

A CASE STUDY OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONSENSUS AND  
CONFLICT: THE MANAGEMENT TASK FORCE OF THE  
MICHIGAN COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE GOALS  
AND STANDARDS

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.  
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY  
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ABSTRACT

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GOALS AND STANDARDS

By

Ronald G. Kirschenheiter

Purpose

Governmental commissions and study groups have become an increasingly common feature of American public life. Frequently the first official response to any type of social problem is the appointment of a "blue-ribbon Commission" to study the problem and make recommendations for the future. More often than not, the findings of these groups have had little positive effect on resolving the issues.

This study examines the deliberations of one such commission, the Michigan Commission on Criminal Justice Goals and Standards. An attempt was made to analyze the decision making process of the Management Task Force, the most important task force appointed to that Commission, and to then determine what impact the various groups concerned with this task force's recommendations had upon the final decisions.

### Methodology

The methods and questionnaires utilized in this study were adopted from the Normative Sponsorship Theory. This theory was originated by Dr. Christopher Sower, Sociology Professor at Michigan State University and modified and extended by Dr. Robert C. Trojanowicz, Criminal Justice Professor also at Michigan State University.

The individuals interviewed in the course of this study were either Commissioners of the Management Task Force or alternates personally chosen by those Commissioners. Additional interviews were conducted with official representatives from each of the groups most likely to be affected by the recommendations of this task force. The Michigan Office of Criminal Justice, through the staff assigned to assist the Commission, provided valuable support throughout the study.

### Results

The basic findings of this case study are that the organizations that will be most affected by the recommendations of the Management Task Force had little influence on the decisions contained in the final report. As a result of this, successful implementation of the goals and standards appears highly doubtful. Moreover, the members of the Management Task Force, in attempting to establish a more efficient system of law enforcement, intentionally





made no effort to analyze and stress the need for changes in the underlying social conditions which directly contribute to the state's increasing crime rate. Therefore even if the numerous goals and standards should eventually be adopted by the criminal justice system, little reduction can be anticipated in the actual incidence of crime in the state of Michigan.

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A THESIS

Submitted to  
Michigan State University  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology

1975

To my wife, Abbi,  
for her help, patience and love

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Dr. Christopher Sower for enabling me to obtain a quarter time research assistantship to help finance this research. I am grateful to Dr. Robert Trojanowicz for his cooperation and "technical assistance." I would also like to especially thank Dr. Kay Snyder for her friendship, guidance, and understanding throughout the course of this undertaking. Finally, I am indebted to Michael Foster, Project Office Manager for the Commission for his willing assistance on many occasions.

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## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

What concrete changes should be made in a badly splintered and divided criminal justice system which produces an ever-increasing amount of crime and an ever-decreasing amount of justice? This was the basic question which the 78 member Michigan Commission on Criminal Justice Goals and Standards dealt with over an 18 month period. Their answers lie in a voluminous report dubbed "the Bible" by its critics, which contains over 600 recommended changes in the present process of criminal justice. This case study focuses on the 14 member Management Task Force, (MTF), the most influential of the six task forces assigned to that Commission. The most frequent criticism of their section of the report radiated from numerous local law enforcement agencies and elected officials. These vested interest groups perceived the report as a threat to their own survival and, after the publication of the first draft of the report, they quickly mounted an intensive campaign to prevent approval of the report and to convince the members

of the MTF to modify their positions. To what extent they were successful and how the input from concerned groups influenced the decision making process of the MTF is the subject of this case study.

The observations and conclusions contained in this paper are based on a continuing nine month study of the Commission's work. Many informative sources were utilized including a wide range of state and local newspapers, Michigan Uniform Crime Reports, publications from the state Office of Criminal Justice Programs (OCJP), public opinion surveys, participant observation at closed-door task force sessions and public hearings, and interviews with each of the Commissioners of the MTF or their alternates and with elected officials of the concerned groups involved.

This study attempted to utilize the Theory of Normative Sponsorship, a model of community action programs developed by Dr. Christopher Sower, Professor of Sociology at Michigan State University. This theory as well as additions to it made by Dr. Robert C. Trojanowicz, an Associate Professor of Criminal Justice at Michigan State University is described in Chapter III. Chapter II, the Survey of the Literature, examines some of the research done in the social sciences relating to organizations and the achieving of successful innovative programs within organizations. This chapter also surveys the rise in professional reform organizations and governmental study groups and delineates

a few of their more identifiable characteristics. Chapter IV describes in more detail the methodology utilized in this case study. Chapter V is a description of the origin of the Commission and the sequence of events leading up to the final approval of the Goals and Standards report on December 16, 1974. Chapter VI contains the basic findings of the research and an analysis of the influence which the critics of the MTF's section of the report had upon the decisions reached by its members. Chapter VII presents some of the limitations of this research and states the implications its findings hold for further studies.

## CHAPTER II

### SURVEY OF LITERATURE

#### Definition of Terms

The language which social scientists utilize in defining terms such as roles, status, and values frequently reflects the influence of the particular disciplines of those scientists and their areas of interests, as well as simple semantic difficulties. Roles, for example, have been presented as expected behavioral patterns as defined by society, as defined by the individual social actors, or as the actual rather than the anticipated behavior of the actors. Despite these differences, however, most definitions find individuals in specific social positions responding to a set of expected behavioral patterns. Thus "a role is a set of evaluative standards applied to an incumbent of a particular position."<sup>1</sup> Values constitute the underlying principles by which the roles and the goals

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<sup>1</sup>Neal Gross, Explorations in Role Analysis (New York: J. Wiley and Sons, 1958), p. 5.

of either individuals or groups are chosen and the criteria by which the means and the objectives of these can be judged. An organization may be defined as a system of intentionally coordinated activities designed to produce some overall explicit ends.<sup>2</sup> These ends may be material goods, services, information, or decisions.

### The Rational and Naturalistic Models of Organizational Analysis

In his survey of the historical development of the analysis of complex organizations, Alvin Gouldner identified two distinct models or ideal types that have dominated most of the sociological studies of complex organizations.<sup>4</sup> Organizations have traditionally either been described in terms of a "rational" or "mechanical" model or have been conceptualized from a "natural systems" approach. In the rational model the organization is conceived of as a rational means for attaining some clearly defined group goal. The individual units of the organization merge to form effective tools for realizing these objectives. Shifts in organizational behavioral patterns are considered calculated attempts to maximize efficiency. Henri

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Erving Goffman, "The Underlife of a Public Institution: A Study of Ways of Making Out in a Mental Hospital," in The Sociology of Organizations Basic Studies, eds.: Oscar Grusky and George A. Miller (New York: The Free Press, 1970), p. 409.

<sup>3</sup>Alvin W. Gouldner, "Organizational Analysis," in Sociology Today, ed.: R. K. Merton (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1959), Chapter 18.



Saint-Simon and Max Weber were the original advocates of this approach. Both men stressed the increasingly important roles that science and technology would play in the organizations of the future and the implications this held for human society. Although Weber accepted the efficiency and increased productivity which often accompanies expanding bureaucracies, he also warned of the potential danger this held for destroying and dehumanizing the individual personality.

William H. Whyte echoed many of these same fears a half century after Weber in his now classic work, The Organization Man. Whyte feared that a new "Social Ethic" had come to displace the Protestant Ethic as the principle underlying doctrine of many organizations. This body of thought justifies and legitimates the increasing demands society makes upon the individual to conform. It assumes the group rather than the individual to be the primary source of creativity, that a desire to belong remains one of the basic needs of all humans, and that science offered the surest route to fulfill this "belongingness."<sup>4</sup> Although conflict might occur as a result of breakdowns in the communication process, it is assumed that through the application of scientific techniques consensus can be achieved and

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<sup>4</sup>William H. Whyte, The Organization Man (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956).

an equilibrium created in which the needs of the system and those of the individual become one and the same.

In the natural systems model the organization is conceived of as a "natural whole" with goal attainment constituting merely one of several equally important tasks of the operation. Auguste Comte became this model's earliest proponent. Comte believed that associations which formed spontaneously were by nature always superior to those intentionally designed by humans. In later years, the writings of Robert Michels and Talcott Parsons reinforced this approach. The natural systems model believes that organizations "become ends in themselves" and "strive to survive and maintain their equilibrium," even after their original objectives have been achieved. New goals are constantly being produced which occasionally detract from or even conflict with the organization's original purposes. Changes in the organization's behavior and shifts in its methods of operation are regarded more as spontaneous responses intended to maintain a stable state of equilibrium than as goal-oriented programs initiated by the membership. The nonrational, unplanned features of organizations receive the primary emphasis, rather than their rationally arranged structures. Since the system is assumed to be an inter-dependent whole, relatively little importance is placed on analyzing the unique and often dependent characteristics of the individual components. Thus the equilibrium of the group relates directly to the degree of conformity

demonstrated by the entire membership. Nonconformity or independence from the accepted group norm, as defined by the leadership, is regarded as deviant and dysfunctional. Disequilibrium, maladjustment or disorganization are by implication, evils that should be eliminated.

Gouldner also identifies several sources of organizational tensions. Included among these are problems which arise when authority figures exercise their control over subordinates whose experience, skills, or interest differ from those of the leadership. Such individuals often depend on external determinants and criteria as their primary source of reward and legitimation, and remain less subject to the direct control of the organization. Eventually these competing loyalties cause friction which can spark into open conflict. The demands and influences that are placed upon a locally elected sheriff, for example, differ both in quantity and quality from those which beset a state-employed law enforcement officer assigned to the same area. Gouldner states that nonconformity rather than strict adherence to official norms may in fact prove beneficial to an association. He feels that the more bureaucratization that occurs, the greater becomes the likelihood that the organization's behavioral patterns primarily mirror the will of those in positions of authority rather than arising voluntarily from the members. Eventually this results in a decline in motivation which disrupts efficiency and causes dissatisfaction.

There exists an obvious need for a new theoretical model which attempts to synthesize the rational and the natural systems approaches. This new model would ideally capitalize on the strengths and amend the weaknesses of each. It would take into account the rational and planned aspects of organizations while realizing that human beings are not merely instruments to be manipulated. It must allow for uncontrived and random elements but not over-emphasize the value of equilibrium, interdependence, and integration. The Normative Sponsorship model of community action has been viewed as a positive step towards achieving this improved framework.<sup>5</sup>

#### Goals and Environmental Factors

Simpson and Gulley demonstrated that goals and environmental factors do indeed influence the internal characteristics of voluntary organizations.<sup>6</sup> The organizations studied were defined as either "focused" or "diffuse" depending on the numbers and types of goals which they sought and as internal or external according to the range of interests they served. Internal associations had to satisfy only their own membership while

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<sup>5</sup>Robert C. Anderson, "A Method and Instrument for Predicting the Consequences of Intra-Organizational Action," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1963).

<sup>6</sup>Richard L. Simpson, William H. Gulley, "Goals, Environmental Pressures and Organizational Characteristics," American Sociological Review 26 (June 1962), 344-351.

external associations confronted demands from both their members and the community at large. It was assumed that diffused external organizations faced a greater number and degree of pressures than did those classified as focused internal. They discovered that, as might be expected,

An association which has many goals and must satisfy an external constituency will be relatively decentralized, with initiation of activity concentrated at the local level and with a strong concern for grass roots membership involvement and internal communication. With this type of organization the leadership can respond to local community demands and to the changing desires of the membership which has diverse goals.<sup>7</sup>

Focused internal associations, on the other hand, tend to maintain a more rigid authority structure which minimizes internal communication and interaction and initiates action programs from a more centralized level.

Studies such as these have obvious implications for many governmental and quasi-governmental organizations, whether they be individual sections of the criminal justice system or governmental commissions. These associations by definition exist to serve the public interest, but they also must satisfy the needs of their own direct membership. Their task becomes complicated by the fact that the objectives of these two groups are typically far reaching and frequently in conflict with one another. Local support and involvement appear vital so that an open, free-flowing stream of communication can evolve. Without this high

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<sup>7</sup>Ibid., p. 345.

level of personal interaction, the leader's role of planning and implementing effective action programs becomes infinitely more difficult if not impossible.

Goal attainment has been utilized in numerous sociological studies of organizations as the central criteria for assessing the effectiveness of those organizations. More often than not, such research has shown that organizations either do not effectively achieve their goals or that they possess objectives which are quite different from those stated publicly. Amitai Etzioni argues that the "goal model" of organizations often mistakenly accepts ideal goals for real ones.<sup>8</sup> Public objectives do not fail to be realized simply because of poor planning or due to a hostile environment but because they were not actually meant to be achieved in the first place.

Frequently social scientists have further confused the issue by projecting their own values onto the organization, by confusing what ought to be, with what in fact is.<sup>9</sup> Studies which attempt to measure, for example, how efficiently mental health facilities or correctional institutions approximate their goals of restoring their patients to health or bringing about a change in their population's behavior, have little value since these are assumed rather

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<sup>8</sup> Amitai Etzioni, "Two Approaches to Organizational Analysis: A Critique and a Suggestion," in The Sociology of Organization Basic Studies, eds.: Oscar Grusky and George A. Miller (New York: The Free Press), pp. 215-227.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., pp. 223-224.



than actual goals. Prisons or medical hospitals have not failed in their goals of rehabilitation or treatment of the mentally ill. On the contrary, they have been reasonably effective in accomplishing their actual central objective, that of removing individuals labeled "deviant" from the mainstream of society. Etzioni recommends replacing this old model with an alternative "systems approach." This model assumes that some resources must be channeled to non-goal activities which maintain the organization as well as to goal achievement, and that effectiveness can be determined by how "optimally distributed" the resources of the organization are allocated.

Georgopoulous and Tannenbaum tested this approach in their evaluation of a delivery system of retail merchandise.<sup>10</sup> They assumed that in addition to productivity, organizations can be evaluated according to their degree of response and adjustment to internal and external changes in the environment and by how well they resolve tension and conflict between and among organizational subgroups. The study revealed that these three criteria produced an efficiency rating which significantly correlated to that provided by experts of the various subsystems of the organization.

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<sup>10</sup> Basil S. Georgopoulous and Arnold S. Tannenbaum, "A Study of Organizational Effectiveness," American Sociological Review 22 (October 1957), 534-540.

Perrow also presents a strong argument for separating goals into major categories.<sup>11</sup> He selects the terms "official" and "operative" to describe this division. Official goals are the publicly stated objectives of the organization, as set forth in press releases or official public documents. Operative goals constitute what the group actually strives to accomplish as reflected by their operating policies. Operative goals may support, conflict, or be irrelevant to official goals. Identifying the operative goals is often a difficult task, but Perrow supplies numerous indicators which assist in predicting where they might lie.

Operative goals are established by the dominant members of the group. "Their background characteristics (distinctive perspectives based upon their training, career lines, and areas of competence)" are all important considerations. Moreover the source of financial backing can often be traced to the dominant group. Agencies funded by the federal government, for example, might be expected to comply with general recommendations set forth on the national level, as well as conform to any specific guidelines--especially if these associations anticipate further federal funding. Although professionals occupy the upper rungs of

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<sup>11</sup>Charles Perrow, "The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations," in Readings on Modern Organizations, ed.: Amatai Etzioni (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1969), pp. 65-80.

the organization's ladder, they continue to maintain specialized interests of their own, which can separate them from other groups in the environment. Critics of the dominant group often label these interests as self-serving or counterproductive to those of the larger group. Thus a state-appointed commission, dominated by state-employed personnel, might well be attacked by locally-based critics for making decisions which favor state rather than local interests. This case study of the MTF reveals that this is precisely what occurred at each of the public hearings held by the Goals and Standards Commission.

In attempts to determine what constitutes the goals of an organization, a broad spectrum of data might be used. Official documents and publications, public statements of organizational spokespersons, the interests represented by individual members of the associations, personal interviews with key leaders, and close observation of their actual behavior and policies, all help to illuminate the subject. It is crucial to remember, however, that the goals of an organization and the process by which they are set should not be regarded as a static element of the organization, but as an ongoing and constantly shifting process.

Thompson and McEwen suggest that similarities exist in these goal-setting processes even though the organizations

might pursue widely divergent goals.<sup>12</sup> As the output of the organization becomes less tangible and increasingly difficult to measure, the reappraisal and restructuring of the goals also becomes more arduous. In the area of law enforcement, for example, crime statistics have traditionally constituted the primary indicator of efficiency. Yet such statistics are among the most unreliable of all social statistics for a variety of reasons.<sup>13</sup> (Donald Cressey observes that, "We measure the extent of crime with elastic rulers whose units of measurements are undefined.")<sup>14</sup>

Strategies for coping with a changing environment which necessitates this review of the organization's goals can be categorized as either competitive or cooperative strategies. The authors subclassify cooperative techniques into three basic types: bargaining, co-optation, and coalition. Since it appears unlikely that a goal can be efficient unless at least partially implemented, competition can supply a useful tactic for eliminating impractical solutions. Bargaining clarifies and limits the amount of resources available to the organization. Co-optation

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<sup>12</sup>James D. Thompson and William J. McEwen, "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal Setting as an Interacting Process," American Sociological Review 23 (February 1958), 23-31.

<sup>13</sup>Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, Principles of Criminology (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1966), pp. 25-51.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 27.



meanwhile, allows outsiders with a potential for power by providing the organization with their knowledge and insights of the problem and by informing the leadership of the potential opposition they face. Coalition becomes "the extreme form of environmental conditioning of organizational goals"<sup>15</sup> and requires a joint solution from two or more relevant groups of individuals. Competition, bargaining, co-optation, and coalition constitute basic approaches for gaining support from within the organization and its environment. The degree to which they are successfully utilized determines to a large extent the selection of goals and the steps for achieving those goals.

From this perspective, the central purpose of this study can be regarded as an attempt to determine how the MTF utilized these different techniques in their efforts to establish a set of goals and standards for the criminal justice system. The findings suggest that the Commissioners, for the most part, adopted a strategy of competition where cooperation was both clearly possible and preferable. These errors will make final attainment of their goals much more difficult. Not only did they virtually ignore input from other organizations which occupied pertinent positions with respect to the problems being confronted, but they also committed several other tactical errors. They underestimated their potential opposition and ignored the possible

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 28.



use of third parties who might have sought out agreements acceptable to both factions. Furthermore, the research reveals numerous indications that, had bargaining, co-optation, and coalition played a more important part in the decision making process of this task force, the same basic goals could have been maintained with only minor alterations in the standards for achieving them.

### Bureaucratic Resistance to Change

A prevailing stereotype exists among many social scientists that bureaucratic organizations will resist any and all efforts at organizational change. Peter Blau tested this hypothesis by examining governmental employment agencies.<sup>16</sup> He determined that resistance to innovations did not occur because a perfect state of equilibrium existed within the bureaucratic structure and that the personnel involved opposed any efforts they perceived as potentially disrupting this ideal adjustment. Many individuals resisted change because they feared it would lead to criticism or censure by their superiors and that it would expose inadequacies within their field of operations. On the other hand, adaptations and innovations often received strong support by these same members if certain conditions

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<sup>16</sup>Peter Blau, "Bureaucracy and Social Change," in The Sociology of Organizations Basic Studies, eds.: Oscar Grusky and George A. Miller (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 249-261.

were present. Attempts at eliminating conditions which caused tension or intergroup conflict were generally welcomed. Efforts aimed at expanding the agency and improving the possibility of attaining the organization's original publicly stated objectives were also well received, especially by the more progressive members of the association. In fact the most experienced members firmly approved of such policies even though this meant increasing the agents' workload and making it more difficult to accomplish.

Blau points out further that competency and experience directly correlated with the likelihood of the individual accepting change. The relative job security provided by civil service employment would encourage open and more flexible attitudes. If the assumption is made, however, that resistance to change is an inevitable element of all bureaucracies, a self-fulfilling prophecy can easily evolve. In such cases energy is directed towards convincing the members of the value and reasoning behind these newer strategies since such efforts are presumed to be a waste of time and resource allocation.

### Conflicting Objectives

To what degree governmental organizations achieve their publicly stated goals remains an extremely moot subject. Many researchers have concluded that such agencies

must fail since successful attainment of their objectives stand in direct conflict with goals and values of the larger community. Helfgot's case study of the Mobilization for Youth Program (MFY) in New York is one of the all too few empirical analyses of these professional reform organizations.<sup>17</sup>

MFY began as a model effort to prevent and control juvenile delinquency through the use of community action programs. In time the organization broadened its goals towards attacking the problems of poverty and attempted to satisfy the most pressing needs of the poor. When eventually efforts were directed towards changing the institutions which create and perpetuate these unequal social conditions, the MFY quickly became the target of intense attacks by the media and the public in general. It was accused of communist infiltration, misuse of funds, and advocating social disorders. Funding for community action shrank from 10 percent of the association's budget down to zero. Environmental pressures encouraged the tendency of professionalization and institutionalization of the organization as a safer alternative to change. The percentage of temporary employment positions occupied by high school graduates dwindled from a high of 92 percent during the

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<sup>17</sup> Joseph Helfgot, "Professional Reform Organizations and the Symbolic Representation of the Poor," American Sociological Review 39 (August 1974), 475-491.

organization's first phases to a low of 45 percent at the time the study ended. Individuals possessing masters or doctoral degrees, however, increased from 38 to 73 percent during the same time frame. Symbolic representation of the poor through the use of professional middle class minority members permitted a stabilization of interaction with the outside community. Although members of the immediate area were still hired "to act as guides who could explain the slum to the professional and explain their presence to the slum," they were repeatedly denied a role in the actual decision making processes. Helfgot states that the absence of a reliable, independent, financial bases was one key reason for the powerlessness of the association. Moreover, he concludes,

From the MFY experience it appears that governmental sponsored social change efforts may be permitted to exist only as long as they remain ineffectual. Once a potential for change in power relationships becomes manifest, support is quickly revoked . . . What develops is an 'institutionalized revolution' primarily aimed at diverting public attention from immediate social problems and pacifying dissidents that demand a realignment of power relationships.<sup>18</sup>

#### The Professionalization of Reform

This professionalization of reform provides the basis for differentiating between two models of reform

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<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 490.

proposed by Moynihan.<sup>19</sup> One model perceives the impetus for reform as arising either from the victims as a means to eliminate oppression or from the upper classes as an attempt at preventing conflict. This appears to have been the dominant trend until the mid-1950's when the pressures for change began to radiate principally from professionals on the outside of the institutions under attack. Moynihan maintains that four major factors contributed to this shift: the post World War II economic expansion; the exponential growth of knowledge in both the natural and the social sciences; the rapid increase in the number of professionals and in the number of professions--"the professionalization of the middle class,"--and the increase in the number of foundations and the money spent by them, especially the Ford Foundation. Nathan Glazer is quoted as observing that, under this more recent trend, the fate of the poor

is in the hands of the administrators and the professional organizations of doctors, teachers, social workers, therapists, counselors, and so forth . . . the chief pressures are not the people, but the organized professional interests that work with that segment of the problem.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Daniel Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding Community Action in the War on Poverty (New York: The Free Press, 1969), pp. 21-59.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 24.

### The Rise in Professional Study Groups

Accompanying the rise in professional reformers has been a growth in the number of local, state, and national commissions assigned to study the various social problems and to draw up numerous sets of recommendations to help eliminate these conditions. In the area of criminal justice, for example, no less than seven major national commissions have addressed the problems associated with the criminal justice system in the last seven years alone: The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice ("The Katzerback Commission") (1967); The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders ("The Kerner Report") (1968); The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (1969); The President's Commission on Campus Unrest ("The Scranton Commission") (1970); The National Commission on Obscenity and Pornography (1970); The United States Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse ("The Schafer Commission") (1972); and The National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Goals and Standards (1973). Not only have such bodies become a staple of American life but as Isidore Silver points out in her analysis of these study groups,<sup>21</sup> each report seems only to supply research material for its

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<sup>21</sup>National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Goals and Standards, A National Strategy to Reduce Crime (New York: Avon Books, 1975), pp. xiii-lvi.

successor. While following each other "like lemmings to the sea," their proposals have tended to change few individuals other than perhaps the Commissioners themselves.

Each of these major commissions, Silver observes, has relied to some degree upon one of the three dominant conceptions regarding crime. The "conservative" approach, which assumes that offenders freely and rationally take part in criminal behavior and that therefore more "law and order" through more efficient law enforcement techniques followed by rapid apprehension and swift punishment, must necessarily remain the only viable solution. The "liberal" position which states that certain adverse social and economic conditions contribute to the crime problem and that reform of the different social institutions as well as rehabilitation of the convict will rectify the situation. And the relatively recent "radical" approach which feels that society, not the individual must be changed. "If our deepest values--those relating to success, mobility, wealth, minorities and the poor, and corruption--give rise to 'crime,' then it follows that there is no crime problem, only the problems of society."<sup>22</sup>

It appears that the failure of the first two approaches to successfully resolve the issue have augmented the number of advocates of the "new criminology." This perspective has lately found some of its most ardent

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. xvii.

supporters within the criminal justice institutions themselves.<sup>23</sup> Edwin M. Schur argues that it is the American system which must be labeled "criminal" on the grounds that it: perpetuates inequality by oppressing a significant minority of the population; by virtue of its involvement in mass indiscriminate violence abroad; by stressing cultural values and goals which generate crime; by creating criminal acts through legislation in attempts to broaden social control; and by adopting an unworkable, naive approach to crime problems.<sup>24</sup>

Many of the final reports of the forementioned Commissions have paid at least a symbolic tribute to this theme. The 1967 national commission admits that there is little the criminal justice system can do to eradicate the root causes of crime. The primary factors that contribute to widespread violence, racism, drug abuse, juvenile delinquency, poverty, and unemployment are conditions which the police, courts, or correctional institutions cannot directly eliminate. The Commissioners openly acknowledge that,

Unless society does take concerted action to change the general conditions and attitudes that are associated with crime, no improvement in law enforcement and administration of

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<sup>23</sup>Ramsey Clark, Crime in America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970).

<sup>24</sup>Edwin M. Schur, Our Criminal Society, The Social and Legal Sources of Crime in America (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1969).



justice, the subjects this Commission was asked specifically to study, will be of much avail.<sup>25</sup>

The 1974 Michigan Goals and Standards report reiterates this perspective, although to a much lesser degree. The main document is prefaced with the warning that although their numerous goals and standards, if adopted, might well improve and modernize the entire criminal justice system by improving the level of productivity and efficiency and by providing a greater degree of justice to both the victim and the offender, all these proposals cannot guarantee a drop in the crime rate. "The basic weapons of crime control are in the hearts and minds of our people, and in their social, economic and physical systems."<sup>26</sup> Unfortunately the main text of the report places little emphasis on this critically important topic. The National Goals and Standards report also argued that "trying to train law breakers to obey the law in a system that does not itself respect the law is self defeating." Perhaps the true value of these reports then resides in what they tell us about our society and its collective flaws rather than about our criminals and their individual deviations.

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<sup>25</sup>President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society; A Report (Washington, D.C.: The United States Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 16.

<sup>26</sup>Michigan Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice, Criminal Justice Goals and Standards for the State of Michigan (Lansing, Michigan, 1975), foreward.

## CHAPTER III

### THE THEORY OF NORMATIVE SPONSORSHIP

The Normative Sponsorship theory of community action was originated during the mid 1950's by Dr. Christopher Sower, professor of sociology at Michigan State University. Rather than providing another idealized paradigm of how community action programs should proceed, this model attempts to present an analytical description of how effective community action processes do in fact occur. Normative sponsorship means that innovations and changes that are part of a community action program stand a better chance of being sponsored by the systems and organizations involved if they are contained within the values and norms of those systems.<sup>1</sup> This theoretical model depicts several principles which help to explain the inefficiency and obsolescence of many modern organizations and social systems. Despite the rapidly changing conditions at all levels of society, many

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<sup>1</sup>Robert C. Trojanowicz, Criminal Justice and the Community (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1974), p. 332.

systems maintain response patterns which, while perhaps effective at an earlier stage of their development, have now become outdated. If new patterns of behavior are not initiated to meet these novel conditions, deterioration and possible collapse of the system become inevitable. Social actors frequently exist within the declining systems or organizations who are aware of these negative tendencies and are willing to undertake efforts at reversing them. At the same time other individuals within the system, however, often have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. Since opinions are often divided on the subject, numerous inquiries can be utilized to determine whether a system is in fact in a state of decline. These include such questions as:

1. Does the system attract the interest and support of succeeding generations of potential members?
2. Does it produce a satisfactory level of goods or services which meets the demands and satisfaction of those outside the system?
3. Does the system or organization spend most of its time in producing this output or in simply maintaining the system itself and in containing criticism within the system?
4. Does the public and the mass media consider the system modern and efficient in fulfilling its obligations to society? Does the public, for example, possess a positive image of the criminal justice system, or is it constantly under attack for being inept and outmoded?<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Christopher Sower, "Updating Outdated Organizations: The Normative Sponsorship Theory" (unpublished paper, Michigan State University, 1967), pp. 7-8.

One basic assumption is intrinsic to the applicability of this model. It is assumed that the action process being described is a voluntary, problem oriented one which is locally controlled with authority dispersed among several competing groups of social actors.<sup>3</sup>

Klein states that this theory is preferable to other models of community action for at least three main reasons.<sup>4</sup> First, it attempts to conceptualize the interaction between and among the public and those in officially recognized positions of power. Second, it stresses that the values and standards of the community play as important a role as the strategy and orientation of the action group. If the proposals under consideration are not consistent with the norms and goals of the participating groups and individuals, conflict and dissension become likely. And finally, Sower's model is useful because it is flexible and broad enough to be applied to a wide variety of different circumstances.

The normative sponsorship model pictures the action process as occurring continuously. In other words, the

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<sup>3</sup>Other more general assumptions of this model are found in John B. Holland, Kenneth A. Tiedke, and Paul A. Miller, "A Theoretical Model for Health Action," in Perspectives on American Community, ed.: Roland L. Warren (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), pp. 320-329.

<sup>4</sup>Donald C. Klein, Community Dynamics and Mental Health (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 192.

activity possesses a natural history which proceeds from an initiation phase, through various crisis or problem stages, on to either successful or unsuccessful resolution of these problems, and finally to attainment or rejection of the desired goals.<sup>5</sup> This action process does not constitute a rigid pattern or time sequence and thus is frequently aberrant and irregular. While the model describes the process as occurring in four basic phases, this does not imply that each phase must follow a predetermined pattern of behavior at a steady pace. The action process can slow down, speed up, or stop completely depending on any number of environmental factors. It is not always possible to predict how different individuals or groups will respond to specific action programs. For example, the tactics perceived by some participants as a viable solution to a problem can easily be regarded by others as aggravating the situation. If a workable level of consensus cannot be achieved then this theory states that effective community action will most likely fail. Although the process itself is constant, the Sower's model maintains that it is possible to isolate and identify for analytical purposes certain elements as they flow through this stream of behavior. While portrayed here sequentially, it is not necessarily

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<sup>5</sup>Christopher Sower, John Holland, Kenneth Tiedke, and Walter Freeman, Community Involvement (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1957), p. 317.

true that they will follow this pattern in all cases in the real world. Two or more elements might occur at the same time or in reverse order.

### Convergence of Interest

The first identifiable element of this model is convergence of interest.<sup>6</sup> Individuals must be present in the community who are interested enough in some problem to make concerted efforts at resolving it. It is not important whether their motives for seeking action are self-centered or altruistic. What is crucial is not why each group decides to seek a plan of action but that they do arrive at this decision and that convergence of interest does take place. Although desirable, it is neither practical nor necessary that all members of the group project the same intensity of interest at the same time. Often a few powerful leaders possess the capability of voicing latent group interests. When Governor Milliken took the initiative of appointing 78 individuals from widely divergent backgrounds to the Goals and Standards Commission, he in effect was fulfilling a desire for more coordination in the state's criminal justice system and for more federal funding to make this possible. Both these intentions had been slowly accumulating supporters over a long period of time. By accepting the appointment, the members implied that they

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<sup>6</sup>Ibid.

held at least a minimal amount of interest in this area. How seriously they fulfilled the task of writing a report which required long hours of voluntary service over an 18 month period, reflects how intense their actual interest was. A small percentage of individuals withdrew from the Commission or played a passive role in its deliberations. The majority of members, however, insisted on a much more active role.

### The Initiating Set

This first condition eventually leads to the second identifiable element, establishment of an initiating set. This amounts to the actual formation of a group of concerned individuals who possess a high level of communication and who can agree upon a set of common end goals. The goals or objectives to be achieved become the "charter" of the initiating set. One method for determining how "common" these end goals are is through a polling of the membership. The Management Task Force (MTF) had many long intense debates over what should constitute their primary objectives and the most appropriate means for achieving them. Inevitably a vote was required to determine if the majority of the group had reached agreement. Throughout the deliberation process, however, a group consensus existed in the sense that no particular individual or group of individuals dissented all of the time. One or more members might

dissent at any one point in the course of discussions, but no recommendation was incorporated into the final report without the approval of the majority of the Commissioners. There must also exist among this group a general consensus that the goals can be attained and that the practical means for attaining them do in fact exist. Moreover, the group must acquire a shared "justification" as to the logic and the necessity of the group as a whole pursuing these goals. Under these circumstances, the third characteristic, legitimation and sponsorship becomes possible.

#### Legitimation and Sponsorship

The charter of the initiating set must accumulate widespread support from the larger community. This involves securing the approval and support necessary for the charter to become a legitimate part of the goals of the relevant systems. Relevant systems are individuals or groups of individuals who, although not necessarily a part of the initiating set, are nevertheless important to the attainment of the desired objectives. The primary thrust of this research evolved into an effort to determine how much input and support the Commissioners of the MTF were able to accumulate from the various relevant systems. Participant observation and interviews with the elected officials of these groups were the basic tools used to determine empirically how firmly these groups backed the objectives of the initiating set.



Relevant systems should be allowed a role in providing input into the decision making process. An effort must be made to include all groups who are either concerned with the problem or will be affected by efforts at its resolution. Reservoirs of potential opposition as well as potential assistance should be tapped. Care should be taken so as not to confuse assumed leaders based on formal positions of authority with the actual leadership of a community. Sampling the members of the various relevant systems is one recommended technique for identifying these key personnel.<sup>7</sup> The initiation set must effectively convince these vested interest groups as to the value of their charter and the means for attaining it. Failing this, the potential opposition must be isolated and neutralized if success is to become possible. Under ideal conditions feedback from these systems will facilitate greater understanding of the charter, clarify the progress that has been made towards attaining its objectives, and show which problems remain to be resolved. Relevant systems should be regarded as a subset of the public in general in that they frequently promote specific vested interests. Public support can be gained by the initiating set through a variety of methods. The members of the initiating set themselves might constitute a significant representation

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<sup>7</sup>Trojanowicz, Criminal Justice and the Community, op. cit., pp. 331-342.

of the concerned public and indirectly demand the backing of larger collectivities. Members of the relevant systems, if denied active participation in the initiating set, can still be permitted influence in composing or modifying the charter and in determining the most appropriate avenues for arriving at it. Following these events, the chances for the establishment of the executive set are maximized.

### The Executive Set

This final element organizes the necessary resources required for actual fulfillment of the charter. While the initiating set defines the actual charter, the executive set adopts and implements it. Attainment of the charter proclaims the termination of the action process. In the case of the Goals and Standards Commission the charter was attained on December 16, 1974 when the six task forces voted to adopt the report. Fulfillment of the charter does not mean that it will necessarily resolve the problems which served as catalysts for the start of the action process. It is important to note that observations regarding the quality of the goals or the adopted tactics for achieving them are beyond the scope of this theoretical model. In other words, due to mistakes or miscalculations on the part of the members of either the initiating set or the relevant systems, a charter might be successfully adopted and implemented but still fail in its confrontation with the community's problems.

### On Achieving Consensus

Normative sponsorship does not mean to imply that consensus can be reached in all cases at all times. It remains flexible enough to realize that conflict and dissonance are at times unavoidable factors in human interaction. Obviously if two groups seek objectives that are directly antagonistic to each other, the likelihood of arriving at even a minimal workable level of consensus is slim. Care must be taken, however, that the existence of the possibility of irresolvable conflicts does not lead to the adoption of a self-fulfilling prophecy. That is, if conflict is assumed to be the inevitable result of a particular course of action, only half-hearted, symbolic attempts at arriving at consensus might be attempted, thus indirectly contributing to the anticipated results. In many cases a mutual understanding concerning what the ideal objectives of two or more groups should consist of either exists or can be attained with a minimum of disagreement. Difficulties typically result when decisions are made regarding what tactics should be adopted as a means of attaining these goals. The commissioners of the MTF, the Michigan Sheriff's Association, and the various Chiefs of Police Associations, for example, readily agreed that changes were both desirable and necessary in order to create a more just, equitable and efficient system of law enforcement. The commissioners concluded that, among

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other measures, eliminating departments of less than 20 persons and possibly state financing of all law enforcement would constitute a positive approach towards attainment of these objectives. Many sheriffs and chiefs, however, strongly believed that these tactics would produce the opposite effect.

#### Technical Assistance

Dr. Robert Trojanowicz has expanded upon Sower's model by identifying other important criteria which are useful in evaluating problem-solving activities. He stresses that legitimation and justification of the charter by the numerous groups and individuals involved often surfaces as a result of different or even conflicting rationale. Yet he also concurs that it is crucial that the charter reflect the roles, values, and goals of each of the relevant systems whenever possible. He insists that one prime method for accomplishing the desired level of consensus is through the employment of technical assistance.<sup>8</sup> Technical assistance units are composed of outside professionals who become involved in the action process only after solicitation by the relevant systems. These experts must strive for neutrality and should not be viewed as partial to any of the pertinent factions. It is their task to identify appropriate resources within the community which might

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<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 336.

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assist in resolving the problems. Challenge rather than conflict should become the dominant theme of the social interaction between and among systems. Actual behavior of the groups is the most appropriate method for differentiating between these two terms. Numerous formal and informal discussions accompanied by an open debate of all possible alternatives involving representatives from each of the parties constitutes challenge. Closed sessions which exclude dissenting participants, inflammatory statements to the press, or violent demonstrations often help contribute to conflict. Positive results in this area can be achieved by:

1. Encouraging a verbal identification of the opinions each relevant system holds with regards to the problem.
2. Promoting an exchange of the perceptions that each system holds about the others and striving to eliminate stereotypes and misperceptions.
3. Clarifying the various self interests involved and attempting to forge them into a united bond of consensus.
4. Adopting the matrix method as a practical technique for identifying the principle areas of agreement and discord, for illuminating these obstacles to consensus, and as a tool in attempting to eliminate them.<sup>9</sup>

Obviously the role of technical assistants is an extremely delicate and difficult one to properly fulfill. They must command an in-depth understanding of each of the relevant systems, as well as an adequate knowledge of

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<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 336.

the problems being attacked and of the weapons available for overcoming these problems. Technical assistant units have no decision-making power; this lies entirely within the realm of the participating groups. They must not allow themselves to become allied with any one faction, but instead provide insights as to the causes and effects of the numerous vested interests, without alienating any of the social actors. In practice, frequently agreement is rapidly reached as to what the ideal goals should be, but then disintegrates into conflict over the questions of what specific recommendations should be adopted as a means for achieving these ideals. If and when the relevant systems arrive at a workable (although obviously not total) degree of consensus and cooperation, the technical assistance unit should withdraw until its services are again requested. Once a course of action is finally decided upon, it will be necessary for the relevant systems to maintain a constant program of monitoring and modifying the action process in order to adapt to new circumstances as they arise.

Normative sponsorship thus postulates that systems and organizations which involve and respond to the various relevant systems in setting their action programs stand a better than average chance of fulfilling their charter. This involvement must be regarded by the members of the relevant systems as meaningful, goal-directed behavior. If these members feel they are participating in activities



designed by the organization simply to appease them, the program will fail. Numerous studies indicate that this is indeed the case. Logan carried out an in-depth analysis of a 150 square block section of Detroit which successfully adopted the tenets of normative sponsorship to confront many of their community's problems and needs.<sup>10</sup> During the 1967 riots this neighborhood remained excluded from the arson, looting, and turmoil which rampaged throughout the surrounding areas.<sup>11</sup> Klein, Miller, and others,<sup>12</sup> have demonstrated that this model supplies an effective framework for enabling public health workers to achieve a greater understanding of complex patterns of interactions within communities and can assist them in isolating the most prominent obstacles to development in these specific localities. Furthermore, Trojanowicz concludes that,

The Normative Sponsorship approach can be used with any program dealing with criminal justice relations regardless of whether the program is focused on the police, the courts, corrections, or a combination of all three. The major difference is that there will be more relevant systems the larger and more vigorous the program . . . (Normative Sponsorship) will guarantee meaningful program development and implementation

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<sup>10</sup>George W. Logan, "Analysis of the Methods and Principles of Community Organization Applied to the Positive Neighborhood Action Committee," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1972).

<sup>11</sup>Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: Bantam Books, 1968), p. 96.

<sup>12</sup>Donald C. Klein, op. cit.; Paul A. Miller, Community Health Action (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State College Press, 1953); Christopher Sower, et al., Community Involvement, op. cit.

that will create a new normative relationship between the criminal justice system and the community that will be mutually beneficial.<sup>13</sup>

Ideally this would result in a meaningful transformation of the criminal justice system as well as the community it is meant to serve. In his research on neighborhood improvement associations in Muskegon, Michigan,<sup>14</sup> Christian discovered that organized groups can play an important role in reducing crime and that many of the established components of the criminal justice system acknowledge the positive impact that recommendations from local communities could have in attempting to reduce crime and increase cooperation. This model can provide explanations of why many past programs in the area of health and welfare or law enforcement have failed, as well as supply the framework for designing more potent and responsive efforts for the future.

It might prove valuable here to elaborate on how many of the concepts of normative sponsorship were utilized in the present study. The action process can be regarded as the entire course of deliberations of the MTF from the time of their appointment by the Governor to the present. The decision making process of the MTF played a central role in this procedure. For the purposes of this research,

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<sup>13</sup>Robert C. Trojanowicz, Criminal Justice and the Community, op. cit., pp. 340-342.

<sup>14</sup>Thomas Frank Christian, "The Organized Neighborhood Crime Prevention and the Criminal Justice System" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1973).

the decision making process was perceived as consisting of five basic elements:

1. Recognizing the need for a decision.
2. Analyzing the situation in depth from varying perspectives.
3. Identifying the different courses of action.
4. Assessing the most probable results of each alternative.
5. Choosing among the most favorable alternatives.<sup>15</sup>

The Commissioners and, to a lesser degree, the staff were recognized as occupying official positions of authority since they actually made the decisions and wrote the report. They composed the membership of the initiating set. The public might be broadly defined as all those individuals living in the state of Michigan not serving as part of the official commission. The relevant systems constituted those groups and organizations directly concerned with the MTF's labors and who would eventually bear the weight of its recommendations. The written testimonies supplied the primary criteria for identifying these groups. All organizations which submitted statements at any of the public hearings were considered relevant systems and attempts were made to identify their representatives. As an additional cross check, during the interviews each Commissioner or official of these systems was asked which groups or

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<sup>15</sup> Adapted from James D. Thompson, William J. McEwen, "Organizational Goals and Environment: Goal Setting as an Interacting Process," American Sociological Review 23 (February 1958), 23-31.

individuals he or she felt the present recommendations would most strongly affect. If they mentioned any group who had not surfaced either during the course of the public hearings or through participant observation, then that group also became labeled as a relevant system. The Michigan State Trooper's Association was the only organized body identified in this manner. If the recommendations of the MTF advance to the phase of implementation, more relevant systems might be expected to evolve, in addition to those which surfaced during this study.

The interviews also served as the basic tools for evaluating the degree of consensus that existed between and among the relevant systems and the Commissioners, as well as for determining the values and norms of these groups. To a certain degree, it became possible to evaluate the level of consensus as a result of participant observation at the private and public sessions of the MTF. At the private sessions, threads of dissension laced through the discussions of the Commissioners; yet most of these were resolved by the time the meetings adjourned. At the public hearings, however, less than four percent of the speakers offered full support to the Management section of the report. The overwhelming majority of speakers stood so staunchly opposed to the recommendations set forth in this section that they advised rejecting the entire document. Specific questions during the interviews were focused on verifying whether consensus had been achieved among the

relevant systems and the MTF Commissioners on the report or if it might have been attained under different circumstances. The Management's goals and standards section of the report was viewed as the "charter" of the group. If a relevant system strongly opposed the charter, the assumption was made that it did not reflect the norms and values of that system to a degree sufficient enough to warrant sponsorship.

This case study of the Management Task Force of the Michigan Commission on Criminal Justice Goals and Standards should be viewed as an empirical application of the Normative Sponsorship Theory rather than as a rigid test. The continuing accumulation of studies will indicate the differences and similarities of various action processes. Analysis of specific cases will make possible the postulating of further tentative generalizations and eventually lead to additional research and further modifications of this model.

## CHAPTER IV

### METHODOLOGY

The description and analysis contained in this report result from a continuing nine month study of the Michigan Commission on Criminal Justice Goals and Standards. Funding was provided through the Department of Sociology at Michigan State University from the Agriculture Experiment Station. The methods for conducting the research, including the design of the interview schedule, were adapted from the Normative Sponsorship Theory. Multiple operationalism is an appropriate term for the numerous techniques and resources that were utilized throughout the study.<sup>1</sup> Rather than adopt any single research method, multiple measures were applied in an attempt to confirm the propositions set forth by the theoretical model. Informative sources included: numerous articles published by the Office of Criminal Justice which summarized the work of the six task forces involved in the Commission's report;

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<sup>1</sup>Eugene J. Webb, Donald T. Campbell, Richard D. Schwartz, Lee Sechrest, Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1971), pp. 1-35.

a reading of all articles pertaining to the work of the Commission contained in any of 56 daily and over 300 weekly state and local newspapers as provided by the Michigan Press Reading Service from July 16, 1973 to the present; a public opinion poll carried out by Market Opinion Research Company at the request of the Commissioners; and approximately 150 written testimonials which were submitted to the various task forces during the public hearings process. Much of the general background material in this report was derived from the Office of Criminal Justice publications.

The reading service also proved to be a valuable time saver in that it identified for further investigation nearly any important newspaper article that pertained to the Commission's labors over the entire eighteen month period published anywhere in the state of Michigan. The Michigan Press Reading Service is contracted by the Office of Criminal Justice (OCJP) to survey all newspapers published in the state of Michigan and to reprint in their original form all articles pertaining to the field of criminal justice. OCJP voluntarily supplied copies of these summaries to be utilized for this case study. The public opinion poll, "The Michigan Public Speaks Out on Crime," was undertaken with the avowed intention of providing the Commissioners with a reliable measure of the public's attitudes towards crime, crime control, and the criminal justice systems. A questionnaire developed by

staff of Market Opinion Research and the Office of Criminal Justice was applied to a sample of 900 Michigan residents who were selected on a probability-proportionate-to size design based on the 1970 census.<sup>2</sup> All respondents were age 16 or over and the resulting data was broken down by age, race, sex, and geographic distribution. The responses of Detroit area cities, Detroit suburbs, other Michigan cities, other suburbs, and outstate areas were presented separately. Comparisons were also made with a similar study which had been conducted 15 months earlier in late 1972. The numerous written testimonials provided a concrete basis for determining which groups or organizations responded most strongly to the Commission's request for public feedback. Roughly 80 percent of these testimonials were submitted by private citizens from throughout the state. The remaining 20 percent came from organizations or their members who frequently had a vested interest in the end result of the Commission's recommendations.

Much of this research was conducted through participant observation. In addition to this, a combination of different research techniques were utilized. These involved not only direct observation but also social interaction with the subjects of the study, formal and informal interviewing,

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<sup>2</sup>"The Michigan Public Speaks Out on Crime" (2nd Annual Survey, January, 1974) conducted by Market Opinion Research Co., Frederick P. Currier, President, Barbara E. Bryant, Project Director, pp. 39-42.



as well as collection and analysis of a wide range of documents. Permission was secured from the Director of the Goals and Standards Project in September 1975, to be permitted attendance at the closed-door sessions of each of the various task forces. The writer was usually introduced at the start of each meeting as a graduate student from Michigan State University who was interested in conducting research on the Commission's deliberations. He was permitted to observe the proceedings and to take notes, but naturally did not take an active part in the meetings themselves. This technique was followed during the private task force sessions as well as at the public hearings. There was ample opportunity, however, during the coffee breaks and at the end of each of the sessions to ask questions of the participants. On the occasions when two or more task forces met simultaneously in different locations, and to gather information with regards to proceedings that occurred prior to the onset of the research, informants or "surrogate observers"<sup>3</sup> were utilized as a means of acquiring the missing data. The project office manager fulfilled the role of principle surrogate observer since he was one of the two staff members responsible for planning and attending nearly all the different task force meetings.

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<sup>3</sup>The terms "respondents" and "informants" are used throughout this report according to the definitions set forth by George J. McCall and J. L. Simmons (eds.), Issues in Participant Observation (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison and Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 1-25.

Midway through the study it was decided that the Management Task Force should become the focal point of concern. The numerical size of the entire Commission accompanied by its dispersion over a large geographic area, made the close observation and personal interviewing of all members somewhat impractical. More importantly, however, it quickly became clear that the Management Task Force was the most important of the entire Commission. This observation was readily agreed to by both the Commissioners themselves and by the representatives of the various vested interest groups.<sup>4</sup> One of the major assumptions of the entire Commission was that the present organizational structure of the criminal justice system constituted a major obstacle to achieving greater levels of efficiency and justice. Since the Management Task Force was primarily "organization" oriented, its recommendation was more influential than those of the other five task forces which were directed towards changes in the areas of services and personnel. Any decisions reached by this key task force would thus produce far reaching effects on the other five.

The central proposition of the Normative Sponsorship Theory states that systems or organizations will sponsor and support new proposals only if they are within the established values, roles, and standards of those

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<sup>4</sup>Mayor Philip Conley of Jackson and Staff, "Analysis of Management Section Criminal Justice Goals and Standards (unpublished paper, October 8, 1974).

organizations. The focus of the interviews which were conducted as part of this study was to determine whether the policies and guidelines laid out in the Management section of the Goals and Standards report did indeed abide by the standards of the systems involved in and affected by that report. The questions were designed to evaluate to what degree the systems felt they were a part of the decision-making process, how responsive the Management Task Force was to their input, and to what extent the goals and standards reflected the consensus of these various groups. The interviews with the members of the task force provided a basis for cross-checking and comparing the different perspectives of the Commissioners with that of the representatives of the relevant systems.

Approximately twenty-five questions were asked of each respondent. All formal interviews were pre-arranged. Each individual was informed as to the purpose and objectives of the study and why he or she had been chosen to be interviewed. They were advised that all their responses would be strictly confidential, since the primary objective of the interview was to attain an understanding of the values, norms, and opinions of the organization or task force as a whole, rather than that of any one person. Although the interviewer asked a predetermined set of questions, the format was kept as open-ended as possible without forfeiting a reliable base for cross comparisons.

Every effort was made to maximize the spontaneity of responses.

Interviews were conducted with one or more key respondents from each of the organizations which submitted written statements at either of the two sets of public hearings. On two occasions respondents asked associates familiar with the work of the Commission to take part in the interview. Respondents from the following groups were interviewed: the Greater Lansing Chapter of the Urban League, the Michigan Sheriff's Association, the Michigan Police Officer's Association, the Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police, the Michigan Municipal League, the Southeastern Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police, and the Wayne County Association of Chiefs of Police. The interviews lasted about an hour to an hour and a half and were usually carried out with either the presidents, directors, or executive secretaries of each organization. In one case, an interview was conducted with an employee of the organization since the director had assigned him the job of researching and drawing up a position regarding the association's stand on the Goals and Standards report. Interviews were also sought with each Commissioner of the Management Task Force as well as with several staff members from the Office of Criminal Justice. The staff members were interviewed informally and were chosen because they alone worked full-time on the Goals and Standards project and were assumed to possess the most knowledge regarding

the Commission's work. If the Commissioners themselves refused to consent to an interview, their alternates were sought as an appropriate replacement. The selection of the alternates occurred whenever the Commissioners had delegated their authority because of previous obligations. In these cases the alternates had attended more sessions than the Commissioners themselves and were thus better prepared to answer questions concerning the task force's efforts. Interviews were successfully conducted with eight of the thirteen Commissioners and five of their alternates. Only one Commissioner refused to be interviewed, a State-Senator who declined on the grounds that he had played no active role in the work of the task force and had managed to attend only one session. Overall approximately twenty-five interviews were conducted between March 25 and May 25, 1975.

The techniques adapted in this case study would be classified as "qualitative methodology" by most social scientists. Qualitative methodology alludes to research procedures such as participant observation and open-ended interviewing, which permit the researcher to maximize his or her understanding of the social process under investigation. It allows the researcher to acquire more personal knowledge of the social actors and processes and leads to more accurate interpretations and predictions of their behavior. Many sociologists, for a variety of personal and professional reasons, regard the qualitative approach as

inferior to more quantitative research strategies. Filstead has convincingly demonstrated, however, that one approach is not necessarily superior to the other.

Quantification is a very useful approach to reality; however there are other approaches to the empirical social world. Qualitative methodology represents an equally important and valid approach to reality. Until sociologists realize the interrelationship and interdependence of both quantitative and qualitative methodology, they will remain incapable of truly understanding the complexities of human behavior.<sup>5</sup>

Every effort was made during the course of this study to "get close to the data." Since many of the individuals interviewed were employed in demanding positions in state and local government, the interviews were often difficult to arrange. Unforeseen events often caused appointments to be canceled; on two occasions the researcher was required to return four different times before the interviews were successfully completed. The dispersion of the Commissioners over a relatively large geographic area also complicated matters. During a two-week period, for example, over 1000 miles were driven in order to conduct eight interviews. In the early stages of the study, two staff members from OCJP stated that it would be impossible to speak with many of the MTF Commissioners since they were much too busy with "more

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<sup>5</sup>William J. Filstead, Qualitative Methodology (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), p. 8.

important" affairs. Fortunately except for the single exception noted previously, each of the MTF Commissioners agreed to be interviewed. Moreover they often spent considerable time after answering the questionnaires in expanding upon and justifying their responses. The researcher's insight and understanding of the labors of the MTF and the opinions of the relevant systems was greatly increased by this unexpectedly high level of cooperation.

## CHAPTER V

### DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS

#### Overview

The exact amount of crime in the state of Michigan cannot be accurately determined, but in 1973 there were 492,358 known index crimes.<sup>1</sup> Index crimes are rape, murder, robbery, burglary, larceny, aggravated assault, and car theft. Between 1965 and 1970, index crimes increased 150 percent, and between 1970 and 1973, they increased by 8 percent. Over 65 percent of these crimes were committed by individuals under 20 years of age. Crime in Michigan has been superficially estimated at costing 1.7 billion annually although this figure does not include the soaring costs of "white collar" crime such as tax fraud and price fixing. That the present system is incompetent and unjust in coping with these problems is frequently agreed upon by most individuals associated with the justice process. No arrests are made for the vast majority of felony offenses;

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<sup>1</sup>Michigan State Police, State of Michigan 1973 Uniform Crime Report (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan Department of State Police), pp. 8-22.



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of those defendants who are charged, over half are dealt with through plea bargaining. At times entire state correctional systems have been declared unconstitutional for violating the Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unjust punishment, and most offenders commit further crimes after release from prison. One of the central assignments of The Michigan Commission on Criminal Justice was the elimination of much of the injustice, waste, confusion, and inefficiency within the present system, a large part of which they concluded is caused by the fragmentation and competition among the various agencies and divisions with the system. The Management Task Force bore the primary responsibility for accomplishing this task. In the state's most populous county, for example, there exists 42 different and independent police agencies, all of whom swim to different political currents; the agencies duplicate each other's services, quarrel over authority and area of jurisdiction, and in general distribute an inept and inequitable system of protection and justice. "Although no part of the criminal justice system can reduce crime by itself nor can afford to be insensitive to the concerns and objectives of the other parts, the interaction among the components of the system are often characterized by unnecessary friction and intramural conflicts."<sup>2</sup> The police are accused

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<sup>2</sup>U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Summary--  
Reports of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal  
Justice Goals and Standards (Washington, D.C.: Law  
 Enforcement Assistance Administration, 1975), p. 12.

of being racist and oppressive, the courts are accused of being lenient and unjust, and correction and probation institutions of being "soft" and merely recycling "deviants" back to the community at large. Former President Johnson's crime commission concluded in its now famous report, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, that only the criminals understand the entire system since only they must pass through its entire maze. Yet they "frequently fall through the cracks and, indeed, through gaping holes in the system . . . in either case, it is not justice but injustice."<sup>3</sup> Seen through this angle, it perhaps was unavoidable that certain factions would feel threatened by the recommendations, and the Commission was fully aware of this fact. As one of the head staff members emphatically warned during an informal interview, "Our primary objective was to provide the most efficient and effective set of recommendations possible and to hell with any toes we might have to step on."

### Background

In order to fully understand the work of the Criminal Justice Commission and that of the Management Task Force, it is necessary to first briefly trace its origin. During the sixties the crime rate in the United States grew

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<sup>3</sup>President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society; A Report (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1967).

at an unprecedented rate. Demands for "law and order" became the rallying cry of numerous politicians. These conditions eventually led to the passage by Congress of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. The law established the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA), a new office under the jurisdiction of the Justice Department whose central task was to evaluate proposals and to channel federal revenues to the states for crime control programs. This act also called for the establishment of State Planning Agencies (SPA's) in each of the fifty states who were to develop and coordinate criminal justice planning and control efforts within the state. Since the passage of this law in 1968, the state has received more than \$108 million for over seventy different projects aimed at improving its process of criminal justice.

In October of 1971 the LEAA set up a National Advisory Commission (NAC) and allocated a grant of \$1.75 million for financing of its research. NAC was comprised of 22 commissioners and several task forces containing 180 members from state and local governments, private citizen's groups, and numerous other experts in the field of criminal justice. Several commissioners of the state's present Goals and Standards Commission also served on NAC. NAC's job was to develop a program of proposals which would help to cut the frequency of specific high fear crimes and improve the quality of criminal justice. After two years of extensive research, the product of the Commission's labors was a

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2,700 page, 6 volume report entitled The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. These volumes contained over 500 detailed and often "radical" recommendations which constituted an action-oriented but flexible program for a coordinated attack on crime.

#### Origin of the Commission

In early 1974 the LEAA ruled that each state must develop its own program of goals and standards by 1976 or forfeit all chances for further federal funding. The LEAA did not dictate to the states what the content of their goals and standards was to be. They maintained that their own report was simply an "advisory example" and insisted only upon the standard-setting process. Moreover in the future, grant applications would be approved according to the strong relationships they bore to the adopted goals and standards. The Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice was the state office which at one time supervised the dispensing of federal grant money to local areas within the state. On March 29, 1973 one of the last official acts of this office was the approval of a \$163,000 federal grant to help establish the state's own Criminal Justice Commission. The entire budget of this Commission eventually reached \$363,000, the remainder of which came from state funds by contributing personnel. On July 16, 1973, the Governor appointed 78 Commissioners to this body

and assigned them a total of 30 staff members, 15 from the Office of Criminal Justice (OCJP), and 15 from other state and local associations. He ordered that, "One of the first tasks of the new Commission will be the development of long-range goals and standards to improve Michigan's criminal justice system and reduce crime."

The Governor said he chose the members of the Commission on the basis of the state's population distribution, expertise and experience in the criminal justice system, and as representative of all segments of society. The membership included 20 members of the former Commission, ten state legislators, three county prosecutors, two county sheriffs, several judges, a few private citizens, and several representatives from the business and educational communities. In addition to their own extensive knowledge and experience on the subject, primary background and resource materials utilized by the Commissioners were: the Report of the National Goals and Standards Commission, the proposals of the American Bar Association, the 1973 legislation concerning the Revised Criminal Code, the Draft of the OCJP 1974 Plan, and other recent state or national reports on criminal justice activities. Present practices and conditions in Michigan were compared with these numerous recommendations to identify those areas most in need of change. The Commission was initially divided into five and later six separate task forces according to areas of related activities and subject matter: Crime Prevention, Investigation

and Apprehension, Adjudication, Rehabilitation, Criminal Justice Management, and Juvenile Justice. Approximately once a month for an 18 month period the six task forces met at different sites throughout the state to hammer out their guidelines. The members were reimbursed for their meals, mileage, and occasionally their lodging; otherwise their efforts were voluntary. The activities and reports of the different task forces were coordinated and administered by the Chair of the Commission, the Lt.-Governor, the Chairs of the respective task forces, together with the project's director, office manager, and staff members.

In the early stages of their research, the members discovered that three subject areas in particular were to generate considerable controversy. These were victimless crimes (such as prostitution, drug addiction, and homosexuality), gun control, and capital punishment. A decision was reached to separate these topics from the main Goals and Standards report and to consider them at a later date under separate headings. This was done to remove these basically emotional issues and the inevitable lengthy debates which would accompany them from the findings and recommendations contained in their central report, thereby improving the chances of passage, adoption, and eventual implementation of the report. The recommendations regarding these topics were not covered in the MTF's present study due to time limitations.



On September 6 and 7, 1974, the entire Commission assembled at a mountain resort to vote on approval of the first draft of the combined reports of the six task forces. Public hearings were held on September 18, at eight different sites throughout the state to obtain the reactions and comments of concerned citizens, vested interest groups, law enforcement personnel, and other elected officials. The Commission had originally planned to then incorporate any new changes into the report before completing their final draft and sending it on to the Governor for his approval.

Several general observations should be made about the numerous goals and standards themselves. There is a distinction between "goals" and "standards." The Commission used the term "standards" to refer to proposals that were clearly formulated steps towards achieving the desired objectives. Many of these are practices which would involve considerable expense and often new legislation to enact. "Goals define what could be, not what necessarily will be. They are aspirations, not predictions."<sup>4</sup> Unlike the National Report which sets specific objectives for cutting the rate of certain crimes such as homicide, rape, and aggravated assault by 25 percent or robbery and burglary by 50 percent by 1983, the Michigan report does not set any specific goal for decreasing any individual crime rate by a certain date. The Commissioners spent considerable time

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<sup>4</sup>U.S. Department of Justice, op. cit., p. 6.

debating these proposals but then concluded that such projections are naive and unrealistic. Whereas the National Commission did not notify the public of the results of their project until it was completed, the state Commission officially proclaimed that it intended to use public feedback as a vital ingredient in the report's proposals. In appealing for participation at the public hearings the Commission stated that since crime affects the entire population, almost everyone has ideas on how to improve the criminal justice system. Ideally they hoped to pool all these ideas, to select those which appear most viable, and then to mold them into a united framework which would eventually become operational. "Any effort at implementation of these goals and standards is doomed to failure unless backed by widespread support among the general public," the Commissioners readily admitted. Finally it might be noted that this research is the first time Michigan or any other state has ever attempted such a large scale and detailed evaluation of the entire criminal justice system.

#### Summary of the Key Proposals

It is impossible and unnecessary to summarize here the more than 600 different goals and recommendations first presented in their report. It is valuable, however, to sort out the most controversial proposals to obtain a clearer picture of the decision process within the Commission and the effect outside sources had upon them. The

seventeen most radical recommendations because of their departure from current Michigan practices contained within the report were:<sup>5</sup> (1) Juvenile delinquents should not be incarcerated in any institutions with adult offenders at any time under any circumstances; (2) a family court should be established as a permanent division of each trial court of general jurisdiction; (3) all juveniles charged breaking of the law should be allotted all the rights provided adult defendants under criminal prosecution including trial by jury; (4) the maximum legal age of juveniles should be raised to eighteen years; (5) the bail bondsman system should be eliminated; (6) the system of plea bargaining should be eliminated as soon as sufficient funds are allocated to accommodate the rise in criminal litigation resulting from this action, but regardless should be eliminated no later than five years after publication of the report; (7) the time lapse between arrest and trial should be no greater than 60 days in the case of felony arrest and 30 days in the case of misdemeanors; (8) law enforcement agencies should make concerted efforts to recruit primarily college educated applicants; (9) law enforcement agencies should eliminate residency requirements as a criteria for employment; (10) school records should be released to criminal justice agencies only after obtaining written

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<sup>5</sup>Michigan Commission on Criminal Justice, Draft Criminal Justice Goals and Standards for the State of Michigan (Lansing, Michigan: The Office of Criminal Justice, 1974).

parental consent; (11) inmates should receive compensation equal to that of the prevailing local rate for any labor that benefits private or public entities (such inmates would be charged for their share of maintenance and job costs); (12) the state should be divided into three basic types of law enforcement jurisdictions: Metropolitan Area Police Sites (MAPS) consisting of the top ten Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas established by the U.S. Bureau of Census; City Area Police Cities (CAPS) consisting of the 20 cities outside of MAPS, possessing a population of over 10,000 inhabitants; and Rural Area Police Sites (RAPS) consisting of all those areas not encompassed by MAPS and CAPS; (13) all appeals court judges should be appointed by the Governor and be submitted to voter approval every six years; (14) there should be established a state-wide system of standards for all correctional facilities; if local areas lack the necessary funds, the state will administer and finance these operations; (15) a separate State Department of Children's Services should be established; (16) the Legislature should set the maximum penalty for all criminal offenses and the courts should have authority to pass a minimum sentence equal to only one-third of the maximum; (17) the Office of Criminal Justice should be raised to Department level status and the Goals and Standards Commission should be re-established on a permanent basis with smaller membership and assigned the task of overseeing implementation of these reforms.

Proposal number 12, often referred to as "MAPS, CAPS, AND RAPS" was set forth by the Management Task Force. Without a doubt this recommendation received the greatest amount of criticism from the numerous concerned groups or "relevant systems" because of the obvious consequences it held for the entire law enforcement community.

Although the thought of implementation was the ideal outcome of their labors, many Commissioners felt this should not play a major role in their efforts to write these proposals. In fact all of the goals and standards contained within the report might be loosely divided into three basic categories with reference to their chances of adoption. First, there are those which are now in effect or so general in content that most observers agree that widespread public support presently exists for them. Recommendations such as those demanding that the police be responsible and courteous and that the court system be administered fairly fall into this category. Secondly, there are goals and standards which could easily be accomplished through policy or procedural changes or executive orders, such as recruitment criteria or establishment of a state-wide 911 emergency system. Thirdly, there are those that would require a long drawn out battle in the press, legislature, or other public arenas. Elimination of plea bargaining or the bail bondsman system would definitely be included here. This third category was intended to "at least get the recommendation on the record

so that our children or grandchildren will see its adoption," as one Chair observed. The controversial MAPS, CAPS, and RAPS recommendations would definitely be placed here.

### The Public Hearings

The first eight public hearings were attended by a total of over 1,000 individuals. Members of every task force were present at each of the eight locations. The public response as presented through various vested interest groups at these meetings was highly critical of the Commission's report. It is safe to say that despite advertising of the time, location, and reasons for the meeting on radio, television, and in the press, the average man in the street either had no knowledge of the report and the meetings or did not care to attend. The Management Task Force Chair lamented that typically such public sessions only attract the "getters," that is representatives from special interest groups, not the public at large. Those who did attend were unanimous in their attacks on the Commission for holding hearings of such importance on such short notice. Complaints were repeatedly voiced that there had not been enough time to read the report, let alone prepare a written evaluation of it. The staff stated that some 1,600 copies of the first draft had been typed and sent to every judge, mayor, State Senator or Representative, and police department in the state, as well as any individual who submitted a written request, yet many individuals stated their copies

arrived only a few days before the scheduled hearings. One influential Probate Judge criticized that, "It's absolutely ridiculous to give us a few days to get through a document about the size of a Detroit telephone directory, let alone not giving us a choice on the Commission . . . this could be a blueprint for disaster." The Commission agreed to have a second public hearing at the Civic Center in the capitol and set the date over a month in advance for October 30, 1974. The six task forces were to meet as individual units with concerned groups and individuals throughout the morning and assemble as a group during the afternoon. They publicly promised to continue the hearings until every interested citizen had either spoken or submitted written testimony.

Perhaps because the time extension allowed for a greater degree of preparation and organization, the criticism and opposition to the report was even more severe during the second set of hearings than it had been at the first. Of the twenty-eight speakers during a three-hour period, for example, only two favored the report's adoption. For the majority of the speakers, their opposition to the MTF section of the first draft remained so strong that they advised vetoing the entire report. The entire meeting was conducted in a hostile, fiery atmosphere, One speaker after another voiced the same criticisms: to eliminate plea bargaining will bring about the collapse of the system; state control of all correctional facilities is a grave

mistake; the MAPS, CAPS, and RAPS proposals are clearly unconstitutional. In more general terms the report was attacked for favoring the criminal to the detriment of the victim and for being poorly researched and entirely too expensive to implement. The debate quickly formed into a question of state versus local control. For much of the hearings the battle lines were clearly drawn between the Commissioners of the Management Task Force and representatives from local law enforcement organizations.

Law enforcement agencies, prosecuting attorneys, county sheriffs, and elected county officials were the most vehement in their criticisms. The sheriffs launched one blistering attack after another, referring to the report as a long first step towards a super-state and complete control of the criminal justice system as "emasculatation or elimination of local units of government in the critically sensitive areas of police, prosecutorial, adjudicatory, and corrections." They said that the Office of Criminal Justice, a small unit that had been established only a few years previously to funnel federal funds to local police units, was now attempting to dominate the entire criminal justice system. The executive secretary of the State's Sheriffs Association charged that, "From what we can see the OCJP is planning a police state by proposing to create a central law enforcement authority. The state wants to eliminate the sheriff. If this persists, we'll take it to the courts." He argued that the 83 County Sheriff's



Departments are much more efficient than the State Police, accomplishing more work, with more men, for less pay. There are approximately 3,000 men in the Sheriff's departments with a budget of \$34 million, the State Police have 2,700 officers and a budget of \$66 million, almost double this amount. Another sheriff from a major county echoed this sentiment, stating that, "It appears to me to be a continuation of the permissive attitude that has been a failure for the past thirty years. This document intends to take everything away from the grass roots and give it to the state." The sheriffs argued that they were not given equal representation on the Commission, that only two Sheriffs were members and that both represented urban counties while the goals and standards primarily affected rural areas--especially MAPS, CAPS, and RAPs. They again sought a further time extension and argued that since the Commission had over a year to prepare the report, it was only proper that they be allowed a year to prepare a rebuttal to it and write an alternate set of proposals--not five short minutes at a public hearing. They felt that the Commission was trying to rush through the public hearing process as quickly as possible in order to stifle criticism and to not allow opposition to mount. Representatives from smaller police agencies echoed these complaints. The executive director of the Police Officers Association of the State warned publically that there were forces at work who were attempting to use the war on crime as a

cover for a state takeover of the numerous police forces and that they would eventually produce a period of national repression. The president of another association of police chiefs compared the MAPS, CAPS, and RAPs proposals to "creating another Nazi Gestapo or Soviet NKVD Intelligence section." This statement was subsequently reprinted in various newspapers throughout the state.

The Michigan Association of Counties fully supported the Sheriff's Association in its efforts to keep control of county correctional and police operations in local hands. The Association's President said that, "Even if we could accept state administration, we are not naive enough to believe that the State would finance its operations. What we would end up with would be state control and local financing of police and correctional operations, for violation of State--not local laws." The counties as a group stated that House Bill 6272 which allows local areas to voluntarily combine police agencies into professional county-wide units would be much more effective. Many elected officials also becried the lack of time allowed for reading and preparation of the public hearings. One county commissioner voiced the sentiments of the majority when she stated, "The implications of this report are broad and affect us all. People are tired of having things shoved down their throats."

Several county prosecutors also opposed the report's adoption and for many of the same reasons, although their

verbal barrages were primarily directed towards the adjudication rather than the Management Task Force. They were especially against the recommendation to eliminate plea bargaining and what they perceived to be the "coddling of criminals." They stressed that certainty of apprehension, a speedy trial, and swift, just punishment is the only proven method for reducing crime. They offered statistics on the very low rate of license plate violations as proof of this fact. They said that this law is rarely broken because possible violators know that they will be caught and punished. One of the head prosecutors from the State's most populous county brought the audience to a standing ovation when he pointed out that for every 100 felonies committed in the State, only nine arrests are made; of these only six are found guilty, and of these six, less than one actually goes to prison. He emphasized that since less than one percent of felons are incarcerated, the argument that jailing offenders as a means to control crime has failed is in fact ridiculous, since it has never been tried. He has 32 prosecutors to handle the 10,000 to 12,000 felony cases that occur in the State's largest city each year; over 80 percent of all their convictions are arranged through plea bargaining. He estimated that it would cost the State 1.5 to 5 billion in additional salaries and expenses if plea bargaining was forbidden. One of the final speakers was one of the two lone supporters of the Commission's report, the representative from the State's

Women's Association. She observed that if the entire power establishment is opposed to their document, as this hearing seemed to indicate, then "you obviously must have done something right."\*

### Response to the Public Hearings

At the hearings the Commissioners accepted both the criticism and the praise without replying publicly. Their comments and actions in the several private sessions which followed the public assemblies, however, demonstrate what value they felt this feedback had and how they should respond to it. Rather than simply providing lip service to the resource of public opinion, the task forces made what they regarded as a concerted effort to fit this additional input into their final draft and yet not discard the basic theme of the report. The meetings which followed the public sessions demonstrated that the members did in fact read, evaluate, and discuss every bit of the material from the sessions; this was true of all the speeches as well as the numerous written testimonies. The task forces reread their reports, section by section, to determine what changes they felt were possible without abandoning their original intentions. Frequently considerable time was spent in discussing the difference between one or two words.

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\*Although amusing, this comment overlooks the fact that it would be extremely difficult to find a more representative group of the establishment than the 78 Commissioners themselves.

No matter how ridiculous some of the submitted proposals appeared, such as the suggestion to "borrow" the National Guard and citizen's vigilance groups on a full time basis to double the size of the police force and thus reduce crime, each was still allotted proper consideration. Some advice such as that offered by a retired university professor which stated that correctional institutions be submitted to the same health standards as public restaurants and inmates guaranteed a nutritionally balanced diet, touched on topics completely overlooked by the members themselves. It became possible to adopt such recommendations without further discussions. Moreover, they often believed they could incorporate much of the public feedback into their document, and in fact adopt many of the criticisms verbatim, without changing the intent of the report, since in their minds this frequently required a simple change in the language. Time and again it became obvious that the ideas the Commissioners meant to put into the report were misunderstood and misinterpreted by the relevant systems. For example, the Chair of the Rehabilitation Task Force observed that there had been considerable confusion as to what had been intended with regards to the county jails and other correctional institutions. The Commission wanted the State to set standards for these facilities and to coordinate the administration but not to control them as many of the relevant systems seemed to believe. The MTF argued that they had intended to set

standards and improve the quality of local law enforcement; but they had not tried to eliminate local control. Moreover, a wide discrepancy persisted between what these groups perceived the role of the Commission to be and what the Commission itself saw as their main objectives. A large segment of local law enforcement felt that the report should be rejected either because it would be too costly or too difficult to implement. The Commission, however, set out and operated under the assumption that they were to write a program of goals and standards for the entire criminal justice system in the State, a set of ideals, and not to worry about the practical aspects of implementing these ideals or paying for them. The Chair of the Investigation and Arrest Task Force stated that the toughest questions which were repeatedly asked at the public meetings were: How were the goals and standards to be put into operation? How would they be controlled? How much would they cost? Who would control the funding? His response was that the Commission could neither answer these questions nor had it attempted to, since this was not their job. Although these conflicts over differences of interpretation and objectives affected each of the six task forces, it became clear that these misunderstandings primarily revolved around the MTF's section of the report. The sheriffs demanded greater representation on the Commission, but the MTF Commission responded that many other organizations wanted greater representation also and that to accept all

their requests would expand the group beyond a workable size. The counties charged that most power would be in the hands of OCJP who drew up the proposals. The Commissioners responded that the task forces were in fact representative of various diverse groups from throughout the State and that they, not the staff, voted on approval or rejection of the various goals and standards. The Task Force on Crime Prevention commented that much of the criticism and opposition that they received, such as that regarding diversion or mandatory educational requirements, also was due to a lack of common understanding. They voiced the desire to correct the situation but were uncertain how to go about doing so.

Without a doubt, the Management Task Force had been subjected to the greatest barrage of verbal attack. The Chair stated that this was obviously because their goals and standards clashed most openly with the numerous vested interest groups. The main impetus behind the highly criticized MAPS, CAPS, and RAPs section of the report was to provide uniformly high and fair standards of police services throughout the state and thus eliminate the present discrepancies between the rural and urban areas. A few of the State standards which many rural departments might not be able to meet include basic criteria such as 24 hour police service, around-the-clock communication networks, minimum educational and training requirements and mastering of specific crime investigation techniques. He also stated

that implementation of the goals and standards would often require legislative action; thus it should be the House and Senate's job to achieve consensus, not the Task Force's. "Even with total agreement among all factions, implementation of these recommendations might take 10 to 15 years." He reminded the members that from the beginning they had agreed that political feasibility would not be a factor in their deliberations. He remained convinced that most if not all their proposals would someday be implemented; it was just a question of time. It took 65 years, he argued, to consolidate the State's school system and most of the money for educational purposes comes from the State government. Four hundred million dollars is spent each year on the criminal justice system but less than 5 percent is brought in through the system in the form of fines or penalties. This task force also confessed to a blatant failure to communicate their intentions to the public clearly and concisely. The relevant systems considered their report as a prelude to a state takeover of the entire system but the Chair insisted that their recommendations do provide for local control. The State would supply central jails and dispatch facilities and set objective standards but once the basic requirements are met, local areas can hire their own police officers and appoint their own department heads. RAPS was the only exception to this rule; this was the single area which would permit a complete takeover by the State Police. Their recommendations allow



for state control if local areas voluntarily choose to do so, but this is not a hard and fast rule with rigid guidelines. There was agreement among the committee members that most critical attacks generated from the vagueness of their language, and that by changing their wording they might be able to appease much of the opposition and still retain the basic proposals.

"Federation" was the key word used throughout the report to emphasize the importance of community control, but the sheriffs did not interpret it this way. At times the Commissioners of the MTF felt their language was purposely not made specific to allow for flexibility of interpretation and thus provide more allowance for local differences. The relevant systems, however, interpreted this same vagueness as a deliberate attempt to permit dominance by the state. In line with this, many speakers at the public hearings demanded a report that is applicable now and established a hierarchy of realistic priorities. One member of the MTF commented that, "If we had tried to provide a complete budget analysis and implementation strategy--which was not our job in the first place--it could easily have taken us another ten years." This task force concluded by reaching agreement on four key points. First, it would be a mistake to continue providing money to local agencies without it also being accompanied by stricter guidelines on how it was to be used. Secondly, in order to achieve any minimal degree of support the

language of their report should stress the theme that the criminal justice system would be similar to the school system. The state will provide the majority of funds but will not hold a monopoly on control. The local police boards will play a role similar to that of the local school boards. Finally, they agreed to emphasize that all the goals and standards presented by the Commission are just one step in a long term process of restructuring the present inequitable system.

On December 16, the entire Commission assembled for a final vote of approval or disapproval of the amended report. After three hours of debate over certain changes and several proposed amendments, the report was adopted. Once again the recommendations contained in the MTF's section of the report tended to monopolize the discussion. More time was spent on debating its merits and evaluating proposed amendments to this one section, than was spent on the other five sections combined. One of the most concrete indications of the impact that the public hearings had on the Commission is reflected in these changes that were incorporated into the document. Five of the six task forces reworded their sections to make it crystal clear at least in their minds, that they were not attempting to usurp local control. They assumed that their adversaries would conclude likewise. Although the first draft did not prohibit local control, it did not promote it. The Commissioners felt that the revised edition now corrected

this mistake. The amended edition stated that local communities would be allowed complete autonomy under an umbrella of standards established by the state. The Rehabilitation Task Force, for example, attempted to eliminate the fear of a state takeover of all correctional facilities by replacing the word "administered" with the term "coordinated" throughout their report. The Chair of the Management Task Force said that in response to public pressure the staff had been ordered to completely rewrite their entire report. He stated that in his opinion, it also now strongly emphasized local autonomy and control. He strongly emphasized that these changes were only accomplished, however, after a closed-door session with the state's Sheriff's Associations and two meetings with the Chiefs of Police. He said the executive boards of both of these groups now agreed to support the report to the extent that at least they agreed not to actively oppose it.

Several other modifications also occurred. The Juvenile Task Force made it clear that, while serious juvenile delinquents could not be incarcerated with adults, they could be institutionalized with their peers. The Adjudication Task Force kept their proposal to eliminate plea bargaining but withdrew their earlier recommendations that this be achieved within a five year time period. Perhaps the greatest modification carried out by the Management Task Force was their decision to discard the RAPS section of the MAPS, CAPS, and RAPS proposal. It was

replaced with a strongly stated recommendation that after an appropriate time period of five years, no police force would be allowed to receive state funding if they possessed less than 20 men. Dispatch personnel were permitted to be civilians so in effect this meant that all departments must maintain a minimum of 15 uniformed officers, therefore assuring at least three officers on duty around-the-clock. Those departments which could not meet this standard had the option of merging with neighboring departments until they achieved the minimum number of personnel or of being supported completely through local revenues. Approximately 73 percent of the departments in the state would be affected by this standard.

## CHAPTER VI

### ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS

In writing their report the Commissioners of the Michigan Commission on Criminal Justice Goals and Standards strongly emphasized that they attempted to produce a document which would not simply be read, discussed, and then relegated to some dusty, obscure corner of the State library. They hoped that their numerous recommendations could be successfully manipulated through the meandering maze of vested interests in the state legislature and would achieve implementation in the foreseeable future. The primary conclusion of this case study is that because of their failure to abide by many of the concepts contained in Normative Sponsorship Theory, the Management Task Force has almost assured a fate for the report very similar to that which they sought to avoid. Interviews with officials from each of the relevant systems showed that they felt the changes incorporated into the final report as a result of the public hearings were not significant enough to warrant their support. The majority of those interviewed believed

that most of the changes were semantic and were adopted only if they maintained the Commissioner's original ideas and intentions.

Change to be successful according to normative sponsorship must not simply be dictated from individuals in positions of power and passed down to those groups to be affected by these decisions; change must result from a two way, free flowing exchange of ideas. Although the MTF knew there existed a likelihood of opposition to their report, they attempted to divorce themselves from these problems. Certain related topics, each of which will be discussed in more detail in the following pages, overshadow this entire action process:

1. The Commissioners willingly failed to establish any type of meaningful dialogue with the relevant systems. This decision influenced each step of the action process from the selection of the Commissioners to final approval of the report.
2. The selection of the Commissioners and the staff was somewhat poorly planned and the tone of the final report reflected their backgrounds in state law enforcement agencies.
3. The public hearings were not used primarily as a means of acquiring input from the concerned groups; the hearings became mainly a "gripe session" during which the relevant systems fruitlessly voiced their frustrations and opposition to the program.
4. The public's concerns as reflected by an extensive opinion survey were regarded as unreliable by the MTF.
5. The Commissioners consciously made no effort to confront the basic social conditions which often lead to crime.

Many Commissioners believed that at the appropriate time, they would convince the public and the relevant systems as to the wisdom of their decisions. They falsely assumed that support was not necessary during the actual setting of the goals and standards but would follow later in the implementation stage of the report. It appears likely that these errors will return to plague the Commissioners at a future date, and will then be much more difficult to resolve.

#### Failure to Communicate

The most basic and troublesome problem which the members of the MTF faced during their deliveries was their failure to communicate clearly with the relevant systems. There are numerous examples and reasons for this. The interviews exposed widespread differences and misunderstandings on a variety of subjects. Not one Commissioner nor the relevant systems knew specifically how the members were chosen, what criteria was used to evaluate potential members, or who it was that made the actual selection. Yet in study groups of this type, such inquiries become critically important.

Most relevant systems complained that they did not understand what the assignment of the MTF was until after they read the report and they did not receive a copy of the first draft until three days before the public hearings. They were unclear whether compliance with the recommendations

would be voluntary or mandatory and why no cost analysis had preceeded the decisions. The Sheriff's Association complained that several letters mailed to the MTF went unacknowledged and attempts to arrange meetings which might have answered some of their questions were rejected. The staff of the MTF offended several police chiefs who sought copies of the report, when they refused to send copies because they came from towns with populations of less than 25,000 inhabitants. The two chiefs interviewed stated that they, as well as other neighboring chiefs, believed that these refusals were intended to prevent them from reading and evaluating the report. The staff argued that financial restrictions severely limited the number of copies available for distribution.

Occasionally the perceptions of the Commissioners and the systems regarding each other became extremely distorted. For example in their description of the only meeting which occurred between members of the MTF and officials of the Sheriff's Association, the Commissioners present said they had a very illuminating, if heated, exchange of ideas and that at the end the Sheriffs agreed to adopt a position of passive acceptance rather than active opposition to the report. The officials of the Association, however, described the meeting as basically a lecture from the Commissioners in which they were told, not asked, what changes had been made and what form the final report would take. They definitely had not shifted from



their original stand of total opposition to the report, but had decided to await any legislative attempts at implementing the program before they rallied public support to their cause.

Another example of the gross misunderstandings which surrounded the report can be seen in the positions taken by the State Police, the county sheriffs and the different chiefs of police. The Michigan State Troopers Association opposes the report out of fear that it will relegate the State Police to the relatively insignificant task of simply patrolling the state's highways. They fear that the 20 man rule will lead to the elimination of many State Police posts since there will exist no need of them after the consolidation and expansion of the local police departments. The Sheriffs and Police Chiefs, on the other hand, warn that this report remains a first step towards a complete state take over of local law enforcement. It would result in the disbandment of over half of all police departments in the state, and vastly increase the numbers and power of the State Police.

Not surprisingly, one phenomena that occurred over and over again during the decision making process was the tendency for each of the various organizations involved to advocate perpetuating their own existence and, if possible, to expand their base of power. They resisted change because it constituted a threat to their survival. Initially the states refused to adopt the national program of goals and

standards because it did not reflect their own influence, needs, and unique characteristics. Later many counties and smaller areas opposed the state report for exactly the same reasons. The states opposed a federal police force but advocated quite strongly the adoption of state-controlled forces. The counties vehemently renounce such proposals but favor combining police agencies into "county-wide units" as the most efficient form of service.

Undoubtedly, municipalities and townships would oppose this plan but quickly accept one advocating greater municipal control, while many block clubs feel that the police force should be broken down into neighborhood units. The difficult task of the Commissioners was to provide a blue print that would make the criminal justice system more efficient but yet would be flexible enough to accommodate local interests. By emphasizing the positive aspects of their proposals, such as higher wages, better working conditions and more job security for the average officer employed by the small departments, the MTF could have greatly improved the possibility of achieving consensus with the local agencies.

Further misunderstandings prevented the MTF Commissioners from establishing a meaningful dialogue with the relevant systems. While cost analysis and practical considerations were vital factors for many of the relevant systems, the MTF had agreed from the start that these factors were largely irrelevant to their central task of

providing goals and standards. While the systems complained that they had not had time to analyze the report, the Commissioners responded that most of their critics either had not read the report at all or read only sections of it.

(At the same time, many Commissioners read only their own task force's section.) One task force member after another exclaimed that the critics could not possibly make the accusations they were making if they had simply read the document carefully and understood the reasoning behind the proposals. They stressed that it is not possible to appreciate the effort that went into the report simply by glancing over it. Anyone who took part in long hours of research, analysis, and bitter debate which preceeded the writing of the report would have supported their decisions.

No technical assistance unit participated in the action process at any time. Unconsciously the Commissioners and the relevant systems attempted to fulfill this role themselves, but were completely unsuccessful. Moreover, despite their avowed dedication to establishing a set of ideal objectives, the Commissioners felt it necessary to include an "Implementation Strategy" section after each set of proposals. Often this wording was so vague and general in nature that it only served to confuse the issues. Statements such as "OCJP funds should support these actions," raise more questions than they answer.

Many Commissioners voiced a self-fulfilling stereotype of the sheriffs and police chiefs which, although

valid in individual cases, often contributed little towards reaching a workable consensus. The members were practically unanimous in their convictions that the only reason local law enforcement officials opposed the report was because it would create a change that would eliminate many of their "own little kingdoms and reduce their power." They read nothing useful in the chief's objections since they resulted from simply a fear of losing their jobs or not being included on the Commission. The Chair of the MTF observed that, "I have learned that when someone says the Commission is not representative, he really means I wasn't on it." When asked why they felt the sheriffs or police chiefs opposed the report several Commissioners responded that, "It is the very nature of most police officers to resist any type of change whatsoever."

At first the MTF underestimated the opposition that their section of the report would encounter. Since they had no reliable contact with the opposing groups, they had no accurate way of estimating how the relevant systems felt about the proposals under consideration. After the public hearings the intensity of the opposition became quite clear but the damage had been done. Conflict rather than challenge came to dominate interaction between the two parties. When asked why he made no effort to convince the police chiefs or the sheriffs of the merits of the MTF's proposals, rather than just the executive boards of their associations, the Chair dryly observed that it was too

late then, since, "they had backed themselves into a corner. It's a little difficult to get fellows to agree with you once they have publicly stated to the news services that the goals and standards would bring about a police state similar to Nazi Germany or the Russian KGB."

Composition of the Management Task  
Force and Its Staff

Only two of the Commissioners interviewed believed that the MTF allowed either too little or too much representation to any one group. All members felt that law enforcement personnel enjoyed adequate (or more than adequate) representation on both the MTF and its staff, yet only three of them saw any point in differentiating between state and local law enforcement agencies. Local law enforcement officials, however, were quick to point out these distinctions and stressed the implications they felt this had on the final tone of the report. Each of the police chiefs interviewed felt that the report emphasized state interests rather than local concerns. They believed that this reflected the predominance of state-employed personnel on the MTF and its staff. Several of the alternates interviewed voiced a different view of the composition of the MTF. They agreed that the MTF over-relied on larger departments to the detriment of local agencies but stressed that this resulted basically from poor planning. It came primarily as a result of the carelessness and rush which influenced all the proceedings of the Commission in

order to meet the deadlines contained in the federal grant. One alternate only half-jokingly remarked that this oversight could not have been intentional as the sheriffs claimed since "the government is much too incompetent for any such conspiracy."

Each of the Commissioners interviewed agreed that local law enforcement personnel, especially the police chiefs and county sheriffs, would be the groups most affected by their recommendations. They also unanimously agreed that these groups possessed sufficient political influence to prevent passage of the proposals once they reached the legislature. Yet only one member of the MTF came from these relevant systems. Moreover, they apparently failed to realize that often individuals who make claims to roles of authority by rights of the title or the official position they might occupy, are often not recognized as valid spokespersons or leaders of the group from which they come. While the only Chief of Police on the MTF was well educated and highly esteemed by his fellow Commissioners and was assumed to be a spokesman for the Chiefs, the interviews with relevant systems revealed him to be the one individual who they would not have selected to represent their interests. They flatly declared that he "spoke for himself not the other chiefs of police," and that no chance existed of this individual convincing the other chiefs of the report's value. They argued that he had "sold out" in order to obtain more

federal funding for his area, while other small communities typically refuse federal grants rather than submit to the controls which accompany acceptance of the funds.

Other groups were noticeable by their absence on the Commission. Only one woman out of 14 Commissioners was assigned to the MTF and only six women out of 78 members served on the entire Commission. Although the eventual success of the report will require strong public support, very few representatives from public interest groups took part in the proceedings. There were no members of the entire Commission under 22 years of age despite their many far reaching decisions relating to juvenile delinquents. While implementation of the goals and standards will definitely involve legislative approval and will require state funding, the only active state legislator on the MTF neither attended the meetings nor did he send alternates. Unfortunately, since he is also the Chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, his participation would have proved valuable in the battle that lies ahead. Although one National Commission recognized convicts and ex-convicts as "the only ones who understand the entire criminal justice system," none were selected to serve on the Commission. Those most affected by the system were not deemed important enough to be given a voice in determining their own futures. Former offenders remain an important yet undeveloped natural resource in the field of criminal justice; they can play a valuable role in educating

others about the flaws in the system and of their own mistakes. As a result of their experience they can offer concrete advice in the area of crime prevention, as many progressive law enforcement officers are beginning to realize, and the personnel problems of attempting to adjust to a society which often regards them as potentially dangerous deviants. One of the more active members of the MTF regretted this deficiency since she admitted, "The information and insights that I have received on other commissions from former residents of state institutions was truly fantastic."

Perhaps to a greater extent than many MTF Commissioners are willing to admit, their report reflects the opinions of the Chair and the Vice-Chair of this task force. Both men occupied high appointive positions in state government. The staff assigned to the task force also played an influential, perhaps a definitive role in the actual writing of the report. The staff was composed of three members of the State Office of Criminal Justice, three State Police Officers, one member of the Michigan Law Enforcement Training Council (which receives funds from the State Police) and one county auditor. The staff members were personally chosen by the heads of the State Police and the OCJP in order to comply with the requirements of the federal grant, and to a degree, produced a report which reflects their background in state law enforcement agencies.



It is unrealistic to expect 14 Commissioners who occupy jobs demanding large amounts of their time and energy to voluntarily contribute long hours to study, analyze, and evaluate the avalanche of relevant data necessary to produce a study of this type. This task inevitably falls to the staff who are paid to carry out these duties. While the staff wrote the report and presented interim drafts during the meetings, the Commissioners voted approval of their language or instigated revisions in terminology and intent wherever they felt necessary. Due to absences, prior engagements, or an overburdened schedule, the Commissioners often sent alternates to replace them (who possessed no voting power) or voted without knowledge of previous debates or discussions and without an in-depth understanding of all the consequences of their decisions. The end product becomes a report written by staff members under the direction of the few committee members who feel the document important enough to contribute a substantial amount of their time to its composition. Furthermore, certain Commissioners were more knowledgeable in those areas than others. One Commissioner observed that the Chair was the leader and knew more about many of the subjects first hand. "We were reactors rather than leaders, we often responded to what he (the Chair) said because this wasn't our field." The Chair of the MTF who was also on the National Commission admitted that, "In Commissions of this type the task forces never actually write the

report, they merely approve or disapprove the wording of the staff. That's the way it also was with the National report." Finally it should be pointed out that although the individuals most vocal in their opposition were those excluded from the decision making process, some representatives from the relevant systems who were appointed to other task forces on the Commission became equally frustrated. Peer group pressure often demanded that they conform to the will of the majority. One police chief who served as a Commissioner on another task force, stressed that he usually fought long and hard for the rights of the chiefs but was repeatedly out-voted 7 or 8 to 1. After a while he said he began to feel like "some kind of nut."

Basically local law enforcement officials believe that the final report places too much power and control in the hands of state agencies, such as the State Police and the Office of Criminal Justice Programs. Many local departments fear that if the Goals and Standards report became implemented, these state agencies would have the authority to set minimum state-wide standards of operation which they might find impossible to meet. The failure of local areas to comply with these requirements would then permit the state to withhold federal or state funding.

#### Public Hearings

The public hearings might have provided a viable opportunity for spokespersons from the relevant systems to

obtain input into the decision making process of the MTF. Unfortunately this was not the case. The Commissioners unanimously agreed that the public hearings offered little that was positive or constructive to their labors, since hearings of this type tend to attract only the vested interest groups. They basically regarded these hearings as offering an opportunity for the special interest groups to voice their concerns and to obtain a feeling that they exercised some degree of influence. According to normative sponsorship, however, it is precisely these vested interests that must be allowed a role in the decision process if that process is to be successful.

Although the Commissioners of each of the six task forces listened to and considered the suggestions presented at the public hearings, the Commissioners of the MTF refused to adopt any amendments which they felt would lead to an abandonment of their original objectives. They mistakenly assumed that by simply rewording their section of the report, they could pacify many of their most vocal critics. The elimination of MAPS, CAPS, and RAPS was the most obvious compromise on the part of the MTF. The substitution of this recommendation with the "20 man rule," however, was still found unacceptable by the overwhelming majority of sheriffs and police chiefs.

In reality, many of the goals and standards were predetermined. The report was written first and foremost to comply with federal standards and to obtain federal

funding. Thus the state produced, with minor alteration, what the federal government sought--a mirror image of the national report. The Chair of the entire Commission reaffirmed this explanation when he opened the public hearings with a speech which emphasized that time had practically expired and that they must produce and approve a report of their own or "the federal government will do it for us." Many critics rightly assumed that regardless of anything they might do or say, the report had to be finished within weeks of the public hearings or millions of dollars in potential federal grant money might be forfeited. This in part also helps to explain why the members of the Michigan Sheriff's Association left the public hearings without bothering to submit to the MTF the alternative set of goals and standards they had prepared. The members returned to the association's office so angry and frustrated that they voted to hold a press conference to publicly condemn the entire report.

#### Public Opinion

The Commissioners regarded the public opinion poll conducted by Market Opinion Research in much the same vein as the public hearings. Several of the trends contained in the poll run counter to the recommendations made by the MTF. Almost half of the task force members (including the Chair) said they had not read the poll and those that did read it felt it was an unreliable source on which to base

their decisions. While the poll showed that the public felt the main causes of crime were drugs, 26 percent; lack of parental guidance, 22 percent; and unemployment, 14 percent; the Commissioners ignored these insights as being outside of their areas of influence. Of the individuals surveyed 58 percent were opposed to combining local police agencies even if it leads to more efficient law enforcement, and a plurality of 47 percent prefer that the State Police continue providing the same services that it does now rather than undertake more or fewer duties. One of the few times the poll was referred to throughout the entire report was to note that it demonstrated that the State Police received a 3.58 approval rating (on a scale of 4.0), as the agency in which the public possessed the greatest amount of confidence.

One of the Commissioners summed up the feeling of the MTF regarding public opinion polls when he remarked that, "Polls are just about worthless. You give me a federal grant of \$35,000 and I will get them to say whatever you want them to say." They often emphasized that everything depends on the wording of the question, the interviewer's skills and experience, their voice inclinations during the interview and so on. They argued that public opinion polls are one thing, but how the public votes is usually quite another; if a politician voted according to public opinion polls he would have a very short political life. Moreover, while the Commissioners

bemoaned the lack of public interest in the report and at the public hearings, they readily agreed that it would have been very difficult for individual citizens to obtain a copy of the report. They added that this was completely logical since otherwise the price of publication would have increased substantially. While public opinion is important, many felt that it remains second to legislative action in determining the future of the report. The two are often, perhaps usually, not the same. The legislature primarily responds to vested interest groups while the public must become quite aroused before the House or the Senate will take notice.

The Commissioners' attitudes toward the public opinion poll appear contradictory and self-serving. Many of the members of the MTF criticized a report which they had not even bothered to read. If they had doubts or technical criticisms regarding the questionnaire, the reliability of the sample, or the ability of the interviewers, they should have consulted with the professionals conducting the survey rather than discredit the undertaking without offering any constructive advice to correct these perceived deficiencies. If the Commissioners believed that polls in general were invalid, they should have opposed spending over \$65,000 from a limited budget to conduct two different surveys on their behalf over a two-year period. They repeatedly complained that they had no accurate method of discovering how the public felt about the issues under

consideration. Yet properly conducted public opinion polls, despite all their potential flaws, remain one of the most reliable instruments for detecting the public's pulse on a variety of subjects. Moreover if the poll was in fact as unreliable as the MTF Commissioners indicated, one cannot help but question why they quoted the survey's findings when these results supported the task force's recommendations, (such as with the high approval rating of the State Police) but then chose to ignore responses which opposed their own objectives.

#### Social Conditions

The most glaring weakness behind all of the MTF's work was that by their own admission, the goals and standards will do nothing to eliminate the true root causes of crime. This decision resulted from intentional efforts and prearranged operating policies by the Commissioners. Despite some press releases to the contrary, the goal of achieving a more just and equitable society never received any serious consideration on the part of the Commissioners. The interviews revealed that although the Commissioners, to one degree or another, unanimously agreed that many adverse and unjust social factors directly contribute to the rising crime rate, they were convinced that it was not their responsibility to recommend the need for major changes in these areas. These oppressive conditions were assumed to be given, and while regrettable, crime was taken to be

the inevitable consequence. Their goals centered on establishing a system which could rapidly and efficiently cope with their "deviant" element. In line with their own backgrounds in state law enforcement agencies and personal interests, the members of the MTF and the staff addressed their recommendations to a specific audience: law enforcement agencies and other segments of the criminal justice system. They argued that little benefit would be derived from preaching changes in the basic structure of society since these changes were outside of their control and would therefore make their intended audience unresponsive to the entire report, and thus would have a negative rather than positive impact. While other Commissions have stressed to a greater extent the desperate need for basic changes in American society, these reports have had an insignificant effect on the crime problem. The MTF wanted a program that was "practical" and "realistic." While a minority of members strongly disagreed, over half of the Commissioners did agree with the statement that no direct parallel existed between unjust social and economic conditions and achievement of a more efficient law enforcement system; they implied that one was attainable without the other. They admitted that the severity of the problems and the wide spectrum of proposed solutions and differences of opinions held by even the experts, led to a murky marsh of confusion that was better left untouched. They maintained that it would take years not months for them to properly research



the subject and to draw up an adequate set of concrete proposals and even then they would have no hope of steering the program successfully through the House and Senate floors. Obviously Sam Rayburn's axiom, "To get along, you go alone," is as appropriate to Lansing as it is to Washington.

### Recommendations for the Future

It was not the primary purpose of this research to analyze and evaluate the merits of the goals and standards themselves but to observe and discuss the decision making process of the MTF. The interviews did not attempt to pass judgement on the relevant systems or the Commissioners but to learn what opinions they held. While "failure to communicate" was the most frequently heard complaint of both parties, this should constitute one of the relatively easier obstacles to overcome. It would have been in the Commissioner's own interests to allocate to the relevant systems greater participation in the decision making process, since students of organizations have long noted that groups which become actively involved in such deliberations tend to support them, while groups that feel they have been intentionally excluded frequently oppose any proposed changes. The experience of the few Commissioners who were also members of the relevant systems offer proof of this phenomena. While freely attacking other sections of the report, these individuals tended to staunchly defend the

section that their task force had written. Another practical reason for allowing the relevant systems a more active role is that if the goals and standards become law, they will fail to become effective without the firm support of local law enforcement officials. If these groups continue in their opposition, an infinite number of ways exist in which they might undermine the success of the program.

The goals and standards can be implemented and still provide for local control of law enforcement. The MTF simply failed to convince the relevant systems of this fact. The Commissioners never made a concerted effort to convince these systems of the value of their decisions. Rather than actively sell their program, they occasionally tried to defend specific proposals with somewhat subjective rationale. What the Commissioners interpreted as lack of interest on the part of the chiefs, actually resulted from unwillingness on their part to change their recommendations to fit the motivations of others. At the same time that they created needless tension and conflict by barring these groups from the planning process, they also ignored the possibility of obtaining consultative assistance from outside the criminal justice system. Professors from nearby Michigan State University might have voluntarily fulfilled the role of technical assistants, as they have frequently done in the past. Technical assistance units might have had the common sense to first ask the sheriffs' or police organizations which standards they felt were most desirous

for achieving a more just and efficient system of law enforcement, rather than simply telling them in an antagonistic manner what changes the MTF had decided were best for them. Under the rush and the pressure of conforming to the time frame imposed by the federal grant, they produced a document which largely disregarded the needs and the attitudes of the local law enforcement community. As is so often the case with professional reform groups, obtaining federal grants and self perpetuation and protection of their own organization took precedence over the concerns of the larger community.

The MTF might have also employed the executive boards of the Michigan Sheriff's Association and the chiefs of police associations as key channels of communication, who could have persuaded their membership of the need for change in the current system and shown them what benefits and values they themselves would derive from the goals and standards. Although this alone might not guarantee complete agreement on all issues, members of both the relevant systems and the MTF agreed that such an approach would have greatly improved the chances for achieving a broader level of consensus.

Several Commissioners now agree that, "Perhaps we should have stroked a few heads differently." A new study group should definitely take steps to broaden their base of support. There should be an active campaign aimed at informing and educating the public and the relevant systems

about the work of the Commission and of the basis behind their decisions. The selection of future commissioners and staff members and more intelligent use of the public hearings process, constitute viable tools for achieving this objective. Several Commissioners believe they could have convinced their most vocal critics to support the program, if only they had taken more time to discuss the subject and reason with them at an earlier stage in the proceedings. On the rare occasions when they tried to achieve consensus and rapport with the relevant systems, this was in fact the net result.

The executive board of the Michigan Association of Police Chiefs remains the only significant group of police chiefs that has lent their approval to the MTF's section of the report. This group is also the only one which the MTF bothered to contact and meet with in an effort to explain just exactly what the report did and did not mean. The MTF Chair remains convinced that, "The executive board merely voted the way their members would have voted if the goals and standards had been explained to the membership the way it was explained to the board."

Numerous other concrete indications suggest that consensus was not impossible. The Michigan Municipal League, which represents over 470 cities and villages of various sizes throughout the state, stood out as one of the most active opponents of the MTF report. Yet one of their position papers admitted that, "Perhaps a minimum

size should be established for police departments, and if a local government cannot meet these standards other arrangements should be made, so that all citizens of the state would get adequate law enforcement." The Municipal League agreed with the ideal of establishing a minimum size department but doubted the wisdom of imposing this ruling on all local departments in just five short years. If the relevant systems have input they tend to accept the defeat of their interests more graciously than if they remain isolated. The Municipal League, perhaps because of its large size, thought they had adequate representation on the Commission. Although many of their ideas were voted down, they did manage to get several of their amendments to the report passed; as a result, they have agreed to support most sections of the final report. The Municipal League had just as many objections to the goals and standards as the sheriff and police associations, but through interaction with the various Commissioners many of their misgivings and misunderstanding were eliminated. After the second set of public hearings they became the only organization permitted attendance at the closed-door sessions of the task force. Partly because of this they came to see the report as a set of ideals or suggestions rather than as the official mandate the sheriffs perceived it to be.

The MTF did not take the time to work with the Michigan Sheriff's Association or the various chiefs of police associations as they did with the Municipal League.

One of the few areas in which the Commissioners and the other relevant systems reached a degree of consensus was that the combined political power of these groups was strong enough to veto many attempts at implementation once they reach the state legislature. A police chief observed that as a result of the tension and conflict which surrounded the proceedings, "Relations between local law enforcement and OCJP have been set back 20 years." Rather than remove the division and fragmentation which characterizes the state's criminal justice system, the MTF often contributed to it thus making attainment of future cooperation and formation of smoothly functioning units more difficult than ever.

Attendance at many of the MTF sessions was often discouragingly poor. At least 4 of the 14 members displayed only a superficial interest in the proceedings, (they accepted the appointment but attended one or less of the sessions), and only 8 members personally played an active role in directing the work of the staff on a regular basis. The inactive members could easily have been replaced by representatives from the relevant systems which demonstrated a pressing desire to participate. If two sheriffs and two police chiefs had been chosen to replace the inactive Commissioners or those who sent alternates, it might have taken more time but the Commissioners could have produced a report containing the same basic recommendations. While maximizing the potential for conflict during the actual

meetings, this approach minimizes the differences that would remain by the time of publication of the final report.

Consensus is possible if many sheriffs and police chiefs become convinced that Michigan does not need two or three man police departments. Such small departments often cannot provide even a minimum level of services to their communities. They are an inefficient and inappropriate use of public funds. With better planning and more foresight on the part of the Commissioners, the public as well as the sheriffs and chiefs might become persuaded of this misuse of tax revenues. It would serve the self interests of many large and small agencies to consolidate since their own tax bases, area of influence, and numerical sizes would all increase. While many departments with less than fifteen officers might be expected to oppose such changes, an alliance between the larger departments and state law enforcement agencies might be able to effectively neutralize their opposition.

In the future the chances for consensus would improve greatly if each of the relevant systems rather than OCJP alone has a voice in selecting the Commissioners and the staff and in determining which task force they will serve on. They could each submit a list of individuals who they believe should serve on the Commission and have the Governor make the final selection. Several relevant systems had representatives on the Commission but on what they regarded as the wrong task force. The president of a

chief of police association, for example, served on the Crime Prevention Task Force rather than on the MTF, and a county sheriff nationally recognized for his work in rehabilitation, worked on the Investigation and Arrest Task Force rather than on the Rehabilitation Task Force. The frequent criticism that the representatives from the relevant systems themselves should have kept their members informed of the decisions being made, ignores these unintentional misplacements and the fact that most task forces had little idea what the other study groups were doing until the final group session. Summaries of each of the meetings with requests for feedback should be mailed to each of the task forces and to each of the concerned systems. Furthermore, if the state or federal government sincerely desires a report produced by the individuals they appoint, then they must either appropriate funds to pay these individuals or reimburse the same alternate for each Commissioner for the duration of the project. Time restrictions should also be minimized. Under the present system of grant funding, only the largest state agencies have sufficient manpower to assign staff members to work full time with such study groups. Not only does this tend to favor state agencies over local areas but it often provides a false impression that consensus exists because the staff and Commissioners are in agreement with each other.

The importance of having spokespersons from each of the relevant systems cannot be over emphasized; even one



individual can make an important difference. The lone black member of the MTF together with the Civil Rights Commission warned that if specific standards were not included promoting the preferred hiring of blacks, women, and other minority groups, the Urban League would be forced to produce and publish a minority report. Although a long intense debate followed, they won their point and the Affirmative Action Program became part of the final report. Later when the Urban League wanted elimination of all written exams for police officers as a criteria for employment but failed to have this motion adopted, their previous success convinced them that they had taken part in the policy decisions and they continued to support the report. One Commissioner unconsciously attested to the importance that the backgrounds of the Commissioners must play in determining the direction any group similar to this will take, when he observed that an analysis of the membership of the new Commission will predict how the Governor feels about their report and which sections will receive the strongest emphasis towards becoming law. The prestige, official positions of the members and their areas of expertise will constitute a reliable indication whether the Governor intends to firmly promote the proposals contained in the report or let them die a quiet death. Whether or not this observation is correct, it does demonstrate that the Commissioners themselves believe that the individuals

appointed to the Commission are influential in determining which objectives will be pursued.

On the few occasions that the possibility existed for the MTF to experience a mutually beneficial exchange of ideas with the relevant systems, the setting and atmosphere of the meetings were not at all conducive to the establishment of a meaningful dialogue. The public hearings took place in an atmosphere of confrontation. It was a one-sided, two session affair with each representative from the relevant systems allotted only five minutes to present their case. The Commissioners did not respond publicly to any of the questions or the attacks of their critics. Rather than be viewed as necessary evils, the public hearings should be utilized as vehicles for achieving a better level of communication and attempting to resolve many misunderstandings. The Commissioners could have easily clarified the role the staff played in the writing of the better, explained how the members of the MTF were chosen, and showed why the date of the first public hearing was set so soon after the initial release of the report. Copies of the report should definitely be made easily available to all concerned groups. A small increase in the number of publications now would save hours of battle in the legislature later. A continuing series of small scale public meetings held throughout the entire process can facilitate the amount of feedback available. The Office of Substance Abuse learned a valuable lesson in this regard.

Previous to their establishment of a community action drug program, they held numerous meetings throughout the state in order to acquire public input and as a means of educating the public about the purpose of the program. The director in charge noted that they held 52 of these sessions in eight regions across the state and as a result, they have encountered very little criticism of their local drug programs. The possibility exists that this program might have been less controversial than that pursued by the MTF. The idea of holding a large number of public hearings, over a broad geographic range, early in the decision making process, however, is clearly preferable to the tactics adopted by the Goals and Standards Commission.

The report written by the MTF is basically an indication of the general direction the criminal justice system will take in the future. The MTF felt it extremely important that the state plan, operate, and control a state-wide sophisticated system of computers to collect and dispense information related to criminal justice. Unfortunately they refused to directly confront the basic causes for the necessity of such a system. Countless authors, researchers and social scientists have reached the conclusion that such attempts at reducing crime and juvenile delinquency are doomed to failure unless the institutionalized social conditions which perpetuate inequality, poverty, inferior education, unemployment or underemployment, and racism, become eradicated at the

same time. Criminologists are well aware that most crime in the United States goes undetected and unreported. In Michigan for every four crimes committed at least one and possibly two go unreported. Nation-wide burglaries, assaults, and larcenies occur two to three times as often as reported. Therefore it appears likely that if the goals and standards do in fact become implemented a more efficient system of detection, reporting, and enforcement might result in an astronomical rise in the official crime rate. Such dilemmas will continue to plague any system which measures the worth of individuals by the amount of material goods and capital they accumulate, regardless of the means used to accumulate them. The Commission practically ignored the frequency of "white collar" crime and the consequences it holds for the larger population; the MTF had no recommendations to make in this area.

There is no single reason or group of causes that explains the abundance of crime in the United States today, nor is it possible to provide a single set of easy solutions. Yet if, as the Katzenback Commission showed, the causes and solutions to the crime problem resemble a gigantic, intricate jigsaw puzzle, then the MTF remains guilty of throwing out the center pieces. The Commissioners maintained that it was not their job to propose changes in the basic factors which contribute to crime, that other commissioners' attempts at advocating such restructuring of societal values have proven futile. Yet it remains

illogical to simply churn out recommendations that will have relatively little impact on resolving the issue because that is what the federal government demands before it will allocate further funding. If many of the underlying pre-conditions for crime are injustices which the criminal justice system alone cannot rectify, the Commissioners should at least accept the responsibility for emphatically asserting the dire need for a total effort by all segments of society at eliminating the contradictions which abound. Although there does exist dissension among many individuals regarding the exact causes of crime and what steps should be taken to alleviate the problem, most social scientists do tend to agree that these adverse social conditions must be eliminated to an unprecedented degree before the crime rate will be significantly reduced. Slum schools and 50 percent unemployment rates for minority teenagers are as important factors in starting youth towards a career of crime as unlocked cars with keys dangling from the ignition. Poor employment opportunities have been positively correlated with family instability and high crime rates.<sup>1</sup> Yet over 25 million Americans have been relegated to the state of poverty and marginal employment in order to keep wages low and as the most "effective" means of fighting inflation and maintaining the present economic system. Doctors have long known that preventive

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<sup>1</sup>Ramsey Clark, Crime in America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), pp. 56-68.

medicine produces vastly superior results than does remedial action; much of the criminal justice system has yet to learn this same valuable lesson. Until they do, such proposals for reducing crime as those contained in the Michigan Goals and Standards Report will continue to treat the symptoms of the disease rather than the sick society itself.

CHAPTER VII

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND IMPLICATIONS  
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

General Comments

Case studies often succumb to one of two general tendencies, either their findings are so broad and general in nature that they produce few concrete results which form a foundation for future research, or the data is so "case specific" that extension to other areas is severely limited. C. Wright Mills labeled studies identified with vague generalities as "top of the ladder" sociology and referred to dull, highly detailed research as "bottom rung" sociology. This study attempted to avoid either extreme. The ideal study should provide insightful information of a specific social process which also may be utilized in future research projects.

In this case study an attempt was made to analyze the decision making process of the Management Task Force on the Michigan Commission on Criminal Justice Goals and Standards, and the effect input from the relevant systems had on this process. No effort was made to expound upon

the basic causes of crime or the increasing crime rate, to pass judgement on the efficaciousness or fairness of the criminal justice system, or to dwell into an in-depth evaluation of the goals and standards themselves. While an abundance of information on these and related topics repeatedly arises in the course of discussing the Commission's work, this might be regarded as an accidental by-product of the central focus of the research.

#### Limitations of the Research

Unfortunately, no one interviewed was present at the selection of the MTF Commissioners. Since the Governor himself made the final decision apparently from a list of potential members submitted by the OCJP, this became impossible. It would have proven valuable to determine precisely what criteria were used in the selection process.

This research did not begin until shortly before the first draft of the report was to be published. Thus it was not possible to observe any of the task force sessions held prior to September, 1974. Moreover, since each task force met on the average of once a month over a period of 18 months at different locations throughout the state, surrogate observers rather than participant observation became the primary source of information for these earlier sessions. Time and financial limitations also prevented first hand observation of several later meetings. In fact not one Commissioner or staff member, even those employed



full time, was present at all of the task force sessions. Since the primary aim of this research focused on determining the effects of the responses of the relevant systems on the MTF's final recommendations and since this reaction was undeterminable until after publication of the first draft, these limitations although regrettable were not decisive.

Public opinion will eventually become an important variable in the future of the goals and standards. At this time, there was no empirically reliable way of determining how the public will react to the final report and what effect this will have upon the ultimate implementation or rejection of the Commissioner's recommendations. Much of the public remains unaware of the implications of the report. The public hearings might have indicated a measure of the public's reaction but, as anticipated, the responses from the man in the street were less than overwhelming. The reasons behind this apparent apathy itself might provide a basis for many different studies. As noted previously, the two annual public opinion surveys conducted by Market Opinion Research Company, a national firm contracted by OCJP, did provide the Commissioners with some sense of the public pulse representative of all Michigan's citizens. The MTF, however, regarded these findings as unreliable. These surveys also showed that the public's reaction to crime and what should be done about the problem fluctuate from year to year. Therefore these current findings must

regarded as temporal in their importance. None of these fluctuations, however, was great enough to question the validity of the study. The sampling error for this study based on 900 interviews was plus or minus 3.4 percent. Any change greater than this must be regarded as statistically significant. Evaluation of public opinion was further complicated by the total absence of any cost-benefit analysis relating to implementation of the goals and standards. The public will undoubtedly respond if a large increase in taxes becomes necessary to finance the program. To what degree this action will be required to successfully implement the recommendations, however, also remains impossible to judge at this date.

Often research which utilizes the participant observation method is attacked on the grounds that the researcher's presence influenced the direction of the decision process. Specifically it might be argued that the MTF made a special artificial effort to demonstrate to an observer their responsiveness to the relevant systems. Such criticisms, although often valid, appear less so in this case. It seems somewhat unrealistic that the Lt.-Governor or various legislators would let a single graduate student determine their behavior for hours at a time. More importantly, the meetings often occurred in

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<sup>1</sup>"The Michigan Public Speaks Out on Crime" (2nd. Annual Survey, January, 1974), conducted by Market Opinion Research Co., Fredrick P. Currier, President, Barbara E. Bryant, Project Director, pp. 43.

such a manner that the members were unaware of an outsider's presence or mistook the researcher for an additional staff member from OCJP.

### Recommendations for Future Research

Future research could rectify many of the aforementioned limitations of this study as well as supply additional valuable information on the effect of concerned groups on governmental Commissions or similar bodies. Further analysis and understanding of the social processes which occur in such decision making bodies has vital theoretical and practical implications. It should be possible to carry out further case studies of Criminal Justice Commissions in other states. Since Michigan became the first state to draw up their own set of goals and standards, a process which each of the fifty states must undertake in order to qualify for future federal funding, ideally it might be possible to design research projects which would observe such commissions from their conception and thus amend for the relatively late start of this study. Comparisons of the data resulting from these studies would illuminate ways in which these action processes are different from one another and allow for further testing of the tenets of normative sponsorship. Furthermore the Michigan Commission is presently drawing up separate reports containing goals and standards pertaining to the

volatile subjects of victimless crime, gun control, and capital punishment. Since these topics appear more emotional in nature, the potential for public interest and responsiveness is greatly enhanced. If public feedback is maximized, it should be possible to determine more clearly what influence this will exert on the Commissioner's decisions.

Perhaps the most promising direction for future research, however, lies in pursuing the present goals and standards to their ultimate fate. If this report is read, discussed, and then dies the dusty death which the Commissioners warned against, it would tend to indicate that the Management Task Force did in fact succumb to many of the errors pointed out in this study. If concerted efforts to implement the goals and standards are swamped by a tide of public opposition led by the relevant systems so tenacious that the implementation strategy fails, then the indication is strong that the MTF failed to adequately incorporate the norms and values of the relevant systems into the final report or to effectively neutralize their opposition.

## APPENDIX

## THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

1. On March 29, 1973, the Michigan Commission on Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice approves a \$163,000 federal grant enabling the state to establish its own Criminal Justice Commission.

2. On July 16, 1973 the Governor appoints 78 Commissioners to this body and assigns them a total of 30 staff members. The Governor orders that the Commission must develop a set of goals and standards which will improve Michigan's criminal justice system and reduce crime.

3. The Commission is eventually divided into six task forces who meet an average of once a month for the next 18 months. They hammer out a report containing over 600 proposals aimed at eliminating much of the injustice and confusion within the present criminal justice system.

4. On September 6 and 7, 1974, the entire Commission assembles at Boyne Mountain Lodge and votes approval of the first draft of the combined reports of the six task forces.

5. On September 18, 1974, public hearings are held at eight different locations to obtain feedback from the state's concerned citizens. A total of over 1,000

individuals attend these hearings. The over-shelming majority of speakers criticize the Commissioners for holding public hearings so soon after the initial publication of the report. County sheriffs and police chiefs are the most vocal critics of the Management Task Force's section of the report.

6. The Commissioners agree to hold a second public hearing a month later at the Civic Center in the state's capitol.

7. On October 30, 1974, at the second public meeting, 93 percent of the speakers attack the report on the grounds that it is unconstitutional, unrealistic from a monetary point of view, and will eliminate local control of law enforcement and place it in the hands of state agencies. The speakers reserve their strongest verbal assaults for the MTF's section of the report. The sheriffs and chiefs are especially fearful that their departments will become controlled by the State Police and the Office of Criminal Justice Programs.

8. Each task force holds further meetings to evaluate the public feedback. The MTF rewords their section of the report in hopes of appeasing the numerous sheriff's and police chief's associations opposed to the report, yet they refuse to change their original intentions as expressed in the first draft.

9. On December 16, 1974, the entire Commission assembles for the last time and votes to adopt the amended edition of the report.

10. The vested interest groups opposed to the final report promise to resist any attempts at implementation of the Commission's recommendations in the state legislature.



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