THE WILLIAMS-CAVANAGH PRIMARY: TWO DETROIT NEWSPAPERS' REPORT ON THE CANDIDATES' VIETNAM STATEMENTS

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ABSTRACT

THE WILLIAMS-CAVANAGH PRIMARY: TWO DETROIT NEWSPAPERS' REPORT ON THE CANDIDATES' VIETNAM STATEMENTS

by Glenn Theodore Job

The Michigan Democratic senatorial primary election in 1966 had two prominent candidates in opposition to each other. The candidates were G. Mennen Williams, a former six-term governor of Michigan, and Detroit Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh, a young mayor who had won national recognition with his administration in the city of Detroit.

The campaign between Williams and Cavanagh took place at a time when the United States was expanding its military commitment to protect South Vietnam, which had become involved in a war. The war, which had its origins in part in guerrilla uprisings against the government, had expanded to a point where the administration of President Johnson ordered more than 200,000 American soldiers to Southeast Asia. Williams, a former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Johnson administration, generally supported U.S. involvement in the war. Cavanagh opposed it. Both candidates issued carefully prepared papers on their positions.

This study is concerned with the position papers issued by the two candidates, and how they were reported

by the Detroit News and the Detroit Free Press. The study also points up the editorial response to the position papers.

This is not an all inclusive study of the press coverage of the Williams-Cavanagh primary election, nor has any attempt been made to place in perspective the coverage of the election by the News and the Free Press. Only one point was under consideration: How well did the News and Free Press discharge their obligations as newspapers in a free society with reference to the Vietnam statements issued by the two candidates?

The results are based on an examination of documents, newspapers, and interviews with the leading figures who were involved in the campaign. The research suggests that the News and the Free Press were deficient in their responsibilities as newspapers in a free society.

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By

Glenn Theodore Job

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INTRODUCTION

The growing commitment of the United States to an undeclared war in Vietnam[1] during 1965 and 1966 divided the American people. One of the first important electoral tests of this issue occurred in the Michigan Democratic senatorial primary election on August 2, 1966, between G. Mennen Williams, former six-term governor, and Jerome P. Cavanagh, mayor of the city of Detroit. Williams had resigned his position as U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs to run for his party's nomination to the United States Senate; he favored a firm stand by the United States in Vietnam. Cavanagh, who had attracted national attention with his accomplishments as mayor of Detroit, was unequivocally opposed to a larger investment of United States military resources in Vietnam. He contended that the United States had an outdated foreign policy that was not in tune with the turn of events.

The debate over Vietnam, both in Michigan and across the nation, reached new shades of bitterness and

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[1]Chinese ideographs were used to write the Vietnamese language for many centuries. In the Romanization of the Vietnamese language, the spelling of Vietnam has not always been uniform. Common spellings today are Vietnam, Viet-Nam, VietNam, and Viet Nam.

anger as the American people became increasingly aware of the war and its ramifications. American soldiers had been in Vietnam for fifteen years. They were there in comparatively small numbers and in an advisory capacity until guerrilla war began drawing forces of division strength, air power, and sea power into battle.

One of the early events that led to the United States involvement occurred on May 24, 1950, when the Truman administration announced that it would provide military and economic aid to the Associated States of Indochina and France.[1] The Associated States referred to in the announcement were Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; these countries composed the French Indochina colonial empire. In 1950, the French were deeply involved in a guerrilla war to preserve their influence in Indochina.

When war erupted in Korea in June of 1950, President Harry Truman announced he was also sending a military mission (of thirty-five men) to Vietnam. The mission comprised advisers who were to instruct the French and indigenous forces in the use of American military weapons that were going to be supplied for use against Ho Chi Minh and his Viet Minh guerrillas.[2] Other United States assistance

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[1]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam (Revised Edition), 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965, p. 22.

[2]Lester A. Sobel (ed.), South Vietnam: U.S.-Communist Confrontation in Southeast Asia 1961-65 (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1966), p. 3.

agreements were concluded with Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam on December 23, 1950.[1]

A Korean truce agreement was signed on July 27, 1953, ending the fighting in Korea. Less than a year later, on May 7, 1954, the French army was dramatically defeated at Dienbienphu, and their time as a major power in Southeast Asia was over.

A peace conference was convened at Geneva, Switzerland, with the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as joint co-chairmen. Other nations at the peace conference were the United States, France, Cambodia, Laos, and the People's Republic of China. The nation of Vietnam was partitioned at the peace conference. Representatives of what eventually became North Vietnam (Democratic Republic of Vietnam), and South Vietnam (State of Vietnam, later the Republic of Vietnam) were also at the Geneva meetings.

The dividing line of Vietnam was the Seventeenth Parallel. The territory north of the parallel was placed under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, a communist revolutionary who had led the struggle against the French; former Emperor Bao Dai, an ineffective figurehead who was subsequently removed, was placed at the head of the government in the south.

The United States had provided $1.2 billion in aid

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[1]Sobel, p. 3.

to help the French in their war in Indochina.[1] After the French defeat at Dienbienphu, the United States government continued its assistance program. On October 23, 1954, President Eisenhower sent a message to the South Vietnamese saying the United States was exploring ways to help them build a strong government that would "discourage any who might wish to impose a foreign ideology" on South Vietnam.[2] About two months later, President Eisenhower made direct offers of assistance to the South Vietnamese for their armed forces on the basis of the agreements that had been made in 1950.[3] On February 12, 1955, United States military advisers accepted the responsibility of training the South Vietnamese armed forces.[4]

Between 1955 and 1962, United States aid to the Vietnamese totaled two billion dollars.[5]

The South Vietnamese were no match for the guerrilla movement that emerged late in the 1950's to challenge the government. Although the South Vietnamese could not suppress the guerrillas, the role of the United States

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[1]U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Vietnam and Southeast Asia, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., 1963, p. 3.

[2]U.S., Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia and Vietnam, 3.

[3]Ibid., 22.

[4]Ibid., 2.

[5]U.S., Vietnam and Southeast Asia, 3.

remained largely advisory on the surface. In 1964, there were 23,000 United States military advisers in South Vietnam.

A significant event occurred August 2, 1964, altering the posture of the United States in Vietnam. The United States Navy destroyer "Maddox" and torpedo boats from the North Vietnamese navy fought an engagement in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Vietnam. The administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson contended the North Vietnamese attacked without provocation.

After the battle, the Congress of the United States overwhelmingly adopted a resolution giving President Johnson approval to repel further attacks on U.S. military forces in the area, and to stop aggression.[1] The Tonkin resolution was the basis for a military buildup that eventually moved the United States toward the third largest war in its history. One year after the Tonkin naval battle, U.S. forces in the Vietnam theater of operations totaled 75,000, and the President indicated the number would be raised to 125,000.[2] As Williams and Mayor Cavanagh went through precampaign maneuverings in March of 1966, the United States had raised its troop strength to 215,000.[3]

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[1] New York Times, Aug. 8, 1964, p. 1.

[2] Ibid., July 29, 1965, p. 1.

[3] Ibid., March 3, 1966, p. 1.

The military buildup was accompanied by correspondingly heavier draft quotas. There were battle casualties: in 1964, American war deaths in Vietnam had totaled 146;[1] the following year, more than 1,350 Americans had been killed.[2]

War Reaction

The commitment by the Johnson administration to Vietnam was opposed in the form of teach-ins (gatherings on college and university campuses where speakers argued against the war), draft card burnings, public marches and student sit-ins; attempts were also made by anti-Vietnam demonstrators to obstruct the movement of United States military forces. The United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, led by influential senators who were hostile to the Vietnam policies of President Johnson, received 20,000 letters and telegrams after conducting televised hearings on the war issue in February of 1966.[3]

The growing intensity of the Vietnam debate could not be ignored by Williams and Cavanagh in their campaign for the Democratic Senate nomination. The war formed the backdrop for many courses of action in the economic,

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[1] State News (Michigan State University), Feb. 21, 1968, p. 4.

[2] New York Times, Jan. 2, 1966, p. 22.

[3] William Fulbright, "Introduction," The Vietnam Hearings (New York: Random House, 1966), n.p.

political, and social life of the nation. Both candidates, sensing the importance of the Vietnam question, issued lengthy, carefully prepared documents stating their positions on the war.[1] These two statements, and the reporting of the statements by the two major Detroit daily newspapers, form the basis of this study.

This study will concentrate on the responses to the candidates' Vietnam statements by the Detroit News and the Detroit Free Press, two important opinion leaders among Michigan's daily newspapers. The Detroit News reported the largest circulation of any newspaper in Michigan in 1966. Its daily circulation was 684,705, and its Sunday circulation was 936,410.[2] The daily circulation of the Detroit Free Press was reported 537,203, and the Sunday circulation was listed as 580,412.[3]

The importance of the issue, and the significance of the office of senator to the electorate, placed great responsibility on the Detroit News and the Detroit Free Press during the campaign. Their editorial views notwithstanding, both newspapers had an obligation to provide the electorate in their circulation areas with information on

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[1]The texts of the Vietnam statements by the two candidates are reproduced in full in the Appendix.

[2]Leonard Bray (ed.), Ayer & Son's Directory: Newspapers and Periodicals 1967 (Philadelphia: N. W. Ayer & Son, Inc., 1967), p. 509.

[3]Ibid., 507.

the Vietnam statements of the two senatorial candidates. The constitutional guarantee of a free press carries a concomitant responsibility to inform the people, and to provide them with information that is necessary to help them govern themselves.[1] The American Society of Newspaper editors adopted a code in 1923 that cites the need for the press to be responsible, truthful, accurate, and impartial in its performance.[2] The code points out the press:

> . . . is not to be excused for lack of thoroughness or accuracy within its control or failure to obtain command of these essential qualities. Headlines should be fully warranted by the contents of the articles they surmount.
>
> . . . Sound practice makes clear distinction between news reports and expressions of opinion. News reports should be free from opinion of any kind.[3]

In a free society, the press has the responsibility for the essential function of mass communication.[4] It must enlighten the people and provide information to service the political system.[5]

This study will examine the reporting of the Vietnam statement by the Detroit News and the Detroit Free Press

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[1]Curtis D. MacDougall, Interpretive Reporting (New York: Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 27.

[2]Ibid., 28.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Theodore Peterson, "The Social Responsibility Theory of the Press," in Four Theories of the Press, Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, Wilbur Schramm (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956), p. 74.

[5]Ibid.

with emphasis on their responsibilities to the electorate as defined by the American Society of Newspaper Editors and others. The investigator will attempt to interpret historical fact, newspaper accounts, books, records, personal interviews, and other sources as accurately as his judgments will allow.

CHAPTER I

WILLIAMS AND CAVANAGH IN PERSPECTIVE

The state of Michigan, conservative politically, and rural in tradition and character, was dominated by the Republican party from the middle of 1850 until the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Democratic party's presidential nominee, in 1932.[1] Between the Roosevelt landslide victory in the Great Depression and 1948, when G. Mennen Williams was elected to his first term as governor, Michigan Democrats were able to elect their gubernatorial nominee three times; they could not consolidate their gains and retain the office for more than one term at a time, however.

The Michigan Democratic party suffered its worst defeat in modern history as the nation emerged from World War II in 1946. Less than one year later, the party's future took on an even darker hue with the election of John Franco, a Pontiac paper products businessman with

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[1]Robert Lee Sawyer, Jr., The Democratic State Central Committee in Michigan, 1949-1959: The Rise of the New Political Leadership ("The University of Michigan Governmental Studies," No. 40; Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute of Public Administration, 1960), p. 2.

a questionable reputation, as state chairman.[1] And the following year, George Fitzgerald, attorney for the International Brotherhood of Teamsters of the American Federation of Labor, was elected Democratic National Committeeman for Michigan. Fitzgerald's selection was accomplished with the support of James R. Hoffa, president of Teamster Local 299 in Detroit. Hoffa was physically aggressive, tough and an uncompromising labor leader. He was attempting to sieze control of the Michigan Democratic party.[2] An important component of Hoffa's plans rested in his support of Victor Bucknell, a lawyer from Kalamazoo, who sought the Democratic nomination for governor in 1948.

As Hoffa expanded his interest in the Democratic party, a reform movement, involving G. Mennen Williams and other Democrats, began drafting a different course for the party. The reformers were nourished by meetings and discussions through most of 1947 and in the early part of 1948. The nucleus of the group included Neil M. Staebler, a wealthy Ann Arbor businessman whose father had been the area's first oil and automobile dealer; Attorney Hicks Griffiths and his wife Martha, who later was elected to Congress; Osmund Kelly, postmaster of Flint; John Boeschenstein, a Muskegon

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[1]Frank McNaughton, Mennen Williams of Michigan: Fighter for Progress (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1960), p. 96.

[2]McNaughton, p. 106.

lawyer; and others.[1] After laying the groundwork the reform gathered around Williams for governor. Williams resigned an appointive position with the state Liquor Control Commission on May 15, 1948, and entered the Democratic primary race. Williams was thirty-seven years old; he had no previous experience in elective office. He was seeking to lead a political party that had a reputation burdened with defeat, divisiveness, and corruption.

The Congress of Industrial Organizations and Hoffa's teamsters, growing more powerful with each passing year, had been fighting jurisdictional and membership battles for years.[2] August Scholle and others in the labor movement in Detroit supported Williams as much for their own survival as for any other compelling reason.[3] Hoffa was a serious threat. In the final analysis, the strength from labor was decisive; Williams defeated Bucknell on the basis of a plurality of 12,000 votes in Wayne county, the state headquarters of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.[4] Two months later, Williams was elected governor by upsetting Michigan's flamboyant Republican incumbent, Kim Sigler, who was seeking his second term. Two other Democratic

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[1] McNaughton, p. 100.

[2] Ralph C. James and Estelle Dinerstein James, Hoffa and the Teamsters: A Study of Union Power (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965), p. 15.

[3] McNaughton, p. 150.

[4] Ibid., p. 111.

candidates were elected with Williams: John W. Connelly won the position of lieutenant governor, and Stephen Roth was elected attorney general.

The Detroit Free Press was critical of the support Williams received from labor. Editorially, the Free Press stated an accusation that would be used against Williams through all of his years as governor:

> Williams owes his election almost entirely to organized labor, particularly the CIO, which backed his campaign. It has been stated that Williams was actually so much the candidate of the CIO that with his election the capitol of Michigan would be moved from Lansing to the Hofmann Building in Detroit.[1]

The Political Rise of Williams

G. Mennen Williams offered the Democratic party some interesting credentials that seemed to be inconsistent with his liberal leanings. He was born February 23, 1911, to Mr. and Mrs. Henry P. Williams, a wealthy Detroit couple. Members of the Williams family were active Republicans.[2] In his youth, Williams attended Salisbury, an exclusive Episcopalian boarding school in Connecticut. He matriculated at Princeton University as a young man, and was initiated into Phi Beta Kappa fraternity, a select national society whose members are chosen for excellent scholarship. Williams was also president of the Young Republican Club

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[1] Detroit Free Press, Nov. 5, 1948, p. 6.

[2] McNaughton, p. 26.

at Princeton.[1]

After his graduation from Princeton, Williams enrolled at the University of Michigan law school. He became a member of the Order of the Coif, an organization that selects law students who have shown scholastic excellence. His interest in the Democratic party grew as he studied law.

When the United States entered World War II, Williams joined the Navy. He became an officer, served aboard an aircraft carrier, and was discharged in 1946, with the rank of lieutenant commander.

Williams-Cavanagh Rivalry

When Williams ran for governor in 1948, one of the obscure campaign workers in the Fifteenth Congressional District in Detroit was Jerome P. Cavanagh, a twenty-year-old political science student at the University of Detroit. He was campaigning for Williams, and it was his first venture into Democratic party politics.[2] After he became governor, Williams appointed Hugh McGoldrick, chairman of the Young Democrats of the Fifteenth District, to the position of director of the Office of Hospital Survey and Construction. Cavanagh succeeded McGoldrick as chairman of the district's Young Democrats.[3] And in 1950, Cavanagh, as

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[1]McNaughton, p. 26.

[2]Interview with Jerome P. Cavanagh, Mayor, City of Detroit, Nov. 28, 1967.

[3]Ibid.

chairman, led his Young Democrats into a delegate squabble in Detroit in opposition to Governor Williams.

Chairman Cavanagh joined the side of the Old Line Democrats and teamsters against Governor Williams supporters, which included the labor leaders who had backed him in 1948, and a group of liberals identified with Americans for Democratic Action.[1] The dispute centered on the control of a number of county and district conventions; the ultimate goals were the selection of delegates to the state convention where party candidates were selected. There were reports of scuffling, pushing, and fisticuffs. When Nicholas Roth, convention chairman in the Fourteenth District, called the meeting to order with a gavel resembling a kitchen potato masher, a rumor began that the supporters of Governor Williams were intimidating delegates with baseball bats.[2] The convention, which solidified the preeminence of Williams in the state Democratic party, became known as the "ballbat convention."[3]

The victory for Williams and the liberal wing of the party was not without a frightful price. So weak was the party after the delegate battle that former Governor Harry F. Kelley came within 1,154 votes of regaining the

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[1] Detroit Free Press, March 20, 1966, p. 3-A.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

governor's chair from Williams.[1] Williams went to bed election night thinking he had lost. The closeness of the margin forced a recount which confirmed the re-election of Governor Williams.

Cavanagh remained a "face in the crowd"[2] as Williams expanded the influence and direction of the Michigan Democratic party.

The recount in the Kelley race was the first of two that Williams had to undergo during his tenure as governor. In 1952, a recount was ordered after Williams defeated Fred M. Alger, Jr., former Secretary of State, by 8,618 votes.[3]

Cavanagh and McNamara.--United States Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, a Republican from Grand Rapids who had been highly influential in drafting the nation's foreign policy, died April 18, 1951. Governor Williams, exercising his prerogative of appointment, chose Blair Moody, a young, handsome, liberal Detroit newspaperman, to fill the vacancy. Governor Williams and Senator Moody added a new dimension to Democratic party gatherings as they campaigned together. In his first election test in 1952, however, Senator Moody was defeated.

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[1] Detroit Free Press, March 20, 1966, p. 3-A.

[2] Interview with Cavanagh.

[3] Michigan, Secretary of State, Michigan Manual 1953-1954, p. 412.

Two years later, Moody entered the Democratic primary to regain a seat in the Senate. Moody, his support from Governor Williams notwithstanding, was opposed by Patrick V. McNamara, an Irish labor leader from Detroit who had served in many political capacities in his home area. Cavanagh, a law student at the University of Detroit, was a member of McNamara's campaign committee.[1] He helped prepare a radio show for McNamara, and he made speeches on behalf of McNamara's candidacy. Moody died unexpectedly during the primary campaign, and McNamara, whose primary nomination was assured with Moody's death, defeated incumbent Homer Ferguson, a Republican, the following November.

Williams won his fourth consecutive term by defeating Donald E. Leonard, former State Police Commissioner, in 1954.

Williams achieved his largest plurality as governor in 1956 when he defeated his Republican opponent, Albert E. Cobo, mayor of Detroit, by 290,313.[2] He carried Detroit over Mayor Cobo by a two to one margin.

In 1958, Williams, who was seeking a sixth two-year term, defeated Paul D. Bagwell, a professor of speech at Michigan State University. He became the first politician in the history of the United States to win six terms

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[1]Interview with Cavanagh.

[2]Michigan, Secretary of State, Michigan Manual, 1957-1958, p. 421.

as governor. His popularity, which helped other Democratic party candidates in Michigan, won recognition across the nation; his name was mentioned as a serious presidential possibility in 1960.[1]

Financial Crisis.--Early in the new term, a financial crisis overtook state government. Governor Williams was blamed by Republicans with leading the state to "bankruptcy." The problem was insoluble with Williams, a Democrat, at loggerheads with a legislature that was dominated by Republicans who were bitterly critical of the changes the Governor and his party had brought to the political life of Michigan. The colorful reputation that Williams had built over a decade was badly soiled, not only in Michigan, but also across the nation, by the conflict. Governor Williams did not seek a seventh term in 1960. He led Michigan Democrats to the side of United States Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts, who was seeking his party's presidential nomination. Kennedy won the nomination and election; and Williams was named Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs by the new President.

The Political Rise of Cavanagh

Jerome P. Cavanagh was one of eight children born to Mr. and Mrs. Sylvester J. Cavanagh, an Irish Catholic couple who resided in the Grand River-Livernois section

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[1]McNaughton, p. 1.

in Detroit. Cavanagh's father was a boilermaker at the Ford Motor Company. Cavanagh attended St. Cecelia High School, and the University of Detroit, a Catholic university under the jurisdiction of the Society of Jesus, a religious order. He earned a bachelor of philosophy degree in political science in 1950, and a bachelor of law degree from the University of Detroit law school in 1954.

Cavanagh's "intellect" was reported as "average" when it was compared with the Phi Beta Kappa academic honor earned by Williams at Princeton University.[1]

Except for some local party responsibilities, Cavanagh was inactive politically for nearly seven years after the election of Patrick McNamara to the U.S. Senate. Cavanagh practiced law during this period.

In 1961, with a seemingly insufficient power base to commend him, Cavanagh decided to run for mayor; he was thirty-three years old. Cavanagh threw his hat into the ring without the support of labor, an important source of strength in Detroit, and with the opposition of the two major city newspapers, the Detroit News, and the Detroit Free Press.

The Detroit News said editorially before the election that incumbent Louis C. Miriani was better qualified to hold the office than was Cavanagh.[2]

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[1]Detroit Free Press, July 31, 1966, p. 1-D.

[2]Detroit News, Nov. 2, 1961, p. 22-C.

The Detroit Free Press endorsed Mayor Miriani. Editorializing against Cavanagh's efforts, the Free Press noted:

> There have been large generalities and some demagogic appeals but when they are winnowed down and the chaff has been blown away we have not been able to detect any residue of substance.[1]

Cavanagh defeated Mayor Miriani in the "biggest political upset in 32 years" in Detroit.[2]

After Cavanagh's victory, the Detroit News said editorially:

> This newspaper was not, to put it mildly, a part of the Cavanagh fan club. Though we had some reservations about Miriani's leadership, we had many, many more doubts about Cavanagh. He is Mayor, nevertheless, and we would be the last to claim infallibility.
>
> Cavanagh has without doubt the vigor to do the job. He has had a resounding vote of confidence from the people for the fresh start he promised. And he has, from us and from all others in the community who wish greatness for Detroit and know that there own futures depend upon it, firm and sincere wishes for success in his task.[3]

The Free Press said editorially, "we wish him well, and recommend that he be given a generous opportunity to live up to his supporters' faith before anyone says he can't."[4]

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[1] Detroit Free Press, Nov. 6, 1961, p. 8-A.

[2] Detroit News, Nov. 8, 1961, p. 1.

[3] Ibid., Nov. 9, 1961, p. 22-C.

[4] Detroit Free Press, Nov. 8, 1961, p. 6-A.

The Cavanagh Administration

Cavanagh was a convincing and able mayor who attracted considerable state and national attention with his administration of the city of Detroit. An important industrial and commercial complex, Detroit would be expected to receive recognition on its own in the normal course of events. Cavanagh, however, expanded its lines of communication in an administration that intended to convey the ideas of accomplishment and action. Cavanagh's administration was not unlike the youthful, public relations conscious approach that marked the early years of the occupancy of John F. Kennedy in the White House. A biographical sketch issued by the Mayor's office pointed up the personality Cavanagh displayed:

> City Hall took on a remarkable transformation once Cavanagh took office. His aggressive, hard-driving leadership ignited a spark in municipal government and Cavanagh soon became known as the 'Mayor who woke up a city.' Bright, imaginative new appointees were placed in executive positions as part of the Cavanagh assault on the status quo.[1]

Mayor Cavanagh became the first public official to serve simultaneously as president of the National League of Cities, and president of the United States Conference of Mayors, the two leading organizations of municipal officials in the United States.[2] He was appointed to White

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[1]Detroit, Office of the Mayor, "Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh: A Biographical Sketch," 1967. (Mimeographed), n.p.

[2]Ibid.

House committees for redevelopment, civil rights, manpower, youth opportunity, and legislative recommendations.[1]

Mayor Cavanagh ran for re-election in 1965 with the support of labor. The Detroit News picked Mayor Cavanagh over his opponent, Walter Shamie.[2] The Detroit Free Press endorsed Cavanagh for mayor with this editorial reference:

> . . . [He] has given the city the kind of intelligent, imaginative leadership it needs. The tributes to him which have appeared in the past few months in national magazines are testimonials to his success--and the success of Detroit. We strongly urge his reelection.[3]

McNamara's Mantle

Senator Patrick V. McNamara informed his administrative assistant, Robert Perrin, in May of 1964, that he would not be a candidate for re-election.[4] This was two and one-half years before his term expired. The information was withheld from the Senator's staff and from other politicians to "reduce gossip and also to maintain some kind of stability within the state party until the Senator was ready for a formal announcement."[5] Perrin continued

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[1]Detroit, "Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh."

[2]Detroit News, Oct. 25, 1965, p. 22-A.

[3]Detroit Free Press, Nov. 1, 1965, p. 8-A.

[4]Letter from Robert Perrin, Assistant Director for Government Relations, Office of Economic Opportunity, Executive Office of the President, Washington, D.C., March 5, 1968.

[5]Ibid.

to operate the Senator's office as if a campaign would be conducted, stopping short of collecting funds.

"This was not entirely a smokescreen; there was always the possibility that the Senator might change his mind, and I did not want to be unprepared,"[1] Perrin said.

Senator McNamara felt that the proper age for retirement was near seventy.

"He did not want to become physically unable to do his job, as he had seen happen to other elderly senators,"[2] Perrin noted.

The Michigan Democratic party had lost much of the vitality of the Williams years, and many important leaders wanted the former governor to succeed Senator McNamara. Much of the problem, however, rested with the decision by Senator McNamara as to whether he would seek re-election.

Williams waited for Senator McNamara's decision. The options had narrowed for Williams since his departure from Michigan in 1961 to join the Kennedy administration. In 1963, Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson had succeeded to the presidency after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas. At the Democratic National Convention in 1960, Williams had termed the selection of Johnson as Kennedy's running mate as a "mistake."[3] Although

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[1]Letter from Perrin.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Detroit Free Press, July 15, 1960, p. 1.

Williams was the Department of State's principal assistant for Africa, others had been assigned more prominent roles in the crises that had occurred in the Congo and Rhodesia.[1]

Williams was a frequent visitor to Michigan and he had remained in touch with the state Democratic party during his five years in Washington.[2] It was reported as "more than a little political mystery" when appearances were scheduled for Williams to speak at Warren, Ypsilanti, Wyandotte, Detroit, and other places over the Fourth of July holiday in 1965.[3]

In the fall of 1965, Mayor Cavanagh was occupied with a campaign to win re-election. Cavanagh was interested in going to Washington as United States Senator but, the mayor was not "consciously" thinking about the Senate during his mayoralty campaign; he was aware, however, of the political opportunity that was building in the Democratic party.[4] He needed a substantial margin of victory over his opponent, Walter Shamie, to further his political career.[5] Cavanagh scored the victory he sought.

McNamara's Announcement

Senator McNamara would not say publicly that he

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[1] Detroit Free Press, Feb. 9, 1966, p. 6-A.

[2] Interview with G. Mennen Williams, Nov. 22, 1967.

[3] Detroit News, July 2, 1965, p. 6-D.

[4] Interview with Cavanagh.

[5] Interview with Cavanagh.

would not be a candidate for re-election. Williams and Cavanagh would not oppose him for the nomination. The quiet maneuvering to succeed McNamara, nevertheless, was underway.

On December 18, 1965, Susan Scholle, daughter of August Scholle, president of the Michigan American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, and John T. Connor, Jr., son of the Secretary of Commerce in the Johnson administration, were married in Detroit. Among the guests at the wedding reception were Senator McNamara, Williams, Cavanagh, and Neil Staebler, Democratic National Committeeman for Michigan. Senator McNamara, Cavanagh recalls, informed them he would not be a candidate for re-election:

> I can recall very well that Pat McNamara was seated over at a table, and I went over and sat down and was chatting with him. Soapy came over. A lot of photographers were taking pictures. He [McNamara] had told me, I think prior to Soapy's coming to the table, that he was not going to be a candidate, and he was going to serve out his term, and then Soapy Williams came. He said to him, and I'm quite sure it was the first time Soapy knew, because it was quite interesting, Neil Staebler came to the table too. He told him the same thing, so he told us both at the same time.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> Williams did not express any reaction. Staebler sort of gave his reaction away. He asked him to repeat it, that he didn't quite hear it. He was a little surprised. That day I didn't express any reaction, but it caused me to do some intensive thinking.[2]

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[1]Interview with Cavanagh.

[2]Ibid.

Newspaper photos taken at the wedding of Senator McNamara, Secretary Williams, and Mayor Cavanagh were published the next day with political inferences. The caption under a photo of Senator McNamara and Williams read: "A Political Dilemma: Senator Patrick McNamara, left (retiring?), and G. Mennen Williams (the potential successor?) at Saturday's wedding."[1] Beneath a photo of Cavanagh moving through the receiving line at the reception, the caption read: "Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh greets the newlyweds. He immediately went into a huddle with 'Soapy' Williams and Senator Patrick McNamara."[2]

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[1] Detroit Free Press, Dec. 19, 1965, p. 1-D.

[2] Ibid.

CHAPTER II

PRESSURES BUILD FOR A PRIMARY

United States Senator Patrick V. McNamara announced on February 23, 1968, that he would not be a candidate to succeed himself for a third term. The date the Senator chose to make public announcement was on the fifty-fifth birthday of his friend, and possible successor, G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Williams was in Washington, D.C., observing his birthday with a small group of African diplomats; he was confident of Senator McNamara's support.[1] His most talked about rival for the Democratic party nomination, Jerome P. Cavanagh, mayor of Detroit, was in San Francisco, California.

There was never any doubt that Williams would be a candidate if McNamara decided not to seek re-election. Even before the Senator's announcement, there were expressions of support for Williams. One of the most significant statements came from August Scholle, who declared for Williams thirty-eight days before McNamara publicly stepped out of contention.[2] Williams had also arranged for James

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[1] Interview with Williams.

[2] Detroit News, Jan. 17, 1966, p. 1.

Robinson, a Detroit Free Press reporter in Washington, to join his campaign staff as press secretary before McNamara's public disclosure.

In addition to quietly enlisting early support for his pending campaign, he assessed his comparative strength with his unannounced opponent. Williams had a poll taken in December to determine his position in relationship to Cavanagh.[1] The results delighted Williams: Cavanagh "wasn't close" in the poll.[2]

A cheering crowd greeted Williams on March 3, 1966, as he arrived at the Capitol in Lansing, ostensibly to begin a tour around Michigan to plumb sentiment for his candidacy. Five days later, on March 8, Williams announced that he would be a candidate for the United States Senate. If he survived a primary, Williams would have to run against U.S. Representative Robert Griffin who appeared to be heading for the Republican nomination unopposed and with the support of Governor Romney and other Republicans.

The Detroit Free Press editorialized that Michigan would be done a great disservice by those critics who rekindled old partisan quarrels with the candidacy of Williams. The editorial added:

> . . . The point is whether Soapy Williams, now 55, with a lifetime of public service in Michigan and

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[1]Interview with James Robinson, campaign press secretary to G. Mennen Williams, Feb. 10, 1967.

[2]Interview with Williams.

> Washington, in domestic and international affairs, is the best possible choice for senator.
>
> We'll reserve that decision for later, after all the candidates have announced and after the campaign trails have been traveled.
>
> But it already appears that Michigan will be the winner. In Republican Robert Griffin and in the Democrat Williams, there are already two candidates qualified for the office by ability and experience.[1]

Cavanagh's Dilemma

In the weeks after Senator McNamara's private disclosure at the Scholle-Connor wedding of his impending political retirement, Cavanagh struggled internally with an implacable ambition and an expanding, highly unfavorable cluster of political facts. A seat in the United States Senate held a "certain attraction"[2] for Cavanagh; so he began casting about for political and financial backing for a campaign to attain that seat.

The problem of political "timing" was important in the deliberations that Cavanagh had with his advisers. Williams, at age fifty-five, could be expected to stay in the United States Senate for the remainder of his political career if he were elected. Michigan's other United States Senator, Philip A. Hart, a popular Democrat, was only fifty-four. If Cavanagh did not choose to seek election

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[1] Detroit Free Press, March 8, 1966, p. 6-A.

[2] Interview with Cavanagh.

at this opportunity, another might not arrive for "fifteen or twenty years."[1]

A poll ordered by Cavanagh clearly established the early superior position of Williams among the electorate.[2] Although a firm believer in polls, Cavanagh began to "rationalize."[3]

"I wanted that job so badly that I began to build a series of reasons why I could overcome what the polls said,"[4] Cavanagh recalled later.

A Williams Steamroller

If the Michigan Democratic party engaged in a seriously contested senatorial primary, there was always the danger of a party split that could not be repaired by the time a runoff election occurred with the Republican nominee in November. The leadership also recognized that two highly expensive primary campaigns would have to be financed along with the final campaign. There appeared to be little enthusiasm among party leadership for a primary, and their choice to succeed Senator McNamara was Williams.[5]

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[1]Interview with Cavanagh.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Interview with Cavanagh, Dec. 7, 1967.

The Democratic party was searching for a nominee to oppose Governor George Romney who was expected to seek re-election as another step toward his presidential campaign. Many saw a highly desirable combination in Williams as the senatorial nominee, and Cavanagh as the gubernatorial nominee. The option did not appeal to Cavanagh. The thought of being in the Senate where he would be one of a few national political figures with primary knowledge of urban affairs was much more inviting.

The announcement in January by August Scholle of his early support for Williams was followed with similar expressions from other Democrats. Representatives of five of the six congressional districts in Wayne county indicated a preference for Williams after meeting with him, David Lebenbom, Wayne County Democratic Chairman, reported. The district not represented at the meeting had previously voiced support for Williams.[1]

Cavanagh interpreted the public support for the Williams candidacy as a "steamroller" tactic designed to discourage him from entering a primary.[2] The atmosphere that was developing in January and February for Williams, however, had the effect of pushing Cavanagh into the race.

". . . The position I have as an unencumbered office holder would be shot overnight if I let them pat me

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[1] Detroit News, Feb. 26, 1966, p. 3-A.

[2] Interview with Cavanagh, Dec. 7, 1967.

on the head and say, 'Sit down boy. Wait your turn,'"[1] Cavanagh commented.

Press Encourages a Primary

Cavanagh wavered over whether to run for the Senate. One day it seemed he would be a candidate, and on the next day, the turn of events discouraged further consideration. He had received expressions of support. Among them was a former ally in the 1950 "ballbat convention" delegate squabbles, James R. Hoffa, head of the teamsters union.[2]

The two major metropolitan newspapers, the Detroit News and the Detroit Free Press, kept the issue alive. There were news stories, editorial cartoons, editorials, and comments from columnists. One of the first of the new year was on January 4, 1966, fifty days before Senator McNamara publicly withdrew from contention, when the Detroit News twitted Cavanagh with an editorial cartoon about entering the primary.[3]

The News pointedly said in an editorial before Williams had announced his candidacy, that August Scholle was calling for a closed primary. The editorial added:

> We can think of a variety of political reasons why Jerry Cavanagh might prefer to wait for more

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[1] Detroit Free Press, April 4, 1966, p. 12-A.

[2] Ibid., Feb. 5, 1966, p. 3-A.

[3] Detroit News, Jan. 4, 1966, p. 22-A.

> auspicious time and not take up arms against the Scholle dictatorship in Democratic party councils. Having said that, we hope he might make a try at it and give Michigan Democrats a chance to vote for a senate contender who doesn't wear a leash.[1]

Of Williams, the Detroit News noted that he was departing from Washington at a time when "African affairs are as dangerously chaotic as Michigan's finances were during his tour at Lansing."[2]

On March 9, 1966, Mayor Cavanagh was challenged to enter the race by his friend, Edgar C. (Doc) Greene, a columnist for the Detroit News. Greene wrote:

> One of the things that is beginning to bug me about Williams and Gus Scholle, and even some of my own brethren, is their arrant assumption that Williams is already the Democratic candidate.
>
> Everyone assures me that Mayor Cavanagh, if he chose to try and go to Washington and pry out federal funds for the state instead of merely the city, would have no chance against Williams.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> And all of the people, especially including my brethren on the political beat, even while they're explaining why Soapy is a cinch, are also admitting that they will vote for Cavanagh if he chooses not to go stand in a corner as the party has apparently bade him.
>
> I wouldn't like a guy who went and stood in a corner just because a lot of duffers thought they owed something to Soapy.
>
> Who owes Soapy anything?[3]

Greene's column was "unconsciously" a determining

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[1] Detroit News, Feb. 27, 1966, p. 14-B.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Detroit News, March 9, 1966, p. 20-D.

factor in Cavanagh's decision to run for the United States Senate.[1]

Five days later, Will Muller, a Detroit News editorial columnist and writer, described Cavanagh as "young, vigorous, and articulate . . . [a man who] could become a giant killer."[2] If this was intended to be additional encouragement to Cavanagh to make a decision, it was unnecessary; the Mayor had already committed himself privately. He announced on March 19.[3]

The Detroit News editorialized on the Cavanagh candidacy:

> This newspaper's enthusiasm for Cavanagh's willingness to defy the back-room king-makers and enter the senate race is not unalloyed.
> . . . . . .
> A live primary between two men who have made public names for themselves, each qualified on the face of things for the office at stake, is not the worst thing that could happen to a party or a state.[4]

With Cavanagh's candidacy, the Detroit Free Press cautioned editorially that the city risked the loss of a full-time mayor during the campaign. However, the Free Press editorial added:

> . . . he is unquestionably qualified for the senate post he seeks, in many ways uniquely qualified for having taken a leadership role in shaping the

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[1] Interview with Cavanagh, Dec. 7.

[2] Detroit News, March 14, 1966, p. 6-B.

[3] Detroit News, March 19, 1966, p. 1-A.

[4] Ibid., March 20, 1966, p. 14-B.

creative federalism which links the metropolitan areas more closely to the nation's capital. He commands national respect.

. . . a senate race with so many top-flight and fully qualified candidates is one that Michigan voters, of whatever political stripe, can applaud.[1]

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[1] Detroit Free Press, March 21, 1966, p. 8-A.

CHAPTER III

CAMPAIGN TECHNIQUES: METHODS, OBJECTIVES, AND COMMUNICATION

The previous political encounters between G. Mennen Williams and Jerome P. Cavanagh, the similarities and contrasts of their personalities and political careers, added an interesting dimension to the senatorial primary election. Both men were tall--Williams at six feet four inches, and Cavanagh at six feet one inch--a definite campaign asset in a crowd. They were outwardly friendly, out-going candidates who could meet voters easily; they were lawyers, natives of Detroit, the most important Democratic area in Michigan. Both had previously established important support in their home areas.

Williams had run for governor the first time at the age of thirty-seven. Cavanagh was elected mayor of the fifth largest city in the United States in his first bid for office at the age of thirty-three. Neither had been defeated at the polls.

The Williams family financial holdings in the Mennen Company, a soap products manufacturing firm, was responsible for the nickname of "Soapy" that Williams had acquired. An inveterate campaigner, Williams had called square dances, had shaken hands constantly, and had

traveled endlessly around Michigan during his twelve years as governor. He was the governor when innabitants of the state still vividly recalled the Great Depression, and the unhappy, sometimes bloody labor organizing efforts in the 1930's. Unemployment benefits, some early steps in civil rights, mental health, and the growth of government, the enlargement of educational opportunities, and many other problems occupied state government. The young people in Michigan's colleges and universities were members of the "silent generation" of students in the 1950's.

The seventeen years of age that separated Williams and Cavanagh represented an unusual period in the nation's history. Young and popular, Cavanagh was representative of a new type of political personality that had become increasingly evident in American politics after the election of John F. Kennedy to the presidency. Articulate, with a keen sense of public relations about him, Cavanagh exhibited an appealing, easy style. He was much closer in age to the growing numbers of impatient young people who were making up a larger share of the electorate. The college generation of the 1960's was noisy and politically active. They marched for civil rights, against the war in Vietnam, and they broke down many barriers that had preserved the existing order.

Government in the sixties was expected to seek out problems and provide rapid answers to them. The old phrase that government that governs least is best had lost

some of its meaning.

Williams believed before the campaign that his old political strength would reassert itself.[1] Cavanagh was convinced that he was politically "hot."[2]

Campaign Techniques

Lapel pins that were replicas of the green polka dot bow tie trademark of G. Mennen Williams were distributed during the senatorial primary campaign by the former governor's supporters. During his years in the state house, Williams had campaigned constantly and had turned the bow tie into a visually powerful campaign symbol. Williams and his bow tie did not have a problem of recognition during the 1950's. With the bow tie as his symbol, Williams, using personal contact and old political loyalties and friendships, sought to re-establish himself in the primary to a position of prominence in the Michigan Democratic party.

Cavanagh and his supporters distributed metal clicking devices that children commonly call "crickets," and they were described in one instance as sounding like a "horde of locusts."[3] The noisy, ubiquitous "crickets" were symbolic of Cavanagh's campaign techniques: he made his appeal for votes with a noisy, media-oriented campaign.

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[1]Interview with Williams.

[2]Interview with Cavanagh, Nov. 23.

[3]Detroit News, July 16, 1966, p. 4-B.

A pre-campaign assessment of the primary suggested to Williams that he still had a solid base of support in Michigan. His principal objective was to prevent any erosion of his position under the vagaries of a political campaign and the aggressive challenge from Cavanagh. Williams had to accomplish his objective without alienating Cavanagh and his supporters; they were necessary for the runoff election in November.

Williams added one more important feature to the primary that he was confident of winning. Inasmuch as the fall campaign against a Republican opponent would be shorter in duration, Williams arranged some of his primary efforts to build support for the runoff election.[1]

Cavanagh recognized that he was behind. A shortage of time to overtake his opponent, and a problem of recognition outstate, were considered to be Cavanagh's two major handicaps as he entered the campaign.[2] To compensate for these deficiencies the decision was made to make significant use of television, radio, newspapers, and other media, blended with a mixture of personal contact.[3] Cavanagh also obtained the services of the United States Research and Development Corporation, a firm that organizes

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[1]Interview with Williams.

[2]Interview with Robert E. Toohey, Campaign Manager for Cavanagh, Sept. 15, 1966.

[3]Ibid.

and operates political campaigns for candidates.

Dialog with the People

Williams formally began his campaign for the Democratic nomination to the Senate on April 11, 1966, at 5 a.m., when he began shaking hands with workmen who were entering the East Jefferson Assembly plant of the Chrysler Corporation in Detroit. His previous political campaigns had begun and had ended at the same factory gate.

The Williams campaign was centered around the theme of a "Dialog with the People," which was essentially the interpersonal communications technique that he had adopted so successfully as governor. The appearance of Williams at gatherings, the importance of handshakes and personal greetings, and the renewal of old acquaintances, were fundamental points to the Williams method.

The person-to-person technique contained the important feature of instant feedback,[1] which was exceptionally important to Williams who had been absent from Michigan's hustings for six years.[2] This was one method to determine which issues were occupying the electorate.

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[1]Feedback is the response that a sender of communications receives from his audiences. Smiles, handshakes, crowd sizes, and similar responses are examples of feedback. This feedback provided Williams with evidence of the reaction of voters to his return to Michigan politics.

[2]Interview with Eddie McGloin, Williams' Campaign Manager, Aug. 24, 1966.

Issues were also determined by scientific polling.[1]

The Williams dialog strategy was welcomed by his political allies and friends who envisaged the campaign as a big step to restore the state Democratic party to its winning ways. To them, Williams was a message in himself. He attended breakfasts, lunches, dinners, gatherings during the day and late at night. Williams' campaign schedule was extremely tight and comprehensive; at one point, it even contained the notation that arrangements were being made to have him usher in church on Easter.

Although Williams represented a message in himself, he did not ignore the issues. He issued a widely distributed position paper on Vietnam. He discussed public education, civil rights, inflation, economics, the war on poverty, water pollution, and other issues.

There were moments of humor and embarrassment for the former governor. He accepted a pair of polka dot swimming trunks at a splash party. And he, along with Cavanagh, was fined twenty-five cents in a humorous kangaroo court at the Traverse City Cherry Festival. Williams was also asked to leave a Children's Parade at the festival because of rules on political participation. He was ushered from a plant gate of the Ford Motor Company at Monroe because

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[1]Harvey Dzodin, "Political Campaigns: A Study in Theory and Practice," an unpublished paper prepared on the Williams-Cavanagh election for police science research at Michigan State University, Sept. 1, 1966, p. 29.

he failed to obtain permission in advance to stop and campaign.[1] He was also asked to leave a Michigan Employment Security office because of government rules against campaigning in certain public offices.[2]

Leadership Support.--Williams would have had difficulty conducting his dialog technique without strong backing from the leadership throughout the state. He had organizations in every county. He pledged that he would visit every county in the primary, and he honored his pledge.

The tremendous groundswell of support was evident at the annual Democratic party Jefferson-Jackson day dinner in Detroit where Mayor Cavanagh received "warm applause" and the partisans "went wild" when Williams was introduced.[3]

"I guess I'm in his home ball park," Cavanagh said to his neighbor at the dinner, former Governor John B. Swainson, after the applause for Williams.

"Yes," Swainson replied, "but remember also that is where the game is going to be played."[4]

Williams was endorsed by the state American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations, a significant portion of the state Democratic party, despite

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[1] Detroit News, May 19, 1966, p. 1.

[2] Detroit Free Press, July 30, 1966, p. 3-A.

[3] Wall Street Journal, July 27, 1966, p. 10.

[4] Ibid.

a protest by Mayor Cavanagh for neutrality.[1]

Negroes are an active political group in the state Democratic party, and both candidates eagerly sought their support. When Williams was governor, the first Negro was placed on a Democratic state ticket. Cavanagh had established rapport with Negroes, too. An indication of the probable turn of events occurred when 15,000 persons, mostly Negroes, attended a Freedom Rally at Cobo Hall in Detroit. Cavanagh drew applause for a speech he gave at the meeting. Williams arrived late and his entrance was described as resembling "Santa Claus arriving at Hudson's on Thanksgiving morning."[2] Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference and a prominent civil rights leader, was embraced by Williams.

Cavanagh also found himself contending with a difficult rumor among the Negroes in Detroit. The rumor suggested what better combination for the cause of civil rights could the Negroes have with Williams as Senator and Cavanagh as mayor of Detroit.

Further evidence of support for Williams came from the endorsements. The First Congressional District, Mayor Cavanagh's home district and the most populous congressional district in Michigan with 417,000, endorsed Williams.[3]

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[1] Detroit News, June 2, 1966, p. 1.

[2] Ibid., June 29, 1966, p. 11.

[3] Detroit Free Press, May 30, 1966, p. 3-A.

Williams eventually won a clean sweep of Wayne county districts, including the Thirteenth and Fourteenth, both heavily populated by Negroes.

Williams and the Press.--Williams did not need the Michigan press to help him defeat Mayor Cavanagh in the primary election. It was not a major concern in campaign planning. For many years as governor, Williams had an unfriendly press, and it began to reassert its hostility during the campaign. News releases were mailed out regularly during the campaign to Michigan dailies, weeklies, radio and television stations. Special attempts were made to place stories in the labor and Negro press.[1] The purchase of radio and television time was limited, and no billboard space was obtained.[2] Williams was holding his resources for the general election.

The Spirit of '66

The open primary election system in Michigan permits voters to choose either party's ballot, although ticket splitting is not permissible. Aware that his candidacy angered many leaders in the Democratic party, Cavanagh attempted to use this open primary to his advantage by encouraging Republicans to cross over and vote for him. He

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[1]Interview with Robinson.

[2]Detroit News, June 17, 1966, p. 9-D.

also courted independent voters.[1]

The type of campaign that Cavanagh had planned to accomplish his task became evident on March 19, 1966, the day he announced for the Senate. A banner across the room where Cavanagh read his announcement said: "Bosses for Soapy--People for Jerry."[2]

Five minute television announcements of Cavanagh's decision to run for the Senate were released through eighteen television stations throughout Michigan on the day the mayor declared his candidacy. In addition, Cavanagh went by airplane to Grand Rapids and Marquette to repeat his announcement. He was accompanied on the flight by four professional football players, all of whom were known to Michigan television football fans: Wayne Walker, Joe Schmidt, John Gordy, all of the Detroit Lions, and Earl Morrall, a former Michigan State University and Lions player who had moved to the New York Giants.

Cavanagh's campaign literature and billboards proclaimed "The Spirit of 66."[3] He described Williams as a man whose "tired answers and slogans of the '40's and '50's"[4] were not applicable to the problems of the 1960's and 1970's.

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[1] Detroit Free Press, July 31, 1966, p. 1-B.

[2] Detroit News, March 20, 1966, p. 1.

[3] Wall Street Journal, July 27, 1966, p. 10.

[4] Ibid.

Underdog Role.--The campaign staff Cavanagh had assembled considered the Mayor to be their biggest asset.[1] He was young, could adapt well under any kind of situation, was politically shrewd, and he was likeable. He did not lose his poise when he was confronted with the formidable opposition in his own party.

Inasmuch as he was behind at the outset, Cavanagh believed that he had to carry the fight to Williams.[2] His attack early in the campaign came in the form of issues. He was hopeful that he could draw Williams into debates. His polls were accented toward determining the issues in the minds of the electorate, giving the Mayor timely talking points during the campaign.[3] The polls disclosed the electorate was concerned most about the war in Vietnam, with education and inflation as their next concerns.[4] Position papers were developed on Vietnam, civil rights, and highway safety. Others were planned for education and inflation, but they were never completed.[5]

On Vietnam, the Mayor said, "I had to establish in the minds of the people that there was a distinct

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[1]Interview with Toohey.

[2]Interview with Cavanagh, Nov. 28.

[3]Interview with Toohey.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Interview with Anthony Ripley, former assistant to Mayor Cavanagh, Feb. 26, 1968.

difference between my views and those of Williams."[1]

The position Cavanagh took on Vietnam, while it was a position of conscience, was intended to be an important piece of evidence that he was not hesitant about taking "new and different positions in the sixties."[2]

A Change in Approach.--On May 14, 1966, Cavanagh returned from a sixteen-day trip to Europe. He had led a trade and travel delegation to Europe at the request of John T. Connor, United States Secretary of Commerce. When the opportunity had been offered, Cavanagh recognized that it could provide him with some needed foreign policy exposure that was lacking in his political background. The Detroit News sent a reporter to Europe to accompany Cavanagh and his delegation. The Free Press did not. Despite specially arranged, timely briefings in Germany, France, and other countries of western Europe, the coverage was disappointing.[3] In addition, he was absent when Senator Patrick V. McNamara died on April 30. After Cavanagh returned to Detroit, some changes were planned in his campaign methods.

Cavanagh turned increasingly to the handshaking type of approach that Williams had been practicing, and

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[1]Interview with Cavanagh, Nov. 28.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid., Dec. 7.

Cavanagh began attacking Williams personally. He began mentioning "payless paydays," a charge Republicans frequently made against Williams.[1] The Senate, Cavanagh said, was not a pasture to pay off old political debts.[2]

Cavanagh's advisers, William Haddad and his associate, Robert Clampitt, of the United States Research and Development Corporation, came up with a slogan, "Ability Makes the Difference." The implication was to suggest that Cavanagh could lead in Detroit even though he had balky opposition on the City Council, while Williams had not been able to lead with a difficult legislature in Lansing.[3]

Haddad and Clampitt had previously assisted Robert King High, mayor of Miami, Florida, in his campaign for the Democratic nomination of governor of Florida. Haddad had also assisted the late President John F. Kennedy, and John Lindsay, mayor of New York.[4]

The Haddad and Clampitt campaign corporation devised a campaign technique. In the Sheraton Cadillac Hotel in Detroit, the firm established an electronic center that had a direct dial telephone to every radio and television station in Michigan. Cavanagh's voice was recorded on the campaign trail and then sent out from the electronics center

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[1] Detroit Free Press, July 17, 1966, p. 4-A.

[2] Detroit News, July 13, 1966, p. 18-A.

[3] Interview with Cavanagh, Nov. 28.

[4] Detroit News, June 20, 1966, p. 24-C.

over high fidelity tape recorders to the broadcast media. Operators, who were skilled in the language of newsmen and disc jockeys, would strike up a conversation and then offer "thirty seconds of Cavanagh." Occasionally, recordings of Williams were offered. The Williams statements were credible, but the most favorable statements that he made were not offered to the disc jockeys.[1]

The attacks began drawing replies from Williams who otherwise had tried to ignore Cavanagh. Williams began using "silly" and "madness" to describe his opponent's efforts.[2] On July 29, Williams charged Cavanagh with yielding to the "influence of the Madison Avenue mercenaries."[3]

In the final weeks of the campaign, Cavanagh took a one-month vacation from his duties as mayor to devote full time to the election. He also purchased space on 300 billboards across Michigan.[4] Some television spot announcements and five-minute talks were taped to be broadcast over television and radio stations throughout the state. He also took an old fashioned campaign whistle-stop train trip across the state, and then as a contrast, he flew in a jet plane to a number of cities in Michigan.[5]

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[1]Interview with Ripley, Nov. 23, 1966.

[2]Detroit News, July 22, 1966, p. 13-A.

[3]Ibid., July 29, 1966, p. 11-A.

[4]Detroit Free Press, July 3, 1966, p. 1.

[5]Interview with Ripley, Nov. 23, 1966.

The Issue of Debate

Williams conducted a campaign that all but publicly ignored the existence of his opponent. Williams was out front, and he could gain little by sparring verbally with Cavanagh. In addition, there was the danger of splitting the party.

Williams, however, did acknowledge the political presence of Cavanagh by repeatedly expressing concern when the Mayor left his office to campaign.

"He felt we were counting the hours he was away from the office," Williams' press secretary, James Robinson, said. "We were trying to throw him off balance. He was trying to explain why he was serving as mayor and running for the senate."[1]

Unlike Williams, Cavanagh conducted a campaign that mentioned the former governor at every possible turn. When he announced for the Senate, Cavanagh invited Williams to debate the issues. He repeated the challenge throughout the campaign.[2]

Mayor Cavanagh tried unsuccessfully to draw Williams into a debate. Facile, articulate, Cavanagh has a fine speaking voice; he presented a sharp contrast to Williams who spoke in a slow, unattractive nasal monotone.

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[1]Interview with Robinson.

[2]Detroit News, March 19, 1966, p. 1-A.

The repeated challenges by Cavanagh were reported in the news columns of the Detroit Free Press and the Detroit News.

The Free Press observed editorially:

> We're not saying Williams is chicken if he doesn't debate Cavanagh face to face on television. Head-on debates are dramatic, but give more weight to make-up and glibness than capacity or comprehension.
>
> We're not saying that campaign style is the best way of judging candidates. Their experience and past records are more important.
>
> We are raising a question: To what extent has Williams been able to convert his concern for people and his experiences into a cohesive and intelligent command of the issues that will face the Senate? At this point in the campaign, who knows?[1]

When Williams told the Seventeenth Congressional District executive committee that he would not fall for the "political trick" of debating, the Detroit News noted editorially:

> Former Gov. G. Mennen Williams efforts to drape himself in the Kennedy mantle during his campaigning for the U.S. Senate came a cropper the other night when he in effect called the late President John F. Kennedy a political trickster.
>
> . . . . . .
>
> When John F. Kennedy debated the issues with former Vice-President Nixon in four highly publicized television programs in 1960, he was widely acclaimed in the Democratic party for his 'statesmanship.' And his showing in the TV debates was widely credited with having turned the tide in his favor.
>
> But now debating the issues with an opponent is just a 'political trick,' Williams says. Is

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[1] Detroit Free Press, July 13, 1966, p. 6-A.

that what it was in 1960, too, governor? Or do you fear the results would be the same as they were in 1960 when the underdog emerged victorious?[1]

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[1]Detroit News, July 10, 1966, p. 14-B.

CHAPTER IV

DETROIT: FOCAL POINT FOR COMMUNICATIONS

The city of Detroit is the focal point of a metropolitan complex that invests itself of three populous counties in the southeastern section of Michigan. In the last federal census, the Detroit Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area, which comprises the counties of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb, recorded a population of 3,762,360.[1] This was 43 per cent of the population listed for the entire state. Inhabitants of the metropolitan area are bound together by common regional interests in transportation, commerce, government services, recreation, and mass communication. This cohesive, intricate, inter-related economic, social, and political community was the base for patterns of communication that have an influence on large portions of Michigan.

Detroit was the fulcrum for the Democratic party.[2] It was particularly important in the Williams-Cavanagh primary because it was an important support base for

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[1]U.S., Bureau of Census, U.S. Census of Population: 1960 General Population Characteristics, Michigan. Final Report PC (1)-24B (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 35.

[2]Interview with Williams.

Cavanagh, and it had been important to Williams in the past. Although the population figures were impressive, the character of the population was more interesting. Labor and minority groups comprised significant parts of Detroit.

Of Michigan's 1,179,000 residents engaged in manufacturing in 1966, some 618,200 worked in metropolitan Detroit.[1] Equally noteworthy were the statistics that indicated the metropolitan area had 75,300 of the states 141,600 employees in transportation and utilities, and 49,400 of Michigan's 112,000 construction employees.[2] These were highly unionized industries, and labor had cast its ballots in the past for the Democratic party candidates. Labor had delivered the Democratic majorities that helped Williams win the Michigan gubernatorial race six times in succession.[3] Cavanagh had received the support of labor in his re-election campaign.

The U.S. Bureau of the Census in 1960 listed metropolitan Detroit as having 558,870 Negroes.[4] Negroes have traditionally affiliated themselves with the Democratic

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[1]U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment and Earnings and Monthly Report of the Labor Force, XIV, No. 7, 75.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Samuel J. Eldersveld et al., Political Affiliation in Metropolitan Detroit, University of Michigan Governmental Studies, No. 34 (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, 1957), p. 87.

[4]U.S. Census of Population, p. 76.

party in overwhelming numbers.[1] Neither candidate could have ignored this sizeable, and politically motivated, minority without placing his candidacy in jeopardy.

Labor and the Negro community were political activists with their own channels of communication throughout Michigan. Labor contracts negotiated in Detroit formed the mould for auto supply industries throughout Michigan. The cause of civil rights had attracted Negroes from every part of Michigan.

The relationship of labor and the Negro community entwined further in the industrial plants of Michigan. With upward mobility still generally denied to Negroes, a large number were employed in factories where the problems of greater opportunity and civil rights were closely bound together. This mixture established a special frame of reference for communication.

Area Voting Strength

After a politician is elected to office, he accepts the role of spokesman for his constituency. By virtue of his office, he is in a position to influence opinion, not only in his own constituency, but also, as his prestige grows, among his legislative colleagues, and voters in other constituencies. The opportunities for leadership from the Detroit area in the legislature are without

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[1] Eldersveld, pp. 87, 88.

parallel in outstate or northern Michigan. Voters in the counties of Wayne, Oakland, and Macomb elect nineteen of the thirty-eight members of the state Senate; fifty-four of 110 members of the House of Representatives are elected from the same area.[1] The interaction of various members of the legislature with each other form other networks of communication that bear on state-wide candidacies and campaigns.

One of the most important state-wide Democratic primary elections since World War II occurred in 1960 when John B. Swainson, lieutenant governor, sought the gubernatorial nomination. G. Mennen Williams had declined to seek re-election. Swainson won the nomination over James M. Hare and Edward Connor on the basis of his plurality in Detroit. There were 540,454 ballots cast in the primary, and 342,457 were from metropolitan Detroit.[2] Swainson received 274,473 votes, and of these, 187,373 were cast in metropolitan Detroit.[3]

Mass Media and Public Opinion

The more personal the communication, the more

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[1]These figures include fractional districts.

[2]Michigan, Secretary of State, Michigan Manual, 1961-1962, pp. 399, 400.

[3]Michigan, Michigan Manual, 1961-1962, pp. 399, 400.

effective it is in converting opinion.[1] Candidates, however, would face an insurmountable task if they had to contact each voter in a campaign. The responsibility for providing information to the masses has been accepted by the mass media, including newspapers, television, radio and magazines. The mass media form an important part of man's daily environment; they are considered to be reliable by its readers.[2]

The mass media are highly critical to the endless networks of personal communication that surround people by nourishing them with information. Ideas tend to flow from the mass media to opinion leaders who influence interpersonal communication, suggesting a process that has been called the "two step flow" in communication.[3]

An unusually heavy burden is placed on the mass media in Detroit with the heavy concentration of adherents to the Democratic party. The information they disseminate reaches opinion leaders who are in a position to influence large segments of the Michigan Democratic party.

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[1]Bernard Berelson, "Communications and Public Opinion," in Reader in Public Opinion and Communication, Bernard Berelson and Morris Janowitz (eds.) (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1950-53), p. 452.

[2]Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Media (New York: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, 1949), Part IV, 50.

[3]Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), p. 151.

The focal points for mass dissemination of news in Detroit are the two major daily newspapers. The oldest is the Detroit Free Press, founded in 1831, the last surviving morning daily newspaper of general circulation in Michigan. The Free Press is a politically independent newspaper[1] and it is published by the Knight Newspapers, Incorporated, which also publishes the Herald in Miami, Florida, the Beacon Journal in Akron, Ohio, and the Observer in Charlotte, North Carolina.

The other major daily newspaper in the city is the Detroit News, which has the largest circulation of any newspaper in Michigan. Founded in 1873, the News is currently published by the Evening News Association, and the editor is Martin Hayden. The Detroit News is published weekday afternoons and Sunday mornings, with a strong emphasis on home delivery.

Wire Services

The Associated Press and the United Press International are news gathering services that have offices around the world. Each wire service maintains national and state wires throughout the United States. Stories are routed from their sources into this expansive arterial system. News of limited geographic importance or interest is kept off the national wires. Both wire services maintain

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[1]Bray, Ayer & Son's Directory, 507.

state networks to serve their state members and clients. The main Michigan bureaus of the Associated Press and the United Press International are situated in the same downtown cluster of buildings that house the Detroit Free Press and the Detroit News.

Both wire services have feeder bureaus in Lansing and Grand Rapids. The Associated Press serves forty-five Michigan newspapers on its news wire, and about seventy broadcast outlets on its radio-television wire.[1] The United Press International serves twenty-four newspapers and about one hundred television-radio outlets.

The Associated Press is a cooperative arrangement operated by the member newspapers. United Press International is a privately owned organization that sells its services to clients. Both wire services, however, operate similarly to each other. The emphasis is on accuracy and speed in the transmission of news.

Reporters for the Associated Press began intensive coverage of the Williams-Cavanagh primary election in the final weeks of the campaign. Previous coverage had been on the basis of press releases from the candidates, examination of material carried by the two major Detroit dailies, and from newspapers in the area where the candidates were campaigning. Editors in the Detroit bureau examine

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[1]Competition for members between the two wire services causes these numbers to change periodically.

every edition of the Free Press and the News.[1]

United Press International in Michigan covered the primary election "about 50 per cent of the time."[2] On other occasions, the news service relied on handouts from the candidates, and clients; and the Free Press and the News were checked regularly for "angles."[3]

The wire services were important to Cavanagh because he needed outstate exposure.[4]

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[1]Interview with Eugene Schroeder, Associated Press news analyst, Feb. 13, 1968.

[2]Interview with Michael J. Conlon, Assistant Bureau Manager, Detroit, United Press International, Feb. 13, 1968.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Interview with Ripley, Nov. 28.

CHAPTER V

THE VIETNAM ISSUE DEVELOPS

Six months after President Johnson obtained congressional approval for the Tonkin resolution, he told the nation in his 1965 State of the Union address that the security of the United States was directly related to the events in Southeast Asia. Other political leaders, some in the President's own political party, began expressing doubts over the growing investment in South Vietnam. What may at one time appeared to have been a guerrilla uprising and a punitive response to an attack on the navy destroyer "Maddox," had become a war of major proportions. The growing ferocity of the fighting was graphically related to the American people in 1965 when 240 Americans perished in a seven-day battle between the U.S. First Cavalry and North Vietnamese regulars, and some guerrillas in the South Vietnam Iadrang Valley. In the preceding seven weeks, culminating with the engagement in the Iadrang Valley, 673 Americans had been killed in Vietnam; this was equivalent to all the American deaths in Vietnam for the previous four and one-half years.[1]

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[1] New York Times, Nov. 25, 1965, p. 1.

American bombers carried the fighting to targets in North Vietnam during 1965. Twice, President Johnson stopped the bombing of North Vietnam as a gesture to start peace talks on the war.[1]

The growing military commitment to Vietnam forced draft quotas to increase. In July of 1965, the nation's draft quota was increased from 17,000 a month to 35,000.[2] Many of the prospective draftees were college students who sought to delay their induction into the armed forces by seeking deferments to continue their education.

Protest and Support

Professors and college students were at the forefront of anti-war movements. They conducted demonstrations, peace marches, and sit-ins. The first teach-in was held at the University of Michigan in March of 1965; this was a new kind of protest meeting where students and faculty spoke on the war, ostensibly to educate themselves, but more accurately to register their opposition.

A group of students at the University of Michigan had their draft deferment classifications revoked after they were arrested at an anti-war sit-in at the draft board

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[1]U.S., Department of State, Viet-Nam in Brief, U.S. Dept. of State, Publication No. 8173 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 5, 6.

[2]Lester A. Sobel (ed.), South Vietnam: U.S.-Communist Confrontation in Southeast Asia (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1966), p. 4.

in Ann Arbor on October 15, 1965. At Michigan State University, five persons were arrested in the student union building as they distributed anti-war literature near a United States Marine Corps booth on October 12, 1965.[1] And when Vice President Hubert Humphrey spoke at commencement exercises at Michigan State University in June, 1966, protesters shouted derisively at him. They also chanted: "Hey! Hey! LBJ! How many kids did you kill today?" When Vice President Humphrey rose to deliver the commencement address in the University stadium, the protesters, numbering about seventy, walked out.[2]

While the anti-war demonstrations attracted considerably more attention than the actions of supporters of the President, there was strong backing, nevertheless, in some regions for the Johnson administration. The pro-war sentiment urged the administration to apply sufficient military pressure to win the war, a survey by Lou Harris and Associates showed.[3] The findings in the Harris poll were similar to the results obtained by Representative James Harvey, a Republican from the Eighth Congressional District of Michigan. More than half of 9,000 respondents

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[1] State News (Michigan State University), Oct. 13, 1965, p. 1.

[2] State Journal (Lansing), June 13, 1966, p. 7-C.

[3] Detroit Free Press, June 13, 1966, p. 1. Lou Harris and Associates is a nationally syndicated public opinion firm that specializes in political polling.

> For the benefit of campus demonstrators, Defense Secretary McNamara gives assurance we are not attempting to terrorize or kill civilians in the North. Each target is very thoroughly reconnoitered and has to be isolated from urban population.
> . . . . . .
> . . . with McNamara's hard facts, and with Mr. Johnson's enlightened, if long delayed, policy of speaking out, the administration is at last moving in a broad front to tell the world why we're in South Vietnam, and, equally vital, why we'll stay there as long as we're needed.[1]

A year earlier, the News had held to the identical policy of continued bombing. The News had said editorially:

> To demand the bombing cease on humanitarian grounds or because of muddled political thinking is like asking a patrolman to holster his gun in the hope some bandit will stop trying to blast his head off.[2]

An indication of the editorial policy of the Detroit Free Press on the bombing was made on December 28, 1965, when the newspaper called for a suspension:

> But not bombing again shows the world that we want peace, that we are willing to settle for less than total victory, and therefore that a negotiated truce is possible.
>
> On whatever grounds it won't be easy. Though we should not have gotten involved in the first place, we are now, apparently determined to stay. So are the VCs.[3]

One day earlier, the Free Press had been critical of Lieutenant General Lewis Hershey, director of Selective Service, because of his order for re-classification to

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[1] Detroit News, April 27, 1965, p. 10-B.

[2] Ibid., April 20, 1965, p. 18-A.

[3] Detroit Free Press, Dec. 28, 1965, p. 8-A.

induction status of the students who had been arrested at a draft protest in Ann Arbor.[1]

Because of the 200,000 men in Vietnam, the Congress was "paralyzed" to act in altering the course of the war, for fearing the results could adversely affect soldiers in the field, the Free Press noted editorially.[2] During the Williams-Cavanagh campaign, a tense internal situation involving Buddhists and the South Vietnamese government threatened to collapse the South Vietnamese government. The Free Press commented:

> Now, with the ninth American-ordained government going down the drain, we are obviously becoming the enemy rather than the ally. Even Vietnamese soldiers, carrying American weapons, marched through Da Nang this week asking us to leave.
>
> Thus the United States no longer has an assortment of choices, but only two with variations. We can take over the country, or we can get out. . . . For our part, we do not believe that Vietnam as an ally is vital to the United States or to the free world. Nor do we believe that such a Vietnam can be achieved.
>
> But the one clear fact is that time has run out. In the best interest of the United States, and in honesty and decency to our 215,000 troops there, we can no longer pretend our misconceived dreams of victory are possible or that the people of Vietnam share them.[3]

Vietnam Dominates Political Climate

The war in Vietnam underscored every important

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[1] Detroit Free Press, Dec. 27, 1965, p. 8-A.

[2] Ibid., Feb. 18, 1966, p. 8-A.

[3] Ibid., April 14, 1966, p. 8-A.

facet of life in Michigan during the campaign between Williams and Cavanagh. The national economy was feeling the strain of supplying civilian goods and war materials simultaneously. Interest rates were adversely affected by the growing war economy. Priorities to improve the nation's cities suffered. Businessmen were uncertain as to the future.[1]

These domestic pressures and the increasing aggressive fighting in Vietnam, and the casualties from the fighting, were responsible for the importance of the war as a campaign issue. Vietnam started out as the major issue and remained the major issue throughout the campaign.[2]

Williams and Cavanagh sensed the importance of Vietnam to their campaigns early. Cavanagh, however, was more enthusiastic. He said:

> I believe in the position [I took]. I also thought it was good politics to separate myself out, particularly on a real gut issue [Vietnam] from the administration, and particularly from Soapy who said [he would] support the administration. I knew there was some political help by adopting what was basically a position of conscience. I tried to establish in the minds of the people there was a distinct difference. . . . Vietnam was evidence that I was not afraid to carve out a new and different position for the sixties.[3]

Williams said:

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[1]Interview with Ripley, Nov. 23.

[2]Interview with McGloin.

[3]Interview with Cavanagh, Nov. 28.

I took the position that I thought was the correct one.

. . . . . .

Vietnam wasn't a choice on our part as a favorite issue. It was something that was there. It was a point the mayor wanted to make an issue of, so we thought the best way to treat it was to give a full and complete explanation of what our position was on it and not hack away at it.[1]

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[1]Interview with Williams.

CHAPTER VI

CAVANAGH'S VIETNAM STATEMENT: PRESS REPORTS

One month after he announced his candidacy for the Democratic nomination to the United States Senate, Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh issued a carefully prepared position paper on the conflict in Vietnam. It was the first of a series of position papers the Mayor had scheduled to simulate political debate with his opponent, G. Mennen Williams.

For many days before the statement was issued on April 19, 1966, Cavanagh conferred with three campaign assistants on the alternatives in Vietnam. The three who advised the Mayor were Anthony Ripley, an assistant to Cavanagh and who had been a Detroit News reporter in Vietnam; Richard Strichartz, a Wayne State University professor of law who was on leave to the city of Detroit as City Controller; and Daniel Schecter, an intern in the mayor's office from the Maxwell School of Public Administration of Syracuse University. Among those who were consulted by the Mayor and his advisers were Professor Thomas H. Greer, chairman of the Department of Humanities at Michigan State University, and a critic of the war; and Otto Feinstein, professor of economics at Wayne State University. Ripley and Schecter prepared the written

drafts.[1]

Cavanagh wanted to meet Williams in a public debate on Vietnam, and he issued challenges at various points during the campaign. He did not expect Williams to accept the offer to debate.[2]

Cavanagh's Position on Vietnam

Cavanagh said in his campaign statement that the United States involvement in Vietnam was the outgrowth of one of many alliances that had been erected to contain communism after World War II. The underlying approaches had been the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Truman Doctrine, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, Central Treaty Organization, the Marshall Plan, and foreign aid.[3]

In 1954, after the defeat of the French in Indochina, the United States had offered assistance to the Republic of South Vietnam to "resist 'a foreign ideology.'" The assistance program in South Vietnam had gradually led the United States into a military venture that had cost the lives of many Americans. In addition to the tragic personal consequences of the conflict, the United States had become involved in a war that was military, and

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[1]Interview with Cavanagh, Dec. 7.

[2]Ibid., Dec. 7.

[3]Jerome P. Cavanagh, "A Road to Peace in Viet Nam: A Call for a New and Creative Policy for Peace and Freedom in Asia" (statement issued by Jerome P. Cavanagh during the senatorial primary campaign, April 19, 1966), p. 2.

politically questionable, and expensive. The war had adversely affected the United States military strength in Europe. It was a drain on the American economy, and it was producing concern over national priorities.[1]

The United States, Cavanagh's statement continued, was in a position of prosecuting a war while it simultaneously sought to introduce large economic and social programs in Vietnam. These objectives seemed "incompatible."[2] Prominent men in both political parties, responsible members of the United States Senate, people on university campuses, mothers, retirees concerned with inflation, and ordinary working people are opposing the war.[3]

The policy of the United States over Vietnam, Cavanagh said, was locked in the past and offered no alternatives but to continue the "uncertain struggle."[4] Cavanagh wrote:

> I believe the time has come to search for a new way out—a realistic and honorable way to end the present war and a realistic stand on which to base our foreign policy for the years ahead.[5]

A Course of Action.—The United States, Cavanagh said in his statement, must adopt a Vietnam policy that

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[1]Cavanagh, "A Road to Peace," pp. 1, 4.

[2]Ibid., p. 3.

[3]Ibid., p. 1.

[4]Ibid., p. 2.

[5]Ibid., p. 4.

was in keeping with the present political situation in the world. Communism should be resisted; the emphasis, however, ought not to be on the military. It ought to be with methods that encourage economic security, progress, and put an end to poverty, hunger, and diseases.[1]

A cease fire should be sought in Vietnam, Cavanagh said. Free elections should be held, and from this popular base, "legitimate negotiations could be started with the National Liberation Front [Viet Cong]."[2]

The cease fire would permit the widest possible participation in the elections. Cavanagh said:

> Let the Vietnamese then seek whatever course their free government desires to settle their national destiny. This may include asking the United States forces to leave. This may include negotiations with the National Liberation Front. Whatever the course, we must accept it.
>
> The National Liberation Front must be recognized and dealt with--not by us but by the South Vietnamese themselves. The Viet Cong fighters are obviously not going away. The nature and scope of their participation in any government will have to be determined by the Vietnamese themselves.[3]

The United States should strive to build a neutral buffer state, one that would remain an ally, but had the option of dealing with the Communists. There are "two Chinas" and the United States should face this fact.

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[1]Cavanagh, "A Road to Peace," p. 4.

[2]Ibid., pp. 4, 5.

[3]Ibid., p. 5.

"Mainland China," the communist People's Republic of China, should be offered a seat in the United Nations and a seat on the Security Council of the United Nations.[1]

Free Press Reports Cavanagh's Statement

Cavanagh called a press conference to issue his statement on Vietnam. On the day of the conference, the early editions of the Detroit Free Press carried a story that accurately "predicted" the substance of the Mayor's Vietnam statement.[2]

The Free Press presented the Mayor's position on Vietnam in a story based on the press conference and the mimeographed Vietnam statement the Mayor had distributed. The Free Press story[3] was printed on April 20, 1966, one day after the press conference; it appeared on page nine, section B. The byline over the story was that of James M. Mudge, chief of the Free Press city-county bureau.

The story had a three-column, two-line headline: "LBJ Hasn't Done Enough in Vietnam, Cavanagh Says."

In its story the Free Press noted that Cavanagh had split with President Johnson over Vietnam. Also pointed up were the important points by Cavanagh for a cease fire, free elections, social reform, and a change in United

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[1]Cavanagh, "A Road to Peace," p. 4.

[2]Detroit Free Press, April 19, 1966, p. 5-B.

[3]The full text of the story is included in the appendix.

States foreign policy. The Free Press also reported Cavanagh's belief that the People's Republic of China should be offered seats in the United Nations and on the United Nations Security Council.[1]

Cavanagh's emphasis that the United States military commitment to Vietnam had warped the entire program there was also noted by the Free Press. The story contained references to a Williams-Cavanagh debate about Vietnam, and it reported that Cavanagh was scheduled to go on a three-week trip to Europe "late this week . . . plugging Detroit and Michigan as tourist attractions."[2]

Free Press Editorial Reaction
to Cavanagh's Statement

Conferences to formulate editorial policy at the Detroit Free Press were attended by the editorial board composed of the editorial writers; Judd Arnett, a daily columnist; Frank Williams, editorial cartoonist; and Mark Ethridge, the editor, who presided over the meetings.[3] The Free Press, which had opposed the war editorially, reacted favorably to Cavanagh's Vietnam position in an editorial[4] three days after the mayor issued his statement.

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[1]Detroit Free Press, April 20, 1966, p. 9-B.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Interview with Mark Ethridge, Editor, Detroit Free Press, March 1, 1968.

[4]The full text of the editorial is contained in the Appendix.

Cavanagh, the Free Press pointed out, has elevated the campaign from "petty bickering" to "a serious discussion of an important policy issue."[1]

The Free Press reviewed Cavanagh's points concerning withdrawal from Vietnam, free elections, the containment of communism, and the acknowledgment that "two Chinas" existed. Williams, the Free Press urged, ought to inform the electorate in an equally clear statement of any differences that he had on these points with Cavanagh.[2]

Cavanagh's Vietnam statement, the Free Press said, revealed an old "trait" in the Mayor--an inexperienced person in foreign affairs with a "fantastic capacity to learn."[3]

Critical Analysis of the Free Press Reporting

The Free Press combined the information in Cavanagh's Vietnam statement and the remarks he had made at the press conference into a story that presented the mayor's most important points on Vietnam. The headline and the first two paragraphs, which emphasized the division between President Johnson and Cavanagh on Vietnam, fully supported the posture the Mayor wanted to convey.

Identification of the historical alliances that Cavanagh said were made to contain communism and had led

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[1] Detroit Free Press, April 22, 1966, p. 6-A.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

to the war in Vietnam was omitted by the Free Press. But the newspaper reported that Cavanagh wanted to recast American foreign policy toward creating buffer nations between the East and west in updating the present policy of containment of communism.

In separate, concise paragraphs, the Free Press itemized Cavanagh's significant points of a cease fire, free elections, and social reform. Cavanagh's assertions that the war was being questioned by many, and that military power could not necessarily assure freedom, were reported. The Free Press, however, did not report the Mayor's expression of concern over casualties and his concern over national priorities.

The second paragraph of the story contained misleading information. The paragraph read:

> In a "position" paper on foreign policy prepared as part of the campaign against former Gov. G. Mennen Williams for the Democratic Senate nomination, Cavanagh said the President has not done enough toward ending the conflict.[1]

To report Cavanagh's statement was "on foreign policy" attributed a broader scope to the statement than its original purpose. While the Vietnam issue was in the realm of foreign policy, the title of Cavanagh's statement narrowed its nature and more accurately suggested its purpose: "A Road to Peace in Viet Nam: A Call for New and Creative Policy for Peace and Freedom in Asia." The mayor said in

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[1]Detroit Free Press, April 20, 1966, p. 9-B.

the introduction to the statement that he expected "to issue a longer and fuller paper on foreign policy in the near future."[1]

In the first nine paragraphs of the story, the newspaper did not explain that a press conference had been held and that some of the information reported had not been a part of the Mayor's Vietnam statement. This omission caused an error. The second paragraph of the story quoted Cavanagh as saying in the position paper that President Johnson had "not done enough" toward ending the war. This was an inaccurate attribution to the position paper. The position paper did not state specifically that President Johnson had failed to do enough to end the war, although this theme was implicit. Cavanagh's reference to Johnson had been made during the press conference.

The Free Press reported Cavanagh wanted "Recognition of Red China" and offered that "country a permanent seat in the United Nations." The word "recognition" carried the connotation of diplomatic recognition. Cavanagh's statement did not specifically urge diplomatic recognition of Red China; it stated the United States must "face the fact that two Chinas exist." The statement said:

> . . . We must face the fact that two Chinas do exist today. We must offer mainland China a seat in the United Nations and a permanent seat . . . on the . . . Security Council. . . . Mainland Chinese have already stated a number of preconditions to their entry [sic] into the United Nations,

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[1]Cavanagh, "A Road to Peace," n.p.

> some of which seem impossible. But the offer must be made and kept open.[1]

The Free Press also omitted Cavanagh's point that the offer of admission to the United Nations to Red China should be accompanied with an offer for a seat on the Security Council.

Detroit News Reports Cavanagh's Statement

The Detroit News reported on Mayor Cavanagh's Vietnam position paper on April 20, 1966. The story[2] was placed on page six, section C, under the byline of Jo Ann Hardee, chief of the News city-county bureau. The headline over the story said: "A Red S. Vietnam Would Pose No Threat, Cavanagh Insists."

The report in the News was a blending of Cavanagh's position paper with remarks that were attributed to the mayor. The News did not report that Cavanagh had held a press conference, nor did the News clearly distinguish between direct remarks by the mayor and those portions that came from the position paper.

The story in the Detroit News reported that Cavanagh did not see any threat to American security in a South Vietnam that voted for a communist government in free elections. If elections were held, the News pointed out that Cavanagh "doubted" if the Communists would win. If the

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[1] Cavanagh, "A Road to Peace," p. 4.

[2] The full text of the story is included in the Appendix.

Communists did win, the News quoted Cavanagh as having said, satisfactory relationships could be developed by the United States similar to relations with the communist countries of Yugoslavia and Poland. Cavanagh's "buffer state" concept was also reported.[1]

The News reported that Cavanagh favored a cease fire, free elections, including participation by the National Liberation Front.

Cavanagh's differences with President Johnson on Vietnam and the mayor's assertion that the President has not done enough to end the war were also reported by the News. The United States, Cavanagh was reported as saying in the News, had erred in its support of Premier Ky of South Vietnam.[2]

Approximately 25 per cent of the Detroit News account of Cavanagh's statement was concerned with the authorship of the paper. The report said the paper was "authorized" by Anthony Ripley and Richard Strichartz, with advice from B. J. Widick, a Wayne State University professor in the University's Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations. Widick's relationship, the News noted, was significant because of his former post in the United Auto Workers research department. The UAW was "expected to support

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[1] Detroit News, April 20, 1966, p. 6-C.

[2] Ibid.

Williams," the News said.[1]

Detroit News Editorial Reaction
to Cavanagh's Statement

Editorial policy for the Detroit News was established in regular meetings attended by Martin Hayden, editor of the News; Wilbur Elston, director of the editorial page; and a staff of editorial writers.[2] The Detroit News, which had been sympathetic to Cavanagh's candidacy, was strongly opposed to his position on the war in Vietnam.

On June 12, 1966, seven and one-half weeks after Cavanagh issued his Vietnam position paper, the News said in an editorial[3] it was "disappointed" with the Mayor.[4] The News said that Cavanagh's belief that a communist government in South Vietnam would pose no threat was a case of his placing his judgment against Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, and their staffs. There was no precedent for Vietnam, a country that had been wracked by twenty years of war, the News editorial said.[5]

The News questioned whether the Communists would permit an orderly campaign and free elections, and it stated

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[1]Detroit News, April 20, 1966, p. 6-C.

[2]Interview with Wilbur Elston, Associate Editor and Editorial Page director of the Detroit News, March 1, 1968.

[3]The full text of the editorial is included in the Appendix.

[4]Detroit News, June 12, 1966, p. 18-B.

[5]Ibid.

the South Vietnamese government and the moderate Buddhists opposed participation of the National Liberation Front in any election. Laos was cited by the News as an example of the "buffer state" idea proposed by the Mayor. The Communists, the News noted, had ignored their agreements on Laos.[1]

The editorial stated:

> We realize . . . the Mayor's current interest is in the votes that he would spread a net which would catch the undetermined number of draft objectors, New Leftists, pacifists, and plain citizens . . . [who] are impatient. . . .[2]

Critical Analysis of the Detroit News Report

The editorial position of the Detroit News strongly supported a firm commitment to Vietnam. When Cavanagh issued his position paper that encouraged disengagement from Vietnam, the News presented the mayor's views in an incomplete and unbalanced report. There were distortions in the story, and the tone was unfriendly. The News presented an account that violated the spirit and intent of Cavanagh's position on Vietnam. This was accomplished by mixing the Mayor's comments with reporting on his position paper.

Cavanagh's important point in his statement that there be a cease fire to permit the "widest participation

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[1] Detroit News, June 12, 1966, p. 18-B.

[2] Ibid.

in elections" formed the basis of a major distortion of the Mayor's views. The distortion began with the headline, "A Red S. Vietnam Would Pose No Threat, Cavanagh Says," and continued for five paragraphs. The account began: "There is no threat to American security in a Communist South Vietnam, Mayor Cavanagh said today."[1] It continued with the statements that if free elections were held, South Vietnam would probably not go Communist. But the United States ought to be prepared to withdraw if the freely elected government asked the U.S. to leave. Satisfactory relationships could be established similar to those with the communist countries of Yugoslavia and Poland if, after elections, the U.S. would have to leave Vietnam.

The Detroit News emphasized the extreme possibilities--free elections that could produce a communist victory and force American withdrawal, posing a threat to American security. The headline on the story, "A Red S. Vietnam Would Pose No Threat, Cavanagh Insists," and the first five paragraphs were devoted to this extreme theme. The point of elections was not placed in the context of Cavanagh's proposal of discarding the old containment policy and building a new American policy in Vietnam with the Vietnamese taking the major responsibility for their own government. Acceptance of the results of a free election--even if they were unfavorable--was a logical consequence in Cavanagh's

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[1] Detroit News, June 12, 1966, p. 18-B.

proposal.

Cavanagh issued his Vietnam position paper on April 19, and the story appeared on April 20. The lead paragraph in the News story said . . . "There is no threat . . . Cavanagh said today [April 20]." In the sixth paragraph, the News reported the position paper was issued "yesterday" [April 19]. This seemingly minor conflict of time was not unimportant. The comments the News reported Cavanagh made "today" were placed above the content in the position paper, which had been issued "yesterday in the story." Unanswered were the questions of when, where, and why had the Mayor made the "today" comments that adversely affected his carefully thought out position paper of "yesterday."[1]

The Detroit News reported that in his position paper Cavanagh had wanted the National Liberation Front to participate in free elections in Vietnam. Cavanagh called for the "widest participation" in the elections, but he did not say precisely the Liberation Front should be involved. Of the Front, he said:

> The National Liberation Front must be recognized and dealt with--not by us but by the South Vietnamese themselves. The Viet Cong fighters are obviously not going to go away. The nature and scope of their participation in any government will have to be determined by the Vietnamese themselves.[2]

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[1] Detroit News, April 20, 1966, p. 6-C.

[2] Cavanagh, "A Road to Peace," p. 5.

The theme of "American security" was threaded through the Detroit News account. Cavanagh's position, the Detroit News account suggested by implication, was a threat to American security. The News reported in one paragraph:

> In response to questions, he [Cavanagh] denied he was willing to trade American security for a reduction in war expenses which would permit more domestic spending, especially on his pet urban programs.[1]

Cavanagh's statement indicated the resistance to communism should have its emphasis in social reform. The News reported that Cavanagh "would advocate social and economic aid to Vietnam even if it went communist after free elections."[2]

The Detroit News omitted any reference that Cavanagh had made to Red China, and Cavanagh's point for Red China's admission to the United Nations.

Approximately 25 per cent of the News story was concerned with the authorship of the Cavanagh paper. The position paper, according to the News, was "authorized" by Anthony Ripley and Richard Strichartz. The use of the word "authorized" was a faulty choice. It suggested that Ripley and Strichartz gave Cavanagh permission to make the Vietnam statement. Inasmuch as Cavanagh was the candidate

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[1] Detroit News, April 20, 1966, p. 6-C.

[2] Ibid.

and Ripley and Strichartz were aides, it was unlikely they were in a position to give their permission.

CHAPTER VII

WILLIAMS' VIETNAM STATEMENT: PRESS REPORTS

G. Mennen Williams acknowledged that Vietnam was one of the major challenges facing the United States at the outset of his campaign for the United States Senate. He addressed himself to the issue from time to time. His comments, however, did not attract sufficient attention to ease the pressure from "newspapers and various others" that he did not have a definite stand on Vietnam.[1]

Williams responded to the criticism by purchasing a full page advertisement in the Detroit Free Press on May 19, 1966, stating his views on the war. The cost was $2,500.[2] A decision to use the advertisement to outline his position was made in part to eliminate the opportunities for misinterpretation or error that might occur in the dissemination of the Williams position through a news story.[3] Williams drafted the statement without outside assistance or consultation, except for some help of "technicians with style."[4]

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[1]Interview with Williams.

[2]Interview with McGloin.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Interview with Williams.

Williams Position on Vietnam

In his statement on Vietnam, Williams reacted sharply to the report by the Detroit News that Cavanagh said he did not see any threat to American security in a communist South Vietnam. Williams wrote in his position paper:

> One thing . . . I want to make absolutely clear. I cannot agree with anyone who says that a Communist takeover in South Viet-Nam would pose no threat to American security. I think it would be dangerous to the security of the United States and the whole free world. It would be a setback for democracy and freedom.
>
> A Communist takeover in South Viet-Nam as a result of a guerrilla war, supported by Peking with weapons from Hanoi with soldiers, would be dangerous to the peace of the world.[1]

South Vietnam was involved in a war against communist aggression, and the security of the United States was firmly tied to the struggle, Williams said. The United States could neither escalate the war, nor withdraw entirely from South Vietnam. To push for all-out war would produce the risk of conflict with the People's Republic of China, and to withdraw would invite the expansion of communist influence throughout Southeast Asia, Williams said. Withdrawal would also encourage other wars of liberation and would discourage resistance to communism.[2]

The United States must continue to seek peace

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[1]G. Mennen Williams, "Viet-Nam: A Message to the People of Michigan from G. Mennen Williams," a campaign statement by Williams that was published as an advertisement in the Detroit Free Press May 19, 1966, p. 17-B.

[2]Ibid.

through negotiations. Peace and stability in South Vietnam required a vigorous military, economic and social effort, according to Williams.[1]

Militarily, Williams said, the communists would not look for an end to the fighting as long as they hold the view that they can subdue South Vietnam by force. It was in the interest of the United States to help the South Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese had more than 500,000 men in the field. In addition, they have gone about their civilian duties despite the abduction of 4,000 officials since January 1, 1964. The communists did not have widespread popular support in South Vietnam. The United States, Williams noted, had increased its military forces "because the aggression from the North has increased."[2]

The economic and social program, Williams said, cannot wait until the fighting is over. The efforts against poverty, ignorance, and disease should be pursued while the war continued. Economic and social assistance must also be given to the neighboring states of Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand to strengthen their nations and preserve their independence.[3]

Free elections, williams said, should be expedited in South Vietnam. Attempts should be made to persuade the

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[1]Williams, "Viet-Nam."

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

Viet Cong to join in the elections. One goal of the free election would be to establish a popular government that could address itself to the variety of problems that confront the South Vietnamese. Eventually, Williams noted, the decision of reunification could be put to the electorate of South Vietnam and North Vietnam.[1]

People's Republic of China.—The peace of Southeast Asia depended upon the policies of the People's Republic of China and the policy of the United States toward that nation, Williams said. China had imposed herself on her neighbors for centuries, and in the current era, she has tried to expand her sphere of influence to Africa and Latin America. China's policy was aggression.[2]

Williams said, "without Red Chinese arms and interest, the problem of communist aggression in South Vietnam probably would have been resolved before this."[3]

The United States, Williams said, must expand its contacts with the People's Republic of China, and it should offer encouragement to greater Chinese entrance into the world affairs. The Chinese should be persuaded to drop their "unreasonable" demands for entry into the United Nations.[4]

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[1]Williams, "Viet-Nam."

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

The United States should make it clear that she had no territorial ambitions or special privileges on the mainland of Asia that would conflict with the security of the People's Republic of China. While supporting the sovereignty of Nationalist China, the United States should assure the People's Republic that it has no intention of assisting Chiang Kai-Shek's return to the mainland.[1]

Detroit News Reports
Statement by Williams

One day before the full-page advertisement was scheduled to appear in the Detroit Free Press, the Detroit News reported on the position paper Williams had prepared on Vietnam.[2] The account was published in section C, page 15, under a two-line, two-column headline: "Soapy Walks Middle Road in Viet war." The byline over the story was that of Glenn Engle, Detroit News political writer.

The Detroit News reported in the lead paragraph of the story that Williams considered himself neither a "hawk nor a dove,"[3] and that he wanted a strong military defense and a vigorous, imaginative peace effort in Vietnam. The decision by Williams to publish his statement

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[1] Williams, "Viet-Nam."

[2] The full text of the story appears in the Appendix.

[3] The term "hawk" was used to describe a person who was aggressive over the war in Vietnam, while "dove" was considered to be a person who was not committed to the war.

in a press advertisement and criticism by Cavanagh of Williams for "not speaking out on . . . issues" was also noted.[1]

Four of the story's fifteen paragraphs were devoted to Cavanagh's reference (as reported by the Detroit News on April 20) that he did not see any danger to American security in a communist South Vietnam. Williams, the Detroit News reported, wanted to make this point of difference with Cavanagh "absolutely clear." Williams visualized a communist South Vietnam as a setback for democracy and freedom, the News reported.[2]

In concise, paragraphs of one and two sentences, the News reported the salient features in Williams' statement: vigorous peace negotiations, free elections, social and economic development, reduction of tensions with Red China, and a limited, defensive conflict in South Vietnam.[3]

Detroit News Editorial Reaction to the Williams Statement

While the editorial position of the Detroit News on Vietnam was similar to that announced by Williams in his position paper, the News did not comment editorially on the paper by Williams.

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[1] Detroit News, May 18, 1966, p. 15-C.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

Critical Analysis of
the News Report

The summary in the Detroit News of the Vietnam position paper issued by Williams was based on the document that Williams issued, with some references to the statement that Cavanagh had issued on Vietnam. With precision and balance, the News cited the major Williams points of peace negotiations, elections, economic and social development, a defensive war, and the firm approach to the People's Republic of China.

The headline, "Soapy Walks a Middle Road in Viet War," was in error. The substance of his Vietnam statement identified Williams in support of the Johnson administration which had contended that it was opposing communism and communist aggression in Vietnam. The foundation for the misleading headline was in the first paragraph of the story, which said Williams did not consider himself a "hawk or a dove." In his statement Williams emphasized he did not want to deal in "symbols and slogans." He said:

> . . . let me say that I think it is unfortunate that so much of the dialogue on Viet-Nam is in symbols and slogans.
>
> Anyone who reads this statement can see that I am neither a 'hawk' nor a 'dove.' I am an American citizen who is anxious and concerned. . . . I am willing to try any . . . honorable means to achieve peace.[1]

Another significant defect in the Detroit News story

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[1] Williams, "Viet-Nam."

was the perpetuation of a distortion of an important point that Cavanagh had advanced on Vietnam. On April 20, 1966, at the time when the News reported on Cavanagh's position paper, the story said that Cavanagh could "simply see no threat in a Communist Vietnam." Williams responded to this quotation, and the News reported the exchange as follows:

> I [Williams] cannot agree with anyone who says a Communist takeover in South Vietnam would pose no threat to American security. I think it would be dangerous to the security of the United States. . . .
>
> In a "position paper" on the subject April 20, Cavanagh said he could "simply see no threat to American security in a Communist Vietnam."[1]

When the quotation was reported in the News initially, it was a distortion of Cavanagh's position. The quotation was not in Cavanagh's position paper. The News did not say precisely when and where Cavanagh made the remark and under what circumstances.

Williams placed the blame on the People's Republic of China for the difficulties in Southeast Asia. He said the defense of Vietnam was necessary to stop the spread of Chinese communism and to discourage other "wars of liberation."[2] The News omitted these important themes that underlined Williams' entire philosophy of the war.

Detroit Free Press Reports Statement by Williams

On May 19, 1966, the Detroit Free Press printed

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[1] Detroit News, May 18, 1966, p. 15-C.

[2] Williams, "Viet-Nam."

an account[1] of the position paper Williams had developed on Vietnam. The story appeared on the same day the Free Press carried a full page advertisement from Williams outlining his position on the war; it was in section B, page 8. The advertisement was also in section B, on page 17.

An eight-column headline over the news account on Williams' statement read, "Williams Says He's Neither 'Hawk' nor 'Dove' on Vietnam." There was no byline over the story.

The lead paragraph reported that Williams had issued a statement in which he said he was neither a "hawk" nor a "dove." The story noted that Williams stated the road to peace in Vietnam was based on a firm military defense and a vigorous effort for peace.

The quotation in the Detroit News by Cavanagh that he could see no danger to American security in a communist South Vietnam also received a response in the Free Press. Without mentioning Cavanagh by name, Williams, the Free Press reported, "stressed that a communist takeover in South Vietnam would be dangerous to the security of the United States. . . ."[2]

Williams' points on the need for free elections, social and economic development, and contacts with Red China were also cited by the Free Press. Red China, the

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[1]The full text is in the Appendix.

[2]Detroit Free Press, May 19, 1966, p. 8-B.

Free Press reported that Williams said in his Vietnam statement, "should be admitted to the United Nations if that nation's communist government would withdraw certain demands for membership." The Free Press also pointed out that Williams wanted the United States to continue its support of Nationalist China on Formosa, while at the same time disavowing assistance to the Nationalist Chinese in any attempt to return to the mainland.[1] The account in the Free Press also reported the full text of Williams' statement was in an advertisement on page 17, section B.

Free Press Editorial Reaction to the Williams Statement

The Detroit Free Press did not comment editorially on the Vietnam statement issued by Williams.

Critical Analysis of the Free Press Report

The summary of the Williams statement in the Detroit Free Press closely resembles the account presented the previous day by the Detroit News. In the first four paragraphs, the Free Press dealt essentially with the same themes that were in the News: (1) the hawk-dove symbolism, (2) firm military defense and a vigorous peace effort, (3) Williams' statement would appear in advertisements, (4) a communist takeover and American security. The Free Press reported the difference between the positions of the two

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[1]Detroit Free Press, May 19, 1966, p. 8-B.

candidates on the "communist takeover" and "American security" point in one paragraph;[1] the News, which developed the issue originally, devoted four paragraphs to it.

In the lead paragraph, the emphasis on the "hawk"-"dove" symbolism provided the basis of a headline that was unimaginative, and lacked any clue to the position Williams had on Vietnam: "Williams Says He's Neither a 'Hawk' Nor 'Dove' on Vietnam." By using this headline, the Free Press did not exercise an opportunity for a headline that was more precise.

In a condensed form, the Free Press reported that Williams stressed five major points: "vigorous efforts for peace negotiations, free elections, and social and economic development . . . , contacts with Red China . . . and defense of South Vietnam."[2]

These were significant to the Williams position. However, the Free Press did not outline Williams' basic rationale that the defense of Southeast Asia against Communist China was firmly embedded in the defense of Vietnam. Williams' suggestion that Red China should be encouraged toward the "mainstream" of world affairs was noted.

"Red China should be admitted to the United Nations," the Free Press reported that Williams said.[3]

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[1] Detroit Free Press, May 19, 1966, p. 8-B.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

Williams did not say in his statement that Red China should be admitted; he said Red China should be persuaded to drop her "unreasonable demands" for admission to the United Nations.

CHAPTER VIII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A free press has an obligation in a democratic society to perform the essential responsibility of mass communication, and it has the obligation to provide the electorate with that information which is necessary to govern themselves. The Vietnam issue in the Democratic primary election between Williams and Cavanagh gave Michigan's two largest newspapers, the Detroit News and the Detroit Free Press, an excellent opportunity to perform these vital obligations. The issue was important; the candidates had national reputations, and the office they sought was significant in state and national politics. Both candidates had addressed themselves forthrightly to the issue, and their positions were in opposition to each other.

The responsibility of serving as a channel of mass communication was particularly important to the News and the Free Press for these reasons: (1) they were published in a community that had 48 per cent of the population of Michigan, (2) they were published in a community that contained Democrats in sufficient numbers to influence a primary election, (3) the Associated Press and the United

Press International, the two major news wires that serviced Michigan dailies, examined the Detroit News and the Detroit Free Press for election news and accordingly distributed rewrites of the news to members or clients.

By virtue of their size, the News and Free Press were in a position to exercise their editorial influence throughout Michigan.

Even before the campaign began, when it appeared that Senator Patrick V. McNamara would not seek re-election, the News and the Free Press encouraged a climate for a primary race to give the electorate a choice. Williams was the choice of many influential leaders in the Democratic party to succeed Senator McNamara, and Cavanagh was considered to be an unwanted challenger. The News said: "We hope he [Cavanagh] might make a try at it. . . ." Cavanagh acknowledged that a column by Edgar (Doc) Greene, a News columnist, was "unconsciously" a determining factor in his entry into the race.

Williams had been governor of Michigan for six consecutive two-year terms. Before he stepped down in 1960, Williams had been considered as a presidential possibility. He had resigned an appointive position of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the Johnson administration to enter the primary. Cavanagh had become mayor of Detroit at the age of thirty-three by upsetting an incumbent mayor. Cavanagh had attracted national attention of his administration of Detroit before he entered the

primary. The News editorialized that both candidates were qualified for the senate, and the Free Press noted that the voters of Michigan would benefit from a senate race with Williams and Cavanagh.

The significance of the war issue was emphasized in an atmosphere of dissent that had developed in Michigan as well as in other parts of the United States. There were protests and demonstrations over the growing commitment to the war in Vietnam. More than 200,000 American soldiers were in Vietnam, and large casualty lists had been reported. Williams and Cavanagh indicated the electorate was concerned more about the war than any other issue.

Both candidates issued carefully prepared statements on the war. Williams generally was in agreement with the Johnson administration, which advocated a vigorous prosecution of the war. Cavanagh opposed a further investment of United States resources in Vietnam.

The News supported President Johnson's war policy, and the Free Press was highly critical of it.

Mayor Cavanagh issued his statement on Vietnam on April 19, 1966, one month after he declared his candidacy for the United States Senate. He held a press conference when he distributed his position paper.

Cavanagh's significant points of a cease fire, free elections, social reform, and the development of a neutral buffer state concept for Vietnam were reported the following day by the Free Press. The Free Press noted that

Cavanagh wanted recognition of Red China. The word recognition carried the connotation of diplomatic recognition which is beyond the precise wording of Cavanagh's statement.

Three days after Cavanagh issued his Vietnam statement, the Free Press commended Cavanagh in an editorial for his posture on Vietnam; and the Free Press urged Williams to speak out if he disagreed with Cavanagh.

On April 20, one day after Cavanagh's Vietnam statement and press conference, the News gave an account of the Mayor's position. In an unbalanced, incomplete, and distorted report, the News presented an account that was not consistent with the spirit and intent of Cavanagh's statement. The News suggested and emphasized an extreme possibility in the Mayor's position--a free election that would produce a communist South Vietnam and force the withdrawal of American soldiers. The story had its theme on a headline that declared: "A Red S. Vietnam Would Pose No Threat, Cavanagh Insists." The News account was taken from the Mayor's statement, and remarks that were attributed to the Mayor; it created an implication that the Mayor's position was a threat to American security. The News reported Cavanagh wanted the communist National Liberation Front to participate in the elections; Cavanagh did not say this in his statement. The News also omitted any references Cavanagh made to the People's Republic of China.

Editorially, the News told its readers that Cavanagh's position on Vietnam was an appeal to draft objectors, new

leftists, pacifists, and impatient "plain" citizens.

One month after Cavanagh's position was announced, Williams responded with a position paper on Vietnam. Williams did not have confidence that the press would publish his position accurately and fully. He decided to announce his views on Vietnam by purchasing a full page advertisement in the Free Press. One day in advance of the advertisement, the News reported on Williams' Vietnam position.

The headline in the News story, "Soapy Walks Middle Road in Viet war," was in error. Williams was not in the middle; he generally supported the administration.

The News, however, accurately reported the salient points of the Williams position: vigorous peace negotiations, free elections, social and economic development, reduction of tensions with Red China, and a limited, defensive war.

It is not insignificant that Williams said in his Vietnam position paper that he could not agree with anyone who saw no danger in a communist South Vietnam. Williams was referring to Cavanagh's position (as reported April 20 by the News) that he [Cavanagh] could not see any threat to the security of the United States if South Vietnam went Communist in free elections. The original reporting of the statement by the News was a distortion of Cavanagh's position. By repeating the statement, the distortion was called to the public's attention again.

The Free Press reported on Williams' Vietnam position on the same day that the advertisement Williams purchased on Vietnam appeared. The story headline said, "Williams Says He's Neither 'Hawk' nor 'Dove' on Vietnam." The headline was not indicative of Williams' position. The headline carried the "middle of the road" connotation advanced by the News. The story in the Free Press was similar to that in the News.

The Free Press said Williams wanted Red China admitted to the United Nations. Williams did not say this in his Vietnam statement.

Neither the News nor the Free Press commented editorially on the Williams Vietnam statement.

Conclusions

There is substantial evidence to assert that although the News and the Free Press reported on the war statements of the two candidates, they did it in a manner that was deficient and did not give the candidates the maximum benefit.

Of the four headlines over the press accounts on the Vietnam statements by Williams and Cavanagh, two of them were in error, and one was not representative of the candidate's position; only one was consistent with its purpose.

A flawless performance in the rapid gathering and transmission of news cannot be expected each and every time.

Some incidental errors are not unexpected. However, the performance of the News and the Free Press on the Vietnam statements contained error and misinformation that went far beyond incidence. In the case of the News, an initial reporting error and distortion was perpetuated as the Vietnam issue unfolded between the two candidates. The News and the Free Press had a special obligation for accuracy because of the complexity of the issue and its importance to the electorate.

The claim by Williams' campaign press secretary that Williams did not have a friendly press was supported on two significant counts: neither the News nor the Free Press would comment editorially on his Vietnam statement, although one agreed with it in substance; and secondly, the failure of Williams to win press attention on his Vietnam position initially forced him to purchase a political advertisement to make his views known. He purchased the advertisement in the Free Press which, ironically, urged him to inform the electorate of his views on Vietnam if they differed with Cavanagh's views.

It is noteworthy that Williams' campaign manager said the decision to use a paid advertisement to announce Williams' views was governed in part by a fear of inaccuracy on the part of the press.

Neither Williams nor Cavanagh can be entirely excused from responsibility for a press-candidate relationship that is extremely important to the electorate. Williams

did not need the press to win, his press secretary said. This kind of an attitude omits a necessary ingredient of a campaign--education of the voters with the help of the mass media.

Cavanagh's decision to comment on Vietnam as he issued his carefully prepared statement may have been a tactical mistake. His comments, particularly those as reported in the News, were not indicative of his position. The press' responsibility to report his statements accurately notwithstanding, Cavanagh should have limited his comments and allowed the statement to speak for itself.

The evidence suggests the following conclusions:

(1) The Detroit News and the Detroit Free Press exercised their responsibilities of mass communication in a democratic society by reporting the Vietnam statements of G. Mennen Williams and Jerome P. Cavanagh.

(2) There were deficiencies in the performances of the newspapers. Editors allowed error and misinformation to find their way into the news columns.

(3) The Detroit News distorted Cavanagh's position by implying an extreme possibility--a communist victory in a free election in Vietnam, forcing an American withdrawal. This distortion was perpetuated in further news accounts.

(4) The lack of confidence in fair and accurate reporting was behind the decision by Williams to announce his Vietnam position in a paid advertisement. This is a

blemish on the election performance of the News and the Free Press.

(5) The News and the Free Press were guilty of press bias by commenting editorially on the Cavanagh statement, but omitting comment on the statement by Williams.

APPENDIX A

"Nations are made and go on living
by having a program for the future."
—Ortega y Gasset

A ROAD TO PEACE IN VIET NAM:

A Call for New and Creative Policy for Peace and Freedom in Asia

By JEROME P. CAVANAGH
Detroit, Michigan

The first in a series of statements on the complex challenges of the 1960's.

April 19, 1966

INTRODUCTION

With the issuing of this statement I do not assume the role of a foreign policy expert. But I have done a good deal of reading on the subject. I have sought the counsel of others and I have clearly seen the impact of our policies abroad on the domestic needs of this nation.

When I entered the campaign for nomination as Democratic candidate for the United States Senate I said this would be a campaign on the issues, not on personalities. In line with this pledge, I have drawn up this paper—the first of a number of position papers I plan to issue during this campaign. I expect to issue a longer and fuller paper on foreign policy in the near future.

I believe Viet Nam is one of the key issues of this campaign and tests whether we will be content to live with the decisions of 20 years ago or if the time has come to chart a bold new course for the future.

As John F. Kennedy said in accepting the nomination of the Democratic Convention in 1960:

> "Today our concern must be with (the) future. For the world is changing. The old era is ending. The old ways will not do."

This paper is offered in the spirit of 1966--a spirit of reality.

Jerome P. Cavanagh
Detroit, Michigan

VIET NAM

I am troubled like many Americans today by the agonizing news from the cities, jungles and rice paddies of Viet Nam. It raises questions we had not asked ourselves before and casts a huge shadow over our international and domestic policies.

War is not a pretty business; death never is. Telegrams from the Defense Department announcing tragedy bring war home to Americans every day. Those telegrams come faster each day. We support our fighting men in Viet Nam--they are men of courage, dedication and loyalty. But we must also pause to question the tangled chain of events that brought them to Viet Nam--the national policies which keep them there.

It is always difficult to raise major questions

about warfare in which Americans are dying and by so doing suggest that perhaps they die for an illogical cause or for inadequate reasons.

In some wars, questions need not be asked. The issues are clear. World War II was such a war. The death of young men was equally bitter then, but the principle was clear and the sacrifice was accepted without question.

But today, for a host of historical and political reasons--and like it or not--this war is different. It is different in its history. It is different militarily. And so its wisdom can be--and is being--questioned politically:

> It is being questioned by prominent men in both parties. Some of our most responsible senators have asked searching questions.
>
> These are not unpatriotic men but concerned and informed men. Men like Senators Mansfield, Kennedy, Church, Cooper, Aiken, Hartke, Fulbright, Morse and even Senator Richard Russell of Georgia.
>
> It is being questioned by mothers who fear for their sons.
>
> It is being questioned by working people and retirees, concerned about war-bred inflation and its effect on their wages and pensions.
>
> It is being questioned on our University campuses.
>
> It is being questioned in the slums and ghettoes of our large cities by the poor who fear inevitable cutbacks in long-needed programs such as the war on poverty, low-income housing and education.
>
> It is being questioned by businessmen--hard-nosed and realistic men--who are concerned about policies which find us at odds with our old allies and in support of nations where free enterprise and individual liberty are under attack. They are concerned, too, about growing shortages and higher prices.

> The events of recent weeks have shown it is being questioned in the cities, the villages and fields of Viet Nam and in the pagodas and churches where men have not known peace in more than 20 years.

As long as our effort was on a small scale in Viet Nam, few of us thought much about it and the questions were little more than a murmur. But when the war was stepped up sharply, when each wave of optimism faded, when it became clear that there was no quick and easy military solution to the problem there, then the questions became loud and incessant. Today this is an issue in all parts of Michigan and the world. It is a complex problem--make no mistake about that--and the answers cannot be given in quick, trite sentences. Instead, it is a problem to be tackled with constructive imagination and thoughtful concern.

The size and cost of our military commitment has raised questions about national priorities. It is clear that while we can have some guns and some butter at the same time, a number of choices must be made between problems overseas and problems at home. And so we are forced to examine our foreign policies and to take a hard look at their reason for being. We must do the same for our domestic policies.

Newsweek Magazine reports the war is costing us $33 million a day. Casualty figures show 1,361 Americans killed from January 1 to April 9 this year, exceeding in little over three months the entire years' total of casualties in 1965.

Since the beginning of the war, we have lost 306 aircraft, 205 of them over North Viet Nam in 14 months.

These losses and the overall cost of the war now must be weighed against the needs at home and we must decide where our vital interests lie.

We are forced to ask these difficult questions--forced to re-examine our policies--because of the size of our military commitment, because of our seeming lack of success, because of the relatively little support our stand has won from our traditional allies, and because of the huge problems the war has either brought or left unfinished at home.

For there have been riots in Watts as well as in Da Nang. And there is fundamental discontent both here and abroad.

As Mayor of Detroit, I know only too well the price of living with outmoded policies when trying to attack the problems of city dwellers. Detroiters--like those living in cities everywhere--know the old problems of decaying housing, clogged traffic, inadequate finances, crime and social disorganization. In Detroit with the firm backing of labor, business and all segments of community life, we changed the old policies and we have made strong progress. We moved forward--and are continuing to move--because we have not been frozen into the tracks of yesterday but have sought new and imaginative approaches. We have not been afraid of experimentation. The anti-poverty programs,

neighborhood conservation, urban renewal, new freeways and public buildings, expanded police training and equipment, the proposed "Demonstration Cities" Act--these are examples of the dramatic type of thinking that seeks to confront problems as they are, not as we would like them to be.

Sometimes we have stubbed our toes. But the progress is all around us. It can be measured.

This same type of thinking must come to characterize our foreign policy.

But instead of new ideas and innovations, instead of a forward thrust toward the future, much of our foreign policy is locked into the past. This same foreign policy is the basis of our commitment in Viet Nam.

At the close of World War II, we set into motion a number of alliances, pledges and aid programs in response to militant and spreading communism. These made up a good policy for that day and they worked. In our dealings with foreign nations since then, we have largely followed a line that is clear only in terms of supporting anti-communist governments and sealing off communist governments. The policy has several names--mutual security, containment, cold war, defense of the free world--and several basic approaches--NATO, the Truman Doctrine, SEATO, CENTO, and Marshall Plan, foreign aid.

The balance point in setting up these alliances and programs was anti-communism--not freedom, though we

constantly tried to define our stand in terms of freedom.

There have been exceptions to this rule--aid programs to Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia and Rumania, and in the agreement to neutralize Laos. But for the most part we have spent our foreign aid money and equipped armies and set our policy around those governments which took anti-communist stands. It has at times made us the supporters of dictators and oppressive governments which only encourage the spread of communism.

The old policy is wanting. It gives us no way out but to continue the uncertain struggle in South Viet Nam.

We moved into Viet Nam in 1954 when the French gave up their struggle and we did it in terms of our policies of containing communism. President Eisenhower wrote President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1954 offering aid in building a government that would resist "a foreign ideology."

Now, with the war such a drain on the American economy, with the moral issues involved, with the apparent inability of massive American military strength to bring a resolution, we must begin to re-examine that policy.

For times are changing. And we must be bold enough to change with them. Policies fashioned to meet the problems of 20 years ago are antiquated and require a thorough re-examination.

The containment policy, designed in part by foreign policy expert George Kennan in the late 1940's, served us well in stopping the spread of communism in Eastern Europe.

But what of the use of the same policy today in Asia. Kennan testified during the recent Senate hearings that it does not apply because of many changes since the policy was first formed and because the Asian problem is different from the European problem at the close of World War II.

Walter Lippmann wrote recently:

> "The world today is a very different world than it was in 1948 ... After every great war there comes a time--some 12 to 20 years later--when the post-war settlement breaks down ... because ... a new generation of men have grown up and taken power."

Today things are warped in Viet Nam by the size of our military commitment, dwarfing positive efforts we must make to bring freedom and self-determination. Military action--dramatic, touched with death and tragedy, temporarily exhilarating with its sense of unity and purposes--can overshadow political objectives if we are not careful. Our objectives in South Viet Nam are political because freedom and self-determination are political conditions. Freedom is seldom created by the might of military power, though armies are necessary for its defense.

But the irony of our position is that our military posture in defense of the free world often creates military structures in other nations which deny the freedom which we sought.

Freedom is what we want for Viet Nam--the freedom of Vietnamese to choose their own way of life, the freedom to live in peace, and the individual dignity that such

freedom brings. Perhaps they will not choose the system of government we chose, and sacrifice great measures of freedom for the security of dictatorship—for dictatorship is a secure but stifling form of government. But we must offer the same freedom of choice which we offer to our own citizens or we are turning away from the finest ideals of man and indeed our own nation.

Freedom in Southeast Asia means more than the existence of democratic institutions. It means a society able to preserve free institutions and at the same time provide the necessities of life and hope for the future.

As President Johnson said there has been a change in today's world in the hopes of man and his expectations for the future. This change finds him looking for solutions to the old problems of poverty, hunger and disease. The President said that if peaceful revolutions are not begun to attack these problems, then violent revolutions are inevitable.

In Viet Nam we are in a war and at the same time, committed to a massive program of economic and social aid which is meant to bring a peace and democracy.

The two seem clearly incompatible. How can you bring peace while making war? How can you life up the economy of a developing nation while tearing it down? How can you encourage democracy while reinforcing a military dictatorship?

It looked last winter as though we could bring peace

through a bold increase in warfare. But now our winter of promise has given way to a spring of discontent. The government of South Viet Nam is trembling again, which suggests that the social reforms hoped for last winter have not arrived. The military government of Premier Ky which we backed tried to solidify its hold and instead almost brought the government down around its own head.

Through our increased military action we have no doubt hurt the Viet Cong badly and have drawn the North Vietnamese deeper and deeper into the warfare--thus fulfilling our own prophesy.

But what have we done to encourage the political institutions needed for freedom and self-determination--the political parties, the freedom of thought and movement needed to bring these about?

I believe the time has come to search for a new way out--a realistic and honorable way to end the present war and a realistic stand on which to base our foreign policy for the years ahead.

We must continue to resist communism. If we must escalate let us escalate social reform but such reform can only be meaningful in a nation not being devastated by war. We cannot fight and effectively introduce social reform at the same time in the same place. The best weapons in our arsenal for winning the hearts and minds of men are the weapons of peace--economic security, advancement, and end to hunger, disease and poverty.

President Johnson's bold plan for a Mekong River development has won the admiration of all sides in the Viet Nam war.

If containment is still a reasonable measure for our stance against communist tyranny, then let it be modified to meet the needs of 1966. Let us emphasize mutual progress as much as mutual security. Let us cease subsidizing tyranny. Let us everywhere encourage and help these governments which clearly have won the loyalty and support of their people.

There have already developed in Asia--as in Europe--a number of nations which deal with our enemies and remain allies. Japan is an outstanding example. I would see as a reasonable policy for the future encouraging formation of more of these neutral buffer states. They would gladly accept the role, I suspect, since they stand to gain from the relationships with both sides. Viet Nam could become one of these neutral buffer states, along with others in Southeast Asia.

This is not the time to disarm the American military establishment or withdraw from our bases abroad. But we must recast our thinking about the size of that commitment and the strength of the peril we face. We must face the fact which Hanson Baldwin, the noted military writer has pointed out, that our strength in Europe has been diluted as our Asian involvement demands more and more trained men and supplies.

We must also begin to deal realistically with our enemies as well as our friends. We must face the fact that the two Chinas do exist today. We must offer mainland China a seat in the United Nations and a permanent seat among the great powers on the United Nations Security Council. This is not being soft on communism. It is being realistic.

The mainland Chinese have already stated a number of preconditions to their entry into the United Nations, some of which seem impossible. But the offer must be made and kept open. The olive branch must be tendered.

In Viet Nam we should seek the building of a neutral buffer state. To do this we should seek free elections as soon as possible. A cease fire would be helpful as a practical matter to make the formation of political parties and the election possible.

As Jean Lacouture has written in his book, "Viet Nam: Between Two Truces":

> "Western policy should try neither to build an artificial anti-communist system in Viet Nam nor to return to power one of the groups that have been fighting each other for so many years; it should try instead to re-establish legitimacy and permit authority to rest on a popular base. This legitimacy--violated by Diemism, foreign intervention and a succession of coups--must be re-established first by permitting a resumption of political life and subsequently by permitting the Viet Cong to integrate themselves into such a legal framework."

From the base of a popular government, legitimate negotiations could be started with the National Liberation Front.

So our points are these:

Let there be free elections in the Republic of South Viet Nam.

Let there be a cease fire to permit the widest participation in the elections.

Let the Vietnamese then seek whatever course their free government desires to settle their national destiny. This may include asking the United States forces to leave. This may include negotiation with the National Liberation Front. Whatever the course, we must accept it.

The National Liberation Front must be recognized and dealt with--not by us but by the South Vietnamese themselves. The Viet Cong fighters are obviously not going to go away. The nature and scope of their participation in any government will have to be determined by the Vietnamese themselves.

Premier Nguyen Cao Ky has promised his people free elections in the next few months. If questions arise regarding full participation of all political and religious forces in these elections, then international supervision should be called in to guarantee fairness.

Only following a cessation of hostilities can the real work of building a modern state begin with the bold and significant plans which President Johnson has proposed. These plans can win us many friends and supporters.

As the President said in Mexico City last Friday:

> "The United States maintains its commitments to government by consent of the governed, a consent to be granted in free and honest elections. It

> does not seek to impose on others any form of government. But let us stand determined on this principle: despots are not welcome in this hemisphere."

Freedom and peace in Asia is a concern uppermost in the mind of every thoughtful American. But winning peace must be part of a large, bolder effort to recast American foreign policy into an instrument which serves the world in 1966 and 1967.

I strongly oppose appeasement. But I believe just as strongly in recognizing reality.

Our foreign policy must be an instrument which deals in reality. We cannot deal with reality if we are fearful of questioning old assumptions or content to hide behind old slogans.

Sir Charles P. Snow wrote in 1957:

> "I fancy a number of people all over the Western world still think of themselves as liberals, but are in essence no such thing. In their hearts they believe their society won't and shouldn't change much, that only communism is the enemy absolute and that the only tasks open to men of good will are to fight the cold war with one hand and perform minor benevolent activities with the other. That is a tenable attitude, but it is one of people who have given up the intellectual struggle."

I am convinced the vast majority of Americans welcome change as a natural fact of our way of life. For other millions in this world, change is necessary for survival—for the rekindling of hope, courage and dreams.

Ortega y Gasset, the Spanish philosopher said it is not yesterday or tradition or the past which is the decisive and determining force in a nation. "Nations are made and go on living by having a program for the future."

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APPENDIX B

VIET-NAM: A MESSAGE TO THE PEOPLE OF MICHIGAN FROM G. MENNEN WILLIAMS

On March 7, 1966, when I became a candidate for United States Senator, I identified the war in Viet-Nam as one of the major challenges facing the nation.

I have chosen this method to state my views in a manner that cannot be misunderstood, and which I hope will be helpful to national unity.

As the campaign progresses, I will continue to carry my views to the people in all parts of Michigan.

These are my views, and no one else's.

Every reasonable person wants to see peace in Viet-Nam. At the same time our national interest requires that Communist aggression in Asia be halted.

Some people believe the way to bring these things about is by increasing the fighting in South Viet-Nam to an all-out war. Others would pull out all American assistance to Viet-Nam.

I do not believe the vast majority of the American people approve either of these alternatives. The first would risk drawing Red China more directly into the conflict and would perhaps involve us in a land war with Chinese armies. The second alternative would invite a Communist

takeover of South Viet-Nam and the greater possibility of further Communist expansion in Southeast Asia.

It is my personal opinion that neither of these extremes would be successful in guaranteeing peace in Southeast Asia for very long.

The harsh reality of Viet-Nam is that peace is not possible without both a firm military defense and a vigorous and imaginative peace effort.

A firm military defense is necessary because the Communists will not seek peace as long as they believe they can attain their objective of dominating South Viet-Nam by force.

A vigorous and imaginative peace effort is necessary because it is right and because a complete military solution is improbable.

In my opinion, therefore, it is essential to go forward with the works of peace immediately, although for the time being, we must assist the South Vietnamese in their defense against Communist aggression so their freedom and independence can be saved.

The cause of peace in South Viet-Nam can be advanced by a more vigorous effort to secure negotiations, by strengthening the government of South Viet-Nam through free elections, by a more rapid economic and social development of Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia and by the reduction of tensions with Red China.

Before explaining my views of the necessity for military defense and the ways of promoting a peaceful

solution, let me say that I think it is unfortunate that so much of the dialogue on Viet-Nam is in symbols and slogans.

Anyone who reads this statement can see that I am neither a "hawk" nor a "dove." I am an American citizen who is anxious and concerned, as all of us are. I am willing to try any reasonable and honorable means to achieve peace in the world.

> One thing, however, I want to make absolutely clear. I cannot agree with anyone who says that a Communist takeover in South Viet-Nam would pose no threat to American security. I think it would be dangerous to the security of the United States and the whole Free World. It would be a setback for democracy and freedom.
>
> A Communist takeover in South Viet-Nam as a result of a guerrilla war, supported by Peking with weapons and Hanoi with soldiers, would be dangerous to the peace of the world.
>
> It would undermine all those in Russia and elsewhere who have chosen the road of co-existence and peaceful competition with the West.

It is all too easy, in a time of public worry and uneasiness, to play upon the concern of the people and represent slogans as solutions to complicated problems. This I will not do.

The people of Michigan should not expect any magic policy to end this war. I can offer sober judgments, hard work and devotion to duty. On this issue and on others, I will continue to seek out the views of the people--and I will listen and give consideration to those views, even when I cannot agree with them.

The right of dissent is one of our basic freedoms in a democracy. You will not find me denouncing those who disagree with me. I will not attempt to silence anyone.

VIGOROUS EFFORTS FOR PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

President Johnson has said that he would talk to any government, anywhere, and without any conditions. I believe we must implement that policy both vigorously and imaginatively.

The United States has tried suspension of bombing, it has tried both quiet and open diplomacy and it has made appeals to the United Nations in an effort to combine informal and formal peace negotiations.

President Johnson has compiled 14 Points on Viet-Nam, indicating a flexible attitude toward opening negotiations. These 14 Points go more than half way to meet the Communist demands. They include such cardinal points as acceptance of the Geneva Accords, encouragement of free elections and willingness to abide by the results, and withdrawal of United States troops and bases once there is peace.

The President has made it clear that there is no objection to participation by the Viet Cong in any peace talks.

When I was assigned by President Johnson as one of his peace emissaries to explain the policy of our government on Viet-Nam and our desire for peace, the response from even the most radical Africans was that the United

States had offered a viable basis for peace talks.

One Chief of State went so far as to say, "Ho Chi Minh can't turn this down." But, Ho Chi Minh did--and the Communists have thus far withheld any movements toward negotiations.

> We should not give up. Peace requires persistence and negotiating with Communists requires patience. This I have learned from my experience in other parts of the world.

We should welcome appropriate channels to Hanoi, Peking and the Viet Cong. We should work with the Soviet Union and other Communist nations, as well as with our friends in the Free world. We should seek the assistance of the non-aligned countries. We should use the machinery of the United Nations and the International Control Commission.

The United States must be ready at all times to talk anywhere, under any sponsorship. We must do a better job of letting the world know of our efforts and desire to resolve this conflict at the conference table.

Equally important, we must do much more to keep our people here in the United States better informed of our policies and our efforts in Viet-Nam. I have found too much confusion at home and lack of understanding overseas.

FREE ELECTIONS

The United States should help expedite free elections to determine the government of South Viet-Nam.

Unless a better method is suggested, I would like to see the United Nations supervise such elections to guarantee that they are truly free and that everyone will be convinced that they are not rigged by the Communists, by the United States, by the current government in Saigon, or by anyone else.

If United Nations supervision is not possible, I would suggest, as a minimum, the use of observers as successfully employed in the Congo.

> Every attempt should be made to persuade the Viet Cong to join in free elections. But if the Viet Cong continue to prefer bombs and terrorism to ballot boxes, the elections should not be delayed. The brave people of South Viet-Nam cannot wait for peace or a cease-fire to begin strengthening their country.

Whatever the results of the elections, the United States should abide by them. We should cooperate willingly with any government the people choose in free elections.

A new government, because of the democratic nature of these elections, would be in a stronger position to deal with the Viet Cong. A government in which the citizens have a fuller voice could attract their loyalties and respond to their desires for a better life.

Some, or all, of the Viet Cong might seek a truce with such a reinforced and representative government. The net result might be a generally accepted government of national unity or a new general election including the Viet Cong.

It is my opinion that in a fair election the people

of South Viet-Nam would not choose a government dedicated to selling out to the Communists. Thus, the desire of the South Vietnamese and the United States to preserve freedom and independence in South Viet-Nam would be brought nearer to accomplishment.

A final stage of free elections would become possible, if there were an end to hostilities between North and South. At this time the people of South Viet-Nam and the people of North Viet-Nam could by free elections decide the question of unification.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

In the great struggle for human betterment and to strengthen South Viet-Nam, the United States must help the people in their fight against poverty, ignorance and disease.

> South Viet-Nam needs a social and economic revolution. The people are fighting and dying for their freedom and they need a better life to fight for.

The social and economic improvement needed in South Viet-Nam is difficult to achieve while a war is going on. As with free elections, however, this work cannot wait upon the Communists to halt the aggression from the North.

It is also essential that the United States assist the neighboring countries of Thailand, Laos and Cambodia to strengthen their economic and social structure to preserve their independence.

President Johnson's Mekong River Basin project and his commitment of $1 billion to the Asian Development Bank are bold steps. Once tamed and brought into useful service,

the Mekong Basin can dwarf even our own TVA. The potential of the Mekong River and its tributaries is enormous, not only for the South Vietnamese, but for all of Southeast Asia. Likewise, the Asian Development Bank is a promise of the future for South Viet-Nam and all of Asia.

REDUCTION OF TENSIONS WITH RED CHINA

More than six years ago, on March 10, 1960, I said: "One quarter of the human race resides in China. Thus, a peace policy requires a China policy."

The necessity for recognizing the existence of Communist China as a force in the world of today has not changed since those words were spoken. Without Red Chinese arms and interest, the problem of Communist aggression in South Viet-Nam probably would have been resolved before this.

For centuries China has considered herself the center of the universe and has invaded her neighbors and demanded subservience or tribute. Red China today is impelled by a militant Communist ideology that wants to subvert and dominate the world.

Africa, particularly the Congo, was one of the first steps in this attempted world domination, and I saw first hand what Red China was trying to do there. Because of that activity, the Africans are now wary. Within the last few months a number of African nations have closed Red Chinese embassies and have expelled Red Chinese diplomats and technicians. Many that retain Red Chinese ambassadors deal with them with great caution.

Latin America is another target area where Red China hopes to make gains by supporting so-called "wars of national liberation." Let them call it what they like. We must not forget that the true name of Red China's policy is "Communist aggression."

Our prospects for eventual peace in Viet-Nam and elsewhere in Asia and the world will be increasingly dependent upon the conduct of Communist China and our policy toward that nation.

> Our goal, as I see it, should be to move Red China into the main stream of world affairs so that her actions can be influenced by world opinion. This will not be easy because Red China seems determined to hide behind her borders and defy the rest of the world. But we must not give up.

We should push for exchange visits of newspaper men, scientists, serious scholars and others who could start a two-way flow of information. We should maintain and try to expand our high level conversations with the Red Chinese in Warsaw, where 129 face-to-face meetings have been held. And we should seek out opportunity for additional conversations in international meetings, both public and private.

> Further, we should attempt to persuade China to drop her unreasonable demands regarding admission to the United Nations. It would not be reasonable to withdraw recognition of Formosa, to rescind the resolution branding Red China as the aggressor in Korea, or to name the United States as the aggressor.

These are Red China's terms and I find them wholly unacceptable.

On our side, we should by word and deed make clear to Red China that we have no territorial ambitions or desire for special privileges on the mainland of Asia that would conflict with Red China's security and legitimate interests. For example, while strongly supporting the sovereignty and integrity of Nationalist China, we could disavow any intention of assisting Chiang Kai-Shek's return to the mainland.

It is for these reasons that I believe our policy toward China should be directed toward opening communications and reducing tensions while firmly resisting Communist aggression. We should not seek to isolate Red China.

We have followed this approach with the Soviet Union and we have had some success. Firmness and patience were required and they will be needed again with Red China.

DEFENSE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM

North Viet-Nam, backed by Red China, is intent upon subduing South Viet-Nam by force and establishing Communist rule over the people of the South. It is not in the interest of the United States to permit this to happen.

Such a Communist takeover of South Viet-Nam would do two things in addition to giving the Communists control of that territory:

First, the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists would be encouraged to believe that their "wars of liberation" and conquest by force and violence do pay off. This then

would jeopardize the security of a number of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Second, it would discourage both our allies and the non-aligned countries in their efforts to resist Communist subversion. For example, it is probable that the anti-Communist forces in Indonesia were encouraged in their determination to curb the Communist tendencies of Sukarno by our strong support of the South Vietnamese.

The South Vietnamese have fielded a military force in excess of 500,000 men in their self-defense. Their civil authorities have stuck to their duties despite the fact that the Viet Cong have slain or abducted more than 4,000 of them since January 1, 1964. Thousands of others were assassinated in earlier years.

There is no evidence, of which I am aware, that the Viet Cong have any significant popular support in South Viet-Nam. The Communists rely on terror and in recent months many Viet Cong reinforcements have been North Vietnamese from the regular army forces of the North.

The majority of the people in South Viet-Nam are anti-Communist. Despite their differences, the Buddhists, the Catholics and other groups all oppose a Communist takeover in the South.

> It should be remembered that one million persons fled as refugees to South Viet-Nam from the North to escape Communist rule. More recently, nearly a million persons have left their homes in areas controlled by the Viet Cong in the South.

I believe the village dweller fears and dislikes the Viet Cong. He would be glad of the opportunity to be really free of them and would prefer a government of his own choosing in Saigon.

While I believe the United States would have to pull out of South Viet-Nam if requested by the people to do so, I am confident the majority of South Vietnamese favor our continued presence and our assistance in their fight against Communism.

In recent months, our military support of South Viet-Nam has been increased because the aggression from the North has increased. The use of force has been met with counter-force.

> Once the aggression from the North is ended, the people of Viet-Nam will be free to decide their own future, and the need for our military action in support of South Viet-Nam will come to an end.

While we are involved in the defense of our own vital national interests in Southeast Asia, we are also protecting the national security of other nations. For this reason, I would urge that the United States seek greater military support in South Viet-Nam from our allies. Their freedom also is at stake.

Our desire is to stop aggression from the North.

We should seek to limit the conflict to the <u>minimum</u> force required to accomplish this objective. As a consequence, the United States should not be the first to escalate the conflict and should do so only to meet escalation on the part of the Communists.

At the same time, we must keep up a maximum effort to bring the conflict to the conference table on an agenda for peace.

. . .

When I decided not to run again for Governor of Michigan, I said I wanted to work for peace.

Presidents Kennedy and Johnson have given me that opportunity and I have been working for peace in the world.

The people of Michigan know that I have always sought peaceful solutions, while standing firm on principles.

I was in one war in the South Pacific, and I know what war means to those who must make the sacrifices.

I believe the people of Michigan will trust me in the United States Senate to work effectively for peace in Viet-Nam and throughout the world.

G. Mennen Williams

Williams for U.S. Senator Committee--Eddie McGloin, Chairman; Richard Austin, Treasurer

APPENDIX C

Detroit Free Press
April 20, 1966

LBJ 'Hasn't Done Enough'
In Vietnam, Cavanagh Says

by James M. Mudge
Chief of Our City-County Bureau

Mayor Cavanagh openly split with President Johnson Tuesday on the Administration's conduct of the Vietnam war.

In a "position paper" on foreign policy prepared as part of his campaign against former Gov. G. Mennen Williams for the Democratic Senate nomination, Cavanagh said the President has "not done enough" toward ending the conflict.

Attacking Williams for supporting the Administration "without having any ideas of his own," Cavanagh said the President and State Department "have not yet taken strong enough action."

Cavanagh listed his policy recommendations as:

A cease-fire as soon as possible.

Free elections in South Vietnam with a hands-off policy on whatever government the South Vietnamese choose for themselves.

Massive social reform programs after peace is achieved through negotiation.

Recasting of American foreign policy toward creating buffer nations between the East and the West in updating the present policy of containment of communism.

Recognition of Red China and offering that country a permanent seat in the United Nations.

Cavanagh, at a press conference, said that if free elections resulted in demands by a new government that the United States withdraw its military forces, "it's a chance we have to take." He took the same view on the possibility of a Communist victory at the polls.

The Mayor again challenged Williams to debate the Vietnam and foreign policy issues "anywhere at any time."

Williams' press secretary, James M. Robinson, quoting the former governor, said: "There is nothing of substance new in the Mayor's statement; therefore I have no comment."

In questioning Mr. Johnson's conduct of the war so far, Cavanagh said he is joining "prominent men in both parties," mothers "who fear for their sons," working people and retirees, college students, "hard-nosed and realistic" businessmen, and "people everywhere in America."

"Today, things are warped in Vietnam by the size of our military commitment," Cavanagh said. "Military action . . . can overshadow political objectives if we are not careful.

"Freedom is seldom created by the might of military power, though armies are necessary for its defense."

Stressing the need for freedom for Vietnam, Cavanagh said the people there may not "choose the system of government we chose."

But, he said, "we must offer the same freedom of choice which we offer to our own citizens or we turn away from the finest ideals of man."

Insisting he will campaign against Williams "only on the issues," Cavanagh said he expects to produce more position papers on other issues, including inflation.

The statements will be made sometime after Cavanagh returns from a three-week tour of Europe starting late this week.

He will make a bid for Detroit as the site for the 1972 Olympics during a stopover in Rome and will visit several major cities plugging Detroit and Michigan as tourist attractions.

APPENDIX D

Detroit News
April 20, 1956

A Red S. Vietnam Would Pose
No Threat, Cavanagh Insists

by Jo Ann Hardee
Chief of Our City-County Bureau

There is no threat to American security in a Communist South Vietnam, Mayor Cavanagh said today.

"But I seriously doubt that Vietnam would go Communist in a free election," he added. "I know of no country that has freely chosen communism."

Nor does he anticipate that a freely elected government would ask for withdrawal of American forces.

MUST ACCEPT RESULTS

"But we should be willing to accept both possibilities if they are the results of a free election," Cavanagh said.

"We have been able to adopt satisfactory relations with Communist countries in Europe—Yugoslavia and Poland, for example. We could adopt similar relationships with Vietnam, in the unlikely event of a freely-elected Communist government there."

In the first of a series of "position papers," as part of his bid for the U.S. Senate, Cavanagh yesterday

called for a cease-fire; free elections including the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong); and creation of South Vietnam as a "neutral buffer state."

In response to questions, he denied he was willing to trade American security for reduction in war expenses which would permit more domestic spending, especially on his pet urban programs.

NO THREAT TO U.S.

"I simply see no threat to American security in a Communist Vietnam," he said.

Cavanagh said his proposal is at variance with President Johnson, who pledged his support to the military junta of Premier Nguyen Cao Ky.

In an obvious reference to the Ky regime, Cavanagh said the United States has erred in supporting dictatorships in an effort to fight communism, saying such actions increased the appeal of communism.

Cavanagh emphasized that his difference with President Johnson "are less important than those with my opponent who wants to say he supports Mr. Johnson and close off debate at that point."

HITS U.S. LAG

He added, however, that the administration, "hasn't strongly enough taken affirmative action" to end the war and gain free elections.

Cavanagh said free elections must include the Viet Cong, "who aren't going to disappear," adding that he would

advocate social and economic aid to Vietnam even if it went communist after free elections.

"Let the Vietnamese seek whatever course their free government desires to take to settle their national destiny," he said. "This may include asking the United States forces to leave.

"Perhaps they will not choose the system of government we choose and will sacrifice great measures of freedom for the security of dictatorship. But whatever the course, we must accept it."

AUTHORED BY AIDES

The Cavanagh paper, it is known, was authorized by his assistant Anthony Ripley, a former Detroit News reporter who covered the Vietnam war, and City Controller Richard Strichartz, a law professor on leave from Wayne State University.

Advice on the document was given by B. J. Widick, a professor in the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations which is jointly operated by the University of Michigan and Wayne State University.

Widick said today he is volunteering three days a week to the Cavanagh campaign, primarily "finding persons in the academic community who are sympathetic to the campaign and have expertise in areas of concern to the mayor."

CONSULTED MANY

Cavanagh said he consulted many persons on the document, but declined to name them, saying they have "a

passion for anonymity which I intend to indulge."

Widick's advice is particularly significant because of his former post in the UAW research department. The UAW is expected to support Williams.

APPENDIX E

Detroit Free Press
April 22, 1966

CAVANAGH'S BIBLIOGRAPHY

Disclaiming any title as foreign policy expert and modestly attaching a 'partial bibliography' to his statement on Vietnam, Mayor Jerry Cavanagh formally opened a wholly new phase in his campaign for the Democratic nomination for U.S. senator. And in opening this new phrase, he revealed an old trait.

The new phase in the primary race is a hopeful phase. In place of the petty bickering over family wealth and the name-calling which accompanied some earlier campaign exchanges between Cavanagh and Soapy Williams, the mayor has now presented a serious discussion of an important policy issue.

What ought this nation now do in Vietnam?

'I believe,' said Cavanagh, 'the time has come to search for a new way out--a realistic and honorable way to end the present war and a realistic stand on which to base our foreign policy for the years ahead.'

In the search for a way out Cavanagh would deal with the Vietcong and he would provide for free elections and accept the verdict of the Vietnamese people at the

ballot box. He considers a realistic stand on which to base our foreign policy no longer to be the sterile military containment of communism--the policy of the post-war years--but rather the fostering of diversity among nations and the willingness to deal not only with neutrals but with those nations which have until now been considered implacably hostile to the U.S. The time has come for the U.S. to realize that two Chinas exist and that Communist China ought to be brought into the U.N.

If Williams disagrees with any of these points, as he has seemed to do on the Red China question, then he ought to spell out his position as clearly and fully as Cavanagh has done. And if he does, the race will have entered a new phase of debate and important issues which concern this state's voters will be articulated.

What of the trait which Cavanagh's statement reveals? It is a flattering one.

When first elected mayor, Cavanagh was a young lawyer without any real experience in municipal affairs and many felt that he simply couldn't handle the vast complex tasks ahead. But he demonstrated a fantastic capacity to learn.

While it is much too early for any similar judgment on affairs beyond the municipal level, his statement on Vietnam was a reasoned discussion of a complicated problem which, with its 'partial bibliography' attached almost in

school-boy fashion, demonstrates something of this same capacity. It shows a determination to learn.

APPENDIX F

Detroit News
July 12, 1966

The Mayor's Foreign Policy Stand
He's Wrong on Vietnam

In the absence of evidence that G. Mennen Williams has the qualifications to represent all the people of Michigan as a U.S. senator, this paper had hoped Mayor Cavanagh might indicate during the primary campaign that he could perform in Washington with the same capacity he has demonstrated in the City Hall.

To date, we have been disappointed. The Cavanagh campaign has been largely a charade. When he has spoken formally, he has followed just one theme of total opposition to all of our commitments and current policies in Vietnam.

Cavanagh wants a cease fire, free elections in which the National Liberation Front (Viet Cong) would participate and the creation of South Vietnam as a "neutral buffer state."

"I simply see no threat to American security in a Communist Vietnam," says the mayor as he surveys the international scene.

On that, Cavanagh pits his judgment against the 12-year consensus of the Eisenhower-Kennedy-Johnson

administrations, their chiefs of staff during that time and the conviction of the men who have served as secretary of state. If he really means that an all-Red Vietnam would be of no importance to us, where does he assume that would leave neighboring Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, not to forget Australia, New Zealand and South Korea who have committed forces to Vietnam in the firm belief that ITS security essentially is THEIR security?

"I seriously doubt," says Cavanagh, "that Vietnam would go Communist in a free election. No country ever has freely chosen communism."

What nonsense to suggest that there is any precedent for Vietnam! What country can Cavanagh name that has been wracked by 20 years of war, sliced in half by a treaty honored more in the breach than observance and subjected to organized terror as the overt arm of political persuasion?

The question is not whether any country has ever freely chosen communism. Of course none has. What Cavanagh should be answering is whether he really believes that, after we have given up fighting, the Reds are going to sit back as good little democrats and permit an orderly campaign and free election in any part of Vietnam. Can he from his study of history recall a time when Communists, once having started a forceful grab for power, ever have been willing to stop killing and let the people debate and then vote them out, or in?

Cavanagh also wants the Viet Cong to participate in this election. To this the Ky government is resolutely opposed. Of course Cavanagh doesn't think much of General Ky. But the moderate Buddhists also oppose V.C. participation in any election. So in fact does that power-hungry monk, Tri Quang. Who in truth is there in South Vietnam who will accept the Cavanagh doctrine of peace at any price?

As for the "buffer state" idea, we must call to the mayor's attention that we already have one formally-agreed on "buffer state" in Southeast Asia. That is Laos, by the multination declaration of 1962. The mayor should be able to read the record of how the Reds ignored that accord to which they were pledged.

We realize, of course, that the mayor's current interest is in votes and that he would spread a net which would catch the undetermined number of draft objectors, New Leftists, pacifists and plain citizens, who, as President Johnson says, "often grow impatient when they cannot see light at the end of the tunnel."

What the mayor forgets is that a majority of Americans have given no indication of wanting to follow the advice of Senator Wayne Morse and surrender to communism on this battlefield.

APPENDIX G

Detroit News
May 18, 1966

Soapy Walks Middle Road in Viet War

by Glenn Engle
Detroit News Political Writer

Labeling himself "neither a hawk nor a dove," former Gov. G. Mennen Williams today called for a combined "firm military defense and a vigorous and imaginative peace effort."

He issued what he called a "major statement" on the war from the Detroit headquarters of his campaign for the Democratic U.S. Senate nomination.

Already criticized by his primary opponent, Mayor Cavanagh, for not speaking out on the major issues, he said his statement would appear later in full-page newspaper advertisements.

'SECURITY THREAT'

Without naming Cavanagh, Williams said he wanted to make one point of difference with his Democratic rival "absolutely clear":

"I cannot agree with anyone who says that a Communist takeover in South Vietnam would pose no threat to American security. I think it would be dangerous to the

security of the United States and the whole free world. It would be a setback for democracy and freedom."

In a "position paper" on the subject April 20, Cavanagh said he could "simply see no threat to American security in a Communist Vietnam."

He added, however, that he doubted whether Vietnam would go Communist in a free election because he has known of "no country that has freely chosen communism."

In a reference to those statements, Williams added:

"It is all too easy, in a time of public worry and uneasiness, to play upon the concern of the people and represent slogans as solutions to complicated problems. This I will not do."

Williams, who quit as assistant secretary of state for African affairs to run for the Senate, stressed five major points in resolving the Southeast Asian problem:

. Vigorous efforts for peace negotiations--We must implement Johnson's announced willingness to "talk to any government, anywhere and without any conditions."

URGES UN ROLE

. Free elections--The United Nations should supervise elections in South Vietnam. If that is not possible, then UN observers should be used as they were in the Congo.

. Social and economic development--South Vietnam "needs a social and economic revolution" and its people "need a better life to fight for." The administration already has taken initial steps in this direction.

. Reduction of tensions with Red China--Its demands for admission to the UN are "wholly unacceptable," but we should encourage exchange visits of newspapermen, scientists, scholars and others "who could start a two-way flow of information."

. Defense of South Vietnam--We should seek to limit the conflict to the minimum force required to stop aggression. The United States "should not be the first to escalate the conflict and should do so only to meet escalation on the part of the Communists."

APPENDIX H

Detroit Free Press
May 19, 1966

Williams Says He's Neither 'Hawk' Nor 'Dove' on Vietnam

In his fullest statement on the Vietnam crisis since he began his campaign for the U.S. Senate March 7, former Gov. G. Mennen Williams said Wednesday he is neither a "hawk" nor a "dove."

"The harsh reality of Vietnam is that peace is not possible without both a firm military defense and a vigorous and imaginative peace effort," Williams said.

The full text of Williams statement, printed as a political advertisement, appears on Page 17B of today's Free Press.

Williams, a Democrat, stressed that a communist takeover in South Vietnam "would be dangerous to the security of the United States and the whole Free World.

He asserted that President Johnson has said he would talk to any government, anywhere, and without prior conditions. "I believe we must implement that policy both vigorously and imaginatively," Williams said.

Williams singled out five major points: vigorous efforts for peace negotiations, free elections and social and economic development in South Vietnam, contacts with

Red China and defense of South Vietnam.

He suggested that Red China should be moved "into the mainstream of world affairs so that her actions can be influenced by world opinion."

Red China should be admitted to the United Nations, Williams said, if she will "drop her unreasonable demands regarding admission."

The United States "could disavow any intention of assisting Chiang Kai-shek's return to the mainland" and still support "the sovereignty and integrity of Nationalist China," he said.

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