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THE UNITED STATES FOREfiGN POLICY
TOWARD REPUBLEC OF KOREA BETWEEN 1945-1957

Thai: for 1h. Degru of M. A.
MICHtGAN STATE URWERSITY

Dao Hang Chang
1958

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THE URITLD STéTLS FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD
REPUBLIC OF KOREA BETWEEN 1945-1957

by
D30 Hons Chang

A THJSIS
Submitted to the School of Gradusto Studio. ot’fliohiean
State Univoraity of Agriculture and Applied Soicnoo
in partial fulfillment of tho requirement-
for tho dogro. of

EASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

1958

Approved [33%;/;*§2;;49¢é;°¢*t

6 I/O (76:,

5'?

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ABSTRACT

Sinco tho and of torld War II. tho responsibility assumed
by tho Unitod Statos in tho Far East as soil as to tho Froo
Iorld in loss devolopod aroao is enormous. thilo tho United
Stotoo hos boon ongagod in tho cold oar bstooon donoorocy and
communion, tho proaroos toward troodon in Koroa has boon slow.

Sinoo 1945. whon tho Ropublic ct Koros I88 liboratod tron
tho Japanooo :oko by tho Froo Allioo. tho United States policy
in tho peninsula in rospect to political settlement. ooononic
stabilisation. social order. and military security hos boon
lorgoly unsuccessful. according to this study.

Politically. tho intsrnnl strugglo would not havo
occurrod it tho American military gOVernnent had achiovcd its
objoctivoo. Economically, tho starvation would not havo boon
possiblo if Ansrican authorities had sado tho boot uoo of thoir
funds. And militarily. tho Korean nor would not hnvo happanod
it America had understood tho Russian and North Koroan intontiono.
Thooo failures in American foreign policy oausod Kcroa to
hocono a testing ground in tho disputo botooon tho troo oorld
and world coanunion.

In this study it has boon shown that tho Unitod Statoo
foreign policy in Koren oas oeak becauso of division, uncertainty,
and tinidity. Tho changso of personnel ond of politicol portion
in loshington inevitably result in changes in local policy as

roll as in objectivos.

ACKIOILEDGEHEHTS

Tho author oishos to oxpross with plossurs his oincoro
approciaticn to Dr. Barry J. Priodman undor ohooo onthuoisstic,
sostful and capablo loodorship this study oss ccnductod and
complotsd.

Bo is also greatly indobtod to Dr. Dans I. loodbridgo of
tho Doportmont of Communication Skills for his valuablo

suggostions and intorost in this study.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o

' Chaptor

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Chapter

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.

7.
8.

Chapter

1.

2.

1: Geography, History, Japanoso Colonization
and Cairo Declaration of 1945 . . . . . .

Goography and Population . . . . . . . .
History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Culture and Resources. . . . . . . .
Japanoso Colonization. . . . . . . . . .
The Cairo Declaration of 1943.

Footnotes. o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o

11: American Military Government in
Korea, 1945-48 . . . . . . . . . . .
Background of Occupation . . . . . . . .
American lilitary Government in Action .
Korean Political Partios . . . . . . . .
Stops Toward Korean Solf-Govornment. . .

Tho Unitod Nations Temporary Commission
on Koroa o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o

May 10, 1948, Election in South Korea. .
North Korea and its Reaction . . . . . .
Summary of Events. . . . . . . . . . . .

Footnotes. o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o

1111 Korean War of 1950 and American
Foreign Policy. o o o o o o o o o o

Communist Invasion and the United States
Decision to AOto o o o o o o o o o o o o

Actual Fighting in the Korean War and
Chinese Intervention . . . . . . . . . .

10
11
12
26

29

32

33
34
38
42

46
48
51
58
62

65

65

74

5.

4.

“SP Of Korea o o o o o o o o o o e o o o

Armed Forces Committed by United
in ‘OIOB o o o o o o o o o o o o

The APEiItiOCo o o . o o o o o o

POOtnOtOIo o o o o o o o o o o o

Chapter 1': Economic Aspects. . . . . . .

1.
2.

3.

4.
5.

6.

Economic Background. o o o o o o

.lission of Economic COOporation

Iationsp

Administration (ECA) to Korea and
United Nations Korean Reconstruction
AEODOI (UHKRA) o o o o o o o o o o o

Combined Economic Board and
Economic Coordinator . . . . . .

Evaluation of the Ailercgram. .

Dr. John A. Hannah's View of the
Korean Economic Aid Program. . .

American lilitary Aid Program. .
Footnotes. o o e o e o o o o o o

Chapter '1 Conclusion and Prospects for Korea

1. lilitary Government Occupation in Korea.
2. Korean war of 1950 . . . . . . .
3. Conflicting Opinions of Korea. .
4. Economic Rehabilitation. . . . .
Footnotes. . . . . . . . . . . .
Appendix - A

A Korean Chronology. . . . . . . . .

Appendix . B
The Korean Declaration of Independence

. 97
.101

.111
.114
.117

.119

.122
.124
.132
.137
.140

.141

.144

Appendix . C
lutual Defense Treaty Between the
States and the Republic of Korea.
Appendix - D
Aikook-Ks, a Patriotic Song . . .

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Governmental Publications . . . .
General References. . . . . . . .
Periodicals . . . . . . . . . . .

Newspaper . o o o o o o o o o o o

United

.147

.149

.150
.150
.153
.154
.154
.154

IITRODUCTION

The author’s primary purpose is to examine American foreign
policy toward Korea between 1945 and 1957. While conducting the
research the author was confronted with great difficulty in
obtaining a true picture of the contrasting ideologies and
nationalismm in the too halves of Korea, because no materials
are available in the University library concerning lorth Korea.
Korean problems are relatively new to American political and
social scientists and few books on the subject are available.
tor this reason the author has used considerable information
from both United States and Korean governmental publications
and current periodicals.

The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I is
devoted to giving background information about Korea prior
to 1945. It includes material on the geography, population,
history, culture and resources. the Japanese colonization. and
the Cairo Declaration of 1943, which contains the general
American foreign policy toward.Koroa in its earlier stage. In
this chapter the reader will find the American commitment deal-
ing with Korean independence and its implications.

In chapter I! the author attempts to give the significance
of American foreign policy as well as United States Kilitary
Government in Korea for the years 1945 through 1948. theme

crucial three years covered one of the most important periods

in modern Korean history. It was a time of dividing the country,
organising the political parties. and negotiating with the
Russians to bring about the unification of the country in an
effort to stabilize it politically and economically. The develop-
ment of South Korean affairs was striking, but the Bilitary
Government's failure in dealing with some aspects of Korean
affairs is clearly apparent. To cite one example, the withdrawal
of the American military forces from South Korea without
comprehending the future intentions of the Berth.Koroans and
their strategic position may have helped to bring about the
Korean war.

In chapter III the author attempts to give particular
emphasis to the presidential decision-making process and the
Chinese Communist and Russian reactions to the Korean warfare.
The Korean war was the first war in history in which troops of
a world organisation acted as "police" to fight on aggressor
nation. In 1955 the armistice was signed by representatives of
the two military commands at PannunJom, but it did not achieve
the objectives of the United States. The author will attempt to
examine not only the contributions made by the United States,
but also why the American government failed to achieve its
objectives.

In chapter IV .- economic organization and military
aspects -- the author discusses various governmental organizations,

their purpose, and how they are operating in war-ruined Korea

today. In addition, the author emphasizes the military portion
of American foreign aid, and what should be done in order to
maintain the Korean army, the second largest in the free world,
and to make the peninsula secure.

Lastly in chapter V the author sums up the whole American
foreign policy during the twelve years, 1945 to 1957, and
describes the American failure in negotiating with Soviet Russia
during the Iilitary Government occupation in Korea, and the
present United States policy toward.Koroa, economic and military.
In addition, the author stresses the particular significance and ~
meaning of the Korean war of 1950, world communism, and prospects
for Korea. 1

Throughout the study, the reader will realise the American
failure in dealing with Korean affairs. However, this failure
carries with it the promise of future success. Knowledge of what
has happened in Korea, why it happened, and, most important of
all, who made it happen, can be a valuable guide as to what can
be attempted and what should be avoided, in forming Iostorn
attitudes and plans toward other less-developed areas of Asia
and tho Biddle East. For unless lessons are learned from the
example of Korea -- and from the mistakes that lost a few
nations in the world to the Communist bloc -- the lost may lose
the rest of the world.

Korea is still one of the greatest of the loss-developed

areas of the world in terms of industrialisation, the ability to

food and support her own indigenous pepulation, and the ability
1 to exploit her vast natural resources and potential power
supply for the benefit of her own peOplo. The nations of the
lost, especially the United States, have attempted to support
those Korean governments which labeled themselves ”democratic3'
Iostorn capital has been invested in Korean industrial develop-
ment. Iostorn physicians laid the foundations of modern medical
facilities in Korea, and Western educators have made significant
contributions to Korean colleges and universities.

Yet, it is now apparent that the inconsistencies of Iostorn
foreign policy, the failure of the Iost to understand the history,
the geography, the conditions, the demands, and the institutions
of Korea have made Korea a vulnerable testing ground in the
battle against world communism. Thus Korea becomes a primary
example of potential Western failure and Communist success in
a loss-developed area, an example which might endanger the
entire world.

that has happened in Korea is not only important in its
own right, but it is also significant for an understanding of
the unfolding struggle for the loyalties of the diverse people
of Asia. In addition, it aids in understanding how national
commitments and international problems assume an inevitability
above and beyond the control of the otatemen who presumably
shape and administer foreign policy. For this reason the

author has attempted to stress the elements in the Korean

situation which not only illuminate e portion of the past, but
also serve as a partial guide for the future.

If a prior historical example existed, the events in Korea
might have been very different. lone did exist, however, and it
is important to use the developments in Korea as lessons.
American foreign policy toward Korea has been one of the moat
important factors in that country‘s history and will continue
to be in the future. If the United States and the Soviet Union
are truely concerned about the fate of Korea, surely an accept-
able settlement can be found. In the future, whatever the United
States does for Korea will affect directly not only Korea but
also the entire world.

The Korean peninsula can help to determine the course of
American-Soviet relations. The United States must remain alert
to all possibilities and dangers inherent in the Korean
situation.

American mistakes as well as American successes in Korea
are described in this study. Uhile much of the discussion is
necessarily historical, it is undertaken with the idea that the
evidence presented here can be used as a guide for future policy
decisions.

lrediotions about human affairs impel us all to draw upon
our knowledge and experience of the past in order to deal as
effectively as possible with the future. Bound policies must

be based upon sound understanding. It is hoped that the evidence

and interpretations presented here might contribute to both, as

well as to the fund of knowledge of the scholarly community.

CHAPTER I
GEOGRAPHY, nxsroar, JAPANESE

COLOHIZATION AND CAIRO DECLARATION
OF 1943

1. GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION,

Korea is 85,246 square miles in area and consists of the
peninsula -- which projects southeastward from the continent of
Asia -- and about two hundred islands, the largest of which is
Cheju. en. greatest length of the peninsula, north and south,
is 512.4 miles and the greatest width, east and west, is 219.4
miles. rn. coast line 1. approximately 6,000 .11.. long. ‘ To.
most northerly point, near Onsong, 11.. at 43°2' north latitude;
CheJu-dc, the southernmost island, reaches as far south as
33°12' north latitude. The easternmost point, near the mouth of
the Ialu River, is lean-do, 124°11° east longitude. the western-
most is Ullung-do, an island in the Sea of Japan, 150°54' east
longitude. 2

The land boundary is formed in large part by the Kalu
(Amnok-kang) and Tuman rivers which separate Korea from southern
Kanchuria and eastern’Siberia. The Russo-Korean frontier, only
20 miles long, is about 80 miles from Vladivostok. The country
is divided into 14 provinces, including the northern half. Each
province is subdivided into counties, cities, towns, and districts.

In spite of its small land area, Korea's papulation is a

little more than that of Spain, and ranks thirteenth among the

3

nations of the world. Before the Korean war the area north
of the 38th parallel had an estimated pepulation of 10 million,
and the southern area an estimated 20 million, making a total of
30 million for the entire nation. Since liberation from Japan,
the population has increased at an annual rate of 5.58 percent.
During the ten years, 1929.1959, the net reproduction rate
(number of births over deaths per thousand) was 12.14, an in-
crease of some 300,000 a year. The proportion of men to women
at the end of 1958 was 103 to 100, placing the total excess of
males over females at nearly one-third of a million. 4
The increase in population will necessitate birth-control
or a corresponding increase in the number of Koreans emigrating
to foreign countries. At least one-tenth of all Koreans are
already living in other countries. It is estimated that at the
present time about 12,000 Koreans are living in the United
States (mainly Hawaii and Califormina), half a million in
Japan, half a million in China (lanchuria), and a quarter of
a million in the Soviet Union (southeastern Siberia). 5

The distributions of population of Korean nationals with-

 

 

in and outside Korea in 1935 and 1947 are as follows: 6
111nm Korea 1935 1947

- thousand thousand
[al.eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 11,271 14,030
’03310eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee 10.937 ' 14,029
Total....................... 22.208 28,059

Outgidg Korea 1935 1947

 

thousand thousand
Japan......................... 600 400
China (mainly lanohuria)...... 774 1,000
Siberia....................... 175 215
Elsewhere..................... 30 21
(including 0.3.1.)
Total 1.579 1,536
Total Koreans - 23,787 29,695

The people of Korea are similar to the peoples of China
and Japan. They usually have straight black hair, dark eyes, and
oliveobrown skins. The people of Korea generally are taller than
the Japanese but shorter than the northern Chinese. The Koreans
are sometimes called "the white-clothing people” of Asia be-
cause they like to wear white.

The Korean language is similar to the Japanese and Chinese
languages. It contains ten vowels and fourteen consonants and is
written in a simple phonetic script, called Bangui. Until recent-
ly, most Koreans used Chinese characters in writing and considered
Chinese their national language. Even today, nearly all Korean
scholars learn Chinese. Host of the peeple use a mixture of
Chinese and Korean characters in their writings. Since 1945,
only the Korean alphabet has been used in school. In a new law
issued by the hinistry of Education, the use of Chinese charact-

ers is prohibited in official documents.

2. HISTORY‘

Korean legends say that Tangun, who lived in 2333 B. C.,
was the father of Korean-civilisation. Korea developed by it-
self until Kija, an exile from China, led about 5,000 followers
to Korea in 1122 n. c., and founded . kingdom which was called
'Chosun.‘ 7 Throughout many hundreds of years, Korea remained
under Chinese influence. Its civilization was based on Chinese
philosophy and literature. 8 From about 100 3.0. to the 1th
century A.D., there were three separate kingdoms in Korea --
Koryu, Peakje and Sinla. Finally one kingdom succeeded in
conquering the other two and ruled the whole peninsula. The
name of the combined kingdom was called 'Koryu,” from which we
get the modern name, “Korea.“

The civilization of Koryu stood on a high plans for many
centuries. It inaugurated the civil service examination for the
first time in history, established schools for the education of
youth and instituted taxation laws to stabilise national re-
venue. Bronze coin was used during this age and the art of
printing was greatly developed. 9

Inch of Chinese oivilizatiOn in Korea was destroyed in the
1200's when the Mongol armies of Genghis Khan and Kublai Khan
overran the country. In 1392, Ii Tao-Jo founded a ruling family
known as the Li (or Lee) dynasty which controlled Korea for
three hundred years. During that time kings of the dynasty main-

tained close relations with China. In 1592, two hundred years

10

after the establishment of the Li dynasty, a Japanese invasion,
commanded by Kideyoshi Toyotomi, was checked by the brilliant
naval victories of Admiral Sun Sin Lee, inventor of the ironclad
ship. 10

In 1882, Korea concluded a treaty of amity and commerce
with the United States, the first Western nation to enter into
a treaty relationship with the Korean kingdom. 11 The action
~was soon followed by similar treaties with Great Britain, Germany
and China in 1333 and 11.1, and Russia in 1884. Korea .1»

concluded a treaty with Japan in 1876. 12

5. THE CULTURE AND RESOURCES;

Korean culture is the outgrowth cf one of the oldest
civilizations in the world. Two thousand years before the
discovery of America, Korea had a well developed civilisation,
and priceless relics of the arts of these ancient days are
exhibited in Korean museums. Korea has made many contributions
to world civilization. Among Korean inventions and discoveries
are movable printing type, which was used for many years before
the Cuttenberg Bible was printed in Germany, the magnetic
compass and the spinning wheel. in astronomical observatory,
first of its kind in the Orient, was built in 634 A. D. 15

The religious beliefs of Koreans are varied. In addition
to the ancient Korean Shamanism, the influences of Buddhism and

Confucianism are still strong in Korea today. Christianity has

11

made great headway, and Korea is indeed the most Christianized
country in the Orient. 14
The basis of the Korean economy is agriculture. Korean rice
is esteemed the finest in the world. Large orcps of rice, barley
and other small grains are the most important agricultural pro-

15

ducts. Korea's fisheries are world famous, as the Korean
offshore are the meeting places of great ocean currents, both
warm and cold. The combination provides abundant food for under-
sea life, and Korean fisheries before the war ranked sixth in
world production. Due to war damage, fisheries production in
Korea has not regained its pro-war levels. Korea contains vast
and largely unexploited mineral'deposits. Among the more important
are tungsten, coal, iron, gold, silver, capper, lead, sine,
magnesite and nickel. Pull develOpment of these resources, plus
the industrialisation necessary to process and fabricate the

deposits, is necessary for Korea‘s economic independence. The

most serious problem of all is the shortage of electric power. 16

4. JAPANESE COLONIZATION

Nippon, ”the Land of the Rising Sun,” has frequently invaded
her neighbors and applied all kinds of methods to obtain addition-
al territories. Strategically situated and rich in natural re-
sources, Korea was the first target of the Japanese Empire.

During many centuries, Japan manifested a great interest

in subjugating adjacent territories, especially after the KeiJi

12

Restoration of 1868. This leiji Restoration of 1868 was the
beginning of modern Japanese history. In a few crowded years
she was transformed from a weak medieval 17 empire into a
modern powerful state. Rapid industrialization by means of
state subsidies, together with improvement in agriculture,
abolition of feudalism, educational reformation, and the adopt-
ion of a parliamentary but autocratic constitution on the
Prussian model, changed the structure of the country. The
organisation of the military machine was copied from the
German army and the British navy. These changes enabled the
Japanese to bring a long-cherish dream to a reality. The dream
was to expand across the continents of the world.

At the same time, Japanese diplomats sought to obtain
outside assistance in the event of a new war. In January 1902,
these efforts were rewarded by an important alliance with
Great Britain, an old competitor of Russia. The Japanese also
successfully wooed their giant neighbor across the Pacific, the
United States President Theodore Roosevelt assured the Tokyo
government he would be benevolent toward Japan in the event of
war. 18

In the summer of 1903, the Japanese brought the matter of
the sovereignty and independence of Korea to a head by formally
proposing to Russia that the questions of lanchuria and Korea
be reopened; The Russians agreed and a conference was quickly

convened in St. Petersburg (now Leningrad), Russia. For seven

13

months, the talks dragged on fruitlessly as each side offered
prOposals and counterpr0posals, one of which was a Russian sug-
gestion that a neutral zone be created along the northern border
between Korean and Russian territory.

The Japanese grew inpatient while the confident Russians
continued to procrastinate. In Tokyo a war party, which had been
urging decisive action, finally won over the government. On
February 3, 1904, the Japanese delegate at St. Petersbrug broke
off the discussions and departed. Three days later Japan launched
her attack on Russian Far Eastern.forces. In her declaration of
war proclaimed on February 10, Japan charged that the Russians
had been threatening the independence of Korea. .

The outcome of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05 was even
more astounding than that of the Sine-Japanese war of the previous
decade. The Russian armies, handicapped at having to defend an
unpopulated frontier territory thousands of.siles from the center
of Russia's population and industry, were soundly defeated by
the Japanese, who overwhelmed Port Arthur and Dairen in a
series of bloody assaults. In Kay 1905, the final blow fell in
Tsushima Bay. There the Japanese destroyed the Russian Baltic
fleet, which had sailed halfway around the world in an effort to
save the situation. Japan's tremendous victory over Russia on
land and sea signaled the rise of a new world power. In Russia
it stirred the revolutionary fevcr of 1905, the prelude to 1917.

It signaled Korea's death knell. ‘9

14

The victory allowed Japan to continue to build a modern
state, the foundations of which had been successfully laid on
the Western prerequisites of technical power. Japan proceeded
to embark on a policy of expansion.
The constant pressure of international power politics
after the middle of the nineteenth century also compelled her
“to expand in search of the foreign markets so desperately
needed to realize the profits which could not be obtained from
the narrow market, and in search of cheap essential raw ma-
terials which were denied her through the accident of geography.” 2°
The desire to plunge into conquest was not new to the
Japanese, who, being the "Chosen PeOple,' always believed in
the divine mission of Japan to conquer and rule other countries.
Twenty-six hundred years ago, Jimmu Tenno, first Emperor of
Japan, is said to have given the divine command "Hakko Ichiu.’ 21
lfter the Imperial Restoration, his phrase was revived. Besides,
“all through the eighteenth century the supporters of movements
for restoration of the Imperial power had consistently coupled
with this program for a political revolution at home the idea
of aggression and expansion, and this was the policy recommended
by such teachers as Shoin Icshida, who educated the Samurai
leaders of the clans that restored the Imperial Power in 1868." 22
The thoughts of new Japan turned once more to the empire

which Hideyoshi Tcyctcmi, often called the Napoleon of Japan,

had set out to attain at the end of the sixteenth century.

15

nideyoshi dreamed of subjugating China, where he planned to

send the excess population of Japan to serve as mercantile over-
lcrds of a new colonial market. In his reply to a letter from the
king of Korea, he said, "Since we cannot live in this world for
even one hundred years, how can we continue to confine ourselves
in this island? It has long been my ambition to conquer the

King Dynasty 23 by way of your country. Our Emperor has expressed
gratification at your readiness to establish relations with us

by sending a delegate to our nation. I hope you will dispatch
troops to help us when we mobilize our forces against the Ring

24 Hideyoshi's plans actually extended far beyond the

Dynasty.“
conquest of China. Bis aim was to create a great Asiatic Empire
out of the lands then known to the Japanese, such as India,
Persia, the islands of Liu Chiu (now the Ryukyus), Formosa, the
Philippines, and the regions in the South Seas. 25

In 1875, only seven years after the Heidi Restoration, the
Kuriles were annexed. Two years later the Bonin Islands were ac-
quired. In 1879 the Ryukyu (Liu Chin) islands were incorporated
into Japan as a prefecture under the name of Okinawa. The Volcano
Islands adjoining the Bonin Islands were annexed in 1891. Japan
next looked for expansion in the only direction permitted by
history and geography, namely the Asiatic mainland, where the
western powers had already begun to divide China, the “Sick Kan
of the Far East,” into spheres of influence for themselves.

Japan's eyes naturally fell on China's tributary, Korea, for the

Korean peninsula was "regarded as a dagger point at Japan's

16

heart, a source of constant irritation and menace to Japan's
security." 26

From the very beginning the American government encouraged
the Korean government to establish close relations with outside
powers, and for the next ten years (from 1882) the American
government actively supported Korean independence. The Western
nations as a whole were anxious to get rid of Chinese interest
and influence in the Korean peninsula. The British moved ships
to a Korean island near the coast and kept them there until China
withdrew its forces from Seoul. The Chinese were also forced to
agree to permit the Japanese to dispatch troops to Korea in
cases of "emergency." This privilege gave the Japanese their
starting point in 1894. The Japanese created the necessary
“emergency“ by declaring war against China with the agreement of
the British and American governments. The Chinese likewise re-
turned their troops to Korea. On July 16, 1894, the Anglo.
Japanese Treaty was signed. The following day the Tokyo govern-
ment decided upon final details of military operations and on
July 25, Japanese forces seised the Korean royal palace and
proclaimed the King's 80oyear-old father as Regent. The Regent
was forced to sign a ”declaration of war” against China and
"called up“ the Japanese to expel the Chinese. The Japanese
promptly responded to this 'call' and launched attacks upon the
Chinese forces.

In a few months, it was clear that the well prepared Japanese

17

were decisively superior to the Chinese armies. On November 22,
the American government showed its sympathy toward Japan by
following the British lead with a revised treaty recognising the
Japanese as virtual “equals" of the western powers -- although
the treaty was held up for a time by heated discussion in the
0.8. Senate of the wholesale massacre of surrendered Chinese
soldiers at Port Arthur and some senators denounced the Japanese
as “blood-thirsty savages." 27

In the peace treaty with China, Japan gained China's ao-
quiescence to the maintenance of Japanese troops in Korea.
General liura became the Japanese minister at Seoul. One of the
most significant turning points in Korean history was reached
when Japan was allowed to remain in Korea.

Queem.lin of Korea, resenting the growing power of the
Japanese, worked steadily to protect Korea's independence. 8he
and her followers organised an anti-Japanese group. The Japanese
attempted to remove the Korean antioJapaneee movements by
diplomacy, by threats, and by bribery, but they never succeeded.
Finally, General liura ordered her killed. Japanese troops on
the night of October 8, 1895, attacked the palace, overcame the
queen's bodyguard, and guarded the entrance while a group of
Japanese assassins went inside. The queen fled but the murderers
pursued her and hacked her to death with swords. They dumped her
body into a well and early next morning burned it under a pine

tree in the palace court. 26

18

The Japanese vigorously pursued policies aimed at making
Korea a colony. Opposition was ruthlessly suppressed. Finally,
the Japanese gained virtual control of the main branches of
Korean administration. in American agent of Tokyo was named
adviser on foreign matters. lith this control achieved, Japan's
power in Korea was further intensified. The Japanese seised for
'war purposes" great stretches of Korean land. 29 Korea be-
came a colony of the Japanese empire after formal annexation
in 1910.

Immediately after annexation, Korea was placed under the
supervision of the Overseas East Asia Iinistry, but in November
1942, upon the establishment of the Greater East Asia Iinistry,
Korea was united with Japan proper and responsibility was
transferred to the Home linistry. 30

is a result of Japanese annexation of Korea, Japan energed
as the strongest power in Asia and the world accepted the ab-
sorption of Korea. But although Korea's international status
had ended, the Koreans themselves could not easily forget their
ancient kingdos. [any Korean patriots, in and out of Korea,
kept alive the dream of independence. Asong them were two
outstanding personalities, Syngman Rhee and the famed Koo Kis,
who proceeded to organise an underground movement to resist
Japanese rule. Both embarked on an almost fortybyear exile, Rhee
spending much of this time in the United States, where be eb-

31

tained a Ph.D. degree and pleaded his country's cause, and

19

Kim living in China.

After Woodrow Wilson attained the Presidency of the United
States and proclaimed his famous "Fourteen Points“ in January,
1918, near the end of Iorld Iar I, Rhee was inspired to take
vigorous steps to attain his country’s freedom. He conceived the
idea of a nationwide, non-violent Korean movement to demonstrate
to the world that, despite thirteen years of Japanese rule, Korea
yearned for independence and selfadetermination. Early in 1919,
after winning Koo Kim's agreement to his plan, Rhee dispatched

)2 '

a message to the Korean underground:

President lilson cf the United States has proclaimed
a fourteen point program of world peace. One of these
points is the self-determination of peoples. Ion must
make the most of this situation. Your voice must be
heard. President Iilson will certainly help.
The Japanese colonial government, which was set up after
the annexation in 1910, was based on a highly organized bureau-
cracy, with a Governor-General 'at the apex of Korea's pyramid of
power.” 33 ”Although the post of Governor-General after 1919
was technically cpen to all, the office in fact was never
occupied by a civilian." 3‘ An important feature of the colonial
administration in Korea, as in Japan's other possessions, was
'the virtual monopoly by Japanese of administrative positions
on the higher levels ... more than 80 percent of the highest
ranking officials (Chokunin and Shonin), 60 percent of the

intermediary rank (Hannin), and about 50 percent of the clerks,

20

secretaries and minor employees were Japanese." 55 The Koreans
were mostly appointed in the lower ranks of the administration.
The Koreans hardly accepted with equanimity their subjection
to Japanese rule and the colonial power had to govern the
peninsula until 1919 by military force and martial law. The
Japanese suppressed all political organization. The outbreak of
the independence movement, following the presentation to the
Japanese authorities of a Declaration of Independence on larch 1,
1919, signed by 35 leading Korean nationalists, 36 resulted in
further severe measures by the colonial authorities, as a result
of which many Koreans had to take shelter abroad. In Chungking,
China and Washington (where a Korean Commission was newly estab-
lished to serve as a diplomatic agency of the exiled Korean Re-
public), the movement was particularly active. }? In larch
1942, a Liberty Conference was held in Washington for the purpose
of gaining diplomatic action on behalf of Korea, and the Korean
cause gained considerable sympathy and encouragement from many
quarter“-38
Bational movements were taking place internally and exter-
nally throughout the structure of the Japanese colonial govern-
ment which existed in Korea. The Japanese tried to suprese the
Korean nationalist movement, but failed. They could not destroy
the Korean national spirit. A self-styled Korean Provisional
Government established itself in exile in Shanghai and remained

in existence until Korea‘s liberation from Japan in 1945. But

21

Japanese domination ”did succeed in supreseing Korean leader-
ship and in weakening the latent capacities of the Koreans for
assuming responsibility in the government of their country,“ 39
and hence Korea remained "politically immature, according to
Western standards.” It was in view of this that the Cairo De-
claration of December, 1943 provided that Korea “in due course

shall become free and independent," 40

but not immediately.
During thirty-six years of Japanese colonisation in Korea,

the Japanese started schools in which Japanese history and

41

literature were prominent. The teaching of Korean history
and literature was suppressed. All Korean names were changed to
Japanese words. Korea was named “Chosen" and the old capital,
Seoul, became known as KeiJo. It should also be remembered that
much of the developement of Korea was effected solely to serve
the colonial interests of Japan.

The annexation of Korea was followed by a period of extreme
rice shortage in the home land of Japan, and the peninsula “was
developed as a rice bowl for Japan.” 42 Rice production was,
therefore, enormously increased under a 30-year-plan applied by
the Japanese. The result was that by the early 1930’s Japan had
succeeded, with the aid of Korean and.Pormosan rice, in making
herself self-supporting in her staple foodstuff. ‘5 Because
much of Korean rice was exported to Japan, the Koreans were

forced to cut down on their rice consumption and to import millet

from.lanchuria. The following statement may serve as evidence of

22

this fact: “Per capita domestic oonsuption in the five-year
period 1931-35 was 45 percent lower than that in the years

1916-20. Yet in the same period the percentage of the rice

exported to Japan had increased from 14 percent to 48 percent.“ 44

Besides rice, cultivation of cotton and tobacco as cash crops

for export was also increased. Korea was responsible for almost
all the cotton grown in the Japanese Empire. Ginseng, a distinct-
ively Korean crops, was cultivated as a government monopoly in

the north, mainly for export to south China where it was much
45

valued for medical purposes.
James H. Shoemaker, an outstanding student of the Korean

economy, makes the following statement regarding Japan's economic

policy in Korea: 46

After the defeat of Russia in 1905 Japan embarked on

a policy of economic penetration into lanchuria which
paralleled her program in Korea. The spearhead of this
policy was the South.lanchurian Railroad, which be-

came much more than a railroad and eventually controlled
factories, mines, shipping concerns, distributive or»
ganisations, and even farm lands. The Korean counter-
parts of the S.I.R. were (a) the Oriental Development
Company, a many-sided officially controlled corporation
for implementing Japan‘s exploitation of Korea and

(b) the Korean Railway system which was closely in-
tegrated with the develOpment and operation of the S.K.R.
These organs, together with Japan's shipping concerns,
constituted the primary instruments for welding'lanohu-
ria, Korea, and Japan to a single economy. The steps

in the development of the empire economy were method-
ical and eminently successful.

As we have seen above, Japanese development in Korea was
designed to promote flippon's military program, and Korea's re.

sources were utilized to serve Japan's domestic and foreign trade.

23

All foreign trade was controlled by a Japanese trust, and Japanese
monopolies were in charge of finance, agriculture, transportation,
shipping, industry, fisheries, and marketing and distributive
systems. Koreans were in no way permitted to deal directly with
foreign concerns. Because technicians and administrators were
Japanese, Koreans were generally uninformed about all matters
pertaining to the management of foreign trade, which was centered
in Tokyo. ‘7

In addition, Korea was controlled by Japan through control
of investments and through the operation of the Bank of Chosen,
which was an official bank ofissue of Japanese currency and the
single most effective instrument by which fiscal policies of the
Japanese government were carried out in the peninsula.

Despite Japanese repression in Korea, the Korean pe0ple made
some significant advances during the period. for example, in the
field of literacy and education, the Korean people at the end of
the Japanese occupation possessed the prerequisites for building
a sound democracy and were far in advance of their status in 1910,
as described by G. K. IcCune. ‘5

Japanese policy toward Korea during the period of 1910-45
makes it abundantly clear that the pivot of colonial administration
was the principle of centralised autocratic bureaucracy on the
model of the "mother" country. Economic exploitation of Korea
through the frame-work cf the Japanese monOpolistic economy for

the benefit of Japan appears to have been a dominant element.

24

This however, was coordinated with the material development of
Korea so far as it was consistent with Japan's own interests.

The promotion of emigration, the elimination of foreign influence,
and the cultural domination of the subject races, with the ulterior
objective of Japanization and assimilation, were the other chief
characteristics of Japanese policy.

In short, the Japanese colonial control in Korea passed
through several stages of development, each of which was signifi-
cant in establishing certain institutions and procedures. In the
first decade, 1910-1920, the Japanese created the administrative
machinery of control and set the pattern of colonial exploitation,
in the second decade, 1950-1940, the Japanese cverlerds built up
the colony to feed their growing war machine by accelerating the
rate of economic exploitation and of political suppression, and
during the war years Korea was turned into an armed camp.

After the surrender of Japan in 1945, the Government-in-

Kxile was dissolved. The Korean independence movement had

developed mature leaders, although the Japanese had suppressed
Korean leadership and had weakened the latent capacities of
Koreans for assuming responsibility in governing their country. ‘9
Korean nationalism was, however, greatly strengthened as well as
modernised by the ordeal of overlordship. K reservier of patriot-
ism was built up under Japanese rule and was consequently ready
to be tapped at the moment of liberation.

Hope for freedom swelled in every Korean breast. Today her

25

people, in their hours of trial and adversity, have faith

that they will some day have a united and independent country.
5. ran carao DECLARATIOI or 194}. 5°

The Cairo Declaration that ”in due course Korea shall be.
come free and independent,“ made by the chiefs of state of the
United States, the United Kingdom and China on December 1, 1943,
was reaffirmed at Potsdam on July 26, 1945, and later endorsed
by the Soviet Union when it declared war against Japan on
August 8, 1945. Thus, before surrender of Japan, four principal
powers publicly supported the cause of Korean independence.

In the earlier American foreign policy toward post-Iorld
Iar II Korea, the United States avoided tendering an official
recognition of the Provisional Government of Korea. The reasons
were given in a statement by Acting Secretary of State Joseph 6.

Grew on June a. 1945. referring to Korean participation in the
51

United Nations conference as follows:

...The United laticns which are represented at the
United Nations conference on International Organisation
all have legally constituted governing authorities
whereas the "Korean Provisional Government“ and other
Korean organizations do not possess at the present time
the qualifications requisite for obtaining recognition
by the United States as a governing authority.

the "Korean Provisional Government” has never exercised
administrative authority over any part of Korea, nor
can it be regarded as representative of the Korean
people of today. Due to geographical and other factors
its following even among exiled Koreans is inevitably
limited. It is the policy of this government in deal-
ing with groups such as the "Korean Provisional Govern-
ment“ to avoid taking action which sight, when the
victory of the United.lations is achieved, tend to

26

compromise the right of the Korean people to choose
the ultimate form and personnel of the government
which they may wish to establish.

The qualifying phrase "in due course” in the Cairo Declaration
of December 1, 1943, gave cause for considerable concern to the
Koreans, who were looking forward to immediate independence. The
Korean problems was subsequently taken up at Ialta in February,
1945. where it was suggested that Korea might best be considered
a trusteeehip of the sort envisaged in the preposed United lotions
Charter. At the time, the United States presented the view that
Korea should become a multi-power trusteeship, if such plans ma-
terialized. Russia concurred, but no commitments were made at the

th‘ e 52

After the death of President Roosevelt and the San
trancisco meeting of the United nations, the indefinite understand-
ing at Ialta was clarified by negotiation. Stalin agreed with the
United States, in a conversation with.narry Hopkins in Kay, 1945,
on a short-term feur-power trusteeship. 5’ The Soviet agreement
on these points was kept secret in view of the fact that Russia
had not yet declared war against Japan. then the Soviet Union de-
clared war against Japan, on August 8, 1945, it announced its ad-
herence to the Potsdam Declaration, which included reference to
the Cairo Declaration, a step which was, in effect, a public
announcement of Russian support of Korean independence. 5‘
Finally, on August 15, 1945, Korea was liberated when the

Japanese surrendered to the World War II Allies. Long-sought

freedom was not immediately restored to the suffering Koreans

27

when the Japanese were ousted from the country which they had
occupied for thirty-six years. After Japanese surrender to the
World lar II Allies, military occupation of Korea in two separate
sones had already become an accomplished fact, with the entry of
Russian combat troops into Berth Korea on August 10 and of
American troOps into South Korea on September 8, 1945. As express-
ed by Secretary of State James S. Byrnes, “For purposes of
military operations the occupation of Korea was divided north and
south of latitude 38 into Soviet and American areas.' 55

Though the international pledge brought an end to Japanese
control in Korea, the country was divided into two separate zones

and an American nilitary Government began to govern South Korea.

28

1.
2.
5.
4.
5.
6.
7.
S.
9.
10.
11.
12.
15.
14.
15.
16.

17.

10.

19.
20.
21.

22.

25.

POOTIOTIB

Kyung Cho Chung, gorse Tomorggws Land E: the logg;gg Calm,
lew Iork, The Kaolillan Co., 195 , p. .

The Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. KIV, lew York, 1951, p. 522.
£nformation Please Almanac, 1955, p. 652.

Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen 1258-52, Seoul,
Government-General of Chosen, 1959, p. 12.

C. B. Creseey, Alia'g Lang; and 2322133, new Icrk, IcGraw-
Kill Co., 1951, p. 255.

gorean Economic ligsion, Department of State, lashington,
Government Printing Office, 1947.

Chosen or Chosun which means, literally, “Land of the
Iorning Calm.“

Colonel Donald Ports”. W.
London, George G. Karrap d c., L ., 19 , p. 50.

Korea, Seoul, Office of Public Information, 1955, p. 11.

Th: World Book Encyclopgdia, Chicago, 1951, Vol. K. p. 4200b.
Korea: Her Ki tor and Cultu , Seoul, Office of Public
Information, 1955, p. 75.

Ibide. Pe 75e ‘

Kyung Chc Chung, fierce Tomorggw, g2. c;§., p. 16.

C. I. lcCune and . . rey, r., Korea T0252, Cambridge,
Harvard University Press, 1950, pp. 8-1 .

The World Almanac and Book 32 F221! for 1251, lew York lorld
Tel-Bren. 1957. PP- 424-5. ' .

Kyung.Kyang Shinmun, July 19, 1956. It is published in Korean
and is a daily newspaper in Seoul, Korea. _

The medieval period of Japanese history lasted about three
hundred years, from the middle of the 16th century. During
this period, Japan was theoretically governed by an Emperor
and practically by the Samurai.

Tyler Dennett, Booggzglt 35d the 22552-2apggglg 23;, Ice
Icrk, Doubleday, Page d 00., 925, p. .

Carl Berger, The Korea Knot: A lilitary Pglit2cal B;ltc£[,
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957, pp. 24-5.
3. n. Herman, Japan'g Kmer‘ggce a! a godegg §tate, Institute
of Pacific Relations, lew Iork, 194 , p. 197.

Kakko Ichiu means the eight corners of the world under one
Japanese roof. This motto was used frequently, especially
after Japan declared war against the United States in 1941.
J. Toynbee and P. T. Ashton-thkin, Surve of International
Afgairl, 1252-46; The World in larch 1252, fondon, x'ord
University Press, 1952, p. 118.

The King Dynasty played a very important role in foreign
affairs especially with Western countries. Korea was in-
fluenced by the King Dynasty more than any other country in

the world during that particular period. The King Dynasty
here indicates China as a whole.

 

 

 

29

24.
25.
26.

27.
28.
29.
50.
31-

52.

33.
54.

35c
36.

37.
58.

390
40.
41.

42.

43.

44.
45.

46.
47.
48.
49.

50.

Quoted in John I. Uheeler-Bennett, Documents on International
Affairs, 1252, London, Oxford University Press, 1955, p. 558.
Ioehi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent,
Vol. 1. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1957, p. 145.
R. Eidemich Akagi, Japan's Foreign Relations 1542-1956, Tokyo,
KOkUUCdO PPCBI, 1936’ De 113e

Korea: Her History and Culture, op. cit., p. 77.

Ibide’ p. 78e

Ibide, p. 80.

Ge 3. loCune and As Le GPO, Jr., OEe Cite. p. 23o

For information about Dr. Syngman Rhee, see Chapter II of

this thesis.

Louise Tim, Uy_Forty Year Fight For Korea, New York, A. A.

Iyn, 1951, p. 50.

thune, op. cit., p. 25.

H. P. lachair and D. F. Lach,
Relations, D. van Nostrand Co., Inc., New York, 1950, p.

floCune, op: cit., p. 25.

See appendix for Declaration of Independence, larch 1, 1919.

See Chapter II for more details.

Korea: Her History and Culture, 0p: cit., pp. 96-7.

IcCune, cp. cit., p. 28.

K. C. Chung, Korea Tomorrqg, op. cit., p. 503.

Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 15, EncycIOpedia Britannica,

Ltde. London, 1951, p. 448s

L. K. Rosinger and Associates, The State of Apia, New York,
Alfred A. Knopf for the American Institute of Pacific Relations,
1953. Po 131.

”Korea Past and Present,“ The Iorld Today, April, 1946,

Pe 190s

lcCune, OEe Cite. p. 36c

Chambers' Enc clo aedia, Vol. 8. George lewnes, Ltd., London,
1950. P0 2570

J. K. Shoemaker, lo e on Korea' Po twar Economic Po iticn,
new York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947, p.
Ibide. PP. 4.50

McCunc, OEe Cite. Pe 27c '

 

   

G. I. lcCune, Korea'p Poptwar Pglitical Problpmp, New York,
'Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947, p. .

The text. ”The several military missions have agreed upon
future military Operations against Japan. The three great
Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure
against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. The
three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and
punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for them-
selves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is
their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands
in the Pacific which she has seised or occupied since the
beginning of the first Iorld War in 1914, and that all the
territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as

50

Hanchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored

to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from

all other territories which she has taken by violence and
greed. THE AFORESAID THREE GREAT POWERS, HIHDFUL OP THE
EHSLAVEHENT OF THE PEOPLE OF KOREA, ARE DETERMINED THAT IR

DUE COURSE KOREA SHALL BECOME FREE AND IRDEPENDEHT.

"With these objects in view, the three Allies, in harmony
with those of the United lotions at war with Japan, will
continue to perservere in the serious and prolonged operations
necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.

”Signed: Franklin D. Roosevelt
Iinston Churchill
Chiang Kai-shek'

(Capitalized passage is not in original text. For additional
details see K. C. Chung, Korea Tomorrow, cp. cit., p. 505.)
Reproduced in Donald F. Tewksbury, comp., Source Katerials
on Korean Politics andJldeologies, New Iork, Institute of
Pacific Relations, 1950, pp.48-50.

51. Statement b Actin Secretar of State Jose h C. Cr w,
lashington D.C. Press Release, Government Printing Office,
_ June 8, 1945.
52. lcCune, Korea'p Postwar Political Problgmp, op. cit., p. 8.
55. G. Schwarzenberger, Power Politics, New York, Praeger, 1951,
p. 418, see also I. H. HcHeill, "America, Britain, and Russia,”

Survey of International Affairs, 1252-1246, Vol. III, London,
Oxford University Press, 1955, pp. 58 . 20.

54. McCunc, 0p. cit., p. 8.

55. Department of State Bu;letin, December 50, 1945, p. 1055.

 

 

51

CHAPTER II

ansaxcas urnzraar covaaaurnr
1s KOREA, 1945-48

In Korean eyes, official Iashington made a great mistake
in its policy even before the ending of World War II. Some Koreans
feel that American high-policy makers in Washington, as well as
military leaders of the United States. should have known that the
war was nearly ended when the atomic bomb was dropped over Japan.
Japan's war allies -- Germany and Italy -- had surrendered long
before the Japanese imperialists announced their own unconditional
surrender. These Koreans feel that the American officials should
have estimated when the Japanese would surrender. American plan-
ners perhaps knew that the Japanese had not yet completed their
own atomic bomb. Policy-makers in the United States probably
presumed that American science, technology, and combat methods
were further advanced than the Japanese. America, according to
some Koreans, should have been confident of victory over the
Japanese when the United States troops began to take over Japan-
ese-occupied territories throughout the Pacific.

There is little published evidence to show the Americans
planned to occupy Italy, Germany and Japan after they surrendered
to the Allies. Almost no study or preparation was made by the
United States to settle the Korean problem, despite the fact that
America showed great concern over Korea early in the twentieth

century. Carl J. Friedrich has described early American Iilitary

52

Government operations in Korea as follows: 1

This is essentially a story of improvisation. Korea,
the one country in the Pacific Theater over which a
real military government was established, was the only
important area occupied by American troops in the
Pacific for which some study or preparations had not
been made. There was almost a complete lack of train-
ing and preparation for military government for Korea.
This is not the place to inquire what dictates of high
policy in Washington repeatedly prohibited the study of
Korea in army schools...

The fact is that only a few military government officers
were given any appreciation of conditions in Korea,

and they were trained in the last two classes at the
school of lilitary Government, which began two months
after the Japanese surrender...

Starting with the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945, 2
the United States Iilitary Government played an important role
until Korea's independence in 1948. these three years were used
for experimentation in administering a nation which had lost
sovereign international status forty years before the landing of

American Iilitary Government forces.

1. BACKGROUND OF OCCUPATIOR

Russian combat troops entered northern Korea on August 10,
1945, and United States occupation troops entered southern Korea
on September 8, 1945. lhen the columns of the Soviet First Eastern
Army marched into Korea from bases near Vladivostok in August,
1945, they were enthusiastically greeted by the Koreans. troops
of the United States Seventh Infantry Division, XXIV Corps, which
landed at the west-coast port of Inchon in September, 1945. re-

ceived similar greetings by the South Koreans.

33

Upon arrival, the military leaders of the United States and
Soviet Union agreed that Soviet troops would accept the Japanese
surrender north of the thirtyaeishth parallel and American troops
would accept the surrender south of it. The line of demarcation
was intended to be a temporary device to fix responsibility bee
tween the United States and the Soviet Union for carrying out the
Japanese surrender, 5 .but the temporary line was interpreted by
the Soviet occupation authorities as creating apermanent deline-
ation between two military cones. As time went on, the zonal
division hardened all phases of Korean life into two separate
patterns.

is soon as the Korean people realised that the United States
and the Soviet Union apparently intended to make the thirtybeighth
parallel a permanent division, the Korean peeple became greatly
concerned over their country's future. In the following three
years of occupation, the two powers demonstrated that their activie
ties in Korean affairs were influenced by bitter disagreement
between themselves. This pattern followed the tradition of earlier
international rivalries which has been so largely responsible
for the destruction of Korean independence. The author believes
that if both powers had sincerely wanted Korea unified they could

have accomplished the unification under one central government.

2. AIKRIGAI IILITARI GOVERNIEUI IS ASIIOS
Shortly after the arrival of the American forces in Seoul,
Korea, on September S, 1945, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge

54

took over command from General chuyuki Abe, the Japanese Govern-
cr-General of Korea. 4 General Hodge was assigned the following
missions in South Korea by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers: 5
1. Take the Japanese surrender, disarm the Japanese armed
forces, enforce the terms of the surrender, and re-
move effects cf Japanese imperialism from.Korea.
2.'laintain order, establish an effective government
along democratic lines, and rebuild a sound economy
as a basis for Korean independence.
3. Train Koreans in handling their own affairs and prepare

Korea to govern itself as a free and independent
nation.

In spite of the order from Washington, General hedge announced
that the 'emieting Japanese administration would continue in office
temporarily to facilitate the occupation.“ 6 the reason given
was that “the XXIV Corps had a long record of combat in the Phili-
ppines and Okinawa, where it had been accustomed to working with
lilitary Government units, but it had no experience in discharg-
ing civil affairs functions during the post-combat stage, and no
conception of the problems to be faced in Korea.‘ 1 As the pre-
sent author indicated previously, American occupation forces had
had little or no briefing on the Korean assignment, and had
little information available on which to base it. The first at-
tempts to provide a measure of Korean participation in the form-
ulation of lilitary Government policies were unsuccessful. The

policy statements provided General Hodge were Iso sparse, vague,

35

and ambiguous, that he was required to feel his way at every
step.” 8

Despite the many difficulties that arose, General Hodge start-
ed out by rejecting the newly-organized Korean Republic Party
which had been set up before American entry into the country.

After abolishing all former political parties, he declared
martial law and lilitary Government to be the sole authority
until a new system of political parties more faithfully represent-
ing the people could be set up. leanwhile, official Washington's
attitudes toward the peninsula were shaped and modified largely
by policies of the resident Kilitary Government.

American lilitary Government operations were made difficult
because of (1) lack of precedents in the situation, (2) a dearth
of information about the problems and (5) the absence of experience
on the part of the governors. In addition to these, there were
language difficulties, cultural differences, and the continual
necessity to act independently, without the sanction of higher
authority.

Of special significance to the first year of Iilitary Govern-
ment in Korea was the policy briefing given by headquarters in
Tokyo, which colored the views of civil affairs personnel in their
attitude toward the Korean people and toward their objectives. In
a conference to decide settlement of Korean civil affair, 6.5

staffs of General Douglas IacArthur gave the impression that one

of the principal missions of Kilitary Government in Korea was

36

“to form a bulwark against communism.“ 9 This caused consid-
erable excitement and speculation. A few days later, the senior
officer who had been present at this conference, attempted to
modify this impression by declaring, “...It was not the intention
to give the impression that the United States lilitary Government
intends to compete with the Soviet Union.“ 10

This did not constitute a retraction of what had been pre-
vicusly stated, and the interpretation made by civil affairs
personnel apparently was that this was merely an attempt to miti-
gate an earlier indiscretion, a view confirmed by some who had
been present at the policy briefing. A complementary objective,
never modified, was “to see that the southern area is democratiaed.'11
This sustained the impression given by the "bulwark“ clause and
produced an emotional reaction against Korean liberalism.

The policies of the United States should be examined against
the background of the stated aims and goals. With respect to Korea,
the State Department of the United States declared in August, 1946,
that "the fundamental objectives of occupation policy ... aim,
simply, toward the eventual reconstruction of political life...

on a peaceful and democratic basis.“ 12

American Iilitary Govern-
ment personnel alone could not carry out the above listed aim and
objectives satisfactorily, because of their unfamiliarity with the
functioning of the political and social institutions. The author

believes the American lilitary Government in Korea was not wholly

accepted by social leaders and political party leaders in its

37

earlier stage because the Korean people had been under Japanese
rule for four decade and they were unfamiliar with Iestern
political behavior. In time, however, the American, as well as
the Korean experiment, developed more in accordance with the

general sin.
3. KOREA! POLITICAL PARTIES

Soon after American military forces arrived in Korea, the
”Korean peOple's Republic" was reorganized. It had been origin-
ally created on the initiative of the Japanese. Korean leaders,
headed by Iocnhyung Lyuh, and including a large number of
patriots released from Japanese prison cells after the surrender,
called upon the Korean people for moderation. They organised
local committees to preserve order and they convened a national
congress in Seoul, attended by representatives from all parts of
Korea. On September 6, 1945, the congress proclaimed the 'People's
Republic.“ In North Korea these local committees were being form-
ed with the sanction of the Russian occupying forces. The revo-
lutionary character of the people's committees was obviously in
keeping with Soviet policy. 17

The Lyuh group insisted it was a legitimate government, but
on October 10, 1945, General Bodge‘s military governor, IaJor
General A. V. Arnold, issued a statement to the Korean press
that “there is only one government in Korea south of 38 degrees

north latitude. It is the government created in accordance with

38

the proclamations of General laoArthur, the general orders of
Lieutenant General Hodge and the Civil Administration orders of
the Iilitary Governor ...” 18
Lyuh announced he was leaving the People's Republic organi-
sation to form a new political grouping which he called the Korean
People's Party. Bis departure left the I'Republic" in the hands of
its more radical members. Their defiance reached a peak after
General Hodge formally requested they dr0p the title "Republic"
and assume the conventional role of a political party. The group,
at a threeoday meeting beginning November 20, 1945, ignored the
army commander's request. On December 12, 1945, Hodge publicly
denounced the organisation, stating that a continuation of its
activities as a government was unlawful and that his occupation
forces would take the necessary steps against it. 19
A second important leftist political organization which
troubled the American command was the Korean Communist Party, a
small but powerful group which the Americans believed to be
controlled by loscow through the Soviet consulate in Seoul. 20
One of the major objectives of South Korean Communists was to
discredit the lilitary Government and to arouse Opposition to
the Americans. In order to counteract the Communist influence
the American command strengthened the rightist elements. As a
result of the mass Communist movements, the United States

Kilitary Government began to support both the Democratic Party

and the lationaliet Party. These organizations were generally

39

cooperative in the early stages of the American occupation. The
Democratic Party, on September 16, 1945, held a meeting in Seoul
and named three famous Korean expatriates -- Dr. Rhee, Dr. Philip
Jaisohn 21 and Koo Kimm -- as their leaders. 22

Threats were also used by the American lilitary Government
in efforts to suppress the Communist elements. As a result of the
attempted suppression, mass Communist demonstrations and riots
took place throughout South Korea from September 30 to October 2,
1946. A railroad strike was the first attempt to destroy the exist-
ing American Kilitary Government: the second was the attempted
overthrow of the newly organised local police and provincial gov-
ernments. At the time of the demonstrations and riots, the present
writer lived in the city of Taegu, where many policemen and other
government officials were killed.

lhen the uprising began, the Iilitary Government authorized
and officially distributed arms and weapons to the Korean police-
men. Koreans call this unexpected event, '8hipilaSakun,' which
means 10-1 or October the 1st. The 10-1 incident caused the Korean
peeple to begin an anti-Communist campaign. After the policemen
were equipped with weapons, they began to arrest alleged Commun-
ist leaders. There is no information on how many were arrested,
but the result was that the Communist Party formally abolished it-
self.

In addition, ”as the result of activities prejudicial to

law and order, the arrest of Pak Heunyong, Lee Kankook and.Lee

40

23

Chuhu, was ordered." At the same time, in September and
October, 1946, the Military Government suspended publication of
all extreme left-wing newspapers and other publications for
persistent violation of ordinances prohibiting the inciting of
revolt. But combined efforts of the American military detective
agencies and the newly organised Korean police could not eliminate
all of the existing Communist elements and movements.
Finally a third general round-up of Communists took place
in August 1947. Prior to the convening of the Joint Commission
of the United nations to discuss the Korean election, rightist
elements had been circumscribed in their anti-Soviet activities,
but on July 10, 1947, the ban forbidding mass demonstrations
against the Uoscow agreement was removed. Violence flared into
the open almost immediately. Terrorist bands of the right, with
the apparent collusion of the Korean police, immediately began
an anti-Communist campaign. Woohyung Lyuh, former head of the
Peeple's Republic, was the first victim of the reign of terror.
he was assassinated on July 19 on a Seoul street in broad day.
I light and in sight of a police box. 2‘
The American Iilitary Government policy of suppressing
"leftists'I is understandable when it is viewed as protection for
the South Korean peeple. It was the most significant policy ever
made by the American Kilitary Government in Korea. Not all observe

ers approved the policy, however. Kr. Roger 1. Baldwin, Director

of the American Civil Liberties Union, on his return from a visit

41

to Korea during the summer of 1947, wrote a severe indictment
of United States methods. He stated, 'Ie offered no constructive
demonstration of democracy for its own sake as a counter-lure to
Communism; ... by nurturing the police state we drive moderates
into the Communist camp ...” 25

General Hodge maintained a formally neutral position on
Korean politics. 26 But, as one observer put it, “It was no
secret that he favored the right and was anxious for the parties

of the right to acquire strong pepular support." 27

4. STEPS TOWARD KOREAN SELF-GOVEREMENT

As early as December 1947, two years after the American
Military Government was established in the southern zone of'Korea,
certain South Korean political groups were seriously considering
calling a Joint conference of North and South Korean leaders to
discuss the reunification of the country. Dr. Kiusio Kimm, Ir.
Koo Kim, and Ir. loonhong Lyuh became actively engaged in promot-

ing such a plan. 28

After the United Nations Temporary Commission
which was created in 1947, agreed to observe elections in South
Korea, the North Korea PeOple's Committee invited many of the
political leaders in South Korea 29 to attend a coalition con-
ference in Pyongyang 50 to discuss the formation of a government.
This invitation immediately drew the fire of the American command
and of most of the southern rightist elements, who denounced it

as a Soviet attempt to seise countrywide power. Despite such oppo-

42

sition, more than fifty political leaders in South Korea attended
the conference. Ho agreement and no result was reported in that
conference.

As time went on, despite personnel handicaps, progressive
measures were taken to transfer more authority to the Koreans. On
August 31, 1948, General Hodge requested the Kilitary Governor, ’1
Iajor General A. L. Larch, to turn over operation of the various
government departments to Koreans, leaving the American personnel
in an advisory capacity. Koreans were given responsibility on a
polioymaking level, in order to obtain support for the Kilitary
Government at a time when its pepularity had reached a low ebb.
0n lebruary 14, the Representative Democratic Council, an all-
Korean body, was created to act in an advisory capacity to the
commanding general. Dr. Syngman Rhee was chairman, Koo Kim and
Kiusic Kimm were vice chairman of the group. Because most of the
appointees were Rightists, with the exception of loonhong Lyuh
and a few others, leading liberals did not lend their support.
The subsequent failure of this body brought adverse criticism and
injured American prestige. Critics likened the Council to the
similar Central Advisory Council employed during the Japanese
occupation. 32

Before they turned over operation of the various government
departments to Koreans, American Kilitary Government authorities

established the administration along democratic lines. Korean

administrative heads were established in the Judiciary, the

43

executive, and the legislative branches. On February 10, 1947,
Chai Bong Ahn was sworn in as civil administrator, and Kong'lc
Kim became Chief Justice of the Korean Supreme Court, head of the
Judiciary. Dr. Kiusic Kim, Chairman of the Korean Interim Legis-
lative Assembly, made the principal congratulatory address. The
name ”South Korean Interim Government“ was formally adopted on.
Kay 17, 1947. 33 Nevertheless, the responsibility vested in the
American authorities was difficult to reconcile with the Korean
bureaucracy which was to administer the government. Some Korean
officials eXpressed dissatisfaction with the limitations placed
upon their positions. In July 1947, there were 3,233 American
military and civilian personnel and approximately 40,000 Koreans
in the employ of the Hilitary Government. 34
United States forces were not entirely uninformed of the
official attitude the Kilitary Government adOpted toward the Re-
public. Standard operating procedure for civil affairs as of
1947 clearly states: 55
leither local political personalities nor organised
political group, however sound in sentiment, should
have any part in determining the policies of military
government. Civil affairs officers should avoid any
commitments to, or negotiating with, any local political
elements except by directions from higher authority.
This was the procedure ordered for normal lilitary Govern-
ment Operations taking place in an enemy area. Korea was, however,

a friendly liberated state, and the Americans had ostensibly come

to the peninsula to help the Koreans from the type of government

44

desired by the peeple. The situation for the tactical force was
confused but their position was clarified when President Truman
in a public statement on September 18 intimated that these efforts
of Korea to establish immediate de facto independence were to be

disregarded. He said: 36

The assumption by the Koreans themselves of the respon-
sibilities and functions of a free and independent
nation ... will of necessity require time and patience.
The goal is in view, but its speedy attainment will
require the joint efforts of the Korean peOple and the
Allies.
haanwhile, the United States government and its hilitary
Government in South Korea made efforts to bring about Korea‘s
unification by means of peaceful negotiations. Again and again
official of the United States and Soviet Russia exchanged letters
on unification of the divided country, but Russia opposed the
United States proposals. 0n Hay 20, 1947, the Joint Commission
reconvened in Seoul for its second and final effort to unify the
peninsula. As the new discussions got under-way, the American
delegation began to hOpe that an agreement was at hand. By early
July, however, this hope was shattered when the Soviet delegation
suddenly reverted to its old position, rejecting all consultations
with those Koreans who had expressed Opposition to the Ioscow
agreement. After repeated failures of the Joint Commission, the
American and Soviet commands moved further and further apart. The

thirty-eighth parallel became an impassable boundary line between

the South and the lorth.

45

5. THE UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

Convinced that unification and independence of Korea could
not be achieved through further negotiations in the Joint Com-
mission, the United States, in August 1947. Preposed to the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom, and China that "the four powers adher-
ing to the hoscow agreement consider how that agreement may be
speedily carried out." The United States also proposed that
elections be held in Korea -- South and North -- under the guidance
of the United Nations for the formation of a provisional legislature
and government. China and the United Kingdom accepted the American
preposal, but the Soviet Union rejected it.

On September 17, 1947, the United States informed the Soviet
Union of its intention to refer the problem to the forth-coming
session of the General Assembly of the United Nations as the only
course remaining to achieve Korean independence. 37 In his address
before the General Assembly on September 17, 1947, Secretary
Harshall introduced the subject of Korea and notified the Assembly
of United States intention to present the problem at the session.
On September 23 the American resolution was placed on the agenda;
on October 17 a formal presentation was made by Ambassador Warren
E. Austin; on November 5 the political and Security Committee
voted 46 to O for the creation of a United Nations Temporary
Commission on Korea to exPedite the moves toward independence;
and on November 14 the General Assembly adapted the resolution by

a vote of 43 to O. In the deliberations of the United lations,

46

the Soviet Union and its satellites objected vigorously to the
iserican plan, first on grounds that elections in “occupied“ Korea
would not be a true reflection of the Korean sill, and next that
Korean delegates should be heard first by the United laticns be-
fore the plan was adopted. Finally. the Soviets declared that the
Korean probles was not an appropriate question to cone before the
United latices and that the Soviet Union could not accept the
decision reached. to. Soviet bloc then boycotted the voting. 3°

Despite the Russian opposition, the United lations General
Assembly recommended that the too occupying pcsers hold elections
in their respective sense not later than.lareh 31, 1940, under
the observation or the United lations, ~.. the initial step lead-
ing to the creation of a National issesbly and the establish-ant
of a lational Government of Korea.“ tee sain issues esersed free
the discussions by the First Coasittee on October 28, 1947. (1)
participation of elected representatives of the Korean people in
the discussion, and (2) withdrawal of United States and Soviet
troops tron Korea. 39

the United Nations resolution esphasised the formation of a
national aovernaent for United.Korea. The United lations respcrary
Gossission on.Korea held its first nesting in Seoul. Korea, on
January 12, 1948. ‘° re. Oosnission sent official oosnunications
to the military commanders in lorth Korea and South Korea. The

American commander in South Korea answered the cossunicaticn

isaediately, but the Russian consander in lorth Korea refused to

47

occopt it. “ lollowinc tho foiluro of tho coniooion to gun
ontry into lorth loros or ovon to ootsblish on: contsct with tho
Boviot authority, tho Ccomission consultod with tho Intorio Coop
oittoo of tho U.l. Gonorol Asooobly (pcpulorly known so tho Littlo
issonbly). Tho opinion of tho dolocotoo to tho Littlo Assoobly
was thst tho rocoonondotions of tho Gonorol Assoobly woro cloor,
sad that if oxiotins conditions nods it iopcooiblo to hold oloc-
tions for o noticnol cowornoont in both lorth out South lcros, it
would nowortholoos bo poosiblo to holo such olocticns in South
torso slono. rhooo oloctions. sponsoooo by tho Unitoi Btotos, woro
to bo hold on In: 10. 1948. in south loroo. ‘2

6. IA! 10, 1948, ELECTION IN SOUTH KOREA.

Iron oorly in Iobruory, 1948. tho Gooouniots, octin; undo:
instructions tron Soviot-occupiod North loroo, hsd ooborkod on
on intonsivo campsign of torroriso to obstruct tho is: olootions
ond torco tho Unitod lotions coo-ission to loovo Koroo. lhoir
coopoicn woo oooplotoly inotfoctivo, hcwowor,

As o rosult of tho olocticn on In: 10. 1948, no port: rocoiv-
od o oloor-cut nojority. Dr. Rhoo's port}, tho lotionol Associo-
tion for tho Rapid Boolisotion of loroon Indopondonco. won fifty-
fiwo sootsg tho [croon Dooocrotic port), twonty-oisht sostsp tho
roodong Youth Group, twolvo; tho notional Iouth Corps, six; ond
tho Inchon Labor Longuo, two. Ion individuslo woro oinzlo ropro-n
oontstivoo of oinor portios ond oichty-tiwo woro olootod so indo-

48

Pondonts. Thoso indopondonts constitutod tho bulk of tho now
Aooombly, thus orooting fluotusting support for tho ooJor portios.
Tho two otrongost portioo woro rightist, but thoy did not onolgonoto,
ohiofly boosuso of porsonolity foctoro. ‘3

For their first donocrotic oloction, 80 por cont of tho
eligiblo wotors in South Koroo woro resistorod ond on ostiootod
92.5 por cont of thoso roportodly coot thoir bollots. ‘4 Tho
olootod roproscntotiwco convonod so tho lotionsl ioooobly for tho
first tino on loy 31, 1948, ond olootod ayncosu Rhoo so Choiruon.
In his inougurol spooch Dr. Rhoo oxprossod rogrot thst tho Ioroono
in tho lorth hsd not boon pornittod by tho Boviot Union to porticio
poto in tho United lotions-sponsorod froo oloctions. ond diroctod
ottontion to tho foot thot ooots proportionsto in nuobor to tho
northorn populstion hsd boon loft wscont for tho lotor porticipo-
tion of tho pooplo in tho northorn sono.

d prinory took on tho losiolstivo ogondo of tho Hotionol
Assoobly woo tho drofting of o constitution for tho Ropublic of
Ioroo. Profossor Chin O In drow up tho first drsft for tho consti-
tution, which woo finolly odoPtod on July 17, 1948. Tho consti-
tution sot up s strong oxocutiwo with s sinslo logiolotiwo body,
tho Aooombly. Tho Prosidont woo to bo olootod by tho Assonbly,
snd m. ohoico of prino ninistor hsd to bo ocnfirncd by um body.”
rho now Bopublic wos officiolly inougurotod on August 15, 1948,
tho third onniworoory of tho liberotion of torso fro-.Joponoso

rulo. Gowornosntol outhority woo promptly tronsforrod froo tho

49

inericon militory suthorities to tho now Republic, snd negotiotions
boson for tho withdrawol of Americon troOps.
On December 12. 1948, tho United lotions Genorol Assembly,
by s vote of 48 to 6, declored that: ‘6
There hos been established s lowful government (the
Government of tho Republic of torso) howing effective
control ond Jurisdiction over that port of Kores where
the Temporary Commission woe oblo to observe snd consult
‘ ond in which the great osJority of the people of Koreo
reside; this government is booed on elections which
were o volid expression of the free will of the sleetoro
ote of that port of Koros ond which woro observed by

the Tomporory Commission; ond this is the only such
government in Iores.

Before the officiol inougurotion of the Republic of Koreo.
the United states end Chino officiolly recognised the Republic of
loreo. In oddition to the United States. the Chinese lotionolist
govornoent onnounoed that ”it occcrds provisional recognition to -
the Governoent of torso.“ On August 23. the Philippine government
extended forool recognition, ond following the 0.]. Gonerol Assesbly's
oction in fsvor of the new government, lster thst yoor, for-s1
recognition woe extended by oony countries.

Sinoe the establishment of the Republic of Kores. the Generol
Assembly hod discussed.loreonnunifiootion and possible loreon
msobership in tho United lotions st eseh session toword the end
of every poor. but without reoching o workobls solution. The only
slternstive woe to mointsin the‘United lotions Ocsoussion in [ores
to work forunifiootion.

50

7. NORTH 10331 AND ITS REACTION:

Upon the liberation of Korea froo Japanese rule on August
15, 1945, rumors from the north circulated to Seoul about the
arrival from lonohuria of a man called '11 Sung Kin“ who woo
welcomed by the Soviet authorities. [is immediately began to
organize the nucleus of o Uorth Korean government. 47 For the
Americans, the splintered political situation in Korea was of
secondary importance compared with the formidable problem which
hovered Juet north of Seoul .- the suspicious Russian army. The
Soviets' swift occupation of Uorth Korea permitted the Russians
to have little difficulty in establishing rigid Communist control
over the territory. With the arrival of the United states 111'
Corps on September 8, the Russians agreed to establish tactical
liaison at the thirty~eighth parallel but. thereafter, tho Soviet
authority remained olmoot entirely unresponsive to General Rodge's
overtures. '

within two weeks of the landing of his force, Rodgo becsso
aware of the uncooperative attitude of the Soviets in the north.
One of the first unfriendly acts of the Soviet woe to cut off

4° In on

electric power service for an area south of Booul.
effort to bring the Buseiano around. Hodge twice invited tho
Soviet commander, Colonel General I. I. Chistiakov, to fly to
Seoul to discuss the various pressing economic and political
probless which were obviously resulting free the division of the

peninsula. Chietiokov's response, in a letter on October 9. 1945.

51

was that he could not take such action as General Hodge suggested
because. he said, matters of unification could only be resolved
by the governments of the two occupying powers. This initial ex-
change of oossages set the somber tone of future negotiations be-
tween the tvo military commands. negotiations in which the Americans
urged on-the-spot integration of the two sones. while the Russians
refused to take any action pending governoental decisions.
to the situation grow more and sore unprosising, the worried
Koreans. early in lovomber, 1945. organised a meeting in Seoul
of .11 political groups. including the Communists, and issued a
Joint memorandum demanding they be given the opportunity of organ-
ising Korea as a unified whole. The division of their country, they
deslared, was ”a most serious blunder that is not of our making.“ ‘9
Still the American government felt it had no choice but to
proceed with establishment of a trusteeship. On November 10, 1945,
President Truman met with Prime linisters Clement Attlee of Britain
and.lackonsie King of Canada in 'aehington to discuse mutual
probless. About Korea, it was agreed that ineediste steps should
be taken to set up the trusteeship under the direction of the
four great powers. is soon as this report reached Korea, the
American command, including hodge's newly assigned diplomatic
advisers. expressed opposition to trusteeship. They reported to
lachington that, in view of this unanimous opposition, it sight
be wise to abandon the trusteeship plan. On November 29, 1945,

Secretary of State James I. lyrnee replied that if, during the

52

impending Ioscow Conference, adequate guarantees could be obtained
from the Russians for the unification and independence of Korea,
it might be possible for the United States to discontinue its
support of trusteeship.

At the some time, lyrnes proposed the establishment of a
Joint Commission to unify the administration of such matters as
currency, trade and transportation, tele-communicotions, electric
power distribution, coastal shipping, and so on. He further proposed
the creation of a fourapcwsr trusteeship to lost for no longer
than necessary to allow the Koreans to form an independent,
representative government. As to how long sueh s trusteeship
should last, the American spoke in terms of five years, but indi-
cated that the tutelage could be extended by agreement of the four
governments. Dyrnee‘ suggestions were accepted by Soviet foreign
linieter V. I. lolotov and they were included with a few amendments
in the lcsoow declaration. However, the written agreement on Korea
contained serious defects which were later to plague the State
Department. A reproduction of the final Ioecow agreement will
illustrate the defects of the trusteeship principle: 50

1. lith a view to the re-ostablishment of Korea as an
independent state, the creation of conditions for
developing the country on democratic principles and
the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous
results of the protracted Japanese domination in
Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean
democratic government which shall take all the

necessary steps for developing the industry, trans-
port and the national culture of the torean people.

53

2.

3.

4.

in order to assist the formation of a provisional
Korean government and with a view to the preliminary
elaboration of the opprepriats measure, there shall
be established a Joint Commission consisting of
representatives of the United States command in
south Korea and the Soviet command in north Korea.
In preparing their prepoeals the Commission shall
consult with the Korean democratic parties and
social organizations. The recommendations worked
out by the Commission shall be presented for the
consideration of the Government of the Union of
Socialist Republic, China, the United Kingdom.and
the United States prior to final decision by the
two Governments represented on the Joint Commission.

It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with
the participation of the provisional Korean democratic
organisations to work out measures also for helping
and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic
and social progress of the Korean people, the develop-
ment of democratic self-government and the establish.
ment of the national independence of Korea. The
proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted
following consideration of the Governments of the
United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
United Kingdom and China for the working out of an
agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of
Korea for a period of up to five years.

for the consideration of urgent problems affecting
both southern and northern Korea and the elaboration
of measures establishing permanent coordination in
administrative-economic matters between the United
States command in southern Korea and the Soviet
command in northern Korea, a conference of the rec
presentatives of the United States and Soviet commands
in Korea shall be convened within a period of two
weeks.

As we observed already, when the news of the Ioscow agreement
reached Korea, most people were greatly angered and opposed to it.
to the Koreans, the “trusteeship" proposal meant only a continua.
tion of outside control, which, under Japanese rule, had brought

them much suffering and the postponement of their long-sought

54

independence.

The Joint Commission met several times betveen early 1946
and early 1947 in Seoul. Again they reconvened their futile meet-
ings in Seoul in August 1947, only to fail again. General Hodge.
now undertook to speed up "the Koreaniaation' of the military
government.

Then the United States came up with a new proposal. In a
letter to Soviet Foreign.linister Iolotov on August 28, 1941,
the State Department proposed that, in view of the Commission
stalemate, a four-power conference should be convened in flashington
to discuss the entire Korean problem. The department also forward-
ed a United States suggestion for holding early elections in both
zones to establish zonal legislatures which could, in turn, elect
representatives to a national provisional legislature to meet in
Seoul to form a United Korea. On September A, Molotov replied
that Russia could not agree to four-power talks “inasmuch as the
Joint Commission is still far from exhausting all its possibilities
for working out agreed recommendations, which are entirely possible."51

As a result of Russia’s disagreement on Korean unification,
the United States decided to make major move to break the stale-
mate. The State Department informed the Russians that the United
States intended to refer the entire problem of Korea's independence
to the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly.
On September 17, 1947, Secretary of State George larshall, appeared

before the General Assembly and stated: 52

55

It appears evident that further attempts to solve the
Korean problem by means of bilateral negotiations will
only serve to delay the establishment of an independent,
united Korea.

Considering the desire of the majority of the Korean people
for a united, independent, and democratic government and convinced
that this aspiration could not be satisfied through further nego-
tiations, the United States government had no choice but to submit
its proposal to the United Nations. On January 24, 1948, the

following editorial appeared in the yaw York Tingl: 53

Is do not see how the United Nations can abandon Korea
now to inevitable war. Hard as it is, the choice should
be made to go ahead with elections and establishment of
a government in South Korea. Then the twenty million
people of that area -- two-thirds of Korea's population ..
at least will have a fighting chance to maintain order
and develop their country along democratic lines once
occupation forces are withdrawn.
the United States proposal was supported by the majority of
member states. Finally on February 28, 1948, the United laticns
adopted a resolution directing the Temporary Commission in Seoul
to observe elections in the area accessible to it. Several days
later the Commission announced it would monitor South Korean
elections, to be held not later than Kay 10, 1948. 5‘ the
election was eventually held in a peaceful atmosphere character-
ized by every mark of public approval and enthusiasm.
On the other hand, the reaction of the Russians and their
lorth Korean allies to thisLunempected development was loud and

clamorous. Kim, already hailed as leader of the Korth Korean

56

regime, called upon South Korean sympathizers to launch a move-
ment to disrupt separate elections. Kim attacked the Temporary
Commission, complaining that it had brought "only disaster and
unhappiness to Korea.“ He charged the United States with deliber-
ately disrupting the Joint Soviet-American Commission, tearing up
the loscow Agreement, violating the Potsdam accord, and all the
while ”scheming to colonize Korea." 55
The creation of the People's Assembly in North Korea was
followed by the establishment of a North Korean government under
the leadership of 11 Sung Kim. On September 3, the North Korean
government adopted a Constitution of the Democratic Republic of

56 It reaffirmed land reform, guaranteed equal rights to

Korea.
all citizens irrespective of sex, race, religion, education, or
profession. It also accorded equal rights irrespective of property
status, although many members of the propertied classes had al-
ready been excluded automatically by the provision which guaranteed
the ‘final and irrevocable disenfranchisement of Korea's oppressors,
whatever the basis of their previous domination." 57

Several weeks after the establishment of the puppet Communist
regime at Pyongyang on September 10, 1948, under the direction of
Russian military authority, 11 Sung Kim addressed a letter to
Stalin, requesting the Soviet Union to establish diplomatic re-
lations with his government and to exchange ambassadors. On

October 12, 1948, Stalin announced that the Soviet Union was ready

to establish such diplomatic relations with the North Korean

57

government. 58
Pravda, on September 14, 1948, published the full text of

the North Korean appeal, excerpts of which include the following: 59

The Supreme People's Assembly of Korea appeals to the
Government of the United States and to the government
of the Soviet Union earnestly requesting the immediate
and simultaneous withdrawal of their tr00ps from Korea,
inasmuch as this is the foremost prerequisite for the
unification of Korea, for its economic, political and
cultural revival ...

insertions to the effect that the simultaneous with-
drawal of all foreign troops might lead to disorder
and even civil war are utterly groundless and offensive
to the national dignity of the Korean pecple.

8. SUMKARI OF EVENTS

Since the establishment of two governments -- in North and
South Korea e- each one has tied for the right to rule entire
country. Of course, Kim's regime was quite aware of the weakness
of South Korea's defense. During the several years of Russian
occupation in Horth Korea, Russians throughly trained and equipped
the North Korean army. Horth Korea then began to appeal both to
the United States and Russia to withdraw their forces from both
sides of Korea.

Planning for the withdrawal was initiated, however, by
General Douglas MacArthur, who had been asked for his opinion by
President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In larch 1949, the
American government approved the withdrawal. The task of making
the first public announcement was given to President Rhee. On

April 18, 1949, Rhee issued a statement in which he proclaimed

58

that South Korea‘s forces were ”rapidly approaching the point at
which our security can be assured, provided the Republic of Korea

is not called upon to face attack from a foreign source. Discussions,
therefore, are now underway between representatives of the Republic
of Korea and of the United States concerning the establishment of

a date in the course of several months for the withdrawal from

Korea of United States troops." 60

Official lashington made a decision. However, this decision
was not accepted by the Korean people. There were mass demonstrations
throughtout the country. Doubt was expressed by the Philippine re-
presentative on the United Nations Commission, Rufino Lunna, who
declared he was strongly opposed to United States withdrawal.

Lunna said that Korea could not defend itself against attack. At
his request, therefore, the Commission adopted a resolution on May
25, 1949, disolaiming any responsibility "for the timing of the
facilitating of the withdrawal of the forces of the occupying
powers.“

The decision to withdraw was made, but President Truman re-
commended to Congress that there be a continuation of economic
assistance to South Korea. On June 8, the State Department issued
a press release which discussed the United States plan for economic
and technical aid to Korea, plans for establishing a United States
military training program, and transfer of military equipment to

the South Koreans. The release added that: 62

59

In pursuance of the recommendation contained in the
General Assembly's resolution of December 12, 1948,

to the effect that the occupying powers should
'withdraw their occupation forces from Korea as early
as practicable,‘ the United States government will
soon have completed the withdrawal of its occupation
forces from that country. As is clear from the broad
program of assistance outlined ... this withdrawal in
no way indicates a lessening of United States interest
in the Republic of Korea, but constitutes rather another
step toward the normalization of relations with the
Republic. e e

On June 29, 1949, the last of the American troops departed,
leaving behind some five hundred members of the United States
military advisory group (KMAG). Even while the last increment of
eight thousand American troops sailed from Inchon harbor, the
U.H. Commission watched South Korean troops battle Northern in-
vaders on the Ongjin peninsula Just northwest of Seoul. In a
report to the U.l. the Commission noted that one of its sub-
committees toured the front lines, passing howitzer batteries and
observing an artillery duel and machine gun fire from both sides. 63

The summer of 1949 was the first summer in a half-century
that the Koreans were alone in their peninsula -- free of foreign
armies. .

, During the three years of American Military Government forces
in South Korea, many goals were accomplished, notably:

1. Elimination of the Communist Party.

2. Establishment of a constabulary (later to become a
regular army).

3. Internal political stabilization and organization.

4. Educational reformation.

60

5. Establishment of a modern medical hoppital and
research laboratory.

6. Economic rehabilitation -- Korea was virtually in
a state of economic collapse when United States
began the occupation of South Korea in September
1945; the division of the country unleashed power.
ful disruptive forces which were reflected in ever-
increasing inflation.

7. Electric plants.

8. Settlement of the Japanese property located within
South Korea.

9. Land reformation and redistribution.
10. Reorganization of the Judiciary.

11. Establishment of a modern police system.

During three and one-quarter years, ending on December 31,
1948, the United States furnished economic assistance, under army
auspices, amounting to more than $285,000,000. 511 million dollars
was made available during the fiscal year 1945-46; 893,000,000
during the fiscal year 1946-47; $113,000,000 during the fiscal
year 1947-48; and about 875,000,000 during the last six months of
1948. 64

Neither Korea nor the United States can achieve Korea's
goal of unification without the cooperation of the other. without
doubt, the Republic of Korea has been heavily dependent upon
American military and economic aid, as well as United Nations
support. With assistance from the United States, the Republic of
Korea made remark-progress toward overcoming the handicaps of its
long subjection to Japan and its severance from the more industri-

alised northern half of the country.
61

1.

2.
3.
4.

6.
1.

O.
9.

10.
11.
120
11.
1.0

19.
200
21s

22s

23.

24.
250

1002.0!!!

Carl J. lrisdrioh sn4 issooistss.{gaggigg%_§§nggiggge;ég

iii s Govsrnnsnt n lorld lsr . ls. ark, Pinsh
‘ 00.. Inc., 1948, Ps 35 6
August 14, 1945 is the stsndsri issrissn fists sad August

15 is ths lorssn dsts.
Gsorgs l. locnns, gorss 1355;, Ossbridss, Isss. nurturd
Bnivsrsity Prsss. 1950, p. 45.
Dyan; Do Lss, lgrssn Eiltggz, lsonl. Isshynns‘rnblishinc 00.,
19530 P0 ‘99.
to s , lsr Iss1 Command: Troops Infornstion.‘ Idnsstion
Bootion. figs, 111' Corps, 1948. p. 111.
lsrtrss D. Burrstsn, 'Iilitsry Govsrnssnta Isrss,"gg;

rn 8m , lovslhsr. 1946. p. 350.

. Grant lssds, Assriosn lilitggz ggvsgggggt in ggrss.
ls! York, King's Grosn Prsss. coin-bis Univsrsity Prsss.
1952. Pd 406
Ibids. ’0 ‘80

iii:.. p. 52.
00 P0 520
FA" p. 52.
srtnsnt 0‘ 81st. 'UII. 9 1" ‘n“.‘. 19“. Isshington,
lsshincton Governssnt Printing Offios, p. 293.

Osorgs I..Iocuns snd Arthur L. Grsy Jr., Kgrgs 12551,
OsIbridgs, lsss. flsrvsrd Univsrsity Prsss, 1950, pp. 46-41.
Csrl Bsrgsr, Egg Kogssn.§ag3, Philsislphis, Univsrsity of
Psnnsylvsnis, 1957. p. 53.

Ibifis . PO 530

b ‘0. pl 530

r. Jaisohn sss ens of ths psrtioipsnts in tho rsvhlt of 1004
who 1stsr 11s! shrosd snd boos-s s oitissn of tho Unitsd
Btstss.
411 thrss son. sbssnt Iran tho ssuntry. ssrs sssooistsd with
tho Iorsnn Provisionsl Govsrnssnt in ths Units4 Ststss and
chinks
Ins Ansriosnylilitsry Oovsrnnsnt issnsl nn ordsr on Bsptssbsr
6, 1946, for violstion st troolsnntion Is. 2. UQAIGIK gallirlgg.
asptsshsr 1946, p. 15. 3.. slso gbsd., annsry, 947, p. 14.
Ink lsunyonc, Lss Ksnkook and nos hnhn sssspdeto lorth Korss
and it was rsportsd thst all of than ssrs killsd by ths lorth
lorsan Gosnunist Pnrty bsosuss of tnilurs in organizing tho
col-unist Psrty in south lorss. Onss Psh sssicnsd ss tics
Prsnisr of tho lorth.lorssn govsrnlsnt sud 1st.: ho sss
yurzsd sud killsd.
Iggul 2132;, July 20, 1947. 800 slso Voigs o; £3533. Insist

5, 1947. s ssshilsnt is yst to bs srrsstsd.
lossr I. lslisin, 'Ilnndsr in.!srss."£§g;lggigg, insist 2,
1947. pp. 119-21.

  

62

26. lynng Che Chung. me no the .
low York, the Ieonil en 0., 195 . pp. 1 3-09.

27. Derrefen, Is I t rn 8 , o ., p. 550.

20. Dr. lien. the Iiherel :E..=... e s Korean Interi-
Degisletive Assenhly end lender of the letionel Independenee
lederetion. Ir. Koo Kin, rightist torner president of the
loreen Provisionel Govern-eat in Chungking, Chine, end heed
of the Doreen Independence Party, end locnhong Lyuh. Diberel
chief of the Socielist Denocretic Perty, end brother of the
felons petriot Ioohhyunc Dyuh. who hed been essessineted the
yeer before..rhe sreetest con-en enbition of these nee wee
to reunite the country.

29. The inviteticn did not include Dr. Bynnen Rhee.

30. Second largest city in horse. it is now the eepitel of lorth
loree.

31. the first Iilitery Governor wee 1.3.: Denerel Archibald 1.
Arnold, end the third wes ledor General Iillien I. Deon.

'fifix George I. lcCune. 1
lew York. Institute of Pecitic Reletione. 941. p. 14.

33. Ibid., p. 15. _

3‘s Chung. 22: 01’s. De 19°e

  

35. Ieede o . p. 60.
36. Ibid.: BE‘Zfiélez. .1.. Depart-out g; g; .33 ggllgtig, xnxx.
p. 4350

37. Iigfell A. Green. ghg_¥2§g_g£_§%§gg, Ieshington D. 0.
Public Affeirs Press, 950, p. .
3.0 IOCW. on. Oi‘e' Po 380

39. United States, Depertnent of Stete, 5.23.; 1255-1¥42,
Ieshington, Governeent Printing Office, 4 . p. .

40. locune end Grey Jr., 22‘_g;¥.. p. 223.

41. United Btetes, Depertnent c Dtete. ggreg 12‘: 1255, ‘gn‘_gi3.,

p. 10.

‘2e Ebidgg De 15e

4}. Shennon.le6une, 'Ioree' in Rosincer end others, Ste
Agig, new York. Alfred A. Knopf, 1951, p. 138.

44. loree, Beoul, Office of Public Intornetion, Inclish Id.,

1954' PO 1140

45. United Itetee. Departnent of 8tete,[grg§.1241-1248,‘33‘_2i§...
pro 16-7-

46. United letions.
zenerel insenbly, Pert I. I1 , so ution 195,

Ill).

41. ll Suns'lin.reportedly wee e guerrille leeder who hed fought
with the Con-unists in.lenohnrie egeinst the Jepenese.

40. lupung hydroelectric plents, the lergest in isie and the
fourth lersest in the world, built by the Jepenese neer the
Ienehurien border. the power wee distributed not only to the
shole cf’loree but else to lenehurie end even northern Chine

  

63

49.
50.

51.

52.
55-
54.

55-
56.

57-
58.

59-
60.
61.
62.

63.
64.

:where the Japanese intended to construct modern industries.

It was destroyed during the Korean war by D.l. bombers on
June 25, 1952. In the Dew Igrk 22‘!!! June 24, 1952, it was
reported that two-thirde o the power plants was destroyed.
Recently, lorth Koreans have reconstructed the plant end

it is now producing full power. In 1955, the lorth Koreans
broadcast that “if South Korea wishes to utilise the power,

we vill reconnect the lines end help you.“ President Rhee
rejected the offer through an official statement.

The low York Time , November 5, 1945.

Department of State, loscow leetig‘ 2f Porgigg ligigtggl,
December 16-26I 1245, leehington, Government Printing

0 £10.. 194 . pp. 14-16e

0.8. Congreea, Senate, The United State and the Korean
Problem, Document 1225-5}, lushington, vernment Printing
Office, 1953, pp. 4- .

b ‘ . pp. 10-118
The low York Times, January 24, 1948.

Department of State, Koren 1945-48, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
The ler York Time , larch 12, 1948.
Ehosun linjujui Inmin Konghwekuk or Democratic People's
Republic of Korea in the prOper name for the lorth Korean

regime.
IoCune and Grey Jr., Op. cit., p. 247.

See Soviet Pregs Translation, Far Eastern Institute, University
of Waehington, 194 -1953. Hereafter Soviet Press references
will be referred to only by publication and date.

Pravda, September 14, 1949.

The lew York Time , April 9, 1949.

The lew iork Times, lay 23, 1949.

U. S. Congrese, Senate, The .S the rean P bl ,
op. git., pp. 26-27. , .

he gew York Timeg, June 29, 1949.

4. . B oomfield and J. P. Jensen, Bankig‘ Rgfoigat§on in
South.lorea, lew Iork, federal Reserve Dank of ew ork,
19510 P0 14-

 

64u

CHAPTER III
KOREAN WAR OF 1950 AND AMERICAN
PORSICI POLICI

Immediately after the withdrawal of the inerican troops and
the Russian troops from both sones, the number of Korth Korean
Communist troops was increased along the thirty-eighth parallel.
In 1949, lorth Korean troops increased their intermittent firing
across the parallel and captured some South Korean soldiers. In
June, when the last United States troops departed, the lorth
Koreans invaded the Ongain peninsula which lies near Inchon, Just
south of the thirty-eighth parallel.

Indeed, 1950-53 was the first “war" in history in which
troops of a world organization acted as ”police“ to fight an
aggressor nation. The war began on the 25th of June, 1950, when
troops of Communist-ruled lorth Korea attacked South.Korea in
an effort to unify the divided country by force. The United
lations Charter, signed by the major nations of the world in
1945, had outlawed all such aggression. So the United States ask-

ed member countries to aid South Korea.

1. consular IIYASIOK an TBS cum auras nncxszoe :0 .cr

1 the lorth Korean Communist

it the dawn of June 25, 1950,
forces launched an armed aggression against the Republic of
Korea, across the thirty-eighth parallel. Pour divisions were

committed, together with three constabulery brigades. Besides

55

some 70,000 men, about seventy tanks were sent into action on
the central front. The road on the east coast is ideal for
mechanized vehicles, and it was in no way defended. Officially
the attack was a cosplete surprise, but obviously the South
Korean government expected trouble. Karly in lay President
Syngman Rhee had appealed for combat-planes, saying, "Key and
June may be the crucial period in the life of our nation.“
Shortly before the North Korean attack, General Roberts, the
head of the Kilitary Advisory Group, we: reported as saying
that the South ...... Army ... well equipped, but that it need-
ed more air power in order to prevent its ground forces from
being immobilised by the air forces available to north.Korea. 2
Within hours after the Berth Korean invasion, the American
ehbassador to the Republic of Korea in the city of Seoul, tele-
graphed to lashington D.C. Then, soon afterward, the United
States diplomatic and defense leaders were summonded to the
State Department. 3 At the same time, a phone call to Secretary
Dean 0. Acheson informed him of the invasion of South Korea by
Darth Korean Communists. Shortly after midnight, Acheson tele-
phoned long-distence to President Truman, who had gone to his
home at Independence, lissouri, for a family visit. 4 After
discussing the Korean crisis, Truman and Acheson agreed to bring
the attack to the attention of the United Nations. This was in
line with earlier United States planning that, in the event of

aggression in Asia, “initial reliance must be on the pecplc

66

attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire
civilised world under the charter of the United Nations.” 5 The
United Kations Secretary-General was called and alerted that an
appeal to the Security Council was coming.

it three o'clock in the morning on the 25th, Ambassador
Krnest Gross formally requested a meeting of the Security Council,
branding the invasion "a breach of the peace and act of aggression.” 6
The United Nations Security Council met at three o'clock in the
afternoon. It had before it the request of the United States
representatives and a cablegram from the United lations Commission
on Korea to the Secretary-General. The representative of the
Soviet Union, who had absented himself from Council meetings since
early January in protest against the Council's refusal to unseat
the Chinese Nationalist representative, was not present. Thus was
removed, for the time being at least, the possibility of a Soviet
veto. After approving the agenda, the Council invited Kr. Trygve
Die, Secretary-General of the United Sations, to report. he
insisted that the General Assembly's resolutions as well as the
principles of the Charter had been violated and concluded with
7

these words.

The present situation is a serious one and is a threat
to international peace. The Security Council is, in my
opinion, the competent organ to deal with it. I consider
it the clear duty of the Security Council to take steps
necessary to reestablish peace in that area.

After the representative of the Republic of Korea had been

67

invited to take his place at the Council table, Ir. Cross, re-
presentative for the United States, made a brief statement and
submitted a draft resolution, declaring that a breach of_the
peace had been committed and calling on the Earth Koreans to cease
hostilities and withdraw their armed forces. This proposal
received general support and, with minor changes, was adopted. 8
On the same day, June 25th, the Council found that the armed
attack from North Korea was a "breach of the peace” in the sense
of Article 39 under Chapter VII. A cease-fire and the immediate
withdrawal of Earth Korean forces was called for. Usmbers of the
United Nations were asked to help in the “execution of this
resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the lorth
Korean authorities.“ When the Commission reported that the cease-
fire had been flouted, the Council, on June 27, "recommended“
that the United Nations members furnish such assistance as was
necessary to repel the attack and restore peace in the area. 9
On June 26 Acheson phoned the President once more early in
the morning. he emphasized that a world crisis was upon them and
that only the President could make the necessary decisions. Im-
mediately after the long-distance phone call from Acheson, Truman
ordered his plane and took off at 2:12 p.m. Central Standard Time
(4:12 p.m. Daylight Time) from Independence, Kissouri, to Washington
n.c. ‘0
President Truman made the 940-mile flight in his plane and

arrived at Washington about 7:20 p.m. 11 Upon his arrival in

68

lashington, Truman hurried into a high-level conference room.
There were Acheson, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, Secretary
of the Army Prank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the levy Francis P.
latthews, Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Pinletter, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, including General Omar R. Bradley, J.
Lawton Collins and Hoyt 3. Vandenberg and Admiral Forrest P.
Sherman, and others. 12 In an air of tension and crisis, the
American leaders held an almost three-hour discussion on the
aggression, the Security Council's resolution, and possible
American courses of action.

Immediately after the three-hour conference with high-rank-
ing governmental officials, President Truman was caught by the
pressmen and asked about the Presidential decision in regard to
the Korean crisis. The President replied, "Don't make it alarm-
ist, it could be a dangerous situation but I hope not...“ Another
reporter asked, “Has there been a formal declaration of war by
north Korea?" President Truman said, 'Ro, there is no formal
declaration of war. That I know.“ 13

It was clear to the President and his advisers that the
Russians were behind the North Korean attack. The American
leaders strongly felt that the Russian plan must not succeed,
but the thought of what it might take to frustrate the Communist
effort was disturbing. General nacirthur was authorized to use
his air and naval power to prevent the Inchon-Kimpo-Seoul area

from falling into unfriendly hands while an evacuation took

69

place. ‘4 In addition, the President approved a suggestion that
American naval and air power be moved from the Philippines and
elsewhere into the danger sons. ‘5

The burden of decision in the matter fell squarely on the

shoulders of President Truman,rand $3.19? a terrible responsibi:’

 

“Wylity. Korea was not an occupied territory of the United States
Army, and the Pentagon pundits not unnaturally regarded South
Korea with complete disfavor from the strategic angle. The

following morning, June 26, Truman issued a statement to the
16

press:

I conferred Sunday evening with the Secretaries of
State and Defense, their senior advisers, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, about the situation in the Par last
created by unprovoked aggression against the Republic
of Korea. The Government of the United States is
pleased with the speed and determination with which

the United Nations Security Council acted to order a
withdrawal of the invading forces to positions north

of the 38th parallel, in accordance with the resolutions
of the Security Council to terminate this serious breach
of the peace.

Our concern over the lawless action taken by the forces
from North Korea, and our sympathy and support for the
people of Korea in this situation, are being demonstrated
by the cooperative action of American personnel in
Korea, as well as by steps taken to expedite and augment
assistance of the type being furnished under the lutual
Defense Assistance Program. Those responsible for this
act of aggression must realise how seriously the Govern-
ment of the United States views such threats to the
peace of the world. iillful disregard of the obligation
to keep the peace cannot be tolerated by nations that
support the United Nations Charter...

The night of June 26 the President and his advisers met once

more at Blair House. At this meeting, which lasted only an hour,

70

they took another step forward in the reversal of United States
policy. Acheson, reading from a prepared state-ant, recommended
to the President that American naval and air power be used to
help the South Koreans repel the North Korean attack. The military
chiefs supported the State Department recommendation, although
there was some discussion of the difficulties that might arise.
Further contemplation that night must have been of a poignant
nature, but at noon on June 27, Truman made his historic state-
ment when he "ordered United States air and sea forces to give
the Korean government troops cover and support.“ 11

than the President's decision reached the far Kast command
in Tokyo, Japan, Occupation Headquarters were preparing to ship
”munitions and war material to South Korea under naval and air
escort.“ 18

On the other hand, two mornings after the outbreak of the
Korean war, Senate majority leader Scott Lucas was summoned at
home at eight o'clock to an 11. a.m. White House conference. In
the meeting were Cabinet members who had listened to the Pree-
ident’s statement earlier in the week. They waited for 20 min-
utes before President Truman came in, took a seat neat to fellow
lissourian Dewey Short, and asked General Bradley to recite the
bad news from Korea. when Bradley had finished, the President
slowly read off the text of his decision to throw United States
troops (land forces) into the battle, to allow the air forces to

bomb "specific targets" in Communist Borth Korea, and to order

71

the Navy to blockade the entire Korean coast. 19

According to the Rev York Times, "the Republican minority,
as well as the Democrats, applauded the President's sessage.
Kinority leaders promised full cooperation in the hour of crisis.
They stated flatly they would support everything necessary to
carry out the President's objective.” 20

It was a few days later that a resolution of the United
Nations Command authorized the United States, as by far the big-
gest partner in the unified efforts, to designate the commander
of the whole force. This proposal was adopted by seven votes
to none, Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt abstaining. The Soviet re-
presentative was still absent. On June 28, Hr. Clement Attlee,
British representative, announced that British naval forces would
be placed at the disposal of the U.S. authorities to operate on
behalf of the Security Council. Eventually, sixteen nations
contributed military units and over forty provided material aid.
Then within ten days, the United Nations Council established a
Unified Command, under the United States, of the forces and
assistance to be provided, the command forsally casing into being
on July e, 1950. 2‘

The State Department, meanwhile, sought to keep diplomatic
lines open to Hoscow. On June 27 the American ambassador in
Iosccw delivered a note to the Russians, calling their attention aw-
to the invasion and requesting the Soviet Union to use its in-

fluence with the Earth Koreans to call of the attack. The

72

American note also asked assurances “that the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republic disavows responsibility for this unprovoked
and unwarranted attack..." 22 The Department, by taking the
public position that the 0.8.8.3. was not involved in the attack,
hoped to give the Russians the opportunity to get out from under
the invasion and to limit its reaction to diplomatic channels.
The rapid-fire developments of June 25-27 sust have confounded
the Kremlin. The initial Russian response was to brand the
Security Council rosolutions as illegal because of the absence
of the Soviet Union and Communist China. 23

The reason for the United States reaction, aside from
America's clear moral commitments to Korea, was that the attack,

24

in icheson's wordsll

...vas a challenge to the whole system of collective
security, not only in the Far East, but everywhere in

the world. It was threat to all nations newly errived

at independence...

This was a test which sould decide whether other nations
would be intimidated by this show of force. The decision
to nest force with force in lorea sas essential. It was
the unanimous view of the political and military advisers
of the President that this was the right thing to do...

The United States' act of giving armed assistance to South
Korea and Formosa was seemingly at variance with the policy shore-
by America's defensive perimeter excluded Korea and Formosa, as
outlined by Secretary of State Acheson in a speech to the lational
Press Club on January 12, 1950. 25

On Thursday, June 29th, the third historic American govern-ent

73

nesting on the Korean crisis was held, this tine at the Ihits
House. 26 The probles facing the President and his advisers was
how to stop the Berth.lorean are:. The use of insrican troops
was briefly explored. A final decision, however, was withheld
pending a report fron.laedrthur, who had flown to Korea for a
first hand inspection of the battlefront. 27

In the early norning hours of June 30th, lashington tile,
laoirthur reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on his personal
reconnaissance. He stated that the South Korean are: was in
confusion, that supplies and equipment had been abandoned or lost,
and um the South toreane were incapable of united action. 2°

The Aserican rar East Air Force and lav: went into action
to aid the South Korean Republic. However, free the air it was
difficult to distinguish friend fron foe, and few profitable
targets were found. Seoul, the capital city of South Korea,
fell to the invaders on.Jnne 28th and the South Koreans began a

disorganised retreat to the south.

2. ACTUAL FIGHTIIG 1! EH! KOREA! IAR AID 0311383 IITERVSRIIOI

the nilitary progress of the war is a.natter of record. 29

As soon as President fruaan's decision rsaohed the For Best
Command -- "in these circusetances I have ordered United States
air and sea forces to give the Korean governnent troops cover
and support' 3on United States and other countries' troops were
poured into the battle of Korea. On June 29, General Iaeirthur

74

flew to Korea following the loss of Seoul, capital city of South
Korea, for the purpose of observing the actual situation there,
as already mentioned.

Eho north Korean army, supported by Russian-built planes,
smashed southward. The Communist press and radio immediately
published the charge that the arnies of "the traitor Syngnan Rhee”
had attacked first and that the lorth.Korsane were sorely launch-
ing a counter-attach. On June 26th ll Sung Kin, in an ossthional

appeal over Pyongyang radio, called upon his forces to liberate

South Korean 31

Dear brothers and sisters! Great danger threatens our
nether-land and its people. that is needed to liquidate
this nenaoo? In this war, which is being waged against
the Syngnan Rhee clique, the Korean people nust defend
the Korean people's Democratic Republic and its consti-
tution, they snot liquidate the unpatriotie fascist
puppet rogiso of Syngman Rhee which has been established
in the southern part of the republic, they nust liberate
the southern part of our nether-land free the dosination
of the Syngnan Rhee clique, and they sust restore the
people's oonmittoes there .. the real organs of power.
Under the banner of the Korean People's Denocratio
Republic, we must complete the unification of the nether-
land and create a single, independent, denooratis state.
The war which we are forced to wage is a Just war for
the unification and independence of the nether-land and
for freodcn and desooraoy...

The 111' Infantry Division went into battle first, a battalion
at a tine, led by laser General fillies P. Dean. the XXIV Division
and the first Cavalry Division landed at Pusan (Inchon port was
already occupied by the essay isnodiately after Seoul fell into

enesy hands on June 20) and were rushed northward by rail and

75

truck to make the first American contact with the enemy on July
5. is soon as American foot troops arrived near Buwon, (see map
for locations) South Korean armies were regrouped along the front
line under the direction of’laJcr General Dean.

The first battle, which was held near duwon, was unsuccess-
ful. The initial retreat before swarming Red hordes lasted for
a south. ind then Lieutenant General Ialton.l. Walker, the Eighth
irsy (0.8.) commander, ordered his sen to “stand or die" on the
laktong River line bordering the northern end of the Pusan periseter.
it the time, it seemed little more than a desperate gesture, but
the defense held. Through lugust into September the thin line
buckled and sometimes broke unau- the fanatical charges of the
north Koreans. But always the Korean and Aserican units sanaged
to patch up the damage and restore their positions. The Second
Infantry Division, the First Karine Brigade, and c.3ritish Brigade
arrived - each one, it seemed barely in ties to save the defense
line fros collapse. it tines, General Ialker had every ccsbat
unit committed with nothing in reserve.

Those were days of despair in Korea when an understrength
arsy battled for its life and for time in which the Free Iorld,
particularly the United states, could muster sore strength for
the fight. The Reds smashed at the southwest anchor of the defense
line and were hurled back. They hit against the center and drove
to within seven miles of Taegu. They shifted their attack to the

eastern anchor of the line. They were aiming for the southern

76

 

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77

port city of Puaan, tho vital point of ontry for Alliod troops
and oupplioc caning by chip tron tho Unitod Statoo and oloowhoro.
Tho Rod attonpt failod, howoworo

On Juno 29, 1950, Gonoral IacArthur flow to South Ioroa to
obocrvo tho actual war operation thoro. and upon hio rotnrn to
Tokyo, ho fornulatod a oaroful plan. Rio plan wao roportod to
tho Joint Chiofo of Staff and includod tho following: 32

with tho doploynont in Ioroa or naJor olononto of tho
Eighth Army now accompliohod, tho firot phaoo of tho
campaign hao ondod and with it tho chanoo of victory
by tho lcrth Korean forooo. rho onony'o plan and
groat opportunity dopondod upon tho opood with which
ho could cvorrun South Ioroa onco ho had broachod tho
Ban Riwor lino with ovorwholning nnlboro and ouporior
woapono tonporarily ohattoring South Koroan rooiotanoo.
Thin ohanco ho hao now loot through tho oxtraordinary
opood with which tho Eighth Army hao boon doployod
fron Japan to atom hio ruoh. Whon ho craohod tho Han
Riwor lino tho way ooonod ontiroly opon victory wao
within hio sraopo

Tho dooporato docioion to throw in piocoaoal Anorioan
olononto ao thoy arrivod by owory availablo noano of
tranoport fro-.Japan wao tho only hopo to oavo tho
oituation. Thoskill and valor thoroaftor dioplayod in
ouccoooiwo holding aotiono by tho ground forooo in
accordanco with this conoopt, brilliantly oupportod in
oonploto coordination by air and naval olononto, forcod
tho onony into continnod doployncnto, cootly frontal
attacko and oonfuood logictioo, which oc olowod hio
advanoo and bluntod hio drivo that wo hovo bought tho
procioua tino nocoooary to build a oocuro baoo.

I do not boliovo that hiotcry roccrdo a conparablo
oporaticn which oxcollod tho opood and procioion with
which tho Eighth Army, tho Far East Air Forco and tho
Sowonth floot hawo boon doployod to a dictant land for
innodiato oonnitnont to major oporation...

Syngnan Rhoo'o oabinot aonboro woro alroady nowod to Puoan,

78

where Lieutenant General Walton K. Walker net up his Eighth Army
Headquartere. With battle front etill moving back and forth, and
bloody, confused fighting near Taejon, General Iillian I. Dean
and a number of hie troope were finally out or! tron retreat.
After wandering thirty-five daye behind enemy linen, Dean was
captured, but the outeide world learned nothing of thin until much
later: 33

During theee battlee, General MacArthur in Ickyo had been
building up a force of flarinea. the Seventh Infantry Divieicn,
and South Koreans -- preparing then for hie now-fanoul Inchon land-
ing behind the enemy'e lineea Deepite nany appreheneione. lac-
Arthur was given a l'guwahemi eignal" and hie brilliant1.3{Cre‘igitbgifN
aea-borne strike hit the enemy before dawn on Septenber 15th:“3‘
Within two weeke of the Inchon landing, lecArthur'e etrategy had
broken the back of the Communiet armiee and the lorth Korean!
fled in confusion in an effort to eecepe the pincer cloeing upon
than. Bearly all of the territory eouth of the 37th parallel wae
econ recaptured by the United Hatione Command. ’5

it the lane tine. General Iaeirthur decided on another eeeo
borne etrike. Be lent the Eighth Army novinc northward after the
nede in the went and noved the tenth Corpe under’lajor Genernl
Edward Io Almond by eee toward lonean on the east coaet. The ROK
(Republic of Korea) troope captured lonean before Almond could
land hie troope. becauee the Red retreat wee no ewift. 36 Later

in October. the United letione troope ruehed toward the Ianchurian

79

border amid sign: that the lcrth Korean Army had ceased to exist
as a coordinated fighting unit.

But then there came ominous report. that Chinese eoldiers
had been taken captive. Hard fighting again broke out. Prior to
the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel by the 0.8. troops.
Washington received eeveral reporte that the Chinese Communiets
were threatening to intervene in the war if United Nations troops
creased the thirty-eighth parallel into lorth.lorea. 57 On
October 1, 1950, Chou En-lai. the Chineae Communist Premier, gave
credence to the-reports with public pronouncement that China would
“not allow seeing their neighbors being invaded by imperialiats.‘ 3'
Several days later, Chou announced latly that China would send
troope to defend Horth Korea,

The first etunning blow came on Hoveuber 2, 1950, illediately
after Chou announced their attitude toward the peninsula. the
Chinese ambushed ROI troope and the Eighth Army, while sweeping
down on the lighth Regiment of the First Cavalry Division. They-
came screaming out of the hills at night with bugles blowing to
overrun the South Korean and American unite and to bring the Eighth
Army‘s daeh to a confused halt.

The unexpected American reaction to the lorth Korean invasion
nuet have been an troubling to Peiping an it was to Moscow -- if
only because it reeulted in Trunan'a order to the Seventh rleet
neutralising lornosa. Ict only did this American action frustrate

the Chinese communists, but the subsequent events of north Korean

80

armies fleeing in confusion, followingilacirthur's brilliant
stroke, must have caused the Chinese and Russians to enter into
hurried consultations, probably in accordance with the Soviet-
Chinese Treaty negotiated in Ioscow February 14, 1950, by Ian and
Stalin. A key sentence of this treaty states: "In the event of
one of the high contracting parties being attacked by Japan or
states allied with it, and thus being involved in a state of war,
the other high contracting party will immediately render military
and other assistance..." 39 However, Japan was not involved.

In the northeast, ilmond’s Corps was moving steadily north-
ward while the temperature dropped below acre in the first on-
slaught of winter. The Eighth Army gathered its strength on the
Chongchon river for the last big push, and on Dove-her 23, General
hacirthur flew to Korea once again to personally direct the kick-

“ Then the Chinese

off to the end-theowar-by-Christmas drive.
smashed into the larines at the ChongJin reservoir and out off
supply routes leading to the coastal city of'hungnan. The story
of the Iarines’ epic fight out of the enemy's trap will live for-
ever in America's military history, but no natter how brave the
words and deeds, it was a retreat. the seventh Division pulled
hastily back from the lanchurian border as the larines fought
their way down and across frozen hills toward Hungan and safety.
Thus, United nations troops faced new probless after Red
China intervened in the Korean war. On November 7, General lac-

irthur issued a special communique: “

81

the Korean war was brought to a practical and with the
closing of the trap on enemy elesents north of Pyongb
yang and saisure of the last coastal area, resulting in
raising the number of enesy prisoners of war in our
hands to well over 135,000 which with other losses
asounting to over 200,000, brought casualties to 335.000.
representing a fair estimate of Berth Korean total
silitary strength. The defeat of the North Koreans and
destruction of their arsies was thereby decisive. In
the face of this victory...the Communists oossitted one
of the scat offensive acts of international lawlessness...
by soving without any notice of belligerency elesents

of alien Cossunist forces across the Ialu River into
Iorth Korea and leasing a great concentration of possible
reinforcing divisions with adequate supply behind the
privileged sanctuary of the adjacent Ianohurian border.
a possible trap was thereby surreptitiously laid calcu-
lated to encospass the destruction of the 0.1. forces
engaged in restoring order and the processes of civil
governsent in the North Korean border area...lhe present
situation therefore is this. Ihile the lorth Korean
forces with which we were initially engaged have been
destroyed or rendered ispotsnt for silitary action, a
new and fresh arsy now faces us backed up by a possi-
bility of large alien reserves and adequate supply with.
in easy reach of the enemy but beyond the lisits of our
present sphere of silitary action. lhether and to what
extent these reserves will be sowed forward to reinforce
units now cossitted rasains to be seen and is a setter
of the gravest international significance...

Iresident frussn and his advisers stated,'Ia should not allow

the action in Korea to extend into a general war. Alloout silitary

action against China had to be avoided. if for no other reason

than beeause it was a gigsntie booby trap.‘ ‘2 However, General
lacirthur ocsplained of the restrictions and his intention was to

obtain the authority free the Joint Chiefs of staff to bash free-

ly the Ianohurias anesy air and supgly bases. It was not allowed

by either lrusan'e adsinistration or JCS.

ill the United lations troops were soved up to the thirtyu

eighth parallel by Christmas eve. Two days before Christmas,
General talker was killed in a Jeep accident. 43 he was succeed.
ed by Lieutenant ,General Matthew B. Ridgeway, a brilliant Iorld
Iar II commander. In the next few weeks, Ridgeway performed a
military miracle with the Eighth Army and Tenth Corps. he drove
the Communists back with what Ridgeway called “OperatianKiller.'
Offensive and defensive war operations moved back and forth near
the thirty-eighth parallel. In the meantime, however, various
incidents 1.4 to an op... break m... Iacdrthur and President
Truman, who relieved the general of his Tar Kastern mmand on
April 11, 1951, on the ground that Iaoirthur was not sympathetic
to the Administration's war policy. Ridgeway repleced.laoirthur
in Tokyo and Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet was put in
command of the Eighth Army. 4‘

Twelve days after hacirthur's removal, the Reds opened a
giant spring offensive and in midplay they followed this up with
a second power drive. But these drives crumpled under the giant
firepower thrown against them by Van Fleet's divisions. Van Fleet
turned on an offensive himself in late Kay that smashed the Reds
bank beyond the thirty-eighth parallel in the last big struggle
of the Korean war.

In.June, 1952, the United States troops (250,000) constituted
more than half of the United letions forces (450,000) fighting in
Korea. The Republic of Korea troops numbered 150,000, about 40

per cent of the total number. it the time of the ceaseofire BOX

83

troops had been expanded to about 70 per cent at the front lines.
Smaller forces came from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia,
Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the letherlanda, law Zealand,
the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, The Union of South Africa, and
the United Kingdom. 45

British Commonwealth forces included about 22,000 combat and
logistics troops, plus 5,000 Canadians and 5,000 Australians and

law Zealandars. 46

'3. AND roach: COBITTED a! cum aurora u roan .1 ‘7
(haximum effort at any time during the war)

3333:; Nation. lgmberg‘ ‘ Armed Force!

United 8tatee..........7 Army Divisions; 1 Karine Division, Army
and Corps hqs, logistical and support forces.

(approximately ten 1 tactical air force and complete supporting
times the effort of complement; 1 combat cargo command, air; 2
all others) medium bombardment wings; U.8. 7th Fleet in-

cluding fast carrier task group, reconnaissance
and antisubmarine units, supply and repair
units; military sea transport service.

United Kingdom.........2 Army brigades of 5 infantry battalions:
2 field artillery regiments, 1 armored
regiment. Far last level forces, include
ing 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, 8
destroyers and supporting units, with Karine
detachment.

Canada. a e e e a a e a e e a e a e e e1 Army brigade Of 5 infantry battalions; 1
artillery regiment and supporting armored
regiment. 3 brigades of about 6,000 men.

Turkey.................1 Army brigade of about 6,000 men.

Australia..............2 infantry battalions, 1 fighter squadron,

1 air transport squadron; 1 aircraft
carrier, 2 destroyers, 1 frigate.

B4

Thfltlwdeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee“ regimental combat t.“ or IbOUt 4.000
men; 2 corvettes; 1 air transport squadron.

Philippines..............1 regimental combat team of about 5,000
m.n. .. . ...

Pranoe...................1 infantry battalion; 1 patrol gunboat.

GrOCOCeeeeee‘eeeeeeeeeeeee‘ infantry battalion; 1 ‘1! transport
squadron.

flew Zealand..............1 infantry battalion, 2 frigatee.
The Netherlands..........1 infantry battalion; 1 destroyer.
Colombia.................1 infantry battalion; 1 frigate.
Belgium..................1 infantry battalion.
EthiOpia.................1 infantry battalion.

Union of 8. Africa.......1 fighter squadron.

Luxembourg...............1 infantry company.
A. THE ARMISTICE-

On June 23, 1951, Russia's United Nations delegate, Jacob
lalik, made a proposal that truce talks be opened. 1 lull in
fighting spread across the battlefront as the peace talks dragged
on month after month at Pansunaos. After a long recess the dead.
locked truce talks were resumed early 1955. As negotiations
continued between the United lations and Bed representatives it
was revealed that the armistice terms being negOtiated were abso-
lutely unacceptable to South Korea. lass demonstrations rocked
the nation day after day, opposing a “dishonorable“ peace. The
stalemated line roughly followed the thirty-eighth parallel, but

35

bulged into lorth Korea in the central section.where the Allies
dug in on mountains commanding the historic invasion route leading
to Seoul.

In larch, 1953, the Reds unleashed their greatest offensive
effort in months. .The fighting then subsided again. China's
Premier and foreign.linister, Chou Enolai, agreed to discuss a
United Nations offer made in December, 1951, for exchange of sick
and wounded prisoners.

On December 3, 1952, 0.8. President-elect Dwight D. Iisenhower
visited Korea. he talked to President Syngman Rhee at Iyungilu Dae,

4° and inspected the military

the presidential mansion in Seoul,
installation for three days. Until his departure on Decesber 7,
Ir. Eisenhower's trip to Korea was shrouded in strict secrecy and
there was no scurce indicating'what they discussed. Reliable
sources indicated at the time that 'both presidents may be discuss.
ing the truce talk.“ 49

President Rhee demanded that anti-Bed Korean prisoners be
immediately released in South Korea, but the armistice negotiatOrs
were discussing a repatriation program that was hardly acceptable
to the South loream side. On June 18, 1953, President Rhee ordered
the release of all anti-Communist I....n prisoners from.0.l. 2.0.1.
_(Prieoners of lar) compounds. 25,000 lcrth dorean prisoners
forcibly resisting repatriation to the_ Communist area were sub.
sequently freed as civilians and instantly “Joined the South Korean

citiesnry.’ 5°

[hen the Communists heard of the prisoner release, they
reacted as Rhee hOped; they promptly broke off the armistice
negotiations at Panmunjom, charging the Americans with complicity
in tho prisoner release. A devastating wave of world criticism
descended upon Rhee and the South Korean government. From almost
every capital Rhee was attacked and denounced.

The armistice talks seemed again standing on the verge of

complete collapse. According to Carl Berger: 5‘

lhile the uproar continued, on June 19 Communist liaison
officers passed a letter to the U.R. delegation at
Panmunjcm, addressed to General Clark. In this letter
they bluntly asked: 'Is the United Nations Command able
to control the Syngman Rhee clique? If not, does the
armistice in Korea include the Syngman Rhee clique?

If it is not included, what assurance is there for the
implementation of the Armistice Agreement on the part
of South Kcrea?...'

To find the answer, Clark flew once more to Seoul on
June 22. On this occasion, he found the Korean president
very nervous and under considerable strain. The General
again urged Rhee to reconcile himself to the situation
and accept the truce. Rhee, sensitive to the world
criticism, remarked that while his government could

not sign an armistice which divided his country, it

could support such an armistice. This statement,
Clark felt, was of utmost importance...

President Rhee adamantly opposed any compromise that failed
to ensure ultimate unification of Korea, north and south. Pres-
ident Eisenhower exchanged letters with him in an effort to reach
an agreement to end the Korean war, and after long personal talks

with President Eisenhower's special envoy, Walter Robertson,

President Rhee promised to go along with the truce.

87

ferns were finally agreed on shortly thereafter and on July
27, 1953, the armistice was signed by representatives of the two
contending commands at Panmunjom, and later by their senior com-
manders at lunsan and Kaesong, respectively. 52 The fighting
stopped at ten o'clock that night along the 120mile front across

the peninsula.

1.
2.
5.

A.
5.

6.

7-?

9.

10.
11.
12.
13.
1d.
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.
23.

2d.
25.
26.

27.
28.

TOOTIOTEB

It was at 4 a.m. on Sunday morning, June 25, 1950, Korean
t1IOe

larguerite Riggins in the lew zork Herald tribung, Ray 50,
and June 5, 1950.

13w Igrk figeg, June 25, 1950.

Ibid., June 25, 1950.

Documents covering developments in June-July, 1950, leading
to 0.8. and U.l. participation in the Korean conflict are
found in the State Department publication, United States

P l c in th Kore Cri is, Iashington, Government Printing
Office, 1950.

low lgrk Times, June 26, 1950.

U.l. Security Council, Official Recordgg 5th zear, 47} meeting,
1). 3e

lew zork Tings, June 25, 1950. the vote was 9 to 0 with one
abstention, that of Yugoslavia.

Daniel S. Cheever and R. Pield.Raviland Jr., Organising for
Peace, Cambridge, lass., Boughtcn lifflin 00., 1954, p. 454.
lew York Times, June 25, 1950.

lbid. See also same date, editorial section, for more details.
Ibid., June 26, 1950.

Leland I. Goodrich, Korea: A Stud of 0.3. Polio in the U I.
Council on Foreign Relations, 195 , p. 127.

State Department, United States Policyiin the Korean Crisis,

02. cit., pp. 16-17.

Korean Regort, 1248-1252, Washington, Korean Pacific Press,
1952' p. 0

New York Times, June 25, 1950.

Ibide’ Jun. 29. 1950s

Ibid., July 20, 1950.

How the United lations let the Challenge of Korea, New York,
United Nations, 1955, p. 18.

United State! Policy in Korean Crisis, op. cit., pp. 63-64.
The Soviet Union delegate returned, finally, to the Council

seat in August.

Acheson's testimony, Xilitiil Situation in the Par East,
lashington, Government Printing 0 fice, 1951, pp. 715-1716.
K. Van der Ylught, Asia Aflame, lew York, Devin-Adair, 1955,
Pe 2°5e

rhe lhite House was being remodeled during this period.
gippgn Times, June 30, 1950.

Bradley's testimony, Iilitigy Situation in the Par Rest,

op, cit., p. 1112.

 

 

 

09

29.

30.
310

32.
35-

54.

350
36.

370
38s
39-
40s

41.
42.

430
44c
45-

48c
49.
50s
51e

52.

Kncyclopedia Britannica, 1954 Vol. 13, pp. 491A~491D. See
also 1.. York Times, July 27, 1953 or A Pictorial Riptogl of
the Korean lar, er York, lies, 1951.

flew York Times, June 28, 1950.

Sexist Pres Translation, Far Eastern Institute, University
of Washington, 194 , 1953. Hereafter, the Soviet references
will be referred to only by publication and date. Pravda,
June 27, 1950.

lilitar Situation in the Far Eapt, c . cit., pp. 5381-3382.
for Dean's story, see The Dian Storp, [111 as L. Worden ed.,
New York, The Viking Press, 1954. He was formally released
after the armistice agreement was signed in Panmunjcm in 1953.
Iopg-lam i122, (South Korean Times) September 16, 1950.
Iarines poured ashore on Ialmi island, overpowered the Red
defenders and swept through Inchon, the port city for Seoul.
Behind them came the 7th Division. Ihile this force closed
in on Seoul, General Ialker unleashed an offensive in the
South that cracked through the Red defenses and moved back
up the road to Taegu -- the road down which the Americans
had retreated two months before. Ten days after the landing,
the Iarines with help from the 7th Division had fought their
way through flaming, battered Seoul in a roaring house-to-
house battle. low the Reds were in headlong flight back to-
ward lcrth Korea.

Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Kilitary Bis-
tory, Korea: 1250, 1952, p. 150.

Ruima nonthl , (Rope monthly magazine, published under the
headline ”Ten Years of Liberation," Raebang Sipnyun.) Rui-
mang publishing Co., Seoul, August, 1955, p. 356.

Achescn's testimony, op. cit., p. 1883.

lippon Times, October 2, 1950.

lilitary Situatign_in the Far Kip}, op. cit., p. 5172.

At the time, the author was in Pyongyang with the lighth Army,
2nd Engineer Construction Group, and lacArthur announced his
plans. Our group withdrew from Pyongyang on December 5, 1950.
lippon Times, November 12, 13 and 15, 1950.

Years of Trial and Hope, New York, Doubleday d Co., 1956,

P0 3750

Huimang lonthlp, op. cit., p. 375.

A gictorial History of the Korean War, gpi_gi1., p. 352.

The Iorld Book EncyclOpedia, 1957, p. 4202.

ng York Times, April 11, 1954.

Rutherford.l. Posts, Be ision in Korea, New York, ledill
IcBridge Co., 1954, pp. 335-333.

Seoul Times, June 10, 1953.

Source: the author's memory.

Si on Times, June 10, 1953.

Carl Berger, Th3 Korea Knot, Philadelphia, University of

Pennsylvania Press, 1957, p. 168.
Korea, Office of Public Information, Seoul, 1954, p. 124.

 

 

 

 

 

9O

CHAPTER 1'

ECONOIIC ASPECTS
1. ECONOIIO BACKGROUND'

Korea is chiefly an agricultural country with a cultivated
area of approximately 11,000,000 acres. 1 The size of Korea as
a whole is slightly larger_than the state of Uinnesota, with
approximately 30 million inhabitants. lore than 80 per cent of
all heavy industry, including munitions, is concentrated in the
northern sector, where Japan built modern industrial plants
valued at about a billion dollars before World tar ll. 2 During
the Japanese domination, Korea was used by the Japanese as a
supplier of raw materials and as a market for Japan‘s surplus
products. The administration, management, and operation of the
Korean economy was controlled by the Japanese from 1910 to 1945.
The properties formerly occupied by the Japanese and their govern-
ment in Korea were transferred to the newly established Korean
government by the American.lilitary Government in Korea. 3

The most serious problem was the economic imbalance caused

by dividing the land into two parts at the thirty-eighth parallel.

”0"

Uorth Korea has practically all of Korea's major mineral and coal
deposits and hydroelectric power potential, and it has all re-
sources, except cil, for extensive industrial development. Among
its basic resources are coal, iron, gold, silver, copper, lead,

zinc, tungsten, lithium, mica, nickel, barytes, molybdenum,

91

magnesite, alum, shale, graphite, fluorspar, kaolin and timber. 4

In other words, about two-thirds of tho raw material for industries
is located in northern Korea. On the other hand, the southern
part of Korea is predominantly agricultural, containing the light-
er industries and some resources, such as coal and tungsten.

Such industries as are located in South Korea were operating
at only 50 per cent of available productive capacity at the end
of World Bar 11. Agricultural production in South Korea was also
at a los ebb.

Like other nations, Korea will solve its economic problems
only as it develops an industrial potential capable of producing
an acceptable standard of living for all its people. Korea’s
natural and human resources contain the basis for extensive
industrialisation to supply the needs of its own people and to
export goods in sufficient quantities to pay for its essential
imports. This is the goal of the Republic of Korea government
and of the United States, which has been said to have initiated a
plan to make Korea a "model progressive democracy” in the Far
East.

In the next pages, the author will examine the American
economic aid programs, how they operated during the Korean ear
and how they have operated in war-damaged Korea. Before we
examine the specific details, one should remember that during
the three and one-quarter years of American.flilitary Government

operation, ending on December 31, 1948, the United States furnish-

92

ed economic assistance, under army auspices, amounting to more
than $285,000,000. Six million dollars was made available during
the fiscal your 1945-46; $93,000,000 during the fiscal year 1946-
47; and about $75,000,000 during the last six months of 1948. 5 In
this chapter, the author is excluding the above mentioned aid
given during the three years of military government.
2. 2133103 or necrosis COOPERATION ADMINISTRATIOB (ECA) ro KOREA
AHD UHITED NdTIONS KOREAN RECONSTRUCTIOH AGZHCK’(UHKRA)

At the end of the American military occupation in South
Korea, an Economic Cooperation Administration was set up in Seoul
to take over the responsibility of economic aid programs which
were previously administered by the military occupation authorities.
The Truman Administration repeatedly emphasised the importance of
American economic aid to the South Korean government. In urging-
Congress to pass the proposed $150,000,000 ECA appropriation for
the United States fiscal year 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson
stated that the Republic of Korea government would fall ”within
three months" if economic assistance were not provided. Under-
secretary James lebb advised Congress that “without a continuation
for the present of outside assistence...the Korean economy would
suffer a rapid and inevitable collapse.” 6

The Economic Cooperation Administration had programmed $170
million in economic aid from the end of the occupation until
South Korea was invaded by the Communists in June, 1950. RCA

aimed to achieve a balance between the immediate needs for consumer

93

goods and the develOpnent of capital projects. The aid provided
by UCA authorities consisted primarily of shipments of foods,
sedical supplies, fertilisers and agricultural products to relieve
the famine, disease, and unrest which prevailed at that tile.

The various projects carried out by the Eocnoaie Cooperation
Administration were suspended by the Bed invasion, and the responsi-
bility for civilian relief and related activities was assigned to
the United Nations Civil Assistance ConngndflggiClwinnlerea under
the control of the United States Eighth Army. On December 1, 1950,
the United Nations Genersl‘Assenbly passed a resolution by 47 to
5, with seven abstentions to form the United Nations Korean re-
construction Agency (UIKRL) to assist the Comnander in Chief or
the United nations Connand (CIHCUUC) and the Korean governsent in
their relief and rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. 7

When the fighting broke out in Korea, ECOSOC (Econosie and
Social Council of the United Iations) asked the Secretary-General
and all governments and agencies assisting in the Korean war to
establish machinery to match offers of assistance against requests
from the Unified Command. By the end of 1953, approximately $600
million in cash or kind had been contributed or pledged by fifty.
four states. To provide more long-range direction in such satters
the Assembly approved, in the fall of 1950, the creation of a
United Untions Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation
of Korea. Later in the session, the Assembly adOpted a full-

blown reconstruction plan based upon ECOSOC recommendations and

94

strongly influenced by the wishes of the foremost contributor of

military force in Korea, the United States, the plan included the

following provisions:

1e

2.

3.

4.

Establishment of a United lations Korean Reconstruction
Agency (UNKRA) under direction of a United Nations
Agent-General (to be an American, by general under-
standing), appointsd by the Secretary-General and
responsible to the General Assembly. The United
Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabili-
tetion of Korea was to issue binding decisions on
where and with what authorities in Korea the UNKRA
should operate, but merely recommend on other policy
questions. The general duties of the AgentuGeneral
were to ascertain rehabilitation requirements and
provide for procurement and distribution.

Establishment of an Advisory Committee of five member
states (the Assembly subsequently elected the United
States, United Kingdom, Canada, India and Uruguay)

to advise the Agent-General on major economic questions.

Approval of a code of principles to govern the relief
and rehabilitation_including the objective to ’lay
the necessary economic foundations for the political
unification and independence of the oountry' the
warning that the program must not 'serve as means
for foreign economic and political interference,'a
statement that 'all olasses...ehall receive their
equitable shares...without disorimination...,' and
the proviso that 'all authorities in Korea shall
freely permit the personnel of the United Nations to
supervise the distribution...‘

Agreement that contributions were to be voluntary in
consultation with a Negotiating Committee of seven
member states appointed by the Assembly President
(United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, India,
Uruguay and Egypt).

In July 1951, an agreement was reached with the Unified

Command whereby the military was to handle all short-term economic

aid until military security had been established, confining UKKRA

95

to furnishing technical assistance to the Republic of Korea,
planning long-range reconstruction programs and implementing
such reconstruction projects which would not interfer with
military operations.) While the situation was highly ”fluid,”
the military-controlled United Nations Civil Assistance provided
the principal external relief amounting to some $300 million
from the outset of the fighting until early 1953. Towards the
end of that period, however, the front became sufficiently stable
for UUKRA to undertake an initial program including the impor-
tation of grain, fertilizers and other consumer items as well as
the reconstruction of the Taegu Radical College and hospital.
The estimated cost for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1953, was
$70 million. For its post-truce effort, UNKRA called for $205
million which had been pledged by August 1953, but actual con-
tributions were feeble.

In addition to the above, the United States alone contri-
buted approximately $50 million worth of engineers, signals, and
transportation which were supplied to Korean military forces and
civilians. Also, another $50 million for raw materials was
supplied to the Korean Army for processing into finished products,
and $250 million for servicing, reparing, and replacing the United
States equipment used in carrying out rehabilitation projects
during the entire period of hostilities from June, 1950 to

August. 1955.

96

3. OOflBIlED ECOIOIIO BOARD AND ECOHOIIO COORDINATOR

following a proposal by the Korean government, combined
Economic Board was created in 1952. The Board was composed of
representatives of the United States and the Korean government,
and its purpose was to serve as a coordinating and advisory agency
for the United laticns Command and the Republic cf’Korea on all
economic programs for relief and rehabilitation.

President Syngman Rhee and Secretary of State John foster
Dulles, in connection with the signing of Iutual Defense Treaty
between the United States and the Republic of Korea on august 8,
1955, made the following declaration regarding the new economic
9

aid program:

le contemplate that the projected threeotoofour-year
pregrams for the rehabilitation of the war ruined Korean
economy shall be coordinated through the Combined
Economic Board, under the joint chairmanship of the
Korean and American representatives.

This program contemplates the expenditures of approxi-
mately 81 billion of funds, subject to appropriations
thereof by the United States Congress.

Two hundred million dollars has already been authorised
out of prospective defense savings...

Ir. C. Tyler Iced was appointed by President Eisenhower,
with Senate confirmation, as a representative of the United States
to the newly organised Combined Economic Beard. Ir. lood took his
position in August 1953, and divided the economic mission evenly

between.KCAC (Korean Civil Assistanee Corps) and UIKRA. KCAC

assumed responsibility in welfare, and supply and distribution.

97

Ullni was given responsibility for general education, vocational
training, irrigation, forestry, flood control, industry, mining,
houeing and power.

!he Economic Coordination Board started its programs with
$200 million, as the author described, which was made available
to it by the United States Congress for the fiscal year of 1954,
as the first installment of the 81 billion of economic aid which
was mentioned in the joint statement by President Rhee and Sec-
retary of State Dulles. In addition to this, Congress appropriated
880.6 million for the United States Army and 835 million for
UIIRA, in fiscal 1954, as part of the contribution the United
States pledged during the war for relief and rehabilitation pro-
grams. ly the end of the fiecal year of 1954, procurement authori-
zation was given for the entire $200 million of the appropriated
funds, and a large proportion of the funds was approved during
the laet quarter of the fiecal year. Approximately 45 per cent
of the total funds appropriated, 088.6 million, was allowed for

the following industrial projects. 10

1. Fertilizer:
Capacity of producing 120,000 tons of fertilizer
p02 year e

2. Power plants:
in aggregate installed capacity of 100,000 kilowatts
to replace the lost power sources in lorth Korea.

3. Seoul central exchange:
Accommodating 10,000 lines of new equipment, a 450
line toll switchboard and 140,000 telephone
inetruments.

98

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

‘ 11.

Railway rolling stock:
Providing parts and backshop equipment and to
purchase 1,400 assorted freight cars.

Rehabilitation of fixed railroad equipment:
Obtaining steel and other materials for repair
of Han-River bridge.

Railroad construction:
80.} kilometers of railroad extenticn and repair
of 40 tunnels and 54 bridges.

Purchase of naval vessels:
two ClliVl naval vessels at $750,000 each for use
of coastal cargo vessels.

Cargo handling equipment:
Purchase of five 350-ton barges, 2,000 tarpaulins,
17 mobile cranes.

Construction of fishing boats:
Rehabilitation of several small shipyards.

Iaterworksa
Building up to 80 per cent of the normal capacity.

Repair and construction of roads and bridges:
Purchase of 1,100 tons of steel, 17,000 tons of
cement, 161,000 linear feet of piling, and 1.9
million boardfeet of lumber in order to repair and
to construct highways and bridges.

In the fiscal year 1955, $280 million was approved by the

United States Congress for continuing the economic programs. Of

that amount,

.19 million was the United States contribution to

United laticns Korean Reconstruction Agency for the fiscal year

‘955-

Creat emphasis was placed on procurement of saleable commod-

ities in order to combat inflation, and the fund was almost evenly

divided between purchase of consumer goode and capital goods. In

99

the same fiscal year, the Department of Defense of the United
States was allowed to spend $420 million for military assistance
to the Korean armed forces. in additional 828.9 million was
allocated for subsistence items to be obtained within the Korean
economy and not from imports.

In the following fiscal year of 1956, the United States
continued its assistance to the Republic of Korea. According
to the figure supplied by the Office of the Boonomio Coordinator,
$338,903,000 was appropriated, and deliveries of $81,867,000
worth arrived at the end of the fiscal year. In this fiscal
year, the Office of the Economic Coordinator assumed the funoe
tion of the 0.]. Civil Assistance Command to Korea (KCAC) and
KCAC was terminated.

Since the ROK-UIC Combined Economic Board was established
in Seoul in 1952, considerable progress has been made. On July
16, 1957, Korean Republic, an English daily newspaper, printed

the following editorial in regard to the Combined locnomio Board.11

The Republic of Korea and.United lations Command Combined
Bccnomic Board is now in the process of establishing
joint organization for a continuing review and evalu-
ation of Korean aid policies and projects. This is
another of the cooperative moves that BIC Economic
Coordinator William B. Warns has backed so strongly,

and it should go a long way toward eliminating any
remaining frictions in aid planning and implementation...
Ir. Warns has insisted (1) that the aid program's
primary purpose is to reconstruct and rehabilitate the
Korean economy, and (2) that his organization work
closely and harmoniously with the affected agencies and
functionaries of the Korean government. This approach
has not eliminated every shortcoming of American aid,

100

and it has not solved every holdover difficulty, but
the failures have not been many, and none of them can
be laid at the door of Br. Warne...

Ir. Warns soon will be going to Iashington .. there to
work cut the fundamental policy structure for the aid
year that began in July. ls know he will represent
both American and Korean interests most ably, and we
have every confidence that the 1957-58 aid period will
be marked by the greatest successes yet achieved in the
recovery and strengthening of this country.

4. IVALUATIOI 0! TH! AID PBOGRAI

So far, the author has briefly examined the United States
economic and military assistance program to the Republic of Korea.
It is felt that the American policy, especially regarding the
economic assistance programs, is designed to meet the specifie
...... of rot... and u .111 remain tn. an. in the mom. n
has been no.1: recognised that the Korean problem 1. mun;
an American problem from every viewpoint -- political, military,
economic and humanitarian. 12 .

Ihile the present writer was conducting this phase of re.
search, hediscovered that the following specific needs remain
in the Republic of Korea: ‘

1. Training of technical and administrative personnel.

2. Control of inflation.

3. Substantial help in meeting the costs of its large
fighting forces. Korea new has the second largest
army in the free world, numbering over 700,000 men.

These military forces are much larger than can be
supported cut of Korea's resources.

One of the major problems in aid programs is the determining

101

of the amount of military assistance. is matters stand, Korea
faces the prospect of a huge deficit in the military budget.
Deficit financing could destroy all progress already made and
plunge Korea back into the morassfrom which it has been emerging.
Even in the United States deficit financing means some inflation.
In Korea the effects can well be disastrous, and the Korean
fiscal authorities quite properly believe that the risk should

be avoided at all costs.

. It has been suggested that the Korean government should

use counterpart deposits to meet a large part of the deficit
spending. But this is contrary to the spirit of the economic

aid program, which earmarks the counterpart for the inevitable

1)

hwan expenses necessary to the implementation of reconst-
ruction and rehabilitation. Ifthe counterpart goes into a mili-
tary account the Korean government will be doing serious damage
to the economic recovery program.

Another alternative is reduction of the armed forces. How»
ever, this would be suicidal. The Communists to the north already
have a preponderance of strength in land and air forces that
they have built up for the possible purpose of an invasion. The
only "catch' is the financing of military forces that are larger
than those a small nation can support with its own resources.
Korea has the manpower to maintain an army of 40 divisions, but
it obviously does not possess the wealth to do so. normally,

this country might be expected to support a force of five or six

102

divisions instead of 30 now in being. Those 30 divisions constitute
the second largest army in the free world; yet the United States

is contributing only a few hundred million dollars, including both
direct and indirect support.

It seems to the Korean government that in the total picture
of economic and military aid, the United States would be contri-
buting to the welfare of Korea and to the security of Free Asia by
increasing the military aid segment sufficiently to fill the gap.
The Korean government does not say that the deficit cannot be
met in other ways, but it does say that there is no other way that
will not have some undesirable effect upon either the total economy
or military security.

One of the sharpest criticisms by the Korean government is
that spending on consumer goods is too much emphasised, while
industrial development projects are treated lightly. Also, the
Korean government has protested strongly against the spending
funds for rehabilitation of the Korean economy in the Japanese
market on consumer goods and other commodities. Japan earned
large dollar credits by providing essential goods and services

to the armies stationed and fighting in Korea. 1‘

In addition,
official lashington urged the Korean government to import more
consumer and other commodities from Japan. is a result, the
Korean government insisted that continuins such a policy would
result in rebuilding the Japanese economy while leaving Korea

without industries and as dependent as ever.

103

On October 6, 1954, President Syngman Rhee was interviewed by
Robert Schakne of International Hews Service. Ir. Schakne asked
"One American condition is reported to concern Japan, if Japan
can produce the items in acceptable quality and at the lowest
price. It is reported your government is opposed to this condi-

tion. Can you explain the reasons for this attitude?” Rhee

replied as follows: ‘5

Few people who criticise Korea for being reluctant to
buy everything she needs from Japan realize the true
state of affairs. Japan, not Korea, is the offender.
Under American-supervised arrangements, it was agreed
that Korea would import annually from Japan 32 million
dollars in goods and Japan would import 16 million
dollars of Korea's export, or half as much as Korea's
purchases. Records show that in 1951 Korea bought two
and one-half times Japan‘s total; in 1952 Korea bought
four and one-half times Japan's purchases and in 1955
Korea bought eight and four-fifths the total Japan
bought from Korea. The 1953 figures Japan sold to
Korea $72,531,484 in goods and bought from Korea
$8,258,150 worth. For the three years Korea bought
$115,105,000 in Japanese products -o more than 600
thousand dollars a year in excess of the minimum while
Japan bought only 20,132,000 worth of goods from Korea
during that time -- about 60 per cent under the amount
promised. e e

You can see from these statistics that reports Korea
does not buy Japanese goods are completely false --
that the reverse is the case. However, many of our
purchases from Japan were not in the best interests of
Korea or the American tax-payers footing the bill...
Korea has bought, is buying and will continue to buy
from Japan, but only when Japanese products compare in
quality and price with goods available elsewhere. le
can understand America's fine motives in desireing to
help Japan's precarious economy, and her disinclination
to let down 0.8. tariff barriers to Japanese sub-quality
products, but we cannot appreciate the persistence with
which some Americans insist that we accept such junk...

104

Another criticism is that the program has been slow to get
started and deliveries of the goods unnecessarily delayed by
overlapping and bureaucratic red tape. Such a criticism is a
constructive one when we examine the situation in the fiscal
year 1955. According to figures furnished to the United lations
Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, by
the Office of Economic Coordiantor, at the end of the fiscal year,
$1,867,000 worth of goods out of $336,905,000 arrived in Korea.

The following article, dated July 2, 1957, is from an edid

torial of the Korean Republic, a deily English newspaper in Seoul,

which criticized the foreign aid program: 16

Korean aid is one of the.most dramatic and heartwarming
stories in the annals of mankind. This country emerged
from the Korean war in devastation and near economic
collapse. With American help and through our own
efforts, we have been able to survive and begin the
creation of what the economists like to call a viable
economy. Korea is still a going concern, and slowly
but surely, it is providing a better and more secure
life for its citizens...

The aid program is not perfect. In the early days, too
much was spent in Japan, and funds were exclusively
devoted to consumer goods. Exchange rate manipulation
continuously shattered the trends toward economic
stabilization. le have had our troubles, and they are
not over yet. But solution will come as the result of
0.8.chrean cooperation, such as we have had to a marked
degree during the last two years, and not as a conse-
quence of sniping at the whole program...

in example of one current difficulty is the Chungju
fertiliser plant. From present indications, that
project will cost about 75 per cent more than origi«
nally estimated. As yet the reasons offered seem
rather vague and inconclusive. But there is no intent
on either side, to make propaganda capital of the

105

fertiliser plant difficulties, or to indulge in
criticism until the full facts are known. Both
American and Korean aid administrators are seeking
to find out why the cost of the plant should have
soared so steeply, and then to take steps to see
that this sort of thing does not happen again.

All in all, the aid program is proceeding much more
smoothly than ever before. Administrators have

come to know and understand each other. Objectives
are identical. Disputes occasionally arise over
implementation of specific projects, but these are
adjudicated fairly and without hurtful controversy.
Cooperation is the keynote. It is, however, a cooper-
ation of give and take ~o of acceptance of more than
one point of view -- and not a cooperation resulting
from the dominance of one side or the other...

In many instances, funds spent to achieve one of Korea's
specific needs also helped to achieve one or more others. There-
fore, dollars spent for salable commodities, in addition to
making local currency available for direct support to military
and other efforts, help to keep down inflation and contribute
to political and social stability. Dollars for selfosuppcrt in
some fields help to attain as well economic strength and a
raised living standard.

Additional beneficial effects of rehabilitation are beginning
to appear. The formerly severe power shortage is empected to be
relieved soon. The railroads have been completely restored and
improved. 17 loads, bridges, port installations, tele—communi-
cation facilities, have also been improved substantially. A
variety of light industries has been rehabilitated and developed.

In evaluating the United States aid program to the Republic
of Korea, it is wise to recognise that the United States interest

106

in Korea is better served by less concern with physical structures
than with what happens in the attitudes and capabilities of the
people. In the words of Gordon R. Clapp, who had experience in

development problems as a Chief of the United nations Economic

Survey for the Hiddle East: 18

How we do the Job is really more important than the
material results our moncy pays... In our impatience
to get things done, in our desire to get on with the
Job that history has more or less thrust upon us we
may be sorely tempted to take hazardous shortcuts.

We may be tempted to push slow and unstable govern-
ments aside, brush away less competent local people
and rush in shock troops of unsensitive technocrats
to do the Job for them. If we succumb to these
temptations, we may damn the world in the process...

Also, it would be correct to believe that the economic and
military aid that the United States continues for the Republic
of Korea to develop a society in which freedom, hope, and
opportunities prevail, will be carried out with lower costs as
time goes on. Alan Valentine has well described the United
States government ezpenditure on aid to underdeveloped countries:19

Paradoxically, the more successful the program the
sooner it will cost more, and then the sooner it will
begin to cost us less. For initial success will open
the doors for further enterprise and investment, and
later greater success will bring the area's economy to
the point where its own capital and know-how can
replace the need for further United Nations or United
States help, which can then begin to diminish...

The author honestly believes that the American investment

in Korea is fundamentally the security of the United States

107

itself. On the whole, it has been one of the best investments
the United States ever made, and the return will become increase
ingly great as time goes on.

In present Korea, the principal remaining question about
the aid programs is not one of how much and how long, but of how
soon Korea will be able to stand on its own feet. Reconstruction
and rehabilitation are big and fancy words, but they have real
meaning only in the sense that they produce a viable economy that
can give Korea security of production and strength of economic
prosperity.

The government of the Republic of Korea strongly asserted,
at the time of the Armistice, that Korea hoped to establish a
sound economy and complete its rehabilitation in‘a minimum of
three years or a maximum of four years but the evidence indicates
a longer period. Official statements indicated that ”for many
Koreans today, day-to-day living is not at what can be called a
subsistence level .. evsn by Asian standards. Some of our pecple
do not get enough to eat; many are inadequately clad; and millions
are living in shacks, in caves, or even in the open. This winter
too many people will die of the cold, and many others will suffer
acutely.“ 20

lost of the Koreans feel that United States foreign aid is
essentially necessary in order to maintain at least a minimum
standard of living and reconstruct the ruined industries. Korea

now faces two potential problems; one is internal stability and

108

the other is the external security of the country. Which is more
important cannot be said for certain but the author strongly
feels that industry is the only salvation. Iithout it, Korea
cannot earn enough foreign exchange to buy even the most funda-
mental commodities. Koren can sell some rice, minerals, handi-
crafts, and a few other items, but these exports will not be
sufficient to raise funds to buy fertilizer, cement, building
materials, paper, textiles, and all the other things that Korea
needs and cannot make for itself. It is not enough to show that
Korea can import something cheaper than Korea can make it. lven
if the figures are correct, Korea still lacks the money to buy.
Internally, Korea has the manpower. Once Korean poser sources
are developed, Korea can make fertilizer and many other commodities.
Sociological and demographic factors are also important for
development of industry. Korea is following the world-side
farm-to-city pattern.t_lt also is facing the fact that agri- 4e
cultural methods are beginning to change, and that as time goes
on, fewer family members will be required to maintain a high
level of agricultural output. This comes at the same time when
the population is increasing sharply:J Where are the nev city-
dwellers to find a means of livelihood? The only answer is
industry -- whether basic, secondary, or service. As the United
States has proved so dramatically, basic industry must come first.
After that, secondary industry will flourish, and services sill

mushroom to provide the little extra comforts of living that

109

basic industry has made possible. What Koreans are seeking, in
other words, is a well-rounded economy that will make Korea
strong and at the same time lift the Korean standard of living
at least a little above the subsistence level.

Economic aid from the United States can serve an useful
purpose for the development of Korean industry. But some mis-

understanding exists concerning application of this aid, as

illustrated by the following excerpts 21

Despite the hundreds of millions of dollars expended,
few Americans know much about the realities of aid,
and fewer still have any understanding of either the
Korean or the U.S. position on its implementation.
Quite possibly this is due to the complexity of the
assistance itself and to the historical setting. But
whatever the reason, the lack of knowledge is
unfortunate, because it leads to differences that
never arise.

A recent statement by Senator Kllender of Louisiana
provides a striking example. Ellender came to Korea
to inspect aid projects and when he returned home he
said that the United States should not reconstruct
Korean industry and then turn such factories over to
the Korean government. Such a policy, he said, is
abetting 'socialism' in Korea. We know, of course,
that Ellender is an avowed opponent of v.3. aid
programs in general, and we would not have been
surprised if he had advocated the withdrawal of
assistance from all countries. But to his credit,
the Senator did not do that. In fact he specifically
endorsed continued help for Korea and some other Free
Asian countries, and he did not raise any questions
about military aid.

Out of ignorance or misinformation, or both, Ellender
implied that Korea has a socialistic economy, that it
is using American aid funds to strengthen socialise,
and that 0.3. aid administrators are assisting the
process. Us is wrong on all three counts. Where he
obtained this false impression, we do not know.

110

Perhaps it was planted by some of the foreign business.
sen who are being asked to pay taxes on the same basis
as our own entrepreneurs. In their view, all taxes not
levied by the United States are socialistic, and they
have sought to bring pressure upon the 0.8. Congress to
stop all aid while they blackmail their way to extra-
territoriul privileges...

5. DR. JOHN A. BAHHAH'S VIEW OF THE KOREAN ECONOHIC AID PROGRAM

The Special Ucnnittee to study the foreign aid program of
the United States was created under the authority of Senate
Resolution 285, agreed to July 11, 1956. The Committee is
composed of all members of the Committee on Foreign Relations
and the chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Armed
Services. A survey of foreign aid programs in the Far East was
undertaken by E£zn£3§3 A. Hannah, President of Michigan State
University, Dr. Howard S. Piquet, senior specialist in inter-
national economics of the Legislative Reference service of the
Library of Congress, and Dr. Emory w. Harris, President of the
Kellogg Foundation. The countries surveyed were Korea, Japan,
Taiwan (Formosa) and the Philippines. Dr. Hannah and his staff
remained in Korea for a week to inspect Various institutions.
Upon his return to the United States, he submitted a report to
the 85th Congress in.hsrch, 1957, in which he described the
Korean situation as follows: 22

They know that without assistance from the United States

they would be in an impossible situation. Directly
north of the demarcation acne is a Communist army which

111

ie better equipped than they in terne ct airfielde.
air euppcrt, and nodern nilitary equipnent. They
know that their own nilitary forcee are dependent
upon Anerican air euppcrt in faraway Japan or Okinawa.
They feel that they are an ccnpetent an the Gonnuniete
to uee nodern aircraft and other nilitary weapcne

it only they had then to uee...

They know that without United Statee aid it will not
be poeeible for then to eetablieh a viable civilian
economy. They are worried about etatenente that are
made tron tine to tinc by reepcneible pereono 1n the
United Staten regarding the poeeibility of terninatinc.
or draetically curtailing. United Statee aid...

The United latione forcee have continued to comply with
the tcrne of the arnietice agreenent. which epecifiee
that old equipnent nay be replaced only by equipment

of the cane type. In ccneequenoe, we now have there in
aeeortnent of largely cbeclete Icrld lar 11 type
nilitary weapone. Ie have not added to the nunber of

airfielde and we have replaced wcrncut aircraft with
aircraft of the type in vogue during the Korean war.

Dr. hannah etated that the aid progran ehould be baeed.upcn
the following objectivees
1. To etrengthen the Korean arned toreee.
2. to nake it pceeible for the Korean governnent to
aneune an increaeing ehare of the ccuntry'e

defence ooete.

3. to increaee the capacity of Korea to support iteel:
economically.

d. To aeeiet in the attaining ct eccnonic etability.

5. And to provide training for Korean governnent
administrative and technical pereonnel.

Dr. Bannah further etated that 'Korea now hae the eecond
largeet army in the free world. numbering over 700,000 nen. It

ie heavily dependent upon the American aid progran for ite

112

eupport and maintenance. the American people mhculd be aware
that to maintain an American army im.Korea, equivalent in terme
of manpower to that being maintained there now by the Republic
cf'Korea. with American.eupport, would coat between 6 and 10
timee am much an at preeent. Koreane make good eoldiere and
when woll trained and equipped conmtitute an effective fighting
force. On the economic aide, we are epending approximately
.500 million a year in Korea. In fieoal 1956 approximately
.100 million of economic aid wam for project ameietance and
$185 million for nonprodect aeeietance. .fhe bulk ef the project
ameimtanoe im in the fielde of induetry, mining, and tranepcrtaticn.
lven though development progreme im clot, it eeemm to be moving
in the right direction..."

In the concluding eection, Dr. Hannah etrongly aemerted that
the people of the United Btatee ehculd recogniae that in.Kcrea,
and im.the Korcane. there in a nation and a people that look in
only one direction for leaderehip and aeeietance, and that ie to
the United Btatee. Be eaid, they place their faith and their
hope in the future in our hande, ineieting only that they not be
eurrendered to the Oomnuniete. Our military eoemandere have
confidence in the Koreanm am ecldierm, eailcre, airmen and marinee,
givon the proper training and the proper equipment.

Again he etated, the Korean problem ie peculiarly an American
problem. from every etandpoint -. military. economic, and humani-
tarian .. wo ehcnld work in cooperation with them. he maid,

113

aeeieting them to help themeelvee develope a mociety that will
aeeure their freedom, hope, and opportunity. Dr. Hannah added,
'Ihie doee not mean that we mumt go on forever expending hundrede
of millicnm of dollare in Korea. Dut we ehculd epend what ie
required and that will be in eubmtential amount for acne yearm

to come.“
6. AIKIIGAIZIILITABI AID PROGRAI

lilitary aid to the Kepublic chKcrea mince 1945 can be
categorized into two partet military equipment tranmferred to
Korea when the American foroee withdrev from Korea in July 1949
and material furniehed under the Kutual Defence Ameimtance Act
of 1949. The military equipment which wae delivered under the
authority of the durplum Property Act had an original coat value
of 856,000,000 and a replacement value of 8110,000.000. It
included einable quantitiee of emall arme. much am riflee.
carbinee, pietcle. grenadem, machine-gune. bazcokae, hcwitaere.
mortarm, and ammunition, a large quantity of eignal equipment;
20 liaiecn aircraft; nearly 5,000 trucke: and 19 veeeele. 2’

Equipment for about 15,000 south Korean troope. eetimated
at a little leee than 01,000,000, wam eupplied from American
depotm in Japan. 2‘ fhe lutual Defence Aeeietance Act for Korea
included approximately $11,000,000 in aemietance. deliveriem of
eeeential ccmncditiee to begin in July 1950. 25 lo military

euppliee had reached the Republic of Korea under thie program

114

before the outbreak of the war in June. 1950. 26 Raval gunc,
ammunition, and aircraft armament valued at $235,000 were cold
to the Republic of Korea under the reimburcable-aid provicicnc
of the act. lo provicion waa made for a Korean air force. 27
The United Statec equipped and trained 150,000 men without
heavy artillery, tankc. or planec. 2'

Since the Korean war of 1950. the Korean defence forcec
have been gradually equipped with the aid of the United Statec.
In addition, in each year ceveral hundred high-ranking military
cfficerc are invited to the United Staten for training in the
uce of modern American weaponc and operaticnc. 0n the other
hand, the Communictc have been cteadily growing ctrcnger. South
Korea hac cuffered a cericuc depletion of military ctrength.
the United Statec pulled out all but two of itc divicicnc and
moat of ite airpcwer. South Korea haa gained a few divicicnc.
but they are not fully organised and for the moat part have
nothing more powerful than handweapcnc. Korea'c air build up
hac begun with the delivery of the firct SabreJetc, but within
a few yearm available planec will be dangercucly inferior.
numerically, to thoce available to lcrth Korea.

All of South Kcrea'c weaponc are of Korean war vintage. A
good many of them are not only cbcolete. but actually worn out.
The army alcc lackc tirec, gacoline. ccmmunicationc equipment

and generatcrc. Even regular divicicnc do not have enough

ammunition for essential training. Part of thie dearth ic the

115

result of delays in the military aid program.

American military aid has been given generously and always
with the beat of intentions. Koreans understand the United
States has helped Korea more than any other country in the world,
but it is suggested that the United States should increase
military aid. Unless KOrea is well equipped. Korea as well as

tree Asia will face another bloody struggle.

116

IOOIIOTIB

1. Th; lgrld Almanac, lew fork, Iorld-felegram, the Sun Co.,

2.
3.

4.

5.

6.
7.

8.
9.
10.

11.
12.

13.
14.

1957. pp. 424-5.

£b£deg pa ‘25s

0n exploitation of the Korean economy by the Japanese, see
chapter I. See Chapter II for more details about transfer
of Japanese properties to the Korean government by the
American military authorities in 1948.

and Tomor w, Iachingtcn D.C.,

Kcr a Ioda Ye ter

Korean Pacific Press, p. 9.

A. J. Bloomfield and J. P. Jensen, Danki Reform in South
rea, federal Reserve Bank of lew fork, 1951, p. 14.

e lew zcrk fines, Kay 27, 1949.

D. 8. Uheever and R. I. Raviland Jr., Qr’ggiaig‘ fgr Pgaoe,
Cambridge, laac., Roughtcm.lifflin.co., 954, p. 45 .

b 09 PP- 544.50

o t 8 temen 8e retar of Sta e John P Dulle

53:29am.”

fice, October 8, 1953.
“Report on the leonomic Progress. lell on the Icy,“ ‘ggggl
fines, December 11, 13, 1953.

"Korean Aid Progress,“
John A. Kannah, rea

, lamhington, Government Print ~

  

J
, Pursuant to 3. Res. 285, 84th Cong., an 8.
Survey lo. 5. Government Printing

W
Res. 35, 65th Cong.,
Office, 1957, p. 16.

The present rate of Ewan and dollar exchange is 500 Kwan to

t “1111‘ e
Rarry O. Drainard,

nternat onal locnomic Policies and

Pcligy, Iew York, Henry Rolt and Co., 954, p. AS.

15. Keria Planiggiligg, Office of Public Information, Vol. II,
195 , pp. 121-}.

16.

17.
18.

19.
20.
21.

22.
23.

The Korean Re ubl , July 2, 1957.
Ebidt, Kay 13. 1957.

Aid to underdeveloped areas," Address by Gordon R. Clapp,
Institute of Public Affairs, University of Virginia,
Charlottecville, July 10, 1951.

“Variant Conceptc of Point Four," The Annals of the American

 

ic

Acade of Political and Social Science, July, 1950, p. 30.
3§hcwp¥ace of Democracy," there Korea Stand, Office of
Public Information, 1955, p. 39.

'Iicinfcrmstion About Aid," Ibid., pp. 24-5.
Hannah, op. cit., pp. 11-16.

U.8. Rouse Committee on Foreign Affairs, Dafikggcund Infor-
mation on.Korea, K. R. 2495, 81st Gong., n esc., 1950,

PP0 34.50

117

24. R. Opie, The Search for P ac Settlement , lashington D.C.,
Rrockings Institution, 1951, p. 516.

25. 0.8. Department of State, Conflict in Korea, Washington,
Government Printing Office, 1951, p. 10.

26a Ibide. Pa 11c '

27. Opie, op: cit., p. 516.
28. The new York Times, July 27, 1956.

118

CHAPTER 7

COKCLUSIOI AND PROSPECTS 10R KOREA

During the thirteen years since the defeat of Japan, Korea
has emerged as one of the areas important to both the definition
and the maintenance of the position of power and responsibility
assumed by the United States. Representative Charles Eaton of
Rev Jersey, the former ranking Republican member on the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, stressed the definitive role of Korea
when he said that "Korea constitutes a laboratory wherein may
best be observed the nature and the causes of the cold war in
which Russia and the United States are engaged.” 1

; Repeatedly, spokesmen for the United States, including «~w
President Truman and successive Secretaries of State, have pointed
out that in the peninsula of Korea events projected an inescapable
test between communion and denocracng Korth ef the thirty-eighth
parallel Russia instituted its own totalitarian political and
economic system. South of that artificial barrier the United
States stimulated and sought to guide the development of a
westerniaed pattern of democracy. Inescapably Korea became a
showcase in which have been displayed some aspects of the ideo-
logies struggling for the allegiance of the two million in-
habitnnts of the globe. 2

The three and a half years of American military occupation

in Korea supplied much material and personnel as well as the

119

principles and practice of American democracy. United States
responsibility for the present situation in Korea has been,

and is, enormous. It is a responsibility shared, but not
lessened, by the USSR, and by independence-hungry Korean leaders
not yet prepared for full responsibility.

__Today Korea is divided by an artificial barrier and two
governments claim sovereignty over all of Korea and operate in
divergent patterns on each side of the line. Roth governments
depend upon outside forces and nations for aid and protection.
Divided Korea today is far from being free and independent; it
has made but few and faltering steps in that direction._J

The United States has a peculiar responsibility for Korea
in spite of official efforts to ignore, deprecate, or side-step
it. The United States was the first Western nation to break
into Korea's medieval isolation by means of its 1882 treaty of
unity and commerce. For twenty years after the signing of this
document American representatives were favored at the Korean
court. They were considered influential agents of a friendly
power during a period when Korea was subject to the pressures
of a major rivalry between China and Japan and a minor one
between England and Russia. China was eliminated as a possible
ally in 1895, England in 1902, Russia in 1905. The two powers
then left in the field were the United States and Japan.
President Roosevelt saw no reason at that time for opposing

Japanese expansion on the Asiatic continent and so, by the end

120

of 1905, Japan had no competitor for Korea except the Koreans
themselves and they were unable to stop the annexation which
came in 1910.

During the four decades of Japanese occupation in Korea,
the Korean people experienced the bitter taste of Oppression
which has developed a deep-seated distrust of foreign instrusion.
They are of an intensely nationalistic nature, and greatly
desire self-government. The national sovesent in Korea is
symbolic of a general political awakening. The possible :9“ .
surgenoe of Japan is feared, as well as the powerful influence
of other foreign countries, owing to Japanese domination and to
Chinese invasions in the past.

The late American diplomat I. I. Sands, in his book,
Engiplomatio hemories, stated, ”There was nothing strange in
the Koreans‘ fear of foreigners and their determination not to
admit then." 3 The Korean people regard foreign promises
cynically, and display an acute sense of political realism
acquired by long experience as subjects of foreign rivalry.
Their political consciousness includes a regard for the rights
of the individual. They have beoose neither serf nor slave
under the illegal sxacticns of Oppressors. though they would
welcome a life of peace without foreign interference, their
willingness to fight an invade is deeply rooted. As a conse-

quenoe, they are called the “Irish of the Orient.”

121

1. IILITARI GOVEREIEHT OCCUPATION I! KOREA

The progress made in South Korea by the American.lilitary
Government in restoring local administration, reestablishing edu-
cational facilities, improving sanitation, restoring transportation
and communication, reclaiming arable land, initiating a reforeste
ation program, improving flood control, rehabilitating the fish-
ing industry, establishing a constabulary and military, creating
modern police forces, instituting social welfare programs, and
preventing widespread starvation were distinct gains, as was
indicated at various points in this study. '

lhethsr thequreans were equipped for effective self-govern-
ment during the three and a m: 3.... of herican Iilitary
Government in.lcrea can be answered in a way which reflects a
measure of credit upon the lilitary Government. At least in an
administrative sense the Americans made efforts to train Koreans
in governmental responsibility, and as soon as practicable,
transferred such responsibilities to native Jurisdiction. But
the hilitary Government rule was unable to provide a stable
economy. reshape it is due to the thirty-eighth parallel's being
converted into an ”iron curtain;' and responsibility must be
assigned to the Russians for this condition.

Other accomplishments could be claimed in evaluating the
years of United States control over civil affairs in.lerea. for '

example, did this control over civil affairs serve as a “bulwark

122

against Communism"? This could only be superficially affirmed,
since American rightist bias drove moderates into the ranks of
the leftists and fellow~travelers. The bulwark was largely

facade. It may be suggested that whether American administra-
tors were especially fitted for their task, and were permitted
to exercise independent judgment in develOping policies, is of
major importance. The study has shown the lack of training of

American administrative personnel. 4 The following statement

5

by leads may serve as the best illustrations

The Korean attitude on independence was demonstrated

in December, 1945, when a group officer, following a
tour of the province, reported to the military governor
of Cholla Ham Do; ‘These pecple want neither us nor

the Russians. They are extremely grateful at being
liberated from the Japanese yoke, but are now anxious
to bid us both God-speed so that they say be left to
their own salvation.’ American foreign policy gained
little or nothing by disregarding this sentiment for
three years. On the other hand, it lost much. The
faith of Koreans in United States world leadership and
sense of obligation was undermined by our inertia. The
Korean people felt that the shifting emphasis of our
policy precluded their relying upon us to secure their
basic objectives. The resulting attitude of many was
forcefully expressed by Kim Kyu Sit: 'If we cannot
unite, independence is impossible...0ur independence
cannot come from war between the big powers or from
peace among them...1t is obvious that we can obtain
independence only through our own hands, and if we are
going to be prosperous let us be so by our own efforts.’
What policy would have promoted beat our future relation-
ship with the Koreans? The United States was faced with
three choices: (1) continue to existing policy: (2)
withdraw ccmpletly from the peninsula; or (3) remain
until initial objectives were realized. The existing
policy would have reacted adversely upon our future
relations with Korea and our position in the Far last.
To realise our Cairo commitments we must support the

125

government of South Korea to the limit necessary to
achieve united independence as quickly as possible...

At any rate, the develOpment of South Korean affairs was
regarded by many Koreans as very satisfactory compared with the
North Korean regime. The Military Government faced difficulties,
however, in the administration of its program, as it was handi-
capped by a difficult language barrier, and was without sufficient
orientation in regard to Korea and Koreans. In addition, it
faced the task of remodeling the governmental machinery set up
by the Japanese. The major political problem, however, was the
establishment of a democratic Korean leadership, a necessary

elements in the develOpment of a modern democracy.

2. KOREAH WAR OF 1950

The story about the Korean war is of significance for many
reasons. that has happened in and to Korea is a valuable case
study of an area in which the ”cold war“ hae been exceedingly
"hot.” War-time Korea offers a heartening example of the al-
most unbelievable resilience of spirit of a pecple who cannot
be beaten down into apathy and despair, because they know the
value of the freedom for which they fight. It offers a valuable
laboratory in which may be studied the newly-evolving methods

utilized by the United Nations for aiding an e2posod outpost in

124

the twentieth century life-andpdeath struggle between totali-

tarian aggression and an uneasy alliance of free pecple. that
has happened in Korea might have turned out much better if the
world had had a previous example of a similar type from which
to learn badly-needed lessons. At the very least, we should

learn what we can from this experience so that the errors made
there need not be repeated elsewhere. Robert T. Oliver states

in condemning the American people's attitude toward the Korean
6

war I

For one thing, the Administration denied that what was
happening in Korea was war. It was a 'police action,’
instead. Forthright Americans, who had ridiculed
Japan’s claim that its four and a half years of
aggression against China prior to Pearl Harbor was not
a war but merely an 'incident,’ were shocked to find
their own government indulging in what sounded like a
similar play on words. Then is a war not a war? Both
the Executive and Legislative officials insisted that
this police action must not be allowed to interfere
with the civilian economy. Luxury goods continued to
pour from the factories. light clubs did their usual
business. The Red Cross pleas for blood sounded un-
real and a year passed before the Government dared
launch a war bond drive. Even in the midst of one of
the worst defeats our military had been forced to
endure, during the summer of 1950, our public was
rather more concerned with color television, new
motor cars, baseball, and the exotic love life of Rita
Bayworth than with the repetitive banner headlines of
new retreats toward Pusan.

By the fall of 1951, newsmen were calling the action in
Korea 'the half forgotten war.“ Anna Rosenberg, the
Department of Hational Defense's manpower director,
that fall told American soldiers in Korea that their
folks back home didn't know what the war was all about.
A 'police action' was something new to which our people
didn't know how to adjust. The feelings of frustrated

125

exasperation became even greater when the Administ-
ration's proliferating phrase-maker substituted 'limited
war' as an alternative term...As one officer back from
the front lines disgustedly said, 'Ie need not only
combat troops but a corps of lawyers to fight this
damned thing.' Confusion was confounded when Chinese
troops poured into the battle, yet we were constrained
from bombing their bases and supply lines behind the
'sanctuary.’...Everyone knew and our officials frankly
said that Russia was the real enemy and directing
power behind the aggression...

No matter how the story runs, the Korean war is something
more than a Soviet experiment in the peninsula or in the war
itself. Its tap roots are deeply embedded in events which
occurred years before, some of them relating to Soviet and
American military-political decisions arrived at during World
War 11. Neither lashington nor Moscow, it is clear, foresaw
what pernicious results would follow those decisions.

According to some Americans, the Korean tragedy would never
have occured had the Soviet Union not attempted to establish a
"friendly“ government in the peninsula. Such a government, in
Soviet terminology, has usually meant a Communistodominated
satellite, where true independence is non-existent. Certainly,
in 1943, when President Roosevelt gave America's pledge at
Cairo that Korea would be free and independent, he did not
envision that his nation would be compelled to fight a Korean
war to save at least a portion of freedom in the peninsula.

Roosevelt's plan for Korea feundered and so did most of

126

his hopes for the postwar world. laced with this collapse, the
United States embarked on a program of improvisation to sten the
march of Connunisn. In Europe the improvisation succeeded. In
Asia, particularly in China, it failed. In lorea, it was only
half successful, at best.

The attack on South Korea and the years of war and peace
which followed were of historic significance in that the sur-
prised American people, only ten to fifteen years after essrging
fro: the chrysalis of isolationiss, took up the role of inter-
national policemen, pledging thenselves in Asia to defend the
lives and liberties of the people of South Korea, Japan, Formosa,
the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Australia, and lew Zealand.
Anericans do not yet quite realise the burden they have so re-
cently shouldered.

It is true Americans have slighted Asia, but that is because
Asia, backward and 'prinitive' has rarely posed a real threat to
Aserioan security. That situation is changing. A sodsrn, in-
dustrialised Asia will certainly have greater ispact on the world
in the future and American foreign policy will have to give
greater recognition to this fact.

There is the viewpoint of the Koreans, especially those
patriots who had placed their high hopes in Anerioa. Who anong
than could have foreseen what finally cane to pass? Korea's
great leader, an... hoped American power would help reestablish

a unified horse in the fasily of nations. Instead, a sonstrosity

127

was born a. two Koreas, neither of which can properly exist

without the other, but both of which, for political reasons,
7

have been forced to travel separate paths.
this seaning of the Korean war is already clearly apparent,
and others have at least become the subject of significant

debate. One viewpoint, as presented by Oliver, is expressed in

the following summary: a

1. The Korean war presented the free world with a

challenge it was not yet ready to nest.

Communist imperialisn, in its several guises,
succeeded in the period 1945-50 in bringing under
Soviet influence an additional pullulation of the
0.8.8.3. This steady and threatening extension
of power was achieved by agree-ent (as at Ialta),
by the collapse of governments under pressure (as
in the fall of China). The sending of an arsed
force across a recognised national boundary to
attack the Republic of Korea sarked a new departure
of Soviet imperialism. This open attack offered
the first real opportunity the free world has had
to nest Connunist aggression and hurl it back...

2. Korea served as an “alarm bell' to impel adoption
of a real arsanent and preparedness program in the

United states and in lestsrn Europe.

The former enphasis upon “butter before guns“ has
been checked even though it is not yet actually
reversed. Politicians debate the relative amounts
to be spent upon armaments, and defense officials
debate whether to 'freeae' current designs and go
into full-scale production or whether to continue
experimentation to produce better weapons before
the go-ahead signal is given to the airplane and

128

3.

4.

and arnanent plants. But despite these differences
of opinion, by the second anniversary of the
Communist attack in Korea: (1) American arns
production was seven tines its “Dre-Korean“ rate.
(2) Pacific Security Pacts had been signed by

the United States with the Philippines, Japan,
Australia and New Zealand; (3) the North Atlantic
Organisation emerged fros the talking to the action
stage; and (4) public opinion became adjusted to
the fact that the free world sight have to fight
and sacrifice to defeat Communist imperialism.

The Korean war has served as a valuable training
ground for Anerican, Chinese Communist, and Republic
of Korea forces as well as, in lesser degree, for

other powers as well.

Russia and the United States have been enabled to
"try out“ certain weapons, though both have care-
fully kept their ultra-nodern weapons concealed.
The Republic of Korea has had its first opportunity
to produce a real army and has notably succeeded
in doing so. In this sense, Korea is playing a
role today sinilar to that played by Spain from
July, 1936, to the end of 1938. lhether the

sequel will be the sane is not so clearly apparent.

During the course of the Korean war the Cossunist
lepire has been proved to be lonelithic and tightly

organised.

At the ease time, the disunity of the democratic
alliance has becose tragically evident. The
United States has had to struggle as hard to hold
its Allies together as it has to fight the enesy.
Sinilar disunity has appeared within the United
States, with the bi-partisan foreign policy so
carefully nursed by Senator Vanderberg and others
broken asunder. This disunity has been heightened

129

by internal political struggles in the United
States, Great Britain and trance...

Aside fros these four conclusions, which appear to be widely
accepted, several vital questions concerning the leaning of the
war in Korea remain in sharp controversy. Such as:

1. Should the WIacArthur plan“ for winning the war have
been followed!

2. Should Red China be recognised?

3. Is the United Iations the proper agency through
which to seek solutions of saJcr international

crises?

4. Ihat kind of preparedness progras should be adopted?

it the tins of this writing, nearly five years after the
war, the probles of Korea's reunification seess insoluble. Korea's
destiny remains inextricably tied to the overall world struggle
between the Scsnunist bloc, led by the Soviet Union, and the
free nations, led by the United States. If, soneday, sosehow,
there is to be a happy conclusion for Korea, as well as for the
other nations on the Oonnunist periphery threatened by direct and
indirect aggression, it will surely be because the Anerican people
remained steadfast in the leadership which was thrust upon then;
and specifically because they saintain their silitary strength.
Speaking on the fourth anniversary of the Connunist invasion,
President Rhee addressed cheering hundreds of thousands of Koreans

nassed in Seoul Iunicipal Stadiun, calling upon the Allies to

130

strengthen the military forces of the Republic of Korea and
then "Join us in saving Southeast Asia“ from the Communists.
The President concluded, ”Even if our friends hesitate, shutting
their eyes to realities, we Koreans will not sheepishly wait

until we have become Communist slaves." He added: 9

Today narks the beginning of the fifth year since the
Communists announced to the world their determination
to conquer all free peoples. Their announcement cans
in the form of an all-out silitary attack upon the
Republic of Korea. I would prefer to forget this day
and that event rather than honor them in memory. This
anniversary is one of pain, death and tragic disc
appointment...

Our Allies have learnt a lesson too. After being
ridiculed by Communists and people of the Free lorld
for trying to avoid all-out war through negotiations
with aggresecrs -- first at Kaesong, then Pannunjom,
then Geneva -. our Allies finally have realised the
uselessness of such talks. When 16 nations Jointly
walked out of the Geneva conference in unanimous
support of the decisions of the Republic of Korea

and the United States, they took the first detersined
steps toward dealing with the Cosnunists in a nanner
the Communists cannot avoid respecting. hereafter,
no one fros the anti-Communist nations will propose
another such conference without branding himself an
appeaser or collaborator. the tine consumed by these
talks was a valuable contribution to the Communist
0Cu30eee

I close these remarks with the declaration that, even
if our friends hesitate, shutting their eyes to
realities, we Koreans will not sheepishly wait until
wo have become Connunist slaves...

On.July 27, 195}, the Armistice was signed by representa-
tivss of the two nilitary cosnands at Pannunjcs. Howevcr, it
did not achieve the United lations objective of repelling and
punishing the Conmunist aggresscrs in Korea, and the ultinate
goal of national unification is still far fros accomplishment.

131

3. COIILICTIIG OPINIOIS 0! KOREA

Opinions differ from one person to another because human
beings are not all alike. Differences among men are important
because they underlie the conflicts which have shaken the world
since history began. With this in mind, here is summary of

opinions uttered by some prominent persons in viewing the Korean

war; 10

The United nations bravely and clearly recognised the
full meaning of the attack against us in 1950. They
demanded the reunification of all Korea and denounced
the Chinese invaders as aggressors. This was a proper
assessment of what had to be done in Korea to maintain
the collective security of the free world. It remains
the task that confronts us today.

President Syngman Rhee, lay 16, 1952.

Is went into Korea because we knew that Communist
aggression had to be met firmly if freedom was to be
preserved in the world. We went into the fight to

save the Republic of Korea, a free country, established
under the United Nations. There are our ails. le

will not give up until we attain them.

President Harry S. Trunan, January 9, 1952.

I repeat here what I said many months ago -- the first
line of freedom's defense is not the libs, not the
Rhine, but it is in Korea on the Xalu.

General Douglas MacArthur, larch 22, 1952.
We are not fighting to win in Korea. And that is not

132

the American way of fighting...1t resolves itself to
this: to have got our foot stuck in the door. to
can't get in or out. to are there. Period.

General Daniel S. Sndeleon, former Commander
of the 40th Infantry Division, in Korea June
22. 1952s

A workable form of modern democratic government with
the classic cheeks and balances was being molded out of
the crucible of events as they affected the Korean
character and ccpabilities. I consider this a
phenomenal record of progress.

0.8. Ambassador John J. luecio, lay 30,
1952.

is could have smashed the enemy completely if we could
have sent our aircraft across the Kalu River at the
right time. i had the planes and the boys were anxious
to cut loose.

General George E. Stratemeyer, February
1952.

He should let it be known that we are prepared to bomb
the mainland of China from the air and bombard it from
the sea if the Reds continue to reject reasonable trues
terms.

General Carl Spaatz, February 4, 1952.

The United lotions hnd the United States interest in

driving the Communists to the lanehurian and Chinese

borders obviously involves vastly more than extending
the status of the South Korean Republic. It involves
the total fate of Asia and must be handled as such.

Senator Arthur H. Yandenbuerg, October 24,
1950.

153

This is no localized war. It is a war with the Russians,
fought as they wish to fight it, without bombers and
atom bombs, but with their rifles and tanks and other
nations' men. I personally don't think it will be over
until we face the Huskies themselves.

Unidentified Karine Corporal, back from
Korea, quoted in Christian Science lonitor,
January 24, 1952.

Se do not know whether or when we shall have an end to
the fighting in Korea...But even if an armistice is
signed...We shall have to remain on guard...There will
remain the task of rehabilitating that suffering land.
And there will rennin the task of realising the 0.8.
objective of unifying Korea. ‘

Secretary Dean Acheson, December 30, 1951.

For centuries Korea has been recognised as a vital
strategic area in Asia.

Manchester Guardian editorial, June 26,
1950e -

The thing to do is to let South Korea fall, but not to
let it look as if we pushed it.

Owen Lattimore, July 11, 1949.

On July 8, 1957, The Kcrgan Republic, daily Korean English
newspaper, reprinted an editorial from the Sonolulu Starohullgtig

under the head-line 'Bomolulu Taper larns Reds lay Strike Before

80! Gets Arms.“ The following comment may serve as the best

future prospect of the Korean situation and American Iilitary

Tolicy toward Korea:

11

154

...Fcr four years the 0.]. has sat by while the Cosmunists
of Earth Korea and hed.0hina, encouraged and backed by
Soviet Russia, have enlarged airfields and built new
ones, and heavily augmented the troops and equipment 10o
cated there when the Pdnnunjom Armistice was signed.

The Armistice, ending (theoretically) the fighting of
the Korean war, has been, in historic words, 'a scrap
of paper.‘ The ink was hardly dry on the signatures
when the Communists north of.the dividing line, began
deliberate violation. They had pledged the-selves not
to carry out an arms build-up in the north. This was
flouted, almost derisively so.

Now Airfields

The United Nations Command in Korea knew it was being
violated. Their own observers could see from afar the
construction of new airfields. And the south Korean
intelligence service got details frcs scores of regugees
from the north who crept across the ’lc han's Land.’ ,
More than two years ago 'neutrals' on the United Nations
Commission in Korea realised that the pledge was being
violated. They so reported to their home government.
And the teas itself reported to the United Nations that
Beds were constantly and dangerously building up
strength in north for another attack on the south Korea.
Iearly two months ago President Syngman Rhee of the
Republic of Korea directly warned that the Red build-up
had grown to menacing prOportions.

leapons lnadequacys

This was in an extensive interview he gave to Robert K.
Honahan of the United Press. Rhee deplored the in-
adequacy of the weapons supplied by the 8.8. and the
0.1. to the South Korean defense forces. Action has
cone late. terhaps too late. Already the Reds of the
north, through the puppet ‘presier’ Communist Kis ll
Sung, are sounding off in protest. This could be the
beginning of another strike by the north across the
border. Already the government of the Republic of
Korea has issued orders cancelling all silitary leaves
for its 700,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen and put
then on military alert.

0.3. und.U.H. leaders should have learned from the
terrible lesson of the invasion fros North Korea that
pledges and treaties mean nothing inviolable to the
Reds. Today they are in position to launch another

135

devastating attack on southern.Korea. They will be
restrained only by bear that the 0.8. with its nuclear
weapons is in position to strike back with enormous
destruction.

So far, the author has examined a variety of opinions in
regard to the Korean war and its related problels. lost of the
ideological conflicts were removed through mutual compromise
and understanding except one major problem; that is, the Korean
government requested that large portions of foreign aid should
be given in the form of weapons, the training of personnel, and
other forms of direct and indirect subsidy. low the Korean
government needs such subsidisation to meet the military deficit.
To quote an official voice. “we hope sincerely that the United
States can find a way to help -- to the end that both Korea's
security and reconstruction will be greatly abetted. If such
a contribution can be coupled with modernisation of the ROI
Armed forces, we need have no fears about the outcome of the
final struggle with Communists.“ ‘2

The conflict in Korea was the war nobody loved. the
Communists did not count on having to fight an all-out war,
having trusted that the weakness of south Korea and the with-
drawal of the United States troops, despite the opposition
expressed by the Korean people and their leaders, would leave
the prime to be plucked by a more show of ferocious strength
from across the thirty-eighth parallel. The war proved to be

136

a prolonged and increasingly painful enbarrassnent. To the
United States it became a nulti-billion dollar drain, a source
of dangerous political disruption, and the fourth most costly

war in hiotory in terns of human casualties.
4. ECONOIIO REHABILITATION

The greater part of Korea‘s mineral wealth was in the
north as was the heavy industry. The lighter oonsuner goods and
processing industries were concentrated in the south, along with
the larger share of agriculture. But the nineral resources and
the heavy industries of north.Korea are alsost valueless to the
lcrth Koreans because there are no neans of converting the raw
materials into oonsuner goods, nor are there export narkets where
they can be traded.

In South Korea, on the other hand, there are nany manufac-
turing plants, but sost of then need the raw saterials frcn
lorth Korea, anong other urgent require-ants. the rice fields
need synthetic fertiliser and the railways need coal. The
blockade at the thirtyoeighth parallel denies these commodities
to South Korea. In food supply, also, the dividing line causes
real hardship. South Korea, the rise-producing area, has with-
held its rice crop from lorth Korea, leaving lorth Korea with
less than its linited supply under Japanese doninion, whereae

South Korea poaoesses more than double its previous supply.

137

In short, in nost characterisaticns of the two sones, for
purposes of conparision, South Korea is terned an agricultural
area and lcrth Korea an industrial sons. 13

In order to saintain at least a sininun standard of living,
Borth Korea needs to exchange its heavy industrial goods for
the consumer goods and food which can be produced in the south.
However, the present situation does not allow South Koreans and
lorth Koreans to exchange connodities, and south Korea sust trade
with others than lorth m...

host of the South Korean trade is transacted with the non-
Oonnunist countries and none of the trade is with lorth Korea.
it the ease tine, Korea is still dependent on large—soils foreign
aid in order to nend the root-and-hranch dislceations which
prevail throughout the entire economy. It is evident that the
help given to Korea by the United States must be for the sake of
Koreans, and not merely for the sake of those supplying the
aid; and that rebuilding a ecllunity is as ilpcrtant as the
physical force necessary to be naintained against eosnunisl.

l.The author has enphasised industrialisation elsewhere in

this thesis. the struggle for economic stability and the search
for a oonnon standard of hunan rights and fundasental freedols
bear witness to the gap between purpose and achievenent. hasty
industrialization is the only nethod which say provide the

veneer of a high standard of living. In spite of their un-
fortunate past and their present uncertainty: ‘50 Korean POOPIO

138

are determined to turn evil to good by their incessant and
unfailing efforts to build a new life. they hope to transform
their war-torn, battered, and disorganised country into a self-
sustaining nation capable of yielding a reasonable livelihood
and a prosperity commensurate with their abilities and resources,
and to join the Western nations in a nore advanced way of life

in a unified Korea of the future.

139

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.
6.

7e
8e

’OOTIOTES

 

K. Grant leads, American lilitar Government n or a,
law fork, King's Crown ress, Columbia University Press,
1952. De 's

gbid.

lilliam l. Bands, Ungiplonatig Ignorigl, lew fork,
IcGraw-Hill, 1930, p. 14 .

See Chapter II of this thesis an¢.leade, op, cit., Chapter
II.

IOIdO. O Gite. Po 236s

Robert T. O iver, Verdict n or a, Lebanon, 2a., Bald
Eagle Press, State College, Pa., 952, p. 9.

See Chapter 11. See also Carl Berger, Khe Korean Knot,
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957, Chapter 15.
Oliver, OBe Gite. pp. 195e 207s

9. gorea Flaming High, Office of Public Information of 30K,
01. II, 195 , pp. 33. 37.

10.
11.
12.
13.

ITwelve Jurors -- Divided Verdict,“ Oliver, op, cit.,

pp. 5-6-

”Beds lay Strike Before ROK Gets Arms,“ Korean Republic,
July 80 19570

Iher orea 8t , Office of Public Information of 80K,
1955 Do 38.

George I. IoCune, and Arthur L. Cray Jr., £££2‘ today,
Cambridge, Iase., Harvard University Press, 1950, pp. 54-5.

APPENDIX - i
A KOREA! CHBOHOLOGK

August 22. 191°eeeeeeeeeeeeeeees
December 1. 1945seeeeeeeeeeeeeee

August 15, 1945eeeeseeeseeeeeees

Korea was annexed by Japan.

China, Great Britain, and the
United States declared in the
Cairo Declaration, that “in due
ccuree Korea shall become free
and independent.”

Liberation of Korea by the Allies,
and the division along the 58th
parallel.

D.C.mbCr 27 . 1945. e s e e e e e e e e e e e 0 30860! Kati“! Gro‘t Brit‘in.

March 20. 1946eeeeeeeeeeeeeeoeee

SCPtCDbCI 17. 1947eeeeeeeeeeeeee
November 14. 1947eeeeseseeeeeeee

January 12. 1948seeeeeeeeeeeeeoe

II, 10, 1948seeeeeeeeseeeeeeeeee

AEEUIt 15. 1948ssoeeeeeeeeeeeese

dugust 25, 1948eeeeeeeeeeeeeesse

December 31. 1948eeooeeeeeeeseeo

January 19. 1’49eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeo

141

soviet Russia, and the United
States agreed to “reestablishment
of Korea as an independent state.“
(China subsequently agreed.)

The American and Soviet Joint
Commission was establiehed to
assist in the forming of a Korean
government. lonths of discussion
in the Joint Commission brought

a deadlock on major problems.

fhe United States referred the
Korean matter to the United,
Kations.

the United Iatione established
the UK fenporary Commission on
Korea.

the United lations Temporary
Commission not in Seoul, and
reported to the UK its inability
to contact authorities in Korth
‘OKOIe

Election sponsored by the UK
held in South Korea.
Establishment of the Republic of
Korea with Rhee as the first
Dresident of South Korea.
Establishment of the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea with
Kim, Il Sung as the first Premier
of lorth.Korea.

The evacuation of Soviet troops
from north Korea.

The Republic of Korea applied for
membership in the United nations.

January 29, 1949eeeeeeeeeeeeee
JUDO 25. 1950eeeeeeeeseeeeeeee

June 30, 1950.................
July 7, 1950..................
October 26, 1950..............
November 26, 1950.............

April 11. 1951eeeeeeeeeeseeeee
June 23. 1951eeeeeeeeaaeeeeeee

JUl’ 10. 1951eeeeeeeeeeeeseeee

Kay 11. 1952eeeseeeeeeeseeeese

Juno 25,«1952aeeoeeeeeeeeeaeee
December 2.4. 1952eeeeeeeeeeee

April 26. 1953eeedeaeeeeeeeeee
June 26. 1955eeeeeeeeeeeeeeeee

July 27, ‘953eeeaeeeeeeeeeeeee

The withdrawal of US occupation
forces except for five hundred
members of the Anerioan.lilitary
Advisory Group in South Korea.

ihe outbreak of the Korean war:

as requested the Secretary-General

~to call an immediate meeting of

the Security Council.

President Truman ordered as ground
troops to Korea.

General KaoArthur appointed United
Iations Commander in Korea.

United Nations troops reached
lanohurian border.

Chinese Communists launched masive
drive.. -»

President Truman dismiseed General
KacArthur, and named General Katthee
Ridgesay as new Supreme Commander.
Russia's Jacob lalik, on a UK radio
program said, “Discussion should be
started for a eeasfirs.‘

UI and Communist representatives
met in-the first truce session.
General Hark Clark replaced General
Iatthes I. Ridgeway as Suprese
Commander.

five hundred Allied planes crippled
lorth Korean hydroelectric plants.
President Dwight D. Eisenhover
inspected Korean military situation.
the armistice negotiations were

.reeumed at Panmunjom after a recess

of six and a half months.

President lisenhower's envoy, Ialter
8. Robertson, began talks vith
President Ihee.

the armistice agreement was signed
at Panmunjom at 10:00 a.m. Lt. Gen.
lilliam K. Harrison, Jr., signed

- for the United Nations Command!

AUEUIt 5. 1953eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee

April 26, 1954eeeeeeeeeeeeeeee

142

Lt. Gen. has 111, eigned for the
North Koreans and Chinese.

The U.S. economic aid plan for
South Korea, involving an approo
pristion of $200,000,000 announced.
A conference held at Geneva to
discuss the unification of Korea,
ending in failures.

Jul, 26. 1954esseeeseeeeeeaeseee

NOVOflbOI' 17. 1954eeeeeeeeeeaeeee

Junc19,1955...................

143

President Rhee came to the United
States, asking economic and
military aid for the Republic of
xOK‘Ot s

The 0.8. agreed to provide Korea
in the fiscal year 1954-55 with
$450,000,000 of military assistance
and $250,000,000 of economic aid.
The 0.8. provided Korea, in the
fiscal year of 1955-56, eith
$460,000,000 of economic and
military aid. ‘

APPENDIX a B

THE KOREAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDEHCE

Ie herewith proclaim the independence cf'Kcrca and the
liberty of the Korean people. We tell it to the world in
witness of the equality of all nations and we pass it on to
our posterity us their inherent right. '

Ie, 20,000,000 united loyal people, make this proclama-
tion, having back of us 5,000 years of history and 20,000,000
of a united loyal people. lc take this step to ensure to our
children, for all time to come, personal liberty in acord with
the awakening consciousness of this new era. This is the
clear leading of God, the moving principle of the present age,
the whole human racc's Just claim. It is something that can-
not be stamped out or stifled or suppressed by any means.

Victims of an older age, when brute force and the spirit
of plunder ruled, we have come after these long thousands of
years of foreign oppression, with every loss to the right to
live, every restriction of the freedom of thought, every
damage done to the dignity of life, every opportunity lost for
a share in the intelligent advance of the age in which we live.

issurcdly, if the defects of the past are to be rectified,
if the agony of the present is to be unlooscd, if future
oppression is to be avoided, if thought is to be set free, if
right of action is to be given a place, if we are to attain
to any way of progress, if we are to deliver our children from
a painful, shameful heritage, if we are to leave the blessing
of happiness intact for those who succeed us, the first of all
necessary things is the clear-cut independence of our people.
Ihat cannot our twenty million do, every man with sword in
hand in this day when human nature and conscience are making a
stand for truth and right? that barrier can we not break,
what purpose can we not accomplish?

Ic have no desire to accuse Japan of breaking many solemn
treaties since 1636, nor to single out especially the teachers
in the schools or governsent officials who treat the heritage
of our ancestors as a colony of their own, and our people and
their civilisation as a nation of savages, finding delight only
in beating us down and bringing us under their heel.

Is have no wish to find special fault with Japan's lack of
fairness or her contempt of our civilization and the principles
on which her state rests; we, who have greater cause to repri-
mand ourselves, need not spend precious time in finding fault
with others; neither need we, who require so urgently to build
for the future, spend useless hours over what is past and gone.
Our urgent used today is the setting up of this house of ours
and not a discussion of who has broken it down, or of what has

144

caused its ruin. Our work is to clear the future of defects
in accord with the earnest dictates of conscience. Let us not
be filled with bitterness or resentment over past agonics or
past occasions for anger.

Our part is to influence the Japanese government, dominated
as it is by the old idea of brute force which thinks to run
counter to reason and universal law, so that it will change,
act honestly and in accord with the principles of right and
truth e

The result of annexation, brought about without any
conference with the Korean people, is that the Japanese, in-
different to us, use every kind of partiality for their own,
and by a false set of figures show a profit-and-loss account
between us two peoples most untrue, digging a trench of ever-
lasting rcsentment deeper and deeper the further they go.

Ought not the way of enlightened courage to be to correct
the evils of the past by ways that are sincere, and by true
sympathy and friendly feeling make a new world in which the
two people will be equally blessed?

To bind by force twenty millions of resentful Koreans will
mean not only loss of peace forever for this part of the Far
East, but also will increase the ever growing suspicion of four
hundred million of Chinese .- upon whom depends the danger or
safety of the r.: East -- besides strengthening the hatred of
Japan. From this, all the rest of the East will suffer.

Today, Korean independence will mean not only daily life and
happiness for us, but also Japan's departure from an evil way,
and exaltation to the place of true protector of the East, so
that China, too, even in her dreams, would put all fear of
Japan aside. This thought comes from no minor resentment, but
from a large hope for the future welfare and blessing of man-
kind.

A new era wakes before our eyes, the old world of force .
is gone, and the new world of righteousness and truth is here.
Out of the experience and travail of the old world arises this
light on life's affairs. The insects stifled by the foe and
snow of winter awake at this same time with the breezes of
spring and the soft light of the sun upon them.

It is the day of the restoration of all things, on the
full tide of which we set forth, without delay or fear. le
desire a full measure of satisfaction in the way of liberty and
the pursuit cf happiness, and an opportunity to develop what
is in us for the glory of the people.

Is awake now from the old world with its darkened condi-
tions, in full determination and one heart and one mind, with
right on our side, along with the forces of nature, to a new
life. Kay all the ancestors to the thousands and ten thousands
of generations aid us from within, and all the force of the

145

world aid us from without, and let the day we take hold be the
In this hcpe we go forward.

day of our attainment.

THREE ITEIS OF AGREEMENT

1. This work of ours is in behalf of truth, religion
and life, undertaken at the request of our pecple,
in order to make known their desire for liberty.
Let no violence be done to anyone.

2. Let those who follow us, every man, always every
hour, show forth with gladness this same mind.

3. Let all things be done decently and in order, so
that our behavior to the very end may be honorable
and upright.

Third flonth, The 4252 Kear of the Kingdom of Korea.
’Representatives of the People, who signed, as follows:

Son, Byung Hi
Paik, Long Sung
Kim, Chang Choon
La, Long Whan
Yang, Han.look
Lee, lung Yong
Lee, Chong ll
Paik, Hi Do

Bin, Suk Ku
Chung, Coon Su
Ban, Iong Icon
Lee, Pil Chu
Kwon, Byung Duk
Lee, Kap Sung
Paik, Chun Seung
Oh, Ihe Young
Bong, Ki Cho

146

Kil, Sun Chu
Kim, Ion Kyc
Kwon, Dong Chin
La, In Bup

10". 2.1 T‘.
Lee, Sung Econ
Lim, Kei When
Psk, Tong Ian
Oh, Sei Chang
Choi, Sung Io
long, Byung Ki
Kim, Pyung Cho
Yang, Chun Paik
Lee, Chong Boon
Sin, Bong Bik
Ch01. Lin

APPENDIX - C

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

October 1, 1953

The parties to this treaty, reaffirming their desire to
live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and
desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area,
desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determi-
nation to defend themselves against external armed attack so
that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that
either of them stands alone in the Pacific area, desiring
further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for
the preservation of peace and security pending the development
of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional
security in the Pacific area, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The parties undertake to settle any international disputes
in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and decurity and Justice are
not endangered and to refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed
by any party toward the United nations.

ARTICLE II

The parties will consult together whenever, in the cpinicn
of either of them, the political independence or security of
either of the parties is threatened by external armed attack.
Separately and Jointly, by self-help and mutual aid, the parties
will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed
attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and

147

agreement to implement this treaty and to further its purposes.

ARTICLE 111

Each party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific
area on either of the parties in territories now under their
respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by
one of the parties as lawfully brought under the administrative
control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and
safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger
in accordance with its constitutional processes.

ARTICLE IV

The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of
America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air
and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of
Korea as determined by mutual agreement.

ARTICLE V

This treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of Korea and
the United States of America in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes and will come into force when instru-
ments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at
Washington.

ARTICLE VI

This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either
party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to
the other party.

148

APPENDIX - D

 

 

 

 

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2. Noam szumiiull - top o'er-green pine trees, like (mops 0' ar-Inounod men,

 

 

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dram and wear.
ar- moored men,

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[$312513 33” 33:3 -..-.3: 3

May God bleesourlaud Ko- re a ior (V ~ er and cv- -er!
E Con- q'ringo'cr the win-try frosl-; Danni-less our sym-bol.

3‘32.- 3 E-_ E i. ’3‘ ‘ ‘ “Tm-3‘“ 5‘ _" ._

 

 

 

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149

1.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.
15.

14.

15.
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

IOOIB

ikagi, lideaioh l. a an' r lation 1 2-1 ,
Tokyo, The lokueeido Preee, 193 .

Berger, Carl, the lgrea ggot, lhiladelphia, Univeraity of
Penneyleania Preae, 1957.

Biehop, Hillaan.l. and.lendel, Baluel. Baeig Liane! gt
tragican Denggragl, lee York, Appleton-Gro ta, no.,
195 .

Brainard, Harry G. International lccnogice and Public
Poli , lee York, Henry Holt and c., 95 .

Cheever, Daniel 8. and Baviland, Hield Jr., Organizing
for Peace, Cambridge laae., Boughton lifflin Co., 1954.
Chung, Kyung Cho, Korea Tomorroes gand of the Iornigg
Gala, lee York, The lacnillan Co., 195 .

Creeaeeaey, C. B. Aeia'a Lande and Peo lee, lee York,
loGrae-Bill Co., 1951.

Dean, Vera lichelee, The lature of the lon-leetern'lorld,
lee York, The Bee American Literature Inc., 1957.

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HEUSPLPERS
1. A an Stud nt 2. m Hyg‘ Shinmun
5. m uh . 4. l r ana

154

5. lee York ggrald Tribune 6. lee York Time;

 

 

 

 

7. Nippon Times 8. Soviet Press Translation,

9. Yong gem Ilbo Far Eastern Institute,
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155

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