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LABOR REAWS N THE AUTOMONLE
INDUSTRY DURENG THE mm mm

Yhosis fat the Dogma oi M. A.
MICHEGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

.390! John Lowery
1958

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LABOR RELATIONS IN THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY

DURING THE NINETEEN TWENTIES.

BY

JOEL JOHN LOWEBY

A THESIS

Submitted to the School of Science and.Arts

of Michigan State University of Agriculture

and Applied Science in partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree of
Master Of The Arts

Department of History
1958.

To
My Mother

who typed the manuscript

And
Dr. Madison Kuhn

My Major Professor.

Introduction

Labor unionism in this country is as old as the
nation. There were strikes and short lived unions in the
last years of the eighteenth century. The first city
locals were started in the eighteen.twenties and in the
eighteen thirties the first nation wide federation, the National
Labor union was founded. By the eighteen fifties this organiza-
tion had locals in many northern cities. In 1869, the Knights
Of Labor, the first industrial type union.was founded. In
1886 Sammuel Gompers founded the American Federation Of Labor
which soon replaced the Knights of Labor as the central labor
organization. Since that time organized labor has had its
periods of "ups" and "downs". One of the “down" periods was
the decade of the nineteen twenties.

In 1920 union memberships amounted to 5,000,000, the
total by 1930 was 3,000,000.

It is the labor union activities of the automobile

workers in this decade, with which this paper is concerned.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page

I THE AUTOMOBILE WORKER . . . . . . . . . . . . . I

II WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE AUTO PLANTS DURING
THE NINETEEN TWENTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

III WORKING CONDITIONS AT FORD . . . . . . . . . . 17

IV EFFORTS To KEEP THE UNIONS OUT . . . . . . . . 39

v ORGANIZING EFFORTS BEFORE 1926 . . . . . . . . 51

VI ORGANIZING EFFORTS IN THE LATE TWENTIES . . . . 62
A. The A. F. of L's Attempt in 1926
B. Minor Strikes In The Late Twenties

VII SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88

CHAPTER I
THE AUTOMOBILE WORKER

In 1928 the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce
listed thirty-two companies which manufactured passenger cars
and trucks. These thirty-two companies manufactured forty-
four makes of autos, and about 765 models.1 These autos were
manufactured in 262 plants, forty-four of which.were in Michigan,
thirty-four in Ohio, twenty-five in Illinois, twenty-two In
California, twenty in New York, nineteen in Indiana, fourteen
each in Pennsylvania and WisconSin, eight each in.Missouri and
New Jersey, six in Massachusetts and smaller number in.twenty-
two other states. The 262 plants included not only the large
ones like Ford, but many assembly plants and small separate
companies all over the country, most of them employing a
thousand workers or less. Actually, in.the nineteen twenties
seventy-five per cent of the cars were produced in.Michigan. In
August 1928, the Detroit area produced 11,000 cars a day, the
Flint area about 5,900, and Pontiac and Lansing between six and
seven hundred each. 0f the seventeen companies that made an

average of more than.3,000 cars a day twelve were in Michigan.2

1United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin #38,

mmmgmnmmww. 1925.
(United States Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C.)
p. 2.

zAgtomotive Igdgstries, Dec. 22, 1928, p. 898.

In.the early days of the auto industry when the shops
were small and the production low, skilled.workers predomin-
ated the industry. By the nineteen twenties, however, the
skilled.worker had almost completely been displaced by the
"machine operator“ with a Job that could be learned in a few
minutes or hours. ‘Workers classed as l'unskilled" were in.the
vast majority by the nineteen.twenties. A report by B. R.
Lutz made in.l916 showed that even then fifty-four per cent
of the Jobs in an auto plant required no skill or previous

3 Henry Ford, in his book, My LL12 ADS m,
stated that in his plant forty-three per cent of the Jobs

experience.

required.not over one days training, thirty-six per cent from
one day to one week, six per cent from one to two weeks, four-
teen per cent from one month to one year, and one per cent
between.one and six years.“ In other words eighty-five per
cent of the employees could learn their trade within one
month.

In addition to being "unskilled” the auto worker dur-
ing the twenties was very apt to be a transient worker. Many

men.in.the auto plant came from the farm or the small townm

3Robert W. Dunn, Labor And Automobiles, (New York

1929) p. 60.

”Henry Ford, NY Mfg £4.12 E2213: (New York, 1923)
p. 110.

In the auto plant he would learn to run a punch press, or
assemble the parts of a motor, but he learned no definite
skill or trade as he moved constantly from firm to firm. Most
of these laborers regarded their work in the auto plants as
itemporary, and many had amitions of opening a filling station
or repair garage of their own. The majority of these early
auto workers lived in a Detroit rooming or boarding house,

saving little of their weekly pay.5

During periods of prosperity and expansion great
numbers flocked to the auto p1ants,‘khen the depression
followed, they returned to the farms and villages. As the
nineteen.twenties wore on,however, they became less mobile
and more static.

Before World War I most of the workers in the auto
plants came from the farms and villages of Michigan, Indiana,
Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, and South.Dakota. During
the nineteen.twenties forty-seven out of every one hundred
workers were born.outside of Michigan, and less than one per
cent of thekresidents of the city of Detroit were born.in that

7

city. At the very beginning of the industry came fairly skilled

craftsmen from the old steamboat engine business of the Great

5Dunn, Labgr And Automobiles, pp. 62-63
6

' Herbert Harris "Revolt Of The Robots", Qgrzgnt
Wfipril 1938. p. 58.

7.1.1049... p. 48.

Lakes and the carriage factories of the middle west. They were
Joined by ex-lumber Jacks, copper miners, and farm laborers.
With the coming of World‘War I and defense work in.the auto
plants, agents from Detroit circulated through the south with
tales of fabulous wages and wonderful conditions. As a re-
sult thousands of transient workers mainly from Tennessee,
Kentucky, Arkansas, Alabama, and Mississippi flocked to Detroit.
This practice continued after the war and throughout: the nine-
teen twenties. Some of the workers, especially if assured of
three months or more work, brought their families. Most regarded
unionism as "Red" and "Bolshevick." By the late nineteen
twenties however, the auto workers were a fairly settled group.
The 1920 census revealed that out of some 121,000 semi-
skilled operators in the auto plants, some 34,000 were foreign
born, and out of 83,000 laborers, 39,000 were foreign.born.
This proportion.was reduced somewhat by the immigration laws
of the twenties. The most prominent of the nationalities re-
presented were Canadian and English. In addition to the
Canadians, English, Irish and Scotch; Poles, Germans, Russians,
Italians, Hungarians, and Belgiums, were among the dominant
groups in.Detroit§ The Polish were the largest single group
other than.the British and the village of Hamtramck'was almost

8United States Census, 1920 Vol. IX, United States
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. 0., p. 688.

exclusively composed of those of this extraction. In addition
Mexicans began.tc be employed in considerable numbers during
the late twenties. In the outstate auto plants in Lansing,
Flint and Saginaw, the number of foreign born.was much lower.
Before the decade of the nineteen.thirties a consider-
able number of Negroes were employed by the Detroit automobile
companies. They were lured north by circulars distributed by
bus companies, employment agencies, and the auto companies
themselves, telling of the high wages and good conditions. A
great many came during World.War I, and later in the nineteen
twenties. In 1926, there were 25,000 to 30,000 Negro wage
earners in Detroit. About 16,800 were employed in.the foundries
and the rest largely in the automobile plants. In most in~
stances the Negroes were employed chiefly in unskilled, heavy,
manual work. Many were employed in.work that no one else
would do. (In the Chevrolet Plant they were employed in the
most rough, and disagreeable work available, such as painting
axles, and working emery grinding wheels. In.the Hudson.plant,
Negroes were employed as floor sweepers, or ice men.trhey were
given a starting wage of thirty-five to thirty-eight cents an
hour and seldom if ever promoted, regardless of ability.9
This kind of treatment was not practiced in.the auto plants

alone during the twenties, but in industry as a whole.

9Dunn, Labor And Agtgggbiles, p. 69.

In 1920 it was estimated that from nine to twelve per
cent of the employees in the auto plants were under twenty-
one years of age. A large number of minors were working at
both skilled and unskilled occupations. They were largely over-
employed as machine operators, stock and tool crib workers,
laborers and helpers in the foundry, truckers, drivers, and in-
spectors. Some were learning the more skilled crafts, acting
as toolmakers helpers, moulders helpers, drill press operators,
and welders. The younger workers were usually paid less than
the older ones.10

In addition to the young men, women were also hired
in the auto plants during the twenties, in ever increasing
numbers. In 1920 over 15,000 women were hired as laborers or
semi—skilled operators in the plants. They were employed in
almost all departments: assembly work, polishing, sanding,
buffing, operating cranes, running punch presses, welding work,
minding lathes and grinders, almost all work except the very
heaviest.

As far as labor unions were concerned, Detroit auto
makenswere not only non—union, but like many other industries
anti-union. The number of union workers in the auto plants

11
numbered only a few hundred, principally skilled craftsmen.

10United States Children's Bureau, Minors In.Automobile
And Metal Manufacturing Industries in Michiggn, (United States
Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 1923, Bulletin

196) pp. 57-58.

11Raymond J. Walsh, 9, ;.,Q., Industrial Unionism in
Action, (New York, 1937) p. 96.

mmmERII
WORKING CONDITIONS IN THE AUTO PLANTS
DURING THE NINETEEN'TWENTIES

In this chapter the conditions of work in the auto plants,
with the exception of those in the Ford Plant, will be divided
into three parts, namely: hours of work, wages, health and safety.

With the exception of the Ford Plant, the average work
V week in the auto plants was fifty hours. In 1925 the Bureau of
Labor Statistics made a survey of the industry, finding that
out of 144,000 workers the average weekly hours of work were
from 50.1 to 50.3. According to this study forty-eight per cent
of the workers covered were on a fifty hour week. Slightly over
twenty-seven per cent worked between forty-eight and fifty hours
a week, eighteen per cent worked between fifty and fifty-five
hours, and four per cent over fifty-five hours.1 The length of
the work day usually ran from eight to nine hours.2 With regard
to Dunn's charge that the auto workers worked a longer day than
those in other industries it is interesting to note that during
the twenties the steel workers, worked twelve hours a day, seven
days a week. The average number of hours worked then, is eighty-
four a week, which is far above the fifty hour average worked

by the employees in the auto plants. Also when the shifts

1United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin 438,
pp. 8-10.

21bid., p. 12.

changed once a fortnight, one shift had to work a twenty-four
stretch. All establishments, with the exception of Hudson,
operated on.a six-day week basis. The length of the day shift
was nine hours, with the night shift running about eleven
hours. Dunn charges that the auto workers were worse off than
the other industries including steel.3 In 1925, thirteen per
cent of theagggkers, worked eight hours per day, for six days.
One per cent worked an eight and one half hour day plus five
and one half hours on Saturday. Forty-eight per cent worked
nine hours per day for five days and a five hour Saturday.“
The length of the work day for the different Jobs in the plant
ranged from the high of the machinist, seventyftwc per cent of
whom worked six days, and the laborers sixty-seven per cent of
whom worked six days, to a low of the top builders, forty-one
per cent of whom worked six days. In the organized industries
ntnety-one per cent were working forty-eight hours or less.
None of the auto workers worked forty-eight hours, unleSs they
were on short time, and this meant a corresponding reduction.in
earnings.

Concerning overtime, there was a great deal of it during

some periods of the year. During the spring particularly the

313m. ___quab as W. p. 93. '

u. 8
United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin
438, p. 11.

amount of overtime could go as high as three or four hours per
day. The shifts, many times, worked twelve hours. Also dur-
ing these periods, the workers were at their benches on Sundays
and holidays. An increased rate of pay was paid for overtime
in sixty of the ninety-nine plants covered in the Bureau of
Labor Statistics survey in 1925. These increased rates ranged
from time and one fifth to time and one half.5 Buick, Nash,
Dodge, and Chrysler employees got the straight rate for over-
time, including Sundays and holidays.

The average full time per hour earnings of all males in
all auto occupations combined increased from 66.2 cents in 1922
to 72.9 cents in 1925. Those of females increased from 43.8
cents to 46.7 cents. Combined the earnings increased from 65.7
cents to 72.3 cents.6 These wages per hour were higher than
those for manufacturing as a whole. Throughout the nineteen
twenties the average hourly wage for workers engaged in manufact-

uring remained steady at about fifty-six cents.7 In its 1925

survey the Bureau of Labor Statistics found that in 1922 the
average hourly earnings ranged from 49.5 cents for laborers to

93.1 cents for stripers. In 1925 laborers received fifty-seven

5United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin
438, p. 23.

61bid., p. 1

7Arthur S. Link, American Epoch, Histgpy,g§ the United

States Since the_1890'§,(New York 1955) p. 303.

 

cents an hour, while the Ading men” who were the most highly
paid workers in the plant, were paid $1.37 cents an hour. ”Strip-
ers' painted the narrow gold band around the auto body, while

the "ding men” “dinged out” the small dents in the fenders and
bumpers which showed up after painting or varnishing.

In terms of weekly earnings the average male workers
were earning $33.19 in 1922 and $36.87 in 1925. These figures
are for steady work.

Concerning real wages or actual purchasing power or
the take home pay, the A. F. L. in.a survey conducted in 1928
concluded that real_wages were only eight and six tenths per
cent higher in.1927, than in.1899, 1899 being the base year -

100. The trend of real wages was as follows:

1899 100 1921 89.6
1904 90.3 1923 111.0
190 82.8 1924 112.1
191 90.4 1925 108.6
1919 89.2

The automobile industry was among those to have the
smallest wage increase in the period from 1899 to 1927. In
comparison.with union.wages,'the wages of the auto workers were
lower. The Bureau of Labor Statistics found the average hourly

rate for male workers in the auto plants to be sixty-six cents

8

‘ United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin
438, p. 1.

9
Paul H. Douglas Rea; nge§,;g The United Stgteg,
(New York, 1930) pp. 306-10.

in the year 1922-23, and about seventy-two cents in 1925.10

The union average wage in 1923 was eighty-six cents per hour,
and ninety-eight cents an hour in 1925 for all industry. The
union.wages showed an increase of twenty—seven per cent between
1922 and 1925, while the auto wage increased only ten.per cent
in the same period.11 Among the plants that payed lower than
the average was Briggs with an average wage of fifty-five cents

an hourolz

Also labor's share in the value of profit decreased.
In.1925 only forty per cent of the value of the auto's price
went to labor, while in 1923 the per cent was about forty-five,
which was about the same as 1904.

With respect to incentive payment, the auto industry
led- all the rest. In its 1925 survey the Department of Labor
found that thirty-eight out of the_ninety-nine plants surveyed

had either group or individual bonus plans.13

The gang bonus
was very common to all departments in the auto plants. Flint
Chevrolet, had 13,000 out of its 14,000 workers on a bonus plan.

Under the bonus system a specific product was made or assembled

by men divided into gangs of fifty or more. A variable bonus

10United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin
438, p. 1.

lchuglas, Real Wageg Ip,The United §tgteg, p. 96.
lggggg'Wczgers Newg, Feb. 1928 and May 1927,

' 13United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin
438. p. 20-

payment was paid to the group, based upon the production above
a certain set standard which it achieved, which was divided
among the members of the group. A flat rate was paid to all
members, the lump sum was the bonus, and the amount depended
upon production above and beyond the set standard.

The accident rate was lower in the auto industry. than
for industry as a whole. For the years 1925 and 1926, the
average accident rate per 10,000 workers was 315.2. One out
of every thirty workers was injured. The death rate was 2.7
per ten thousand workers, the permanent disability rate was
40.9, and the temporary disability rate was 71.6. The assembly
line was a great source of accidents in the twenties. Also the
noise in the plant blunted the worker's senses, thus rendering
him unconscious of danger. The most common accidents consisted
of getting caught in belts or chain belts, being caught between
car chassis on the assembly line, dropping material on the feet,
being run over by small shop trucks and getting the hands caught
in machines. The punch presses were extremely dangerous, as
were lathes and grinders. Most of the plants had safety rules,

but in many cases they were not strictly enfOrced.

On April 23, 1927, at least twenty-one workers were
burned to death, and many others permanently injured when a fire
and an explosion destroyed a large part of the Harper Avenue
plant of the Briggs Company in DetrOit. Highly inflammable

materials such as nitro-cellulose, acetone, benzol, and.wood

h‘l

alcohol were stored in the plant. These materials were used
in mixing the lacquer that was sprayed on the auto bodies.
The mixture was sprayed at a very high pressure, producing a
situation very condusive to explosion. In addition the Agtg
Workers N§w§,charged that the company failed to provide an
adequate system of blowers to carry the fumes away.lu Follow-
ing the explosion was a fire which almost completely destroyed
the building. The reason for the explosion was the fact that
the metal nozzles on the paint Sprayers were not grounded. Also
many of the workers were burned to death or injured because of
the fact that their clothes were saturated with the inflammable
paint mixture. The painting was done on the third floor of a
five story building, thus making for greater danger to the other
workers. Today most painting is done in a one-story building
devoted-solely to that purpose. The Briggs fire caused damages
estimated at three milliOn dollars.15

In the auto plants, about the greatest danger to health
was the paint department. According to Kober and Hayhurst, about
five per cent to ten per cent of the workers contracted tubercu-
10913 or lead P0180ning.16 In the paint department the paint,

which was sprayed at a tremendous velocity, created a cloud of

14Auto Workerg News, July 1929.

15The New York Times, April 24, 1927.

16Kober'and Hayhurst, Industrial Health, (Philadelphia, Pa.
1924) pp. 193-94.

fog, in.which the men had to work. Respirators were not used
because they were too uncomfortable and bulky. According to
the Michigan Safety Law, blowers were required, but in many
of the auto plants they were generally inadequate or none
existent.

In addition to the actual painting, wet sanding was
also a hazard to the worker's health. The sanders worked the
day through in a cloud of sand and metal dust.

Another health hazard.was the electroplating process
used in making chromium bumpers, and other auto accessories.
Many workers received chrome poisoning and skin irrations from
the operation.

The lack of adequate washrooms and a short lunch
period were also a health hazard in the auto plants. Many of
the auto plants provided no washrooms whatever for the workers,
just an occasional toilet stool. There was no place to hang
the street clothes, and no place tovvash when the shift was
over. The Michigan Safety Law provided that all manufacturers
should provide adequate washrooms for the employees.17 This
was flouted in.the Michigan auto plants.18 The fifteen or ten

minute lunch period was a great health hazard. The lunch had

17am as: 2.1: mm . p. 13.

’ ‘18Keith Sward, The Legegg, ___f_ 3331 £9,131, (New York
1948) p. 78.

15

to be eaten at the bench, and not in a special place. The
grease and grime of the factory was bound to get into the
worker's lunch bucket. Over all conditions in the auto plant
during the twenties, however, were fairly good.when compared
with industry as a'whole, and especially such industries as
textiles, mining, or steel.

Throughout the nineteen twenties unemployment was
chronic in the auto industry.‘ This was due to season fluctu-
ation, technological advances, speedups and.demand. Needless
to say, employment was very irregular. A slow-up in orders
for cars, the season, a new machine, could all result in a
large number of workers being temporarily unemployed. The
layoffs might be from a few hours to several months in duration.
The seasonal unemployment was the greatest in the fall and
least in the spring and early summer}9 The demand had a great
deal to do with employment. If the "style“ of a new model
wa81flfl3fancied by the buyers, the plant was likely to be "down”
for the season. In the yeansfrom 1923-1925, unemployment in-
creased in Detroit's auto plants. The years 1925-27, saw a
further increase but, the unemployment figure lessened from
1927 to the depression.

Although in the auto industry, the wages were sometimes

low, the hours long, and pace fast, these were not the principal

. 1 a
9United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletin
[+383 p. 17.

16

grievances of the workers. The greatest amount of unrest
was caused by the uncertainty of tenure, and the almost
total lack of seniority privileges.20

Employment methods in the twenties were crude to say
the least. The man merely waited in line until he came to the
hiring agent, who conducted a short interview. If no jobs were
open, a sign.was posted to that effect, and the job hunter
slowly made the rounds of the plants looking for work. If the
plant was hiring, the men as they stood in line were constantly
"supervised" by the police.

Toward the end of the decade, however, there were some
employment offices set up. The Employers Association of Detroit
for one established an employment office in 1928. The person
looking for work would go to one of these offices and register
his name and skill for a fee of $5.00. When a job became avail-

able he was notified.21

20S. M. Levin, "Ford Profit Sharing", Personnel Journal,

August 1927, p. 534.

21
Dunn, Labor and Automobiles, p. 116.

17

CHAPTER III
WORKING CONDITIONS AT FORD

According to Henry Ford, businessmen must operate in
a social sense, not just for profit. Prices should not be what
the traffic will bear, but as low as possible. The classical
system of charging and paying according to supply and demand
is false and doomed. A business is a service and not a profit
pump, said Ford. The business must be the businessman's work,
pleasure, profession and religion. He must bear alike the
gains and the losses. A business system that causes depression
in a nation cannot be called a success. The degree of success
or failure of business is the degree to which it provided a
useful necessary service to all the people. Prosperity takes
the brains out of business. Businessmen turn from the altar
of service to the altar of mamon.l'

Ford was against hard.work, but he also said a man
must work hard. In his book, Tpggylgnd Tomorr w, he stated,
"We will not put on the back of a man.what we can put on the
back of a machine."1 When a man performed hard work, he was
not very productive, but when he worked hard he was very pro-

ductive. In addition the worker must be willing and able to work.

1Henry Ford, Todey and Tomorrow,_(New York, 1926)
p. 150.

 

 

18

In Ford's scheme of things, purchasing power depended
upon wages. If men.were unemployed, purchasing power, and
the level of the economy goes down. Business depression is
brought about. Purchasing power drops when.wages drop. The
cure, then, for business depression, is to boost purchasing
power, and this is done by raising wages. This was the main
reason for the 85.00 day in 1914. Wages are more of a question
for management than for laborfipfow wages will ruin business.
much more quickly than they will ruin labor. The old theory
that the wages depend upon the bargaining power of labor is
false. This just breeds trouble in the form of labor strife
and violence. A business should have its rate of wages, and
dividends somewhere in agreement._ It would mean disaster to
have dividends high and.wages low, or vice versa. The way to
check a threatened depression is to lower prices and raise
wages. _The wage motive Starts with the employer and not the
employs. The employer must make a product to help people
and not just something to sell. Before a man can call him-
self a businessman,, he must want to get the most from his
labor and materials, charge the lowest possible price, and
pay the highest possible wage. But the worker also must be
willing to do a good days work. “The starting point of high

2
wages is willingness to work," said Ford. "Make work" schemes

'ZR. M. Fox "Fordism, A Critical Examination” Nipeteeppn
Cent , Feb. 1927, p. 234.

are bad because they raise unit labor costs, which mean price
increases, thus nullifying any wage increases which may be
granted. The employer must pay the highest possible wage and
charge the least he can for his product. In this way the
economy will be healthy. The worker must be able to buy the
product he makes. At first glance, said Ford, labor saving
machinery appears to throw people out of work, but over the
long period of time the opposite happens. By using machines,
the unit labor costs will be lower, making lower selling prices
possible. This fact will create higher demand, thus employing
more people rather than less.

According to Ford, there was no place for democracy
in business. The employee must have nothing to say in the
determination of his wages or working conditions. "Business
holds no place for democracy, if by democracy is meant the
shaping of policies by the vote of a large number of people or
their delegates. The theory of democratic government as
applied to a nation has never proved sufficiently practical
even to be tried in business. This is because the theory makes
no provision at all for getting anything done. It starts and
stops with discussion."3

Business has to have something more than discussion. It

demands action. The employees of a firm should never be allowed

3Henry Ford, Moving Forw rd, (New York 1930) p. 146.

20

to vote on company policy because they do not know what is
going on, and even if they did they would act to slowly. One
man who sees clearly the whole picture must run business.
Business will not be run properly unless everything is accord-
ing to a plan, and most of all the management must see that
they are carried out by the workers. The plan and schedule
must end in a service or a product. The plant is a tool the
manager uses to serve society.

Henry Ford was not opposed to the organization of labor
into unions.“ He was, however, opposed to the limitation of
production. Limiting production instead of creating more jobs,
creates fewer. It makes the cost of a product so high that it
will be beyond the reach of most people According to Ford,
"The only real labor leaders are those who lead men to work . .
.."5

Ford further stated that labor agitators and socialists
are merely misfits, living from union salaries, paid by the
members. They merely agitated to build up their "class struggle“
idea to prove that they are needed.

In respect to personnel policy, Ford said, "The best

social spirit is evidenced by some act which costs management

“Henry Ford, N1 Life And Work (New York 1923) p. 254.
51big., p. 256.

6Allan Nevins and Frank Ernest Hill, Ford Bipansign
and Challenge,ll915 pp 1233, (New York 1957) p. 535.

something and which benefits all. This is the only way to
prove good intentions and win respect. Propaganda, bulletins,
lectures, they are nothing. It's the right act sincerely done
that counts."7

Conversely Ford also said that the employee in.a busi-
ness must be also able to perform his job adequately, other-
wise he must go. In My _I_._i_i’_e_ _a_r_1_c_i 1923, Ford states, "We make no
attempt to coddle the people who work with us,“ and "We do not
believe in the 'glad hand' or the professionalized 'personal
touch'.or the human element."8

In answer to the question of charity Ford stated,”My
gospel is work. The best use to which I can put my money is
to make more work for more men."9

The best charity was giving jobs, paying high wages,
lowering car prices, and thus creating spending power in the
economy. The greatest cure for ,poverty was the development of
work habits., Every man.who works, helps to drive poverty out
of the world. Sympathy is wrongly manifested in charity. Sym-
pathy should go to remove the cause of poverty, not just tem-

porarily alleviate it. I'The best charity is to help a man to

7Henry Ford,,fl1 Life and Work, (New York 1923) p. 260.

819.121.. p. 163.

~98amue1 Marquis, Hgnzy Fgrd, An lgterpretatign, (Boston
1923) P. 39.

21

a place where he will never need charity."lo

Working conditions at Ford were better than the aver-
age of the automobile industry, and very good for industry as
a whole. According to Ford, a shop that was ill-lighted, dirty
and unkept was condusive to inefficiency and immorality. In
the Ford Plant no worker ever had to stand on a dirty floor.
The floors were scrubbed every eight hours and 500 brooms and
mops were worn out every five days by 4,000 janitors. Rubbish
cans were emptied every two hours.

The interior of the Ford Plant was also very well
lighted. There were many windows and they were constantly
being washed. An abundance of windows, letting in light made
working more healthful and safe, and at the same time cutting
down on light bills. To reflect the light the interior walls
were painted an eggshell white, above the wainscoating. The
floors and the walls up to the wainscoating were painted olive
green. The machines were painted "machine blue.” The for-
bidden areas as well as many safety devices were painted red.
Five thOusand gallons of blue paint was used a month as well as
11,000 gallons of white.11 Great quantities of cement paint,
rubber base paint, and aluminum paint were also used in the Ford
Plant during the twenties. The Ford Plant in the twenties was

dotted.with morale boosting signs, written by Ford, such as:12

10Henry Ford, Moving Forward, (New York 1930), p. 118.

 

llNevins, Ford, Expansion and Challenge; 1915 Lg 1922

 

P. 511.

12Henry Hamilton, Henry Ford, The Man The Worker, The
Citizen, (New York 1927) p. 217.

23

"People are all right," "Help the other fellow", and
"Cut your own wood, and it will warm you twice."

The Ford medical department was also very active in
achieving cleanliness in the Ford Plant. This department re-
gulated the water temperature of the 2300 drinking fountains
in the plant. The department also sterilized all telephones
every twenty-four hours, and all goggles and other safety
appliances after each shift. The coat racks and rest rooms
were also regularily disinfected. The safety department also
supervised the installation of an air suction system which
removed particles of metal dust from the plant, the first of
its kind in the country.

The Ford workers were given in the twenties, ten
minutes for lunch. The lunch could be carried or bought from
one of the 200 lunch wagons that circulated through the plant.
These box lunches were carefully prepared and tested for the
prOper balance of calories and vitamins.

All employees who received the slightest scratch while
working were urged to report to the nearest first aid station.
If the case was not serious, the patient was treated on the spot.
If he was seriously injured he was promptly taken to Ford

1
HOSpital. 3

l
3Nevins, Ford Expansion and Challenge, l9l5 §p_l9§fi,
pp. 513-514.

24

In 1927, the Medical Transfer Division was created
for the purpose of placing employees with physical deficiencies
in departments where the physical condition.would best suit
them. Under this system many blind,deaf, and tuberculosis
cases were given jobs at Ford. A few years prior to this when
disabled World War I veterans sought jobs at Ford, according to
Dr. Meade, the Director of the Division, no one was turned down,
unless he was suffering from a contagious disease, whereupon,

he was taken to Ford Hospital, cured, and then given a job.14

According to Dr. Meade, on November 1, 1917, 6,054 men in the
Ford Plant were in an either crippled or diseased condition.
There were three men without legs, fifty-four with a leg or

foot missing, twenty-two with an arm or hand missing, and two
totally blind. Eighty-five per cent of these men.were fully
efficient in their particular jobs. In 1918 out of 33,000
employees, 9,563 were physically below par. There were in 1923,
thirty-seven deaf and dumb, sixty epileptics, and 1,031 employees
minus fingers or thumbs, employed at Ford.15

Safety conditions in the Ford Plant were very good.

14"Employment of Cripples In A Large Industrial Plant?
Monthly Labgr Review, Dec. 1918, p. 1255.

15 ,
"Training and Employment of Disabled Workmen,"
Monthly Labo; Review, Nov. 1923, pp. 1163—64.

After World War I, there was no more belting and each machine
had its own individual drive. Most machines had alarms, bells,
guards, locks, and shields. All these apparatuses were painted

16

red.

There were two causes of accidents in the Ford Plant,
internal and external. Internal reasons could be traced to
carelessness, the mental state of the worker, loss of sleep
or problems at home. External causes could be traced to im-
proper protection of machinery, bad machinery arrangement, or
insufficient light. External causes were the easiest to correct
by the use of protective devices such as guards or shields. In
the Ford Plant every belt was surrounded by a cage or guard.
Railings and iron fences were erected around furnaces and heat-
treating vats. Isles were well defined, and all monorail isles
were well marked. There were wire guards around the presses,
and tin shields on the lathes. Also "safety," "danger," and
"to stop this machine pull plug" signs were numerous in the
shop. The plant was also fully equipped with fire hoses and
extinguishers. There were also periodic inspections of cloth-
ing.

Working rules and discipline differed little from

these in the other auto plants during the twenties. There was

l6Nevins, Ford, Expansion and Challenge, 1915,tg 1932.
pp. 510-110

to be no talking or sitting down on the part of the worker.
Talking according to Ford, took the worker's attention from
his job and made him more likely to have an accident. Also
the men stood at their benches all day. Time margins were
strictly watched at Ford.‘When.the starting bell rang the men
were required to be at their benches with their tools out and
ready to go. The workers then.worked steadily until the noon
bell rang. In addition the worker stayed at his bench until
the quitting bell rang. Quitting a few minutes early to
”wash up" was unheard of.17 In the early days before World
War I, a dismissal could be appealed, but by the nineteen
twenties dismissal by the foreman was final. The workers at
Ford always had to be wearing their badges. If a worker was
caught without his badge, he would be dismissed, If he was
found to be canSistently wearing his badge in a place other
than on his left lapel, he was in some cases sent homafor two
weeks. Smoking was prohibited in.the Ford P1ant,7€gere was
even an attempt to stop chewing, but that failed. Before 1920,
Ford welcomed suggestions from his employees, but by 1922 this
practice was dead. The spirit of the factory after 1920 was

not stimulating, but repressive.18 Absence without notice was

u l7Nevins. Foss. _s__.___riEx ansio _Ean W. 19.15 12.9 19.11.
p. 51 .

183mm P. Norwood, Ford, Men And Methods, (New York.

27

strictly against the rules in the Ford Plant during the nine-
teen twenties. If a worker who was absent without nOtice re-
turned with an excuse of being sick he was taken to the medi-
cal office where his cause was investigated. If it was valid,
he was admonished and sent back to work but if not, he was fired.

In the Ford Plant, as has been said before, the worker
could learn most jobs very rapidly. In two days an unexperienced
man could be made into a first class coremaker. Toolmakers,
experimental room hands, patternmakers, and draftsmen formed
the aristocracy in the Ford Plant. The toolmakers learned
their craft outside Ford and worked for the prevailing union
scale.19 The plant did however, train its own machinists. In
addition to this training, Ford also started the Henry Ford
Trade School and the Ford Service School during the second
decade of the twentieth century. Ford's philosophy toward
education centered around the thought that a person should be
educated for life and not for education alone. True education
would turn a person toward.work, and not away from it. It
would enable a person to live a better life.

The Henry Ford Trade School was started for boys aged
sixteen to twenty years. These boys had to show a great deal

of promise, and also be unable to obtain an education elsewhere.

l9Interview - George Dean President of Michigan State
Federation of Labor. (A. F. of L.) January 20, 1958, Lansing,
Michigan.

 

28

Many were the sons of widows or were orphans. Out of the
750 boys in the Trade School in 1926 fifty were orphans, 300
were the sons of widows, 170 were sons of Ford employees, and
200 were from other sources. By 1926, 400 boys had been gradu-
ated from the school. When a boy first started in the trade
school, he was given a scholarship which paid $7.20 a week.
This scholarship was gradually raised to 8:18.00.20 In addition
each boy received 82.00 a month as thrift money. The school was
governed by three principles:2
1. A boy was to be kept a boy, not made into a pre-
mature man.
2. Academic training was to go hand-in—hand with indus-
trial training.
3. A boy was to be given a sense of reSponsibility
while being trained.
The boys spent two thirds of this time in the shop,zand one
third in the classroom. The subjects they took in class were
English, Mechanical Drawing, Physics, Chemistry, and Trigono-
metry. The boys graduated after three years in the school.
They were offered positions at Ford, but some went to other

firms. In addition to the trade school, the Ford Motor Company

20Henry Ford, Today and Tomorrow, (New York, 1926),
pp. 177-850

lebid.. pp. 177-85.

 

29

also maintained the Service School for the purpose of educat-
ing newly arrived immigrants. These schools taught Economics,
English, United States History, and American Government. The
classes were not held on company time. Attendance was not com-

’ “\

pulsary, but highly recommendeag

On the fifth of January 1914, Ford declared he was
going to divide among his workers a bonus amounting to ten
million dollars a year. This would bring the lowest minimum
wage to 85.00 a day. Also in this year hours were reduced
from nine to eight. The first effect of this announcement was
to make Ford famous. He became one of AmericaiS‘ heroes over
night. The businessmen. called him a traitor to his class, and
the newspapers called him a statesman of industry. On the
first day of the $5.00 day there were 10,000 men at the gates
of the Highland Plant looking for work: The actual wage was
to remain.the same but a bonus was taxpaid every two weeks.
Also only workers who qualified were paid the bonus. To
qualify a married man had to be living with his wife and support-
ing his family. Single men over twenty-two had to be living
wholesomely, and be of '‘proud and thrifty habits”?3 All men

an
under twenty-two had to be the sole support/of some next of kin.

22Hamilton, Henry Forg, The Egg The Worker, The Cipizen,
(New York 1927), p. 232.

23Upton Sinclair, The Fliver King, (Pasadena, Calif. 1937)
p. 64.

30

Also none of those receiving the bonus could take boarders in
their homes, consume alcoholic beverages, have unclean homes.
or sickly children. To perform the function of ascertaining
the facts, Ford set up a social department of fifty men. A
clergyman, Dr. S. S. Marquis,was placed in charge. Sixty per
cent of the employees received the bonus at once. At the end
of six months seventy-five per cent shared, and at the end of
one year eighty-seven per cent shared. From then on.ninety-
nine plus per cent shared. 24 A. Nevins in his book,,ang
Expansion,gnd Challenge, placed the percentage somewhere
between a third and a half.

Ford's purpose in giving the bonus according to J. G.
Hamilton was to help to attain his goal of having all his
employees of good character and good citizens. Ford, said
J. G. Hamilton, wanted all his employees proSperous and con-
tented.25 Keith Sward says,he gave the bonus to keep the
Industrial Workers of the World from organizing his plant.
Starting in 1913, says Keith Sward the Industrial Workers of
the'World began preaching outside of Ford's Plant in Highland
Park. They also called a strike in 1913 for the eight hour
day, and weekly pay days at the Detroit plant of Studebaker.

2“Hamilton, Henry Fgrd, The Man The Wgrker, The
Citizen, p. 216.

2511219,, p. 220

31

The Industrial WOrkers of the World paper 2E2 Emgncipatgy
began calling Ford the "speedup king“, and the "proprietor

of the sweat shop“. At first the Ford officials had the
”wobblie" organizers jailed each time they appeared outside
the plant. In the summer of 1914 the grapevine had it, that
the Industrial Workers of the World wenagoing to strike Ford?6

James Couzens, according to Sward, came to the rescue by pro-
posing the 85.00 day. Also accompaning the $5.00 day was the
speedup.. Due to the speedup profits were running from

8100, 000, 000 to 8150, 000,000 a year by the nineteen.twenties?7
Ford gays in his book ing and Tomo row, that the 85. 00 day
provided a great deal of incentive for Ford.workers. It en-
couraged them to give their all, and to do their best. He

says nothing of’a-speedup.28 In addition the $5.00 brought a
decreased turnover in the Ford Plant. Before the bonus the
turnover was as high as fourteen per cent a day. After the
bonus the rate fell sixty per cent. In 1919, out of 60,000

at River Rouge there was an average turnover of only eighty
men per day. Keith.Sward here charges that this was the glut
of labor in.Detroit, brought about by the bonus. The men could

26Keith Sward, Tne Legenn,nilHenyy,Enydy(NeW York 1948)

p. 50.

22Reinhold Niebuhr, "How Philanthrophic Is Henry Ford"
Christian Century, December 9, 1926, p. 1516.

28Ford, ngigy and W, p. 160.

32

be replaced very easili? Keith Sward in his condemnation of
Ford, fails to recognize Ford's philosophy of wages and buy-
ing power. Ford states that in order to buy mass produced
goods the workers must have a high wage. This would create pur-
chasing power, and more prosperity for everyone. That was the
reason for the $5.00 day, and not the threat of the Industrial
Workers of the World. From 1914 to 1927, the cost of living
doubled in Detroit, while the weekly Ford minimum.wage remained
the same at $30.00. By 1925, the Ford averageiveekly wage was
lower than that of the industry as a whole, the Ford wage being
$30.00, while the average for the industry was $36.67. By 1919
the cost of living had jumped 108 percient over 1914. The $5.00
W38 worth only 82.40.30 Also along with the $5.00 day came a
closer surveillance of the employees. With the coming of the
bonus, and the speedups, however, Ford was able to out the
price of the Model T. Keith Sward with all his talk about
speedups and increased earnings, failed to mention this fact.
By the end of World War I, the five-dollar day had lost
its magic. There was also a great deal of labor unrest in the
plant. Ford, at first, tried to fight these things by work.
He started the company publication, 2E§.EQ£Q.NEE: and employed

29SWard. The Leases. 9.1:. we Ears. pp. 50-63.

30Nevins. M r . ME ansi and challenge. 1215 to 1211.
p. 325.

33

Edgar A. Guest to compose such poems as ”Stick To The Job
You've Got." When these attempts failed, Ford set his
minimum wage at six dollars a day. According to Keith Sward,
he reimbursed himself, by introducing another speedup. The
result was more cars produced, in proportion to the six dollar
day, than the number produced during the five dollar day, and
thus higher profits. Ford called the six dollar day, “one of
the finest cost-cutting mOves we ever made“.31 In 1921 Ford
produced the same number of cars with forty per cent fewer
employees than in 1920. In 1920 there were fewer workers than
in 1919, but double the number of cars were produced. Some

of this production increase was due to more efficient labor
saving machinery. After the 86.00 day was inaugurated only the
most efficient, strongest, and most willing of the employees
could survive. Even though the six dollar day brought an in-
crease in pay, the real wages of the Ford workers were still
lower than they had been in 1913, and in many cases workers
were pushed back to a four and one-half day week, making wages
lower. In 1922 the Ford weekly wage was higher than the aver-
age of the industry as a whole. The Ford wage tuni' $36.00 a
week (assuring full time) while the average of the industry
was $32.92. With the six-dollar day and the speedup, came a

demand for younger men. Young men could work harder, and keep

3lSward, Legend 9; Henry Ford, p. 75.

up to the pace of the line. Old men were discharged, regard-
less of the number of years service. Edmund Wilson, in his
book, American Jitters, remarked that, "A man checks his brains
and his freedom at the door when he goes to work at Ford's."32
Reinhold Niebuhr bitterly stated in 1926, that "The auto indus-
try is too young to have a conseience." 33 These speedups dur-
ing the twenties were due to the actions of Ford, but to a
greater extent the policies of Sorensen and Bennett.

In the fall of 1926, Ford introduced the five instead
of six day week. The men were to be paid six days pay for five
days work. The purpose of the move, said Ford, waréy‘to decrease
wages, but to enable the workers to earn their present income
in five sixths of the time. Also Ford said the man that has
two leisure days per week will have more time to enjoy and use
his automobile. There will be more consumption on the part of
the worker. This will make for more production and higher pro-
fits.34 Reinhold Niebuhr, in an article in Christian Century

stated that the five day week came as a cover up for the de-

creased demand for Ford cars.35 Although Ford said that the

32Edmund wilson, The American Jitters, (New York, 1932),
Chapter 8, p. 46.

33Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Century, Dec. 9, 1926,
p. 1517.

34"The Five Day Week In.The Ford Plant," Montnly Labor
Review, Dec. 1926, p. 1162.

.353

workers would receive six days pay for five days work, a
wage reduction did follow very shortly. The average Ford
worker lost $4.00 a week in pay. At the same time the
assembly line was speeded up to put production twenty-five
per cent greater than during the six day week. Sorensen also
began his policy of discovering and eliminating the "dronesl"
One man in six was discharged. The five day week paid for
itself many times over as a result of the tremendous speedups
that followed.

In Detroit the cost of living had jumped one hundred
per cent since 1914. In 1925 the Ford weekly wage was 84.21
below the average for the industry, and in 1928 they were
81.27 below. Despite, however, the reductions in earnings in
late 1926, the average rate of pay went up for the years 1925,
1926, and 1927. In 1927, 45,000 workers got pay increases of
8.40 an hour until the worker reached $7.20 a day. From the
87.22 on up, it was very difficult to get a raise. In the
years from 1925 to 1927, the weekly pay rate rose by an average
of 84.68. During the year 1927 the average rate of hourly pay
was 93.6 cents.6

In 1927, the Ford Motor Company closed down to retool

for the new Model A. Sixty-thousand men were out of work for

one year.37

 

36Nevins, Ford, Expansion and Challenge, 1915 t2_19§§,
p. 1517. .

37P. U. Kellogg, "When Mass Production Stalls," Surve ,
March 1, 1928, p. 682.

The Ford shut down.was responsible for forty-five per cent
of the unemployment in the city of Detroit in 1927. Yet Ford,
being outside the city paid no taxes. At this time Ford stated:
"I know it has donekhem a lot of good, if there is any unemploy-
ment in America, it is because the unemployed do not want to
work."38

Although at first speedups came with the new model,
the assembly line pace by 1929 had slowed down a considerable
extent. According to E. P. Norwood the worker must work at a
brisk, but not tiring pace.39 In addition to E. P. Norwood,
Stanley B. Mathewson, who completed a survey of Ford conditions
in 1930, found that the Ford workers had no difficulty in keep-
ing up with the assembly line. The assembly line speed by this
time was not excessive.

In 1929, Ford, after attending a White House conference
of business and labor leaders, declared a 87.00 minimum daily
wage in his plants. Ford declared that the purchasing power
of the nation must be held up, and the way to accomplish this
was by higher wages. The $7.00 day was maintained for about
two years. At first it did instill some confidence but as the

depressiOn deepened, and the workers worked fewer seven-dollar

38Sward, The Legend d; Henry Ford, p. 20.

39Edwin P. Norwood, Ford Men And Methods, p. 9.

days the figure gradually lost some of its luster. Also the
Ford Motor Company began diverting an increasing share of its
sub-assembly work to suppliers, who for the most part paid
very low wages. In 1929 there were 2200 concerns supplying
Ford, while in 1930 therewere 5800. The Auto Workers News
charged that the Briggs Company which made forty-three per
cent of Ford bodies, cut its wages from fifteen to fifty per
cent in 1930, and from five to thirty per cent in 1931.40 In
1932 unskilled workers were being paid twenty-five cents an
hour. The Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Company, another supplier, cut
(the wages of toolmakers from $1.10 to 8.80 an hour. The
Detroit Gear Company laid off all its men who were earning $.90,
and hired them all back at 8.73 an hour. In 1930, 80,000 men
were out of work at Rouge Plant because of the farming out of
assemblies to suppliers]...1

Hours of work in the Ford plant remained about the
same throughout the nineteen.twenties. The office hours were
from: 8:15 A. M., to 12:00 noon and 1:00 P. M. to 5:15 P. M.

The factory worker might work any one of three shifts.

First shift: '12:00 Midnight to 8:00 A. m.

4:00 to 4:10 lunch period.

”OAutg Worker'g News, May 1930.

”IR. L. Cruden, "The Great Ford Myth". New Repnplig,
March 16, 1932, pp. 116-119.

38

The workers did not leave their places during lunch

periods.

Second shift: 8:00 A. M. to 4:00 P. M.

12:00 noon to 12:10 Lunch

Third shift: 4:00 P. M. to 12:00 Midnight

8:00 to 8:10 Lunch

The shifts of machinists, car assemblers, testers, ship-
ping and stores employees, receiving department employees,
laborers and truckers:

First shift: 6:30 A. M. to 10:30 A. M.

30 minutes for lunch
11:00 A. M. to 3:00 P. M.
Second shift: 3:30 P. M. to 7:30 P. M.
10 minutes for lunch
7:40 P. M. to 11:40 P. M.
The draftsmen only worked one shift.
8:00 A. M. to 5:00 P. M.

Throughout the first half of the decade of the twenties
the morale of the employees at Ford grew steadily lower. After
1925, and the end of the speed drive, the morale remained at a
low ebb but static. There was grumbling about the wages, hours
and working conditions in the Ford Plant during the twenties.
The work was no doubt hard, and the policies of Bennett and
Sorensen were Oppressive. But it also must be remembered that
the conditions at Ford were better than those of the auto indus-

try as a whole, and far better than fOr all industry.

cmmmlv
EFFORTS TO KEEP THE UNION OUT

In the nineteen twenties the auto manufacturers were
not only non-union, but anti-union. They employed every possible
means to keep the unions out of their plants as did manufacturers
in many other industries.

One method by which the automobile employers insured
themselves against labor unions was by forming organizations
among themselves. The National Automobile Chamber of Commerce,
one such organization, included all Detroit auto makers except
Ford. Each member of this organization reported its production
figures each month, and in turn was provided with the produc-
tion figures of all the other members. Also this organization
established a cross patent system among its members. All the
members together had a total of 300 patents between them. Each
could use a patent belonging to any other member.1 Others were
the National Automobile Dealers Association, The Motor and
Equipment Association, and the Motor and Accessory Manufacturers
Association. These organizations included all those who were
not in the Automobile Chamber of Commerce, with the exception of
Ford, who was not a member of any of these organizations. The

National Automobile Dealers Association took an agressive stand

1
Ralph C. Epstein, The Automobile Industry Its Economig
and Commercial Development, (New York 1928), pp. 235-37.

when the machinist union tried to form the garage mechanics in
Chicago.2 The association instructed the garage owners to

screen carefully all their employees for union activity, partic-
ularly those hired within a recent period of time. All those
suspected of union leanings were to be discharged and blacklisted.
Every auto dealer was to find out the extent of union activity

in his city. If any union men called upon the dealer he was to
refuse to discuss union activities. If the union organization
campaign was vigorous and persistent, the association would send
help in the form of thugs and spies. The National Automobile
Dealers Association had an excellent espionage system serving

its members with reports of union activity and membership. Another
body that worked against organization was the Employers' Club of
Detroit. This organization coined the slogan, "Detroit is Detroit
because of the open shop." The members met once a month chiefly
for the purpose of exchanging information and reaching agreement
on wages, hiring practice, and general personnel relations.

Dunn in his book,,Ldndy,And,nnip§J charges that members helped

one another to end their labor troubles. If a member had a

strike in his plant the others lent their workers as strike
breakers. Some of the other employer organizations were the

2
The New York Times, July 9, 1927.

41

Michigan Manufacturers Association, the Manufacturers Associa-
tion of Flint, and the Pontiac Manufacturers Association?

The Employers‘ Association of Detroit spent $100,000
to break the building trades unions in Detroit in 1925. Twenty-
five thousand dollars of this was contributed by Fisher Body.
The organization also fought the A. F. L. when it held its con-
vention in.Detroit in 1926. The Annn,Workers N§n§,charges that,
in 1927 this organization, with the aid of the Citizens Committee,

conducted a company to keep the A. F. L. out of the Detroit auto

plants.“

Charles W. Nash once told a group of men that “if labor
ever tried to organize his plants he would close them up"? In
the Nash Plants, man talking unionism were discharged, and in
1928, Nash himself, contributed heavily to a campaign to drive
. the Hosiery Union out of the City of Kenosha, Wisconsin, Nash's
home city. Also, during the twenties, General Motors conducted
a great and constant campaign to keep the union out of its
plants. This consisted of Yellow-Dog contracts, company unions

and labor spies. The Murray Body Company's Yellow-Dog contract

3Dunn, Labon And Antdnobiles, p. 167.

gAuto Workerg Newg, May 19, 1928.

:93. Cit., p. 170.

reads as follows: "As an employee of the Murray Corporation

of America, I understand that I am working under open shop
regulations. That no union or shop committee is recognized

and that wage adjustment will be made from time to time when
deemed advisable after careful study of conditions and methods
by the management."6 Also General Motors battled the coal
union, by refusing to buy coal from union Operated mines. Union
papers, if found on.a worker, were grounds for dismissal. When
a union paper was distributed in.front of a Pontiac General
Motor Plant in 1926 the distributors were arrested on charges
of; disorderly conduct, distributing literature that tended

to disturb the peace, scattering paper on the sidewalks, and
interfering with the plant employees. The Anne, Mew
was prohibited from sale several times at Lansing, Detroit,

Flint, Pontiac, and Toledo.7

The LaFollette Senate sub-committee investigating civil
liberties. revealed that many private detective agencies
furnished spies to the auto plants in.the twenties. In one
year alone, Chrysler paid $72,611 to the Corporationis Aux-

iliary Agency, a labor spy and information service. There were

6Auto Wgrgerg News, Sept. 1929.

7Dunn, Laer And Antgmobileg, pp. 172-3.

228 such agencies in the country, serving all industry.8
Where the machinists attempted to organize the auto repair
garages, the Chicago Auto Trades Association promptly hired
spies to discover who the unionists were.

According to Leo Huberman, the labor spy would hire
out in the plant and work along with the men.9 He would move
into the neighborhood of the workers, and generally fraternize
with them. If there was a union in the plant, the spy would
sttend all the meetings, and probably get himself elected to
an office. When.the spy would go to his home in the evening
he would write a detailed report of the day’s happenings, where
he went, whomhe met, what they said, who were the union's
officers, who attended the meetings and so on. He would mail
the report to the agency headquarters, where it would be
edited and returned to the employer. When not occupied with
union business the spies circulated freely around the worker
neighborhoods, and in the places where the workers congre-
gated.lo

In addition to coercing the workers to stay out of

unions, the employers openly wooed them. A way of doing this
8Herbert Harris, "Revolt of the Robots:, Cnrrent
Hi tor , April 1938, p. 49.

9Leo Huberman, The Ldbon,_py, (New York 1937) pp.34-49.

10United States Congress, Senate Committee on Education

 

and Labor. Violatidng of Free S eec Md Right 91 Labor..fl_ay-
24tn Cc res ,.gnd ess U. S. Government Printing

Office, 193 -19 1 Part 1 9 B, p. 1182.

was to institute a profit sharing program. Two outstanding

such programs were those of Ford and Studebaker. The Ford
profit sharing program was instituted in 1915, popularly

known as the five dollar day. The plan reduced employee turn-
over and also quieted any union stirrings. Before this time,
Ford paid a bonus in 1909 amounting to 880,000, and in 1913 a
$200,000 bonus was distributed. The actual wages in the 1915
plan were the same per day, but the bonus made the actual take
home pay $5.00. For example if a worker earned $.26 per hour,
$2.34 per day, he was given a daily bonus of 82.66 for a total
of $5.00. The profit was simply added to the wage.11 The
system was dissolved by 1919. Throughout the 1920's the workers
were paid a flat rate, with no bonus attached. The bonus plan
was terminated because of the opposition of Ford executives,
principally Sorensen, and later BEnnett, growing skepticism ‘.
of Ford himself and a great increase in administration costs.12
The old Sociological Department had disappeared by 1920. In
the opinion of S. M. Levin, an economics instructor at the ‘
City College of Detroit, however, the real reason for the

failure and ultimate termination of the plan was that when

the plan was introduced the cost of living in Detroit rose so

118. M. Levin, "Ford Profit Sharing," Personnel Journal,
August 1927, pp. 75-86.

128. M. Levin, "The End of Ford Profit Sharing,"
Personnel Jonyngl, October 1927, pp. 161-170.

45

rapidly and so far, that the plan was abandoned.

The directors of Studebaker adopted a profit-sharing
plan for management in 1914, and a wage dividend plan for labor
in 1917. In 1919 it increased the rates and also granted
vacations with pay. All employees from executives down to and
including foremen, who held positions of authority, were classed
as management. Also this position.might involve the Spending
or committing of the corporation's money. Labor was defined
as the great body of men.who have no responsibility, other than
the daily performance of their jobs. The first profit-sharing
plan for the year 1914 was to be paid, provided the profit on
the common stock equaled three per cent after seven per cent
on the preferred stock. If the profits exceeded the above
amount, twelve percent of the first million, fourteen.per<3ent
of the next million, and fifteen per cent of the excess would
go into the fund}3 These percentages were lowered as the decades
of the teens and twenties wore on.

The recipients of the plan were divided into groups;

I - Several high officials (six)

II - Next ten.

III - Next twenty.

IV - The rest.

13Albert R. Erskine, History _o_f;_ the Studebdkdy £912..
(South Bend, Ind. 1924) p. 115.

The groups received their payment in one half cash and one-
half common stock, which was held in trust. Twenty-five per
cent of the stock was paid the first year; twenty-five per

cent the second year, and fifty per cent the third year. If

a worker quit the company before the three years was up, he

lost all his stock.14

The co-operative plans for labor, as adopted by the
corporation were not stictly profit-sharing plans, as the
payments under them were fixed expenses. These payments were
made before dividend payments and were put at the fixed cost
of the company. These payments were in addition to and not
in place of wages. Continuous service was necessary in order
for payment under the plan. An absence of thirty days, if
for illness, was accepted, but chronic late-comers, or immoral
employees were not accepted. _Only employees "who were steady
and true" were under the plan. With an average, in 1923, of
17,094 workers at Studebaker, 11,376, received checks under
the plan.15

Studebaker also had an employee (labor) stock purchase

plan. Employees were allowed to subscribe up to twenty per

cent of their annual pay to the purchase of common stock. Ten

1“Erskine, Hietory,d; the Studebaker ngnoratipn,
p. 11?.

151mg... p. 119.

47

per cent was paid down and the rest was paid in monthly in-
stallments amounting to three per cent of the purchase price.
All the cash dividends were accredited to the employee.
Employees also received dividend checks on each anniversary

16
date at Studebaker during the twenties at the rate of:

5 per cent - first - fourth year
10 per cent - fifth year on.

Upon completion of twoyear's service each Studebaker
employee was to receive a week's vacation with pay.

The company also had an employee pension plan. Each
employee, whose earnings averaged not more than $3,000 a year
for the preceding five years and reached the age of sixty
years, could retire on a pension. The pension rate was twenty-
five per cent of the average rate of pay in the five year
directly preceding retirement. The minimum was $30.00 a
month. In 1923 sixty-eight employees were receiving benefits
from the pension plan.

Dependents of deceased employees of Studebaker, with
five years service or longer who were earning less than
83,000 at the time of their death received a cash payment of
$5,000. The toal expense of the co-operating department for
1923 was $1,993,360, plus $358,036, which went for the mainten-
ance of the employment office, hospital, bank, and the publica-
1?

tion of the employee magazine.

l6Erskine, Histgry ni the Stndebaker Cgrporation, p. 123.

17Ibid., p. 129.

Other employee activities of Studebaker consisted of
glee clubs, bowling teams, basketball team, bands and symphony
orchestras, men's clubs, baseball team, picnics, banquets, and
outings.

In Ford during the twenties there were male choruses,
bands, orchestras, athletics, picnics, general get-togethers,
a company store which sold goods at a cut rate, and legal aid
for the employees.18 In addition there were the schools.

In the Buick Plant there was a neWSpaper called the
fining Family which had tidbits about the company band, feather
parties, horse-shoe pitching tournaments, twenty—year emblem
receivers, and the company bowling team.19

Tnn,Cadillac Craftsman published news about the
company bathing beauty contest, poetry, honeymoon pictures,
and the progress of the factory athletic teams. Also there
was news about picnics, "kiddies parties," the girls ukulele
club, the glee club, and the winners of the photo contest.
There were also many “self—help" quotations from Harvey
Firestone, and Andrew Carnegie. The Budd Company published
a paper called the "Buddgette." All the employees were called

"Buddites" and their children "junior "Buddites."20 The

18Nevins, "Ford Profit Sharing," Personnel Journal,
August 1927, pp. 75-86.

19Dunn, pahor And_Automobiles, p. 149.

20Ibid p. 156.

Packard employee paper expounded upon the success of the
company bowling teams, and the different workers who had
five, ten, and twenty-five year pins. The paper state that
all Packard employees must become citizens, and "practice
Americanism in their daily lives".

The Studebaker magazine, the Studebgker Co-operator,
contained pictures of the foreman, marriage news, and the
results of the company baseball teams.21

Many plants conducted raffles and failure to purchase
a ticket could be grounds for discharge.22

In Lansing the Rec Motor Car Company published the
329 Spirit, which contained news of the company baseball and
horseshoe pitching teams, news of the band, the annual Rec
employee's ball held in the Rec Clubhouse, and the annual
picnic. This firm also had a large and well-stocked employee
library, and a free movie once a week. The Rec Band was well
known throughout the midwest, and was considered by many
authorities on the subject. as almost a professional organiza-
tion. The band had a very large and complete library of
music, and in its later days played weekly concerts over a

Lansing radio station in addition to its regular concerts.

21
Auto Workers News, June 1927.

 

22
Ibid., March 1928.

Many of these employer recreation programs, were sincerely
instituted for employee entertainment and betterment, but

all had the effect of discouraging union membership.

50

CHAPTER V
ORGANIZING EFFORTS BEFORE 1926

'American labor organizations entered upon a period of
retrogression after World War I, which lasted until the New
Deal. The total union membership in 1920, numbered five million
and in 1926 the membership was 4,450,000. During the twenties,
only about twenty-two per cent of the labor force was organized.1
The losing of both the coal and steel strikes in 1921 were
heavy blows to organized labor. The depression of 1921 and the
"Red Scare" also were harmful to labor's interests. The courts
also hurt labor by their use of the injunction.

Management by its use of spies, the Yellow Dog contract,
and employer associations managed to keep labor on the run, and
the "American Plan” in effect. The unions themselves were also
divided in the period. The A. F. of L. did not care to organize
the large industries unless it could do it on a craft basis,
which was practically impossible. The inability of organized
labor to penetrate such industries as autos, steel, food packing,
rubber, and others was partially due to the indifferent attitude
of craft union leaders. Many A. F. of L. leaders both feared

and looked down upon industrial unionism.2

1S. M. Levin, "Ford Profit Sharing," Personnel Journal,
August 1927, p. 509.

2Ibid,, p. 509.

Despite the open shop or "American Plan", there was

some organizing activity being carried on in the auto plants
during the early twenties. This work was being done primarily
by two unions, the Machinists Union and the Auto Workers Union.
In 1919, the Machinists Union claimed 7,000 to 10,000
members in Detroit. Some of these men.were in the automobile
industry.3 During this year the union conducted a strike
against the Timken Roller Bearing Company's Detroit Plant,
whick R. Dunn says involved 4,500 workers and lasted a month?
The strike was called on May 16, at 9:00 in the morning. Some
weeks before the company had cut pay rates and lengthened
hours. When the shop committee protested, the company prom-
lead to restore the old rates. This promise was never made
good, and finally the workers voted to strike at a meeting
on the evening of May 15. The strikers demanded a minimum
of $6.00 a day and an eight hour day.5 Colored strike breakers
were brought in from Toledo, Ohio, and normal operations at
Timken.were resumed, contrary to R. W. Dunn's statement that

the plant was closed for a month.6 The pickets remained for

3Dunn, Labon And Automobiles, pp. 184-85.

“Ibid., p. 184.

 

 

5Detroi§ Labor News, May 23, 1919.

6
Ibid., June 6, 1919.

 

 

53

five weeks at which time an injunction.was issued against them
by circuit court Judge Charles Marschmer. Between the strike
breakers. and the injunction the workers were beaten; they
were permanently dismissed and blacklisted.7 Also in 1919 the
union conducted a strike against the Willys-Overland Company
in Toledo, Ohio. The company increased hours from forty-four
to forty-eight weekly, and lowered wages. It looked out all
employees who refused the offer. Led by the machinists the
13,000 employees turned the walkout into a strike. There were
three shifts of pickets at the Willys Plant, and up to May 8,
1919, there was no violence. On May 9, however, when non-strik-
ing workers tried to cross the picket line, they were beaten
and stoned. The police intervened and dispersed the rioters.
The next day 500 ex-soldiers were sworn in as extra police
deputies, and order was kept for approximately two weeks, dur-
ing which time strike breakers operated the Willys Plant. Early
in the evening of June 3, a pitched battle occurred between
150 non-strikers and 300 strikers? The battle occurred as the
non-strikers were entering the plant on board two railway
passenger cars pulled by a switch engine. Sixteen of the ex-
soldier deputies armed with repeating rifles who were on hand

at the time intervened. As a result three persons were killed

7Detroi; Labgn News, August 8, 1919.

8The New Yorn Times, May 8, 1919.

91bid., June 4, 1919.

54

and many more wounded, either from bullets or flying bricks.
The next day strikers also stoned a streetcar which was
loaded.with strike breakers. Workers in the Willys-Overland
Plant in Detroit, who had not gone out on strike,were beaten
as they entered the plant, by strikers from Toledo];0 On the
same day, the Willys-Overland management sent a message to
NewYork importing sixty to seventy more strike breakers. At
1:00 A. M. the next morning, the mayor of Toledo, when aroused
from bed. by rocks being thrown.through his front window, sent
word to Governor Cox of Ohio, asking for state troops to keep
the city safe from the strikers. The gpvernor refused on the
grounds that the situation was not outof controI}

Federal Judge, John M. Killits, on Saturday, June 7,
issued a restraining order prOhibiting the strikers from inter-
fering with the non-strikers. Peaceful picketing was permitted,
but the picket had to be an American citizen. The following
Monday, twenty-five secret service men arrived from‘Washington,
D. C., to enforce the order. The plant resumed full scale pro-
duction the next day, with the aid of the strike breakers, and

the secret service men. The strike was broken. On July 18, the

Willys-Overland Plant announced it would suspend its profit-

10The New York Times, June 4, 1919.

11Ibid., June 5, 1919.

sharing program for the preceding quarter. The company said,
"Owing to the unjust strike, instead of making a profit in the

12
quarter ending June 30, we sustained a loss".

One interesting side-light on the Willys-Overland strike
was the injunction issued by Judge John M. Killits. This accord-
ing to The New York Times, was the first time the Clayton.Anti-

Trust Act was applied to a labor union.13 The Clayton Act

states that an injunction cannot be issued if the union activity
is Flawful“ or “peaceful". The judge. interpreted the Toledo
riot as ”illegal", and"unpeaceful", and on this basis issued the
restraining order.

Two months before the Willys strike, the union.fared
a little better against the Russell Auto Company of Buffalo. In
this case the court decided it was perfectly legal for the union
to attempt to organize the p1ant.1u 'At its 1921 convention.the
Machinists Union executive committee, which.was beginning to
incur the wrath of the A. F. L. for its industrial organizing
activities,_voted to break from the parent union and become an
independent. Once on the convention floor, the resignation

15

resolution was voted down. All through the nineteen.twenties

12The New Xnng Times, July 19, 1919.
l31bid., June8, 1919 and Sept. 25, 1919.

141tid., May 6. 1919.

 

15Ibid., June 11, 1921.

machinist union agents continued to agitate in the auto plants,
but the union's power was broken in the 1919 Willys strike.

The second union to organize in the auto plants was
the Auto Workers Union. This union, an industrial union,
developed out of the A. F. L. carriage workers union founded
in 1893._ In 1911 the A. F. L. recognized the growing automobile
industry, especially because many A. F. L. craftsmen, were going
to work as non-union men in the auto plants. In 1918 the Auto-
mobile Workers Union.was ordered by the parent A. F. L. to
strike the name ”automobile” from its titléEKEhis the smaller
union refused to do. By 1919, the union membership was 13,000
strong, mostly Detroit auto workers.16 The union continued
under the A. F. L. until 1921, when it was expelled because of
its violation of A. F. L. craft principle of organizing painters,
metal workers, electricians, etc.,into separate unions instead
of one large union. By 1921, the Auto Workers Union had 45,000
members, and thirty-five locals in Detroit, Toledo, Cleveland,
Cincinnati, Flint, Pontiac, Buffalo, Chicago, and New York.17

Seven organizers were working full time. The Detroit Local
127, was the largest local. R. Dunn states that it was the

first to get the forty-eight hour week, pay increases, and better

16Heston‘William McPherson, Labor Relationg in the Anto
lndustny, (Washington, D. C. 1940) p. 16.

'17Ben Stolberg, The Stony p1 the d. I. 9., (New York
1938) p. 156. """'

conditions, although he does not say in which plants. It was
described by Auto Workers Union President, W. A. Logan as the
strongest single labor local in Detroit.18 The Detroit Local
had a form of organization similar to the shop—steward system
so prevalent today. The Detroit auto workers were organized
into shop units which were composed of committee men, elected
one for every ten workers in the plant. The governing body at
the local, the board of administration, was made up of the
secretaries and chairmen of these units, the executive board,
and the board officials. All grievances came to the shop
committee men, who handled them on the spot. If the grievance
could not be settled at this point the board of administration
took up the case. The Auto Workers Union had committees in
the following plants in Detroit; Studebaker, Hupp, Fisher
Body, American Auto Trimming, Young, Cadillac, Anderson, Briggs,
Hudson, Chalmers, Wilson Body, McCord, Lincoln, and Packard.
The managements may have recognized these committees but the
chances are that they did not, particularly Briggs. Dodge,
Wadsworth, Ford, Paige, KelSey Wheel, and Saxon had members,
but no committees had been set up. 19

In its short career, the Auto Workers Union had many

18Dunn, Labor And Automobiles, p. 188.

19Ibid., p. 188.

strikes. In.Apri1 1919, the Wadsworth strike occurred, in-
volving some 1500 workers. The cause of the strike was the
company's refusal to permit a worker's committee. The
company was engaged in turning out Ford automobile bodies and
used this company's workers to break the strike?0 In the
Spring also of 1919, 700 workers of the Young Spring & Wire
Company struck for an increase in pay, and the reinstatement
of three shop girls who had been discharged. After'twoveeks
the demands were won. Also in 1919 there were minor strikes
at the Wilson Body Company, Dodge Brothers, and Studebaker.

A number of strikes also were staged in the early
twenties. In November 1920, Fisher Body instituted a ten
per cent out in.pay.' This was followed by another decrease
in February 1921 of twenty-five per cent?1 At this point a
strike was called. This strike, for all practical purposes,
marked the climax of the Auto Workers Union in Detroit.22 The
country was in a state of depression and there was a surplus
of labor. Fisher Body easily imported.non-strikers and normal
production.continued. There were also strikes during this
period in the paint departmentsat Packard and Hupp. The Auto

Workers Union won both of these, but the number of workers ine

20 , .
Detrglt Labgr Newe, May 16, 1919 and May 23, 1919.

21m.) may 16, 19200

22 Ibid. , Feb. 11, 1921.

2
volved was very small, both under a hundred.

Outside of Detroit, the union had some measure of
success in its stronger locals. In Grand Rapids, workers in
the Hayes-Ionia Body Company struck. For fifteen weeks the
company tried to break the strike by injunctive action and
the use of strike breakers. In the end the 400 workers were
taken back. As to their demands I could find nothing concern—
ing losses or gains. Other strikes were staged in the Seaman
Body Company in Milwaukee. and Buick in Flint.24 The most
effective strike outside of Detroit in the 1919 to 1921 period
was staged by the workers in about 100 body-building, painting,
and repairing plants in Manhattan and Queens in New York. The
Auto Workers Union local, about 1200 strong, was headed by
Arthur Rohen. The demands were a forty-four hour week instead
of forty-eight, and a fifteen per cent wage increase for
workers receiving less than $35.00 a week, and a ten per cent
wage increase for those earning $35.00 a week or over?5 Charles
E. Hawkes, Sr., President of the Auto Body Manufacturing and
Applied Trades Association, said that his organization.would
not deal with the union, but it would deal with the workers

Eastman halos; News. Feb. 11. 1921.

291bit, July 1, 1921. ' .

25211.2 Lemmas Times. Oct. 16. 1919.

individually.26 On.April 2, 1920, Supreme Court Justice.
Gavegan denied an application by Locke and Company and twenty
other auto body manufacturers for an injunction preventing
the officers of the Auto Workers Union from interfering with
their business. S. John Block, attorney for the defendants,
told the court that since the strike in October 1919, the 100
employers rejected a settlement proposed by the Mediation
Bureau of the New York Department of Labor. About seventy-
five of the members then formed the Auto Coach Buildeni.
Association of Greater New York and accepted the union demands.
These shops then operated under union contracts. The other
shops, gradually resumed production, without the benefit of
the union?7
By 1922. the Auto Workers Union.was for all practical
purposes dead. A number of things killed it. The A. F. L.
dealt the union a hard blow by expelling it for its industrial
activities in 1921. The depression of 1920 and 1921 also hurt
the union.very greatly, because members who were unemployed or
received severe pay cuts ceased to pay dues. And in addition,
in a depressed market, employers would make no concessions to

the employees to end a strike. The union newspaper dwindled

from sixteen to eight to four pages. This paper,Tne Autg

26 he New Yorg Times, October 16, 1919.

271bid., April 3, 1920.

Workers Newe, was published sporadically all during the
twenties by the Auto Workers Union. The price was one cent
a copy and the paper was published monthly in the later
twenties.
After the Auto Workers Union.was expelled from the

A. F. L. the communists began to infiltrate its ranks and it
came rightly to be branded "Red”.28 This, especially during
the "red scars" of the early twenties, was particularly

29

harmful to the union.

The next stirrings of organized labor in the auto

industry were to come in 1926.

28A. J. Muste, The Autp TEQUStEY.§EQ Organized Lab r,

(Baltimore, Md. 1936) pp. 27-28.

29Ben Stolberg, The Story p; the d. I. 9., p. 156.

 

62

CHAPTER VI
ORGANIZING EFFORTS IN THE LATE TWENTIES

A. THE A. F. of L'S ATiEiPT IN 1926. The week before
the A. F. of L. convention, the building trades council met in
Detroit to settle jurisdictional disputes between affiliate
unions. Frank Morrison, Secretary of the A. F. of L., arrived
in Detroit on Friday, October 1, 1926, and conferred with
Frank X Martel, President of the Detroit Federation of Labor.
William Green arrived on Sunday morning, October 3, at the
Michigan Central Station. That afternoon the A. F. of L.
executive council held a conference. At that conference, the
council drew resolutions recommending the affiliation of the
Metal Trades Department with the International Federation of
Metal Workers, and that all state and national government con-
tracts calling for the use of metal workers, hire only American
employees. The committee charged that there was discrimination
between hiring American born and foreign born workers on
government jobs. The foreign born.workers would work for less
money.

On Monday, October 4, 400 delegates met in the Graystone
Hotel ballroom for the official opening of the convention. The
meeting was opened with a summary of the past year‘s progress
and the formulation of policies for 1927.

The A. F. of L. declined in membership in the year 1925
and 1926. The 1925 membership had been 2,877,910 while the

1926 membership was 2,813,910. This decrease was partially

due to the fact that the postal railway clerks left the A. F.Of
L. and formed their own.independent union. The executive

council was the same for the two years: James Duncan, Frank
Duffy, T. A. Rickert, Jacob Fischer, Matthew W011, Martin F.
Ryan, James Wilson, and James P. Noonan. The Vice-President

was Daniel J. Tobin, the Secretary Frank Morrison, and after

so many years with Sammuel Gompers, a new face in the president's
chair, William Green.

Big questions to be put before the 1926 convention
were, the six-hour day,the company union, organization of the
auto workers, union insurance, aid to Mexican unionists, and
the recognition of Soviet Russia.

On Monday, October 4, Mayor Smith of Detroit delivered
the welcoming speech to the convention. He said,"Detroit has
some of the finest employers in the country, and also some of
the punkest". He added,"I hope that you fellows will be able
to soften them up". Smith was introduced by F. X. Martel,
President of the Detroit Federation of Labor. The annual re-
port, read the first day, described the company union as danger-
ous to the interests of the workers, and concluded by saying:
"The American Federation of Labor will oppose to the full ex-

tent of its powers the efforts of employers to compel employees

to join company unions'.‘l In addition the report said the

1Detroit Nei , October 3, 1926.

64

"American" plan had spent its force, but could be revived.
The report also referred several times, to the unorganized
workers, but the auto industry was not mentioned, It called
for more worker education, union participation in an inter-
national union, with headquarters in Amsterdam, Holland, and
the end of the use of the injunction.with regards to labor
unions. Concerning communists, the report stated "they have
no place in a free American Trade Union". 2 Constantly stress-
ing co-operation between employer and employee, the report con-
cluded by saying:"The trades union is the custodian of the
craft skill in industry, and the management that co-operates
with the union.will obtain the most intelligent production re-
sults. This fact requires co-operation to the extent of almost
a partnership."3

At his opening speech, President Green attacked
company unions and employee representation plans. He admitted
that company unions jeopardized the labor movement but pre-
dicted that organized labor would triumph in the end. He said
that the A. F. L. would continue in its efforts to organize
the open shop plants, in the city of Detroit as well as every

other American city, “The labor movement is here, it will ever

2Detroit News, October 3, 1926.

3Ibid., October 3, 1926.

remain, its destruction is inconceivable. It has proved by
conflict and contest its right to be recognized as a part of
the institutional life of our great land?“
Continuing President Green said that company unions
would not, in the end, satisfy the workers. The desire was
strong to form independent trade unions. A company union did
not permit the worker to express his views and push for ends he
wanted. All good conditions, had been obtained not by company
unions, but by independent trade organizations. President
Green prophesied that company unions would ultimately fail,
"Each employer has his own peculiar form of organization so
localized in its character, so transient in its basis that it
must ultimately fail . . . . He, (the working man) is always
controlled by those who shaped and formed the organization and
conferred it upon him. The working people will not long sub-
ject themselves to such subordination of conscience because if
there is any one characteristic of the working people of our
land, that stands out more prominently than another, it's the

determination to be independent and free economically and

politically."5
President Green explained that the A. F. L. would

welcome any action on the part of the employers toward the

“The New Yorg Times, October 5, 1926.

 

51bid., October 5, 1926.

shorter work week and higher wages. He added, "We ask him to
accept the philosophy and the theory of the A. F. of L. regarding
6
fl

these reforms. The A. F. of L., said President Green, was equal

culturally, intellectually, and socially to any other group in
the country. A minority of the people feared trade unions and
they were the ones who stated that the working people were con-
tented. If this was so, asked President Green, why did the people
of Detroit elect a unionist as a mayor? President Green ended on
the note that men to be free politically must first be economi-
cally free.

After President Green's speech, the convention adopted a
resolution to make war on company unions. "The United States
cannot remain half trade union and half company union.n7

This was the first time that the A. F. of L. took the
offensive against the company union. A fund of m200,000 was
to be raised to carry out the campaign. The money would be
Spent to educate the workers in the company unions. A tax of
one cent a month for ten months would be placed on each A. F.
of L. member to raise the fund.

On Wednesday, October 6, 1926, the awaited resolution

to organize the auto industry was introduced by James O'Connell,

6
The New York Times, October 5, 1926.

 

7Ibid., October 3, 1926.

President of the Metal Trades Department. "Resolved, that the
officers of the A. F. of L. be hereby authorized to inaugurate
a general organizing campaign in the automobile industry at the
earliest possible date and that the president of the A. F. of L.
call a conference of all officers of national or international
organizations for the purpose of working out the details, so
the question of jurisdiction may be, for the time being elimin-
ated to the end that all employees in the auto industry may be
brought into the membership of the A. F. of L."8

This resolution was first drawn up in the joint meetings
of the Metal Trades Council and the executive council before the
convention started.

By 1926 the industry was producing four and half million
cars a year. The time was considered ripe for organization by
the A. F. of L. At first it was thought that the Metal Trades
Department of the A. F. of L. might be able to handle the job
alone.9

Before 1926 there were a few union (A. F. of L.) men work-
ing in the auto plants. They were craftsmen, principally core-

makers and machinists. These men received union wages, and the

prescribed union conditions, but they had no contract with the

10
employer. Another directly opposite version of the story is

8Detroit News. October 6, 1926.
9Dunn, Labor And_Automobiles, p. 176.

10Interview - George Dean, President of The Michigan State
Federation of Labor, January 20, 1958, Lansing, Michigan.

put forth by Lewis Lorwin. He states that the machinist

union, working through the Metal Trades Department wanted the

A. F. of L. to take over the organizing. The machinist's union
did not have the funds. The reason behind the machinist union's
action, says L. Lorwin, was that this union wanted to keep the
gains it had made in the automobile repair garages throughout
the country. The only way these gains could be safe was to have
the main plants unionized. This plan was abandoned. Funds were
lacking, and at that time the Metal Trades Department was con-
centrating on industries where the percentage of skilled workers
was higher than in the auto plants. A preliminary p1an.was then
drawn up and placed before the 1926 convention. After a short
discussion it passed. The resolution as stated above called for
a meeting of all department heads for the purpose of planning an

organization campaign.ll

Back in 1925, the convention also had a similar resolu-
tion placed before it, but it differed from the first one by
proposing to organize the auto workers on a purely industrial
basis. This proved a bit drastic for the convention and the whole
thing;quietly died in committeGEZThe 1926 resolution which planned

to organize initially on an industrial basis,but which later divided

llLewis L. Lerwin, The Ame ican Federation EL Labor,
(Washington, D. C. 1933), p. 244. _

12Ibid., p. 244.

the workers into crafts was more agreeable.

Reaction to the 1926 resolution rolled from the press.
The editors spoke of the coming, "battle of the Titans“. The
Detroit Employers Association ground out the slogan, "Detroit
is Detroit because of the open shop". John Lester Dryden,
told the Detroit Employers Association that the real cause for
Detroit's growth.was the open shop. ”Ninety-seven per cent of
the workers in Detroit go happily about their callings, with-
out the hindrance of trade unions", said Mr. Dryden. Members
of the Detroit Employers Association at the same meeting at
which Mr. Dryden Spoke, took an oath to protect the open shop}
The citizens committee backed by the Chamber of Commerce, set
up a committee of fifty businessmen to combat the A. F. L.
This committee accused Mr. Green and his associates of being
"unrAmerican" and against the government. The committee further
said.that if the A. F. L. was permitted to organize the auto
Lilants it would mean untold hardship for the men.and ”the ex-
penditure of millions of dollars by our employees".1

The magnitude of the task of uniting the auto workers
became apparent when President Green and members of the execu-

tivwa council visited the Ford plant on October 8. The labor

IBQQEEQAE.N§E§, October 6, 1926.

1“Dunn, Labon dnd.Automgbile§, p. 97.

leaders watched the workers on the assembly line turning a
bolt or tightening a nut. They saw the automobiles grow
before their eyes. The belt never slowed or hesitated. Hindus,
Negroes, Japanese, Poles,Hungarians, Slavaks, and Russians,
all worked side by side. Upon leaving the plant the "delegates
appeared dispirited' and had very little to say. After the
visit the original organizing resolution.was amended to give
the A. F. L. leaders more time to plan before the campaign
started. The Detnoit NEES- stated that, "the Ford visit took
the steam out of labor's‘sails".15 About theonly comment
concerning the visit, by a labor leader, was made by the
Secretary of the Metal Trades Department, A. J. Barres, who
said, "The constant monotony of the work, and the tremendous
pressure under which these men.work, means that within a few
years they are added to the human junk heap, and their places
are taken over by new arrivals . . . . this system makes good
material for the radical and the demagogue to work upon:l6
Upon entering the plant the labor leaders all re-
ceived a pamphlet, outlining Ford practices and procedure.

‘Under the Industrial Relations Section were the words, "Shop

committees, unions, or labor leaders are unnecessary because

15W News. October 9. 1926.

162n9,N§n,Yorg Times, October 9, 1926.

71'

there is nothing to argue about except in individual cases

II
and these are settled man-to-man.l7

After the October 9. (Saturday) session of the conven-
tion had adjourned, James O'Connell, President of the Metal
Trades Department,outlined a tenative program for the conduct
of the campaign to organize the auto industry. A meeting of
the principal craft unions involved.wou1d be held in.Washington,
D. 0., immediately after the convention.was over. The meeting
would be under the direction of the executive council. The
organizing campaign.was scheduled to begin in January of 1927.
A nation.wide publicity program lasting two years would be an
important segment of the campaign. Concerning the conduct of
the campaign, O'Connell said, "The executive council will do
the organizing, thus getting around any jurisdictional disputes.
In this campaign the union.will be free of the old bugaboo juris-
diction. The worker will be free of the usual handicaps and
obstruction generally involved in the business of organizing an
industry through the efforts of a dozen or more distinct craft
international unions."18

Earlier in the day, (October 9) during the session, a
resolution.was adopted calling for shorter hours and higher

pay for workers. Green asserted that the American prosperity

”The New .1er Times. October 9. 1926.

lalpid., October 10, 1926.

was based upon consumption, and higher pay and shorter hours
would work to increase consumption.

On the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth of October,
the convention voted against; recognition of "Red Russia," Wm.
Z. Foster, company unions, the labor injunction, and employer
representation plans. The convention closed on Friday October
15, with a short speech by Green calling for more co-operation
on the part of labor and management.

The closing of the pulpit to Detroits' labor leaders,
and the withdrawal of an invitation by the Y. M. C. A. to
President Green, caused a great deal of furor in the A. F. of L.
convention. Covering the matter President Green said: "it is
difficult to believe that Detroit's churches would yield to
such sinister influences."19 The church and the "Y" leaders
decided to ban the union leaders because of the open shop con-
troversy centering about organizing the auto industry. Officials
of the "Y" who withdrew the speaking invitation to President
Green were Charles Van Dusen and Charles Beecher Warren. Con-
cerning the churches, the A. F. of L. leaders had been speaking
in the churches of the convention cities for seven years. In
Atlantic City the year before sixteen pulpits were filled by A.
F. of L. leaders. Detroit was the first city that refused per-

mission. The possibility of a split in the members of the

19The New York Times, October 6, 1926.

Detroit Council of Churches grew eminent until the labor leaderHs
invitation were withdrawn. Only two of the several hundred
Detroit churches scheduled to have labor speakers, went through
with the original plans. The two churches having labor speakers
were the Bethel Evangelical, whose pastor was Reinhold Niebuhr,
and the First Unitarian Church, Augustus P. Recard, pastor. The
speaker was Albert F. Coyle, of the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers who spoke at both churches, one in the morning and
one in the afternoon. Many ministers favored the labor leader's
speaking, but were voted down by their vestrymen. One church,
the First Congregational, whose pastor was Dr. Glenn.Atkins,
voted to have the speakers, but Rev. Atkins turned the decision
down, saying that it did not represent the true view of the
vestrymen, seeing as some were absent. Rev. Niebuhr, commented
that the church was open to criticism e- "sublimation of
economic interests of a certain class, is just making the
Protestant pulpit a class tool“. 20 According to Tn§,N§n_Xpnk
Tinee, the reason.why the churches turned down the usual privi-
leges of letting labor leaders Speak, was due to a letter sent
by the Detroit Chamber of Commerce to the pastors of all Detroit
churches advising them to refuse to allow the labor leaders to
Speak. Tge Chamber of Commerce branded the labor leaders as

men "who are admittedly attacking our government and our

20
Tne Nan Yonk Tineg, October 7, 1926.

'American plan' of employment".21 The letter was sent just
after the convention got under way.

On October the sixth, (Wednesday) President Green
turned down a new invitation put forth by the Detroit Council
of Churches to address a mass meeting on the Sunday afternoon
of October, 10. The invitation.was extended by James Meyers
through the courtesy of Rev. Atkins and the Council of Churches.
The Detroit Chamber of Commerce was bitterly denounced on the
convention floor and James P. Frey, President of the Ohio Feder-
ation of Labor, called the businessmen of Detroit I'a bunch Of
cutthroats and Slackers”, who try to use the city's churches
for their own selfish ends. C. 0. McGill of the Detroit Chamber
of Commerce later answered the convention by stating, "We are
determined that Detroit Shall not be in the grips of the Trade
Union Leaders. Our city is the most prosperous because it is
the stronghold of the union shop”.22 By the following Friday
however, the controversy had almost subsided. The Rev. Worth
M. Tippey, Executive Secretary of the Social Service Commission,
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in.Amerioa, announced the
completion of arrangements for eighteen labor speakers to appear

in Detroit churches the following Sunday. The list of speakers

21The New York Timeg, October 7, 1926.

 

22Ibid., October 9, 1926.

75

included. President William Green, Frank Morrisson, John
Walker and Albert F. Coyle. President Green.was to speak

at a general meeting which.was to be held at Detroit's First
Congregational Church at 1:00 P. M. on Sunday, October 10.
This meeting was interdenominational and was to be held under
the auspices of the Detroit Council of Churches. The labor
leaders were not to discuss issues such as the closed shop,

23

but the "social and spiritual aims of the labor movement".

One of the speakers was to be Rev. John McDowell, a labor
pastor, who started working in the West Virginia coal mines
at the age of fourteen. The theme of the sermon in all of
the churches was, the relationship of the goals of the union.
and the goals of the church. President Green said: "The
whole tendency of the human race has been toward organization
and co-operation. The churches with their teachings of
brother-hood have helped very greatly".2u The ministers in
Detroit also joined with labor in a rebuke of the Detroit
businessmen for the affront made to the churches, when the
Detroit Board of Commerce sought to intimidate pastors, to
persuade them not to permit labor leaders to Speak in the
churches. Dr. Atkins said the church was independent from out-

side influence, and declared further the right of labor to

2
3The New Yorg Times, October 9, 1926.

2”_I_b_1_<3,.., October 11, 1926.

organize and bargain collectively. Other ministers also
assailed the Board Of Commerce, and linked labor's aims with
those of the church.

On October 14, the Citizens Committee of Detroit sent a
letter to the final session of the A. F. L. convention. The
letter denied that the committee representing forty-five busi-
ness organizations was attempting to control the church and
labor in the city. They were merely attempting to save
Detroit's laborers from control such as had been evidenced by
organizing methods in other cities. ”Before the conclusion
of your convention? the letter went on, ”it is sincerely hoped
that you will answer the questions; What can the Federation do

25

for Detroit workmen”.

The letter was circulated on the convention floor, but

nothing more was done with it. In addition to the church trouble,

the Detroit Y. M. C. A. also withdrew an invitation to President
Green to Speak. The invitation.was withdrawn after the union
resolution concerning the closed shop, company union, and the
organizing of the auto workers. According to the Detroit "Y"
President, Van.Dusen said; "Mr. Green is a Christian gentlemen,
but it would be inexpedient for him to address the "Y“ members

26
at the present time".

25211.2 New. York Times. October 15. 1926.

26Detr it Edna, October 7, 1926.

76

T :77

Van Dusen said further that the invitation had been
sent before the open shop resolutions were passed. The "Y"
was in the process of conducting a building fund campaign.

The Fisher Body Corporation had recently contributed $500,000,
and Ford gave $1,500,000.

Both the Detroit Free,§;g§§, and the Detroit News
editorialized about the.A: F. L. convention. Both said in
effect that the A. F. L. was a very fine organization, and it
had done a great deal for a great many workers in some parts
of the country, and in some industries. But, both also said
that the American Plan was what had made Detroit great. To
destroy the American Plan would be doing an injustice to the
City of Detroit and all the workers in it. The editorials
stated that in Detroit, management and labor act together
harmonously, and a union would Just disturb the arrangement;
therefore the A. F. L. and its organizers should go somewhere
else where they were needed, but they should not stay in
Detroit.27

When the smoke of the convention cleared the seven-
teen.A. F. L. unions involved in the auto organizing campaign
(claiming Jurisdiction over the auto workers) held a conference

to set a line of action. This meeting was held on December 21,

27Detroit Free Press, October 4, and 5, 1926.

 

1926. It decided to waive temporarily all the Jurisdictional
claims of the different internationals concerning the auto
workers. Many of the large internationals balked at the plan,
but it was instituted after much debate. President Green also
intimated that some of the manufacturers were in a receptive
mood, and would possibly consider letting their plants be organ-
ized, if they were safeguarded against Jurisdictional disputes.

A second meeting of the executive council alone was
held in Washington, D. C., on January 11, 1927. After deliber-
ating on the problem of the auto workers and their organization,
the council directed William Green to call a conference of all
labor leaders having jurisdiction over employees in the auto
plants to decide on the organizational steps. After the meet-
ing President Green at his press conference said, "These
trades probably would consider organizing in the various large
auto plants, waiving jurisdiction temporarily to permit greater
expansion among employees of such plants. Some labor leaders
are known to favor a policy of building up independent organiza-
tions of employees within the large auto plants to be absorbed
later by regular labor groups."28

When another conference was held on March 24, 1927,

only nine instead of seventeen unions were represented:

28The New York Times, January 18, 1927.

machinists, molders, draftsmen, plumbers, pattern makers, up-
holsters, painters operating engineers, and electrical workers?9
A plan submitted by President Green was adopted.with a few
minor modifications. It provided for the waiving of Jurisdic-
tion by the various internationals concerned. The A. F. L.
was to direct the campaign. The international unions were to
furnish the organizers and the funds. Workers were to be
formed into organizations directly affiliated with the A. F. L.
The Federation also pledged to bring about the transfer of those
who were organized into the different internationals eventually.
Organizers in the campaign.were to stress the inter-dependent
interests of labor and management, the duties and obligations
of both sides, with regard to collective agreements, and the
need, not only for regulating wages and hours, but also for
improving work standards and stablizing employment. It was
also agreed that where the workers had already been organized
by their craft, they were not to be disturbed?0

Another part of this line of attack consisted of letters
to the leaders of the auto industry, with a view to induce them

31
to enter an understanding that would help the plant to be organized.

29Lorwin, Amerigan Federation.g§ Labor, p. 246.

301333;. , p. 247.

31
Dunn, Labor And Automobiles, p. 176.

 

L. .l u u 2...!” . . . M .Iw..wi
>

in 4‘

 

80

The employers, when they bothered to answer the letters, said
they and their employees were very contented with the existing
situation and no union was necessary. 32

On June 27, 1927, another conference convened to decide
upon immediate steps. An A. F. of L. organizer was appointed
head of the organizing campaign, with five others to work with
him. Work would start in Detroit. Premature strikes were to be
avoided since there was no money for strike benefits. The
organizers were instructed to impress upon the employers the
union's concern for the welfare of the industry. The conditions
of employment at this timevvere bad, many workers were out because
of the model change at Ford. The organizers thought that their
only chance was a conference with Ford. Proposals were put forth,
they failed.33

Not only were the employers adamant, but the local
international union heads wanted very little to do with organ-
ising the auto plants. They were doing "all right" for them-
selves. The did not relish the idea of stirring themselves,

and undertaking the spade work of organizing a "bunch of

ignorant hill billies."3)+ By 1928, the whole organizing campaign

32Raymond Walsh, 9, l. 9. Industrial Unionism in Action,
(New York 1937) p. 97.

33Lorwin, American Federation of Labor, p. 248.

3“'Harris, "Revolt of the Robots," Current History,
April 1938, p. 500

had been abandoned.

_B. MINOR STRIKES IN THE LATE TWENTIES. Starting
in 1926, the machinists union set out to organize the auto
industry ,by working through the garages. and auto repair
mechanics. When this campaign.was started, the employers
used a lookout to kill the union. In order to be allowed to
work, an employee was compelled to sign a Yellow Dog contract.
In the Chicago area the workers refused, and the lockout
turned into a strike. On July 8, 1927, the employees of sixty
per cent of the 1500 gasoline stations in the Chicago area
struck. In addition to the recognition issue there was also
a wage dispute. The station attendants, whose salary was
$140.00 a month, wanted a seven to ten.dcllar increase. The
oil truck drivers wanted a $15.00 increase over their going
rate of $175.00 a month.35 The strike ended two days later
in a compromise. The filling station attendants and oil
truck drivers each received about half of their original
demand. As for the recognition of the machinists. union, the
whole campaign quietly died. The filling station and garage
employees. were still unorganized.

There were a few more strikes of any consequence in

the auto industry before 1933. One event took place in

35The New York Times, July 9, 1927.

 

82

Oshawa, Ontario, at the General Motors plant on March 27, 1928.
Three hundred trimmers walked out of the body plant protesting
a wage cut of forty per cent, the third such cut in six months.
The manager of the plant said that the workers would not be
dealt with collectively, but individually. He further added
that the company was having no difficulty in bringing in
strikebreakers. The strike ended three days later, the workers
accepting a partial cut but not the full forty per cent.36 The
workers in the plant did have a very weak union which was
affiliated with the Canadian branch of the A. F. L. After
the strike the affiliation was severed, and a new one estab-
lished with the All Canadian Trade Union Congress, a more
militant organization.37 Two more strikes in the auto industry
of any consequence during the years from 1926 to 1930 were the
Flint Oil Sanders strike, and the Oakland California Fisher
Body Strike. 3

The Flint Oil sanders struck Fisher Body because of
bad working conditions and a pay out. A non-union shop com-
mittee presented the following demand to the management:

1. A pay raise of $.25 an hour.

2. Better grinding compound.

36The New York Times, March 31, 1928.

371bgd., November 3, 1928.

83

3. Hot water for washing.

4. No victimization.

At a meeting with the management, the workers were
urged to try to earn their old wage, at the new reduced hourly
rate. This the workers refused to do. The strike continued
with mass-meetings and picketing. The stike began to spread
to other parts of the Fisher Plant until also a thousand
workers were involved. To combat this the company offered a
minimum wage of a dollar an hour to all non-strikers. This
move not only stopped the spreading of the strike, but broke
it. Workers returned to their benches, the oil sanders were
fired permanently, men were brought in to fill their places
and normal operation resumed.38

On June 5, 1929, 250 men led the Oakland,California,
Fisher Body Strike. Their demands were;

1. Eight hour day.

2. A six dollar day minimum.

3. Time and a half for all overtime.

4. Recognition of the auto workers union.

5. Equal pay for children and women doing the

same job as the men.

6. One hour lunch period.

38Agto Workers News, August 1928.

84

7. Better working conditions.
8. Paid vacation.
A month later the strike was broken by bringing in
strike breakers under police protection.39
During this period of the late twenties there were
very few minor strikes in the Packard Plant, Hudson Motor
Company, Fisher No. 18 and 21, Pontiac, Seaman Body Company,
Briggs, Kalamazoo Limousine Body Company, and the Grand Rapids
Body Company. Most of these were failures on the part of the
workers.40 These strikes were non—union and spontaneously
called. In all these strikes the Auto Workers News merely
announced that on a certain day so many workers went on strike
in a particular plant in protest for low wages or bad con-
ditions, etc. In subsequent issues the strike is not mentioned

again.

39Auto Workers News, June 1929.

uoIbid., February 1927
July 1927
August 1927
October 1927
July 1929
October 1929
December 1928
March 1929

There was very little or no organizing activity in
the auto plants until 1933, when the A. F. of L. again made
another attempt. It is interesting to note however, that
all through the twenties there were small pockets of union
men in the auto plants. These men were for the most part
skilled tradesmen, such as toolmakers, moulders,pattern-
makers, or machinists. They worked for union.wages, but
not under a contract. They were not recognized as union men

by the management.

CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY

This thesis has served to reaffirm the doctrine that
there were few labor unions in the auto plants during the
decade of the nineteen twenties. At no time during the twenties
except for a brief period directly after World War I, and the
depression of 1921, were the unions in any of the auto plants.
The Ford Motor Car Company, the largest of the auto makers,
was without a labor union throughout this entire period.

The Auto Workers Union which was first made up of
carriage and wagon workers, organized some plants on a very
small scale in the period between.World.War I and the depres-
sion of 1921. The union had numerous small strikes in Dodge
Brothers, Timken, Willys-Overland and others. The Fisher
Body strike which occurred in early 1921, marked the climax
of the union's career. From this time on the union declined
in membership, until the middle twenties it was for all practi-
cal purposes non-existent. The union was also gradually taken
over by the communists, and its tabloid the Ap59.Workers Ngflg
became merely a carrier of the communist party line. The
machinist union during the twenties, also made a feeble effort
to organize the auto workers which came to nothing.

In 1926 the A. F. L. set out to organize the auto
plants but after a series of conferences and letters sent to

the employers, the whole campaign quietly died.

The conditions in the plants themselves during the
twenties, were for the most part good when compared with
those of other industries during the same period. The pay
was not as low or the hours as long as in many others. Due
to this fact unions were kept out. The workers however,
had grievances, the main one being the lack of security, but
they were not voiced, at least in public. Also to counter
organization the employers either used spies, Yellow Dog
contracts, outright physical coercion, or conversely they -
openly wooed the workers by Sponsoring picnics, bands, glee
clubs, and baseball teams. Many of the employers doubtlessly
had good intentions when they staged a company picnic or
banquet, but regardless of intentions the effect was to I
keep out the unions.

If, during the nineteen twenties there had been
labor unions in the auto plants, the later labor leaders of
the nineteen thirties might have been less militant and

violent.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL ESSAY

There has been one major study on labor relations
in the auto plants during this period, that being Robert F.
Dunn's book, Lgp92_Ang,Automobiles, which was published in
1929, by International Publishers. This book is extremely
critical of the auto makers, and the A. F. of L., while at
the same time glorifying the left-wing Auto Workers Union.
Labor And Automobiles proved most helpful for its description
of the organizing activities in the auto plants immediately
after World War I, and during the early twenties by the Auto
Workers Union.

The major source used concerning labor relations in
the Ford Plant was the new book by Allan Nevins, entitled
Ford, Expansion,and Challenge,;2;5,§g,1211, published by

Charles Scribner's Sons in 1957. This source gave a good

 

account of the five-dollar day, the Sociology Department,
and the company's labor policies under Sorensen and later
Harry Bennett. A good description of the Ford factory
methods and conditions was found in E. P. Norwood's, Epgd
Men and Methods, published by Doubleday in 1931. While these
two sources tend to glorify Ford and his policies, he is
soundly debunked by Keith Sward in his book, Th§,Legeng 9;
Henry 292d, published by Rhinehart in 1948. Mr. Sward gives
a very critical account of the five-dollar day, and Ford‘s
labor policies during the twenties. There was almost no

material concerning the working conditions and wages of

Buick or Oldsmobile or any of the other auto plants besides
Ford, about which there was a great deal. The Ford materials
either tended to glorify him very highly or critize him very
sharply. Henry Hamilton a biographer of Ford, and Samuel
Crowther tend to make Ford into an industrial statesman, while
Keith Sward in The Legend 9; Henry Eggd, and Upton Sinclair
in Eng Flivve; Egng, published by Upton Sinclair in 1937,
protray him as somewhat of a scoundrel.

Ben Stolberg in The Sim 91 23112 9.. .1. 2., Viking
Press, 1938: Raymond J. Walsh in.Q, 2,,9. Industrial Unignism
,In Action, Norton, 1937: and Lewis L. Lorwin in Th§.Amerigan
Federation,9£ Lgpgg, Brookings Institute, 1933, all deal very
briefly and critically with the A. F. of L's attempt to organ-
ize the auto industry in 1926.

Concerning wages and hours in the auto plants during
the twenties a very useful study was published in 1925 by the
Bureau Of Labor Statistics, entitled Wages and Hours pi,Lgpgz

,in the Motor Vehicle Industry l2 5.

Turning to neWSpapers, the Detroit Labor News carried

 

 

a fairly complete and objective account of the organizing
activities of the Auto Workers Union and the Machinists Union
in the early twenties. This paper was published by the
Detroit Federation of Labor (A. F. of L.). Another newspaper,

a tabloid used was the Auto Workers News. The only issues avail-

 

able are those from May 1927 to May 1930. Also a few months

are available during the early nineteen thirties. The Agtg
Workers News, published monthly was usually four pages long.

The single copy price was one cent, but the yearly subscrip-
tion price was fifty cents. From reading the Appg'Workers Eggs
one is lead to believe that the Auto Workers Union.was a com-
munist front organization, and that the Auto Workers News merely
reiterated the party line. The Detroit daily newspapers had
almost nothing to say about the union activities in the auto

plants during the twenties, with one exception, the organiz—

 

ing campaign of the A. F. of L. in 1926. The Detroit News
carried a daily front page column on the happenings of the A.
F. of L. convention which included the auto organization plans.
The auto organizing campaign plans were played down by the,N§gs
but they were mentioned.

Concerning periodicals, S. M. Levin in the Personnel
’Journal, October and August 1927, does a fairly objective job
of analyzing the Ford profit-sharing program. Reinhold Niebuhr
very critically analyzes the plan in two articles appearing in
Christian Century for December 1926 and June 1927. The tactics
of the managers and the efforts to organize in the twenties, as
a background for later developments in the thirties are set
forth by Herbert Harris in an article entitled "Revolt of the

Robots" which appeared in the April 1938 issue of Current

History,

M
I?

a. p . .2.
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