POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND INEQUALITY AMONG - .. " MUNICIPALITiES IN DETROIT Thesis for the Degree of M.‘ A. _ ' MICHIGAN. STATE UNWERSIW ALLEN EDWARD RADTKE -‘ ‘ 1975 ' 3 1293 {I'll I" II "I llll “I {WI 11“! (ILII 1ll [MUN Nfllflllfl ([11 ll L. r L0 ‘i luu\ : :3?! SEP 0 1’ 2003‘ .. '13" HEN! 2166? . 1 ‘ \ ABSTRACT POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND INEQUALITY AMONG MUNICIPALITIES IN DETROIT By Allen Edward Radtke This paper examines metropolitan political fragmentation and intermunicipal socio-economic differences over three decennial population censuses to discover if class and status segregation cor- responds with the process of political fragmentation over time. Central to this proposition is the idea that an increasing number of permanent political divisions within a metropolitan area will be characterized by increasing intermunicipal differences. In the United‘States metropolitan political fragmentation typically involves a fringe of autonomous municipalities surrounding a central city. This fragmentation enables isolation from the central city but per- mits optimal access to the benefits of public goods and services and other resources of the metropolitan arena. Intermunicipal differences were measured through income, life style indicators and the number of municipalities added inter- decennially to the Detroit Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). Data were gathered from the U.S. Bureau of the Census Popula- tion Censuses for 1950, 1960 and l970 for all Detroit SMSA munici- palities with 2,500 population or more. Three hypotheses were Allen Edward Radtke tested: that over time in the Detroit SMSA as political fragmentation increases intermunicipal socio-economic differences would become greater as measured by life style characteristics; that as status homogeneity is sought through residential locus, higher income munici- palities will be less unequal (more homogeneous) as measured by life style characteristics; that among new municipalities in the SMSA those which are new incorporations will tend to have both higher SES indi- cators and less inequality as measured by life style characteristics than for both the Detroit SMSA and new municipalities which are not new incorporations. Interval variations, standard deviation and a related measure, coefficient of variation, were used to measure in- equality in the distribution of income, education and poverty. The first two hypotheses were supported by the evidence of this research. The third hypothesis was supported by l960 data, but not by data for l970. A The major findings of this research were: (l) there is pronounced income segregation which has occurred since 1950; (2) the middle Class is a rapidly falling proportion of the residents of the city of Detroit, while at the same time in the suburbs the numbers of those who are below poverty level are falling; (3) the life style vari- ables of education are less demonstrative of the widening of social distance than the income variables, but still point to homogenization of status groups; (4) there are gross differences between the emerging municipalities included in the 1970 census data and the city of Detroit; (5) the growing numbers of municipalities in the Detroit SMSA are a Allen Edward Radtke manifestation of metropolitan disintegration by the drawing of race and class lines through specialized municipalities. POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND INEQUALITY AMONG MUNICIPALITIES IN DETROIT By Allen Edward Radtke A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Sociology 1975 Dedicated to Nancy ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Dr. Richard Hill, my committee chairman, has been mentor, teacher and critic during the writing of this work. To him I express deepest appreciation for his guidance and example of scholarship with- out which this work would not have reached completion. Special thanks go also to Dr. James McKee and Dr. Kay Snyder for reading, providing critiques of the manuscript and serving on the committee. I would also like to thank my wife, Nancy, and daughter, Elisabeth, and my parents for their patience, understanding and encour- agement. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES ........................ V INTRODUCTION ......................... l HYPOTHESES .......................... l9 DATA AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS ................. 22 FINDINGS ........................... 28 CONCLUSIONS ......................... 47 APPENDIX A: ANNEXATION ................... 54 APPENDIX B: POVERTY INCOME CUTOFFS ............. 57 APPENDIX C: TABLES ..................... 63 ENDNOTES ........................... 104 REFERENCES .......................... lll iv Table 10. LIST OF TABLES Socio-economic characteristics--Detroit SMSA, municipalities 3_2,500 population, 1950 ....... Socio-economic characteristics--Detroit SMSA, municipalities 3_2,500 population, 1960 ....... Socio-economic characteristics--Detroit SMSA, municipalities 3_2,500 population, 1970 ....... Median family income and percent of families below poverty level, Detroit SMSA municipalities 1 2,500 for T950, T960, T970 ............. Median family income interval comparisons by quar- tiles, quintiles and deciles: 1950, l960 and 1970 ........................ Population concentration by median family income quintiles and deciles, Detroit SMSA municipali- ties 3_ 2,500 .................... Concentrations in percent of families and population of those below poverty level by median family income deciles, Detroit SMSA municipalities 1 2,500 ........................ Concentrations in percent of families and population of those below poverty level by median family income quintiles, Detroit SMSA municipalities 1 2,500 ....... . .......... . ..... Median school years completed and percent with four years high school or more, Detroit SMSA municipali- ties 3_2,500 for 1950, l960 and l970 ........ Concentrations of population of those twenty—five years old and over with four years of high school or more by median family income deciles, Detroit SMSA municipalities 3_2,500 ............. Page 63 66 7O 75 77 78 79 8O Bl 82 Table 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. Concentrations of population of those twenty-five years old and over with four years of high school or more by median family income quintiles, Detroit SMSA municipalities > 2, 500 ............. Median family income quintiles, Detroit SMSA munici- palities 3_2,500, 1950 ............... Median family income deciles, Detroit SMSA munici- palities 3_2,500, 1950 ............... Median family income quintiles, Detroit SMSA munici- palities _>_ 2,500, 1960 ............... Median family income deciles, Detroit SMSA munici- palities 1 2,500, 1960 ............... Median family income quintiles, Detroit SMSA munici- palities 3_2,500, 1970 ............... Median family income deCiles, Detroit SMSA munici- palities 3_2,500, 1970 . . . ............ Percent of families with annual incomes less than poverty level, Detroit SMSA municipalities“: 2,500, by census year and income quintiles ..... Percent of families with annual incomes less than poverty level, Detroit SMSA municipalities > 2,500, by census year and income deciles ...... Median school years completed for those twenty-five years old and over, Detroit SMSA municipalities 3_2,500 by census year and income deciles ...... Median school years completed for those twenty-five years old and over, Detroit SMSA municipalities 3_2,500, by census year and income quintiles Percent completed four years high school or more for those twenty-five years old and over, Detroit SMSA municipalities 3_2,500, by census year and income deciles ....................... Percent completed four years high school or more for those twenty-five years old and over, Detroit SMSA municipalities 3_2,500, by census year and income quintiles . . .................... vi Page 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 9O 92 94 96 98 Table Page 24. Median family income and percent of families below poverty level for municipalities new to 1960 and 1970 population censuses, Detroit SMSA munici- palities 3_2,500, by census year and inclusion criteria . . . . . . . . . .............. 102 25. Median school years completed and percent with four years high school or more for municipalities new to 1960 and 1970 population censuses, Detroit SMSA municipalities 3_2,500, by census year and inclusion criteria .................. 103 vii INTRODUCTION On Monday, January 28, 1974 the Detroit Free Press ran an article about a suburban development in Farmington called Hunter's Ridge which . . looks something like a medieval walled city from beyond its eight-foot high serpentine brick borders. . . . The for- tress disguised as a suburban subdivision. It's just one of scores of new security oriented subdivisions springing up on the outskirts of the nation's major cities. Some of the sub- divisions are so self-sufficient that the residents can, if they wish, turn their backs on the rest of the world almost forever (Detroit Free Press, 1974). Hunter's Ridge boasts an international border style "Check- point Charlie"--a blocked entrance with a toll gate arm and a neon stop sign, an electronic eye and buzzer to warn the gate house guard (who is linked directly to the Farmington Police) of someone approach- ing. Seven guards patrol the 67.3-acre complex. Some complexes have not only recreational facilities but banks, churches, office buildings and shopping centers. One in California has a moat and another out- side Houston has "a cement wall, elaborate iron gates and musket-toting guards in 18th-century costumes." The purported aim of such precaution is the establishment of security against the dangers of personal violence and threat to property common to the neighborhoods of the city. As a resident put it: "It's more than security, it's peace and contentment" (Detroit Free Press, January 28, 1974). In the United States, metropolitan political fragmentation typically involves a fringe of autonomous municipalities skirting a central city. This fragmentation, defined as a decentralization of economic and political activity, enables those who are financially able to reside in municipalities in the urban fringe where they can, through their political power, isolate and insulate themselves from the class and status mix of the central city. It is through this use of political power (which is contingent upon economic power) that the benefits of better access to public goods and services accrue to middle and upper—middle class residents of politically fragmented metropolitan areas. The central city, which depends for its vitality on diversity of life-style, occupational specialization and cultural heterogeneity, is depleted by the outward mobility of those groups which are essential to it as a center of urban life.1 Such class and status homogeneous suburban municipal enclaves are possible through their ability to incorporate as separate munici- palities and focus their political and economic power on the mainte- nance of neighborhood stability and areal specialization, in this case residential. Hill, investigating power distribution and class segregation, found that class segregation is positively correlated with the number of municipal governments in a metropolitan community. He also found evidence that while population size and number of municipalities do Pincrease together political fragmentation itself independently influ- hences economic segregation (Hill, 1973:27-28). Hunter's Ridge exempli- fies essential consequences of urban political fragmentation, i.e. the gaining of access to an optimum site and protecting it from the ills of the central city by isolation behind a complex of physical and legal barriers. The present study examines political fragmentation and SES differences, substantiating Hill's (1973) and Schnore's (1972) findings about political fragmentation, SES differences and residential segrega- tion. These issues will be explicated in terms of both the consequences of metropolitan political fragmentation and the import these conse- quences have for those involved. It is the purpose of this paper to relate these consequences and their antecedent structural conditions to the Detroit SMSA and examine it over three decennial population censuses to discover if class and status segregation corresponds with the prOcess of political fragmentation over time. At work in urban political fragmentation is a two-fold process. First, there is the struggle to maintain advantaged access to scarce J goods and resources within the context of the metropolis. This struggle involves the use of political power by affluent status groups to locate residentially in relative isolation from other less affluent groups. Social distance is translated by this use of power into spatial dis- tance. Second, there is exclusion of status "undesirables" from more advantaged residential location through the operations of political and economic institutions controlled by the affluent. Durkheim (1964) and Nirth (1938) both commented upon size and density of human settlements leading to social and economic dif- ferentiation. This differentiation led, in turn, to specialization in employment and also to class segregation due to the loss of shared bonds of experience. With this loss and the consequent shift from mechanical to organic solidarity this source of cohesion was to some degree replaced by the shared sense of status equality among members within status groups. Collins (1971), in discussing educational stratification, posits status groups as the most basic associational units of society.2 By sharing a common culture, status groups provide a fundamental sense of identity for their members as they participate in that culture. Sense of identity is established not only in such participation but especially in contrast to other less similar cultural groups. Styles of language, tastes in clothing and decor, manners and opinions all provide a shared sense of status equality. Exclusion of those not part of the status group's culture is legitimated through the group's categories of moral evaluation (1971:1009). In the metropolitan arena the various groups seeks, through L/the mechanism of the urban housing market, to acquire and maintain optimum site advantage in competing for the various goods available.3 Conformity with group values leads to the pursuit of appropriate resi- dential location in accordance with the group's mandate, i.e. the shared sense of status equality translated into propinquity of resi- dence. All minority groups will, to some extent, choose to segregate themselves. The motives are rather obvious. A people who share a culture, a common set of experiences, sometimes a language and among whom kinship ties are important, will want to cluster residentially. Clustering permits easier communica- tion and encourages the establishment of services and institutions--food stores, clubs, churches and the like--with specialized appeal for the group (Pascal, 1970:409-410). Conflict among groups having differentially greater or lesser access to economic resources and hence to political hegemony will be heavily weighted in favor of that group which has the greatest resources and ability to manipulate legal and economic institutions to its advantage. \. In pursuing advantaged residential location social distance will obtain between those immobile in the central city who have lesser amounts of economic and political power and those who are more powerful and are spatially mobile. Political fragmentation occurs as a result of the latter maneuvering to protect those values which inhere in their status group and to exclude status "undesirables.'I Burgess (1924) first used the concentric-zonal hypothesis to describe the movement of higher income groups away from the center of the U.S. city to new residential areas on the fringe leaving the inner, older zones to the less affluent. This movement typically repeats itself with each new wave of migration to the city. As a new working force at the bottom of the SES scale comes into the central city, other groups move out to the suburbs leaving behind the least expensive 4 Thus, the conceptualization of patterned social distance housing. between the central city and the suburbs became almost an axiom (Schnore, 1963:76). In the oldest and largest U.S. metropolitan areas, those left behind in the central city are, for the most part, the poorly paid, the underemployed or unemployed and those with the least education. This pattern tends to perpetuate itself over time and with the cessa- tion of immigrant waves to the U.S. the movement of the more affluent to the suburbs has had the effect of widening and now crystallizing the social distance between the central cities and the suburbs (Schnore, 1972:1).5 As a result, those in the suburbs have sought to reduce any threat of residential invasion by class and status undesirables fleeing the decaying central city by sequestering themselves behind a complex of economic and legislative barriers in autonomous municipalities (and a proliferation of local and special purpose governments) (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1966). Thus, outmigration in the metropolis is selective in class terms (Schnore, 1972:101) and spatially segregates SES groups into specialized, homogeneous residen- tial areas. A set of generalizations had grown up around the Burgess work stereotyping the distribution of different SES groups in the metropolis. However, critical review of the concentric-zonal hypotheses found a valid starting point in the developing specialization among suburbs. Schnore was the first in more recent literature to focus upon the notion of age of the city as the critical factor in predicting spatial locus of different SES groups in specialized suburbs (1963). In prior work Schnore had examined the economic dichotomy between consumption ("resi- dential") and production ("employing") suburbs which Nirt carried fur- ther in his work on political activity as a manifestation of suburban specialization. Nirt found similarity of political partisanship to increase with extreme SES characteristics (Schnore, 1971:49; Nirt, 1965:106). Social rank is a determining factor in suburban attitudes, opinions and their influence on policy—making as shown in a study of Philadelphia by Williams, et al. (1965). This study focused in part upon how a community's social characteristics are maintained by exclu- sionary policies. To retain SES characteristics formal policy as well as informal means provide avenues for specialized municipalities to exclude status undesirables. This study also found that social rank rather than wealth alone was crucial to determining intermunicipal co- operation for public services. Here an important link is forged between the political partisanship found by Wirt and the election of political leaders. Wirt found leaders tend to have backgrounds similar to their constituent bodies. Because these leaders tend to share the same attitudes and policy preferences as their communities, this political convergence has serious consequences for metropolitan areas experiencing conflict among specialized suburbs. Development of municipal life- styles among suburbs, Williams purports, are the result of space fric- tion costs and the ability of certain groups to exploit a given location by being able to afford its site advantages. Homogeneity, in terms of cultural attributes, is then a result of similar "units" (groups and families) seeking the same locations. Protection of site advantages through municipalities and other institutions means for Williams that specialized areas protect the basis of a sense of community solidarity, identity and a dominant style of life dependent on location for their realization. This for Williams is a major source of metropolitan poli- tics (1971a). Following Schnore (1972) we find a great deal of variety in SE3 differentiation between central cities and their suburbs and among suburbs, but Schnore concludes from trend analysis that movement of SES groups can be predicted on the basis of not only age and size of the city but race and class as well. As a result of the social distance between the central city and the suburbs and urban political fragmentation, there are important consequences which have been pointed to by research on the metropolis. One of the most salient of these consequences is the division of metro- politan areas into relatively status homogeneous municipalities, as mentioned above, their segregation and isolation as residential neigh- borhoods by class and race and their preservation over time as politi- cally autonomous units. Second, this division has consequences for the distribution of public goods and services and scarce, desired resources among the several broad income and status groups in the metropolitan community. Third, the spatial distribution of these SES groups in the metropolitan setting influences not only the degree of urban political integration or fragmentation but the differential allocation of jobs and income, educational opportunity and access to the urban housing market. There is thus a chain of consequences from the broadest struc- tural level to the narrowly individual in terms of life chances and quality of everyday existence. Tracing somewhat more specifically the consequences of each of these four structural areas may help to clarify the nature of the class division which occurs as a result of governmental fragmentation. In considering the distribution of public goods and services the most elemental problem is the divorce of resources from social needs at the community level, i.e. the inequality in the distribution of taxable wealth (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1965 and 1966; Schnore, l972:xii). As the metropolis becomes politically fragmented the resources of wealth and skill, talent and knowledge move from the center city leaving those with relatively few economic and human resources to meet the needs of both the central city resident and the suburban commuter. The central city is also expected to provide other municipal benefits (e.g. museums, libraries, institutions of higher education) which are exploited by suburban residents but for which they are not financially responsible. The suburbs then tax their own residents relatively less to provide status enhancement services (education and recreation, for example) while the central city taxes its residents to provide essential system maintenance, e.g. police and welfare services and the like. Another problem of the distribution of public goods and services is the lack of cooperation and coordination among governmental units. Not only are costs increased by the lack of cooperation, but municipal governments are unable to cope with problems because they are too small, they lack jurisdiction and have too little power to deal with them effectively (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1966:54). Thus, governments are impoverished financially by political fragmentation and there is no mix of resources upon which to draw and no government which is able to assume responsibility. Also, there is the potential of breakdown of public control when people have to deal with too many governmental units as they must in cases where there are overlapping jurisdictions. The second set of consequences of class division is in jobs and income. As social disparities in housing lead to economic 10 disparities peOple are separated from employment opportunities. There is a structuring of unemployment by physically isolating workers from decentralized manufacturing by the lack of suitable housing within 6 The urban housing market is one access of jobs (Williams, l97laz64). of the major institutions through which income is converted into access to the job and employment opportunities of the community. As access to better housing and to educational opportunities is narrowed by dif- ferential distribution in the urban housing market, so are occupational and hence income opportunities correspondingly narrowed. For those in class and status homogenized residential areas similarities of jobs and income and hence of life situation may remove conflict and contentment may be the norm, but this may have the consequence of positively dis- couraging upward mobility. The culture of the community may dissuade achievement by exerting social pressure on those who perceive opportu— nities outside the normal avenues and who would betray discontent with the status quo (Williams, l97la:64). For the poor this kind of cultural isolation means low levels of aspiration and destruction of incentive for self-improvement (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1966). The third major area of consequences is education-~in terms of both quality and opportunity. Schools have two critically important functions as they perpetuate inequality. First, they must transmit the dominant status culture, teaching values, behavior and obedience (Collins, 1971:1010; Katz, l97l:xviii). This occurs differentially, i.e. some among the privileged, higher SES groups are selected to become employees who acquiesce to existing social and economic 11 arrangements (Collins, 1971:1011). For the less affluent ”they [the schools] are imperial institutions designed to civilize the natives; they exist to do something to poor children, especially, now, children who are black or brown. Their main purpose is to make these children orderly, industrious, lawabiding, and respectful of authority" (Katz, 1971:xviii). Secondly, the schools through class and status segrega- tion maintain a systematically advantaged experience for the affluent and an increasingly alien and negative experience for the poor. [A]lso significant in school success or failure is the fact that most lower income children are deprived of the broad range of life experiences open to upper income children. The lower income child, in fact, seldom emerges from his neighbor- hood confinement in order to test the experiences of the out- side world. . . . [H]e is afraid to go out of his neighbor- hood; the outside world is afraid to let him come out; he does not have the money or the opportunity to go out; he does not know enough about the outside world to know where to go. He is denied the life experiences which give children con- fidence in themselves and interest in their studies. Such experiences greatly increase reading potential by providing some familiarity with the vocabulary and subject matter of books. In addition, they offer a better basis for under- standing and evaluating all the subject matter that must be learned in school (Sexton, 1961:144—145). Thus, as the quality and opportunities of education are stratified and segregated by residence, inequality is perpetuated, through access to jobs and income, housing and again education. The last set of consequences has to do with housing itself. It is not just the physical quality of the housing that is central here, although that is of obvious importance, but (1) location, (2) the resources to which housing provides access and (3) the institu- tions of residence allocation and their operation which are critical to understanding the nature of the struggle for residential location. 12 Residential segregation is the result of a series of housing site choices, based on both the racial (or ethnic) and non- racial attributes of various sites, such as price, quality, style, location and so forth (Pascal, 1970:406). The control of place in time is used as a means of access to objects. The unique spot or place which each of us occupies in time defines that to which we can relate around us. Because objects are not randomly distributed, neither is the value and meaning of places (Williams, 1971b:12). In turn, concentration of population with characteristics of greater age, lower income and minority ethnic status affects business location in the central city: The reduction of the tax base and increased demand for ser- vices (e.g. welfare, compensatory education, protection) can serve to drive traditional residents as well as firms outward beyond the central city limits. The result, of course, is a speed-up in the process of suburbanization with all the costs in service provision inefficiency and fragmentation in poli- tical and social life that this process is alleged to entail (Pascal, 1970:427). Access is a resource which facilitates the use of other resources, primarily interaction for messages and exchange of objects. Social meanings of access stem from (1) artifacts--such as buildings and structures, (2) networks of interactions which access may aid and (3) social structures (Williams, 1971b:26-27). ”Economic advantages, status, symbolic identification and physical and psychic comfort are among the possible goals" (Williams, 1971b:22). Thus, according to Thompson: [G]ood sites sell high and justify expensive houses with wealthy families which in turn spawn luxury shops all of which create addresses of distinction that attract more affluent families. This clustering to reduce movement requirements of the household as a consuming unit is consistent with the sector thesis of Hoyt (1965:128). There are important political consequences of class isolated housing also. When political fragmentation of the metropolitan area 13 occurs, isolation of the less advantaged at the level of local government can produce, on the one hand, apathy toward municipal govern- ment or, on the other hand, a growing recognition of the political power resulting from the concentration of those with similar attributes in an area. Pascal notes that the net political effects of segregation are unclear as to the direction that will be taken by ethnic minorities (1970:425-426). It is not unclear, however, that the political isola- tion of higher income groups is a product of the political power they enjoy as a result of their economic power. As political power and economic power work together and function to spatially distribute social classes, powerful groups will act to protect their interests through the basic institutional sources of control and policy in the urban hous- ing market. This happens in several ways: most basic is intra-class stratification by which the working or middle-class is split occupa- tionally by basic capitalist institutions to prevent their uniting and hence seeking a larger portion of the available product and better work- ing conditions. Protest and solidarity are thus weakened (Gordon, 1973: 61). In the same way residential class segregation--by splitting the working and middle class on racial, age, sex or status group grounds-- can maintain class and status differences through fragmented local governments; social distance is emphasized and systems of advantage for the privileged maintained. By separating groups with common interests through differences in life-style status groups are isolated and atten- tion is focused upon differences among these groups rather than on the root problems of urban growth and development. Thus, intra-class stratification acts to distract and concentrates upon other issues 14 such as material consumption and maintenance of an acceptable style of life and adherence to the norms of a legitimated status culture. Exclusion of status undesirables is important to maintenance of status homogeneous residential areas. There are at least two ways in which exclusion of status undesirables can work. Exclusion by policy eliminates those who are deemed underqualified in the Opinion of those with power over residence selection such as real estate agents, officials of lending institutions and zoning officials. Underqualified status undesirables cannot meet standards of consumption, purchasing power, occupation and so forth; basically they are people too poor or ethnic, uneducated or in some way incompatible with the dominant cul- tural pattern of a residential neighborhood (National Advisory Commis- sion on Civil Disorders, 1968:244). There are also what might be called overqualified status undesirables-~those who would prevent the obsolescence of a neighborhood by investing in it, upgrading residences and generally make it a better place to live. Such activity may work to the disadvantage of lending institutions who want to keep out of a neighborhood those who would be likely to question devices such as "disinvestment" policy and possess the political acumen to organize and contest such policies.8 There are other methods of exclusion ranging from zoning residence areas out of the price range of all but the upper-middle class by insisting on large lots and other land deve10pment controls to a simple refusal to show homes to those who are "undesirable." An example of these zoning and development controls is the emergence of residential patterns with no commercial or retail outlets. Retail 15 stores are zone-isolated in shopping centers or malls sometimes miles away. Dependency on an automobile (or several per family) results because there is little or no redundancy in transportation systems for these areas. Public transit, as an alternative to the private auto- mobile, typically is occasional bus service, if there is any at all. Housing in these areas is then undesirable and unsuitable for those too poor or too old or for other reasons unable or unwilling to use automobiles. Hence, as constraints of economic, political and status vari- ables as well as fluidity of resources and political channels and bar- riers operate residence selection alternatives are sharply restricted along class lines (Williams, l97lb:30). There is a high degree of interdependence among the institutions here presented as affected by governmental fragmentation. Long calls this the "charmed circle“ of: housing, jobs, matrimony, income and again housing (1967:254). What happens in one area has consequences for each of the other areas. As suburbs become more specialized and homogeneous, it becomes easier to politically manipulate access to retain those values deemed most important (Williams, 1971a:59).9 While much of the literature on SES differences takes a stratification perspective writings on metropolitan political integra- tion are largely descriptive and treat the distribution of population as a reflection of the social structure, not as a consequence and determinant of it. In considering the consequences of metropolitan fragmentation above, it was noted that intermunicipal fragmentation carried serious implications for the well-being of the city and its 16 inhabitants for both the long and short term. To alleviate these consequences, successful political integration, usually in the form of annexation, is proposed as a way of overriding the barrier of social class distance which favors wealthy suburbs. Resistance to political integration has been attributed in the literature variously to fears about changes in taxation and lowered school quality (Zimmer and Hawley, 1968). This study failed to tie these sources of resistance to SES groups, however, and hence conclusions can be drawn only regarding the p0pulation size of the municipalities that were under study. Hawkins (1971) found lower amounts of resistance to political integration than he hypothesized and that demographic distance favoring suburbs was not associated with strong fringe opposition to integration. Scott (1971) found that voters who were confronted with what he regarded as abnormal or "radical" government reorganization proposals approved them only in areas with unusual SES characteristics and these cases had to be explained as unique and deviations from normal patterns.10 Scott fails to address the problem per se of resistance also, however, and focuses on how proposals may gain acceptance but not in terms of conflicting status groups or institutions which may offer special resis- tance to reorganization proposals. Annexation is important to urban political fragmentation because it influences how politically and legally constricted the city will be and how easily the suburbs can keep themselves isolated. State laws regarding ease of incorporation or annexation will influence the amount of political fragmentation and, hence, status homogeneity (see Appendix A). 17 It will be recalled that Schnore (1963) was concerned with the relationship between age of settlement and SES group distribution. Dye (1967) used the same SES indicators as Schnore and concentrated on annexation (not fragmentation) to test status attributes, spatial dis- tribution and annexation. Dye correlated age of city with city—suburban social differential and found it to be an independent predictor of suc- cessful annexation-~that social class distance favoring suburbs appeared as a barrier to urban political integration. Central cities with larger pr0portions of the middle class (i.e. educationally and occupationally middle class) were more successful in annexing than less middle class cities. Investigating policy-making and central city needs, Frisken (1973) found that suburbs have defended local self-government although they recognize it as less efficient and more expensive. Differences between the central city and the suburbs and policies maintaining them act to prevent the growth of a genuine metropolitan community of interest. While Frisken ignores the notion of per se status differences accounting for opposition he recognizes the central city with its grow- ing poor population as at a disadvantage in reorganization or coopera- tion proposals as it suffers from suburban fears of central city domi- nance and loss of identity. Paradoxically, central cities fear suburbanites may dominate metropolitan political organizations through their political skill, economic clout and so forth. Metropolitan political fragmentation has been treated in the literature largely as an evil difficult to overcome due to suburban resistance attributable to intermunicipal status differences. Using Schnore's basic notion, i.e. older settlements will exhibit SES 18 differentiation evolving in directions predicted by the Burgess concentric-zonal hypothesis, the present study focuses upon metropolitan political fragmentation and SES distance (measured by SES indicators similar to Schnore's) as these differences obtain over time. This set of interrelationships forms the basic paradigm from which the hypotheses tested in this study come. HYPOTHESES It is a central idea of this study that an increasing number of permanent political divisions within a metropolitan area will over time be characterized by increasing intermunicipal differ- ences; for example, between the central city and suburbs or among suburbs. These variables can be measured, respectively, through life- style11 indicators and the number of municipalities added interdecen- nially to the SMSA. This pattern of changes varies systematically; thus, certain population subgroups shift their residential location in predictable directions. As areal specialization holds, resistance to governmental reorganization or integration is more likely to come from groups benefiting from present arrangements than from those who do not. This study tests a number of hypotheses which emerge from the central argument. It uses the Detroit SMSA as the data base for test- ing the following hypotheses specifically: H]: That over time in the Detroit SMSA as political fragmentation increases intermunicipal SES differences will become greater as measured by life-style character- istics. H2: That as status homogeneity is sought through residential locus, higher income municipalities will be less unequal (more homogeneous) as measured by life- style characteristics. 19 20 Higher income municipalities should evince less inequality by life-style characteristics due to their exclusionary power through control of critical institutions in the distribution of housing. That is, only those with both the income and acceptable status characteris- tics should pass through the net of exclusionary restrictions. Lower income municipalities, on the other hand, should be more unequal because the exclusionary policies of higher income areas are largely absent and a more mixed residential population results. The important focus here is on homogeneity within the upper income municipalities because it is through their ability to concentrate in cardinal metro- politan loci that assurance of continued advantaged access is maintained and perpetuated. Thus, it is through the operations of exclusionary housing institutions and restrictive policies that homogeneous income areas enjoy both financial advantages and broader social benefits such as lesser amounts of crime, better transportation and the like. H3: Among new municipalities in the SMSA those which are new incorporations will tend to have both higher SES indicators and less inequality as measured by life- style characteristics than for both the Detroit SMSA and new municipalities which are not new incorporations. Incorporation as a municipality restricts to one locality powers of government and decision-making regarding institutions salient to the distribution of housing and education. It is through restric- tive localization that new municipalities can effect a triage of members of entering status groups and so is a central advantage of incorpora- tion. 21 By virtue of their more affluent and mobile populations seeking better access to the SMSA which they surround, new incorpora- tions should be characterized by higher standards of living and educa- tion than the central city or new municipalities (the latter having simply grown large enough to be included in census data). This is due to the selective capacity which control of restrictive (n: exclusionary devices such as zoning laws, construction codes and the like permits the new municipality. DATA AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS To test the hypotheses data were gathered from the census of population (U.S. Bureau of the Census) for 1950, 1960 and 1970 for all municipalities with 2,500 population or more in the Detroit SMSA. As life-style and status homogeneity indicators four variables were selec- ted from census reports: (1) median annual family income in dollars, (2) median school years completed and (3) percent with four years of high school or more (both (2) and (3) are for individuals twenty-five years old and over) and (4) percent of families and unrelated indi- viduals below poverty level.12 For 1950 the Detroit SMA13 contained thirty-nine municipali- ties which had to be first located by population in the three counties comprising the SMA--Macomb, Oakland and Wayne. This was done using Table 6--Number of Inhabitants from Part 22, Characteristics of the Population, 1950. Once all municipalities of 2,500 population or more were gathered they were ranked by median family income and the remain- ing data on the variables gathered. For 1960 and 1970 the same process was followed, using the appropriate tables.14 A problem emerged in gathering income data for 1960. For those municipalities with populations from 2,500 to 10,000 with median family incomes over $10,000 no exact income figure was given in the tables with the other life-style indicators (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1963:Tables 33, 34). The tables show $10,000+ in lieu of an exact 22 23 income figure which would have made ranking by income impossible for the five municipalities affected. For those municipalities over 10,000 population exact (to the nearest dollar) figures were given. To solve this problem these municipalities were identified by census tract num- ber (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1966) and cross-referenced to the U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing: 1960 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1962), where exact income figures were given by census tract number in Table P-l. The Detroit SMSA evidence is comprised of data on thirty-nine municipalities for 1950, fifty—eight for 1960 and seventy-two for 1970. To determine how new municipalities entered the lists much the same procedure was followed as that for culling the municipalities in the SMA in 1950. By identifying the new municipalities and referring to tables on the number of inhabitants in municipalities for each county it was possible to determine if a new municipality was a new incorpora- tion or had been included as part of the SMSA because it had passed the Census Bureau population threshold of 2,500.15 The standard deviation and a related measure, coefficient of variation, were used to measure inequality in the distribution of income, education and poverty in Detroit in this study. Attention will be focused upon standard deviation and coefficient of variation as the most sophisticated indicators of SES differences among municipalities. Means and ranges are also given. Standard deviation and coefficient of variation indicate the amount of divergence from the average on a given variable for the families of a municipality in the Detroit SMSA. For example, a standard 24 deviation of zero would indicate that, on whatever measure was being used, each of the families in the municipality would enjoy essentially the same position on that measure, say, family income. Assuming a normal distribution in the proportions of these life-style indicators across the Detroit metropolitan area for each census year, one standard deviation from the mean includes roughly two-thirds or about sixty- seven percent of the families in the Detroit SMSA; one-third on either side of the mean. A closely related measure, the coefficient of variation is used to compare distributions while looking at something besides the standard deviation. The standard deviation can be inexact in the sense that it may misrepresent changes over time which do not reflect changes in degree of equality. So, while the standard deviation may increase from one time period to another, the degree of inequality may not co- vary symmetrically and, thus, comparisons between two standard devia- tions may be invalid if their means are not comparable. To overcome the deficiencies of the standard deviation, the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean (coefficient of variation) may be used to provide a percentage figure for comparison of distributions. The variables involved must have real (rather than arbitrary) values to use this measure. Computing the coefficient of variation (cv) uses the formula 0/7 = cv where o = standard deviation and X = mean. Comparison of two time periods is derived using the following formula: 01/511 = cv]; 02/72 = cv2; (cv1-cv2)/cv1 = amount of change in percent (Jencks, 1972: 352). 25 The size of the standard deviation indicated the degree to which inequality obtains, i.e. as the standard deviation increases it indicates that some municipalities have a much greater proportion of, say, family income, while other municipalities have much less. A standard deviation of twenty percent on median family income indicates that for about sixty-seven percent of the municipalities in the SMSA the median family income varies from the mean by twenty percent or less. Again, as the coefficient of variation increases the number of munici- palities with very high income families and very low income families increases. Another, but less powerful measure, interval variations, was also used to indicate income inequality by quartiles, quintiles and deciles. Interquartile variation, for example, is computed using the formula Q3-Ql/Q]+Q3 where 01 is that item one quarter of the way up from the bottom of the income array and 03 is that item three quarters of the way up. The figure resulting from this will yield a primitive indication of the municipal income inequality for the SMSA for a census period. For example, for 1950 the interdecile variation is .319 (see Table 5). That is, the median family income for the municipality one— fourth of the way up from the bottom is roughly 31.9 percent less, or only 68.1 percent as much as the median of all the median municipal family incomes for the Detroit metropolitan area. That income three- fourths of the way up from the bottom receives about 31.9 percent more, or 131.9 percent of the median, assuming a normal distribution (Thompson, 1965:110). 26 While standard deviation has some weaknesses it is a strong measure of inequality and here indicates the growth in SES differences across census years for the Detroit SMSA.16 The data were ranked according to median family income and then grouped into quintiles and deciles to facilitate examining several 17 In order to consider the effects of both aspects of this evidence. inequality and homogeneity upon the life-style indicators, the two sets of tables provide a more detailed look than the use of only one group- ing, say, quartiles, would afford. Examination of the extremes in the concentration of income inequality in the richest segments and the con- centration of poverty among the poorest groups is afforded by decile tables, using means and ranges. Quintiles tables permit a look at how central groups of data show relative changes over time in the growth of unequal distribution of income and education, through the coefficient of variation. There is a more powerful explanatory effect when the standard deviation combines measures at several points on a distribution. Hence, there is less distortion with more complete data. This is especially salient in the case of income distribution among the middle class and quintile tables provide a better view of this distribution over time. The ranked municipalities were distributed into symmetrical quintiles and deciles for comparisons and calculations of means, stan- dard deviations and ranges. This was done first for the SMSA as a whole and then for the quintile and decile groups for all census years, on each of the life-style indicators. The same calculations were then done for municipalities new to the 1960 census and for those new to 27 1970 once these were divided into two groups--those which passed population thresholds of 2,500 to be included in the SMSA, and new incorporations. FINDINGS The increase in the number of municipalities from 1950 to 1970, the rise in median family incomes and the increased income range are shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3. These three tables provide basic life— style data for the municipalities of the Detroit SMSA for each of the three census years. The tables contain two groups of two life-style indicators--income and education. In the income group are (l) median family income in dollars for municipalities and (2) families and unre- lated individuals below poverty level, in percent. For education there are (l) median school years completed for those twenty-five years old and over and (2) percent completed four years of high school or more for those twenty-five years old and over. For each census year the tables include all the municipalities in the SMSA with 2,500 population or more, which is the cutoff for inclusion by the Census Bureau defini- tion of an SMSA. Also given are population size, the county in which each municipality is located and for Tables 2 (1960) and 3 (1970) whether new additions to the SMSA were new incorporations or had passed the 2,500 population threshold. That there has been a major increase in the spread of incomes as well as in the number of municipalities within which these incomes are distributed is obvious. There also has been a significant redis- tribution of income and other resources which has occurred as a conse- quence of intermunicipal segregation during this time span. 28 29 H1 holds that as political fragmentation increases, SES differences will become greater among municipalities. Tables 1, 2 and 3 show that there has been a steady increment in the number of munici- palities--from thirty-nine in 1950 to fifty-eight in 1960 to seventy- two in 1970. The greatest increase in the number of municipalities follows the 1950-1960 decade but is nearly matched by an increase of fifteen in 1970, when the greatest amount of intenmunicipal income inequality obtained (thirty-nine percent) as measured by the coefficient 18 During this time there was a 728 percent of variation (see Table 4). increase in the range of incomes, from a 1950 difference of $4,590 between highest and lowest municipalities to a $37,997 difference in 1970.19 The growing social distance between the city of Detroit and other municipalities in the SMSA is especially highlighted by relative income rank and its change over time. In 1950 the city of Detroit ranked twenty-two out of thirty-nine or roughly half-way in the SMSA income array. By 1960 the city of Detroit had fallen to forty-one of fifty-eight and in 1970 was ranked sixty-six of seventy-two municipal- ties in the SMSA (Tables 1, 2 and 3). Clearly, median family income increases in the suburbs were leaving Detroit's population less able to compete effectively for goods and services in the urban arena. While the mean of all the median family incomes nearly doubled from 1960 to 1970 it appears that the mean percent of poor families in the SMSA was cut by more than half from 9.7 to 4.0 percent. According to the findings in Table 4, there is a steady decline in families below poverty level from 16.2 in 1950 to 4.0 percent in 1970. The inequality 30 experienced by municipalities in this regard has grown as measured by the coefficient from forty-four percent in 1950 to seventy-one percent in 1970. Thus, while it appears there are fewer families under the official poverty level, these families are concentrated more heavily in a few municipalities. (Tables 18 and 19 show that consistently these concentrations are in the bottom mean income fifths or tenths.) Considerable skepticism must be attached to the apparent decline from 1960 to 1970 in the numbers of families below poverty level, however, because it was in this decade that the official poverty definition was changed from the Social Security Administration's economy food plan to the Consumer Price Index (see Appendix B). The evidence of Table 5 discloses a slight diminishment across censuses in inequality among median income quartiles, quintiles and deciles by interval comparisons. In each case there has apparently been some equalization in the distribution of income among the munici- palities of the Detroit SMSA. In 1950 interquartile variation was 12.3 percent, i.e. that municipality three-quarters of the way up the income distribution receives about 112.3 percent of the median and that municipality one-fourth of the way up gets about 87.7 percent of the median. Interdecile variation for l950--thirty-two percent--has the municipality at the ninetieth percentile receiving only about sixty-eight percent of the median while up at the tenth percentile that municipality enjoys 132 percent of the median. By 1970 this had been reduced for interquartile variation to roughly ninety percent of the median income for those at the bottom quarter while it was 110 percent for those at the top quarter. For deciles it was down from 31 132 to 127 percent at the top tenth percentile and up to 73 percent from 68 percent at the ninetieth percentile. This pattern may be explained in part by the failure of the interval comparisons to reach far enough into the extremes of the income array to reveal the redistribution of income toward those at the very top and away from those at the very bottom. Also, as Table 6 shows, there has been substantial redistribution of population into the bottom income groups; this may have resulted in the median incomes at the bottom intervals being elevated high enough to partially negate, through this sample, the effects of the redistribution of wealth as it is shown elsewhere in this study. It is important to note that in comparison to other more sophisticated empirical-statistical measures the interval comparison (such as interdecile variation) is relatively primitive, and much weaker than the standard deviation, for example. Table 6 shows the redistribution of population by income groups for deciles and quintiles and, hence, reflects the redistribution of municipal income in the SMSA. In 1950 only about .6 of a percent of the population of the SMSA were in municipalities in the top income tenth. By 1970 this had changed so that over two percent were in these municipalities. In con- trast, those in municipalities in the bottom income decile were only about .8 percent of the population in 1950, but in 1970 had swelled to nearly forty-eight percent of the SMSA. This also points to income leaving the city of Detroit. In 1950 Detroit was in the sixth income decile, fell to seventh in 1960 and hit bottom in 1970. In income quintiles, Table 6 shows that for the top twenty percent of municipalities 32 the changes from 1950 to 1970 were more dramatic. Increasing from two and a half percent to just less than ten percent, the population of the top income group saw the bottom income group increase in rela- tive share of the population from three percent to over half of all those in the SMSA. For the middle classes, in the meantime, there was a change in the percentage of the SMSA population in the middle three fifths of income groups from 94.4 percent in 1950 to 88.0 percent in 1960 to 38.6 percent in 1970. In other words, while over half of the population of the Detroit SMSA found themselves in the bottom twenty percent of municipalities by income, fifty-nine percent fewer found themselves in the middle three income groups by 1970. At the same time, there was a seventy-five percent increase in the percentage of those in municipali- ties in the top income fifth, there was a ninety-four percent increase of those in municipalities in the lowest fifth, from 1950 to 1970. The other side of the coin of municipal income--the concentra- tions of those below poverty level--presents a similar pattern of redis- tribution. Table 7, those who are below poverty level, mirrors the movement of population in Table 6. In this case, those municipalities in the lowest income decile have disproportionately the greatest number of the poor by 1970. The city of Detroit across the three census has, in absolute numbers, the greatest portion of the poor in each census year. But more significant is what occurred in the upper income muni- cipalities. In percentage figures, the 1950 distribution is relatively uniform among deciles compared to the homogenization which occurred by 1970, when the top income tenth municipalities had gone from 12.9 33 percent to 1.3 percent of the poor. It must be noted also that the process of homogenization did not stop with the top income decile. By 1970 the top eight deciles all had less than four percent poor persons in their municipalities with the bottom two deciles absorbing the greatest percentages of poor people. Thus, it is in the poorest muni- cipalities that the greatest percentages of those needing increased social and other services are found. While the 1960 population of the top income decile increased by 24,912 from 1950 (168 percent), the number of poor in these munici- palities increased by only 392 people (a 20.5 percent increase). This represents a 7.1 point drop in the share of poor persons in this decile (from 12.9 to 5.8 percent). From 1960 to 1970 the population of this decile increased 32,677 (87.2 percent). The number of those classified as poor for this period fell by 1,364 from 2,305 to 941 (59.2 percent decrease). Over the three censuses then the population of the top income decile municipalities increased 388 percent while their share of the poor fell 50.8 percent. At the other end of the income array, the bottom decile also experienced an increase in population from 1950 to 1960. However, while the 447.8 percent population increase occurred it saw a 315.3 percent increase in the numbers of poor in these municipalities, going from 5,559 to 23,084 people. From 1960 to 1970 (when the city of Detroit became part of this decile) the population increase was 1,467.4 percent with a 658 percent increase in the numbers of poor. Thus, while the top decile municipalities experienced a decline of 50.8 percent from 1950 to 1970 the bottom decile saw an increase of 3,047.4 percent while 34 its population growth was 8,485.7 percent. This clear and unmistakable polarization of the poor and the rich in the Detroit SMSA is sub- stantiated further by examining the quintile distributions in Table 8. The highest income fifth fell from a 14.7 percent share of the poor to 1.8 percent from 1950 to 1970. While there was a gradient of increasing mean percentages of the poor toward the bottom quintile in all census years, this gradient steepened by 1970 to isolate the greatest numbers of the poor in the bottom twenty percent of municipalities. Thus, just 24.7 percent of the poor were in the top four-fifths income municipali~ ties which had forty-eight percent of the SMSA population, while the lowest fifth of municipalities with fifty-two percent of the population had 75.3 percent of the poor. The remaining indicator of life-style differences among municipalities is shown in Tables 9, 10 and 11. While it is the mid- dle income groups who have benefitted most noticeably from greater educational opportunities across census years, all groups have realized increments both in numbers of people going through high school or beyond as well as the per se number of school years completed. Table 9 shows that for median school years completed from 1950 to 1970 the mean has risen from 10.9 to 12.2 years. At the same time the mean percent with four years high school or more has risen from 43.2 to 59.3. For both of these variables the standard deviation and coefficient of variation has also decreased, a preliminary indication of narrowing inequality for all groups. Table 10 shows, however, that it is in the middle and upper income municipalities that greater increases accumulated. The 1950 to 35 1970 time span reveals a gain of 5.9 percentage points of those with four years of high school or more for the highest income tenth munici- palities from 79.3 to 85.2 percent. The largest gains were in the middle income groups ranging from a 14.2 percentage point increase for the fourth decile up to a 23.5 point increase for the fifth decile with the exception of the second tenth which had a 7.4 percentage point gain. The lowest income tenth, meanwhile, gained the least, 3.7 points, to 41.3 percent from 37.6. The city of Detroit during this time gained merely 3.3 percentage points moving from 38.0 percent of its twenty- five-year-olds or over with high school diplomas or more to 41.3 per- cent, as it moved from the sixth to the tenth decile. In terms of larger groupings the same pattern holds for this 1950 to 1960 period. From the top income fifth to the bottom the gains were 11.1, 14.6, 21.5, 20.5 and 9.2 points, respectively (Table 11). The city of Detroit gained 7.8 percentage points for the same period, while the SMSA as a whole went from 37.6 to 53.1 percent, a 15.5 point gain. Thus, two of the four SES indicators--income and percent below poverty level--point to growing social distance among municipali- ties in the Detroit SMSA. Tables 4 and 5 presented a picture of life- style equality among municipalities in Detroit from 1950 to 1970. Municipal incomes have risen and become more unequal (coefficient of variation rising from 25.4 to 39.0 percent). Also, the average percent of poor families in municipalities appears to fall from 16.2 to 4.0 percent, but inequality of their distribution greatly increased rising from forty-four to seventy-one percent (see Appendix B). On the other 36 hand, the education variables showed not only more education accruing in terms of years and percentages of those with high school or more but overall inequality falling for both these variables, across the SMSA (Tables 9, 10 and 11). H2 proposes that there will be less status inequality among higher income municipalities as they seek status homogeneity through residential locus and differentially greater inequality among those municipalities which are less affluent, and not able to exercise exclu- sionary policies and programs in regard to the characteristics of their populations. The finding relating to this hypothesis will be treated in the same order as for H], that is income, poverty and education. Income distribution has become much more unequal both as to the range and the proportions going to income fifths (Tables 12, 14 and 16) or tenths (Tables 13, 15 and 17). And, at the same time, there has been a great surge in the number of autonomous municipalities in the SMSA, poor families are more concentrated in the lowest income munici- palities (Tables 18 and 19) as hypothesized. First, looking at income inequality by coefficient of varia- tion, there is increasing inequality (thirty-eight percent in 1970) among the highest income quintile (Tables 12, 14 and 16) and a rela— tively steady amount of inequality over time among the lowest income group, having dropped slightly from 1950 from nine to eight percent. Among the middle groups, however, which started low and stayed low, there is little change in the clear homogeneity across the three cen- suses (see Tables 13, 15 and 17). The increasing inequality in 1960 and 1970 for the top income groups may be explained by the extremely 37 high incomes (over $40,000) which helped in driving the standard deviation for the top income tenth to almost $9,000 (Table 17). Note that range here is in median incomes which are from almost $47,000 to about $19,000. For income groups there emerges a picture of either a great deal of homogeneity, especially as shown by income quintiles (Tables 12, 14 and 16), among the top eighty or ninety percent, or high amounts of inequality for those at the bottom of the income array. Given a caveat regarding the changes in the basis upon which poverty income cutoffs are determined (Appendix B) the decisive segre- gation of poor families in the lowest income municipalities is unmis- takable. Over the period covered in this study there has been a very conspicuous and rapid shift in the distribution of poor families among the various income categories of municipalities in the Detroit SMSA. In Table 18 the quintiles in 1950 show a more or less even distribution of families below poverty level among the top eighty per- cent (from nine to sixteen percent) with a somewhat heavier concentra- tion in the bottom twenty percent of municipalities (25.8 percent). By 1960 this had shifted to a somewhat steeper gradient but while the bottom forty percent of communities held greater numbers of poor families the top sixty percent shared relatively even numbers among themselves (about six to seven percent). In 1970 the redistribution had become almost completely effected with the overwhelming percent of the poor in the poorest income fifth municipalities and the top four fifths having from less than two to less than four percent of their families with incomes below poverty level. This is reflected in the inequality shown in Table 4 where the coefficient of variation 38 shifts from forty-four to seventy-one percent for the SMSA. The maldistribution of the poor families among municipalities by income deciles gives somewhat greater detail to the pattern in Table 18. For 1950 Table 19 dramatizes the segregation that had occurred by 1970. With the poor almost wholly concentrated in the two bottom income tenths the remaining eighty percent of municipalities contained only token numbers of those below poverty level. Presumably, some of these were household service workers, perhaps others were elderly relatives living in the home and the like. In regard to both the median number of school years completed and the percent of those completing four years of high school or more there has been a steady growth in the differential between those municipalities in the highest income groups and the lowest. As noted above, there has been steady increases for all income groups for this variable, but it is in the upper income groups that the most signifi- cant gains occurred. Table 20 shows this most clearly for median school years completed. For the municipalities in the highest income tenth there was a gain of 1.2 years but for the lowest tenth a gain of only .2 of a year from 10.6 to 10.8. Although inequality by coefficient of variation has grown for the highest income tenth from .62 to 4.4 per— cent, inequality for the bottom tenth remains about twice as great (4.4 versus 8.4 percent). The growth in both median years and inequality for those municipalities in the highest income decile is of a different character than for the bottom decile. For the more affluent group the increase 39 in median years means more in these municipalities are going to and graduating from college, professional and graduate schools with the coefficient of variation measuring differences of achievement among these relatively well-educated people. In the bottom tenth the increase in years means some fewer numbers of students are dropping or being pushed out of school before graduation. The large coefficient of vari- ation points to a large group, though, which is far below this mean number of median years and some who have progressed much farther in numbers of years of school. Again, the evidence of these tables indi- cates greater heterogeneity among the less affluent and relative homo- geneity among the upper income municipalities, as hypothesized. A similar symmetrical pattern prevails for the percent of those completing four years of high school or more (Tables 22 and 23). There is a regular increment evident in this variable with increasing income in both quintiles and deciles but without the exceptions at the extremes of the array as in the case of median school years completed. This is especially clear in Table 23 but the extreme inequality in the bottom income tenths (twenty-three percent) in Table 22 in contrast with the differences in the means (eighty-five versus forty-one percent) make the variable exceptional in pointing to intermunicipal differences in life-style. Homogeneity, i.e. the least inequality, is most pro- nounced where the percentage of those with better educations is highest and inequality is greatest in municipalities where there are the fewest well-educated people. A coefficient of variation about five times as great (23.2 versus 4.1 percent) in the lowest as in the highest income tenth evinces substantial inequality. 4O Essentially the same pattern holds if municipalities are distributed by income fifths as in Table 23. This table‘ also shows clearly a steady increase, however, for all income groups in the mean percent finishing high school or more. Especially for the middle sixty percent of municipalities has there been a decrease in the amount of inequality for this variable. This has changed little over the census years of this study which points to the centrality of education for access to not only income but style of life and status group acceptance involved in privileged residential location. H3 holds that as new municipalities in the SMSA emerge those which are new incorporations will have higher SES indicators and less inequality than those which are included in the SMSA by simply having 20 This is attributable to passed the population threshold of 2,500. the new incorporation's powers of selection through control of exclu— sionary devices as noted above. Hence, income and other life-style indices should be higher and more homogeneity of inhabitants result. Table 24 shows that for economic criteria, income and percent of families below poverty level, the hypotheses predicted 1960 income but not for 1970. For 1960 the new incorporations (NI) were higher in income than for the Detroit SMSA and new municipalities by population increase (PI). Those which passed the census population threshold of 2,500 were lower in mean incomes than both. Mean income for NI fell between the second and third deciles for the 1960 SMSA (Table 15). That for PI fell between the sixth and seventh deciles. The same order held for 41 mean percent of poor families, with NI at 7.8 percent having fewer than both the Detroit SMSA and P1 (9.7 and 9.9 percent). By 1970 this order had almost reversed itself. This may be the result of the emergence of working class suburbs as the new incor- porations for 1970. Because of the decentralization of manufacturing and the political exclusion of existing municipalities new working class suburbs could account for the lower income of this group. NI were the poorest of the three in terms of income, with P1 having mean incomes between the first and second highest income deciles for the SMSA taken as a whole. This is compared to mean income falling between the fifth and sixth 1970 decile for NI. The same pattern emerges for percent of poor families. NI and the SMSA have about four percent while PI have on the average only 2.4 percent poor families. In each of these census years the municipalities which ranked at the upper income extreme experienced the greatest amount of income inquality and those which ranked at the lower extreme had the least. For exam- ple, in 1960 NI had the highest incomes and also had the most income inequality as measured by the coefficient of variation (thirty-five percent). The lower incomes, which were in the PI municipalities, had much less inequality (eleven percent). In 1970 (when the new munici- palities exchanged places) PI municipalities had higher inequality (sixty-one percent) than new incorporations (seven percent). In general, those municipalities with more poor families had greater inequality in their distribution except the extreme inequality (seventy-eight percent) for the 1970 PI municipalities which were higher income (Table 24). For both 1960 and 1970 the municipalities 42 which ranked highest in income also generally had a lower percentage of poor families. For example, in 1960, new incorporations had higher incomes and 7.8 percent poor families with a lesser degree of inequal- ity (forty-six percent) than PI municipalities with 9.9 percent poor families and fifty-nine percent inequality by standard deviation. In 1970 the income leader had only 2.4 percent poor families but high inequality (seventy-eight percent) while NI municipalities had more (3.9 percent) poor families but less inequality (forty percent). For the other life-style indicators, distribution of educa— tion, there is once again a similar pattern. Table 25 shows that for the income leaders there are slightly more median school years for both 1960 and 1970 with higher inequality measures consistently going with the better educated municipalities. For 1960 the richer new incorpora- tions were slightly higher in median years of education (11.7 versus 11.4), somewhat more unequal (7.5 versus 6.0 percent), had a higher percent with four years of high school or more (fifty-two versus forty- eight percent) and about nine percent more unequal than the PI munici- palities. There was less inequality in both groups of new municipalities, however, than among the municipalities of the SMSA as a whole, for 1960. In 1970 PI municipalities were income leaders and this is reflected in education data. PI municipalities led NI municipalities in median school years (13.0 versus 12.1) and in mean percent with four years of high school or more (sixty-seven versus fifty-five percent). Inequality follows the same pattern as for 1960, i.e. the higher income and education municipalities are more unequal in median school years 43 completed (9.0 versus 2.4 percent) and percent high school graduates or more (23.0 versus 23.8 percent). The picture that emerges for new municipalities is mixed, therefore, and it appears that per se income is the more likely predic- tor of other higher SES indicators. It was hypothesized that higher income would accrue to new municipalities in the SMSA which were new incorporations, and that on the basis of that incorporation they would be likely to have other, higher SES indicators. The rising income of some of the middle class helped the new PI municipalities to emerge in 1970 as income leaders, however, and it is income which more accurately indicates other SES advantages. It is possible that higher SES groups moved to areas already incorporated and then SES differences began to obtain as a consequence of a more Optimum site and accumulation of advantages. Inequality points to a lack of status homogeneity according to the hypotheses used in this study. What becomes clear is not so much a lack of status homogeneity in higher income municipalities as indicated by the coefficient of variation but the growth of homogeneity as indicated by the means and ranges from 1960 to 1970. For each vari— able the ranges show a relatively uniform growth in the 1960-1970 period with income leaders having the highest ranges but in each case the minimum figures are quite close. For instance, in l960 median family income for NI ranged from $6,000 up to about $15,000. For PI municipalities this ranged from $5,821 to $8,648. Note that the bottom of each range is quite close, about $260 difference (Table 24). This is true for the other indicators also. In effect, there are minimum 44 limits for entering new municipalities and these are becoming higher and more restrictive over time. There is a sharp drop from 8.7 to 3.0 percent in the numbers of poor families to be found in all new municipalities from 1960 to 1970. Mean income was higher in all new municipalities than the mean for the SMSA for 1970 ($17,164 versus $14,221), decisively changed from 1960 ($7,912 versus $7,916), as shown in Table 24. While the gaps in education indicators grew less strongly than the previous two variables they are still higher than the SMSA mean figures. Median school years completed shifted up a full year for all new municipalities while it was slightly less than a year (.8 year) for the SMSA (Table 25). The mean percent completing four years of high school or more increased 12.4 percentage points for all new municipalities and 10.2 points for the SMSA for the same period. Using the tables to compare SES indicators for the income leader new municipalities and the city of Detroit (which is in the bottom income tenth) may help attest to the increasingly restrictive nature of these changes. For 1960 the city of Detroit's median family income of $6,825 (Table 2) was $1,856 less than the mean $8,681 median income for new incorporations--NI (Table 24). In 1970 this difference had widened 435.5 percent to $9,938, the difference between Detroit's $10,045 med- ian family income (Table 3) and PI municipalities mean figure of $20,083 (Table 24). For 1960 Detroit's median school years completed were 10.0 (Table 2) compared to 11.7 for new municipalities (Table 25), a 45 difference of 1.7 years. 1970 figures reveal a 17.7 percent increase in this difference, to 2.0 years--11.0 for Detroit and 13.0 for PI municipalities. While this is numerically small, it is in the nature of the difference between not having graduated from high school and having a year of college; of obvious, manifest and critical difference in securing meaningful employment and a decent share of available goods and services. The percent of those twenty-five and over who graduated from high school or had more education--the educational and cultural level of the municipalities--also changed from 1960 to 1970. For Detroit in 1960 the figure was 34.4 percent (Table 2) as against 51.9 percent for new incorporations (Table 25). This difference of 17.5 percentage points increased 20.5 percent in 1970 when Detroit was 25.1 points below the income leader PI municipalities (41.8 versus 66.9 percent). The percent of those below poverty level, however, presents a different and confounding outcome. In 1960 Detroit had nineteen per- cent of its families below poverty level; for 1960 NI this was 7.8 per- cent, an 11.2 percentage point difference. By 1970 this difference diminished by twenty-one percent. Detroit had 11.3 percent poor fami- lies in 1970 while PI municipalities had only 2.4 percent, an 8.9 per- centage point difference. This is still a substantial difference and occurs while all other indicators pointed to increasing social distance between the city of Detroit and PI for 1970. The restrictive and exclusionary nature of these changes means that for those who are poor or marginally well-off there is less opportunity to obtain residential locus which will provide access to those life chances the SMSA has to 46 offer. It must be noted here that the city of Detroit is used here as an example only and it is not the poorest municipality in the SMSA. There are six other municipalities which are less advantaged in com- peting for the goods and services of the metropolis. CONCLUSIONS A brief summarization of the history of the city and the findings of this study highlight the character of social distance and political fragmentation in the case of Detroit. Detroit is the fifth largest city in the United States. Primarily a manufacturing city, it is p0pulated by a large, ethnically diverse industrial labor force and financed through real estate taxes supplemented by an income tax. Founded by the French in 1701 and taken by the British in 1763, it has always been an international and cul- turally cosmopolitan site. Its ethnic history from the early nineteenth icentury includes Canadian, Irish, German, Russian, Austrian, Hungarian and Polish immigrants. From the 19205 southern blacks migrated to the city's job opportunities especially with the labor demands of the 1940s and World War II. In 1970 blacks were 43.7 percent of the city popula- tion. Detroit also has a variegated industrial and commercial his- tory. The capital base for automobile manufacturing was the lumber fortunes of the 18005 and the labor base was the shipbuilding and machine manufacturing industries. After the Civil War the city yielded iron, steel, boot and shoe, rail car, stove, wheel and axle, and chemical and pharmaceutical products. Dominated since 1914 by the automobile industry, Detroit also saw the rise of the United Auto Workers union, one of the largest in the United States. 47 48 In contrast to this diverse and heterogeneous development, the isolation and homogenization during the past two decades appears as a discordant and profound change. A city finds its essential strengths in diversity. The strengths in diversity are so important to the life of the city that mention of them (and drawbacks) is war- ranted to point to what is threatened by the processes evidenced in this research of Detroit. Diversity of cultural and ethnic units is the basis of the freedom of choice and creation of varied possibilities in the city. Complex problems of change and development can result from great diver- sity along with its attendant inefficiency and discomfort. This is at the bottom of much urban conflict and disorder. But innovative and transforming remedies can also be provided by these problems through the acceleration of social change as a result of the impact of these units upon one another. Social tension provokes a search for attitudes and laws insuring justice for everyone and makes tolerance a necessity for survival rather than a mere virtue. The wide range of choices and experiences makes possible experimentation with modes of living and creating which enriches the life of the city and its social and economic strengths. The fact of a city implies a web of political, economic and cultural institutions, a mesh of income and status groups making their unique contributions. In lieu of this creative mix there is the isola- tion of autonomous municipalities. Instead of recognized interdepen- dency there is the exclusion of class and status groups to which the following newsstory is witness. 49 On Tuesday, December 17, 1974 the Detroit Free Press ran an article which was headlined "Oakland Tells Detroit: Keep Guns Out: Patterson Wants Eight Mile Frontier." L. Brooks Patterson, the Oakland County prosecutor, was commenting on the beginning of a program to eliminate plea bargaining in concealed weapons cases in that county. The article continued: "Although the law prohibits him from treating the Wayne County-Oakland County line as an international border, Patter- son said it can at least be considered an imaginary frontier." Patter- son was quoted: "I assume if we charted it, we could establish that we have more trouble from outside than we do from Oakland. But it's not like you are going into East Berlin. You can't put up a border guard. But you have to put up an invisible border" (Detroit Free Press, Decem- ber 17, 1974). As the evidence of this study shows, borders already exist in the form of municipal political fragmentation and income and status group segregation. It is noteworthy that Oakland County in 1970 had nine municipalities in the top income quintile of fifteen municipalities. Summarizing the empirical evidence of this research reveals several important findings regarding political fragmentation and in- equality in the Detroit SMSA. First, there is the pronounced income segregation which has occurred since 1950. The shift of a largely middle class city into a poor central city and relatively affluent suburbs with the top income group far outdistancing the rest of the SMSA probably is the most salient manifestation of this income segregation. 50 Second, the middle class is a rapidly falling proportion of the city of Detroit while at the same time in the suburbs the numbers of those who are below poverty level are falling. Poor families are segregated in municipalities at the bottom of the income array. Thus, the distribution of the rich and poor is increasingly unequal with segregation and homogenization of each occurring apace. Third, the life-style variables of schooling are less demon- strative of the widening of social distance than the income variables but still point to homogenization of status groups. This is due to greater equality among top income groups for educational attainment. Fourth, there are gross differences between the emerging municipalities included in the 1970 census data and the city of Detroit. The extreme differences in style of life due to income and education again point to class and status stratification through political frag- mentation. Fifth, the growing numbers of municipalities in the SMSA are a manifestation of metropolitan disintegration. The drawing of race and class lines by means of specialized municipalities establishes and perpetuates inequality in the distribution of life chances. Thus, not only does this affect those now experiencing this maldistribution but there is an intergenerational effect which contributes to its perpetu- ation. The achievement of full equality by those who are consistently left with the worst housing, education and employment becomes problem- atic as this obtains over time. There are many rewards stemming from the housing people secure. This is especially clear in consideration of housing 51 distribution by class in the metropolis. The aesthetics and psychological values, the efficiency of housing as a physical plant in which to work, rest and play become important here. A higher degree of personal satisfaction and the absence of group stigma about where one is in terms of the reward structure of American society vis a vis residential locus are also important. Income groups which can afford to spend differentially greater amounts for homes also have that economic power available to contribute to the manipulation of economic and political institutions (e.g. banks, zoning commissions, city and state government agencies) to do their will in terms of legislative action, court rulings, building permits, favor- able commission rulings and so on. Some general inferences may be drawn about the future direc- tions of metropolitan Detroit from the evidence of this research. Certainly there will be both fiscal and social consequences of continu- ation of present tendencies. It might be anticipated that with the continued isolation of the poor, mostly blacks and other minorities, in the central city there will be a further weakening of the fiscal base of the city. Unless there is a fundamental change in the methods of finance from the real estate tax the city will be increasingly unable to support its service requirements and other financial obligations due to the outflow of wealth to the suburbs. This will result in the loss of both commercial and cultural resources not only to the city but the state and nation as well. The fiscal burden of welfare, education, fire and police protection and other essential city services will fall on either state or federal governments or both. 52 One possible response might be the annexation and consolidation of the surrounding metropolitan area to tap additional financial resources but, given the existing legislative obstacles, this is not likely. Another fiscal response might be the imposition of a heavy income tax on those who work in the city but are not resi- dents. Another may be the charging of steep admissions fees to non- residents for use of the cultural treasures of the city--its museums, libraries, recreation sites and other social capital. More likely, however, is the loss of these resources by the simple inability of the city to meet its payrolls due to insolvency. This may result because the city will be unable to convince the state to grant it taxing power appropriate to its needs. If the possibility of solvency should emerge through adequate and equitable taxation, use fees or some other device, a possible political response may be mounted by the last immigrant wave to the central city. Those who have been left in the blighted areas by the flight to the suburbs--the poor blacks and other minority ethnic resi- dents—-may resist annexation. Because these groups will soon be a resident majority in Detroit, it is possible they will perceive their political power as diluted by annexation and, thus, strive to retain and consolidate their political hegemony in the city. This implies a political class consciousness, an urban nationalism with fiscal over- tones. With the central city the hub of financial, communications and commercial activity for the metropolis then fiscal exploitation may potentially be altered by political independence of the central city. 53 This, however, will only be possible with the unified, solidary political movement of the central city as a whole. While the measures used in this study are primitive and the findings limited in scope they are consistent with basic theoretical proposals set forth earlier in this paper. The generality of class segregation and political disintegration in urban areas are clearly subject to much more extensive and concentrated research.21 The element of time also is important to further testing of the hypotheses and theoretical notions to determine their validity and reliability and that of the measures used to test them. The conclusions here noted, then, are tentative at best because the tendencies under study will want careful analysis to determine their temporality. APPENDICES APPENDIX A APPENDIX A ANNEXATION According to Andrews, boundary changes are typically in response to urbanization (l968:5). It is the procedural requirements for annexation and incorporation themselves which operate to exacer- bate problems of urbanization for cities attempting to annex. There are two broad types of procedures for annexation in Michigan. There is the standard method which requires an election and there are special procedures, chief of which is the "joint resolu- tion" requiring the consent of the governing bodies of the city and township affected. Of the two types, the first, popular determination, is the most widely used for making boundary changes. In most instances, home rule cities and other municipalities can, by petition and elec- tion, bring about annexation (National League of Cities, 1966). Basically, the annexation procedure for home rule cities and villages is one of filing petitions with the county board of super- visors who then set dates for elections. Approval is normally by two separate majority votes--one by residents of the area proposed to be annexed and the other by a combined majority of voters in the annexing city and in the remainder of the township which includes the proposed area. There are other requirements which apply to unique annexation 54 55 forms as in cases of uninhabited areas and land which is owned by an annexing city (Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated, 1967:402-404). From a legal standpoint the county board has no discretion-- it is obliged by law to receive the petitions if they meet the legal requirements of form and content. County boards have, however, occasionally delayed setting an election date. This may be a conse- quence of the rural-urban balance among board members. In cases such as this, cities have resorted to court orders to force board action (Andrews, 1968:12). In contrast to annexation, incorporation is a considerably less involved matter. New municipalities are incorporated by a single majority vote approval by the voters in the proposed city or village and by meeting population and density requirements. These are 2,000 population and an average density of 500 persons per square mile for a home rule city and for a village 150 population and 100 persons per square mile average density. The exacerbating effect on urban problems of the procedural requirements described above occurs when one community seeks to project itself from annexation by countering one proposed boundary change with another. A few citizens can initiate action by signing petitions and legal procedures are easily engaged when a city or an adjacent unin- corporated area is threatened by another community. Thus, a community threatened by annexation can incorporate to protect itself. And a central city threatened by separate incorporation of its suburbs can begin annexation procedures (Andrews, 1968:12). Hence, boundary man- euvering is not only stimulated by the legal procedures but through 56 this legal system there is a decided advantage to incorporation because only one voter majority is required, so, for example, for a suburb attempting to preserve its autonomy in the face of threatened annexa- tion, incorporation provides speedy protection from the more cumbersome attempts of, say, a large metropolitan city (Andrews, 1968:11). APPENDIX B APPENDIX B POVERTY INCOME CUTOFFS The income cutoffs for lower income levels used by the Bureau of the Census raises some problems of comparability among the census years and of validity for this study. First, the definition has been changed several times over the twenty years prior to the 1970 population census so for each census year relevant to this study there is a problem of comparability. Also, the base upon which determination of poverty has been made is misleading and arbitrary, making the defi- nition to some degree invalid. Tracing the chronology of changes may help to briefly outline the problems raised. In 1948, about one-third of all families and individuals in the United States were found to have money income of less than $2,000, based on income data from a Bureau of the Census sample of roughly 25,000 households (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1950zl). It is this arbitrary $2,000 figure that was used in 1949 by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress to define poverty for a family of four (Ferman, et a1., l968z3). Being without an official poverty definition, the Bureau of the Census used $2,000 as an income cutoff in 1950 and $3,000 in 1960 to approximate this definition. This poverty defini- tion is based on food requirements as the central factor in measuring 57 58 individual's well-being (in terms of the proportion of total income going to purchase this necessity). In 1964 the Social Security Administration (SSA) originated an official poverty definition which was based upon a nutritionally adequate food plan--the "economy" plan which was designed by the Depart- ment of Agriculture "for emergency or temporary use when funds are low'I (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973:App32). Annual revisions in this plan followed price changes of items in the economy food budget. The rationale was that some indication of the society's, as well as the individual's, well-being would be revealed by the percentage of total family income expended for necessities, particularly food. Thus, families spending approximately the same amounts for food are considered as sharing the same level of living. For families of three or more persons the poverty level was set at three times the cost of the economy food plan. This was the average food cost-to-family income relationship reported by the Department of Agriculture on the basis of a 1955 survey of food consumption. For smaller families and persons residing alone, the cost of the economy food plan was multiplied by factors that were slightly larger to com- pensate for the relatively higher fixed expenses of these smaller households. The SSA poverty cutoffs also took account of differences in the cost of living between farm and non-farm families (U.S. Bureau of the Census, l969:l). Modifications were recommended in this plan, the most impor- tant of which was a shift in the cost-of-living adjustment. The dif- ferences between changes in the overall cost-of-living and the economy food plan led to new poverty cutoffs based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI), adopted in 1969. Primarily it was because [a]nnual revisions of the SSA poverty thresholds were based only on changes in the average per capita cost of the foods in the economy food budget. This method of updating the 59 poverty cutoffs did not fully reflect increases in the overall cost of living in the 19605. . . . The pace at which the general cost of living advanced in recent years was not uniformly matched by increases in the price of goods in the economy food plan. Thus, general price changes since 1959 were not paralleled by comparable changes in the poverty thresholds. For example, the CPI went up by 13.7 percent between 1959 and 1966, while poverty thresholds increased by 7.9 percent for an average family during the same period (U.S. Bureau of the Census, l970:2). While there is a fifty percent increase from the 1950 pov- erty level of $2,000 to the 1960 level of $3,000 as the income cutoff used by the Bureau of the Census, the 1970 cutoff is only 24.8 percent greater. This is a result of the shift from the economy food plan to the CPI. The 1970 income cutoff for a male-headed, non-farm family of four is $3,745. However, this $745 or 24.8 percent increase over the 1960 cutoff follows a decade of inflation fueled by war and rising personal income. For example, the Detroit SMSA experienced a 79.8 per- cent increase in the mean of all the median family incomes of all municipalities with populations of 2,500 or more from $7,915.91 in 1960 to $14,221.40 in 1970. This is clearly not in accord with the intent of the shift to the CPI--to "reflect increases in the overall cost of living during the 19605 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, l970:2). Other reasons given for this shift are that the CPI is published regu- larly and that it is a generally accepted measure. Poverty statistics were not published before 1959 in decennial census material, but have been since, annually in the Current Population Survey in March. Contrasting the CPI and the economy food plan may provide some insight to the nature of the inconsistencies involved in their use as poverty indicators. 60 The CPI, called the cost-of—living index prior to 1964, has gone through four major revisions since its inception in 1913 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1966:2). It is designed to ”[m]easure the average changes in prices of all types of consumer goods and services pur- chased by urban wage-earners and clerical workers" (U.S. Bureau of Labor, 1973:10). There are approximately 400 goods and services cur— rently priced. The "market basket" items are carefully described to insure that the same quality of good or service is priced and differ- ences in prices reflect only price changes and not changes in quality. By contrast the [flood plans prepared by the Department of Agriculture have, for more than thirty years, served as a guide for estimating costs of food needed by families of different composition. The plans represent a translation of the criteria of nutri- tional adequacy set forth by the National Research Council into quantities and types of food compatible with the prefer- ence of United States families, as revealed in food consump- tion studies. Plans are developed at varying levels of cost to suit the needs of families with different amounts to spend. All the plans, if strictly followed, can provide an acceptable and adequate diet, but--generally speaking--the lower the level of cost, the more restricted the kinds and qualities of food must be and the more skill in marketing and food preparation that is required. Recently the Department of Agriculture began to issue an "economy" food plan, costing only 75-80 percent as much as the basic low cost plan, for "temporary or emergency use when funds are low." In January, 1964, this plan suggested foods costing $4.60 a week per person, an average of only 22 cents a meal per person in a four-person family (Orshansky, 196526). It is manifest that the economy food plan is inadequate to measure the needs of families in terms of income. The CPI measures many more consumer items and provides a more realistic measure of family income requirements. However, one brief example provides interesting 61 insights into CPI underestimation of thenumber of persons who are poor in population census figures. The now discarded poverty thresholds (the economy food plan) measure only a 7.9 percent increase from 1959 to 1966, while the CPI increases 13.7 percent for the same period. For the decade (1960 to 1960), however, the CPI poverty level increased 24.8 percent but the 22 1970 census figures paradoxically show CPI increased 31.1 percent. a drop in the number of poor families from 1960 at the same time that median family incomes were rising precipitously (79.8 percent in the Detroit SMSA). Insofar as poverty is relative, i.e. poverty is judged not just in terms of survival but one's share of society's goods and resources (Orshansky, 1965z3), then it is problematic that the number of poor families would fall in the face of such rapidly rising incomes. While this is a matter for further research, the implication is clear. The shift to the CPI poverty level and rise in the poverty thresholds by less than half of the income increase for the Detroit SMSA (24.8 versus 79.8 percent) will eventually result in an increase of poor families as they compete with the affluent for items in the CPI "market basket." Also, during this same period, income distribution became increasingly unequal (see Table 4 for coefficient of variation). In describing the relativity of definitions of poverty, Downs (l970:8) notes the extreme lowness of U.S. poverty income thresholds and points out that they are about one-third of a "moderate standard of living" as estimated by a 1967 Bureau of Labor Statistics study for a four- person household. 62 Similarly, a study conducted by Real Estate Research Corporation in 1968 showed that using the cost of housing, rather than the cost of food, to define poverty resulteg in much higher income thresholds than those set forth above.* 3 Raising these thres- holds would greatly increase the number of persons considered poor in each of the categories mentioned above (Downs, l970:8). In view of these considerations regarding the CPI poverty level income cutoffs only carefully qualified conclusions may be drawn from the Bureau of the Census figures purporting to measure the percent of families below poverty level. 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Median family income and percent of families* below poverty level,** Detroit SMSA municipalities 3_2,500 for l950, 1960, 1970. Median Family Income Census Number of Btaqurd Year Municipalities -311——195 In Coefficient of Mean Dollars Variation T950 39 $ 4,364.97 $ l,l07.42 25.37% l960 58 7,9l5.9l 2,204.90 28.ll T970 72 l4,22l.40 5,562.88 39.l2 *l950 figures based on data for families and unrelated individuals, l960 and l970 figures on data for families only. *1? "Poverty level" definitions are not perfectly comparable across all three census years. See Appendix B. Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: l950, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Tables ll, 37, 39; Census of Population: l960, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 33, 34; U.S. Censuses of Population and Housin : l960, Final Report PHC(l)-40. Table’P-l; Census Of'Population: |§70, Voi. i, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 41, 42. '76 Percent families below poverty level Standard Range deviation Range In Coefficient of Mean percent variation 3 7,237 - $ 2,647 16.2% 7.11% 43.89% 6.1 - 36.1% 14,954 - 5,324 9.7 5.40 55.67 2.3 - 24.2 46,715 - 8,718 4.0 2.84 71.00 0.7 - 14.5 77 III .S .3 828 58285 .E is .F is .22 ”cottage; .3 msmcmu ”rum m_nwh .o¢-A_vo:a pgoqmm chwm .oom_ "mcwmsoz ucm cowpmpzaoQ mo mwmsmcmu .m.: mam .mm mwFQMP .cmmwcowz .vm ucmm .r .ro> .owm— ”cowum—zaom mo msmcmu mmm .mm mmFDmp .cmmwzuwz .NN “can .N ._o> .omm_ “cowuwpaaom mo msmcmu .mzmcmu mgu mo :mmgzm .m.= ”mwucsom Fo.NN mm.NF . mm.o_ oxa~ _m.mm ow.mp om.oF oom_ &mm._m §mo.mm on.FP omm_ me> mfiwumugmch m—wpcvzccmch mFPmechmucH msmcmu .okmp ucm oom_ .omm— ”mm—wumu wcm mmepcwzc .mmeuLozc >2 mcomwcmaaou _m>cmucw wEOUCW >Fwsm$ :mwumz .m wramh 78 Table 6. Population concentration by median family income quintiles and deciles, Detroit SMSA municipalities :_2,500. Income 1950 1960 1970 Decile Percent Population Percent Population Percent P0pulation Highest .58% 14,826 1.28% 39,738 2.04% 72,415 2 1.88 48,333 3.44 107,152 7.82 277,894 3 6.71 172,152 11.13 346,755 7.47 265,242 4 3.28 84,075 5.21 162,168 11.05 392,474 5 2.48 63,503 3.39 105,596 7.82 277,912 6 74.83 1,919,717 5.12 159,587 4.33 153,695 7 1.71 43,850 59.14 1,842,173 5.63 200,142 8 5.44 139,489 4.08 127,162 2.26 80,344 9 2.33 59,803 3.37 116,156 3.77 133,915 Lowest .77 19,785 3.48 108,373 47.81 1,698,682 Tota1s 100.00 2,565,533 100.00 3,114,860 100.00 3,552,715 ancome 1950 1960 1970 u1n- tile Percent Population Percent Population Percent Population Highest 2.46% 63,159 4.72% 146,890 9.86% 350,309 2 9.99 256,227 16.34 508,923 18.51 657,716 3 77.30 1,983,220 8.51 265,183 12.15 431,607 4 7.15 183,339 63.22 1,969,335 7.90 280,486 Lowest 3.10 79,588 7.21 224,529 51.58 1,832,597 Tota1s 100.00 2,565,533 100.00 3,114,860 100.00 3,552,715 Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of the POpulation: 1950, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Tables 6, 10, ll, 39; Census of Popu- lation: 1960, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 7, 33, 34; 0.8;hggn; suses of Population and Housing; 1960, Final Report PHC(l)-40. Table P-l; Census of Population: 1970, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. 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N gum NNm.__ -moe.m_ N_._ mo.e- oo.eo~.~_ N epN mme.~, -mmm.m_ mm._ ew.©mp Nm.meN.~_ N :30 mem.m_ -NmN.mN mm. m_.mop Nm.¢©o.m. N gum Nem.mp -wmm.m_ me. NN.ew oo.ome.mN N :33 mpo.m_ -_wm.eN mN.N mw.N_m mm.~o_.e_ N utm mmm.efi -Ne..mp om.m Nm.ee_._ mm.eoo.m_ N ucm _om.mpw-m_N.oew Nmo.em ow.mmm.mw mN.mme.o~w w “magma: cowpmwgm> mo mgmppoo mmcmm ucmvowuwwmww>mo cH com: meWWmMMWHwfiaz thwwm camecmam .onN .oom.N.M mmwa_aa.oNc:E N_Eae cmwuaz .NN mNnae 9() * ’ Table 18. Percent of families* with annual incomes less than poverty level* Detroit SMSA municipalities 3_2,500, by census year and income quintiles. 1950 Income Standard Quintile Deviation In Coefficient Mean Percent of Variation Range Highest 14.7% 5.39% 36.67% 6.9%-22.l% 2nd 9.5 2.20 23.16 6.1 -11.9 3rd 14.7 4.85 32.99 8.2 -22.2 4th 16.1 4.54 28.20 10.3 -23.0 Lowest ~ 25.8 5.65 21.90 19.5 -36.1 *** See Table 1 - note. 'Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1950, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Table 11; Census of Population: 1960, Vol.71, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 33, 34; Census of Population: 1970, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 41, 42. 91 1960 1970 Standard Standard Deviation Deviation In Coefficient In Coefficient Mean Percent of Variation Range Mean Percent of Variation Range 5.8% 1.69% 29.14% 2.3%- 8.4% 1.8% .87% 48.33% 0.7%- 3.9% 6.6 1.89 28.64 3.5 -10.2 2.9 .80 27.59 2.0 - 4.9 6.8 1.95 28.68 3.5 -10.5 3.2 .93 29.06 1.2 - 5.1 11.5 4.12 35.83 7.4 -21.0 3.8 1.57 41.32 0.6 - 6.4 18.2 3.73 20.50 11.0 -24.2 8.3 3.01 36.27 4.3 -12.8 $32 Table 19. Percent of families* with annual incomes less than poverty level**, Detroit SMSA municipalities 3_2,500, by census year and income deciles. 1950 Income Standard Dec11e Deviation In Coefficient Mean Percent of Variation Range Highest 12.9% 4.3% 33.33% 8.4%-18.7% 2nd 16.1 5.71 35.47 6.9 -22.1 3rd 9.2 2.37 25.76 6.1 -1l.9 4th 9.9 1.95 19.70 7.8 -11.9 5th 11.1 2.68 24.14 8.2 -l4.4 6th 18.2 3.79 20.82 14.0 -22.2 7th 12.7 2.43' 19.13 10.3 -16.7 8th 19.5 3.44 17.64 14.0 -23.0 9th 23.4 3.45 14.74 19.5 -28.4 Lowest 21.1 6.38 22.71 20.6 -36.1 *** See Table l - note. 24, Michigan. Sources: Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Part 24, Michigan. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: Table 11; Census of Population: Tables 33, 34; Census of Population: Tables 41, 42. 1950, 1960, V01. 1, 1970, V01. 1, Part 93 1960 1970 Standard Standard Deviation Dgyjatjpn In Coefficient , In Coefficient Mean Percent of Variation Range Mean Percent of Variation Range 5.8% 2.11% 36.38% 2.3%- 7.9% 1.3% .42% 32.31% 0.7%- 2.1% 5.9 1.23 20.85 4.5 - 8.4 2.4 .84 35.00 1.2 - 3.9 5.8 1.47 25.35 3.5 - 8.3 2.5 .42 16.80 2.0 - 3.2 7.5 1.89 25.20 5.6 -10.2 3.2 .95 29.69 2.3 - 4.9 6.7 2.42 36.12 3 5 -10.5 3.1 .89 28.71 1.2 - 3.9 6.9 1.30 18.84 5 3 - 9.1 3.4 .95 27.94 2.0 - 5.1 10.7 3.91 36.54 7 4 -19.0 3.7 1.31 35.41 2.5 - 5.9 12.3 4.17 33.90 7.8 -21.0 3.9 1.80 46.15 0.6 - 6.4 15.6 2.65 16.99 11.0 -20.1 6.1 1.32 21.64 4.3 - 8.4 21.3 2.00 9.39 18.8 -24.2 10.3 2.66 25.83 5.8 -14.5 941 Table 20. Median school years completed for those twenty-five years old and over, Detroit SMSA municipalities 3_2,500 by census year and income deciles. 1950 Income Standard Decile Deviation In Coefficient Mean Years of Variation Range Highest 12.9% .08 0.62% 13.0%-12.8% 2nd 12.6 .17 1.35 12.8 -12.4 3rd 11.7 .49 4.19 12.2 -ll.1 4th 11.1 .75 6.76 12.1 -10.1 5th 10.2 .58 5.69 11.2 - 9.8 6th 10.6 .44 4.15 11.1 - 9.9 7th 10.2 .68 6.67 11.3 - 9.5 8th 9.9 1.10 11.11 11.5 - 8.4 9th 9.8 .93 9.49 11.2 - 8.9 Lowest 10.6 .96 9.06 11.6 - 9.0 Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: .1950, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Table 11; Census of Po ulation: l960, V012 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 32, 34; Census of Population: 1970, Vol. I, Part 24, Michi- gan. Tables 40, 42. 95 1960 1970 Standard Standard Deviation Deviation In Coefficient In Coefficient Mean Years of Variation Range Mean Years of Variation Range 13.0% .08 0.62% 13.1%-12.9% 14.1% .62 4.40% 15.1%-12.9% 12.7 .31 2.44 13.3 -12.4 12.9 .50 3.88 14.1 -12.5 12.2 .10 0.82 12.3 ~12.0 12.4 .14 . 1.13 12.6 -12.2 11.9 .49 4.12 12.2 -10.8 12.2 .04 0.33 12.2 -12.1 12.0 .21 1.75 12.2 -11.6 12.2 .23 1.89 12.5 -11.7 11.3 .51 4.51 12.2 -10.5 12.2 .13 1.07 12.4 -12.0 10.7 .53 4.95 11.3 -10.0 12.0 .38 3.17 12.5 -11.2 10.3 .50 4.85 10.8 - 9.7 11.9 .40 3.36 12.3 -1l.0 10.8 .79 7.32 11.8 - 9.7 11.5 .50 4.35 12.2 -10.7 9.6 .89 9.27 10.9 - 8.7 10.8 .91 8.43 12.2 - 9.5 536 Table 21. Median school years completed for those twenty-five years old and over, Detroit SMSA municipalities 3_2,500, by census year and income quintiles. 1950 Income Standard Quintile Deviation In Coefficient Mean Years of Variation Range Highest 12.7% .22 1.73% 13.0%-12.4% 2nd 11.4 .71 6.23 12.2 -10.l 3rd 10.4 .55 5.29 11.2 - 9.8 4th 10.0 .93 9.30 11.5 - 8.4 Lowest 10.2 1.03 10.10 11.2 — 8.9 Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1950, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Michigan. gan. Tables 40, 42. Table 11; Census of Population: Tables 32, 34; Census of Population: ’196Q,_V01. 1, Part 24, 1970, Vol. 1} Part 24, Michi- 97 1960 1970 Standard Standard Deviation Deviation In Coefficient In ' Coefficient Mean Years of Variation Range Mean Years of Variation Range 12.8% .26 2.03% 13.l%-12.4% 13.6% .81 5.96% 15.1%-12.5% 12.0 .38 3.17 12.3 -10.8 12.3 .14 1.14 12.5 —12.1 ' 11.6 .51 4.40 12.2 -10.5 12.2 .19 1.56 12.5 -11.7 10.5 .55 5.24 11.3 - 9.7 12.0 .39 3.25 12.5 -1l.0 10.3 1.02 9.90 11.4 - 8.7 11.2 .81 7.23 12.2 - 9.5 98 Table 22. Percent completed four years high school or more for those twenty- five years old and over, Detroit SMSA municipalities 3_2,500, by census year and income deciles. 1950 Income Standard Decile Deviation In Coefficient Mean Percent of Variation Range Highest 73.9% 2.78% 3.76% 77.3%-70.5% 2nd 66.6 3.76 5.65 72.3 -62.9 3rd 50.1 8.05 16.07 60.0 -41.1 4th 43.8 8.98 20.50 52.6 -31.4 5th 33.8 5.47 16.18 43.2 -29.7 6th 38.3 3.40 8.88 41.8 -33.6 7th 32.4 6.73 20.77 43.4 -26.4 8th 31.5 8.70 27.62 45.3 -21.3 9th 31.8 7.98 25.09 43.0 -22.8 Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Po ulation: 1950, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Tables 34, 38; Census of P ulaEion: 1960, Vol Part 24, Michigan. Tables 32, 34; Census of Population: 1970 Vol. I, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 40, 42. 1| 99 1960 . 1970 Standard Standard Deviation Deviation In Coefficient In ' Coefficient Mean Percent of Variation Range Mean Percent of Variation Range 76.4% 1.65% 2.16% 79.0%-74.4% 85.2% 3.51% 4.12% 91.3%-79.3% 69.5 4.82 6.94 79.2 -65.3 75.7 4.96 6.55 85.4 -69.7 55.2 3.50 6.34 60.1 -52.3 65.0 3.62 5.57 69.4 -59.4 50.7 5.58 11.01 55.6 -38.6 58.0 1.67 2.88 59.9 -54.7 51.5 3.67 7.13 54.6 -47.0 57.3 6.11 10.66 65.6 -53.1 44.3 5.83 13.16 55.7 -36.4 58.0 5.65 9.74 68.0 -49.9 39.0 4.03 10.33 44.8 -34.4 53.1 7.50 14.12 68.0 -42.9 35.7 6.14) 17.20 93.9 -27.7 51.7 5.51 10.66 62.1 -42.1 40.0 7.24 18.10 48.2 -28.7 46.9 6.27 13.37 57.0 -37.4 30.6 7.77 25.39 41.4 -22.8 41.3 9.59 23.22 57.0 -29.5 l()O Table 23. Percent completed four years high school or more for those twenty- five years old and over, Detroit SMSA municipalities 3_2,500, by census year and income quintiles. 1950 Income Standard Quintiles Deviation In Coefficient Mean Percent of Variation Range Highest 69.7% 4.93% 7.07% 77.3%-62.9% 2nd 46.9 9.08 19.36 60.0 -3l.4 3rd 36.1 5.08 14.07 43.2 -29.7 4th 31.9 7.79 24.42 45.3 -21.3 Lowest 34.7 8.26 23.80 44.9 -22.8 Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1950, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Tables 34, 38; 24, Michigan. Tables 32, 34; Census 0 Michigan. Tables 40, 42. 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P.m_ Nm.N om.o N.NF NN we pcmecmm cum: emcem cewpewce> we mcee> new: pcewewwwmeu :H pcmwewwweeu :H cewpmw>mo cewpew>m3 -wwemwwwcaz eeee< Lee> eceeceem egmecepm we Le3E:z 3e: mzmcmu ego: to _eegem Law: mcmm> czew guwz pcmegea empmwaaeu mcem> wee3em coweez .ewwmuwce cewmzwecw 3:3 Lem> memcee >3 .oom.N.M mewuwpeewewcze Leew cpwz “smegma ece emmeeEee mgem> _ee3em :ewemz .mN ew3ew a .4 ENDNOTES ENDNOTES 1. Richard Sennett (1970) has written on the internal contradictions between the press for status homogeneity and cultural diversity in the urban setting. His book deals with these issues from a basically social-psychological rather than a structural standpoint, however. 2. Weber writes on three possible sources for the derivation of status groups: (1) there are class (economic) differences in life- style; (2) there are party differences and (3) there are cultural dif- ferences stemming from cultural conditions or institutions (1968:926- 939). The notion of status groups is more basic than that of class because the concept of classes came into use with capitalism and pro— perty relations in industrial society. Status groups are used in this paper as an ideal type, an abstraction not existing in pure form in society but as a heuristic device for the purposes of comparison and explication. 3. There are distinct benefits which derive from the clustering of status groups and status homogeneity, especially if the group is affluent. It is another example of the "accumulation of advantages" (Mills, 1956:111). Various commercial establishments follow the wealthy as they establish new class and status homogeneous enclaves in the metropolis. 104 105 4. While fringe and suburb are used interchangeably in this study, suburb is to some degree the preferred term. Fringe has the connotation of mixed rural and urban land use while that part of the city that is not central is comprised of both the suburbs and urban fringe. Suburb generally refers to residential or mixed residential and industrial use. 5. It is important to note at this point that in older U.S. cities SES differences typically favor the suburbs at the expense of the older central city. In newer, smaller cities Schnore and others have found the reverse situation. The central city is higher in SE5 measures and it is the suburbs which have the less well-to-do with corresponding sentiments toward annexation and other issues as their central city counterparts in older areas. In either case, focus on per se social distance is at issue and how it is influenced by govern- mental fragmentation. 6. As new clean industry is sought by suburbs for tax advantages those who are excluded from residence in the area on class or status grounds incur higher-transportation costs to get to work. These costs may become so high or transportation so difficult without a car that the jobs may become unavailable for these people. It is the affluent who are served by the freeways which lead from the city to the suburbs because it is they who can afford the expense of an automobile (or several for a family). The poor who cannot support a car then have little access to jobs which result from the decentralization of manu- facturing. With nearly no redundancy in transportation systems in American cities, i.e. there is a predominant dependency on the private 106 car, alternative transit costs, if, indeed, other forms are available, can be high enough to deter the poor central city resident from trying to reach work in these new plants. This leaves a surplus labor pool bound to the center city available for the secondary labor market (see Priore, 1971:90-94 and Baron and Hymer, 1971:94-101 for a basic explana- tion of the secondary labor market). 7. See also Fantini, et a1., 1970:216 for reference to the transmission of the dominant status culture as "political socialization” whereby the educational system instills attitudes and values important allegiance to the status quo. Also two empirical studies (Gans, 1969: 197; Vidich and Bensman, 1969) present evidence of the status culture transmitting function of the public schools. Schrag speaks to the notion of learning an inferior set of roles and behavior for black children and the selection mechanism for recruiting new elite members of organizations (1969:315). 8. This exclusion device can be used to segregate by race (as it most often is) but can work among suburbs in favor of the central city if that is where more profit can be gained. While the division here is between the central city and the suburbs for the purposes of the present study, it could take many configurations. 9. Dye suggests eight positive functions of decentralized suburban political structure specialization which act by their cohesive capacity to integrate status groups in communities (Dye, 1967:451-453). Briefly these are: (l) a source of social identification; (2) social scale is reduced and hence alienation; (3) institutional protection from status undesirables; (4) an opportunity for public catharsis to 107 reduce frustration; (5) permits more elites to hold power; (6) more opportunity for public participation; (7) insures more control by public contact (less remote); (8) allows minorities to influence policy through own control. 10. Under normal patterns, Scott found, proposals leave the general public indifferent and unless they are major changes will be approved by voter referenda (Scott, 1971). 11. The term life-style in this study refers to a mode of living of status groups who share a common set of beliefs and values and who thereby engage in similar patterns of behavior. For status groups life-style is a device by which judgements are made for both inclusion and exclusion in the group, assuming there is some degree of congruence between the group's espoused values and actual behavior. Life-style by itself is not a sufficient description of differences among groups to measure inequality accurately. However, the term does indicate differential choices which members of social classes make about criti- cal 1ife chances, especially educational choices for their children. In this study the empirical reference to life-style is specifically the education variables, i.e. median number of school years completed and percent of those completing four years of high school or more. A more general use of the term life-style is a shorthand expression for a more complex social fact of which educational achievement is but one indicator. Other indicated social values, beliefs and behaviors range from, for example, ideas about child rearing, religious practices and involvement in civic life to grooming, dress and other matters of what is commonly referred to as "taste." 108 12. For 1950 the data included both families and unrelated individuals. For 1960 and 1970 the percent of families below poverty level was for families only. These data also use income cutoffs of $2,000 for 1950, $3,000 for 1960 and "poverty level“ for 1970. These families are referred to as "poor" families or below "poverty level" in the text regardless of census year cutoff. See Appendix B for details on these income cutoffs. . 13. In 1950 the Bureau of the Census first used "Standard Metro- politan Area" to enable the uniform presentation of a wide variety of statistical data. It "is a county or group of contiguous counties which contains at least one city of 50,000 inhabitants or more" (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1950: Part 22, xv). For 1960 and 1970, this was changed to "Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area." The Bureau of the Census recognized 243 SMSAs in the United States and four in Puerto Rico, making a total of 247 in the 1970 census." Except in the New England states, a SMSA is a county or group of contiguous counties which contains at least one city of 50,000 inhabitants or more, or "twin cities“ with a combined population of at least 50,000. In addition to the county, or counties, containing such a city or cities, contiguous coun- ties are included in an SMSA if, according to certain criteria, they are socially and economically integrated with the central city. In a few SMSAs, where portions of counties outside the SMSA as defined in 1967 were annexed to the central city, the population living in those counties is not considered part of the SMSA or the central city. In the New England states, SMSAs consist of towns and cities instead of counties. Each SMSA must include at least one central city and the complete title of an SMSA identifies the central city or cities (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973:App 6). 14. See tables for details on exact data sources from census materials. 109 15. Only one municipality dropped out of the census list of municipalities. Lathrup Village experienced a 59.8 percent population decrease from 1960 to 1970, putting it below the population threshold of 2,500 used by the Census Bureau to include municipalities in the SMSA. 16. The standard deviation results from squaring the deviations from the mean of a frequency distribution and finding the square root of that figure. Alker and Russett (1966:356-357) cite two shortcomings of standard deviation. It is not readily comprehended by those unfamil- iar with statistical methods and its size may vary with some extreme values in a frequency distribution having a distorting effect. 17. The data were ranked according to income because income is the single most central element in the provision of life chances. From income stems all the other avenues of access to goods and services which enhance style of life in a capitalist economy. Income as an empirical variable has the advantage of being readily understood and distribution of the population by income groups clearly points out the equality or lack of equality in wealth. It must be recognized that there is a two-way relationship between education and income. While education is an avenue of mobility and opportunity, though, it is largely an effect of income and not a cause (see Kolko, 1962:113ff). Education is crucial to maintaining style of life in many other respects, however, because it is so important in establishing a "world view," and in informing of matters of "taste," e.g. styles of dress and speech, topics of conversation and other social status indicators. Income remains the primary determinant of style of life in the end, though, 110 because it provides the potential to realize aspirations vis 5 vis life-style. 18. There were fifteen new municipalities for 1970, not fourteen as indicated by the numerical increase from fifty-eight in 1960 to seventy-two in 1970 (see endnote 14). 19. Percentage changes are computed using the formula 100(N2-N1/ N1) = percentage change (Zelditch, 1959:131). Where comparisons or contrasts are made of finding the simple difference between two per- centage figures by subtraction the phrase "percentage points" or "points" is used. 20. New municipalities are designated in Tables 2 and 3 and cate— gorized as to whether they have previously incorporated and passed the population threshold of 2,500 or are new incorporations. 21. For 1970 the Census Bureau reported that 73.5 percent of the United States population resided in SMSAs. 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