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THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD
REPUBLIC OF KOREA BETWEEN 1945-1957

by

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A THESIS

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan
State University of Agriculture and Applied Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

1958

Approved

H. J. Friedman

ABSTRACT

Since the end of World War II, the responsibility assumed by the United States in the Far East as well as to the Free World in less developed areas is enormous. While the United States has been engaged in the cold war between democracy and communism, the progress toward freedom in Korea has been slow.

Since 1945, when the Republic of Korea was liberated from the Japanese yoke by the Free Allies, the United States policy in the peninsula in respect to political settlement, economic stabilization, social order, and military security has been largely unsuccessful, according to this study.

Politically, the internal struggle would not have occurred if the American military government had achieved its objectives. Economically, the starvation would not have been possible if American authorities had made the best use of their funds. And militarily, the Korean war would not have happened if America had understood the Russian and North Korean intentions. These failures in American foreign policy caused Korea to become a testing ground in the dispute between the free world and world communism.

In this study it has been shown that the United States foreign policy in Korea was weak because of division, uncertainty, and timidity. The changes of personnel and of political parties in Washington inevitably result in changes in local policy as well as in objectives.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author wishes to express with pleasure his sincere appreciation to Dr. Harry J. Friedman under whose enthusiastic, zestful and capable leadership this study was conducted and completed.

He is also greatly indebted to Dr. Dana M. Woodbridge of the Department of Communication Skills for his valuable suggestions and interest in this study.

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INTRODUCTION

The author's primary purpose is to examine American foreign policy toward Korea between 1945 and 1957. While conducting the research the author was confronted with great difficulty in obtaining a true picture of the contrasting ideologies and nationalisms in the two halves of Korea, because no materials are available in the University library concerning North Korea. Korean problems are relatively new to American political and social scientists and few books on the subject are available. For this reason the author has used considerable information from both United States and Korean governmental publications and current periodicals.

The thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I is devoted to giving background information about Korea prior to 1945. It includes material on the geography, population, history, culture and resources, the Japanese colonization, and the Cairo Declaration of 1943, which contains the general American foreign policy toward Korea in its earlier stage. In this chapter the reader will find the American commitment dealing with Korean independence and its implications.

In chapter II the author attempts to give the significance of American foreign policy as well as United States Military Government in Korea for the years 1945 through 1948. These crucial three years covered one of the most important periods

in modern Korean history. It was a time of dividing the country, organizing the political parties, and negotiating with the Russians to bring about the unification of the country in an effort to stabilize it politically and economically. The development of South Korean affairs was striking, but the Military Government's failure in dealing with some aspects of Korean affairs is clearly apparent. To cite one example, the withdrawal of the American military forces from South Korea without comprehending the future intentions of the North Koreans and their strategic position may have helped to bring about the Korean war.

In chapter III the author attempts to give particular emphasis to the presidential decision-making process and the Chinese Communist and Russian reactions to the Korean warfare. The Korean war was the first war in history in which troops of a world organization acted as "police" to fight an aggressor nation. In 1953 the armistice was signed by representatives of the two military commands at Panmunjom, but it did not achieve the objectives of the United States. The author will attempt to examine not only the contributions made by the United States, but also why the American government failed to achieve its objectives.

In chapter IV -- economic organization and military aspects -- the author discusses various governmental organizations, their purpose, and how they are operating in war-ruined Korea

today. In addition, the author emphasizes the military portion of American foreign aid, and what should be done in order to maintain the Korean army, the second largest in the free world, and to make the peninsula secure.

Lastly in chapter V the author sums up the whole American foreign policy during the twelve years, 1945 to 1957, and describes the American failure in negotiating with Soviet Russia during the Military Government occupation in Korea, and the present United States policy toward Korea, economic and military. In addition, the author stresses the particular significance and meaning of the Korean war of 1950, world communism, and prospects for Korea.

Throughout the study, the reader will realize the American failure in dealing with Korean affairs. However, this failure carries with it the promise of future success. Knowledge of what has happened in Korea, why it happened, and, most important of all, who made it happen, can be a valuable guide as to what can be attempted and what should be avoided, in forming Western attitudes and plans toward other less-developed areas of Asia and the Middle East. For unless lessons are learned from the example of Korea -- and from the mistakes that lost a few nations in the world to the Communist bloc -- the West may lose the rest of the world.

Korea is still one of the greatest of the less-developed areas of the world in terms of industrialization, the ability to

feed and support her own indigenous population, and the ability to exploit her vast natural resources and potential power supply for the benefit of her own people. The nations of the West, especially the United States, have attempted to support those Korean governments which labeled themselves "democratic;" Western capital has been invested in Korean industrial development. Western physicians laid the foundations of modern medical facilities in Korea, and Western educators have made significant contributions to Korean colleges and universities.

Yet, it is now apparent that the inconsistencies of Western foreign policy, the failure of the West to understand the history, the geography, the conditions, the demands, and the institutions of Korea have made Korea a vulnerable testing ground in the battle against world communism. Thus Korea becomes a primary example of potential Western failure and Communist success in a less-developed area, an example which might endanger the entire world.

What has happened in Korea is not only important in its own right, but it is also significant for an understanding of the unfolding struggle for the loyalties of the diverse people of Asia. In addition, it aids in understanding how national commitments and international problems assume an inevitability above and beyond the control of the statesmen who presumably shape and administer foreign policy. For this reason the author has attempted to stress the elements in the Korean

situation which not only illuminate a portion of the past, but also serve as a partial guide for the future.

If a prior historical example existed, the events in Korea might have been very different. None did exist, however, and it is important to use the developments in Korea as lessons.

American foreign policy toward Korea has been one of the most important factors in that country's history and will continue to be in the future. If the United States and the Soviet Union are truly concerned about the fate of Korea, surely an acceptable settlement can be found. In the future, whatever the United States does for Korea will affect directly not only Korea but also the entire world.

The Korean peninsula can help to determine the course of American-Soviet relations. The United States must remain alert to all possibilities and dangers inherent in the Korean situation.

American mistakes as well as American successes in Korea are described in this study. While much of the discussion is necessarily historical, it is undertaken with the idea that the evidence presented here can be used as a guide for future policy decisions.

Predictions about human affairs impel us all to draw upon our knowledge and experience of the past in order to deal as effectively as possible with the future. Sound policies must be based upon sound understanding. It is hoped that the evidence

and interpretations presented here might contribute to both, as well as to the fund of knowledge of the scholarly community.

CHAPTER I
GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY, JAPANESE
COLONIZATION AND CAIRO DECLARATION
OF 1943

1. GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION ,

Korea is 85,246 square miles in area and consists of the peninsula -- which projects southeastward from the continent of Asia -- and about two hundred islands, the largest of which is Cheju. The greatest length of the peninsula, north and south, is 512.4 miles and the greatest width, east and west, is 219.4 miles. The coast line is approximately 6,000 miles long. ¹ The most northerly point, near Onsong, lies at 43°2' north latitude; Cheju-do, the southernmost island, reaches as far south as 33°12' north latitude. The easternmost point, near the mouth of the Yalu River, is Maan-do, 124°11' east longitude; the westernmost is Ullung-do, an island in the Sea of Japan, 130°54' east longitude. ²

The land boundary is formed in large part by the Yalu (Amnok-kang) and Tuman rivers which separate Korea from southern Manchuria and eastern Siberia. The Russo-Korean frontier, only 20 miles long, is about 80 miles from Vladivostok. The country is divided into 14 provinces, including the northern half. Each province is subdivided into counties, cities, towns, and districts.

In spite of its small land area, Korea's population is a little more than that of Spain, and ranks thirteenth among the

nations of the world. ³ Before the Korean war the area north of the 38th parallel had an estimated population of 10 million, and the southern area an estimated 20 million, making a total of 30 million for the entire nation. Since liberation from Japan, the population has increased at an annual rate of 5.58 percent. During the ten years, 1929-1939, the net reproduction rate (number of births over deaths per thousand) was 12.14, an increase of some 300,000 a year. The proportion of men to women at the end of 1938 was 103 to 100, placing the total excess of males over females at nearly one-third of a million. ⁴

The increase in population will necessitate birth-control or a corresponding increase in the number of Koreans emigrating to foreign countries. At least one-tenth of all Koreans are already living in other countries. It is estimated that at the present time about 12,000 Koreans are living in the United States (mainly Hawaii and California), half a million in Japan, half a million in China (Manchuria), and a quarter of a million in the Soviet Union (southeastern Siberia). ⁵

The distributions of population of Korean nationals within and outside Korea in 1935 and 1947 are as follows: ⁶

<u>Within Korea</u>	1935 thousand	1947 thousand
Male.....	11,271	14,030
Female.....	10,937	14,029
Total.....	22,208	28,059

<u>Outside Korea</u>	1935 thousand	1947 thousand
Japan.....	600	400
China (mainly Manchuria).....	774	1,000
Siberia.....	175	215
Elsewhere..... (including U.S.A.)	30	21
Total	1,579	1,636
Total Koreans	23,787	29,695

The people of Korea are similar to the peoples of China and Japan. They usually have straight black hair, dark eyes, and olive-brown skins. The people of Korea generally are taller than the Japanese but shorter than the northern Chinese. The Koreans are sometimes called "the white-clothing people" of Asia because they like to wear white.

The Korean language is similar to the Japanese and Chinese languages. It contains ten vowels and fourteen consonants and is written in a simple phonetic script, called Hangul. Until recently, most Koreans used Chinese characters in writing and considered Chinese their national language. Even today, nearly all Korean scholars learn Chinese. Most of the people use a mixture of Chinese and Korean characters in their writings. Since 1945, only the Korean alphabet has been used in school. In a new law issued by the Ministry of Education, the use of Chinese characters is prohibited in official documents.

2. HISTORY

Korean legends say that Tangun, who lived in 2333 B. C., was the father of Korean civilization. Korea developed by itself until Kija, an exile from China, led about 5,000 followers to Korea in 1122 B. C., and founded a kingdom which was called "Chosun." ⁷ Throughout many hundreds of years, Korea remained under Chinese influence. Its civilization was based on Chinese philosophy and literature. ⁸ From about 100 B.C. to the 7th century A.D., there were three separate kingdoms in Korea -- Koryu, Peakje and Sinla. Finally one kingdom succeeded in conquering the other two and ruled the whole peninsula. The name of the combined kingdom was called "Koryu," from which we get the modern name, "Korea."

The civilization of Koryu stood on a high plane for many centuries. It inaugurated the civil service examination for the first time in history, established schools for the education of youth and instituted taxation laws to stabilize national revenue. Bronze coin was used during this age and the art of printing was greatly developed. ⁹

Much of Chinese civilization in Korea was destroyed in the 1200's when the Mongol armies of Genghis Khan and Kublai Khan overran the country. In 1392, Yi Tae-Jo founded a ruling family known as the Li (or Lee) dynasty which controlled Korea for three hundred years. During that time kings of the dynasty maintained close relations with China. In 1592, two hundred years

after the establishment of the Li dynasty, a Japanese invasion, commanded by Hideyoshi Toyotomi, was checked by the brilliant naval victories of Admiral Sun Sin Lee, inventor of the ironclad ship.¹⁰

In 1882, Korea concluded a treaty of amity and commerce with the United States, the first Western nation to enter into a treaty relationship with the Korean kingdom.¹¹ The action was soon followed by similar treaties with Great Britain, Germany and China in 1883 and Italy and Russia in 1884. Korea also concluded a treaty with Japan in 1876.¹²

3. THE CULTURE AND RESOURCES

Korean culture is the outgrowth of one of the oldest civilizations in the world. Two thousand years before the discovery of America, Korea had a well developed civilization, and priceless relics of the arts of these ancient days are exhibited in Korean museums. Korea has made many contributions to world civilization. Among Korean inventions and discoveries are movable printing type, which was used for many years before the Guttenberg Bible was printed in Germany, the magnetic compass and the spinning wheel. An astronomical observatory, first of its kind in the Orient, was built in 634 A. D.¹³

The religious beliefs of Koreans are varied. In addition to the ancient Korean Shamanism, the influences of Buddhism and Confucianism are still strong in Korea today. Christianity has

made great headway, and Korea is indeed the most Christianized country in the Orient. ¹⁴

The basis of the Korean economy is agriculture. Korean rice is esteemed the finest in the world. Large crops of rice, barley and other small grains are the most important agricultural products. ¹⁵ Korea's fisheries are world famous, as the Korean offshore are the meeting places of great ocean currents, both warm and cold. The combination provides abundant food for under-sea life, and Korean fisheries before the war ranked sixth in world production. Due to war damage, fisheries production in Korea has not regained its pre-war levels. Korea contains vast and largely unexploited mineral deposits. Among the more important are tungsten, coal, iron, gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, magnesite and nickel. Full development of these resources, plus the industrialization necessary to process and fabricate the deposits, is necessary for Korea's economic independence. The most serious problem of all is the shortage of electric power. ¹⁶

4. JAPANESE COLONIZATION

Nippon, "the Land of the Rising Sun," has frequently invaded her neighbors and applied all kinds of methods to obtain additional territories. Strategically situated and rich in natural resources, Korea was the first target of the Japanese Empire.

During many centuries, Japan manifested a great interest in subjugating adjacent territories, especially after the Meiji

Restoration of 1868. This Meiji Restoration of 1868 was the beginning of modern Japanese history. In a few crowded years she was transformed from a weak medieval ¹⁷ empire into a modern powerful state. Rapid industrialization by means of state subsidies, together with improvement in agriculture, abolition of feudalism, educational reformation, and the adoption of a parliamentary but autocratic constitution on the Prussian model, changed the structure of the country. The organization of the military machine was copied from the German army and the British navy. These changes enabled the Japanese to bring a long-cherish dream to a reality. The dream was to expand across the continents of the world.

At the same time, Japanese diplomats sought to obtain outside assistance in the event of a new war. In January 1902, these efforts were rewarded by an important alliance with Great Britain, an old competitor of Russia. The Japanese also successfully wooed their giant neighbor across the Pacific, the United States President Theodore Roosevelt assured the Tokyo government he would be benevolent toward Japan in the event of war. ¹⁸

In the summer of 1903, the Japanese brought the matter of the sovereignty and independence of Korea to a head by formally proposing to Russia that the questions of Manchuria and Korea be reopened. The Russians agreed and a conference was quickly convened in St. Petersburg (now Leningrad), Russia. For seven

months, the talks dragged on fruitlessly as each side offered proposals and counterproposals, one of which was a Russian suggestion that a neutral zone be created along the northern border between Korean and Russian territory.

The Japanese grew impatient while the confident Russians continued to procrastinate. In Tokyo a war party, which had been urging decisive action, finally won over the government. On February 3, 1904, the Japanese delegate at St. Petersburg broke off the discussions and departed. Three days later Japan launched her attack on Russian Far Eastern forces. In her declaration of war proclaimed on February 10, Japan charged that the Russians had been threatening the independence of Korea.

The outcome of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05 was even more astounding than that of the Sino-Japanese war of the previous decade. The Russian armies, handicapped at having to defend an unpopulated frontier territory thousands of miles from the center of Russia's population and industry, were soundly defeated by the Japanese, who overwhelmed Port Arthur and Dairen in a series of bloody assaults. In May 1905, the final blow fell in Tsushima Bay. There the Japanese destroyed the Russian Baltic fleet, which had sailed halfway around the world in an effort to save the situation. Japan's tremendous victory over Russia on land and sea signaled the rise of a new world power. In Russia it stirred the revolutionary fever of 1905, the prelude to 1917. It signaled Korea's death knell. ¹⁹

The victory allowed Japan to continue to build a modern state, the foundations of which had been successfully laid on the Western prerequisites of technical power. Japan proceeded to embark on a policy of expansion.

The constant pressure of international power politics after the middle of the nineteenth century also compelled her "to expand in search of the foreign markets so desperately needed to realize the profits which could not be obtained from the narrow market, and in search of cheap essential raw materials which were denied her through the accident of geography." 20

The desire to plunge into conquest was not new to the Japanese, who, being the "Chosen People," always believed in the divine mission of Japan to conquer and rule other countries. Twenty-six hundred years ago, Jimmu Tenno, first Emperor of Japan, is said to have given the divine command "Hakko Ichiu." 21 After the Imperial Restoration, his phrase was revived. Besides, "all through the eighteenth century the supporters of movements for restoration of the Imperial power had consistently coupled with this program for a political revolution at home the idea of aggression and expansion, and this was the policy recommended by such teachers as Shoin Yoshida, who educated the Samurai leaders of the clans that restored the Imperial Power in 1868." 22

The thoughts of new Japan turned once more to the empire which Hideyoshi Toyotomi, often called the Napoleon of Japan, had set out to attain at the end of the sixteenth century.

hideyoshi dreamed of subjugating China, where he planned to send the excess population of Japan to serve as mercantile overlords of a new colonial market. In his reply to a letter from the king of Korea, he said, "Since we cannot live in this world for even one hundred years, how can we continue to confine ourselves in this island? It has long been my ambition to conquer the Ming Dynasty ²³ by way of your country. Our Emperor has expressed gratification at your readiness to establish relations with us by sending a delegate to our nation. I hope you will dispatch troops to help us when we mobilize our forces against the Ming Dynasty." ²⁴ Hideyoshi's plans actually extended far beyond the conquest of China. His aim was to create a great Asiatic Empire out of the lands then known to the Japanese, such as India, Persia, the islands of Liu Chiu (now the Ryukyus), Formosa, the Philippines, and the regions in the South Seas. ²⁵

In 1875, only seven years after the Meiji Restoration, the Kuriles were annexed. Two years later the Bonin Islands were acquired. In 1879 the Ryukyu (Liu Chiu) islands were incorporated into Japan as a prefecture under the name of Okinawa. The Volcano Islands adjoining the Bonin Islands were annexed in 1891. Japan next looked for expansion in the only direction permitted by history and geography, namely the Asiatic mainland, where the western powers had already begun to divide China, the "Sick Man of the Far East," into spheres of influence for themselves. Japan's eyes naturally fell on China's tributary, Korea, for the Korean peninsula was "regarded as a dagger point at Japan's

heart, a source of constant irritation and menace to Japan's security." ²⁶

From the very beginning the American government encouraged the Korean government to establish close relations with outside powers, and for the next ten years (from 1882) the American government actively supported Korean independence. The Western nations as a whole were anxious to get rid of Chinese interest and influence in the Korean peninsula. The British moved ships to a Korean island near the coast and kept them there until China withdrew its forces from Seoul. The Chinese were also forced to agree to permit the Japanese to dispatch troops to Korea in cases of "emergency." This privilege gave the Japanese their starting point in 1894. The Japanese created the necessary "emergency" by declaring war against China with the agreement of the British and American governments. The Chinese likewise returned their troops to Korea. On July 16, 1894, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty was signed. The following day the Tokyo government decided upon final details of military operations and on July 23, Japanese forces seized the Korean royal palace and proclaimed the King's 80-year-old father as Regent. The Regent was forced to sign a "declaration of war" against China and "called up" the Japanese to expel the Chinese. The Japanese promptly responded to this "call" and launched attacks upon the Chinese forces.

In a few months, it was clear that the well prepared Japanese

were decisively superior to the Chinese armies. On November 22, the American government showed its sympathy toward Japan by following the British lead with a revised treaty recognizing the Japanese as virtual "equals" of the western powers -- although the treaty was held up for a time by heated discussion in the U.S. Senate of the wholesale massacre of surrendered Chinese soldiers at Port Arthur and some senators denounced the Japanese as "blood-thirsty savages." 27

In the peace treaty with China, Japan gained China's acquiescence to the maintenance of Japanese troops in Korea. General Miura became the Japanese minister at Seoul. One of the most significant turning points in Korean history was reached when Japan was allowed to remain in Korea.

Queen Min of Korea, resenting the growing power of the Japanese, worked steadily to protect Korea's independence. She and her followers organized an anti-Japanese group. The Japanese attempted to remove the Korean anti-Japanese movements by diplomacy, by threats, and by bribery, but they never succeeded. Finally, General Miura ordered her killed. Japanese troops on the night of October 8, 1895, attacked the palace, overcame the queen's bodyguard, and guarded the entrance while a group of Japanese assassins went inside. The queen fled but the murderers pursued her and hacked her to death with swords. They dumped her body into a well and early next morning burned it under a pine tree in the palace court. 28

The Japanese vigorously pursued policies aimed at making Korea a colony. Opposition was ruthlessly suppressed. Finally, the Japanese gained virtual control of the main branches of Korean administration. An American agent of Tokyo was named adviser on foreign matters. With this control achieved, Japan's power in Korea was further intensified. The Japanese seized for "war purposes" great stretches of Korean land.²⁹ Korea became a colony of the Japanese empire after formal annexation in 1910.

Immediately after annexation, Korea was placed under the supervision of the Overseas East Asia Ministry, but in November 1942, upon the establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry, Korea was united with Japan proper and responsibility was transferred to the Home Ministry.³⁰

As a result of Japanese annexation of Korea, Japan emerged as the strongest power in Asia and the world accepted the absorption of Korea. But although Korea's international status had ended, the Koreans themselves could not easily forget their ancient kingdom. Many Korean patriots, in and out of Korea, kept alive the dream of independence. Among them were two outstanding personalities, Syngman Rhee and the famed Koo Kim, who proceeded to organize an underground movement to resist Japanese rule. Both embarked on an almost forty-year exile, Rhee spending much of this time in the United States, where he obtained a Ph.D. degree and pleaded his country's cause,³¹ and

Kim living in China.

After Woodrow Wilson attained the Presidency of the United States and proclaimed his famous "Fourteen Points" in January, 1918, near the end of World War I, Rhee was inspired to take vigorous steps to attain his country's freedom. He conceived the idea of a nationwide, non-violent Korean movement to demonstrate to the world that, despite thirteen years of Japanese rule, Korea yearned for independence and self-determination. Early in 1919, after winning Koo Kim's agreement to his plan, Rhee dispatched a message to the Korean underground; ³²

President Wilson of the United States has proclaimed a fourteen point program of world peace. One of these points is the self-determination of peoples. You must make the most of this situation. Your voice must be heard. President Wilson will certainly help.

The Japanese colonial government, which was set up after the annexation in 1910, was based on a highly organized bureaucracy, with a Governor-General "at the apex of Korea's pyramid of power." ³³ "Although the post of Governor-General after 1919 was technically open to all, the office in fact was never occupied by a civilian." ³⁴ An important feature of the colonial administration in Korea, as in Japan's other possessions, was "the virtual monopoly by Japanese of administrative positions on the higher levels ... more than 80 percent of the highest ranking officials (Chokunin and Shonin), 60 percent of the intermediary rank (Hannin), and about 50 percent of the clerks,

secretaries and minor employees were Japanese." ³⁵ The Koreans were mostly appointed in the lower ranks of the administration.

The Koreans hardly accepted with equanimity their subjection to Japanese rule and the colonial power had to govern the peninsula until 1919 by military force and martial law. The Japanese suppressed all political organization. The outbreak of the independence movement, following the presentation to the Japanese authorities of a Declaration of Independence on March 1, 1919, signed by 33 leading Korean nationalists, ³⁶ resulted in further severe measures by the colonial authorities, as a result of which many Koreans had to take shelter abroad. In Chungking, China and Washington (where a Korean Commission was newly established to serve as a diplomatic agency of the exiled Korean Republic), the movement was particularly active. ³⁷ In March 1942, a Liberty Conference was held in Washington for the purpose of gaining diplomatic action on behalf of Korea, and the Korean cause gained considerable sympathy and encouragement from many quarters. ³⁸

National movements were taking place internally and externally throughout the structure of the Japanese colonial government which existed in Korea. The Japanese tried to suppress the Korean nationalist movement, but failed. They could not destroy the Korean national spirit. A self-styled Korean Provisional Government established itself in exile in Shanghai and remained in existence until Korea's liberation from Japan in 1945. But

Japanese domination "did succeed in suppressing Korean leadership and in weakening the latent capacities of the Koreans for assuming responsibility in the government of their country," ³⁹ and hence Korea remained "politically immature, according to Western standards." It was in view of this that the Cairo Declaration of December, 1943 provided that Korea "in due course shall become free and independent," ⁴⁰ but not immediately.

During thirty-six years of Japanese colonization in Korea, the Japanese started schools in which Japanese history and literature were prominent. ⁴¹ The teaching of Korean history and literature was suppressed. All Korean names were changed to Japanese words. Korea was named "Chosen" and the old capital, Seoul, became known as Keijo. It should also be remembered that much of the development of Korea was effected solely to serve the colonial interests of Japan.

The annexation of Korea was followed by a period of extreme rice shortage in the home land of Japan, and the peninsula "was developed as a rice bowl for Japan." ⁴² Rice production was, therefore, enormously increased under a 30-year-plan applied by the Japanese. The result was that by the early 1930's Japan had succeeded, with the aid of Korean and Formosan rice, in making herself self-supporting in her staple foodstuff. ⁴³ Because much of Korean rice was exported to Japan, the Koreans were forced to cut down on their rice consumption and to import millet from Manchuria. The following statement may serve as evidence of

this fact: "Per capita domestic consumption in the five-year period 1931-35 was 45 percent lower than that in the years 1916-20. Yet in the same period the percentage of the rice exported to Japan had increased from 14 percent to 48 percent." 44 Besides rice, cultivation of cotton and tobacco as cash crops for export was also increased. Korea was responsible for almost all the cotton grown in the Japanese Empire. Ginseng, a distinctively Korean crops, was cultivated as a government monopoly in the north, mainly for export to south China where it was much valued for medical purposes. 45

James H. Shoemaker, an outstanding student of the Korean economy, makes the following statement regarding Japan's economic policy in Korea: 46

After the defeat of Russia in 1905 Japan embarked on a policy of economic penetration into Manchuria which paralleled her program in Korea. The spearhead of this policy was the South Manchurian Railroad, which became much more than a railroad and eventually controlled factories, mines, shipping concerns, distributive organizations, and even farm lands. The Korean counterparts of the S.M.R. were (a) the Oriental Development Company, a many-sided officially controlled corporation for implementing Japan's exploitation of Korea and (b) the Korean Railway system which was closely integrated with the development and operation of the S.M.R. These organs, together with Japan's shipping concerns, constituted the primary instruments for welding Manchuria, Korea, and Japan to a single economy. The steps in the development of the empire economy were methodical and eminently successful.

As we have seen above, Japanese development in Korea was designed to promote Nippon's military program, and Korea's resources were utilized to serve Japan's domestic and foreign trade.

All foreign trade was controlled by a Japanese trust, and Japanese monopolies were in charge of finance, agriculture, transportation, shipping, industry, fisheries, and marketing and distributive systems. Koreans were in no way permitted to deal directly with foreign concerns. Because technicians and administrators were Japanese, Koreans were generally uninformed about all matters pertaining to the management of foreign trade, which was centered in Tokyo. 47

In addition, Korea was controlled by Japan through control of investments and through the operation of the Bank of Chosen, which was an official bank of issue of Japanese currency and the single most effective instrument by which fiscal policies of the Japanese government were carried out in the peninsula.

Despite Japanese repression in Korea, the Korean people made some significant advances during the period. For example, in the field of literacy and education, the Korean people at the end of the Japanese occupation possessed the prerequisites for building a sound democracy and were far in advance of their status in 1910, as described by G. M. McCune. 48

Japanese policy toward Korea during the period of 1910-45 makes it abundantly clear that the pivot of colonial administration was the principle of centralized autocratic bureaucracy on the model of the "mother" country. Economic exploitation of Korea through the frame-work of the Japanese monopolistic economy for the benefit of Japan appears to have been a dominant element.

This however, was coordinated with the material development of Korea so far as it was consistent with Japan's own interests. The promotion of emigration, the elimination of foreign influence, and the cultural domination of the subject races, with the ulterior objective of Japanization and assimilation, were the other chief characteristics of Japanese policy.

In short, the Japanese colonial control in Korea passed through several stages of development, each of which was significant in establishing certain institutions and procedures. In the first decade, 1910-1920, the Japanese created the administrative machinery of control and set the pattern of colonial exploitation, in the second decade, 1930-1940, the Japanese overlords built up the colony to feed their growing war machine by accelerating the rate of economic exploitation and of political suppression, and during the war years Korea was turned into an armed camp.

After the surrender of Japan in 1945, the Government-in-Exile was dissolved. The Korean independence movement had developed mature leaders, although the Japanese had suppressed Korean leadership and had weakened the latent capacities of Koreans for assuming responsibility in governing their country. ⁴⁹ Korean nationalism was, however, greatly strengthened as well as modernized by the ordeal of overlordship. A reservoir of patriotism was built up under Japanese rule and was consequently ready to be tapped at the moment of liberation.

Hope for freedom swelled in every Korean breast. Today her

people, in their hours of trial and adversity, have faith that they will some day have a united and independent country.

5. THE CAIRO DECLARATION OF 1943. 50

The Cairo Declaration that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent," made by the chiefs of state of the United States, the United Kingdom and China on December 1, 1943, was reaffirmed at Potsdam on July 26, 1945, and later endorsed by the Soviet Union when it declared war against Japan on August 8, 1945. Thus, before surrender of Japan, four principal powers publicly supported the cause of Korean independence.

In the earlier American foreign policy toward post-World War II Korea, the United States avoided tendering an official recognition of the Provisional Government of Korea. The reasons were given in a statement by Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew on June 8, 1945, referring to Korean participation in the United Nations conference as follows: 51

...The United Nations which are represented at the United Nations conference on International Organization all have legally constituted governing authorities whereas the "Korean Provisional Government" and other Korean organizations do not possess at the present time the qualifications requisite for obtaining recognition by the United States as a governing authority. The "Korean Provisional Government" has never exercised administrative authority over any part of Korea, nor can it be regarded as representative of the Korean people of today. Due to geographical and other factors its following even among exiled Koreans is inevitably limited. It is the policy of this government in dealing with groups such as the "Korean Provisional Government" to avoid taking action which might, when the victory of the United Nations is achieved, tend to

compromise the right of the Korean people to choose the ultimate form and personnel of the government which they may wish to establish.

The qualifying phrase "in due course" in the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, gave cause for considerable concern to the Koreans, who were looking forward to immediate independence. The Korean problem was subsequently taken up at Yalta in February, 1945, where it was suggested that Korea might best be considered a trusteeship of the sort envisaged in the proposed United Nations Charter. At the time, the United States presented the view that Korea should become a multi-power trusteeship, if such plans materialized. Russia concurred, but no commitments were made at the time.⁵² After the death of President Roosevelt and the San Francisco meeting of the United Nations, the indefinite understanding at Yalta was clarified by negotiation. Stalin agreed with the United States, in a conversation with Harry Hopkins in May, 1945, on a short-term four-power trusteeship.⁵³ The Soviet agreement on these points was kept secret in view of the fact that Russia had not yet declared war against Japan. When the Soviet Union declared war against Japan, on August 8, 1945, it announced its adherence to the Potsdam Declaration, which included reference to the Cairo Declaration, a step which was, in effect, a public announcement of Russian support of Korean independence.⁵⁴

Finally, on August 15, 1945, Korea was liberated when the Japanese surrendered to the World War II Allies. Long-sought freedom was not immediately restored to the suffering Koreans

when the Japanese were ousted from the country which they had occupied for thirty-six years. After Japanese surrender to the World War II Allies, military occupation of Korea in two separate zones had already become an accomplished fact, with the entry of Russian combat troops into North Korea on August 10 and of American troops into South Korea on September 8, 1945. As expressed by Secretary of State James S. Byrnes, "For purposes of military operations the occupation of Korea was divided north and south of latitude 38 into Soviet and American areas." 55

Though the international pledge brought an end to Japanese control in Korea, the country was divided into two separate zones and an American Military Government began to govern South Korea.

FOOTNOTES

1. Kyung Cho Chung, Korea Tomorrow: Land of the Morning Calm, New York, The MacMillan Co., 1956, p. 6.
2. The Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. XIV, New York, 1957, p. 522.
3. Information Please Almanac, 1953, p. 652.
4. Annual Report on Administration of Tyosen 1938-39, Seoul, Government-General of Chosen, 1939, p. 12.
5. G. B. Cressey, Asia's Lands and Peoples, New York, McGraw-Hill Co., 1951, p. 233.
6. Korean Economic Mission, Department of State, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1947.
7. Chosen or Chosun which means, literally, "Land of the Morning Calm."
8. Colonel Donald Portway, Korea: Land of the Morning Calm, London, George G. Harrap & Co., Ltd., 1953, p. 30.
9. Korea, Seoul, Office of Public Information, 1953, p. 11.
10. The World Book Encyclopedia, Chicago, 1957, Vol. X. p. 4200b.
11. Korea: Her History and Culture, Seoul, Office of Public Information, 1953, p. 75.
12. Ibid., p. 75.
13. Kyung Cho Chung, Korea Tomorrow, op. cit., p. 76.
14. G. M. McCune and A. L. Grey, Jr., Korea Today, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1950, pp. 8-16.
15. The World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1957, New York World Telegram, 1957, pp. 424-5.
16. Kyung Hyang Shinmun, July 19, 1956. It is published in Korean and is a daily newspaper in Seoul, Korea.
17. The medieval period of Japanese history lasted about three hundred years, from the middle of the 16th century. During this period, Japan was theoretically governed by an Emperor and practically by the Samurai.
18. Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War, New York, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1925, p. 27.
19. Carl Berger, The Korea Knot: A Military Political History, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957, pp. 24-5.
20. E. H. Norman, Japan's Emergence as a Modern State, Institute of Pacific Relations, New York, 1946, p. 197.
21. Hakko Ichiu means the eight corners of the world under one Japanese roof. This motto was used frequently, especially after Japan declared war against the United States in 1941.
22. J. Toynbee and F. T. Ashton-Gwtkin, Survey of International Affairs, 1939-46; The World in March 1939, London, Oxford University Press, 1952, p. 118.
23. The Ming Dynasty played a very important role in foreign affairs especially with Western countries. Korea was influenced by the Ming Dynasty more than any other country in the world during that particular period. The Ming Dynasty here indicates China as a whole.

24. Quoted in John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Documents on International Affairs, 1932, London, Oxford University Press, 1933, p. 358.
25. Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, Vol. 1. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1937, p. 143.
26. R. Hidemich Akagi, Japan's Foreign Relations 1542-1936, Tokyo, Kokusendo Press, 1936, p. 113.
27. Korea: Her History and Culture, op. cit., p. 77.
28. Ibid., p. 78.
29. Ibid., p. 80.
30. G. M. McCune and A. L. Grey Jr., op. cit., p. 23.
31. For information about Dr. Syngman Rhee, see Chapter II of this thesis.
32. Louise Yim, My Forty Year Fight For Korea, New York, A. A. Wyn, 1951, p. 30.
33. McCune, op. cit., p. 23.
34. H. F. MacNair and D. F. Lach, Modern Far Eastern International Relations, D. van Nostrand Co., Inc., New York, 1950, p. 623.
35. McCune, op. cit., p. 25.
36. See appendix for Declaration of Independence, March 1, 1919.
37. See Chapter II for more details.
38. Korea: Her History and Culture, op. cit., pp. 96-7.
39. McCune, op. cit., p. 28.
40. K. C. Chung, Korea Tomorrow, op. cit., p. 303.
41. Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 13, Encyclopedia Britannica, Ltd., London, 1951, p. 448.
42. L. K. Rosinger and Associates, The State of Asia, New York, Alfred A. Knopf for the American Institute of Pacific Relations, 1953, p. 131.
43. "Korea Past and Present," The World Today, April, 1946, p. 190.
44. McCune, op. cit., p. 36.
45. Chambers' Encyclopaedia, Vol. 8. George Newnes, Ltd., London, 1950, p. 257.
46. J. H. Shoemaker, Notes on Korea's Postwar Economic Position, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947, p. 6.
47. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
48. McCune, op. cit., p. 27.
49. G. M. McCune, Korea's Postwar Political Problems, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947, p. 6.
50. The text: "The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land, and air. The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as

Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. THE AFORESAID THREE GREAT POWERS, MINDFUL OF THE ENSLAVEMENT OF THE PEOPLE OF KOREA, ARE DETERMINED THAT IN DUE COURSE KOREA SHALL BECOME FREE AND INDEPENDENT. "With these objects in view, the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.

"Signed: Franklin D. Roosevelt
 Winston Churchill
 Chiang Kai-shek"

(Capitalized passage is not in original text. For additional details see K. C. Chung, Korea Tomorrow, op. cit., p. 303.) Reproduced in Donald F. Tewksbury, comp., Source Materials on Korean Politics and Ideologies, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950, pp.48-50.

51. Statement by Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, Washington D.C. Press Release, Government Printing Office, June 8, 1945.
52. McCune, Korea's Postwar Political Problems, op. cit., p. 8.
53. G. Schwarzenberger, Power Politics, New York, Praeger, 1951, p. 418, see also W. H. McNeill, "America, Britain, and Russia," Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946, Vol. III, London, Oxford University Press, 1953, pp. 586. 620.
54. McCune, op. cit., p. 8.
55. Department of State Bulletin, December 30, 1945, p. 1035.

CHAPTER II
AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT
IN KOREA, 1945-48

In Korean eyes, official Washington made a great mistake in its policy even before the ending of World War II. Some Koreans feel that American high-policy makers in Washington, as well as military leaders of the United States, should have known that the war was nearly ended when the atomic bomb was dropped over Japan. Japan's war allies -- Germany and Italy -- had surrendered long before the Japanese imperialists announced their own unconditional surrender. These Koreans feel that the American officials should have estimated when the Japanese would surrender. American planners perhaps knew that the Japanese had not yet completed their own atomic bomb. Policy-makers in the United States probably presumed that American science, technology, and combat methods were further advanced than the Japanese. America, according to some Koreans, should have been confident of victory over the Japanese when the United States troops began to take over Japanese-occupied territories throughout the Pacific.

There is little published evidence to show the Americans planned to occupy Italy, Germany and Japan after they surrendered to the Allies. Almost no study or preparation was made by the United States to settle the Korean problem, despite the fact that America showed great concern over Korea early in the twentieth century. Carl J. Friedrich has described early American Military

Government operations in Korea as follows: ¹

This is essentially a story of improvisation. Korea, the one country in the Pacific Theater over which a real military government was established, was the only important area occupied by American troops in the Pacific for which some study or preparations had not been made. There was almost a complete lack of training and preparation for military government for Korea. This is not the place to inquire what dictates of high policy in Washington repeatedly prohibited the study of Korea in army schools...

The fact is that only a few military government officers were given any appreciation of conditions in Korea, and they were trained in the last two classes at the school of Military Government, which began two months after the Japanese surrender...

Starting with the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945, ² the United States Military Government played an important role until Korea's independence in 1948. These three years were used for experimentation in administering a nation which had lost sovereign international status forty years before the landing of American Military Government forces.

1. BACKGROUND OF OCCUPATION

Russian combat troops entered northern Korea on August 10, 1945, and United States occupation troops entered southern Korea on September 8, 1945. When the columns of the Soviet First Eastern Army marched into Korea from bases near Vladivostok in August, 1945, they were enthusiastically greeted by the Koreans. Troops of the United States Seventh Infantry Division, XXIV Corps, which landed at the west-coast port of Inchon in September, 1945, received similar greetings by the South Koreans.

Upon arrival, the military leaders of the United States and Soviet Union agreed that Soviet troops would accept the Japanese surrender north of the thirty-eighth parallel and American troops would accept the surrender south of it. The line of demarcation was intended to be a temporary device to fix responsibility between the United States and the Soviet Union for carrying out the Japanese surrender,³ but the temporary line was interpreted by the Soviet occupation authorities as creating a permanent delineation between two military zones. As time went on, the zonal division hardened all phases of Korean life into two separate patterns.

As soon as the Korean people realized that the United States and the Soviet Union apparently intended to make the thirty-eighth parallel a permanent division, the Korean people became greatly concerned over their country's future. In the following three years of occupation, the two powers demonstrated that their activities in Korean affairs were influenced by bitter disagreement between themselves. This pattern followed the tradition of earlier international rivalries which has been so largely responsible for the destruction of Korean independence. The author believes that if both powers had sincerely wanted Korea unified they could have accomplished the unification under one central government.

2. AMERICAN MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN ACTION

Shortly after the arrival of the American forces in Seoul, Korea, on September 8, 1945, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge

took over command from General Nobuyuki Abe, the Japanese Governor-General of Korea. ⁴ General Hodge was assigned the following missions in South Korea by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers: ⁵

1. Take the Japanese surrender, disarm the Japanese armed forces, enforce the terms of the surrender, and remove effects of Japanese imperialism from Korea.
2. Maintain order, establish an effective government along democratic lines, and rebuild a sound economy as a basis for Korean independence.
3. Train Koreans in handling their own affairs and prepare Korea to govern itself as a free and independent nation.

In spite of the order from Washington, General Hodge announced that the "existing Japanese administration would continue in office temporarily to facilitate the occupation." ⁶ The reason given was that "the XXIV Corps had a long record of combat in the Philippines and Okinawa, where it had been accustomed to working with Military Government units, but it had no experience in discharging civil affairs functions during the post-combat stage, and no conception of the problems to be faced in Korea." ⁷ As the present author indicated previously, American occupation forces had had little or no briefing on the Korean assignment, and had little information available on which to base it. The first attempts to provide a measure of Korean participation in the formulation of Military Government policies were unsuccessful. The policy statements provided General Hodge were "so sparse, vague,

and ambiguous, that he was required to feel his way at every step." ⁸

Despite the many difficulties that arose, General Hodge started out by rejecting the newly-organized Korean Republic Party which had been set up before American entry into the country. After abolishing all former political parties, he declared martial law and Military Government to be the sole authority until a new system of political parties more faithfully representing the people could be set up. Meanwhile, official Washington's attitudes toward the peninsula were shaped and modified largely by policies of the resident Military Government.

American Military Government operations were made difficult because of (1) lack of precedents in the situation, (2) a dearth of information about the problems and (3) the absence of experience on the part of the governors. In addition to these, there were language difficulties, cultural differences, and the continual necessity to act independently, without the sanction of higher authority.

Of special significance to the first year of Military Government in Korea was the policy briefing given by headquarters in Tokyo, which colored the views of civil affairs personnel in their attitude toward the Korean people and toward their objectives. In a conference to decide settlement of Korean civil affair, G-5 staffs of General Douglas MacArthur gave the impression that one of the principal missions of Military Government in Korea was

"to form a bulwark against communism." ⁹ This caused considerable excitement and speculation. A few days later, the senior officer who had been present at this conference, attempted to modify this impression by declaring, "...It was not the intention to give the impression that the United States Military Government intends to compete with the Soviet Union." ¹⁰

This did not constitute a retraction of what had been previously stated, and the interpretation made by civil affairs personnel apparently was that this was merely an attempt to mitigate an earlier indiscretion, a view confirmed by some who had been present at the policy briefing. A complementary objective, never modified, was "to see that the southern area is democratized." ¹¹ This sustained the impression given by the "bulwark" clause and produced an emotional reaction against Korean liberalism.

The policies of the United States should be examined against the background of the stated aims and goals. With respect to Korea, the State Department of the United States declared in August, 1946, that "the fundamental objectives of occupation policy ... aim, simply, toward the eventual reconstruction of political life... on a peaceful and democratic basis." ¹² American Military Government personnel alone could not carry out the above listed aim and objectives satisfactorily, because of their unfamiliarity with the functioning of the political and social institutions. The author believes the American Military Government in Korea was not wholly accepted by social leaders and political party leaders in its

earlier stage because the Korean people had been under Japanese rule for four decade and they were unfamiliar with Western political behavior. In time, however, the American, as well as the Korean experiment, developed more in accordance with the general aim.

3. KOREAN POLITICAL PARTIES

Soon after American military forces arrived in Korea, the "Korean people's Republic" was reorganized. It had been originally created on the initiative of the Japanese. Korean leaders, headed by Woonhyung Lyuh, and including a large number of patriots released from Japanese prison cells after the surrender, called upon the Korean people for moderation. They organized local committees to preserve order and they convened a national congress in Seoul, attended by representatives from all parts of Korea. On September 6, 1945, the congress proclaimed the "People's Republic." In North Korea these local committees were being formed with the sanction of the Russian occupying forces. The revolutionary character of the people's committees was obviously in keeping with Soviet policy. ¹⁷

The Lyuh group insisted it was a legitimate government, but on October 10, 1945, General Hodge's military governor, Major General A. V. Arnold, issued a statement to the Korean press that "there is only one government in Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude. It is the government created in accordance with

the proclamations of General MacArthur, the general orders of Lieutenant General Hodge and the Civil Administration orders of the Military Governor" 18

Lyuh announced he was leaving the People's Republic organization to form a new political grouping which he called the Korean People's Party. His departure left the "Republic" in the hands of its more radical members. Their defiance reached a peak after General Hodge formally requested they drop the title "Republic" and assume the conventional role of a political party. The group, at a three-day meeting beginning November 20, 1945, ignored the army commander's request. On December 12, 1945, Hodge publicly denounced the organization, stating that a continuation of its activities as a government was unlawful and that his occupation forces would take the necessary steps against it. 19

A second important leftist political organization which troubled the American command was the Korean Communist Party, a small but powerful group which the Americans believed to be controlled by Moscow through the Soviet consulate in Seoul. 20 One of the major objectives of South Korean Communists was to discredit the Military Government and to arouse opposition to the Americans. In order to counteract the Communist influence the American command strengthened the rightist elements. As a result of the mass Communist movements, the United States Military Government began to support both the Democratic Party and the Nationalist Party. These organizations were generally

cooperative in the early stages of the American occupation. The Democratic Party, on September 16, 1945, held a meeting in Seoul and named three famous Korean expatriates -- Dr. Rhee, Dr. Philip Jaisohn²¹ and Koo Kim -- as their leaders.²²

Threats were also used by the American Military Government in efforts to suppress the Communist elements. As a result of the attempted suppression, mass Communist demonstrations and riots took place throughout South Korea from September 30 to October 2, 1946. A railroad strike was the first attempt to destroy the existing American Military Government; the second was the attempted overthrow of the newly organized local police and provincial governments. At the time of the demonstrations and riots, the present writer lived in the city of Taegu, where many policemen and other government officials were killed.

When the uprising began, the Military Government authorized and officially distributed arms and weapons to the Korean policemen. Koreans call this unexpected event, "Shipil-Sakun," which means 10-1 or October the 1st. The 10-1 incident caused the Korean people to begin an anti-Communist campaign. After the policemen were equipped with weapons, they began to arrest alleged Communist leaders. There is no information on how many were arrested, but the result was that the Communist Party formally abolished itself.

In addition, "as the result of activities prejudicial to law and order, the arrest of Pak Heunyoung, Lee Kankook and Lee

Chuhu, was ordered." ²³ At the same time, in September and October, 1946, the Military Government suspended publication of all extreme left-wing newspapers and other publications for persistent violation of ordinances prohibiting the inciting of revolt. But combined efforts of the American military detective agencies and the newly organized Korean police could not eliminate all of the existing Communist elements and movements.

Finally a third general round-up of Communists took place in August 1947. Prior to the convening of the Joint Commission of the United Nations to discuss the Korean election, rightist elements had been circumscribed in their anti-Soviet activities, but on July 10, 1947, the ban forbidding mass demonstrations against the Moscow agreement was removed. Violence flared into the open almost immediately. Terrorist bands of the right, with the apparent collusion of the Korean police, immediately began an anti-Communist campaign. Woohyung Lyuh, former head of the People's Republic, was the first victim of the reign of terror. He was assassinated on July 19 on a Seoul street in broad daylight and in sight of a police box. ²⁴

The American Military Government policy of suppressing "leftists" is understandable when it is viewed as protection for the South Korean people. It was the most significant policy ever made by the American Military Government in Korea. Not all observers approved the policy, however. Mr. Roger M. Baldwin, Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, on his return from a visit

to Korea during the summer of 1947, wrote a severe indictment of United States methods. He stated, "We offered no constructive demonstration of democracy for its own sake as a counter-lure to Communism; ... by nurturing the police state we drive moderates into the Communist camp ..." ²⁵

General Hodge maintained a formally neutral position on Korean politics. ²⁶ But, as one observer put it, "It was no secret that he favored the right and was anxious for the parties of the right to acquire strong popular support." ²⁷

4. STEPS TOWARD KOREAN SELF-GOVERNMENT

As early as December 1947, two years after the American Military Government was established in the southern zone of Korea, certain South Korean political groups were seriously considering calling a joint conference of North and South Korean leaders to discuss the reunification of the country. Dr. Kiuse Kim, Mr. Koo Kim, and Mr. Woonhong Lyuh became actively engaged in promoting such a plan. ²⁸ After the United Nations Temporary Commission which was created in 1947, agreed to observe elections in South Korea, the North Korea People's Committee invited many of the political leaders in South Korea ²⁹ to attend a coalition conference in Pyongyang ³⁰ to discuss the formation of a government. This invitation immediately drew the fire of the American command and of most of the southern rightist elements, who denounced it as a Soviet attempt to seize countrywide power. Despite such oppo-

sition, more than fifty political leaders in South Korea attended the conference. No agreement and no result was reported in that conference.

As time went on, despite personnel handicaps, progressive measures were taken to transfer more authority to the Koreans. On August 31, 1948, General Hodge requested the Military Governor, ³¹ Major General A. L. Lerch, to turn over operation of the various government departments to Koreans, leaving the American personnel in an advisory capacity. Koreans were given responsibility on a policymaking level, in order to obtain support for the Military Government at a time when its popularity had reached a low ebb. On February 14, the Representative Democratic Council, an all-Korean body, was created to act in an advisory capacity to the commanding general. Dr. Syngman Rhee was chairman, Koo Kim and Kiung Kim were vice chairmen of the group. Because most of the appointees were Rightists, with the exception of Woonhong Lyuh and a few others, leading liberals did not lend their support. The subsequent failure of this body brought adverse criticism and injured American prestige. Critics likened the Council to the similar Central Advisory Council employed during the Japanese occupation. ³²

Before they turned over operation of the various government departments to Koreans, American Military Government authorities established the administration along democratic lines. Korean administrative heads were established in the judiciary, the

executive, and the legislative branches. On February 10, 1947, Chai Hong Ahn was sworn in as civil administrator, and Yong Mo Kim became Chief Justice of the Korean Supreme Court, head of the Judiciary. Dr. Kiusic Kim, Chairman of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly, made the principal congratulatory address. The name "South Korean Interim Government" was formally adopted on May 17, 1947.³³ Nevertheless, the responsibility vested in the American authorities was difficult to reconcile with the Korean bureaucracy which was to administer the government. Some Korean officials expressed dissatisfaction with the limitations placed upon their positions. In July 1947, there were 3,233 American military and civilian personnel and approximately 40,000 Koreans in the employ of the Military Government.³⁴

United States forces were not entirely uninformed of the official attitude the Military Government adopted toward the Republic. Standard operating procedure for civil affairs as of 1947 clearly states:³⁵

Neither local political personalities nor organized political group, however sound in sentiment, should have any part in determining the policies of military government. Civil affairs officers should avoid any commitments to, or negotiating with, any local political elements except by directions from higher authority.

This was the procedure ordered for normal Military Government operations taking place in an enemy area. Korea was, however, a friendly liberated state, and the Americans had ostensibly come to the peninsula to help the Koreans from the type of government

desired by the people. The situation for the tactical force was confused but their position was clarified when President Truman in a public statement on September 18 intimated that these efforts of Korea to establish immediate de facto independence were to be disregarded. He said: 36

The assumption by the Koreans themselves of the responsibilities and functions of a free and independent nation ... will of necessity require time and patience. The goal is in view, but its speedy attainment will require the joint efforts of the Korean people and the Allies.

Meanwhile, the United States government and its Military Government in South Korea made efforts to bring about Korea's unification by means of peaceful negotiations. Again and again official of the United States and Soviet Russia exchanged letters on unification of the divided country, but Russia opposed the United States proposals. On May 20, 1947, the Joint Commission reconvened in Seoul for its second and final effort to unify the peninsula. As the new discussions got under-way, the American delegation began to hope that an agreement was at hand. By early July, however, this hope was shattered when the Soviet delegation suddenly reverted to its old position, rejecting all consultations with those Koreans who had expressed opposition to the Moscow agreement. After repeated failures of the Joint Commission, the American and Soviet commands moved further and further apart. The thirty-eighth parallel became an impassable boundary line between the South and the North.

5. THE UNITED NATIONS TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON KOREA

Convinced that unification and independence of Korea could not be achieved through further negotiations in the Joint Commission, the United States, in August 1947, proposed to the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and China that "the four powers adhering to the Moscow agreement consider how that agreement may be speedily carried out." The United States also proposed that elections be held in Korea -- South and North -- under the guidance of the United Nations for the formation of a provisional legislature and government. China and the United Kingdom accepted the American proposal, but the Soviet Union rejected it.

On September 17, 1947, the United States informed the Soviet Union of its intention to refer the problem to the forth-coming session of the General Assembly of the United Nations as the only course remaining to achieve Korean independence.³⁷ In his address before the General Assembly on September 17, 1947, Secretary Marshall introduced the subject of Korea and notified the Assembly of United States intention to present the problem at the session. On September 23 the American resolution was placed on the agenda; on October 17 a formal presentation was made by Ambassador Warren R. Austin; on November 5 the political and Security Committee voted 46 to 0 for the creation of a United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea to expedite the moves toward independence; and on November 14 the General Assembly adopted the resolution by a vote of 43 to 0. In the deliberations of the United Nations,

the Soviet Union and its satellites objected vigorously to the American plan, first on grounds that elections in "occupied" Korea would not be a true reflection of the Korean will, and next that Korean delegates should be heard first by the United Nations before the plan was adopted. Finally, the Soviets declared that the Korean problem was not an appropriate question to come before the United Nations and that the Soviet Union could not accept the decision reached. The Soviet bloc then boycotted the voting. ³⁸

Despite the Russian opposition, the United Nations General Assembly recommended that the two occupying powers hold elections in their respective zones not later than March 31, 1948, under the observation of the United Nations, "as the initial step leading to the creation of a National Assembly and the establishment of a National Government of Korea." Two main issues emerged from the discussions by the First Committee on October 28, 1947: (1) participation of elected representatives of the Korean people in the discussion, and (2) withdrawal of United States and Soviet troops from Korea. ³⁹

The United Nations resolution emphasized the formation of a national government for United Korea. The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea held its first meeting in Seoul, Korea, on January 12, 1948. ⁴⁰ The Commission sent official communications to the military commanders in North Korea and South Korea. The American commander in South Korea answered the communication immediately, but the Russian commander in North Korea refused to

accept it. ⁴¹ Following the failure of the Commission to gain entry into North Korea or even to establish any contact with the Soviet authority, the Commission consulted with the Interim Committee of the U.N. General Assembly (popularly known as the Little Assembly). The opinion of the delegates to the Little Assembly was that the recommendations of the General Assembly were clear, and that if existing conditions made it impossible to hold elections for a national government in both North and South Korea, it would nevertheless be possible to hold such elections in South Korea alone. These elections, sponsored by the United States, were to be held on May 10, 1948, in South Korea. ⁴²

6. MAY 10, 1948, ELECTION IN SOUTH KOREA.

From early in February, 1948, the Communists, acting under instructions from Soviet-occupied North Korea, had embarked on an intensive campaign of terrorism to obstruct the May elections and force the United Nations Commission to leave Korea. Their campaign was completely ineffective, however,

As a result of the election on May 10, 1948, no party received a clear-cut majority. Dr. Rhee's party, the National Association for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence, won fifty-five seats; the Korean Democratic party, twenty-eight seats; the Taedong Youth Group, twelve; the National Youth Corps, six; and the Taehan Labor League, two. Ten individuals were single representatives of minor parties and eighty-five were elected as inde-

Pendents. These independents constituted the bulk of the new Assembly, thus creating fluctuating support for the major parties. The two strongest parties were rightist, but they did not amalgamate, chiefly because of personality factors. ⁴³

For their first democratic election, 80 per cent of the eligible voters in South Korea were registered and an estimated 92.5 per cent of these reportedly cast their ballots. ⁴⁴ The elected representatives convened as the National Assembly for the first time on May 31, 1948, and elected Syngman Rhee as Chairman. In his inaugural speech Dr. Rhee expressed regret that the Koreans in the North had not been permitted by the Soviet Union to participate in the United Nations-sponsored free elections, and directed attention to the fact that seats proportionate in number to the northern population had been left vacant for the later participation of the people in the northern zone.

A primary task on the legislative agenda of the National Assembly was the drafting of a constitution for the Republic of Korea. Professor Chin O Yu drew up the first draft for the constitution, which was finally adopted on July 17, 1948. The constitution set up a strong executive with a single legislative body, the Assembly. The President was to be elected by the Assembly, and his choice of prime minister had to be confirmed by that body. ⁴⁵ The new Republic was officially inaugurated on August 15, 1948, the third anniversary of the liberation of Korea from Japanese rule. Governmental authority was promptly transferred from the

American military authorities to the new Republic, and negotiations began for the withdrawal of American troops.

On December 12, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly, by a vote of 48 to 6, declared that: ⁴⁶

There has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of Korea reside; this government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and this is the only such government in Korea.

Before the official inauguration of the Republic of Korea, the United States and China officially recognized the Republic of Korea. In addition to the United States, the Chinese Nationalist government announced that "it accords provisional recognition to the Government of Korea." On August 23, the Philippine government extended formal recognition, and following the U.N. General Assembly's action in favor of the new government, later that year, formal recognition was extended by many countries.

Since the establishment of the Republic of Korea, the General Assembly had discussed Korean unification and possible Korean membership in the United Nations at each session toward the end of every year, but without reaching a workable solution. The only alternative was to maintain the United Nations Commission in Korea to work for unification.

7. NORTH KOREA AND ITS REACTION:

Upon the liberation of Korea from Japanese rule on August 15, 1945, rumors from the north circulated to Seoul about the arrival from Manchuria of a man called "Il Sung Kim" who was welcomed by the Soviet authorities. Kim immediately began to organize the nucleus of a North Korean government.⁴⁷ For the Americans, the splintered political situation in Korea was of secondary importance compared with the formidable problem which hovered just north of Seoul -- the suspicious Russian army. The Soviets' swift occupation of North Korea permitted the Russians to have little difficulty in establishing rigid Communist control over the territory. With the arrival of the United States XXIV Corps on September 8, the Russians agreed to establish tactical liaison at the thirty-eighth parallel but, thereafter, the Soviet authority remained almost entirely unresponsive to General Hodge's overtures.

Within two weeks of the landing of his force, Hodge became aware of the uncooperative attitude of the Soviets in the north. One of the first unfriendly acts of the Soviet was to cut off electric power service for an area south of Seoul.⁴⁸ In an effort to bring the Russians around, Hodge twice invited the Soviet commander, Colonel General I. M. Chistiakov, to fly to Seoul to discuss the various pressing economic and political problems which were obviously resulting from the division of the peninsula. Chistiakov's response, in a letter on October 9, 1945,

was that he could not take such action as General Hodge suggested because, he said, matters of unification could only be resolved by the governments of the two occupying powers. This initial exchange of messages set the somber tone of future negotiations between the two military commands, negotiations in which the Americans urged on-the-spot integration of the two zones, while the Russians refused to take any action pending governmental decisions.

As the situation grew more and more unpromising, the worried Koreans, early in November, 1945, organized a meeting in Seoul of all political groups, including the Communists, and issued a joint memorandum demanding they be given the opportunity of organizing Korea as a unified whole. The division of their country, they declared, was "a most serious blunder that is not of our making." 49

Still the American government felt it had no choice but to proceed with establishment of a trusteeship. On November 10, 1945, President Truman met with Prime Ministers Clement Attlee of Britain and Mackenzie King of Canada in Washington to discuss mutual problems. About Korea, it was agreed that immediate steps should be taken to set up the trusteeship under the direction of the four great powers. As soon as this report reached Korea, the American command, including Hodge's newly assigned diplomatic advisers, expressed opposition to trusteeship. They reported to Washington that, in view of this unanimous opposition, it might be wise to abandon the trusteeship plan. On November 29, 1945, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes replied that if, during the

impending Moscow Conference, adequate guarantees could be obtained from the Russians for the unification and independence of Korea, it might be possible for the United States to discontinue its support of trusteeship.

At the same time, Byrnes proposed the establishment of a Joint Commission to unify the administration of such matters as currency, trade and transportation, tele-communications, electric power distribution, coastal shipping, and so on. He further proposed the creation of a four-power trusteeship to last for no longer than necessary to allow the Koreans to form an independent, representative government. As to how long such a trusteeship should last, the American spoke in terms of five years, but indicated that the tutelage could be extended by agreement of the four governments. Byrnes' suggestions were accepted by Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov and they were included with a few amendments in the Moscow declaration. However, the written agreement on Korea contained serious defects which were later to plague the State Department. A reproduction of the final Moscow agreement will illustrate the defects of the trusteeship principle: 50

1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and the national culture of the Korean people.

2. In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean government and with a view to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measure, there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States command in south Korea and the Soviet command in north Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Government of the Union of Socialist Republic, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the two Governments represented on the Joint Commission.
3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the provisional Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted following consideration of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years.
4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern Korea and the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks.

As we observed already, when the news of the Moscow agreement reached Korea, most people were greatly angered and opposed to it. To the Koreans, the "trusteeship" proposal meant only a continuation of outside control, which, under Japanese rule, had brought them much suffering and the postponement of their long-sought

independence.

The Joint Commission met several times between early 1946 and early 1947 in Seoul. Again they reconvened their futile meetings in Seoul in August 1947, only to fail again. General Hodge now undertook to speed up "the Koreanisation" of the military government.

Then the United States came up with a new proposal. In a letter to Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov on August 28, 1947, the State Department proposed that, in view of the Commission stalemate, a four-power conference should be convened in Washington to discuss the entire Korean problem. The department also forwarded a United States suggestion for holding early elections in both zones to establish zonal legislatures which could, in turn, elect representatives to a national provisional legislature to meet in Seoul to form a United Korea. On September 4, Molotov replied that Russia could not agree to four-power talks "inasmuch as the Joint Commission is still far from exhausting all its possibilities for working out agreed recommendations, which are entirely possible."⁵¹

As a result of Russia's disagreement on Korean unification, the United States decided to make major move to break the stalemate. The State Department informed the Russians that the United States intended to refer the entire problem of Korea's independence to the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly. On September 17, 1947, Secretary of State George Marshall, appeared before the General Assembly and stated: ⁵²

It appears evident that further attempts to solve the Korean problem by means of bilateral negotiations will only serve to delay the establishment of an independent, united Korea.

Considering the desire of the majority of the Korean people for a united, independent, and democratic government and convinced that this aspiration could not be satisfied through further negotiations, the United States government had no choice but to submit its proposal to the United Nations. On January 24, 1948, the following editorial appeared in the New York Times: ⁵³

We do not see how the United Nations can abandon Korea now to inevitable war. Hard as it is, the choice should be made to go ahead with elections and establishment of a government in South Korea. Then the twenty million people of that area -- two-thirds of Korea's population -- at least will have a fighting chance to maintain order and develop their country along democratic lines once occupation forces are withdrawn.

The United States proposal was supported by the majority of member states. Finally on February 28, 1948, the United Nations adopted a resolution directing the Temporary Commission in Seoul to observe elections in the area accessible to it. Several days later the Commission announced it would monitor South Korean elections, to be held not later than May 10, 1948. ⁵⁴ The election was eventually held in a peaceful atmosphere characterized by every mark of public approval and enthusiasm.

On the other hand, the reaction of the Russians and their North Korean allies to this unexpected development was loud and clamorous. Kim, already hailed as leader of the North Korean

regime, called upon South Korean sympathizers to launch a movement to disrupt separate elections. Kim attacked the Temporary Commission, complaining that it had brought "only disaster and unhappiness to Korea." He charged the United States with deliberately disrupting the Joint Soviet-American Commission, tearing up the Moscow Agreement, violating the Potsdam accord, and all the while "scheming to colonize Korea." 55

The creation of the People's Assembly in North Korea was followed by the establishment of a North Korean government under the leadership of Il Sung Kim. On September 3, the North Korean government adopted a Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Korea. 56 It reaffirmed land reform, guaranteed equal rights to all citizens irrespective of sex, race, religion, education, or profession. It also accorded equal rights irrespective of property status, although many members of the propertied classes had already been excluded automatically by the provision which guaranteed the "final and irrevocable disenfranchisement of Korea's oppressors, whatever the basis of their previous domination." 57

Several weeks after the establishment of the puppet Communist regime at Pyongyang on September 10, 1948, under the direction of Russian military authority, Il Sung Kim addressed a letter to Stalin, requesting the Soviet Union to establish diplomatic relations with his government and to exchange ambassadors. On October 12, 1948, Stalin announced that the Soviet Union was ready to establish such diplomatic relations with the North Korean

government. 58

Pravda, on September 14, 1948, published the full text of the North Korean appeal, excerpts of which include the following: 59

The Supreme People's Assembly of Korea appeals to the Government of the United States and to the government of the Soviet Union earnestly requesting the immediate and simultaneous withdrawal of their troops from Korea, inasmuch as this is the foremost prerequisite for the unification of Korea, for its economic, political and cultural revival ...

Assertions to the effect that the simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign troops might lead to disorder and even civil war are utterly groundless and offensive to the national dignity of the Korean people.

8. SUMMARY OF EVENTS

Since the establishment of two governments -- in North and South Korea -- each one has vied for the right to rule entire country. Of course, Kim's regime was quite aware of the weakness of South Korea's defense. During the several years of Russian occupation in North Korea, Russians thoroughly trained and equipped the North Korean army. North Korea then began to appeal both to the United States and Russia to withdraw their forces from both sides of Korea.

Planning for the withdrawal was initiated, however, by General Douglas MacArthur, who had been asked for his opinion by President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In March 1949, the American government approved the withdrawal. The task of making the first public announcement was given to President Rhee. On April 18, 1949, Rhee issued a statement in which he proclaimed

that South Korea's forces were "rapidly approaching the point at which our security can be assured, provided the Republic of Korea is not called upon to face attack from a foreign source. Discussions, therefore, are now underway between representatives of the Republic of Korea and of the United States concerning the establishment of a date in the course of several months for the withdrawal from Korea of United States troops." 60

Official Washington made a decision. However, this decision was not accepted by the Korean people. There were mass demonstrations throughout the country. Doubt was expressed by the Philippine representative on the United Nations Commission, Rufino Lunna, who declared he was strongly opposed to United States withdrawal. Lunna said that Korea could not defend itself against attack. At his request, therefore, the Commission adopted a resolution on May 23, 1949, disclaiming any responsibility "for the timing of the facilitating of the withdrawal of the forces of the occupying powers." 61

The decision to withdraw was made, but President Truman recommended to Congress that there be a continuation of economic assistance to South Korea. On June 8, the State Department issued a press release which discussed the United States plan for economic and technical aid to Korea, plans for establishing a United States military training program, and transfer of military equipment to the South Koreans. The release added that: 62

In pursuance of the recommendation contained in the General Assembly's resolution of December 12, 1948, to the effect that the occupying powers should 'withdraw their occupation forces from Korea as early as practicable,' the United States government will soon have completed the withdrawal of its occupation forces from that country. As is clear from the broad program of assistance outlined ... this withdrawal in no way indicates a lessening of United States interest in the Republic of Korea, but constitutes rather another step toward the normalization of relations with the Republic...

On June 29, 1949, the last of the American troops departed, leaving behind some five hundred members of the United States military advisory group (KMAC). Even while the last increment of eight thousand American troops sailed from Inchon harbor, the U.N. Commission watched South Korean troops battle Northern invaders on the Ongjin peninsula just northwest of Seoul. In a report to the U.N. the Commission noted that one of its sub-committees toured the front lines, passing howitzer batteries and observing an artillery duel and machine gun fire from both sides. ⁶³

The summer of 1949 was the first summer in a half-century that the Koreans were alone in their peninsula -- free of foreign armies.

During the three years of American Military Government forces in South Korea, many goals were accomplished, notably:

1. Elimination of the Communist Party.
2. Establishment of a constabulary (later to become a regular army).
3. Internal political stabilization and organization.
4. Educational reformation.

5. Establishment of a modern medical hospital and research laboratory.
6. Economic rehabilitation -- Korea was virtually in a state of economic collapse when United States began the occupation of South Korea in September 1945; the division of the country unleashed powerful disruptive forces which were reflected in ever-increasing inflation.
7. Electric plants.
8. Settlement of the Japanese property located within South Korea.
9. Land reformation and redistribution.
10. Reorganization of the judiciary.
11. Establishment of a modern police system.

During three and one-quarter years, ending on December 31, 1948, the United States furnished economic assistance, under army auspices, amounting to more than \$285,000,000. Six million dollars was made available during the fiscal year 1945-46; \$93,000,000 during the fiscal year 1946-47; \$113,000,000 during the fiscal year 1947-48; and about \$75,000,000 during the last six months of 1948. 64

Neither Korea nor the United States can achieve Korea's goal of unification without the cooperation of the other. Without doubt, the Republic of Korea has been heavily dependent upon American military and economic aid, as well as United Nations support. With assistance from the United States, the Republic of Korea made remark-progress toward overcoming the handicaps of its long subjection to Japan and its severance from the more industrialised northern half of the country.

FOOTNOTES

1. Carl J. Friedrich and Associates, American Experience in Military Government in World War II, New York, Pinehart & Co., Inc., 1948, p. 356.
2. August 14, 1945 is the standard American date and August 15 is the Korean date.
3. George M. McCune, Korea Today, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1950, p. 45.
4. Byung Do Lee, Korean History, Seoul, Peakyung Publishing Co., 1953, p. 499.
5. Korea, Far East Command: Troops Information & Education Section, Hqs, XXIV Corps, 1948, p. 111.
6. Bertram D. Darrafan, "Military Government: Korea," Far Eastern Survey, November, 1946, p. 350.
7. E. Grant Meade, American Military Government in Korea, New York, King's Crown Press, Columbia University Press, 1952, p. 48.
8. Ibid., p. 48.
9. Ibid., p. 52.
10. Ibid., p. 52.
11. Ibid., p. 52.
12. Department of State Bulletin, XV, August, 1946, Washington, Washington Government Printing Office, p. 293.
17. George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey Jr., Korea Today, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press, 1950, pp. 46-47.
18. Carl Berger, The Korean Knot, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, 1957, p. 53.
19. Ibid., p. 53.
20. Ibid., p. 53.
21. Dr. Jaisohn was one of the participants in the revolt of 1884 who later fled abroad and became a citizen of the United States.
22. All three men, absent from the country, were associated with the Korean Provisional Government in the United States and China.
23. The American Military Government issued an order on September 6, 1946, for violation of Proclamation No. 2. USANGIK SUMMATION, September 1946, p. 15. See also Ibid., January, 1947, p. 14. Pak Heunyoung, Lee Kankook and Lee Chuhu escaped to North Korea and it was reported that all of them were killed by the North Korean Communist Party because of failure in organizing the Communist Party in South Korea. Once Pak assigned as Vice Premier of the North Korean government and later he was purged and killed.
24. Seoul Times, July 20, 1947. See also Voice of Korea, August 15, 1947. The assailant is yet to be arrested.
25. Roger M. Baldwin, "Blunder in Korea," The Nation, August 2, 1947, pp. 119-21.

26. Kyung Che Chung, Korea Tomorrow: Land of the Morning Calm, New York, The Macmillan Co., 1956, pp. 188-89.
27. Sarrafan, Far Eastern Survey, op. cit., p. 350.
28. Dr. Kimm, the liberal chairman of the Korean Interim Legislative Assembly and leader of the National Independence Federation. Mr. Koo Kim, rightist former president of the Korean Provisional Government in Chungking, China, and head of the Korean Independence Party, and Woonhong Lyuh, Liberal chief of the Socialist Democratic Party, and brother of the famous patriot Woonhyung Lyuh, who had been assassinated the year before. The greatest common ambition of these men was to reunite the country.
29. The invitation did not include Dr. Synman Rhee.
30. Second largest city in Korea, it is now the capital of North Korea.
31. The first Military Governor was Major General Archibald V. Arnold, and the third was Major General William F. Dean.
32. George M. McCune, Korea's Post-War Political Problems, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1947, p. 14.
33. Ibid., p. 15.
34. Chung, op. cit., p. 190.
35. Meade, op. cit., p. 60.
36. Ibid., p. 60. See also Department of State Bulletin, XLII, p. 435.
37. Wigfall A. Green, The Epic of Korea, Washington D. C. Public Affairs Press, 1950, p. 89.
38. McCune, op. cit., p. 38.
39. United States, Department of State, Korea, 1945-1948, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1948, p. 7.
40. McCune and Grey Jr., op. cit., p. 223.
41. United States, Department of State, Korea 1945-1948, op. cit., p. 10.
42. Ibid., p. 15.
43. Shannon McCune, "Korea" in Rosinger and others, The State of Asia, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1951, p. 138.
44. Korea, Seoul, Office of Public Information, English Ed., 1954, p. 114.
45. United States, Department of State, Korea, 1945-1948, op. cit., pp. 16-7.
46. United Nations, Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, Resolution A/810, Resolution 195, (III).
47. Il Sung Kim reportedly was a guerrilla leader who had fought with the Communists in Manchuria against the Japanese.
48. Supung hydroelectric plants, the largest in Asia and the fourth largest in the world, built by the Japanese near the Manchurian border. The power was distributed not only to the whole of Korea but also to Manchuria and even northern China.

- where the Japanese intended to construct modern industries. It was destroyed during the Korean war by U.N. bombers on June 23, 1952. In the New York Times, June 24, 1952, it was reported that two-thirds of the power plants was destroyed. Recently, North Koreans have reconstructed the plant and it is now producing full power. In 1955, the North Koreans broadcast that "if South Korea wishes to utilize the power, we will reconnect the lines and help you." President Rhee rejected the offer through an official statement.
49. The New York Times, November 3, 1945.
 50. Department of State, Moscow Meeting of Foreign Ministers, December 16-26, 1945, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1946, pp. 14-16.
 51. U.S. Congress, Senate, The United States and the Korean Problem, Document 1943-53, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1953, pp. 4-6.
 52. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
 53. The New York Times, January 24, 1948.
 54. Department of State, Korea 1945-48, op. cit., pp. 70-71.
 55. The New York Times, March 12, 1948.
 56. Chosun Minjujuui Inmin Konghwakuk or Democratic People's Republic of Korea is the proper name for the North Korean regime.
 57. McCune and Grey Jr., op. cit., p. 247.
 58. See Soviet Press Translation, Far Eastern Institute, University of Washington, 1946-1953. Hereafter Soviet Press references will be referred to only by publication and date.
 59. Pravda, September 14, 1949.
 60. The New York Times, April 9, 1949.
 61. The New York Times, May 23, 1949.
 62. U. S. Congress, Senate, The U.S. and the Korean Problem, op. cit., pp. 26-27.
 63. The New York Times, June 29, 1949.
 64. A. J. Bloomfield and J. P. Jensen, Banking Reformation in South Korea, New York, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1951, p. 14.

CHAPTER III

KOREAN WAR OF 1950 AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Immediately after the withdrawal of the American troops and the Russian troops from both zones, the number of North Korean Communist troops was increased along the thirty-eighth parallel. In 1949, North Korean troops increased their intermittent firing across the parallel and captured some South Korean soldiers. In June, when the last United States troops departed, the North Koreans invaded the Ongjin peninsula which lies near Inchon, just south of the thirty-eighth parallel.

Indeed, 1950-53 was the first "war" in history in which troops of a world organization acted as "police" to fight an aggressor nation. The war began on the 25th of June, 1950, when troops of Communist-ruled North Korea attacked South Korea in an effort to unify the divided country by force. The United Nations Charter, signed by the major nations of the world in 1945, had outlawed all such aggression. So the United States asked member countries to aid South Korea.

1. COMMUNIST INVASION AND THE UNITED STATES DECISION TO ACT

At the dawn of June 25, 1950,¹ the North Korean Communist forces launched an armed aggression against the Republic of Korea, across the thirty-eighth parallel. Four divisions were committed, together with three constabulary brigades. Besides

some 70,000 men, about seventy tanks were sent into action on the central front. The road on the east coast is ideal for mechanized vehicles, and it was in no way defended. Officially the attack was a complete surprise, but obviously the South Korean government expected trouble. Early in May President Syngman Rhee had appealed for combat-planes, saying, "May and June may be the crucial period in the life of our nation." Shortly before the North Korean attack, General Roberts, the head of the Military Advisory Group, was reported as saying that the South Korean Army was well equipped, but that it needed more air power in order to prevent its ground forces from being immobilized by the air forces available to North Korea. ²

Within hours after the North Korean invasion, the American ambassador to the Republic of Korea in the city of Seoul, telegraphed to Washington D.C. Then, soon afterward, the United States diplomatic and defense leaders were summoned to the State Department. ³ At the same time, a phone call to Secretary Dean G. Acheson informed him of the invasion of South Korea by North Korean Communists. Shortly after midnight, Acheson telephoned long-distance to President Truman, who had gone to his home at Independence, Missouri, for a family visit. ⁴ After discussing the Korean crisis, Truman and Acheson agreed to bring the attack to the attention of the United Nations. This was in line with earlier United States planning that, in the event of aggression in Asia, "initial reliance must be on the people

attacked to resist it and then upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under the charter of the United Nations." ⁵ The United Nations Secretary-General was called and alerted that an appeal to the Security Council was coming.

At three o'clock in the morning on the 25th, Ambassador Ernest Gross formally requested a meeting of the Security Council, branding the invasion "a breach of the peace and act of aggression." ⁶ The United Nations Security Council met at three o'clock in the afternoon. It had before it the request of the United States representatives and a cablegram from the United Nations Commission on Korea to the Secretary-General. The representative of the Soviet Union, who had absented himself from Council meetings since early January in protest against the Council's refusal to unseat the Chinese Nationalist representative, was not present. Thus was removed, for the time being at least, the possibility of a Soviet veto. After approving the agenda, the Council invited Mr. Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations, to report. He insisted that the General Assembly's resolutions as well as the principles of the Charter had been violated and concluded with these words: ⁷

The present situation is a serious one and is a threat to international peace. The Security Council is, in my opinion, the competent organ to deal with it. I consider it the clear duty of the Security Council to take steps necessary to reestablish peace in that area.

After the representative of the Republic of Korea had been

invited to take his place at the Council table, Mr. Gross, representative for the United States, made a brief statement and submitted a draft resolution, declaring that a breach of the peace had been committed and calling on the North Koreans to cease hostilities and withdraw their armed forces. This proposal received general support and, with minor changes, was adopted.⁸

On the same day, June 25th, the Council found that the armed attack from North Korea was a "breach of the peace" in the sense of Article 39 under Chapter VII. A cease-fire and the immediate withdrawal of North Korean forces was called for. Members of the United Nations were asked to help in the "execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities." When the Commission reported that the cease-fire had been flouted, the Council, on June 27, "recommended" that the United Nations members furnish such assistance as was necessary to repel the attack and restore peace in the area.⁹

On June 26 Acheson phoned the President once more early in the morning. He emphasized that a world crisis was upon them and that only the President could make the necessary decisions. Immediately after the long-distance phone call from Acheson, Truman ordered his plane and took off at 2:12 p.m. Central Standard Time (4:12 p.m. Daylight Time) from Independence, Missouri, to Washington D.C.¹⁰

President Truman made the 940-mile flight in his plane and arrived at Washington about 7:20 p.m.¹¹ Upon his arrival in

Washington, Truman hurried into a high-level conference room. There were Acheson, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews, Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K. Finletter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, including General Omar N. Bradley, J. Lawton Collins and Hoyt S. Vandenberg and Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, and others.¹² In an air of tension and crisis, the American leaders held an almost three-hour discussion on the aggression, the Security Council's resolution, and possible American courses of action.

Immediately after the three-hour conference with high-ranking governmental officials, President Truman was caught by the pressmen and asked about the Presidential decision in regard to the Korean crisis. The President replied, "Don't make it alarmist, it could be a dangerous situation but I hope not..." Another reporter asked, "Has there been a formal declaration of war by North Korea?" President Truman said, "No, there is no formal declaration of war. That I know."¹³

It was clear to the President and his advisers that the Russians were behind the North Korean attack. The American leaders strongly felt that the Russian plan must not succeed, but the thought of what it might take to frustrate the Communist effort was disturbing. General MacArthur was authorized to use his air and naval power to prevent the Inchon-Kimpo-Seoul area from falling into unfriendly hands while an evacuation took

place. ¹⁴ In addition, the President approved a suggestion that American naval and air power be moved from the Philippines and elsewhere into the danger zone. ¹⁵

The burden of decision in the matter fell squarely on the shoulders of President Truman, and it was a terrible responsibility. Korea was not an occupied territory of the United States Army, and the Pentagon pundits not unnaturally regarded South Korea with complete disfavor from the strategic angle. The following morning, June 26, Truman issued a statement to the press: ¹⁶

I conferred Sunday evening with the Secretaries of State and Defense, their senior advisers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, about the situation in the Far East created by unprovoked aggression against the Republic of Korea. The Government of the United States is pleased with the speed and determination with which the United Nations Security Council acted to order a withdrawal of the invading forces to positions north of the 38th parallel, in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council to terminate this serious breach of the peace.

Our concern over the lawless action taken by the forces from North Korea, and our sympathy and support for the people of Korea in this situation, are being demonstrated by the cooperative action of American personnel in Korea, as well as by steps taken to expedite and augment assistance of the type being furnished under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Those responsible for this act of aggression must realize how seriously the Government of the United States views such threats to the peace of the world. Willful disregard of the obligation to keep the peace cannot be tolerated by nations that support the United Nations Charter...

The night of June 26 the President and his advisers met once more at Blair House. At this meeting, which lasted only an hour,

they took another step forward in the reversal of United States policy. Acheson, reading from a prepared statement, recommended to the President that American naval and air power be used to help the South Koreans repel the North Korean attack. The military chiefs supported the State Department recommendation, although there was some discussion of the difficulties that might arise. Further contemplation that night must have been of a poignant nature, but at noon on June 27, Truman made his historic statement when he "ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean government troops cover and support." 17

When the President's decision reached the Far East command in Tokyo, Japan, Occupation Headquarters were preparing to ship "munitions and war material to South Korea under naval and air escort." 18

On the other hand, two mornings after the outbreak of the Korean war, Senate majority leader Scott Lucas was summoned at home at eight o'clock to an 11. a.m. White House conference. In the meeting were Cabinet members who had listened to the President's statement earlier in the week. They waited for 20 minutes before President Truman came in, took a seat next to fellow Missourian Dewey Short, and asked General Bradley to recite the bad news from Korea. When Bradley had finished, the President slowly read off the text of his decision to throw United States troops (land forces) into the battle, to allow the air forces to bomb "specific targets" in Communist North Korea, and to order

the Navy to blockade the entire Korean coast. ¹⁹

According to the New York Times, "the Republican minority, as well as the Democrats, applauded the President's message. Minority leaders promised full cooperation in the hour of crisis. They stated flatly they would support everything necessary to carry out the President's objective." ²⁰

It was a few days later that a resolution of the United Nations Command authorized the United States, as by far the biggest partner in the unified efforts, to designate the commander of the whole force. This proposal was adopted by seven votes to none, Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt abstaining. The Soviet representative was still absent. On June 28, Mr. Clement Attlee, British representative, announced that British naval forces would be placed at the disposal of the U.S. authorities to operate on behalf of the Security Council. Eventually, sixteen nations contributed military units and over forty provided material aid. Then within ten days, the United Nations Council established a Unified Command, under the United States, of the forces and assistance to be provided, the command formally coming into being on July 8, 1950. ²¹

The State Department, meanwhile, sought to keep diplomatic lines open to Moscow. On June 27 the American ambassador in Moscow delivered a note to the Russians, calling their attention to the invasion and requesting the Soviet Union to use its influence with the North Koreans to call off the attack. The

American note also asked assurances "that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic disavows responsibility for this unprovoked and unwarranted attack..."²² The Department, by taking the public position that the U.S.S.R. was not involved in the attack, hoped to give the Russians the opportunity to get out from under the invasion and to limit its reaction to diplomatic channels. The rapid-fire developments of June 25-27 must have confounded the Kremlin. The initial Russian response was to brand the Security Council resolutions as illegal because of the absence of the Soviet Union and Communist China.²³

The reason for the United States reaction, aside from America's clear moral commitments to Korea, was that the attack, in Acheson's words:²⁴

...was a challenge to the whole system of collective security, not only in the Far East, but everywhere in the world. It was threat to all nations newly arrived at independence...
This was a test which would decide whether other nations would be intimidated by this show of force. The decision to meet force with force in Korea was essential. It was the unanimous view of the political and military advisers of the President that this was the right thing to do...

The United States' act of giving armed assistance to South Korea and Formosa was seemingly at variance with the policy whereby America's defensive perimeter excluded Korea and Formosa, as outlined by Secretary of State Acheson in a speech to the National Press Club on January 12, 1950.²⁵

On Thursday, June 29th, the third historic American government

meeting on the Korean crisis was held, this time at the White House.²⁶ The problem facing the President and his advisers was how to stop the North Korean army. The use of American troops was briefly explored. A final decision, however, was withheld pending a report from MacArthur, who had flown to Korea for a first hand inspection of the battlefield.²⁷

In the early morning hours of June 30th, Washington time, MacArthur reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on his personal reconnaissance. He stated that the South Korean army was in confusion, that supplies and equipment had been abandoned or lost, and that the South Koreans were incapable of united action.²⁸

The American Far East Air Force and Navy went into action to aid the South Korean Republic. However, from the air it was difficult to distinguish friend from foe, and few profitable targets were found. Seoul, the capital city of South Korea, fell to the invaders on June 28th and the South Koreans began a disorganized retreat to the south.

2. ACTUAL FIGHTING IN THE KOREAN WAR AND CHINESE INTERVENTION

The military progress of the war is a matter of record.²⁹ As soon as President Truman's decision reached the Far East Command -- "in these circumstances I have ordered United States air and sea forces to give the Korean government troops cover and support"³⁰ -- United States and other countries' troops were poured into the battle of Korea. On June 29, General MacArthur

flew to Korea following the loss of Seoul, capital city of South Korea, for the purpose of observing the actual situation there, as already mentioned.

The North Korean army, supported by Russian-built planes, smashed southward. The Communist press and radio immediately published the charge that the armies of "the traitor Syngman Rhee" had attacked first and that the North Koreans were merely launching a counter-attack. On June 26th Il Sung Kim, in an emotional appeal over Pyongyang radio, called upon his forces to liberate South Korea: 31

Dear brothers and sisters! Great danger threatens our mother-land and its people. What is needed to liquidate this menace? In this war, which is being waged against the Syngman Rhee clique, the Korean people must defend the Korean people's Democratic Republic and its constitution; they must liquidate the unpatriotic fascist puppet regime of Syngman Rhee which has been established in the southern part of the republic; they must liberate the southern part of our mother-land from the domination of the Syngman Rhee clique; and they must restore the people's committees there -- the real organs of power. Under the banner of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, we must complete the unification of the mother-land and create a single, independent, democratic state. The war which we are forced to wage is a just war for the unification and independence of the mother-land and for freedom and democracy...

The XXIV Infantry Division went into battle first, a battalion at a time, led by Major General William F. Dean. The XXIV Division and the First Cavalry Division landed at Pusan (Inchon port was already occupied by the enemy immediately after Seoul fell into enemy hands on June 28) and were rushed northward by rail and

truck to make the first American contact with the enemy on July 5. As soon as American foot troops arrived near Suwon, (see map for locations) South Korean armies were regrouped along the front line under the direction of Major General Dean.

The first battle, which was held near Suwon, was unsuccessful. The initial retreat before swarming Red hordes lasted for a month. And then Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, the Eighth Army (U.S.) commander, ordered his men to "stand or die" on the Naktong River line bordering the northern end of the Pusan perimeter. At the time, it seemed little more than a desperate gesture, but the defense held. Through August into September the thin line buckled and sometimes broke under the fanatical charges of the North Koreans. But always the Korean and American units managed to patch up the damage and restore their positions. The Second Infantry Division, the First Marine Brigade, and a British Brigade arrived -- each one, it seemed barely in time to save the defense line from collapse. At times, General Walker had every combat unit committed with nothing in reserve.

Those were days of despair in Korea when an understrength army battled for its life and for time in which the Free World, particularly the United States, could muster more strength for the fight. The Reds smashed at the southwest anchor of the defense line and were hurled back. They hit against the center and drove to within seven miles of Taegu. They shifted their attack to the eastern anchor of the line. They were aiming for the southern

[illegible]

port city of Pusan, the vital point of entry for Allied troops and supplies coming by ship from the United States and elsewhere. The Red attempt failed, however.

On June 29, 1950, General MacArthur flew to South Korea to observe the actual war operation there, and upon his return to Tokyo, he formulated a careful plan. His plan was reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and included the following: ³²

With the deployment in Korea of major elements of the Eighth Army now accomplished, the first phase of the campaign has ended and with it the chance of victory by the North Korean forces. The enemy's plan and great opportunity depended upon the speed with which he could overrun South Korea once he had breached the Han River line with overwhelming numbers and superior weapons temporarily shattering South Korean resistance. This chance he has now lost through the extraordinary speed with which the Eighth Army has been deployed from Japan to stem his rush. When he crashed the Han River line the way seemed entirely open victory was within his grasp.

The desperate decision to throw in piecemeal American elements as they arrived by every available means of transport from Japan was the only hope to save the situation. The skill and valor thereafter displayed in successive holding actions by the ground forces in accordance with this concept, brilliantly supported in complete coordination by air and naval elements, forced the enemy into continued deployments, costly frontal attacks and confused logistics, which so slowed his advance and blunted his drive that we have bought the precious time necessary to build a secure base.

I do not believe that history records a comparable operation which excelled the speed and precision with which the Eighth Army, the Far East Air Force and the Seventh Fleet have been deployed to a distant land for immediate commitment to major operation...

Syngman Rhee's cabinet members were already moved to Pusan,

where Lieutenant General Walton K. Walker set up his Eighth Army Headquarters. With battle front still moving back and forth, and bloody, confused fighting near Taejon, General William F. Dean and a number of his troops were finally cut off from retreat. After wandering thirty-five days behind enemy lines, Dean was captured, but the outside world learned nothing of this until much later. ³³

During these battles, General MacArthur in Tokyo had been building up a force of Marines, the Seventh Infantry Division, and South Koreans -- preparing them for his now-famous Inchon landing behind the enemy's lines. Despite many apprehensions, MacArthur was given a "go-ahead signal" and his brilliantly executed sea-borne strike hit the enemy before dawn on September 15th. ³⁴ Within two weeks of the Inchon landing, MacArthur's strategy had broken the back of the Communist armies and the North Koreans fled in confusion in an effort to escape the pincer closing upon them. Nearly all of the territory south of the 37th parallel was soon recaptured by the United Nations Command. ³⁵

At the same time, General MacArthur decided on another sea-borne strike. He sent the Eighth Army moving northward after the Reds in the west and moved the Tenth Corps under Major General Edward M. Almond by sea toward Wonsan on the east coast. The ROK (Republic of Korea) troops captured Wonsan before Almond could land his troops, because the Red retreat was so swift. ³⁶ Later in October, the United Nations troops rushed toward the Manchurian

border amid signs that the North Korean Army had ceased to exist as a coordinated fighting unit.

But then there came ominous reports that Chinese soldiers had been taken captive. Hard fighting again broke out. Prior to the crossing of the thirty-eighth parallel by the U.N. troops, Washington received several reports that the Chinese Communists were threatening to intervene in the war if United Nations troops crossed the thirty-eighth parallel into North Korea.³⁷ On October 1, 1950, Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communist Premier, gave credence to the reports with public pronouncement that China would "not allow seeing their neighbors being invaded by imperialists."³⁸ Several days later, Chou announced flatly that China would send troops to defend North Korea. ✓

The first stunning blow came on November 2, 1950, immediately after Chou announced their attitude toward the peninsula. The Chinese ambushed ROK troops and the Eighth Army, while sweeping down on the Eighth Regiment of the First Cavalry Division. They came screaming out of the hills at night with bugles blowing to overrun the South Korean and American units and to bring the Eighth Army's dash to a confused halt.

The unexpected American reaction to the North Korean invasion must have been as troubling to Peiping as it was to Moscow -- if only because it resulted in Truman's order to the Seventh Fleet neutralizing Formosa. Not only did this American action frustrate the Chinese Communists, but the subsequent events of North Korean

armies fleeing in confusion, following MacArthur's brilliant stroke, must have caused the Chinese and Russians to enter into hurried consultations, probably in accordance with the Soviet-Chinese Treaty negotiated in Moscow February 14, 1950, by Mao and Stalin. A key sentence of this treaty states: "In the event of one of the high contracting parties being attacked by Japan or states allied with it, and thus being involved in a state of war, the other high contracting party will immediately render military and other assistance..."³⁹ However, Japan was not involved.

In the northeast, Almond's Corps was moving steadily northward while the temperature dropped below zero in the first onslaught of winter. The Eighth Army gathered its strength on the Chongchon river for the last big push, and on November 23, General MacArthur flew to Korea once again to personally direct the kick-off to the end-the-war-by-Christmas drive.⁴⁰ Then the Chinese smashed into the Marines at the Chongjin reservoir and cut off supply routes leading to the coastal city of Hungnam. The story of the Marines' epic fight out of the enemy's trap will live forever in America's military history, but no matter how brave the words and deeds, it was a retreat. The seventh Division pulled hastily back from the Manchurian border as the Marines fought their way down and across frozen hills toward Hungnam and safety.

Thus, United Nations troops faced new problems after Red China intervened in the Korean war. On November 7, General MacArthur issued a special communique:⁴¹

The Korean war was brought to a practical end with the closing of the trap on enemy elements north of Pyongyang and seizure of the East coastal area, resulting in raising the number of enemy prisoners of war in our hands to well over 135,000 which with other losses amounting to over 200,000, brought casualties to 335,000, representing a fair estimate of North Korean total military strength. The defeat of the North Koreans and destruction of their armies was thereby decisive. In the face of this victory...the Communists committed one of the most offensive acts of international lawlessness... by moving without any notice of belligerency elements of alien Communist forces across the Yalu River into North Korea and massing a great concentration of possible reinforcing divisions with adequate supply behind the privileged sanctuary of the adjacent Manchurian border. A possible trap was thereby surreptitiously laid calculated to encompass the destruction of the U.N. forces engaged in restoring order and the processes of civil government in the North Korean border area...The present situation therefore is this. While the North Korean forces with which we were initially engaged have been destroyed or rendered impotent for military action, a new and fresh army now faces us backed up by a possibility of large alien reserves and adequate supply within easy reach of the enemy but beyond the limits of our present sphere of military action. Whether and to what extent these reserves will be moved forward to reinforce units now committed remains to be seen and is a matter of the gravest international significance...

President Truman and his advisers stated, "We should not allow the action in Korea to extend into a general war. All-out military action against China had to be avoided, if for no other reason than because it was a gigantic booby trap." ⁴² However, General MacArthur complained of the restrictions and his intention was to obtain the authority from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to bomb freely the Manchurian enemy air and supply bases. It was not allowed by either Truman's administration or JCS.

All the United Nations troops were moved up to the thirty-

eight parallel by Christmas eve. Two days before Christmas, General Walker was killed in a jeep accident. ⁴³ He was succeeded by Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgeway, a brilliant World War II commander. In the next few weeks, Ridgeway performed a military miracle with the Eighth Army and Tenth Corps. He drove the Communists back with what Ridgeway called "Operation Killer." Offensive and defensive war operations moved back and forth near the thirty-eighth parallel. In the meantime, however, various incidents led to an open break between MacArthur and President Truman, who relieved the general of his Far Eastern Command on April 11, 1951, on the ground that MacArthur was not sympathetic to the Administration's war policy. Ridgeway replaced MacArthur in Tokyo and Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet was put in command of the Eighth Army. ⁴⁴

Twelve days after MacArthur's removal, the Reds opened a giant spring offensive and in mid-May they followed this up with a second power drive. But these drives crumpled under the giant firepower thrown against them by Van Fleet's divisions. Van Fleet turned on an offensive himself in late May that smashed the Reds back beyond the thirty-eighth parallel in the last big struggle of the Korean war.

In June, 1952, the United States troops (250,000) constituted more than half of the United Nations forces (450,000) fighting in Korea. The Republic of Korea troops numbered 150,000, about 40 per cent of the total number. At the time of the cease-fire ROK

troops had been expanded to about 70 per cent at the front lines. Smaller forces came from Australia, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey, The Union of South Africa, and the United Kingdom. ⁴⁵

British Commonwealth forces included about 22,000 combat and logistics troops, plus 5,000 Canadians and 5,000 Australians and New Zealanders. ⁴⁶

3. ARMED FORCES COMMITTED BY UNITED NATIONS IN KOREA ⁴⁷ (Maximum effort at any time during the war)

United Nations Members

Armed Forces

United States.....	7 Army Divisions; 1 Marine Division, Army and Corps Hqs, logistical and support forces. 1 tactical air force and complete supporting complement; 1 combat cargo command, air; 2 medium bombardment wings; U.S. 7th Fleet including fast carrier task group, reconnaissance and antisubmarine units, supply and repair units; military sea transport service.
(approximately ten times the effort of all others)	
United Kingdom.....	2 Army brigades of 5 infantry battalions; 2 field artillery regiments; 1 armored regiment. Far East Naval forces, including 1 aircraft carrier, 2 cruisers, 8 destroyers and supporting units, with Marine detachment.
Canada.....	1 Army brigade of 3 infantry battalions; 1 artillery regiment and supporting armored regiment. 3 brigades of about 6,000 men.
Turkey.....	1 Army brigade of about 6,000 men.
Australia.....	2 infantry battalions; 1 fighter squadron; 1 air transport squadron; 1 aircraft carrier, 2 destroyers, 1 frigate.

Thailand.....1 regimental combat team of about 4,000 men; 2 corvettes; 1 air transport squadron.

Philippines.....1 regimental combat team of about 5,000 men.

France.....1 infantry battalion; 1 patrol gunboat.

Greece.....1 infantry battalion; 1 air transport squadron.

New Zealand.....1 infantry battalion; 2 frigates.

The Netherlands.....1 infantry battalion; 1 destroyer.

Colombia.....1 infantry battalion; 1 frigate.

Belgium.....1 infantry battalion.

Ethiopia.....1 infantry battalion.

Union of S. Africa.....1 fighter squadron.

Luxembourg.....1 infantry company.

4. THE ARMISTICE

On June 23, 1951, Russia's United Nations delegate, Jacob Malik, made a proposal that truce talks be opened. A lull in fighting spread across the battlefield as the peace talks dragged on month after month at Panmunjom. After a long recess the deadlocked truce talks were resumed early 1953. As negotiations continued between the United Nations and Red representatives it was revealed that the armistice terms being negotiated were absolutely unacceptable to South Korea. Mass demonstrations rocked the nation day after day, opposing a "dishonorable" peace. The stalemated line roughly followed the thirty-eighth parallel, but

bulged into North Korea in the central section where the Allies dug in on mountains commanding the historic invasion route leading to Seoul.

In March, 1953, the Reds unleashed their greatest offensive effort in months. The fighting then subsided again. China's Premier and Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, agreed to discuss a United Nations offer made in December, 1951, for exchange of sick and wounded prisoners.

On December 3, 1952, U.S. President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower visited Korea. He talked to President Syngman Rhee at Kyung Mu Dae, the presidential mansion in Seoul, ⁴⁸ and inspected the military installation for three days. Until his departure on December 7, Mr. Eisenhower's trip to Korea was shrouded in strict secrecy and there was no source indicating what they discussed. Reliable sources indicated at the time that "both presidents may be discussing the truce talk." ⁴⁹

President Rhee demanded that anti-Red Korean prisoners be immediately released in South Korea, but the armistice negotiators were discussing a repatriation program that was hardly acceptable to the South Korean side. On June 18, 1953, President Rhee ordered the release of all anti-Communist Korean prisoners from U.N. P.O.W. (Prisoners of War) compounds; 25,000 North Korean prisoners forcibly resisting repatriation to the Communist area were subsequently freed as civilians and instantly "joined the South Korean citizenry." ⁵⁰

When the Communists heard of the prisoner release, they reacted as Rhee hoped; they promptly broke off the armistice negotiations at Panmunjom, charging the Americans with complicity in the prisoner release. A devastating wave of world criticism descended upon Rhee and the South Korean government. From almost every capital Rhee was attacked and denounced.

The armistice talks seemed again standing on the verge of complete collapse. According to Carl Berger: 51

While the uproar continued, on June 19 Communist liaison officers passed a letter to the U.N. delegation at Panmunjom, addressed to General Clark. In this letter they bluntly asked: 'Is the United Nations Command able to control the Syngman Rhee clique? If not, does the armistice in Korea include the Syngman Rhee clique? If it is not included, what assurance is there for the implementation of the Armistice Agreement on the part of South Korea?...'

To find the answer, Clark flew once more to Seoul on June 22. On this occasion, he found the Korean president very nervous and under considerable strain. The General again urged Rhee to reconcile himself to the situation and accept the truce. Rhee, sensitive to the world criticism, remarked that while his government could not sign an armistice which divided his country, it could support such an armistice. This statement, Clark felt, was of utmost importance...

President Rhee adamantly opposed any compromise that failed to ensure ultimate unification of Korea, north and south. President Eisenhower exchanged letters with him in an effort to reach an agreement to end the Korean war, and after long personal talks with President Eisenhower's special envoy, Walter Robertson, President Rhee promised to go along with the truce.

Terms were finally agreed on shortly thereafter and on July 27, 1953, the armistice was signed by representatives of the two contending commands at Panmunjon, and later by their senior commanders at Munsan and Kaesong, respectively. ⁵² The fighting stopped at ten o'clock that night along the 120-mile front across the peninsula.

FOOTNOTES

1. It was at 4 a.m. on Sunday morning, June 25, 1950, Korean time.
2. Marguerite Higgins in the New York Herald Tribune, May 30, and June 5, 1950.
3. New York Times, June 25, 1950.
4. Ibid., June 25, 1950.
5. Documents covering developments in June-July, 1950, leading to U.S. and U.N. participation in the Korean conflict are found in the State Department publication, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1950.
6. New York Times, June 26, 1950.
7. U.N. Security Council, Official Records: 5th Year, 473 meeting, p. 3.
8. New York Times, June 25, 1950. The vote was 9 to 0 with one abstention, that of Yugoslavia.
9. Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Haviland Jr., Organizing for Peace, Cambridge, Mass., Houghton Mifflin Co., 1954, p. 454.
10. New York Times, June 25, 1950.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid. See also same date, editorial section, for more details.
14. Ibid., June 26, 1950.
15. Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy in the U.N. Council on Foreign Relations, 1956, p. 127.
16. State Department, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, op. cit., pp. 16-17.
17. Korean Report, 1948-1952, Washington, Korean Pacific Press, 1952, p. 6.
18. New York Times, June 25, 1950.
19. Ibid., June 29, 1950.
20. Ibid., July 20, 1950.
21. How the United Nations Met the Challenge of Korea, New York, United Nations, 1953, p. 18.
22. United States Policy in Korean Crisis, op. cit., pp. 63-64.
23. The Soviet Union delegate returned, finally, to the Council seat in August.
24. Acheson's testimony, Military Situation in the Far East, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951, pp. 1715-1716.
25. E. Van der Vlugt, Asia Aflame, New York, Devin-Adair, 1953, p. 205.
26. The White House was being remodeled during this period.
27. Nippon Times, June 30, 1950.
28. Bradley's testimony, Military Situation in the Far East, op. cit., p. 1112.

29. Encyclopedia Britannica, 1954 Vol. 13, pp. 491A-491D. See also New York Times, July 27, 1953 or A Pictorial History of the Korean War, New York, Wise, 1951.
30. New York Times, June 28, 1950.
31. Soviet Press Translation, Far Eastern Institute, University of Washington, 1946, 1953. Hereafter, the Soviet references will be referred to only by publication and date. Pravda, June 27, 1950.
32. Military Situation in the Far East, op. cit., pp. 3381-3382.
33. For Dean's story, see The Dean Story, William L. Worden ed., New York, The Viking Press, 1954. He was formally released after the armistice agreement was signed in Panmunjom in 1953.
34. Yong-Nam Ilbo, (South Korean Times) September 16, 1950. Marines poured ashore on Walmi island, overpowered the Red defenders and swept through Inchon, the port city for Seoul. Behind them came the 7th Division. While this force closed in on Seoul, General Walker unleashed an offensive in the South that cracked through the Red defenses and moved back up the road to Taegu -- the road down which the Americans had retreated two months before. Ten days after the landing, the Marines with help from the 7th Division had fought their way through flaming, battered Seoul in a roaring house-to-house battle. Now the Reds were in headlong flight back toward North Korea.
35. Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, Korea: 1950, 1952, p. 150.
36. Huimang Monthly, (Hope monthly magazine, published under the headline "Ten Years of Liberation," Haebang Sipnyun.) Huimang publishing Co., Seoul, August, 1955, p. 356.
37. Acheson's testimony, op. cit., p. 1883.
38. Nippon Times, October 2, 1950.
39. Military Situation in the Far East, op. cit., p. 3172.
40. At the time, the author was in Pyongyang with the Eighth Army, 2nd Engineer Construction Group, and MacArthur announced his plans. Our group withdrew from Pyongyang on December 5, 1950.
41. Nippon Times, November 12, 13 and 15, 1950.
42. Years of Trial and Hope, New York, Doubleday & Co., 1956, p. 378.
43. Huimang Monthly, op. cit., p. 375.
44. A Pictorial History of the Korean War, op. cit., p. 352.
45. The World Book Encyclopedia, 1957, p. 4202.
46. New York Times, April 11, 1954.
47. Rutherford M. Poats, Decision in Korea, New York, Medill McBride Co., 1954, pp. 335-336.
48. Seoul Times, June 10, 1953.
49. Source: the author's memory.
50. Nippon Times, June 10, 1953.
51. Carl Berger, The Korea Knot, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957, p. 168.
52. Korea, Office of Public Information, Seoul, 1954, p. 124.

CHAPTER IV

ECONOMIC ASPECTS

1. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Korea is chiefly an agricultural country with a cultivated area of approximately 11,000,000 acres.¹ The size of Korea as a whole is slightly larger than the state of Minnesota, with approximately 30 million inhabitants. More than 80 per cent of all heavy industry, including munitions, is concentrated in the northern sector, where Japan built modern industrial plants valued at about a billion dollars before World War II.² During the Japanese domination, Korea was used by the Japanese as a supplier of raw materials and as a market for Japan's surplus products. The administration, management, and operation of the Korean economy was controlled by the Japanese from 1910 to 1945. The properties formerly occupied by the Japanese and their government in Korea were transferred to the newly established Korean government by the American Military Government in Korea.³

The most serious problem was the economic imbalance caused by dividing the land into two parts at the thirty-eighth parallel. North Korea has practically all of Korea's major mineral and coal deposits and hydroelectric power potential, and it has all resources, except oil, for extensive industrial development. Among its basic resources are coal, iron, gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, tungsten, lithium, mica, nickel, barytes, molybdenum,

magnesite, alum, shale, graphite, fluorspar, kaolin and timber. ⁴
In other words, about two-thirds of the raw material for industries is located in northern Korea. On the other hand, the southern part of Korea is predominantly agricultural, containing the lighter industries and some resources, such as coal and tungsten.

Such industries as are located in South Korea were operating at only 30 per cent of available productive capacity at the end of World War II. Agricultural production in South Korea was also at a low ebb.

Like other nations, Korea will solve its economic problems only as it develops an industrial potential capable of producing an acceptable standard of living for all its people. Korea's natural and human resources contain the basis for extensive industrialization to supply the needs of its own people and to export goods in sufficient quantities to pay for its essential imports. This is the goal of the Republic of Korea government and of the United States, which has been said to have initiated a plan to make Korea a "model progressive democracy" in the Far East.

In the next pages, the author will examine the American economic aid programs, how they operated during the Korean war and how they have operated in war-damaged Korea. Before we examine the specific details, one should remember that during the three and one-quarter years of American Military Government operation, ending on December 31, 1948, the United States furnish-

ed economic assistance, under army auspices, amounting to more than \$285,000,000. Six million dollars was made available during the fiscal year 1945-46; \$93,000,000 during the fiscal year 1946-47; and about \$75,000,000 during the last six months of 1948. ⁵ In this chapter, the author is excluding the above mentioned aid given during the three years of military government.

2. MISSION OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION (ECA) TO KOREA AND UNITED NATIONS KOREAN RECONSTRUCTION AGENCY (UNKRA)

At the end of the American military occupation in South Korea, an Economic Cooperation Administration was set up in Seoul to take over the responsibility of economic aid programs which were previously administered by the military occupation authorities. The Truman Administration repeatedly emphasized the importance of American economic aid to the South Korean government. In urging Congress to pass the proposed \$150,000,000 ECA appropriation for the United States fiscal year 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that the Republic of Korea government would fall "within three months" if economic assistance were not provided. Undersecretary James Webb advised Congress that "without a continuation for the present of outside assistance...the Korean economy would suffer a rapid and inevitable collapse." ⁶

The Economic Cooperation Administration had programmed \$170 million in economic aid from the end of the occupation until South Korea was invaded by the Communists in June, 1950. ECA aimed to achieve a balance between the immediate needs for consumer

goods and the development of capital projects. The aid provided by ECA authorities consisted primarily of shipments of foods, medical supplies, fertilizers and agricultural products to relieve the famine, disease, and unrest which prevailed at that time.

The various projects carried out by the Economic Cooperation Administration were suspended by the Red invasion, and the responsibility for civilian relief and related activities was assigned to the United Nations Civil Assistance Command (CAC) in Korea under the control of the United States Eighth Army. On December 1, 1950, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution by 47 to 5, with seven abstentions to form the United Nations Korean reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) to assist the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command (CINCUNC) and the Korean government in their relief and rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. ⁷

When the fighting broke out in Korea, ECOSOC (Economic and Social Council of the United Nations) asked the Secretary-General and all governments and agencies assisting in the Korean war to establish machinery to match offers of assistance against requests from the Unified Command. By the end of 1953, approximately \$600 million in cash or kind had been contributed or pledged by fifty-four states. To provide more long-range direction in such matters the Assembly approved, in the fall of 1950, the creation of a United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea. Later in the session, the Assembly adopted a full-blown reconstruction plan based upon ECOSOC recommendations and

strongly influenced by the wishes of the foremost contributor of military force in Korea, the United States, the plan included the following provisions: ⁸

1. Establishment of a United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) under direction of a United Nations Agent-General (to be an American, by general understanding), appointed by the Secretary-General and responsible to the General Assembly. The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea was to issue binding decisions on where and with what authorities in Korea the UNKRA should operate, but merely recommend on other policy questions. The general duties of the Agent-General were to ascertain rehabilitation requirements and provide for procurement and distribution.
2. Establishment of an Advisory Committee of five member states (the Assembly subsequently elected the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, India and Uruguay) to advise the Agent-General on major economic questions.
3. Approval of a code of principles to govern the relief and rehabilitation including the objective to 'lay the necessary economic foundations for the political unification and independence of the country' the warning that the program must not 'serve as means for foreign economic and political interference,' a statement that 'all classes...shall receive their equitable shares...without discrimination...', and the proviso that 'all authorities in Korea shall freely permit the personnel of the United Nations to supervise the distribution...'
4. Agreement that contributions were to be voluntary in consultation with a Negotiating Committee of seven member states appointed by the Assembly President (United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, India, Uruguay and Egypt).

In July 1951, an agreement was reached with the Unified Command whereby the military was to handle all short-term economic aid until military security had been established, confining UNKRA

to furnishing technical assistance to the Republic of Korea, planning long-range reconstruction programs and implementing such reconstruction projects which would not interfere with military operations.) While the situation was highly "fluid," the military-controlled United Nations Civil Assistance provided the principal external relief amounting to some \$300 million from the outset of the fighting until early 1953. Towards the end of that period, however, the front became sufficiently stable for UNKRA to undertake an initial program including the importation of grain, fertilizers and other consumer items as well as the reconstruction of the Taegu Medical College and hospital. The estimated cost for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1953, was \$70 million. For its post-truce effort, UNKRA called for \$205 million which had been pledged by August 1953, but actual contributions were feeble.

In addition to the above, the United States alone contributed approximately \$50 million worth of engineers, signals, and transportation which were supplied to Korean military forces and civilians. Also, another \$50 million for raw materials was supplied to the Korean Army for processing into finished products, and \$250 million for servicing, repairing, and replacing the United States equipment used in carrying out rehabilitation projects during the entire period of hostilities from June, 1950 to August, 1953.

3. COMBINED ECONOMIC BOARD AND ECONOMIC COORDINATOR

Following a proposal by the Korean government, combined Economic Board was created in 1952. The Board was composed of representatives of the United States and the Korean government, and its purpose was to serve as a coordinating and advisory agency for the United Nations Command and the Republic of Korea on all economic programs for relief and rehabilitation.

President Syngman Rhee and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, in connection with the signing of Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea on August 8, 1953, made the following declaration regarding the new economic aid program: ⁹

We contemplate that the projected three-to-four-year programs for the rehabilitation of the war ruined Korean economy shall be coordinated through the Combined Economic Board, under the joint chairmanship of the Korean and American representatives. This program contemplates the expenditures of approximately \$1 billion of funds, subject to appropriations thereof by the United States Congress. Two hundred million dollars has already been authorized out of prospective defense savings...

Mr. C. Tyler Wood was appointed by President Eisenhower, with Senate confirmation, as a representative of the United States to the newly organized Combined Economic Board. Mr. Wood took his position in August 1953, and divided the economic mission evenly between KCAC (Korean Civil Assistance Corps) and UNKRA. KCAC assumed responsibility in welfare, and supply and distribution.

UNKRA was given responsibility for general education, vocational training, irrigation, forestry, flood control, industry, mining, housing and power.

The Economic Coordination Board started its programs with \$200 million, as the author described, which was made available to it by the United States Congress for the fiscal year of 1954, as the first installment of the \$1 billion of economic aid which was mentioned in the joint statement by President Rhee and Secretary of State Dulles. In addition to this, Congress appropriated \$80.6 million for the United States Army and \$35 million for UNKRA, in fiscal 1954, as part of the contribution the United States pledged during the war for relief and rehabilitation programs. By the end of the fiscal year of 1954, procurement authorization was given for the entire \$200 million of the appropriated funds, and a large proportion of the funds was approved during the last quarter of the fiscal year. Approximately 45 per cent of the total funds appropriated, \$88.6 million, was allowed for the following industrial projects. ¹⁰

1. Fertilizer:
Capacity of producing 120,000 tons of fertilizer per year.
2. Power plants:
An aggregate installed capacity of 100,000 kilowatts to replace the lost power sources in North Korea.
3. Seoul central exchange:
Accommodating 10,000 lines of new equipment, a 450 line toll switchboard and 140,000 telephone instruments.

4. **Railway rolling stock:**
Providing parts and backshop equipment and to purchase 1,400 assorted freight cars.
5. **Rehabilitation of fixed railroad equipment:**
Obtaining steel and other materials for repair of Han-River bridge.
6. **Railroad construction:**
80.3 kilometers of railroad extension and repair of 40 tunnels and 54 bridges.
7. **Purchase of naval vessels:**
Two CIMAVI naval vessels at \$750,000 each for use of coastal cargo vessels.
8. **Cargo handling equipment:**
Purchase of five 350-ton barges, 2,000 tarpaulins, 17 mobile cranes.
9. **Construction of fishing boats:**
Rehabilitation of several small shipyards.
10. **Waterworks:**
Building up to 80 per cent of the normal capacity.
11. **Repair and construction of roads and bridges:**
Purchase of 1,100 tons of steel, 17,000 tons of cement, 161,000 linear feet of piling, and 1.9 million boardfeet of lumber in order to repair and to construct highways and bridges.

In the fiscal year 1955, \$280 million was approved by the United States Congress for continuing the economic programs. Of that amount, \$19 million was the United States contribution to United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency for the fiscal year 1955.

Great emphasis was placed on procurement of saleable commodities in order to combat inflation, and the fund was almost evenly divided between purchase of consumer goods and capital goods. In

the same fiscal year, the Department of Defense of the United States was allowed to spend \$420 million for military assistance to the Korean armed forces. An additional \$28.9 million was allocated for subsistence items to be obtained within the Korean economy and not from imports.

In the following fiscal year of 1956, the United States continued its assistance to the Republic of Korea. According to the figure supplied by the Office of the Economic Coordinator, \$338,903,000 was appropriated, and deliveries of \$81,867,000 worth arrived at the end of the fiscal year. In this fiscal year, the Office of the Economic Coordinator assumed the function of the U.N. Civil Assistance Command to Korea (KCAC) and KCAC was terminated.

Since the ROK-UNC Combined Economic Board was established in Seoul in 1952, considerable progress has been made. On July 16, 1957, Korean Republic, an English daily newspaper, printed the following editorial in regard to the Combined Economic Board:¹¹

The Republic of Korea and United Nations Command Combined Economic Board is now in the process of establishing joint organization for a continuing review and evaluation of Korean aid policies and projects. This is another of the cooperative moves that UNC Economic Coordinator William E. Warne has backed so strongly, and it should go a long way toward eliminating any remaining frictions in aid planning and implementation... Mr. Warne has insisted (1) that the aid program's primary purpose is to reconstruct and rehabilitate the Korean economy, and (2) that his organization work closely and harmoniously with the affected agencies and functionaries of the Korean government. This approach has not eliminated every shortcoming of American aid,

and it has not solved every holdover difficulty, but the failures have not been many, and none of them can be laid at the door of Mr. Warne...

Mr. Warne soon will be going to Washington -- there to work out the fundamental policy structure for the aid year that began in July. We know he will represent both American and Korean interests most ably, and we have every confidence that the 1957-58 aid period will be marked by the greatest successes yet achieved in the recovery and strengthening of this country.

4. EVALUATION OF THE AID PROGRAM

So far, the author has briefly examined the United States economic and military assistance program to the Republic of Korea. It is felt that the American policy, especially regarding the economic assistance programs, is designed to meet the specific needs of Korea, and it will remain the same in the future. It has been widely recognized that the Korean problem is peculiarly an American problem from every viewpoint -- political, military, economic and humanitarian.¹²

While the present writer was conducting this phase of research, he discovered that the following specific needs remain in the Republic of Korea:

1. Training of technical and administrative personnel.
2. Control of inflation.
3. Substantial help in meeting the costs of its large fighting forces. Korea now has the second largest army in the free world, numbering over 700,000 men. These military forces are much larger than can be supported out of Korea's resources.

One of the major problems in aid programs is the determining

of the amount of military assistance. As matters stand, Korea faces the prospect of a huge deficit in the military budget. Deficit financing could destroy all progress already made and plunge Korea back into the morass from which it has been emerging. Even in the United States deficit financing means some inflation. In Korea the effects can well be disastrous, and the Korean fiscal authorities quite properly believe that the risk should be avoided at all costs.

It has been suggested that the Korean government should use counterpart deposits to meet a large part of the deficit spending. But this is contrary to the spirit of the economic aid program, which earmarks the counterpart for the inevitable hwan ¹³ expenses necessary to the implementation of reconstruction and rehabilitation. If the counterpart goes into a military account the Korean government will be doing serious damage to the economic recovery program.

Another alternative is reduction of the armed forces. However, this would be suicidal. The Communists to the north already have a preponderance of strength in land and air forces that they have built up for the possible purpose of an invasion. The only "catch" is the financing of military forces that are larger than those a small nation can support with its own resources. Korea has the manpower to maintain an army of 40 divisions, but it obviously does not possess the wealth to do so. Normally, this country might be expected to support a force of five or six

divisions instead of 30 now in being. Those 30 divisions constitute the second largest army in the free world; yet the United States is contributing only a few hundred million dollars, including both direct and indirect support.

It seems to the Korean government that in the total picture of economic and military aid, the United States would be contributing to the welfare of Korea and to the security of Free Asia by increasing the military aid segment sufficiently to fill the gap. The Korean government does not say that the deficit cannot be met in other ways, but it does say that there is no other way that will not have some undesirable effect upon either the total economy or military security.

One of the sharpest criticisms by the Korean government is that spending on consumer goods is too much emphasized, while industrial development projects are treated lightly. Also, the Korean government has protested strongly against the spending funds for rehabilitation of the Korean economy in the Japanese market on consumer goods and other commodities. Japan earned large dollar credits by providing essential goods and services to the armies stationed and fighting in Korea.¹⁴ In addition, official Washington urged the Korean government to import more consumer and other commodities from Japan. As a result, the Korean government insisted that continuing such a policy would result in rebuilding the Japanese economy while leaving Korea without industries and as dependent as ever.

On October 6, 1954, President Syngman Rhee was interviewed by Robert Schakne of International News Service. Mr. Schakne asked "One American condition is reported to concern Japan, if Japan can produce the items in acceptable quality and at the lowest price. It is reported your government is opposed to this condition. Can you explain the reasons for this attitude?" Rhee replied as follows: ¹⁵

Few people who criticize Korea for being reluctant to buy everything she needs from Japan realize the true state of affairs. Japan, not Korea, is the offender. Under American-supervised arrangements, it was agreed that Korea would import annually from Japan 32 million dollars in goods and Japan would import 16 million dollars of Korea's export, or half as much as Korea's purchases. Records show that in 1951 Korea bought two and one-half times Japan's total; in 1952 Korea bought four and one-half times Japan's purchases and in 1953 Korea bought eight and four-fifths the total Japan bought from Korea. The 1953 figures Japan sold to Korea \$72,531,484 in goods and bought from Korea \$8,238,150 worth. For the three years Korea bought \$115,105,000 in Japanese products -- more than 600 thousand dollars a year in excess of the minimum while Japan bought only 20,132,000 worth of goods from Korea during that time -- about 60 per cent under the amount promised...

You can see from these statistics that reports Korea does not buy Japanese goods are completely false -- that the reverse is the case. However, many of our purchases from Japan were not in the best interests of Korea or the American tax-payers footing the bill... Korea has bought, is buying and will continue to buy from Japan, but only when Japanese products compare in quality and price with goods available elsewhere. We can understand America's fine motives in desiring to help Japan's precarious economy, and her disinclination to let down U.S. tariff barriers to Japanese sub-quality products, but we cannot appreciate the persistence with which some Americans insist that we accept such junk...

Another criticism is that the program has been slow to get started and deliveries of the goods unnecessarily delayed by overlapping and bureaucratic red tape. Such a criticism is a constructive one when we examine the situation in the fiscal year 1955. According to figures furnished to the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, by the Office of Economic Coordinator, at the end of the fiscal year, \$1,867,000 worth of goods out of \$338,903,000 arrived in Korea.

The following article, dated July 2, 1957, is from an editorial of the Korean Republic, a daily English newspaper in Seoul, which criticized the foreign aid program: 16

Korean aid is one of the most dramatic and heartwarming stories in the annals of mankind. This country emerged from the Korean war in devastation and near economic collapse. With American help and through our own efforts, we have been able to survive and begin the creation of what the economists like to call a viable economy. Korea is still a going concern, and slowly but surely, it is providing a better and more secure life for its citizens...

The aid program is not perfect. In the early days, too much was spent in Japan, and funds were exclusively devoted to consumer goods. Exchange rate manipulation continuously shattered the trends toward economic stabilization. We have had our troubles, and they are not over yet. But solution will come as the result of U.S.-Korean cooperation, such as we have had to a marked degree during the last two years, and not as a consequence of sniping at the whole program...

An example of one current difficulty is the Chungju fertilizer plant. From present indications, that project will cost about 75 per cent more than originally estimated. As yet the reasons offered seem rather vague and inconclusive. But there is no intent on either side, to make propaganda capital of the

fertilizer plant difficulties, or to indulge in criticism until the full facts are known. Both American and Korean aid administrators are seeking to find out why the cost of the plant should have soared so steeply, and then to take steps to see that this sort of thing does not happen again.

All in all, the aid program is proceeding much more smoothly than ever before. Administrators have come to know and understand each other. Objectives are identical. Disputes occasionally arise over implementation of specific projects, but these are adjudicated fairly and without hurtful controversy. Cooperation is the keynote. It is, however, a cooperation of give and take -- of acceptance of more than one point of view -- and not a cooperation resulting from the dominance of one side or the other...

In many instances, funds spent to achieve one of Korea's specific needs also helped to achieve one or more others. Therefore, dollars spent for salable commodities, in addition to making local currency available for direct support to military and other efforts, help to keep down inflation and contribute to political and social stability. Dollars for self-support in some fields help to attain as well economic strength and a raised living standard.

Additional beneficial effects of rehabilitation are beginning to appear. The formerly severe power shortage is expected to be relieved soon. The railroads have been completely restored and improved. ¹⁷ Roads, bridges, port installations, tele-communication facilities, have also been improved substantially. A variety of light industries has been rehabilitated and developed.

In evaluating the United States aid program to the Republic of Korea, it is wise to recognize that the United States interest

in Korea is better served by less concern with physical structures than with what happens in the attitudes and capabilities of the people. In the words of Gordon R. Clapp, who had experience in development problems as a Chief of the United Nations Economic Survey for the Middle East: ¹⁸

How we do the job is really more important than the material results our money pays... In our impatience to get things done, in our desire to get on with the job that history has more or less thrust upon us we may be sorely tempted to take hazardous shortcuts. We may be tempted to push slow and unstable governments aside, brush away less competent local people and rush in shock troops of unsensitive technocrats to do the job for them. If we succumb to these temptations, we may damn the world in the process...

Also, it would be correct to believe that the economic and military aid that the United States continues for the Republic of Korea to develop a society in which freedom, hope, and opportunities prevail, will be carried out with lower costs as time goes on. Alan Valentine has well described the United States government expenditure on aid to underdeveloped countries: ¹⁹

Paradoxically, the more successful the program the sooner it will cost more, and then the sooner it will begin to cost us less. For initial success will open the doors for further enterprise and investment, and later greater success will bring the area's economy to the point where its own capital and know-how can replace the need for further United Nations or United States help, which can then begin to diminish...

The author honestly believes that the American investment in Korea is fundamentally the security of the United States

itself. On the whole, it has been one of the best investments the United States ever made, and the return will become increasingly great as time goes on.

In present Korea, the principal remaining question about the aid programs is not one of how much and how long, but of how soon Korea will be able to stand on its own feet. Reconstruction and rehabilitation are big and fancy words, but they have real meaning only in the sense that they produce a viable economy that can give Korea security of production and strength of economic prosperity.

The government of the Republic of Korea strongly asserted, at the time of the Armistice, that Korea hoped to establish a sound economy and complete its rehabilitation in a minimum of three years or a maximum of four years but the evidence indicates a longer period. Official statements indicated that "for many Koreans today, day-to-day living is not at what can be called a subsistence level -- even by Asian standards. Some of our people do not get enough to eat; many are inadequately clad; and millions are living in shacks, in caves, or even in the open. This winter too many people will die of the cold, and many others will suffer acutely." 20

Most of the Koreans feel that United States foreign aid is essentially necessary in order to maintain at least a minimum standard of living and reconstruct the ruined industries. Korea now faces two potential problems; one is internal stability and

the other is the external security of the country. Which is more important cannot be said for certain but the author strongly feels that industry is the only salvation. Without it, Korea cannot earn enough foreign exchange to buy even the most fundamental commodities. Korea can sell some rice, minerals, handicrafts, and a few other items, but these exports will not be sufficient to raise funds to buy fertilizer, cement, building materials, paper, textiles, and all the other things that Korea needs and cannot make for itself. It is not enough to show that Korea can import something cheaper than Korea can make it. Even if the figures are correct, Korea still lacks the money to buy. Internally, Korea has the manpower. Once Korean power sources are developed, Korea can make fertilizer and many other commodities.

Sociological and demographic factors are also important for development of industry. Korea is following the world-wide farm-to-city pattern. It also is facing the fact that agricultural methods are beginning to change, and that as time goes on, fewer family members will be required to maintain a high level of agricultural output. This comes at the same time when the population is increasing sharply. Where are the new city-dwellers to find a means of livelihood? The only answer is industry -- whether basic, secondary, or service. As the United States has proved so dramatically, basic industry must come first. After that, secondary industry will flourish, and services will mushroom to provide the little extra comforts of living that

basic industry has made possible. What Koreans are seeking, in other words, is a well-rounded economy that will make Korea strong and at the same time lift the Korean standard of living at least a little above the subsistence level.

Economic aid from the United States can serve an useful purpose for the development of Korean industry. But some misunderstanding exists concerning application of this aid, as illustrated by the following excerpt: ²¹

Despite the hundreds of millions of dollars expended, few Americans know much about the realities of aid, and fewer still have any understanding of either the Korean or the U.S. position on its implementation. Quite possibly this is due to the complexity of the assistance itself and to the historical setting. But whatever the reason, the lack of knowledge is unfortunate, because it leads to differences that never arise.

A recent statement by Senator Ellender of Louisiana provides a striking example. Ellender came to Korea to inspect aid projects and when he returned home he said that the United States should not reconstruct Korean industry and then turn such factories over to the Korean government. Such a policy, he said, is abetting 'socialism' in Korea. We know, of course, that Ellender is an avowed opponent of U.S. aid programs in general, and we would not have been surprised if he had advocated the withdrawal of assistance from all countries. But to his credit, the Senator did not do that. In fact he specifically endorsed continued help for Korea and some other Free Asian countries, and he did not raise any questions about military aid.

Out of ignorance or misinformation, or both, Ellender implied that Korea has a socialistic economy, that it is using American aid funds to strengthen socialism, and that U.S. aid administrators are assisting the process. He is wrong on all three counts. Where he obtained this false impression, we do not know.

Perhaps it was planted by some of the foreign businessmen who are being asked to pay taxes on the same basis as our own entrepreneurs. In their view, all taxes not levied by the United States are socialistic, and they have sought to bring pressure upon the U.S. Congress to stop all aid while they blackmail their way to extra-territorial privileges...

5. DR. JOHN A. HANNAH'S VIEW OF THE KOREAN ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM

The Special Committee to study the foreign aid program of the United States was created under the authority of Senate Resolution 235, agreed to July 11, 1956. The Committee is composed of all members of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the chairman and ranking minority member of the Senate Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Armed Services. A survey of foreign aid programs in the Far East was undertaken by Dr. John A. Hannah, President of Michigan State University, Dr. Howard S. Piquet, senior specialist in international economics of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, and Dr. Emory W. Morris, President of the Kellogg Foundation. The countries surveyed were Korea, Japan, Taiwan (Formosa) and the Philippines. Dr. Hannah and his staff remained in Korea for a week to inspect various institutions. Upon his return to the United States, he submitted a report to the 85th Congress in March, 1957, in which he described the Korean situation as follows: ²²

They know that without assistance from the United States they would be in an impossible situation. Directly north of the demarcation zone is a Communist army which

is better equipped than they in terms of airfields, air support, and modern military equipment. They know that their own military forces are dependent upon American air support in faraway Japan or Okinawa. They feel that they are as competent as the Communists to use modern aircraft and other military weapons if only they had them to use...

They know that without United States aid it will not be possible for them to establish a viable civilian economy. They are worried about statements that are made from time to time by responsible persons in the United States regarding the possibility of terminating, or drastically curtailing, United States aid...

The United Nations forces have continued to comply with the terms of the armistice agreement, which specifies that old equipment may be replaced only by equipment of the same type. In consequence, we now have there an assortment of largely obsolete World War II type military weapons. We have not added to the number of airfields and we have replaced wornout aircraft with aircraft of the type in vogue during the Korean war.

Dr. Hannah stated that the aid program should be based upon the following objectives:

1. To strengthen the Korean armed forces.
2. To make it possible for the Korean government to assume an increasing share of the country's defense costs.
3. To increase the capacity of Korea to support itself economically.
4. To assist in the attaining of economic stability.
5. And to provide training for Korean government administrative and technical personnel.

Dr. Hannah further stated that "Korea now has the second largest army in the free world, numbering over 700,000 men. It is heavily dependent upon the American aid program for its

support and maintenance. The American people should be aware that to maintain an American army in Korea, equivalent in terms of manpower to that being maintained there now by the Republic of Korea, with American support, would cost between 6 and 10 times as much as at present. Koreans make good soldiers and when well trained and equipped constitute an effective fighting force. On the economic side, we are spending approximately \$300 million a year in Korea. In fiscal 1956 approximately \$100 million of economic aid was for project assistance and \$185 million for nonproject assistance. The bulk of the project assistance is in the fields of industry, mining, and transportation. Even though development progress is slow, it seems to be moving in the right direction..."

In the concluding section, Dr. Hannah strongly asserted that the people of the United States should recognize that in Korea, and in the Koreans, there is a nation and a people that look in only one direction for leadership and assistance, and that is to the United States. He said, they place their faith and their hope in the future in our hands, insisting only that they not be surrendered to the Communists. Our military commanders have confidence in the Koreans as soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, given the proper training and the proper equipment.

Again he stated, the Korean problem is peculiarly an American problem. From every standpoint -- military, economic, and humanitarian -- we should work in cooperation with them, he said,

assisting them to help themselves develops a society that will assure their freedom, hope, and opportunity. Dr. Hannah added, "This does not mean that we must go on forever expending hundreds of millions of dollars in Korea. But we should spend what is required and that will be in substantial amount for some years to come."

6. AMERICAN MILITARY AID PROGRAM

Military aid to the Republic of Korea since 1945 can be categorized into two parts: military equipment transferred to Korea when the American forces withdrew from Korea in July 1949 and material furnished under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. The military equipment which was delivered under the authority of the Surplus Property Act had an original cost value of \$56,000,000 and a replacement value of \$110,000,000. It included sizable quantities of small arms, such as rifles, carbines, pistols, grenades, machine-guns, bazookas, howitzers, mortars, and ammunition; a large quantity of signal equipment; 20 liaison aircraft; nearly 5,000 trucks; and 79 vessels. ²³

Equipment for about 15,000 South Korean troops, estimated at a little less than \$1,000,000, was supplied from American depots in Japan. ²⁴ The Mutual Defense Assistance Act for Korea included approximately \$11,000,000 in assistance, deliveries of essential commodities to begin in July 1950. ²⁵ No military supplies had reached the Republic of Korea under this program

before the outbreak of the war in June, 1950.²⁶ Naval guns, ammunition, and aircraft armament valued at \$235,000 were sold to the Republic of Korea under the reimbursable-aid provisions of the act. No provision was made for a Korean air force.²⁷ The United States equipped and trained 150,000 men without heavy artillery, tanks, or planes.²⁸

Since the Korean war of 1950, the Korean defense forces have been gradually equipped with the aid of the United States. In addition, in each year several hundred high-ranking military officers are invited to the United States for training in the use of modern American weapons and operations. On the other hand, the Communists have been steadily growing stronger. South Korea has suffered a serious depletion of military strength. The United States pulled out all but two of its divisions and most of its airpower. South Korea has gained a few divisions, but they are not fully organized and for the most part have nothing more powerful than handweapons. Korea's air build up has begun with the delivery of the first Sabrejets, but within a few years available planes will be dangerously inferior, numerically, to those available to North Korea.

All of South Korea's weapons are of Korean war vintage. A good many of them are not only obsolete, but actually worn out. The army also lacks tires, gasoline, communications equipment and generators. Even regular divisions do not have enough ammunition for essential training. Part of this dearth is the

result of delays in the military aid program.

American military aid has been given generously and always with the best of intentions. Koreans understand the United States has helped Korea more than any other country in the world, but it is suggested that the United States should increase military aid. Unless Korea is well equipped, Korea as well as Free Asia will face another bloody struggle.

FOOTNOTES

1. The World Almanac, New York, World-Telegram, The Sun Co., 1957, pp. 424-5.
2. Ibid., p. 425.
3. On exploitation of the Korean economy by the Japanese, see Chapter I. See Chapter II for more details about transfer of Japanese properties to the Korean government by the American military authorities in 1948.
4. Korea Today, Yesterday and Tomorrow, Washington D.C., Korean Pacific Press, p. 9.
5. A. J. Bloomfield and J. P. Jensen, Banking Reform in South Korea, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1951, p. 14.
6. The New York Times, May 27, 1949.
7. D. S. Cheever and H. F. Haviland Jr., Organizing for Peace, Cambridge, Mass., Houghton Mifflin Co., 1954, p. 457.
8. Ibid., pp. 544-5.
9. Joint Statement by Secretary of State John F. Dulles and President Syngman Rhee, Washington, Government Printing Office, October 8, 1953.
10. "Report on the Economic Progress: Well on the Way," Seoul Times, December 11, 13, 1953.
11. "Korean Aid Progress," The Korean Republic, July 16, 1957.
12. John A. Hannah, Korea, Japan, Taiwan (Formosa) and the Philippines, Pursuant to S. Res. 285, 84th Cong., and S. Res. 35, 85th Cong., Survey No. 5. Government Printing Office, 1957, p. 16.
13. The present rate of Hwan and dollar exchange is 500 Hwan to a dollar.
14. Harry G. Brainard, International Economic Policies and Public Policy, New York, Henry Holt and Co., 1954, p. 45.
15. Korea Flaming High, Office of Public Information, Vol. II, 1956, pp. 121-3.
16. The Korean Republic, July 2, 1957.
17. Ibid., May 13, 1957.
18. "Aid to underdeveloped areas," Address by Gordon R. Clapp, Institute of Public Affairs, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, July 10, 1951.
19. "Variant Concepts of Point Four," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, July, 1950, p. 60.
20. "Showplace of Democracy," Where Korea Stand, Office of Public Information, 1955, p. 39.
21. "Misinformation About Aid," Ibid., pp. 24-5.
22. Hannah, op. cit., pp. 11-16.
23. U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Background Information on Korea, H. R. 2495, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1950, pp. 34-5.

24. R. Opie, The Search for Peace Settlements, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution, 1951, p. 316.
25. U.S. Department of State, Conflict in Korea, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1951, p. 10.
26. Ibid., p. 11.
27. Opie, op. cit., p. 316.
28. The New York Times, July 27, 1956.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS FOR KOREA

During the thirteen years since the defeat of Japan, Korea has emerged as one of the areas important to both the definition and the maintenance of the position of power and responsibility assumed by the United States. Representative Charles Eaton of New Jersey, the former ranking Republican member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, stressed the definitive role of Korea when he said that "Korea constitutes a laboratory wherein may best be observed the nature and the causes of the cold war in which Russia and the United States are engaged." ¹

Repeatedly, spokesmen for the United States, including President Truman and successive Secretaries of State, have pointed out that in the peninsula of Korea events projected an inescapable test between communism and democracy. North of the thirty-eighth parallel Russia instituted its own totalitarian political and economic system. South of that artificial barrier the United States stimulated and sought to guide the development of a westernized pattern of democracy. Inescapably Korea became a showcase in which have been displayed some aspects of the ideologies struggling for the allegiance of the two million inhabitants of the globe. ²

The three and a half years of American military occupation in Korea supplied much material and personnel as well as the

principles and practice of American democracy. United States responsibility for the present situation in Korea has been, and is, enormous. It is a responsibility shared, but not lessened, by the USSR, and by independence-hungry Korean leaders not yet prepared for full responsibility.

Today Korea is divided by an artificial barrier and two governments claim sovereignty over all of Korea and operate in divergent patterns on each side of the line. Both governments depend upon outside forces and nations for aid and protection. Divided Korea today is far from being free and independent; it has made but few and faltering steps in that direction.

The United States has a peculiar responsibility for Korea in spite of official efforts to ignore, deprecate, or side-step it. The United States was the first Western nation to break into Korea's medieval isolation by means of its 1882 treaty of amity and commerce. For twenty years after the signing of this document American representatives were favored at the Korean court. They were considered influential agents of a friendly power during a period when Korea was subject to the pressures of a major rivalry between China and Japan and a minor one between England and Russia. China was eliminated as a possible ally in 1895, England in 1902, Russia in 1905. The two powers then left in the field were the United States and Japan. President Roosevelt saw no reason at that time for opposing Japanese expansion on the Asiatic continent and so, by the end

of 1905, Japan had no competitor for Korea except the Koreans themselves and they were unable to stop the annexation which came in 1910.

During the four decades of Japanese occupation in Korea, the Korean people experienced the bitter taste of oppression which has developed a deep-seated distrust of foreign intrusion. They are of an intensely nationalistic nature, and greatly desire self-government. The national movement in Korea is symbolic of a general political awakening. The possible resurgence of Japan is feared, as well as the powerful influence of other foreign countries, owing to Japanese domination and to Chinese invasions in the past.

The late American diplomat W. P. Sands, in his book, Undiplomatic Memories, stated, "There was nothing strange in the Koreans' fear of foreigners and their determination not to admit them." ³ The Korean people regard foreign promises cynically, and display an acute sense of political realism acquired by long experience as subjects of foreign rivalry. Their political consciousness includes a regard for the rights of the individual. They have become neither serf nor slave under the illegal exactions of oppressors. Though they would welcome a life of peace without foreign interference, their willingness to fight an invader is deeply rooted. As a consequence, they are called the "Irish of the Orient."

1. MILITARY GOVERNMENT OCCUPATION IN KOREA

The progress made in South Korea by the American Military Government in restoring local administration, reestablishing educational facilities, improving sanitation, restoring transportation and communication, reclaiming arable land, initiating a reforestation program, improving flood control, rehabilitating the fishing industry, establishing a constabulary and military, creating modern police forces, instituting social welfare programs, and preventing widespread starvation were distinct gains, as was indicated at various points in this study.

Whether the Koreans were equipped for effective self-government during the three and a half years of American Military Government in Korea can be answered in a way which reflects a measure of credit upon the Military Government. At least in an administrative sense the Americans made efforts to train Koreans in governmental responsibility, and as soon as practicable, transferred such responsibilities to native jurisdiction. But the Military Government rule was unable to provide a stable economy. Perhaps it is due to the thirty-eighth parallel's being converted into an "iron curtain;" and responsibility must be assigned to the Russians for this condition.

Other accomplishments could be claimed in evaluating the years of United States control over civil affairs in Korea. For example, did this control over civil affairs serve as a "bulwark

against Communism"? This could only be superficially affirmed, since American rightist bias drove moderates into the ranks of the leftists and fellow-travelers. The bulwark was largely facade. It may be suggested that whether American administrators were especially fitted for their task, and were permitted to exercise independent judgment in developing policies, is of major importance. The study has shown the lack of training of American administrative personnel.⁴ The following statement by Meade may serve as the best illustration:⁵

The Korean attitude on independence was demonstrated in December, 1945, when a group officer, following a tour of the province, reported to the military governor of Cholla Nam Do; 'These people want neither us nor the Russians. They are extremely grateful at being liberated from the Japanese yoke, but are now anxious to bid us both God-speed so that they may be left to their own salvation.' American foreign policy gained little or nothing by disregarding this sentiment for three years. On the other hand, it lost much. The faith of Koreans in United States world leadership and sense of obligation was undermined by our inertia. The Korean people felt that the shifting emphasis of our policy precluded their relying upon us to secure their basic objectives. The resulting attitude of many was forcefully expressed by Kim Kyu Sik: 'If we cannot unite, independence is impossible...Our independence cannot come from war between the big powers or from peace among them...It is obvious that we can obtain independence only through our own hands, and if we are going to be prosperous let us be so by our own efforts.' What policy would have promoted best our future relationship with the Koreans? The United States was faced with three choices: (1) continue to existing policy; (2) withdraw completely from the peninsula; or (3) remain until initial objectives were realized. The existing policy would have reacted adversely upon our future relations with Korea and our position in the Far East. To realize our Cairo commitments we must support the

government of South Korea to the limit necessary to achieve united independence as quickly as possible...

At any rate, the development of South Korean affairs was regarded by many Koreans as very satisfactory compared with the North Korean regime. The Military Government faced difficulties, however, in the administration of its program, as it was handicapped by a difficult language barrier, and was without sufficient orientation in regard to Korea and Koreans. In addition, it faced the task of remodeling the governmental machinery set up by the Japanese. The major political problem, however, was the establishment of a democratic Korean leadership, a necessary element in the development of a modern democracy.

2. KOREAN WAR OF 1950

The story about the Korean war is of significance for many reasons. What has happened in and to Korea is a valuable case study of an area in which the "cold war" has been exceedingly "hot." War-time Korea offers a heartening example of the almost unbelievable resilience of spirit of a people who cannot be beaten down into apathy and despair, because they know the value of the freedom for which they fight. It offers a valuable laboratory in which may be studied the newly-evolving methods utilized by the United Nations for aiding an exposed outpost in

the twentieth century life-and-death struggle between totalitarian aggression and an uneasy alliance of free people. What has happened in Korea might have turned out much better if the world had had a previous example of a similar type from which to learn badly-needed lessons. At the very least, we should learn what we can from this experience so that the errors made there need not be repeated elsewhere. Robert T. Oliver states in condemning the American people's attitude toward the Korean war: 6

For one thing, the Administration denied that what was happening in Korea was war. It was a 'police action,' instead. Forthright Americans, who had ridiculed Japan's claim that its four and a half years of aggression against China prior to Pearl Harbor was not a war but merely an 'incident,' were shocked to find their own government indulging in what sounded like a similar play on words. When is a war not a war? Both the Executive and Legislative officials insisted that this police action must not be allowed to interfere with the civilian economy. Luxury goods continued to pour from the factories. Night clubs did their usual business. The Red Cross pleas for blood sounded unreal and a year passed before the Government dared launch a war bond drive. Even in the midst of one of the worst defeats our military had been forced to endure, during the summer of 1950, our public was rather more concerned with color television, new motor cars, baseball, and the exotic love life of Rita Hayworth than with the repetitive banner headlines of new retreats toward Pusan.

By the fall of 1951, newsmen were calling the action in Korea 'the half forgotten war.' Anna Rosenberg, the Department of National Defense's manpower director, that fall told American soldiers in Korea that their folks back home didn't know what the war was all about. A 'police action' was something new to which our people didn't know how to adjust. The feelings of frustrated

exasperation became even greater when the Administration's proliferating phrase-maker substituted 'limited war' as an alternative term...As one officer back from the front lines disgustedly said, 'We need not only combat troops but a corps of lawyers to fight this damned thing.' Confusion was confounded when Chinese troops poured into the battle, yet we were constrained from bombing their bases and supply lines behind the 'sanctuary.'...Everyone knew and our officials frankly said that Russia was the real enemy and directing power behind the aggression...

No matter how the story runs, the Korean war is something more than a Soviet experiment in the peninsula or in the war itself. Its tap roots are deeply embedded in events which occurred years before, some of them relating to Soviet and American military-political decisions arrived at during World War II. Neither Washington nor Moscow, it is clear, foresaw what pernicious results would follow those decisions.

According to some Americans, the Korean tragedy would never have occurred had the Soviet Union not attempted to establish a "friendly" government in the peninsula. Such a government, in Soviet terminology, has usually meant a Communist-dominated satellite, where true independence is non-existent. Certainly, in 1943, when President Roosevelt gave America's pledge at Cairo that Korea would be free and independent, he did not envision that his nation would be compelled to fight a Korean war to save at least a portion of freedom in the peninsula.

Roosevelt's plan for Korea foundered and so did most of

his hopes for the postwar world. Faced with this collapse, the United States embarked on a program of improvisation to stem the march of Communism. In Europe the improvisation succeeded. In Asia, particularly in China, it failed. In Korea, it was only half successful, at best.

The attack on South Korea and the years of war and peace which followed were of historic significance in that the surprised American people, only ten to fifteen years after emerging from the chrysalis of isolationism, took up the role of international policemen, pledging themselves in Asia to defend the lives and liberties of the people of South Korea, Japan, Formosa, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Australia, and New Zealand. Americans do not yet quite realize the burden they have so recently shouldered.

It is true Americans have slighted Asia, but that is because Asia, backward and "primitive" has rarely posed a real threat to American security. That situation is changing. A modern, industrialized Asia will certainly have greater impact on the world in the future and American foreign policy will have to give greater recognition to this fact.

There is the viewpoint of the Koreans, especially those patriots who had placed their high hopes in America. Who among them could have foreseen what finally came to pass? Korea's great leader, Rhee, hoped American power would help reestablish a unified Korea in the family of nations. Instead, a monstrosity

was born -- two Koreas, neither of which can properly exist without the other, but both of which, for political reasons, have been forced to travel separate paths. ⁷

This meaning of the Korean war is already clearly apparent, and others have at least become the subject of significant debate. One viewpoint, as presented by Oliver, is expressed in the following summary: ⁸

1. The Korean war presented the free world with a challenge it was not yet ready to meet.

Communist imperialism, in its several guises, succeeded in the period 1945-50 in bringing under Soviet influence an additional pullulation of the U.S.S.R. This steady and threatening extension of power was achieved by agreement (as at Yalta), by the collapse of governments under pressure (as in the fall of China). The sending of an armed force across a recognized national boundary to attack the Republic of Korea marked a new departure of Soviet imperialism. This open attack offered the first real opportunity the free world has had to meet Communist aggression and hurl it back...

2. Korea served as an "alarm bell" to impel adoption of a real armament and preparedness program in the United States and in Western Europe.

The former emphasis upon "butter before guns" has been checked even though it is not yet actually reversed. Politicians debate the relative amounts to be spent upon armaments, and defense officials debate whether to "freeze" current designs and go into full-scale production or whether to continue experimentation to produce better weapons before the go-ahead signal is given to the airplane and

and armament plants. But despite these differences of opinion, by the second anniversary of the Communist attack in Korea; (1) American arms production was seven times its "Pre-Korean" rate; (2) Pacific Security Pacts had been signed by the United States with the Philippines, Japan, Australia and New Zealand; (3) the North Atlantic Organization emerged from the talking to the action stage; and (4) public opinion became adjusted to the fact that the free world might have to fight and sacrifice to defeat Communist imperialism.

3. The Korean war has served as a valuable training ground for American, Chinese Communist, and Republic of Korea forces as well as, in lesser degree, for other powers as well.

Russia and the United States have been enabled to "try out" certain weapons, though both have carefully kept their ultra-modern weapons concealed. The Republic of Korea has had its first opportunity to produce a real army and has notably succeeded in doing so. In this sense, Korea is playing a role today similar to that played by Spain from July, 1936, to the end of 1938. Whether the sequel will be the same is not so clearly apparent.

4. During the course of the Korean war the Communist Empire has been proved to be monolithic and tightly organized.

At the same time, the disunity of the democratic alliance has become tragically evident. The United States has had to struggle as hard to hold its Allies together as it has to fight the enemy. Similar disunity has appeared within the United States, with the bi-partisan foreign policy so carefully nursed by Senator Vandenberg and others broken asunder. This disunity has been heightened

by internal political struggles in the United States, Great Britain and France...

Aside from these four conclusions, which appear to be widely accepted, several vital questions concerning the meaning of the war in Korea remain in sharp controversy. Such as:

1. Should the "MacArthur plan" for winning the war have been followed?
2. Should Red China be recognized?
3. Is the United Nations the proper agency through which to seek solutions of major international crises?
4. What kind of preparedness program should be adopted?

At the time of this writing, nearly five years after the war, the problem of Korea's reunification seems insoluble. Korea's destiny remains inextricably tied to the overall world struggle between the Communist bloc, led by the Soviet Union, and the free nations, led by the United States. If, someday, somehow, there is to be a happy conclusion for Korea, as well as for the other nations on the Communist periphery threatened by direct and indirect aggression, it will surely be because the American people remained steadfast in the leadership which was thrust upon them; and specifically because they maintain their military strength.

Speaking on the fourth anniversary of the Communist invasion, President Rhee addressed cheering hundreds of thousands of Koreans massed in Seoul Municipal Stadium, calling upon the Allies to

strengthen the military forces of the Republic of Korea and then "join us in saving Southeast Asia" from the Communists. The President concluded, "Even if our friends hesitate, shutting their eyes to realities, we Koreans will not sheepishly wait until we have become Communist slaves." He added: ⁹

Today marks the beginning of the fifth year since the Communists announced to the world their determination to conquer all free peoples. Their announcement came in the form of an all-out military attack upon the Republic of Korea. I would prefer to forget this day and that event rather than honor them in memory. This anniversary is one of pain, death and tragic disappointment...

Our Allies have learnt a lesson too. After being ridiculed by Communists and people of the Free World for trying to avoid all-out war through negotiations with aggressors -- first at Kaesong, then Panmunjom, then Geneva -- our Allies finally have realized the uselessness of such talks. When 16 nations jointly walked out of the Geneva conference in unanimous support of the decisions of the Republic of Korea and the United States, they took the first determined steps toward dealing with the Communists in a manner the Communists cannot avoid respecting. Hereafter, no one from the anti-Communist nations will propose another such conference without branding himself an appeaser or collaborator. The time consumed by these talks was a valuable contribution to the Communist cause...

I close these remarks with the declaration that, even if our friends hesitate, shutting their eyes to realities, we Koreans will not sheepishly wait until we have become Communist slaves...

On July 27, 1953, the Armistice was signed by representatives of the two military commands at Panmunjom. However, it did not achieve the United Nations objective of repelling and punishing the Communist aggressors in Korea, and the ultimate goal of national unification is still far from accomplishment.

3. CONFLICTING OPINIONS OF KOREA

Opinions differ from one person to another because human beings are not all alike. Differences among men are important because they underlie the conflicts which have shaken the world since history began. With this in mind, here is summary of opinions uttered by some prominent persons in viewing the Korean war; 10

The United Nations bravely and clearly recognized the full meaning of the attack against us in 1950. They demanded the reunification of all Korea and denounced the Chinese invaders as aggressors. This was a proper assessment of what had to be done in Korea to maintain the collective security of the free world. It remains the task that confronts us today.

President Syngman Rhee, May 16, 1952.

We went into Korea because we knew that Communist aggression had to be met firmly if freedom was to be preserved in the world. We went into the fight to save the Republic of Korea, a free country, established under the United Nations. There are our aims. We will not give up until we attain them.

President Harry S. Truman, January 9, 1952.

I repeat here what I said many months ago -- the first line of freedom's defense is not the Elbe, not the Rhine, but it is in Korea on the Yalu.

General Douglas MacArthur, March 22, 1952.

We are not fighting to win in Korea. And that is not

the American way of fighting...It resolves itself to this: We have got our foot stuck in the door. We can't get in or out. We are there. Period.

General Daniel H. Hudelson, Former Commander of the 40th Infantry Division, in Korea June 22, 1952.

A workable form of modern democratic government with the classic checks and balances was being molded out of the crucible of events as they affected the Korean character and capabilities. I consider this a phenomenal record of progress.

U.S. Ambassador John J. Muccio, May 30, 1952.

We could have smashed the enemy completely if we could have sent our aircraft across the Yalu River at the right time. I had the planes and the boys were anxious to cut loose.

General George E. Stratemeyer, February 1952.

We should let it be known that we are prepared to bomb the mainland of China from the air and bombard it from the sea if the Reds continue to reject reasonable truce terms.

General Carl Spaatz, February 4, 1952.

The United Nations and the United States interest in driving the Communists to the Manchurian and Chinese borders obviously involves vastly more than extending the status of the South Korean Republic. It involves the total fate of Asia and must be handled as such.

Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, October 24, 1950.

This is no localized war. It is a war with the Russians, fought as they wish to fight it, without bombers and atom bombs, but with their rifles and tanks and other nations' men. I personally don't think it will be over until we face the Ruskies themselves.

Unidentified Marine Corporal, back from Korea, quoted in Christian Science Monitor, January 24, 1952.

We do not know whether or when we shall have an end to the fighting in Korea...But even if an armistice is signed...We shall have to remain on guard...There will remain the task of rehabilitating that suffering land. And there will remain the task of realizing the U.N. objective of unifying Korea.

Secretary Dean Acheson, December 30, 1951.

For centuries Korea has been recognized as a vital strategic area in Asia.

Manchester Guardian editorial, June 26, 1950.

The thing to do is to let South Korea fall, but not to let it look as if we pushed it.

Owen Lattimore, July 17, 1949.

On July 8, 1957, The Korean Republic, daily Korean English newspaper, reprinted an editorial from the Honolulu Star-Bulletin under the head-line "Honolulu Paper Warns Reds May Strike Before ROK Gets Arms." The following comment may serve as the best future prospect of the Korean situation and American Military Policy toward Korea: 11

...For four years the U.N. has sat by while the Communists of North Korea and Red China, encouraged and backed by Soviet Russia, have enlarged airfields and built new ones, and heavily augmented the troops and equipment located there when the Panmunjom Armistice was signed. The Armistice, ending (theoretically) the fighting of the Korean war, has been, in historic words, 'a scrap of paper.' The ink was hardly dry on the signatures when the Communists north of the dividing line, began deliberate violation. They had pledged themselves not to carry out an arms build-up in the north. This was flouted, almost derisively so.

New Airfield:

The United Nations Command in Korea knew it was being violated. Their own observers could see from afar the construction of new airfields. And the South Korean intelligence service got details from scores of refugees from the north who crept across the 'No Man's Land.' More than two years ago 'neutrals' on the United Nations Commission in Korea realized that the pledge was being violated. They so reported to their home government. And the team itself reported to the United Nations that Reds were constantly and dangerously building up strength in north for another attack on the south Korea. Nearly two months ago President Syngman Rhee of the Republic of Korea directly warned that the Red build-up had grown to menacing proportions.

Weapons Inadequacy:

This was in an extensive interview he gave to Robert E. Monahan of the United Press. Rhee deplored the inadequacy of the weapons supplied by the U.S. and the U.N. to the South Korean defense forces. Action has come late. Perhaps too late. Already the Reds of the north, through the puppet 'premier' Communist Kim Il Sung, are sounding off in protest. This could be the beginning of another strike by the north across the border. Already the government of the Republic of Korea has issued orders cancelling all military leaves for its 700,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen and put them on military alert.

U.S. and U.N. leaders should have learned from the terrible lesson of the invasion from North Korea that pledges and treaties mean nothing inviolable to the Reds. Today they are in position to launch another

devastating attack on southern Korea. They will be restrained only by the fact that the U.S. with its nuclear weapons is in position to strike back with enormous destruction.

So far, the author has examined a variety of opinions in regard to the Korean war and its related problems. Most of the ideological conflicts were removed through mutual compromise and understanding except one major problem; that is, the Korean government requested that large portions of foreign aid should be given in the form of weapons, the training of personnel, and other forms of direct and indirect subsidy. Now the Korean government needs much subsidization to meet the military deficit. To quote an official voice: "We hope sincerely that the United States can find a way to help -- to the end that both Korea's security and reconstruction will be greatly abetted. If such a contribution can be coupled with modernization of the ROK Armed Forces, we need have no fears about the outcome of the final struggle with Communists." ¹²

The conflict in Korea was the war nobody loved. The Communists did not count on having to fight an all-out war, having trusted that the weakness of South Korea and the withdrawal of the United States troops, despite the opposition expressed by the Korean people and their leaders, would leave the prize to be plucked by a mere show of ferocious strength from across the thirty-eighth parallel. The war proved to be

a prolonged and increasingly painful embarrassment. To the United States it became a multi-billion dollar drain, a source of dangerous political disruption, and the fourth most costly war in history in terms of human casualties.

4. ECONOMIC REHABILITATION

The greater part of Korea's mineral wealth was in the north as was the heavy industry. The lighter consumer goods and processing industries were concentrated in the south, along with the larger share of agriculture. But the mineral resources and the heavy industries of North Korea are almost valueless to the North Koreans because there are no means of converting the raw materials into consumer goods, nor are there export markets where they can be traded.

In South Korea, on the other hand, there are many manufacturing plants, but most of them need the raw materials from North Korea, among other urgent requirements. The rice fields need synthetic fertilizer and the railways need coal. The blockade at the thirty-eighth parallel denies these commodities to South Korea. In food supply, also, the dividing line causes real hardship. South Korea, the rice-producing area, has withheld its rice crop from North Korea, leaving North Korea with less than its limited supply under Japanese dominion, whereas South Korea possesses more than double its previous supply.

In short, in most characterisations of the two zones, for purposes of comparison, South Korea is termed an agricultural area and North Korea an industrial zone. ¹³

In order to maintain at least a minimum standard of living, North Korea needs to exchange its heavy industrial goods for the consumer goods and food which can be produced in the south. However, the present situation does not allow South Koreans and North Koreans to exchange commodities, and South Korea must trade with others than North Korea.

Most of the South Korean trade is transacted with the non-Communist countries and none of the trade is with North Korea. At the same time, Korea is still dependent on large-scale foreign aid in order to mend the root-and-branch dislocations which prevail throughout the entire economy. It is evident that the help given to Korea by the United States must be for the sake of Koreans, and not merely for the sake of those supplying the aid; and that rebuilding a community is as important as the physical force necessary to be maintained against communism.

(The author has emphasised industrialization elsewhere in this thesis. The struggle for economic stability and the search for a common standard of human rights and fundamental freedoms bear witness to the gap between purpose and achievement. Hasty industrialization is the only method which may provide the veneer of a high standard of living. In spite of their unfortunate past and their present uncertainty, the Korean people

are determined to turn evil to good by their incessant and unfailing efforts to build a new life. They hope to transform their war-torn, battered, and disorganized country into a self-sustaining nation capable of yielding a reasonable livelihood and a prosperity commensurate with their abilities and resources, and to join the Western nations in a more advanced way of life in a unified Korea of the future.

FOOTNOTES

1. E. Grant Meade, American Military Government In Korea, New York, King's Crown Press, Columbia University Press, 1952, p. v.
2. Ibid.
3. William F. Sands, Undiplomatic Memories, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1930, p. 146.
4. See Chapter II of this thesis and Meade, op. cit., Chapter II.
5. Meade, op. cit., p. 236.
6. Robert T. Oliver, Verdict in Korea, Lebanon, Pa., Bald Eagle Press, State College, Pa., 1952, p. 9.
7. See Chapter II. See also Carl Berger, The Korean Knot, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1957, Chapter 15.
8. Oliver, op. cit., pp. 195. 207.
9. Korea Flaming High, Office of Public Information of ROK, Vol. II, 1956, pp. 33. 37.
10. "Twelve Jurors -- Divided Verdict," Oliver, op. cit., pp. 5-6.
11. "Reds May Strike Before ROK Gets Arms," Korean Republic, July 8, 1957.
12. Where Korea Stand, Office of Public Information of ROK, 1955, p. 38.
13. George M. McCune, and Arthur L. Grey Jr., Korea Today, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1950, pp. 54-5.

APPENDIX - A
A KOREAN CHRONOLOGY

August 22, 1910..... Korea was annexed by Japan.

December 1, 1943..... China, Great Britain, and the United States declared in the Cairo Declaration, that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

August 15, 1945..... Liberation of Korea by the Allies, and the division along the 38th parallel.

December 27, 1945..... Moscow Meeting: Great Britain, Soviet Russia, and the United States agreed to "reestablishment of Korea as an independent state." (China subsequently agreed.)

March 20, 1946..... The American and Soviet Joint Commission was established to assist in the forming of a Korean government. Months of discussion in the Joint Commission brought a deadlock on major problems.

September 17, 1947..... The United States referred the Korean matter to the United Nations.

November 14, 1947..... The United Nations established the UN Temporary Commission on Korea.

January 12, 1948..... The United Nations Temporary Commission met in Seoul, and reported to the UN its inability to contact authorities in North Korea.

May 10, 1948..... Election sponsored by the UN held in South Korea.

August 15, 1948..... Establishment of the Republic of Korea with Rhee as the first President of South Korea.

August 25, 1948..... Establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with Kim, Il Sung as the first Premier of North Korea.

December 31, 1948..... The evacuation of Soviet troops from North Korea.

January 19, 1949..... The Republic of Korea applied for membership in the United Nations.

January 29, 1949..... The withdrawal of US occupation forces except for five hundred members of the American Military Advisory Group in South Korea.

June 25, 1950..... The outbreak of the Korean war: US requested the Secretary-General to call an immediate meeting of the Security Council.

June 30, 1950..... President Truman ordered US ground troops to Korea.

July 7, 1950..... General MacArthur appointed United Nations Commander in Korea.

October 26, 1950..... United Nations troops reached Manchurian border.

November 26, 1950..... Chinese Communists launched massive drive.

April 11, 1951..... President Truman dismissed General MacArthur, and named General Matthew Ridgeway as new Supreme Commander.

June 23, 1951..... Russia's Jacob Malik, on a UN radio program said, "Discussion should be started for a ceasefire."

July 10, 1951..... UN and Communist representatives met in the first truce session.

May 11, 1952..... General Mark Clark replaced General Matthew B. Ridgeway as Supreme Commander.

June 23, 1952..... Five hundred Allied planes crippled North Korean hydroelectric plants.

December 2-4, 1952..... President Dwight D. Eisenhower inspected Korean military situation.

April 26, 1953..... The armistice negotiations were resumed at Panmunjom after a recess of six and a half months.

June 26, 1953..... President Eisenhower's envoy, Walter S. Robertson, began talks with President Rhee.

July 27, 1953..... The armistice agreement was signed at Panmunjom at 10:00 a.m. Lt. Gen. William K. Harrison, Jr., signed for the United Nations Command; Lt. Gen. Nam Il, signed for the North Koreans and Chinese.

August 5, 1953..... The U.S. economic aid plan for South Korea, involving an appropriation of \$200,000,000 announced.

April 26, 1954..... A conference held at Geneva to discuss the unification of Korea, ending in failures.

July 26, 1954..... President Rhee came to the United States, asking economic and military aid for the Republic of Korea.

November 17, 1954..... The U.S. agreed to provide Korea in the fiscal year 1954-55 with \$450,000,000 of military assistance and \$250,000,000 of economic aid.

June 19, 1955..... The U.S. provided Korea, in the fiscal year of 1955-56, with \$460,000,000 of economic and military aid.

APPENDIX - B

THE KOREAN DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

We herewith proclaim the independence of Korea and the liberty of the Korean people. We tell it to the world in witness of the equality of all nations and we pass it on to our posterity as their inherent right.

We, 20,000,000 united loyal people, make this proclamation, having back of us 5,000 years of history and 20,000,000 of a united loyal people. We take this step to ensure to our children, for all time to come, personal liberty in accord with the awakening consciousness of this new era. This is the clear leading of God, the moving principle of the present age, the whole human race's just claim. It is something that cannot be stamped out or stifled or suppressed by any means.

Victims of an older age, when brute force and the spirit of plunder ruled, we have come after these long thousands of years of foreign oppression, with every loss to the right to live, every restriction of the freedom of thought, every damage done to the dignity of life, every opportunity lost for a share in the intelligent advance of the age in which we live.

Assuredly, if the defects of the past are to be rectified, if the agony of the present is to be unloosed, if future oppression is to be avoided, if thought is to be set free, if right of action is to be given a place, if we are to attain to any way of progress, if we are to deliver our children from a painful, shameful heritage, if we are to leave the blessing of happiness intact for those who succeed us, the first of all necessary things is the clear-cut independence of our people. What cannot our twenty million do, every man with sword in hand in this day when human nature and conscience are making a stand for truth and right? What barrier can we not break, what purpose can we not accomplish?

We have no desire to accuse Japan of breaking many solemn treaties since 1636, nor to single out especially the teachers in the schools or government officials who treat the heritage of our ancestors as a colony of their own, and our people and their civilization as a nation of savages, finding delight only in beating us down and bringing us under their heel.

We have no wish to find special fault with Japan's lack of fairness or her contempt of our civilization and the principles on which her state rests; we, who have greater cause to reprimand ourselves, need not spend precious time in finding fault with others; neither need we, who require so urgently to build for the future, spend useless hours over what is past and gone. Our urgent need today is the setting up of this house of ours and not a discussion of who has broken it down, or of what has

caused its ruin. Our work is to clear the future of defects in accord with the earnest dictates of conscience. Let us not be filled with bitterness or resentment over past agonies or past occasions for anger.

Our part is to influence the Japanese government, dominated as it is by the old idea of brute force which thinks to run counter to reason and universal law, so that it will change, act honestly and in accord with the principles of right and truth.

The result of annexation, brought about without any conference with the Korean people, is that the Japanese, indifferent to us, use every kind of partiality for their own, and by a false set of figures show a profit-and-loss account between us two peoples most untrue, digging a trench of everlasting resentment deeper and deeper the further they go.

Ought not the way of enlightened courage to be to correct the evils of the past by ways that are sincere, and by true sympathy and friendly feeling make a new world in which the two people will be equally blessed?

To bind by force twenty millions of resentful Koreans will mean not only loss of peace forever for this part of the Far East, but also will increase the ever growing suspicion of four hundred million of Chinese -- upon whom depends the danger or safety of the Far East -- besides strengthening the hatred of Japan. From this, all the rest of the East will suffer. Today, Korean independence will mean not only daily life and happiness for us, but also Japan's departure from an evil way, and exaltation to the place of true protector of the East, so that China, too, even in her dreams, would put all fear of Japan aside. This thought comes from no minor resentment, but from a large hope for the future welfare and blessing of mankind.

A new era wakes before our eyes, the old world of force is gone, and the new world of righteousness and truth is here. Out of the experience and travail of the old world arises this light on life's affairs. The insects stifled by the foe and snow of winter awake at this same time with the breezes of spring and the soft light of the sun upon them.

It is the day of the restoration of all things, on the full tide of which we set forth, without delay or fear. We desire a full measure of satisfaction in the way of liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and an opportunity to develop what is in us for the glory of the people.

We awake now from the old world with its darkened conditions, in full determination and one heart and one mind, with right on our side, along with the forces of nature, to a new life. May all the ancestors to the thousands and ten thousands of generations aid us from within, and all the force of the

world aid us from without, and let the day we take hold be the day of our attainment. In this hope we go forward.

THREE ITEMS OF AGREEMENT

1. This work of ours is in behalf of truth, religion and life, undertaken at the request of our people, in order to make known their desire for liberty. Let no violence be done to anyone.
2. Let those who follow us, every man, always every hour, show forth with gladness this same mind.
3. Let all things be done decently and in order, so that our behavior to the very end may be honorable and upright.

Third Month, The 4252 Year of the Kingdom of Korea.
Representatives of the People, who signed, as follows:

Son, Byung Hi
Paik, Long Sung
Kim, Chang Choon
La, Long Whan
Yang, Han Mook
Lee, Mung Yong
Lee, Chong Il
Paik, Hi Do
Sin, Suk Ku
Chung, Coon Su
Han, Yong Woon
Lee, Pil Chu
Kwon, Byung Duk
Lee, Kap Sung
Paik, Chun Seung
Oh, Wha Young
Hong, Ki Cho

Kil, Sun Chu
Kim, Won Kyo
Kwon, Dong Chin
La, In Hup
Lew, Yel Tae
Lee, Sung Hoon
Lim, Yei Whan
Pak, Tong Wan
Oh, Sei Chang
Choi, Sung Mo
Hong, Byung Ki
Kim, Pyung Cho
Yang, Chun Paik
Lee, Chong Hoon
Sin, Hong Sik
Choi, Lin

APPENDIX - C

MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

October 1, 1953

The parties to this treaty, reaffirming their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, and desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace in the Pacific area, desiring to declare publicly and formally their common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that either of them stands alone in the Pacific area, desiring further to strengthen their efforts for collective defense for the preservation of peace and security pending the development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

The parties undertake to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, or obligations assumed by any party toward the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

The parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of either of them, the political independence or security of either of the parties is threatened by external armed attack. Separately and jointly, by self-help and mutual aid, the parties will maintain and develop appropriate means to deter armed attack and will take suitable measures in consultation and

agreement to implement this treaty and to further its purposes.

ARTICLE III

Each party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the parties in territories now under their respective administrative control, or hereafter recognized by one of the parties as lawfully brought under the administrative control of the other, would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

ARTICLE IV

The Republic of Korea grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea as determined by mutual agreement.


ARTICLE V

This treaty shall be ratified by the Republic of Korea and the United States of America in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them at Washington.

ARTICLE VI

This treaty shall remain in force indefinitely. Either party may terminate it one year after notice has been given to the other party.

APPENDIX - D



Aikook-Ka, a patriotic song

1. Tong Hai Main and Pak-doo Moun-tain, Though they may drain and wear,
2. Naam Saan Hill - top cef-green pine trees, like troops of ar-moured men,
drain and wear,
ar-moured men,

May God bless our land Ku-re a for ev-er and ev-er!
Con-quiring the win-try frost-; Daunt-less our sym-bol.
for ev-er!
our sym-bol.

CHORUS

Moo koong-wha, Saam-chun-ree, O... beaut'-ful land; —
O beau-ti-ful land; beau-ti-ful.

You and I must pro-lect and nurse-; Long live our Fa-ther-land!

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