'FHE WILLIAMScCAVANAGE-i PREMARY:
TWO DETROIT NEWS‘PAPERS' REPQRT ON
THE CANDIDATES.‘ VEETNAM STATEMENFS

fluent: for flu Dawn of M. A.
EEICHLGAN STATE UNEVERSETY

Glenn Theodore Job
1968

ABSTRACT

THE WILLIAMS-CAVANAGH PRIMARY: TWO DETROIT NEWSPAPERS'
REPORT ON THE CANDIDATES' VIETNAM STATEMENTS

by Glenn Theodore Job

The Michigan Democratic senatorial primary election
in 1966 had two prominent candidates in opposition to each
other. The candidates were 0. Hannah Williams, a former
six-tern governor of Michigan, and Detroit Mayor Jerome P.
Cavanagh, a young mayor who had won national recognition
with his administration in the city of Detroit.

The campaign between Williams and Cavanagh took
place at a time when the United States was expanding its
military commitment to protect South Vietnam, which had
become involved in a war. The war. which had its origins
in part in guerrilla uprisings against the government, had
expanded to a point where the administration of President
Johnson ordered more than 200,000 American soldiers to
Southeast Asia. willians, a former Assistant Secretary
of State for African Affairs in the Johnson administration,
generally supported 0.3. involvement in the war. Cavanagh
opposed it. Both candidates issued carefully prepared
papers on their positions.

This study is concerned with the position papers
issued by the two candidates, and how they were reported

Glenn Theodore Job

by the Detroit News and the Detroit Free Press. The study
also points up the editorial response to the position papers.

This is not an all inclusive study of the press
coverage of the Williams~Cavanagh primary election, nor
has any attempt been made to place in perspective the cov-
erage of the election by the Eggs and the Free Press. Only
one point was under consideration: How well did the £223
and Free Press discharge their obligations as newspapers
in a free society with reference to the Vietnam statements
issued by the two candidates?

The results are based on an examination of docu-
ments, newspapers, and interviews with the leading figures
who were involved in the campaign. The research suggests
that the Egg; and the Free Press were deficient in their

responsibilities as newspapers in a free society.

‘
..J-

(1",

THE WILLIAMS-CAVANAGH PRIMARY: TWO DETROIT NEHSPAPERS'

REPORT ON THE CANDIDATES' VIETNAM STATfiMENTS

BY

Glenn Theodore Job

A THESIS

Submitted to
nichigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

School of Journalism

1968

Copyright by
GLENN THEODORE JOB

1968

Accepted by the faculty of the School of Journalism,
College of Communication Arts, Hichigan State University,
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master

W, (2111mm 7W5

blrector o?_Thes1s

of Arts degree.

 

 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the assistance of G. Mennen
willians and Jerome P. Cavanagh; Prank Sanger, chairman
of the School of Journalism, and Dr. w. cameron Meyers,

associate professor in the School of Journalism; my wife

Betty.

iv

I.
II.

III.

IV.
V.
VI.
VII.

VIII.

ACK.'C'-.JL
INTRODUCTION.
WILLIAMS AND CAVANAGH IN
PRESSURES

CAMPAIGN TECHNIQUE
COMMUNICATION .

DETROIT:
THE VIETNAM ISSUE DEVELOPS.
CAVANAGH'S VIETNAM STATEMENT:
WILLIAMS'

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

APPENDIXES

2!: Q "3 ('1 U 0 (D
O

BIBLIOGRAPHY

TABLE OF CCNTE

BUILD FOR A PRIYARY

VIETNAM STATEHENT:

HTS

3?an yr:

HMIJ. use 0 e e e

OBJECTIVES AND

FOCAL POINT FOR CCMHUNICATICN . . .

PRESS REPORTS.

PRESS REPORTS .

Page
iv

10
27

36
53
61
70
87
99

108
123
136
139
143
146
149
152
154

INTRODUCTION

The growing commitment of the United States to an
undeclared war in Vietnam; during 1965 and 1966 divided
the American people. One of the first important electoral
tests of this issue occurred in the Michigan Democratic
senatorial primary election on August 2, 1966, between
G. Mennen Williams, former six-term governor, and Jerome P.
Cavanagh, mayor of the city of Detroit. Williams had re-
signed his position as 0.8. Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs to run for his party's nomination to
the United States Senate: he favored a firm stand by the
United States in Vietnam. Cavanagh, who had attracted
national attention with his accomplishments as mayor of
Detroit, was unequivocally opposed to a larger investment
of United States military resources in Vietnam. He con-
tended that the United States had an outdated foreign
policy that was not in tune with the turn of events.

The debate over Vietnam, both in Michigan and

across the nation, reached new shades of bitterness and

 

1Chinese ideographs were used to write the Viet-
namese language for many centuries. In the Romanisation
of the Vietnamese language, the spelling of Vietnam has
not always been uniform. Common spellings today are
Vietnam, Viet-Nam, VietNam, and Viet Nam.

anger as the American peeple became increasingly aware of
the war and its ramifications. American soldiers had been
in Vietnam for fifteen years. They were there in compara-
tively small numbers and in an advisory capacity until
guerrilla war began drawing forces of division strength,
air power, and sea power into battle.

One of the early events that led to the United
States involvement occurred on May 24, 1950, when the
Truman administration announced that it would provide
military and economic aid to the Associated States of

1 The Associated States referred

Indochina and France.
to in the announcement were Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia;
these countries composed the French Indochina colonial
empire. In 1950, the French were deeply involved in a
guerrilla war to preserve their influence in Indochina.
when war erupted in Korea in June of 1950, Presi-
dent Harry Truman announced he was also sending a military
mission (of thirty-five men) to Vietnam. The mission com-
prised advisers who were to instruct the French and indig-
enous forces in the use of American military weapons that
were going to be supplied for use against Ho Chi Hinh and

his Viet Minh guerrillas.2 Other United States assistance

 

10.5., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Re-
lations, Background Information Relating_to Southeast Asia
and Vietnam‘IRevised hdition), 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,“196§,
p. 220

zLester A. Sobel (ed.), South Vietnam: U.S.-Com-
munist Confrontation in Southeast Asi§"l§£l«§§fiuew York:
FCCts on Fil‘. 1:16., 1965). De 3e

agreements were concluded with Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam
on December 23, 1950.1

A Korean truce agreement was signed on July 27,
1953, ending the fighting in Korea. Less than a year later,
on May 7, 1954, the French army was dramatically defeated
at Dienbienphu, and their time as a major power in south-
east Asia was over.

A peace conference was convened at Geneva, Switzer-
land, with the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet So-
cialist Repunlics as Joint co-cnairmen. other nations at
the peace conference were the United States, France, Can-
bodia, Laos, and the People's Republic of China. The na-
tion of Vietnam was partitioned at the peace conference.
Representatives of what eventually became North Vietnam
(Democratic Republic of Vietnam), and South Vietnam (State
of Vietnam, later the Republic of Vietnam) were also at
the Geneva meetings.

The dividing line of Vietnam was the Seventeenth
Parallel. The territory north of the parallel was placed
under the leaderShip of Ho Chi Minn, a communist revolu-
tionary who had led the struggle against the French; for-
mer Emperor Bao Dai, an ineffective figurenead who was
subsequently removed, was placed at the head of the gov-
ernment in the south.

The United States had provided $1.2 billion in aid

 

1Sobei, p. 3.

4

1 After the

to help the French in their war in Indochina.
French defeat at Dienbienphu, the United States government
continued its assistance program. On October 23, 1954,
President Eisenhower sent a message to the South Vietnamese
saying the United States was exploring ways to help then
build a strong government that would "discourage any who
might wish to impose a foreign ideology" on South Vietnam.2
About two months later, President Eisenhower made direct
offers of assistance to the South Vietnamese for their
armed forces on the basis of the agreenents that had been
made in 1950.3 On February 12, 1955, United States .111-
tary advisers accepted the responsibility of training the
South Vietnamese armed forces.4

Between 1955 and 1962, United States aid to the
Vietnamese totaled two billion dollars.5

The South Vietnamese were no match for the guer-
rilla movement that emerged late in the 1950's to challenge
the government. Although the South Vietnamese could not

suppress the guerrillas, the role of the United States

 

10.3., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Re.
lations, Vietnam and Southeast Asia, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.,

1963, p. $2

2U.S., Background Information Relating to Southeast
Asia and Vietnag, 3.

31bid., 22.

w

4Ibid., 2.

5U.S., Vietnam and Southeast Asia, 3.

renained largely advisory on the surface. In 1964, there
were 23,000 United States nilitary advisers in South Viet-
nan.

A significant event occurred August 2, 1964, alter-
ing the posture of the United States in Vietnam. The United
States Navy destroyer "Maddox" and torpedo boats from the
North Vietnamese navy fought an engagement in the Gulf of
Tonkin off the coast of North Vietnam. The administration
of President Lyndon B. Johnson contended the North Vietnam~
ese attacked without provocation.

After the battle, the Congress of the United States
overwhelmingly adopted a resolution giving President Johnson
approval to repel further attacks on 0.3. nilitary forces

1

in the area, and to stop aggression. The Tonkin resolu-

tion was the basis for a military buildup that eventually
moved the United States toward the third largest war in
its history. One year after the Tankin naval battle, U.S.
forces in the Vietnam theater of operations totaled 75,000,
and the President indicated the number would be raised to

2

125,000. As Williams and Mayor Cavanagh went through pre-

campaign maneuverings in March of 1966, the United States

had raised its troop strength to 215,000.3

 

1New York Times, Aug. 8, 1964, p. 1.

21bid., July 29, 1965, p. 1.

31bid., March 3, 1966, p. 1.

The military buildup was accompanied by correspond-
ingly heavier draft quotas. There were battle casualties:
in 1964, American war deaths in Vietnam had totaled 146;1
the following year, more than 1,350 Americans had been

killed.2

war Reaction

The commitment by the Johnson administration to
Vietnam was opposed in the form of teach-ins (gatherings
on college and university campuses where speakers argued
against the war), draft card burnings, public marches and
student sit-ins; attempts were also made by anti—Vietnam
demonstrators to obstruct the movement of United States
military forces. The United States Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, led by influential senators who were
hostile to the Vietnam policies of President Johnson, re-
ceived 20,000 letters and telegrams after conducting tele-
vised hearings on the war issue in February of 1966.3

The growing intensity of the Vietnam debate could
not be ignored by Williams and Cavanagh in their campaign

for the Democratic Senate nomination. The war formed the

backdrop for many courses of action in the economic,

 

1State News (Michigan State University), Feb. 21,
1968, p. 4.

2New York Times, Jan. 2, 1966, p. 22.

Bailliam Fulbright, ”Introduction," The Vietnam
Hearings (New York: Random House, 1966), n.p.

 

political, and social life of the nation. Both candidates,
sensing the importance of the Vietnam question, issued
lengthy, carefully prepared documents stating their posi-
tions on the war.1 These two statements, and the report-
ing of the statements by the two major Detroit daily news-
papers, form the basis of this study.

This study will concentrate on the responses to
the candidates' Vietnam statements by the Detroit News and
the De roit Free Press, two important Opinion leaders among
Michigan's daily newspapers. The Detroit News reported
the largest circulation of any newspaper in Michigan in
1966. Its daily circulation was 684,705, and its Sunday
circulation was 936,410.2 The daily circulation of the
betroit Bree Press was reported $37,203, and the Sunday
circulation was listed as 580,412.3

The importance of the issue, and the significance
of the office of senator to the electorate, placed great
responsibility on the Detroit Nee§_and the Detroit Free
£5333 during the campaign. Their editorial views notwith-
standing, both newspapers had an obligation to provide the

electorate in their circulation areas with information on

 

1The texts of the Vietnam statements by the two
candidates are reproduced in full in the Appendix.

Zbeonard Bray (ed.), Ayer a Sonfs Directory;
Newspapers and Periodicals 1967 (Fhiladelpnias 5. w.
A!“ & 5011, inCo, 1907), p0 5390

31bid., 507.

the Vietnam statements of the two senatorial candidates.
The constitutional guarantee of a free press carries a
concomitant responsibility to infer. the peeple, and to
provide them with infornation that is necessary to help
then govern themselves.1 The American Society of Newspaper
editors adopted a code in 1923 that cites the need for the
press to be responsible, truthful, accurate, and impartial
in its performance.2 The code points out the press:

. . . is not to be excused for lack of thoroughness
or accuracy within its control or failure to obtain
command of these essential qualities. Headlines
should be fully warranted by the contents of the
articles they surmount.

. . . Sound practice makes clear distinction between
news reports and expressions of opinion. News re-
ports should be free from opinion of any kind.3

In a free society, the press has the reaponsibility

4

for the essential function of mass communication. It must

enlighten the people and provide information to service

the political system.5

This study will examine the reporting of the Viet-

nan statement by the Detroit News and the Detroit Free Press

 

1Curtis D. MacDougall, Interpretive Reporting (New
York: Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 27.

2

Ibid., 28.

31bid.

4Theodore Peterson, "The Social Responsibility
Theory of the Press," in Four Theories of the Press,
Fred 5. Siebert, Theodore PétcibUfl, wilour Scnramm (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1956), p. 74.

SIbid.

with emphasis on their reaponsibilities to the electorate
as defined by the American Society of Newspaper Editors
and others. The investigator will attempt to interpret
historical fact, newSpaper accounts, books, records, per~
sonal interviews, and other sources as accurately as his

Judgments will allow.

CHAPTER I
WILLIAMS AND CAVANAGH IN PERSPECTIVE

The state of Michigan, conservative politically,
and rural in tradition and character, was dominated by the
Republican party from the middle of 1850 until the election
of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Democratic party's presiden-
tial nominee, in 1932.1 Between the Roosevelt landslide
victory in the Great Depression and 1948, when G. Mennen
hilliams was elected to his first term as governor, Mich-
igan Democrats were able to elect their gubernatorial non~
inee three times; they could not consolidate their gains
and retain the office for more than one term at a time,
however.

The Michigan Democratic party suffered its worst
defeat in modern history as the nation emerged from world
war II in 1946. Less than one year later, the party's
future took on an even darker hue with the election of

John Franco, a Pontiac paper products businessman with

 

1Robert Lee Sawyer, Jr., The Democratic State
gentral Committee in Michigan,_l943-l§$§z The Rise of
the flow ’olitical Lenderstip ("rue UniverSIty of hichigan
Eovernmental Studies," No. 40; Ann Arbor, Mich.: Insti-
tute of Public Administration, 1960), p. 2.

10

11

1 And the

a questionable reputation, as state chairman.
following year, George Fitzgerald, attorney for the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters of the American Federa-
tion of Labor, was elected Democratic National Committeeman
for Michigan. Fitzgerald's selection was accomplished with
the support of James R. Hoffa, president of Teamster Local
299 in Detroit. Hoffa was physically aggressive, tough

and an uncompromising labor leader. He was attempting to
sieze control of the Michigan Democratic party.2 An im-
portant component of Hoffa's plans rested in his support
of Victor Bucknell, a lawyer from Kalamazoo, who sought

the Democratic nomination for governor in 1948.

As noffa expanded his interest in the Democratic
party, a reform movement, involving G. Mennen Williams and
other Democrats, began drafting a different course for the
party. The reformers were nourished by meetings and dis-
cussions through most of 1947 and in the early part of 1948.
The nucleus of the group included Neil M. Staebler, a wealthy
Ann Arbor businessman whose father had been the area's first
oil and automobile dealer; Attorney Hicks Griffiths and
his wife Eartha, who later was elected to Congress; Csmund

Kelly, postmaster of Flint; John Boeschenstein, a Muskegon

 

1Frank HcNaughton, hennen ailliams of Michigan:
Fighter for Progress (New York: Oceans Publications, Inc.,
1960) g p. 960

2McNaughton, p. 106.

12

1 After laying the groundwork the re-

lawyer; and others.
fore gathered around willians for governor. willians re-
signed an appointive position with the state Liquor Control
Comeission on May 15, 1948, and entered the Democratic
primary race. Williams was thirty—seven years old; he
had no previous experience in elective office. He was
seeking to lead a political party that had a reputation
burdened with defeat, divisiveness, and corruption.

The Congress of Industrial Organizations and Hoffa's
teaasters, growing more powerful with each passing year,
had been fighting jurisdictional and membership battles

2

for years. August Scholle and others in the labor move-

ment in Detroit supported Williams as much for their own

3 Hoffa was

survival as for any other compelling reason.
a serious threat. In the final analysis, the strength from
labor was decisive; xilliams defeated Bucknell on the basis
of a plurality of 12,000 votes in Wayne county, the state
headquarters of the Congress of Industrial Organisations.4
Two months later, Williams was elected governor by upset-

ting Michigan's flamboyant Republican incumbent, Kim Sigler,

who was seeking his second term. Isa other Democratic

 

lthaughton, p. 100.

2Ralph C. James and Estelle Dinerstein James, Hoffa
and the Teamsters: A stufiv of Boise Poss: (Princeton, 5.3.:

‘L

D. Van hostrand Company, Inc., 1965), p. 15.

3P1CNaught0n, pe 150 e

‘1b1d., p. 111.

13

candidates were elected with Williams: John w. Connelly
won the position of lieutenant governor, and Stephen Roth
was elected attorney general.

The uetroit Free Press was critical of the support

williams received from labor. editorially, the Free Press

 

stated an accusation that would be used against milliams
through all of his years as governor:

williams owes his election almost entirely to
organized labor, particularly the Clo, which backed
his campaign. It has been stated that williams
was actually so much the candidate or the C10 that
with his election the capitol of hicnigan would
be moved from Lansing to the Hermann building in
U3 “Oitel

The Political hisg_gf hilli§p§_

 

G. hennen williams offered the Democratic party

some interesting credentials that seemed to be inconsistent
with his liberal leanings. He was born February 23, 1911,

to Mr. and Mrs. henry P. Williams, a wealthy Detroit couple.
Members of the williams family were active Republicans.2
In his youth, Williams attended Salisbury, an exclusive
Episcopalian boarding school in Connecticut. He matricu—
lated at Princeton University as a young man, and was in-
itiated into Phi Beta Kappa fraternity, a select national

society whose members are chosen for excellent scholarship.

Williams was also president of the Young Republican Club

 

1Getroit Free Press, Nov. 5, 1948, p. 6.

 

thNaughton, p. 26.

14

at Princeton.1
After his graduation from Princeton, Williams en-
rolled at the University of Michigan law school. He became
a member of the Order of the Coif, an organization that
selects law students who have shown scholastic excellence.
His interest in the Democratic party grew as he studied law.
When the United States entered world her 11, williams
joined the Navy.. He became an officer, served aboard an
aircraft carrier, and was discharged in 1946, with the rank

of lieutenant commander.

hilliams-Cavanagh Rivalry

When silliams ran for governor in 1948, one of the
obscure campaign workers in the Fifteenth Congressional
District in Detroit was Jerome P. Cavanagh, a twenty-year-
old political science student at the University of Detroit.
He was campaigning for hilliams, and it was his first ven-

2 After he became gov-

ture into Democratic party politics.
ernor, Williams appointed Hugh Mchldrick, chairman of the
Young Democrats of the Fifteenth District, to the position
of director of the Office of Hospital Survey and Construc-

tion. Cavanagh succeeded Mcfioldrick as chairman of the

district's Young Democrats.3 And in 1950, Cavanagh, as

 

1Pich'aughton, p. 26.
2Interview with Jerome P. Cavanegh, hayor, City
of Detroit, Nov. 28, 1967.

3Ibid.

15

chairman, led his Young Democrats into a delegate squabble
in Detroit in opposition to Governor willians.

Chairman Cavanagh joined the side of the Old Line
Democrats and teamsters against Governor Williams support-
ers, which included the labor leaders who had backed him
in 1948, and a group of liberals identified with Americans

1 The diSpute centered on the con~

for Democratic Action.
trol of a number of county and district conventions; the
ultimate goals were the selection of delegates to the state
convention where party candidates were selected. There
were reports of scuffling, pushing, and fisticuffs. When
Nicholas Roth, convention chairman in the Fourteenth Dis—
trict, called the meeting to order with a gavel resembling
a kitchen potato masher, a rumor began that the supporters
of Governor Williams were intimidating delegates with base-

2

ball bats. The convention, which solidified the pre-

eminence of Hilliams in the state Democratic party, became
known as the "ballbat convention."3

The victory for Williams and the liberal wing of
the party was not without a frightful price. So week was

the party after the delegate battle that former Governor

Harry F. Kelley came within 1,154 votes of regaining the

 

1Detroit Free Press, March 20, l9éb, p. 3-A.

 

 

16

1 Williams went to bed

governor's chair from Williams.
election night thinking he had lost. The closeness of

the margin forced a recount which confirmed the re-election
of Governor Williams.

2 as Williams

Cavanagh remained a "face in the crowd"
expanded the influence and direction of the Michigan Demo-
cratic party.

The recount in the Kelley race was the first of
two that Williams had to undergo during his tenure as gov-
ernor. In 1952, a recount was ordered after Williams de-

feated Fred M. Alger, Jr., former Secretary of State, by

8,618 votes.3

Cavnna;b and WaNemara.--United States Senator
Arthur H. Vandenberg, a Republican from Grand Rapids who

had been highly influential in drafting the nation's for-

U)

eign policy, died April 13, l 51. Governor uilliams, ex—
ercising his prerogative of appointment, chose Blair Moody,
a young, handsome, liberal Detroit newspaperman, to fill
the vacancy. Governor Williams and Senator fioody added

a new dimension to Democratic party gatherings as they

campaigned tagether. In his first election test in 1952,

however, Senator Moody was defeated.

 

1Detroit Free Press, Harch 20, 1966, p. 3-A.

2Interview with Cavanagh.

3hichigan, Secretary of State, Fichigan Manual
1953-1954, p. 412.

17

Two years later, Moody entered the Democratic pri-
mary to regain a seat in the Senate. Moody, his support
from Governor Williams notwithstanding, was opposed by
Patrick V. McNamara, an Irish labor leader from Detroit
who had served in many political capacities in his home
area. Cavanagh, a law student at the University of Detroit,
was a member of McNamara's campaign committee.1 He helped
prepare a radio show for McNamara, and he made speeches
on behalf of McNamara's candidacy. Moody died unexpectedly
during the primary campaign, and McNamara, whose primary
nomination was assured with Koody's death, defeated in-
cumbent Homer Ferguson, a Republican, the following November.

hilliams won his fourth consecutive term by defeat-
ing Donald 3. Leonard, former State Police Commissioner,
in 1954.

williams achieved his largest plurality as governor
in 1956 when he defeated his Republican opponent, Albert E.
Cobo, mayor of Detroit, by 290,313.2 He carried Detroit
over mayor Coho by a two to one margin.

In 1958, Williams, who was seeking a sixth two-
year term, defeated Paul D. Eagwell, a professor of speech
at Michigan State University. He became the first poli-

tician in the history of the United States to win six terms

 

1Interview with Cavanagh.

2Michigan, Secretary of State, Eichigan Manual,
1957*1958, p. 421.

18

as governor. His pepularity, which helped other Democratic
party candidates in Michigan, won recognition across the
nation; his name was mentioned as a serious presidential

possibility in 1960.1

ginancial Crisis.-Early in the new term, a finan-
cial crisis overtook state government. Governor Williams
was blamed by Republicans with leading the state to "bank-
ruptcy." The problem was insoluble with Williams, a Demo-
crat, at loggerheads with a legislature that was dominated
by Republicans who were bitterly critical of the changes
the Governor and his party had brought to the political
life of Michigan. The colorful reputation that Williams
had built over a decade was badly soiled, not only in Mich-
igan, but also across the nation, by the conflict. Governor
williams did not seek a seventh term in 1960. He led Niche
igan Democrats to the side of United States Senator John F.
Kennedy of Massachusetts, who was seeking his party's pres-
idential nomination. Kennedy won the nomination and elec-
tion; and Williams was named Assistant Secretary of State

for African Affairs by the new President.

The Political Rise of Cavanagg
Jerome P. Cavanagh was one of eight children born
to Mr. and Mrs. Sylvester J. Cavanagh, an Irish Catholic

couple who resided in the Grand River-Livernois section

 

1thaughton, p. l.

19

in Detroit. Cavanagh's father was a boiler-aker at the
Ford Motor Company. Cavanagb attended St. Cecelia High
School, and the University of Detroit, a Catholic univer-
sity under the Jurisdiction of the Society of Jesus, a
religious order. He earned a bachelor of philosophy de-
gree in political science in 1950, and a bachelor of law
degree from the University of Detroit law school in 1954.

Cavanagh's "intellect" was reported as "average"
when it was compared with the Phi Beta Kappa academic honor
earned by Williams at Princeton University.1

Except for some local party responsibilities,
Cavanagh was inactive politically for nearly seven years
after the election of Patrick McNamara to the v.3. Senate.
Cavanagh practiced law during this period.

In 1961, with a seemingly insufficient power base
to commend him, Cavanagh decided to run for mayor; he was
thirty-three years old. Cavanagh threw his hat into the
ring without the support of labor, an important source of
strength in Detroit, and with the opposition of the two
major city newspapers, the Detroit News, and the Detroit
Free Press.

The Detroit News said editorially before the elec-
tion that incumbent Louis C. Miriani was better qualified

to hold the office than was Cavanagh.2

 

1Detroit Free Press, July 31, 1966, p. 1-9.

2Detroit News, Nov. 2, 1961, p. 22-C.

w"

20

The Detroit Free Press endorsed Mayor Hiriani.
Editorialising against Cavanagh's efforts, the Free Press
noted:

There have been large generalities and some
demagogic appeals but when they are winnowed down
and the chaff has been blown away we have not been
able to detect any residue of substance.1

Cavanagh defeated Mayor Miriani in the ”biggest

political upset in 32 years" in Detroit.2

After Cavanagh's victory, the Detroit News said

editorially:

This newspaper was not, to put it mildly, a
part of the Cavanagh fan club. Though we had some
reservations about hiriani's leadership, we had
many, many more doubts about Cavanagh. He is
Mayor, nevertheless, and we would be the last to
claim infallibility.

Cavanagh has without doubt the vigor to do the
Job. He has had a resounding vote of confidence
from the people for the fresh start he promised.
And he has, from us and from all others in the com-
munity who wish greatness for Detroit and know that
there own futures depend upon it, firm and sincere
wishes for success in his task.3

The Free Press said editorially, "we wish him well,
and recommend that he be given a generous Opportunity to
live up to his supporters' faith before anyone says he

can'te"4

 

0'"

Detroit Free Press, Nov. 6, 1961, p. B-A.

Detr°1t NEWS, NOV. 3, 1961' p. 1.

UN

Ibide’ NOVO 9, 1961, pe 22’Ce

hv

Detroit Free Press, Nov. 8, 1961, p. 6-A.

21

The Cavanagh Administration
Cavanagh was a convincing and able mayor who at-
tracted considerable state and national attention with his
administration of the city of Detroit. An important indus-
trial and commercial complex, Detroit would be expected
to receive recognition on its own in the normal course of
events. Cavanagh, however, expanded its lines of communi-
cation in an administration that intended to convey the
ideas of accomplishment and action. Cavanagh's administra-
tion was not unlike the youthful, public relations conscious
approach that marked the early years of the occupancy of
John P. Kennedy in the White House. A biographical sketch
issued by the Mayor's office pointed up the personality
Cavanagh displayed:
City Hall took on a remarkable transformation
once Cavanagh took office. His aggressive, hard-
driving leadership ignited a spark in municipal
government and Cavanagh soon became known as the
'Mayor who woke up a city.‘ Bright, imaginative
new appointees were placed in executive positions
as part of the Cavanagh assault on the status quo.1
Mayor Cavanagh became the first public official
to serve simultaneously as president of the National League
of Cities, and president of the United States Conference
of Mayors, the two leading organizations of municipal of-

ficials in the United States.2 He was appointed to white

 

1Detroit, Office of the Mayor, "Mayor Jerome P.
Cavanagh: A Biographical Sketch," 1967. (Mimeographed),
n.p.

ZIDid.

w

22

House committees for redevelOpment, civil rights, manpower,
youth opportunity, and legislative recommendations.1
Mayor Cavanagh ran for re-election in 1965 with

the support of labor. The Detroit News picked Mayor
Cavanagh over his Opponent, Walter Shamie.2 The Detroit
Free Press endorsed Cavanagh for mayor with this editorial
reference:

. . . [He] has given the city the kind of intelli-

gent, imaginative leadership it needs. The trib—

utes to him which have appeared in the past few

months in national magazines are testimonials to

his success-and the success of Detroit. he

strongly urge his reelection.3
McNamara's Mantle

Senator Patrick V. McNamara informed his adminis-

trative assistant, Robert Perrin, in May of 1964, that he
would not be a candidate for re-election.4 This was two
and one-half years before his term expired. The informa-
tion was withheld from the Senator's staff and from other
politicians to "reduce gossip and also to maintain some

kind of stability within the state party until the Senator

was ready for a formal announcement."5 Perrin continued

 

Detroit, ”Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh.”

Detroit News, Oct. 25, 1965, p. 22-A.

“NH

Detroit Free Press, Nov. 1, 1965, p. 8-A.

‘Letter from Robert Perrin, Assistant Director for
Government Relations, Office of Economic Opportunity, Bx-
ecutive Office of the President, Washington, D.C., March 5,
1968.

51bid.

23

to operate the Senator's office as if a campaign would be
conducted, stopping short of collecting funds.

”This was not entirely a smokescreen; there was
always the possibility that the Senator might change his

1 Perrin said.

mind, and I did not want to be unprepared,”
Senator McNamara felt that the proper age for re~
tirement was near seventy.
”He did not want to become physically unable to
do his Job, as he had seen happen to other elderly sena-

2 Perrin noted.

tors,"
The Michigan Democratic party had lost much of the
vitality of the Williams years, and many important leaders
wanted the former governor to succeed Senator McNamara.
Much of the problem, however, rested with the decision by
Senator McNamara as to whether he would seek re~election.
williams waited for Senator McNamara's decision.
The options had narrowed for Williams since his departure
from Michigan in 1961 to join the Kennedy administration.
In 1963, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson had succeeded
to the presidency after the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy in Dallas. At the Democratic National

Convention in 1960, Williams had termed the selection of

Johnson as Kennedy's running mate as a "mistake."3 Although

 

1Letter from Perrin.

21bid.

m

3Detroit Free Press, July 15, 1960, p. 1.

M.

24

Killians was the Department of State's principal assistant
for Africa, others had been assigned more prominent roles
in the crises that had occurred in the Congo and Rhodesia.1
Williams was a frequent visitor to Michigan and
he had remained in touch with the state Democratic party
during his five years in washington.2 It was reported as
"more than a little political mystery" when appearances
were scheduled for Williams to speak at Warren, Ypsilanti,
Wyandotte, Detroit, and other places over the Fourth of
July holiday in 1965.3
In the fall of 1965, Mayor Cavanagh was occupied
with a campaign to win re-election. Cavanagh was interest-
ed in going to Washington as United States Senator but,
the eayor was not "consciously" thinking about the Senate
during his nayoralty campaign; he was aware, however, of
the political opportunity that was building in the Demo-

‘ He needed a substantial margin of victory

cratic party.
over his opponent, walter Shamie, to further his political

career.5 Cavanagh scored the victory he sought.

McNamara's Announcement

Senator McNamara would not say publicly that he
Detroit Free Press, Feb. 9, 1966, p. 6-A.
Interview with G. Mennen Williams, Nov. 22, 1967.

Interview with Cavanagh.

MhWNH

Interview with Cavanagh.

25

would not be a candidate for re-election. Williams and
Cavanagh would not Oppose him for the nomination. The
quiet maneuvering to succeed McNamara, nevertheless, was
underway.

On December 18, 1965, Susan Scholle, daughter of
August Scholle, president of the Michigan American Federa-
tion of Labor—Congress of Industrial Organizations, and
John T. Connor, Jr., son of the Secretary of Commerce in
the Johnson administration, were married in Detroit. Among
the guests at the wedding reception were Senator McNamara,
Williams, Cavanagh, and Neil Staehler, Democratic National
Committeeman for Michigan. Senator McNamara, Cavanagh re-
calls, informed them he would not be a candidate for re-
election:

I can recall very well that Pat McNamara was
seated over at a table, and I went over and sat
down and was chatting with him. Soapy came over.
A lot of photographers were taking pictures. He
[McNamara] had told me, I think prior to Soapy's
coming to the table, that he was not going to he
a candidate, and he was going to serve out his
term, and then Soapy williams came. He said to
him, and I'm quite sure it was the first time
Soapy knew, because it was quite interesting,

Neil Staebler came to the table too. He told
him the same thing, so he told us both at the
same time.

0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O I O 0

Williams did not express any reaction. Staebler
sort of gave his reaction away. He asked him to
repeat it, that he didn't quite hear it. He was
a little surprised. That day I didn't express any
reaction, but it caused me to do some intensive
thinking.2

 

1

zlhid.

Interview with Cavanagh.

Newspaper photos taken at the wedding of Senator
McNamara, Secretary williams, and Mayor Cavanagh were pub-
lished the next day with political inferences. The caption
under a photo of Senator McNamara and Williams read: "A
Political Dilemma: Senator Patrick McNamara, left (retir-
ing?), and G. Mennen Williams (the potential successor?)
at Saturday's wedding."1 Beneath a photo of Cavanagh mov-
ing through the receiving line at the reception, the cap-
tion read: "Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh greets the newlyweds.
He immediately went into a huddle with 'Soapy' Williams

and Senator Patrick McNamara.”2

1Detroit Free Press, Dec. 19, 1965, p. l-D.

21bid.

CHAPTER II
PRESSURBS BUILD FOR A PRIMARY

United States Senator Patrick V. McNamara announced
on February 23, 1968, that he would not be a candidate to
succeed himself for a third term. The date the Senator
chose to make public announcement was on the fifty-fifth
birthday of his friend, and possible successor, G. Mennen
Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.
Williams was in Washington, D.C., observing his birthday
with a small group of African diplomats; he was confident
of Senator McNamara's support.1 His most talked about rival
for the Democratic party nomination, Jerome P. Cavanagh,
mayor of Detroit, was in San Francisco, California.

There was never any doubt that Williams would be
a candidate if McNamara decided not to seek re-election.
Even before the Senator's announcement, there were expres-
sions of support for Williams. Cne of the most significant
statements came from August Scholle, who declared for
Williams thirty~eight days before Mchamsra publicly stepped

2

out of contention. Williams had also arranged for James

 

1Interview with Williams.

zaetroit News, Jan. 17, 1966, p. 1.

27

28

Robinson, a Detroit Free Press reporter in Washington, to
join his campaign staff as press secretary before McNamara's
public disclosure.

In addition to quietly enlisting early support for
his pending campaign, he assessed his comparative strength
with his unannounced opponent. Williams had a poll taken
in December to determine his position in relationship to

l The results delighted Williams: Cavanagh

2

Cavanagh.
"wasn't close" in the poll.

A cheering crowd greeted Williams on March 3, 1966,
as he arrived at the Capitol in Lansing, ostensibly to be-
gin a tour around Michigan to plumb sentiment for his can-
didacy. Five days later, on March 8, hilliams announced
that he would be a candidate for the United States Senate.

If he survived a primary, williams would have to run against
0.3. Representative Robert Griffin who appeared to be head-
ing for the Republican nomination unopposed and with the
support of Governor Romney and other Republicans.

The Detroit Free Press editorialized that Michigan
would be done a great disservice by those critics who re~
kindled old partisan quarrels with the candidacy of Williams.
The editorial added:

. . . The point is whether Soapy Williams, now 55,
with a lifetime of public service in hichigan and

 

1Interview with James Robinson, campaign press sec-
retary to Go Mennen Williams, Feb. 10, 1967.

2Interview with Williams.

29
Washington, in domestic and international affairs,
is the best possible choice for senator.
we'll reserve that decision for later, after
all the candidates have announced and after the
campaign trails have been traveled.
But it already appears that Michigan will be
the winner. In Republican Robert Griffin and in
the Democrat Williams, there are already two can-
didates qualified for the office by ability and
experience.1
Cavanagh's Dilemma
In the weeks after Senator McNamara's private dis-
closure at the Scholle-Connor wedding of his impending po-
litical retirement, Cavanagh struggled internally with an
implacable ambition and an expanding, highly unfavorable
cluster of political facts. A seat in the United States

2 for Cavanagh; so he

Senate held a "certain attraction"
began casting about for political and financial backing
for a campaign to attain that seat.

The problem of political "timing“ was important
in the deliberations that Cavanagh had with his advisers.
Williams, at age fifty-five, could be expected to stay in
the United States Senate for the remainder of his political
career if he were elected. Michigan's other United States
Senator, Philip A. Hart, a popular Democrat, was only
fifty~four. If Cavanagh did not choose to seek election

1

Detroit Free Press, harcn 8, 1966, p. 6~A.

2Interview with Cavanagh.

30

at this opportunity, another night not arrive for "fifteen
or twenty years.”1

A poll ordered by Cavanagh clearly established the
early superior position of Williams among the electorate.2
Although a fire believer in polls, Cavanagh began to ”ra-
tionalize."3

”I wanted that job so badly that I began to build
a series of reasons why I could overcome what the polls

a

said,” Cavanagh recalled later.

A Williams Steamroller

If the Michigan Democratic party engaged in a
seriously contested senatorial primary, there was always
the danger of a party split that could not be repaired by
the time a runoff election occurred with the Republican
nominee in November. The leadership also recognized that
two highly expensive primary campaigns would have to be
financed along with the final campaign. There appeared
to be little enthusiasm among party leadership for a pri-
mary, and their choice to succeed Senator McNamara was

williams.5

 

l

21bid.

m

Ibid.

Interview with Cavanagh.

 

Aw

Ihid.

 

Ul

Interview with Cavanagh, Dec. 7, 1967.

31

The Democratic party was searching for a nominee
to Oppose Governor George Romney who was expected to seek
re-election as another step toward his presidential cam-
paign. Many saw a highly desirable combination in williams
as the senatorial nominee, and Cavanagh as the gubernatorial
nominee. The option did not appeal to Cavanagh. The thought
Cf being in the Senate where he would be one of a few na-
tional political figures with primary knowledge of urban
affairs was much more inviting.

The announcement in January ty August Scholle of
his early support for williams was followed with similar
expressions from other Democrats. Representatives of five
of the six congressional districts in wayne county indicated
a preference for Williams after meeting with him, David
Lebenbom, hayne County Democratic Chairman, reported. The
district not represented at the meeting had previously
voiced support for Williams.1

Cavanagh interpreted the public support for the
Williams candidacy as a "steamroller" tactic designed to
discourage himerom entering a primary.2 The atmosphere
that was developing in January and February for hilliams,
however, had the effect of pushing Cavanagh into the race.

". . . The position I have as an unencumbered of-

fice holder would be shot overnight if I let them pat me

 

1Detroit News, Feb. 26, 1966, p. 3‘s.

zlnterview with Cavanagh, Dec. 7, 1967.

32

on the head and say, 'Sit down boy. Wait your turn,”1

Cavanagh commented.

Press Encourages a Primary

Cavanagh wavered over whether to run for the Sen-
ate. One day it seemed he would be a candidate, and on
the next day, the turn of events discouraged further con-
sideration. He had received expressions of support. Among
them was a former ally in the 1950 "ballbat convention"
delegate squabbles, James R. Hoffa, head of the teamsters
union.2

The two major metropolitan newspapers, the Detroit
Eggs and the Detroit Free Press, kept the issue alive.
There were news stories, editorial cartoons, editorials,
and comments from columnists. One of the first of the new
year was on January 4, 1966, fifty days before Senator
McNamara publicly withdrew from contention, when the Detroit
figgg twitted Cavanagh with an editorial cartoon about enter~
ing the primary.3

The Eggs pointedly said in an editorial before
Williams had announced his candidacy, that August Scholle
was calling for a closed primary. The editorial added:

we can think of a variety of political reasons
why Jerry Cavanagh might prefer to wait for more

 

1Detroit Free Press, April 4, 1966, p. lZ-A.

21bid., Feb. 5, 1966, p. 3-5.

32§troit News, Jan. 4, 1966, p. ZZ-A.

33

auspicious time and not take up arms against the
Scholle dictatorship in Democratic party councils.
Having said that, we hope he might make a try at
it and give Michigan Democrats a chance to vote
for a senate contender who doesn't wear a leash.1

Of hilliams, the Detroit Paws noted that he was
departing from Washington at a time when "African affairs

are as dangerously chaotic as Eichigan's finances were dur-

ing his tour at Lansing."2

On March 9, 1966, hayor Cavanagh was challenged
to enter the race by his friend, Edgar C. (Doc) Greene,
a columnist for the Detroit flows. Greene wrote:

One of the things that is beginning to bug me
about Williams and Gus Scholle, and even some of
my own brethren, is their errant assumption that
williams is already the Democratic candidate.

Everyone assures me that Mayor Cavanagh, if
as chose to try and go to washington and pry out
federal funds for the state instead of merely the
city, would have no chance against williams.

And all of the people, especially including
my brethren on the political beat, even while
they're explaining why Soapy is a cinch, are also
admitting that they will vote for Cavanagh if he
chooses not to go stand in a corner as the party
has apparently bade him.

I wouldn't like a guy who went and stood in
a corner just because a lot of duffcrs thought
they owed something to Soapy.

Who owes Soapy anything?3

Greene's column was "unconsciously" a determining

 

lDetroit News, Feb. 27, 1966. p. 14-3.

21bid.

BDetroit News, March 9, 1966, p. 20-0.

34

factor in Cavanagh's decision to run for the United States

Senate.1

Five days later, will duller, a Detroit News edi-
torial columnist and writer, described Cavanagh as “young,
vigorous, and articulate . . . [a man who] could become

2

a giant killer.“ If this was intended to be additional

encouragement to Cavanagh to make a decision, it was un-
necessary; the Mayor had already committed himself pri-
vately. He announced on March 19.3

The Detroit News editorialized on the Cavenagh

candidacy:

This newspaper‘s enthusiasm for Cavanagh's
willingness to defy the back-room king-makers and
enter the senate race is not unalloyed.

A live primary between two men who have made
public names for themselves, each qualified on the
face of things for the office at stake, is not the
worst thing that could happen to a party or a state.4

with Cavanagh's candidacy, the Detroit Free Press
cautioned editorially that the city risked the loss of a
full-time mayor during the campaign. However, the;§ggg
£5353 editorial added:
. . . he is unquestionably qualified for the sen-

ate post he seeks, in many ways uniquely qualified
for having taken a leadership role in shaping the

 

Interview with Cavanagh, Dec. 7.

NH

Detroit News, March 14, 1966, p. 6—8.

Detroit Nogg,'March 19, 1966, p. l-A.

Ihid., march 20, 1966, p. 14-3.

 

#0)

35

creative federalism which links the metropolitan
areas more closely to the nation's capital. He
commands national respect.

. . . a senate race with so many top~flight and
fully qualified candidates is one the: Michigan 1
voters, of whatever political stripe, can applaud.

 

IDetroit Free Press, March 21, 1966, p. B-A.

CHnPISR III

CAMPAIGN TECHNIQUES: MEIHODS,
bBJdJTinS, Aha CLEHUNlCAIlLN

The previous political encounters between G. hennen
Williams and Jerome P. Cavanagh, the similarities and con-
trasts of their personalities and political careers, added
an interesting dimension to the senatorial primary election.
Both men were tall-hilliams at six feet four inches, and
Cavanagh at six feet one inch-us definite campaign asset
in a crowd. They were outwardly friendly, out-going can-
didates who could meet voters easily; they were lawyers,
natives of Uetroit, the most important Democratic area in
Michigan. Both had previously established important sup-
port in their home areas.

williams had run for governor the first time at
the age of thirty-seven. Cavanagh was elected mayor of
the fifth largest city in the United States in his first
bid for office at the age of thirty-three. Neither had
been defeated at the polls.

The Williams family financial holdings in the
Nennen Company, a soap products manufacturing firm, was
responsible for the nickname of "Soapy" that Williams had
acquired. An inveterate campaigner, williams had called

square dances, had shaken hands constantly, and had

36

37

traveled endlessly around Michigan during his twelve years
as governor. He was the governor when inhabitants of the
state still vividly recalled the Great Depression, and the
unhappy, sometimes bloody labor organizing efforts in the
1930's. Unemployment benefits, some early steps in civil
rights, mental health, and the growth or government, the
enlargement of educational opportunities, and many other
problems ocCUpied state government. The young people in
Michigan's colleges and universities were members of the
”silent generation" of students in the 1950’s.

The seventeen years of age that separated williams
and Cavanagh represented an unusual period in the nation's
history. Young and popular, cavanagh was representative
of a new type of political personality that had become
increasingly evident in American politics after the elec-
tion of John P. Kennedy to the presidency. Articulate,
with a keen sense of public relations about him, Cavanagh
exhibited an appealing, easy style. he was much closer
in age to the growing numbers of impatient young people
who were making up a larger share of the electorate. The
college generation of the 1960's was noisy and politically
active. They marched for civil rights, against the war
in Vietnam, and they broke down many barriers that had
preserved the existing order.

Government in the sixties was expected to seek
out problems and provide rapid answers to them. The old

phrase that government that governs least is best had lost

some of its meaning.

38

Killian: believed before the campaign that his old

political strength would reassert itself.l

Cavanagh was

convinced that he was politically "hot."2

Campaign Tachnigfics

 

Lapel pins that were re

dot bow tie trademark of G.

uted during the senatorial primary

governor's supporters. During

hilliams had campaigned constantly

tie into a visually powerful campaign symbol.

and his bow tie did not have a

ing the 1930's.
using personal contact and old
friendships, sought to re-estw

to a position of prominence in

Mennan

plicas of the green polka
Williams were distrib-
campaign by the former
his

years in the state house,

and had turned the bow
Will 13115

Problem of I8COgnit10n dur-

1

with the bow tie as his symbol, Williams,

political loyalties and

.lish himself in the primary

Democratic party.

Cavanagh and his supporters distributed metal click-

ing devices that children commonly call "crici

they were described in one instance

"horde of locusts."3

were symbolic of Cavanagh's campaign techniques:

The noisy, ubiquitons

and

he made

his appeal for votes with a noisy, media-oriented campaign.

 

1Interview with Williams.

zlntarview with Savannah, Nov. 23.

3

gotroit News, July 15: 1955: P'

4-8 o

39

A. pro-campaign assessnent of the primary suggested
to williams that he still had a solid base of support in
Michigan. His principal objective was to prevent any ero-
sion of his position under the vagaries of a political cam—
paign and the aggressive challenge from Cavanagh. Williams
had to accomplish his objective without alienating Cavanagh
and his supporters; they were necessary for the runoff elec-
tion in November.

williams added one more important feature to the
primary that he was confident of winning. Inasmuch as the
fall campaign against a Republican opponent would be shorter
in duration, Williams arranged some of his primary efforts
to build support for the runoff election.1

Cavanagh recognized that he was behind. A short-
age of time to overtake his opponent, and a problem of rec-
ognition outstate, were considered to be Cavanagh's two
major handicaps as he entered the campaign.2 To compensate
for these deficiencies the decision was made to make sig~
nificant use of television, radio, newspapers, and other
media, blended with a mixture of personal contact.3
Cavanagh also obtained the services of the United States

Research and Development Corporation, a firm that organizes

1

ZInterview with Robert E. Toohey, Campaign Manager
for Cavanagh, Sept. 15, 1965.

3
bids

Interview with Williams.

40
and operates political campaigns for candidates.

Dialog with the People

williams formally began his campaign for the Demo-
cratic nomination to the Senate on April 11, 1966, at 5
a.m., when he began shaking hands with workmen who were
entering the East Jefferson Assembly plant of the Chrysler
Corporation in Detroit. His previous political campaigns
had begun and had ended at the same factory gate.

The milliams campaign was centered around the theme
of a "Dialog with the People," which was essentially the
interpersonal communications technique that he had adopted
so successfully as governor. The appearance of hilliams
at gatherings, the importance of handshakes and personal
greetings, and the renewal of old acquaintances, were
fundamental points to the hilliams method.

The person-to~person technique contained the im-
portant feature of instant feedback,1 which was exception-
ally important to Williams who had been absent from Mich—
igan's hustings for six years.2 This was one method to

determine which issues were occupying the electorate.

 

1Feedback is the response that a sender of com-
nunications receives from his audiences. Smiles, hand-
shakes, crowd sizes, and similar responses are examples
of feedback. This feedback provided Williams with evidence
of the reaction of voters to his return to hichigan poli-
tiC‘ 0

2Interview with Eddie McGloin, Williams' Campaign
Manager, Aug. 24, 1966.

41

Issues were also determined by scientific polling.1

The Williams dialog strategy was welcomed by his
political allies and friends who envisaged the campaign
as a big step to restore the state Democratic party to
its winning ways. To them, Williams was a message in him-
self. He attended breakfasts, lunches, dinners, gatherings
during the day and late at night. hilliams' campaign sched-
ule was extremely tight and comprehensive; at one point,
it even contained the notation that arrangements were be-
ing made to have him usher in church on Easter.

Although Williams represented a message in himself,
he did not ignore the issues. He issued a widely distrib-
uted position paper on Vietnam. He discussed public edu-
cation, civil rights, inflation, economics, the war on
poverty, water pollution, and other issues.

There were moments of humor and embarrassment for
the former governor. He accepted a pair of polka dot swim-
ming trunks at a splash party. And he, along with Cavanagh,
was fined twenty-five cents in a humorous kangaroo court
at the Traverse City Cherry Festival. Williams was also
asked to leave a Children's Parade at the festival because
of rules on political participation. He was ushered from

a plant gate of the Ford Motor Company at Monroe because

 

lHarvey Dzodin, “Political Campaigns: A Study in
Theory and Practice," an unpublished paper prepared on the
Williams-Cavanagh election for police science research at
Michigan State University, Sept. 1, 1966, p. 29.

42

he failed to obtain permission in advance to stop and cam-

l

paign. He was also asked to leave a Michigan Employment

Security office because of government rules against cam-

paigning in certain public offices.2

Leadership Sugport.-—Williams would have had dif-
ficulty conducting his dialog technique without strong
backing from the leadership throughout the state. He had
organizations in every county. He pledged that he would
visit every county in the primary, and he honored his pledge.

The tremendous groundswell of support was evident
at the annual Democratic party Jefferson-Jackson day dinner
in Detroit where Mayor Cavanagh received "warm applause"
and the partisans "went wild" when Williams was introduced.3

"I guess I'm in his home ball park," Cavanagh said
to his neighbor at the dinner, former Governor John B.
Swainson, after the applause for Williams.

"Yes," Swainson replied, "but remember also that
is where the game is going to be played."4

Williams was endorsed by the state American Federa-
tion of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, a sig-

nificant portion of the state Democratic party, despite

 

Detroit News, May 19, 1965, p. 1.

NH

Detroit Free Press, July 30, 1966, p. 3-A.

gall Street Journal, July 27, 1966, p. 10.

‘50)

Ibid.

43

a protest by hayor Cavanagh for neutrality.1

Negroes are an active political group in the state
Democratic party, and both candidates eagerly sought their
support. when Williams was governor, the first Negro was
placed on a Democratic state ticket. Cavanagh had estab-
lished rapport with Negroes, too. An indication of the
probable turn of events occurred when 15,000 persons, most-
ly Negroes, attended a Freedom Rally at Cobo Hall in Detroit.
Cavanagh drew applause for a speech he gave at the meeting.
Williams arrived late and his entrance was described as
resembling "Santa Claus arriving at Hudson's on Thanks-
giving morning."2 Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., head of
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and a prom-
inent civil rights leader, was embraced by Williams.

Cavanagh also found himself contending with a dif-
ficult rumor among the Negroes in Detroit. The rumor sug~
gested what better combination for the cause of civil rights
could the Negroes have with Williams as Senator and Cavanagh
as mayor of Detroit.

Further evidence of support for hilliams came from
the endorsements. The First Congressional District, Mayor
Cavanagh's home district and the most populous congressional

district in Michigan with 417,000, endorsed wiiiiams.3

lDCtIOit NEVA, Jung 2’ 1966, p. 10
21bid., June 29, 1966, p. 11.

3Detroit Free Press, May 30, 1966, p. 3-A.

44

Williams eventually won a clean sweep of Wayne county dis-
tricts, including the Thirteenth and Fourteenth, both heav-

ily populated by Negroes.

Williams and the Press.--uilliams did not need the
Michigan press to help him defeat mayor Cavanagh in the
primary election. It was not a major concern in campaign
planning. For many years as governor, Williams had an un-
friendly press, and it began to reasscrt its hostility dur-
ing the campaign. News releases were mailed out regularly
during the campaign to Hichigan dailies, weeklies, radio
and television stations. Special attempts were made to
place stories in the labor and Negro press.1 The purchase
of radio and television time was limited, and no billboard
space was obtained.2 Williams was holding his resources

for the general election.

The Spirit of '66

The Open primary election system in Michigan per-
mits voters to choose either party's ballot, althOUgh ticket
splitting is not permissible. Aware that his candidacy
angered many leaders in the Democratic party, Cavanagh at-
tempted to use this Open primary to his advantage by en-

couraging Republicans to cross over and vote for him. He

 

1Interview with Robinson.

ZDetroit News, June 17, 1966, p. 9-D.

 

also courted independent voters.1

The type of campaign that Cavanagh had planned to
accomplish his task became evident on March 19, 1965, the
day he announced for the Senate. A banner across the room
where Cavanagh read his announcement said: "Bosses for
Soapy-—People for Jerry."2

Five minute television announcements of Cavanagh's
decision to run for the Senate were released through eighteen
television stations throughout Michigan on the day the mayor
declared his candidacy. In addition, Cavanagh went by air—
plane to Grand Rapids and Marquette to repeat his announce-
ment. He was accompanied on the flight by four professional
football players, all of whom were known to Michigan tele-
vision football fans: Wayne Walker, Joe Schmidt, John
Gordy, all of the Detroit Lions, and Earl Morrall, a for-
mer Michigan State University and Lions player who had
moved to the New York Giants.

Cavanagh's campaign literature and billboards pro-

3

claimed ”The Spirit of 66." He described Williams as a

man whose "tired answers and slogans of the '40's and 'SO's"4

were not applicable to the problems of the 1960's and 1970's.

 

1Detroit Free Press, July 31, 1966, p. l-B.

N

Detroit News, March 20, 1966, p. l.

0.)

Wall Street Journal, July 27, 1966, p. 10.

41bid.

45

Underdog Role.-The campaign staff Cavanagh had
assembled considered the Mayor to be their biggest asset.1
He was young, could adapt well under any kind of situation,
was politically shrewd, and he was likeable. He did not
lose his poise when he was confronted with the formidable
opposition in his own party.

Inasmuch as he was behind at the outset, Cavanagh
believed that he had to carry the fight to williams.2 His
attack early in the campaign came in the form of issues.

He was hapeful that he could draw Williams into debates.
His polls were accented toward determining the issues in
the minds of the electorate, giving the Mayor timely talk:

ing points during the campaign.3

The polls disclosed the
electorate was concerned most about the war in Vietnam,
with education and inflation as their next concerns.4
Position papers were developed on Vietnam, civil rights,
and highway safety. Others were planned for education and
inflation, but they were never completed.5

On Vietnam, the Mayor said, ”I had to establish
in the minds of the people that there was a distinct

 

1

Interview with Toohey.
Interview with Cavanagh, Nov. 28.

Interview with Toohey.

hunt-I

Ibid.

UT

Interview with Anthony Ripley, former assistant
to Mayor Cavanagh, Feb. 26, 1968.

47

difference between my views and those of Williams."1

The position Cavanagh took on Vietnam, while it
was a position of conscience, was intended to be an impor-
tant piece of evidence that he was not hesitant about tak-

ing "new and different positions in the sixties."2

A Change in Approach.—-Cn Kay 14, 1936, Cavanagh
returned from a sixteen-day trip to Lurope. He had led
a trade and travel delegation to EurOpe at the request of
John T. Connor, United States Secretary of Commerce. When
the Opportunity had been offered, Cavanagh recognized that
it could provide him with some needed foreign policy ex-
posure that was lacking in his political background. The
etroit News sent a reporter to Europe to accompany Cavanagh
and his delegation. The Free Prose did not. Despite spec—
ially arranged, timely-briefings in Germany, France, and
other countries of western Europe, the coverage was dis-
appointing.3 In addition, he was absent when Senator
Patrick V. ficNamara died on April 30. After Cavanagh
returned to Detroit, some changes were planned in his
campaign methods.

Cavanagh turned increasingly to the handshaking

type of approach that williams had been practicing, and

 

1Interview with Cavanagh, Nov. 28.

21bid.

w

31.131110. Dec. 70

48

Cavanagh began attacking Williams personally. He began
mentioning "payless paydays,” a charge Republicans fre-

1

quently made against Williams. The Senate, Cavanagh said,

was not a pasture to pay off old political debts.2

Cavanagh's advisers, william Haddad and his asso-
ciate, Robert Clampitt, of the United States Research and
Development Corporation, came up with a slogan, "Ability
Makes the Difference." The implication was to suggest that
Cavanagh could lead in Detroit even though he had balky
opposition on the City Council, while Williams had not
been able to lead with a difficult legislature in Lansing.3

Haddad and Clampitt had previously assisted Robert
King High, mayor of Miami, Florida, in his campaign for
the Democratic nomination of governor of Florida. Haddad
had also assisted the late President John F. Kennedy, and
John Lindsay, mayor of New York.4

The Haddad and Clampitt campaign corporation de~
vised a campaign technique. In the Sheraton Cadillac Hotel
in Detroit, the firm established an electronic center that
had a direct dial telephone to every radio and television

station in Michigan. Cavanagh's voice was recorded on the

campaign trail and then sent out from the electronics center

 

1Detroit Free Press, July 17, 1966, p. 4-A.

2Detroit News, July 13, 1966, p. lB-A.

3Interview with Cavanagh, Nov. 28.

4Detroit News, June 20, 1966, p. 24-c.

49

over high fidelity tape recorders to the broadcast media.
Operators, who were skilled in the language of newsman and
disc Jockeys, would strike up a conversation and then offer
"thirty seconds of Cavanagh." Occasionally, recordings
of Williams were offered. The Williams statements were
credible, but the most favorable statements that he made
were not offered to the disc Jockeys.1
The attacks began drawing replies from Williams
who otherwise had tried to ignore Cavanagh. Williams be-
gan using "silly" and "madness" to describe his opponent's
efforts.2 On July 29, williams charged Cavanagh with yield-
ing to the "influence of the Madison Avenue mercenaries."3
In the final weeks of the campaign, Cavanagh took
a one-month vacation from his duties as mayor to devote
full time to the election. He also purchased space on 300
billboards across Michigan.4 Some television spot announce-
ments and five-minute talks were taped to be broadcast over
television and radio stations throughout the state. He
also took an old fashioned campaign whistle-step train trip

across the state, and then as a contrast, he flew in a jet

plane to a number of cities in Michigan.5

 

1Interview with Ripley, Nov. 23, 1966.

N

Detroit News, July 22, 1966, p. lB-A.

U

Ibiée, JUIY 29, 1965, p. ll'Ao

Detroit Free Press, July 3, 1956, p. 1.

U'lfi

Interview with Ripley, Nov. 23, 1966.

50

Ibo Issue o{_De§a§e

Williams conducted a campaign that all but publicly
ignored the existence of his opponent. Williams was out
front, and he could gain little by sparring verbally with
Cavanagh. In addition, there was the danger of splitting
the party.

williams, however, did acknowledge the political
presence of Cavanagh by repeatedly expressing concern when
the mayor left his office to campaign.

"He felt we were counting the hours he was away
from the office," Nilliams' press secretary, James Robinson,
said. "we were trying to throw him off balance. He was
trying to explain why he was serving as mayor and running
for the senate."1

Unlike Williams, Cavanagh conducted a campaign that
mentioned the former governor at every possible turn. When
he announced for the Senate, Cavanagh invited Williams to
debate the issues. He repeated the challenge throughout
the campaign.2

Mayor Cavanagh tried unsuccessfully to draw williams
into a debate. Facile, articulate, Cavanagh has a fine
speaking voice; he presented a sharp contrast to Williams
who spoke in a slow, unattractive nasal monotone.

1Interview with Robinson.

2Detroit News, March 19, 1966, p. l-A.

 

51

The repeated challenges by Cavanagh were reported
in the news columns of the Detroit Free Press and the
Detroit News.

The Free Press observed editorially:

 

we're not saying Williams is chicken if he doesn't
debate Cavanagh face to face on television. head-
on debates are dramatic, but give more weight to
make-up and glibness than capacity or comprehension.

we‘re not saying that campaign style is the
best way of judging candidates. Their experience
and past records are more important.

We are raising a question: To what extent has
Williams been able to convert his concern for people
and his experiences into a cohesive and intelligent
command of the issues that will face the Senate?

At this point in the campaign, who knowszl

when nillians told the Seventeenth Congressional
District executive committee that he would not fall for
the "political trick” of debating, the Detroit News noted
editorially:

Former Gov. G. hennen nillians efforts to drape
himself in the Kennedy mantle during his campaign-
ing for the 0.5. Senate came a cropper the other
night when he in effect called the late President
Jonn F. Kennedy a political trickster.

O O O O O O Q 0 O O O O O O Q 0 O O O O O O O C

When John F. Kennedy debated the issues with
former Vice-President Nixon in four highly publi-
cized television programs in lQGu, he was widely
acclaimed in the Democratic party for his 'states-
manship.’ And his showing in the TV deoates was
widely credited with having turned the tide in his
f avor 0

But now debating the issues with an opponent
is just a 'political trick,’ Williams says. Is

 

1Detroit Free Press, July 13, 1966, p. G-A.

52

that what it was in 1960, too, governor? Or do
you fear the results would be the same as they
were in 1960 when the underdog emerged victori-

ous?1

 

lDetroit News, July 10, 1966, p. 14-3.

CHAPTER IV

DETROIT: FOCAL POINT FDR COMMUNICATIONS

The city of Detroit is the focal point of a metro-
politan complex that invests itself of three populous coun—
ties in the southeastern section of Michigan. In the last
federal census, the Detroit Standard “strepolitan Statis-
tical Area, which comprises the counties of Wayne, Oakland,

1 This was

and Macomb, recorded a population of 3,762,360.
43 per cent of the population listed for the entire state.
Inhabitants of the metropolitan area are bound together

by common regional interests in transportation, commerce,
government services, recreation, and mass communication.
This cohesive, intricate, inter-related economic, social,
and political community was the base for patterns of com-
munication that have an influence on large portions of
Michigan.

Detroit was the fulcrum for the Democratic party.2

It was particularly important in the williams-Cavanagh

primary because it was an important support base for

 

1U.S., Bureau of Census, U.S._§ensus of Population}
1960 General Population Characteristics1 hicniggn. Final
Report 95—il)-243“Twasdlngton, J.£.; vagfiumgnt Printing
Office, 1961), p. 35.

zlnterview with Williams.

53

54

Cavanagh, and it had been important to Williams in the past.
Although the population figures were impressive, the char-
acter of the population was more interesting. Labor and
minority group: comprised significant parts of Detroit.

Cf Michigan's 1,179,000 residents engaged in manu-
facturing in 1966, some 618,200 worked in metropolitan
Detroit.1 Equally noteworthy were the statistics that
indicated the metropolitan area had 75,300 of the states
141,600 employees in transportation and utilities, and
49,400 of Michigan's 112,000 construction employees.2
These were highly unionized industries, and labor had cast
its ballots in the past for the Democratic party candidates.
Labor had delivered the Democratic majorities that helped
Williams win the Michigan gubernatorial race six times in
succession.3 Cavanagh had received the support of labor
in his re-election campaign.

The 0.5. Bureau of the Census in 1960 listed metro-
politan Detroit as having 558,870 Negroes.4 Negroes have

traditionally affiliated themselves with the Democratic

 

10.3. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and
Earnings and Monthly Report of the Labor Force, XIV, No.
7. 75.

21bid.

33amuel J. Eldersveld et 31., Political_hffiliation
in Metropolitan Detroit, University of Michigan Governmental
Studies, no. JéfiTfiufi uroor, hich.: Bureau of Government,
Institute of Public Administration, 1957), p. 87.

40.3. Census of Population, p. 76.

55

1 Neither candidate could

party in overwhelming numbers.
have ignored this sizeable, and politically motivated,
minority without placing his candidacy in jeopardy.

Labor and the Negro community were political acti-
vista with their own channels of communication throughout
Michigan. Labor contracts negotiated in Detroit formed
the mould for auto supply industries throughout Michigan.
The cause of civil rights had attracted Negroes from every
part of Michigan.

The relationship of labor and the Negro community
entwined further in the industrial plants of Michigan.
with upward mobility still generally denied to Negroes,

a large number were employed in factories where the prob-
lems of greater Opportunity and civil rights were closely
bound together. This mixture established a special frame

of reference for communication.

Aroaggoting_§treng§§

After a politician is elected to office, he accepts
the role of spokesman for his constituency. By virtue of
his office, he is in a position to influence Opinion, not
only in his own constituency, but also, as his prestige
grows, among his legislative colleagues, and voters in

other constituencies. The opportunities for leadership

from the Detroit area in the legislature are without

 

1oldersveld, pp. 87, 88.

56

parallel in outstate or northern Michigan. Voters in the
counties of Wayne, Oakland, and Mecomb elect nineteen of
the thirty-eight members of the state Senate; fifty—four
of 110 members of the House of Representatives are elected
from the same area.1 The interaction of various members
of the legislature with each other form other networks of
communication that bear on state-wide candidacies and cam-
paigns.

One of the most important state-wide Democratic
primary elections since World her II occurred in 1960 when
John B. Swainson, lieutenant governor, sought the gubernae
torial nomination. G. Mennen Williams had declined to seek
re-election. Swainson won the nomination over James H.
Hare and Edward Connor on the basis of his plurality in
Detroit. There were 540,454 ballots cast in the primary,
and 342,457 were from metropolitan Detroit.2 Swainson
received 274,473 votes, and of these, 187,373 were cast

in metropolitan Detroit.3

.
I

hass Fedia and Public Cpiaioa

The more personal the communication, the more

 

1These figures include fractional districts.

2Eichigan, Secretary of State, Vichigan Manual,
1961-1962, pp. 399, 400.

3Michigan, Michigan Manual, 1961-1962, pp. 399,
400.

57

effective it is in converting opinion.1

Candidates , how-
ever, would face an insurmountable task if they had to con-
tact each voter in a campaign. The responsibility for pro-
viding information to the masses has been accepted by the
mass media, including newspapers, television, radio and
magazines. The mass media form an important part of man's
daily environment; they are considered to be reliable by
its readers.2

The mass media are highly critical to the endless
networks of personal communication that surround people
by nourishing them with information. Ideas tend to flow
from the mass media to Opinion leaders who influence inter-
personal communication, suggesting a process that has been
called the "two step flow" in communication.3

An unusually heavy burden is placed on the mass
media in Detroit with the heavy concentration of adherents
to the Democratic party. The information they disseminate
reaches opinion leaders who are in a position to influence
large segments of the Michigan Democratic party.

1Bernard Berelson, "Communications and Public Opin-
ion," in Reader in Public Opinion and Communicat_ion, Bernard
Berelson and Lorrie uanowitz (eus.§ (olencoe, 111.. Free
Press, 1950-53), p. 4520

2Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Media (New
York: Bureau of Applied Social aesearcn, Columbia Univer~

3Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel
Gaudet, ghe keople's Choice (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1946), p. 151.

 

S8

The focal points for mass dissemination of news
in Detroit are the two major daily newspapers. The oldest
is the Detroit Free Press, founded in 1831, the last sur-
viving morning daily newspaper of general circulation in
Michigan. The Eree Press is a politically independent
newspaper1 and it is published by the Knight Newspapers,
Incorporated, which also publishes the Herald in Miami,
Florida, the Beacon Journal in Akron, Ohio, and the Observer
in Charlotte, North Carolina.

The other major daily newspaper in the city is the
Detroit News, which has the largest circulation of any news-
paper in Michigan. Founded in 1873, thedfiggg is currently
published by the Evening News Association, and the editor
is Martin Hayden. The Detroit News is published weekday
afternoons and Sunday mornings, with a strong emphasis on

home delivery.

wire Services

The Associated Press and the United Press Inter-
national are news gathering services that have offices
around the world. Each wire service maintains national
and state wires throughout the United States. Stories are
routed from their sources into this expansive arterial sys-
tem. News of limited geographic importance or interest is

kept off the national wires. Both wire services maintain

 

lEray, £13: a Son's Directory, 507.

59

state networks to serve their state members and clients.
The main Michigan bureaus of the Associated Press and the
United Press International are situated in the same down-
town cluster of buildings that house the Detroit Free Press
and the Detroit News.

Both wire services have feeder bureaus in Lansing
and Grand Rapids. The Associated Press serves forty-five
Michigan newspapers on its news wire, and about seventy
broadcast outlets on its radio-television wire.1 The
United Press International serves twenty—four newspapers
and about one hundred television-radio outlets.

The Associated Press is a cooperative arrangement
operated by the member newspapers. United Press Inter-
national is a privately owned organization that sells its
services to clients. Both wire services, however, Operate
similarly to each other. The emphasis is on accuracy and
speed in the transmission of news.

Reporters for the Associated Press began intensive
coverage of the williams-Cavanagh primary election in the
final weeks of the campaign. Previous coverage had been
on the basis of press releases from the candidates, exam-
ination of material carried by the two major Detroit dai-
lies, and from newspapers in the area where the candidates

were campaigning. Editors in the Detroit bureau examine

 

1Competition for members between the two wire serv-
ices causes these numbers to change periodically.

60

every edition of the Free Preseand the News.1

United Press International in Michigan covered the

2

primary election "about 50 per cent of the time." On other

occasions, the news service relied on handouts from the
candidates, and clients; and the Free Free; and the News
were checked regularly for "angles."3

The wire services were important to Cavanagh be-

cause he needed outstate exposure.4

W

1Interview with Eugene Schroeder, Associated Press
news analyst, Feb. 13, 1968.

2Interview with tichael J. Conlon, Assistant Bureau
Manager, Detroit, United Press International, Feb. 13, 1968.

31b1d.

4Interview with Ripley, Nov. 28.

CHAPTER V
THE VIETNAM ISSUE DEVELOPS

Six months after President Johnson obtained con-
gressional approval for the Tonkin resolution, he told the
nation in his 1965 State of the Union address that the se-
curity of the United States was directly related to the
events in Southeast Asia. Cther political leaders, some
in the President's own political party, began expressing
doubts over the growing investment in South Vietnam. What
may at one time appeared to have been a guerrilla uprising
and a punitive response to an attack on the navy destroyer
"Maddox," had become a war of major proportions. The grow-
ing ferocity of the fighting was graphically related to

me American people in l§65 when 240 Americans perished
in a seven-day battle between the U.S. First Cavalry and
North Vietnamese regulars, and some guerrillas in the
South Vietnam Iadrang Valley. In the preceding seven
weeks, culminating with the engagement in the Iadrang
Valley, 678 Americans had been killed in Vietnam; this
was equivalent to all the American deaths in Vietnam for

the previous four and one-half years.1

 

IMew York Times, Nov. 25, 1965, p. l.

61

62

American bombers carried the fighting to targets
in North Vietnam during 1965. Twice, President Johnson
stopped the bombing of North Vietnam as a gesture to start
peace talks on the war.1

The growing military commitment to Vietnam forced
draft quotas to increase. In July of 1965, the nation's
draft quota.was increased from 17,000 a month to 35,000.2
Many of the prospective draftees were college students who

sought to delay their induction into the armed forces by

seeking deferments to continue their education.

Protest and Srcfcrt

Professors and college students were at the fore-
front of anti—war movements. They conducted demonstrations,
peace marches, and sit—ins. The first teach-in was held
at the University of hichigan in Larch of 1965; this was
a new kind of protest meeting where students and faculty
spoke on the war, ostensibly to educate themselves, but
more accurately to register their opposition.

A group of students at the University of hichigan
had their draft deferment classifications revoked after

they were arrested at an anti-war sit-in at the draft board

 

1U.S., Department of State, Viet-Nam in Brygg,
U.s. Dept. of State, Publication No. 8173 (washington:

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 5, 6.

2Lester A. Sobel (ed.), South Vietnam: 0.3.-
Communist Confrontation in Southeast Asia (New York:
Facts on File, inc., late), p. 4.

63

in Ann Arbor on October 15. 1965. At Michigan State Uni-
versity, five persons were arrested in the student union
building as they distributed anti—war literature near a
United States Marine Corps booth on October 12, 1965.1
And when Vice President Hubert Humphrey spoke at commence-
ment exercises at Michigan State University in June, 1966,
protesters shouted derisively at him. They also chanted:
"Hey: Hey! LBJ! How many kids did you kill today?" When
Vice President Humphrey rose to deliver the commencement
address in the University stadium, the protesters, number-
ing about seventy, walked out.2

hhile the anti-war demonstrations attracted con-—
siderahly more attention than the actions of supporters
of the President, there was Strong backing, nevertheless,
in some regions for the Johnson administration. The pro-
war sentiment urged the administration to apply sufficient
military pressure to win the war, a sarvey by Lou Harris
and Associates snowed.3 The findings in the Harris poll
were similar to the resalts obtained by Representative
James Harvey, a Republican from the Eighth Congressional

District of Michigan. more than half of 9,000 respondents

 

1State News (Michigan State University), Oct. 13,
1965, p. 1.

2§tate Journal_(Lansing), June 13, 1966, p. 7-C.

 

3Detroit Free Press, June 13, 1966, p. 1. Lou
Harris and Associates is a nationally syndicated public
opinion firm that specializes in political polling.

 

66

For the benefit of campus demonstrators,
Defense Secretary McNamara gives assurance we
are not attempting to terrorize or kill civilians
in the North. Bach target is very thoroughly
reconnoitered and has to be isolated from urban
population.

. . . with McNamara's hard facts, and with Mr.
Johnson's enlightened, if long delayed, policy
of Speaking out, the administration is at last
moving in a broad front to tell the world why
we're in South Vietnam, and, equally vital, why
we'll stay there as long as we're needed.

A year earlier, the News had held to the identical
policy of continued bombing. The News had said editorially:
To demand the bombing cease on humanitarian
grounds or because of muddled political thinking
is like asking a patrolman to holster his gun in

the hope some bandit will stop trying to blast
his head off.2

An indication of the editorial policy of the Detroit

Free Press on the bombing was made on December 28, 1965,

 

when the newspaper called for a suspension:

But not bombing again shows the world that we
want peace, that we are willing to settle for less
than total victory, and therefore that a negoti-
ated trace is possible.

On whatever grounds it won't be easy. Though
we should not have gotten involved in the first
place, we are now, apparently determined to stay.
30 are the VCs.

One day earlier, the Free Press had been critical
of Lieutenant General Lewis Hershey, director of selective

Service, because of his order for re-classification to

 

IDetrOit News, April 27, 1965, p. lO-B.
g£2$g°o April 20, 1965, p. 18-A.

3Detroit Free Press, Dec. 28, 1965, p. B-A.

57

induction status of the students who had been arrested at

a draft protest in Ann Arbor.1

Because of the 200,000 men in Vietnam, the Congress
was "paralyzed" to act in altering the course of the war,

for fearing the results could adversely affect soldiers

2

in the field, the Free Press noted editorially. During

the Nilliams-Cavanagh campaign, a tense internal situation
involving Buddhists and the South Vietnamese government
threatened to collapse the South Vietnamese government.
The Free Press commented:

Now, with the ninth American-ordained govern-
ment going down the drain, we are obviously be-
coming the enemy rather than the ally. Even Viet-
namese soldiers, carrying American weapons, marched
through Ua Nang this week asking us to leave.

Thus the United States no longer has an assort-
ment of choices, but only two with variations.
we can take over the country, or we can get
out. . . . For our part, we do not believe that
Vietnam as an ally is vital to the United States
or to the free world. Nor do we believe that such
a Vietnam can be achieved.

But the one clear fact is that time has run
out. In the best interest of the United States,
and in honesty and decency to our 215,000 troops
there, we can no longer pretend our misconceived
dreams of victory are possible or that the people
of Vietnam share them.

Vietnam Dominates Political Climate

The war in Vietnam underscored every important

 

1Detroit Free Press, Dec. 27, 1965, p. B-A.

F0

libido, FBI). 18, 1966, p0 8’Ao

m

Ihido, April 14, 1966’ p. 3“}.

h)

68

facet of life in Michigan during the campaign between
Williams and Cavanagh. The national economy was feeling
the strain of supplying civilian goods and war materials
simultaneously. Interest rates were adversely affected
by the growing war economy. Priorities to improve the
nation's cities suffered. Businessmen were uncertain as
to the future.1
These domestic pressures and the increasing ag-
gressive fighting in Vietnam, and the casualties from the
fighting, were responsible for the importance of the war
as a campaign issue. Vietnam_started out as the major
issue and remained the major issue throughout the campaign.2
Williams and Cavanagh sensed the importance of
Vietnam to their campaigns early. Cavanagh, however, was
more enthusiastic. He said:
I believe in the position [I took]. I also
thought it was good politics to separate myself
out, particularly on a real gut issue [Vietnam]
from the administration, and particularly from
Soapy who said [he would] support the administra«
tion. I knew there was some political help by
adopting what was basically a position of conscience.
I tried to establish in the minds of the people
there was a distinct difference. . . . Vietnam was
evidence that I was not afraid to carve out a new

and different position for the sixties.3
williams said:

 

1Interview with Ripley, Nov. 23.

2Interview with McGloin.

3Interview with Cavanagh, Nov. 28.

69

I took the position that I thought was the
correct one.
Vietnam wasn't a choice on our part as a favorite
issue. It was something that was th re. It was
a point the mayor wanted to make an issue of, so
we thought the best way to treat it was to give
a full and complete explanation of what our posi-
tion was on it and not hack away at it.1

 

1Interview with silliams.

CILKPTSR V1
CAVANASEUS VIETNAM STATZI'ZSXT: PRESS REPORTS

One month after he announced his candidacy for the
Democratic nomination to the United States Senate, Mayor
Jerome P. Cavanagh issued a carefully prepared position
paper on the conflict in Vietnam. It was the first of a
series of position papers the Mayor had scheduled to sinu-
late political debate with his Opponent, G. mennen willians.

For many days before the statement was issued on
April 19, 1966, Cavanagh conferred with three campaign
assistants on the alternatives in Vietnam. The three who
advised the Mayor were Anthony Ripley, an assistant to
Cavanagh and who had been a Detroit Fees reporter in
Vietnam; Richard Strichartz, a aayne State University
professor of law who was on leave to the city of Detroit
as City Controller; and Daniel Schecter, an intern in the
mayor's office from the maxwell School of Public Adminis-
tration of Syracuse University. Among those who were con-
sulted by the Mayor and his advisers were Professor
Thomas H. Greer, chairman of the Department of Hunanities
at Michigan State University, and a critic of the war;
and Otto Feinstein, professor of economics at sayne State

University. Ripley and Schecter prepared the written

70

71

drafts.1

Cavanagh wanted to meat Williams in a public debate
on Vietnam, and he issued challenges at various points dur-
ing the campaign. He did not expect nilliams to accept

the offer to debate.2

V ‘ '1‘ 1" (1 '3' 3 i "n T : .‘. ' .-
Lav. a h'a zonition on Ji;tnam

 

Cavanagh said in his caroaign statement that the
United States involvement in Vietnam was the outgrowth of
one of many alliances that had been erected to contain com-
munism after uorld War II. The underlying approaches had
been the North Atlantic Treaty Crganization, the Truman
Doctrine, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Central
Treaty crgznization, the Marshall Plan, and foreign aid.3

In 1954, aftnr the defeat of the French in Indo-
china, the United States had offered assistance to the
Republic of South Vietnam to "resist 'a foreign idoology.'”
The assistance pregram in South Vietnam had gradually led
the United States into a military venture that had cost
the lives of many Americans. In addition to the tragic

personal consequences of the conflict, the United States

had become involved in a war that was military, and

llntcrview with Cavanagh, Dec. 7.

..L'I:;:'i...i., 36C. 70

 

3Jerome P. Cavanagh, "A Road to Peace in Viet Nam:
A Call for a New and Creative Policy for Peace and Freedom
in Asia" (statement issued by Jerome P. Cavanagh during
the senatorial primary campaign, April 19, 1966), p. 2.

72

politically questionable, and expensive. The war had ad-
versely effected the United States military strength in
Europe. It was a drain on the American economy, and it
was producing concern over national priorities.1

The United States, Cavanagh'a statement continued,

was in a position of prosecuting a war while it ainultane-
ously sought to introduce large economic and social programs
in Vietnam. These objectives aeemed "incompatible."2
Prominent men in both political parties, responsible men-
bera of the United States Senate, people on university
campuses, mothers, retirees concerned with inflation, and
ordinary working peeple are opposing the war.3

The policy of the United States over Vietnam,

Cavanagh said, was locked in the past and offered no al-
ternatives but to continue the "uncertain struggle.”4
Cavanagh wrote:

I believe the time has come to search for a
new way out——a realistic and honorable way to end
the present war and a realistic stand on which to
base our foreign policy for the years ahead.5

A gourse of Action.-The United States, Cavanagh

said in his statement, lust adopt a Vietnam policy that

 

1

21bid., p. 3.

W

Ibide’ p. 10

-Midl, p. 2.

Cavanagh, "A Road to Peace," pp. 1, 4.

b w
r

 

lhido’ Po ‘0

 

73

was in keeping with the present political situation in the
world. Communism should be resisted; the emphasis, how-
ever, ought not to be on the military. It ought to be with
methods that encourage economic security, progress, and
put an end to poverty, hunger, and diseases.1

A cease fire should be sought in Vietnam, Cavanagh
said. Free elections should be held, and from this popu-
lar base, ”legitimate negotiations could be started with
the National Liberation Front [Viet Cong]."2

The cease fire would permit the widest possible

participation in the elections. Cavanagh said:

Let the Vietnamese then seek whatever course
their free government desires to settle their
national destiny. This may include asking the
United States forces to leave. This may include
negotiations with the National Liberation Front.
hhatever the course, we must accept it.

The National Liberation Front must be recog-
nized and dealt with-«not by us but by the South
Vietnamese themselves. The Viet Cong fighters
are obviously not going away. The nature and
scope of their participation in any government
will have to be determined by the Vietnamese
themselves.3

The United States snould strive to build a neutral

buffer state, one that would remain an ally, but had the
option of dealing with the Communists. There are "two

Chinas" and the United States should face this fact.

 

1Cavanagh, "A Road to Peace," p. 4.

ZIbide, LP. 4’ 5e

31b1d0. p. 5.

74

"Mainland China," the communist People's Republic of China,
should be offered a seat in the United Nations and a seat

on the Security Council of the United Nations.1

Free Press Reports Cavanagh's Statanalt

Cavanagh called a press conference to issue his
statement on Vietnam. 0n the day of the conference, the
early editions of the Detroit Free Press carried a story
that accurately "predicted“ the substance of the mayor's
Vietnam statement.2

The {ice Press presented the mayor's position on
Vietnam in a story based on the press conference and the
mimeographed Vietnam statement the Mayor had distributed.
The Free Press story3 was printed on April 20, 1966, one
day after the press conference; it appeared on page nine,
section B. The byline over the story was that of James M.
Nudge, chief of the Free Press citymcounty bureau.

The story had a three-column, tho-line headline:
"LBJ Hasn't Done Enough in Vietnam, Cavanagh Says."

In its story the Free Press noted that Cavanagh
had split with President Johnson over Vietnam. Also point-
ed up were the important points by Cavanagh for a cease

fire, free elections, social reform, and a change in United

1Cavanagh, "A Road to Peace," p. 4.

zuetrcit Free 9ress, April 19: 1966: 9' 5'B°

w

3
appendix.

The full text of the story is included in the

75

States foreign policy. The Free Press also reported
Cavanagh‘e belief that the People's Republic of China
should be offered seats in the United Nations and on the
United Nations Security Council.1

Cavanagh's emphasis that the United States mili-
tary commitment to Vietnam had warped the entire program
there was also noted by the Eree Press. The story con-
tained references to a Williams-Cavanagh debate about Viet-
nam, and it reported that Cavanagh was scheduled to go on
a three-week trip to Europe "late this week . . . plugging
Detroit and Michigan as tourist attractions."2

Free Press Editorial Reaction
to Cavanagn's Statement

 

Conferences to formulate editorial policy at the
Detroit Free Press were attended by the editorial board
composed of the editorial writers; Judd Arnett, a daily
columnist; Prank williama, editorial cartoonist; and Mark
Ethridge, the editor, who presided over the meetings.3
The Free Press, which had opposed the war editorially,

reacted favorably to Cavanagh's Vietnam position in an

 

 

editorial4 three days after the mayor issued his statement.
1Detroit Free Press, April 20, 1966, p. 9-8.
21bid.
3

Interview with Mark Ethridge, Editor, yptroit
Free Press, March 1, 1968.

4The full text of the editorial is contained in
the Appendix 0

76

Cavanagh, the ggee Press pointed out, has elevated
the campaign from "petty bickering” to "a serious discus-
sion of an important policy issue."1

The Free Press reviewed Cavanagh's points concern-
ing withdrawal from Vietnam, free elections, the contain-
ment of communism, and the acknowledgment that "two Chinas"
existed. Williams, the Free Press urged, ought to inform
the electorate in an equally clear statement of any differ-
ences that he had on these points with Cavanagh.2

Cavanagh's Vietnam statement, the firee Pres§_said,
revealed an old "trait" in the Mayor-~an inexperienced per-

son in foreign affairs with a "fantastic capacity to learn.“3

Critical Analysis of the
fires Press Reporting

The Free Press combined the information in Cavanagh's
Vietnam statement and the remarks he had made at the press
conference into a story that presented the mayor's most
important points on Vietnam. The headline and the first
two paragraphs, which emphasized the division between
President Johnson and Cavanagh on Vietnam, fully supported
the posture the Mayor wanted to convey.

Identification of the historical alliances that

Cavanagh said were made to contain communism and had led

 

lggtroit Free Press, April 22, 1966, p. 6-A.
21bid.

31bid.

77

to the war in Vietnam was omitted by the Free Press. But
the newspaper reported that Cavanagh wanted to recast Amer-
ican foreign policy toward creating buffer nations between
the best and west in updating the present policy of contain-
ment of communism.

In separate, concise paragraphs, the {res Press
itemized Cavanagh‘s significant points of a cease fire,
free elections, and social reform. Cavanagh's assertions
that the war was being questioned by many, and that mili-
tary power. ould not necessarily assure freedom, were re-

ported. The Free Pgess, however, did not report the Mayor's

 

expression of concern over casualties and his concern over
national priorities.
The second paragraph of the story contained mislead-
ing information. The paragraph read:
In a "position" paper on foreign policy pre-
pared as part of the campaign against former Gov.
G. hennen Williams for the Democratic Senate nom-
ination, Cavanagh said the President has not done
enough toward ending the conflict.1
To report Cavanagh's statement was "on foreign pole
icy" attributed a broader scope to the statement than its
original purpose. while the Vietnam issue was in the realm
of foreign policy, the title of Cavanagh's statement nar-
rowed its nature and more accurately suggested its purpose:
"A Road to Peace in Viet Nam: A Call for New and Creative
Policy for Peace and Freedom in Asia." The mayor said in

lDetroit Free Press, April 20, 1966, p. 9—3.

78

the introduction to the statement that he expected ”to is-
sue a longer and fuller paper on foreign policy in the near
future.”1

In the first nine paragraphs of the story, the news-
paper did not explain that a press conference had been held
and that some of the information reported had not been a
part of the Mayor's Vietnam statement. This omission caused
an error. The second paragraph of the story quoted Cavanagh
as saying in the position paper that President Johnson had
"not done enough" toward ending the war. This was an in-
accurate attribution to the position paper. The position
paper did not state specifically that President Johnson
had failed to do enough to end the war, although this theme
wesimplicit. Cavanagh's reference to Johnson had been made
during the press conference.

The Free Press reported Cavanagh wanted "Recogni-
tion of Red China" and offered that "country a permanent
seat in the United Nations.” The word ”recognition" car-
ried the connotation of diplomatic recognition. Cavanagh's
statement did not specifically urge diplomatic recognition
of Red China; it stated the United States must "face the
fact that two Chinas exist." The statement said:

. . . We must face the fact that two Chinas do
exist today. We must offer mainland China a seat
in the United Nations and a permanent seat . . .
on the . . . Security Council. . . . Mainland

Chinese have already stated a number of precondi-
tions to their entry [sic] into the United Nations,

1Cavanagh, "A Road to Peace," n.p.

79
some of which seem impossible. But the offer must
be made and kept open.1
The Free Press also omitted Cavanagh’s point that
the offer of admission to the United Nations to Red China
should be accompanied with an offer for a seat on the Sc—

curity Council.

Detroit News Reports

: s

The Detroit News reported on hayor Cavanagh's Viet-

2 was placed

new position paper on April 20, 1966. The story
on page six, section C, under the byline of Jo Ann Hardee,
chief of the §g§§.city-county bureau. The headline over

the story said: "A Red 3. Vietnam Would Pose No Threat,
Cavanagh insists."

The report in the figgngas a blending of Cavanagh's
position paper with remarks that were attributed to the
mayor. The £25§_did not report that Cavanagh had held a
press conference, nor did the §g5§_clearly distinguish be-
tween direct remarhs by the mayor and those portions that
came from the position paper.

The story in the netroit News reported that Cavanagh
did not see any threat to American security in a South
Vietnam that voted for a communist government in free elec-

tions. If elections were held, the News pointed out that

Cavanagh "doubted” if the Communists would win. If the

1Cavanagh, "A Road to Feace," p. 4.

2The full text of the story is included in the
Appendix.

80

Communists did win, the‘figgg quoted Cavanaqh as having said,
satisfactory relationships could be developed by the United
States similar to relations with the communist countries
of Yugoslavia and Poland. Cavanagh's "buffer state" con-
cept was also reported.1

The flggg,reported that Cavanagh favored a cease
fire, free elections, including participation by the Na-
tional Liberation Front.

Cavanagh's differences with President Johnson on
Vietnam and the mayor's assertion that the President has
not done enough to end the war were also reported by the
‘gggg. The United States, Cavanagh was reported as saying
in the Eggs, had erred in its support of Premier Ky of South
Vietnam.2

Approximately 25 per cent of the Detroit Newg_ac-
count of Cavanagh's statement was concerned with the author-
ship of the paper. The report said the paper was "author-
ized" by Anthony Ripley and Richard Strichartz, with advice
from B. J. hidick, a Wayne State University professor in
the University's Institute of Labor and Industrial Rela-
tions. Widick's relationship, the Eggg_noted, was signif-

icant because of his former post in the United Auto Workers

research department. The UAW was "expected to support

 

1Detroit News, April 20, 1966, p. 6-C.

21bid.

81

Williams," the News said.1

Detroit Nave Editorial Reaction
to Cavanagh's Statement

Editorial policy for the Detroit News was estab-
lished in regular meetings attended by Martin Hayden, ed-
itor of the Egggj Wilbur Elston, director of the editorial
page; and a staff of editorial writers.2 The Detroit News,
which had been sympathetic to Cavanagh's candidacy, was
strongly opposed to his position on the war in Vietnam.

On June 12, 1966, seven and one-half weeks after
Cavanagh issued his Vietnam position paper, the 5333 said

in an editorial3 ‘

it was "disappointed" with the Mayor.
The Egg; said that Cavanagh's belief that a communist gov-
ernment in South Vietnam would pose no threat was a case
of his placing his judgment against Presidents Eisenhower,
Kennedy, and Johnson, and their staffs. There was no prece-
dent for Vietnam, 3 country that had been wracked by twenty
years of war, the £33; editorial said.5
The $53; questioned whether the Communists would
permit an orderly campaign and free elections, and it stated
1Detroit News, April 20, 1966, p. 6-C.
2Interview with Wilbur Elston, Associate Editor
iggeEditorial Page director of the detroit News, harch l,

3The full text of the editorial is included in the
Appendix.
4Uetroit News, June 12, 1966, p. lB-B.

SIbid.

 

82

the South Vietnamese government and the moderate Buddhists
opposed participation of the National Liberation Front in
any election. Laos was cited by the EEEE as an example
of the "buffer state" idea preposed by the Mayor. The
Communists, the E233 noted, had ignored their agreements
on Laos.1
The editorial stated:
We realize . . . the Mayor's current interest
is in the votes that he would spread a net which
would catch the undetermined number of draft ob-

jectors, haw Leftists, pacifists, and plain citi-
zens o o 0 [W110] are impatient. e o 0

Critical Analysis of the
Detroit New§_Report
The editorial position of the getgpit heg§_strongly
supported a firm commitment to Vietnam. When Cavanagh is-
sued his position paper that encouraged disengagement from
Vietnam, the Egflg presented the mayor's views in an incom-
plate and unbalanced report. There were distortions in
the story, and the tone was unfriendly. The 3233 presented
an account that violated the spirit and intent of Cavanagh's
position on Vietnam. This was accomplished by mixing the
Mayor's comments with reporting on his position paper.
Cavanagh's important point in his statement that

there be a cease fire to permit the "widest participation

 

lggfir01t News, June 12, 1966, p. lB-B.
2

 

lbid.

 

83

in elections" formed the basis of a major distortion of

the Mayor's views. The distortion began with the headline,
"A Red 5. Vietnam would Pose No Threat, Cavanagh Says,”

and continued for five paragraphs. The account began:
”There is no threat to American security in a Communist
South Vietnam, Mayor Cavanagh said today."1 It continued
with the statements that if free elections were held, South
Vietnam would probably not go Communist. But the United
States ought to be prepared to withdraw if the freely elect-
ed government asked the v.5. to leave. Satisfactory rela—
tionships could be established similar to those with the
communist countries of Yugoslavia and Poland if, after elec-
tions, the U.S. would have to leave Vietnam.

The Detroit News emphasized the extreme possibili-
ties-ofree elections that could produce a communist victory
and force American withdrawal, posing a threat to American
security. The headline on the story, ”A Red 5. Vietnam
would Pose Ho Threat, Cavanagh Insists,” and the first five
paragraphs were devoted to this extreme theme. The point
of elections was not placed in the context of Cavanagh's
proposal of discarding the old containment policy and build-
ing a new American policy in Vietnam with the Vietnamese
taking the major responsibility for their own government.
Acceptance of the results of a free election-even if they

were unfavorable-was a logical consequence in Cavanagh's

 

1Detroit News, June 12, 1966, p. 18-8.

84

preposal.
Cavanagh issued his Vietnam position paper on
April 19, and the story appeared on April 20. The lead
paragraph in the Egg; story said . . . "There is no
threat . . . Cavanagh said today [April 20]." In the
sixth paragraph, the Egg§_reported the position paper was
issued "yesterday" [April 19]. This seemingly minor con-
flict of time was not unimportant. The comments the £332_
reported Cavanagh made "today" were placed above the con-
tent in the position paper, which had been issued “yester-
day in the story." Unanswered were the questions of when,
where, and why had the Mayor made the "today“ comments that
adversely affected his carefully thought out position paper
of "yesterday."1
The Detroit News reported that in his position paper
Cavanagh had wanted the National Liberation Front to para
ticipate in free elections in Vietnam. Cavanagh called
for the "widest participation" in the elections, but he
did not say precisely the Liberation Front should be in-
volved. Of the Front, he said:
The National Liberation Front must be recog»
nized and dealt with-~not by us but by the South
Vietnamese themselves. The Viet Cong fighters are
obviously not going to go away. The nature and

scope of their participation in any government will

have to be determined by the Vietnamese themselves.2

Detroit News, April 20, 1966, p. 6-C.

2Cavanagh, ”A Road to Peace," p. 5.

l

85

The theme of ”American security" was threaded
through the Detroit News account. Csvanagh's position,
the Detroit News account suggested by implication, was a
threat to American security. The Eggg.reported in one
paragraph:

In response to questions, he [Cavanagh] de-

nied he was willing to trade American security
for a reduction in war expenses which would per-
mit more domestic spending, especially on his pet
urban programs.

Cavanagh's statement indicated the resistance to
communism should have its emphasis in social reform. The
£333 reported that Cavanagh "would advocate social and eco-
nomic aid to Vietnam even if it went communist after free
elections."2

The Detroit News omitted any reference that Cavanagh
had made to Red China, and Cavanagh's point for Red China's
admission to the United Nations.

Approximately 25 per cent of the 5333 story was
concerned with the authorship of the Cavanagh paper. The
position paper, according to the £233, was "authorized"
by Anthony Ripley and Richard Strichartz. The use of the
word "authorized“ was a faulty choice. It suggested that
Ripley and Strichartz gave Cavanagh permission to make the

Vietnam statement. Inasmuch as Cavanagh was the candidate

 

lgetroit News, April 20, 1966, p. 6-C.

21bid.

86

and Ripley and Stricharts were aides, it was unlikely they

were in a position to give their permission.

CHAPTER VII
WILLIAMS' VIETNAM STATEMENT: PRESS REPORTS

G. Mennen Williams acknowledged that Vietnam was
one of the maj;: challenges facing the United States at
the outset of his campaign for the United States Senate.
He addressed himself to the issue from time to time. His
comments, however, did not attract sufficient attention
to ease the pressure from "newspapers and various others"
that he did not have a definite stand on Vietnam.1

dilliams responded to the criticism by purchasing
a full page advertisement in the Detroit Free Pres; on
May 19, 1966, stating his views on the war. The cost was
$2,500.2 A decision to use the advertisement to outline
his position was made in part to eliminate the opportuni-
ties for misinterpretation or error that might occur in
the dissemination of the Williams position through a news
story.3 Williams drafted the statement without outside
assistance or consultation, except for some help of "tech—

nicians with style."4

 

Interview with Williams.

Interview with McGloin.

u: a: r»

Ibid.

.5

Interview with Williams.

87

88

Williams Position on Vietnam
In his statement on Vietnam, Williams reacted sharp-
ly to the report by the Detroit News that Cavanagh said
he did not see any threat to American security in a com-
munist South Vietnam. williams wrote in his position paper:
One thing . . . I want to make absolutely clear.
I cannot agree with anyone who says that a Communist
takeover in South Viet-Nam would pose no threat to
American security. I think it would be dangerous
to the security of the United States and the whole
free world. It would be a setback for democracy
and freedom.
A Communist takeover in South Viet—Nam as a
result of a guerrilla war, supported by Peking
with weapons from hanoi with soldiers, would be
dangerous to the peace of the world.1
South Vietnam was involved in a war against commu-
nist aggression, and the security of the United States was
firmly tied to the struggle, williams said. The United
States could neither escalate the war, nor withdraw entire—
ly from South Vietnam. To push for all-out war would pro-
duce the risk of conflict with the People's Republic of
China, and to withdraw would invite the expansion of com-
munist influence throughout Southeast Asia, ailliams said.
withdrawal would also encourage other wars of liberation

and would discourage resistance to communism.2

The United States must continue to seek peace

1G. Mennen Williams, "Viet-Nam: A Message to the
People of Michigan from G. Mennen silliams," a campaign
statement by Williams that was published as an advertise-
ment in the Detroit Free Press hay 19, 1966, p. 17-8.

I,
‘Ibid.

 

89

through negotiations. Peace and stability in South Vietnam
required a vigorous military, economic and social effort,
according to Williams.1
Militarily, williams said, the communists would
not look for an end to the fighting as long as they hold
the View that they can subdue South Vietnam by force. It
was in the interest of the United States to help the South
Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese had more than 500,000
men in the field. In addition, they have gone about their
civilian duties despite the abduction of 4,000 officials
since January 1, 1964. The communists did not have wide-
spread popular support in South Vietnam. The United States,
Williams noted, had increased its military forces "because
the aggression from the Nerth has increased."2
The economic and social proqram, Williams said,
cannot wait until the fighting is over. The efforts against
poverty, ignorance, and disease should be pursued while
the war continued. Economic and social assistance.must
also be given to the neighboring states of Cambodia, Laos,
and Thailand to strengthen their nations and preserve their
independence.3
Free elections, williams said, should be expedited
in South Vietnam. Attempts should be made to persuade the

 

1Williams, "Viet-Nam."

 

90

Viet Cong to join in the elections. One goal of the free
election would be to establish a pepular government that
could address itself to the variety of problems that con-
front the South Vietnamese. Bventually, Williams noted,
the decision of reunification could be put to the elector-

ate of South Vietnam and North Vietnam.1

People's Republic of China.-—The peace of Southeast
Asia depended upon the policies of the People's Republic
of China and the policy of the United States toward that
nation, Williams said. China had imposed herself on her
neighbors for centuries, and in the current era, she has
tried to expand her sphere of influence to Africa and Latin
America. China's policy was aggression.2

Williams said, "without Red Chinese arms and inter-
est, the problem of communist aggression in South Vietnam
probably would have been resolved before this."3

The United States, williams said, must expand its
contacts with the People's Republic of China, and it should
offer encouragement to greater Chinese entrance into the
world affairs. The Chinese should be persuaded to drop

their "unreasonable" demands for entry into the United

Nations.‘

 

lwilliams, "Viet-Nam.”

zlhid.

31b1d.

41bid.

91

The United States should make it clear that she
had no territorial ambitions or special privileges on the
mainland of Asia that would conflict with the security of
the People's Republic of China. While supporting the sov-
ereignty of Nationalist China, the United States should
assure the People's Republic that it has no intention of

assisting Chiang Kai-Shek's return to the mainland.1

Detroit News Reports
Statemenfi*by Williams

One day before the full-page advertisement was
scheduled to appear in the Detroit free Press, the Detroit
fleas reported on the position paper williams had prepared
on Vietnam.2 The account was published in section C, page
15, under a two-line, two-column headline: "Soapy walks
Middle Road in Viet war." The byline over the story was
that of Glenn angle, Detroit News political writer.

The Detroit News reported in the lead paragraph

 

of the story that Nilliams considered himself neith r a
"hawk nor a dove,”3 and that he wanted a strong military
defense and a vigorous, imaginative peace effort in Viet-

nam. The decision by Williams to publish his statement

 

1willians, "Viet-Nam."
2The full text of the story appears in the Appen-
dix e

3The term "hawk" was used to describe a person who
was aggressive over the war in Vietnam, while "dove" was
considered to be a person who was not committed to the war.

92

in a press advertisement and criticism by Cavanagh of

Williams for “not speaking out on . . . issues“ was also

noted.1
Four of the story's fifteen paragraphs were devoted

to Cavanagh's reference (as reported by the ggtroit News

on April 20) that he did not see any danger to American

security in a communist South Vietnam. Williams, the

Qgtroit News reported, wanted to make this point of dif-

 

ference with Cavanagh "absolutely clear." hilliams visual-
ized a communist South Vietnam as a setback for democracy
and freedom, the £333 reported.2

In concise, paragraphs of one and two sentences,
the 5333 reported the salient features in williams' state-.
ment: vigorous peace negotiations, free elections, social
and economic development, reduction of tensions with Red

China, and a limited, defensive conflict in South Vietnam.3

Detroit_flgflg Editorial Reaction
to the williams Statement

while the editorial position of the getroit News
on Vietnam was similar to that announced by williams in
his position paper, the 3232 did not comment editorially

on the paper by Williams.

IDetroit News, May 18, 1966, p. lS-C.

21bid.

31bid.

93
Critical Analysis of
the News Report

The summary in the Detroit News of the Vietnam
position paper issued by hilliams was based on the docu-
ment that Williams issued, with some references to the
statement that Cavanagh had issued on Vietnam. with pre-
cision and balance, the News cited the major Williams points
of peace negotiations, elections, economic and social de-
velOpment, a defensive war, and the firm approach to the
PeOple's Republic of China.

The headline, "Scapy halks a Middle Road in Viet
war," was in error. The substan e of his Vietnam state-
ment identified hilliams in support of the Johnson admin-
istration which had contended that it was Opposing commu-
nism and communist aggression in Vietnam. The foundation
for the misleading headline was in the first paragraph of
the story, which said ailliams did not consider himself
a "hawk or a dove." In his statement Williams emphasized
he did not want to deal in "symbols and slogans." He said:

. . . let me say that I think it is unfortunate
that so much of the dialogue on Viet-Nam is in
symbols and slogans.

Anyone who reads this statement can see that

I am neither a 'hawk' nor a 'dove.‘ I am an Amer-
ican citizen who is anxious and concerned. . . .

I am willing to try any . . . honorable means to
achieve peace.

Another significant defect in the Detroit News story

 

1williams, "Viet-Nam."

94

was the perpetuation of a distortion of an important point
that Cavanagh had advanced on Vietnam. On April 20, 1966,
at the time when the Eggg’reported on Cavanagh's position
paper, the story said that Cavanagh could "simply see no
threat in a Communist Vietnam." williams responded to this
quotation, and the §§3§_reported the exchange as follows:

I [Williams] cannot agree with anyone who says

a Communist takeover in South Vietnam would pose

no threat to American security. I think it would

be dangerous to the security of the United States. . . .
In a "position paper" on the subject April 20,

Cavanagh said he could "simply see no threat to

American security in a Communist Vietnam."1

When the quotation was reported in the 53:3 initi-
ally, it was a distortion of Cavanagh's position. The quo-
tation was not in Cavanagh's position paper. The £333 did
not say precisely when and where Cavansgh made the remark
and under what circumstances.

Williams placed the blame on the People's Republic
of China for the difficulties in Southeast Asia. He said
the defense of Vietnam was necessary to stop the spread
of Chinese communism and to discourage other "wars of lib-

ration."2 The 5233 omitted these important themes that
underlined killiams' entire philosophy of the war.
petroit Free Press Reports

Stateront r3 sillia11

Cn May 19, 1966, the Detroit Free Press printed

 

lflotroit News, May 18, 1966, p. 15-c.

2williams, "Viet—Nam."

95

an account1 of the position paper Williams had developed

on Vietnam. The story appeared on the same day the E559,
‘ggggg carried a full page advertisement from Williams out-
lining his position on the war; it was in section B, page 8.
The advertisement was also in section B, on page 17.

An eight-column headline over the news account on
Williams' statement read, ”Williams Says He's Neither 'Hawk'
nor 'Dove' on Vietnam." There was no byline over the story.

The lead paragraph reported that Williams had is-
sued a statement in which he said he was neither a "hawk"
nor a "dove." The story noted that Williams stated the
road to peace in Vietnam was based on a firm military de-
fense and a vigorous effort for peace.

The quotation in the Detroit News by Cavanagh that
he could see no danger to American security in a communist
South Vietnam also received a response in the EEfie Press.
Without mentioning Cavanagh by name, hilliams, the £552,
ggggg_reported, "stressed that a communist takeover in
South Vietnam would be dangerous to the security of the
United States. . . ."2

Williams' points on the need for free elections,
social and economic development, and contacts with Red

China were also cited by the Egge Press, Red China, the

lThe full text is in the Appendix.

2Detroit Freg_2re§s, May 19, 1966, p. 8-5.

96

Free Press reported that Williams said in his Vietnam state-
ment, "should be admitted to the United Nations if that
nation's communist government would withdraw certain demands
for membership." The {gee Press also pointed out that
milliams wanted the United States to continue its support

of Nationalist China on Formosa, while at the same time
disavowing assistance to the Nationalist Chinese in any
attempt to return to the mainland.1 The account in the

Free Press also reported the full text of hilliams‘ state-
ment was in an advertisement on page 17, section B.

Free Press Editorial Reaction
to the williams Statement

 

The Detroit Free Press did not comment editorially
on the Vietnam statement issued by williams.
Critical Analysis of the
free Press Report

The summary of the hilliams statement in the Detroit
Free Press closely resembles the account presented the

previous day by the petroityfieys. In the first four para-

 

graphs, the Free Press dealt essentially with the same
themes that were in the £333: (1) the hawk-dove symbolism,
(2) firm military defense and a vigorous peace effort, (3)
Williams' statement would appear in advertisements, (4) a
communist takeover and American security. The Free Press

reported the difference between the positions of the two

 

1getroit Free Press, May 19, 1966, p. 8-8.

97

candidates on the ”communist takeover" and "American secur-

ity" point in one paragraph;1

the £335, which develOped
the issue originally, devoted four paragraphs to it.

In the lead paragraph, the emphasis on the "hawk“-
"dove" symbolism provided the basis of a headline that was
unimaginative, and lacked any clue to the position Williams
had on Vietnam: "hilliams Says He's Neither a 'Hawk' Nor
'Dove' on Vietnam." By using this headline, the Free Press
did not exercise an opportunity for a headline that was
more precise.

In a condensed form, the Free Press reported that
williams stressed five major points: "vigorous efforts
for peace negotiations, free elections, and social and
economic development . . . , contacts with Red China . . .
and defense of South Vietnam."2

These were significant to the Williams position.
However, the Free Pres§_did not outline Williams' basic
rationale that the defense of Southeast Asia againet Com-
munist China was firmly embedded in the defense of Vietnam.
Williams' suggestion that Red China should be encouraged
toward the "mainstream" of world affairs was noted.

"Red China should be admitted to the United Na-

tions," the Free Press reported that Williams said.3

 

10 etroit Free Press, May 19,1966, p. 8-3.
2?

raid.

 

31:11

 

.«3

«illixns did ngt say in his statgmeut that neg Jaina should

\

be admittafi; he said fiad China should be kg;;u&ded t: drop
her "unreasonab’e demands" for admission to tha United

Nations.

SUHMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A free press has an obligation in a democratic
society to perform the essential responsibility of mass
communication, and it has the obligation to provide the
electorate with that information which is necessary to
govern themselves. The Vietnam issue in the Democratic
primary election between Williams and Cavanagh gave Mich-

igan's two largest newspapers, the getroit News and the

 

getrcit Free Press, an excellent opportunity to perform
these vital obligations. The issue was important; the
candidates had national reputations, and the office they
sought was significant in state and national politics.
Both candidates had addressed themselves forthrightly to
the issue, and their positions were in opposition to each
other.

The responsibility of serving as a channel of mass
communication was particularly imgortant to the Egg§_and

the Free Press for these reasons: (1) they were published

 

in a community that had 48 per cent of the population of
Michigan, (2) they were published in a community that con-
tained Democrats in sufficient numbers to influence a pri-

mary election, (3) the Associated Press and the United

99

100

Press International, the two major news wires that serviced
Michigan dailies, examined the Detroit News and the Detroit
Free Pres§_for election news and accordingly distributed
rewrites of the news to members or clients.

By virtue of their size, the Eggs and Free Eress
were in a position to exercise their editorial influence
throughout Richigan.

Even before the campaign began, when it appeared
that Senator Patrick V. Echamara would not seek re—election,
the Eggs and the Free Pres§_encouraged a climate for a pri-
mary race to give the electorate a choice. Williams was
the choice of many influential leaders in the Democratic
party to succeed Senator McNamara, and Cavanagh was con~
sidered to be an unwanted challenger. The 3225 said: "we
hope he [Cavanagh] might make a try at it. . . ." Cavanagh
acknowledged that a column by Edgar (Doc) Greene, a £333
columnist, was "unconsciously" a determining factor in his
entry into the race.

Williams had been governor of Richigan for six con-
secutive two-year terms. Before he stepped down in 1960,
williams had been considered as a presidential possibility.
He had resigned an appointive position of Assistant Secre-
tary of State for African Affairs in the Johnson adminis-
tration to enter the primary. Cavanagh had become mayor
of Detroit at the age of thirty-three by upsetting an in-
cumbent mayor. Cavanagh had attracted national attention

of his administration of Detroit before he entered the

101

primary. The Egg; editorialized that both candidates were
qualified for the senate, and the Free Press noted that
the voters of Michigan would benefit from a senate race
with Williams and Cavanagh.

The significance of the war issue was emphasized
in an atmosphere of dissent that had developed in Michigan
as well as in other parts of the United States. There were
protests and demonstrations over the growing commitment
to the war in Vietnam. More than 200,000 American soldiers
were in Vietnam, and large casualty lists had been report-
ed. Williams and Cavanagh indicated the electorate was
concerned more about the war than any other issue.

Both candidates issued carefully prepared state—
ments on the war. Williams generally was in agreement with
the Johnson administration, which advocated a vigorous pros-
ecution of the war. Cavanagh opposed a further investment
of United States resources in Vietnam.

The figgg'supported President Johnson's war policy,

and the Free Press was highly critical of it.

 

Mayor Cavanagh issued his statement on Vietnam on
April 19, 1966, one month after he declared his candidacy
for the United States Senate. He held a press conference
when he distributed his position paper.

Cavanagh's significant points of a cease fire, free
elections, social reform, and the development of a neutral
buffer state concept for Vietnam were reported the follow-

ing day by the Free Press. The Free Press noted that

102

Cavanagh wanted recognition of Red China. The word recog-

nition carried the connotation of diplomatic recognition

which is beyond the precise wording of Cavanagh's statement.
Three days after Cavanagh issued his Vietnam state-

ment, the Free Press commended Cavanagh in an editorial

 

for his posture on Vietnam; and the fires Pre5§_urged

 

Williams to speak out if he disagreed with Cavanagh.
On April 20, one day after Cavanagh's Vietnam
statement and press conference, the Eggs gave an account
of the Mayor's position. In an unbalanced, incomplete,
and distorted report, the Egg; presented an account that
was not consistent with the Spirit and intent of Cavanagh's
statement. The EEEE suggested and emphasized an extreme
possibility in the Mayor's position-a free election that
would produce a communist South Vietnam and force the with-
drawal of American soldiers. The story had its theme on
a headline that declared: "A Red 3. Vietnam Would Pose
No Threat, Cavanagh Insists." The §£E§_account was taken
from the Mayor's statement, and remarks that were attrib~
uted to the Mayor; it created an implication that the
Mayor's position was a threat to American security. The
Eggg_reported Cavanagh wanted the communist National Libera-
tion Front to participate in the elections; Cavanagh did
not say this in his statement. The Eggs also omitted any
references Cavanagh made to the People's Republic of China.
Editorially, the §§g§_told its readers that Cavanagh's

position on Vietnam was an appeal to draft objectors, new

103

leftists, pacifists, and impatient "plain" citizens.

One month after Cavanagh's position was announced,
Williams responded with a position paper on Vietnam.
Williams did not have confidence that the press would
publish his position accurately and fully. He decided
to announce his views on Vietnam by purchasing a full
page advertisement in the Free Press. One day in advance
of the advertisement, the Eggs reported on uilliams' Viet-
nam position.

The headline in the.§g3§ story, "Soapy Walks Mid-
dle Road in Viet War," was in error. Williams was not in
the middle; he generally supported the administration.

The £233, however, accurately reported the salient
points of the Williams position: vigorous peace negotia-
tions, free elections, social and economic deveIOpment,
reduction of tensions with Red China, and a limited, de-
fensive war.

It is not insignificant that Williams said in his
Vietnam position paper that he could not agree with anyone
who saw no danger in a communist South Vietnam. Williams
was referring to Cavanagh's position (as reported April 20
by the flags) that he [Cavanagh] could not see any threat
to the security of the United States if South Vietnam went
Communist in free elections. The original reporting of
the statement by the‘figgg was a distortion of Cavanagh's

position. By repeating the statement, the distortion was

called to the public's attention again.

104

The Free Press reported on Williams' Vietnam posi-
tion on the same day that the advertisement Williams pur-
chased on Vietnam appeared. The story headline said,
"Williams Says He's Neither 'Hawk' nor 'uove' on Vietnam.”
The headline was not indicative of Williams' position.

The headline carried the "middle of the road" connotation
advanced by the flags. The story in the free Press_was sim-
ilar to that in the £233.

The Free Press said Williams wanted Red China ad-

 

mitted to the United Nations. Williams did not say this
in his Vietnam statement.
Neither the News nor the free Press commented edi-

torially on the Williams Vietnam statement.

f!
conclusiers

 

There is substantial evidence to assert that although

(1'

he Hews and the Free Press reported on the war statements

 

of the two candidates, they did it in a manner that was
deficient and did not give the candidates the maximum bene-
fit.

Of the four headlines over the press accounts on
the Vietnam statements by Williams and Cavanagh, two of
them were in error, and one was not representative of the
candidate's position; only one was consistent with its
purpose.

A flawless performance in the rapid gathering and

transmission of news cannot be expected each and every time.

105

Some incidental errors are not unexpected. However, the
performance of the Egg§,and the {gee Press_on the Vietnam
statements contained error and misinformation that went

far beyond incidence. In the case of the Efifiiv an initial
reporting error and distortion was perpetuated as the Viet-
nam issue unfolded between the two candidates. The Eggs
and the Eree Press had a special obligation for accuracy
because of the complexity of the issue and its importance
to the electorate.

The claim by uilliams' campaign press secretary
that williams did not have a friendly press was supported
on two significant counts: neither the figgg_nor the Eggg.
§£g§g_would comment editorially on his Vietnam statement,
although one agreed with it in substance; and secondly,
the failure of Williams to win press attention on his
Vietnam position initially forced him to purchase a polit-
ical advertisement to make his views known. He purchased
the advertisement in the gree Presnghich, ironically,
urged him to inform the electorate of his views on Vietnam
if they differed with Cavanagh's views.

It is noteworthy that hilliams' campaign manager
said the decision to use a paid advertisement to announce
williams' views was governed in part by a fear of inaccuracy
on the part of the press.

Neither williams nor Cavanagh can be entirely ex-
cused from responsibility for a press-candidate relation-
ship that is extremely important to the electorate. Williams

106

did not need the press to win. his press secretary said.
This kind of an attitude omits a necessary ingredient of
a campaign-education of the voters with the help of the
mass media.

Cavanagh’s decision to comment on Vietnam as he
issued his carefully prepared statement may have been a
tactical mistake. His comments, particularly those as re-
ported in the Eggs, were not indicative of his position.
The press' responsibility to report his statements accur-
ately notwithstanding, Cavanagh should have limited his
comments and allowed the statement to speak for itself.

The evidence suggests the following conclusions:

(1) The Detroit Edie and the Detroit Free Press
exercised their responsibilities of mass communication in
a democratic society by reporting the Vietnam statements
of G. Mennen Williams and Jerome P. Cavanagh.

(2) There were deficiencies in the performances
of the newspapers. Editors allowed error and misinforma-
tion to find their way into the news columns.

(3) The Detroit News distorted Cavanagh's position
by implying an extreme possibility-—a communist victory
in a free election in Vietnam, forcing an American with-
drawal. This distortion was perpetuated in further news
accounts.

(4) The lack of confidence in fair and accurate
reporting was behind the decision by Williams to announce

his Vietnam position in a paid advertisement. This is a

107

blemish on the election performance of the News and the
Free Press.
(5) The hens and the Free Press were guilty of

press bias by commenting editorially on the Cavanayh state-

ment, but omitting comment on the statement by Williams.

APPENDIX A

"Nations are made and go on living
by having a program for the future.”
-Ortega y Gasset
A ROAD TO PEACE IN VIET NAfl:

A Call for New and Creative Policy
for Peace and Freedom in Asia

By Janene P. CAVANAGH
Detroit, Michigan

The first in a series of
statements on the complex
challenges of the 1960's.

April 19, 1956

INIROUUCTION

with the issuing of this statement I do not assume
the role of a foreign policy expert. But I have done a
good deal of reading on the subject. I have sought the
counsel of others and I have clearly seen the impact of
our policies abroad on the domestic needs of this nation.

when I entered the campaign for nomination as Demo-
cratic candidate for the United States Senate 1 said this
would be a campaign on the issues, not on personalities.
In line with this pledge. I have drawn up this paper-the
first.of a number of position papers I plan to issue dur-
ing this campaign. I expect to issue a longer and fuller
paper on foreign policy in the near future.

108

109

I believe Viet Nam is one of the key issues of this
campaign and tests whether we will be content to live with
the decisions of 20 years ago or if the time has come to
chart a bold new course for the future.

As John F. Kennedy said in accepting the nomination
of the Democratic Convention in 1960:

"Today our concern must be with (the) future. For
the world is changing. The old era is ending. The
old ways will not do.”

This paper is offered in the spirit of lSééu—a
spirit or reality.

Jerome P. Cavanagh
Detroit, tiichigan

I an troubled like many Americans today by the ago-
nizing news from the cities, jungles and rice paddies of
Viet Nam. It raises questions we had not asked ourselves
before and casts a huge shadow over our international and
domestic policies.

war is not a pretty business; death never is. Tele-
grams from the Defense Department announcing tragedy bring
war home to Americans every day. Those telegrams come
faster each day. We support our fighting men in Viet Nam.-
they are men of courage, dedication and loyalty. But we
must also pause to question the tangled chain of events
that brought them to Viet Nam-the national policies which
keep them there.

It is always difficult to raise major questions

110

about warfare in which Americans are dying and by so doing
suggost that perhaps they die for an illogical cause or
for inadequate reasons.

In some wars, questions need not be asked. The
issues are clear. World War II was such a war. The death
of young man was equally bitter than, but the principle
was clear and the sacrifice was accepted without question.

But today, for a host of historical and political
reacons-and like it or not.-this war is different. It
is different in its history. It is different militarily.
And so its wisdom can be-and is being-qucstioned polit-
ically:

It is being questioned by prominent men in both
parties. Son. of our most responsible senators
have asked searching questions.

These are not unpatriotic men but concerned and
informed non. Men like Senators Mansfield, Kennedy,
Church, Cooper, Aiken, Eartha, Fulbright, Morse

and oven Senator Richard Russell of Georgia.

It is being questioned by mothers who fear for their
50115 0

It is being questioned by working people and re-
tiroos, concerned about var-bred inflation and its
effect on their wages and pensions.

It is being questioned on our University campuses.

It is being questioned in tho alums and ghettoes
of our large cities by the poor who fear inevitable
cutbacks in long~needcd programs such as the war
on poverty, low-income housing and education.

It in being questioned by businessmen—~hard-noaod
and realistic men-«who are concerned about policies
which find us at odds with our old allies and in
support of nations where free cntcrpriso and indi-
vidual liberty are under attack. They are concerned,
too, about growing shortages and higher prices.

111

The events of recent woeka have shown it is being
questioned in the cities, the villages and fields
of Viet Nam and in the pagoda: and churches where
men have not known peace in more than 20 years.

A3 long as our effort was on a small scale in Viet
Nam, few of us thought much about it and the questions warn
little more than a murmur. But when the wor was stepped
up sharply. when each wave of optimism faded, when it be.
came clear that there was no quick and easy military solu-
tion to the problem there. than the questions became loud
and incessant. Today this is an issue in all part: of filth»
igan and the world. It is a complex problem-«make no air—
tako about that-and the answers cannot be given in quick,
trite aentoncoa. Instead, it is a problom to be tackled
with constructive imagination and thoughtful concern.

The size and cost of our military commitment has
raised questions about national priorities. It is clear
that whilo we can havo some guns and some butter at the
some time, a number or choice: must be mods between prob—
lems overseas and problems at home. And no we or. forced
to ordain: our forcign policies and to take a hard look
ct their reason tor being. We must do the some for our
douaatic policies.

Newsweek Magazine reports the war is costing us
:33 million a day. Casualty figures show 1,361 Americans
killod from January 1 to April 9 this year, exceeding in
little over three month: the entire years' total of casual-

ties in 1965.

112

Since the beginning of tho war. we have lost 306
aircraft, 205 of then over North Viet Ram in 14 nonthr.

These losses and the overall coat.of the war now
must be weighed against the needs at home and we must duo
cida where our vital interests lia.

We are forced to ask thoon difficult questions—-
forced to rc—oxaminn our policies-becau3a of the size of
our military commitment, because of our rooming lack of
success, because of the relatively little support our stand
has won from our traditional allies, and because of the
huge problcms the war has either brought or left unfinished
at home.

For there have been riots in Watts as well as in
Da Hang. And there is fundamental discontent both hero
and abroad.

no Mayor of Detroit, I know only too well the price
or living with outmoded policies when trying to attack tho
problems of city dwellers. Detroitorr-likc those living
in citios everywhere-know the old problem: of decaying
hauling, clogged traffic, inadequate finances, crime and
social disorganization. in Detroit with the firm backing
of labor. businass and all segments or community 111.. we
changed the old policies and we have made strong progross.
we moved forward-—and are continuing to move-bocausc we
have not boon frozen into the tracks of yesterday but have
sought new and imaginative approaches. we have not been

afraid of orporimentation. The antiapoverty programs,

113

neighborhood conservation, urban renewal, new freeways
and public buildings, expanded police training and equip-
ment, the proposed "Demonstration Cities" A¢t-these are
examples of the dramatic type of thinking that seeks to
confront problems as they are, not as we would like them
to he.

sometimes we have stabbed our toes. But the prog-
ress is all around us. It can be measured.

This same type of thinking must come to character-
ise our foreign policy.

But instead of new ideas and innovations, instead
of a forward thrust toward the future, such of our foreign
policy is locked into the past. This same foreign.policy
is the basis of our commitment in Viet Nam.

At the close of world war II, we set into notion
a nunber of alliances, pledges and aid programs in response
to militant and spreading communism. These made up a good
policy for that day and they worked. In our dealings with
foreign nations since then, we have largely followed a line
that is clear only in terms of supporting anti-communist
governments and sealing of! communist governments. The
policy has several names-mutual security, containment,
cold war, defense of the free world-«and several basic
approachesuNA'rO, the Truman Doctrine, SSATO, CENTO, and
Marshall Plan, foreign aid.

The balance point in setting up these alliances

and programs was anti~comnunism-not freedom, though we

114

constantly tried to define our stand in terms of freedom.

There have been exceptions to this rule-aid pro—
grams to Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia and Runnnia, and in
the agreement to neutralize Laos. But for the most part
no have spent our foreign aid money and equipped nrnica
and set our policy around those governments which took
anti-communist stands. It has at times made us the sup~
porters of dictators and oppressive governments which only
encourage the spread of communism.

The old policy is wanting. It gives us no way out
but to continue the uncertain struggle in South Viet nan.

we moved into Viet Nam in 1954 when the French gave
up their struggle and we did it in torn: of our policies
of containing communism. President Eisenhower wrote Prcs~
ident Ngo Dinh Siam in 1954 offering aid in building a
government that would resist ”a foreign idoology."

Now, with the war such a drain on the American econ-
omy, with the moral issues involved, with the apparent in-
ability of massive American military strength to bring a
resolution, we must begin to re-examino that policy.

For times are changing. And no must be bold enough
to change with them. Policies fashioned to meet the prob-
lems of 20 years ago are antiquated and require a thorough
rc~examination.

The containment policy, designed in part by foreign
policy expert George Kennan in the late 1940's, sarvcd us
well in stepping tho spread of communism in Eastern fiuropo.

115

But what of the use of the some policy today in Asia.
Kennan testified during the recent Sonata hearing: that
it does not apply because of many changes since the policy
was first formed and because the Asian problem is differ-
ent from the European problem at the close of World war II.
waiter Lippmann wrote recently:

"Tho world today is a very different world than

it was in 1943 ... After every great war there

comes a time-somo 12 to 20 years later-when the

post-war aettlement breaks down ... because ...

a new generation of men have grown up and taken

power."

Today things are warped in Viet Nam by the size
or our military commitment, dwarfing positive efforts wo
must make to bring freedom and self-determination. Hill.
tary action~~dramatic, touched with death and tragedy, tea-
porarily exhilarating with its sense of unity and purposes-
can overshadow political objectives if we are not careful.
Our objective: in South Viet Man are political because
freedom and aelfcdotermination are political conditions.
Freedom is seldom created by the might of military power.
though armies are necessary for its defense.

But the irony of our position is that our military
posture in defense of the free world often creates military
atructurea in other nations which deny the freedom which
we sought.

Freedom is what we want for Viet Neon-the freedom

of Vietnamese to choose their own way of life. the freedom
to live in peace. and the individual dignity that such

115

freedom brings. Perhaps they will not choose tho system
of government we chose, and sacrifice great measures of
freedom for the security of dictatorship-for dictatorship
is a secure but stifling form of government. But we must
offer the same freedom of choice which wo offer to our own
citizens or as are turning away from the finest ideals of
man and indoed our own nation.

Freedom in Southeast Asia means more than the ox-
istenca of democratic institutions. It means a society
able to preserve free institutions and at the same time
provide the necessities of life and hope for the future.

As President Johnson said there has been a change
in today's world in the hopes of man and his expectations
for the future. This change finds him looking for solutions
to the old problems of poverty, hungor and disease. Th0
Prosidont said that if peaceful revolutions are not begun
to attack these problems, than violent revolutions are inu
evitsble.

In Viet Nam we are: in a war and at the some time,
committed to a massive program of economic and social aid
which is meant to bring a peace and democracy.

The two seam clearly incompatible. How can you
bring peace while making war? How can you life up the
economy of a developing nation while tearing it down? How
can you encourage democracy while reinforcing a military
dictatorship?

It looked last winter as though we could bring peace

117

through a bold incraaso in warfare. But now our winter

of promiso has given way to a spring of discontent. The
government of South Viet Nam is trembling again, which nug-
gests that the social reforms hoped for last wintor havo
not arrived. The military government of Premier Ky which
we backed tried to solidify its hold and instead almost
brought the government down around its own head.

Through our incraaoed military action we have no
doubt hurt the Viet Cong badly and have drawn the North
Vietnamese deeper and deeper into the warfare-«thus fulfill—
ing our own prophesy.

But what have we done to encourage the political
institutions needed for froodam and aelf-determination-
the political parties. the freedom of thought and movement
needed to bring those about?

I believe the time has come to search for a new
way out-~a realistic and honorable way to and the present
war and a.realistic stand on which to base our foreign pol-
icy for the years ahead.

we must continue to resist communism. If we must
escalate lot on oscalato social reform but such reform can
only be meaningful in a nation not being devastated by war.
we cannot fight and effectively introduce social reform
at the some time in the some place. The best weapon; in
our arsenal for winning the heart: and minds of men are
the weapons of peace-*economio aocority, advancomont, and

end to hunger, disease and povorty.

118

President Johnson's bold plan for a Mekong River
develonment has won the admiration of all sides in the Viet
Nam war.

It containment is still a reasonabla measure for
our stance againnt communist tyranny, than let it be mod-
ified to meet the needs of 1966. Lot us emphasize mutual
progress as much as mutual security. Let us cease subsi-
dizing tyranny. Let us everywhara encourage and help these
governments which clearly have won the loyalty and support
of their people.

There have alraady developed in Asia-as in Butane—-
a number of nations which deal with our enemies and tannin
allies. Japan is an outstanding example. I would see as
a reasonable policy for the future encouraging formation
of more of these neutral buffar states. They would gladly
accept the role, I suspect, since they stand to gain from
the relationships with both sides. Viet Nam could become
onn or these neutral buffer states, along with other: in
Southeast Asia.

This is not the time to disarm the hmerican mili-
tary establishment or withdraw from our bases abroad. But
we must recast our thinking about the sizo of that commit-
ment and the strength of the peril we face. to must face
the fact which Hanson Baldwin, the noted military writer
has pointed out, that our strangth in Europa has bean
diluted as our Asian involvamont damanfis more and more

trained men and supplies.

119

he must also begin to deal realistically with our
enemies as well as our friends. we must face the fact that
the two Chinas do exist today. he must offer mainland China
a seat in tho United Nations and a pmrmanent ooot among
the grout powcrn on the United Kotions Security Council.
This is not being soft on communism. It is being realistic.
The mainland Chinese have already stated a number
of preconditions to their entry into the United Nations,
some of which seem imgosslblo. But the offor moat ho mode
and kept open. Tho olive branch must be tendered.
In Viet Nam we should cook the building of a neutral
buffer state. To do thia we should seek free elactions
as soon as possible. A coase fire would be helpful as a
practical matter to make the formation of political parties
and tho election possible.
A: Joan Lacouturo has writton in his book, "Viet
Nam: Between Two Trucos”:
"western policy should try neither to build an arti-
ficial anti-communist system in Viet Nam nor to
return to power one of the groups that have been
fighting each other for so many years; it should
try instead to ro-ostablish logiticaoy_nnd permit
authority to rest on a popular base. This legit-
imacywuviolatad by Dicmism, foreign intervention
and a succession of coups-«must be re—ostablished
first by permitting a resumption of political life
and subsequently by permitting the Viet Cong to
integrate thomsclvos into such a legal framework."
From the base of a poPUlar government, legitimate
negotiations could no startod with the National Liberation
Front.

So our points ara these;

120

Let there bu freo elections in the Republic of
South Viet Nam.

Let the: be a cease fire to 95 wit the widest
participation in the elections.

Lot tho Vi etna nose than nook whatever courso their
free government desires to settla the:ir natir nal d: stiny.
This may includea n; the ni ed States force 5 to leave.
This may include ne-got1a ion with the Nationnl Liberation
Front. Whatever tho course, we must accept it.

The National Liborotion Front must be recognized
and dealt witho-not by us but by the South Vietnamese them-
aelvos. The Viet Cong fighters are obviously not going
to go away. The nature and scope of their participation
in any government will have to be determined by the Viet-
namese themselves.

Premier Nguyen Cao Ky has promised his people free
elections in the next few months. If questions arise rc-
gnrding full participation of all political and religious
forces in these elections, than international supervision
should be called in to guarantee fairnass.

Only following a cessation of hostilities can the
real work of building a modern state begin with the bold
and significant plans which Prenidnnt Johnaon has proposed.
These plans can win us many friends and supporters.

fit the President said in toxiso C}.t.y inst Friday:

"The‘United States maintains its comaitronts to

government by consent of the governed, a consent
to be granted in free and hc-nest elrctior.. 1t

121

does not seek to impose on other: any form of gov-
ernment. But let us stand determined on this prin~
ciplo: despots are not welcome in this hemisphoro.”

Freedom and peace in Asia is a concern upoormoat
in the mind of every thoughtful American. But winning peace
must be part of a large, boldnr effort to rocz: American
foreign policy into an instrument which serves the world
in 1966 and 1957.

I strongly opjoao oppoaacmont. But I believe Just
a: strongly in recognizing reality.

Our foreign policy must be an instrumont which deals
in reality. We cannot deal with reality it we are fearful
of questioning old aasuoptions or content to hide behind
old slogans.

Sir Charles P. Snow wrote in 1957:

”I fancy a nucher of people all over the wootern

world still think of themselves as libarals. but
are in easenco no such thing. In their hearts they

believe their society won't and shouldn't change
ouch, that only communion is the enemy absolute

and that tho only tasks open to men of good will
are to fight the cold war with one hand and perform
minor benevolent activities with the other. That
is a tenable attitude, but it is one of pooole who
have given up the intellectual struggle.”

I am convinced the vast majority of Americana wel-
coao change as a natural fact of our way of life. For othar
millions in this world, change is necessary for survival-
for the rekindling of hope, courage and dreams.

Ortaga y Gasaat. the Spanish philosopher said it
is not yaaterday or tradition or the paat which is the de-
cisive and determining force in a nation. "Nations ara

made and go on living by having a program for the future."

H
k)
N

PRFTTIL Exvzycnwmpuv

 

i..__ _ w

 

Socks:
B'”N2PJ FXLL, :fa Twn Visg F135: A Political and Military

Analysis, Ravisad Ed.
Str¢ét without Jay, Revised, 1954
W M

‘A‘ILLIAE’! FULLER ICIZI‘, (‘1 1‘. P"”*"23 P" "3 13?“! I?“ 9.3. i ‘ " ‘39 , 1954

EARVIN a. 3:33 3323, v4 r<mz "'~~rvr, :nv 2*: FLd

C.-.3..'.’Cni 13 0'13 '1 ill-:3 ‘N JIAd “I313. 1966

 

 

PRESIDENT LYNJON B. JOHflSCN, "A Pattern far Peace in South-
Uupdrtwent of State Bullfitin,
April 25, 19€S

 

GLCRSS stman, Tastimcny bsfcre the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, February 10, 1965

JEAN LACOUTURS, Viet finm: Eet2aern TLO Trhzc-3, February,
15gb

UNITS: 532333 SZNATS, CCKKITTZS CH FCRS'ZN RZLATICN 3:
Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia
and Viet Nam, hatch 1366

Newspaper: and Magazines:

Every communications media is a valuable source
of information about the war in Viet Nam, eSpecialiy valu-
able to me have been The Congressional Record, Time, News-
weak, Foreign Affairs, U.S. flaws and world Reports, and
the #311 Street Journal. as well as articles in The Detroit
Neva, Th3 Detroit Free PreBS and The New York Times.

REPENDIX B

.1“ ,~-.* ~ ._

p t-‘ O" V“ *‘fl '7 f“ :.' -. . . . . y
u; L' ‘4‘..- L H»; x. i ;-*\.13J.~Jr.lq

T

"V'fl "F'O. p owl-.4... .g.
VIJL- "'Li U o .‘i L-...‘t.2.-*- )-

FRCM G. F“

TC
:I 2"

C3 N::~fi 7, ?66, when I became a Lixiiia-3 for
United States 3333333, I ifiantifiad '33 W33 in Viet-Ham
as one of the majox c.3iic";ws £3313; the natian.

I h3ve c333 33 this method to state my views in a
manner that cannet be misundazstood, and which I hope will
be helpful to national unity.

L3 the campaign progress33, I will continue to carry
my views to tha people in all pazts of Lic.igan.

These are my views, and no one 3133's.

Every reasonable p3r33n wants to 333 peace in Viet-
Nam. At the 5333 Lima our nut&bua& interest :3 31:35 that
Communist aggre3aion in Asia be halted.

Sowe people believe the way to bling these things
about is by 3:333139 the fighting in South Viet-33m to
an all—out war. ether: would pull out all American assist-
ance to Vie‘-Lav

I do not believe the V3st majoxity of the American
people s~'r3vC eituei of £33.33 alter: 3tiv33. The first
would r133 drawing F33 Crhi:a more directly into the conflict
and would perhaya involve us in a land war with Chinese

armies. The second alternative would invite a Communist

123

takaover of South Viet-Nam and the greater possibility of
further Communist expansion in Southeast Asia.

It is my personal o;inion that neither of th3se
extremes would be successful in guaranteeing peace in South-
east Asia for very long.

he harsh r3ality of Viet-Nc.m is that peace
is not possible without both a firm military de-
fense and a vigorous and imaginative peace effort.

A firm military 33 fr gn53 is neces sary recaus e the
Communists will not seek peace as long as they beliave they
can attain th3ir objective of dominating South Viet-Nam by
force.

A vigorous and imaginative peaca effort is neces-
sary becaua 3 it is right and E33 3‘33 3 complcta military
solution is is Q3‘ 333313.

In my opinion, th3refore, it is essential to go
forward with the works of peace immeiiately, although for
tne tim3 being, we must assist tha South Vietnamesa in their
def 3353 against Communist 3ggression so their freedom and
inde;>3ndcnco (on £3 sav.d.

The cause of £3333 in 3.3 3th Vi3t-313m can be advanced
by a more V'gorous effort to zzcura 33;:tiatior 3, by strength-

ening the go'Arnxant of South Vi3t—sz through free elec-
tions, by a 333 3 r3; id 3 2333313 and szzi:.l cavel.opme nt of
Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia w: by th3 reducticn of tensions
with R3 China.

Eefcra explainifi; my views of the necessity for

military 33* f3 3.:3 and the w .ya of promotir; a peace '1

solution, let me say that I think it is unfortunato that
so much of the dialogue on Viet-Nam is in symbols and slo-
gans.

Anyone who Leafs this at tenant can 3=a that I am
noithor a "hawk" no: a ”dove." I an an Amcricon citizen

who is anxious and concozned, as all of us are. I am will-

ing to try any reasonable and honogahle means to achieve

L‘s

. , 1 1.... . .‘
peace in tuo wall

033 thing, homavcr, I wont to make absolutely
clear. 1 cannot agree with anyone who says that
a Communist t;koovor in South Viet-Nam would poso
no threat to American security. I think it would
be d-.!f‘.'5¢3£0‘i3 to the oawmdty of tho Uszltc-‘c'i States
and the whole Free world. It would be a sotback
for democracy and f:ocdom.

A Zommunist takeover in South Viol-xam as a
result of e guerrilla war, supported by Peking with
weapona and Honoi with soldisrs, would to danger-
ous to the peace of the world.

It would undermine all those in Russia end else-
where who have chofien the tool of co~oniotcnco and
peaceful competition with the West.

It is all too easy, in a time or public worry and
uneasiness, to play upon the concern of the people and rep-
resent slogans as solutions to complicated problems. This
I will not do.

The peeple of Michigan should not expect any magic
policy to end this war. I can offer sober judgmonts. hard
work and devotion to duty. On this issue and on others,

I will continue to seek out the views of the poopleu-and
I will listen and give consideration to those views, even

when I cannot agree with thom.

The right of dissent in one of our basic freedom:
in e democracy. You will not find me denouncing those who
disagree with me. I will not attempt to silence anyone.

VIGOROUS EFFGRTS FOR PEA-CE LIT-31" CHTIATICNS

President Johnson has said that he would talk to
any government, mywhore, and without any cond di tions. I
believe we must implement that policy both vigorously and
imaginatively.

The United States has tried suspension of bombing,
it has tried both quiet and oven diplomacy and it has made
appeals to the United Nations in an effort to combine in-
formal and formal pe.ace negotiatm as.

President Johnson has cooriled 14 Points on Viet-
Nem, indicating a flexiblee . ttitude toward Opening negotia-
tions. These 14 Points go more than half way to meet the
Communist do...e nos. They include such cardinal points as
acceptance of the Geneva \ccords, eococrajemont of fro
elections and willingness to abide by the results, and
withdrawal of United States troops and bases once there
is peace.

The President has redo it cloar that there is no
objection to particiootic n by the Viet Cong in any peace
talks.

when I we: assigned by President Johnson as one

of his peace eoissaries to explain the policy of our gov-

H

ernment on Viet—Nam and our dog ire fo peace, the response

from even the most radical nfric one w25 tb at the United

States had offered a viable basis for peace talks.

Cne Chief of State want so far as to say, ”Ho Chi
hinh can't turn this down.” Bot, Yo Chi fluh did-~and the
Comruniato have thus for withhold any movcaonts toward
negotiations.

to rhould not oivn up. Ponce requires por-

aistence and negotiating with Communists requires
patience. Chis I have loarnod {ram ry eigelienca
in other parts of the world.

we should welcome apprOpriato channels to Hanoi,
Peking and the Viet Cong. We should work with the Soviet
Union and other Communist nations. as well as with our
friends in the Free world. he should seek the assistance
of the non—aligned countries. we should use the machinery
of tho United Nations and the International Control Com.
mission.

The United States must be ready at all times to
talk anywhere, under any sponsorship. we must do a better
job of letting the world know of our efforts and desire
to resolve this conflict at the conference table.

Eqnally important, we must do much more to keep
our people bore in the United States better informed of
our policies and our efforts in Viet-Nam. I have found
too much confusion at home and lack of understanding over-
seas.

FREE ELEC’l‘IC £3
The United States should help expedite free elec~

tions to determine the government of South Viot—Nan.

128

Unless a better methed is suggested, 1 would like
to see the United Katlcns supervise such elections to guar-
antee that they axe truly fies 335 that eveiycne will be

canvlnced t! :at thcy are net ri3ged by the Ccmnunists, by

the United States, b7 the cnglet (Vuznpnai in p g ,on,

I
or by anyone L133.

If U.ltqd Nations supervisicn is not possible, I
would suggest, as a minlrm 3m, the use of obsexvera as suc-
Cessfully emplcyed in the Conga.

Every a“Lvm;t suLulJl a ITad¢ to persuade the
Viet Cong to Join in {Lee elactlcna. But if the
Viet Con3 continue to prwfur b 5L3 and terrarlsm
to ballot boxes, the elections suuuld not be de-
layed. The brave peeple of 30min Viet-Lam cannot
wait for peace or a cease-fire to begin strength-
enlng Lhcir country.

Lhatcver Le results cf the echtions, the United

1

atates should abide by them. ae should cooperata willingly
with any govuxnaent Lhu pL03le choupc in fzes echtions.

A new govelnmant, LLLLusa of Lhe LLmoLrLLic nature
of these elections, would be in a stronger pasltien ta deal
with thm Viet Sang. A gavernaegt in which the citizens
have a fuller voice could attxact LLLlr egdltles 3nd re-
spond to LELIx desir3s far a Lettgr liia.

303;, an all. of t." 3 Via: LLL3 aith 33 ;k a truce

with SJCh a rz-lnfgrced "n" regrczcuLLLiIc govegnmcnt. The

CI

net result might be a gensgally LLcagtgd QLVuLHwEflt u!
nat 31 u. it; or a n.w 3 chal L-LcLi;n inclLL-ng Lne
Viet Gang.

I.t 13 I3 cglnicn that is a fLir Llwction thé geoplo

129

of South Viet-533 would not choose a ggvernment dedicated
to selling out to the Communists. Thus, the desire of the
S3uth "‘3tn3.::3 and tha United 3::3 t3 3 to ;z3 3m*va freadom
and 133393333333 in Sauth Viet-N33 wculd be brcught nearer
to at»: ‘J :1 31:253. {EL-rt o

A final stage of free elect io;ts usu‘d 53:33 3 pos-

siLla, if thgra 33:3 33 and to hss ' LLlitlas L3t33en flarth

and S3uth. .t fills time tha 933313 of Sguth Viet-Nam and
the peoyla 3: "-rt? V132~343 could by 5:33 3133 ‘ sdecida

the (jaestion of unification.
$331.33.; 3A1!) iiliiiét. 321-: :L»LJJL~.LL§-Zgl;éf
Lti th. fixeat strdggla f3: hum3n batt33m3nt and to
Web-33:, 111:2} United "$32.33 must help the
933913 in -431: 5:33: against 3333.3 t;, ignorance and disease.
south Vi3t~wam D3333 a sscial and economic revo~
lution. The people are fighting and dying for their
£33330m and they new: a L3::-r Life t3 LL5LL for.
The aaaial 333 36330 L: imgr3vemant 333333 in South
Viet-Ham 13 diffic alt to achieve wi Lie 3 war is going on.
As with £533 alecticns. hcwevur, thia waxk C3330t w¢it upon
the Commugidts to halt Lhe 3431333133 £33m the 53:33.
It is also 333:L-331 tha t trm Uni ad States assist
th3 .3i ;"Lzozing countries 3f LL31L3ML, L303 3nd Cambodia
to 342333333 final: :gaguwzni: an .i :53 35. l structm‘e t3 pro-
safiva their 133393333333.
Presidcnt Johnson" Lakang Live: fiasin project and

his cox.*tm 6.x 3. $1 billion to the Asian Duvelopsunt Bank

axe bold $3333. Cace t3mud and chught into us3£ul service,

the Mekong Basin can dwarf even our own TVA. The potantial
of the fiekong River and its tributaries is enormous, not
only for the South Vietnamese, but for all of Southeast
Asia. Likewise, tn- Asian Levels pment Bank is a premise
of the future for South V1et~Kam and all of fisia.

PSCUCTICN CF TS-ESICNS 1511‘}! R23 C TIME

More than six years ago, an Harsh 10, 1263, I said:
"One quarter of the hvran race resides in China. Thus, a
penca policy requires a China palicy”

The neceasity for rec03niming thee :13tanca of Cam-
munist China as a farce 1n the wcrld of toiay has net changed
since those words were spckan. aitheut Red Cb incse arms
and int wrt, the {rahlan ofu r st aggressien in South
Viet~nam probably wauld Lava Léi re Ivad Laforn this.

For cer turics China has considered Le: self the cen-
ter of the universe 52:13 has inv a; 2:1 I? 2: 12:31:; 31:61:33 and d3.
manfiad aubsarvianca or tribute. Red China tcday ls impelled

by a militant Cowmanist ideolegj that wLnts L3 agbvert and

daminate the warld.

fifrica, particulgrly tLa C3553, has Lne of tha first
steps in this atte m {.53 ac ’ fiahinatign, and I Law first
hand what Rafi China wés trying L: de th;re. Ec;au32 of
that activity, the Africans are {SW wary. within the last

few manths a flanker Gf éerCnn nLLiumL haw: c 0b$l Rad

.. .. -.. _.. ‘ u '- 1 ,- L p _.
CZILIICIEDE e‘ca‘xw'XS-h: ‘(LE 3 (aficikt r&|1ve e ‘5 ‘5'U1 1C4” ‘9 .4“ C}: A- J (:50 : 'h-ik'lv whats

., ., .1, .._... 3.. , . ,‘...° "- “x: A, .,.-...,-...4
and L:Cl‘;fu.~..ia. :5 o {“3111 tlaé L 1‘: LL}. Ln -. u...x..£1... um: a..$.-uuaauora

2 .1 . 1. L . . '.- . «m ...~
(“£365.45 hilt” mafia kite: 51;;1'; Curtiwu.

131

Latin America is another target area where Red China
hapes to make gains by supporting so-called "wars of national
liberatian." Lat them sell it what th2y lLke. he rust

h tr; 2 name of Red Chi2a's pa r 1.3

w

G

not forget that
'."~‘ .eflu. 7 ~’ ... 5‘. g ‘ 5 - ‘
bO£AJJ*Sb d2;_C331Gno"

O

C"* prospects for evontunl pzazo in Vie —K;m and

elsewhere in Asia: 25 tne w2rl:i 2111 D3 in-2r 22msi 2;.v depend-
ent u22n trze 22r‘1ct of C. mist Ct.ina 22% our p211:y to~

Cur goal, 22 I see it, should to to mov Rod
China into the main stream of world affairs so that
her aJ:tions c :n Lo 1? flLant‘ by werli oginion.
This will not be easy because Red China seems de~
teriined to hide :h.ind ha: bor3.-r3 a:.i d; -fg the
rest of the world. But u. must not give up.

he should push for exchange visits of newspaper
men, scientists, serious scholars and other: who could
start a two-way flow of information. we should maintain
and try to expand our high level conversations with the
Red Chinese in Warsaw, where 129 face-to—face meetings have
been held. And we should seek out opportunity for addi~
tional conversations in international meetings, both puh~
11c and private.
Further. we should attempt to persuade China
to drcp her unreasonable demands regarding admis-
sion to the United Nations. It would not be reason-
able to withdraw recognition of Foruosa, to rescind
the resolution branding Red China as the aggressor
in Esrea, or to neLc tLe United itatcs as tae ea»
greasor.

These are Red China's terms and i find them wholly

unacceptable.

132

On our side, we should by word and deed make clear
to Red China that we have no territorial ambitions or do-
sire for special privileges on the mainland of Asia that
would conflict with Rod China’s security and legitimate
intarests. For example, while strongly supporting tho
sovereignty and integrity of Nationalist China, we could
disavow any intention of assisting Chiang Kai-Shok's return
to the mainland.

It is for these reasons that I believe our policy
toward China should be directed toward Opening communica-
tions and reducing tensions while firmly resisting Commu-
nist aggression. we should not soot to isolate Red China.

we have followed this approach with the Soviet Union
and we have had some success. Firmnoss and patience were
required and they will be needed again with Red China.

KEEPS-22553 OF SOUTH VIST-NAM

North Viet-ham, backed by Red China, is intent
upon subduing South Viet-Nam by force and establishing
Communist rule over the people of the South. it is not
in tho interest of the United States to permit this to
happen.

Such a Communist takeovor of South Viet-Nan would
do two things in addition to giving the Communists control
of that territory:

First. the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists would
be encouraged to believe that their "wars of liberation"

and conquest by force and violence do pay off. This then

133

would Jeepardizo tho security of a number of countries in
Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Second, it would discourage both our allies and
the non~aligned countries in their efforts to resist Com-
munist subversion. For trample, it is probable that the
anti-communist forces in Indcnesia were encouraged in their
determination to curb the Communist tendencies of Sukarno
by our strong support of the South Vietnamese.

The South Vietnamese have fielded a military force
in excess or 530,000 men in their self-defense. Their
civil authorities have stuck to their duties despite the
fact that the Viet Cong have slain or abducted more than
4,000 of them since January 1, 1954. Thousands of other:
were assassinated in earlier years.

There is no evidence, of which I am aware, that
tho Viet Cong have any significant popular supyort in South
Viet—Nam. The Communist: rely on terror and in recent
months many Viet Cong reinforcements have been North Viet-
nameac from the regular army forces of the :orth.

Tho majority of the peopln in South Viet-mam are
anti-Communist. Despite their differences, the Buddhists.
the Catholics and other groups all oppose a Communist tak¢~
over in the South.

It should be remembered that one million per-

sons fled as refugacs to South Viet~flam from tho
North to escape Communist rule. bore recently,

nearly a million persons have left their homes in
areas controlled by the Viet Cong in the South.

134

I boliove the village dweller fours and dislikes
the Viet Cong. He would be glad of tho Opportunity to be
really free of them and would prefer a government of his
own choosing in Saigon.

nhile I beliove the United States would have to
pull out of South Viot-Edm if regueotod by the people to
do so, I am confident tho majority of South Vietnamese favor
our continued presence and our assistance in their fight
againat Communism.

‘ In recent months, our military support of South
Viet-Ham has boon increased because the aggreosion from
the North has increuood. The use of force had been met
with counter-force.

Once the aggroosion from the North is ended,

the people of Viet-Nam will be free to decide their
own future, and the mood for our military action
in support of South Viet~Nam will come to an end.

While no are involved in the defense of our own
vital national interests in Southeast Asia, we ars also
protecting the national security of other nations. For
this reason, I would urge that the United States seek
greater military support in South Viet—Nam from our allies.
Their freedou.slso is st stako.

Our dosir. is to stop aggression from the North.

we should seek to limit the conflict to the ginimum
(arcs required to accomplish this objectivs. As s conso-
quoncs. tho‘United Ststos should not be ths first to os-
cslsto ths oonrlict and should do so only to seat escala-

tion.on the part of the Communists.

135

At the same time, we must hoop up a maximam effort
to bring the conflict to the conference tabla on an agenda

for peace.

. . .

When I decided not to run again for Governor of
Michigan. I said I wantod to work for peace.

Prcsidonts Kennedy and Johnson have givon no that
opportunity and I nova been working for peace in tho world.

Tho people of Hichigan know that I have always
sought peaceful solutions, whilo Itnnding firm on principles.

I was in on. war in the South Pacific. and I know
what wax mean: to those who must nuke tho sacrificcn.

I bellovo the peeplo of Michigan will trust no in
tho United States Sonata to work effectively for peace in
Viet-Nan and throughout tho world.

Go Monnen WilliaM'

Williams for v.3. Senator Committee-deic MoGloin, Chair-
man; Richard Austin, Treasure:

APPfiNUIX C
Detroit Free Press

LBJ 'Hann't Done Enough'
In Vietnam, Cavanagh Says

by James M. nudge
Chief of Our City~County Bureau

Mayor Cavanagh.oponly split with President Johnson
Tuesday on tho Administration's conduct or the Vietnam war.

In a "position paper" on foreign policy preparod
as part of his campaign against former Gov. G. Kennen
Williams for the Damocratic Sonata nomination, Cavanngh
said tho Prcaidont has ”not done enough" toward ending the
conflict.

Attacking Killian: for supporting tho Administra—
tion "without having any ideas of his own,” Cavanagh said
the President and State Department "have not yet taken
strong enough action."

Cavanagh listed his policy recommendations as:

A cease-fire as soon as poasibla.

Fran elections in South Vietnam with a hands-off
policy on whatever government the South Vietnamese choose
for themselves.

hassivo social reform program: after peaco is

achieved through negotiation.

136

137

Recasting of American foreign policy toward crest-
ing buffer nations between the East and the west in updat-
ing the present policy of containment of communism.

Recognition of Rad China and offering that country
a pcrmanent seat in the United Nations.

Cavanagh, at a press conference, said that it free
elections resulted in demands by a now government that tho
United States withdraw its military forces. "it's a chance
wa have to take." He took the same view on the possibility
of a Communist victory at the polls.

The Mayor again challenged willians to debate the
Vietnam and foreign policy issues "anywhere at any tine.”

willians' press secretary, James a. Robinson, quot-
ing tho former governor, said: “There is nothing of sub~
stance new in the Mayor's statement; therefore I have no
comment.”

In questioning Mr. Johnson's conduct or the war
so far, Cavanagh said he is joining “prominent man in both
parties," mothers "who fear for their sons,” working people
and retirees, collego students, "hard—nosed and realistic“
businessmen, and ”people everywhere in America.“

"Today, things are warped in Vietnam by the size
of our military commitncnt," Cnvanagh laid. "Military ac-
tion . . . can overshadow political objectivos if we are
not careful.

"Proedom is seldom created by the might of military

power. though armies are necessary for its defense.”

138

Stressing the need for freedom for Vietnam, Cavanagh
laid the people there may not ”choose tho system.of govern-
ment we chose."

But, he said, "we must offer the same freedom of
choice which we offer to our own citizens or we turn away
from the finest ideals of man.”

Insisting he will campaign against hilliama "only
on the issues," Cavanagh said he expects to produce more
position papers on other issues, including inflation.

The statements will ho made sometime aftor Cavonagh
returns from a three-week tour of Europe starting late this
week.

Ho will make a bid for Detroit as the site for tho
1972 Olympics during a stepovsr in Roma and will visit
several major cities plugging Detroit and Eichigan as tour-
ist attractions.

APPENDIX D
Detroit News
Ame

A Red 3. Viatnam Would Pose
No Threat, Cavanagh Insists

by Jo Ann Harden
Chief of Our City-County Bureau

There is no threat to American security in a Com»
muniat South Vietnam, Mayor Cavanagh said today.

"But I seriously doubt that Vietnam would go Com-
munist in a free election.” he added. “I know of no coun-
try that has freely chosan communism."

Nor does he anticipate that a freely elected govu
arnment would ask for withdrawal of American forces.

MUST ACCEPT RESULTS

"But we should be willing to accept both possibil-
ities it they are tho results of a frea election.” Cavanagh
said.

"wa have been abla to adapt satisfactory relations
with Communist countries in Europa-Yuqoslavia and Poland,
for example. we could adopt similar ralationahips with
Viatnan. in the unlikely event of a freely-elected Commu~
nirt government thorn.”

In the first of a aariaa of "position papers," as
part of his bid for tho 0.3. Sonata, Cavanagh yoatarday

139

140

called for a cease-fire; free elections including the Na-
tional Liberation front (Viet Cong); and creation of South
Vietnam as a "neutral buffer state."

In response to questions. he denied he was willing
to trade American security for reduction in war expenses
which would permit more domestic spending, especially on
his pet urban programs.

N0 THREAT TO U.5.

"I simply see no threat to American security in a
Communist Vietnam." he said.

Cavanagh said his proposal is at variance with Pres—
ident Johnson, who pledged his support to the military junta
of Premier Nguyen Cao Ky.

In an obvious reference to the Ky regime. Cavanagh
said the United States has erred in supporting dictatorships
in an effort to fight.communism, saying such actions in~
creased the appeal of communism.

Cavanagh emphasized that his difference with Pres-
ident Johnson "are less important than those with uy oppo»
nent who wants to say he supports Mr. Johnaon and close
of: debate at that point."

HITS U.S. LAG

He added, however. that the administration, "hasn't
strongly enough taken affirmative action” to end the war
and gain free elections.

Cavanagh said free elections must include the Viet

Cong, ”who aren't going to disappear," adding that he would

141

advocate social and economic aid to Vietnam even if it went
communist after free elections.

"Let the Vietnamese seek whatever course their free
government desires to take to settle their national destiny,“
he said. "This may include asking tho United States forces
to leave.

"Perhaps they will not choose the system of govern~
want we choose and will sacrifica great measures of free-
don for the security of dictatorship. But whatever the
course, we must accept it."

AUTEiC-RED BY AIDES

The Cavanagh paper, it is known, was authorized
by his assistant Anthony Ripley, a former Detroit News ran
porter who covered the Vietnam war, and City Controller
Richard Strichartz, a law professor on leave from Kayne
State University.

Advice on the document was given by B. J. hidick,

a professor in the Institute of Labor and Industrial Rela-
tions which is jointly Operated by the University of Mich»
igan and Wayne State University.

nidick said today he is volunteering three days a
week to the Cavanagh campaign, primarily "finding persons
in the academic community who are sympathetic to the can»
paign and have expertise in areas of concern to the mayor.“

CONSULTED HAN!

Cavanagh said he consulted many persons on the
document, but declined to name than. saying they have "a

142

passion for anonymity which I intend to indulge.”
ridick's advice is particularly significant because
of his former post in the Una rasaarch department. The

UAN is expected to support killiams.

APPENDIX E

Effirbit Free Pr-gg

 

CAVANAGH‘S BIBLIOGRAPHY

Disclaiming any title as foreign policy expert and
modestly attaching a 'partial bibliography' to his state-
ment on Vietnam, Mayor Jerry Csvanagh formally opened a
wholly new phase in his campaign for the Democratic non-
ination for v.3. senator. And in opening this new phrase,
he revealed an old trait.

The new phase in the primary race is a hepeful
phase. In place of the petty bickering over family wealth
and the name-calling which accompanied some earlier can-
paign exchanges between Cavanagh and Soapy Williams. the
mayor has now presented a serious discussion of an impor-
tant policy issue.

what ought this nation now do in Vietnam?

'I believe,‘ said Cavansgh, ‘tho time has come to
search for a new way out-a realistic and honorable way
to and tho present war and a.realistic stand on which to
base our foreign policy for the years shead.’

In the search for a way out Cavanagh would deal
with the Vietcong and he would provide for free elections
and accept the verdict of the Vietnamese people at the

143

144

ballot box. Be considors a realistic stand on which to
has. our foreign policy no longer to he the sterile mili~
tary containment of communism-tha policy of the postfiwar
years-«but rather the fostering of diversity among nations
and the willingness to deal not only with neutrals but with
those nations which have until now been considered implac~
ably hostile to the U.S. The time has come for the U.S.

to realize that two Chinas exist and that Communist China
ought to be brought into the U.N.

If Williams disagrees with any of these points, as
he has seemed to do on the Red China question, then ha ought
to spell out his position as clearly and fully as Cavanagh
has done. And if he does, the race will have entered a
new phase of debate and important issues which concern this
atate'a voters will be articulated.

what of the trait which Cavanagh's statement reveals?
It is a flattering one.

When first elected mayor, Cavanagh was a young law-
yer without any real experience in municipal affairs and
many felt that ho simply couldn't handle the vast complex
tasks ahead. But he demonstrated a fantastic capacity to
learn.

While it is much too early for any similar Judgment
on affairs beyond the municipal level, his statement on
Vietnam was a reasoned discussion of a complicated problem

which, with its ‘partial bibliography' attached almost in

14S

school-boy fashion, demonstrates something of this same

capacity. It shows a determination to learn.

APPENDIX F
Detroit News
July 12, 1936

The Mayor's Foreign Policy Stand
He's Wrong on Vietnam

In the absence of evidence that G. Mennen Williams
has the qualifications to represent all the peeple of Mich-
igan as a U.S. senator, this paper had hoped Mayor Cavanagh
might indicate during the primary campaign that he could
perform in Washington with the same capacity he has demon-
strated in the City Hail.

To date, we have been disappointed. The Cavanagh
campaign has been largely a charade. When he has spoken
formally, he has followed just one theme of total opposi-
tion to all of our commitments and current policies in
Vietnam.

Cavanagh wants a cease fire, free elections in
which the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) would par-
ticipate and the creation of South Vietnam as a "neutral
buffer state.”

"I simply see no threat to American security in
a Communist Vietnam," says the mayor as he surveys the
international scene.

On that, Cavanagh pits his judgment against the

lZ-year consensus of the Bisenhower-Kennedy-Johnson

146

147

administrations, their chiefs of staff during that time

and the conviction of the men who have served as secretary
of state. if he really means that an all-Red Vietnam would
be of no importance to us, where does he assume that would
leave neighboring Thailand, malaysia and the Philippines,
not to forget Australia, New Zealand and South Korea who
have committed forces to Vietnam in the firm belief that
ITS security essentially is THEIR security?

"I seriously doubt," says Cavanagh, "that Vietnam
would go Communist in a free election. No country ever
has freely chosen communism."

that nonsense to suggest that there is any prece-
dent for Vietnam: that country can Cavanagh name that has
been wrecked by 20 years or war, sliced in half by a treaty
honored more in the breach than observance and subjected
to organized terror as the overt arm of political persua-
sion?

The question is not whether any country has ever
freely chosen communism. Of course none has. what Cavanagh
should be answering is whether he really believes that,
after we have given up fighting, the Reds are going to sit
back as good little democrats and permit an orderly can-
peign and free election in any part of Vietnam. Can he
from his study of history recall a time when Communists,
once having started a forceful grab for power, ever have
been willing to stop killing and let the people debate and

then vote then out, or in?

148

Cavanagh also wants the Viet Cong to participate
in this election. To this the Ky government is resolutely
opposed. Of course Cavanagh doesn't think much of General
Ky. But the moderate Buddhists also oppose V.C. partici-
pation in any election. So in fact does that power-hungry
monk, Tri Quang. who in truth is there in South Vietnam
who will accept the Cavanagh doctrine of peace at any price?

A: for the ”buffer state" idea, we must call to
the mayor's attention that we already have one formally~
agreed on "buffer state" in Southeast Asia. That in Laos,
by the multination declaration of 1962. The mayor should
be able to read the record of how the Reds ignored that
accord to which they were pledged.

we realize. of course, that the mayor's current
interest is in votes and that he would spread a not which
would catch the undetermined number of draft objectors,
New Leftists, pacifist: and plain citizens, who. as Pres-
ident Johnson says, "often grow impatient when they cannot
see light at the end of the tunnel."

What the mayor forgets is that a majority of Amer-
icans have given no indication of wanting to follow the
advice of Senator Wayne Morse and surrender to communism

on this battlefield.

APPENDIX G

Dotrait Hrug

Edy 13,1955

 

Soapy Walks Middle Road in Viet War

by Glenn Engle
Detroit News Political Writer

Labeling himself "neither a hawk nor a dove," for-
me: Gov. G. Noumea Williams today called for a combined
”firm military defense and a vigorous and imaginative peace
effort."

He issued what he called a "major statement” on
the war from the Detroit headquarters of his campaign for
the Democratic v.3. Sonata nomination.

Already criticized by his primary Opponent, Mayor
Cavanagh. for not speaking out on the major issues, he said
his statement would aopear later in full-pogo newspaper
advertisements.

'SBCURIYY THREAT'

without naming Cavanagh, williams said he wanted
to make can point of difference with his Democratic rival
"absolutely clear":

”I cannot agree with anyone who says that a Commuu
nist takeover in South Vietnam would pose no thzaat to

Imican security. I think. it would be dangerous to the

149

150

security of the United States and the whole free world.
It would be a setback for democracy and freedom."

In a "position paper” on the subject April 20,
Cavnnagh said he could ”simply soc no threat to American
security in a Communist Vietnam."

He added, however. that he doubted whether Vietnam
would go Communist in a free election because he has known
of "no country that has freely chosen communism."

In a reference to those statements, williams added:

"It is all too easy, in a time of public worry and
uneasiness, to play upon tho concern of the people and ropn
resont slogans as solutions to complicated problems. This
I will not do."

Williams, who quit as assistant secretary of state
for African affaira to run for the Sonata. stressed five
major points in rosolving tho Southeast Asian problem:

. Vigorous efforts for poaco negotiations~cuo must
implement Johnson's announced willinfncss to "talk to any
governmcnt. anywhere and without any conditions.”

U; 333 UN ROLE:

. Fran elections-«Tho United Nations should super-
visa elections in South Vietnam. If that is not possible.
then UN observers should be used as they were in the Congo.

. Socicl and economic dovclopment-South Vietnam
”needs a social and economic revolution" and its people
"need a better life to fight for." Tho administration al-

ready has taken initial steps in this direction.

. Reduction of tensions with Red China-—Its demands
for admission to the UN are "wholly unacceptable,“ but we
should encourage exchanga visits of newspapcrmcn, scientists,
scholars and others “who could start a two-way flow of
information.”

. Defense of South Vietnam-lo should seek to limit
the conflict to the minimum force required to stop aggres-
sion. The United States "should not be the first to es-
calato the conflict and should do so only to meat escala-

tion on the part of the Communists."

APPSflDIX H

Williams Says Ra's neither 'Hawk'
Nor 'Dova' Qn Vietnam

In his fullest statement on the Vietnam crisis
since ha bagan his campaign for the v.3. Sanata march 7,
former Gov. G. Eennen Williams said hednesday he is neither
a ”hawk" nor a ”dove."

"The harsh reality of Vietn&m is that peace is not
possible without both a firm military defanae and a vigor-
ous and imaginative peaca effert," fiilliama said.

The full taxt of Hilliams statamcnt, printad as
a pelitical advertisament, appaars on Piga 173 of today':
Free Press.

killiams, a chocrfit, stressed that a ccmmunist
takaover in South Vietnam "would ha dangerous to the secur-
ity of tha United States and the whole Free kcrld.

He aascrtad that Praaident Jann3on has said he would
talk to any government, anywhere, and without prior condi-
tions. "I believe we must implement that policy both
vigorously and imaginativaly,” Williams said.

hilliams singied out fiva major points: vigorous
efforts for peace negotiations, free elections and sscial

and aconomic development in South Vietnam, cantaats with

152

Red China and defense of South Vietnam.

He suggested that Red China should be moved "into
the mainatraam cf wczld affairs so that ha: actians can
be influanuad by world opinion.“

Red China ahnald be flCfiittcd to the Unitad Nations.
Hilliama said, if she will "drop her unreasonabla demands
regarding admiiaisn."

The United States "cauld diagvou any intention of
assisting Chiag; Kdi~shek's zet;rn to the m&inland" and
still Bugpcrt "the sover313nty and integrity or Ratienal-

is: China," he said.

8131.16 "RAPHY

Rooks

Berelson, Bernard, and Janowitz, Norris (eds.). Roz ce:m
in Publi:_§p£nion and Loowunioation. Glencoe,
$11.8 ihe slaw taco», liib-iSéSo

Bray, Leonard (ed.). ago: & Tor's 1539:1911: Howfipapogg
and P :10: .ica Ls 13u7. khiiadolpuiat N. m. Aye:
& vaua’ :“CO. lIUI’O

Lox Lcr, Lewis Anthony, and hhite, David Laruning (ed3.).
gehn‘fi Lociety, and ha 9.5 Communications. Glencoo,

-~xmv1
111.: Ah“ tion rlcbé, lava.

C).

aldersvolu L, Saxucl J., at al. Eo £11331 Iffiliation in
“12339131145113 LotroIt. mm Arbors puree uof Gov-
LrLLLLt, institute of Public Administration, Uni-
versity of hichigan, 1957.

 

Pall, Bernard B. The Two Viet—Name: A Political and
9ilif?:} {ALLALLuo nun LVLAE ALwLLlLu& Mo

Praeger.‘1§o3.

James, Ralph C., and James, Estelle Dineratein. Hoffa
E “3 1-.o 33%17:t:r52 .3 :‘1 131:.1 C5? cu11J:L&:.

Pziflubtian. tic—Ea; 0";Usualtd b‘ahiydily. 13-330. 1965.

Key, V. 0., Jr. Politics, Partioa1 and Pressure Groups.
4th @do any." 159*“. Alumnus.) J.- HVI“«;.|.L uvusydfly.

1958.

Klappor. Joseph T. The Effects_ of Ma 33 biodia. New York:
Buroau of dprLiLL .LLLLLLL, LLLLLLiL University,
1949.

Lazarsfeld, Paul F., Berelson, Bernard, and Gaudet, Hazel.
3,: a} 94-31 3 3'. 33:. ' 3 '1'..,=.-"1~‘,':f. Ce. KEN lurk. Lulumbia bxdver-

Sity tress. 1545.
MacDougall. Curtis D. In nt__nrotive Reportggg. 4th edi~

tion. New Yeti. natuliiuu Lumpauj, 1963.
HcNaughton, Frank. Pcnnon 11111313 of F;:.hi;cn: ?i;htgg

for Progress. *New York: Leeann rubllcations,
3‘60. 11"”).

154

Petorson, Theodore, Jensen, Jay u., and Rivers, Lillian L.
The Fass Media and Modern Society. New York:
114.412.1113: t Bold "-1413 3.1011. 11'“: o ’ l} J'J o

 

Jawcr. £11.11)”: Lou. 11:13 ' 1:137:3- ‘r.f.-': '3': “2 171:1” tr. :1“. "‘ .tt
in Lichigan: :rna LiLa (.1 tue New Eolffl cal Leader-
I 1 £161 J-Luwio uwcuu VI WVuLi..L1s.LAC' 111.51.11.11“
of rublic Administration, University of Hichigan,
LO.
Schramm, 1ilLLr (ed. ). 1:3: Crrr”“ic:ti:gg. Urbanaz
University of Illinois :rL .3, 5 ”

. rho Science of H::-Lan Ccnmunication. Nan York:

b39415. udvmut and... vado

 

Siebart, Fred L., PL: r503, Theodcre, an: Lanramm, Lilbur.
Feur_Theoriea_cf_ghe Press. Urbana: University
of 11:1nu13 riuLn, luoo.

 

 

 

Sahel, Lester R. (ed.). South ”‘3‘“"3: U.§,~ 31": 13L
.. ‘ ‘7“ "i w
gpn rontatgpn in Loutueast n$ in I“Li- ~L new York:
tut-bub 9:; &¢;§, J-OJCO’ aavvo
Vietnam Vearijgg. ion York: Vintage Books, 1955.

 

Articles and Periodicals
Detroit Freo Pregg. 1948-1966.
gotgoit News. 1948-1966.
Journali¢-m gparterlx. 1955-1957.
‘ggw York Times, 1964—1966.
State Jocrrzl (Lansing), 1966.
State cw. (nichigan State University). 1365.

Wall Street Journal, July 27, 1966.

Paulie Locumunts

U.S. L*pa atant of LomerLL, Bureau of tho Census. United
_§;:t 93 Census of Ponulatigp: 1960. V01. 1. Gen—
erui ruruiét1uu Luciauhuiibtiuai hicnigLA. 1961.

J

U.3. Departmant of Labor, Bureau of LLLor StutlaticL.
Lmrloyment_ and Lirr inns and Monthiy_fir.¢rf cf the

LCw-FJa: .w-‘uk-jE-‘O UV‘. “at“. i“. J.

 

136

U.S. Departmant of State. Eietfflam in Brief. 1966.

U.S. Congress. Senate Corn ittea on Foreign Relations.
Background Information Relating_to Southeast Asia
mini VJfilL '1”... tusv'lécu CH‘i-J-Ullo 9:531 uvu-jo. Jubt

2.3... 19.5.

v.3. Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
yiatnam and South fist Afiia. 53th Cong., lst 3e83.,

1953. *" _f

Ungublishod tatazial

Cavanagh, Jerome P. "A Road to [once in Viot Nam: A Call
for a New and Creative Policy for Peace and Freeo
com in Asia." A position paper issued by Cavanagh
during Primary Campaign and released April 19, 1966.
(himcograghed.)

Dzodin, Harvey. "Political Campaigns: A Study in Theory
and Practice." A research paper prepared for a
political soianca course at hi2higan State Univer-
sity, Fall term, 1956. In possession of Harvey
ozooin, East Lansing.

"Kayor Jerome P. Cavanagh: a ri.gra'ri-al 5ketch." Office
of the Ma or 1967. (Himoographed.)
Y t

Perrin, Robert. Former administrative assistant to U.S.
Senator ratrick V. inciiernara. Let? -or to author,
march 5. 1968.

williams, G. Mennen. “Viet—Nam: A message to tho People
Of Eichigan from G. Nonnen nilliams." A statement
on the Vietnam issue by Williams during the Primary
Campaign, may 19, 19.5. (mimoogragnao.)

Other Sources

Cavanagh, Jerome P. Mayor of Detroit. Personal inter-
views, Nov. 2., 1&57, and ~oc. 7, 1967.

Conlon, Richaa l J. Pasistant fianagor, Detroit 3' can,
United Press International, personal interview,
Feb. 13. 13" «'3 o

Elston, uilbur. associats editor and editor of the editor-
ial page. gotrcit News, Personal interview, March 1.
12930

Ethridgo, Hark. Editor, fair:*t ?r~n Prong, ?orsonal
interview, March 1. 1368.

 

McClain, Eddie. Campaign manager for G. Mennen Williamt.
Poroonol intorviow, Aug. 2%, 1366.

Ripley, nothony. Formor osoistant to hoyor Cavanagh.
Personal interviews, Nov. 23, 1966, and Feb. 25,

lkubo

M

iobinson, Jamos. Pros: secretary to G. tonne williams.
Personal interview, ran. 10, 1967.

Schroeder, Eugene. Associated Press news analyst. Per-
sonal interviow, Fat. 13, lfioé.

Strichortr, Richard. Porno: Cit] Controller of Detroit.
Personal interview. Nov. 22, 1967.

Toohey, Robert 5. Campaign manager for Jerome P. Cavanagh.
.ozsonal intorviow, dept. 15, 1955.

nilliams. G. honnon. Personal interview, nov. 22, 1367.

 

WWMWWW“

470262