. For- k :3; ulation increases an rressures on available land force the peasantry to require earloyment outside of agriculture, an‘ so the self-sufficient village cormunity continues to break doma under the irract of economic disorganization. The rural proletariat becomes more and more dependent on tapes for a living in the rrocess. The Communists attack the caritalist enterprises through infiltration of the labor movement, which forces economic chaos and ultimately swells the ranks of the Comrunist move- ment. Like the other political organioations, th« Karxist croups seek to build a broad workins base of operations. No movesent to date has succeeded in this endeavor, but the Com- 0: H C l munists are capitalizing on the great reassnt unrest and content. -\IO\ Ul-P 148 Footnotes George Hoturnan Kahin. "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism" in Killian L. Holland, Editor, Asian Nationalism and the Nest. Institute of Pacfic Relations. New York; 1950, pp.74-81. Ibid., pp. 82-83. . C.A. van Nieuwenhuijze. "The Darul Islam Movement in fiest Java” Pacific Affairs. Volume 15, 1950, pp. 220-230. Kahin, QR §i§., Part I. Ibid., Part I. Ibiio, pp. 88-104 Justus M. van der Kroef "Indonesia's Labour Movement" United Asia. 1954, pp. 223-231. 149 7 M JAYTCR VI Several conclusions are rossitle in an analysis of social class narticination in Indonesian nationalism. In the first place, emanating from the change of social class structure, new classes have arisen. Secondly, the social levels sunnort nolitical narties which reflect their as- niration and need as a social class. As a conseouence and comolementary factor, it has been observed that several nolitical oarties offer effective anneals to the resnec- tive levels of society. Finally, agrarian unrest and discontent is leading to new nolitical consciousness and activity in the village society. 1. New social classes have arisen from the charge of social class structure. (1) The new classes arisins from the chanse in social class structure reflect a long and continuous orocess of social disnlacenent and dis- orsanization. These new classes consist of the rural and urban proletariat, the Western intellectuals, the Nuslim middle class, the Nuslim intellectuals, the non- Nuslim intellectuals, and the Narxist intellectuals. Probably the most obvious result of social change in Indonesia is the rural and urban oroletariat Which was born in the introduction of a money economy and the village production of cash crons for foreign consumction. Among the many causes of the breakdown of the traditionally closed and self-sufficient village community, a host of factors are relevant, including the excess ponulation in- creases over available cultivatable land, the constant desire for money waves, and the demand for livelihood employment by the peasantry, now completely displaced from its sroun responsible society -- these factors contributed greatly to the establishment of a rural and urban workina class. The Western intellectuals came initially from the traditional governing class, the aristocracy, and later from the class of commoners. They became enamored of the concept of unifying and saining independence for Indonesia as they became accuainted with the various treatises on democratic rights, as authored by the Nestx through Dutch-encouraged and often Dutch-sponsored edu- cational nroprams. Owing to the superior and inherent wealthy status of the aristocracy, as well as the new gained riches of the comparatively small but socially conscious Indonesian middle class group Of merchants and tradesmen, educations along Western lines were increasing- ly made available to their sons. The Muslim middle class developed in direct competi- tion to the age-old indigenous entrepreneurial group, the Chinese and Arabs, as it became aware of the necessity for gaining capital for a livelihood. Although this group is small, it is a vital intermediary for the peasant class which either sells or processes its agricultural products throush the middle class. is a product of the new capital- - ist society introduced by the Vest, this group has entered small-scale industry, transportation and communication services, artisan enterprises, and professional fields, such as medicine, the civil service, and law. They are interested in Islamic reform, social welfare, intividual- ism, and exhibit a liberalistic-rationalistic tendency toward the moderniz tion of the Republic. Another product of the change in Indonesian social class structure istLhe group of Fuslim intellectuals com- posed of younser separation so-called "Religious Socialists". Possessed of enlightened minds and a strong sense of duty to their countrymen, the luslim intellectuals have pained their outlook through western education and an awareness of social justice and democracy through Islam for Indonesia. like the Fuslim intellectuals, the non-Fuslim intel- lectuals were accusinted with fiestern liberal and demo- APS‘I’ ciatic concepts throurh education, however, they aregyuided by Islam in their political and social aspirations. To the contrary, they have emphasized the orsanization of a secular state dedicated to correctinr the social ills of the Indonesians. Without the contributing influence of 'estern capitalism and individualism, vhich has guided this arour to prominence, especially in sovernrent and business, it is almost a certainty that they would not have been created. Indeed, they are a product of Western education and ideolorical training coupled with the indirenous Indo- nesian factors of national unity and independence and the desire to increase the standard of living of their fellows. Whe Farxist intellectuals, liiet he huslim and non- Luslim intellectuals, arose from contact Vith ”estern edu- cation and iJccloyy, They are not inflwenccd by reliaion H U1 P) and the philosophy of capitalism, however. Tany are sincere Indonesian nationalists devoted to the cause of a socialistic state, which they feel till most adeouately meet the needs of the masses. Still, a small but eaten- Cl) tially powerful group re absolute and ardent supporters of communism. Like other sections of society, this class came from the disintegration of traditional society and thrives on its own interests: the impotency of Indonesia's economy, peasant unrest, and the desire to govern. 2. Social levels support political parties which reflect their aspirations and needs as social classes. (2) The extent to which the various social levels support political parties is a reflection of their social class aspirations and needs. Of the major political parties considered in this discussion, it has been found that they are grouped into three categories -- the Nuslim, the Na- tional-Liberal, and the Barxist. The largest political party in Indonesia is the Kasjumi which receives support from the major non—political Fuslim social organizations, many of the village religious leaders, the young generation "Religious Socialist" intellectuals, and the majority of the larger Indonesian landowners as well as a significant proportion of the industrial and com— mercial middle class. Its basic principles represent the views of its membership, these including an emphasis upon the cause of social justice and democracy as found in Islam, popular rule of the state by the will of the majority, ac- ceptance of a combined cooperative, socialistic, and capitalistic economy, gradual nationalization of key in- dustries, and absolute neutrality in the "Cold war" be- tween the United States and Russia. The partai Sarekat Islanilndonesia is led by former Hasjumi party members who became dissatisfied with the socialist orientation of the latter organization. It has a small peasant following in Indonesia except for Sumatra and the Celebes where it is contesting with the Masjumi for political supremacy. This clash of interests is re- vealed in Sarekat Islanfs appeal which is based on op— position to socialism, respect of individual property rights, individualism and capitalism, governmental control or industry if absolutely required for the peOple's wel- "cold war". As fare, and a strict neutral position in the a consequence, it has attracted the Muslim boureoisie and support of many of the villagers. Another distinct political movement which reflects the social and economic philosophy of its constituents is Darul Islam which has a very small peasant base and is directed in executive control by old fashinod Hohammedans. It seeks the establishment of an Islamic state and makes political cap- ital of peasant discountent with the government, but it is not a large movement and certainly does not appear to be representative of the Muslim group. The Partai Nasional Indonesia initially won great mass support stemming from the personal popularity of Soekarno and Hatta, incorrectly indentified with the party, and the peasant's traditional tendency to place confidence in the judgement of its governors-~the local administrative off- icers, the old aristocratic civil service and the non- aristocratic subordinates--who are firm supporters of the movement. Its power also originated among the small but influential professional class, some of the industrial and commerical middle class, some non-Communist Marxist in- tellectuals and small unions. Basically, the P.V.I. seeks to establish a socialistic society and refuses to align itself with either Russia or the United States. Older generation civil servants organized the Per- satuan Indonesian Raja which has a considerable mass- backed party base. Its concepts are identified with a composite of traditional social-economic practices par- tially modified and adapted to those of the West, but it has a definite paternal and authori-tarian outlook bordering on reactiona y, social-economic ideas and non- democratic political concepts. The Partai Sosialis Indonesia has gathered much strength from the student class and the Marxist inclined intellectuals. It does not advocate class warfare in Indonesia,fiadhers to a gsoitive neutrality in world pol- itics, and believes that an Indonesian socialism based on a mixed economy with a substantial sector of economic life being left to private enterprise is a political de- siraability. It does not have a mass backing since the party is first concerned with making the Indonisian masses |._.l n U1 politically conscious and mature in independent judgment of political issues. The Partai Kommunis Indonesia is the exrression of the precepts of Comrunist class warfare rrinciples, the com- plete adherence to the Kosccw party line and the total elémination of capitalism in Indonesia. It is led by Karx— ist intellectuals but does not have a great follovinq amonn Indogsians. The Partai Nurba, or the Proletarien Party, is an at— tempt by the Communists to create a peasant—based organiza- tion. It is looked upon with favor by many students and older intellectuals and, with mass support, could make its EWCG O.) influence felt in government. hhile it advocates indepen of action in vorld affairs, it is based on a philosophy which requires povernrent by the proletariat and envisions a soc- ialist state. 3. Political partie:_gffgrwef:egtite 9::eals to the —~—.—. -..-.—_..—~——..—..—.__. respective levels of society. (3) Political parties in In- donesia offer effective appeals to the respective levels of society. This is a recognition of The needs and aspirations of the social classes. The hnsjuri party reflects the views of the young gen- eration Muslim intellectuals, non-political huslim social or— 11 ’4. (D {ani7atione, v he relirious leaders, large Indonesian landowners, and the industrial and commercial middle class. On the other hand, the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesie- expresses the social and the economi opinions of the Luelim bourgeoisie O H Ul U\ ('3 nd a portion of the peasantry. As a further contrast, the old-fashioned hohsnredans and " small peasant base supfort the rhilosorhy of Darul Islam, or the Muslim State. The political hover of the Partai Ncsionsl Indonesia is direct outgrotth of the support of a considerable peasant base, the new civil service, the influential professional class, as well as some of the industrial and commercial middle class, non—Cox unist Kerxist intellectuals, and several minor unions. A conservative vievpoint, that of the old aristocracy of t edition-bound society, is O H. <: H [,4 ’0 l h '1 <,‘ a .3 ._+ ‘2’) l) J F) 1 D ' S r—J. J “'3 (+- 3 m ’3 ref1cntrs iq th‘ }ewqo+*sn Isdonesian Rafa. In the Ksrxist movement, the Partai Sosialis Indonesia 5 represents the ideas of the student class and the harxist- inclined intellectuals. Outright Communists, also knovn as Earxist intellectuals, have establiSued the Partai Kosmunis Indonesia as an expression of their social-economic interests. Finally, the potentially powerful Partai Furba reflects the views of sony students, older intellectuals, and the Com- s not made an eff~ctive anneal to the peas— .~ munists, hut it h (A) ( emitry. It has been demonstrcted that political parties offer effective apteals to the respective levels of society, which is a reflection of their aspiratioss and needs as socisl l 0 {l3 sses. Euch over—lapping exists, however. bor instance, it is a common assurrtion that the rural and Lrben proletariat .1 like hcrxism as an iceolofy, but the role of Islam and the 157 adat as a traditional and influential political challenger is frequently overlooked. While Marxism has been a vocal and active ally of nationalism, having succeeded in pictur- ing itself as "progressive," especially in the case of the Communists, its present promise of establishing an ideal society where "foreign" capitalist exploitation would cease to exist and all national resources would be based on common ownership as an immediate solution to Indonesian societal unrest, has not succeeded in capturing mass peasant backing. Moreover, while Communism is strong in the union group it must be remembered that Islam's social-religious leaders and the village's political leaders exert a powerful grip on the views of the masses. In this respect it is important to re- call that Indonesia is an area where 30 different languages are used, where tribal and folk societies surround modern urban conclaves, and where many different ethnic groups are goverened by an incredible number and diversity of custom laws, social structures, and native political systems. Marxism does have a grip on the urban and rural proletariat, but it does not appear likely that it will take control of the government in the Com- munist sense. For the majority of the Muslims, the National- Liberals, and the Marxists are agreed that Indonesian society must be shaped around a socialist type state which for the present is built upon a capitalist, cooperative, and socialist foundation with the Muslim society a requisite supporting class. 4. ggrarian unrest and discontent is leading to new pglitical consciousness and activity in the village society. (4) Economic disorganization in the Indonesian village has led 158 to a displacement and proletarization of the rural workers in particular. The rural proletariat is, for the most part, poverty stricken, restless, and discontented, espousing radical ideologies in an attempt to better its lot in life. hereithe clash of economic dualism, one system based on capitalism and the other self-sufficient system becoming in- creasingly affected by international economic fluctuations. Debt-ridden and subject to money demands, the peasantry is forced to grow cash crops and, failing to obtain sufficient money needs, then seeks employment outside of the village and agriculture so that the self-protective and self-sufficient village community continues to break down under the impact of economic disorganization. The rural proletariat competes for money wages in estate and mining enterprises, but, in general, uiemployment is high. Communism promises immediate rectification of economic troubles and, with its firm hold on the union movement, appeals to the gorwing number of rural proletarians. Although no political movement to date has succeeded in capturing a broad peasant base of operation, the Communists are capitalizing on the great peasant unrest and agrarian discontent. The Republic of Indonesia has independence, but many problems remain. The Republic must evolve a system of universal education for the masses and a program directed toward the de- velopnect of natural native resources and economic recovery if the nation is to continue as a member of the free world com- munity. In particular, the Indonesian export pattern must be adjusted so that her exports and products are stablized on the international market. 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"The Daru1 Islam {overeat in West Java" P9cifla Affairs. Volume 15. 1C50 Martheim h. F. "De OdtdeLkin" Van Asie" (The Dipcoverv of 3 .2 Asia) Le *19116 S en.(The New Voice). J?nu2ry, 1954. ,JAb 55 ”51LH'LWIRIHRYLUAN {I'd-.i 7 (I: .ffi} m w ~~v L , I ' v Nov 15 ’57 .-x '- r . ti? « ‘ 4‘ ‘ ‘ ' ‘ t 2 ~ . . u f» . ‘ A ’1 I y {I I s . .- , La ' . V _ £3: ‘ " ‘4 I VI‘ HICHIGQN STRTE UNIV. LIBRQRIES "III | 4 312931012 5649