POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND INEQUALITY AMONG MUNICIPALITIES IN DETROIT

Thesis for the Degree of M. A. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY ALLEN EDWARD RADTKE 1975



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ABSTRACT

POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND INEQUALITY AMONG MUNICIPALITIES IN DETROIT

By

Allen Edward Radtke

This paper examines metropolitan political fragmentation and intermunicipal socio-economic differences over three decennial population censuses to discover if class and status segregation corresponds with the process of political fragmentation over time. Central to this proposition is the idea that an increasing number of permanent political divisions within a metropolitan area will be characterized by increasing intermunicipal differences. In the United States metropolitan political fragmentation typically involves a fringe of autonomous municipalities surrounding a central city. This fragmentation enables isolation from the central city but permits optimal access to the benefits of public goods and services and other resources of the metropolitan arena.

Intermunicipal differences were measured through income, life style indicators and the number of municipalities added interdecennially to the Detroit Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). Data were gathered from the U.S. Bureau of the Census Population Censuses for 1950, 1960 and 1970 for all Detroit SMSA municipalities with 2,500 population or more. Three hypotheses were tested: that over time in the Detroit SMSA as political fragmentation increases intermunicipal socio-economic differences would become greater as measured by life style characteristics; that as status homogeneity is sought through residential locus, higher income municipalities will be less unequal (more homogeneous) as measured by life style characteristics; that among new municipalities in the SMSA those which are new incorporations will tend to have both higher SES indicators and less inequality as measured by life style characteristics than for both the Detroit SMSA and new municipalities which are not new incorporations. Interval variations, standard deviation and a related measure, coefficient of variation, were used to measure inequality in the distribution of income, education and poverty. The first two hypotheses were supported by the evidence of this research. The third hypothesis was supported by 1960 data, but not by data for 1970.

The major findings of this research were: (1) there is pronounced income segregation which has occurred since 1950; (2) the middle class is a rapidly falling proportion of the residents of the city of Detroit, while at the same time in the suburbs the numbers of those who are below poverty level are falling; (3) the life style variables of education are less demonstrative of the widening of social distance than the income variables, but still point to homogenization of status groups; (4) there are gross differences between the emerging municipalities included in the 1970 census data and the city of Detroit; (5) the growing numbers of municipalities in the Detroit SMSA are a manifestation of metropolitan disintegration by the drawing of race and class lines through specialized municipalities.

POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND INEQUALITY AMONG MUNICIPALITIES IN DETROIT

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Allen Edward Radtke

A THESIS

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Dedicated to

Nancy

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INTRODUCTION

On Monday, January 28, 1974 the Detroit Free Press ran an article about a suburban development in Farmington called Hunter's Ridge which

... looks something like a medieval walled city from beyond its eight-foot high serpentine brick borders... The fortress disguised as a suburban subdivision. It's just one of scores of new security oriented subdivisions springing up on the outskirts of the nation's major cities. Some of the subdivisions are so self-sufficient that the residents can, if they wish, turn their backs on the rest of the world almost forever (Detroit Free Press, 1974).

Hunter's Ridge boasts an international border style "Checkpoint Charlie"--a blocked entrance with a toll gate arm and a neon stop sign, an electronic eye and buzzer to warn the gate house guard (who is linked directly to the Farmington Police) of someone approaching. Seven guards patrol the 67.3-acre complex. Some complexes have not only recreational facilities but banks, churches, office buildings and shopping centers. One in California has a moat and another outside Houston has "a cement wall, elaborate iron gates and musket-toting guards in 18th-century costumes." The purported aim of such precaution is the establishment of security against the dangers of personal violence and threat to property common to the neighborhoods of the city. As a resident put it: "It's more than security, it's peace and contentment" (Detroit Free Press, January 28, 1974).

In the United States, metropolitan political fragmentation typically involves a fringe of autonomous municipalities skirting a central city. This fragmentation, defined as a decentralization of economic and political activity, enables those who are financially able to reside in municipalities in the urban fringe where they can, through their political power, isolate and insulate themselves from the class and status mix of the central city. It is through this use of political power (which is contingent upon economic power) that the benefits of better access to public goods and services accrue to middle and upper-middle class residents of politically fragmented metropolitan areas. The central city, which depends for its vitality on diversity of life-style, occupational specialization and cultural heterogeneity, is depleted by the outward mobility of those groups which are essential to it as a center of urban life.¹

Such class and status homogeneous suburban municipal enclaves are possible through their ability to incorporate as separate municipalities and focus their political and economic power on the maintenance of neighborhood stability and areal specialization, in this case residential.

Hill, investigating power distribution and class segregation, found that class segregation is positively correlated with the number of municipal governments in a metropolitan community. He also found evidence that while population size and number of municipalities do increase together political fragmentation itself independently influerces economic segregation (Hill, 1973:27-28). Hunter's Ridge exemplifies essential consequences of urban political fragmentation, i.e. the

gaining of access to an optimum site and protecting it from the ills of the central city by isolation behind a complex of physical and legal barriers.

The present study examines political fragmentation and SES differences, substantiating Hill's (1973) and Schnore's (1972) findings about political fragmentation, SES differences and residential segregation. These issues will be explicated in terms of both the consequences of metropolitan political fragmentation and the import these consequences have for those involved. It is the purpose of this paper to relate these consequences and their antecedent structural conditions to the Detroit SMSA and examine it over three decennial population censuses to discover if class and status segregation corresponds with the process of political fragmentation over time.

At work in urban political fragmentation is a two-fold process. First, there is the struggle to maintain advantaged access to scarce goods and resources within the context of the metropolis. This struggle involves the use of political power by affluent status groups to locate residentially in relative isolation from other less affluent groups. Social distance is translated by this use of power into spatial distance. Second, there is exclusion of status "undesirables" from more advantaged residential location through the operations of political and economic institutions controlled by the affluent.

Durkheim (1964) and Wirth (1938) both commented upon size and density of human settlements leading to social and economic differentiation. This differentiation led, in turn, to specialization in employment and also to class segregation due to the loss of shared

bonds of experience. With this loss and the consequent shift from mechanical to organic solidarity this source of cohesion was to some degree replaced by the shared sense of status equality among members within status groups.

Collins (1971), in discussing educational stratification, posits status groups as the most basic associational units of society.² By sharing a common culture, status groups provide a fundamental sense of identity for their members as they participate in that culture. Sense of identity is established not only in such participation but especially in contrast to other less similar cultural groups. Styles of language, tastes in clothing and decor, manners and opinions all provide a shared sense of status equality. Exclusion of those not part of the status group's culture is legitimated through the group's categories of moral evaluation (1971:1009).

In the metropolitan arena the various groups seeks, through the mechanism of the urban housing market, to acquire and maintain optimum site advantage in competing for the various goods available.³ Conformity with group values leads to the pursuit of appropriate residential location in accordance with the group's mandate, i.e. the shared sense of status equality translated into propinquity of residence.

All minority groups will, to some extent, choose to segregate themselves. The motives are rather obvious. A people who share a culture, a common set of experiences, sometimes a language and among whom kinship ties are important, will want to cluster residentially. Clustering permits easier communication and encourages the establishment of services and institutions--food stores, clubs, churches and the like--with specialized appeal for the group (Pascal, 1970:409-410).

Conflict among groups having differentially greater or lesser access to economic resources and hence to political hegemony will be heavily weighted in favor of that group which has the greatest resources and ability to manipulate legal and economic institutions to its advantage.

In pursuing advantaged residential location social distance will obtain between those immobile in the central city who have lesser amounts of economic and political power and those who are more powerful and are spatially mobile. Political fragmentation occurs as a result of the latter maneuvering to protect those values which inhere in their status group and to exclude status "undesirables."

Burgess (1924) first used the concentric-zonal hypothesis to describe the movement of higher income groups away from the center of the U.S. city to new residential areas on the fringe leaving the inner, older zones to the less affluent. This movement typically repeats itself with each new wave of migration to the city. As a new working force at the bottom of the SES scale comes into the central city, other groups move out to the suburbs leaving behind the least expensive housing.⁴ Thus, the conceptualization of patterned social distance between the central city and the suburbs became almost an axiom (Schnore, 1963:76).

In the oldest and largest U.S. metropolitan areas, those left behind in the central city are, for the most part, the poorly paid, the underemployed or unemployed and those with the least education. This pattern tends to perpetuate itself over time and with the cessation of immigrant waves to the U.S. the movement of the more affluent

to the suburbs has had the effect of widening and now crystallizing the social distance between the central cities and the suburbs (Schnore, 1972:1).⁵ As a result, those in the suburbs have sought to reduce any threat of residential invasion by class and status undesirables fleeing the decaying central city by sequestering themselves behind a complex of economic and legislative barriers in autonomous municipalities (and a proliferation of local and special purpose governments) (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1966). Thus, outmigration in the metropolis is selective in class terms (Schnore, 1972:101) and spatially segregates SES groups into specialized, homogeneous residential areas.

A set of generalizations had grown up around the Burgess work stereotyping the distribution of different SES groups in the metropolis. However, critical review of the concentric-zonal hypotheses found a valid starting point in the developing specialization among suburbs. Schnore was the first in more recent literature to focus upon the notion of age of the city as the critical factor in predicting spatial locus of different SES groups in specialized suburbs (1963). In prior work Schnore had examined the economic dichotomy between consumption ("residential") and production ("employing") suburbs which Wirt carried further in his work on political activity as a manifestation of suburban specialization. Wirt found similarity of political partisanship to increase with extreme SES characteristics (Schnore, 1971:49; Wirt, 1965:106).

Social rank is a determining factor in suburban attitudes, opinions and their influence on policy-making as shown in a study of

Philadelphia by Williams, et al. (1965). This study focused in part upon how a community's social characteristics are maintained by exclusionary policies. To retain SES characteristics formal policy as well as informal means provide avenues for specialized municipalities to exclude status undesirables. This study also found that social rank rather than wealth alone was crucial to determining intermunicipal cooperation for public services. Here an important link is forged between the political partisanship found by Wirt and the election of political leaders. Wirt found leaders tend to have backgrounds similar to their constituent bodies. Because these leaders tend to share the same attitudes and policy preferences as their communities, this political convergence has serious consequences for metropolitan areas experiencing conflict among specialized suburbs. Development of municipal lifestyles among suburbs, Williams purports, are the result of space friction costs and the ability of certain groups to exploit a given location by being able to afford its site advantages. Homogeneity, in terms of cultural attributes, is then a result of similar "units" (groups and families) seeking the same locations. Protection of site advantages through municipalities and other institutions means for Williams that specialized areas protect the basis of a sense of community solidarity, identity and a dominant style of life dependent on location for their realization. This for Williams is a major source of metropolitan politics (1971a). Following Schnore (1972) we find a great deal of variety in SES differentiation between central cities and their suburbs and among suburbs, but Schnore concludes from trend analysis that movement

of SES groups can be predicted on the basis of not only age and size of the city but race and class as well.

As a result of the social distance between the central city and the suburbs and urban political fragmentation, there are important consequences which have been pointed to by research on the metropolis. One of the most salient of these consequences is the division of metropolitan areas into relatively status homogeneous municipalities, as mentioned above, their segregation and isolation as residential neighborhoods by class and race and their preservation over time as politically autonomous units. Second, this division has consequences for the distribution of public goods and services and scarce, desired resources among the several broad income and status groups in the metropolitan community. Third, the spatial distribution of these SES groups in the metropolitan setting influences not only the degree of urban political integration or fragmentation but the differential allocation of jobs and income, educational opportunity and access to the urban housing market. There is thus a chain of consequences from the broadest structural level to the narrowly individual in terms of life chances and quality of everyday existence.

Tracing somewhat more specifically the consequences of each of these four structural areas may help to clarify the nature of the class division which occurs as a result of governmental fragmentation.

In considering the distribution of public goods and services the most elemental problem is the divorce of resources from social needs at the community level, i.e. the inequality in the distribution of taxable wealth (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental

Relations, 1965 and 1966; Schnore, 1972:xii). As the metropolis becomes politically fragmented the resources of wealth and skill, talent and knowledge move from the center city leaving those with relatively few economic and human resources to meet the needs of both the central city resident and the suburban commuter. The central city is also expected to provide other municipal benefits (e.g. museums, libraries, institutions of higher education) which are exploited by suburban residents but for which they are not financially responsible. The suburbs then tax their own residents relatively less to provide status enhancement services (education and recreation, for example) while the central city taxes its residents to provide essential system maintenance, e.g. police and welfare services and the like.

Another problem of the distribution of public goods and services is the lack of cooperation and coordination among governmental units. Not only are costs increased by the lack of cooperation, but municipal governments are unable to cope with problems because they are too small, they lack jurisdiction and have too little power to deal with them effectively (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1966:54). Thus, governments are impoverished financially by political fragmentation and there is no mix of resources upon which to draw and no government which is able to assume responsibility. Also, there is the potential of breakdown of public control when people have to deal with too many governmental units as they must in cases where there are overlapping jurisdictions.

The second set of consequences of class division is in jobs and income. As social disparities in housing lead to economic

disparities people are separated from employment opportunities. There is a structuring of unemployment by physically isolating workers from decentralized manufacturing by the lack of suitable housing within access of jobs (Williams, 1971a:64).⁶ The urban housing market is one of the major institutions through which income is converted into access to the job and employment opportunities of the community. As access to better housing and to educational opportunities is narrowed by differential distribution in the urban housing market, so are occupational and hence income opportunities correspondingly narrowed. For those in class and status homogenized residential areas similarities of jobs and income and hence of life situation may remove conflict and contentment may be the norm, but this may have the consequence of positively discouraging upward mobility. The culture of the community may dissuade achievement by exerting social pressure on those who perceive opportunities outside the normal avenues and who would betray discontent with the status quo (Williams, 1971a:64). For the poor this kind of cultural isolation means low levels of aspiration and destruction of incentive for self-improvement (U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 1966).

The third major area of consequences is education--in terms of both quality and opportunity. Schools have two critically important functions as they perpetuate inequality. First, they must transmit the dominant status culture, teaching values, behavior and obedience (Collins, 1971:1010; Katz, 1971:xviii). This occurs differentially, i.e. some among the privileged, higher SES groups are selected to become employees who acquiesce to existing social and economic

arrangements (Collins, 1971:1011). For the less affluent "they [the schools] are imperial institutions designed to civilize the natives; they exist to do something to poor children, especially, now, children who are black or brown. Their main purpose is to make these children orderly, industrious, lawabiding, and respectful of authority" (Katz, 1971:xviii). Secondly, the schools through class and status segregation maintain a systematically advantaged experience for the affluent and an increasingly alien and negative experience for the poor.

[A]lso significant in school success or failure is the fact that most lower income children are deprived of the broad range of life experiences open to upper income children. The lower income child, in fact, seldom emerges from his neighborhood confinement in order to test the experiences of the outside world. . . [H]e is afraid to go out of his neighborhood; the outside world is afraid to let him come out; he does not have the money or the opportunity to go out; he does not know enough about the outside world to know where to go. He is denied the life experiences which give children confidence in themselves and interest in their studies. Such experiences greatly increase reading potential by providing some familiarity with the vocabulary and subject matter of books. In addition, they offer a better basis for understanding and evaluating all the subject matter that must be learned in school (Sexton, 1961:144-145)./

Thus, as the quality and opportunities of education are stratified and segregated by residence, inequality is perpetuated, through access to jobs and income, housing and again education.

The last set of consequences has to do with housing itself. It is not just the physical quality of the housing that is central here, although that is of obvious importance, but (1) location, (2) the resources to which housing provides access and (3) the institutions of residence allocation and their operation which are critical to understanding the nature of the struggle for residential location. Residential segregation is the result of a series of housing site choices, based on both the racial (or ethnic) and nonracial attributes of various sites, such as price, quality, style, location and so forth (Pascal, 1970:406).

The control of place in time is used as a means of access to objects. The unique spot or place which each of us occupies in time defines that to which we can relate around us. Because objects are not randomly distributed, neither is the value and meaning of places (Williams, 1971b:12).

In turn, concentration of population with characteristics of greater age, lower income and minority ethnic status affects business location in the central city:

The reduction of the tax base and increased demand for services (e.g. welfare, compensatory education, protection) can serve to drive traditional residents as well as firms outward beyond the central city limits. The result, of course, is a speed-up in the process of suburbanization with all the costs in service provision inefficiency and fragmentation in political and social life that this process is alleged to entail (Pascal, 1970:427).

Access is a resource which facilitates the use of other resources, primarily interaction for messages and exchange of objects. Social meanings of access stem from (1) artifacts--such as buildings and structures, (2) networks of interactions which access may aid and (3) social structures (Williams, 1971b:26-27). "Economic advantages, status, symbolic identification and physical and psychic comfort are among the possible goals" (Williams, 1971b:22).

Thus, according to Thompson:

[G]ood sites sell high and justify expensive houses with wealthy families which in turn spawn luxury shops all of which create addresses of distinction that attract more affluent families. This clustering to reduce movement requirements of the household as a consuming unit is consistent with the sector thesis of Hoyt (1965:128).

There are important political consequences of class isolated housing also. When political fragmentation of the metropolitan area occurs, isolation of the less advantaged at the level of local government can produce, on the one hand, apathy toward municipal government or, on the other hand, a growing recognition of the political power resulting from the concentration of those with similar attributes in an area. Pascal notes that the net political effects of segregation are unclear as to the direction that will be taken by ethnic minorities (1970:425-426). It is not unclear, however, that the political isolation of higher income groups is a product of the political power they enjoy as a result of their economic power. As political power and economic power work together and function to spatially distribute social classes, powerful groups will act to protect their interests through the basic institutional sources of control and policy in the urban housing market. This happens in several ways: most basic is intra-class stratification by which the working or middle-class is split occupationally by basic capitalist institutions to prevent their uniting and hence seeking a larger portion of the available product and better working conditions. Protest and solidarity are thus weakened (Gordon, 1973: 61). In the same way residential class segregation--by splitting the working and middle class on racial, age, sex or status group grounds-can maintain class and status differences through fragmented local governments; social distance is emphasized and systems of advantage for the privileged maintained. By separating groups with common interests through differences in life-style status groups are isolated and attention is focused upon differences among these groups rather than on the root problems of urban growth and development. Thus, intra-class stratification acts to distract and concentrates upon other issues

such as material consumption and maintenance of an acceptable style of life and adherence to the norms of a legitimated status culture.

Exclusion of status undesirables is important to maintenance of status homogeneous residential areas. There are at least two ways in which exclusion of status undesirables can work. Exclusion by policy eliminates those who are deemed underqualified in the opinion of those with power over residence selection such as real estate agents, officials of lending institutions and zoning officials. Underqualified status undesirables cannot meet standards of consumption, purchasing power, occupation and so forth; basically they are people too poor or ethnic, uneducated or in some way incompatible with the dominant cultural pattern of a residential neighborhood (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968:244).

There are also what might be called overqualified status undesirables--those who would prevent the obsolescence of a neighborhood by investing in it, upgrading residences and generally make it a better place to live. Such activity may work to the disadvantage of lending institutions who want to keep out of a neighborhood those who would be likely to question devices such as "disinvestment" policy and possess the political acumen to organize and contest such policies.⁸

There are other methods of exclusion ranging from zoning residence areas out of the price range of all but the upper-middle class by insisting on large lots and other land development controls to a simple refusal to show homes to those who are "undesirable." An example of these zoning and development controls is the emergence of residential patterns with no commercial or retail outlets. Retail

stores are zone-isolated in shopping centers or malls sometimes miles away. Dependency on an automobile (or several per family) results because there is little or no redundancy in transportation systems for these areas. Public transit, as an alternative to the private automobile, typically is occasional bus service, if there is any at all. Housing in these areas is then undesirable and unsuitable for those too poor or too old or for other reasons unable or unwilling to use automobiles.

Hence, as constraints of economic, political and status variables as well as fluidity of resources and political channels and barriers operate residence selection alternatives are sharply restricted along class lines (Williams, 1971b:30). There is a high degree of interdependence among the institutions here presented as affected by governmental fragmentation. Long calls this the "charmed circle" of: housing, jobs, matrimony, income and again housing (1967:254). What happens in one area has consequences for each of the other areas. As suburbs become more specialized and homogeneous, it becomes easier to politically manipulate access to retain those values deemed most important (Williams, 1971a:59).⁹

While much of the literature on SES differences takes a stratification perspective writings on metropolitan political integration are largely descriptive and treat the distribution of population as a reflection of the social structure, not as a consequence and determinant of it. In considering the consequences of metropolitan fragmentation above, it was noted that intermunicipal fragmentation carried serious implications for the well-being of the city and its

inhabitants for both the long and short term. To alleviate these consequences, successful political integration, usually in the form of annexation, is proposed as a way of overriding the barrier of social class distance which favors wealthy suburbs. Resistance to political integration has been attributed in the literature variously to fears about changes in taxation and lowered school quality (Zimmer and Hawley, 1968). This study failed to tie these sources of resistance to SES groups, however, and hence conclusions can be drawn only regarding the population size of the municipalities that were under study. Hawkins (1971) found lower amounts of resistance to political integration than he hypothesized and that demographic distance favoring suburbs was not associated with strong fringe opposition to integration.

Scott (1971) found that voters who were confronted with what he regarded as abnormal or "radical" government reorganization proposals approved them only in areas with unusual SES characteristics and these cases had to be explained as unique and deviations from normal patterns.¹⁰ Scott fails to address the problem per se of resistance also, however, and focuses on how proposals may gain acceptance but not in terms of conflicting status groups or institutions which may offer special resistance to reorganization proposals.

Annexation is important to urban political fragmentation because it influences how politically and legally constricted the city will be and how easily the suburbs can keep themselves isolated. State laws regarding ease of incorporation or annexation will influence the amount of political fragmentation and, hence, status homogeneity (see Appendix A).

It will be recalled that Schnore (1963) was concerned with the relationship between age of settlement and SES group distribution. Dye (1967) used the same SES indicators as Schnore and concentrated on annexation (not fragmentation) to test status attributes, spatial distribution and annexation. Dye correlated age of city with city-suburban social differential and found it to be an independent predictor of successful annexation--that social class distance favoring suburbs appeared as a barrier to urban political integration. Central cities with larger proportions of the middle class (i.e. educationally and occupationally middle class) were more successful in annexing than less middle class cities. Investigating policy-making and central city needs, Frisken (1973) found that suburbs have defended local self-government although they recognize it as less efficient and more expensive. Differences between the central city and the suburbs and policies maintaining them act to prevent the growth of a genuine metropolitan community of interest. While Frisken ignores the notion of per se status differences accounting for opposition he recognizes the central city with its growing poor population as at a disadvantage in reorganization or cooperation proposals as it suffers from suburban fears of central city dominance and loss of identity. Paradoxically, central cities fear suburbanites may dominate metropolitan political organizations through their political skill, economic clout and so forth.

Metropolitan political fragmentation has been treated in the literature largely as an evil difficult to overcome due to suburban resistance attributable to intermunicipal status differences. Using Schnore's basic notion, i.e. older settlements will exhibit SES

differentiation evolving in directions predicted by the Burgess concentric-zonal hypothesis, the present study focuses upon metropolitan political fragmentation and SES distance (measured by SES indicators similar to Schnore's) as these differences obtain over time. This set of interrelationships forms the basic paradigm from which the hypotheses tested in this study come.

HYPOTHESES

It is a central idea of this study that an increasing number of permanent political divisions within a metropolitan area will over time be characterized by increasing intermunicipal differences; for example, between the central city and suburbs or among suburbs. These variables can be measured, respectively, through lifestyle¹¹ indicators and the number of municipalities added interdecennially to the SMSA. This pattern of changes varies systematically; thus, certain population subgroups shift their residential location in predictable directions. As areal specialization holds, resistance to governmental reorganization or integration is more likely to come from groups benefiting from present arrangements than from those who do not.

This study tests a number of hypotheses which emerge from the central argument. It uses the Detroit SMSA as the data base for testing the following hypotheses specifically:

H₁: That over time in the Detroit SMSA as political fragmentation increases intermunicipal SES differences will become greater as measured by life-style character-istics.

H₂: That as status homogeneity is sought through residential locus, higher income municipalities will be less unequal (more homogeneous) as measured by lifestyle characteristics.

Higher income municipalities should evince less inequality by life-style characteristics due to their exclusionary power through control of critical institutions in the distribution of housing. That is, only those with both the income and acceptable status characteristics should pass through the net of exclusionary restrictions. Lower income municipalities, on the other hand, should be more unequal because the exclusionary policies of higher income areas are largely absent and a more mixed residential population results. The important focus here is on homogeneity within the upper income municipalities because it is through their ability to concentrate in cardinal metropolitan loci that assurance of continued advantaged access is maintained and perpetuated. Thus, it is through the operations of exclusionary housing institutions and restrictive policies that homogeneous income areas enjoy both financial advantages and broader social benefits such as lesser amounts of crime, better transportation and the like.

> H₃: Among new municipalities in the SMSA those which are new incorporations will tend to have both higher SES indicators and less inequality as measured by lifestyle characteristics than for both the Detroit SMSA and new municipalities which are not new incorporations.

Incorporation as a municipality restricts to one locality powers of government and decision-making regarding institutions salient to the distribution of housing and education. It is through restrictive localization that new municipalities can effect a triage of members of entering status groups and so is a central advantage of incorporation.

By virtue of their more affluent and mobile populations seeking better access to the SMSA which they surround, new incorporations should be characterized by higher standards of living and education than the central city or new municipalities (the latter having simply grown large enough to be included in census data). This is due to the selective capacity which control of restrictive or exclusionary devices such as zoning laws, construction codes and the like permits the new municipality.

DATA AND METHODS OF ANALYSIS

To test the hypotheses data were gathered from the census of population (U.S. Bureau of the Census) for 1950, 1960 and 1970 for all municipalities with 2,500 population or more in the Detroit SMSA. As life-style and status homogeneity indicators four variables were selected from census reports: (1) median annual family income in dollars, (2) median school years completed and (3) percent with four years of high school or more (both (2) and (3) are for individuals twenty-five years old and over) and (4) percent of families and unrelated indi-viduals below poverty level.¹²

For 1950 the Detroit SMA¹³ contained thirty-nine municipalities which had to be first located by population in the three counties comprising the SMA--Macomb, Oakland and Wayne. This was done using Table 6--Number of Inhabitants from Part 22, Characteristics of the Population, 1950. Once all municipalities of 2,500 population or more were gathered they were ranked by median family income and the remaining data on the variables gathered. For 1960 and 1970 the same process was followed, using the appropriate tables.¹⁴

A problem emerged in gathering income data for 1960. For those municipalities with populations from 2,500 to 10,000 with median family incomes over \$10,000 no exact income figure was given in the tables with the other life-style indicators (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1963:Tables 33, 34). The tables show \$10,000+ in lieu of an exact

income figure which would have made ranking by income impossible for the five municipalities affected. For those municipalities over 10,000 population exact (to the nearest dollar) figures were given. To solve this problem these municipalities were identified by census tract number (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1966) and cross-referenced to the U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing: 1960 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1962), where exact income figures were given by census tract number in Table P-1.

The Detroit SMSA evidence is comprised of data on thirty-nine municipalities for 1950, fifty-eight for 1960 and seventy-two for 1970. To determine how new municipalities entered the lists much the same procedure was followed as that for culling the municipalities in the SMA in 1950. By identifying the new municipalities and referring to tables on the number of inhabitants in municipalities for each county it was possible to determine if a new municipality was a new incorporation or had been included as part of the SMSA because it had passed the Census Bureau population threshold of 2,500.¹⁵

The standard deviation and a related measure, coefficient of variation, were used to measure inequality in the distribution of income, education and poverty in Detroit in this study. Attention will be focused upon standard deviation and coefficient of variation as the most sophisticated indicators of SES differences among municipalities. Means and ranges are also given.

Standard deviation and coefficient of variation indicate the amount of divergence from the average on a given variable for the families of a municipality in the Detroit SMSA. For example, a standard
deviation of zero would indicate that, on whatever measure was being used, each of the families in the municipality would enjoy essentially the same position on that measure, say, family income. Assuming a normal distribution in the proportions of these life-style indicators across the Detroit metropolitan area for each census year, one standard deviation from the mean includes roughly two-thirds or about sixtyseven percent of the families in the Detroit SMSA; one-third on either side of the mean.

A closely related measure, the coefficient of variation is used to compare distributions while looking at something besides the standard deviation. The standard deviation can be inexact in the sense that it may misrepresent changes over time which do not reflect changes in degree of equality. So, while the standard deviation may increase from one time period to another, the degree of inequality may not covary symmetrically and, thus, comparisons between two standard deviations may be invalid if their means are not comparable. To overcome the deficiencies of the standard deviation, the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean (coefficient of variation) may be used to provide a percentage figure for comparison of distributions. The variables involved must have real (rather than arbitrary) values to use this measure.

Computing the coefficient of variation (cv) uses the formula $\sigma/\bar{X} = cv$ where σ = standard deviation and \bar{X} = mean. Comparison of two time periods is derived using the following formula: $\sigma_1/\bar{X}_1 = cv_1$; $\sigma_2/\bar{X}_2 = cv_2$; $(cv_1-cv_2)/cv_1$ = amount of change in percent (Jencks, 1972: 352).

The size of the standard deviation indicated the degree to which inequality obtains, i.e. as the standard deviation increases it indicates that some municipalities have a much greater proportion of, say, family income, while other municipalities have much less. A standard deviation of twenty percent on median family income indicates that for about sixty-seven percent of the municipalities in the SMSA the median family income varies from the mean by twenty percent or less. Again, as the coefficient of variation increases the number of municipalities with very high income families and very low income families increases.

Another, but less powerful measure, interval variations, was also used to indicate income inequality by quartiles, quintiles and deciles. Interquartile variation, for example, is computed using the formula Q_3-Q_1/Q_1+Q_3 where Q_1 is that item one quarter of the way up from the bottom of the income array and Q_3 is that item three quarters of the way up. The figure resulting from this will yield a primitive indication of the municipal income inequality for the SMSA for a census period. For example, for 1950 the interdecile variation is .319 (see Table 5). That is, the median family income for the municipality one-fourth of the way up from the bottom is roughly 31.9 percent less, or only 68.1 percent as much as the median of all the median municipal family incomes for the Detroit metropolitan area. That income three-fourths of the way up from the bottom receives about 31.9 percent more, or 131.9 percent of the median, assuming a normal distribution (Thompson, 1965:110).

While standard deviation has some weaknesses it is a strong measure of inequality and here indicates the growth in SES differences across census years for the Detroit SMSA.¹⁶

The data were ranked according to median family income and then grouped into quintiles and deciles to facilitate examining several aspects of this evidence.¹⁷ In order to consider the effects of both inequality and homogeneity upon the life-style indicators, the two sets of tables provide a more detailed look than the use of only one grouping, say, quartiles, would afford. Examination of the extremes in the concentration of income inequality in the richest segments and the concentration of poverty among the poorest groups is afforded by decile tables, using means and ranges. Quintiles tables permit a look at how central groups of data show relative changes over time in the growth of unequal distribution of income and education, through the coefficient of variation. There is a more powerful explanatory effect when the standard deviation combines measures at several points on a distribution. Hence, there is less distortion with more complete data. This is especially salient in the case of income distribution among the middle class and quintile tables provide a better view of this distribution over time.

The ranked municipalities were distributed into symmetrical quintiles and deciles for comparisons and calculations of means, standard deviations and ranges. This was done first for the SMSA as a whole and then for the quintile and decile groups for all census years, on each of the life-style indicators. The same calculations were then done for municipalities new to the 1960 census and for those new to

1970 once these were divided into two groups--those which passed population thresholds of 2,500 to be included in the SMSA, and new incorporations.

FINDINGS

The increase in the number of municipalities from 1950 to 1970, the rise in median family incomes and the increased income range are shown in Tables 1, 2 and 3. These three tables provide basic lifestyle data for the municipalities of the Detroit SMSA for each of the three census years. The tables contain two groups of two life-style indicators--income and education. In the income group are (1) median family income in dollars for municipalities and (2) families and unrelated individuals below poverty level, in percent. For education there are (1) median school years completed for those twenty-five years old and over and (2) percent completed four years of high school or more for those twenty-five years old and over. For each census year the tables include all the municipalities in the SMSA with 2,500 population or more, which is the cutoff for inclusion by the Census Bureau definition of an SMSA. Also given are population size, the county in which each municipality is located and for Tables 2 (1960) and 3 (1970) whether new additions to the SMSA were new incorporations or had passed the 2,500 population threshold.

That there has been a major increase in the spread of incomes as well as in the number of municipalities within which these incomes are distributed is obvious. There also has been a significant redistribution of income and other resources which has occurred as a consequence of intermunicipal segregation during this time span.

 H_1 holds that as political fragmentation increases, SES differences will become greater among municipalities. Tables 1, 2 and 3 show that there has been a steady increment in the number of municipalities--from thirty-nine in 1950 to fifty-eight in 1960 to seventy-two in 1970. The greatest increase in the number of municipalities follows the 1950-1960 decade but is nearly matched by an increase of fifteen in 1970, when the greatest amount of intermunicipal income inequality obtained (thirty-nine percent) as measured by the coefficient of variation (see Table 4).¹⁸ During this time there was a 728 percent increase in the range of incomes, from a 1950 difference of \$4,590 between highest and lowest municipalities to a \$37,997 difference in 1970.¹⁹

The growing social distance between the city of Detroit and other municipalities in the SMSA is especially highlighted by relative income rank and its change over time. In 1950 the city of Detroit ranked twenty-two out of thirty-nine or roughly half-way in the SMSA income array. By 1960 the city of Detroit had fallen to forty-one of fifty-eight and in 1970 was ranked sixty-six of seventy-two municipalties in the SMSA (Tables 1, 2 and 3). Clearly, median family income increases in the suburbs were leaving Detroit's population less able to compete effectively for goods and services in the urban arena. While the mean of all the median family incomes nearly doubled from 1960 to 1970 it appears that the mean percent of poor families in the SMSA was cut by more than half from 9.7 to 4.0 percent. According to the findings in Table 4, there is a steady decline in families below poverty level from 16.2 in 1950 to 4.0 percent in 1970. The inequality

experienced by municipalities in this regard has grown as measured by the coefficient from forty-four percent in 1950 to seventy-one percent in 1970. Thus, while it appears there are fewer families under the official poverty level, these families are concentrated more heavily in a few municipalities. (Tables 18 and 19 show that consistently these concentrations are in the bottom mean income fifths or tenths.) Considerable skepticism must be attached to the apparent decline from 1960 to 1970 in the numbers of families below poverty level, however, because it was in this decade that the official poverty definition was changed from the Social Security Administration's economy food plan to the Consumer Price Index (see Appendix B).

The evidence of Table 5 discloses a slight diminishment across censuses in inequality among median income quartiles, quintiles and deciles by interval comparisons. In each case there has apparently been some equalization in the distribution of income among the municipalities of the Detroit SMSA. In 1950 interquartile variation was 12.3 percent, i.e. that municipality three-quarters of the way up the income distribution receives about 112.3 percent of the median and that municipality one-fourth of the way up gets about 87.7 percent of the median. Interdecile variation for 1950--thirty-two percent--has the municipality at the ninetieth percentile receiving only about sixty-eight percent of the median while up at the tenth percentile that municipality enjoys 132 percent of the median. By 1970 this had been reduced for interquartile variation to roughly ninety percent of the median income for those at the bottom quarter while it was 110 percent for those at the top quarter. For deciles it was down from

132 to 127 percent at the top tenth percentile and up to 73 percent from 68 percent at the ninetieth percentile.

This pattern may be explained in part by the failure of the interval comparisons to reach far enough into the extremes of the income array to reveal the redistribution of income toward those at the very top and away from those at the very bottom. Also, as Table 6 shows, there has been substantial redistribution of population into the bottom income groups; this may have resulted in the median incomes at the bottom intervals being elevated high enough to partially negate, through this sample, the effects of the redistribution of wealth as it is shown elsewhere in this study. It is important to note that in comparison to other more sophisticated empirical-statistical measures the interval comparison (such as interdecile variation) is relatively primitive, and much weaker than the standard deviation, for example.

Table 6 shows the redistribution of population by income groups for deciles and quintiles and, hence, reflects the redistribution of municipal income in the SMSA.

In 1950 only about .6 of a percent of the population of the SMSA were in municipalities in the top income tenth. By 1970 this had changed so that over two percent were in these municipalities. In contrast, those in municipalities in the bottom income decile were only about .8 percent of the population in 1950, but in 1970 had swelled to nearly forty-eight percent of the SMSA. This also points to income leaving the city of Detroit. In 1950 Detroit was in the sixth income decile, fell to seventh in 1960 and hit bottom in 1970. In income quintiles, Table 6 shows that for the top twenty percent of municipalities

the changes from 1950 to 1970 were more dramatic. Increasing from two and a half percent to just less than ten percent, the population of the top income group saw the bottom income group increase in relative share of the population from three percent to over half of all those in the SMSA.

For the middle classes, in the meantime, there was a change in the percentage of the SMSA population in the middle three fifths of income groups from 94.4 percent in 1950 to 88.0 percent in 1960 to 38.6 percent in 1970. In other words, while over half of the population of the Detroit SMSA found themselves in the bottom twenty percent of municipalities by income, fifty-nine percent fewer found themselves in the middle three income groups by 1970. At the same time, there was a seventy-five percent increase in the percentage of those in municipalities in the top income fifth, there was a ninety-four percent increase of those in municipalities in the lowest fifth, from 1950 to 1970.

The other side of the coin of municipal income--the concentrations of those below poverty level--presents a similar pattern of redistribution. Table 7, those who are below poverty level, mirrors the movement of population in Table 6. In this case, those municipalities in the lowest income decile have disproportionately the greatest number of the poor by 1970. The city of Detroit across the three census has, in absolute numbers, the greatest portion of the poor in each census year. But more significant is what occurred in the upper income municipalities. In percentage figures, the 1950 distribution is relatively uniform among deciles compared to the homogenization which occurred by 1970, when the top income tenth municipalities had gone from 12.9

percent to 1.3 percent of the poor. It must be noted also that the process of homogenization did not stop with the top income decile. By 1970 the top eight deciles all had less than four percent poor persons in their municipalities with the bottom two deciles absorbing the greatest percentages of poor people. Thus, it is in the poorest municipalities that the greatest percentages of those needing increased social and other services are found.

While the 1960 population of the top income decile increased by 24,912 from 1950 (168 percent), the number of poor in these municipalities increased by only 392 people (a 20.5 percent increase). This represents a 7.1 point drop in the share of poor persons in this decile (from 12.9 to 5.8 percent). From 1960 to 1970 the population of this decile increased 32,677 (87.2 percent). The number of those classified as poor for this period fell by 1,364 from 2,305 to 941 (59.2 percent decrease). Over the three censuses then the population of the top income decile municipalities increased 388 percent while their share of the poor fell 50.8 percent.

At the other end of the income array, the bottom decile also experienced an increase in population from 1950 to 1960. However, while the 447.8 percent population increase occurred it saw a 315.3 percent increase in the numbers of poor in these municipalities, going from 5,559 to 23,084 people. From 1960 to 1970 (when the city of Detroit became part of this decile) the population increase was 1,467.4 percent with a 658 percent increase in the numbers of poor. Thus, while the top decile municipalities experienced a decline of 50.8 percent from 1950 to 1970 the bottom decile saw an increase of 3,047.4 percent while

its population growth was 8,485.7 percent. This clear and unmistakable polarization of the poor and the rich in the Detroit SMSA is substantiated further by examining the quintile distributions in Table 8. The highest income fifth fell from a 14.7 percent share of the poor to 1.8 percent from 1950 to 1970. While there was a gradient of increasing mean percentages of the poor toward the bottom quintile in all census years, this gradient steepened by 1970 to isolate the greatest numbers of the poor in the bottom twenty percent of municipalities. Thus, just 24.7 percent of the poor were in the top four-fifths income municipalities which had forty-eight percent of the SMSA population, while the lowest fifth of municipalities with fifty-two percent of the population had 75.3 percent of the poor.

The remaining indicator of life-style differences among municipalities is shown in Tables 9, 10 and 11. While it is the middle income groups who have benefitted most noticeably from greater educational opportunities across census years, all groups have realized increments both in numbers of people going through high school or beyond as well as the per se number of school years completed. Table 9 shows that for median school years completed from 1950 to 1970 the mean has risen from 10.9 to 12.2 years. At the same time the mean percent with four years high school or more has risen from 43.2 to 59.3. For both of these variables the standard deviation and coefficient of variation has also decreased, a preliminary indication of narrowing inequality for all groups.

Table 10 shows, however, that it is in the middle and upper income municipalities that greater increases accumulated. The 1950 to

1970 time span reveals a gain of 5.9 percentage points of those with four years of high school or more for the highest income tenth municipalities from 79.3 to 85.2 percent. The largest gains were in the middle income groups ranging from a 14.2 percentage point increase for the fourth decile up to a 23.5 point increase for the fifth decile with the exception of the second tenth which had a 7.4 percentage point gain. The lowest income tenth, meanwhile, gained the least, 3.7 points, to 41.3 percent from 37.6. The city of Detroit during this time gained merely 3.3 percentage points moving from 38.0 percent of its twentyfive-year-olds or over with high school diplomas or more to 41.3 percent, as it moved from the sixth to the tenth decile.

In terms of larger groupings the same pattern holds for this 1950 to 1960 period. From the top income fifth to the bottom the gains were 11.1, 14.6, 21.5, 20.5 and 9.2 points, respectively (Table 11). The city of Detroit gained 7.8 percentage points for the same period, while the SMSA as a whole went from 37.6 to 53.1 percent, a 15.5 point gain.

Thus, two of the four SES indicators--income and percent below poverty level--point to growing social distance among municipalities in the Detroit SMSA. Tables 4 and 5 presented a picture of lifestyle equality among municipalities in Detroit from 1950 to 1970. Municipal incomes have risen and become more unequal (coefficient of variation rising from 25.4 to 39.0 percent). Also, the average percent of poor families in municipalities appears to fall from 16.2 to 4.0 percent, but inequality of their distribution greatly increased rising from forty-four to seventy-one percent (see Appendix B). On the other

hand, the education variables showed not only more education accruing in terms of years and percentages of those with high school or more but overall inequality falling for both these variables, across the SMSA (Tables 9, 10 and 11).

 H_2 proposes that there will be less status inequality among higher income municipalities as they seek status homogeneity through residential locus and differentially greater inequality among those municipalities which are less affluent, and not able to exercise exclusionary policies and programs in regard to the characteristics of their populations. The finding relating to this hypothesis will be treated in the same order as for H_1 , that is income, poverty and education.

Income distribution has become much more unequal both as to the range and the proportions going to income fifths (Tables 12, 14 and 16) or tenths (Tables 13, 15 and 17). And, at the same time, there has been a great surge in the number of autonomous municipalities in the SMSA, poor families are more concentrated in the lowest income municipalities (Tables 18 and 19) as hypothesized.

First, looking at income inequality by coefficient of variation, there is increasing inequality (thirty-eight percent in 1970) among the highest income quintile (Tables 12, 14 and 16) and a relatively steady amount of inequality over time among the lowest income group, having dropped slightly from 1950 from nine to eight percent. Among the middle groups, however, which started low and stayed low, there is little change in the clear homogeneity across the three censuses (see Tables 13, 15 and 17). The increasing inequality in 1960 and 1970 for the top income groups may be explained by the extremely

high incomes (over \$40,000) which helped in driving the standard deviation for the top income tenth to almost \$9,000 (Table 17). Note that range here is in median incomes which are from almost \$47,000 to about \$19,000. For income groups there emerges a picture of either a great deal of homogeneity, especially as shown by income quintiles (Tables 12, 14 and 16), among the top eighty or ninety percent, or high amounts of inequality for those at the bottom of the income array.

Given a caveat regarding the changes in the basis upon which poverty income cutoffs are determined (Appendix B) the decisive segregation of poor families in the lowest income municipalities is unmistakable. Over the period covered in this study there has been a very conspicuous and rapid shift in the distribution of poor families among the various income categories of municipalities in the Detroit SMSA.

In Table 18 the quintiles in 1950 show a more or less even distribution of families below poverty level among the top eighty percent (from nine to sixteen percent) with a somewhat heavier concentration in the bottom twenty percent of municipalities (25.8 percent). By 1960 this had shifted to a somewhat steeper gradient but while the bottom forty percent of communities held greater numbers of poor families the top sixty percent shared relatively even numbers among themselves (about six to seven percent). In 1970 the redistribution had become almost completely effected with the overwhelming percent of the poor in the poorest income fifth municipalities and the top four fifths having from less than two to less than four percent of their families with incomes below poverty level. This is reflected in the inequality shown in Table 4 where the coefficient of variation

shifts from forty-four to seventy-one percent for the SMSA. The maldistribution of the poor families among municipalities by income deciles gives somewhat greater detail to the pattern in Table 18. For 1950 Table 19 dramatizes the segregation that had occurred by 1970. With the poor almost wholly concentrated in the two bottom income tenths the remaining eighty percent of municipalities contained only token numbers of those below poverty level. Presumably, some of these were household service workers, perhaps others were elderly relatives living in the home and the like.

In regard to both the median number of school years completed and the percent of those completing four years of high school or more there has been a steady growth in the differential between those municipalities in the highest income groups and the lowest. As noted above, there has been steady increases for all income groups for this variable, but it is in the upper income groups that the most significant gains occurred.

Table 20 shows this most clearly for median school years completed. For the municipalities in the highest income tenth there was a gain of 1.2 years but for the lowest tenth a gain of only .2 of a year from 10.6 to 10.8. Although inequality by coefficient of variation has grown for the highest income tenth from .62 to 4.4 percent, inequality for the bottom tenth remains about twice as great (4.4 versus 8.4 percent).

The growth in both median years and inequality for those municipalities in the highest income decile is of a different character than for the bottom decile. For the more affluent group the increase

in median years means more in these municipalities are going to and graduating from college, professional and graduate schools with the coefficient of variation measuring differences of achievement among these relatively well-educated people. In the bottom tenth the increase in years means some fewer numbers of students are dropping or being pushed out of school before graduation. The large coefficient of variation points to a large group, though, which is far below this mean number of median years and some who have progressed much farther in numbers of years of school. Again, the evidence of these tables indicates greater heterogeneity among the less affluent and relative homogeneity among the upper income municipalities, as hypothesized.

A similar symmetrical pattern prevails for the percent of those completing four years of high school or more (Tables 22 and 23). There is a regular increment evident in this variable with increasing income in both quintiles and deciles but without the exceptions at the extremes of the array as in the case of median school years completed. This is especially clear in Table 23 but the extreme inequality in the bottom income tenths (twenty-three percent) in Table 22 in contrast with the differences in the means (eighty-five versus forty-one percent) make the variable exceptional in pointing to intermunicipal differences in life-style. Homogeneity, i.e. the least inequality, is most pronounced where the percentage of those with better educations is highest and inequality is greatest in municipalities where there are the fewest well-educated people. A coefficient of variation about five times as great (23.2 versus 4.1 percent) in the lowest as in the highest income tenth evinces substantial inequality.

Essentially the same pattern holds if municipalities are distributed by income fifths as in Table 23. This table also shows clearly a steady increase, however, for all income groups in the mean percent finishing high school or more. Especially for the middle sixty percent of municipalities has there been a decrease in the amount of inequality for this variable. This has changed little over the census years of this study which points to the centrality of education for access to not only income but style of life and status group acceptance involved in privileged residential location.

 H_3 holds that as new municipalities in the SMSA emerge those which are new incorporations will have higher SES indicators and less inequality than those which are included in the SMSA by simply having passed the population threshold of 2,500.²⁰ This is attributable to the new incorporation's powers of selection through control of exclusionary devices as noted above. Hence, income and other life-style indices should be higher and more homogeneity of inhabitants result.

Table 24 shows that for economic criteria, income and percent of families below poverty level, the hypotheses predicted 1960 income but not for 1970.

For 1960 the new incorporations (NI) were higher in income than for the Detroit SMSA and new municipalities by population increase (PI). Those which passed the census population threshold of 2,500 were lower in mean incomes than both. Mean income for NI fell between the second and third deciles for the 1960 SMSA (Table 15). That for PI fell between the sixth and seventh deciles. The same order held for

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mean percent of poor families, with NI at 7.8 percent having fewer than both the Detroit SMSA and PI (9.7 and 9.9 percent).

By 1970 this order had almost reversed itself. This may be the result of the emergence of working class suburbs as the new incorporations for 1970. Because of the decentralization of manufacturing and the political exclusion of existing municipalities new working class suburbs could account for the lower income of this group. NI were the poorest of the three in terms of income, with PI having mean incomes between the first and second highest income deciles for the SMSA taken as a whole. This is compared to mean income falling between the fifth and sixth 1970 decile for NI. The same pattern emerges for percent of poor families. NI and the SMSA have about four percent while PI have on the average only 2.4 percent poor families. In each of these census years the municipalities which ranked at the upper income extreme experienced the greatest amount of income inequality and those which ranked at the lower extreme had the least. For example, in 1960 NI had the highest incomes and also had the most income inequality as measured by the coefficient of variation (thirty-five percent). The lower incomes, which were in the PI municipalities, had much less inequality (eleven percent). In 1970 (when the new municipalities exchanged places) PI municipalities had higher inequality (sixty-one percent) than new incorporations (seven percent).

In general, those municipalities with more poor families had greater inequality in their distribution except the extreme inequality (seventy-eight percent) for the 1970 PI municipalities which were higher income (Table 24). For both 1960 and 1970 the municipalities

which ranked highest in income also generally had a lower percentage of poor families. For example, in 1960, new incorporations had higher incomes and 7.8 percent poor families with a lesser degree of inequality (forty-six percent) than PI municipalities with 9.9 percent poor families and fifty-nine percent inequality by standard deviation. In 1970 the income leader had only 2.4 percent poor families but high inequality (seventy-eight percent) while NI municipalities had more (3.9 percent) poor families but less inequality (forty percent).

For the other life-style indicators, distribution of education, there is once again a similar pattern. Table 25 shows that for the income leaders there are slightly more median school years for both 1960 and 1970 with higher inequality measures consistently going with the better educated municipalities. For 1960 the richer new incorporations were slightly higher in median years of education (11.7 versus 11.4), somewhat more unequal (7.5 versus 6.0 percent), had a higher percent with four years of high school or more (fifty-two versus fortyeight percent) and about nine percent more unequal than the PI municipalities. There was less inequality in both groups of new municipalities, however, than among the municipalities of the SMSA as a whole, for 1960.

In 1970 PI municipalities were income leaders and this is reflected in education data. PI municipalities led NI municipalities in median school years (13.0 versus 12.1) and in mean percent with four years of high school or more (sixty-seven versus fifty-five percent). Inequality follows the same pattern as for 1960, i.e. the higher income and education municipalities are more unequal in median school years

completed (9.0 versus 2.4 percent) and percent high school graduates or more (23.0 versus 23.8 percent).

The picture that emerges for new municipalities is mixed, therefore, and it appears that per se income is the more likely predictor of other higher SES indicators. It was hypothesized that higher income would accrue to new municipalities in the SMSA which were new incorporations, and that on the basis of that incorporation they would be likely to have other, higher SES indicators. The rising income of some of the middle class helped the new PI municipalities to emerge in 1970 as income leaders, however, and it is income which more accurately indicates other SES advantages. It is possible that higher SES groups moved to areas already incorporated and then SES differences began to obtain as a consequence of a more optimum site and accumulation of advantages.

Inequality points to a lack of status homogeneity according to the hypotheses used in this study. What becomes clear is not so much a lack of status homogeneity in higher income municipalities as indicated by the coefficient of variation but the growth of homogeneity as indicated by the means and ranges from 1960 to 1970. For each variable the ranges show a relatively uniform growth in the 1960-1970 period with income leaders having the highest ranges but in each case the minimum figures are quite close. For instance, in 1960 median family income for NI ranged from \$6,000 up to about \$15,000. For PI municipalities this ranged from \$5,821 to \$8,648. Note that the bottom of each range is quite close, about \$260 difference (Table 24). This is true for the other indicators also. In effect, there are minimum

limits for entering new municipalities and these are becoming higher and more restrictive over time.

There is a sharp drop from 8.7 to 3.0 percent in the numbers of poor families to be found in all new municipalities from 1960 to 1970. Mean income was higher in all new municipalities than the mean for the SMSA for 1970 (\$17,164 versus \$14,221), decisively changed from 1960 (\$7,912 versus \$7,916), as shown in Table 24. While the gaps in education indicators grew less strongly than the previous two variables they are still higher than the SMSA mean figures. Median school years completed shifted up a full year for all new municipalities while it was slightly less than a year (.8 year) for the SMSA (Table 25). The mean percent completing four years of high school or more increased 12.4 percentage points for all new municipalities and 10.2 points for the SMSA for the same period.

Using the tables to compare SES indicators for the income leader new municipalities and the city of Detroit (which is in the bottom income tenth) may help attest to the increasingly restrictive nature of these changes.

For 1960 the city of Detroit's median family income of \$6,825 (Table 2) was \$1,856 less than the mean \$8,681 median income for new incorporations--NI (Table 24). In 1970 this difference had widened 435.5 percent to \$9,938, the difference between Detroit's \$10,045 median family income (Table 3) and PI municipalities mean figure of \$20,083 (Table 24).

For 1960 Detroit's median school years completed were 10.0 (Table 2) compared to 11.7 for new municipalities (Table 25), a

difference of 1.7 years. 1970 figures reveal a 17.7 percent increase in this difference, to 2.0 years--11.0 for Detroit and 13.0 for PI municipalities. While this is numerically small, it is in the nature of the difference between not having graduated from high school and having a year of college; of obvious, manifest and critical difference in securing meaningful employment and a decent share of available goods and services.

The percent of those twenty-five and over who graduated from high school or had more education--the educational and cultural level of the municipalities--also changed from 1960 to 1970. For Detroit in 1960 the figure was 34.4 percent (Table 2) as against 51.9 percent for new incorporations (Table 25). This difference of 17.5 percentage points increased 20.5 percent in 1970 when Detroit was 25.1 points below the income leader PI municipalities (41.8 versus 66.9 percent).

The percent of those below poverty level, however, presents a different and confounding outcome. In 1960 Detroit had nineteen percent of its families below poverty level; for 1960 NI this was 7.8 percent, an 11.2 percentage point difference. By 1970 this difference diminished by twenty-one percent. Detroit had 11.3 percent poor families in 1970 while PI municipalities had only 2.4 percent, an 8.9 percentage point difference. This is still a substantial difference and occurs while all other indicators pointed to increasing social distance between the city of Detroit and PI for 1970. The restrictive and exclusionary nature of these changes means that for those who are poor or marginally well-off there is less opportunity to obtain residential locus which will provide access to those life chances the SMSA has to

offer. It must be noted here that the city of Detroit is used here as an example only and it is not the poorest municipality in the SMSA. There are six other municipalities which are less advantaged in competing for the goods and services of the metropolis.

CONCLUSIONS

A brief summarization of the history of the city and the findings of this study highlight the character of social distance and political fragmentation in the case of Detroit.

Detroit is the fifth largest city in the United States. Primarily a manufacturing city, it is populated by a large, ethnically diverse industrial labor force and financed through real estate taxes supplemented by an income tax. Founded by the French in 1701 and taken by the British in 1763, it has always been an international and culturally cosmopolitan site. Its ethnic history from the early nineteenth century includes Canadian, Irish, German, Russian, Austrian, Hungarian and Polish immigrants. From the 1920s southern blacks migrated to the city's job opportunities especially with the labor demands of the 1940s and World War II. In 1970 blacks were 43.7 percent of the city population.

Detroit also has a variegated industrial and commercial history. The capital base for automobile manufacturing was the lumber fortunes of the 1800s and the labor base was the shipbuilding and machine manufacturing industries. After the Civil War the city yielded iron, steel, boot and shoe, rail car, stove, wheel and axle, and chemical and pharmaceutical products. Dominated since 1914 by the automobile industry, Detroit also saw the rise of the United Auto Workers union, one of the largest in the United States.

In contrast to this diverse and heterogeneous development, the isolation and homogenization during the past two decades appears as a discordant and profound change. A city finds its essential strengths in diversity. The strengths in diversity are so important to the life of the city that mention of them (and drawbacks) is warranted to point to what is threatened by the processes evidenced in this research of Detroit.

Diversity of cultural and ethnic units is the basis of the freedom of choice and creation of varied possibilities in the city. Complex problems of change and development can result from great diversity along with its attendant inefficiency and discomfort. This is at the bottom of much urban conflict and disorder. But innovative and transforming remedies can also be provided by these problems through the acceleration of social change as a result of the impact of these units upon one another. Social tension provokes a search for attitudes and laws insuring justice for everyone and makes tolerance a necessity for survival rather than a mere virtue. The wide range of choices and experiences makes possible experimentation with modes of living and creating which enriches the life of the city and its social and economic strengths. The fact of a city implies a web of political, economic and cultural institutions, a mesh of income and status groups making their unique contributions. In lieu of this creative mix there is the isolation of autonomous municipalities. Instead of recognized interdependency there is the exclusion of class and status groups to which the following newsstory is witness.

On Tuesday, December 17, 1974 the Detroit Free Press ran an article which was headlined "Oakland Tells Detroit: Keep Guns Out: Patterson Wants Eight Mile Frontier." L. Brooks Patterson, the Oakland County prosecutor, was commenting on the beginning of a program to eliminate plea bargaining in concealed weapons cases in that county. The article continued: "Although the law prohibits him from treating the Wayne County-Oakland County line as an international border, Patterson said it can at least be considered an imaginary frontier." Patterson was quoted: "I assume if we charted it, we could establish that we have more trouble from outside than we do from Oakland. But it's not like you are going into East Berlin. You can't put up a border guard. But you have to put up an invisible border" (Detroit Free Press, December 17, 1974).

As the evidence of this study shows, borders already exist in the form of municipal political fragmentation and income and status group segregation. It is noteworthy that Oakland County in 1970 had nine municipalities in the top income quintile of fifteen municipalities.

Summarizing the empirical evidence of this research reveals several important findings regarding political fragmentation and inequality in the Detroit SMSA.

First, there is the pronounced income segregation which has occurred since 1950. The shift of a largely middle class city into a poor central city and relatively affluent suburbs with the top income group far outdistancing the rest of the SMSA probably is the most salient manifestation of this income segregation.

Second, the middle class is a rapidly falling proportion of the city of Detroit while at the same time in the suburbs the numbers of those who are below poverty level are falling. Poor families are segregated in municipalities at the bottom of the income array. Thus, the distribution of the rich and poor is increasingly unequal with segregation and homogenization of each occurring apace.

Third, the life-style variables of schooling are less demonstrative of the widening of social distance than the income variables but still point to homogenization of status groups. This is due to greater equality among top income groups for educational attainment.

Fourth, there are gross differences between the emerging municipalities included in the 1970 census data and the city of Detroit. The extreme differences in style of life due to income and education again point to class and status stratification through political fragmentation.

Fifth, the growing numbers of municipalities in the SMSA are a manifestation of metropolitan disintegration. The drawing of race and class lines by means of specialized municipalities establishes and perpetuates inequality in the distribution of life chances. Thus, not only does this affect those now experiencing this maldistribution but there is an intergenerational effect which contributes to its perpetuation. The achievement of full equality by those who are consistently left with the worst housing, education and employment becomes problematic as this obtains over time.

There are many rewards stemming from the housing people secure. This is especially clear in consideration of housing

distribution by class in the metropolis. The aesthetics and psychological values, the efficiency of housing as a physical plant in which to work, rest and play become important here. A higher degree of personal satisfaction and the absence of group stigma about where one is in terms of the reward structure of American society vis à vis residential locus are also important.

Income groups which can afford to spend differentially greater amounts for homes also have that economic power available to contribute to the manipulation of economic and political institutions (e.g. banks, zoning commissions, city and state government agencies) to do their will in terms of legislative action, court rulings, building permits, favorable commission rulings and so on.

Some general inferences may be drawn about the future directions of metropolitan Detroit from the evidence of this research. Certainly there will be both fiscal and social consequences of continuation of present tendencies. It might be anticipated that with the continued isolation of the poor, mostly blacks and other minorities, in the central city there will be a further weakening of the fiscal base of the city. Unless there is a fundamental change in the methods of finance from the real estate tax the city will be increasingly unable to support its service requirements and other financial obligations due to the outflow of wealth to the suburbs. This will result in the loss of both commercial and cultural resources not only to the city but the state and nation as well. The fiscal burden of welfare, education, fire and police protection and other essential city services will fall on either state or federal governments or both.

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One possible response might be the annexation and consolidation of the surrounding metropolitan area to tap additional financial resources but, given the existing legislative obstacles, this is not likely. Another fiscal response might be the imposition of a heavy income tax on those who work in the city but are not residents. Another may be the charging of steep admissions fees to nonresidents for use of the cultural treasures of the city--its museums, libraries, recreation sites and other social capital. More likely, however, is the loss of these resources by the simple inability of the city to meet its payrolls due to insolvency. This may result because the city will be unable to convince the state to grant it taxing power appropriate to its needs.

If the possibility of solvency should emerge through adequate and equitable taxation, use fees or some other device, a possible political response may be mounted by the last immigrant wave to the central city. Those who have been left in the blighted areas by the flight to the suburbs--the poor blacks and other minority ethnic residents--may resist annexation. Because these groups will soon be a resident majority in Detroit, it is possible they will perceive their political power as diluted by annexation and, thus, strive to retain and consolidate their political hegemony in the city. This implies a political class consciousness, an urban nationalism with fiscal overtones. With the central city the hub of financial, communications and commercial activity for the metropolis then fiscal exploitation may potentially be altered by political independence of the central city.

This, however, will only be possible with the unified, solidary political movement of the central city as a whole.

While the measures used in this study are primitive and the findings limited in scope they are consistent with basic theoretical proposals set forth earlier in this paper. The generality of class segregation and political disintegration in urban areas are clearly subject to much more extensive and concentrated research.²¹ The element of time also is important to further testing of the hypotheses and theoretical notions to determine their validity and reliability and that of the measures used to test them. The conclusions here noted, then, are tentative at best because the tendencies under study will want careful analysis to determine their temporality.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

ANNEXATION

According to Andrews, boundary changes are typically in response to urbanization (1968:5). It is the procedural requirements for annexation and incorporation themselves which operate to exacerbate problems of urbanization for cities attempting to annex.

There are two broad types of procedures for annexation in Michigan. There is the standard method which requires an election and there are special procedures, chief of which is the "joint resolution" requiring the consent of the governing bodies of the city and township affected. Of the two types, the first, popular determination, is the most widely used for making boundary changes. In most instances, home rule cities and other municipalities can, by petition and election, bring about annexation (National League of Cities, 1966).

Basically, the annexation procedure for home rule cities and villages is one of filing petitions with the county board of supervisors who then set dates for elections. Approval is normally by two separate majority votes--one by residents of the area proposed to be annexed and the other by a combined majority of voters in the annexing city and in the remainder of the township which includes the proposed area. There are other requirements which apply to unique annexation

forms as in cases of uninhabited areas and land which is owned by an annexing city (Michigan Compiled Laws Annotated, 1967:402-404).

From a legal standpoint the county board has no discretion-it is obliged by law to receive the petitions if they meet the legal requirements of form and content. County boards have, however, occasionally delayed setting an election date. This may be a consequence of the rural-urban balance among board members. In cases such as this, cities have resorted to court orders to force board action (Andrews, 1968:12).

In contrast to annexation, incorporation is a considerably less involved matter. New municipalities are incorporated by a single majority vote approval by the voters in the proposed city or village and by meeting population and density requirements. These are 2,000 population and an average density of 500 persons per square mile for a home rule city and for a village 150 population and 100 persons per square mile average density.

The exacerbating effect on urban problems of the procedural requirements described above occurs when one community seeks to project itself from annexation by countering one proposed boundary change with another. A few citizens can initiate action by signing petitions and legal procedures are easily engaged when a city or an adjacent unincorporated area is threatened by another community. Thus, a community threatened by annexation can incorporate to protect itself. And a central city threatened by separate incorporation of its suburbs can begin annexation procedures (Andrews, 1968:12). Hence, boundary maneuvering is not only stimulated by the legal procedures but through

this legal system there is a decided advantage to incorporation because only one voter majority is required, so, for example, for a suburb attempting to preserve its autonomy in the face of threatened annexation, incorporation provides speedy protection from the more cumbersome attempts of, say, a large metropolitan city (Andrews, 1968:11). APPENDIX B
APPENDIX B

POVERTY INCOME CUTOFFS

The income cutoffs for lower income levels used by the Bureau of the Census raises some problems of comparability among the census years and of validity for this study. First, the definition has been changed several times over the twenty years prior to the 1970 population census so for each census year relevant to this study there is a problem of comparability. Also, the base upon which determination of poverty has been made is misleading and arbitrary, making the definition to some degree invalid. Tracing the chronology of changes may help to briefly outline the problems raised.

In 1948, about one-third of all families and individuals in the United States were found to have money income of less than \$2,000, based on income data from a Bureau of the Census sample of roughly 25,000 households (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1950:1). It is this arbitrary \$2,000 figure that was used in 1949 by the Joint Economic Committee of Congress to define poverty for a family of four (Ferman, et al., 1968:3). Being without an official poverty definition, the Bureau of the Census used \$2,000 as an income cutoff in 1950 and \$3,000 in 1960 to approximate this definition. This poverty definition is based on food requirements as the central factor in measuring

individual's well-being (in terms of the proportion of total income going to purchase this necessity).

In 1964 the Social Security Administration (SSA) originated an official poverty definition which was based upon a nutritionally adequate food plan--the "economy" plan which was designed by the Department of Agriculture "for emergency or temporary use when funds are low" (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973:App32). Annual revisions in this plan followed price changes of items in the economy food budget. The rationale was that some indication of the society's, as well as the individual's, well-being would be revealed by the percentage of total family income expended for necessities, particularly food. Thus, families spending approximately the same amounts for food are considered as sharing the same level of living.

For families of three or more persons the poverty level was set at three times the cost of the economy food plan. This was the average food cost-to-family income relationship reported by the Department of Agriculture on the basis of a 1955 survey of food consumption. For smaller families and persons residing alone, the cost of the economy food plan was multiplied by factors that were slightly larger to compensate for the relatively higher fixed expenses of these smaller households. The SSA poverty cutoffs also took account of differences in the cost of living between farm and non-farm families (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1969:1).

Modifications were recommended in this plan, the most important of which was a shift in the cost-of-living adjustment. The differences between changes in the overall cost-of-living and the economy food plan led to new poverty cutoffs based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI), adopted in 1969. Primarily it was because

[a]nnual revisions of the SSA poverty thresholds were based only on changes in the average per capita cost of the foods in the economy food budget. This method of updating the poverty cutoffs did not fully reflect increases in the overall cost of living in the 1960s. . . . The pace at which the general cost of living advanced in recent years was not uniformly matched by increases in the price of goods in the economy food plan. Thus, general price changes since 1959 were not paralleled by comparable changes in the poverty thresholds. For example, the CPI went up by 13.7 percent between 1959 and 1966, while poverty thresholds increased by 7.9 percent for an average family during the same period (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970:2).

While there is a fifty percent increase from the 1950 poverty level of \$2,000 to the 1960 level of \$3,000 as the income cutoff used by the Bureau of the Census, the 1970 cutoff is only 24.8 percent greater. This is a result of the shift from the economy food plan to the CPI. The 1970 income cutoff for a male-headed, non-farm family of four is \$3,745. However, this \$745 or 24.8 percent increase over the 1960 cutoff follows a decade of inflation fueled by war and rising personal income. For example, the Detroit SMSA experienced a 79.8 percent increase in the mean of all the median family incomes of all municipalities with populations of 2,500 or more from \$7,915.91 in 1960 to \$14,221.40 in 1970. This is clearly not in accord with the intent of the shift to the CPI--to "reflect increases in the overall cost of living during the 1960s (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970:2). Other reasons given for this shift are that the CPI is published regularly and that it is a generally accepted measure. Poverty statistics were not published before 1959 in decennial census material, but have been since, annually in the Current Population Survey in March.

Contrasting the CPI and the economy food plan may provide some insight to the nature of the inconsistencies involved in their use as poverty indicators. The CPI, called the cost-of-living index prior to 1964, has gone through four major revisions since its inception in 1913 (U.S. Department of Labor, 1966:2). It is designed to "[m]easure the average changes in prices of all types of consumer goods and services purchased by urban wage-earners and clerical workers" (U.S. Bureau of Labor, 1973:10). There are approximately 400 goods and services currently priced. The "market basket" items are carefully described to insure that the same quality of good or service is priced and differences in prices reflect only price changes and not changes in quality. By contrast the

[f]ood plans prepared by the Department of Agriculture have, for more than thirty years, served as a guide for estimating costs of food needed by families of different composition. The plans represent a translation of the criteria of nutritional adequacy set forth by the National Research Council into quantities and types of food compatible with the preference of United States families, as revealed in food consumption studies. Plans are developed at varying levels of cost to suit the needs of families with different amounts to spend. All the plans, if strictly followed, can provide an acceptable and adequate diet, but--generally speaking--the lower the level of cost, the more restricted the kinds and qualities of food must be and the more skill in marketing and food preparation that is required. Recently the Department of Agriculture began to issue an "economy" food plan, costing only 75-80 percent as much as the basic low cost plan, for "temporary or emergency use when funds are low." In January, 1964, this plan suggested foods costing \$4.60 a week per person, an average of only 22 cents a meal per person in a four-person family (Orshansky, 1965:6).

It is manifest that the economy food plan is inadequate to measure the needs of families in terms of income. The CPI measures many more consumer items and provides a more realistic measure of family income requirements. However, one brief example provides interesting

insights into CPI underestimation of the number of persons who are poor in population census figures.

The now discarded poverty thresholds (the economy food plan) measure only a 7.9 percent increase from 1959 to 1966, while the CPI increases 13.7 percent for the same period. For the decade (1960 to 1960), however, the CPI poverty level increased 24.8 percent but the CPI increased 31.1 percent.²² 1970 census figures paradoxically show a drop in the number of poor families from 1960 at the same time that median family incomes were rising precipitously (79.8 percent in the Detroit SMSA). Insofar as poverty is relative, i.e. poverty is judged not just in terms of survival but one's share of society's goods and resources (Orshansky, 1965:3), then it is problematic that the number of poor families would fall in the face of such rapidly rising incomes. While this is a matter for further research, the implication is clear. The shift to the CPI poverty level and rise in the poverty thresholds by less than half of the income increase for the Detroit SMSA (24.8 versus 79.8 percent) will eventually result in an increase of poor families as they compete with the affluent for items in the CPI "market basket." Also, during this same period, income distribution became increasingly unequal (see Table 4 for coefficient of variation). In describing the relativity of definitions of poverty, Downs (1970:8) notes the extreme lowness of U.S. poverty income thresholds and points out that they are about one-third of a "moderate standard of living" as estimated by a 1967 Bureau of Labor Statistics study for a fourperson household.

Similarly, a study conducted by Real Estate Research Corporation in 1968 showed that using the cost of housing, rather than the cost of food, to define poverty resulted in much higher income thresholds than those set forth above.*²³ Raising these thresholds would greatly increase the number of persons considered poor in each of the categories mentioned above (Downs, 1970:8).

In view of these considerations regarding the CPI poverty level income cutoffs only carefully qualified conclusions may be drawn from the Bureau of the Census figures purporting to measure the percent of families below poverty level. APPENDIX C

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5	ty & county		v cito M	Median	Percent		Families & un-
Ma Va Wa	comb kland yne	Σοз	family income	school years completed ^l	cumpleted 4 years high school or morel	Population	related indi- vidualspercent having incomes less than \$2,000
	Huntington Woods	0	7,237	12.8	77.3	4,949	8.4
2	Grosse Pointe	м	6,818	12.9	70.5	6,283	18.7
m	Pleasant Ridge	0	6,659	13.0	73.9	3,594	11.6
4	Grosse Pte. Park	м	6,467	12.4	62.9	13,075	19.2
ഹ	Grosse Pte. Woods	З	6,292	12.4	63.6	10,381	6.9
9	Grosse Pte. Farms	З	6,175	12.6	67.7	9,410	22.1
7	Birmingham	С	5,898	12.8	72.3	15,467	16.1
ω	Allen Park	м	4,723	11.4	41.1	12,329	6.1
6	Dearborn	З	4,655	11.1	43.3	94,994	11.0
의	Royal Oak	0	4,633	12.2	55.9	46,898	11.9
=	Berkeley	0	4,626	12.2	60.0	17,931	7.7
12	Oak Park	0	4,471	12.1	52.1	5,267	7.8
13	Ferndale	0	4,337	11.4	52.6	29,675	11.9
14	Lincoln Park	м	4,272	10.1	31.4	29,310	8.0
15	St. Clair Shores	Σ	4,262	10.7	39.1	19,823	11.7
16	East Detroit	Σ	4,195	10.0	31.5	21,461	8.7
17	Clawson	0	4,092	11.2	43.2	5,196	13.0

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Socio-economic characteristics--Detroit SMSA, municipalities <u>></u> 2,500 population, 1950. Table 1.

Cit	y & county		neiboM	Median	Percent		Families & un- velated indi-
Mac [.] Oak Way	omb land ne	Σο3	family income	school years completed ^l	4 years high school or more	Population	vidualspercent having incomes less than \$2,000
18	Wyandotte	з	4,092	9.8	30.8	36,846	14.4
19	Melvindale	м	4,073	9.8	29.7	9.483	8.2
20	Trenton	м	4,064	1.11	41.8	6,222	14.9
21	Livonia	м	4,056	10.5	36.6	17,534	14.0
22	Detroit	з	4,026	6.9	33.6	1,849,568	21.8
នា	Highland Park	м	3,977	10.8	41.3	46,393	22.2
24	Centerline	Σ	3,927	6 •6	32.1	7,659	10.3
25	Hazel Park	0	3,911	9.5	26.4	17,770	12.3
26	Garden City	м	3,777	9.9	27.5	9,012	11.4
27	Wayne	з	3,717	11.3	43.4	9,409	16.7
28	Pontiac	0	3,707	9.8	30.4	73,681	23.0
29	Hamtramck	м	3,705	8.4	21.3	43,355	19.4
30	Roseville	Σ	3,635	9.7	28.9	15,816	14.0
5	Plymouth	М	3,532	11.5	45.3	6,637	21.7
32	Rochester	0	3,522	11.2	43.0	4,279	24.7
33	Ecorse	м	3,494	8.9	22.8	17,948	19.5
34	Mt. Clemens	Σ	3,489	10.0	35.5	17,027	28.4

City	/ & county		i i c	Median	Percent		Families & un-
Mac(Jak Mayn	omb land ne	Σ03	family income	school years completed ^l	completed 4 years high school or more	Population	related indi- vidualspercent having incomes less than \$2,000
35	River Rouge	з	3,436	9.0	25.9	20,549	21.0
36	Northville	м	3,392	11.6	44.9	2,981	20.6
37	Inkster	Μ	3,339	0.0	25.3	11,156	23.3
38	Romeo	Σ	2,904	10.9	41.1	2,985	32.5
39	НоПЈУ	0	2,647	10.8	38.3	2,663	36.1
	¹ For those	twent	.v-five vears	s old and over			
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Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, <u>Census of Population: 1950</u>, Vol. 2, Part 22 Michigan. Tables 6, 10, 11, 34, 37, 38, 39.

Table 1. (Continued)

C.	ty & county		MaiboM	Median	Percent		Families
Ma Oa Wa	comb kland yne	ΣΟ3	family income	school years completed ¹	d years 4 years high school or more	Population	percent having incomes less than \$3,000
-	Beverly Hills**	0	14,954	12.9	79.0	8,633	2.3
2	** Lathrup Village	0	14,219	12.9	76.8	3,556	4.6
e	Grosse Pointe	м	13,974	13.1	74.9	6.631	7.9
4	Grosse Pte. Farms	м	13,179	13.0	74.4	12,172	6.2
പ	Huntington Woods	0	12,746	12.9	77.1	8,746	7.8
9	Grosse Pte. Park	м	11,179	12.6	65.4	15,457	8.4
7	Grosse Pte. Woods	м	11,160	12.6	67.8	18,580	4.5
ω	Pleasant Ridge	0	10,778	12.9	71.5	3,807	5.8
6	Birmingham	0	10,723	13.3	79.2	25,525	5.1
10	Oak Park	0	8,680	12.4	65.3	36,632	5.8
=	Farmington	0	8,648	12.5	67.6	6,881	5.5
12	Allen Park	З	8,492	12.1	58.3	37,494	3.5
13	Southfield ^{**}	0	8,387	12.2	54.9	31,501	6.4
14	Livonia	З	8,243	12.2	58.9	66,702	5.2
15	Dearborn	м	8,195	12.0	50.0	112,007	8.3
16	Royal Oak	0	8,184	12.3	60.1	80,612	6.2
1	Trenton	м	8,047	12.1	55.0	18,439	5.1

Socio-economic characteristics--Detroit SMSA, municipalities <u>></u> 2,500 population, 1960. Table 2.

Cit	y & county			Median	Percent		Families
Mac Oak Wayi	omb land ne	203	family income	school years completed ¹	d years high school or more	Population	percent having incomes less than \$3,000
18	Harper Woods **	з	8,036	12.0	51.3	19,995	5.6
19	Plymouth	3	7,755	12.1	53.8	8,766	10.2
20	St. Clair Shores	Σ	7,752	12.1	52.0	76,657	5,9
21	East Detroit	Σ	7,715	10.8	38.6	45,756	6.5
22	* Fraser	Σ	7,699	12.1	52.9	7,027	6.6
23	Northville	м	7,642	12.2	55.6	3,967	10.0
24	Berkeley	0	7,589	12.1	54.6	23,275	6.5
25	Troy **	0	7,588	11.6	47.0	19,382	9.2
26	Clawson	0	7,586	12.2	56.9	14,795	5.2
27	Flat Rock [*]	3	7,529	11.9	49.0	4,696	5.3
28	Garden City	м	7,354	11.8	48.0	38,017	3.5
29	Rochester	0	7,340	12.1	53.3	5,431	10.5
30	southgate	м	7,269	11.2	42.6	29,404	5.4
ເຍ	Madison Heights	0	7,157	11.5	45.3	33,343	6.9
32	Milford	0	160,7	12.2	55.7	4,323	7.6
33	Lincoln Park	3	7,065	10.5	36.4	53.933	7.1

City	& county		MerihoM	Median	Percent		Families
Maco Oakl Wayn	mb and e	ΣΟ3	family income	school years completed ¹	4 years high school or more	Population	percent having incomes less than \$3,000
34	Ferndale	0	7,064	11.3	43.9	31,347	9.1
35	kiverview *	м	7,023	11.1	41.6	7,237	5.3
36	Warren *	Σ	6, 948	10.5	36.2	89,246	7.4
37	Centerline	Σ	6,946	10.1	34.9	10,164	9.4
38	Novi **	0	6 , 934	11.3	44.8	6,390	11.2
39	Wayne	м	6,929	11.2	42.8	16,034	8.5
40	Roseville	Σ	6,925	1.1	40.9	50,195	8.4
41	Detroit	3	6 ,825	10.0	34.4	1,670,144	19.0
42	Wyandotte	м	6,749	10.1	33.0	43,519	10.8
43	Inkster	3	6,664	10.8	39.3	39,097	12.6
44	Melvindale	м	6,657	9.7	29.1	13,089	7.8
45	New Baltimore*	Σ	6,484	10.8	41.3	3,159	21.0
46	Hazel Park	0	6,391	9.7	27.7	25,631	11.6
47	Richmond [*]	3	6,277	10.8	43.9	2,667	10.0
48	Romeo	Σ	6,242	11.4	45.9	3,327	15.9
49	** Keego Harbor	0	6,189	9.7	28.7	2,761	11.0
50	Mt. Clemens	Σ	6,092	10.8	41.2	21,016	20.1

City & county			W	Percent		
Macomb Oakland Wayne	ΣΟ3	Median family income	reulan school years completed	completed 4 years high school or more ¹	Population	Families percent having incomes less than \$3,000
51 Walled Lake	0	6,080	11.8	48.2	3,550	14.9
52 Holly	0	6,073	11.2	44.2	3,269	15.7
53 Pontiac	0	6,011	9 . 8	31.9	82,233	15.8
54 Lake Orion [*]	0	5,821	10.9	41.4	2,698	20.0
55 Highland Park	В	5,696	10.4	38.2	36,063	20.6
56 Ecorse	м	5,479	8.9	23.1	17,328	18.8
57 Hamtramck	М	5,345	8.7	22.8	34,137	23.1
58 River Rouge	З	5,324	9.1	27.4	18,147	24.2
* New munici	ipaliti€	es in 1960 c	ensus, passed po	pulation threshol	d > 2,500.	
** New munici	ipaliti∈	s in 1960 c	ensus, new incor	porations.	Ī	
^l For those	twenty-	five years	old and over.			
Source: U. Tables 7, 32, 33, 3 P-1.	S. Bure 4. <u>U.S</u>	au of the C . Censuses	ensus, <u>Census of</u> of Population and	Population: 196 <u>1 Housing: 1960</u> ,	<mark>()</mark> , Vol. l, Part Final Report P	t 24, Michigan. MC(1)-40. Table

						1	
C i Ma	ty & county comb cland	ΣΟ	Median family income	Median School years completed	Percent completed 4 years high school	Population	Familiesper- cent having incomes less than poverty
Wa	/ne	3			or more'		level
-	Bloomfield Hills*	0	46,715	15.1	91.3	3,672	0.7
8	Grosse Pte. Shores*	З	32,565	14.1	83.1	3,042	2.1
m	Franklin [*]	0	29 , 658	14.6	89.4	3,344	0.8
4	Beverly Hills	0	22,909	14.1	86.1	13,598	1.1
2	Grosse Pte. Farms	з	21,798	14.2	84.6	11,701	1.4
9	Huntington Woods	0	19,920	13.5	83.6	8,536	1.6
7	Grosse Pointe	м	19,020	14.2	84.4	6,637	1.4
ω	Grosse Pte. Woods	3	18,981	12.9	79.3	21,885	1.1
σ	Southfield	0	18,141	12.7	74.2	69,285	2.4
10	Grosse Pte. Park	з	17,760	12.9	74.9	15,585	3.9
=	Birmingham	0	17,292	14.1	85.4	26,170	2.1
12	Farmington	0	16,819	12.8	1.77	13,337	1.2
13	Pleasant Ridge	0	16,047	13.0	78.4	3,989	3.2
14	Livonia	З	15,216	12.5	69.7	110,109	1.7
15	Troy	0	14,955	12.6	70.2	39,419	2.6
16	Trenton	м	14,581	12.4	66.5	24,127	3.0

Socio-economic characteristics--Detroit SMSA, municipalities <u>></u> 2,500 population, 1970. Table 3.

Cit	y & county		nei hom	Median	Percent		Familiesper- cent having
Mac Oak Way	omb land ne	ΣΟ3	family income	school years completed ¹	4 years high school or more	Population	incomes less than poverty level
17	Northville	з	14,387	12.6	69.4	5,400	2.0
18	Oak Park	0	14,274	12.5	68.2	36,762	3.2
19	Allen Park	м	14,153	12.2	59.9	40,747	2.1
20	Riverview	м	13,913	12.2	59.4	11,342	2.4
21	Sterling Hgts.**	Σ	13,793	12.4	65.2	61,365	2.3
22	Royal Oak	0	13,619	12.4	66.6	85,499	2.7
23	St. Clair Shores	Σ	13,598	12.2	58.3	88,093	2.6
24	Fraser	Σ	13,548	12.2	59.7	11,868	2.4
25	Harper Woods	м	13,534	12.2	59.9	20,186	2.3
26	** Dearborn Hgts.	м	13,499	12.2	57.2	80,069	2.6
27	Warren	Σ	13,452	12.1	54.7	179,260	3.1
28	** Woodhaven	М	13,387	12.2	58.9	3,330	4.3
29	Novi	0	13,342	12.2	57.2	9,668	4.9
30	Dearborn	м	13,257	12.2	57.5	104,199	3.9
3]	C1 awson	0	13,170	12.3	62.8	17,617	3.5
32	Plymouth	м	13,082	12.5	65.6	11,785	1.2

cit	y & county		מיידסש	Median	Percent completed		Families-per-
Mac Oak Wayı	omb land ne	ΣC3	family income	school years completed ¹	d years high school or more	Population	incomes less than poverty level
33	Southgate	з	13,058	12.1	52.1	33,909	2.5
34	Garden City	м	12,994	12.1	53.1	41,864	3.0
35	Berkeley	0	12,948	12.3	62.3	22,618	3.4
36	East Detroit	Σ	12,943	11.7	47.7	45,920	3.9
37	Milford	0	12,933	12.4	68.0	4,699	3.7
38	Flat Rock	З	12,902	12.1	56.2	5,643	5.1
39	Westland	м	12,787	12.2	56.9	86,749	3.0
40	Madison Heights	0	12,781	12.1	54.1	38,599	3.5
41	Gibralter [*]	м	12,756	12.2	56.6	3,325	2.0
42	Centerline	Σ	12,621	12.0	49.9	10,379	3.9
43	Wolverine Lake	0	12,439	12.3	64.0	4,301	2.4
44	Rockwood *	З	12,408	12.1	55.2	3,119	2.5
45	Utica [*]	Σ	12,269	12.2	56.9	3,504	3.5
46	Roseville	Σ	12,262	12.0	49.7	60,529	4.3
47	Lake Orion	0	12,225	12.0	51.7	2,921	1.5
48	Rochester	0	12,156	12.5	68.0	7,065	5.9

cit	y & county		ae i poM	Median	Percent completed		Familiesper-
Mac Oak Way	omb land ne	ΣΟ3	family income	school years completed ¹	4 years high school or more	Population	than poverty level
49	Lincoln Park	з	12,131	11.2	42.9	52,984	4.2
50	Taylor	з	11,977	12.3	47.2	70,020	4.1
51	Wayne	з	11,878	12.0	50.6	21,054	4.0
52	South Lyon	0	11,812	11.9	49.0	2,675	0.6
53	Romeo	Σ	11,695	12.1	53.3	4,012	6.4
54	Walled Lake	0	11,625	12.1	52.6	3,759	2.3
55	New Baltimore	Σ	11,568	12.3	62.1	4,132	4.8
56	Ferndale	0	11,525	12.1	51.9	30,850	3.6
51	Melvindale	З	11,523	11.0	42.1	13,862	5.3
58	Inkster	3	11,290	11.7	47.2	38,595	8.4
59	Wyandotte	3	11,283	1.11	42.1	41,061	4.3
60	Lake Orion Hts.**	0	11,268	11.5	46.4	2,552	6.9
61	Mt. Clemens	Σ	11,210	12.1	54.1	20,476	7.0
62	Hazel Park	0	11,208	10.7	37.4	23,784	5.7
63	Keego Harbor	0	11,195	11.3	44.1	3,092	5.3
64	Holly	0	10,863	12.2	57.0	4,355	4.9

cit	y & county			Median	Percent		Familiesper-
Mac Oak Way	omb land ne	ΣΟ3	Median family income	school years completed ¹	completed 4 years high school or morel	Population	cent naving incomes less than poverty level
65	0xford*	0	10,123	12.2	57.0	2,536	7.0
99	Detroit	З	10,045	11.0	41.8	1,511,482	11.3
67	Richmond	Σ	10,000	12.1	55.2	3,234	5.8
68	Ecorse	3	9,708	6.9	29.5	17,515	10.9
69	Pontiac	0	9,681	10.7	37.7	85,279	10.0
70	River Rouge	З	9,433	10.3	35.6	15,947	12.8
71	Hamtramck	3	9,395	9.5	30.9	27,245	10.1
72	Highland Park	3	8,718	11.2	43.0	35,444	14.5
	* New munic	cipalit.	ies in 1970	census, passed	population thres	hold > 2,500.	
	** New munic	cipalit	ies in 1970	census, new inc	corporations.	I	
	¹ For those	e twent	y-five years	s old and over.			
gan	Sources: . Tables 10, 40,	U.S. 42.	Bureau of th	ie Census, <u>Censu</u>	s of Population:	1970, Vol. 1,	Part 24, Michi-

		*	**
Table 4.	Median family income and percent of	families below poverty	level,
	Detroit SMSA municipalities > 2,500	for 1950, 1960, 1970.	-

			Median Family	Income
Census Year	Number of Municipalities		St. De	andard viation
		Mean	In Dollars	Coefficient of Variation
1950	39	\$ 4,364.97	\$ 1,107.42	25.37%
1960	58	7,915.91	2,204.90	28.11
1970	72	14,221.40	5,562.88	39.12

^{*}1950 figures based on data for families and unrelated individuals, 1960 and 1970 figures on data for families only.

** "Poverty level" definitions are not perfectly comparable across all three census years. See Appendix B.

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, <u>Census of Population: 1950</u>, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Tables 11, 37, 39; <u>Census of Population: 1960</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 33, 34; U.S. <u>Censuses of Population and</u> <u>Housing: 1960</u>, Final Report PHC(1)-40. Table P-1; <u>Census of Population</u>: <u>1970</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 41, 42.

	Percent	<mark>: families bel</mark> o	w poverty level	
Range			Standard <u>deviation</u>	Range
	Mean	In percent	Coefficient of variation	
\$ 7,237 - \$ 2,647	16.2%	7.11%	43.89%	6.1 - 36.
14,954 - 5,324	9.7	5.40	55.67	2.3 - 24.
46,715 - 8,718	4.0	2.84	71.00	0.7 - 14.

Table 5.	Median family income interval 1960 and 1970.	comparisons by quartiles, quintiles	and deciles: 1950,
Census Year	Interquartile	Interquintile	Interdecile
1950	11.10%	25.09%	31.93%
1960	10.30	15.89	35.91
1970	10.23	12.96	27.01
Michigan. 34; <u>U.S.</u> of Popula	Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Control Tables 37, 39; Census of Popu Censuses of Population and Hous Stion: 1970, Vol. 1, Part 24, M	ensus, <u>Census of Population: 1950</u> , lation: 1960, Vol. 1, Part 24, Mic ing: 1960, Final Report PHC(1)-40. ichigan. Tables 41, 42.	Vol. 2, Part 22, higan. Tables 33, Table P-1; <u>Census</u>

Income]	950]	960]	970
Decile	Percent	Population	Percent	Population	Percent	Population
Highest	. 58%	14,826	1.28%	39,738	2.04%	72,415
2	1.88	48,333	3.44	107,152	7.82	277,894
3	6.71	172,152	11.13	346,755	7.47	265,242
4	3.28	84,075	5.21	162,168	11.05	392,474
5	2.48	63, 503	3.39	105,596	7.82	277,912
6	74.83	1,919,717	5.12	159,587	4.33	153,695
7	1.71	43,850	59.14	1,842,173	5.63	200,142
8	5.44	139,489	4.08	127,162	2.26	80,344
9	2.33	59,803	3.37	116,156	3.77	133,915
Lowest	.77	19,785	3.48	108,373	47.81	1,698,682
Totals	100.00	2,565,533	100.00	3,114,860	100.00	3,552,715

Table 6.	Population concentration by median family income quintiles
	and deciles, Detroit SMSA municipalities > 2,500.

Income	1	950	1	960		1970
tile	Percent	Population	Percent	Population	Percent	Population
Highest	2.46%	63,159	4.72%	146,890	9.86%	350,309
2	9.99	256,227	16.34	508,923	18.51	657,716
3	77.30	1,983,220	8.51	265,183	12.15	431,607
4	7.15	183,339	63.22	1,969,335	7.90	280,486
Lowest	3.10	79, 588	7.21	224,529	51.58	1,832,597
Totals	100.00	2,565,533	100.00	3,114,860	100.00	3,552,715

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, <u>Census of the Population</u>: <u>1950</u>, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Tables 6, 10, 11, 39; <u>Census of Popu-</u> <u>lation: 1960</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 7, 33, 34; U.S. Cen-<u>suses of Population and Housing: 1960</u>, Final Report PHC(1)-40. Table <u>P-1; Census of Population: 1970</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 10, 40, 42.

$ \begin{array}{c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c $			1950			1960			1970	
Decrife Mean Population Percent Pop Pop Population Percent Pop Pop Population Percent Pop Population Percent Pop Pop Percent Pop Population Percent Pop Population Percent Pop Population Percent Pop Pop Percent Pop Population Percent Pop Population Percent Pop Population Percent Pop Pop Pop Percent Pop Pop Percent Pop Pop Pop Pic Pic Pic Pic Pic Pic Pic Pic Pic Pic <th>Income Decile</th> <th>5 Croce</th> <th>Thos pover</th> <th>e below ty level</th> <th>SLOSS</th> <th>Thos</th> <th>e below ty level</th> <th>งงบนย</th> <th>Thos</th> <th>e below ty level</th>	Income Decile	5 Croce	Thos pover	e below ty level	SLOSS	Thos	e below ty level	งงบนย	Thos	e below ty level
Highest 14,826 12.9% 1,913 39,738 5.8% 2,305 72,415 1.3% 2 48,333 16.1 7,782 107,152 5.9 6,322 277,894 2.4 6 3 172,152 9.2 15,838 346,755 5.8 20,112 265,242 2.5 6 4 84,075 9.9 8,323 162,168 7.5 12,163 392,474 3.2 12 5 63,503 11.1 7,049 105,596 6.7 7,075 277,912 3.1 8 7 43,850 12.7 5,569 1,842,173 10.7 197,113 200,142 3.7 7 8 139,489 19.5 27,200 127,162 12.3 10,7 197,113 200,142 3.7 7 8 139,489 19.5 27,200 127,162 12.3 15,641 80,344 3.9 5 5 3.7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 442,616		Decile	Mean Percent	Population	Decile Population	Mean Percent	Population	Decile	Mean Percent	Population
2 48,333 16.1 7,782 107,152 5.9 6,322 277,894 2.4 6 3 172,152 9.2 15,838 346,755 5.8 20,112 265,242 2.5 6 4 84,075 9.9 8,323 162,168 7.5 12,163 392,474 3.2 12 5 63,503 11.1 7,049 105,596 6.7 7,075 277,912 3.1 8 7 43,850 12.7 5,569 1,842,173 10.7 197,113 200,142 3.7 7 8 139,489 19.5 27,200 127,162 12.3 15,641 80,344 3.9 3 9 59,803 23.4 116,156 15.6 18,120 133,915 6.1 8 10west 19,785 28.1 5,559 108,373 21.3 23,084 1,698,682 10.3 174 9 59,665,533 17.3 442,616 3,114,860 10.1 3,12,947 3,552,715 6.6 23,04 1,698,682 <t< td=""><td>Highest</td><td>14,826</td><td>12.9%</td><td>1,913</td><td>39,738</td><td>5.8%</td><td>2,305</td><td>72,415</td><td>1.3%</td><td>941</td></t<>	Highest	14,826	12.9%	1,913	39,738	5.8%	2,305	72,415	1.3%	941
3 172,152 9.2 15,838 346,755 5.8 20,112 265,242 2.5 6 4 84,075 9.9 8,323 162,168 7.5 12,163 392,474 3.2 12 5 63,503 11.1 7,049 105,596 6.7 7,075 277,912 3.1 8 6 1,919,717 18.2 349,389 159,587 6.9 11,012 153,695 3.4 5 7 43,850 12.7 5,569 1,842,173 10.7 197,113 200,142 3.7 7 8 139,489 19.5 27,200 127,162 12.3 15,641 80,344 3.9 3.9 9 59,803 23.4 116,156 15.6 18,120 133,915 6.1 8 10west 19,785 28.1 5,559 108,373 21.3 23,084 1,698,682 10.3 174 10tals 2,565,533 17.3 21.4 312,947 3,552,715 6.6 534	2	48,333	16.1	7,782	107,152	5.9	6,322	277,894	2.4	6,670
4 84,075 9.9 8,323 162,168 7.5 12,163 392,474 3.2 12 5 63,503 11.1 7,049 105,596 6.7 7,075 277,912 3.1 8 6 1,919,717 18.2 349,389 159,587 6.9 11,012 153,695 3.4 9 7 43,850 12.7 5,569 1,842,173 10.7 197,113 200,142 3.7 7 8 139,489 19.5 27,200 127,162 12.3 15,641 80,344 3.9 3.9 9 59,803 23.4 13,994 116,156 15.6 18,120 133,915 6.1 8 10west 19,785 28.1 5,559 108,373 21.3 23,084 1,698,682 10.3 174 10tals 2,565,533 17.3 442,616 3,114,860 10.1 312,947 3,552,715 6.6 234	ო	172,152	9.2	15,838	346,755	5.8	20,112	265,242	2.5	6,631
5 63,503 11.1 7,049 105,596 6.7 7,075 277,912 3.1 8 6 1,919,717 18.2 349,389 159,587 6.9 11,012 153,695 3.4 9 7 43,850 12.7 5,569 1,842,173 10.7 197,113 200,142 3.7 7 8 139,489 19.5 27,200 127,162 12.3 15,641 80,344 3.9 3 9 59,803 23.4 13,994 116,156 15.6 18,120 133,915 6.1 8 Lowest 19,785 28.1 5,559 108,373 21.3 23,084 1,698,682 10.3 174 Lotals 2,565,533 17.3 442,616 3,114,860 10.1 312,947 3,552,715 6.6 236	4	84,075	6.9	8,323	162,168	7.5	12,163	392,474	3.2	12,559
6 1,919,717 18.2 349,389 159,587 6.9 11,012 153,695 3.4 5 7 43,850 12.7 5,569 1,842,173 10.7 197,113 200,142 3.7 7 8 139,489 19.5 27,200 127,162 12.3 15,641 80,344 3.9 3 9 59,803 23.4 13,994 116,156 15.6 18,120 133,915 6.1 8 10west 19,785 28.1 5,559 108,373 21.3 23,084 1,698,682 10.3 174 10tals 2,565,533 17.3 442,616 3,114,860 10.1 312,947 3,552,715 6.6 236	ß	63,503	11.1	7,049	105,596	6.7	7,075	277,912	3.1	8,615
7 43,850 12.7 5,569 1,842,173 10.7 197,113 200,142 3.7 7 8 139,489 19.5 27,200 127,162 12.3 15,641 80,344 3.9 3 9 59,803 23.4 13,994 116,156 15.6 18,120 133,915 6.1 8 10west 19,785 28.1 5,559 108,373 21.3 23,084 1,698,682 10.3 174 Totals 2,565,533 17.3 442,616 3,114,860 10.1 312,947 3,552,715 6.6 236	9	1,919,717	18.2	349,389	159,587	6.9	11,012	153,695	3.4	5,226
8 139,489 19.5 27,200 127,162 12.3 15,641 80,344 3.9 3 9 59,803 23.4 13,994 116,156 15.6 18,120 133,915 6.1 8 10west 19,785 28.1 5,559 108,373 21.3 23,084 1,698,682 10.3 174 Totals 2,565,533 17.3 442,616 3,114,860 10.1 312,947 3,552,715 6.6 234	7	43,850	12.7	5,569	1,842,173	10.7	197,113	200,142	3.7	7,405
9 59,803 23.4 13,994 116,156 15.6 18,120 133,915 6.1 8 Lowest 19,785 28.1 5,559 108,373 21.3 23,084 1,698,682 10.3 174 Totals 2,565,533 17.3 442,616 3,114,860 10.1 312,947 3,552,715 6.6 234	ω	139,489	19.5	27,200	127,162	12.3	15,641	80,344	3.9	3,133
Lowest 19,785 28.1 5,559 108,373 21.3 23,084 1,698,682 10.3 174 Totals 2,565,533 17.3 442,616 3,114,860 10.1 312,947 3,552,715 6.6 234	б	59,803	23.4	13,994	116,156	15.6	18,120	133,915	6.1	8,169
Totals 2,565,533 17.3 442,616 3,114,860 10.1 312,947 3,552,715 6.6 234	Lowest	19,785	28.1	5,559	108,373	21.3	23,084	1,698,682	10.3	174,964
	Totals	2,565,533	17.3	442,616	3,114,860	10.1	312,947	3,552,715	6.6	234,313

Concentrations in percent of families and population of those below poverty level by median family income deciles. Detroit SMSA municipalities $\geq 2,500$. Table 7.

Sources:U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population:1950, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan.Tables 6, 10, 11, 39; Census of Population:1960, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan.Tables 7, 33, 34; U.S.Censuses of Population and Housing:1960, Final Report PHC(1)-40.Table P-1; Census of Population:1970, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan.Tables 10, 40, 42.

Table 8.	Concentrat family inc	ions in p ome quint	ercent of fau iles, Detroi	milies and p t SMSA munic	opulation ipalities	of those be :≥2,500.	low poverty	level by	median
		1950			1960			1970	
Income Quin-	บรร	Thos pover	e below ty level	irns c	Thos pover	ty level	Sross Bross	Thos pover	e below ty level
tiles	Quintile Population	Mean Percent	Population	Quintile Population	Mean Percent	Population	Quintile Population	Mean Percen t	Population
Highest	63,159	14.7%	9,284	146,890	5.8%	8,520	350,309	1.8%	6,306
0	256,227	9.5	24,342	508,923	6.6	33,589	657,716	2.9	19,074
ę	1,983,220	14.7	291,533	265,183	6.8	18,032	431,607	3.2	13,811
4	183,339	16.1	29,518	1,969,335	11.5	226,474	280,486	3.8	10,659
Lowest	79,588	25.8	20,534	224,529	18.2	40,864	1,832,597	8.3	152,106
Totals	2,565,533	14.6	375,211	3,114,860	10.5	327,479	3,552,715	5.7	201,956

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of the Population: 1950, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Tables 6, 10, 11, 39; Census of Population: 1960, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 7, 33, 34; U.S. Cen-suses of Population and Housing: 1960, Final Report PHC(1)-40. Table P-1; Census of Population: 1970, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 10, 40, 42.

Census Number of Municipalities Standard Deviation Standard Deviation Year Municipalities In Coefficient Mean years of Variation Range Rean 1950 39 10.9% 1.24 11.38% 13.0-8.4 43.2% 15.29% 35.39% 77.3%-21.3 1960 58 11.4 1.12 9.83 13.1-8.7 49.1 14.49 29.51 79.0 -28.1 1970 72 12.2 .96 7.87 15.1-9.5 59.3 14.12 23.31 91.3<-30.9			Med	ian sch	ool years compl	leted P	ercent	with 4 yea	urs high schoo	l or more
In Coefficient In Coefficient Mean years of Variation Range Mean Percent of Variation Range 1950 39 10.9% 1.24 11.38% 13.0-8.4 43.2% 15.29% 35.39% 77.3%-21.3 1950 58 11.4 1.12 9.83 13.1-8.7 49.1 14.49 29.51 79.0 -28.7 1970 72 12.2 .96 7.87 15.1-9.5 59.3 14.12 23.81 91.3<-30.9	Census Year	Number of Municinalities		Ϋ́Δ	tandard eviation			Sta Dev	undard viation	
1950 39 10.9% 1.24 11.38% 13.0-8.4 43.2% 15.29% 35.39% 77.3%-21.3 1960 58 11.4 1.12 9.83 13.1-8.7 49.1 14.49 29.51 79.0 -28.3 1970 72 12.2 .96 7.87 15.1-9.5 59.3 14.12 23.81 91.3<-30.9	5		Mean	In years	Coefficient of Variation	Range	Mean	In Percent	Coefficient of Variation	Range
1960 58 11.4 1.12 9.83 13.1-8.7 49.1 14.49 29.51 79.0 -28.7 1970 72 12.2 .96 7.87 15.1-9.5 59.3 14.12 23.81 91.3 -30.9	1950	39	10.9%	1.24	11.38%	13.0-8.4	43.2%	15.29%	35.39%	77.3%-21.3%
1970 72 12.2 .96 7.87 15.1-9.5 59.3 14.12 23.81 91.3 -30.9	1960	58	11.4	1.12	9.83	13.1-8.7	49.1	14.49	29.51	79.0 -28.7
	1970	72	12.2	.96	7.87	15.1-9.5	59.3	14.12	23.81	91.3 -30.9

+ *

		1950			1960			1970	
come	ยากรร	Four y school	ears high or more	Gross	Four y school	ears high or more	Gross	Four y school	ears high or more
-	Decile Population	Mean Percent	Population	Decile Population	Mean Percent	Population	Decile Population	Mean Percent	Population
ghest	14,826	79.3%	10,956	39,738	76.4%	30,360	72,415	85.2%	61,698
2	48,333	66.6	32,190	107,152	69.5	74,471	277,894	75.7	210,366
e	172,152	50.1	86,248	346,755	55.2	191,409	265,242	65.0	172,407
4	84,075	43.8	36,825	162,168	50.7	82,219	392,474	58.0	227,635
പ	63,503	33.8	21,464	105,596	51.5	54,382	277,912	57.3	159,244
9	1,919,717	38.3	735,252	159,587	44.3	70,697	153,695	58.0	89,143
7	43,850	32.4	14,207	1,842,173	39.0	718,448	200,142	53.1	106,275
ω	139,489	31.5	43,939	127,162	35.7	45,397	80,344	51.7	41,538
6	59,803	31.8	19,017	116,156	40.0	46,462	133,915	46.9	62,806
lest	19,785	37.6	7,439	108,373	30.6	33,162	1,698,682	41.3	701,556
als	2,565,533	39.3	1,007,537	3,114,860	43.3	1,347,007	3,552,715	51.6	1.832,668

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1950, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Tables 6, 10, 11, 34, 38; Census of the Population: 1960, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 7, 32, 34; U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing: 1960, Final Report PHC(1)-40. Table P-1; Census of Population: 1970, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 10, 40, 42.

Concentrations of population of those twenty-five years old and over with four years of high school or more by median family income deciles. Detroit SMSA municipalities > 2.500 Table 10.

Income Quin- Guintile Quintile PopulationFour years school or Mean Percent PopHighest63,15969.7%2256,22746.931,983,22036.14183,33931.9	years high		1960			1970	
tile Quintile Mean Population Percent Pop Highest 63,159 69.7% 2 256,227 46.9 1 3 1,983,220 36.1 7 4 183,339 31.9	ol or more	5 ADE E	Four y school	ears high or more	Lance C	Four y school	ears high or more
Highest 63,159 69.7% 2 256,227 46.9 1 3 1,983,220 36.1 7 4 183,339 31.9	t Population	Quintile Population	Mean Percent	Population	Quintile Population	Mean Percent	Population
2 256,227 46.9 1 3 1,983,220 36.1 7 4 183,339 31.9	44,022	146,890	72.6%	106,642	350,309	80.8%	283,050
3 1,983,220 36.1 7 4 183,339 31.9	120,171	508,923	53.0	269,729	657,716	61.5	404,495
4 183,339 31.9	715,942	265, 183	47.9	127,023	431,607	57.6	248,606
	58,485	1,969,335	37.4	736,531	280,486	52.4	146,975
Lowest 79,588 34.7	27,617	224,529	35.7	80,157	1,832,597	43.9	804,510
Totals 2,565,533 37.6 9	966,237	3,114,860	42.4	1,320,082	3,552,715	53.1	1,887,636
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Tables 6, 10, 11, 34, 38; Census o U.S. Censuses of Population and Ho	eau of the Cen nsus of the Po and Housing: Tables 1	sus, <u>Census</u> pulation: 1 1960, Final	of Popula 960, Vol. Report PH	tion: 1950, 1, Part 24, C(1)-40. Ta	Vol. 2, Par Michigan. ble P-l; <u>Cen</u>	t 22, Mic Tables 7, sus of Po	higan. 32, 34; pulation:

Concentrations of population of those twenty-five years old and over with four years of high Table 11.

Table 12.	Median family income qu	intiles, Detroit	: SMSA municip	alities <u>></u> 2,500, 1	950.
Income	Number of	a o M		standard eviation	00000 00000
Quintile	Municipalities		In Dollars	Coefficient of Variation	a di la di
Highest	7	\$6,506.57	\$410.86	6.32%	\$7,237-\$5,898
2nd	ω	4,497.38	174.39	3.88	4,723- 4,262
3rd	ω	4,071.88	58.51	1.44	4,195- 3,977
4th	ω	3,738.88	123.85	3.31	3,927- 3,532
Lowest	ω	3,277.88	302.17	9.22	3,522- 2,647

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Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, <u>Census of Population: 1950</u>, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michi-gan. Tables 37, 39.

Income	Number of	R I	Stan Devia	dard stion	
Decile	Municipalities		In Dollars o	Coefficient of Variation	канде
Highest	3	\$6,904.67	\$243.80	3.53%	\$7,237-\$6,659
2nd	4	6,208.00	206.96	3.33	6,467- 5,898
3rd	4	4,659.25	38.33	.82	4,723- 4,626
4th	4	4,335.50	83.36	1.92	4,471- 4,262
5th	4	4,113.00	47.97	1.17	4,195- 4,073
6th	4	4,030.75	34.11	.85	4,064- 3,977
7th	4	3,833.00	88.76	2.32	3,927- 3,717
8th	4	3,644.75	71.26	1.96	3,707- 3,532
9th	4	3,485.25	31.09	.89	3,522- 3,436
Lowest	4	3,070.50	309.25	10.72	3,392- 2,647
S. gan. Table:	ource: U.S. Bureau s 37, 39.	of the Census, (Census of Population:	: 1950, Vol. 2	, Part 22, Michi-

Median family income deciles, Detroit SMSA municipalities > 2,500, 1950. Table 13.

Table 14.	Median family income qu	iintiles, Detroit	. SMSA municipal	ities <u>></u> 2,500,	1960.
Income	Number of	M M	Sto Dev	andard iation	
Quintile	Municipalities		In Dollars	Coefficient of Variation	אמבוקס
Highest	11	\$11,840.00	\$2,044.36	17.27%	\$14 , 954-\$8 ,64 8
2nd	12	8,012.25	280.77	3.50	8,492- 7,642
3rd	12	7,304.58	215.58	2.95	7,589- 7,023
4th	12	6,727.41	226.03	3.36	6,948- 6,277
Lowest	11	5,850.18	323.28	5.53	6,242- 5,324
gan. Tabl	Source: U.S. Bureau of es 33, 34; U.S. <u>Censuses</u>	the Census, <u>Cens</u> of Population a	us of Populatio nd Housing: 19	n: 1960, Vol. 60, Final Repor	l. Part 24, Michi- t PHC(1)-40. Table

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Income	Number of	N CON		Standard Deviation		
Decile	Municipalities	неан	In Dollars	Coefficient of Variation	кануе	
Highest	ۍ ا	\$13,814.40	\$ 778.86	56.38%	\$14,954-\$1	2,746
2nd	9	10,194.67	1,095.95	10.75	11,179-	8,648
3rd	9	8,258.00	144.67	1.75	8,492- 8	8,047
4th	9	7,766.50	126.28	1.63	8,036-	7,642
5th	9	7,497.67	108.62	1.45	7,589-	7,340
6th	9	7,111.50	81.19	1.14	7,269-	7,023
7th	9	6,917.83	42.35	.61	6,948- (6,825
8th	9	6,537.00	166.93	2.55	6,749- (6,277
9th	9	6,114.50	77.39	1.27	6,242- (6,011
Lowest	S	5,533.00	195.68	3.54	5,821-	5,324

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Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1960, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michi-Tables 33, 34; U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing: 1960, Final Report PHC(1)-40. Table gan. P-1.

Table 16.	Median family income qu	uintiles, Detroit	: SMSA municipa	lities <u>></u> 2,500, 7	1970.
Income	Number of		νa	tandard sviation	
Quintile	Municipalities		In Dollars	Coefficient of Variation	
Highest	15	\$21,847.73	\$8,235.68	37.70%	\$46,715-\$14,955
2nd	14	13,791.43	388.73	2.82	14,581- 13,342
3rd	14	12,905.07	208.77	1.62	13,251- 12,439
4th	14	11,932.43	299.99	2.51	12,408- 11,523
Lowest	15	10,361.33	840.28	8.11	11,290- 8,718
Tables 41,	Source: U.S. Bureau of 42.	the Census, <u>Cens</u>	us of Populati	on: 1970, Vol.	l, Part 24, Michigan.

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Income	Number of	acoM	Ω Δ	tandard sviation	or action of the second s
Decile	Municipalities		In Dollars	Coefficient of Variation	varige
Highest	ω	\$26,435.75	\$8,995.60	34.03%	\$46,715-\$18,901
2nd	7	16,604.29	1,144.82	6.90	18,141- 14,955
3rd	7	14,102.86	317.88	2.25	14,581- 13,619
4th	7	13,480.00	84.77	.63	13,598- 13,342
5th	7	13,064.57	108.13	.83	13,257- 12,943
6th	7	12,745.57	156.84	1.23	12,933- 12,439
7th	7	12,204.00	124.68	1.17	12,408- 11,977
8th	7	11,660.86	130.13	1.12	11,878- 11,523
9th	7	11,188.14	137.53	1.23	11,290- 10,863
Lowest	8	9,637.88	431.01	4.47	10,123- 8,718

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, <u>Census of the Population: 1970</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michi-gan. Tables 41, 42.

			1950	
Income Quintile		D	itandard eviation	
	Mean	In Percent	Coefficient of Variation	Range
Highest	14.7%	5.39%	36.67%	6.9%-22.1%
2nd	9.5	2.20	23.16	6.1 -11.9
3rd	14.7	4.85	32.99	8.2 -22.2
4th	16.1	4.54	28.20	10.3 -23.0
Lowest	25.8	5.65	21.90	19.5 -36.1

Table 18. Percent of families^{*} with annual incomes less than poverty level^{**}, Detroit SMSA municipalities > 2,500, by census year and income quintiles.

***See Table 1 - note.

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, <u>Census of Population: 1950</u>, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Table 11; <u>Census of Population: 1960</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 33, 34; <u>Census of Population: 1970</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 41, 42.

		1960				1970	
	C	Standard Deviation			C	Standard Deviation	
Mean	In Percent	Coefficient of Variation	Range	Mean	In Percent	Coefficient of Variation	Range
5.8%	1.69%	29.14%	2.3%- 8.4%	1.8%	.87%	48.33%	0.7%- 3.9%
6.6	1.89	28.64	3.5 -10.2	2.9	.80	27.59	2.0 - 4.9
6.8	1.95	28.68	3.5 -10.5	3.2	.93	29.06	1.2 - 5.1
11.5	4.12	35.83	7.4 -21.0	3.8	1.57	41.32	0.6 - 6.4
18.2	3.73	20.50	11.0 -24.2	8.3	3.01	36.27	4.3 -12.8
			1950				
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Income Decile		S D	tandard eviation				
	Mean	In Percent	Coefficient of Variation	Range			
Highest	12.9%	4.3%	33.33%	8.4%-18.7%			
2nd	16.1	5.71	35.47	6.9 -22.1			
3rd	9.2	2.37	25.76	6.1 -11.9			
4th	9.9	1.95	19.70	7.8 -11.9			
5th	11.1	2.68	24.14	8.2 -14.4			
6th	18.2	3.79	20.82	14.0 -22.2			
7th	12.7	2.43	19.13	10.3 -16.7			
8th	19.5	3.44	17.64	14.0 -23.0			
9th	23.4	3.45	14.74	19.5 -28.4			
Lowest	21.1	6.38	22.71	20.6 -36.1			

Table 19.	Percent of families $*$ with annual incomes less than poverty level $*$ Detroit SMSA municipalities $\geq 2,500$, by census year and income deciles

***See Table 1 - note.

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, <u>Census of Population: 1950</u>, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Table 11; <u>Census of Population: 1960</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 33, 34; <u>Census of Population: 1970</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 41, 42.

		1960				1970	
	S [.] De	tandard viation			S De	tandard viation	
Mean	In Percent	Coefficient of Variation	Range	Mean	In Percent	Coefficient of Variation	Range
5.8%	2.11%	36. 38%	2.3%- 7.9%	1.3%	.42%	32.31%	0.7%- 2.1%
5.9	1.23	20.85	4.5 - 8.4	2.4	.84	35.00	1.2 - 3.9
5.8	1.47	25.35	3.5 - 8.3	2.5	.42	16.80	2.0 - 3.2
7.5	1.89	25.20	5.6 -10.2	3.2	.95	29.69	2.3 - 4.9
6.7	2.42	36.12	3.5 -10.5	3.1	.89	28.71	1.2 - 3.9
6.9	1.30	18.84	5.3 - 9.1	3.4	.95	27.94	2.0 - 5.1
10.7	3.91	36.54	7.4 -19.0	3.7	1.31	35.41	2.5 - 5.9
12.3	4.17	33.90	7.8 -21.0	3.9	1.80	46.15	0.6 - 6.4
15.6	2.65	16.99	11.0 -20.1	6.1	1.32	21.64	4.3 - 8.4
21.3	2.00	9.39	18.8 -24.2	10.3	2.66	25.83	5.8 -14.5

			1950	
Income Decile		[Standard Deviation	
	Mean	In Years	Coefficient of Variation	Range
Highest	12.9%	.08	0.62%	13.0%-12.8%
2nd	12.6	.17	1.35	12.8 -12.4
3rd	11.7	.49	4.19	12.2 -11.1
4th	11.1	.75	6. 76	12.1 -10.1
5th	10.2	.58	5.69	11.2 - 9.8
6th	10.6	.44	4.15	11.1 - 9.9
7th	10.2	.68	6.67	11.3 - 9.5
8th	9.9	1.10	11.11	11.5 - 8.4
9th	9.8	.93	9.49	11.2 - 8.9
Lowest	10.6	.96	9.06	11.6 - 9.0

Table 20. Median school years completed for those twenty-five years old and over, Detroit SMSA municipalities \geq 2,500 by census year and income deciles.

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, <u>Census of Population: 1950</u>, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Table 11; <u>Census of Population: 1960</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 32, 34; <u>Census of Population: 1970</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 40, 42.

		1960				1970	
	D	Standard Neviation				Standard Deviation	
Mean	In Years	Coefficient of Variation	Range	Mean	In Years	Coefficient of Variation	Range
13.0%	.08	0.62%	13.1%-12.9%	14.1%	.62	4.40%	15.1%-12.9%
12.7	.31	2.44	13.3 -12.4	12.9	.50	3.88	14.1 -12.5
12.2	.10	0.82	12.3 -12.0	12.4	.14 .	1.13	12.6 -12.2
11.9	.49	4.12	12.2 -10.8	12.2	.04	0.33	12.2 -12.1
12.0	.21	1.75	12.2 -11.6	12.2	.23	1.89	12.5 -11.7
11.3	.51	4.51	12.2 -10.5	12.2	.13	1.07	12.4 -12.0
10.7	.53	4.95	11.3 -10.0	12.0	.38	3.17	12.5 -11.2
10.3	. 50	4.85	10.8 - 9.7	11.9	.40	3.36	12.3 -11.0
10.8	.79	7.32	11.8 - 9.7	11.5	.50	4.35	12.2 -10.7
9.6	.89	9.27	10.9 - 8.7	10.8	.91	8.43	12.2 - 9.5

Table 21. Median school years completed for those twenty-five years old and over, Detroit SMSA municipalities \geq 2,500, by census year and income quintiles.

Income Quintile		C	1950 Standard Deviation	
	Mean	In Years	Coefficient of Variation	Range
Highest	12.7%	.22	1.73%	13.0%-12.4%
2nd	11.4	.71	6.23	12.2 -10.1
3rd	10.4	. 55	5.29	11.2 - 9.8
4th	10.0	.93	9.30	11.5 - 8.4
Lowest	10.2	1.03	10.10	11.2 - 8.9

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, <u>Census of Population: 1950</u>, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Table 11; <u>Census of Population: 1960</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 32, 34; <u>Census of Population: 1970</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 40, 42.

					1970	
D	Standard eviation				Standard Deviation	
In Years	Coefficient of Variation	Range	Mean	In Years	Coefficient of Variation	Range
.26	2.03%	13.1%-12.4%	13.6%	.81	5.96%	15.1%-12.5%
.38	3.17	12.3 -10.8	12.3	.14	1.14	12.6 -12.1
.51	4.40	12.2 -10.5	12.2	.19	1.56	12.5 -11.7
.55	5.24	11.3 - 9.7	12.0	.39	3.25	12.5 -11.0
1.02	9. 90	11.4 - 8.7	11.2	.81	7.23	12.2 - 9.5
	In Years .26 .38 .51 .55 1.02	In Years Coefficient of Variation .26 2.03% .38 3.17 .51 4.40 .55 5.24 1.02 9.90	In YearsCoefficient of VariationRange.262.03%13.1%-12.4%.383.1712.3 -10.8.514.4012.2 -10.5.555.2411.3 - 9.71.029.9011.4 - 8.7	In Years Coefficient of Variation Range Mean .26 2.03% 13.1%-12.4% 13.6% .38 3.17 12.3 -10.8 12.3 .51 4.40 12.2 -10.5 12.2 .55 5.24 11.3 - 9.7 12.0 1.02 9.90 11.4 - 8.7 11.2	In Years Coefficient of Variation Range Mean In Years .26 2.03% 13.1%-12.4% 13.6% .81 .38 3.17 12.3 -10.8 12.3 .14 .51 4.40 12.2 -10.5 12.2 .19 .55 5.24 11.3 - 9.7 12.0 .39 1.02 9.90 11.4 - 8.7 11.2 .81	In Years Coefficient of Variation Range Mean In Years Coefficient of Variation .26 2.03% 13.1%-12.4% 13.6% .81 5.96% .38 3.17 12.3 -10.8 12.3 .14 1.14 .51 4.40 12.2 -10.5 12.2 .19 1.56 .55 5.24 11.3 - 9.7 12.0 .39 3.25 1.02 9.90 11.4 - 8.7 11.2 .81 7.23

			1950	
Income Decile		S De	tandard eviation	
	Mean	In Percent	Coefficient of Variation	Range
Highest	73.9%	2.78%	3.76%	77.3%-70.5%
2nd	66.6	3.76	5.65	72.3 -62.9
3rd	50.1	8.05	16.07	60.0 -41.1
4th	43.8	8.98	20.50	52 .6 -31.4
5th	33.8	5.47	16.18	43.2 -29.7
6th	38.3	3.40	8.88	41.8 -33.6
7th	32.4	6.73	20.77	43.4 -26.4
8th	31.5	8.70	27.62	45.3 -21.3
9th	31.8	7.98	25.09	43.0 -22.8
Lowest	37.6	7.48	19.89	44.9 -25.3

Table 22. Percent completed four years high school or more for those twentyfive years old and over, Detroit SMSA municipalities \geq 2,500, by census year and income deciles.

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, <u>Census of Population: 1950</u>, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Tables 34, 38; <u>Census of Population: 1960</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 32, 34; <u>Census of Population: 1970</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 40, 42.

		<u>1960</u>				<u>1970</u>		
	De	viation			De	viation		
Mean	In Percent	Coefficient of Variation	Range	Mean	In Percent	Coefficient of Variation	Range	
76.4%	1.65%	2.16%	79.0%-74.4%	85.2%	3.51%	4.12%	91.3%-79.3%	
69.5	4.82	6.94	79.2 -65.3	75.7	4.96	6.55	85.4 -69.7	
55.2	3.50	6.34	60.1 -52.3	65.0	3.62	5.57	69.4 -59.4	
50.7	5.58	11.01	55.6 -38.6	58.0	1.67	2.88	59 .9 -54. 7	
51.5	3.67	7.13	54.6 -47.0	57.3	6.11	10.66	65.6 -53.1	
44.3	5.83	13.16	55.7 -36.4	58.0	5.65	9.74	68.0 -49.9	
39.0	4.03	10.33	44.8 -34.4	53.1	7.50	14.12	68.0 -42.9	
35.7	6.14	17.20	93.9 -27.7	51.7	5.51	10.66	62.1 -42.1	
40.0	7.24	18.10	48.2 -28.7	46.9	6.27	13.37	57.0 -37.4	
30.6	7.77	25.39	41.4 -22.8	41.3	9.59	23.22	57.0 -29.5	

Table 23. Percent completed four years high school or more for those twentyfive years old and over, Detroit SMSA municipalities \geq 2,500, by census year and income quintiles.

			1950		
Income Quintiles		S De	tandard viation		
	Mean	In Percent	Coefficient of Variation	Range	
Highest	69.7%	4.93%	7.07%	77.3%-62.9%	
2nd	46.9	9. 08	19.36	60.0 -31.4	
3rd	36.1	5.08	14.07	43.2 -29.7	
4th	31.9	7.79	24.42	45.3 -21.3	
Lowest	34.7	8.26	23.80	44.9 -22.8	

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, <u>Census of Population: 1950</u>, Vol. 2, Part 22, Michigan. Tables 34, 38; <u>Census of Population: 1960</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 32, 34; <u>Census of Population: 1970</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 40, 42.

<u></u>		1960				1970	
	St De	andard viation			St Dev	andard viation	
Mean	In Percent	Coefficient of Variation	Range	Mean	In Percent	Coefficient of Variation	Range
72.6%	5.09%	7.01%	79.2%-65.3%	80.8%	6.38%	7.90%	91.3%-69.7%
53.0	5.17	9.76	60.1 -38.6	61.5	4.51	7.33	69.4 -54 .7
47.9	6.06	12.65	55.7 -36.4	57.6	5.89	10.23	68.0 -47.7
37.4	5.45	14.57	44.8 -29.1	52.4	6.62	12.63	68.0 -42.1
35.7	8.84	24.76	48.2 -22.8	43.9	8.67	19.75	57.0 -29.5

Table	24. Median f and 1970 criteria	amily inco populatio	ome and perconcervises.	cent of fam Detroit Sn	ilies be MSA munic	elow poverty cipalities <u>></u>	level** 2,500,	for mun by census	icipalities n s year and in	ew to 1960 clusion
				Median Fam	ily Incor	٩	Percent	Familie	s Below Pover	ty Level
Census	Ном Вадаа	Number of Municipal	f li-	Stan Devi	idard ation			St Dev	andard viation	
		ties	Mean	in Co Dollars o	oefficier f Variati	it ion Range	Mean	In Percent	Coefficient of Variation	Range
	Population 2,500	6	\$ 7,057.78	\$ 791.96	11.22%	\$8,648-\$5,82	1 9.9%	5.86%	59.19%	5.5%-21.0%
1960	New incor- porations	10	8,681.30	3,034.15	34.95	14,954- 6,08	30 7.8	3.58	45.90	2.3 -14.9
	Both	19	7,912.26	2,408.22	30.44	14,954- 5,82	21 8.7	4.9]	56.44	2.3 -21.0
	Detroit SMSA	58	7,915.91	2,224.90	28.11	14,954- 5,32	24 9.7	5.40	55.67	2.3 -24.2
_	<pre>Population 2,500</pre>	6	20,082.78	12,276.61	61.13	46,715-10,12	23 2.4	1.87	77.92	0.7 - 7.0
1970	New incor- porations	9	12,785.17	893.37	7.03	13,793-11,26	58 3.9	1.54	39.49	2.3 - 6.9
	Both	15	17,163.73	10,175.12	59.28	46,715-10,12	23 3.0	1.89	63.00	0.7 - 7.0
	Detroit SMSA	72	14,221.40	5,562.88	39.12	46,715- 8,71	8 4.0	2.84	71.00	0.7 -14.5
	- E 3+++									

***See Table l - note.

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, <u>Census of the Population: 1960</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 33, 34; U.S. Censuses of Population and Housing: 1960, Final Report PHC(1)-40. Table P-1; <u>Census of Population: 1970</u>, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 41, 42.

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ore [*] for municipalities 00, by census year and	ith four years 1001 or More	ndard ation	Coefficient of Variation Range	19.10% 67.6%-36.2%	28.05 79.0 -28.7	24.97 79.0 -28.7	29.51 79.0 -22.8	23.02 91.3 -49.0	11.95 65.2 -46.4	22.26 91.3 -46.4	23.81 91.3 -30.9
school or the school of the second s	Percent w High Sc	St Dev	In Percent	9.09%	14.56	12.46	14.49	15.40	6.61	13.87	14.12
high s icipali			Mean	47.6%	51.9	49.9	49.1	6.9	55.3	62.3	59.3
four years t SMSA muni			Range	2.5%-10.5%	2.9 - 9.7	Both 19 11.6 0.81 6.98 12.9 9.7 49.9 12.46 24.97 79.0 -28.7 Detroit 58 11.4 1.12 9.83 13.1 8.7 49.1 14.49 29.51 79.0 -28.7 Population 9 13.0 1.18 9.08 15.1 -11.9 66.9 15.40 23.02 91.3 -49.0 Population 9 13.0 1.18 9.08 15.1 -11.9 66.9 15.40 23.02 91.3 -49.0 New Incor- 6 12.1 0.29 2.40 12.4 11.5 55.3 6.61 11.95 65.2 -46.4 Both 15 12.6 1.02 8.10 15.1 -11.5 62.3 13.87 22.26 91.3 -46.4 Detroit 72 12.6 1.02 8.10 15.1 -11.5 65.2 31.3 14.12 23.81 91.3 -46.4 SMSA 72 12.2 0.96 7.87 15.1 -9.5 59.3	5.1 - 9.5				
oercent with f suses, Detroit	an School Completed	andard Tation	oefficient f Variation	6.14%	7.52 1	6.98 1	9.83 1	9.08	2.40 1	8.10 1	7.87 1
f and p ion cens	Medi Years	Sti Dev	In C 'ears o	0.70	0.88	0.81	1.12	1.18	0.29	1.02	0.96
. Median school years completed new to 1960 and 1970 populati inclusion criteria.			Mean Y	11.4%	11.7	11.6	11.4	13.0	12.1	12.6	12.2
	Number of Municipali- ties			6	10	19	58	б	9	15	72
	How Added			Population > 2,500	New Incor- porations	Both	Detroit SMSA	Population > 2,500	New Incor- porations	Both	Detroit SMSA
Table 25		Census Year			1960			1970 1970			

Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1960, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 32, 34; Census of Population: 1970, Vol. 1, Part 24, Michigan. Tables 41, 42.

*For those twenty-five years old and over.

ENDNOTES

ENDNOTES

1. Richard Sennett (1970) has written on the internal contradictions between the press for status homogeneity and cultural diversity in the urban setting. His book deals with these issues from a basically social-psychological rather than a structural standpoint, however.

2. Weber writes on three possible sources for the derivation of status groups: (1) there are class (economic) differences in lifestyle; (2) there are party differences and (3) there are cultural differences stemming from cultural conditions or institutions (1968:926-939). The notion of status groups is more basic than that of class because the concept of classes came into use with capitalism and property relations in industrial society. Status groups are used in this paper as an ideal type, an abstraction not existing in pure form in society but as a heuristic device for the purposes of comparison and explication.

3. There are distinct benefits which derive from the clustering of status groups and status homogeneity, especially if the group is affluent. It is another example of the "accumulation of advantages" (Mills, 1956:111). Various commercial establishments follow the wealthy as they establish new class and status homogeneous enclaves in the metropolis.

4. While fringe and suburb are used interchangeably in this study, suburb is to some degree the preferred term. Fringe has the connotation of mixed rural and urban land use while that part of the city that is not central is comprised of both the suburbs and urban fringe. Suburb generally refers to residential or mixed residential and industrial use.

5. It is important to note at this point that in older U.S. cities SES differences typically favor the suburbs at the expense of the older central city. In newer, smaller cities Schnore and others have found the reverse situation. The central city is higher in SES measures and it is the suburbs which have the less well-to-do with corresponding sentiments toward annexation and other issues as their central city counterparts in older areas. In either case, focus on per se social distance is at issue and how it is influenced by governmental fragmentation.

6. As new clean industry is sought by suburbs for tax advantages those who are excluded from residence in the area on class or status grounds incur higher transportation costs to get to work. These costs may become so high or transportation so difficult without a car that the jobs may become unavailable for these people. It is the affluent who are served by the freeways which lead from the city to the suburbs because it is they who can afford the expense of an automobile (or several for a family). The poor who cannot support a car then have little access to jobs which result from the decentralization of manufacturing. With nearly no redundancy in transportation systems in American cities, i.e. there is a predominant dependency on the private

car, alternative transit costs, if, indeed, other forms are available, can be high enough to deter the poor central city resident from trying to reach work in these new plants. This leaves a surplus labor pool bound to the center city available for the secondary labor market (see Priore, 1971:90-94 and Baron and Hymer, 1971:94-101 for a basic explanation of the secondary labor market).

7. See also Fantini, et al., 1970:216 for reference to the transmission of the dominant status culture as "political socialization" whereby the educational system instills attitudes and values important allegiance to the status quo. Also two empirical studies (Gans, 1969: 197; Vidich and Bensman, 1969) present evidence of the status culture transmitting function of the public schools. Schrag speaks to the notion of learning an inferior set of roles and behavior for black children and the selection mechanism for recruiting new elite members of organizations (1969:315).

8. This exclusion device can be used to segregate by race (as it most often is) but can work among suburbs in favor of the central city if that is where more profit can be gained. While the division here is between the central city and the suburbs for the purposes of the present study, it could take many configurations.

9. Dye suggests eight positive functions of decentralized suburban political structure specialization which act by their cohesive capacity to integrate status groups in communities (Dye, 1967:451-453). Briefly these are: (1) a source of social identification; (2) social scale is reduced and hence alienation; (3) institutional protection from status undesirables; (4) an opportunity for public catharsis to

reduce frustration; (5) permits more elites to hold power; (6) more opportunity for public participation; (7) insures more control by public contact (less remote); (8) allows minorities to influence policy through own control.

10. Under normal patterns, Scott found, proposals leave the general public indifferent and unless they are major changes will be approved by voter referenda (Scott, 1971).

The term life-style in this study refers to a mode of living 11. of status groups who share a common set of beliefs and values and who thereby engage in similar patterns of behavior. For status groups life-style is a device by which judgements are made for both inclusion and exclusion in the group, assuming there is some degree of congruence between the group's espoused values and actual behavior. Life-style by itself is not a sufficient description of differences among groups to measure inequality accurately. However, the term does indicate differential choices which members of social classes make about critical life chances, especially educational choices for their children. In this study the empirical reference to life-style is specifically the education variables, i.e. median number of school years completed and percent of those completing four years of high school or more. A more general use of the term life-style is a shorthand expression for a more complex social fact of which educational achievement is but one indicator. Other indicated social values, beliefs and behaviors range from, for example, ideas about child rearing, religious practices and involvement in civic life to grooming, dress and other matters of what is commonly referred to as "taste."

12. For 1950 the data included both families and unrelated individuals. For 1960 and 1970 the percent of families below poverty level was for families only. These data also use income cutoffs of \$2,000 for 1950, \$3,000 for 1960 and "poverty level" for 1970. These families are referred to as "poor" families or below "poverty level" in the text regardless of census year cutoff. See Appendix B for details on these income cutoffs.

13. In 1950 the Bureau of the Census first used "Standard Metropolitan Area" to enable the uniform presentation of a wide variety of statistical data. It "is a county or group of contiguous counties which contains at least one city of 50,000 inhabitants or more" (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1950: Part 22, xv). For 1960 and 1970, this was changed to "Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area." The Bureau of the Census recognized 243 SMSAs in the United States and four in Puerto Rico, making a total of 247 in the 1970 census."

Except in the New England states, a SMSA is a county or group of contiguous counties which contains at least one city of 50,000 inhabitants or more, or "twin cities" with a combined population of at least 50,000. In addition to the county, or counties, containing such a city or cities, contiguous counties are included in an SMSA if, according to certain criteria, they are socially and economically integrated with the central city. In a few SMSAs, where portions of counties outside the SMSA as defined in 1967 were annexed to the central city, the population living in those counties is not considered part of the SMSA or the central city. In the New England states, SMSAs consist of towns and cities instead of counties. Each SMSA must include at least one central city and the complete title of an SMSA identifies the central city or cities (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973:App 6).

14. See tables for details on exact data sources from census materials.

15. Only one municipality dropped out of the census list of municipalities. Lathrup Village experienced a 59.8 percent population decrease from 1960 to 1970, putting it below the population threshold of 2,500 used by the Census Bureau to include municipalities in the SMSA.

16. The standard deviation results from squaring the deviations from the mean of a frequency distribution and finding the square root of that figure. Alker and Russett (1966:356-357) cite two shortcomings of standard deviation. It is not readily comprehended by those unfamiliar with statistical methods and its size may vary with some extreme values in a frequency distribution having a distorting effect.

17. The data were ranked according to income because income is the single most central element in the provision of life chances. From income stems all the other avenues of access to goods and services which enhance style of life in a capitalist economy. Income as an empirical variable has the advantage of being readily understood and distribution of the population by income groups clearly points out the equality or lack of equality in wealth. It must be recognized that there is a two-way relationship between education and income. While education is an avenue of mobility and opportunity, though, it is largely an effect of income and not a cause (see Kolko, 1962:113ff). Education is crucial to maintaining style of life in many other respects, however, because it is so important in establishing a "world view," and in informing of matters of "taste," e.g. styles of dress and speech, topics of conversation and other social status indicators. Income remains the primary determinant of style of life in the end, though,

because it provides the potential to realize aspirations vis à vis life-style.

18. There were fifteen new municipalities for 1970, not fourteen as indicated by the numerical increase from fifty-eight in 1960 to seventy-two in 1970 (see endnote 14).

19. Percentage changes are computed using the formula $100(N_2-N_1/N_1) = percentage$ change (Zelditch, 1959:131). Where comparisons or contrasts are made of finding the simple difference between two percentage figures by subtraction the phrase "percentage points" or "points" is used.

20. New municipalities are designated in Tables 2 and 3 and categorized as to whether they have previously incorporated and passed the population threshold of 2,500 or are new incorporations.

21. For 1970 the Census Bureau reported that 73.5 percent of the United States population resided in SMSAs. There were 3,393 urban places of 2,500 population or more in SMSAs (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1973:vi, Part 1, Table 3). If the case of Detroit is indicative of a nationwide pattern, it points to the need for further research regarding the extent of class and status stratification and the growth of inequality in the United States.

22. This figure of 31.1 percent is based on a computation using an annual average over the years of the decade. It was made available through the Information Division of the Bureau of Labor Statistics by telephone, April 23, 1974.

23. [Down's note]: *Real Estate Research Corporation, unpublished report to the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (Chicago, 1968).

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