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This is to certify that the
thesis entitled
A Study of Some of the Policies and
Practices of the American Federation of
Musicians Which Tended to Have a
Restrictive Effect on Broadcast Programing
During the Decade of the 1940's
presented by
Albert D. Talbott
has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for
)1vo degree in Television-Radio
jyéiltï¬i«. ASZ éE;VLC
Major professor
Date MALIZL 1961
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ABSTRACT
A STUDY OF SOME OF THE POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS WHICH TENDED TO HAVE A RESTRICTIVE EF-
FECT ON BROADCAST PROGRAMMING DURING THE DECADE OF THE 1940's
by Albert D. Talbott
gzgadgastigg and Federal Policy.--With regard to broad-
casting in this country, we are committed to a federal regula-
tory policy by which the government licenses qualified persons
to Operate privately owned broadcast facilities on publicly
owned broadcast channels. Accompanying the privilege to utilize
these channels, the licensee is charged with the responsibility
of providing a broadcast Operation that serves the "public
convenience, interest, or necessity." To implement the latter,
both the FCC and the Courts have stressed that the individual
licensee must bear the responsibility for the selection and
presentation of program material and that this can neither be
delegated nor transferred to others, or be unduly affected or
restricted by contractual arrangements. Accordingly, this
responsibility for maintaining control over programming should
not be subject to infringement by outside parties.
The Pngleg Under Study.--The general problem with
which this research was concerned was the restriction of and
control over broadcast programming imposed from sources outside
the licensee. It was the purpose of the research to make a
historical-critical study of this general problem as it was
reflected in the policies, practices, and activities of the
American Federation of musicians with respect to the broad-
Albert D. Talbott
casting industry during the 1940's.
Sources Used,--The important sources utilized for this
study were trade and news publications, official AFN records,
and numerous federal government documents of Congress, the
FCC, and the Courts. For background material, a number of
Journal articles and books were consulted as well as numerous
accounts in papular contemporary periodicals.
Pindigg§.--A.number of instances of AFM policies, prac-
tices, and activities which tended to restrict programming
were documented. Among them were: (1) secondary boycotts
against the national radio networks (1940-1946); (2) restric-
tions on nusicians' employment for Fl, TV (both live and
film), and cooperatively sponsored programs, and for record—
ings and transcriptions (1940-1948): (3) restrictions on the
TV use of films produced specifically for theatre exhibition
(1946-1951); (4) interference with the broadcasting of music
programs originating outside the v.3. (1946); and (5) palicies
affecting the broadcast performances of amateur and military
musicians (1940-1947).
In enforcing the above, it was found that the AFM
managed to engender considerable Opposition and reaction from
numerous segments of the American society. At the culmina-
tion of this public disapproval, the Lea Act was passed in
1946 as an amendment to the Communications Act for the purpose
of stepping such actions of the Union. The study traces the
legislative history of the law. Ultimately, the Les Act had
to face a constitutional test which it successfully met. The
Albert D. Talbott
decisions which played a part in this test are reviewed.
Although the legislation was not immediately and entirely
successful in stopping the Union, the AFM ultimately had to
bow to the public will. By 1948, the AFM had withdrawn by
choice or force nearly every one of its policies of a restric-
tive nature which had affected broadcast programming.
A STUDY OF SOME OF THE POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF THE AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS WHICH TENDED TO HAVE A RESTRICTIVE EF-
FECT ON BROADCAST PROGRAMMING DURING THE DECADE OF THE 1940's
By
A
J"
Albert D.0 Talbott
A THESIS
Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
Department of Television and Radio
1961
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to express a debt of gratitude to
Dr. Walter B. Emery for his most generous aid and direc-
tion in the planning and execution of this project. Also,
I would like to dedicate this endeavor to my wife, Rose,
and my mother, Mrs. Maude E. Talbott.
11
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
LIST OF TABLES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . viii
Chapter
I 0 INTRODUCT I ON 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 1
Broadcasting and Federal Policy
The Nature of the Problem
Ldmitations ‘
Definition of Terms
Significance and Justification
Selective Review of the Literature
Important Sources
Organization
II. PRELUDE TO CONFLICT: THE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY
AND THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS OF
THE FORTIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
A. The Broadcasting Industry. 1940-1950 . 18
Radio: 1940 Stile
Radio: 1940-19 5
Broadcasting and the Postwar Period
of the forties
Summing Up
B. The American Federation of Musicians . 48
Early History
Orggï¬ized and Centralized Power of the
Extent of Unionism
Objectives of the Federation
Canned music and Technology
The Musicians and the Machine
Progress and the A!!!
Union Featherbedding Practices
Leadership of the ARM
Summing Up
C. Music and Broadcast Programming . . . 72
MUsio and Radio Programs
Music and a Vision
111
Chapter
Music "Broadcasting" Before Radio
Music and Early Radio
Music in Broadcast Programming
Recordings Used in Broadcasting
Extent of the Use of Recording and Trans-
criptions and Music in Radio Program-
ming in the Forties
Concern for Recorded Program Material in
Radio Broadcasting
Musicians' Em loyment in Broadcasting
During the 's
Summing Up
III. POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND ACTIVITIES OF THE
B.
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS WHICH TEND-
ED TO HAVE A RESTRICTIVE EFFECT ON BROADCAST
PROGRAMMING DURING THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES
A. AFM Strikes Against the Major Radio Net-
works Which were Related to Disputes
Between AFM Locals and Network Affili-
ated St at ion 8 O O O O 0 O O O O 0 O O O
The First AFM Action Against the Broad-
casting Industry During the Forties
AFM's Network Strikes Associated with
Local Disputes
The Remote Band Network Strike Procedure
Refinement of the Method
Effectiveness of the Procedure
AFM Objectives
Actual Network Involvement
The Strikes as Secondary Boycotts
Effect of Network Strikes on Programming
Public Reaction
The Short-lived Ban on Broadcasts Involv-
ing Military Musicians . . . . . . . . .
AFM Staps Military Band from Broadcasting
AIM General Military Ban Announced
Military Ban Removed
ARM Policy Regarding Military Musicians
Effects of the AFM's Military Music Policy
on Programming
C. The Interlochen Dispute and Amateur and
School Musicians. . . . . . . . . . . .
AFM Action Against Amateurs
Interlochen Dispute
AFM Justification of the Interlochen
Action
Public Reaction
Other Restrictions on School and Amateur
Musicians
iv
Page
114
. 114
. 143
1A9
Chapter
D.
F.
Page
AFM Ban on Amateur Broadcasts
Announced ARM Policy Regarding Amateurs
Effect of Union Policy Regarding Ama-
teurs on Radio Programming
The Recording Ban of 1942. . . . . . . . 167
The AFM Moves Against Recordings
Federal Government Involvement
The Hold- ts Give-In
Effect of he Recording Ban on Radio
Programming
Public Reaction
The Television Problem. . . . . . . . . 179
The TV Ban ‘
Earlier Concern
Employment for Films Produced for TV
Theatre Films on TV
Theatre Films on TV
1946 Film Agreement
Union Justification of Its Policies
Industry Reaction
Effect on TV Programming
Confused State of Affairs: TV
After 1948
Press and Public Reaction
One Last Consideration
me m PmbluO O O O O O O O O O O O O 195
AM-FM Duplication
Networks Encounter Difficulty with AFM
Over Their New AM-FM Policies
FM Ban
Industry Reaction
FCC Reaction
Further FM Restrictions
Effect of ARM Policies on FM Broadcast
Programming
Union Justification of the Ban
A Myth DeveIOps
Ban on International or Foreign Musical
Broadcasts 1n Uese e e e e e e e e e e 207
AFM Announces International Music Ban
International Repercussions of the Ban
Effect of foreign Ban on Broadcast Pro-
gramming
All Policy Toward Cooperative Programs . 211
Cooperative Programs
AFM s Action Against Cooperative Programs
Cooperative Ban
V
Chapter
IV.
V.
I.
Page
Union Objection to Cooperative Programs
Effect on Programming
The Recording Ban of 1948. . . . . . . . 218
Taft-Hartley
The AFM's Unemployment Fund
Recording Ban of 1942
Purpose of the Ben
Effects of the 19h8 Ban on Programming
Final Settlement of the 1948 Recording
Ban
CONGRESS INTERVENES! LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
m LEA ACT. 0 O O C O O A. O O I O O O O O O 228
A.
C.
The Seventy-seventh Congress . . . . . . 228
First Hint of Congressional Interest
The Clark Bearings
House Interest
The Clark Bill
The Seventy-eighth Congress. . . . e . . 232
Continuation of the Clark Hearings
Other Congressional Action to March l9A4
Public and Press Reaction
Clark Hearings Reopen
Senator Vandenberg Acts
The Seventy-ninth Congress . . . . . . . 237
The Vandenberg Prepcsal and the New
Congress
Inadequacy of the Vandenberg Measure
The Lea Hearings
The May Continuation of the Lea Hearings
Other AFM Activities
The Second Session
The Lea Committee Report
Provisions and Intent of the Lea Measure
The House Passes the Lea Measure
The Bill Goes to Conference
Debate in the Senate
The Bill Becomes Law
The Broad Pressures Which Converged and
Precipitated the Lea. AOte e e e e e e e 264
Public Disapproval
Industry Reaction
Concern for the Basic Issues
Summing Up
POST LEA ACT: RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT . . . 277
A.
AFM Test of the Lea Act in the Courts . . 277
71
Chapter Page
Chain of Events Leading up to the Court
Test of the Lea Act
The Government Starts Action in District
Court
The District Court's Decision
District Court's Decision Appealed
Decision of the Supreme Court
Retrial in District Court
Judge LaBuy's Decision
B. Effectiveness of the Lea Act. . . . . . . 294
Unwanted Musicians
International Ban
Amateur Musicians
Other Lea Act Objectives
C. Negotiations for Renewal of the Contracts
Between the AFM and the Networks Which
were to Expire January 1, 1948 and the
Issues Settled During Them. . . . . . . 308
FM
gooperative Programs
V
Final Settlement Contained in the 1948
Contracts
Reasons Speculated for the Settlement
Summing Up
VI. SUMMAR! AND CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . 323
Summary of Findings
One Last Consideration
Suggestions for Further Research
APPme A. O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 332
APPENDIX B. O o O O O O O O O O 0 O 0 O O O O O O O O 334
BIBLIOGRAPHY. O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 336
vii
Table
1.
7.
LIST OF TABLES
Page
Income (Total Revenues Less Total Expenses) Be-
fore deeral Income Taxes for All AM Radio
Stations and Regional and National Radio Net-
works for the Years 1946-1950. . . . . . . . . . 41
Total Revenues, Total Expenses, and Income (To-
tal Revenues Less Total Expenses) Before Fe-
deral Income Taxes for the Entire Broadcasting
Industry for 13110 Years 1939‘1950e e e e e e e e “'4
Estimated Number of AM FM, and TV Receivers in
Use for the Years 19A6-1950. . . . . . . . . . . 46
Use of Recorded Music by Radio Broadcast Stations
According to Certain Selected Variables During
the Week of April 5 Through 11, 1942. . . . . . 87
Analysis of the Total Radio Time Between 8:00 AM
and 1:00 PM Daily of the Four Key Stations Lo-
cated in New York City of the Four Major Na-
tional Radio Networks for the Years 1945-1949... 90
Full-Time Employment and Compensation Data for
all Employees Whose Wages were Paid by AM
Stations and Regional and National Radio Net-
works for the Week Beginning October 17. 1943. .101
Full-Time Employment and Compensation Data for
Staff Musicians Whose Wages were Paid by AM
Stations (Excluding Network Key Stations) by
Class and Time of Station for the Week Begin-
ning October 17, 1943. . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Full-Time Employment and Compensation Data for
Staff Musicians and All Employees Whose Wages
were Paid by AM Stations (Excluding all Net-
work Operations) for one Week in October for
the YOEI'B 1939‘191‘50 e e e e e e e e e e e e e 104
Full-Time Employment and Compensation Data for
Staff Musicians and A11 Employees Whose Wages
were Paid by the Major National Radio Networks
and Their Key Stations for One Week in October
for the Years 1943-19A5. . . . . . . . . . . . 105
viii
Table Page
10. Full-Time Employment and Compensation Data for
Staff Musicians and All Employees Whose Wages
were Paid by AM Stations and Regional and Na-
tional Radio Networks fer One Week in October
for the Years 1942-1945. . . . . . . . . . . . 106
11. Employment of Musicians in Radio Broadcasting
for the YOEI‘S 194#‘1949e e e e e e e e e e e e 107
12. Full-Time Employment of Staff Musicians in Radio
Broadcasting Whose Wages were Paid by Radio
Stations for the Years 1944-19A9 . . . . . . . 110
13. Summary of Strikes by the AFM of Remote Bands
Against the Major National Radio Networks
Between 1940-1943 in which the Dispute was
Between an Affiliated Station and an AFM
local. 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 120
IA. Summary of the AFM Strikes Against NBC and CBS
Involving the Musicians on Three Network Com-
mercial Programs which were Associated with
Disputes Between AFM Locals and Network Af-
filiates O O O O O O O O O 0 O O O O O O O O O 127
15. Summary of Local Disputes Between AFM Locals and
Affiliated Stations of the National Radio Net-
works which were Settled Through Assistance of
the National President's Office by Seeking to
involve the Affiliate's Network in the Dispute 130
ix
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Broadcasting and Federal Policy.—-In the United States,
the public owns the channels which are used for broadcasting.1
Under the philosophy expressed in the Communications Act of
193A, as amended, we are committed to the policy of private
ownership of broadcast facilities, with licenses granted by
the federal government to qualified persons to operate on these
publicly owned channels in the public interest.2 Such a policy
imposes a responsibility upon the broadcast licensee for the
selection and presentation of program material which will
serve this public interest.3 Both the Federal Communications
Commission“ and the courts have stressed that this responsi-
bility rests on the individual licensees, and can neither be
delegated nor transferred to others, or be unduly affected or
*— *‘w
148 Stat. 1064, 1081, 1083 (1934). Sections 301 and
304, respectively.
248 Stat. 1064, 1083 (1934). Section 307(a).
3The Federal Communications Commission stressed this
in its report: U. 8. Federal Communications Commission, In
the Matte g; Ed;torig%izigg by Broadcast Licensees (Docket
No. l , June 2, 9 9 , p. 2. (MImeographed.)
4Hereafter in this thesis, the Federal Communications
Commission may be referred to as the FCC or the Commission.
With respect to the citation of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission as an author, hereafter in this thesis, it
will be cited as: U.S. FCC.
2
restricted by contractual arrangements.5 To be consistent
with federal policy, this responsibility for maintaining
control over broadcast programming should not be subject to
infringement or restriction imposed upon licensees from out-
side organizations, groups or individuals.
WW.--During the 1940's, a number
of the policies and practices of the American Federation of
Musicians6 tended to have a restrictive effect upon certain
types of broadcast programming, notably programs containing
5The FCC stressed this inits report: U. 3. FCC,
Laï¬aflato KWMWLWO 96.9.2.
25†pe e
In: Belliï¬ggag B:gadcast%g§ . 33 51., 8 F.C.C.
159. 165 (19 3 e ommiss on s a .3?
The licensee of a radio broadcast station must be
necessarily held responsible for all program service
and may not delegate his ultimate responsibility Car
such to others.
In promulgating its regulations on chain broadcasting,
the Commission indicated that one of its purposes was to free
broadcast licensees from contractual relationships which pre-
cluded maintaining control of their broadcast programming.
In its report: 0.3. FCC, gg’Chain t (Docket
No. 5060, May 2, 1941), p. 3 he Commission sai :
It is the station, not the network, which is li-
censeed to serve the public interest. The licensee
has the duty of determining what programs shall be
broadcast over his station s facilities, and cannot
lawfully delegate this duty or transfer the control
of his station directly to the network or indirectly
to the advertising agency. He cannot lawfully bind
himself to accept programs in every case where he
cannot sustain the burden of proof that he has a better
program. The licensee is obligated to reserve to
himself the final decision as to what programs will
best serve the public interest.
The network regulations were sustained by the courts
1n2WWMV-mm. 319 U. 8.
190 ( 9 .
6Hereafter in this thesis, the American Federation of
IMusioiane may be referred to as the AFM, the Union, the
Federation, or the National.
3
music. That is, through the implementation of these policies
and practices, the AFM was in a position whereby a certain
amount of control could be and was exercised over some types
of broadcast programs involving the use of instrumental mu-
sicians.
Among the earliest of such policies and practicess
during the 1940's directly affecting broadcasting was a series
of strikes which prevented the networks from presenting late
evening radio programs which were originated remotely from
night clubs, ballrocms, and other"night spots." The feature
of these programs was the popular and â€big name" bands and
orchestras appearing at the night spots.7
Also, the AFM was successful in preventing the broad-
casting of the performances of some amateur, school, and
military musical groups. The most dramatic and highly publi-
cized of such actions on the part of the Union grew out of
the Interlochen dispute. In 1942, the AFM forced the can-
cellaticn of the National Broadcasting Company's8 annual
series of summer concerts (of twelve years' standing) featur-
ing the student symphony orchestra of the National Music
Camp at Interlochen, Michigan.9
Other policies adapted by the Federation affected tele—
vision.’ For approximately three years, AFM members were not
7The AFM policies and practices outlined in the above
paragraph are covered in detail with full documentation in
Chapter III.
8Hereafter in this thesis, the National Broadcasting
Company may be referred to as NBC
98ee Footnote 7.
4
permitted to appear on or perform for any kind of TV program.
For a time, the Union was successful in preventing the use on
TV of Hollywood feature films containing music of any kind
which were produced primarily for theatre exhibition. Also,
other policies affected the use of film containing music
which was specifically produced for television.10
The struggling broadcast medium of FM (frequency modu-
lation) was not exempt from the actions of the AFM. In
October of 1945, the AFM demanded that the networks hire
double orchestras for all programs which were broadcast
simultaneously over AM (amplitude modulation) or standard
broadcasting and FM. This policy nearly stopped the use of
live music in FM programming. In addition, the Union prevented
the feeding of AM network programs containing live music to FM
stations. Another Federation Policy prohibited its members
from working for FM networks. However, member musicians could
be employed for broadcasts of individual stations.11
Other policies and practices affected other types of
musical programs. The Union almost totally curtailed the
broadcasting of musical programs originating outside the United
States and Canada in 1946. Another example of such AFM policies
and practices was that its members were prohibited from seeking
engagments on radio's so-called "cooperative programs.†These
were commercial programs which were originated by the networks
but without sponsorship on the national level. Time was
1OSee Footnote 7.
118cc Footnote 7.
5
reserved during such programs for local sponsors to present
commercial messages.12
It will be noted from the preceding that the full range
of broadcasting services--AM, FM, and TV--was affected in
some measure by AFM policies during the forties. However,
the important point with respect to this study is that such
policies and practices of the AFM did affect the content of
certain segments of broadcast programming. Furthermore, a
number of these policies were imposed on broadcasters by
unilateral determination. In other words, certain policies
and practices of the American Federation of Musicians during
the 1940's tended to interfere seriously with the ability of
duly licensed broadcasters to maintain control over their
broadcast programming.
Accordingly, the general problem with which this research
is concerned is the restriction on the control over broadcast
programming imposed by outside sources, which appears to be
inconsistent with federal regulatory policy. It is the purpose
of this research to make a historical-critical study of this
problem as it is reflected in the policies, practices, and
activities of the American Federation of Musicians with respect
to the broadcasting industry during the 1940's. Particular
emphasis is given to governmental action taken in this matter.
Limitations.--This study is limited to those policies
and practices of the American Federation of Musicians which
tended to have a restrictive effect on broadcast programming
123cc Footnote 7.
6
presented by U.S. broadcasting facilities during the forties.
In addition, with respect to governmental action concerning
the AFM and its activities, only the action taken by Congress
is of primary concern. One exception involves the judicial
review and interpretation of the Lea Act. The Lea Act,13
passed as an amendment to the Communications Act, represents
the most significant action taken by Congress with respect to
the problem under consideration.
Definition of Terms.--The American Federation of Mu-
sicians is the international labor organization of musicians
whose jurisdiction includes instrumental performers, copyists,
arrangers of music, and orchestral librarians.14 It is com-
posed of "local unions of musicians, the individual musicians
" and "such organizations active
who form such local unions,
in the field of music which may be granted a charter of af-
filiation."15 In 1958, the number of member locals was nearly
700,16 with a total membership of approximately 264,000.17
Since this study is limited to the United States, the AFM will
1360 Stat. 89 (1996). The act had been pepularly named
after Representative Clarence F. Lea (Calif. ) who was in-
strumental in the passageo of the legislation.
14American Federation of Musicians of the United States
and Canada, Constitution (1958). Art. 3, Sect. 3. p. 6.
With respect to the citation of the American Federa-
tion of Musicians of the United States and Canada as an author,
hereafter in this thesis, it will be cited as: AFM.
15Ibid., Art. 1, p. 5.
16AFM. Proceedings, 1958, pp. 189- 257.
Hereafter in this thesis, AFM. Proceedings will be
cited as: AFM. Proceed.
17Ibid., p. 93.
7
be considered national in sccpe. Technically speaking, how-
ever, the Union is international in scope, i.e., it has mem-
bers in two countries, the United States and Canada.
By policy of the Federation, what is referred to is
that policy formulated in behalf of the national organization
by either the national union officers, the executive board,
or the convention which was binding on all members.18 By
practices and activities of the Federation, what is referred
to is that action which was taken by both the national organi-
zation and its member locals to implement the policy of the
Federation. Policies, practices, and activities associated
with the AFM or its member locals of a strictly local nature
involving policies which were not binding on all members of
the Union are not within the consideration of this study.
Broadcast programming includes all programming of net-
work organizations (both regional and national), network
affiliates, and independent stations. Also, it includes
programming on the three broadcast media, AM, FM, and TV.
Significance and Justification.--With respect to
some of the policies, practices, and activities of the AFM
in the 1940's, one Congressional leader wrote the following
in a committee hearing's report to the House:
In recent years the broadcasting industry has
been subjected to extortionate demands enforced by
18The national union officers, the International Exe-
cutive Board, and the convention are the constituted officers
and bodies which can formulate policies, orders, rules, and
etc. which are binding on all members. AFM Const tution,
(1958), Art. 4. pp. 7-8; AFM, yer-Laws (1958),Trt. 1, pp. 19-34.
Hereafter in this thesis, {He International Executive
Board may be referred to as the IEB.
8
coercive methods which increasingly threaten to re-
strict and handicap it in performing its rightful
functions to the Netion.19
Communication plays an extremely vital role in our complex
contemporary society. It would seem that anything that could
potentially disrupt the functioning of any segment of our
society's complex communications network is worthy of study.
In addition, the general problem still appears to be
a current one. In 1959. another labor union of the broadcast-
ing industry, the National Association of Broadcast Employees
and Technicians,20 tried to enforce a policy which was very
similar to some of those of the AFM during the 1940's.21 NABET
members refused to handle a video tape recording of a network
television program made outside the United States which em-
ployed non-union foreign technicians in its production. As a
result, there was a work st0ppage involving the NABET employees
of the National Broadcasting Company. However, only one day's
programming was significantly affected. NBC's supervisory
employees filled in for the NABET technicians, and near normal
19U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, Report: Prohibiting Certain Coer-
cive P actices Affecting Broadcasting, H.R. Rep. No. 1508,
pt. 1, 9t ong., 2nd Sess., 19 , p. 2.
QOHereafter in this thesis, the National Association
gingoadcast Employees and Technicians may be referred to as
Membership qualifications for NABET are as follows:
â€Any person employed or qualified for employment in the broad-
casting, telecasting, recording or allied industries, shall be
eligible for membership." National Association of Broadcast
Employee: and Technicians, Constitution (1959). Art. II, Sect.
e'pe e
21For accounts, see: Broadcastin , May 4, 1959. pp.
60-63; Ng!_Yc£k Times, April 28, I959. P. 3724.
9
programming was resumed on the second day of the work stop-
page. This situation does point up the current nature of the
problem under consideration. To more fully understand and
appreciate the current problem requires a careful study of
the situation in the forties which precipitated legislation
(the Lea Act) designed to cope with such problems. This
legislation is still on the statute books.
Selective Review of thg Literatuge.--With respect to
the specific problem being considered, little literature was
found which related directly to it. As far as it is known,
this study represents one of the first systematic attempts to
study the problem and its effects upon broadcast programming
and upon the ability of duly licenseed broadcasters to maintain
control over their programming.
Charles H. Tower, in an article for £53,239 Contemporary
Eggplggg, examines the general question of union-management
relationships in the broadcasting industry.22 His principal
emphasis is on the employer-employee relationship within the
framework of collective bargaining and organized labor and not
-specifically on the possible effects that union policies and
practices may have on broadcast programming. However, he does
allude to some of the general effects when he discusses the
major sources of bargaining strength of broadcast unionsf“3
In brief, Tower suggests that some of the broadcast unions may
22Charles H. Tower, â€Labor Relations in the Broad-
casting Industry," Law and antemporagy Problems 23 (Winter
1958), pp. 62-101. . '
231b1de’ ppe 82-85e
10
derive some additional bargaining power because of the pos-
sible interruption that they could cause to broadcast program-
ming through the use of strikes and work stappages.
In a thesis done at Columbia University entitled,
â€The American Federation of Musicians and the Radio and Record-
ing Companies: A Report on a Controversy," Anders S. Lunde
made a study of the so-called AFM recording ban of 1942.24
This was a controversy which primarily involved the Federation
and the recording and transcriptiOn companies. The AFM, in
mid-1942 informed the companies that its members would no
longer be permitted to make recordings and transcriptions until
further notice. The ban resulted in almost complete steppage
of the recording and transcribing of any kind of instrumental
music for commercial and home use in certain segments of the
recording industry for over two years. Although the radio
industry took an active role, it was not directly involved in
the dispute except from two standpoints: (l) the radio in-
dustry had vested interests in some of the recording and
transcription companies, and (2) because of the broadcast
industry's extensive reliance on recorded music to fill program
schedules, its use of newly recorded music could become serious-
ly affected (especially important in the area of â€papular
music") if the ban were of prolonged duration. The primary
2(â€Anders S. Lunde, â€The American Federation of Musicians
and the Radio and Recording Companies: A Report on a Cbntro~
versy" (Unpublished Master s thesis, Faculty of Political
Science, Columbia University, 1947).
The following is based on the thesis: Anders S. Lunde,
"The American Federation of Musicians and the Recording Ban,"
Public Qpinion Quarterly, 12 (Spring, 1948), pp. 45-56.
11
emphasis of the Columbia study is on the recording ban of 1942
and not on the problem under instant consideration as outlined
above.
Two other works of some consequence deal specifically
with the American Federation of Musicians from other points
of view. They are: (1) an extensive two-part article for
the University 2; Chicggo pal Review by Vern Countryman,25
and (2) a book entitled Th2 Musicians ggd_Petrillo by Robert
D. Leiter.26 Countryman's article is concerned with the whole
sweep of activities of the AFM which have legal and judicial
ramifications with particular emphasis on labor, copyright,
and performers' rights with respect to legislation, judicial
interpretation and accompanying problems. Leiter's book takes
the form of a historical exposition of the national organiza-
tion of professional instrumental musicians. The emphasis is
on the American Federation of Musicians, the national labor
organization which survived. Although both of these works
touch on the problem under consideration, their chief signi-
ficances lie in the areas indicated above.
Besides these more extensive studies, there have been
a number of journal articles which touch to a lesser degree on
25Vern Countryman, "The Organized Musician: I "
O
Univegsity g; Chic 0 Law Review 16 (Autumn 1948) pp. 56-85-
e anized Musician: II," Un ve it 2i Chicago £51.32? ’
£111, 1 (Winter, 1949), pp. 203-29 .
A chapter in the following was "reproduced almost ver-
batim" from Countryman's article: Harry P. Warner, Radio and
Television Ri hts (New York: Matthew Bender and Co., IHc.,
1953 9 PP. “5210
26Robert D. Leiter, The Mgsicians and Petrillo (New Yerk:
Bookman Associates, Inc., 1933).
12
the AFM and the Lea Act?â€7 Both the journal articles and
the above mentioned longer studies tend to regard the Lea
Act as a labor law and not as an amendment to the Communica-
tions Act. However, the emphasis in this study with regard
to the Lea Act is not as a labor law but as a Communications
Act amendment. Only one source was found which did regard the
Lea Act in this manner, but this was only in one brief section.28
This was a study completed in 1958 by Monroe Carol at Michigan
State University of "Congressional and judicial comments con-
cerning the federal regulation of broadcast programming."
To be sure, the studies and articles cited do deal in
some measure and in varying degrees with the possible effects
that the policies and practices of labor unions can have on
broadcast programming and on the ability of broadcast licensees
to maintain control over programming. However, none dealt
specifically with this problem area. The research studies
seem to be limited, and there appears to be a real need for
systematic exploration in the area described.
27As examples, five such journal articles are: Benjamin
Aaron, "Governmental Restraints on Featherbedding,†Stanford
L 1 Review, 5 (July, 1953), pp. 680-721; Walter L. Daykin,
Featherbedding," Labog 5;: Journal, 7 (November, 1956), pp.
699-710; "Lea Act, Taft-Hartley and State Remedies for Feath-
erbedding," Columbia Lg: Review, 15 (May, 1955). PP. 754-62;
E. C. Rodriguez, "The Lea Act: An Enactment to Proscribe Cer-
tain Coercive Practices Affecting Broadcasting," ngrgetown
Lg! Journgl, 45 (November, 1946), pp. 79-91; W. A. o uel,
The Petrillo Problem," Southwestern Lg! Journal, 2 Spring,
1948), pp. 211-25.
28Mbnroe E. Carol, "An Analytical Review of Congres-
sional and Judicial Comments Concerning the Federal Regula-
tion of Broadcast Programming†(Unpublished Master's Thesis,
Depargmgnt of Speech, Michigan State University, 1958),
pp. 5 - 0.
13
Important Sources.-—Besides the sources mentioned in
the selective review of the literature, there are a number of
other sources which were important in the execution of this
study. A thorough search of Broadcasting, the broadcasting
industry's principal trade publication, and the N2! 12;; ZAEEE
was made for all news accounts and editorial comment which
were related to the problem under study. Other news periodi-
cals were consulted to a lesser degree such as Business 122;,
Newpweek, llpp, and Unlted States N215 gpd_!pplg Report. In
addition to these sources, papular, mass circulation periodi-
cals were utilized to get some fool of the times with respect
to current thinking and public and press reactions. Among such
sources were Collier's, Harper's Magazine, Life, Nation, New
Republic, Reader's Digest, Saturday Evenipg Post, and Saturday
glvlew p; thepptpye.
For the industry point of view, one important source
was a bulletin published by the National Association of Broad-
casters dealing exclusively with the AFM. This special publi~
cation was entitled, Natlonal Association 2; Broadcasters.
Speclal A, F, of M, Bulletin.29 In addition to the industry
point of view, this publication contained a lot of material
which could be considered primary source material.30
ï¬â€” ï¬â€”
29This publication was obtained from the library of the
National Association of Broadcasters, Washington, D.C. It was
contained in the bound volumes of the N.A.B. Reports, vols.
10-13. 1942-1945.
30This publication contained on a number of occasions
verbatim reproductions and reprints of letters, telegrams,
communications, reports, government documents, labor agreements,
articles and editorials from newspapers all over the country,
14
AFM official records provided a very important source
of information about the Union and its activities. The re-
cords referred to are the published proceedings of the annual
conventions of the Federation cited as: American Federatlon
p; Musicians p£_ppp_United States ppg Canada, Proceedlngs.
These covered the years 1939 to 1951. They contained the
official accounts of the convention proceedings, the annual
reports of the AFM officers, and the official minutes of a
number of the meetings of the International Executive Board.
In addition, a number of pamphlets published by the Union
were useful in gaining insight with respect to its point of
view.
Regarding governmental action, a number of govern-
ment documents provided important and useful sources.
Fer the action of Congress, the Congressional Record was
consulted. In addition, another significant source was
the series of investigations and hearings conducted by
Congressional Committees in 194231 1943-1944.32
30and etc. In a few instances, there were verbatim
excerpts of testimony before Congressional committees and
other government agencies.
31U.S. Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, Hear-
ipgs: Use of Mechanics Re rcduction 9; Music, 77th Cong.,
2n Sess., 1942 Washington, D.C.: vernment Printing Office,
1943).
32The Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce held a
series of hearings in 1943-1944 which were conducted by a
subcommittee headed by Senator D. Werth Clark of Idaho. In
late 1944, Senator Clark announced that none of these hearings
were published nor were they reported on to the Senate. He
also indicated at that time, that there was no intention to
do either. See: Newsweek, October 16, 1944, pp. 67-68;
Np! York Times, October 9, 1944, p. 13:1.
15
1945,33 1947.34 1948,35 and 1956.36 The official reports of
these hearings were consulted, also. The Federal Communica-
tions Commission provided some important sources. Among these
were the Apppgl_Reports and the series of yearly reports on-
titled Statistics p£,ppp_Communicatipns Indusppy lp_ppp,United
States. Other miscellaneous Commission documents were utilized,
32For accounts of these hearings, other sources had
to be utilized. For the most complete source of the hearings
held in January of 1943, see: National Associatlon p; Broad-
aste s Specigl A F of M B et n, No. 5, anuary 22,
1943, pp. 1-35. THis source contains significant verbatim
excerpts of the testimony hearing by the Clark subcommittee.
(Hereafter in this thesis, Nation Associati %;
roadcasters S ecia A, F, o; M, la in wiIl be cite as:
m .. mil "'"""""'
Fer other accounts of the January, 1943 hearings, see:
Broadcasti , January 18, 1943, pp. 9, 36-42; Np! Yo k Tlmes,
January 13, 1943, p. 18:1: January 14, 1943. pp. 1: , 9:5;
January 15, 1943, p. 12:5; "Musicians Want Work," Amepican
Fedepationipp, 50 (February, 1943). P. 23.
Other sessions were held in March of 1944. For accounts
of these, see: Broadcasting, March 27, 1944, pp. 26, 28, 36;
Np!_York Times, March 18, 1944, p. 28:1.
t is not known if the Clark subcommittee held hearings
at any other times other than those indicated above.
33H. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Inter-
station and Foreign Commerce, Hea in s: Inte ference with
Byoadcastlpg pf'N commeroi Eflgcatgonal Programp, 79tE‘Cong.,
1st ession. 94% (iasEIngton, . .: vernment Printing
Office, 1945)-
d La 3AU.§. House ofIRepresentatives, Committee on Education
an bor sayipgs: nvestigation 91,James C Peppillg the
Agpplpap Fedora ion f sic ans, 31. ., Botï¬ Cong., lgt Sess.,
19 ashington, D. : Government Pr nting Office, 1947).
d La 35U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education
an bor, Hearipgs: Restrictlve Union Practices p1 th Amerl-
can Federation 2; Mus cian , 0t Cong., 2n3 Sess., 1945 as ing-
ton, D.C.: GSvernment Printing Office, 1948).
6
3 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education
and Labor, H arin s: sicians Performan e Trust Fund, 84th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 95 ashington, D.C.: Government Printing
Office, 1956)
Hereafter in this thesis, the Congressional hearings
cited in Feotnotes 31 and 33 through 36 will be cited without
16
also. United Stateg Reports and Fedppgl Reporter (2d editipn)
provided the official reports of the test cases in the federal
courts concerning the Lea Act.
Particularly in the background chapter (Chapter II),
a number of the standard works, commentaries, and histories
of the broadcasting industry provided highly useful sources
of background information essential for gaining insight into
the general contextual setting that the problem under considera-
tion was superimposed against. '
Organization.--Chapter I contains the introduction to
the study and its purpose is to outline the problem under
consideration.
Chapter II.--This is what might be characterized as
the background chapter. It purports to provide the setting in
which the problem is laid and to convey the essential informa-
tion needed for a fuller and more complete understanding of
the exposition that follows. It is divided into three main
sub-sections. Firstly, an overview of the broadcasting
industry of the forties is presented. This is followed by a
discussion of the American Federation of Musicians with respect
to its organization, objectives, general policies, points of
view, prior related actions, etc. Lastly, the use of music
in its various forms in broadcast programming is considered.
Chapter III.--This chapter is a detailed account in
more or less chronological order of the policies, practices,
and activities of the American Federation of Musicians which
publishing information.
17
tended to have a restrictive effect on broadcast programming
during the decade of the forties. Its pattern of development
follows rather closely the brief review of these policies and
practices enumerated earlier in this chapter under the heading,
"The Nature of the Problem." Also, brief accounts of the
recording ban of 1942 and a subsequent one in 1948 are
included.
Chapter IV.--Chapter IV is primarly concerned with
the Congressional action taken with regard to the activities
of the AFM documented in Chapter III. This congressional
interest and intervention finally culminated in the passage
of the Lea Act in 1946.
Chapter V.--What happened after the Lea Act was
passed? How were the problems and conflicts finally resolved
between the broadcasting industry and the AFM? These are
the kinds of questions that are considered in Chapter V.
Also, included is a discussion of the test cases instituted
in the federal courts with regard to the Lea Act.
Chapter VI.--The last chapter contains the author's
summaries, conclusions, and suggestions for possible areas
for further research.
CHAPTER II
PRELUDE TO CONFLICT: THE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY AND THE
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS OF THE FORTIES
A. The Broadcasting Industry, 1940-1950
Radio: 1240 Style.--
THE VASTNESS of American radio needs to be
emphasized. There are 915 radio stations, four
coast-to-coast networks, 25 regional networks.
Stations Operate l7 and 18 hours a day. Programs
parade past four and five abreast from before day-
light to after midnight. In New York City alone
there are 20 stations. There are 16 in Chicago,
12 in Los Angeles, eight in Boston.
Over two-thirds of the stations are affiliated
with national or regional networks, During the day
the stations intermittently Join or leave these
chains, losing or gaining in the process a national,
a regional or a local complexion. Thus is provided
to the American public a many-sided, many-sized,
diverse, diffuse, far-flung, non-st0p broadcasting
service. Sometimes it is demagogic, sometimes
bucolic, on occasion mildly pedagogic. In its
finer moments it is dynamic. It represents perhfps
a sort of democratic splendor, a trifle clouded.
This glowing, enthusiastic description of the broad-
casting industry as it emerged into the decade of the forties
was penned by one of its contemporaries, Robert Landry. This
marvel called radio had come into its own and it was not
long ago that all radio consisted of was scratching around on
a little rock with a "cat whisker" straining your ears to
discern some recognizable sounds on an earphone. Just how
1Robert J. Landry, Who, What, Wh lg Radio? (New York:
George W. Stewart, Publisher, Inc., 1942), p. 3.
18
19
much radio had come into its own was evidenced by a Fortune
survey of the time reported by Landry in his book.2 Among
the leisure time activities pursued by the American pe0p1e,
radio listening led the list followed in second place by the
movies. Taking the third, fourth, and fifth spots, respec-
tively, were magazines and books, sports, and hunting and
fishing. A radio set was a part of the American home. By
1942, ninety per cent of all American families were equipped
with at least one radio and the national average was slightly
over one and a half receivers per family.3
Radio, l240-124§.--Sydney Head described the first
half of the forties as a "period of stability in which the
medium was prosperous and even complacent, with gradual,
orderly increase in stations and network competition."4 Also,
he indicated that there was an increase in surveillance by
the government and "an artificial stimulation of profits and
limitation on competition during the war years."5 Head sug-
gested that sound broadcasting, standard AM radio, reached
its "high water mark" during this period.6
Era of Stability and Prosperity.--After the United
States entered World War II in late 1941, the broadcasting
industry's normal rate of expansion and growth came to a
2Ibid., p. 87.
3U 8 FCC An Economic St d
. . , __ u y 2; Standard Broadcasting
(October 31, 1947), p. 82. (Mimeographed.
4Sydney W. Head, Broadcastin lp_America (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1956). p. 9.
5mid.
Glpi .
20
near standstill as to the number of standard AM facilities
providing service to the public. This was necessitated by
the government's program of conserving critical materials so
that they could be diverted to the war effort.7 Broadcastlpg
Yearbook reported the official count of U.S. Broadcasting
stations as taken from the records of the FCC for '40-'45
period as follows:8
Jmuary 1’ 1940.00.00.000000000.00.814
January 1, 1941....................822
January 1, 1942....................923
January 1’ 1943.00.00.00000000.....917
January 1, 1944....................9l2
January 1, 1945eeeeeeeoeeeeeeeeeeee943
After the U.S. entered the war, there were no dramatic in-
creases in the number of stations; there was even some back-
sliding.
The following presents a brief picture of the pros-
perity AM stations owners were enjoying during this period of
time, from 1940-1945:
1. For all AM stations, excluding major network key
stations, aggregate broadcast revenues for 1945
were 112 per cent over the 1940 level, while aggre-
gate gxpenses for the same period only rose 87 per
cent.
2. Broadcast income before federal taxes for all AM
stations excluding major network key stations for
the period ranged between 20 and 34 per cent of
broadcast revenues.
3. In 1940, broadcast income before federal taxes re-
presented 72.3 per cent of "tangible depreciated
70.3. FCC, pp. cit., p. 1.
8Broadcasting Yearbook, 1945, p. 19.
90.3. FCC, o . cit., p. 9.
1°Ibid., p. 17.
21
broadcast property" and by 1944, it had climbed
to 204.1 per cent.
4. "Percent increase in return on investment between
1939-1945" was 234 per cent for all classes of
radio stations. For one class of AM radio stations,
those operating on local channels with unlimited
time, the return was a dramatic 964 per cent.
5. In 1940, nearly a quarter of all AM broadcast
stations reported losses in their Operations.
By 1944 3nd 1945, only about 5 per cent reported
losses.
As can be seen from the above, this prosperity that Head
referred to was not limited to the networks; stations all
over the country were sharing in it.
Era of Increased Government Surveillance.--For a
number of years prior to the forties, dissident elements
in Congress had been screaming "monOpoly" and pointing a
collective finger at the radio networks.14 In response, on
the eve of this decade, the FCC instituted an investigation
of network practices which culminated in the issuance of a
report on May of 194115 accompanied by some "rules applicable
to stations engaged in chain broadcasting."16 With the
industry protesting loudly and strongly-~in particular, the
networks17--it took a court battle to establish the legality
11Ibid., p. 14.
12Ibid., p. 16
131bid., p. 18.
14Walter B. Emery, "An Ambivalent Congress-~and a
Frustrated FCC," NAEB Journ:l, 19 (March-April, 1960), p. 71.
15U. S. FCC, Report on Chain Broadcastin (Commission
Order No. 37. Docket No. 5065, ‘MEFJ 19
156? *2282 (1941)
17Some of the protests and charges espoused by NBC
22
of these rules.18
In March of the same year-~before the Report pp gppip_
Broadcasp;pg was off the press and after some more charges
of monopoly from Congress--the fiery and colorful chairman of
the FCC, James Lawrence Fly,19 announced that the Commission
was going to examine very carefully the inroads that newspaper
and publishing interests were allegedly making into the
ownership and control of broadcasting stations.2o After much
activity and publicity, finally in 1944:
....a short statement of policy was made to the
effect that there would be no general rule against
newspaper ownership of radio stations but that the
fact of creating a monopoly would be taken into
account in specific cases of applications for new
licenses or transfers of license.21
and CBS which by the way, were supported by the NAB will be
found in: Clifford J. Durr, Freedom 9; Speech :2; Whom?
(Speech delivered when serving term as F Commissioner,
1944), pp. 1-2. (Mimeographed.)
18
National Broadcasting Company v. United States, 319
U. S. 190 (19535.
19Siepmann, in one of his books, related an incident
which brings out very pointedly the fire and color of the con-
troversial Chairman Fly. In a statement to the press, after
being snubbed by broadcasters at the NAB Convention in 1941,
he told reporters that radio's management reminded him of a
"dead mackerel in the moonlight which both shines and stinks."
See: Charles A. Siepmann, Radio's Second Chance (Boston: Lit-
tle, Brown and Co., 1946), pp. 212-13.
Also, see the following pepular biography: Henry F.
Prin e, "The Controversial Mr. Fly," saturday Evening Post,
217 July 22, 1944), pp. 9-10, 41-42.
20Liewo11yn White, The Americ Radio (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1947Tj'p. 1E9; ng. 299, Annual Rpport,
1941, pp. 25-26.
For the formal announcements of the hearings, see:
6 F.R, 1580 (1941); 6 9,3, 3302 (1941).
21White, pp. cit., p. 159. For the statement of policy
referred to above, see: 9 F,R, 702 (1944).
23
Near the end of this five year period in April of 1945,
the Commission indicated that it was embarking on "a policy
of more detailed review of broadcast station performance
when passing upon applications for license renewal" which
finally resulted in the publication of the Public Service
Responsibility p; Broadcast Licensees, better known as the
£122 £225.22 Such action Congress had been urging for a
number of years, also?3 This was followed by a storm of
1
protest and many accusations of "censorship,' particularly
from the industry.24
During this time, Congress became bi-focal with cer-
tain elements becoming more interested in the actions of the
Commission than the industry. Amid numerous charges that
FCC actions were capricious, arbitrary, and even unconstitu-
tional emanating from both the industry and Capitol Hill, the
Reuse launched the highly publicized Cox Investigation in
1943 headed by Representative Eugene Cox of Georgia.25 This
ill-fated adventure came to an unexpected close shortly after
the sensational charge was made that the Congressional crusader,
Cox, had accepted part-interest in a new radio station in ex-
change for his influence in seeing that the station got a
22
U. S. FCC, Public Service Res onsibilit p; Brpadcast
Licensees (FCC Report, Farah 7, 1946}, p. 3.
23Emery, pp, 913., p. 73.
24As an example, the industry reaction and accusations
were evidenced by the following title of an editorial appearing
in the trade press occasioned by the release of the Blue Book:
"F(edera1) C(endorship) C(ommission)." See: Broadcasting,
March 18, 1946, p. 58.
25Emery’ 220 Me, ppe 72-730
24
license from the very body that he was investigating.26 No
formal charge was ever instituted against him by the Justice
Department. The aftermath was Cox's resignation as chairman
of the investigation and a report that, in general, exonerated
the Commission of serious malfeasancefl7
The War and the OWI.--After Pearl Harbor, the radio
industry mobilized for war. In mid-June of 1942, President
Roosevelt combined a number of war information agencies and
created the Office of War Information with a former broadcaster
in charge?8 Elmer Davis, Director of the OWI, described the
duties of his agency in the following way:
Our office is charged with informing the American
public about the issues of the war, the nature and
progress of the war effort and the war activities,
mostly of our Government. They are also charged
with informing other nations about the same thing,...29
About radio, he stated:
This Office has a direct and vital concern with the
maintenance of the radio coverage in this country.
It is one of the most important media for the con-
veyance of war information in general to the pe0p1e,
and may become of still greater importance when
26Walter B. Emery, Government and Broadcasti 1p 2
ee Societ (Background working paper for a session on "Free-
on and Responsibility in Broadcasting" at the 30th Institute
for Education by Radio and Television, Ohio State University,
May 4-7, 1960), pp. 15-16. (Himeographed.)
27Ibid., p. 16
230 s Bu
_;_. __pppg 2; Public Inguiries gpppgg p; War
Information, United States Gavernmen Manual, Fall, 1931,
pp. 82-83; "Two Exciting Decades," Broadcastipg, October 16,
1950, p. 130.
29U.S. Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, Hear-
ings: Use 2; Mechanical Reproduction 9; Music, 77th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 1942, p. 3.
25
there is occasion for an emergency message from the
national leadership. A policy which threatens the
continued existence of many of these stations is in-
Jurious to the national system of communication,
and may seriously hamper the work for which this Office
was established, of informing the people about the
status and progress of the war effort and the war
policies, activities, and aims of this government.
With the coming of the war, radio assumed a new role
of importance as suggested by the words of Elmer Davis. An-
other measure of broadcasting's importance during the war was
evidenced by the fact that the Selective Service "defined as
critical a score of broadcast occupations."31 This was the
era of radio commentators and radio reporters with the lat-
ter's dramatic eyewitness descriptions and accounts of the
progress of the war from the battlefields scattered around
the world.32 During the war years, broadcasters submitted to
a voluntary system of censorship as did the other media.33
AH and TV.--As we entered the war, A! and FM were
emerging as promising new media of radio communications.
A halt was put on all new broadcast construction.34 This put
a temporary stop to any further growth in these newer broad-
cast media for the duration of the war. However, throughout
the war years, "about 40 prewar FM stations continued to
30Ibid., p. 5.
31"Two Exciting Decades,†Broadcastinï¬. October 16:
1950, p. 131.
32Robert J. Landry, This Fascinatin Radio Business
(Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 19465, p. 2 .
33Ib1d., pp. 252-53.
34"Two Exciting Decades," Broadcasting, October 16,
1950, p. 131.
26
serve some 400,000 receivers"35 and six TV stations remained
in operation.36
Broadcasting and the Postwar Period 0; the Fortipp.--
During the postwar period of the forties, the whole complexion
of broadcasting was altered. The "freeze" on the wartime
construction of new broadcast facilities was lifted in October,
1945. Following it was a period of technological change
and innovation which brought with it numerous problems and
uncertainties which always accompany such periods. AM under-
went tremendous expansion. FM took its first faltering steps
toward public acceptance. TV became established, bringing
with it many problems.
Head divided the postwar period into two sections:
....l946-1948. Period of rapid change. Sudden
great increase in the number of stations, with re-
sulting sharper competition. FM introduced. Tele-
vision imminent.
....l948 and following. Period of adjustment to
television, at first accelerating to a panic, then
settling. down to a series of stpategic withdrawals
and build-ups of strong points.3
AM Expansion.--A report of the Commission described the
tremendous growth of AM following the war:
The high level of earnings and the interruption
during war of normal expansion necessitated by
the critical materials conservation program have
since VJ-Day brought about an extraordinary fermenta-
tion in the broadcasting industry. While, on 0cto~
ber 8, 1945, after a history of 24 years, there were
909 commercial standard broadcast stations authorized
35v 3 FCC Radi and Television Broadcast P ime
. . r (INF
Bulletin No. 2, April, 19§67. D. . imeograpHed.
35Ib1d., p. 11.
37H03d, 0 e Elke ’ ppe 135-36e
27
in the United States, by February 7. 1947: ....
sixteen months later, approximately 600 new
stations were either on the air or under construc-
tion and more than 700 applications were still
pending for new stations. By the end of 1948 there
will undoubtedly be 2,000 AM stations in Operation.38
By 1948, the Commission reported:
From an engineering viewpoint, the desirable AM
facilities are becoming scarcer, with unlimited
time facilities practically non-existent, and
daytime only facilities extremely hard to find in
the more heavily populated areas of the country.39
The following figures indicate the very rapid expan-
sion that took place in the number of AM facilities after the
war:40
No. of AM No. of AM
Date Authorized Licensed
June 30, 1945 955 951
June 30, 1946 1,215 961
June 30, 1947 1,795 1,298
June 30, 1948 2,034 1,693
June 30, 1949 2,179 1,963
June 30, 1950 2,303 2,118
FM.--At thebeginning of the war, FM had been described
as being "on the verge of immediate commercial development."41
By the time of the U.S. entry into the war, only about 30
38U.S. FCC, Ag Economic Study 3; Standard Broadcasting,
pp. cit., p. 1.
39218... .1192- dasssi assess. 1948. p. 30.
4°1bid., 1950. p. 102.
41w. Rupert Maclaurin, Invention and Innovatipp i_ the
Radio Industry (New York: Macmillan 00., 1949), p. 230.
28
stations were on the air.“2 Much further development was then
precluded. In 1941, 35 channels had been allocated for
"commercial FM and 5 channels for noncommercial educational
FM use" in the 42-50 megacycle portion of the radio frequency
spectrum.43
FM is purported to have a number of advantages over
its sister type of broadcasting, AM. Among these are:
1. FM transmission is not subject t2 the static inter-
ference that AM transmission is. 4
2. Because the band width allocated to an FM channel
is much wider than the band width allocated to a
similar AM channel, a greager frequency range of
sound can be transmitted.
3. FM has an improved dynamic range over AM, i.e., FM
has a greater ability than AM to reproduce g wider
range of loudness or intensities of sound.4
4. FM has a greater ability to override competing
signals than does AM; hence, there is considerably
less interference from other FM stations.
The above advantages are used to support the claim that FM
broadcasting is high fidelity broadcasting and, hence, the
broadcast medium best suited to present music.
Through the war years and before, there had been "con-
cern that FM broadcasting in the vicinity of 50 megacycles
would be subject to serious skywave interference, nullifying
42Head, 0 . cit., p. 42.
43U.S. FCC, Radio and Telgyisï¬pp Bypadcasy P imer, pp.
cit., p. 8. Also, see: U.S. C . ual eport, 19 1, p. 29.
MHead, o . 9_i_t_., p. 33.
45
46
Ibid., pp. 35-40.
Ibid., p. 40.
47Ibid., p. 34.
29
to a great extent the possibilities of interference-free
reception of FM."48 After extensive hearings with controver-
sial engineering evidence,49 the Commission relocated FM in
June, 1945 and allocated the 88-108 portion of the radio
spectrum to it which included 20 channels for noncommercial
educational use, 70 channels for commercial use, and 10
channels for facsimile which could be reverted to FM broad-
cast use.50 Stations operating on the old frequencies were
given until January 1, 1947, to make the transition to the
new ones.51
The initial response to FM broadcasting was very en-
thusiastic, at least in some quarters. Its most optimistic
supporters were predicting a very rosy future for FM. An
advertising executive predicted that "FM will be the standard
type of broadcasting in 10 years."52 Broadcastipg reported
in 1945 that a number of industry leaders and government
8
4 U,S, FCC. Annual Report, 1945, p. 20.
49The Commission conceded that there was a "divergence
of opinion" at these hearings. U,S, 399. Annual Report, 1945,
p. 20.
Also, Dr. Edwin H. Armstrong--the acknowledged inventor
of FM--contended that a former FCC engineering official made
a very serious technical error at these hearings upon which
a great deal of the Commission's eventual decision in the mat-
ter was based. See Armstrong's testimony in both of the
following: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on
Education and Labor, Hearings: Restrictive Union Practices 9;
the American Federation 2; Musicians, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
1948, pp. 158-60; U.S. Senate, Committee on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, Hearin 8: Progress pg FM Radio, 80th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 1948 (Wash ng on, . .: vernment Printing Office, 1948),
p. 16.
501191.. 2.0.9 amass. assert. 1946. p. 16
51Ibid.
Szgrgmdcastin , November 6, 1944, p. 74,
30
officials were of the opinion that FM would eventually re-
place AM.53 Among the government officials specifically
mentioned was FCC Chairman Paul Porter. Others were predic-
ting there would be 5,000 FM stations on the air by 1954 and
that the only use for AM would be for a few high power
stations for remote rural coverage.54 A couple of the critics
who were not too pleased with the public service performance
record of American radio in the mid-forties viewed FM as
"radio's second chance."55 9
This bright future that was supposed to be assured for
FM never materialized. The peak of activity and interest in
FM, as suggested by the following figures, was about 1948:
Date Agghogizgg55 Eiceg§e§g6 Inngpeggtign57
June 30, 1945 53 45 53
June 30, 1946 456 48 55
June 30, 1947 918 48 283
June 30, 1948 1,020 142 587
June 30, 1949 855 377 737
June 30, 1950 732 493 591
531212-. August 6. 1945. pp. 16-17, 44.
54Ib1de, ppe 16-170
55Durr, pp. cit., pp. 11-12; Siepmann, pp. 211..
ppe 254-760
561"igures in the column were compiled from: U.S.
FCC, Annual Re ort, 1950, p. 102.
57Figures in the column were compiled from: U,S,
FCC Annual Re ort, 1945 p. 19; 1946, p. 19; 1947 p. 20:
43. p. 35: 1949. p. 393 1950. p. 109. '
31
Even from the beginning of the postwar period, FM
seemed to be beset with difficulties. Broadcasting reported
that the production of FM receivers for the public was lagging
seriously and for this reason, at the beginning of 1946, there
would be fewer potential listeners than before the war.58
By 1948, the pear year of FM activity, there were other signs
that FM might be in difficulty. A survey of a cross-section
of the nation's advertising executives and time buyers showed
that 85 per cent were planning no expenditures on FM adver-
tising for the 1948-1949 season.59 Another survey showed
that advertising agencies, on the whole, were not too favor-
ably disposed to FM.6o By 1950, there were definite signs
that FM was in trouble. An American Research Bureau study con-
ducted for the NAB of FM listening in the Washington, D.C.,
metropolitan area revealed that 13.2 per cent of the area
families had sets capable of receiving FM, while only 7.3 per
cent of the total area population listened to FM regularly.61
The rosy picture of FM's future was changing to one of pessimism.62
583roadcastipg, December 17, 1945, p. 20. It must be
remembered that the shift to the 100 megacycle band from the 50
megacycle band at the end of the war made all prewar FM receivers
obsolete. The receivers designed for the 50 megacycle band
gouéd not pick up FM signals transmitted in the 100 megacycle
an .
59Survey conducted by Broadcasting, see: Broadcasting,
September 13, 1948, pp. 23, 80.
60Survey conducted by the AAAA, see: Broadcastipg,
October 4, 1948, pp. 23, 68.
61Broadcasting, January, 2, 1950, p. 21.
62For examples of this pessimism, see: Broadcasting,
January 9, 1950, p. 18.
32
Just how serious the situation was becoming for FM
was evidenced by an announcement in early 1950 by Walter J.
Damm, vice president fo the Journal Company of Milwaukee,
owner of the Milwaukee Journal, WTMJ (AM), and two FM sta-
tions--WTMJ-FM (Milwaukee) and WSAU-FM (Wausau, visc.).53
Damm announced that the Journal Company, after thorough con-
sideration, was dropping its two FM outlets. The principal
cause for the action, according to Damm, was that FM had'hot
lived up to its 'bright promise Of ten years ago.'"64
Further, he stated that the public had not seen fit to invest
in sufficient numbers Of receivers to warrant Operation on a
permanent basis. This event assumes greater importance be-
cause Of the involvement Of FM pioneer, Walter J. Damm.
Broadcasting described Damm as having been:
....one Of FM's most enthusiastic supporters. He
was president of the FM Broadcasters Inc. when the
association was formed in the early '40's and was a
director of the ggccessor FM Assn. which last autumn
merged into NAB.
Also, WTMJ-FM was the first FM station to go into Operation
west of the Alleghenies on both the 50 and 100 megacycle
bands.
By the end of the forties, the prospects for FM broad-
casting were rather gloomy, to say the least. One member Of
the industry in January, 1950 described FM as having been
63E£22§22§£125v April 3. 1950. P. 80.
33
"still born."66 Many reasons were given for this apparent
failure of FM to establish public acceptance. From the
variety Of reasons given, it is clear that the "FM problem"
was a very complex issue with many ramifications and implica-
tions. Some said that FM's failure could be traced to the
opposition from the established interests in AM broadcasting.67
Congress investigated certain charges involving a relationship
between the development of FM radio and RCA patent policies.68
One FM broadcaster felt that the supposed superior advantages
Of FM over AM were more theoretical than Operational.69 An
FM listener suggested that FM set manufacturers were partly
to blame in that they did not engineer receiving sets to
take full advantage of FM's superior qualities.7o Another
FM broadcaster but part of the responsibility on the FCC
because the Commission, in his Opinion, had taken too little
positive action "to foster its growth."71
One Congressman summed up the whole situation in the
following way:
....FM has been obstructed, stepped on, blocked, or
ignored from the start....
661211 . January 9. 1950. p. 18.
67Charles A. Siepmann, Radio Television and Societ
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1950), pp. 57-58.
68
U.S. Senate, Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, Hearin s: Pro ress 9; FM Radio, 80th Cong., 2nd
Sezgs, 194 ashington, .C.: Government Printing Office,
19 .
69
7O
Broadcasting, January 9, 1950, p. 18.
Ibid.
711bid.
34
Ever since the superiority of FM radio was first
demonstrated in a field scale -- in 1934 -- it has
been beset by Opposition, and it has had to go over
and around road blocks.72
Specifically mentioned by the Congressman as having impeded
the development of FM were the FCC, Broadcast Measurement
Bureau, the NAB, RCA, the "big networks," FM receiver manu-
facturers, and the "big interests in AM radio."
Some suggested that the development Of TV was at the
heart Of FM's downfall.73 Still others felt that certain
policies of the American Federation of Musicians with respect
to the use of musicians on FM had a dilatory effect on the
develOpment Of FM.7A At any rate, it can be easily seen
that FM presented a very complex and knotty problem to the
broadcasting industry throughout the entire second half of
the forties.75
The Rise Of TV.--On the eve of World War II, TV had
not quite progressed to the same stage of development as FM.
TV was not ready for immediate commercial utilization as was
72Remarks of Re . Francis Walter (D.-Pa.), see: 95
Cong. Rec. A2205 (1946?.
â€We. January 9. 1950. p. 18.
7"'This point will be developed more fully later in
this thesis.
75There were many plans and panaceas proposed for the
wolution of FM's problems. One interesting proposal was sug-
gested by Irving R. Merrill, then Director of the University
of South Dakota's KUSD, Vermillion. In a letter to Senator
Ed 0. Johnson (D.-COlO.), Merrill inquired about the possi-
bility of a law or FCC regulation requiring FM tuners to be
installed in all TV sets manufactured. Merrill Observed that
the SMA Co. Of Chicago had FM tuners that could be used for
this purpose at a cost of about 3-5 dollars. Broadcasting,
July 24, 1950, p. 81.
35
FM.76 In the latter years of the 1930's, it was generally
conceded that TV had not developed sufficiently to warrant
the establishment of technical standards of transmission.77
As a result, the Commission had taken no action in the matter.
After a series of studies and investigations beginning in
1939 conducted by both the FCC and the National Television
System Committee:78
....The Commission announced that a public hearing
would be held beginning March 20, 1941, tO consider
the various engineering standards suggested, and
also to determine when television broadcast stations
should be permitted tO broadcast commercial programs
as a public service.79
On April 30, 1941, the FCC promulgated rules embodying
the standards Of television transmission prOposed by the NTSC.80
Our monochrome TV standards Of today date to this FCC decision.
Subsequently, "rules were adapted for commercial Operation
effective July 1, 1941."81 Before manufacturers could get
their Operations tooled for TV receiver production and broad-
casters could build new stations, Pearl Harbor intervened.
Following the war, further delays in the full develOp-
ment of TV were encountered. First, an acute postwar materials
76Head, pp. g;£., p. 149.
77US FCC. Annual Report, 1937, p. 37: 1938. p. 65
781bid., 1939. pp. 45-46; 1940, pp. 70-72; 1941, pp. 32-33.
The National Television System Committee-~abbreviated
NTSC-owas a body created through the joint OOOperation of the
FCC and the Radio Manufacturers Association to study the pro-
blem Of television transmission standards and to make recom-
mendations.
792.21 we. 111111.121 3.22.221. 1941. p. 33.
80Ibid. For the rules promulgated, see: 6 F.R. 2286 (1941).
81
U S FCC Annual Re ort 1941, p. 34. For the rules
adopted, see: 6F R 22 ï¬4 (19415.
36
shortage precluded the building of stations and the manufac-
turing Of sets immediately following the lift in the wartime
construction freeze.82 Before this problem was overcome, the
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.83 raised the issue of
color.8h On the basis of wartime experimentation and inven-
tion to meet military needs, the FCC was able to extend the
usable portion of the spectrum "from a prewar ceiling Of 300
to 30,000 megacycles."85 As a result, the Commission, in
1945, allocated 13 channels in the VHF band86 to be used for
commercial TV and assigned a block of frequencies in the
UHF band for experimentation.87
What CBS contended was that TV should possibly move
up into the newly discovered usable frequency band (UHF)
where wider channels could be utilized for its color TV
system.88 083 highly publicized its contentions with the
82Head, 0 . cit., p. 157.
83Hereafter in this thesis, the Columbia Broadcasting
System, Inc. may be referred to as CBS.
8"head, 0 . 233., p. 157.
85219... 19.9... M mm. 1915. p. vn.
86VHF is the abbreviation used for Very High Frequency.
Very high frequencies are a band of frequencies in the radio
spectrum extending from 30 to 300 megacycles. Gordon R.
Partridge, A Dictionary pg Electronic Terms (4th ed.; Chicago:
Allied Radio Corporation, 195 . p. .
8?
U.S. FCC. Annual Report, 1945, pp. 21-22. Also,
see: 10 F.R, 6259 (19455.
UHF is the abbreviation used for Ultra High Frequency.
Ultra high frequencies are a band of frequencies in the radio
spectrum extending for 300 to 3,000 megacycles. Partridge,
22e Que. pe 670
8811.9... 1199- in_n11.e1 322.222. 1917. p. 23.
37
result that many electronic manufacturers and prospective
station licensees preferred to wait for the outcome of this
possibility before investing too heavily in TV.89 Finally,
in late 1946 and early 1947, the Commission held hearings on
a petition from CBS "seeking Operation of its (Columbia's)
particular color television system in the ultra-high-frequencies
of 480 to 920 megacycles."9o On March 18, 1947, the petition
was denied on the basis that the CBS color TV proposal was
not ready for use and that futher experimentation was needed.91
For the first half Of 1948, the Commission reported
that there was a "sudden surge in TV applications."92 Head
described 1948 as the "crucial year in the history of tele-
vision†because "for the first time the expansion of the
industry could go ahead on firm technical and economic grounds."93
However, TV's problems were not over yet.
As 1948 progressed with its expanded activity in TV,
it became increasingly evident to the Commission that the 12
channels then allocated to commercial television94 would be
"inadequate to provide a truly nationwide competitive TV
89Head, pp. 211., pp. 157-58.
9ogyp, FCC, Annual Report, 1947, p, 23,
911bid.
92
93
Ibid., 1948, p. 2.
Head, O . cit., p. 158.
94The original allocation in 1945 was for 13 channels.
However, these channels were shared with certain other radio
services. Due to Objectionable interference from these other
services, one of the channels (ch. 1) was deleted so that fre-
quencies would be available for these services so as to avoid
sharing. U,S, 299. Annual Report, 1948, pp. 39-40.
38
service."95 As a result, on September 30, 1948, after a
hearing and the Joint Commission-Industry conference on this
problem, the FCC instituted its famous "freeze" pc11cy.96
Under this so-called freeze policy, the Commission stopped
granting any further authorizations for new TV stations pending
a study of the entire situation and the problems facing the
TV industry. Before the freeze was lifted, the following
areas were taken under extensive consideration:
....new engineering standards; Opening UHF channels
for TV broadcasting; consideration of color systems,
reservation of channels for noncommercial educational
use; and a national assignment plan incorporating
VHF and UHF channels.97
With the adaption of thelpgppp Report gpg 9392; on April 11,
1952, the freeze came to an end.98 This was followed "by a
tremendous expansion in television broadcasting."99
After the freeze was imposed, any dramatic increases
in the potential number of TV stations which could serve the
country were not possible. The following summarizes the
950.8. FCC, Radio and Television Broadcast Primer,
pp. cit., p. 11.
950,3, FCC. Annual Report, 1949, pp. 42-43.
97U.S. FCC Radio and Television Broadcast Primer,
2B Cite, pe 12e
98
U S FCC. Annual Report 1952 p. 197. For text
_l._l.. _..._...
Of the report, see: 17 F.R. 3095 (1952)-
A Senate committee became interested in the "freeze" be-
fore it was over and conducted a short investigation of it on
July 18, 1951 which primarily involved just the testimony of
the FCC chairman, Wayne Coy. See: U.S. Senate, Committee on
Interstate and foreign Commerce Hfarings: FCC Policy on
Television Freeze app Other Commun cation Maitars, 2nd‘Uong., lst
Sess., 1951 (Washington, D.CT_EOvernment Printing Office, 1951).
992.9,. 10.9... .Aarmai 32.9.2111. 1953. p. 93.
39
growth of TV facilities during the last half of the
1940's:
No. of TV NO. of TV No. Of TV
Date Authorizedloo Licensedloo In Operation101
June 30, 1945 25 6 6
June 30, 1946 30 6 6
June 30, 1947 66 6 12
June 30, 1948 109 7 30
June 30, 1949 117 - 13 71
June 30, 1950 109 47 106
Prosperity Of the Broadcasting Industry, l946-l950.--
The postwar period Of the forties was not one of unparalleled
prosperity as had been the war period. Income from the in-
dustry's total AM Operation decreased throughout the period
except for 1950.102 For the TV end of the industry, no
income was realized throughout the whole period.103 However,
the FCC did report that 3 TV stations in 1949 did show an
income.104 It was not until 1951 that the TV industry as a
whole experienced revenues which were in excess of expenses.105
1°°1bid., 1950, p. 102.
lolgpid., 1945. pc 21; 1946, p. 17; 1947, p. 23; 1948,
p. 39: 1949. p. 41; 1950. P. 102-
lo23ee Table l.
103U,S, FCC. Annual Re ort, 1949-1951. Egg Annual
Reports only report financial data for the TV industry for
the years 1948-1950.
10"Ibid., 1950, p. 122.
1°5Ibid., 1952, p. 123.
40
The brighter side of the picture for TV was that total
revenues were making some dramatic increases. The 1949 level
was almost four times the 1948 level106 and the 1950 level
was more than triple the 1949 level}07 Financial data for
FM Operations that could be found were very incomplete.108
What little data there were available in the FCC Annual Reports
revealed that FM broadcasting was Operating at a loss during
the entire 5-year period, and that there were no dramatic
increases in total revenues.109 An FM Association survey
in 1947 revealed the following:110
1. 86 per cent of the respondents reported Operating
at a loss.
2. 8 per cent Of the respondents reported profit from
Operations.
3. 6 per cent of the respondents reported that their
Operations were breaking even.
4. 70 per cent Of the respondents reported no increases
in total revenues.
The FCC reported that for the entire broadcasting
industry including AM, FM, and TV operations, broadcast
income before federal taxes dropped to a prewar level of 27.4
1°6Ibid., 1950, p. 122.
1°7Ibid., 1951, p. 129.
108The reason that little financial data were available
on FM operations was because most FM stations were jointly
Operated in connection with an AM station. Financial data were
generally filed jointly, also. The FCC noted that there was no
way to separate the data accurately from such joint statements.
1°90,s, FCC. Annual R ort, 1949-1951. The Annual 32-
ports only report financial ata for the FM industry for the
years 1948-1950.
110New York Times, October 12, 1947, p. 31:3.
41
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42
TABLE cont. .--INCOME (TOTAL REVENUES LESS TOTAL EXPENSES
BEF INCOME TAXES FOR ALL AM RADIO STATIONS AND RE-
GIONAL AND NATIONAL RADIO NETWORKS FOR THE YEARS 1946-1950°
aCompiled from: U,S. Federal Communications Commis-
sion. Statistics of the Communications ndustr in the United
_St—at-es_, "1"94'6,"p".' $85; 194'7,""p'."1'9E;—""‘194 , pp. 187-388719_E'—9, "'
ppe 201-103e
Hereafter, in this thesis, U. S, Federal Communication
Commission. Statistics of the Communications Industr in the
United Siates wiii be cited“ as follows: 0.5: FCC, Stat. of
the Comm. industry.
bCompiled from: U.S. Ecg. Annual Rgport, 1951,
°It should be noted that the data for all AM stations
and networks contain data for some FM Operations which have
been indicated in the table. A number of AM and FM stations
were joint Operations and financial data for such Operations
were generally filed jointly, The FCC noted that there was
no way separate such data accurately.
dThe number Of FM stations included in the income data
was not indicated except that it was stated that the FM data
was included for all FM stations affiliated with AM stations
The FCC Annual Rgports for 1947 (p. 20) and 1948 (p. 36.)
showed that between 75 and 80 per cent of all FM applications
and authorizations involved AM station owners. The directories
Of FM stations in Broadcastipg Yearbooks for 1947 (pp. 224- 37)
and 1948 (pp. 286- 322) indicated that approximately 171 FM
stations were on the air at the end Of 1946 and approximately
372 at the end Of 1947. The figures in the column represent
75 per cent of these two counts, respectively.
Abbreviations Used: Reg.--Regiona1
Nat.--Nationa1
Nets--Networks
43
million in 1949.111 This was a drop of 40.8 per cent over
the previous year's 46.1 million.112 By 1950, income figures
rose 116.1 per cent over the 1949 level to 79 million.113
Income data for the entire period of the 1940‘s will be found
summarized in Table 2.
Public Acceptance of AM, FM, and TV.--In 1947, the
Commission described the public acceptance of standard radio
(AM) with respect to the purchase of AM receiving sets in
the following way: "It is obvious that a virtual saturation
in radio homes has been reached."114 Table 3 suggests this
very readily. The Table also suggests that FM was in trouble.
In 1948, there were approximately four FM sets in use for
every TV set. However, by 1950, the number of TV sets in
use exceeded the number of FM sets in use by about a million
and a half. The Table suggests that the public was accept-
ing television at a more rapid pace than FM broadcasting.
Growth of Broadcasting During the Forties.--The fol—
lowing is the official count of all U.S. broadcasting sta-
tions reported in Broadcasting Yearbook:115
1110.3, FCC. Annual Report, 1950, p. 118.
The similar broadcast income figure for 1940 for the
whole industry was 33.3 million. U.S. FCC. Stat. of the Comm.
Industry, 1940, p. 130.
112g.s. FCC. Annual Report, 1950, p. 118.
113Ib1d.. 1951. p. 130.
114U.S. FCC, An Economic Study of Standard Broadcasting.
22, Cl ., p. 82.
115The official count is taken from the records of the
FCC. Broadcasting Yearbook, 1951, p. 40.
44
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45
TABLE 2 (cont.2.--TOTAL REVENUES, TOTAL EXPENSES, AND INCOME
AL RE N S LESS TOTAL EXPENSES) BEFORE FEDERAL INCOME
TAXES FOR THE ENTIRE BROADCASTING INDUSTRY FOR THE YEARS
l939--1950
aCompiled from: U.S. FCC. Stat. 93 the Comm. Induszgy,
1939’ D. 233; 19409 p. 130; lgale p0 201; 19E? e 226; 19 39
p. 223; 1944, p. 206: 1945, p. 198; 1946, p. 185; 1947. p. 194.
bCompiled from: U.S. FCC. Annual Report, 1949, p. 54;
cSee Footnote d for Table l.
dNot possible to compute from FCC records available.
0Figures are expressed in millions of dollars.
Abbreviations Used: Reg.--Regiona1
Nat.--Nationa1
Nets--Networks
46
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ommm o000.000.ma 000.0m>.a 000.00m.m mama .0m ones
omam o000.000.ma 000.com 000.000.m mama .0n ocsh
owmm o000.000.mo oootom 000.000 aama .0m mass
ouom o000.000.mm o--- 000.00m mama .0m mass
:4 weapon :4 no .oz n>e co .oz oza no .oz oooo
ooaaaaaa co m
0mmauoama mmama mma mom mm: za mmm>am0mm >9 024 .2a .24 a0 mmmzsz amaaxaemm--.m mamas
47
January 1, 1940........... 814
January 1, 1941........... 822
January 1, 1942........... 923
January 1, 1943........... 917
January 1, 1944........... 912
January 1, 1945........... 943
January 1, 1946...........1,004
January 1, 1947...........1,52O
January 1, 1948...........1,962
January 1, 1949...........2,662
January 1, 1950...........2.917
To paraphrase Landry a bit, the picture of the American
broadcasting as it left the forties and emerged into a new
decade was as follows:
THE VASTNESS of American broadcasting needs to
be emphasized. There are nearly three thousand
broadcasting stations providing three types of ser-
vice to the public: standard AM, frequency modula-
tion, and television. There are four coast-to-coast
radio networks, numerous regional radio networks,
and four major television networks. In the New York
City metrOpolitan area alone, there are 60 broadcast-
ing stationg in Operation which include 30 AM, 24 FM,
and 6 TV.11 There are 51 broadcasting stations in
Chicago, 50 in Los Angeles, and 23 in Boston.117
Summing Up.--This then, represents a brief picture of
the broadcasting industry of the forties. The whole decade
was one that can hardly be characterized as a period of normalcy.
The first half was dominated by World War II and an increase in
government surveillance. The second half was dominated by
tremendous technological innovation and rapid expansion. The
conditions present in either of the periods do not tend to
promote a true state of stability and security. Both were as-
sociated with and accompanied by many very complex and difficult
115Comp11od from the "Directory of AM, FM, and Tv sta-
tions of the United States" in: Broadcasting Yearbook, 1950,
pp 0 69‘325 e
117See Footnote 116.
48
problems and issues. The conflict between the American Federa—
tion of Musicians and the broadcasting industry was superimposed
against such a background. This conflict represented only
one of many serious conflicts, problems, and issues that were
facing both the industry and the country during the decade of
the 1940's.
B. The American Federation of Musicians118
Early History.--The American Federation of Musicians,
the national labor union composed primarily of instrumental
musicians and their locals, dates to 1896 when it was organized
and chartered by the American Federation of Labor.119 The
organization of the AFM did not represent the first attempt
to organize the musicians on a nation-wide scale. There were
other attempts before 1896, but it was the AFM that succeeded
in becoming the dominant national labor organization represent-
ing instrumental musicians.12o
118For the principal systematic works on the AFM, see:
Robert D. Leiter, 2;; sicians and Petrillo (New York: Bookman
Associates, Inc., 1953;; Vern CoGEiryman, "The Organized Music-
ian: I," Univezsity g; C ica 0 Lay Review, 16 (Autumn, 1948), pp.
56-85: Vern Countryman, he Organized Musicians: II, University
a; Chica 0 LE! Review, 16 (Winter, 1949). pp. 203-297: Anders S.
Lunde, "The American Federation of Musicians and the Radio Record-
ing Companies: A Report on a Controversy" (Unpublished Master's
thesis, Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University, 1947)
Note.--As near as can be determined, any references in
this section to the provisions of the 1958 edition of the AFM's
Constitution or B -1aws were in effect during the decade of the
ort es un ess ct erwise specified.
Hereafter, the two articles by Countryman will be cited
respectively as follows: Countryman (I), Op, 313. and Country-
man (II), 92. gig.
119Leiter, 220 ï¬ne Do 16.
120For discussions of the earlier attempts at national
49
Early success of the AFM.--Very early in its existence,
the Federation was able to make its strength felt. This was
echoed in the complaints of a New York theatre owner in 1904:
"I notice that the union does not make any distinc-
tion between good and bad musicians. The bad ones,
and they are many, get just as much pay as the good
ones. Besides their regular pay they charge 82 ex-
tra for every holiday. There not being a sufficient
number of legal holidays to suit them, they make
holidays themselves. Easter Monday, St. Patricks
Day, and the eve's of New Year's, Washington's birth-
day, Thanksgiving and Christmas are all holidays in
the eyes of musicians.121
Two years later, John R. Commons-~one of the great students
of the American labor movement--observed that one of the out-
standing characteristics of the AFM was its "growth as a
trade union into a more complete control of their business
throughout the United States.... than that enjoyed by any other
large union in the American Federation of Labor."122
Through the years, the Union prospered and became well
established organizationally. It became powerful enough to
make the closed shOp a characteristic of its collective bar-
gaining relationships.123 By 1940, there was little or no
dual unionism of instrumental musicians left.124 Effectively,
organization of musicians, see: Leiter, op. cit., pp. 1-15:
Countryman (I), o . cit., pp. 56-69.
121Leiter, op. cit., p. 24.
122John R. Commons, "Types of American Labor Unions.--
The Musicians of St. Louis and New Yerk," Quarterly Journal 9;
Economics, 20 (May, 1906), p. 419.
lâ€Leiter, 92. cit., p. 25.
1241 id.
50
the AFM was the only national labor organization representing
instrumental musicians.
Organization and Centralized Power_gf the AFM.--Strict1y
speaking, the American Federation of Musicians is a national
labor organization of local unions of musicians. However, the
Constitution not only grants membership in the national organi-
zation to the locals which comprise it, but it also grants
national membership to the individual members who comprise the
locals.125 Through this arrangement, the AFM-~as the national
body--not only is able to exert control over its member locals
but can exert control over the individual musicians of those
locals. The supreme body of the Federation is the convention
composed of duly elected representatives of the member locals.195
Each convention elects a slate of national officers to act in
its behalf between conventions.127 The officers consist of a
president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, and an execu-
tive committee composed of five members elected at large.128
Collectively, these officers constitute the International
Executive Board.129
Centralized Power.--The power of the Federation is
centralized. That is, the national organization dominates
125AFM, Constitution (1958), Art. 1, p. l.
195Ib1d.
127m, gal-Lap (1958), Art. 29. pp. 179-81
128AFM, Constitution (1958), Art. 8, Sect. 1, p. 11.
129131a.
51
its member locals. This is accomplished in a number of ways.
Among them are the following:130
1. The convention representation policies insure against
the larger locals assuming a dominant position or
role in the conventions. (Rules operate like the
law governing the election of U.S. senators.)
2. There is wide and discretionary executive, legis-
lative, and judicial power vested in the national
officers, International Executive Board, and, in
particular, the national president.
3. A number of provisions in the Constitution and By-laws
insure the supremacy and dominance o? the national
power over local power in such areas as membership
requirements, initiation fees, transfers of local
membership, certain types of contracts, strikes,
traveling musicians, and certain segments of collec-
tive bargaining and representation. As one example
of such provisions, the International Executive Board
must sanction all strikes called by member locals.
Powers of the President.--One manifestation of this
centralization was reflected in the Byaggys up until a few
years ago which related to the powers and duties of the
national president. That provision was as follows:
Duties of the president: It shall be the duty
of the president to preside at all meetings of the
federation and executive board: sign all documents
of an official character pertaining to the federa-
tion; sign all vouchers; appoint all committees
unless otherwise ordered. It shall be his duty and
prerogative to exercise supervision over the affairs
of the federation; to make decisions in cases where,
in his opinion, an emergency exists; and to give
effect to such decisions he is authorized and em-
130According to Leiter and Countryman, the centralized
power of the Federation resulted from the peculiar problems,
difficulties, and practices associated with the employment of
musicians, e.g., the transitory and itinerate nature of the
average musician's employment, large numbers of part-time
instrumentalists, and the use of the contractor and booking
agent. For discussions of the centralized power of the AFM,
see: Leiter, 22. 913., pp. 1-32: Countryman (I), 92. 313.,
ppe 56‘690
52
powered to promulgate and issue executive orders,
which shall be conclusive and binding upon all
members and/or locals; any such order may by its
terms (a) enforce the constitution, by-laws,
standing resolutions, or other laws, resolutions,
or rules of the federation, or (b) may annul and
set aside same or any portion thereof, except such
which treat with the finances of the organization
and substitute therefor other and different pro-
visions of his own making, in which case such
change shall be published in the next issue of the
International Musicians after its promulgation; the
power so to do is hereby made absolute in the
president when, in his opinion, such orders are
necessary to conserve and safeguard the interests
of the federation, the locals, and/or members:
and the said power shall in like manner extend to
and include cases where existing laws are inade-
quate gf provide no method of dealing with a situa-
tion.1
Much of the same power is vested in the International Executive
Board.132
Extent of Unionism.--After telling some House investi-
gators how large his Union was, AFM president James C. Petrillo
added with pride: "That includes all the professional musi-
cians."133 That the AFM has for its membership virtually
every professional musician in this country has been attested
to by writers on the subject of the Union and by Congressional
131U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, Report: Investigation 9; James 9. Petrillo,
and the Ame ican deration 2; Musicians, H.R. Rep. No. 1152,
85th‘38n3., ls? Sess., 9 , pp. - .
The above section of the By-Laws (Art. 1, Sect. 1 of
the edition from which the quote was taken) was in effect dur-
ing the 1940's. However, it was apparently later repealed.
The 1958 edition of the AFM's Bnyaws contains no such pro-
vision.
1 2 a
3 AFM, gl‘Laws (1958), Arte lo Seete s-B. p. 270
133Testimony of James C. Petrillo, see: U.S. Hou
Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, Hear:
Investigation of James C Petrillo, the American Federat
Musicians, 3; 21., 80th.COng., lst Sess., 19‘7, p. i81.
G
e of
It?
p
O
:1
I».
53
investigators.134 During the period of the forties, the
membership--as compiled from Union records--was as follows:135
No. of No. of
Year Locals Members
1940 723 134,372
1941' 721 137,005
1942 718 134,835
1944 696 ’146,772
1946 693 . 181,794
1947 704 216,469
1948 711 232,370 ’
1949 705 237.535
1950 698 239.777
Continuance of Membership.--As indicated above, the
AFM was able to make the closed snap a characteristic of its
bargaining relationships. This means that any musician who
wants to make playing an instrument his livelihood must join
the Union in order to secure a maximum of employment Oppor-
tunities, and, in turn, maintain his membership if he wishes
to continue to avail himself of such expanded Opportunities.
If a member violates the rules and regulations of the Federa-
tion or engages in acts detrimental to the aims of the
Federation, he may be expelled.136 As can be seen, this would
severely limit employment possibilities, which in turn would
134See: Countryman (I), 2%. cit., p. 71: Leiter, 92.
c t., p. 7: Lunde, _2. cit., p. .
135Leiter, 22. cit., p. 80
135AFN, By-Laws (1958). Art. 13. pp- 86-95.
54
encourage obedience of the rules and regulations and result
in maintenance of membership.
Objectives oggthe AFM,a-Countryman summarized rather
succinctly the major objectives of the American Federation of
Musicians:
Since his occupation is almost completely free
from physical hazards, the musicians had littlg_iny
terest in workmen's compensation laws and safety
legislation.... In most cases his employment is too
<tr’a‘ï¬sitory for him to be greatly concerned about such
matters as working conditions, seniority arrange-
ments, and vacations, Since it is a rare engage-
ment which calls for more than four hours of per-
formance, he has ngflnggg,ofymaximum:h%u§sfllegi§lation.
For th same reason, minimum wage leg 8 ation geafid“
to the eight:hour1dayï¬is_of no value to him, And
his union was so strong ana*so well organized by
1935 that it has had no occasion to invoke the certi-
fication machinery or protection for collective
bargaining activity provided by the Wagner Act.
In short, the Federation's primary concern has
been with Wine: ,llishienhases “9,9111
more employment. Generally, the first of"these two
objectives has been pursued at the local level,....
and even in those instances in which the national
organization intervened, its activities have not
raised any special problems nor provoked any serious
complaint from employers. I to the secondflob-
jectixegthatflthelEedaration_has always a ressed
its ringipalhgffgrts. And, in its constantâ€Â§ndeavor
to secure more work for its members, no possible
threat had been regarded as either too large
or too small to be attacked. It is this single-
minded devotion to the employment problem which
characterizes nearly all AFM activity and which 7w“
has involved the union in its most serious diffi- "â€
culty.137
Unfair Competition.--There are three general sources of
"unfair" competition that the AFM has always considered a
137C0unt1'yman (I), 220 Me. ppe 71-720
Countryman's conclusions are supported by the following
from an article by Petrillo: "....the major objectives of
the A. F. of M. have been complete organization, adequate pay
and greater employment Opportunities. James C. Petrillo, "Musi-
cians' Progress," American Federationist, 56 (October, 1949), p.
33.
55
possible threat to employment opportunities: (1) military
musicians,138 (2) foreign musicians,139 and (3) amateur
musicians.140
Military and Foreign Musicians.--It was only through
a series of laws passed by Congress at the constant urging
of the Federation that the competition from military141 and
142 was successfully controlled to the satis-
foreign musicians
faction of the Union. However, this Congressional action was
accomplished before the advent of popular radio. With the
coming of radio, competition from these two groups, according
to the union, became serious again.143 Radio could go into the
camps and pick up military musicians by remote control or
recordings could be utilized. With respect to foreign
musicians and radio, the actual musicians need not be im-
ported. Their performances could be recorded and played back
over the air which, in the eyes of the Union, constituted the
same kind of "unfair" competition.
Amateur Musicians.--Also, the AFM has always considered
amateur and non-union music groups as a possible source of
138For discussions, see Leiter, 99. cit., pp. 37-40:
Countryman (I) Op. cit., pp. 72-73.
139Eor discussions, see: Leiter, 99. 213., pp. 32-36;
Countryman (I), 99. cit., pp. 73-75.
lhoFor discussions, see: Leiter, 99. 999,, pp. 149-
56; Countryman (I) 99. ci§., pp. 75-77.
141In general, the statutes prohibit military musicians
from going into competition with civilian musicians with respect
to their customary employment. These statutes are: 35 Stat.
110 (1908): 39 Stat. 188 (1916): 39 Stat. 612 (1916).
142For the statute, see: 47 §Eï¬io 57 (1932):
143This point will be more fully developed later
56
unfair competition. The Union has tended to view any musical
performance as a possible source of employment for its member
musicians and, as a result, has attempted to control such
competition.
One means of control is accomplished by the very lib-
eral entrance requirements. Countryman has classified the
AFM with respect to membership qualifications as an "open"
union, i.e., its rules encourage membership rather than limit
it.144 The 91-9999 define profeSsional instrumental musicians
as any performers â€who render musical services of any kind
for pay," and hence, are eligible for membership.1A5 There is
no mention at all in the Constitution or §y¢99y9 of any level of
skill required for membership. This is backed up by an-
other provision which states that any local law which prohibits
the admission of any eligible musician, male or female six-
teen years or older, shall be null and void.146 In other
words, membership qualifications are measured not inï¬terms
of musical ability, but in terms of ability to secure employ-
ment. Such liberal policies have tended to eliminate a
certain amount of job competition created by the existence
of rival union and nonunion groups because almost any person
who plays a musical instrument can become a member of the
ï¬â€” w —— 1 it
in this thesis.
144
Countryman (I), 99. cit., p. 62.
1‘5Am’ E1.Lawe (1958). Art. 3, 3801.. 1’ p. 370
46
Ibid., Art. 3, Seat. 19. p. 41.
57
Union.147 This has probably tended to cut down on the number
of nonprofessional and nonunion musical groups in existence.
Another means of effective control of school musicians,
probably the most numerous of amateur musicians, is achieved
through its control of its members who are teachers and con-
ductors of school and nonunion music groups. A large number
of music teachers supplement their income through outside
professional engagements and are thereby members of the Federa-
tion. In this regard, the 9139999 provide:
The right of a member of the Federation to teach a
nonunion band or orchestra (amateur or otherwise),
or to conduct or perform with it at any time and
place, is always subject to ghe orders of the Exe-
cutive Board of the Looa1.14
Also, the 91:9999 specifically state that "students of colleges,
music schools, universities, or similar institutions" are elig-
ible for membership.149 In addition, the International Exe-
cutive Board is empowered to grant membership to any instru-
mental musician under the age of sixteen if it "finds it
advisable."150
‘— ‘—
147In addition, there are certain fiscal policies of
the Federation which encourage the musician who only plays his
instrument occasionally for pay or who is unemployed to maintain
his membership. The yearly dues to maintain membership are
among the lowest in the trade union movement. The revenue from
these charges represents only a minor source of income. By far,
the major source of income used to Operate the Federation is de-
rived from a per capita tax on earnings of varying percentages
depending on the nature of the employment. As can be seen, this
could encourage maintenance of membership because there would be
very little financial burden to the unemployed or partially em-
ploygï¬ gember. For a discussion, see: Countryman (I), 99. 919.,
pp. " 50
148
149
AFM, gnyaws (1958), Art. 13, Sect. l2, p° 89.
Ibid., Art. 3, Sect. 5, p. 38.
15°Ibid,, Art. 3, Soot. 20, p. 41.
58
Attitude Toward Nonunion Musicians.--The AFM has de-
finite views with respect to the use of amateur, and other
nonunion and nonprofessional musicial groups on the air.151
The Union contends that broadcast time is limited. Hence,
any time that is devoted to such groups limits the amount of
time that can be devoted to the use of professional musicians.
From time to time, this argument has been used as justification
for preventing broadcast performances of such groups. In
other words, the Union does not want amateur, foreign, and
military musicians to go into competition with its members.
Canned Music and Technology.--Canned music or mechanized
music are terms that the AFM has often used to refer to the
reproduction and/or distribution of musical performances by
mechanical and electrical means.152 Under such a classifica-
tion would come the following:
A. Devices for the reproduction of musical performances.
l. Phonograph records.
2. Electrical transcriptions.
3. Motion picture sound tracks.
a. Use in theatres.
b. Use on commercial TV
4. Magnetic recordings.
a. Audio wire.
b. Audio tape.
c. Video tape.
B, Devices or machines for the distribution of musical
performances.
l. Broadcasting by individual stations.
a. AM.
b. FM.
e. TV.
2. Network broadcasting.
a. AM
151For a discussion, see: Leiter, 99. cit.. PP- 155-55;
15eli'or the Union's point of view on this matter see:
AFM. 2219. 3:23.13. as 3.29% (New York: AFM. NJ). (19483).
59
b. FM.
e. TV.
3. Recording playback machines
a. Jukeboxes.
b. Use in all kinds of broadcasting.
4. Distribution by wire.
a. Muzak
b. Other "piped" music systems.
It is contended by the Union that the extensive use of
canned or mechanized music and the machine seriously threaten
the employment possibilities of its member musicians.153 Ac-
cording to president Petrillo, the AFM is engaged in a perpet-
ual battle â€against the machine."154
Union Attitude Toward Technology.--The whole attitude
of the Union toward technology in the music field was colored
by the disastrous effects accompanied by the introduction of
the sound motion picture in 1926.155 Approximately 22,000
musicians were employed in local theatres throughout the
country at the peak of the pOpularity of the silent film.
Three years after the introduction of the sound film, 18,000
musicians had lost their jobs. Approximately 500 musicians
153For statements of the Union's point of view, see:
"Musicians Want Work," American Federationist, 50 (February,
1943), p. 23: "P11 ht of the Professional Eusician," American
Federationist, 49 October, 1942), po 8.
154Testimony of James 00 Petrillo before the Senate
Committee on Interstate Commerce in January, 1943 as reported
in the verbatim excerpts found in: NAB. 999,995 Bul,, No. 15.
January 22, 1943. p. 4.
These hearings were never published nor reported on,
see Footnote 32, Chapter I.
155This coloring can be detected in excerpts from
an article by Petrillo appearing in the International Musician,
the AFM's official publication, reported in: E99_York imes,
May 1, 1946, pp. 1:2, 28:2.
60
in Hollywood eventually replaced these 18,000.156
The AFM has summed up the problem, as it sees it, of
technology and its effects on employment as follows:
Fifty years ago, a concert orchestra, a dance
band, or a military band could be heard at one time
by as many as a thousand or two thousand persons.
If a band played in a stadium, perhaps fifty thou-
sand might hear the performance.
Today our progressive technology makes it pos-
sible for an orchestra to be recorded on a strip
of magnetic tape from which broadcast programs will
be heard, not by one, two or fifty thousand listeners,
but by as many as fifty million. The musicians play
but once, then pack up their instruments. Their
work has been recorded forever. Where once they
would have played a hundred or a thousand perform-
ances, they are now employed for one.
The result was inevitably increasing unemploy-
ment for the professional musician. 57
Also, the Union resents the situation which allows
the extensive user of recorded musical performances, e.g.,
jukebox operator, radio station, wired and "piped in" music
service, etc., to derive "huge" profits from such use and who,
at the same time, pays nothing "directly to the music-makers
whose talent.... (the extensive user) exploits so profitably."158
With respect to the commercial use of recorded music,
Petrillo once asked the following rhetorical questions: "How
many jobs are musicians going to play for one price? What
right has anybody to sell the services of musicians over and
156For accounts of the effects of the introduction of
sound motion pictures, see: Leiter, 99. cit., pp. 54-61;
Countryman (II), 99. cit., pp. 244-46.
157
AFM Crescendo (New York, AFM N.D. (1959??) p. 4.
This resentment aIso finds expression in the article by
Petrillo: Petrillo, 99. cit., p. 34.
15BAFM, The Fifth Freedom (New York: AFM, N.D.‘[I95227).
p. 7.
61
over again?"159 On another occasion, Petrillo estimated that
"a good recording.... costs musicians about a million dollars
in wages before it runs its course."160 These comments of
Petrillo reveal the attitude of the Union toward the commercial
use of recorded music.
The rights of performing artists with respect to the
commercial use of recorded performances have not been recog-
nized in this country neither at common law nor by legislation.161
The only extensive performer's rights that have been recognized
are the so-called "residual rights" established through col-
lective bargaining.162 The average instrumental musician--
exclusive of leaders, conductors, and solo artists--genera11y
receives no pay other than that which he received at the time
of the recording of the original performance.
The AFM also contends that the alleged declining num-
ber of employment Opportunities not only seriously threatens
the economic future Of practicing professional instrumental
159U.S. House of Representatives, CommitteeC on Educa-
tion and Labor, Hearings: Inv sti ation 9; James Petrillo,
999 Ameriian Federatg99_9£ usic ans, et a1., 80 thC ong., lst
Sess., 9 , p. 2
160C. Williams, "Mr. Petrillo's Hapeless War," Nati9n,
155 (October 3, 1942), p. 291.
161For discussions of the rights of performing artists,
see: Countryman (II),o 99. cit., pp. 252-62; J. G. Moser and
Richard A. Lavine, Radio and the Law (Los Angeles: Parker and
Co., 1947), pp. 129- 35; Herbert T. Silverberg, "Authors‘ and
Performers Rights," Law and Contem orar Problems, 23 (Winter,
1958), pp. 150-64; Harry P. Warner, Ra die 999 e evision Rights
(New York: Matthew Bender and Co., Inc., 1953 pp. 9 5-72.
162For a discussion of"residua1 rights," see: Robert
W Gilbert, "'Residual Rights' Established by Collective Bar-
gaining in Television and Radio," Law and Contem iorary Problems,
62
musicians but it also discourages prospective musicians from
pursuing such a career. The Union points out that it takes
long years Of study, practice, and professional experience
to produce a first-class, accomplished instrumental musician.
It is argued that because of the declining employment Oppor-
tunities youthful talent will not be willing to invest in
such time and expense if they will be unable to make a suit-
able living. This will, in time, result in a serious shortage
of first class instrumental musicians. Hence, the musical
culture Of our country will be endangered.163 That danger,
according to the Union, is:
The day fast approaches when there will be
no adequate supply of skilled musicians. The pre-
sent dearth of competent string instrumentalists
is desperate enough to evoke immediate concern.
Without orchestras and ensembles to employ them
the incentive for students to play stringed instru-
ments will disappear completely. One depends on
the other and without them, our nation's heritage
Of music will eventually consist only Of histori-
cal libraries Of recordings. There will be no new
music, no youthful talent coming along to man our
symphonies or make new records. There will be
only memories of a better day when musical culture
was a cherished part Of the American way of life.
We can hOpe that our generation won't see the
debacle, but it approachgg so fast that even we
may see that sorry day.
Using a slightly different approach, one Union official
dramatized the Union's point of view in the form of an analogy.155
23, (Winter, 1958), pp. 102-24.
163For the most complete statement in a single source
of the point of view expressed in the paragraph, see: AFM,
Diminuendo (New York, AFM, 1954).
1541bid., p. 23.
165Leo Cluesmann, "Music's Plight," American Federation-
ist, 62 (October, 1955). p. 1.
63
It was suggested that makers and users of recorded music
were like a farmer who planted the same crop year after
year on the same plot of ground without using fertilizer or
any other technique to replenish and revitalize the soil.
In time, the farmer could raise no crop at all because the
soil became depleted. In the same manner, the Union Official
contended that extensive reliance on "canned music" and doing
nothing to replenish the supply Of those who create this
music through instrumental interpretation, the danger becomes
much greater that, in time, there will not be an adequate and
desirable supply Of instrumental musicians to create our music.
The Musician and the Machine.--Countryman described
one very important characteristic of the machine in the music
field as it relates to the musician:
This problem can best be understood if one
significant characteristic of the machine in the
field Of music be noted at the outset. In whatever
form, the machine has never eliminated or even
altered the musician's function. The machine does
not make music--it merely provides a means of
preserving and giving wider dissemination of
those performances possible, the machine has created
a greater demand for music without creating a cor-
respondingly greater demand for the services Of
musicians. Secondly, the machine is still depen-
dent on the musician for the original performance--
a fact which has at once served to dramatize the
musician's plight and to aid him in his struggle
against mechanization.166
In this connection regarding the relationship between
the musician and the machine, the AFM is quick to point out
one very interesting aspect.167 In this situation-~unlike
most, where the worker being displaced has nothing to do with
166GOuntryman (II). 22. cit., pp- 939‘40-
157Testimony of James C. Petrillo, see: U.S. House of
64
that which displaces him-—the musician is being asked to
provide the "machine" that replaces him. For example, the
ice man had nothing to do with the making Of the refrigerator.
Such is not the case with the musicians and, in the words of
the Union, the AFM is being asked to play at its own "funeral.?
Progress and the AFM.—-Leiter concluded in his study
of the AFM that: "The musicians union has accepted the prin-
ciple that in a democracy labor cannot permanently stifle
technological progress."168 This conclusion has been borne
out by statements of two Of the leading spokesmen Of the Union.
Joseph N. Weber, president of the AFM from 1900 to 1940 except
for one year, emphasized in his 1939 report to the annual con-
vention that it was the function Of unions, not to fight
technological progress, but to protect the workers from the
ill effects of it.169 Weber's successor, James C. Petrillo,
again emphasized this point in testimony before a Congress-
ional Committee in 1947. In answer to whether it was the
purpose of the Union to step progress in radio and television,
Petrillo answered: "There is no question about stOpping pro-
gress. I do not think that anybody is big enough in this
country to stop progress."170 Over the years, the aim of
Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, Hearin s:
Restrictive Union Practices Of the American Federation of Mu-
sicians, 30th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1943, p. 337.
158mm», pp. gig†p. 187.
169AFM. Proceed., 1939. PP. 71-73.
1700.3. House of Representatives, Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, Hearings: Restrictive Union Practices g; the
American Federation of Musicians, 30th Cong., 2nd 3ess., 1935,
3 .
65
the AFMe-as Weber suggested--appears to have been, not to
step progress and technological innovation in the music
field, but to attempt to protect musicians from the ill ef-
fects of them. The principal ill effect, in the eyes of the
Union, seems to be the diminishing employment Opportunities
for professional musicians.
ynign,FeatherbeddinggPracticesLe-In its fight with
technology, the Union has become associated with featherbed-
ding practices over the years.171 Featherbedding has been
defined as "a method of creating or spreading employment by
unnecessary maintaining or increasing the number of employees
or the time to complete a particular Job."172 Featherbedding
appears to be frequently associated with advancing technology.
One writer indicated that it most frequently occurs among
skilled workers who have a lot to lose in the event of techno-
logical innovation, i.e., Job security, skill, high earnings,
prestige, etc.173 This writer emphasized: "In the main,
featherbedding practices develOped for economic reasons, that
is, to protect or mitigate technological unemployment, to
protect Job opportunities, to divide the existing work, or
171For general discussions of featherbedding, see:
Benjamin Aaron, "Governmental Restraints on Featherbedding,"
Stanford Law Review, 5 (July, 1953). Pp. 680-721; Walter L.
Daykin, "Featherbedding," "Labor L ngournal, 7 (November,
1956), pp. 699-710: "Featherbedding and Taft-Hartley,"
Columbia Law Review, 52 (December, 1952), pp. 1020-33.
172"F‘eatherbedding and Taft-Hartley," 92. giko.
p. 1020.
1
73Daykin, 9p, cit., p. 700.
66
to spread the burden of unemployment."174
Quota Rules and Standby Demands.--With respect to the
AFM, the manifestations of these featherbedding practices
have, in the main, taken two forms: (1) quota rules,175 and
(2) standby demands.176 The basis of the quota rules is con-
tained in the gy-ngg of the Federation.177 The member locals
are empowered to specify "the minimum number of men who shall
be allowed to play for engagements of any kind" within their
respective Jurisdictions.178 Also, if a local has difficulty
in enforcing its quota rules, the International Executive
Board may intervene if it deems it necessary "to adjust the
matter."179 These provisions date back to the early 1900's.180
Unlike the quota rules, the standby technique has not
been formalized in either the Constitution or the By-Laws of
the Federation. In fact, Countryman has indicated that "the
Federation has scrupulously avoided any public declaration of
policy on the matter."181 Apparently, the standby demands and
174Ibid., p. 701. Other writers concur on this point,
see: Aaron, 92. cit., p. 680; "Featherbedding and Taft-
Hartley," g2 cit., p. 1020.
8 175For a discussion, see: Countryman (I), 92. cit. pp.
77" 00
176
For a discussion, see: Countryman (I), o . cit.,
pp. 80-850 —_
177AFM, Eeraws (1958), Art. 12, Sect. 16-19. pp. 79-80.
178
Ibid., Arte 1?, SBCt. 16, pp. 79-800
1
79Ibid., Art. 1?, Sect. 19, p. 80.
180Countryman (I), 22 cit., p. 78
lalIbid., p. 81.
67
practices have evolved out of custom and practice. Countryman
described this evolution in the following way:
Originally, as used by the AFM, it meant that the
employer, in order to placate union objections to
performances by nonunion musicians, actually hired
a certain number of union members to do nothing
but stand by while the performance went on. But
since the union musicians performed no services,
the employer was not disposed to complain if they
departed before the end of the performance, or if
they failed to appear at all. And when the custom
had develOped to this extent, it was frequently
arranged to have the employer pay the agreed number
of salaries directly into the Local's unemployment
fund rather than to the individual musicians.
Thus the "standby" has gradually been transformed
from a live musician to a bookkeeping device used
to calculatg the amount of payment to be made to
the union.1~2
It is not difficult to see that the ultimate aim of both the
quota rules and the standby demands are consistent with the
main objective of the Federation of securing a maximum of
employment possibilities for its members.
Leadership of the AFM.--One very important variable in
the AFM's fight with the broadcasting industry during the
forties was reflected in the predispositions and personalities
of its two principal leaders, Joseph N. Weber183 and James C.
Petrillo.184 Weber served as president of the AFM from 1900
182Ibid., pp. 80-81.
183For biographical information about Weber, see: Leiter,
o . cit., pp. 20-24; "Joseph N. Weber: Master Builder of the
erican Federation of Musicians," American Federationist, A7
(JUIy, 1940). pp. 14-15.
184For biographical information about Petrillo, see:
Leiter, 92. g;£., pp. 42-53. 181-83; "James C. Petrillo,"
Current Biography, 1940, pp. 650-52.
In addition to the above, there were numerous popular
biographies appearing in the current mass circulation periodi-
cals during the forties. Among them were the following: Robert
68
6
to 1940 (except for one year185) when he decided to retire.18
Subsequently, the convention of 1940 unanimously elected
Petrillo to succeed Weber.187
Joseph N. Weber.--During Weber's term in office, no
evidence was found that the Federation formulated any extensive
national policies which had a restrictive effect on broadcast
programming. The key to this lies in the predisposition of
Weber. In successfully thwarting a movement to get certain
restrictions placed on the use of radio's remote lines which
picked up musical performances from hotels, night clubs, dance
halls, etc., he stated in his annual report:
Outstanding in the entire question is that
we have no authority and never will have, to de-
cide as to what should go over the air, as this
authority strictly rests with the broadcaster,
as a prerequisite to their responsibility to the
Government concerning ége purposes for which
broadcasting is used.1
Coughlan, "Music's Stormy Petrillo," Reader's Digest, 41 (Octo-
ber, 19h2), pp. 77-81; Robert Coughlan, "Petrillo: Little
Caesar of Symphony and Swing Wages War on Juke Boxes, Musical
Children, Army Bands," Life, 13 (August 3% 1942), pp. 68-76
George Frazier "Santa Claus with a Horn, Col ier s, 119
(March 8, 1947), pp. 17, 83-8h; Jack Gould,‘"?§FEFETt of
Musician 8 Leader: James C. Petrillo, Head of the American
Federation," New York Times, September 1, 1940, IX, p. 5:5;
"Pied Piper of_ChI," Time, 51 (January 26, 1948), pp. 18-22;
Victor Riesel, â€Petrillo of the Musicians Union, American
Mercury, 63 (July, 1946), pp. 56-63.
To appreciate some of the color and controversy that was
associated with Petrillo during the forties, some of these
popular biographies should be consulted.
185Weber was president continuously except for the year
1914 when he declined to run on account of ill health. Leiter,
OJ. MO , p. 26.
186Leiter, gp.'gi§.. pp. 73-74.
157Ib14., p. 74.
laaapu. Proceed., 1939. p. 10?.
69
In other words, Weber recognized and accepted the philosophy
associated with the federal regulation of broadcasting which
indicates that the broadcast licensee has an affirmative
responsibility to maintain control over his programming mater-
ial. In short, Weber was not predisposed favorably to the
Federation enacting policies which would interfere with the
ability of broadcasters to maintain this control.
James C. Petrillo.--Not a single bit of evidence was
found which indicated that Petrillo had any predisposition
along these lines. Hence, after Petrillo became president,
it should not have been too surprising that the Federation did
enact policies which tended to have a restrictive effect on
broadcast programming. Before ascending tO the national pre-
sidency, Petrillo had been the president of the Chicago local
since 1922.189 A brief look at some of the policies and
practices Of the Chicago local under Petrillo's direction
would give some hint of things to come after he emerged as the
national leader in 1940.190
Late in 1931, a strike was called against Chicago
191
radio stations to be effective New Year's Eve. One Of the
declared intentions Of the proposed strike was to prevent
the use of recorded music in commercial broadcasting in the
189American Federationist, 47 (July, 1940), p. 30.
190For a description of the Operation Of the Chicago
local under Petrillo's supervision in the late thirties, see
the chapter by C. Lawrence Christenson in: Twentieth Century
Fund, How Collective Bar aini WOrks (New York: American Book-
Stratford Press, Inc., 1952), pp. 858-66.
191“Two Exciting Decades," Broadcasting, October 16,
1950, p. 72. '
70
jurisdiction Of the Chicago loca1.192 Although unsuccessful
in this demand, the strike was averted when the Chicago area's
Class A stations agreed to increase the minimum size Of their
studio orchestras from 10 to 15 musicians.193 Also, in 1931,
a strike was threatened against the Chicago radio station
which was carrying the inauguration Of the newly elected
mayor, Anton J. Cermak.194 The Chicago local objected to the
prOposed use Of a high school band in connection with the
ceremonies. Subsequently, the strike threat was withdrawn
when the school band was dropped and union musicians were
employed. The recording ban Of 1942 was no new experience for
Petrillo, either. In 1937 and 1938, in the Chicago local under
his direction had imposed such a ban on recordings and trans-
criptions in the Chicago area which lasted eighteen months.195
It is interesting to note that very soon after Petrillo assumed
the national presidency, the restriction on radio's remote
lines which Weber had Opposed were put into effect.196
Leiter summarized very nicely what this change in
national leadership was going to mean for the decade of the
forties:
192Leiter, 92. cit., p. 68.
193"Two Exciting Decades," Broadcasting, October 16,
1950, p. 72.
194Leiter, 22. 313., pp. 46-47.
195Ibid., p. 132.
196
AFM. Proceed., 1941, p. 43.
71
Weber had the qualities needed by a good
leader and he was able to build the union from a
small organization into a huge and successful enter-
prise. But by nature he was cautious and slow to
act. It was his policy generally to gather, sift,
and weigh the facts in each situation carefully be-
fore making any major decision. As a result, many
tasks which should have been considered, but which
were not critical at the moment, were pushed aside.
Only in an emergency did he show boldness and
daring.
Persons who knew Petrillo expected a more
aggressive action from the musicians union after
the change in leadership in 1940, and they were not
disappointed. Petrillo has been more willing to
take a chance and more likely to act impetuously.
He has been more familiar with what he wants than
Weber had been. It was not long before empligprs,
union members, and the public realized this.
Summing Up.--The American Federation Of Musicians,
upon entering the 1940's, was a strong, well organized, and
recognized labor organization. Its whole outlook and attitude
toward technology was deeply colored by the disastrous results
Of the introduction of the sound motion picture on musicians'
employment. Its leader, James C. Petrillo, had a past record
of fighting the 'machine." Moreover, he was aggressive and
willing to take a chance. With the centralized power of the
Federation to back him, when Petrillo assumed the presidency
as the decade Of the forties began, he was ready to take
action and wage an aggressive, extensive, nation-wide campaign
against the "machine" which he believed wholeheartedly was
seriously threatening the means Of livelihood Of his "brothers"
Of the Federation. With such a background, it is not so sur-
prising that the AFM pursued the course it did in its fight
‘7 aw
l
97Leiter, 92. cit., p. 112.
72
with the broadcasting industry during the first ten years Of
Petrillo's term in Office.
C. Music and Broadcast Programming
Music and Radig Programs.--
Not SNIFFS AND SNAILS and puppy dog tails but
WORDS
MUSIC
SOUND EFFECTS
SILENCE
are what radio programs are made of,....
198
This was Landry's amusing conception Of the essential
ingredients that are used in varying quantities to create
radio programs for the American public. On the serious side,
the above does show that Landry does conceive Of music as
being a very important essential in radio programming. The
importance Of music in its various forms in radio programming
can be seen in some Of the descriptive phrases that have been
used tO describe it such as: "staple Of broadcasting,‘I199
"backbone of small stations programmingfeoo and without re-
corded music, many small radio stations "would be unable to
keep going."201 Music has been closely associated with broad-
casting since its inception.
198Landry, Who, What, Why is Radio?, QB. 01 ., p. 61.
1
99H21 2255,21232, October 20, 1940, IX, p. 12:3.
200Broadcasting, November 19, 1945, p. 48.
201Testimony Of Elmer Davis, Director Of the Office
Of War Information, see: U.S. Senate, Committee on Interstate
Commerce, Hearin s: Use of Mechanical Reproduction g; MusicI
77th Cong., 2nd Eess., 1952, p. .
73
Music and g Vigiog.--In 1916, a young visionary fore-
saw the commercial possibilities Of radio and prOposed the
following scheme:
"1 have in mind a plan Of develOpment which
would make radio a 'household utility' in the same
sense as the piano or phonograph. The idea is to
bring music into the house by wireless.
....Fbr example-oa radio telephone transmit-
ter having a range of say 25 to 50 miles can be
installed at a fixed point where instrumental or
vocal music are produced. ....Thc receiver can be
designed in the form Of simple 'Radio Music Box'
and arranged for several different wave lengths....
"....The box can be placed on a table in the
parlor or living room, the switch set accordingly
and the transmitted music received. There should
be no difficulty in receiving music perfectly when
transmitted within a radius Of 25 to 50 miles.
Within such a radius there reside hundreds Of
thousands Of families: . . . .
"The same principle can be extended to numer-
ous other fields as, for example, receiving
lectures at home.... events Of national impor-
tance...° Baseball scores.... By the purchase Of
a'RadiO music ch' they could enjoy concerts, lectures,
music, recitals, etc.,....
"....The main revenue to be derived will be
from the sale Of 'RadiO Music Boxes' which if manu-
factured in quantities of one hundred thousand or
so could yield a handsome profit....
"Aside from the profit to be derived from this
proposition the possibilities for advertising for
the Company are tremendous: for its name would ulti—
mately be brought into the household and wireless
would receive national and universal attention."2O2
That young visionary was David Sarnoff. It is interesting
that his prOpOsal relied so heavily on the use Of music.
Music "Eggggcastigg" Befggg RadiO.--It is also in-
teresting to note that the concept Of broadcasting as a means
Of "distributing entertainment and news" pre-dates radio or
202Cited in: Gleason L. Archer, Hist O Rad to
1226 (New Yerk: American Historical Society, Enc.. 193%).
pp e 112-13 e
74
wireless and was associated with the develOpment of the tele-
phone in the 1870's.203 LaPrade credited Bell with not only
the invention Of the telephone as a means of point to point
communication but with the invention Of "wire broadcasting."201+
According to Banning, "the entertainment idea" was distinguish-
able in Bell's earliest demonstrations of the telephone. For
example, a handbill Of 1877 for one demonstration promised
that â€vocal and instrumental music and conversation will be
transmitted a distance of 27 miles and be received by the
audience."205
In the descriptions Of the demonstrations by
both LaPrade and Banning, music was a constituent part of the
entertainment that was to be transmitted by wire.
Music and Early Radio.--Westphal, in a dissertation
completed at the Eastman School of Music, documented the close
association Of music to the early history of broadcasting.206
Among some the membrable events in the history Of broadcasting
which were associated with music are the following:
1. Fessenden was successful in making "the first act-
ual broadcast received publicly" from Byrant Rock,
Massachusetts, on Christmas Eve in 1906. Among
203This point was emphasized by the following two
writers: William P. Banning, Commercia Broadcastin Pioneer:
The WEAF Experiment 1 22-1 26 (Cambridge: Harvar University
0 pp. "
Press, 19 3 ; Ernest LaParde, Broadcastin Mggig
(New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1947). pp. 7-9.
204
LaParde, 22. cit., p. 7.
205
Banning, 92, cit., p. 3.
206
Frederick W. Westphal, "Music in Radio Broadcasting"
(Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department Of Music Education,
Eastman School of Music, University Of Rochester, 1948).
3.
75
the material broadcast was a vocal solo and a
violin 3010.207
In the summer Of 1908, deForest, in his experi-
ments in France, broadcast "recorded music and
speech" from the Eiffel Tower which was heard
"as far away as 500 miles."20
Later in New York City, deForest successfully
broadcast portions Of two Operas direct from the
stage Of the Metropolitan Opera House on January
13, 1910‘5 Enrico Caruso appeared in one of the
Operas.
Shortly after Obtaining a license in April, 1920,
Dr. Frank Conrad began broadcasting "the first
regularly scheduled broadcasts Of entertainment"
from his home in Pittsburgh. Programs "made up
entirely of phonograph records Of music" were
broadcast from 7:38 to 9:30 on Wednesday and
Saturday evenings. 10
Samuel L. Ross was appointed music director, "a
new position in the annals of radio broadcasting,"
of radio station, WBAY, New York City, in August
of 1922.211
"The first simultaneous broadcast by two stations
in different cities occurred on January 4, 1923
when station WNAC in Boston was linked by long
distance wires with WEAF in New York....' Among
material broadcast was a saxophone 8010.212
Dr. Walter Damrosch started his long career in
radio broadcasting on October 29, 1923, with a
lecture-concert on the music of Beethoven."913
The National Broadcasting Company began Opera-
tions on November 15, 1926, with a program
2°7Ibia.. p. 46
2°81bid., pp. 47-48.
2091bid.. pp. 48-50.
Zlolbide, pp. 51-52.
Ibid., p. 69.
2121bid.. pp. 79-80.
913Ibid., p. 73.
76
originating from the Grand Ballroom of the
Waldorf-Astoria which "involved an impressive
array of musical talent," e.g., Walter Damrosch
conducting the New YOrk Symphony Orchestra,
Harold Bauer, the New York Oratorio Society,
the Goldman Band, and a "grand Opera company under
the baton Of Casare Sodero."214
9. The Columbia Phonograph Broadcasting System, pre-
cusor of the Columbia Broadcasting System, began
broadcast Operations on September 18, 1927, with
the performance of Deems Taylor's "The King's
Henchman" by the MetrOpolitan Opera Company.215
Another event, early in the history of radio, dramatizes
the intimate association Of music with broadcasting. It was
in the fall Of 1922 that the American Society of Composers,
Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) first demanded that broad-
casters pay royalties for their use Of recorded music.216 To
fight ASCAP's demands was one Of the reasons the National
Association of Broadcasters was formed.217 It is hoped that
the foregoing has demonstrated that music has been closely
allied with broadcasting since its very beginning.
Music in Broadcast Programming.--Music can be and is
utilized in broadcast programming in many and varied ways.218
Music can be the integral portion of the program or it can
provide only an incidental part Of it. Music can be used
2141818.. p. 84.
elsIbid. , p. 89.
216
White, 22. cit., p. 28.
217Ibid., pp. 28, 70.
218For an attempt to classify the various uses of
music in radio programming, see: Jack K. Lee, "An Analysis of
Current Practice in the Use of Music for Radio Broadcasting"
(Unpublished Master's thesis, Ohio State University, 1947).
77
for transitional purposes or for creating background moods.
Sometimes music is used to identify a program or personality
and sometimes music is used to emphasize or highlight some-
thing. Anyone who has listened tO radio or watched television
programs can think of many more uses of music. The point is
that music is used quite extensively in broadcast programming
for many and varied purposes.
Live and Recorded Music.--There are two principal forms
in which music can be used in broadcasting. It can either be
"live" or “recorded." Live music needs little explanation
except that it is music which is performed by actual musicians
at the time the program is broadcast. Recorded music involves
a prior performance Of some kind of actual musicians which is
mechanically or electrically reproduced by one of a number Of
methods into a form which is played back at the time the
program is broadcast. The significant thing with respect to
recorded music is that the same performance of the musicians
can be utilized over and over again.
Recordings Used in Broadcasting.--Prior to the intro-
duction Of television, there were primarily two types Of
recordings used in broadcasting; processed and instantaneous
recordings.219 Processed recordings are manufactured in
varying quantities from a master recording. With respect to
instantaneous recordings, the actual vehicle, i.e., disc,
magnetic wire, or magnetic tape, used to record the performance
is used in the playback. After the introduction Of TV, two
219For a more detailed discussion, see: Westphal. 22-
°1t.’ pp. 220-22.
78
other means of recordings began to be utilized; the motion
picture film sound tract and the magnetic video tape record-
ing.220
The Phonograph Record and the Electrical Transcrip-
tion.--Processed recordings as used in radio generally take
either the form of the "phonograph record" or the "electrical
transcription."221 The term phonograph record refers to disc
recordings which are manufactured and released for sale to the
general public. Such recordings are also available to broad-
casters for use on the air. In 1942, it was estimated by the
U.S. Department of Justice that 80 per cent of all phono-
graph records manufactured were sold tO the general public for
home use, 19 per cent were sold for use in juke boxes, and
about one per cent were sold to radio stations.222 However,
electrical transcriptions are disc recordings which are made
specifically for broadcast purposes and cannot be purchased
for use in the home. In fairly general usage in the broad-
casting industry, the term "recording" refers to phonograph
records, the term "transcription" or "ET" refers to electrical
‘—
220There is not further discussion Of the motion picture
on television in the remainder of this chapter. Any further
discussion that will be needed for expositional purposes will
be handled later in the thesis. Magnetic video tape recordings
were not develOped for Operational use during the time chosen
for consideration and hence, needs no further discussion.
221For a more detailed discussion of the differences,
222Testimony of Thurman W. Arnold, U.S. Assistant At-
torney General, see: U.S. Senate, Committee on Interstate
Commerce, Hearin 3: Use Of Mechanical Reproduction 2; Music,
77th Cong.""“§“. 2nd 688._, 1915, pp. 100-101.
79
transcriptions.
Use Of Phonograph Records.and ET's.--Phonograph re-
cords are simply used as a source of ready-made and readily
available music and entertainment by radio stations. However,
electrical transcriptions can be categorized on the basis of
223
four general usages:
l. Custom-made transcriptions Of radio programs es-
pecially produced for specific sponsors.
2. Open-end transcriptions Of radio programs which
were not produced for specific sponsors. Time is
allowed on each transcription for the commercial
messages of any advertiser, generally a local one,
who may desire to sponsor the program. Such pro-
grams are sometimes called syndicated programs.
3. Transcription libraries which are rented to
broadcast stations generally consisting of record-
ed musical selections to be used as a possible
source of program material.
4. Transcriptions of sound effects and special music
effects available from a number Of concerns which
are generally used in connection with dramatic
programs.
Use of Instantaneous Recordings.--The principal use of
the instantaneous recording or transcription in radio is in
connection with the so-called "delayed broadcast."224 Delayed
broadcasts generally take two forms. First, when an affil-
iated station cannot air a network program at the time it
comes over the wire, sometimes the station will transcribe
such programs and broadcast them when time becomes available.
Second, networks sometimes make Off the line transcriptions of
their programs for two purposes: (1) for rebroadcast to their
223For a discussion, see: Westphal, 22. cit.. Po 221-
224
221-22.
For a discussion, see: Westphal, 22, cit., p.
80
affiliates along the wire at a later time due tO time zone
differentials, and (2) for distribution to unaffiliated
stations.
Advantages Of Recordings and Transcriptions.--The Com-
mission, in the §;22 2222, listed "five particular advantages"
of transcriptions in their use in broadcasting:
(a)....Transcriptions make possible the compila-
tion Of a permanent archive of the best in radio,...o
(b) Transcriptions make possible the placing Of
pro ams at convenient hours....
0) Transcriptions make possible the sharing Of
programs among stations not directly connected by
wire lines....
(d) Transcriptions Offer to the writer, director,
and producer Of programs the same technical advantages
that the moving picture industry achieves through
cutting room techniques....
(e) Portable recorders make it possible to pre-
sent tO the listener the event as it occurs rather
than a subsequent re-creation of it.... actual press
conferences, for example,....92
With respect to recorded music, Westphal listed a number Of
advantages:
First, any station can play recordings Of
music at any time,....Second, a relatively small
budget for recordings, over a period Of time, will
build a sizeable record collection for the station,
....Third, in many instances the carefully prepared
performances will be superior to the performances
Of local groups outside the metrOpolitan centers.
Fburth, recordings provide a means for repeated
hearings of the same composition, ....Fifth, record-
ings greatly extend the variety of selections heard:
....Sixth, a greater amount of music can be
heard;....22
Economic Advantage Of Recorded Music.--The use of record-
ed music also Offers one very significant economic advantage
2250.5. FCC, Pub ic Service Responsibility 2; Broadcast
Ligcnsees, 22. git., p. 3 .
225wcctphal, 22. cit., pp. 213-14.
81
which could be rather important to the commercial broad-
caster as the Operator of a business enterprise for profit.
Any performance of a copyrighted musical composition, whether
live or recorded over a commercial broadcast station is pro-
tected by the Copyright Code.227 As a result, the commer-
cial broadcaster cannot escape the cost Of the clearances on
protected musical compositions by utilizing recorded music
instead Of live. However, since our legal system does not
recognize "performers rights, the commercial broadcaster will
incur no additional costs in this area if recordings are
used (provided that there are no labor contracts calling for
residual rights). Further, the use Of recorded music in-
volves no musicians' wages. This results in a tremendous
economic advantage for the use Of music in its recorded form
as Opposed to its being performed by "live†or actual musi-
cians with regard to commercial stations.
Extent Of the Use of Recordings and Transcri2tions and
Music in Radio Programming in the Forties.--The estimates of
the amount of broadcast time devoted to recorded program
fare have tended to vary somewhat and have been expressed in
a number Of ways. In a study Of radio programming released
in early 1941, it was estimated that the national and regional
network affiliated stations devoted an average of 10 to 15 per
cent Of their time to electrical transcriptions and that
local unaffiliated stations devoted up to 85 per cent to the
227Wa1ter B. Emery, "Legal Restrictions on Use Of Pro-
gram Materials," Journal 2; Broadcasting, 4 (Summer, 1960),
pp . 242-43 .
82
same.228 A survey of "mechanized music" conducted by the AFM
phrased the estimate differently.229 The report estimated
that out of seven hours broadcast daily by the average radio
station in this country, only about 58 minutes originated
live in the studios. FCC Chairman Fly told a Senate committee
in September, 1942, that recordings and transcriptions con-
stituted the program source of over 40 per cent of all radio
timo.23° In the §122_§ggg, the Commission estimated that
"in January of 1945, approximately 32.3% of all the time of
standard broadcast stations was devoted to transcriptions and
recordings."231 Late in the following year, Egg; reported an
estimate that 43 per cent of all radio time was filled with
recordings and characterized them as radio's "staff of live."232
By 1947, it was being concluded by some that the disc Jockey
or DJ programs had recently emerged as a popular type of radio
entertainment and that the disc Jockeys themselves were becom-
ing regarded as "respectable radio talent."233 As some indica-
tion of this trend, a few of the leading DJ‘s were commanding
228Kenneth G.Bartlett, "Trends in Radio Programs."
Amer c Academ gf'Political ggg_Soc;a1 Science. Annals 213
anuary, 19515, p. 19. ’
229AEE, P:gceed.. 1941, pp. 272-80.
2300.3. Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, ï¬gs;-
iggsx Use g£_Mechanica; Rengductign g; Music 77th Cong. 2nd
Sess., $552, p. 25. . '
231
U.S. FCC, Public Service Responsibility,g; Broadcast
Licensees, 92, 2;§.. p. 37.
232Time, December 30, 1946, p. 82.
233Ed James, "Will Petrillo Unseat the Jockeys," Ameri-
ggg Magazine, 144 (December, 1947), pp. 31, 82.
83
yearly salaries of 200-400 thousand dollars per year.234
Although it is difficult to state with precision the prOpor-
tion of radio time devoted to recorded program material, the
above does suggest that recordings and transcriptions did
provide the radio industry with a rather significant source
of program material during the forties.
Music in Radio Programming Prior to the '40's.--With
respect to the thirties, Bartlett, in a study of the trends
in radio programming compiled the following estimates of the
percentage of network radio time which was devoted to music
programs:235
1932.........63.0 1936.........63.0
l933.........67.3 l937.........59.7
1934.........67.7 1938.........58.2
1935.........63.3 1939.........57.2
Bartlett concluded that there was a trend away from music
programs (programs in which the feature was music) to a higher
proportion of "talk" programs. Nevertheless, music constituted
a very significant element of all broadcast programming at
the beginning of the forties.
FCC Survey.--Probably the most extensive survey of
music in radio programming was conducted by the FCC in 1942.
The results of this survey were reported to a Senate investigat-
ing committee by Chairman F1y.935 It was found that radio
23Ssartiett, op, cit., p. 16.
236U. S. Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, Hear-
ings: Use of Mechanical Reproduction of Music, 77th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 1952, pp. 13- 5.
84
stations were on the air an average of 112 hours per week of
which an average of 86 of these hours contained music in
some form. In other words, approximately 76 per cent of all
broadcast time was devoted to programs which contained some
kind of music. In slightly greater detail, the breakdown
was:
%of all
Type of Program Radio Time
Entire program musical................. 48.2
Integral part of program musical....... 13.8
Music an incidental part of program.... 14.3
Programs containing no music........... 23.7
With respect to whether music was live or recorded,
the Commission found:
% of all
Type of Program Radio Time
Programs containing recorded music..... 42.6
Programs containing live music......... 33.7
Programs containing no music........... 23.7
The above citation will serve as the documentation for
the entire section entitled: "FCC Survey."
The purpose of the Commission's survey was to determine
the extent to which the radio industry was dependent on record-
ings and transcriptions. The data was compiled from a question-
naire which was mailed out to all AM broadcast licensees on
August 15, 1942. The questionnaire covered all programming
presented during the week of April 5 through 11. “Licensees
were asked to indicate what portion of their programs, both
commercial and sustaining, broadcast durin the week contained
music (1) recorded on phonograph records, 2) recorded on
transcriptions, (3) played live by professional musicians, or
(4) played live by amateur musicians." Other information was
asked for, also. By the date of the hearings (September 17,
18, 21, 1942), 796 of the 890 AM stations in Operation had
replied. Upon checking, it was found that the 796 stations
provided a representative sample.
85
Regarding the time devoted to programs containing recorded
music, it was found that programs which utilized phonograph
records constituted 37.6 per cent of this time and programs
utilizing electrical transcriptions constituted 62.4 per cent.
Broken down into three categories of programs containing
music, the time devoted to programs containing recorded music
237
was as follows:
% of Total Time Devoted to Pro-
,grams containing Recorded Music
Phonograph Electrical
Type of Program Records Transcriptions
Entire program musical 30.3 40.1
Integral part of
program musical 5.4 10.1
Music an incidental
part of program 1.9 12.2
TOTAL 37.6 62.4
In the survey, the FCC found that the preportionate
use of recorded music in radio programming was not uniform
by any means. Its use tended to vary according to certain
variables as Table 4 demonstrates. A number of generalizations
can be made, based on the FCC survey, about the use of recorded
music by radio stations in the early forties:
1. Low-power stations did, in the main, use a higher
prOportion of recorded music than did high-power
stations.
237The cited figures do not include paid spot announce—
ments on electrical transcriptions containing music which were
broadcast during the week under survey. In addition to the above,
there were 32,470 such spot announcements broadcast on the 796
stations during the week. This represented an average of 40.8
per station. The revenue derived from the sale of time for these
spots amounted to $209,514 or an average of 8263 per station.
86
2. Stations located in smaller cities and towns tended
to utilize a greater prOportion Of recorded music
than their counterparts in large cities and metro-
politan areas.
3. As the time sales Of radio stations increased, the
programming time devoted to recorded music was apt
to decrease.
4. As the income before taxes of radio stations de-
creased, recorded music tended to fill a greater
prOportion of programming time.
5. National network affiliated stations generally used
less music prOportionally to fill programming
schedules than did stations which were not affiliated
with national networks.
In summing up then, the smaller, local. low-power, less prosper-
ous radio stations without network affiliation located in
smaller cities or towns tended in the forties to utilize a
much higher prOportion of recorded music in their programming
than did the larger, high-power, more prosperous stations with
major network affiliation located in larger metropolitan areas.
AFM Survey Of Network Key Station Programming.--Table
5 summarizes a survey of the programming of the four major
network key AM stations located in New York City. It should
be noted that the Table includes both network and local
programs of the stations. As might be expected from the
generalizations, these stations utilized a rather high propor-
tion of live music programs and live programs, in general.
Over the five-year period covered, programs which featured
instrumental music ranged between approximately 33 and 43 per
cent of all programming for the three key stations Operated by
NBC, CBS, and ABC. The MBS key station tended to use fewer
music programs preportionately than did the other three keys.
Despite the MBS key, this again serves to demonstrate that
87
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92
music represents a significant source of radio programming
material. The most important trend that should be noted in
the data over time is that the prOportionate use of recorded
music increased rather significantly for three Of the network
stations (NBC, CBS, and ABC). However, over the five-year
period, the overall use of music programs did not change very
much except for the MBS station.
Concern for Recorded Program Material in Radio Broad-
casting.--As early as 1930, the AFM complained to the Federal
Radio Commission 238 that too much recorded music was being
used by radio stations.239 However, the AFM was not the first
to become overtly concerned about the use of recordings in
radio programming as was evidenced by the following excerpt
from the Annual Report of the Department Of Commerce in 1929:
During the early days the programs of a major-
ity of the stations consisted almost entirely of
phonograph records. The announcers usually had
favorite records which they repeated numerous times
during a program. The Secretary of Commerce fore-
saw the danger Of stations losing public interest
if a change was not made in the programs.2
Department of Commerce Concern.--Seven years earlier
to avert this danger to the public interest, the Department
Of Commerce, under Herbert Hoover's direction, had "by regula-
tion prohibited the playing of phonograph records by stations
having the better (Class B) channel assignment except in
238
Hereafter in this thesis, the Federal Radio Commis-
sion may be referred to as the FRC.
239Lunde, 22. g;t., p. 57.
Cited in: Countryman (II), 92, ci ., p. 242.
93
emergencies or to fill in between program periods; and later
in the same year, it amended the regulation to prohibit even
such use Of records by Class B stations."241
FRC Concern.--The Federal Radio Commission, created
in 1927, showed some concern for recorded program fare also.
In its 1928 Annual Report, the FRC stated:
....the commission, while not condemning the
practice of using mechanical reproductions such
as phonograph records or perforated rolls, required
that all broadcasting of this nature be clearly
described in the announcement Of each number.
The commission has felt, and still feels, that
to permit such broadcasting without apprOpriate an-
nouncements is, in effect, a fraud upon the pub-
lic.... 0n the whole,....the commission is inclined
to believe that the use of ordinary commercial
records in a city with ample original program re-
sources is an unnecessary duplication of service
otherwise available to the public, and the crowded
channels should not be wasted in this manner.?42
FCC Concern.--The Federal Communications Commission
continued the policy of identifying mechanical reproductions
but it did make some refinements on it. Over the years, the
FCC has applied this policy with varying degrees of stringency.
As of 1939. the regulations in this regard required the
following:243
1. For mechanical reproductions or series of them
which exceeded 15 minutes in length, identify-
ing announcements were required at the beginning,
at every 15 minute interval, and at the end. Ex-
ceptions were made for programs Of a continuing
nature such as plays or symphony concerts.
4
2 1U.S. FCC., Public Service Responsibility 9: Broad-
cast Licensees, pp, cit., p. 3 .
242
Cited in: Countryman (II), pp. cit., pp. 248-49.
243
a F.R. 2721 (1939).
94
2. For mechanical reproductions or series of them
lasting from 5 to 15 minutes, identifying an-
nouncements must be made at both the beginning and
end.
3. For mechanical reproductions of less than 5 minutes'
duration, identifying announcements must precede
them.
4. The complete wording that such identifying an-
nouncements should have was not specified in de-
tail, but some suggestions were offered. It was
clearly stated that the wording Of the announce-
ments must accurately describe the kind Of
mechanical reproduction used. For example, it was
required that such announcement must differentiate
between "electrical transcriptions" and "recordings."
However, throughout the decade Of the forties, these regula-
tions became somewhat relaxed. In 1940, the 15-minute inter-
val in parts 1 and 2 Of the rules outlined above was increased
to 30 minutes.2M4
Four years later, in 1944, a provision
was added which stated that "a licensee shall not attempt to
create the impression that any program being broadcast by
mechanical reproduction consists Of live talent."245 Then in
1945, all specific suggestions for the wording of the re-
d.246
quired announcements were delete In the following year,
an amendment exempted mechanical reproductions of one minute
or less from the requirement of identifying announcements.247
Finally, in 1947, a further amendment provided that delayed
recorded re-broadcasts of programs by networks due to day-
light time differentials in the summer no longer needed to be
244
245
24610 F,R. 8381 (1945).
247
5 F,R. 112 (1940).
9 F,R, 10268 (1944).
11 F,R, 14291 (1946).
95
identified as being mechanically reproduced.248
Broadcasters seemed to be concerned about these
regulations of the Commission. Everytime the FCC proposed or
promulgated regulations in this regard, the pros and cons on
the severity of such regulations would be heard from vari-
ous segments of the industry.249 Needless to say, the AFM
went on record as "strongly" supporting the FCC regulations
with respect to identifying recorded programs, particularly
music.250
Network Concern.--Alarm over the fairly widespread
use of mechanical reproductions or recordings for program
material was not confined only to the AFM and the government.
Countryman pointed out that it was shared by some Of the
networks, in particular, NBC and CBS:
The small radio station which otherwise might
be driven to a network contract by the dearth of
local talent has in many cases been able to fill
out its broadcasting hours with recorded music.
Moreover, the electrical transcription affords a
means for nationwide broadcasting of an entire
program without resort to the networks.... Recog-
nizing the threat of such competition, NBC in
1934 began gradually to eliminate all recorded
programs on the stations it Operates. CBS adopted
the same policy,....9 1
24812 F,a, 2435 (1947).
249For some accounts Of the discussions of the pros and
cons Of disc announcements and the activities of the FCC con-
cerning them, see: Broadcastin April 24, 1944, p. 13; May 22,
1944. pp. 12, 60; August 21, 19Et. p. 14; July 2, 1945, pp. 18,
81; May 6, 1946, pp. 16, 76; June 10, 1946, p. 32; August 26.
1946, p. 20; September 2, 1946, pp. 15, 79; November 25, 1946;
p. 93; December 9, 1946, pp. 15, 85.
250This point was emphasized in the president's report to
the 1939 AFM convention, see: AFM Proceed., 1939. Pp. 99-101.
251Countryman (II), pp. cit.. p. 251.
96
Apparently, ABC and MBS adapted much the same policy also.252
This policy was reflected in the results of the FCC survey of
one week's programming in 1942. During the week in question,
neither NBC or CBS had any programs containing recorded
music and MBS had only a limited number.253 However, with
the advent of television, the situation changed. Late in
1948, NBC and CBS announced that they were embarking on a new
policy. Instead Of summer replacements for their regular
programs, the two networks decided to start using "recorded
reruns."254 However, NBC and CBS were not the first to relax
the former policy of only "live talent." ABC and M38 had
started to utilize transcribed programs in 1946.255 It was
not until 1949 that NBC and CBS permitted the general use of
recordings and transcriptions.256
AFM Action Against Recordings Prior to l940.--Prior to
the decade Of the forties, the AFM's most active concern for
2 _l_
5QAlthough not specifically mentioned, it was implied
by Hzgd that ABC did adopt such a policy, see: Head, 0 . cit..
p. 1 .
MBS reportedly had such a policy, see: New York Times,
September 18, 1941, p. 31:3.
253Testimony by James L. Fly, FCC Chairman, see: U.S.
Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, Hearings: Use of
M ch ica Rappoductipn p; Music, 77th Cong., 2n Sess., 1942,
p. 2 .
Fly told the committee that he understood that it was
the policy of NBC and CBS to broadcast live talent only.
4
25 Bpoadpasting, November 8, 1949, p. 26.
255Head, pp. p;p., p. 148.
6
25 Ibid.
The gradual relaxation of the policy against the use
if gecordzd program material by the networks can be detected
n able .
97
broadcasting's use of recorded music was manifested in the
sO-called "quota agreements" negotiated and executed in 1937
and 1938.957 In effect, the AFM told the broadcasting industry
that if it wanted to continue to use recordings and trans-
criptions made by Union members, receive network programs,
or even employ musicians, the industry as a whole would have
to increase the employment of staff musicians to a level
satisfactory to the Federation. A nation-wide strike Of musi-
cians was threatened against both the radio and recording
industries. The Union first made its demands known to the
major networks. Since the networks had adopted a policy of
utilizing "live talent" only, a nation-wide strike of musicians
could affect them quite severely.
The affiliates Of the national networks finally banded
together and formed the Independent Radio Network Attiliates,958
an organization specifically designed to cope with the Union
demands that the industry must increase musicians' employment.
After lengthy and intense negotiations, the AFM finally reached
257For accounts of the so-called "quota agreements,"
see: "Two Exciting Decades," Broadcastin , October 16, 1950,
pp. 104, 106, 110, 116-17, 122; Leiter, pp. 313., pp. 69-70;
U.S. Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, Hearings: lgpp
p; Mechanical Reproduction p; Music, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1942
p. 1 ; .8. House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, Hearings: Interference with Broadcasting
pg anpppmgrpia; Ed 0 i nal Pro rams, 79th Cong., lst Sess.,
1945: PP- 9. 90-91= is Wu 1938. pp. 38-39. 76-77;
1940. pp. 51. 55-56.
The above citations will serve as the documentation
for the entire section entitled: "AFM Action Against Re-
cordings Prior to 1940."
258Hereafter in this thesis, the Independent Radio
Network Affiliates may be referred to as the IRNA.
98
a two-year agreement with the key stations Of the networks
and the IRNA to be effective January 17, 1938. The networks
and their affiliates agreed to increase their current annual
expenditure of $3,500,000 for musicians by approximately
$2,000,000. The key stations of the major networks were to
assume a quarter of this increase.
Later in 1938, a similar "quota agreement" was reached
with stations not having network affiliations. Under this
agreement, unaffiliated statiOns were to Spend 5.5 per cent
of their net income over 815,000 for the employment of
musicians. However, all stations whose annual income did not
exceed $20,000 were exempted from the terms of the agreement.
In return for this increased employment by both groups, the
AFM was to withdraw any Objections to the broadcast use Of
recordings and transcriptions.
In 1940, when the agreements came up for renewal, the
Department Of Justice notified the parties involved that they
were illegal and if renewed, an anti-trust suit would be
instituted. No new agreements were negotiated or signed in
1940, but the quota arrangements were continued informally at
the local level.
Mppicians' Emplozpent in Broadcasping During the '40's.--
There appears to be two general groups Of musicians who are
employed in broadcasting which are distinguishable. The first
group is composed of those whose wages are paid by stations
and networks. The bulk of these musicians are full-time
employees and are generally referred to as"staff musi-
99
cians."259 The other group involves those musicians whose
wages are paid by sponsors and advertising agencies.260 General-
ly, this latter category involves employment for specific
broadcasts only.
Staff musicians who were employed by broadcast stations
were among the most highly paid broadcast employees during the
forties. In 1943, among all broadcast employees excluding
executives, there were only two occupational classifications
which had a higher average weekly wage than staff musicians
(see Table 6). In the same year, on an industry-wide basis,
the average weekly wage of staff musicians was 369.39 compared
with an industry average Of 849.35 for all employees except
executives or when executives were included, $55.60. Network
staff musicians were exceptionally well compensated (see Table
9). Table 7 suggests that as the power of radio stations
increased, so did the average wage paid tO musicians. All in
all, staff musicians in radio; during the forties, appear to
have been a group of well paid broadcast employees.
With respect to what kind of stations employ musicians,
stations with the greater power appeared to have hired the
highest number of musicians per station, and as the power
decreased, the average number of musicians employed also de-
creased, (see Table 7).
2591t will be noted from Table 11 that the bulk or
the gross salaries paid by radio stations to musicians went
to full-time employees, that is, those who were employed 50-
52 weeks per year.
26OSes Table 11.
100
Regarding the volume Of musicians' employment in radio,
what data Of any consequence that was found is summarized
in Tables 8 through 12. Lunde pointed out in his thesis that
the dearth Of descriptive and complete data for the decade of
the forties made it almost impossible to make any accurate
evaluation of the volume of musicians' employment. However,
on the basis of what data he found available, Lunde concluded
that there was some increase in radio employment during the
first half Of the decade and that after 1946 it declined.26l
The data compiled for this study suggest that if there were
an increase in the number of musicians employed during the
1940-1945 period, it was very slight and did not compare
very favorably with the general increase in the number of all
broadcast employees (see Tables 10 and 12). Figures for the
same period on the number Of musicians employed in AM stations
exclusive of network Operations tend to show a slight decline
in employment (see Table 8). This would suggest that any
increase in the number of employed musicians might have Oc-
curred at the network level and the stations in the large
metropolitan areas. In other words, the increases, if any,
probably came from stations which utilized a higher proportion
of "live" music in their programming. The AFM was more apt
to be successful in its bargaining relationships with those
stations which depended on live music in contrast to those
stations which did not. Table 9 does show some increase in
261Lunde, pp. cit., p. 32.
101
TABLE 6e--FULL-TIME EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSATION DATA FOR ALL
EMPLOYEES WHOSE WAGES WERE PAID BY AM STATIONS AND REGIONAL
AND NATIONAL RADIO NETWORKS FOR THE WEEK BEGINNING OCTOBER 17.
19438‘
Number Average
Employee Classification Employed Wage
EXECUTIVES:
General Managerial 1,011 144.95
Technical 577 59.09
Program 537 74.21
Commercial 411 109.71
Publicity 121 79.17
Other 224 81.34
"'EBEZLI'EEEEEET'"-"m"m"""2651 """"" {5333'
EMPLOYEES (other than executive):
TECHNICAL:
Research and DevelOpment 97 74.84
Operating 4.492 51.79
Other 329 36.62
PROGRAM:
Production 1,037 54.45
Writers 823 41.02
Announcers 3.189 46.88
Staff Musicians 2,191 69.39
Other Artists 1,402 63.75
Other 1,201 44.34
COMMERCIAL:
Outside Salesmen 1,390 81.94
Promotion and Merchandising 594 51.75
Other
489
40.06
102
TABLE 6 cont .--FULL-TIME EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSATION DATA
FOR I EMPL ES WHOSE WAGES WERE PAID BY AM STATIONS AND
REGIONAL AND NATIONAL RADIO NETWORKS FOR THE WEEK BEGINNING
OCTOBER 17, 19438
Number Average
Employee Classification Employed Wage
EMPLOYEES (other than executives): (cont.)
GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE:
Accounting 961 36.68
Clerical 1,151 25.21
Stenographic ' 1,204 28.38
Other 1,258 28.61
MISCELLANEOUS: 419 28.40
“'aahi:‘m;1;;;;;""'"'““‘"““;;:;;; """"" 215:3?
GRAND TOTAL, Executives and
Employees 25,108 55.60
8‘The data for Table 6 were compiled from: U,S, :29.
Stat, of the Comm. Industr , 1943, pp. 264-65.
.Althsugh not specifIcally indicated by the FCC, it is
assumed that the data are for full-time employees.
The data collected by the FCC were based on 855 AM
stations, 4 major national radio networks, and 5 regional
radio networks.
103
TABLE .--FULL-TIME EMPLOYMENT AND COMPENSATION FOR STAFF MU-
I IANS WHOSE WAGES WERE PAID BY AM RADIO STATIONS (EXCLUDING
NETWORK KEY STATIONS) BY CLASS AND TIME OF STATION FOR THE WEEK
BEGINNING OCTOBER 17, 19438’
No . of Average
Class and Time No. of Musicians No. per Average
of Station Stations Employed Station Wage
CLEAR CHANNEL:
50kw Unlimited 41 437 10.7 69.53
50kw Part-time 3 61 20.3 75.59
5-20kw Unlimited 25 ' 116 4.6 55.24
5-20kw Part-time 2 11 5.5 77.55
TOTAL 71 625 8.8 67.18
REGIONAL CHANNEL:
Unlimited 270 739 2.7 47.24
Part-time 62 177 2.9 42.37
TOTAL 332 916 2.8 46.46
LOCAL CHANNEL:
Unlimited 417 130 0.3 34.60
Day and Part-time 26 3 0.1 70.00
TOTAL 443 133 0.3 35.40
GRAND TOTAL 846 1,674 2.0 53.39
aThe data in Table 7 were compiled from: QL§. FCC,
Stat. 21 the Comm. Industry, 1943, pp. 261-63.
Although not specifically indicated by the FCC, it
is assumed that the data are for full-time staff musicians.
Staff musicians, by definition, are full-time employees.
Note.--"Kw" is the abbreviation used for kilowatts.
"Unlimited" stations have no restrictions with respect to
time of Operation. "Part-time" stations have restrictions
with respect to time of operation. "Day" or "Daytime" sta-
tions may operate only between local sunrise and local sun-
set.
104
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.mnoï¬ampm hex
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105
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mo.mo mom.m mm.mmn oom _ m 4 mean
owe: cohoaaam owe: cohoaqsm mcoprpm manozpoz neow
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mzo mom monadam Nam mHHmB 92¢ mHmOBBmz oHndm AdonB<z mend: may Mm QH<m mmMS mmm<3 Mmomz
mmmwoqmzm 44¢ nz¢ madHonDz hh<am mom <a<n onadmzwmxoo 92¢ Bzmzhoqmzm HEHBIAADM:I.M HAm<H
106
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roam en omonp no osoz
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on» an we nook onp non
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moohonasm nn<
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mcwnonmsz hhdpm
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107
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108
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109
TABLE 11 cont. .--EMPLOYMENT OF MUSICIANS IN RADIO BROADCAST-
ING FOR THE YEARS 1944-1949a
aTable 11 was compiled from data contained in the pre-
sident's reports to the annual conventions of the American
Federation of Musicians. The data were originally compiled
by the Union's research department. See: AFM. Proceed.,
1946. p. 53: 1947. pp. 61-62: 1948. pp. 115-15: 1949. pp.
122-23; 1950, pp. 108-109; 1951, pp. 128-29.
bData were not included in the Union source utilized.
cRepresents an incomplete total for the year.
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.neoh non oxoot mmnom Bonn no pcoshonaso
me docnnoe on .mn enema on poonoon nun: .pcoahonaao oanpnnnsme
110
o.n mac.m m.nm nme mmo.m aean
n.n mam.m e.mm One mma.n mean
e.n . ohm.m o.mm mme mem.n eean
a.n mne.m a.on «mm mom.n wean
h.m anm.m w.mm awn oma mean
m.m mmm.m n.en enm mna eean
nne on» :0 2e ouohonasm onenonosx omeononmsz nnne on» no nee»
and non cenaopm non onenonosz manhonmsm manhonnafl muonpepm neenoneo
oomonnsm meononms: canpunnsm meanpeam osonpeam ze no .02
no .02 oweno>4 no .oz ze nno no R :4 no .02
omemaueema mm<mw Hma mom mona<Bm oHndm Hm anm
mmmx mmwdx Mmomz mzHBmdundomm oHndm zH mz<HonDS madam ho Bzmzwoqmzm MXHBIAADEII.WH mqmda
111
employment of musicians at the network level. For the
industry including all levels, Table 10 indicates some slight
increases also. The data do give some support to the above
generalization, but it is far from being conclusive.
With respect to the gross salaries paid by radio
stations there appears to have been an increase between 1944
and 1946 (see Table 11). However, this does not neces-
sarily reflect an increase in the number of musicians em-
ployed. It might be Just a reflection of increasing wages.
Tables 8, 9, and 10 indicate that the average wage paid to
musicians was increasing throughout the period. This tends
to support the conclusion that the increase in gross salaries
reflected increasing wages more than it reflected increas-
ing numbers of musicians employed.
It appears, then, that the data compiled for this
study suggest that the employment of musicians by radio
stations and networks was fairly stable during the first half
of the decade of the forties and that no dramatic increases
or decreases were experienced. However, it should be
noted that the data available and reported for this period
ignore one significant area of employment in radio broadcas-
ing, the musicians whose wages were paid by sponsors and
advertising agencies. If figures were available for this
sector, the whole picture could be changed.262
262.1. Harold Ryan, former NAB president, testified
to a Congressional investigating committee that up to 1944,
the gross amount paid to musicians from the radio industry
and sponsors had shown a steady increase. He gave no figures
to back up his statement. See: U.S. House of Representatives,
112
After 1946, a definite decline in musicians‘ employ-
ment can be detected in the number of full-time musicians
employed, in the gross salaries paid, and in the average
number of musicians employed per station (see Tables 11 and 12).
In terms of gross salaries, there was, by 1949, a drop of
nearly 86,000,000 under the 1946 level. In 1945 and 1946,
about one in three stations hired at least one musician,
but by 1949, only one in five had at least one musician on
the payroll. The data do support Lunde's conclusion that em-
ployment of musicians in radio declined after 1946.
Summing Up.--There is little doubt that music repre-
sented a significant source of radio program material during
the 1940's. In 1942, the FCC found that 76 per cent of all
radio time was devoted to programs which contained music in
some form or other. or the two principal forms of music,
"live" and "recorded," the latter was used quite extensively
by the smaller radio stations even in the earliest part of
the forties. As the decade of the forties progressed, there
is evidence that the practice of using recorded music was
on the increase even at the network level. Given the stand
of the Union, such a situation would be deplored most em-
phatically by the American Federation of Musicians. The
Federation could only interpret it as the gradual curtailment
of employment opportunities. To a union leader, the general
picture of musicians' employment in radio throughout the whole
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearin s: Inter-
ference with Broadcasting of Noncommercial Educationa Programs
79th Cong., lst Sess., 1945, p. . '
113
period would appear rather bleak. Even during the 1940-45
period when there may have been some slight increase in
employment, if the union leader had contrasted this to the
general economic picture of the rest of the industry, he would
not have been able to derive a great deal of satisfaction.
He would have noticed that the industry as a whole was making
the highest level of profits ever experienced. Also, he would
have noticed that employment in the other segments of the
industry was increasing to a much greater extent than his
own segment. After 1946, there was little question that the
employment picture for the musicians would be rather die-
heartening. In the face of such a situation, if a union
leader would not attempt to take some remedial action it is
doubtful if he could remain a union leader very long. Given
the temper of the organized musicians' national leader, James
C. Petrillo, it is not at all surprising that the American
Federation of Musicians asserted itself in the dramatic way
that it did during the decade of the forties.
CHAPTER III
POLICIES, PRACTICES, AND ACTIVITIES OF THE AMERICAN FEDERA-
TION OF MUSICIANS WHICH TENDED TO HAVE A RESTRICTIVE EFFECT
ON BROADCAST PROGRAMMING DURING THE DECADE OF THE FORTIES
A. AFM Strikes Against the Major National Radio Networks Which
Were related to Disputes Between AFM Locals and Network Af-
~filiated Stations
The first AFM Action Agaiggt the Broadcasting Industry
During the Fortig§.--About the middle of June, 1940, James
C. Petrillo assumed national presidency of the American Feder-
ation of Musicians. It did not take the broadcasting industry
long to feel the effects of this change in leadership. On
June 28, 1940, Petrillo called a strike of all "remote bands"
performing for the National Broadcasting Company.1 The strike
order grew out of a dispute between an AFM local and radio
station KSTP, St. Paul, Minnesota, an NBC affiliated. NBC
remained without the services of remote bands until July 8,
1940, when the dispute between the AFM local and the NBC af-
filiate was settled "in a manner satisfactory to the St. Paul
Local."2 The event signaled the beginning of a whole series
of policies and practices instituted by the American Federation
1For Petrillo's account of the KSTP dispute, see:
AFM. Proceed,, 1941, pp. 37-38. Also, see No. l of Table 13
of this chapter.
2Ibid., p. 38.
114
115
of Musicians during the decade of the 1940's which tended to
have a restrictive effect on broadcast programming.
AFM's Netwogk Strikes Associated with Lgcgi Disputes.--
The above event also hearlded the beginning of one specific
Federation policy and practice of a restrictive nature with
respect to programming--in particular, the "remote band"
programs originated by the major radio networks during the
late evening hours. Since the policies of the networks pro-
hibited the use of recorded program material, they had devised
a method of programming in the late evening--after 11 PM--
without resorting to the use of recordings and electrical
transcriptions. These late hours were filled by musical broad-
casts originating by remote control from hotels and night
clubs featuring the bands or orchestras performing at them.3
Broadcagiing characterized the late night schedules of the
networks as â€almost entirely dependent on name bands from the
various night spots throughout the country."4 The bands and
orchestras featured on such broadcasts were referred to as
â€remote bands." There was one very important economic advan-
tage of these remote broadcasts. The networks could present
"live" music programming at a very low cost since the wages of
the musicians were being paid by the establishments where they
were performing. Generally, there was no additional charge as
far as the performing musicians were concerned for the privilege
3Broadggstigg, September 9, 1946, pp. 13, 83; Septem-
bar 16. 9 p p. e
4
Ibide, September 9. 1946. p. 139
116
of picking up their performances from such places.5 The
publicity value both to the musicians and the establishments
involved was usually sufficient.
The "quota agreements" executed in 1937 and 1938 clasp-
ed in 1940 and were continued only on an informal basis. It
appeared that the AFM locals had difficulty in a number of
instances of getting stations to continue their "quotas."
During the first half of the forties, there was a rash of
disputes between AFM locals and radio stations throughout the
country over the "quotas" or the number of musicians a parti-
cular station should employ and a number of other questions
pertaining generally to the terms and conditions of work.6
The locals, soon after Petrillo took office, began appealing
to the national president's office, for aid in settling these
disputes. With respect to the disputes involving network
affiliates, Petrillo devised a method whereby the Federation
could aid its locals which involved strikes or strike threats
against the affiliate's network with regard to the remote
bands.
The Remote Band Network Strike Procedure.-- Briefly,
the method, when put into operation, was as follows.7 There
SResolutions introduced at the AFM convention in 1950
suggested that it was not a general practice to charge broad-
casters for remote musical broadcasts originating from night
clubs, etc., see: AFMg Proceed., 1950, pp. 77, 80.
6See Tables 13 and 15 of this chapter.
7For Petrillo's description of this method, see his
testimony in: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on
Education and Labor, Heariggs: Investi ation of James C.
Petrillo, the American Federation g_ Musicians, gt 21.,—80th
117
would be a dispute between an AFM local and a major network
affiliated station concerning the number of musicians the
station should employ or some other question related to the
terms and conditions of employment. The local would appeal
to the national president's office for aid in settling the
dispute. The national president, Petrillo, would look into
the dispute and, if he felt the local was justified in its
demands, he would contact the affiliate's network and request
aid in settling the dispute. Also, the network would generally
be notified that if the dispute between the local and the
affiliate was not settled shortly, the AFM would be forced to
withdraw the services of remote bands. If this threat failed
to bring about the desired results, a strike of a number of the
remote bands would be called. Such a strike would be very
disruptive to late evening programming for the network in-
volved and, in turn, for all of its affiliates. A number of
these strikes were ordered by the national president's office
between 1940-1943 and have been summarized in Table 13. Dur-
ing the first year of the strikes, 88 bands were taken out of
service for periods ranging from one to thirty days.8
Cong., lst Sess., 1947, p. 281.
This method has also been described by J. Harold Ryan,
when NAB president, in his testimony in: U. S. House of Repre-
sentatives, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hear-
ing : Interference with Broadcasting of Noncommercial Educa-
tional Programs, 79th Cong., lst Sess., 1955. p. 70.
8The period covered was June, 1940 through May, 1941.
See 52!. Proceed., 1941, pp. 37-40.
Also, at the same place, the names of many of the
bands that were withdrawn were listed. Some of the pOpular
name bands involved in the strikes during the first year were
the following:
118
Refinement of the method.--Although the pattern outlined
above was apparently very successful,9 Petrillo began to make
refinements on the method. If, after calling out the remote
bands, Petrillo did not think the settlement of the diapute was
forthcoming, he would threaten to call a strike of one or more
of the studio bands employed by the network.10 After this
strike threat was made, the settlement was generally achieved
in a day or two.11 Finally, Petrillo made his threat good in
the WJAS and KQV disputes (See No. 10 and 11 in Table 13) in
October, 1941.12 The remote bands on CBS and NBC had been
withdrawn on October 8. Since "it did not appear that any
settlement was in sight," President Petrillo issued strike or-
Tommy Dorsey Guy Lombardo
Charlie Barnet Eddy Duchin
Woody Herman Claude Thornhill
Horace Heidt Henry Busse
Gene Krupa Lawrence Welk
Xavier Cugat Alvino Rey
Louis Prima Duke Ellington
Harry James Shep Fields
Jimmy Lunceford Freddy Martin
Jan Gerber Dick Jurgens
Ray Noble
9
From Table 13, it will be noted that, according to
the Union, the agreements achieved in 13 of the 19 known
disputes were listed as "satisfactory"to the local involved.
Satisfactory to the Union generally meant that the station
gave into the full demands of the local.
10This occurred during the following disputes listed
in Table 13: KSTP (No. 1), AFM: Proceed., 1941, p. 37: KWK
(No. 6), AFM. Proceed., 1941, p. 40; WGRC (No. 8), AFM, Egg-
ceed., 1942: p. .
11
The local came to terms the day after the threat in
the KSTP dispute, immediately in the KWK dispute, and two days
after in the WGRC dispute.
121"or Petrillo's account of these disputes, see: AFM.
Proceed., 1942, p. 48.
119
ders on October 14 and 15 covering some of the studio bands
performing for sustaining programs on NBC and CBS in New
Ybrk, Chicago, and Los Angeles.13 However, some of the
networks' more important public service programs were exempted.14
No commercial programs were affected by the strike orders.
Petrillo emphasized that this was the first time that regular
studio musicians under contract to the networks had ever been
called out on strike. The disputes between the local and
stations WJAS and KQV were settled on October 17 and all
musicians returned to work.
In April of the following year, still further refine-
ment was made in the method. After calling out the remote
bands because of a dispute between the Nashville local of
the AFM and MBS affiliate WSIX (See No. 13 in Table 13),15
Petrillo "realized that this matter could not be settled with-
out drastic action."16 On April 1st, he issued a strike order
covering all musicians on all MBS programs, commercial, sus-
taining, and otherwise, which were being carried by station
WSIX. Such a strike would affect a great deal of Mutual's
total programming schedule. Since nearly all commercial pro-
grams containing live music would be affected, rather sub-
stantial economic loss could result. With the prospects of
13Ib1d.
14Broadcastin , October 20,1941, p. 10.
15For Petrillo' s account of this dispute, see: AFM.
Proceed., 1942, pp. 49- 50; 1944, p. 53.
16
AFM Proceed., 1942, p. 48.
oxnnam oneepm
Head
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peosoonwo .onm .wnoe
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enpmonono
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oean .eH .boz pmosoonwm .em
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1. oean peoaoonwe
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Mnoz no ozone
oean -nenoo one some: mmz .w>
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oxnnao oncspo oean .w knee peoaeonwo .ecnz
e m cocooaonep see new ease mason on enema: umz .nssm .em meme .n
eonsom opens noenspm nan: soennnm neoon see sen: none nonesoon oesamna
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cannoe nonpo enorpoz vendoben
. eonpsem
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-nmz onnem n<zonaez acne: men emzneee mazem meozmm no see mun no mmunmem mo nmezaem--. memea
121
oohonaao on
on mnononosa no
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enormom Bonn
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mean anoaoonmo .h&
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mama
use even .noo
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oosemno wannapom oohoneao on on neon
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n m eoemosuon zme umn .voom nobo unosoonweonn nomz .meoonno 3oz mzm3 .a
oonsow cocoa nounnpm nun: ooxnnpm Hoooq zhd Sun: cone connoooq oasamnn
nonupom ooponoomoe no acneonen opsemnn no onsoez uonnnnnd en
canuoe nonpo anompoz oobnobnn
eoneoom
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cohonoao on on omen
mmOnponaowo: en meaH tonnes no nomad: .em
> m consenonensa mmo .omuom .cse so>o neoaoonwsmno moo .ewnsnmapnm >am .an
vohonaao on on neon
mconponpowoe an mean nonmsa no noesme oznm .om
s m eoneanonenea omz .mmsow .see no>o aeoaoonwesno -omz .emeenmeenm mew: .mn
cohonoao
on 0p onenenmss no
mean noose: one meme: .6:
p m exceed: .a .pmom nobo unosoonweonn mmo .onosnanom one: .bn
â€H mm: Bonn nnoo vohoneso
1. nan doggone zm4:. on o» oeononmss no
â€oxnnum onceeo mean .e .w:¢ noeszm one women
m e cocooeonep zme lam hash nobo peosoonweonn mm: .mm .eopnonom awe: .wn
oohoneso
on on econonoss no
mean .e .w:< neeaeo one memo: .nnnoo .00
n < meoexcs tam anew nopo anosoonwomno mm: nonoeenm mom omen .mn
oonuom canoe noxnnem nan: ooxnnem noooq End nun: eon» acneeooq ouseonn
nonpeom ooeenooooe no conveneo oezomnn no onspez nonnnnne on
menace nonpo unoruez conno>nn
conesem
n<oon zme 24
nae zenaenm amaenenmme z< amasamm me: mnemmnn may zone: zn neanaoean zmmaemm memo:
mezOnaez meme: ems amzneee mazem meozmm me see was we mmunmam mo naezzom--.
123
TABLE I; (cont,).--SUMMARY OF STRIKES BY THE AFM OF REMOTE
S A AINST THE MAJOR NATIONAL RADIO NETWORKS BETWEEN 1940-
1943 IN WHICH THE DISPUTE WAS BETWEEN AN AFFILIATED STATION
AND AN AFM LOCAL
aUnder "Duration of Strike," the strike referred to
is a strike of the remote bands (either all or in part) called
by the AFM against one of the major national radio networks
during a dispute between an affiliated station and an AFM
local. “
b"Other Action Associated With Strike" refers to ac-
tion either threatened or taken by either the AFM or the
network involved (who took the action will be specified in
each instance) in addition to the strike of remote bands
against the network called by the AFM.
°"Settlement" refers to the settlement that was achieved
in the various strikes. A, S, and C represent a code for
the various general types of settlements as follows:
A---indicates that an agreement of some kind was
reached;
S---indicates that an agreement satisfactory to
the AFM local involved was reached. In other words,
the affiliated station involved yielded to all of
the demands of the AFM local involved.
C---indicates a compromise settlement was reached.
In other words, the AFM local involved had to
give in on some of its demands.
dAFM. Proceed., 1941, pp. 37-38; New York Times, July 2,
1940, p. 17:3; 3uIy 4, 1940, p. 10:8; July 10, I940, p. 16:1;
"Two Exciting Decades," Broadcasting, October 16, 1950, p. 122.
e
AFM. Proceed. 1941 p. 38; New York Times July 2
1940, p. 17:3; July 4: 1940: p. 10:4; "Two Exciting Decades,"
Broadcastin , October 16, 1950, p. 122.
rAFM. Proceed., 1941, pp. 38-39.
5Ibid.
thid., p. 39.
11bid.
JIbid., 1942, p. 46.
k
AFM. Proceed. 1942 p. 47; Broadcastin September 22,
1941, p. 7; New York Times,'September 18, l94I, p. 31:3; Sep-
tember 20, 193I, p. 11:1.
124
TABLE 12 Scont.2.--SUMMARY OF STRIKES BY THE AFM OF REMOTE
ANDS AG INST THE MAJOR NATIONAL RADIO NETWORKS BETWEEN 1940-
1943 IN WHICH THE DISPUTE WAS BETWEEN AN AFFILIATED STATION
AND AN AFM LOCAL
1535. Proceed., 1942, pp. 47-48; Broadcasting, September
22, 1941, p. 7: October 6, 1942, p. 6; New York Times, Septem-
ber 18, 1941, p. 31:4.
mAFM Proceed., 1942, p. 48; Broadcasting, October 13,
1941, p.-7? October 20, 1941, p. 10; 321 York Times, October 10,
1941; p. 27:4; October 11, 1941, p. 20:2; October 16, 1941,
p. 23:8; October 18, 1941, p. 21:5.
nSame as Footnote m.
°AFM, Proceed., 1942, p. 49.
p'AF'M Proceed. 1942 p. 49: 1944, p. 53; Broadcasting,
April 6, 1942’ p. 60' ’
“gag. Proceed., 1944, p. 53; Broadcasting, July 13,
1942, p. 12; July 20, 1942, p. 7; New York Times, July 15,
1942, p. 21:6; July 16, 1942, p. 18:1; July 18, 1942, p. 15:8;
July 26, 1942, p. 30:2; July 30, 1942, p. 16:7.
rAFM. Proceed., 1944, p. 54; New York Times, July 29,
1942, p. 5:1; August 5. 1942, p. 21:4.
8New York Times, July 29, 1942, p. 15:1; August 5,
1942, p. 21:4.
tBroadcasting, September 14, 1942, p. 9; New York
Times, September 10, 1942, p. 48:1.
“AFM, Proceed., 1944, p. 54; Broadcasting, January 25,
1943, p. ; February 1, 1943, p. 14; New York Times, January
22, 1943, p. 25:2.
vSame as Footnote u.
125
such a strike in the immediate foreground, MBS stopped feed-
ing all programs containing live music to WSIX Just a few
hours before the strike was to become effective. This MBS
action ended both the strike of remote bands and the proposed
strike of all musicians on programs being fed to the affili-
ate involved. WSIX was without MBS service with respect to
programs containing live music until September 18, 1942, when
it came to terms with the AFM local involved.
Nearly the same circumstances occurred again in a
local dispute involving another MBS affiliate, WARM in Scranton,
Pennsylvania (See No. 16 in Table 13).17 However, in this
instance, the network did not have to drOp its service to the
station. WARM agreed not to carry any MBS programs utilizing
remote bands. MBS remote bands were out from July 27 to
August 4, 1942, as a direct result of this dispute. It was not
until September 18 of the same year that an agreement was
reached and the station could resume carrying the remote band
programs.
Another MES affiliate, WSAY in Rochester, N.Y., got
involved in a dispute with the Rochester local of the AFM
over the station's refusal to employ staff musicians.18 The
local requested the aid of the national president's office.
17For accounts, see: AFM. Proceed., 1944, p. 53; New
Ybrk Times, July 29, 1942, p. 15:1; August 5, 1942, p. 21:4.
18For Petrillo's account, see: AFM. Proceed.» 1944:
pp. 54-55.
For other accounts, see: Broadcastin , July 19, 1943,
p. 16; September 20, 1943, p. 51: ï¬g! gg£§_liggg, July 2,
1943, p. 10:4; July 16, 1943. p. 20:2; September 12, 1943,
P- 1935: EAL. 1322.2. AH... 13.11.14. No. 20. August 13. 1943. pp. 1-4.
126
In this situation, Petrillo did not bother to call a strike
of remote bands. Instead, a strike of all musicians on pro-
grams being fed to WSAY was threatened immediately. This was
sufficient for MBS to drop its affiliate from network service
with respect to programs containing live music on July 15,
1943. WSAY sought injunctive relief and damages in the New
York Courts, but was unsuccessful. Mutual service was not
resumed until late October when WSAY hired a number of musicians,
which was satisfactory to the AFM local involved.
In late 1945, still another refinement was made in the
AFM's general policy of attempting to utilize the networks to
strengthen its locals' position in bargaining with affiliated
stations. In connection with local disputes involving five
affiliates of NBC and CBS, strikes were called which affected
one CBS and two NBC commercial programs.19 The entire affair
has been summarized in Table 14. Regarding these strikes,
Petrillo told the next AFM convention the following:
This is the first time in the history of the
Federation that we stopped musicians from playing
commercial broadcasts but it was the onl way the
stations....cou1d be handled, as....[the stations
....refused to consider any type of agreement until
this action was taken.20
Shortly after the strike action was taken against the networks
the five affiliated stations involved came to terms.
Effectiveness of the Procedure.--By mid-1941, after
a number of strikes involving remote bands, the disputes
19For Petrillo's account, see: AFM, Proceed., 1946,
pp 0 55-570
2OAFM, Proceed., 1946, p. 57.
127
mnmaoamsa
unmum hoaaao
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madman new mama o:asom haaamm useaooawm mouse
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madman pop mqma czasom maï¬amm ecoaeoamm peace .mm
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ham>apomam nzpsom
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mean even apoxpoz uporaez cobaobcH
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128
TABLE 14 cont. .--SUMMARY OF THE AFM STRIKES AGAINST NBC AND
B LVING THE MUSICIANS ON THREE NETWORK COMMERCIAL PRO-
GRAMS WHICH WERE ASSOCIATED WITH DISPUTES BETWEEN AFM LOCALS
AND NETWORK AFFILIATES
aThe "Fitch Band Wagon" featured the Artie Shaw Band
which was substituted by a vocal chorus on the occasion of the
strike.
bThe "Carnation Contented Hour" featured the Percy
Faith Orchestra. On the occasion of the strike, the program
was canceled.
0On the occasion of the strike, the "Prudential Family
flour" was canceled. It is not known what musical group was
involved.
Proceed., 1946, p. 57; Broadcastin October 8,
1945. DP mm ew York Times, October 1,19 5, p. 9:8;
October 2,1945, p. 13:
°AFM, Proceed., 1946, p. 55: Broadcastin , October 8,
1945, pp. 17.85: New York Times, October 1, 1945, p. 9: 8,
Octoberr 2, 1945, p. ‘13:5.
rAFM .Proceed., 1946, p. 56; Broadcastin October 8,
1945, pp, ew York Times, October 6, l9 5, p. 3’3.
8AFM. Proceed., 1946, p. 56; New York Times, October 8,
1945. p. 30: 2.
hAFM Proceed., 1946, p. 56; Broadcasting, October 8,
1945, pp. 85; October 15, 1945, p. 20; New York Times,
October 6, 1945. p. 3: 3
129
between AFM locals and national network affiliates began to
be settled soon after the networks were notified and before the
strike deadline. At the end of the first year that the remote
band strike technique had been utilized, Petrillo stated:
I believe the chains are beginning to realize
that when I say a strike will be called, it will
be called. But it took a half a dozen episodes
like the ones herein before detailed refers to re-
mote band strikeg7, to convince them.
There is every reason to believe that when Petrillo notified
a network of a local dispute that it was accompanied by a
strike threat. His above statement tends to indicate that.
Also, in a report, Petrillo--in referring to some of these
local disputes--stated:
I immediately took the bull by the horns and ad-
vised the chains that unless these grievances were
adjusted with the locals involved, I would pull the
chain programs.22
The known disputes between affiliates and AFM locals which
were settled soon after the networks were notified to their
existence have been summarized in Table 15.
AFM Objectives.--One of the major AFM objectives in
their plan of action was to get the networks involved in the
local disputes. The Federation wanted the networks to put
pressure on their affiliates to come to terms with the AFM's
local musicians‘ unions. In many of the disputes, the locals
were trying to protect musicians' employment at the affiliated
stations. The affiliates did not rely on live music to the
2
1Ibid., 1941, p. 40.
22 .
IRAQ»: 1945. pp. 54-44.
130
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ad dam mmz use osam mama ua>0Ln mono oomOHo osam .ch
nomz sopmcsoop za< .sflsn po>o pcoaoohmsman -omz .spanoas Hmau .s
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mnwaoamsa
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an copsaaonessa mm: .aapsm ca assumes man: mm: .Haoxog mag; .m
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131
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132
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can ousamac mcaavpem ca mama wcaxpo: one meme: .N.z
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133
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mcoapaccoo
mama wcaahoz can name: .2.2
4 caocxmz ..oon ao>o pceaooammman mmo .aeamenoom 022: .am
macapacnoo
mama wcaxao: use mews: .H.z
4 axonaab ..oon hobo anoaomawmman omz .aopmonoom 2423 .mm
mnoaamap
Iowa: ca oomeaoapama
oma “mm: spa: pea
unoo ow om4 vexed cam mnoapaccoo
opsamau mcaawaom ca mama wCaxaoz one meme: .2.2
4 cam ompmmdcoh 2&4 ..oon ao>o pnoaeoawmman om4 .oamuusm mm: .mm
macaw
nuapowo: Ca dogma
-aoaphsa omz «smug
spa: pounce on omz
venue use mpsamac macauaucoo
wnaappom ca cam mama mnaxaoz one some: .2.2
a mmo oopmosuop zaa ..oon peso aeosmouwsmao omz .oasuusm 2mm: .am
moasom apnea musoao>ao>ca epzaman awooa 2&4 Qua: :oau coaawooq onsamao
-oaopom unexpoz no apsaman ho opspez neaaamua ca
open 2903902 ue>ao>ca
:oapwvm
mszmman mma 2H umoxamz m.MB<HAH&&4 mma H>AO>ZH OB UZHMMMm 2m HUHh
1&0 m.azmnHmmmm A4ZOHB<Z ams m0 Muz<BmHmm4 2030mma amqaamm 2mm: mOHmB mmmoxamz O
mma ho monadam QHB4HAHEE4 924 mAdooq 2&4 zmm38mm mmesmmHn A4004 ho Nm422Dmll.
134
cohoaaso
on o» mamaoamza
mo honed: can and
2mm: Spa: mama macapavcoo wcaxhoz .2.2
m 4 oocohemcoo a was mm2 ..hw2 hobo acoaoohwwman mm2 .oawhusm 2mm: .mm
mhdaoamsa
w 4 2:0:xd: mama :OaCSIGoh mca .hcoa
..:sn -hoamso we: ham: oma .oaaabnmaz xamz .wm
mama
oazamac ..no& whoapaczoo
wnaauvom ha 4am mama manho: use meme: .mm
m a oma sopmoscoh zaa ..ooa hobo pameoohmamam oma .sanmaoesaaam aha: .em
mama
opsamap ..no& whoapaccoo
wcaapaom ca can :mama whaxhoa chm mama: .w&
w 4 omz copmodmoh 2&4 ..oon hobo usesoohwmman omz .magaaocmaasm 322 .mm
oohzom names muhoaobaobna opsaman awooa 2&4 nuaz coaa acaumooa opsaman
uoaapom ghozpoz mo ousanan no 0.59me sdaaa&&4 ha
open xhozaez cobaObha
uoaaeum
msammHn mma zH Mm039Mz m.ma4HAH&m4 are m>ao>zH OH wzHMMHm Hm Moam
tho m.ezmnammm& A4ona4z Mme mo H024BmHmm4 mwbomxa amasamm mmm: monk mmmozamz oHn4m A4ona4z
was &0 mz0H94Bm nt4HAH&&4 n24 m44ooa 2&4 zmm3amm mmasmmHn A4ooa ho Mm4223mut.~.pcoov ma mam4s
ont. .
TABLE I? (c 2
135
--SUMMARY OF LOCAL DISPUTES BETWEEN AFM LOCALS
AN AFF LI TED STATIONS OF THE NATIONAL RADIO NETWORKS WHICH
WERE SETTLED THROUGH ASSISTANCE OF THE NATIONAL PRESIDENT'S OF—
FICE BY SEEKING TO INVOLVE THE AFFILIATE'S NETWORK IN THE
DISPUTE
Note.--In addition to the disputes summarized in Table
14, there were a number of other of which little is known
except that they were "local radio controversies adjusted
through assistance of the president's office."
If these dis-
putes followed the established pattern, pressure was put on the
affiliate's network to become involved.
The stations involved
in these disputes occurring between June, 1941 and May, l942
were as follows:
STATION
KNX
KRNT
KSO
WHBC
WLLH
WTRY
WAGA
WSB
WAPO
KXOK
KWK
KSD
KMOX
WHAS
WFEA
KYW
WMMN
WCBM
WCAO
WFBR
WREC
Source:
LOCATION
Los Angeles, Calif.
Des Moines, Ia.
Des Moines, Ia.
Canton, Ohio
Lowell, Mass.
Troy, N.Y.
Atlanta, Ga.
Atlanta, Ga.
Chattanooga, Tenn.
St. Louis, Mo.
St. Louis, Mo.
St. Louis, Mo.
St. Louis, Mo.
Louisville, Ky.
Manchester, N.H.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Pairmount, W. Va.
Baltimore, Md.
Baltimore, Md.
Baltimore, Md.
Memphis, Tenn.
AFFILIATION
CBS Key
CBS
NBC, MBS
MBS
Yankee
NBC-Blue
NBC
NBC
NBC-Red & Blue
NBC-Blue
MBS, NBC
NBC-Red
CBS
CBS
NBC, MBS
NBC
CBS
NBC-Red
CBS
MBS
MBS
AFM. Proceed., 1942, pp. 48-49.
8The network, in each of the cases listed, was first
notified by the national president's office of the AFM that
a local dispute (one in which the network was not directly
involved) did exist between an affiliated station and an AFM
local.
The "involvement" listed represents either the known
action sought or threatened by the national president's office
with respect to the network involved and/or the known action
taken by the network involved in the local dispute.
bn
Settlement" refers to the settlement that was
achieved in the various disputes. A, S, and C represent a
136
TABLE 15 goont.2.--SUMMARY OF LOCAL DISPUTES BETWEEN AFM LOCALS
D AFFIL ATED STATIONS OF THE NATIONAL RADIO NETWORKS WHICH
WERE SETTLED THROUGH ASSISTANCE OF THE NATIONAL PRESIDENT'S OF-
FICE BY SEEKING TO INVOLVE THE AFFILIATE'S NETWORK IN THE
DISPUTE
code for the various general types of settlements as follows:
A---Indicates that an agreement of some kind was reached;
S---Indicates that an agreement satisfactory to the
AFM local involved was reached. In other words,
the affiliated station involved yielded to all of
the demands of the AFM local involved.
C---Indicates a compromise settlement was reached. In
other words, the AFM local involved had to give
in on some of its demands.
OAFM. Proceed., 1941. p. 40.
dBroadcasting, August 24, 1942, p. 1?.
eAFM. Proceed., lghh, p. 54; NAB. s . AFM Bul., No. 6.
September 11, 1942, p. 4.
rAFM. Proceed., 194“, pp. 54-55.
SAFM. Proceed., 1946, pp. 54-63.
137
extent that the networks did. If the local would strike the
affiliate, the time could simply be filled with recorded
music. However, theAFM's power over the networks was much
greater because they relied much more heavily on live music
and hence live musicians.23 Network policies dictated that
they should not use recorded music also. This would make a
musicians' strike against a network a great deal more serious
and disruptive to programming in comparison to one of its
affiliates. Also, when the network programming was disrupted,
all affiliated stations' programming would be disrupted.
Particularly with respect to network commercial programs and
the huge sums of money involved, a strike could be extremely
costly. In these respects, the networks would tend to want
to avoid strikes of any kind. This was the weakness of the
networks that the AFM was exploiting. In order to avoid
threatened strikes, the Union hoped that the network would
intervene in some fashion and use its influence to bring about
the settlement of the disputes that might exist between AFM
locals and affiliated stations. According to Table 15. this
technique was rather successful.
There was one very important aspect of the remote
band strike technique that was highly advantageous to the
Union. When a remote band went on strike against the network,
231n testimony to a Congressional Committee, an NBC
official estimated that in 1947 that more than 70 per cent of
all of his network's programs employed live musicians in some
capacity or other, see: U. S. House of Representatives, Commit-
tee on Education and Labor, Hearings: Restrictive Union Prac-
tices of the American Federation of Musicians, 80th Cong., 2nd
Sess., 1953. p. 259.
138
the musicians involved did not lose their wages since they
were paid by the hotel or night club. The strike did not
affect their performance at the particular night spot except
that it could not be broadcast. Under these circumstances,
the AFM was in a position where it could call an effective
strike without any economic hardship on any of its members.
Actual Network Involvement.--The actual involvement
of the networks in these disputes was open to some question
and was difficult to determine conclusively. An NBC official,
when asked by a Congressional investigating committee, denied
any involvement or participation by his network in any of the
local labor negotiations of affiliated stations.24 He was
emphatic that he could only speak for his own network. How-
ever, the records of the Union tend to refute the testimony
of the NBC official regarding a number of specific disputes.
Fbr example, the following excerpts from Union records admit
involvement of NBC in more than a passive way:
WFEA Dispute (No. 9, Table lS).--"The National Broad-
casting Company which feeds programs was informed
of the situation. we requested that they give their
assistance in settling the matter, which was finally
brought about."25
wsav Dispute (No, 11, Table 15).--NBc "was notified of
the difficulties and immediately contacted the sta-
tion manager, following which the local was suc-
oessful in obtaining a new agreegent at greatly
improved terms and conditions.’
wsav Dispute (No. 17, Table 15).--"Upon advising the
National Broadcasting Company of the situation, they
24Testimony of Frank E. Mullen, NBC executive vice-
president, see: Ibid., pp. 303-304.
2552!. Proceed., 1944, p. 55.
25am... 1946. p. 57.
139
in turn contacted the management of this station
and as a result of their efforts, a new agreement
was made on about October 1, 1945."27
KSD Dispute (No 18, Table 15).--NBC "was notified of
this situation and was successful in having the
Station make an agreemgnt satisfactory to the Local
on October 26, 1945."?
The same kind of documentation can be made from Union records
for the other major radio networks?9 With respect to MBS,
on two occasions, stations (WSIX and USA!) were dropped from
network service with respect to programs containing live
music for periods lasting several months. On one other oc-
casion, an MBS affiliate (WARM) "voluntarily" drOpped itself
from network service regarding remote band programs. All of
which does suggest that the networks probably did play much
more than Just a passive role in some of the local labor
disputes between their affiliates and AFM local musicians'
unidns.
The Strikes as Secondary Boycotts.--J. Harold Ryan,
when NAB President, called these strikes and pressures on the
networks designed to help settle local disputes "secondary boy-
271bid.
28Ibid., p. 54.
29The following are three examples contained in Union
records which suggested overt network involvement in local
disputes involving CBS and MBS affiliates.
In the wnon dispute (No. 8, Table 15), the following
was contained: "Mr. Winger, manager of the station, visited
this office on January 27th accompanied by Messrs. White and
Ackerberg, both vice-presidents of the Columbia network, at
whicg time the situation was discussed." AFM. Proceed., 1944,
p. 5 .
In the WEBR dispute (No. 29, Table 15), the Union
record indicated that MBS was notified and was successful in
having the affiliate resume negotiations which resulted in
140
cotts."30 None of these local disputes involving independent-
ly owned affiliated station directly involved the networks.
The secondary boycott has been defined as a "union tactic
whereby a dispute with Employer A is used as a Justification
for putting economic pressure on Employer B."31 In the case
of the network strikes, Employer A would be one of the affili-
ates of a national network or the primary employer with which
an AFM local had the basic dispute. Employer B would be one
of the networks and was the neutral or secondary employer.
Neither the local involved nor the Federation had any basic
dispute with the network in the strikes outlined herein. In
terms of the above definition, the network strikes rather
clearly constituted "secondary boycotts."
Effect of Network Strikes 9n Prggrggging.--It was pos-
sible to document 19 instances when the AFM was successful in
removing one type of program--the so-called "remote bandâ€
program--from network schedules for periods ranging from one
to thirty days. It should be remembered that when a program
was removed from the schedule of a network, the effect was
multiplied by the number of affiliates who were scheduled to
an agreement. P ceed. 1946, p. 63.
In the an'Jdm'WL'AW disputes (Nos. 5 and 6, Table 15),
the Union records indicated that it was through the Joint ef-
forts of both CBS and M88 that agreements were reached with
the two stations. AFM. 2222329., 1946, p. 61.
O
3 U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, Hearin ’4 Interfeg$nce with Broad-
§astégg _1 No commerci. Educa iona Programs, 9th Cong.,
330! e p0
31Cha:les H. Tower, "Secondary Boycotts: An Outline,"
Labor Law Journal, 5 (March, 1954), p. 185.
141
carry the program affected. It was also rather clear that the
deletion of this type of program in the instances outlined was
being forced on the networks by the Federation and, as such,
did not represent a voluntary choice by either the networks or
their affiliates. The next most serious interference with
programming associated with the network strikes was the
"forced" dropping of the two stations from Mutual network ser-
vice and the third "by choice" with respect to certain types
of programs. In the former cases, the two MBS affiliates could
not carry any programming containing live music which would
represent a significant portion of the network schedule. In
the latter case, the station "voluntarily" decided not to
carry the Mutual remote band programs. It has already been
indicated that this type of programo-the remote band program--
"almost entirely" filled the late evening schedules of the
major networks. It was disclosed to a Congressional committee
that one of the stations involved could not endure with the
network service affected, so it had to "give into union de-
mands."32
Lastly, the strikes of studio musicians probably did
not have as much noticeable effect on programming as did the
other actions indicated. The less extensive use of this
tactic represents the reason why these strikes did not. However,
they potentially could. Nevertheless, the same question
—— ——— ï¬
— v—y
32Testimony of J. Harold Ryan, when NAB president, in:
U.S. ngee of Representatives, Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, Heari s: Interference with Broadcasting g;
Ngn-commercia$ Educa ional Programs, 79th Cong., 1st ess.,
: PP. 0' 0
142
remained in the background. The AFM was in a position whereby
restrictions could be placed on what was to be broadcast.
Public Reaction.--There was a little evidence which
suggested that the public did not approve of such action on
the part of the AFM which tended to have restrictive effects
on certain areas of radio programming. Two letters to the
Egg’zggk‘liggg from readers tended to indicate this. In one
letter, the reader complained about the number of programs
that the AFM had taken off the air.33 In the order, protests
were registered concerning the control that the reader felt
the AFM and Petrillo had over radio programming.34 Also, an
editorial in the Tiggg decried the situation as one in which,
according to the writer, the AFM and Petrillo were deciding
what kind of music the American peeple shall hear on the radio.35
The public criticism of the AFM's network strikes did not
appear to be as widespread as that which was aroused by
certain other policies of the Federation yet to be explored.
Besides the newspaper accounts of the actions of the
AFM, two instances were found where broadcasters informed
the public through the use of their facilities about the net-
work strikes. In 1941, WGRC (See No. 8, Table 13) made the
following announcement four times each evening after 10 PM
during a strike of remote bands:
"Ybu are not hearing your usual parade of Mutual
dance bands tonight because of the American Federa-
33321.22£! Zlaas. September 12. 1942. p. 1227.
34
35
£259.. September 21. 1942, p. 14:6,
M" July 3! 1945' Do 12:10
143
ation of Musicians. This organization, headed by
James C. Petrillo, has canceled all remote dance
band programs over the entire Mutual Broadcasting
System of 176 stations simply because WGRC refused
to bow to his union's demand that we add six ad-
ditional, and unnecessary, musicians to our present
staff.
"WGRC declines to add an additional 810,000 in
such annual costs on the terms demanded by the
union and under threats. we have always used union
musicians, and have always been willing to negoti-
ate unicn requests in a normal manner. WGRC engi-
neers are members of the Electrical werkers' Union.
So we have no quarrel with unions as such. But we
decline to add unnecessary musicians on their own
terms simply because a union demands it or 'else' .
"We believe the American radio industry must
sooner or later face the attempted dictatorship of
network and local station broadcasting by Petrillo
and his associates, and WGRC is ready and willing
to be the showdown and right now. "36
Then in 1945, CBS read a statement on the air occasioned by
the strike of musicians on the "Prudential Family Hour"
(See Table 14) expressing regret that "as a result of the
action taken by the AFM,†the program had to be canceled.37
To what extent other broadcasters used this technique is not
known. No other instances could be documented. One other
function of the WGRC statement is that it gave some indication
of the reaction of the broadcasting industry to this tactic
of the AFM.
B. The Short-lived Ban on Broadcasts Involving Military
Musicians
AFM Stops Military Band from Broadcasting.--In point of
time, the next area of activity that the AFM became involved
3€A§!. Proceed., 1942, p. 47.
3
7Broadcasting, October 15. 1945, po 20.
144
in after instituting the network strike policy was in connec-
tion with military musicians. As indicated previously. the
Federation had always been concerned with competition from
military musicians. On or about December 15. 1940, the AFM
prevented the 104th Engineers Band from Fort Dix, New Jersey
from participating in an MBS program.38 The program was one
of a series being presented by Mutual designed to create
interest in national defense. Petrillo indicated that the ARM
was not opposed to the program series, but that the appearance
of themilitary band pointed up an existing problem that
should be cleared up. He was referring to the delimitation
of the respective jurisdictions of the performing musicians of
both the AFM and the military services in such a way that
military musicians did not create "unfair competition" for
professional musicians. Also, Petrillo pointed out that such
competition was unlawful under existing legislation, anyway.
AFM General Military Ban Announced.--The following
day, the ban on the broadcast performance of the Fort Dix band
was extended to encompass the broadcasting of all music from
military posts.39 The alleged reason for the ban was to
enable the AFM and the War Department to have a conference and
work out a formula to limit the radio activities of military
musicians so that'destructive competition" could be eliminated.
At such time as an agreement could be worked out, the Federa-
tion said that the ban would be removed.
38For an account, see: New York Times, December 15.
1940, p. 12:}.
39F'or an account, see: Ibig., December 16, 1940, p. 16:3.
145
Military Ban Removed,--The day after the ban was in-
stituted, it was removed. Apparently, not only had an agreement
been reached with the War Department, but one with the net-
works also.40 However, the War Department refused to make any
comments on its meeting with AFM officials. With respect to
the networks, it was agreed that as long as they did not
dispense with the services of any of their staff musicians as
a result of music originating from military camps, military
musicians could be utilized. A further proviso agreed upon
was that programs employing professional musicians could not
be substituted by programs involving military musicians.
AFM Policy Regagging Militagy Musicians.--A few months
later, the AFM spelled out the Federation's policy with respect
to military musicians in a letter sent to all locals:
The Federation will not authorize military
bands to play over radio except when the follow-
ing conditions are met:
1. such engagement will not endanger the
employment of already employed music-
ians.
2. such engagment will not be in connection
with a commercially sponsored program
3. such engagement will not be in competition
with professional musicians. (This means
for engagements that normally professional
bands are employed)
The military is not expected to clear engagements
through the AFM. It seems that the individual
stations and networks could clear through the Union
voluntarily, to avoid trouble and misunderstanding."1
The above statement of policy concerning military music-
ians seems fairly consistent with the public policy regarding
40For an account, see: Ibid., December 17, 1940, p. 27:7.
4
155! Proceeg,, 1941, p. 48.
146
the same. In general, the federal statutes prohibit military
musicians from going into to competition with civilian musicians
with respect to their customary employment.42 Naval policy
with respect to the broadcasting of Navy and Marine Corps bands
' was quite similar to the announced policy also."3 Neither the
policy of the Army or the Navy permitted commanding officers
to clear the radio performances of military bands with the
Federation or its locals.M
A short time after Pearl Harbor, one of the general
counsels of the AFM was commissioned to make a study of the
general situation and report the results to the International
Executive Board.45 In the report, it was indicated that al-
though there had been a great influx of musicians into the
— __ *ï¬â€˜ — t
“235 Stat. llO (1908): 39 Stat. 188 (1916): 39 St L.
612 (1916).
43The naval policy with respect to the broadcasting of
military music as announced in 1945 was as follows:
Radio broadcasting of regular band concerts per-
formed at routine times on naval stations when the
privilege of broadcasting is made available to all
responsible broadcasters at no cost and under agree-
ment that the broadcast will n t be used in con-
nection with any advertising g7 not contrary to
law in any case where their performance is given
without remuneration.
Also, in the naval policy, it was stipulated that no group
will be permitted to play if their performance, other than
at official functions, will conflict with the customary and
regular employment of local musicians. Source: U.S. Reuse of
Representatives, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Hearin : Inte fe use with ngagcasting o; Noncommercial Edu-
cat on Prggrams, th Cong., 1st ess.. 194 , p. 33.
44For the Army policy in this regard, see: Ibid.. p. 47.
Apparently, prior to 1945, some naval commanding of-
ficers had cleared performances of naval bands with the AFM.
However. in 1945. the practice was no longer permitted, see:
1219.. p. l22.
"Sam. M" 1942. p. 277.
147
military services and that many new military music groups had
been formed since the beginning of the war, the conclusion
was:
So far the Federation members have been pro-
tected from this menace far better than we anti-
cipated. But the subject is one that has to be
handled with care, lest in this time of war, the
Federation will be subject, however ggjustly, to
the criticism of a sensitive public.
Eggects 9; yhe AFM's Military Mugig Pglicy on nggram-
nigg.--J. Harold Ryan, when NAB president, told a Congressional
committee in 1945 that the AFM had some kind of broadcast pro-
hibition:
....applicable to the service bands, and this
includes, of course, the bands of the Army, Navy,
Marines, and Coast Guard. In the case of service
bands, some locals have granted occasional permis-
sion for their appearance on sustaining programs.
Such permission, however, is at the pleasure of
the union. In other cases, however, and in the
case of commercial programs, such permission is
either denied or granted only if the broadcaster
will pay at the full union scale for the same num-
ber o musicians as are included in the service
band.
Ryan's testimony was unsupported by any specific instances
where the AFM had interfered with the broadcast performance
of any military bands. There was no evidence found which
would support the position that the AFM had any type of whole-
sale or far-reaching prohibitions against the appearances of
military instrumental music groups on broadcasting during the
*—
.—
45 id.
4
7U.S. House of Representatives, ICommittee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, Hearings: Ingerference wo th Broad-
astin of Nggcommercia; EducatiogglP mg mg. 79th g., 1st
%;ss., 1955,p 22.
148
forties. The AFM had some encounters with military bands
during the decade which brought adverse public criticism, but
the known incidents of this nature were not associated with
broadcasting."8
With regard to Ryan's testimony, the appearance of
military musicians on regular commercial radio programs would
tend to raise some questions of legality when the existing
federal laws are considered. There were restrictions on the
use of military musicians in broadcasting since the broadcaster
can not use them in every way he saw fit. However, these
restrictions were not placed on the broadcaster primarily by
the AFM. It was done by Congress through legislation. No
evidence of consequence was found which would indicate that
the AIM, in any extensive manner, had extended the sccpe of
— w
"BOne such incident was the subject of some testimony
to a Congressional committee in 1942. It involved the use of
a servicemen's band in connection with various patriotic func-
tions sponsored by some of West Palm Beach, Florida's civic and
service organizations. A few of the functions had involved
the local radio station. After the band had been used several
times, it allegedly had been "mysteriously shipped out." The
sudden debarkation was supposedly to have had some connection
with action taken by the AFM. See: U.S. Senate, Committee on
Interstate Commerce, Heariggs: Egg 2; Mechanical Rgpzoducticn
g1 Music, 77th Cong., 2nd ess., 1942, pp. TOE-109.
other incident occurred in New York City in connec-
tion with the opening of the Times Square Servicemen‘s Center.
The AFM allegedly prevented a servicemen's band from playing
at the cpening ceremonies. See: N2! York Times, July 22,
1942, pp. 1:5, 15:2. (It is interesting to note that this
incident made the front page of the Times. This might be
some indication of the sensitivity of'EKE public in this area.)
Representative Dondero of Michigan related one incident
of this nature to hisfellow Congressmen. It involved the pre-
vention of a military band from performing at the dedication
of a gold star plaque in a small Michigan town. See: 92 ang.
Egg. 1544-45 (1946).
In the latter part of the forties, no such incidents
of this kind were found in the literature reviewed.
149
the federal statutes by virtue of its own policies with respect
to the broadcast performances of military musicians. "In 1945,
a naval officer told the same committee which heard Ryan's
testimony that the United States Naval Band was broadcasting
four times a week on programs carried by NBC, CBS, MES, and a
local New York City radio staticn.49 Further, he added that
in the twenty years that the U.S. Naval Band had been broad-
casting, there had never been one protest registered by the
AFM. It appears, then, that any restrictions that the AFM
may have enforced during the forties were those which were
placed on the performances of military musicians by federal
law.
C. The Interlochen Dispute and Amateur and School Musicians
AFM Action Against Amateurs.--In keeping with the ob-
Jective of protecting professional employment Opportunities,
the AFM had always been cpposed to the performances of amateur
and school musicians, including ones on radio, which offered
competition to professional musicians. Prior to the early
forties, the Federation had been able to enforce this general
policy without arousing much attention.50 However, the AFM
decided to take some action against some school musicians in
—' ——V— mw‘
"9Testimcny of Capt. William F. Loventhal, United States
Navy (Retired), Officer in Charge, United State Naval Band, see:
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce, Hearings: Interference with Broadcastin g;
Ist Sess.,
Nonc mmercia Educational Programs, 79th Cong.,
19 5. ppe “45e
50
Robert D. Leiter The Musicians and Petrillo (New
Yerk: Bookman Associates: Tné.,â€I9535,'pT‘Iso.
150
the early forties which attracted nation-wide attention and
concern. That action involved the forced cancellation of a
network series of broadcasts featuring the student symphony
orchestra of the National Music Camp of Interlochen, Michigan.
Interlochen Dispute.--The National Music Camp was
founded by Dr. Joseph Maddy, a music educator, in 1928.51
Dr. Maddy described the camp in the following way:
The purpose of this camp has been to provide
apprOpriate advanced training for the most gifted
and highly skilled high-school musicians of the
entire Nation.
The faculty of the National Music Camp in-
cluded one or more artists performers of each in-
strument, drawn from the major symphony orchestras
of the Nation.
While all branches of music are taught at Inter-
lochen, the chief interest centers around the
camp's symphony orchestras, bands, and choral or-
ganizations, for the reason that there is no other
place on earth where young musicians of high-school
age actually master and perform in public a complete
symphonic program cg musical masterpieces each week
of the school term. 9
Each year, the camp had been attended by talented boys and
girls from all over the Uhited States and even some foreign
countries for a summer of musical activities and training
in the woods of Michigan.53
As a cultural and educational contribution, the National
Broadcasting Company began carrying a series of radio concerts
51U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Educa»
tionAgnd Labor, Heariggs: Restrictive Union Practices 9;
the erican Federation 2; Musicians 80th Cong. 2nd Sess.
1618;7p. éZZ. ' ' " ' ' '
Serid.
53For an article on the activities of the camp, see:
William F. McDermott, "Art Goes Camping," Rotarian, 64
(June, 1944), pp. 28-30
151
in the summer of 1930 originating from Interlochen featuring
the student symphony orchestra.54 Except for the first year,
this annual summer series had been a sustaining feature of
NBC and had been presented without any kind of restriction
$33333 by the Federation.55 In 1941, Petrillo demanded on
behalf of the AFM that the Interlochen series be discontinued.56
NBC had gotten Petrillo to drop his demand with the argument
that all arrangements had been made and that a great deal of
inconvenience would result from any change. Petrillo had
agreed on the condition that the matter would be reapened for
discussion before the next season's series was scheduled.
Apparently. the network ignored this agreement and
went ahead and scheduled the series for the summer of 1942
without consulting with the AFM. On July 10, 1942, Petrillo
notified BBC that it would not be permitted to carry the
Interlochen series for the 1942 summer season.57 This announce-
ment came just days before the first program was to go on the
air. NBC acceded to the Union's demands and replaced the
series with one of its studio orchestras.
‘ï¬w ‘— _ ï¬â€”v
54U.S. Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, Hear-
s U o Mocha ica Renggugtion o Musig. 77th Co .
lag-Sad so??? ISM, p. 03. ‘I as '
55The concerts during the first year were sponsored
by Majestic Radio and a standby orchestra had been employed.
See: Ngy,zgyg_Tiges, July 12, 1942, p. 28:2.
56For an account of the 1941 demands of the AFM, see:
Leiter, 92, gig.. pp. 150-51
570.8. H use of Representatives, Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, Hearings: Resigictive Union Practices 2; the
American Federationlgg Musicians, Ot Cong., 2nd Session..
1 , p. 2 .
.‘riilillnlr .‘ .'
152
AFM Justizicaticn of the Interlochen Action.--Petrillo
justified the actions of his Union on two bases.58 First,
he maintained that the more radio time that was devoted to
"free music," as in the case of the Interlochen concerts,
the less time that there would be left for the employment of
professionals. Second, he contended that the school was
Operated on a commercial basis since it charged tuition.
Also, he implied that the radio concerts were used as advertis-
ing to attract pupils to the camp.
When the evidence is examined, the charges of Petrillo
that the National Music Camp was a commercial enterprise do
not stand up. First of all, Dr. Maddy, the founder and pres-
ident of the camp, was a professor of music at the University
of Michigan.59 In addition, the camp was affiliated with the
University of Michigan and courses were offered for college
credit. Maddy told a Congressional committee that Interlochen
had been getting an annual apprOpriation from the Michigan
Legislature since 1939 and that all camp prOperty would revert
to the state of Michigan should anything happen to the National
Music Camp as an organization.60 Further, he gave the commit-
tee some documents relating to the finances of the camp which
*— v—v—w‘_v — w— v— fl
58The justifications were contained in a letter from
Petrillo to the FCC, dated July 30, 1942. For excerpts of
the letter, see: Ibid.
59Leiter, pp. git†p. 151.
6°U.3. House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, Hearings: Interference with Broadcasting
%;ANoncommercial Educatignal Programs, 79tH Cong., 1st ess.,
9 s p0 550
153
indicate that it was in debt in 1945 and had been in that
condition since its founding. If it were a commercial enter-
prise, it was not making any profit. Lastly, the U.S.
Attorney General and the Michigan Attorney General had granted
the National Music Camp tax exemption as a nonprofit educa-
tional institution.61
Public Reaction.--A wave of public indignation swept
the country after the Interlochen ban was announced. Almost
immediately, the National Bureau for the Advancement of Music
came out in Opposition to the ban.62 The United Ybuth for
Victory, a national youth organization, charged the action
was an "attack on all youth."63 In New York City, a group of
boys and girls picketed the hotel in which Petrillo lived
and demanded the resumption of the Interlochen radio ccncerts.64
Senator Vandenberg of Michigan denounced Petrillo and the AFM
on the floor of the Senate for their part in the cancellation
of the Interlochen series.65 .Within ten days after the ban
had been called, the FCC announced that it had received numer-
ous protests concerning it.66 The "dean of American conductors
and composers," Walter J. Damrosch, publicly stated in a letter
61Leiter, 22. g_t., p. 151.
62New York Times, July 13, 1942, p. 17:4.
631219;. July 14. 1942, p. 26:6.
641219.. July 18. 1942. p. 15:8.
6
588 92.2.1.5. ass. 6284 (1942).
6639.! $2.11!. 1.1% July 20. 1942. p. 13:1.
154
to Vice-President Wallace that he was unalterably cpposed to
the action of the AFM concerning Interlochen.67 The students
at the National Music Camp both publicly and privately appealed
to Petrillo to lift the ban so that at least one concert could
be broadcast before the summer was over and the school was
closed.68 At the Oberlin College Conservatory of Music in
Ohio, about forty members of the faculty went on record as
opposing the Union's ban on the camp's broadcasts and appealed
to the country's leading music schools to actively fight it.69
In January, 1943, the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce
sponsored an investigation headed by Senator D. Worth Clark
(Democrat of Idaho) which looked into the Interlochen situation.7O
Needless to say, public reaction to this move by the AFM was
very strong. Even in the face of this tremendous public
Opposition, the Union did not relent and the National Music
Camp remained off the air.
Despite all of the controversy generated, the whole
affair managed to quiet down and little notice of it was
taken by the press throughout most of 1943. However, Petrillo
i *—
672212-. July 22. 1942. p. 15:3.
68
ibid., July 23, 1942, p. 15:2.
6
91bid., September 18, 1942, p. 24:3.
70According to Dr. Maddy, president of the National
Music Camp, he testified before the Clark investigation on
January 13, 1943. See: U. S. House of Representatives, Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearings: Inr0 r-
ference with WBroadcagtigg _1 Noncommercial Educationgi_
gygm_, ong., 1st ss., 1943, 20.
These hearings were never published nor reported on.
See Footnote 32 of Chapter I.
155
made a statement in the January, 1944, issue of the AFM's of-
ficial publication, the Internaiional Musician, which fanned
the coals and caused the Interlochen dispute to burst into
flames again. In reviewing some of the activities of his
organization, Petrillo wrote:
"However, when all the shooting was over and
we came to the sumer of 1943. there was no Inter-
lochen high school student orchestra on the air.
Nor was there any other school band or orchestra
on the networks and there never will be without
the permission of the American Federation of
Musicians."
This boast of Petrillo provoked Dr. Maddy and he im-
mediately called it to the attention of the United States
Senate.72 The most immediate effect of Maddy's action was
that Senator Vandenberg introduced a bill designed "to pro-
hibit interference with the broadcasting of noncommercial,
cultural, educational programs."73 According to the Senator,
"the chief and important objective ....[3f the measure wa§7
to release music of American school children from the domination
of James Caesar Petrillo."7" Petrillo's statement marked the
revival of interest in the press and a rekindling of public
opposition.
Ed 7igited in; bU.S. House of Representatives, Committee
on uca on an a or, Hearin s: Restrictiv Union Pyacticeg
of the Ame ican Federat n of 55s c ans, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
e 48.—p.
72:ccording to Dr. Maddy, he informed the subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce on March 20,
1944. See: Ibid.
7390 gp_g. 333. 5074 (1944). The bill was introduced
on May 29th.
7"90 Cong. 322. 5075 (1944).
156
The music students of two high schools adOpted
resolutions condemning the AFM and demanding that Congress
do something about it.75 According to Maddy, during 1945,
"the Members of Congress were deluged with letters, tele-
grams, and petitions demanding action to free American boys
"76
and girls from Petrillo's domination. Newsweek reported
that the "press and public were indignant."77 A Cgllier's
editorial termed the Interlochen affair as one of Petrillo's
n78
"smelliest acts of dictatorship. Petrillo was being called
"Caesar" and hailed as a "dictator."79 Petrillo v. the Boys
and Girls"80 and "Petrillo v. the People"81
are examples of
the captions being placed over articles appearing in the
popular periodicals relating to the Interlochen affair. This
public indigention continued until Congress did take some
action to restrain the Federation.82
75U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce Hearings: Interference wéth Broad-
, ca onal o
caeti of Non-co ercia Edu Programs, 79th ng., lst
Sess., 1555, pp. E9, 31
76U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education
and Labor, Hea n s: Restric ive Union Pgactices the American
0
Federation 0 sicians, Ot ong., 2nd ess., 9 , p. 257.
77Ngw§week, February 19 , 1945, p. 76.
78"
Petrillo vs. the People " ollieg'e 117 (Februar
16. 1945). p. 90. ' ' y
79Any precusory review of the popular literature of the
times will reveal a number of such examples concerning Petrillo,
the AFM, and the Interlochen affair.
803.1222. February 19. 1945. p. 19.
8
1"Petrillo vs. the People." 0°111°"5 116 (February 16’
1946), p.-90.
82'1‘he action that Congress took to restrain the AFM wil‘
157
Apparently, Petrillo and the AFM had not learned the
lesson from the earlier statement that had gotten them in
trouble. Instead of leaving the Interlochen affair alone,
the National Music Camp was placed on the Union's unfair list
in January, 1945.83 This meant that no AFM member could
associate himself with the camp in any fashion whatsoever
without the danger of being expelled from the Federation. If
a member were expelled, this would cut down severely on his
employment opportunities. ‘Since the camp generally used artist
performers as teachers, the pool of available teaching talent
would be restricted considerably. Also, placing the camp
on the unfair list ended any hope of ever restoring nation-
wide broadcast coverage of the summer Interlochen concerts.
Any network or radio station with a contractual arrangement
with the AFM would run the risk of a prolonged musicians'
strike if such a thing were attempted with the camp on the
Union's unfair list. This did not stop Dr. Maddy, who was a
member of the AFM, from continuing his activities at Inter-
lochen and from continuing his efforts to get the situation
remedied. Subsequently, Dr. Maddy was expelled from the
Federation in early 1948.81+ These further actions of the
v—_ _ *— ~—
be handled in detail in Chapter IV.
83U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, Hearings: Interference with Broad-
castin o; Noncommeroi Educational Programs, 79th Cong.,
let Sess., 19 , p. l .
84U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education
and Labor, Hearin s: Restrictize Union Practices of the American
Federation of Musicians, 0th Cong., 5nd Sess, 1933, pp. 251-32.
158
Federation, it goes without saying, further incensed an al-
ready disgruntled and sensitive public.
Other Restrictions on School and Amateu: Musicians.--
Very few other specific instances of the forced cancellation
of broadcasts utilizing amateur and school musicians or situa-
tions involving the required payment of standby musicians or
fees as a prerequisite for such broadcasts were found, i.e.,
when the action was initiated by the national organization.
The AFM forced the cancellation of the CBS series concerts of
the Cincinnati Conservatory of Music Orchestra in the fall
of 1942.85 On October 1 of that year, the Conservatory would
have begun its ninth season on the air. This was the only
instance that was found which could be definitely linked to
action initiated by the Federation. However, an article in
Lefe alleged that during the winter of 1941-42, Petrillo had
"successfully stapped broadcasts by children in Chicago,
Cleveland, Washington, Milwaukee, St. Louis, and San Francisco."86
No specifics were included.
A number of instances involving the actions of locals
can be documented, but these cases could not be linked con-
clusively to the National. In Rochester, New York, in the
fall of 1942, an AFM local would not permit further broadcasts
of the Eastman School of Music Orchestra over a local radio
*— ‘
85For accounts, see: New York Times, September 10
1943, p. 48x1; NAB, _e. A:§|§g;., No. 6, September 11, 19ha,
p. .
86Robert Coughlan, "Petrillo: Little Caesar of Symphony
and Swing Wages War on Juke Boxes, Musical Children, Army Bands,"
Life, 13 (August 3, 1942), p. 68.
159
station.87 The Chicago Sunday Evening Club, a nondenomina-
tional religious organization, was required to pay standby fees
to the Chicago local because two nonunion organists were used
for the broadcasts of its meetings.88
According to the Congressional testimony of the director
of radio for the Chicago Public Schools, no instrumental
music performed by school musicians had been utilized on the
school system's owned and operated FM station from 1945 to
19117.89 Supposedly, the reason why the school instrumental
musicians were not used was because it was economically impos-
sible for the school system to make the payment of the required
standby fees before such broadcasts would be permitted by the
Chicago local. On a couple of occasions, NBC was supposed to
have paid the necessary standby fees for the Chicago school
system. The director of radio indicated that no instrumental
musicians of any kind were used so as to avoid any difficulty
with the Chicago local. When asked specifically if the school
station would have to pay standby fees if instrumental music
were used, the reply was: "I presume so." It was rather clear
from his testimony that it was an assumption on the part of the
Chicago schools' director of radio and not the result of any
specific encounters with the local on occasions when school
873—3.! 29.33. We September 159 19429 P- 2533.
88U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, Hearings: Investigation e; James C Petrillo
the Ameeican Federation e1 Musicians, et a;., 50th-Cong., ,
lst Sess., 1957, pp. 217-18.
89For an account, see: Ibid., pp. 264-67.
160
Instrumentalists had been used. When encountered with the
above situation, Petrillo indicated that he was not fully aware
of it.90 He added that he could not see why the local should
have any objections since the FM station was owned by the
taxpayers.
According to one Congressman, a situation similar to
the onein Chicago existed with respect to the Los Angeles
County Sohool System.91 In Pittsburgh, a nonprofit educational
children's program was required to pay an extra fee for a
union staff musician because the program was recorded.92
Because it was felt that this extra fee was unfair, the program
had been taken off the air. When a Congressman and former mu-
sic teacher had tried to get some broadcasts on the air of a
band composed of Pennsylvania high school students in 1943, the
station allegedly had told him that this was not possible be-
cause the AFM did not allow such broadcasts.93 Another in-
teresting incident involving restrictions on amateur musicians
concerned the visiting mayor of Mexico City when he was
“ ———.— ~— v‘ —.v
90m†p. 269.
91Comments of Representative Richard M. Nixon, see:
1919.- 9 P- 267-
2
9 For an account, see: U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearings: Igter—
fegence with Br adcasti e; Noncom e ci Educetionel 222?
grams, 79th Cong., st Sess., 19 , p. 5 .
3
Comments of Representative Carroll D. Kearns, see:
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education and La-
bor, Hearin s: Investi a on 9; James C .Petgillo the egeri-
can Fe era 0 21, usicians, et al., SOEH'Cong., 1st Sess.,
193:, ppe 239’40e
161
interviewed on a Philadelphia radio station.94 Because the
mayor played the piano during the course of the interview,
a standby fee was reported to have been required. It must be
remembered that, with the exception of the Cincinnati incident,
these examples of interference with amateur and school music
broadcasts could not be traced conclusively to action initiated
by the national organization. As near as can be determined,
they represent isolated instances of actions taken by AFM
locals with the National taking no active part in them.
AFM Bee on Amateur Bzoadcasts?.~-Was there an announced
ban on amateur broadcasts being enforced by the AFM? There
were many who were convinced that there was. In 1945, Dr.
Maddy testified to the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce that except for a few isolated instances,
since Petrillo had become the national president of the AFM,
all school music broadcasts had been stopped.95 In testimony
to the same committee, J. Harold Ryan, then NAB president,
corroborated Dr. Maddy's position. He stated: "One of the
most important steps taken by the musicians' union, particular—
ly from the public view point, is the banning of school
orchestras from the air. "95 In 1947, a L"! X915 m article
referred to a broadcast ban of amateur musicians that was
94For an account, see: £239., p. 260.
95U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce, Hearings: Interference with Broad-
castin e; Noncommercia Edecationel Progeams, 79th Cong.,
let S
ess., l , p. .
6
9 Ibid., p. 82.
162
being imposed by the AFM.97 Leiter, in his study of the
Union, implied that there was some kind of a ban against the
appearance of amateur and school musicians on radio.98 The
belief seems to have been quite wide-spread that the AFM had
imposed some kind of an absolute ban on the appearance of
sunh.musicians on the air.
Ann e AFM Po 0 ardi ateurs.--However,
from the official records of the AFM, any such absolute ban
was not apparent. There were a couple of resolutions passed
by conventions of the AFM in the early forties which might re-
flect a national policy. They were as follows:
Whereas, many localities in the United States
maintain excellent high school and college bands,
supported by taxes levied upon prOperty owners, and
composed entirely of amateur musicians of school
age, and
Whereas, Ambitious civic organizations often
prevail upon school authorities to permit school
bands to appear in commercial public engagements,
and,
Whereas, The practice is usually in direct
competition to legitimate, professional bands and
is reflected in financial loss to professional
musicians, and
Whereas, we have no objection to the use of
school bands for strictly legitimate school func-
tions, now, and therefore,
Be It Resolved, That the American Federation
of Musicians, in its convention assembled, does
hereby stand opposed to the use of school bands
for such engagements which savers of commercial-
ism or professionalism, and
Be It Further Resolved, That the Executive
Board of the American Federation of Musicians
endeavor to prepare appropriate legislation aimed
at curbing this unfair practice, and
*— ‘w t
97
Ne: Ice! T;eee, July 24, 19h7, p. 12:1.
981.01.13.15 22o me. ppe 152-530
163
Be It Further Resolved, That the American
Federation of Musicians urge all locals, in their
respective states, to introduce and sponsor the
enactment of such legislation in their respective
states.99
BE IT RESOLVED, That it is mandatory upon all
locals to place local school bands on the Local
Unfair List wherever and whenever, after due negoti-
ation, such Locals are unable to revent unfair
competition by such school bands. 00
It is difficult to interpret these resolutions as instituting
some kind of an absolute ban on the appearance of amateur and
school musicians on radio.
Petrillo's statement in 1944 which got the Union in
difficulty suggested no absolute ban either.101 The only ban
suggested by his statement was one which might affect the
networks only. There was some support of this position.
When the CBS series featuring the Cincinnati Conservatory of
Music Orchestra was cancelled, the Cincinnati AFM local stated--
according to the New York Times--that it was "the national
policy of the American Federation of Musicians to permit only
union musicians to broadcast."102 A network was involved in
this case and, in this respect, it was similar to the Inter-
lochen situation. The other known instances of restrictions
on school and amateur broadcasts did not involve networks.
Regarding these other instances, there was no evidence found
which suggested that they reflected a formal national policy
995.1221.- m†1941. pp. 314-15.
100943.. 1942. p. 312.
101See quote in text at Footnote 71 of this chapter.
102New Yerk Timee, September 10, 1942, p. 48:1.
164
other than the consistent one of protecting employment from
what was referred to as "unfair competition." This does not
necessarily mean that some kind of absolute ban had been im-
posed. Petrillo, himself, stated on several occasions during
the forties that the determining factor as to whether the AFM
would permit amateur and school musical groups to be presented
on radio was whether they would compete with professionals.103
ngect of Unien Poliey Regazeing Amateees on Radio
Pgeg;amming.--When the FCC surveyed the use of music and
recordings in radio programming in 1942, the Commission also
asked the stations to advise it if "in the past three years
there had been any ....instances involving their particular
stations where amateur musicians have been kept off the air,
or permitted to broadcast only if professional 'standbys'
were specifically employed for the occasion."104
The replies
revealed that there were 31 instances where amateur musicians
had been kept off the air either because the broadcasts were
not permitted or the station involved refused to submit to
the standby demands. In addition, there were 36 reported in-
stances where standby demands were met in order to secure
permission for the broadcasts. Of the 796 stations replying,
723 reported no such incidents. Chairman Fly warned that:
103For one occasion, see: 0.8. House of Representa-
tizes, Committee Con Education and Labor, H arin vesti-
ga ion e£_J egos Petr;llo, the Amezican Federati n of Easi-
siege, et a ______., B-t'h ong., 2nd-Sess., 1 7, .272.
1(â€For the results of this aspect of the FCC survey,
see: U. S. Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, Heariegs:
Use of Mechanical Reproductien of Wsic. 77th Cong., 2n ess.,
T932, p.
165
....this does not necessarily indicate that these
stations are free from problems of this character.
It may well be that they know that the local union
would not permit theuse of amateurs and have,
therefore, avoided making an issue of this point.105
A statement of a California broadcaster in 1945 tended to
support the contentions of Fly.106 He stated that, in his
experience, situations were avoided which might result in the
payment of standby fees. Specifically mentioned were amateur
music programs. It was evident, however, even with Fly's
qualifications, that the Cammission was unable to document
very much direct interference by either the AFM or its locals
with amateur music programs.
For the year 1946, Petrillo made a survey of AFM
locals regarding amateur music broadcasts.107 Replies were
received from 454 locals out of a total of nearly 700. In
these 454 locals, 3,234 amateur broadcasts were permitted with-
out any interference on the part of the locals involved. This
certainly does not suggest any kind of universal ban against
amateur instrumental performances on radio.
The official Union records examined and the state-
ments of AFM officials reviewedlo8 did not reveal any universal
“ w _—_‘
1051b! .
106U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, Heae;ngs: Inveseigation of JamesC T‘C’ Petelllo,
0th 0
§_e $7. z;can 9Federatéen e; Musicians, et al., ng.,
955-9 e p0 o
107Petrillo revealed the results of this survey in
his testimony, see: Ibid., pp. 240-41.
108The AFM official records examined for this study
were those contained in: AFM P c ed., 1939-1951. This
source contained primarily the off cial accounts of the an-
nual convention proceedings, the texts of the annual reports
166
or absolute ban on the broadcast performance of amateur
musicians. As will be demonstrated throughout this chapter,
when the AFM instituted what can be termed a "ban," there was
always some kind of an official statement outlining "what"
was being "banned." No such statement was found or even
referred to by those who thought some kind of ban on amateurs
existed. It is difficult to assess the direct impact of Union A
policy regarding amateur musicians on broadcast programming.
Only two instances of direct interference by the National
could be documented. It would be difficult to generalize any
logical or consistent pattern on the basis of only two cases,
in the absence of a clear, announced policy. All of the
other instances documented involved action of local origin
and not action originating at the national level. It appears,
then, the only logical or consistent pattern implicit in the
actions of both local and national origin was devotion to the
long-standing policy of protecting professional employment
from what was considered "unfair competition" of nonprofes-
sional musicians.
The indirect impact of Union policy is almost impos-
sible to assess. It does appear, however, that many broad-
casters thought that there was some kind of ban or severe
of the officers of the Federation, and minutes of International
Executive Board Meetings. Also, a number of pamphlets pub-
lished by the Union were examined.
Primarily, the statements of the AFM officials re-
viewed, in addition to the above source, were those contained
in the press (newspapers and eriodicals, including popular,
trade, and labor publications and testimony before Congres—
sional committees.
III
"1"". 1 ILraseO fl
167
restrictions existing with regard to amateur music broadcasts.
Broadcasters might have reasoned that since the Union did
institute a number of bans affecting other things, there must
be some kind of ban against amateurs. On this basis, it was
possible that any ban affecting amateur music broadcasts was
more industry-imposed than AFM-imposed. If this were the case,
given the personality of Petrillo, he would have been the
last person to tell broadcasters that no such ban existed. In
conclusion, it is felt that the direct effects on broadcast
programming of AFM policy and action with respect to amateur
musicians was in no measure commensurate with the ill-will and
public reaction generated by them. In a few instances,
Petrillo, the AFM, or its locals had tried to tamper with one
of the American people's "sacred cows"--little school children.
In this realm, the attempt is as fully serious as the deed.
D. The Recording Ban of 1942109
The AFM Mbves Against Recordings.--A1most concurrent
with the Interlochen affair was the AFM move against "mechanized
music." In June, 1942, Petrillo notified the recording and
transcription companies that the AFM would no longer permit
its members to make recording and transcriptions after August 1.
1
09For more detailed accounts of the recording ban of
1942, see: Vern Countryman, "The Organized Musicians: II,"
Universit 22 Chicago La! Review, 16 (Winter, 1949). pp. 203-
297. Leiter, ep. 232-: pp. 132-40; Anders S. Lunde, The
American Federation of Musicians and the Radio and Recording
Companies: A Report on a Controversy" (Unpublished Master's
thesis, Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University,
19‘7)! PD. 53-810
168
Although the order was not phrased in the terms of a strike,
the implication was that the Federation was going on strike
against the recording and transcription companies. The country
was at war, which made any kind of work stoppage an extremely
serious matter in the thinking of patriotic Americans. Public
and press reaction and revulsion was immediate. Various
agencies of the federal government became involved in at-
tempts to stop the ban. All kinds of dire results of the re-
cording ban were being predicted. In the face of this opposition,
the Union proceeded with its plans and the ban became effective.
For the companies who came to terms first, the ban lasted ap-
proximately 14 months. For those who most adamantly resisted
'the demands of the Union, recording and transcription production
was not resumed for nearly 27 months.
In the end, all companies, in effect, agreed to the
terms laid down by the AFM. The final settlement established
the Recording and Transcription Fund which was to be adminis-
tered solely by the Union.110 Contributions to the fund were
to come from a royalty paid by the manufacturer on all record-
ings and transcriptions manufactured. According to the
Federation, the purpose of the fund was to â€protect the skill
and talent of the worker @uaiciap] by providing him with em-
ployment opportunities in which his skill and talent can be
preserved."111 Only musicians who played their instruments
v—w *7
110For texts of the agreements reached, see: Broad-
casting, October 25, 1943, pp. 58-59; November 20, 1955, p. 20.
111Joseph A. Padway, "Are Royalties Wrong," American
Federationist, 52 (April, 1945), p. 35. Fer a time during
the foFties, Padway was a counsel for the AFM,
169
at free public performances were to receive any payments from
the fund.112 Throughout the duration of the recording ban,
the Union contended that such action was necessary and
Justified on the grounds that the commercial use of "mechan-
ized" or "canned†music was making tremendous inroads into the
employment possibilities and Opportunities of .professional
musicians.113 In other words, this was but one manifestation
of the musicians' continuing battle with the "machine."
Fedeee; Governmene Invelvement.--Almost immediately,
the federal government became interested and involved in the
AFM's actions regarding recordings and transcriptions. In
July, 1942, Elmer Davis, who was OWI director, appealed to
Petrillo to revoke the recording ban on "behalf of the War
Department, the Navy Department, the Marine Corps, the Coast
Guard, the Treasury Department, the Office of Civilian De-
fense, and the Office of War Information."11# To reject such
a plea in time of war would be "unthinkable." Nevertheless,
Petrillo did.
Justice Department Action.--Also, in July, the Depart-
ment of Justice set to work in an attempt to stop the
Federation from carrying out its ban order. An injunction
was sought from the United States District Court in Chicago
lleeze. Proceed., 1947, p. 99.
n 113For expression of this position of the Union, see:
Plight of the Professional Musician," American Federationist,
49 (October, 1942), p. 8.
1140.3. Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce,
Heariegs: Use e£_Mechanical Reproduction e; Music, 77th Cong.
2nd Sess., 1952, p. 3. ’
17C
to restrain the Union from such action.115 The bill of com-
plaint filed by the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice charged the AFM and its officers with "wrongful and
unlawful combination and conspiracy in restraint of ....inter-
state trade and commerce in phonograph records and transcrip-
tions and radio broadcasting."116 This allegedly constituted
a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act of
1890.117 However, the district court judge ruled that a
labor dispute was involved and hence, no injunction --under
the law--could be issued.118 Upon appeal, the U.S. Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.119 In the
last analysis, the efforts of the Department of Justice fail-
ed to end the recording ban.
Senate Hearings.--The United States Senate became riled
at the actions of Petrillo and his Union. Senator D. Worth
Clark of Idaho introduced a resolution in late August calling
for an investigation of the AFM and the recording ban.120
The resolution was subsequently passed in late September121
115Ibid., p. 57.
1151bid., p. 102
117Ibid., p. 100.
1180 s v Am
._a_- . erican Federati n 2; Musicians 47 F. Supp.
304 (1942). The ems-N a... . dommer 14.
119 U.S. v. American Federation sf Musicians, 318 0.3.
741 (1943). The decision was handed down on February 15.
12088 Con Rec. 6974 (1942). The resolution was intro-
duced on August 2 .
12188 Con , Rec, 7402 (1942). The resolution was passed
on September 2 .
171
after three days of preliminary hearings.122 The emphasis of
these hearings was the possible effect of the recording ban on
radio broadcasting.
Elmer Davis told the committee that music was a re-
creational activity, and, hence, the supply of music could
have a potential effect on the morale of a country at war.
From this standpoint, he said that a continuous supply of
"freshly recorded music" was needed and that was what the re-
cording ban prOposed to step. Also, he emphasized that many
small radio stations were dependent on recorded music to
secure and hold their audiences. His contention was that
with the halt in the production of recorded music, many small
radio stations "would be unable to keep going." Further, he
contended that this would interfere seriously with the ability
of the OWI in performing its function of informing the Ameri-
can people about the war effort because of the possible dis-
ruption that could be caused to the country's network of
radio communication.123
FCC Chairman Fly's testimony supported the contentions
of Davis. Fly predicted that possibly a third to a half of
all radio stations would eventually go out of business if
there were a prolonged diminution in the supply of recorded
*—
1220.S. Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce.
Hearéegs: Use e; Mechanicel Reproductioe e;,Music, 77th Cong.,
2n ess., 1942.
123
For the testimony referred to in the above para-
graph, see: Ibid., pp. 4-5.
_ 172
music.12# "Within a year," Fly suggested, the recording ban
would have"a very substantial effect" on the number of radio
stations Operating.125 It was also brought out in the testi-
mony of Thurman W. Arnold, who was then U.S. Attorney General,
that the Department of Justice was basing a significant part
of its case on the potential damage of the recording ban to
the country's radio stations.126
More Hearings.-—In January, 1943, the Clark committee
held hearings on the resolution that was passed. Authoriza-
tion for continuing the investigation also was granted by the
next Congress.127 Since these hearings were not published
and no report was filed, what is known about them had to be
obtained from other sources.128 About the most immediate and
important result of the January hearings was that the committee
was successful in getting Petrillo to formulate some demands
to present to the recording and transcription companies.129
Up to that time, no demands had been formally made of the
companies involved. In February, 1943, the AFM presented its
plan for royalties on each recording and transcription
124211.2- . p. 27.
12591.1.
1261259., pp. 61-62.
on Fobr:::$94%225a§22- 570 (1943). The resolution was passed
128
See Footnote 32 of Chapter I.
129For the most complete source for the testimony in-
volving the AFM, see: NAB. gee AFM Bul., No. 15, January 22,
19#3e DP. 1‘350
173
manufactured, which provided the basis for the final settle-
ment.13o
NWLB Action.--The National War Labor Board, created
to cope with wartime labor disputes which interfered with the
war effort, became involved in extensive proceedings in the
attempt to stop the recording ban.131 Before the final deci-
sion in the matter was rendered, the AFM had already signed
with a number of the recording companies in late 1943.132 So
when its final decision and directive was issued in June,
1944, which ordered the Union to go back to work,133 the AFM
ignored the order.134 The Union was not about to go back to
work for some of the companies when it had favorable agree-
ments with a majority of them. At this juncture, the AFM's
refusal to obey the NWLB directive was referred to the Office
of Economic Stabilization in mid-August, 1944.135
Petrillo Defies the President.--This office finally
referred the entire matter to President Roosevelt.136 In a
telegram, dispatched in early October, the President appealed
'130Broadcasting, February 15, 1943. pp. 9, 52.
131For summaries of the National War Labor Board
(hereafter, may be referred to as the NWLB) proceedings, see:
Breadcasging, March 13, 1944, pp. 9, 70-71; June 19, 1944,
pp. 9
1321bid., September 27, 1943, pp. 9, 64-65.
133For the text of the final decision, see: NAB. Sp.
A Bul., No. 28, June 22, 1944, pp. 2-3.
13"Broadcastin , July 10, 1944, p. 14.
135
136
New York Times, August 19, 1944, p. 13:7.
Broadcasting, August 28, 1944, p. 156.
174
to Petrillo to end the ban and comply with the directive of
the NWLB.137 In the face of tremendous public indignation,
Petrillo notified President Roosevelt on October 10 that he--
with regret--could not comply with the request.138
The Hold-Outs Give-In.--Fina11y, the remaining com-
panies signed with the AFM on its terms in the latter part
of November, 1944, and full production of recordings and tran-
scriptions was once again resumed.139 The Columbia Recording
Corporation and RCA Victor, two of the companies who made the
"last-ditch" efforts to resist the Union's demands, empha-
sized that they had to capitulate because of the "unwilling-
nose" or "incapacity" of the government to enforce its
ordere.1“° They indicated that they had waited too long and
now had no other choice but to sign because the unfair com-
petitive condition had existed too long. It is interesting to
note that the two major companies that held out the longest
were associated with broadcasting interests.
Effect of the Recording Ban on Radio Programming.--
On one occasion, Petrillo frankly admitted that one of the
aims of the recording ban represented an attempt to get radio
stations to limit the use of recorded music.141 Also, the
137!eg York Times, October 5, 1944, pp. 1:3, 14:3.
138Broadcastin , October 16, 1944 (supplement), p. 8;
New Yerk Times, aatober 11, 1944, pp. 1:2, 38:2.
139Broadcasti , November 20, 1944, pp. 15, 56: New
Ybrk Times, November 12, 1944, p. 1:1.
1“Broadcasting, November 20, 1944, p. 22,
14132! York Tim 3, July 2, 1943, p. 10:4.
175
National Association of Broadcasters led the fight against
the AFM during the recording ban.142 The latter, along with
the fact that the two major companies who held out were
associated with broadcasting interests, tended to indicate that
broadcasters were rather concerned about the recording ban.
However, the actual impact of the ban on radio programming
was rather difficult to ascertain, particularly with respect
to specific effects.143 Some of the general effects can be
deduced. It was apparent, though, that the dire effects
predicted by Davis and Fly did not result. Radio stations
did not go off the air in droves or even lose money. It was
indicated previously that this whole period was a very prosper-
ous one for the industry, in general.
Very early in the ban, the AFM had allowed its members
to perform for commercially sponsored programs which were
electrically transcribed on the condition that such tran-
scriptions would be broken immediately after each had been
used once.144 In early September, 1942, the AFM decided to
place all electrical transcriptions under the ban order.145
Actual programming of the major networks would be little
142Lunde emphasized this point, see: Lunde, 92,
e;1.,'p. 68.
Also, the recording ban provided the impetus for
publishing its special publication: NAB, See_5§! gel.
143The literature was almost devoid of any mention
of the specific effects of the recording ban on radio pro-
gramming. In most cases, the comments were of a general
nature.
1M'New York Times, August 7, 1942, p. 11:6.
145Broadcasting, September 7, 1942, p. 7.
176
affected by the recording ban since it was their policy not to
use recordings and transcriptions. However, there would be
some effect on the distribution of the network programs in two
respects. Due to time zone differentials, some programs were
transcribed at broadcast time and then later rebroadcast at
more appropriate times.146 Also, some network programs were
transcribed and distributed to nonaffiliates thus increasing
the supplemental coverage of such programs.147 Both of these
practices would be affected by the recording ban.
The most serious effect of the recording ban would be
in the area of non-network programming. Under the ban, no
new music was being recorded. The FCC survey in 1942 of the
use of recorded music revealed that non-network stations de-
pended rather heavily on recorded and transcribed music."'*8
The ban would severely curtail the supply of music that had
been recently written or arranged. This was particularly
important with respect to the so-called "popular" music. The
pOpularity of a piece of this kind of music generally lasted
only a matter of weeks and then it was replaced by another
one. The ban would mean that many broadcasters would not be
able to get all of the newly written and recorded popular
music that they might want. However, there was a large
146The forced cancellation of transcribed rebroadcasts
of network programs, due to time zone differentials, was re-
ported by: Eew Yeek nges, October 10, 1942, p. 7:1.
1A7Transcribed network programs of this kind were re-
portedly affected, see: §¥22%2&£&$BE: September 14, 1942,
p. 54; New Yet; Tieee, Sop em or 9, 1942, pp. 1:3, 17:1.
1“Fer details, see Section C of Chapter II.
177
backlog of previously recorded music so that broadcasters
would still be able to fill program schedules. It was a
matter of the broadcaster not being able to program with the
recorded music he wanted rather than not having any music at
all. Business Week reported in early 1943 that some of the
late night disc jockies were feeling the effects of the short
supply of new popular music.149 As a result, some had re-
sorted to using recordings that were not covered by the ban
such as vocals without instrumental accompaniment or recordings
of instruments not recognized by the AFM, such as harmonicas
and ocarinas. Also affected by the ban were commercials dis-
tributed by electrical transcriptions involving instrumental
music.150 These were the principal general effects of the
recording ban on radio programming.
Public Reaction.--Probably, the most important effect
of the recording ban was the public and press reaction and
indignation generated against the AFM. Broadcasting, on a
number of occasions, cited the criticism of the country's
press regarding the actions of the Federation.151 An article
in Hageer's Magazine reported in late 1942 that the press and
and editorial position on the recording ban was "unfavorable
“—— fl.
1l'gBusiness Week, January 23, 1943, p. 39.
150New York Times, September 9, 1942, p. 1:3.
151
For some articles concerning the press criticism,
see: Broadcastin , August 3, 1942, p. 12; August 10, 1942,
pp. 9, 57; September 7, 1942, p. 7; February 22, 1943, p.
49; July 12, 1943, p. 26; October 16, 1945 (supplement),
p. 4; November 20, 1944, p. 30.
178
from one end of the country to the other."152 Between June,
1942-~the time of the announcement of the recording ban-~and
November 1, 1942, the NAB reported that it had received 2,438
clippings of editorials from the nation's newspapers which
cpposed the AFM's ban on recordings.153 These editorials came
from 946 newspapers in 771 cities and from every state except
North Dakota.154
In late August, 1942, Gallup polled the opinion of the
American public regarding their attitude toward Petrillo and
the recording ban.155 Seventy-five per cent responded un-
favorably to the question: "What is your Opinion of Mr.
Petrillo's rulings?" In the survey, 73 per cent of the voters
were in favor of government action to stOp Petrillo and the
AFM. This same opinion was reflected in a number of letters
to the Ne: 2225.21222-156 The National Federation of Music
Clubs and the General Federation of Women's Clubs passed
152Bernard 3. Smith, "What's Petrillo Up To?" Hageer's
Ma azine, 186 (December, 1942), p. 90.
153NAB, se, egg Bu;,, No. 13. November 13, 1942, p. 4.
154For reprints of a number of these editorials and
ones appeari after the tabulation see: NAB 8 AFM Bul
No. 1, July 2 , 1942; No. 2, July 31. 1942;‘Ndf , Aï¬gï¬ï¬t‘fl{
1942; No. 6, September 11, 1942; No. 16, February 19, 1943;
No. 18, March 26, 1943; No. 19, July 15, 1942; No. 20,
August 13, 1943; No. 23, N.D. [Late 1943 or early 194437;
No. 24, March 14, 1944; No. 29, November 24, 194 . All of
the mentioned issues contain reprints of editorials in them
in various places.
155
For the text of the release of this survey by George
Gallup, see: gee; gee Age Bul,, No. 5, September 4, 1944, p. 4.
156For three such letters, see: Nee York Times, Octo-
ber 9, 1944, p. 22:7; October 19, 1944, p. 22:7: November 16,
1944, p. 22:7.
179
resolutions condemning the Federation and its recording
157
ban.
There was little doubt that the cpinion of both the
American public and the press was mobilized against Petrillo
and the American Federation of Musicians. To be sure, the
recording ban did have some effects on radio programming.
However, in the fight between the Union and the broadcasting
industry, the most important effect of the ban appears to
have been on public cpinion and not necessarily on program-
ming. When Congress would finally decide to take some
action against the AFM,158 broadcasters would be able to draw
on this public sentiment for support of their position.
E. The Television Problem
The TV Ban.--Although the AFM showed some active con-
corn for television as early as 1939, the problem did not
come to a head until early 1945. The following official
directive to all AFM locals appeared in the February issue of
the Ietezeational Musician, the Union's official publication:
Re TELEVISION
By order of the International Executive
Board, members of the American Federation of
157For text of the resolution of the National Federa-
tion of Music Clubs, see: New York Times, September 1, 1942,
p. 12:3.
For text of the resolution of the General Federation
ofAWOmen's Clubs, see: NAB, Se. AFM Bul., No. 13, November 13,
19 2. p. l. â€'
158The action taken by Congress will be developed in
detail in Chapter IV.
180
Musicians are not permitted to play for tele-
vision in any form until further notice.
James C. Petrillo 15
President, A. F. of M. 9
After February and for about three years thereafter, the
above directive put a st0p to all TV programming which in-
volved live musicians who were members of the AFM. This TV
ban affected both levels of television broadcasting, i.e.,
the national networks and local TV stations.
Earlier Concern.--The AFM convention of 1939 unanimous-
ly adopted a resolution directing president Weber to make an
160 A committee
investigation of the entire TV situation.
composed of Weber, Petrillo and another Union official was
created by the IEB to make the investigation.161 The commit-
tee, in late 1939. recommended to the IEB that the National
assume jurisdiction over television.162 This recommendation
was adOpted.163 This meant that locals could not negotiate
or enter into agreements concerning TV employment without the
express consent and/or approval of the National. Also, all
locals would have to conform to all National policies and di-
rectives concerning any aspect of TV employment. The IEB, at
about the same time, passed a ruling which prohibited radio
staff musicians from being utilized on television broad-
lsgéï¬ï¬‚. Proceed., 1946, p. 88.
6
1 0Ibid., 1939, p. 408.
Ibid., p. 413.
1521bid,, 1940, p. 50.
161
1631bid.
181
164 In other words, any musicians employed for TV
caste.
programs had to be specifically hired for such purposes and
no musicians employed on a full-time basis for radio stations
would be eligible for such employment.
Throughout the war years, no evidence was found which
suggested any difficulties experienced between the AFM and
the industry concerning musicians' TV employment. Most of
the activity in the whole area of TV broadcasting was temporar-
ily halted as a result of the war effort. However, in January,
1945, CBS announced that it was temporarily discontinuing the
use of musicians on its network TV programs because of the
Union policy which did not allow radio staff musicians to be
utilized for such programming.165 This decision only affected
two CBS programs. It must be remembered that the dimensions
of the then infant TV broadcasting industry were very small
in l945--only six TV stations were on the air. Then, in the
following month, the AFM put a stop to all TV employment with
regard to its member musicians. Since virtually all competent
musicians were members of the AFM, this policy, in effect,
totally curtailed the use of live music on television during
the period affected.
Emelozeent for Films_Produced for TV.--Not only did
the TV ban affect the employment of musicians for live tele-
vision, but it also affected the employment of musicians in
the production of sound films specifically designed for use
1541bid.
165Broadcastieg, January 22, 1945. Do 58-
182
on Tv.155 Since TV broadcasting combined both aural and visual
elements, the motion picture film was ideally suited to this
new medium. With respect to the AFM, this could constitute
another form of canned music that could be utilized in TV
broadcasting. As a result, the TV ban included the prohibi-
tion of employment in the making of films for specific use on
television. In the making of films, it is possible to re-
record or "dub" on the sound track previously recorded music.
In this manner, circumvention of the TV ban could have been
accomplished. However, the AFM had foreseen this possibility
in its 1939 investigation. At that time, the IEB had adapted
a ruling which prohibited dubbing of music for television
"under any circumstances."167
Theatre Films en TV.--The TV ban was not the only
Union policy which affected TV programming. Hollywood had a
large backlog of motion picture feature films produced
specifically for theatre exhibition. These films could be
used as a source of TV programming, In its 1944 contracts
with the Hollywood motion picture producers, the Union was
successful in obtaining several provisions relating to the
dubbing of previously recorded music.168 These provisions
provided that music recorded for sound tracks could not be
1660. 3. House of Representatives, Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, Hearin s: Restrictive Union Practices of the
American Federation of Music cians, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
1958, p. 12.
167AFM. Proceed., 1939. p. 50.
168
For text of the provision, see: Ibid., 1946, p. 78.
183
used for any purpose other than the film for which it was
specifically recorded. Also, the producers agreed not to
dispose of, lease, or sell any music recorded for sound
tracts without the express permission of the AFM. This would
tend to prohibit the re-use of this music in the production of
films for TV. Itdid not appear that the 1944 contracts pro-
hibited the actual use of theatre films on TV, only the music
recorded for them. It would seem that the 1944 contracts
strengthened already existing policies of the Federation which
prevented the use of previously recorded music for films
produced specifically for TV. Petrillo indicated that these
provisions were the most important provisions of the 1944
agreements.169
1246 Film Agreements.-~The Union must have realized
that, if it were to successfully control the use of music on
TV played by its members, some control over motion picture
films produced specifically for theatre exhibition would have
to be exerted. Probably with this in mind, the 1946 agreements
with the Hollywood motion picture producers contained the
following clause: .
(I) The producers agree that they will not, with-
out the prior consent of the Federation, license,
lease, lend, give, sell, utilize, or in any other
way whatsoever authorize the use, in whole or in
part, of the music sound track containing the record-
ed music made by members of the Federation perform-
ing on musical instruments or conducting heretofore
made or which will be made prior to the expiration
of this agreement, on or in connection with tele-
vision, during the life of this agreement and there-
1693cc president's annual report: Ibid., p. 70.
184
after; except only after separate negotiations are
entered upon and after a separate written agree-
ment has been reached between the Federation
and the producer with respect to the use of such
music sound track or such scenes or shots, on or in
connection with television, can such use be made
and then only upon the terms and conditions agreed
upon by the Federatien and the producer in such
separate agreement.
Since nearly every Hollywood motion picture feature film de-
pended rather heavily on music for its effectiveness, the
above clause, in effect, prohibited the use of theatre films
on television. Petrillo emphasized that the above restric-
tions on the use of sound tracks comprised three of the five
most important features of the 1946 movie contracts.171 This
clause of the 1946 contracts made the AFM's control of music
that could be used on television nearly complete. The only
type of music that TV broadcasters had available after 1946 were
disc recordings. This was one area in which it was not pos-
sible for the AFM to exert much control. As pointed out pre-
viously, once disc recordings have entered the stream of
commerce, no restrictions could be placed on their use by the
performing artists.
Unien Jestigieation of Its Policies.--If it is realized
how the Union and its officers perceived the coming of tele-
vision, the policies which were adOpted should not be too
surprising. The AFM perceived the coming of TV as a situation
170Cited in: U. S. House of Representatives, Committee
on Education and Labor, Hearin s: Investigation of James C.
Pet 1 lo the Amezic eew Fe eration e; Musicians et. a1. 85th
ong., 1steess., 19 , p. ’ '
171See president's annual report: AFM. Proceed.-
1947e pp. 68-69.
185
analogous to the introduction of the sound motion picture and
the resultant theatre unemployment. Petrillo summed up the
television situation, as viewed by the AFM, in one of his
annual reports:
The introduction and develOpment of Television
presents the same threat to employment of musicians
as did the change from silent to sound movies....
The American Federation of Musicians is determined
to avoid a repetition of that experience, until we
find out exactly where we will stand we are not
going to render services in the making of Tele-
vision. That is, whether TV is going to destroy
radio employment....
Television is not going to grow at the expense
of the musicians....
Of course, the American Federation of Musicians
cannot permit any moving pictures made with the
services of our members for theatres, to be used
for Television.
We have been fooled so many times and misled
by the employers so many times by their saying that
every new invention would help us, that if we
permit ourselves to fall in line again with that
kind of talk, we deserve the consequences.
There was evidence which suggested that the view
expressed by Petrillo was shared by the 1944 convention.
Two resolutions introduced, which were referred by the con-
vention to the International Executive Board for consider-
ation, showed definite concern for the TV situation. One
resoluthnicalled for a study of the entire question of tele-
vision, and it expressed a strong desire to avoid the
recurrence of the sound motion picture loss of employment.173
The other resolution expressed great concern for the use of
canned music on TV.174 This resolution went so far (as to
172—Rides 194601313. 9139?.
173lbid., 1944, p. 175.
174lbid., p. 178.
. 186
recommend) that the AFM should prohibit its members from
"mimicing to records."175
Industry Reaction.--As might be expected, the broadcast-
ing industry was very much cpposed to the TV restrictions im-
posed by the AFM. A few days after the announcement of the
TV ban in the International Musician, Broadcasting reported that
TV station officials emphasized that the ban would cause the
industry to drop a number of experimental programs and would
seriously hamper efforts to gain experience in the production
of programming involving music.176 Also, it was reported that
a number of programs would be affected, but no specific pro-
grams were mentioned.177 Business leek also reported that
radio interests charged that the TV ban would seriously inter-
fere with thedevelopment of TV.178
J. Harold Ryan, when he was NAB president, testified
to a Congressional committee in 1945 with regard to the TV
restrictions as follows:
The entire program of experimentation in
certain aspects of the art is, therefore, being
delayed with the resultant loss not only to
broadcasters and members of the American Federa-
tion of Musicians, but to the citizens of our
country who expect to find employment in this
new field, and to the great number of our citi-
175Mimicing to records refers to acting out what is
contained on record and if voice is used in recording, moving
the lips in synchronization with the record.
17sBroadcasting, February 12, 1945, p. 16.
177Ibid.
178
Business Week, May 11, 1946, p. 94.
187
zens who will ultimately reap its benefits as the
television audience.1
Two other industry spokesmeno-Justin Miller, Ryan's successor
in the NAB, and Frank Mullen, NBC executive vice-president--
also emphasized that the Union policies with regard to TV could
prevent it from realizing its full potentialities.180 Both
men, in addition, felt that television showed promise of
providing a stimulus to the national economy and they implied
that the Union policies would interfere with the full reali-
zation of this promise.
' Effec} en TV Pzegzammigg.--The AFM's policies with
regard to television affected what TV programming there was
quite considerably. Nearly every kind of TV program uses
music in some form or other, if only to introduce the program,
as in the case of the musical theme. The Union policies
prevented TV broadcasters from using music from all sources
except one, processed disc recordings. For programs employ-
ing only a musical theme, the policies would not present very
much difficulty. In the case of dramatic programs, the use
of music is considered to be very important in creating moods
and effects which producers often wish to convey. Much of the
music used for such purposes is specifically written or ar-
ranged and performed for the specific dramatic program involved.
1790.8. House of Representatives, Committee on Inter-
state and 2I’lloreign Commerce, H a i s Interferenee wieh Beead-
eaetiegï¬ pe ca 1 n Peeggams, 9th ong.,
$88..
180See their testimony in: U.S. House of Represen-
tatives, Committee on Education and Labor, H a s° Reageie-
ve Unien P act see 91, Amee;ceg {Ed egegi ee Mus cian
th 00118.,211688.’ 13%. DP. 2 3"
188
A number of the desired effects sought by producers would be
almost impossible to create with only processed disc record-
ings available. The latter is generally considered a rather
inflexible source of music for such purposes. TV programs
featuring music were almost impossible under the AFM policies.
Since both film and live instrumental musicians were unavaible
to TV broadcasters, disc recording and unaccompanied vocal
music provided the only sources available for such programs.
Music presented in the disc recorded form would be rather un-
satisfactory. Since there would be no musicians present in
the case of recorded instrumental music, the visual elements
of TV would not be fully utilized.
Some Examples of Specific Effects.--Some of the
practical problems that the TV broadcaster faced under the
AFM policies with regard to television were revealed in the
comments of two network officials:
Because of the union's ban, we [FBQ7’are
forced to cut our television pickups from Madi-
son Square Garden whenever musicians perform.
Instances are numerous where a proposed tele-
vision program has had to be rejected because
music was so intertwined with the rest of the pro-
gram that the two could not be separated. Tele-
casters have had to resort to the use of reco ed
music to serve as accompaniment fer singers.1 1
Two events that we [§B§7'pick up by tele-
vision in Madison Square Garden are the Rodeo,
and the Ice Follies.
Now in the Rodeo, and in the Ice Follies,
there is incidental music from time to time.
I think some of the horses are trained a
little bit to sort of dance to a waltz tune, or
181Testimony of Frank Mullen, NBC executive vice-
president, see: Ibid., p. 264.
189
somethin c that nature, and, of course, in ice-
caping s 0 they skate in time with music, and
it adds a good deal to the desirability of the
performance.
Now, we cannot pick up any music at all from
Madison Square Garden because the musicians that
play that music for live performances are, of
course, union musicians.
So, what do we do?
we turn down the sound entirely when the music
comes on and then our technicians, at our tele-
vision studio, put on a record and they try to syn-
chronize the record with what the animal or the
ice skater is doing.
It is very unsatisfactory. It makes no sense
at all. It is a less good service to the pe0p1e,
and yet that is the type of thing we have to do
simply because we are not allowig to have any live
music whatsoever on television. 2
anggsed State of Affairs: TV.--Near the end and
after the war, television was in a rather confused state of
affairs. T.A.M. Craven warned of coming chaos unless the
allocations problem was not realistically dealt with.183
Immediately after the war, CBS kept the industry in still
further doubt about TV's future with the long-drawn out color
proceedings. Ezoadcastigg, in late 1945, reported that some
â€New York retail store executives raised some sharp objection
to the profusion of professional discussion of telecast-
ing's present and future plans, which they said was leaving
the potential customer bewildered."184
The research department of an advertising agency in
mid-1946 prepared a report concerning the state of affairs of
wâ€”ï¬ W V“
182Testimony of Joseph Ream, CBS executive vice-
president, see: Ibid., p. 295.
18
3Broadcasting, October 16, 1944 (supplement), p. 16.
184Ibid., December 17. 1945, p. 30.
190
television for its clients.185 The report described
television's overall picture as of June, 1946, as "confused,
halting and uncertain."186 The TV industry, as a whole, was
described as not being on a sound Operating basis in terms of
"either economics or of artistic accomplishment."187 Also,
internal dissension, strife, and controversy was pointed out
concerning the allocations and color problems. The report
indicated that behind these controversies hung the threat
of the obsolescence of both transmitting and receiving equipment
which resulted in the restricted manufacture of both. Tele-
vision, immediately after the war, posed a very vexing and
confusing picture for nearly everyone concerned.
As indicated above, the Union saw the coming of TV
as an analogous situation to the coming of sound motion
pictures. Petrillo and Federation wanted some kind of as-
surance that TV could not cause the loss of all radio employ-
ment.188 Also, the possible extensive use of film in tele-
vision broadcasting posed the threat of severely curtailing
the amount of potential employment there would be in the new
broadcast medium. Petrillo, on a number of occasions, em-
phasized that before the AFM would permit its members to be
185[or an account, see: Ibid.. August 12. 1945. Po 32-
1861bid.
1871b: .
188
Petrillo emphasized this in his testimony, see: U.S.
House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor,
Heari s: Investi ation 0 James C Pet 0 the American
Federaiign gprus cians, g al., 85th ong., lst Sess., 9 ,
p. 229.
191
employed in TV his Union must be able "to find out first
where television's going."189 With the confusion and uncer-
tainty rampant as documented above, Petrillo and the AFM
encountered considerable difficulty in finding any kind of
an answer to the question that was vexing them. No one
seemed to know where television was going with any certainty.,
In the face of such a situation, rather than commit itself
to a course of action that it might later regret, the AFM
appears to have attempted to avoid a positive decision with
regard to the whole question of television. Instead, it
took a negative approach and abandoned TV employment until
such time as it felt there was a sufficient basis for making
a decision which would allow its members to participate in
the new broadcast medium.
Afteg l248.--As indicated in Chapter II (Section A),
it was not until 1948 that the TV industry was on a sound
enough footing for expansion and develOpment to occur.
It was during the period of uncertainty--1945-1948—-that the
AFM instituted and enforced its most severe restrictions on
television. It seems doubtful that the AFM restrictions, in
and by themselves, impeded the progress and development of
TV very seriously. In all probability, the delay was due
primarily to the other serious problems facing it which were
generated, in a large part, by the allocations and color con-
troversies. However, the AFM policies did contribute to the
complexity of the situation. When the industry was in a
V ï¬r ï¬â€˜ ‘7 _—.
189F‘or one of these occasions. 809* 32!.222k.2£!210
March 30, 1947, VI, p. 14.
192
position where it could expand, the AFM and the industry came
to terms and the restrictions on live television were removed.190
However, the restrictions on the use of film on TV
remained for another two to three years. The AFM did make
one important concession in 1948 in the use of film on TV.
The use of kinescOpe film recordings on TV programs involving
AFM_musioians was allowed for repeat broadcasts only.191 In
the early days of national network television before the
linking system of coaxial cable and microwave links was com-
pleted, kinescOpe film recordings were necessary to provide
network service to the parts of the country not yet Joined to
the networks by cable or microwave. It should be noted that
the AFM was not the only obstacle with regard to the use of
film on TV. The Screen Actors Guild and other unions in the
entertainment industry have policies which place limitations
on the TV use of film.192 It does not appear that the AFM
restrictions regarding film on TV retarded the progress of
any particular phase of television. The TV industry, in the
beginning, seemed to have been initially intrigued by the
possibilities of "live†television. As a result, the industry
‘ ‘
190The agreements removing the restrictions on the
use of musicians for live television will be fully discussed
in Chapter V.
~191 52!, Prgceed., 1948, p. 101.
192§29agcastigg, August 20, 1941. p. 70.
For a summary of the various policies of a number of
the unions in the entertainment industry with respect to the
TV use of film involving employment of members of the respective
unions in its production, see: U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Education and Labor, H arin s: Musicians Performance
Tgust Funds, Beth Cong., 2nd Sess., 95 . pp. - 9.
193
pushed forward in this sphere. The more extensive reliance on
film did not come until the mid-1950's and later which was
several years after agreements had been reached which removed
the remaining problems with respect to the use of film on
TV utilizing music performed by AFM members.193
Pzgss and Public Reaction.--Little evidence of any
strong reaction by either the press or the public with regard
to the Union policies regarding TV was found.â€4 During the
period when the restrictions were instituted, television was
still a relatively unknown quantity. All of them were in-
stituted in 1946 or before. As of June of 1946, there were
only six TV stations in operation which were providing service
for fewer than 50,000 receivers.195 This probably accounts
for the relative indifference of the press and the public as
compared to the violet reaction in the Interlochen affair.
The most attention that the TV restrictions received in the
press was when they were removed. By the time that television
had expanded to the point where a very high proportion of the
American public could see the effects of the AFM restrictions
193For a brief summary of the agreements removing the
restrictions on the use of film on TV which utilized AFM musi-
cians in its production, see Footnote 111 of Chapter V.
19I‘As a brief example of the lack of notoriety that
accompanied the imposition of the TV ban, when FCC chairman
Paul A. Porter was asked about it during a Congressional in-
vestigation about two or three weeks after it had been imposed,
Porter had to admit that he was not even aware of the AFM
restrictions that had been placed on television. See his tes-
timony in: U.S. House of Representatives, Hearings: Inter:
ference with Brgadcastigg 21 Noncommercia; Educgtiogal Pro-
grams, 79th Cong., st ess., l9 , p. .
1955ss Chapter II, the text at Footnote 101 and Table 3.
194
on the programming they viewed, the restrictions had been
removed. It would seem doubtful if a very high percentage
of the public was even actually aware of the AFM's TV
policies.
One Last ansideration,--Although the TV policies of
the AFM were very restrictive by nature, there was very little
programming before 1948 that they could affect. Also, TV's
audience was very tiny when compared to AM radio during the
pro-1948 period when the AFM policies affecting it were the
most restrictive. Even by mid-1948, after the restrictions
on live TV had been removed, there were still only about 500,000
TV receivers in use in comparison with 73,000,000 radio
receivers.196 When the preceeding is considered, the TV
policies of the AFM lose some of their seriousness as far as
their practical application and actual effect in restricting
TV broadcast programming. In other words, there was very
little programming on a very limited number of stations that
could be affected by the AFM's restrictions. Secondly, there
was a very tiny audience that could view the effects of these
restrictions. Nevertheless, the principle still remained that
it did represent an attempt to control broadcast programming.
Under the terms of the federal regulatory policy, control is
supposed to remain in the hands of the broadcast licensee.
— ï¬â€” h it v—w—
ï¬
196See Chapter II, Table 3.
195
F. The PM Problem
After the war, as indicated in Chapter II (Section A),
FM faced a number of difficulties and problems which tended to
slow down its rate of development and expansion. The develOp-
ment of FM did not proceed at the pace that many of its enthu-
siastic supporters had envisaged and predicted. Certain
policies of the American Federation of Musicians concerning
the newer aural broadcast media tended to add greater complex-
ity to the already complex and knotty problems that were
facing FM.
AM-FM Duplication.--When FM had been established in
the 50 megacycle ban before the war, the FCC's rules and regu-
lations concerning FM had specified that an AM station cpera-
tor who also Operated an FM station could not completely
duplicate his AM service over his FM facilities.197 A mini-
mum of two hours per day had to be devoted to programming that
did not duplicate AM programmingo-one hour before 6:00 PM and
one hour after. However, these regulations were suspended
for the duration of the war due to manpower shortages.198
Also, as a part of the prewar regulations, the Commission had
indicated that consideration of whether an FM station was
serving the public interest would be in part determined as to
197
5 F,R, 2385 (1940). Regulation 3.261 (b).
Also, see: Broadcastin , May 6, 1946, p. 15.
8
19 8 2.34, 9463 (1943).
Also, see: Broadcasting, May 29, 1944, p. 22: June
26’ 1944' De 14c
196
how a licensee had made use of his FM facilities in order
"to develOp a distinct and separate service from that others
wise available in the service area."199
In early l9h4, the major radio networks took advantage
of the war-time suspension of the duplication regulations.
Bnnadcasiing reported that:
NBC programs, both commercial and sustaining,
will be made available to PM stations operated by
present standard ban affiliates, with no addition-
al sponsor cost until the audiences to both systems
increase to the pOint where rate adjustments become
desirable, according to a policy adopted by the
network and disclosed to its Stations Planning and
Advisory Committee last week. The plan was also dis-
cussed with Government Officials, both elective and
appointive, in washington.
Regarded as a project which will give impetus
to FM, the NBC policy is generally in accord with
those enunciated informally by the other net-
works, e e e e 200
The argument that the industry was using to support its con-
tension that such a policy of duplication would provide an
impetus to FM growth was summed up by Justin Miller when he
was NAB president:
The reception of an FM broadcast requires the
purchase of a new radio set. If the people could
hear their favorite [ZM7 programs with increased
fidelity and with freedom from the annoyance of
man-made and natural static by means of FM broad-
casts, this would be an enormous stimulus to the
manufacture and purchase of sets.201
1995 e.n, 2385 (1940). Regulation 3.261 (0).
Also, see: Brnadcasting, May 29, 1944, p. 22.
eooBroadcasting, January 17, 1944, p. 12.
9°1U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education
and Labor, Hearings: Restrictive Unign Pnactices n; th inani-
can Federation 2; Musicians, 0th Cong., 2n Sess., 195%,
p. 13-
197
Apparently, the FCC endorsed the above network policies. In
1945, when the FM was relocated to the 100 megacycle band, the
Commission dropped its earlier limitations on AM-FM dupli-
202
Ngtworks Encounter Difficulty with AFM Over Their Ngw
AM-FM Policies,--Soon after the networks announced the policy
cation.
of allowing AM-FM duplication for their affiliates, they con-
tacted the New Ybrk City AFM local and requested contract
recognition of the new pelicy with regard to such use of AM
staff musicians.203 The local told the networks that it did
not have jurisdiction over FM employment. The National had
jurisdiction and contracts with regard to FM would require
both National negotiation and approval. A meeting was held
between Petrillo and network officials concerning the use of
their AM staff musicians for simultaneous broadcasts over AM
and FM. No formal contracts or agreements for FM were signed,
but the network officials concluded from the negotiations that
the AFM had given its approval to the utilization of staff musi-
cians for simultaneous broadcasts. The networks immediately
started feeding affiliated FM stations their respective AM
programming services.
The AFM objects to Dual AM-FM Service.--Apparently,
the networks provided dual service for several months. Then,
'QOQBroadcastin , May 5. 1945. p. 15. For the rules
adopted in 1955, see: 10 F,R, 12006 (1945).
2°3FOr an account of these negotiations, see: U.S.
House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor,
Hearin s: R strict ve Union Practices ni_the Ame ican Federa-
tion a. Musiol'sn"s,"§'o'th"c'o"'ng., 2nd Sess., T558, pp. 2 1272"."
198
in late September, 1944, the networks received a telegram
from Petrillo challenging their right to duplicate program-
ming involving AFM musicians.204 This was followed by an
exchange of telegrams and wires between network officials and
Petrillo.205 The network officials contended that they had
received permission during the earlier meeting to use musicians
for simultaneous broadcasts. Petrillo denied that any such
permission had been granted and charged that the networks
were violating their contracts with the AFM. The networks
asked for a meeting to discuss the problem. This offer was
refused by Petrillo until such time as the networks stopped
utilizing AFM musicians for dual AMAFM broadcasts. The net-
works refused to do this. As a result, no meeting was ar-
ranged and the networks continued to provide dual service.
Finally, a year later in mid-October, 1945, a meeting was
arranged between AFM officials and network representatives.
However, no agreement was reached during this session.
Petrillo and his associates indicated that the entire matter
would be taken under advisement.
FM Ban.--The networks were notified of the AFM's
decision a few days later. On October 22, 1945, the four ma-
jor radio networks received the following wire from Petrillo:
This is to advise you that after the meeting
between your company and the American Federation
204For an account of these negotiations, see: Ibid..
pp. 273-76; AFM, Proceed., 1947, pp. 48-50.
205For this series of telegrams and wires reproduced
verbatim, see: AFMI Pnnceed., 1947. pp. 48-50.
199
of Musicians held in my office, the matter was
further discussed and we came to the final deci-
sion that beginning Mbnday, October 29, 1945, wherever
musicians play for FM broadcasting and AM broad-
casting simultaneously, the same number of men must
be employed for FM broadcasting as are employed for
AM broadcasting, which means a double crew musgoge
employed. Kindly govern yourself accordingly.
The networks pleaded with Petrillo to reconsider the above
decision, but it was of no avail.207
. Industny Reaction.--Immediately, many charges were
made that the AFM policy would have the effect of interfering
seriously with the development of FM. FM pioneer, Walter
Damm, said that:
....unless this matter is promptly cleared up it
is my opinion that hundreds of present applicants
will indefinitely defer going into FM angoéhat FM
as a whole will be drastically retarded.
A CBS official contended that the AFM action would, in his
cpinion:
....seriously retard development of FM broadcasting.
Unless listeners can receive by FM their favorite
programs there will be little incentive for buying
the new PM receivers and broadcasters cannot as-
sume the impossible economic burdengowhich would
result from the musicians' demands.
"NAB officials express the belief that FM stations' programming
would suffer because the AFM broadcaster§7....[§§7 not command
sufficient income to justify expenditure of large sums for
2°5Ibid., 1946, p. so.
2070. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, Heari s: Restrictive Un nion Practices n£_the
Amenican Federaiion of usiciW s, 2nd ess., 1955,
PP-
QOBBroadcastin , October 29, 1945, p. 16.
2°9Ibid.. p. 88.
200
musicians."210 NBC announced, as did most broadcasters, that
because Of monetary considerations, it had no alternative but
to discontinue "the dual AM-FM transmission of musictl pro-
grams."211 Easton WOOley, an NBC official, announced:
We [NBQ7'regret exceedingly these restrictions
impeding the progress Of FM, the benefits Of which
we are anxious to make available to the ublio and
broadcast stations serving the public.21
Other broadcasters contended that the AFM policy would "set
FM back years."213
FCC Reaction.--Chairman Paul Porter of the FCC was of
the personal Opinion tht the "Petrillo edict" (as he called
it) would "very seriously" restrict the employment potential-
ities as well as the immediate develOpment of FM.214 Speaking
in his official capacity, he knew Of "nothing the FCC could do
about it."215 Regardless of the potential effect that the new
policy might have on the develOpment Of FM, the AFM was in a
position where it could restrict programming broadcast over
this media. Very little could be done about it, either.
Further FM Restrictions.--In November of 1945, the AFM
enlarged the scope of the so-called FM ban. The November issue
of the Intennational Musician contained the following direc-
2101b1d., p. 87.
2111bid.. p. 88.
2lelbid.
213New York Times, October 24, 1945, p. 13:1.
glaBroadcasting, November 19. 1945. P- 20.
2
15Ibid.
201
Notice to all Locals
All locals are forthwith advised that the Ameri-
can Federaticn of Musicians has not been able to
consummate an agreement with the radio networks,....
covering the services of musicians for FM ....broad-
casting.
Under the circumstances, the networks have been
advised that they are not permitted to feed chain
programs played by orchestras on AM stations....to
FM stations.
Therefore, the locals are further advised that
the above order, which applies to the network
stations, is equally applicable to local broad-
casting stations, This means that local musical
programs, emanating from local AM stations, are
not permitted to be duplicated on FM stations,
regardless of whether the AM and FM stations are
Operated under the same ownership.
However, this is not to be construed as inter-
fering with the rights of a local to make a sepa-
rate contract for services for FM broadcasting
exclusively.
Kindly govern yourselves accordingly.
James C. Petrillo 216
President, A. F. of M.
On September 12, 1947. a newly formed network-~the
Continental Network-~the first one devoted exclusively to FM
broadcasting, began commercial Operations with a program
featuring the Rochester (N.Y.) Symphony Orchestra.217 This
provided the AFM with the occasion to place further restric-
tions on the use of musicians for FM broadcasting. On
September 17th, the Continental Network was notified by the
AFM that effective September 18th, Federation members would
not be allowed to play for FM network programs.
216AFM, Proceed., 1946, p. 88.
217
For an account, see: Broadcasti , September 22,
1947! p9 13c
202
Effect of AFM Poiicies on FM Brnadcast Prognamming.--
In general, FM stations were restricted in their use of live
music as a source of program material to only that which was
originated and carried by a single individual station. Even
if a particular FM station was affiliated with either an AM
or FM radio network, it could not carry any network programs
which involved live music performed by AFM members. Since
most FM stations were Operating at a loss, it would be an
almost impossible economic burden for the average FM licensee
to employ musicians for live musical broadcasts. For music,
nearly all FM stations had to (or at least did) rely on re-
corded music. In 1947, Petrillo estimated that only six of
the nation's 616 FM stations carried any live music at all.218
Despite FM's unique transmission qualities which made it
ideally suited for presenting live music, this kind of music
was almost entirely absent from FM broadcasting. This
situation was brought about primarily by the AFM's FM
policies.
One brief example will serve to show the effect Of the
AFM's policies on the Operation of an FM station which
was affiliated with a natiOnal AM radio network. An Official
Of an FM station affiliated with the Mutual Broadcasting
System informed a Congressional committee about the extent to
which the AFM's policies affected the station's network service:
218
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, Hearings: Investigation Of James C Petrilio
ihe American Federation n; Musicians, et al., 80th ong., st,
Sess., 1957, pp. 193-95.
203
As of January 1948, the Mutual Broadcasting
System program structure contains 74 programs with
live music, which WBCA may not carry, and 48 pro-
grams without live music available to us.21
Union Justification of the Ban.--At the meeting prior
to the calling Of the ban, Petrillo wanted to know why music-
ians should not be paid extra for performances over both AM
and FM.220 The network officials had replied that the dupli-
cated service was available to the affiliated stations without
additional cost and was an attempt to aid the future develop-
ment of FM. Further, they pointed out that there was no addi-
tional revenues being realized from broadcast advertisers and
sponsors for the duplicated service. They argued that total
listenership would not be increased since what FM listeners
there would be would have been diverted from AM stations. On
this basis, the network Officials pointed out that additional
payment to musicians for dual broadcasts would not be justi-
fied.
Petrillo and the AFM Officials, in attendance at the
meeting, apparently rejected the argument of the networks.
At any rate, the FM ban was instituted a few days later. In
his report to the convention of 1946, Petrillo stated the
Union's position with respect to FM broadcasting.221 The
position Of the Federation, according to Petrillo, centered
ti 219U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Educa-
on and Labor Hearin s: Restrictive Union Practices 2; the
American Federation n; Musicians.. 80th ong., 2nd Sess., 1938,
p09.
22
0For an account Of this meeting, see: Ibid., p. 276.
221AFM, Proceed., 1946, p. 93.
204
around the following question: "How many jobs are musicians
going to have to play for one price?" He pointed out that
FM broadcasters employ separate announcers and engineers and
asked why they should not hire separate musicians. Using
musicians for both AM and FM broadcasts simultaneously,
Petrillo contended constituted a "dual job for one scale."
He felt that the radio industry could afford to pay the
musicians for the development Of FM. This was only fair he
emphasized, since AFM members had given a lot of free time in
the develOpment of AM. On this basis, he felt the AFM was
' justified in the policies that it had adopted regarding FM.
A Mxih Develons.--Throughout the duration of the 27
month long FM ban, a persistent notion develOped in some quar-
ters that the only thing holding FM back was the AFM policies.
However, such an accusation does not tell the whole story.
FM had other problems that were just as serious, if not more
so, than the one which involved the AFM.222 Despite these
other problems, the myth develOped that the AFM and Petrillo
represented the principle force that was in the way of the
rapid development and eXpansion of FM.223 It almost seemed
2228ee Chapter II, text at Footnote 42.
223For expression Of this myth by an advertising execu-
tive, see: N21 York Times, February 3, 1948, p. 42:6.
During a 1958 investigation of the AFM, it found ex-
pression in the testimony Of a number of the industry spokes-
men, see the testimony Of Justin Miller, NAB president; Everett
L. Dillard, FM Association president; and Theodore Streibert,
MBS vice-chairman of the board in: U.S. House of Representa-
tives, Committee on Education and Labor, Hearings: Restrictive
Union Practices n§,the American F deration n; usicians, 30th
Cong" . '2‘n"d 'S'e—‘s s . , 1658’, "p'p .' '1'3 ,‘ 1'2L9',“2'2'8'.' '
Also, it found expression in a Congressional committee
205
that a number of persons felt that as soon as the AFM's
FM ban was removed, FM's problems would be solved and its
future would be assured. This point of view finally found the
ultimate in recognition in 1948, when the following appeared
in the FCC's Annual Renort:
Of importance to the develOpment and public
acceptance Of FM broadcasting was the agreement in
January 1948, between the standard broadcast net-
works and the musicians, under which AM musical pro-
grams may be duplicated over FM stations without
extra cost or additional programming personnel. As
a result, listeners found many of gazir favorite
programs on FM for the first time.
Newsweek acid, on the occasion of the removal of the ban, that
such action was the "green light" that FM needed to get it
started.225
In general, broadcasters were very much stirred up
about the FM ban. In late l9h7, a group of tap broadcast of-
ficials even met with Department of Justice lawyers to see if
there was anything that could be done about the AFM's policies
regarding FM.226 The Justice Department declined to bring
any action against the AFM.
report, see: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Edu-
cation and Labor, Re ort: Investi ation of James 9‘ Petriiin
and the American Fe eration n: Musicians,—H.R. Rep. NO. 1 2,
. 35th-53ng., 1st Sess., 1937, p. 11.
Even a 32! ank Times' editorial argued that the only
thing holding back FM was the AFM, see: New YOrk Times,
September 10, 1947, p. 26:1.
224
U.S. FCC. Annual Re art, 1948, p. 36.
2
5Newsweek, February 9, 1948, p. 46.
226
For accounts, see: Broadcasting, Au net 25, 1947,
p. 13; New YOrk Times, August 29, 19 7. p. 18: .
206
However, not all peOple accepted the myth that the AFM
was the principal deterrent in FM's develOpment. Acting FCC
Chairman Paul walker told a group Of FM broadcasters in mid-
September, l947 that he thought that duplication on FM and
AM would be a "substantial aid" to the develOpment of FM,
but he did not feel that its whole future turned on that
point.227 He told the FM broadcasters that he thought FM
should develOp its own distinctive programming. About the
. same time, Jack Gould of the HE!.XQ£E.ZLEE§ spoke out along the
same lines. He said that "in all fairness it must be noted
that Mr. Petrillo is but one link in an insidious chain Of
circumstances which have impeded FM's progress."228 He indi-
cated that it was very easy to use Petrillo and the AFM as a
"whipping boy."
To blame all of FM's difficulties on Petrillo and the
AFM clearly was unjustified. There was a great deal more to
the general problem of FM than just the AFM policies. In all
probability, for some, Petrillo and the AFM--as Gould sug-
gested-~provided a convenient scapegoat for FM's troubles and
difficulties. By 1946 and 1947, there was little doubt that
Petrillo and the AFM were rather unpopular with the public.229
It would seem doubtful if very many would have objected to
having one more "evil" attributed to Petrillo and his Union.
227Broadcasting, September 15, 1947, p. #1.
228New YOrk Times, August 31, 1947, p. 7:1.
229This public disapproval was more or less demonstra-
ted by the passage of the Lea Act in mid-1946. This event
will be discussed more fully in Chapter IV.
207
In 1948, at least one Congressman accused the industry of
such tactics:
I do not mind saying that I have been attend-
ing these meetings regularly and listening with great
interest and care to the testimony advanced by the
witnesses for the industry.
I am fully satisfied that FM has been victim-
ized by solid Opposition of the industry rather
than by anything the musicians union so far has
done. I am of the opinion that, at least as far
as the FM situation is concerned, the industry is
using the union's actions as a deliberate smoke 2
screen to obscure their own sins in this matter. 30
Even after the ban was removed in 1948, FM still continued to
be in trouble and it remained in that state for the remainder
of the decade of the forties.
G. Ban on International or Foreign Musical Broadcasts in U.S.
AFM Announces Internationai Music Ban.--Short1y after
the FM ban had been put into effect, the AFM embarked on an-
other policy affecting broadcast programming which evoked
considerable unfavorable publicity for the Union. In a let-
ter in early December, l9h5, the AFM informed the networks
that since the war was over, broadcasts originating from for-
eign countries would be no longer needed "to promote good will
and good relationships."231 The letter indicated that the
AFM had been only too happy to cOOperate in this matter during
23°Comments of Representative John Lesinski of Michigan,
see: U.S. House Of Representatives, Committee on Education and
Labor Hearings: Restrictive Union Practices oi the Amgnican
. Cong., 2nd Sess., 1953, pp. 5-
ngenation 2; Music ans,
2 l
3 For text Of the letter, see: AFM. Pnncged., 1946,
P. 47.
208
the war, but the war was over now. In conclusion, the letter
stated: "Therefore, will you kindly discontinue the broad-
casting of any musical programs emanating from foreign coun-
tries effective December 31, 1945."232 It was to apply all
programs, both live and recorded.
Since Canadian musicians were members of the AFM,
musical programs originating from Canada were exempted. Reli-
gious musical programs and overseas musical programs of the
U.S. armed forces were also exempted from the ban, according
to Business £225,233 In effect, then, this policy almost
totally curtailed the broadcasting of musical programs originat-
ing outside the United States and Canada except for the exemp-
tions noted above. The reason behind the ban on foreign music
broadcasts was quite simple according to Petrillo.234 He
emphasized that its sole purpose was to prevent foreign musi-
cians from competing with American musicians. FUrther, he
stressed that the idea behind the ban was the same as the
idea behind the tariff laws that have been passed by Congress
on occasions.
erna on Re er as one o the Ban.--The press
generally was unfavorable toward this latest ban by the AFM.235
232g !
233 .
Business Week, January 5, 1946, p. 86.
23A
AFM, Pngcegd,, 1946, pp. 88-89.
235For a summary of some of the press reaction and
disapproval in different parts of the country, see: greed-
casting, December 31, 1945, p. 65.
Business Wee; also reported that the nation's press
highly publicized the international music ban, see: gnninggn
‘ 209
However, this reaction was not limited to this country, alone.
The ban caused international repercussions, also. The U.S.
State Department was caused some embarrassment as, at the
time, it was sponsoring cultural exchange programs with other
countries. The office of the State Department which was
handling the exchanges-~the Office of International and Cul-
tural Affairs-~feared that the AFM ban might interfere seri-
ously with.its efforts to distribute programs of information
overseas.236 It was speculated that some of the countries
involved might, in retaliation, ban American broadcasts in
their countries. Some State Department Officials denounced
the Union's foreign music ban as a "return to isolationism."237
The H2!.XQE§.IAE§£.£°1t that the ban represented a set-back to
the United Nations with respect to its cultural exchange en-
deavors.238 A Coiiier's editorial suggested the ban might
interfere with the struggle for world peace.239 An article in
Nation charged that the AFM policy would interfere with the
general cultural interchange between nations.240
W *— ‘— ‘v‘v —— —
Meg}, January 5, 1946, p. 84.
In all probability, with all the publicity that was
reportedly in the press, public reaction was probably rather
unfavorable and critical with regard to the AFM's action.
However, no direct evidence Of such public reaction was noted.
236§znancasting, December 31, 1945, p. 18.
237Newsweek, January 7. 1946, p. 75.
ZBBEQn‘YOrk Times, December 25. 1945, p. 1:2.
239"
Petrillo vs. the POOple " niiien's, 117 (Februar
16, 1946), p. 90c ' y
-240"Petrillo WOuld Bar Foreign Broadcasts," Nation,
162 (January 59 1946). Fe 30
210
British Broadcasting Company officials protested the
AFM action and asked the State Department to intervene. One
BBC official was reported to have made the following comment
when referring to the ban: "It's terrible."241 A cultural
mission musical program of the Cuban Department of Education,
on tour in California at the time, was affected by the ban.242
The Cuban Consul in Los Angeles threatened diplomatic inter-
vention if the U.S. tour of the Cuban mission was beset with
difficulty because Of the AFM policy. On April 2, 1946, the
Mexican Musicians' Union reciprocated the AFM's ban by placing
restrictions on U.S. musicians who were performing in Mexico.243
A number Of U.S. musicians were traveling in Mexico at the
time and were affected by the action of the Mexican Union.
However, these restrictions were short-lived and were with-
drawn on April 7th.2M
the British Musicians' Union. It backed the AFM's international
The only support for the AFM came from
music ban calling it "a sound, necessary and justifiable
«245
step.
E ect F ei Be on oadcast P .--
gynadcasting reported that the AFM ban would affect a few regu-
241Newsweek, January 7. 1946. p. 75.
- 2A2For an account, see: Ngw Tenn Times, January 26.
1946’ pe 7:20
243For an account, see: Ibid., April 3. 1945. Do 10:6.
244
Ibid., April 7, 1946, p. 40:4.
245
Ibid., January 25, 1946, p. 15:1.
211
larly scheduled programs, particularly of network origin.246
There was little evidence which suggested that a very large
number of programs were affected by this policy. However, the
situation did point up the fact that the AFM was in a position
where it could institute policies which had the potential of
having a restrictive effect on broadcast programming. One of
the more important aspects of this action by the Union was
that it created more highly unfavorable publicity for the AFM.
The entire affair tended to anger an already angry public even
more.
H. AFM Policy Toward COOperative Programs
Coonenative Prognams.--An MBS official described the
sO-called cOOperative network program in the following way:
Unlike the regular network commercial program,
a cOOperative program is not sponsored by a single
national advertiser who pays for the facilities of
all the local affiliated stations over which the
network program is transmitted. The cOOperative
program is made available by the network to each
of its affiliated stations which offer it for spon-
sorship to local advertisers. The local advertiser
purchases the time directly from the local station.
The network does not participate in the sale of
the time to the local advertiser nor does it receive
any share of the proceeds. The only income derived
by the network from cOOperative programs is the
talent fee which the network charges to each station
246Broadcasti , December 31, 1945. p. 18.
The £33,10rk %imes reported that the most prominent
and pOpular programs affected were NBC's "Atlantic Spotlight"
and 088's â€Translantic Calla†both BBC offerings. See: ï¬g!
5:
Inrk Times, December 25, 19 p. 20:5.
siness Week indicated that most of the international
music programs or Broadcasts affected by the ban were distributed
by the BBC. Business ngn, January 5, 1946, p. 86.
212
which sells the program to a local advertiser.
The network pays this fee over to the artist,
keeping only a small portion.24
One distinct advantage that was often cited in favor of the
cOOperatively sponsored program was that it allowed local radio
stations to Offer to local advertisers network quality pro-
grams at local prices.248 In other words, small local adver-
tisers, under this procedure, could bring high quality radio
programs to their local communities which featured talent of
.the highest calibre which would be economically impossible
under any other circumstances.
AFM's Action igningi annenaiing Pnngnnns.--Although
the AFM's policy toward cOOperative programs was of long
standing, it did not attract much attention until 1947. In
early November of that year, musicians were pulled off of
several network cOOperative programs.249 The producers of
one Of the programs, MBS's IInformation Please," decided to
resist the Union in its action of prohibiting a pianist from
participating in their program. Petrillo had indicated that
"Information Please" could use the pianist if every one of the
stations on which the cooperative program was being carried
with local sponsorship would hire a standby pianist at 831.88
247Testimony Of Theodore C. Streibert, MBS vice-chair-
man of the board, see: U. 8. House of Representatives, Commit-
tee On Education and Labor, Hea Restrictive Uni n Pnac-
tices‘ng the minnniï¬nn Fedora on O aMusic ans, Cong.
Sess., 19W p.
248
Ibid., p. 284.
249
For an account, see: Ngw X22§,T$Q°3v November 11,
1947, p. 31:4.
213
per man. This would amount to an added cost Of 39,564 which
the producers of the program objected to very strenuously.
Coonenative Ban.--The above incident did not serve to
provide the basis for instituting a policy with respect to
cOOperative programs. Rather, it provided an occasion for
the AFM to invoke a previously adepted policy that heretofore
had attracted little or no attention.250 The 1940 AFM conven-
tion referred the following resolution to the Union's inter-
national Executive Board for consideration:
Whereas, It is the contention of the Federa-
tion and its locals that radio stations the country
over should employ more musicians: and
Whereas, the Federation has, and is still us-
ing every effort toward the employment of more Of
its members in the radio field: and
Whereas, Many radio stations are refusing our
members because they claim they do not have enough
time on their schedule for the use of local musi-
c ians; and
Whereas, It is a known fact that there are
many network radio programs originating from key
stations, and sold to different sponsors in the
various towns and cities for less than the same
number of local musicians would cost if the pro-
gram were sold locally; and
Whereas, There is no doubt that this practice
is the worst kind of unfair competition and should
it continue, will help to a large degree destroy
what employment our members now enjoy, (expecting
a few key stations);
Therefore, Be It Resolved, That Federation members
are forbidden to play network radio programs wherein
said program is sold commercially to different spon-
sors in the various towns and cities covered by said
network unless the same number of musicians, exclu-
sive of staff musicians, are employed and by and
paid the local scale by the radio stations in each
jurisdiction in which said program is sold.251
250No mention of the AFM's policy toward cOOperative
programs was found in the press or popular periodicals re-
viewed for this study prior to the incident outlined above.
251AFM, Pnncged., 1940. pp. 269-70.
214
The IEB did consider this resolution which authorized them to
take action against cOOperative programs.252 It was decided
to refer the matter to the president's office and let Petrillo
formulate the necessary policy.
The result of Petrillo's consideration of the matter
was the following letter which was sent to the major radio
networks on September 25, 1940:
This is to advise that on and after September
30th, 1940, members of the American Federation of
Musicians will not be permitted to accept or play
cOOperatively sponsored radio engagements.
The above means that a single engagement program
paid at the single engagement price cannot advertise
more than one sponsor, regardless of the number of
stations over which the program is broadcast.2
Petrillo emphasized that the above order stepped all studio
orchestras or staff musicians from playing for commercial or
sustaining programs which in any way could involve cOOpera-
tively sponsored broadcasts.254 Also, the order meant that
local stations were not to sell any time for commercials
during, or as a part of, any network sustaining programs on
which AFM musicians were utilized. Prior to 1947, no evidence
was found which indicated that the AFM had invoked this policy
regarding cOOperative programs.255
25?;Eid.. Pp. 359-60.
253Ibid., 1941. p. 42.
254Ib .
2551t was stated in the introduction that the organi-
zation of this chapter would be more or less in terms of
chronological order. With regard to the date of adOption, this
section would be out of place. However, it was not on this
basis that this section was placed in this order. It was on
the basis of when the policy achieved the most attention.
215
Uninn gnjection to Connerative Prognnns.--According to
the flnn_lnnnflginnn, the Federation objected to cOOperative
programs on the grounds that they jeOpardized employment Oppor-
tunities for local members.255 AFM officials must have rea-
soned that if local advertisers could get big name musicians
on broadcast through cooperative sponsorship for about the
same price as they could get local musicians, they would natur-
ally favor the big name musicians. In this manner, the local
musicians would be at a distinct disadvantage in securing
local radio engagements. This would explain why the condition
that the employment of local standbys was demanded before the
AFM would allow a pianist to be utilized on the "Information
Please†program. It should be noted also, that such a condi-
tion for cOOperative program employment was outlined in the
resolution that was referred to the IEB.
£11293 9n Prggnamming.--Apparent1y, the cOOperative
ban was in effect for about seven years before it was invoked.
It would seem likely that, given its other actions, the AFM
would have invoked this policy if the networks had given them
an opportunity to do so. Also, if the AFM had invoked this
policy against the networks, it would seem unlikely that the
networks would not have squelched any publicity on any such
occasions. Since no mention of this policy or its application
was found in the literature reviewed for this study before
1947. it would seem safe to conclude that the AFM did not in-
voke this policy prior to that time, and probability because
—7 —~
25633:,ank Timgg, November 19. 1947. Do 54‘20
216
the networks used very little or no live music on cOOpera-
tive programs.
Some hint of this was contained in the testimony of
an M38 official to a Congressional committee in January Of
1948. He said:
In the first stages of cOOperative broadcasting,
programs were limited largely to commentary and news
programs. The Fulton Lewis, Jr., program from Hash-
ington was one of the first. Somewhat later an at-
tempt was made to introduce variety into the programs
and to broaden their sccpe. The union, however, did
not permit the use Of musicians on such.programs.257
Although he did not specify dates in his testimony, it might
be logically inferred that it was about 1947 when the first
attempts were made to utilize musicians on cOOperative programs.
It appears then, that before 1947, the networks must not have
used musicians on such programs or even made any serious at-
tempts tO do so. If the networks had used musicians on such
programs to any great extent, the AFMh-in all probability--
would have voiced strenuous objections which, in turn, would
have been reported in the press.
The evidence found seems to indicate that the cOOpera-
tive ban was invoked for the first time in early November, 1947.
By the following month, however, the ban was revoked.258 It
is not known to what extent the AFM policy concerning cooperative
. 257Testimony of Theodore C. Streibert, MBS vice-
chairman of the board, see: 0.3. House of Representatives,
Committee on Education and Labor, H arin s: Restnictivg Unign
0 cos 0 th rica Federatign E: ï¬ï¬sigians, 0 Cong.
h:3"t‘;""'2n Sess., 9E8? p“. £2817 ‘ '
258The removal of the ban will be more fully discussed
in Chapter V.
217
programs prior to 1947 influenced decisions whether musi-
cians would be used On such programs. There was no evidence
which would indicate whether it was a factor or not. There
was some inferential evidence which suggested that the net-
works probably did not use musicians on cooperative programs
to any great extent prior to the first time the ban was
invoked. However, the question still remains that if the AFM
did not think the situation was serious enough in 1940, why
did it formulate its policy concerning such programs. No
logical answer was found for this question, unless the Federa-
tion, at that time, was taking no chances of losing any kind
of employment no matter how small. Safely, about the only
thing that can be concluded was that prior to 1947. very
few, if any, musicians were used on cOOperative programs.
Also, it would seem that if the networks had wanted to use
musicians on such programs, they would have brought the pro-
blem out in the open. There is no reason to believe that
they would not have wanted the AFM to receive some more un-
favorable publicity.
In conclusion, it would appear that the cOOperative
ban was more restrictive in a theoretical sense than in a
practical one. It almost seems that this policy of the AFM
was prohibiting the networks from doing something that they
were not doing anyway prior to 1947. Then, when the networks
did start to use musicians on cOOperative programs and came
face to face with the AFM policy, the ban was revoked a short
time later. In a practical sense then, the ban was directly
restrictive only a short time. Nevertheless, the principle
218
still remains that it represented an attempt to control pro-
gramming. As has been pointed out previously, control of
programming, under terms of federal regulatory policy, is
supposed to remain in the hands of the broadcast licensee.
I. The Recording Ban Of 1948
Ta -Har .--In June of 1947, the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947 or the Taft-Hartley Act was enacted into
law by Congress.259 Among other things, there were some
provisions which specified certain conditions that had to be
met before the so-called union welfare funds could be consider-
ed legal. The AFM's unemployment fund, the Recording and
Transcription Fund, which was established under the royalty
agreements with the recording and transcription companies
was generally considered to be a welfare fund which would
come under these provisions of Taft-Hartley.26o It will be
remembered that these agreements ended the recording ban
of 1942. In essence, Section 302 of the law, laid down the
following conditions for establishing the legality of a wel-
fare fund:261
1. Welfare funds can be used only for the "sole and
exclusive benefit" of the employees and their
25961 Siai. 136 (1947).
260This was admitted by one of the AFM's lawyers in
testimony before a Congressional investigation, see: 0.8.
House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor,
Hea in s: Restnictige Union Pnacticg 21.nnn,Amgnigan zgdnna-
§I§n ni_2nsigians, ong., 2nd ess., 19 . p. l.
25151 stag 136. 157 (1947).
219
families and dependents of the company(ies) in-
volved.
2. The fund from which the payments are to be made has
to be held in trust.
3. The detailed basis Of the benefits received from
such funds had to be specified in a written agree-
ment between the union and employer involved.
4. Employers and union Officials have to be equally
represented in the administration of the fund.
’ 5. Procedures have to be specified in the event the
administrators of the fund can not come to a
decision for the resolution Of such deadlocks through
the use of a neutral empire.
6. Purposes for which such funds can be utilized were
specified in Section 302, also.
The AFM's gnemninyngnt Ennd.--The unemployment fund
established by the earlier agreements was to be solely admin-
istered by the AFM. The detailed basis for benefits to be
distributed from the fund was not specified in writing, either.
The benefits of the fund were to be used primarily for persons
other than the employees Of the recording and transcription
.companies.262 The AFM's unemployment fund rather clearly did
not meet the conditions laid down in Section 302 of Taft-
Hartley for it to be considered legal. When the agreements
expired which established the AFM's fund, in all probability,
their renewal without change would have constituted grounds
for action by the Justice Department. The penal provisions of
Beetion 302 provided that:
Any person who willfully violates any Of the
provisions of this section shall, upon conviction
262Fer texts Of the agreements reached with regard to
the 1942 recording ban, see: Broadcasting, October 25, 1943,
pp. 58-59; November 20, 1944, p. .
220
thereof, be guilty of a misdemeanor and be sub-
ject to a fine of not more than 810,000 or to
imprisgnment for not more than one year, or
both.2 3
Rncnrding Ban 0: 1242.--The royalty agreements were
due to expire December 31, 1947. There was almost no prospect
of continuing the unemployment fund as it had been established
by these agreements without a battle in the courts. Probably,
with such considerations in mind, a motion was introduced and
unanimously passed by the AFM convention in the summer of 1947
which authorized the Union's International Executive Board
to call a recording ban when the present contracts expired.25h
A short time later, the recording and transcription companies
received the following notice from the AIM:
GENTLEMEN: Your contract with the American
Federation of Musicians for the employment Of its
members in the making of musioel recordings will
expire on December 31, 1947.
This contract will not.be renewed because on
and after January 1, 1948, the members of the
American Federation of Musicians will no longer
perform the services provided in said contract.
This notice carries with it our declared in-
tension, permanently and completely, to abandon that
type of employment.
James C. Petrillo
President American Federation of
Musiciansé55
The wording of this ban notice differed from the 1942
ban in certain respects. In the earlier one, the AFM simply
25361 Stat. 136, 158 (1947).
264cm. marl-as... 1947. pp. 277-78.
ti :6igï¬g. House Of Representatives, Committee on Educa-
On an r, Heari s: Restricti e Uni n Pra tices n;_the
gelzican Fedegati'o'n'ï¬i'sï¬ï¬sio'i'an—‘Bs, 'O'lth' Co'JngP'. . '2n" ;d:L-§e_—ss. . 1138',
p. l.
221
announced that its members would no longer be permitted to
make recordings and transcriptions. In the announcement of
the 1948 ban, the Federation was very careful to specify that
it was not simply calling a strike against companies, rather
it was its intention to permanently abandon that section of
its jurisdiction which included employment in the recording
and transcription industries.266 No demands were accompanied
by the notice since demands would not be appropriate if the
intent was never to work for the companies involved again.
Leiter concluded that the purpose of the wording in
the 1948 notice was to give the AFM added bargaining strength.267
In other words, the Federation was overstating its position in
the matter for effect. However, in reaching this conclusion,
Leiter overlooked one very important aspect. Section 8(b) (3)
of the Taft-Hartley Act had made it an unfair labor practice
for a union to refuse to bargain collectively with an employ-
er.268 It would seem likely that the AFM worded the ban
notice in such a way that it would be difficult for the re-
cording and transcription companies to utilize this section of
the act in opposing the ban.269
266The 32!.Y02k Times reported that Petrillo was very
emphatic about the point that the AFM was "quitting forever
employment in the recording and transcription industry. See:
Ngn_YOn§ Times, October 19, 1947, pp. 1:2, 5:2.
267Leiter, gni_nii., p. 166.
26861 Stat. 136, 141 (1947).
269Broadcasting reported that sources at the Harvard
Law School viewed the wording of the ban as an attempt designed
to circumvent Taft-Hartley. See: Bnnadcasting, December 1,
1947. p. 88.
222
Punnose of the Ban.--One of the purposes of’the 1942
recording ban, as admitted by Petrillo, had been an attempt
to control the use of recordings on radio. With respect to
this goal, the Union had not been too successful in the earlier
ban. On the occasion of the 1948 ban, Petrillo admitted that
there was no way he knew Of to force broadcasters to limit
their use of recorded music.270 In lieu of this goal, he
said that the AFM had resorted to the royalty arrangement
which established the Recording and Transcription Fund which,
in turn, could be used to provide employment for musicians who
had been displaced by technology. It had taken a long battle
to establish this arrangement and it is doubtful that the AFM
would sit idly by and watch its efforts being outlawed by
Taft-Hartley. The recording ban of 1948, in all likelihood,
represented an attempt to salvage the unemployment fund in
some fOrm or other. This point was suggested by Petrillo in
his testimony to a Congressional Committee in January of
1948.271
Efigcts o; the i248 Ban on Pnngnamming.--There was
further evidence that Petrillo and the AFM were more inter-
ested in salvaging the unemployment fund than in restricting
27°NsLYsak Times. June 5. 1947. p. 50:2.
271U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education
and Labor, Hearings: Restr ct ve Union gnactices ni’the Ameri-
pnn Fede at on 93; msiolanjjs,‘8'ol"t"h Cong., 2nd Base. 1653, p. 353.
everal years after the recording ban of 1948, Petrillo
admitted that the impetus of the AFM's 1948 action was because
the Taft-Hartley had outlawed the existing royalty arrangements.
See: James C. Petrillo "Musicians' Fight," Amenigan Federa-
tinnint, 62 (June, 1955 e P. 19.
223
the use of recording on radio. At first, it was assumed by
broadcasters that the ban would be complete and would cover
all fbrms of broadcast transcriptions.272 In anticipation of
such a situation, most of the producers of commercial radio
programs being distributed by transcriptions built up a back-
log of programs that would last for a year or two before the
ban went into effect.273 However, shortly after the ban did
go into effect, Petrillo clarified the applicability Of it.
In early January, it was announced that the AFM would "permit
recorded and transcribed repeats in those instances where
they ....[§erg7'performed because of time zone differentials
in various time zones."277 Early the following month, the
Federation indicated that the recording ban did not apply to
"recorded or transcribed network programs."275 In other
words, commercial programs distributed on transcriptions were
exempted. This would allow network programming to proceed
as usual, with little or no noticable effect due to the ban.
The area Of broadcast programming most affected by the
ban was in the area of non-network programming particularly in
those segments of programming that were composed primarily of
music on processed recordings and transcriptions. Here again,
as in the case of the 1942 ban, the kind of music that was
most affected was pOpular music. The ban meant that there
q w v— _—
27 nzcadcasting, October 27, 1947, p. 88.
27393.40: January 5: 1948: P0 13.
274 1
no
27sibid.. February 9, 1948, p. 15.
224
would be an interruption in the continuous recording of newly
written "hit" or "pep" tunes upon which the pOpular music
business depended so heavily. For some stations, this kind of
music was one of the principal sources of programming material.
These stations would not be able to get all of the newly
written and recorded pOpular tunes that they might desire as
long as the ban was in effect. However, they would not be
without recorded music since they would have a tremendous back-
log of previously recorded popular music. During the 1948
ban, there were only a minimum Of restrictions which tended to
have an effect on broadcast programming. This would suggest
that the principal emphasis Of the ban with respect to the AFM
was to restore or maintain the unemployment fund in some form
or other.276
F n Settlem nt th 48 c rdi‘ Ban.--The final
settlement of the 1948 recording ban did not allow the Federa-
tion to salvage the Recording and Transcription Fund, in
toto.277 However, it was salvaged in a different form. The
276 On the eve of the recording ban, the New Y k Tines
reported that the public would not even be aware that t e ban
was in effect for at least a year because of the stockpiles
of selections that were recorded before the ban became effec-
tive. Petrillo and officials of the recording industry were
supposedly to have expressed this point of view. See: Egg
in:§_Timgs, December 27. 1947. p. 15:5.
ime reported that RCA Victor had a stockpile Of re-
corded classical selections that could last for 25 years if
necessary. See: Ti e, November 24, 1947, p. 74.
277For some of the accounts Of the negotiation and
execution of the agreements ending the 1948 recording ban,
see: Broadcasting, November 1, 1948, pp. 21, 68; November 15,
1948. PD. 21, 2; December 20 1948, pp. 21, 62-63- Ngn_YOrk
Tingn, November 6, 1948, 9. 28:2; December 11, 1948, p. 3:7;
December 14, 1948, pp. 1:6. 39:23 Milton Diamond, "Following
the Ban--The Petrillo Deal," Sainnnay Review 23 Liienature, 32
22S
principle that contributions to the fund were to come from
a royalty paid by the manufacturer on all recordings and
transcriptions produced remained essentially the same. How-
ever, the significant difference with respect tc the 1942 ar-
rangements related to the manner in which the fund was to
administered. The royalties would be paid to a trust fund to
be administered by an independent trustee who had no connec-
tions whatsoever with either the recording industry or the
AFM.
Under the trust agreement, the trustee was charged
with:
"organizing and arranging the presentation of
personal performances by instrumental musi-
cians ....at such times as in the judgement of
the Trustee will contribute to the gublic know-
ledge and appreciation Of music."27
Regarding the expenditures from the fund, the trust agreement
provided:
"The Trustee shall organize such performances upon
occasions where no admission fees are charged,
in connection with activities Of patriotic, chari-
table, educational, civic, and general public nature,
such as, but not limited to, veterans' hospital
entertainment programs, educational programs in
schools and institutions Of higher learning, pat-
riotic and recruiting drives, symphony society or
other musical activities of a non-profit nature,
and similar programs and activities, entirely with-
out profit to the trust fund.2 9
The first trustee of the fund was Samuel Rosenbaum,
Philadelphia lawyer and one time president of radio station
278Diamond, _n, cit., p. 51.
279Ibid.
226
WFIL of the same city.280 All succeeding trustees of the
Musicians Performance Trust Fund, the title the trust fund
was given, were to be appointed by the U.S. Secretary of
Labor.
Since the trust fund had been designed in such a way
that it would not be in violation of the pertinent sections
of Taft-Hartley, the parties wanted assurances that the fund
was a legal arrangement. Before the trust fund agreement be-
came final, it was submitted both to the Department of Justice
and the Department of Labor for rulings with regard to its
legality. Both the Justice and the Labor Departments, after
careful study, approved the plans in mid-December of 1948.
The Department of Justice specifically indicated that the
trust fund agreement did not violate Section 302 of Taft-
Hartley, the provision dealing with union welfare funds. By
the end of 1948, full-scale production of recordings and
transcriptions were resumed. Thus ended the last major under-
taking by the American Federation Of Musicians during the
decade of the forties. 281
ii
28°1t is interesting to note that a former broadcaster
was named as trustee Of the newly created Musicians Performance
Trust Fund. However, Rosenbaum was highly favorable to the AFM.
During the recording ban of 1942, when President of WFIL, he
had gone on record as opposing an all out fight with the AFM.
He indicated that he felt that there was considerable merit in
the unemployment claim espoused by Petrillo. It will be re-
membered that the NAB was, of sorts, the unofficial leader of
the opposition to Petrillo and the AFM during the 1942 ban.
Rosenbaum had prOposed a plan whereby all commercial users of
recorded music should pay a royalty for the use Of such music
into an independent fund to be administered for the purposes
of providing for the employment and the encouragement of live
music. See: Broadcastin , February 1, 1943, pp. 14, 50.
281For some accounts regarding the Operation of and the
227
musical activities supported by the Recording and Transcrip-
tion Fund, the Musicians Performance Trust Fund, and other
trust funds established by the settlement of the TV-film issue
(for the latter, see Footnote 111, Chapter V), see some of the
following: AFM, Cngscendo (New York: AFM, N.D. 1195917: AFM,
Diminuengo (New Yerk: AFM, 1954); AFM, The S r inn Am r -
nnn, e eraiiï¬n n; Musician; (New York: 'IFM, 1953 3 Broad§asé-
ing, pr 1 , 1945, p. 1 3 Leo Cluesmann, 'Music in the Public
terest," Internaiignai Mu ician, 49 (June, 1951), pp. 6-7;
"Free Public oncerts n Phila elphia," inerican Fedenationist,
54 (October, 1947), p. 34; Paul Hume, "A Lot of D. . Music is
Given for Free," I ternatio a Musician, 51 (May, 1953). P. 8;
"Musicians Will Give FFee Concerts, American Fedenatinnist,
54 (May, 1947). p. 34; "Promoting Employment and ive Music,"
ati ï¬nsician, 51 (November, 1952), p. 11; Leonard
駧nto, "ï¬usic ones to Disabled Veterans," Inte tion Muni-
cian 51 (May, 1953), pp. 6-8; James C. Petrillo, "Musicians
TTEEt," ineniian Eederationigt, 62 (June, 1955). pp. 18-22;
James C. e ri o s cians Progress," ingï¬innn_ngeratinnist,
56 (October, 1949 , pp. 33-35: U.S. House 0 epresen a ives,
Committee on Education and Labor, He rin s R str ct ve Union
Pr c i e ni_ he American Fedenation n: gï¬sic ans, t Cong.,
23 089., 19 ’ ppe -19e
The trust funds created by the settlements Of the re-
cording ban of 1948 and the TV-film issue, collectively called
the Musicians Performance Trust Funds by the AFM, were the
subject of an investigation in 1956, see: U.S. House of Re-
presentatives, Committee on Education and Labor, Hearings:
Enninin%§,Penfonnangg Tnnni Ennn, 84th Cong., 2nd ess., 1956.
or the report on these hearings, see: U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, ggngnni
EEE!£$&B£.P2££°£!3n°° Innst Fund, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1956.
CHAPTER IV
CONGRESS INTERVENES: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LEA ACT
A. The Seventy-Seventh Congress
First Hint o Co essio Interest.--One of the first
indications of overt interest of Congress in the activities
of the AFM came a few days after Petrillo notified NBC that it
would not be permitted to carry the Interlochen concerts for
the summer of 1942. Senator Vandenberg of Michigan registered
a strong protest on the floor of the Senate concerning the part
that Petrillo and the AFM had in the cancellation Of the NBC
series of radio concerts featuring the student symphony or-
chestra of the National Music Camp.1 Also, Vandenberg filed
a formal letter of protest with the FCC concerning the
Federation's action.2
The AFM recording ban of 1942 provided the basis for
the next overt action in Congress. Late the following month,
Senator D. Werth Clark of Idaho introduced a resolution (S.
.Res. 286) calling for a full scale investigation of the AFM
and the recording ban.3 The comments of both Senator Clark
—‘
‘— ï¬ï¬ï¬â€˜ —_
188 Cong. Eng. 6284 (1942).
2For text of letter, see: Ibi .
388 CO 2. Rec. 6974 (1942). S. Res. was introduced on
August 27, -F3r text of the resolution, see: 88 gnng.
Rec. 5974-759 (1942)-
228
229
and Vandenberg indicated that at least some of the members of
Congress were looking with disfavor on certain Of the actions
of the AFM, notably the Interlochen affair and the recording
ban." _
Th Ciark Hearings.--On September 17. 18, and 21, 1942,
Senator Clark headed a subcommittee on the Senate Committee on
Interstate Commerce which conducted a preliminary investigation
of the recording ban pursuant to the prOposed resolution (S.
Res. 286).5 The principal testimony at these hearings was
provided by Elmer Davis, Director of the Office of War Infor-
mation; James L. Fly, Chairman of the FCC: and Thurman Arnold,
Chief of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.
Both Davis and Fly emphasized in their testimony that the re-
cording ban was a matter of great concern to their reapective
government agencies because of the possible ill effects of it
on the nation's radio stations.6 It was emphasized that be-
cause many radio stations relied so heavily on recorded music
for programming material, the recording ban would interfere
seriously or even shut Off this important source of program
material and cause stations to lose their audiences. Without
audiences, advertisers would hesitate to invest in broadcasting,
and stations would have to go off the air as a result. In
time of war, they pointed out that this was a very undesirable
l
k
88 Cong.,flgg. 6975-76 (1942)
50.8. Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, Hearings:
Use nilMechanicai Renroduction 9;,Music, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
1942. .
6Ibid., pp. 4-5, 25-26.
230
result because all radio stations were needed to convey vital
war information to the American people. Fly indicated that
the FCC did not have any jurisdiction in the recording ban
from a legal point Of view.7 He indicated that about all the
Commission could do was to make public statements opposing
the AFM action. Arnold, who was in charge of the government's
antitrust suit against the AFM and its officers, revealed
that part Of the basis of the government's case was the pos-
sible ill effects on the nation's radio stations which both
Davis and Fly had outlined.8
As a result Of the investigation, the Committee on
Interstate Commerce recommended to the Senate the following:
The committee is of the Opinion that the pro-
blem presented by this resolution is an urgent one.
' The Nation is engaged in a great war to preserve
the free democratic system, and the conduct Of
that war in the best and most efficient manner is
threatened by the acts and practices which this
resolution prOposes the Senate shall investigate.
The Committee on Interstate Commerce of the
Senate recommends that Senate Resolution 286 be
adapted with the amendment indicated.9
The amendment referred to above was that the Committee be given
35.000 to cover the cost of the investigation.10 On September
7Me. pp. 48-49e
amide ' pp 0 61-620
Other testimony provided by Davis, Fly, and Arnold will
be found in Chapter III, Section D. The testimony Of Fly re-
lating to the extent to which music and its various forms in
broadcasting will be found in Chapter II, Section C.
90. 3. Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, Rengnt:
Investi a ion of Certain Practices of the erican Feds at n
sic ans and Its Pngsident, Zamgs §:7Petrillg, 8. Rep No.
1 14, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1942, p. 2.
10
Ride. Do 10
231
24, the Senate considered 8. Res. 286 and passed it author-
izing Senator Clark and the Committee on Interstate Commerce
to conduct a full scale investigation of the AFM and its
activities concerning the recording ban.11 I
Housn Interest.--During the same period, the House be-
came interested in the actions of the AFM but to a lesser
degree. The House interest had not gone beyond the stage of
a few representatives placing some unfavorable newspaper
articles in the 322229, An article entered by Representative
Hoffman called Petrillo "America's musical Hitler."12 An-
other representative placed in the Recnrd a number of articles
from the A22 £2222 N213 concerning the Interlochen arrair.13
Representative Cox of Georgia entered an article charging an
AFM local with interfering with a Treasury Department program
designed to sell war bonds.1" According to the article,
Local 802 had prevented an amateur music group from participat-
ing on a radio program that was to be carried over a number
of FM stations.
The Ciark Biii.--Near the end of October, Senator
'Clark introduced a bill (S. 2874) designed to cOpe with the
AFM and the recordingban.15 The title of the bill gave some
1188 gpng. .1322- 7402 (1942).
1288 ang. 522. A2776 (1942).
1388 ang. Egg..A2820-3O (1942).
1"88 gong. 59;. 7913 (1942).
1588 ang. Eng. 8562 (1942). s. 2874 was introduced on
October 23. 19 2. No further action was indicated in the 32?
cgrd on this measure. '
232
hint as to its nature: "A bill to prohibit certain contracts,
agreements, conspiracies, end combinations which prevent the
making of recordartions for use by radio broadcasting sta-
tions and coin Operated phonographs."16 No further action
on this measure was indicated in the 532222» Apparently. the
77th Congress came to an end before the Senate could take
any action on the proposed legislation.
B. The Seventy-eighth Congress
Continuatinn 9i Clark Hganings.--One of the first ac-
tions of Senator Clark in the new Congress was to introduce
an identical bill (S. 149) to the one he had introduced
during the last Congress.17 This was necessary as measures
not enacted are not carried over from one Congress to the
next. On January 21, 1943. Clark submitted S. Res. 81 to
the Committee on Interstate Commerce asking for authority
to continue the investigation of the AFM and the recording
ban.18 The senator needed the authority renewed since the
resolution of the last Congress authorizing the investigation
did not carry over to the 78th Congress, either. A week
later, Clark submitted a favorable report of his committee On
the resolution to the Senate. This committee reported the
Clark resolution to the floor of the Senate on February 4,
‘— v w —
16Ibid.
1789 Con . Rec. 35 (1943). S. 149 was introduced on
January 7. l9 3. No further action was indicated in the ï¬n:
conn on this measure.
1889 Cong. 523. 258 (1943).
233
1943 and asked for immediate consideration.19 The Senate
agreed to the resolution. Clark now had authority to con-
tinue his investigation of the AFM.
More Clark Hearings.--Clark and his subcommittee heard
testimony on January l2, l3, and 14, 1943 from AFM officials.20
The principals at these sessions were Petrillo and the coun-
sel for the AFM, Joseph A Padway. Throughout their testimony,
Petrillo and Padway emphasized that what the AFM was concerned
with and always had been was with the protection of job
Opportunities of its members. They stated that the Federation
did not necessarily want higher wages but more importantly,
it wanted more money spent for the employment of a greater
number of musicians. It was brought out in the testimony
that no demands had been presented to the recording and
transcription companies by the AFM thus far during the course
of the recording ban. It was in this area that Clark and his
subcommittee made their biggest contribution to the settle-
ment of the ban. They got Petrillo to agree to formulate
demands and submit them to the companies for their considera-
tion. The hearings adjourned on this agreement. Petrillo
fulfilled his agreement early the following month and pre-
sented to the recording industry the plan which was to ultimate-
ly provide the basis for the final settlement of the dispute?1
1989 CO . 52p. 570 (1943). Text of S. Res. 81 will
be found at 3 place in the Recong.
20NAB, ï¬n, AFM Bul., No. 15. January 22, 1943, pp. 1-35.
(These hearings were unpublished, see Footnote 32, Chapter I.)
21
For a more detailed account of the settlement of the
recording ban, see Chapter III, Section D.
234
Other Congressional Action to March 1944.--Shortly af-
ter Clark had obtained authority in early February to continue
the investigation of the AFM and its activities, the Congres-
sional interest in the Union appeared to wane. Only two
minor actions were noted in the ggnnnn_prior to March 1944.
In mid-February of 1943, Representative Gossett made a few
comments on the floor of the House concerning the AFM.22 He
charged that the AFM was a monOpoly with which the government
should deal. Also, he called Petrillo a "racketeer." Then
in early July of 1943, Senator Tunnell introduced a bill
(S. 1333) "to make unlawful certain practices relating to the
making of records for radio transcriptions and for other
purposes."23 The Recgrd contained no mention of further
action on this measure throughout the remainder of the 78th
Congress.
Pubiic and Press Rgaction.--It will be remembered that
the controversy generated by the AFM's actions in the Inter-
lochen dispute and the recording ban almost literally engulfed
the country in a storm of protest directed at the Federa-
24
tion. Public and press reactions were running very high
against the Union. Despite the intensity of this indignation,
the whole affair managed to quiet down in early 1943 and
remained quiet until early 1944. Little notice Of the AFM
_ — ———
2289 Cong. 323. 951 (1943).
2389 Cnng. 333. 7423 (1943). S. 1333 was introduced on
July 8, 1943.
2"For a more detailed account Of the public and press
reaction associated with the Interlochen affair and the record-
ing ban of 1942, see Chapter III, Sections C and D, respectively.
235
and its activities was taken in the press during this period.
Also, it will be noted that this period coincided with a
period of inactivity and apparent lack of interest in Con-
gress regarding the Union.
Clark Hearings Reggen.--Shortly after Petrillo made
the mistake of boasting about how no more amateurs had been
broadcast by the networks since the Interlochen incident
in 1942, Dr. Maddy called this to the attention of the Senate
Committee on Interstate Commerce.25 This provided the impetus
for the Clark subcommittee to reapen the investigation of
the AFM around the middle of March, 1944.25 Maddy was the
star witness at these proceedings. He recounted his experi-
ences with the AFM with regard to the Interlochen affair.
During these sessions, Clark asked Rosel Hyde, then assistant
general counsel for the FCC, to prepare legislative drafts to
cover the Interlochen incident and to send them to the Depart-
ment of Justice for study. It is not known what resulted
from this request. However, the Record does not indicate
that Senator Clark introduced any legislation after these
hearings. As has been indicated previously, Senator Clark
and his associates never did publish these hearings nor did
they offer any report on them to the Senate.27
‘V—— ———
2SFbr a more detailed account of Petrillo's comments
which enraged Dr. Maddy, see Chapter III, Section C.
26F‘or accounts, see: adcast , March 27, 1944,
pp. 26, 28, 36; New York Times, March 1 , 1944, p. 28:1.
(These hearings were unpu lished, see Footnote 32, Chapter I.)
27
See Footnote 32, Chapter I.
236
Senator Vandenberg Acts.--Senator Vandenberg of Michi-
gan introduced a bill in late May of 1944 which was prompted
by the Interlochen incident.28 It will be noted that Vanden-
berg represented the state in which the National Music Camp
was located. The prOposed legislation was "to amend the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, so as to prohibit
interference with the broadcasting of noncommercial, cultural,
or educational programs."29 In his comments when introducing
the measure, the senator revealed his intent: "The chief
and important objective is to release the music of American
school children from the domination of James C. Petrillo."30
Vandenberg's bill was referred to the Senate Committee
on Interstate Commerce at the time of its introduction. It
was not until late November that the bill was finally re-
ported out of the committee.31 The report which accompanied
S. 1957 recommended that the measure be passed by the
Senate.32 A letter from FCC Chairman Fly was contained in
the report. Fly implied FCC approval by indicating that
insofar as the prOposed legislation was designed to prevent
the recurrence of incidents such as the Interlochen affair,
i~ ‘7 —— w
2890 Con . 523. 5074 (1944). S. 1947 was introduced
on May 29, 19 .
Em.
3(’90 93g. 392. 5075 (1944).
3190 9995. see. 8537 (1944). s. 1957 was reported out
of Committee on November 29, 1944. .
32U.S. Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, Re 0 t:
Amendment to the C mmunica ions Act, S. Rep. No. 1233. 7 t
Cong., 2nd Sess., 19 , p. .
237
it represented "a desirable objective†and merited "considera-
tion."33 About two weeks later, the Senate passed the Vanden-
berg bill without debate.34 Before the House had time to
act on the measure, the 78th Congress came to a close, ending
any chance of immediate Congressional approval of the legisla-
tion proposed by vandenberg.
C. The Seventy-ninth Congress
The Vandenberg Prepgsal and the New Coggrgss.--Having
seen his prOposed legislation killed with the ending of the
previous Congress, the first thing that Vandenberg did in
the new Congress was to introduce another identical bill
(S. 63) on January 6, 1945.35 The bill was read for the
first time and then referred to the Senate Committee on Inter-
state Commerce. Another bill (H.R. 1648), identical to the
Vandenberg measure, was introduced in the House by Representa-
tive Dondero of Michigan about two weeks later.36 It would
seem that Vandenberg wanted to make sure that some kind of
action would be taken by the new Congress against Petrillo
and the AIM.
33
M.-
3 90 c . 9431- 32 (1944). 3.1947 was passed by
the Senate on ecem r 14,1944. The text of the bill will be
found at this place in the 332223. Also, the version of the
bill in Appendix A is essentially the same as the bill at this
stage of development.
::91 9235,. _g_, 77 (1945).
3691 Qgg§,R . 431 (1945). H.R. 1648 was introduced
on January 2 945.
238
The Vandenberg bill (S. 63) was considered by the
Senate on February 1, 1945 and was passed by unanimous con-
sent.37 Four days later, the bill was referred to the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.38 Indications
in the Senate report which accompanied the bill to the House
showed that the Senate action was prompted to a large extent
by the AFM ban on the radio broadcasts of the National Music
Camp at Interlochen, Michigan.39 Also, contained in the
report was a cepy of the letter from FCC Chairman Fly which
implied FCC approval of the measure. The Regggg_indicated
that no further action was taken on either of the prOposed
bills (8. 63 and H.R. 1648) during the rest of the First
Session.
{pageggacy 2f the Vagggnbgzg Meagggg.--The Vandenberg
bill prepcsed to make it unlawful for anyone to interfere with
the broadcasting of noncommercial, educational or cultural
programs of a tax exempt, academically accredited educational
institution provided that the commercial radio station carry-
ing the program was doing it free of charge.40 Also, such
interference with a program would not be unlawful if it was .
part of a more general action in which the purpose was not
specifically to cause interference to this kind of program.
‘— —-v _ _ r-
3791 2995. see. 698 (1945).
390.8. Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, 5!?
ggï¬Ã©f’ fgfn%g%§¥;tÂ¥9§§?,g. . a s Adi. 3. Rep. No. 9, 79th
4°For text of the bill, s. 63, see Appendix A.
239
The purpose of this latter qualification appears to have
been an attempt, for example, to exempt a strike from the
provisions of this proposed law which was being conducted
for higher wages which.might, incidently, cause interference
to a protected educational program.
Hearings on the proposed legislation were scheduled
for late February. These hearings were probably scheduled
as a partial result of the pessimism with which the Vandenberg
measure was being received in some quarters. In early February,
just-before the hearings, the AFM announced the TV‘ban. Also,
besides the Interlochen affair and the entire question of .
amateurs on the air, the broadcasting industry was very con-
cerned about the secondary boycotts that the AFM'was institu-
ting against the networks in the attempt to increase local
employment."1 These tended to have a restrictive effect on
programming which many people were aware of. Also, there
were other activities that the AIM was engaging in during
this time that do not fall within the sccpe of this study
which many were resentful of.“2 At this point, there were
_—‘ —w_ —-——
‘1Fbr more details of these AFM actions, see Chapter
III.
42The AFM's actions during the decade of the forties
were not limited to Just those contained in this study. In
the mid-forties, the Aflihad demanded that the broadcasting
industry employ its members to load and unload the turntables
used to air recordings and transcriptions. The Federation
was even successful in getting the networks and their owned and
operated stations to agree to this demand. See: .131 m"
19“. pp. 61-62.
However, it was generally considered to be the work of
the broadcast technicians to load and unload turntables and
their union, the National Association of Broadcast Employees
and Technicians, objected to this agreement on the grounds
240
other things besides the Interlochen situation which prompted
support for Congressional action against Petrillo and his
Union. The vandcnberg bill was designed specifically for the
prevention of any further incidents such as Interlochen. Some
of the other activities of the Federation that some wished to
control were not covered in the prOposed legislation as it
then stood. Hence, there was criticism that the Vandenberg
bill was not broad enough to cover all of the situations that
it might be desirable to central.
W M expressed grave doubts with respect
to the Vandenberg bill's ability to fulfill its intended
v—‘v‘ “ ‘— i
of encroachment of its Jurisdiction. The result was a long
proceeding before the National Labor Relations Board which
finally ended up in the courts before it was settled. For
hi lights of the dispute, see: Bzï¬adcast%%g, January 22,
19 5, p. 58: April 9 1945, p. 30; ugust , 1945, p. 18;
October 1, 1945, p. 83. The AFM was not successful in enforc-
ing this demand.
With regard to the above demand, the AFM struck two
local stations in late 1944 and early 1945 in the attempt to
enforce it. The two stations involved were KSTP in Minneapolis,
and WJJD in Chicago. Before these two strikes were settled,
Petrillo and the Federation defied the War Labor Board and
refused to go back to work. It will be remembered that the
war had not yet ended and such action on the part of the
Union was not favorably received by the American public.
For highlights of these disputes see: §22§2§2§ELEEo May 8,
1944, pp. 11, 51; August 21, 19 , pp. 10, 2; ebruary 19,
1945, p. 14: New,Â¥o Tings, May 2, 1944, pp. 1:2, 13:3.
The above g ves some suggestion of some of the other
activities of the AFM that many peeple were resentful of.
One of the limitations that was placed on this study was
that the activities and policies of the AFM had to have some
kind of observable effect on broadcast programming to be
included. It was felt that such activities as the above
did not have such an observable effect and hence, were ex-
cluded. Other activities that were excluded related to the
Union's activities in the area of theatre employment. Some
of its actions in these other areas, such as the theatre,
attracted public notice during the forties, also.
241
purpose.43 An editorial in the £31,22gghggmgg suggested
that the bill did not strike at the heart of the problem.M
It indicated that what might be needed was a "re-examination
of the whole existing body of Federal Labor 1aw."45 At about
the same time, the public ire was being aroused by the war
Labor Board's disclosure that the AFM‘had been engaging in
featherbedding practices in the face of serious wartime man
pcwershortagcs.46 Even before the House committee had
heard any testimony, its chairman, Representative Lea, indi-
catcd that he might press for amendments to the Senate bill to
provide for punitive provisions.“7 The Vandenberg bill, as
passed by the Senate, did not contain any such provisions.
The Lga Hea;ings.--On February 22 and 23, 1945, Lea
and his committee held hearings on S. 63 and H.R. 1648, the
bills introduced by Vandenberg and Dondero, respectively.48
Principal witnesses at these sessions were FCC Chairman
Paul A. Porter, and Dr. Maddy, president of the National
Music Camp. Even before any testimony was heard, four members
of the committee expressed doubts that the Vandenberg measure
‘ ‘ ~—
432111112931 3223,. February 17. 1945. p. 108.
MM 293:! 11932. February 8. 1945. p. 18:2.
4512199
46% January 22, 1945. p. 58.
47%. February 12, 1945, p. 15.
48U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, Hearings: Igt_zg%gggg% with ngadggsting
gf'N n Educatigggl? ms, 9th ong., let ess.,
194 9 Pp. ‘ o
242
would correct the "evils" it was intended to correct.49 The
conccnsus of the four representatives was that probably the
bill would have to be enlarged to encompass all of the
â€evils" that needed to be proscribed. ‘
Porter Testimony.--Porter told the committee that the
FCC was still in favor of the bill.50 He expressed the same
point of view about the bill that had been expressed by his
predecessor, Fly. Chairman Porter commented on the restric-
tive implications of the Interlochen ban as it was related to
the control of broadcast programming and the public service
responsibility of broadcast licensees:
The evil inherent in the ban by the American
Federation of Musicians on the Interlochen broadcasts
so far as broadcasting is concerned is twofold. In
the first place, this action of the American Federa-
tion of Musicians results in a severe restriction
being imposed upon what may be broadcast over the
air. Under the American system of broadcasting,
as you know, the Government is expressly forbidden
to dictate to broadcasters what shall and what
shall not be broadcast. But more than this is neces-
sary if radio is really to be free. we must make
sure that no arbitrary restrictions are imposed by
private groups concerning material which shall be
braodcast. It is the Commission's constant endeavor
to see that the radio industry keeps itself as free
as possible of all unreasonable fetters so that
radio stations are in a position to discharge their
obligation of operating in the public interest.
Radio's ability to fulfill this obligation is ham-
pered fully as much when its freedom of action is
imposed upon by a labor organization as when it is
self-imposed. If an organization can prevent radio
stations from broadcasting a concert by high school
'students, a precedent is established where by broad-
casts of speeches forums, conventions, and so forth,
will be prevented. Such precedents should not be
permitted to be established.
_. ————v ‘—
M‘! pp. 3' 7e 1°e
503219.. p. 11.
49
243
The second evil is found in the effect of the
American Federation of Musicians' action on small
radio stations. we all are familiar with the fact
that most of the professional talent is concentrated
in the large cities. For the small stations this
means that it must to a great extent rely on amateur
talent which it can find or develcp in the commun-
ity. Many of these communities have a good deal
of latent talent that can be develOped to the bone-
fit cf both the talent and the community: this is
particularly true of communities which have univer-
sities located nearby. However, the action of the
American Federation of Musicians prevents radio
stations from using musical talent of this kind,
and if the American Federation of Musicians can pre-
vent the use of musical talent other groups will
direct this activity to dramatic groups, singers,
etc. Such action would force small radio stations
to either broadcast network programs all day or to
use records and transcriptions instead of develOp-
ing their own talent individually and contributing
to the growth of the community.
I think that from what I have said you can
realize the importance as far as radio is concerned,
of preventing arbitrary restrictions on the use of
noncommercial educational or cultural programs such
as that of Interlochen.51
Porter told the committee that he felt corrective measures
should be taken with respect to the AFM but, at the same
time, be indicated that Congress should proceed in such a
fashion that the legitimate rights of organized labor would
be protected.52
Joseph Maddy retold the story of the Interlochen inci-
dent.53 This was the third time that Maddy had been before
‘
511bIbzgee ppe 11-12e
Borter' s second objection relating to the develOpment
of local amateur talent was incorporated intoU the B%%e Bo
which was released the following year, see: Pu ic
Service 3°9E°§9121ll§§ %I.B§2adca§t LicenseesU (FCC Report,
PO 9 PP- '
52U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate
and Foreisn Commerce. .__L.§Hear1n 8: We .le h W
g1__%g_ggg§gggigl,Educatiogg; :ggzams, 79th Cong., lst Sess.,
p. 1 .
5311214" pp. 18-24 ff.
244
a Congressional committee to relate his encounter with the
AFM. Maddy revealed that the AFM had placed the National
Music Camp on the Union's unfair list. Such action by the
Federation would virtually make it impossible to put the con-
certs back on the air. Contracts between broadcasters and
the AFM precluded such a possibility. In effect, Maddy told
the Committee, the proposed law had been nullified before it
was passed as far as Interlochen was concerned.
At these sessions in February, Lea entered into the
record of the hearings two correspondences from organizations
which supported Congressional action. The National Congress
of Parents and Teachers urged the passage of the bill in a
telegram.‘34 A letter from the National Commission for the
Defense of Democracy through Education gave its support to
the corrective measure pending before Congress that was to
cepe with the AFM.55 An enclosure in the letter indicated
that the National Education Association endorsed the Congres-
sional efforts, also.
The May Contingatign of the Egg Heg;iggs,--During the
course of the February hearings, Lea became convinced that the
Vandenberg measure was too limited in its scope to cover the
kinds of AFM activities that he felt warranted Congressional
censure. This point of view was expressed in a letter of
invitation that he sent to the NAB to appear before further
wï¬ â€˜â€” w
54am†I» 58.
55
MM P0 550
245 ‘
hearings which were scheduled for May.56 He wanted the NAB
to provide any information about the activities of the AFM
that might need regulating. The hearings were finally held
on May 8 and 10, 1945.57 The principal witnesses at these
sessions represented the industry. They were J. Harold Ryan,
NAB president, and Sydney M. Kaye, special counsel for the
NAB.-
Ryan Tcstimony.--Ryan cited many instances of AFM inter-
vention in broadcast activities, among them were the TV ban,
the secondary boycotts, alleged restrictions on amateur
broadcasts, as well as a number of problems that related
strictly to collective bargaining.58 with respect to the
prosposed legislation, Ryan told the committee the following:
I have not appeared before you as the advocate
or sponsor of any specific piece of legislation.
Nor have I any specific legislation to suggest. I
do not believe the bill which is before you success-
fully meets any phase of the problem which has been
outlined. That the problem exists and that it must
be remedied, however, I hope that this pre-
sentation of the bald facts has made clear....
At the present time we have no remedy when we
are confronted with demands which are unjust.59
Kaye Kaye's Testimony.--Kaye's testimony collaborated the
testimony of Ryan.60 With respect to the prOposed legislation,
551%. Am 55 gig... No. 2 (Vol. 13), March 5, 1945, p. 2.
57U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce,-gfgf§§g§:l Interference wiéh adcast-
éag 21 Noncg?e?ia1 E uca W 9t ong., ls
.Bae. ppe e
53m" pp. 65-86.
59m" p. 86.
60113.11" PP- 87-103.
246
Kaye stated:
....in this matter, I should say, it would clearly
indicate tgat the existing laws did not meet the
situation. 1
....If you want to reach these issues, it is es-
sential that legislation be passed, because the
present6%aws are wholly ineffective in that dir-
ection.
In summing up, the two representatives of the broadcast-
ing industry were of the opinion that there were no laws on
the federal statute book which could be used to step the
activities of the AFM that affected broadcasting adversely.
Both men were in favor of Congressional action in order to
remedy the existing situation. Also, they felt the Vanden-
berg measure was totally inadequate to cape with the situa-
tion as it then existed. Broadcasting reported that Chairman
Lea and his House committee became convinced as the hearings
progressed that the proposed legislation was not adequate
and that other means would have to be devised to stop the
Union interference with broadcasting.63
Other AFM Activities.--Things remained rather quiet
throughout the summer of 1945, but in the fall, public reac-
tion was aroused again by a series of actions of the AFM. In
mid-September, one minor incident associated with the TV ban
attracted attention. A Union organist was prohibited from
participating in a Jewish religious program over a Chicago
‘.
61Ibi ., p. 102.
e
62
Ibid., p. 103.
6
3Broadcastigg, May 14, 1945, p. 17.
247
television station.64 In the following month, Petrillo
announced one of the AFM policies which affected FM.65 After
October 31, 1945, a double crew would have to be employed for
all network music programs broadcast simultaneously over AM
and FM. Then, in the following month, this policy was en-
larged somewhat. The announcement of the FM policies was
followed by a storm of protest from the industry with cries
that these actions would set back the progress of FM for
years. Chairman Porter publicly stated that there was not a
thing the FCC could do about these AFM policies which adverse-
ly affected FM. Before these situations had a chance to be
resolved, the AFM instituted the international music ban.66
This policy almost totally curtailed the broadcasting of
musicial programs originating outside the United States and
Canada. The international ban caused a storm of protest not
only in this country but overseas, also.
In the closing moments of the let Session of the 79th
Congress, Lea introduced a bill (H.R. 4737) in the House on
November 19, 1945. .Its title, "A.bill to prevent control of
broadcasting by coercive practices," suggested that it was a
broader measure than the one originally introduced by Senator
Vandenberg.67 No further action was indicated in the m
on this particular bill.
__
'64For an account, see: Baggggggtlgg, September 17,
1945, p. 90c
65
For moreodiscussicn, see Chapter III, Section F.
66For more discussion, see Chapter III, Section G.
5791 gong, 32;. 10826 (1945).
248
The Second Session.--In the cpening proceedings of
the 2nd Session, Representative Lea introduced still another
bill (H.R. 5117) which was broader that either the Vandenberg
bill (S. 63) and the one (H.R. 4737) he had introduced near
the close of the last sossion.68 The language of this bill
was essentially the same as the language of the act as it
was finally passed: the only changes were of a minor nature.69
The essential content and provisions were identical. Its
title was "A.bill to amend Title V of the Communications
Act of 1934 so as to prohibit certain coercive practices
affecting radio broadcasting." The Egg,xgg§“2imgg indicated
that Lea admitted that the bill was directed at the activi-
ties cf Petrillo and the AFM.70 The‘ggggg also pointed out
that. the timing of the international ban was such that it
allowed Lea to make a last minute addition which prohibited
interference with foreign broadcasts.71
e Lea C t e Re .--H.R. 5117, the measure
introduced by Lee, was reported favorably out of the Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.72 The report which ac-
companied the bill provided some hint of the general temper
‘ _‘ w
6892 Eggs, Be_. 17 (1945).
d1 B 69For text of the bill as finally passed, see Appen-
X e
7033!,Zgnggymgg, January 15, 1946, p. 336.
"leis.
72U. 8. House of Representatives, Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce nghibiaing Ce
$§E§amoW9WHm up- No. ï¬oe 'pï¬ 1
0116., SBe,
249
of the men in the House who were working actively to curb the
activities of the ARM.
About the general purpose of the proposed legislation,
the report stated: I
For some years the radio broadcasters of the
Nation have been harrassed by ever-increasing ex-
tortionate and racketeering demands to which they
have been forced to yield by coercive methods. The
tributes thus exacted are now measured by millions
of dollars.
These exactions have not been in compensation
for services performed for broadcasters or in set-
tlement of any obligations due from them. They have
not been made for the enforcement of any rights due
those who demanded them.
The object of this prOposed legislation is to
put an end to these exacticns for the protection of
the broadcasting industry and for the integrity of
the Nation.73
The committee report alleged that the so-called tribute
that the AFM was demanding and getting from the broadcasting
industry amounted to â€probably much in excess of $20,000,000
a year.â€74 No evidence in support of this charge was con-
tained in the report. It will be noted that the Congressmen
qualified the allegation with â€probably.†It seems doubtful
that this charge would have been true in fact. The wages that
the ARM were receiving from their services in the broadcasting
industry from all sources (includes not only stations and
networks,-but sponsors and advertising agencies) was in the
neighborhood of twenty million dollars in l9#4 and 1945. If
the charges made in the report were true, this would have meant
that the AFM and its members were receiving from the industry
73Me. pe 1e
74m" p- 3.
250
an annual sum in the forty to fifty million dollar range.
This would have been equal to more than one half of the
industry's total income (total revenues less total expenses)
before federal taxes for 1944 and 1945 or equal to about one
forth to one third of the total expenses for the same years.75
It might be that all money received by the AFM or its mem-
bers from the broadcasting industry was considered by the
committee as tribute irrespective of whether it was legiti-
mate or not despite the report's avowal to the contrary. If
this were the case the sum contained in the charge could have
been accurate, but such a definition of tribute would have been
unjustifiable. However, given the temper of the times and
the attitude toward the AFM, such a definition could have
been endorsed.
The report also enumerated some of the "evils" that
the Congressman wished to have corrected by the bill intro-
duced by Lea:
Broadcasting has become one of the great in-
dustries of our time. It is now one of the chief
means of communication of our Nation. It is one of
our greatest implements for free speech. It prompt-
_ly carries news to the remotest sections of the
country. It is a forum for the discussion of our
political, economic, and social problems. It is a
source of information, education, entertainment,
music, culture, and a vehicle for the messages of
all religions, utilized by practically every home
in the Nation.
In recent years the broadcasting industry has
been subjected to extortionate demands enforced
by coercive methods which increasingly threaten to
‘w *7 V ._ ï¬
275
For wages paid to musicians and income data, see
Tables 11 and 12, respectively, in Chapter II.
251
restrict and handicap it in performing its right-
ful functions to the Nation.
Those making these demands, empowered by organi-
zed groups, not only have exacted tributes from
the broadcasters but have assumed and exerted the
power to say what shall and shall not be communi-
cated over radio. True, they have limited their
dominations and demands to purposes which serve
their particular groups, but nevertheless they have
set a pattern for a like power of private control
exerted for mercenary purposes over other phases
of the broadcasting industry of the Nation. The
same power exercised for other purposes, if per-
mitted might make the right of free speech only a
name and estabiish censorship of broadcasting for
private gain.7
Despite all of their emotionality, it will be noted from the
above that at least some of the Congressmen recognized one of
the basic issues associated with the actions of the AFM was
related to the control that tended to be exerted by the Fedora-
tion over broadcast programming.
The report also contained a summary of the so-called
"coercive practices†that the committee alleged the Union was
guilty of:
The local broadcasters of the Nation are
greatly dependent on the networks for rounding out
their programs. This situation had augmented the
coercive power of the Federation of Musicians in
forcing compliance with its demands. Through
coercive efforts, including boycotts and strikes,
and threats of boycotts and strikes against broad-
casters, the networks and those who furnish mater-
ials for broadcasters, the industry has been forced
to comply rather than suffer penalizations that
would follow a refusal to submit to these extortion-
ate demands.
Among other things, the following demands upon
the broadcasting industry have thus been made in
recent years: That broadcasters employ persons in
excess of the number wanted; that in lieu of failure
t t 7EUTS. Sous; of Representatives, Committee on Inter-
s a e an oreign ommerce Repert: nghibiï¬ing Certaig Cgez-
cave Pragtiggs e ti Bigadgasting, .3. ep. No. 8,
p . 1, 9th on
3., 2nd ess., l9 , p. 2.
252
to employ such persons the broadcaster should
pay to the federation sums of money equivalent to
or greater than funds required for the employment
of members of the federation; that payments for
services already performed and fully paid for should
be repeated; that payments should be made for services
not performed; that broadcasters should refrain from
broadcasting noncompensated noncommercial educational
or cultural programs; that broadcasters should re-
frain from broadcasting musical programs of foreign
origin; that tributes should be paid for using re-
cordings, transcriptions, and other materials used
for broadcasting; that restrictions should be placed
on the manufacture and use of recordings and tran-
scriptions for the purpose of restricting and pre-
venting the use cf such materials for broadcasting;
that tributes should be paid for recordings previous-
ly paid for; that dual orchestras should be employed
for a single broadcast over two or more outlets;
that over 400 small broadcast stations in the coun-
try be compelled to employ such orchestras: that
the use of voluntary noncompensated orchestras be
barred from broadcasts unless an orchestra of the
Federation of Husicians were also employed or that
the union was paid an equivalent or greater amount
than the regular charge for a federation orchestra.77
nggisions and Intent 9f the Lea geasuzg.78--Subsection
(a) of the prcposed bill as reported out of committee by Lea
and his associates would make unlawful acts involving the
"and" p. 3.
78The following discussion at this point was primarily
designed to apply to the proposed Lea bill at the time it was
reported out of the House Committee on Interstate and.Foreign
Commerce. All of the references to the prOposed bill and its
provisions are based on the version of the bill at that time
which was contained in the report which accompanied it out of
committee. For text of the bill, see: U. S. House of Represen-
tativgzi Committee cg Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Re 0 t:
2%. 3 ing eréain oercive Practices Affecting Bfgadcastigg,
9 :8. . l O , p . 1, 9th ong., 2n Sess.,
pp. " 0
However, since the version of it as it was reported out
of committee was essentially the same as the bill that was
actually passed, the discussion at this point which relates to
the provisions and intent is applicable to the Lea bill as it
was finally passed with one exception. Subsection (d) regard-
ing the penal provisions was amended with reduced penalities.
This will be discussed later.
253
"use or express or implied threat of the use of force, vio-
lence, intimidation, or duress, or by the use or express or
implied threat of the use of other means, to coerce, compel,
or constrain or attempt to coerce compel or constrain" a
broadcast licensee to do any of the following:79
1. Tc employ or agree to employ more persons than
are needed for the conduct of broadcast business;
2. To pay or agree to pay more persons than are needed
for the normal conduct of broadcast business;
3. To pay or agree to pay more than once for services
performed;
4. To pay or agree to pay for services not performed;
5. To refrain or agree to refrain from broadcasting
noncommercial educational or cultural programs
performed by unpaid performers on a noncommercial
basis;
6. To refrain or agree to refrain from broadcasting
any radio communication originating outside the
United States.
Items 1 and 2 listed above represented an attempt to
put a stop to the Union's practice of forcing stations to
hire more musicians than were actually needed. In orther
words, the attempt was to prevent the AFM from enforcing
its quota rules. It will be remembered that the common ob-
jective of the network remote band strikes in the early part
of the forties was often to force the affiliated stations to
hire additional musicians. The objective then, was to put a
stop to such actions of the Union designed to force broad-
casters to hire or pay for musicians not needed in the normal
conduct of broadcast business.
79For text of subsection (a), see: Ibid.
254
Items 3 and 4 were to be directed against the AFM's
so-called "standby demands." Such demands were manifested
in the directive that was issued by Petrillo which touched
off the FM problem:
....beginning Honday, October 29, 1945, wherever
musicians play for FM broadcasting and AM broad-
casting simultaneously, the same number of men
must be employed for FM broadcasting as are employed
for AM broadgasting, which means a double crew must
be employed. 0
The objective of these sections was to prevent the AFM from
forcing broadcasters to employ standby musicians or to pay
money directly to the Union in lieu of the employment of
standbys.
Items 5 and 6 are more or less self-explanatory. Item
5 was to be directed against the recurrence of incidents
such as Interlochen. Its intent, according to Lea, was as
follows:
This was designed primarily to prevent Mr. Petrillo's
ban on the Interlochen, Michigan Music Camp broad-
casts, but it applies, also, to local school and
other amateur bands, service bands, etc. when per- 8
formances is without pay and in the public interest. 1
The last item grew out of the AFM ban on the broadcasting of
musical programs originating outside the United States and
Canada which became effective on the first day of 1946.
Subsection (b) of the prOposed Lea measure contained
three provisions with respect to the broadcast use of record-
ings and transcriptions. These provisions were introduced
with the same language as the six provisions contained in
80%. PPOOOOde, 1946’ Do 50.
8lsroadcestin , April 15, 1945, p. 104.
255
subsection (a) with one exception. Whereas subsection (a)
was applicable only in cases of coercion involving broadcast
licensees, subsection (b) was applicable to coercion involv-
ing anyone. Any actual or attempted coercive act which
forced a broadcast licensee or any other person to do any
of the following were to be unlawful:82
1. To pay or agree to pay an exaction for the privi-
lege to broadcasting any kind of recordings;
2. To accede to or impose any restriction on the use
of any kind of recordings or recording equipment
fer broadcast purposes;
3. To pay or agree to pay any exaction for the re-
broadcast cf recorded or transcribed programs for
which services have been previously paid.
The items in subsection (b) probably grew out of the
recording ban of 1942 and the settlement which resulted in
the payment of royalties on all recordings manufactured to
a fund to be used by the Union for mitigating the effects of
technological unemployment. Subsection (b) represented some
attempt at preventing or at least controlling such funds.
However, Representative Lea indicated that such funds created
by future contracts would not be unlawful per se but that the
determining factor would be whether coercion was involved
and whether the record makers entered into such contracts
willingly.83
*— h
82For the text, of subsection (b), see: U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
Re rt: P hibitin Ce tain Co ve P ctices fe ti ngad-
ï¬g, 111%. 5p. go. {505, pt. g, ’79tï¬ Cong., 2n Sess.,
' pe 0e
83Broadcastin , April 15. 1945, p. 104.
256
Also, Item 3 related to a practice that was not in-
cluded in this study as a practice which tended to have an
observable restrictive effect on broadcast programming. It
was to apply to the forced payment of residuals through
coercive means when recordings and transcriptions were used
more than once. If a broadcaster agreed willingly to pay
added or additional fees for the rebroadcast of transcriptions,
such agreements would not be construed as unlawful under the
84
proposed legislation according to its author. The payment
of residuals had to be accompanied by coercion before it
would come under the prohibitions of the bill.
The Lee committee's report made some comments with
respect to the "broad" language which introduced subsections
(a) and (b) which the committee felt.it was forced to use in
order to endow the proposed law with some degree of effec-
tiveness:
It has been necessary to use the broad language
â€or by the use or eXpress or implied threat of the
use of other means" in order to make the legislation
effective. It was necessary to use language broad
enough to embrace actual or threatened boycotts and
actual or threatened strikes, because these, as well
as action or threatreatened action of like character,
could well be among the means by which the coercion,
compulsion or constraint prohibited by the bill may
be accomplished or attempted to be accomplished. If
the language were not this broad the legislation
would fail to accomplish ts purpose.
This subsection [Ta does not prohibit the
right to strike or to withhold services, or force
individuals to work againt sic their will or
desire. It will place no lim ation whatsoever on
the use of strikes for the accomplishment of legi-
timate objectives, such as wage increases or better
84Ibid.
257
working conditions. What it does do is to pro-
hibit the accomplishment, by actual or attempted
coercion, compulsion, or constraint, of certain un-
conscionable and wrongful objectives regardless of
the means used. A strike or threat to strike is
one method by which it is possible to exert or at-
tempt to exert such coercion, compulsion or cons-
traint, and, if it is the method used, the wrongful
character of the offense is the same as though other
means have been used.85
In addition to the two subsections outlined above,
the Lea bill contained three other short subsections. Sub-
section (c) provided that the law could not be used as a
means of circumventing a contract or legal obligation law-
fully entered into and legally binding. Penal provisions
were contained in subsection (d). Willful violation of any
provision of the proposed law, upon conviction, would carry
with it a maximum fine of 85.000 or imprisonment fer not
more than two years, or both. The last subsection, (c),
defined a broadcast licenses as including â€the owner or
owners, and the person or persons having control or manage-
ment, of the radio station in respect of which a station
license has been granted."86
The gcusg Passes the Lea Mgasgzg.--Apparently, the
House was rather stirred up about Petrillo and the AFM and was
desirous of taking some overt action against them. At any
rate, in the middle of February, the House Rules Committee
took steps which resulted in hastening the consideration of
d F 850.8a House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate
an oreign ommerce Re t: ngï¬ibithpg Cï¬gta%g Coe i e
P ct ces Affegting H Egcast , . . ep. 0. 08, pt. ,
ong., 2nd ess., 9 , p. 6.
1 85Fbr text of subsections (c). (d). and (0): 309‘ IRL_'-
p. O.
258
the Lea measure.87 On February 21, 1946, the House passed a
resolution (H. Res. 52#) calling for the immediate considera-
tion of the bill introduced by Lea (H.R. 5117).88 The debate
that followed was very spirited and, at times, was accompanied
by boisterous applause and shouting.89
The history of the proposed legislation and was re-
viewed as well as most of the activities of Petrillo and the
AFM which prompted it. much of the argument for the bill
centered around the highly controversial president of the
American Federation of Musicians, James C. Petrillo. Some
of the remarks of Representative Brown illustrated the level
of a good share of the debate. He gave his support to the
bill saying that it was â€specifically designed for the pur-
pose of putting in his place and the cutting down to size a
man by the name of James Caesar Petrillo."9° Also, he re-
called hcw Petrillo had told President Roosevelt and the
Congress that "they could go to hell." He added: "I may
go to hell some day, but not because of James Caesar Petrillo."
Typical of the allegations made against Petrillo was the
following by Representative Boron:
—'—'——— w—V ï¬ï¬
3792 Cong. ago. '1275 (1946): 92 Cong. ago. 1300 (1946).
3892 gong. ago. 1542 (1946). Text of 3. Res. 524 will
be found at: 92 9235, Reg. 1275 (1946).
8992 man. 1542-65 (1945).
In Broadcasti 's report of the House proceedings, it
was characterized as follows: "Four‘hours of stormy debate
were marked by applause and cheers when the name of the AFM
dictator was mentioned critically." See: Broadcasting,
February 25. 1946, p. 15.
9°92 9935. ago. 1547 (1946).
259
He [Petrillg7 is a power-grasping dictator and,
in the realm of his nefarious activities, his ac-
tions are exactly in the same pattern as the dic-
tators over the nations whose Sgwer frenzy brought
the world to the chaos of war.
In reading the House debate, it would be difficult
to forget that Petrillo's middle name happened to have been
â€Caesar." The basic issues involved in the prcposed legisla-
ticn were generally ignored by its prcponents who, as sug-
gested above, centered their argument on Petrillo, his alleged
arbitrary power and abuses, and his middle name. It was fair-
ly evident from their comments during the debate that the
country was generally up in arms against Petrillo and the AFM.
Undoubtedly, many of the Congressmen were under pressure
from â€back-home" to do something about Petrillo and his
Union. Even those members of the House who cpposed the bill
appeared to have been quite apprehensive in their opposition
to it so that it could not be construed as approval of
Petrillo or the activities of the AFM. During the entire
debate not a single Congressmen made a positive statement in
behalf of either Petrillo or the AFM.
The opposition, led by Representative Mercantonio,
objected to the bill on what considered its anti-labor
characteristics. It was feared that the bill would severely
restrict the right to strike of the employees of the broad-
casting industry as guaranteed tc all employees by the Wagner
Act. Marcantonio said that an analysis of the bill revealed
that "it goes further than any other bill that the Congress
9192 Cong. 329. 1556 (1946).
260
has ever had before it with respect to the right to strike."92
He added that the language of the law was so broad that a
musician can go to jail just for going on strike for any pur-
pose whatsoever. Representative Lea defended the bill indi-
cating that this was not true.93 He said that coercion
must be present and for the purposes outlined in the bill's
provisions. He further defended his proposed legislation and
his position that the bill did not limit the right to strike,
per so, by reading the section of his committee's report
which was cited previously in this chapter which disclosed
the intent of the so-called broad language.94
The only other fairly significant point of contention
was related to the penal provisions. In an amendment spon-
sored by Lea, the maximum fine was reduced from 85,000 to
81,000 and the maximum period of imprisonment was cut from
two to one year. The above was the only significant amend-
ment to the proposed bill; all others which were adopted
were minor. Several other amendments, including one by
Marchntonio to delete the phrase â€of the use of other means,"
were rejected by the House.
9992 song. 322. 1545-46 (19A6).
Also, see the minority section of the Lea committee's
report to the House authored by Marcentonio for more of the
argument against the bill: U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Report: 229:
hibiténg Certain Coergive P ctices ec Bzoadggsting
.R. ep. No. 150 , pt. 2, 9 ong., d ess, l9 . '
93
92 9235, ï¬g_. 1559 (1946).
4
9 See text beginning at Footnote 85 of this chapter.
261
The Bill Goes to ngferenge,--The final vote was 222
in favor to A3 in opposition. To prevent the bill (H.R.
5117) from being killed in committee after it was sent back
to the Senate, it was passed as an amendment to the Vanden-
berg bill (S. 63). That is, everything after the enacting
clause of the Vandenberg bill was struck out and substituted
with the provision of the Lea bill. It was thought that
this would force the Senate to submit the bill to a conference
committee. This was exactly what did happen in the Senate.95
The House, over the objections of Representative
Marcantcnio, agreed to the conference asked by the Senate.96
Harcantonio was still objecting to the bill on the grounds
that it infringed on the worker's right to strike. The
House was the first to act on the report of the conference
committee.97 The conferees, by unanimous vote, had agreed to
the substitute measure and recommended that it be passed.
With very little serious discussion or debate, the conference
report was accepted by the House on March 29, 1946 by a vote
of 186 to 16. '
2gbate in the Senate.--The conference report and the
consideration of the revised bill as passed by the House
occasioned a fairly considerable amount of debate in the
Senate.98 Broadcasting reported that the debate lasted about
9592 9235. 593. 1709-1710 (1946).
9592 Eggs, Egg. 1827 (1945)-
9792 9.011.5- ;a_e;_c_:_. 2820-23 (1946)-
9892 £95, 592. 3241958 (1946).
262
four hours.99 The opposition arose with regard to the ques-
tion of whether the bill would restrict the right to strike
and whether it would adversely affect the legitimate rights
of radio employees.100 The reply to these charges was quite
similar to that of Representative Lea with respect to the
same charges in the House.101 In general, the supporters
of the bill were able to dispel the doubts of many of the
Senators in regard to this matter. Also, several senators
expressed great concern that the legislative intent of the
bill be thoroughly understood and that it appear in the
sears-
The approach of the senators who spoke in favor of
the bill dealt more with the basic issues involved in the
legislation. At no time did the Senate debate resolve itself
into a discussion of the middle name of Mr. Petrillo as it
had in the House.
The most significant issues of the proposed legisla-
tion were brought to light rather clearly by Senator White.
He cited the testimony of FCC Chairman Paul Porter at the
â€We. April 15. 1946. p. 15.
100Some of the senators were under pressure from some
of the broadcast talent unions to oppose the Lea bill. The Les
bill were passed, residuals would be outlawed. However, Lea
had stated publicly that it was not the intent of his proposed
legislation to outlaw such arrangements, per se, but rather
only those which were obtained through coercion. Some of
the big name stars that contacted some of the senators in
this regard were Bob HOpe, Bing Crosby, Frank Sinatra, Dinah
Shore, and Gene Hershcld. See: cadcastin , April 8, 1946,
pp. 15. 73; 32: York Times, April g, 1556, p. 18:1.
101 ‘
See text beginning at Footnote 9} of this chapter.
263
hearings conducted by the House. As indicated previously,
Chairman Porter testified that certain practices of the
AFM have interfered seriously with the responsibility of
broadcast licensees to maintain control over their program-
ming as well as their ability to operate in the public
interest and provide public service.102 In the conclusion
of his remarks, Senator White pointed out another very close-
ly related issue involved:
....there is one other consideration to which I
wish to allude briefly. we speak about a free radio.
we have endeavored, in assuming a free radio to the
pe0ple of this country, to assert Federal jurisdic-
tion over the channels of the air and over the con-
trol and licensing of all those who use the air for
broadcasting. we have placed certain regulations
and authorities over that activity, and we have
vested in the Federal Communications Commission cer-
tain responsibilities. That Commission determines
the channels of the air on which stations shall
operate, and whether the stations are conforming to
the technical requirements laid down by the Com-
mission. we also have to see that stations serve
a public interest, a public convenience, or a
public necessity. '
I say to the members of the Senate that if we
are to admit for a single moment that anyone other
than the broadcasting stations, subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission, is to determine
what shall be broadcast over the air in the United
States, we shall have taken the responsibility
which must be its, if we are to have an grdered
system of communications in this Nation. 03
Apparently the members of the Senate concurred with Senator
White's comments and observation; no one took exception to
them.
The'Bill Becomes ng.--The bill was submitted to a
roll call vote and was passed by a margin of 47 to 3. The
A...
1°23ee text beginning at Footnote 50 of this chapter.
10392 gong. ago. 325511946). '
264
bill was then sent to the President.104 On April 16, 1946,
President Truman gave his approval to the measure by signing
Senate Bill Number 63.105 Thus, the Lea Act became federal
law.
D. The Broad Pressures which Converged and
Precipitated the Lea Act
One writer, Robert D. Leiter, concluded the following
with regard to the passage of the Lea Act:
The Lea Act represented the first significant
legislative curb imposed on the activities of
labor unions subsequent to the introduction of the
New Deal labor policy by the federal government.
The enactment of legislation such as the Lea Act,
was inevitable, given the temper of Congress in
1946. The practices of featherbedding, of standbys,
and of banning various groups from broadcasting had
irked many people who were not fully conversant
with the issues.
It should be recognized that the policies
similar to those adapted by the musicians union,
directed towards increased employment, were ap-
proved and enforced by many other labor organiza-
tions. Make-work problems are certainly more
serious on the railroads and in the building trades.
But the methods used by the musicians union con-
stantly were arousing bitterness and resentment.
Attention had been centered on Petrillo and every
move he made was deemed worthy of newspaper head-
lines. The public relations of the union were
rather unsatisfactory....
....At the culminatiog of public disapproval,
the Lea Act was passed. 0
~The perspective taken by Leiter would appear to be a
rather narrow or limited one. The Lea Act was interpreted
10592 ogng. Reg. 3829 (1946).
For the final version of the Les Act, see: 60 Stat.
89 (1946).
106
Robert D. Leiter, The musicians and Pet 1 10 (New
York: Bookman Associates, Inc., 19 . pp. 162- .
265
almost entirely in the context of a labor law. The question
is asked, if it were strictly a labor law--why was it not
passed as an amendment to a labor law like the Wagner Actlo7
instead of the Communications Act? Granted, the Lea Act is
a law which g§n_affect labor organizations, but it is sug-
gested that it is not a labor law, per so. It is a law
designed primarily to regulate aspects of the Broadcasting
industry, not to regulate labor unions or organizations.
Labor unions are not even mentioned anywhere in the language
of the statute. The closest the Lea Act comes to regulating
labor unions is that some acts of labor organizations may be
prohibited as the impinge upon broadcasting. Some measure
of support is given to this view by the mere fact that the
Lea Act was passed as an amendment to the Communications
Act rather than to some labor law. It should be noted that
the applicability of the Lea Act is not just limited to
members of labor organizations. It can be applied to any
persons or organizations who engage in the behaviors pro-
scribed.
Leiter almost suggested that the Lea Act represented
the precusor to the Taft-Hartley Act. The latter rather
clearly constituted the first major large-scale legislative
curb on the activities of labor unions since the Vagner Act,
the heart of the New Deal labor policy.108 However, there
‘— —— —_ ~——_w ‘—_ ï¬â€˜
10749 Stat. 449 (1935).
108For a short summary concerning the background as-
sociated with the passage of the Taft-Hartley, see: Lloyd
G. Reynolds bor Eccnomi s an_ Labor Relat o s (2nd ed. rev.;
Englewood ci1:%é'§"w". TIE—3:13 ntioT'ET-s , nc., 1956), pp. 2&4-so
266
is one difficulty in considering the Lea Act in this light.
The Lee Act was passed by the 79th Congress, a democratic
controlled one which had been elected with Roosevelt in 1944.
It will be remembered that it was a democratic administration
under Roosevelt's leadership that had enacted the Wagner Act
in.1935. The Taft-Hartley Act was passed by the republican
dominated 80th Congress.
Public Disappggla1.--In Leiter's analysis of the Lea
Act, he concluded that public disapproval was one of the most
significant pressures which resulted in the Lea Act. In
effect, Leiter said that the American people had gotten
â€fed up? with the AFM's "practices of featherbedding, of
standbys and of banning various groups from broadcasting."
This interpretation can be supported to some extent, but
there are other considerations. If as Leiter said, feather-
bedding and make-work problems are more serious on the rail-
roads and in the building trades than they were in the broad-
casting industry, why has not something been? It is true
that one provision of Taft-Hartley was intended to prohibit
make-work tactics.1°9 However, it has been concluded by some
that this attempt had proved, by in large, rather ineffective.11°
It is suggested that it was not concern for make-work tactics
or methods themselves (featherbedding, standbys, and bans),
1°9The pertinent section is 8(b)(6). For text, see:
61 Stat. 136. 142 (1947).
11oThis point is stressed in the following, see:
Charles H. Tower, "Labor Relations in the Broadcasting Industry,"
gag’ggg’Contegpggggy 2:921:39, 23 (Winter, 1958), p. 98.
267
per so, that contributed significantly to the public dis-
approval of the AFM. For if there had been concern for such
behaviors in and of themselves, it would seem likely that the
Lea Act would have been directed more specifically at labor
unions in general. Benjamin Aaron, in an article on feather-
bedding, suggested that the public revulsion toward such
tactics is not necessarily related logically to the degree
of importance or economic loss resulting from such actions.111
Rather, he indicated that public revulsion seems to be more
related to the manner in which a union enforces such practices.
Also, Aaron implied that the impetus for the Lea Act did not
grow out of a sudden public interest in the evils of feather-
bedding practices in general, but rather, it was the result
of specific situations and the manner in which the AFM en-
forced such practices.112 It is suggested that there were
at least three such situations which gave rise to the public
indignation. Aaron only suggested one, the Interlochen
affair.
. Recording Ban cf 1942.--In effect, the recording ban
of 1942 was a strike or at least it was probably perceived
by the majority of Americans as a strike. The ban was im-
posed when the nation was at war. Just the mere fact of a
labor organization, in time of war, going on a "strike" would
be considered by many as "um-American." Also, during the
111Benjamin Aaron, "Governmental Restraints on
Featherbedding," Stanfgrd Leg,Revigw, 5 (July, 1953). P. 686.
1121b;d., pp. 697-98.
268
war, there was a great deal of interest in the effect and
importance of music on the morale of the American people.113
Recorded music was being used in defense plants and was
' considered to be a good means of increasing production and
decreasing error by relieving the boredom and monotony of
routine tasks and long hours. The AFM's recording ban was
interfering with the supply of music when the nation was at
war. Hence, it was probably felt by many that the AFM was
interfering with the war effort. Also, during the course
of the recording ban, Petrillo and the AFthad defied Presi-
dent Roosevelt, America's wartime leader, by refusing to
comply with his request to return to work. Such action would
not be conducive to public support and backing. Also, the
recording ban was instituted by what would be considered by
many as a "dictatorial fiat." Considering the times and the
tactics used, the recording ban served to alienate the
American pecple against the AFM. .
Interference with Radio Programming.--As documented in ‘
Chapter III, the AFM had caused interference with a number of
radio programs, particularly on the network level. EVen
though the press did a very adequate job of keeping the
American people informed regarding the activities of the AFM,
113For some accounts of the growing interest and alleged
importance of music to the war effort, see: Business W ,
April 3, 1943, pp. 64, 66, 68; 32! York Times, September 2,
1943, p. 6:3; D. K. Antrim, "Importance of Music in Wartime
Industry,“ Etude Music Magazine, 61 (February, 1943), pp. 90,
130-36; B. March, sic is roving a war-Time Need, Musi-
50 (March, 1945), pp. 51-52; D. Moore, "Importance of
s c in Wartime," Saturday Review gflLiteratgrg, 26 (January
30. 1943). p. 12; William D. Revell "How Music Can Help Win
the War," Etude Music Magazine, 60 (November, 1942), pp. 741,
779.
269
many of the make-work policies of the AFM such as the remote
band strikes would be apparent to the public just by listen-
ing to the radio. There were programs missing from the air-
ways from time to time. It is suggested that this gave rise
to some of the public indignation and it was not because the
American people necessarily and expressly disapproved of
â€featherbedding, standbys, and bans." It was because the AFM
was depriving the American people of something that it on-
joyed, radio programs involving music. Also, the manner in
which the Union achieved these ends gave the appearance that
it was dictating to the American people what kind of music they
could hear.
A letter to the Ng!,§ggklgiggg from one of its readers
occasioned by one of the bane appears to support this view.114
Petrillo probably had the best interests of the musicians at
heart when he put into effect some of his bans suggested the
reader, but is it not a bit short-sighted and selfish of him
to rob the American people of hearing their favorite musicians.
Other articles and letters decried the control that was being
exerted over radio programming by the Federation.115 It was
the public disapproval over being denied something that it
desired and the manner in which it was accomplished-~not over
114N31,§gg§.Times, January 1, 1946, p. 26:7.
115
For other examples of letters to the Times from its
readers either complaining about the AFM policies or urging
federal government action, are: Neg York Tim s, September 12,
1942, p. 12:7; September 21, 1942, p. 14:6; Oc ber 9, 1944,
p. 22:7; October 19, 1944, p. 22:7; November 16, 1944, p. 22:7;
October 28, 1945, p. 14:7.
270
featherbedding, standbys, and other make-work policies, as
such--which represented one of the broad pressures which
helped precipitate the Lea Act.
Interlochen.--The entire Interlochen affair contri-
buted immensely to public disapproval. No single incident
contributed as much to the public disgrace of the AFM as
did this incident. In the Interlochen affair, it was sug-
gested that Petrillo and the AFM attempted to tamper with one
of the American people's â€sacred cows," littlg,gghgglwghilgggg,
Story captions in Time’such as "Petrillo v. the Boys and
Girls†certainly suggested this.116 This is one of those
sensitive areas that it is disasterous to become associated
with. Public disapproval was the only possible consequence
of the AFM's actions in this realm.
Also, Dr. Maddy, president of the National Music Camp
at Interlochen, Michigan, kept this incident in the public
notice throughout most of the decade of the 1940's. The
incident provided the impetus for Senator Vandenberg, by his
own admission, to introduce the bill which eventually evolved
into the Lea Act. Between 1943 and 1948, Maddy appeared be-
fore Congressional committees at least five times and related
the Interlochen incident.ni7 It almost seemed that Maddy took
wï¬ â€˜â€” V
—— —
115mg. February 19. 1945. p. 19.
117See Footnotes 70 and 72 of Chapter III for documen-
tation of hearings in January, 1943 and March, 1944 of the
earliest appearances of Maddy before Congressional committees.
For other testimony, see: U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Hearings: Inter-
ren e with ngadgastigg o N no a Educational nggrams,
9the ong., 1st ess., l9 , pp. 1 -2 .
271
as his personal responsibility the task of keeping the
American pecple stirred up about this incident. This is no
doubt that the Interlochen affair coupled with the assis-
tance from Dr. Maddy contributed significantly to the
public disapproval which resulted in the passage of the Lea
Act. In the face of such public reaction, Congress had to
act.
Industgy Reaction.--Although it has been suggested
that the American people were not "irked" with the AFM's
make-work policies, per so, there was one group that definite-
ly was--the broadcasters. Such policies of the Federation
which required the hiring of additional employees that were
not wanted or even allegedly not needed would represent
added or unnecessary costs which broadcasters, as would most
good businessmen, would like to avoid. The broadcasters,
as businessmen, would naturally try to do everything pos-
sible to stop such actions of the AFM. There is no doubt
that the National Association of Broadcasters and other seg-
ments of the industry put a considerable amount of pressure
on Congress to get remedial legislation passed. Such pres-
sure can be easily detected in the hearings that were conducted
by committees of Congress. The Opposition of the NAB and
Then after the Lea Act was passed, Maddy testified a
couple of more times. For one see: U.S. House of Representa-
tives, Committee on Education and Labor, Hea in s: Restrictive
Uni n Practices 9; the American Fedegation gf’Musi'ciansI Oth
Cong'" ., 2'n'd' s'e‘ss.. 1558', pp. 239-55.
At these 1948 hearings, Maddy testified that he had
appeared before the committee in early 1947, As part of his
testimony at the 1948 hearings, Maddy included the formal
statement that he had presented at the 1947 sessions. See:
Ib;de' ppe 243-490
272
broadcasters, in general, represenusanother broad pressure
which resulted in the Lea Act.
Concern f9; the Basic Issues.--Probably, the most
basic issues involved in the Lea Act were associated with
one aspect of the federal regulatory policy toward broadcast-
ing in this country. who is to control broadcast programming?
What is to be ultimately served, public or private interest?
In this country, the public owns the channels which are
used for broadcasting. We are committed to the policy of
private ownership of broadcast facilities which are licensed
by the government to be operated by qualified persons on
these public channels for the public interest, convenience,
and necessity. This imposes a responsibility upon the
licensee for the selection and presentation of program mater-
ial to be broadcast. Both the FCC and the courts have
stressed this responsibility rests on the individual licen-
see, and can neither be delegated nor transferred to any
network or other persons or groups, or be unduly affected
or restricted by contractual arrangements.118 To be consis-
tent with this federal pclicy, this responsibility for
maintaining control over broadcast programming should not be
subject to infringement in behalf of private interest.
Certain of the make-work policies of the AFM tended,
in effect, to usurp the control of certain types of broadcast
programming from licensees. For example, the AFM demand
that double crews be hired for simultaneous music broadcasts
—— ‘—
118For documentation of this federal regulatory policy,
see Chapter I.
273
over AM and FM was a case in point. For many stations,
this policy made it economically impossible for live music
broadcasts to be presented over FM. FM was new and under-
developed at the time, and advertisers were reluctant to
invest in this newer media of broadcast. This left a big
share of the financial burden on the broadcast industry to
develOp FM. This was part of the FCC's reasoning in not
continuing its prohibitions against the complete duplication
of programming over both AM and FM. This Union policy tended
to restrict the use of live music broadcasts over FM.
Similar cases can be built up for many of the other policies
of the Federation such as those affecting remote band broad-
casts, live TV programs, film on TV, international music
broadcasts, and etc. 'These policies represent examples of
imposed restriction by the AFM on broadcasters which tended
to exert a certain amount of control over broadcast program-
ming.
In the circumstances alluded to above, the broadcasters
had the choice of either acceding to the Union's demands or
losing the services of professional musicians entirely. It
must be remembered that nearly every competent musician in
the U.S. was a member of the AFM. Since the latter, in many
cases, would result in severe program service disruption and
considerable economic loss, particularly in the case of the
networks, the former was probably conceived as the lesser of
the two evils. This, as can be readily seen, tended to
interfere very seriously with the broadcast licensee's
responsibility to maintain control over his broadcast program-
274
ming. As Chairman Porter indicated, in the face of such .
situations, the FCC was powerless to do anything. Sidney Kaye,
the music counsel of the NAB, was of the opinion that there
were no existing federal laws which could be used to remedy
the restrictive actions of the AFM. It was becoming very
apparent that some kind of corrective measures would have to
be taken by Congress if the Union continued to engage in such
actions.
What is to be ultimately served, private or public
interest? There is no doubt that federal policy demands that
broadcasting serve the public interest. This point is at the
heart of the Communications Act. To refer back to Leiter's
statements cited earlier, he said:
It should be recognized that policies similar
to those by the musicians union, directed towards
increased employment, were approved and enforced
by many other labor organizations. Made-work pro-
blems are certainly more serious on the railroads
and in the building trades.119
What Leiter failed to point out was that there is one
significant difference between the broadcasting industry and
the railroad and building industries. Broadcast stations are
licensed by the federal government to operate in the public
~interest. This is not the case with the railroad and building
industries. The imposed restrictions of the AFM which affected
broadcast programming through its make-work policies were
specifically designed to create more jobs for its members--
about 182,000 members in all in 1946--which tended rather
clearly to be private interest. It would be difficult to
119Leiter, pp. 913., p. 163.
275
rationalize such imposed restrictions on broadcast program-
ming as being in public interest, as defined by the Communica-
tions Act, the policies of the FCC, and the decisions of the
courts.
Chairman Porter of the FCC, Representative Lea, and
Senator W. White were concerned about a precedent being
established which might lead to censorship of broadcast pro-
gramming in behalf of private interest or gain. The concern
of men like Porter, Lea, and White that broadcasting remain
as free as possible from unreasonable restraint in behalf of
private interest, undoubtedly, represented another broad
force which helped precipitate the Lea Act.
Bugging Up.--First of all, a view of the Lea Act
as strictly a labor law, tends to obscure certain aspects
of it. In the first place, the Les Act is an amendment to the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended. As such, it was
designed to regulate certain aspects of the broadcasting
industry. Not just limited to activities of labor unions,
the Act can be applied to any person or group who commit
the behaviors proscribed by the statute.
The broad pressures which converged and precipitated
the Lea Act came from at least three sources: (1) public re-
action, (2) industry reaction, and (3) concern of men who
wished broadcasting to remain as free as possible from un-
reasonable restraints. The Interlochen affair along with Dr.
Maddy's efforts contributed more to the public disgrace of
the AFM than did any other single incident associated with
the Union during the entire decade of the forties. Hence,
276
the Interlochen affair contributed significantly to the
passage of the Lea Act. In essence then, the Lea Act was
a public declaration that vast segments of the American
culture were very much displeased with many of the actions
and policies of the American Federation of Musicians.
CHAPTER V
POST LEA ACT: RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT
A. AFM Test of the Lea Act in the Courts
Immediately after the Lea Act was passed, Petrillo and
the Federation's counsel, Joseph Padway, announced that the
AFM would test the constitutionality of the Lea Act in the
Courts.1 At radio station WAAF in Chicago, the first situa-
tion that presented itself which was suitable for such a
purpose came in mid-May, 1946.2 By the middle of the follow-
ing month, the federal government had filed a criminal informa-
tion with the U.S. District Court at Chicago charging Petrillo
with the willful violation of the Lea Act.3
1That Petrillo and the AFM publicly admitted that a
test in the courts of the Lea Act was sought by them and that
the situation in which to do was deliberately created by them
was emphasized in the press, see: Br adcastin , April 22, 1946,
PP36170 973 June 3: 12469 pp. 13'133wmd4_§ 1‘ T1 9:: ï¬réé 19:
19 . p. 5:2; Upitgd ates N we an 921 e or pr ,
1946, p. 48; Newsw , une l , 1946, p. 29; me, June 10,
1946. ppe 24"? e
In early June, during the midst of the preparation for
the first court test of the Lea Act, Broadcasting reported that
Petrillo said the following at a news con erence: "we are vio-
lating the laws of the United States if the Lea Act is a con-
stitutional law. If I have violated a Federal Law, it is only
because I feel it is unconstitutional." Bzgadcasting, June 3,
1946, p. 13.
2
AFM. Proceed., 1948, p. 91.
3New York Times, June 15, 1946, pp. 1:2, 12:}.
277
278
Chain of Events Leading up to the Cgurt Test of the
Lea Agt.“--deio station wear, located in Chicago, was owned
and operated by the Drovers Journal Publishing Company. Ap-
proximately 90 per cent of the station's programming consisted
of recorded and transcribed program material. In May, 1946,
WAAF‘had in its employ three members of the Chicago local of
the AFM who functioned in the capacity of record librarians.
However, the contracts with the radio station for these AFM
members had stated that two were supposed to function as
record turners and the third was to function in the dual
capacity of record turner and pianist. Not one of them per-
formed the duties prescribed in their formal contracts. They
only performed the duties of record librarians. As of May,
1946, there was no contract between WAAF and the AFM or one
of its locals. However, there had been contacts in the past,
but the most recent one had clasped in February of 1944 and
had never been renewed. '
On May 11, 1946, Petrillo, in behalf of the Chicago
local of the AFM, sent the following letter to radio station
WAAF:
"Inasmuch as our agreement concerning wage scales,
rules and regulations for broadcasting over your
station has expired, the following are the changes
and revisions requested by the Chicago Federation
of Musicians to cover a new agreement:
the 4For accounts of the chain of events which led up to
governmen s suit, see: U,S, v. Pgtrilli 75 F. Supp.
176, 177-79 (1948); Bgoadcasti%g, June 3, l9 6, pp. 13-14;
1947. Do 723 AE!;.§EQ£22_-e 9 9 Pp. 92-93.
The above sources will serve as the documentation
for this section. The first named source above is the best
and most complete.
279
â€(1) New agreement to be for a period com-
meflcing May 20, 1946, and terminating February 1,
19 7:
"(2) Three (3) extra musicians shall be
employed as staff musicians, makin the total
number of musicians employed, six (6);
"(3) The record turners shall turn records
exclusively and shall not be required to perform as
instrumentalists.
"All other conditions now in force and effect
as relating to local broadcasting stations, as
stipulated in Section 7 of the by-laws of the
Chicago Federation of Musicians, known as Radio
Wages Scales, Rules and Regulations (a copy of
which is attached hereto) shall remain in force
and effect during the terms of this agreement,
except as herein altered, revised, or amended.
Kindly advise whet er the foregoing prcpcsals
are acceptable to you."
Following the receipt of the above letter by WAAF
officials, Petrillo was contacted by the station's attorney
who requested a meeting between Union and station officials.
Petrillo refused to agree to such a meeting. Finally, after
several telephone discussions between Petrillo and the
station's attorney, it was disclosed on May 25th that WAAF
would be willing to employ one additional musician. Petrillo
indicated that he would take the counteroffer under considera-
tion and then inform the station of his decision on May 27th.
0n the 27th, WAAF officials received a telegram from Petrillo
stating that he had no alternative but to withdraw the ser-
vices of the three AFM members employed by the station in
view of the inability to reach an agreement. On the same day,
the three AFM members employed at the station were notified
that they were not to report to work starting May 28 until
further notice. Subsequently, an AFM picket was placed in
SQL§, v. Petrillo., 75 F. Supp. 176, 177-73 (1948).
280
front of the station.
The Government Starts Action in District Court.--The
information filed by the U.S. district attorney charged
Petrillo with willfully violating the Lea Act.6 It was con-
tended by the government that the three AFM members employed
by WAAF "were sufficient and adequate in number to perform
all of the actual services needed ....in connection with the
cperation of its radio broadcasting facilities."7 Specifically,
the information charged that Petrillo had willfully:
....by the use of force, intimidation, duress and
by the use of other means did attempt to coerce,
compel and constrain said licensee to employee and
agree to employ in connection with the conduct of
its radio broadcasting business, three additional
persons not needed by said licensee to perform
actual services, in the following manner, towit:
(1) By directing and causing three musicians,
members of the Chicago Federation of Musicians,
theretofore employed by the said licenses in con-
nection with the conduct of its broadcasting busi-
ness to discontinue their employment with said
licensee; '
(2) By directing and causing three employees
and other persons, members of the Chicago Federa-
tion of Musicians, not to accept employment by said
licensee; and
(3) By placing and causing to be placed a person
as a picket in front of the place of business of
said licensee.
The section of the Act alleged by the government to be violated
was Section 506(a)(1).9
6For a summary of the information, see: 0,3, v.
Petrillg, 68 F. Supp. 845, 847-48 (1946).
71bid.. 847.
8Ibid. .
9For text of the Lea Act, see Appendix B.
281
AFM attorneys filed a motion with the District Court
to dismiss the government's information on the grounds that
the Lea Act contravened the First, Fifth, and Thirteenth
Amendments to the Constitution. The contents of the motion
were briefly described in Petrillo's report to the 1948 AFM
convention as follows:
Our attorneys filed a motion to dismiss the
information on three constitutional grounds, (1)
that the statute imposed involuntary servitude
contrary to the Thirteenth Amendment; (2) that it
deprived us of freedom of speech contrary to the
First Amendment; (3) that the phrase "more persons
than are needed was so vague and indefinite to
deprive us of due process of law contrary to the
Fifth Amendment.10
Hearings and argument on the information and motion were
heard in November, and then on December 2, 1946, Judge LaBuy
of the Federal District Court at Chicago handed down his
decision which challenged the constitutionality of the Lea
Act.11
Th2 Distzict Court's Decision.--Briefly, Judge LaBuy's
decision attacked the constitutionality of the Lea Act on
four principal grounds. First, the framing of Section 506
_
IOAFM P ee ., 1948, p. 92.
FuFtE:r_§%%TE%ation of the AFM'motion will not be
presented. The grounds used by the District Court to attack
the constitutionality of the Lea Act were essentially the'
same as those contained in the AFM motion plus one other.
The court's constitutional attack of the Lea Act will be~
covered fully in the next section of this chapter.
11U,S, v. Pet 0, 68 F. Supp. 845 (1946).
For some 0 e news accounts of the proceedings, see:
¥2§gg§g§t;%g, August 26, 1946, p. 87; October 7. 1946, pp. 15,
O ; oven or 11, 1946, p. 84; December 9. 1946, pp. 18, 37'
83; N2; York T mes, May 29, 1946, pp. 1:6, 4:1; June 15. 1946,
pp. 1:2, 12:2; Ju y 16, 1946, p. 13:2; August 6, 1946, p. 22:7;
August 16, 1946, p. 2:8; October 1, 1946, p. 2:6; October 9,
282
(a)(1), particularly with reference to the phrase "to employ
or agree to employ, in connection with the conduct of the
broadcasting business of such licensee, a person or persons
in w 91 221'. gum gLemplgzeeg negdgg by such licensee
to perform actual services" was held by the Judge to be
"patently defective in its failure to define with reasonable
certainty the crime charged."12 He stated that there was
"no means, or guide, or standard by which the defendant may
know 'the number of employees needed.â€13 Further, he indi-
cated that the "number of employees needed" was "established
by the licensee without the prior knowledge upon the part of
the person subjected to prosecution for violation of the sec-
tion."lh Judge LaBuy held that such a provision in a
criminal statute was repugnant to one of the essentials of
the principle of due process of law as guaranteed by the
Fifth Amendment. It was pointed out that a criminal statute
cannot either forbid or require "the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application."15
Because it would be the licensee who would determine the â€num-
1946, p. 2:3; October 16, 1946, p. 4:7; November 5, 1946,
pp. 1:3, 30:7; December 3, 1946, pp. 1:4, 34:2; Newswee
December 9, 1946, p. 70; United States News ggd,E§EI§ Report,
June 21, 1946, p. 38.
120.5, v.,Petri;lg, 68 F. Supp. 845, 848 (1946).
13Ibid.
14Ibi .
151bid.
283 ‘
ber of employees needed," the Judge suggested that life and
liberty would "be imperiled by or subject to such a frail
and uncertain device as one man's opinion against another's."16
The Judge held that "the will of an individual to make an
act a crime or not, depending upon his own judgement,....[§a§7
abhorrent to our form of government."17
With reference to the second grounds upon which he
attacked the Act, Judge LaBuy noted that the law did not
prohibit the employment of more persons than are needed if
there was an absence of constraint and coercion upon the
licensee and if he agreed to do so willingly. The information
charged that one of the means by which the defendant enforced
his demands was through the use of the technique of peaceful
picketing. Peaceful picketing "had been repeatedly and
universally held ....[by the courts a§7 a form of speech and
discussion that cannot under the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments be curtailed by any legislative enactment."18 With
regard to the law's application in this situation, the Judge
asked the following question:
Can the hiring of additional employees which can
be done legally by agreement of the licensee and
the union, or by the licensee alone, be constitu-
tionally denounced as illegal when done by the right
of free speech as manifested by peaceful picketing?19
In Answer to this question, the Judge held that:
It is this fundamental right that is here
challenged as an unlawful means to procure the
284
accomplishment of an admittedly legal objective.
The court is of the opinion, therefore, that
picketing where not accompanied by any force or
violence, used merely for the purpose of dissemi-
nating the views of defendant and the members of
the musicians union is a manifestation of the
exercise of the right of free speech and cannot be
defined as illegal except under circumstances which
warrant a restraint upon freedom of sgeech or where
it is used for some unlawful purpose. 0
Thirdly, Judge LaBuy pointed out that the government's
infor mation charged Petrillo with attempting "to coerce,
compel and constrain employment by means of (1) causing three
musicians to discontinue their employment; and (2) causing
three musicians not to accept employment by such licensee."21
The application of the law in this situation, the Judge con-
tended, would tend to impose "involuntary servitude." Further
attacking the constitutionality of the Lea Act, the court
held that:
Under the Thirteenth Amendment the right of
any worker to leave his employment at will or for
no reason at all is protected and that right is
inviolate. The freedom to Quit and refuse to
undertake work may as readily be exercised through
a group organization as individually.22
The fourth and last grounds of attack related to the
law's allegedly discriminatory nature. In short, the law
could be used as a means whereby broadcasting employees could
be deprived of the right to peaceful picketing and the right
to quit collectively in order to enforce their demands.
However, all other employees in the country would have such
285
rights because the law only applied to broadcast employees.
Judge LaBuy held that: ‘
A.pena1ty which applied uniquely to broadcasting
station employees and no others; a prohibition
which relates solely to contracts between these
same employees and no others; an inhibition which
defines lawful acts as unlawful when applied to
these employees and no others cannot survive the
constitutional test. This segregation and classi-
fication plainly falls within the arbitrary group
of class legislation.23
In summing up the decision of the court, Judge LaBuy
stated:
The court finds it necessary to hold that the
statute here involved in the application here sought
to be made violates the First Amendment because of
the indefiniteness and uncertainty in the definition
of a criminal offense; violates the First Amendment
by its restrictions upon freedom of speech by peace-
ful picketing; violates the Fifth and Thirteenth
Amendments by its restriction upon employment of
labor; and violates the Fifth Amendment by an arbi-
trary classification as between employers and employ-
ees and as to other communication industries.
Whether or not the objectives sought to be at-
tained by this statute are or are not economic
evils which should be restrained or suppressed are
questions not within the province of this court.
This court does not hold that Congress is power-
less tc act or that the declared objectives of this
law are beyond the reach of federal legislative
control. The only question before the court is the
constitutional aspect of this statute as was written
by Congress. On this question the court is of the
opinion that this statute is unconstitutional for
the above stated reasons.2
Distgigt Court's Decigign Appgaled.--Shortly after
Judge LaBuy handed down the decision of the District Court,
the Department of Justice announced plans of appealing the
case to the Supreme Court.25 Representative Lea, the author
23
25New Yogk Tings, December 27, 1946, p. 3:3.
286
of the law, was rather unhappy with the decision of the
lower court and he suggested that the court involved had dis-
regarded the Congressional intent in its decision.26 Lea
said that if the Lea Act failed, the fight to get legislation
to remedy the situation involving the AFM and all other
similar situations involving labor unions must not stop.
Lawyers for the Justice Department agreed with Lea in his
contentions that Judge LaBuy ignored Congressional intent in
his decision}?7 The government filed its briefs with the
Supreme Court in late April, 1947.28 In them, the argument
of the District Court with regard to the constitutionality
of the Lea Act was refuted.29 In the AFM briefs filed a few
days later,30 the constitutional attack of the District
Court was essentially repeated.31 Argument was presented by
both parties before the Supreme Court on May 5th and 6th with
the decision being handed down on June 23, 1947.32
25W. December 9. 1946. p. 18.
27lhid., December 30, 1946, p. 81.
28121 221.1; Times. April 25. 1947. p. 14:6.
29For a summary of the briefs with citations, see:
U,S, v. Petzillo, 91 L.ed. 1877, 1880 (1947).
â€new. May 5. 1947. p. 15.
31For a summary of the briefs with citations, see:
U,S, v. Petrillo, 91 L.ed. 1877, 1880 (1947).
390,3, v. Petï¬illo. 332 U.S. l (1947).
For some 0 e news accounts of the proceedings, see:
Broadcasti , December 30, 1946, p. 81; May 5, 1947, p. 15;
May 15. 59%9. p. 92: June 30. 1947. pp. 13. 72. 74-75’
York Times, December 27. 1946, p. 3:3; Januar 28, 194
p. 4:6; April 15, 1947, p. 20:7; April 25. 19 7. p. 14:6;
May 6, 1947, p. 7:1; June 24, 1947, pp. 187. 5:5.
New
7.
287
Decision of the Supreme Court.--In a 5-3 decision, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the District Court
and remanded the case back to it for retrial. In the offi-
cial publication containing the decisions of the Supreme
Court, this decision was summarized as follows:
1.
2.
rSection 506 (a)(1) of the Communications Act,
making it a crime, by the use or threat of use of
force, violence, intimidation, or duress, to coerce,
compel or constrain a radio-broadcasting licensee
to employ or agree to emplo , in connection with
the conduct of the licensee s broadcasting busi-
ness, any person or persons â€in excess of the num-
ber of employees needed by such licensee to per-
form actual services," is not so vague, indefinite
or uncertain as to violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment....
(a) the question was properly presented to this
Court for a decision on an appeal by the Governement
under the Criminal Appeals Act from a decision of
a District Court dismissing, on the sole ground that
the section was unconstitutional, an information
charging a violation in substantially the statutory
langu e.... .
(b The contention that persons of ordinary
intelligence would be unable to know when their
compulsive actions would force a person against his
will to hire employees he did not need, cannot be
sustained....
(c) When measured by common understanding and
practices, the language of the statute provides
an adequate warning as to what conduct falls under
its ban, and marks boundaries sufficiently distinct
for Judges and Juries fairly to administer the law
in accordance with the will of Congress; and the
Constitution requires no more....
It does not contravene the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment by denying equal protection of
the laws to radio-broadcasting employees as a class--
even though it provides no punishment fer employers
violating the policy and leaves other classes of
employees free to engage in the practices forbidden
to radio workers.... ~
(a) This question was prcperly presented to
this Court for a decision on an appeal by the Govern-
ment under the Criminal Appeals Act dismissing an
information on the sole ground that the statute is
unconstitutional as written....
(b) It is not within the province of this Court
to say that, because Congress had prohibited some
288
practices within its power to prohibit, it must
prohibit all within its power....
3. On its face, the statute does not contravene the
First Amendment by abridging freedom of speech; but,
since the statute does not mention picketing and it
is uncertain on the record in this case whether it
would have been applied so as to prohibit peaceful
picketing, the question of whether such an applica-
tion would violate the First Amendment is not be-
fore this Court in a form apprOpriate for decision...
A. On its face, the statute does not violate the
provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibiting
slavery and involuntary servitude; but no decision
is made on the question whether some possible
application of it to particular persons in particu-
lar sets of circumstances would violate the
Thirteenth Amendment, since questions of that
kind are not presented in the record in this case
in a form apprOpriate for decision by this
Court....
- 5. The Criminal Appeals Act does not require this
Court to pass on constitutional questions premature-
ly decided by a district court's dismissal of an
information which had not been tested by a motion
to strike or for a bill of particulars....
68 F. Supp. 845, reversed and remanded.33
With regard to parts 3 and A of the above summary of
the decision when it was stated that a question was not
presented in a form suitable for decision, some discussion
might be in order.34 The AFM's motion to dismiss was made
only on the grounds that the statute, as written, was in
contravention of the First and Thirteenth Amendments with
regard to restricting peaceful picketing and imposing involun-
tary servitude. Also, it will be noted that the statute
does not specifically mention picketing or any aspect of the
involuntary servitude issue. From this standpoint, then,
the application of the statute to cover these specific actions
330 s. v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 1-2 (1947).
34For a full discussion of these questions in the de-
cision, see: Ibid., 9-13.
289
did not come from prohibitions specifically written into
the act. Rather, they came from the information's charges
that Petrillo attempted to compel the radio station to hire
unneeded employees by calling a strike and placing a picket
in front of the station. "Thus, rather than holding the
statute as written to be.... unconstitutional...., the
District Court ruled on the statute as it was prOposed to be
applied by the information as it then read."35 This con-
stituted a ruling with regard to the information and how the
statute was to be applied, and not specifically to the
statute as written.
The motion to dismiss only challenged the statute as
written. However, if the idfbrmation had been challenged,
the case would have taken a different route to the Supreme
than the one taken. Under the Criminal Appeals Act, it would
have had to have gone to the Circuit Court of Appeals first.
Since the .motion to dismiss only challenged the statute as
written with not mention with regard to the information,
the case could then be directly appealed from the District
Court to the Supreme Court. Because the Criminal Appeals Act
did not require it, the Supreme Court found it appropriate,
under these circumstances, to rule only on the statute as
it was written and not on the statute as it was proposed to
be applied by the information. With regard to the issues of
peaceful picketing and involuntary servitude then, the Court
ruled only that the statute, on its face, did not violate
351hid., 9-10.
290
the Constitution. In-a sense, the Supreme Court's review of
the Les Act in this situation was of a limited nature.
With regard to the three Justices who dissented, their
objection to the statute was with respect to its vagueness
and indefiniteness regarding the "statutory description of
the thing for which force must not be used--that is, 'to
compel' a licensee under the Communications Act 'to employ....
any person or persons in excess of the number of employees
needed by such licensee to perform actual services.â€36 It
was pointed out that the Lea Act was creating new crimes.
As such, common eXperience had not created any general under-
standing of their criminality. "Consequently, in order to
adequately inform the public of the limitations on conduct,
a more precise definition of the crime....[§ag7 necessary to
meet constitutional requirements.â€37
Retrial in District Court.--Upon being reversed and
remanded by the Supreme Court, the case was retried in
District Court with Judge LaBuy presiding. The government
filed an amended information near the middle of October,
19A? with the government still charging Petrillo with viola-
tion of Section 506 (a)(1) of the Les Act. In this amended
information, all reference to picketing was deleted supposedly
as a result of the Supreme Court decision.38 Then in the
36Ibid., 16.
For the full dissent, see: Ibid., 16-18.
37Ihid., 17.
38For an account of the filing of the amended informa-
tion, see: Broadcasting, October 20, 1947, p. 74.
291
following month, Petrillo only entered a plea of not guilty.39
In the retrial, no motion to dismiss or petition of any kind
was filed with the Court as had been done previously. Also,
Petrillo waived the right of Jury trial, so the full respon-
sibility for the decision was left in the hands of Judge
LaBuy.4° The decision was handed down by the Judge on
January 14, 1948.41
Judge LaBuy's Decigigg,--Judge LaBuy indicated, in his
decision, that the key issue in the retrial was the following:
The amended information charges that the
defendant "knowing that the licensee had no need
for the services of additional employees" did
commit the acts complained of. This allegation
is an essential element of the offense charged and
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.42
In an attempt to get at this issue, the Judge presented a
rather complete summary of the chain of events which led up
to the government's charges.43 After examining the evidence
in this regard, Judge LaBuy finally concluded the following
in his decision:
From the evidence presented during the trial
the court is of the opinion that three additional
musicians were not needed by the station under its
39Broadcastin , November 17, 1947, p. 19.
4Gigglork Times, January 3, 1948, p. 10:2.
410,3, v. Petrillg. 75 F. Supp. 176 (1948).
. For some of the news accounts of the proceedings, see:
Broadcastin , October 20, 1947, p. 74; November 17, 1947, p. 19;
ganuagy 5. 1948, pp. 13, 8hz7January 19, 1948, pp. 11, 27-88; 333
ork imes, November 13. 19 , p. 19:3; December 31, 19 7. pp.
1:2, 3:1; January 1, 1948, p. 3:3; January 3, 1948, p. 10:2;
January 15, 1948, pp. 1:2, 17:2; Newsweek, January 26, 1948,
pp. 23-2 .
ngflméa V- 2223;112. 75 F. Supp. 176, 180 (1948).
“3___Ibm. . 177-79.
292
program of using records and transcriptions during
90 per cent of its time. But, is there any evidence
in the record which shows that defendant had know-
ledge or information of, or was advised of the lack
of need for additional employees either at the time
of the request made in his original letter of May 11,
1946, or at any time during the entire period of
negotiations? Nothing contained in the letters and
telegrams between defendant and the representatives
of the station disclosed to defendant the lack of
need for additional employees as a reason for re-
Jecting the defendant's demands. Neither does the
testimony in this case show that the defendant had
knowledge of or was told that the station had no
need for additional employees. There is no evidence
whatever in the record to show that defendant had
knowledge of or was informed of the lack of need
for additional employees prior to the trial of this
case.
For the reasons above stated the court is of
the opinion that the prosecution has failed to #4
prove the defendant guilty of the violation charged.
Summipg up.--Thus, the Les Act--an amendment to the
Communications Act--had stood the test of a limited review
by the Supreme Court. Representative Lea was not too happy
with the acquittal of Petrillo and called it unwarranted.45
However, he noted that the decision did not bar further prose-
cutions since the Act still stood despite the fight to
defeat it. As one observer put it: "The union thus won the
battle, but lost the war."45 What.was Petrillo's reaction to
the battle in the courts? Heuld the AFM seek further test
in the courts? Some clue was given in this regard in a state-
ment by Petrillo reported in the N2! 39;! giggg:
“mg. 181 .
45For Lee's comments, see:' Broadcastin , January 26,
1948. p. 47. ‘
46Charles H. Tower, â€Labor Relations in the Broadcast-
ing Industry,†Law and Contemporagz Problems, 23 (Winter, 1958),
p. 99.
293
"The Supreme Court has spoken. This is my country
and the Supreme Court makes the final rulings on
its laws. No one will say that Jim Petrillo fought
his country or the Supreme Court. I thought that I
had the law on my side, and I made the best fight I
knew how. The Supreme Court has spoken and I bow to
its dictates."47
. The AFM did not make any further efforts to contest
the statute in the courts. It will be remembered that two
weeks prior to the time the decision was handed down, the
AFM had instituted the recording ban of 1948. Wishing to
devote all energy to this-endeavor, the AFM definitely wanted
to put an end to the litigation over the Lea Act.48 However,
this did not stop the Federation and its officials from
working for the repeal of the Act in Congress.49 Also, it
will be noted that the Petrillo case represented the only
action brought by the federal government in the courts under
the Lea Aet.5°
“7.1.1.0.: 19.11 lists. June 24. 1947. p. 5:6.
48This point was emphasized by Petrillo in his report
to the AFM convention, see: 525. zzooeed., 1948, p. 93.
49This was suggested by Petrillo in: James C. Petrillo,
"An Important Message to all Members of the American Federa-
tion of Musicians," nternatigga; Musician, #9 (September,
1950). ppe 8-9e
For evidence of a general growing concern for greater
participation in the political process, see: Herman D. Kenin,
It's Still a Depression for America's Musicians," Amerécan
Federationist, 66 (January, 1959). pp. 15-16; James . etrillo
"Hï¬sicians' Fight,†American Federatignist, 62 (June, 1955)
pp. 18-22; James C. Fetrillo, The ax of No Return, Ame ican
Federationist, 62 (December, 1955). PP. 13-14; 53!. P:gcee3.,
19 0. ppe 2‘91, .102’117e
50The Lea Act has been given some incidental considera-
tion in two civil cases and has been construed in a series of
decisions in the New Yerk state courts. No discussion of these
cases has been included in this study because it is felt that
they do come within the realm of the problem under study. For
294
B. Effectiveness of the Les Act
Unwanted Musicians.r-One of the principal goals of
the policies of the AFM which tended to interfere with broad-
cast programming, as has been emphasized previously, was to
increase employment of its members in the broadcasting in-
dustry. Also, it will be noted that this had been a consistent
and continuing goal of the policies and actions of the Federa-
tion in all of its spheres of influence, not Just with regard
to broadcasting. One of the reactions of the industry to
this goal, and the AFM actions to implement it, was that it
forced broadcasters to employ more musicians than they felt
they needed and hence, represented an undesirable economic
burden. One of the obJectivee of the Les Act was to prevent
the AFM from forcing broadcasters to employ more musicians
than were needed for the normal conduct of broadcast business.
or all of the specific objectives of the Lea Act, this one
relating to â€unwanted" musicians was realized to a greater
extent than any of the others. The Lea Act alone, however,
did not accomplish this result. It was aided by the passage
of the Taft-Hartley Act.51
One of the most effective means that the AFM had em-
ployed to force broadcasters to employ more musicians had
been the strikes conducted against the networks with the
a short discussion and citation of these cases, see: Tower,
92' we. ppe 99-100e
51Taft-Hartley was passed June 23, 1947. For text
of thebill, see: 61 Stat. 136 (19fl7).
295
purpose of getting the networks to apply pressure on
their affiliates to come to terms with arm locals.52 It
will be remembered that these AFM actions involved primarily
strikes of musicians on the late evening remote band broad-
casts, but did, on occasion, involve studio bands and bands
on commercial programs. The procedure involved putting
pressure on the network--in many cases, a strike of musicians--
during a dispute between an AF! local and one of the net-
work's affiliated stations generally over how many musicians
the affiliate should employ. In nearly every case, the
number of musicians that the AFM local wanted the affiliate
to employ was a number in excess of the number that the
affiliated wanted or allegedly needed to employ. Rather
than suffer prolonged disruption of network service, it
was hoped by the AFM that the networks would bring pressure
to bear on affiliated stations involved to settle such
disputes with the Federation's locals. The evidence in-
dicated that this procedure was rather effective, in that,
the arm was able to help its locals achieve settlements,
many of which, were considered quite favorable.53
The evidence, also, indicated that the networks did become
involved in the disputes on a number of occasions and, in
all probability, did put pressure on affiliates to seek
—— ï¬vï¬â€˜
52Fbr a detailed discussion of this technique, see:
Section A of Chapter III.
53See Tables 13, 14, and 15 of Chapter III.
296
settlements with the AFM locals involved. On two occasions,
the AFM got one network to stop feeding affiliates network
programs involving live music.
This technique of applying economic pressure on the
network during a dispute which did not involve them directly
constituted a secondary boycott. The secondary boycott has
been defined as a "union tactic whereby a dispute with Em-
ployer A is used as a Justification for putting economic
pressure on Employer B."54 With the passage of Taft-Hartley
(Labor Management Relations Act of 19A?), the secondary boy-
cott was outlawed.55 Petrillo admitted to a Congressional
investigating committee in early 1948 that Taft-Hartley was
preventing the AFM from continuing to use the technique of
the "secondary boycott" in their attempts to increase employ-
ment.55 In other words, the AFM discontinued the use of this
technique out of fear of violation of Taft-Hartley. Coupled
with the Les Act, the AFM, faced a double threat of action
if it continued to use the technique of the secondary boycott
to increase employment in radio stations if the employer es-
tablished that the additional employees were not needed.
Being unable to utilize the secondary boycott without
risk of action under Taft-Hartley and with the Supreme Court's
54Charles H. Tower, â€Secondary Bo cotts: An Outline,"
Labog L 1 Journal. 5 (March, 1945), p. 1 5.
55Section 303 of the Act pertains to secondary boycotts,
see: 61 Stat. 136, 159 (1947).
d Labz6u 2, House ofRRepresentatives, Committee on Education
an r, ear ggs: estgictive Union Practice g; th gaggi-
gan Federatign 91|Mu icians, 0th Cong., nd ess., 1935, p.
82.
297
decision that the Les Act which prohibited compelling a
licensee "to employ....any person or persons in excess of
the number needed by such licensee to perform actual services"
was not too vague or indefinite so as to avoid prosecution,
the AFM began to lose its ability to force broadcasters to
employ more musicians than they felt they needed. Shortly
after the Supreme Court's decision in mid-1947, WAPO, a radio
station in Chattanooga, ceased employing an orchestra of
10 AFN musicians which a station official said had not
been used by the station since 1943.57 It was reported that
the annual cost to the station to maintain this orchestra
which was not even used was $13,000.58 About two weeks
later, radio station KWK in St. Louis dismissed 10 of the 16
musicians employed by it when its AFM contracts expired.59
It was reported that there were no reprisals threatened by
the Federation. About the same time, Petrillo told a Congres-
sional committee that the Federation had "several thousand
men on notice" as a result of the Les Act.60
In September, 1947, Broadcastigg reported that a radio
station in Rochester, New York had defied the AFM.61 The
57Broadcasting, July 14, 1947, p. 15.
SBIbid.
59 id., July 28, 1947, pp. 15. 76.
, 6°U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education
and Labor Hearings: Investigation g1 James C Pgtril%o, the
Amegican F eration g; usic ans, gt. a1, 86th‘Cong., st Sess.,
9 g P. 155.
GIEEQEQEEEEABA. September 15. 1947. p. 60.
298
station allegedly had told the AFM that if it dared to call
a strike, "it would discharge as many musicians as it wanted
to."62 Later in January of 1948, in testimony to a House
investigation, Petrillo seid the following:
And, as of this date, since the Lea Bill and Taft-
Hartley Bill, we have lost so far $332,000 in wages
and in the neighborhood of 164 men in radio.
As the contracts expire in the smaller stations,
the musicians are being let out.
So, while the industry that we work for is
growing more and more each day, our future is very
dark.5
In April, 1948, the New York Times carried an editorial com-
menting on the fact that since the passage of the Lea and
Taft-Hartley Acts a great number of radio stations had dis-
charged musicians that they felt were unneeded.64
Also, a drOp in employment can be detected in Table
11 of Chapter II which reports the employment of musicians
in the broadcasting industry as compiled from Federation re-
cords. Gross salaries paid to musicians by networks, sta-
tions, advertising agencies, and sponsors declined in the
three years following the passage of the Lea and Taft-Hartley
Acts--l947. 1948, and l949--nearly six million dollars. Over
the three year period, this represented a drop of approximate-
ly 23 per cent under the 1946 level. When the 1958 figures
are compared with the 1946 figures, the drOp in income of
62Ibid.
63U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education
and Labor, Hearin s: Restrictive Union P actices g; the Ameri-
can Federation 22 iusicIans, 80th Cong., nd ess., 1938, pp. 234.
6419.! 1.9.13 Haas. April 20. 1948. p. 12:3.
299
musicians from broadcasting was even more dramatic. The
gross salaries paid by all sources dropped from 825,531,441
in 1946 to 817.862.150.65 This represented an approximately
8 million dollar drOp in income or about 30 per cent under
the 1945 level.
With respect to the effectiveness and results of the
Les Act, Charles H. Tower, when manager of the National
Association of Broadcasters‘ EmployerbEmployee Relations
Department, concluded the following:
The effect of the Les Act on broadcasting
labor relations has been a good deal more signi-
ficant than the cases [refers to the Petrillo
cases and the other cases in which the Les Act
pla ed some part (see Footnote 50 of this chap-
teri7 might indicate. The employment of unwanted
staff musicians has ceased to be a problem in
station bargaining. The act is not, of course,
limited in its application to the employment of
standby musicians. Its prohibitions are drawn in
the broadest terms-~broad enough, in all proba-
bility, to cover other instances of featherbedding
in broadcasting. The announcer-control issue
comes readily to mind. Restrictions on the use
of recorded voices or of unpaid public personali-
ties on noncommercial programs may be others. Once
agreed to, of course, such commitments are binding
until the contract is terminated. Nevertheless,
at the bargaining table, the force of the Act may
well be behind station management on many of these
issues. Broadcasters have been reluctant to use
this power because they feel, and rightly, that
criminal prosecution is a drastic remedy to be
used only as a last resort. Furthermore, they feel
that, given any degree of reason, the complex
human problems involved in accomodation to changing
conditions are, under most circumstances, best
{orkgg out in the framework of collective bargain-
ng.
655!!! EEEEEEQ-o 1958, pp. 82-86.
66Tower, "Labor Relations in the Broadcasting Indus-
try," 92, cit., p. 100.
300
Given the degree to which musicians' employment
has dropped in the face of a greatly expanding broadcasting
industry, there is certainly evidence that unwanted musicians
have ceased to be a problem for broadcasters. No doubt
further development in broadcast technology, e.g., higher
fidelity recordings and transcriptions, higher quality
broadcast film, video tape recordings, etc., has contributed
to the loss in musicians' employment. However, with these
developments, since the forties, there was no evidence
that indicated that the AFM has resisted or attempted to
soften the effects of them with the vigor and determination
that it did during that decade. Probably in no small measure,
the Les Act coupled with Taft-Hartley has prevented the
AFM from continuing to use the same tactics it used during
the 1940's to increase employment. In all probability, if
the AFM had, it would have run the great risk of a great
many legal actions under both laws. In 1949, Petrillo openly
admitted that both the Lea Act and Taft-Hartley had hurt
the Union's bargaining power considerably.67 Also, he told
his 1950 convention that every time the Federation tried to
make a move to improve employment in the broadcasting indus-
try, it was being blocked by the Lea and Taft-Hartley Acts.68
He further indicated that the AFM was now fighting an up-hill
67James C. Petrillo, "Musicians' Progress," American
Federationist, 56 (October, 1949), pp. 34-35.
68
AFM. Proceed., 1950, p. 91.
301
battle. He admitted the following: "We have lost a great
number of men in radio stations since the passage of the
Les Act." The following year, in an article in the
Intezgational Musician, Petrillo stated: "The Lea Act pro-
hibits our organization from dealing with radio stations to
increase employment opportunities."69 He further emphasized
that, to September, 1950, approximately 600 staff musicians
had lost their Jobs since the law was passed. With the
secondary boycott no longer being used coupled with the pro-
hibitions in the Les Act, one of the Federation's more
restrictive policies with respect to broadcast programming
came to an end.
Intezpatiogal Ban.r-Another specific obJective of the
Les Act was to prevent the interference with programs which
originated outside the Unï¬ted States. Section 506(a)(6)
specifically related to this problem and did prohibit coer-
cive interference with them.70 The Federation's international
ban was put into effect on December 31, 1945, Just three and
a half months prior to the passage of the Lea Act.71
Apparent-
ly, the Lea Act put a stop to any further activities in this
area. At any rate, after the passage of the Act, not a
single mention was made in any of the literature reviewed for
69James C. Petrillo, â€An Important Message to all
Members of the American Federation of Musicians," Integgationa;
Mu ician, 49 (September, 1950). p. 8.
70For text of Section 506(a)(6), see Appendix B.
For more details of the international ban, see Sec-
tion G of Chapter III.
302
this study which indicated that the AFM had taken any fur-
ther action in this direction. If the AFM had done so, in
all probability, broadcasters would have seen to it that it
would have been aired in the press. On this basis, it can
probably be safely inferred that the Les Act aided substantial-
ly in preventing the AFM from continuing its interference
with broadcast programs involving music which originated out-
side the United States and Canada.
Amateur Musicians,--A1so, the Lea Act outlawed coercive
interference with the broadcasting of "noncommercial educa-
72 The intent of Congress was
tional or cultural programs."
clear with respect to its application to amateur and school
musicians such as the series of concerts which had been broad-
cast by NBC prior to 1942 originating from the National Music
Camp at Interlochen, Michigan which featured the Student
Symphony Orchestra. Most of the wrath that had been aroused
in this area was created primarily by a single instance of
interference with school musicians, the Interlochen affair.73
Little evidence was found which would support the allegation
that the Federation had stopped completely the broadcasting
of all amatuer and school musicians by any announced policy
on its part. It was suggested previously that what inter-
ference may have been caused might have been caused more by
the broadcasters themselves rather than by any overt action
72This was the primary purpose of Section 506(a)(5).
Forvtext, see Appendix B.
'73For more details of the Interlochen affair, see Sec-
tion C of Chapter III.
303
or announced policy on the part of the Union specifically
in this regard. This is, the broadcasters did indicate on
several occasions that they believed the AFM did have a
policy which prevented them from utilizing amateur and school
musicians. No evidence was found which indicated that the
Federation had any such announced general policy. The only
consistent policy in this regard that could be ascertained
was that the AFM objected to the broadcast performances of
amatuer and school musicians when they were in competition
with the customary employment of professional musicians. It
was suggested that possibly broadcasters had imposed on them-
selves a broadcast ban on amatuer musicians. Since the AFM
was "banning" everything else, there must be a ban covering
amateur musicians was the kind of thinking suggested which
could have produced such a self-imposed ban. If such were
the case, Petrillo would have been the last person to inform
broadcasters that no such policy existed regarding amateur and
school musicians.
About a year after the Les Act was enacted, a House
investigator asked Petrillo about the status of amateur and
school music on the air. Petrillo replied:
Now, of course, with the Les bill passed, the
American Federation of Musicians has no part there
at all. we are finished. If the broadcast compan-
ies desire to put ...[Emateur and school musician§7
on the air, that is their business; we will not
interfere. We live up to the law as passed by Con-
gress. If Congress says that is the law, then we
ire a part of this country, and we live up to the
aw.
74U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, Hearings: Investigation gf’James 9, Petrillo,
304
With this kind of an attitude eXpressed by the AFM leader,
the way would seem clear for resumption of such broadcasts
that may have been affected by any real or imputed restric-
tions in this area. During the same investigations, Petrillo
expressed a willingness to meet with music educators to formu-
late a policy with regard to school musicians which would be
mutually advantageous to both sides.75 Representative Kearns,
chairman of the investigation, arranged such meetings which
resulted in a formal agreement between the Music Educators
National Conference, the American Association of School Admini-
strators, and the American Federation of Musicians.76
Entitled "A Code of Ethics," it was signed by representatives
of each group on September 22, 1947.77 In essence, this
agreement delineated very carefully the respective fields of
"professional music and music education" in such a way that
school musicians would not be in competition with the custom-
ary employment of professional musicians.78 In actuality,
the Ame ican Fede at on f Mu icians et . 80th Con . lst
asst‘fflrï¬ï¬L’L "‘3’ 5'
75Ibid., p. 264.
d LabZéU.§. House 2f Representatives, Committee on Education
an r, sport: nves i ation g;,James C Petr o and the
Amerigan Fedepatigg_%z Musiciagg, H.R. R3p.‘No. 1 2, 80th
Cong., st Sess., 19 7, p. 5.
For some of the news accounts concerning the a reement
and its negotiations, see: B cadcastin , July 21, l9g7, pp. 17.
C
74° July 2 1947. DD. 15 7 : ew 0;? Times September 23
19i7, p. 21:2; September 24, l9z7rjp.- 6:3. ’ .
77For text of the agreement signed, see: U.S. House
of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor, Reapings:
Restrigtive Union Practices 2; the American Federation Musi-
cians, 0th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1918, pp. 3 3-65. 2;
78The agreement that was signed was not the first time
305
the agreement did little except formalize the already exist-
ing policy of the Federation in this regard. Thus, the air
had been cleared of misunderstanding and now the broadcasting
of school musicians, under terms of the formal agreement,
could proceed with little fear of interference from the AFM.
It is a little difficult to access the impact of the
Les Act on the A 7's policies toward amateur and school
musicians. Except for'a few isolated and one highly publicized
incident, little evidence was found which indicated that the
AFM had interfered actively to any great extent with the
braodcasting of such musicians. No doubt, if broadcasters
believed that the Union had some kind of a policy which pre-
vented amateur music broadcasts, amateur and and school
musicians might have been kept off the air under such circum-
stances. If this were the case, the principal effect of
the provision in the Les Act relating to noncommercial educa-
tional or cultural programs was that it brought the problem
out in the open where a reasonable solution of it could be
achieved. In this respect, it could be said that this specific
obJective of the Lea Act was realized to some extent.
Interlochen.--However, one very specific obJective
that the framers of the Act had in mind for this provision
relating to educational programs--resumption of the Interlochen
concerts--was never fully realized. The Interlochen concerts
— ~—
that such a settlement had been prOposed. As far back as
1939 and 1940, efforts had been made to get resolutions adopted
by AFM conventions which called for such a demarcation of pro-
fessional and amateur activities. However, these efforts
had met with failure. See: AFM. Proceed., 1939. PP. 395-96;
1940, ppm 321-22 0
306
were never again carried by any of the networks. However,
broadcast concerts of the National Insic Camp's Student
Symphony Orchestra were resumed on July 1, 1943 on a very
limited basis. At that time, WKAR, the educational AM radio
station owned and operated by Michigan State University at
East Lansing, Michigan, began the exclusive carrying for
many years to follow of the Interlochen concerts.79
1 Dr. Maddy, the Camp's director, did make attempts in
1946 and 19A8 to get the concerts back on the air on a
national basis. A few months after the Lea Act was passed
in 1946, Maddy wrote a letter to NBC suggesting that the con-
certs could be resumed if arrangements could be worked out.80
In reply to Maddy's letter, NBC informed him that there was
no room in its summer schedule for resumption of the Inter-
lochen concerts.81 Two years later, in 1948, Maddy again
tried.82 According to Maddy, NBC flatly refused his request
on the grounds that the Camp was on the AFM's unfair list.
With MBS, apparently he did not receive a flat negative ans-
wer. At any rate, Maddy made the announcement to the press
in the latter part of May, 1948 that Mutual had agreed to
79Robert William Kamins, "The History of Radio Broad-
casting and Radio Education at Michigan State College 1917-
1947" Unpublished Master's thesis, Department of Speech,
Michigan State University, 1947). p. 36.
8033: Ygrk Times, June 17, 1946, p. 43:1.
81;-Pug" June 19. 1946' pe 18:6e
821=‘or accounts of the 1948 attempts by Maddy, see:
Broadcastin , May 31, 1948 p. 26; New York Times, May 22,
1958, p. 17:2; May 28, 194 , p. 26:8.
307
carry concerts from Interlochen starting on July 5. Almost
immediately, MBS officials accused Maddy of making the announce-
ment without consulting them. Emphasizing the tentative
nature of any plans that had been made, they were angered at
the premature disclosure of them before they had an Opportun-
ity to discuss them with the AFM. The result was that MBS
withdrew its invitation to Maddy to present the concerts
and canoeled any plans that it may have had in this regard.
MBS said that it felt as if it had been used as an "instru-
ment" in Dr. Maddy's private controversies with Petrillo, the
AFM, and the other networks. Thus, the Interlochen concerts
were never resumed on a national basis.
Othe: Lea Act ObJectives.--The Lea Act was supposed to
provide the broadcasting industry with remedies for such AFM
actions as those which affected FM and live TV and was sup-
posed to prevent recurrence of another recording ban. The
Lee Act did not prevent the recording ban of 1948 and it did
not play any apparent significant part in the settlement of
it, either. It was primarily settled through negotiation
between the recording industry and the AFM. With respect
to the AFM policies affecting FM and live TV, the Lea Act
did not have any immediate.effect which could be detected.
Some of the Federation's policies with regard to these broad-
cast media remained in effect for nearly two years after the
law was enacted. These issues were finally settled during
the negotiations for the renewal of the contracts between
the networks and the AFM which were to expire on January 31,
1948. To what extent,the possibility of legal action under
308
the Les Act influenced the AFM to come to terms when it
did with regard to the issues concerning FM and live TV, it
is difficult to assess. However, since it was nearly two
years before they were settled, it would seem to indicate
that the Les Act was not immediatgly effective in this regard.
C. Negotiations for Renewal of the Contracts Between the AFM
and the Networks Which Were to Expire January 1, 1948 and
the Issues Settled During Them
E!.--The FM question was the subject of a series of
meetings between the AFM and various groups representing
various segments of the broadcasting industry, i.e., the
national AM networks, an FM network, the FM Association, the
NAB, and a special industry-wide committee created to cope
with the problem, during the latter part of 1947.83 This
whole series of meetings can be viewed as part of the general
negotiations that went on with reSpect to the contracts that
were to expire on January 31, 1948 between the AFM and primar-
ily the networks. These meetings accomplished very little
before the first week in October, 1947. At which time,
Petrillo lifted the ban on FM network employment temporarily
until the date the present contracts were due to expire.84
This move marked the first concession that the AFM had made
83For some of the accounts of these earlier meetings,
see: AME. Proceed., 1948, pp. 128-30; Broadcasting, August 4,
1947, pp. 13, 73; September 29, 1947, pp. 13, 73; October 5,
1947, pp. 17, 84; October 20, 1947, pp. 13, 74; N21_Y k Tiges
August 20, 1947, pp. :2, 14:4; August 27. 1947, pp. :2;
September 9. 1947, p. 24:6; October 7, 1947. p. 54:2.
84
Broadcastigg, October 6, 1947, p. 17.
309
thus far regarding the FM problem. The decision allowed
the Continental Network, a newly formed exclusive FM network,
to start distributing a few programs involving live musicians.
However, on October 14, Petrillo withdrew part of the con-
cession that he had made.85 As of that date, no additional
AFM musicians other than those which had already become
employed were allowed to play for FM networks. Also at
this time, Petrillo reinterated that the prohibitions relating
to the dual performance of AFM members simultaneously on AM
and FM were still in effect.
In 1947, a great deal of optimism was still being
shared by many with regard to FM's future. There was still
a rather substantial amount of pressure being exerted for the
purpose of settling this problem. In July, a few months
prior to the AFM's first concession, the AM networks had
been asked when they were going to release muSic programs for
broadcast by FM stations.86 Network officials stated definite-
ly that they would not release such programs until the AFM
officially withdrew its obJectionS. In the following month,
a group of industry officials asked the Department of Justice
to look into the FM situation for possible violations of the
Lee and Taft-Hartley laws.87 The Department of Justice
85:213., October 20, 1947, p. 17.
85§g§,york Times, July 25, 1947, p, 34:2,
87For some of the accounts concerning the possible
action by the Department of Justice, see: Bfgadcastigg,
August 25. 1947. pp. 13. 74: September 1. 19 7. pp. 13. 75;
Ngg.York Times, August 20, 1947, p. 14:1; August 22, 1947,
p. 9:3; August 29, 1947, p. 18:6.
310
promised it would do So, but nothing ever resulted from
this promise. In addition to this pressure, there was some
evidence that some FM stations were defying Petrillo and the
AFM by presenting AM network programs involving live music
88 In all probability, the broad-
without Union permission.
casters who took this course of action did so on the strength
of the Lea and Taft-Hartley Acts. In the face of the pres-
sures like the above, it would be difficult for the AFM to
hold out indefinitely with regard to this issue.
The break finally came on the eve of the date the
contracts were to expire. On January 30, Petrillo agreed to
end the ban on the broadcasting of AM network programs by
affiliated FM stations.89 Since negotiations on the other
issues were not yet complete, it was agreed by the AFM and
the networks to continue the present contracts for an
additional sixty days so that the remaining issues could be
ironed out.90 Broadcasting was of the opinion that the way
was now clear for the AFM and the networks to come to agree-
ment over the other issues than facing them.91 By the time
the contracts were signed, the FM problem was completely
resolved.
88For examples of this alleged defiance, see: New
Y rk Times, September 17, 1947 p. 21:3; September 28,‘I§47,
p. 8:'2‘,'-"'6ctober 7, 1947. p. 54:2.
8
9Ng! York Ti es, January 30, 1948, pp. 1:2, 2:3.
90
Broadcagting, February 2, 1948, pp. 13, 18.
91
Ib1§., p. 13.
311
Cooperative Pppgpams.--It was also during the negotia-
tions for the 1948 contracts that agreement was reached between
the AFM and the industry which allowed musicians to be employed
for cooperative programs. It will be remembered that the AFM
had a long standing policy which prohibited its members from
being employed on such programs.92 Also, it was during
the 1948 contract negotiations that his problem had come to
a head over the use of a pianist on a MBS program. It was
in this area, that Petrillo made the second maJor concession.
In the closing days of November, 1947, the prohibitions against
the employment of AFM members on coop pregrams was terminated
until the present contracts expired.93 Within a week,
Broadcastipg reported that live music was added to seven of
the coop programs out of the thirty-five that the maJor
networks were presenting.94 As with the FM problem, the
coop program issue was resolved permanently with the signing
of the 1948 contracts.
11.--When the 1948 contracts were signed on March 18,
1948, the AFM prohibition of its members from appearing on
live television came to an end, also.95 The only restrictions
left with respect to TV were related to the use of film on TV
which utilized AFM members in its production.‘ These latter
92For more details concerning the coop ban, see Section
H of Chapter III.
93Fer accounts of the termination of the c00p ban, see:
Broadcast , December 1, 1947 pp. 13, 88; N21,Yor§ Timps,
November 2%, 1947, p. 33:3.
94Bppadcasting, December 8, 1947, pp. 15. 90.
951hid., March 22, 1948, pp. 13-14.
312
issues were not settled by the 1948 contracts completely.
On March 20, NBC and CBS celebrated the ending of the live
TV'ban by presenting TV firsts.96 Both networks presented
special music programs. NBC featured the NBC Symphony
Orchestra conducted by Arturo Toscanini with CBS featuring the
Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra conducted by Eugene Ormandy.
gipai Setiiepept Coniained ip the 1248 Cpntpacts,97--As
indicated above, the 1948 contracts covered the following
issues that had been plaguing the industry for some time, FM
cooperative programs, and live TV. In addition to the con-
tracts signed on March 18, further contracts were signed in
the latter part of April covering the wage scales appli-
cable to TV. This issue could not be resolved in time to
have it included in the earlier contracts, so Special con-
tracts were negotiated and executed covering only this issue.
In a letter to all locals upon conclusion of the TV wage
agreements, Petrillo notified all members of the Federation
of the terms and conditions of the 1948 settlement, thus
making it official. The following represents a summary of
the resolution of the various issues agreed upon during the
negotiation and execution of the 1948 contracts.
FM.--All AFM restrictions affecting musicians'
vw ———— —_ it. ———_
96â€Petrillo Relents." Lita: 2“ (AP’11 5' 1948)' pp’
43-44, 46. ’
97For accounts of the final settlement as established
by the 1948 agreements see: ,igg. P ce d., pp. 97-101; s -
as March 22 19 , pp. 1 ~14, - March 29, 1948, pp. ,
: pm 12 1958. p. 29: May 5. 194é. p. 25: easiest; .2.†o -
March 27. 19 , pp. 100-102.
The above serves as documentation for this entire section.
313
employment on FM were withdrawn. FM networks could employ
musicians. AM networks could feed live music programs to
affiliated FM stations. AM programs using live music could
be presented simultaneously over FM. In other words, the
settlement permitted all broadcasters to use AFM musicians on
AM and FM, simultaneously and interchangeably. Also, there
was no extra fee required for such use.
Coop Programs.--A11 restrictions with respect to the
use of AFM’musicians on cooperative programs or any programs
of network origin which involved participation or local spon-
sorship were withdrawn. In short, the AFM's cooperative ban
came to a permanent and unqualified end.
TV.--The restrictions applicable to the use of AFM
members on live television programs were permanently withdrawn,
also. The wage rates to be paid to musicians employed exclu-
sively for TV were set at a level that was below the rates
being paid to musicians being employed for radio (AM and/or
FM). The agreement was that the TV wage rates would be ad-
Justed upward as the infant TV industry prospered. The lower
rates were to be the AFM's contribution to the growth and
expansion of the TV industry. In addition, radio staff
musicians could be utilized for TV programming. However, if
such musicians were used, they must be paid at the full radio
wage rates. The agreement provided, with respect to the duplica-
tion of radio programs involving live music over TV or vice
versa, that an extra fee would be charged for such privileges.
With respect to kinescope recordings, these would be allowed
for delayed broadcast purposes only. In other words, kines
314
could be made of live music programs so that networks could
provide service to affiliates who were not yet linked to the
parent network by coaxial cable or micro-wave relay. However,
kinescope recordings could be presented over any key station
or affiliate only once. The understanding was that no music
on the kines was to be dubbed off for any other purposes.
Also, the networks agreed not to sell, lease, or in anyway
dispose of such recordings without first obtaining the per-
mission of the AFM.
Network Musicians' Employment.--The original demands
that the AFM had made to the networks had included a sub-
stantial pay increase and more employment. 'However, the
Federation gave in on these points. The final 1948 contracts
with the networks provided for the same number of musicians
to be employed and at the same wage rates that had been con-
tained in the contracts that had expired. The Federation made
no gains in this area.
It will be noted that most of the outstanding problems
between the AFM and the broadcasting industry were resolved
by the 1948 settlement.
Reasons Speculated go: the Settlemgnt.--Why did Petrillo
and the AFM come to terms with the broadcasting industry so
completely and quickly as they had? ,Busingss Egg; character-
ized the 1948 settlement as a surrender on the part of the
Union.98 0n the surface, it appeared that Petrillo and the
AFM had conceeded on almost every point of contention what
V ‘—
98% hash March 27. 1948. p. loo.
315
had existed between them and the industry. The only issue
that remained was concerned with the use of musicians for
films produced specifically for TV and the use on TV of films
produced primarily for theatre exhibition. In 1948, this
issue was not very important. 1948 was the first big year
on TV and the industry was greatly interested in exploiting
and developing live television programming. In the early
years, film--aside from the use of kinesc0pes for delayed
broadcasts-~was not extensively used. In this settlement,
the surprising thing was the AFM had not even pressed its
demands on the networks for higher wages and more employment.
Economics of the Industry.--Fer one thing, the economic
shape of the broadcasting industry in 1948 left something to
be desired.99 Income for that year dropped 40 per cent over
the previous one. Both FM and TV were losing prepositions.
Both media were in their infancy and, at their state of
development, represented a financial liability to the broad-
casting industry as a whole. When asked why the AFM did not
press its demands for higher wages and more employment,
Petrillo answered: "They (the networks) simply said they
couldn't give us any more money or any more men."100 Petrillo
was a realist and recognized when it was of little use to
press for something that, in all likelihood, would be impos-
sible to get.
i —_w
99See Table 2, Chapter II.
looBroadcastipg, March 22, 1948, p. 14.
316
Restrictive Legislation.--Also, the two laws on the
statute books-~the Lea Act and Taft-Hartley--undoubted1y
influenced, to some extent, the AFM's actions in coming to
terms with the broadcasting industry. Although neither law
had been used very extensively, still there was always a
constant threat hovering in the background that they could
be if broadcasters became angered enough. Petrillo must
have realized that he had been pushing broadcasters almost
to the breaking point and that if the AFM continued its present
course of action, there was the danger of reaching that point.
Then, the probability that the laws might be used would in-
crease. The attitude of the industry toward the AFM and
Petrillo was revealed in a survey conducted by a House sub-
committee in mid-1947.101
Some 2,000 questionnaires had been
sent out to broadcasters to voice their complaints about
their dealings and relationships with the AFM. At the date
the results were made public, approximately 1,500 had been
returned. Of these, only gpp,had a favorable comment about
the Federation. Also, it will be remembered that in connec-
tion with the negotiations concerning FM, there had been some
threats of legal action if a solution was not worked out.
Coupled with the two statutes and the highly unfavorable
attitude of the industry, in all likelihood, Petrillo must
have realized that if the settlement was delayed much longer,
101U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Educa-
tion and Labor, Hearings; Invest at 0 Q1; James L Petpiilo,
c ans,
n
he American Feds ation p__Mus i et, ai. 30th Cong.
1;? Sess., 1957, p. 192. . ’ .
317
the AFM's chances of avoiding legal action would become much
less.
The Public Reaction.--The Lea and Taft-Hartley laws
were indicative of another pressure on the AFM to come to
terms with the industry. There was no doubt that public
opinion was mobilized against the AFM and labor in general.
The Les Act represented an expression of public disfavor
against the Union Specifically. The Taft-Hartley can be
viewed as an expression of disfavor toward organized labor
in general. Another demonstration that public opinion was
unfavorable toward the Union was exhibited by the actions of
the House Committee on Education and Labor. Concurrent with
the negotiations of the 1948 contracts, this House committee
held two investigations of the AFM. A subcommittee listened
102
to testimony in June, July, and August of 1947 with the
full committee convening in early January, 1948 to hear more
testimony.lo3 These hearings dealt exclusively with the AFM.
1021b!!-
1°3U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Educa-
tion an Labor, Hearin s: Resipictive Unipn Ppgcticgp e
ApppipppiFedeEatIcn ES Mhsipians, th ong., 2nd Sess.?£l%%8.
t 0 two hearings within the Span of less than Six
months might suggest considerable interest by Congress in
the activities of the AFM, these hearings were part of a
whole series of them that the House committee was conducting
into the general area of organized labor's activities. No
Specific action or proposal resulted from these hearings in
Congress with respect to the Federation.
The principal and most Significant result of the first
hearings which were headed by Representatives Kearns was that
[earns was instrumental in getting the formal agreement be-
tween the AFM and music educators. '
The later hearings are significant only to the extent
that they represent a very_excellsnt review of the whole sweep
of the AFM's policies and practices for the entire decade of
the forties up to 1948.
318
From the testimony presented at them and the comments of the
House investigators, it was not difficult to see that the
American pecple, the broadcasting industry, and Congress
'was getting â€fed up" with the actions of the AFM. There was
strong evidence that the AFM recognized that this public
reaction existed, also. For in January of 1948, the AFM set
up a public relations department for the first time in the
existence of the organization.104
Also, the following year,
the AFM'published a public relations manual for its member
locals.105 Petrillo must have realized that the Federation
would not have been able to hold out much longer in coming to
terms with the industry in the face of such strong public
opposition.
Changed Attitude of the AFM.--With the foregoing con-
sidered, the AFM and its officers must have realized that
they were fighting a battle with fairly Significant odds
against them. In the past, the Federation, led by Petrillo,
had thought nothing of fighting on several fronts at the
same time. In this process, the AFM had angered vast segments
of the American public. Under such circumstances, it was
almost mandatory for the Federation to change its tactics
IOAAEM. Proceed., 1948, p. 95.
. There had been attempts at three previous conventions
to get some kind of public relations department established,
but all of these attempts had failed. This would indicate that
at least some segments of the AFM were aware of the problem
facing the Federation of growing public Opposition. See:
5:5. Ppoceeg., 1944, p. 191; 19 6, p. 253; 1947, p. 279.
105AFM, Public Relations Manugi gpp’ggggi_0nions (New
York: AFM, 1949).
319
sand attempt to recapture some public goodwill if the AFM
wanted any room at all in which to Operate.106 On the eve
(of the 1948 AFM convention, Petrillo was reportedly to have
stated that in view of the restrictive labor legislation on
'the books and all other things considered, that it was unwise
for*the Federation to continue fighting on so many fronts.107
He SXpressed the opinion that the AFM, in the past, had been
fighting on too many fronts. Under the present circumstances,
he said it would be disasterous to fight on more than one.
In January, 1948, the AFM had committed itself to another
recording ban. In all probability, the Federation wanted to
resolve all of the old issues so that it could devote its
full energies to this commitment.108 Rather early in the
negotiations for the 1948 contracts, according to Broadcastipg,
106A brief bit of Petrillo's testimony to a Congres-
sional committee in January of 1948 tended to reveal that he
had become fully aware that it was essential for the AFM to
cultivate some public good will.
And I say to you gentlemen, while I am talking
about the public, I am satisfied that if the public
of America knew the plight of the musician, knew
what he is up against, that public sentiment would
immediately change, and we are today making such a
Campaign.
. We are starting one of the finest campaigns that
labor unions have ever started-~good clean, no vili-
fication like the National Association of Broadcasters...
....we are going to tell the people the story
exactly as it really is.
See: U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education and
labor, Hearin s: Restrictive Union P actices p£_the American
Fedepation of Music ans, Ot Cong., 2n ess., 1938, p. 339.
107Bpoadcasiing, June 14, 1948, p. 25.
108Petrillo expressed this point of view in his report
to the 1948 convention with respect to the test cases of the
lea Act. It is felt that this point of view was equally ap-
rfligable to the 1948 contract negotiations. See: AFM Ppppggg.
19 . p. 93.
320
ZPetrillo had expressed a determination to settle the conflicts,
Sign a contract, and to start out on a new era with friendlier
feelings between the AFM and the industry.109
This apparently changed attitude on the part of the
.AFM along with the other factors indicated above probably ac-
count for the most of the mediating circumstances which result-
ed in the 1948 settlement. Regarding the changed attitude
of the Union, a statement released by Petrillo on the occasion
of the signing of the 1948 contracts was indicative of this
change and also suggested that the AFM and the broadcasting
industry were entering a new period where greater cooperation
could be expected. With regard to TV, the statement read:
The AFM fully recognizes the public's stake in
television and that was a principal consideration
throughout the negotiations. We were determined
from the outset that we would go all-out to assist
in the development of an art which has great educa-
tional and entertainment possibilities for the
public. The musicians want to aid television's
growth, Just as we did in the early days of standard
. broadcasting.
To prove our good faith, we have pledged that
the rate pattern for live music during this develop-
ment period for television will be reasonable. It
will be available on a basis that this new, but
growing industry can afford to pay. The industry,
likewise has pledged that it will afford Opportunity
for our musicians to participate substantially in
the development of television.110
This statement was certainly a far cry from many of the earlier
statements of Petrillo with regard to television.
Summipg Up.--The final 1948 settlement resolved most
of the outstanding issues, problems, and difficulties which
—— ï¬â€”Vï¬â€”r—ï¬
109Bppadcasting, November 24, 1947. p. 13-
110Ihid., March 22. 1948. p. 13-
321
existed between the AFM and the broadcasting industry. The
only unsettled problems that remained related to the use of
:mueicians on films produced Specifically for television and
the use on TV of films involving music recorded by AFM members
which were produced primarily for theatre exhibition.111 All
_
111As was indicated previously, these problems relat-
ing to the use of films on TV were probably not too salient
during the decade of the forties. As an indication of that,
they were not settled until the very early fifties. Since
this study was limited to the decade of the forties, only the
following brief summary of the settlement of these issues
will be included.
The part of the problem that was settled first was
with reference to the employment of musicians by the inde-
pendent film producers for films produced specifically for
TV use. This was the subJect of agreements between indepen-
dent film producers and the AFM in mid-1950. In exchange
for the right to employ AFM members for such films, the pro-
ducers agreed to pay five per cent of the gross receipts for
the sale or rental of such films when released for exhibition
on TV to a trust fund similar to the one established by the
agreement ending the recording ban of 1948. This newly created
fund was to be used for the same purposes as the recording
trust fund. Expenditures from the fund would be controlled
by the same trustee. See: cadcastin , June 12, 1950, p.
52; "53rd Annual Convention,ï¬ Internationa; Musician, 49
(July, 1950), p. 7.
Similar agreements were executed in the following
year with the networks. In exchange for the right to employ
AFM musicians for films made specifically for TV use, the
networks agreed to pay five per cent of the gross revenues
from such films to a Similar trust fund. Independent sta-
tions could enter into the same general kind of an arrangement
if they wished to produce films for TV. It was stipulated
in these agreements that the networks or stations would not
relinquish their control of these films. These agreements
were signed in March, 1951. See: Br adcast n , March 19,
1951, pp. 27, 49, 63; James C. Petrillo, cm the President's
Office, International Musician, 49 (April, 1951), p. 6.
Fer text 9 t e agreement, see: "Trust Agreement: Television
ggagions,' pggrmatipnal Musician, 49 (April, 1951), pp. 7,
" g 32. .
The above settled the issue of the employment of AFM
musicians for the production of films specifically for tele-
vision. The only issue that remained related to the use on
TV of feature films produced with the services of AFM musi-
cians
322
indications were that the AFM and the broadcasting industry
*were entering a new era of greater sccperation and more
cordial relations. To celebrate this new era and the sign-
ing of the 1948 contracts, it was reported by [Lin that the
maJor networks presented Petrillo with an engraved gold
trumpet.112 The trumpet was the instrument which Petrillo
hed.once made his livelihood before entering Union politics.
.Aside from the controversy generated by the recording ban of
l9h8, the press reported no controversies of any consequence
‘between the AFM and the broadcasting industry throughout the
remainder of the decade of the 1940's.
primarily for theatre exhibition. This was first settled
with an agreement effective May 14, 1951 with the Hollywood
producers. This agreement provided that a film could be
released for TV use only if the producer agreed to employ the
same number of musicians as had been originally employed for
the film for the purpose of re-recording the music that had
been utilized in the making of that film. This arrangement
proved to be unworkable and was subsequently modified. On
September 3, 1952, it was changed to a provision that each
of the musicians who had been employed in the production of
the film were to receive a re-use payment of 825 before the
film could be released for TV use. Then in 1955, it was
modified again. It was agreed that the re-use payment would
no longer be paid to the individual musicians, but instead,
it was to be paid to a trust fund similar to the ones men-
tioned above. See: U.S. House of Representatives, Commit-
tee on Education and Labor, H ar n Musicians zngggggggg
Iggst d, 8#th Cong., 2nd ess., 1956, p. .
does not appear that the above represented the
final settlement with regard to theatre films. A news article
in 1960 suggested that the condition for release for TV use
was changed back to the 1952 arrangement. That is, the in-
dividual musicians who were employed in the production of the
theatre film were to receive the re-use payment before the
film could be released to TV. See: g;11_sgrggt gagggal,
August 17, 1960, p. 6:1.
This in brief, represents a summary of the way the
issues relating to the use of film on TV were resolved.
112219;, March 28, 1948, p. 65.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Summary of Findings.--Hith regard to broadcasting in
this country, we have committed ourselves to a federal regu-
latdry policy in which the government licenses qualified
persons to operate privately owned broadcast facilities on
publicly owned broadcast channels. The licensee is charged
with the responsibility that this broadcast operation will
serve the "public convenience, interest, or necessity."
In this connection both the FCC and the courts have stressed
that the individual licensees must bear the maJor responsi-
bility for the presentation and selection of program material.
Also, both the FCC and the Courts have stressed that this
responsibility can neither be delegated nor transferred to
others, or be unduly affected or restricted by contractual
arrangements. Accordingly, the responsibility for maintaining
control over programming should not be subject to infringe-
ment by outside parties.
However, during the decade of the forties, it has been
demonstrated that a number of the policies, practices and
activities of the American Federation of Musicians tended to
have a restrictive effect upon certain types of broadcast
programming, notably programs containing music. Among such
policies, practices, and activities of the AFM were the follew-
ing:
32}
324
1. Network strikes of remote bands, studio bands, and
bands for commercial programs which were associated
with local disputes (secondary boycotts). (1940-
1946.)
2. Restrictions on employment for FM programs. (1945-
1948.)
3. Restrictions on employment for live TV programs.
4. Restrictions on the TV use of films producted
specifically for theatre exhibition. (1946-1951.)
5. Restrictions on employment for filmed TV programs.
6. Recording bane of 1942 and 1948.
7. Ban on the broadcasting of music programs originat-
ing outside the U.S. and Canada. (1946.)
8. Policies affecting the broadcast performances of
amzteur, school, and military musicians. (19ho-
19 7.
9. Restrictions on employment for coo eratively spon-
sored radio programs. (1940-19h8.§
The above list represents an approximate ordering in
terms of their actual restrictiveness with respect to broad-
cast programming (the most restrictive being listed at the
tap). Despite the conclusion that some of the policies, with
regard to their observable effects, were not very restrictive,
the principle still remained in the background that they did
represent attempts to exert undue control over broadcast
programming by an outside group.
In the process of enforcing its policies and practices
which tended to restrict programming, the Federation managed
to engender considerable Opposition and reaction from numerous
segments of the American society. The most notable of these
practices in this regard were the Interlochen affair, the
recording ban of 1942, and the FM policies. The Interlochen
325
affair probably contributed more to the public disgrace of
the AFM than did any other single incident.
At the culmination of this public disapproval of the
“AFM, the Les Act was passed as an amendment to the Communica-
tions Act in 1946. One of the chief aims of the legislation
‘was to place restraints on the Federation and its colorful
leader, James C. Petrillo, and bar further actions which
might cause interference with broadcast programming. Although
there was considerable emotionality and bitterness associated
with the passage of the Lea Act, some of its more rational
supporters saw in the situation involving the AFM the danger
that broadcasting could become unduly restricted by groups
and organizations for strictly private gain or interest, thus
negating the "public convenience, interest, or necessity?
philosOphy of federal regulatory policy. Although it might
be argued that such considerations were not the primary
motivations in the passage of the Act, they were none the
less present. Two provisions of the law provide evidence of
this. They forbid coercive interference with educational and
international broadcast programs.
Subsequently, the Les Act was approved by the Courts.
Although the legislation was not immediately and entirely
successful in causing the Federation to put a stop to its
restrictive actions in the area of broadcast programming, it
undoubtedly made the Union fully cognizant of the growing and
widespread public disapproval and opposition to its policies
and activities. Ultimately, the American Federation of
Musicians had to bow to the public will. By 1948, the Union
326
had withdrawn by choice or force nearly every one of its
policies of a restrictive nature which tended to affect
broadcast programming.
Ww-Behind every one of the
AFM's policies affecting programming can be detected devotion
to one of its primary goals as a labor organization: 252333:
4.4.21: at o mwwmmw. After the
disastrous unemployment which resulted from the introduction
of the sound motion picture, the AFM tended to view all
technological innovation within its sphere of influence with
suspicion, the broadcasting industry not being exempted. Also,
the Union feared that the growing reliance on the use of
"mechanized†or recorded music, in all of its forms, for
commercial purposes would drastically reduce musicians' em-
ployment opportunities. The AFM's policies and practices
affecting broadcasting outlined in this study, were attempts
on the part of the Union to ameliorate what it considered
to be the effects or possible effects on employment resulting
from technological innovation and the commercial use of
recorded music. There is little doubt that musicians'
employment since the mid-forties has been decreasing. It is
very possible to argue convincingly that much of this de-
creased employment can be traced to technological innovation
and the commercial use of recorded music.
However, Petrillo, the fiery leader of the AFM, was
quick to point out that the deleterious effects of the situa-
tion did not step with Just decreasing professional musicians'
employment. In essence, his argument was as follows. Such
327
a situation also endangered America's musical culture. With
decreased professional employment Opportunities, talented per-
sons would be discouraged from pursuing instrumental music as
a career. This would tend to narrow the base from which first-
class musicians could emerge and develop. Not every career
musician will ultimately develOp into a first-class instru-
mentalist. It can be argued that, in order to insure an ade-
quate supply of such instrumentalists, there must be a broad
base of practicing or professional musicians in the field.
Also, the lack of employment Opportunities would prevent or
at least make it considerably more difficult for the young
prOfessional who might decide to pursue a music career to gain
the experience and competence necessary (which is needed in
addition to early training and practice) in order to develOp
into a tap-flight, accomplished instrumentalist. The long
range effect could very well be a serious shortage of high
calibre musicians. Composers can create vast quantities of
beautiful music, but before it can have its full impact on
culture, it must be interpreted by performing artists. In
this respect, the instrumentalist performs a very vital ser-
vice. A.vita1 growing musical culture needs and demands an
adequate supply of first class, accomplished instrumentalists,
in addition to creative composers. With either element missing,
musical culture will suffer.
Despite the immediate and selfish concern for the pro-
tection of its members' employment, the AFM also showed some
concern for these aspects of the problem. This is demonstrated
by the Union's establishment of the Recording and Transcription
328
Fund and ultimately the Musicians Performance Trust Funds.
'The earlier fund, the Recording and Transcription Fund, was
solely administered by the AFM. Less than one per cent was
'utilized for administration. 'It was used almost entirely for
jpayments to musicians who performed for free public concerts
all over the United States. The Musicians Performance Trust
Funds are administered by an independent trustee who has no
connection with either the contributors to the funds or the
American Federation of Musicians. The use Of these funds is
not restricted to Just providing employment Opportunities for
AFM members. Non-union musicians can receive payments from
these funds. Any lizg,music activity can be subsidized if
it is deemed by the trustee to be worthy. It is very doubtful
if these funds would have ever been established if it had not
been for the stubborn insistence of the Federation. The radio
and recording industries vehemently fOught the establishment
of these funds. This suggests that the AFM was possibly
motivated by other considerations abOve and beyond the immedi-
ate and selfish interest with respect to the economic welfare
of its members.
However, the radio industry, for the most part, through-
out the decade of the forties, demonstrated little concern
for possible long range effects on music culture which might
result from technological innovations and their commercial use.
Generally, the industry seemed content to reap the profits
from the use of recorded music with little interest in the
welfare of the instrumentalists who made it possible for it to
do so. The industry seemed little concerned about the
329
possibility that in the pursuit of its short term goal of
‘maximizing profits that there could be, in the long run, a
shortage of tap-flight instrumentalists to make high quality
‘recorded music in its various forms. What the radio industry
apparently failed to recognize was, that despite its reliance
on recorded music, in the long run, it would still need the
professional musician. Actually, it is to the gggpgmig_
advantage of the broadcasting industry that there be maintained
an adequate supply of accomplished instrumentalists. The
technology has not replaced musicians entirely; the machine
still, by and large, must depend upon their performance. It
would seem that the broadcasting industry should assume some
of the responsibility for maintaining an adequate supply of
them. However, in general, it has not seen fit to do this.
In view of the broadcast industry's rather extensive reliance
on recorded music for commercial purposes, it would seem that
some sort Of plan should be worked out, possibly patterned
after the trust funds, to which broadcasters would be encour-
aged tO contribute and which would be utilized to foster
live music culture.
In this area, there is much that can be said in favor
Of the AFM and little that can be said in favor of the broad-
casting industry. It might be argued that the so-called aid
to music culture fostered by the AFM is in actuality still
nothing but selfish interest and an elaborate Job protection
scheme. In this situation, it is felt that the motives, as
such, are not important. What is important is that the AFM
has recognized that its economic future is closely tied to
330
the live music culture Of the nation. With this in mind, the
Union has turned to a course of action, in the case of the
trust funds, which can be mutually advantageous to both its
members' economic interest and the nation's live music culture.
The broadcasting industry's course of action, on the con-
trary, during the forties, largely failed to consider the
cultural aspects of this problem.
In pursuit of the objectives of protecting employment
Opportunities and fostering live music during the forties, the
Federation made one serious error. It alienated the public
because of some Of the tactics it employed. It might have pur-
sued a course of action which would have engendered less public
animosity. The Federation should have realized that any hOpe
of fully achieving its ends would require public approval and
support. Also, Petrillo and the Federation should have listened
to former AFM president Heber's advice in 1939 against enforc-
ing policies, regardless of the legitimacy of the end, which
involved exerting control over material to be broadcast. Weber
must have realized that if the Federation got itself too
heavily involved in policies of this nature that it would
eventually get itself into difficulty. Such was the case dur-
ing the decade of the forties.
Sugggstions for Further Research.--With regard to the
general problem Of control being exerted over broadcast pro-
gramming from organized groups, there are a number Of areas
that can be approached for study. The American Federation of
Musicians is only one of the many labor unions associated with
broadcasting. Studies could be made Of the impact of the
331
policies, practices, activities, work rules, etc. of other
broadcast unions upon programming. Also, in addition to labor
organizations, there are a number of other organizations which
appear to exert some control over broadcast programming. One
such group of organizations is the so-called music licensing
organization such as ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC. Professional,
amateur, and school athletic organizations are among .Other
groups that might be studies for their impact on broadcast
programming. This class of organizations would include, for
example, the National Boxing Association, the Amateur Athletic
Association, and the National Collegiate Athletic Association,
as well as many others. These are a few suggestions for
further research in the general problem area with which this
study has been concerned.
APPENDIX A
THE TEXT OF'THE PROPOSED VANDENBERG BILL
Broadcasting of Noncommercial, Cultural
or Educational Programs
SEC. 330. It shall be unlawful for any person, or any
person representing an organization or group, to interfere with,
intimidate any person or persons, hinder, extort, delay, pre-
vent, or conspire with other persons for the purpose of hinder-
ing,delaying, interfering with, or stOpping the production or
transmission, by means of any radio station of any noncommer-
cial educational or cultural program presented by any academical-
ly accredited and tax-exempt educational institution, prepared
and planned for presentation by radio or in the process of
being transmitted by radio stations, and it shall likewise
be unlawful for any person as a part of a group or organiza-
tion to threaten or intimidate any other person for the purpose
Of preventing by group action the cperation of any broadcasting
station while preparing for or in the Operation of broadcasting
such noncommercial educational or cultural programs, unless
such interference, work stoppage, or group action is part of
a general action for other purposes and is of general and
broader nature or purpose than to prevent or interfere with
the broadcasting of such noncommercial educational and cul-
tural programs: Provided, That such radio station or stations
have agreed to broadcast such programs and that no service,
money, or other valuable consideration is directly or indirectly
paid or promised to, or charged or accepted by such station
from any person for broadcasting or agreeing to broadcast such
program and no service, money, or other valuable consideration
is directly or indirectly paid or promised to, or charged or
accepted by the persons producing or participating in such
program from such station or from any commercial sponsor, for
services rendered in producing or participating in such pro-
gram.
"Definition"
"To conspire, for the purposes of this section, shall
mean to plan with others, to hold meetings for the purpose of
planning, to take action as the result of a plan or purpose--
such as united stoppage of work at the radio plant, or to
332
333
‘write communications urging interference by action or by word
of mouth to induce action for purpose of interference.
Source.--9O Cong. Rg_. 9431-32 (1944).
APPENDIX B
THE TEXT OF THE LEA ACT
Coercive Practices Affecting Broadcasting
SEC. 506. (a) It shall be unlawful, by the use or
express or implied threat of the use of force, violence,
intimidation, or duress, or by the use or express or implied
threat of the use of other means, to coerce, compel or con-
strain or attempt to coerce, compel, or constrain a licensee--
(l) to employ or agree to employ, in connection with
the conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee, any
person or persons in excess of the number of employees needed
by such licensee to perform the actual services; or
(2) to pay or give or agree to pay or give any mondy
or other thing of value in lieu of giving, or on account of
failure to give, employment to any person or persons, in
connection with the conduct of the broadcasting business of
such licensee, in excess of the number of employees needed by
such licensee to perform actual services; or
_ (3) to pay or agree to pay more than once for services
performed in connection with the conduct Of the broadcasting
business of such licensee: or
(4) to pay or give or agree to pay or give any money
or other thing of value for services, in connection with the
conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee, which
are not to be performed: or
' (S) to refrain, or agree to refrain, from broadcasting
or from permitting the broadcasting of a noncommercial educa-
tional or cultural program in connection with which the par-
ticipants receive no money or other thing of value fOr their
services, other than their actual expenses, and such licensee
neither pays nor gives any money or other thing of value for
the privilege of broadcasting such program nor receives any
money or other thing of value on account of the broadcasting
Of such.program; or
(6) to refrain, or agree to refrain, from broadcasting
or permitting the broadcasting of any radio communication
originating outside the United States.
(b) It shall be unlawful, by the use or express or
implied threat of the use of force, violence, intimidation or
duress, or by the use or express or implied threat of the use
Of other means, to coerce, compel or constrain or attempt to
coerce, compel or constrain a licensee or any other person--
(1) to pay or agree to pay any exaction for the privilege
of, or on account of, producing, preparing, manufacturing,
selling, buying, renting, Operating, using, or maintaining
33A
335
:recordings, transcriptions, or mechanical, chemical, or
electrical reproductions, or any other articles, equipment,
:meehines, or materials, used or intended to be used in broad-
casting or in the production, preparation, performance, or
:presentation of a program or programs for broadcasting; or
(2) to accede to or impose any restriction upon such
‘production, preparation, manufacture, sale, purchase, rental,
Operation, use, or maintenance, if such restriction is for
the purpose of preventing or limiting the use of such arti-
cles, equipment, machines, or materials in broadcasting or
in the production, preparation, performance, or presentation
Of'a program or programs, for broadcasting; or
(3) to pay or agree to pay any exaction on account
of the broadcasting, by means of recordings or transcriptions,
Of a program previously broadcast, payment having been made,
or agreed to be made, for the services actually rendered in
the performance of such program.
(c) The provisions Of subsection (a) or (b) of this
section shall not be held to make unlawful the enforcement
or attempted enforcement, by means lawfully employed, of any
contract right heretofore or hereafter existing or of any
legal obligation heretofore or hereafter incurred or assumed.
(d) Whoever willfully violates any provision of sub-
section (a) or (b) of this section shall, upon conviction
thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not more than one
year or b a fine of not more than 81,000, or both.
(e As used in this section the term "licensee" in-
cludes the owner or owners, and the person or persons having
control or management, of the radio station in respect of
which a station license was granted.
Source.--6O Stat. 89 (1946).
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Oks
Archer Gleason L. Histor Of Radio to i226. New York: Ameri-
' can Historical Society, Inc., 193 .
Banning, William P. Cgm¥egciai B cadcastin Pioneer, The WEAF
eriment6192 - 2 . Cam r e: arvard flniversity
ress,
Barzum, Jacques. Music inbAmerica. Garden City, N.J.:
Doubleday, I956.
Carpenter, Pauls S. Mus an A t egg,a msigesg. Norman:
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901 -95e
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:CEtcber 31, 1947. (Mimeograpged.)
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. Public Service Re ns bi t 21 Broadcasr
Eirenseeg. epo , arc , 9 .
. §%QA§ d Teievision adcast n Primer. INF
ï¬ziï¬allet n 0%EE, pr , 94g. (MImeograpEed.)
. R rt gr_Chain Brgadcasiing. Docket No. 5060
Kay 2, 5941. ’
Un te8t§%:$::c8 §%3%g%9C;rrunications Industr! ir Egg
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U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Education and Labor.
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25g, 9 eratign Musicians et . 0th ong. let
8.88.. 9 . W%§h ' De e: ’6? . 19470 '
344
. Hearin s: Musicians Perf ance T ust nd. 84th
,63h5., 2n ess., 1955. Wa ., D.C.: 550, £955.
_____ . Hea Rest ve U o P ac e g; the
garrican e at 2%_M c s. Cong., 533
688.. 9 o 8.811., O a: . 194'80
. Re 0 8 ve t a n Jgges C Petriiig and the
'_— éï¬eï¬ican e Eration us c an . .RI‘Rep. o. 115 .
O ong., s ess., 1937. Wash., D.C.: GPO, 1947.
. ï¬rpgrig Musigiggg 2%:§%EEE%E% Trust Eggs. 84th
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U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate and
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t o . 2 pts. Sggh Cong., 2n Sess., §Sï¬g. aash., .
. .: GPO, 19 .
er.n e wiih Broa ca t of N93-
W a 5m . e 79 0116c . BFSOBS. ,
o 88 o. 0 e3 C . ' 9 O
. Re 0 t P b Ce a Coe v P t c s
'—“"“_’ If ectI Eégadcasting. a. . ï¬e . No. Eéaï¬, 5 pts.
ong., ess., 1946. Wash., D.C.: GPO, 1946.
U.S. Sengte, Committee on Interstate and Fbreign Commerce.
' garirgsg FCC Po gr Tgierigign Efggze grg_othe
ragga ï¬atiggs gat erg. 2n ong., s ess.,-195%.
88 o ' e e 8 G ’ 9 e
. H n a Pro a FM Rad 0. 80th Cong. 2nd
73333., i9ï¬g. Wa35., §.£.%1â€GPO, . ’
. Rggrirggz Us 0 Mgihggiagi d gasic.
1th 0115. . 2nd ï¬st-.1 19 2e 3 e. e e: 0?].
. ï¬lilfli‘ ï¬grï¬grgri he Co ' c t Ac . S.
ï¬p. 132.59. 79 0118c . ï¬ts-5:83. . e a $13.0. 3
arc,
. R I
.EEQEEL Iâ€n es Ceréagn2;;ao§%gg§.§f .
ggiiï¬ C E p. o. . ong., 2nd
ess.,-t9 . a ., D.C.: GPO, 1942.
U.S. m am. Vols. 35p 39e A7"“9. 60-610
Case Maierigi
311.111.1523 Broadcastirg 2g. 31411., 8 F.C.C. 159 (1940).
345
Ration§i(B adcasti Company v. griigd Stairs, 319 U.S. 19o
19%3).
‘Unitgg States v. 4igerigan Zegeratign _£‘Mg§igi§g§, 47 F. Supp.
354 (19 42 .
“29.-0!: as a as v. M Fnedgraiig g; W 318 U. S.
1943
22159.4 £13.31: 7- 2.9.3.1112. 58 F. Supp. 845 (1946).
:291129 Sigtes v. Eggrilig, 332 U.S. 1, 91 L.ed. 1877 (1947).
:931121.S§3§3§ v. Peiriiio, 75 F. Supp. 176 (1948).
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Emery, Walter B. ï¬gzgrgnrg3,grg,B as n ir,a Sggie t1,
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