THE DevaLomem a; NATEONALSSM
AMONG THE mwmx 925091.55
(191449.36)

Thai: for Fm Degree oi" M. A.
MICHKSAN STATE COLLEGE
Abdufla M. Lufiiyya
1954

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0-169

Date

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

THE DV‘J'r'lVTFMT CF T'TI“ ICI'ALIS AT CITE
"NFL E1};1TIAL~.‘ ' t’flzuno, lSJTL-IQBO

presented by

Abdull a Lu ’0 f' i yjfa

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

I". A. degree in High OI"V

Major professor

 

 

 

 

 

 

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(1914-1936)

by

ABD‘LLA M. LUTFIYEA
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Submitted to the LChCCl cf
:tete College of Agriculture

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of hichigan

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

L:LI.T;;T‘.;;1 OF LETS

De ertment of History
1954

Agproved

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ILVAXAJKJ ,-', .LJ .44 p.141»; J.

The author w'sres to express his sincere thanks
to Dr. Arthur ?. Adams unier whose direction and super-

vision and unfailing interest this work was undertaken.

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offering helpful suggestio.s and eesistence; to hrs.

P. Alubowicz, the Reference Librarian at hichigen State
Colleqe and the rest of the Library staff and the staff
of the University of Michigan Library for their constent
help in securine the documcrhsand books needed for this
investigation; and to my brother, Issa M. Lutfiyya, who

secured for me all the books which I needed from the

Near Test.

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The :ritish Occugation . . . . . . . . .
htcllectual Fevolution . . . . . . . . .

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II. herld Tar I 2nd Its Influence tn the avnloo-
Lent of letionalism in glpt
l. The Effects of the ar an LZtlQn lien . .
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Fsvolt . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
L. The gnglc-E;Jitian he: tieticne Leading to
the rroclicv“tion cf the Miggti-n Inieksir
deuce in IQIZ . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. Islam and Lby,tian La+ianliSfl
A. Ju‘el dl-Jin el— f;h::i anf L~itien
A?L10Hfili$fl . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Muh:fi .d 'sbdu E’c ;;;ti:h lationalism .
C. Ihe Soqnencement of ieli‘io—roliticel

IV. The Infiegenderce and fteh
h. The :olitical iarties in igyyt . . . . .
B. heticnalism end the cudgn froolcm . . . .
C. Latiozelism vs. nutccracy . . . . . . .
D. Safiret-Jhamberl:in Yogctiation: . . . . .
V. The making of the 1933 Iroety
A. The Iefflist CLV-FCMEnt and the gsseebly
“1115' o o o o o o e o o o o o o o o o o
E. Lehmud‘s Lictatorship eufl ths ;h*lo-
léygtian h‘grtieticns . . . . . . . . .
CS.’713 Dictatorshi- cfi“ Isma'il.i;i§£i rasha .
D. The Re toration of u~rlienenterv and Ctn-
ti' icnel hlfe to 'Lyft . . . . . . .
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L_:ufidiA III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
LL;EEdiX IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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«a

THE DEVELOPMLLT OF .LTICYALIEM AMCTG HT EGYPTIAN PEOPLES
(1914— 9:0)

Chapter I

53

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BizustILLL‘ . T -xg‘L.L."..‘«~...v...LJ.L~—an-

V
.—
Li‘s

The word nationalism first atteareo in Zuropean lan-

 

gue gas in about the early part of the nineteenth century.

This term was cerived from the word nation, which, from the

(D

eventeenth century onward, has been used to describe the

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sad to define a group of yerscns soéaxinu a cor on lan-

110

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Rationalicm durin, the ei;h eenth and nineteenth cen—

 

turies acquired many rcenin s and rifle c<tnct4tiors It

people had of the historical crocees through nhicn the

various states were develdped into n ticnal units. It also
descrioed the coliticel olilcs thi‘e which fcrjei the heck—
;round of a national state anc the Conscioue nee Oi nation—

.1 nify a political

(0
’Jo

ty. It hes been further tutldyod to si.

...
la
Hunt

[[1

C3

ve ien nt accomccnjin the awakening or “tr thenin

rtionel consciousness, as, when we speak of “German ne .tion—

.3
L)

&

alismvor “npyction nation-:1ism.x1 Etill furthrr, netionelism

2.

is understood as e concert describin; e stete of mind in
which the mamhers of e netionel stete ere extremely
patriotic, and exoress an elwost fenetiCel loyelty for
their netionel state.

In this study the historicel develtpment of Egypt,

from an Ottoman colony to a sovereign independent stete

0

shall be discussad it some len th. At the same time tie
political philosoohies which were the bese for the develop-
ment, and the implementation of these ideals by the nation-
elist leaders of Lgypt shall also be treetci here. "Nation-
alism" to this group of netionelist leaders often meent
patriotism to their state of 73ypt for which they held the

highest allegiance.

gvptiens beceme conscious of their nation-

elity end their belonging to each other, they began to

"5

consider any foreigner who interfered in their effei

83531“.

\D

intruder to be resisted. Then beLcn tn strUggle to secure

I

”E yot for the 2:”otiens.” The :riti h, who occupied 7s7ot

since 1914, were comcletely different from the Egyptiens;

they spoke differently, wrote differently, worsnipei

diffe ently, end enterteined different velues end conceptions

over then end their country. They wanted an independent

netionel state under Egyptian rule.

Irior to the HensleOnic invasion, stit vcs under

vu-

ule, but ectuslly tn: g3£1UK€S controlled the

country. When Rope leon invaded Egyet, Lurkei, hopin; that
her ellicnce with cther EOV9' would save the Lrovinces of

the Rear Jest from French dcminstion, allied hirself with

P
’N ‘ 0 (I x a a
crest criteln. oonoined the ottomnns eno the -ritish were
sole to defeat ”rpoleon s for”es, and in 1102 he signed the

reetr the French evacuate; igypt completely. ihcrtly there-
so withdrew their troons

unhemmed ‘511, a generel with the Turkish forces in
Egy,t, wee enbitious to rule. He knew the fellehin heted
both the Turns end the Kshloxes for eXploiting the country,
but he was convinced that the ignorant, one res d and un'disc i-
plined messes could never be strong encn: h to free themselves.
Realizing thst th gosition of the Turks in gyet was three-

tened by the Memlukes, he decided to utilize this rivalry to

nis adventa;e. Hoping thet the tTO gowers would destroy one

 

.1The Hemlukes were oricm inelly a grooo of slaves who served the

early me ters of Lgygt (lie lstcmit s). They were trusted

end given high positions in goverircnt Then the Fetemite
power deterioreted, the TJUlok who then occouisfl the high
offices of the government end who were very oros erou shy then

fcr:ed the rict‘crc+ic class, end, in f ct, PLlEd ovie r Es ypt.

we Kno‘n to us todev were hut

2The states of the h e
s ’ men ;£QLlI€T'th8n.

smell orovince

"Z

”inhsmmed 'Ali was born in 1769 et Cevelle,
port on the Aeoean see now under Greece. H ceme of poor
carentege and we es bron eht up es an orphan b. the Leyor of his
home team. He worked ior a French toes qcc o m»-rchent, honsieur
Leon, until he was enlisted in the Tornish army in 17 ’

smell mecedoni:n

(003

Q"
\‘

4.

another, 'Ali instigated war between them.

First, he aided the Mamlukes until their position was
secure. Then, in 1803, he massacred the surprised Mamluke
leaders in their homes, killed as many as possible and forced
the rest to leave Cairo. Next, he urged the Egyptians to
rise against the Turkish Governor, Khursid Pasha. After the
people demonstrated in the streets and demanded the Fasha's
return home, 'Ali began to support the Egyptians openly. In
1805, the leaders of the country chose him to be Governor of
Egypt.4 Khursid Pasha, however, refused to relinquish his
position. 'Ali armed his followers with the weapons available
to him as a Turkish general, and under pressure, the Turkish
Government, in July, 1805, ordered Khursid Pasha's withdrawal
from Egypt and officially requested Muhammad 'Ali to take his
place. After a year had elapsed, the Turkish government at
Constantinople tried to weaken the power of Muhammad 'Ali by
asking him to leave Egypt to rule over other Turkish provin-
ces. All efforts in this direction were failures because
Muhammad 'Ali was backed by the Egyptian people and there was
no choice but for him to remain.

In 1807, after the Turkish government failed to side

with Britain and Russia against Napoleon, the British Govern-

 

4The masses of Egypt at that time were led by Shaykh Al-Shak-
rawi, the director of Al-Azhar University and by Al-Sayed

Omar Makram, the head of the religious nobility of the country.
M. Rifihat Bay, The Awakening pf Modern Egypt (London, 1947),

p. 18.

 

5.

ment planned to invade and occupy Constantinople. However,
the British efforts in that direction were in vain, as the
Turks, with the help of France, were able to fortify and
save their capital.5
To cover up their defeat, the British attacked Egypt.

6 who promised

They were counting on the support of al-Alfi,
them that if they would come to Egypt and take it away from
the hands of Muhammad 'Ali they would be given the privilege
of ruling the Egyptian seashore. Muhammad 'Ali acted quickly
and by using the influence of the religious leaders (shayk-
hes) he was able to persuade the Mamlukes to cooperate with
him rather than with the British. Although the British were
able to conquer Alexandria with ease,7 they were ultimately
defeated. A treaty of peace with Muhammad 'Ali was signed at
Damanhur and they evacuated Alexandria in September, 1807.
Mr. Valentine Chirol describes this defeat of the Bri-
tish troops in Egypt in 1807 as, "one of the most humiliating

defeats the British troops ever suffered in the East," and

remarks further that Muhammad 'Ali's "victory over the

 

5The Turkish Sultan was influenced by Sebastiani, Napoleon's
clever ambassador who was sent to represent France at the
Turkish Court. He was greatly responsible for carrying the
Sultan at that time to side with France against England and
Russia and at the same time he saw to it that the Turkish
shores were well fortified and able to resist the British
invaders.

6Al-Alfi was a Mamluke leader who visited England after the
Napoleonic invasion of Egypt and involved himself in an agree-
ment with the British. He died Just two months before the
expedition took place.

7Amin Agha was the governor of Alexandria at that time, as it

was still in the hands of the Turks. It was said that he
made a peaceful surrender to the British because he was paid
to do so. Rif'aat, p. 23.

6.

Infidel" made him the master of Egypt.8 To quote M. Rifat
Bey, "The victory over the English made Muhammad 'Ali the
undisputed champion of Egyptian nationality, and his fame
began to traverse the boundaries of Egypt to the outside
world."9

After Muhammad 'Ali had established himself as a ruler
of Egypt, he turned against all forces in the country that
might at a later date question his authority or dispute his
control. The first group he attacked was the Mamlukes. He
slaughtered at one time about 500 of their Beys in Cairo and
put an end not only to their strength but to their existence
as well. As Chirol puts it, "The Mamlukes had ruled by the
sword and they perished by the sword."10

Among other actions strengthening his position with
the Egyptian people and with his nominal master, the Ottoman
Sultan, was Muhammad 'Ali's complying with the Sultan‘s re-

quest that he crush the Wahhabi rebellion in Arabia.11 In

 

8
Sir Valentine Chirol, The Egyptian Problem (London, 1921),
p. 4.

9Rif'aat, p. 27.

 

10Chirol, 92. cit., p. 5.

11The Wahhabi sect in Islam is the group which accepted Ortho-
dox teachings of Muhammad ibn‘Abd Alwahab of the strict Han-
bali school of Islam. It began its religious and political
movements early in the 18th century when the Ottoman Sultan,
Salem, took for himself the title of Caliph. Up until that
time the Fatimite rulers who ruled in Egypt and North Africa
used this title on the basis that they were descended from
Fatima, the daughter of the prophet, Muhammad, and the wife
of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, the last of the four Caliphss who suc-
ceeded Muhammad. The Turkish Sultans did not have any legal
right to this title. Thus, the Wahhabies questioned the
issue and Opposed the Turkish authority.

-Continued -

7.

1811 Muhammad 'Ali sent his son, Tussoon, with an Egyptian
force to recapture the holy places from the Wahhabis and
bring them back under Turkish control. Tussoon was success-
ful at first in reconquering Medina. The complete defeat of
the Wahhabi forces was not accomplished until 1818 when Ibra-
him, the favorite son of Muhammad 'Ali, was able to capture
Deraye, the last stronghold in the hands of the Wahhabi in
Arabia and to take prisoner their leader, Abdullah Ibn Sa'ud,
who was then sent to Constantinople to pay for his disobedi-
ence to the Sultan. Muhammad ‘Ali was able to render another
service for the Sultan when the latter called on him in 1821
to save Crete from the Greeks, who were at that time seeking
their independence from the Turks. Ali was successful in
putting an end to the Greek rebellion and saving the island
for the Sultan. As a reward for this great service, the Sultan
appointed 'Ali as the titular Pasha of the island.

Muhammad 'Ali was a very ambitious man, always hoping to
obtain independence in Egypt and to expand his control and
influence from there rather than to remain an agent of the
Ottoman Government, spending all his effort in strengthening

the stronghold of the Sultan. After his expeditions in Arabia

 

11 (continued)The Wahhabies were supported by the Bedouin tribe
of Bani Sa'ud which roamed the area of Southeastern Arabia.
The Wahhabies in the course of time were able to lay their
hands on the sacred shrines in {ecca and Medina and forbade
prayers for the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph of all Moslems. The
Wahhabies were in power in Arabia until they were defeated in
1818 by Ibrahim, son of Muhammad 'Ali. For further informa-
tion about the Wahhabi movement see: H. St. J. B. Philby,
Arabia (London, 1930). See also, Stoddard Lothrop, ID§.EEE
World 9: Islam (New York, 1921), pp. 25-45.

8.

and Crete, he apparently became convinced of his power and
decided to start working for himself. He began thinking of
acquiring and adding the territories of Palestine and Syria
to his domain, and thus, in 1831, we see him sending his son,
Ibrahim, at the head of a strong Egyptian force to recapture
these areas from the Turks. His justification for this expi-
dition was based on his claim that the Ottoman Government in
ConstantinOple had promised him earlier that he would become
ruler over this region in recognition of his help to the
Turks in subduing the Greeks, a promise which the Turks had
failed to honor.

Ibrahim was able during this expedition to play on Arab
sympathies and on the issue of Arab nationalism and to move
those people to help him against the enemy of both parties;
namely, the Turks.

He was also able to advance in Syria and in the summer
of 1832 arrived at Adana in Asia Minor, which is but a few
hundred miles from Constantinople. This action of Muhammad
'Ali did not please the European nations who looked at Turkey
as the weak man of Europe. Russia preferred to see a rather
weak power on her borders and offered help to the Sultan of
Turkey against the forces of Muhammad 'Ali. Austria and Eng-
land also offered assistance. The Sultan accepted the help
of his former enemies, and Ibrahim Pasha, as the head of the
Egyptian forces, was halted at a small town known as Kutahi-
yah (Kutahya) where he agreed to sign a peace treaty with the

Sultan of Turkey. This treaty was named after the town 'The

Treaty of Kutahiyah' and apparently it spoke of preserving
the status quo.12

The Kutahiyah Treaty was an acknowledgment of the defeat
of the Sultan. Although on June 24, 1839, we see him attack-
ing the Egyptian troops at Nasabain, his Turkish troops were
badly defeated by the Egyptians. At the same time the Otto-
man fleet in the Mediterranean Sea surrendered and Joined the
forces of Muhammad 'Ali at Alexandria. Then this news reach-
ed the broken-hearted Sultan he became ill and passed away
within a week from the time he started his attack on the
Egyptians at Nasabain.

In 1840, the European powers met at Lundra and agreed
among themselves on special terms to force on Muhammad 'Ali.
The pressure of the Western powers was very effective, and
Muhammad 'Ali found himself obliged to sign, on November 13,
1840, the Lundra Treaty with the Governments of Turkey, Great
Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia; according to the terms
of this treaty Muhammad 'Ali evacuated the Ottoman territory
which he then occupied, and satisfied himself with Egypt.
Muhammad 'Ali was declared to be the hereditary Pasha of
Egypt, which became an independent state under the control of
Turkey, rather than a part of the Ottoman Empire.

Muhammad 'Ali proved himself to be a great reformer as

well as a brilliant military men and statesman. In an effort

 

12Ahmad Shafik Pasha, Hauliyat Misr al-Siyagiyah (Cairo, 1928)

I, 7. cf. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, (New York,
1946), pp. 27-32.

10.

to encourage trade and improve the economy of the country,
he developed Alexandria harbor and built a shipyard there,
encouraged trade with foreign states, opened the door for
foreign investment in Egypt, and started a number of new
industries. In the field of education he subsidized many
students to study in different fields in France. He also
built the first medical school in Egypt at Qasr al-‘Ayni. He
built the Egyptian army on Napoleonic lines and introduced
technical military training. He reformed the Egyptian gov-
ernment and developed a functional Department of State.
Muhammad 'Ali was succeeded by other men of his
dynasty who lacked his ability and great enthusiasm. The
following diagram shows the relationship to Muhammad 'Ali of

later rulers of Egypt.13

 

13
The Geneological table was obtained from the Royal Insti-

tute of International Affairs, The Middle East: A Political
and Economic Surve‘ (London, 1951), p. 152. (Hereafter
cited as R I I A, The Middle EastJ

 

 

King Farouk, who is the descendant of Muhammad 'Ali's
family, was forced to abdicate in the summer of 1952 in be-
half of his infant son, Prince Ahmad Fu'ad, who was but a
few months old. The year in which Farouk abdicated and the
name of Prince Ahmad Fu'ad, son of Farouk I, were added by
the writer. In 1953 Egypt was declared a republic and
Muhammad Nagub became the first President of the New Egypt-
ian Republic.

Ibrahim Pasha
Regent of Egypt
(1848)

Isma'il, Vice-
roy of Egypt
(1849-92)

Tawfiq, Kedive
of Egypt
(1849-92)

Abbas Hilmi II,

Khedive of

Egypt (1892-
1914)

Prince Abdul
Mun'im

11.

Viceroy of Egyp
(1805-1849)

Tusan Pasha

Abbas I, Vicero
Egypt (1849-54

Husain Kamih,
Sultan of Egypt
(1814-17)

Prince Muhammad 'Ali

MuhammadYAli The Great

t

y of

Muhammad Sa'i'd
Pasha, Viceroy of
Egypt (1854-63)

Admad Fu'ad,
Sultan of Egypt
(1817-22), King

of Egypt (1822-36)

Farouk I, King of
Egypt (1930-52)

Prince Ahmad Fu'ad

12.

THE SUEZ CANAL

Muhammad 'Ali was succeeded by men from his dynasty
who were not as capable as he and who lacked the incentive
and the dynamic personality which he possessed. The age of
those successors may be characterized as static. A. M. Has-
sanein and H. A. Mahmud, two Egyptian historians, in taking
about this period say:

In studying the history of these two viceroys,
[Abbas I an Eafig7 we pass from the heroic age to
the commonplace, we drop from the high plateau of
the great Pasha's reign into an abyss unrelieved by
a single incident of statesmanship. There is little
to admire in this period of fifteen years.

The story of modern Egypt until the reign of

Isma'il Pasha becomes dull after the death of

Muhammad ‘Ali. It is chronicle of bad finance and

foreign intervention.14

In 1852, during the reign of Abbas I, a French diplo-
mat called Ferdinand de Lesseps who had just retired from the
French Consular Service after a long experience in Tunis,
Egypt, Rotterdam, Malega and Barcelona, came out with a plan
which was translated into Arabic and sent to Abbas Pasha of
Egypt through the Dutch Consul-General. The plan was to cut
a canal to Join the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea, thus

shortening the distance from Europe to India and the Far

East. De Lessep's idea met with an unfavorable reception.15

14A. M. Hassanein and H. A. Mahmud, Outlines 9: Egyptian

Modern History (Cairo, 1948), p. 71.
15Eva March Tappan, (ed.) Ez t Africa and Arabia. The
World's Story, New York, 1914 , III, 231.

 

13.

The idea Of De Lesseps did not die. The Pasha of
Egypt who was not in accord with this idea passed away in
1854 and was succeeded by an old friend Of De Lesseps, Sa'id
Pasha, who accepted the plan, which was put into effect in
1859.16

Sa'id Pasha passed away on January 17, 1863, after the
process of digging the canal had been in progress for three
years. Sa'id was succeeded by Isma'il Pasha, the grandson of
Muhammad 'Ali. Isma'il, unlike the two rulers who had pre-
ceded him as Pashas of Egypt, possed the dynamic and agressive
personality of his grandfather. He was educated in Paris
where he acquired Western ideas and conceptions.

It is not strange, then, that Isma'il followed the steps
Of his grandfather, Muhammad 'Ali in trying to westernize

Egypt, advance education, and speed up production. Helpful to

 

16The idea of digging a canal to Join the Mediterranean by

the Red Sea was not originated by De Lesseps. Long before
his time the idea was introduced and investigated, but it
was declared to be impractical. This was the conclusion to
which England had come in the past. Now the rising of a
Frenchman like De Lesseps to disprove the old and mistaken
theory that the Red Sea is about 30 feet below the Mediter-
ranean Sea and that the connection would only lead to an
inundation or permanent waterfall, was not appreciated by
the British Government, especially as the British Government
was fearful of French interference in the affair, and bring-
ing Egypt into their sphere of influence, or under their
control. On this basis we find that Great Britain had in-
fluenced Turkey to side with her in Opposing the issue of the
canal. Said Pasha of Egypt sided with his friend, Ferdinand
De Lesseps, who was at last victorious in opening a sub-
scription to the cause, collecting almost eight million
pounds and starting the Operation of the digging in 1859.
For reference on this point see: Ibid., III, 231-237.

14.

him in this was his success in 1866 in securing a proclama-
tion (firman) from the Sultan in Constantinople which gave
the dynasty of Isma'il direct succession to the Egyptian'
governorship in the EurOpean tradition, from father to the
oldest son, instead of Turkish succession by seniority. In
the succeeding year Isma'il was able to Obtain another firman
which gave him the right to negotiate commercial and adminis-
trative treaties, to issue new laws, contract loans, and
enlarge the Egyptian army if he chose to do so. In other
words, he was given full power to deal with all Egyptian
affairs except in connection with international treaties. He

17 This was a

also was given the title of Khedive 'Ruler'.
bold step representing an effort to free Egypt from the Otto-
man interference which had prevailed during the reign Of the
two Pashas who had preceded him.

After these accomplishments, Isma‘il turned toward local
affairs and tried to complete the reforms started by his
grandfather, Muhammad 'Ali, a few years before, but which were
forgotten in the intervening period. In this direction
Isma'il was very successful.18 He was able to establish a
post Office in Egypt. He introduced the sugar industry, built
docks and harbors, new railways, and many canals for irriga-

tion. In other words, he was able to stimulate commercial as

well as agricultural progress.

 

17Carl Brockelmann, History 23 the Islamic Peoples, trans.

Joel Camichael and Moshe Perlmann (Cornwall, N.Y., 1947),
p. 371.

18
Ibid., p. 371.

15.

In attempting to modernize Egypt, he provided the
three great cities of the country with gas and waterworks
for the first time.19 In the field of education he was able
to make great progress. This is evident when we realize that
the number of schools during his reign rose from 185 to
4,817, and that he was responsible for the formation of a
school of medicine, a military academy, and the first girls'

20

school in Egypt. Also, during Isma'il's reign, a chamber of

deputies was convened for the first time. This made him "a

pioneer in the sphere of constitutional government" 21 in

Egypt.
Despite the horrible picture of Isma'il diligently pre-
sented by British sources, it can be said that he was loyal
to the Egyptian cause and was successful in advancing Egypt-
ian society toward the goals of progress and civilization.22
Unfortunately he lived in an age in which European ambitions,
especially those of England and France, were directed toward
the ideal of conquering Egypt and keeping her under their

control, especially after the Suez Canal was completed.2:5

 

19Edward W. P. Newman, Great Britain ig Egypt, (London, 1928),

p. 26.
20

21

Brockelmann, p. 273.
A. M. Hassanein and H. A. Mahmud, p. 82.

2
2See Appendix No. 1.

23Joseph Morton Howell, Egypt's Pastnyresent and Future,
(Dayton, Ohio, 1929), pp. 135-136.

16.

Isma‘il, in order to carry out his plans, was forced
to borrow money from abroad. This policy was not a wise one,
considering that Egypt was already in debt when Said Pasha

died.24

Isma'il's personal extravagance was another drain on
the Egyptian budget. It is said that the cost of the
Egyptian festivities connected with the opening of the Suez
Canal were B.E. 12 million.25 Also, Isma'il had to spend
large amounts of money on his unsuccessful expeditions in
the southern part of the Sudan and Abyssinia.26 All of
these acts required large amounts of money, which Egypt did
not have. Therefore Egypt was forced to borrow from foreign
creditors in Europe at high interest.27

In 1875, Isma'il found himself facing a great dilemma;
his creditors were urging payment of interests which were due,
but Isma'il was unable to face them, and found the only solu-
tion was to declare bankruptcy and sell Egypt's 177,602 shares
in the Suez Canal to the British Government, headed at that

time by Mr. Disraeli, for an amount Of'fi. 4 million sterling.28

 

2‘The debt of Egypt at the time of Said's early death in Janu-

ary, 1863, amounted to-£.E. 12,000,000; for further details
see: A. E. Crouchle , The Economic Development 9: Modern
Egypt, (London, 1938 , pp. 115-116.

25R I I A, The Middle East, p. 154.

 

 

ZGBrockelmann, p. 372.

27It was reported that some bankers charged Isma'il up to 12

per cent interest and made the loans at a discount of as much
as 25 per cent. R I I A, The Middle East, p. 154. Also, see
Lord Milner, England and Egypt, (London, 1894), pp. 15 and
176. See also: Ahmad SheficPasha, pp; cit., I, p. 9.

 

Ibid., I, .: 10.

 

17.

The total debt which Egypt owed the Western bankers in
1876 amounted to‘E 100 million.29 Isma'il was unable to pay
even the interest on the debt and, at the same time, no one
would lend him any more money. To make up a part of the de-
ficit he doubled the taxes on the fellahin and paid no
salaries to his employees.30

The European creditors sought the help of their govern-
ments, England and France, which were able then to interfere
directly in the affairs of the Egyptian government, establish-
ing "dual control" over them. In 1879 they deposed and exiled
Isma'il, who, instead of locating "Egypt in Europe", brought

Europe to Egypt.
The 'Orabi Revolution

After Isma'il was deposed, his son, Tawfiq, succeeded
him as the new Khedive of Egypt. Despite all the troubles and
financial and political crises in which he found himself,
Tawfiq insisted that the Egyptians should be given priority in

1 He

governmental Jobs, and high posts in the Egyptian army.3
also declined to accept the unfair treatment which his father'

was forced to accept from England and France, and refused to

 

29Brockelmann, p. 372.

30

12.1.94: P. 3720
31It was the custom in the past that the high positions in the
Egyptian army were occupied by officers from Saracen or Turk-
ish origin. Tawfik was able to outdo that and to promote
many Egyptian officers as Ahmad ‘Orabi, who led the Egyptian
National revolution later on to the highest positions in the
army. See Ahmad Shafik Pasha, pp; 213., I. 15.

18.

recognize the "dual control" or to have any British or
French ministers in his government.32

Tawfiq's recognition of the Egyptian officers created
Jealousy and a negative reaction toward them in the hearts
of Saracen and Turkish officers. In the course of time this
111 feeling grew between the two groups and culminated in a
bloody clash. The reduction of the officer corps by the
Khedive (necessitated by the fact that Tawfiq had to econo-
mize in order to pay the Egyptian Government's debts) caused
a growing dislike towards him among the Turkish and Saracen
officers who had been eliminated. During this period an
Egyptian leader emerged in the person of a young officer
called Ahmad 'Orabi. Ahmad came from the upper stratum of
the fellahin class and was the son of a village shaykh.33
He Studied at al-Azhar University, where he came in contact
with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who had great influence on him

and other young future leaders of the nationalist movement.34

 

32
During the last period of the reign of Isma'il, England and

France imposed on him two foreign ministers. The first was
a British Minister of Finance and the second a French Mini-
ster of Public Works. The influence of those two ministers
on the policy of the government was great and Isma‘il's life
and works became very miserable, as he found himself not
free to do anything without the approval of those two mini-
sters. In 1879 he rebelled against the "dual control" but

he was not successful and he was forced to leave the country.
R I I A, The Middle East, p. 154.

33A. M. Galatoli, Egypt lg Mid-passage, (Cairo, 1950), p. 10.

34
See Chapter IIIof this study.

19.

'Orabi, although young, was able to advance during the
reign of Tawfiq Pasha to Colonel and Commander of the Fourth
Regiment in the Egyptian army.35 The rivalry between the
Egyptian officers and officers of Turkish origin was at its
peak during this period. 'Othman Pasha Rifqi, who was the
Minister of War in the Egyptian Government at that time,
favored the Turkish officers. Thus, he was opposed by 'Orabi,
who, in 1881, with the help of another Egyptian officer, 'Ali
Fahmi, drew a protest against Cthman's "unjust treatment of
the Egyptian officers."36 Then 'Orabi assumed the leadership
of a small but highly organized National Party which became
well known for its concern for the Egyptian fellah and its
struggle against the great landholders of Turkish origin.37

'Orabi came to be the Nation's leader, or as one his-
torian puts it, "All the nation came to be ‘Orabi, and 'Orabi

'38 In February, 1882, 'Orabi

came to be the complete nation.‘
was elected Minister of Defense (Jihadiyyah). This did not
please the officers of Turkish origin who were afraid that
their enemy, the great nationalist, 'Orabi, would attempt to
lessen their influence and prestige. The Turkish officers

started a conspiracy against 'Orabi and at one time plotted to

kill him. 'Orabi, aware of this conspiracy, had them arrested

 

35Brockelmann, p. 379.
36
Sir Chirol, 0p. cit., p. 38.
37For the program of the National Party see Apendix II.

38
Ahmad Shafik Pasha, op. cit., I, .~ 19.

20.

and tried before a military court which passed very harsh
Judgments against them. The Khedive then interfered and
tried to soften the judgment against the accused officers.
This behavior did not please 'Orabi who began to think of
getting rid of the Khedive.39

England and France were watching carefully. At this
time, it appears, both of these countries became afraid that
the lives and property of EurOpeans in Egypt were in danger,
and thought it time to show the Egyptian Government as well
as the Egyptian Nationalists their readiness to interfere and
protect, if necessary, Europeans and their possessions in
Egypt. On May 20, 1881, France and England arranged for a
demonstration of their fleets before Alexandria. This demon-
stration heightened the tension in Egypt and trouble broke out
in Alexandria.

Great Britain and France then put extreme pressure on
the Khedive to dismiss 'Orabi from office and send him and
other Nationalist leaders to exile outside Egypt. The Cabi-

net then resigned. The Egyptian civil and religious leaders
demonstrated and presented themselves to the Khedive, request-
ing that 'Orabi be returned as Minister of Ear. The Khedive,
thus pressed, had no choice but to return 'Orabi to office in
order to keep peace. At this time ‘Orabi became the absolute

ruler of the country (dictator) and took as his responsibility

 

39
Ibid., p. 17.

21.

the issue of maintaining peace and order. Thus, the posi-
tion of the Khedive became insignificant as compared to
that of 'Orabi.4o

As 'Orabi was afraid of foreign intervention in
Egyptian domestic affairs, he set about fortifying Alexan-
dria. This did not please Great Eritain who began to think
that it was her responsibility to take some measures in an
effort to protect Europeans then residing in Egypt. Suddenly,
on July 11, 1882, as a result of a quarrel which took place
between an Egyptian donkey driver (makari) and a British sub-
ject from Malta, bloody fighting evolved and about 50 Euro-
peans were killed.41 On the same day the British fleet,
located near the Egyptian shores and then under the leader-
ship of Sir Beauchamp Seymour, bombarded the forts of Alexan-
dria. France and Italy declined to cooperate with Britain
against Egypt. Two months after the bombardment of Alexan-
dria, Eritish troops led by General lolseley landed at Tel
al-Kabir to fight the National troops and conquer the country.

'Orabi led his army against the Eritish troops on
September 13, 1882, at Tel al—Kabir, where he was defeated.
He then surrendered to the British, who tried him, but re-
voked the death sentence which was passed for fear of a
nation-wide revolution, as 'Orabi was a very popular leader.
They satisfied themselves with 'Orabi‘s exile to Ceylon.

Hence, in 1901 he was allowed to return to Cairo.

 

40Ibid., p. 18.

41Chirol, op. cit., p. 41.

(1')
[‘3
0

THE BRITISH OCCUPATION

The defeat of the 'Orabi forces at Tel al-Kabir marked
for Egypt the and of the degree of independence which had
been achieved by Isma'il and the beginning of a long period
of subjection and struggle against the government of Great
Britain. Sir Evelyn Baring (later the Earl of Cromer),
better known to students of history as Lord Cromer, "a man
with an iron fist,"42 was the first British Agent and Consul-
General to be appointed in Egypt. Lord Cromer was no stranger
to Egypt and the Egyptians, having been a member of the "dual
control" of Egyptian finance during the last stages of
Isma'il's rule.43

The British occupation of Egypt "paralyzed the Nation-
alist movement", says Mr. Galatoli, ”and reinstated the
Khedive Tawfiq with absolute powers unchecked by the Egyptian
people, but tightly controlled by the British Representa-

tive 0"44

Cromer attempted some reforms, and, in fact, was effec-
tive in putting some of them through. He has been given the
credit for balancing the Egyptian budget, although the
Egyptian historian, Ahmad Shafik Pasha, reports that the
budget was already balanced during the early part of Khedive

Tawfiq's reign and that it then contained a considerable

 

42Galatoli, p. 13.

4OR I I A, The Middle East, p. 155.

44Galatoli, p. 12.

23.

amount of reserve money.45 Lord Cromer was able to carry out
some administrative reforms, an important one being the dis-
posal of the corvee or forced labor system practiced during
the reign of Isma‘il. The major reforms instituted by Cromer
were improvement of the irrigation system, building of large
dams on the Nile, and extension of the cultivated area.46
In addition to the administrative reforms initiated by
Lord Cromer in Egypt, it is worth mentioning here that the
Sudan problem, which later had a great influence in determin-
ation of the Anglo-Egyptian relations, started during this
period; and the year 1898 marked the occupation of the Sudan
by Anglo-Egyptian forces. Long before the coming of the
British, the Sudan was under Egyptian control, but the
Egyptian forces withdrew in 1883 as a result of pressure from
the British Government and its representative in Egypt. The
forces which reoccupied the Sudan in 1898 under Lord Cromer4'7
were not by any means all British. Mr. Ahmad Shafik Pasha
reports that five-sixths of the army was composed of Egyptian
soldiers,48 and even Lord Cromer admits that most of the cost

of the whole operation was met by the Egyptian budget. He

writes:

 

45Ahmad Shafik Pasha, op. cit., I, . 23.

46Chirol, op. cit., pp. 69-75.

47Lord Cromer, Modern Egypt, (London, 1908), I, 391-395.

48
Admad Shafik Pasha, op. cit., I, . 32.

24.

The financial success was no less remarkable
than the military. The total cost of the campaigns

of 1896-98 was b.E. 2,354,000 of which E.E. 1,200,000

was spent on railways and telegraphs and E.E. 155,000

on gunboats. The 'military expenditure', properly

so-called, only amounted to L.E. 996,000.

0f the total sum of L.E. 2,354,000, rather less
than E.E. 800,000, was paid by the British and the
balance of about E.E. 1,554,000 by the Egyptian

Treasury.

Despite the fact that Lord Cromer had accomplished
much in Egypt, he never became popular. He was criticized
severely for the ineffective system of education which he
fostered. His interest was limited to secularizing elemen-
tary education. There is no doubt that he did well in that
direction, as most of the village schools of that time were
tied in one way or antther to the mosques and were definitely
ineffective in spreading basic education. The only kind of
instruction carried on in those village schools (Kuttabs) was
the forcing of students to read and memorize the Kuran, plus
some instruction in elementary arithmetic. Most of the time

0 Cromer re-

the educators themselves had little education.5
ports: "In 1906, 4554 village schools were either directly
under government control or under departmental inspection for
grants-in-aid. They gave instruction to 165,000 pupils of

whom nearly 13,000 were girls."51

 

49Cromer, 11, 105-106.

50For further information about the village school (Kuttab)
see Taha Husain, al-Ayyam (Cairo, 1940), I. Lord Cromer in
his book Modern Egypt, II, also made reference concerning
this particular point to Haughes' Dictionary 2: Islam.

51Cromer, II, 534.

25.

The reader might think that Cromer had done much to
promote elementary education, but this is untrue, as the
figures he had given show how few were those children who
had Opportunity to receive elementary education. In 1906,
the population of Egypt was about 11,287,359,52 including
those of grade school age,53 but only 1.35 per cent of this
population were in school. This is very low, especially in
so young a nation.

0n the other hand, Lord Cromer did not show any in-
terest in promoting or improving secondary or advanced educa-

tion. This led Egyptian thinkers to conclude that Cromer's
aim was the development of a new class of people, not intel-
lectuals, not thinking for themselvers, not future revolu-
tionaries against England, but a new class of petty clerks
with a little learning enabling them better to serve the
standing government,54 or, to use Chirol's own words, "to
produce government servants to work under British officials."55

Cromer's attitude toward secondary education and his
Opposition to the creation of an Egyptian State University
were severely criticized by the Egyptians. Cromer never had
been able to understand or appreciate the Egyptians. He

thought them people with very low intelligence, inferior to

52

Galatoli, p. 13.
53There was a great increase in the Egyptian population during
the British occupation of the country (from 6,804,021 in

1882 to 11,287,359 in 1907.) See Ibid., p. 13.

4 Egyptian) Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Egypt, (Cairo,
the year of publication is not given), p. 56.

55
Chirol, op. cit., p. 77.

26.

Europeans in every way. In his book, Modern Egypt, he relates

 

some stories, attempting to prove his point of view. In the
chapter entitled "Dwellers in Egypt", Lord Cromer tries to
draw a comparison between the Egyptian and the European, his
aim being to show the stupidity of the former and the super-
iority of the latter. He writes:

The European is a close reas her; his statements of
fact are devoid of ambiguity; he is a natural logician,
although he may not have studied logic; he loves
symmetry in all things; he is by nature sceptical and
requires proof before he can accept the truth of any
proposition, his trained intelligence works like a
piece of mechanism. The mind of the Oriental, on the
other hand, like his picturesque streets, is eminently
wanting in symmetry. His reasoning is of the most
slipshod description. . . .(the Egyptians) are often
incapable of drawing the most obvious conclusions from
any simple premises of which they may admit the truth.
. . . In political matters, as well as in the affairs
of everyday life, the Egyptian will, without inquiry,
- accept as true the most absurd rumours.

He adds:

Then, again, side by side with the European's appreci-
ation of arithmetic, consider that in all matters
connected with number or quantity the ordinary Egypt-
ian goes hopelessly astray. . . Tell an Egyptian cook
that he puts too much salt into the soup. He will
abstain altogether from the use of salt. Or, on the
other hand, tell him that he does not use salt enough;
he will throw in a bucket ful. He cannot hit the happy
mean; moderation in the use of salt, or anything else,
is foreign to his nature; he cannot grasp the idea of
quantity.

. . . .We hear a great deal in praise of Oriental
courtesy and the praise is in some respects well de-
served. A high class European will be charmed with
manners of a high class Oriental, although he is aware
that the exaggerated compliments common in the East

are merely figurative and cannot be taken to represent
the real sentiments of the speaker. But look a little
deeper and examine the ground on which these outward
forms of courtesy are based. The examination will
bring out a somewhat unpleasant feature of the Egyptian

27.

character. For one of the main reasons why an

Egyptian, if he is in a position of authority, is

courteous, is that he thinks it in his interest to

be so.56

These generalizations are but a few of the many which
reflect Lord Cromer's failure to understand Egypt and the
Egyptians. This misunderstanding and ill treatment of the
Egyptians and love of the foreigners in Egypt was reflected
not only in his words but in his deeds. He once wrote ex-
pressing his idea that the Egyptians are unfit and will never
be able to control their own government: "To suppose that
the characters and intellects of even a small number of
Egyptians can in a few years be trained to such an extent as
to admit of their undertaking the sole direction of one of the
most complicated political and economic machines which the
world has ever known is a sheer absurdity."57 His lack of
faith in Egyptian ability antagonized the Egyptian population
and made him a target for the Egyptian press.

It can be said without any hesitation that Cromer mis-
understood and disliked the Egyptians and that he was dis-
liked by them. This was proved in the events of Dinshaway
which occurred on June 13, 1906. Some English officers at a
pigeon shoot in the village of Dinshaway in the Delta, shot
a woman. The fellahin of that village, already antagonized

by the misbehavior of the British soldiers, as were many of

 

56Cromer, 11, 146-154.

Ibid., II, 52.

 

28.

their countrymen, rioted and set upon those unlucky officers
with cudgels. Cne of the officers died while running away
under the burning sun. Cromer, who considered the Egyptian
people uncivilized, ”ordered a merciless condemnation of the
culprits."58 Four men were hanged publicly on June 28 and
seventeen others were flogged and sent to Jail. This punish-
ment, which could only be described as barbarous, strengthen-
ed the conviction of the Egyptians that they should unite and
fight British imperialism which had proved to be the enemy

of all Egyptians, regardless of class or geographical loca-
tion. The "Massacre of Dinshaway" created a favorite tepic
for Egyptian writers, poets, and nationalists, who used the
episode to arouse the Egyptian people whenever they wanted to
call for a struggle with the British. This attitude of
Cromer was not criticized by the Egyptians alone. Many Euro-
peanspapers, including some in England, attached his ideas.
Even in the English Parliament many representatives objected
to the way Lord Cromer punished the villagers who attacked
the British officers.59 The term of Lord Cromer in igypt
after Dinshaway, was cut snort and he was recalled to England,
where he retired in May, 1907. His retirement marked the end

of an era of iritish occupation.60

 

58Brockelmann, p. 457.

C

U9"The Denshawi Affray", The Parliamentapy Debates 9: EEE
United Kingdom pf Great iritain and Ireland, authorized
edition (London, 19067: CLXVI, 294-295 (Rev. 29, 1906).

 

 

 

 

6OChircl, op. cit., p. 81.

INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION

In the first part of this chapter it was mentioned
that the father of nationalism in Egypt, Muhammad 'Ali, al-
though illiterate himself, encouraged education and financed
many promising students to travel and study abroad, mainly
in France. Peturning fiom Europe, these students spread

*—
-—1

European ideas and French culture throughout ,gypt. This
pattern of behavior was encouraged by Muhammad 'Ali who, as
Brookelmann says, ”showed great admiration for the blessings
of European civilization, insofar as it gave promise of in-
creasing the productivity of the country."61 The influence
of those EurOpeanized students was of considerable import-
ance as they encouraged others to seek higher education in
Europe.

Schools also were established in Egypt during the
reign of Muhammad 'Ali. At the head of each was a French
professor. In the course of time the number of westernized
men increased and with their increase their influence in
directing public Opinion and national and international poli-
cies of their country became greater.

Isma‘il, who later became the Khedive of Egypt, was
educated in France. This gave him the background and the de-

sire to start a movement of educational development. He was

the one who declared to the foreign consuls uppn his ascension

 

l
Brockelmann, p. 349.

30.

to the throne: "Egypt is no longer in Africa. It is part
of Europe now."62 Isma'il did not say this without justifi-
cation; in fact, he tried to back the statement with action.
It was reported that "he spent L.E. $9,394,000 in building
railroads, harbors, canals, bridges and telegraph lines."63
He also established a postal system embellishing the main
Egyptian cities with broad avenues and modern buildings; gave
fine waterworks to Alexandria; founded a Geographical Society;
instituted a Museum of Antiquities; and opened a National
Library in Cairo and thousands of schools, including the

first Egyptian school for girls, a school of medicine and a
military academy. He benefited agriculture by establishing
new dams and canals for irrigation from the hile, and by the
introduction of the sugar cane industry. It is unfortunate
that circumstances were unfavorable and he fell into the hands
of merciless debtors who forced him to abdicate.

The influence of the French on the ngptians was of im-
mense importance as many Egyptian youths were taught to read
and write the French language. They read the writings of the
great French writers such as Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu
and others, and the French slogan ”Liberty, equality, and
fraternity" became the new slogan of the Egyptian nationa-

lists Sa'd Zaghloul, Mustafa Kamil, and others.

 

62
This quotation was cited in A. M. Galatoli, p. 9.

63Ibid., p. 9.

31.

During the British occupation, the number of foreign
communities in Egypt increased, protected64 and favored by
Lord Cromer and other influential firitish officers in Egypt.
Those Europeans, Lord Cromer reported, represented the
greater part of the Health and intelligence and no small pro-

portion of the rascality and aggressive egotism of the
country. . ."65 The Egyptians, being in contact with those
European communities and individuals, were affected in two

66 .
and second, they were

ways. First, they imitated them,
antagonized by the most advanced and privileged foreigners,
and thus, waited for the day that they might satisfy them-
selves by throwing them out of the country.
During this period, also, an event took place outside

Egypt which had a great effect in sharpening Egyptian nation-
alism. This was the Russo-Japanese war which ended in 1904
with the overwhelming victory of the Japanese over the Russ-
ian Europeans. This victory brought hope to the Egyptians
who began to think that the time might come when they would
be able to fight the hritish and defeat them. Mr. Hans Kohn,
in an address which he delivered on March 22, 1952, at the
Sixth Annual Conference on Middle East Affairs, said, "There
has been no single event exercising such a tremendous in-

fluence on nationalism in the Middle East as the Russo-

Japanese War." And he continued: "In fact, if I had to put

 

64
65

Cromer, II, 129.
Ibid., II, 131.
651b1d.

32.

my finger on a definite event which gave birtn to nationa-
lism in Asia or Africa, I would choose the Russo-Japanese
War."67
The poets and writers made much of that event; many

popular poems were written and memorized by students as well
as by adults. There were not many who had finished the ele-
mentary school anywhere in the Arab world who had not memo-
rized or at least become familiar with Hafith Ibrahim‘s (the
Poet of the Nile) lovely poem entitled "The Japanese Lass",
about a Japanese girl in Egypt who was a very good fliend of
the poet. When the Russo-Japanese Ear started, the

Japanese government recalled this girl to Japan to serve in
the army. The following conversation occurred when she came

to bid Hafith goodby:

If only my people are loyal and steadfast, I shall
never complain of other things.

A nation is weakened by the hatred of its people for
one another, and their love for foreigners.

[The people 027 this nation love em ty titles, and
sacrifice their souls [for unworth rank.

And though surrounded by danger [Eh927 spend their
lives in search of pleasure.

They do not care whether time or their enemies make
playthings of them.

I wish that [this naticg7 would listen to this story
of mine, which is full of wonders.

Once I loved a lady upon whom God had bestowed many
good qualities.

 

67Hans Kohn, "General Characteristics of Nationalism in the

Middle East", Nationalism la the Middle East, ed. by Middle
East Institute (washington, D. 0., 1952), pp. 62-63.

 

33.

She had a beautiful face; Beauty tinted it a yellow
color [and made it lovely7 so that if a Jew should
see it, he would forget about glittering gold.

She carried to me one day an item of news. Oh God,
withhold your blessing from that message.

She came walking toward me while night was still young,
And while the crescent was creeping over the horizon.

Then she said with a smiling mouth,
In which pearls and water drops were arranged,

"I have been informed of my early departure,
I do not believe I shall come back after it.

“My fatherland calls me back,
So that I may render my duty to it.

"We shall kill the Bear and skin him. Does the Bear
think that he'll never be defeated?"

I spoke then with a heart full of pain:
"Alas! What can deer do in a war?

"We never think of war as a playground
For deer, where they may seek pleasure.

"Wars are not the buying of souls with precious belong-
ings, or the stealing of hearts [by beauty7.

"Leave it to those who are experienced in it,
And stay, 'deer of the forest‘, in your chamber."

She answered me then in a quivering tone, And showed
me that [What I thought to b§7 a deer was indeed a
fierce lion.

"My people love to quench their thirst in death, [she
saig7. How dare you ask me not to drink!

"I am a Japanese girl. I will never retreat until I
reach my aim or be killed.

"If I do not master shooting or handling arms, I shall
serve the wounded people, do my duty toward them, and
help those who are affected by war.

"This is the way the Mikado taught us to follow, to re-
gard our land as father and mother."58

 

68Hafith Ibrahim, Diwan Hafith Ibrahim, Cairo).

34.

The "Japanese Lass" no doubt loses much of its power and
forcefulness through translation, but still the reader can
feel its very revolutionary significance. The phrases, "My
fatherland calls me back", "My people love to quench their
thirst in death", "I am a Japanese girl", "We shall kill
the Bear. .", and "This is the way the Mikado taught us to
follow, to regard our land as father and mother", are strong
nationalistic phrases and likely to foment a revolutionary
trend in the mind and heart of any Oriental reader. The
Egyptian reader could easily identify the sentiments as his
own. If a Japanese girl could defeat the Russians, why
could not the Egyptian at least free his country from the
rule of the British?

The idea of nationalism was already developed among
many Egyptian people, especially among the educated and the
urban communities, prior to world Ear I. In the following
chapter we shall see how the her affected this development
and how Egyptian people of different social classes and geo-
graphical areas became aware that they belonged to the
Egyptian nation, and that it was their duty to liberate

Egypt from its conquerors, the British.

35.
Chapter II

WORLD WAR I AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE DEVTLCFMTVT
OF EATIONALISM IN EGYPT

War between Germany and Great Britain broke out
August 4, 1914. On the same day, the british in Egypt pro-
claimed martial law throughout the country, and on Septem-
ber 10, war was declared on Turkey. This was followed by
the British government's declaration of a protectorate
over Egypt on December 18. At that time the Khedive of
Egypt, 'Abbas Hilmi, who was disliked by the British auth-
orities because of his sympathy with the Turkish cause, was
visiting at Constantinople.1 The British considered this
visit Justification for their replacing Hilmi with his
uncle, Husain Kamil, upon whom they conferred the title of
Sultan. Kamil enjoyed throughout his reign the "blessing"
and "confidence” of the British authority in Egypt.2

During this period, Hussin Rushdi Pasha was the Prime
Minister of the Egyptian government. He was relatively
strong, "and on the whole well disposed towards the British

controlling power."3 .Actually, the country was ruled by Sir

Henry McMahon, who was then appointed as High Commissioner

 

1Chirol, op. cit., p. 120.

2George Lenczowski, The Middle East lg World Affairs,
(Ithaca, N. Y., 19527, p. 514.

3Chirol, op. cit., p. 120.

.6.

f' ,.]

LI -3

4 ‘ O 0 O I
of dgypt. This was a Olallcult position for a man who,

W
Sir ohirol says, “h

principal task was to make all the auxiliary resources of

5‘0

8

N)

:d no knowledge at all of .gypt.”5 ”His

the country available not only for its defense on the Sinai
front but also for an egressive war against Turkey.“6
One of the first actions of General Sir John Naxwell,

who was in command of the British forces in gypt during the

war, was to proclaim that “the dritish were now fighting to

Ho

protect the rights and libert es of ggypt thich were origin-
ally won upon the battlefield by Mehemet Ali [:uhammad 'All7,"
and to preserve the peace and prosperity which she had en-
Joyed during the thirty years of the Eritish occupation.

Greet eritain, nevertheless, “recognizing the respect and
veneration with which the Lultan [of Turkey is reear ed by
the mahomedans huhanmadan§7 of eoy‘
sole burden of the present mar without calling upon the

:17 "

Egvatian people for aid therein. however, ”wherever and

byla- A.
whenever the iritish found it convenient to do so” they did

8

use Lgyptian forces and ig‘p ian help. In fact, sir Chirol,

one of the few English writers who treat this period

 

Sir Henry Mciahon, prior to his new appointment as High Com-
missioner of egypt, was political secretary of the govern-
ment of Simla 1. India.

5Chirol, pp. cit., p. 121.

6-; ‘ 1-7' A Y‘, :f‘ .

eroonelmdnn, p. 40o.

r]

C)
o

as quoted in Ohirol, on. cit., p. l.

BIOido’ p0 1300

37.

objectively, declares that "Egypt's contribution to the war
can challenge comparison with that of many other parts of
the British Empire."9

Once, when the Suez Canal was attacked by the Turks in
early February, 1915, the British communications with India
and Australia were in great danger. If it were not for the
courage of an Egyptian officer, the Turks would have captured

10 Later, the "Turks were

the Canal and advanced into Egypt.
marched into Cairo as prisoners instead of entering it as
conquerors."11 Although the Egyptians were cooperative and
of great help to the nritish during the war they were never
given due credit and rec0gnition.12 This effected a revival
of Egyptian hostility toward the British.

As a result of the British war policy, rural areas
were bled of manpower and beasts of burden. Strong young men
were drafted to serve with the British troops as civilians.
Oxen and camels were taken away, leaving the old people with-

out animal power to cultivate the land. The result was a

food shortage problem.13

 

gIbido, p0 1310

1OAhmad Shafik Pasha, 92. cit., p.

11Chirol, op. cit., pp. 131-132.

12Ibid., p. 131.

Chirol, Tsurumi and Salter, The Reawakening of the Orient,
and other Addresses, (New Haven, 19251, p. 23. (Hereafter
cited as Reawakening.)

 

 

 

58.

Despite this, the British army paid high prices on
the Egyptian market for foods to be consumed by the British
soldiers and Egyptians employed by the firitish, as ”the
dearth of shipping and the growing submarine danger in the
Mediterranean made it imperative to supply and feed them as
far as possible from Egypt itself.“14 This created infla-
tion, and huge sums of money found their way into the pockets
of big businessmen and landlords, since only they had any-
thing to sell. The peasants suffered considerably because
they were not able to meet the high prices of the essential
commodities necessary to maintain even a subsistence standard.

In August, 1915, a corps of Egyptian laborers was sent
to Madras, India. They did not like being taken away from
home. Later, when an Egyptian corps came under fire, the
Egyptian peasants hated participating in a war which did not
especially concern them, and endangering themselves only to
serve British interests. "Good pay soon could no longer win
the fellah for this work in the army,"15 and the fellahin of
Egypt then resorted to passive resistance.

During the war the British authorities landed many
foreign troops, such as English, Australian and New Zealan-

ders, on Egyptian soil. This action "wounded Egyptian

 

14
Chirol, op. cit., pp. 1:3-134.

15Brockelmann, pp. 458-459.

39.

national pride."16 The behavior of these soldiers, and

particularly their rude treatment of the natives, intensi-

fied Egyptian zenophobia. hiss Durham, an English subject,
testifies:

I was in Egypt from November, 1915, to April,
1916, and can confirm Dr. Haden Gest in his statement
that it is to our own treatment of the Egyptians that
we owe the present trouble. The authorities were
certainly to blame in landing Colonial troops in Egypt
without carefully instructing them as to the popula-
tion they would meet there. So ignorant were numbers
of these men that they imagined that Egypt was English
and the natives of the land were intruders.

More than one Australian said that he would
clear the lot out if he had his way. They treated the
natives with cruelty and contempt. In the canteen in
which I worked, a very good native servant was kicked
and knocked about simply because he did not understand
an order given him by a soldier. An educated native
in the town was struck in the mouth, and had his in-
laid walking stick forcibly snatched from him by a
soldier who wanted it. More than one English resident
said to me: "It will take years to undo the harm that
has been done here by the army." Personally I felt
that if I were an Egyptian I should have spared no
effort to evict the British. I felt ashamed of my
country--bitterly ashamed. The Opinion of the native
for the soldier was amusingly illustrated by a small
conversation book, one phrase of which was to the
effect: "Xbu fool! What for you spend all your money
on beer?" and, a diaIOgue with a beggar which ended:
"Go to hell!"

I spoke with great severity frequently to the
soldiers, telling them that by their conduct they
were proving themselves the enemies of England; that
the Germans maltreated the enemy, but that they were
attacking their own side and would make enemies. This
surprised them very much. They were absolutely ignor-
ant of the situation.

To make matters worse, for the first few days
after the troops arrived in quantities, the drink
shops were open all day, and the unlovely results
filled the natives with disgust and contempt. It was

 

16Lenczowski, p. 314.

40.

reported, I do not know with what truth, that
drunken men had snatched the veils from Moslem women.
The tale was believed by the natives.

Small wonder if they hate and dread us.17

The Egyptians were ”watching, listening, and waiting."
They were watching the Allies win the war, and listening to
Allied promises that they were fighting only for “liberty and
jus ti ice for the vhole world, through a confederation of great
and small states, all to possess equal rights;318

The Lritish claimed that the protectorate and importa-
tion of English Colonial troops were necessary ”to defend

1

Egypt against attack and to K189 tn. internal administration
19

U

running smoothly. King oeorge stated that the purpose
was “to overcome all influences wnich are seeking to destroy
the independence of Lgypt. ”20

The words which gave the greatest hepe of in*epa ndence

to the Lgyptians were those of yocdrow ils cn:

 

7 .
As quoted 1
Question, (I

My1tian cu

8
ui‘:.c' m. .;o DU

9 ti‘kthn

 

Igyptian Delegation, (ed.), To.
ESL irrton, D. 0., 1919). (as MP8 Hft: r cited at
stion). The complete text of the Article by
rho m appeared in The Leily news (A ril 2, 19I®.

 

 

18Ibid., p. 9. A reference is made to rarlien ermt ry Debates,

Lecemoer 19, 1917.

19 o - ' ‘ c ‘41" r ‘ - ,3
As Cited in ggyctian siestion wnere a reierence is name to
The Londcn Times, December 19, 1914.

 

 

 

 

COAS cited in ‘gyptian Question, p. 16. The quotation is
taken from a letter by King George to the sultan whom he
had appointed to rule .1y t. This letter was widely cir-

culated throughout i&Y' and was published in the Londgg
1

st:
TimQS, DQCQTDSP 21, 9140

41.

There can be but one issue. The settlement
must be final. There can be no compromise. No half-
way decision is conceivable. There are the ends for
which the associated peoples of the world are
fighting, and which must be conceded them before
there can be peace. . . .The settlement of every
question, whether of territory, or sovereignty, or
economic engagement, or of political relationship
upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settle-
ment by the peOple immediately concerned and not upon
the basis of the material interest or advantage of
any other nation or people which may desire a differ-
ent settlement for the sake of its own influence or
mastery. . . .fihat we seek is the reign of law based
upon the consent of governed and sustained by the
organized opinion of mankind.21

The words of Iilson were widely read and highly
appreciated by the Egyptian nationalists. It was reported
that when the great nationalist leader, Sa‘d Zaghloul, was
arrested in 1919, the British authorities found on his person
only a paper clipping containing Wilson's Fourteen Points.

22 "A general assoc-

Article Fourteen was heavily underlined.
iation of nations must be formed under specific covenants
for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political
independence and territorial integrity to great and small
states alike."23

By the end of World tar I, the Egyptians were in a
great dilemma. Although there was in the Egyptian treasury

an accumulated sum of-£.E. 152,000,000, exclusive of reduc-

tion in liabilities, the common man was in great distress.

 

I

Woodrow Wilson in his Mt. Vernon address, July 4, 1918.
For the full text see: The New York Times (July 5, 1919)
p. 1:2. (Hereafter cited New York Times.7

CEBrockelmann, p. 459.

(‘1

53
Frank Lee Benns, Europe Since 1914 (New York, 1941), p. 100.

 

42.

Prices had skyrocketed to 237 per cent of the pre-war
level, while wages had increased only slightly. Malnutri-
tion and disease were so rampant that in 1918 the number of

deaths exceeded the births.24

In addition, the Egyptian
people had come to believe that the British control was not
merely a matter of temporary expediency, as the Britons had
said at the beginning of the war, but was intended to be
permanent. After the peace treaty was concluded the Eritish

tr00ps remained, and martial law was kept in force. Egypt

revolted.

SA'D ZAGHLUL

Sa'd Zaghlul, who once was reported to have said: "It
is true that we are week: we have no army or fleet but we
are strong because Right is on our side, for weakness with
Right is a strong arm",25 is regarded by many students of
history, as well as by the Egyptian people, as the champion
of modern Egyptian nationalism, because he was able to
achieve for his nation the independence which it sought from
the time of Khedive Isma'il.

Zaghlul, despite the statements of many writers, was

not the son of a poor peasant. His fatner was the 'Umdah

 

24

Charles Issawi, An Economic an social Analysis

E t,
(Oxford, 1947), p. 100.

csGalotoli, p. 5.

45.

(chief) of his town. He was a prosperous man, possessing
over 200 faddans‘e6 at al-Jazireh, good lands, and a huge
palace with a veranda large enough to accommodate 200 people
at one time. This old 'gmdah behaved as a feudal lord in
his relationship with the people in his town.27

Sa'd's mother was the daughter of a noble house, that
is, of Shaykh 'Abdu Earakat. This family has been in con-
tact with the rulers of Egypt since the time of Muhammad

'Ali,28

but despite this noble origin, Zaghlul was born and
brought up in a peasant (fellahin) community. This back-
ground helped him, of course, to understand and evaluate

the misery of the fellahin, and acquainted him with the in-
justice of the rulers. Those relationships and experiences
which Sa'd acquired in his early life had great influence in
the develOpment of his ideas and personality.

The birth date of Sa'd is not known exactly, but the
most reliable sources indicate that he was born at a little
town known as Lbyanah, in Thi Al-hiiah, 1274 A.H., which
corresponds with July, 1857, A.D. This ”was the date which

f"
"‘9 However,

Sa'd gave when he was asked about his birthday.
the date appearing on the Lisance Degree which Sa'd received

in France indicates that he was born in 1860.

 

26The faddan is about 1.083 acres. Two hundred faddans might

not sound a vast area of land to the farmer in the United
States, but it is so regarded in Egypt.

27Al-‘Aqqad, Ea'd Zaghlal (Cairo, 1936), pp. 49-50.
281bid., p. so.
29lbid., p. 54.

 

44.

In any event, it could be concluded that Sa'd was born
and brought up in a time in which the ideas and slogans of
"Equality, liberty and fraternity," introduced by the French
Revolution, have been fresh and strong. A learned man such
as Sa'd, during the course of his youth, must have become
acquainted with such ideas, which, of course, added to the
development of his personality and radical thinking.

Sa'd's father passed away when the child was but six
years old. The youngster was like his father, tall and
strong in build, strong in character, and strong willed.30
Unlike other children of the same age, he was a serious and
determined youth, regarding his playmates as "spoiled brats".31
It is very possible that the death of his father, to whom
Sa'd was strongly attached, was at least in part the cause
of his serious childhood.

Sa'd, as with other children of his age, was sent to
the village (Koranic) school (kuttab) to be prepared to con-

32 As his

tinue his higher studies at al-Azhar University.
bibliographers point out, Sa'd was never happy at al-kuttab,

but his half-brother, al-Shinawi, and his young mother, were

 

3OIbid.

311b1d., p. 55.

32
It is interesting to note here that at this time there was

not a single elementary school in the district in which Sa'd
was brought up, and in all Egypt there were but two high
schools; the first in Cairo, known as al-Madrasah al-Taj-
hiziyyah, was founded in 1863, and the second, at Alexan-
dria, was founded also in 1863, and was called Madrasat Ra's
al-Tiin. See Ibid., pp. 59-60.

45.

able to force the lad to remain. There in al-kuttab, Sa'd
35

 

learned the Koran well.

In 1871, La'd was admitted to al-Azhar University, to
continue his education. In the same year, the great advoca-
tor of pan-Islamism, Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani, came to Cairo
and started to spread his ideas and philosophies at al-Azhar
among studants and professors slike, and outside the univer-

Z4

sity among both intellectuals and non-intellectuals.” Sa'd

Zaghloul and one of his professors, namely, Muhammad ‘Abdu,
came under the influence of Jamal.35

At al-Azhar, Sa‘d started a revolutionary movement
against the corrupted professors and doctrines. In the
course of time he was able to gather around him a group of
students who agreed with his ideas and backed by this group,
Ea'd then urged an immediate reform in the university,
issuing a pamphlet pointing out the areas of corruption and
prescribing the means of treatment.36

At al-Azher also, sa'd attended the lectures of
Muhammad 'abdu, Jamal al-Din al-afghani, and other liberal
professors. lhen al-éfghani was suspended from lecturing at
the University, :a'd and other students followed him to his

home. It was reported that Jamal once asked his students to

 

Ibid., p. 58.

4See Chapter III of this study.

Cd
0'1

31"Aqqad, p. 62.
Ibid., p. 62.

\

(<1
03

 

46.

write an essay about the subject of freedom. When Jamal
read the essay written by Sa‘d he was quoted as saying, "The
best proof that liberty is flourishing in Egypt is the fact
that this youth could write so intelligently about it."3l7
To say the least, as al-‘Aqqad remarks, "The best thing Sa'd
learned from Jamal was to express himself clearly and intel-
ligently."58

The first official job to be held by Sa'd Zaghlul was
his appointment in 1881 as editor of the literary section of
al-Waq'i' al-Misriyyah (The Egyptian Official Gazette).
This appointment came about when his professor, Muhammad
'Abdu, was chosen to be the chief editor of the paper. Ea'd
published all letters and articles which he received that
were suitable for publication. Publication was followed by
a public debate for or against the opinions expressed in
these letters.39

In the little time left to him after his work at the
Gazette, Sa'd studied law. He was promoted subsequently to
a post in the Ministry of the Interior, and a short time

later was commissioned a judge at al-Jizah.4O He occupied

the latter post but a few weeks, and was ejected from the

 

37Ibid., p. 63.

fi

38

H
0"
...J.
0..

 

9
3 Ibid.-

 

4OMahmud Fu'ad, Najmu'at-Khutab Ea'd Pasha Zaghlul al-Hadit-
had (Cairo, 19287? p. 6.

47.

position because of his association with, and support of,
the Nationalist revolution then being led by 'Crabi.41
After the 'Orabi revolution was over and the nation-
alist cause defeated, at least temporarily, 'Orabi and his
top supporters were exiled. The situation then looked dark
and gloomy, and terror filled the hearts of all Egyptians
and made them speechless. One British witness remarks about
this period by writing, "Apprehension sealed men's lips, and
concealed their hopes and fears. No one ventured to proph-
esy; no one dared to criticize the government. An indis-
creet phrase was often sufficient to cause the arrest of the
speaker, and the prisons were crowded with men suspected of
disloyalty."42 The half-hearted nationalists who were left
in the country asked the government to pardon them; but not
Sa'd, who was courageous enough to abstain from changing his

43

principles. Then it was rumored in Cairo that Sa'd was in

the process of forming a new secret society which he was
calling the "Revenge Society" (Jam'iyat al-Intiqam),44 its
purpose being to kill all people who had betrayed the nation-

45

alist cause and cheated 'Orabi. Sa'd was then arrested,

 

41Chirol, Op. cit., p. 77.

42F. G. Elgood, The Transit g: Tgypt (London, 1924), p. 140.
(Hereafter cited Transit).

 

43Al—‘Aqqad, p. 72.

44Mahmud Fu'ad, p. 7.

45A1-321qqad, p. 73.

48.

but after a period of about three months he was released for
lack of evidence.

After that it was very difficult for Sa'd to find a
job which would enable him to live respectably. The practice
of law was the only door left open to him, but the career of
a lawyer was not appreciated, and advocate were looked down
upon by the Egyptian society of that day. To escape smears
and discrimination, and to save his name and reputation,
Sa'd tried not to let anyone know of his new career unless
it became necessary. He writes in reference to it,

I started practicing law without letting my

family know of it, and if someone asked me whether I

had become a lawyer, I said: 'May the Lord save me

from becoming one of those lost people'; and in

summary I tried my best not to let anyone know who I
was, except the persons who were involved in the

cases.

For eight long years Sa'd Zaghral practiced law.
During those years he did not concern himself with crime and
criminals alone, or with collecting as much money as possi-
ble, as some other lawyers did. Instead, he tried and
succeeded, during those eight years, in proving to the
Egyptian society that the lawyer, as well as any other
citizen, could be honest to his career and principles, and
at the same time helpful to his community in more than one

way. He also tried his utmost to help the nationalists and

the nationalist cause. He supported, for example, the two

 

Ibid., p. 71.

49.

great Egyptian nationalists of that time, Hustafa Kamil and
bhaykh Ali Yusuf,47 and at one time contributed the sum of
L.E. 100.00 (approximately p400.00) to al-Liwa', the daily
newspaper which was published by those two notables. He also
contributed b.E. 1,000.00 to the first igyptian University
fund, and supported this movement wholeheartedly by speaking
directly to influential and concerned peOple and by writing

publicly in papers and magazines. Kasim Amin, the yptian

{Kl

writer and reformer, found a great understanding and encour-
agement in Zaghloul. Thus, when the former published his bad:

Tahrir al-har'ah (the Emancipation of woman), he dedicated it
48

 

to the great sympathizer of the movement, sa'd Zaghloul.

During those eight years, Zaghloul was not disturbed by
the authorities as he had "found a protector in the Princess
Mazili,“49 the daughter of Prince Xustafa Fadhil, and the
great admirer of 'Orabi, who entrusted Sa‘d with the admin-
istration of her estates.

Also, during this period two important things happened
to Sa'd; first, he studied the Erench language and in it
passed an examination in law, and secondly, he married the
daughter of a well-known cgyptian politician, namely, Mustafa

Fahmi, who was ”Cromer's favorite protege.”50

 

Ibido ’ pp. 90-920

49Galatoli, p. 14.

 

Odrockelmann, p. 460.

50.

In 1907, Sa'd, with his father-in-law, played an im-
portant political role in founding the People's party, which
Cromer hOped would be detrimental to the strong nationalist
Fatherland party, headed by Mustafa Kam11.51 But the
People's party, since it was not able to establish contact
with the people, ceased its activities as early as the
second year of World Her I.

It appears that after the Dinshaway incident, and the
agitation which was aroused,52 Cromer tried to modify his
policy in hope of regaining tranquility in Egypt. Thus, he
looked around for the cooperation of some popular leaders in
the Egyptian society, hoping that by promoting them to
higher posts the government would gain their support, and
the masses would be convinced that there was a change in
governmental policy. Sa'd, as mentioned above, was the son-
in-law of Mustafa Fahmi, Cromer's favorite protege, and on
the other hand, Sa‘d was popular among the masses. Thus,
Cromer chose to appoint him as his Minister of Education.
This was "a courageous choice."53

The appointment of Ea'd as head of the Ministry of
Education was hailed throughout Egypt. The Egyptian nationa-

lists expected from their old supporter plenty of action and

 

SIEbld.,LL 460.

5ZSee Chapter I of this study.
530h1r01, pp. cit., p. 77.

51.

a grasping of power. Al-Liwa', the nationalist newspaper,
then remarked:

What the people do know about the character of
Sa'd Eek Zaghlul when he was a lawyer at first, and
in the position of a judge at last, makes them all
feel at ease to the appointment which was bestowed on
an Egyptian, who is well-known for his ability, know-
ledge, high education and love of justice.

But since the Ministry for many years past and
up to date has been but an idle job, and that the
English advisers have been the true masters in mini-
stries and bureaus, the people now have the right to
ask what the honorable Ea'd Zaghlul could do in the
Ministry of Education; is he going to be like the
rest of the ministers, he and his Ministry in the
hands of Mr. Danlop? Or is he going to be a minister
by name and action, and revive the authority of
Egyptian ministers?

We have known Ea‘d Zaghlul in his past and pre-
sent as the greatest believer in independence and in
his rights, and a severe critic of those who had left
the authority of their posts go to others, and we
heard him very often insulting the lazy people, no
matter whether they were small or high in rank. If
Sa'd remains in his post as he is now and as he was
in the past-~and that is what we believe-~he will be
a great hope to the Ministry of Education and it is
our desire that such feeling will creep to other
Ministerg4 and that the Egyptian life will come back
to them.”

To say the least about Zaghlul in his new post, he
was able to help the advancement of education in the country.
Cromer himself, who begrudged credit to any Egyptian's

thought or work, testifies,

 

54 ,
Al-Aqqad, pp. 98-99.

U dor the enlig
preSCJt lelqtvr, QQ'Q f3$n9 Z3 Eb
adviser, WP. Dunlop, e ucetion of
13 mgklnt P9.e‘1d strides in advarce.

fiOPeOV9r, in a speeon which Jromer

eve of his final degerture, he contradicts

E?)
d

which he once made aessdt the lack of i

among the ”gyptien jeople and found nimse

’(
9.
L

'htened administration of the
‘ ‘ loul and of his
eggry description

delivered on the

(J4

a statement

ve intelligence

(T

If o'liged to admit

that a short period of cooperation with Sa'd Zaghloul had

taught him Jto entertain a high regerd‘ for the person of

this honest, Cflyable and courageou Ray} t

\— La

m

Lastly, gentlemen, I should 1
name of one with whom I have only r
but for whom, in that short time, I
entertain a high regard. Unless I
a career of great public usefulness
present Minister of education, Sa'd
He is honest; he is capable; he has
his convictions; he has been abue~j
less Mort y of his own countrymen.
qualifications. He should go far.

In 1909, during the period in which
has eded the Ministry of education, the fir

sity was founded. ba'd was ”one of those

iar..

ike to mention the
ecently cooperated,
have learned to
am ruch mistaken,
ies before the
aghloul Pasha.

he courage of

v many of the

see are high

:a'd Eaghloul

st 'erptian Univer-

\
"’\.d

who took the

keenest interest in 1t."57 Despite the fact that this

university was weak in the beginning, it

sors such as the distinguished openish Cr

 

(D
(J!

Cromer, II, 52.

U]
03

As quoted in Chirol, ‘C. cit., p. lbs.
57

(0

Ibid., p. 4.

attracted profes

ienta list, Counte

V. dc Golanza, who lectured in Arabic about Lestern philoso-

58
phy.

The year 1907 marked the date of Mr. Cromer's retire-

ment.59

He was succeeded by sir Eldon Gorst, who remained
in Egypt until 1911. During the course of Sir{%3%:t's ad-
ministration, Sa'd Zaghkul took over the Ministry of Justice,
but after a conflict with Khedive 'Abbas Helmi, Zaghloul
resigned his office in April, 1912. Shortly after this he
was elected to the post of Vice—president of the new Legis-
lative Assembly, which had recently been established by
Lord Kitchener, who was successor to Sir Gorst as Pesident
(1911-14).60

Zaghloul, in occupying his new position, was able
through his natural eloquence to gain a constantly growing
following; ”with its backing he was on occasion even able to
venture serious difficulties for Kitchener."61 Also, as ,
Galatoli puts it, he was able to turn the Assembly “into a
court where all the faults and corruption of the Executive

were mercilessly publicized,” and the ministers themselves

0
"were unable to stand his incisive and documental attacks."6“

 

58Ibid., p. 225.
59 _
See Chapter I of this study.

60Chirol, 0p. cit., pp. 113-114.

61Brockelmann, p. 460.

62C‘1alatoli, p. 14.

54.

World .ar I brought martial law to Egypt. The Legis-
lative Assembly was silenced, Zaghloul was forced into re-
tirement, and Egypt became a British Protectorate. Despite
the fact that martial law and prohibition of public meetings
were very effective in limiting the activities of Ea'd, it
did not stop him from maintaining contact with other nation-
alist leaders, so long as he created no disturbance or
immediate troubles for the iritish authorities in igypt.
Sa'd and his followers and colleagues adopted the policy of
"watchful waiting".

The announcement by President gilson in 1917 concerning
"the rights to self-determination of smaller nations” gave a
new hope to Egyptian nationalists, and at the end of the war
in 1918, a new nationalist party, headed by Ea‘d Zaghloul,
emerged to demand a complete independence for *gypt. This

was the tafd party.

AL-WAFD AL-MAERI AND THE 1919 NATICheLliT FTVOLT

On November 13, 1918, Sa'd Zaghloul, with two of his
nationalist colleagues, 'Ali Sha'rawi Pasha and 'ibd al-‘Aziz
Fahmi Bey, called on the british High Commissioner, Sir
Eegi-ald wengate, to demand the complete independence of
their country. This delegation, headed by Zaghloul Pasha,
called itself “al-Wafd al-Nasri , or the Egyptian Delegation.

Zaghloul and his delegation claimed that they were

e."63 The answer

speaking "in the name of the Egyptian peopl
which Zaghloul received from Sir Eeginald fléngate was that
the latter ”was not acquainted with the intentions of his
Majesty's Government in regard to the future of Egypt,"64
and that he could not do anything about it until he re-
ceived instructions from his superiors in London. Such an
answer did not please either Zaghloul or his friends, who
decided to appeal directly to the Big Four. A few days
later Zaghloul asked the High Commissioner to support his
request to the military authorities for permission for him-
self and colleagues to leave for England "to place the

"65 But the request

Egyptian case before the British people.
was refused. This marked the birth for the Wafd party.66
Zaghloul immediately appealed to the Tgyptian people,
trying to remove any doubt that he was their true represen-
tative, and that he had the right to speak in their behalf.
"All classes rallied to his call" and "thousands of tele-
grams and letters bearing numberless signatures were sent to
the leader to testify the people's support of his program,"67
when he declared once: "I intend to spend the rest of my

life in attacking the English. . . .I have no quarrel with

 

63Reawakening, p. 2

64Chirol, pp. cit., p. 143.

65Ibid., p. 143.

66Brockelmann, p. 460.

67Ibid., p. 15. 2

56.

them personally, and I have a number of English friends,
but I want to see an independent Egypt, and I am determined
to do all I can to make her so,"68 and "the great majority
of the native press Joined in the campaign with all wonted
vehemence."69 In the early part of 1919 Zaghloul founded
the Wafd Party which attracted to its lines many of Egypt's
well-known diplomats.

Before speaking of al-Yafd party and its program, it
is important to remark here that Zaghloul was not an extreme
nationalist as many people came to believe. In fact, some
so-called extreme nationalists and recent writers such as al-
Shurbaji, consider him a traitor and think of Zaghloul as
the leader who betrayed the Egyptian cause through his com-

70 In any case, the keen observer

promises with the British.
could realize that after Sa'd had married the daughter of
Mustafa Pasha Fahmi, who was Cromer's loyal friend and prime
minister, Sa'd had changed. His cooperation with his father-
in-law in establishing the People's party in 1906, which was
hoped to checkmate the nationalist Fatherland party of Mus-
tafa Kamil, as it was pointed out earlier in this chapter,

his cooperation with Cromer who awarded him for his services71

the position of Minister of Education, his exclusion of the

 

68As quoted in Galatoli, p. 15.

6
7

9Chirol, op. cit., p. 148.

 

oAl-Shurbaji, "Sa'd Zaghloul”, Rose al-Yusuf (Cairo, 1953)
( a series of articles published through the month of Mays.

71Brockelmann, p. 460.

57.

extreme ha is na Wllst who demanded :ritain's with mirewal from
both Egypt and the eudan, from the ”efd party7‘ and his

“*3

ruards

,.
L.

offering for the independence of ugypt ”special

U)

'3

\4

.44

i

for foreigners and their tra'itic nal privileg3s and guaran-
ties to insure the neutrality of the Suez Canal,” and his
willingness ”to place igypt under the protection or even the
supervision of the League of Laticns,”73 are but a few of the
signs which prove that be: hloul w'.zs far from being an extreme
nationalist.

The Hr gram of the hafd advocated ”cemolete indepen—
dence,” based on "the abrogation of the aritish Protectorate

and the recognition of :gypt as a SCVereign state." It also
"stood for constitutional government, res ect of capitula~
tion foreign control of the public debt, and the neutrality

74 . . n
” such a strong program caused the aEfd

of the Suez Canal.
party to become not only the most poyular party in Egypt but
also preserved her and kept her as the str gcst party in
that country until this very nay.

sir Reginald Jingate was able to realize how dangerous
the Wafd party had become and was able to see that Zaghloul
and his supporters would be less dangerous at the peace con-
75 W

ininv in Lgypt. - nus, this was

ference in Paris than red

(1'

 

7‘Galatoli, p. 15.

73R I I A, The Riddle Last,

 

 

74Royal Institute of International Affairs, Treat -rit§in ard
Zevst, 1914-1951 (London, 1951) p. b. (hereafter Cit-d

Great Britain and EiV:t.)

75irockelmann, p. 461.

 

EB.

(I)

ir Reginald's recomoendation to his government when he was
called back to lngland to confer with his superiors in the
Foreign Office. His recommendations in tnis direction were
not appreciated and he was not heeded,76 because up untiltids
time the iritish government was wrongly informed that ”the
Nationalist movement was merely the outcome of shallow prope—
l

g.

V

to

...,

sida engineered by a handful of discontented politicians
o n I o 1 1 V 3'77
imagining they could stamp it out by strieing at tneleaoers:

It so happened that during the absence of tie High

Commissioner in Lngland, the government in Egyot resigned

from office. zaghloul then acted fast and threatened Sultan
78

V

Fu'ad with violence if he dared to form a new government.
Then Ea'd Zaghloul and nine other members of the Iefd party
were summoned by the General officer commanding the writish
troops in igypt, who reminded them ”that the country res

still under martial law, and Warned them against any action

limely to disturb order or hamper the work of the Lgyptian

.97

. w

authorities. at the same time these ten 43re denied the

right to talk back, and the party was dismissed in anger, to

CL
U3

issue in the second my a severe protest which was ”Consider-
t

.E‘

ed to be so worded as o constitute a flagrant deiiance of

the warning.”80

 

iv
78"; I .; .\ 4,11
nrocnelmunn, 9. lo .

79Chirol, do. cit., p. 149.

BOIbid., p. 149.

59.

The outcome of this was that in the afternoon of
March 8, 1919, Ea'd Pasha zaghloul and three of his closest
friends were arrested and sent to Alexandria to be placed
upon a British destroyer which carried them to Malta. The
three men who were arrested and sent to exile with Zaghloul
were Isma'il Sidki, Muhammad mahmud and Hamad al-Basil
Pasha.81

The exile of the four nationalist leaders did not
frighten their followers nor calm the situation in Egypt.
In fact, it did just the opposite, and turned the whole
country into chaos. "The students rose first," says Gala-
toli, "Unarmed but with faith and love of country, thousands
of youth faced machine guns of the police and British troops
to protest the exile of their leader. They paid for their
temerity in blood."82 The students' bloody revolt was
followed by a general strike which paralyzed the nation,
and all communications with Cairo were completely cut by
March 17.83 To give a clear picture of what was happening
in Egypt during this period, it is interesting to quote the
official account subsequently sent by General Allenby to the

Foreign Office. It read in part:

 

81Isma'il Sidki, Muthakerati (Cairo, 1950), p. 19.

82Galatoli, p. 16.

83
Chirol, op. cit., p. 182.

60.

On the train which left Luxor at 6 p.m. on
Monday, March 17th, were two officers and eight
other ranks. Khan the train stopped at Nag' Hamadi
some natives entered the train and insulted the men.
The two officers noticed this, and took them into
their first-class carriage. They reached Assiut in
the early morning of Tuesday, March 18th, where three
of the men left the train, and Kaimakam Pope Bey,
Inspector in the Egyptian Prisons Department, Joined
it. The train left Assiut at 4 a.m. Crowds had
collected at every station; they threw stones at the
train and attempted to board it, shouting for the
‘Ingleez‘ [English7. Several stations were passed
safely, but on arrival at Beirut a huge crowd rushed
at the train, pulled the driver from the engine, and
forced their way into the first-class carriage, where
the British were now collected. It seems probable
that two of the party were killed here. The train
went on again, some of the natives of Beirut remaining
on board. On arrival at the station of Deir Kowas
another large crowd joined them, and there, with
stones and knives, murdered the remainder of the party,
not one of whom was armed. All the bodies were left
in the train, except one which has not yet been traced,
and the train went on. At every station huge crowds
had collected who raised shouts of Joy on hearing that
the English had been killed. When the train reached
Minieh, the bodies were taken from the train and
buried.84

In this 1919 nationalist revolution, men and women,
Copts and Moslems all fought side by side. Apparently it was
the first time in the history of Egypt that COpts and Moslems
were able to realize the great fact that it was to the advan-
tage of both parties to be rid of their foreign imperialist
masters, and come to live freely and independently in their

own Egypt. "A Coptic priest and a Moslem woman became the

tribunes of the revolution," Galatoli remarks. "Funerals of

 

84
As quoted in Chirol, op. cit., p. 184.

61.

Egyptian casualties were transformed into gigantic political
demonstrations which harmed the British more than any frontal
assault."85 The Copts also proved during this revolution
that they were very eloquent orators. "One of them enthusi-
astically compared Zaghloul's exile to the Crucifixion and
linked the Fatherland, Liberty and Zaghloul to the Christian
Trinity."86

The British authorities in Egypt were not able to put
an end to this national uprising and were forced to ask for
reinforcement from Syria to crush the revolt of the whole
population. On April 11, of the same year, the daily bulle-
tin issued at General Headquarters of the British troops in
Cairo reported, "All seems to be quiet throughout Egypt. ."87

This took place after the arrival of General Sir Edmund
Allenby from Palestine, and his promise to the Egyptian
people on April 7, to release the leaders deported to Malta.88

When the National rebellion broke out in March, Sir
Wingate, the High Commissioner, was in London. Acting in
his place was his deputy, Sir Milre Cheetham, who was respon-

sible for sending the four nationalist leaders to exile in

 

.7

95
86

Galatoli, p. 16.
Ibid., p. 167.

8
7As quoted in Chirol, pp. cit., p. 188.

88Brockelmann, p. 461.

62.
Malta. On March 22, General Allenby, who was in Paris report-
ing to and consulting with British plenipotentiaries to the
Peace Conference in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief in
Egypt and Syria, was made a Special High Commissioner to Egypt
and sent back to his post immediately. He was instructed:
to exercise supreme authority in all matters

military and civil, to take all such measures as he

considers necessary and expedient to restore law and

order and to administrate in all matters as required

by the necessity of maintaining the King's Egotectorate

over pgypt on a secure and equitable basis.

The first thing General Allenby thought of doing was to
form a new government in the country which would help him to
bring peace and order back to Egypt. It did not take him
long to discover that any cooperation from the Egyptian
people would be impossible unless the four exiled leaders
were released. Thus, on April 7, he proclaimed "in agreement
with H. H. the Sultan" that there were "no restrictions on
freedom to travel" and that the four deportees to Malta would
"be released from internment and given similar freedom of
movement."90 On the succeeding day Husain Rushdi, the ex-
Prime Minister, was able to form a new Cabinet.

Accordingly, the four exiled leaders were released and
permitted to go to Paris to present the case of their nation

before the Peace Conference.91 The Egyptian delegation was

ignored in Paris by all other delegations except that of

 

BgAs quoted in Chirol, pp. cit., p. 190.
goes quoted in Ibid., p. 149.

glIsma'il Sidki Pasha, p. 20.

63.

92 This action was very

Italy, headed by Sr. Aurnaldo.
possibly caused by pressure from the British delegation.

The chief work of the Egyptian delegation then was con-
centrated in spreading propaganda and acquainting the Western
diplomats and people with their case.93

While in Paris, Isma'il Sidki, a Tafdist and one of the
four men who were exiled in Malta, disagreed with other
leaders of the group and left Paris for Cairo. It was rumor-
ed then that on his way to Cairo, Sidki went to England to
intrigue with the British Government. Despite the fact that
Sidki denied all those rumors,94 it is not impossible to
credit this rumor about him, especially since after he engaged
in collaboration and intrigue with the British on various

occasions at a later date.

 

92
Ibid., p. 21.

93Ibid., p. 22.

Ibid.

64.

THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN NFGOTIATIONS IAGING TO THE PROCLAMATION
OF THE EGYPTIAN INDEPENDEKCE IN 1922

The 1919 nationalist revolution in Egypt obliged the
British Government to admit that "a certain amount of mis-
handling of difficult native questions by inexperienced
officers"95 was committed during Eorld War I in Egypt and
also "brought home to the British the fact that Egyptian
nationalism could no longer be disposed of by military mea-
sures and that some compromise was necessary to preserve
British supremacy in the delta of the Nile."96 The develop-
ment of such ideas by responsible British officials, resul-
ted in a commission headed by Lord Milner and named after
him, being dispatched to Egypt to examine the whole
Egyptian question and recommend to the government in
London the steps of a new policy which ought to be followed
there.

The Milner Mission which arrived in Cairo on December
7, 1919, was not appreciated by the Wafd party. Accordingly,

the Mission found great difficulty and little cooperation

from the Egyptian people, especially since the government of
Saifl.Pasha had retired from office the same day the Mission

arrived in Egypt.97

 

95Chirol, 92. cit., p. 243.

96Lenczowski, p. 315.

97
Brockelmann, p. 461.

65.

Chirol reports that,"Down with the Milner Mission"

became the new legan of the Lgyptian people.98

Everybody
in the country at that time seems to have boycotted the
Mission, and the "newspapers reproduced every day columns
and columns of telegrams, all protesting in suspiciously
identical language against the Mission." And, Chirol adds,
"any person of position who held aloof from the movement was
liable to be pilloried in the press or even to see his house
invaded by bands of students, whose remonstrances were not
always limited to wordy abuse."99 The policy of this
Egyptian movement was directed by the Wafd party and Sa'd
Zaghloul, who was able to control the policy of his party,
which was the only organized and effective one in the delta
of the Nile at that time.100

Despite the great opposition and boycott which Milner
faced in Egypt, the Mission remained there until March, 1920,
and came out with a report which recommended the abolition
of the Protectorate and its replacement by a treaty of alli-
ance which would recognize the independence of Egypt, subject
to certain guarantees of British and foreign interests.

Accordingly, "Great Britain was to have the right to maintain

a military force in Egyptian territory, and . . . .to have a

 

98
Chirol, 92. cit., p. 246.

991bid., pp. 246-247.

1001bid., p. 247.

66.

certain measure of control over Egyptian legislation and
administration insofar as they affected foreigners."101

Upon the return of the Mission to London, Lord Milner,
realizing the importance and effectiveness of Sa'd Zaghloul,
and his group, called on the deputies of the Wafd who were
still in Paris, to confer with the Mission in London. The
Wafd accepted the invitation and journeyed to London to
attend the conference scheduled to begin on July 7. Lord
Milner, of course, "did his utmost to enlist the sympathies
of the Wafd for the solution which his proposed measures
embodied,"102 but to no avail, as negotiations between the
two parties concerned ended in a deadlock when Zaghloul in-
sisted on some reservations to the proposed settlement before
it could be considered acceptable to the Tgyptians, "the more
important being that British troops should be limited in
number and should be confined to the district adjoining the
Suez Canal, and that Egypt should have'an equal share with
Great Britain in the administration of the Sudan."103

The breakdown of the negotiations between London and
Cairo this time established the important fact "that Zaghloul

Pasha . . .was by far the most important figure in :gyptian

politics, that he was an undisguised hater of British

 

101
1

R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 5.

021616., p. 6.

103
Ibid., p. 6.

67.

interference in Egypt, and that Egyptian nationalism was a
force to be reckoned with."104
The negotiations between London and Cairo were re-
sumed again on February 22, 1921, when the government of
Lloyd George asked Sultan Fu'ad of Egypt to appoint a new
delegation to come to London for the purpose of renewing the

105

long disturbed negotiations. This resulted in a change

in ministers and 'Adli Pasha Yakan (Yagan) became the new
Prime Minister of the Government.106

Sa‘d Zaghloul and 'Adli Yakan immediately disagreed on
when of them should head the delegation, and from whose
party the majority of the delegation members should be

107 The result was: 'Adli as a Prime Minister "com-

elected.
posed a delegation selected entirely from among his suppor-
ters."108 This led to the outbreak of disorder in Cairo and
Alexandria. The scape goats this time were the foreign immi-
grants in the country, particularly Greeks and Italians.109
‘Adli's delegation left for London on July 1, 1921, to
negotiate with the British on the basis of "a relationship

that would secure the special interests of Great Britain and

 

104Ibid., p. 6.

105Brockelmann, p. 462.

106Sidki Pasha, p. 22.

lO7Ibid.

108Brockelmann, p. 462.

68.

meet the legitimate demands of Egypt."110

This delegation
was not appreciated by the Egyptian people which it was re-
presenting, and it was ill-received even by Egyptian students
studying in ingland at that time.111 In any event, no agree-
ment was reached by the two parties concerned, and Yakan re-
turned to Egypt, to resign and leave the country without a
government.112

In order to smooth the way for the formation of a new
government, the authorities in Egypt realized the necessity
of removing the source of disturbance, Sa'd Zaghloul, at
least until a new government could be formed and order re-
stored. Thus, Zaghloul and five of his supporters were
arrested and deported to Ceylon on December 29, and from there
to the Seychelles.n:5 At this time also the British Govern-
ment "declared her readiness to abolish the Protectorate and
allow the formation of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs."114
Then, Sarwat Pasha, a lawyer by trade, was entrusted and
succeeded in forming a new government.

Lord Allenby was successful in selling Lloyd George
the idea of abolishing the protectorate in Zgypt at the ear-

liest possible time.115 Accordingly, the High Commissioner

 

110R I I A, The Middle Past, p. 158.

111sidki Pasha, p. 24.

1121616, p. 25.
113

R I I A, The Middle East, p. 158.
11
4Brockelmann, p. 463.
115R I I A, Great Britain and Zgypt, p. 8.

69.

(‘

issued a new proclamation on February 28, 1922, in which he
declared the independence of Egypt with the absolute reserva-
tion of four points to the discretion of His Majesty's
government. The four points were: (1) the security of the
communications of the British Empire in Egypt; (2) the de-
fense of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference,
direct or indirect; (3) the protection of foreign interests

in Egypt and the protection of the minorities; and (4) the
Sudan. Since that day Egypt has become a kingdom and

Sultan Fu'ad crowned as the first king of Egypt.116

 

116
For the text of February 28, declaration, see Appendix

No. III.

70.
Chapter III
ISLAM AND EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM

Almost nothing was said in the previous two chapters
about the impact of the Moslem religion on the nationalist
movement in agypt. This chapter is devoted to explaining
the influence of Islam in stimulating and encouraging the
whole movement, how religious figures such as Jamal al-Din
al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abdu were regarded as political
leaders as well, how they were able to influence many of
their students and acquaintances, such as Zaghloul, Casim
Amin, and many others.

When the European powers in the nineteenth century
began to interfere directly and indirectly in the affairs
of the weak and divided hoslem states, new Moslem thinkers
arose to develop the concept that in order that Moslems
might have the power to check the intrusion of western
Christians, a unity first must be achieved. The strongest
and best known among these was Jamal al-Bin al-Afghani,
whose object was "to arouse the Moslem people to the need
of uniting their forces against hestern aggression and ex-

ploitation."1

 

Charles C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Ta pt (London, 1953)
p. 9.

71.

JAMAL AL-DIN AL-AFGHAEI AND EGYPTIAN EATICEALIEA

.Sayid Jamal al-Cin was born at as‘ad-Abad, near Kabul,

2 His father attended to his education

Afghanistan in 1859.
while still a child, later he studied in different schools
in Persia and in Afghanista . At the age of eighteen, he
was able to embrac “almost the whole range of hoslem
sciences--Arabic grammar, philolOgy and rhetoric in all

‘4

their branches, history, noslem theology, sufism logic,

philOSOphy, practical and theo ratios physics and metaphy-
sics, mathe era tics, astronomy, medicine, anatomy, etc.43

In 18uo-56, Jamel visited India and stayed there for

(H

about fifteen months. Inere he became acquainted with west—
ciences and methods and gained soie knowledge of Tng-
lish.4 From there he proceeded to mecca to perform the

duty of pilgrimage. Upon his return to Afghanistan, Jamal
entered in the service of the riling Awir (pr'nce) 23st

huhaUI ad Khan, and later on, after Cust's death, he att2c1ed

 

r._L1

c"

Chistoriehs dii fer an Jamal's birthplace. tthzis who accep-
ted the 1ers an version of his biography claim him to be a
Persian by birth and th; t he was burn in As'ad- -Abad, near
Hamadan, Iran, but that he acqu ran his last rame, al-Afg-
hani, ”partly in order to 0:85 ore convenicntly as an
Orthodox Sunni :uhahmadan Agoslcm and pa'tly in order to
withdraw him self from the e ious 'protection' accordel by
the tersian OW rhm=nt to its subjects.” He was called
Layid (mast ) because .e claified to he a Ceecehdent of
ol-Husain, h- JaLQSCh of t e mr;.I(3t Luhampad. see:
deard 110 dr' Ihe Persia n ; my lu.ticn of 19C5-19C9 (Cam—
bridge, 1910), p. 4.

3 . _
Ibldo, P“. 4'05.

1.8
r-
E
I

I“
'3
.L.

L»

 

4Prior to that Jamal al- Din had a fi rm Knc. edg“ o. the ifs-
hani, Persian, Turkish, and Arabic la eI. guegus. ee: damS,
p. 5.

72.

himself to Muhammad A'zam, the brother and successor of
Dust, who appointed Sayid Jamal al-Din as his Prime Eini~
ster.

A'zam was defeated by his rival brother, Shir 'Ali,
who was supported by British money.6 This fact might explain
in part why Jamal al-Din denounced British imperialism for
the most part of his life and worked to unite the Moslem
people to check foreign interference from their lands.

After A‘zam had been defeated, Jamal excused himself to take
another pilgrimage to Mecca. He left Afghanistan in 1869
for India where he was received with high honors but was
barred from contacting other koslem leaders there.7 He then
was given a passage on an English ship to Egypt. While
there he frequently visited al-Azhar University. In Cairo
also he lectured on various subjects to all of those who
came to see him at his home.

After staying in Egypt for forty days,9 Jamal left for

Constantinople where he was received with great honors by

10

the Sultan and top government officials. A few months

later, after a controversy occurred between him and Shaykh

 

5
Ibid., p. 5.

 

6
7

Browne, p. 6.
AdaHLS ’ p O 5 O

8Browne, p. 6.

9Adams, p. 5.

10Ibid., p. 6.

73.

al-Islam, Hassan Fahmi Lfendi, the Turkish government

11

ordered Jamal to leave the country. Jamal again moved to

Cairo, Egypt.

12 He was

Jamal arrived in Egypt on march 22, 1871.
welcomed back and was granted a monthly allowance of ten
Egyptian pounds. This was ”not for any specific service,

but to do honor to an illustrious visitor."13

Jamal stayed
in Cairo for about eight years until he was expelled by the
Egyptian government in 1879.14 The two reasons which may

account for his expulsion were, first, the enmity and jea-
lousy which the old-fashioned theologians developed against
him, because of his attempt to revive the study of philoso-

15 .
The second was a political reason: fir. (afterwards

phy.
"Lord") Vivian, the gritish Consul-General in Egypt, being

"suspicious of. . .Zfamal's7 political activities, succeeded

 

It appears that Shaykh Hassan Fahmi became very jealous of
Jamal who was favored by the sultan mainly because of his
Pan-Islamism notions. Thus after al-Afghani had delivered
a speech on the importance of crafts and tools in Dar al-
Funun (the Turkish University), Ehaykh Hassan Fahmi accused
him of using terms derogatory to the dignity of Islam.
This accusation instigated a not controversy between the
two. On this point see: J. Zaidan, Mashahir al-Sharg

(Cairo, 1905), (iastern Celebrities), II, 55. Also, Browne,

 

p. 7, and Adams, p. 60

12Browne, p. 7.
13
As quoted in Ibid., p. 7.
14Ibid., p. 8.
15

Adams, p. 7n.

74.

in inducing Tawfiq Pasha, who had recently succeeded as Khe-
dive, to order his expulsion from Egypt, together with that
of his faithful disciple, Abu Turab".16

This time iayid Jamal went to India. while there ”the
'Young Egyptian movement' with which . . .Zhg7 had been so
prominently identified culminated in the 'Arabi Rebellion."17
For that Jamal was detained in India until after the rebel+
lion was put down by the Lnglish troops which occupied
Egypt after that.18

From India Jamal al-Din proceeded to Eerie, through
London. In Paris, with the help of Muhammad 'Abdu, one of
his disciples who was expelled from Egypt because of his

19 Jamal founded the

association with the 'Orabi Rebellion,
short-lived Arabic weekly newspaper, a1 'Urwatu 'l—Wuthqa

(Le Lien Indissoluble),2O in which Jamal attacked western
agression policies, particularly those of England, and called

for Moslem unity in order to combat the '.:"iest.21 When the

British government became aware of al-‘Urwatu '1-Wuthqa's

 

6Browne, p. 8.

17Adams, p. 8.

8%
Browne, p. 8.

19
Adams, p. 9.

20
Ibid.

21
Ibid.

75.

attacks, it I‘excluded the paper from India and figypt,” and
probably it ”employed other means to put an end to its
existence."23

After that, Jamal wandered in European and Near East—

24

ern capitals, spending four years in Eussia, moving after-

wards to Persia to occupy the Ministry of bar for a while,25
then to Constantinople where he remained until his death on
March 9, 1897 from cancer of the jaw and neck.26 “It is
asserted by many Persians, and denied by most Turks that he
did not die a natural death.“27
This is a short biography of :ayid Jamal al-Din a1—
Afghani whose influence on the development of political
thinking was extremely important, despite the fact that he
stayed in igypt only nine years. In fact, the English his-
torian J. Alexander goes so far as to declare that Jamal "was
personally responsible for that renaissance of Egyptian
national spirit."28
While in agypt Sayid Jamal al-Din affil‘iated himself

with the most important university in the Moslem world, a1-

Azhar, where he lectured for students and professors alike.

 

ZSBrowne, p. 9.
24Adams, p. 10.
25113151., p. 11.
26;§1d., p. 12.
27Browne, p. 12.

28John R. Alexander, The truth About Lgypt (London, New York,
Toronto and Melbourne, 1911?, p. 1.

76.

Jamal was a very eloquent Speaker and a highly persuasive
debater, or, as or. Hmthrop :toddard describes him, "a born
propagandistflg9 Thus in a short time he was able to gain
"the affection and respect of an ever-increasing circle of
student disciples of varied races and religious creeds.”50
Unlike the old-fashioned Shaykhs of al-Azhar, Sayid
Jamal al-Din was a modern thinker in many respects. He
opposed the reactionary ideas of clinging to the past and for-
getting about the future. He also was able to realize that
Islam must be interpreted rightly to suit modern world deve-
lopments and ideas rather than to remain an obstacle in the
way of progress and advancement. Thus “he sought to convert
the religious intellect . . . .to the necessity of reconsid-
ering the whole Islamic position and, instead of clinging to

the past, of making an onward intellectual movement.
order to prepare the way for that theory, he worked on re-
viving the teaching of philosophy at al-Azher and originated

a ”Liberal religious Reform Movement among the ulema [pro-

'21:"
fessor§7 of Cairo."°° Such behavior was considered a heresy

 

chonthrop Stoddard, The New World 92 Islam (New York, 1921),
p. 63.

30Alexander, 0p. cit., p. l.
31

 

wilfred 8. Blunt, Eecret History 9: the English Cccupation
2: Egypt (New York, 1922), pp. 76—77.

 

U21bid., p. 76. See also, Hans Kohn, fiationalism and Imper-

ialism lg the Hither hast (New York, 1952), p. 28.

 

77.

by the conservative and reactionary ulemas of al-Azhar
University.
- Though sayid Jamal al-Din introduced and preached ”a
popular program to the pan-Islamic movement,”33 Professor
H. A. R. Gibb reports that he restated ”the basis of the
'2

Islamic community in terms of wationalism."°4 Pan-Islamism
to him then was on the political side. He wanted to see a
unity among the Moslem nations in order to enable them to
check European penetration. In other words, al-Afghani
played on religious sentiments only to achieve political
ends.

The notions which Jamal entertained and advocated could
safely be summed in the following few sentences:

The Christian world, despite its internal differ-
ences of race and nationality, is, as against the East
and especially as against Islam, united for the des-
truction of all Muhammadam states.

The Crusades still subsist, as well as the fana—
tical spirit of Peter the Hermit. At heart Christen-
dom still regards Islam with fanatical hatred and con-
tempt. This is shown in many ways such as in inter-
national law, before which hoslem nations are not
treated as the equals of Christian nations.

Christian governments excuse the attacks and
humiliations inflicted upon Moslem states by citing the
latter's backward and barbarous conditions; yet these
same governments stifle by a thousand means, even by
war, every attempted effort of reform and revival in
Moslem lands.

Hatred of Islam is common to all Christian peo-
ples, not merely to some of them, and the result of

this spirit is a tacit, persistent effort for Islam's
destruction.

 

'2'?
Up

Alexander, pp. cit., p. 2.
34H.A.R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam (Chicago, 1947), p. 27.

 

78.

Every Moslem feeling and aspiration is carica-
tured and calumniated by Christendom. The iuropeans
call in the trient “fanaticism” what at home they call

”nationalism= and i‘patriotism." And what in the west
they call "self-respect,~I "pride," "national honor,"
in the Mast they call ”chauvinism." flhat in the west

they esteem as ”national sentiment,I in the East they
consider ”xenOphobia.”

From all this it is plain that the whole koslem
world must unite in a great defensive alliance to
preserve itself from destruction; and to do this it
must acquire the technique of Restern pregress and
learn the secrets of Luropean power.35
Jamal al-Din also was able to observe that in order to
have a society in Lgypt which could be effective in checking
foreign penetration, such a society must first be reformed
internally. Thus we see him attacking "with the same vigor,
the abuses which he saw within Islam and the evils of the
Moslem governments."36

To preach progressive teachings like those of Jamal a1-
Din in Egypt during this critical period might sound easy.
But it was not so. ”Courage indeed was needed in those days
for any man in Cairo to speak out," says Mr. Blunt.

"Isma'il brooked no kind of opposition and wield-
ed power so absolute in the country that independent
speech, almost independent whispering, had disappeared
from men's mouths. It was only the fellahin of the
villages, already despoiled of all, who dared complain,
or those in the city too poor and insignificant to be

of any political count. The highest religious author-
ities, as well as the highest officials, had long been

 

'2
”5As quoted by Lothrop Stoddard, 9p, cit., pp. 64-65. A re-
ference to the origin of this quotation is made in an
article by "X", "Le Fan-Islamisme et le Pan-Turquisme",

Revue Qu Monde Husulman (March, 1913).

 

caGibb, op. cit., p. 28.

79.

silent about injustice and had chosen their part of

acquiescence, content so long as they could get

their share, each one however small, of the general

plunder.”07

But Jamal al-Din was courageous enough, and so were
his followers who accepted him as a leader and as an exam-
ple.

"Among those who listened eagerly to his exhortations

of the subjects of patriotism and national liberty," reports

J. Alexander, ”were many Syrians who in those days particu-
fi '2
larly controlled the vernacular press of igypt."”8 They

began advocating, directly and indirectly, the teachings of
their great master, Jamal al-Zin, and were able to carry them
to all parts of the country and to all classes of the
Egyptian society.

His student disciples from al-kzhar were numerous and
very capable. They devoted themselves to teaching, writing,

preaching or other careers which may greatly influence public

opinion. Among them were Ahmad 'Orabi, Muhammad 'Abdu, Sa'd

7
Blunt, p. 79.

38Alexander, pp. cit., p. 2.

 

80.

Zaghloul, Kasim Amin, Taha Husain, :aykh 'Ali ‘Abdul-Razik

and many others.39

These,of course, were a great asset in
conveying and explaining the ideas of their great teacher

to the lgyptian public.

 

39Kasim Amin (died 1908) was the first Egyptian author who
advocated the emancipation of Egyptian women. His books
were entitled Tahrir al-Mar'ah (The dmancipation 9: Woman),
and gl-Maéah aleJadidah'(The sew Woman). Taha Husain,
after his completion of his studies at al-Azhar University,
was sent to the Soreonne, in France, where he acquired a
Ph.D. degree in literature. He is an extensive author and
a very critical one. In his book on Pre-Islamic Poetry
(Al-Shi'r al-Jahiti), Dr. Husain ”examined the pre-Islamic
civilization without regard to the legends consecrated by
the Islamic religion. Certain things he declared to be
apocryphal and legendary, and the Ulemas demanded the sup-
pression of the book and the expulsion of the hieratic fnom
the philosophical faculty of the ;gyptian University, since
Islam was the state religion in Egypt, and it was the duty
of the state to watch over the safety and purity of the
faith.” Another book which Dr. Husain had written was al-
gyyam (The Coursg_2§ Qayg), in two volumes. In this book,
which is but an autobiography, the author criticized sever-
ely the social structure of the Lgyptian society, as well
as the reactionary elements at al-Azhar University. Dr.
Husain has written over thirty volumes and during the course
of his life has occupied many important posts in the educa-
tional system in Egypt; at one time he was a professor at
the dgyptian University; later on he became the President
of the same university and more recently he occupied the
post of Minister of Education in the country. Taha Husain
is well known to millions of readers all over the Arab
world, and quite a few of his books were translated into
foreign languages such as French and English.

Shaykh 'Ali Abdul-Razik is another graduate of al-

Azar. Following graduation he went to England and contin-
ued his education at Oxford University. He is the author of
al-Islamwa 'Usul al-Hukm (Islam and the Principles of the
btate), a book which was attacked severely by the Ulemas of
al-Azhar, and because of which the author lost his Job in
ecclesiastical court, and the Liberal Constitutionalist
government of Ziwar Pasha had to resign, when it refused to
charge Shaykh ‘Ali. In this book the author advocated the
principle of separation of church and state and cited many
examples to prove that Islam is but a religion, "and not an
institution embracing the whole of political and social life;
not a state; and that the Caliphate with its political aut-
hority was alien to primitive Islamfi

 

 

 

 

 

 

81.

The nationalist Moslem, Jamal al-Din attacked severely
the aritish interference in Lgyptian affairs, and worked
hard during the reign of Isma'il to awaken the ggyptan public
opinion to the danger of the dual control. In fact, he is
considered the instigator of the 'Orabi Revolution which the
British unfortunately used to justify their action of aggres-
sion against Egypt in 1822." ". . . .From the preaching of
Jamal al-Din the people of modern ngypt learned that they had
national rights and national claims. It was due to his in-
fluence that the army first learned its strength; to his in-
stigation must be attributed that great military demonstra-
tion under Latif Lelim Eey which resulted in the ‘Orabi re-
volt of 1881, and, consequently, he is also answerable for
no small proportion of the good and evil which has happened
since."40

Besides all of that, Jamal al-Din supported many reform
movements. For example, he supported whole-heartedly the
emancipation of women. He also advocated the freedom of
speech and the principle of popular sovereignity, and "main-
tained that the growing absolutism of Muhammadan princes in
modern times was contrary to the spirit of Islam which in
its essence was a hepublic where every Moslem had the right
of free speech in its assemblies, and where the authority of

the ruler rested on his conformity to the law and on popular

 

40
Alexander, op. cit., p. 5.

CD
m
0

approval.”41 He further made it clear ”that constitution-

‘

alism was comuatiole with Islam, and should replace the

absolutism to which Hoslem countries were eV%rywhrre in

~ ~42

subjection.”
The influence of Jamal al—Din al-ifghani was extensive.

"It is not much to say that he is the father of every shade

of ngyptien Ketionslism. He influenced not merely violent

agitators like 'Crabi 3::3‘

SJ
I“)
L:
w
(n
(f,
c A

'fs Professor Stoddard, ”but
also conservative reformers like sheikh (shaykh7 Muhanmed

Abdou (:uhsmaed 'aodu who realized Lay“t's weakne s nd
L. , WV}

(D

I

were content to labor patiently by evolutionary methods for

distant goals."4s

nvenxwwo ‘AEDU ABE EGYP

rd
H
E:
I 0
5—;
.r.
{n-
I-3
H
0
pi

i
h.
V
[—4
H
(H
5%!

It was reported that when Sayid Jamal el-Din al-Afg-
hani Spoke to the multitudes which came to bid him farewell
upon his final deporture from ggypt in 1879, he said: ”I

.‘

leave with you Ehaikh huhamnad 'abdu, and he is sufficient
It is evident from this that the
famed nationalist and scholar felt that Ku.amma 'gbd' would

be an ac0¢ptable replacement.

 

4151unt, p. 95.

42. . m . . _ ._ Fm: ,
m. Travers symons, mrltfln and gypt (London, lead), p. l.

45 .. , A
stoodarc, p. 170.

44¢

 

83.

'Abdu, like most Egyptian nationalist leaders, was

45 and the year 1849 is common-

46

the son of a fellahin family,
ly accepted as the date of his birth. Muhammad 'Abdu was
married at an early age; in fact, he was but 16 years old
when his family arranged his marriage.47

Despite the poverty of 'Abdu's father, he attended to
the education of his child and was able to send young 'Abdu
to al-Azhar University. There 'Abdu came in contact with
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani who was able to cure him ”of his
extreme devotion to sufisim (mysticism),"48 which he had
acquired from his association with mystic personalities such
as that of Shaykh Darwish.49

Before his graduation from al-Azhar University, Muham-
mad ‘Abdu lectured there on different theOIOgical subjects,
applying "the . . .methods of reasoning and logical proof
which Jamal al-Din had taught him to use."50 Later on
through the influence of Riad Pasha, then the Prime Minister
and for a long time an admirer of Sayid Jamal al-Din, 'Abdu
was appointed to teach history in the school known as La; al;
LUIEQ, which had been founded by 'Alifasha Mubarak, during

the reign of Khedive Isma'il to train the Ulama in modern

 

45Ibid.

460ther dates are given by different biographers of 'Abdu.
For details on this point see: Ibid., p. 19.

 

471b1d., p. 22.

481b1d., p. 52.

49
Ibid., p. 21.

5
OIbid” p. 44.

84.

fiestern sciences which were not taught at al-Azhar Univer-
sity.51 There he based his lectures on Muqdimat ibn Khaldun
(the rrolegomena of ibn Khaldun), the great ioslem philoso—
phical historian of the fifteenth century.52

During this period the igyptian government was passing
into the control of foreigners through the attempts which

were made to reorganize the financial system of the country

which had deteriorated because of Khedive Isma‘il's extrava-

53 Muhammad ‘Abdu at

gance and poor financial management.
that time proposed ”education as a means to a better state
of things in the future,” and in his classes he put great
emphasis upon "character development” and upon i'training in
principles of government” in an effort to accomplish the
desirable ends which he wanted for his country.54
After the abdication of Isma'il on June 25, 1879, in
behalf of his son Tawfiq, Jamal al-Din, as was pointed out
earlier, was ordered out of the country and Muhammad ‘Abdu,

who was his closest associate, was removed from his job at

Dar al-‘Ulum and ordered to stay at his native village,
55

 

Mahallat wasr. One of the reasons which explains this

action was that Jamal al-Din and his group began pressing

 

51Muhammad Rashid Rida, Tarikh al-Ustath al-imam al-shaykh
Muhammad 'Abdu, III, 242.

52,
Adams, p. 45.

53see under pp. 16-17 of this study.

 

 

54Adams, p. 46.

55Ibid., p. 46.

for the fulfillment of Tawfiq Pasha's earlier promises, “for

85.

the formation of a representative assembly which would be

the keystone of all the reforms they hoped to introduce.

A year later Prime Minister Riad Pasha appointed

Muhammad 'Abdu with two others to edit al-ana'i' al-Hisr-

iyyah (the Egyptian Official Journal).

In a short time he

had advanced to become chief editor and then he took the

young shaykh Ea'd Zaghloul, who was to play an important

part at a later date in directing igyptian nationalism, to

be his assistant editor.

'Abdu

larging the

was able

to

which later

57

took on himself the task of improving and en-

scope of al-waqa'i' al-Misriyyah. In time he

introduce a definite regime for the Journal

was approved and made effective by Riad.

According to this new plan, each of the government depart-

monts had to send an outline of

sions to
right to
so doing

In
insisted

of their

be published in this journal.

criticize and comment on those publications.

'Abdu came to be the mouth-piece of the government.

its activities and deci-

‘Abdu then had the

Y

[1)

the reports from the different departments 'Abdu

upon higher literary standards.

This forced many

writers to attend night schools which were opened

 

56Ibid.,

57

58Ibid.,

Adams,

p.
PP-

p.

8n. cf., Blunt, pp.
46-47 0
47.

95-96.

”56

58

86.

especially to train writers and journalists in an effort to
give Egypt a better literary material. Muhammad 'Abdu him-
self volunteered to lecture in these schools.59 According
to his scheme also, 'Abdu, being the editor-in-chief of al-
Waqa'i' al-Misriyyah, had the right to censor all newspapers
published in Egypt regardless of whether they were under
Egyptian or foreign control.60 This privilege, of course,
gave him a good Opportunity to direct and channel public
opinion in the path he always cherished--that of leading
Egypt to achieve its freedom through reform and advancement.

During this period, observes Lord Cromer, "the native
press was appealing to Mohammedan fanaticism and inciting
hatred against Luropeans." Cne Nationalist newspaper wrote,
"We are the prey of two lions, England and France, who are
watching for the favorable moment to realize their design,
hidden under a deceptive policy . . . .Cne day we hope to
see our administrations cleared of all luropeans, and on that
day we can say that Lngland and France have rendered us a
great service for which we really shall thank them."61

Another paper wrote:

 

 

59

Ibid., p. 47.
6O

Cromer, I, 212-213.
61

r mil to

 

 

 

87.

Some people pretend that fanaticism is ruinous
to progress. Yet our best days were those in which
we conquered the Universe by devotion to our faith.
Today we have neglected it and we and our country are
in the hands of strangers, but our misfortunes are 8
Just punishment for our sins. 0 Ya Ulema of Al-Azhar,
whose sacred duty it should be to combat this reli-
gious decadence, what will be your answer at the day
of judgment to Him who can read the secrets of your
Hearts75‘

Shaykh 'Abdu ”was one of the leading spirits of the
'Orabi movement"63 of 1822, says Lord Cromer, but this was
just insofar as ”the intellectual movement was concerned, as
he opposed violence vehemently and thought that anything of
this kind might throw out every reform which he had begun."64
Mr. Blunt, an Englishman, but a personal friend of Muhammad
'Abdu once wrote,

I knew . . . that Shaikh Muhammad 'Abdu and the
rest of my Azhar friends were for other methods than
that of violence and that the reforms they had been
so long preaching would, in their Opinion, take a
life-time to achieve.Ob
Nevertheless, Muhammad 'Abdu was removed from his job

and sent into exile in Syria but from there he proceeded to
Paris to assist Jamel al-Din al-Afghani in publishing al-
‘Urwatu 'l-‘h'uthqa.66 When this publication was suppressed,

'Abdu went to Tunis where he stayed for a short while. Then

he travelled in different wuropean and Near lastern

 

621bid.

63Ibid., II, 179.
64AdEI—DS , p e 53 o
65

., Muhammad Rif'aat, Terikh Misr al-
32), II, 189.

 

Elunt, p. 120. cf
Siyasi (Cairo, 19

66Rida, Op. cit., II, tea-52 .

88.

countries before he was pardoned by Khedive Tawfiq "under
British pressure" and was allowed to return to Lgypt in
1888.67

For better or worse, huhammad ‘nbdu was completely
changed this time and ”when he returned to Egypt at the
termination of his exile he adepted a much mtre conciliatory
attitude towards the Occupation than he had held formerly;
he came to favor openly the existing government 'because',
as he said, 'he estimated at its true value the freedom
which it made possible', he became the close friend and ad-
viser of Mustafa rasha Fahmi, Prime hinister from 1895 to
1908, and also the friend and confidant of Lord Cromer."68

Shortly after his arrival in Zgypt, 'Abdu was appointed
Kadi (judge) in al-Mahakim al-Ahliyyah al-Ibtida'iyyah (the

69 Later

Courts of First Instance of the Native Tribunals).
he was advanced to Consultative Member of the Court of
Appeal (Mahkamat al-Isti'naf) in Cairo:70 when Shaikh Has-
sunah al-Nawawi resigned from the office of Mufti of all
Egypt (the interpreter of the doctrines of Islam), Muhammad
'Abdu was appointed on June 8, 1899 by recommendation of the

71

Khedive to occupy that office. He occupied that office

until his death in 1905.

 

67Cromer, II, 179.
68Adams, p. 64.
59Rida, 92. cit., III, 21.

7OIbid.

71Adams, p. 79.

89.

The change which affected 'Abdu following his return
from exile was not understood by the agyptian peOple. His
cooperation with the Occupation authorities was considered a
crime in the eyes of many nationalist sgyptians. This, of
course, made ‘Abdu's reform movement ineffective72 and he and
his half-Europeanized followers became marginal people.

Lord Cromer writes in that connection:

The political importance of Mohammad 'Abdu's
life lies in the fact that he may be said to have been
the founder of a school of thought in Egypt very
similar to that established in India by Syed Ahmed,
the founder of the Alighur College. The avowed ob-
Ject of those who belong to this school is to justify
the ways of Islam to man, that is to say, to Moslem
man. On the other hand, they are often not suffic-
iently Europeanized to attract the sympathy of the
Egyptian mimic of Luropean ways. They are inferior
to the strictly orthodox Moslem in respect to their
Mohammedanism, and inferior to the ultra-Europeanized
Egyptian in respect to their Europeanizatiogg Their
task is, therefore one of great difficulty.

The Egyptians at this period turned toward the nationa-
list leaders, who basically opposed the Cccupation and de-
manded complete independence for Agypt. Such an observation

H florHu -DU'M°
was expressed by . He wrote, "Up to 1922, an
Egyptian was considered a traitor unless he was a follower

of Sa‘d Zaghloul,“74 and during this period also, "The num-

ber of . . .students [at al-Azhag7 decreased perceptibly and

 

72J. Heyworth-Dunn, Religious and Political Trends 13 Egypt

(Washington, 1950), p. 6.
73Cromer, II, 180.
74Heyworth-Dunne, pp. cit., p. 5.

90.

its influence seemed for a time to be waning."75

Thus it could be said that during the period between
1888 and the middle of the 1920's loyalty to Islam was put
aside and that the sgyptian people turned their faces to-
wards the leaders who led the nationalist movement,76 who
strangely enough were trained in Eastern manners and fash-
ions and were far from being religious in the literal sense
of the word.7'7

In the early part of the 1920's the people of igypt
realized that ”nationalism” was not the holy institution they
were made to believe, that some of the nationalist leaders
were selfishly motivated, and that these leaders could at any
time deviate from the general line of the main front, namely
the wafd, and go on to form new political parties which would
serve their purposes.78 Seeing these parties fight each
other, each claiming to be the party which the people should
follow, the Egyptian people did not know whom they should
follow or whom they should believe. This, plus the death of
the great nationalist leader, Laghloul, in 1927, without
having achieved the complete independence for which they had
fought, brought doubts to the minds of those people as to

whether nationalism was the right path for the achievement of

great things or not.

 

r75Chirol, p. 240.
76

Heyworth-Dunne, pp. cit., p. 8.
77Ibid., p. 8.

78See under p. 105 of this study.

91.

Through this period there was also ”a marked lack of
public-spirited organizations and persons who would take an
interest in the social welfare and progress of Moslem
youth."79 The Egyptian schools, which since the time of
Muhammad 'Ali had been looked upon just as places where cer-
tificates and degrees could be acquired for vocational pur-
poses, "contributed very little towards the social improve-

80 To combat this, "Coptic,

ment and moral uplift of youth."
Jewish and foreign communities had already formed well-
organized programs of social welfare and had financed several
societies in order to implement them."81 Because of those

things, remarks Dr. Heyworht-Dunn, "parents and serious

peOple welcomed a revival of interest in Moslem ethics."82

THE cothNothghT or RELIGIO-POLITICAL OEGANIZATIONS

One of the first active Moslem organizations to be
established in Lgypt was Jam'iyat al-Shubban al-huslimin (The
Young Men's Moslem Association) commonly referred to as
Y.M.M.A. It was founded in November, 1927, and according to
its rules it accepted as members only Moslems of reputable

behavior.83

 

79
80

Heyworth-Dunne, op. cit., p. 9.

Ibid.

81Ibid.

821bid., p. 9.

83
Ibid., p. 11.

92.

This association had the following four points as an
aim which it set to achieve:
(1) to teach Islamic morals and ethics.
(2) to spread that knowledge best suited to the modern
way of life.
(3) to discourage dissensions and abuses amongst
Moslems.
(4) to make use of the best of gastern and aestern
cultures and to reject all that is bad in them.84
From the outset this association adopted as part of its
regulations and by-laws two stipulations which guaranteed
that its name should be permanent and that it "would not

85 Natur-

under any circumstances interfere with politics."
ally, the second stipulation was idealistic and impractical
as a look at the list of names of the men on the Board of
Directors of this association showed many names of highly in-
fluential political leaders.

The president of the doard, 'Abdul-Hamid Bey Sa'id, was
a well-known deputy and a very ardent member of the Father-
land (Hizb al-fiatani), which always expressed the most hostile
attitude toward the Sritish. Sa'id also was known for his
undisputed nationalism and hatred of any foreign interference.
During lorld Tar I, for example, he fought on the side of the
Arabs against the Turks. The first vice-president of the
board was Shaykh ‘Abdul 'Aziz Shawish who was a leading mem-

ber of the nationalistic Fatherland party and for some time

 

84Ibid.

__

85Ibid.

93.

was editor of the organ of that party. He also was an ardent
disciple of Jamal al-hin al-Afghani and well-known as was
his professor for being an outstanding political agitator.
The Secretary-General of the Association, Muhib al-Din
al-Khatib, was Syrian by birth and a journalist-propagandist
by trade. He was a close associate and disciple of Muhammad
'Abdu.86
Another fact to be observed in connection with the rela-
tions between the Y.M.M.A. and its activities in politics was
the oath which every new member made before being accepted.

The second sentence of this oath obligated the member "to be

ctive as a mujahid (warrior), fighting for the revival of

D‘)

the glory of Islam by restoring its religious law and its

'87 "The militant tone of this sentence cannot

superiority.‘
be missed," remarks Heyworth-Dunne, "especially since it was
signed by and meant for the youth of the country." He adds,
"Any ethical and figurative explanation which might be
attached to any particular word or phrase, such as mujahid,
might be understood by the mature but not by the average
school-boy, whose martial spirit is stirred by the use of

88
such words as these.”

 

86
For further details on the Y.M.M.A. and its leadership see:
Ibid., p. 12-150

8
738 quoted in Ibid., p. 15.
881bid.

94.

The Y.M.M.A. in time was able to spread out and have
branches in almost all the woslem countries. It always
carried with it the ideas of pan-Islamism. Nationalism is
stressed and the members are told ”to love their country
and make use of its products and manufactures,“ "to guard
against foreign schools,” and "not to send their sons to
European schools until they are provided with the force of
the Islamic faith and loyal to their country,” etc.89 The
Y.M.M.A. also has been very active against Christian
missionaries and on occasions used great influence on the
Egyptian Minister of the Interior to take action against
foreigners and missionaries who dared to attack Islam.90

Al-Ikhwan al-fiuslimin (The Moslem Brotherhood) was
another one of those religio-political associations which
were organized during this period. The founder of this
organization was a government schoolteacher named Hasan al-
Banna,91 who was sent after his graduation from her al-‘Ulum

in 1928-29 to teach arabie at al-Isma'iliyyah,9‘ the city

which is mostly inhabited by Luropeans who are officials of

 

 

the Suez Canal Company and the Occupation forces.93
aglhid-
golbid., pp. 13-14.
91R I I A, Great Britain and igypt, p. 52.
92 _
Heyworth-Dunne, 9p. gi§., p. 15.
93

Ibid.

95.

There Hassan started organizing this association
shortly after his arrival at Isma'iliyyah. He attracted
around him the ”Barberine servants, workers, some members
of the surrounding Sufi (mystic) orders and a few students."94
At those early stages the purpose of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin,
remarks Heyworth, was ”entirely religious."95

Hasan al-danna was a very intelligent person. In
fact, it was reported that he led his class in his senior
year.96 He was a little shy, but a "perfect orator with a
mastery of all the technique of persuasion and of emotional
appeal to a crowd."97 Hence he was able in the course of
time to attract around him followers whose number was esti-
mated at one time to be 500,000.98

When al-Banna was transferred to Cairo, he founded
there a chapter for al-Ikhwan al-huslimin. From that time on
this order was rapid in its growth and it spread not only in
Egypt but all over the hoslem world.

Al-Ikhwan al-huslimin were very strong nationalists.
They tried earnestly to help in building their country but

held that every reform should come through religion. They

founded schools, economic establishments, sports clubs, many

 

 

96Ibid., p. 15.

 

Ibid., p. 16.

 

98Lenczowski, p. 527.

96.

clinics and one hospital where medical services were offered

99

free. All those establishments plus the daily paper named

after their organization, al-Ithan al-huslimin, the weekly

 

and monthly periodical al-ehihab, and the thousands of arti-

 

cles they published were used as means of propaganda to
attract more people to their order.

Hasan al-sanna, who was Known as al-nurshid al-‘am
(the beneral Guide) set a good example in nationalism for
his followers. i‘His clothes,“ remarks Heywort -Lunno, ”were
made of material manufactured in Egypt in factories set up
by the IKhwan of which he was so proud."100

Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin did not remain as it originated,
a religious organization which had nothing to do with poli-

lOl

tics. It became a militant organization which allowed

itself to indulge in politics affecting all the noslem
world. In fact, it has become recognized as an influential

terrorist party.102

 

99 H ,_ v. .. in.
wejla Izzedoin, the arab world (Chicago, 193$), p. 382.

 

lOOHeyworth-Dunne, 92. cit., p. 15.

161, .. . p
R I I A, Great srltain and igypt, p. 02.

102Galatoli, p. 120

97.

Chapter IV

It was pointed out at the end of the second chapter,
that when no bilateral agreement was reached between the
government at London and that at Cairo, the aritish govern-
ment alone issued the proclamation of February 28, 1922, by
which Egyptian independence was recognized.

Directly after this declaration had taken place,
sultan Fu'ad, who was but a critish-sponsored ruler,1 accept-
ed the declaration and on march 15 of the same year changed
his title fxom Sultan to King (Malk). 'Abdul Khalid Sawrat
Pasha, who conducted the negotiations with Lord Allenby,
agreed to form a government and to start the drafting of a
new constitution. This did not mean that the Lgyptian nation,
as led by the “afd, had accepted the November declaration.
tn the contrary, the wafdists, whose leader zaghloul was still
in exile, "poured scorn upon the declaration of the 28th of
February and called for a boycott of anglishmen and of british
manufacturers as Egypt's proper answer to it . . . . and
hardly a week passed without some outrage being signalled.”2

The flafdists explained this attitude by pointing out

that the declaration could not in any way be Considered as an

 

1George loung, :gyot (New York, 1927), p. 262.

2Elgood, Transit, p. 288.

98.

adequate substitute for the true independence which they had
been seeking for a long time. On this point ;. w. Polson
Newman remarks,
The establishment of ggyptian independence in
1922 was merely carrying our policy of unreality one
stage further, and the change from a frotectorate to
an independent Monarchy was mainly superficial.
Although the elevation of the title of Tgypt's ruler
from sultan to that of King pleased the Ealace clique
and a small section of the official classes, the great
majority, whose susceptibilities lay in other direct-
ions, were far from pacified by this measure. They
clearly saw that as far as fundamental considerations
were concerned, in which their national pride was at
stake, the position was in no way a solution of the
Egyptian question.5
The Wafdists were in the right and the designation of
Egypt as an independent sovereign state was but a mere ”dip-
lomatic fiction," according to the eminent English historian,
Arnold Toynbee, who expresses the oritish point of View and
goes further to explain that, ”while the sovereign indepen-
dence which the declaration had conferred on Egypt might
eventually be translated from shadow into substance if the
agreements contemplated in the declaration itself were duly
concluded, it was equally true that, if their conclusions

were indefinitely postponed, some untoward event might take

even the shadow of independence away from Egypt once again.”4

 

3Newman, p.

4 . ...
Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey 93 International affairs, 1925:
The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement (London, 1927),
I, 1925. (Hereafter cited as survey).

99.

In fact, on March 15, 1922, Great britain sent a dispatch to
all His hajesty‘s representatives in foreign countries in
which she instructed them that Egyptian independence was to
be by no means known as perfect. In this notification

Great Britain made it clear that,

The termination of the aritish frotectorate over
Egypt involves, however, no change in the status quo
as regards the position of other powers in _gypt itself.

The welfare and integrity of Tgypt are necessary
to the peace and safety of the aritish ;mpire, which
will therefore a1v.ays maintain as an essential British
interest the special relations between itself and Egypt
long recognized by other governments. These special
relations are defined in the declaration recognizing
agypt as an independent sovereign state. His Majesty's
Government has laid them down as matters in which the
rights and interests of the aritish Empire are vitally
involved, and will not admit them to be questioned or
discussed by any other rower. In pursuance of this
principle, they will regard as an unfriendly act any
attempt at interference in the affairs of igypt by
another lower, and they will consider any aggression
against the territory of Egypt as an act to be repelled
with all the means at their command.

The Wafdists disturbance was not the only thing that
confronted the government of :awrat Pasha. As indicated
earlier, he was charged with the drafting of a new constitu-
tion for Egypt. This task was not an easy one especially
since King Fu'ad, who all the time wascheaming of absolute

monarchy, rejected the idea of parliamentary monarchy from

 

Cmd. 1617. Circular stating the decision of H.M. Govern-
ment to terminate the :rote ctolate and to r7co n1ze fsypt
add independent sovereign state (London, 1922).

 

 

100.

the outset.6 This fact, plus another point of trouble which
Sawrat had with the iritish when he tried in the new consti-
tution to claim the sovereignity of the igyptian King over
the Sudan,7 put him in such a position that at last he found
hinself obliged to resign and leave the office of Premier to
be occupied by Tawfiq Pasha hassim.

Nassim, while in office, mas not able to ignore the
cry of the ygyptian people demanding that the new constitu-
tion must include the declaration of the fgyptian claim over
the Sudan, The Lritish authorities, on the other hand, re-
fused to accept such a claim. It should be kept in mind
that up until this very date Eritain was still occupying
Egypt, and at this critical junction, Allenby, the tritish
High Cohmissioner in Egypt, went ahead and appointed a mili-
tary Governor for qairo. In other words, the gritish Govern-

ment tried to make it clear to King Pu‘ad and the Tgyptian

 

“King Fu'ad,” writes Toynbee, “remembering the autocratic
powers enjoyed by his ancestor, Mehmed Ali, and by success-
ive members of the dynasty down to the deposition of his
father, the Khedive Isma‘il, in 1879, and unmindful of the
fate which has recently overtaken autocratic rulers in
neighbouring Islamic countries who had sought to stem the
tide of democratic ideas flowing in from the Kest--had not
reconciled himself to exchanging the rule of a :ritish
nominee for that of an Zgyptian constitutional Monarch."
Survey, 1925, I, 226.

7Elgood, Transit, p. 288.

lOl.

nation that independence was not a reality.8

The King then
saw to it that Nassim should resign; he waived his claim to
the title of the Sudan, and appointed Yahya Pasha Ibrahim to
succeed Nassim.

Ibrahim Pasha, who was bound to no party as yet, was
able, on April 19, to succeed in publishing the new :gyptian
constitution which declared that “all power emanates from
the nation,” and consequently placed the government of Egypt
in the hands of a senate (Majlis al-Shuyukh) and a chamber
of deputies (Majlis al-huwab).g

After all this was completed, Sa'd Pasha Aaghloul and
some of his followers who had been in forced exile since
1921 were allowed to come back to Egypt on Leptember 17, 1925
and participate in the new elections.

Now before speaking of the new Zgyptian Parliament and
the continuance of the struggle by the Nationalists for a
true independence, it is worth while to pause here and iden-
tify briefly the political parties as they began to organize

themselves during this period in the hope of taking over the

new government.

 

8Ibid., p. 289. A reference ”for announcement by High Commis-

sioner that unless the commission (drafting the new constitu-
tiog7 gave way, Great Britain would retake her old liberty of
action in Egypt," is made to the Official Journal, February
10, 1923.

 

9 V . . . I
For the test of the agyptian Constltution of april, 19
Appendix IV. This constitution was modeled after that
Selgium constitution.

102.

THE PCLITICéL PARTIEL IL TGYPT

The oldest official political party came into existence

in ngypt in 189410

and was called the Fatherland Party (Hizb
al-natan). The founder of txis party was Hustafa Kamil, a
young Lgyptian gentleman who studied law at Toulouse in
France. In 1900, Kamil founded the Arabic newspaper Elfélfli'
(The nanner) as the organ of the party. From 1907 onward
al-Liwa' appeared in Lnglish and Branch, as well as in
Arabic.

Kamil' hOpe was to win the public opinion of Europe

(1)

for the cause of agyptian liberation. Thus he labored hard
to spread the news of sgyptian struggles against the British
aggression in the auropean capitals as well as in 7gypt it-
self. Kamil was able while in Erance to establish a life-
long friendship with the famed French journalist, Juliette
Adam, who proved to be a great asset in putting his program
in effect.

The Fatherland rarty, according to its program, was

0 I
L

even more extremist than the ”a a.
It was Opposed to any negotiations with Great
Britain and demanded the absolute independence of the
whole Nile Valley, its evacuation by the Lnglish, a
declaration that all the decrees promulgated in Zgypt
since the imposition of martial law at the beginning
of Jorld Ear I were invalid, and the neutralization
of the Suez Canal under ;gyptian protection.11

L

0- . . .
arocxelmann, p. ebb.

ck
1 IKOhn?.f‘-p o 82 o

103.

Also, from the very start the National Party was favorable
to pan-Islamism and faithful to the Ottoman Caliphate.
This party began to decline following the death of her

12

founder in 1908. In 1923, when elections were held for

the new Egyptian Parliament, this party has but few members.13
Consequently it was ineffective in gaining any votes.

Up until April, 1924, the iafd14 was not a political
party in the true sense of the word ”but everywhere in
Egypt,” says Mr. Kohn, ”it had set up district and local com-
mittees, and had at its disposal such a complete organiza-
tion that it was able to direct the fortunes and demonstra-
tions of the whole country from its local center in the
'People's House', Zaghloul Pasha's residence in Lg§,rpt.”15
The organ of the wafd was the daily Arabic Newspaper g1;
Balagh (The Reporter) which was founded in 1922.

After the election of the first Egyptian Parliament in
April, 1924, the Eafd found itself obliged, because of the
requirements of parliamentary discipline, to organize itself
in the line of an official party, which adopted the name of
Parliamentary Lafd Party. hot pleased with that, ba'd Zagh-
loul then declared, "We are not a party, we are the nation

itself."

 

ldYoung, P. 188.
”mm £135? 82 .

14For the origin of the mafd, see Chapter II of this study.

15Kohn, op. cit., p. 82.

1C4.

The Fatherland Party was then the only official poli-
tical party in agypt before the declaration of 1922. DUt
nevertheless there was a kind of political understanding
between certain groups. Those groups now were able to re-
c0gnize the wisdom of organizing themselves in offidal
parties. Thus on October 29, 1922, a new political party
was established. This was Hizb al-ehrar al-Dusturiyin, or
the Liberal Constitutional rarty. 'Adli Yakan (Yeghen)
Pasha, the founder, assumed the presidency. This party
attracted “first and foremost the representatives of the

"16 Its program was not much different from the

aristocracy.
other two parties, it Jdemanded Tgypt's absolute independence
and sovereignty, and that of the budan, the evacuation of

the country, a constitutional democracy, and a number of

”l7 The organ

prOgressive social and educational measures.
of the Liberal Constitutionalists was the daily Arabic news-
paper iiyassah (Politics) edited by muhammad Husain Baikal
Bey.

On January 10, 1925, another party was organized.

This was al-IttihadJ or the Union rarty. Yahya Ibrahim Pasha

 

the rrime minister under whom the constitution of 1923 was
drafted, assumed the presidency. Al-Ittihad received its
whole support from the King and his court, consequently it

Worked according to the wishes of the Palace clique.

61bid., p. 83.
71,”.

105.

These were the sgyptian political parties at this
period, but in the course of days many were added until at

one time their numcer exceeded a dozen.18

NnTIONALISM.AND THE SUDAN PROBLEM

Ten days after zaghloul's arrival in Egypt from exile
the primary elections were held as scheduled. Laghloul again
headed the wafd to lead it to a great victory. The campaign
speeches of Zaghloul and other leaders of the tafd were cen-
tered around the slogan (al-Istiqlal al-Tamm) or absolute
independence.19 The lafd also included and supported Moslem
and Christian candidates.2O At the same time, Zaghloul was
very careful not to commit himself or his party to anything

which might prove difficult to solve in regard to future

negotiations with angland. His speeches and statements, in

 

8
1 when on september 9, 1952, a decree was issued by the
Lgyptian Government requiring all political parties to sub-
mit their programs and the names of their founders for
approval by the Minister of the Interior, 15 parties regis-
tered under the decree. see LurOpa Publication Limited,
(Pub.), The Middle East, 1953 (London, 1955), p. 80.

 

()1

9 _
Kohn, pp. cit., p. 8 .
O u H n -
For example, wissa wassiI say, who is a Christian by faith,
was supported and elected by the gafd in a purely hoslem
constituency. On this point see: Ibid., p. 85.

106.

general, were regarded as vague and emotional.21

Other parties had almost the same programs in regard to

 

foreign policy. only al-Ittihad Party included in its pro-
gram some dangerous and extreme notions. It denounced King
Fu'ad publicly, showed great enmity toward dreat sritain and
wanted to recall the Khedive 'Aboas hilmi, who had been
exiled in Turkey since the beginning of Lorld tar I, to rule

over the country.

 

21The following passage taken from one of Zaghloul's campaign

speeches gives a good idea of the nature of his speeches
while campaigning in 1924. He said: ”we shall meet with
difficulties in our path; we shall remove them. The King
of the country stands with the people; the people are united
and resolute. we have right on our side and God is on our
side; what, then, is lacking to the attainment of our goal,
to victory? how my voice may cease. For in all your
mouths are the songs of freedom and your hearts are over-
flowing with them and their echoes are sent back from with-
in the walls of tombs and coming generations will rise up
to their sound. You are the forgers of your own hopes,

the builders of your own glory, you are the sons of immor-
tal Lgypt. I bow in homage to your national sentiment and
to the nobility of your aims and with you I cry, 'Long

live agyptl' . . . .The days that stand betneen you and the
elections are numbered; your most important duty is to
understand the high nature of the action that is required
of you, the significance of the task to which you are
summoned. nefore these elections the nation was rent into
classes and parties, aristocracy and peasantry, handi-
craftsmen, labourers, and merchants. gut with these elec-
tions you have all, without distinction, entered a new
camp. It is needful now that the national will snall pre-
vail and the country govern itself as it pleases.” This
passage was quoted in Ibid., pp. 85-56.

107.

When the elections of January, 1924, were held, the
sgyptian nation went to the polls to vote the most deserving
party, on the basis of its high organization. Thus the fiafd
won with 188 seats as against 27 for other parties. The King
then had to charge Zaghloul with forming a government on
January 27, 1924.22

The two important points of policy which faced al-Wafd
after its ascendency to power in 1924 were, first, the unfor-
getable issue of the Sudan which was still vivid in the minds
of the Egyptian people who claimed Egyptian sovereignty over
that territory. The second point was the major item around
which the campaign strategy of al-lafd was centered, namely,

al-istiqlal al-tamm or absolute independence.

 

During this period there was also a change of govern-
ments in England itself. Now the Laror party under the lea-
dership of Ramsey MacDonald had come to power. This party,
as a point in its September, 1923, election campaign program,
promised to support a ”full independence of Egypt."23
Zaghloul then regarded that as a great opportunity and hoped
that the new Labor government would stand up to its promise

and reverse the policy of its predecessor. This was a mis-

take into which Zaghloul had fallen.24

 

f"

dgdrockelmann, p. 463.

2gYoung, p. 272.

24Elgood, Transit, p. 291.

108.

Not only the Bafdists but "all Egyptian parties were
agreed in regards to the Sudan as an inseparable part of
Egypt."25 In fact, it could be said that the Egyptian nation
as a whole, plus many Sudanese had the same notion. In the
Sudan new societies with this aim were founded, and educated
Sudanese started creating disturbances against England,
asking publicly for the unity of the Nile valley under the

O
sovereignty of the Egyptian crown.”6

The British then imme-
diately started taking a positive action to put an end to all
those activities.27

In the House of Lords, also, on June 25, 1924, Lord
Parmoor declared, ”His Majesty's government is not going to
abandon the Sudan in any sense whatsoever."28 This, of
course, was a great disappointment to Zaghloul and the whole
Egyptian nation.

The dissatisfaction which was expressed by the Egyptian

government and people toward the February, 1922, Declaration

of agyptian Independence, and toward the late attitude of the

 

P

Kohn, op. cit., p. 87.

26"In Khartoum, the capital of the Sudan," reports Hans Kohn,

"the white Flag Society had been founded, on whose banner
the whole Nile Valley was depicted in red on a white ground,
united (under Egyptian sovereignty). The members of this
Society were educated Sudanese who had passed through the
English Gordon College in Khartoum, and Lgyptian residents
in the Sudan." See: Ibid., p. 87.
27”In 1924, an Egyptian who was to present a loyal address to
King Fu'ad in the name of . . .(the White Flag) Society was
stopped at the frontier and sent back by the Vnglish." See:
Ibid., p. 87.

28
Quad. 2269Ligypt1‘io. 1, 1924). cf. Cmd. 2171Liudan, No. 1,
1924) (London, 1924).

o 1 f". -
British Government,69 plus the uprisings in the eudan, led
Mr. MacDonald to invite Laghloul to discuss and negotiate

Q '2
with him “for a settlement of the reserved points.“O Zagh-

loul accepted the invitation and on July 12, 1924, as h

(D

stepped into the train which would carry hih to the port on
his way to angland, an extreme nationalist young student
tried in vain to as sa;sinate hin. extreme nationalists were

against maxing any kind of compromises with England, and

01

thought that Zaghloul was wavering from this principle. 1

This incident did not stop Zaghloul from continuing
his journey and conversing for a long time with MacDonald,
but to no avail. ”He aswed too much; he would make no con-
cession in return,“ remarks Elgood.
He reouired the withdrawal of the -ritish troops,
the dismissal of the financial and judicial advisers,
the abandonment of Gre at oritain‘s claim to direct

Egypt's foreign policy, to wrot‘ ct minoriti and for-
eign interest, and to defend the Luez anal.§

He also asked for the unity of the iudan with agypt

7.?
under the sovereignty of the agyptian crown.”‘ wachnald at

last made it clear that his g_overrrent we as not ready at any

 

v.9 #

6 Ch lvay 8, 1924, aegh aloul arnounced that he had rejected
the rebruary Declare tion of In ependence. Cn this point
see: Young, 9. 272.

L

 

3OIbid ., p. 273.
1

 

 

3 fig .

bew York Times (July lo, 192;), p. 1.
éEElgood, Transit, p. 292. :aa also: Zgypt ho. 1, 1924.
35.

(33
{\3
o

waxxi Abbas, The Sudan Q estion (Ne -w Vorx, 1952), p.

 

110.

cost to quit the Sudan, or give up the riéht secured to her
by the February 28, 1922, Declaration of Independence.34
The conversation between the two heads of states then came
to an end and Zaghloul returned to sgypt.

Disturbances were increased upon the return of Zagh-
loul, especially after it was learned in Cairo that nothing
was accomplished and no conclusion reached between Zaghloul

- 35 - . ,
and MacDonald. Zaghloul tnen resigned but his resignation

was not accepted by the ding.:6 Meanwhile there was a change
in government in England and a conservative party came to
power.

Cn November 19, 1924, while sir Lee stack, Eirdar (Com-
mander-in-Chief) of the hgyptian army and Governor-General
of the Sudan, was on his way in a car to his home from the
ear office, he was attacked by seven man dressed like
students. He was injured severely and died on the second
day.87

Despite the fact that the two igyptian officials imme-
diately responsible for the murder of air Lee Ctack, namely

the Chief of rolice in Cairo and the Director-General of the

Luropean section of the department of iublic safety, were

 

64Ib1d.

 

D . . .—

Lenczowskl, p. 016.
'26, -
‘“ Kohn, oo. cit., p. 88.

7New.York Times (November 20, 1924, p. 1.

111.

English nationals,38 Zaghloul, to ease the tension and solve
the problem as peacefully as possible, called on the British
Residence within an hour after the death of the Sirder to ex-
press his profound sorrow and to assure the Eritish authori-
ties that the ggyptian government would do all in her power
to find and punish the guilty ones.’39 In fact, ”the igyptian
government at once put 10,000 “gyptian pounds as a reward on
the murderers heads.”40 The American Minister in Egypt at
that time appeared to have been very impressed by Tgyptian
promptness in restoring justice and order. He reports, ". .
. .but certain it is, that no government could possibly have
taken more active, urgent and successful steps to bring the
guilty to justice than did the Egyptian government with Zagh-
loul Pasha as its leading head.”41

This was not enough as far as the iritish were concerned
as they had been waiting for an opportunity to suppress the
Jafdist nationalists. Hence they did not miss this opportun-

42 and on the afternoon of the funeral, Lord Allenby, who

”43

ity

maintained that "7gypt should be taught a stern les:on,

 

()1

8
9

Survey, 1925, I, 215.

 

('23

New York Times (November 20
Monein Omar, The Sudan Ques
(Cairo, 1952), pp. 80-

C') l--'
:1 (O
In
1%
V

: P. 8. See also: Abdel-
based on British Documents,

 

81.
40Young, p. 276.

41Howell, p. 200.
42:1300d, Transit, p. 294.

43Lord Lloyd, Lgypt Cince Cromer (London, 1983-34), II, 95.

112.

delivered two ultimatums in which he demanded an apology from
the Egyptian government, the search for and the punishment of
all the criminals involved in the assassination, the prohibi-
tion of all political demonstrations, the payment of an in-
demnity of a half-million Egyptian pounds (about$£,500,000),
to the British government, maintainance of the offices of the
financial and judicial :ritish advisors, and surrender of the
Lgyptian's right to retain the services of foreign officials
against the will of Great sritain. The issue of the Sudan
also arose, and the ultimatum required the withdrawal of all
Egyptian troops from the sudan, and announced that the area
to be irrigated in the Gezira district of the Sudan would be
extended from 300,000 fagggns to an unlimited figure as the
need might arise.44 This last notification meant simply that
Egypt would be destroyed.

The ultimatum also blamed Zaghloul and his government
falsely for the murder of the Lirdar. It declared to Zagh-
loul, dThis murder, which holds up Egypt as at present
governed to the contempt of civilized peoples, is the natural
outcome of a campaign of hostility to British rights and
British subjects in dgypt and hudan, founded upon a headless

ingratitude for benefits conferred by Great Britain, not

 

44
For the text of the two ultimatums delivered by Lord

Allenby to the agyptian dovernment, see: Cmar, pp. 83-85.

113.

discouraged by Your Excellency's [Zaghloul7 Government, and
fomented by organization in close contact with that govern-

45

ment.” This accusation was not built on any evidence; it

was only used to smear the reputation of Zaghloul and to
force him to abandon power. Elgood comments on this point
that, i'There is no reason to lay the outrage at Zaghloul‘s
door. He neither instigated nor approved of its commission.

80 much was clear to men who knew him best. He was a rebel

nd time and

Q)

at heart but never a partisan of violence,
again he had denounced the campaign of assassination as
foolish and wrong.”46

The dritish demands were extremely high, and by all

means were far from reas-nable. The American Minister to

Egypt, Dr. Howell in his book, igypt‘s Past, Present and

 

Future, expresses the same notion by comparing it with other
incidents of the same nature. He writes,

Compare the british action over the assassina-
tion of air Lee stack, if you please, with the action
of our government over the brutal killing of our
Vice-Consul, Imbrie, in Persia. Shall we briefly re-
view our demands made upon the government of Persia
in this case: (1) a suitable apology to our govern-
ment; (2) the arrest, trial and conviction of the

ssassins; (8) their execution; (4) payment to hrs.

Imbrie, the widow, the sum of e60,00o; (5) payment of
the expense of sending a warship to Eersia to convey
the remains of the Vice-Consul to America. All this

 

Ibid., p. 83.
46
_New York Times (November 25, 1924), p. l.

114.

was agreed to and complied with by the Persian govern-
ment. Lhen the rersian authorities notified us that
the last requirement made by us had been fulfilled, and
that the @100,000, the cost of the warship was in a
bank subject to our order, we in turn notified the Tar-
sian government that we desired that this sum be inves-
ted by it, and the proceeds resulting therefrom be used
to teach the young men of Persia that murder is wrong/9"7

In any event, Zaghloul's government accepted all the
British demands concerning the apology, the indemnity, and
the punishment of the criminals, but rejected points regard-

ing the Sudan. In fact, the required indemnity was paid

48

within twenty-four hours. Zaghloul refused to accept the

British demands concerning the Sudan, especially the point
which indicated that most of the water of the Kile would be
used to irrigate british plantations there, as this fact was

a matter of life or death to Lgypt, for without the water

from the hile Egypt would be but an unproductive desert.49

To withdraw the Lgyptian troops from the Eudan would also

mean that Lgypt had given up its historical right and

47

8
4 Young, p. 276.

49 _ . a H 1 . .n
Crabtes, “egypt, the Ludan and the mile“, Forelgn nIfeirs

(December 15, 1924), p. 528. (hereafter "hiN" Foreign
Affairs). Even the anglish public opinion did not accept
easily the notion that irrigation must be extended in the
Blue Nile Valley in the Queen as described in the ultima-
tum. The secretary of state for foreign affairs appeared
to voice this when he promised a commission of inquiry into
the distribution of water between egypt and the Sudan. See:
The House of Commons, Earliamentagy sebates, 15th December,
1924, p. .

 

 

115.

50

economical interests in that territory. This, of course,

would put Aaghloul in a very critical position not only in
the eyes of his own nationalist supporters but also in the
eyes of the whole ; yptian nation.

when the hgyptian government refused to yield to the
English demands as presented by Lord Allenby, iritish troops
were ordered to take over the custom house at Alexandria,
whose receipts constituted a major source of the revenue of
the Egyptian government. The acting Governor-General of the

Sudan was also instructed to evacuate all Lgyptian units

51

within his jurisdiction from the Sudan. Zaghloul then re-

signed at once rather than ”accept the black looks of the
British community as part of his purgatory."52 He then re-

turned home and soon afterward issued a manifesto to the

5
0For the reasons according to which Egypt always claiued its

right to govern and annex the sudan see: Abbas, pp. 63-64;
Crabtes, "ISR",Foreign Affairs, pp. 620-531; and M. Travers
Symons, pp. 131-256. On this point Arnold Toynbee, well-
known anglish historian, writes, i"Englishmen tended to re-
gard the well-governed and increasingly prosperous Sudan of
the twentieth century as their exclusive creation and
therefore their exclusive affair, to minimize the quanti-
tatively great (though qualitatively subordinate) contri-
butions which Lgypt had made to this achievement, to ignore
the vital economic interest of Tgypt in the Upper Nile
Basin (an interest which was much larger than Great Eri-
tain's), and to brush aside Lgypt's historical title. Thus
Englishmen were as deeply shocked and exasperated when the
Egyptian claim was presented in an extreme and militant
form, as Egyptians were when they found this claim dis-
missed off-hand by anglishmen as preposterous. All the
elements of misunderstanding and bitterness, in regard to
this question, existed on both sides in 1919, and in five
years they combined to produce violent and tragic conse-
quences,"

51e1good, Transit, pp. 295-296.

 

b2Ibid., p. 296.

116.

nation in which he declared that the "cabinet had done its
best to settle the critical situation arising out of the
murder of Sir Lee Stack and to preserve the country from
serious results, but that it had found that its continuation
in office was difficult and would probably expose the country
to dangers which might be avoided by its resignation. [He
alsg7. . . .called on the nation to keep calm, and to remem-
ber it was to its interest to refrain from any act against
public peace. He concluded by saying that he and his friends
were ready to support any cabinet which worked in the interest

53 In other words, Zaghloul proved that he

of the country."
was working for the interest of Lgypt and only for Egypt's
interest, and that he was of the opinion that the murder of
Stack was not right or desirable.

As a result of the murder of Eirdar Lee stack, England
was able to accomplish two important aims; first, it got rid
of the strongly nationalistic and hostile Zafd government;
and second, it secured the Sudan as a purely Tnglish colony?4
These accomplishments did not mean that they were final or
that Egyptian nationalists have ever quit demanding their
absolute independence and their right to the sudan.

Before this point is concluded, it is important to make

it clear here that the Egyptian demand for the control of the

 

ssflafl 191K Times (November 25, 1924), p. l.

54 , a . . g
R I I A, Great LPltEln and ggyct, pp. o-l4.

117.

Sudan was not, by all means, of an imperialistic nature, as

55 It is rather built on

Mr. George Young claims it to be.
5;
historical, natural, and essential rights."6 Crabtes states,
It . . . .is not imperialism but a question of
life and death which causes independent bgypt to claim
the Sudan. . . . without a practical monopoly of the
'unappropriated waters' of the Nile and the right to
erect reservoirs in the Sudan, Egypt cannot expand

and will be unable to provide for her increasing popu-
lation.5

NATIONALISM VS. AUTCCRICY

After Zaghloul Pasha's resignation had been accepted,
King Fu'ad turned to Ahmad Ziwar Pasha, who then was the
president of the Egyptian Senate (Majlis al-Nuwab), and en-
trusted him with the formation of a new government.58 Ziwar
accepted the King's request and without delay went ahead in
forming a "ministry of the aristocracy,"59 so—callcd because
it was composed originally of members of the Constitutional

Liberal party and of the palace clique.

 

55
Young, p. 277.

56Abbas, pp. 73-100.

57Crabtes, "sew", Foreign_affairs, p. 528.

 

5asurvey, 1925, p. 218.

59Kohn, pp. cit., p. 90.

——

 

118.

Ziwar Pasha was known throughout igypt and to the Eng-
lish government for his cooperation with the British author-
ities in Egypt. During uorld War I, reports the New York
Times, :‘He was governor of Alexandria, which was one of the
important depots of the british troops, and he managed to
handle the difficult situation there without friction with

60

the british authorities.” In fact, the English Daily

Herald, Labor's organ, spoke of Zaghloul Pasha as ”being

'forced out of office' to make way for a :ritish nominee."61

In any case it could be said that the new government under
Ziwar was expected to be milder and much more moderate in
its dealings with the firitish than its predecessor, the
strong nationalistic Lafd Party.62

The inclusion in the new cabinet of a man like Ismail

63 who at one time was a

Sidki fasha, as Minister of Finance,
close associate of Zaghloul and a prominent member of the
wafd, but who at a later date had deviated and become a

64 obviously meant that the

bitter enemy of the Tafd Party,
new government was anti-wafd, and accordingly it was not ex-

pected to receive the support of the Parliament which had a

 

ONew Xork Times (November 25, 1924, p. 2:1.
61Ibid., (November 25, 1924), p. 2:2.
62Ibid., (November 25, 1924), p. 2:1-2.

63

 

For the names of the members of Ziwar's cabinet see: Ibid.,
(November 25, 1924i p. 2.

64See Chapter II, p.63 .

119.

Wafdist majority.65

In the afternoon of the same day in which Zaghloul re-
signed his office, he appeared before a meeting of the
Egyptian Chamber of peputies and explained his position in
regard to the current events and gave the reasons which caused
him to resign‘?6 The Chamber, after a i‘stormy scene" following
Zaghloul‘s speech, adopted a resolution to protest to the
League of Nations and the parliaments of all powers against
the British government's exploitation of the sad incident of
Sir Lee Stack's assassination, by aggression against Egypt
and seizure of the Sudan's territory.67

The agyptian people on the other hand listened to the
word of their leader Zaghloul and remained calm, using peace-
ful means in expressing their attitude toward England's harsh
treatment.68 Nevertheless, British troops went on parading
and demonstrating their strength to terrify the Egyptian
nationalists.69

On November 50, 1924, Ziwar's government's discussions

with the British authorities in Egypt came to an end after the

 

65Sidki, p. 31. Cf., R I I A, Great :ritain and Egypt, p. 15.

66New York Times (November 25, 1924), p. 2:1.

For the text of the protest recei ed by the League of Nations
see: Ibid. (November 27, 1924).

 

67

8 .
The students, for example, went on strike but remained at
home. On this see: Ibid. (November 25, 1924), p. 2:1.

69 .- ‘ P . _
Ibid. (wovemoer 44, 1924), p. 2:4.

Egyptian side had "accepted the :ritish conditions relative
to the Sudan and to the protection of foreigners in Egypt."70
On the other hand, the Iritish detachment which occupied the
custom house at Alexandria was to be withdrawn as s0on as
possible.71
About this time rumors were spread all over the world
that the Communist government at Moscow had been trying hard

2
7 The New

to influence the nationalist movement in qupt.

York Times, for example, on December 14, 1924, ran an article
in which it stated that Zaghloul, while in detention at

Gibraltar, and before he was permitted to return to Egypt in

1923, was approached by two Egyptians, ”who spoke in the name

of a certain Troyanovsky of the Moscow Third International,

or Comintern, [and offere§7 to aid Zaghloul in his project

for the complete independence of Egypt."75 But the same arti-
cle goes on to deny any notion that Zaghloul had agreed to
cooperate or to accept any help from Moscow and quoted him

as saying in answer that, ”Lgypt is an agricultural country;
its people believe in the individual ownership and exploita-

tion of property; it is a Moslem country and your teachings

would find no place at the University of al-Azhar. Cur aims

70For details on this point see: Ibid. (December 1, 1924),
p. 1:2.

Ibid. (December 1, 1924, p. 152.

721bid. (December 14, 1924), Sec. II, 9:2.

73

71

Ibid. (December 14, 1924), Sec. II, 9:2.

121.

are nationalistic and patriotic, not internationalistic and
unpatriotic.”74
On February 15, 1925, The New York Times published a
translation of a pronouncement found in one of the numbers
of the International Press Correspondence, published in
Vienna, signed by four Asiatic Communist chiefs, in which the
Communist International denounced the aritish imperialistic
policy pursued in pgypt, called on the workers and peasants
of angland as well as those of the whole world to raise
their voices in protest against it, and addressed the "work-
ers and peasants of hgypt," by the following words:

Do not despair. Keep a brave heart. The advan-
ced workers of all countries are coming to your aid.
Expose the shameful conduct of the igyptian govern-
ment! Unite around your Communist Party! . . . .De-
mend a determined and irreconciliable struggle against
British imperialésm for the complete and real indepen-
dence of bgypt.

This, however, did not indicate that daghloul or the
Nafd Party had ever come under the influence of the Communist
International. Leghloul Opposed imperialism so strongly long
before the Communist regime came to power in Russia. The
Communist International and the Communist party in Lgypt, to
which the appeal had referred, being interested in the des-

truction of imperialism in general, had shared with the net-

ionalists of Egypt their struggle to free themselves from the

 

74Ib1d.

 

75

F-

Ibid. (February 15, 1925), Sec. VIII, 7:4-0.

122.

yoke of Great Britain. An appeal like the one mentioned
above is not, then, a strange thing to have happen.

It is very probable, though, that Zaghloul and the
nationalist leaders were approached by Communist agents, and
other foreign elements, to be helped in their struggle for
freedom and independence. In fact, the expulsion of the
mysterious Henry Rose, on December 23, 1924, a man whose
nationality was not clearly identified, but who was known to
have been using more than one name and giving false informa-
tion about himself, at the same time identifying himself with
Nafdist circles and delivering lectures "reserved for Egypt-
ians, on civilization, courage, and duty,” in which he is
alleged to have expressed violently anti-British Opinions,76
is a good case to illustrate the presence of foreign agita-
tors among the Egyptians during this period.

As it was pointed out earlier, Ziwar's government was
handicapped by the presence of a Parliament with a large Nafd

majority. Ziwar, in order to remedy this, notified the King

 

76Henry Rose was expelled from lgypt on account of his politi-
cal activities which were considered by the Lgyptian govern-
ment likely to disturb public peace. Rose also used the
name of Hirsch Beer, and Abraham Rosenhiem. He claimed to
be a nationalized anglish subject but was found not to have
registered at any British consulate, as it is the custom. gt
the time he was expelled it was found that he had registered
in the hotel in which he stayed as a Rumanian merchant.
Rose during the course of his life visited igypt more than
once, and always identified himself with the Lafdist group.
On this point see: Ibid. (December 25, 1924), p. 4:2.

123.

that "the chambers [Wera7 entirely dominated by the party
represented by the previous cabinet and continuation of par-
liamentary debates would only serve to increase the excite-

ment, giving rise to a worse situation and barring the road

H77

to a solution of the conflict. Therefore on December 24,

1924, Liwar fasha obtained a dissolution of Parliament from

King FU'ado78

The new elections were set to be held in January, 1925,

79

but were postponed until March. The government during

this period did all it could to influence the elections,80

81

and Ziwar managed to have a non-wafd coalition and ”the

Wafd majority appeared to have been reduced to the vanishing

82 but when the Chamber met on March 25, 1925, it

83

point."
elected Laghloul rasha as president by 125 votes to 85.
Ziwar then resigned. sut when his resignation was not accep-
ted, he demanded the newly elected parliament should be
dissolve”. His demand was complied with. "The collapse of
the sgyptian rarliament,” reports the New York Times at that

time, ”is considered a striking victory for former Premier

 

 

77 i- .
Ioid. (Decrmoir 24, 1324), p. 2:0.
78R I I A, Great Britain and Loyst, p. 15.

 

gKohn, 22. 313., p. 90.
80;g;g., p. 91.

81R I I A, Great critain and ;gypt, p. 15.
82Kohn, pp. 915., p. 91.

87a ,, P
USurve , 1925, p. 225.

124.

Zaghloul Pasha, who has maintained all along that the results
in the recent elections afforded his opponents no justifica-

“84 But despite the fact of

tion for forming a government.

this statement, for the following eleven months ”Egypt was

ruled autocratically in defiance of the Constitution and

without iarliament.“85
The new Egyptian government was approved by Great iri-

tain. In fact, hens Kohn speaks of it as *an experiment

which the Lnglish forced upon the country,” and goes further

to declare that after the new figyptian parliament had been

dissolved, "the British government and the tritish press be-

lieved that conditions in Egypt had been restored to normal.86
This situation did not last long, however, as Ziwar

Pasha left for gurope in the sunmer of 1925 forraesons of

88
not only a friend of King Fu'ad but was an adherent and a
very close associate with the newly organized Ittihad party,
.89 .
popularly known as "the King's party.‘I A drastic cris1s

developed in the government at this time due to the hostility

 

84 ,_
ICU” YCFK T1788 (wiBI‘Ch 2%, lgaL), p. $26.

 

85n’ohn, 9p. cit., p. 91.

86Ibid., p. 9.
Newmann, p. 250.

£38 ,
Ibid., p. 2:30.

R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 15.

125.

which occurred bet een the conservative King and the liberal

... A

attitude of the constitutional liberal party.90 The King

1

his confidential adviser, K

Q.
U)
s:
o
:5‘

sh'at ras ha, instigate

(D

a dispute because they felt th: t the time had come to get

rid of the Constitutional Liberalists and to secure an abso-
lute lttihedi (King's friend) government.91 Ihe results were
exactly as the King expected; the three ministers who be-
llnged to the Constitutional Liberal party resigned alcng

with Isma'il sic ki, who called himself independent from all

92

political parties. The government was then reconstructed

. I , :95
"on a purely ralace oasisul
During this period and specifically on x: 20, 1925,

it was announced in ingland that the resignation of Lord

 

90During this period, snaykn Ali Lbdul-Razik, the author of
Islam and the ITthlL]“Q of the Etate, was attacked for the
ideas which he ex:;ressed in this book and was removed from
his office as ecclesiastical judre by the unanimous vote of
the Senate of al-Azhar. (Kohn%%j.'29). When the case was
brought up, in september, 1925, in front of the Minister of
Justice, Abdul-A212 Pasha Eahmi, who also was president of
the Liberal Constitutionalist party, he failed to confirm
the judgment of al-Azhar's senate. Hence he was dismissed

 

 

by a Royal Lecre (Newman, p. 250. ) This resulted in the
res i_gnation of the Lib:,ra l ministers and Isma'il Sidki
Pasha, who called himself an ”Independent.” flee Lloyd, II,
114.

92Isma'il Eidki was vacationing at this time in Vitchi,

Fran e. He went to -urope originally to negotiate with the
government for an agreeme.nt concerning the ” yptian western
frontiers. after his resignation from the cabinet became
effective he was asked to continue the negotiations which
he did. See Sidki, pp. 32-55.

93Lioye, II, 114.

126.

Allenby had been accepted and air George Lloyd (who shortly
thereafter became Lord Lloyd) was appointed to succeed him

_ . , r . . . a 9
as gritlsh Hiya donm1s31oner in sgypt. 4

Lord Lloyd arrived
in Egypt on October 20 of the same ear, to witness the con-
spiracy of the palace clique in taking over the Egyptian
government, and the new nationalist revolution for the pur-
pose of securing the former democratic parliamentary type of
government which had been out of existence in qupt for a
while.

The angry Liberal constitutionalists now turned to the
Lafd party to form a new strong coalition in an effort to re-
store the parliament and prevent ggypt from passing to the
hands of an absolute monarch, represented by the personality

95

of King bu'ad. such a coalition upset the balance of

power,96 and brought about many new problems.

tn hovember 2 , 1925, Zaghloul Pasha, under the direct-
ion of the agyptian constitution which provides that rarlia-
ment must meet on the third saturday in hovember of each
year, called on the deputies to assemble as provided by the
Constitution. when the .gyptian government went against

. a H 97
this wish and sent troops to occupy the garliament house,

 

4(— :‘-"" I r' c‘
survey, lan, p. 2&6.

 

Lloyd, 11, 114.

Newman, p. 250.

127.

98

the deputies proceeded to the Hotel Continental where Zagh-

99 The first decision the

loul was again elected president.
Parliament passed was that it declared itself to be ”a lawful
assembly of the senate and shamber, and denounced the govern-
ment for violating the Constitution.”100

It is obvious then to think of Lord Lloyd, who had just
recently arrived in Egypt to replace Lord Allenby, as getting
worried about the new development in jgyptian politics.101
Lloyd was confronted with the very delicate and important
issue. He was forced to work swiftly to maintain peace.

He had to choose between either supporting the King's
clique, as manifested in the Ittihadist government which was
then in office, or to help restore a democratic government
with a parliament and a constitution, as it was prior to the

a sassination of air Lee Stack. To quote Lord Lloyd on this

U)

point, he had ”the alternative of either Zaghloulism or auto-

cracy."102
If England decided to support the former Ittihadi

government then she would be supporting a government without

any "popular support,” thus it would be rather impossible to

negotiate a durable treaty which would result in peace and

 

Ibid., p. 250.

 

91 _
srockelmann, p. 265.

lOONewman, p. 250.

101Lloyd, II, 114.

lozlbid., 11, 115-116.

128.

103

3

better relations between the two concerned goVernments.
On the other hand, if Lngland supported free elections and

a constitutionalist overnment, then it was feared that the

0“.

strong nationalist nafd party would come back into power.
The negotiation of a tre-ty would then be hard, but once
negotiated it would be more enduring as there was o’ery in-
dication to believe that the sgyptian people were ready to
accept whatever the dafd party might decide for the good of
Egypt.

Lord Lloyd tried to avoid both alternatives by trying
a very shrewd solution for the problem. He influenced the
King to dismiss his close associate and head of the Ittihad
party, Nash‘at rasha, in an effort to win back the most in-
fluential Isma‘il bidki Pasha, with whom Lord Lloyd hoped
that the weak government of Ziwar would be strengthened.104
However, all Lloyd's efforts in that direction were in vein.

The government now was faced with a great dilemma and
found itself obliged to think of holding a new election for
the Parliament. In an effort to reduce the number of Legh-
loul's supporters, the Erime Kinister promulgated a new

electoral law 0 on December 8, 19:5, which “made Eu the

H

(Ti

 

1C5Ibid., II, 116.
1V4Kohn, pp. ci ., p. 92.

1U5Lloyd, II, 152.

minimum age for the active franchise . . .electors who could
show that they had reached a certain leVel either in educa-
tion or as taxpayers were to enjoy the active franchise at

25."106 This, of course, meant that many men from the

\1

farmint districts, the nationalist youth of the country, and

1

many others who would usually support Laghloul would be dis-

qualified. Obviously this was not liied by the Nation 1

L11

Coalition which threatened to boycott the elections if the
government did not ”abstain from enforcing the new .lectoral
Law, and . . . . hold elections under 'the law conforming to
the Constitution'."107

when the government showed some reluctance, the three-
party National Coalition108 called for a National Congress in
Cairo for February 19, 1926. IMore than 95 per cent of all
persons who played a part in Lgyptian public and political
life were present. The demonstration was perfectly orderly
and might claim to voice the sentiment of the whole nation)"09
The government then found it very necessary to change its
position and decide to hold a general election under Zagh-

loul‘s electoral law of 1924.110

 

105Kohn, 92. cit., p. 92.

107Lloyd, II, 153.

108The three parties united in this National Coalition were:
the uafd, the batherland (al-Hizb al-aatani), and th
Liberal Constitutional parties.

109Kohn, oo. cit., p. 93.

_L..____
llosurVey, 1925, p. 227.

 

The outcome of the polling nhich took place on May 22,
1926, was announced to be in favor of the National Coalition,
with a great majority for the Qafd Party.111 The Ittihad
party which was sponsored by the gOVernment and supported by
the King received but 7 out of 200 seats.112

Accordingly, Laghloul was the rightful and most logical
man to be called upon to form the new government. ”This Lord

Lloyd opposed.”113

Zaghloul was "faced with an ugly dilemma?
said Major Newman. "If he had returned to office and worked
in cooperation with the Eritish Government, he would have
broken up the Nations Party [fiational Coalition] and sacri-
ficed his own position. If, on the other hand, he had resumed
power with a great majority behind him and continued his
policy of trying to eliminate the tritish from Egypt and the
Sudan, he would have invited trouble with the nritish Govern—
ment which might well have defeated the objects of the Nation-
alistic cause."114 Zaghloul then, understanding this point
intelligently, declared that he was too old to assume an
office, and resigned to the role of ”the Father of the Father-

land."115

 

7.

[\1

111Ibid., p. 2
112

11:SKohn, pp. cit., p. 93.

l
14Newman, pp. 253-254.

(U

Ibid., p. 2,7.

5
Brockelmann, p. 465.

131. ‘

The King then called on the Liberal'adli Pasha Yakan
(Yagan) and instructed him to form the government.116 The
new cabinet then was formed of six flafdists, three Liberals
and one Independent.117

When Egypt's third Parliament was opened on June 16,
1926, the Chamber of Deputies unanimously elected Zaghloul
as president. from the beginning Zaghloul made it clear that
he would put all his support behind the Liberal Prime Mini-
ster 'Adli Yakan.118 There is no doubt that 'idii needed
the support of Laghloul who alone at that time represented
the popular will of Egypt and controlled the greatest major-
ity of the Parliament. In fact, 'Adli Pasha expected to be
influenbed by Zaghloul who could, at any time, obtain a vote

a 119

During this period the wafdist Parliament tried to
legislate new laws which created some friction between this
body and the cabinet. One of the laws was concerned with the
election of the 'Omdas (mayors). The lafd party in the par-
liament proposed that the 'Omdas of the villages should be

elected in the future only by the people of the village who

 

1163 I I A, Great britain and Egypt, p. 16.

117I‘oid.

llsfigw York Times (June 4, 1926), 9- 533°

119 ..
Amine Youssef icy, Independent Egypt (London, 194U}, p.

149.

132.

120

were enfranchised for parliamentary elections. Such pro-

cedure would resemble the same democratic way of elections as
practiced in the "..est.121 This, though, was not to Lord
Lloyd's liking as he was afraid that “an degh once elected
on a Zaghloulist ticket could safely be trusted to see that
his village voted for a Zaghloulist Deputy."122 Lloyd's
pressure was so great that Yakan opposed this point of legis-
lation strongly.123
The Parliament as led by the hafd party during this
period also wanted to ”make sure that there was nothing
happening behind the scenes which [Woulg7’endanger25tg7

authority."124

Thus it claimed ”the right of the Chamber to
give detailed instructions to ministers as to administrative
measures, . . . . the Prime Minister . . .stoutly denied
this right."125

Another point of difference which occurred between the
Prime Minister and the wafd arose when the latter demanded
from the Prime Minister i‘a pledge that during the King‘s pro-

posed visit to London, Anglo-sgyptien relations would not be

discussed. . . . This pledge,” says Col. Newman, “‘Adli

Lloyd, II, 180-181.

lglKohn, 92: cit., p. 94.

O
1°2Lloyd, II, 181.

1‘31b1d., p. 182.
1MtYoussef, p. 150.
125

Llob’fd, II, 182.

133.

Pasha refused to give."126

It was obvious that when the Prime Minister was con-
fronted by these problems and many others,127 he became dis-
couraged and began to feel that the iafdist parliament was
in opposition to him. Once, while the Egyptian dudget was
being discussed by the Parliament, it was moved that the
Ministry should be thanked for the support and encouragement
that had been extended to Bank Misr. The motion was voted

128

down by a great majority. This displeased the Prime

Minister very much, and despite the fact that the ”leading

members of the wafd itmediately spoke to the effect that this

“129

vote did not imply any lack of confidence, 'Adli Pasha

and his cabinet members regarded the vote as a lack of con-
fidence and decided to resign. ”Zaghloul used all his power
of persuasion," says Col. Newman, "to induce 'Adli Pasha and

"150 but without avail.

131
3

his colleagues to remain in office,
The Coalition government then resigned on April 18, 1927
leaving the ailing Zaghloul in a great dilemma.

The crisis in the government was not allowed to last

for a long time as negotiations between Zaghloul Pasha, the

 

P

1fiaNewman, p. 258. On the invitation which King Eu'ad re-
ceived from King George to visit England, see: New York
Times. (February 25, 1926), p. 25:5.

1('7Newman, p. 258.
12BLioyd, II, 198-199.
1291bid., p. 199.

“O-
U Newman, p. 259.

C, 1
O)
m
o

1C1New York Times (gpril 19: 1927): P-

134.

leader of the majority party, and the Liberal Constitution-
alist, bawrat Pasha, who was the Foreign minister in the
previous cabinet, started immediately. On April 24, 1927,
the New Yerk Times reported that an Agreement was reached

between the two leaders,102

and Sawrat agreed to form the
new cabinet.

Shortly after Sawrat accepted office, the Lafdist
majority in the Parliament which, as was indicated earlier,
has been trying to put in practice its program of democrati-
zation of the country and to achieve an absolute independence,
raised the issue of increasing the effectiveness of the
Egyptian army by adding to its units, replacing the old use-
less articles by modern equipment,15:3 depriving the British
head of the army of his powers as a Eirdar, and investing
those powers in the Army Council.134

This desire instigated a misunderstanding and a crisis.
The hgyptian government supported the notion that i5The
Egyptian army is no concern of the iritish government which
did not mention the matter during the negotiations which pre—
ceded or followed the tritish declaration of Lgyptian inde-
pendence in 1922."155 The jritish authorities in :gypt, oh

the other hand, were of the opinion that once the little

 

T

m

Balbid (' 14 or so T -
o ADPIJ. -.., 1v‘C7), UVCo 1..., 2.10

133 c
Kohn, op. cit., p. e4.
154‘ ‘ .1 ‘r r‘ ‘h r‘
hew YorK limes (May as, 1857), p. 4zc.
135

Ibid.

155.

Egyptian army became strong it would strike against the mighty
iritish forces, at that time considered to be one of the
greatest and strongest armies of the world, and maintained
that ”the Egyptian army policy . . . .was clearly essential
under the terms of . . .Zthe Britis¥7 1922 policy.”1:56 At
the same time the British government, in an effort to cause
the scyptian nationalists to fear losing their independence
if they did not yield to British suggestions and demands,
dispatched three battleships to Alexandria Harbor.137
Dr. Howell, who at that time was planning to leave his
post in sgypt as the United States Minister to that country,
in an interview granted to the Arabic Newspaper al-Ahram,
frankly "criticized britain‘s attitude in the present crisis

‘_‘
...-

and praised the members of the s
138

gyptian Parliament for their
conduct."
The Egyptians fully realized that they could not face
Britain in case of war, and they had no alternative but to
yield; thus on June 4, 1927, an :cyptian note was delivered
in London which denied the fact that the Egyptian government
had planned to dismiss the British Eirdar of the :gyptian

army, and declared that the proposal concerning this point

had been introduced in the parliament by only two

 

'7
U

6Lloyd, II, 194-195.
137

C
0 JV.

Kohn, pp. cit.,

'U

 

138New York Times (Juv

{3
’D
14>-
....s
(O
{\7)
.4

\__/

"O
C
C)
U1
C

13G.

representatives and that it had never been adepted,139

The outcome of the negotiations carried on between the
Egyptian government and Lord Lloyd was summarized in a speech
by bawrat Pasha, the Prime Minister of Lgypt, which he deli-
vered in the Chamber of Deputies on the evening of June 16,
1927. Sawrat then pointed out that his government under the
cdrtain circumstances ”had decided to maintain the status
quo in the army . . . .at the same time safeguarding the
authority and responsibility of the Ministry in these

matters."140

SAWRAT-CHAKLIRLIN KQSCTIATICHS

On February 22, 1926, King Fu'ad accepted an invitation

141 it that time Fu‘ad

from King George to visit London.
hoped to be able to make the trip early in June of the same
year after the opening of the sgyptian Parliament had taken
p1ace.142 The political develOpments in Egypt delayed the
visit, and for a time during the Army crisis, it seemed that
such a trip was impossible. However, on June 16, 1927,

after agypt and iritain came to terms on the Army crisis,

King Fu'ad once again started preparing to fulfill the desire

 

Ibid. (June 5, 1927), p. 17:16.
Ibid. (June 17, 1927), p. 23:4.

 

Ibid. (February 23, 1926), p. 25:5.

137.

which he had entertained for some time and the promise which
he had given to visit England.145

King Fu'ad was accompanied by his Prime Minister,
Sawrat Pasha, whom Zaghloul asked to discuss the political
situation in Egypt with the british government.144 The King
visited first of all in the western European capitals and at
last proceeded to London where he was received with high
honors.145 This, of course, meant very much to King Fu'ad
and to the Egyptian nation as well. It was undoubtedly a
gracious gesture on the part of Great Britain in an effort
to create better relations with the developing state of Lgypt.

During this period also, Lord Lloyd arrived in London.
Despite the fact that Lloyd had quoted his superior, air
Austen Chamberlain to have written,

I did not suggest that we should carry on any

negotiations during his [King Fu'ad's7 visit in

London, but might we not perhaps prepare the way for

conversations between himself and Lord Lloyd when

they had both returned to sgypt.14

It appeared that everything was prepared for the
starting of new negotiations. In fact, directly after
Sawrat‘s arrival, negotiations started between him and the

147

Prime Minister of angland, Austen Chamberlin. This marked

 

143Ibid. (June 17, 1927), p. 23:4.

144Youssef, p. 151.

145

146Lloyd, 11, 227-228.

147Ibid., 11, 231.

Newman, p. 262.

138.

the beginning of a new era in Lgyptian politics which was
culminated by the 1956 treaty.

The negotiations of a new treaty beteeen Lngland and
Egypt were disturbed by the death of the great nationalist
leader Zaghloul, who “had been the one person whose support
of a treaty with England could have insured its accept-
ance.”148

Zaghloul's death did not come suddenly. He was ill
for a long time, but despite this he continued to lead
Egyptian politics and to fight for Egyptian independence.
Zaghloul died in Cairo on August 23, 1927, at the age of
seventy~four. "His funeral in Cairo produced remarkable
scenes, showing the affection and admiration in which he was
held by all classes of the Lgyptian people. The death of no
other ggyptian of modern times has evoked such natural and
genuine sorrow, such manifestations of truly national
mourning, as that of ba'd Pasha Zaghloul, whose chief claim
to the affections of the people was as a great nationalist
leader.”149

The funeral of Aaghloul was followed by twenty-five
thousand persons. Remarks Galatoli,

Deputations from every village in the land laid

the flowers of their fields on the grave of the son of

a fellah who became the Spirit of the Eeople and made

the hgyptians rise from the slough of despondency caused

by 'Orabi's defeat, to a proud awareness of their right
to freedom.150

 

148Newman, p. 203.

1491b1d., p. 263.
150Galatoli, p. 19.

l.J{ VIA... v

 

 

 

139.

The election of a new leader to succeed Zaghloul and
a statement concerrine the policy of the party were two of

k,

the most serious questions ever to face the efd party. On
August 27, 1927, all the parliamentary members of the Wafd
who were in Egypt at that time were assembled to deal with
the problems created by the death of eaghloul.151 However,
the conference accomplished only the setting of a date for a
full conference of the party to be held on September 19, 1927.
During the September 19 conference of the Jafd party,
a manifesto was issued declaring ”that the party would con-
tinue its efforts to obtain the true independence of Egypt
and would follow the principles and aims adopted by Zaghloul.
The manifesto also declared that the fiafd desired to main-
tain the coalition of parties as being necessary to national
unity, and called upon the igyptian peeple to support the
coalition."152 A week later, on September 26, 1927, hustafa
Pasha Nahes was unanimously elected to head the Lafd party
and to fill the vacant chairmanship of the Parliamentary

Committee.153

 

7‘“

DlNewmen, p. 265.

1521bid., pp. 265-266.

Ibid., p. 266.

 

Chapter V.
THE MAKI-G CF TEE 1936 TRIAT‘

It was indicated earlier that negotiations between the
Egyptian brime W niste r, Lawrat :esha and Sir Austin Chamber-

.L. 1-

lain concerning an agreement in regard LC he ngptien ques-

tion was interrupted by the death of Zaghloul iasha. ves~
pits that, certa 1n points were agreed upon1 by both sides
even before the return of Lawrat to Egypt to consult the new
leadership of the Eafd to see where it stood on the matter.

On Movember 24, 1927, the draft of a treaty was sent to
Lord Lloyd, together with a note of instruction in which the
Eritis h Government declared that it had accepted the men-
tioned draft after communication with the Dominions and India,
and ordered him to sign it on behalf of his Majesty, the King
of England, at any time that L wrat was in a po ition to do

9 1 O 2
so on behalf of the :ryptlan King.

\-

Article two of his draft treaty forbade Egypt ”to

adopt in foreign countries an attitude incompatible with the

 

1The British as well as the dgyptian side agreed on the fol-
lowing points: (1) that both governments should enter into
an alliance, (2) that Lritain must assist fgypt in a mili-
tary manner if its security was ever threatened, (6) that
British officers will be charged with training the Egyptian
armies. Lee: Survey, 1926, pp. 246-260 and 253-236.

 

2.1 . ,. .- _
:"vrt, no. 1, 1928. Also, Royal Institute of International
Affairs, Locjypnts on Interrztional Affairs, 1928, ed. by

 

 

John W. Hheeler—sunne.tt (Lendin, 1929), PP. E45— 250- (Here—
after Documcn s, 1926).

 

141.

alliance or liable to create difficulties for his britannic
Majesty; . . . .1327 to conclude with a foreign power any
agreement which might be prejudicial to british interests."
The British Government on the other hand accepted responsi-
bility to use her influence with other capitulatory powers
to obtain modifications of the capituletory regime in Egypt
(Art. 9), and to use her good offices *for the admission of
Egypt to the League of iietionsiz (art. 10), and that England
will be represented in Lgypt by an ambassador with ”prece-
dence over all other foreign representatives” (Art. 11).3
Article seven provided that:

In order to facilitate and secure to His ari-
tannic Majesty the protection of the lines of communi-
cation of this dritish Empire, and pending the con-
clusion at some future date of an agreement by which
His :ritannic Majesty entrusts His Lajesty the King of
Egypt with the task of ensuring this protection, His
Majesty the King of flgypt authorizes His Lritannic
Majesty to maintain upon Egyptian territory such armed
forces as His aritannic Ma esty's covernment consider
necess»ry for this purpose. The presence of these
forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupa-
tion and will in no way prejudice the sovereign rights
of Lgypt.

After a period of ten years from the coming into
force of the present treaty, the high contracting

parties will reconsider, in the light of the provisions

of the present treaty, the question of the localities
in which the said forces are to be stationed. should
no agreement be reached on this point, the question
may be submitted to the Council of the League of
Rations. If the decision of the League of Nations be
adverse to the claims of the igyptian Government, the
question can, at their request and under the same con-
ditions, be reinvestigated at the intervals of five
years from the date of the league's decision.4

142.

This article proved to be the

could have been able to convince the

'V\,-:
Ll.;'

Egypt of the nec inteihin

m

sity of

--
D

l'T".‘

inus has 3 as the em

.. -l
‘1"

Layet-

11:,

rejected the tregty on the grounds

evacuation of the

{T5

for the comylete

firitish military forces.

TH

LIJ

WAFDIST GOVsnI KENT

After the treety dreft hed been

Pasha, Eewret, Knowing that his legal

Minister of ngg t deuer ded on the sup

no choice but to reject the treaty.

he called at the Residency

that the A?

his overnant because, as he explained,
"incompetehle with the indedend
Egypt,n6 From the Residenc 3' the P

to the King's pelece end handed

tion, but, upon the King's reouest,

office until a new

 

 

94:4;811, £3. C(6o

6.~ 7 '1‘. \‘rr ; hr; .-
we! lork limes (chCh u, less), p.
7

 

stumbling

netionelist leaders

port of the
Thus on Ierch 4,
end delivered

.glo-Lgyptien treaty draft n

in the

government could be

block es no he
in
in

Party,

grovide

AND THE ASSEZBLY BILLS

Q

he

rejected by Eehe

existence as Prime

)3fd, had

1928,

a note declaring

on

W— ‘w

not acceptable to

ence end sovereignty of

rims Minister proceeded

Cebinet's resigne-

screed to re main in

formed.

In answer to the Egyptian rejection of the draft
treaty, the :ritish government on March 7 delivered a note
to cawrat Pasha in which they declared that since . . . .

the conversations with the Lgyptian government
failed to achieve their objective, His Le'esty's
government cannot permit the discharge of any Lof
their responsibilities under the declaration of
February 28, 1922, to be endangered, whether by
Egyptian legislation or by administrative action,
and they reserved the right to take such steps as in
their view the situation might demand.8

Such a note was very shocking to Lgyptian diplomats and
in certain political quarters it was feared that no one would
dare to face the situation by accepting to form a new cabi-

net.9

. . lO - - .

On March 16, 1928, Mustafa al-hahas Pasha accepted
and formed a new Lafdist cabinet. lhree days later when the
new ministry met the Chamber for the first time, the Prime
minister announced in a formal statement the policy of the
new government tonard aritain. He said,

. . . .the_Cabinet's policy would be to main~
tein completeély/ the rights of Lgypt and the Sudan

in accordance with national dignity and to coisoli-

date the constitution. The Cabinet does not intend

to admit anything encroachina on the comolete inde-
pendence and sovereignty of the country.

 

 

 

8Ibid. (March 8, 1928), f. 1:8.
91b1d. (March e, lees), p. 4:4.
1 i . h
On I I A, treat ~ritein ard .gypt, p. c0.
11

few York Times (March 20, 1928), p. 4:6.

 

144.

The first task the new govsrnmant had ves to give an
answer to the strong éritish note of March 4, 1928. On
March 30, nghloul delivered to Lord Lloyd 8 note in which
he expressed on behalf of the :gyptian government her ”deep

regret” towards his side memoirs of March 4, and pointed out

 

that the Egyptian government had considered that the aide
memoirs “does not correspond with its frank willingness to
deVelop and fortify the bonds of friendship which should

govern the relations between Great “ritein and Tgypt.“ Fur-

ther, it declared that the aide memoirs showed good evidence

 

of British “interference with the internal conduct of fgypt-
ian affairs, perslyzing the exercise by earliemant of its
right to legislate and ccntrol administration, and rendering

impossible the existence of a government worthy of the neme.i

U')
(

J

T

P

LL

U1

And at last he declared that ‘for these rea. the Lgyntian

goVernment cannot admit the principle of an interv iticn

q . u o a ‘0 u i12
WHlCh would be tantamount to its Veritaole BbCICEtlon.”

In answer to this note, Lord Lloyd informed Uehes
Pasha that he was unable to accept his note ”as a correct

1

oetwe n Crest writain

(D

6Xpositicn of the relations existing

and hgypt, or their respective obligations,‘ as they were
0 o -, 1 (,9 (ur‘ (a 13

oy the declaration of reoruary ad, lees

LL
0

determine

 

12

15
For the text of both notes see: Ibid.

Ibid., (April 5, 1928), p. 8:1-2.

 

145.

On March 31 the British government received a note
from the Egyptian government then headed by Nahes Easha.
This note was interpreted to indicate jgypt's refusal to
consider any terms of the proposed Anglo-Egyptian treaty as
a basis for further discussion betxeen iritain and :Eypt.
The note included the following three demands: "First,
complete independence; second, the right of pgypt to defend
the Euez Canal with her own army without the assistance of
British forces unless figypt explicitly requested them;
third, that pgypt should be regarded no longer as a member
of the gritish ;mpire but an ally on an equal footing with
dritain."14

In answering this note of Nahas, the :ritish govern-
ment declared that the demands were not acceptable to her

and reminded the ggyptian government of the February, lgs2,

eclaration.

Ci

Meanwhile, three bills usually referred to as the
Public Assembly 5111s were introduced in the lower House of
the sgyptian Parliament giving the right to ;3yptiens to
assemble and hold demonstrations, increasing the power of

the 'Omdahs (the Village headmen), and vine the Lgyptian

(K,
H.

people the right to carry arms. The British authorities

 

Ibid. (April 1, 1928), p. 52:6.

15 , . _‘ . n
Ibid. (spril a, less), 111, 0:2.

 

146.

immediately reacted to that and demanded the withdrawal of
the bills on the basis that they were in otnflict with the

‘ebruar" 28, 1922, Declaration.16 The lgyptians,on the other

I11

3

hand, considered the introduction of such bills as a comes-
tic affair and not the concern of the aritish government.

on the 29th of April, 1928, the Aritish Besident handed
an ultimat‘m to the Egyptian government in which the former
requested the Lgyptian krime minister ”to take the necessary
steps to prevent the Bill refulating public meetings and
demonstrations from becoming law.” Further, it warned him
that if ”a categorical assurance in writing that the above
mentioned measure will not be proceeded with,“ delivered to
the Residency within forth-eight hours, then ”His Britannic
Majesty's government will consider themselves free to take

17 In the

such action as the situation may seem to require.”
meantime it was reported that part of the british Mediter-
ranean fleet stationed in Malta was ordered “to proceed
., - _ , . , V H18

immediately to ngypt to await oeVelopments.

On the second day the Erimc kinister Nahas Easha, re-
acting under fear of new nritish occupation, asked for a
secret session in the Chamber of Deputies, “in order that a

“19

special matter might be discussed. When this was granted

he read the british ultimatum and after three hours of dis-

 

lslhli- (April 12, 1928), p. 15:1.
17L10yd, II, 272.

18New Ybrk Times (April 50, 1928), p. 1:3.

19
Ibid. (May 1, 1928), p0 30:20

 

147.

cussion it was agreed that the Public Assemblies Bill would
be postponed until next session. During the time until the
next session the cabinet was supposed to seek a compromise
with the aritish government on the issue.20

On April 1 the Lgyptian Cabinet met again and drafted
a reply answering the British ultimatum. In the reply Egypt
voiced her regret at dritish interference in flgyptian legis—
lative matters but nevertheless informed the Eritish auth-
orities of her recommendation to the Parliament to ”postpone
further proyress on the Assemblies Law until the next
session, hoping in this manner to give Britain an opportun-
ity of reconsidering its position in a calmer atmosphere.”21
The Jritish government accepted the word of Nahas on the
postponement of the Public Assemblies sill but warned him
against the danger of any attempt to revive such a bill in
the future.2

On June 24, 1928, after some misunderstanding had
occurred within the Agyptian cabinet, two Liberal and tab
Hafdist ministers resigned their offices. Nahas did not then

do what was expected of him; that is, submit the resignation

20
I id.

“

21Ibid.. (May 2, 1928), p. 6:2. For the text of'the Egyptian
reply to the iritish ultimatum of June 29, 1928, see:
Ibid. (May 3, 1928), p. 29:6. '

D?

 

148.

of his government to the King, but instead he tried to
fill the vacant offices by members of his own party and keep
on going. The opposition then published some documents
which accused Nahas and two other prominent members of his
party of accepting a bribe to use their political influence
in the Egyptian courts in favor of a wealthy party};5

King Fu'ad now lost patience with Nahas and the Parlia-
mentary regime, “his hated enemy."24 On June 25, 1928, he
dismissed Nahas from the premiership on the grounds that his
Ministry Jwas formed on the basis of a coalition which no
longer existed.”25 On the same day the King invited Muhammad
Mahmud to form a new cabinet. Mahmud formerly had been a
prominent member of the gafd party but had broken with it in
1922 after a quarrel with Sa'd Zaghloul ”over the latter‘s
attitude toward Great aritain.” He then joined the Liberal
Constitutional party and in time advanced in its ranks to
become its Vice-President.26

A man of Mahmud's sympathies and background was not
wanted by the bulk of the Lgyptian people who were nationa-
listic in their general outlook and in general supported

the "true” nationalist Wafd party. Thus demonstrations were

 

ESIbid. (June 25, 1928), p. 6:1

24Lloyd, II, 276.

r
‘5Naw York Times (June 28, 1928), p. 1o;2,

 

149 0

held against the new Premier, the Egyptian press attacked

him severely, and the Egyptian Parliament which had a

wafdist majority planned to give him a vote of non—confidence.
To combat this the King immediately on June 19, 1928,

suspended both Houses of Parliament for a period of three

years by a royal decree. The press immunity likewise was

suspended indefinitely, and the King and his ministers an-

7

nounced that they would rule over Lgypt by themselves.2

This was the start of a new reign of dictatorship.

MAHMUD'S DICTATORSHIP AND THE AEGLO-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS

In an editorial in the New York Times issue of July 20,
1928, it was noted that ”behind King Fu‘ad‘s decree lies the
momentous admission that the limited self-government granted
by the sritish to sgypt has failed. . . . From now on, [the
article went on to saz7'2gypt will in reality be governed
from London. Her King, placed on the throne by Britain,
will take orders from the British High Commissioner. There
will be no political opposition to trouble him, for temper-
arily at least the lafd as a Parliamentary force is wiped
out of existence together With electoral self-governrmennt.“28
In other words, the King by his decree carried Egypt 8 step

backward.

 

27Ibid. (July 20, 1928), p. 6:1.

28Ibid.

However, it appeared now that England under the present
circumstances would succeed in concluding a treaty with the
new regime in Egypt. In June of 1929 Oxford University in-
vited the dictatorial Prime Minister Mahmud Pasha to come to
receive the Honorary Degree of Doctor of Civil Law. Upon
his arrival in London Mahmud Eashe was approached by Mr.

0;
Arthur Henderson, the successor of Sir Austin Chamberrfh,

and was given the new terms for an Anglo-Egyptian tree.ty.29

The official text of the proposals which later on was issued
by the Foreign Office included the following points:

(1) The military occupation of Lgypt by British
forces is terminated, but troops are to occupy locali-
ties bordering the Suez Canal; (2) an alliance is
established between the two countries, with cooper-
ation in foreign policy and mutual assistance in case
of war; (2) lgy'tien legislation is to be applied to
foreigners, and the jurisdiction of the Consular
Courts is to be transferred to the mixed tribunals;
(4) the status of the Sudan remains as under the 1899
convention, and a battalion of Egyptian troops is to
return to the Sudan; (5) ambassadors are to be ex-
changed, and Great Er itein is to support ngypt's
entry into the League of Nations.3

 

9During this period there was also a change of government
in England. The Labor party succeeded in replacing the
Tory. As a result of this Lord Lloyd, the High Commiss-
ioner of ';gy: at was forced to resign on the grounds that
the policy which he conducted in :gypt was not entirely
agreeable to the Labor government which appeared to be
interested in pursuing a more liberal policy in Egypt.
For details see: Ibid. (July 26, 1929),10:p; (July 26,
19?;9), p. 6:4, and p. *6: 1; (July 27, 1929),. 4:1, and
4: 2; and (July 30,1929), p. 8:2.

0 , - - . . .
Thomas Greenwood, ”nritain's Lerils in the New

 

 

'ugy, tian
Treaty”, Current History (November, 1929), p. $22. For
th text of the draft proposals see: Egypt, No. I (1L29)
Cmd. 5606. Also it could be found in the flaw York Times

 

 

(August 7, 1929), p. 7:2.

151.

It appeared that the new proposals, which were in fact
based in general upon the prOposals agreed upon between Sir
Austin Chamberlain and bawrat Pasha in 1927, had appea ed to
Mahmud rasha, who in a note addressed to Mr. Henderson de-
clared himself as willing to submit those proposals to the
Egyptian people and Earliament ”in the sincere belief that

w 1 o e o - '7‘
tneir acceptance would be in the interest of my country.""1

In a message dated Au ust 6, 1929, addressed ”to the people

of Lgypt” he announced:

I am happy to announce that after long and
difficult negotiations I have succeeded in obtaining
proposals for settlement of relations between Lgypt
and England on the basis of friendly, mutual under-
standing.

Full details will be published in due course,

- and it is my fervent hope that they will be examined
in the spirit of enlightened patriotism by all
Egyptians who love their country, regardless of
party or creed. I believe that if examined in this
spirit they will be found to go far beyond any pro-
posals which have preceeded them, and that a treaty
embodying these proposals will consolidate friend-
ship and enable the two countries t2 cooperate in
preserving the peace of the world.0
Before leaving London on August 6, 1929, Premier

Mahmud promised Mr. Henderson that upon his return to flgypt

he would bring about the election of a new Earliement.

This Parliament, thought Mahmud, will ”accept the present

proposals as the best possible thing they could get.””

 

Sllbid.
32

‘ u
I

The text was published in new York Times (August 6, 1929),
p. 8:4.

 

ZSIbid. (Auéust 7, 1929), p. 1:79

However, the thought which Mahmud expressed concerning
the Egyptian Parliament's acceptance of the new prOposals
for an Anglo-Egyptian settlement L88 not expected by close
observers to become a reality because the Lafd party was
determined to defeat these proposals and “showed even less
mercy to Muhamrad Mahmud than they had shown to 'nbdu ‘1-
Khaliq sawrat,"34 who had negotiated with the dritish in
1922.

On the 61st of August, 1929, Mahmud rasha addressed a
meeting of his Liberal Constitutional party and was able to

convince the members to pass a resolution approving the

R
u

()1

Henderson-Mahmud proposals. On the same day Nahas Pasha
addressed a meeting of the Jafd and demanded that Mahmud
Pasha resign, declaring that the Lafd would not express any
opinion on the proposals except in Parliament.36 The 13:;-
had party (the King's party), the third most important party
in Egypt, issued a statement in which it announced her
approval of the proposals. This Was the reaction of the
Egyptian political parties to the Henderson-Mahmud proposals

before the election of the new Parliament had taken place.

 

4, .
Survey, 1930, p. 206.

:55 N,

Ibid., pp. cu-ZO4.

36Ibid., p. 204.

 

153.

The attitude of the Wafd toward the Henderson-Mahmud
proposals, its refusal to discuss them except ”under the
Dome of the Chamber , and only after Mahmud Pasha had re-
signed, plus the new attitude of dislike developed by King
Fu'ad toward Mahmud Easha whom the King thought of as be-
coming very powerful and personally ambitious, placed
Mahmud in an uncompromising position and forced him to re-
sign from the premiership on the second day of October,
1929.37 King Fu'ad accepted Mahmud's resignation and sent
for the great mediator ‘Adli Yekan (Yeghen) and asked him

-' 'I '2;
to form Ha temporary administration.“8

The acceptance of
the King‘s request by ‘Adli Pasha put an end to the dicta-
torial regime of Mahmud Pasha as the new government started
planning to restore constitutional life to Egypt.

On December 21, 1929, the new elections took place in
Egypt and the results were exactly as everyone expected
them to be--the Jafd won, almost with an exclusive majority.
Nahas rasha was then charged with forming the new govern-
ment.

In his speech on the occasion of the opening of Bar-
liament on January 11, 1930, King Fu‘ad expressed his satis-

faction concerning the present era of friendship bet een his

 

F

07
Kohn, pp. cit., p. 106.

New York Times (Cctober E, 1929), p. 25:1.

 

154.

country and England and voiced the hope of entering into

negotiations with Lngland soon. The new negotiations, he

hoped, would lead to the draft of a new treaty between the

. 39

two states concerned.
0n the 6th of Eebruary, 1930, 3the Zafdist government

asked and obtained . . . a mandate from the Deputies to

open negotiations with the Eritish government on the basis

.4 .
of the Henderson proposals.“O Negotiations as scheduled
were formally opened in London on March 51, 1950. doth

parties were friendly and appeared to be interested in
reaching an acceptable solution. In fact there was a great
hope that a treaty (between the two concerned parties) would
be concluded soon, and thirteen of the sixteen clauses of

the Henderson-Mahmud proposals were adopted without much

41

discussion. A disagreement arose, however, between the

two negotiating parties over article Fifteen of the draft
which dealt with the Sudan question. This article read as
follows:

While reserving liberty to conclude new conven-
tions in the future modifying the conventions of 1899,
the high contracting parties agree that the status of
the Sudan shall be that resulting from the said con-
ventions. accordingly the Governor General shall
continue to exercise on the joint behalf of the high
contracting parties the powers conferred upon him by
the said conventions.42

391913' (January 12: 1930), II, 4:5.
40.1231- (February 7, 1930), p. 4:2.

41George Glasgow, ”The anglo-ggyptian dreakdownd, The Contem-
porary Review (July, 1950), p. 112.

 

 

guew York Times (August 7, 1930), p. 7:4.

155.

Despite the many efforts of Mr. Henderson to satisfy
the sgyptian claims in the Sudan, the conference at last
adjourned on April 17, 1930, after Nahas had informed the
aritish negotiators that the Egyptian delegation "could not
commit themselves to accept the treaty as they did not feel
that their requirements in regard to the Sudan had been
adequately met.“43 At the same time though, Nahas Pasha
asked for a copy of the proposed treaty and notes so that
he could send them to Cairo for discussion.

0n the 5th of May discussions were resumed. Kahas
then submitted a modified Lgyptian draft treaty with two
alternative proposals for the Liudan.44 The British nego-
tiators at this point informed Nahas that unless the English
draft of the treaty was restored, the negotiations would be
broken off. bhen the two parties refused to compromise,
the conference was brought to an end. "Nevertheless,” re-
marks nr. Kohn, ”both parties regarded the rupture as merely

temporary, and both Henderson and Mustafa Nahas Pasha gave

 

 

assurances of undiminished friendship."45

43.. -, I . .. {q '-
n I I A, Great sritaln and Egypt, p. LO.

44(a) "without prejudice to Egypt‘s rights and material in-
terests in the Sudan, the High Contracting parties agreed
that the question of the Sudan shall be reserved for future

negotiations to be conducted between them in the course of
the period of one year from the *atification of the present
treaty.” (b) Alternatively, ”. . . reserved for the future
negotiations. Meanwhile the de facto position obtaining in
the buden before 1924 shall be restored.‘ See: Ibid, p.25n.

 

5
Kohn, 9p. cit., p. 109.

 

JI'III'II"

or,

Upon his return to Lgypt, Nehas rasha, who had never
forgotten that King Fu'ad had dismissed him from office in
June, 1929, and had also dissolved the Parliament for a
period of three months to prepare the way for a dictator—
ship by Kuhammad Mahmud Pasha, wanted to put an end to the
possible recurrence of such distatorships. Thus in May,
1930, he submitted to the King a bill ”which was intended
to safeguard the constitution” by inflicting direct major
penalties on any Minister who attempted to suspend the con-
stitutional liberties.46

The King, who was dictatorially inclined, not only
ignored the request of his Prime finister that he sign the
bill but he went further to voice dissatisfaction with its
provisions. This led the Tafdist cabinet to resign "to

preserve its dignity.”47

THE DICTATORSHIP CF ISMA'IL SIDKI PASHA AND THE NEW CCNSTITU-
TION

On June 17, 1930, Nahas submitted thgresignation of his
cabinet to the King and it was accepted. Isma'il Sidki
Pasha, who was then regarded as "a vigorous enemy of the

Wafd and of democracy and a great favorite in European

 

 

45_
New York Times (June 17, 1930), p. 6:6.
47Ib1d.

*—

157.

financial circles in Lgypt,“48 was reQUGStGd by the King to

form a new government. Isma'il did not by any means enjoy

a majority in the Earliament or have even the support of the
_ , 1 , . Ag ,

palace ano tne edrOpean financiers,- nevertheless he

"\

accepted the King's request and on the Eoth of June, 1930,
he submitted to the King the names of the members of his
ministry. They were five Ittihadists and five Liberal Con-
stitutionalists. The Kin immediately approved of it des-
pite the fact that the fiafdist party which controlled the
great majority of the seats in the Parliament did not have
any representation in the new government.

The fiafd party, of course, was in opposition to the
new regime; in fect,it urged and arranged huge demonstrations
throughout the country and publicly declared that,

The stand of the gafd from the new cabinet could
be summarized in that the hafdiet Pepresentatives do
not support a cabinet which is unconstitutional, and
which does not submit her program to the Parliament
for a vote of confidence. LThe nefd7 shall fight every
cabinet which does not observe those rules and consider

it to be rebellious against the gonstitution and the
rights of tie Lagyptian people.~

 

 

 

 

4d
Konn, Op. Cit., p. 111.

49‘ O -r'\. j v - Lr _ ~__ ‘ 3'. '_ o _ 1 ‘r ‘ ' .‘ _
as quoted in. or. m. H. naykel, I. hazini, and m. 3. .inner,
al-giyesah el-iisriyyah we linoileb al—dusturi (Jairo, 1929),
p. 9.

50

 

....J

m
J

C

To ease the situation the King exercised his preroga-

tive under Article 39 of the Jcnstitution end adjcurned
--.. _ .1 .- . - r. +‘ 51 7" ‘
rariiament for a period 01 one month. however, the new

1

cabinet announcec directly thet *it will always insist thet
the country should enjoy a constitutional life which is the

true sign of cooperation betxeen the government and the

3

y

nation.”52 This, of course, did .ot guerentee that the
democratic constitution of 1923 should be protected or the
free elections for the Parliament would be held; it simply
meant that there would be in Lgypt a kind of e constitution
and a kind of a parliament which the new dictatorship would
cause to be in accord with its regime.

The Eritish authorities agpeared to be puzzled by the

new develogments and did not Know exactly whet to do. It

was cleer to them that sidki's government was not wanted by
the bulk of the igyttian yeoble and thet the regime would

never be able to accomylish anythin: eccegtable b0 the
majority of the Egyptians, but nevertheless Ingland seemed
to have enjoyed the fact thet fishes and his iafd were out of
power. gritein then took the stand that whet were going on
in sgypt were but domestic h s and were not of her

2
concern.5“

L0

lNew York Times (June 22, lgbo), o. 115.

CW.

U
m

hayka , p. ll.

53 1 ‘ h ‘ ° W} 1 7
Tbid., Ep. ll-lc. ”A reference is made to ihe (London,
Times (June 23, 1900).

...:
(n
(r)
O

V

The first Chang

LU

the new government attempted to carry
out was to replace the democratic constitution of 1925 by a
new constitution which in the future would limit the power
which the gafd yarty could receive through free and direct
elections. Eidki basha justified this action by declaring
that ”Egygt is not Lurope” anl what suits Zurope of political
freedom and direct election is not necesSPrily suitable for
Egypt which did not enjoy a long democratic tradition.54
After this was accomtlished, Sidki's government
announced that ”a general election has to be held in the
spring of 1931.“ The purpose behind the announcement was an

attempt ifto legitimize the regime which they had established

0..

e facto in the preceeding year by securing for it a retro-

I

{‘0
f)

...:
(3

active 9 rl'imentary sanction; and it ma, a forgone con-

(D
'0

clusion that an election held under the existing conditions
would produce a Parliament that would be amenable to Kin'
. . 55
Fu‘ad's W111."

bidki, the Prime Hinister who strangely enough never
officially belonged to a political party, found himself now
obliged to form a new party which would support him and his

regime in the general elections. The new garty Sidki named

k

54Sidki, p. 43.

55
survey, 199g, pp. 665-556.

 

160.

Hizb al-Sha'b, or the People's Party. ”This political

 

organization did not have a political program of its own and

(3.;

it did not limit itself by a definite plan or a fine goelxfie
To assure himself of victory in the new elections,

Sidki forcibly suppressed *the Uafd's attempts to conduct an

0'1
.4

election campaign." This plus other grievances which the

fiafd had held against the government led the Mafd and the
Liberal Constitutional parties to boycott elections.58 As a
result the aha'b party headed by Premier sidki and supported
by the Ittihad party was able to secure the great majority of

. s . 59 , an ‘-. -
the seats in the rarllament. Following that “ugypt lemply/
disappeared .rom the news for a While.

This did not mean that the opposition had given up and
that the dictatorial regime of Sidki ruled with harmony and
peace. Demonstrations, attacks on government policies, and
bitter criticism of sidki and his regime by the Iafdists and
the Liberals continued all through this period. However,
nothing of any importance happened in ;gypt until the last

part of 1935.61

,—

On September 21, 1935, Eidki iasha resigned the premier-

ship because of health difficulties. He was succeeded by

 

56Haykal and others, p. 19-

57survey, 1936, gp. 913-, p. 666-

58R I I A, Great sritain and Egypt, Po 50°
59
60

survey, 1936, p. 666.
R I I A, oreat sritain and favot, p. 51.

61Ibid.

 

161.

'Abdul Fattah rasha Yahya, the former hinister of Foreign
Affairs. The new regime did not bring any change in the
government, it simply carried on after the steps of Sidki's
dictatorship.62

During this period King Fu'ad became ill and had to
isolate himself from politics for a while. Ihis situation
gave Zaki Pasha al-Ibrashi, the Director of the Royal Privy
Purse, a chance to forge ahead and seek more power for him-
self. A great rivalry resulted between him and the weak
Prime Minister, who immediately sought help from the :ritish
Resident in dgypt.63 The nationalist Wafd then came to the
aid of Ibrashi fasha against what they described as "an un-
warrantable -ritish interference in Lgyptian internal a-fairséfi4
This alliance between the Jan and the palace put Premier
Yahya Pasha in a critical and dangerous position which he
was not ready or in a position to handle. Thus Yahya Fasha

had to resign. His resignation was accepted and he was

 

 

succeeded by Tawfiq Resin rasha.65
62..= 7
survey, 1956, p. 667.
65
Ibid., p. 668
64Ibid.
65“ . , i . s i
r I I n, Greet nrltain and Egypt, pp. él-QQ.

 

162.

THE ngsToieTch ca PnRLIAXqNTARY are etzzrlidiic*wt LIFE To

Kasim resha, who at one time was the leader of the
Ittihad party (Palace party), a pa sonal edvisor of the
King and one of his closest friends, went on record as being
opposed to the constitution of 1930 and he refused to co-
operate with Sidki's government. Nasim Pasha now ‘ecame an
advocate of the 1923 constitution and parliamentary life for
:gypt. Thus when he was invited by the King to form a new
cabinet he made his acceptance dependent upon the fulfill-
ment of some conditions. Although those conditions were

r made public,66 there are indications that they included

7
men

(B

(D

a r quest for the abolition of the 193 Constitution and a

return to parliamentary life as provided for by the 1923
, . . - I w 0 .' )1 ' ,' r. 67
Constitution and as it eXisteo prior to sidxi s regime.
The King may not have liked this idea but he had to com-
promise with Nasim rasha, who accepted the Premiership offi-
cially on No ember 12, 1854, and on the 53t1 of the same
month King Fu'ad signed a decree abolishing :idki's Consti-
tution and dissolving the Earliament which supported him.

This was considered a great victory to the nationalist Wafd

party which now hoped to return to power.

 

66. r?”
survey, less, p. 668.

67R I I A, Great iritain and E;xst, p. 32.

163.

In June of 1935 the Lafd party issued a manifesto in

which it was declared that they would sugport :esim Tasha.68

This, of course, strengthened the position of hasim but made

him largely dependent on the gafd's sup,ort of his policies.
During this period the Italians invaded Abyssinia.

The Eritish who under the unilateral declaration of February,

1922, had reserved for themselves “the security of communi-

cations of the firitish impire in igypt,” and ”the defense of

Lgypt against all foreign aggression or interference direct

”59

or indirect, decided now that the Italian aggression

affected the ngyptian security and necessitated immediate
iritish preparations to meet the Italians if they aggressed
against or threatened the nritish interests in Egypt.

This conflict [reports the surve$7 affected
Egypt closely in several different ways. In the first
place her sympathies were engaged in behalf of a
fellow African country. In the second place, deci-
sions were required of her as a state with at least the
formal attributes of sovereignty, in the face of a war
between two of her neighbors. In the third place, she
found herself at closer quarters geographically with
the belligerents than other countries who, like Egypt
herself, were not actually engaged in the struggle.
And in the fourth place, the difficulties and dangers
of her position were vastly inc‘eased by the conse-
quences that now began to flow from her anomalous re—
lation with Great nritain. In fact, these consequences
were so grave that they inevitably raised the whole of
the Anglo-agyptian question more urgently than it had
ever been raised before.

 

 

 

164.

The iritish, of course, wanted to move some more of
their troops to Egypt and decided to use Alexandria as the
he adoUert~rs of their naval opera tions in the area, but

nevertheless, in response to representations made by Premier

...»
O

assurance that no

/4

sim rasha, the iritish gave ubl

71

military or naval measures would be taken on igyptian soil

1

without previous communication and discussion with the

[11

gyptian goverr ment. 71

When, despite that, on tctober 18, 1935, in an elec-
tion speech at Eenzen e, Hr. galter Edgifi n announced that
"the Sritish Mediterranean Fleet had been temporarily trans-

ferred from n a>1ta to A1exandria,"72

the pgyptian political
groups revolted against the government in power and again
denounced aritish imperialism. hehmud Pasha, the leader of
the Liberal rarty, in a speech which he delivered at a mass
meeting in Cairo, called for the resignation of Nasim's
Cabinet, condemned the aritish infringement on Egypt's sover-
eighty, and at the same time ‘Ihe demanded the iimediete con-
clusion of a treaty [with Great gritein7 to regu”arize the
position.“73 The Lafd at this point also withdrew its sup-

port for the Cabinet and demanded an i mediate restoration of

 

 

 

Arthur Merton, ”Great eritain and gypt', Contagpor ary :e-
view (flarch, 1936), p. 217. Hereafter cited “GEE”, Cont.
Review, larch, 1956).

72- . 3 o 1"; .. ...‘ i P:
h I I A, Great :ritain and hgypt, p. c4.

75

Ibid.

 

165.

the 1923 Constitution. The Agyptian students were moved by
the two parties to demonstrate against the standing regime
and to ask for the restoration of the 1925 Constitution.

This new development in the Egyptian national struggle
brought about the unification of all Lgyetian political
parties in a ”United Front“ which had the objective of ob-
taining "the return of the 1925 Constitution and a treaty
on the basis of the 1950 proposals which are considered as
still binding to treat aritain.”74

In any case it could be observed that the Egyttians
now for the first time in their modern history started to
think that they were really in need of a :ritish alliance.
They realized that if it was not for the presence of england
in Egypt, the Italians, hungry for building an Italian empire
in Africa, could have easily chosen to attack the fertile
valley of the Nile instead of the less fruitful Abyssinia.
many of the Lgyptian statesmen began to feel sorry for not
coming to an agreement with :ritain in years passed, and
started to look for a new opportunity to improve Anglo-
Egyptian relations by concluding a treaty on the basis of the
1930 proposals.

Nahas Pasha now changed his tone and started preaching

better understanding and cooperation with Great iritain. In

 

166.

a speech which he delivered on September 8, 1935, he said
that ”there could be no cooperation with Great britain un-
less the people of Egypt so willed," and added, "We shall
not take part in a coming war unless we can do so on a basis
of cooperation between equals.”75 This was a great indica-

tion that the strong nationalist leader and head of the

Nafd, the strongest national :gyvtian party, was willing to

J-

[..Jo

tf

U.‘
f—Jo

nces with Great :r

(‘1'
{D
H
FT
'6
(D
(‘3
O
‘ D
,0
Q;
£0
0
O
..D
'73
C...
I")
...]
i...)
} .1.
£17

n.

On December 12, 1935, the United Front preseited Sir

"5

ing of negotiations between Eritain and Egypt on the basis

of the 1950 pro*osals. This note was signed by the most

f

influential leaders of the country, includine Nahas, Kehmud,

,,
;
n

"1

and sidki.7° Meanwhile, in En land Mr. Tden succeeded Sir
Samuel Hoare as head of tie Foreign Cffice.

Cn January 20, 1936, Sir Miles Lampson presented King
Fu'ad an answer to the appeal for a treaty. ”A settlement

of the outstanding uettions would be welcome, but the mili—

,Q

U"

H)

t

D“

tary clauses would ir ave to be settled. If igytt

(I)

agreed, there was no reason why negotiations for the other

questions should not follow. The Sudan would have to be in-

”'77

cluded in any settlement. On February 4, anthony Tfden..,,

 

5 .. I ,‘ o I"

As quoted in n I I a, treat Britain and sgypt, p. 64.

.A reference 's made to LLondonf The Times (:eptewber 9,
1935).

 

 

76

R I I A, Great dritain and Ervcu, o. 56.

77Merton, ”GEE" Cont. Review (March, 1956), p, 314.

 

 

167.

he Foreign Secretary, told the House of Sermons in an
answer to a question which he'sas asked, that

The High Commissioner was instructed to state
that His hejesty‘s government was prepared to enter
forthwith into con ersations with the :gyptian govern-
ment with the object of arriving at an Anglo-Egrptian
treaty settlement. fiith a view to promoting the pro-
spects of a comprehensive settlement, His Iajesty's
government thought it desirable to begin with the
categories which have given most difficulty in 1930.
They felt that, if these difficulties were surmounted,
the prospects of reaching a settlement would clearly
be favorable.

--1

The egyptian diplomats did not want to lose any oppor-
tunity this time, and King Fu'ad immediately asked Nasim
Pasha to resign and in cooperation with the Eritish wish of
having an lgyptian government representing all parties for

negotiation, the King asked Nahas fasha to form such a cabi-

net; but when he insisted on having only

£0

Lafdist Cabinet,

the Kin left him and turned to 'Ali mahir iasha, the

Director of the Royal Cabinet, who succeeded in forming ”a
neutral Cabinet under himself and a delegation for negotia-

tions under Nahas rasha consisting of thirteen members, viz.

.1

seven Jafdists, the 1 alers of the Liberal, sneéo, and Itti-

(D

issentient “afdist."79

,0;

had parties, two independents and a

 

78- _ , _ ah i
h I I A, Great :ritain and E vet, pp. 00-07.

 

79
Merton, ”GiE“ Cont. P view, (march, 1956), p. 319.

 

168.

THE 1936 TREATY

On March 2, 1956, negotiations were opened in Cairo
between the Tnited Front and the eritish government as it
was represented by sir miles Lampson, the head of the dele-
gation, and included a staff of senior naval and military

80
iefore any concrete results were reached, on april 26,
1966, King Fu'ad passed away. He was survived by his son
Faruq, who was still a minor, and a council of regency had
to be appointed. A great difficulty was experienced by all
Egyptian parties over the formation of the council of regen-

cy. The government of 'Ali Xahir found itself in a difficult

to

ituation over the regency question and chose to resign.

Thus an election of a ferliement had to be ,xpedited and on
the 2nd and 7th of May, 1956, elections were held. The hafd,
as usual, swept the elections and won 166 seats out of 252

in the Chamber and 62 out of 79 elective seats in the den-

81

ate. Three days later hehas sasha formed an exclusive

nefdist Cabinet and in due time restored the most beloved
1923 Constitution.
Conversations beteeen the aritish and [gyptian delega—

tions were resumed in Cairo a day after the return of sir

(

Miles from London as he was called earlier for a short

 

R I I a, Great :ritain and E vpt, p. 36.

 

l:- f
O
:1
K1
0
*1
7’:
i-Zl

limes (May 8, 1956), P-

169.

period of consultation. The igyptian delegation now appeared
to be willing to accept the military clauses and the clause
in regard to the Sudan as they were stated in the 1930 draft
proposals. The jritish, on the other hand, agreed to end

)

pi
q.” 1 . . 82 V ... . i_ .
ngnea in London and was ratified by the :gyptian rarlia-

the system of ca tulations. Ch iugust 26 a treety was
ment on kovember 15 and 18, and by the LPitiSh Earliement on
November 24 and 25, 1936. Thus it became a 18W binding in
both countries.

according to this treaty of alliance83 the military
occupation of igypt was terminated. (Art. 1) British
troops, however, were to be kept in the Canal Zone for the

Egression from

m

purpose of defending the Canal against any
outside and to maintain the security of british communica-
tion through that area. ”The presence of these forces shall
not constitute in any manner an occupetion and will in no

way prejudice the sovereign rights of lgypt.“ it the end of
a period of twenty years the question of whether the British
forces should remain there or not should be determined. How-
ever, it should depend on whether the ggyptian army would be
in a position to carry the responsibility or not. If any
disagreement might arise, the case would be submitted to the

Council of the League of Kations (Art. 8). fhe number of

 

82Ibid. (August 27, 1956)

83” .: . .
bor the complete text of the JTreaty of alliance Between
His Majesty, In Respect of the United Kingdom, and His
Majesty the King of ggyptd, see appendix No. IV.

 

170.

British troops in the Canal pone iishall not exceed, of the
land forces, 13,000, and of the air forces, 400 pilots,
together with necessary auxiliary personnel, e.g. clerks,
artisans and labourers.” (Annex to Art. 8).

The King of gngland is to be represented in Egypt by
an ambassador who will be accorded precedence over the re—
presentative* of other countries. Likewise, the King of
hgypt shall be rep'esented at the Court of it. James by an
ambassador who will be duly accredited. (Art. 2).

The United Kingdom agreed to sponsor the entry of

bgypt into the League of Nations as a complete sovereign and

b

p‘

independent state. (Art. c). The two contracting parties
also agreed ”not to adopt in relations to foreign countries

an attitud

CD

which is inconsistent with the alliance, nor to

conclude political treaties inconsistent with the provisions

of the present treaty.” (Art. 5).
The two parties further agreed to come to the aid of

each other in case of war with a third part"; iritain agreed
to defend Egypt while pgypt promised to elace under the Sri-
tish disposal all communication facilities available. (Art.
7).

The ngyptian immigration into the sudan was not to be
restricted ”except for reasons of public order and health”
(Art. 11, sec. 4). Egyptian troops are to be returned to
the Sudan, but are to be toEether with the anglish troops

under the disposal of the Governor General (Art. 11, sec. 3).

171.

The signing of this treaty of alliance started a new
era of relations between gngland and Lgypt. Neverthe ess,
it did not take the Egyptian nationalists long to discover
that this treaty of 1936 was not exactly what they wanted.
The day when the fear of an Italian invasion ended, the

respect of the Lgyptian nationalists for this treaty ended

and a new era of nationalist struggle began.

172.

Chapter VI

C' ’ " . ' ?* nr‘d' " T'C'TF‘TI
lJU~-J-\-LLLFX 11s). 14:.) ax) ‘-'.'-CLU“‘I.L \-LJ

In summary it could be said that the Napoleonic inva-

(I)

sion of igypt in 179 drew _gypt onc o more into international
diplomatic affairs. The strategic importance of this country
became very clear to EurOpean nations, especially areat
Britain and France. nothe r PQSL 1t of the xe poleonic wars
was tLe coming of Luharnad 'eli to Egypt. This uneducated
Turkish officer was able in the course of time to distinguish
himself as a military genius and an accomplished statesman.

Through diplomacy and otherrise, luno' ad ‘ili became the

ul in securing in that

'"fJ

rasha of “gypt and was success
country a hereditary state to be ruled by his heirs.
Muhaamad '311 was also a reformer. he labored hard to
industrialize, westernize, and educate jgypt. For that pur-
pose he SOUght the help of french scholars whom he hired to

work in ggypt, and he sent e3yptian students to be educated

in France. Those educated and westorriized igyptiars had a
tremendous influence in bringing uestern ideas and ioe0103ies

to the hiyptian soc1ety, but their influence did not extend
to the roots of that society.
The second important ruler to govern and influence

ypt was the ‘ra “d on of nuhanmad ‘nli, Khedive Isma'il,

‘

who was educated in the nest and was very interested in was-

ternizing and develtping the :gylttim nsociety. He started

173.

where his grandfather loft off and led an extensive reform
movement in many fields. He was very extravagant, however,
and was finally forced to sell Egypt's grand share of the
buez Canal to nisraeli, the ,n lish :rims hinister, and to
borrow huge sums of money from uropean nanns. Khan ho

was unable to pay his debts, oritain and Erance, who were
greatly inter wt d in .3th, particularly since the di33ing
of the buez canal, forced two advisors on him; an English-
man who would control the finances of agypt and a Frenchrsn
who would supervise the interior affairs of the country.

The extravagance and corruption of Isma'il's resime
and the interference of Angland and France in Iéyptian
affairs, followed by the advent of Jamal el-Din al-Afghani,
well-known propa 3a nrdis t and reli3ious loader, prompted the
Egyptian intelligensis to revolt and to demand the tbserva-
tion of their rights and the integrity of their country.
Their revolt was used by the ;ritish as an excuse to justify

their occupation of sgypt in 1882.

The presence of anglish trUOps in itypt aLd the in-
crease of the number of intelle ctu ual who had studied in

surope intensified the Anglo-cgyptian relations. The igypt-

ians, by this time, were dchloping a sense of beloneins to

each other and to prpt, becoming nationalistic, and begin—
ning to de and i'Egg t i‘or the ugyptians.

with the turn of the century the Japanese were victor-
ious in their war with the Russians. This had a great psycho-

103ical effect on the ygygtians who beget to think that

lifti fl

174.

the LUPOPEBDS were not t-e sugcrior race they claimed to be.

The turopean

U}

, just as any other t;csle, could be defeeted
and conguered.

rrior to Eorld ':r I, Egyutien netionelish tat limited
to the intellectuals of the CLUUth, but the ou break of war
changed th's, ;;yot res declared to be e grotectorate and
an lnglish puppet Covernment was established. brring the war
Colonial trOops were brought into Egypt. The presence of such
troops injured the Lgyotians pride and they were appalled by
the trooos crude conduct. For he first time the fellahin
in the small villages were aware of the oc upetion forces.
Able men were taken from the feris to work for the -ritisn
forces, their amiaals were also taken aray to be used by t
military force and only the old, the unfit, and the women
were left on the land. The land was left uncultivated CEUEiRQ
hunger to strike in the succeeding years.

‘

During the var the ;ritish paid high prices for the
available food in the Joyrtien markets, making high profits
for the great landlords and merchants but bringing only

misery and hunger to the fellahin and littl; people of the

cities. bisease broke out, adcilg to the hardships.

04
£0
(D
:1
'~<,‘
‘15
F
..‘J

.Jo
U)
G)
(P

Also, during the war the iritish ma
regarding Lgyyt, declaring more than once tnet they were
only in that country to orotect its sovereignty anl indepen-

t

yptians, believing the British s atements and

(‘1‘!

the ccnceuts of “self-determination” as stated by President

175.

Woodrow Dilson of the United states, congeratefi with the
British and waited for the peace settlement, eXpec ting that,
under pressire from the thPlCEUS and other liberal groups,

r‘.
‘-

Lriteins first act would be to tree ;gypt.

However, when the war was concluded, he
found thet ;n; lend kert her forces there and showed no in-
tention of recognizing tryttiin sovereignty. The Igygtian
16 ads s, led by Leghloul re sha, peels d to er
world for justice but receiving no symgethy or assistance,
they revolted.

The intellectual nationalists at this time found
supoort from the saystian fellah who had learned to dislike
inoerielisru durinv the nor. The ngotian he tionalist leaders

could Mi-kitly clair at this time that they represented and

socks for the entire sky
The Lritis h eutho ities exiled Zegrloul end his

colleebues but could not cacify the Cryptisns and, thus, in

H.
....»
C1"
'T
d.
:3
t D

19 22 they i‘ound tnelcclv obliged to con,rcs

nationalists oy offerin: to re‘; lace the Cccuuetion rwiime by

K44

I
d‘
L_J
m
r ~r
m
f:
k
m
LV’
( D
:1
} _J
<

L

L

a treaty. hothing acceetable to the

H
J

:5

Ha

so crset ~,rita'xin issued the February 1923 fw=c er t' n
which she recognized the sovereignty and independeLce of
Tngygt but with four reservations: (1) The protection of
pritish communications in “gyst, (Z) t11e defense of gygt
ageinst any foreign egtression or interfer-nce, (E) the pro-

tection of foreigiers and fOFSleH interests in 3:”gt, (4)

the cuden.

176.

The nafd, the party led by naghloul, denounced the

....
*1

Lu'a

[\
L

I

\D

J.
3.

t n

Y)

FJ

H

u

( i7

declaration, out nevertheless it was aces; C by

whose title was cheneed at this time to King. A democratic
constitution was written, segthJl end other nationalist
leaders were released from exile and allowed to return to
.tione then here held and the Iefd came into power.
This geriod witnessed the birth and develcpment of

political parties in ygyyt. The most imyortant e on: those

03

fd, lariest and Lost highly oriahized, the Lioeral

‘
werwa ”he

s

I" 4. ' . ‘ ; ,, .. ‘_\ 'I- _ . .-., .IV ,V A ..\ ‘ —‘
constitutional grfty, the sectno lei wet, she the

‘1

l

forty which was the «atremist and the oldest Party. These

,1.
j
W
(U
(P
e
*5
d.
p
(I)
01
H.

deluded in their yrogregs the demand for an

J

U

absolute inoeoenoence for ‘gylt.

[I

J

a;
Q.

.EEC’

by Leghloul rashe continued its

...;
3‘
CD
Q
Ft
Q.
T
m
W
:‘1‘
x

(L

eoendence, but in 1824 it chose to

‘4.

sale ior absolute in
resivn rather than to accept the harsh ultimatum issued by
General Lllenby, then the Resident in ggypt, following the
assassination of cir Lee ~tacx, the Governor of the ,uden and
the -irdar of the .gystian army in Cairo.

The government which succeeded the nefd in office
accepted the ultimatum and dissolved the )Eyptian rarliament

'PS

(H

containing a gafdist majority. In the succeedirg ten ye
tho qefd then had to content with critish imoerielism on one
hand and hing ru'ad‘s autocracy on the other.

Durin; this geriod oa'd Zathloul died and Leheo Easha
‘he death of gaghloul

replaced him as the leader of the “afd.

weaxened the laid and affected the religious groans vho began

5‘”.

177.

to think of new ways and methods to solve the figyttian gro—
blems than those followed oy the Jifd and other political

L’E‘r‘tlt’} S 0

King Fu'ad desirefi to rule veyyt as an absolute
monarch. Thus he urged one of his friends, Resin Easha to

form a rJolitical part" supporting a rcnarch\. The latter
ccmtlied, forming the Unionist Barty, often referred to as
the King's party. The King's purpose in this was to use

this party as a means of ruling over the country ,crsonelly

as he wished. The King's efforts in this direction were st

strongly opposed or the flxfd party as well as by other

(‘0

\
v

1

liberal gr

"I

. In the decade fricr to 1936, Lgy,t was

1

7'.
”Lt—r
a.

(

uled by three dictatorships with a heriod of intermission

in which the nefd oarty, which was always able to crntrol

the majority of votes in rarliament, was allowej to rule.
The greatest among those dictatorships was that of

r"\

Isma‘il :iixi :asna (lQEo-l

\

"idki

(fl

). During this Period

Cr}

v'

1

Pasha dissolved the drmocratic :arliament an: replaced it
with a sham. Further, he attempted unsuccessfully to abolish
the democratic constitution of 1923 and reolace it with one
he had written.

The international trouoles of the middle thirties and

the fear resultiné from the Italian invasion of ;thiopia

4

(1'

influenced the nationalists to accept a treaty witi ore»
Sritain in 1936. This treaty aid not achieve for Zgypt the
indeoendence they had desired, out it was a matter of exeedi-

ancy, not meant to last

 

mrf

In conclusion, the student of Lgyptian history cannot
help but observe that ”gyptian nationalism has its roots in
the Lapoleonic invasion of ygypt and the coming of muhammad
'sli. eetween that time and 1918, the nationalistic ideas
were limited to the intellectuals of the country LhO had
been abroad in lurOpe or had had the chance to study European
writings and philosophies.

after the war, however, the .gyptian nationalists were

the cormcn peOple of the country (fellahin), with the intel-

H
(j
H.
rr)

loctuals or their sons as leaders. fact distinguished

utian from huropean nationalism of the 19th century which

1
w
<<
.—

was manipulated by the middle class. The eXplanation of this
may be found in the fact that during the period 1914-1936
there was no middle class in ;5ypt in the sense understood

in the heat, but nevertheless the :gyptian fellah was Just

H)

as exposed to the tyr»nnical acts 0 the people above him
and the exploitation of foreigners in the country as much,
if not more, than the middle classes of Lurope during the
19th century.

Such observers could also not fail to notice that

isvntian nationalism had stemmed from two facts, first the

:JA-

w

corrupted social and economic systems of the country, as

the wealth of Egypt, including the land, we and still is

C')

concentrated in the hands of a small group of people, namely
the upper class in agypt, and second, from the ill-treatment
which the fellahin had received from the gnglish troOps and

rulers who were in ;gypt. The :ritish were also disliked on

179.

the basis of their religion, foreign lancgu uage , and the fact

that they Here the pIOdUCt of a different stock of people.
The leaders of .gyttian nationalism were men who were

either educated in the Yest or had had some good exoeriences

I

along western lines. tary of tfl9h_8130 were trained in law.
This helped CyltlQD n: tionalists to OPC“D1 e ther nselves in
political parties and systems. The "ofd party, for example,
had an organization almost in every town or villeoe in the

L.

country, no matter how small. The fd party dur mg the

m

period from 1914-1926 always tried to get into power in a
legal and constitutional manner and not through demagogary.
The Lafd also were the cha noions at d main supporters of a
constitution which gua anteed democratic life and groceedings
for egypt.

ypti n he ti on alis .t ultih tete goal was not only

03

the achievement of comgleto independence for ,gypt but in-
sisted on the existence of a democratic and constitutional
regime as well. lhey wanted to see their country adVancing
and deVeloping on puropean lines and technicues. This was
because they were sole to see that in order to be strong and
able to defend themselVes against any foreign agreesor they
must dev lop scientiiically.

The acceptance of the 1936 treaty was only a matter of
necessity and expediency. Any historian who has had the oppor-
tunity of observing the developments which led to the conclu-

sion of the said treaty could easily have predicted that this

180.
Frcm the

KS desired.
have

m

ypti
n nationalists

VII
3ng '?~2t 1:
VJ -

trexty w

beginniné until this very déte the

as not exactly what the 3g
.nding co plete infleandence for Hgypt.

(3

been dfim

101.

APPENDIX NO. I

Differenciation between two reignsl

 

At the end of At the end of

 

Sa'id's reign Isma'il's reign

Number of cultivated

faddans 4,052,000 5,425,000
Imports .3. 1,991,000 5.3. 5,410,000
Exports 5.8. 4,454,000 L.E.l$,810,000
Income b.E. 4,837,000 8.3. 8,562,000
National debt 2.3. 5,300,000 s.:.9&,540,000
Population 4,855,000 5,518,000
Schools 185 4,817
Railroad tracks (miles) 275 1,185
Telegraph lines (miles) 650 5,820
Canals (miles) 8,400

 

1Taken from Muhammad Rif'aat, Tarikhu Misr al-Eigasi :1 al-
Azminah al-Hadithah (Cairo, 1952), Apoendix II, 255.

182.
APEiEDIX NO. II
Program of the National Party of Egypt

1. The National party of ;gypt accept the existing rela-
tions of ;gypt with the Ports as the basis of their movement.
That is to say: They acknowledge the Sultan sbd e1 Hamid
Khan as their Suzerain and Lord, and as actual Caliph or
Head of the Mussulman religion; nor do they propose, while
his empire stands, to alter this relationship. They admit
the right of the Ports to the tribute fixed by law, and to
military assistance in case of foreign war. At the same
time, they are firmly determined to defend their national
rights and privileges, and to oppose, by every means in
their power, the attempts of those who would reduce ngpt
again to the condition of a Turkish Pashalik. They trust
in the protecting Powers of Europe, and especially in Eng-
land, to continue their guarantee of Egypt‘s administra-
tive independence.

2. The National party express their loyal allegiance to the
person of the reigning Khedive. They will continue to sup-
port Mohammed Tawfiq's authority as long as he shall rule in
accordance with justice and the law, and in fulfillment of
his promises made to the people of ;gypt in September, 1881.
They declare, however, their intention to permit no renewal
of that despotic reign of injustice which Egypt has so

often witnessed, and to insist upon the exact execution of
his promise of Parliamentary government and of giving the
country freedom. They invite His Highness, Mohammad Tawfiq
to act honestly by them in these matters, promising him their
cordial help; but they warn him against listening to those
who would persuade him to continue his despotic power, to
betray their national rights, or to elude his promises.

3. The National party fully recognize the services render-
ed to Egypt by the Governments of England and France, and
they are aware that all freedom and justice they have obtained
in the past has been due to them. For this they tender them
their thanks. They recognize the European Control as a
necessity of their financial position, and the present con-
tinuance of it as the best guarantee of their prosperity.
They declare their entire acceptance of the foreign debt as
a matter of (national honour)--this, although they know that
it was incurred, not for Egypt's benefit, but in the private
interests of a dishonest and irresponsible ruler-—and they
are ready to assist the Controllers in discharging the full

national obligations. They look, nevertheless, upon the
existing order of things as in its nature temporary, and
avow it as their hope gradually to redeem the country out

of the hands of its creditors. Their object is, some day to
see :gypt entirely in ;gyptian hands. Also they are not
blind to the imperfections of the Control, which they are
ready to point out. They know that many abuses are committed
by those employed by it, whether fiuropeans or others. They
see some of these incapable, others dishonest, others too
highly paid. They knew that many offices, now held by
strangers, would be better discharged by jgyptians, and at

a fifth of the cost; and they believe there is still much
waste and much injustice. They cannot understand that
Europeans living in the land should remain forever exempt
from the general taxation, or from obedience to the general
law. The National party does not, however, propose to remedy
these evils by any violent action; only it would protest
against their unchecked continuance. They would have the
Governments of France and jngland consider that, having
taken the control of their finances out of the hands of the
sgyptiand, they are responsible for their prosperity, and
are bound to see that efiicient and honest persons only are
employed by them.

4. The National party disclaim all connection with those
who, in the interest of rowers jealous of Sgypt's indepen-
dence, seek to trouble the peace of the country-~and there
are many such--or with those who find their private advan-
tage in disturbance. At the same time they are aware that a
merely passive attitude will not secure them liberty in a
land which is still ruled by a class to whom liberty is hate-
ful. The silence of the people made Isma'il Pasha's rule
possible in ;gypt, and silence now would leave their hepe of
political liberty unfulfilled. The igyptians have learned
in the last few ‘ears what freedom means, and they are re-
solved to complete their national education. This they look
to find in the Parliament just assembling, in a fair measure
of freedom for the press and in the general growth of know-
ledge among all classes of the people. They know, however,
that none of these means of education can be secures except
by the firm attitude of the national leaders. The Egyptian
Parliament may be cajoled or frightened into silence, as at
Constantinople; the press may be used as an instrument
against them, and the sources of instruction cut off. It is
for this reason and for no other that the National party has
confided its interests at the present time to the army, be-
lieving them to be the only power in the country able and
willing to protect its growing liberties. It is not, how-
ever in the plans of the party that this state of things
shall continue; and as soon as the people shall have estab-
lished their rights securely the army will abandon its pre-
sent political attitude. In this the military leaders fully

in.

184.

concur. They trust that on the assembling of the Parlia-
ment their further interference in affairs of State may be
unnecessary. but for the present they will continue to per-
form their duty as the armed guardians of the unarme"
people. Such being their position, they hold it imperative
that their force should be maintained efficient, and their
complement made up to the full number of 18,000 men. They
trust that the European Control will keep this necessity in
view when considering the army estimates.

5. The National party of Egypt is a political, not a reli-
gious party. It includes within its ranks men of various
races and various creeds. It is principally Mohammedan,
because nine-tenths of the Egyptians are Mohammedans; but
it has the support of the Moore, of the Coptic Christians,
of the Jews, and others who cultivate the soil and speak
the language of Egypt. Between these it makes no distinc-
tion whatever, holding all mento be be brothers and to have
equal rights, both political and before the law. This
principle is accepted by all the chief Sheykhs of the Azhar
who support the party, holding the true law of Islam to for-
bid religious hatrcd and religious disabilities. With
Europeans resident in Egypt the Rational party has no quar-
rel, either as Christians or as strangers, so long as these
shall live comformably with the laws and bear their share
of the burdens of the State.

6. Finally, the general and of the National party is the
intellectual and moral regeneration of the country by a
better observance of the law, by increased education, and by
political liberty, which they hold to be the life of the
people. They trust in the sympathy of those of the nations
of Lurope which enjoy the blessing of self-government to aid
Egypt in gaining for itself that blessing; but they are aware
that no nation ever yet achieved liberty except by its own
endeavours; and they are resolved to stand firm in the posi-
tion they have won, trusting to God's help if all other be
denied them.

December 18, 1881.

 

This is the Programme of the National Party of Egypt, as for-
warded by Mr. Blunt to Mr. Gladstone, than Prime Minister of
Great Eritain, Dec. 20th, 1881.

APPENDIX III

DECLARATION TO EGYPT

JHEREAS His Majesty's Government, in accordance with their
declared intentions, desire forthwith to recognize hgypt as
an independent sovereign State, and

JHEREAS the relations between His Majesty's Government and
Egypt are of vital interest to the British empire;

The following principles are hereby declared:-

1. The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated,
and Lgypt is declared to be an independent sovereign State.

2. 80 soon as the Government of His Highness shall
pass an act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants
of Egypt, Martial Law as proclaimed on November 2, 1914,
shall be withdrawn.

3. The following matters are absolutely reserved to the
discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it
may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommoda-
tion on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto
between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt.

(a) The security of the communications of the
British Empire in Lgypt;

(b) The defense of Egypt against all foreign
aggression or interference, direct or indirect;

(3) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt
and the protection of minorities;

(d) The iudan.

Pending the conclusion of such agreement the status quo
in all these matters shall remain intact.

28th February, 1922.

186.
APPENDIX IV.

TREATY OF ALLIANCE EETAETH H S MAJESTY, IN RHEPE“T OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM, AND HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF EGYPT

London, August 26, 1956

Art. 1. The military occupation of Egypt by the forces
of His Majesty the King and Emperor is terminated.

Art. 2. His Majesty the King and Emperor will hence-
forth be represented at the Court of His Majesty the King of
Egypt and His Majesty the King of Egypt will be represented
at the Court of St. James's by Ambassadors duly accredited.

Art. 3. Egypt intends to apply for membership to the
League of Kations. His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom, recognising Egypt as a sovereign independent State,
will support any request for admission which the Egyptian
Government may present in the conditions prescribed by Arti-
cle l of the Covenant.

Art. 4. An alliance is established between the High
Contracting Parties with a view to consolidating their friemr
ship, their cordial understanding and their good relations.

Art. 5. Each of the High Contracting Parties undernflms
not to adopt in relation to foreign countries an attitude whim
is inconsistent with the alliance, nor to conclude political
treaties inconsistent wfldlthe provisions of the present'UUaty.

Art. 6. Should any dispute with a third State produce a
situation which involves a risk of a rupture with that State,
the High Contracting Parties will consult each other with a
view to the settlement of the said dispute by peaceful means,
in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the
League of Nations and of any other international obligations
which may be applicable to the case.

Art. 7. Should, notwithstanding the provisions of Art}
cle 6 above, either of the High Contracting Parties become
engaged in war, the other High Contracting Party will, sub-
ject always to the provisions of Article 10 below, immediat-
ely come to his aid in the capacity of an ally.

The aid of His Majesty the King of Egypt in the event
of war, imminent menace of war or apprehended international
emergency will consist in furnishing to His Majesty The King
and Emperor on Egyptian territory, in accordance with the
Egyptian system of administration and legislation, all the
facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of
his ports, aerodromes and means of communication. It will
accordingly be for the Egyptian Government to take all the ad-
ministrative and legislative measures, including the establhdr
ment of martial law and an effective censorship, necessary to
render these facilities and assistance effective.

187.

Art. 8. In view of the fact that the Suez Canal,
whilst being an integral part of Egypt, is a universal means
of communication as also an essential means of communication
between the different parts of the British Empire, His Majes-
ty the King of Egypt, until such time as the High Contracting
Parties agree that the Egyptian Army is in a position to en-
sure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of
navigation of the Canal, authorises His Majesty The King and
Emperor to station forces in Egyptian territory in the vicin-
ity of the Canal, in the zone specified in the Annex to this
Article, with a View to ensuring in co-operation with the E
Egyptian forces the defence of the Canal. The detailed
arrangements for the carrying into effect of this Article are
contained in the Annex hereto. The presence of these forces
shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in
no way prejudice the sovereign rights of Egypt. ,

It is understood that at the end of the period of
twenty years specified in Article 16 the question whether the
presence of British forces is no longer necessary owing to
the fact that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure
by its own resources the liberty and entire security of navi-
gation of the Canal may, if the High Contracting Parties do
not agree thereon, be submitted to the Council of the League
of Nations for decision in accordance with the provisions of
the Covenant in force at the time of signature of the present
treaty or to such other person or body of persons for deci-
sion in accordance with such other procedure as the High Con-
tracting Parties may agree.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE 8

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article
7, the numbers of the forces of His Majesty The King and
Emperor to be maintained in the vicinity of the Canal
shall not exceed, of the land forces, 10,000, and of the
air forces, 400 pilots, together with the necessary an-

cillary personnel for administrative and technical duties.

These numbers do not include civilian personnel, e.g.
clerks, artisans and labourers.

2. The British forces to be maintained in the
vicinity of the Canal will be distributed (a) as regards
the land forces, in Moascar and the Geneifa area on the
south-west side of the Great Bitter Lake, and (b) as re-
gards the air forces, within 5 miles of the Port Said-
Suez railway from Kantara in the north to the junction
of the railway Suez-Cairo and Suez-Ismailia in the south,
together with an extension along the Ismailia-Cairo rail-
way to include the Royal Air Force Station at Abu Sueir
and its satellite landing grounds; together with areas
suitable for air firing and bombing ranges, which may
have to be placed east of the Canal.

188.

3. In the localities specified above there shall
be provided for the British land and air forces of the
numbers specified in paragraph 1 above, including 4,000
civilian personnel (but less 2,000 of the land forces,
700 of the air forces and 460 civilian personnel for
whom accommodation already exists), the necessary lands
and durable barrack and technical accommodation, inclu-
ding an emergency water supply. The lands, accommoda~
tion and water supply shall be suitable according to
modern standards. In addition, amenities such as are
reasonable, having regard to the character of these
localities will be provided by the planting of trees
and the provision of gardens, playing fields, etc., for
the troops, and a site for the erection of a convales-
cent camp on the Mediterranean coast.

4. The Egyptian Government will make available
the lands and construct the accommodation, water supplies,
amenities and convalescent camp, referred to in the
preceding paragraph as being necessary over and above
the accommodation already existing in these localities,
at its own expense, but His Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom will contribute (l) the actual sum spent
by the Egyptian Government before 1914 on the construc-
tion of new barracks as alternative accommodation to
the Kasr-el-Nil Barracks in Cairo, and (2) the cost of
one-fourth of the barrack and technical accommodation
for the land forces. The first of these sums shall be
paid at the time specified in paragraph 8 below for the
withdrawal of the British forces from Cairo and the
second at the time for the withdrawal of the British
forces from Alexandria under paragraph 18 below. The
Egyptian Government may charge a fair rental for the
residential accommodation provided for the civilian
personnel. The amount of the rent will be agreed be-
tween His Majesty‘s Government in the United Kiigdom and
the Egyptian Government.

5. The two Governments will each appoint, immedia-
tely the present treaty comes into force, two or more
persons who shall together form a committee to whom all
questions relating to the execution of these works from
the time of their commencement to the time of their com-
pletion shall be entrusted. Proposals for, or outlines
of, plans and specifications put forward by the repre-
sentatives of His Majesty‘s Government in the United
Kingdom will be accepted, provided they are reasonable
and do not fall outside the scope of the obligations of
the Egyptian Government under paragraph 4. The plans
and specifications of each of the works to be undertaken
by the Egyptian Government shall be approved by the re-
presentatives of both Governments on this committee be-
fore the work is begun. Any member of this committee,

189.

as well as the Commanders of the British forces or their
representatives, shall have the right to examine the
works at all stages of their construction, and the
United Kingdom members of the committee may make sugges-
tions as regards the manner in which the work is Carried
out. The United Kingdom members shall also have the
right to make at any time, while the work is in pregress,
proposals for modifications or alterations in the plans
and specifications. Effect shall be given to sugges-
tions and proposals by the United Kingdom members, sub-
ject to the condition that they are reasonable and do
not fall outside the scope of the obligations of the
Egyptian Government under paragraph 4. In the case of
machinery and other stores, where standardization of
type is important, it is agreed that stores of the stan-
dard type in general use by the British forces will be
obtained and installed. It is, of course, understood
that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom may,
when the barracks and accommodation are being used by
the British forces, make at their own expense improve-
ments or alterations thereto and construct new buildings
in the areas specified in paragraph 2 above.

6. In pursuance of their programme for the deve-
lopment of road and railway communications in Egypt, and
in order to bring the means of communications in Egypt
up to modern strategic reguirements, the Egyptian Govern-
ment will construct and maintain the following roads,
bridges and railways:--

(A)--Roads

(i) Ismailia-Alexandria, via Tel-el-Kebir,
Zagazig, Zifta, Tanta, Kafr-el-Zayat, Damanhour.

(ii) Ismailia-Cairo, via Tel-el-Kebir and
thence continuing along the Sweet tater Canal to Helio-
polis.

(iii) Port Said-Ismailia-Suez.

(iv) A link between the south end of the Great
Bitter Lake and the Cairo-Suez read about 15 miles west
of Suez.

In order to bring them up to the general stan-
dard of good-class roads for general traffic, these
roads will be 20 feet wide, have by-passes round villages,
etc., and be made of such material as to be permanently
utilisable for military purposes, and will be constructed
in the above order of importance. They will comply with
the technical specifications set out below which are the
ordinary specifications for a good-class road for
general traffic.

Bridges and roads shall be capable of carrying
a double line of continuous columns of either heavy four-
wheeled mechanical transport, six-wheeled mechanical

 

rl'1

190.

transport or medium tanks. With regard to four-
wheeled vehicles, the distance between the front axle
of one vehicle and the rear axle of the vehicle next
ahead shall be calculated at 20 feet, the load on each
rear axle to be 14 tons, on each front axle to be 6
tons and the distance between axles 18 feet. With re-
gard to six-wheeled vehicles, the distance between the
front axle of one vehicle and the rear axle of that
next ahead shall be calculated to be 20 feet, between
rear axle and middle axle to be 4 feet and between
middle axle and front axle 13 feet; the load on each
rear and middle axle to be 8.1 tons and on each front
axle to be 4 tons. Tanks shall be calculated for as
weighing 19.25 tons, to be 25 feet over all in length
and to have a distance of 3 feet between the front of
one tank and the rear of the next ahead; the load of
19.25 tons to be carried by tracks which have a bearing
of 13 feet upon the road or bridge.

(B)--Railways

(1) Railway facilities in the Canal Zone will
be increased and improved to meet the needs of the in-
creased garrison in the zone and to provide facilities
for rapid entrainment of personnel, guns, vehicles and
stores according to the requirements of a modern army.
His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are here-
by authorised to make at their own expense such subse-
quent additions and modifications to these railway
facilities as the future requirements of the British
forces may demand. where such additions and modifica-
tions affect railway lines used for general traffic, the
permission of the Egyptian Government must be obtained.

(11) The line between Zagazig and Tanta will
be doubled.

(iii) The Alexandria-Mersa Matruh line will be
improved and made permanent.

7. In addition to the roads specified in para-
graph 6(A) above, and for the same purposes, the Egypt-
ian Government will construct and maintain the following
roads:--

(1) Cairo south along the Nile to Kena and Kus;
(ii) Kus to Kosseir;
(iii) Kena to Hurghada.

These roads and the bridges thereon will be con-
structed to satisfy the same standards as those specified
in paragraph 6 above.

It may not be possible for the construction of the
roads referred to in this paragraph to be undertaken at
the same time as the roads referred to in paragraph 6,
but they will be constructed as soon as possible.

v!!!

I.

191.

8. When, to the satisfaction of both the High
Contracting Parties, the accommodation referred to in
paragraph 4 is ready (accommodation for the forces re-
tained temporarily at Alexandria in accordance with
paragraph 18 below not being included) and the works
referred to in paragraph 6 above (other than the rail-
ways referred to in (ii) and (iii) of part (B) of that
paragraph) have been completed, then the British forces
in parts of Egypt other than the areas in the Canal
Zone specified in paragraph 2 above and except for
those maintained temporarily at Alexandria, will with-
draw and the lands, barracks, aircraft landing grounds,
seaplane anchorages and accommodation occupied by them
will be vacated and, save in so far as they may belong
to private persons, be handed over to the Egyptian
Government.

9. Any difference of opinion between the two
Governments relating to the execution of paragraphs 5,
4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 above will be submitted to the decision
of an Arbitral Board, composed of three members, the two
Governments nominating each a member and the third being
nominated by the two governments in common agreement.
The decision of the Board shall be final.

10. In order to ensure the proper training of
British troops, it is agreed that the area defined below
will be available for the training of British forces:
(a) and (b) at all times of the year, and (c) during
February and March for annual manoeuvres:--

(a) West of the Canal: From Kantara in the
north to the Suez-Cairo railway (inclusive) in the south
and as far as longtitude 31 degrees 50 minutes east, ex-
clusive of all cultivation;

(b) East of the Canal as required;

(c) A continuation of (a) as far south as lati-
tude 29 degrees 52 minutes north, thence south-east to
the Junction of latitude 29 degrees 30 minutes north and
longitude 31 degrees 44 minutes east and from that point
eastwards along latitude 29 degrees 30 minutes north.

The areas of the localities referred to above
are included in the map (scale 1:500,000) which is
annexed to the present Treaty.

11. Unless the two Governments agree to the con-
trary, the Egyptian Government will prohibit the passage
of aircraft over the territories situated on either side
of the Suez Canal and within 20 kilometres of it, except
for the purpose of passage from east to west or vice
verse by means of a corridor 10 kilometres wide at Kan-
tara. This prohibition will not, however, apply to the
forces of the High Contracting Parties or to genuinely
Egyptian air organisations or to air organisations genu-
inely belonging to any part of the British Commonwealth

[—3
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{\3
O

of Nations Operating under the authority of the
Egyptian Government.

12. The Egyptian Government will provide when
necessary reasonable means of communication and access
to and from the localities where the British forces
are situated and will also accord facilities at Port
Said and Suez for the landing and storage of material
and supplies for the British forces, including the
maintenance of a small detachment of the British forces
in these ports to handle and guard this material and
these supplies in transit.

13. In view of the fact that the speed and range
of modern aircraft necessitate the use of wide areas
for the efficient training of air forces, the Egyptian
Government will accord permission to the British air
forces to fly wherever they consider it necessary for
the purpose of training. Reciprocal treatment will be
accorded to Egyptian air forces in British territories.

14. In view of the fact that the safety of flying
is dependent upon provision of a large number of places
where aircraft can alight, the Egyptian Government will
secure the maintenance and constant availability of ade-
quate landing grounds and seaplane anchorages in Egypt-
ian territory and waters. The Egyptian Government will
accede to any request from the British air forces for
such additional landing grounds and seaplane anchorages
as experience may show to be necessary to make the num-
ber adequate for allied requirements.

15. The Egyptian Government will accord permiss-
ion for the British air forces to use the said landing
grounds and seaplane anchorages, and in the case of
certain of them to send stocks of fuel and stores there-
to, to be kept in sheds to be erected thereon for this
purpose, and in case of urgency to undertake such work
as may be necessary for the safety of aircraft.

16. The Egyptian Government will give all neces-
sary facilities for the passage of the personnel of the
British forces, aircraft and stores to and from the said
landing grounds and seaplane anchorages. Similar facil—
ities will be afforded to the personnel, aircraft and
stores of the Egyptian forces at the air bases of the
British forces.

17. The British military authorities shall be at
liberty to request permission from the Egyptian Govern-
ment to send parties of officers in civilian clothes to
the Western Desert to study the ground and draw up
tactical schemes. This permission shall not be unreason-
ably withheld.

18. His Majesty the King of Egypt authorises His
Majesty The King and Emperor to maintain units of his
forces at or near Alexandria for a period not exceeding
eight years from the date of the coming into force of

the present treaty, this being the approximate period
considered necessary by the two High Contracting
Parties--

(a) For the final completion of the barrack
accommodation in the Canal Zone:

(b) For the improvement of the roads--

(1) Cairo-Suez;

(ii) Cairo-Alexandria via Giza and the
desert;

(iii) Alexandria-Mersa Matruh;
so as to bring them up to the standard specified in
part (A) of paragraph 6;

(c) The improvement of the railway facilities
between Ismailia and Alexandria, and Alexandria and
Mersa Matruh referred to in (ii) and (iii) of part (B)
of paragraph 6.

The Egyptian Government will complete the work
specified in (a), (b) and (c) above before the expiry
of the period of eight years aforesaid. The roads and
railway facilities mentioned above will, of course, be
maintained by the Egyptian Government.

.19. The British forces in or near Cairo shall,
until the time for withdrawal under paragraph 8 above,
and the British forces in or near Alexandria until the
expiry of the time specified in paragraph 18 above, con-
tinue to enjoy the same facilities as at present.

Art. 9. The immunities and privileges in jurisdictional
and fiscal matters to be enjoyed by the forces of His Majesty
The King and Emperor who are in Egypt in accordance with the
provisions of the present treaty will be determined in a separ-
ate convention to be concluded between the Egyptian Government
and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

Art. 10. Nothing in the present treaty is intended to
or shall in any way prejudice the rights and obligations which
devolve, or may devolve, upon either of the High Contracting
Parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations or the
Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed at Paris the 27th
August, 1928.

Art. 11. (1) While reserving liberty to conclude new
conventions in future, modifying the agreements of the 19th
January and the 10th July, 1899, the High Contracting Parties
agree that the administration of the Sudan shall continue to
be that resulting from the said agreements. The Governor-
General shall continue to exercise on the joint behalf of the
High Contracting Parties the powers conferred upon him by the
said agreements.

The High Contracting Parties agree that the primary aim
of their administration in the Sudan must be the welfare of
the Sudanese.

194.

Nothing in this article prejudices the question of
sovereignty over the Sudan.

(2) Appointments and promotions of officials in
the Sudan will in consequence remain vested in the Governor;
General, who, in making new appointments to posts for which
qualified Sudanese are not available, will select suitable
candidates of British and Egyptian nationality.

(5) In addition to Sudanese troops, both British
and Egyptian troops shall be placed at the disposal of the
Governor-General for the defence of the Sudan.

(4) Egyptian immigration into the Sudan shall be
unrestricted except for reasons of public order and health.

(5) There shall be no discrimination in the Sudan
between British subjects and Egyptian nationals in matters of
commerce, immi ration or the possession of property.

(6 The High Contracting Parties are agreed on
the provisions set out in the Annex to this Article as regards
the method by which international conventions are to be made

applicable to the Sudan.
ANNEX TO ARTICLE 11

1. Unless and until the High Contracting Parties
agree to the contrary in application of paragraph 1 of
this Article, the general principle for the future shall
be that international conventions shall only become
applicable to the Sudan by the joint action of the
Governments of the United Kingdom and of Egypt, and that
such joint action shall similarly also be required if it
is desired to terminate the participation of the Sudan
in an international convention which already applies to
this territory.

2. Conventions to which it will be desired that
the Sudan should be a party will generally be conven-
tions of a technical or humanitarian character. Such
conventions almost invariably contain a provision for
subsequent accession, and in such cases this method of
making the convention applicable to the Sudan will be
adOpted. Accession will be effected by a joint instru-
ment, signed on behalf of Egypt and the United Kingdom
respectively by two persons duly authorised for the pur-
pose. The method of depositing the instruments of

'accession will be the subject of agreement in each case
between the two Governments. In the event of its being
desired to apply to the Sudan a convention which does
not contain an accession clause, the method by which
this should be effected will be the subject of consul-
tation and agreement between the two Governments.

3. If the Sudan is already a party to a conven-
tion, and it is desired to terminate the participation
of the Sudan therein, the necessary notice of termina—
tion will be given jointly by the United Kingdom and by

Egypt.

y...’
((7
()1
O

4. It is understood that the participation of
the Sudan in a convention and the termination of such
participation can only be effected by joint action
specifically taken in respect of the Sudan, and does
not follow merely from the fact that the United Kingdom
and Egypt are both parties to a convention or have both
denounced a convention.

5. At international conferences where such conven-
tions are negotiated, the Egyptian and the United King-
dom delegates would naturally keep in touch with a view
to any action which they may agree to be desirable in
the interests of the Sudan.

Art. 12. His Majesty The King and Emperor recognises
that the responsibility for the lives and property of foreign—
ers in Egypt devolves exclusively upon the Egyptian Govern-
ment, who will ensure the fulfillment of their obligations in
this respect.

Art. 13. His Majesty The King and Emperor recognises
that the capitulatory regime now existing in Egypt is no longer
in accordance with the spirit of the times and with the present
state of Egypt.

His Majesty the King of Egypt desires the abolition of
this regime without delay.

Both High Contracting Parties are agreed upon the arran-
gements with regard to this matter as set forth in the Annex
to this Article.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE 13

1. It is the object of the arrangements set out
in this Annex:--

(1) To bring about speedily the abolition of
the Capitulations in Egypt with the disappearance of the
existing restrictions on Egyptian sovereignty in the
matter of the application of Egyptian legislation (in-
cluding financial legislation) to foreigners as its
necessary consequence;

(ii) To institute a transitional regime for a
reasonable and not unduly prolonged period to be fixed
during which the Mixed Tribunals will remain and will,
in addition to their present judicial jurisdiction,
exercise the jurisdiction at present vested in the Con-
sular Courts. At the end of this transitional period
the Egyptian Government will be free to dispense with
the Mixed Tribunals.

2. As a first step, the Egyptian Government will
approach the Capitulatory Powers as soon as possible
with a view to a) the removal of all restrictions on
the application of Egyptian legislation to foreigners,
and b} the institution of a transitional regime for the
Mixed Tribunals as provided in paragraph 1 (ii) above.

_ 8. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom,
as the Government of a Capitulatory Power and as an ally
of Egypt, are in no way opposed to the arrangements re-
ferred to in the preceding paragraph and will collabor-
ate actively with the Egyptian Government in giving
effect to them by using all their influence with the
Powers exercising capitulatory rights in Egypt.

4. It is understeod that in the event of its being
found impossible to bring into effect the arrangements
referred to in paragraph 2, the Egyptian Government re-
tains its full rights unimpaired with regard to the
capitulatory regime, including the Mixed Tribunals.

5. It is understood that paragraph 2 (a) involves
not merely that the assent of the Capitulatory Powers
will be no longer necessary for the application of any
Egyptian legislation to their nationals, but also that
the present legislative functions of the Mixed Tribunals
as regards the application of Egyptian legislation to
foreigners will terminate. It would follow from this
that the Mixed Tribunals in their judicial capacity
would no longer have to pronounce upon the validity of
the application to foreigners of an Egyptian law or
degree which has been applied to foreigners by the
Egyptian Parliament or Government, as the case may be.

6. His Majesty the King of Egypt hereby declares
that no Egyptian legislation made applicable to foreign-
ers will be inconsistent with the principles generally
adopted in modern legislation or, with particular re-
lation to legislation of a fiscal nature, discriminate
against foreigners, including foreign corporate bodies.

7. In view of the fact that it is the practice
in most countries to apply to foreigners the law of
their nationality in matters of "statut personnel,"
consideration will be given to the desirability of ex-
cepting from the transfer of jurisdiction, at any rate
in the first place, matters relating to "statut person-
nel" affecting nationals of those Capitulatory Powers
who wish that their Consular authorities should continue
to exercise such juriddiction.

8. The transitional regime for the Mixed Tribu-
nals and the transfer to them of the jurisdiction at
present exercised by the Consular Courts (which regime
and transfer will, of course, be subject to the provis-
ions of the special convention referred to in Article
9) will necessitate the revision of existing laws re-
lating to the organisation and jurisdiction of the
Mixed Tribunals, including the preparation and promul-
gation of a new Code of Criminal Procedure. It is under-
stood that this revision will include amongst other
matters:--

(1) The definition of the word "foreigner" for
the purpose of the future jurisdiction of the Mixed Tri-

bunals;

(ii) The increase of the personnel of the
Mixed Tribunals and the Mixed Parquet, which will be
necessitated by the proposed extension of their juris-
diction;

(iii) The procedure in the case of pardons
or remissions of sentences imposed on foreigners and
also in connection with the execution of capital sen-
tences passed on foreigners.

Art. 14. The present treaty abrogates any existing
agreements or other instruments whose continued existence is
inconsistent with its provisions. Should either High Con-
tracting Party so request, a list of the agreements and in-
struments thus abrogated shall be drawn up in agreement
between them within six months of the coming into force of
the present treaty.

Art. 15. The High Contracting Parties agree that any
difference on the subject of the application or interpreta-
tion of the provisions of the present treaty which they are
unable to settle by direct negotiation shall be dealt with
in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the
League of Nations.

Art. 16. At any time after the expiration of a period
of twenty years from the coming into force of the treaty, the
High Contracting Parties will, at the request of either of
them, enter into negotiations with a view to such revision of
its terms by agreement between them as may be appropriate in
the circumstances as they then exist. In case of the High
Contracting Parties being unable to agree upon the terms of
the revised treaty, the difference will be submitted to the
Council of the League of Nations for decision in accordance
with the provisions of the Covenant in force at the time of
signature of the present treaty or to such other person or
body of persons for decision in accordance with such proce-
dure as the High Contracting Parties may agree. It is agreed
that any revision of this treaty will provide for the contin-
uation of the Alliance between the High Contracting Parties
in accordance with the principles contained in Articles 4, 5,
6 and 7. Nevertheless, with the consent of both High Con-
tracting Parties, negotiations may be entered into at any time
after the expiration of a period of ten years after the
coming into force of the treaty, with a view to such revision
as aforesaid.

Art. 17. The present treaty is subject to ratification.
Eatifications shall be exchanged in Cairo as soon as possible.
The treaty shall come into force on the date of the exchange
of ratifications, and shall thereupon be registered with the
Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

198.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

DOCUIJHTE

Cmd. 1131: (Egypt No. 1, 19 21), Eolort of th3 gpeciel Com-
mission to agypt, (London, 1921)_

 

 

 

Cmd. 1592: Egypt No. l, 1922), Correspondence Besoect g
Affairs In _gyp§ (London, 1 2‘

 

Cmd. 1617: ( cypt No. 2, 1922), Ciro ule r Ltoh His .

—7—'_———;-f 2.
Fe resentnt1ves abroad/ Statin: the 2e
5 ' e

ii'grtv's government to Termine

 

 

 

 

 

CtJTBtG and go f”CLLfllZ° gypt As an 1 en-
nt Sgyereign state (London, 1922 .

 

 

Cmd. 1‘

(Q
(n
CI)
0 O

't J
m
E
(2
D.
'1
*3
Q
"I"
H
(n

L
{0

. a 1 A _ :y's High 33m1cs1cn r in
'tpypt33;nclcsina the Decision of the Chuncil_g£
Ministers ielative to the Ihde nitv Act, Text of

the Inde'nltv ipt and  10 es '“C’Chy o with the

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cmd. 2269: (Mr. Macoonald‘s Lisprtch {espectiv’ the Fog;-
tionmgf Hi§_haj32ty‘s governs ent in Re are t3
wevutugnd the Sudan (London, 19 24).

Cmd. 2171: (Sudan no. 1, 1924), Jnrres orhénce BespggEiHS
the Sezira lrrL ation rrcjhct (londc on, 1924).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Cmd. 5050: Egypt 20. 1, 1928), repere Cgardipg Ne otietiors
for a_g§e:ty_p§_:ilifgpe 11th 13L t (London, 1920).

Cmd. 5097: Papers Zea 3ctin the rroposwd ‘V0§1321L?E_E§'
gglatini ruolic .9 tin s and rzpnitgatirng
(London, 1928).

Cmd. 5276: Eve ge of Notes ;e_1ating_to treposals for an

 

 

 

,A ran
an lo'vijytlag Sett ement (London, 192 ).

 

 

 

Cmd. 6573: nepoti tion2 for a Treaty With Tgypt (London, lax».
Cmd. 5575: Egypt 10. 1, 1930) Papers Regarding the iece nt
Me gotia tions for an Anglo-ggyptien Settleme “.t,
LQPCh Zl-Azy CJ_19?S (London, 1930).

 

i—J
1C)
'0
O

ergtien qhite jvok (Paris, 1919).

‘—

Collection of official correspondence of the ugygtien
Celengt on to the reece Conference.

ue or Peticns ;re3§y Eer1234¥gcl. 271;; (London, 1923).

y—t

_QO-
4\ ..-

h‘
L

 

Nevis, Helen tiller (8 . ,011st:tutions,L 121 C
irewt1~s of Ctatés ing the Leer end midulw (tot
(Lurhem, m. 0., 1921??

 

 

1. , i313u'it Khute b Sa'd Lash? ieghlog1_31-Fadit-
heh The neofint _2coresses of Qa'd resha uaghloul?

 

 

A collection of addresses oelivered by 23rhloul in his

;

erl is nehtery ;eoeees, Jol. ,(Lonoon).

l_
L
-—-— .—

mouse of Couzons,

 

Royal Institute of 1nt3rn:titnel -ff:irs, Locuments Ch Inter-
gaticnal ffairs (1928-19 LG and 1936), J. h. ”heeler
(ed.), (Lonoon, 929-195 and 1997 ).

 

 

(Y)
C)
F)
o

I

r
(
i-
(’1

‘

 

‘ TI- I h . 5 . f“. v ‘\~. r-~ v ~ ‘ ‘l ‘ ‘I f: . . ‘ ‘ :2
shoes, rekki 1ne gUJCH uestion (new :ork, Ere erlcx n.
Breeeer 195;).
‘- b ,

A scholarly work written by a iudenese 10hrler
v.ho criticizes the kn lish policy to;.erd the iuoen and
CyEt. inis cook is sell aritten and covers the Anglo-
1gygtim -;‘denese relations edeguetely. It as of some

help to the suthor on those points.

n1 iodrrnism in ?.cJ»t (London,

 

 

This book includes the biographies of Ja eel el-
Din al-Afgheni, Shaykh Nuhemmed 'Abeu and e deteiled
study of the movement associated with those tv n.!o nat-
ionalist and religious leaders who had a gr at effect
on the deVelopment of Egyptian notionalism.e

There is but a very little difference bet een the
bioErephy of J3m31 sl-Din el-Affhonie as told by ”dwsrd
broune in his book The Fersien -evolution of 1905-l909
and the way it is relhted in this book. In fact, the
author was able to observe in more then one instsnce

 

that hr. Adszs hes copied Nr. .trow e, to whose Work
Adams had PffEPPJF. heve rth3le es the book is very in-
formative end 9 M11 htenint.1t hes beo {1 of a great
value for t‘ 9L thor in un erste nding and appreciating

the influe es of religion on politics.

 

al-‘Aqqed, 'nbbjs Mahmud, :e'd r ghlul LFiogrern47 (Seiro,
m1kteoet Hija 21, l' 1

This is the mo led biOgreEhy of the
'(yptian netioneliet loader Leghloul. The author is
vell -known es s lite ure 8 1 through the Arab
Lorld.

b in recorFins the

al-‘Aqqed has done a o

‘ tionelist lender.
1..
l

life of this important

he; n n
he further tried to reinijgin o‘jjec ivity all through
his work. This work has been of e tremendo ous Velue
for the author.
alexanoer, John Rom h ghgngrgthmhbtot Irygt (London, yew

 

J
nto 2nd Helbourre, Jessell and DomEeny,

This book covers in deteil the o riod of Lgypt—
ien history loceted between the incilent o1 ;Ehsh r
in 1906 and the essessinetion of Eremier -utrus C ;
resha in 191 . It reflects the story of the igyEtiin

netionalie t struwgle against the -ritish Cccuoetion.
1r. le‘T nder seems to heve had a good com end of his
esuite the feet of his nationality attem-

subject, and d
pts to be objr:
editorials and

ive in what he write s. His use of
rticles fu_blished in in;
and :yptien pr1ss during this e‘rici tax 3 the mate -
ial of the booK vce ry interesting and reflects the
different ideas end ojinions o: the peOple involved .
1he student of “Lygtien netionalism will find this book
very interesting and informetive.

el-xafi‘i, solar—nrh agn, al-Thewretu el-‘Orebiyeh [The 'Crebi
Pevc'utio_/ (Cairo, 1957}.

 

A thorough account of the 'Crabi Revolution. The
student of (cystian nationalism 1111 find this worK
very helpful and beneficial.

 

 

al-Rafi'i, gbcur-Rehnen, feriKh al:3§raKeh al-Leumiyeh fi
isr /lhe history of the Le 1onalist Lovement in
qupt , 3 1015., Cairo, 1929).
In those three volumes a Refi' i attempted suc-
ce ssfully to write the story of .gygtien netionelism.
He gives a very interesting explenetion of events as
the1 happened, and tries all through his worK to main-
tain a remarkable objectivity. These oooKs were of
great help to the author.

Antonnius, decree, The gre b Arexenir" (New YorK, G. r.
Eutman's tens, 1346).

 

A thorough study of Arab nationalism. It as of
very little value to the euthor as it spoKe of E ypt-
ien netionelism only incidentally.

as -’hati', lbnet, »e iiyatu el-Ee_heh Lihe Fellah's Casg7
(Cairo, 19¢7).

 

An intere stinu st dy 1hich gives the facts ebcut
the _gy;tien fe Lleh and describes his troubles. lxcept

Ior that pert, the book was o1 no value for the euthhr
in pregering this study.

.-"(\‘ x L.- -'
DCLKSP, it. b. , ,1)qu PC":

1 n and .crlé bettlement, 2 volumes
(New lorK, 1s

 

 

beemen, hrdern Hulme, [he Dethronement of the Kheoive (London,

George Allen and 'nion, 9293.

 

 

The author, who happens to be an Vnglishmen by
nationality was censidered as an euthoritv on ~rypt and

D3
0
t0

and ,gyotisn 9fi9«1r9. ihis book is in feet mor9 th9n
what the title imgli9s. It includ99 a 9h9 rp criticiEm
of the :riti9h policy it . 1;t 99 it W99 carried out
by Cromer and Aitchsner 9:;id of the :ritish tres tm9nt
to Khedive 9boas II, and the whole Qcyotian ouestion
prior to ”orld ”9r I. Eirics this book covered only
the p9riod prior to the wsr it grovsd to be of little
V9lu9 to the author.

oenns, Frank Lee, ;urooe Since 1914 (19W Eork, 3T0ft5: 1041)°

U

‘

A reliable survey of modern Curopssn history.

blunt, Hilfrid EC9W9n, ;ecr9t History of thp ipiligh C3
tion of Egytt (19w 1ork, alfrez' ;. Knopf, 1-

This book 999 written by an “ ijlishm9n who was
a close 99;oci9t9 of 'Orabi n m1 9ykh kuhsmm9d 'Abdu
and a symiathizer with the t'an nationalist revo-
lution. Ihis ocok WES of son vslue to the author
ir199 9r 9.9 th9 99rly deve t of the .: pti9n nstion-
slist movenent.

 

brockelmann, Carl, Eistory of the Islsrnic 191-199 , trsns.
Joel J9rmich991 9nd :oshe rerlmt..nn (Sew York,
U. f. futnjm's ions, 18 97;.

A g9n9r9l survey of Islamic history, but well
produced and it proved to be of some V91u9 t0 the
author.

1

m

1" n
u C; 9:,
”d (duall-

Brcwne, toward, lhe Lorsian revolution of 19 90
brid :, The University rress, 191

C10"

Y
O": /
Chapter I contains 9 schol9r1y writtsn biography
of Jsmsl al-sin 91-9fgh9ni. ihe rest of the book was
of no use for the author in this study.

throl, Lir W191 ntins, The Egygti9n rroblem (London, M90-
tillsn 00., Limited, 1921).

Mr. Chirol's book constitutes 9 vory vslusble
analysis of the gygtian n—tionsli t oovoment since
about the turn of the ‘.ontieth century. 1he author
attemgts to be obj9Ctive in th9t he r919t99. This
book was of {rest vslue for the authrr.

Chirol, sir Valentine, and others, the 399 kcrirc of the
Crient, 9no other 9odr99999 {19w Esvsn, Yale
Lrivs rsity iress, 1925).

 

Chirol, :ir Valentine, 1h9 tccident 9nd the Cri~1t (Chica
1he Univsrzity of Uhicogo :reSs, 1994).

Cromer, -velyn 3., nodern .7yfit, 2 vols. (New York, Mec-
nillen $0., leoey.

 

This two-volune work by the Terl of Cromer eno
for the oeriod 1663-1906 ruled for ingland in Tgypt
st

represents the View of the “reservetive perieli
side. Lord Cromer in my judglent never hed been able
to understand or epprecie te tr; ‘«Votl‘RS. 1hus his

writings are biased and give a ron9 in

ressicn to
the reader, if he was not aware of this fee

t.

Lesoite all t::2t, those t.o Valum s deserve to
be read 1s they represent the officiel conservative
oritish oint of view, and heve plenty of infornetion
about the development of _ gytt. oromor works should
be read along with the writings of Lord Lloyd and Lord
11-111161".

”icey, ;dwerd, lbs 1tory40f the Ihedivete (London, Ei\n
1902).

 

The main bulk of t.is book goes for the descrip-
tion of the 'Crobi Bevel utif n of ldui. It describes

in detail the factors whicn led greet lritein to occupy
Egypt. since it coveret only this early period it wss
of very limited vslue for the author.

Lodwell, Henry, none"ue' 'ill, The Founder of nodern Lgypt
(Lemorldu , university :ress

trofessor Lodvell wes co: missioned by King ru‘ed
of Zgypt to Write this oook. inis fact gives the
ens er for the bias ed interbrettticns hfllCh the suthor
had given of cert3in aspect s of matters of locel in-
terest. oesgite that the book contains e good sunmary

of the reign of guheaued 'Lli es based on the official
documents in London. since the book covered only the
reign oi nuhsmned 'sli it has been of a Very slight
value to the author.

Egyptian pelece tion, (ed.), The gygtisn Question ( eshing-

ton, D. o., 1919).

A collection of articles and ed: Mr see from
Various sources. It proved to be of greet Help to the
author.

 

Elgood, rerciv
I1

1 sec ge, ‘ivot end the _rny (London, foord
L V3 ‘

:rsity tress s, 1924).

:4. .3‘

In this book Sol nel lgoo od covers the develtp-
ment of 1 1r-tien stru gles ior incefoni~ncn do ring the

204.

period of .'orld er I. Ihe author e«.re-,es a notice-
able s moathy toy? Jd the mo e:ent.1h s o: ok was of
some value in gregarin; this study.

ilgood, rercivel ceorte, lhel

1

Arnole and 30.,

sit of E;ygt (London, waard

 

E?) b:—

TC} Tl
20)

This is a brie survey of .g\ptien history
starting with the early fersien subjugation under Cam-
byses. In other words, this survey covers a feriod of
2,0b0 years. ihe part of the early ;gy;tian history
is cove e. in a few pages, but the bulk of the book is
devoted to angle-igygtian relations.

Colonel ylgood, LLO was an n N11 h soldier lived
in leytt for a long geriod throuih wnich he was able
to observe and study the ptyptie-s and afbrec'ate the ir

point of vieW. his evaluation of the hgyptian nation-

alist movement is one of the best. The infornetion in

this boon is very reliable an‘ ngood tried all through
his book to Maintain a scholarly objectivity.

Europa Lublicaticn Limited (pub.), The fiiddle ;es
(London, .uropa rublication Limited,

 

A reliable source on statistics on th Middle
Eastern social, political and cultural development.

Galatoli, A. M., Lgygt in Mideassage (Gairo, Urwand and Sons
bress, 19:0).

 

A brief but an interesting study. The stud
who is interested in the economical and social d
ment of Modern Egypt will find this book very he
It Proved to be of some help to the author.

Gibb, H. A. E. (ed.), “hither Islam (London, 1952

 

Four lectures on Moslem novements in North Africa,
Egygt, India and Indochina, with introduction and con-
clusion. It see not of any help to the author in pre-

paring this study.

 

Gibb, H. A. R., Mohammedanism (London, He» YorK and Toronto,
Oxford bnivprsity irees, 1947).

3h alts r n of thisV book deals with the i'iect of

nestein idea 9 on tne cm elnpment of .losle m reviVali.m.

 

Gibb, Hamilton A1,Xandrr hcsskun, Eodern irelds in Islam
(Chicago, 1he University of chicato LTSEE l.

N)
C)
01
o

 

 

 

 

 

This back was of some value to this euthor in
unferst1nding the n: w oeW 1 pmer.ts in Islam end their
impact on moslem thought end action in Agygt as well
Cis in bther Ioslem countries.

Hellberg, Charles 5., Ihe mguEg Hegel: Its kictcrg are Its

Diplomatic L mo t»;;ce (London, r. 5. king, 1951).

It is about the best eccount given in refer rence
to the history or tht cecal end the international tro-

blems connecteo with it.

Hassanein, A. h., and Ishmud, H. 3., Ah Catline of I;y2tien
Iodern History (Ceiro, 1940, Ihe Renaissance
LUbKShOp) o

 

A Very brief outline of Iodern Lygflt en history.
Ineffective.
" onelis m(Ne“;' York, The hac-

 

neyes, oarlton J., fsseys on Let
Iillen ocmceny, lot?

A helpful account in explaining the issue of
nationalism

8S9

..l.’

Heykal, 113;. £10

[fl

 

Iazini, I. ';. and '“nnsn, I. _i., e iy
'h we 4lirilsb 31-. Lsturi (Jeiro, 1&31).

 

Liberal cons stituticnel Party, to
criticize end denounce the diastorshio of sidki (1930).

This buck WPS written by Isvotien jcurnelists
Y‘ ‘ t . a

li; icus its Eclitlc 1 1r; hes

 

 

Heyworth-Lunne, uumcl-pdline, h
in Iodwln -5;;§1(Hes;ington, Q. 0., I 1011s “ oy
the author, 1930).

 

[his is 2 Very interestin; era .chclsrly written
“ox. It descr Loeo in a Scamsry fz—hicn the r;li ious
and toliticel st “u 1 s in Iodern ggtt, the o v» Lt p-
ment she the GfobbiVbHESS Lf the r ligic-yolitical
groups “hich tended to b: ro~rt‘v or terrorist.
Ihis worK mes of e trcwe nd'us V lue for the author.
H'lmi, Obes, II Khedive of Igypt, a Few fitrds tn the lo—
L,tien -ettlement (London, ceorfic Illan In-

 

onw1n, ILbO).

An urge by the formpp Khedi
ccuntrymen to accett the draft LP'”
first stop torerd their goal of hi
In int.r3;ting took hut vss of 11
author.

nonell, 192;:n n., xvgt's 12 t, :reg Lt ens Tuture (Devton,

L.__ -..._

‘ I ——‘L ‘ A
cnic, L:rvics, 1L;e§.

 

In this n.o; the eutncr r212.,,
* “' in Lgyct. in's bio

t; J 561" Sn
‘- - 1 e “ . is full of 1
terestir; lfiiOIm“tiOn 2 tout ev‘rts occurring in that
ctuntry before 929, end it concemns no system of
cnfiitwletions. IL 1:29 the .: :tian :cverrment, then
a Kind of e oicte,orship, witnout p2rli2ment or con-
stitution forbade th; ixtortat on an} 2212 of this
t

book in sgyy

ins suthor mes the American swoessadcr to dgypt.
synpethizes with the gyrtien n2tionslist point of
ew end condemns severely the .ritish imgerislistic
titude in Lgyyt.

Husain, Tens, al--h‘v-em, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1930).

This book mes trenslsted into Hnglish in 1932 by
an English scholar knovn as i. H. Pextor. It was again
trsnsleted in 1948 by anot.er English scholer, H. Eey-
ment. This book is 2n essentiel to every scholar who
attempts to unflerstend the Zgyptien soci2ty. It is en
entobiogrsphy of the euthor who heggened to be a son
of a fellahin class, but was able in the course of
time to envencc to the rank of Minister of iiucetion
in 353 t. This bLOK historicelly has been of no value
for th 2 author.

mil‘

1&2 Etcry of 'rvct end Jnglo-2339tian 9212—

L‘HL

Hussein, Anm , 1
OBS Kittk'v ‘iLer, 154.73.

A srort bcoxlet spo sored by the young Lgypt
isrty (Lisr el-zstet). It 22s put out m3r31y for Lro-
pagsnee purposes and ass of no value to t‘ie author.

Issawi, Cherles, Ervbt: An Lccnomic and 500121 Analysis

 

A scholsrly work in which 1r. Issewi covers the
ieveloym2nt of economic 2nd sociel institutions in
modern agytt. It hes been of' 2 very little V2102 to
the eutnor es ot spesk specifically of the
dc*:1o;nvwit of n:

Izzeijin, Nejle, The gre§_;,rlo
(3 1883C, iayry Esgency ecu;

 

 

A general textb.ok on the subjtct.
of vsry little V2lue to the author es it h2
chettsrs oevo te: to 3vptien 2.fi:irs

45:.)

P”
C» o

 

 

 

Kemel, hustefe, férthn-JPCHCC Letters erdre‘cee to fine.
Jo - i-HJ'BQJ C): j-lfdca (u: iTU , . ‘u ..t‘-" a -'(:':Al:l “1611001 ,
lC‘Lk') 0

4 £011 Ctikh pf l—tt~re eAcnzrfed “~t.eai tne
;;y9tien nftionelitt leader enfi gcliticien, Kuztefe
Kémal eni thr finei Frcrch jsurhalist, Iwr. J. LJMm.
Lgtss latt rs ejri; 2 true xlCtUIE of tne ngjgtlg.
nationalist movement as viewed by an r>tr:re hatiChslist
who fcr sor~ tine h e‘Pj th€ “:tn rlsnd Lerty. Th
n chic and the _n;li&n trenslgticn of tatse litters do

r~1=icnistic attitudes

BkiFt in tl’lli b 5.117}.

the book was of no value to the

Kirk, G. i., n Lhcrt Hist
rublic gffe

 

...—.— A‘

(Le: lcrx, i rccurt, ”r

 

Kohn, Hans, feticnelism end Iirerielism In the Ketner
,_____ _ - i i

‘1 r "q. .1
J -‘l A

A study in the imfect cf Lurcpeen imghrislism on
tLe devalcgment of netionelism in the countries of the
3 5‘ rest. uETktET V in this study deals gsrticvlerly
w tn ' ggtien naticnslism and schievenents. The biCk

‘ ‘f

IT} f—h (1)

H.
‘3
P
ox
57W
:5
C

vary interestin; she informative. IL
t value for tzs author.

*3
Q

Marshall, J. s., Th. 1'“ tign Tni;fi2, 1590-1926 (Lanfion,

. \
##A

John Murray, 13gb).

he‘sh—ll in this 000k riVes ris observations 9 d
a surv y cf mcdern .\v5ti2n ristcry es based on his
ka‘r13hc95 in thet cointry. ‘3 m'cte in the same
Orthodox style 0: Lord Cromer. ;his bcoK is interesting
5 a cue: in; qurP~. t Lreved to be of sane help to

rt ‘0
L'

’E

i

(“3'
D
C

*‘j >
O

a

 

,— ..-

ihe iidflle io“t Institute, LitiChelism In the *ifidlc wit,
‘9:

<

It conteins er intsrestin; and halgful article h
hens Kohn.

."‘

,. ' 4. "‘ r ,..,.
.*L-ln&b(:n, Ll. IUD , lC’Ué/I O

. : 0 ’ ~ —— _ I u _ w ‘v- A . \
mllnSP, Lora, ingleni In igggt \Lcnaon, lose).

 

This is one of the stdnoeri xcrks tn the tritish
OCCUJatlon of :yct. It renxs along the line of Lord
' L m " v C

‘Id's worxs. ,eceuse it dealt with
was of no help to the author.

Lfigyptien? pinistry of ucmzlrce and Industry, “"VEt (Cairo,
no date is niVen).

This is a statistical study which ccnte
tremez jcus emount of iects about verious QSge
_;y:L i»n liie. It ues of very little help to

author.

:4.
pl

F“
kW
:5

 

, Lenard a. r., Greet -ritein in ‘gygt (London,

Ch, of the best vritinxs on
tions. t gives a detailee eccoun
post-her QLVQlements in ”<ygt. I

we;

lo-igyptien rela-
oi the her enfl the
as very helpful.

HD

cm:r, Ltd; l—Loneiu, The ;uden u ation :eeg- on :rltien
\nJ“ ants (JLlrv, 1;:‘T'24 O

 

 

Cmcr ettemyted to criticize end condemn the
‘ ‘Cyst snfi the Luian by to
l s eni incons sistency of :ri
It was of very little help to the

rhilby, H. :t. J. 3., grehie (London, 1330).

The f llest ,ccount in “nglisu of the Tehehhi

'\ -

Rife'et, Mon :cdern Tgygt (London,

 

”Lad ce’, The A exening of
n V

E; 3_-C, 194.750
This book has been of very little vclu to the
eutnor as it only deelt rith the eerly pert of wodern
_ yptien history.

Terikh hisr el-iiy51, 3 vols. (Ceiro,

 

in int3res ting and detailed diplometic history
97D gygt. ine euthor hed access to only the
t 0 volumes. Those perticulerly proved to be
ry little v: lue as they covered only the ers
om 175d to lc82.

el Affairs, 3r
Information We

Royal Institute of Internatic
hgygt, 1914-1930
(Lmuidcu1, trma Inst

P.

 

:t -.- : n
er Yo. I“)

 

n
(
1

A brief sorvey of Anglo-Igygtien Itletion: Since
.orld per I. It proved to be of some ve lue to the

author.

(\1

1)
(D
o

 

 

Royal Institute of IUL er rational Afieirs, The niidle _est:
.1 :olitic 1 end gc:npmic 1UPV’ZV (Lennon ano
Nan lor K, lne groadwatcr rress, 1951).

 

 

 

1 gencrel text book lel of informr;tion. It was
of some he p to the author.
Rushid Lila, thanmad, Terihh al-Usteth al— Imgcm el-Sb.eykh
FHherm:d 'i‘dg, 3 vols. (oeiro, al-ienner frees,
vol. s, 19(8; vol. 3, 191C; vol. 1, 931).

A eteile ed bio rainy and works of Nuhogmad 'ibdi.

n. V., gritain son the —§3§ ;t3t33 (London,

 

 

ihafi; rashe, Ahmad, r:¢11y3tfiii=r al—-i"3~iyyah g [yptian
roliticel history/, 5 vols. (o-iro, chafia rasha
I ass, 1933).

i oel hist.

‘/:

A detailed survey of .ryot ian p0
It contains a we ealth of W torial on in
lations and the developmvnt of the he
ment in figypt. 'lhe st ucent of eypti nationalism
would find this worn very interesting an -d informative.

\—

 

ohafiq Eashe, Ahmed, Moths ukkerati fi Nisf ‘arn 'My memoires
in Bali a dentury/, 6 vols. (Cairo, hisr Press,
19:4).

The memoires of Shafiq Pasha for a period of half
a century which nreceeoed .orld war I. As it covered
only this earlv era it was of very limited help.

 

bidki, Isma'il, guthakareti éfy Memoire37, Cairo, al-Eilel,

It eapeers the t the principal motive Nh 1ch drove
Eidki iasha to record his memoirs in this boo has an
attempt to justify his actions while in government.
Inasfar as some of the interoretetions which are given,
this book is far from being reliable.

stodderd, Lanthrop, New icrld of Islem (New York, C. Scrib-
ner's ' V“ V

 

In this be OK the author attempted to record an
cnelysis of the new movements in Islam since the turn
of the 19th century and their influ nose on the society
and oolitics of the hoslsm vorld. It proved to be of

— gree t he 1p alifln those lines.

II ‘IIIII’ Ill}

 

 

 

 

synons, M. irave1s, Britain
;‘ O U _‘ ' n _‘

 

This is the o: the v—1y fen r lieole histories
of the Igyftian netwonalist movement. It ass of great
help to the author.

 

 

O
Iorld's :tCrV, vol. III th
ht) hton miiilin Domrcny, 1‘

 

if
i

Toynbee, srnold J., LUPV y 1 Int rn3ticn1 ijfiwirs, 1925,
vol. 1, QThe Islsmic ”irl; gin ce tho :cece tuttl

1:; , lg; ().
A very heloftl sary rv

Velyi, Felix, Revolution In3§slegz Sgtituel and Political
(London, 192s).

 

 

part of this book res devoted to
in which hr. Velyi presented an
inV WetinL interpretation of
m. Ihis section of the book is an
LES of are t help in the grocers-
ie'a ti- on.

A considerab
the”prob 19m of
honest picture

t1-r nations
inspiring p art 8
tion cf this inve

F0 }_‘|
ID (1' {D

(‘3

:3 1—4 5 (13:1
L!) (D- H 13.1%
'0

(1‘

-ry of Lvents In Igygt Ficm

weigall, grtrur so. ), A EIList_
on., 1:. :lackwcmx Enid :iixz, 191:).

1798-1914 QLcnd

1 n1rrative history covering the era indicated in
the title. It has of little help to the author.

ioune George, i1vct (New iork, cherles icribners and Sons,
w 15“7}
O

A narrative history of modern igypt covering the
period between the coming of kuhecmad ‘111 and the
death or the great ciyptian netionalist, La'd caghloul.

:0

nt 'r t QLoncon, J. Eurrey, 1940}

Youssef, nmine sey, Ind.pe nd W3

 

his is en nutcoio~reony of an ugyptian politician
who identifie o. hirself .ith the ”efd Party until the
mid- tw onties. He broke with that party eftor the death
of caghloul. I; ter he turned to be critical of the
;efd's oolicies and leedershit, esyecielly of its head,

111311135 1 ‘3 one o

This work is very reedeble and interesting. It
was of some help to the author.

211s

Zaidan, Jurgi, Mashahir al-sharq A1astern Celebritieg/ vol.
II (Cairo, 190$).

It conteins ”c.11ent bio fizhit= of Jamel al-
Din al-afghani and huh;nnad 'Lbou.

ZEICJICALS

V

31- Hurb 31, M “he'd Zegnloul“, Eose el-Yusuf (Cairo, Hey

')
.4’7
53...).

 

a otanldtln; series of orticles written by an
ext-mr1e netitna 11.-t many yeers after the death of
La ehlo ul. Al-éhurbaji sounds very cr1 tical of the
nationalie t Ire o<_.r enfi accuses him of treason and
cookc*re tion vith the iritish.

Crabites, tie rre, r‘Ljf?1‘v},zpt, the Sudan ane the 1119*, Foreien
[ifai 1 (fecenber In, 1524), pp. EEO-ELI.

A very interesting and stimulating article. It
was written by Judge Grabilee before the asseesinetion
of air Lee :tack. It shows the importance and natural
right of 1gybt in the mile and the suoan. [his arti-
cle has been of great ncl: to the author.

Slaeéov,’ , Ue (21}58 , “Tile L111E1C'- 37:3ti‘1n' :I‘an; KdUW 1'1. .4 , Tfle :/ Cntem’
gorery Review (July,19:o)

 

 

A dissertation about the g9fd‘*.flt13h negotia-
tion of I583. An interesting and helbiul article.

areennood, fior s, Jiritein's Eerils in the New Egyptian
Tree ty,“ Current History Qkovember, 1529).

 

An interesting discussion about Ans lo-yry
negotiations of 1529. lhis article "es of son:
to the author.

ti

'65

a
h l

Merton, Arthur, “ Greet'5ritein and -Eypt“, uLntJm‘Lf pv 5e-
X121 Klai?rch,1eee).

 

A very interesting end helpful article in which
Merton surveyed the becxground and the major points of
the 576 treaty.

The hen 1051 iimes (1914-1v35)°

m
1...!
m
0

The following erticles were also consulted but the] Here of
lesser V3133 to the eutncr in the preg3r3tion of this etuoy.

t‘, Tne filneteen-

wlic c ‘3 I 3 6 :
ur-Xianfi 4ftpr (fiflfbh, 1$Z9), :Jp° 005-516.

 

 

\r

”Anglo-styttian breekdo3n“, ggect3tor, (@LY 17, 1330).

 

Arminjon, ti rre, and c3rbitee, Lierre, “31 Azh3r University“
etcerth Jentury end ”ft9P (October, 1925), pt.

 

Ilh 0' :"n in
040-0490

"J
,,
1.4
15
m
I

 

carrcn, Lieut. Col. J. 3., JCLntrol of the 11134, Ih'
tee nth centur1;enfi 3ft3r (:3 t3moe r, 1Lbé), 9p. 573-
580.

 

 

Beamen, A. Eulm3, 'Ihe igolitiC3l -ituatlon in «‘tt‘, The
contrn or31y W 3 (July, 1327), go. 15-44.

 

 

53y, A. h 3t3m, JIhe Future 0
Century and lfter J

 

 

German, Har Mr3 F., ”.n»lend or” .gygtlcn rroole ' Polltlcal
Science IEVllh u=rt3rlx_(1921), up. 01-79.

 

Chirgwin, Rev. A. M., ”The dreak-up of Is
Eorary_fieview (August, 1925), pp. 1

 

 

 

”Iglam aha lritiin”, Fureign 3ff3irs

 

 

 

l
A

‘Pabites’ LiBPPe *England's Fifty leere In “ngt , The
Eineteenth 'enturxiend Aftez (July, 19:2), 9p. 36-43.
C”abit°" I CPPG, ”anpt, The pudan end tgo "11; , Forging
i510215ll"‘8 (Decemoer 1;, 1924), pp. - L1 —~—

 

Crabites, rierre, I’Iema'il the .zgnificent‘, The Iineteenth
Qtntury and ”fter (July, 1927) gp. 108-119.

 

 

 

Edwards, 3 3., ”The gayot
Lop ry Réview (l;~

D
r)
d!*

 

, Lieut. Col. :. 6., “Cur Lifficulti3e 41th .Qyptfi
IFQ hinetaenth Co turxfianfi After (”ebruery lBLE), pp.

1 n rgi
‘Jfio‘Cub .

:lgood

 

 

”Fresh etert In 3ivct , ivect tor (Eerch 10, 1928).

 

N)
'—J
(91
o

3, ., dTne Luez panel In Ii'e C
Frr3izn 4f131r3 (Octob:r 193;), pp. 33—1;

 

Ibrahifi, Eefith, “Ll-P3tetu el-Y3h3r Ii
' ‘ '3 v

W h , giu3n H3fitn
not :i 3

.n).

Johnson, F., ”23tionalicm 3nd 3311 ioue Lib ty fiith ferti-
culer F333rd to Islam", Loel+m .Irlc :nU3 ry 19L6).

(4’1

 

 

r' ‘ f m ‘ . .i' .— ' - . 9." FT“ A ' J: ‘ - I-) 7‘. ~°
khan, “-0, 'lns Ix TL noelem aUIlJ‘, ,nw IcInrnrgn notiew
' -‘ ‘ r"; . ("IA ""
(Octoo:r 133;}, gp. <‘3-zb7.

 

 

Lca3r, ucpt. I. we V. (I.I. ), ”Igypt Luring and Since The
.or” Tor ;dinbur:n 1"fVlCW (July 19 26), pp. 1-22

Low, Eidre , “Foe Iiddle .aet”, The 1dinbur£n Review (irril
1915“, pp. OCB‘rz/lrz/o

. ., The hgyptian Fecto
;d1nburgh “eview (Jul; 1924), pp. 32-50.

 

 

Marshall, J. L., ”The Tgvotr Troblem“, The Tinet3enth Gen-
3 ' e h ”‘ ' ‘1

 

heurice, eir Frederick M
Foreign AfIEIr

 

Iellor, R. I., ”Tie Zgyptian Kindle” ”[3 -1n3t—ertn centurg
end ;It3r (C toner 1930), pp. 49 -4uc.

 

Herton, Irthur ”The Anglo- g

\
2 v L .
in teenth Jentury 3n“ after ((ctcbcr 936), pp.

 

qucclm, -l:yptian hetion3liem“,
13w (Jul y 1919), pp. 172-180.

6
C; O
(.1 J
(L)
<*1

\
. v

1:, '3 333353 Tg‘ptien Iolitics‘,
\ Egg), LED. 1-72‘1800

(\

Iieville, bir ‘3lt3r F., “3y Friend the F311fl3”,Ih3 Kine-
tofnth CFRIQPI and After (:eptemoer 190-) , mp. 343-453.

 

 

Newman, M3jor i. W. Folson, “Egypt and tLe Iresty‘, The Con-
tagporery Reviéw (C3tob3r 19:8), pp. 437-413.

 

 

OP 3. '75. o L Olfac r1, 4- “ -- 3“) "C l ’ 1711:? j (.1’1tem-
9V1FW {-ufiust 1939), pp. 174-131.

 

PO
b—J
IA
0

ROLZd’ lE/i

‘1

P T—‘—~'3-"-‘3'11: ”The (resent fiitu3tion In 7&Y9t”, Tfntem-
1‘3..I‘j/'“V;__ (.pgri'l 1322), p}, 435-417, “'3“

Shah, zird3r Ikbql 311, “The Kodernizetion of Islam , The
Centempc 3ry figvi:g_kFebr13ry 1339):

_;
A

-_'—_-

 

R., ~¢3tion311ty In Ie
v

1 C LQUGS”, Intern3tinn31
iew of Missions (Agril 1329)

thson, I., ”Iationality anc 1313m , {03133 World (IgriI 1926).

 

3t Eon. Ir31 ”Inf nd szpt”: Th9_§iE§'
1 — r.‘
(“V . I
\J

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Feb 28 '55

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fab! ’66
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