

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM
AMONG THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLES
(1914-1936)

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.
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Arthur E. Adams

Major professor

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM AMONG THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLE
(1914-1936)

by

ABDULLA M. LUTFIYYA

A THESIS

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONALISM AMONG THE EGYPTIAN PEOPLES (1914-1936)

Chapter I

THE BACKGROUND OF NATIONALISM

The word nationalism first appeared in European languages in about the early part of the nineteenth century. This term was derived from the word nation, which, from the seventeenth century onward, has been used to describe the inhabitants of a sovereign entity, regardless of the presence or absence of any racial or linguistic unity. Nationality, still another term stemming from the same origin is often used to define a group of persons speaking a common language and observing common customs.

Nationalism during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries acquired many meanings and wide connotations. It described in the first place the political image that the people had of the historical process through which the various states were developed into national units. It also described the political philosophies which formed the background of a national state and the consciousness of nationality. It has been further employed to signify a political movement accompanying the awakening or strengthening of national consciousness, as, when we speak of "German nationalism" or "Egyptian nationalism." Still further, nationalism

is understood as a concept describing a state of mind in which the members of a national state are extremely patriotic, and express an almost fanatical loyalty for their national state.

In this study the historical development of Egypt, from an Ottoman colony to a sovereign independent state shall be discussed at some length. At the same time the political philosophies which were the base for the development, and the implementation of these ideals by the nationalist leaders of Egypt shall also be treated here. "Nationalism" to this group of nationalist leaders often meant patriotism to their state of Egypt for which they held the highest allegiance.

Once the Egyptians became conscious of their nationality and their belonging to each other, they began to consider any foreigner who interfered in their affairs as an intruder to be resisted. Then began the struggle to secure "Egypt for the Egyptians." The British, who occupied Egypt since 1914, were completely different from the Egyptians; they spoke differently, wrote differently, worshiped differently, and entertained different values and conceptions from those which the Egyptians cherished. Thus the Egyptians nationalists were unable to tolerate such a group ruling over them and their country. They wanted an independent national state under Egyptian rule.

The Coming of Muhammed 'Ali

Prior to the Napoleonic invasion, Egypt was under Turkish rule, but actually the Mamlukes controlled the country.¹ When Napoleon invaded Egypt, Turkey, hoping that her alliance with other powers would save the provinces of the Near East from French domination, allied herself with Great Britain.² Combined, the Ottomans and the British were able to defeat Napoleon's forces, and in 1802 he signed the peace treaty of Amiens with Britain. In accordance with this treaty the French evacuated Egypt completely. Shortly thereafter, the British also withdrew their troops.

Muhammed 'Ali,³ a general with the Turkish forces in Egypt, was ambitious to rule. He knew the fellahin hated both the Turks and the Mamlukes for exploiting the country, but he was convinced that the ignorant, unarmed and undisciplined masses could never be strong enough to free themselves. Realizing that the position of the Turks in Egypt was threatened by the Mamlukes, he decided to utilize this rivalry to his advantage. Hoping that the two powers would destroy one

¹The Mamlukes were originally a group of slaves who served the early masters of Egypt (The Fatemites). They were trusted and given high positions in government. When the Fatemite power deteriorated, the Mamlukes who then occupied the high offices of the government and who were very prosperous by then formed the aristocratic class, and, in fact, ruled over Egypt.

²The states of the Near East as known to us today were but small provinces of the Ottoman Empire then.

³Muhammed 'Ali was born in 1769 at Cavalla, a small Macedonian port on the Aegean Sea now under Greece. He came of poor parentage and was brought up as an orphan by the Mayor of his home town. He worked for a French tobacco merchant, Monsieur Leon, until he was enlisted in the Turkish army in 1798.

another, 'Ali instigated war between them.

First, he aided the Mamlukes until their position was secure. Then, in 1803, he massacred the surprised Mamluke leaders in their homes, killed as many as possible and forced the rest to leave Cairo. Next, he urged the Egyptians to rise against the Turkish Governor, Khursid Pasha. After the people demonstrated in the streets and demanded the Pasha's return home, 'Ali began to support the Egyptians openly. In 1805, the leaders of the country chose him to be Governor of Egypt.⁴ Khursid Pasha, however, refused to relinquish his position. 'Ali armed his followers with the weapons available to him as a Turkish general, and under pressure, the Turkish Government, in July, 1805, ordered Khursid Pasha's withdrawal from Egypt and officially requested Muhammad 'Ali to take his place. After a year had elapsed, the Turkish government at Constantinople tried to weaken the power of Muhammad 'Ali by asking him to leave Egypt to rule over other Turkish provinces. All efforts in this direction were failures because Muhammad 'Ali was backed by the Egyptian people and there was no choice but for him to remain.

In 1807, after the Turkish government failed to side with Britain and Russia against Napoleon, the British Govern-

⁴The masses of Egypt at that time were led by Shaykh Al-Shakrawi, the director of Al-Azhar University and by Al-Sayed Omar Makram, the head of the religious nobility of the country. M. Rifaat Bey, The Awakening of Modern Egypt (London, 1947), p. 18.

ment planned to invade and occupy Constantinople. However, the British efforts in that direction were in vain, as the Turks, with the help of France, were able to fortify and save their capital.⁵

To cover up their defeat, the British attacked Egypt. They were counting on the support of al-Alfi,⁶ who promised them that if they would come to Egypt and take it away from the hands of Muhammad 'Ali they would be given the privilege of ruling the Egyptian seashore. Muhammad 'Ali acted quickly and by using the influence of the religious leaders (shaykhes) he was able to persuade the Mamlukes to cooperate with him rather than with the British. Although the British were able to conquer Alexandria with ease,⁷ they were ultimately defeated. A treaty of peace with Muhammad 'Ali was signed at Damanhur and they evacuated Alexandria in September, 1807.

Mr. Valentine Chirol describes this defeat of the British troops in Egypt in 1807 as, "one of the most humiliating defeats the British troops ever suffered in the East," and remarks further that Muhammad 'Ali's "victory over the

⁵The Turkish Sultan was influenced by Sebastiani, Napoleon's clever ambassador who was sent to represent France at the Turkish Court. He was greatly responsible for carrying the Sultan at that time to side with France against England and Russia and at the same time he saw to it that the Turkish shores were well fortified and able to resist the British invaders.

⁶Al-Alfi was a Mamluke leader who visited England after the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt and involved himself in an agreement with the British. He died just two months before the expedition took place.

⁷Amin Agha was the governor of Alexandria at that time, as it was still in the hands of the Turks. It was said that he made a peaceful surrender to the British because he was paid to do so. Rif'aat, p. 23.

Infidel" made him the master of Egypt.⁸ To quote M. Rifat Bey, "The victory over the English made Muhammad 'Ali the undisputed champion of Egyptian nationality, and his fame began to traverse the boundaries of Egypt to the outside world."⁹

After Muhammad 'Ali had established himself as a ruler of Egypt, he turned against all forces in the country that might at a later date question his authority or dispute his control. The first group he attacked was the Mamlukes. He slaughtered at one time about 500 of their Beys in Cairo and put an end not only to their strength but to their existence as well. As Chirol puts it, "The Mamlukes had ruled by the sword and they perished by the sword."¹⁰

Among other actions strengthening his position with the Egyptian people and with his nominal master, the Ottoman Sultan, was Muhammad 'Ali's complying with the Sultan's request that he crush the Wahhabi rebellion in Arabia.¹¹ In

⁸ Sir Valentine Chirol, The Egyptian Problem (London, 1921), p. 4.

⁹ Rif'at, p. 27.

¹⁰ Chirol, op. cit., p. 5.

¹¹ The Wahhabi sect in Islam is the group which accepted Orthodox teachings of Muhammad ibn'Abd Alwahab of the strict Hanbali school of Islam. It began its religious and political movements early in the 18th century when the Ottoman Sultan, Salem, took for himself the title of Caliph. Up until that time the Fatimite rulers who ruled in Egypt and North Africa used this title on the basis that they were descended from Fatima, the daughter of the prophet, Muhammad, and the wife of 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, the last of the four Caliphs who succeeded Muhammad. The Turkish Sultans did not have any legal right to this title. Thus, the Wahhabies questioned the issue and opposed the Turkish authority.

1811 Muhammad 'Ali sent his son, Tussoon, with an Egyptian force to recapture the holy places from the Wahhabis and bring them back under Turkish control. Tussoon was successful at first in reconquering Medina. The complete defeat of the Wahhabi forces was not accomplished until 1818 when Ibrahim, the favorite son of Muhammad 'Ali, was able to capture Deraye, the last stronghold in the hands of the Wahhabi in Arabia and to take prisoner their leader, Abdullah Ibn Sa'ud, who was then sent to Constantinople to pay for his disobedience to the Sultan. Muhammad 'Ali was able to render another service for the Sultan when the latter called on him in 1821 to save Crete from the Greeks, who were at that time seeking their independence from the Turks. Ali was successful in putting an end to the Greek rebellion and saving the island for the Sultan. As a reward for this great service, the Sultan appointed 'Ali as the titular Pasha of the island.

Muhammad 'Ali was a very ambitious man, always hoping to obtain independence in Egypt and to expand his control and influence from there rather than to remain an agent of the Ottoman Government, spending all his effort in strengthening the stronghold of the Sultan. After his expeditions in Arabia

11 (continued) The Wahhabies were supported by the Bedouin tribe of Bani Sa'ud which roamed the area of Southeastern Arabia. The Wahhabies in the course of time were able to lay their hands on the sacred shrines in Mecca and Medina and forbade prayers for the Ottoman Sultan as Caliph of all Moslems. The Wahhabies were in power in Arabia until they were defeated in 1818 by Ibrahim, son of Muhammad 'Ali. For further information about the Wahhabi movement see: H. St. J. B. Philby, Arabia (London, 1930). See also, Stoddard Lothrop, The New World of Islam (New York, 1921), pp. 25-45.

and Crete, he apparently became convinced of his power and decided to start working for himself. He began thinking of acquiring and adding the territories of Palestine and Syria to his domain, and thus, in 1831, we see him sending his son, Ibrahim, at the head of a strong Egyptian force to recapture these areas from the Turks. His justification for this expedition was based on his claim that the Ottoman Government in Constantinople had promised him earlier that he would become ruler over this region in recognition of his help to the Turks in subduing the Greeks, a promise which the Turks had failed to honor.

Ibrahim was able during this expedition to play on Arab sympathies and on the issue of Arab nationalism and to move those people to help him against the enemy of both parties; namely, the Turks.

He was also able to advance in Syria and in the summer of 1832 arrived at Adana in Asia Minor, which is but a few hundred miles from Constantinople. This action of Muhammad 'Ali did not please the European nations who looked at Turkey as the weak man of Europe. Russia preferred to see a rather weak power on her borders and offered help to the Sultan of Turkey against the forces of Muhammad 'Ali. Austria and England also offered assistance. The Sultan accepted the help of his former enemies, and Ibrahim Pasha, as the head of the Egyptian forces, was halted at a small town known as Kutahiyah (Kutahya) where he agreed to sign a peace treaty with the Sultan of Turkey. This treaty was named after the town 'The

Treaty of Kutahiyah' and apparently it spoke of preserving the status quo.¹²

The Kutahiyah Treaty was an acknowledgment of the defeat of the Sultan. Although on June 24, 1839, we see him attacking the Egyptian troops at Nasabain, his Turkish troops were badly defeated by the Egyptians. At the same time the Ottoman fleet in the Mediterranean Sea surrendered and joined the forces of Muhammad 'Ali at Alexandria. When this news reached the broken-hearted Sultan he became ill and passed away within a week from the time he started his attack on the Egyptians at Nasabain.

In 1840, the European powers met at Lundra and agreed among themselves on special terms to force on Muhammad 'Ali. The pressure of the Western powers was very effective, and Muhammad 'Ali found himself obliged to sign, on November 13, 1840, the Lundra Treaty with the Governments of Turkey, Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia; according to the terms of this treaty Muhammad 'Ali evacuated the Ottoman territory which he then occupied, and satisfied himself with Egypt. Muhammad 'Ali was declared to be the hereditary Pasha of Egypt, which became an independent state under the control of Turkey, rather than a part of the Ottoman Empire.

Muhammad 'Ali proved himself to be a great reformer as well as a brilliant military man and statesman. In an effort

¹² Ahmad Shafik Pasha, Hauliyat Misr al-Siyasiyah (Cairo, 1928) I, 7. cf. George Antonius, The Arab Awakening, (New York, 1946), pp. 27-32.

to encourage trade and improve the economy of the country, he developed Alexandria harbor and built a shipyard there, encouraged trade with foreign states, opened the door for foreign investment in Egypt, and started a number of new industries. In the field of education he subsidized many students to study in different fields in France. He also built the first medical school in Egypt at Qasr al-'Ayni. He built the Egyptian army on Napoleonic lines and introduced technical military training. He reformed the Egyptian government and developed a functional Department of State.

Muhammad 'Ali was succeeded by other men of his dynasty who lacked his ability and great enthusiasm. The following diagram shows the relationship to Muhammad 'Ali of later rulers of Egypt.¹³

¹³The Geneological table was obtained from the Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey (London, 1951), p. 152. (Hereafter cited as R I I A, The Middle East.)

King Farouk, who is the descendent of Muhammad 'Ali's family, was forced to abdicate in the summer of 1952 in behalf of his infant son, Prince Ahmad Fu'ad, who was but a few months old. The year in which Farouk abdicated and the name of Prince Ahmad Fu'ad, son of Farouk I, were added by the writer. In 1953 Egypt was declared a republic and Muhammad Nagub became the first President of the New Egyptian Republic.

Muhammad 'Ali The Great
Viceroy of Egypt
(1805-1849)

Ibrahim Pasha
Regent of Egypt
(1848)

Tusan Pasha

Muhammad Sa'i'd
Pasha, Viceroy of
Egypt (1854-63)

Isma'il, Vice-
roy of Egypt
(1849-92)

Abbas I, Viceroy of
Egypt (1849-54)

Tawfiq, Kedive
of Egypt
(1849-92)

Husain Kamih,
Sultan of Egypt
(1814-17)

Admad Fu'ad,
Sultan of Egypt
(1817-22), King
of Egypt (1822-36)

Abbas Hilmi II,
Khedive of
Egypt (1892-
1914)

Prince Muhammad 'Ali

Prince Abdul
Mun'im

Farouk I, King of
Egypt (1930-52)

Prince Ahmad Fu'ad

THE SUEZ CANAL

Muhammad 'Ali was succeeded by men from his dynasty who were not as capable as he and who lacked the incentive and the dynamic personality which he possessed. The age of those successors may be characterized as static. A. M. Hassanein and H. A. Mahmud, two Egyptian historians, in talking about this period say:

In studying the history of these two viceroys, [Abbas I and Sa'id] we pass from the heroic age to the commonplace, we drop from the high plateau of the great Pasha's reign into an abyss unrelieved by a single incident of statesmanship. There is little to admire in this period of fifteen years.

The story of modern Egypt until the reign of Isma'il Pasha becomes dull after the death of Muhammad 'Ali. It is chronicle of bad finance and foreign intervention.¹⁴

In 1852, during the reign of Abbas I, a French diplomat called Ferdinand de Lesseps who had just retired from the French Consular Service after a long experience in Tunis, Egypt, Rotterdam, Malaga and Barcelona, came out with a plan which was translated into Arabic and sent to Abbas Pasha of Egypt through the Dutch Consul-General. The plan was to cut a canal to join the Mediterranean Sea with the Red Sea, thus shortening the distance from Europe to India and the Far East. De Lessep's idea met with an unfavorable reception.¹⁵

¹⁴ A. M. Hassanein and H. A. Mahmud, Outlines of Egyptian Modern History (Cairo, 1948), p. 71.

¹⁵ Eva March Tappan, (ed.) Egypt, Africa and Arabia. The World's Story (New York, 1914), III, 231.

The idea of De Lesseps did not die. The Pasha of Egypt who was not in accord with this idea passed away in 1854 and was succeeded by an old friend of De Lesseps, Sa'id Pasha, who accepted the plan, which was put into effect in 1859.¹⁶

Sa'id Pasha passed away on January 17, 1863, after the process of digging the canal had been in progress for three years. Sa'id was succeeded by Isma'il Pasha, the grandson of Muhammad 'Ali. Isma'il, unlike the two rulers who had preceded him as Pashas of Egypt, possessed the dynamic and aggressive personality of his grandfather. He was educated in Paris where he acquired Western ideas and conceptions.

It is not strange, then, that Isma'il followed the steps of his grandfather, Muhammad 'Ali in trying to westernize Egypt, advance education, and speed up production. Helpful to

¹⁶The idea of digging a canal to join the Mediterranean by the Red Sea was not originated by De Lesseps. Long before his time the idea was introduced and investigated, but it was declared to be impractical. This was the conclusion to which England had come in the past. Now the rising of a Frenchman like De Lesseps to disprove the old and mistaken theory that the Red Sea is about 30 feet below the Mediterranean Sea and that the connection would only lead to an inundation or permanent waterfall, was not appreciated by the British Government, especially as the British Government was fearful of French interference in the affair, and bringing Egypt into their sphere of influence, or under their control. On this basis we find that Great Britain had influenced Turkey to side with her in opposing the issue of the canal. Said Pasha of Egypt sided with his friend, Ferdinand De Lesseps, who was at last victorious in opening a subscription to the cause, collecting almost eight million pounds and starting the operation of the digging in 1859. For reference on this point see: Ibid., III, 231-237.

him in this was his success in 1866 in securing a proclamation (firman) from the Sultan in Constantinople which gave the dynasty of Isma'il direct succession to the Egyptian governorship in the European tradition, from father to the oldest son, instead of Turkish succession by seniority. In the succeeding year Isma'il was able to obtain another firman which gave him the right to negotiate commercial and administrative treaties, to issue new laws, contract loans, and enlarge the Egyptian army if he chose to do so. In other words, he was given full power to deal with all Egyptian affairs except in connection with international treaties. He also was given the title of Khedive 'Ruler'.¹⁷ This was a bold step representing an effort to free Egypt from the Ottoman interference which had prevailed during the reign of the two Pashas who had preceded him.

After these accomplishments, Isma'il turned toward local affairs and tried to complete the reforms started by his grandfather, Muhammad 'Ali, a few years before, but which were forgotten in the intervening period. In this direction Isma'il was very successful.¹⁸ He was able to establish a post office in Egypt. He introduced the sugar industry, built docks and harbors, new railways, and many canals for irrigation. In other words, he was able to stimulate commercial as well as agricultural progress.

¹⁷ Carl Brockelmann, History of the Islamic Peoples, trans. Joel Camichael and Moshe Perlmann (Cornwall, N.Y., 1947), p. 371.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 371.

In attempting to modernize Egypt, he provided the three great cities of the country with gas and waterworks for the first time.¹⁹ In the field of education he was able to make great progress. This is evident when we realize that the number of schools during his reign rose from 185 to 4,817, and that he was responsible for the formation of a school of medicine, a military academy, and the first girls' school in Egypt.²⁰ Also, during Isma'il's reign, a chamber of deputies was convened for the first time. This made him "a pioneer in the sphere of constitutional government"²¹ in Egypt.

Despite the horrible picture of Isma'il diligently presented by British sources, it can be said that he was loyal to the Egyptian cause and was successful in advancing Egyptian society toward the goals of progress and civilization.²² Unfortunately he lived in an age in which European ambitions, especially those of England and France, were directed toward the ideal of conquering Egypt and keeping her under their control, especially after the Suez Canal was completed.²³

¹⁹ Edward W. P. Newman, Great Britain in Egypt, (London, 1928), p. 26.

²⁰ Brockelmann, p. 273.

²¹ A. M. Hassanein and H. A. Mahmud, p. 82.

²² See Appendix No. 1.

²³ Joseph Morton Howell, Egypt's Past, Present and Future, (Dayton, Ohio, 1929), pp. 135-136.

Isma'il, in order to carry out his plans, was forced to borrow money from abroad. This policy was not a wise one, considering that Egypt was already in debt when Said Pasha died.²⁴ Isma'il's personal extravagance was another drain on the Egyptian budget. It is said that the cost of the Egyptian festivities connected with the opening of the Suez Canal were £.E. 12 million.²⁵ Also, Isma'il had to spend large amounts of money on his unsuccessful expeditions in the southern part of the Sudan and Abyssinia.²⁶ All of these acts required large amounts of money, which Egypt did not have. Therefore Egypt was forced to borrow from foreign creditors in Europe at high interest.²⁷

In 1875, Isma'il found himself facing a great dilemma; his creditors were urging payment of interests which were due, but Isma'il was unable to face them, and found the only solution was to declare bankruptcy and sell Egypt's 177,602 shares in the Suez Canal to the British Government, headed at that time by Mr. Disraeli, for an amount of £. 4 million sterling.²⁸

²⁴ The debt of Egypt at the time of Said's early death in January, 1863, amounted to £.E. 12,000,000; for further details see: A. E. Crouchley, The Economic Development of Modern Egypt, (London, 1938), pp. 115-116.

²⁵ R I I A, The Middle East, p. 154.

²⁶ Brockelmann, p. 372.

²⁷ It was reported that some bankers charged Isma'il up to 12 per cent interest and made the loans at a discount of as much as 25 per cent. R I I A, The Middle East, p. 154. Also, see Lord Milner, England and Egypt, (London, 1894), pp. 15 and 176. See also: Ahmad Shefik Pasha, op. cit., I, p. 9.

²⁸ Ibid., I, . . 10.

The total debt which Egypt owed the Western bankers in 1876 amounted to £ 100 million.²⁹ Isma'il was unable to pay even the interest on the debt and, at the same time, no one would lend him any more money. To make up a part of the deficit he doubled the taxes on the fellahin and paid no salaries to his employees.³⁰

The European creditors sought the help of their governments, England and France, which were able then to interfere directly in the affairs of the Egyptian government, establishing "dual control" over them. In 1879 they deposed and exiled Isma'il, who, instead of locating "Egypt in Europe", brought Europe to Egypt.

The 'Orabi Revolution

After Isma'il was deposed, his son, Tawfiq, succeeded him as the new Khedive of Egypt. Despite all the troubles and financial and political crises in which he found himself, Tawfiq insisted that the Egyptians should be given priority in governmental jobs, and high posts in the Egyptian army.³¹ He also declined to accept the unfair treatment which his father was forced to accept from England and France, and refused to

²⁹Brockelmann, p. 372.

³⁰Ibid., p. 372.

³¹It was the custom in the past that the high positions in the Egyptian army were occupied by officers from Saracen or Turkish origin. Tawfik was able to outdo that and to promote many Egyptian officers as Ahmed 'Orabi, who led the Egyptian National revolution later on to the highest positions in the army. See Ahmad Shafik Pashe, op. cit., I. 15.

recognize the "dual control" or to have any British or French ministers in his government.³²

Tawfiq's recognition of the Egyptian officers created jealousy and a negative reaction toward them in the hearts of Saracen and Turkish officers. In the course of time this ill feeling grew between the two groups and culminated in a bloody clash. The reduction of the officer corps by the Khedive (necessitated by the fact that Tawfiq had to economize in order to pay the Egyptian Government's debts) caused a growing dislike towards him among the Turkish and Saracen officers who had been eliminated. During this period an Egyptian leader emerged in the person of a young officer called Ahmad 'Orabi. Ahmad came from the upper stratum of the fellahin class and was the son of a village shaykh.³³ He studied at al-Azhar University, where he came in contact with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, who had great influence on him and other young future leaders of the nationalist movement.³⁴

32

During the last period of the reign of Isma'il, England and France imposed on him two foreign ministers. The first was a British Minister of Finance and the second a French Minister of Public Works. The influence of those two ministers on the policy of the government was great and Isma'il's life and works became very miserable, as he found himself not free to do anything without the approval of those two ministers. In 1879 he rebelled against the "dual control" but he was not successful and he was forced to leave the country. R I I A, The Middle East, p. 154.

33

A. M. Galatoli, Egypt in Mid-passage, (Cairo, 1950), p. 10.

34

See Chapter III of this study.

'Orabi, although young, was able to advance during the reign of Tawfiq Pasha to Colonel and Commander of the Fourth Regiment in the Egyptian army.³⁵ The rivalry between the Egyptian officers and officers of Turkish origin was at its peak during this period. 'Othman Pasha Rifqi, who was the Minister of War in the Egyptian Government at that time, favored the Turkish officers. Thus, he was opposed by 'Orabi, who, in 1881, with the help of another Egyptian officer, 'Ali Fahmi, drew a protest against Othman's "unjust treatment of the Egyptian officers."³⁶ Then 'Orabi assumed the leadership of a small but highly organized National Party which became well known for its concern for the Egyptian fellah and its struggle against the great landholders of Turkish origin.³⁷

'Orabi came to be the Nation's leader, or as one historian puts it, "All the nation came to be 'Orabi, and 'Orabi came to be the complete nation."³⁸ In February, 1882, 'Orabi was elected Minister of Defense (Jihadiyyah). This did not please the officers of Turkish origin who were afraid that their enemy, the great nationalist, 'Orabi, would attempt to lessen their influence and prestige. The Turkish officers started a conspiracy against 'Orabi and at one time plotted to kill him. 'Orabi, aware of this conspiracy, had them arrested

³⁵ Brockelmann, p. 379.

³⁶ Sir Chirol, op. cit., p. 38.

³⁷ For the program of the National Party see Apendix II.

³⁸ Ahmad Shafik Pasha, op. cit., I, . . 19.

and tried before a military court which passed very harsh judgments against them. The Khedive then interfered and tried to soften the judgment against the accused officers. This behavior did not please 'Orabi who began to think of getting rid of the Khedive.³⁹

England and France were watching carefully. At this time, it appears, both of these countries became afraid that the lives and property of Europeans in Egypt were in danger, and thought it time to show the Egyptian Government as well as the Egyptian Nationalists their readiness to interfere and protect, if necessary, Europeans and their possessions in Egypt. On May 20, 1881, France and England arranged for a demonstration of their fleets before Alexandria. This demonstration heightened the tension in Egypt and trouble broke out in Alexandria.

Great Britain and France then put extreme pressure on the Khedive to dismiss 'Orabi from office and send him and other Nationalist leaders to exile outside Egypt. The Cabinet then resigned. The Egyptian civil and religious leaders demonstrated and presented themselves to the Khedive, requesting that 'Orabi be returned as Minister of War. The Khedive, thus pressed, had no choice but to return 'Orabi to office in order to keep peace. At this time 'Orabi became the absolute ruler of the country (dictator) and took as his responsibility

³⁹ Ibid., p. 17.

the issue of maintaining peace and order. Thus, the position of the Khedive became insignificant as compared to that of 'Orabi.⁴⁰

As 'Orabi was afraid of foreign intervention in Egyptian domestic affairs, he set about fortifying Alexandria. This did not please Great Britain who began to think that it was her responsibility to take some measures in an effort to protect Europeans then residing in Egypt. Suddenly, on July 11, 1882, as a result of a quarrel which took place between an Egyptian donkey driver (makari) and a British subject from Malta, bloody fighting evolved and about 50 Europeans were killed.⁴¹ On the same day the British fleet, located near the Egyptian shores and then under the leadership of Sir Beauchamp Seymour, bombarded the forts of Alexandria. France and Italy declined to cooperate with Britain against Egypt. Two months after the bombardment of Alexandria, British troops led by General Wolseley landed at Tel el-Kabir to fight the National troops and conquer the country.

'Orabi led his army against the British troops on September 13, 1882, at Tel el-Kabir, where he was defeated. He then surrendered to the British, who tried him, but revoked the death sentence which was passed for fear of a nation-wide revolution, as 'Orabi was a very popular leader. They satisfied themselves with 'Orabi's exile to Ceylon. Hence, in 1901 he was allowed to return to Cairo.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 18.

⁴¹ Chirol, op. cit., p. 41.

THE BRITISH OCCUPATION

The defeat of the 'Orabi forces at Tel al-Kabir marked for Egypt the end of the degree of independence which had been achieved by Isma'il and the beginning of a long period of subjection and struggle against the government of Great Britain. Sir Evelyn Baring (later the Earl of Cromer), better known to students of history as Lord Cromer, "a man with an iron fist,"⁴² was the first British Agent and Consul-General to be appointed in Egypt. Lord Cromer was no stranger to Egypt and the Egyptians, having been a member of the "dual control" of Egyptian finance during the last stages of Isma'il's rule.⁴³

The British occupation of Egypt "paralyzed the Nationalist movement", says Mr. Galatoli, "and reinstated the Khedive Tawfiq with absolute powers unchecked by the Egyptian people, but tightly controlled by the British Representative."⁴⁴

Cromer attempted some reforms, and, in fact, was effective in putting some of them through. He has been given the credit for balancing the Egyptian budget, although the Egyptian historian, Ahmad Shafik Pasha, reports that the budget was already balanced during the early part of Khedive Tawfiq's reign and that it then contained a considerable

⁴²Galatoli, p. 13.

⁴³R I I A, The Middle East, p. 155.

⁴⁴Galatoli, p. 12.

amount of reserve money.⁴⁵ Lord Cromer was able to carry out some administrative reforms, an important one being the disposal of the corvee or forced labor system practiced during the reign of Isma'il. The major reforms instituted by Cromer were improvement of the irrigation system, building of large dams on the Nile, and extension of the cultivated area.⁴⁶

In addition to the administrative reforms initiated by Lord Cromer in Egypt, it is worth mentioning here that the Sudan problem, which later had a great influence in determination of the Anglo-Egyptian relations, started during this period; and the year 1898 marked the occupation of the Sudan by Anglo-Egyptian forces. Long before the coming of the British, the Sudan was under Egyptian control, but the Egyptian forces withdrew in 1883 as a result of pressure from the British Government and its representative in Egypt. The forces which reoccupied the Sudan in 1898 under Lord Cromer⁴⁷ were not by any means all British. Mr. Ahmad Shafik Pasha reports that five-sixths of the army was composed of Egyptian soldiers,⁴⁸ and even Lord Cromer admits that most of the cost of the whole operation was met by the Egyptian budget. He writes:

⁴⁵ Ahmad Shafik Pasha, op. cit., I, . 23.

⁴⁶ Chirol, op. cit., pp. 69-75.

⁴⁷ Lord Cromer, Modern Egypt, (London, 1908), I, 391-395.

⁴⁸ Admad Shafik Pasha, op. cit., I, . 32.

The financial success was no less remarkable than the military. The total cost of the campaigns of 1896-98 was E.E. 2,354,000 of which E.E. 1,200,000 was spent on railways and telegraphs and E.E. 155,000 on gunboats. The 'military expenditure', properly so-called, only amounted to E.E. 996,000.

Of the total sum of E.E. 2,354,000, rather less than E.E. 800,000, was paid by the British and the balance of about E.E. 1,554,000 by the Egyptian Treasury.⁴⁹

Despite the fact that Lord Cromer had accomplished much in Egypt, he never became popular. He was criticized severely for the ineffective system of education which he fostered. His interest was limited to secularizing elementary education. There is no doubt that he did well in that direction, as most of the village schools of that time were tied in one way or another to the mosques and were definitely ineffective in spreading basic education. The only kind of instruction carried on in those village schools (Kuttabs) was the forcing of students to read and memorize the Kuran, plus some instruction in elementary arithmetic. Most of the time the educators themselves had little education.⁵⁰ Cromer reports: "In 1906, 4554 village schools were either directly under government control or under departmental inspection for grants-in-aid. They gave instruction to 165,000 pupils of whom nearly 13,000 were girls."⁵¹

⁴⁹Cromer, II, 105-106.

⁵⁰For further information about the village school (Kuttab) see Taha Husain, al-Ayyam (Cairo, 1940), I. Lord Cromer in his book Modern Egypt, II, also made reference concerning this particular point to Haughes' Dictionary of Islam.

⁵¹Cromer, II, 534.

The reader might think that Cromer had done much to promote elementary education, but this is untrue, as the figures he had given show how few were those children who had opportunity to receive elementary education. In 1906, the population of Egypt was about 11,287,359,⁵² including those of grade school age,⁵³ but only 1.35 per cent of this population were in school. This is very low, especially in so young a nation.

On the other hand, Lord Cromer did not show any interest in promoting or improving secondary or advanced education. This led Egyptian thinkers to conclude that Cromer's aim was the development of a new class of people, not intellectuals, not thinking for themselves, not future revolutionaries against England, but a new class of petty clerks with a little learning enabling them better to serve the standing government,⁵⁴ or, to use Chirol's own words, "to produce government servants to work under British officials."⁵⁵

Cromer's attitude toward secondary education and his opposition to the creation of an Egyptian State University were severely criticized by the Egyptians. Cromer never had been able to understand or appreciate the Egyptians. He thought them people with very low intelligence, inferior to

⁵² Galatoli, p. 13.

⁵³ There was a great increase in the Egyptian population during the British occupation of the country (from 6,804,021 in 1882 to 11,287,359 in 1907.) See Ibid., p. 13.

⁵⁴ (Egyptian) Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Egypt, (Cairo, the year of publication is not given), p. 56.

⁵⁵ Chirol, op. cit., p. 77.

Europeans in every way. In his book, Modern Egypt, he relates some stories, attempting to prove his point of view. In the chapter entitled "Dwellers in Egypt", Lord Cromer tries to draw a comparison between the Egyptian and the European, his aim being to show the stupidity of the former and the superiority of the latter. He writes:

The European is a close reasoner; his statements of fact are devoid of ambiguity; he is a natural logician, although he may not have studied logic; he loves symmetry in all things; he is by nature sceptical and requires proof before he can accept the truth of any proposition, his trained intelligence works like a piece of mechanism. The mind of the Oriental, on the other hand, like his picturesque streets, is eminently wanting in symmetry. His reasoning is of the most slipshod description. . . . (the Egyptians) are often incapable of drawing the most obvious conclusions from any simple premises of which they may admit the truth. . . . In political matters, as well as in the affairs of everyday life, the Egyptian will, without inquiry, - accept as true the most absurd rumours.

He adds:

Then, again, side by side with the European's appreciation of arithmetic, consider that in all matters connected with number or quantity the ordinary Egyptian goes hopelessly astray. . . . Tell an Egyptian cook that he puts too much salt into the soup. He will abstain altogether from the use of salt. Or, on the other hand, tell him that he does not use salt enough; he will throw in a bucket ful. He cannot hit the happy mean; moderation in the use of salt, or anything else, is foreign to his nature; he cannot grasp the idea of quantity.

. . . . We hear a great deal in praise of Oriental courtesy and the praise is in some respects well deserved. A high class European will be charmed with manners of a high class Oriental, although he is aware that the exaggerated compliments common in the East are merely figurative and cannot be taken to represent the real sentiments of the speaker. But look a little deeper and examine the ground on which these outward forms of courtesy are based. The examination will bring out a somewhat unpleasant feature of the Egyptian

character. For one of the main reasons why an Egyptian, if he is in a position of authority, is courteous, is that he thinks it in his interest to be so.⁵⁶

These generalizations are but a few of the many which reflect Lord Cromer's failure to understand Egypt and the Egyptians. This misunderstanding and ill treatment of the Egyptians and love of the foreigners in Egypt was reflected not only in his words but in his deeds. He once wrote expressing his idea that the Egyptians are unfit and will never be able to control their own government: "To suppose that the characters and intellects of even a small number of Egyptians can in a few years be trained to such an extent as to admit of their undertaking the sole direction of one of the most complicated political and economic machines which the world has ever known is a sheer absurdity."⁵⁷ His lack of faith in Egyptian ability antagonized the Egyptian population and made him a target for the Egyptian press.

It can be said without any hesitation that Cromer misunderstood and disliked the Egyptians and that he was disliked by them. This was proved in the events of Dinshaway which occurred on June 13, 1906. Some English officers at a pigeon shoot in the village of Dinshaway in the Delta, shot a woman. The fellahin of that village, already antagonized by the misbehavior of the British soldiers, as were many of

⁵⁶ Cromer, II, 146-154.

⁵⁷ Ibid., II, 52.

their countrymen, rioted and set upon those unlucky officers with cudgels. One of the officers died while running away under the burning sun. Cromer, who considered the Egyptian people uncivilized, "ordered a merciless condemnation of the culprits."⁵⁸ Four men were hanged publicly on June 28 and seventeen others were flogged and sent to jail. This punishment, which could only be described as barbarous, strengthened the conviction of the Egyptians that they should unite and fight British imperialism which had proved to be the enemy of all Egyptians, regardless of class or geographical location. The "Massacre of Dinshaway" created a favorite topic for Egyptian writers, poets, and nationalists, who used the episode to arouse the Egyptian people whenever they wanted to call for a struggle with the British. This attitude of Cromer was not criticized by the Egyptians alone. Many European papers, including some in England, attacked his ideas. Even in the English Parliament many representatives objected to the way Lord Cromer punished the villagers who attacked the British officers.⁵⁹ The term of Lord Cromer in Egypt after Dinshaway, was cut short and he was recalled to England, where he retired in May, 1907. His retirement marked the end of an era of British occupation.⁶⁰

⁵⁸Brockelmann, p. 457.

⁵⁹"The Denshaw Affray", The Parliamentary Debates of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, authorized edition (London, 1906), CLXVI, 294-295 (Nov. 29, 1906).

⁶⁰Chircl, op. cit., p. 81.

INTELLECTUAL REVOLUTION

In the first part of this chapter it was mentioned that the father of nationalism in Egypt, Muhammed 'Ali, although illiterate himself, encouraged education and financed many promising students to travel and study abroad, mainly in France. Returning from Europe, these students spread European ideas and French culture throughout Egypt. This pattern of behavior was encouraged by Muhammad 'Ali who, as Brockelmann says, "showed great admiration for the blessings of European civilization, insofar as it gave promise of increasing the productivity of the country."⁶¹ The influence of those Europeanized students was of considerable importance as they encouraged others to seek higher education in Europe.

Schools also were established in Egypt during the reign of Muhammad 'Ali. At the head of each was a French professor. In the course of time the number of westernized men increased and with their increase their influence in directing public opinion and national and international policies of their country became greater.

Isma'il, who later became the Khedive of Egypt, was educated in France. This gave him the background and the desire to start a movement of educational development. He was the one who declared to the foreign consuls upon his ascension

⁶¹ Brockelmann, p. 349.

to the throne: "Egypt is no longer in Africa. It is part of Europe now."⁶² Isma'il did not say this without justification; in fact, he tried to back the statement with action. It was reported that "he spent E.E. 39,394,000 in building railroads, harbors, canals, bridges and telegraph lines."⁶³ He also established a postal system embellishing the main Egyptian cities with broad avenues and modern buildings; gave fine waterworks to Alexandria; founded a Geographical Society; instituted a Museum of Antiquities; and opened a National Library in Cairo and thousands of schools, including the first Egyptian school for girls, a school of medicine and a military academy. He benefited agriculture by establishing new dams and canals for irrigation from the Nile, and by the introduction of the sugar cane industry. It is unfortunate that circumstances were unfavorable and he fell into the hands of merciless debtors who forced him to abdicate.

The influence of the French on the Egyptians was of immense importance as many Egyptian youths were taught to read and write the French language. They read the writings of the great French writers such as Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu and others, and the French slogan "Liberty, equality, and fraternity" became the new slogan of the Egyptian nationalists Sa'd Zaghloul, Mustafa Kamil, and others.

⁶²This quotation was cited in A. M. Galatoli, p. 9.

⁶³Ibid., p. 9.

During the British occupation, the number of foreign communities in Egypt increased, protected⁶⁴ and favored by Lord Cromer and other influential British officers in Egypt. Those Europeans, Lord Cromer reported, represented the greater part of the wealth and intelligence and no small proportion of the rascality and aggressive egotism of the country. . . ."⁶⁵ The Egyptians, being in contact with those European communities and individuals, were affected in two ways. First, they imitated them,⁶⁶ and second, they were antagonized by the most advanced and privileged foreigners, and thus, waited for the day that they might satisfy themselves by throwing them out of the country.

During this period, also, an event took place outside Egypt which had a great effect in sharpening Egyptian nationalism. This was the Russo-Japanese war which ended in 1904 with the overwhelming victory of the Japanese over the Russian Europeans. This victory brought hope to the Egyptians who began to think that the time might come when they would be able to fight the British and defeat them. Mr. Hans Kohn, in an address which he delivered on March 22, 1952, at the Sixth Annual Conference on Middle East Affairs, said, "There has been no single event exercising such a tremendous influence on nationalism in the Middle East as the Russo-Japanese War." And he continued: "In fact, if I had to put

⁶⁴Cromer, II, 129.

⁶⁵Ibid., II, 131.

⁶⁶Ibid.

my finger on a definite event which gave birth to nationalism in Asia or Africa, I would choose the Russo-Japanese War."⁶⁷

The poets and writers made much of that event; many popular poems were written and memorized by students as well as by adults. There were not many who had finished the elementary school anywhere in the Arab world who had not memorized or at least become familiar with Hafith Ibrahim's (the Poet of the Nile) lovely poem entitled "The Japanese Lass", about a Japanese girl in Egypt who was a very good friend of the poet. When the Russo-Japanese War started, the Japanese government recalled this girl to Japan to serve in the army. The following conversation occurred when she came to bid Hafith goodbye:

If only my people are loyal and steadfast, I shall never complain of other things.

A nation is weakened by the hatred of its people for one another, and their love for foreigners.

∟The people of∟ this nation love empty titles, and sacrifice their souls ∟for unworthy∟ rank.

And though surrounded by danger ∟they∟ spend their lives in search of pleasure.

They do not care whether time or their enemies make playthings of them.

I wish that ∟this nation∟ would listen to this story of mine, which is full of wonders.

Once I loved a lady upon whom God had bestowed many good qualities.

⁶⁷ Hans Kohn, "General Characteristics of Nationalism in the Middle East", Nationalism in the Middle East, ed. by Middle East Institute (Washington, D. C., 1952), pp. 62-63.

She had a beautiful face; Beauty tinted it a yellow color /and made it lovely/ so that if a Jew should see it, he would forget about glittering gold.

She carried to me one day an item of news. Oh God, withhold your blessing from that message.

She came walking toward me while night was still young,
And while the crescent was creeping over the horizon.

Then she said with a smiling mouth,
In which pearls and water drops were arranged,

"I have been informed of my early departure,
I do not believe I shall come back after it.

"My fatherland calls me back,
So that I may render my duty to it.

"We shall kill the Bear and skin him. Does the Bear
think that he'll never be defeated?"

I spoke then with a heart full of pain:
"Alas! What can deer do in a war?"

"We never think of war as a playground
For deer, where they may seek pleasure.

"Wars are not the buying of souls with precious belongings,
or the stealing of hearts /by beauty/.

"Leave it to those who are experienced in it,
And stay, 'deer of the forest', in your chamber."

She answered me then in a quivering tone, And showed
me that /what I thought to be/ a deer was indeed a
fierce lion.

"My people love to quench their thirst in death, /she
said/. How dare you ask me not to drink!

"I am a Japanese girl. I will never retreat until I
reach my aim or be killed.

"If I do not master shooting or handling arms, I shall
serve the wounded people, do my duty toward them, and
help those who are affected by war.

"This is the way the Mikado taught us to follow, to re-
gard our land as father and mother."⁶⁸

⁶⁸ Hafith Ibrahim, Diwan Hafith Ibrahim, (Cairo).

The "Japanese Lass" no doubt loses much of its power and forcefulness through translation, but still the reader can feel its very revolutionary significance. The phrases, "My fatherland calls me back", "My people love to quench their thirst in death", "I am a Japanese girl", "We shall kill the Bear. .", and "This is the way the Mikado taught us to follow, to regard our land as father and mother", are strong nationalistic phrases and likely to foment a revolutionary trend in the mind and heart of any Oriental reader. The Egyptian reader could easily identify the sentiments as his own. If a Japanese girl could defeat the Russians, why could not the Egyptian at least free his country from the rule of the British?

The idea of nationalism was already developed among many Egyptian people, especially among the educated and the urban communities, prior to World War I. In the following chapter we shall see how the War affected this development and how Egyptian people of different **s**ocial classes and geographical areas became aware that they belonged to the Egyptian nation, and that it was their duty to liberate Egypt from its conquerors, the British.

Chapter II

WORLD WAR I AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF NATIONALISM IN EGYPT

War between Germany and Great Britain broke out August 4, 1914. On the same day, the British in Egypt proclaimed martial law throughout the country, and on September 10, war was declared on Turkey. This was followed by the British government's declaration of a protectorate over Egypt on December 18. At that time the Khedive of Egypt, 'Abbas Hilmi, who was disliked by the British authorities because of his sympathy with the Turkish cause, was visiting at Constantinople.¹ The British considered this visit justification for their replacing Hilmi with his uncle, Husain Kamil, upon whom they conferred the title of Sultan. Kamil enjoyed throughout his reign the "blessing" and "confidence" of the British authority in Egypt.²

During this period, Hussin Rushdi Pasha was the Prime Minister of the Egyptian government. He was relatively strong, "and on the whole well disposed towards the British controlling power."³ Actually, the country was ruled by Sir Henry McMahon, who was then appointed as High Commissioner

¹Chirol, op. cit., p. 120.

²George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs, (Ithaca, N. Y., 1952), p. 314.

³Chirol, op. cit., p. 120.

of Egypt.⁴ This was a difficult position for a man who, as Valentine Sir Chirol says, "had no knowledge at all of Egypt."⁵ "His principal task was to make all the auxiliary resources of the country available not only for its defense on the Sinai front but also for an aggressive war against Turkey."⁶

One of the first actions of General Sir John Maxwell, who was in command of the British forces in Egypt during the war, was to proclaim that "the British were now fighting to protect the rights and liberties of Egypt which were originally won upon the battlefield by Mehemet Ali [Muhammad 'Alī]," and to preserve the peace and prosperity which she had enjoyed during the thirty years of the British occupation. Great Britain, nevertheless, "recognizing the respect and veneration with which the Sultan [of Turkey] is regarded by the Mahomedans [Muhammadans] of Egypt, takes upon herself the sole burden of the present war without calling upon the Egyptian people for aid therein."⁷ However, "wherever and whenever the British found it convenient to do so" they did use Egyptian forces and Egyptian help.⁸ In fact, Sir Chirol, one of the few English writers who treat this period

⁴Sir Henry McMahon, prior to his new appointment as High Commissioner of Egypt, was political secretary of the government of Simla in India.

⁵Chirol, op. cit., p. 121.

⁶Erockelmann, p. 458.

⁷As quoted in Chirol, op. cit., p. 130.

⁸Ibid., p. 130.

objectively, declares that "Egypt's contribution to the war can challenge comparison with that of many other parts of the British Empire."⁹

Once, when the Suez Canal was attacked by the Turks in early February, 1915, the British communications with India and Australia were in great danger. If it were not for the courage of an Egyptian officer, the Turks would have captured the Canal and advanced into Egypt.¹⁰ Later, the "Turks were marched into Cairo as prisoners instead of entering it as conquerors."¹¹ Although the Egyptians were cooperative and of great help to the British during the war they were never given due credit and recognition.¹² This effected a revival of Egyptian hostility toward the British.

As a result of the British war policy, rural areas were bled of manpower and beasts of burden. Strong young men were drafted to serve with the British troops as civilians. Oxen and camels were taken away, leaving the old people without animal power to cultivate the land. The result was a food shortage problem.¹³

⁹ Ibid., p. 131.

¹⁰ Ahmad Shafik Pasha, op. cit., p.

¹¹ Chirol, op. cit., pp. 131-132.

¹² Ibid., p. 131.

¹³ Chirol, Tsurumi and Salter, The Reawakening of the Orient, and other Addresses, (New Haven, 1925), p. 23. (Hereafter cited as Reawakening.)

Despite this, the British army paid high prices on the Egyptian market for foods to be consumed by the British soldiers and Egyptians employed by the British, as "the dearth of shipping and the growing submarine danger in the Mediterranean made it imperative to supply and feed them as far as possible from Egypt itself."¹⁴ This created inflation, and huge sums of money found their way into the pockets of big businessmen and landlords, since only they had anything to sell. The peasants suffered considerably because they were not able to meet the high prices of the essential commodities necessary to maintain even a subsistence standard.

In August, 1915, a corps of Egyptian laborers was sent to Madras, India. They did not like being taken away from home. Later, when an Egyptian corps came under fire, the Egyptian peasants hated participating in a war which did not especially concern them, and endangering themselves only to serve British interests. "Good pay soon could no longer win the fellah for this work in the army,"¹⁵ and the fellahin of Egypt then resorted to passive resistance.

During the war the British authorities landed many foreign troops, such as English, Australian and New Zealanders, on Egyptian soil. This action "wounded Egyptian

¹⁴ Chirol, op. cit., pp. 133-134.

¹⁵ Brockelmann, pp. 458-459.

national pride."¹⁶ The behavior of these soldiers, and particularly their rude treatment of the natives, intensified Egyptian xenophobia. Miss Durham, an English subject, testifies:

I was in Egypt from November, 1915, to April, 1916, and can confirm Dr. Haden Gest in his statement that it is to our own treatment of the Egyptians that we owe the present trouble. The authorities were certainly to blame in landing Colonial troops in Egypt without carefully instructing them as to the population they would meet there. So ignorant were numbers of these men that they imagined that Egypt was English and the natives of the land were intruders.

More than one Australian said that he would clear the lot out if he had his way. They treated the natives with cruelty and contempt. In the canteen in which I worked, a very good native servant was kicked and knocked about simply because he did not understand an order given him by a soldier. An educated native in the town was struck in the mouth, and had his in-laid walking stick forcibly snatched from him by a soldier who wanted it. More than one English resident said to me: "It will take years to undo the harm that has been done here by the army." Personally I felt that if I were an Egyptian I should have spared no effort to evict the British. I felt ashamed of my country--bitterly ashamed. The opinion of the native for the soldier was amusingly illustrated by a small conversation book, one phrase of which was to the effect: "You fool! What for you spend all your money on beer?" and, a dialogue with a beggar which ended: "Go to hell!"

I spoke with great severity frequently to the soldiers, telling them that by their conduct they were proving themselves the enemies of England; that the Germans maltreated the enemy, but that they were attacking their own side and would make enemies. This surprised them very much. They were absolutely ignorant of the situation.

To make matters worse, for the first few days after the troops arrived in quantities, the drink shops were open all day, and the unlovely results filled the natives with disgust and contempt. It was

¹⁶Lenczowski, p. 314.

reported, I do not know with what truth, that drunken men had snatched the veils from Moslem women. The tale was believed by the natives.

Small wonder if they hate and dread us.¹⁷

The Egyptians were "watching, listening, and waiting." They were watching the Allies win the war, and listening to Allied promises that they were fighting only for "liberty and justice for the whole world, through a confederation of great and small states, all to possess equal rights."¹⁸

The British claimed that the protectorate and importation of English Colonial troops were necessary "to defend Egypt against attack and to keep the internal administration running smoothly."¹⁹ King George stated that the purpose was "to overcome all influences which are seeking to destroy the independence of Egypt."²⁰

The words which gave the greatest hope of independence to the Egyptians were those of Woodrow Wilson:

¹⁷ As quoted in Egyptian Delegation, (ed.), The Egyptian Question, (Washington, D. C., 1919). (Hereafter cited at Egyptian Question). The complete text of the Article by Miss M. E. Durham appeared in The Daily News (April 2, 1919).

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 9. A reference is made to Parliamentary Debates, December 19, 1917.

¹⁹ As cited in Egyptian Question where a reference is made to The London Times, December 19, 1914.

²⁰ As cited in Egyptian Question, p. 16. The quotation is taken from a letter by King George to the sultan whom he had appointed to rule Egypt. This letter was widely circulated throughout Egypt, and was published in the London Times, December 21, 1914.

There can be but one issue. The settlement must be final. There can be no compromise. No half-way decision is conceivable. There are the ends for which the associated peoples of the world are fighting, and which must be conceded them before there can be peace. . . .The settlement of every question, whether of territory, or sovereignty, or economic engagement, or of political relationship upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation or people which may desire a different settlement for the sake of its own influence or mastery. . . .What we seek is the reign of law based upon the consent of governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.²¹

The words of Wilson were widely read and highly appreciated by the Egyptian nationalists. It was reported that when the great nationalist leader, Sa'd Zaghloul, was arrested in 1919, the British authorities found on his person only a paper clipping containing Wilson's Fourteen Points. Article Fourteen was heavily underlined.²² "A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."²³

By the end of World War I, the Egyptians were in a great dilemma. Although there was in the Egyptian treasury an accumulated sum of £.E. 152,000,000, exclusive of reduction in liabilities, the common man was in great distress.

²¹

Woodrow Wilson in his Mt. Vernon address, July 4, 1918. For the full text see: The New York Times (July 5, 1919) p. 1:2. (Hereafter cited New York Times.)

²²

Brockelmann, p. 459.

²³

Frank Lee Benns, Europe Since 1914 (New York, 1941), p. 100.

Prices had skyrocketed to 237 per cent of the pre-war level, while wages had increased only slightly. Malnutrition and disease were so rampant that in 1918 the number of deaths exceeded the births.²⁴ In addition, the Egyptian people had come to believe that the British control was not merely a matter of temporary expediency, as the Britons had said at the beginning of the war, but was intended to be permanent. After the peace treaty was concluded the British troops remained, and martial law was kept in force. Egypt revolted.

SA'D ZAGHLUL

Sa'd Zaghlul, who once was reported to have said: "It is true that we are weak: we have no army or fleet but we are strong because Right is on our side, for weakness with Right is a strong arm",²⁵ is regarded by many students of history, as well as by the Egyptian people, as the champion of modern Egyptian nationalism, because he was able to achieve for his nation the independence which it sought from the time of Khedive Isma'il.

Zaghlul, despite the statements of many writers, was not the son of a poor peasant. His father was the 'Umdah

²⁴ Charles Issawi, Egypt, An Economic and Social Analysis (Oxford, 1947), p. 100.

²⁵ Galotoli, p. 5.

(chief) of his town. He was a prosperous man, possessing over 200 faddans²⁶ at al-Jazireh, good lands, and a huge palace with a veranda large enough to accommodate 200 people at one time. This old 'Umdah behaved as a feudal lord in his relationship with the people in his town.²⁷

Sa'd's mother was the daughter of a noble house, that is, of Shaykh 'Abdu Barakat. This family has been in contact with the rulers of Egypt since the time of Muhammad 'Ali,²⁸ but despite this noble origin, Zaghlul was born and brought up in a peasant (fellahin) community. This background helped him, of course, to understand and evaluate the misery of the fellahin, and acquainted him with the injustice of the rulers. Those relationships and experiences which Sa'd acquired in his early life had great influence in the development of his ideas and personality.

The birth date of Sa'd is not known exactly, but the most reliable sources indicate that he was born at a little town known as Ebyanah, in Thi Al-hijah, 1274 A.H., which corresponds with July, 1857, A.D. This "was the date which Sa'd gave when he was asked about his birthday."²⁹ However, the date appearing on the Lisance Degree which Sa'd received in France indicates that he was born in 1860.

²⁶The faddan is about 1.083 acres. Two hundred faddans might not sound a vast area of land to the farmer in the United States, but it is so regarded in Egypt.

²⁷Al-'Aqqad, Sa'd Zaghlul (Cairo, 1936), pp. 49-50.

²⁸Ibid., p. 50.

²⁹Ibid., p. 54.

In any event, it could be concluded that Sa'd was born and brought up in a time in which the ideas and slogans of "Equality, liberty and fraternity," introduced by the French Revolution, have been fresh and strong. A learned man such as Sa'd, during the course of his youth, must have become acquainted with such ideas, which, of course, added to the development of his personality and radical thinking.

Sa'd's father passed away when the child was but six years old. The youngster was like his father, tall and strong in build, strong in character, and strong willed.³⁰ Unlike other children of the same age, he was a serious and determined youth, regarding his playmates as "spoiled brats".³¹ It is very possible that the death of his father, to whom Sa'd was strongly attached, was at least in part the cause of his serious childhood.

Sa'd, as with other children of his age, was sent to the village (Koranic) school (kuttab) to be prepared to continue his higher studies at al-Azhar University.³² As his bibliographers point out, Sa'd was never happy at al-kuttab, but his half-brother, al-Shinawi, and his young mother, were

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., p. 55.

³² It is interesting to note here that at this time there was not a single elementary school in the district in which Sa'd was brought up, and in all Egypt there were but two high schools; the first in Cairo, known as al-Madrasah al-Taj-hiziyyah, was founded in 1863, and the second, at Alexandria, was founded also in 1863, and was called Madrasat Fa's al-Tiin. See Ibid., pp. 59-60.

able to force the lad to remain. There in al-kuttab, Sa'd learned the Koran well.³³

In 1871, Sa'd was admitted to al-Azhar University, to continue his education. In the same year, the great advocator of pan-Islamism, Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani, came to Cairo and started to spread his ideas and philosophies at al-Azhar among students and professors alike, and outside the university among both intellectuals and non-intellectuals.³⁴ Sa'd Zaghoul and one of his professors, namely, Muhammad 'Abdu, came under the influence of Jamal.³⁵

At al-Azhar, Sa'd started a revolutionary movement against the corrupted professors and doctrines. In the course of time he was able to gather around him a group of students who agreed with his ideas and backed by this group, Sa'd then urged an immediate reform in the university, issuing a pamphlet pointing out the areas of corruption and prescribing the means of treatment.³⁶

At al-Azhar also, Sa'd attended the lectures of Muhammad 'Abdu, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and other liberal professors. When al-Afghani was suspended from lecturing at the University, Sa'd and other students followed him to his home. It was reported that Jamal once asked his students to

³³Ibid., p. 58.

³⁴See Chapter III of this study.

³⁵Al-'Aqqad, p. 62.

³⁶Ibid., p. 62.

write an essay about the subject of freedom. When Jamal read the essay written by Sa'd he was quoted as saying, "The best proof that liberty is flourishing in Egypt is the fact that this youth could write so intelligently about it."³⁷ To say the least, as al-'Aqqad remarks, "The best thing Sa'd learned from Jamal was to express himself clearly and intelligently."³⁸

The first official job to be held by Sa'd Zaghlul was his appointment in 1881 as editor of the literary section of al-Waq'i' al-Misriyyah (The Egyptian Official Gazette). This appointment came about when his professor, Muhammad 'Abdu, was chosen to be the chief editor of the paper. Sa'd published all letters and articles which he received that were suitable for publication. Publication was followed by a public debate for or against the opinions expressed in these letters.³⁹

In the little time left to him after his work at the Gazette, Sa'd studied law. He was promoted subsequently to a post in the Ministry of the Interior, and a short time later was commissioned a judge at al-Jizah.⁴⁰ He occupied the latter post but a few weeks, and was ejected from the

³⁷ Ibid., p. 63.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Mahmud Fu'ad, Majmu'at-Khutab Sa'd Pasha Zaghlul al-Hadith (Cairo, 1928), p. 6.

position because of his association with, and support of, the Nationalist revolution then being led by 'Orabi.⁴¹

After the 'Orabi revolution was over and the nationalist cause defeated, at least temporarily, 'Orabi and his top supporters were exiled. The situation then looked dark and gloomy, and terror filled the hearts of all Egyptians and made them speechless. One British witness remarks about this period by writing, "Apprehension sealed men's lips, and concealed their hopes and fears. No one ventured to prophesy; no one dared to criticize the government. An indiscreet phrase was often sufficient to cause the arrest of the speaker, and the prisons were crowded with men suspected of disloyalty."⁴² The half-hearted nationalists who were left in the country asked the government to pardon them; but not Sa'd, who was courageous enough to abstain from changing his principles.⁴³ Then it was rumored in Cairo that Sa'd was in the process of forming a new secret society which he was calling the "Revenge Society" (Jam'iyat al-Intiqam),⁴⁴ its purpose being to kill all people who had betrayed the nationalist cause and cheated 'Orabi.⁴⁵ Sa'd was then arrested,

⁴¹Chiröl, op. cit., p. 77.

⁴²P. G. Elgood, The Transit of Egypt (London, 1924), p. 140. (Hereafter cited Transit).

⁴³Al-'Aqqad, p. 72.

⁴⁴Mahmud Fu'ad, p. 7.

⁴⁵Al-'Aqqad, p. 73.

but after a period of about three months he was released for lack of evidence.

After that it was very difficult for Sa'd to find a job which would enable him to live respectably. The practice of law was the only door left open to him, but the career of a lawyer was not appreciated, and advocates were looked down upon by the Egyptian society of that day. To escape smears and discrimination, and to save his name and reputation, Sa'd tried not to let anyone know of his new career unless it became necessary. He writes in reference to it,

I started practicing law without letting my family know of it, and if someone asked me whether I had become a lawyer, I said: 'May the Lord save me from becoming one of those lost people'; and in summary I tried my best not to let anyone know who I was, except the persons who were involved in the cases.⁴⁶

For eight long years Sa'd Zaghlul practiced law. During those years he did not concern himself with crime and criminals alone, or with collecting as much money as possible, as some other lawyers did. Instead, he tried and succeeded, during those eight years, in proving to the Egyptian society that the lawyer, as well as any other citizen, could be honest to his career and principles, and at the same time helpful to his community in more than one way. He also tried his utmost to help the nationalists and the nationalist cause. He supported, for example, the two

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 71.

great Egyptian nationalists of that time, Mustafa Kamil and Shaykh Ali Yusuf,⁴⁷ and at one time contributed the sum of E.E. 100.00 (approximately \$400.00) to al-Liwa', the daily newspaper which was published by those two notables. He also contributed E.E. 1,000.00 to the first Egyptian University fund, and supported this movement wholeheartedly by speaking directly to influential and concerned people and by writing publicly in papers and magazines. Kasim Amin, the Egyptian writer and reformer, found a great understanding and encouragement in Zaghoul. Thus, when the former published his book Tahrir al-Mar'ah (the Emancipation of Woman), he dedicated it to the great sympathizer of the movement, Sa'd Zaghoul.⁴⁸

During those eight years, Zaghoul was not disturbed by the authorities as he had "found a protector in the Princess Mazili,"⁴⁹ the daughter of Prince Mustafa Fadhil, and the great admirer of 'Orabi, who entrusted Sa'd with the administration of her estates.

Also, during this period two important things happened to Sa'd; first, he studied the French language and in it passed an examination in law, and secondly, he married the daughter of a well-known Egyptian politician, namely, Mustafa Fahmi, who was "Cromer's favorite protege."⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 90-92.

⁴⁹ Galatoli, p. 14.

⁵⁰ Brockelmann, p. 460.

In 1907, Sa'd, with his father-in-law, played an important political role in founding the People's party, which Cromer hoped would be detrimental to the strong nationalist Fatherland party, headed by Mustafa Kamil.⁵¹ But the People's party, since it was not able to establish contact with the people, ceased its activities as early as the second year of World War I.

It appears that after the Dinshaway incident, and the agitation which was aroused,⁵² Cromer tried to modify his policy in hope of regaining tranquility in Egypt. Thus, he looked around for the cooperation of some popular leaders in the Egyptian society, hoping that by promoting them to higher posts the government would gain their support, and the masses would be convinced that there was a change in governmental policy. Sa'd, as mentioned above, was the son-in-law of Mustafa Fahmi, Cromer's favorite protege, and on the other hand, Sa'd was popular among the masses. Thus, Cromer chose to appoint him as his Minister of Education. This was "a courageous choice."⁵³

The appointment of Sa'd as head of the Ministry of Education was hailed throughout Egypt. The Egyptian nationalists expected from their old supporter plenty of action and

⁵¹Ibid., p. 460.

⁵²See Chapter I of this study.

⁵³Chirol, op. cit., p. 77.

a grasping of power. Al-Liwa', the nationalist newspaper, then remarked:

What the people do know about the character of Sa'd Bek Zaghlul when he was a lawyer at first, and in the position of a judge at last, makes them all feel at ease to the appointment which was bestowed on an Egyptian, who is well-known for his ability, knowledge, high education and love of justice.

But since the Ministry for many years past and up to date has been but an idle job, and that the English advisers have been the true masters in ministries and bureaus, the people now have the right to ask what the honorable Sa'd Zaghlul could do in the Ministry of Education; is he going to be like the rest of the ministers, he and his Ministry in the hands of Mr. Danlop? Or is he going to be a minister by name and action, and revive the authority of Egyptian ministers?

We have known Sa'd Zaghlul in his past and present as the greatest believer in independence and in his rights, and a severe critic of those who had left the authority of their posts go to others, and we heard him very often insulting the lazy people, no matter whether they were small or high in rank. If Sa'd remains in his post as he is now and as he was in the past--and that is what we believe--he will be a great hope to the Ministry of Education and it is our desire that such feeling will creep to other Ministers, and that the Egyptian life will come back to them.⁵⁴

To say the least about Zaghlul in his new post, he was able to help the advancement of education in the country. Cromer himself, who begrudged credit to any Egyptian's thought or work, testifies,

⁵⁴

Al-'Aqqad, pp. 98-99.

Under the enlightened administration of the present Minister, Sa'd Pasha Zaghoul, and of his adviser, Mr. Dunlop, education of every description is making rapid strides in advance.⁵⁵

Moreover, in a speech which Cromer delivered on the eve of his final departure, he contradicted a statement which he once made about the lack of native intelligence among the Egyptian people and found himself obliged to admit that a short period of cooperation with Sa'd Zaghoul had taught him "to entertain a high regard" for the person of this honest, capable and courageous Egyptian.

Lestly, gentlemen, I should like to mention the name of one with whom I have only recently cooperated, but for whom, in that short time, I have learned to entertain a high regard. Unless I am much mistaken, a career of great public usefulness lies before the present Minister of Education, Sa'd Zaghoul Pasha. He is honest; he is capable; he has the courage of his convictions; he has been abused by many of the less worthy of his own countrymen. These are high qualifications. He should go far.⁵⁶

In 1909, during the period in which Sa'd Zaghoul headed the Ministry of Education, the first Egyptian University was founded. Sa'd was "one of those who took the keenest interest in it."⁵⁷ Despite the fact that this university was weak in the beginning, it attracted professors such as the distinguished Spanish Orientalist, Counte

⁵⁵ Cromer, II, 52.

⁵⁶ As quoted in Chirol, op. cit., p. 182.

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 224.

V. de Goltan, who lectured in Arabic about Western philosophy.⁵⁸

The year 1907 marked the date of Mr. Cromer's retirement.⁵⁹ He was succeeded by Sir Eldon Gorst, who remained in Egypt until 1911. During the course of Sir ^{Eldon}Gorst's administration, Sa'd Zaghlul took over the Ministry of Justice, but after a conflict with Khedive 'Abbas Helmi, Zaghloul resigned his office in April, 1912. Shortly after this he was elected to the post of Vice-president of the new Legislative Assembly, which had recently been established by Lord Kitchener, who was successor to Sir Gorst as President (1911-14).⁶⁰

Zaghloul, in occupying his new position, was able through his natural eloquence to gain a constantly growing following; "with its backing he was on occasion even able to venture serious difficulties for Kitchener."⁶¹ Also, as Galatoli puts it, he was able to turn the Assembly "into a court where all the faults and corruption of the Executive were mercilessly publicized," and the ministers themselves "were unable to stand his incisive and documental attacks."⁶²

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 225.

⁵⁹ See Chapter I of this study.

⁶⁰ Chirol, op. cit., pp. 113-114.

⁶¹ Brockelmann, p. 460.

⁶² Galatoli, p. 14.

World War I brought martial law to Egypt. The Legislative Assembly was silenced, Zaghloul was forced into retirement, and Egypt became a British Protectorate. Despite the fact that martial law and prohibition of public meetings were very effective in limiting the activities of Sa'd, it did not stop him from maintaining contact with other nationalist leaders, so long as he created no disturbance or immediate troubles for the British authorities in Egypt. Sa'd and his followers and colleagues adopted the policy of "watchful waiting".

The announcement by President Wilson in 1917 concerning "the rights to self-determination of smaller nations" gave a new hope to Egyptian nationalists, and at the end of the war in 1918, a new nationalist party, headed by Sa'd Zaghloul, emerged to demand a complete independence for Egypt. This was the Wafd party.

AL-WAFD AL-MASRI AND THE 1919 NATIONALIST REVOLT

On November 13, 1918, Sa'd Zaghloul, with two of his nationalist colleagues, 'Ali Sha'rawi Pasha and 'Abd al-'Aziz Fahmi Bey, called on the British High Commissioner, Sir Reginald Wengate, to demand the complete independence of their country. This delegation, headed by Zaghloul Pasha, called itself "al-Wafd al-Masri", or the Egyptian Delegation.

Zaghloul and his delegation claimed that they were

speaking "in the name of the Egyptian people."⁶³ The answer which Zaghloul received from Sir Reginald Wingate was that the latter "was not acquainted with the intentions of his Majesty's Government in regard to the future of Egypt,"⁶⁴ and that he could not do anything about it until he received instructions from his superiors in London. Such an answer did not please either Zaghloul or his friends, who decided to appeal directly to the Big Four. A few days later Zaghloul asked the High Commissioner to support his request to the military authorities for permission for himself and colleagues to leave for England "to place the Egyptian case before the British people."⁶⁵ But the request was refused. This marked the birth for the Wafd party.⁶⁶

Zaghloul immediately appealed to the Egyptian people, trying to remove any doubt that he was their true representative, and that he had the right to speak in their behalf. "All classes rallied to his call" and "thousands of telegrams and letters bearing numberless signatures were sent to the leader to testify the people's support of his program,"⁶⁷ when he declared once: "I intend to spend the rest of my life in attacking the English. . . .I have no quarrel with

⁶³Reawakening, p. 23.

⁶⁴Chirol, op. cit., p. 143.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 143.

⁶⁶Brockelmann, p. 460.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 15. 2

them personally, and I have a number of English friends, but I want to see an independent Egypt, and I am determined to do all I can to make her so,"⁶⁸ and "the great majority of the native press joined in the campaign with all wonted vehemence."⁶⁹ In the early part of 1919 Zaghoul founded the Wafd Party which attracted to its lines many of Egypt's well-known diplomats.

Before speaking of al-Wafd party and its program, it is important to remark here that Zaghoul was not an extreme nationalist as many people came to believe. In fact, some so-called extreme nationalists and recent writers such as al-Shurbaji, consider him a traitor and think of Zaghoul as the leader who betrayed the Egyptian cause through his compromises with the British.⁷⁰ In any case, the keen observer could realize that after Sa'd had married the daughter of Mustafa Pasha Fahmi, who was Cromer's loyal friend and prime minister, Sa'd had changed. His cooperation with his father-in-law in establishing the People's party in 1906, which was hoped to checkmate the nationalist Fatherland party of Mustafa Kamil, as it was pointed out earlier in this chapter, his cooperation with Cromer who awarded him for his services⁷¹ the position of Minister of Education, his exclusion of the

⁶⁸As quoted in Galatoli, p. 15.

⁶⁹Chirol, op. cit., p. 148.

⁷⁰Al-Shurbaji, "Sa'd Zaghoul", Rose al-Yusuf (Cairo, 1953), (a series of articles published through the month of May).

⁷¹Brockelmann, p. 460.

extreme nationalists, who demanded Britain's withdrawal from both Egypt and the Sudan, from the Wafd party⁷² and his offering for the independence of Egypt "special safeguards for foreigners and their traditional privileges and guarantees to insure the neutrality of the Suez Canal," and his willingness "to place Egypt under the protection or even the supervision of the League of Nations,"⁷³ are but a few of the signs which prove that Zaghloul was far from being an extreme nationalist.

The program of the Wafd advocated "complete independence," based on "the abrogation of the British Protectorate and the recognition of Egypt as a sovereign state." It also "stood for constitutional government, respect of capitulation foreign control of the public debt, and the neutrality of the Suez Canal."⁷⁴ Such a strong program caused the Wafd party to become not only the most popular party in Egypt but also preserved her and kept her as the strongest party in that country until this very day.

Sir Reginald Wingate was able to realize how dangerous the Wafd party had become and was able to see that Zaghloul and his supporters would be less dangerous at the peace conference in Paris than remaining in Egypt.⁷⁵ Thus, this was

⁷²Galatoli, p. 15.

⁷³R I I A, The Middle East, p. 157.

⁷⁴Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1951 (London, 1951), p. 5. (Hereafter cited Great Britain and Egypt.)

⁷⁵Erockelmann, p. 461.

Sir Reginald's recommendation to his government when he was called back to England to confer with his superiors in the Foreign Office. His recommendations in this direction were not appreciated and he was not heeded,⁷⁶ because up until this time the British government was wrongly informed that "the Nationalist movement was merely the outcome of shallow propaganda engineered by a handful of discontented politicians imagining they could stamp it out by striking at the leaders!"⁷⁷

It so happened that during the absence of the High Commissioner in England, the government in Egypt resigned from office. Zaghloul then acted fast and threatened Sultan Fu'ad with violence if he dared to form a new government.⁷⁸ Then Sa'd Zaghloul and nine other members of the Wafd party were summoned by the General Officer commanding the British troops in Egypt, who reminded them "that the country was still under martial law, and warned them against any action likely to disturb order or hamper the work of the Egyptian authorities."⁷⁹ At the same time these ten were denied the right to talk back, and the party was dismissed in anger, to issue in the second day a severe protest which was "considered to be so worded as to constitute a flagrant defiance of the warning."⁸⁰

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 461.

⁷⁷Chirol, op. cit., p. 148.

⁷⁸Erockelmann, p. 461.

⁷⁹Chirol, op. cit., p. 149.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 149.

The outcome of this was that in the afternoon of March 8, 1919, Sa'd Pasha Zaghloul and three of his closest friends were arrested and sent to Alexandria to be placed upon a British destroyer which carried them to Malta. The three men who were arrested and sent to exile with Zaghloul were Isma'il Sidki, Muhammad Mahmud and Hamad al-Basil Pasha.⁸¹

The exile of the four nationalist leaders did not frighten their followers nor calm the situation in Egypt. In fact, it did just the opposite, and turned the whole country into chaos. "The students rose first," says Galatoli, "Unarmed but with faith and love of country, thousands of youth faced machine guns of the police and British troops to protest the exile of their leader. They paid for their temerity in blood."⁸² The students' bloody revolt was followed by a general strike which paralyzed the nation, and all communications with Cairo were completely cut by March 17.⁸³ To give a clear picture of what was happening in Egypt during this period, it is interesting to quote the official account subsequently sent by General Allenby to the Foreign Office. It read in part:

⁸¹ Isma'il Sidki, Muthakerati (Cairo, 1950), p. 19.

⁸² Galatoli, p. 16.

⁸³ Chirol, op. cit., p. 182.

On the train which left Luxor at 6 p.m. on Monday, March 17th, were two officers and eight other ranks. When the train stopped at Nag' Hamadi some natives entered the train and insulted the men. The two officers noticed this, and took them into their first-class carriage. They reached Assiut in the early morning of Tuesday, March 18th, where three of the men left the train, and Kaimakam Pope Bey, Inspector in the Egyptian Prisons Department, joined it. The train left Assiut at 4 a.m. Crowds had collected at every station; they threw stones at the train and attempted to board it, shouting for the 'Ingleez' ~~English~~. Several stations were passed safely, but on arrival at Deirut a huge crowd rushed at the train, pulled the driver from the engine, and forced their way into the first-class carriage, where the British were now collected. It seems probable that two of the party were killed here. The train went on again, some of the natives of Deirut remaining on board. On arrival at the station of Deir Mowas another large crowd joined them, and there, with stones and knives, murdered the remainder of the party, not one of whom was armed. All the bodies were left in the train, except one which has not yet been traced, and the train went on. At every station huge crowds had collected who raised shouts of joy on hearing that the English had been killed. When the train reached Minieh, the bodies were taken from the train and buried.⁸⁴

In this 1919 nationalist revolution, men and women, Copts and Moslems all fought side by side. Apparently it was the first time in the history of Egypt that Copts and Moslems were able to realize the great fact that it was to the advantage of both parties to be rid of their foreign imperialist masters, and come to live freely and independently in their own Egypt. "A Coptic priest and a Moslem woman became the tribunes of the revolution," Galatoli remarks. "Funerals of

Egyptian casualties were transformed into gigantic political demonstrations which harmed the British more than any frontal assault."⁸⁵ The Copts also proved during this revolution that they were very eloquent orators. "One of them enthusiastically compared Zaghloul's exile to the Crucifixion and linked the Fatherland, Liberty and Zaghloul to the Christian Trinity."⁸⁶

The British authorities in Egypt were not able to put an end to this national uprising and were forced to ask for reinforcement from Syria to crush the revolt of the whole population. On April 11, of the same year, the daily bulletin issued at General Headquarters of the British troops in Cairo reported, "All seems to be quiet throughout Egypt. ."⁸⁷

This took place after the arrival of General Sir Edmund Allenby from Palestine, and his promise to the Egyptian people on April 7, to release the leaders deported to Malta.⁸⁸

When the National rebellion broke out in March, Sir Wingate, the High Commissioner, was in London. Acting in his place was his deputy, Sir Milre Cheetham, who was responsible for sending the four nationalist leaders to exile in

⁸⁵Galatoli, p. 16.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 167.

⁸⁷As quoted in Chirol, op. cit., p. 188.

⁸⁸Brockelmann, p. 461.

Malta. On March 22, General Allenby, who was in Paris reporting to and consulting with British plenipotentiaries to the Peace Conference in his capacity of Commander-in-Chief in Egypt and Syria, was made a Special High Commissioner to Egypt and sent back to his post immediately. He was instructed:

to exercise supreme authority in all matters military and civil, to take all such measures as he considers necessary and expedient to restore law and order and to administrate in all matters as required by the necessity of maintaining the King's Protectorate over Egypt on a secure and equitable basis.⁸⁹

The first thing General Allenby thought of doing was to form a new government in the country which would help him to bring peace and order back to Egypt. It did not take him long to discover that any cooperation from the Egyptian people would be impossible unless the four exiled leaders were released. Thus, on April 7, he proclaimed "in agreement with H. H. the Sultan" that there were "no restrictions on freedom to travel" and that the four deportees to Malta would "be released from internment and given similar freedom of movement."⁹⁰ On the succeeding day Husain Rushdi, the ex-Prime Minister, was able to form a new Cabinet.

Accordingly, the four exiled leaders were released and permitted to go to Paris to present the case of their nation before the Peace Conference.⁹¹ The Egyptian delegation was ignored in Paris by all other delegations except that of

⁸⁹As quoted in Chirol, op. cit., p. 190.

⁹⁰As quoted in Ibid., p. 149.

⁹¹Isma'il Sidki Fasha, p. 20.

Italy, headed by Sr. Aurnaldo.⁹² This action was very possibly caused by pressure from the British delegation.

The chief work of the Egyptian delegation then was concentrated in spreading propaganda and acquainting the Western diplomats and people with their case.⁹³

While in Paris, Isma'il Sidki, a Wafdist and one of the four men who were exiled in Malta, disagreed with other leaders of the group and left Paris for Cairo. It was rumored then that on his way to Cairo, Sidki went to England to intrigue with the British Government. Despite the fact that Sidki denied all those rumors,⁹⁴ it is not impossible to credit this rumor about him, especially since after he engaged in collaboration and intrigue with the British on various occasions at a later date.

⁹² Ibid., p. 21.

⁹³ Ibid., p. 22.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO THE PROCLAMATION
OF THE EGYPTIAN INDEPENDENCE IN 1922

The 1919 nationalist revolution in Egypt obliged the British Government to admit that "a certain amount of mis-handling of difficult native questions by inexperienced officers"⁹⁵ was committed during World War I in Egypt and also "brought home to the British the fact that Egyptian nationalism could no longer be disposed of by military measures and that some compromise was necessary to preserve British supremacy in the delta of the Nile."⁹⁶ The development of such ideas by responsible British officials, resulted in a commission headed by Lord Milner and named after him, being dispatched to Egypt to examine the whole Egyptian question and recommend to the government in London the steps of a new policy which ought to be followed there.

The Milner Mission which arrived in Cairo on December 7, 1919, was not appreciated by the Wafd party. Accordingly, the Mission found great difficulty and little cooperation from the Egyptian people, especially since the government of Sa'id Pasha had retired from office the same day the Mission arrived in Egypt.⁹⁷

⁹⁵Chirol, op. cit., p. 243.

⁹⁶Lenczowski, p. 315.

⁹⁷Brockelmann, p. 461.

Chirol reports that, "Down with the Milner Mission" became the new slogan of the Egyptian people.⁹⁸ Everybody in the country at that time seems to have boycotted the Mission, and the "newspapers reproduced every day columns and columns of telegrams, all protesting in suspiciously identical language against the Mission." And, Chirol adds, "any person of position who held aloof from the movement was liable to be pilloried in the press or even to see his house invaded by bands of students, whose remonstrances were not always limited to wordy abuse."⁹⁹ The policy of this Egyptian movement was directed by the Wafd party and Sa'd Zaghloul, who was able to control the policy of his party, which was the only organized and effective one in the delta of the Nile at that time.¹⁰⁰

Despite the great opposition and boycott which Milner faced in Egypt, the Mission remained there until March, 1920, and came out with a report which recommended the abolition of the Protectorate and its replacement by a treaty of alliance which would recognize the independence of Egypt, subject to certain guarantees of British and foreign interests. Accordingly, "Great Britain was to have the right to maintain a military force in Egyptian territory, and . . . to have a

⁹⁸

Chirol, op. cit., p. 246.

⁹⁹

Ibid., pp. 246-247.

¹⁰⁰

Ibid., p. 247.

certain measure of control over Egyptian legislation and administration insofar as they affected foreigners."¹⁰¹

Upon the return of the Mission to London, Lord Milner, realizing the importance and effectiveness of Sa'd Zaghloul, and his group, called on the deputies of the Wafd who were still in Paris, to confer with the Mission in London. The Wafd accepted the invitation and journeyed to London to attend the conference scheduled to begin on July 7. Lord Milner, of course, "did his utmost to enlist the sympathies of the Wafd for the solution which his proposed measures embodied,"¹⁰² but to no avail, as negotiations between the two parties concerned ended in a deadlock when Zaghloul insisted on some reservations to the proposed settlement before it could be considered acceptable to the Egyptians, "the more important being that British troops should be limited in number and should be confined to the district adjoining the Suez Canal, and that Egypt should have an equal share with Great Britain in the administration of the Sudan."¹⁰³

The breakdown of the negotiations between London and Cairo this time established the important fact "that Zaghloul Pasha . . . was by far the most important figure in Egyptian politics, that he was an undisguised hater of British

¹⁰¹R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 5.

¹⁰²Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁰³Ibid., p. 6.

interference in Egypt, and that Egyptian nationalism was a force to be reckoned with."¹⁰⁴

The negotiations between London and Cairo were resumed again on February 22, 1921, when the government of Lloyd George asked Sultan Fu'ad of Egypt to appoint a new delegation to come to London for the purpose of renewing the long disturbed negotiations.¹⁰⁵ This resulted in a change in ministers and 'Adli Pasha Yakan (Yagan) became the new Prime Minister of the Government.¹⁰⁶

Sa'd Zaghloul and 'Adli Yakan immediately disagreed on who of them should head the delegation, and from whose party the majority of the delegation members should be elected.¹⁰⁷ The result was: 'Adli as a Prime Minister "composed a delegation selected entirely from among his supporters."¹⁰⁸ This led to the outbreak of disorder in Cairo and Alexandria. The scape goats this time were the foreign immigrants in the country, particularly Greeks and Italians.¹⁰⁹

'Adli's delegation left for London on July 1, 1921, to negotiate with the British on the basis of "a relationship that would secure the special interests of Great Britain and

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 6.

¹⁰⁵Brockelmann, p. 462.

¹⁰⁶Sidki Pasha, p. 22.

¹⁰⁷Ibid.

¹⁰⁸Brockelmann, p. 462.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

meet the legitimate demands of Egypt."¹¹⁰ This delegation was not appreciated by the Egyptian people which it was representing, and it was ill-received even by Egyptian students studying in England at that time.¹¹¹ In any event, no agreement was reached by the two parties concerned, and Yakan returned to Egypt, to resign and leave the country without a government.¹¹²

In order to smooth the way for the formation of a new government, the authorities in Egypt realized the necessity of removing the source of disturbance, Sa'd Zaghloul, at least until a new government could be formed and order restored. Thus, Zaghloul and five of his supporters were arrested and deported to Ceylon on December 29, and from there to the Seychelles.¹¹³ At this time also the British Government "declared her readiness to abolish the Protectorate and allow the formation of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs."¹¹⁴ Then, Sarwat Pasha, a lawyer by trade, was entrusted and succeeded in forming a new government.

Lord Allenby was successful in selling Lloyd George the idea of abolishing the protectorate in Egypt at the earliest possible time.¹¹⁵ Accordingly, the High Commissioner

¹¹⁰R I I A, The Middle East, p. 158.

¹¹¹Sidki Pasha, p. 24.

¹¹²Ibid, p. 25.

¹¹³R I I A, The Middle East, p. 158.

¹¹⁴Brockelmann, p. 463.

¹¹⁵R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 8.

issued a new proclamation on February 28, 1922, in which he declared the independence of Egypt with the absolute reservation of four points to the discretion of His Majesty's government. The four points were: (1) the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt; (2) the defense of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect; (3) the protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of the minorities; and (4) the Sudan. Since that day Egypt has become a kingdom and Sultan Fu'ad crowned as the first king of Egypt.¹¹⁶

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For the text of February 28, declaration, see Appendix No. III.

Chapter III

ISLAM AND EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM

Almost nothing was said in the previous two chapters about the impact of the Moslem religion on the nationalist movement in Egypt. This chapter is devoted to explaining the influence of Islam in stimulating and encouraging the whole movement, how religious figures such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammed 'Abdu were regarded as political leaders as well, how they were able to influence many of their students and acquaintances, such as Zaghloul, Casim Amin, and many others.

When the European powers in the nineteenth century began to interfere directly and indirectly in the affairs of the weak and divided Moslem states, new Moslem thinkers arose to develop the concept that in order that Moslems might have the power to check the intrusion of western Christians, a unity first must be achieved. The strongest and best known among these was Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, whose object was "to arouse the Moslem people to the need of uniting their forces against Western aggression and exploitation."¹

¹ Charles C. Adams, Islam and Modernism in Egypt (London, 1933) p. 9.

JAMAL AL-DIN AL-AFGHANI AND EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM

Sayid Jamal al-Din was born at As'ad-Abad, near Kabul, Afghanistan in 1839.² His father attended to his education while still a child, later he studied in different schools in Persia and in Afghanistan. At the age of eighteen, he was able to embrace "almost the whole range of Moslem sciences--Arabic grammar, philology and rhetoric in all their branches, history, Moslem theology, sufism logic, philosophy, practical and theoretical physics and metaphysics, mathematics, astronomy, medicine, anatomy, etc."³

In 1855-56, Jamal visited India and stayed there for about fifteen months. There he became acquainted with western sciences and methods and gained some knowledge of English.⁴ From there he proceeded to Mecca to perform the duty of pilgrimage. Upon his return to Afghanistan, Jamal entered in the service of the ruling Amir (prince) Dost Muhammad Khan, and later on, after Dost's death, he attached

²Historians differ on Jamal's birthplace. Others who accepted the Persian version of his biography claim him to be a Persian by birth and that he was born in As'ad-Abad, near Hamadan, Iran, but that he acquired his last name, al-Afghani, "partly in order to pass more conveniently as an Orthodox Sunni Muhammadan [Moslem] and partly in order to withdraw himself from the dubious 'protection' accorded by the Persian government to its subjects." He was called Sayid (Master) because he claimed to be a descendent of al-Husain, the grandson of the prophet Muhammad. See: Edward Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (Cambridge, 1910), p. 4.

³Ibid., pp. 4-5.

⁴Prior to that Jamal al-Din had a firm knowledge of the Afghani, Persian, Turkish, and Arabic languages. See: Adams, p. 5.

himself to Muhammad A'zam, the brother and successor of Dust, who appointed Sayid Jamal al-Din as his Prime Minister.⁵

A'zam was defeated by his rival brother, Shir 'Ali, who was supported by British money.⁶ This fact might explain in part why Jamal al-Din denounced British imperialism for the most part of his life and worked to unite the Moslem people to check foreign interference from their lands. After A'zam had been defeated, Jamal excused himself to take another pilgrimage to Mecca. He left Afghanistan in 1869 for India where he was received with high honors but was barred from contacting other Moslem leaders there.⁷ He then was given a passage on an English ship to Egypt. While there he frequently visited al-Azhar University. In Cairo also he lectured on various subjects to all of those who came to see him at his home.⁸

After staying in Egypt for forty days,⁹ Jamal left for Constantinople where he was received with great honors by the Sultan and top government officials.¹⁰ A few months later, after a controversy occurred between him and Shaykh

⁵ Ibid., p. 5.

⁶ Browne, p. 6.

⁷ Adams, p. 5.

⁸ Browne, p. 6.

⁹ Adams, p. 5.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 6.

al-Islam, Hassan Fahmi Efendi, the Turkish government ordered Jamal to leave the country.¹¹ Jamal again moved to Cairo, Egypt.

Jamal arrived in Egypt on March 22, 1871.¹² He was welcomed back and was granted a monthly allowance of ten Egyptian pounds. This was "not for any specific service, but to do honor to an illustrious visitor."¹³ Jamal stayed in Cairo for about eight years until he was expelled by the Egyptian government in 1879.¹⁴ The two reasons which may account for his expulsion were, first, the enmity and jealousy which the old-fashioned theologians developed against him, because of his attempt to revive the study of philosophy.¹⁵ The second was a political reason: Mr. (afterwards "Lord") Vivian, the British Consul-General in Egypt, being "suspicious of. . . [Jamal's] political activities, succeeded

¹¹ It appears that Shaykh Hassan Fahmi became very jealous of Jamal who was favored by the Sultan mainly because of his Pan-Islamism notions. Thus after al-Afghani had delivered a speech on the importance of crafts and tools in Dar al-Funun (the Turkish University), Shaykh Hassan Fahmi accused him of using terms derogatory to the dignity of Islam. This accusation instigated a hot controversy between the two. On this point see: J. Zaidan, Mashahir al-Sharq (Cairo, 1903), (Eastern Celebrities), II, 55. Also, Browne, p. 7, and Adams, p. 6.

¹² Browne, p. 7.

¹³ As quoted in Ibid., p. 7.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 8.

¹⁵ Adams, p. 7n.

in inducing Tawfiq Pasha, who had recently succeeded as Khedive, to order his expulsion from Egypt, together with that of his faithful disciple, Abu Tureb".¹⁶

This time Sayid Jamal went to India. While there "the 'Young Egyptian Movement' with which . . . he had been so prominently identified culminated in the 'Arabi Rebellion'."¹⁷ For that Jamal was detained in India until after the rebellion was put down by the English troops which occupied Egypt after that.¹⁸

From India Jamal al-Din proceeded to Paris, through London. In Paris, with the help of Muhammad 'Abdu, one of his disciples who was expelled from Egypt because of his association with the 'Arabi Rebellion,¹⁹ Jamal founded the short-lived Arabic weekly newspaper, al 'Urwatu 'l-Wuthqa (Le Lien Indissoluble),²⁰ in which Jamal attacked western aggression policies, particularly those of England, and called for Moslem unity in order to combat the West.²¹ When the British government became aware of al-'Urwatu 'l-Wuthqa's

¹⁶Browne, p. 8.

¹⁷Adams, p. 8.

¹⁸Browne, p. 8.

¹⁹Adams, p. 9.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Ibid.

attacks, it "excluded the paper from India and Egypt," and probably it "employed other means to put an end to its existence."²³

After that, Jamal wandered in European and Near Eastern capitals, spending four years in Russia,²⁴ moving afterwards to Persia to occupy the Ministry of War for a while,²⁵ then to Constantinople where he remained until his death on March 9, 1897 from cancer of the jaw and neck.²⁶ "It is asserted by many Persians, and denied by most Turks that he did not die a natural death."²⁷

This is a short biography of Sayid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani whose influence on the development of political thinking was extremely important, despite the fact that he stayed in Egypt only nine years. In fact, the English historian J. Alexander goes so far as to declare that Jamal "was personally responsible for that renaissance of Egyptian national spirit."²⁸

While in Egypt Sayid Jamal al-Din affiliated himself with the most important university in the Moslem world, al-Azhar, where he lectured for students and professors alike.

²³Browne, p. 9.

²⁴Adams, p. 10.

²⁵Ibid., p. 11.

²⁶Ibid., p. 12.

²⁷Browne, p. 12.

²⁸John R. Alexander, The Truth About Egypt (London, New York, Toronto and Melbourne, 1911), p. 1.

Jamal was a very eloquent speaker and a highly persuasive debater, or, as Dr. Lonthrop Stoddard describes him, "a born propagandist."²⁹ Thus in a short time he was able to gain "the affection and respect of an ever-increasing circle of student disciples of varied races and religious creeds."³⁰

Unlike the old-fashioned Shaykhs of al-Azhar, Sayid Jamal al-Din was a modern thinker in many respects. He opposed the reactionary ideas of clinging to the past and forgetting about the future. He also was able to realize that Islam must be interpreted rightly to suit modern world developments and ideas rather than to remain an obstacle in the way of progress and advancement. Thus "he sought to convert the religious intellect . . . to the necessity of reconsidering the whole Islamic position and, instead of clinging to the past, of making an onward intellectual movement."³¹ In order to prepare the way for that theory, he worked on reviving the teaching of philosophy at al-Azhar and originated a "Liberal religious Reform Movement among the ulema [professors] of Cairo."³² Such behavior was considered a heresy

²⁹Lonthrop Stoddard, The New World of Islam (New York, 1921), p. 63.

³⁰Alexander, op. cit., p. 1.

³¹Wilfred S. Blunt, Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt (New York, 1922), pp. 76-77.

³²Ibid., p. 76. See also, Hans Kohn, Nationalism and Imperialism in the Hither East (New York, 1932), p. 28.

by the conservative and reactionary ulemas of al-Azhar University.

- Though Sayid Jamal al-Din introduced and preached "a popular program to the pan-Islamic movement,"³³ Professor H. A. R. Gibb reports that he restated "the basis of the Islamic community in terms of nationalism."³⁴ Pan-Islamism to him then was on the political side. He wanted to see a unity among the Moslem nations in order to enable them to check European penetration. In other words, al-Afghani played on religious sentiments only to achieve political ends.

The notions which Jamal entertained and advocated could safely be summed in the following few sentences:

The Christian world, despite its internal differences of race and nationality, is, as against the East and especially as against Islam, united for the destruction of all Muhammadan states.

The Crusades still subsist, as well as the fanatical spirit of Peter the Hermit. At heart Christendom still regards Islam with fanatical hatred and contempt. This is shown in many ways such as in international law, before which Moslem nations are not treated as the equals of Christian nations.

Christian governments excuse the attacks and humiliations inflicted upon Moslem states by citing the latter's backward and barbarous conditions; yet these same governments stifle by a thousand means, even by war, every attempted effort of reform and revival in Moslem lands.

Hatred of Islam is common to all Christian peoples, not merely to some of them, and the result of this spirit is a tacit, persistent effort for Islam's destruction.

³³Alexander, op. cit., p. 2.

³⁴H.A.R. Gibb, Modern Trends in Islam (Chicago, 1947), p. 27.

Every Moslem feeling and aspiration is caricatured and calumniated by Christendom. The Europeans call in the Orient "fanaticism" what at home they call "nationalism" and "patriotism." And what in the West they call "self-respect," "pride," "national honor," in the East they call "chauvinism." What in the West they esteem as "national sentiment," in the East they consider "xenophobia."

From all this it is plain that the whole Moslem world must unite in a great defensive alliance to preserve itself from destruction; and to do this it must acquire the technique of Western progress and learn the secrets of European power.³⁵

Jamal al-Din also was able to observe that in order to have a society in Egypt which could be effective in checking foreign penetration, such a society must first be reformed internally. Thus we see him attacking "with the same vigor, the abuses which he saw within Islam and the evils of the Moslem governments."³⁶

To preach progressive teachings like those of Jamal al-Din in Egypt during this critical period might sound easy. But it was not so. "Courage indeed was needed in those days for any man in Cairo to speak out," says Mr. Blunt.

"Isma'il brooked no kind of opposition and wielded power so absolute in the country that independent speech, almost independent whispering, had disappeared from men's mouths. It was only the fellahin of the villages, already despoiled of all, who dared complain, or those in the city too poor and insignificant to be of any political count. The highest religious authorities, as well as the highest officials, had long been

³⁵As quoted by Lothrop Stoddard, op. cit., pp. 64-65. A reference to the origin of this quotation is made in an article by "X", "Le Pan-Islamisme et le Pan-Turquisme", Revue Du Monde Musulman (March, 1913).

³⁶Gibb, op. cit., p. 28.

silent about injustice and had chosen their part of acquiescence, content so long as they could get their share, each one however small, of the general plunder."³⁷

But Jamal al-Din was courageous enough, and so were his followers who accepted him as a leader and as an example.

"Among those who listened eagerly to his exhortations of the subjects of patriotism and national liberty," reports J. Alexander, "were many Syrians who in those days particularly controlled the vernacular press of Egypt."³⁸ They began advocating, directly and indirectly, the teachings of their great master, Jamal al-Din, and were able to carry them to all parts of the country and to all classes of the Egyptian society.

His student disciples from al-Azhar were numerous and very capable. They devoted themselves to teaching, writing, preaching or other careers which may greatly influence public opinion. Among them were Ahmad 'Orabi, Muhammad 'Abdu, Sa'd

³⁷ Blunt, p. 79.

³⁸ Alexander, op. cit., p. 2.

Zaghloul, Kasim Amin, Taha Husain, Shaykh 'Ali 'Abdul-Razik and many others.³⁹ These, of course, were a great asset in conveying and explaining the ideas of their great teacher to the Egyptian public.

³⁹

Kasim Amin (died 1908) was the first Egyptian author who advocated the emancipation of Egyptian women. His books were entitled Tahrir al-Mar'ah (The Emancipation of Woman), and Al-Mar'ah al-Jadidah (The New Woman). Taha Husain, after his completion of his studies at al-Azhar University, was sent to the Sorbonne, in France, where he acquired a Ph.D. degree in literature. He is an extensive author and a very critical one. In his book on Pre-Islamic Poetry (Al-Shi'r al-Jahili), Dr. Husain "examined the pre-Islamic civilization without regard to the legends consecrated by the Islamic religion. Certain things he declared to be apocryphal and legendary, and the Ulemas demanded the suppression of the book and the expulsion of the hieratic from the philosophical faculty of the Egyptian University, since Islam was the state religion in Egypt, and it was the duty of the state to watch over the safety and purity of the faith." Another book which Dr. Husain had written was al-Ayyam (The Course of Days), in two volumes. In this book, which is but an autobiography, the author criticized severely the social structure of the Egyptian society, as well as the reactionary elements at al-Azhar University. Dr. Husain has written over thirty volumes and during the course of his life has occupied many important posts in the educational system in Egypt; at one time he was a professor at the Egyptian University; later on he became the President of the same university and more recently he occupied the post of Minister of Education in the country. Taha Husain is well known to millions of readers all over the Arab world, and quite a few of his books were translated into foreign languages such as French and English.

Shaykh 'Ali Abdul-Razik is another graduate of al-Azar. Following graduation he went to England and continued his education at Oxford University. He is the author of al-Islam wa 'Usul al-Hukm (Islam and the Principles of the State), a book which was attacked severely by the Ulemas of al-Azhar, and because of which the author lost his job in ecclesiastical court, and the Liberal Constitutionalist government of Zivar Pashe had to resign, when it refused to charge Shaykh 'Ali. In this book the author advocated the principle of separation of church and state and cited many examples to prove that Islam is but a religion, "and not an institution embracing the whole of political and social life; not a State; and that the Caliphate with its political authority was alien to primitive Islam."

The nationalist Moslem, Jamal al-Din attacked severely the British interference in Egyptian affairs, and worked hard during the reign of Isma'il to awaken the Egyptian public opinion to the danger of the dual control. In fact, he is considered the instigator of the 'Orabi Revolution which the British unfortunately used to justify their action of aggression against Egypt in 1882." ". . . From the preaching of Jamal al-Din the people of modern Egypt learned that they had national rights and national claims. It was due to his influence that the army first learned its strength; to his instigation must be attributed that great military demonstration under Latif Selim Bey which resulted in the 'Orabi revolt of 1881, and, consequently, he is also answerable for no small proportion of the good and evil which has happened since."⁴⁰

Besides all of that, Jamal al-Din supported many reform movements. For example, he supported whole-heartedly the emancipation of women. He also advocated the freedom of speech and the principle of popular sovereignty, and "maintained that the growing absolutism of Muhammadan princes in modern times was contrary to the spirit of Islam which in its essence was a Republic where every Moslem had the right of free speech in its assemblies, and where the authority of the ruler rested on his conformity to the law and on popular

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Alexander, op. cit., p. 3.

approval."⁴¹ He further made it clear "that constitution-
alism was compatible with Islam, and should replace the
absolutism to which Moslem countries were everywhere in
subjection."⁴²

The influence of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was extensive.
"It is not much to say that he is the father of every shade
of Egyptian Nationalism. He influenced not merely violent
agitators like 'Orabi Pasha," says Professor Stoddard, "but
also conservative reformers like Sheikh [Shaykh] Muhammed
Abdou [Muhammad 'Abdu], who realized Egypt's weakness and
were content to labor patiently by evolutionary methods for
distant goals."⁴³

MUHAMMAD 'ABDU AND EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM

It was reported that when Sayid Jamal al-Din al-Afg-
hani spoke to the multitudes which came to bid him farewell
upon his final departure from Egypt in 1879, he said: "I
leave with you Sheikh Muhammad 'Abdu, and he is sufficient
for Egypt as a scholar."⁴⁴ It is evident from this that the
famed nationalist and scholar felt that Muhammad 'Abdu would
be an acceptable replacement.

⁴¹ Blunt, p. 95.

⁴² M. Travers Symons, Britain and Egypt (London, 1925), p. 1.

⁴³ Stoddard, p. 176.

⁴⁴ As quoted in Adams, p. 18.

'Abdu, like most Egyptian nationalist leaders, was the son of a fellahin family,⁴⁵ and the year 1849 is commonly accepted as the date of his birth.⁴⁶ Muhammad 'Abdu was married at an early age; in fact, he was but 16 years old when his family arranged his marriage.⁴⁷

Despite the poverty of 'Abdu's father, he attended to the education of his child and was able to send young 'Abdu to al-Azhar University. There 'Abdu came in contact with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani who was able to cure him "of his extreme devotion to sufisim (mysticism),"⁴⁸ which he had acquired from his association with mystic personalities such as that of Shaykh Darwish.⁴⁹

Before his graduation from al-Azhar University, Muhammad 'Abdu lectured there on different theological subjects, applying "the . . . methods of reasoning and logical proof which Jamal al-Din had taught him to use."⁵⁰ Later on through the influence of Riad Pasha, then the Prime Minister and for a long time an admirer of Seyid Jamal al-Din, 'Abdu was appointed to teach history in the school known as Dar al-'Ulum, which had been founded by 'Ali Pasha Mubarak, during the reign of Khedive Isma'il to train the Ulama in modern

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Other dates are given by different biographers of 'Abdu. For details on this point see: Ibid., p. 19.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 22.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 32.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 21.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 44.

Western sciences which were not taught at al-Azhar University.⁵¹ There he based his lectures on Muqdimat ibn Khaldun (the Prolegomena of ibn Khaldun), the great Moslem philosophical historian of the fifteenth century.⁵²

During this period the Egyptian government was passing into the control of foreigners through the attempts which were made to reorganize the financial system of the country which had deteriorated because of Khedive Isma'il's extravagance and poor financial management.⁵³ Muhammad 'Abdu at that time proposed "education as a means to a better state of things in the future," and in his classes he put great emphasis upon "character development" and upon "training in principles of government" in an effort to accomplish the desirable ends which he wanted for his country.⁵⁴

After the abdication of Isma'il on June 25, 1879, in behalf of his son Tawfiq, Jamal al-Din, as was pointed out earlier, was ordered out of the country and Muhammad 'Abdu, who was his closest associate, was removed from his job at Dar al-'Ulum and ordered to stay at his native village, Mahallat Nasr.⁵⁵ One of the reasons which explains this action was that Jamal al-Din and his group began pressing

⁵¹ Muhammad Rashid Rida, Tarikh al-Ustath al-imam al-shaykh Muhammad 'Abdu, III, 242.

⁵² Adams, p. 45.

⁵³ See under pp. 16-17 of this study.

⁵⁴ Adams, p. 46.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 46.

for the fulfillment of Tawfiq Pasha's earlier promises, "for the formation of a representative assembly which would be the keystone of all the reforms they hoped to introduce."⁵⁶

A year later Prime Minister Riad Pasha appointed Muhammad 'Abdu with two others to edit al-Waqa'i' al-Misriyyah (the Egyptian Official Journal). In a short time he had advanced to become chief editor and then he took the young shaykh Sa'd Zaghoul, who was to play an important part at a later date in directing Egyptian nationalism, to be his assistant editor.⁵⁷

'Abdu took on himself the task of improving and enlarging the scope of al-Waqa'i' al-Misriyyah. In time he was able to introduce a definite regime for the journal which later was approved and made effective by Riad. According to this new plan, each of the government departments had to send an outline of its activities and decisions to be published in this journal. 'Abdu then had the right to criticize and comment on those publications. By so doing 'Abdu came to be the mouth-piece of the government.⁵⁸

In the reports from the different departments 'Abdu insisted upon higher literary standards. This forced many of their writers to attend night schools which were opened

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 8n. cf., Blunt, pp. 95-96.

⁵⁷ Adams, pp. 46-47.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 47.

especially to train writers and journalists in an effort to give Egypt a better literary material. Muhammad 'Abdu himself volunteered to lecture in these schools.⁵⁹ According to his scheme also, 'Abdu, being the editor-in-chief of al-Waqa'1' al-Misriyyah, had the right to censor all newspapers published in Egypt regardless of whether they were under Egyptian or foreign control.⁶⁰ This privilege, of course, gave him a good opportunity to direct and channel public opinion in the path he always cherished--that of leading Egypt to achieve its freedom through reform and advancement.

During this period, observes Lord Cromer, "the native press was appealing to Mohammedan fanaticism and inciting hatred against Europeans." One Nationalist newspaper wrote, "We are the prey of two lions, England and France, who are watching for the favorable moment to realize their design, hidden under a deceptive policyOne day we hope to see our administrations cleared of all Europeans, and on that day we can say that England and France have rendered us a great service for which we really shall thank them."⁶¹ Another paper wrote:

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 47.

⁶⁰ Cromer, I, 212-213.

⁶¹ Ibid., I, 211.

Some people pretend that fanaticism is ruinous to progress. Yet our best days were those in which we conquered the Universe by devotion to our faith. Today we have neglected it and we and our country are in the hands of strangers, but our misfortunes are a just punishment for our sins. O Ye Ulema of Al-Azhar, whose sacred duty it should be to combat this religious decadence, what will be your answer at the day of judgment to Him who can read the secrets of your Hearts?⁶²

Shaykh 'Abdu "was one of the leading spirits of the 'Orabi movement"⁶³ of 1822, says Lord Cromer, but this was just insofar as "the intellectual movement was concerned, as he opposed violence vehemently and thought that anything of this kind might throw out every reform which he had begun."⁶⁴ Mr. Blunt, an Englishman, but a personal friend of Muhammad 'Abdu once wrote,

I knew . . . that Shaikh Muhammad 'Abdu and the rest of my Azhar friends were for other methods than that of violence and that the reforms they had been so long preaching would, in their opinion, take a life-time to achieve.⁶⁵

Nevertheless, Muhammad 'Abdu was removed from his job and sent into exile in Syria but from there he proceeded to Paris to assist Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in publishing al-'Urwatu 'l-Wuthqa.⁶⁶ When this publication was suppressed, 'Abdu went to Tunis where he stayed for a short while. Then he travelled in different European and Near Eastern

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid., II, 179.

⁶⁴ Adams, p. 53.

⁶⁵ Blunt, p. 120. cf., Muhammad Rif'aat, Terikh Mistr al-Siyasi (Cairo, 1932), II, 189.

⁶⁶ Rida, op. cit., II, 528-529.

countries before he was pardoned by Khedive Tawfiq "under British pressure" and was allowed to return to Egypt in 1888.⁶⁷

For better or worse, Muhammad 'Abdu was completely changed this time and "when he returned to Egypt at the termination of his exile he adopted a much more conciliatory attitude towards the Occupation than he had held formerly; he came to favor openly the existing government 'because', as he said, 'he estimated at its true value the freedom which it made possible', he became the close friend and adviser of Mustafa Pasha Fahmi, Prime Minister from 1895 to 1908, and also the friend and confidant of Lord Cromer."⁶⁸

Shortly after his arrival in Egypt, 'Abdu was appointed Kadi (judge) in el-Mahakim al-Ahliyyah al-Ibtida'iyah (the Courts of First Instance of the Native Tribunals).⁶⁹ Later he was advanced to Consultative Member of the Court of Appeal (Mahkamat al-Isti'naf) in Cairo.⁷⁰ When Shaikh Has-sunah al-Nawawi resigned from the office of Mufti of all Egypt (the interpreter of the doctrines of Islam), Muhammad 'Abdu was appointed on June 3, 1899 by recommendation of the Khedive to occupy that office.⁷¹ He occupied that office until his death in 1905.

⁶⁷Cromer, II, 179.

⁶⁸Adams, p. 64.

⁶⁹Rida, op. cit., III, 21.

⁷⁰Ibid.

⁷¹Adams, p. 79.

The change which affected 'Abdu following his return from exile was not understood by the Egyptian people. His cooperation with the Occupation authorities was considered a crime in the eyes of many nationalist Egyptians. This, of course, made 'Abdu's reform movement ineffective⁷² and he and his half-Europeanized followers became marginal people.

Lord Cromer writes in that connection:

The political importance of Mohammed 'Abdu's life lies in the fact that he may be said to have been the founder of a school of thought in Egypt very similar to that established in India by Syed Ahmed, the founder of the Alighur College. The avowed object of those who belong to this school is to justify the ways of Islam to man, that is to say, to Moslem man. On the other hand, they are often not sufficiently Europeanized to attract the sympathy of the Egyptian mimic of European ways. They are inferior to the strictly orthodox Moslem in respect to their Mohammedanism, and inferior to the ultra-Europeanized Egyptian in respect to their Europeanization. Their task is, therefore one of great difficulty.⁷³

The Egyptians at this period turned toward the nationalist leaders, who basically opposed the Occupation and demanded complete independence for Egypt. Such an observation was expressed by ~~Mr. Chirac~~ ^{Heyworth-Dunne}. He wrote, "Up to 1922, an Egyptian was considered a traitor unless he was a follower of Sa'd Zaghloul,"⁷⁴ and during this period also, "The number of . . . students [at al-Azhar] decreased perceptibly and

⁷²J. Heyworth-Dunn, Religious and Political Trends in Egypt (Washington, 1950), p. 6.

⁷³Cromer, II, 180.

⁷⁴Heyworth-Dunne, op. cit., p. 5.

its influence seemed for a time to be waning."⁷⁵

Thus it could be said that during the period between 1888 and the middle of the 1920's loyalty to Islam was put aside and that the Egyptian people turned their faces towards the leaders who led the nationalist movement,⁷⁶ who strangely enough were trained in Western manners and fashions and were far from being religious in the literal sense of the word.⁷⁷

In the early part of the 1920's the people of Egypt realized that "nationalism" was not the holy institution they were made to believe, that some of the nationalist leaders were selfishly motivated, and that these leaders could at any time deviate from the general line of the main front, namely the Wafd, and go on to form new political parties which would serve their purposes.⁷⁸ Seeing these parties fight each other, each claiming to be the party which the people should follow, the Egyptian people did not know whom they should follow or whom they should believe. This, plus the death of the great nationalist leader, Zaghloul, in 1927, without having achieved the complete independence for which they had fought, brought doubts to the minds of those people as to whether nationalism was the right path for the achievement of great things or not.

⁷⁵Chirol, p. 240.

⁷⁶Heyworth-Dunne, op. cit., p. 8.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 8.

⁷⁸See under p. 105 of this study.

Through this period there was also "a marked lack of public-spirited organizations and persons who would take an interest in the social welfare and progress of Moslem youth."⁷⁹ The Egyptian schools, which since the time of Muhammad 'Ali had been looked upon just as places where certificates and degrees could be acquired for vocational purposes, "contributed very little towards the social improvement and moral uplift of youth."⁸⁰ To combat this, "Coptic, Jewish and foreign communities had already formed well-organized programs of social welfare and had financed several societies in order to implement them."⁸¹ Because of those things, remarks Dr. Heyworth-Dunn, "parents and serious people welcomed a revival of interest in Moslem ethics."⁸²

THE COMMENCEMENT OF RELIGIO-POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS

One of the first active Moslem organizations to be established in Egypt was Jam'iyat al-Shubban al-Muslimin (The Young Men's Moslem Association) commonly referred to as Y.M.M.A. It was founded in November, 1927, and according to its rules it accepted as members only Moslems of reputable behavior.⁸³

⁷⁹ Heyworth-Dunne, op. cit., p. 9.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Ibid., p. 9.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 11.

This association had the following four points as an aim which it set to achieve:

- (1) to teach Islamic morals and ethics.
- (2) to spread that knowledge best suited to the modern way of life.
- (3) to discourage dissensions and abuses amongst Moslems.
- (4) to make use of the best of eastern and western cultures and to reject all that is bad in them.⁸⁴

From the outset this association adopted as part of its regulations and by-laws two stipulations which guaranteed that its name should be permanent and that it "would not under any circumstances interfere with politics."⁸⁵ Naturally, the second stipulation was idealistic and impractical as a look at the list of names of the men on the Board of Directors of this association showed many names of highly influential political leaders.

The president of the Board, 'Abdul-Hamid Bey Sa'id, was a well-known deputy and a very ardent member of the Fatherland (Hizb al-Watani), which always expressed the most hostile attitude toward the British. Sa'id also was known for his undisputed nationalism and hatred of any foreign interference. During World War I, for example, he fought on the side of the Arabs against the Turks. The first vice-president of the board was Shaykh 'Abdul 'Aziz Shawish who was a leading member of the nationalistic Fatherland party and for some time

⁸⁴Ibid.

⁸⁵Ibid.

was editor of the organ of that party. He also was an ardent disciple of Jamal el-Din al-Afghani and well-known as was his professor for being an outstanding political agitator.

The Secretary-General of the Association, Muhib al-Din al-Khatib, was Syrian by birth and a journalist-propagandist by trade. He was a close associate and disciple of Muhammad 'Abdu.⁸⁶

Another fact to be observed in connection with the relations between the Y.M.M.A. and its activities in politics was the oath which every new member made before being accepted. The second sentence of this oath obligated the member "to be active as a mujahid (warrior), fighting for the revival of the glory of Islam by restoring its religious law and its superiority."⁸⁷ "The militant tone of this sentence cannot be missed," remarks Heyworth-Dunne, "especially since it was signed by and meant for the youth of the country." He adds, "Any ethical and figurative explanation which might be attached to any particular word or phrase, such as mujahid, might be understood by the mature but not by the average school-boy, whose martial spirit is stirred by the use of such words as these."⁸⁸

⁸⁶ For further details on the Y.M.M.A. and its leadership see: Ibid., p. 12-15.

⁸⁷ As quoted in Ibid., p. 13.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

The Y.M.M.A. in time was able to spread out and have branches in almost all the Moslem countries. It always carried with it the ideas of pan-Islamism. Nationalism is stressed and the members are told "to love their country and make use of its products and manufactures," "to guard against foreign schools," and "not to send their sons to European schools until they are provided with the force of the Islamic faith and loyal to their country," etc.⁸⁹ The Y.M.M.A. also has been very active against Christian Missionaries and on occasions used great influence on the Egyptian Minister of the Interior to take action against foreigners and missionaries who dared to attack Islam.⁹⁰

Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (The Moslem Brotherhood) was another one of those religio-political associations which were organized during this period. The founder of this organization was a government schoolteacher named Hasan al-Banna,⁹¹ who was sent after his graduation from Dar al-'Ulum in 1928-29 to teach Arabic at al-Isma'iliyyah,⁹² the city which is mostly inhabited by Europeans who are officials of the Suez Canal Company and the Occupation forces.⁹³

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 13-14.

⁹¹ R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 52.

⁹² Heyworth-Dunne, op. cit., p. 15.

⁹³ Ibid.

There Hassan started organizing this association shortly after his arrival at Isma'iliyyah. He attracted around him the "Berberine servants, workers, some members of the surrounding Sufi (mystic) orders and a few students."⁹⁴ At those early stages the purpose of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, remarks Heyworth, was "entirely religious."⁹⁵

Hasan al-Banna was a very intelligent person. In fact, it was reported that he led his class in his senior year.⁹⁶ He was a little shy, but a "perfect orator with a mastery of all the technique of persuasion and of emotional appeal to a crowd."⁹⁷ Hence he was able in the course of time to attract around him followers whose number was estimated at one time to be 500,000.⁹⁸

When al-Banna was transferred to Cairo, he founded there a chapter for al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin. From that time on this order was rapid in its growth and it spread not only in Egypt but all over the Moslem world.

Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin were very strong nationalists. They tried earnestly to help in building their country but held that every reform should come through religion. They founded schools, economic establishments, sports clubs, many

⁹⁴Ibid.

⁹⁵Ibid.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 15.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 16.

⁹⁸Lenczowski, p. 327.

clinics and one hospital where medical services were offered free.⁹⁹ All those establishments plus the daily paper named after their organization, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin, the weekly and monthly periodical al-shihab, and the thousands of articles they published were used as means of propaganda to attract more people to their order.

Hasan al-Banna, who was known as al-Murshid al-'am (the General Guide) set a good example in nationalism for his followers. "His clothes," remarks Heyworth-Dunne, "were made of material manufactured in Egypt in factories set up by the Ikhwan of which he was so proud."¹⁰⁰

Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin did not remain as it originated, a religious organization which had nothing to do with politics. It became a militant organization¹⁰¹ which allowed itself to indulge in politics affecting all the Moslem world. In fact, it has become recognized as an influential terrorist party.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Nejla Izzeddin, The Arab World (Chicago, 1953), p. 382.

¹⁰⁰ Heyworth-Dunne, op. cit., p. 15.

¹⁰¹ R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 52.

¹⁰² Galatoli, p. 120

Chapter IV

THE INDEPENDENCE AND AFTER

It was pointed out at the end of the second chapter, that when no bilateral agreement was reached between the government at London and that at Cairo, the British government alone issued the proclamation of February 28, 1922, by which Egyptian independence was recognized.

Directly after this declaration had taken place, Sultan Fu'ad, who was but a British-sponsored ruler,¹ accepted the declaration and on March 15 of the same year changed his title from Sultan to King (Melk). 'Abdul Khalid Sawret Pasha, who conducted the negotiations with Lord Allenby, agreed to form a government and to start the drafting of a new constitution. This did not mean that the Egyptian nation, as led by the Wafd, had accepted the November declaration. On the contrary, the Wafdists, whose leader Zaghloul was still in exile, "poured scorn upon the declaration of the 28th of February and called for a boycott of Englishmen and of British manufacturers as Egypt's proper answer to it . . . and hardly a week passed without some outrage being signalled."²

The Wafdists explained this attitude by pointing out that the declaration could not in any way be considered as an

¹George Young, Egypt (New York, 1927), p. 262.

²Elgood, Transit, p. 288.

adequate substitute for the true independence which they had been seeking for a long time. On this point L. W. Polson Newman remarks,

The establishment of Egyptian independence in 1922 was merely carrying our policy of unreality one stage further, and the change from a Protectorate to an independent Monarchy was mainly superficial. Although the elevation of the title of Egypt's ruler from Sultan to that of King pleased the Palace clique and a small section of the official classes, the great majority, whose susceptibilities lay in other directions, were far from pacified by this measure. They clearly saw that as far as fundamental considerations were concerned, in which their national pride was at stake, the position was in no way a solution of the Egyptian question.³

The Wafdists were in the right and the designation of Egypt as an independent sovereign state was but a mere "diplomatic fiction," according to the eminent English historian, Arnold Toynbee, who expresses the British point of view and goes further to explain that, "While the sovereign independence which the declaration had conferred on Egypt might eventually be translated from shadow into substance if the agreements contemplated in the declaration itself were duly concluded, it was equally true that, if their conclusions were indefinitely postponed, some untoward event might take even the shadow of independence away from Egypt once again."⁴

³Newman, p.

⁴Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1925: The Islamic World Since the Peace Settlement (London, 1927), I, 1925. (Hereafter cited as Survey).

In fact, on March 15, 1922, Great Britain sent a dispatch to all His Majesty's representatives in foreign countries in which she instructed them that Egyptian independence was to be by no means known as perfect. In this notification Great Britain made it clear that,

The termination of the British Protectorate over Egypt involves, however, no change in the status quo as regards the position of other powers in Egypt itself.

The welfare and integrity of Egypt are necessary to the peace and safety of the British Empire, which will therefore always maintain as an essential British interest the special relations between itself and Egypt long recognized by other governments. These special relations are defined in the declaration recognizing Egypt as an independent sovereign state. His Majesty's Government has laid them down as matters in which the rights and interests of the British Empire are vitally involved, and will not admit them to be questioned or discussed by any other power. In pursuance of this principle, they will regard as an unfriendly act any attempt at interference in the affairs of Egypt by another power, and they will consider any aggression against the territory of Egypt as an act to be repelled with all the means at their command.⁵

The Wafdists disturbance was not the only thing that confronted the government of Sawrat Pasha. As indicated earlier, he was charged with the drafting of a new constitution for Egypt. This task was not an easy one especially since King Fu'ad, who all the time was dreaming of absolute monarchy, rejected the idea of parliamentary monarchy from

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Cmd. 1617. Circular stating the decision of H.M. Government to terminate the Protectorate and to recognize Egypt as an independent sovereign state (London, 1922).

the outset.⁶ This fact, plus another point of trouble which Sawrat had with the British when he tried in the new constitution to claim the sovereignty of the Egyptian King over the Sudan,⁷ put him in such a position that at last he found himself obliged to resign and leave the office of Premier to be occupied by Tawfiq Pasha Nassim.

Nassim, while in office, was not able to ignore the cry of the Egyptian people demanding that the new constitution must include the declaration of the Egyptian claim over the Sudan. The British authorities, on the other hand, refused to accept such a claim. It should be kept in mind that up until this very date Britain was still occupying Egypt, and at this critical junction, Allenby, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, went ahead and appointed a military Governor for Cairo. In other words, the British Government tried to make it clear to King Fu'ad and the Egyptian

⁶"King Fu'ad," writes Toynbee, "remembering the autocratic powers enjoyed by his ancestor, Mehmed Ali, and by successive members of the dynasty down to the deposition of his father, the Khedive Isma'il, in 1879, and unmindful of the fate which has recently overtaken autocratic rulers in neighbouring Islamic countries who had sought to stem the tide of democratic ideas flowing in from the West--had not reconciled himself to exchanging the rule of a British nominee for that of an Egyptian constitutional Monarch." Survey, 1925, I, 226.

⁷Elgood, Transit, p. 288.

nation that independence was not a reality.⁸ The King then saw to it that Nassim should resign; he waived his claim to the title of the Sudan, and appointed Yehya Pasha Ibrahim to succeed Nassim.

Ibrahim Pasha, who was bound to no party as yet, was able, on April 19, to succeed in publishing the new Egyptian constitution which declared that "all power emanates from the nation," and consequently placed the government of Egypt in the hands of a senate (Majlis al-Shuyukh) and a chamber of deputies (Majlis al-Muwab).⁹

After all this was completed, Sa'd Pasha Zaghoul and some of his followers who had been in forced exile since 1921 were allowed to come back to Egypt on September 17, 1923 and participate in the new elections.

Now before speaking of the new Egyptian Parliament and the continuance of the struggle by the Nationalists for a true independence, it is worth while to pause here and identify briefly the political parties as they began to organize themselves during this period in the hope of taking over the new government.

⁸Ibid., p. 289. A reference "for announcement by High Commissioner that unless the commission [drafting the new constitution] gave way, Great Britain would retake her old liberty of action in Egypt," is made to the Official Journal, February 10, 1923.

⁹For the text of the Egyptian Constitution of April, 1923, see Appendix IV. This constitution was modeled after that of the Belgium constitution.

THE POLITICAL PARTIES IN EGYPT

The oldest official political party came into existence in Egypt in 1894¹⁰ and was called the Fatherland Party (Hizb al-watan). The founder of this party was Mustafa Kamil, a young Egyptian gentleman who studied law at Toulouse in France. In 1900, Kamil founded the Arabic newspaper al-Liwa' (The Banner) as the organ of the party. From 1907 onward al-Liwa' appeared in English and French, as well as in Arabic.

Kamil's hope was to win the public opinion of Europe for the cause of Egyptian liberation. Thus he labored hard to spread the news of Egyptian struggles against the British aggression in the European capitals as well as in Egypt itself. Kamil was able while in France to establish a life-long friendship with the famed French journalist, Juliette Adam, who proved to be a great asset in putting his program in effect.

The Fatherland Party, according to its program, was even more extremist than the Wafd.

It was opposed to any negotiations with Great Britain and demanded the absolute independence of the whole Nile Valley, its evacuation by the English, a declaration that all the decrees promulgated in Egypt since the imposition of martial law at the beginning of World War I were invalid, and the neutralization of the Suez Canal under Egyptian protection.¹¹

¹⁰ Brockelmann, p. 456.

¹¹ Kohn, ^{act}p. 82.

Also, from the very start the National Party was favorable to pan-Islamism and faithful to the Ottoman Caliphate.

This party began to decline following the death of her founder in 1908.¹² In 1923, when elections were held for the new Egyptian Parliament, this party has but few members.¹³ Consequently it was ineffective in gaining any votes.

Up until April, 1924, the Wafd¹⁴ was not a political party in the true sense of the word "but everywhere in Egypt," says Mr. Kohn, "it had set up district and local committees, and had at its disposal such a complete organization that it was able to direct the fortunes and demonstrations of the whole country from its local center in the 'People's House', Zaghloul Pasha's residence in Egypt."¹⁵ The organ of the Wafd was the daily Arabic Newspaper el-Balagh (The Reporter) which was founded in 1922.

After the election of the first Egyptian Parliament in April, 1924, the Wafd found itself obliged, because of the requirements of parliamentary discipline, to organize itself in the line of an official party, which adopted the name of Parliamentary Wafd Party. Not pleased with that, Sa'd Zaghloul then declared, "We are not a party, we are the nation itself."

¹²Young, p. 188.

¹³Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

¹⁴For the origin of the Wafd, see Chapter II of this study.

¹⁵Kohn, op. cit., p. 82.

The Fatherland Party was then the only official political party in Egypt before the declaration of 1922. But nevertheless there was a kind of political understanding between certain groups. Those groups now were able to recognize the wisdom of organizing themselves in official parties. Thus on October 29, 1922, a new political party was established. This was Hizb al-Ahrar al-Dusturiyin, or the Liberal Constitutional Party. 'Adli Yekan (Yeghen) Pasha, the founder, assumed the presidency. This party attracted "first and foremost the representatives of the aristocracy."¹⁶ Its program was not much different from the other two parties, it "demanded Egypt's absolute independence and sovereignty, and that of the Sudan, the evacuation of the country, a constitutional democracy, and a number of progressive social and educational measures."¹⁷ The organ of the Liberal Constitutionalists was the daily Arabic newspaper Siyassah (Politics) edited by Muhammad Hussain Haikal Bey.

On January 10, 1925, another party was organized. This was al-Ittihad, or the Union Party. Yahya Ibrahim Pasha the Prime Minister under whom the constitution of 1923 was drafted, assumed the presidency. Al-Ittihad received its whole support from the King and his court, consequently it worked according to the wishes of the Palace clique.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 83.

¹⁷ Ibid.

These were the Egyptian political parties at this period, but in the course of days many were added until at one time their number exceeded a dozen.¹⁸

NATIONALISM AND THE SUDAN PROBLEM

Ten days after Zaghloul's arrival in Egypt from exile the primary elections were held as scheduled. Zaghloul again headed the Wafd to lead it to a great victory. The campaign speeches of Zaghloul and other leaders of the Wafd were centered around the slogan (al-Istiqlal al-Tamm) or absolute independence.¹⁹ The Wafd also included and supported Moslem and Christian candidates.²⁰ At the same time, Zaghloul was very careful not to commit himself or his party to anything which might prove difficult to solve in regard to future negotiations with England. His speeches and statements, in

¹⁸ When on September 9, 1952, a decree was issued by the Egyptian Government requiring all political parties to submit their programs and the names of their founders for approval by the Minister of the Interior, 15 parties registered under the decree. See Europa Publication Limited, (Pub.), The Middle East, 1953 (London, 1953), p. 80.

¹⁹ Kohn, op. cit., p. 85.

²⁰ For example, Wissa Wassef Bey, who is a Christian by faith, was supported and elected by the Wafd in a purely Moslem constituency. On this point see: Ibid., p. 85.

general, were regarded as vague and emotional.²¹

Other parties had almost the same programs in regard to foreign policy. Only al-Ittihad Party included in its program some dangerous and extreme notions. It denounced King Fu'ad publicly, showed great enmity toward Great Britain and wanted to recall the Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi, who had been exiled in Turkey since the beginning of World War I, to rule over the country.

²¹The following passage taken from one of Zaghloul's campaign speeches gives a good idea of the nature of his speeches while campaigning in 1924. He said: "We shall meet with difficulties in our path; we shall remove them. The King of the country stands with the people; the people are united and resolute. We have right on our side and God is on our side; what, then, is lacking to the attainment of our goal, to victory? Now my voice may cease. For in all your mouths are the songs of freedom and your hearts are overflowing with them and their echoes are sent back from within the walls of tombs and coming generations will rise up to their sound. You are the forgers of your own hopes, the builders of your own glory, you are the sons of immortal Egypt. I bow in homage to your national sentiment and to the nobility of your aims and with you I cry, 'Long live Egypt!' . . . The days that stand between you and the elections are numbered; your most important duty is to understand the high nature of the action that is required of you, the significance of the task to which you are summoned. Before these elections the nation was rent into classes and parties, aristocracy and peasantry, handicraftsmen, labourers, and merchants. But with these elections you have all, without distinction, entered a new camp. It is needful now that the national will shall prevail and the country govern itself as it pleases." This passage was quoted in Ibid., pp. 85-86.

When the elections of January, 1924, were held, the Egyptian nation went to the polls to vote the most deserving party, on the basis of its high organization. Thus the Wafd won with 188 seats as against 27 for other parties. The King then had to charge Zaghloul with forming a government on January 27, 1924.²²

The two important points of policy which faced al-Wafd after its ascendancy to power in 1924 were, first, the unforgettable issue of the Sudan which was still vivid in the minds of the Egyptian people who claimed Egyptian sovereignty over that territory. The second point was the major item around which the campaign strategy of al-Wafd was centered, namely, al-istiqlal al-tamm or absolute independence.

During this period there was also a change of governments in England itself. Now the Labor party under the leadership of Ramsey MacDonald had come to power. This party, as a point in its September, 1923, election campaign program, promised to support a "full independence of Egypt."²³

Zaghloul then regarded that as a great opportunity and hoped that the new Labor government would stand up to its promise and reverse the policy of its predecessor. This was a mistake into which Zaghloul had fallen.²⁴

²²Brockelmann, p. 463.

²³Young, p. 272.

²⁴Elgood, Transit, p. 291.

Not only the Wafdists but all Egyptian parties were agreed in regards to the Sudan as an inseparable part of Egypt."²⁵ In fact, it could be said that the Egyptian nation as a whole, plus many Sudanese had the same notion. In the Sudan new societies with this aim were founded, and educated Sudanese started creating disturbances against England, asking publicly for the unity of the Nile valley under the sovereignty of the Egyptian crown.²⁶ The British then immediately started taking a positive action to put an end to all those activities.²⁷

In the House of Lords, also, on June 25, 1924, Lord Parmoor declared, "His Majesty's government is not going to abandon the Sudan in any sense whatsoever."²⁸ This, of course, was a great disappointment to Zaghloul and the whole Egyptian nation.

The dissatisfaction which was expressed by the Egyptian government and people toward the February, 1922, Declaration of Egyptian Independence, and toward the late attitude of the

²⁵ Kohn, op. cit., p. 87.

²⁶ "In Khartoum, the capital of the Sudan," reports Hans Kohn, "the White Flag Society had been founded, on whose banner the whole Nile Valley was depicted in red on a white ground, united (under Egyptian sovereignty). The members of this Society were educated Sudanese who had passed through the English Gordon College in Khartoum, and Egyptian residents in the Sudan." See: Ibid., p. 87.

²⁷ "In 1924, an Egyptian who was to present a loyal address to King Fu'ad in the name of . . . (the White Flag) Society was stopped at the frontier and sent back by the English." See: Ibid., p. 87.

²⁸ Cmd. 2269 (Egypt No. 1, 1924). cf. Cmd. 2171 (Sudan, No. 1, 1924) (London, 1924).

British Government,²⁹ plus the uprisings in the Sudan, led Mr. MacDonald to invite Zaghloul to discuss and negotiate with him "for a settlement of the reserved points."³⁰ Zaghloul accepted the invitation and on July 12, 1924, as he stepped into the train which would carry him to the port on his way to England, an extreme nationalist young student tried in vain to assassinate him. Extreme nationalists were against making any kind of compromises with England, and thought that Zaghloul was wavering from this principle.³¹

This incident did not stop Zaghloul from continuing his journey and conversing for a long time with MacDonald, but to no avail. "He asked too much; he would make no concession in return," remarks Elgood.

He required the withdrawal of the British troops, the dismissal of the financial and judicial advisers, the abandonment of Great Britain's claim to direct Egypt's foreign policy, to protect minorities and foreign interest, and to defend the Suez Canal.³²

He also asked for the unity of the Sudan with Egypt under the sovereignty of the Egyptian crown.³³ MacDonald at last made it clear that his government was not ready at any

²⁹ On May 8, 1924, Zaghloul announced that he had rejected the February Declaration of Independence. On this point see: Young, p. 272.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 273.

³¹ New York Times (July 13, 1924), p. 1.

³² Elgood, Transit, p. 292. See also: Egypt No. 1, 1924.

³³ Makki Abbas, The Sudan Question (New York, 1952), p. 62.

cost to quit the Sudan, or give up the right secured to her by the February 28, 1922, Declaration of Independence.³⁴ The conversation between the two heads of states then came to an end and Zaghloul returned to Egypt.

Disturbances were increased upon the return of Zaghloul, especially after it was learned in Cairo that nothing was accomplished and no conclusion reached between Zaghloul and MacDonald.³⁵ Zaghloul then resigned but his resignation was not accepted by the King.³⁶ Meanwhile there was a change in government in England and a conservative party came to power.

On November 19, 1924, while Sir Lee Stack, Sirdar (Commander-in-Chief) of the Egyptian army and Governor-General of the Sudan, was on his way in a car to his home from the War Office, he was attacked by seven men dressed like students. He was injured severely and died on the second day.³⁷

Despite the fact that the two Egyptian officials immediately responsible for the murder of Sir Lee Stack, namely the Chief of Police in Cairo and the Director-General of the European Section of the Department of Public Safety, were

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Lenczowski, p. 316.

³⁶ Kohn, op. cit., p. 88.

³⁷ New York Times (November 20, 1924, p. 1.

English nationals,³⁸ Zaghloul, to ease the tension and solve the problem as peacefully as possible, called on the British Residence within an hour after the death of the Sirdar to express his profound sorrow and to assure the British authorities that the Egyptian government would do all in her power to find and punish the guilty ones.³⁹ In fact, "the Egyptian government at once put 10,000 Egyptian pounds as a reward on the murderers heads."⁴⁰ The American Minister in Egypt at that time appeared to have been very impressed by Egyptian promptness in restoring justice and order. He reports, ". . . but certain it is, that no government could possibly have taken more active, urgent and successful steps to bring the guilty to justice than did the Egyptian government with Zaghloul Pasha as its leading head."⁴¹

This was not enough as far as the British were concerned as they had been waiting for an opportunity to suppress the Wafdist nationalists. Hence they did not miss this opportunity⁴² and on the afternoon of the funeral, Lord Allenby, who maintained that "Egypt should be taught a stern lesson,"⁴³

³⁸Survey, 1925, I, 215.

³⁹New York Times (November 20, 1924), p. 8. See also: Abdel-Moneim Omar, The Sudan Question Based on British Documents, (Cairo, 1952), pp. 80-81.

⁴⁰Young, p. 276.

⁴¹Howell, p. 200.

⁴²Elgood, Transit, p. 294.

⁴³Lord Lloyd, Egypt Since Cromer (London, 1933-34), II, 95.

delivered two ultimatums in which he demanded an apology from the Egyptian government, the search for and the punishment of all the criminals involved in the assassination, the prohibition of all political demonstrations, the payment of an indemnity of a half-million Egyptian pounds (about \$2,500,000), to the British government, maintenance of the offices of the financial and judicial British advisors, and surrender of the Egyptian's right to retain the services of foreign officials against the will of Great Britain. The issue of the Sudan also arose, and the ultimatum required the withdrawal of all Egyptian troops from the Sudan, and announced that the area to be irrigated in the Gezira district of the Sudan would be extended from 300,000 faddans to an unlimited figure as the need might arise.⁴⁴ This last notification meant simply that Egypt would be destroyed.

The ultimatum also blamed Zaghloul and his government falsely for the murder of the Cirdar. It declared to Zaghloul, "This murder, which holds up Egypt as at present governed to the contempt of civilized peoples, is the natural outcome of a campaign of hostility to British rights and British subjects in Egypt and Sudan, founded upon a headless ingratitude for benefits conferred by Great Britain, not

⁴⁴ For the text of the two ultimatums delivered by Lord Allenby to the Egyptian Government, see: Omar, pp. 83-85.

discouraged by Your Excellency's Zaghloul Government, and fomented by organization in close contact with that government."⁴⁵ This accusation was not built on any evidence; it was only used to smear the reputation of Zaghloul and to force him to abandon power. Elgood comments on this point that, "There is no reason to lay the outrage at Zaghloul's door. He neither instigated nor approved of its commission. So much was clear to men who knew him best. He was a rebel at heart but never a partisan of violence, and time and again he had denounced the campaign of assassination as foolish and wrong."⁴⁶

The British demands were extremely high, and by all means were far from reasonable. The American Minister to Egypt, Dr. Howell in his book, Egypt's Past, Present and Future, expresses the same notion by comparing it with other incidents of the same nature. He writes,

Compare the British action over the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, if you please, with the action of our government over the brutal killing of our Vice-Consul, Imbrie, in Persia. Shall we briefly review our demands made upon the government of Persia in this case: (1) a suitable apology to our government; (2) the arrest, trial and conviction of the assassins; (3) their execution; (4) payment to Mrs. Imbrie, the widow, the sum of \$60,000; (5) payment of the expense of sending a warship to Persia to convey the remains of the Vice-Consul to America. All this

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 83.

⁴⁶ New York Times (November 25, 1924), p. 1.

was agreed to and complied with by the Persian government. When the Persian authorities notified us that the last requirement made by us had been fulfilled, and that the \$100,000, the cost of the warship was in a bank subject to our order, we in turn notified the Persian government that we desired that this sum be invested by it, and the proceeds resulting therefrom be used to teach the young men of Persia that murder is wrong.⁴⁷

In any event, Zaghoul's government accepted all the British demands concerning the apology, the indemnity, and the punishment of the criminals, but rejected points regarding the Sudan. In fact, the required indemnity was paid within twenty-four hours.⁴⁸ Zaghoul refused to accept the British demands concerning the Sudan, especially the point which indicated that most of the water of the Nile would be used to irrigate British plantations there, as this fact was a matter of life or death to Egypt, for without the water from the Nile Egypt would be but an unproductive desert.⁴⁹ To withdraw the Egyptian troops from the Sudan would also mean that Egypt had given up its historical right and

⁴⁷ Howell, pp. 179-180.

⁴⁸ Young, p. 276.

⁴⁹ Crabtree, "Egypt, the Sudan and the Nile", Foreign Affairs (December 15, 1924), p. 328. (Hereafter "FFA" Foreign Affairs). Even the English public opinion did not accept easily the notion that irrigation must be extended in the Blue Nile Valley in the Sudan as described in the ultimatum. The Secretary of State for foreign affairs appeared to voice this when he promised a commission of inquiry into the distribution of water between Egypt and the Sudan. See: The House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, 15th December, 1924, p. .

economical interests in that territory.⁵⁰ This, of course, would put Zaghloul in a very critical position not only in the eyes of his own nationalist supporters but also in the eyes of the whole Egyptian nation.

When the Egyptian government refused to yield to the English demands as presented by Lord Allenby, British troops were ordered to take over the custom house at Alexandria, whose receipts constituted a major source of the revenue of the Egyptian government. The acting Governor-General of the Sudan was also instructed to evacuate all Egyptian units within his jurisdiction from the Sudan.⁵¹ Zaghloul then resigned at once rather than "accept the black looks of the British community as part of his purgatory."⁵² He then returned home and soon afterward issued a manifesto to the

⁵⁰ For the reasons according to which Egypt always claimed its right to govern and annex the Sudan see: Abbas, pp. 63-64; Crabtes, "ESN", Foreign Affairs, pp. 320-331; and M. Travers Symons, pp. 131-238. On this point Arnold Toynbee, well-known English historian, writes, "Englishmen tended to regard the well-governed and increasingly prosperous Sudan of the twentieth century as their exclusive creation and therefore their exclusive affair, to minimize the quantitatively great (though qualitatively subordinate) contributions which Egypt had made to this achievement, to ignore the vital economic interest of Egypt in the Upper Nile Basin (an interest which was much larger than Great Britain's), and to brush aside Egypt's historical title. Thus Englishmen were as deeply shocked and exasperated when the Egyptian claim was presented in an extreme and militant form, as Egyptians were when they found this claim dismissed off-hand by Englishmen as preposterous. All the elements of misunderstanding and bitterness, in regard to this question, existed on both sides in 1919, and in five years they combined to produce violent and tragic consequences."

⁵¹ Elgood, Transit, pp. 295-296.

⁵² Ibid., p. 296.

nation in which he declared that the "cabinet had done its best to settle the critical situation arising out of the murder of Sir Lee Stack and to preserve the country from serious results, but that it had found that its continuation in office was difficult and would probably expose the country to dangers which might be avoided by its resignation. He also⁷. . . called on the nation to keep calm, and to remember it was to its interest to refrain from any act against public peace. He concluded by saying that he and his friends were ready to support any cabinet which worked in the interest of the country."⁵³ In other words, Zaghloul proved that he was working for the interest of Egypt and only for Egypt's interest, and that he was of the opinion that the murder of Stack was not right or desirable.

As a result of the murder of Sirdar Lee Stack, England was able to accomplish two important aims; first, it got rid of the strongly nationalistic and hostile Wafd government; and second, it secured the Sudan as a purely English colony.⁵⁴ These accomplishments did not mean that they were final or that Egyptian nationalists have ever quit demanding their absolute independence and their right to the Sudan.

Before this point is concluded, it is important to make it clear here that the Egyptian demand for the control of the

⁵³ New York Times (November 25, 1924), p. 1.

⁵⁴ R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, pp. 13-14.

Sudan was not, by all means, of an imperialistic nature, as Mr. George Young claims it to be.⁵⁵ It is rather built on historical, natural, and essential rights.⁵⁶ Crabtes states,

It . . . is not imperialism but a question of life and death which causes independent Egypt to claim the Sudan. . . . Without a practical monopoly of the 'unappropriated waters' of the Nile and the right to erect reservoirs in the Sudan, Egypt cannot expand and will be unable to provide for her increasing population.⁵⁷

NATIONALISM VS. AUTOCRACY

After Zaghloul Pasha's resignation had been accepted, King Fu'ad turned to Ahmad Ziwari Pasha, who then was the president of the Egyptian Senate (Majlis el-Nuwab), and entrusted him with the formation of a new government.⁵⁸ Ziwari accepted the King's request and without delay went ahead in forming a "ministry of the aristocracy,"⁵⁹ so-called because it was composed originally of members of the Constitutional Liberal party and of the palace clique.

⁵⁵Young, p. 277.

⁵⁶Abbas, pp. 73-100.

⁵⁷Crabtes, "ESN", Foreign Affairs, p. 328.

⁵⁸Survey, 1925, p. 218.

⁵⁹Kohn, op. cit., p. 90.

Ziwar Pasha was known throughout Egypt and to the English government for his cooperation with the British authorities in Egypt. During World War I, reports the New York Times, "He was governor of Alexandria, which was one of the important depots of the British troops, and he managed to handle the difficult situation there without friction with the British authorities."⁶⁰ In fact, the English Daily Herald, Labor's organ, spoke of Zaghloul Pasha as "being 'forced out of office' to make way for a British nominee."⁶¹ In any case it could be said that the new government under Ziwar was expected to be milder and much more moderate in its dealings with the British than its predecessor, the strong nationalistic Wafd Party.⁶²

The inclusion in the new cabinet of a man like Isma'il Sidki Pasha, as Minister of Finance,⁶³ who at one time was a close associate of Zaghloul and a prominent member of the Wafd, but who at a later date had deviated and become a bitter enemy of the Wafd Party,⁶⁴ obviously meant that the new government was anti-Wafd, and accordingly it was not expected to receive the support of the Parliament which had a

⁶⁰New York Times (November 25, 1924, p. 2:1.

⁶¹Ibid., (November 25, 1924), p. 2:2.

⁶²Ibid., (November 25, 1924), p. 2:1-2.

⁶³For the names of the members of Ziwar's cabinet see: Ibid., (November 25, 1924), p. 2.

⁶⁴See Chapter II, p. 63 .

Wafdist majority.⁶⁵

In the afternoon of the same day in which Zaghloul resigned his office, he appeared before a meeting of the Egyptian Chamber of Deputies and explained his position in regard to the current events and gave the reasons which caused him to resign.⁶⁶ The Chamber, after a "stormy scene" following Zaghloul's speech, adopted a resolution to protest to the League of Nations and the parliaments of all powers against the British government's exploitation of the sad incident of Sir Lee Stack's assassination, by aggression against Egypt and seizure of the Sudan's territory.⁶⁷

The Egyptian people on the other hand listened to the word of their leader Zaghloul and remained calm, using peaceful means in expressing their attitude toward England's harsh treatment.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, British troops went on parading and demonstrating their strength to terrify the Egyptian nationalists.⁶⁹

On November 30, 1924, Ziwar's government's discussions with the British authorities in Egypt came to an end after the

⁶⁵Sidki, p. 31. Cf., R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 15.

⁶⁶New York Times (November 25, 1924), p. 2:1.

⁶⁷For the text of the protest received by the League of Nations see: Ibid. (November 27, 1924).

⁶⁸The students, for example, went on strike but remained at home. On this see: Ibid. (November 25, 1924), p. 2:1.

⁶⁹Ibid. (November 24, 1924), p. 2:4.

Egyptian side had "accepted the British conditions relative to the Sudan and to the protection of foreigners in Egypt."⁷⁰ On the other hand, the British detachment which occupied the custom house at Alexandria was to be withdrawn as soon as possible.⁷¹

About this time rumors were spread all over the world that the Communist government at Moscow had been trying hard to influence the nationalist movement in Egypt.⁷² The New York Times, for example, on December 14, 1924, ran an article in which it stated that Zaghloul, while in detention at Gibraltar, and before he was permitted to return to Egypt in 1923, was approached by two Egyptians, "who spoke in the name of a certain Troyanovsky of the Moscow Third International, or Comintern, [and offered] to aid Zaghloul in his project for the complete independence of Egypt."⁷³ But the same article goes on to deny any notion that Zaghloul had agreed to cooperate or to accept any help from Moscow and quoted him as saying in answer that, "Egypt is an agricultural country; its people believe in the individual ownership and exploitation of property; it is a Moslem country and your teachings would find no place at the University of al-Azhar. Our aims

⁷⁰For details on this point see: Ibid. (December 1, 1924), p. 1:2.

⁷¹Ibid. (December 1, 1924, p. 1:2.

⁷²Ibid. (December 14, 1924), Sec. II, 9:2.

⁷³Ibid. (December 14, 1924), Sec. II, 9:2.

are nationalistic and patriotic, not internationalistic and unpatriotic."⁷⁴

On February 15, 1925, The New York Times published a translation of a pronouncement found in one of the numbers of the International Press Correspondence, published in Vienna, signed by four Asiatic Communist chiefs, in which the Communist International denounced the British imperialistic policy pursued in Egypt, called on the workers and peasants of England as well as those of the whole world to raise their voices in protest against it, and addressed the "workers and peasants of Egypt," by the following words:

Do not despair. Keep a brave heart. The advanced workers of all countries are coming to your aid. Expose the shameful conduct of the Egyptian government! Unite around your Communist Party! . . . Demand a determined and irreconcilable struggle against British imperialism for the complete and real independence of Egypt.⁷⁵

This, however, did not indicate that Zaghloul or the Wafd Party had ever come under the influence of the Communist International. Zaghloul opposed imperialism so strongly long before the Communist regime came to power in Russia. The Communist International and the Communist party in Egypt, to which the appeal had referred, being interested in the destruction of imperialism in general, had shared with the nationalists of Egypt their struggle to free themselves from the

⁷⁴Ibid.

⁷⁵Ibid. (February 15, 1925), Sec. VIII, 7:4-5.

yoke of Great Britain. An appeal like the one mentioned above is not, then, a strange thing to have happen.

It is very probable, though, that Zaghloul and the nationalist leaders were approached by Communist agents, and other foreign elements, to be helped in their struggle for freedom and independence. In fact, the expulsion of the mysterious Henry Rose, on December 23, 1924, a man whose nationality was not clearly identified, but who was known to have been using more than one name and giving false information about himself, at the same time identifying himself with Wafdist circles and delivering lectures "reserved for Egyptians, on civilization, courage, and duty," in which he is alleged to have expressed violently anti-British opinions,⁷⁶ is a good case to illustrate the presence of foreign agitators among the Egyptians during this period.

As it was pointed out earlier, Ziwar's government was handicapped by the presence of a Parliament with a large Wafd majority. Ziwar, in order to remedy this, notified the King

⁷⁶ Henry Rose was expelled from Egypt on account of his political activities which were considered by the Egyptian government likely to disturb public peace. Rose also used the name of Hirsch Beer, and Abraham Rosenhiem. He claimed to be a nationalized English subject but was found not to have registered at any British consulate, as it is the custom. At the time he was expelled it was found that he had registered in the hotel in which he stayed as a Rumanian merchant. Rose during the course of his life visited Egypt more than once, and always identified himself with the Wafdist group. On this point see: Ibid. (December 23, 1924), p. 4:2.

that "the chambers [were] entirely dominated by the party represented by the previous cabinet and continuation of parliamentary debates would only serve to increase the excitement, giving rise to a worse situation and barring the road to a solution of the conflict."⁷⁷ Therefore on December 24, 1924, Ziwar Pasha obtained a dissolution of Parliament from King Fu'ad.⁷⁸

The new elections were set to be held in January, 1925, but were postponed until March.⁷⁹ The government during this period did all it could to influence the elections,⁸⁰ and Ziwar managed to have a non-Wafd coalition⁸¹ and "the Wafd majority appeared to have been reduced to the vanishing point."⁸² But when the Chamber met on March 23, 1925, it elected Zaghloul Pasha as president by 125 votes to 85.⁸³ Ziwar then resigned. But when his resignation was not accepted, he demanded the newly elected parliament should be dissolved. His demand was complied with. "The collapse of the Egyptian Parliament," reports the New York Times at that time, "is considered a striking victory for former Premier

⁷⁷ Ibid. (December 24, 1924), p. 2:6.

⁷⁸ R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 15.

⁷⁹ Kohn, op. cit., p. 90.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 91.

⁸¹ R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 15.

⁸² Kohn, op. cit., p. 91.

⁸³ Survey, 1925, p. 225.

Zaghloul Pasha, who has maintained all along that the results in the recent elections afforded his opponents no justification for forming a government."⁸⁴ But despite the fact of this statement, for the following eleven months "Egypt was ruled autocratically in defiance of the Constitution and without Parliament."⁸⁵

The new Egyptian government was approved by Great Britain. In fact, Hans Kohn speaks of it as "an experiment which the English forced upon the country," and goes further to declare that after the new Egyptian parliament had been dissolved, "the British government and the British press believed that conditions in Egypt had been restored to normal."⁸⁶

This situation did not last long, however, as Ziwar Pasha left for Europe in the summer of 1925 for reasons of health,⁸⁷ and was succeeded by Yahya Ibrahim Pasha in the capacity of acting Prime Minister.⁸⁸ Yahya Ibrahim Pasha was not only a friend of King Fu'ad but was an adherent and a very close associate with the newly organized Ittihad party, popularly known as "the King's party."⁸⁹ A drastic crisis developed in the government at this time due to the hostility

⁸⁴ New York Times (March 24, 1922), p. 3:3.

⁸⁵ Kohn, op. cit., p. 91.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 9.

⁸⁷ Newmann, p. 250.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 250.

⁸⁹ R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 15.

which occurred between the conservative King and the liberal attitude of the constitutional liberal party.⁹⁰ The King and his confidential advisor, Nash'at Pasha, instigated such a dispute because they felt that the time had come to get rid of the Constitutional Liberalists and to secure an absolute Ittihadi (King's friend) government.⁹¹ The results were exactly as the King expected; the three ministers who belonged to the Constitutional Liberal party resigned along with Isma'il Sidki, who called himself independent from all political parties.⁹² The government was then reconstructed "on a purely Palace basis."⁹³

During this period and specifically on May 20, 1925, it was announced in England that the resignation of Lord

⁹⁰ During this period, Shaykh Ali Abdul-Razik, the author of Islam and the Principles of the State, was attacked for the ideas which he expressed in this book and was removed from his office as ecclesiastical judge by the unanimous vote of the Senate of al-Azhar. (Kohn^{op. cit.}, p. 29). When the case was brought up, in September, 1925, in front of the Minister of Justice, Abdul-Aziz Pasha Fahmi, who also was president of the Liberal Constitutionalist party, he failed to confirm the judgment of al-Azhar's Senate. Hence he was dismissed by a Royal Decree. (Newman, p. 250.) This resulted in the resignation of the Liberal ministers and Isma'il Sidki Pasha, who called himself an "Independent." See Lloyd, II, 114.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 114.

⁹² Isma'il Sidki was vacationing at this time in Vitchi, France. He went to Europe originally to negotiate with the government for an agreement concerning the Egyptian Western frontiers. After his resignation from the cabinet became effective he was asked to continue the negotiations which he did. See Sidki, pp. 32-33.

⁹³ Lloyd, II, 114.

Allenby had been accepted and Sir George Lloyd (who shortly thereafter became Lord Lloyd) was appointed to succeed him as British High Commissioner in Egypt.⁹⁴ Lord Lloyd arrived in Egypt on October 20 of the same year, to witness the conspiracy of the palace clique in taking over the Egyptian government, and the new nationalist revolution for the purpose of securing the former democratic parliamentary type of government which had been out of existence in Egypt for a while.

The angry Liberal Constitutionalists now turned to the Wafd party to form a new strong coalition in an effort to restore the parliament and prevent Egypt from passing to the hands of an absolute monarch, represented by the personality of King Fu'ad.⁹⁵ Such a coalition upset the balance of power,⁹⁶ and brought about many new problems.

On November 21, 1925, Zaghloul Pasha, under the direction of the Egyptian constitution which provides that Parliament must meet on the third Saturday in November of each year, called on the deputies to assemble as provided by the Constitution. When the Egyptian government went against this wish and sent troops to occupy the Parliament House,⁹⁷

⁹⁴ Survey, 1925, p. 226.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 226.

⁹⁶ Lloyd, II, 114.

⁹⁷ Newman, p. 250.

the deputies proceeded to the Hotel Continental⁹⁸ where Zagh-loul was again elected president.⁹⁹ The first decision the Parliament passed was that it declared itself to be "a lawful assembly of the Senate and Chamber, and denounced the government for violating the Constitution."¹⁰⁰

It is obvious then to think of Lord Lloyd, who had just recently arrived in Egypt to replace Lord Allenby, as getting worried about the new development in Egyptian politics.¹⁰¹ Lloyd was confronted with the very delicate and important issue. He was forced to work swiftly to maintain peace.

He had to choose between either supporting the King's clique, as manifested in the Ittihadist government which was then in office, or to help restore a democratic government with a parliament and a constitution, as it was prior to the assassination of Sir Lee Stack. To quote Lord Lloyd on this point, he had "the alternative of either Zaghoulism or autocracy."¹⁰²

If England decided to support the former Ittihadi government then she would be supporting a government without any "popular support," thus it would be rather impossible to negotiate a durable treaty which would result in peace and

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 250.

⁹⁹ Brockelmann, p. 265.

¹⁰⁰ Newman, p. 250.

¹⁰¹ Lloyd, II, 114.

¹⁰² Ibid., II, 115-116.

better relations between the two concerned governments.¹⁰³ On the other hand, if England supported free elections and a constitutionalist government, then it was feared that the strong nationalist Wafd party would come back into power. The negotiation of a treaty would then be hard, but once negotiated it would be more enduring as there was every indication to believe that the Egyptian people were ready to accept whatever the Wafd party might decide for the good of Egypt.

Lord Lloyd tried to avoid both alternatives by trying a very shrewd solution for the problem. He influenced the King to dismiss his close associate and head of the Ittihad party, Nash'at Pasha, in an effort to win back the most influential Isma'il Sidki Pasha, with whom Lord Lloyd hoped that the weak government of Ziwar would be strengthened.¹⁰⁴ However, all Lloyd's efforts in that direction were in vain.

The government now was faced with a great dilemma and found itself obliged to think of holding a new election for the Parliament. In an effort to reduce the number of Zaghloul's supporters, the Prime Minister promulgated a new electoral law¹⁰⁵ on December 8, 1925, which made 30 the

¹⁰³ Ibid., II, 116.

¹⁰⁴ Kohn, op. cit., p. 92.

¹⁰⁵ Lloyd, II, 152.

minimum age for the active franchise . . . electors who could show that they had reached a certain level either in education or as taxpayers were to enjoy the active franchise at 25."¹⁰⁶ This, of course, meant that many men from the farming districts, the nationalist youth of the country, and many others who would usually support Zaghloul would be disqualified. Obviously this was not liked by the National Coalition which threatened to boycott the elections if the government did not "abstain from enforcing the new Electoral Law, and . . . hold elections under 'the law conforming to the Constitution'."¹⁰⁷

When the government showed some reluctance, the three-party National Coalition¹⁰⁸ called for a National Congress in Cairo for February 19, 1926. "More than 95 per cent of all persons who played a part in Egyptian public and political life were present. The demonstration was perfectly orderly and might claim to voice the sentiment of the whole nation."¹⁰⁹ The government then found it very necessary to change its position and decide to hold a general election under Zaghloul's electoral law of 1924.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁶Kohn, op. cit., p. 92.

¹⁰⁷Lloyd, II, 153.

¹⁰⁸The three parties united in this National Coalition were: the Wafd, the Fatherland (al-Hizb el-Watani), and the Liberal Constitutional parties.

¹⁰⁹Kohn, op. cit., p. 93.

¹¹⁰Survey, 1925, p. 227.

The outcome of the polling which took place on May 22, 1926, was announced to be in favor of the National Coalition, with a great majority for the Wafd Party.¹¹¹ The Ittihad party which was sponsored by the government and supported by the King received but 7 out of 200 seats.¹¹²

Accordingly, Zaghloul was the rightful and most logical man to be called upon to form the new government. "This Lord Lloyd opposed."¹¹³ Zaghloul was "faced with an ugly dilemma," said Major Newman. "If he had returned to office and worked in cooperation with the British Government, he would have broken up the National Party [National Coalition] and sacrificed his own position. If, on the other hand, he had resumed power with a great majority behind him and continued his policy of trying to eliminate the British from Egypt and the Sudan, he would have invited trouble with the British Government which might well have defeated the objects of the Nationalistic cause."¹¹⁴ Zaghloul then, understanding this point intelligently, declared that he was too old to assume an office, and resigned to the role of "the Father of the Fatherland."¹¹⁵

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 227.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 227.

¹¹³ Kohn, op. cit., p. 93.

¹¹⁴ Newman, pp. 253-254.

¹¹⁵ Breckelmann, p. 465.

The King then called on the Liberal 'Adli Pasha Yakan (Yagan) and instructed him to form the government.¹¹⁶ The new cabinet then was formed of six Wafdists, three Liberals and one Independent.¹¹⁷

When Egypt's third Parliament was opened on June 10, 1926, the Chamber of Deputies unanimously elected Zaghloul as president. From the beginning Zaghloul made it clear that he would put all his support behind the Liberal Prime Minister 'Adli Yakan.¹¹⁸ There is no doubt that 'Adli needed the support of Zaghloul who alone at that time represented the popular will of Egypt and controlled the greatest majority of the Parliament. In fact, 'Adli Pasha expected to be influenced by Zaghloul who could, at any time, obtain a vote against the Prime Minister.¹¹⁹

During this period the Wafdist Parliament tried to legislate new laws which created some friction between this body and the cabinet. One of the laws was concerned with the election of the 'Omdas (mayors). The Wafd party in the parliament proposed that the 'Omdas of the villages should be elected in the future only by the people of the village who

¹¹⁶R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 16.

¹¹⁷Ibid.

¹¹⁸New York Times (June 4, 1926), p. 5:3.

¹¹⁹Amine Youssef Bey, Independent Egypt (London, 1940), p. 149.

were enfranchised for parliamentary elections.¹²⁰ Such procedure would resemble the same democratic way of elections as practiced in the West.¹²¹ This, though, was not to Lord Lloyd's liking as he was afraid that "an Omdah once elected on a Zaghloulist ticket could safely be trusted to see that his village voted for a Zaghloulist Deputy."¹²² Lloyd's pressure was so great that Yakan opposed this point of legislation strongly.¹²³

The Parliament as led by the Wafd party during this period also wanted to "make sure that there was nothing happening behind the scenes which would endanger its authority."¹²⁴ Thus it claimed "the right of the Chamber to give detailed instructions to ministers as to administrative measures, . . . the Prime Minister . . . stoutly denied this right."¹²⁵

Another point of difference which occurred between the Prime Minister and the Wafd arose when the latter demanded from the Prime Minister "a pledge that during the King's proposed visit to London, Anglo-Egyptian relations would not be discussed. . . . This pledge," says Col. Newman, "'Adli

¹²⁰ Lloyd, II, 180-181.

¹²¹ Kohn, op. cit., p. 94.

¹²² Lloyd, II, 181.

¹²³ Ibid., p. 182.

¹²⁴ Youssef, p. 150.

¹²⁵ Lloyd, II, 182.

Pasha refused to give."¹²⁶

It was obvious that when the Prime Minister was confronted by these problems and many others,¹²⁷ he became discouraged and began to feel that the Wafdist parliament was in opposition to him. Once, while the Egyptian Budget was being discussed by the Parliament, it was moved that the Ministry should be thanked for the support and encouragement that had been extended to Bank Misr. The motion was voted down by a great majority.¹²⁸ This displeased the Prime Minister very much, and despite the fact that the "leading members of the Wafd immediately spoke to the effect that this vote did not imply any lack of confidence,"¹²⁹ 'Adli Pasha and his cabinet members regarded the vote as a lack of confidence and decided to resign. "Zaghloul used all his power of persuasion," says Col. Newman, "to induce 'Adli Pasha and his colleagues to remain in office,"¹³⁰ but without avail. The Coalition government then resigned on April 18, 1927,¹³¹ leaving the ailing Zaghloul in a great dilemma.

The crisis in the government was not allowed to last for a long time as negotiations between Zaghloul Pasha, the

¹²⁶Newman, p. 258. On the invitation which King Fu'ad received from King George to visit England, see: New York Times. (February 23, 1926), p. 25:5.

¹²⁷Newman, p. 258.

¹²⁸Lloyd, II, 198-199.

¹²⁹Ibid., p. 199.

¹³⁰Newman, p. 259.

¹³¹New York Times (April 19, 1927), p. 36:2.

leader of the majority party, and the Liberal Constitutionalist, Sawrat Pasha, who was the Foreign Minister in the previous cabinet, started immediately. On April 24, 1927, the New York Times reported that an Agreement was reached between the two leaders,¹³² and Sawrat agreed to form the new cabinet.

Shortly after Sawrat accepted office, the Wafdist majority in the Parliament which, as was indicated earlier, has been trying to put in practice its program of democratization of the country and to achieve an absolute independence, raised the issue of increasing the effectiveness of the Egyptian army by adding to its units, replacing the old useless articles by modern equipment,¹³³ depriving the British head of the army of his powers as a Sirdar, and investing those powers in the Army Council.¹³⁴

This desire instigated a misunderstanding and a crisis. The Egyptian government supported the notion that "The Egyptian army is no concern of the British government which did not mention the matter during the negotiations which preceded or followed the British declaration of Egyptian independence in 1922."¹³⁵ The British authorities in Egypt, on the other hand, were of the opinion that once the little

¹³²Ibid. (April 24, 1927), Sec. II, 2:1.

¹³³Kohn, op. cit., p. 94.

¹³⁴New York Times (May 29, 1927), p. 4:2.

¹³⁵Ibid.

Egyptian army became strong it would strike against the mighty British forces, at that time considered to be one of the greatest and strongest armies of the world, and maintained that "the Egyptian army policywas clearly essential under the terms of[the British] 1922 policy."¹³⁶ At the same time the British government, in an effort to cause the Egyptian nationalists to fear losing their independence if they did not yield to British suggestions and demands, dispatched three battleships to Alexandria Harbor.¹³⁷

Dr. Howell, who at that time was planning to leave his post in Egypt as the United States Minister to that country, in an interview granted to the Arabic Newspaper al-Ahram, frankly "criticized Britain's attitude in the present crisis and praised the members of the Egyptian Parliament for their conduct."¹³⁸

The Egyptians fully realized that they could not face Britain in case of war, and they had no alternative but to yield; thus on June 4, 1927, an Egyptian note was delivered in London which denied the fact that the Egyptian government had planned to dismiss the British Sirdar of the Egyptian army, and declared that the proposal concerning this point had been introduced in the parliament by only two

¹³⁶Lloyd, II, 194-195.

¹³⁷Kohn, op. cit., p. 95.

¹³⁸New York Times (June 4, 1927), p. 6:5.

representatives and that it had never been adopted.¹³⁹

The outcome of the negotiations carried on between the Egyptian government and Lord Lloyd was summarized in a speech by Sawrat Pasha, the Prime Minister of Egypt, which he delivered in the Chamber of Deputies on the evening of June 16, 1927. Sawrat then pointed out that his government under the certain circumstances "had decided to maintain the status quo in the army . . . at the same time safeguarding the authority and responsibility of the Ministry in these matters."¹⁴⁰

SAWRAT-CHAMBERLIN NEGOTIATIONS

On February 22, 1926, King Fu'ad accepted an invitation from King George to visit London.¹⁴¹ At that time Fu'ad hoped to be able to make the trip early in June of the same year after the opening of the Egyptian Parliament had taken place.¹⁴² The political developments in Egypt delayed the visit, and for a time during the Army crisis, it seemed that such a trip was impossible. However, on June 16, 1927, after Egypt and Britain came to terms on the Army crisis, King Fu'ad once again started preparing to fulfill the desire

¹³⁹ Ibid. (June 5, 1927), p. 17:16.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid. (June 17, 1927), p. 23:4.

¹⁴¹ Ibid. (February 23, 1926), p. 25:5.

¹⁴² Ibid.

which he had entertained for some time and the promise which he had given to visit England.¹⁴³

King Fu'ad was accompanied by his Prime Minister, Sawrat Pasha, whom Zeghloul asked to discuss the political situation in Egypt with the British government.¹⁴⁴ The King visited first of all in the western European capitals and at last proceeded to London where he was received with high honors.¹⁴⁵ This, of course, meant very much to King Fu'ad and to the Egyptian nation as well. It was undoubtedly a gracious gesture on the part of Great Britain in an effort to create better relations with the developing state of Egypt.

During this period also, Lord Lloyd arrived in London. Despite the fact that Lloyd had quoted his superior, Sir Austen Chamberlain to have written,

I did not suggest that we should carry on any negotiations during his [King Fu'ad's] visit in London, but might we not perhaps prepare the way for conversations between himself and Lord Lloyd when they had both returned to Egypt.¹⁴⁶

It appeared that everything was prepared for the starting of new negotiations. In fact, directly after Sawrat's arrival, negotiations started between him and the Prime Minister of England, Austen Chamberlin.¹⁴⁷ This marked

¹⁴³Ibid. (June 17, 1927), p. 23:4.

¹⁴⁴Youssef, p. 151.

¹⁴⁵Newman, p. 262.

¹⁴⁶Lloyd, II, 227-228.

¹⁴⁷Ibid., II, 231.

the beginning of a new era in Egyptian politics which was culminated by the 1936 treaty.

The negotiations of a new treaty between England and Egypt were disturbed by the death of the great nationalist leader Zaghloul, who "had been the one person whose support of a treaty with England could have insured its acceptance."¹⁴⁸

Zaghloul's death did not come suddenly. He was ill for a long time, but despite this he continued to lead Egyptian politics and to fight for Egyptian independence. Zaghloul died in Cairo on August 23, 1927, at the age of seventy-four. "His funeral in Cairo produced remarkable scenes, showing the affection and admiration in which he was held by all classes of the Egyptian people. The death of no other Egyptian of modern times has evoked such natural and genuine sorrow, such manifestations of truly national mourning, as that of Sa'd Pascha Zaghloul, whose chief claim to the affections of the people was as a great nationalist leader."¹⁴⁹

The funeral of Zaghloul was followed by twenty-five thousand persons. Remarks Galatoli,

Deputations from every village in the land laid the flowers of their fields on the grave of the son of a fellah who became the Spirit of the People and made the Egyptians rise from the slough of despondency caused by 'Orabi's defeat, to a proud awareness of their right to freedom.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸Newman, p. 263.

¹⁴⁹Ibid., p. 263.

¹⁵⁰Galatoli, p. 19.

The election of a new leader to succeed Zaghloul and a statement concerning the policy of the party were two of the most serious questions ever to face the Wafd party. On August 27, 1927, all the parliamentary members of the Wafd who were in Egypt at that time were assembled to deal with the problems created by the death of Zaghloul.¹⁵¹ However, the conference accomplished only the setting of a date for a full conference of the party to be held on September 19, 1927.

During the September 19 conference of the Wafd party, a manifesto was issued declaring "that the party would continue its efforts to obtain the true independence of Egypt and would follow the principles and aims adopted by Zaghloul. The manifesto also declared that the Wafd desired to maintain the coalition of parties as being necessary to national unity, and called upon the Egyptian people to support the coalition."¹⁵² A week later, on September 26, 1927, Mustafa Pasha Nahas was unanimously elected to head the Wafd party and to fill the vacant chairmanship of the Parliamentary Committee.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹Newman, p. 265.

¹⁵²Ibid., pp. 265-266.

¹⁵³Ibid., p. 266.

Chapter V.

THE MAKING OF THE 1936 TREATY

It was indicated earlier that negotiations between the Egyptian Prime Minister, Sawrat Pasha and Sir Austin Chamberlain concerning an agreement in regard to the Egyptian question was interrupted by the death of Zaghoul Pasha. Despite that, certain points were agreed upon¹ by both sides even before the return of Sawrat to Egypt to consult the new leadership of the Wafd to see where it stood on the matter.

On November 24, 1927, the draft of a treaty was sent to Lord Lloyd, together with a note of instruction in which the British Government declared that it had accepted the mentioned draft after communication with the Dominions and India, and ordered him to sign it on behalf of his Majesty, the King of England, at any time that Sawrat was in a position to do so on behalf of the Egyptian King.²

Article two of this draft treaty forbade Egypt "to adopt in foreign countries an attitude incompatible with the

¹The British as well as the Egyptian side agreed on the following points: (1) that both governments should enter into an alliance, (2) that Britain must assist Egypt in a military manner if its security was ever threatened, (3) that British officers will be charged with training the Egyptian armies. See: Survey, 1928, pp. 245-250 and 253-256.

²Egypt, No. 1, 1928. Also, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1928, ed. by John W. Wheeler-Bennett (London, 1929), pp. 245-250. (Hereafter Documents, 1928).

alliance or liable to create difficulties for his Britannic Majesty; . . . or to conclude with a foreign power any agreement which might be prejudicial to British interests." The British Government on the other hand accepted responsibility to use her influence with other capitulatory powers to obtain modifications of the capitulatory regime in Egypt (Art. 9), and to use her good offices "for the admission of Egypt to the League of Nations" (Art. 10), and that England will be represented in Egypt by an ambassador with "precedence over all other foreign representatives" (Art. 11).³

Article seven provided that:

In order to facilitate and secure to His Britannic Majesty the protection of the lines of communication of this British Empire, and pending the conclusion at some future date of an agreement by which His Britannic Majesty entrusts His Majesty the King of Egypt with the task of ensuring this protection, His Majesty the King of Egypt authorizes His Britannic Majesty to maintain upon Egyptian territory such armed forces as His Britannic Majesty's Government consider necessary for this purpose. The presence of those forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of Egypt.

After a period of ten years from the coming into force of the present treaty, the high contracting parties will reconsider, in the light of the provisions of the present treaty, the question of the localities in which the said forces are to be stationed. Should no agreement be reached on this point, the question may be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations. If the decision of the League of Nations be adverse to the claims of the Egyptian Government, the question can, at their request and under the same conditions, be reinvestigated at the intervals of five years from the date of the league's decision.⁴

³Ibid., pp. 245-248.

⁴Ibid., pp. 246- 247.

This article proved to be the stumbling block as no one could have been able to convince the nationalist leaders in Egypt of the necessity of maintaining British troops in Egypt. Thus Mahas Pasha, the new leader of the Wafd Party, rejected the treaty on the grounds that "it did not provide for the complete evacuation of the Egyptian territory by British military forces."⁵


THE WAFDIST GOVERNMENT AND THE ASSEMBLY BILLS

After the treaty draft had been rejected by Mahas Pasha, Sawrat, knowing that his legal existence as Prime Minister of Egypt depended on the support of the Wafd, had no choice but to reject the treaty. Thus on March 4, 1928, he called at the Residency and delivered a note declaring that the Anglo-Egyptian treaty draft was not acceptable to his government because, as he explained, such a treaty was "incompatible with the independence and sovereignty of Egypt."⁶ From the Residency the Prime Minister proceeded to the King's palace and handed in the Cabinet's resignation, but, upon the King's request, agreed to remain in office until a new government could be formed.⁷

⁵Newman, p. 276.

⁶New York Times (March 5, 1928), p. 7:1.

⁷Ibid.



In answer to the Egyptian rejection of the draft treaty, the British government on March 7 delivered a note to Sawrat Pasha in which they declared that since

the conversations with the Egyptian government failed to achieve their objective, His Majesty's government cannot permit the discharge of any of their responsibilities under the declaration of February 28, 1922, to be endangered, whether by Egyptian legislation or by administrative action, and they reserved the right to take such steps as in their view the situation might demand.⁸

Such a note was very shocking to Egyptian diplomats and in certain political quarters it was feared that no one would dare to face the situation by accepting to form a new cabinet.⁹

On March 16, 1928,¹⁰ Mustafa al-Nahas Pasha accepted and formed a new Wafdist cabinet. Three days later when the new ministry met the Chamber for the first time, the Prime Minister announced in a formal statement the policy of the new government toward Britain. He said,

. . . .the Cabinet's policy would be to maintain completely the rights of Egypt and the Sudan in accordance with national dignity and to consolidate the constitution. The Cabinet does not intend to admit anything encroaching on the complete independence and sovereignty of the country.¹¹

⁸ Ibid. (March 8, 1928), p. 1:8.

⁹ Ibid. (March 8, 1928), p. 4:4.

¹⁰ R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 20.

¹¹ New York Times (March 20, 1928), p. 4:6.

The first task the new government had was to give an answer to the strong British note of March 4, 1928. On March 30, Zoghoul delivered to Lord Lloyd a note in which he expressed on behalf of the Egyptian government her "deep regret" towards his aide memoire of March 4, and pointed out that the Egyptian government had considered that the aide memoire "does not correspond with its frank willingness to develop and fortify the bonds of friendship which should govern the relations between Great Britain and Egypt." Further, it declared that the aide memoire showed good evidence of British "interference with the internal conduct of Egyptian affairs, paralyzing the exercise by Parliament of its right to legislate and control administration, and rendering impossible the existence of a government worthy of the name." And at last he declared that "for these reasons the Egyptian government cannot admit the principle of an intervention which would be tantamount to its veritable abdication."¹²

In answer to this note, Lord Lloyd informed Nahas Pasha that he was unable to accept his note "as a correct exposition of the relations existing between Great Britain and Egypt, or their respective obligations," as they were determined by the declaration of February 28, 1922.¹³

¹²Ibid., (April 5, 1928), p. 8:1-2.

¹³For the text of both notes see: Ibid.

On March 31 the British government received a note from the Egyptian government then headed by Nahas Pasha. This note was interpreted to indicate Egypt's refusal to consider any terms of the proposed Anglo-Egyptian treaty as a basis for further discussion between Britain and Egypt. The note included the following three demands: "First, complete independence; second, the right of Egypt to defend the Suez Canal with her own army without the assistance of British forces unless Egypt explicitly requested them; third, that Egypt should be regarded no longer as a member of the British Empire but an ally on an equal footing with Britain."¹⁴

In answering this note of Nahas, the British government declared that the demands were not acceptable to her and reminded the Egyptian government of the February, 1922, Declaration.¹⁵

Meanwhile, three bills usually referred to as the Public Assembly Bills were introduced in the lower House of the Egyptian Parliament giving the right to Egyptians to assemble and hold demonstrations, increasing the power of the 'Omdahs (the village headmen), and giving the Egyptian people the right to carry arms. The British authorities

¹⁴ Ibid. (April 1, 1928), p. 32+6.

¹⁵ Ibid. (April 8, 1928), III, 3:2.

immediately reacted to that and demanded the withdrawal of the bills on the basis that they were in conflict with the February 28, 1928, Declaration.¹⁶ The Egyptians, on the other hand, considered the introduction of such bills as a domestic affair and not the concern of the British government.

On the 29th of April, 1928, the British Resident handed an ultimatum to the Egyptian government in which the former requested the Egyptian Prime Minister "to take the necessary steps to prevent the Bill regulating public meetings and demonstrations from becoming law." Further, it warned him that if "a categorical assurance in writing that the above mentioned measure will not be proceeded with," delivered to the Residency within forth-eight hours, then "His Britannic Majesty's government will consider themselves free to take such action as the situation may seem to require."¹⁷ In the meantime it was reported that part of the British Mediterranean fleet stationed in Malta was ordered "to proceed immediately to Egypt to await developments."¹⁸

On the second day the Prime Minister Nahas Pasha, reacting under fear of new British occupation, asked for a secret session in the Chamber of Deputies, "in order that a special matter might be discussed."¹⁹ When this was granted he read the British ultimatum and after three hours of dis-

¹⁶Ibid. (April 12, 1928), p. 15:1.

¹⁷Lloyd, II, 272.

¹⁸New York Times (April 30, 1928), p. 1:3.

¹⁹Ibid. (May 1, 1928), p. 30:2.

cussion it was agreed that the Public Assemblies Bill would be postponed until next session. During the time until the next session the cabinet was supposed to seek a compromise with the British government on the issue.²⁰

On April 1 the Egyptian Cabinet met again and drafted a reply answering the British ultimatum. In the reply Egypt voiced her regret at British interference in Egyptian legislative matters but nevertheless informed the British authorities of her recommendation to the Parliament to "postpone further progress on the Assemblies Law until the next session, hoping in this manner to give Britain an opportunity of reconsidering its position in a calmer atmosphere."²¹ The British government accepted the word of Nehas on the postponement of the Public Assemblies Bill but warned him against the danger of any attempt to revive such a bill in the future.²²

On June 24, 1928, after some misunderstanding had occurred within the Egyptian cabinet, two Liberal and two Wafdist ministers resigned their offices. Nehas did not then do what was expected of him; that is, submit the resignation

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid. (May 2, 1928), p. 6:2. For the text of the Egyptian reply to the British ultimatum of June 29, 1928, see: Ibid. (May 3, 1928), p. 29:6.

²² Ibid.

of his government to the King, but instead he tried to fill the vacant offices by members of his own party and keep on going. The opposition then published some documents which accused Nahas and two other prominent members of his party of accepting a bribe to use their political influence in the Egyptian courts in favor of a wealthy party.²³

King Fu'ad now lost patience with Nahas and the Parliamentary regime, "his hated enemy."²⁴ On June 25, 1928, he dismissed Nahas from the premiership on the grounds that his Ministry "was formed on the basis of a coalition which no longer existed."²⁵ On the same day the King invited Muhammad Mahmud to form a new cabinet. Mahmud formerly had been a prominent member of the Wafd party but had broken with it in 1922 after a quarrel with Sa'd Zaghloul "over the latter's attitude toward Great Britain." He then joined the Liberal Constitutional party and in time advanced in its ranks to become its Vice-President.²⁶

A man of Mahmud's sympathies and background was not wanted by the bulk of the Egyptian people who were nationalistic in their general outlook and in general supported the "true" nationalist Wafd party. Thus demonstrations were

²³Ibid. (June 25, 1928), p. 6:1

²⁴Lloyd, II, 276.

²⁵New York Times (June 28, 1928), p. 10:2.

²⁶Ibid.

held against the new Premier, the Egyptian press attacked him severely, and the Egyptian Parliament which had a Wafdist majority planned to give him a vote of non-confidence.

To combat this the King immediately on June 19, 1928, suspended both Houses of Parliament for a period of three years by a royal decree. The press immunity likewise was suspended indefinitely, and the King and his ministers announced that they would rule over Egypt by themselves.²⁷ This was the start of a new reign of dictatorship.

MAHMUD'S DICTATORSHIP AND THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN NEGOTIATIONS

In an editorial in the New York Times issue of July 20, 1928, it was noted that "behind King Fu'ad's decree lies the momentous admission that the limited self-government granted by the British to Egypt has failed. . . . From now on, [the article went on to say] Egypt will in reality be governed from London. Her King, placed on the throne by Britain, will take orders from the British High Commissioner. There will be no political opposition to trouble him, for temporarily at least the Wafd as a Parliamentary force is wiped out of existence together with electoral self-government."²⁸ In other words, the King by his decree carried Egypt a step backward.

²⁷Ibid. (July 20, 1928), p. 6:1.

²⁸Ibid.

However, it appeared now that England under the present circumstances would succeed in concluding a treaty with the new regime in Egypt. In June of 1929 Oxford University invited the dictatorial Prime Minister Mahmud Pasha to come to receive the Honorary Degree of Doctor of Civil Law. Upon his arrival in London Mahmud Pasha was approached by Mr. Arthur Henderson, the successor of Sir Austin Chamberlain,²⁹ and was given the new terms for an Anglo-Egyptian treaty.²⁹ The official text of the proposals which later on was issued by the Foreign Office included the following points:

(1) The military occupation of Egypt by British forces is terminated, but troops are to occupy localities bordering the Suez Canal; (2) an alliance is established between the two countries, with cooperation in foreign policy and mutual assistance in case of war; (3) Egyptian legislation is to be applied to foreigners, and the jurisdiction of the Consular Courts is to be transferred to the mixed tribunals; (4) the status of the Sudan remains as under the 1899 convention, and a battalion of Egyptian troops is to return to the Sudan; (5) ambassadors are to be exchanged, and Great Britain is to support Egypt's entry into the League of Nations.³⁰

²⁹ During this period there was also a change of government in England. The Labor party succeeded in replacing the Tory. As a result of this Lord Lloyd, the High Commissioner of Egypt was forced to resign on the grounds that the policy which he conducted in Egypt was not entirely agreeable to the Labor government which appeared to be interested in pursuing a more liberal policy in Egypt. For details see: Ibid. (July 25, 1929), 10:2; (July 26, 1929), p. 3:4, and p. 5:1; (July 27, 1929), p. 4:1, and 4:2; and (July 30, 1929), p. 8:2.

³⁰ Thomas Greenwood, "Britain's Perils in the New Egyptian Treaty", Current History (November, 1929), p. 322. For the text of the draft proposals see: Egypt, No. I (1929) Cmd. 3305. Also it could be found in the New York Times (August 7, 1929), p. 7:2.

It appeared that the new proposals, which were in fact based in general upon the proposals agreed upon between Sir Austin Chamberlain and Sawrat Pasha in 1927, had appealed to Mahmud Pasha, who in a note addressed to Mr. Henderson declared himself as willing to submit those proposals to the Egyptian people and Parliament "in the sincere belief that their acceptance would be in the interest of my country."³¹ In a message dated August 5, 1929, addressed "to the people of Egypt" he announced:

I am happy to announce that after long and difficult negotiations I have succeeded in obtaining proposals for settlement of relations between Egypt and England on the basis of friendly, mutual understanding.

- Full details will be published in due course, and it is my fervent hope that they will be examined in the spirit of enlightened patriotism by all Egyptians who love their country, regardless of party or creed. I believe that if examined in this spirit they will be found to go far beyond any proposals which have preceded them, and that a treaty embodying these proposals will consolidate friendship and enable the two countries to cooperate in preserving the peace of the world.³²

Before leaving London on August 6, 1929, Premier Mahmud promised Mr. Henderson that upon his return to Egypt he would bring about the election of a new Parliament. This Parliament, thought Mahmud, will "accept the present proposals as the best possible thing they could get."³³

³¹Ibid.

³²The text was published in New York Times (August 5, 1929), p. 8:4.

³³Ibid. (August 7, 1929), p. 1:7.

However, the thought which Mahmud expressed concerning the Egyptian Parliament's acceptance of the new proposals for an Anglo-Egyptian settlement was not expected by close observers to become a reality because the Wafd party was determined to defeat these proposals and "showed even less mercy to Muhammad Mahmud than they had shown to 'Abdu 'l-Khaliq Sawret,"³⁴ who had negotiated with the British in 1922.

On the 31st of August, 1929, Mahmud Pasha addressed a meeting of his Liberal Constitutional party and was able to convince the members to pass a resolution approving the Henderson-Mahmud proposals.³⁵ On the same day Nahas Pasha addressed a meeting of the Wafd and demanded that Mahmud Pasha resign, declaring that the Wafd would not express any opinion on the proposals except in Parliament.³⁶ The Ittihad party (the King's party), the third most important party in Egypt, issued a statement in which it announced her approval of the proposals. This was the reaction of the Egyptian political parties to the Henderson-Mahmud proposals before the election of the new Parliament had taken place.

³⁴ Survey, 1930, p. 203.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 203-204.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 204.

The attitude of the Wafd toward the Henderson-Mahmud proposals, its refusal to discuss them except "under the Dome of the Chamber", and only after Mahmud Pasha had resigned, plus the new attitude of dislike developed by King Fu'ad toward Mahmud Pasha whom the King thought of as becoming very powerful and personally ambitious, placed Mahmud in an uncompromising position and forced him to resign from the premiership on the second day of October, 1929.³⁷ King Fu'ad accepted Mahmud's resignation and sent for the great mediator 'Adli Yekan (Yeghen) and asked him to form "a temporary administration."³⁸ The acceptance of the King's request by 'Adli Pasha put an end to the dictatorial regime of Mahmud Pasha as the new government started planning to restore constitutional life to Egypt.

On December 21, 1929, the new elections took place in Egypt and the results were exactly as everyone expected them to be--the Wafd won, almost with an exclusive majority. Nahas Pasha was then charged with forming the new government.

In his speech on the occasion of the opening of Parliament on January 11, 1930, King Fu'ad expressed his satisfaction concerning the present era of friendship between his

³⁷ Kohn, op. cit., p. 106.

³⁸ New York Times (October 3, 1929), p. 25:1.

country and England and voiced the hope of entering into negotiations with England soon. The new negotiations, he hoped, would lead to the draft of a new treaty between the two states concerned.³⁹

On the 6th of February, 1930, "the Wafdist government asked and obtained . . . a mandate from the Deputies to open negotiations with the British government on the basis of the Henderson proposals."⁴⁰ Negotiations as scheduled were formally opened in London on March 31, 1930. Both parties were friendly and appeared to be interested in reaching an acceptable solution. In fact there was a great hope that a treaty (between the two concerned parties) would be concluded soon, and thirteen of the sixteen clauses of the Henderson-Mahmud proposals were adopted without much discussion.⁴¹ A disagreement arose, however, between the two negotiating parties over Article Fifteen of the draft which dealt with the Sudan question. This Article read as follows:

While reserving liberty to conclude new conventions in the future modifying the conventions of 1899, the high contracting parties agree that the status of the Sudan shall be that resulting from the said conventions. Accordingly the Governor General shall continue to exercise on the joint behalf of the high contracting parties the powers conferred upon him by the said conventions.⁴²

³⁹Ibid. (January 12, 1930), II, 4:5.

⁴⁰Ibid. (February 7, 1930), p. 4:2.

⁴¹George Glasgow, "The Anglo-Egyptian Breakdown", The Contemporary Review (July, 1930), p. 112.

⁴²New York Times (August 7, 1930), p. 7:4.

Despite the many efforts of Mr. Henderson to satisfy the Egyptian claims in the Sudan, the conference at last adjourned on April 17, 1930, after Nahas had informed the British negotiators that the Egyptian delegation "could not commit themselves to accept the treaty as they did not feel that their requirements in regard to the Sudan had been adequately met."⁴³ At the same time though, Nahas Pasha asked for a copy of the proposed treaty and notes so that he could send them to Cairo for discussion.

On the 5th of May discussions were resumed. Nahas then submitted a modified Egyptian draft treaty with two alternative proposals for the Sudan.⁴⁴ The British negotiators at this point informed Nahas that unless the English draft of the treaty was restored, the negotiations would be broken off. When the two parties refused to compromise, the conference was brought to an end. "Nevertheless," remarks Mr. Kohn, "both parties regarded the rupture as merely temporary, and both Henderson and Mustafa Nahas Pasha gave assurances of undiminished friendship."⁴⁵

⁴³ R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 25.

⁴⁴ (a) "Without prejudice to Egypt's rights and material interests in the Sudan, the High Contracting parties agreed that the question of the Sudan shall be reserved for future negotiations to be conducted between them in the course of the period of one year from the ratification of the present treaty." (b) Alternatively, ". . . reserved for the future negotiations. Meanwhile the de facto position obtaining in the Sudan before 1924 shall be restored." See: Ibid, p.25n.

⁴⁵ Kohn, op. cit., p. 109.

Upon his return to Egypt, Nohas Pasha, who had never forgotten that King Fu'ad had dismissed him from office in June, 1928, and had also dissolved the Parliament for a period of three months to prepare the way for a dictatorship by Muhammad Mahmud Pasha, wanted to put an end to the possible recurrence of such dictatorships. Thus in May, 1930, he submitted to the King a bill "which was intended to safeguard the constitution" by inflicting direct major penalties on any Minister who attempted to suspend the constitutional liberties.⁴⁶

The King, who was dictatorially inclined, not only ignored the request of his Prime Minister that he sign the bill but he went further to voice dissatisfaction with its provisions. This led the Wafdist cabinet to resign "to preserve its dignity."⁴⁷

THE DICTATORSHIP OF ISMA'IL SIDKI PASHA AND THE NEW CONSTITUTION

On June 17, 1930, Nohas submitted the resignation of his cabinet to the King and it was accepted. Isma'il Sidki Pasha, who was then regarded as "a vigorous enemy of the Wafd and of democracy and a great favorite in European

⁴⁶ New York Times (June 17, 1930), p. 6:6.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

financial circles in Egypt,"⁴⁸ was requested by the King to form a new government. Isma'il did not by any means enjoy a majority in the Parliament or have even the support of the palace and the European financiers,⁴⁹ nevertheless he accepted the King's request and on the 20th of June, 1930, he submitted to the King the names of the members of his ministry. They were five Ittihadists and five Liberal Constitutionalists. The King immediately approved of it despite the fact that the Wafdist party which controlled the great majority of the seats in the Parliament did not have any representation in the new government.

The Wafd party, of course, was in opposition to the new regime; in fact, it urged and arranged huge demonstrations throughout the country and publicly declared that,

The stand of the Wafd from the new cabinet could be summarized in that the Wafdist Representatives do not support a cabinet which is unconstitutional, and which does not submit her program to the Parliament for a vote of confidence. [The Wafd] shall fight every cabinet which does not observe those rules and consider it to be rebellious against the constitution and the rights of the [Egyptian] people.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Kohn, op. cit., p. 111.

⁴⁹ As quoted in: Dr. M. H. Haykal, I. Mazini, and M. A. 'Anner, al-Siyasah al-Misriyyah wa linqilab al-dusturi (Cairo, 1929), p. 9.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 10.

To ease the situation the King exercised his prerogative under Article 39 of the Constitution and adjourned Parliament for a period of one month.⁵¹ However, the new cabinet announced directly that "it will always insist that the country should enjoy a constitutional life which is the true sign of cooperation between the government and the nation."⁵² This, of course, did not guarantee that the democratic constitution of 1923 should be protected or that free elections for the Parliament would be held; it simply meant that there would be in Egypt a kind of a constitution and a kind of a parliament which the new dictatorship would cause to be in accord with its regime.

The British authorities appeared to be puzzled by the new developments and did not know exactly what to do. It was clear to them that Sidki's government was not wanted by the bulk of the Egyptian people and that the regime would never be able to accomplish anything acceptable to the majority of the Egyptians, but nevertheless England seemed to have enjoyed the fact that Nahas and his Wafd were out of power. Britain then took the stand that what were going on in Egypt were but domestic happenings and were not of her concern.⁵³

⁵¹New York Times (June 22, 1930), p. 135.

⁵²Haykal, ^{and others} p. 11.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 11-12. A reference is made to The [London] Times (June 23, 1930).

The first change the new government attempted to carry out was to replace the democratic constitution of 1923 by a new constitution which in the future would limit the power which the Wafd party could receive through free and direct elections. Sidki Pasha justified this action by declaring that "Egypt is not Europe" and what suits Europe of political freedom and direct election is not necessarily suitable for Egypt which did not enjoy a long democratic tradition.⁵⁴

After this was accomplished, Sidki's government announced that "a general election was to be held in the Spring of 1931." The purpose behind the announcement was an attempt "to legitimize the regime which they had established de facto in the preceeding year by securing for it a retrospective parliamentary sanction; and it was a forgone conclusion that an election held under the existing conditions would produce a Parliament that would be amenable to King Fu'ad's will."⁵⁵

Sidki, the Prime Minister who strangely enough never officially belonged to a political party, found himself now obliged to form a new party which would support him and his regime in the general elections. The new party Sidki named

⁵⁴ Sidki, p. 43.

⁵⁵ Survey, 1936, pp. 665-666.

Hizb al-Sha'b, or the People's Party. "This political organization did not have a political program of its own and it did not limit itself by a definite plan or a fixed goal."⁵⁶

To assure himself of victory in the new elections, Sidki forcibly suppressed "the Wafd's attempts to conduct an election campaign."⁵⁷ This plus other grievances which the Wafd had held against the government led the Wafd and the Liberal Constitutional parties to boycott elections.⁵⁸ As a result the Sha'b party headed by Premier Sidki and supported by the Ittihad party was able to secure the great majority of the seats in the Parliament.⁵⁹ Following that "Egypt [simply] disappeared from the news"⁶⁰ for a while.

This did not mean that the opposition had given up and that the dictatorial regime of Sidki ruled with harmony and peace. Demonstrations, attacks on government policies, and bitter criticism of Sidki and his regime by the Wafdists and the Liberals continued all through this period. However, nothing of any importance happened in Egypt until the last part of 1933.⁶¹

On September 21, 1933, Sidki Pasha resigned the premiership because of health difficulties. He was succeeded by

⁵⁶Haykal and others, p. 19.

⁵⁷Survey, 1936, op. cit., p. 666.

⁵⁸R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 30.

⁵⁹Survey, 1936, p. 666.

⁶⁰R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 31.

⁶¹Ibid.

'Abdul Fattah Pasha Yahya, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs. The new regime did not bring any change in the government, it simply carried on after the steps of Sidki's dictatorship.⁶²

During this period King Fu'ad became ill and had to isolate himself from politics for a while. This situation gave Zaki Pasha al-Ibrashi, the Director of the Royal Privy Purse, a chance to forge ahead and seek more power for himself. A great rivalry resulted between him and the weak Prime Minister, who immediately sought help from the British Resident in Egypt.⁶³ The nationalist Wafd then came to the aid of Ibrashi Pasha against what they described as "an unwarrantable British interference in Egyptian internal affairs."⁶⁴ This alliance between the Wafd and the palace put Premier Yahya Pasha in a critical and dangerous position which he was not ready or in a position to handle. Thus Yahya Pasha had to resign. His resignation was accepted and he was succeeded by Tawfiq Nasir Pasha.⁶⁵

⁶²Survey, 1936, p. 667.

⁶³Ibid., p. 668.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵F I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, pp. 31-32.

THE RESTORATION OF PARLIAMENTARY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIFE TO EGYPT

Nasim Pasha, who at one time was the leader of the Ittihad party (Palace party), a personal advisor of the King and one of his closest friends, went on record as being opposed to the constitution of 1930 and he refused to co-operate with Sidki's government. Nasim Pasha now became an advocate of the 1923 constitution and parliamentary life for Egypt. Thus when he was invited by the King to form a new cabinet he made his acceptance dependent upon the fulfillment of some conditions. Although those conditions were never made public,⁶⁶ there are indications that they included a request for the abolition of the 1930 Constitution and a return to parliamentary life as provided for by the 1923 Constitution and as it existed prior to Sidki's regime.⁶⁷ The King may not have liked this idea but he had to compromise with Nasim Pasha, who accepted the Premiership officially on November 12, 1934, and on the 30th of the same month King Fu'ad signed a decree abolishing Sidki's Constitution and dissolving the Parliament which supported him. This was considered a great victory to the nationalist Wafd party which now hoped to return to power.

⁶⁶ Survey, 1933, p. 668.

⁶⁷ R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 32.

In June of 1935 the Wafd party issued a manifesto in which it was declared that they would support Nasim Pasha.⁶⁸ This, of course, strengthened the position of Nasim but made him largely dependent on the Wafd's support of his policies.

During this period the Italians invaded Abyssinia. The British who under the unilateral declaration of February, 1922, had reserved for themselves "the security of communications of the British Empire in Egypt," and "the defense of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference direct or indirect,"⁶⁹ decided now that the Italian aggression affected the Egyptian security and necessitated immediate British preparations to meet the Italians if they aggressed against or threatened the British interests in Egypt.

This conflict [reports the survey] affected Egypt closely in several different ways. In the first place her sympathies were engaged in behalf of a fellow African country. In the second place, decisions were required of her as a state with at least the formal attributes of sovereignty, in the face of a war between two of her neighbors. In the third place, she found herself at closer quarters geographically with the belligerents than other countries who, like Egypt herself, were not actually engaged in the struggle. And in the fourth place, the difficulties and dangers of her position were vastly increased by the consequences that now began to flow from her anomalous relation with Great Britain. In fact, these consequences were so grave that they inevitably raised the whole of the Anglo-Egyptian question more urgently than it had ever been raised before.⁷⁰

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Appendix III.

⁷⁰ Survey, 1936, pp. 669-670.

The British, of course, wanted to move some more of their troops to Egypt and decided to use Alexandria as the headquarters of their naval operations in the area, but nevertheless, in response to representations made by Premier Nasim Pasha, the British gave public assurance that no military or naval measures would be taken on Egyptian soil without previous communication and discussion with the Egyptian government.⁷¹

When, despite that, on October 18, 1935, in an election speech at Penzance, Mr. Walter Runciman announced that "the British Mediterranean Fleet had been temporarily transferred from Malta to Alexandria,"⁷² the Egyptian political groups revolted against the government in power and again denounced British imperialism. Mahmud Pasha, the leader of the Liberal Party, in a speech which he delivered at a mass meeting in Cairo, called for the resignation of Nasim's Cabinet, condemned the British infringement on Egypt's sovereignty, and at the same time "he demanded the immediate conclusion of a treaty [with Great Britain] to regularize the position."⁷³ The Wafd at this point also withdrew its support for the Cabinet and demanded an immediate restoration of

⁷¹ Arthur Merton, "Great Britain and Egypt", Contemporary Review (March, 1936), p. 317. (Hereafter cited "GEE", Cont. Review, March, 1936).

⁷² R. I. I. A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 34.

⁷³ Ibid.

the 1923 Constitution. The Egyptian students were moved by the two parties to demonstrate against the standing regime and to ask for the restoration of the 1923 Constitution.

This new development in the Egyptian national struggle brought about the unification of all Egyptian political parties in a "United Front" which had the objective of obtaining "the return of the 1923 Constitution and a treaty on the basis of the 1930 proposals which are considered as still binding to Great Britain."⁷⁴

In any case it could be observed that the Egyptians now for the first time in their modern history started to think that they were really in need of a British alliance. They realized that if it was not for the presence of England in Egypt, the Italians, hungry for building an Italian empire in Africa, could have easily chosen to attack the fertile valley of the Nile instead of the less fruitful Abyssinia. Many of the Egyptian statesmen began to feel sorry for not coming to an agreement with Britain in years passed, and started to look for a new opportunity to improve Anglo-Egyptian relations by concluding a treaty on the basis of the 1930 proposals.

Nahas Pasha now changed his tone and started preaching better understanding and cooperation with Great Britain. In

⁷⁴ Ibid.

a speech which he delivered on September 8, 1935, he said that "there could be no cooperation with Great Britain unless the people of Egypt so willed," and added, "We shall not take part in a coming war unless we can do so on a basis of cooperation between equals."⁷⁵ This was a great indication that the strong nationalist leader and head of the Wafd, the strongest national Egyptian party, was willing to talk peace and accept alliances with Great Britain.

On December 12, 1935, the United Front presented Sir Miles Lampson with a note in which it requested the reopening of negotiations between Britain and Egypt on the basis of the 1930 proposals. This note was signed by the most influential leaders of the country, including Nehas, Mahmud, and Sidki.⁷⁶ Meanwhile, in England Mr. Eden succeeded Sir Samuel Hoare as head of the Foreign Office.

On January 20, 1936, Sir Miles Lampson presented King Fu'ad an answer to the appeal for a treaty. "A settlement of the outstanding questions would be welcome, but the military clauses would first have to be settled. If Egypt agreed, there was no reason why negotiations for the other questions should not follow. The Sudan would have to be included in any settlement."⁷⁷ On February 4, Anthony Eden,

⁷⁵As quoted in R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 34.
A reference is made to London The Times (September 9, 1935).

⁷⁶R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 36.

⁷⁷Merton, "GBE" Cont. Review (March, 1936), p. 314.

the Foreign Secretary, told the House of Commons in an answer to a question which he was asked, that

The High Commissioner was instructed to state that His Majesty's government was prepared to enter forthwith into conversations with the Egyptian government with the object of arriving at an Anglo-Egyptian treaty settlement. With a view to promoting the prospects of a comprehensive settlement, His Majesty's government thought it desirable to begin with the categories which have given most difficulty in 1930. They felt that, if these difficulties were surmounted, the prospects of reaching a settlement would clearly be favorable.⁷⁸

The Egyptian diplomats did not want to lose any opportunity this time, and King Fu'ad immediately asked Nessim Pasha to resign and in cooperation with the British wish of having an Egyptian government representing all parties for negotiation, the King asked Nahas Pasha to form such a cabinet; but when he insisted on having only a Wafdist Cabinet, the King left him and turned to 'Ali Mahir Pasha, the Director of the Royal Cabinet, who succeeded in forming "a neutral Cabinet under himself and a delegation for negotiations under Nahas Pasha consisting of thirteen members, viz. seven Wafdists, the leaders of the Liberal, Shu'ao, and Ittihad parties, two independents and a dissentient Wafdist."⁷⁹

⁷⁸ R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, pp. 36-37.

⁷⁹ Merton, "GSE" Cont. Review, (March, 1936), p. 319.

THE 1936 TREATY

On March 2, 1936, negotiations were opened in Cairo between the United Front and the British government as it was represented by Sir Miles Lampson, the head of the delegation, and included a staff of senior naval and military advisers.⁸⁰

Before any concrete results were reached, on April 25, 1936, King Fu'ad passed away. He was survived by his son Faruq, who was still a minor, and a council of regency had to be appointed. A great difficulty was experienced by all Egyptian parties over the formation of the council of regency. The government of 'Ali Mahir found itself in a difficult situation over the regency question and chose to resign. Thus an election of a Parliament had to be expedited and on the 2nd and 7th of May, 1936, elections were held. The Wafd, as usual, swept the elections and won 166 seats out of 232 in the Chamber and 62 out of 79 elective seats in the Senate.⁸¹ Three days later Nahas Pasha formed an exclusive Wafdist Cabinet and in due time restored the most beloved 1923 Constitution.

Conversations between the British and Egyptian delegations were resumed in Cairo a day after the return of Sir Miles from London as he was called earlier for a short

⁸⁰ R I I A, Great Britain and Egypt, p. 36.

⁸¹ New York Times (May 8, 1936), p.

period of consultation. The Egyptian delegation now appeared to be willing to accept the military clauses and the clause in regard to the Sudan as they were stated in the 1930 draft proposals. The British, on the other hand, agreed to end the system of capitulations. On August 26 a treaty was signed in London⁸² and was ratified by the Egyptian Parliament on November 15 and 18, and by the British Parliament on November 24 and 25, 1936. Thus it became a law binding in both countries.

According to this treaty of alliance⁸³ the military occupation of Egypt was terminated. (Art. 1) British troops, however, were to be kept in the Canal Zone for the purpose of defending the Canal against any aggression from outside and to maintain the security of British communication through that area. "The presence of these forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of Egypt." At the end of a period of twenty years the question of whether the British forces should remain there or not should be determined. However, it should depend on whether the Egyptian army would be in a position to carry the responsibility or not. If any disagreement might arise, the case would be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations (Art. 8). The number of

⁸²Ibid. (August 27, 1936)

⁸³For the complete text of the "Treaty of Alliance Between His Majesty, In Respect of the United Kingdom, and His Majesty the King of Egypt", see Appendix No. IV.

British troops in the Canal Zone "shall not exceed, of the land forces, 10,000, and of the air forces, 400 pilots, together with necessary auxiliary personnel, e.g. clerks, artisans and labourers." (Annex to Art. 8).

The King of England is to be represented in Egypt by an ambassador who will be accorded precedence over the representatives of other countries. Likewise, the King of Egypt shall be represented at the Court of St. James by an ambassador who will be duly accredited. (Art. 2).

The United Kingdom agreed to sponsor the entry of Egypt into the League of Nations as a complete sovereign and independent state. (Art. 3). The two contracting parties also agreed "not to adopt in relations to foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance, nor to conclude political treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present treaty." (Art. 5).

The two parties further agreed to come to the aid of each other in case of war with a third party; Britain agreed to defend Egypt while Egypt promised to place under the British disposal all communication facilities available. (Art. 7).

The Egyptian immigration into the Sudan was not to be restricted "except for reasons of public order and health" (Art. 11, Sec. 4). Egyptian troops are to be returned to the Sudan, but are to be together with the English troops under the disposal of the Governor General (Art. 11, Sec. 3).

The signing of this treaty of alliance started a new era of relations between England and Egypt. Nevertheless, it did not take the Egyptian nationalists long to discover that this treaty of 1936 was not exactly what they wanted. The day when the fear of an Italian invasion ended, the respect of the Egyptian nationalists for this treaty ended and a new era of nationalist struggle began.

Chapter VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

In summary it could be said that the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798 drew Egypt once more into international diplomatic affairs. The strategic importance of this country became very clear to European nations, especially Great Britain and France. Another result of the Napoleonic wars was the coming of Muhammad 'Ali to Egypt. This uneducated Turkish officer was able in the course of time to distinguish himself as a military genius and an accomplished statesman. Through diplomacy and otherwise, Muhammad 'Ali became the Pasha of Egypt and was successful in securing in that country a hereditary state to be ruled by his heirs.

Muhammad 'Ali was also a reformer. He labored hard to industrialize, westernize, and educate Egypt. For that purpose he sought the help of French scholars whom he hired to work in Egypt, and he sent Egyptian students to be educated in France. Those educated and westernized Egyptians had a tremendous influence in bringing western ideas and ideologies to the Egyptian society, but their influence did not extend to the roots of that society.

The second important ruler to govern and influence Egypt was the grandson of Muhammad 'Ali, Khedive Isma'il, who was educated in the West and was very interested in westernizing and developing the Egyptian society. He started

where his grandfather left off and led an extensive reform movement in many fields. He was very extravagant, however, and was finally forced to sell Egypt's grand share of the Suez Canal to Disraeli, the English Prime Minister, and to borrow huge sums of money from European banks. When he was unable to pay his debts, Britain and France, who were greatly interested in Egypt, particularly since the digging of the Suez Canal, forced two advisors on him; an Englishman who would control the finances of Egypt and a Frenchman who would supervise the interior affairs of the country.

The extravagance and corruption of Isma'il's regime and the interference of England and France in Egyptian affairs, followed by the advent of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, well-known propagandist and religious leader, prompted the Egyptian intelligensia to revolt and to demand the observation of their rights and the integrity of their country. Their revolt was used by the British as an excuse to justify their occupation of Egypt in 1882.

The presence of English troops in Egypt and the increase of the number of intellectuals who had studied in Europe intensified the Anglo-Egyptian relations. The Egyptians, by this time, were developing a sense of belonging to each other and to Egypt, becoming nationalistic, and beginning to demand "Egypt for the Egyptians."

With the turn of the century the Japanese were victorious in their war with the Russians. This had a great psychological effect on the Egyptians who began to think that

the Europeans were not the superior race they claimed to be. The Europeans, just as any other people, could be defeated and conquered.

Prior to World War I, Egyptian nationalism was limited to the intellectuals of the country, but the outbreak of war changed this. Egypt was declared to be a protectorate and an English puppet government was established. During the war Colonial troops were brought into Egypt. The presence of such troops injured the Egyptians pride and they were appalled by the troops crude conduct. For the first time the fellahin in the small villages were aware of the occupation forces. Able men were taken from the farms to work for the British forces, their animals were also taken away to be used by the military force and only the old, the unfit, and the women were left on the land. The land was left uncultivated causing hunger to strike in the succeeding years.

During the war the British paid high prices for the available food in the Egyptian markets, making high profits for the great landlords and merchants but bringing only misery and hunger to the fellahin and little people of the cities. Disease broke out, adding to the hardships.

Also, during the war the British made many promises regarding Egypt, declaring more than once that they were only in that country to protect its sovereignty and independence. The Egyptians, believing the British statements and the concepts of "self-determination" as stated by President

Woodrow Wilson of the United States, cooperated with the British and waited for the peace settlement, expecting that, under pressure from the Americans and other liberal groups, Britains first act would be to free Egypt.

However, when the war was concluded, the Egyptians found that England kept her forces there and showed no intention of recognizing Egyptian sovereignty. The Egyptian leaders, led by Zoghloul Pasha, appealed to England and to the world for justice but receiving no sympathy or assistance, they revolted.

The intellectual nationalists at this time found support from the Egyptian felleh who had learned to dislike imperialism during the war. The Egyptian nationalist leaders could rightly claim at this time that they represented and spoke for the entire Egyptian nation.

The British authorities exiled Zoghloul and his colleagues but could not pacify the Egyptians and, thus, in 1922 they found themselves obliged to compromise with the nationalists by offering to replace the Occupation regime by a treaty. Nothing acceptable to the Egyptians was achieved so Great Britain issued the February 1922 Declaration in which she recognized the sovereignty and independence of Egypt but with four reservations: (1) The protection of British communications in Egypt, (2) the defense of Egypt against any foreign aggression or interference, (3) the protection of foreigners and foreign interests in Egypt, (4) the Sudan.

The Wafd, the party led by Zaghloul, denounced the declaration, but nevertheless it was accepted by Sultan Fu'ad whose title was changed at this time to King. A democratic constitution was written, Zaghloul and other nationalist leaders were released from exile and allowed to return to Egypt. Elections then were held and the Wafd came into power.

This period witnessed the birth and development of political parties in Egypt. The most important among these were the Wafd, largest and most highly organized, the Liberal Constitutional party, the second largest, and the Fatherland party which was the extremist and the oldest party. These three parties included in their programs the demand for an absolute independence for Egypt.

The Wafd party, headed by Zaghloul Pasha continued its struggle for absolute independence, but in 1924 it chose to resign rather than to accept the harsh ultimatum issued by General Allenby, then the Resident in Egypt, following the assassination of Sir Lee Stack, the Governor of the Sudan and the Cirdar of the Egyptian army in Cairo.

The government which succeeded the Wafd in office accepted the ultimatum and dissolved the Egyptian Parliament containing a Wafdist majority. In the succeeding ten years the Wafd then had to content with British imperialism on one hand and King Fu'ad's autocracy on the other.


During this period Sa'd Zaghloul died and Ismael Pasha replaced him as the leader of the Wafd. The death of Zaghloul weakened the Wafd and affected the religious groups who began

to think of new ways and methods to solve the Egyptian problems than those followed by the Wafd and other political parties.

King Fu'ad desired to rule Egypt as an absolute monarch. Thus he urged one of his friends, Nasin Pasha to form a political party supporting a monarchy. The latter complied, forming the Unionist Party, often referred to as the King's party. The King's purpose in this was to use this party as a means of ruling over the country personally as he wished. The King's efforts in this direction were at first strongly opposed by the Wafd party as well as by other liberal groups. In the decade prior to 1936, Egypt was ruled by three dictatorships with a period of intermission in which the Wafd party, which was always able to control the majority of votes in Parliament, was allowed to rule.

The greatest among those dictatorships was that of Isma'il Sidki Pasha (1930-1933). During this period Sidki Pasha dissolved the democratic Parliament and replaced it with a sham. Further, he attempted unsuccessfully to abolish the democratic constitution of 1923 and replace it with one he had written.

The international troubles of the middle thirties and the fear resulting from the Italian invasion of Ethiopia influenced the nationalists to accept a treaty with Great Britain in 1936. This treaty did not achieve for Egypt the independence they had desired, but it was a matter of expediency, not meant to last.



In conclusion, the student of Egyptian history cannot help but observe that Egyptian nationalism has its roots in the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt and the coming of Muhammad 'Ali. Between that time and 1918, the nationalistic ideas were limited to the intellectuals of the country who had been abroad in Europe or had had the chance to study European writings and philosophies.

After the war, however, the Egyptian nationalists were the common people of the country (fellahin), with the intellectuals or their sons as leaders. This fact distinguished Egyptian from European nationalism of the 19th century which was manipulated by the middle class. The explanation of this may be found in the fact that during the period 1914-1936 there was no middle class in Egypt in the sense understood in the West, but nevertheless the Egyptian fellah was just as exposed to the tyrannical acts of the people above him and the exploitation of foreigners in the country as much, if not more, than the middle classes of Europe during the 19th century.

Such observers could also not fail to notice that Egyptian nationalism had stemmed from two facts, first the corrupted social and economic systems of the country, as the wealth of Egypt, including the land, was and still is concentrated in the hands of a small group of people, namely the upper class in Egypt, and second, from the ill-treatment which the fellahin had received from the English troops and rulers who were in Egypt. The British were also disliked on

the basis of their religion, foreign language, and the fact that they were the product of a different stock of people.

The leaders of Egyptian nationalism were men who were either educated in the West or had had some good experiences along western lines. Many of them also were trained in law. This helped Egyptian nationalists to organize themselves in political parties and systems. The Wafd party, for example, had an organization almost in every town or village in the country, no matter how small. The Wafd party during the period from 1914-1936 always tried to get into power in a legal and constitutional manner and not through demagoguery. The Wafd also were the champions and main supporters of a constitution which guaranteed democratic life and proceedings for Egypt.

The Egyptian nationalist ultimate goal was not only the achievement of complete independence for Egypt but insisted on the existence of a democratic and constitutional regime as well. They wanted to see their country advancing and developing on European lines and techniques. This was because they were able to see that in order to be strong and able to defend themselves against any foreign aggressor they must develop scientifically.

The acceptance of the 1936 treaty was only a matter of necessity and expediency. Any historian who has had the opportunity of observing the developments which led to the conclusion of the said treaty could easily have predicted that this

treaty was not exactly what the Egyptians desired. From the beginning until this very date the Egyptian nationalists have been demanding complete independence for Egypt.

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APPENDIX NO. I

Differentiation between two reigns¹

	At the end of Sa'id's reign	At the end of Isma'il's reign
Number of cultivated faddans	4,052,000	5,425,000
Imports	E.E. 1,991,000	E.E. 5,410,000
Exports	E.E. 4,454,000	E.E. 13,810,000
Income	E.E. 4,837,000	E.E. 8,562,000
National debt	E.E. 3,300,000	E.E. 98,540,000
Population	4,833,000	5,518,000
Schools	185	4,817
Railroad tracks (miles)	275	1,185
Telegraph lines (miles)	630	5,820
Canals (miles)		8,400

¹ Taken from Muhammed Rif'aat, Tarikhu Misr al-Siyasi fi al-Azminah al-Hadithah (Cairo, 1932), Appendix II, 235.

APPENDIX NO. II

Program of the National Party of Egypt

1. The National party of Egypt accept the existing relations of Egypt with the Porte as the basis of their movement. That is to say: They acknowledge the Sultan Abd el Hamid Khan as their Suzerain and Lord, and as actual Caliph or Head of the Mussulman religion; nor do they propose, while his empire stands, to alter this relationship. They admit the right of the Porte to the tribute fixed by law, and to military assistance in case of foreign war. At the same time, they are firmly determined to defend their national rights and privileges, and to oppose, by every means in their power, the attempts of those who would reduce Egypt again to the condition of a Turkish Pashalik. They trust in the protecting Powers of Europe, and especially in England, to continue their guarantee of Egypt's administrative independence.
2. The National party express their loyal allegiance to the person of the reigning Khedive. They will continue to support Mohammed Tawfiq's authority as long as he shall rule in accordance with justice and the law, and in fulfillment of his promises made to the people of Egypt in September, 1881. They declare, however, their intention to permit no renewal of that despotic reign of injustice which Egypt has so often witnessed, and to insist upon the exact execution of his promise of Parliamentary government and of giving the country freedom. They invite His Highness, Mohammed Tawfiq to act honestly by them in these matters, promising him their cordial help; but they warn him against listening to those who would persuade him to continue his despotic power, to betray their national rights, or to elude his promises.
3. The National party fully recognize the services rendered to Egypt by the Governments of England and France, and they are aware that all freedom and justice they have obtained in the past has been due to them. For this they tender them their thanks. They recognize the European Control as a necessity of their financial position, and the present continuance of it as the best guarantee of their prosperity. They declare their entire acceptance of the foreign debt as a matter of (national honour)--this, although they know that it was incurred, not for Egypt's benefit, but in the private interests of a dishonest and irresponsible ruler--and they are ready to assist the Controllers in discharging the full

national obligations. They look, nevertheless, upon the existing order of things as in its nature temporary, and avow it as their hope gradually to redeem the country out of the hands of its creditors. Their object is, some day to see Egypt entirely in Egyptian hands. Also they are not blind to the imperfections of the Control, which they are ready to point out. They know that many abuses are committed by those employed by it, whether Europeans or others. They see some of these incapable, others dishonest, others too highly paid. They knew that many offices, now held by strangers, would be better discharged by Egyptians, and at a fifth of the cost; and they believe there is still much waste and much injustice. They cannot understand that Europeans living in the land should remain forever exempt from the general taxation, or from obedience to the general law. The National party does not, however, propose to remedy these evils by any violent action; only it would protest against their unchecked continuance. They would have the Governments of France and England consider that, having taken the control of their finances out of the hands of the Egyptians, they are responsible for their prosperity, and are bound to see that efficient and honest persons only are employed by them.

4. The National party disclaim all connection with those who, in the interest of powers jealous of Egypt's independence, seek to trouble the peace of the country--and there are many such--or with those who find their private advantage in disturbance. At the same time they are aware that a merely passive attitude will not secure them liberty in a land which is still ruled by a class to whom liberty is hateful. The silence of the people made Isma'il Pasha's rule possible in Egypt, and silence now would leave their hope of political liberty unfulfilled. The Egyptians have learned in the last few years what freedom means, and they are resolved to complete their national education. This they look to find in the Parliament just assembling, in a fair measure of freedom for the press and in the general growth of knowledge among all classes of the people. They know, however, that none of these means of education can be secured except by the firm attitude of the national leaders. The Egyptian Parliament may be cajoled or frightened into silence, as at Constantinople; the press may be used as an instrument against them, and the sources of instruction cut off. It is for this reason and for no other that the National party has confided its interests at the present time to the army, believing them to be the only power in the country able and willing to protect its growing liberties. It is not, however in the plans of the party that this state of things shall continue; and as soon as the people shall have established their rights securely the army will abandon its present political attitude. In this the military leaders fully

concur. They trust that on the assembling of the Parliament their further interference in affairs of State may be unnecessary. But for the present they will continue to perform their duty as the armed guardians of the unarmed people. Such being their position, they hold it imperative that their force should be maintained efficient, and their complement made up to the full number of 18,000 men. They trust that the European Control will keep this necessity in view when considering the army estimates.

5. The National party of Egypt is a political, not a religious party. It includes within its ranks men of various races and various creeds. It is principally Mohammedan, because nine-tenths of the Egyptians are Mohammedans; but it has the support of the Moors, of the Coptic Christians, of the Jews, and others who cultivate the soil and speak the language of Egypt. Between these it makes no distinction whatever, holding all men to be brothers and to have equal rights, both political and before the law. This principle is accepted by all the chief Sheykhs of the Azhar who support the party, holding the true law of Islam to forbid religious hatred and religious disabilities. With Europeans resident in Egypt the National party has no quarrel, either as Christians or as strangers, so long as these shall live conformably with the laws and bear their share of the burdens of the State.

6. Finally, the general end of the National party is the intellectual and moral regeneration of the country by a better observance of the law, by increased education, and by political liberty, which they hold to be the life of the people. They trust in the sympathy of those of the nations of Europe which enjoy the blessing of self-government to aid Egypt in gaining for itself that blessing; but they are aware that no nation ever yet achieved liberty except by its own endeavours; and they are resolved to stand firm in the position they have won, trusting to God's help if all other be denied them.

December 18, 1881.

This is the Programme of the National Party of Egypt, as forwarded by Mr. Blunt to Mr. Gladstone, then Prime Minister of Great Britain, Dec. 20th, 1881.

APPENDIX III

DECLARATION TO EGYPT

WHEREAS His Majesty's Government, in accordance with their declared intentions, desire forthwith to recognize Egypt as an independent sovereign State, and

WHEREAS the relations between His Majesty's Government and Egypt are of vital interest to the British Empire;

The following principles are hereby declared:-

1. The British Protectorate over Egypt is terminated, and Egypt is declared to be an independent sovereign State.

2. So soon as the Government of His Highness shall pass an Act of Indemnity with application to all inhabitants of Egypt, Martial Law as proclaimed on November 2, 1914, shall be withdrawn.

3. The following matters are absolutely reserved to the discretion of His Majesty's Government until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto between His Majesty's Government and the Government of Egypt.

- (a) The security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt;
- (b) The defense of Egypt against all foreign aggression or interference, direct or indirect;
- (c) The protection of foreign interests in Egypt and the protection of minorities;
- (d) The Sudan.

Pending the conclusion of such agreement the status quo in all these matters shall remain intact.

28th February, 1922.

APPENDIX IV.

TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY, IN RESPECT OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM, AND HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF EGYPT

London, August 26, 1936

Art. 1. The military occupation of Egypt by the forces of His Majesty the King and Emperor is terminated.

Art. 2. His Majesty the King and Emperor will henceforth be represented at the Court of His Majesty the King of Egypt and His Majesty the King of Egypt will be represented at the Court of St. James's by Ambassadors duly accredited.

Art. 3. Egypt intends to apply for membership to the League of Nations. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, recognising Egypt as a sovereign independent State, will support any request for admission which the Egyptian Government may present in the conditions prescribed by Article 1 of the Covenant.

Art. 4. An alliance is established between the High Contracting Parties with a view to consolidating their friendship, their cordial understanding and their good relations.

Art. 5. Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to adopt in relation to foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance, nor to conclude political treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present treaty.

Art. 6. Should any dispute with a third State produce a situation which involves a risk of a rupture with that State, the High Contracting Parties will consult each other with a view to the settlement of the said dispute by peaceful means, in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of any other international obligations which may be applicable to the case.

Art. 7. Should, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 6 above, either of the High Contracting Parties become engaged in war, the other High Contracting Party will, subject always to the provisions of Article 10 below, immediately come to his aid in the capacity of an ally.

The aid of His Majesty the King of Egypt in the event of war, imminent menace of war or apprehended international emergency will consist in furnishing to His Majesty The King and Emperor on Egyptian territory, in accordance with the Egyptian system of administration and legislation, all the facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of his ports, aerodromes and means of communication. It will accordingly be for the Egyptian Government to take all the administrative and legislative measures, including the establishment of martial law and an effective censorship, necessary to render these facilities and assistance effective.

Art. 8. In view of the fact that the Suez Canal, whilst being an integral part of Egypt, is a universal means of communication as also an essential means of communication between the different parts of the British Empire, His Majesty the King of Egypt, until such time as the High Contracting Parties agree that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of navigation of the Canal, authorises His Majesty The King and Emperor to station forces in Egyptian territory in the vicinity of the Canal, in the zone specified in the Annex to this Article, with a view to ensuring in co-operation with the Egyptian forces the defence of the Canal. The detailed arrangements for the carrying into effect of this Article are contained in the Annex hereto. The presence of these forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of Egypt.

It is understood that at the end of the period of twenty years specified in Article 16 the question whether the presence of British forces is no longer necessary owing to the fact that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of navigation of the Canal may, if the High Contracting Parties do not agree thereon, be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for decision in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant in force at the time of signature of the present treaty or to such other person or body of persons for decision in accordance with such other procedure as the High Contracting Parties may agree.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE 8

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 7, the numbers of the forces of His Majesty The King and Emperor to be maintained in the vicinity of the Canal shall not exceed, of the land forces, 10,000, and of the air forces, 400 pilots, together with the necessary ancillary personnel for administrative and technical duties. These numbers do not include civilian personnel, e.g. clerks, artisans and labourers.

2. The British forces to be maintained in the vicinity of the Canal will be distributed (a) as regards the land forces, in Moascar and the Geneifa area on the south-west side of the Great Bitter Lake, and (b) as regards the air forces, within 5 miles of the Port Said-Suez railway from Kantara in the north to the junction of the railway Suez-Cairo and Suez-Ismailia in the south, together with an extension along the Ismailia-Cairo railway to include the Royal Air Force Station at Abu Sueir and its satellite landing grounds; together with areas suitable for air firing and bombing ranges, which may have to be placed east of the Canal.

3. In the localities specified above there shall be provided for the British land and air forces of the numbers specified in paragraph 1 above, including 4,000 civilian personnel (but less 2,000 of the land forces, 700 of the air forces and 450 civilian personnel for whom accommodation already exists), the necessary lands and durable barrack and technical accommodation, including an emergency water supply. The lands, accommodation and water supply shall be suitable according to modern standards. In addition, amenities such as are reasonable, having regard to the character of these localities will be provided by the planting of trees and the provision of gardens, playing fields, etc., for the troops, and a site for the erection of a convalescent camp on the Mediterranean coast.

4. The Egyptian Government will make available the lands and construct the accommodation, water supplies, amenities and convalescent camp, referred to in the preceding paragraph as being necessary over and above the accommodation already existing in these localities, at its own expense, but His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will contribute (1) the actual sum spent by the Egyptian Government before 1914 on the construction of new barracks as alternative accommodation to the Kasr-el-Nil Barracks in Cairo, and (2) the cost of one-fourth of the barrack and technical accommodation for the land forces. The first of these sums shall be paid at the time specified in paragraph 8 below for the withdrawal of the British forces from Cairo and the second at the time for the withdrawal of the British forces from Alexandria under paragraph 18 below. The Egyptian Government may charge a fair rental for the residential accommodation provided for the civilian personnel. The amount of the rent will be agreed between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government.

5. The two Governments will each appoint, immediately the present treaty comes into force, two or more persons who shall together form a committee to whom all questions relating to the execution of these works from the time of their commencement to the time of their completion shall be entrusted. Proposals for, or outlines of, plans and specifications put forward by the representatives of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will be accepted, provided they are reasonable and do not fall outside the scope of the obligations of the Egyptian Government under paragraph 4. The plans and specifications of each of the works to be undertaken by the Egyptian Government shall be approved by the representatives of both Governments on this committee before the work is begun. Any member of this committee,

as well as the Commanders of the British forces or their representatives, shall have the right to examine the works at all stages of their construction, and the United Kingdom members of the committee may make suggestions as regards the manner in which the work is carried out. The United Kingdom members shall also have the right to make at any time, while the work is in progress, proposals for modifications or alterations in the plans and specifications. Effect shall be given to suggestions and proposals by the United Kingdom members, subject to the condition that they are reasonable and do not fall outside the scope of the obligations of the Egyptian Government under paragraph 4. In the case of machinery and other stores, where standardization of type is important, it is agreed that stores of the standard type in general use by the British forces will be obtained and installed. It is, of course, understood that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom may, when the barracks and accommodation are being used by the British forces, make at their own expense improvements or alterations thereto and construct new buildings in the areas specified in paragraph 2 above.

6. In pursuance of their programme for the development of road and railway communications in Egypt, and in order to bring the means of communications in Egypt up to modern strategic requirements, the Egyptian Government will construct and maintain the following roads, bridges and railways:--

(A)--Roads

(i) Ismailia-Alexandria, via Tel-el-Kebir, Zagazig, Zifta, Tanta, Kafr-el-Zayat, Damanhour.

(ii) Ismailia-Cairo, via Tel-el-Kebir and thence continuing along the Sweet Water Canal to Heliopolis.

(iii) Port Said-Ismailia-Suez.

(iv) A link between the south end of the Great Bitter Lake and the Cairo-Suez road about 15 miles west of Suez.

In order to bring them up to the general standard of good-class roads for general traffic, these roads will be 20 feet wide, have by-passes round villages, etc., and be made of such material as to be permanently utilisable for military purposes, and will be constructed in the above order of importance. They will comply with the technical specifications set out below which are the ordinary specifications for a good-class road for general traffic.

Bridges and roads shall be capable of carrying a double line of continuous columns of either heavy four-wheeled mechanical transport, six-wheeled mechanical



transport or medium tanks. With regard to four-wheeled vehicles, the distance between the front axle of one vehicle and the rear axle of the vehicle next ahead shall be calculated at 20 feet, the load on each rear axle to be 14 tons, on each front axle to be 6 tons and the distance between axles 18 feet. With regard to six-wheeled vehicles, the distance between the front axle of one vehicle and the rear axle of that next ahead shall be calculated to be 20 feet, between rear axle and middle axle to be 4 feet and between middle axle and front axle 13 feet; the load on each rear and middle axle to be 8.1 tons and on each front axle to be 4 tons. Tanks shall be calculated for as weighing 19.25 tons, to be 25 feet over all in length and to have a distance of 3 feet between the front of one tank and the rear of the next ahead; the load of 19.25 tons to be carried by tracks which have a bearing of 13 feet upon the road or bridge.

(B)--Railways

(i) Railway facilities in the Canal Zone will be increased and improved to meet the needs of the increased garrison in the zone and to provide facilities for rapid entrainment of personnel, guns, vehicles and stores according to the requirements of a modern army. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are hereby authorised to make at their own expense such subsequent additions and modifications to these railway facilities as the future requirements of the British forces may demand. Where such additions and modifications affect railway lines used for general traffic, the permission of the Egyptian Government must be obtained.

(ii) The line between Zagazig and Tanta will be doubled.


(iii) The Alexandria-Mersa Matruh line will be improved and made permanent.

7. In addition to the roads specified in paragraph 6(A) above, and for the same purposes, the Egyptian Government will construct and maintain the following roads:--

- (i) Cairo south along the Nile to Kena and Kus;
- (ii) Kus to Kosseir;
- (iii) Kena to Hurghada.

These roads and the bridges thereon will be constructed to satisfy the same standards as those specified in paragraph 6 above.

It may not be possible for the construction of the roads referred to in this paragraph to be undertaken at the same time as the roads referred to in paragraph 6, but they will be constructed as soon as possible.



8. When, to the satisfaction of both the High Contracting Parties, the accommodation referred to in paragraph 4 is ready (accommodation for the forces retained temporarily at Alexandria in accordance with paragraph 18 below not being included) and the works referred to in paragraph 6 above (other than the railways referred to in (ii) and (iii) of part (B) of that paragraph) have been completed, then the British forces in parts of Egypt other than the areas in the Canal Zone specified in paragraph 2 above and except for those maintained temporarily at Alexandria, will withdraw and the lands, barracks, aircraft landing grounds, seaplane anchorages and accommodation occupied by them will be vacated and, save in so far as they may belong to private persons, be handed over to the Egyptian Government.

9. Any difference of opinion between the two Governments relating to the execution of paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 above will be submitted to the decision of an Arbitral Board, composed of three members, the two Governments nominating each a member and the third being nominated by the two governments in common agreement. The decision of the Board shall be final.

10. In order to ensure the proper training of British troops, it is agreed that the area defined below will be available for the training of British forces: (a) and (b) at all times of the year, and (c) during February and March for annual manoeuvres:--

(a) West of the Canal: From Kantara in the north to the Suez-Cairo railway (inclusive) in the south and as far as longitude 31 degrees 30 minutes east, exclusive of all cultivation;

(b) East of the Canal as required;

(c) A continuation of (a) as far south as latitude 29 degrees 52 minutes north, thence south-east to the junction of latitude 29 degrees 30 minutes north and longitude 31 degrees 44 minutes east and from that point eastwards along latitude 29 degrees 30 minutes north.

The areas of the localities referred to above are included in the map (scale 1:500,000) which is annexed to the present Treaty.

11. Unless the two Governments agree to the contrary, the Egyptian Government will prohibit the passage of aircraft over the territories situated on either side of the Suez Canal and within 20 kilometres of it, except for the purpose of passage from east to west or vice versa by means of a corridor 10 kilometres wide at Kantara. This prohibition will not, however, apply to the forces of the High Contracting Parties or to genuinely Egyptian air organisations or to air organisations genuinely belonging to any part of the British Commonwealth

of Nations operating under the authority of the Egyptian Government.

12. The Egyptian Government will provide when necessary reasonable means of communication and access to and from the localities where the British forces are situated and will also accord facilities at Port Said and Suez for the landing and storage of material and supplies for the British forces, including the maintenance of a small detachment of the British forces in these ports to handle and guard this material and these supplies in transit.

13. In view of the fact that the speed and range of modern aircraft necessitate the use of wide areas for the efficient training of air forces, the Egyptian Government will accord permission to the British air forces to fly wherever they consider it necessary for the purpose of training. Reciprocal treatment will be accorded to Egyptian air forces in British territories.

14. In view of the fact that the safety of flying is dependent upon provision of a large number of places where aircraft can alight, the Egyptian Government will secure the maintenance and constant availability of adequate landing grounds and seaplane anchorages in Egyptian territory and waters. The Egyptian Government will accede to any request from the British air forces for such additional landing grounds and seaplane anchorages as experience may show to be necessary to make the number adequate for allied requirements.

15. The Egyptian Government will accord permission for the British air forces to use the said landing grounds and seaplane anchorages, and in the case of certain of them to send stocks of fuel and stores thereto, to be kept in sheds to be erected thereon for this purpose, and in case of urgency to undertake such work as may be necessary for the safety of aircraft.

16. The Egyptian Government will give all necessary facilities for the passage of the personnel of the British forces, aircraft and stores to and from the said landing grounds and seaplane anchorages. Similar facilities will be afforded to the personnel, aircraft and stores of the Egyptian forces at the air bases of the British forces.

17. The British military authorities shall be at liberty to request permission from the Egyptian Government to send parties of officers in civilian clothes to the Western Desert to study the ground and draw up tactical schemes. This permission shall not be unreasonably withheld.

18. His Majesty the King of Egypt authorises His Majesty The King and Emperor to maintain units of his forces at or near Alexandria for a period not exceeding eight years from the date of the coming into force of

the present treaty, this being the approximate period considered necessary by the two High Contracting Parties--

(a) For the final completion of the barrack accommodation in the Canal Zone:

(b) For the improvement of the roads--

(i) Cairo-Suez;

(ii) Cairo-Alexandria via Giza and the desert;

(iii) Alexandria-Mersa Matruh;

so as to bring them up to the standard specified in part (A) of paragraph 6;

(c) The improvement of the railway facilities between Ismailia and Alexandria, and Alexandria and Mersa Matruh referred to in (ii) and (iii) of part (B) of paragraph 6.

The Egyptian Government will complete the work specified in (a), (b) and (c) above before the expiry of the period of eight years aforesaid. The roads and railway facilities mentioned above will, of course, be maintained by the Egyptian Government.

19. The British forces in or near Cairo shall, until the time for withdrawal under paragraph 8 above, and the British forces in or near Alexandria until the expiry of the time specified in paragraph 18 above, continue to enjoy the same facilities as at present.

Art. 9. The immunities and privileges in jurisdictional and fiscal matters to be enjoyed by the forces of His Majesty The King and Emperor who are in Egypt in accordance with the provisions of the present treaty will be determined in a separate convention to be concluded between the Egyptian Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

Art. 10. Nothing in the present treaty is intended to or shall in any way prejudice the rights and obligations which devolve, or may devolve, upon either of the High Contracting Parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed at Paris the 27th August, 1928.

Art. 11. (1) While reserving liberty to conclude new conventions in future, modifying the agreements of the 19th January and the 10th July, 1899, the High Contracting Parties agree that the administration of the Sudan shall continue to be that resulting from the said agreements. The Governor-General shall continue to exercise on the joint behalf of the High Contracting Parties the powers conferred upon him by the said agreements.

The High Contracting Parties agree that the primary aim of their administration in the Sudan must be the welfare of the Sudanese.

Nothing in this article prejudices the question of sovereignty over the Sudan.

(2) Appointments and promotions of officials in the Sudan will in consequence remain vested in the Governor-General, who, in making new appointments to posts for which qualified Sudanese are not available, will select suitable candidates of British and Egyptian nationality.

(3) In addition to Sudanese troops, both British and Egyptian troops shall be placed at the disposal of the Governor-General for the defence of the Sudan.

(4) Egyptian immigration into the Sudan shall be unrestricted except for reasons of public order and health.

(5) There shall be no discrimination in the Sudan between British subjects and Egyptian nationals in matters of commerce, immigration or the possession of property.

(6) The High Contracting Parties are agreed on the provisions set out in the Annex to this Article as regards the method by which international conventions are to be made applicable to the Sudan.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE 11

1. Unless and until the High Contracting Parties agree to the contrary in application of paragraph 1 of this Article, the general principle for the future shall be that international conventions shall only become applicable to the Sudan by the joint action of the Governments of the United Kingdom and of Egypt, and that such joint action shall similarly also be required if it is desired to terminate the participation of the Sudan in an international convention which already applies to this territory.

2. Conventions to which it will be desired that the Sudan should be a party will generally be conventions of a technical or humanitarian character. Such conventions almost invariably contain a provision for subsequent accession, and in such cases this method of making the convention applicable to the Sudan will be adopted. Accession will be effected by a joint instrument, signed on behalf of Egypt and the United Kingdom respectively by two persons duly authorised for the purpose. The method of depositing the instruments of accession will be the subject of agreement in each case between the two Governments. In the event of its being desired to apply to the Sudan a convention which does not contain an accession clause, the method by which this should be effected will be the subject of consultation and agreement between the two Governments.

3. If the Sudan is already a party to a convention, and it is desired to terminate the participation of the Sudan therein, the necessary notice of termination will be given jointly by the United Kingdom and by Egypt.

4. It is understood that the participation of the Sudan in a convention and the termination of such participation can only be effected by joint action specifically taken in respect of the Sudan, and does not follow merely from the fact that the United Kingdom and Egypt are both parties to a convention or have both denounced a convention.

5. At international conferences where such conventions are negotiated, the Egyptian and the United Kingdom delegates would naturally keep in touch with a view to any action which they may agree to be desirable in the interests of the Sudan.

Art. 12. His Majesty The King and Emperor recognises that the responsibility for the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt devolves exclusively upon the Egyptian Government, who will ensure the fulfillment of their obligations in this respect.

Art. 13. His Majesty The King and Emperor recognises that the capitulatory regime now existing in Egypt is no longer in accordance with the spirit of the times and with the present state of Egypt.

His Majesty the King of Egypt desires the abolition of this regime without delay.

Both High Contracting Parties are agreed upon the arrangements with regard to this matter as set forth in the Annex to this Article.

ANNEX TO ARTICLE 13

1. It is the object of the arrangements set out in this Annex:--

(i) To bring about speedily the abolition of the Capitulations in Egypt with the disappearance of the existing restrictions on Egyptian sovereignty in the matter of the application of Egyptian legislation (including financial legislation) to foreigners as its necessary consequence;

(ii) To institute a transitional regime for a reasonable and not unduly prolonged period to be fixed during which the Mixed Tribunals will remain and will, in addition to their present judicial jurisdiction, exercise the jurisdiction at present vested in the Consular Courts. At the end of this transitional period the Egyptian Government will be free to dispense with the Mixed Tribunals.

2. As a first step, the Egyptian Government will approach the Capitulatory Powers as soon as possible with a view to a) the removal of all restrictions on the application of Egyptian legislation to foreigners, and b, the institution of a transitional regime for the Mixed Tribunals as provided in paragraph 1 (ii) above.

3. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, as the Government of a Capitulatory Power and as an ally of Egypt, are in no way opposed to the arrangements referred to in the preceding paragraph and will collaborate actively with the Egyptian Government in giving effect to them by using all their influence with the Powers exercising capitulatory rights in Egypt.

4. It is understood that in the event of its being found impossible to bring into effect the arrangements referred to in paragraph 2, the Egyptian Government retains its full rights unimpaired with regard to the capitulatory regime, including the Mixed Tribunals.

5. It is understood that paragraph 2 (a) involves not merely that the assent of the Capitulatory Powers will be no longer necessary for the application of any Egyptian legislation to their nationals, but also that the present legislative functions of the Mixed Tribunals as regards the application of Egyptian legislation to foreigners will terminate. It would follow from this that the Mixed Tribunals in their judicial capacity would no longer have to pronounce upon the validity of the application to foreigners of an Egyptian law or degree which has been applied to foreigners by the Egyptian Parliament or Government, as the case may be.

6. His Majesty the King of Egypt hereby declares that no Egyptian legislation made applicable to foreigners will be inconsistent with the principles generally adopted in modern legislation or, with particular relation to legislation of a fiscal nature, discriminate against foreigners, including foreign corporate bodies.

7. In view of the fact that it is the practice in most countries to apply to foreigners the law of their nationality in matters of "statut personnel," consideration will be given to the desirability of excepting from the transfer of jurisdiction, at any rate in the first place, matters relating to "statut personnel" affecting nationals of those Capitulatory Powers who wish that their Consular authorities should continue to exercise such jurisdiction.

8. The transitional regime for the Mixed Tribunals and the transfer to them of the jurisdiction at present exercised by the Consular Courts (which regime and transfer will, of course, be subject to the provisions of the special convention referred to in Article 9) will necessitate the revision of existing laws relating to the organisation and jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals, including the preparation and promulgation of a new Code of Criminal Procedure. It is understood that this revision will include amongst other matters:--

(1) The definition of the word "foreigner" for the purpose of the future jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals;

(11) The increase of the personnel of the Mixed Tribunals and the Mixed Parquet, which will be necessitated by the proposed extension of their jurisdiction;

(111) The procedure in the case of pardons or remissions of sentences imposed on foreigners and also in connection with the execution of capital sentences passed on foreigners.

Art. 14. The present treaty abrogates any existing agreements or other instruments whose continued existence is inconsistent with its provisions. Should either High Contracting Party so request, a list of the agreements and instruments thus abrogated shall be drawn up in agreement between them within six months of the coming into force of the present treaty.

Art. 15. The High Contracting Parties agree that any difference on the subject of the application or interpretation of the provisions of the present treaty which they are unable to settle by direct negotiation shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Art. 16. At any time after the expiration of a period of twenty years from the coming into force of the treaty, the High Contracting Parties will, at the request of either of them, enter into negotiations with a view to such revision of its terms by agreement between them as may be appropriate in the circumstances as they then exist. In case of the High Contracting Parties being unable to agree upon the terms of the revised treaty, the difference will be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for decision in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant in force at the time of signature of the present treaty or to such other person or body of persons for decision in accordance with such procedure as the High Contracting Parties may agree. It is agreed that any revision of this treaty will provide for the continuation of the Alliance between the High Contracting Parties in accordance with the principles contained in Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7. Nevertheless, with the consent of both High Contracting Parties, negotiations may be entered into at any time after the expiration of a period of ten years after the coming into force of the treaty, with a view to such revision as aforesaid.

Art. 17. The present treaty is subject to ratification. Ratifications shall be exchanged in Cairo as soon as possible. The treaty shall come into force on the date of the exchange of ratifications, and shall thereupon be registered with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

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This two-volume work by the Earl of Cromer who for the period 1882-1906 ruled for England in Egypt represents the view of the Conservative imperialist side. Lord Cromer in my judgment never had been able to understand or appreciate the Egyptians. Thus his writings are biased and give a wrong impression to the reader, if he was not aware of this fact.

Despite all that, these two volumes deserve to be read as they represent the official conservative British point of view, and have plenty of information about the development of Egypt. Cromer works should be read along with the writings of Lord Lloyd and Lord Milner.

Dicey, Edward, The Story of the Khedivate (London, Rivingtons, 1902).

The main bulk of this book goes for the description of the 'Crabi Revolution of 1882. It describes in detail the factors which led Great Britain to occupy Egypt. Since it covered only this early period it was of very limited value for the author.

Dodwell, Henry, Mohammed 'Ali, The Founder of Modern Egypt (Cambridge, University Press, 1931).

Professor Dodwell was commissioned by King Fu'ad of Egypt to write this book. This fact gives the answer for the biased interpretations which the author had given of certain aspects of matters of local interest. Despite that the book contains a good summary of the reign of Muhammad 'Ali as based on the official documents in London. Since the book covered only the reign of Muhammad 'Ali it has been of a very slight value to the author.

Egyptian Delegation, (ed.), The Egyptian Question (Washington, D. C., 1919).

A collection of articles and addresses from various sources. It proved to be of great help to the author.

Elgood, Percival George, Egypt and the Army (London, Oxford University Press, 1924).

In this book Colonel Elgood covers the development of Egyptian struggles for independence during the

period of World War I. The author expresses a noticeable sympathy toward the movement. This book was of some value in preparing this study.

Algood, Percival George, The Transit of Egypt (London, Edward Arnold and Co., 1928).

This is a brief survey of Egyptian history starting with the early Persian subjugation under Cambyses. In other words, this survey covers a period of 2,000 years. The part of the early Egyptian history is covered in a few pages, but the bulk of the book is devoted to Anglo-Egyptian relations.

Colonel Algood, who was an English soldier lived in Egypt for a long period through which he was able to observe and study the Egyptians and appreciate the ir point of view. His evaluation of the Egyptian nationalist movement is one of the best. The information in this book is very reliable and Algood tried all through his book to maintain a scholarly objectivity.

Europa Publication Limited (pub.), The Middle East, 1953 (London, Europa Publication Limited, 1953).

A reliable source on statistics on the Middle Eastern social, political and cultural development.

Galatoli, A. M., Egypt in Midpassage (Cairo, Urwand and Sons Press, 1950).

A brief but an interesting study. The student who is interested in the economical and social development of Modern Egypt will find this book very helpful. It proved to be of some help to the author.

Gibb, H. A. R. (ed.), Whither Islam (London, 1932)

Four lectures on Moslem movements in North Africa, Egypt, India and Indochina, with introduction and conclusion. It was not of any help to the author in preparing this study.

Gibb, H. A. R., Mohammedanism (London, New York and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1947).

Chapter A of this book deals with the impact of western ideas on the development of Moslem revivalism.

Gibb, Hamilton Alexander Rosskun, Modern Trends in Islam (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1947).

This book was of some value to the author in understanding the new developments in Islam and their impact on Moslem thought and action in Egypt as well as in other Moslem countries.

Hellberg, Charles W., The Suez Canal: Its History and Its Diplomatic Importance (London, P. S. King, 1931).

It is about the best account given in reference to the history of the canal and the international problems connected with it.

Hassanein, A. M., and Mahmud, H. A., An Outline of Egyptian Modern History (Cairo, 1946, The Renaissance Bookshop).

A very brief outline of Modern Egyptian history. Ineffective.

Hayes, Carlton J., Essays on Nationalism (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1937).

A helpful account in explaining the issue of nationalism.

Haykal, M. H., Mazini, I. 'A. and 'Annan, M. A., al-Siyasah al-Misriyyah wa Aliqilab al-Lusturi (Cairo, 1931).

This book was written by Egyptian journalists who belonged to the Liberal Constitutional party, to criticize and denounce the dictatorship of Sidki (1930).

Heyworth-Dunne, Jamal-Addine, Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt (Washington, D. C., published by the author, 1930).

This is a very interesting and scholarly written book. It described in a summary fashion the religious and political struggles in Modern Egypt, the development and the effectiveness of the religio-political groups which tended to be subversive or terrorist. This work was of a tremendous value for the author.

Hilmi, Abbas, II Khedive of Egypt, A Few Words on the Anglo-Egyptian Settlement (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1930).

An urge by the former Khedive of Egypt to his countrymen to accept the draft treaty of 1929 as the first step toward their goal of absolute independence. An interesting book but was of little value to the author.

Howell, Joseph M., Egypt's Past, Present and Future (Dayton, Ohio, Service, 1929).

In this book the author relates the experiences which he had while in Egypt. This book is full of interesting information about events occurring in that country before 1929, and it condemns the system of capitulations. In 1929 the Egyptian government, then a kind of a dictatorship, without parliament or constitution forbade the importation and sale of this book in Egypt.

The author was the American Ambassador to Egypt. He sympathizes with the Egyptian nationalist point of view and condemns severely the British imperialistic attitude in Egypt.

Husain, Tehe, al-Ayyam, 2 vols. (Cairo, 1930).

This book was translated into English in 1932 by an English scholar known as E. H. Paxton. It was again translated in 1948 by another English scholar, H. Wayment. This book is an essential to every scholar who attempts to understand the Egyptian society. It is an autobiography of the author who happened to be a son of a fellahin class, but was able in the course of time to advance to the rank of Minister of Education in Egypt. This book historically has been of no value for the author.

Hussein, Ahmad, The Story of Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations (New York, 1947).

A short booklet sponsored by the young Egypt Party (Misr el-Zetet). It was put out merely for propaganda purposes and was of no value to the author.

Issawi, Charles, Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis (Oxford, 1947).

A scholarly work in which Mr. Issawi covers the development of economic and social institutions in modern Egypt. It has been of a very little value to the author as it does not speak specifically of the development of nationalism.

Izzeddin, Nejla, The Arab World: Past, Present and Future (Chicago, Henry Regency Company, 1953).

A general textbook on the subject. It has been of very little value to the author as it has only two chapters devoted to Egyptian affairs.

Kamal, Mustafa, Egyptian-French Letters addressed to Mrs. J. Adam, 1895-1908 (Cairo, Mustafa Kamal School, 1909).

A collection of letters exchanged between the Egyptian nationalist leader and politician, Mustafa Kamal and the famed French journalist, Mrs. J. Adam. These letters carry a true picture of the Egyptian nationalist movement as viewed by an extreme nationalist who for some time headed the Fatherland party. The Arabic and the English translation of these letters do exist in this book. Beside impressionistic attitudes the book was of no value to the author.

Kirk, G. L., A Short History of the Middle East (Washington, Public Affairs Press, 1949).

Kohn, Hans, Nationalism and Imperialism In the Mether East (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952).

A study in the impact of European imperialism on the development of nationalism in the countries of the Near East. Chapter V in this study deals particularly with Egyptian nationalism and achievements. The book is very interesting and informative. It has been of great value for the author.

Marshall, J. L., The Egyptian Unions, 1890-1928 (London, John Murray, 1928).

Marshall in this book gives his observations and a survey of modern Egyptian history as based on his experiences in that country. He wrote in the same Orthodox style of Lord Cromer. This book is interesting as a checking source. It proved to be of some help to the author.

The Middle East Institute, Nationalism In the Middle East, (Washington, D. C., 1952).

It contains an interesting and helpful article by Hans Kohn.

Milner, Lord, England In Egypt (London, 1894).

This is one of the standard works on the British Occupation of Egypt. It runs along the line of Lord Cromer and Lord Lloyd's works. Because it dealt with an early period it was of no help to the author.

[Egyptien] Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Egypt (Cairo, no date is given).

This is a statistical study which contains a tremendous amount of facts about various aspects of Egyptian life. It was of very little help to the author.

Howman, Edward L. F., Great Britain in Egypt (London, Cassell, 1923).

One of the best writings on Anglo-Egyptian relations. It gives a detailed account of the war and the post-war developments in Egypt. It was very helpful.

Omar, Abdel-Moneim, The Sudan Question based on British Documents (Cairo, 1932).

Omar attempted to criticize and condemn the British policy in Egypt and the Sudan by pointing out the contradictions and inconsistency of British behavior. It was of very little help to the author in this study.

Philby, H. St. J. B., Arabia (London, 1930).

The fullest account in English of the Wahhabi movement.

Rifa'at, Mohammad Tay, The Awakening of Modern Egypt (London, Longmans, 1947).

This book has been of very little value to the author as it only dealt with the early part of modern Egyptian history.

Rifa'at, Muhammad, Tarikh Misor el-Biyyi, 3 vols. (Cairo, 1932).

An interesting and detailed diplomatic history of Modern Egypt. The author had access to only the first two volumes. Those particularly proved to be of very little value as they covered only the era from 1798 to 1882.

Royal Institute of International Affairs, Great Britain and Egypt, 1914-1930 (Information paper No. 19) (London, the Institute, 1931).

A brief survey of Anglo-Egyptian Relations since World War I. It proved to be of some value to the author.

Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey (London and New York, The Broadwater Press, 1951).

A general text book full of information. It was of some help to the author.

Rushid Rida, Muhammad, Terikh al-Ustath al-Imam al-Shaykh Muhammad 'Abdu, 3 vols. (Cairo, al-Mannar Press, vol. 2, 1908; vol. 3, 1910; vol. 1, 1931).

A detailed biography and works of Muhammad 'Abdu.

Seton-Williams, M. V., Britain and the Arab States (London, 1946).

Shafiq Pasha, Ahmad, Haraliyat Misr al-Siyasiyyah [Egyptian Political History], 5 vols. (Cairo, Shafik Pasha Press, 1928).

A detailed survey of Egyptian political history. It contains a wealth of material on Anglo-Egyptian relations and the development of the nationalism movement in Egypt. The student of Egyptian nationalism would find this work very interesting and informative.

Shafiq Pasha, Ahmed, Muthakkerati fi Nisf 'Asr [My Memoires in Half a Century], 3 vols. (Cairo, Misr Press, 1934).

The memoirs of Shafiq Pasha for a period of half a century which preceeded World War I. As it covered only this early era it was of very limited help.

Sidki, Isma'il, Muthakarati [My Memoires], (Cairo, al-Hilal, 1950).

It appears that the principal motive which drove Sidki Pasha to record his memoirs in this book was an attempt to justify his actions while in government. Inasfar as some of the interpretations which are given, this book is far from being reliable.

Stoddard, Lanthrop, New World of Islam (New York, O. Scribner's Sons, 1921).

In this book the author attempted to record an analysis of the new movements in Islam since the turn of the 19th century and their influences on the society and politics of the Moslem world. It proved to be of great help along those lines.

Symons, M. Travers, Britain and Egypt: The Rise of Egyptian Nationalism (London, Cecil Palmer, 1923).

This is one of the very few reliable histories of the Egyptian nationalist movement. It was of great help to the author.

Toppan, Eva March, (ed.), Egypt, Africa and Arabia, The World's Story, vol. III (Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914).

Toynbee, Arnold J., Survey of International Affairs, 1923, vol. 1, (The Islamic World since the Peace Settlement); 1926, part III; 1936, part V (London, 1927, 1931, 1937).

A very helpful survey.

Velyi, Felix, Revolution In Islam: Spiritual and Political (London, 1925).

A considerable part of this book was devoted to the "problem of Egypt" in which Mr. Velyi presented an honest picture and an interesting interpretation of Egyptian nationalism. This section of the book is an inspiring part and was of great help in the preparation of this investigation.

Weigall, Arthur (ed.), A History of Events In Egypt From 1798-1914 (London, W. Blackwood and Sons, 1913).

A narrative history covering the era indicated in the title. It was of little help to the author.

Young, George, Egypt (New York, Charles Scribners and Sons, 1927).

A narrative history of modern Egypt covering the period between the coming of Muhammed 'Ali and the death of the great Egyptian nationalist, Sa'd Zaghloul.

Youssef, Amine Bey, Independent Egypt (London, J. Murray, 1940).

This is an autobiography of an Egyptian politician who identified himself with the Wafd party until the mid-twenties. He broke with that party after the death of Zaghloul. Later he turned to be critical of the Wafd's policies and leadership, especially of its head, Nahas Pasha.

This work is very readable and interesting. It was of some help to the author.

Zaidan, Jurji, Mashahir al-Sharq [Eastern Celebrities] vol. II (Cairo, 1903).

It contains excellent biographies of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abdu.

PERIODICALS

al-Shurbaji, M., "Sa'd Zaghoul", Rose al-Yusuf (Cairo, May 1933).

A stimulating series of articles written by an extreme nationalist many years after the death of Zaghoul. Al-Shurbaji sounds very critical of the nationalist leader and accuses him of treason and cooperation with the British.

Crabites, Pierre, "Egypt, the Sudan and the Nile", Foreign Affairs (December 15, 1924), pp. 320-331.

A very interesting and stimulating article. It was written by Judge Crabites before the assassination of Sir Lee Stack. It shows the importance and natural right of Egypt in the Nile and the Sudan. This article has been of great help to the author.

Glasgow, George, "The Anglo-Egyptian Breakdown", The Contemporary Review (July, 1930).

A dissertation about the Anglo-British negotiation of 1930. An interesting and helpful article.

Greenwood, Thomas, "Britain's Perils in the New Egyptian Treaty," Current History (November, 1929).

An interesting discussion about Anglo-Egyptian negotiations of 1929. This article has of some help to the author.

Merton, Arthur, "Great Britain and Egypt", Contemporary Review (March, 1936).

A very interesting and helpful article in which Merton surveyed the background and the major points of the 1936 treaty.

The New York Times (1914-1936).

The following articles were also consulted but they were of lesser value to the author in the preparation of this study.

Amos, Sir Maurice Sheldon, "England and Egypt", The Nineteenth Century and After (March, 1929), pp. 308-318.

"Anglo-Egyptian breakdown", Spectator, (May 17, 1930).

Arminjon, Pierre, and Carbittes, Pierre, "Al Azhar University" The Nineteenth Century and After (October, 1925), pp. 540-549.

Barron, Lieut. Col. J. E., "Control of the Nile", The Nineteenth Century and After (September, 1925), pp. 370-380.

Beaman, A. Hulme, "The Political Situation in Egypt", The Contemporary Review (July, 1927), pp. 15-23.

Bey, A. Rustem, "The Future of Islamism", The Nineteenth Century and After (June, 1925), pp. 843-854.

Carman, Harry F., "England and Egyptian Problem", Political Science Review Quarterly (1921), pp. 51-79.

Chingwin, Rev. A. M., "The break-up of Islam", The Contemporary Review (August, 1925), pp. 137-193.

Chinol, Sir Valentine, "Islam and Britain", Foreign Affairs (March 15, 1923), pp. 48-59.

Crabites, Pierre, "England's Fifty Years In Egypt", The Nineteenth Century and After (July, 1922), pp. 33-49.

Crabites, Pierre, "Egypt, The Sudan and the Nile", Foreign Affairs (December 15, 1924), pp. 320-331.

Crabites, Pierre, "Isma'il the Magnificent", The Nineteenth Century and After (July, 1927) pp. 108-119.

Craig, J. I., "The Water Supply of Egypt and the Sudan", The Contemporary Review (February 1925), pp. 163-170.

Edwards, F. M., "The Egyptian Rural Problem", The Contemporary Review (August 1931), pp. 191-199.

Elgood, Lieut. Col. F. G., "Our Difficulties with Egypt", The Nineteenth Century and After (February 1925), pp. 252-259.

"Fresh Start In Egypt", Spectator (March 10, 1928).

- Hoskins, Halford L., "The Suez Canal In Time of War", Foreign Affairs (October 1933), pp. 93-102.
- Ibrahim, Hefith, "Al-Istatu al-Yahaniyah", Sinan Hefith Ibrahim (Cairo, year is not given).
- Johnson, F., "Nationalism and Religious Liberty With Particular Regard to Islam", Moslem World (January 1926).
- Khen, Leo, "The New Moslem World", The Edinburgh Review (October 1923), pp. 220-227.
- Loder, Capt. J. De V. (M.P.), "Egypt During and Since The War", The Edinburgh Review (July 1928), pp. 1-22.
- Low, Sidney, "The Middle East", The Edinburgh Review (April 1915), pp. 328-343.
- Marriott, J. A. R., "The Egyptian Factor in European Diplomacy", Edinburgh Review (July 1924), pp. 32-50.
- Marshall, J. L., "The Egyptian Problem", The Nineteenth Century and After (August 1926), pp. 188-198.
- Maurice, Sir Frederick, "British Policy In the Mediterranean", Foreign Affairs (October 1925), pp. 103-114.
- Mellor, R. I., "The Egyptian Riddle", The Nineteenth Century and After (October 1930), pp. 426-430.
- Merton, Arthur, "The Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance", The Nineteenth Century and After (October 1926), pp. 385-395.
- McIlwraith, Sir Malcolm, "Egyptian Nationalism", The Edinburgh Review (July 1919), pp. 172-180.
- McIlwraith, Sir Malcolm, "A Decade of Egyptian Politics", The Contemporary Review (August 1922), pp. 172-180.
- Mieville, Sir Walter F., "My Friend the Follah", The Nineteenth Century and After (September 1904), pp. 443-450.
- Newman, Major E. W. Polson, "Egypt", The Contemporary Review (November 1930), pp. 570-577.
- Newman, Major E. W. Polson, "Egypt and the Treaty", The Contemporary Review (October 1930), pp. 407-416.
- Newman, Major E. W. Polson, "Progress In Egypt", The Contemporary Review (August 1929), pp. 174-181.

Rodd, Sir Rennell, "The Present Situation In Egypt", Contemporary Review (April 1922), pp. 406-417.

Shah, Sirder Ikbal Ali, "The Modernization of Islam", The Contemporary Review (February 1929).

Watson, R., "Nationality In Islamic Lands", International Review of Missions (April 1929):

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