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POLICE UNION INFLUENCES 0N DISCIPLINE —

 

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ABSTRACT

POLICE UNION INFLUENCES
ON DISCIPLINE

BY

Ralph A. Olmos

 

The dramatic growth of police unionism in recent

. -a.~m——a—.

 

years has, for the firsgmfiimgiifllfihé police service, imposed

Hum...—

 

 

 

 

“—

the problems of participatory management on police adminis-

(

 

 

 

 

 

trators. The review of the literature in this area reveals
(that research concerning the implications of police unionism
is inadequate.

This study, through the means of in-depth surveys
of two urban police departments, is exploratory research
into the effects of unionism on police discipline. Three
major questions are: (1) what effect, if any, has the
imposition of union intervention had on the chief's authori-
ty? (2) If sanctions are less severe, is it because the
administrators have been intimidated? (3) If there is any
appreciable difference in discipline, has it been in the

substantive nature of the rules or rather in procedural

differences?

 

Ralph A. Olmos

By studying some of the general dimensions of
change in administrative disciplinary practices, the study
attempted to gain some insight in generating ideas for more
specific types of research.

The data from the two sets of interviews indicate
that police employee organizations have, to a certain extent,
challenged the chiefs' traditional authority and that the
imposition of a police union does cause the chief to examine
his prerogatives more closely before he acts, and to exer-
cise a greater amount of care insofar as the due process
rights of his men are concerned. It also shows that most
of the union induced changes in discipline have involved
thefprocedures rather than the rules.

Significant side issues which emerged from this
study were: (1) black police organizations; (2) civilian
review boards. T ere is strong evidence indicating the
black police groups are fast becoming "a third world" force

F

in law enforcement opposed to both the administrators and

 

 

 

 

 

 

the regular employee associations.

 

 

 

 

One of the surveyed departments has had a civilian
trial board in operation for over 35 years. The imposition
of discipline by this civilian board compares quite favor—
ably with the second department where there is no civilian
involvement. The data suggest that further research is
needed to examine the relative merits of civilian imposed

discipline.

POLICE UNION INFLUENCES

ON DISCIPLINE

BY

Ralph A. Olmos

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE
School of Criminal Justice

1972

APPROVED BY: j/ 4% flzfi4/

Cflrman
OWJ

DMZ» lat/tie? Cam/J"
J N

K

Mefi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my sincere
Dr. John McNamara and Dr. Hervey Juris for
advice in preparing this thesis.

I would also like to thank my wife
understanding and encouragement during the
graduate studies.

I want to express a special thanks
and neighbor James Spooner for the help he

me in preparing this study.

ii

thanks to

their help and

Sue for her

time of my

to my good friend

unselfishly gave

TABLE

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . .

LIST OF TABLES . . .

Chapter

I.

II.

III.

IV.

INTRODUCTION .

The Problem .
Hypothesis .

OF

Definition of Terms

Union . .
Discipline‘

Mediation-Arbitration

CONTENTS

Grievance Procedure

Collective Bargaining

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Sources on Collective Bargaining

Generally

Sources on Unionism and Collective

Bargaining In Public Employment
Sources on Collective Bargaining
Unionism In The Police Service

Summary . .

RESEARCH METHOD

Sampling Procedure

Data Collection

Analysis of The Data

SURVEY FINDINGS

City "A":
City "B":
Table 1:
Table 2:
Table 3:

iii

Background Information
Background Information
Comments
Comments
Comments

and

Page

ii

koooqqcnmbm |—’

[—1
O

[.4
H

l3

18
23

25

Table 4: Comments . .
Tables 5 and 6: Comments
Table 7: Comments . .
Table 8: Comments . .
Table 9: Comments .
Table 10: Comments . .
Table 11: Comments . .
Table 12: Comments . .

Table

V. SUMMARY

13: Comments .

AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary . . . . .
Question One . . .
Question Two . . .
Question Three . .

Other Implications of the

Black Police Organizations
Civilian Trial Board

Conclusions . . . .

BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX . .

iv

Study

Page

45
47
50
52
54
57
57
6O
63

65

65
66
67
69
7O
71
72
74

76

8O

LIST OF TABLES

Challenge to Chief's Authority . . . .
Comparison of Administrative Difficulty of
Chief in a Unionized Department to Chief
in a Non-union Department . . . . .

Police Association's Right to Intervene in
Disciplinary Procedures . . . . . .

Union Related Improvement in Discipline .

Administration Sensitivity to Association
Reaction . . . . . . . . . . .

Effect of Sensitivity . . . . . . .
Effect of Association Involvement on Morale
Comparison of Membership Benefits . . .
Recommended Changes in Discipline . . .
Hiring Policy for Managerial Personnel .
Lateral Recruitment and Promotion . . .
Three Classes of Police Officer Concept .

Where Should Union Efforts be Concentrated?

Page

40

42

44
46

48
49
51
53
55
58
59
61
64

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been a marked increase in
police unionism. The police are displaying a propensity

toward banding together for the purpose of engaging in

Ran—“ALF ‘ m.” -. _———-——'--—

bargaining relationships with their employing agencies,

 

 

 

7“» kflw- -‘._ ,__.___._.-- -—‘-—‘ ‘ “" "—"'-“ ‘3‘ ———‘~‘"

 

___—._—— _.

through means of labor uHion affiliation, ormthrogghdlgcal

 

 

 

 

. “4...“.
m..- ..__..... - --

autonomous employee organizationsv—

 

It is reasonable to assume that this trend is having
a certain effect on police wages and general working condi-
tions, but if it is true, as Dr. Daniel R. Kruger suggests,
that, "In addition to being economic institutions, unions
are social, educational and political institutions as well,"1
then it may be equally reasonable to assume that police
unionism is having politiEal’and_sogialflramifications_on

law enforcement generally. More specifically, policemen

a, Aa_’,,___

could use the collective strength of their organizations

to challenge the traditional autocratic power base of the

police chief and bring about changes in the working

 

1Daniel H. Kruger, Associate Director and Professor,
Dept. of Labor and Industrial Relations, Michigan State
University, From comments made in a personal interview.

relationship between chief and patrolmen--ostensibly in

the democratization of that relationship.

The Problem

 

Conflict is inherent in the union-management rela-
III “ ”MIMI

.tionship; Indeed it is necessaryfiif both the unionwanda_

 

 

.-

management are to survive.2 Union leadership that is in

__~_.

 

—~—— — , _____.————-——

iconstant agreement with management will not likely remain
in office for long, and management which accedes to every
union demand will soon find itself bankrupt. Even though
public bargaining does not have the same market place
constraints that exist in the private sector, the leader—
ship of public employee associations has the mission of
winning benefits for its membership while government
officialdom is charged with providing services to the
public at.reasonable rates of taxation. And although
police unions may have certain unique features, the labor-
management conflict phenomenon generally holds true.

In discussing areas of labor—management conflict
in the private sector, Sumner H. Slichter coined the term,

"industrial jurisprudence," to describe that part of col—

lective bargaining which introduces civil rights and

 

2Clark Kerr, "Management of Industrial Conflict in
Society," The Pacific Spectator, Vol. VIII, No. 4 (Autumn
1954), p. 22. (Kerr maintains that without conflict,
management will also lose its institutional identity.)

 

grievance relief into the rubric of union concern and
responsibility.3 In the police service, one of the princi-
pal facets of industrial jurisprudence or human relations
is the question of discipline.

In the police service, discipline! that is, the means

,.__.—..—... ..___._.—-
H...-

gr“-

of obtaining order, compliance and morale within the depart-

ment, has been traditionally imposed through negative means.

’__-—-’

A

The police officer who violates the rules is usually

 

 

 

punished, and it is the chief of police, generally, who
has the authority and responsibility for imposing the
punishment. Forms of discipline can include oral or
written reprimand, loss of days off, suspension from duty
without pay and finally dismissal.

The advant of the police employee associatigp, with

its attendant political and financial strength has made it

'——-
_.-.__——--
’-

 

feasible and practical to contest disciplinary action,

even if it involves less serious forms of punishment. The

employee organization assumes thisflgbligation (the investi-

___.———
‘___——-d

 

gation and review of discipline) as part ofmmembership

benefits. Most police associations employ, or have access

 

to, labor attorneys who assist at grievance proceedings
and disciplinary trial boards. As Hervey Juris states,
"The most obvious challenge to traditional personnel

management practices is the negotiation of grievance

 

3Harold W. Davey, Contemporary Collective Bargaining
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice HalITCInc., 1959),

p. 7.

 

procedures whereby superior officer implementation of
regulations can be effectively subject to review by an
employee who believes his rights have been violated."4
What effect does this and will this have on the
chief's power to control or influence the behavior of his
men in relation to the ability of the employee association
to effectively review or contest his methods of control?
Will the chief be able to continue receiving quasi-military
obedience, or will he be forced to modify his posture to

reach an accommodation with the organizations that represent

his men?

Hypothesis

 

Discipline-—its philOSOphy, procedures and related
sanctions--provides a wide area of conflict between the
administrator and union leaders. Both parties can display
their relative strengths; the chief in trying to impose his
authrotiy over those patrolmen who have violated the rules,
and the union in trying to demonstrate the benefits of
membership by examining and reviewing the chief's actions.
The frequency and results of these contests have a strong
bearing on how the union membership (patrolmen) perceives
the comparative status of their chief and their union
leadership. These contests will also bear upon how the

chief perceives his own authority. Simply knowing that

 

4Harvey A. Juris, "Implications of Police Unionism."
Law and Society Review (November, 1971), p. 8.

 

his action may be challenged and may generate conflict with
the union, a conflict in which he may have to yield, may
cause the chief to examine his prerogatives more closely
before he acts.

The following study will examine the dimensions of
change in administrative authority where there is police
union activity. Major questions are: (1) what effect, if
any, has the imposition of union intervention had on the
chief's authority? (2) If sanctions are less severe, is
it because the unions have forced improvement in the
processes or because the administrators have been intimidated?
(3) If there is any appreciable change in discipline, has it
been in the substantive nature of the rules or rather in
procedural differences?

By studying the general dimensions of change in
administrative disciplinary practices, this study hopes to
gain some insight into the overall implications of police
unionism on the administrative power structure and to
generate hypotheses for more specific research in the

future.

Definition of Terms

 

To avoid confusion, certain key terms and phrases

will be defined according to their usage in this text.

12122.

For the purposes of this research the terms "union,"
"employee association" and "employee organization" will be
used interchangeably. A standard definition of "labor

union" is, . . . an organization of workers formed for

‘,

 

 

 

phe_puppg§§_pf advancing its members' interests in respect

to wages and working conditional"5

~‘~_‘____”p_,,l.
differences among various types of union organizations,

There are striking

but whether referring to groups of tradesmen, factory
workers or professional associations, the main thrust of
these groups is directed toward promoting the economic
interests of their memberships. This study will broaden
the definition to include the concept that, ". . . a union
is a political, social, educational and welfare institution
as well."6 In varying degrees an employee association will
serve part or all of these diverse needs of their member-
ship.

It would be helpful to place police associations
into a more specific niche for definition purposes, but
available research does not yet indicate exactly what direc-
tion police unionism will take. That is, will it be more
professionally oriented such as the teachers' groups, or

will it take a more traditional trade union approach?

 

5Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary_(Chicago,
Illinois: R. R. Donnelley & Sons, The Lakeside Press, 1967),
p. 471.

 

6Kruger, pp. cit., personal interview.

Discipline

 

Discipline will be regarded as a system to obtain
order, to promote adherence to prescribed standards of
conduct and behavior, and to obtain compliance to the
policies of the administrator as well as to the mission
of the department. It includes a body of rules, with
their corresponding rewards and punishments, and the pro-
cedural machinery for dispensing these rewards and punish-

ments.

Mediation-Arbitration

 

Mediation-Arbitration, while often used interchange-
ably, are actually two distinct processes. According to
Webster, mediation is, "Intervention between conflicting
parties to promote reconciliation, settlement, or compro—
mise."7 Arbitration is defined as, "The hearing and
determination of a case in controversy by a person chosen
by the parties or appointed under statutory authority."8
This study defines arbitration as the process whereby a
person or group of persons hear both sides of a case in
controversy and then make a determination either by compro-
mising between the opposing points of View or deciding in

favor of one or the other.

 

7Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, pp, cit.,

p. 526.

8Ibid., p. 45.

In labor disputes arbitration can be binding or
advisory. In the case of binding arbitration, both sides
are bound beforehand to accept and abide by the decision.
In advisory arbitration, also known as fact-finding,
either or both sides are free to accept or reject the
arbitrator's judgment.9

Mediation is similar to arbitration but lacks the
finality or authority of the latter. Mediators act more
in the role of peace makers, attempting to promote recon-
ciliation, settlement, or compromise. A mediator would be
analogous to a marriage counselor whereas an arbitrator is

‘similar to the judge in a divorce court.

Grievance Procedure

 

This is a formal process whereby an employee can
contest an action or decision by management concerning
either interpretation of the collective bargaining agree-

10 Although

ment, or an alleged violation of the agreement.
grievance procedures can take many forms, the usual practice
is that the last step of appeal calls for arbitration by a

third party.

 

9According to Dr. Kruger, pp. cit., this is tech-
nically and legally the case. In practIEE, however, advisory
arbitration is usually accepted. There is a significant
amount of ethical and financial pressure to accept an
advisory decision even though it may be perceived as moder-
ately unfavorable by one of the parties.

10Management can also invoke grievance proceedings
against the union for alleged contract violations.

Collective Bargaining

 

The term collective bargaining is defined to cover
the negotiation, administration, interpretation, application,
and enforcement of written agreements between employers and
unions representing their employees, setting forth joint
understandings as to policies and procedures governing
wages and other conditions of employment. It is more than
just across-the-table bargaining in that it provides a
mechanism for continuous organized relationships between

. 11
management and unions.

 

llDavey, pp. cit., p. 6.

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Prior to examining specific aspects of the effects
of unionism on police discipline it has been necessary to
acquire a certain background knowledge. The review of the
literature then, for this study shall be divided into three
areas: (1) Collective bargaining in the private sector;

(2) Collective bargaining in public employment; (3) Police
unionism in general. The continuity and sequence of these
classifications coincide with the logical development of
ideas from the general to the more specific. This review
then, will center on: Books and articles concerning the
mechanics, dynamics and processes of collective bargaining;
sources which discuss collective bargaining and unionism in
public employment; and literature concerning collective
bargaining and unionism in the police service.

Before beginning the discussion of the above mentioned
area, the writer would like to note parenthetically that[§ost
of the standard texts and sources on police administration in
use today are out of date in their treatment of police

organizations and union activities. Perhaps the reason

 

1Two of the most popular texts of this type, Municipal

 

Police Administration (Chicago, Illinois: InternationaI'City

 

10

11

there is such a dearth of material on unionism and collective
bargaining in law enforcement, is that students of police
administration did not anticipate that police chiefs would be
faced with these problems.:]Nevertheless, in order to gain
insight into the intricacies and dynamics of collective
bargaining processes, it was necessary to turn to sources

outside the criminal justice field.

Sources on Collective Bargaining Generally

 

There is a great deal of literature on trade unionism,
the labor movement in general and collective bargaining in

the private sector. It is almost impossible to read any

 

Managers' Association, 1961), and; O. W. Wilson's, Police
Administration (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.
1963), admonish police administrators to exerciSe great care
about which type of association they permit their officers
to join (P 179, Wilson). One passage in Municipal Police
Administration advises that recognizing the proper type of
empIOyee association can afford the police chief certain
advantages, one of which is, ". . . to give administrative
officials opportunity to educate employees, or their repre-
sentatives, regarding management problems and thus build
employee appreciation of the reasons why requests cannot
always be granted" (p. 162). Wilson's remarks are much in
the same vein. He, too, sanctioned membership in certain
kinds of approved organizations, but viewed union activity
as a definite threat to effective law enforcement.

This same philosophy is expressed in another well-
known text, A. C. Germann's, Police Personnel Management
(Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1958).
"Police membership in a labor union would imperil the
impartiality of law enforcement, no matter how scrupulous
the intent of the individual patrolman or the union. It
would imperil discipline, which is as necessary to a
police department as to an army" (p. 199).

 

 

 

 

12

newspaper or periodical without finding some reference to
labor and its problems. Faced with a selection problem
due to an abundance of sources, Michigan State University's
School of Labor and Industrial Relations suggested two

basic references: Contemporary Collective Bargaining,2

 

and a monograph entitled, "Management of Industrial Conflict
in Society."3

Davey introduces the various forms of collective
bargaining; explaining the economic, political and social
dynamics of unionism and how they relate to collective
bargaining. He also discusses appropriate union terminology
and illustrates techniques and procedures used in collective
bargaining.

The Clark Kerr article concentrates on the social
implication of collective bargaining and how it helps manage
conflicts between labor and management. Kerr feels that
conflict ". . . is more than an expression of irrationality
or ill will," (p. 1) it is essential to survival as both
management and labor lose their identities without some form
of disagreement. Viewing the scene from a sociopsychological
perspective, Kerr explains how collective bargaining keeps

conflict within manageable proportions and provides the

impetus for change and improvement in labor relations.

 

2Davey, pp. cit.

3Kerr, pp. cit.

13

Sources on Unionism and Collective Bargaining
In Public Emplpyment

 

 

In Public Management at The Bargaining Table,4the

 

authors discuss some of the aspects that differentiate
public employment from the private sector. This work
provides a bridge from general labor problems into more
specific issues such as: the interrelationship of legisla-
tive bodies to their bargaining representatives; the problems
of financing bargaining agreements in the absence of market
place mechanisms; and the very critical issue of strikes in
public employment--an issue that is quite relevant to the
labor movement in law enforcement.

A more recent text which views public employment
bargaining from an historical and political perspective is,

Collective Bargaining in Public Employment.5 This work

 

traces the development and progress of public unionism by
occupational groups with major sections separately devoted
to federal employees; state, county and municipal employees;
teachers; and police-firefighters. The authors also dis—
cuss strikes and impasse procedures. They also make some
interesting predictions as to what the future holds for
public employment.

The problem of finding suitable alternatives to the

strike in settling impasses in public employment is treated

 

4Mary L. Hennessy and Kenneth 0. Warner, Public
Management at The Bargaining Table (Chicago, IllinOis:
Public Personnel Association, 1967).

 

5Edward Clifford Koziara, J. Joseph Loewenberg and
Michael Moskow, Collective Bargaining in Public Employment
(New York: Random House, 1970).

l4

extensively in two sets of essays edited by Herbert L.
Marx, Jr.6 It contains an article by Everett M. Kassalow
which describes the growth of trade unionism in public
employment.7 Another essay by Henry G. Marsh takes a
negative stand against compulsory arbitration in public
employment impasses on the grounds that it defeats honest
collective bargaining efforts.8 An article by Jack Stieber
advocates limited use of the strike in public employment
for certain non-essential occupations.

The second collection of essays is from the Michigan

Law Review. In one article, Russell A. Smith outlines the

 

findings of recent government task force reports on develop-
ing legal machinery for regulating collective bargaining and
settling impasses.lo In another article in this collection,

Charles M. Rehmus discusses the serious problem of obtaining

monies to finance increased benefits won by public employee

6Herbert L. Marx, Jr., ed., Collective Bargaining
for Public Employees (New York: H.W. Wilson Co., 1969).

 

 

7Everett M. Kassalow, "Trade Unionism Goes Public,"
Public Interest (Winter, 1969), pp. 118-122.

 

8Henry G. Marsh, "Compulsory Arbitration: A Pandora's
Box," Michigan Municipal Review, 41:227+.S. (1968).

9Jack Stieber, "A New Approach to Strikes in Public
Employment," Business Topics (Autumn, 1967).

 

 

10Russel A. Smith, "State and Local Advisory Reports
on Public Employment Labor Legislation: A Comparative
Analysis," Michigan Law Review, Vol. 67, No. 5 (March,
1969). pp. 891-918.

 

15

organizations.11 In "Strikes and Public Employment," by
Theodore Kheel, the author outlines the problems in settling

12 Included

disputes by arbitration rather than by strikes.
in this essay is the question of whether third parties
(bargaining agents) can lawfully bind legislatures, and
what effect this has on public policy and taxation. Kheel
suggests that the answers may lie in improving the bargaining
processes and encouraging collective bargaining to the fullest
extent.

In another essay in this series, Arvid Anderson
writes about the legal implications of strikes in public
employment.13 Anderson points out that the precedent for
regulating or forbidding public strikes has been set in
the private sector where strikes affecting the public
welfare have long been controlled by law. The author
also points out that the theory of governmental sovereignty

is still very much alive and cites the recent Supreme

Court decision in Gardner v. Broderick as an indication

 

that the High Court may be quite willing to constrain police

 

11Charles M. Rehmus, "Constraints on Local Govern-

ments in Public Employee Bargaining," Michigan Law Review,
Vol. 67, No. 5 (March 1969), pp. 919-930.

12Theodore Kheel, "Strikes and Public Employment,"
Michigan Law Review, Vol. 67, No. 5 (March 1969), pp. 931-
942.

 

 

l3Arvid Anderson, "Strikes and Impasse Resolution
in Public Employment," Michigan Law Review, Vol. 67, No. 5
(March 1969), PP. 943-970.

 

l6

unionism should the unions engage in action against the
public interest.

Although the strike is an integral part of trade
unionism, generally, job actions and strikes in public
employment are proscribed by law. Nonetheless, public
employee strikes are not unknown and government officials
often hesitate to impose legal sanctions against their
striking employees.14

The recognition that legal restrictions are ineffec-
tive in preventing strikes is the theme of an informative
essay by Edward R. Lev in which he calls for the establish-
ment of a federal public employee mediation board as part
of a broad legislative program that would also require
government agencies to bargain with legally constituted
employee associations.15 The author points out that there
are still close to 10 million unorganized public employees
who represent about 600 million dollars in revenue for
unions. Lev asserts that it is evident that many of these
employees will be organized in the near future and that it

is vital that suitable machinery is established to deal

 

l4Recent examples of this were the Postal Worker's
strike and police walkout in New York. Although it is a
felony for a federal employee to strike and the New York
Taylor Act provides penalties against strikers, not one
employee was charged in either case.

15Edward R. Lev, "Strikes by Government Employees:
Problems and Solutions," Journal of The American Bar Associa-
tion, Vol. 57 (August, 1971).

 

17

with them. Lev also proposes that all public strikes be
forbidden in favor of binding arbitration and cites the
following reasons: (1) The public should not have vital
services interrupted by strikes, as strikes really do not
decide what is a fair benefit level, but only demonstrate
which side is prepared to go the furthest; (2) in spite of
rhetoric to the contrary, unions really do not want strikes
as they are costly and bring severe hardship on members as
well as the union treasury (p. 777). Lev mentions that
local governments should be entitled to federal financial
assistance if they cannot meet the costs of the arbitrated
settlement.

The Emerging Law of Labor Relations in Public
Employment,16 provides a thorough overview of the back—
ground and development of labor law as it applies to public
employment. Hanslowe discusses the doctrine of sovereignty
in relation to collective bargaining and traces the evolu-
tion of this doctrine into its present day meaning. He also
discusses such milestones as the Lloyd—LaFollete Act of
1912 which offered legal guidelines under which federal
employees could organize in limited fashion; the Executive
Orders of 1962 which have since guided labor relations with

federal employees; and the Taylor Act of New York which in

 

l6Kurt L. Hanslowe, The Emerging Law of Labor

Relations in Public Employment (Ithaca, New York: Cayuga
Press, 1967).

 

 

18

1967 set up a Public Employment Relations Board (PERB)
designed to deal exclusively with labor relations in the
public sector.

Sources on Collective Bargaining and Unionism
In The PoIice Service

 

One of the early sources which deals exclusively

with the problems of police unionism is the 1958 pamphlet,

17

Police Unions. Although this work is largely a prOpaganda

 

vehicle opposing unionism, it is interesting to View it

from a comparative standpoint with later IACP publications.
The central theme of the 1968 IACP convention was

police unionism. Not surprisingly, a substantial portion

of the 1968 IACP Yearbook contained reprints from that

corresponding convention. One such article which received

wide attention was Donald D. Pomerleau's, "Police Management—

18

Employee Relations Revisited." Pomerleau took a somewhat

conciliatory approach to the problem:

. . . we and our subordinates have not listened, nor
have we provided our personnel with a means to seek
redress for the real or imagined problems. The old
autocratic and dictatorial approach to problem
solving has come under severe criticism, and right-
fully 50.19

 

l7Police Unions (Washington, D.C.: International
Association of Chiefs of Police, 1958).

18Donald D. Pomerleau, "Police Management—Employee
Relations Revisited," The Police Yearbook 1968 (Washington,
D.C.: International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1968).

lgIbid., p. 43.

 

 

19

Another outgrowth of the 1968 IACP convention was
a joint report by three police chiefs, Curtis Brostron of
St. Louis, Donald D. Pomerleau of Baltimore, and Charles F.
Pegg of East Lansing, Michigan.20 The report stated that
unionism was becoming a potent force in the police service,
and it expressed the hope that policemen would organize
into autonomous independent organizations rather than
affiliate with labor unions:

The objective of labor unions are, by definition
narrow in scope, immediate in nature and almost
entirely non-altruistic in outlook. There is a
definite lack of evidence to indicate that any
police union has ever gone on record in defense of
raising the educational requirements for police
officers or for any other phase of professionaliza-
tion. The advancement of social or professional
goals is definitely not an important part of union
programs, and it is quite likely that, if police
unionization were to become the rule rather than
the exception, the struggle for professional status
would deteriorate intp a struggle for immediate
financial betterment. 1

After observing two years of increased militancy by
police organizations, Commissioner Pomerleau expressed an
altered View of police organizations:

In my opinion, employee organizations as they eXist
today represent the greatest deterrent to the

professionalization of law enforcement. Many of
my contemporaries share this View.22

 

20Curtis Brostron, Charles F. Pegg, and Donald D.
Pomerleau, Report of The Special Committee on Police Employee
Organizations (Washington, D.C.: International ASSOCiation
of Chiefs of Police, 1969).

ZlIbid. , p. 19 .

22Donald D. Pomerleau, "On Union," Police Yearbook
of 1970 (Washington, D.C.: International Association of
CHiefs of Police, 1970), P. 104. In his remarks, Pomerleau

 

 

 

20

The New York State Police was the first State Law
Enforcement Agency to obtain a collective bargaining contract.
This came about under the authority of the state's Public
Employment Relations Board (PERB), an agency created under
the Taylor Act of 1967. In 1969, William E. Kirwan,
superintendent of the New York State Police, published
a pamphlet which outlined the background, development
and results of these negotiations.23 Kirwan's information
should be of interest to police administrators as a guide
to what can be expected in dealing with employee groups.

"Dealing with Police Unions," is a collaboration
between a police administrator, Robert Igleburger and an
academician, John E. Angell.24 This article is a handbook
to guide chiefs in coexisting with their employee groups.

It promotes the concept that, through the use of information,
p_fl_fl____,

 

'_

training, techniques and strategies, the chief can effect

~_~¥_’p,,_ 4A—’——-—~

a relationship with the union through a position of relative
44’______________

 

 

 

.—

 

 

.0... »'.ns—v‘§-

llm\_p‘_“~_’p____,_
strength and understanding. The article advocates the

fi

 

 

 

had been referring to New York's PBA stand against Mayor
Lindsay's reform efforts, FOP President John Harrington's
remarks about lack of official support for the police, and
the many "blu flu" epidemics that had been occurring around
the country.

23William E. Kirwan, The New York State Police:
History and Development of Collective Negotiations (New
York: New York State Police, May, 1969).

24John E. Angell and Robert M. Igleburger, "Dealing
With Police Unions," The Police Chief (May 1971), pp. 50-55.

 

 

 

21

abandonment of traditional autocratic approaches to employee
relations while trying, at the same time, to prevent the
debilitation of the chief's role as leader of the department.

More recently, the academic world has become inter-
ested in the problems of police employee relations, and one
researcher who is heavily committed to this area is
Dr. Hervey A. Juris of Northwestern University. In his
monograph, "Police Personnel Problems, Police Unions, and
Participatory Management," Juris discusses the issue of
job enrichment through collective bargaining as one possible
solution for upgrading the police.25

Juris also engaged in extensive research to determine
the contemporary legal status of police organizations and
police collective bargaining. In 1970 he published, "The
Legal Status of Municipal Employee Organizations," which
reported the results of his surveys and investigations.
The work contains data on various categories of police
groups, the types of bargaining relationships they engage
in, and what their status is under the various state laws.

In his most recent paper, Juris discusses the social

and economic implications of police unionism, attempting to

 

25Hervey A. Juris, "Police Personnel Problems, Police
Unions, and Participatory Management," Proceedings of the
22nd Annual Meeting of The Industrial Relations Research
Association (Repfint No. 135, 1969).

 

 

 

26Hervey A. Juris and Kay B. Hutchison, "The Legal
Status of Municipal Employee Organizations," Industrial and
Labor Relations Review (Reprint No. 130, April 1970), pp. 352-
366.

 

 

22

analyze what direction police collective bargaining will
take in light of current social and political developments.
The paper argues that:

. . . police unionism is an established institution
in the society and that there is a need for both
police executives and public officials to consider
now how they intend to approach this new power
center. It will be suggested that there exists a
sufficiently large body of experience which should
be examined before legislative bodies adopt guide-
lines for institutionalizing the relationship.27

The Police Rebellion, is a collection of essays which

 

View police unionism not only as a struggle for economic
power, but also as an expression of militancy toward a
basically hostile society.28 In the first section of the
book the author, Bopp, examines the social circumstances
which have motivated policemen to organize. The second
part of the work is a diversified collection of essays and
articles offering various perspectives on the political
implications of police unionism; the last part presents
several case studies of recent conflicts and job actions
involving police organizations. Included in this section
is "Black Versus White in The Station House," by Robert A.
Jones, which examines the increasing polarization between

black and white officers; a situation which has generated

 

27Juris, "The Implications of Police Unionism,"

pp, cit.

28William J. Bopp, ed., The Police Rebellion: A
Quest for Blue Power (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C.
Thomas Publisher, 1971).

 

 

23

the growth of all black police organizations as separate

power bases within police departments.

Summary

Until recent years police patrolmen did not have
their own institutional identity. Generally it was the
administrators who acted as spokesmen for law enforcement.
With the coming of the 1960's, the social climate plus
increased concern for "law and order" created a favorable
climate for the police to develop their own power bases
apart from their administrators. The evolution of police
social and fraternal groups into bargaining organizations
was a concurrent development.

In relatively few years police organizations have
caused considerable impact on law enforcement, and it is
the recognition of this impact that is now generating research
of police unionism. Early studies and publications were
geared to combat the growth of this phenomenon. Now that
police unionism is an accomplished fact, research is taking
a more constructive direction. Academicians as well as law
enforcement people are now engaging in extensive studies
trying to determine existing effects and potential effects
of the new police militancy. The size and complexity of
our society demand that we have a clear understanding of our
law enforcement machinery. Although research on police

employee relations can now be described as embryonic, the

24

problem is beginning to receive the increased attention it

demands.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH METHOD

The research for this study was initiated in a pilot
study of two police departments similar in size and struc-
ture to the departments which were selected for the actual
survey. Several interviews were conducted with the adminis-
trative personnel and employee association officials from
both departments. During these interviews, the pilot study
respondents were encouraged to express their views on what
they felt were pertinent issues and problems concerning
police unionism. They were also asked what they felt were
important questions for inclusion in a survey of this type,
and accordingly what information would they hold to be of
value. The suggestions and ideas obtained from these pilot
interviews were incorporated into the survey questionnaire.

The actual data for this study was obtained from
in-depth interviews of the personnel of two medium-sized
police departments located in an industrial, midwestern
state. Included were the administrators, union officials
and police officers.

The first purpose in surveying these departments was

to establish what types of relationships, both formal and

25

26

informal, existed between the employee association and the
administration. Secondly, the study examined the effects
of the relationships on administrative discipline. The

surveys concentrated on pprceptions of authority rather

 

than trying to measure, statistically, the actual changes
in the chief's authority. This decision was based upon
two considerations. First, the researcher's experience
as a police supervisor raised strong doubts about the
validity of written records concerning discipline and
punishment. Second, it was felt that in terms of actual

impact on how people interact, the perception of a situation

 

often has an equal or greater effect on behavior than the

impact of the actual or "real" situation.

Sampling Procedure

 

The two departments selected for this study were
chosen primarily because they have employee organizations
which are legally constituted and have collective bargaining
agreements which include provisions for grievance procedures.
Three population strata from each department were interviewed
in depth. They were: (1) administrators; (2) union officials;
(3) selected police personnel. The third category was further
stratified to include: the internal investigators; five
middle management people; four detectives and/or youth
officers; and twelve uniform patrolmen.

It was decided that for the purpose of delimiting

focus and working within the resources available for this

27

study, only medium-sized departments would be utilized. A
working definition of "medium—size" are those departments
that employ more than one hundred but less than one
thousand sworn officers.‘ Aside from the question of
resources, the larger departments such as Detroit or
Chicago present their own special problems and might be
viewed as distinct cases unto themselves. The sheer size
of these organizations makes them difficult for one
researcher to survey and analyze. Conversely, departments
with less than one hundred officers might be overly intimate
and informal in their labor-management relations, thereby

not allowing the researcher to achieve his research goals.

Data Collection

 

All the respondents in the survey were interviewed
personally. Additional time was spent questioning the
administrators and union officials. The interviews were
conducted in face—to-face fashion using a written interview
schedule as a guide.1 All the responses were recorded
according to the appropriate question number. Identical
formats were followed in every interview and each respondent
was invited to expand or comment upon his replies. It is
felt that many years of operational police experience
enabled the researcher to establish rapport with the re-

Spondents and obtain satisfactory results with the interviews.

 

1A copy of the interview schedule can be found in
the appendix to this study.

28

The first series of interviews was conducted at
department "A". The chief of "A" had been contacted
beforehand and an appointment arranged. After the inter—
view with chief "A", permission was obtained to interview
the assistant chief (he has charge of operations), the
internal investigator, five supervisors (three sergeants
and two lieutenants, all line supervisors), four detectives
(two of whom are youth officers), and twelve patrolmen.
Arrangements were also made to interview the vice-president
of the FOP. The president of the FOP was also interviewed
on a subsequent return trip to city "A".

It was explained to all respondents that the
researcher was a graduate student engaged in a study of
police unionism. They were also advised that permission had
been received to conduct the survey, but they were not
obligated to participate unless they wished to do so. It
was also mentioned that the researcher had been a police
officer for over nine years, and that great care would be
taken to insure anonymity. The mention of the researcher's
police experience had a definite beneficial effect in
"breaking the ice." There were no refusals to engage in
the interviews, and generally, the respondents appeared
to be relaxed and willing to express their views freely.

Other than the chiefs and captains, all respondents
were selected by chance and were interviewed in a variety

of ways. Some of the interviews were conducted in squad

29

cars, some to patrolmen waiting to come on duty, but for the
most part the researcher remained in the report room and
spoke with the men who came in to write their reports during
their tour of duty.

The same basic procedures were followed in depart-
ment "B." The supervisors were interviewed in their offices
and the report writing room.was again utilized to interview
the patrolmen. There were no refusals to be interviewed,
and again, the respondents were friendly and open in their

conversation.

Analysis of The Data

 

For the purpose of making comparative analyses, the
responses from each department were grouped into sets such
as: administrators, union officials, and patrolmen. In
this way comparisons concerning interdepartmental as well
as intradepartmental population sets are possible, i.e.,
patrolmen from department "A" might have the same views as
patrolmen from department "B," but differ with the opinions
expressed by their own managerial personnel.

The reSponses from all the interviews have been
compiled into respective tables with appropriate comments

added for necessary clarification.

CHAPTER IV

SURVEY FINDINGS

City "A": Background Information

 

"A" is an industrial city of approximately 200,000
population. Its economy is largely dependent on its auto-
motive factories. During a prolonged automotive strike
[which occurred in 1971, the city was so adversely affected
that the police department seriously considered the possi-
bility of lay-offs.

Like many urban, industrial areas, "A" is experi-
encing considerable racial strife, and the racial polarity
of the city is dramatically reflected in the police
department. Of the 368 sworn personnel, in a city that is
35% black, there are 11 black officers; this has become a
political issue in the city.

Although promotions come slowly in department "A"
(the average age of the supervisors interviewed was 43),
morale appears to be good as reflected by the high

standard of physical appearance.1 Almost all the men

 

1There has been a freeze on promotions in
department "A" for the past 5% years. There has also been
a phasing out of certain promotional classifications due
to budget restrictions.

30

31

interviewed are from working class backgrounds. Many of
their fathers were (and are) employed at the automobile
plants in "A" as laborers or assemblers.

The chief of department "A" has almost 24 years of
service. He was appointed chief about nine years ago after
having worked his way up "through the ranks." He holds a
Master's degree in police administration and was quite
active in The Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) prior to
becoming chief.

At present the department requires that an appli-
cant must have two years college training to be eligible
for service. This has proven to be an impediment to
recruiting more black policemen. The administration is
attempting to hire more blacks, but neither it nor the FOP
is willing to agree to a waiver of the college requirement;
in spite of strong pressure from community groups and some
governmental agencies. The demand for compromise has been
advanced under the concept of "affirmative action." This
is a very volatile issue within the police department,
and the FOP is strongly committed to resist this program.

As a result of this stand, all but one of the 11
blacks on the department have withdrawn from the FOP and
have formed their own group, the Society of Afro-American
Policemen (SAAP). The president of SAAP is attached to
special duty at city hall where he serves as Ombudsman for

the city. It is his task to receive, process and

32

investigate all citizen complaints against police officers.
There are no black officers of superior rank, however,
there is a black detective (detective is a civil service
rank).

During his interview, the president of SAAP
alleged that the department has a double standard of
justice, with blacks being punished more often and more
severely than white officers. He also claimed that the
chief often uses the FOP as an excuse for inaction on
racial issues.2 This respondent also recounted several
street incidents involving confrontations between white
and black officers. In some instances the black officers
were charged with interferring with the white officers.
According to its president, SAAP provided legal aid in
successfully defending these black officers against the
charges.

The organization which is the bargaining agent for
the patrolmen and detectives and enjoys almost 100% member-
ship, is the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP). The FOP
has national and state lodges which receive per capita
payment from every member. However, for all practical
purposes, a local lodge is autonomous with its own leader-
ship, by-laws and policies. The Lodge in "A" was

;

2The SAAP president claims that the chief resists

pressure from citizen groups by stating that he would
like to accommodate them, but the FOP has his hands tied.

33

organized many years ago, but it wasn't until the mid
1960's that it evolved into a union-like organization.
Superior officers are still able to maintain membership
in the lodge (most of them do), but they are not part of
the bargaining unit.3 Although there is no written con-
tract, all agreements between the FOP and the city have
been incorporated into city ordinances.

Present agreements call for binding arbitration

on all impasse matters excluding discipline. The FOP is

 

currently Opting for this right and the Emief is strongly
resisting as he feels that discipline is not negotiable
nor a working condition:] The FOP dpp§_have the pre-
rogative of providing representation for its members who
are charged for hearing before the police trial board.
The trial board consists of three to four officers of
superior rank who act as a quasi-legal tribunal. The
chief may prefer charges against any officer for alleged
misconduct or rules violation, and then direct him to
appear before the trial board. Members are arbitrarily
selected by the chief and they advise him as to their
findings. The chief may accept or reject the recommenda-
tions of the trial board as he sees fit, although in

practice he usually abides by their decisions.

 

3Sergeants, lieutenants and captains maintain
their own bargaining unit which is a sub-division of the
same FOP lodge that the patrolmen and detectives belong to.

34

In punishments involving dismissal or suspension
from duty of 29 days or more, there must be an automatic
appeal to the civil service commission which has the power
to uphold or overturn decisions by the chief and/or trial
board. After appeal to the civil service commission, the
charged officer may then carry his case to the circuit

court. In cases involving suspension of less than 29 days,

 

the charged officer has the option of appeal to the com—
mission. In commission hearings or in court appeals,
the POP provides legal counsel for its members although
the organization's executive body may refuse to furnish
counsel should it feel that the member's cause has
absolutely no merit. The FOP also provides representa-
tion, in the form of an official from the association,
to assist a member should he be called in front of the
police trial board.

The question was raised during the course of the
interviews as to whether or not transfers were used as a
form of discipline. There was strong disagreement between
the FOP officials and the administration, with the former
claiming that they are and the latter asserting they are

not.

Cipy "B": Background Information

 

"B" is a community of approximately 90,000 people,

with an economy largely dependent upon its automotive

35

plants. About 30% of the population ishdack; this city
also has had its share of racial problems, largely
centering around the issue of busing.

The police department has 167 sworn officers,
12 of whom are black. The bargaining group is an inde-
pendent Police Officers' Association (hereinafter referred
to as the POA). For the past four years the POA has
operated as a closed shop with all detectives and patrol-
men required to pay dues (there is close to 100% voluntary
membership, however). There is also an FOP lodge, but it
serves strictly as a social and fraternal organization.

The 12 black officers have their own SAAP chapter
which is not as militant as the similar group in "A" city.
The main thrust of the SAAP in "B" is directed at recruit-
ing more black officers from the community. The members
of SAAP also belong to the POA, and look to the associa-
tion to represent them in bargaining and legal disputes.

The relationship between the POA and the administra-
tion in "B" is more institutionalized than in "A", and
the organization is more firmly established. The POA has
a collective bargaining contract, but like "A", there is
no provision for binding arbitration on disciplinary
matters. There are, however, some unusual provisions in
the contract. For example, detectives are not required to

work evenings nor midnights. Should the services of a

36

detective be required during those hours, he is "hired
back" and must be paid a minimum of six hours. (All
"hired-back" officers receive a minimum of six hours pay
at their regular hourly rate even if their services are
required for only a few minutes.) Another provision of
the contract allows each officer the privilege of having
a union steward present during reprimands by a superior
officer. If the reprimand occurs during the steward's
day off, then the steward is called in, and receives a
minimum of six hours pay.

As a result of negotiation with the POA, city "B"
has also instituted what is termed the "4-40" work week.
All Operational personnel work ten hours per day, four
days per week. Each officer has three days off each week,
selected by seniority.

The POA began its operations in the mid 60's as
an off-shoot of the FOP lodge. At present there is a
power struggle taking place within the association. The
current vice-president was elected on a platform of pro-
moting professionalism and increasing discipline. He is
planning to challenge the incumbent president in the
coming election. If successful, the vice-president
intends to change the focus of the POA from the current
trade union model to a more professionally oriented
association. He claims to have popular support for this

concept among the membership of the POA.

37

Patrolmen in "B" are not as dependent upon their
association for protection in disciplinary matters as are
those in "A". City "B" is obliged to provide legal
assistance to any patrolman against charges which origi-
nate outside the department, i.e., citizen complaints.4
On complaints originating within the department (charges
against a patrolman or detective by a superior officer
or the chief), the association is obligated to provide
legal defense for the officer.5

The chief of department "B", who is in his late
forties, has spent his entire career of 26 years with this
department, and has been chief for the past nine years.

He has completed advanced training courses for administra-
tors although he has no college degree. The chief's

power to discipline is restricted; serious charges being
handled through a civilian trial board which has been in
operation for 35 years. The chief is empowered to require
that an officer work up to 10 of his regular days off,
without pay. These minor punishments are subject to review
by an inquiry board of police officers. An inquiry board

for a patrolman is comprised of a patrolman, a detective,

 

4This lack of dependency on the association for
legal aid is ironic to a certain extent as it was the
association which gained the legal representation benefit
for its members.

5Unlike the FOP lodge of department "A", the POA
is obligated to defend its members regardless of how
little merit the case may have.

38

a sergeant, a lieutenant, and a captain. It has an
advisory role, but in practice the chief usually abides
by its recommendations. For more serious offenses, the
chief is obliged to refer a case to the civilian trial
board. The board is appointed by the city commissioners
and contains seven members. It is legally empowered to
dismiss or suspend police officers and its decisions are
final, subject to review by the circuit court.6

Citizen complaints against police officers are
handled by the sergeant who heads police—community rela—
tions. He is charged with investigating every complaint
and submitting a report to the chief and the civilian
trial board. The board has the option of settling the
case by negotiation (with the consent of all parties
involved), refusing to hold a hearing due to lack of
evidence, or to conduct a full hearing into the matter
and impose judgment. Any citizen can initiate a com-
plaint against a police officer by submitting a signed
affidavit to the police department or the civilian trial

board.

 

6There is a difference of opinion on what grounds
a case may be appealed to the circuit court. The
administration claims that a civilian trial board's
decision can only be appealed on technical grounds (legal
error, etc.), while the POA claims appeal can be on any
grounds. Evidently the ordinance is worded ambiguously
and the situation has not yet been tested in court.

39

Promotions are more plentiful in department "B"
than in "A" with more youthful detectives, sergeants and
lieutenants in evidence. Morale in the lower ranks and
the upper echelon appears to be good, but there is a
noticeable morale problem in middle management. This
could partly be explained by the fact that the chief
enjoys a very good relationship with the union and has
develOped his labor-management skills to a high degree,
but the every day operational problems of working within-
the framework of a restrictive union contract seems to

have fallen on the shoulders of middle management.

Table 1: Comments

 

Perhaps the most significant data in Table 1 con-
cerns the answers by the administrators and union
officials. It appears that the chiefs and captains (in
each department both the chief and the captain in charge
of operations were interviewed), feel a greater threat from
the unions than the union leaders are willing to acknowl—
edge.7

The reply by the internal investigator ("No

challenge") of department "A" is somewhat contradictory in

 

7This is even more evident in consideration of the
fact that the union official in department "A" who answered,
"appreciable challenge," qualified his answer by stating
that the attempt to challenge the chief's authority had
been great, but that the results have been only moderately
successful.

40

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41

relation to his other answers. For example, in Table 2

he answered that it is moderately more difficult for a
chief to run a unionized department; in Table 4 he replied
that the union has brought about improvement in discipline
procedures; and in Table 5 he answered that he felt the
chief was sensitive to union reaction.

It can also be observed that by and large the
patrolmen in department "B" felt that their organization
presented less of a challenge to their chief than did the
patrolmen of "A". Perhaps the explanation for this lies
in the fact that most of the serious discipline in depart—
ment "B" is handled by the civilian trial board which
results in less direct confrontation between the chief and

the POA .

Table 2: Comments

 

All the respondents from both city "A" and "B" who
answered that a chief in a unionized department has a
moderately or much easier task than a chief in a non-union
department, had basically the same explanation for their
answers. The rationale is that in a union department the
chief has a clearer understanding of his position and just
what his prerogatives are. The contract or agreement with
the union provides definite ground rules from within which
the chief can function with less misunderstanding. A

paraphrased summary of the answer would be that these

42

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43

respondents feel it is easier for the chief to operate
within the framework of an institutionalized relationship.
Many of the respondents in city "A" who answered "easier"
cited the example of a nearby Sheriff's Police Department
that had been plagued with morale problems until they
unionized.

Generally speaking, however, most of the respon-
dents from all the categories felt that it was more dif-
ficult for a chief to operate within a unionized depart-
ment. The usual given reason for this was that constant
intervention by the union makes administrative decisions

more difficult to impose.

Table 3: Comments

 

The distribution of responses of city "A" in
Table 3 are generally what might be expected. There is a
definite contrast to be found in Table 3 regarding the
responses of department "B". In "A" the chief and
assistant chief are quite adamant in their assertion
that discipline is strictly an administrative prerogative.
The patrolmen, detectives and youth officers of "A" are
fairly uniform in their opinions to the contrary.

In "B" the chief and captain are somewhat more
conciliatory in their attitudes and there is a much greater
spread of opinion in the lower ranks. Again, the fact

that serious discipline is handled by an outside agency

44

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45

in city "B", may explain why there is less polarization Of
attitudes on this question.

Of added interest might be the reply of the
internal investigator in department "B". Possibly he may
eXperience some degree of frustration at the prospect of
having the union intervene in cases that he has prepared
with considerable effort.

The investigator in department "A" has a somewhat
different role in that he must represent the interests of
the citizens to a greater degree than his counterpart in
department "B". This difference is expressed in a more
ambivalent attitude toward the problem. As ombudsman he
sees the FOP as interferring with the expectations of
black citizens regarding behavior of white Officers. How—
ever, he concedes that the black officers need the inter—
vention of the SAAP to insure their due process rights in

disciplinary disputes with the administration.

Table 4: Comments

 

Of those respondents who feel there has been a
union induced improvement in discipline, the vast majority
believe that the biggest improvement has been in pro-
cedures or due process.

The chief of "B" freely conceded that the union
has brought about due process improvements from the

standpoint of the patrolmen. Chief "B" stated that it

46

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47

would be unrealistic to assert that an autocratic or
paternal administrator would have as much consideration
for due process as an administrator whose actions are
subject to review by an employee group.

This question was also an indicator of the
existence of morale problems in the supervisory ranks of
"B". Four of the supervisors who were interviewed strongly
stated that union imposed procedures made supervision dif-
ficult and in certain instances frustrating. They par-
ticularly cited the practice of waiting for the appearance
of a union steward prior to reprimanding a patrolman
stating that this Often tied up patrol cars for long
periods. It appears that in certain instances the super-
visor may opt to ignore a situation rather than become
involved in the procedural requirements.

The union Official in "B" eXpressed agreement on
this point, stating that he planned to delete this require-

ment from the contract should he be elected president.

Tables 5 and 6: Comments

 

Of the total number of 26 respondents in "A", only
the chief and assistant chief felt there was no administra-
tion sensitivity to union reaction on discipline
("sensitivity" in the sense of providing for and antici-
pating the actions of another). The negative replies of

the chief and the assistant chief do not seem to square

48

TABLE 5.--Administration Sensitivity to Association
Reaction.*

 

 

 

 

 

 

Class of Respondent Yes No Totals
City "A"
Administrators 0 2 2
Union Officials 2 0 2
Internal Investigator l O l
Supervisors 4(1+) 0 5
Detectives-Youth Officers 4 0 4
Patrolmen 12 0 12
TOTALS 24 2 26
City "B"
Administrators 0 2 2
Union Officials 1+ 0 1
Internal Investigator 1+ 0 l
Supervisors 2(2+) l 5
Detectives-Youth Officers 2+ 2 4
Patrolmen 5(4+) 1 10++
TOTALS 17(10+) 6 23
*
Question to Table 5 read as follows: "Giving an

opinion, would you say that in matters pertaining to
discipline and punishment, the administration is sensitive
to possible association reaction?"

+ .
Felt that middle management rather than the
administration is sensitive to association reaction.

++ I I I
Two patrolmen answered "no opinion" to this
question.

49

TABLE 6.--Effect of Sensitivity.*

 

 

 

 

 

 

Class of Respondent Quality Quantity Total
City “All
Administrators 0 0 0+
Union Officials 2 0 2
Internal Investigator l 0 1
Supervisors 5 0 5
Detectives-Youth Officers 4 O 4
Patrolmen 12 O 12
TOTALS 2 4 0 2 4
City "B"
Admininistrators 0 0 0+
Union Officials 1 0
Internal Investigator 1 0
Supervisors 4 0 4+
Detectives-Youth Officers 2 0 2+
Patrolmen 9 0 9+
TOTALS 17 O 17
*
Question to Table 6 reads as follows: "If you

pp feel that the administration ii sensitive to associa-
tion reaction, then do you feel that this sensitivity has
affected either the quality or the quantity of
punishment?"

+The difference in total number of responses
between Table 5 and Table 6 is because those who responded
"no" to the first question did not answer the second
question.

50

with the situation as it exists within department "A".
The overall mood of the interviews with both the chief and
the FOP officials of "A" indicate a pronounced adversary
relationship with each side quite sensitive to the
reactions of the other.

In "B" almost everyone agreed that the chief was
not sensitive to union reaction, but again there was a
strong indication of problems in middle management. The
implication is that the chief of "B", through his situa-
tion as well as his skill and finesse, has developed a
good working relationship with the POA, but somewhat at

the expense of his middle management.

Table 7: Comments

 

This table indicates that there may be less of a
direct relationship between the union and morale in
department "B". The question of middle management morale
arises in "B" while there is nothing to suggest this
type of problem in "A".

The relationships between the administration and
the POP in "A"anxastill in flux and the labor-management
struggle may be responsible for an increased emotional
level on the morale issue.

In "B" these relationships appear to be more
stabilized and institutionalized, and the chief is more

willing to deal with POA on egalitarian terms. The result

51

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52

is that in "B" each side may feel less threatened by the
other and the union, because of this lack of threat, is
not the paramount factor in morale.

The captain of operations of "B" qualified his
negative answer by adding that the union has caused some
problems with the sergeants and lieutenants in terms of
morale. He also noted that some of the procedures (such
as the shop steward system) has caused a certain loss of
efficiency. However, he did feel that in general terms
the POA has effected an improvement in the morale of the

patrolmen.

Table 8: Comments

 

As regards the issue of membership benefits,
there appears to be a greater concern with financial
matters in department "B". Sixty-eight percent of the
patrolmen and detectives of "A" opted for protection as
their prime union benefit, while in "B" 62.5% felt that
financial benefits were foremost.

The interviews indicated that this might be
eXplained by the fact that the patrolmen in "B" exhibit
much less concern about outside threat. Their city has
adOpted an ombudsman-like role in dealing with citizen
complaints and is willing to provide for the legal defense
of the patrolmen when they get into these types of dif-

ficulties. Additionally, serious discipline on "B" is

53

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54

handled by an outside agency (the civilian trial board),
which means that the chief of "B" need not be as con-
cerned by pressure from various citizen groups when police
brutality cases arise. The brunt of such outside pres-
sure loses much of its effectiveness when it is divided
seven ways between the members of the trial board.

On the other hand, the chief of "A" must bear the
full weight of citizen pressure when controversial cases
arise. In these situations he must be politically sensi-
tive to the demands of the community while at the same
time provide support and leadership for the men of his
department. The patrolmen are sophisticated enough to
comprehend the situation and thus they place a high value

on the legal help the union provides.

Table 9: Comments

 

During the interviews with department "A", the
issue of "personalities" repeatedly arose; "personalities"
in the sense of allowing subjective emotions to interfere
with the administration of justice within the department.
In many cases this issue was tied to the question of
including peers on the police trial board proceedings.
Unlike department "B", there is presently no peer group
representation on these boards. Many respondents felt
that the inclusion of peers might alleviate some of the

"personality" problems.

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56

The answers of the respondents in "B" centered
around the civilian trial board. Sixty-eight percent of
ail those interviewed in "B" wanted to eliminate the
civilian board (the civilian trial board has been in
operation for over 35 years). Of the four who answered
that they would like a mixed police and civilian board,
three actually wanted an all_police board, but felt that
realistically a mixed board would be the most they could
expect. None of "B's" respondents, however, could cite
any instance wherein the board had been too harsh with
patrolmen. Several men stated they wanted to abolish the
board because it was too lenient.

Several respondents, including the internal
investigator of "B", felt the main fault of the civilian
board was that it is too informal in its operation. It
was pointed out that rarely did all seven members appear
for hearings, and that the hearings are run rather
loosely. The most typical criticism was that civilians
don't understand the problems of the police, and because
of this they are not in a position to judge police.

Due to its relevance to this study as well as its
topical relevance to law enforcement, a great deal of
time was spent discussing the civilian trial board of
city "B". Because of its importance and controversial
nature, several pages Of remarks are devoted to the

civilian board in the concluding chapter of this study.

57

Table 10: Comments

 

This question regarding outside recruitment of
administrative personnel as well as the questions in
Tables 11 and 12 were included in the survey to attempt
to gain some insight into attitudes regarding professional
concerns. The proposals in these questions are based on
often mentioned recommendations to help professionalize
the police.

In the main, this proposal elicited very negative

 

responses. The usual explanation for the rejection was
that only a man who has worked his way up through the
ranks can thoroughly understand the problems of enforcing
the law. Others stated that it was the goal of every
dedicated policeman to be a chief and that it wasn't fair
to give the tOp jobs to outsiders, bypassing the career

men within the department.

Table 11: Comments

 

The concept of lateral recruitment and promotion
was explained in detail to each respondent along with the
remark that it was a recommendation of the President's
Task Force.8 The responses from both departments were

very unfavorable.

 

8Lateral recruitment is a concept which allows for
mobility of police officers from one department to another
without losing seniority or pension credit. Under the
present system, in most jurisdictions, should an officer

58

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59

 

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60

Several officers stated that it was important
that a policeman should have a thorough knowledge of the
community where he works, and that this wasn't possible
with lateral recruitment. Many respondents were quite
defensive in their eXplanations, stating that it would not
be right to have a stranger from another city promoted over
them. (The mention of the fact that pppy_could go else-
where and be promoted did not alter the negative response.)

The chief of department "A" had warned that the

term "lateral recruitment" might be taken as a pseudonym

 

for "affirmative action" and because of this might meet
with a negative reaction. Several patrolmen did indicate
that they felt lateral recruitment was some type of
"gimmick" or "trick" to force departments to hire more

blacks.

Table 12: Comments

 

The concept of three classes of police officer was

explained fully to each respondent who was not familiar

 

wish to work for another police agency, he must begin
again as a recruit at the lowest level of pay, and he must
relinquish any pension credit he has earned with his pre-
vious department.

Similarly, lateral promotion would allow any
policeman within a particular geographic district (a state
for example), to take promotion examinations for any
police department within that district. Under present
conditions a patrolman, sergeant, lieutenant or captain
may be promoted only within his own department.

61

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62

with it.9

As the figures indicate, the response was more
favorable in department "A", than in "B". This is not
surprising in light of the fact that "A" is employing a
modified version of this system. There are between 30

and 40 Community Service Officers (CSO's) in department
"A". They are employed in handling minor complaints on

a follow-up basis and are also used for parking control.
The CSO's on "A" are a type of cadet or apprentice police-
man, most of whom are attending college.

Most Of the respondents in "B" who felt negative
about this concept were somewhat vague in their reasons.
However, the chief and several of the supervisors stated
that they felt there was an inherent flaw in the plan:
that is—-many calls that begin as minor or nuisance calls
can quickly evolve into something very serious. "Trigger"
incidents in riots have been of a minor nature, and it is
not unknown for homicides to begin over simple arguments

between neighbors. The chief conceded that much of the

patrolman's time is occupied by these nuisance or minor

 

9The Task Force Report: The Police, recommends
that law enforcement agencies employ three levels of police
personnel: (1) The pplice agent would be the most highly
trained and educated. He would be responsible for major
crimes, family crisis, crowd confrontation, etc. (2) The
police officer would handle less serious crimes, engage in
routine patrol and handle traffic enforcement, excluding
parking. (3) The community service officer would handle
parking control, nuisance calls and minor complaints, i.e.,
loud radio, missing children. The CSO's would be cadets
or apprentice policemen and would pass into the rank of
police officer after completing their period of apprentice-
ship.

 

 

 

 

63

type calls, but he feels that he wants the insurance of
having an eXperienced officer handle these calls, in case

they should develop into more serious incidents.

Table 13: Comments

 

There was little variation between departments on
this question. The mean for "A" was 5.15 and the mean
for "B" 5.4. The distribution from all categories hovers
near the middle ground of equal concern.

These figures would be more significant if they
could be compared with the means of other occupational
groups such as school teachers and factory workers to see
how the police would compare with these other groups as

regards professional concerns.

64

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CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary

The primary purposes of this study were to examine
some of the dimensions of change in administrative authority
as regards discipline where there is police union activity,
and to generate ideas for more specific research regarding
the implications of police unionism on administrative
power. Three questions implicit in the study were:

(1) what effect, if any, has the imposition of union inter-
vention had on the chief's authority? (2) if discipline
sanctions are less severe, is it because the unions have
fOrced improvement in the processes or because the
administrators have been intimidated? (3) if there is

any appreciable change in discipline, has it been in the
substantive nature of the rules or rather in procedural
differences? This chapter will first answer these three
questions based on data received from departments "A" and
"B". It will then discuss some other implications of the

research and make recommendations regarding the findings.

65

66

Question One

 

The administration of department "A" does feel
that the union (FOP) has challenged its authority (see
Table l) and the patrolmen of "A", for the'most part,
believe that the administration lg sensitive to possible
FOP reaction (see Tables 5 and 6).

The authority problem in "B" centers around the
middle management rather than the chief (see Tables 5 and

6). The supervisors appear to experience the greatest

difficulty in making the department 'run on a daily
basis, within the framework of the union contract.

Although both associations "A" and "B" have
agreements which call for arbitration as a last step in
grievance proceedings, the question of discipline is
presently excluded from arbitration. Both groups do,
however, have other areas of intervention in discipline,
and "A" is attempting to obtain binding arbitration on
this issue.

The principal areas of union involvement in p ,
“*MJ/,
discipline are: the representation that the employee 3
organization (FOP) provides at police trial boards of
department "A", and the similar representation by the POA
for the police incident boards of department "B". The

FOP also provides formal legal assistance for the men of

"A" for hearings in front of the civil service commission

67

and appeals to the circuit court. In "B", through a POA
gained benefit, the city provides legal counsel for police-
men who face civilian trial board hearings. In situations
where the city does not provide this aid (complaints that
arise internally as opposed to external citizen complaints),
the POA is obligated to furnish legal aid for its members.
In department "B" the labor-management conflict
appears to be more subdued than in "A", primarily because
the chief of "B" has never had the same degree of discipli-
nary power that the chief of "A" enjoyed prior to unioniza-
tion. The more serious discipline cases are adjudicated by
the civilian trial board, and this board does not have
personal, daily authority interaction with the men of "B".
It would appear then, that the advent of the union (POA)
in "B" has not caused any significant alteration in the
relationship between the men and the ppipf. This is not
to say that there has been no challenge to administrative
authority. The fact that the POA has induced the city to
provide legal aid for its members is a good indication that
it has had an effect on management's authority generally,

if not the chief's specifically.

Question Two

 

After reviewing the survey of both departments, it
was concluded that the term "less severe" was not the most

accurate means of describing what has occurred concerning

68

the severity of sanctions. Perhaps a more accurate appraisal
of the situation is the proposition that greater care is
exercised in seeing that procedures are strictly adhered

to and the severity of the punishment fits the nature of

the offense.

It was also felt that the term "intimidated" is too
strong to be used in describing the cause Of the above
proposition. The overall general effect of union involve-
ment in disciplinary proceedings is that they have become

subject to review and scrutiny by a third party (the union).

M~hn _H. .-v-.. A

This "watchdog" effept gives the individual officer moral

-- _

‘—

and a greater degree of confidence in the proceedings

--—uH-—-u«.

support

H.. -_

-‘._

(see Table 7).

On the other hand, the superior officers who sit in
judgment on these various trial boards, must realize that
their actions are subject to review by the union and that
the union can exert pressure should it conclude that a
superior officer did not act in concert with the facts.

Perhaps the situation is best summarized by the
chief Of "B" when he maintains that it is unrealistic to
assume that an autocratic or paternal chief will have as
much consideration for the individual rights of his men
than an administrator whose actions are subject to review
by an employee organization.

It would, however, be stating the case too strongly

to say that the realization by an administrator that his

69

actions are subject to review is indicative of intimidation

until more evidence is in.

Question Three

 

A substantial portion of the men in both departments
feel that their union caused some improvement in discipline,
and that this improvement has been primarily in the procedures
rather than the rules (see Table 4 which also indicate there
was slightly more emphasis on rules in "B"). There was also

consensus that union involvement in discipline had been

k

 

m

beneficial for morale although the men in "B" were not as

 

 

 

 

dependent upon their association for moral support (see
Table 7).

The interviews with the union leaders point out that

Y"

they are mospwppncernedrwith_promotipg_impartiality rather

 

than attempting to change regulations. This concern for

‘.

procedural matters is reflected by the expressed desire of

 

many patrolmen to eliminate the "personality" elements in
discipline (see Table 9). It appears that both the union
leadership and the membership are prepared to live with the
existing rules, provided they are administered fairly.

In examining the three preceeding questions, ip__

p4_f_p,_,__
appears that the participatory management effect of unionism

I

 

fin,“

.. ”mm 1‘

 

has brought about change in the administration of discipline

M

 

 

in both departments, both procedurally and attitudinally.

‘\__—— 4

 

 

the changes are not as pronounced in "B", but this may be

7O

explained by the fact that the civilian trial board's
involvement in discipline is responsible for a much lower-
keyed type of conflict between the chief and his employees'
association.

One very crucial factor in the collective bargaining
agreements of both departments is the legal status of
discipline. The question of whether discipline is a working
condition, subject to binding arbitration, or an adminis-
trative prerogative is in doubt throughout the state in
which these two departments are located. It seems reasonable
to predict that this issue will necessitate legal adjudica-
tion before it is resolved. At present, both the adminis-
trators and the unions are well aware of the importance of
this issue and each is strongly resisting the other's efforts

in this area.

Other Implications of the Study

There are other issues which emerge from this study
as being worthy of further consideration and research.
Among these, two assume added significance topically and
socially: they are--the black police officers associations
and the civilian trial board. The black organizations are
gaining importance as separate power bases in the law
enforcement schema and the concept of civilian review has,
for several years, generated as much controversy as any

issue in the police service.

71

Black Police Organizations

 

The survey of department "A" and to a lesser extent,
department "B", indicates that black policemen are following
the model of blacks generally by forming their own power
bases rather than rely upon white demonated organizations
to gain concessions for them.

In department "A" the polarity between the white
and black officers is dramatic and complete. The issue of
affirmative action has severed the department racially, and,
in fact, triggered the birth of the Society of Afro-American
Policemen (SAAP). White policemen are allowed to join SAAP,
but are not permitted to vote, (to date, no white officer
has taken advantage of this arrangement). SAAP has gone to
the community for support and has managed to raise enough
money to provide for legal defense of its members. In
department "B", the SAAP is described as a social organi-
zation whose primary concern is to recruit more blacks to
the department.

Even a brief examination of the black organizations
in "A" and "B" suggest the need for administrative expertise
and understanding. Additionally, it calls for study on at
least two important questions: (1) are black police
organizations in fact legal? (2) Are these groups
actually accomplishing their stated goals? That is, do
they promote racial equality within the police department

and the community, or do they inadvertently promulgate a

72

tacit type of racism? In other words, by banding together

in a restrictive fashion, do the black groups allow the
administrator to alleviate himself of his true responsibility
toward his black officers? Does this racial grouping give
the administrator a moral and legal excuse for treating his
black policemen as a "special problem," or "something
different?"

This study would argue that black police groups
which deny equal membership rights to white officers are,
in fact, illegal. Why then do administrators permit their
existence? Is it because they are fearful of reaction
should they attempt to disband them, or does it serve to
the advantage of the administrator to have these groups in

Operation?

Civilian Trial Board

 

Even the most casual Observer of the police scene
knows that the concept of civilian review or trial boards
has been a highly volatile issue for several years. The
PBA in New York and the FOP in Philadelphia were able to
scuttle the civilian review boards in their respective
cities, and many similar plans have been thwarted by police
associations around the country.

Department "B" is somewhat unique in the sense that
it has had a civilian trial board in operation for 35 years.
The board is composed entirely of non—police personnel.

There are seven members, each being appointed by one of

73

the seven city commissioners. Any police Officer who is
charged with an offense that could result in suspension or
dismissal must appear in front of this board. Aside from
the possibility of an appeal to the circuit court, the
judgment of the board is final. The most serious punishment
the chief can impose without going to the civilian board is
to require an officer to work up to ten of his regular days
Off, without pay.

Of the 26 men who were interviewed in department "B",
17, or 68 per cent stated they would like to see the board
either eliminated or changed in some way (see Table 9).
When questioned in detail, not one of the respondents could
cite an instance where the board had been unfair or too
severe. In fact, four men felt the board was too lenient.

After completing several of these interviews, the
researcher began to feel that many of the men were responding
the way policemen were "supposed to" respond. It is almost
traditional for policemen to be Opposed to civilian involve-
ment in police affairs. The rationale expressed by most of
the men of "B" is that civilians don't understand the problems
of the police and therefore are in no position to judge.
Interestingly enough, the men of "B" have no specific
criticism of the civilian board, while many of the men of
"A", are unhappy with the discipline they receive in which
there is no civilian involvement (see Table 9). This table

indicates that seven men from "A:, including a union official,

74

wanted more uniformity in enforcing discipline, while only
two men from "B" expressed concern about uniformity.
Department "B" offers an unusual Opportunity to
study the problem of civilian involvement in policing the
police. It may be that when properly implemented, civilian
trial boards dp_work, perhaps even quite well. In any
case, this is a matter that is topical and relevant today

and should be explored further.

Conclusions

 

In relative terms, the development of police unionism
has come about rather suddenly. In our fast moving society
it is not unusual for events to out-pace technology, and
police-employee relations is a good example of this type
of gap.

The contrast between chief "A" and chief "B" offers
a valid argument for training in labor management skills.
Chief "B", while he has no formal college training, has
acquired an accurate appraisal of current police-employee
relations and has trained himself to cope with these new
developments with a minimum of conflict. Chief "A", while
possessing a master's degree in police administration,
still adheres to traditional ground rules and experiences
a much greater degree of conflict than does chief "B".

In an era when police organizations are fast becoming

a potent political factor in law enforcement, most police

75

administration texts are at least 10 years out of date. While
much more research is needed concerning the legal, economic
and social implications of police unionism, the first step
toward resolving some of the conflict must lie in training
and educating police administrators and police union leaders
in labor-management skills. Trial and error learning, while
it may be dramatic, is costly and inefficient. In this
regard, it is suggested that advantage be taken of the
available training facilities offered through the resources
of the federal government, the large labor unions and many
universities. This would be a valuable first step in helping

to close this "knowledge gap."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

76

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

 

Berkley, George. The Democratic Policeman. Boston: Beacon
.. Press, 1969.

Bopp, William J. The Police Rebellion: A Quest for Blue
Power. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas
Publisher, 1971.

Bordua, David J., ed. The Police: Six Sociological Essays.
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 11567.

Brostron, Curtis; Pegg, Charles F.; and Pomerleau, Donald D.
Report of The Special Committee on Police Employee
Organizations. Washington, D.C.: International
Association of Chiefs of Police, 1969.

 

Cramer, James. The World's Police. London: Cassell, 1964.

 

Davey, Harold W. Contemporary Collective Bargaining.
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc.,
1959.

Germann, A. C. Police Personnel Management. Springfield,
Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1958.

Hanslowe, Kurt L. The Emerging Law of Labor Relations in
Public Employment. Ithaca, New York: Cayuga
Press, 1967.

 

Hennessy, Mary and Warner, Kenneth 0. Public Management at
The Bargaining Table. Chicago, Illinois: Puinc
Personnel Association, 1967.

 

Kirwan, William E. The New York State Police: History and
Development of Collective Negotiations. New York:
New York State Police, 1969.

Koziara, Edward Clifford; Loewenberg, Joseph J.; and Maskow,
Michael. Collective Bargaining in Public Employment.
New York: Random House, 1970.

Marx, Herbert L., Jr., ed. The Reference Shelf: Collective

Bargaining for Public Employees. New York: The
H. W. Wilson Company, 1969. '

77

78

. Municipal Police Administration. Chicago: The
International City Manager‘s Association, 1961.

. Police Unions. Washington, D.C.: International
Association of Chiefs of Police, 1958.

 

. The Police Yearbook 1968. Washington, D.C.:
International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1968.

 

. The Police Yearbook 1970. Washington, D.C.:
International Association of Chiefs of Police, 1970.

 

. The President's Commission on Law Enforcement
and Administration of Criminal Justice Task Force
Report: The Police. Washington, D.C.: U. S.
Government Printing Office, 1967.

 

Skolnick, Jerome H. Justice Without Trial. New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1966.

 

Thaft, Philip. Organized Labor in American History. New
York: Harper & Row, 1964.

. Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionagy.

Springfield, Massachusetts: G. & C. Merriam MICHH

Company, 1965.

Wilson, James Q. Yarieties of Police Behavior. Cambridge
Mass.: Harvard UniVersity Press, 1969.

Periodicals

 

Anderson Arvid. "Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public
Employment." Michigan Law Review, Vol. 67, No. 5,
March, 1969.

 

Angell, John E., and Igleburger, Robert M. "Dealing With
Police Union." The Police Chief, May, 1971.

 

Hutchison, Kay B., and Juris, Hervey A. "The Legal Status
of Municipal Police Employee Organizations."
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, April, 1970.

Juris, Hervey A. "The Implication of Police Unionism."
Law and Society Review, November, 1971.

 

Juris, Hervey A. "Police Personnel Problems, Police Unions
and Participatory Management." Proceedings of The
22nd Annual Meeting of The Industrial Relations
Research AssociaEion, Reprint NO. 135, 1969.

79

Kelling, George L., and Kliesmet, Robert B. "Resistance to
The Professionalization of The Police." The Police
Chief, May, 1971.

 

 

Kerr, Clark. "Management of Industrial Conflict in Society."
The Pacific Spectator, Vol. VIII, No. 4, Autumn,
1954.

Kheel, Theodore. "Strikes and Public Employment." Michigan
Law Review, Vol. 67, No. 5, March, 1969.

 

Lev, Edward R. "Strikes by Government Employees: Problems
and Solutions." Journal of The American Bar
Association, Vol. 57, August, 1971.

 

 

Rehmus, Charles M. "Constraints on Local Governments in
Public Employee Bargaining." Michigan Law Review,
Vol. 67, NO. 5, March, 1969.

Serrin, William. "God Help Our City." Atlantic Monthly,
March, 1967.

 

Smith, Russell A. "State and Local Advisory Reports on
Public Employment Labor Legislation: A Comparative
Analysis." Michigan Law Review, Vol. 67, No. 5,
March, 1969.

 

Wurf, Jerry. "The Case Against Compulsory Arbitration."
Tpe Public Employee, Vol. XXXI, No. 3, March,
1966.

 

APPENDIX

80

APPENDIX

SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Question 1.

How would you describe the overall effect of police

unionism on administrative authority? To what extent has

the authority of the police chiefs been challenged?

1. Great challenge

2. Appreciable challenge

3. Slight challenge

4. No challenge

 

Question 2.

ment to

How would you compare a chief in a unionized depart-
one where there is no union?

Chief in a union department has a much more difficult

 

time imposing discipline.

Chief in a union department has a moderatelyymore

 

difficult time imposing discipline.

 

Chief in a union department has an equally difficult

 

time imposing discipline.

Chief in a union department has a moderately easier

 

time imposing discipline.

Chief in a union department has a much easier time

 

imposing discipline.

81

82

Question 3.

It is generally agreed that police associations have
the right to represent the men on matters pertaining to wages
and general working conditions. However, there is some
question as to whether or not disciplinary matters are
working conditions or up to the discretion of the chief.

To what extent would you agree or disagree that disciplinary
procedures (including punishment) should be subject to union
involvement?

1. Strongly disagree

2. Moderately disagree

3. Undecided or neutral

4. Moderately agree

5. Strongly agree

 

Question 4.

If you think that association involvement in matters
of discipline and punishment pap caused improvement in
discipline, then which part of the discipline has improved,
the actual rules and regulations or the procedures?

1. Rules and regulations.

2. Procedures (due process).

3. No difference in discipline.

 

Question 5.

Giving an opinion, would you say that in matters
pertaining to discipline and punishment, the administration
is sensitive to possible union reaction?

Yes. No.

 

83

Question 6.

If you do feel that the administration pp sensitive
to union reaction, then do you feel that this sensitivity
has affected either the quality or quantity of punishment?
____Quality
____Quantity
Question 7.

What effect do you think that union involvement in
discipline proceedings has on morale?

1. Good for morale

2. Bad for morale

3. No effect on morale

 

Question 8.

What do you think is the most important part of
association membership, the wages and fringe benefits, or
the protection you receive when you are in trouble?

1. Wages and fringe benefits.
2. Protection '

3. Equally important

 

Question 9.

If you had the power to change any part of the
discipline procedures or policies of your department, what
would you change?

Explain

 

84

Question 10.

In Europe it is common for police agencies to recruit
managerial personnel from other walks of life. What is your
position regarding this practice?

1. Strongly approve

2. Moderately approve

3. Neither approve nor disapprove
4. Moderately disapprove

5. Strongly disapprove

 

Question 11.

The Task Force Report: The Police, recommends the

 

implementation of lateral recruitment and promotion in the
police service as a means of "professionalization." What

is your position regarding this recommendation? (Explain

concept of lateral recruitment.)

l. Strongly approve

2. Moderately approve

3. Neither approve nor disapprove

4. Moderately disapprove

5. Strongly disapprove

 

Question 12.

The Task Force Report: The Police, also recommends

 

the implementation of the "three classes of police Officer"
concept. What is your feeling on this? (Explain concept

to respondent.)

85

1. Strongly approve

2. Moderately approve

3. Neither approve nor disapprove
4. Moderately disapprove

5. Strongly disapprove

 

Question 13.

As a matter of Opinion, could you please place a
numerical value on what you think the primary concern Of a
police association should be. The choice is between having
the association concentrate its main efforts on professional
concerns such as raising educational standards or improving
the quality Of training, or—-concentrating its efforts on
the improvement of wages and working conditions. A value
of "0" means that all the association's efforts should be
spent on professional concerns. A value of "10" means that
all the association's efforts should be on improving wages
and working conditions. A value of "5" would mean that you
feel efforts should be equally divided between both. Please
choose any value from "0" to "10".

O 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Professional Equal Financial
Concerns Concern Concerns

 

 

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