

SOCIAL CLASS PARTICIPATION
IN INDONESIAN NATIONALISM

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Wesley R. Fishel

Major professor

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HAROLD W. SUNDSTROM

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ABSTRACT

SOCIAL CLASS PARTICIPATION II. INDONESIAN NATIONALISM

By Harold W. Sundstrom

Among the many perplexing problems facing the peoples of Southeast Asia, nationalism, or the desire for national independence and unity, is probably the problem of paramount importance. For the doctrine of nationalism is chorused by the official and unofficial propaganda and leadership of most political factions above and beyond the immediate concern for real internal difficulties, such as food shortages, excess population over available land, and dollar supports. Moreover, the masses sometime reflect the same doctrinaire attitude.

The author has examined the degree of support for nationalism among the various social classes in Indonesia. He has attempted to determine the social and economic interest of Indonesian social classes as they are expressed in political parties and platforms. Emphasis has been given to those parties which were or are active in the movement to establish national independence. The author has also examined the rise of new social classes, such as the rural and urban proletariats, the non-aristocratic intelligentsia, the changing position of the native aristocracy, and the Muslim commercial interests. In examining these social classes an attempt has been made to assess their political outlook and their degree of participation in Indonesian political parties.

Use has been made of English, Dutch, and Indonesian primary and secondary sources and of the methodology of sociology in the analysis of class structure. It is hoped that this study will contribute to an understanding of one of the important new nations of Southeast Asia.

MAJOR PROFESSOR: *Alley R. Fisher*

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INTRODUCTION

Among the many perplexing problems facing the peoples of Southeast Asia, nationalism, or the desire for national independence and unity, is probably the problem of paramount importance. For the doctrine of nationalism is chorused by the official and unofficial propaganda and leadership of most political factions above and beyond the immediate concern for real internal difficulties, such as food shortages, excess population over available land, and dollar supports. Moreover, the masses sometime reflect the same doctrinaire attitude. This thesis will examine the degree of support for nationalism among the various social classes in Indonesia.

Nationalism through the years has been resolved in several shades of meaning. In the first place, it represents an actual historical process, that of establishing nationalities as political units as the modern institution of the national state. Secondly, the term is indicative of the ideal implicit in the actual process, especially significant of an intensification of national consciousness and political philosophy of the national state. Thirdly, it may mean in such phrases as "Indonesian nationalism" and "Indonesian freedom" the activities of a particular political party, like the Indonesian Nationalist Party, combining^N an historical process and a political theory. The fourth and final use of nationalism is the nationalism which is in wide spread evidence today -- it colors thought and conditions action in political, social, and cultural spheres, in domestic politics and foreign relations. This nationalism is best defined, according to Carlton J. H. Hayes, as denoting

"...a condition of mind among members of a nationality, perhaps already possessed of a nation state, a condition of mind in which loyalty to the ideal or to the fact of one's national state is superior to all other loyalties and of which pride in one's nationality and belief in its intrinsic excellence and in its 'mission' are integral parts." (1)

The traditional phenomena of nationality and patriotism has given way to a modern emotional fusion and exaggeration called nationalism. Nationalism has been defined by Hans Kohn as a social process demanding popular sovereignty, complete revision of the social classes, and the creation of the third estate's power, which is represented as being the universal leader for the masses. It is, furthermore, a process of integrating the masses of people into a common political form towards the realization of common aspirations and needs. Professor Kohn observes that a nationality usually has common descent, language, territory, political entity, customs and traditions, and religion. Other essential elements of nationalism include, especially in Asia, the creation of government as a unifying force for defense against imperialism, concentration of power, introduction of modern industrial technology, mass communication, and an ideology. An unfortunate feature of present day nationalism is the Fascist tendency in an uncompromising manner to push nationalism to its very limits -- a type of totalitarian nationalism wherein humanity and the individual disappear; they as an end to itself, nothing remains but the nationality, which has become the one and the whole. Commenting on the communal psychological changes in nationalism, Professor Kohn has written

"Nationalism is an idea, an idee-force, which fills man's brain and heart with new thoughts and new sentiments, and drives him to translate his consciousness into deeds of organized action. Nationality is

therefore not only a group held together and animated by common consciousness; but it is also a group seeking to find its expression in what it regards as the highest form of organized activity, a sovereign state. As long as a nationality is not able to attain this consummation, it satisfies itself with some form of autonomy or pre-state organization, which, however, always tends at a given moment, the moment of "liberation," to develop into a sovereign state. Nationalism demands the nation-state; the creation of the nation-state strengthens nationalism." (2)

An attempt will be made to determine also the social and economic interest of Indonesian social classes as they are expressed in political parties and platforms. Emphasis will be given to those parties which were or are active in the movement to establish national independence.

Before the advent of Western civilization's discovery and entry into Southeast Asia, and the resultant impact and influence of the West upon the people, society was characterized by a large peasantry and a relatively small aristocracy, both satisfied with their way of life and dependent upon an agrarian and sometimes maritime economy; in between the peasantry and the aristocracy, a group of middle-men, consisting of traders and creditors, functioned. The basis for society was the traditional and ancient system of mutual assistance and cooperative economy activity, clearly communal in practice.

Basically, the communal pattern of life was rooted in the struggle for existence. Common planning was manifested in mutual close cooperation for the conduct of war and defense, religion, and the promotion of the village livelihood. The desire for group responsibility and conformity caused an orientation of the village toward a cooperative enterprise. The village resources were considered the property of the group as a communal right. The land, the instruments of cultivation, seeds and livestock were used in common. In essence, the vil-

lage society was self-sufficient and a closed economic unit. The strong relationship of kinship represented by the clan life was still another cause for the semi-sheltered safety of the communal life. (3)

During the first two and a half centuries of Western colonial influence, the communal pattern of living was not threatened nor changed appreciatively, the colonial governments seeking economic gain through the local headmen, chieftains, and aristocracy. Direct contact with the village was practically non-existent. The leaders -- the aristocracy -- content with a secure, comfortable, social-political-economic status under their colonial rulers, were in fact eager to cooperate with the various regimes. The peasantry remained unchanged.

It was not until the middle of the 19th Century, when private enterprise began to creep into the area, that the village society was directly affected by the Western impact, and the first vestige of nationalism arose concomitant with Western capitalism. The pressure from the outside world took many forms: a new money economy, welfare programs and surveys, the production of cash crops for foreign consumption, education of aristocracy and commoner, the latter to a minor degree, and administrative reform. This constant and thorough attack brought about a completely weakened village society and sometimes totally collapsed the system. The end result was a social class displacement of the aristocracy and the peasantry, as new social classes developed: the rural and urban proletariat, the urban middle class, and the intelligentsia, joining the traditional aristocracy and peasant groups.

By displacement is meant the loss of original and psychologically satisfying class participation and status security.

It is a result of social disorganization in the sociological sense. Social disorganization is defined by Mabel A. Elliott and Francis E. Merrill "as a serious disturbance in the habits, customs, or working life patterns of the group." They further acknowledge that "the process of social disorganization is derived from the conflicting social attitudes and values which make group consensus impossible." In other words, the basic harmony between individual attitudes and social values is based upon common acceptance of a similar definition of the situation. When there is no longer any social consensus, disorganization is inevitable. (4)

Cities grew as the displaced population came from the land. A class of commoners, having been educated in the West and nurtured with its democratic principles, aspired to total emancipation from colonial servitude. The sons of the aristocracy, having received Western education, too, developed a sense of pride in their people as well as an awareness of paternal responsibility for the masses. The new educated class of youth, the young aristocrats and commoners, formed the nationalist bloc, which led the way in the struggle to secure national independence and unity.

The aristocratic displacement originally occurred when the colonial governments assimilated the "blue bloods" into the civil service in the position of minor functionaries. This removal from the traditional political structure disorganized the aristocracy and made them excessively dependent on the colonial government, which opened the door to corruption and apathy. At the same time, the intelligentsia recruited from the class of commoners felt slighted and its burning desire to govern was thwarted.

Rural displacement began in Indonesia when the Dutch introduced the dual economy -- cultivation of "cash crops" for use in export to foreign markets (in addition to an age-old custom of self-sufficient crop production) -- which caused the displacement of the traditional marginal man. Whereas the individual had been self-sufficient in the past in a subsistence economy, now he became a part of the world market. (5) The aristocracy urged this transition since it prospered under the colonial exploiters. Since there were no jobs in industry, which was virtually non-existent, a life of continual poverty and unrest became the lot of the peasant. And so it was that the peasant sometimes joined with the national intelligentsia (though often fighting it) in a stand for equity, for reform, and nationalism, with the aristocracy a little-interested bystander.

In Indonesia two world religions, Islam and Christianity, have clashed with the traditional religion of the rural society. This attack on the peasant's magico-panteism -- a kind of folkways religion bound up in a sacred connection between the land, peasantry, and crops, and based on an implicit confidence in the village elders, who are regarded as being descendants of the village founders, "the ancestors to be" -- has caused a religious displacement. Islam and its precepts of individualism for males and social restrictions on females has caused a social conflict by breaking down woman's generally free status and the village's traditional religious communal pattern of responsibility. Christianity has opposed the age-old custom of bride price marriages, thereby disrupting clan unity, impoverishing clans owing to the inability to exchange goods, indenturing the suitor in the service of the father-in-law,

and extending the length of time before the husband can unite his family in their own home. Christianity opposes animal religious sacrifices which may result in social unrest and disorganization, for the death cult worship is tied to an intense socio-economic pattern of living. (6)

The importance of the social conflicts engendered by Christianity and Islam may derive from the fact that both religions have played a decisive role in the development of national consciousness in Indonesia. Moreover, constant agitation and propaganda on the part of some religious and political factions demand the creation of a national theocratic state under Islamic leadership, as favored by the Indonesian Masjumi party. On the other hand, large numbers of supporters of the Nationalist party favor a **secular state**.

In summation, it is a paradox of the age that nationalism in the former colonial strongholds of Southeast Asia was actually sired by the Western masters of the area, and was strengthened in some cases by the Japanese occupation. By improving communication, introducing education, utilizing Western governing institutions and principles of democracy, building conservation control sites, creating conditions of sanitation and hygiene, uniting modern technology and techniques in industrialization and applying agrarian reform in cultivation practices which made it possible to support larger populations on the land, the West created a consciousness in the minds of the articulate leaders of the different social classes, a desire for political and economic freedom and equality, and a demand to be seated in the world community of nations. This thesis will examine this desire and demand for independence in relation to the participation of the various social classes in

Indonesian nationalism.

Footnotes

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2. Hans Kohn. The Idea of Nationalism. The MacMillan Company, New York: 1944, pp 1-24
3. The most exhaustive study of communal patterns in the Indonsian village soc@ity, with implications for Southeast Asia, is still C. Van Vollenhoven. Het adatrecht van Nederlandsch-Indie (The Custom Law of the Netherlands-Indies). Noordhollandsche Uitgevers mij, Amsterdam, The Hague: 1919-1925, 4 Volumes. See also, J.R. Andrews. Burmese Economic Life. Stanford University Press, Stanford: 1954, Chapter I.
4. Mabel A. Elliott and Francis E. Merrill. Social Disorganization. Harper Brothers, New York: 1941, pp. 26, 43, 46.
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CHAPTER I

PRE-WESTERN SOCIETY AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN INDONESIA

I

THE VILLAGE AND PEASANTRY

In order to describe the social displacement and social participation of various classes in the Indonesian nationalist movement it is first necessary to look at the structure of traditional Indonesian society before the coming of the West.

Perhaps the fundamental feature of the communal pattern of the peoples of Indonesia before the impact of the West was the presence of social units or autonomous groups in society. These autonomous groups participated in life as a legal internal-external entity. The acceptance of the autonomous community was a natural and necessary obligation. The internal order prescribed that certain groups or individuals had precedence, power, and authority. However, material objects, such as land, water, crops, buildings and temples, were subject to the group as a whole, which profited from these things to the exclusion of outsiders. Consequently, the dissolution of the group was unthinkable to the Indonesian. The ancient native concept of a firm and ordered unity of the community provided a basis for dual, quadrupal or other divisions of human forms, and each with its proper place. Visible evidence of community solidarity could be found in the communal houses of various Indonesians, the communal boats of the Kei and Aru islanders, the weapons of the Toraja, the ornaments of the South Celebes and the stones of the

sub-clan in Ambon. (1)

While the traditional pattern of Indonesian Society was communal, it was also hierarchical, the strata consisting roughly of the aristocracy, the peasantry, and the middle man. At the top of the village structures were the chiefs and the village elders, who were believed to be of common descent from a single ancestor, the founder of the village, thus forming an unbreakable bond of kinship. The legal ties between the clans, groups and individuals were expressed in adat or customs practiced in the archipelago, the multitude of social obligations being so diverse that law-areas functioned. These were cultured geographical units which shared many traits in common with all other Indonesian peoples, but... "possessing enough distinctive features of social organization, especially in the field of law *to be set up as an equally important factor in the evolution of all other areas.*" (2) In short, these autonomous groups were ordered, permanent in character, self-governing, and possessing their own material and incorporeal property.

In order to understand the position of the self-governing community in the social structure of the archipelago, it is necessary to examine the significance of territorial and kinship factors in its origin and occurrence. The territorial factor may be defined as a definite area with a common concern. For the purpose of grouping the instances of territorial organization, three classifications, in general, are possible. These types are: the village community, the regional community, and the union of villages. The typical Indonesian village community before Western

discovery, for example, is the Balinese and Javanese "desa," where the community chiefs, and other functionaries lived in common territory. A representative regional community ^{defined as a community which possessed its own boundaries} contained a number of ^{independence}, and yet all sub-divisions of a larger community which possessed its own boundaries and distinctive administrative authority over occupied fields, virgin lands, and abandoned areas. Examples of the regional community are Angkola or Mandailing "kuria" with its "huts", and the South Sumatra "marga" with its "dusun". The central Batak country offered an example of the union of villages where individual village communities banded together in the pursuit of common purposes such as defense against enemies, irrigation projects and administration of justice.

It may be observed from the above discussion that the local living unit was the small village community, independent in nature, encompassed in a larger community, or joined with other communities of equal status for joint interest. The kinship system of the people determined the form which the small village community took in reaching one of the three types of territorial organization. Indonesian kinship relations were expressed in several forms: patrilineal, matrilineal, bilateral and alternating organization. The common descent (natural or artificial) from one common male ancestor along the male line determined the patrilineal membership in the functioning kinship group of the clan or sub-clan. The Gao, Batak, Nias and some of the Lampong Peoples were excellent representation of this form while

the Moluccas and Timor archipelago also gave frequent rise to this form. Matrilineal organization was found in Minangkabau, Semendo, and Korinchi, where, as may be expected, the social group was based on descent from one common female along the female line. The prohibition of marriage to a member of one's own clan or sub-clan or exogamy, is a feature of the unilateral kinship group. Conversely, endogamy, or the maintenance of tribal unity which permitted marriage within the tribe, such as was found in many regions of Borneo and Celebes, was a bilateral relationship. A system where the form of marriage determined the kinship organization, that is, where the children belonged to either the father's or mother's clan, produced an alternating unilateral kinship organization. A third (bilateral) marriage form allowed the child to be placed in an equal position towards the clans of the father and mother. The inter-action of kinship and territorial factors was present in the autonomous community, thus foreigners could only gain acceptance in the village community if he was accepted in a native kinship group and if he settled in the territory; the connection with the land and the association by relationship was of vital structural significance to the community. (3)

The self-governing political communities were characterized by a systematic division of citizens into classes with variable principles of divisions evident. One characteristic of class status was the possession of land, a classification found in Java and Bali. The highest class contained those persons possessing agricultural land in addition to a

compound; title to marginal fields or a compound alone put one in the second class, while landless persons were relegated to the lowest class. Chieftainship, developed internally in many regions of Sumatra, Borneo, Celebes, and Timor was maintained by an Indonesian right of inheritance with election, which is the selection of one person from a specified class to discharge certain duties in a state, corporation, or society. (4) Since the chief status was above that held by the common man, the members of the chieftain group had to adhere to a marital relationship within their own status. Precedence was customarily shown toward the chief class in ceremonies, protocol, the quality of food and the portion of food served the chief. The manner of dress was distinctly differentiated between chief and commoner and the mode of burial of chiefs differed from that of the commoner. At the same time, the difference in class resulted in a careful regulation of daily activities, each with many legal ramifications. The methods of maintaining the chieftain rank varied from marriage outside the tribe to the purchase of higher rank and title. Clan distinctions were another basis for class distinction. A triad, consisting of chieftain class, commoners, and slaves was very common. Another class criterion of ancient vintage was the subservience and dependence of the vanquished, debtors, and their offspring. There are, however, records of people never having had a developed chieftain class, such as the torajas.

The status of aliens in the community was regulated by an age-old process. Aliens could come to the community as slaves, thereby filling a needed menial economic capacity; through marriage for both males and females, or through adoption by adat law (e.g., the "anaq samang" attached to the "indug samang" in Minangkabau). A stranger could gain citizenship in an inferior status through long residence in a territorially-based community. Gifts were customarily required like rice, fowl, and money payments. Some time could lapse before total acceptance in the community, this often taking generations like in the village of Ambon. An almost imperceptible membership was acquired by descendants of the immigrants while a difference in the religion was a complete bar to acceptance and membership. Consequently, the full responsibility of citizenship was required of all entering into the adat community, which, incidentally, applied to individuals or to a group.

The formation of new communities was dependent upon several factors. It could be the result of a fission from the parent community caused by a desire for independence, insufficient forest and farming lands, or family quarrels. The circumstance of the entry into the new community--whether the area was occupied or unoccupied, hostile or friendly inhabitants, river valleys, islands, flat country--contributed to giving the village its structure. This fission often led to colonization with new communities growing up with their own organization and chiefs, however, the complete authority of the people first on the land was recognized the new-comers. (5)

The traditional form of Indonesian rural society is perhaps best illustrated by taking a look at the intergrated communal patterns prevalant on the island of Bali. In the first place rural society in Bali should be viewed as a religiously oriented and traditionally sanctioned interlocking system of various social levels and interpersonal relations. (6) The "desa" or village is only one such level of social organization. The general structural categories consist of large and complex levels of rural society as well as smaller territory inter-personal associations in line with Balinese traditions:

1. The regional community. This may be discribed as a federation of villages, united through religious and cultic ties, having originated from a single mother community to which the nominal authority of the mother village's officials is recognized; there is, however, daughter village representation in the federation's council. In ancient times, groups of regional communities were the component parts of the old Balinese kingdoms.

2. The desa or desa association. The village proper functions as a religious unit and temple association; here the mutual assistance patterns that distinguish social and economic life find expression: the mutual veneration of common gods and ancestors at familial shrines, the pacification of demons, the cleansing and maintenance of the religious edifices, and the closely followed ritualistic adjustment of village life to the traditional principles of cosmic unity.

3. The bandjar or tempek. The bandjar may be described as a village ward, an association of villagers from a given section of the village concerned with the secular aspects of a desa life: common defense against marauders; the collection of taxes in produce, in kind, and money; the harvesting and storage of rice crops; cultivation of lands; and maintenance of public works, roads, and houses. It is possible in some instances that one bandjar represents all the people where the desa is small; in this case the bandjar is the same as the desa association. The desa's secular authority consisting of the village chief, an assistant chief, a council of founding elders, a village clerk, a forester, etc., is sometimes democratically appointed or holds office owing to a hereditary right, but operates only in the secular level of the bandjar. The communal or bandjar rights are the basis for mutual assistance and cooperation that characterize the villages in their role as peasants.

4. The task associations. This is an association of some of the desa members contributing to some form of social service such as the traditional artistic performance, the education of the community's young men in "sekaha troena" or village traditions, or the construction and care of irrigation systems. The task or "subak" association may comprise members within a bandjar or desa, from several different bandjars, or rarely, from neighboring desas. The subak association, like the desa, is a closely-welded, religiously oriented social organization, with its own laws, officials, and shrines. Membership in the subak association may be traditional for some families, particularly those families

regarded as direct descendants of the "founding fathers" of the community. There is also evidence that the task association may have been the community vigilance society or police force in ancient times.

5. The geneological societies. The membership of these societies cuts across the various bandjars of a desa, sometimes cutting across different desas. Their function supplements the religious function of the priesthood, and often some of the members were regarded as being priestly assistants. Their concern traditionally is to maintain shrines, relics, ancestral graves of unknown origins, and to rehearse the intricate rituals of the dead. While these societies had their own executive and treasury, they had no separate status in adat or customary law.

6. The private associations. Numerous private groups or clubs are found within a given desa; they have no traditional function or legal status and are formed or dissolved upon individual initiative. These groups are composed of almost everyone in the desa or bandjar, functioning generally as "service clubs": small cooperative and savings associations, sowing and harvesting, theatre and dance arts, for music, for cremation of the dead, for the cleaning and weeding of gardens and village compounds, and for the extermination of rodents. Considered within the confines of tradition, the village society allows considerable latitude in human behavior in keeping with the democratic orientation of the village itself. Men and women often share the same rights: inheriting property, owning part of the communal land, participating in most religious rites,

expression of opinion in communal affairs, etc. Moreover, clearly delineated class distinctions in the village are kept to a minimum. There are exceptions and these comprise a few influential people in the rural society. These people are: (1) the officials of the desa, bandjar, and subak whose position is continued by popular mandate and whose authority of office provides a measure of extra social prestige; (2) the village elders, considered as being the living descendants of the founders of the village, and whose prerogatives are expressed in various religious rites, some marriage laws, and the right of preference on the occasion of the reapportionment of the communal land. (3) members of the so-called caste nobility, dating to the Hindu influence in the period of the conquest of Bali by Gadjah Mahda. This nobility consists of Brahman, Ksatriyas, and Wesias, and identified itself with the Javanese conquerors and colonists, some Balinese kings, their courtiers and more important officials, and possibly some indigenous Balinese priests were given a similar high caste standing in society. The Balinese regarded the three upper castes as one with appropriate internal divisions, their composition including about 7 per cent of the population. The great mass of Balinese were classified as Sudras in spite of the oft-times high social and political status of many of its component class, consequently, the caste ordering has never been a very tight one within the village society. Standing in a class by themselves, the Brahman priests, or pedanda, and the native priests, or pemangkoe, often worked side by side complementing and supplementing each other's

religious activities. The Brahman priest was the scholarly religious sanctifier of communal law and the chief guide in wide-realm of gods, demons, and myths. (7)

It has been observed that Indonesian society was a closed, self-centered, society before the impact of the West. The native society offered maximum security and protection to its membership and afforded religious, political, and economic certainty through its existing classes, which were not mutually antagonistic, but rather functioned harmoniously in an integrated whole, strengthened by the rural cohesion of the kinship and territorial factors of societal organization.

II

THE ARISTOCRACY, KRATON AND TOWN

The over-capping element in Indonesian society has traditionally been the aristocracy which lived in the court center or "kraton," the latter forming the foundation for the development of the town. The inter-dependence of the aristocracy, the kraton, and the town as an indispensable part of early urban organization and as the top elements in the structure of society, for the latter were dependent upon the center of habitation used by the aristocrats, provided ample basis for a combined study.

Historically the Indonesian village has supported the courts, or kratons, of the aristocracy throughout the indigenous population of the Indonesian archipelago. The village was a traditional closed society, self-sufficient and seclusive, with its own customs, and its own religious practices, in some instances. The individual was "first

of all a member of the group, and his freedom of action was restricted in every way by the lore of the past; self-assertion, economic interest not hallowed by accepted tradition, and social innovation were frowned upon--indeed, resisted--and generally led to ostracism." (8) Since spontaneous evolution brought about changes in custom and law, the collective element was the dominant feature in the communal ethos. Legally the village was a closed community to the out-siders, and the communal adat or customary law held the supreme place in village social and political structure. (9) A feudal aristocracy, responsible to the kraton supervised the controlled peasant economy in Indonesian states, especially Java, before the coming of Westerners. Economic life was marked by forced levies of manpower, and produce, prescribed cultivation, and control over prices and allocation of resources. In addition to its communal pattern, the indigenous Indonesian economy was also hierarchal, the social hierarchy consisting of four groups: (1) the court aristocracy; (2) the provincial nobility; (3) the village elders; and (4) the peasants, who as late as the outbreak of the second world war were still part of a paternal, authoritarian, and unindividualistic society and economy which had existed in Indonesia for centuries. (10)

THE KRATON

Since ancient times village life has always been influenced by the Indonesian town, which originated as centers of royal and therefore aristocratic control. The nuclei

around which most of the cities came into being as the "dalem," or feudal aristocratic residence, more commonly termed "kraton," or court. The city was also the product of a concentration of population in a cluster of villages near or on a fertile strip of soil, a river crossing near a bridge or ferry, or because of the location of a market or fair. Indonesia's ancient trade and international commerce early developed a market for the island spices, there-by determining the character and development of cities. For instance, Indonesia's first port, Surabaya, was founded long before the coming of the Hindus to Indonesia, and the history of Achin, Bantam, Macassar and Palembang is older than that of many towns in Europe. Trade was controlled by Indonesian rulers and the aristocracy, "their privileges expressed themselves in collected import and export duties, cornered markets, monopolized ship-building, investment rights and even piracy. Assisted by a handful of wealthy merchant investors and money lenders and by a foreign group of peddlers residing in the cities, the rulers of coastal towns and principalities regulated the immense flow of textiles, objects d'art of gold and silver and other luxury items, spices and foodstuffs brought to the Indonesian world.(11) In addition to the court center where the ruler, clerics, literati, wealthy merchant princes of foreign origin, singers and dancers lived, special quarters were provided for the peddlers, who lived together according to national origin. The market place and the commercial center lay between these two sections of the city.

The cultural development of the Indonesian city was

influenced by both the kraton proper and the foreign merchant elements, with the court being especially susceptible to the foreign tradition of the Hindu and Muslim civilizations, as court ritual and etiquette was often under the direction of Brahmins from India, who accomplished the semi-religious legitimatization of the authority of Indonesian rulers; Indian literati and clerics (boedjangga) partially "sanskritized" the Javanese language and developed many traditions of the "wayang," or native theatre; Brahmins and other Hindu culture bearers were also employed by wealthy merchants, who resided in the immediate vicinity of the kraton. Both probably contributed to the development of the feudal kshatriva of Hindu knight culture in Indonesia, superimposed for centuries on the unique indigenous tradition of the village.(12) The masses in the interior were little affected by this alien culture while the court and aristocracy largely adopted the Hindu-Javanese culture. Political reasons motivated the Mohammedanization of the courts in the 14th and 15th centuries as the result of contact between the Indonesian princes and the Muslim traders from India and Arabia. The influences of the kraton made possible the adoption of Islam by the masses in the interior, the egalitarian character of Muslim civilization being more suited to the Indonesian traditional life. Cultural influence was also exerted by the numerous peddlers and merchants in the city in the form of technology and craftsmanship relating to the luxury items in which they traded; being a generally migratory and low class of society, untutored and impoverished, they could not transmit a mature culture. With the modification by Hindu or Muslim

value gradations and concepts, the urban community or kraton cities remained as an integral part of the indigenous feudal society. As a more universal characteristic of the religion, Islam offered salvation to all believers, being therefore more democratically oriented than Hinduism, however, both class structure and cultural traits in the kratons were little affected by the coming of Islam; which van Leur has described:

"The Islamic principalities, centered around the sea ports along the coast, remained despotically governed; the privileges of the aristocracy, court etiquette, social gradations and class subtleties in language continued to exist, indeed reached even greater heights in Islamic courts. The adoption of Islam by the courts led to its gradual infiltration into the village society, so much indigenous tradition persisted that one may well say that the Indonesian is a Muslim in name only. Actual cultural resistance to Islam in the cities was insignificant; the new faith was rather blended with existing cultural patterns." (13)

The Indonesian city in the pre-colonial era was marked by planning and regularity. The kraton was located in the center, surrounded by or near a "alun-alun," or park, used as a market; streets formed a perpendicular thoroughfare pattern, all leading to the center of the city. Merchant princes, literati and entertainers were quartered either in ~~either~~ in the kraton or very near it. Towards the harbor or the edge of the city, the sections for peddlers, foreign nationalities and lesser merchants were found; the city was expanded by the influx of foreigners to its outskirts. This social pattern remained the same until influenced by the advent of colonial governments. (14)

THE ARISTOCRACY (15)

The class of Indonesian princes formed the top aristocracy in society, originating from a leading tribal unit be-

longing to their own region. An alien Indonesian from another area, or sometimes of total foreign origin, might be included in this group or class. Throughout the whole area the principedom exhibited similarities. The power of the princely state was bound up in the person of the prince himself, together with the state ornaments and paraphernalia. The prince was the ~~state~~ and the state was the prince, such as he possessed the sacred objects of the state and they possessed him. Theoretically, his power was unlimited since the welfare of the state was his welfare. In practice, however, his power was limited, his relations with the commune being undisturbed and unbroken. The hierarchy of nobility which inhabited the court center was formed by a group of noble relatives and high state officials whose rank was minutely marked from the highest to the lowest degree. Membership to this aristocracy, other than by birth, could be gained by academic or other evidences of success. As may be expected, hierarchal status was of great importance in marriage and external marks of dignity, rank or status were carefully followed.

Throughout Indonesia executors or administrative officials functioned as appendages to the princely hierarchy. They transmitted royal edicts and collected and forwarded taxes. The higher ranking officials were usually found close by or in the city while the lower ranking administrators were relegated to country positions where they affiliated themselves with the needs of the people. Some of them became quite independent of royal control, assuming identity as people's chiefs and being compensated by feudal income.

The aristocracy had its own body of custom and law: court language, literature, drama, music and dance, and the specialized arts of wood and leather carving and metal working. The legal life of the subordinate officials was determined by the structural organization and hierarchy which entered into matters of land transactions, money loans, marriage and death. The prince was the supreme judge handing down legal decisions through his law courts as a part of his princely power. He was required through custom to follow the adat, but he could merge local controversies with adat and thus influence the adat law of the communities. He also issued a law book to his courts as a further legal guide. Co-equally with his judicial and legislative powers, the prince was also the responsible religious head of the area. He allowed priests and administrators to regulate religious affairs, and sometimes to administer justice in some matters.

The prince and the royal sphere^{was} inseparately linked to the peasantry of the people's world in spite of the seemingly separateness of the former. In the first place, the prince was descended from a mythical cultural hero of the people while the state paraphenila and ornaments used by the prince were believed to have magical import to both high and low. The free distribution of food at feasts and festivals cemented the bond between prince and people. The prince was also the final arbiter in instances of inter-communal disputes and squabbles. As a group of people could appear before the prince to request justice so could one little individual, even the lowest in the community,

evoke justice from the prince. The prince further strengthened the bonds of kinship with the people by selecting concubines from commoners.

Another feature of the prince's status in society was his marked dissociation with local government. The prince permitted the communities to conduct their own legal affairs. The levy in kind and services was the most important official contact, this practice finding sanction in the adat law obligations of the citizenry which required the rendering of mutual aid to the chiefs. The intermediaries between the prince and the people were the chiefs who would take the levies and forward them up the hierarchy of government. Consequently, forced labor and the occurrence of regal *in the conduct of which the prince assumed that normal duties of the royal which demands* demands became common practice. It was soon disorganized or destroyed the independent communities by assuming the function of chiefs.

It has been demonstrated that the aristocracy was the over-capping element in Indonesian society, maintaining the social classes in a harmonious relation with each other, and providing through the aristocracy's magically-sanctioned position of religious and political supremacy additional cohesive strength. Its position was reflected in prestige, sacred offerings, and tributes, or money taxes from the masses. In the main the aristocrat represented, like the sultan of Djokjakarta, " the NAIL on which the heavens hung."

III

THE MIDDLE-MEN

While never actually being a real part of society,

the position of the middle-men was sanctioned by tradition in Indonesia. This middle class was a small segment of society and it consisted of middle-men, peddlers and entrepreneurs as a kind of pre-colonial capitalist influence. Living apart from the village and the princely kraton, the middle-men formed districts of basic importance to the economy of the state and lived apart in the capital of the state ^{with} the protection of the prince or some lesser lords. Since they were alien to the community the unwritten native adat governed their relationship with the native communities, yet there was no protective wall drawn around the legal life of the folk communities contacted by these foreigners.(16)

Official documents as early as the 9th century A. D. mentioned persons who were not part of the established social order, the "wang yuki," which included slaves, the "mandala," and ~~some~~ foreign merchant groups. The "mandala," or autonomous communities (estates), were controlled ^{by} by indigenous priesthood which exercised magical and ritualistic supervision over trades and a variety of craftsmanship. The mandala held a strong animosity towards Hindusim, Hindu class concepts and urban culture traits; usually the mandala expressed only a nominal recognition of the Hindu oriented ruler.

The numerous harbor principalities which dotted the coastline from Sumatra to the Moluccas contained an indigenous trading element long before the coming of the first Westerners to Indonesia. These centers of international trade connected the Middle and Near East with the Far East, the many markets patronized by a constant flow of hundreds of merchants

peddlers who travelled from port to port. The indigenous Indonesian aristocracy derived much of its wealth from overseas trade investment while Indonesian traders also participated in great measure in the coastal commerce; it is probable that some non-Indonesians made up the peddler element. This trading community was well organized in its commercial capitalist investment activity, and on a part with the European systems, this latter fact having been discovered by the first Portuguese and Dutch mercantilists on the Indonesian scene.

The middle-men in Indonesia were sandwiched between the court and its aristocracy and the village centered peasant society as an urban oriented, indigenous trading element in the pre-Western period. Furthermore, this trading class appears to have come primarily from the bottom level of society, owing to the largely passive position of the aristocracy which was in its commercial investment attitude, secure in its divinely sanctioned and ritualistically enshrined position of social primacy.(17)

The foreign merchants--the Indians, Chinese and Arabs came to the Indonesian archipelago in a search for spices. The Chinese came from their home ports in the adjacent mainland; the Hindus coming from a distant base in the far west found it necessary to establish bases in the Straits of Malacca where they could replenish rice and water stores. An Arabic-Islamic influence began to assert itself about 1250, and by the end of the fifteenth century the Mohammedans were well on their way to control of the area. (18)

Though living in special quarters in the cities and

and being the dispensers of certain urban technological advances, the foreign merchants remained an exclusive group, never becoming a part of the urban culture, and as a consequence arousing suspicion and resentment from the masses. The Chinese minority was noted for its privileged position, having its own chieftain class and judiciary. Indonesian cities never underwent an assimilated homogeneous merchant culture and efforts to produce harmony among the merchant nationalities were in vain. Since Indonesian tradition regarded the foreign trader as coarse and impure, the outsider's exclusive position was further emphasized.(19)

In summation, the middle-men were in some cases, a disruptive element in society and, as will be discussed later, provided the vehicle by which Western influence could penetrate into native society, causing a further differentiation and displacement.

Indonesian society before the impact of Western influence may be described then as extremely cohesive and socially stratified with the aristocracy and the peasantry providing the main structural supports. This cohesion had a political and religious quality designed to resist change and social disorganization. In the towns the embryo middle class of traders and entrepreneurs could occasionally bring about social disruption, but this group was as yet too small to exercise any great influence upon the traditional balanced social order. Only with the increasing inroads of the West is this order threatened until by the 19th century a vast process of social displacement having far reaching political consequences

commences. In the next few pages this displacement as a result of Western contact will be analyzed.

Footnotes

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CHAPTER II

THE IMPACT OF MODERN WESTERN ECONOMY

I

THE PEASANTRY AND DUTCH ECONOMIC AND LAND POLICIES (1)

In the 17th Century the weakening of the self-contained and mutually protective village society was accomplished in Indonesia through the penetration of Western estates producing for the world market and requiring village labor in order to maintain production levels. This resulted in the disorganization and disruption of society. Through the introduction of the money economy, the peasant found that money was needed for money taxes and to pay for items which had suddenly become essential to his welfare and material comfort; so he obtained money wages by selling his labor and producing for a distant market. The peasant was thereby drawn away from his traditionally closed economy. This resulted in the displacement of a growing number of peasants, many of whom became increasingly dependent on a money wage; in time this dependency on a money wage and dissatisfaction with economic, social and political conditions led to a rural labor movement which was largely manifested in unionism, communism and nationalism.

The basis for Dutch economic and political control over Indonesia for more than three centuries rested upon the mercantile adventure which brought Western man in ever increasing numbers to the Pacific. This movement was eventually headed in the archipelago by the Dutch East India Company. The Company was formed by a group of enterprising

mercantilists interested in obtaining a monopoly over Southeast Asia's rich products, particularly the spice regions of the Moluccas, as well as the carrying trade in the Orient. Having been granted sovereign rights and a Charter by the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands, the Company assumed the position of a state within a state and proceeded to consolidate her monopoly in Indonesia through increasing amounts of effort and capital spent for the administration, judiciary and defense of its acquired trading posts and territories. In the 17th and 18th Centuries the Dutch group made use of international trade which had existed in the Orient long before the coming of the white man. The Company's concessions were eventually expanded to include rented fortresses and trading posts, with or without surrounding land, certain commercial privileges gained by perennial loan, or through war, bequest or purchase, with or without annual tax and manpower deliveries according to indigenous custom, and finally obtaining considerable land under her absolute control. (2) This alien Dutch occupation provided the vehicle for the penetration of the Western estate economy and the eventual displacement of the village society.

At the time of the first Western contact with Indonesia, the peasantry was self-sufficient and predominantly dependent upon agriculture as the chief means of subsistence. The "sawah", or irrigated rice cultivation, and the shifting cultivation of the "ladang" were the main features of the subsistence economy. The closed village economy found

the peasants producing largely for their own needs, with the rice surplus supporting the royal princes and their kraton abode. In short, the village society was self-contained and featured mutual protection in all forms of existence.

The extensive ladang areas produced marketable crops, such as pepper, the proceeds usually finding their way to the Chiefs. No fundamental changes in the pattern of social structure were experienced until the Westerners appeared as organizers of the economy. The creation of a Western estate economy required village labor. This ever-deepening penetration into the Indonesian economy disturbed the desa or village community by requiring the population to cultivate crops for the world market and using the sawahs in particular for the alternating growth of sugar and rice crops. This revolutionary introduction by the Dutch of the cultivation of cash crops in certain village areas helped to cause an increase in population and compelled the use of money in trading transactions. Consequently, the peasant was caught up in the market economy which required money, money wages, and money taxes; the peasant was required to sell his labor and to produce for a distant market.

A growing number of peasants were displaced from their traditional role in society and many became increasingly dependent on a money wage. The increase in population resulted from administrative measures which provided for the construction of roads, greater security from marauders,

vaccination against smallpox, and provisions to reduce the threat of famines. Money came into circulation in the form of wages among the population, who worked in sugar factories. Agrarian legislation during the Netherlands so-called liberal period from 1870 to 1900 sought to protect the peasants from disappropriation on the part of foreigners while fostering large scale investment of Western capital in private agricultural undertakings. (3) The most important crops consisted of Deli's tobacco and Javanese plantation production of sugar, coffee, tea and quinine. The private leasing of the watery rice fields from the Indonesian owners for the cultivation of sugar cane in rotation with the rice grown by the native owners led to a further weakening of the native ownership of land. This was accomplished by the sugar planters who regarded the village areas as one single complex and the village communities as public corporations, owning the land on a communal basis; consequently, the landowner was not dealt with individually, but rather through the village chiefs. This was an outright usurpation of the peasant's traditional right and by disrupting the customary practices helped to reduce the peasant's self-sufficiency.

As daily wage earners or seasonal workers on the plantation and as the recipient of rents paid by the plantation owner, the Indonesian peasantry obtained money income. In addition to the cultivation of cash crops, cheap mass produced goods penetrated the formerly self-sufficient Indo-

nesian village economy. For instance, the native weaving industry was ousted by the import of printed cotton goods from the Dutch industrial area of Twente. The predominantly passive attitude of the Indonesian peasant towards the incursions of the money economy was characterized by this attitude: the peasant remained a self-sufficient farmer, seeking other income only when forced to and attempting to restrict the periods of his dependency on the Western-owned undertaking to a minimum; above all, he preferred to leave the profit making (as will be shown) to the planter, the money lender, and middleman. The ever-increasing population occurred chiefly in the areas of the sugar plantations, which, by providing increased opportunity for employment, increased in turn the means of livelihood while the cultural aspects of Indonesian life made its contribution to the rapid growth in the population for the "tani", or farmer, desired to possess many children, sufficient to help the "tani" with the farm work and to insure him against the high death rate among children.(4) The peasantry remained passive in its outlook causing the Netherlands government to become quite concerned over the gradually declining welfare of the Javanese.(5)

From 1900 to 1930 it became increasingly necessary that it was the government's duty to protect the population against the economic enterprise. Dutch industrialists hoped for a widening of their sales markets in Indonesia as a result of increased welfare of the people by such means as irrigation, education, the promotion of popular credit facil-

ities, and expert agricultural advice. During this age of imperialism as in previous times the colonies were required to provide raw material for Western industry. In addition to the profitable consumption goods, such as coffee, sugar, teas, quinine and tobacco produced in the estate economy, the Outer Islands were providing oil, tin, bauxite, and coal for use in the Netherlands and for sale elsewhere by Dutch capitalists. A further dependency of the islands beyond Java, such as Sumatrans, upon foreign middlemen or upon large Western businesses helped to compensate for the vast stretches of uncultivated ground in the region. In these areas, the peasants, being displaced from a subsistence economy, were given the opportunity to earn money for the purchase of various types of imported goods in addition to their usual occupation in subsistence farming. During the 1920's, the modernization of the Western social and economic outlook provided new occupational opportunities in administrative and technical capacities for a relatively large number of skilled Indonesian personnel. Western transportation methods gave^{rise} to a need for chauffeurs and mechanics. The shortage of farmland caused a further displacement as many of the peasantry were forced to leave for the towns in search of work. Completing the break with the traditional land-bound society, many found work in retail and intermediary trade, education and medicine while some farmers, in addition to growing the main subsistence crops of rice and maize,

improved techniques and cultivation practices of profitable market-crops and thereby achieved a degree of prosperity. Some workers found employment in refining and processing of agricultural materials: sugar, tea, and rubber; and in small cottage industry making cheap consumer goods: textiles, calico, flashlights, and sandals.

In the main, the ranks of the subsistent farmer increased, the population rising from 28 million in 1900 to 41 million in 1930. While retaining a predominantly agrarian economic structure, the Javanese economy remained extremely poor owing to the low productivity of labor, the absence of mechanization based on the abundance of cheap manual labor, and the small total output of crop production. At the same time, the general standard of living was low; this fact was further underscored by the almost total absence of native capital investment and to the circumstance that a large part of the profits was exported to the Netherlands and other countries. The displacement of the peasant was complete, for he was virtually bankrupt and held little hope of attaining economic self-sufficiency as in the pre-estate economy period. It has been observed that the native population's reaction to economic stimuli from the West was no longer passive.

Increasingly Indonesians underwent great personal sacrifice in order, by means of education, to improve their social and economic status, and an awareness of the import-

ance of mutual cooperation in economic matters led to the formation of trade unions, cooperatives and political movements of a nationalist character, like the Sarekat Islam. All of this activity was in an embryonic form, yet it held great promise for the future. A movement developed in the country on the sugar plantations as a direct result of dissatisfaction with social conditions. It developed--along a labor, nationalist, and communist pattern--as a rudimentary endeavor on the part of the peasantry to form a Western-like power concentration of its own in Indonesian business.(6)

As a result of the impact of Western entrepreneurs and the displacement of a portion of the peasantry a rural proletariat emerged and organized into trade unions and was suffused by radical political ideologies, especially communism. This meant that in the growth of nationalist parties the peasant labor element forced native political leaders to adopt extreme positions with respect to self government and the role of private Western capital. Not infrequently this extremism collided with more conservative political platforms sponsored by the Westernized aristocracy and growing native middle class.

The crisis of the world depression, war and revolution marked the period from 1930 to 1950, with serious consequences for the lot of the peasant, who was faced with greater economic and social uncertainty. The economic crisis of the world depression wrought a catastrophic decline in world agricultural prices which affected both the Western plantations and the Indonesian farmer

equally. Undertakings either closed down outright or considerably reduced their working acreage, their staffs, costs, and wages. Many Indonesians witnessed the disappearance of their money earnings or saw them shrink to a fraction of the former account. Many unemployed coolies left the plantations and workers and workers without the means to earn a living returned to the desa where the tani was receiving a trifle for his crops. (7)

There was a gradual return to the old level of subsistent economy, but it was marked by misery and paupery. Indeed, the peasantry could not return to the traditional self-sufficient pattern of society, for now there was a tremendous excess population over the available land and, more important, he was also involved in a new social and economic value system, i.e. the need for gas lamps, flashlights, sandals, etc. (8) Furthermore, the peasant became increasingly indebted as he borrowed to meet the payment of land taxes. In the process of being denied all the modest luxuries which the peasant had become accustomed to in better days, and in order to meet his financial obligations, the peasant was compelled to sell a large portion of the rice harvest, necessitating in its place the purchasing of an inferior food for his subsistence. The large-scale impoverishment and disappropriation of large numbers of peasant farmers gave rise to a further displacement of Indonesians into new trading and industrial professions in the years before World War II.

In the period after 1936, some economic recovery was made; it was occasioned by the rise of native industry which created new purchasing power. The fluid nature of the social structure and economic need required this industrialization. Large

numbers of peasants sought new opportunities in the small-scale Indonesian industries, town factories, in trade, or as colonists in the Outer Islands. By and large the standard of living of the masses benefited little by the inroads of native capitalism. A group of large Indonesian landowners was created because of the rapid turnover in land ownership and because of the ^{landless peasants increased.} ~~landless peasants increased.~~

While alleviating some of the economic burdens the wages of native industrial workers remained low.

The great economic depression of the 1930's helped to develop a degree of political consciousness in the peasantry; ^{this} is indicated in the following information.(9)

WAGES OF VARIOUS GROUPS OF WORKERS

	Daily Wage in U.S. dollars
Regular workmen on sugar plantations	.22 (1940)
Seasonal laborers on sugar plantations (male)	.11 (1940)
Male workers on tobacco plantations of Deli Planter's Union (East Coast of Sumatra)	.23 (1939)
Average daily wage of workers in sugar factories in Java	.11 (1940)
Skilled Laborers in metal industry (Java and Madura)	.24-.32 (1939)
Male workers in tile and pottery factories (Java and Madura)	.12-.24 (1939)
Male and female workers in textile factories (Java and Madura)	.06-.13 (1939)
Male workers in batik enterprises (Java and Madura)	.07-.17 (1939)

Western business asked the government to direct and control production as a means to make their business pay again. This resulted in a severe restriction of production and later was followed by import limitations. The war, Japanese occupation and revolution, which struck Indonesia during the period of 1941 to 1949 witnessed a further development of cooperatives, a weakening of the plantation system, and an increased tempo for Indonesian industry. The peasantry

in some parts of Java agitated for the need for land distribution, and again social and economic disruption is indicated by the flow of impoverished country-dwellers to the towns which continued at a high rate. The introduction of forced labor by the Japanese, and the flow of young peasants into the army and gerilla bands partially switched the problem of over-population in the countryside to the towns. Impoverishment since 1945 continues to prevail among the masses' economy.(10)

II

THE ARISTOCRACY

It was a characteristic of Dutch colonial policy to use the native aristocracy, beginning with the East India Company, to govern Indonesia in an indirect capacity. The Aristocracy, having become stooges of the Dutch, especially in the 19th and 20th centuries, were no longer responsible to the people. This dependence of the aristocracy on the Dutch was marked by the latter's giving official civil service rank to the aristocracy, while the Dutch officials took on the attributes of Indonesian aristocracy. The aristocracy became fully dependent on Dutch prestige and more apathetic to the interest of their fellow nationals as time passed; this apathy and favored position aroused the enmity of a growing non-aristocratic intelligentsia.

The 19th century witnessed the growth of a Dutch political philosophy which regarded the East India Archipelago as an integral part of the Netherlands Empire. This in turn gave rise to the development of a hierarchy of civil servants who functioned in a feudal-supervisory

position over the native world. As puppets of the Dutch, the original native aristocracy was confirmed in its hereditary privileges through absorption in the new civil service by the colonial government. Among the attributes of aristocracy life given the native aristocracy and the Dutch civil servants were: the right to be accompanied by a fixed number of body guards, each carrying the symbols of power, such as the naked sword, the whip or images of the sacred birds, (11) while the entire Dutch civil service was accorded the ornaments of Indonesian feudalism in the 19th century. The method by which the indigenous aristocracy made their adjustment to the Dutch colonial was manifested through an ideological tour de force, in some instances justifying their subordinate position to the Dutch government through a mythological rationale involving the descent of their own kings from the Dutch monarch and incorporating in their code of chivalry obedience to the representatives of the Dutch Crown. The city remained the administrative center exacting the payment of taxes according to a variety of systems based on the traditional feudal deliveries. That part of the aristocracy not absorbed by the new civil service resisted the Dutch penetration into the traditional order, going so far as to wage war, i.e. the Java War of 1825-1830. The increasing dependency of the aristocracy on the Dutch colonial government was heightened as a result of the physical impact of progress in the 20th century through the introduction of technological advances in construction and transportation and through a cultural Westernization process afforded by the cities, such as education.

New social classes in the city, coupled with an influx of Europeans from all walks of life, gave the Indonesian city a Western flavor with sharp social and cultural differences. Above all, race became the fundamental basis governing social relationships, educational attainment having little importance in the societal scheme.

The most significant critic of the place of the aristocrat in the civil service and society was the influential new 20th century class of native intellectuals and professional men. Their ranks were swelled by the growing numbers of Indonesians receiving higher education in Europe and, later, in Indonesia. They became the vanguard of a new cultural force dedicated to bring within the reach of every Indonesian the advantages of modern Western technological and cultural achievements. The continued caste structure of society, opposition to many aspects of Dutch rule and culture, the small numbers of Indonesians allowed to enter the higher executive and government position, and opposition to the continuation of the privileged position of the native aristocracy in the civil service, to the exclusion of the commoners, were the main objects of criticism. The intellectual class used the academic degree as a standard of equality with the European group, and as a weapon to combat the latter's class consciousness. There were many limitations on realizing an academic training, but those succeeding became a part of an urban elite which was distinguished by an extreme nationalist attitude; this intellectual group fostered a further social differentiation between the population groups of the modern colonial town.(12)

THE MIDDLE CLASS

The position of the Europeans and Chinese middle-men became considerably less stable even before world war II. Individual property, prosperity and intellectual abilities began to form the base for a new status-system, but the old structure of feudal and colonial society largely checked the development of the middle class.

The expansion of foreign trade in the 18th and 19th centuries created many middle-man's jobs, this capacity being assumed by the Chinese, their position eventually solidifying through the years as a link between the Western authorities and the passive ^{native} population. Because of their economic interests, the Chinese as a social group fitted well into the new middle class positions being created in the commercial part of the economy. The following figures reveal the percentage distribution of Chinese economic activity in Indonesia according to the latest census.(13)

	Born in Indonesia		Born Elsewhere	
	Men	Women	Men	Women
Primary production, incl. agriculture and mining	21.7%	13.2%	36.2%	23.7%
Industry	14.8	20.5	22.2	19.2
Traffic and transport	5.7	.5	1.6	.8
Commerce	44.1	54.2	32.1	37.5
Other, incl. professional and white-collar work	13.7	11.6	7.9	18.8

Owing to the traditional absence of the profit motive in Indonesian society, the Chinese were able to obtain a firm footing in the independent middle class, their position being maintained by connections and cooperation within their own groups as well as an abundant possession of capital reserves and a superior knowledge of world affairs. The

Chinese therefore became increasingly dependent upon large scale enterprise.

In the 19th century, the indispensable part of society, the Chinese or Arab middle-men, lent the peasant money and purchased his irregular crops. Practicing usury, they nevertheless provided cash in time of need, extending long-range credits and asking no questions. When the village elders were unable to provide assistance to the peasantry, tradition prescribed that the peasantry be brought into contact with the moneylender. The middle-man was viewed by the peasant as an indispensable guide in the labyrinth of a money economy, the relationship of the peasant to the moneylender resembling "that of a feudal client to his patron." (14)

As founders and managers of large and small scale undertakings, the Indonesian middle class created new jobs for the masses, as for instance the investment in the weaving industry in 1936. By providing jobs for the peasantry, the middle-men fostered a further displacement and disruption of the traditional society. Together Chinese and Arabs operated as professional traders, independent merchants and artisans. The Chinese were held in little esteem by the Indonesian nobility and peasantry, but in the colonial estimation the Chinese middle-men were fairly loyal and very useful as intermediaries between the white man and the natives.

Concurrent with the rise of the intellectuals a middle class of traders, small manufacturers and shopkeepers emerged in the Indonesian towns. The interests of this group almost

from the beginning clashed with the more established position of the Chinese and Europeans; more important, this native Indonesian middle class became very nationalist in its economic activity. The small class of native Indonesian entrepreneurs developed strong nationalist attitudes because of their opposition to the Chinese middle-men. The Javanese *barik* (i.e., printed native cloth) as early as 1911 formed an association, the Sarekat Islam, using their religion as the unifying element; the organization conducted several bloody riots against the Chinese, later taking a more nationalist character which condemned indiscriminately all nonnative economic control. The government in 1920 declared that the true character of the million member Sarekat Islam was tied to economic grievances: "The essence of the native movement is: the effort to remove the restrictive competition of non-native capitalist concerns by endeavouring to end the entire non-native domination, politically, as well as economically. The core of the nationalist movement is, therefore, the revolt of the increasing productive powers of an early-capitalist native society against the economic and political domination of foreign capital." (15)

The Sarekat Islam in later years waged a fight against all capitalism with "Western" capitalism its primary target, for "Eastern" capitalism was permissible in the organization's seemingly socialistic outlook; it even became the vanguard in countless labor disputes. Local chambers of commerce were divided when native members would secede and form separate groups on the grounds that "their economic interests were

wholly incompatible with the viewpoints of Dutch businessmen"(16)

As part of the indigenous society, the middle class joined with the intellectuals to form a new elite segment of social strata, especially adopting a superior attitude toward the life of the simple villager which it frequently derided. Since the Chinese no longer enjoyed a monopoly in trade, they were obliged to organize larger concerns in order to withstand Indonesian competition, otherwise they were faced with the prospect of seeking employment elsewhere, i.e., in industry or the civil service, two fields in which they had shown little interest in the past. As a consequence, Chinese intellectuals began to compete with the native, Indonesian and Indo-European mestizo elements for the higher posts in civil service. Owing to their long association in the archipelago, the Indl-Chinese held a cultural similarity with other Indonesians; the Indo-Chinese had already forgotten their Sino-language, some using Dutch and the vast majority Indonesian languages.

With the expansion of the native Indonesian middle class of business and intellectuals, the middle class begins to assume a political outlook that can be described as bourgeois nationalism, i.e., a national independent state in which the propertied middle class holds preponderant political power. This means (as will be described later) that a conflict developed between the rural proletariat organized in radical political parties and the growing Indonesian bourgeois. (17)

Footnotes

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6. Wertheim, Op Cit., pp. 4-9.
7. Gonggrijp. Op Cit., Chapter 7.
8. Samitro Djodjadikusomo. Het Volkscrédietwezen in de depressie (Popular Credit during the Depression). Kolff, Djakarta: 1952, Chapter I.
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10. See the survey of Indonesia national income published in Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia (Economics and Finance of Indonesia). Jakarta: June, 1954, pp. 350-388.
11. van der Kroef, "The Indonesian City", Op Cit., p. 567.
12. Ibid., pp. 564-571.
13. Justus L. van der Kroef. "Chinese Assimilation in Indonesia" Social Research. Winter, 1953, p. 464.
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17. W. F. Wertheim. "De ontdekking van Azië" (The Discovery of Asia) De Nieuwe Stem (The New Voice). January, 1954. pp. 5-15.

CHAPTER III

THE SOCIAL CLASSES AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION

I

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM 1900-1940

The advent of liberalism in Indonesia was the product of many individuals, some of them idealists and humanitarians (W. van Hoevell, Multatuli), academic Liberals and statesmen (Thorbecke, de Waal), and practical men of affairs (Fransen van de Putte). During the 19th century thousands of Dutchmen of all walks of life went to Indonesia in pursuit of career opportunity and in consequence laid the foundation of a cultural interaction between the two countries. It was also a period marked by great freedom of individual enterprise, Dutch colonial consolidation, and numerous problems which liberalism seemed unable to cope with. The impact of Western estate and mining operations in the Indonesian world disrupted native economy, and the population increased rapidly as a result of peace and order. Another difficult problem raised with the attempt to establish the "pax Neerlandica" was the heavy drain on the Dutch treasury. Finally, the question of constitutional autonomy pitted the growing community of Dutchmen in Indonesia against the far away Netherlands Administration, this political struggle being joined after the turn of the century by an increasing number of Western trained Indonesian intellectuals. (1)

Another departure in colonial policy was Queen Wilhelmina's announcement in 1901 of the so-called ethical policy. Attributed in part to Java's diminishing welfare, the advent of a new combination of confessional political parties and the increasing demand for autonomy, the ethical policy had as its basis the realization that the Netherlands had a "moral duty" to perform as regards the peoples of Indonesia. While the Dutch provided considerable financial assistance in 1905 for the improvement of economic conditions in Java and Madura, and again in 1936 as compensation for the Indonesian sacrifice in reserving part of its market during the world depression, the economic cleavage in the country between Indonesian and European enterprise was unbridgeable; a growing number of Indonesians resented the Dutch economic policy which worked undue hardship upon the colony.

An increased amount of autonomy was granted to Indonesia during the years of the ethical policy. The trend toward a representative form of government was reached in 1903 when the decentralization law was passed; this law widened the powers of local councils of administration and laid the foundation for the development of regional divisions, a pattern which was broken by the outbreak of the Second World War. A need for a central representative body was in great evidence. Besides the rising tide of Indonesian nationalism made the formation of such a body imperative. This demand was manifest with the establishment of a representative

body was in great evidence. Besides the rising tide of Indonesian nationalism made the formation of such a body imperative. This demand was manifest with the establishment of a representative body in the Netherlands India, the Volksraad, which was formally opened in 1918. Indonesian nationalists hailed the move toward national self-government however the public, according to reports of the time, was not interested "to play at holding parliament." (2)

The apathy of the Indonesian masses was perhaps due to the fact that of the 39 original members of the Volksraad, half of the membership, including the chairman, were appointed by the Government and that the Volksraad had little or no legislative authority. Its powers were gradually expanded to include, in addition to financial advice, co-legislative authority in budgetary matters, full legislative authority in relatively minor administrative affairs and consultative powers, as well as the rights of initiative, petition and interpellation. Through the years the number of delegates was raised, until an Indonesian majority sat in the Volksraad. The years up to the end of the First World War were marked by a barrage of hostile criticism, anti-capitalism, anti-Dutch and revolutionary speeches.

In the wake of nationalist incidents, following the end of World War I in Europe, colonial policy was again revised. Parliamentary motions considered by the so-called Revision Commission envisaged complete parliamentary powers for the Volksraad, a steady decentralization of the

administration, and the establishment of an Imperial Council. However, the Commission report agreed that greater legislative powers for the Volksraad, a new Constitution for the Netherlands, which would place Indonesia upon a level of higher equality with the Motherland, and the further decentralization of the internal administration of Indonesia leading towards more local autonomy, were essential to the successful solution of Indonesian-Netherlands problems. (3)

Meanwhile a separate Dutch commission had worked on a new constitution for the Netherlands, which was adopted in 1922. Hereafter the word "colony" was dropped and Indonesia was recognized as an integral part of the Netherlands realm. The Volksraad was given new legislative authority, the Minister of the Colonies was made responsible to the Dutch legislature, and, more important, a sense of self importance was created in many layers of the Indonesian public; all of this was indicative of the democratic rule of law which was an essential element in the constitutional relationship between Holland and Indonesia soon after World War I terminated.

The reactionary legalism which engulfed Dutch colonial policy after 1922 completely destroyed the bright promise of a harmonious constitutional government for Indonesia. This unenlightened conservatism was consequently met by an ever-increasing nationalist resentment. Foremost in the breakdown of autonomous government was the institution of the Regulation of 1925 by the Colonial Minister

de Graaff which provided: limitation of a few of the powers of the Crown, gave the Volksraad some legislative authority, and reduced the Council of the Indies to a mere advisory body. The Regulation of 1925 became law, thereby neglecting the promise of the Constitution: Indonesian independence as an integral part of the realm.

The causes of the upsurge in conservatism in Indonesia can be ascribed to several primary factors. (4) First, the Dutch community was alarmed by the profound nationalist demonstrations between 1920 and 1930. A large degree of Communist agitation, mass demonstrations led by nationalists and Communists, Communist inspired strikes and incendiary propaganda in the native press caused the open hostility between the Indonesian masses and the Dutch community. Now demands for autonomy and equal rights for the Indonesian had given way to a form of reactionary legalism. Separatism among the various population groups and racial differentiation became stronger between all ethnic groups. Even the Volksraad, after 1931, became a sounding board for narrow and particular interests.

Colonial society in Indonesia during this period was marked by racialism and racial discrimination. Above all the Indonesian community was structured in a strict caste-like society with the small European minority at the top, this tending to cause friction in political and economic distinctions between the various ethnic groups. An obvious factor which increased the tension of this period

was this racial consciousness and discrimination which resulted in the "sealing off" of the native world in its growth upward. Indonesians were barred from certain recreational establishments, leading functions in business, Government services, and, most important, the racial bias tended to prevent a fruitful cooperation between progressive Dutchmen and Indonesians in their avowed goal of building a new Indonesia.

The world-wide economic depression of the 1930's further strained relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands and seriously affected the constitutional relationship between the two countries. The selfish economic and political conservatism of the Dutch during the depression years increased the standard of living in the Netherlands but further reduced the standard of living for Indonesians and caused a division of mental outlook which remained practically unchanged through the period of the formation of the Republic of Indonesia. Indonesia's economy was hard hit by the depression owing to its position as a producer of raw materials (sugar, tea, rubber, and tropical agricultural products). Reorganization and retrenchment of holdings dictated the policies of the badly hit Western enterprises. Far more serious the economy of the Indonesian was ruinously affected; unemployment in the Western economic enterprises forced many Indonesians back to the village society, where poverty's handmaiden misery abounded. Unfortunately for the Indonesian the Government followed economic commercial and financial policies which adversely

influenced Indonesia's economy, to the extent that Indonesia was listed in the League of Nations reports as the area where the depression waged longest and most severely. Another factor which sharply influenced Indonesian opinion was the curtailment by the Dutch of most of the welfare services. The most damaging blow to Indonesian-Netherlands relations was the awareness of the groups clamoring for more political and economic independence that Indonesian tariffs financed to a large extent the Dutch economy. Subsidies to Dutch shipping lines and the support of the greater half of the Dutch fleet was paid by her financially weak colony. (5)

The political conservatism in the late twenties and thirties was directly traced to the too heavy hand of the Netherlands Government and of the States-General. The Volksraad, or People's Council, was not an instrument of popular autonomy for Indonesians, a situation dispised by both Indonesians and Dutch in the colony.

These trends of conservatism produced a reaction among the Indonesian intelligentsia and the native population which was rapidly becoming aware of their stake in an independent Indonesia. The chief reactions consisted of extremist agitation, the formation of new nationalist blocs demanding parliamentary government and independence, a host of nationalist propaganda in the native press, and oftimes a sense of hopelessness and apathy. The causes for complaint in colonial life were many: qualified Indonesians, on the economic side, were excluded from the better executive functions and in public life their ability was confined to

the lowest levels; educationally, the Government as late as 1930 pursued a policy which left more than 93% of the Indonesian population illiterate, which allowed only about 200 Indonesians on an annual average to graduate from various high schools and which kept popular education at the level of extreme simplicity. Underscoring the glaring inequities of such a system was the fact that the Dutch annually made millions of dollars from their various estate enterprises, Indonesia's share of the profits being abysmally low. In a final underestimate of the situation, the Dutch refused to entertain motions calling for greater autonomy in the Volksraad. (6)

In summary it may be said that nationalist parties arose as a result of a variety of factors. Boedi Oetomo, or Noble Endeavor, became a party of moderate nationalists of aristocratic origin with western education who worked for the social and educational independence of Indonesians, both rural and urban. An entrepreneur middle class adopted Islam as its rallying point and organized under the banner of the Sarekat Islam. The radical Marxist groups, appealing to the organized labor groups, split into several factions, one desiring socialist government and the other striving for the supremacy of the Soviet-dominated Communist party. A nationalist party of educated Indonesian commoners dedicated to the complete economic and political independence of Indonesia based on the unity and self-reliance of the masses attracted millions of followers. Even ethnic groups banded together in the cause of racial self-protection. Finally, in the wake

of dissatisfaction with the Volksraad, the regulation of autonomy, an oppressive press censorship, and unequal and limited educational opportunity, Indonesian public opinion took on a still more radical tone.

II

POLITICAL ORGANIZATION AND NATIONALISM

Indonesian nationalism before 1912 largely followed cultural currents, with education being the chief vehicle for this phase of the nationalist movement. The first cultural-nationalist movement was called Boedi Oetomo, or Noble Endeavor. It was founded by two medical students, sons of aristocrats, Raden Soetomo and Raden Goenawan Mangoenkoesomo, in October, 1908, and propagandized for the development of traditional and Western education among the peoples of Java and Madura, the advancement of agriculture, industry and commerce among them, and, finally, everything that will guarantee the Indonesians the life of a dignified people. (7) Civil servants provided the heavy majority of the movement's almost 10,000 members in 1909, but the organization soon disbanded owing to the great loss of membership to political-nationalist organizations by 1913.

MUSLIM POLITICAL ACTIVITY

The Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, or the Indonesian Islamic Association Party (PSII), was the first politically-based native Indonesian nationalist organization. Founded in 1912, it built a membership of over 360,000 in four years and embarked upon a program which demanded self-government, to be obtained by force if required. Its membership increased to almost two and a half million and practically universal

sentiment endorsed its militant nationalist bid for complete independence. The Sarekat Islam was swelled with an almost overnight increase in membership since the Dutch were not prepared for the outgrowth of the organization while the Indonesian masses flocked to the banners of the native-led movement. Also contributing to the spread of Sarekat Islam was the surge of Chinese nationalism which greatly influenced the Indo-Chinese. By 1904, there emerged a penetration into the interior of Java of aggressive, competitive Chinese entrepreneurs who impinged upon the traditional interests of the vestigial Javanese merchant class. A co-operative trading organization was formed by the Javanese to combat the inroads of the Chinese traders; this Islamic Trading Association eventually gave way to the Sarekat Islam. Its original economic motive was soon over-shadowed by its religious unity against foreigners and, especially, Chinese, and its advancement of the interests of all and mutual assistance was easily interpreted in terms of strong nationalism. Of this new common bond the leaders were able to establish rapport with the people through the medium of religion, the national bond, and were thereby able to give expression to the feelings and dreams of the Indonesians. (8)

By 1912, the Sarekat Dagang Islam emerged as the Sarekat Islam, or Islam Association, under the leadership of non-merchant intellectuals and religious spokesmen as well as merchants. Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, its first chairman, was possessed of considerable Western education. He announced the Association's initial program as being of absolute loyalty to the Dutch government (the Dutch had forbade organizations and meetings of a political nature by then). The program was

dedicated to promoting commerce among Indonesians; mutual protection and support of members who encounter economic difficulties; promotion of the intellectual development and material interests of the Indonesians; and opposition to wrong religious concepts concerning the Mohammedan religion, and promotion of religious life among Indonesians. (9)

The movement's leaders emphasized the antithesis between the traditional Indonesian aristocracy and the interests of the people, especially since the aristocratic Indonesian administrative officers of the Dutch regime opposed the Sarekat Islam, for they felt that it attacked their privileges and threatened their position. Fromberg observed in 1914 that

"One characteristic of the Sarekat Islam movement is that it blames the native government officials for a large part of the misery of the people; in them and the emancipation of the people opposing elements are seen. The non-native is seen making off with the profits of the country, and these native officials are found to be protectors; people feel themselves repressed and obstructed by the oppressive customary laws; every attempt to raise themselves is frustrated, and the native officials are seen as the main-tainers of these laws." (10)

A Sarekat Islam leader, Raden Achmad, stated in March, 1914, that

"The people have joined Sarekat Islam en masses because they seek their rights! They have sought them in vain from their legal chiefs (the Indonesian aristocracy)...It is the people that sees its rights continually threatened; that is why there is the great cry for them to unite themselves in order to defend and resist with more power those who rob them of their rights." (11)

As the Sarekat Islam movement expanded it increasingly took on a political emphasis, using religion as a principal means to a definite political ends.

Heterogeneous elements provided the wide basis of support by the beginning of 1914, the leaders of Sarekat Islam recog-

nizing that mass appeal was the key to success. Its membership consisted of religious leaders, merchants, peasants, laborers, and educated young Javanese. The Dutch government was naturally alarmed at the movement's tremendous growth and sought to deal with it by an indirect approach, for it was aware that a direct attempt to suppress to suppress the movement could lead to a dangerous mass reaction against the government. The act of March, 1914, found the government conferring legal status on the various branches of Sarekat Islam, thereby cutting off its central headquarters from the various branches. This action definitely weakened the movement, but the long range consequence, beginning in several years, was the development of the movement in a very radical direction. The authority of the central moderate exponents of Modernist Islam ideas was undermined by the Dutch; this factor allowed an easier infiltration by the more radical elements, basically Communist, who captured control of a major number of Sarekat Islam's branches.

The Marxist penetration of the PSII was originally based with the foundation of the Indies Social Democratic Association by Hendrick Sneevliet, which attracted a small minority of the National Indies Party. Racial equality, socio-economic justice, and ultimate independence, based on the cooperation of society's Eurasian-Indonesian element, was the program of the short-lived National Indies Party, the Nationale Indische Partij, formed in December, 1912. Its membership was composed of about 1500 Indonesians and 6,000 Eurasians, who resented the growing competition of Dutch administrators who came to the archipelago for career purposes, then returned to the Netherlands in retirement. The party was suppressed within

a year's time and its leaders exiled -- Douwes Dekker, an Eurasian, and Dr. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Ki Hadjar Dewantoro. This was the first and last threat of an Indonesian-Eurasian combination against Dutch rule. (12)

Uniting with the small number of former National Indies Party members, the Indies Social Democratic Association experimented with the radicalism of socialism. The party was formed in 1914 by Sneevliet and the Dutch socialists H. W. Dekker, Bergsma, and Brandsteder. The organization grew rapidly in numbers and in the radicalism of its Marxism although some of its political moderates defected. However, it became evident that political independence and socialist economic organization, to be obtained through a successful revolution, would not attract a broad base of Indonesians with European leadership directing the Association. This fact spurred contact with several socialistically inclined Indonesian leaders of the Semarang branch of Sarekat Islam; the Semarang branch joined the Social Democratic Association while remaining active in the Islam organization as energetic proselytizers, Semaoen and Darsono by 1917 being the most able of the Communist heralds. With the government order forcing Sarekat Islam's organizational disintegration an ideal situation was presented for infiltration the mass-based Sarekat Islam with the express purpose of capturing the support of the Indonesian masses. The Social Democratic Association became influenced by events in Russia, and by 1922 Sneevliet was sent to China as the Comintern's first delegate, proposing to the Chinese Communist Central Committee that the ranks of the Kuomintang be infiltrated by the Communists in order to gain contact with the broad mass of Chinese people. This indicates the success of

the Communist penetration into Sarekat Islam. (13)

The program drawn up by the Sarekat Islam's second national congress in October, 1917, reflected the increasing strength of many local branches influenced by Marxism, since by now independence was demanded and it was hinted that violence might be in the offing if this goal was not attained. Furthermore, an outright condemnation of "sinful capitalism" was pressured through the congress by the Communist-dominated branches. Tjokroaminoto placated the merchant financial backers of Sarekat Islam by declaring that foreign capitalism was "sinful capitalism" as opposed to Indonesian capitalism which was acceptable. Many urban laborers and the poorer peasants gave sympathetic support to the Marxist slogans, serving to impell the central leadership of Sarekat Islam to move even closer to a revolutionary political program and Marxist ideas. By October, 1918, a membership of 450,000 was represented in the third national congress, its potentially revolutionary character and increased socialistic emphasis being quite apparent.

The congress once more called for wide-spread social reforms, but the powerful Marxist faction led by Semaen was not satisfied. Since the revolutionary atmosphere prevalent in Europe in 1917-18 seemed to threaten even Holland, the Governor-General of Indonesia became thoroughly alarmed and promised rapid and extensive reforms in the structure of the Indies government, but this attitude revealed a weakness and willingness on the part of the government to appease in a time of crisis which prompted the Indonesian leaders to embark upon more extreme nationalist programs. The government arrested Sneevliet and forced him to leave Indonesia in

in December, 1918, but this did not prevent the continued infiltration of Sarekat Islam by members of the Social Democratic Association. They were not able to gain control of the fourth congress of Sarekat Islam held in 1919, with a membership of two and a half million represented. The extreme proposals of Semaoen's faction were not accepted by the leadership of Sarekat Islam, so he and other leaders of the Social Democratic Association undertook to form the Communist Party of the Indies. (14)

While the Communist Party of Indonesia was undergoing growth and consolidation, the central leadership of Sarekat Islam initiated an active policy which surpassed the activity of the Semaoen faction. Violent attacks against the policy of the government led to several small insurrections in the Celebes and West Java in 1919. (15) Trade union organization attracted the leaders of Sarekat Islam, and by the end of 1919, twenty-two Indonesian trade unions with a total of 77,000 members were united under the Trade Union Central. The Semaoen faction attempted to gain control of the organization, but was defeated in this effort. As a consequence, a rival association of trade unions, the Revolutionary Trade Union Central was set up, detaching considerable strength from the older organization.

The bitter dispute over control of the Sarekat Islam's branches and the growing trade union movement, coupled with the organization's central leadership differences over such points as class warfare and religion, made a formal rupture between the two groups inevitable. The struggle was culminated in a motion by Hadji Agoes Salim at the Sixth National Congress of Sarekat Islam, which called for party discipline

and required that no party member could hold membership in any other organization. The opposition to the motion was led by Semaoen and Tan Malaka, a Communist leader; both accused the central leadership of being capitalist and anti-socialist. This attempted ridicule was effectively refuted by Hadji Salim wherein he maintained that "Mohammed had preached socialist economics twelve centuries before Marx was born." This resulted in a vote which ended in victory for the central leadership as the membership by a huge majority favored party discipline. When the results became known, the Communists present resigned, and later were followed by the secession of the Communist-controlled branches of Semarang. There is no doubt that the chief sufferer in the intense struggle that followed for control of the local branches of Sarekat Islam was the Indonesian nationalist movement, since most of the peasant base was destroyed. Increasingly effective barring of contact between the leaders (both non-Communist and Communist) and the peasantry by the government, and the fact that the Communists alienated the influential religious leaders by violating their religious sensitivities, contributed greatly to the diminishing peasant base.

The Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, or the PSII, the Sarekat Islam having changed its name in 1929, became split on the question of whether or not to cooperate with the Dutch as well as an increasing emphasis on religion at the expense of social and economic problems. By 1934, Dr. Sukirman and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, two of the party's top leaders, attempted to expand its religious base to build up a non-cooperative mass party. A group led by Jadji Agoes Salim felt that such an attitude abandoned the social and economic reform inherent in modernist teach-

ing. Besides, Salim's group, which became known as the Penjedar Barisan PSII, or the Movement to Make the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesian Conscious, believed further concessions might be won from the government through a policy of limited cooperation. (16)

By April, 1937, Sarekat Islam combined with other leading nationalist parties in recognition of the threat of world fascism as well as the inadequacies and conservative bent of the Indonesian nationalist movement. With the advent of the Japanese attack on Southeast Asia, most members of the Sarekat Islam sympathized with the freedom-loving Westerners.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE INDIES

The Perserikatan Kommunist di India, the PKI, or the Communist Party of the Indies, was formed at the Semarang office of Sarekat Islam on May 23, 1920, with Semaoen elected as president, Darsono as vice-president, Berhama as secretary, and H. W. Dekker as treasurer. It developed close ties with the Comintern, joining that organization in 1920. Sneevliet represented Indonesia at the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920 as a self-appointed delegate while Darsono in 1921 went to Moscow for the Third Congress. The Fourth Congress was attended by Tan Kalaka, a party chief, in 1922. Faced with exile to Timor in 1923, Semaoen left the country, and by the end of the year all Dutch leaders of the party were also forced to leave the country. Because of the existing prejudice against the Dutch, the departure of the Dutch leaders raised the organization's prestige in the eyes of the masses. During the 1920's and thereafter there was little rapport with the Netherlands' Communist Party, Semaoen declaring that association with the Dutch group was a liability to the Indonesian Communists.

The bitter contest mentioned earlier between Sarekat Islam

and the Marxist-Communist oriented nationalists led to the latter's loss of confidence among religious leaders and the peasantry. Although the Communists realized their mistake by 1926, they were unable to live down the stigma of anti-religious charges. An attempted strike led by Malaka, and which embraced all Indonesian labor, was unsuccessful in early 1922. Given the choice of exile or leaving the archipelago, Tan Malaka took refuge in Russia. The next several years were marked by the continued effort of the Communists to organize trade unions as the party's mass base for revolutionary action. By 1925, the program drawn up by the party called for the establishment of a Soviet Republic of Indonesia, however, it was far from finding favor with the Comintern, which criticized the Indonesian Communists: (17)

"The Communist press devotes too little attention to the idea of a united front and to a platform on which all the national-revolutionary elements could be united. Methods of approach to those masses still under the influence of the reformist leaders have not yet been worked out....The Indonesian Communist Party despite all its activity has not yet got properly down to working among the peasantry and drawing the latter into the nationalist movement. The errors of the Indonesian comrades with respect to the national organizations are repeated with regard to the peasantry....If the Party does not adopt a correct policy towards the peasantry in time, the political movement of the latter will pass by the Party."

The Comintern was concerned that the Indonesian Communist Party become an "indomitable mainstay around which all the active anti-imperialist forces of the Indonesian people will rally." (18) These directions arrived too late to be effective. In any event, the PKI was troubled by internal difficulties; leaders of more extreme elements, like Dahlan and Soekra, refusing to take orders from the regular party leadership, agitated for revolution and dominated the party through terroristic methods. Many strikes

and increased violence by small armed bands (and possible knowledge of the long range revolution plans) caused by the PKI extremist element prompted the government to suspend the right of assembly throughout nearly all of Indonesia for the Communist Party, the Sarekat Rakjat, or Red Sarekat Islam, and most of the Communist-controlled labor organizations. The government also suppressed strikes and arrested most of the important labor leaders concerned as well as the few top remaining Communist leaders still in Indonesia -- Darsono, Ali-archam and Mardjoha. Tan Malaka, in exile in Manila during this period, was strongly opposed to the PKI leading the revolution against the Dutch at this time. He wrote in a booklet entitled *Massa Actie*

"...a successful revolution demanded mass support. A putsch by leaders divorced from the masses would never succeed...If indeed the Communist leaders possessed the necessary mass support, they had already let pass the psychological and practical moment for revolt.... That should have occurred immediately upon the Dutch arrests of PKI and labor leaders and the suspension of the right of assembly at the end of 1925." (19)

It was Tan Malaka's concern that if the PKI lacked sufficient mass backing and its workers did not have "Marxist stability and Leninist elasticity" then

"...chaos in the whole revolutionary movement in Indonesia. Non-workers will take the helm and lead the party to a putsch or to anarchism, and ultimately it will be completely destroyed. This danger becomes greater and greater as the great revolutionary leaders who have influence over the masses are exiled from Indonesia one after the other..." (20)

It is obvious, then, that the leadership of the PKI was not agreed upon the proper time for starting the revolution against the Dutch.

During this period, the Communist Party was forced to operate underground without its ablest leaders and its activities became less and less coordinated. The extreme elements

in the party remained in the ascendancy, many uncoordinated sporadic outbreaks of violence in several sections of Java attesting to the breakdown in coordination, a rapid loss of contact with former peasant supporters, and the arrest of more Communist leaders, revealed the poor discipline and preparation for the revolution which finally broke out on the night of November 12, 1926. At that, the revolution began in Batavia whereas it was slated to begin in Padang on Sumatra's west coast. An uprising did occur in Padan two months after the Batavian outbreak had been crushed by the Dutch. (21) In any event, swift government action against the small number of insurgents in Java and Sumatra, since the masses of the city workers and plantations laborers adopted an attitude of indifference towards the rebel movement, halted the revolution almost before it had begun. The Communist's organization was crushed with the failure of the 1926-27 rebellions, especially owing to the large-scale arrest and deportation of Communist leaders still in Indonesia. By now the power of the Communists was clearly broken and remained ineffective for the remainder of Dutch rule. The leadership of the nationalist movement had definitely passed to the non-Communist leaders and their organizations.

THE LIBERAL PARTIES

An organization essentially political in nature and composed of Indonesian students studying in Holland was formed there in 1922. This group, the *Perhimpunan Indonesia*, or Indonesian Union, came to play a dominant role in Indonesian nationalism, many of the top nationalist leaders having been members of the organization in Holland. Its program by 1923,

favored unequivocal independence for Indonesia through the unified base and efforts of all Indonesian groups and classes on the basis of cooperation with each other and non-cooperation with the Dutch. Although the party had strong Marxist orientation, it did not become a doctrinaire Marxist group; above all, it welcomed support from all anti-colonial groups and organizations, whether they were Communist or not. The leader of the Indonesian Union until his departure in late 1932, was Mohammed Hatta. With his departure, the organization came increasingly under the control of Setiajit and Abdulmedhid, both having emerged as members of the Communist Party. After 1936, they changed the Union's policy to one of cooperation with the Dutch, in line with Comintern policy, and criticized other nationalist leaders, such as Hatta and Sjahrir as well as Soekarno. (22)

The Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI, or the Indonesian Nationalist Party, was established by members of the Bandung Study Club on June 4, 1927; this was the culmination of efforts by members of the Indonesian Union in Holland and in Indonesia. It is significant that the chairmanship of the party was voted to a young engineer, Soekarno, who was not a member of the Indonesian Union Party. Possessed of an engineering degree, a considerable Moslem as well as Western education, Soekarno also had the ability to synthesize Western and Islamic concepts with the ancient though surviving Hindu-Buddhist tempered Javanese mysticism, and translating it in terms which the peasant understood. The PNI aimed for complete economic and political independence for Indonesia, with a government elected by and responsible to the whole Indonesian people. The PNI's primary objectives were unity among and self-reliance by Indonesians with a basis

of non-cooperation with the Dutch. Soekarno's strong opposition to an Islamic state helped shape the principle that independence was as much the objective of Indonesian Christians as of Mohammedans, and therefore the party could not have an Islamic base. It was characteristic of Soekarno's common sense that he stressed in speeches the uselessness of waiting for help from "an airplance from Moscow or a caliph from Istanbul. (23) Among the immediate programs engaged in by the PNI were the building of labor movements through unions, the development of cooperatives, and support of national education.

The PNI through the support of Sarekat Islam became the most powerful nationalist organization in Indonesia, being able to gather a loose federation of all the important existing nationalist organizations, a unity which had never before been achieved by the nationalist movement. Contributing to the initial success of the PNI were the tolerant policies followed by De Graeff, the Dutch Governor-General, however, this attitude of tolerance changed by December 24, 1929, when Soekarno and other leaders of the organization were arrested as a result of their outspoken anti-government and anti-capitalist (non-Communist) criticism. All were sentenced from one to three years, with Soekarno receiving the maximum term. Soekarno was charged with

"...having participated in an organization which had as its aim the committing of crimes as well as...deliberately expressing themselves in words wherein the disturbance of public order and the overthrow of the established Netherlands Indies Authority were recommended." (24)

The outlawing of the PNI followed the arrests of its leaders, both factors contributing to a cautious and moderate approach to independence by the nationalist organizations, a period which lasted for a considerable time. Three groups ab-

sorbed the PNI's membership: the Partai Rakjat Indonesia (Indonesian People's party), which desired cooperation with the Dutch and eventual independence through parliamentary means; Partai Indonesia, usually referred to as Partindo, was formed in April, 1931, under Sartono, and it aimed at independence through non-cooperation, but its advocations were along moderate lines; the Golongan Merdeka, Independent Group, opposed the dissolution of the PNI, maintained substantially the same program as had the PNI, and was successively chaired by two well qualified leaders, Soetan Sjahrir, and Mohammad Hatta. The Golongan Merdeka was changed to Club Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, or the Indonesia National Educational Club, in 1932. Of the three groups, Partindo attracted the Majority membership, but it is significant that Hatta and Sjahrir allied themselves with the relatively small, and highly politically conscious, nationalists in the Golongan Merdeka. Their threat to Dutch sovereignty is characterized by George McT. Kahin

"Both were convinced that such mass parties and the charismatic leadership upon which they depended were unsuited to the effective furtherance of the nationalist movement. The ability of the Dutch to jail at will any leader whose appeal to the masses became dangerous to their interests made reliance on such leadership useless, they felt. A national movement dependent upon a few key men at the top was doomed to failure since the Dutch could be relied upon to remove such leaders from the political scene. Such a movement, they believed, would have enduring strength only if a significant number of the Indonesian people were educated to political maturity and a thorough understanding of nationalist principles. This process of education they conceived of as a long-term, unspectacular operation. The building up of cadres of first-and second-echelon leaders was the necessary first step. These in turn could educate wider circles. Small cadres of self-reliant, strongly conscious nationalists would in the long run, they were convinced, achieve the independence that mass support

of short-careered charismatic leaders could not." (25)

The Dutch soon understood the threat to their ascendancy, and arrested Hatta and Sjahrir in February, 1934; both were exiled without trial to the Tanah Merah concentration camp at Boven Digul, New Guinea, remaining there and on the tiny island of Banda in confinement until the Japanese invasion brought their release in 1942. The arrest of at least four executive boards after the taking of Hatta and Sjahrir attested to the soundness of their organizational idea, moreover, it continued to operate until their return to Java. After a shortened prison sentence, Soekarno returned from exile December 31, 1931, and attempted to unite the Partindo and the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia into one party. He was without success, finally joining Partindo in July, 1932 and becoming its chairman by unanimous acclaim. Adopting a firmer nationalist line under Soekarno, Partindo's growth was accelerated enormously to 50 branches and 20,000 registered members by mid-1933, with a mass following undoubtedly many times that great. (26) Once again Soekarno's danger to the Dutch government--his ability to command respect from intellectuals and maintain rapport with the masses--was realized by the colonial regime which arrested him, and without trial, exiled him to the islands of Flores and Benculen where he remained until released by the Japanese in 1942. With the arrest of Soekarno, Hatta and Sjahrir and other dynamic nationalist leaders, the Indonesian independence movement adopted a policy of limited co-operation as the only practical way of gaining further political concessions.

The general trend towards evolutionary political organi-

zations was marked by the rise of a relatively moderate parindra party, the Partai Indonesia Paja, or Greater Indonesia Party, which was either cooperative or non-cooperative as the occasion warranted. As the chief Indonesian political organization, the party was formed in 1935, from a fusion of the Persatoean Bangsa Indonesia (a federation of moderate study clubs), the Boedi Oetomo, and several non-Javanese nationalist organizations, with Dr. Raden Soetomo as one of its principal leaders. The Parindra performed valuable work for Indonesian society by establishing retail and peasant cooperatives, a bank granting reasonable credit terms to Indonesians, a hostel for impoverished laborers, and a program to combat illiteracy. Desiring to work through the Dutch sponsored Volksraad (People's Council) which assembled together Indonesians from various parts of the immense archipelago in an effort to make them aware of their common problems and common relationship with the Dutch (and which tended to develop nationalism by providing a more conscious unity), the Parindra accomplished little in the political sphere. The Parindra had joined with other moderate nationalist groups in the Volksraad in a proposal to the Dutch in mid-1936 asking that a conference be convened to discuss plans for the evolutionary development of Indonesian over a ten-year period toward self-government within the limits of the existing Dutch Constitution. (27) This very moderate proposal was rejected by the Dutch, a fact which gave sobering realization of Dutch intentions to the leaders of the nationalist movement.

In April, 1937, many Indonesian intellectuals, recognizing the threat of world Fascism as well as the inadequacies and

conservative bent of the nationalist movement, formed the Gerindo, the Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia, or Indonesian People's Movement. This was also a result of reaction to the government's rejection of evolutionary development of Indonesian independence. The party grew rapidly, becoming the powerful left wing of the nationalist movement and displaying an international orientation. The party's inherent militant nationalism was relegated to a secondary consideration, as most of its members felt their struggle for national independence was superseded by the forthcoming fight between the forces of Fascism and anti-Fascism. As such the Gerindo sought solidarity with the Dutch to defend Indonesia against the growing threat of Japanese imperialism. Above all, the Gerinda called for collaboration between Holland and Indonesia against Fascism the basis of equality. (28)

By May, 1939, one large federation of the principal nationalist organizations, the Gapi, Gaboengan Politiek Indonesia, or Federation of Indonesian Political Parties, united eight of the major nationalist organizations. Its triumvirate chairmanship consisted of Amir Sjarifuddin, representing Gerindo; Abikusno, representing the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia; and Thamrin, representing Parindra. The Gapi's common program consisted of

"(1) the right of self-determination for Indonesia, (2) national unity founded upon 'political, economic and social democracy, (3) a democratically elected Indonesian parliament responsible to the people of Indonesia; and (4) solidarity in order to maintain a strong anti-Fascist front." (29)

Indonesian nationalist political groups and individuals

An Indonesian People's Congress, Kongres Rakjat Indonesia, sponsored by Gapi in December, 1939, gave more definite form

to this program . The Congress attracted delegates from ninety different nationalistic political, social, and economic organizations, and stressed the need for unity among the nationalist organizations. Furthermore, the Congress adopted a national language, the Indonesian language, Bahasa Indonesia, a national red and white flag, and a national anthem, Indonesia Raya, Greater Indonesia. It also adopted a resolution calling for Indonesia berparlemen, a parliament for Indonesia, which became its chief slogan.

The government of the Netherlands refused to grant any degree of independence to Indonesia in spite of the acute danger to Dutch national sovereignty in Europe. This attitude was maintained even after the German occupation of Holland, being largely responsible for the rapid decline of Indonesian-Dutch solidarity. The average Indonesian, according to Sjahrir, held secret satisfaction concerning the fall of Holland.

"...and it was expected that there would be still more radical happenings....The consciousness of foreign domination coupled with an intense desire for freedom and independence became increasingly strong. As the war (in Europe) developed in those first years, the people derived a vicarious satisfaction from the misfortunes of their rulers. And this provided a stimulus for further estrangement from the Dutch and for the growth of a national self-consciousness....The masses....expressed sympathy for the Axis openly (in part)." (30)

The coming Japanese attack was looked upon as a liberation movement by many Indonesians, and finally, with the advent of Japanese troops in the archipelago, the majority of the Indonesians either anticipated better conditions under the Japanese or were apathetic, convinced that things could at least be no worse.

THE CHINESE AND PRE-WAR NATIONALISM

Political life among the peranakans or Indonesian-born Chinese before World War II was divided into three distinct organizations. One faction closely followed the lead of the Communist-bent Chinese language paper, SinPo, which was composed of an outright core of Chinese nationalists. This organization attracted its largest following among the peranakans and also gathered a large number of followers from the singkehs, or newcomers, which were usually contract laborers having no great interest in politics at home or abroad. By the early 1930's, the Sin Po group was very sympathetic toward and propagandized for the aspirations of Indonesian nationalists.

The second and most democratic of the Chinese political parties, the Partai Tiong Hwa, was founded in 1932, and became oriented almost entirely toward younger peranakan intellectuals. This group was an "assimilation" party which advocated the ultimate creation of an independent Indonesia in which the Indo-Chinese would share equal rights with all Indonesian citizens. The Partai Tiong Hwa sought political representation, unlike the Sin Po group, as well as collaboration with Indonesian nationalists groups in the Volksraad.

A group of moderates composed predominantly of conservative Chinese businessmen interested in protection and advancement of the interests of the Chinese as a minority formed the third organization, the Chung Hua Hui. They were loyal to the colonial government, performing much useful work, especially in social welfare and educational fields, however,

the party remained unpopular among most Chinese through the decades before the war owing to its "old school" character. Its position in the Volksraad eventually passed by default to the Partai Tiong Hwa Indonesia, the Chung Hua hui lacking popular support and being the least significant party among the Chinese.(31)

THE SOCIAL CLASSES IN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION (32)

Having examined the rise of Indonesian political organizations during the period 1900-1940, it is appropriate to inquire into the nature of support manifested by the social classes in the various political parties and their social-political demands. Four major social-political movements developed in Indonesia, each represented by one or more parties and functioning as a potential oligarchy. The four are (1) the liberal, Westernized-nationalist group, as typified by the Partai Nasional Indonesia; (2) the Marxist-egalitarian movement, as represented by the Socialist and various Communist parties; (3) the conservative-aristocratic division prevalent in the Partai Indonesia Raya and sometimes found in certain Islamic elements; and (4) the Islamic movement, which is the most complex of the social-political movements.

THE LIBERAL-WESTERNIZED MOVEMENT

In the development of Indonesian nationalism, the liberal-Westernized group has been the most important contributor. It is also characteristic of this group that some of its representatives are found in the left wing of the Islamic movements.

Essentially, the intellectual elite in the towns provides the leadership for this movement which places positivism and technology, Westernized education, and the historic liberal

traditions of nineteenth-century Europe upon the platform of its ideological goals. In short it desires to create a bourgeois civilization, based on a substantial middle class, a developed economy, and a stable intrenchment of state control, and it is outwardly impatient of the adat-bound village society. A definite slavish imitation of the outer evidences of Western urban civilization (symphonic orchestras, moving-picture theaters, art galleries) has been the cultural bent of this movement; furthermore it has an almost exaggerated concern for social freedom as expressed, for example, in the numerous lectures, articles, and books devoted to the Indonesian woman of today; and it is devoted to the acquisition of pseudo-sophisticated social ways, an attitude popular in the films of the "alay world.

Typical of the extent to which this movement had influenced contemporary Indonesian culture is the *roman pitjisan*, or "dime novel," avidly read by the fairly educated younger generation. The problems of Indonesian life are amply portrayed in the characters, settings, and dialogues of these books. The chief societal themes used in these books include the problem of the ways of tradition versus the ways of modern, Westernized society; of the country versus the city, of conservation versus dynamic change through social revolution. The contest between old and new is generally underscored in these books, their universal theme "Political freedom is the same as social emancipation." In all of these books the Westernization of society is anticipated as the ultimate goal.

THE MARXIST-EGALITARIAN MOVEMENT

The Marxist-egalitarian wing of Indonesian society is marked by tactical political dissension among its members. However, most see eye to eye with one another on the theoretical premises on which the social order is to be founded. The supposed tenets favored by the left wing are the establishment of the much-heralded "social justice," the abolition of all social gradations, a maximum of economical equality, and the ultimate creation of a genuine classless society in Indonesia. Aside from their goal of national independence, this movement insists individual independence from class rule, from adat restrictions, and from economic hardship need yet to be established. Nationalism and the concept of national citizenship in a modern state is a secondary consideration of the Marxist-egalitarian movement. The Marxist-egalitarian movement seeks to establish, not necessarily in Indonesia alone, a completely egalitarian social order. In consequence, the interests of this group competes with the rising petit bourgeois in the "westernized-liberal wing, although it, to, looks with favor on Westernization.(33)

Despite the collectivist program of the Marxist movement in Indonesia, it is not a mass movement, rather it is a small potential oligarchy. The movement is usually outside of the general popular aspirations, except perhaps those of a specific economic nature and although its tenets include a broad appeal to the masses. Therefore, the Marxist movement is much smaller and much more dependent on a tight hierarchical control than the other movements. The Communist party

in Indonesia, for example, demands the ruling position in the national republic as a single concentration of power, so its tactic does not necessarily include a general popular upheaval to bring it to power. As such it is dependent on local coup d'etat methods as opposed to a massive attempt to convince growing numbers of people of the validity of Marxist doctrine and thus capture control of the government.

THE ARISTOCRATIC-CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT

The remaining Indonesian nobility and the more tradition-bound members of the Westernized-liberal movement who have seceded from it make up the aristocratic-conservative movement. The pre-eminent place of the adat and the maintenance of the traditional social gradations in Indonesian society are this movement's primary concern. The members of this movement come from the old class of native regents and aristocrats (priajis) through which the Dutch colonial regime governed the Indies; this group is opposed to a complete Westernization and Islamization of Indonesia, however, most members are not averse to adopting some of the economic and technological advantages offered by Western living.

The importance of this group rests on its position as the pillar of society, especially in some more isolated places beyond Java and Sumatra. The priajis have since time immemorial been the chief source of political power and thus by implication the core and centripetal force of the social order. This is particularly true where nationalism, Islam, and Westernization are weak, since the priajis as the old aristocracy is still the pillar of society, indispensable to the maintenance of

order and security.. Although tis group is the lest "socially conscious," the least concerned with a raped emancipation of the Indonesian along bourgeois-liberal or Marxist-egalitarian lines. Nevertheless, this group is much more a "mass movement" than the Marxist-egalitatian wing in-so-far as it is directed by such purposeful groups as the Partai Indonesia Rajah. This condition exists owing to the still important place of the adat, the presence of aristocratic political control in many areas, and the psychological security stemming from out of a careful dicision of the social order. Indeed, there is evidence that some of those who have lived during the various periods of bersiap or periods of violent destruction, have voiced their wish to return to the times of peace and order, or toto tentrem, and the traditional organization of society to which the aristocratic-conservative element is committed.(34)

The three movements discussed--the liberal-Westernized, the Marxist-egalitarian, and the Aristocratic-conservative--are not free from the influence of the others. Separate wings within the parties of each movement tend to touch one another; for example, many tenets of the left wing of the Islamic movement is approximated in the principles of the Socialist party. At the same time, none of the movements is exclusively concerned with the rationale of party politics alone, since each movement remains essentially a future social power group. None of the movements has succeeded in completely absorbing all political control.

THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT

Like the three above-named movements, the Islamic movement in Indonesia essentially attempts to provide a new social basis

for the Indonesian state. It is important to note that the Indonesian accords Islam a far greater place in his life culturally than religiously. While he does not know the meaning of thrology and religious duties, he does venerate the Mohammedan faith as tradition and its leaders hold positions of high prestige. Tradition-bound Moslems are interested in continuing their life in the same old way while advanced Moslems are often divided on technical and tactical questions such as the concept of the state, collaboration with non-Moslem groups, and the position of women. As a result the untutored believer lacks clear directions that would give his religion purposeful and continued emphasis in everyday life.

The period of the Japanese occupation, which will be discussed in the following chapter, pointed to the sociological significance of the kiahih group in Indonesia; this group was deliberately selected by the Japanese as a medium of propaganda. New social and political ideologies were introduced to the Moslem leaders through the Latihan Kiahihs, or "courses for Kiajihs." As a mediator between his people and the occupation authorities, the Kiajih was accorded a new position of significance upon his return to his own community. This new authority also provided a basic cohesion in the disrupted village life in the confusion of the post-World War II revolutionary period. The republican authorities attempted to diminish the independent position of the Kiajih by abosrbing it in the framework of the republican-nationalist government. In most areas, unlike some instances where this absorption occurred without difficulty, the kiajihs stiffly

resisted the intoads of secular political idealism. Besides, they used the unsettled times to propagate their own political views using this new religious orthodoxy. These *kiajihs* advocated the establishment of the Ummat Islam, the all-Moslem state and society in the new Indonesia. Other Moslem political parties arose at the same time, a few of them being resolutely opposed to the Westernized-nationalist movement which almost completely dominated political life at the time. Ultimately, all of the major Islamic parties were joined into a single Masjumi party, however, no greater religious unanimity among Indonesia's Moslems developed: close to the position of the Socialists and embracing most of the tenets of Islamic modernism, stands the left wing of this party; envisaging a bourgeois civilization as the groundwork of an orthodox all-Moslem state, the center and right operate. A meeting of minds exist only on the formal, religious questions for the various wings of the Moslem movement.(35) However great their divergencies the, followers of Islam, have constructed a fairly consistent program for the formation of a Moslem Indonesian state. Religious law and secular law, in the first place, would be welded together in the closest possible connection. The establishment of his own society is the interpretation of the Moslem quest for freedom of religion; it does not imply intolerance for other faiths. In practice the closed character of such a community would make such tolerance an impossibility; by a purposeful and personal surrender to Allah and his laws one can only enter the community. Western thought and culture would remain outside this society although some Moslem ranks hold a keen appreciation of Western technology, particularly in economic life. In this community the important pivotal

places would be occupied by the religious leaders, schoolmen, and the consecrated secular leaders hallowed by them. In fact, a democratic state would hardly exist since such an Indonesian would be oriented toward the Ummat Islam, or the world community of Moslems. Those quarters favoring a Westernized or modern society, such as the liberal-nationalist group, vehemently denounce this scheme, nevertheless, many Indonesian Moslems support the idea of Ummat Islam.

Islamic modernism in Indonesia is generally confined to a number of intellectuals. The extreme left wing of the Islamic movement, which is composed of religious socialists, desires to preserve what is believed to be an essentially religious orthodoxy; this group also manages to give qualified approval to the social and technological innovations of the Western world. The greatest popularity is reserved for the moderate orthodoxy underlying such organizations as Muhammadiyah, which is a missionary-social welfare group having an early history of potent religious-social force in Moslem life in contemporary Indonesia.

The persistence of religious orthodoxy in Indonesian Islam is caused by the character of bourgeois Moslem society in a colonial environment. Founded at a time when Islam had fallen into disrepute, the Muhammadiyah organization, for example, had to overcome apathy, not only among Indonesian aristocrats, but also among the masses. Western ideas and education greatly influenced a younger generation of potential Moslems which turned toward a non-Islamic world view. Around the early 1900's Islam began to be regarded as a cultural and religious anachronism unsuited to modern times. The

Muhammadiyah attempted to place new emphasis on the Koran and to purify Islam from its centuries-old contamination. This movement appealed to reason as well as to tradition and authority; it fought supposed harmful superstitions in the realm of marriage and funeral rites, and its ethical emphasis found expression in the creation of many social welfare agencies for the emancipated, individual Moslem. Other organizations reflected this new Islam in the years preceding World War I, and one of these, the Sarekat Islam, became the vanguard of the new Moslem political movement as well.

The aspirations of an Islamic bourgeoisie, a rising Moslem middle class, was reflected in this Islamic reform, especially since the progressive rationalism, the individualism, and the emphasis upon social welfare reform was an ideal adjustment of thought in the rest of the Indonesian world and, moreover, it appeared that Islam had been brought in tune with the changing times.(36)

The implications of a bourgeois liberal kind of Islam produced unexpected results for the growing Moslem middle class in the Indonesian towns. An increasing number of peasants, rural workers, and lower-class city dwellers became organization-conscious in the Islamic revival, joining various Moslem associations, notably the Sarekat Islam. This society soon began to assume a militant nationalist tone, its aspirations ranging from views of semi-Westernized intellectual Moslems, who had become Marxists and political extremists, to the outlook of the original founders of the movement, the middle-class Moslems, whose economic interests often collided with those of European and Chinese business groups. The political

radicalism of the leaders of Sarekat Islam urged by the pressure of lower class demands and the increasingly leftist sentiments that entered the Moslem movement in general greatly influenced the hostility of the European business groups. The masses began to use Sarekat Islam as a weapon in a class struggle with non-Islamic colonial capitalist groups, and Marxism and nationalism rather than Islam became for them the chief motive factors. Conflict between two schools of thought was inevitable since the Moslem bourgeoisie regarded the Islamic movement primarily as the expression of group solidarity, with modern Islam's religious-cultural lines providing the integration of ideology. However, the struggle between these two factions produced a loss of solidarity. A nominal victory was scored by the bourgeois Moslems when they expelled all of the radical elements from the ranks of the Sarekat Islam. It was only during the revolutionary period that the left-wing elements returned to the presumptive successor of the Sarekat Islam, the Masjumi; this occurred with the understanding that the bourgeois tradition buttressed by a nominal religious orthodoxy of the middle-class Moslem faction would predominate in the movement's program. In order to retain its following among the masses, however, the Masjumi was required to fly the radical banner in a short period of time, but the right wing of the party continues its fight with the "religious socialist" wing. In all the right wing continues to exercise an uncompromising orthodoxy in their religious convictions. (37)

The creation of the national state, then, means different things to different kinds of Moslems: it may mean either a

religiously oriented middle class culture with certain qualified liberalistic-rationalistic overtones, such as the Muhammadiyah, or an out and out orthodox Moslem state, exemplified by Dar'ul Islam to the Moslem proletariat led by an intellectual elite in so far as it is both politically and religiously Moslem conscious. In such a struggle the traditional religious guiding element, the *kiajihs*, would seek more support from the bourgeoisie than from the masses, since its own advantageous position rests upon a conservatively integrated Moslem social order. In all, the more fixed delineation of income groups and economic interests tends to reveal that a clash between the right and the left in Indonesian society will begin as a conflict between Islam and Islam, such as Wertheim has suggested.

In Indonesia, the preservers of adat and communal tradition, the conservative-aristocratic faction, runs a poor second to the attraction of the Westernized-liberal and the Marxist groups holds on the Moslem movement. A bitter antagonism has existed between the conservative-aristocratic faction and the world of Islam; for instance, in the decades after the first World War, Islam and adat have often been in sharp conflict. The adat has remained supreme only in those areas with a distinct and unique pattern of life, such as the west coast of Sumatra. Otherwise, and especially in Java, the situation is the reverse, but everywhere in Indonesia the struggle goes on.

This conflict has progressed as a major source of social instability in Indonesia today. The adat is important to the tradition-conscious community as an indispensable component of its existence, this communalism being affected by the coming of Islam. In its emphasis upon the private relationship between the believer

and God and upon the full equality of all believers in the Islamic world community, Islam appeared to be individualistic. At the same time, the subordinate, hierarchial, and often autocratic nature of the village community was threatened by the personal responsibility to a source outside the traditions of the group. This conflict became even sharper as Islam came to be associated with the budding nationalism of the twenties, for this nationalism was essentially urban-directed and influenced by a distinctly Western positivism and approved of Western techniques and economic organization. Finally, Indonesian Islam, as introduced by traders and merchants, brought a disruptive economic element into the picture. As a part of the highly developed commercial capitalist social order of the antique Orient, the Moslem trader came upon a precapitalist if not anticapitalist village entity. Thus the Moslem traders in their missionary activity also brought the essentials of a money economy into the subsistence peasant society, and this tended to enforce the individualistic outlook and the personal independence of the villager who accepted the new faith.

An even greater threat to the continued integrated harmony of indigenous society is present in the danger stemming from the conflict between adat jurisprudence and Moslem law. In this respect, the hukum, or legal prescriptions, have made their influence felt on traditional customs wherever Islam has spread in Indonesia. Here, Islam has tried to impose its precepts upon the Indonesian in such matters as inheritance and succession, marriage and divorce, and general family laws.

On Sumatra and Java *kiajihs* have taken issue with the adat chiefs on numerous occasions involving family and blood-relation-

ship problems necessitating government interference. On the whole, the adat is supreme in life because of the tendency of Indonesians to favor Islamic rules. As a result of this continued impact of Islam on traditional ways of life many adat associations have been formed, devoted to the rigid preservation of communal law. In some instances, such as in the western and southern parts of Sumatra, the conflict has been measureably deepened. This struggle has been of lasting importance in particular in the development of nationalism, because Islam quickly allied itself with the independence and emancipation movement. The adat group, slow to grasp the significance of the nationalist agitation, often resisted the movement, and the Moslem faction became more militantly nationalist with the support of the Westernized-liberal nationalist parties. The adat faction was then relegated to the position of being reactionary and of being a "stooge" of the colonial power.

In the middle of this multifarious social struggle stands Indonesian Islam and it is directed against certain elements nominally in its own ranks as well as the adat group and certain liberal-nationalist elements. Further complicating this conflict is the fact that neither the conservative-aristocratic movement, champions of the adat, nor the liberal nationalist movement, advocates of Western bourgeois culture, is homogeneous, since in both these movements there are factions which are not adverse to collaboration with Islam. The Marxist-egalitarian wing, in an attempt to establish a united Communist-Islamic front, has repeatedly sought the support of Moslem leaders. Owing to its many faceted programs, Islam through the colonial period remained the least successful force as a potential oligarchy, though its nominal importance would be recognized in any social order that would arise

in Indonesia. Yet, even when Islam appears to be a unified force, such as in its struggle against the Marxist extremism or the adat, the diversity of its component elements robs it of its strength. (38)

Footnotes

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12. Kahin, Op Cit., pp. 68-71.
13. Ibid., pp. 71-72.
14. Blumberger, Op Cit., p. 962.
15. Sitorus, Op Cit., p. 19.
16. Kahin, Op Cit., pp. 94-95.
17. Ibid., pp. 74-75.
18. "A" "The Revolutionary Movement in the East" Communist International. Leningrad and London: 1926, Numbers 18-19, pp. 113-115; cited by Kahin, pp. 78-79.
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21. Kahin, Op Cit., pp. 83-84.
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CHAPTER IV

CONTEMPORARY INDONESIAN NATIONALISM

I

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS DURING THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION

The advent of the Second World War and the subsequent Japanese conquest and occupation of Indonesia had profound and lasting effects upon the people of the Indies, particularly in the rise of Indonesian nationalism. Japan came upon an Indonesia which had been under Dutch control since the 1600's, the Japanese having little intercourse with the Indies except for a nominal amount of trade. Above all, relations between Japan and the Netherlands Indies presented no special difficulties until the 1930's. The background of this international friction dated to a law of 1899 which granted the Japanese the same status as Europeans in the Indies, and to a general trade treaty concluded in 1912 with the Dutch which granted the Japanese the usual most-favored-nation position in regard to trade, shipping, business, and immigration. The economic crises of world-wide depression in 1929-1932 led to disturbing Japanese activities as their imports to the Netherlands Indies rose from 11 per cent in 1929 to 30 per cent in 1935; meanwhile, a drop from 20 per cent to 13 per cent occurred for the Netherlands. At the same time Japan's share of the Indies' exports was only 5 per cent. However, by far the most disturbing problem to the Dutch and the Indonesians was the great influx of Japanese nationals--business, middle men, and fishermen. The Japanese had embarked on an extensive program of acquiring mining, agricultural, and lumber rights, often of

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doubtful economic value, but which were leased in localities of military importance; in addition, the Japanese accelerated their holdings in coastal shipping and fishing industries. Among the protective measures adopted by the Netherlands colonial administration were included licensing for imports and import businesses, a foreign-labor law to protect local labor, immigration quotas, and a law prohibiting foreign fishing in territorial waters. Although these laws were designed to protect the Indies and the Dutch investment in their colonial holding, the Japanese clamored for immediate settlement of what they considered "discriminatory measures" directed against Japan. Considerable negotiation directed toward the amiable settlement of their differences transpired between the Netherlands and Japan, however, the Asiatic plan of conquest envisaged in Japan's Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was extended to Indonesia wherein that archipelago became a part of the Japanese Empire. In spite of the heroic defense waged by Dutch air and naval forces against a superior equipped enemy, the capitulation of the Dutch army only eight days after the Japanese invasion of Java (March 1, 1942) made a lasting impression on the Indonesians.

The defeat of the Netherlands in the light of a very poor military showing caused a great loss of Dutch prestige in the islands and, secondly, many Indonesians were convinced that if they had possession of arms they could have done as well as the Japanese. Moreover, many Indonesians among the educated elite were convinced the Dutch surrendered owing

to their eagerness to make a deal with the Japanese such as Vichy France had done in Indo-China, whereby they would continue to administer the country, but under Japanese supervision. In all, the Dutch suffered a tremendous loss of confidence among the Indonesian masses. When the Japanese arrived in Java they were greeted as liberators, this popular feeling being reinforced by their immediately allowing the singing of the Indonesia Raja, a nationalist patriotic song which became the national anthem, and the display of the red and white Indonesian national flag. (1)

The manner in which the new rulers of Indonesia brought about a socio-economic status change for the majority of educated Indonesians was of great importance in winning acceptance of the Japanese occupation. Since the Japanese interned in concentration camps within six months of their arrival practically the whole Dutch population, a substantial proportion of the Eurasians, and a number of Christian Indonesians whom were suspected of harboring pro-Dutch sympathies, it was necessary for the Japanese to fill most of the middle and upper-bracket administrative and technical positions with Indonesians; this development was no less caused by the lack of extremely few Japanese military government personnel. Owing to these advancements to one and frequently two or three ranks in the hierarchy in which they had been employed, the Japanese either captured the immediate support or neutralized the antipathy of a very large portion of educated Indonesians. The Japanese for this reason, the welcome from the masses, and a lack of opposition from the

nationalist leaders, concluded an exploitation of Indonesia for the Japanese war effort could be made without any concessions to the Indonesian nationalist movement.

It was this conviction which led to the launching of the Triple A Movement, or Pergerakan Tiga A, on April 29, 1942, which stood for the slogans introduced and much propagandized by the Japanese: "Japan the Light of Asia, Japan the Protector of Asia, and Japan the Leader of Asia." Furthermore, the Japanese did not utilize important nationalist leaders to implement their program, the objectives of the movement being dedicated to mobilizing Indonesian support for Japan's war effort and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. However, Indonesians were not conducive to Asian solidarity against the West under Japanese leadership, especially since the economic exploitation of Indonesia was soon subordinated to the benefit of Japan with no quid pro quo for Indonesia. Thus in spite of the high-powered Japanese propaganda the Triple A Movement was a complete bust. The specific grievances which the Indonesians became enamored with against their Japanese occupiers were based in the fact that the archipelago was being drained of quinine, oil, and foodstuffs, while much-needed consumer goods, such as machine parts and cloth, were not coming in. In addition the Japanese insisted that the Japanese language replace Dutch in the secondary and higher schools and as the language of governmental administration, as well as exercising a heavy-handed and harsh control over school curriculum which resulted in sharp negative reactions. More-

over, the overbearing rudeness and frequent brutality on the part of many Japanese in their dealings with Indonesians created a strong antagonism which pervaded almost the entire Indonesian population. Early in the occupation the Japanese realized they no longer had the confidence of either the masses or the educated Indonesians, factors punctuated by open small-scale insurrections by the end of 1942. Even secondary-school and college students had become hostile and occasionally defiant, some even joining the recently discovered underground organizations along with more-seasoned political leaders. The Japanese became alarmed when they comprehended that the Indonesian nationalist movement was a definite force which, if correctly regulated, could assist in realizing the minimum aims of the occupation. Realization of this brought the Japanese to adopt radically different policies based on the cooperation and use of the nationalist leaders who they felt certain commanded real popular support. (2)

THE NATIONALIST LEADERS

One of the most popular nationalist leaders, Soekarno, was released by the Japanese shortly after their arrival; he proceeded from his place of detention in Benculen to Java where he quickly contacted Hatta and Sjahrir, both of whom were already in touch with the underground. These nationalist leaders were agreed that the nationalist struggle could best be conducted at two levels--legally above ground and covertly underground -- and that Soekarno and Hatta would work above ground through the Japanese while Sjahrir would organize an underground resistance movement, but keep in

touch with the other nationalist leaders. Attesting to this agreement after the Second World War, Sjahrir, one of the bitterest opponents of those who collaborated with the Japanese for their own personal ends, remarked about Soekarno and Hatta: Soekarno thought of the Japanese "as pure fascists, and felt that we must use the most subtle countermethods to get around them, such as making an appearance of Collaboration." Both Soekarno and Hatta, according to Sjahrir, agreed to do "everything legally possible to give the nationalist struggle a broader legal scope, and at the same time secretly support the revolutionary resistance." In return for their capitalization on Soekarno's popularity for propaganda purposes, the three were resolved "that political concessions from the Japanese must be pressed for in return." Hatta's work in the nationalist movement, although sheltered by the cloak of his position under the Japanese, served to secure funds and facilitate the travel of the underground group. In fact, Hatta accepted the Japanese position at the behest of Sjahrir's group and "never made common cause with those Indonesians who went to work for the Japanese because of either material designs or political sympathies." Above all Hatta kept the underground informed of anything that took place among the Japanese and among the collaborating Indonesians. (3)

The Japanese promised that self-government would be granted in return for the support of Soekarno, Hatta, and some of the other influential nationalist leaders and on

March 9, 1943 allowed the establishment of the Poesat Tenaga Rakjat, or Center of People's Power, which was an all-inclusive nationalist organization. This organization came to be known as Poetera and it included all of the former Indonesian political and nonpolitical nationalist associations domiciled in Java and Madura. By June, 1943 the decision to allow Indonesians to take part in their own government was implemented by the appointment of a board of four members consisting of Soekarno as chairman; Hatta as vice-chairman; and including Ki Hadjar Dewantoro and a prominent Mohammedan leader, Kiaji H. M. Mansoer. Many Indonesians, even from the student group which supported the underground organization, felt that Poetera was a genuinely nationalist organization headed toward self-government, this general conviction being lent support in early September, 1943, when ancillary to the Poetera, a Central Advisory Board, or an appointed representative council for Indonesia, was created with Soekarno as president. In addition numerous local boards were appointed as consultative groups which passed on the merit of important measures before the Japanese authorities.

The importance of the Poetera to the nationalist movement was the fact that it was used by the Indonesian nationalist leaders as an instrument to advance the cause of Indonesian independence. Although the Japanese used it as a means for rallying Indonesian support behind their war effort, the nationalist leaders used the Poetera to spread and intensify nationalist ideas among the masses and forced concessions

from the Japanese leading toward self-government; while its subordinate position was dedicated to helping the Japanese war effort, it was only to the minimum extent necessary in order to allow the furtherance of the long-range nationalist plans. As a vehicle for Indonesian independence the Poetera was an imperfect and imprecise instrument, for in the process of arousing Indonesian nationalism it begot dangerous consequences. It strengthened the Japanese war effort and helped to establish organizations, particularly among the youth who were inculcated with authoritarian mentalities which respected force and exhibited emotional anti-Westernism. This was particularly true among the youthful and slightly educated members of the military and para-military organizations which it sponsored. It is a fact that in the end many of their members emerged anti-Japanese and pro-Allied, but these youthful military parrots retained the legacy of uncritical response to Authoritarian command from above and were disposed to rely on violence and brutality to accomplish their aims. However, the tremendous increase in political consciousness of the Indonesian masses and their will to independence stands out as the most important long-term result of the activities of the Poetera. While the Japanese used the Poetera to indoctrinate the masses to support them, to hate the Allies, to recruit labor battalions and rear-area troops for the Japanese army, and to mobilize raw-material resources, their goals were never near realization. Using radio propaganda in particular, the Poetera under Soekarno's direction actually saturated Indonesia with nationa-

list talk which actually made it easier for the peasant to equate "anti-imperialism" with "anti-Japanese."

The most important of the Poetera-sponsored organizations, the Soekarela Tentara Pembela Tanah Air (Volunteer Army of Defenders of the Fatherland), or Peta as it was commonly known, was established in September, 1943. The Peta was a native Indonesian armed group trained by the Japanese but Indonesian officered and charged with the defense of Indonesia against Allied invasion. A continuous indoctrination of the Peta's members with a pro-Indonesian point of view and only outwardly a pro-Japanese and anti-Allied orientation, was the continuous objective of Soekarno, Hatta, and other Poetera leaders. In this they only partially succeeded, but by 1944 the average Peta member was consciously strongly nationalist, anti-Japanese, anti-Dutch, but favorably disposed towards the other Allies, particularly the United States. The nationalist leaders were able to maintain control over the Peta's officers since their influence on the Japanese officers making the selection usually followed the advice of Soekarno and Gatot Mangoepradja, the Indonesian head of Peta. They successfully argued that an army dedicated to the defense of the fatherland must have strongly nationalist officers and that the rank and file would be a good defensive organization only if it had an aroused national consciousness. The nationalist leaders succeeded in their mission and in no time their propaganda helped many Peta members equate Japan's activities with imperialism by themselves. (4)

THE YOUTH GROUPS

The Japanese propaganda service, the Sendenbu, established several youth organizations early in the occupation, being aware of the favorable political results that might be realized through organizing the uneducated Indonesian youth. Having little knowledge of the West, these youth were often easily and effectively indoctrinated to hate and to fight the Allies. The first youth organization, the Seinendan, was established at the end of 1942, as a mass youth group based particularly on the village. A Japanese-trained member of the village was charged with the mission of training the youth in simple military exercises, mass drill, and anti-Allied ideas. By 1943, the Gakutotai was organized and composed of students from the seventh grade through high school in the cities; its members were given intensive anti-Allied propaganda indoctrination and some military training. The most heavily indoctrinated of all youth corps was the Barisan Pelopor, or Pioneer Column, which was established last; its members also were militarily trained and their anti-Western orientation was considerably stronger than that of any of the others. (5)

As might be expected, the Indonesian nationalist underground movement infiltrated the ranks of the youth movement. the Perstoean Mahasiswa, or Student Union, was made up of university students in Jakarta who pursued a continuous defiant attitude and open and public criticism of the Japanese in the interests of circulating anti-Japanese revolutionary sentiment. This underground group cooperated with other underground organizations in their two-fold youth group infiltration objectives: 1. To establish as much control as possible within the units of these organizations through reliable men holding

key positions and; 2. To influence their membership in an anti-Japanese and pro-Allied direction, specifically to prepare them to rise against the Japanese whenever the expected Allied invasion should come.

In order to control the increasingly hostile educated youth and especially to keep them from effective participation in underground activity, the Japanese established the Angkatan Muda, or Youth Organization, composed of educated young men from about twenty to thirty which they closely controlled. Created in mid-1944, this organization was headed at Japanese insistence by Indonesians known or suspected as being active in the underground; they were thus kept out in the open and more directly supervised. The Japanese strategem was only partly successful in that they managed to weaken the undergrounds by restricting the activities of many of their best leaders, however, these men working in the Student Union resulted in making the rank and file members more anti-Japanese and more pro-Allied, to the exclusion of the Dutch.

Recognizing that the Poetera was actually accomplishing more for the Indonesian nationalist movement than it was for their war effort, the Japanese in March, 1944, created a new organization, the Perhimpunan Kabaktian Rakjat, or People's Loyalty Organization. Moreover, the Japanese were concerned that the supporters of the Poetera, especially the educated youth, should change their attitudes that were more anti-Japanese than anti-Allied. Known by its Japanese name, the Djawa Hokokai, the organization helped neutralize and limit the force of the nationalists since the Japanese required that it represent the Chinese, Arab, and Eurasian community as well as the Indonesian and forced it to submit to a much closer

supervision and control than had been the case with the Poetera. Although chairmaned by Soekarno, the new organization was under the direct control of the Japanese Commander in Chief, the Gunseikan, and the highly developed Hokokai, with a branch in every village, was compulsorily maintained and as a consequence did not win popular backing. Clearly the cause of the Indonesian nationalist movement was not advanced greatly. Concurrent with their attempt to win Indonesian support through the Hokokai, the Japanese established one large, all-inclusive Islamic organization which subsumed all existing ones of a non-political nature. The Japanese succeeded in building a spirit of nationalism among the masses, but they did not infuse much anti-Allied sentiment.

Marked changes in Japanese policy developed in October, 1944, just after the announcement of Premier Koiso that Indonesia would be given independence very shortly. Almost immediately in Java and Madura controls were relaxed over the Hokokai and Soekarno, Hatta, and other speakers were given greater opportunity to contact the masses, were allowed to talk unadulterated independence, and obliged to infuse less pro-Japanese content into their talks. The most remarkable new departure was the establishment of a school for semi-educated youths of eighteen to twenty in Jakarta called the Asrama Indonesia Merdeka, or Dormitory for Free Indonesia. This school was given lectures by nationalist leaders on nationalism, economics, politics, sociology, and Marxism. The objectives of this training was to equip students as able nationalist leaders, to make them fully conscious of the fact that the Indonesian independence to which they were to lead their people must have a social content meaningful to all of them, to those of the villages as

well as the towns. The Japanese exerted influence on the schools which were required to give principal emphasis to the study of communism of a strongly international type, based on social justice for the world as a whole. Some Indonesian leaders believed the Japanese used this indoctrination for the primary purpose of penetrating and eventually controlling the illegal and underground Communist Party of Indonesia, or the PKI, through the youths trained in these schools. Other Indonesian nationalists were of the opinion that the Japanese were genuinely sincere in their desire for Indonesian independence and that they approached domestic as well as world-wide social problems in a progressive manner. Another school of thought is convinced that the Japanese were aware of their defeat and that if a Communist revolution broke out in Indonesia it could conceivably lead to an alliance with Russia for Japan, so it seemed logical that the Japanese should endeavor to equip potential leaders with pro-Communist leanings. In any event, the picture is not clear since the Japanese leaders have never explained their motivations. (6)

With the approach of Allied power to Indonesia, the Japanese were forced by the resultant anti-Japanese feeling to take further steps towards the establishment of an independent Indonesian government. Several residents and sub-residents, the political administrators of areas or residencies, were appointed in late 1944. On March 1, 1945, the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence, the Badan Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan, was created. It was composed of representatives of the Japanese, all of the principal social and ethnic groups of Java and Madura, and important nationalist leaders, including Soekarno and Hatta. This committee reached

basic agreement concerning constitutional and economic questions. Despite the concessions made by the Japanese, the demand for self-government increased. Finally, on June 1, 1945, Soekarno delivered a speech before the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence in which he enunciated his five basic principles, or the Pantja Sila, that he felt should guide and serve as the philosophical foundation of an independent Indonesia: nationalism, internationalism or humanitarianism, consent or representative government, social justice or social prosperity, and belief in one God or freedom of worship. The first two principles were reduced by Soekarno to one term, socio-nationalism, the next two principles to socio-democracy, so that three principles remained: socio-nationalism, socio-democracy, and a belief in God. He further reduced these principles to an Indonesian term, gotong rojong, or mutual cooperation, and called for the establishment of a gotong rojong Indonesian state. Because of the capitulation of the Empire of Japan to the Allied Powers in August, 1945, the peaceful transfer of governmental authority from the Japanese armed forces to the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Committee, established in August, 1945, was not realized. This situation precipitated the Indonesian revolution. (7)

PUBLIC OPINION AT THE RICE-ROOT LEVEL

The impact of the Japanese occupation upon Indonesian society fostered several significant developments, the most outstanding of which was the tremendous increase in national consciousness and the will to political independence which it sired. In contrast to the moderate and much less felt Dutch rule, the Japanese aroused a consciousness of common suffering and humiliation, and a common resentment owing to the harsh

and arbitrariness of the Japanese administrators; this greatly strengthened the already existing national awareness of the Indonesians. In particular, the peasantry suffered a direct and pointed intrusion by the Japanese, which was slightly cushioned by the operation of the Poetera and the Hokokai. The foundations of the rural society was undermined through the three and a half years of Japanese occupation by kidnapping from homes or conscription as laborers abroad or as soldiers, forced regulations, compulsory surrender of harvested crops, and compulsory planting of designated crops, about which Sjahrir has observed, "all imposed with unlimited arbitrariness." (8)

The heavy demands on the village labor supply forced the peasantry to re-align their structures since the traditional patterns of work and land apportionment had to be altered. An intense bitterness against the Japanese was born from the condition of repayment for labor and crops with a worthless currency, money which buy almost none of the traditional needs, such as agricultural implements, cloth, etc. As a result, the peasantry became more politically conscious than it had ever been, and its anti-Japanese feeling is attested to by the widespread and frequent peasant revolts that occurred with increasing regularity during the last year of the Japanese occupation. Continuous propaganda chorused by the nationalist leaders, the underground, and even the Japanese encouraged Indonesian nationalism. This was particularly true of the imprint of the Japanese occupation left on the Indonesian youth between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five; the propaganda narrowed and intensified their nationalist sentiments and many developed a strong, emotional, anti-Western bias which frequently verged on sheer hatred and often extended itself to antipathy against Eurasians and Indies

Chinese. In spite of this attitude most youths followed the lead of the wiser, saner, nationalists. Many students became loath to study under the Japanese-controlled school system and were forced into the labor market to earn their own way, which was a completely new experience. They found jobs in government and commercial enterprises because of the absence of educated workers resulting from the incarceration of the European population. Able to support themselves, they found a degree of self-confidence which they had not possessed before.

Another result of the occupation was the introduction into general use of the Malay language, or Bahasa Indonesia, as a short-run expediency language of administration. Administrators, merchants, students, and teachers were required to learn this Indonesian language thereby furthering the cause of national unity. Forced by the Japanese occupation to assume administrative and technical positions which were formerly staffed by Europeans, usually Dutch, Indonesians became aware that they could operate such establishments as railroads, electric power facilities, communication enterprises, and a new national self-confidence was in consequence instilled in the people. This new found pride led to the natural conclusion for most Indonesians that they were capable of self-government. Furthermore, the socio-economic movement affected those Indonesians having received positions formally occupied or reserved by the Dutch in the colonial hierarchical structure; they were anxious to protect their recently won vested interests and not disposed toward returning to a subordinate position after the occupation. Then, too, they wanted higher positions without the incubus of a Japanese adviser or overseer. Perhaps the ultimate despoiler

of former effective and reliable instruments of Dutch rule was the role of the old indigenous aristocracy. They were elevated to positions which they had no hope of attaining under the old regime, so that in them, too, was developed a conviction that they could handle these new positions, that they were entitled to such positions, and that they would be assured them in an independent Indonesia. (9)

II

SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE OCCUPATION

The Japanese occupation brought a great psychological change to the Indonesian masses, for with the defeat of the Dutch the father image of colonialism was destroyed. To Indonesians, and especially nationalists, colonialism resembled nothing so much as a father image, respected, fearful, and engendering unreasoned hatred. By the end of the Second World War the Dutch colonial aristocrat -- one type being autocratic, arrogant, and alien to Indonesian life, and the other a paternal colonial emancipator often mistrusted or not appreciated by the native group -- was shed of his traditional cloak of authority. In consequence, political disorders and wanton extremism resulted when the pent-up resentment of the natives was released after the traditional checks or barriers were removed in the uneasy period between the crumbling of the colonial regime, the occupation, and the demise of the Japanese. At this time, the sense of frustration and hate that had lain dormant in colonial times was reawakened and directed against the return of colonial Dutch regime; in this instance, nationalist objectives became allied with a new frenzied fever of fanaticism present in Indonesia.

The social upheaval of the occupation was great and touched all classes. The village recruitment of labor by the Japanese led to social displacement and permanent dislocation of large sections of the village population from its traditional society, which created a mass of rootless and disorganized people who after the occupation did not know where to go. The middle class was brought to the brink of poverty as they were frustrated by Japanese monetary levies; as a result, they turned to extremists and nationalist leaders (who were liberated by the Japanese) for social and political guidance, which in turn strengthened the hand of nationalist leaders following the war. The aristocracy, composed of many former civil servants who were loyal to the Dutch, suffered personal loss of property and sometimes prison at the hands of the Japanese. Consequently, faced with a new social stigma, many turned to their own aristocrats, some collaborated with the Japanese, but in general most lost position and face in the community, except in more remote areas.

Being taken out of the traditional and paternal setting of the village, the youth groups were organized into nihilistic and super-nihilistic units which eventually supported the efforts of the nationalist leaders after the war. Many of the intellectuals favored the coming of the Japanese and openly collaborated with the occupation regime. Its chief result for the intellectuals rests in the fact they were given a chance to govern under Japanese guidance. Some of them went underground but more united with nationalist leaders working under the Japanese with the ultimate view of Indonesian independence their goal. The Eurasian and Chinese minority faced imprisonment under the Japanese. Being held up in mockery by the Japanese, the population was whipped into denouncing these minority groups. After the war,

degradations against them occurred by native Indonesians. Thus it was that a social disorganization and loss of traditional affiliation produced a still dissatisfied Indonesian society bound over to a tide of fanatical nationalism. But the rootless mass which was created from the break with past traditions sought a dynamic leadership, and so they turned to nationalist leaders and political parties for guidance. (10)

III

THE REVOLUTION AND ITS SOCIAL AFTERMATH

Rumors of the evident capitulation of the Empire of Japan to the Allies spurred the underground nationalist organizations to demand that Soekarno make a public pronouncement of Indonesian independence. As early as August 10, 1945, Sjahrir, having received radio reports that Japan had or was about to surrender, urged that Hatta and Soekarno^{should} immediately proclaim Indonesian independence. However, Hatta and Soekarno hoped to avoid bloodshed and stalled for more time; in particular, they were concerned that the nationalist movement was not adequately supported by a large military organization. In the final analysis, it was the Peta and the youth groups which furnished the revolution the needed manpower strength. On the night of August 16th both Soekarno and Hatta were kidnapped by Sukarni's underground, which was largely supported by the Student Union. They convinced Soekarno and Hatta that the Japanese had really surrendered and attempted to prevail upon them to make an immediate declaration of independence. These nationalist leaders did not want to risk an open rebellion without first having ascertained the attitude of the Japanese military; besides, any declaration, they both felt, must have as its emphasis an all-Indonesian source, the Independence Preparatory Committee with its all-Indonesian

representation. Thereby, they felt, their chances of mobilizing the population against the Japanese, if need be, would be much greater. The leaders of the nationalist movement won out and, on his return to Jakarta on the night of the sixteenth, Hatta immediately made contact with the Japanese. He learned that under no circumstance would a declaration of independence by the Indonesian be countenanced. It was then clear to Hatta and Soekarno that bloodshed would be necessary if independence was to be realized, so on August 17, 1945, Soekarno read the Indonesian declaration of independence to a small group outside his own residence, with Hatta later making a personal statement to his old nationalist friends. These messages were then broadcast over the Dutch Indonesian radio and telegraph network by Indonesian employees behind locked office doors in Jakarta. The Indonesian independence movement was launched. (11)

The Japanese promptly rejected the independence declaration and ordered that announcements being posted around the city were to be torn down by the Kempeitai. The next day the Peta, Hei Ho, and all other armed Indonesian organizations were officially dissolved. The tremendous response and controlled power which Soekarno received from the Jakartans greatly impressed the Japanese so that the leaders of the movement were allowed their freedom. Where they were not too far outnumbered, Peta units throughout Indonesia kept their arms, clashed with the Japanese, and sometimes even disarmed their former masters. Armed Indonesian groups, the Peta, and units of organized youth groups began to absorb political power in large areas of the archipelago, although the Japanese still retained control of the larger cities. The Indonesian flag was ordered flown by Soekarno from all public buildings as the symbol of the revolu-

tion. Under the red and white flag the students became the vanguard of the revolution. They directed the demobilized youth from the Japanese-sponsored youth organizations and with them seized arms from the Japanese, ousted Japanese functionaries from government buildings, dragged Japanese officers from their cars, and provided the chief military force for the Soekarno-led bid for independence. The Japanese, under orders from the Allied Southeast Asia Command to maintain the political status quo until Allied troops took over, were aware that the suppression of this independence bid would result in a gigantic and bloody struggle, a fight in which the Japanese might or might not be victorious, so their action until the Allied troops arrived at the end of September, 1945, was uncertain, wavering, and compromising. The Japanese sought to avoid a head-on collision with the Indonesian revolution. (12)

The administration of the Republic's governing machinery was nominally in nationalist hands with the advent of British troops in late 1945. At its first meeting on August 18, 1945, the Independence Preparatory Committee elected Soekarno and Hatta respectively president and vice-president of the Republic of Indonesia, and further constitutional revision was made so that within a week the new constitution was promulgated which provided for wide-scale social and economic as well as political change. The egalitarian-fraternal content of the Republic's new revolutionary symbol, the word "Bung," which was introduced by Soekarno, was a synthesis of ideas corresponding roughly to "brother revolutionary," "brother Indonesian nationalist," and "brother Republican;" this mode of address, the Bung, was of great significance since young and old, poor and rich, President

and peasant could and usually did address each other with this word. As such the Bung was instrumental in bringing about a socio-political unity by reducing all to a commonly associated bond.

An all-Indonesian cabinet of the Republic of Indonesia was announced on August 31, 1945, which contained the Indonesian department heads under the Japanese administration who speedily declared for the new government plus several new appointees of Soekarno and Hatta. After September 1, 1945, the Republican government administered Indonesia although the Japanese still retained military control of the chief urban centers. The Independence Preparatory Committee was abolished on August 29, and replaced by the Central Indonesian National Committee, or

the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat: this body came to be known as KNIP and was composed of Soekarno-Hatta appointed membership whom they deemed were the outstanding Indonesian nationalists and the most important leaders of the chief ethnic, religious, social, and economic groups in Indonesia. These men and women were not merely amenable political stooges, but men and women nearly all of whom commanded wide popular support as outstanding leaders of the Indonesian society.

Indonesia was likewise divided into eight provinces: Middle Java, East Java, ^{West Java} Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku, and Sunda-Ketjil, with a governor appointed for each province from among its own population. A new army was established upon the base of the armed and unarmed Peta units and from the ranks of the several youth organizations; this army, the People's Peace Preservation Corps, or the Badan Keamanan Rakjat, was headquartered in Jakarta, but was highly autonomous and virtually independent since it operated largely in the

territorial base of the individual provinces. Beginning on October 5, 1945 the name of the army was changed to TKR or Tentara Keamanan Rakyat, or People's Peace Preservation Army, and brought under greater degrees of central control. The TKR hard-pressed the Japanese garrisons until the British relieved them. It was apparent from the beginning that peace and order and the re-establishment of the Netherlands East Indies government was the intent of the victorious Allied Powers in Indonesia. The British used Japanese troops and later landed Dutch forces in the attempt to comply with the orders the British commander had received from the Allied Governments. The attempt to reconstitute Dutch power was systematically challenged by the Indonesian nationalists so that for the first four years of the Republic's existence warfare against powerful adversaries dominated the Indonesian scene--a warfare that its nationalist leaders well knew could determine the very survival of the young Republic.(13)

Civil war broke out because of the Dutch inability to arrive at a peaceful modus vivendi with the Indonesians wherein the former had to learn how to give up power and the latter how to exercise it. In the face of action by elusive guerrillas waging the Republican war wherein the Dutch were unable to control captured territory and Indonesians and worldwide condemnation of Dutch action, a transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia occurred on December 27, 1949. Thereby was created the Netherlands-Indonesian Union with the Dutch Queen as a symbolic head.

During the early days of the revolution and the aftermath of the Japanese Occupation certain political parties rose

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to prominence, some satisfying the demands of the socio-politically conscious masses. The most powerful of the parties launched was the Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Party), or PNI as it was generally known. The backing for this new PNI came largely from the Republic's professional people and a probable majority of the civil servants who had worked in the prewar colonial administration. It was an older-generation party since, for the most part, a large number of its intellectuals had been active in the prewar nationalist movement. The PNI's initial mass following was attracted by the fact that it bore the name of Soekarno's prewar massparty as well as that of a short lived government-sponsored party; besides a popular fiction held that the PNI was "the party of Soekarno and Hatta," a fiction not disabused by many Indonesians for over a year after the party was formed. As part of its mass-support attraction, the PNI was able to enlist the support of the local administrative officers which was a long-term political forte of the PNI since there remained a strong tendency for the peasantry to look for political guidance and directives from its traditional governors, the experience Indonesian administrative class. In addition the PNI gained the support of most of the members of the tiny Indonesian industrial and commercial middle class. Owing to this fact and the incorporation of the old regime Indonesian bureaucracy, the PNI eventually became referred to as "the middle-class party" of Indonesia. A small minority of non-Communist Marxist intellectuals, some small labor groups and a group of progressively inclined students provided the base for the party's left wing. However the group of prewar nationalist,

who held the political domination followed neither the right wing old line aristocratic^{conservative} nor the left progressivism; they insisted that national independence must precede any basic social reform and as such held its constituent groups together in spite of the wide differences in regard to domestic questions that arose between its factions.

The religious tie with the peasantry held by the Masjumi party, or the Council of Indonesian Moslem Associations, within a year of its November 5, 1945 founding date was responsible for its rise to the largest political party in the Republic. Though it bore the name of its Japanese predecessor, it was a new and distinct organization, enrolling all nonpolitical Islamic organizations subsumed under the Masjumi of the Japanese period, such as the Mohammadijah and Nahdatul Ulama, as well as such prewar Islamic political organizations as the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia. The Masjumi was supported by the large, nonpolitical Moslem social organizations and the important village religious leaders, which accounted for its mass backing. In addition many of the Indonesian commercial and industrial middle class throughout Java, Madura and Sumatra supported the movement. Likewise it attracted the majority of the larger Indonesian landowners. The Masjumi's basic tenets were the attainment of national independence as the chief aim and, next, to organization of the state according to Islamic principles. It was the interpretation of what Islamic social principles were and how they should be applied in Indonesia that the two chief groups within the party were generally at odds; these groups were the "Religious Socialist" and the conservative, older-generation religious leaders. (14)

The third political party that was organized and helped dominate the first two year's of the Republic's existence was the Socialist Party, or the Partai Sosialis which was established in early December, 1945 as merger of the short-lived Partai Sosialis Indonesia and the Partai Rakjat Socialist. Headed by Sjahrir, this new Socialist Party commanded great strength among the younger intellectuals, college and secondary students, including many members of the anti-Japanese Sjahrir under-ground. While the party lacked the large, loose mass following of the PNI and the Masjumi it did command the respect and support of a more politically conscious, solidly and effectively organized, rank and file. Its additional support was obtained from most of the small group of actively pro-Republican Indonesian Chinese. Like the other parties, the Socialist Party was pledged to the acquisition of Indonesian Independence and the national unity prerequisite thereto; moreover, its membership believed that social reform could be realized before full independence was obtained.

The PIR, or Partai Indonesia Radja, was formed from the remnants of the aristocratic segment of political life with private backing among the older civil servants, many of whom were of the colonial administration.

Several powerful semi-autonomous irregular military organizations held sway in the internal politics of the Republic during the first year of the revolution. These groups were the Pesindo, or Indonesian Socialist Youth; the Hizbullah, or armed Moslem young men; the Parisan Panteng, or Buffalo Legion, composed of poorly educated young men

initially loyal to the PNI and Soekarno; the Barisan Pemberontakan Rakjat Indonesia, or Revolutionary Legion of the Indonesian People; and the Laskar Rakjat, or home guard People's Army. Significantly, most of these armed units remained outside of politics. Especially important to the Republic's cause in the early days of the revolution, were the bands of dacoits. Because of their later significance for social developments during and after the revolution it is perhaps wise to describe their origins and activities in some detail.

DACOITISM

The band of dacoits is a very troublesome element in the present Indonesian scene. Dacoitism dates to the pre-Western period, especially in Java, when certain individuals ~~formed outlaws into established criminal bands; these groups~~ or groups consisted of travelling players and dancers, peddlers and merchants, journeymen and students searching for a master who could give them instruction in the sacred arts of metallurgy or in mysticism, wandering knights and their followers in search of adventure, and outlaws and bandits. Many of these wanderers became condottieri; some were able to carve out a principality through daring and intrigue (the 17th century slave Ki Untung who ruled an East Javanese principality). Village society, perhaps troubled by the growing population and declining welfare, was also troubled by a group of unemployed, usually single young men, who lived off their families, and acted as rowdies and as "buaja" (sharks) on markets and in the country-side. In any event, as has been demonstrated, there were plenty of people attracted to the dacoit bands or robbers, whose depredations or "rampok" were usually endured in silence

by the village. Part of the attraction for joining a robber band is found in the sense of superiority enjoyed by its membership, the air of dashing, romantic adventure and the psychological, supernatural powers supposedly possessed by the leader of the group (this power was claimed to make the bearer of an amulet or talisman containing the supernatural powers as well as his followers invisible and invincible). A "calling," or the special mandate from the spirit world or legendary heroes, provides the leader with the right to command even the wildest excesses to be practiced. Sometimes a leader possesses a little education, but his strongest ties with the group are the ritual ties of brotherhood. The appointment for attack was determined by divination, the band then joining in an orgy of common action. Formally rampok activity was notorious and included a simple extortion of villagers, attacks on travellers, larceny of fruits and fish, and simple thefts of grain.

During the Japanese occupation the dacoit bands were provided with weapons, and with the occupation's termination and the nationalist revolution these rampok bands became the mainstay of the Republic's power. As part of the Republic's "nationalist" military, the dacoit bands were a major source of strength in their agitation against Dutch security and military measures; as "guerillas" these dacoits could not be controlled by the Dutch, this same factor operating against the Republic once independence was achieved. Their depredations and intimidations continue to cause disorder, especially in remote rural areas. (15)

Owing to the occupation and the revolution, many persons received training in violence in direct contradiction to the traditional habit. As a result of this displacement many found it easier to live off the countryside. Secondly, political tensions and ideological extremes provided many new members to the bands. This is especially true of the Darul Islam which seeks to establish the traditional thocratic Islamic state. Also belonging to this group are the left wing extremists, such as the Bambu Runtjing group and the "Army of the Sick at Heart" (Barisan Sakit Hati). In consequence members of the dacoit bands justify their existence through the rationale that they are members of a political-ideological movement dedicated to an Islamic or Communistic program. This again is another cycle in the displacement of society. (16)

Footnotes

1. George McTurman Kahin. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Cornell University Press, Ithaca: 1952, pp. 101-102; P. M. van Wulfften Palthe. Psychological Aspects of the Indonesian Question. Brill, Leyden: 1949, pp. 15-36.
2. Willard Elsbree. Japan's Role in Southeast Asia's Nationalist Movements. Harvard University Press, Cambridge: 1953, Chapter 3.
3. Kahin, Op Cit., p. 242; Soetan Sjahrir. Out of Exile. New York: 1949, p. 246.
4. Kahin, Op Cit., pp. 105-109.
5. Ibid., pp. 109-110.
6. Ibid., pp. 110-121.
7. Ibid., pp. 121-218.
8. Soetan Sjahrir. Onze Strijd (Our Struggle). Vrij Nederland, Amsterdam: 1946, p. 11.
9. Kahin, Op Cit., 128-131
10. Report of the Parliamentary Commission States-General (Dutch East Indies). No Publisher, Amsterdam: 1948, passim.
11. Kahin, Op Cit., pp. 134-136.
12. Ibid., pp. 136-138; G. de Kadt. De Indonesische Tragedie (The Indonesian Tragedy). Hokema, Amsterdam: 1949, Chapter 2.
13. Kahin, Op Cit., pp. 138-147.
14. Ibid., Chapter 6.
15. Justus M. van der Kroef. "Southeast Asia--Some Anthropological Aspects" Human Organization. Volume 10, Number 1, Spring, 1951, pp. 5-15.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL PARTIES AND CLASS PARTICIPATION

In this chapter the major political parties and programs will be described. In addition to the social origins and class status of their members, the political and economic desires of the membership as related to their present position in Indonesian life, and the use of party machinery to attain their desired position, will be presented.

I

THE MUSLIM, NATIONALIST-LIBERAL, AND MARXIST POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

MUSLIM:

THE MASJUMI

The largest political party in Indonesia, the Masjumi, is a highly complex political organization which was founded on November 7, 1945, as the Council of Indonesia Moslem Associations. It received initial support from the major non-political Moslem social organizations, and, particularly, from the village religious leaders, so it attracted a huge but unorganized mass backing. It is dominated by the younger generation of Manarists, usually referred to as the "Religious Socialists," holding views which reflect the impact of the Indonesian revolution upon sincere Moslems possessed of enlightened minds and a strong sense of duty to society. In addition, the Masjumi attracted the majority of the larger Indonesian landowners and the backing of most of the vestigial Indonesian industrial and commercial middle class.

The Masjumi's principles, as espoused by the Masjumi Party Council in late 1948, appear to be valid today:

1. Complete independence of Indonesia
2. Following of and emphasis upon the principles of social justice and democracy found in Islam.
3. Government of the state according to the will of the majority, with its principal officers being chosen through direct elections.
4. Opposition to capitalism in principle, but acknowledgment of the necessity for its continuance for some time in certain spheres.
5. Acceptance of mixed economy--cooperative, socialistic, and capitalistic.
6. Emphasis on the cooperative sector, with the state advancing credit to develop this.
7. Gradual nationalization of transportation, communications, mining, oil production, large plantations and any large-scale industry as long as such nationalization is in the country's best interests. Nationalization should be accomplished through payment of reasonable compensation to those whose property is expropriated.
8. Agreement that small-scale economic enterprise on an individual basis -- as long as it is not uncontrolled-- is socially healthy, in particular, because it develops individual initiative and responsibility.
9. Small-scale economic enterprise to remain in the hands of the individual. But only where it cannot be integrated into cooperatives should it remain on a purely capitalistic basis.
10. Foreign capital to be welcome as long as it is non-political and so controlled that the Indonesian worker is protected and excessive profits are not taken out of the country.
11. Latching of wages with the social value of the work performed.
12. Assurance by the government that owners of capital in non-nationalised economic enterprises do not take excessive profits and that the workers share in the profits.
13. Absolute neutrality in the "cold war" and alignment with neither the U.S.S.R. nor the U.S. (1)

THE PARTAI SAREKAT ISLAM INDONESIA

Owing to the increasing dominance of the young Religious Socialists within the Masjumi, the dissatisfaction many of the older prewar PSII leaders held concerning their relatively lower postwar positions in the party, and their opposition to the Religious Socialists' agreement with Sjahrir's policy of negotiation with the Dutch, a schism within the Masjumi occurred. As

as a result a small part of its leadership formed a separate party, a new Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, or PSII. The party's leaders, in addition to being opposed to negotiations with the Dutch, evolved a program which included:

1. Domestic social reform must await the full attainment of independence.
2. Opposition to socialism, which is different from Communism.
3. Respect of individual property rights and private property.
4. Exports must remain in private hands.
5. The activities of the individual are more intensive than the government's and the individual can be better relied upon. As long as private enterprise is able to meet the needs of the people it is all right; otherwise the government must regulate economic enterprise.
6. If found to be in the country's interest, nationalization of transport and key industries would be countenanced.
7. Strict neutrality between the United States and Russia and a refusal to be involved in a fighting or cold war.

(2)

While attracting no more than a small fraction of the large popular following of the Masjumi, the PSII received a greater response elsewhere, particularly in Sumatra and the Celebes. To people there, the party recalled the dominant pre-war Islamic political organization; others joined the new party on the basis of habit and tradition alone. Most significantly, the control for Islamic organizations outside of Java began to be vigorously contested by the PSII and the Masjumi, the outcome of which would certainly have a bearing on the future of Indonesia.

DARUL ISLAM

The influence of old-fashioned Mohammedan leaders, strongly opposed to Western ideas and learning, manifested itself in West Java in the late 1940's, in the formulation of the working concept of Darul Islam, or the Islamic State. As a political organization, Darul Islam had its own government, military

force which controlled its territory, and it sought to expand both during the period of the war for independence. In March, 1948, the defense organization of Darul Islam was organized along theocratic lines. Its chief civil officers were kiaihs, the Moslem religious teachers, and its laws were exclusively those of Islam, with a definite anti-colonialism and anti-capitalism emphasis, however, its lofty aims were soon relegated to a secondary position as the war for independence progressed. Consequently, four chief factors have generated the Darul Islam movement during the last decade;-- These include:

1. Frustrated nationalism.
2. Exclusive, fanatical Mohammedanism.
3. Over-stimulated personal ambitions.
4. Agrarian discontent.

The motivation of frustrated nationalism has largely been removed, as is true of the second, which has given way to the increasingly tangible symptoms of independence. The factor of personal ambition has resulted from the social mobility caused by the Indonesian revolution, a condition walled-up by colonial rule for centuries. Thus it is that ambitions -- personal for power's sake and personal for service to the new nation -- has led to an intensity of competition which has increased with the breaking down of the wall of colonial control and the attendant social mobility of the revolutionary period. The fourth of the chief factors, agrarian discontent, still remains and thereby offers political capital to those opposed to the government until the conditions responsible for it are removed. This is the basic cause of the lack of security in the areas where Darul Islam operates, although the new Indonesian government is dedicated to bettering these conditions. (3)

THE NATIONAL-LIBERAL MOVEMENT

THE PARTAI NASIONAL INDONESIA

The supposed party of Soekarno, the Partai Nasional Indonesia, the PNI, or Indonesian National Party, is the second largest political organization in the country. Although Soekarno was not a member of the PNI, he was associated with it since he had led the prewar party of the same name, and had backed a short-lived government party of that name which had existed from August 22 to 31, 1945. The PNI attracted a large mass backing as a result ^{and} more important, the backing of a probable majority of Republican local administrative officers, who were by and large the same men who had made up the old aristocratic Indonesian administrative civil service as well as the non-aristocratic subordinates in the civil service. This factor coupled with the traditional tendency of the peasantry to look for political guidance and directives to its habitual governors -- the aristocratic Indonesian administrative class -- was the long-term political strength of the PNI. In addition, the PNI gained the support of the relatively small but influential professional class and the tiny Indonesian industrial and commercial middle class that had not been attracted to the ranks of the Masjumi.

Although strongly backed by the old-line, aristocratic, civil servant leaders and a small left wing minority based upon the support of some non-Communist Marxist intellectuals and small labor groups, the leadership of the party remained in control of a small but powerful group of men who had held important positions in the prewar nationalist movement. The PNI's social-economic ideology developed a marked tendency to support the

party's left wing, however, the uneasy alliance of such heterogeneous elements made it difficult for the formation of a clear, consistent, and united program. By June, 1948, the political polarization between the Right and the Center-Left coalition reduced the Right wing to almost complete impotence in the formulation of policy. The socialist tendencies were reflected in the address delivered by Sujono Hadinoto, party chairman, at its third annual congress on June 24, 1948. The following lines include some of the more relevant remarks of Hadinoto's speech.

"The social revolution, which is to establish the new society we are striving for, must be carried out through the national revolution....Our goal, the establishment of a socialistic society, will never be achieved as long as national freedom and a sovereign national state have not been attained...from the beginning the PNI has declared that nationalism (socio-nationalism but not jingoistic nationalism) is the road to a national state; the latter will provide the bridge which will bring us to the realization of a socialist society...socio-nationalism is a kind of nationalism which is based on broad principles and differs entirely from narrow-minded or jingoistic nationalism, because socio-nationalism in its relationship to the international world recognizes the duty of the nations to constitute a community of nations, free from domination and oppression, not only in political, but in an economic and cultural sense as well....National freedom is the gate to prosperity. The social structure and the way of life we seek can only be realized after the achievement of independence.

(4)

The right wing of the party clearly stood apart from the socialist goal and, moreover, they were fearful of concessions to the Dutch by the Hatta Government, so many of the leaders of the PNI seceded from the party. This resulted in a closer adherence by the party as a whole to the social-economic tenets and political orientation of the left wing and a new emphasis on attracting labor support as compensation for the loss of some peasant support.

THE PERSATUAN INDONESIA RAJA

Joining with several prominent persons who had previously

belonged to no party, the dissident PKI members launched the new Persatuan Indonesian Raja, PIR, or the Greater Indonesian Union Party. The PIR's founders were, for the most part, older-generation civil servants with aristocratic backgrounds whose positions gave them an excellent opportunity to organize the peasant vote. Their program corresponds to the following pattern.

1. It is a mass-backed party based on the traditional Indonesian political and economic concepts with social implications, modified and adapted to those of the West.
2. The present is a transitional period between the old authoritarian society and the more Western-oriented Indonesian society that is to come.
3. The ballot alone cannot insure the interests of the people will be safeguarded, rather they need and expect guidance from above, as ingrained by acceptance through the centuries.
4. Therefore, some means must be found to give real representation to the agrarian population.
5. The leaders of the government must find some way to ascertain what the people's interests are, so that the Indonesian government's character must allow for "fatherly authority" from above to look after the needs of the peasantry. (5)

These ideas, as paraphrased by Kahin, may or may not have been justified, but they frightened away some of the non-party group that was prepared to support the PIR particularly on the basis of its support of Hatta. Two large older student organizations withdrew their support of the party, for they were apprehensive that an "overly paternalistic" attitude would develop into an authoritarian political pattern with fascist characteristics bordering on reactionary social-economic ideas and non-democratic political ideas.

THE MARXIST MOVEMENT (6)

THE PARTAI SOSIALIS INDONESIA

The older Partai Sosialis Indonesia and the Partai Rakyat Sosialis gave way to the formation of the new Socialist Party in December, 1945. Headed by Sjahrir, the party commanded great strength among the younger intellectuals of secondary and

college levels, most of the former members of Sjahrir's anti-Japanese underground, and a large percentage of those from that of Sjarifuddin. Although its mass support was smaller than that of the PNI and the Masjumi, its membership was more politically conscious and more solidly and effectively organized behind its leadership. Since the Sjarifuddin group closely adhered to the Stalinist concept of class warfare and alignment with Russia, they were opposed by Sjahrir's component which felt that Indonesian nationalism antedated any Communist aspirations and that it was absurd to advocate class warfare in Indonesia since there was practically no Indonesian bourgeoisie, excepting the small group of Dutch and Chinese. Moreover, Sjahrir's group advocated a strict and positive neutrality in world politics.

It was inevitable that the Sjarifuddin faction withdrew from the party in February, 1948, so the Sjahrir group formed themselves into a new party, the Partai Sosialis Indonesia, PSI, or the Socialist Party of Indonesia, in contradistinction to Sjarifuddin's Partai Sosialis. Thus it is that Sjahrir propagates his belief that a third factor in the pattern of international relations can and must be maintained if world polarization between a Russian and American bloc is to be averted, so his party works toward a condition which will find Indonesia sufficiently independent in political and economic action, thereby not relying on either Russia nor the United States.

Other specific goals of the PSI include a socialism for Indonesia which is adapted to its own peculiar needs and conditions, a society based on a mixed economy, with a substantial sector of economic life left to private enterprise. Considerable training time is needed to provide the administrative per-

sonnel capable of assuming managerial roles in the economy; to this extent capitalism is welcome in Indonesia since it will help fill the gap in the economic life of Indonesia that a socialistically-inclined government will not have the necessary administrative personnel to manage -- and also provide the government with the personnel necessary to operate the growing government-managed sectors of the economy. Socialism, Sjahrir believes, must be decentralized and administered locally as much as possible, for he fears totalitarianism and authoritarianism which might easily result from strong centralization of the economy. The efforts of the PSI are directed, then, to making the Indonesian masses politically conscious and mature, endowed with the capacity for independent analysis and judgment of political issues. In consequence, the PSI does not seek to build up a great mass of blind, uncritical followers, but to build up cadres of enlightened and convinced Indonesians dedicated to serve the best interests of Indonesia.

THE PARTAI KOMUNIS INDONESIA

The Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI, or the Indonesian Communist Party, was resurrected a few months after the attainment of Indonesian independence, finally obtaining able leadership in 1946 when two of its prewar leaders, Sardjono and Alimin, returned from the Netherlands. At first, their Marxism concentrated on what was best to serve the cause of Indonesian nationalism, but by 1948, the party's leaders increased their conformity with Moscow policy. The new program followed emphasized the division of the world into two blocs -- the "aggressive" capitalist bloc led by the United States, and the "democratic" bloc led by Russia -- and called on Indonesia to lean closer to Russia in the fight for independence since it appeared

that the United States was backing the Dutch. With the arrival of the old-line Communist leader, Musso, from Moscow in mid-August, 1948, a plan was formulated under his leadership which called for the overthrow of the Indonesian government by building a revolutionary machine based on military backing and a corresponding munitions build-up; a revolution was begun when it became apparent that the party could not seize the reins of government through peaceful infiltration. The premature outbreak of the Communist insurrection resulted in their defeat and within a month the rebellion was crushed. This virtually eliminated any popular support for the PKI. The Indonesian government reaffirmed its intention to allow Communism as a doctrine a free position in Indonesian ideologies, but it would not countenance advocates of an ideology which sought to overthrow the lawful government by force. The Republic's spokesmen made it clear that the Communists would have the same freedom as anyone else so long as they adjured the use of force and made Indonesia rather than Russia their chief object of loyalty.

THE PARTAI MURBA

The Partai Murba, or Proletarian Party, was established by strongly nationalistic Communists as an attempt to concentrate power and build a wide political front which they might dominate and through which they might capture control of the government. On November 7, 1948, the Partai Murba was created from a fusion of the Partai Rakjat, or People's Party, the Partai Rakjat Djelata, or Poor People's Party, and the Partai Buruh Indonesian Merdeka, or Independent Indonesian Labor Party. The executive leadership of the Partai Murba rested with the followers of Tan Malaka, for the most part young men possessed of a militant idealism. A strong potential for a large organi-

zation was further advanced with the attraction of a large fringe of sympathizers amongst students and older intellectuals, although they generally have not become outright members. The Partai Murba is not organized as a dogmatic organization, this factor tending to influence the friendship of the students and older intellectuals. The important provisions of the Partai Murba's constitution include the following major points.

1. The basis of the party is anti-facism, anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, and it bases its struggle on the orderly action of the proletariat.
2. To negotiate with the Dutch on the basis of full recognition after foreign troops have left the Republic.
3. Confiscation and exploitation of enemy properties.
4. Nationalization and collectivization of vital economic enterprises to include plantations, transports, industry, and mining.
5. To endeavor that Indonesia become a member of the United Nations and other international organizations on the basis of equal status, democracy and with the purpose of establishing a proletarian world government.
6. Organization of the Partai Murba according to the principles of "Democratic Centralism".
7. The desire that Indonesia be independent of the spheres of control of either the United States and Soviet Russia; in this sense the party does not subscribe to orthodox Stalinism.

THE LABOR MOVEMENT

The Indonesian labor movement had its beginning with the organization of the Union of Railroad and Trolley Car Personnel, founded in 1908. Since that date, the labor movement has developed several rather unique aspects. Influencing the development of the labor movement has been the factor of nationalism; the rise of labor organization in the setting of a colonial, agrarian economy; the great amount of Communist-led unions; the traditional communal society and its host of religious rites and obligations; and, finally, the fluidity and extreme instability in its central organization which has been marked by frequent and bewildering changes in membership. Adding to this factor is the speed with which new federations of unions appear and disappear.

The Indonesian labor movement was characterized by a precarious balance between strict colonial supervision and nationalist-Communist sponsored strikes, which occurred before the Second World War. During the period of the Japanese occupation, the Japanese Labor Office forced either the total dissolution of labor unions or else required the unions to combine into a central labor federation, which chiefly "recruited" labor battalions for the Japanese. Since the proclamation of Indonesian independence by Soekarno, the labor movement has been marked by political and non-political organizations, the latter category applying to the most influential Indonesian political labor movement, the Partai Buruh. This union denounces capitalism, fascism, and imperialism, wishes to be free from Communist influence although it admittedly is a progressive-revolutionary party seeking the socialist state by democratic parliamentary means. As such, the Partai Buruh continues to attract an increasing number of unions and members, since it is a non-Communist political labor party which acts as a champion of the rights of labor through the democratic process.

Other large unions are organized in such fields as estate workers, mining, oil drilling, transportation, and communication. In the quest for political stability and economic prosperity, the Indonesian labor movement's success may be measured by the growing number of unions which are leaning towards a non-political orientation in labor affairs, however, there is extreme danger from the influence of political fanaticism, and self-centered interests. In consequence, the labor movement desires a recognition of its rights and is becoming increasingly aware of its obligations to the Republic. (7)

II

SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS

In analyzing the significance of the political movements in Indonesia today it is necessary to refer constantly to the broad social layers and social structure of the country. In this section an effort will be made to relate the political movements to this social structure.

THE MUSLIM MOVEMENT

The Muslim Bourgeoisie:

The Muslim bourgeoisie are desirous of maintaining their vested interests and propertied rights, these motivations taking primary consideration in their political agitation. They are the traditional leaders, the wealthy landlord group, most inclined toward opposition to socialism and communism alike. As an Indonesian vested interest group, the Muslim bourgeoisie respect individual property rights and private property. Quite naturally they believe in private enterprise, but they are disposed to government regulation of economic enterprise in-so-far as private enterprise cannot fulfill the needs of the people. They also favor nationalization of transportation and other key industries if it would be in the country's interests. This group is solidly entrenched in Indonesian society, besides, they play an important role in Indonesian politics and economics. Many of the Muslim bourgeoisie have received Western education, a factor which promotes the continued existence of their dominant role in Indonesian life since they are able to adapt Western managerial and technical skills to the operation of the large estates, the production and income therefrom being a necessary government and economic foundation support.

The aspiration of the Islamic bourgeoisie, the rising Muslim middle class, is rooted in a base of Islamic reform which reflects a demand for social welfare, individualism rather than collective group responsibility, and progressive rationalism. This group regards the Islamic movement as the expression of group solidarity integrated along the cultural-religious lines of modern Islam. Furthermore, the Muslim bourgeoisie are supported by the village social-political leaders, the priajih, the traditional pace setters and guardians of Indonesian culture. As a consequence, the religiously oriented bourgeoisie middle class pursues a culture with qualified liberalistic-rationalistic overtones, or, as in the case of Darul Islam, clamors for an outright Muslim State.

The Muslim Intellectuals:

A group of younger generation Muslims, the educated intellectuals, or so-called "Religious Socialists," are Islamic rebels in the sense that they are possessed of enlightened minds and a strong awareness of duty to society. They are sincere Muslims devoted to strengthening the bonds of national unity and to the improvement of the social lot of the Indonesian masses. They, too, exert a strong pressure on the Republic's political developments, emphasizing the principles of social justice and democracy found in Islam and accepting the philosophy of a mixed economy -- cooperative, socialistic, and capitalistic. Indeed, they are political "realists" in the movement of Sarekat Islam. They are prone to modernism and socialism, remaining firm in their opposition to "archaic" Islam.

The Muslim Schoolmen:

The "Scholars of Writ," the Muslim schoolmen, or kiaihs, have a vast amount of influence over the masses, since it is

their task to educate the youth. Their cooperation is without doubt desired by the government if the goal of modernizing Indonesia is to be realized. They tend to an uncompromising orthodoxy in their religious convictions, however. Steeped in the traditions of the past and the tenets of orthodox Islam, they are opposed to change, to Western learning and innovations. Since they are the habitual social-religious education masters in the village they exert a powerful force for retarding the Republic's efforts and goals in its attempt to improve the nation's standard of living and, conversely, solve the great problem of agrarian unrest.

The Muslim Villagers:

The Indonesian villagers, the peasantry, are immersed in centuries of Islam social-religious practices and, therefore, are prone to follow the advice of their religious leaders. There has been no peasant revolution in Indonesia, the villagers preferring to cling to their traditionally closed society, often self-sufficient with its own customs, laws and religious practices. The lore of the past and the dominance of the group right has persisted and dominated village life. In spite of this opposition, the village has been subjected to change. This may be traced to the willingness of the traditional leaders, the *priajih*s, to accept cultural innovations. Islam in Indonesia holds an immense social position among the masses, and it is this factor which, more than religious orthodoxism, controls the destiny of the peasantry.

Islam in Indonesia has followed a course of devastating attack on traditional society where it historically has been super-imposed on indigenous folkways. The traditional village is a closed and self-sufficient society, having its own religious

practices, laws, and social classes, which is a direct recognition of the sacred connection between the land, the villagers, and the crops they cultivate, and the respect due the group of elders. Beyond the subsistence production level of the village are the regional communities and the inter-village federations, often with their own headmen and their own rights. Social classes are carefully delimited, finding expression in property rights, the disposal of the village lands, the levying of tribute, and in the competence to solve all sorts of disputes.

By the sixteenth century, Islam was adopted by various court circles, primarily because of political considerations, and it spread from the courts and cities into the rural areas. Islam through the years has become a matter of nationality for the Indonesian even in the villages, and with this adherence has come respect for the Muslim schoolmen, the *kiajihs*, and the Mosque officials, the *pengulus*. The full impact of Islam on Indonesian society has brought social disorganization and structural change. Two outstanding examples of this contention are the status of women under Islamic influence and the creation of the new social elite -- the *kiajihs* and *pengulus*. The former position of the Indonesian woman in the traditional indigenous law, or *adat*, was always secure and usually high, influential, and sometimes even decisive, as in the case of the *Bataks*.

The more obvious aspects of Islamic law which have affected the traditional position of the Indonesian woman center about the pre-marital courtship period, divorce, and inheritance. The paternal control of Islam forbade public dancing and singing among the young people and prescribed rigid rules of conduct, sanctioned by Islam, which reduced the generally former free status of women. The divorce code under Islam, moreover, has replaced the

relatively unrestrictive adat law with the effect of reducing the woman's initiative rights, increasing the possibilities for divorce, particularly on the husband's complaint, giving the husband far greater freedom than the wife, and creating the possibility of divorce without the intervention of the traditional village authority, the adat chiefs. With regard to the question of inheritance, Islam does not recognize the equality of the children, the sons receiving usually twice as much as the daughters, while adat entitled the daughter to the same amount as the son.

An outstanding example of a society where Islam produced a new social elite -- the group of Muslim schoolmen, religious officials and judges, whose activities along nationalistic and communistic lines created profound social disturbances in the rural community -- is present in the Sumatra group, the Minangkabau.

The individualizing effect of Islam on the village society and its members has been demanded by the "higher" responsibility to Allah, which is a personal obligation. Thus it is not related to the collective obligation, as in the village adat, nor related to the deified village ancestors as founders of the particular village community. Under the impact of a growing sense of individualism, the old feeling of being ashamed over possible breaches of adat is rapidly disappearing.

Islam's Influence on the Rural and Urban Proletariat:

The influence of Islam on the rural and urban proletariat has been pronounced. In general, lower class city dwellers, peasants, and rural workers have flocked to Sarekat Islam. They use Marxism and nationalism as their main motivators rather than Islam. In their efforts, Sarekat Islam is the chief weapon in

a class struggle with the non-Islamic colonial groups. This de-emphasis of orthodoxism in Islam may be traced to the development of a kind of "folk" Islam, a religion of social practicallity based on a cultural ideal. It is therefore possible that Islam directed by the kiaihs can rise to conflict with the adat-conscious aristocracy, the priajhs. This gives rise to an adverse social effect on custom and law. A great appeal to the peasantry, to agrarian discontent, has not as yet been realized, but it remains a prime target, as it does in general, for most social-political movements. The peasantry is caught in the web of the various organizations seeking to control the estiny of the Republic.

THE NATIONAL-LIBERAL MOVEMENT

The Secular, or Non-Muslim, Intellectuals:

The secular, or non-Muslim, intellectuals were a product of Western education and influential ideas which were successively allowed sons of the aristocracy and commoners during the late colonial period. Becoming obsessed with the notion "Indonesia should be for the Indonesians," they became the independence agitators, the leaders in the opposition to the Japanese occupation, and the rallying beacons for the revolutionary period. This constant cry for freedom was based on the unity of Indonesia and the masses, and the formation of a popular, secular, Republic. These intellectuals are, for the most part, the executive leaders of the government and the cabinet. They espouse the cause of Western education and technology, but are extremely jealous of outside influences from either the United States or the Soviet Union. They are distinguished by a definite "paternal" attitude towards the tani, or peasant, feeling careful guidance of the masses is their obligation and responsi-

bility -- a factor which often borders on authoritarian patterns. This group further provides a wealth of civil servants to the administrative blood-stream of the government. Of the leadership provided the Republic's cause, probably Soekarno and Hatta are this group's chief contributions.

The Secular, or Non-Muslim, Middle Classes:

The secular, or non-Muslim, middle classes are a relatively small group with certain commercial and trading interests. It was this group which looked to the nationalist-intellectual leadership for salvation and deliverance from Japanese rule. Under this obligation, they supported Soekarno's bid for independence and, now that this aim has been achieved, seek to protect their propertied interests. As the capitalist entrepreneur class, they seek free enterprise, but allow for governmental direction when it will serve the interests of the people. Some Europeans and a significant Chinese minority compose to a large degree this secular middle class. The Indonesian middle class today is divided into the following general categories.

1. The group of industrial entrepreneurs is concerned with the weaving and textile industry, native cigarette production, manufacturing of sandals and umbrellas, stone and tile baking, and small rice milling and shelling industries. Drawing its labor from the rural areas, much of this kind of industry is dependent on the consumers in the village society, though some depends also on those in towns. The presence of heavy Chinese and Arab competition gives this small-scale industry a precarious existence.

2. Concerned with the purchase and resale of agricultural products, or with the preliminary processing and refining of these products, are the distributing middle class entrepreneurs.

More and more Indonesians are actively competing with the Indo-Chinese in this field.

3. The middle class conducting transport and communication services operate on such varied conveyances as trucks and busses, boats, or low-bottomed prahs, small fleets of motor-tricycles and dogcarts. These operations are not scheduled and offer passenger and cargo service.

4. Artisan entrepreneurs located in their own shops serve a local market from some branch of urban technical enterprise, mechanized to some extent, and largely supplying a local, urban group of consumers. Included in their field of specialization are the fabrication or purchase and resale of consumer goods, such as crockery, hardware, sarongs, sandals, hats, muslim garments, the processing of food, and operation of bakeries, slaughterhouses and dairies. A few are gold and silver-smiths and furniture makers.

5. The professional middle class by virtue of its political orientation exercises an influence far out of proportion to its numerical strength, especially in the administrative civil service which they staff.

The Civil Service:

The civil service has joined the Nationalist-Liberal movement over and above humanitarian adoration for their Indonesian compatriots. Faced with the prospect of losing (or being demoted to their old Dutch regime minor) positions, the former colonial civil servants hurried to enlist in the quest for national independence under Soekarno's leadership, so that they might preserve their new won status, as attained under the Japanese, and ultimately aspire to higher positions in the young Republic's government. As such, they have become the backbone of the Republic, especially since they have traditionally been the go-

between the government and the people, their views being reflected in considerable support by the latter. On the whole, the older aristocratic civil servant tends to be more conservative, as in the Persatuan Indonesia Raja, while the younger civil servants are inclined toward radicalism and support of the Partai Nasional Indonesia.

The Indonesian Proletariat:

The Indonesian proletariat, that laboring class of wage earners, is attracted to the ranks of the National-Liberal movement initially because they identify this movement as being synonymous with Indonesian independence. Since the National-Liberal movement has increasingly given closer adherence to social-economic tenets and political orientation reflected in socialist tendencies, the proletarian workers continue to support this movement.

THE MARXIST MOVEMENT

The Marxist Intellectuals:

Although the Muslim and National-Liberal movements have, generally speaking, captured the confidences of the masses, the Marxist movement has many supporters. Its leaders, for the most part, drawn from the intellectual class and are native Indonesians. Their political orientation is varied and usually divided sympathies predominate their outlook on politics. Some are desirous of establishing a socialist state, such as the Partai Sosialis Indonesia which is organized along intellectual lines, and others lean towards a sort of combined social-Communist state. Of the Communist faction, some intellectuals are conspicuously devoted to an Indonesian type communism, peculiar to the nation's circumstances, while others are rigid followers

of the Moscow party line, like the Partai Komunis Indonesia which is wholly subservient to the Soviet Union. By far, the greatest percentage of Indonesian Marxists appear to be genuinely interested in Indonesia for the Indonesians, but they are suspect since Marxism to the Westerner and many Indonesians, such as the Muslim bourgeoisie, smacks of Russian communism and imperialism.

The Urban and Rural Proletariat Influenced by Marxism:

The immediate objectives of the Marxists are the proletariat found in urban and rural areas. This mass of estate, mining, commercial, trading, and industrial workers are constantly wooed with the appealing propaganda of higher wages and social reform which is effectively and continuously chorused by Marxist agitators. Moreover, this proletarian group is urged to band together in Marxist originated and controlled unions. These workers are a potentially powerful force to reckon with, however, the Marxist grip on this class is somewhat mitigated by the appeal of Sarekat Islam and the National-Liberal willingness to accede to further social reforms.

The Partai Murba, as an example of the national communist infiltration and expansion among the masses, is organized in the rural proletariat. Economic disorganization in the Indonesian village has led to a proletarianization of the rural workers in particular. The existence of economic dualism has been beset with disruptive processes: one system largely the product of late finance capitalism in the Western world, scientifically based and organized, sensitive to the world market, and supported with adequate capital reserves; and the other economic system comprising the debt-ridden small farmer, now heavily subject to money demands, oriented to a local market and given to the pro-

duction of his own food and modest consumer goods.

The capitalist estate economy faces a decline in labor production, i.e. rubber and tin, due generally to frequent and wide-scale labor strikes. Coupled with this factor is the decline in production demand by former heavier purchasers, such as the United States. The already weakened Indonesian economy is propped up by estate supports and is further troubled by unemployment and underemployment of workers. Population increases and pressures on available land force the peasantry to require employment outside of agriculture, and so the self-sufficient village community continues to break down under the impact of economic disorganization. The rural proletariat becomes more and more dependent on wages for a living in the process.

The Communists attack the capitalist enterprises through infiltration of the labor movement, which forces economic chaos and ultimately swells the ranks of the Communist movement. Like the other political organizations, the Marxist groups seek to build a broad working base of operations. No movement to date has succeeded in this endeavor, but the Communists are capitalizing on the great peasant unrest and discontent.

Footnotes

1. George McTurnan Kahin. "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism" in William L. Holland, Editor, Asian Nationalism and the West. Institute of Pacific Relations. New York; 1950, pp.74-81.
2. Ibid., pp. 82-83.
3. C.A. van Nieuwenhuijze. "The Darul Islam Movement in West Java" Pacific Affairs. Volume 15, 1950, pp. 220-230.
4. Kahin, Op Cit., Part I.
5. Ibid., Part I.
6. Ibid., pp. 83-104
7. Justus M. van der Kroef "Indonesia's Labour Movement" United Asia. 1954, pp. 223-231.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Several conclusions are possible in an analysis of social class participation in Indonesian nationalism. In the first place, emanating from the change of social class structure, new classes have arisen. Secondly, the social levels support political parties which reflect their aspiration and need as a social class. As a consequence and complementary factor, it has been observed that several political parties offer effective appeals to the respective levels of society. Finally, agrarian unrest and discontent is leading to new political consciousness and activity in the village society.

1. New social classes have arisen from the change of social class structure. (1) The new classes arising from the change in social class structure reflect a long and continuous process of social displacement and disorganization. These new classes consist of the rural and urban proletariat, the Western intellectuals, the Muslim middle class, the Muslim intellectuals, the non-Muslim intellectuals, and the Marxist intellectuals.

Probably the most obvious result of social change in Indonesia is the rural and urban proletariat which was born in the introduction of a money economy and the village production of cash crops for foreign consumption. Among the many causes of the breakdown of the traditionally closed and self-sufficient village community, a host of factors are relevant, including the excess population increases over available cultivatable land, the constant

desire for money wages, and the demand for livelihood employment by the peasantry, now completely displaced from its group responsible society -- these factors contributed greatly to the establishment of a rural and urban working class.

The Western intellectuals came initially from the traditional governing class, the aristocracy, and later from the class of commoners. They became enamored of the concept of unifying and gaining independence for Indonesia as they became acquainted with the various treatises on democratic rights, as authored by the West, through Dutch-encouraged and often Dutch-sponsored educational programs. Owing to the superior and inherent wealthy status of the aristocracy, as well as the new gained riches of the comparatively small but socially conscious Indonesian middle class group of merchants and tradesmen, educations along Western lines were increasingly made available to their sons.

The Muslim middle class developed in direct competition to the age-old indigenous entrepreneurial group, the Chinese and Arabs, as it became aware of the necessity for gaining capital for a livelihood. Although this group is small, it is a vital intermediary for the peasant class which either sells or processes its agricultural products through the middle class. As a product of the new capitalist society introduced by the West, this group has entered small-scale industry, transportation and communication services, artisan enterprises, and professional fields,

such as medicine, the civil service, and law. They are interested in Islamic reform, social welfare, individualism, and exhibit a liberalistic-rationalistic tendency toward the modernization of the Republic.

Another product of the change in Indonesian social class structure is the group of Muslim intellectuals composed of younger generation so-called "Religious Socialists". Possessed of enlightened minds and a strong sense of duty to their countrymen, the Muslim intellectuals have gained their outlook through Western education and an awareness of social justice and democracy through Islam for Indonesia.

Like the Muslim intellectuals, the non-Muslim intellectuals were acquainted with Western liberal and democratic concepts through education, however, they are ^{not} guided by Islam in their political and social aspirations. To the contrary, they have emphasized the organization of a secular state dedicated to correcting the social ills of the Indonesians. Without the contributing influence of Western capitalism and individualism, which has guided this group to prominence, especially in government and business, it is almost a certainty that they would not have been created. Indeed, they are a product of Western education and ideological training coupled with the indigenous Indonesian factors of national unity and independence and the desire to increase the standard of living of their fellows.

The Marxist intellectuals, like the Muslim and non-Muslim intellectuals, arose from contact with Western education and ideology. They are not influenced by religion

and the philosophy of capitalism, however. Many are sincere Indonesian nationalists devoted to the cause of a socialistic state, which they feel will most adequately meet the needs of the masses. Still, a small but potentially powerful group are absolute and ardent supporters of communism. Like other sections of society, this class came from the disintegration of traditional society and thrives on its own interests: the impotency of Indonesia's economy, peasant unrest, and the desire to govern.

2. Social levels support political parties which reflect their aspirations and needs as social classes. (2)

The extent to which the various social levels support political parties is a reflection of their social class aspirations and needs. Of the major political parties considered in this discussion, it has been found that they are grouped into three categories -- the Muslim, the National-Liberal, and the Marxist.

The largest political party in Indonesia is the Masjumi which receives support from the major non-political Muslim social organizations, many of the village religious leaders, the young generation "Religious Socialist" intellectuals, and the majority of the larger Indonesian landowners as well as a significant proportion of the industrial and commercial middle class. Its basic principles represent the views of its membership, these including an emphasis upon the cause of social justice and democracy as found in Islam, popular rule of the state by the will of the majority, acceptance of a combined cooperative, socialistic, and

capitalistic economy, gradual nationalization of key industries, and absolute neutrality in the "cold war" between the United States and Russia.

The partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia is led by former Masjumi party members who became dissatisfied with the socialist orientation of the latter organization. It has a small peasant following in Indonesia except for Sumatra and the Celebes where it is contesting with the Masjumi for political supremacy. This clash of interests is revealed in Sarekat Islam's appeal which is based on opposition to socialism, respect of individual property rights, individualism and capitalism, governmental control of industry if absolutely required for the people's welfare, and a strict neutral position in the "cold war". As a consequence, it has attracted the Muslim bourgeoisie and support of many of the villagers.

Another distinct political movement which reflects the social and economic philosophy of its constituents is Darul Islam which has a very small peasant base and is directed in executive control by old fashioned Mohammedans. It seeks the establishment of an Islamic state and makes political capital of peasant discontent with the government, but it is not a large movement and certainly does not appear to be representative of the Muslim group.

The Partai Nasional Indonesia initially won great mass support stemming from the personal popularity of Soekarno and Hatta, incorrectly identified with the party, and the peasant's traditional tendency to place confidence in the

judgement of its governors--the local administrative officers, the old aristocratic civil service and the non-aristocratic subordinates--who are firm supporters of the movement. Its power also originated among the small but influential professional class, some of the industrial and commercial middle class, some non-Communist Marxist intellectuals and small unions. Basically, the P.N.I. seeks to establish a socialistic society and refuses to align itself with either Russia or the United States.

Older generation civil servants organized the Persatuan Indonesian Raja which has a considerable mass-backed party base. Its concepts are identified with a composite of traditional social-economic practices partially modified and adapted to those of the West, but it has a definite paternal and authoritarian outlook bordering on reactionary, social-economic ideas and non-democratic political concepts.

The Partai Sosialis Indonesia has gathered much strength from the student class and the Marxist inclined intellectuals. It does not advocate class warfare in Indonesia, it adheres to a positive neutrality in world politics, and believes that an Indonesian socialism based on a mixed economy with a substantial sector of economic life being left to private enterprise is a political desirability. It does not have a mass backing since the party is first concerned with making the Indonesian masses

politically conscious and mature in independent judgment of political issues.

The Partai Komunis Indonesia is the expression of the precepts of Communist class warfare principles, the complete adherence to the Moscow party line and the total elimination of capitalism in Indonesia. It is led by Marxist intellectuals but does not have a great following among Indonesians.

The Partai Murba, or the Proletarian Party, is an attempt by the Communists to create a peasant-based organization. It is looked upon with favor by many students and older intellectuals and, with mass support, could make its influence felt in government. While it advocates independence of action in world affairs, it is based on a philosophy which requires government by the proletariat and envisions a socialist state.

3. Political parties offer effective appeals to the respective levels of society. (3) Political parties in Indonesia offer effective appeals to the respective levels of society. This is a recognition of the needs and aspirations of the social classes.

The Masjumi party reflects the views of the young generation Muslim intellectuals, non-political Muslim social organizations, village religious leaders, large Indonesian landowners, and the industrial and commercial middle class. On the other hand, the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia expresses the social and the economic opinions of the Muslim bourgeoisie

and a portion of the peasantry. As a further contrast, the old-fashioned Mohammedans and a small peasant base support the philosophy of Darul Islam, or the Muslim State.

The political power of the Partai Nasional Indonesia is a direct outgrowth of the support of a considerable peasant base, the new civil service, the influential professional class, as well as some of the industrial and commercial middle class, non-Communist Marxist intellectuals, and several minor unions. A conservative viewpoint, that of the old aristocracy of civil servants and part of the tradition-bound society, is reflected in the Persatuan Indonesian Raja.

In the Marxist movement, the Partai Sosialis Indonesia represents the ideas of the student class and the Marxist-inclined intellectuals. Outright Communists, also known as Marxist intellectuals, have established the Partai Komunis Indonesia as an expression of their social-economic interests. Finally, the potentially powerful Partai Murba reflects the views of many students, older intellectuals, and the Communists, but it has not made an effective appeal to the peasantry.

It has been demonstrated that political parties offer effective appeals to the respective levels of society, which is a reflection of their aspirations and needs as social classes. Much over-lapping exists, however. For instance, it is a common assumption that the rural and urban proletariat like Marxism as an ideology, but the role of Islam and the

adat as a traditional and influential political challenger is frequently overlooked. While Marxism has been a vocal and active ally of nationalism, having succeeded in picturing itself as "progressive," especially in the case of the Communists, its present promise of establishing an ideal society where "foreign" capitalist exploitation would cease to exist and all national resources would be based on common ownership as an immediate solution to Indonesian societal unrest, has not succeeded in capturing mass peasant backing. Moreover, while Communism is strong in the union group it must be remembered that Islam's social-religious leaders and the village's political leaders exert a powerful grip on the views of the masses. In this respect it is important to recall that Indonesia is an area where 30 different languages are used, where tribal and folk societies surround modern urban conclaves, and where many different ethnic groups are governed by an incredible number and diversity of custom laws, social structures, and native political systems. Marxism does have a grip on the urban and rural proletariat, but it does not appear likely that it will take control of the government in the Communist sense. For the majority of the Muslims, the National-Liberals, and the Marxists are agreed that Indonesian society must be shaped around a socialist type state which for the present is built upon a capitalist, cooperative, and socialist foundation with the Muslim society a requisite supporting class.

4. Agrarian unrest and discontent is leading to new political consciousness and activity in the village society. (4)

Economic disorganization in the Indonesian village has led

to a displacement and proletarianization of the rural workers in particular. The rural proletariat is, for the most part, poverty stricken, restless, and discontented, espousing radical ideologies in an attempt to better its lot in life. Hereⁱⁿ the clash of economic dualism, one system based on capitalism and the other self-sufficient system becoming increasingly affected by international economic fluctuations. Debt-ridden and subject to money demands, the peasantry is forced to grow cash crops and, failing to obtain sufficient money needs, then seeks employment outside of the village and agriculture so that the self-protective and self-sufficient village community continues to break down under the impact of economic disorganization. The rural proletariat competes for money wages in estate and mining enterprises, but, in general, unemployment is high.

Communism promises immediate rectification of economic troubles and, with its firm hold on the union movement, appeals to the growing number of rural proletarians. Although no political movement to date has succeeded in capturing a broad peasant base of operation, the Communists are capitalizing on the great peasant unrest and agrarian discontent.

The Republic of Indonesia has independence, but many problems remain. The Republic must evolve a system of universal education for the masses and a program directed toward the development of natural native resources and economic recovery if the nation is to continue as a member of the free world community. In particular, the Indonesian export pattern must be adjusted so that her exports and products are stabilized on the international market. This burden largely falls upon the West which can also provide needed capital investments if Indonesians

will divest themselves of the fear of foreign economic control and Republican policies which prohibit capital investment expansion in the archipelago. So long as social and economic unrest and discontent are present, the masses will be drawn to ideologies, such as that of the Proletarian Party, which promise to promote the welfare of the proletariat. (5)

Footnotes

1. See pp. 137-147.
2. See pp. 125-136, 137-147.
3. See pp. 125-135.
4. See pp. 141,145,146.
5. Justus M. van der Kroef, "Marxism in Southeast Asia"
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November, 1954, pp. 289-297.

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