THE-.353 FOR THE DEGREE OF M A
MECHiGAN STATE UNIVERSIW
MRRY LEE PONTIUS
1 9 6 6

 

 

 

OVERDUE FINES:

25¢ per day per item

RETURNING LIBRARY MATERIALS:

Place in book return to remove
charge from circulation records

 

ABSTRACT

DECISION AND AFTERMATH
A TWO PART INVESTIGATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPORTANT

CONSEQUENCES OF NINE U.S. TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS' DECISION
TO ESTABLISH THE CIGARETTE ADVERTISING CODE.

by Larry Lee Pontius

Decision and Aftermath is a two part study of the Cigarette
Advertising Code of 1964. Beginning with the "Great Smoking Scare" of
1953, part one chronologically traces the actions and counteractions
taken by tobacco's foes and friends which lead to the establishment
of the Code. Part two investigates the consequences of the Code's

establishment.

The study was based on information gained from published material
in books, periodical news media, and Government documents, a thorough
investigation of the cigarette advertising used by U.S. tobacco man-
ufacturers from 1950 through 1965, and the author's own experience in

the advertising business.

The major findings of this study of the Cigarette Advertising
Code are as follows: 1) the tobacco manufacturers' adoption of short-
term goals and striving for quick profits made the Cigarette Advertising
Code an inevitable eventuality, and 2) the Cigarette Advertising Code
has failed to effectively change the main thrust of cigarette adver-

tising.

c0pyright by
Larry Lee Pontius

1966

DECISION AND AFTERMATH

A TWO PART INVESTIGATION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPORTANT
CONSEQUENCES OF NINE U.S. TOBACCO MANUFACTURERS' DECISION
TO ESTABLISH THE CIGARETTE ADVERTISING CODE.

By

Larry Lee Pontius

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Department of Advertising

1966

II

III

IV

VI

VII

VIII

XI

XII

XIII

XIV

XVI

XVII

XVIII

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART ONE -- DECISION

Introduction .

Beginnings -- The Great Smoking Scare
Contradictions -- The Great Smoking Scare
The End of a Scare -- New Trends . . . .
Continuations -- Controversy and Comeback
History Repeats Itself

The Tar Derby -- Race Toward Regulation
Return to Flavor -- Calm Before the Storm
A New Offensive -- The Youth Question
College Exodus . . . . . . . . . .
Continuations -- Controversy and Conciliation
The Final Scare . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Decision .

PART TWO -- AFTERMATH

Reaction . . . . . . . .

Days of Anticipation .

Day of Reckoning . . . . .

Too Little, Too Late . . . . . . .

Tomorrow . . . . . .

AFTERWORD

ii

.17
.41
.55
.64

.82

. 108

. 122

. 141

. 155

. 165

. 188

. 198
. 214

. 231

268

. 280

APPENDIX

I Cigarette Advertising Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

iii

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This is the story of a single battle in a war which has lasted
nearly four hundred years. It has been a war unlike any other in
history. There have been no national boundaries. The combatants have
included kings, p0pes, medical experts, sportsmen, business giants and
private citizens. The weapons used have not been guns and bombs, but

threats, decrees, taxes and speeches.

The first salvo was fired by a reigning monarch of England:
"What humor or policie can move us to imitate the
barbarous and beastly manners of the wilde, godless
and slavish Indians, especially in so vile and
stinking a custome?"1

Thus, in the year 1604, England's James I signaled the beginning of

the "Tobacco War"; the war between tobacco's adherents and condemners.

The overriding issue in this essentially moral war has always
been health. King James himself set the pattern of attack. "Smoking,"
he said, "is a custome loathsome to the eye, hateful to the nose,

harmful to the braine, and dangerous to the lungs."2 His remarks were

 

1Tobacco and Americans, Robert K. Heimann (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1960), p. 250.

21bid.

moderate compared to some later attacks. Since its discovery by white
men tobacco has been accused of causing a desire for strong drinks,
increases in crime, nervous paralysis, blindness, loss of intellectual
capacity, female sterility, effeminacy in men, moustaches on ladies'

lips, tuberculosis, and finally, in 1953, respiratory cancer.

This, however, has not been a war of accusation only. In the
early years the accusers took action, sometimes violent, against the
pungent smelling leaf from the strange new world. James, the first
leader in the fight against "the lively image and pattern of hell,"
levied exorbitant import taxes on tobacco.1 Louis XIII of France
decreed the death penalty for smokers. Czar Michael I issued a ukase
punishing smokers with castration. POpe Urban VIII threatened tobacco

users with excommunication.2

As people flocked to the Americas, home of the tobacco habit,
the "Tobacco War" continued. And as various forms of tobacco consump-
tion gained popularigg as the chaw, the pipe, the cigar and finally
the cigarette took the people's fancy, so the condemners shifted their

aim.

Although a distinctive American cigarette was not to emerge until

 

1"Tobacco, the controversial princess," Time, April 11, 1960,
p. 104.

21b1d.

3
1903, as early as 1884 the New York Times ventured into the field of
battle. In that year the Times editorialized:
"The decadence of Spain began when the Spaniards
adopted cigarettes and if this pernicious prac-

tice obtains among adult Americans the ruin of
the Republic is close at hand."1

As the twentieth century opened, Lucy Gaston (a tobacco tintype
of Carrie Nation) organized a full scale campaign against the white
roll, which by then had come into its own as the main target in the
war. Her crusade ended in the prohibition of cigarette sales in twelve

states.2

There was also controversy over cigarettes in the sporting world
during the early 1900's. Boxing's Battle of the Century was, in a way,
an exchange in the "Tobacco War.” For Corbett smoked and was proud of
it, while Sullivan scorned the habit and was not reluctant to be quoted

on the subject.3

Finally, even the business world had occasion to take antagonis-
tic aim at tobacco. Henry Ford, Sr., and Thomas Edison both stated

publicly during their careers that they would not knowingly hire anyone

 

1Tobacco and Americans, Robert K. Heimann (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1960), p. 214.

21bid.

31bid., p. 215.

4
who smoked.1 And so, tobacco's condemners have kept up an almost con-
stant barrage against the brown colored leaves Captain ChristOpher
Columbus received as a gift from the natives on the shores of San

Salvador.

But what of the other force in this drama? What of tobacco's
adherents; the people who used tobacco, sold tobacco, or for one
reason or another approved of it? History records little about them,

except that they smoked. And smoked. And smoked!

Throughout this war, despite the accusations, the taxes, the
decrees and legal bans, people continued to smoke. The habit has grown
steadily through the years until, in 1960, in the United States alone,
over 15,000 cigarettes were purchased every second of every day. Today
Americans spend more on cigarettes than the nation of Canada spends on

its entire national budget.2

Does this mean the war is essentially over? Have tobacco's
foes lost the battle and given up? No. Today we are witnessing yet
another skirmish in the protracted conflict. And this might well be
the most lively of the entire war. The anti-tobacco forces have a new
accusation which, unlike the often undocumented and usually incredible
claims of the past, must be seriously considered. Cigarette smoking

has now been accused of causing today's most feared diseases; cancer,

 

1"Tobacco, the controversial princess," Time, April 11, 1960,
p. 104.

21bid.

heart ailment, and emphysema. This accusation has, or at least appears
to have, the backing of one of the most respected elements on the

modern American scene, science.

In addition, and most importantly here, a new development has
taken place which makes the current exchanges between these old foes
truly unique. A controversy has arisen over cigarette advertising
practices. For the first time, the promotion of cigarettes has become

an important part of the "Tobacco War."

Robert K. Heimann, a recognized and respected tobacco historian

has stated, in his book Tobacco and Americans, that the practice of

 

smoking is a natural human habit which, once introduced to civilized
man, needed no promotion to attain popularity. The growth of the habit
over the years when there was little or no promotion of it seems to

bear him out.

On the other hand, after tobacco advertising and other forms of
promotion were introduced the growth of smoking increased phenomenally.
Since cigarette smoking in the United States has kept pace with the
increasing din of cigarette advertising, many people on both sides of

the "Tobacco War" feel there is a direct relationship between the two.

Consequently the introduction of cigarette advertising as a
major consideration in the war has given new hope to those who wish to
see an end to smoking, and caused increased concern among those who

are fighting for its continued existence. Both parties in the current

fight feel they are engaged in a death struggle.

In May of 1964, nine U.S. tobacco manufacturers announced they
had established a Cigarette Advertising Code. Thus a unique maneuver
in the "Tobacco War" was unveiled. And thus an important climax in the

struggle over cigarette advertising was reached.

The decision to establish such a code came more than four hundred
years after the introduction of tobacco to the civilized world. It was
over a hundred years after the first cigarette advertisement appeared
in this country. The Cigarette Advertising Code was one of the few
cooperative actions ever taken by the American tobacco companies and
their first major effort to self-police their advertising. As such it
constituted a major change in the companies' traditional stance and

past practices concerning cigarette advertising.

The events which occurred in the months preceding and following
this climax have left an indelible mark on cigarette advertising. The
conclusions and predictions which can be drawn from the development
and after-effect of the Cigarette Advertising Code may leave their

mark on all advertising.

PART ONE -- DECISION

CHAPTER II

BEGINNINGS -- THE GREAT SMOKING SCARE

The establishment of the Cigarette Advertising Code was an un-
precedented action for American tobacco manufacturers. How did the
tobaccomen come to such a radical decision? What pressures from within
or outside the industry lead them to voluntarily place restrictions on

the promotion of their own products?

The immediate inclination is to ascribe the Code's establishment
to the 1964 Surgeon General's Report on Smoking and Health. And there
are facts which give some merit to that theory. First, chronologically,
the Report's issuance and the Code's establishment followed each other
by a mere three months. Secondly, many of the provisions of the Ciga-
rette Advertising Code appear to stem directly from the criticism and
prOposed actions irate citizens, businessmen and legislators made

immediately following the Government report.

However, the answer to why the code was established is not that
uncomplicated. The Surgeon General's report of 1964 can more correctly
be called the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. For as
advertising entered into and increased in importance in the fight over
the larger question of cigarette smoking, a series of influential
actions and reactions were taken by tobacco's friends and foes. It was
not a single event, but a whole chain of events which prompted the manu-

facturers' decision to establish their advertising code. To arrive at

8

9
a true profile of that decision, each link in this chain of events must

be considered.

The logical tracing of events begins in 1953 with the first "Great
Smoking Scare." For it was the scare and the happenings surrounding it

which brought advertising irrevokably into the war..

Events of this magnitude seldom take place spontaneously. The
first smoking scare was no exception. Almost all Of'thé elements
which combined to produce the smoking scare of 1953 had been on the
scene for some years. Health considerations concerning smoking cer-
tainly did not begin in 1953. As has already been pointed out, smoking
and health had been a subject for discussion since 1604. Nor was the
supposed cancer/smoking link a totally new idea. Twenty-six years
earlier, Dr. James Ewing, one of the leaders in organizing the Ameri-
can Cancer Society, had pleaded for a public information drive about
the dangers of cancer, including its suspected relationship to smoking.
He is reported to have said, "Cancer prepaganda should emphasize the
danger signs that go with it," pointing at the tobacco habit as one

such sign.1

Smokers did not suddenly, in 1953, become aware and overly con-
cerned about possible harmful effects from smoking. In 1949, when

Gallup researchers conducted a poll, more than half of the smokers

 

1"Cancer by the Carton", Reader's Digest, December, 1952, p. 7-8.

 

10

questioned said they thought cigarette smoking was harmful and had at

one time or another tried to give it up.1

The health claims in cigarette advertising which appeared shortly
after the first reports connecting smoking and cancer, and helping to
publicize the smoking/health issue were not a novelty, either. Adver-
tising had actually become a part of the Tobacco War twenty years

earlier. According to Business VWeek, "By a logical and empirical pro-

 

cess the companies...hit upon the theme that sold the most cigarettes.
From the early 1930's on, this meant almost solely one thing -- sell
health."2 Where the health claim trend began is a moot point now, but
by 1933 it was well under way as an established theme with, "Chester-
fields are milder," Lucky Strike's "Nature in the raw is seldom mild,"
and the Old Gold claim that there was, ”Not a cough in a carload."
Health had remained the overriding theme in cigarette advertising dur-
ing the twenty years preceding the first smoking scare. Tobaccomen
had been quoted as saying every time we "...switch from health -- sales

go to pot."3

If all of this is true, why did the scare take place? And why
did it make advertising such an important part of the Tobacco War? The
answer to the first question can be summarized in three words; timing,

source, weight.

 

1"Cigarettes", Consumer Reports, February, 1953, p. 58-74.

 

2"Cigarette Scare: What will the trade do?", Business Week,
December 5, 1953, p. 58.

 

31bid.

11

The time was ripe for a public explosion concerning smoking.
Since Doctor Ewing's first accusations against smoking in connection
with cancer a generation had grown to maturity. Many in this generation
had acquired the smoking habit and had lived not only with his accusa-
tion, but with the constant bombardment of advertising claims connecting
smoking with health. They had good reason to be concerned and a pre-

disposition to accept an anti-smoking claim which sounded well founded.

In the almost thirty years since a cancer/smoking link was first
theorized the medical profession had had ample time to consider the
theory, conduct research, and begin to obtain findings. There had also
been time for the conflicting and often fallacious sounding advertising
claims to become suspect, not only by the public but also by the Govern-
ment. In 1942 the Federal Trade Commission began a campaign to clean
up the health aspects of cigarette advertising. By 1950 the FTC had
proceeded against all of the five largest tobacco companies except
Liggett and Meyers.1 These actions put an end to claims such as the
onetime statement that Camels were helpful for athletes who had to
keep fit, and the assertion that smoking Kools would give extra pro-
tection against colds. However, the FTC action did not seriously
inhibit the health claims of companies not directly involved. While
one company was under investigation, the others continued to seek new
and better ways to imply health benefits to their brands. Neverthe-
less, these proceedings, especially carried over so long a time, did
help to keep the health issue in the news and suggest that the Govern-

ment did not approve.

 

1"Cigarettes", Consumer Reports, February, 1953, p. 58-74-

12

The source of the cancer link accusation against smoking also
played an important part in the scare. It had been years since Sin-

clair Lewis' Arrowsmith, and the public's attitude toward science in

 

general and the medical profession specifically no longer encompassed
the distrust and disrespect it had at one time. In 1953, medicine had
become one of the most respected and trusted professions in America.
An accusation from this source was not likely to be taken lightly.
Since the accusation concerned cancer, one of the major diseases

medical science had not yet conquered, this was even more true.

Finally, weight must be considered. Had the accusation that
cigarette smoking caused cancer come from a single source or been
reported by one or two news media, the end result might have been
totally different. However, the time element allowing for smoking/
cancer research on a grand scale, had played its part. Over a com-
paratively short period of time research reports linking smoking and
cancer rolled in from numerous sources, not just in the United States
but also in foreign countries. The news media seemed to sense the pub-
lic's inherent interest in this subject and took full advantage of it.
Reader's Digest, a major element of the anti-tobacco forces then and
today, ran a number of influential articles on the subject beginning in
1950. As the various researchers made their reports more and more news

media carried them. Time, The Economists, Science Digest, Science,

 

Science Newsletter, Business Week, Newsweek, Consumer Reports, Prin—

 

 

ter's Ink, and many more had articles concerning the question before
the scare was really under way. When the inflow of medical informa-

tion reached its peak it was headline material for newspapers and radio

13

stations across the country. Smokers could not help but be reached by

this tremendous outpouring of information.

A combination of timing, source and weight produced the "Great
Smoking Scare". The scare in turn resulted in advertising's entry into
the "Tobacco War" as a major consideration. To understand why and how,

we must investigate some details of the scare's development.

In January, 1950, Reader's Digest published an article titled:

 

"How harmful are cigarettes?" This article signaled the real beginning
of advertising's entrance into the war as a major factor. It provided
Viceroy, one of the first filter cigarettes, with a health claim that
packed more competitive punch than any used in the twenty odd years in
which health had been a standby. Shortly after the magazine hit the
stands Viceroy ads were headlined: "January Reader's Digest tells why

Filtered cigarette smoke is better for your health."1 This kind of

 

harshly competitive, health-oriented advertising combined with the
Digest article and the growing number of other slaps at cigarette smo-
king appeared to panic tobaccomen. They Opened the flood gates. The
major cigarette manufacturers threw the earlier FTC experience to the
wind and began a no-holds-barred health fight. Had the Viceroy adver-
tising gone in any other direction, the manufacturers might have seen
the approaching storm and backed away from the health issue. But with

one company striking out, hitting its competition in a vital weak spot,

 

1"The times have changed -- or have they?", Printer's Ink,
August 2, 1957, p. 52.

 

14

the others reacted defensively, as is usually the case with old, multi-
product markets. By the time the storm broke and the scare spread
across the nation, cigarette advertising was so entangled with the

health issue that it had become an inseparable part of it.

In the opinion of many observers cigarette advertising also
helped to create the scare. For as the studies connecting cancer and
smoking began to pour in, the pitch of the advertising health fight

grew higher and higher.1 As articles such as Reader's Digest's

 

"Cancer by the Carton", "Newsweek's "Cigarettes and Cancer," and 2123's
"Smoking and Cancer" were published, the pitch increased. This adver-
tising, pushing old filter brands, introducing new filter-tips and king-
size brands, giving new emphasis to regular brands, and always stres-
sing health publicized the issue to millions upon millions of people.
The fact that this publicity was of a positive nature, emphasizing that
one cigarette or another was not harmful made little difference. It

was still literally pushing the health question down the public's col-

lective throat.

Late in 1953, when the scare had barely become an established
fact (with the revelation that cigarette consumption had sustained a
drop of approximately 3%, the first decrease in 20 years) knowledge-
able people were already agreeing that there was no question but that
the tobacco companies themselves had, "...scared some smokers out of

the cigarette habit by claiming that each brand does not contain the

 

1"Cancer by the Carton", Reader's Digest, December 1952, p. 7-8.

 

15

'harmful ingredients' that others do."1

The president of a tobacco
warehouse association was quoted as saying, "The public is being
frightened from tobacco by outlandish medical claims...Much of this
advertising is plain silly."2 Market specialists Phil Hedrick of the
North Carolina agriculture department was reportedly sure that, "It's
defensive advertising that's doing it."3 Still another source said,

"Instead of scaring customers away from competing brands they're scar-

ing them away from tobacco althgether."4

The cigarette manufacturers themselves apparently discounted or
were unaware of this rising tide of concern. A November 22, 1952
Business Week article stated:

"While many business men have qualms about what

might happen to their profits in 1953, cigarette

manufacturers are blowing silver-lined smoke rings."5
Nowhere in the article was the health issue or its possible complica-
tions even mentioned. Total domestic sales of cigarettes were reaching
a new high at the end of an unbroken twenty year stretch of annual in-

creases and the developing 394.9 billion units sales figure overshadowed

all other issues.6

 

1"What has hit tobacco stocks?", Business Week, November 21, 1953,
p. 140.

 

2"Cigarette Hangover", Time, November 9, 1952, p. 100.
31bid.

4Ibid.

5"Cigarette Makers See Good Times Ahead", Business Week, November
22, 1952, p. 138.

 

6"Cigarettes: is this a turning point?", Business Week, January
2, 1954, p. 74.

 

16

However, less than six months later, to the manufacturers' cha-
grin, a new light began to dawn. The indicated cigarette consumption
for April, 1953 took an unexpected and unprecedented dip, down 1.64%
from the like month in 1952. This dip soon developed into a trend
with the situation growing worse in each succeeding month. May saw a
slide down 4.25% from the 1952 level, June an unheard of 8.34%, and

July an alarming 11.19%.1 The scare was on.

 

1"What has hit tobacco stocks?", Business Week, November 21,
1953, p. 140+.

 

CHAPTER III

CONTRADICTIONS - THE GREAT SMOKING SCARE

Much of what happened during the Great Smoking Scare remains a
conundrum today. When the cigarette/cancer story became important
news, raising a public furor and affecting the sudden and unexpected
decline in cigarette consumption, the tobacco manufacturers were caught
with their advertising showing. Almost all of the major brands were
emphasizing health. The logical reaction for the manufacturers would
seem to be to back away from the issue. It was becoming more obvious
every month that the smokers were scared. Millions of dollars of health
oriented advertising could only add impetus to the public's nervousness.
But, possibly because of the first shock of the loss, and because of the
industry's strong competitive history, no one company was willing to be
the first. Instead, the opposite happened. As the smokers appeared to
get more and more nervous, the tobaccomen rushed stronger and stronger
claims into the market pushing advertising further and further into the

war .

Near the end of 1953 Business Week magazine said, "The widespread

 

fear that cigarettes may induce lung cancer is making the cigarette

makers turn some strange somersaults."1

 

1"Fear and Jitters," Business Week, November 14, 1953, p. 54.

 

17

18

Indeed, in view of the situation, claims such as the cigarette
that "takes the FEAR out of smoking," and "No other cigarette is less
irritating or easier on the throat or contains less nicotine" do seem
strange. But through 1953 and 1954 they were rampant. In advertising,
Camel became the cigarette that "agrees with more pe0ple than any other
cigarette." Lucky, the number one brand at that time, said, "Luckies
taste better -- cleaner, fresher, smoother. Be happy -- Go Lucky."
Pall Mall, the important entry in king-size cigarettes from American
Tobacco, was said to, "guard against throat scratch" and peeple were
entreated to try them to, "Let your throat enjoy smooth smoking."
Smokers were told, "You're £2.§EE££.£° smoke Parliament" and "Viceroy

gives you double-barreled health protection." Kent advertising said,

 

"Get the health protection you definitely need...and the smoking plea-
sure you want." L&M headlined, "This is it! Just what the doctor

ordered."1

If the claims alone were not enough to scare smokers, there were
other developments to help. The greatest selling point for king-size
cigarettes had always been their greater length and resultant filter-
ing. Using that theme, tobaccomen had quintupled the king-size market
share in the six years between 1948 and 1953 from 5.5% to 287..2 With
the scare on, and total sales falling, the cigarette makers put more
emphasis on the benefits of king-size cigarettes and more dollars be-

hind their promotion. This extra advertising weight helped to imply

 

1These claims quoted from 1953 and 1954 issues of Time Magazine.

2"Uproar in cigarettes," Fortune, December, 1953, p. 130.

19

there was something special about king-size cigarettes, but it also

suggested there was something wrong with all cigarettes.

In addition, over a short period of time, there was a tremendous
proliferation of filter-tip brands. Before 1950, Viceroy and Parlia-
ment were about the only brands available. But after Viceroy's 1950
competitive pinch, and the huge sales gains that both Parliament and
Viceroy reaped during 1951 and 1952 other filtered brands flooded the
market, receiving strong promotion. Again, emphasis served to put a
special aura around a kind of cigarette, while demeaning cigarettes in

general.

These two types of so-called "more healthful" cigarettes were
also combined, producing hybrids such as Liggett & Meyers' king-size,
filter-tip Fatima, king-size, filter-tip Dunhill from.Philip Morris,
and king-size, filter-tip Viceroy from. Brown & Williamson.1 These

hybrids helped to heighten the effect.

Finally, in at least one case, the positioning of the relatively
blatant health claims added an extra twist. Investigation reveals that
for more than five straight weeks during late 1953, the Viceroy ads
touting its Health Guard filter were placed within the medical section

of Time magazine. It's highly unlikely that this positioning was a

 

1"Cigarette Competition Gets Hotter, Companies Plan New Appeal,"

Printer's Ink, March 6, 1953, p. 29.

 

20

matter of chance. The implication, then, can only be that Brown &
Williamson requested it in the hopes of gaining more effectiveness for

their claims.

These reactions on the part of tobaccomen did more than just put
smokers' nerves on edge. As the cigarette makers moved more and more
to king-size and filter-tip cigarettes and ever stronger health claims,
they also moved further down a collision course with the anti-tobacco

forces.

In 1953 events which might bring these two forces into a direct
confrontation began to pile up. While tobaccomen were pushing their
filter brands on the basis of less tar and nicotine and king-size
brands for their extra filtering length, a massive article in Consumer
Reports declared that "...a smoker actually gets more nicotine and no
less tar from filter-tip and king-size cigarettes than he does from the
regular brands."1 In addition, it pointed out that, contrary to the
highly competitive claims being made, "...among the leading popular
brands there (are) no significant differences in the amount of nico-
time and tar in their smoke." Pointing a finger at a single brand,
the Consumer Reports article noted that when the FTC stopped Old Gold
clahms of less nicotine or less irritation than other brands, the claim
was simply turned around to read: "No other leading cigarette is less
irritating or easier on the throat or contains less nicotine than Old

Gold."2

 

1"Cigarettes," Consumer Reports, February, 1953, p. 58.

 

2"Ibid., p. 60.

21

Commenting on the extent of cigarette advertising, the same
article took yet another implied swipe at tobaccomen. "A secondary
effect of the great volume of advertising," the magazine suggested,

"is to protect cigarette manufacturers from unfavorable press comment."1
Continuing, the article explained that only Reader's Digest, "probably
the only mass-circulation publication in the country that doesn't have
to worry about losing cigarette advertising, carries on war against
smoking."2 These statements, especially in such an authoritative and
respected publication, presented contradictions which must certainly

have raised eyebrows, not only among readers, but among the cigarette

makers, too.

Other sources also panned cigarette ad claims, serving to antag-
onize the manufacturers and bring a collision closer. For example,
Goodman Ace, in his Saturday Review column, devoted an entire issue to
satirizing what he called the ”confusing and conflicting health claim."
In conclusion, he said:

"Before we all begin biting our nails down to our
nicotine-stained fingers it would be a healthy
thing if all cigarette manufacturers got together
for a friendly talk on their contentious claims
and statistics and smoked the pipe of peace."3
Jack Gould, TV editor of the New York Times, said, "If the viewer

really took to heart all the urgent admonitions of the cigarette

 

1"Cigarettes," Consumer Reports, February, 1953, p. 74.
21bid., p. 74.

3"Smoke gets in your ears," Saturday Review, February 28, 1953,
p. 41.

22

manufacturers, he would be in a constant state of worry over his

health."1

And, of course, the constant reporting of research reports link-
ing cancer and smoking continued. In many of these the doctors did not
restrict themselves to scientific comments. "If the tobacco peOple
are smart -- as I am sure they are, because they have been enormously
successful -- they will support research to find this (cancer causing)
factor and remove it," said one medical man.2 Another declared:

"The cigarette companies are trying to induce more
cigarette smoking particularly among the young...
many of whom.wi11 become cancer victims 20 years
from now. It is certainly the moral obligation
and common sense on the part of the manufacturers
to support research."3

The tobaccomen were aware of these disParaging remarks concern-
ing their advertising and other practices, and not happily so.
Printer's Ink said, "In the recent outcry against medical claims in

cigarette copy, some tobacco companies took an injured air, rather

than dealing forthrightly with the complaints."4

All was not talk, however. Piled on t0p of the verbal criti-.

cisms were actions taken against cigarettes and their advertising.

 

1"AMA Ban Puts Spotlight on Misuses of Medical Data in Adver-
tising," Printer's Ink, November 20, 1953, p. 48.

2"Beyond Any Doubt", Time,November 30, 1953, p. 60.
3Ibid.

4"AMA Ban Puts Spotlight on Misuses of Medical Data in Adver-
tising," Printerjs Ink, November 20, 1953, p. 48.

23

The North Dakota state senate, for example, passed a bill to "dis-
courage juvenile smoking.”l And the American Medical Association"...
put a harsh Spotlight on medical claims in cigarette copy," by ousting
tobacco ads from its publications.2 The Better Business Bureau issued
a list of standards to "cure the abuses in cigarette advertising” and
to "stop advertising that cigarette smoking cannot or will not cause

harmful effects."3

Toward the end of 1953 it began to appear that cigarette con—
sumption was not the only facet of the tobacco industry being adversely
affected. A Business Week article revealed a sudden change in the
standing of tobacco stocks. "Not long ago," said the article, "tobacco
stocks headed the group known as 'defensive' shares -- those looked
upon as potential pillars of strength in declining as well as rising
markets. They were considered 'depression proof'. But suddenly
things have changed."4 After noting that Standard and Poor's 50 indus-

trials index rose 8.8% from September to December while tobacco shares

 

1"North Dakota Senate Passes Bill to Discourage Juvenile Smoking,”
New York Times, February 15, 1953, p. 5.

2"AMA Ban Puts Spotlight on Misuses of Medical Data in Adver-
tising," Printer's Ink, November 20, 1953, p. 48.

3"More Trouble for Cigarettes," Business Week, December 19, 1953,
p. 55.

4"What Has Hit Tobacco Stocks?", Business Week, November 21,
1953, p. 140.

24

drOpped 6.8%, one securities analyst said:
"...there have been attacks on cigarette smoking for
years, but they have always stressed the moral as-
pects. The moral evils have never been strong
enough to cause many to give up the habit. Pros-
pects of death from an incurable disease might,
however, be sufficiently persuasive to bust the
cigarette industry."
Generally, the Wall Streeters agreed that the reason behind the sudden
stock decline was the much publicized American Cancer Society report
linking smoking and lung cancer.2 And they put themselves on record
as believing that health claims in cigarette advertising had scared
some smokers out of the cigarette habit and that the big push on
”filter mouthpiece cigarettes...has not only turned many smokers from
conventional cigarettes, but, in addition, scared some from cigarettes

entirely.3

The verbal attacks and actions against cigarette advertising,
combined with the reports linking smoking with cancer and the finan-
cial setbacks for the manufacturers, finally produced the direct
confrontation which had been in the offing. In the words of one
source, "The slow fuse that (had) been burning under the cigarette

industry for several years reached the powder."4 The explosion that

 

1"What Has Hit Tobacco Stocks?", Business Week, November 21,
1953, p. 141.

2Ibid., p. 140.
31bid., p. 141.

4"Cigarette Scare: What Will the Trade Do?", Business Week,
December 5, 1953, p. 58.

25

followed helped to forge another link in the chain of events which

eventually lead to the establishment of the Cigarette Advertising Code.

In early December, the fast~paced events of the past year
"loosened up, for the first time, official tongues of the tobacco
industry."1 Until then, the tobaccomen as a group had remained silent
on the lung cancer issue. Now, they Spoke out in defense of cigarettes.
The first to Speak was Paul M. Hahn, then president of the giant
American Tobacco Company. In a tempered statement of reassurance to
the public he said: "No one has yet proven that lung cancer in any
human being is directly traceable to tobacco or to its products in
any form."2 He was also reported as scoring, "much loose talk on the
subject as reported in the press during recent months."3 Continuing on
the general subject of charges against tobacco he said:

"At one time or another within the past 350 years
practically every known disease of the human body
has been ascribed to the use of tobacco. One by
one these charges have been abandoned for lack of
evidence."4

And more Specifically about the current cancer claim:

"We are confident that long-range impartial inves-

tigation...will confirm the view that neither

tobacco nor its products contributes to the inci-
dence of lung cancer."5

 

1Ibid.
2"Vote for Acquittal," Time, December 7, 1953, p. 54.

3"Cigarette Scare: What Will the Trade Do?", Business Week,
December 5, 1953, p. 58

4Ibid., p. 60.

5"Vote For Acquittal," Time. December 7. 1953. p- 54-

26

With the largest company on record, other tobaccomen stepped
forward, for the most part, in parrot fashion. E. A. Darr, R. J.
Reynolds president, stated much the same case as American's Hahn.

Then he added this testy statement about cancer research: "One of the
best ways of getting publicity is for a doctor to make some startling
claim relative to people's health, regardless of whether such state-
ment is based on fact or theory."1 Philip Morris, too, subscribed
officially to the sentiments of Paul Hahn. And within a relatively

short period of time P. Lorillard also made an echoing statement.2

According to Business Week, "Many observers thought the actions
of the cigarette companies had the air of haste and improvisation."
The significant point, however, the magazine stated was that, "...the
cigarette industry has recognized that a problem exists."3 The ques-
tion now was, "can the industry go on this way after admitting that

there is fear about lung cancer?"4 Business Week editors said:

 

"Ignoring the thing doesn't make sense, now that
the cat is out of the bag. Neither does pound-
ing harder on health which could drive away even
more smokers than critics have."5

 

1"Cigarette Scare: What Will the Trade Do?", Business Week,
December 5, 1953, p. 58.

2"More Trouble for Cigarettes," Business Week, December 19,
1953, p. 55.

3"Cigarette Scare: What Will the Trade Do?", Business Week,
December 5, 1953, p. 59.

 

41bid., p. 60.

5Ibid., p. 60.

27

The cigarette makers apparently did not see things in the same
light. Deep in a competitive fight as to who had the least harmful
or most healthful cigarette, they were unwilling to turn aside. At the
same time, now that official refuting statements had been made they
would not retract nor ignore the official defense of cigarettes. In
fact, even though most of the manufacturers were somewhat leery of
joint efforts, remembering the trust busters who broke up the great
tobacco giants in the famous 1941 Lexington case, they began to organ-
ize a defense under the aegis of the National Association of Tobacco
Distributors. These efforts would soon bear fruit in the Tobacco
Industry Research Committee, a group of doctors and scientists paid
collectively by the tobaccomen to do independent research on the
smoking/cancer link and report their findings to the public. The
unfortunate result of this two-pronged approach to the problem was
that the cigarette makers had placed themselves in the embarrassing
and damaging situation of publicly contradicting themselves. While
insisting there was no proven connection between cigarette smoking and
cancer, the companies were advertising as if there definitely was.
Such a contradiction, if allowed to continue, could not help but in-
vite attacks on the industry's advertising practices and further under-
mine smoker's confidence in the cigarette companies and their adver-

tising.

However, it was immediately clear that some of the tobaccomen
saw no harm whatever in this contradiction. Brown & Williamson, for
example, ran a full page Viceroy advertisement in Time magazine

directly opposite the article which quoted the industry's first

28

official defensive statements. What's more, the ad was as competitive
on the health issue as any they had previously placed. It featured,
"A Report on the Double Filtering Action of King Size, Filter-Tip
Viceroy," which according to a display line at the top of the ad was,
"A Report to Doctors -- Published in Leading Medical Journals."1 The
"Report" stated that "double filtering action" means that "Viceroy

gives smokers less nicotine and tars than any other leading cigarette."

As 1953 ended and a new year began, the first effects of the can-
cer scare became historical fact. The total domestic sales in billions
of cigarettes were permanently recorded: 387, down 7.9 billion from the
year earlier high of 394.9. Out of the turmoil it became clear that
smokers were turning away from regular size cigarettes. Most of the
drop came in that category. King size cigarettes, which were backed
throughout the year with health oriented advertising, sold over a 100
billion units. This was nearly a thirty per cent share of the market
and a new high in king size consumption.2 The changes in filterétip
sales, the cigarettes using the most blatant health claims, showed
startling increases for every brand. Viceroy, the number one filter,
sold 2.2 times more than it had in 1952. Parliament sales increased
57.9%. Kent, which had only been on the market during the last nine
months of 1952, multiplied sales by 400%. Liggett & Meyers' L&M fil-

ter, beginning in October of 1953, pulled down sales of almost one-

 

1"Vote for Acquittal," Time, December 7, 1953, p. 55.

2"Cigarette Sales: The Real Story," U.S. News & World RQPOEE.
August 6, 1954, p. 85.

29

third of a billion units.1 The entire filter category had increased
from its next to nonexistent 1950 market share of 0.06% to an esti-
mated 3%. "Filters are here to stay," said the eXperts, "and may some

day take as much as one-third of the market."2

These unalterable figures gave reinforcement to the manufacturer's
emphasis on health in advertising and to the proliferation of king
size, filter tips, and king size filter-tip cigarettes. Or at least

it would appear so. For they continued in 1954.

On January 4, 1954 it also became obvious that the contradiction
in which the manufacturers found themselves would continue. That day
the readers of 448 neWSpapers throughout the United States were
greeted in their daily papers with a large advertisement headed, "A
Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers." It was signed by the newly

created Tobacco Industry Research Committee.3

Consumer Reports said the ad was:

"...the tobacco companies' reply to the rumors and
the reports which have been hitting at their sales
in recent months -- rumors and reports that cigar-
ettes are responsible for the shocking increase in
the incidence of cancer of the lung over the past
twenty years."

 

1"Cigarettes: is this a turning point?", Business Week, January
2, 1954, p. 74.

2Ibid., p. 75.

3"Cigarette Smoking and Lung Cancer." ConsumeLRePQE‘fe
February 1954, p. 54.

4Ibtd.

30

The magazine went on to give the tobaccomen a certain amount of praise,
saying, "And a good reply it was, too, at least as a starter. For
leaders of the tobacco industry, the ad announced, have banded together
to carry out...research...into all phases of tobacco use and health."1
But this was only a scholarly kind of investigation of the ad, for in
the same article the magazine announced that, "(the evidence against
tobacco)...now appears to be so strong that consumers would be well
advised to decide (to smoke or not to smoke)...on the assumption that

cigarette smoking does increase the possibility of lung cancer."2

Kenneth B. Wilson, then president of the National Better Business
Bureau, was also willing to dole out praise for the industry. He said,
"I was...delighted to note that the industry has joined together..."3
But he, too, had reservations. "I h0pe," Wilson said, "that having
thus joined forces the industry also will give its just consideration
to the elimination of questionable advertising claims, particularly

those dealing with health aspects of smoking."4

These statements, combined with the Wilson reminder that, ”...

much corrective work remains to be done if cigarette advertising is to

 

1"cigarette Smmking and Lung Cancer," Consumer Reports, February,
1954, p. 54-

21bid.

3"Dept. of Justice to Investigate New Tobacco Group," Printer's
Ink, January 8, 1954, p. 10.

4Ibid.

31

enjoy public confidence," should have thrown light upon the tobacco-
men's deepening contradictory position, but did little to change

things.1

As 1954 developed attacks against tobacco continued. If the
formation of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee was designed to
placate tobacco's foes while it reassured smokers, there was soon evi-
dence that it had not. Within a month from the publication of the
"Frank Statement" advertisement, two major reports unfavorable to smo-
king reached the news media. Britain's Health Minister, Mr. Iain
Mac Leod, reporting on investigations of the Standing Advisory Com-
mittee on Cancer and Radiotherapy which was set up in 1953, told the
English Parliament that, "It must be regarded as established that
there is a relationship between smoking and cancer of the lungs."2
Then he recommended that, "It is desirable that young people should be
warned of the risk apparent."3 At almost the same time U.S. News &
World Report published a lengthy article on the smoking/cancer issue
including a detailed interview with Dr. E. Cuyler Hammond of the
American Cancer Society. In short, it was the doctor's opinion that

smoking and cancer were definitely related.4

 

1"Dept. of Justice to Investigate New Tobacco Group," Printer's
Ink, January 8, 1954, p. 10.

2"What Britons Are Told About Smoking," U.S. News & World Report,
February 26, 1954, p. 71 .

3"Cigarettes and Cancer," Time, February 22, 1954, p. 66.

4"Is There Proof That Smoking Causes Cancer," U.S. News & World
Report, February 26, 1954, p. 62-71.

32

While these attacks went on unabated so did the health claims
in cigarette advertising. Camels remained the cigarettes that "agree
with more peOple than any other cigarette." L&M was still "Just what
the doctor ordered." People were still "So smart to smoke Parliament,"
only now it was king size. Viceroy not only had "Double the filtering
action," but now "20,000 tiny filter traps," too.1 As might be expec-
ted, e3pecially in View of the contradictions, the claims drew fire.
One magazine flatly called the filter claims "false and misleading"
saying they gave the reader no information on what a filter does. In
that critic's Opinion, they were "Just playing on their (smokers')

fear of cancer."2

In March the fire grew momentarily white hot as a factory worker
made medico-legal history by suing four cigarette manufacturers for
breach of warranty in connection with health claims. Ira C. Lowe, 39,
from Festus, Missouri, filed suit in St. Louis, blaming the tobaccomen
for a cancer which caused him to lose a lung. The suit stated that the
manufacturers were reSponsible because Lowe had "accepted the defen-
dants' public assurances that their cigarettes were free from harmful
substances."3 The courts did not convict the cigarette makers, but

the case must certainly have given them some second thoughts.

 

1These claims taken from 1954 issues of Time and New Yorker.
2"Filtering the Cigarette Ads," America, March 20, 1954, p. 643.

3”Cigarette Case," Time, March 22, 1954, p. 59.

33

A survey taken by the advertising and sales weekly magazine,
2322: gave the tobaccomen yet another reason for taking a second look
at their health claims. The magazine polled 2,200 advertising execu-
tives, seeking their Opinions of television commercials and of the 100
commercials listed the ad men picked cigarette spots as the seven most
objectionable. Their reasons: exaggerated claims, gross wording,

unconvincing, and unbelievable.1

While the attacks against tobacco and the defensive advertising
for tobacco products continued, so, too, did the outflow of official
contradictory information. In April of 1954 the Tobacco Industry
Research Committee took the cigarette makers one step further into the
contradiction. Until then, the critics of tobacco and the implications
of the manufacturers' own advertising had been refuted through rather
ambiguous statements of company representatives. But now the TIRC
fired back its own brand of scientific information. In an 18 page
booklet, packed with statements by distinguished cancer researchers,
physicians and medical school professors the committee "tartly chal-

lenged those who link cigarettes and cancer."2

 

1"Easy on the Drawback," Time, May 31. 1954. P- 70.

2"Case for Tobacco," Newsweek, April 19, 1954: P- 94°

34

In the booklet Dr. Clarence Cook Little of the Roscoe B. Jackson
Memorial Laboratory in Bar Harbor, Maine and scientific director of
the TIRC said:

"From a laboratory point of view, I do not feel that a
definite cause—and-effect relationship between cigar-
ette smoking and human lung cancer has been estab-
lished."1

Also quoted was Dr. Walter B. Martin, president elect of the American
Medical Association:

"I do not think the evidence is convincing enough to
establish as a positive fact that cigarette smoking
is necessarily the cause of cancer of the lung."2

Dr. Max Cutler, a cancer surgeon working in Chicago, was represented
as making an even tougher statement:

"...the blanket statements and conclusions...in the
press that there isa direct and causative relation
between...cigarettes and...cancer of the lungs are
absolutely unwarranted. Simply because one finds

bullfrogs after a rain does not mean that it rained
bullfrogs."3

This time it was tobacco's foes who fired back a statement in
defense of their position. Dr. Charles S. Cameron, who as medical
director Of the American Cancer Society was readying another damaging

report against tobacco, said:

 

1"Case for Tobacco," Newsweek, April 19, 1954: P- 94-
2Ibid.

3Ibid., p. 95.

35

"Evidence to date justifies the suspicion that
cigarette smoking does to a degree not yet deter-
mined increase the likelihood of developing can-
cer of the lungs."

A few short months later the ACS medical director made his new
and damaging report for the Society, and doctors Little and Cameron
reversed their positions as attacker and defender. And so the tobacco
manufacturers' contradiction continued. Speaking before a San Fran-
cisco convention of the American Medical Association, Dr. E. Cuyler
Hammond, researcher for the American Cancer Society, summarized the
latest ACS investigations in these words:

"It is our Opinion that regular cigarette smoking
causes an increase in death rates from (heart
disease and cancer). We now advance this as a
positive theory."2

The American Cancer Society statistics hit page one across the nation

and in their wake common stocks of the big five tobacco manufacturers

temporarily fell as much as four points.3

Even closer in their wake came comments from Dr. Little of
the TIRC. First, he suggested that "discussion and comment on their

(Doctor Hammond and co-worker Doctor Horn) data would be more useful

 

1Ibid., p. 94.
2"Smoking and Cancer -- ACS Report," Time, July 5, 1954, p. 37.

31bid.

36

when all of the work has been completed and fully analyzed and set
forth."1 Then, disregarding his own suggestion, he noted that after
reviewing the information available Dr. Charles Cameron, medical and
scientific director of the ACS issued a statement to the effect that
he is "...not convinced the cause and effect relationship is as yet

entirely proven."2

One publisher, when printing the Little comments,
was quick to point out that Dr. Cameron's quoted statement referred
not to cancer of the lung, but to other kinds of cancer. Finally, the
Tobacco Industry Research Committee scientific director advanced a
theory of his own to refute the ACS report. Heavy smoking, Dr. Little

suggested, and the tendency to cancer are both expressions of a more

fundamental cause of a constitutional or hormonal nature.3

By this time the cigarette makers were thoroughly entrenched in
their contradiction. Health oriented advertising claims which implied
that smoking was harmful were established as the basic selling propo-
sition for almost all cigarettes. Practically daily the claims became
stronger and Stronger as individual brands sought some competitive edge.
Meanwhile, first company representativeS,and then hired doctors, sur-

geons and professors proclaimed their disagreement with any suggestion

 

1"Tobacco Industry Gives Its View," U.S. News & World Repprta
July 2, 1954, p. 67.

21bid.

31bid.

37

that cigarettes caused cancer. And these refuting statements had gone
from disorganized general comments to a highly organized united front

including national advertisements, and informational brochures.

It is highly likely that this continuing and ever deepening con-
Itradiction helped to bring about the next link in the chain of events

preceding the writing of the Cigarette Advertising Code.

In September of 1954 Sporadic reports of a new move by the
Federal Trade Commission against cigarette advertising began to appear.
In its ”Business Briefs" section Business Week said that the "FTC has
demanded voluntary compliance with a new and strict set Of rules banning
claims that cigarettes are not harmful or irritating."l It was also
reported that the Government agency had invited the tobacco industry to
State its side before the rules were put into effect. Here, a full ten
years before the manufacturers' Advertising Code took shape, was a fore-
shortened version of the same thing. The FTC had issued a nine point
list of do's and don'ts regarding cigarette advertising and sent them
to twenty-four members of the industry. In the list the Commission
was asking the tobaccomen to "eliminate all claims and implications
that recent scientific research makes questionable," pointing Specifi-

cally at the not harmful or not irritating themes so widely in use.2

 

1"Business Briefs," Business Week, September 18. 1954. Po 34-

2"FTC Trying to Get Voluntary Industry Compliance," Business
Week, September 25, 1954, p. 124.

38

In addition, the cigarette makers were asked to "stop referring in ads
to parts of the body such as the throat, larynx and lungs and to such
terms as digestion, energy, nerves and doctors."1 It is interesting
to note that these points were "based mainly on decisions already

reached in FTC cases against the cigarette companies."2

The Commission also asked for a ban on the cigarette makers'
practice of claiming that by reason of ingredients, length, or filter
the smoke Of any brand contained less nicotine, tar or resins unless
the advertiser can produce "impartial scientific test data...which con-

clusively prove the claimed differences to a significant degree..."3

These rules, if agreed to, would go further than the Federal
Trade Commission could normally in restricting the tobaccomen's adver-
tising. For without voluntary compliance from the manufacturers the
Commission would have to prove a claim false before it could be
stopped. If that continued to be the case -- if the manufacturers re-
fused tO comply -- the FTC would remain in the almost hopeless position
it had maintained during its twenty-five year battle to police the
cigarette makers' claims. Litigation against the tobaccomen had always

been so slow that before claims could be stopped they had been changed.

 

1"FTC Trying to Get Voluntary Industry Compliance," Business
Week, September 25, 1954, p. 124.

21bid.

31bid.

39

To some observers it appeared that the Commission, in making
this new move and trying to bypass the ineffective restrictive methods
available to it, was "evidently relying on the industry's worry over

the cancer scare to get compliance to the code."1

However, the tobaccomen's "worry" over the scare was apparently
not as strong as the Commission hOped. No one rushed to comply to the
rules. After receiving the FTC list their only comment was "No com-
ment."2 Hearing that peOple wagged their heads saying, "It still
looks like a code can only be effective if there's pressure from the

industry or from the public against violators."3

As the year came to an end the matter of whether or not the
cigarette makers would bow to the FTC's wishes was still unsettled.
The Commission had not established its nine rules as official FTC policy
and neither had the industry agreed to voluntary compliance. If the
manufacturers did agree and conscientiously abided by the rules, it
could mean an end to their self-imposed contradictions. Would they?
No one was sure. At the year's end the contradiction was still a part
of standard practice. The claims continued. Tobacco Industry Research
Committee representatives were still disclaiming smoking/cancer relation-

ships. In December Dr. William F. Rienhoff, a lung cancer Specialist

 

1Ibid.

21bid.

3Ibid.

40

of Jdmngflopkins HOSpital and a member of TIRC's Scientific Advisory
Board Spoke before the Baltimore Rotary Club. In his speech he said,
"GO ahead and smoke all you want," calling the findings that connected

smoking with lung cancer "silly and irreSponsible."1

 

1"Smoke?", Newsweek, December 13, 1954: Po 56-

CHAPTER IV

THE END OF A SCARE -- NEW TRENDS

At the end of 1954, total domestic cigarette sales were down an
estimated 8% from the 1952 peak.1 Reports accusing smoking Of causing
cancer and other ills were Still being made. The manufacturers were
Still denying the validity of these reports while, at the same time,
using defensive advertising which seemed to contradict their official
statements. And more and more sources were taking an antagonistic view
Of this practice. The new year promised little hOpe of much variance

in the pattern.

It was not surprising then that in 1955 the smoking/cancer contro-
versy remained up in the air. Doctor Ernest Wynder, one of the most
reSpected and reported cancer researchers continued to make news with
his side of the issue. In April he reported to an American Association
for Cancer Research meeting that "several groups of scientists had in-
duced cancer in animals with cigarette tar from which all nicotine was
removed."2 Thus, he felt it was established that nicotine was not the

villain in cigarette smoke. But he was still certain that "Smoking...

 

1"Tobacco's Troubles Pile Up," Business Week, April 9, 1955, P-
182.

2"The Answers: NO," Business Week, April 23, 1955, p. 108.

41

42

plays a role in the causation of lung cancer."1 TO prove his point he

wrote a book on the subject entitled The Biological Effects of Tobacco.

Doctors Hammond and Horn of the American Cancer Society whose
1953 report on the smoking habits of 188,000 men warned that smokers
were prone to cancer, and had helped immensely in bringing the issue
before the public, now made a second highly publicized report. Before
the American Medical Association, Dr. Hammond once again revealed find-

ings connecting smoking with cancer.2

0n the other Side of the issue Ehner Hess, the then in-coming
president of the American Medical Association, Spoke out against the
"hard won information on the subject of smoking and cancer."3 In a
speech before the Association he called much of it "Lies, damned lies

and statistics."4

There was at least one occasion when the two opposing views came
face to face in a head-on clash before millions of peOple. Edward R.
Murrow's popular "See It Now" television program presented a two-part
probe of the smoking/cancer relationship in which proponents of both

sides took part. The result was a stand-Off. In fact, some members

 

1"Smoking and Other Diseases," Time, June 13, 1955, p. 68.

2"Smoking-Cancer DiSpute Gets Hotter," Printer's Ink, June 10,
1955, p. 86.

3"Smoking and Cancer," Time, June 13, 1955, p. 67.

41b1d., p. 68.

43

of the same research organizations contradicted each other. For exam-
ple, Dr. John Heller, director of the National Cancer Institute,
reported that there were strong indications that cancer and smoking
were related. During the same program Dr. W. C. Hueper, also of the

NCI, maintained that smoking wasn't a major cause of cancer.1

While this fight was continuing other things were happening
which, contrary to expectations, did not fit the pattern. Before the
first six months of 1955 were past it became clear that it would be a
year of changes. It would be a year of new trends. The cancer scare
which had been building and causing cigarette sales to exPerience one
reverse after another suddenly gave indications that it was coming to
an and. Domestic sales for the first six months of 1955 turned upward.
The trend which had seen six months Sales fall from 211 billion units
in 1953 to 201 billion in 1954 was broken with a 1955 rise to an esti-

mated 207 billion.2

Today, it is next to impossible to determine exactly why the fal-
ling sales trend was broken. Obviously, smokers had lost some of
their fear of the cigarette habit. But there are such a myriad of
factors involved that no one stands out as a single answer. Time cer-

tainly played a part. Smokers had had two years to consider the issue.

 

1"Smoking-Cancer DiSpute Gets Hotter," Printer's Ink, June 10,
1955, p. 86.

2"Smoking on the Rise Again,” U.S. News & World Report,
October 14, 1955, p. 30.

44

Much can be forgotten in two years. Two years was time enough for
many to get used to and learn to live with a prOposition which, at
first, might have shocked them out of smoking. Time was also impor-

tant in the development of many of the other influencing factors.

In two years time the cigarette companies had introduced an
amazing proliferation of filter-tip and king size brands. These new
brands such as Kent, L&M, filter-tip Fatima and Dunhill, as well as
regular cigarettes, had been promoted for two years with strongly
health-oriented advertising. Although this proliferation and this
type of advertising cast a shadow of doubt on all cigarettes, it also
gave smokers who were unwilling to quit the habit a way to reduce any
guilt feelings they might have had about destroying themselves. And
that, apparently, was having its effect. In 1955, according to one
source, approximately 1.5 million Americans had quit smoking since the
scare started.1 But 38 million continued to smoke and many of them

were continuing only after switching to a different brand of cigarettes.

Harry M. Wootten, an authoritative cigarette sales estimator,
said that in 1953 one out of thirty packages of cigarettes sold were
filter-tipped. In 1954, he estimated that figure at one out of ten.

His estimate for 1955 was then one out of five.2 Wootten also pointed

 

llbid.

21bid.

45

out that in three years the sales of king Size brands had doubled.
It was his Opinion that before the end of 1955 filter and king size
cigarettes would be used by half of the cigarette smokers in the

country.1
The following chart shows that Mr. Wootten was certainly on the
right track.

PER CENT OF DOMESTIC MARKET
BY CIGARETTE TYPES*

ape 19.5.2 122
Regular Size 61.0% 52.7%
King Size 28.9 27.6
Filter-Tip 10.1 19.7

*Data from December 30, 1955 Printer's Ink

Together filter-tips and king Size cigarettes accounted for nearly
half of the domestic market, capturing more than forty-seven per cent
of sales. Filters, however, were the only type that showed a per cent
of market increase in 1955. King size, as well as regular size per-

centages were down.

Sales data from the end of 1955 helps to substantiate the theory
that smOkers who had quit or cut down were returning to the habit be-
cause of the availability and promotion of the so-called healthful

brands. 0f the top ten brands in 1955, two were kings and three were

 

1Ibid.

46

filter-tips.1 Filter-tip sales had doubled during the year. Marlboro,
Winston, L&M, Viceroy, and Kent were all up. Meanwhile, regular cigar-
ette sales were down, excluded from the overall 3.1% increase the indus-
try had experienced.2 The leader, Camel, had lost eight per cent.

Lucky Strike, now in second place, was down one per cent. Pall Mall
King had strengthened its hold on third place, and the one-time third,

Chesterfield, was off sixteen and a half per cent.3

Finally, in the two years since the scare began there had also
been time for, not only the industry with its Tobacco Industry Research
Committee, but other completely independent researchers to publish
information which seemed to refute the early confident claims of to-
bacco's foes. Witness the AMA's Ehner Hess and Dr. Hueper of the
National Cancer Institute who as early as August of 1954 had said:

"The data on hand make it unlikely that cigarette
smoking represents a major factor in the produc-
tion of lung cancer and its recent phenomenal
rise in frequency."
None of these factors can be pinpointed as the one reason for

the upward trend in cigarette sales which became apparent in the early

months of 1955. And, in fact, if a solution to the puzzle must be

 

1"Cigarette Sales Turn Up Again in 1955", Printer's Ink,
December 30, 1955, p. 12.

21bid., p. 11.
3
Ibid., p. 13.

4"Cigarette Sales: The Real Story," ULS: News_§wWorldfiRepgrt,
August 6, 1954, p. 83.

47

presented a combination would seem to be the only alternative. A com-
bination whose result lead many to agree with Agriculture Department
Officials who said simply that they "believe...the main impact on

cigarette smOking of the cigarette vs. health reports now (was) past."1

At the same time the new trend in cigarette sales was being
established a new and dramatic change was taking place in cigarette
advertising techniques. Later, one source said of the change, "The
saga of cigarette advertising for 1955 filters down to this; good

taste toOk over."2

Beginning early in 1955, almost all cigarette advertising turned
to flavor. L&M, which had been "Just what the doctor ordered", went
first to "L&M stands out from all the rest. Much more flavor -- and
light and mild." They kept the filter story with copy saying, "effec-
tive filtration -- low nicotine" and still had a Special name for
their filter, "pure white Miracle tip."3 But the emphasis was now on
flavor. Before the end of the year, L&M had another new campaign:
"Your big Red Letter day. The day you change to L&M." Again, they
retained the filter-effectiveness pitch, stating that L&M had a "super-

ior filter" but they followed it up with a claim for "superior taste."4

 

1"Smoking On The Rise Again", U.S. News & World Report, October
- 14, 1955, p. 30.

2"Ad Trend in Cigarettes", Printer's Ink, December 30, 1955,
p. 150

3From advertising in 1955 issue of Saturday Evening Post.

4"Ad Trends in Cigarettes", Printer's Ink, December 30, 1955,
p. 16.

48

Marlboro, in 1955, was promoted with advertising that said, "You get
a lot to like with a Marlboro -- filter, flavor, flip tOp box." Win-

ston said, "Winston tastes good -- like a cigarette should."l

King size and regular cigarettes were also promoted with adver-
tising emphasizing flavor. Pall Mall advertising asked smokers to
"Reward yourself with the pleasure of smooth smoking. Smoke long and
finer and milder Pall Mall." Camel advertising switched to a theme
asking, "How's your diSposition today?" and telling smokers, "For
BEES pure pleasure -- have a Camel." Lucky Strike, too, had a new
flavor oriented theme: "Light up a Lucky. It's light up time. Luckies
taste better."2 Old Gold became the cigarette that's "Always smooth...
never harsh or bitter," with a flavor claim that said, ”Old Gold
treats your taste right all day long." Philip Morris was "Gentle,
more delicate in flavor...for those with keen young tastes." The
brand's advertising entreated smokers to "DO as young America does;
enjoy Philip Morris.” Chesterfield was the cigarette to smoke to
"Put a smile in your smoking," the one with "Smoothness, mildness,

refreshing taste."3

Only Viceroy, the first really successful filter-tip cigarette,

continued with its health oriented ads. "Facts about cigarette

 

lIbid.
21bid., p. 17.

3Various issues of 1955 Saturday Evening Post.

49

smoking" read their headlines. The copy, instead of emphasizing fla-
vor, came down hard on Viceroy's 20,000 tiny filter traps and what

they could do for smokers.1

Why did this change take place? Again, as in the case Of the new
trend in sales, the answer is not clear cut. It could have been as
Simple as the industry finally taking some of its own advice. Whole-
salers had been decrying the defensive advertising claims ever since
cigarette sales began to dip in 1953. Even Paul Hahn, president of
the largest member of the industry had some time before, at an Ameri-
can Tobacco Company Stockholder's meeting, commented on the "short-

Sightedness" of medical claim advertising employed by some companies.2

However, it was undoubtedly more complicated than that. Other-
wise the advice would not have been taken so belatedly. Another influ-
encing factor might have been that while the cigarette makers ignored
the advice from their wholesalers and some of their own industry mem-
bers and continued to sell health, their sales continued to fall. On
the surface, the defensive advertising appeared to be making very
little impact. For as the health claims became more and more blatant
domestic consumption of cigarettes dropped lower and lower. The only
encouraging note for the manufacturers was that their new filter-

tipped and king-size brands were taking a bigger and bigger slice of

 

1Various issues of 1955 Saturday Evening Post.

2"Department of Justice to Investigate New Tobacco Group",*
Printer's Ink, January 8, 1954, p. 10.

50

the total market. But even that was false encouragement since the

total market was declining alarmingly.

Another factor which may have had some sway over the manufac-
turer's decision tO turn to taste in their advertising was the growing
evidence that "health" was not the only formula to success. Winston,
R. J. Reynolds' major entry into the filter-tip field, was from the
beginning sold primarily on the basis of taste. It entered the market
after others had Spent a good deal of time and money establishing the
desirability of filter cigarettes in the minds of smokers. Reynolds
was, therefore, able to play on the past and current advertising which
touted filters for "health" sake and, in effect, say here's another
that tastes good. Using this technique the company had not only estab-
lished the brand, but was now beginning to make substantial inroads
into the filter market. Marlboro, another later entry into the field,
was using essentially the same technique and also producing reSpectable
sales gains. The other tobaccomen were aware of the apparent accept-
ance of these brands by smokers, and this combined with the intra and
extra-industry diSparagement of the "health" approach may have changed

their minds.

Still another, and probably the most important factor influencing
the sudden trend away from health and to flavor was the Federal Trade
Commission's Suggested advertising guidelines which reached the cigar-
ette makers in late 1954. True, the tobaccomen's only comment on the

guides thus far had been the noncommittal "No comment." This would

51

indicate that the manufacturers were not deeply concerned with the pro-
posed restrictions. On the other hand, it must be remembered that
these were two old and well-acquainted foes. The FTC had been nipping
at the heels of the cigarette makers for years. And the major manu-
facturers had, after the disastrous anti-trust case in the early 1940's,
develOped a pattern Of literally beating the Commission to the punch

in the fight over advertising claims; changing campaigns before the

FTC could Obtain any action against them. The FTC'S preliminary con-

tact with the tobaccomen, asking for comments on the proposed guides,

gave the manufacturers a perfect chance to repeat the pattern.

In addition, it should be pointed out that no matter how uncon-
cerned the cigarette makers appeared, it is unlikely that they would
simply sit by and wait for the guidelines to take effect, leaving
their claims unchanged. To do so would be to invite FTC action. By
changing their campaigns before the guidelines became Commission policy
they could not only sidestep the chance of litigation, but bypass the
adverse publicity which invariably resulted from legal action regard-

less of its success or failure.

Finally, by moving to change their advertising approach when
they did, the tobaccomen could gain all the Obvious benefits Of appear-
ing to voluntarily restrict their advertising without actually agreeing
to a pact with the FTC. Thus they gave themselves an out Should they,
at a later date, feel a need to reverse the trend to flavor and return

to health claims. Therefore, although there is no published informa-

tion to Specifically support it, it is not illogical to suggest that

52

the pending guidelines did play a more than minor role in the 1955

advertising trend to flavor claims.

In October, when the Commission finally did lay down its guides,
the manufacturers certainly did nothing to refute the theory. The
headline of a Business Week article on the subject aptly describes
their reaction: "Cigarette Trade Yawns at FTC Ad Rules." The indus-
try tended to just shrug its shoulders. "Most members have pretty

much soft-pedaled their claims, anyway," they said.1

At any rate, the new trend to flavor in 1955 was set. It becomes
another link in the chain of events which eventually lead to the 1964
Cigarette Advertising Code. For, with the change to flavor, a great
deal of the heat was taken off the industry. Tobacco was still accused
by its most vehement detractors, but for the moment, cigarette adver-

tising had ceased to be a major issue in the larger fight.

The cigarette makers no longer presented a two-faced image, con-
tradicting themselves with their advertising claims and official
statements. Those who had represented the industry as playing on smo-
‘kers fears had lost their point of argument. Smokers who had quit the
habit or cut down because of the increased publicity the industry had
given the cancer/smOking issue with their massive Spending against

health claims had much less reason to hold cigarettes in suspicion.

 

1"Cigarette Trade Yawns At FTC Ad Rules", Business Week,
October 1, 1955, p. 56.

53

According to one source, "The cigarette industry, in the eyes of
the public, (had) undergone a subtle but distinct change for the better

"1 This change could be "largely attributed to refor-

during the...year.
mation in advertising."2 Tobacco's enemies, the news media and the
public in general no longer had the concrete, daily reasons to criti-
cize the industry's advertising. Because, "In marked contrast to the
bellicose COpy of yesteryear that often engendered violent criticism,
the larger manufacturers (had) now swung into line with advertising

themes patently in good taste -- literally and figuratively."3

With the horizon turning rosy, with sales again on the increase
and criticism of advertising dwindling, there seemed to be little doubt
that this new trend in ad themes would become a permanent part of the
picture. As one publication said:

"It is doubtful that any major cigarette again will be
stampeded into a campaign like 'Take the fear out
of smoking' or even 'Just what the doctor orderedl'"
"The 1955 comeback in sales with gentler ads should
have taken care of that. Chances are the advertisers
will stock to the flavor stories."4
Tobacco wholesalers and other members of the industry who had

been against the health claims from the beginning must have breathed a

sigh of relief and crossed their fingers in hopes that it was a trend

 

1"Cigarette Sales Turn Up Again in 1955," Printer's Ink, December
30, 1955, p. 14.

2mm.
31b1d.

4"Ad Trend in Cigarettes," Printer'8 135. December 30, 1955,
p. 150

54

‘with.permanency. And the Federal Trade Commission, which had now

established its guides as permanent policy, would concur. When the

rules were announced the commission said, "Conformity with these

guides is completely voluntary and the FTC hOpeS to keep it that way."

However, deSpite the hOpes of many and the confident predictions

of others, the trend to flavor was not to be long-lived. The develop-

ment and effect of its reversal will outline yet another link in our

lengthening chain of important events.

1

"FTC Has a Busy Week -- New Ad Rules For Cigarettes," Printer's
Ink, September 30, 1955, p. 73.

l

CHAPTER V

CONTINUATIONS - CONTROVERSY AND COMEBACK

1956 was a year of continuation; of the controversy surrounding
cigarettes, of the trend to flavor in cigarette advertising, and of the

comebaCk in cigarette sales.

In the first month of the new year Dr. Charles S. Cameron,
Medical and Scientific Director of the American Cancer Society made it
clear that there would be no letup in the reports and statements derog-
atory to the smOking habit. In what could be considned a lengthy arti-
cle in the Atlantic Monthly, he discussed "What we really know" about
the association between cigarettes and lung cancer.1 After admitting
that there was still some confusion, he Said, "...most scientists who
have given thought or study to the subject agree that.an association

between cigarette smoking and lung cancer does exist."2

Then, delineating the Official position of the society, he made

it clear that the body of workers intended to do everything in its

 

1"Lung Cancer and Smoking," Atlantic Monthly, January, 1956,
p. 71.

21bid.

55

56

power to keep the issue alive and before the public:

”The American Cancer Society has resolved to support...
research efforts to identify whatever cancer-inciting
substances may be in tobacco...and to find the means
Of eliminating them. In the meantime, it is committed
to setting the facts, as they stand today and as they
accumulate, before the people - all the people - of
this country."

Dr. Ernest Wynder, by now a long-time foe of the smoking habit,
followed close behind Dr. Cameron, helping keep the issue alive. In
April, Wynder reported that he and Dr. George Wright, working for the
Sloan-Kettering Institute, had isolated the active cancer-causing
fraction in tar from smoking. The next step he said was to "identify
the compounds, find out where they come from and try to eliminate them

from cigarettes."2

Less than a month later the English, who were also in an argument
over cigarettes, made a major move. After British Minister of Health
Turton told Parliament that "...20 times more smokers than nonsmokers
die of lung cancer," the connection between cigarette smoking and can-
cer was officially accepted by the British Government as "statistically
incontrovertible."3 British investors, in contrast to what might have
been expected from their American counterparts in the same situation,

were unalarmed. Tobacco shares went up after the announcement.4

 

11bid., p. 75-

2"Cancer-Causing Faction," Time, April 23, 1956, p. 70.

3"British Cabinet Links Lung Cancer to Smoking," Business Wgek,
May 12, 1956, p. 36.

4
Ibid.

57

Back in this country the fires continued under the tobacco manu-
facturers. In June Lifg magazine said, "...a new report makes the
case against cigarettes more convincing than ever." Dr. Oscar Auerbach
of the East Orange, New Jersey hOSpital had analyzed lung tissue taken
from cadavers. According to the doctor the results showed that, "The
degree of lung damage correSponds with the number of cigarettes smoked
daily."1 On hearing this Charles Cameron of the ACS stepped back into
the news long enough to point out that the Auerbach findings provided

"...the very evidence skeptics demanded."2

While this smOking/cancer fight continued to smolder, another
controversy began to take shape. This one was not only between tobac-
co's friends and foes, but also between the tobaccomen themselves. It
revolved around a new process for making the tobacco core of cigarettes,

especially filter cigarettes.

For eight to ten years the companies had been experimenting with
a process variously called homogenized or synthetic tobacco. Essen-
tially, it amounted to grinding up stems and heretofore unusable
tobacco leaves and reconstituting them for use in filter cigarettes.
This process would save the companies a great deal of money by making

available parts Of the tobacco plant which were normally discarded.3

 

1"New Cigarette-Cancer Link," Life, June 11, 1956, p. 126.

21pm.

3”New Trend in Cigarettes," Business Week, May 26, 1956, p. 198.

58

However, it would also do two other things. First, according to some
Observers, it would mean that cigarettes produced in this manner would
contain much lower quality tobaccos and therefore higher nicotine and
tar. Even more importantly at the time, it would mean a substantial

loss in sales to tobacco growers and warehousers.

Through the first months of 1956 rumors Spread that the cigarette
makers were thinking of using this process in a big way. In May, under
pressure from growers and warehouse associations the controversy came
out into the Open. The manufacturers were called before an investi-
gating Senate-House Agriculture subcommittee.. Subcommittee and asso-
ciation members tried to pry information out Of the manufacturers, but
.met with little success.1 The cigarette makers simply would not di-
vulge their plans concerning the process. That would be giving away

"trade secrets," they said.2

Some sources gave different reasons for the tobaccomen's silence.
It was suggested that the real reason behind their hesitancy in giving
information was the unknown public reaction to the process. Competi-
tion's unpredictable reaction was also suggested as a reason. If it
became known that some companies were using homogenized or synthetic
tobacco in their cigarettes, others could possibly take advantage of

the fact with a "100% tobacco" claim.3

 

11bid.

21bid.

31bid.

59

The growers and warehouse men registered a strong dissent regard-
ing any use Of the process. Politicians from the tobacco growing States
Spoke out against it, too. Even among the cigarette makers themselves
there was divided Opinion. Mighty American Tobacco insisted that "...
reconstituted tobacco does not make as good a smOke..."l Nevertheless,
by September it was reported that most in the industry were using re-
constituted leaf and stem in their cigarettes.2 This move served to
undermine the relationship between the tobacco companies and their
suppliers. In addition, it forced the manufacturers to stand before
a Government agency and answer for yet another practice to which many
objected. And to those who would seek it, it presented another ques-
tion about the companies' advertising policies. One might aSk, "If
they are, or are planning to use lower grade tobaccos in filter cigar-
ettes, why would they claim they contain less tar and nicotine?" It
was a question that would not be forgotten. But for the present it

remained unasked and unanswered.

Probably the major reason this question was left in limbo was
the continuation of the trend to flavor in cigarette advertising. As
long as low tar and nicotine claims were not being made there was
little relevancy in attacking the kind of tobacco being used. And it
was now definite; flavor stories had replaced health claims as the

main approach in cigarette advertising.

 

1"Brighter Glow-Filter Tips Sparking Comeback in Cigarettes,"
Barron's, September 3, 1956, p. 3.

21bid.

60

Printer's Ink said, "After taking a long, satisfying pull on
taste and flavor in 1955, cigarette ads in 1956 wisely puffed along in
the pleasure groove.”l Another advertising trade source said that the

tobacco companies now have ...a generally observed agreement to avoid

negative COpy approaches in cigarette advertising."2

While it was true that most of the manufacturers were tipping
the scales strongly in favor of flavor, there were indications that
some of them remained jittery over the health question. Viceroy, for
example, after slightly underplaying its "20,000 filter traps" refrain
at the end of 1955 was now back pushing it strongly. L&M remained
with the "Live Modern Smoke L&M" theme, but to a greater extent the

brand's "Miracle Tip" was played up.3

Future events would soon reveal that all of the companies had a
case of nerves. Despite the seeming entrenchment in the flavor trend
it would not take much to start another stampede to health. .A fresh
fire under the smoking-health controversy or a fresh decline in sales

could do it. But, in 1956, neither of these setbacks appeared eminent.

 

1"Fresh Appeals, Bigger Pictures, CriSp COpy - That's Cigarette
Ad Outlook," Printer's Ink, December 28, 1956, p. 15.

2"The Great Cigarette Opera," Ad Agency Magazine, December 7,
1956, p. 22.

3"Fresh Appeals, Bigger Pictures, CriSp COpy - That's Cigarette
Ad Outlook," Printer's Ink, December 28, 1956, p. 16.

61

In fact, Harry Wootten, the tobacco industry's sales consultant
said, "The Smoking health controversy may be collapsing for lack of
nourishment." He pointed out that "For the second straight year the
British Empire Cancer Campaign reported failure to induce cancer in ex-
perimental animals using cigarette derivatives."1 Many concluded with
him that the current "anti-cigarette allegations...seem to be taking
their place in the long history of accusations that do not stand up

under examination."2

The sales picture, too, looked brighter than it had in years. In
the first six months of the year consumption moved up 2.6 per cent. As
early as September there were predictions that the 1956 level would
total a record 395 billion smOkeS, 3.4 per cent above 1955.3 At the
end of the year people were repeating these same figures. Thirteen
billion more cigarettes had been sold in 1956 than in the preceding

year.4

Much of the increase was due to filter-tip sales. 1956 had seen
the introduction of still more brands. Even American Tobacco, which
had held back most in the filter race, now had a major entry, Hit
Parade. And during the year there was another super-refinement in the

filter fight--a cigarette not only big sized and filter tipped, but

 

1"Cigarette Output Up," Printer's Ink, December 28, 1956, p. 14.

21bid.

3"Brighter Glow - Filter Tips Sparking Comeback in Cigarettes,"
Barron's, September 3, 1956, p. 3.

4"SmOke RingsRise," Newsweek, December 31, 1956, p. 52.

62

also mentholated. Early in the year, R. J. Reynolds introduced Salem.
Philip Morris was represented by the modernized Spud, Brown & William-

son by K001, and Liggett & Meyers by the new Oasis.1

When market shares were totalled at the end of the year, the
expected increase for filter brands was there. Filter-tip sales
grabbed an estimated 30 per cent of the total market. Regular size
cigarettes were down to only 45 per cent. King size cigarettes were

also down, attaining only 25 per cent.2

Other areas locked promising for the manufacturers, too. After
six months almost all Of the major companies had reported reSpectable
gains in net earnings. American Tobacco earned $3.55 per share, up
from its 1955 $3.33 per share. Liggett & Meyers was up from $2.73 to
$2.93 a share. Philip Morris rose from $1.52 in 1955 to a 1956 level

of $1.83. R. J. Reynolds jumped from $2.37 to $2.81 in 1956.3

Toward the end of the year sales estimator Wootten predicted
that American Tobacco and R. J. Reynolds would enjoy the best earnings
in their history. Liggett & Meyers, he said, should have its best year
since 1950, and Philip Morris its best since 1952.4 In Short, as one

magazine said, "after a two year slump, the growth trend (was)

 

1"In the Hit Parade," Newsweek, October 1, 1956, p. 66.

2"Brighter Glow - Filter Tips Sparking Comeback in Cigarettes,"
Barron's, September 3, 1956, p. 3.

31bid.

4"Smoke Rings Rise," Newsweek, December 31, 1956, p. 52.

63

reappearing in cigarettes."1

However, at the same time, another factor was beginning to make
itself felt which would have an effect on all future trends in cigar-
ettes. The so-called "War babies" were coming of age. This was a
bracket of the pepulation which, according to some Observers,,"...
cigarette economists (were) awaiting eagerly."2 A loOk at the 1956
advertising Of the cigarette companies makes it easy to agree with
those who then said, "The industry is making a conscious effort to key
advertising to the younger age groups."3 Although it would be years
developing, this was the beginning of another link in the chain of
events which helped to produce the Cigarette Advertising Code. While

it was developing there was time for other links to be forged.

 

1"Brighter Glow - Filter Tips Sparking Comeback in Cigarettes,"
Barron's, September 3, 1956, p. 3.

21bid.

31bid.

CHAPTER VI

HISTORY REPEATS ITSELF

Four years had passed Since headlines across the nation pro-
claimed ”SmOking Causes Cancer!" By 1957 many of the changes which

had taken place following those headlines were coming full circle.

SmOkers who had turned away from the smOking habit in 1953 had
now returned in even greater numbers, yielding to the persuasive pro-
motion of a multitude of "healthful" cigarettes. The cigarette makers,
after experiencing drastic declines in sales, were selling more cigar-
ettes and more kinds of cigarettes than ever before. In fact, an April,
1957 issue of Timgymagazine pronounced the tobacco industry "completely
recovered."1 "The Agriculture Department," the magazine said, "esti-
mates Americans are smOking 9% more than a year ago and predicted 1957
sales will t0p last year's 392 billion (171 packs for every American

aged 15 or over) and...probab1y exceed the 1952 level."2

In their advertising the tobacco manufacturers had gone from the
comparatively mild health claims used in the years preceding the "Great

SmOking Scare" to the sweeping and blatant health claims of 1953 and

 

1"Tobacco--Complete Recovery, Time, April 22. 1957: Po 97-

2Ibid.

64

65

1954. They had combined these claims with the defensive press releases
of an especially created organization -- the Tobacco Industry Research
Committee. Then, finding there was a limit to which these practices
could be carried, they did an about face. With a growing tide of antag-
onism against health claims and with the FTC breathing down their necks
the cigarette makers turned to flavor claims in their advertising. For
two years they had remained with flavor stories and the official and
unofficial attitudes toward cigarette advertising had warmed consider-

ably.

The anti-tobacco forces, in the meantime, had changed very little.
Neither time, nor advertising, nor press releases had altered their sta-
tistics. If anything, the tobacco manufacturers' practices and the
smokers' return to the habit had made them more vehement than ever in

their fight against cigarettes.

This, then, was the stage as set for 1957. The events of the
past four years were now recorded history. They were permanent, avail-
able facts from which all of the parties in this drama could draw les-

sons should the need arise. That need would soon make itself felt.

Although 1957 started with the calm which had pervaded much of
1955 and 1956, it was destined to become a year of violent storms. Be-
fore the year was out history would repeat itself. SmOkers, the cigar-
ette manufacturers and the anti-tobacco forces would come face to face

with the same'kind of turmoil which created the "Great SmOking Scare"

66

Of 1953. Their combined and specific reactions to this second coming
outline one of the largest and most important links in the chain of
events which were leading inevitably to a major decision on the part

of the tobacco manufacturers.

As has been pointed out, the happenings of 1953 were actually the
culmination of events which began years earlier. The same is true of
the important occurrences of 1957. When the demand for filter-tip
cigarettes exploded onto the scene in 1952 and 1953 the cigarette makers
quickly learned that although smOkers now desired "health protection,"
they also continued to demand taste in a cigarette. To solve the prob-
lem the tobacco industry began to make filter cigarettes loaded with
Stronger tobacco. Later they also began to use "homogenized" tobacco.
Naturally, the Stronger and homogenized tobaccos released more tar and

nicotine into the mainstream smOke of the new brands.

For some time this change in tobacco content was known only among
cigarette makers and tobacco growers and sellers. Then, as wholesalers
and growers became alarmed at the decreasing amounts and different
kinds of tobacco being purchased, others were made aware. Evidence
the 1956 House-Senate hearings on the tobacco industry which featured

prominently in the preceding chapter.

In 1957 the Spread of this information continued. A Time maga-

zine article, for example, covered the subject:

67

"The filter boom is doubly gratifying to manufacturers.
Filter cigarettes sell for more but cost less to pro-
duce. Chief reason: They use a low-grade, high nico- 1
tine, heavy bodied tobacco to get the taste through..."

And more specifically:

"...filtered smoke usually carries more nicotine than the
average regular, and just about the same amount of tar.”2

The matter Of "homogenized" tobacco was also touched upon by Time.
The magazine stated that the cigarette makers were also saving by sal-

vaging the "stems and scraps once thrown away."3

Pointing to the re-
sults which were causing tobacco growers to decry the introduction of
this new technique the article said tobaccomen bought "...35 million

pounds less tobacco last year as in 1955."4

While Time editors were merely presenting the information others
were condemning it. A North Carolina state senator said, "What is
happening to the cigarette is a shame. It is scrap tobacco at one end,

cellulose at the other and tissue paper all around."5

Articles such as the one in Time and complaints from tobacco
wholesalers and growers and tobacco state legislators undoubtedly helped
build the storm which was brewing. But, just as in earlier turmoil, the

first real bolt of lightning-came from Reader's Digest. In the first

 

months of 1957 the magazine had Sponsored laboratory tests to determine

the tar and nicotine content of leading cigarettes. In the July issue

 

lIbid.

21bid.
3Ibid.

4Ibid.

51bid.

68

Digest editors published the findings along with a blistering condemna-
tion of the brands which had been "...the salvation of the tobacco

industry."1

The article attacked the industry and its filter-tips from sev-
eral directions. First, the latest information on the cigarette con-
troversy was quoted. In March, at the request of the American Cancer
Institute and the National Heart Institute, the Study Group on Smoking
and Health had been formed. According to the article this panel of
medical experts, organized to settle the cigarette controversy, had
found:

"The sum total Of scientific evidence establishes
beyond a reasonable doubt that cigarette smoking
is the cause of the increasing incidence of lung
cancer.”2

The magazine was also quick to include the unscientific, defen-
sive sounding rebuttal to the Study Group from tobaccomen. The chief
executive of the National Association of Tobacco Distributors was

quoted as saying, "This will blow over like other blasts."3

Next, the article delved into a Sloan-Kettering Institute survey

which stated that more than 70% of the smokers who had switched from

 

1"The Facts Behind Filter-Tips," Reader's Digest, July 1957,
p. 33.

 

2Ibid.

31bid.

69

plain and to filter-tip cigarettes said they did so for "health pro-

tection."1

And finally, with the scene set, the figures comparing the tar
and nicotine in the mainstream smoke of most of the pOpular cigarettes
were revealed. The results must have been shocking for smokers who had
switched to filters. According to Digest figures the most pOpular fil-
ter brands such as Winston, L&M, Marlboro, and Hit Parade contained more
tar and nicotine than regular cigaretteS. Of course, there were more
effective filter brands. They included Kent, Kool, Viceroy and Tarey-
ton. But the magazine tore into these, too, stating that "medical
authorities say that these tar reductions are too small to be really

significant in terms of health protection."2

This was only the beginning. Unsatisfied with merely putting
the so-called facts on record, the article began to ask questions and
serve up its own answers. The more questions and answers touched upon,

the more embarrassing it became for the tobacco industry.

Why, the magazine asked, were these cigarettes which peOple had
been lead to believe were more healthful, actually higher in tar and
nicotine? To find the answer the Digest sent investigators to talk to

tobacco growers, warehousemen, auctioneers, cigarette manufacturers

 

11bid.

2Ibid., p. 37.

70

and government officials. This was the story according to the inves-
tigators:

”Back in 1953, when filter-tip cigarettes were in their
infancy, a newcomer called Kent claimed very-high
filtration...

"At that very moment, however, Kent was having trouble
selling at the tobacco counters. The filter tip was
too good. It not only filtered out a lot of tar, but
most of the tobacco taste as well!

"Kent quickly modified its tip to give the smoker more
'taste satisfaction' -- and, of course, more tar and
nicotine.

"Other cigarette makers...profited from the Kent exper-
ience. They went all out to give smOkers 'satisfac-
tion' at any cost. Not only did they adapt filters
which, in most cases, are little more than mouth
pieces; they also began loading the blends with heav-
ier tobacco."1

Now the questions raised earlier during the House-Senate Subcom-
mittee investigations had been brought to the surface on a national
level. The Digest called on the records of those investigations to
hammer home its point. Quoting the statements made before the Congres-
sional subcommittee by Fred Royster, president of the Bright-Belt
Warehouse Association, the article told of marked changes in tobacco
buying patterns which began in 1953. Royster, it was said, accused
the tobacco companies of buying inferior grade tobaccos for their fil-
ter cigarettes. He Sighted the "tremendous price increases in the in-
ferior grades," Specifically pointing out that the harsh top leaves of
Burley tobacco had gone from twenty cents per pound to sixty-two cents

2

per pound, as proof of his claim. This warehouse association president,

 

11bid., p. 37.

2Ibid., p. 37.

71

an authority on tobacco, was also quoted as stating that "...on the
average this heavier tobacco yields 16% more tar and 40% more nico-

tine."l

Although it was not stated Specifically, the Digest was making a
strong case against the tobaccomen as taking advantage of smokers by using
cheap, inferior tobacco in filter cigarettes while calling them "more
healthful." The implied result was that smOkers now got less health-
ful cigarettes while the tobacco companies got more money. According
to the magazine, some of the tobaccomen themselves saw the current fil-
ter cigarettes as a black eye for the entire industry. John Berry,
vice president of the Burley Tobacco Growers Cooperative Association
was quoted as telling the House-Senate subcommittee that "Such prac-
tices ultimately will bring into bad repute the manufactured cigarette

and the people who manufacture it."2

This Reader's Digest article was a repeat of history, very simi-
lar to the Digest attack which preceded the 1953 "Great SmOking Scare."
The subject may have been slightly different, but the aim.was the same;
tell the public, smOking is bad. In many ways, the results, too, were
the same. The July issue of the Digest which carried the damaging arti-
cle hit the newsstands near the end of June. By July the cigarette con-

troversy was in a stir from one end of the nation to the other.

 

1Ibid., p. 37.

2
Ibid., p. 37.

72

In July, in Washington, Surgeon General Leroy E. Burney made this
statement:
"There is an increasing and consistent body of
evidence that excessive cigarette smoking is one of
the causative factors in lung cancer."
As in the past the tobaccomen came forward to meet anti-smoking claims.
Dr. Clarance CoOk Little Of the Tobacco Industry Research Committee
immediately answered the Burney statement, saying it ”...adds nothing
to what had been known about the causes of lung cancer."2 Doctor Little
said as far as he was concerned:
"It reflects the opinions of some statisticians and
relatively few experienced scientists who have
actively charged that cigarette smoking is the cause
of lung cancer."

Whether or not Doctor Little was right this much was true: Now, at

least one agency of the U.S. Government had taken a stand in the fight.

The develOpment of the cigarette controversy in other countries
was also suddenly in the news again. The British Government was moving
ahead in its anti-smOking campaign with an educational drive and its
leaflets and posters were quoted in the American news media:

"There are now the strongest reasons to believe that
smOkers, particularly of cigarettes, run a greater
risk of lung cancer than nonsmOkers."

Back in the United States the official Government interest in the

tobacco industry reached a new high as a Congressional investigation of

 

1"Cigarette Controversy Smokes up Here and Abroad," Newsweek,
July 22, 1957, p. 58.

21bid.

31bid., p. 59.
41b1d., p. 59.

73

filter cigarettes Opened before the House Government Operations Sub-
committee. At the outset, subcommittee chairman John A. Blatnik said:
"We want to find out if the public is receiving the
protection it is paying for and which the manufac-
turers have assured it (in advertising) it is
receiving."
The first few days of these hearings were devoted to harsh arguments
over the question of whether or not smokers needed protection from tars
and nicotine. Each time the anti-tobacco forces paraded their Statis-

tics supposedly answering the question, one or more of tobacco's

friends challenged them.

Then, Doctor Ernest Wynder attacked the cigarette makers for
taking advantage of "...the public's desire for filtered cigarettes
and its equal wish for good tobacco flavor by marketing increasingly
ineffective filters."2 To this claim the tobaccomen Offered no refu-
tation. In fact, when congressmen pressed for an answer from the
Tobacco Industry Research Committee's Clarence Cook Little, they won
the surprising admission that he knew nothing about filters one way or
the other. He had, he confessed, never received any reports on fil-
ters from the industry which paid his salary. Nor had he ever been

shown filter experiments on trips to the cigarette companies.3

Doctor Wynder appeared much less in the dark about filters and
1"House Probes Filter Tips," Printer's Ink, July 26, 1957, p. 60.

2"Filtered for Safety," Time, July 29, 1957, p. 28.

3Ibid.

74

their effectiveness. He expressed the belief that filters could be

made and tobacco blends used which together would provide adequate pro-
tection for smokers.1 He told the committee that a filter that could
st0p 40% or more of the tar from a regular cigarette made of good tobac-
co "...will be a partial answer."2 But the doctor was quick to note

that during the five year boom in filters no such tip had been made.

AS a solution to the problem Doctor Wynder stepped into the con-
gressmen's area, suggesting legislation. Regulations should be passed,
he felt, that established criteria for the amount of tar which might
pass through a given filter and required manufacturers to state the
effectiveness of filters.3 In doing so, the doctor became the first
of many who would recommend lawmaking action against the tobaccomen

during the year.

The happenings in Congress and at the Surgeon General's office
and the increased news coverage of the cigarette controversy may or
may not have been direct results of the Digest article on filter cigar-
ettes. But, the article at least played a part in focusing public

attention on them.

Another major event was most certainly triggered by the article.

And in this event history closely paralleled itself. The Reader's

 

1"House Probes Filter Tips," Printer's Ink, July 26, 1957, p. 60.
2"Filtered for Safety," Time, July 29, 1957, p. 28.

31b1d.

75

Digest article in the early fifties which helped to set Off the "Great
Smoking Scare" also helped to establish Viceroy filter cigarettes as a
major force in the tobacco market. After the article's publication
Viceroy ads proclaimed, "Filtered cigarette smOke is better for your

health," using the Digest as a convincing authority on the subject.

The happy results for Brown & Williamson were that plant facil-
ities had to be enlarged to meet consumer demand for Viceroy. However,
the eventual result for the industry was a far less than happy one.
For, as has here been recorded, the Viceroy claim was the beginning of
an advertising fight which brought the cigarette makers into an unnerv-

ingly close brush with their enemies and FTC legal action.

Now an almost identical situation had developed. The July issue
of Reader's Digest pointed to P. Lorillard Company's Kent as the cigar-

ette with the most effective filter and therefore the most "healthful."

The Digest was aware that its earlier articles condemning cigar-
ettes had unwittingly created powerful advertising themes for certain
manufacturers. This time special precautions were taken against indi-
rectly helping the tobaccomen. Before publication of the article all
of the cigarette companies signed an agreement with the magazine to

refrain from using the Digest findings in advertising.1

 

1"Reader's Digest Asks New Regulations for Cigarette Ads and
Labels," Printer's Ink, July 26, 1957, p. 76.

76

However, the precautionary measures taken by the magazine were
of no avail. In complete disregard of the agreement and deSpite the
lessons which might have been learned from the "Great SmOking Scare"
the cigarette makers Opened a new health claim fight, based on Digest

findings.

A sales rush on Kent cigarettes had started almost the day the
July issue of Reader's Digest hit the newsstands. Lorillard Obviously
meant to keep the rush going. In the middle of July, with boxcar type
and an avalanche of ads the company revealed their big secret:
unbeknownst to the public, Kent had been equipped Since May with a new
filter that "significantly reduces tar and nicotine."1 Before the end
of the month full page newsPaper ads were playing up filtration with
the claim that "Kent Filters Best" and a tar and nicotine chart compar-
ing Kent favorably with seven unnamed brands.2 The other cigarette
manufacturers hesitated only briefly. But it was long enough for them
to be exppsed to a strong reminder of what had happened in the past and

a preview of what might occur in the near future.

While the tobaccomen were tooling up new health oriented cam-
paigns, Reader's Digest published a second article on filter cigarettes.
This new article included four suggestions on legislation which the

magazine believed should be passed by Congress to regulate cigarette

 

1"Telling a Secret," Newsweek, July 22, 1957, p. 68.

2"Reader's Digest ASks New Regulations for Cigarette Ads and
Labels," Printer's Ink, July 26, 1957, p. 74.

77

manufacturers. To deal realistically with the problem of filter tips,
Digest editors said, legislation should: (1) require label statements
on packages of nicotine and tar content, (2) require manufacturers to
correct information on labels when changes are made to the blend or
filter construction, (3) require manufacturers to confine advertising
claims to statements they can support with scientific proof, and (4)
enable the Federal Trade Commission to stop false or misleading ad

claims.1

There were other statements and suggestions which also might
have given the cigarette makers second thoughts about a new health
fight. For example, the same Reader's Digest article stated:

"Lately there have been signs that the cigarette
advertisers are growing restless. The FTC may
soon be facing a rash of new claims that it is

powerless to deal with--except by prolonged liti-
gation."

At the same time the House-Senate hearings on cigarette adver-
tising were coming to a close with disturbing statements from a key
witness, Federal Trade Commissioner Robert T. Secrest. He commended
the manufacturers for living up to the FTC guides set in 1955. But
then he revealed that the commission would make a survey of consumer
attitudes for a basis on which to bring complaints and also a necessity

for evidence offered in court against the tobaccomen.3

 

1Ibid., p. 76.

2"Wanted Available, Filter-Tips That Really Filter," Reader's
Digest, August, 1957, p. 44.

3"FTC Plans Filter Cigarette Study," Printer's Ink, August 2,
1957, Po 240

78

Secrest also suggested that the Wheeler-Lea Act which allowed the
FTC to obtain injunctions to halt SUSpect food and drug advertising be

amended to include tobacco.1

Throughout the House-Senate hearings filter-tip ad claims had
been cited as "hoax," "fake," and "phony." Immediately after the
hearings ended subcommittee chairman John A. Blatnik leveled this blast
at the cigarette makers:

"This filter-tip phony should never have been allowed
to occur and if either the law or its administration
is found to be defective we will make appropriate
recommendations to Congress."2

In August, according to Printer's Ink, the air was full of cries
for cigarette package labeling and ad statements regarding nicotine
and tar content and filter effectiveness. It was thought that to es-
cape FDA Act type Of control, the tobacco industry would have to "volun-

tarily agree to standards as was done in the case of the FTC adverti-

sing guides."3

Consumer Reports carried the issue a step further, asking these
questions: "Is nice cigarette advertising good enough for a product
which almost certainly causes cancer? Should all packages and adver-

tising be required to notify consumers to that effect?"4

 

11b1d.

21bid.

31bid.

4"Cigarettes on Trial," Consumer Reports, September, 1957, p.
407.

79

In the face of these reminders of pastunpleasantness and portents
of possible future problems, it would seem that the tobacco industry
would want to give a wide berth to health claims. As one source said:

"Today with the Surgeon General's action, with new
and persuasive medical reports, with a crusading
editorial campaign from Reader's Digest directed
at its enormous audience and the Congressional
hearings, the controversy has reached its peak to
date."

Another health fight within the industry could only make matters

worse.

However, the lessons of the past and the likely dark expectations
for the future were not enough to discourage the tobaccomen in the
present. Lorillard's Kent had spurted ahead sensationally since the
Digest gave the word. _ Production was being increased to meet consumer
demand.2 The Kent Splurge, in the minds of many, was credited to the
Digest article and the new Kent advertising. That, apparently, was the
only thing the manufacturers could see. One by one they began to join

what was soon to be called "The Tar Derby."

In December, tobacco sales estimator Harry Wootten revealed that
cigarette consumption had set a new record, finally surpassing the 1952
level of 394.1 billion units. He estimated domestic consumption at
410.5 billion, a gain of 18.9 billion units or 4.9 per cent over 1956.

According to Wootten, filter cigarettes had jumped to roughly 40 per

 

1Ibid., p. 409.

2"The Times Have Changed--Or Have They?", Printer's Ink,
August 2, 1957, p. 52.

80

cent of the total domestic market. Regular and king Size cigarettes

were down to 39.1 per cent and 20.9 per cent respectively.1

Speaking specifically, he said it was "most fortuitous" for
Lorillard that a national magazine published a private survey which
showed that Kent tested out lower in respect to tar and nicotine content
than other brands. Lorillard's third quarter sales, Wootten estimated,

had jumped $34.3 million or 66.3 per cent over the same period a year

earlier.2

On the subject of maximum filtration in cigarettes, Mr. Wootten
had this to say:

"Under the stimulus of fear, a small but Obviously
increasing percentage of smokers show interest in
maximum filtration."

"While competition may dictate added effort along these
lines on the part of manufacturers, it is difficult

to envision any substantial enduring consumption for

a product that efficiently removes the pleasure smo-
kers derive from tobacco."

Finally, summing up, he said:

"If the intangible - psychological - as well as the
tangible problems faced by cigarette manufacturers
throughout the current year could be fully evaluated
and placed in their prOper perspective, 1957 would
likely go down in history as the year the industry
met its greatest challenge."

 

1"Filters Push Cigarette Sales up 4.9%," Printer's Ink,
December 27, 1957, p. 22.

 

21bid., p. 23.

31bid., p. 26.

41616., p. 22.

81

It is true that the events of 1957 presented the tobacco indus-
try with one Of its greatest challenges. However, contrary to Mr.
Wootten's prediction, it has not gone down in history as the year great
challenges were met. Rather, 1957 was the second time the tobacco in-
dustry walked away from its greatest challenge and, thus, one step

closer to May, 1964.

CHAPTER VII

THE TAR DERBY -- RACE TOWARD REGULATION

The challenges which tobacco estimator Wootten said the industry
had faced in 1957 continued to present themselves during the next two
years. And throughout those years the tobaccomen continued to react
in the same manner by turning their backs. With advertising claims
centered around health and hinged upon tar and nicotine content, they

mounted a competitive fight which is now known as the ”Tar Derby."

At the time, the cigarette makers apparently thought they were
galloping toward success. Today, however, it is clear that they were
racing toward regulation. The "Tar Derby" itself forms one Of the
largest and most important links in the chain of events which lead to
the Cigarette Advertising Code. In addition, this advertising battle
helped to forge a number of smaller links. To see how this major link
fits into the lengthening chain of events and how it caused other minor
links to be formed, we must investigate the develOpment and course of

the "Tar Derby."

As pointed out in the preceding chapter, the ”Derby" actually be-
gan in July of 1957 with the publishing of the Reader's Digest article,
"The Facts Behind Filter Tips." The findings in that article helped

P. Lorillard Company make a competitive health claim for Kent cigarettes.

82

83

This competitive claim, combined with the impact of the article itself,
provided Kent with impressive sales gains. These sales gains, in turn,
began to lure other manufacturers to health-oriented advertising. At
first, the race gained momentum slowly. Then, as additional Digest
articles were published, each one caused a further flurry and increased

the pace.

In January of 1958 the magazine published, "Nicotine - The Smoker's
Enigma." Inherent in this article, as in preceding ones, were broad
challenges to the tobacco companies concerning the ill effects of cigar-
ette smoking. Specifically, the attack was against nicotine, which was
pointed out as a ”violent poison."l Digest editors said they had re-
ceived substantial amounts of mail from their readers asking about the
subject. "Is it harmful?" the readers asked. "Can it be taken out of
cigarettes?" According to the article, these kinds of questions prompted
new tests to determine the nicotine content of leading cigarettes. A
major portion of the article was devoted to presenting the results of
these tests. And, as in the past, cigarettes found to be lower in the

supposed harmful substances were pointed up as being "worthy of mention."2

What was the tobaccomen's reaction to this new attack and the
questions it raised? The Digest suggested that smokers' questions were
getting to the industry; that, although they looked placid, the cigar-

ette makers were really worried. One tobacco distributor was quoted

 

1"Nicotine - The Smoker's Enigma," Reader's Digest, January, 1958,
p. 26.

21bid., p. 27.

84

as saying:

"Sure smokers are shifting brands. But it's worse than
that. PeOple are now asking questions. And you can't
answer these questions with singing commercials."1

A more visible and tangible reaction from the tobaccomen was not
long in coming. The new charges and comparisons published in Reader's
Digest were followed by a ”vicious fight between Kent and Parliament

as to who had less tar and nicotine.”2

P. Lorillard's Kent, which had fared well in the July, 1957
Digest article, and now again in January, 1958, was still claiming
"Kent filters best." On January 14, 1958, Parliament tried to counter
the Kent claim. New Parliament ads challenged Kent's "best" position
with findings published in Consumer Rgports. However, this was done
without the consent of Consumers Union, publisher of the magazine, and
within a week Parliament was forced to issue an apology.3 In the mean-
time, Kent blasted back with a new claim: "Today, more than ever, Kent
filters best of all leading filter cigarettes at any price.”4 With its
first attack frustrated, Parliament turned to another claim: "First

filter cigarette in the world that meets the standards of the United

 

1"Nicotine - The Smoker's Enigma," Reader's Digest, January, 1958,
p. 25.

2"Rival Cigarette Claims Provoke Big As War," Printer's Ink,
January 17, 1958, p. 2.

 

3"Parliament, Kent Still Tilting Over Claims For Filters,"
Printer's Ink, January 24, 1958, p. 4.

4Ibid.

85

States Testing Company."1 This claim was one which Parliament could
and would continue to use. It was true, too. But it was also true
that Parliament was the only cigarette ever tested by the United States

Testing Company.2

This kind of highly competitive infighting lead some tobaccomen
to foresee the inevitable result. One company official stated pri-
vately that:

"...Lorillard and Philip Morris are doing their utmost to
drag the industry's advertising back into a health claim
trend. It's all pretty ridiculous...all they'll do is
get the FTC down on us again."

There was soon evidence to support that prediction. While Parlia-
ment and Kent battled and other manufacturers groomed their entries
into the "Derby," charges of "deceit" were being leveled by a Govern-
ment agency. In February, the House Government Operations Subcommittee
(which began investigating cigarette advertising in 1957) issued its
concluding report, stating that the public had been "brainwashed" and
"deceived" by cigarette advertising. Subcommittee chairman, John A.

Blatnik, also Slapped the FTC for being "weak" and "tardy” in policing

filter claims.4

 

1"Tobaccomen Find Claims in Test Tubes - How Far Can They Go?",
Printer's Ink, February 14, 1958, p. 65.

2"Making Cigarette Ads Tell the Truth," Harper's, August, 1958,
p. 46.

3"Tobaccomen Find Claims in Test Tubes - How Far Can They Go?",
Printer's Ink, February 14, 1958, p. 67.

4"Filters and a Flare-up," Newsweek, March 3, 1958, p. 71.

86

The reactions to this new attack against the industry were wide-
SPread and swift. Prodded by the Blatnik charges, the FTC called the
cigarette companies to Washington to confer on setting uniform standards
of testing cigarette smoke.1 When news of the report hit Wall Street,
the bottom momentarily fell out of tobacco stocks. Philip Morris
dropped almost three points, American nearly two, and R. J. Reynolds
and Lorillard were both off more than two points.2 Tobacco industry
officials were quick to react, commenting harshly on the report.

Bowman Gray, president of R. J. Reynolds, said that the subcommittee
had used figures which were a year out of date and added:

"We attach no significance to the measurable quantities
of solids and nicotine reported to have been found in
smoke Of cigarettes.”3

Lorillard's president, Louis Gruber, said:

"Our advertising has been and is scrupulously honest
and truthful. Our claim has been a simple Statement
of fact - Kent filters best of all leading brands."4

These overt reactions to the subcommittee's report are all worth
mentioning. But the most important reaction was a covert one; the pace
of the fight over tar and nicotine content continued,to increase. Des-

pite the attack from the subcommittee, the call from the FTC for con-

ferences, and the drop in stock quotations, the major manufacturers

 

1"FTC Faces Fight With Filter Smokes in Setting Uniform Testing
Methods," Printer's Ink, February 28, 1958, p. 8.

2"Filters and a Flare-up,” Newsweek, March 3, 1958, p. 71.

3"FTC Faces Fight With Filter Smokes in Setting Uniform Testing
Methods," Printer's Ink, February 28, 1958, p. 8.

4Ibid.

87

charged ahead with health claim advertising. Kent continued to play
heavily on its "filters best" claim. Parliament not only continued to
use the ”seal of the United States Testing Company," but also began
boasting that its tip had "more than 30,000 filter traps." Another
Philip Morris brand, Marlboro, pushed its Selectrate filter as "the
modern effective filter for cigarettes." L&M, the major entry from
Liggett & Meyers, put new emphasis on its "Patented Miracle Tip.” And,
in the face Of Parliament claims, Brown & Williamson upped Viceroy's

filter trap count from 20,000 to 22,000.1

All of this was part of the "Tar Derby" link in our chain of
events. But, in addition, it can also be considered a minor link of
its own. For this was a turning point. The "Derby" had begun and
almost immediately the manufacturers had received negative reaction to
it. It was clear that unless changes were made, restriction was not far
down the road. Now it was up to the cigarette makers to decide whether
or not to continue the race. Their decision in the affirmative was a
decision to disregard the possibility of future restrictions in favor

of immediate sales gains.

While the ”Derby" was developing into an all-out race, another
link in the chain of events was being formed. It centered around an
issue which is still important today; cigarette advertising's appeal

to youth. This subject had been touched upon in a 1956 Barron's

 

1"Tobaccomen Find Claims in Test Tubes - How Far Can They Go?",
Printer's Ink, February 14, 1958, p. 66.

88

article. Then, youth was mentioned only as an age group toward which
the tobacco industry was making a conscious effort to key its adver-
tising.1 As more and more medical evidence piled up against cigarette
smoking, peOple became disturbed over this approach to youth. In May
of 1958, after witnessing the cigarette makers break with FTC adver-
tising guides, Senator Richard Neuberger finally took action. Stating
that he believed "...there is no possibility that anything will be done
to curb this advertising (appealing to youth)," he prOposed federal

payments to states which conduct anti-cigarette educational programs.2

According to Neuberger, children were subject to a constant bar-
rage of advertising which promoted smoking and drinking. In a lengthy
Speech before the Senate he said:

"As some of my colleagues know, I have been disturbed for
some years over the torrent of skillful advertising
which seeks to persuade young people to embark upon the
cigarette and liquor habits.

"Particularly with regard to cigarettes, this advertising
seeks to make the habit attractive to young people.
Television films actually feature the use of cigarettes
by famous male athletes or by the glamorous girls of
the stage or screen.

"It means that young Americans are constantly beseeched
by radio, TV, signboards and printed advertisements to
commence upon a habit which the U.S. Public Health Ser-
vice believes may lead eventually to the most dreadful
disease which can befall large numbers of peOple in our
modern state of medical knowledge."3

 

1"Brighter glow - filter tips Sparking comeback in cigarettes,"
Barron's, September 3, 1956, p. 3.

2"Sen. Neuberger asks U.S. subsidy to counteract liquor, cigar-
ette ads," AdvertisingiAge, May 26, 1958, p. 1.

3Ibid.

89

Hurling a direct attack at the cigarette manufacturers and the Federal
Trade Commission, the senator added:
"...thus far efforts to bring about the policing of
that advertising have been glaringly unsuccessful
as far as previnting its deliberate appeal at youth
is concerned.”
Senator Neuberger's prOposal and attack had little immediate effect.
But, still, his presentation of the youth issue forms a link in the
chain of events leading to the Cigarette Advertising Code. For, once
introduced, youth remained a constant part of the controversy over
cigarette advertising. Richard Neuberger goaded the industry with the
issue until his demise at the hands of the very disease he was fighting.

And in subsequent chapters we will see how his wife, Maurine Neuberger,

then stepped into his Senate seat and continued to carry the fight.

For the moment, however, youth was still a background issue. The
industry itself made little comment on the Neuberger attack or prOpo-
sals. One big reason why was that the industry was too busy reacting
to yet another Reader's Digest report. In fact, the tobaccomen had
been nervously awaiting the next Digest article on cigarettes. Specu-
lation was that the stock market and some ad plans might be affected.
Trade sources also said, "Judging from reactions to past Digest arti-
cles, readers are certain to ponder the new score card."2 The July
issue of the magazine had scarcely hit the newsstands before there were

other things to ponder, too. As one news weekly said, the cigarette

 

1"Sen. Neuberger asks U.S. subsidy to counteract Liquor,
cigarette ads," Advertising Age, May 26, 1958, p. l.

2"Lorillard scores in Digest smoking report," Printer's Ink,
June 20, 1958, p. 10.

9O

makers "... rolled out the big guns to join a new and furious battle in

the war for smokers favor."1

All but one of the top six tobacco manufacturers entered the
parade of stronger and ever more confusing health claims. Only R. J.
Reynolds, with its Camel, Winston, and Salem brands continued to stress
flavor. Lorillard, the first runner in the race toward regulation,
tried to hold on to its front-running position with full page neWSpaper
ads stating, "Don't be mislead by confusing c1aims...Kent filters best."
Ads for American Tobacco's Hit Parade said, "The score on filter cigar-
ettes has changed. Now Hit Parade has America's best filter." Liggett
& Meyers touted its L&M brand with an "improved filter" story. Brown
& Williamson said, "Viceroy gives you more of what you change to a fil-
ter for." Parliament, made by Philip Morris, ran advertising claiming

its "recessed filter is best."2

As the weeks passed the confusion deepened. Not only were most
of the major filter brands claiming essentially the same things, but
Specific claims changed almost daily. Fencing for some competitive
edge, American changed the overline in Hit Parade ads from "The score
on filter cigarettes has changed," to "Latest method of testing -- the
most accurate and uniform ever developed -- proves it!" Trying to keep

in Step, Lorillard changed Kent's claim to, "Today, as before, you get

 

1"Filter fury," Newsweek, June 23, 1958, p. 85.

21bid.

91

less tar and nicotine in Kent than in any other leading filter cigar-
ette in America." Then, Hit Parade ads were changed again. Now the
story was "400,000 filter traps" and "filters best of all leading cig-

arettes."1 Printer's Ink said:

 

"The filter-tip derby is reaching its highest Speeds

ever, but also rounding more dangerous corners than

ever before. The question is ~- who's going to get

hurt: the racers, the public in the stands, or the

umpires -- those 'outstanding independent consulting

laboratories.'"2
The cigarette makers obviously thought it would not be them. The United
States Tobacco Company, makers of King Sano which had shown up best in
nicotine content in the most recent Digest report, entered the race
with a "least nicotine" claim.3 At the same time, Lorillard Opened up
with a new campaign for Old Gold straights, another brand high on the
Digest list of low tar and nicotine cigarettes. In 150 newspapers and
83 radio and television markets this regular cigarette was proclaimed

as "An all tobacco cigarette dramatically reduced in tar and nicotine."4

Advertising Age said Specifically that this advertising was "...geared

 

to take advantage of the article in the July issue of Reader's Digest

 

which reported that Old Gold straights, Kent, Sano and King Sano are

 

1"Filters keep on fencing for some competitive edge," Printer's
Ink, June 27, 1958, p. 10.

2"Umpiring the cigarettes' ad claims," Printer's Ink, July 4,
1958, p. 56.

 

3"New filter-a-day policy keeps the doldrums away in cigarette
ads," Printer's Ink, July 11, 1958, p. 12.

 

4"Old Gold readies ad drive based on new Digest report,”
Advertising Age, July 7, 1958, p. 2.

 

92

the safest smokes available."1 From American, came a whole new idea
in filter cigarettes. On Herbert Tareyton, the company offered "some-
thing novel called a dual-filter."2 And Hit Parade advertising once
again got a revamping. Now the claim was, "Only one cigarette can
filter best." A Philip Morris brand, Marlboro, too, was revamped with

3

a "new improved filter."

In July, while this filter flurry was going on, things began to
happen which should have had some effect on the race. According to
trade sources, it was rumored that the U.S. Public Health Service
might use its latest lung cancer study as a Springboard for an inten-
sive educational campaign against cigarettes. When pressed, a Spokes-
man for the service said discussion of smoking problems is a matter
for state or local health departments.4 And so, the rumor went up in
smoke. Nevertheless, it was an indication of growing unrest among

anti-smoking groups.

Later in the month, the "Tar Derby" and its predicted end came
up as a subject of discussion before an agency of the Government. The
FTC's call for conferences with tobaccomen to establish uniform methods
of testing cigarette smoke had been unproductive. Now the commission's

effectiveness in regulating advertising of cigarettes, weight reducers

 

11bid.

2"New filter~a~day policy keeps the doldrums away in cigarette
ads," Printer's Ink, July 11, 1958, p. 12.

31bid.

4"Anti-Smoking Drive up to states, says U.S. Health Service,"
Advertising Age, July 14, 1958, p. 38.

93

and dentifrices was being investigated by a House subcommittee. At
those hearings, an FTC official said its advertising code for cigar-
ettes operated effectively for two years but "...a major breakdown
occurred after Lorillard launched a campaign...claiming Kent has less
tar and nicotine than other brands.”1 Commissioner Gwynne of the FTC
said the breakdown occurred because there were no standards for enforc-
ing the provision which outlawed less tar and nicotine claims without
competent scientific proof. Gwynne also stated that there was hOpe
that the FTC would soon have a standard test to make it possible to
move against misleading brands. However, his personal opinion was that
Congress should pass a law requiring tobacco companies to print tar and

nicotine content on packages.2

Both the Health Service rumor and the House subcommittee inves-
tigations should have slowed down the "Derby." For, both events gave
clear hints of future expectations. But, on the contrary, instead of
slackening, the pace picked up. On the very day when FTC commissioner
Gwynne's remarks were being reported, AdvertisinggAgg also commented
that:

"P. Lorillard Co., setting a furious pace in the

tobacco world, this week announced still another
new develOpment -- a Spin filter for Old Gold."3

 

1"Standard test may end Tar Derby," Advertising Age, July 21,
1958, p. 1.

21bid.

3"Print ads herald bow of Old Gold's new Spin filter," Adver-
tising Age, July 21, 1958, p. 2.

94

The ads for the new Old Gold filter proclaimed, "You get less tars and
nicotine than before -— yet the true tobacco taste comes through, cool
and mild."1 In the same magazine there was an article covering the
introduction of American's king size dual-filter Tareyton. It would
be introduced with ads reading, "No leading filter king made by any
other company delivers less smoke solids."2 In addition to these new
developments, the claims for Kent, Viceroy, Hit Parade, Parliament,

L&M, Marlboro and King Sano continued.

Again, in August, events occurred which logically should have
lead to changes in the tobacco industry's approach to advertising. In
Harper's magazine, John Blatnik, chairman of the House Operations Sub-
committee which investigated cigarette advertising, wrote a scathing
condemnation of the industry. "Much of the current cigarette adver-
tising," he said, "is misleading the public into thinking that it is

getting a protection which really isn't there.”3

Getting more Speci-
fic, he said:
"In June 1958, six different cigarettes simultaneously
were being advertised as having the lowest tar content
of any on the market. This must be stopped."
To do just that, Blatnik said he would introduce a series of bills in

Congress. One bill would include tobacco under the injunctive powers

of the FTC. Another would regulate the use of the word "filter";

 

11bid.

2"Biggest ad push for Tareytons will introduce new king size
dual-filter,” Advertising Age, July 21, 1958, p. 8.

3"Making cigarette ads tell the truth," Harper's, August, 1958,
p. 45.

4Ibid., p. 49.

95

prohibiting it unless the tar and nicotine in a cigarette were reduced
to 11 milligrams. Still another bill would call for labeling and ad-
vertising to state tar and nicotine content. In addition, he cited

"a great deal of cigarette advertising" as being ”slanted at young
peOple" and said he would recommend that a program to educate school
children on the cigarette health problem be conducted by the U.S.
Public Health Service. Ana finally, in no uncertain terms, Blatnik
warned the tobacco companies that if they didn't set up their own

standards the U.S. Bureau of Standards or the FTC soon would.1

The manufacturers had reacted with silence to the July hints

that they were heading toward regulation. Individually, their reac~
tion was the same to this Blatnik article. However, the newly estab-
lished public relations organ of the industry, the Tobacco Institute,
was quick to answer. James P. Richards, president and executive direc-
tor of the Institute, said the Blatnik proposals were ”based on assump-
tions that are not supported by the facts, even as they were presented
last summer before Mr. Blatnik's own committee.” Demeaning the bill
proposals, as well as Blatnik personally, Richards said:

"Apparently he (Blatnik) is willing to present legis-

lation on the basis of statistical reports that are

admittedly not backed up by clinical and laboratory
research."2

 

11bid., p. 49.

2"Tobacco Institute raps Blatnik plan,” Advertising Age, August
4, 1958, p. 3.

 

96

The tobaccomen's answer to the Harper's article left little hope that
there would be any immediate change in the "Derby." But the simple
fact that an answer had been made indicates that Mr. Blatnik's charges
and proposals had struck their mark. The cigarette makers were begin-
ning to feel the pinch of the antagonism created by their own health-

oriented advertising.

Coinciding with the Blatnik attack in Harper's magazine, another
event occurred which drew even more heated comment from the industry.
To the surprise of almost everyone, Patrick O'Neill-Dunne, world tech-
nical director of Rothman's Ltd. (a British cigarette maker) conceded
a link between smoking and cancer. "It is now felt," he said, "that a
link between smoking and lung cancer has been proven beyond all reason-
able doubt."1 The reaction in the United States was immediate. One
U.S. tobacco company Spokesman said the O'Neill-Dunne statement "was
an obvious and ugly piece of sales promotion."2 This time the official
spokesman for the industry was the Tobacco Industry Research Committee.
Timothy V. Harnett, chairman of the TIRC, in an attempt to disassociate
the American industry from the Rothman statement, said:

"The position of this country's cigarette industry
is unchanged because the facts have not changed.
Scientific evidence simply does not support the

theory that there is anything in cigarette smoke
known to cause human lung cancer."3

 

1"British Cigarette Maker Concedes Link of Smoking, Cancer,"
Adyertising Age, August 4, 1954, p. 74.

21bid.

3"No smoking-cancer link TIRC head replies to Briton," Adver-
tising Age, August 4, 1958, p. 73.

97

Now the world wide industry's united front had broken down. Cigarette
makers were in a fight among themselves over the smoking/cancer contro-
versy. In October, the American tobacco companies' united front began
to wither. In that month a new tobacco company, North American.Cigar-
ette Manufacturers, sought to "gain an edge on big brands by discussing

the health controversy boldly."l

In advertising for its new Diplomat
cigarettes, the company said, ”Authorities agree there is a health
question relating to smoking...if you must smoke cigarettes...here's a
frank message of importance from a cigarette manufacturer."2 The cepy
in these ads bypassed the familiar emphasis on tar and nicotine con-
tent. Instead, an "exclusive process" was cited. This process suppos—
edly minimized "the toxic effects of nicotine and tar without effecting
the cigarette taste most peOple desire." In large type across the
prominently displayed package, Diplomat was proclaimed as "The safer

cigarette."3

However, the Diplomat advertising ran into trouble even before
it was exposed. The ads were scheduled to break in the New York Times'
October 2nd edition. But they were held up by the newspaper. The
Iimg§_questioned a section of the c0py dealing with the findings of a
medical report and refused to run the ads until it was changed. So
North American representatives met with the newspaper to try to find

an alternative. Meanwhile, more serious trouble developed. At their

 

1 0
"Is public ready for frank approach to health and smok1ng?",

Printer's Ink, October 3, 1958, p. 13.
21bid.

31bid.

98

annual meeting, the National Association of Tobacco Distributors issued
a resolution which stated in part:

"...the scheme of introducing a new brand of cigarettes

or other tobacco product as a panacea rather than a

pleasure, by launching a marketing drive founded upon

Spurious health claims, is hereby condemned as mis-

leading to the public, prejudiced to the economic wel-

fare of the industry and repugnant to the accepted 1

moral and ethical standards of American competition."
In regards to this resolution at least one trade source said, "...there
can be little doubt that much of it was prompted by the impending

appearance of Diplomat,"2

Dr. Eugene O. Kronisch, general manager of the North American
company made a strong retort to the resolution, calling the NATD stand
a head-in-the-sand attitude. "We do not," he said, "accept or reject
the conclusions published to date on health and smoking. We do not
believe, however, that the public interest is served by acting and
talking as if they did not exist."3 It was a good try on the part of
Dr. Kronisch, but next to useless. With the issuance of the NATD reso-
lution, Diplomat, for all practical purposes, was a dead brand. Approv-
al was eventually secured from the New York Times. This was done by
changing a section of the c0py from:

"The medical report states that Diplomat cigarettes

do not cause the same medically undesirable effects
caused by the smoking of other cigarettes tested."

 

1"Diplomat ads await Times' perusal," Printer's Ink, October 17,
1958, p. 10.

21bid.

3"Diplomat ads edge into print," Printer's Ink, October 31, 1958,
p. 14.

 

99

to:

"The medical report states that Diplomat cigarettes do

not cause medically undesirable effects of nicotine

and tars.”1
In the early part of November the Diplomat ads did make it into print.
And later in November, Robert Marks of Robert M. Marks, the agency for

Diplomat, stirred the issue with a Speech before the Association of

Advertising Men and Women in New York. He said:

"We think the cigarette industry should take a lesson
from the liquor industry -- deal honestly with the

public, control the product, properly label the

product, and don't deny that it can have harmful

effects."2
But the hard fact was that North American and its agency had failed to
learn a lesson. They had crossed over the line that American tobacco-
men had unofficially drawn for their advertising claims. They had, in
the eyes of other cigarette manufacturers, endangered the industry.
And consequently, they received the full measure of the industry's
enmity, including the powerful tobacco distributors who held deep in-

fluence over sales. Diplomat ads continued to appear Sporadically

until September of 1959 and then the brand disappeared completely.

The Diplomat affair can be considered another link in the chain

of events leading to the Cigarette Advertising Code for two reasons.

 

1"Diplomat ads edge into print," Printer's Ink, October 31, 1958,
p. 14.

 

2"Marks more frank on Diplomat ads," Printer's Ink, November 21,
1958, p. 13.

100

First, it caused a momentary Split in the ranks of cigarette manufac-
turers. Up until then, every cigarette company had professed complete
disbelief in any relationship between smoking and health. Such a split,
no matter how short lived, must have weakened the tobaccomen's position
and encouraged the anti-tobacco forces. Secondly, and more important-
ly, in trying to subdue Diplomat the NATD had actually condemned not
only Diplomat, but almost all cigarette advertising then currently
being used. This could not help but make the entire industry more vul-

nerable to future attacks.

What is strange today is that this obviously never occurred to
the association. In fact, toward the end of 1958, the NATD managing
director, Joseph Kolodny, contradicted the association's earlier reso-
lution by heaping lavish praise on the industry, its products and its
advertising. In his year-end appraisal statement, Kolodny said:

"Confronted by its gravest challenge, and assailed

by unconscionable villification of its products
(grossly unsubstantiated), the industry's reaction

has been truly remarkable. The cigarette industry

has introduced and vigorously promoted new packaging,
new sizes, new filters and new blends...the flexi-
bility and resiliency of the industry is barely short
of miraculous."1

Part of what Mr. Kolodny said was provable fact. The industry had

introduced and promoted a striking number of new product variations.

There were now over forty brands on the market, most of them being

 

1"Puff for cigarette," Printer's Ink, December 26, 1958, p.
21.

 

101

promoted vigorously with health-oriented advertising. The industry had
proved itself resilient, too. Cigarette sales in 1958 had made the

"biggest peace-time advance in twenty years."1

However, it is hard to conceive the cigarette manufacturers' reac-
tions in 1958 as "truly remarkable." During the year the industry had
deepened the contradictions into which it had placed itself, almost
asking for attack. More than one manufacturer had openly stated that
there was a connection between smoking and health. The industry's
official position was exactly the opposite. Individual advertising cam-
paigns walked the fence, somewhere in between these two views. And
those individual campaigns, along with the ones which stated a connec-
tion, were condemned by one of the strongest elements within the indus-
try. In addition, when sales estimator Harry M. Wootten made his pre-
dictions in December, he added yet another contradiction. According to
Wootten, the filter cigarette gain for the year was 35.8 billion units.
This meant filter cigarette sales were up 21.9% over 1957 and now con-
trolled 45.9% of the total domestic market. Regular size nonfilter
brands were down 8.5% or 13.6 billion units. King size regulars had
shown a small gain of about 3.3 per cent.2 In the face of this infor-
mation and all of the other events of 1958, Mr. Wootten declared that

the "so-called health scare appears to be reduced to ineffectiveness."3

 

1"Cigarette sales 1958," Printer's Ink, December 26, 1958, p.
21.

21bid., p. 23.

31bid., p. 26.

102

This, however, would hardly seem to be the case. For, how else, but
through a continuing scare could filter cigarette sales increase so
sharply? If the scare was now inOperative, why had health-oriented
advertising been such an effective tool in increasing individual brand
shares during the year? The only "truly remarkable" thing about 1958
was the fact that so few peOple within the industry saw where the road

they were taking would end.

1959 might be considered "remarkable" for the same reason. The
runners in the "Tar Derby" continued to race headlong toward regula-
tion, even though there were more and more road signs pointing in that
direction. In February, like clockwork, Reader's Digest lashed out
again at the industry. This new article quoted Dr. Alton Ochsner as
saying:

"...without exception, every heavy smoker is certain
to get lung cancer, unless heart disease or some-
thing else kills him first."1

Then, in painful, gory detail, the magazine described a lung cancer

Operation.

The results were predictable. On the Monday following the arti-
cle's release tobacco stocks fell sharply. R. J. Reynolds dr0pped
three points. American Tobacco, Philip Morris, and P. Lorillard each

were off two or more points.2 Tobaccomen, in the now expected fashion,

 

1"Reader's Digest Links Cancer smoking in dramatic and arresting
report," Printer's Ink, February 13, 1959, p. 9.

2"Tobaccomen retort to cancer smoking report," Printer's Ink,
February 20, 1959, p. 11.

103

answered the Digest report. James P. Richards, president of the
Tobacco Institute, attacked the magazine for having failed to include
a disclaimer carried with the original article in Today's Health which
pointed out that:

"The House of Delegates of the AMA has taken no defin-

itive action on the possible connection between can-

cer and smoking. There is still considerable differ-

ence of Opinion among medical authorities on this

controversial subject.”
Some tobaccomen toOk the normal reaction a Step further by trying to
stop the advertising of the Digest article. TranSportation DiSplayS
Incorporated, the firm handling this advertising in New York commuter
systems reported that they were asked by cigarette manufacturers to
remove posters promoting "The Growing Horror of Lung Cancer" in the
Digest. Meanwhile, New York Subway Advertising Company began posting
cards in the New York commuter systems carrying the disclaimer the

Digest had left out of its artic1e.2

A number of other "road Sign" events occurred in 1959 which
received less overt attention from the industry. There was another
rwunor that the U.S. Public Health Service was planning an anti-cigarette
educational campaign. The American Cancer Society actually did begin
an anti-cigarette campaign in selected high schools. In an extreme
move, the North Dakota legislature nearly passed a bill that would re-

quire the Skull and cross bones on each package of cigarettes sold in

 

1Ibid.

2"Are cigarette advertisers edgy again over the health issue,‘I
Printer's Ink, March 20, 1959, p. 12.

104

the state.1 During the year U.S. Surgeon General Burney pointed to

cigarettes as "the principal cause" of the rise in lung cancer.2

There were articles, too, which acted as Sign posts, giving the
direction in which the tobacco industry was racing. A Nation article,
for example, came down hard on the youth issue as it related to health.
"Can anything be done until it (the cancer problem) is solved?" the
magazine asked. ”Well, we can at least keep carcinogens away from
peOple; and the primary one here is cigarette smoke," was the answer.3
Continuing, the article said:

"...the tobacco*industry is proud to report an increase in
youthful smokers, so that total U.S. consumption of
cigarettes is up 20 per cent in 5 years, though many
adults have quit smoking. In view of what has been given
here, this tactless brag is equivalent to announcing a
war that will kill off more American men than World War
II did, and on the average more painfully."4

Finally, after describing in detail the kind of advertising cigarette
companies were doing in college neWSpapers, the article said:

"In a matter that concerns the preservation of the race,
such a narrowly aimed advertising campaign, for all its
genial jokes and exclamation points, can easily be re-
garded as a frivolously treasonable conSpiracy."

Late in the year, the remarks of an individual deeply involved in

cigarette advertising pointed directly to what was in the offing for

 

1"Reader's Digest Links cancer smoking in a dramatic and arrest-
ing report," Printer's Ink, February 13, 1959, p. 9.

2"Smoking: Dr. Burney's Alarm," Newsweek, December 7, 1959,
p. 66.

3"Cigarettes, cancer and the campus," Nation, August 15, 1959,
p. 69.

41b1d., p. 70.
51bid., p. 71.

105

tobaccomen and their advertising. Ted Bates Company, the advertising
agency for Life cigarettes, had been cited in a suit by the FTC, along
with the Life manufacturer Brown & Williamson. Rosser Reeves, presi-
dent Of the agency, defended the Life ads as being "truthful" and "not
misleading." But, in answer to questions from the Federal Trade Com-
mission he also stated that he did not believe self rule would work in
the advertising business. It was Mr. Reeves Opinion that "Some com-
panies always will need government supervision."1 Although it was not
Specifically noted, the implication that this included tobacco com-

panies was certainly there.

So, these were the Sign posts in 1959. They were plentiful and
clearly marked. Yet, the industry failed to see them. Throughout the
year cigarette advertising continued in its health claim trend. For
the most part, the only brands that were not advertised in terms of
tar and nicotine were those which were high in these elements and,
thus, could not be presented favorably. Winston, near the tOp of the
list in tar and nicotine content, pushed its "filter-blend." Salem,
another brand at the tOp end of the list, promoted "high porosity paper."2
Many Of the regular cigarettes steered clear of health, too. But, the
others raced harder and harder with ever more confusing and damaging
health claims. For example, Duke cigarettes, made by Liggett & Meyers,

were advertised as, "lowest in tars of all leading low tar cigarettes."

 

1"Build up FTC; self rule won't work; defends Life ads," Adver-
tisinggAgg, December 21, 1959, p. l.

ZuAd Strategies behind the '59 sales high," Printer's Ink,
December 25, 1959, p. 25.

106

Ads for Parliament said that it was, "at the lowest level of tars and
nicotine among all leading cigarettes." Kent claims Stated that Kent,
"has reduced tars and nicotine to the lowest level among all leading
brands." And the P. Lorillard produced Spring cigarettes, a new entry
in the menthol field, was advertised as "lowest in tars, lowest in

nicotine, lightest in menthol of all menthol cigarettes."1

The sales results of this kind of advertising must have convinced
the cigarette manufacturers they were doing the right thing. During
the year, filter cigarettes leaped ahead to garner 50% of the market.
And while regulars were down to 30% and king size brands remained at
20%, total cigarette sales were pushed to a new high, 4.5% above the

1958 record.2

Earlier in the year a Reader's Digest article had shown that there
were now at least a dozen low-tar, low-nicotine brands from which smokers
could ChOOSE- This led trade sources to believe that new claims would
be needed to give a competitive edge. They suggested grade of tobacco,
flavor over filtration, and the observable qualities of cigarettes such
as shape, filter, and length as possibilities.3 However, the manufac-
turers had thus far proven the trade sources wrong. In his annual re-

port, Harry Wootten predicted that they would continue to be wrong.

 

1"Ad Strategies behind the '59 sales high," Printer's Ink,
December 25, 1959, p. 26.

21bid.

3"Why new smoke scare will alter ads, sales," Printer's Ink,
October 16, 1959, p. 85.

107

Regarding the eXpectations for the coming year he said:
"In 1960 cigarette advertising will continue under
the ultra-competitive head of steam it picked up
in 1959. Health will remain a big advertising
issue."
Only as an after thought did he make the most relevant Statement of
the year:
"...but the FTC may have more to say on just how
competitive it becomes."2
The FTC soon would have something to say. Whether the tobacco
industry knew it or not, the ”Tar Derby" was fast coming to the finish
wire. With the end of 1959 came the end of a two year era in cigarette

advertising and the final closing of one of the largest links in a long

chain of events.

 

1"Ad Strategies behind the '59 sales high," Printer's Ink,
December 25, 1959, p. 26.

21bid.

CHAPTER VIII

RETURN TO FLAVOR -- CALM BEFORE THE STORM

Early in 1960 events in the "Tobacco War" came full circle once
again. The highly competitive claims in cigarette advertising which
were insPired by the Great Smoking Scare of 1953 had been stopped after
two years by actions of the Federal Trade Commission. Now, after a
similar period of time, the same Government agency moved to Stop the

Tar Derby.

In December of 1959 the FTC sent letters to each of the major
tobacco manufacturers asking them to voluntarily agree to 1) end tar
and nicotine advertising claims, 2) end comparative claims about fil-
ter effectiveness, and 3) end, in effect, all health claims, even im-
plied ones.1 The FTC said the then current claims violated provisions
Of the commission's tobacco advertising guides which held that tar and
nicotine claims should not be used unless they could be proven and un-
less the differences claimed were significant. The stated purpose of
the letters was to persuade the tobacco firms to "...muffle the com-

petitive din of high filtration claims rather than invite FTC complaints

 

1"New FTC cigarette ad policy seen as one of containment on
health basis," Advertising Age, February 15, 1960, p. l.

108

109

later on."1

This move on the part of the Federal Trade Commission was similar
to the one preceding the manufacturer's trend to flavor claims Of 1955.
It also produced similar reactions in that the tobaccomen headed the
FTC's unsought advice. Cigarette advertising claims moved swiftly away
from tar and nicotine and began to emphasize flavor. However, in

another reSpect, the reactions were quite different.

In 1955, the cigarette manufacturers, although changing to flavor
claims, had refused to acknowledge the commission's part in this change.
Few of them made any comments whatsoever on the FTC'S 1955 cigarette
advertising guides. Therefore, the 1955 move appeared to be strictly
of the manufacturers' own accord. And, since the cigarette makers had
made no Official agreement, they were free to begin using "health"

claims again if they saw fit.

Conversely, this Similar 1960 change in advertising was publicly
and Officially acknowledged as being directly related to FTC actions.
By February of 1960 all but one of the major manufacturers had signed

an affidavit filed with the Federal Trade Commission which stated that:

 

1"Will FTC tone down ad claims of filter cigarettes?", Printer's
Ink, February 15, 1960, p. 13.

110

"The undersigned states on behalf of
company its intention to omit from cigarette adver-
tising references direct or implied to health benefits
to be derived from the use of cigarettes to be pro-
duced by it. It is understood this statement includes
references to tar and nicotine."

 

Thus, the Tar Derby reached its inevitable climax. From the beginning
it had been clear where the race would end: a forced return.to flavor
claims. The only real question had been how. Now that, too, was clear.
The FTC had accomplished what the diSparaging remarks and implied
threats of regulation during 1957, 1958, and 1959 had failed to do.

And in the process, something else of vital importance had occurred.

For the first time, the cigarette manufacturers were tied to regula-

tion in their advertising.

There were many suggestions as to why this new agreement took
place. Some sources Said the manufacturers bowed to the FTC rather
than risk bad publicity as a result of charges which might be made by
the commission. This, however, seems unlikely. As pointed out in
previous chapters, the industry had for some time been receiving sub-
stantial unfavorable press without being deterred in the least.
Business Week said the switch to flavor revealed, "...a new and power-
ful pressure that the Federal Trade Commission is exerting on all ad-
vertising practices."2 AS far as Business Week editors were concerned

the commission received COOperation mainly because tobaccomen knew the

 

1"FTC, Congress may alter cigarette ad rules," Advertising Age,
January 13, 1964, p. 1.

2"Soft pedal on filter claims," Business Week, February 13,
1960, p. 29.

lll

FTC "meant to file formal cases if filter claims were not dropped."1
But, again, this can hardly be the real answer. For, the tobacco in-
dustry had thirty years of successful eXperience in combating FTC for-
mal litigation. And there was little reason for them to believe they
could not continue to do so. Within the Federal Trade Commission it-
self, the impending shift away from tar and nicotine claims was hailed
as a "landmark example of industry cooPeration in solving a pressing
problem."2 But this answer, too, seems wide of the mark. For the
commission's December, 1959 letter to cigarette makers was little less
than an outright threat. It gave tobaccomen only two alternatives:
adherence to the agreement, or commencement of legal action by the
FTC. In addition, it must be remembered that the need for an agree-
ment came about only because the manufacturers failed to stay within
the 1955 cigarette advertising guides. Therefore, the FTC/tobacco
industry agreement might better be called a landmark example of the

results of unCOOperativeness.

What, then, is the answer? Why did the cigarette makers and the
Federal Trade Commission come to an agreement to end the Tar Derby?
Advertising Age editors probably came closest when they called the
agreement "...an accommodation of both sides to the curious legal and

technical deadlock over the dangers involved in cigarette smoking."3

 

1Ibid.

2"01garette makers drop nicotine, tar ad claims," Advertising
figs, February 8, 1960, p. 1.

3"New FTC cigarette ad policy seen as one of containment on
health basis," Advertising Age, February 15, 1960, p. 1.

112

Concerning that deadlock, the magazine said:
"At this stage, the government is neither able nor
prepared to treat cigarettes as a dangerous com-
modity. On the other hand it is sufficiently
aroused about the health problem so that it is
determined to make things rough for the tobacco
industry if cigarettes contipue to make what it
regards as 'health' claims."
And more Specifically about the new agreement:
"While the government isn't prepared to move against
the sale or use Of cigarettes, the FTC's power in
the advertising field could be used to contain the
industry and at least foreclose the use of sales
appeals which suggest that cigarettes can be used
safely."
Thksanswer is incomplete, however. It only gives one side of the
story; why the agreement was sought by the Government. To get a clear
picture, the cigarette manufacturers' side of the Story must also be
told. Why did they consent to the agreement the Government sought?
In this author's Opinion, it was as Advertising Age said, a case of
accommodation. However, this accommodation was not to the present
situation, but to a now clearly possible future situation. It was an
accommodation, not to the FTC, but to others such as Congress, the Food
and Drug Administration, and the the Federal Conmunications Commission,
who might soon take action against cigarettes. For, in the recent past,
while cigarette advertising was being investigated, the FTC's ability

to control that advertising was also under study. There were sugges-

tions in the air for regulation by other agencies of the Government.

 

1"New FTC cigarette ad policy seen as one of containment on
health basis," Advertising Agg, February 15, 1960, p. 1.

21bid.

113

And should the FTC prove unable to cope with cigarette advertising,

these suggestions might well be taken to heart. The tobacco industry
could not easily afford new litigation from the FTC and the accompany-
ing bad publicity. But, even more so, it could not afford regulation

from an unfamiliar and quite possibly harsher source.

So, the manufacturers signed the affidavit and, as they had done
in 1955, turned to flavor as their main selling theme. Kent, the
first cigarette in the Tar Derby, switched its claim to "The cigarette
that satisfies your appetite for a real smoke."1 That change was typi-
cal of the kind of advertising remodeling that was done in 1960 and
continued through 1961.. During those years L&M advertising said,
"Expect more, get more from.L&M. More body in the blend. More flavor
in the smoke. More taste through the filter." Oasis advertising asked
the question, "How can it smoke so cool...taste so rich!" and answered
it with, "The basis for Oasis is tobacco -- the forgotten flavor in
other menthol cigarettes." Salem ads said, "Salem refreshes your
taste, air-softens every puff." Winston continued with "Winston tastes
good like a cigarette should," and added "It's what's up front that
counts..." Chesterfield switched to, "21 great tobaccos make 20 won-

derful smokes."

Camel ads asked smokers to, "Have a real cigarette--
Camel. The best tobacco makes the best smOke!" Lucky cigarettes turned

to, "Remember how great cigarettes used to taste? Luckies Still do."2

 

1"Cigarette makers drop nicotine, tar ad claims," Agyertising_égg,
February 8, 1960, P- 1-

2"It'll be flavor, taste again in '62," Printer'sfiInk, December
22, 1961, p. 37.

114

The move to flavor was an across the boards move, including filters,
both plain and menthol, regular non-filters and king size non-filters.
Of course, there was some straying from the flavor path. For example,
late in 1960, Kent advertising featured the claim that, "More scientists
and educators smoke Kent than any other brand.” In 1961, advertising
for the same cigarette told smokers, "You'll feel better about smoking
with the taste Of Kent." Both of these claims teetered on the health
issue. SO did a 1961 King Sano claim which touted that brand as "...

1

America's purest tobacco taste." However, the trend was definitely

to flavor.

The results of this trend were in many ways like those following
the 1955 switch to flavor. As health claims disappeared from cigar-
ette advertising, the din of criticism began to ebb. This was true
not only Of the criticism directed toward cigarette advertiSing, but
also Of criticism pointed at smoking in general. As might be expected,
with cigarette advertising's millions of dollars subtracted from the
smOking/health issue, that issue received less weight in the news. Of
course, this ebb in criticism cannot be attributed solely to the fact
that manufacturers had ceased to use health claims. Other events
occurred during 1960 and 1961 which overshadowed references to smOking
and health in the news media. 1960 was the year of one of this nation's
most heated presidential elections. 1961 was the beginning of a new

president's term.in Office and consequently covered heavily in news

 

lflIt'll be flavor, taste again in '62," Printer's Ink, December
22, 1961, p. 40.

115

magazines, magazines, newsPapers and television. 1961 was also the

year of the Bay of Pigs incident, which for a time dominated the news.

In addition, at least one other factor helped to decrease the
importance given to the smoking/health issue. There seemed to be a
growing fight among scientists over whether smoking or air pollution
was the greater cause of cancer. In January of 1960 this fight flared
up as authorities from both schools of thought met in San Francisco
under the auspices of the University of California. The Tobacco Indus-
try Research Committee, quite naturally, supported the fight, putting
up approximately $28,000 Of the researchers' eXpenses in attending
the meeting. At the conclusion of that meeting the two sides had come
to only one major agreement, an agreement favorable to the tobacco
industry and tending to lend less credence to the smOking/health issue.
As Doctor David F. Eascott, a New Zealand general practitioner, said:

"The incidence Of lung cancer is complexly determined
and cannot be related solely or principally to a
single factor. Tobacco smoking plays a part. Atmos-
pheric pollution plays a part."

These events then, the trend toward flavor in cigarette adver-
tising, the develOpment of other and more newsworthy occurrences, and
scientists' confusion over smoking's causational relationship to can-
cer gave the smOking/health arena an appearance of calm. During that
apparent calm, security analysts took another close look at tobacco

group stocks. As a result, the cigarette industry began receiving

 

1"Smoking and Cancer," Time, January 25, 1960, p. 64.

116

increasing recognition from the financial community for its growth
potential.1 There was good reason, too. For the present was bright
and the future looked even rosier. In 1960 cigarette sales rose, with
filters Sparking the way. And in its "1962 Outlook" issue of the
Department of Agriculture said, in part:
"In 1961, for the fifth consecutive year, cigarette

consumption will reach a new high and a further

significant gain is expected in 1962."2
In his 1961 year-end report, tobacco eXpert Harry Wootten estimated
that filter cigarette sales had increased 7.0 per cent over the previous
year and now commanded 53.9 per cent of the total domestic market.
Straight king-size cigarettes were up 6.9 per cent, increasing their
total Share to 19.8 per cent. Only straight regular cigarettes were
Off, with their market share declining from 28.3 to 26.3 per cent.3
With the Wootten Report Showing another all-time high in cigarette
sales, one source felt that it was apparent that the tobacco industry
was, "coping successfully with recurrent charges that cigarettes may
be harmful to health."4 And as far as the future was concerned, it was

felt that, "...the industry's public relations arms will probably hold

the health issue in check."5

 

1"Cigarette sales up 4.2% in '61," Printer's Ink, December 22,
1961, p. 24.

21bid., p. 26.
31bid., p. 29.

4"How smoking counters its critics," Printer's Ink, December 22,
1961, p. 52.

51b1d., p. 53.

117

However, deSpite these impressive sales gains and glowing pre-
dictions, all was not well. The patches of blue sky now hovering over
the cigarette makers were only the calm before a gathering storm. At
their annual meeting, one member of the National Association of Tobacco
Distributors saw the picture clearly when he said:

"The economic health of the industry is being

jeopardized by an unrelenting negative force --

a force for which it cannot compensate.”
Although anti-tobacco actions were not full in the news, they contin-
ued. In October of 1960, for example, the industry again came danger-
ously close to being held legalbrreSponsible for a cancer death. In
Louisiana, Mrs. Victoria St. Pierre Lottique brought suit against
Liggett & Meyers and R. J. Reynolds in the lung cancer death of her
husband, a two to five pack a day smoker. The Louisiana woman lost
her suit when the jury Stated that proof of smoking's relationship to
cancer had not been established. But the case did provide a close
brush with legal disaster for the industry.2 A verdict unfavorable to
cigarette makers could bring a tumult of additional suits and restric-

tive actions.

In turning to flavor, tobaccomen may have eased talk about so-
called health claims, but this Switch did not deter those who were

critical of advertising's appeal to youth. In fact, the trend to

 

1"6O cigarette sales set U.S. record," Advertising Age,
December 11, 1961, p. 68.

2"Layman's verdict," Time, October 24, 1960, p. 94.

118

flavor actually served to emphasize the youth question. Since Senator
Richard Neuberger's introduction of this issue, the forces behind it

had been steadily growing in numbers and strength. However, the tur-
moil over the question of smoking and health had kept this issue largely
submerged. Now, with health claims fading into the background, the

youth question began to rise to the surface.

The anti-tobacco groups and individuals who were already con-
cerned about the youth issue saw the FTC bring the Tar Derby and health
claims to an end. But, well-known personalities were still being used.
in cigarette advertising. Cigarettes were still being played up as
Status items and advertised heavily on college campuses. These were
the advertising tactics that they deplored, and they were determined
to do something about them, too. In addition, the groups and indivi-
duals who had been putting most of their time against Stopping health
claims, were now free to turn their attention toward youth. And final-
ly, in the overall picture, it was becoming increasingly apparent that
the drive to Stop the cigarette habit among smokers was doomed to
failure. Therefore, mmre and more anti-tobacco forces began to turn

to the best alternative: stOp the habit before it began.

In the early months of 1960, in the middle of the cigarette
makers' change to flavor themes, the American Cancer Society began a
campaign to dissuade teenagers from beginning to smoke. During the
first eight months of that campaign the ACS distributed over 10,000

anti-tobacco film Strips and millions of brochures. The New York Times

119

said the society's move was "clearly designed to Offset efforts of
cigarette makers to sell their products to young persons."1 The ACS
investment Of $113,000 was infinitesimally small compared to the indus-
try's promotional expenditures. However, compared to the monies avail-
able to these two foes, it Showed that this was a serious and deter-
mined effort on the part of the society. Later in 1960, the ACS provided
proof of the tenacity Of its effort. American Cancer Society represen-
tatives polled 587 doctors around the country and published the finding
that two out of three felt that cigarette smoking was a major cause of
lung cancer. Then, in November, the society declared that, "The college
market is of great importance in the manufacturers' calculations," and
publicly attacked cigarette makers for their use of Specialized college

campaigns and promotional contests.2

Throughout 1961 the youth issue continued to slowly build steam.
As that year ended the hard core anti-tobacco forces concerned pri-
marily with youth were still carrying the major thrust. But new recruits
were continually coming to the cause. In December, 1961, a panel of
four doctors -- including cancer Specialist.Dr. Michael B. Shimkin from
the National Health Institute -- told the District of Columbia Medical
Society that tobacco was "such a dangerous environmental toxin that it

should be controlled at least as strictly as alcohol."3 All four

 

1"Catch 'em on the campus," The Nation, November 5, 1960,
P. 339.

21bid.

3"Doctors urge ad control to curtail smoking by teens," Adver-
tising Age, December 4, 1961, p. 89.

120

doctors agreed that the tobacco industry and the Government were fail-
ing to come to grips with the problem. They argued that the least the
Government and the industry should be doing was to make tobacco less
accessible to young people and eliminate advertising campaigns which
were directed at teenagers. Doctor Shimkin called the appeals used by
cigarette advertisers "shameful" and said:

"Cigarette advertising equates smOking cigarettes with

bravery, sexual virility and social status...it is

little wonder that so many youngsters smoke.”1

Summing up, he epitomized the feelings of a growing number Of tobacco's
foes, feelings that would soon change the relatively calm complexion
of the Tobacco War:

"We must change this picture. We have an obligation

to our children."2
The end of the Tar Derby can be considered a link in the chain Of

events leading to the Cigarette Advertising Code for two reasons.
First, it signaled a temporary reprise in the harsh fighting between
cigarette manufacturers and their antagonists. It showed that a step
backward away from the health issue by the industry could bring a cor-
reSponding cooling of the fires under their advertising practices. It
also relieved considerably the contradictions into which the manufac-
turers had placed themselves by once again advertising health while

officially insisting no health problem existed. Secondly, and just as

important, it became a turning point for tobacco's critics. With health

 

1"Doctors urge ad control to curtail smoking by teens," Adver-
tising Age, December 4, 1961, p. 89.

2Ibid.

121

claims out of the way, the more emotional and potentially more danger-

ous issue of youth moved toward prominence.

CHAPTER IX

A NEW OFFENSIVE -- THE YOUTH QUESTION

The storm clouds which had been gathering over cigarette adver-
tising for two years began to release their deluge in January of 1962.
During that year and the early months of the next, the trickle of
criticism falling upon advertising's appeal to youth turned into a
torrent. This new offensive launched by tobacco's foes and the manner
in which it develOped encompass another link in the chain of events

leading to the Cigarette Advertising Code.

Doctor Michael B. Shimkin, the National Institute of Health
Official who had entered the fight near the end Of 1961, was one of
the first to fire a volly in 1962. It was aimed as much at cigarette
advertising as it was at the supposed health problems surrounding
cigarettes. Using a collection of cigarette ads running back to 1914
as proof, Dr. Shimkin told medical groups around the country:

"...the advertisement of cigarettes in the U.S. has

pursued a course that can be described as 'hard
sell' only as a ludicrous understatement."

 

1"U.S. Government cancer prober eyes cigarette ads," Adver-

tising Age, January 29, 1962, p. 44.

122

123

Then, making his real point he said:

"In fairness to our children, the least the industry and

our government should do is eliminate some of the shame-

ful appeals from tobacco advertising, such as those

which equate smOking with bravery, sexual virility, and

social status."1
The doctor's Speeches reached an influential, but nonetheless small
group of individuals. Had the criticism of cigarette advertising's
appeal to youth remained at this level, it probably would have taken
months, even years for it to develop any real momentum. However, close

on the heels of the Shimkin efforts came a more impressive and much

more far reaching attack.

On March 7, 1962, in London, the Royal College of Physicians
claimed that "cigarette smOking is a cause of lung cancer," and urged
the British Government to restrict tobacco advertising.2 The British
physicians' report to their Government covered many areas. Included
were prOposals to 1) require that tar and nicotine content be printed
on each pack of cigarettes, 2) increase cigarette taxes, 3) educate
the public to the hazards of smoking, and, finally, 4) restrict tobacco
sales to children.3 Out of this report would come the first substan-
tial restriction of cigarette advertising anywhere in the capitalist
world. The proposal that did more to bring this about than any other

was the fourth. As we shall later see, the eventual restrictions placed

 

1"U.S. Government cancer prober eyes cigarette ads," Advertising
Age, January 29, 1962, p. 3.

2"Smoking causes cancer, other ills, British medics say," Adver-
tising Age, March 12, 1962, p. 12.

31bid.

124

on British cigarette advertising by the Independent Television Author-
ity stemmed from this proposal or variations thereof. For the moment,
however, youth was only one Of the questions being raised. It was
still in the undercurrent and many of tobacco's foes and friends were
not yet aware of its coming importance. The immediate reactions to

the Royal College's report help point out this fact.

In the United States the American Cancer Society "welcomed" the

British report.1

But even though the ACS had its own youth oriented
anti-tobacco campaign, little or no mention was made of the portion
dealing Specifically with youth. The American tobacco industry contin-
ued to publish argumentative information concerning, not youth, but the
general question about smoking's hazard to health. Even in direct
comments on the British report youth was excluded by U.S. tobacco in-
dustries Officials. George V. Allen, president of the Tobacco Insti-
tute, labeled the report as "admittedly a review of Old data without
any new research findings."2 Commenting Specifically on its relation-
ship to the American industry, he said:

"I question whether the report will have any bearing

on the situation in the U.S. since the same data have
been under study for some time."3

In another reaction to the report there were hints that, quite to the

contrary, it might have a considerable bearing on the situation here,

 

1"Smoking causes cancer, other ills, British medics say,"
Advertising Age, March 12, 1962, p. 12.

21bid.

31b1d.

125

eSpecially as regards advertising.

The British Physicians' report had in it implications that filter
cigarette smoking was more healthful than non-filter smoking. Manu-
facturers of filter tip cigarettes who were unhappy with the 1960 FTC
policies concerning the advertising Of filters took this information
to the Federal Trade Commission in hopesof obtaining a reversal of
those policies. At the time, trade sources said:

"In the past few days -- particularly Since the
release of the report on 'Smoking & Health' by
the Royal College of Physicians in London this
week -- filter tip marketers are talking back,
charging that FTC policies are unrealistic and
are contributing to a situation where smokers
are switching back to non-filters."1
In presenting their case, the filter brand makers complained that the
FTC policy prevented them from using the big sales point for their
product -- its effectiveness in filtering out tars and nicotine. In
addition, they said that the commission's policy had three damaging
results: 1) it had encouraged consumption of high-tar, high-nicotine
cigarettes, 2) it had d15couraged an upward trend toward low-tar, low-
nicotine brands, and 3) it had discouraged research on improved filters,
since no promotional value could result.2 Not too unexpectedly, this
line of thinking made an impression on the commission. Byron H. Jacques,
head of the FTC'S bureau of trade practice conferences and industry

guides confirmed that closed-door discussions between commission mem-

bers and cigarette makers had raised some serious questions. "If

 

1"FTC may revise ban on health claims in cigarette ads 'If
difference is real,'" Advertising Age, March 12, 1962, p. 12.

21bid.

126

there really is a significant difference in the health hazards involved
in filter-tips compared with non-filters," he said, "some change in

our attitude might be necessary."1

Although this reaction to the British report was directly rela-
ted to questions about advertising practices, it still failed to touch

upon the dormant, but soon to bloom youth issue.

There were, of course, also reactions from abroad. In Italy,
where the tobacco industry was a Government-owned monOpoly, advertis-
ing for Italian cigarettes had been eliminated in 1955 on the grounds
that cigarettes were "harmful to the public health."2 Shortly after
the release of the British report the Italian Parliament adopted a
bill banning foreign tobacco ads, too. In all likelihood this move
was triggered by the statements made in London. But, apparently, the
British comments and proposals dealing with youth were not a major
factor in the Italian move because it was not, in any way, Specific in

terms Of youth.

Only in England itself did the youth issue, at this early stage,
produce Significant reactions. Unlike many anti-tobacco groups and the
cigarette manufacturers in the United States, British tobaccomen saw

the youth issue as a coming danger. So much so that they reacted

 

1"FTC may revise ban on health claims in cigarette ads 'If
difference is real,'" Advertising Age, March 12, 1962, p. 12.

2"Italy bans ads for imported cigarettes,” Advertising_Ag§,
April 9, 1962, p. 12.

127

before the report from the Royal College of Physicians was released.
The particular way they reacted was later to cause controversy in the

American "Tobacco War," making it extra noteworthy here.

In England it had been, for years, unlawful for youngsters under
the age of sixteen to smoke. Nevertheless, in anticipation of the
unfavorable report from physicians, seven British tobacco firms (com-
prising 90% of the market) voluntarily agreed to suspend television
cigarette advertising before the hour of nine o'clock at night.1 The
obvious intention of this moVe was to eliminate cigarette television
commercials during the high viewing hours of young peOple. The simple
fact that it left only one prime-time hour in which these cigarette
makers could screen commercials indicates that they were deeply con-
cerned about the future of the youth question. Why did the British
industry react so Strongly, while tobacco interests in America and
elsewhere seemed to miss the point entirely? One very good reason was
because Britain was the only country where public officials were taking
such a strong position. If we remember that this report from England's
highest medical authorities approximates the Surgeon General's report
in this country, it is then easy to understand why British tobaccomen

reacted asthey did.

In fact, within months they were, perhaps, wishing they had taken
even stronger steps. For despite the U.S. tobacco industry's apparent

lack of interest in the problem and regardless of the English industry's

 

1"British report Sparks cancer-smoking scare," Business Week,
April 14, 1962, p. 42.

128

radical move, the youth issue continued to snowball. In May of 1962
the Independent Advertising Inquiry Council of Britain urged the
Government to impose a ceiling on the amount of cigarette advertising
that could be done. This group also called for a total ban Of all
television advertising of tobacco. Further, they urged that cigarette
advertising be restricted to package illustrations and product name
identifications.1 One of the major considerations behind all of these
prOposals was cigarette advertising's appeal to youth. In the same
month, additional, similar moves were made. A bill was introduced in
the British Parliament which would ban smoking in theatres and on
busses and forbid their sale through vending machines. There also
were investigations as to how best the English laws forbidding cigar-
ette sales to children could be enforced.2 The American manufacturers,
after being attacked SO vehemently for so long, may have been dis-
creetly enjoying the Englishman's plight. But, if so, their enjoyment

soon evaporated. There were new developments in the United States, too.

While Parliament was considering anti-tobacco bills, two proposals
were brought before the United States Senate Labor Committee. The
first was a bill making it mandatory for cigarette labels to give tar
and nicotine content.3 This measure related directly back to the Royal

College of Physicians' report. The implications in that report that

 

1"Consumer group asks Britain to curb cigarette ads," Advertising
Agg, May 7, 1962, p. 2.

2"New develOpmentS in cigarette-cancer controversy," Printer's
Ink, May 18, 1962, p. 5.

31bid.

129

filter cigarettes were better for peOple's health had affected anti-
tobacco groups as well as same filter cigarette makers. And they, too,
were now trying to sidestep or change the FTC policies which forbade
the use Of tar and nicotine. The second proposal was a call for a new
Government program to educate school children to the effects of nar-

cotics, alcohol, and tobacco.1

Here was the youth question again. Now
it had moved from the small confines of one doctor's Speech-making into
a much larger arena. Although it still remained a secondary issue in

the United States, this potentially explosive question was nearing the

tinder point.

However, in the closing days of May much broader anti-tobacco
moves were being made and receiving more extensive coverage. For
example, appearing in the June issue of Reader's Digest was the arti-
cle "Lung Cancer and Cigarettes." This article was a summary of the
Royal College of Physicians' report. By some, it was considered as
"the most potentially damaging in a series of blows at the tobacco
industry."2 Coinciding with the article the Digest announced that it
would no longer accept cigarette advertising in its international edi-
tions.3 Also in the June issue of Reader's Digest was a reprint of a
letter Senator Maurine Neuberger had sent to the New York Times.

Although She had taken up the youth issue after her husband's cancer

 

1"New develOpments in cigarette-cancer controversy," Printer's
Ink, May 18, 1962, p. 5.

2"Cigarette ad ban lit big week for ad men," Printer's Ink,
May 25, 1962, p. 15.

3"Digest to drOp all cigarette ads; hits health effect," Adver-
tising Age, May 21, 1962, p. l.

130

death, this time she was taking wider aim. In her letter Mrs. Neuber-
ger diSputed an American Tobacco Company report that claimed its
employees "smoke twice as much, live longer, and have fewer deaths from
lung cancer and heart disease than the general public."1 In her retort
She said in part:

"Cold and disinterested analysis of Statistical data
by the Society of Actuaries reports that the rate of
death and permanent disability claims for tobacco
industry employees is significantly higher than the
rate for comparable employees of other industries."

Then, in broad strokes, Senator Neuberger outlined her feelings on the
overall cigarette-cancer controversy:

"Lung cancer does pose a threat to the cigarette indus-
try: it also threatens a substantial segment of the
advertising industry. It is a grave threat to national
health. And it is a threat that neither distortion Of
scientific data nor the most inventive advertising cam-
paigns can abate."3

The tobacco industry had no comment on Mrs. Neuberger's Statements.
Nor did industry Officials make any new comments on the Digest summary
of the British report which had not already been made on the original

version.

At the same time another broad anti-tobacco move began to develop.
This one would eventually become the most damaging the cigarette manu-
facturers have faced to date. The youth issue was growing in stature.

More and more sources, both abroad and at home, were insisting that

 

1"Tobacco folk are big smokers, healthy too, American says,"
Advertising Agg, March 12, 1962, p. 12.

2"Digest to drOp all cigarette ads; hits health effect," Adver-
tising Age, May 21, 1962, p. 1.

31bid.

131

something be done about cigarette advertising's appeal to youth. In
addition, as has already been pointed out, there were implications in
the British report on smoking and health that filter cigarette smoking
was less harmful than smoking non-filters. These implications caused
many filter cigarette makers and some anti-tobacco groups to appeal
for revision of Federal Trade Commission policies which prohibited the
use of tar and nicotine references in advertising. On the other hand,
many researchers and scientists feared that any change in the existing
Government policies would only lead to a resumption of high pressure

advertising for filter cigarettes.

These two issues combined to set up intensive behind-the-scenes
pressure for the Government to make some new moves in the controversy
over cigarette advertising. First, negotiations were begun between
the FTC and the Public Health Service to determine whether Government
Official policy statements on cigarette smoking needed to be revised.1
But, before these negotiations were culminated, President Kennedy was
drawn unexpectedly into the controversy by a press conference question
asking "if he felt our Government was doing all it should."2 The Pres-
ident Side-stepped the question, saying he would be "happy to answer

3

it next week," but he needed more information. So the word for

 

1"Cigarette forces build fire under U.S. rule makers," Adver-
tising Age, May 28, 1962, p. 1.

2Ibid.

31bid.

132

cigarette/health facts went out. As one trade source said:

"The smoking-cancer hot potato rested in the laps

of the top echelon at the U.S. Public Health

Service...as the rest of the government, from

President Kennedy on down, asked for some fresh

advice."1
This call for "fresh advice" precipitated a major study by the PHS
and resulted in the January, 1964, Surgeon General's Report on Smoking
and Health. Thus, the die was cast for the last eXplosion preceding
the Cigarette Advertising Code. However, in terms of events which

affected the decision to establish the code, that eXplosion was a long

way Off.

The strategy Of the anti-tobacco forces had now developed three
distinct fronts. First, there was the ever present attempt to estab-
lish a definite relationship between smoking and health. Secondly,
because the anti-tobacco groups were beginning to lose hope that they
could discourage the cigarette habit among smokers, was the attempt
to get adults to smoke the cigarettes deemed least harmful. And third-
ly, for Similar reasons, was the attempt to convince children not to
start smoking. Fighting on the first front had been going on for at
least twelve years. But, deSpite all the statistical data brought to
light, it was proving to be an uphill battle. The second front's suc-
cess was tied closely to that Of the first. For, unless the facts
that cigarettes did cause cancer and how they caused it could be estab-

lished, no "least harmful" cigarette could be delineated. Additionally,

 

1"Cigarette ad future awaits health report," Advertising Age,
June 4, 1962, p. 1.

133

communicating exactly which cigarette brands were least harmful would
necessitate the revoking of present Government policies. Therefore,

the first two fronts could be considered as momentarily blocked. The
third front had been Open for some years. But until recently, little
force had been put behind it. Projects to educate youngsters to the
supposed dangers of smoking and criticisms of advertising's appeal to
youth had increased relatively slowly. However, this third front had
few of the inherent problems of the other two. And now, blocked on

two sides, the anti-tobacco groups began to make more of it.

In a Speech before the Senate, Maurine Neuberger said:

"Perhaps the most insidious aSpect of the cigarette
epidemic has been the massive use of advertising to
swell the ranks of youthful smokers. It does not
take an expert in motivation research to discover
that the glorification of a game Of tennis -- fol-
lowed by a smoke; or a romantic encounter -- fol-
lowed by a smoke -- is designed solely to convince
youth that cigarette smoking is a concomitant of
the good life."1

Continuing her onslought she added:
"If this were not sufficient proof of the youth directed
appeal of cigarette advertising, consider the fact
that tobacco companies account for forty per cent of
all national advertising placed in college neWSpapers."2
Finally, after praising the actions of tobaccomen in England, she asked

why "American cigarette companies continue to abdicate their reSponsi-

bility."3

 

1"Cigarette ad future awaits health report," Advertising Age,
June 4, 1962, p. 1.

21bid.

31bid.

134

Cigarette manufacturers were silent on the Neuberger speech. In
fact, as yet, they had apparently not come to grips with the implica-
tions of the growing youth issue. Instead, they continued to push for
the revival of tar and nicotine advertising. In June of 1962 Printer's
ng_said there were "increasing signs that cigarette advertisers are
pressing to re-enter the health-claimderby."1 According to that maga-
zine the latest sign was a discreet 59 word press release to science
editors by P. Lorillard Company. In the release Lorillard announced a
new filter on Kent, which it said screened out "up to 90 per cent of

all phenols" in the smoke.2

It is somewhat understandable that tobaccomen in the United
States were then remaining incommunicado on the youth question. They
could hardly declare that children should smoke, or that cigarettes
Should be advertised to children. In addition, many of the statements
made against them, such as the amount of advertising done in college
newSpaperS, were true. Finalby,the youth issue still appeared to be
a minor problem. This situation was changing quickly, however. In
England, for example, the youth question had now become a major prob-

lem for tobacco advertisers.

In July, under pressure from medical and other anti-tobacco

groups, the Independent Television Companies Association Limited issued

 

1"Will FTC allow a revival of tar and nicotine ad clash?",
Advertising Age, June 1, 1962, p. 17.

2Phenol was a substance then accused of stopping cilia action in
the throat and thereby allowing more tar and nicotine to enter
the lungs.

135

a set of ”notes of guidance." These notes contained this broad prin-
ciple statement:

"Advertising should not encourage people, and young

people in particular, to believe that they will have

any advantage romantically, physically, socially, or

in their jobs if they smoke."
In addition Specific "areas of danger" were pinpointed for the British
tobaccomen. These included copy that had ”hero appeal" or appeal to
"manliness" or to social success.2 The British tobacco industry was
also asked not to suggeSt that smoking was a part of the modern, smart,
sOphisticated or fashionable way of life, and that one should smoke to
be "in the swim."3 According to the guidance notes romantic appeal
was to be avoided as was the creation Of a romantic atmOSphere in which
it is implied that cigarettes are an essential ingredient. Other
avoidance areas included; impressions of "exaggerated satisfaction,"
luimplicit encouragement" of habitual or excessive smoking or impres-
sions Of dependence on cigarettes, the use of young people unmistakably
under twenty-one, and the suggestion that cigarettes overcome "nerves"
or Strain or direct offers of cigarettes as an aid to relaxation or
concentration.4 These "notes of guidance" were the most comprehensive
list Of restrictions that had ever been placed on cigarette advertiSing.
And almost every one of the restrictive measures related directly to
the youth issue. From this point on, the American tobaccomen probably

saw the coming storm, but it was too late.

 

1"British TV restrictions on tobacco ads," Broadcasting, January
28, 1963, p. 90.

21bid.
31bid.

4Ibid.

136

In September, in the United States, the youth question soared
onto the national scene in a CBS Reports television program titled,
"The Teen Age Smoker." In that program CBS newsmen made the point
that cigarette advertising was reSponsible for introducing young peo-
ple to the smoking habit.1 This attack forced the first reactions to
the youth issue from.American tobaccomen. The Tobacco Institute
promptly labeled the program "one-sided."2 An individual manufacturer
went even further. Officials of the American Tobacco Company asked
for, but did not get, equal time for the tobacco industry to present

its views.3

Following this first flare-up over youth in the U.S., the Ameri-
can tobaccomen received the brunt of another broad anti-tobacco move.
Printer's Ink said:

"Embattled Of late, because Of the drumfire of
scientific findings pointing to the health
hazards of smoking, tobacco men were startled

by the announcement that gifts of cigarettes to
Air Force hospitals and clinics were forbidden.

"4
The reason given for the Air Force change of policy was that the "ever
increasing evidence linking cigarette smOking with lung cancer, pulmon-

ary disease, cardiovascular disease, etc., can no longer be ignored."5

 

1"Collins hint of corrective action by radio-TV on cigarette
ads stirs hassel," Advertising Age, November 26, 1962, p. 1.

21bid.
31b1d.

4"Tobacco men stung by Air Force move," Printer's Ink, October
12, 1962, p. 13.

51bid.

137

A month later the youth issue was in the news again. Sir Robert
Platt, president Of the British Royal College of Physicians, declared
that it was "frightful and immoral" for cigarette manufacturers to
advertise to young peOple. "If you know that cigarettes are causing
large numbers of deaths," he said, "you're getting Off rather lightly

1 While the Platt re-

if someone doesn't prevent you from advertising."
marks were still ringing, comments from another source placed youth,

once and for all, on the list of tOp priority problems for the American

tobacco industry.

In a Speech at the fall conference of the National Association of
Broadcasters, NAB president LeRoy Collins lashed out at cigarette ad-
vertising. More and more children of high school age and younger, he
said, are becoming habitual smOkers "under the promotional impact Of
advertising designed primarily to influence young people."2 Then,
making implications unprecedented in the American "Tobacco War," he
said:

"Where others have persistently failed to Subordinate
their profit motives to the higher purpose of the
general good health of our young people, then I think
the broadcaster should make corrective moves on his
own."3

These statements threw a penetrating and disturbing light on the Sub-

ject of youth. Broadcasters had been Considered among the tobacco.

 

1"Advertising of cigarettes to youth is immoral: Plate" Adver-
tising Age, November 5, 1962, p. 86.

2"NAB vs. TI", Printer's Ink, November 30, 1962. P- 11-

31bid.

138

industry's closest friends. There were millions of reasons. For the
tobaccomen were Spending nearly $140,000,000 annually on television
advertising. Yet, here was evidence from a high authority that Ameri-
can broadcasters, like the English, might be turning against cigarette
advertising. It is no wonder then that as Printer's Ink said, tobacco-
men and many broadcasters showed the "half-dazed, half-indignant reac-

tion of peOple who have been hit by a meteor out of a clear blue sky.”1

When queried for a reaction, tobacco company officials shook
their heads and said they would let the Tobacco Institute answer Mr.
Collins. George V. Allen, president of the TI, denied that cigarette
advertising was targeted primarily at youngsters. Then, touching upon
the broader cigarettes-cause-cancer issue implicit in the Collins re-
marks on youth, he said:

"Collins' statement applies a judgment of finality
to complex medical questions that are still under
study by scientists."2
On the same subject he also added:
"Like many laymen, Mr. Collins mistakes repetition
of charges for what he refers to as 'mounting
eV1dence-O '"
Not too surprisingly, as much if not more reaction came from the

broadcasters themselves. Clearly, many of them were not ready to part

with millions of dollars cigarette advertisers were investing in tele-

 

1nNAB Vs. TI", Printer's Ink, November 30, 1962, p. 11.
21bid.

3"Collins hint of corrective action by radio-TV on cigarette
ads stirs hassel," Advertising Age, November 26, 1962, p. l.

139

vision. The Television Bureau of Advertising, television's sales pro-
motion arm, quickly met with tobaccomen, reportedly to discuss their
public relations problems.1 After the meeting, the TvB circulated a
memo among broadcasters which amounted to a storm.warning. The memo,
it was said, advised television men to ”be ready for anything and try
to reassure tobacco men that their advertising (was) still welcome on

the air."2

Others within broadcasting's ranks also were trying to douse the
fires started by Collins.. Kevin Sweeney, president of the Radio Adver-
tising Bureau, sent a wire to the presidents and advertising directors
Of tobacco companies saying that the Collins statement "did not repre-
sent the Opinion Of even a small segment of the radio stations."3 The
three major networks, at first maintained a dignified silence. But as
other broadcasting sources began to heap criticism on the NAB presi-
dent, they too joined in. NBC said it did not "share in the stand he
(Collins) has taken." American Broadcasting Company Officials were
quoted as saying, "ABC does not concur," with Mr. Collins. And a sim-

ilar dissent came from CBS.4

 

1"Collins hint of corrective action by radio-TV on cigarette

ads stirs hassel," Advertising Age, November 26, 1962, p. 1.
2"NAB Vs. TI," Printer's Ink, November 30, 1962, p. 11.

3"Collins hint of corrective action by radio-TV on cigarette

ads stirs hassel," Advertising_Age, November 26, 1962, p. 1.
4"Tobacco ad curb plan draws fire, praise," Advertising Age,
December 3, 1962, p. l.

140

Praise of the Collins' statement was much slower in coming. One
of the few individuals to make an early favorable reaction was Martin
Mayer, author of the boOk Madison Avenue U. S. A. Mayer said, "I think

Mr. Collins is dead right."1

However, deSpite the lack of any thunderous approval, Collins
had obviouSly made his point and the implications of the youth issue
now began to dawn on tobaccomen and trade sources. AS 1962 came to a
close Business Week was saying that ”even though sales have risen dur-
ing the commotion over smoking and health, tobaccomen are worried about
the future.."2 The only signs that the hubbub may have affected smo-
kers, the magazine said, are the facts that this year's rate Of in-
crease in cigarette sales is only about half that of 1961, and that
regular cigarettes continued to lose ground to filter tips. Then, in
predicting the future outlook, the magazine, for the first time, turned
to the youth question. The long term threat, it said, was a concen-
trated effort by groups, states, etc., to persuade youth not to begin
smOking. According to Business Week, the effect of this threat on the
industry's revenue and on dependent advertising income and Government

tax revenues "could be felt soon."3

 

1"Tobacco ad curb plan draws fire, praise," Advertising Age,
December 3, 1962, p. 1.

2"Smoking more deSpite the scare," Business Week, December 22,
1962, p. 78.

31bid., p. 79.

CHAPTER X

COLLEGE EXODUS

As 1963 began the tobacco industry experienced what appeared to
be a reSpite in the attacks against its advertising practices concern-
ing youth. In fact, for a moment, it looked as though the youth issue
might collapse altogether. But, as we shall see, this staggering only
set the scene for the final plunge; a plunge which caused the cigarette
manufacturers to take a step backwards. And this step took them one

stride closer to the Cigarette Advertising Code.

In November of 1962 when LeRoy Collins spoke out against cigar-
ette advertising, he had asked the Television Code Review Board to
amend its voluntary code of standards to provide restraints against
"the use of commercials eSpecially designed to influence the very young
and beginning smoker."1 But, the board had refused, deferring any
decision until its next meeting in January of 1963. Failing in that,
Collins then asked the combined NAB boards to approve a Study of cigar-
ette advertising and minors. This they agreed to. Consequently, be-

tween November, 1962 and January, 1963 the Television Code Board made

 

1"Smoking more deSpite the scare," Business Week, December 22,
1962, p. 80.

141

142

such a study. Now, at the January meeting of the NAB, William Pabst,
chairman of the Television Code Board, reported that the code group's
study failed to substantiate charges that cigarette advertising was
directed toward encouragement of smoking by minors.1 Following this,
the recommendation was made and accepted that the National Association
of Broadcasters take no position on cigarette advertising pending the
outcome of the U.S. Public Health Service Study on smOking and health.

It loOked like a favorable turning point for cigarette manufacturers.

However, this seeming timidity to move ahead with restrictions
on the part of broadcasters was only a small ripple in the tide. LeRoy
Collins had opened the floodgates, and now, though his companions in
broadcasting obviously wanted to slow the onrushing current, others
coming through those gates paid no attention. If anything, the fact
that broadcasters had turned away from direct action served to Spur

attacks.

While the NAB was approving continuing study of the relationship
Of cigarette advertising and minors, Reader's Digest published another
damaging article. This one struck not at smOking in general, as had
been the case in the past, but at advertising's appeal to youth. In a
reprint of an article from Changing Times, Digest editors said that if
young people were persuaded to smOke, a "million children now in school

will die of lung cancer before they reach age of seventy."2

 

1"No crackdown seen on TV cigarette ads," Broadcasting, January
21, 1963, p. 38.

2"Youth Smoking Issue Builds New Heat," Printer's Ink, January
25, 1963, p. 7.

143

Shortly after this Digest attack, the American Medical Associa-
tion, by dropping a long-awaited study into the relationship between
smoking and cancer, gave the controversy a kind of see-saw appearance.
The reported reason of the AMA for the cutoff of its own research was
the decision of the Public Health Service to conduct a similar but
broader study.1 Officials Of the medical association said they would
have early access to the PHS study and would then take a firm stand.
This move did little to stem criticisms of cigarette advertising. But
it still holds importance here. For, combined with the NAB's similar
decision to wait, it began to give added importance to the results of
the Public Health Service study. From this moment on, tobaccomen knew
that if the PHS study should prove unfavorable, it could bring not
only the Government, but also the AMA and broadcasters down on them.
This fact would later give more impact to the Surgeon General's Report
on Smoking and Health, helping to bring tobaccomen to their decision

to establish the code.

If the AMA'S decision put an ounce of weight on the "no" end
of the see-saw battle over whether immediate, direct action should be
taken against cigarette advertising, then ten pounds were settling on
the other end. In April, Broadcasting magazine admitted that the smo-
king and health controversy "now includes the question of whether

television tobacco commercials should be aimed at youth," and listed

 

1"AMA will rely on Public Health Service findings," Business
Week, March 23, 1963, p. 96.

144

some of the then Current movements.1 Senator Frank Moss had written
to the presidents of the TV networks and tobacco companies. He urged
the tobaccomen "to take the glamour out of cigarette advertising." To
the network heads he said:

"...take a hard look at the type of cigarette adver-

tising you are allowing Sponsors to present. How

can it be ethical for our mass media to continue

using Sports heroes and glamourous models in an

effort to associate smoking with all that is exciting,

pleasant and desirable in life?"2
Meanwhile, Senator Maurine Neuberger was seeking the backing of the
FTC and the FDA in requiring tobacco firms to identify their products
as injurious to health. And, Senator Joseph S. Clark and Representa-
tive Morris K. Udall were preparing legislation to bring smoking prod-
ucts under jurisdiction of the FDA and require package labels to

include nicotine and tar contents.3

The heat grew more intense as additional attacks were made and
tobaccomen and their frkxms began answering. Still in April, the
American Cancer Society issued a pamphlet with statistics to buttress
its claim that cigarette smoking is "the major cause" of lung cancer.4

Discussing teenagers, the pamphlet said:

"It is to this age group that much Of the promotional

and advertising of cigarettes seems to be directed."5

 

l"Smoking controversy Still burns," Broadcasting, April 29: 1963.
page 38 o

21bid.
3Ibid.

4"Tough talk about smoking and health," BroadcaStiflfip April 22:
1963, p. 42.

51bid.

145

Suggesting what should be done, the ACS told of its campaign to educate
youth to the dangers of smoking. The society had reportedly now dis-
tributed 25,000 COpies of its anti-smOking film and over three million
of an information booklet. It was estimated that the campaign had

reached half of the high school students in the country.

On the same day that the American Cancer Society pamphlet was
issued, Tobacco Institute president, George V. Allen charged the ACS
had "omitted or oversimplified" Opposing views of reputable scientists.1
Less than a week later the scientific director of the Tobacco Industry
Research Committee denounced reports of the type issued by the cancer
society as "a disservice to true scientific research." "It is a mat-
ter Of fact," he said, "that, in our present state of knowledge, no one

knows the answers."2

In early May more Government action was taken. This time it was
on a state level. California state assemblyman Alfred E. Aloist,
described himself as "incensed over cigarette ads in college newSpapers.3

To prove it he introduced a bill in the California legislature to ban

tobacco advertising from school and college papers.

This mounting pressure against cigarette advertising certainly

did not go unfelt by the tobacco industry, nor unheard by the press.

 

1"Tough talk about smoking and health," BroadCaStiQEp April 22:
1963, PO 42.

2"Increasing pressure on tobacco advertising," Printer's Ink,
May 10, 1963, p. 48.

31bid.

146

On May 10, 1963 the news media began asking publicly the questions that
tobaccomen must have privately been asking themselves. Printer's Ink
said:
"Can they (the cigarette manufacturers) get through
1963 without having major restrictions slapped on
their sales, their istribution or - worst of all -
their advertising?"
The magazine didn't offer a flat ”no," but it definitely implied that
the tobacco industry was heading for dark days:
"There are several reasons why advertising should be
singled out (for restriction). First, restrictions
on advertising are more practical, and more easy to
enforce than...prohibition would be; second, the
average citizen could support a campaign to limit
cigarette advertising without feeling that he was
interfering with his neighbor's right to go on smo-
king; third, restrictions on advertising do not
strike the layman as a very serious problem."2
In the same article, this trade source listed the advertising restric-
tions and actions it foresaw as possible anti-tobacco moves. These
included: 1) regulations governing copy, such as a ban on ads aimed at
young peOple or on suggestions that smoking is smart, SOphisticated or
.identified. with social status and success, 2) regulations on the use
Of media, such as a pre-p.m. blackout or elimination of the use of col-
lege neWSpaperS, 3) required statements on packages that they consti-
tute a hazard to health, 4) an outburst of state, county or even muni-
cipal local-option laws setting limitations of every size, shape and

variety on cigarette ads, and 5) circulation by Official or send-

Official agencies of anti-smOking publicity.3 Of all Of these possi-

 

1"Increasing pressure on tobacco advertising," Printer's Ink,
May 10, 1963, p. 48.

21bid., p. 49.

31bid., p. 49.

147

bilities, it was the Printer's Ink editor's opinion that those most
directly related to the youth question carried the "strongest emo-

tional impact."1

As far as any of the anti-tobacco moves actually
becoming an eventual reality, the article said:

"The tobacco industry could be in for stormy weather
if, armed with what it regards as reasonable argu-
ments, it relies on an assumption that 'they can't
do this to us.‘ They can."2

The underlying question in this statement was will the tobaccomen

rely on their "reasonable” argument, or will they make some move to

head off restriction.

While those interested waited to see, the controversy continued.
In mid-May one of those standing on the side of tobacco sharply chal-
lenged the critics of cigarette advertising. Joseph H. Ream, than
vice president for program services, CBS television, said that he
felt the critics were not only demanding that broadcasters decide a
medical question on which medical experts disagree, but also trying to
dictate the verdict that tobacco is harmful to health. Ream told
reporters, in part:

"...the president of the NAB demands that we sift and
judge the conflicting and complicated medical claims

and decide that cigarette advertising in its present
form is undermining the health of our young peoplé."3'

 

1"Increasing pressure on tobacco advertising," Printer's Ink,
May 10, 1963, p. 49.

 

21bid., p. 50.

3"Let's await Surgeon General's cigarette report, Ream urges,"
Broadcasting, May 13, 1963, p. 44.

148

Then, in turn, Mr. Ream gave the reasons why he felt no decision
should be made until after the Surgeon General had made his report.

In fact, he said, cigarette commercials are not directed to minors --
and indeed, deciding what does and what does not have an appeal for

the young is probably impossible anyway. Just as important, he felt,
was his Speculation that a move to control some cigarette advertising
would be the first step in a campaign to ban it all. "You can't expect
a zealot to stop with half a loaf," he said, "and already we have re-

ceived letters objecting to any advertising of cigarettes at all."1

Before the end of May, 1963 members of the public finally became
officially involved in the question of cigarettes and health and youth.
Speakers at the annual convention of the National Congress of Parents
and Teachers attacked the industry for using "glamourized advertising"
to "smokewash" teenagers. In the wake of this language, the congress
voted to step up its efforts against teenage smOking, and unanimously
decided to invite tobacco company and agency representatives to ex-
change views on advertising techniques.2 This move by the parents and
teachers was probably then considered as the coup de grace by tobacco-
men. Now, it seemed, everyone was against their advertising practices.
Their old foes, the anti-tobacco medical experts and scientists, were
Still at it. Restrictive bills and prOposals stood before both nation-

al and state legislative bodies. The Public Health Service, highest

 

1"Let's await Surgeon General's cigarette report, Ream urges,"
Aroadcasting, May 13, 1963, p. 44.

2"Parents and Teachers Assn. pushes effort against cigarette
ad appeals to teens," dvertising Age, June 3, 1963, p. 78.

149

medical authority in the land, was conducting a massive study into the
suspected relationship between smoking and health. Both the American
Medical Association and the National Association Of Broadcasters stood
ready to act Should that study prove unfavorable. News media were

beginning to act as if restrictive action was expected. And now, even

groups Of consumers had begun to strike out at the tobacco industry.

The tobaccomen politely declined the invitation from the parents
and teachers group and made a final attempt to deny the accusations
against cigarette advertising. A Spokesman for the Tobacco Institute,
for example, said, it is industry policy that "cigarettes are not and
should not be promoted for use by children."1 However, the fight had
obviously turned. The cigarette manufacturers were backing away. Gone
were the quick references to the fact that nothing had been proven
against cigarettes. Gone were the statistics exonerating the smoking
habit. Gone was the confident attitude of the past. In place of these
was an almost apologetic voice. One industry Official said, "NO cigar-
ette company is going to admit it is aiming its advertising at teen-
agers."2 The spokesman for another tobacco firm was quoted as saying
Simply, "It's impossible to take an official position or discuss this
with anybody at this stage."3 Still another company representative
said, every manufacturer has a program directed at college students,

but they "come pretty close to being adults."4

 

1"Parents and Teachers Assn. pushes effort against cigarette ad
appeals to teens," Advertising Age, June 3, 1963, p. 78.

21bid.
31bid.
4Ibid.

150

Even in the face of these kinds of statements there were sources
outside the industry who foresaw no action from the manufacturers. It
was felt that the ”cigarette companies (were) privately bullish about
the U.S. Surgeon General's report on Smoking and Health."1 Generally,
these sources said, tobaccomen are confident there is no proven link
between smoking and health, and they feel the Surgeon General's report

cannot legitimately condemn the industry.

However, a major conciliatory move was imminent. In less than a
month the cigarette makers had proven not only that they might not be
as bullish as some thought, but that the youth issue had, in fact,
backed them to the wall. The major manufacturers decided to drOp vir-
tually all cigarette advertising in c llege neWSpapers, magazines and

football programs and cease their college promotional activities.2

Because of restraint of trade implications, the manufacturers
took Special pains to point out that this move was taken individually
by each company. In addition, both the Tobacco Institute and its mem-
bers tried to muffle the college withdrawal's appearance as a startling
victory for anti-tdxmro forces. George V. Allen, president of the
Tobacco Institute said, "The indust ' wants to make it demonstrably

clear that it does not wish to promote or encourage smoking among

 

1"Parents and Teachers Assn. pushes effort against cigarette ad
appeals to teens," Advertising Age, June 3, 1963, p. 78.

2"Cigarette promotions on college campuses end," Advertising_Agg,
June 24, 1963, p. 1.

151

youth."1 Robert K. Heimann, assistant to the president of American
Tobacco insisted that the policy of not advertising Specifically to
teenagers was not new and quoted from the company's annual report:
"It has always been the position of American Tobacco
that smoking is a form of enjoyment for adults and
Special pains are taken to see that nothing in our
advertising implies anything to the contrary."
Speaking specifically of the cigarette makers exodus from the campus,
he said:
"The abandonment of campus promotion is an indication
the companies are bending over backwards to be sure
there is no misunderstanding of their position."3
Nevertheless, there were many who were neither impressed by the
industry's move away from the campus, nor convinced by its reasondwhy
statements. LeRoy Collins, president of the NAB, commended the company
ies for yielding the campus field. But this was probably to be expected.
The industry's flight could be interpreted as the first show of weak-
ness on the health issue and, as such, it strengthened the hand of the
broadcasting executive. Business Week said, "The tobacco industry has
drOpped the first shoe," and suggested that the next item to go on the
chopping block might be endorsement of cigarettes by athletes.‘4 Accord-

ing to Broadcasting magazine, some Observers felt that by acknowledging

that the promotion of smoking among young people was undesirable, the

 

1"Signs of change in tobacco ads," Broadcasting, June 24, 1963,
p. 31.

2"Cigarette promotions on college campuses end," Advertising_Agg,
June 24, 1963, p. 1.

31bid.

4"Smoke still swirls around cigarettes," Business Week, June 29,
1963, p. 122.

152

companies were indirectly conceding that a question existed about the
desirability Of smOking at any age.1 Other observers reportedly saw

the withdrawal as primarily a public relations move designed to "quiet
mounting complaints about cigarette advertising directed toward teen-

agers."2

Of all those making comments on the industry's move, Senator
Maurine Neuberger took the most negative stance. Speaking in the
Senate Chambers, she expressed a dim view Of the companies' concession,
reminding her fellow senators that British tobacco advertisers were
already subject to Independent Television Authority regulations which

enjokquthem from five classes of ads which appealed to youth.3

On the college campuses themselves there were reactions, too.

These, naturally, were more limited in outlook, dealing mainly with

the probable effects of the cigarette advertising withdrawal upon the
campus. Interviews with the National Advertising Service, which repre-
sented nearly nine hundred college neWSpapers, gave an inside view on
the subject. The advertising service acknowledged that the loss of
cigarette advertising would hurt, but Said the newSpapers would sur-
vive.4 Representatives of college radio stations said that, as a rule,

their volume of cigarette advertising was not great enough to leave a

 

1"Signs of change in tobacco ads," Broadcasting, June 24, 1963:
p. 31.

21bid.

31bid., p. 33.

4"cigarette promotions end on college campuses," Advertising Agg,
June 24, 1963, p. 1.

153

serious gap in revenue if withdrawn. These radio men were not, how-
ever, as Optimistic about the future of their printed competitors.
"Many college neWSpapers and magazines," the young broadcasters said,
"are strongly dependent on cigarette advertising for their existence."1
One college related firm did make comment on the wider aSpectsof the
tobacco industry's action. College Radio Corporation, a sales repre-
sentation company handling about one hundred and thirty campus stations,
pointed out that a survey conducted in twenty-five colleges showed
sixty-three per cent of the smOkers started smoking before attending
college. Because of this, the firm said, little could be accomplished

by the discontinuance of campus advertising.2

However, on the contrary, much had already been accomplished by
the manufacturers' exodus from college advertising. No matter what
statements industry Spokesmen made, and no matter what the immediate
reactions were, it was clear that tobacco had lost a decisive battle.
The college withdrawal was an extreme move for the cigarette makers.
To reach the 4,200,000 college student market, six of the major mem-
bers of the Tobacco Institute had been advertising in about 1,000 cam-
pus newSpapers and accounting for nearly 40 per cent of all college
newSpapers advertising. Each had been investing approximately $1,000,000

annually on the college campuses of its choice.3 In drawing back this

 

1"Signs of change in tobacco ads," Broadcasting, June 24, 1963,
p. 32.

2Ibid.

3"Cigaret promotions on college campuses end," Advertising_Agg,
June 24, 1963, p. 1.

154

weighty promotional tool, the industry had all but publicly announced
that it had, in fact, been encouraging smoking among youth. This, of
course, meant that earlier denials were false, putting a questionable
light on any and all statements the industry had made or would make.

In addition, in the withdrawal itself and in the statements made about
it, the tobacco group had, in effect, agreed with their antagonists
that smoking was bad for children. Consequently, future preachments
from them insisting that no link between smOking and health had been
proven would carry little weight. The decision to discontinue college
advertising also helped to make other industry advertising practices
questionable. For, if the manufacturers agreed that children should
not be encouraged to smoke, why were they advertising in television

and radio time segments and in other media that obviously reached young-
sters in large numbers? And why were they continuing to use appeals
which could possibly attract young people to the smOking habit? Final-
ly, the college withdrawal Showed that the industry could be moved in
the direction desired without the harsh Governmental regulations to
which many objected.~ Because of this, regulatory threats were free to
increase in numbers and popularity. The tobacco industry's withdrawal
from college advertising, then, was clearly a major link in the chain
of events leading to the Cigarette Advertising Code Of 1964. From that
point in time, the offensive had been wrenched from the tobaccomen.

The moves they made thereafter revealed one backstep after another.

CHAPTER XI

CONTINUATION -- CONTROVERSY AND CONCILIATION

In June of 1963 there was widespread Opinion that the tobacco
industry's withdrawal from the college field was intended to placate
groups and individuals who argued that the manufacturers were encour-
aging America's young peOple to smOke. If this was so, the attempt was
a failure. Even while the cigarette makers were making and putting
into effect their decision to stOp advertising on the campus, other

events in the controversy were catching fire.

First, the American Heart Association reversed its traditional
conservative stand in the smoking and health issue. Joining hands
with such staunch anti-tobacco campaigners as the American Cancer
Society, the AHA voted to begin a public information drive against
smoking.1 Then a Florida supreme court Opinion brought the cigarette
manufacturers near a legal finding they had been dreading. A year
earlier, in the case of Pritchard vs. Liggett & Meyers, a jury had
found that "cigarette smoking was a contributory cause to cancer," but

that the smoker assumed the risk.2 Now in a similar case, it was a

 

1"Smoke Still Swirls Around Cigarettes," Business Week, June 29:
1963, p. 122.

2"Status of Ad as 'Warranty' Unclear After Cigarette Verdict,"
Advertising Age, November 19, 1962, p. 12.

155

156

Florida court's Opinion that any ill effects from smoking are the
reSponsibility of the manufacturer not the smoker.1 Thus, the tobac-
comen moved closer to a determination that they were liable for health
damages attributed to smoking. Following this action in the legal
arena there were more stirrings from interested governmental personages.
Senator Maurine Neuberger, it was learned, was working with consider-
able unofficial cooperation from official sources on a book about

tobacco "evils" which was due for release in the fall.2

The biggest fire helping to keep the issue hot had its source
outside the United States. In Canada, three major tobacco firms deci-
ded to shift their commercials, as the British had done, into the after
nine p.m. hours on radio and television. Their action, it was Said,
was taken to "keep youngsters from getting ideas about emulating grown-
ups."3 Since the youth issue was already strongly in the news, it pro-
duced immediate reactions from almost all sides. Dr. Arthur Kelly,
general secretary of the Canadian Medical Association, welcomed the
action as "a step in the right direction."4 Among American broadcasters,
on the other hand, the consensus seemed to be that confining cigarette
commercials to hours after nine p.m. made no sense -- at least in the

United States. They pointed out that commercials presented at nine in

 

l"Smoke Still Swirls Around Cigarettes," Business WEEK. June 299
1963, P. 122m

 

2"Tobacco Industry To Weigh Ad Code On Youth Appeals," Adver-
tisinggAge, July 1, 1963, p. 3.

3"signs of Change in Tobacco Ads," Broadcasting, June 24, 1963,
p. 33.

4Ibid.

157

the east were seen at eight in the midwest and expressed doubt that
susceptible teenagers would be in bed by nine, much less eight. One
broadcaster went on to say:

"If we can't have cigarette advertising until 9 p.m.,
then let's take magazines and newspapers out of the
homes until 9 p.m. Billboards will have to be cov-
ered up until after 9 p.m. ... and to be really
effective, parents must stOp smoking until 9 p.m.,
because that's where the example is set in the first
place."

Tobaccomen, in general, agreed with the broadcasters on the infeasi-
bility of such a move in the U.S. The Spokesman for one company said:

"It won't work here. There's just not enough room
after 9 p.m. Colgate certainly isn't going to give
up prime time to accommodate us."

Whether or not the tobaccomen and their friends agreed with the
Canadian move, they had been affected by it. Combined with the other
moves and attacks being made against cigarette advertising it helped
foster a tobacco group move which some sources said reflected a signi-
ficant "change of heart” at the industry's highest levels with reSpect
to the steps that should be taken to meet rising criticism Of its pro-
motional practices.3 That move was a Washington, D. C. meeting between
Tobacco Institute officials and manufacturers' representatives to con-

sider restrictions on cigarette television advertising. As a result

of that meeting, the TI issued a series of what it called, "informal

 

1"Signs of Change in Tobacco Ads," Broadcasting, June 24. 1963a

p. 33.

2"Smoke Still Swirls Around Cigarettes," BusinesgVngk, June 29,
1963, p. 122.

3"Tobacco Industry to Weigh Ad Code on Youth Appeals," Adver-
tisingiAge, July 1, 1963, p. 3.

158

advisories." One of these advisories offered this euphoric suggestion:
"Cigarette commercials should be characterized by good judgment and
good taste."1 But the lion's Share dealt directly with the area re-
ceiving the hottest fire from tobacco's Opposition; youth. Speaking
in general terms, one advisory said:

"In keeping with the position that smoking is a

custom for adults, cigarette advertising Should

not give a contrary impression."
Becoming more specific, it continued, "Persons featured in advertising
should be and should appear to be adults."3 Another advisory Spoke
directly to the after 9 p.m. question:

"Television or radio programs and other media whose

content is directed particularly at youthful audi-

ences Should not be Sponsored or used. Thus, good

judgment in program content, rather than arbitrary

restriction of sponsorship to certain hours of the

listening or viewing day, should be the determining

factor." .
This last statement sounded as much like an answer to critics as it did
an advisory to tobaccomen. But few were surprised. For, like the col-
lege withdrawal, this latest industry move was seen as an attempt "to

head Off mounting criticism Of cigarette advertising."5 And like the

industry's first backward step, it, too, failed to quiet the din.

 

1"Don't Restrict Hours; Avoid Shows With Kid Appeal, Tobacco Men
Urged," Advertising Age, July 15, 1963, p. l.

21bid.

31bid.
4Ibid.

51bid.

159

In fact, this new move on the part of cigarette makers seemed to
make matters worse. The "informal advisories" were a conciliation, but
they were not nearly as much as the vocal critics in the youth issue
wanted. The Tobacco Institute's statement describing its advisories
had barely been released before negative reactions were made. Senator
Maurine Neuberger took the floor of the Senate to denounce the cigar-
ette position as an "exercise in futility." "We do not eXpect an
industry to preside at its own dissolution," she said, "but we expect

realistic answers to fundamental challenges."1

Concerning the future
the senator said:
"It is apparent to all nonindustry Observers that
radical changes must be made in the marketing of
cigarettes if their sales are to be permitted to
continue."

In addition, the "informal advisories” provided more evidence
that tobaccomen were giving way in their stand that cigarettes and
health Were not related.. The advisories also gave another example
that the industry could be made to move voluntarily. These facts both
served to inSpire further attacks against the manufacturers. Consumers
Union now released a book on smoking and health which outlined a
"nationwide program that might be undertaken to combat the problem."3

In that book was a list of suggested regulations Of cigarette adver-

tising including: 1) Federal Communications Commission rulings on

 

1"Some changes in cigarette ads likely. Tobacco Institute says
they Should not appeal to youth," Broadcasting, July 15, 1963,
p. 36.

21bid.

3"Regulate cigarette advertising, CU suggests in smoking-health
book," Advertising Age, July 22, 1963, p. 40.

160

whether radio and television stations that carry cigarette commercials
are acting in the public interest, 2) FTC control of meaningful tar
and nicotine claims, and 3) health warning requirements on package
labels. The book also offered these additional measures against cigar-
ettes: limited prohibition Of sales, high taxation, a program Of

counter advertising, and special help for persons who want to stop

smoking.1

Shortly after the Consumers Union book was released cigarette
makers were treated to a harsh example of what broadcasters might do
pending the issuance of a damaging Surgeon General's report. WMCA,

a radio station owned by the city of Camden, New Jersey, announced it

would no longer accept cigarette commercials.2

In August Of 1963, just two months after the Tobacco Institute
issued its "informal advisories,” a campaign for Lucky Strike cigar-
ettes caused a furor which added still more heat to the controversy.
The campaign, "Lucky Strike separates the men from the boys -- but not
from the girls," was accused of being a flagrant violation of the manu-
facturers' agreement not to aim advertising at youth. It raised indig-
nation on both sides Of the controversy. Cigarette manufacturers felt

that the entire industry was being hurt because Of the impropriety of

 

1"Regulate cigarette advertising, CU suggests in smoking-health
book," Advertising Age, July 22, 1963, p. 40.

2"City owned Camden station bans all cigarette ads," Advertising
Age, August 26, 1963, p. 3.

 

161

one company. Senator Maurine Neuberger summarized the feelings of many
anti-tobacco groups when she said:

"So far the self regulation campaign of the industry

offers little prOSpect for control without...

government regulation."
Lucky Strike advertising director Albert Stevens refused comment on

the criticisms, but said flatly, "Our advertising is obviously aimed

at adults. We have dropped our campaigns in college neWSpapers."2

Then, almost as if in answer to Mr. Stevens, the pain of with-
drawal symptoms on college campuses across the nation began to make
news. College radio stations, contrary to their earlier predictions,
were feeling the pinch of the cancellation of cigarette advertising.
Broadcasting magazine quoted a leading national sales representative as
now predicting, "As many as twenty stations may discontinue operations
as a result of the tobacco withdrawal."3 Robert Vance, president of
the College Radio Corporation, described the tobacco company departure
from campus advertising as ”the most serious setback from college radio

since it really got going in 1951."4

But regardless of this timely reminder from the campus that the
tobacco industry was taking action to limit its advertising's approach

to youth, more criticism and anti-tobacco action broke out. In

 

1"Words and meaning," Newsweek, August 26, 1963, p. 62.

21bid.

3"Cigarette withdrawal symptomS," Broadcasting, September 16’
1963, p. 34.

4Ibid.

162

Baltimore, city health commissioner Dr. Robert E. Farber said, "The
cigarette companies put out a really vicious sort of advertising which
is difficult to combat."1 Then he added:

"Television commercials, magazine.advertising and

other cigarette promotion efforts are aiming more

toward youth."
With a view to combating these influences, the Baltimore Health Depart-
ment launched a stinging campaign of its own. In a trial run, anti-
smoking posters, pamphlets, films and lectures were distributed in one
of the city's largest high schools. The posters in the campaign said:
"Why buy a pack of trouble?"; "Don't let your allowance go up in smoke";
"Treat your lungs kindly -- don't smOke"; and "Smoking improves her-
ring -- not humans."3 According to Farber, these would be used to
evaluate and perfect anti-smoking propaganda techniques. Then the
health department officials would exPand the campaign throughout the
city school system. Even if the program did not make large inroads on
the smoking habits of students, Farber pointed out, it would still be
valuable if it tended to counteract prevailing pressures on youth to

smoke.4

About the same time, the American Cancer Society came up with
its own brand of anti-smoking advertising called "Athletes against can-

cer." The society's ads were a series of cigarette testimonials in

 

1"Baltimore starts drive to combat cigarette ads," Advertising
Age, October 7, 1963, p. 102.

21bid.

31bid.

4Ibid.

163

reverse by noted sports figures. Over the simple caption, "I don't

smOke,"

were pictures of people such as Olympic star Bob Mathias,
pitcher Whitey Ford, track stars Jim Beatty and Tom Courtney, swimmers
Buster Crabbe and Pat McCormick, and fighters Jack Dempsey, Sugar Ray
Robinson and Floyd Patterson. Eimg'magazine promptly tagged the ads

1
as "uncommercials."

But, in fact, they were highly commercial prOp-
erties. This was not a local campaign as was Baltimore's. It was
designed to be used on a national scale, to reach millions of young-
sters. And the ACS immediately set to work to accomplish that goal.
The ads were offered free to any national teenage magazine that would

promise to run them. In a matter of days, ten such magazines had

agreed.2

As 1963 began to close, attacks against cigarette advertising's
appeal to youth continued. There is every reason to believe that, even
without the Surgeon General's report, they would have continued into
1964 and beyond, probably increasing and possibly forcing cigarette
manufacturers into further conciliations. But that is a contention
which cannot be decided definitely. For as the last page turned on
1963 an era in the "Tobacco War" ended. However, this much can be said

with certainty: whatever was to come in the new year must be tied to

 

1"Ads in reverse," Time, November 15, 1963, p. 69.

21bid.

164

the youth question. The controversy over youth was one of the major
considerations in the Governmental decision to undertake the Public
Health Service study which would herald the new era. The youth issue
was feared by the tobacco industry. It had already produced two sub-
stantial conciliatory moves from tobaccomen. The evil of cigarette
advertising's appeal to youth held the most emotional impact of any
accusation the anti-tobacco forces had thus far made. And, finally,
the youth question had not yet been answered to the satisfaction of a

large number of tobacco's enemies.

CHAPTER XII

THE FINAL SCARE

The date: January 11, 1964. After fourteen months of evaluating
eight thousand smoking and health studies by investigators from around
the world, a Special U.S. Public Health Service committee headed by the
Surgeon General reported that cigarette smoking "contributes substan-
tially to mortality from certain Specific diseases and to the overall
death rate."1 The sharpest health risk for smokers was identified as
lung cancer, a disease which, according to the report titled Smoking
and Health, killed eleven times as many smokers as nonsmokers. The
smokers' death rate from other diseases were listed as: bronchitis
and emphysema, 6.1 times the rate for nonsmokers; cancer of the larynx,
5.4 times as high; ulcers of the stomach and duodenum, 2.8; cancer of
the bladder, 1.9; coronary artery disease, 1.7; and hypertensive heart
disease, 1.9. The "possible benefits" from the use of tobacco, which
were described as an unmeasurable "psychogenic search for contentment,"

took only one and one half pages of the 150,000-word report.2 The

 

1"Smoking, The Government Report," Time, January 17, 1964, p. 42.

21bid.

165

166

conclusion was:

"On the basis of prolonged study and evaluation, the
committee makes the following judgment: Cigarette
smoking is a health hazard of sufficient importance
in the U.S. to warrant appropriate remedial action."

This was the report tobaccomen had felt sure could not legiti-
mately condemn smoking. It was the report anti-tobacco forces were
convinced must be unfavorable. It was the report upon which Govern-
ment was waiting to act. It was the report cliff-hangers, such as the
AMA and the NAB, had been awaiting before making decisions upon ques-

tions at hand. To all of these groups the result of the U.S. Public

Health Service study was a surprise to a greater or lesser extent.

The surprise to U.S. cigarette manufacturers was simply that
they had been wrong. COntrary to their previous beliefs, the Surgeon
General's report proved to be a bristling condemnation of smoking. As
far as the anti-tobacco forces are concerned, the surprise was in
degree. They had expected the report to be less than favorable to the
smoking habit, but the measure of damaging material and the firmness of
the conclusions in Smoking and Health had not been anticipated. The
Government and the cliff-hangers were also surprised by degree. For
the massive extent of the accusation against smoking seemed to demand
immediate actions and decisions on their part, actions and decisions

they had probably intended to make less quickly.

 

1"Smoking, The Government Report," Time, January 17, 1964, p. 42.

167

To many other groups and individuals outside the inner circle of
fighting over the smoking and health issue, the Surgeon General's re-
port of 1964 was a revelation. The general public, for example, had
not seen this subject as front page headline material for years. They,
for the most part, were not aware of the intricacies in the battle over
smoking's relationship to health.' But now, in their morning newsPapers
and radio programs, an impartial committee of top medical experts,
backed by the full authority of the U.S. Government, was declaring
cigarettes were dangerous. Businessmen were affected in a similar
manner. As members of the public, many of them smOkers, they were
startled by the official Government attack against tobacco. In addi-
tion, as businessmen, they felt the impact of a dramatic Governmental
assault against one of the largest and most powerful elements in the
business community. Some business parties, such as members of the
advertising and media industries, were affected even more so. For they

were part of organizations more deeply involved.

To still other groups and individuals the PHS's Smoking and Health
was a distant and much less important event. These include the tobac-
co, anti-tobacco, government, business and public factions in other
countries. Among these groups and individuals an American move against
smOking might be interesting, helpful, or damaging, but events nearer

home would, naturally, hold sway.

In the aftermath of the Surgeon General's report, all of these

various groups and individuals reacted simultaneously according to the

168

way in which they had been affected. Together, these reactions formed
the last link in the chain of events leading to the Cigarette Adver-
tising Code. To fully understand how and why the chain finally closed
requires an investigation of each of these separate reactions and a
further investigation of the ways in which they influenced each other.
For many of these groups reacted not only to the Surgeon General's
report, but also to the reactions being made in other circles. Since
the immediate reactions, those taken upon the release of the report
and pertaining Specifically to it, laid the ground work for later

intertwining reactions they should be discussed first.

To the tobaccomen, it has been reported, January 11, 1964 was

"the Day the Bomb Dropped."1 The reactions of individuals within the
tobacco industry quickly give the picture. For example, upon reading
the first few sentences of the report as it Sped across the country on
Western Union wires, Dan Provost, a publicity executive of Liggett &
Meyers, reportedly gasPed, "Oh my God!"2 Morgan Cramer, president of
P. Lorillard Company, was called out of a meeting to listen to the same
news diSpatch over the phone, and was quoted as saying, "I just 232;;

"3

believe it. Of course, there were exceptions. One company executive,

for example, showed defiant bravado, telling newsmen:
"We licked an English King, James I, when he attacked

the use of tobacco in 1604, and I think we can lick
the United States Government today."4

 

1"New hope for cigarette smokers: crash effort for safer cigar-
ette," Saturday Evening_Post, April 18, 1964, p. 19.

21b1d.

31bid.
41b1d.

169

But, in general, the tobacco industry reacted with abhorrence. Five of
the big Six tobacco manufacturers asked broadcasters to move their com-
mercials out of positions in or adjacent to programs dealing with the
report. Liggett & Meyers went further, asking thirty minutes separa-
tion between any L&M spot and any commercial or any educational message
antithetical to smoking.1 When Tobacco Institute spokesman George V.
Allen was pressed for comment he said he had not had time to read the
387 page report with its 80 tables, but added:
"I endorse wholeheartedly Dr. Terry's (the Surgeon

General) call not for less but more research. The

tobacco industry which is already supporting a con-

siderable body of health Stands ready to increase

that support.”2
The immediate tobacco reaction also included precautionary moves in
anticipation of the reactions others might take. Broadcasting.Maga-
zine said that there were several reports that cigarette companies
instructed their advertising agencies to begin work revising the copy
appeal of commercials so that they could not be interpreted as aiming
at youth. But, the magazine also reported that the advertisers and
their agencies would not confirm the reports.3 A more substantive move
was American Tobacco Company's adoption of the policy of not Sponsor-

ing Sports events.4

 

1"Meeting the cigarette crisis," Broadcasting, January 13, 1964,
p. 33.

21b1d.
31b1d.

4"W111 tobacco firms quit Sports?”, BroadcaSting. February 3:
1964. P0 23'

170

The first reactions from the outSpoken friends of the industry,
such as pro-tobacco scientists and legislators, can also be included as
part of the total tobacco reaction. The scientists who were on record
as friendly to the industry made the usual rebuttals, pointing out, as
one source said, "that the Government report involved no new research
but was merely a compilation of old reports..."1 They reportedly
claimed that there was as much evidence against air pollution as there
was against cigarettes as a cause of lung cancer.2 Some of the tobacco
state legislators, it seemed, were, for the moment, too stunned to
react publicly. But others immediately Spoke out or took action. A
South Carolina legislator was quoted as stating that all the scien-
tists and doctors on the Surgeon General's committee were Northerners
and that the report was "just another Yankee attempt to subdue the
South."3 U.S. Senator John Sherman C00per quickly wrote the Surgeon
General, asking and getting confirmation on the fact that the report
was based largely on studies of old-fashioned non-filter cigarettes.

In his letter he asked, "Is it not correct that the advisory committee
made no judgment as to the effect of adding filters to cigarettes?"4
In his answer Surgeon General Dr. Luther L. Terry not only admitted
the truth of Cooper's supposition, but added, "Filters in common use

do remove a variable portion of the tars and nicotine," and that "the

 

1"New hope for cigarette smokers: crash effort for safer cigar-
ette," Saturday Evening Post, April 18, 1964, p. 21.

21bid.
31bid.

4Ibid.

171

committee felt that the development of better filters or more selec-
tive filters is a promising avenue for further development."1 Thus,
Senator Cooper extracted some hOpe out of the situation for tobacco-
men. However, this was precious little compared to the dark aSpectS
that first reactions from almost all other sources portended. For, as
we Shall now see, upon release of the Surgeon General's report, the

entire nation seemed to turn against the industry.

Most of the reactions from known anti-tobacco groups was predic-
table. While they were making 1audatory comments on the report they
also began immediately to sift the information in Smokinggand Health,
compiling statistics for new anti-smoking brochures, pamphlets and
films. State health agencies, along with the American Cancer Society,
the American Heart Association, and the National Tuberculosis Asso-
ciation were reported.planning-to join the Public Health Service in a
nationwide campaign againstcigarettes.2 Drives to st0p youngsters
from.taking up smOking were reported getting under way in the public
schools of Detroit, New York, Philadelphia and other cities.3 Churches
who frowned on smoking as well as drinking were said to be in partner-

ship with the American Cancer Society and other organizations in a

 

1"New hope for cigarette smokers: crash effort for a safer cigar-
ette," Saturday Evening Post, April 18, 1964, p. 22.

2"Smoking scare: What's happened to it?", U.S. News & World
Report, January 11, 1965, p. 38.

3"Cigarette warning, the aftermath; reaction of smOkers, congress-
men, stockmarket," U.S. News & World Report, January 27, 1964,
p. 39.

172

drive to set up anti-smoking clinics to help people break the cigarette
habit.1 There was one ray of light in the anti-tobacco reaction. It
came from a most unexPected source -- from Dr. Ernest L. Wynder of the
Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research. Doctor Wynder had been
known for years as one of the industry's most implacable foes. It was
Wynder who helped precipitate the first big cancer scare in the early
1950's when he revealed he had produced cancers on the backs of mice
with concentrates from cigarette smoke. Since then he had become one
of the world's most articulate critics of smoking. Nevertheless, on
January 24, Doctor Wynder reportedly made the statement that "some
elements in the tobacco industry have already made good progress in
develOping safer cigarettes."2 However, the Wynder remark was lost in

the turmoil surrounding the Surgeon General's report.

A good part of that turmoil stemmed from the reactions of Govern-
ment agencies. The Government, and eSpecially Congress and state
legislatures, had been the industry's most feared foe for many years.
Threats from these sources had played a major part in every concilia-
tory action tobaccomen had thus far taken. It is only natural than
that the cigarette manufacturers held their breath, waiting to see what
the Government's reaction would be. They didn't have to wait long.

The Surgeon General's report caught Congress in mid—stride of a number

of Steps against smoking. At least five bills putting controls on

 

1"New HOpe for cigarette smokers: crash effort for a safer cigar-
ette," Saturday Evening Post, April 18, 1964, p. 20.

21bid., p. 22.

173

cigarettes and/or their advertising were pending before House and
Senate committees. The two big bills were companion measures, one in
the Senate and one in the House. Representative Morris K. Udall had
introduced his H. R. 5973 on April 30, 1963. Senate bill S 1682 was
introduced by Senator Frank E. Moss and co-Sponsored by Senator Joseph
S. Clark on June 6, 1963. Both bills were prOposals to bring smoking
products under Federal food and drug laws, thus giving the FTC power
to issue restraining orders against cigarette advertising without
first going through lengthy litigation. In addition, three other
bills were before the House Commerce Committee. Representative Vernon
Thomson's H. R. 3610, introduced on February 7, 1963, required dis-
closure of the effectiveness of filters on cigarettes. H. R. 4168,
requiring cigarette packages to be labeled with tar and nicotine con-
tent, was introduced by Representative Paul Fino on February 25, 1963.
Finally, H. R. 7476, introduced by Representative Bernard Grabowski

on July 10, 1963 required labeling of cigarette packages to read:
"Warning -- contents may be dangerous to health."1 The release of the
Surgeon General's report vastly stimulated the atmOSphere around these
bills and set in motion the drafting of many more. In fact, the number
and variety of bills coming from legislators' first flush of indigna-
tion over the report, combined with the already Standing measures and
soon to be disclosed action from the Federal Trade Commission, became
so convoluted and confusing that hearings before the House Interstate

and Foreign Commerce Committee were eventually initiated to straighten

 

1"Meeting the cigarette crisis," Broadcasting, January 13, 1964,
p. 33.

 

174

them out. In addition to this actual action in Washington, there was
also a raft of rumors concerning Congressional moves. It was believed
that somewhere in Congress bills were being drawn up which would com-
pletely ban cigarettes or do away with their promotion. Other rumors
foretold quick passage of package labeling laws and measures designed
to encourage Federal Communications Commission interferences with

broadcast codes.1

On the state level some legislatures made similar first reactions.
A committee of the New York State Senate, for example, reportedly
charged cigarettes with causing "mass murder" and called for "a decla-
ration of war against cigarettes,"2 and, as on the national scene,
widesPread restrictive moves were rumored. These included not only

state, but also county and local anti-cigarette laws.3

One Government post outside the legislative area provided an
outstanding exception to the official anti—tobacco furor. President
Kennedy, the moving force behind the initiation of the Public Health
Service study, had been assassinated in November of 1963. The new
occupant of the White House was still getting settled and, presumably

considering the report tricky politically, kept aloof from the problem.

 

1"Cigarette report gives basis for strong action, but FTC
ponders prOper steps," Advertising Age, January 20, 1964, p. 44.

2"New hope for cigarette smokers: crash effort for safer cigar-
ette," Saturday Evening Post, April 18, 1964, p..21u

31b1d.

175

An aid was quoted as saying that the report "hasn't been read, and

isn't likely to be."1 Other non-legislative agencies, however, out-
lined a striking contrast to this one exception. The Public Health
Service, it was rumored, had an educational campaign of major prOpor-
tions impending -- a campaign to mobilize doctors and health organiza-
tions in a strong drive to get an anti-smoking message directly to
smokers.2 The Federal Trade Commission, the tobacco industry's most
long standing Governmental foe, hesitated momentarily. In the first
days after the Surgeon General's report was released, FTC lawyers were
said to believe that, on the basis of the findings in the report, "vir-
tually every existing (cigarette advertising) campaign Could be success-
fully challenged as unfair and deceptive."3 According to trade sources,
commission planners believed that the tobacco companies "would readily
agree voluntarily to some form of cautionary warning on packages,"

but this, by itself, did not measure up to the need as they saw it.4
Then, a week after Surgeon General Terry's report, the FTC produced

the measure which was later to become one of the most controversial
introduced in the aftermath of Smoking and Health. In a reported attempt
to "protect the consuming public from false, misleading, deceptive or
unfair advertising of products that may endanger human health or

safety," the commission issued a three-part trade regulation ruling.5

 

1"FTC tries to kick the habit," Business Week, January 25. 1964.
p. 290

2"Cigarette report gives basis for strong action, but FTC pon-
ders prOper steps," Advertising Age, January 20, 1964, p. 44.

31bid.
4Ibid.

5"Cigarette ad control program would protect consumer, FTC con-
tends," Advertising_Aggn January 27, 1964, p. 3.

176

The three Specific rules included would: 1) require a strong health
hazard warning clearly and prominently diSplayed in every ad, announce-
ment or package, 2) ban pictures, symbols, sounds, or devices which
implied that smoking promoted good health or physical well being, was
not a hazard to health or -- unless that advertising could prove other-
wise -- that smoking one brand was less hazardous than another, and 3)
permit claims for filter performance provided (a) the claims were in
terms of a standard measurement which the FTC approved, (b) that all
other material facts bearing on the health consequences of smoking the
filtered brand were disclosed.1 In addition, the FTC proposed a volun-
tary tobacco industry code to control cigarette advertising's appeal

to youth.2

While these tobacco, anti-tobacco and Government reactions to
the Surgeon General's report were being made, the major cliff-hangers
were also reacting. From one of these previously undecided groups,
the AMA, came a ray of hOpe for tobaccomen. The American Medical
Association, which had cancelled a smoking and health study of its
own in deference to the Government project, had said, at that time,
that it would take a firm stand after seeing the Surgeon General's
findings. Now, however, the AMA refused to take that stand. Instead,
association officials announced that they would take up where the

Public Health Service committee left off. "Our purpose," the officials

 

1"FTC cigarette ad plan: industry code, plus rules," Advertisigg
Age, January 27, 1964, p. 3.

21bid.

177

were quoted as saying, ”is to find out what in the tobacco is harmful,

the mechanism of injury and what can be done to remove it."1

On the other hand, the reaction from the second cliff-hanging
group offered a note of darkness. The NAB TV code board, according
to Advertising Age, faced up to "the question of whether television
should move against its fourth biggest customer, the tobacco industry,
in an effort to protect young peOple...from the health hazards of
cigarette smoking."2 In a meeting in late January the board amended
its code to crack down on cigarette advertising which appealed to youth
or conveyed the impression of promoting general health. The key sec-
tions of that amendment were reported as follows: 1) care should be
exercised so that cigarette smoking will not be depicted in a manner
to impress the youth of our country as a desirable habit worthy of
imitation, and 2) the advertising of cigarettes should not be presented
in a manner to convey the impression that cigarette smoking promotes
health or is important to the personal development of the youth of our
country.3 The radio code board made a similar, but less conclusive
move when it passed a resolution against the portrayal of cigarette
smoking "in such a manner as to indicate to the youth of our nation.

that cigarette smOking contributes to the health and development of

 

1"New hope for cigarette smOkers: crash effort for safer cigar-
ettes," Saturday EveningZPost, April 18, 1964, p. 22.

2"Code action portends cigarette TV ad changeS," Advertising Age,

February 3, 1964, p. 3.

31bid.

178

youth or is a habit worthy of imitation.1

This move, unlike the TV
board's amendment, gave the code authority no power to deal with sta-
tions which chose to retain the status quo in cigarette copy. How-
ever, the overall reaction of the National Association of Broadcasters
was clearly negative to tobacco. Shortly after the television amend-
ment and radio proposal had been presented, the NAB board of directors
approved them. At the same time, in an additional confirmation of
their position, the directors defeated a move to oust NAB president

LeRoy Collins, electing him to another term in office.2

Among members of the NAB there were also reactions which illus-
trated concurment with the association's stand. Some of these were
even harsher than the NAB reactions. Paced by CBS, all of the TV
networks announced they were re-examining their advertising standards.
Frank Stanton, president of the Columbia Broadcasting System, indi-
cated little concern over the tobaccomen's situation when he reported-
ly said, "Any decline in cigarette advertising would be more than made
up from other products," with the increased demand for television
time.3 George B. Storer, Jr. of Storer Broadcasting gave much the
same impression when he was quoted as saying, the cigarette and health
controversy "naturally has worried" him a good bit, but that there were

advertisers waiting in line for the good time periods occupied by the

 

1"NAB directors okay curb on cigarette TV ads," Advertising Age,
February 3, 1964, p. 1.

2Ibid.

3"Cut in cigarette ads won't hurt: Stanton," Advertising Age,
January 27, 1964, p. 3.

179

tobacco companies.1

Individual radio stations, according to Egggdf
casting magazine, began "casting cold eyes on what they considered
their responsibilities in cigarette advertising."2 WMCA radio, New
York, canceled cigarette advertising on a popular late evening pro-
gram which had been receiving commercials for as many as six differ-
ent brands. A suburban Oakland, California station, KWUN, took
tougher measures, banning all cigarette commercials in all time periods.
In the midwest, W. A. Hillebrand, owner of Toledo's WMHE radio, posi-
tioned that Station even further down the road. Because of the health
'hazard implicit in smoking and the appeal of advertising to young peo-
ple, he said, "WMHE will no longer accept advertising for tobacco or
tobacco products."3 Finally, in the heart of tobaccoland, WAVA radio,
Arlington, Virginia, went so far as to launch a series of anti-smoking
messages. Using commercials for a fictional product called Big Deal
Cigarettes, the station began parodying conventional cigarette adver-
tising, ridiculing the idea that smoking was in some way a glamourous

paStjmeo4

Broadcasters were not the only members of the business to make
reactions to the Surgeon General's report. Other businessmen, and

eSpecially those directly or indirectly connected with cigarette adver-

 

1"Others wait in line to buy time held by cigarette companies:
Storer," AdvertisingyAge, January 27, 1964, p. 3.

2"Some radio stations ban cigarette ads," Broadcasting, February
3, 1964, p. 25.

31bid.

4Ibid.

180

tising, made their voices heard. Editor and Publisher said that while
no official scoreboard was kept on newsPaper editorials, "it was noted
that many editors thought the decision to smoke or not to smoke was up
to the individual."1 According to the same §§§_article almost all
neWSpapers considered prohibition "ridiculous," but a minority said
some public control was necessary. Others favored further research
and Government-supervised education on the hazards of smoking.2 The
managers of some media turned a darker face toward tobacco as a result
of Smoking and Health. New Yorker magazine, for example, announced it
would reject cigarette advertising pending publication of the Federal
Trade Commission's controls on such advertising.3 The Saturday Review
made a similar move, susPending cigarette advertising, trade sources
said, until "formulation of government policy with reSpect to labeling

and other appropriate measures" had been established.4

In another business area even closer to the tobacco industry and
its advertising, key executives of advertising agencies reacted. John
Orr Young, a founder of Young & Rubicam and publisher of the newsletter,
Better Advertisigg, reportedly said, "Whatever brickbats cigarette com-

panies and their agencies have received from their critics, they've had

 

1"Cigarette ads now running in papers," Editor and Publisher,
February 29, 1964, p. 32.

21bid.

3"New Yorker bars all cigarette ads," Advertising Age, February
3, 1964, p. 3.

4”Saturday Review suspends cigarette ads," Advertising Agg,
January 27, 1964, p. 3.

181

coming to them.”1

William Bernbach of Doyle Dane Bernbach, an agency
which had once handled Alpine cigarettes, was quoted as saying:
"In view of the recent report by the U.S. Surgeon
General, our present position is that we would not
accept a cigarette account. If subsequent infor-
mation or technical developments were to change
or negate the findings of the report, we would
review our position at that time."
Continuing, he said, "I just don't believe in cigarette advertising.
Smoking is bad for health. It shouldn't be encouraged."3 Another
agency head, David Ogilvy, chairman of Ogilvy Benson & Mather, took a
similar but more vehement stand. Questioned by Advertising Age, Mr.
Ogilvy told the magazine that his agency would not handle a cigarette
account.4 Later, in the CBS Reports program, Cigarettes: a Collision
of Interests, he made his personal feelings more explicit. In that
program Mr. Ogilvy characterized American cigarette commercials as
"disgraceful" and asserted that "they are intellectually dishonest
and the men who wrote them and who paid for them know it."5 The only
agency man immediately reported to be standing up for the tobacco
industry was Fairfax Cone of Foote, Cone & Belding in Chicago. Mr.

Cone told reporters that he didn't think advertising cigarettes per se

was any more immoral than the advertising of anything else. He was

 

1"Brickbats deserved, Young says," Advertising Age, February 3.
1964, p. 3.

2"DDB won't handle cigarette client, Bernbach says,” Advertising
Age, February 10, 1964, p. 91.

31bid.

4"Agency would refuse cigarette client: Ogilvy,” Advertising
Age, February 10, 1964, p. 91.

5"Collins, Cone, Ogilvy repeat views on cigarette situation,"
Broadcasting, April 20, 1964, p. 40.

182

also quoted as suggesting that if the manufacture and sale of cigar-
ettes was legal, then the advertising of them should be legal, too.
Additionally, one agency man was reported as extending a helping hand
to tobaccomen. Walter Terry, VP of Johnson and Lewis, an agency in
San Francisco, suggested at a January meeting of the Advertising
Association of the West that the AAW lend its influence to persuade
the cigarette companies to set up a code of advertising practice and
thereby avoid possible action by the FTC.1 Of course, Terry cannot be
credited as being the first to suggest such a code. It had been
offered as a possible solution to the smoking and health problem more
than once in the past. The British tobacco manufacturers were already
working under such a code. And, in the current turmoil, the Federal
Trade Commission was prOposing a similar arrangement as part of its

ad control program. However, the AAW accepted Mr. Terry's suggestion
and adopted a resolution calling for the cigarette companies to estab-

"2 This shows that

lish a code ”in the interest of health and economy.
by the time of the Surgeon General's report the idea of an advertising
code was present in the minds of individuals on many levels of the con-
troversy. It also helps to point out that not all advertising peOple
were reacting negatively to tobacco. As would be expected, some of

them were Silent. This group included all of the agencies then handling

cigarette accounts. And some, such as Fairfax Gone and Walter Terry,

 

1"AAW may urge cigarette makers to set up code," Advertising
Age, January 27, 1964, p. l.

2"AAW urges cigarette makers to adopt code in interest.of
health, economy," Advertising Age, February 3, 1964, p. 3.

183

were standing up for, or trying to help the cigarette makers.

The Americans who could have the most immediate and telling
effect upon tobaccomen were, of course, members of the buying public.

At first, there seemed to be no reaction from the public. U.S. News &

 

World Report, as late as January 27, 1964, said:
"Cigarette smokers appear to be taking the latest
health scare in stride. Spot checks across the
country indicate they ari continuing to smoke
about as much as usual."
But then, in February, as sales and shipment figures poured in, a
quite different picture develOped. The Saturday Evening Post, in a
major article published later in the year, said:
"All over the country, many people stopped smoking
completely, strove to cut down, or switched to
pipes or cigars, with the result that cigarette
sales dropped anywhere between 10 and 20 per cent
in every section of the United States."2
In its February 24, 1964 issue U.S. News & World Report was forced to
reverse its earlier appraisal of the Situation. "State tax officials,"
the magazine said, "found their income from cigarette taxes dwindling."3
January figures showed that New York State tax collections had fallen

five per cent. South Dakota had a 24 per cent drop in collections.

And, according to the magazine, "many other states felt it, too."4 But

 

1"Cigarette warning, the aftermath: reaction of smokers, con-
gressmen, stock market," U.S. News & World Report, January 27,
1964, p. 38.

2"New hOpe for cigarette smokers: crash effort for a safer cigar—
ette," Saturday Evening Post, April 18, 1964, p. 20.

3"Smokers' slowdown: How long will it last?", U.S. News & World
Report, February 24, 1964, p. 39.

41b1d.

184

the states were not the only ones feeling the sudden decline. A
nationwide grocery chain reported that carton sales of cigarettes were
20 per cent lower. Later reported IRS figures showed February Ship-
ments from manufacturers to retailers dropped 29.2 billion units -- 12
billion fewer than had shipped in January, which was also off the pace,

and 8.8 billion fewer than in February of 1963.1

The only less than
dark indications for tobaccomen were the sudden and contrasting spurt
in the sales of cigars and smoking tobacco, which many of the manufac-
turers also made, and what appeared to be a gradual recovery of cigar-
ette sales in the state of Idaho. However, these could not be called
beacons of light, either. Although cigar and smoking tobacco shipments
were up substantially, they could not begin to counteract the decline
in cigarettes, which accounted for over 80 per cent of the manufactur-
ers sales. Idaho sales, after first drOpping a reported 15 per cent,

had climbed back to within S to 10 per cent of the pre-report level,

but there were still forty-nine states showing a continuing slowdown.2

There was reaction, too, in other parts of the world. These
reactions should be recorded. For, though they were more distant they
added to the total effect of the Surgeon General's report. According
to AdvertisinggAgg, the worldwide reactions to Smoking and Health

"ranged from the swift 'let's ban all cigarette advertising' to 'we've

 

1"Smoking scare? What's happened to it?", U.S. News & World
Report, January 11, 1965, p. 38.

21bid.

185

heard it before' indifference."1

The strongest reaction came from
England. There, Laborite Legislator Francis Noel-Baker, a leader of
the Advertising Inquiry Council, said:
"We hope that as a first step toward a total ban

the Independent Television Authority will now

take cigarette advertising off British commercial

television altogether."2
In New Zealand, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, and the Netherlands
there were similar, but less pronounced reactions. On the other hand,
Australia, Italy, Japan, West Germany, Sweden and France seemed unmoved
by the American report. The official Australian reaction, for example,
reportedly was that "facts concerning smoking and cancer are already
widely-known and thus no sensational immediate restrictions on cigar-
ette ads are eXpected."3 West German Health Minister, Elisabeth
Schwarzhaupt, was quoted as saying, "the prevention of smoking would

be anti-democratic..."4

The French state-run tobacco industry said

the U.S. Surgeon General's report "has brought nothing new to light."5
In Japan, although the public reaction was reported as mixed, the chief
of public health in the Japanese Welfare Ministry said a ban on cigar-

ettes would be "impossible to impose.”6 The state-owned Swedish

 

1"Nations voice caution toward smoking study," Advertising Agg,
January 20, 1964, p. 3.

21bid.
31bid.
4Ibid.

5”French find nothing new in cigarette-health report," Adver-
tising Agg, January 27, 1964, p. 43.

6"Nations voice caution toward smoking StUdY." Advertising_Age,
January 20, 1964, p. 3.

186

tobacco industry reported that it did not plan to change its attitude
toward tobacco advertising, and would continue to support research

projects into smoking and health.1

These then were the immediate reactions to the Surgeon General's
report here and abroad. American tobaccomen were stunned and tried
to move away from the issue. Anti-tobacco groups, getting more of an
upper hand than they had expected, moved to begin new drives against
smoking. The Government, including both state and national legisla-
tures and the Federal Trade Commission, reacted swiftly, pushing old
and proposing new restrictions on the sale and promotion of cigarettes.
The two major groups who had been awaiting the report before taking a
stand on the smoking and health issue split, the NAB placing cigarette
restrictions in its code and the ANA suggesting further research needed
to be done. Some members of the business world, including those close
to cigarette advertising struck out at cigarette makers. Radio station
owners and managers of other major media announced bans on cigarette
advertising. Advertising agency executives declared that they would
not accept tobacco companies as clients. The American public reacted
by giving tobaccomen the first sales reversal they had experienced in
almost a decade. Finally, half of the foreign comments on the report

indicated stepped-up action against cigarettes and their promotion in

 

1"Nations voice caution toward smoking study," Advertising Agg,
January 20, 1964, p. 3.

 

187

countries outside the United States. The situation obviously called
for counteraction on the part of American tobaccomen. That counter-

action took the cigarette manufacturers down a road which ended in

the Cigarette Advertising Code.

CHAPTER XIII

DECISION

Of all the actions taken or prOposed in the early days after the
Surgeon General's report, those emanating from Government agencies held

the most serious, long-term threat for the tobacco industry.

Consider, for a moment, the other moves. Anti-tobacco informa-
tional and educational drives from known enemies of tobacco were famil-
iar and had been dealt with before. So, too, had declines in sales
brought about by health scares. In fact, only months before, the Amer-
ican manufacturers had witnessed the familiar decline and recovery
pattern in England after the British Royal College of Physicians' smo-
king and health report in that country. The new restriction placed in
the broadcasters' code, when examined in detail, revealed little that
was Specific. On the contrary, it was couched in rather ambiguous
terms, leaving generous looPholes and making it next to impossible to
enforce. Besides this, there were immense financial considerations
involved, and many NAB members had already proved their unwillingness
to damage those considerations. Those relatively few members of the
media and agency worlds who turned against cigarettes could not be

viewed as a serious threat, either. For they were not large in numbers,

188

189

nor substantial recipients of advertising dollars. Not a single tele-
vision station and not one agency then handling cigarette advertising
was involved. And here, again, there were financial considerations.
The monetary gains available to those who would not turn against the
industry afforded the cigarette companies confidence in this area.
Finally, just as the Surgeon General's report failed to produce a major
Stir in foreign countries, so those few actions taken abroad failed to

greatly impress the American industry.

In contrast to these actions, the Governmental threat including
state and national restrictive legislation, plus a new and far-reaching
ad control plan by the Federal Trade Commission was awesome. There-
fore, the tobacco industry's counteraction soon boiled down to a con-
certed effort to turn aside restrictive moves from the Government. Out

of this effort came the 1964 Cigarette Advertising Code.

Two types of Governmental threats faced the cigarette manufac-
turers: legislative action and FTC prOposals. Of the two the commis-
sion's ad control plan received the greatest and most immediate atten-
tion. The reasons for this involved time and content. Legislation
was likely to be delayed by lengthy argumentation, since tobacco
group congressmen were sure to oppose it. However, the FTC action
could be swift. In addition, although the proposed legislative mea-
sures were harsh, the ad control program proposed by the FTC appeared
harsher, eSpecially with its provision demanding warnings not only on
packages, but also in advertising. Consequently, the tobacco industry

and its friends moved quickly in a drive to stop the FTC plan.

190

That drive started early with rather unorganized attacks against
the FTC rules by individuals. Fairfax Cone of Foote, Cone & Belding
was one of the first to strike out. In an intraoffice memo, which was
made public, he reportedly said, "The FTC in its zeal is something less
than perfection." Of the three proposed rules, only the second seemed
reasonable to Mr. Cone. And even there, he was quoted as saying, "it
is doubtful what is meant by physical well being." Concerning the most
controversial rule, that dealing with package and ad warnings, the
advertising executive said the commission was "swimming in water way

over its head."1

By March, when the FTC held hearings on its prOposed plan, the
defensive tobacco strategy was highly organized and contained two
major weapons. The first was a head on clash over the legality of the
FTC'S move. Using this technique in the hearing debates, industry
Spokesmen tried to divert any restrictive measures into the legisla-
tiNt: area where they could better be controlled or stopped. "The
commission has no authority to issue such rules," said the tobaccomen,
asserting that "regulation of this sort is the job of Congress."2 The
second element in the tobacco industry's arsenal was designed to negate
the need for an ad control program. On March 16, 1964, counsel repre-

senting the Tobacco Institute informed the Federal Trade Commission

 

1"FTC too zealous in cigarette rules, Cone declares," Advertising
Agg, February 3, 1964, p. 3.

2"Smoking ad rule debate gets heated," Editor and Publisher,
March 21, 1964, p. 12.

191

that the tobacco companies had been working for "some time on an adver-

tising code."1

The comments from other participants in the hearings on these two
defensive weapons Showed that neither was held in high esteem. For
example, upon hearing that tobaccomen were challenging the legality of
the FTC'S proposals, Dr. Michael B. Shimkin stepped forward and de-
clared that the tobacco industry had "the morals of a barracuda."2 Re-
garding the call for self-regulation by the companies, Senator Maurine
Neuberger said, "Self-regulation is at best fantasy and at worst a
dilatory tactic."3 However, regardless of these statements, the in-
dustry continued on its course. Throughout the hearings and well
afterward industry Spokesmen continued to indicate that they would
fight the commission's authority to act. In April, Paul Rand Dixon,
chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, told congressmen that a
warning placed on each cigarette package "might save the companies a
lot of lawsuits." "However," he said, "the industry is backing away
from such a warning being used."4 It was Mr. Dixon's opinion that

any action taken by the FTC on labeling of cigarette ads would wind up

 

1"Cigarette makers' code sets up ad czar," Editor and Publisher,
May 21, 1964, p. 9.

2”Smoking ad rule debate gets heated," Editor and Publisher,
March 21, 1964, p. 12.

3”Tobacco - the Washington hearings," Time, March 27, 1964, p. 79.

4"c1garette makers' code sets up ad czar," Editor and Publisher,
May 2, 1964, p. 9.

192

up in the courts. In the meantime, Paul A. Porter of Arnold, Fortas
& Porter ~- one of the law firms representing the tobacco people --
reportedly talked to the Justice Department about the possible prob-
lems involved in setting up a cigarette advertising code. His purpose
in doing this, it was said, was to make sure the signatory companies

wouldn't be prosecuted or sued under antitrust laws.1

Although no
immediate answer from the Justice Department was forthcoming, the manu-
facturers proceeded. In early May the Tobacco Institute announced in
behalf of American Tobacco Company, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp-
oration, Larus & Brother Company, Incorporated, Liggett & Meyers
Tobacco Company, Philip Morris Incorporated, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco
Company, Stephano Brothers Incorporated, and United States Tobacco

Company that they had voluntarily agreed to abide by a Cigarette

Advertising Code drawn up by the Institute. Thus, as Editor and Pub-

 

lisher magazine said, "Another chapter in the long and smokey history
of cigarette advertising was written..."2 And thus, our story reaches

its climax.

The Cigarette Advertising Code was clearly another attempt by
the tobacco industry to placate its enemies. The four major sections
in article IV of the Code, which pertained to advertising standards,
were a two point conciliation to the attacks being made against cigar-

ette advertising. Section one dealt directly with the problem of

 

1"Smoke screen," New Republic, January 9, 1965, p. 6.

 

2"Cigarette makers' code sets up ad czar," Editor and Publisher,
May 2, 1964, p. 9.

 

193

advertising's appeal to youth. In it, advertisers were restricted
from 1) advertising on or near television and radio programs, or in
publications, directed primarily to persons under twenty-one years of
age, 2) advertising in school, college, or university media, or in
comic books or comic supplements to newspapers, 3) distributing sample
cigarettes to persons under twenty-one years of age, or distributing
sample cigarettes or conducting promotional efforts on school, college,
or university campuses, 4) representing that cigarette smoking is
essential to social prominence, distinction, success, or sexual attrac-
tion, 5) depicting smokers as being or appearing to be under twenty-
five years of age, 6) suggesting that the appearance or good health of
any person used in advertising is due to smoking, 7) picturing or illus-
trating a person smoking in an exaggerated manner, 8) depicting as a
smoker any person well known as being, or having been, an athlete, 9)
depicting as a smoker any person participating in, or having just
participated in, physical activity requiring stamina or athletic con-
ditioning beyond that of normal recreation, and 10) using testimonials
from athletes, or celebrities in the entertainment world, or other per-
sons who would have special appeal to persons under twenty-one years

of age. (See Appendix I)

Sections two, three and four dealt with various aspects of health
claims. In section two advertisers were restricted from making a rep-
resentation with respect to health unless: 1) it was significant in
terms of health and based on adequate relevant and valid scientific

data, or 2) a disclaimer as to Significance in terms of health was

194

included. Section three forbade references to the presence or absence
of a filter, or the description or depiction of a filter which consti-
tuted a representation with respect to health. Section four outlawed
references to the removal or the reduction of any ingredient in the
mainstream smoke of a cigarette unless: I) it was Significant in terms
of health and based on adequate relevant and valid scientific data; or
2) a disclaimer as to significance in terms of health were included; or
3) that the reference was not a health implication or that the impli-
cation was not material and the quantity of the ingredient was deter-
mined and expressed in accordance with pre-determined uniform standards.

(See Appendix I)

In addition to these broad restrictions dealing with the two
prime anti-tobacco areas of concern, the Cigarette Advertising Code
also included another conciliation. This one was a major Step for the
cigarette makers. Article II of the Code established a Code Adminis-
trator who was to be "a person of recognized independence, integrity
and intellectual achievement to the end that decision by him shall
command public confidence and respect."1 Under section two of that
article the Code Administrator was given "complete and final authority
to determine whether cigarette advertising complies with the standards
of (the) Code and to enforce (the) Code in all other respects."2 Thus,

for the first time, the industry placed control of its advertising

 

1Cigarette Advertising Code, p. 2.

21bid.

195

practices totally in the hands of an outside force. For, according to
the Code:
"Neither the Administrator nor any member of his stall
Shall be an officer, director, employee or stock-
holder of any manufacturer of tobacco products, nor
shall any such person have any financial interest in
the business of any such manufacturers."

Finally, in what could be considered another conciliation, the
Cigarette Advertising Code included several sections to assure the
manufacturers' compliance to its regulations. The most important of
these was contained in Article V, Procedures in Events of Violation of
Code. In section one of that article, Code members were made subject
to a fine of $100,000 for each violation of the Code. In section three
of the same article, the Code Administrator was given the power to
make violations public. In Article IV there was still another induce-
ment to compliance. Section five of Article IV stated:

"Any advertising determined by the Administrator to be
in conformity with the Code may include the following
legend: 'This advertising conforms to the standards of
the Cigarette Advertising Code.'"2

80 this is where the battle over cigarettes and their promotion
has brought the American tobacco manufacturers. The Cigarette Adver-
tising Code, as pointed out here, took at least fourteen years to

develop. It was the last and most sweeping in a series of conciliatory

moves which tobaccomen in America have been forced to make. The

 

1Cigarette Advertising Code, p. 2.

21bid., p. 7.

196

reasons why the battle over cigarette advertising began and eventually
reached this climax have been pointed out in detail in this investi-
gation. Those reasons can be distilled to two major facts. First, in
words and deeds, the American cigarette manufacturers consistently
revealed themselves as placing the health of the tobacco industry over
the health of the nation. This is not to say that this author sub-
scribes to the belief that cigarette smoking does, in fact, cause can-
cer and other ills. That determination was not the purpose of this
report, nor is it intended to be implied here. Rather, it is the
”possibility" of a relationship between smoking and health which is
referred to. This ”possibility” was strongly established in the years
between 1950 and 1964. And even if diSputed, it was still widely
accepted in public and official circles in the United States. These
factors should have had strong implications for the manufacturers
products and advertising. They did not. Second, in words and deeds,
the American cigarette manufacturers placed the immediate financial
health of their individual companies over the long-term health of the
entire industry. Time after time the critics of cigarettes and their
promotion were soothed, only to have an individual manufacturer dis-
regard the lessons of the past and the eventual effect upon the industry
in a search for quick profits. As a result of these two attitudes, the
industry and its largest members today face major advertising restric-

tions born and nurtured by their own hands.

PART TWO -- AFTERMATH

CHAPTER XIV

REACTION

After the Cigarette Advertising Code was established, burning
questions remained. How would its establishment affect the tobacco
industry and its friends, tobacco's known enemies, the Government, the
public? What changes would the Code produce in cigarette advertising?
How would these changes, in turn, affect the above mentioned groups?
In essence, what would the major consequences of the Code be? Without

the answer to this question, the story remains incomplete.

The immediate reactions of those involved provide the first part
of the answer. For they set the scene for what was to later follow.
It goes without saying that the signatory tobacco manufacturers were
at least moderately favorable to the Code. Otherwise, they would not
have signed. If there were questions in their minds those questions
would more than likely fall into two areas: 1) who would the Adminis-
trator be, and how would he interpret the Code, and 2) would the Code
with its chosen administrator have the desired effect: a calming of
the controversy. Part of the first of these two questions would soon
be answered by the tobaccomen themselves. Through the Tobacco Insti-
tute, they would pick an administrator. According to 3122 magazine,

industry officials were hopeful that they could "satisfy critics with

198

199

the kind of strong 'czar' professional football (had)."1 But the
questions of exactly how the administrator would interpret the Code
and what effect that would have on the industry and others would have
to wait. In the meantime, however, there were many Speculations among

industry members and those closely associated with the industry.

The cigarette manufacturers' comments covered the full spectrum
from a shrug of the shoulders to a confident "no changes" attitude.
For example, an American Tobacco Company spokesman reportedly said,
"No one knows just how it'Llaffect our advertising."2 On the other
hand, Robert Steinle, advertising manager for U.S Tobacco was quoted
as stating that the Code "will not product any change at all."3 James
Bolling, assistant to the president at Philip Morris, was a little
more Specific, indicating that the column, "On Campus," written for
Philip Morris by Max Schulman, would have to be cancelled.4 Sources
outside the industry, but related to it in one way or another, made

comments just as varying. According to Broadcastipg magazine, a few

 

observers believed that 90% of cigarette commercials would be changed
by the Code.5 "But more moderate experts," the magazine said, "agreed

that no administrator (was) liable to interpret the new rules so

 

1"Calling a smoke a smoke," Time, May 8, 1964, p. 84.

2"The Cigarette Ad Code: Will FTC buy it?", Sponsor, May 4,
1964, p. 24.
31bid.

4"Tobacco firms keep print ads in their plans," Editor and Pub-
lisher, May 2, 1964, p. 9.

 

5"What now for cigarette spOtS," Broadcasting, May 4: 1964,

p. 29.

 

200

strictly."1 These moderates, it was said, saw a gradual toning down
of cigarette commercials with less emphasis on the social importance

of smoking.2

The days following the announcement of the Code were a
time of silence for some agencies handling cigarette advertising
accounts. But others spoke out. Clifford Spiller, vice chairman of
the executive committee of Sullivan, Stauffer, Colwell and Bayles,
which handled part of American Tobacco's advertising, said, "During
the past eight months we have been living under the provisions of the
Code."3 In a reported sampling of commercial producers there was
little evidence that they expected the Code to be a financial bonanza.4
Mickey Dubin of Klaeger Associates, a New York production house, was
quoted as saying:
"I think most cigarette companies were completely

ready for the code. Most points in the code were

included in commercials currently being shot or

recently completed."5
A Spokesman for MPO film producers told Sponsor magazine, "The cigar-
ette code is likely to have little effect as a panic producer." Al

Mendelsohn of Elliot, Unger & Elliot reportedly said, "Essentially,

everything in the code has been discussed between us and agencies for

 

1"What now for cigarette SPOtS," Broadcasting. May 4. 1964,
p. 29.

 

21bid.

3"Tobacco firms keep print ads in their plans," Editor and Pub-
lisher, May 2, 1964, p. 9.

4

 

Ibid.

5"No code panic at commercial filmers," Sponsor, May 4, 1964.
p. 3.

61bid.

201

the past eight or nine months."1 Trade sources, too, made contrasting
speculations. Newsweek, for example, said that "If it meant what it
seems to say, the code will snuff out some of the industry's subtlest
sales pitches."2 In its own speculation, Sponsor magazine felt that
the code, "even under a severe administration," would not wander far

from what were already accepted as sound practices.3

While these speculations were being made, other groups reacted
to the Code's establishment. Tobacco state legislators, who had a deep
interest in the industry, naturally applauded. Kentucky senators
Thurston B. Morton and John Sherman C00per were reported as jointly

4 North Carolina representative Harold C. Cooley,

praising the code.
chairman of the House Agriculture Committee and a major supporter of
federally financed tobacco research, was quoted as stating that the
code in combination with research was the "only effective means of pro-
viding maximum assurances of health for the millions of adults who
prefer to continue smoking."5 A similar plaudit came from Governor

Terry Sanford of North Carolina, who reportedly said the code is

"evidence of statesmanship and public responsibility."6 Praise flowed

 

1"No code panic at commercial filmers," Sponsor, May 4. 1964:
p. 3.

2"Smoke-filled code,” Newsweek, May 11, 1964, p. 72.

3”The cigarette Ad Code: Will FTC buy it?", Sponsor, May 4.

 

1964, p. 24.

4"What now for cigarette spots?", Broadcasting, May 4. 1964,
p. 32.

5Ibid.

61bid.

202

freely from other congressmen, too, including those who had introduced
anti-smoking bills. Representative Morris K. Udall, noting his own
record of criticism of the tobacco industry "for its flagrant attempts
to lure young peOple into the smoking habit" said, "the industry de-
serves commendation for taking such a big Stride."1 Senator Frank E.
Moss, who in 1963 had written tobacco manufacturers and TV network
heads asking them ”to take the glamour out of cigarette advertising,"
also commended the industry's move. Representative Paul A. Fino,
backer of his own anti-smoking measure, was quoted as saying, "this is

a step in the right direction."2

However, there were congressmen and representatives of other
Government agencies who did look as kindly toward the industry and its
Inew code. Senator Mike Monroney, for example, reportedly observed
that the code "provides an excellent beginning" but that while it
seemed to deal with affirmative representation, it did not touch upon
"failure to reveal something."3 This, presumably, was a reference to
the package and advertising warnings which were under consideration.
Senator Maurine Neuberger made essentially the same point when she
commended the companies for their code. "The plan," she said, "goes
far beyond the meager efforts of the recent past." But, at the same

time, She told Broadcasting magazine that she was "disappointed that

 

there is no requirement that the public be warned about the effect of

 

1"What now for cigarette spots?", Broadcasting, May 4, 1964.
p. 32.

 

2Ibid.

3Ibid.

203

smoking on health."1 Surgeon General Terry, in a keynoting speech at
the National Conference on Cigarette Smoking and Youth called by the
American Cancer Society, reportedly expressed his "highest praise" for
the code Stating that he hOped ”it will be enforced as written."2
Then, in the same speech, he sounded an ominous note when he said, "it
would be helpful to us in dissuading peOple from smoking if the cigar-
ette industry Spent less money in advertising, especially in radio and
TV."3 Darkening the situation even more, Dr. Terry listed some of the
anti-smoking actions planned by the Government. These included a
group of surveys to analyze the amount and distribution of smoking, an
evaluation of the methods used in clinics for smokers who wished to
break the habit, and the establishment of a Public Health Service
clearing house on smoking and health.4 However, of all those not
exactly satisfied with the code, FTC chairman Dixon was the most vehe-
ment. The new tobacco company code, he warned, "is not going to remove
our obligations in any way to enforce the law..."5 He felt that the
code in no way dealt with the problem of smoking as a health hazard,

and, according to Advertising Age, he said, "this is the main problem

 

we are lookin at."6 Mr. Dixon's comments ortended actions in the
8 P

immediate future.

 

1"What now for cigarette spots?", Broadcasting, May 4: 1964:
p. 32.

 

2"Dr. Terry lauds cigarette code, raps misleading advertising,"
Sponsor, June 15, 1964, p. 14.

31bid.

4Ibid.

5"What now for cigarette Spots?", Broadcastipg, May 4, 1964, p. 32.

 

6"Cigarette code may obviate FTC action," Advertising Age, p. 1.

 

204

In early June the cigarette manufacturers made their Code Adminis-
trator choice. He was Robert B. Meyner, ex-Governor of New Jersey.
After their choice was made public there were reactions to the Meyner
appointment. According to Newsweek Senator Neuberger stated that
"Meyner had the potential to be the strong, vigorous, no-nonsense type
of administrator that is necessary if the code is to be more than a
simple statement of good intentions."1 Howard Bell, director of the
National Association of Broadcasters' Code Authority, reportedly said:

"I feel confident Governor Meyner will prove to be
an excellent choice. I have known him for years.
He is competent, courageous, and has a deep under-
standing of public needs."
In the same statement, however, Bell added that the NAB would continue
to administer its own code on cigarette advertising, working in infor-
mal liaison with the cigarette industry. Meyner himself was quoted as
saying this about his appointment:
"It will involve a great deal of work, but I look
with favor on the industry's efforts to regulate
itself. I'll be a judge, enforcing the code whgre
it's clear, and deciding where it's not clear."
In another report, he was quoted as stating, "it is better for the

industry to regulate itself and the cigarette companies are attempting

to do this."4

 

1"Tobacco: Cigarette Czar," Newsweek, June 22, 1964, p. 42.

2"Meyner gets nod as cigarette code czar," Sponsor, June 15,
1964, p. 14.

3"Tobacco: Cigarette Czar," Newsweek, June 22, 1964, p. 42.

4"Meyner gets nod as cigarette code czar," Sponsor, June 15,

1964, p. 14.

205

Later in June, it became apparent there were those who disagreed
with Mr. Meyner. On June 23, 24, 25, 29 and July 2 hearings were held
before the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee to deter-
mine how the industry and its advertising practices could best be regu-
lated by the Government. The discussion was not over self-rule vs.
Government-rule as much as it was over which agency of the Government
should regulate tobacco. In those hearings Senator Maurine Neuberger
said:

"The industry, in adOpting its code of cigarette
advertising practices, has demonstrated the limits
of its capacity for self-regulation. In doing so
it has Shown that it is able to eliminate certain
gross practices, particularly relating to appeals
to children, but the industry code ignores the
crucial requirement of an affirmative warning in
all cigarette advertising. I think we can be sat-

isfied that this requirement will not come by way
of voluntary action."

Speaking out for the three-point FTC proposal and the educational

and investigative program of the Public Health Service she declared:
"Congress, either directly or by implication, should
do nothing which would obstruct or impede the imple-
mentation of those agency programs."

Some legislators felt that the FTC plan was not pre-emptive as legis-

lation could be, and would leave the tobacco industry at the mercy of

massive and conflicting state and local laws. Senator Neuberger

 

1U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, Hearings, Cigarette Labeling_and Advertisigg, 88th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964, p. 25.

21bid., p. 24.

206

answered:
"The FTC prOposals strike at the heart of the public
issues raised by cigarette advertising practices.
If the rules are issued substantially as prOposed,
I have no doubt that the steam will be dissipated
from all local attempts to add what may be onerous
conditions to the sale of cigarettes..."1
Speaking specifically about the advertising warning portion of the FTC
rules, which were also in the bills she had introduced, the Senator
said:
"No one who has viewed the phenomenon of cigarette
advertising practices objectively believes that we will
be able to convince our children that cigarette smoking
is a truly significant hazard to their health so long
as cigarette advertisements are free from warning."
"The prOposed FTC rules will require such a warning. It
would be tragic indeed, Mr. Chairman, if these rules
were to fall victim to the tobacco lobby."2
Following Senator Neuberger, North Carolina Representative Horace
R. Kornegay expressed an Opposing view. "...I maintain, to brand
every package of cigarettes is utterly absurd on the basis of informa-
tion published thusfar," he said.3 The argument continued as Repre-
sentative Bernard F. Grabowski defended his regulative bill, one of

the nine under consideration, by quoting from a Changing Times article

dating back to December, 1962:

 

1U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Cam-
merce, Hearings, Cigarette Labeling and Advertising, 88th Congp,
2nd Sess., 1964, p. 24.
2

Ibid., p. 26.

3Ibid., p. 27.

207

"In view of all that is known about cigarettes now,

the freedom permitted cigarette advertising must

be regarded as an anomaly, even in a nation dedi-

cated to free enterprise."
"While there may have been some justification for a 'go slow' approach
in the past before medical evidence was conclusive," Representative
Grabowski added, "there is no such justification now."2 Roy A. Taylor,
another representative from North Carolina, took aim at all the mea-
sures being considered, including the FTC ad control plan and the pro-
posed Public Health Service program. In his opinion, the Surgeon
General's report was not definitive research and no steps should be
taken until more research was conducted. "...I believe," Taylor said,

"that we need more research, more study and more information before

drastic action of the type proposed is taken."3

When Paul Rand Dixon, chairman of the FTC, came before the House
Committee the tone of the hearings grew hotter. As 2393 magazine later
said, critical Congressmen "talked tough" to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion chief.4 They wanted him to forget his plan to make cigarette man-
ufacturers place warning labels on their products. Mr. Dixon replied
to their challenge with a statement which shocked everybody. It was
too late, he told them. The commission had already voted to adopt pack-

aging and advertising labeling regulations and the order had been written.

 

1U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-c

merce, Hearings, Cigarette Labeling and Advertising, 88th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 1964, p. 35.

21bid.

3

Ibid., p. 37.

4"Smoke & Ire," Time, JUlY 3. 1964: P- 78°

208

Then, distributing copies of the order to Congressmen, he reportedly
remarked somewhat sarcastically: "We had our printers working all

night in case you wanted one."1

The hearings before the House Committee were the first chance
that interested parties had had to test what the reactions to the
industry's code might be. Now they had a definite answer. The code's
establishment may have affected arguments over the legislative mea-
sures being proposed. It may also have affected some portions of the
FTC ad control program as originally proposed. But it had not affected
the prOposed FTC ruling which tobaccomen feared most; packaging and
especially advertising labeling. Despite the code, and despite appeals
from influential Congressmen, the FTC had ordered cigarette makers to
print health warnings on all their packages by January 1, 1965, and

write them into all advertisements as of July 1, 1965.

Now it was time for the tobacco industry to react. That reaction
was forceful and immediate. Bowman Gray, chairman of R. J. Reynolds,
called the order "unwise" and "unwarranted."2 Speaking for the indus-
try, Mr. Gray said that if the FTC rule was allowed to go into effect,

the tobacco industry would Oppose it "in the courts, if necessary."3

 

1"Smoke & Ire," Time, July 3, 1964, p. 78-
21bid.

3"How tobacco men will fight the FTC rule," Printer's Ink,
July 10, 1964, p. 9.

 

209

Trade sources said that the Gray statement meant that the industry
planned on contesting the FTC'S authority "to enforce conformity with
broad principles without establishing the applicability to each case

II]-

it tests. A further statement from the Reynolds executive revealed

where the tobaccomen's major concern lay. According to Printer's Ink,

 

Gray said that warnings on packages were enough, and that to warn
against the use of a product in advertising "would subvert the purpose
of advertising."2 Representative Horace R. Kornegay of North Carolina,
one of Dixon's chief challengers, demanded an opinion from the come
mission chairman on whether action by Congress would not nullify the

FTC action.3

Chairman Dixon, however, was unmoved. He said that the
July deadline for advertising labeling compliance might be revised or
eliminated by the commission, but that would only be done if evidence
were presented to the FTC by May which showed that warnings in adver-

tising were no longer necessary.4

Tobaccomen were not the only ones who reacted to the Federal
Trade Commission order. Officials in the departments of Agriculture,
Commerce, and Health, Education and Welfare were reported as wondering
whether they should have jurisdiction in the matter instead of the

independent FTC -- or whether any labeling rule should be enforced at

 

1"How tobacco men will fight the FTC rule," Printer's Ink, July
10, 1964, p. 9.

 

21bid.
3"FTC 'might' revise ruling," Sponsor, June 29, 1964, p. 16.

4"How tobacco men will fight the FTC rule," Printer's Ink, JUIY
10, 1964, p. 9.

210

all.1 Surgeon General Terry, whose fact-finding body had triggered

the restrictive furor, was quoted as doubting that the FTC had juris-
diction, and suggesting that the matter be turned over to the Food

and Drug Administration.2 In a letter submitted as additional infor-
mation for the record of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce
Committee hearings, Mark F. Cooper, president of the Advertising Feder-
ation of America, made it clear that members of the advertising world
were also opposed to the ruling. Speaking of the advertiser's rights,
he declared it was an "infringement on the advertiser's right under

the first amendment of the Constitution for a regulatory agency (the

FTC) to promulgate substantive rules having full force of law."3

Faced with this kind of broad negative reaction and what appeared
to be a long dispute in the courts and Congress, chairman Dixon himself
was quoted as admitting that the FTC rule would not take effect for
years -- if ever.4 In mid-August still another reaction to the order
made that prospect seem even more likely. Representative Oren Harris,
chairman of the House committee on interstate and foreign commerce,
notified Dixon that cigarettes would be high on his 1965 legislative
program. In a letter to the FTC chairman, Harris reportedly requested

that the order be withheld, on the grounds that "in such a grave matter

 

1"Smoke & Ire," Time, July 3, 1964, p. 78.

21bid.

3U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, Hearings, Cigarette Labeling and Advertising, 88th
Cong., 2nd Sess., 1964, p. 322.

4"Smoke & Ire," Time, July 3, 1964, p. 79.

211

Congress should be given the opportunity to legislate."1 As AHXEE'
tisingpAgg said, the FTC had "discovered who held the whip hand."2

By return mail the commission agreed to postpone the effective date of
its rule from January 1st until July lst. So now, although the Cigar-
ette Advertising Code by itself had failed to accomplish it, the
Federal Trade Commission threat had been turned aside. However, the
question of whether or not that threat could be eliminated was still

undecided.

While this regulative controversy was under way, further reac-
tions were being made to the establishment of the tobacco industry's
code. In July, 1964 a group of anti-tobacco campaigners made a new
move without so much as a public mention of the code. After years of
uncoordinated attacks against cigarettes and their advertising, a long
list of tobacco's enemies announced in a Government press release that
they had formed the National Interagency Council on Smoking and Health.
The participating members included: the American Association of School
Administrators, the American Cancer Society, the American Dental Asso-
ciation, the American Heart Association, the Association of State and
Territorial Health Officers, the National Congress of Parents and
Teachers Association, the National Tuberculosis Association, the U.S.
Office of Education, the U.S. Public Health Service, the U.S. Chil-

dren's Bureau, and the Department of Classroom Teachers.3 Regardless

 

1"Smokescreen," New Republic, January 9, 1965, p. 6.

 

2"Who controls smoking?", Advertising Agg, January 4, 1965, p. 6.

 

3"Meyner confers with FTC; Surgeon General; group formed to
combat smoking hazard," Advertising Agg, July 20, 1964, p. 3.

 

212

of the fact that the Cigarette Advertising Code was not Specifically
discussed in the press release, this must be considered a negative
reaction to the code; positive proof that a majority of the anti-tobacco

groups felt it was not enough.

In September, a final and, to tobaccomen, disturbing reaction to
the code's establishment was made. Emerson Foote, executive of McCann-
Erickson and long-time tobacco advertising man, publicly announced that
he was resigning from the agency and the whole business of advertising
cigarettes. In view of the Surgeon General's report and in spite of
the Cigarette Advertising Code, Mr. Foote felt his conscience would no
longer allow him to be connected in any way with cigarettes. 0n the
contrary, he declared himself as against tobacco products and their
promotion. As proof of his convictions, he offered his services to
the newly formed National Interagency Council on Smoking and Health.
Some advertising men praised the Foote resignation. David Ogilvy of
Ogilvy Benson & Mather, for example, reportedly said, "I can only ad-
mire acts of conscience."1 Others, especially those connected with
cigarette accounts, quickly stepped forward to indicate that Mr. Foote's
move would not be the first in a chain reaction. Norman H. Strouse,
chairman of J. Walter Thompson, was quoted as saying:

"Our management has no conflict of interest. We have

a very fine c%ient in Liggett & Meyers and we have
no problems."

 

1"Reactions to Foote resignation range from admiration to doubt,"
Advertising_Age, September 28, 1964, p. 3.

 

2Ibid.

213

Edward M. Thiele, president of Leo Burnett Company, Inc. which handled

much of the Philip Morris business, told Advertising Age:

 

"We find it no stretch whatever of our conscience
to advertise cigarettes. There is no proof that
cigarettes are bad for health."
Kenneth Laird, president of Tatham-Laird, reportedly said, "as long as
cigarettes may be legally sold, we feel that cigarettes are entitled
to effective advertising."2 However, even with these assurances that

many agencies were standing behind the manufacturers, the situation

still had a man-biteS-dog appearance.

Finally the statements and moves which could be considered direct
or indirect reactions to the Cigarette Advertising Code's establish-
ment died down. In their wake there were still unanswered questions.

How would the code and its new administrator affect cigarette adver-
tising? How would that effect, whatever it might be, affect the contro-
versy? Indeed, would the code have a chance to affect cigarette adver-
tising or the controversy? Would there be a coordinated Government
position which could negate the code? Or would there continue to be a
tug-of-war between individual members of Congress and regulatory agencies
like the FTC? Not until these questions and others have been answered

can the true consequence of the code be determined.

 

1"Reactions to Foote resignation range from admiration to doubt,"
Advertising Age, September 28, 1964, p. 3.

2Ibid.

CHAPTER XV

DAYS OF ANTICIPATION

Since the Cigarette Advertising Code contained much broad,
interpretable language, attention focused upon the man who was chosen
as its administrator. Both pro and anti-tobacco groups watched closely
for any hint of how Meyner would interpret the code. On that could
well rest the future of cigarette advertising, and of the entire tobac-

co industry.

The hints were not long in coming. Nor were they small in mean-
ing. In his first move as administrator, Meyner met not with tobacco-
men, as might be expected, but with the FTC, the Surgeon General and
the infant National Interagency Council on Smoking and Health. His
purpose reportedly was to get the "thinking and suggestions of those
in Washington who would have an interest in the cigarette code."1 This
action must have distressed the cigarette makers and encouraged their
enemies. It appeared that the code's administrator might be closely
allied with Government movements to restrict cigarette advertising.

Certainly, it indicated he was not wholly on the side of the industry.

 

1"Meyner confers with FTC; Surgeon General; group formed to
combat smoking hazard," Advertisipg Agg, July 20, 1964, p. 3.

 

214

215

Later, in a memo written by John Crichton to the American Assoc-
iation of Advertising Agencies, and distributed among many of its mem-
bers, more concrete notions of the new administrator's views came to
light. On September 14, 1964 Crichton had met with Meyner as a repre-
sentative of the advertising community. Recalling that meeting in his
memo, he said:

"Governor Meyner expressed the view that the FTC had
warned him of the importance of getting the totality
of an advertisement. He (the administrator) was con-
cerned about the sound and inflection, and whether
the total effect of the advertisement might be mis-
leading..."1
Continuing, Crichton said:
"He does not lean toward an explicit interpretation
of the points of the tobacco advertising code at
this time. It may be that he will revise this Opin-
ion as he moves toward the meeting with advertising
men from the tobacco companies."
In the same memo the advertising representative said that he (Crichton)
had suggested that Meyner might be well advised to have an advertising
man on his staff. But the administrator, according to the memo, said
he wondered if the advertising man "would be sympathetic toward the

need for regulation and if he would be too permissive."3 Under a sec-

tion of the memo headed "Some observations" Crichton also made other

 

1John Crichton, "Memorandum of Conversation between Governor

Meyner and John Crichton," American Association of Advertising
Agencies, September 14, 1964.

 

2Ibid.

3Ibid.

216

revealing points. Speaking of Meyner, he said:

"At one point he asked whether advertisements could be
'standardized' to make clearance problems easier. At
a later point he said he had sometimes thought that
promotion of the brand name was most important, and
that simply Showing the package might be as effective
as many present themes."

And finally:

”Evidently a good deal of the Governor's preoccupation
is with the role of the office. Several times he
mentioned the problems of regulation, repeating that
the situation might require action, not Speeches. He
said a definite date for the installation of the code
might imply that there would be a noticeable change

in advertising before and after that date. He asked
if regulation didn't have to be 'visible and present'

..."

Now it began to look like the code, under Meyner, might have real
teeth in it. He apparently thought highly of the Government advice he
had received. In addition, he had some ideas of his own. What is
more, it appeared as though he intended to act on that advice and those
ideas. This could mean a strict interpretation of the code, indeed, and

some major changes in cigarette advertising.

In October the code administrator made public some of his views.
His statements served to back up the Crichton.impressions. According

to Advertising Age, Meyner said that he was "still undecided about how

 

 

1John Crichton, "Memorandum of Conversation between Governor

Meyner and John Crichton," American Association of Advertisigg
Agencies, September 14, 1964.

2Ibid.

217

his office (would) regulate advertising."1

However, just as John
Crichton had indicated, he said he was considering a "standardized"

creative approach such as ads showing only the package to "make clear-

ance problems easier."2

Deepite these indications that the code might be strictly inter-
preted, members of the industry seemed unperturbed. In fact, some of
the tobacco companies' movements made it appear that they were getting
ready for another record rush on their brands; another year like all
those in the past decade. Philip Morris, for example, announced that
it would back its products with the heaviest network television adver-
tising schedule in the firm's history in 1965.3 American Tobacco,
which had introduced charcoal filter-tipped Carlton cigarettes with
tar and nicotine contents printed on the package and pointed up in
advertising in early 1964, continued to give the product extensive
exposure. The introduction or test marketing of other charcoal brands
such as Tempo,Galaxy, Lark, MMltifilter, and Devon with filters made-
of bonded charcoal, activated charcoal, fortified charcoal, and coconut-
shell charcoal, all gave the appearance that the manufacturers were

tuning up for another derby.

However, there were also changes being made which reflected an

anticipation of the code's enforcement. For example, early 1964 ads

 

1"Czar ponders cigarette ad rule ways and means," Advertising
Age, October 5, 1964, p. l.

21bid.

3"Philip Morris to launch record network TV drive," Sponsor,
October 5, 1964, p. 24.

218

prominently featured the phrase, "Kent with the MICRONITE filter gives
you the best combination of filter-action and satisfying taste." In
the c0py the Micronite filter was described as "highly adsorptive."
When the October Kent ads appeared the former phrase had been altered
to delete any reference to filter action. It now read, "Kent combines
the famous MICRONITE filter with the world's finest 'Flavor-blended'
tobaccos...the best combination of filter and good taste..." The des-
cription of the brand's filter as "highly adsorptive" had been elimi-
nated completely. In addition to these c0py changes, there were also
some subtle visual changes in Kent advertising between January and
October of 1964. In January, the main illustration of the ad was a
colorful photograph of a young-looking male and female model in what
could easily be considered a dating situation. On the other hand,
October Kent ads featured much older looking models in a husband and
wife situation. The colorful photography had been replaced by an empha-
sis of white upon white, with both the models' clothes and the back-

ground in that color.1

These c0py changes, and the first of the two
visual changes can be related directly to sections of the code. The
second visual change, the switch to white upon white, was apparently

introduced for other reasons.

Another somewhat subtler example of anticipatory changes is
demonstrated by Winston advertising. In January advertising for this
brand described the filter as "pure white, modern." In October it had

been reduced simply to "modern." Additionally, just as with the Kent

 

1Various 1964 consumer magazines.

219

advertisements, the models and the situation had changed. In January
the display line, "Flavor that goes with fun," was under illustrations
of a young couple obviously enjoying themselves on a skiing date. The
October Winston ad used the same display line, but it was under illus-
trations of an older and more mature-looking couple enjoying home
movies.1 Again, these changes can be attributed to sections of the

manufacturers' code.

Viceroy advertising provides yet another example of anticipatory
changes. In January Viceroy advertisements strongly featured the fil-
ter aspects of the brand. The main illustration pictured seven filter
cigarettes. The headline asked, "Which one is the Viceroy? Why should
you care?" The immediate answer was "You should care because Viceroy's
got the Deep-Weave filter and the taste that's right." The copy went
on to say:

"Viceroy is scientifically made to taste the way you'd
like a filter cigarette to taste."

"Not too strong like those filter brands that taste as
if they didn't have a filter at all. And not too
light. Viceroy's got the taste that's right."
With the appearance of Viceroy's October advertising one major change
had been made. The rather stark comparative illustration of the seven
filter brands had been relegated to a small box near the bottom of the
ad, and in its place was a photograph of a mature-looking couple en-

joying a cigarette. Along with this illustration change, the headline

had been changed to "Viceroy's got the Deep-Weave filter for the taste

 

1Various 1964 consumer magazines.

220

that's right!" This headline idea, as mentioned above, was part of

the answering subhead in the earlier ad. However, there was one subtle

difference. In the January version the line said, "...and the taste
that's right," but in the later rendition it was, "...for the taste
that's right." This change, as small as it seems, could be implied to

put less emphasis on the filter by tying it more directly into the
taste of the cigarette. Beyond this, the October ad had another slight
difference. The c0py, instead of saying, "Not too strong like those
filter brands that taste as if they didn't have a filter at all. And
not too light," was shortened to simply, "Not too strong...not too

light."1

Anticipatory changes could also be seen in the advertising of
charcoal filter cigarettes. Tareyton, the oldest and most well estab-
lished brand, provides an example. Both January and October advertise-
ments for Tareyton featured models with blacked eyes and the headline:
"Us Tareyton smokers would rather fight than switch." However, the
inner portions of the ads had been altered. In January the subhead
had said, "Join the Unswitchables. Get the filter that made Activated
Charcoal famous...and the taste that makes Tareyton smokers so loyal."
By November it read, "Join the Unswitchables. Get the charcoal filter
with the taste worth fighting for." This change, like the one made in
Viceroy ads, tied the filter story closer to taste. Descriptive copy

dealing specifically with the filter also showed a variation. The

 

1Various consumer magazines, 1964.

221

early 1964 c0py in this area said, "The white filter gives you clean
taste -- the charcoal filter gives you smooth taste. Together they
give you the great taste of Dual Filter Tareyton." Copy in the later
ad failed to mention the words, "clean" or "smooth," but said only:
"The Activated Charcoal filter works with the white

filter to actually improve the flavor of Tareyton's

fine tobaccos...and deliver a more fully balanced

taste than you've enjoyed before."

Advertising for Lark, one of the newer charcoal brands also
showed signs of change. In February of 1964 Lark advertising was
based heavily on filtration. An overline read, "Unique in cigarette
filtration." The main illustration was an oversized cut-away repre-
sentation of what was called "Lark's unique 3-piece Keith filter."
The headline said, "Discover the good things that happen to smoke fil-
tered through charcoal granules." The c0py of the ad went into great
lengths to tell an action story for the filter. In this copy it was
pointed out that Lark's fine tobaccos were "made to taste even better
because the smoke is filtered through charcoal granules," and that
Lark had a new kind of smoothness "made possible by charcoal granules
not only activated but specially fortified..." Going even further,
the back of the Lark package was displayed, giving more details about
the filter and its charcoal. Here it was pointed out that charcoal
granules were "a basic material science uses to purify air," and that
Lark's granules, "not only activated but Specially fortified, filter
smoke selectively..." In October this advertising had received two

alterations, both of which appear to relate to the pending code enforce-

 

1Various consumer magazines, 1964.

222

ment. First, the overline was changed from "Unique in cigarette fil-
tration," to "Look into Lark." The "unique" idea was still carried on
the diSplayed package. However, by taking it out of the overline, its
importance was diminished somewhat. Second, the word "Discover" in the
headline was changed to "Taste." This could have merely been a factor
of the brand's move through the introductory stage. But, on the other
hand, since it brought taste directly into the headline, it might also
be considered an attempt to comply with anticipated code interpreta-

tions.1

Filter cigarettes were not the only brands changed in anticipa-
tion of the code. Some regular cigarette advertising was changed, too.
Most of these changes dealt with advertising's appeal to youth under
section one of Article IV in the code. Chesterfield advertising is a
case in point. The major change in this advertising from January to
October was the extraction of an excitement element which, it must
have been felt, violated part (d) of section one by representing cigar-
ette smoking as essential to success, distinction, social prominence,
or sexual attraction. January ads pictured two men participating in
the dangerous task of mountain climbing. An overline said, "Taste of
action: Rock climbing in Cheyenne Canyon." The headline, "Tastes
great because the tobaccos are," was followed by copy emphasizing that
Chesterfield had "vintage tobaccos -- grown mild, aged mild, blended
mild and made to taste even milder thru longer length." In October

the action climbing scenes had given way to a composite of static

 

1Various consumer magazines, 1964.

223

photographs Of "Chesterfield People": PeOple who, according to the
headline, "like a mild smoke, but just don't like filters." These
photos, which in one ad, included a pottery maker, a stock and grain
farmer, and an Optical physicist, were not of exactly ordinary people.
But, compared to the earlier pictures, neither were they heroic fig-
ures. The COpy in the October ads remained basically the same as it
had been in January, emphasizing the qualities of the Chesterfield

tobaccos.1

While some of these anticipatory changes were being put into
effect, the administrator began holding talks with representatives Of
the tobacco industry. During these talks his views and the code, as
it would be, solidified even more. In the process it became apparent

that some Of the changes already made would not be enough.

Advertising agency personnel, after meeting with company Offi-
cials who had attended those meetings, said the administrator again
indicated that he would judge the acceptability of advertising by the
total impression he felt it would generate in the minds of consumers.2
This was recognized by the advertisers and their agencies as a good
deal broader than the approach used in years past by the FTC which
examined words and phrases, not totality. While Meyner did not go so
far as to suggest that cigarette advertising be "standardized", he did

hand down a set of standard guidelines. These guidelines covered four

 

1Various consumer magazines, 1964.

2Discussions with various agency men.

224

areas; filter, filter and flavor, what the Governor called euphoria,

and celebrities and athletes.

Concerning filter claims, it was established by these guidelines
that no descriptive or modifying words could be used. This immediately
meant that words then widely in use, such as Micronite, Selectrate,
Keith, Dual, and Deep-Weave, would have to be elhminated. WOrds like
charcoal and white and inner and outer would be questionable. One
brand, Philip Morris Multifilter, would even have to change its name.
Further, it was established that no action could be attributed to fil-
ters. This, too, would seem to indicate changes in graphics and word-

ing.

The guideline on filter and flavor established that if these two
words were given equal emphasis, or if filter received more emphasis,
the advertising would not be acceptable. However, the administrator
indicated that reference could be made to a filter within the framework
of advertising which delivered a predominantly flavor message. So,
although the advertiser's ability to describe or place importance on a
filter story was apparently going to be reduced, filters could remain

a part Of cigarette advertising.

The euphoria guideline was basically Meyner's interpretation of
part (d) under section one in Article IV of the code which stated:
"Cigarette advertising shall not represent that cigar-

ette smoking is essential to social prominence, dis-
tinction, success, or sexual attraction."1

 

1Cigarette Advertising Code, 1964.

225

However, the administrator expanded on the already broad meaning Of the
words, making it broader in application. Advertising men said that
"euphoria" was the Governor's umbrella description for Situations in
cigarette advertising which made the cigarette essential to personal
well-being. Meyner reportedly told the tobacco representatives that

if he felt that the total impression of a commercial or ad was one
which implied that smoking a particular brand would contribute to
physiological well-being or was essential to romance, business suc-

1 Under this

cess, etc., that advertising would not be acceptable.
interpretation, one small part of the code could change many, many
facets Of cigarette advertising. The areas covered were almost limit-
less. The setting of a commercial or ad would be involved. SO, too,
would the clothes that models wore, the models themselves, their
actions and expressions. Voice inflections, music, animation, and
props could also be included. And this is to say nothing of the
actual words, total visual impressions, and basic concepts behind the

advertising. In addition, these kinds of evaluations would have to be

made on a very subjective basis.

The fourth guideline covering celebrities and athletes was also
considered by many to be a subjective area. While it was made clear
that testimonials would not be acceptable, the decision as to which
presenters and models constituted known athletes and celebrities was
entirely in the hands of the administrator. Names such as Gary Moore
and Paul Hornung were obviously out as far as performing these duties.

But there were many other personalities who could be considered small

 

1Discussion with various advertising agency men.

226

”names" and the situation, as far as these peOple were concerned, was
unclear. It would depend on the Governor's experience and how he

personally viewed individuals.

In addition to these guidelines, some other Specifics were dis-
cussed in the Meyner-tobacco company meetings. With regard to cigar-
ettes containing menthol, it was established that the word "fresh"
could be acceptably used only as it applied to the product itself.

COpy relating fresh to filtration or menthol was not acceptable. Tenm-
inology which related fresh to taste and flavor was questionable. Con-
cerning the actual mechanics of obtaining code approval on advertising,
the following procedures were set; 1) all material would be mailed to
the code office and not submitted with personal representation, 2) all
creative ideas would be submitted to the administrator for tentative
approval before production, and 3) the administrator's final approval
would be given only on final material; i.e., proofs of print ads and
answer prints and tapes of TV and radio commercials. The tobaccomen
were told to expect it to take at least one week to receive the admin-
istrator's comments on both tentative and final presentations. Finally,
in the meetings taking place in the latter part of October, January 1,
1965 was established as the effective date for all advertising run by

cigarette manufacturers to conform to the new code.

Soon after these initial discussions between Governor Meyner and
the signatory companies were completed, more changes in cigarette pro-

motional activities began to become publicly visible. As has been men-

227

tioned the introduction of American Tobacco's Carlton cigarettes in
early 1964 had triggered what, under different circumstances, might
have become a "Charcoal Derby." Carlton's apparent success in the
marketplace was followed by introductions of other charcoal filtered
brands. One of these was R. J. Reynold's TempDCigarettes. Tempo, in
its initial introduction had been sold as the cigarette with a new
"bonded" charcoal filter that was "right in taste with the times."1
Now, in November, Reynolds announced that Tempo was getting a new
package design. The slogan "right in taste with the times" which had
previously been prominently displayed on the package, had been changed
to "for taste too good to miss."2 Officials of the tobacco company
reportedly said the change was being made because market reports indi-
cated that the Tempo package "was not sufficiently registering the
concept of satisfying taste."3 While this may well have been one of
the reasons for the change, it is highly likely that the recently
established code guidelines also played a part. For the earlier phrase
implied a sociableness and modernity that the Meyner interpretation of
the code certainly would not allow. On the other hand, another Tempo
package change was clearly made in spite of the guidelines. A new
word, "Actifilter," was coined to describe the brand's bonded charcoal

filter. According to Advertising Age, Royal Dadmun, president of the

 

industrial design company working on the project, said Actifilter was

registered as a trademark and a logotype was designed "to give the word

 

1"Reynolds redesigns Tempo package for 'satisfying' image,"
Advertising:Age, November 30, 1964, p. 3.

21bid.

31bid.

228

visual importance on the package as well as in advertising."1 Why this
new word was added was not explained. And it remains inexplicable
today. If Governor Meyner had determined that words such as Micronite
and Dual could not be used to modify filter, then he could not be ex-
pected to accept this new modifier. This is especially so, since Acti-
filter also implied some kind of action to the filter. Nevertheless,

the change was made.

In December a move by American Tobacco Company demonstrated
another code-inspired effort. Robert B. Walker, president of the com-
pany, was quoted as stating that in order to comply with "the dictate
of the cigarette advertising code as conceived by the administrator,
as well as its policy to adhere to the code's letter and implication,"
American had discontinued labeling the tar and nicotine content of its
Carlton and Montclair (the menthol version of Carlton) cigarettes.2
Continuing, Mr. Walker reportedly said:

"While we offered labeled cigarette brands to fulfill
an obvious demand and believe we performed a service,
in so doing, we wholeheartedly endorse the purpose
and principles of the cigarette advertising code."

At about the same time as the American announcement of tar and

nicotine labeling discontinuance, code administrator Meyner publicly

announced the January lst effective date for the code. Mr. Meyner told

 

1"Reynolds redesigns Tempo package for 'satisfying' image,"
Advertising Age, November 30, 1964, p. 160.

2"American drOps tar, nicotine label data," Advertising Age,
December 21, 1964, p. 3.

 

31bid.

229

trade sources that since his office had Opened, he had been reviewing
advertising items -- ranging from ballpark billboards to vending
machine tabs -- at the rate of about "30 or 40 pieces a day."1 Accord-
ing to another report, the administrator said he had been strict,
requiring changes in "a majority of the ads for more than 150 brands

submitted to him."2

The nine cigarette companies subscribing to the
code, he reportedly said, had been "most cooperative" in acceding to
his decisions about whether ads were acceptable or not.3 In talking

to reporters about the new code Meyner indicated that he was particu-
larly concerned about TV commercials. He also mentioned TV programming
as an area of concern. There were no plans at the moment, but "if we
see the shows are directed at young people we'll move in," he was
quoted as saying. When asked about a Cigarette Advertising Code seal,
he said none was contemplated, since his organization was "quasi-

judicial" and not "image-making." But he did add that he would not

prevent advertisers from referring to the code in their advertising.4

Even after this effective date announcement had been made, there
were those who continued to speculate about the changes pending in cig-

arette advertising. For example, Newsweek quoted one veteran tobacco

 

1"Cigarette ad code goes into effect Jan. 1: Meyner," Adver-
tisinggAgg, December 21, 1964, p. 50.

2"Tar Czar," Newsweek, December 28, 1964, p. 46.

3Ibid.

4Ibid.

230

industry observer as saying the differences would largely be "in
details."1 However, the time for speculation had ended. In only a
matter of days the proof of the code's influence on cigarette adver-

tising would be running in magazines and television programs.

 

1"Tar Czar," Newsweek, December 28, 1964, p. 46.

CHAPTER XVI

DAY OF RECKONING

Finally the day arrived: January 1, 1965. Now the changes had
been made. The influence of the code was available for inspection.
The interested observers began that inspection, and this is what they

53W:

231

 

Fir.

Pa] 1'

NOVEMBER, 1964

First, some cigarette advertising had changed very little or not at all.

Pall Mall ads, for example, were the same, precode and postcode.

 

FEBRUARY, 1965

 

 

l4
6
9
1
R
E
B
0
T
C
0

 

 

O .
\0‘.’ 01.3"..Wvl.
..O v V .

 

MARCH, 1965

This was also true of Chesterfield advertising.

 

         

a! J n. 1 I i n.‘ c Q . . . .V" s! ‘
o .I\ «1. ”0.14”? ...; field \ a d V ' In.
C o I .l . u‘ 4 .I ' .
4......1 o a .c
. ..lnv..." .

 

9
.utulltnfu‘.‘ ...)..rc. - .
. - v ....
. ... 4 ad“.

e. . .... -.

OCTOBER, 1964 -

 

i:

 

JANUARY, 1965

Lucky Strike ads were essentially the same.

 

NOVEMBER, 1964

 

\ ,1 ‘ ’ - ,_ , - , --. ----
‘. ‘ . ‘ .

x \- t I

\ P<t t

II R

f t
y .

|
t

:

 

 

l
t
l
r
l
a
'
a

5

Come to where the flavor is . . .
Come to Marlboro Country

This IS the flavor that won the West. The
Rmhmond Recipe dishes it up. [he Selectrate'
hlter smooths It. You get a lot "to like.

 

 

 

JANUARY, 1965

 

Marlboro a-vertising had been subjected to one small change between its

precode and postcode versions; the deletion of COpy referring to its

"Selectrate" filter.

 

OCTOBER, 1964

Secondly, a great deal of cigarette advertising had gone through slightly

more numerous, but rather subtle changes. For example, the word, "MICRO—

NITE," was no longer used to describe Kent's filter. The reference to

Kent as the "best combination" of filter and taste had also been deleted.

 

 

 

. ,,I«‘>asure...t:z.nll for Kent!

3 "‘l

LJT SATISFIES EEST

The word, "filter," had been taken out of the overline, "First with the

finest filter cigarettes through Lorillard Research." The phrase, "New
exclusive MICRONITE filter," on the package had been changed to, "The

world's finest cigarettes." And, the "Micronite" seal had been drOpped.

 

242

OCTOBER, 1964

" _.-..~——_’ “..-

rrViceroy’s got the Deep-Weave Filter *
for the taste that’s right! 1

 

A'-

  
 

 

 

cb .- .,
,~__ —-e0c --a‘

  

“
k.;‘. . . ' "' . A I
‘ b.- _ ‘3 ' " 4 o
if ‘0 I.” - :-

Y.'

' rite-443313

24.5
JANUARY, 1965

 

 

.,'[6w|htw h dwnuuhwitutush‘thvxxuy 5' .‘
‘ h'h'l'19411Jh‘lttlflkhk \tfl My“ , "a““r‘

‘ hm 11'." ' \11t‘1'()\"‘{f4131”It'ltl‘dl'

 

The words, "Deep-Weave" were no longer being used as a filter modifier
in Viceroy advertising. The comparative illustration and COpy block
had also gone by the wayside in Viceroy ads. And, the words ”Scienti-
fically made," had been changed to, "Specifically designed."

244

NOVEMBER, 1964

 

"as ans-acts u'

 

\W "\Hll 1H! '1llit‘l';lll(ll"|t'|l1.1;l\Hl'.1HH'.)

\lzllgc the Logical \Iow 1o HI

e; ,

'l'lzr rir/r/lumr z'g'gmz'l/z' (NI/1 (I mm/wm (l/l-II‘lII/('_ //'//r/

In L&M.ads the ”filter" and ”flavor" references had been reversed in the

diSplay line, "Are you for a filter and rich flavor, too?" The block of

COpy describing L&M's filter had been dropped. In addition, the display

 

." -

 

 

 

FEBRUARY, 1965

line at the bottom of ads had been changed to exclude references to the fil-

ter. Finally, the package copy, "The Miracle Tip," had been replaced by,

"Quality Cigarettes."

 

 

9

r
t.
a
.4. ,

v

 

246

NeWport ads no longer carried the overline, "First with the finest
filter cigarettes through Lorillard Research." The display line,
"Ready to try a great, fresh taste?", had been added. The exten-
sive references to NeWport's menthol had been shortened to, "Mild
natural menthol." The word, "smokes," had been replaced by the
word, "tastes," in the headline idea. And, again, package copy had
undergone a change. "Refreshes while you smoke," had given way to,

”Mild menthol."

NOVEMBER, 1964

 

                

u -
o
.5 '

1
5 o

      

    

’_1
O

   

- o
~I~l
I
h
'
I

        

‘ v
‘
Q
1

 

J

~.
a: u
0

.V

.2
0-!

.
-.
I

C

., We
3.! - co

.. ..
OI
. . J . . 1.
7 4.) o .-.O . , . .. . c 3..

V I.
. . o .l .441} -a n ..LV . ..
. - O '0 d . 54." ....n’\.. \ ..tndl 35' ... . o . . .l .
.... . t . . k .l .x .v. _. ’0 sf 1. . . M:.J....r.. ../\a.~'o. .l (3' ‘4 .
w.’.lt“” I ..wl ..jH ... . t .0“) u . A . -' .plnfOHSRUHv fin ’h‘v‘. I“
.mtw..- a. - - t . . . ......1. ....»r... 15......» ... .
.y. .01.. . , .. .- ..s...
l. we. .5 .r. . '0 . “.0 mi
. ...1 .* o is" . . O . ..
. ...“ '. . ..r»
o .al... .7
4 . a ..h
w
1‘
5'

     

I. t I .
a. 3w”
. int. .... V
.. E .. ....
c. do ..-
‘ ‘3', u
‘ O
(S i t
.W t
n : Ix
. 3‘.1 VI- .
1-. \- In

1.99%... -..

I. t
. I'd.
. ‘
| ’ n I
'- .fi
. .
..M. A: . 1
.u a \ IV .
I I, I O n
.. 0 I . 6'.)
.1 u n O A n
. . . .l! . BID. 1' J l. n.
. . . _ . . a o I.
I. . . . .

 

.. . . .’
“0 ...... .hféx ... . . . ....... u. ..n . ..v.t .u. . . .
. .. . Le. . , . . . .
may 2. ..

1‘. v . . . .

a
I -

JANUARY, 1965

   

248

Mild. nature] menthol
Great-techng tobaccos.
White hltertoo.

\.

l l

l. -
JIM/{JUN}.

, .
-.&.'. .

. .-. " ‘0‘

I
ll‘

 

. I .wl . .(1...
.. l . . . ... . .4- .
. .421... .. . . .s./ .. “Mn “.1 w. I 1
. ... . air. 3.. $1»;va .. .
l. y u'

 

..I ...! LL
.. . . . Jxmf. ». .J- .anI ...

. .3 .. 0. .A.. V .

it .jwdu IQ. v 0 r... vy

.. a...» ”1.34! 1......

249

OCTOBER, 1964

 

\‘4

l
11

Join the Unswitchables. .

Activated Ch urcoal make 3 .l llllll renal: you can see in the filter.
, , '1'": lllll ‘ f , . l
... _ III/({V/m/ ;

- 1"er 11;]:

...unll .l dill‘urcntu you can taste in the smoke.

.' I ' '3‘"? '4'!
. l?..t:.ll,;‘. "-".r,l' l
""'1 ' l “r l
, :3 l 1| .

Tam/Ion '

hmlmrJ-IK. 9’“ m oAK-im ( 194»! fly 1 .

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

250
JANUARY, 1965
V, J. .\ a ,,~-V’-VM-W ww—

’ “Us Tareyton smokers wOuld rather fight than " I switch!”

 

Join the Unswitchables.
Get the filter Cigarette with the taste worth fighting for!

z T
Liwylou lids 21 while, Olllt“! ll1) '

.lilll .m mum Si‘CllOli oi izhaicoal. ‘
limrlhm, they actually improve [HINT/(Ill ;
llw ll.ivm ol liiittylon's lint: tobaccos. ‘ i
I 7 - .
j .
/(II( Wm

’4. v‘fl. 1.6.... (Wynn, .

lllllll
illinl'illli

 

 

In Tareyton ads the word, ”charcoal," had been deleted and the word,
”cigarette,” added in the diSplay COpy beneath the illustration. The
two COpy blocks describing the Tareyton filter had been condensed into
one and all references to ”Activated" charcoal had ceased, including

the one on the package front.

 

 

 

251

Finally, some cigarette advertising had undergone rather
extensive changes. Salem advertising, for example, had switched from
the theme line, "Salem softness freshens your taste," to "Turn to

Salem for a taste that's Springtime fresh." Filter references had

 

been reduced to a single mention. The "wonderful world” of Salem
had been deleted. The "smoothest flavor" line had been replaced with
"For fresh rich flavor that stands out from the crowd." And, on the
package used in advertising, the word, "fresh" had been changed to

"flavor."

OCTOBER, 1964

 

FEBRUARY, 1965

: ylmngw

 

. fl é .
{332*
‘ o

I" ~

 

 

 

254

Philip Morris Multifilter had gone through not only a campaign change,
but also a name alteration. The cigarette was now called simply Philip
Morris Filter. The advertising for the brand under its new name put
much less emphasis on the mechanics of the charcoal story both in
pictures and copy. The huge coconut and package photographs and fil-
ter oriented headlines gave way to photographs of smokers making

favorable exclamations about the cigarette.

NOVEMBER, 1964

 

 

_ _ . ’5'. v
.' .‘.3'".‘--'-'3ss
. r . If

I.

 

 

 

256
JANUARY, 1965

i \
5.
i

4..

 

"'
a
I
l -= .
,' . .. “‘\
l g ‘ ‘ ‘ I
.' i“"‘:\:\“
.t - in“ \w‘. ‘..
l . ~* --:-;‘~‘. »
’ 91". ..O\ ..xh
. t“ i ‘
r o “. “x “’

 

V
l‘ ‘ ' 1‘1 ‘ {‘.\\
. ‘1 ‘. .9. )'-‘; ‘ J .:\
l I '.‘X e k, “
J ~ . .‘ x . e
“ x 'n ‘a . if ’- ‘ fi'
1 ‘ . 1““. .30 l 1", l/‘u \ \ ‘X
'l ’9‘ w“. v» r :\-.\*
' . '. iko ‘~. ," (' ’ 5.7.5" ..o'. 't,..‘\~
} _" ‘.‘ ‘ -. - .. ' I 1 .. '.'l 1" '. ’.‘ \
' ' J I . '1' 1"".o ‘
. . I I " 0’3 o ‘-t
. V ' .,¢’ “’0‘.
‘ . .0 .‘ g' ..

Was liarhara surp sod! She didn’t realize a lillvr
rigarvllc rould he . ) full of flavor. Coconut-shell
vharmal is why. It's the new Philip Morris Filter
1)" gully, you’ll like 'em. loo!

     

   

 

New!

l’l oi. “I . .o ‘ ijilr|1|1l nu _
I. ll, 1 ‘,I I '5' i J t i wanna»;

I, -..
- O

.f‘iit‘li‘ii‘l‘l'i Iranii

257

. OCTOBER, 1964

‘K

'4‘.-

l '

 

 

 

 

 

 

(MM/(2H

ARMY!“ or III! won: or smru s or CARL lON ClGA
all!!! All mot muomcuu av AN mmrtuo
EM usulcu LAOORAIORY ANAIYus uunme IIII
I03! Item! I!!! PCIIOO PRIOR 10 m MANUMC
ml! or III! CIGAR”!!! III II": PACIIAO! AVIIIAIIIII

I "HI!” 2,? I8 PtR ClBMItlll
NICOHNE 0.3 In . .. "(R cIaAIIIIII

‘SHOM COMI'ONENYS COMMON“
IUI lNACCUIAYEU CALLED "IAR‘

 

I Look again.

 

 

 

 

Jl

   
  
  
 
  
  
 
 

IIII\ ist .II'IIIIII. IIII lllllhll. II III‘\\ IIgaI'I‘III- lI'uIII IIII- .\IIH'llI.ll| ih‘i‘aQ‘id-fi’
i IIIIIII.III\. I \IleIIiII . .IIIIIIII t .IIIIIIII is \lIKIIiII .lIIII \I IiI\II In minutiae,
IIIl‘s IIIII- |\"~llIIZ \ Iiuawllv III.II Ix III“ in "LII" .lllII liIxI‘IIIIt' \\ I',l| 'II in
\IIII‘I\IIIL{ I‘It ..I~IIII‘.\ .IIIIIIII I\ \I' IN“ ill .lllIII |IIIUIIIII‘ III. II In print
It‘\I It"\\llII IIII .III |‘.III\\ IIII III t.||'.I\‘II\ at IIIlIIII II. I- .Ilii‘IIII\II\\ IMIKIIL!
IIII'II ‘HHIINII\ Imp”. l‘l\'\i‘II\'II .III \tlII‘\ .IIIII .I .IH'\\ iI.I\\‘I NIIII \'Illi\
.lI II\.IlI'II I II.II'I II.II \\ IIII II .II lII.III\ I IIIII III'w lIII' t‘rlt . U \\I in III \\ \I'll II

. ‘9” ...“ " "‘
‘.\.IIII III II\ I .IIIiIIII. \\I‘ '.\I‘-U In Ii‘I'II‘ \IIII'II IIIIII II .I llt'\\ .IHII pII..I~III.II-I('.

\lllIIIIIllgz I".III'liIIII'I‘. II.IIIIIIII II};I|It"~I ‘III"I\‘ \‘I .III.U\II' IIII \Iltll'\III.-

IIIIII'I
\ I

I I '
o O .-. v ’
.
O
..
I. .Q 0 '
.. . 5
I a
f .
a. «L ..
:5 L.‘.. I
.

r .6 u I

I O
’ 11.-l

I...
I
to
a .
I
.
'

258
MARCH, 1965

'I IlL‘ word is light.
’I I'Ic L‘igzlrctlc is
L,,‘;II“IIIIII.

\ IIIIIIII-I III’_.|I'('II(‘ lII.IlI
\I‘ll .I I \II IIII.II,:iIII'.
IIII;III«. III IIIIILIIIgIIIIuIsIIII‘

IILIlI ‘leI II I \II I‘\l\('I l.

IiII lIII III II. lll IIH' \IIIIIIu‘

, ‘b
.( .IIIIIIII“.I‘VII.III. 4",“

ll—D ”m thsi MIMI HI Lmlltlli

E IRA CMIIM (annulus Mt tum tan
a UM" HM 30mm mm N” In ”-

 

The Carlton campaign, based heavily on tar and nicotine contents and

featuring close-up photography of the back of the Carlton package, was
exchanged for "light" and "mild" references, stylized art work of smo—
kers, and smaller package fronts altered to delete tar and nicotine

references.

259

These changes in cigarette advertising, taken individually or as
a whole, did not produce the dramatic "new look" that many outside
observers had hoped for. Nor did they portray the "visible and present
'-- before and after" picture that Governor Meyner had spoken of so
many times during his early thinking on the code. Instead, they re-
vealed only the establishment of some rather subtle new trends. First,
cigarette package fronts were subjected to changes which reduced refer-
ences to filters. This might be expected after administrator Meyner's
early preoccupation with packages. The reader will remember that
Meyner, at one time, considered standardizing advertising and restrict-
ing it to package indentification. Secondly, there was a movement away
from scientific sounding terms and action references in the description
of filters. Thirdly, there was a general trend to more extensive refer-
ences to the taste or flavor of cigarettes. It must be pointed out,
however, that this trend was rarely carried out at any substantial loss
of references to filters. Rather, it was accomplished by tying the
flavor or taste of cigarettes to the filter. Finally, there was a
general shift to more mature-looking models pictured in somewhat less
romantic situations. Outside of these nuances, the precode and post-
code advertising for most brands remained remarkably similar. In fact,
viewed in totality and at a glance, as consumers view advertising, much
of it appeared to be virtually the same, before and after. With a code

as potentially harsh as this one, the natural question is "Why?"

In this author's opinion, there were two interlocking reasons.

The first of these ‘wasthe manufacturers' obvious desire and their

260

agencies' ingenuity in retaining theme lines and concepts while devel-
oping code-approved advertising. The second and connecting reason
pertains not to the cigarette makers, but to the code's administrator.
Despite administrator Meyner's previous statements that he would view
cigarette advertising in its totality and not examine words and

phrases only, he failed to do so. For these reasons, the manufacturers
were able to change only details and secure code approval. A few exam-

ples of this phenomenon will help to make the point.

'Throughout 1964 Camel advertising had used the theme, "Camel
Time." This advertising pictured virile-looking men who, after parti-
cipating in a heroic situation or one calling for special talents,
were enjoying a Camel. One television commercial, for example, showed
men in a weather plane being buffeted by the winds of a hurricane. As
the plane emerged from the storm into clear weather, the men eased
back and started pleasurably smoking a Camel. The announcer copy that
went over these pictures, according to tape recordings made by this
author, said:

"This is a hurricane, and you're flying smack into
angry black clouds pushed at you by a wind that
knows no speed limit. You're bouncing from cloud
to cloud recording weather data when suddenly
you're through the storm into the clear. You can
ease up. It's Camel Time right now."
Shortly after January 1, 1965, this commercial appeared in its modi-

fied, code approved version. The pictures remained unchanged. The

copy, again, according to tape recordings made by this author, had

261

been changed to:
"Time to start for the office. And for these men,
the office is six miles up. Their assignment is
to go up, meet tomorrow's weather, and get the
data down. There's nothing to it when you do it
every day. Mission accomplished. Homeward bound.
Time for a Camel. Camel Time."
The changes made in this commercial indicated that the code adminis-
trator objected to it under his "euphoria" guideline. That is, he
apparently felt it represented cigarette smoking as essential to suc-
cess, distinction, social prominence, or sexual attraction. If, as it
appears, that was the case, then the changes made in this commercial
can hardly be said to have extracted that representation. True, the
announcer copy, when read alone, seems to change the advertising. How-
ever, the overall impression of the commercial remains the same. For
the situation is the same: men weathering a hurricane and then enjoy-

ing a smoke. And words cannot detract substantially from the tension

of excitement of such a situation presented pictorially.

Another example of this kind of detail change can be demonstrated
through the alterations made in Parliament advertising. In precode ads
Parliament referred to its filter as the "recessed filter." In post-
code advertising this had been changed to, "the filter that's in --
recessed in." This change was apparently made because of health impli-
cations. But, if "recessed filter" was seen as having health implica-
tions, then making this change does not negate the implication. For,
the two phrases give the same total impression. In fact, in this case,

the detail change of eliminating a modifier before the word filter

262

probably increased the health implications in the minds of smokers.
The word, "in," is used widely in colloquial phraseology to refer to
something which is the thing to do or use, something which is popular

and accepted.

A change made in Newport advertising provides yet another exam-
ple. The precode Newport jingle said, "NeWport smokes fresher, tastes
better, too." After January lst this had been changed to, "Newport
tastes fresher, tastes better, too." Here, again, the alteration
appears to have been made because of health implications. The adminis-
trator apparently objected to the word, "smoke," being tied to the
word, "fresh," which, today (through past use of the word) connotes a
certain goodness or wholesomeness. However, substituting "tastes"
for "smokes" makes only a minute difference in the total impression

projected by this phrase.

Even in advertising that had to be totally rebuilt by manufac-
turers and their agencies, there are examples of changes which, in the
end, must be viewed merely as detail alterations. Advertising run for
Carlton cigarettes before the code became effective, the reader will

remember, looked like this:

263

I . . 7 UV“ . r, . .“HII....15.

. r.>l'..p&.I.ul ..I-O.co->..I hit. ...Iiffi. .K.

.. Q‘IL . l...) . 'V..g..y . .I. 'o , .. . .

rte... .2... .M I _. I ... -. it. s . . “a...
”21*. Thkfihh- - III

. . ..o.
.. ifih.y

A

I O

4‘. ...:

 

 

 

The above is a sample of Carlton advertising after the code became effec-

tive. By the changes made, it seems obvious that the administrator

objected to health implications being made in the precode advertising.

 

265

But, as the 1964 headline says, "Look again." Does not the later ad
represent an expert distillation of the earlier one? There is a re-
markable similarity, even in arrangement, between the main copy points,
"A cigarette that is low in 'tar' and nicotine -- yet high in smoking
pleasure," and "A milder cigarette than you'd ever imagine. Higher
in smoking pleasure than you'd ever expect." After over thirty years
of health oriented advertising using words such as "strong,” "light,"
"harsh," and "mild" it is hard to believe that these words, in the
minds of smokers, refer only to taste. Even the information on the
Carlton package projected the same impression. The tar and nicotine
content numbers had been reduced to their simplest expression, "EXTRA
MILD...made especially for smokers who seek exceptional mildness in a

filter cigarette."

In another area of possible code influence there were even fewer
signs of change. Editor and Publisher said, "There will be no immed-
iate change in choice of media for cigarette advertising as a result
of the Cigarette Advertising Code..."1 Quoting administrator Meyner,

the magazine continued:

"Robert B. Meyner, Code Administrator, said he is
relying on the judgment of the manufacturers as

to whether or not TV programs appeal to people
under 21. He said he is not making any checks

of audiences of shows which cigarette makers spon-
sor or of those following or preceding cigarette
commercials."

 

1"Media use unchanged by cigarette code," Editor and Publisher,
January 9, 1965, p. 20.

2Ibid.

266

All of this is not to say that cigarette advertising practices
were not at all affected by the code. As previously pointed out,
certain gross practices were eliminated or diminished. Models were
no longer as youthful as they once had been. Testimonials from indi-
viduals known to be heroes of the youth had ended. Some of the blatant
health implications surrounding filters had been reduced. And the
representation running through almost all cigarette advertising that
smoking was an exciting and desirable habit had been weakened. How-
ever, as Advertising Ag; said:

"Two weeks after the start of the code enforcement
by Robert Meyner...observers of the smoking scene
looked vainly for radical alterations in cigarette
advertising."

The changes which had been made as a result of the code were simply

too subtle for the average reader or viewer to be aware of them.

In all truthfulness, it alsoCBnnot be said that the code did not
affect the manufacturers. It did. In general, the cigarette makers
and their agencies were forced to add a time lag of at least two weeks
to secure code approval of their advertising. In some cases, when
that approval was not immediately forthcoming, further delay and nomi-
nal expenses for altered layouts and storyboards were also involved.
The changes that were made in existing commercials, ads and package
and carton designs forced some additional expense. But here again, the

money involved was minimal. For instance, the announcer voice track

 

1"Cigarette ads reflect minor changes as code takes effect,"
Advertising Age, January 25, 1965, p. 14.

267

in the Camel commercial which has been discussed earlier had to be re-
recorded. The cost of this change has been estimated by agency per-
sonnel at approximately $400. When new campaigns had to be created,
considerable dollar outlays had to be made. For example, the average
cigarette television commercial is estimated by advertising agency
personnel to cost from $10,000 to $12,000. The average size of a pool
of commercials is about four. Therefore, losing one pool and develop-
ing another could amount to a cost of about $100,000. However, this
compares to yearly brand advertising budgets of from one to ten million
dollars. So, the effect of even full-scale campaign changes was minor.
With the tremendous resources available to the manufacturers code
changes represented only slight headaches. And compared to the work
and expense the code might have produced, the industry must be consi-

dered as getting off lightly.

However, how they would "get off" in the end had not yet been
decided. Now that the influence of the code on the manufacturers and
their advertising has been discussed, there still remains a final
important question. What effect would that influence have on the
smoking controversy -- and especially the Government moves pending?
To affect these moves in favor of the tobacco industry was the major
intention of the code's establishment. Therefore, to arrive at the
full consequence of that establishment, this subject must also be

investigated.

CHAPTER XVII

TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE

As January, 1965 opened, what appeared to be the final struggle
approached. The deadline for the FTC'S package and advertising label-
ing rule was nearing. Congress was readying itself for another ses-
sion on the smoking and health controversy. And the two Opposing
forces in the Tobacco War stood ready with their ultimate weapons;
anti-tobacco groups with the Surgeon General's report, and the indus-

try with its advertising code.

On Monday, January 11, 1965 -- just a year to the day from the
release of the Surgeon General's report -- the anti-tobacco forces,
which now presented a united front through the National Interagency
Council on Smoking and Health, began warming up. In a two-day confer-
ence leading members of the Council took turns hurling insults and
threats at the tobacco industry. Surgeon General Terry declared that
cigarettes were responsible for killing "at least" 125,000 persons a
year in the United States.1 Then, unveiling a new bombshell, he said
a Government poll showed the public overwhelmingly supporting compul-

sory warnings and disclosures on cigarette ads and labels.2 Emerson

 

1WilliamMcGaffin, "Cigarette's Yearly Death Toll: 125,000

Americans," Chicago DailygNews, January 12, 1965, p. 12.

2"Public Wants Cigarette Warnings: Terry Report," Advertising
‘532, January 11, 1965, p. l.

268

269

Foote, former tobacco advertising man, marked his debut as chairman of
the interagency group by reportedly charging that "the tobacco industry,
through its present advertising of cigarettes is encouraging people to
kill themselves."1 Continuing, he said, "we believe it is not morally
justifiable to encourage peOple to kill themselves," and asserted that
"decisive progress toward reducing cigarette consumption cannot be made
while cigarette advertising is allowed to flourish unchecked."2 Togeth-
er Dr. Terry and Mr. Foote endorsed the council recommendation that if
tobacco manufacturers did not voluntarily suspend cigarette advertising
they should be required by law to put a warning message in all cigar-
ette advertising.3 Senator Maurine Neuberger, who also attended the
interagency meeting, pointed out that the old Congress blocked enforce-
ment of the Federal Trade Commission rules requiring warnings on cigar-
ette packages and in ads, and denied funds for a national clearing
house for information on smoking and health. "Thus," she was quoted

as saying, ”one year from the delivery of the Surgeon General's unequi-
vocal verdict against the cigarette, Congress has provided no funds

for smoking education, no regulations to warn the smoker or potential
smokers of the hazards of smoking, no laws to inhibit cigarette adver-
tising campaigns -- nothing, in short, but a directive to the FTC to

undo the steps which it had forcefully taken to fulfill its mandate to

 

1"Cigarette Use Going Down, U.S. Reports," Chicago DailyfiNews,

January 11, 1965, p. l.

 

2WilliamMcGaffin, "Cigarette's Yearly Death Toll: 125,000

Americans," Chicago Dailerews, January 12, 1965, p. 24.
31b1d., p. 4.

270

protect the consuming public."1

Then in a call for stepped up efforts
from all interested parties, she said:

"We are now entered upon a new Congress. Nothing is

more clear than that Congress will again avert its

glance from the stark and inescapable conclusions

of the Surgeon General's report, and will again

avoid its responsibilities to the American people

unless it is made to feel that the American people

are deeply concerned about such default of respon-

sibility."2
George V. Allen, president of the Tobacco Institute, immediately ans-
wered the new attacks, claiming that Terry's year later conference
produced only "questionable assumptions."3 Making what was obviously
a blast at Emerson Foote, he said these assumptions were, in turn, used
as the basis for "sensational" headlines by "laymen" at the conference.4

Thus, as one source said, "round two of the heavyweight fight between

the tobacco industry and its foes (was) under way."5

However, these were only preparatory exercises. The real battle
loomed ahead in the Congressional hearings on cigarette labeling and
advertising which Representative Oren Harris had promised a year earlier.
There the Cigarette Advertising Code and its power to influence deci-
sions would be given the test. As those hearings neared, it began to

look as if the code's influence was already being felt. For, of all

 

1"Public Wants Cigarette Warnings: Terry Report," Advertising
Age, January 11, 1965, p. 73.

 

21bid.

3"Tobacco Institute answers Surgeon General," Sponsor, January
18, 1965, p. 20.

4Ibid.

5"Round 2 in cigarette fight: Tobacco firms are ready," Chicago
Daily News, January 13, 1965, p. 25.

271

the bills introduced before both the House and Senate commerce commit-
tees, only one, Senator Maurine Neuberger's 8.547 required warnings in
cigarette advertising. House bill H. R. 2248 would amend the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act so as to make it applicable to smoking
products. H. R. 3014, H. R. 4007, and H. R. 7051 would require warn-
ings on cigarette packages, but by pre-empting the field would nullify
the FTC rule requiring warnings in advertising. H. R. 4244 and Senate
Commerce Committee chairman Warren Magnuson’s S. 559 both required
warnings on packages and disclosures of tar and nicotine content. But,
again, by pre—emption the FTC rule would be nullified. Nevertheless,
the struggle was not over. The National Interagency Council on Smoking
and Health, in its conference, had emphasized its intention to join

the fight for "congressional minds."1

In addition, the Senate Demo-
cratic caucus had decided to place staunch anti-tobaccoist Maurine
Neuberger on the Senate Commerce Committee and that, according to some,

could have considerable influence on the resolution of the issue.2

In late March and early April the hearings before the House and
Senate committees opened and the battle commenced in earnest. The
anti-tobacco forces and some senators and representatives spoke out
vehemently in favor of stringent regulations. Before the Senate Com-
mittee SUrgeon General Terry called for warning statements on packages

and in advertising. Senator Neuberger joined the chorus defending her

 

1"Tobacco men may find anti-cigarette forces more effective

under Foote," Advertising Age, January 18, 1965, p. 18.

 

21bid.

272

bill which required such warnings. Over in the House, Representative
Morris K. Udall, in behalf of his bill amending the Food, Drug and
Cosmetics Act, quoted from a newsletter he had written to his consti-
tuents eighteen months earlier. The American tobacco industry, he
said, has a plan to "lure more and more young peOple to smoke cigar-
ettes, to stimulate more and more adults to smoke more and more packs
a day..." In the Senator's opinion it amounted to a "plot to kill
100,000 Americans this year." In conclusion, he added this emotional
blast:

"Speaking as a parent, as well as a congressman, I

might express my reaction to these facts in some

such manner as this: who needs enemiei when we

have friends like the 'Marlboro Man'?"
When industry spokesmen began to testify, the anti-tobacco forces tried
to answer the arguments presented. For example, after an impressive
parade of medical men appeared in support of the industry position that
evidence linking smoking and disease was inconclusive, Dr. Harold S.
Diehl, vice chairman of the National Interagency Council on Smoking and
Health, told Senators that "the physician spokesmen for the tobacco
industry represent a very small segment of medical and scientific
opinion."2 In support of his own statement the doctor pointed out that
a survey indicated that 94.8% of American physicians believed cigarette
smoking was a health hazard. He also submitted over twenty pages of

anti-smoking resolutions by medical associations, foreign and domestic.3

 

1U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce, Hearings, Cigarette Labeling and Advertising, 89th Cong.,
lst Sess., 1965., p. 25.

2"Less-stringent tobacco rules?", Broadcasting, March 29, 1965,
p. 40.

 

3Ibid.

273

Doctor Thomas Carlile, chairman of the American Cancer Society's com-
mittee on tobacco and cancer, was even more blunt. He said:
"The technique has been to use with great public rela-
tions effectiveness a handful of physicians who are
not conv1nced by the evidence..."

However, despite these efforts by the anti-tobacco groups, it
soon became clear where the battle would eventually end. The forces
moving against stringent regulation controlled the day. The long
parade of scientific witnesses speaking on behalf of the industry were
impressive enough to induce Science magazine to comment editorially
that they "left the legislators with the impression that there is no
more evidence against tobacco than there is against tomato soup."2
The tobacco block congressmen remained as persuasive and powerful as
ever. In the Senate they argued for a bill which would give the indus-
try a chance to show what it could do voluntarily with its advertising
code: one which would require only package warnings and suspend or
postpone the FTC'S advertising ruling. Meanwhile, in the House, they
presented a similar argument. Advertising and broadcasting men also
aligned themselves against advertising warnings. Representatives of

the American Federation of Advertising declared that such warnings would

be unconstitutional under the first amendment.3 NAB president Vincent

 

1"Less-stringent tobacco rules?", Broadcasting, March 29: 1965:
p. 40.

 

2"Tobacco: Congress moves closer to requiring warning of dan-
ger included on cigarette packages," Science, April 23, 1965,
p. 479.

3"The first step?", Printer's Ink, April 9, 1965, p. 70.

 

274

Wasileneski, speaking of advertising warnings, said:
"The government would thereby affirmatively dictate
advertising standards. It would cast the govern-
ment in a new role in that it would prescribe a
course of action rather than proscribe undesirable
conduct."
Indirectly standing up for the manufacturers' code, he added: "This
could seriously impair industry self-regulation and, in the long run,
the public interest."1 Finally, the industry itself, apparently con-
vinced that some regulation could not be avoided, moved to restrict
that regulation to package warnings. Bowman Gray, R. J. Reynolds
chairman, urged congressmen to pass a law nullifying the FTC regula-
tions. If more is needed, he was quoted as saying, the industry sug-
gests that Congress pass a law requiring a "fair and factual" state-
ment on packages, but specifying that no warning is required in

advertising.2

As a result of these arguments, the bills reaching the House and
Senate floors appeared to regulate the FTC as much as they did the
tobacco industry. A slightly revised version of Senator Magnuson's
S. 559 was offered by the Senate committee. In its committee-approved
wording the measure called for warnings on packages without the origi-
nally prOposed tar and nicotine content disclosures and pre-empted the

field, barring the FTC from requiring advertising warnings for three

 

1"The first step?", Printer's Ink, April 9, 1965, p. 70.

2"Cigarette ad rule urged, hit in Senate hearing," Adyertising
Agg,‘March 29, 1965, p. 3.

275

years.1 Printer's Ink said the bill "will represent a victory for the

 

industry and a setback for the Federal Trade Commission."2 The House
measure was considered even more favorable to the industry. It dif-
fered from the Senate bill in that it permanently barred the FTC from
requiring warnings in advertising. In addition, it required the warn-
ings to be placed on the side of packages, rather than on the front or

back as did the Senate measure.3

In early July Senate and House conferees, after reviewing both
bills, agreed on the wording of a final bill to be presented to the
combined Congress. It was, essentially, the Magnuson sponsored S. 559.
There were two key provisions in the bill. First, it required all
cigarette packages and cartons to bear the following label on their
side panels by January 1, 1966: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be
Hazardous To Your Health."4 Secondly, it barred the FTC and other
Governmental agencies from requiring advertising warnings for three
years. The Senate agreed to the conference report on July 6, the
House on July 13. On July 27, 1965 that bill became Public Law 89-92:
The Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965. This leg-

islation, because of its restrictions pertaining to the FTC, must be

 

1"Senators defer cigarette rule by FTC for 3 years,9 Advertising

Age, May 10, 1965, p. 1.

 

2"Warnings on packs, but not on labels," Printer's Ink, May 14,
1965, p. 12.

 

3"Milder cigarette bill okayed for action in House," Advertising
Age, May 31, 1965, p. l.

 

4"Cigarettes sell, warnings or not," Printer's Ink, July 9, 1965:
p. 4.

 

276

considered a victory for the tobacco industry. The Cigarette Adver-
tising Code obviously helped to affect that victory. Is this, then,
the final answer? As a consequence of the code's establishment, has
the pendulum of the smoking and health controversy swung once and for
all in favor of tobaccomen? Some would say yes. However, this author
must disagree. For although the code helped to win a victory, the
hollowness of that victory unquestionably points to the code as being
far too little and too late. The true importance of the Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act lies not in the fact that it restricted
the FTC, but in the more basic fact that the gears of Government,
after almost fifteen years of controversy, had finally turned, and in
turning they moved against the tobacco industry. Public Law 89-92
officially announced the Government's belief that smoking was, in fact,
hazardous to health. And, in that sense, the legislation must be con-
sidered a much fuller victory for the anti-tobacco forces. For once
Government steps have been taken against a product or industry it is
next to impossible to retract those steps and, moreover, much easier

to take additional ones.

The Cigarette Advertising Code came years too late to affect
that step. The die was cast years before by the industry itself when,
time and again, it refused to face the eventualities of the smoking
and health controversy, in favor of quick profits. Columnist Sidney
J. Harris of the Chicago Daily News, in a column concerning the code,

said:

277

"If such agencies as the Federal Communications
Commission, the Food and Drug Administration and
others, increase their control over private busi-
ness, it will be because private business has been
so greedy about short-term profits that long-term
values are ignored."

"There is a natural tendency in all Government to
assume as much power as it can get, and as it will
be allowed. The way to stop this tendency is not
to shout, 'Hands off!‘ but to do privately and vol-
untarily what will later be done under official
dictum. Business has learned to anticipate public
markets, it must also learn to anticipate public
needs and welfare."1

And this was the lesson the tobacco industry learned too late.

Even if the code had been in time, it was still too little. The
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 postponed the question
of advertising regulations, but not permanently. In three years it
will arise again. And because the code is considered weak, the FTC
and anti-tobacco groups will be waiting. Federal Trade Commission
chairman Dixon made that clear even before the enactment of S. 559.

As the bill came out of committee to the Senate floor, and in the face
of a probable postponement or suspension of the FTC rules, be fired a
letter at Senator Magnuson which said in part:
"The cigarette advertising code, under which the indus-
try has been operating for some months, has produced
no material improvements in cigarette advertising.
There is no indication, either, that extensive efforts
by the cigarette industry to educate the American pub-
lic in the hazards of cigarette smoking are likely in
the near future or that the industry will voluntarily

affect substantial and significant changes in the na-
ture, content and sc0pe of cigarette advertising."

 

1Sidney J. Harris, "Self-policing in Slow Motion," Chicago Daily
News, January 5, 1965, p. 18.

 

2"3-year delay on cigarette ad rule is too long: FTC," Adver-
tising Age, May 17, 1965, p. l.

278

In the absence of these developments, it was his opinion, that the
warnings on packages would not be enough to protect the public. An
Advertising Age editorial written shortly before the cigarette legis-
lation was enacted can help make the point here. According to that
editorial, passage of the legislation would mean ”the dispute over the
advertising of cigarettes moves into a new phase, which is both a
challenge to and an opportunity for the cigarette advertisers."1 Con-
tinuing it said:

"On the basis of a congressional finding that smoking
'may be hazardous' anti-smoking forces will be in a
strong position to intensify their educational acti-
vities, and their demands for further voluntary re-
strictions on cigarette ads by media, as well as by
the industry itself. The cigarette companies are
in a strong position to meet this through good faith
adherence to the codes that already exist. But the
value of the codes will quickly evaporate unless
they_do in fact achieve their purpose: the elimina-
tion of ads that make health claims and make smokigg
attractive to young people."2 (Emphasis supplied)

 

 

 

 

In previous chapters it has been pointed out that the Cigarette Adver-
tising Code did not achieve that purpose in this author's opinion. In
addition, as just pointed out, the FTC and anti-tobacco groups hold a
similar opinion. Therefore even before the "dispute" moved into its
"new phase," the cigarette makers by failing to make major changes in
advertising had failed to meet the challenge or take advantage of the
opportunity. Thus, the code's long-term value began to evaporate on the
day it became effective and its influence on cigarette advertising be-

came known.

 

1"A new stand on cigarette ads," Advertising Age, May 31a 1965:

p. 20.

 

2Ibid.

279

In summary, although the Cigarette Advertising Code's establish-
ment did produce detail changes in cigarette advertising and later help
to win a temporary and empty victory for the industry, it did not pro-

duce a major effect upon the smoking and health controversy. It was

too little and too late.

CHAPTER XVIII

TOMORROW

This has been the story of a single battle in a war which has
lasted over three centuries. Today the war continues. And because
of this the account of that battle can have no finite boundaries. For
it has been merely one exchange in an ongoing stream of exchanges, and
the casualties suffered, the ground won and lost, will have their
effect on following battles and on the eventual outcome of the war.
As with any event in history, a complete and final evaluation of the
significance of the establishment of the Cigarette Advertising Code
will not be possible until long after those "following battles" have

been fought and when and if an end in the Tobacco War has been reached.

However, even at this early date, predictions can be made. And
to give a completeness to this investigation the probable effect of
the code's establishment upon future events must be included. There-
fore, based on the record as it stands today, the following predic-
tions have been made: 1) in the future, further official restrictions
are likely to be placed on cigarette advertising, and 2) those restric-
tions will come first in the area of television, but may eventually

include all forms of cigarette promotion.

280

281

There are three major reasons for the first prediction. The
first of these concerns the code in its present form and under its
present interpretation. For reasons which have already been examined
the Cigarette Advertising Code has, to date, failed to fulfill its
stated purposes, or to any extent placate those Government agencies,
anti-tobacco groups, or individuals who have decried the content and
scope of cigarette advertising. Today, in fact, the promotion of
cigarettes has not changed appreciably from what it was before the
code's inception. Nor, based on the historical record of the indus-
try, is there any reason to believe there will be appreciable changes
in the desired direction within the next three years. Because of
this the postponement of cigarette advertising regulations which was
affected by the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965 will
be just that -- a postponement. When the pre-emption clause of the
Act ceases to be effective in July of 1969, the FTC and other major
enemies of the tobacco industry can be expected to renew their efforts
to eliminate from cigarette advertising those practices which they
feel are objectionable. Thus, will begin the second battle over

cigarette advertising.

The shape of that second battle will, to a large extent, be
determined by the results of the first. This means that the hollow-
ness of the manufacturers' victory in temporarily turning aside adver-
tising restrictions, and the fuller victory of anti-tobacco forces in
obtaining an official move against tobacco will begin to realize their

true significance. Under a 1969 re-examination the cigarette makers

282

and their friends will have difficulty in showing just reason why fur-
ther steps should not be taken against them and their advertising
practices. At that time the industry's voluntary efforts at self-
policing will be highly vulnerable to attack. And, since the Govern-
ment, in enacting S. 599, has admitted its belief in a smoking and
health relationship, tobacco spokesmen will no longer be able to
effectively use the old argument of inconclusive evidence. Thus, the
victory that some writers claim for the tobacco industry will prove
itself to be the precedent for actions not in favor of, but against the
manufacturers. Having taken a first indirect step toward regulation
of cigarette advertising, official sources will, under pressure from
anti-tobacco groups and in the absence of a defensible tobacco posi-

tion, be obliged to take additional, more tangible steps.

A second and closely connected reason for the first prediction
relates to this author's opinion of what the code will be by 1969.
Evidence presented in this investigation indicates that there is good
reason to believe that by 1969 the Cigarette Advertising Code will be
substantially weakened in its effectiveness in controlling advertising,
or possibly cease to exist altogether. Throughout the cigarette con-
troversy there have been incidents which offered a single manufacturer
or group of manufacturers an opportunity to advance immediate interests
at the expense of the industry and its own long-term health. The first

major attack against cigarettes by Reader's Digest is an example of

 

such an incident. The 1957 Digest report on tar and nicotine content

which immediately preceded the Tar Derby is another example. The

283

Surgeon General's report provides still another example. For within

the report was the implication that cigarettes with charcoal filters
might be more healthful; an obvious opportunity. The history of the
cigarette controversy shows that whenever such an Opportunity presented
itself some member or members of the tobacco industry moved to capi-
talize upon it. The manufacturers of Viceroy cigarettes took advantage
of the early Digest report by using the respected magazine as an
authority and claiming that filter cigarettes were better for a smoker's
health. The makers of Kent cigarettes did essentially the same thing

with the 1957 Reader's Digest article. Shortly after the Surgeon Gen-

 

eral's report, Dr. Louis F. Fieser, one of the ten scientists on Dr.
Terry's expert committee, was asked in an interview what cigarette he
smoked and replied, Larks. "This cigarette," he reportedly said,

"represents a definite encouraging advance."1

Thousands of reprints
of that interview thereupon appeared all over the country, and, thus,
the manufacturers of Lark cigarettes took advantage of a piece of infor-

mation contained in the most damaging attack the industry as a whole

has ever received.

The history of the cigarette controversy also reveals that each
time a single manufacturer took advantage of such an opportunity, its
steps were soon traced by almost all the other industry members. In
the early fifties the Viceroy move was followed by an intensive health

claim fight in cigarette advertising which helped to bring on the Great

 

1"New hope for cigarette smokers: Crash effort for a safer
cigarette," Saturday Evening Post, April 18, 1964, p. 22.

 

284

Smoking Scare of 1953. In 1957 the Kent move was followed by a mass

of confusing and conflicting tar and nicotine content claims which is
now called the Tar Derby. Finally, in 1964 the quick success of Lark
after the issuance of the Surgeon General's report and the release of
reprints of the Fieser interview, was followed by charcoal filter
cigarette introductions from most manufacturers and what, under dif-
ferent circumstances, would surely have developed into a Charcoal

Derby.

Today the cigarette controversy, although it is not in the
headlines, continues to simmer. It is, therefore, quite possible and,
in fact, probable that another incident such as those just described
will be forthcoming. It may come from the continuing research being
carried out on cigarettes. It may come from some future attack against
cigarettes. It may even come from some new anti-tobacco group or
Government policy statement concerning cigarettes. However, it will
come. And, reading the history of the controversy, it is only logical
to assume that one or more of the cigarette manufacturers will take
advantage of that opportunity. If that happens the code's effective-
ness as a voluntary control organ will have been shattered. For it
will probably mean that one or more of the members will openly defy
the code's authority or, what is more likely, go back on its signa-
tory agreement to abide by the code and refuse to remain under its con-
trol at all. This is what happened in 1957 when the manufacturers
ignored their tacit agreement to end health claims. It is also what

happened in early 1964 when they ignored the signed FTC affidavits

285

agreeing to refrain from making health claims or disclosing tar and
nicotine contents in their advertising. In this author's opinion,
if the opportunity arises, they will just as quickly ignore their

agreement to live by the provisions of the Cigarette Advertising Code.

The results of such a development can be expected to be similar
to those predicted for an unchanged code, only more so. With the
code's ability to control the advertisers demonstrated as failing,
or with concrete evidence of the code's disintegration available,
Government regulation of cigarette advertising would be more certain.
For the manufacturers would have even less of a leg to stand on and

their foes' position would be vastly strengthened.

The third reason for the prediction that further steps will be
taken against cigarette advertising involves the situation as it may
appear following 1969. When the pre-emptive power of current cigar-
ette legislation expires, moves against the industry's advertising
will begin. When this happens the manufacturers will surely take
action of their own in another attempt to stOp or postpone regulative
action. Where will this action center? Most likely it will be a
rejuvenation of the present code, the establishment of a second code,
or an effort to forego Government regulation through promised adher-
ence to non-industry codes in the media area. While one of these
actions may well secure a further postponement, experience precludes
a serious belief that an extended reprise can be achieved. In the

conciliatory moves taken thus far by the American tobacco companies,

286

there has been no indication that they actually intended to permanently
change the main thrust of their advertising. The 1955 return to fla-
vor lasted only two years. Then the Tar Derby opened, bringing back
the health claims to which many had objected. The 1960 end to the

Tar Derby lasted a mere four years. When the Surgeon General's report
was released many manufacturers were in the process of again returning
to health. In fact, even in the interim, there were those who refused
to bow to the FTC. Kent's claim that "more scientists and educators"
smoke Kent is an excellent example. The 1963 exodus from college cam-
pus advertising comes closest to being a true conciliation. But even
that must be considered lacking. For the move away from the campus

was supposed proof that the manufacturers had agreed not to appeal to
youth. However, in other media the cigarette makers continued to use
the themes which were accused of having youth appeal. Finally, after
their advertising code had been established the manufacturers again
showed their determination to resist real change. It has been shown
that most manufacturers managed to retain basic pre-code concepts in
their code approved advertising. Therefore, substantial and lasting
changes in cigarette advertising can hardly be anticipated in any
future conciliatory moves. Consequently a lack of good faith adherence
to either industry or non-industry codes can be expected to become
apparent. And because of this additional infraction, the manufacturers
will undoubtedly face a further antagonized foe, a less receptive

Government, and harsher restrictions.

287

The reasons behind the second prediction which has been made
are, for the most part, obvious. Television is where the major por-
tion of cigarette advertising money is spent. Of all media, tele-
vision with its sight, sound, and motion is the most dramatic. It is
in television commercials that cigarette makers can best effectively
present their message. Consequently television advertising is the
form of cigarette promotion most vehemently Opposed by tobacco indus-
try detractors. In addition, there is a precedent for television
restrictions in cigarette advertising. Both the British and Canadian
industries have come under regulations in this medium. These facts
lead naturally to the conclusion that if further restrictions are
made in American cigarette advertising they will be in the area of
television. Just what these restrictions will include will, of course,
have to await the development of Government action and industry counter-
action. However, some predictions can also be made here. The major
issue in the smoking and health controversy now centers on advertising's
appeal to youth. Therefore the restriction should fall in that area.
This could include restriction to certain time periods within the
broadcast day, restrictions pertaining to the kinds of programs which
can carry cigarette advertising or, in the extreme, a total ban. Which
one or combination of these possibilities will become an eventuality
will depend on the attitudes and relative strengths of the industry

and its enemies when and if this question becomes a reality.

In any event, once restrictions are placed on television adver-

tising, there will be a propensity for it to also creep into other

288

media, eventually encompassing all forms of cigarette promotion. For
if the cigarette makers are restricted in one area they can be expec-
ted to double their efforts elsewhere. The same reasoning which lies
behind the first prediction offered here leads to this conclusion.
Stepped up efforts in areas outside of television will, in turn, bring
anti-tobacco action into those areas. In fact, even if the manufac-
turers do not move heavily into non-television media, anti-tobacco
forces will probably still insist on restriction there. Their goal

is not to reduce or stop television advertising, but to stop all cigar-
ette advertising. With television out of the way they will move on to
the next strongest cigarette medium, and then the next, and the next.
And, without major changes in the basic cigarette marketing concepts
now in use tobacco's enemies will someday extend restrictive measures

to include all media advertising, promotional material, and packaging.

Need this story necessarily have such a dark ending? No. The
predictions made here are all based on the past historical record of
the American cigarette manufacturers. The picture that has been
painted can be drastically altered before the paint is dry, but only
through sincere, dramatic, and lasting efforts by the industry to
face up to its responsibilities. This will mean a final end to health
implications in the advertising of a product whose manufacturers in-
sist has no relationship to health, and whose incriminating agents, if,
in fact, they do exist, have not been determined. It will mean a final
end to claims for one filter over another when there is no agreement

whatsoever in the basic fact of whether any filter cigarette is more

289

healthful than another. This will mean a final end to practices such
as the development of homogenized tobacco to produce stronger taste
and, at the same time, higher tar and nicotine contents in filter
smokes. It will mean a final end to all attempts to encourage youth

to begin the cigarette habit; an end to he-men in cigarette ads; an
end to sophistication appeals; an end to romantic appeals; an end to
modeling cigarettes as a panacea for all the ills in the American

way of life. It will mean a final end to the insistence that there is
no relationship between smoking and health and a public admission that
the "possibility” of a connection has been established. Finally, it
will mean a final end to spending thousands of dollars in cigarette re-
search while millions upon millions of dollars are sunk into the promo-
tion of the sale of this product, a real beginning of a truly determined

effort to find a safe cigarette.

Only when these things have been done can the tobacco industry
look forward to a brighter future than the one presented here. John
Orr Young, one of the giants of the advertising world, once said that
"whatever brickbats cigarette companies and their agencies have re-
ceived from their critics, they've had coming to them."1 Unless they
face up to their responsibilities today, the "brickbats" they receive

in the future will also be deserved.

 

1"Brickbats deserved, Young says," Advertising Age, February 3,
1964, p. 3.

 

AFTE RWORD

291

In the early months of 1966:

"Washington, March 25 -- In a policy turnabout, the Federal
Trade Commission moved today to touch off a new 'Tar Derby'
among cigarette advertisers.

After citing the relevant section of the cigarette adver-
tising guides, FTC'S one paragraph letter to cigarette
companies said:

'On the basis of the facts now available to it, the
commission has determined that a factual statement
of tar and nicotine content {expressed in milligrams)
of the main stream smoke from a cigarette would not
be in violation of...'"

”New York, March 31 -- P. Lorillard Co., tagged with a mav-
erick reputation since resigning from the cigarette adver-
tising code earlier this week, is now understood to be
preparing the first entry in a new cigarette 'Tar Derby.'"2

”Washington, April 17 -- The possibility of new Congressional
hearings on cigarette advertising developed this week, as
the House and Senate commerce committees asked the Federal
Trade Commission for information about its recent suggestion
that tobacco companies giye the public more information about
tar and nicotine levels.”

 

1"FTC shifts, call tar and nicotine claims desirable," Advertising
Age, March 28, 1966, p. l.

 

2"Lorillard early starter in 'Tar Derby'", Advertising Age,
April 4, 1966, p. 1.

 

3"Congress asks FTC to elucidate its cigarette shift," Adver-
tising Age, April 11, 1966, p. l.

292

"Washington; April 27 -- The proposal for a new cigarette
'Tar Derby' found the cigarette code administrator,
Robert Meyner, and the Federal Trade Commission on a col-
lision course this week. And, in a related development,
there were signs that the National Assn. of Broadcasters
may intensify monitoring of cigarette ads under its own

codes."

"New York, May 5 -- If it takes two to make a 'Tar Derby'
then the derby is on. American Tobacco has brought out
Carlton filter cigarettes in a new pack -- with tar and
nicotine contents listed on the label and advertised in

newspapers."2

 

1"Meyner won't accept FTC shift on tar claims," Advertising
Age, May 2, 1966, p. 1.

2"Carlton pack has tar, nicotine info," Advertising Age,
May 9, 1966, p. 2.

C IGARETTE ADVERTIS ING CODE

CIGARETTE ADVERTISING CODE

STATEMENT OF PURPOSES

The purposes of this Code are to establish uniform standards
for cigarette advertising and to provide means whereby compliance

with this Code can be ascertained promptly and fairly and on a con-

sistent basis.

ARTICLE I
Definitions

Section 1. "Advertising":

(a) Means all forms of advertising in, or primarily directed
to, the United States, Puerto Rico, any territory or
posession of the United States, or any military instal-
lation of the United States, including, but not limited
to, radio, television and cinema commercials of all
types, newspaper and magazine advertisements, billboards,
posters and signs, subway and rail or bus car cards,
automobile and truck decals, posters and signs, calendars,
pamphlets, handbills, matchbook advertising, and point of

sale display material of all types;

294

295

(b) Includes any written material or article or excerpt
therefrom, not otherwise advertising, when used for

promotional purposes;

(c) Includes labeling, namely, the display of written,
printed, or graphic matter upon any portion of the
package, carton, or other container in which cigarettes

are packaged or shipped by the manufacturer; but

(d) Does not include the entertainment portion of any

television or radio program.

Section 2. "Cigarette" means any roll of tobacco wrapped in paper or

in any substance other than tobacco.

Section 3. "Representation" means any statement, reference, or claim,
express or implied, direct or indirect, whether in oral, written,

printed or graphic form, or in any combination of such forms.

ARTICLE II

The Code Administrator

Section 1. There shall be a Code Administrator who shall be a person
of recognized independence, integrity and intellectual achievement to
the end that decision by him shall command public confidence and
respect. The Administrator shall have all of the powers and authority
necessary and proper to enable him to discharge effectively the respon-

sibilities entrusted to him by this Code.

296

Section 2. The Administrator shall have complete and final authority
to determine whether cigarette advertising complies with the standards

of this Code and to enforce this Code in all other respects.

Section 3. The Administrator shall appoint a staff adequate and com-

petent to assist him in discharging his duties.

Section 4. Neither the Administrator nor any member of his staff shall
be an officer, director, employee or stockholder of any manufacturer of
tobacco products, nor shall any such person have any financial interest

in the business of any such manufacturer.

Section 5. The Administrator is authorized to convene scientific
advisory panels to enable him to carry out his duties. Persons sel-
ected for such panels shall be of independence, integrity and compe-
tence in their particular areas of scientific discipline. In selec-
ting such persons, the Administrator may consult with appropriate
Governmental and private agencies such as the U. S. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare; National Academy of Sciences; National
Research Council; American Medical Association; Scientific Advisory
Board of The Council for Tobacco Research -- U. S. A.; medical and
scientific societies; colleges and universities; and non-profit research

institutes.

Section 6. The Administrator shall by regulation establish procedures
for the administration and enforcement of this Code including, without

limitation, procedure for:

297
(a) The submission to him of proposed cigarette advertising
which, together with any supporting data or documents,
shall be kept confidential, except as otherwise provided
in Article IV, Section 4, of this Code or as agreed to

by the submitting party;

(b) The submission of protests by parties subject to this Code

concerning any determination by him;

(c) Hearings in connection with all submissions and protests;

and

(d) Reconsideration by him of any of his determinations.

ARTICLE III

Advertising Clearance

Section 1. No cigarette advertising shall be used unless such adver-
tising shall first have been submitted to the Administrator and deter-
mined by him to be in compliance with the standards of this Code; pro-
vided that by regulation promulgated by the Administrator specified
advertising may be excepted from the requirement of such submission
but not from the requirement of compliance with the standards of this

Code.

Section 1.

298

ARTICLE IV

Advertising Standards

All cigarette advertising and promotional activities shall

be subject to the following:

(a)

(b)

(C)

Cigarette advertising shall not appear
(i) On television and radio programs, or in publi-
cations, directed primarily to persons under

twenty-one years of age;

(ii) In spot announcements during any program break
in, or during the program break immediately
preceding or following, a television or radio
program directed primarily to persons under

twenty-one years of age;

(iii) In school, college, or university media (in-
cluding athletic, theatrical and other pro-

gram»);

(iv) In comic books, or comic supplements to news-

papers.

Sample cigarettes shall not be distributed to persons under

twenty-one years of age.

No sample cigarettes shall be distributed or promotional
efforts conducted on school, college, or university cam-
puses, or in their facilities, or in fraternity or sorority

houses.

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h)

(i)

299
Cigarette advertising shall not represent that cigarette
smoking is essential to social prominence, distinction,

success, or sexual attraction.

Natural persons depicted as smokers in cigarette advertising
shall be at least twenty-five years of age and shall not

be dressed or otherwise made to appear to be less than
twenty-five years of age. Fictitious persons so depicted

in the form of drawings, sketches or any other manner shall
appear to be at least twenty-five years of age in dress and

otherwise.

Cigarette advertising may use attractive, healthy looking
models, or illustrations or drawings of persons who appear
to be attractive and healthy, provided that there is no

suggestion that their attractive appearance or good health

is due to cigarette smoking.

No cigarette advertising shall contain a picture or an

illustration of a person smoking in an exaggerated manner.

Cigarette advertising shall not depict as a smoker any per-

son well known as being, or having been, an athlete.

Cigarette advertising shall not depict as a smoker any per-
son participating in, or obviously having just participated
in, physical activity requiring stamina or athletic condi-

tioning beyond that of normal recreation.

300

(j) Testimonials from athletes or celebrities in the enter-
tainment world, or testimonials from other persons who,
in the judgment of the Administrator, would have special
appeal to the persons under twenty-one years of age, shall

not be used in cigarette advertising.

Section 2. No cigarette advertising which makes a representation with

respect to health shall be used unless:

(a) The Administrator shall have determined that such represen-
tation is significant in terms of health and is based on

adequate relevant and valid scientific data; or

(b) If the Administrator shall have determined it to be appro-
priate, a disclaimer as to significance in terms of health
shall be set forth in such advertising in substance and

form satisfactory to the Administrator; or

(c) The Administrator shall have determined that the represen-
tation with respect to health in such advertising is not

material.

Section 3. The inclusion in cigarette advertising of reference to the
presence or absence of a filter, or the description or depiction of a
filter, shall not be deemed a representation with respect to health
unless the advertising including such reference, description or depic-
tion, shall be determined by the Administrator to constitute, through
omission or inclusion, a representation with respect to health. If

the Administrator shall have determined that such advertising constitutes

a representation with respect to health, the provisions of Section 2 of

301

this Article shall apply.

Section 4.

No cigarette advertising shall be used which refers to the

removal or the reduction of any ingredient in the mainstream smoke of

a cigarette, except that it shall be permissible to make a representa-

tion as to the quantity of an ingredient present in the mainstream

smoke or as to the removal in toto of an ingredient from the mainstream

smoke, or as to the absence of an ingredient normally present in the

mainstream smoke, if:

(a)

(b)

(C)

(d)

The Administrator shall have determined that such repre-
sentation is significant in terms of health and is based

on adequate relevant and valid scientific data; or

A disclaimer as to significance in terms of health shall
be set forth in such advertising in substance and form

satisfactory to the Administrator; or

The Administrator shall have determined that a disclaimer
is unnecessary for the reason that the representation in
such advertising has no health implication or that such

implication is not material; and

The quantity of such ingredient is determined and expressed
in accordance with uniform standards adopted by the Admin-
istrator for measuring the quantity of the ingredient present
in the mainstream smoke, provided that, until such uniform

standard is so adopted, the quantity of such ingredient may

302

be determined and expressed in accordance with any
recognized scientifically valid method disclosed to
the Administrator without any requirement of confi-

dential treatment.

Section 5. Any advertising determined by the Administrator to be in
conformity with the Code may include the following legend: "This
advertising (label) conforms to the standards of the Cigarette Adver-

tising Code."

ARTICLE V

Procedures in Event of Violation of Code

Section 1. Any person, firm or corporation subject to this Code, who
violates any provision of this Code, shall, in the discretion of the
Administrator with respect to each such violation, pay to the office
of the Administrator as liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, a
sum, not to exceed One Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000), as deter-
mined by the Administrator after consideration by him of all relevant
facts. The Administrator shall establish regulations for the deter-
mination of such violation and for the assessment and payment of such
damages. No sanction shall be imposed without affording a hearing to
the alleged violator. Upon written request from the Administrator, an
alleged violator of the Code shall promptly deliver to the Adminis-

trator any material and documents in its possession which are relevant

303

and material to a determination by the Administrator as to whether the

Code has been violated.

Section 2. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to give any
person, firm or corporation, other than the Administrator, any cause

of action.

Section 3. In the event of a violation of this Code, the Administrator
in his discretion may make public the fact of such violation in such

manner as he may deem approPriate.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

U. 3. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.
Hearings on Cigarette Labeling and Advertising. 88th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 1964.

 

BOOKS

Heimann, Robert K. Tobacco and Americans. New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1960.

 

ARTICLES AND PERIODICALS
"Ads in reverse," Time, November 15, 1963, p. 69.

AdvertisingAAge. 1958-1965.

 

"AMA will rely on Public Health Service findings,” Business Week,
March 23, 1963, p. 96.

 

"Beyond Any Doubt,” Time, November 30, 1953, p. 60.

”Brighter Glow--Filter Tips Sparking Comeback in Cigarettes," Barron's,
September 3, 1956, p. 3.

"British Cabinet Links Lung Cancer to Smoking," Business Week,
May 12, 1956, p. 36.

 

"British report sparks cancer-smoking scare,” Business Week, April 14,
1962, p. 42.

 

"British TV restrictions on tobacco ads," Broadcasting, January 28,
1963, p. 90.

 

"Business Briefs," Business Week, September 18, 1954, p. 34.

 

"Calling a smoke a smoke," Time, May 8, 1964, p. 84.

”Cancer by the Carton," Reader's Digest, December, 1952, p. 7, 8.

 

"Cancer-Causing Faction," Time, April 23, 1956, p. 70.
"Case for Tobacco,” Newsweek, April 19, 1954, p. 94, 95.

"Catch 'em on the campus." The Nation. November 5, 1960, p. 339.

 

"Cigarette ads now running in papers," Editor and Publisher, February
29, 1964, p. 32.

 

304

305

"Cigarette Case," Time, March 22, 1954, p. 59.

"Cigarette Controversy Smokes up Here and Abroad," Newsweek, July 22,
1957, p. 58, 59.

"Cigarette Hangover," Time, November 9, 1952, p. 100.

"Cigarette makers' Code sets up ad Czar," Editor and Publisher, May 21,
1964, p. 9.

 

"Cigarette Makers See Good Times Ahead," Business Week, November 2,
1952, p. 138+.

"Cigarettes," Consumer Reports, February, 1953, p. 58-74.

 

"Cigarette Sales: The Real Story," U. S. News & World Report,
August 6, 1954, p. 83-850

 

”Cigarettes and Cancer," Time, February 22, 1954, p. 66.

"Cigarettes, cancer and the campus," The Nation, August 15, 1959,
p. 69-710

”Cigarette Scare: What will the trade do?," Business Week, December 5,
1953, p. 58-60.

 

"Cigarettes: is this a turning point?", Business Week, January 2,
1954, p. 74.

 

"Cigarette Smoking and Lung Cancer," Consumer Reports, February,
1954, p. 54.

 

"Cigarettes on Trial," Consumer Reports, September, 1957, p.407, 409.

 

"Cigarette Trade Yawns at FTC Ad Rules," Business Week, October 1,
1955, p. 56.

"Cigarette Use Going Down, U. S. Reports," Chicago Daily News,
January 11, 1965, p. l.

"Cigarette warning, the aftermath, reactions of smokers, Congressmen,
stockmarket," U. S. News & World Report, January 27, 1964,
p. 38-39.

 

"Cigarette withdrawal symptoms,” Broadcasting, September 16, 1963,
p. 34.

 

"Collins, Cone, Ogilvy repeat views on cigarette situation,"
Broadcasting, April 20, 1964, p. 40.

 

Dr. Terry lands cigarette code, raps misleading advertising," Sponsor,
June 15, 1964, p. 14.

"Easy on the Drawback," Time, May 31, 1954, p. 70.

306

"Fear and Jitters," Business Week, November 14, 1953, p. 54.
"Filtered for Safety," limp, July 29, 1957, p. 28.

"Filter Fury," Newsweek, June 23, 1958, p. 85.

"Filtering the Cigarette Ads," America, March 20, 1954, p. 643.
"Filters and a Flare-Up," Newsweek, March 3, 1958, p. 71.

”FTC 'might' revise ruling," Sponsor, June 29, 1964, p. 16.

"FTC tries to kick the habit," Business Week, January 25, 1964, p. 29.

 

"FTC Trying to Get Voluntary Industry Compliance," Business Week,
September 25, 1954, p. 124.

 

Harris, Sidney J. "Self-policing in Slow Motion," Chicago Daily News,
January 5, 1965, p. 18.

 

"In the Hit Parade," Newsweek, October 1, 1956, p. 66.

"Is There Proof That Smoking Causes Cancer," U. S. News & World Report,
February 26, 1954, p. 62-71.

"Layman's verdict," Time, October 24, 1960, p. 94.

"Less-stringent tobacco rules?," Broadcasting, March 29, 1965, p. 40.

 

"Let's await Surgeon General's cigarette report, Ream urges,"
Broadcasting, May 13, 1963, p. 44.

"Lung Cancer and Smoking,” Atlantic Monthly, January, 1956, p. 71-75.

 

"Making Cigarette Ads Tell the Truth," Harper's, August, 1958, p. 45-49.

"Media use unchanged by cigarette code," Editor and Publisher,.
January 9, 1965, p. 20.

"Meeting the cigarette crisis," Broadcasting, January 13, 1964, p. 33.

 

"Meyner gets nod as cigarette code Czar," Sponsor, June 15, 1964, p. 14.

"More Trouble for Cigarettes," Business Week, December 19, 1953, p. 55.

 

McGaffin, William. "Cigarets' Yearly Death Toll: 125,000 Americans,"
Chicago Daily News, January 13, 1965, p. 18.

 

"New Cigarette-Cancer Link," Life, June 11, 1956, p. 126.

"New hope for cigarette smokers: crash effort for safer cigarette,"
Saturday Evening Post, April 18, 1964, p. 19-22.

 

"New Trend in Cigarettes," Business Week, May 26, 1956, p. 198.

 

307

New Yorker. 1954.

 

"Nicotine--The Smoker's Enigma," Reader's Digest, January, 1958,
p. 25.27.

 

”No code panic at commercial filmers," Sponsor, May 4, 1964, p. 3.

"No crackdown seen on TV cigarette ads," Broadcasting, January 21,
1963, p. 38.

 

"North Dakota Senate Passes Bill to Discourage Juvenile Smoking,"
New York Times, February 15, 1953, p. 5.

"Philip Morris to launch record network TV drive," Sponsor, October 5,
1964, p. 24.

Printer's Ink. 1953-1965.

 

"Round 2 in cigarette fight: Tobacco firms are ready," Chicago Daily
News, January 13, 1965, p. 25.

 

Saturday Evening Post. 1955.

"Signs of change in tobacco ads,” Broadcastigg, June 24, 1963,
p. 31-330

 

"Smoke?," Newsweek, December 13, 1954, p. 56.
"Smoke & Ire," Time, July 3, 1964, p. 78-79.
"Smoke-filled Code," Newsweek, May 11, 1964, p. 72.

"Smoke gets in your ears," Saturday Review, February 28, 1953, p. 41.

 

"Smoke Rings Rise,” Newsweek, December 31, 1956, p. 52.

”Smokers' slowdown: How long will it last?", U. S. News & World Report,
February 24, 1964, p. 39.

 

"Smoke screen," New Republic, January 9, 1965, p. 6.

"Smoke still swirls around cigarettes," Business Week, June 29, 1963,
p. 122.

"Smoking ad rule debate gets heated,” Editor and Publisher, March 21,
1964, p. 12.

 

 

"Smoking and Cancer," Time, January 25, 1960, p. 64.
"Smoking and Cancer," Time, June 13, 1955, p. 67, 68.
"Smoking and Cancer---ACS Report," Time, July 5, 1954, p. 37.

"Smoking and Other Diseases," Time, June 13, 1955, p. 68.

308

"Smoking controversey still burns," Broadcasting, April 29, 1963, p. 38.

 

"Smoking: Dr. Burney's Alarm," Newsweek, December 7, 1959, p. 66.

"Smoking more despite the scare," Business Week, December 22, 1962,
p. 78, 80.

 

"Smoking on the Rise Again," U. S. News & World Report, October 14,
1955, p. 30.

 

"Smoking scare: What's happened to it?", U. S. News & World Report,
January 11, 1965, p. 38.

 

"Smoking, The Government Report," Time, January 17, 1964, p. 42.

"Soft pedal on filter claims," Business Week, February 13, 1960, p. 29.

 

"Some changes in cigarette ads likely. Tobacco Institute says they
should not appeal to youth," Broadcasting, July 15, 1963, p. 36.

 

"Some radio stations ban cigarette ads," Broadcasting, February 3,
1964, p. 25.

 

"Tar Czar," Newsweek, December 28, 1964, p. 46.
"Telling a Secret," Newsweek, July 22, 1957, p. 68.
"The Answers: No," Business Week, April 23, 1955, p. 108.

"The Cigarette Ad Code: Will FTC buy it?", Sponsor, May 4, 1964,
p. 24.

"The Facts Behind Filter-Tips," Reader's Digest, July, 1957, p. 33,
37.

 

"The Great Cigarette Opera," Ad Agency Magazine, December 7, 1956,
p. 22.

 

Time. 1953-1954.
"Tobacco: Cigarette Czar," Newsweek, June 22, 1964, p. 42.
"Tobacco--Comp1ete Recovery," Time, April 22, 1957, p. 97.

”Tobacco: Congress moves closer to requiring warning of danger
included on Cigarette packages," Science, April 23, 1965, p. 479.

"Tobacco firms keep print ads in their plans," Editor and Publisher,
May 2, 1964, p. 9.

 

"Tobacco Industry Gives Its View," U. S. News & World Report, July 2,
1954, p. 67.

 

"Tobacco Institute answers Surgeon General," Sponsor, January 18,
1965, p. 20.

309

"Tobacco, the controversial princess," Time, April 11, 1960, p. 104.
"Tobacco--the Washington hearings,” Time, March 27, 1964, p. 79.

”Tobacco's Troubles Pile Up," Business Week, April 9, 1955, p. 182.

 

"Tough talk about smoking and health," Broadcasting, April 22, 1963,
p. 42.

 

"Uproar in cigarettes," Fortune, December, 1953, p. 130.
"Vote for Acquittal," Time, December 7, 1953, p. 54.

"Wanted Available, Filter-Tips That Really Filter," Reader's Digest,
August, 1957, p. 44.

 

"What Britons Are Told About Smoking," U. S. News & World Report,
February 26, 1954, p. 71.

 

”What has hit tobacco stocks?", Business Week, November 21, 1953,
p. 140+.

 

"What Now for cigarette spots," Broadcasting, May 4, 1964, p. 29, 32.

"Will tobacco firms quit sports?", Broadcasting, February 3, 1964,
p. 23.

 

"Words and Meaning," Newsweek, August 26, 1963, p. 62.
UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL
Crichton, John. "Memorandum of Conversation between Governor Meyner

and John Crichton," American Association of Advertisingnngencies,
September 14, 1964.

 

OTHER SOURCES

Chicago advertising agencies. Discussions and interviews with agency
personnel. January, 1966 - June, 1966.

"I111111111111111111“