THE SOURCE AND NATURE OF SELF-EXPRESSION IN CHILDREN'S ART

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ABSTRACT

THE SOURCE AND NATURE OF SELF-EXPRESSION IN CHILDREN'S ART

By

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One of the most prominent theoretical influences in art education today is the belief that the child's art works are a form of self-expression. A nonverbal process of self-clarification wherein the child makes coherent and concrete his private experience of his internal and external world. The purpose of this inquiry is to explore the function of self-expression in children's art. This can be apprehended more completely by clarifying the source for all expressive behavior and determining how such expressions influence a child's making in art.

Self-expression is viewed in this inquiry as those visible manifestations that relate uniquely to the individual. It is what distinguishes one individual from another and arises from within each of us. It becomes our unique means of functioning in our environment. Hence, self-expression is more than visible manifestation. It has covert aspects that impel the individual to respond in a particular way. These are the feelings, perceptions, needs and emotions that each of us privately experiences

and overtly projects. In art, self-expression is the visible elements that relate uniquely to its maker. An idiosyncratic commingling of process, subject and art elements that project aspects of the artist's personality and cause a response in the viewer. Neither aspect of self-expression, the urge from within, or the response of the perceiver, can be rule governed or predetermined. Each is an organic fusion of perceiving, responding and interacting.

The first focus of the inquiry is to establish a theoretical framework for self-expression based on the concept of a cohesive "self" or "personality" that functions as the source for all human responding. Personality is described here as the locus of all acts, the center and driving force for all behavior. Without this concept, behavior would be viewed as automatic and reactive. With the concept of personality behavior is viewed as unique to the individual, purposive, forward striving and arising out of individual need and perception.

A major portion of this phase of the inquiry is to delineate more specifically how personality influences expressive behavior and what that behavior means to the individual and to others. The data sighted illustrates that expressive traits are consistent within the individual's personality and hence may function as a mirror of that personality. Expressive traits are those unique behaviors

that separate each individual from all others. They arise out of past experience and present perception and need. Research indicates that the individual has varying degrees of consciousness concerning his expressive behavior dependent upon the importance he ascribes to such behaviors and his willingness to recognize their covert meanings. The theory that children express their feelings, temperament, environmental conditions and interests through their art can be validated, in part, through the concept of self or personality. Ultimately, it is personality that all expression describes.

Psychological theory and data alone cannot answer for the complexity of human expression however. Self-expression is ultimately a fusion of overt manifestations and subjective mental processes that can culminate in the most subtle and complex expressive form--art. Artistic activities and the products of that activity are of a nature that tends to defy precise measurement, observation or prediction. Hence the inquiry turns to another source, one that transcends measurement and observable features to apprehend through intuition the essence of self-expression. This essence may be found in philosophical inquiry into the relation between art and human expression. Hence, philosophical theory is utilized in this inquiry to discern the relation between the act of the artist as a process of

self-expression and the role of the expressive qualities perceivable within the art product.

The last portion of this inquiry seeks to clarify the function of self-expression in children's art. Research into the child's development in art, along with the influence of the major components such as culture and environment, motor development, concept formation, and perceptual awareness are sighted as they interact with the child's feeling states. The inquiry concludes that no one component predominates at all times in child art. Rather, each component exerts varying degrees of influence on the continually maturing child. At all times the child's expressions in art are anchored within his privately responding personality. It is the uniqueness of his experience, carried to completion via his maturing capacities, that cause the child's work to have expressive value for him and for the viewer of his work.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Expression is a fundamental element in all art. It is contained in the creative-expressive process and in the appreciative phase. It is the unifying element amongst all the arts. Expression is generally considered paramount in children's art also. This inquiry will seek then to clarify the source and nature of children's expression through art. Insights into the following questions will be sought.

1. What is the source and nature of self-expression within the individual?
2. How is self-expression provoked?
3. What value or meaning does the individual place on his expressions?
4. What value or meaning does an individual's self-expression have for others?
5. Is there a relation between the individual's self-expression and expression in art?
6. Do children express their personalities through their art?

In seeking comprehension of these questions this inquiry will focus first on the sources and nature of self-expression in individual behavior. Second on philosophical theories relating to the function of expression in art. Third on children's development in art and their use of art as a means of self-expression.

The methodology will include an interdisciplinary survey of the pertinent literature in philosophy, psychology and art education. This is conducted as an open-ended inquiry rather than an attempt to delineate specific predetermined concepts or support a priori any conclusions. Conclusions, when given, occur as a synthesis and interpretation of the theory and data presented and are not based on any one theoretical presupposition or philosophical notion. The aim is comprehension in the nature of a meaningful whole that does not destroy the intrinsic qualities of art or the child's experience.

We can and do express ourselves over time and from moment to moment. In a sense we are continually expressing ourselves, even when we are unaware of it. This occurs because so much about each of us has expressive value. We come to be known and recognized by this self-expression. It is what is expressive about each of us that distinguishes each from the other.

Self-expression can take any form and may not be rule governed or categorized. We may express ourselves

verbally, or in nonarticulate verbal utterances. We may express ourselves through body posture, facial expression or movements, gestures (involving the entire body or particular parts), and handwriting. We may express ourselves through the environments we create, and our choices between persons, objects, and events. We may express ourselves also through artistic activities. The only criteria this study has found to be essential for self-expression is that: to be an expression the behavior must be subjective in origin. In other words, as Allport points out, behavior has two aspects. What one does and how one does it. What one does is termed coping behavior, how one does it is expressive. The underlying surge for both lies within the individual personality. The proportion of what is expressive in behavior varies from person to person. Yet coping and expression are present in every act and no act is purely and solely expressive, just as no act is purely and solely coping (3). All behavior is heavily laden with subjective overtones. It is here that this inquiry will begin.

Tormey defines the perimeters of this inquiry well when he says

> . . . the concept of expression is associated in a primitive way with the image of "pressing out." There is something"inside" which is ex-pressed, forced out, and which in turn reveals what remains inside. But human expression is revealing in a dual sense. . . . Thus an expression points simultaneously in two directions, back toward the person and outward toward the object. It is a characteristic of the concept of expression to make implicit allusion to both these features of a total situation (27:28).

That there is a duality to the concept of expression is significant to its understanding. There is a link between the individual and the object of his expression. To understand this concept, one needs to look first to the individual (or personality) who is expressing or being expressive.

CHAPTER II

THE CONCEPT OF SELF: PSYCHOLOGY

The self then, or personality, is the first focus of attention. That there even is a "self" is subject to controversy. Allport addresses this issue in Becoming Basic Considerations for a Psychology of Personality.

> Not every brand--indeed no single brand--of modern psychology is wholly adequate to the problem of man's individuality and growth. Yet it is to psychology, and to psychology alone, that the assignment falls--the assignment of accounting for the organization and growth of the individual person with all his outreaching, downward, upward, inward, outward (1:5).

Preliminary to developing his concept of personality, Allport reviews the two basic currents in research in psychology today. They are important for consideration here because they have considerable influence on our educational system. Also they directly affect what one may determine to be the nature and source of self-expression.

There are a diversity of psychological assumptions viewing the human system as a whole.

> We cannot here attempt to depict all of the current psychological schools of thought with their diverse philosophical assumptions. It will be helpful for our purposes, however, to have in mind two broadly contrasting approaches to the problem of man's becoming. Virtually all modern psychological theories seem oriented toward one of two

> polar conceptions, which, at risk of some historical oversimplification, I shall call the Lockean and the Leibnitzian traditions respectively. It is not the total philosophy of Locke or of Leibnitz that is here in question. Rather it is their views on one aspect of man's mind--its essential passive (Locke) or its active nature (Leibnitz)--that I wish to contrast. The same polarity, as I say, is found in current theories of growth and change in human personality (1:7).

Locke assumed the mind to be a tabula rasa at birth. The intellect being a passive thing acquiring content and structure only through the impact of sensation and the criss-cross of associations.

> The Lockean point of view, . . ., has been and is still dominant in Anglo-American psychology. Its representatives are found in associationism of all types, including environmentalism, behaviorism, stimulus-response (familiarly abbreviated as S-R) psychology, and all other stimulus-oriented psychologies, in animal and genetic psychology, in positivism and operationism, in mathematical models--in short, in most of what today is cherished in our laboratories as truly "scientific" psychology. These movements, diverse though they may appear at first sight, have in common with Lockean empiricism certain fundamental presuppositions (1:8).

Allport reviews the Lockean presuppositions as: (1) "What is external and visible is more fundamental than what is not." It is what happens to the organism from the outside that is important. Motives are regarded as "drives," a mere matter of change in the condition of peripheral tissues. Motives more complex than drives are considered drive-instigated behaviors and when conditioned give way to cue-instigated behavior. "The cause remains external to the organism" (1:9).

Lockean empiricism also presupposes that (2) "What is small and molecular is more fundamental than what is large and molar." Human personality is regarded by most psychologists working in the field of learning, growth, and development, as a concatenation of reflexes or of habit. This emphasis on molecular units has caused, Allport believes, an equivalence of species. Thus, supposedly, every basic feature of human nature can be studied without essential loss among lower species (1:10).

Lockean empiricism also assumes that (3) "What is earlier is more fundamental than what is late in development." Thus the simple original ideas are the elements of later mental life and what is important is childhood learning, childhood fixations, childhood conditioning. This point of view inhibits a theory of growth and change in personality (1:10).

> All of these Lockean presuppositions are congenial to modern positivism. In keeping with the preference for visible externals, positivism (operationism) holds that the devices employed on experimentation or measurement shall be specified in the definitions of every concept. The idea behind this stringent requirement is to bring psychology into line with physics and mathematics so as to make for a unity of science. Positivism desires to reduce abstract concepts to the data of observation or the process of observation itself. In spite of reluctant concessions to verbal reporting as an allowable operation under certain circumstances, the sparseness that results from the application of operational criteria discourages the investigation of consciousness as a datum, as well as of personality as a complex structure, for in these domains relatively few concrete operations can be performed, few are repeatable, and few are public (1:11).

The Leibnitzian tradition on the other hand maintains that the person is the source of acts. Activity is purposive and every state of the person is pointed in the direction of future possibilities. To understand this tradition we must look to both contemporary cognitive psychology and then to theories of motivation.

> Briefly then, the present situation in cognitive psychology can be described in four statements. (1) The full-scale phenomenology which presupposes an active thinker and a primary process of relating this thinker to his own states of consciousness--has led to a flourishing school of epistemology, but because of its inherent subjectivity has had little direct influence upon American psychology. (2) The Gestalt school, though indirectly influenced by this philosophical phenomenology, is grounded in the experimental tradition, and has led especially in Europe to a rich store of concepts that presume the existence of an active intellect (e.g., dynamical self-distribution, belongingness, insight, closure). Unlike phenomenology proper, Gestalt theory does not place primary emphasis upon the subject-object relationship, but on varied dynamic processes, each considered in its own right. (3) In American cognitive theory the concepts of Gestalt psychology have been considerably diminished so far as their emphasis upon self-activity (autochthonous process) is concerned, with the substitution of less dynamic concepts such as hypothesis, expectancy, cognitive maps. (4) Many American positivists and associationists repudiate all such concepts, even the dilute American theory, and hold that the conceptual frame of stimulus-response theory is adequate, and that the hypothesis of the "empty organism" is preferable to the assumption of an organism furnished with a self-active intellect (1:14).

Both theories of cognition and motivation are necessary to explain a complete psychology of personality. As opposed to drive and conditioning theories may be a conception of plural instincts as central to all behavior.

> While we certainly learn habitual modes of reducing tension, we also come to regard many of our past satisfactions to be as worthless as yesterday's ice cream soda. While we learn dependable modes of reducing tension we also abandon old habits and take risks in searching out new courses of conduct. It's only through risk-taking and variation that growth can occur. But risk-taking and variation are fraught with new and often avoidable tensions, which however we scorn to avoid. Hence the formula that seems appropriate enough for drive reduction seems to break down when motivation is no longer a matter of segmental drives or of opportunistic adjustment but rather partakes of propriate striving (1:66).

Another common postulate is one basic motive in life--the maintaining, actualizing, and enhancing of the capacities of the experiencing organism (8).

It is believed that the Lockean tradition is to a great extent inadequate to develop either a complete concept of self-expression or to understand the essential nature of self-expression. It is believed that the origins of all expression are inherently subjective and cannot be determined completely by external and visible manifestations alone. Ultimately, one must look to the complex structure of personality, to the person as the source of his acts, and to the individual as an active thinker. The Leibnitzian tradition with its emphasis on maintaining, actualizing, and enhancing of the capacities of the experiencing organism allow for both the subjective nature of expression and the need in man to project himself through his expressive acts.

Thus, we return to a concept of "self" or "personality" to explain the subjective origins of self-expression.

Inherent in any conception of the self will be the essential uniqueness of the individual. Allport states that,

> Personality is less a finished product than a transitive process. While it has some stable features, it is at the same time continually undergoing change. It is this course of change, of becoming, of individuation that is now our special concern (1:19).

> The first fact that strikes us is the uniqueness of both the process and the product. Each person is an idiom unto himself, an apparent violation of the syntax of the species. An idiom develops in its own peculiar context, and this context must be understood in order to comprehend the idiom. Yet at the same time, idioms are not entirely lawless and arbitrary; indeed they can be known for what they are only by comparing them with the syntax of the species (1:19).

The most outstanding feature of personality says Allport is its manifest uniqueness of organization. Man alone is capable of becoming. He does not live his life by repeating, with trivial variations, the pattern of his species.

> Man alone has the capacity to vary his biological needs extensively and to add to them countless psychogenic needs reflecting in part his culture (no other creature has a culture), and in part his own style of life (no other creature worries about his life-style)(1:22).

The problem of man's individuality cannot be determined through assumptions, methods, and concepts of natural and biological sciences. Ultimately we must transcend the limitations of a psychology of species, and look to a psychology of personal growth to explain individuality. "I venture the opinion that all of the animals in the world are psychologically less distinct from one another than one man is from the other men," says Allport (1:23).

The source of man's uniqueness, individuality, lies within his personality and the two cannot be separated. Allport believes that man's uniqueness is the "keynote to the whole of human nature." Personality of the individual is a self-contained system that can be considered independently of other factors. It is the individual's motives, traits, and personal style that are of major import in considering personality. He puts major emphasis upon the concepts of "functional autonomy," a belief that motivation is not solely attributable to instincts or other propensities stemming from birth, but is, rather a "contemporary system," possessing an autonomy in its own right and responsible for the governance of the personality (3).

Allport's conception of personality is not based on social reputation or superficial charm. Rather, he ascribes to personality a solid organization of dispositions and sentiments. Supportive of this would be definitions of personality or self that refer to the style of life, to modes of adaptation to one's surroundings, to progressive growth and development and to distinctiveness (3:21). Essentially, Allport considers personality as what man really is (3).

A less brief and vague definition of personality by Allport is:

> Personality Is The Dynamic Organization within the Individual Of Those Psychophysical Systems That Determine His Unique Adjustment To His Environment (3:28).

This definition stresses an active organization, constantly evolving and changing, as motivational and as self-regulating. Psychophysical systems entails the operation of both body and mind, inextricably fused into a personal unity. The personality then is neither exclusively mental nor exclusively neural. Rather it consists of habits, specific and general attitudes, sentiments, and dispositions. Dispositions are ordered within a theory of traits. The term "system" refers to traits or groups of traits in a latent or active condition.

The use of the term "determine" implies that personality is something and does something. It is what lies behind specific acts and within the individual. The systems that constitute personality are in every sense determining tendencies, and when aroused by suitable stimuli provoke those adjustive and expressive acts by which the personality comes to be known (26:397).

Unique is emphasized by Allport because of the quantitative variation among individuals in respect to the so-called "common" traits. Every person is unique in time and place, and in quality (26:398).

By Adjustments to His Environment, Allport asserts that personality is a mode of survival. The term has both functional and evolutionary significance. Adjustments must be interpreted broadly enough to include maladjustments and "environment" to include the behavioral environment (meaningful to the individual) as well as the surrounding

geographical environment. Thus adjustment to the physical world as well as to the imagined or ideal world--both being factors in the "behavioral environment"--involves mastery as well as passive adaptation (26:396-398).

It is difficult to separate Allport's conception of man's inherent uniqueness from his theory of the "Proprium" or self. He believes the proprium to be a broader and more comprehensive label than self or ego. Proprium includes the self as "the knower," or "as object" of knowledge and feeling. A cognizing self, that transcends all other functions of the self and holds them in view. The proprium is not at all moments conscious even though we derive the concept from experiences of self of which we are fully aware. These experiences are effective even when we are not observing them because ego-involved interest is constantly with us. Hence, the concept is not only justified, but entirely indispensable in psychological theory (26:401).

There must be a distinction between what the individual feels as important, or vital and central in his becoming and what belongs to the periphery of his being. Those characteristics of our life-style which are not propriate, not really central to our sense of existence. Allport says,

> Personaltiy includes those habits and skills, frames of reference, matters of fact and cultural values, that seldom or never seem warm and important. But personality includes what is warm and important

> also--all the regions of our life that we regard as peculiarly ours, and which for the time being I suggest we call the proprium. The proprium includes all aspects of personality that make for inward unity (1:40).

The eight aspects of self-hood are all states of self-relevance that we feel. Each aspect is an intimate region involved in matters of importance to the organized emotional life of the individual. Together they comprise the self, as felt and known, the proprium (1).

1. Bodily sense. The first aspect is the bodily me. "It seems to be composed of streams of sensations that arise within the organism--from viscera, muscles, tendons, joints, vestibular canals, and other regions of the body. The technical name for the bodily sense is coenesthesis." It may, at times, be experienced unconsciously or consciously. "The bodily sense remains a lifelong anchor for our self-awareness, though it never alone accounts for the entire sense of self" (1:41).
2. Self-identity. Organic continuity of the neuro-muscular system is one factor in self-identity. Yet more than reminiscence is the gradual growth of a sense of self-identity. "It seems to occur partly as a result of being clothed and named, and otherwise marked off from the surrounding environment." Through social interaction the child comes to realize that he is not the other, but a being in his own right. Until the age of four or five,

personal identity as perceived by the child is unstable. From about this point on it becomes the "surest attest a human being has of his own existence" (1:44).

3. Ego-enhancement. Self-seeking, pride, humiliation, self-esteem and narcissism are often thought of as prominent factors when we speak of ego or self. There does seem to be a natural impulse for self-assertion along with the emotions of self-satisfaction and pride. Ego-enhancement, along with self-identity and bodily sense are relatively early developments in personality, characterizing the whole of the child's proprium. Their solicitations have a heavily biological quality and seem to be contained within the early organism itself (1:44).
4. Ego-extension. The process of learning brings with it a high regard for possessions, for loved objects, and later, for ideal causes and loyalties. These must be objects of importance to the individual, objects he calls "mine." From the beginning of loved objects, through maturity, comes a wide range of feelings of self-involvement in abstract ideals.
5. Rational agent. The rational function of the proprium is capable of both defense mechanisms and yielding true solutions, appropriate adjustments, accurate planning, and a relatively faultless solving of the equations of life. Whether the ego

reasons or merely rationalizes; it has the property of synthesizing inner needs and outer reality (1:45).

6. Self-image. Also called the phenomenal self, self-image has two aspects: "the way the patient regards his present abilities, status, and roles; and what he would like to become, his aspirations for himself." The ideal self-image is the imaginative aspect of the proprium, and whether accurate or distorted, attainable or unattainable; it plots a course by which much propriate movement is guided and therapeutic progress achieved. This image helps us bring our view of the present into line with our view of the future (1:46).

7. Propriate striving. To understand this aspect of the proprium, motivation, we must distinguish between propriate and peripheral motives. At low levels of behavior the formula of drives and their conditioning appear to suffice. A formula in terms of drive and conditioned drive views personality as nothing more than habitual modes of reducing tension. Thus, the presupposition that man is by nature a passive being, capable only of receiving impressions from, and responding to external goads.

But as soon as the personality enters the stage of ego-extension, and develops a self-image with visions of self-perfection, we are, . . ., forced

to postulate motives of a different order, motives that reflect propriate striving. "The characteristic feature of such striving is its resistance to equilibrium: tension is maintained rather than reduced" (1:49).

"Propriate striving distinguishes itself from other forms of motivation in that, however beset by conflicts, it makes for unification of personality." "The possession of long-range goals, regarded as central to one's personal existence, distinguishes the human being from the animal, the adult from the child, and in many cases the healthy personality from the sick" (1:51).

Striving always has a future reference. "While not all future-directedness is phenomenally propriate; it all requires a type of psychology that transcends the prevalent tendency to explain mental status exclusively in terms of past occurrences. People, it seems, are busy leading their lives into the future, whereas psychology, for the most part, is busy tracing them into the past" (1:51).

8. The Knower. In addition to these various propriate functions--all of which we regard as peculiarly ours--do we also have a cognizing self? A knower, that transcends all other functions of the proprium and holds them in view? "We not only know things, but we know (i.e., are acquainted with) the

> empirical features of our own proprium. It is I who have bodily sensations, I who recognizes my self-identity from day to day; I who note and reflect upon my self-assertion, self-extension, my own rationalizations, as well as upon my interests and strivings. When I thus think about my own propriate functions I am likely to perceive their essential togetherness, and feel them intimately bound in some way to the knowing function itself" (1:53).

Based on these eight aspects of the proprium, Allport feels a concept of self is necessary.

> Certainly all legitimate phenomena that have been, and can be ascribed, to the self or ego must be admitted as data indispensable to a psychology of personal becoming. All eight functions of the "proprium"--must be admitted and included. In particular the unifying act of perceiving and knowing (of comprehending propriate states at belonging together and belonging to me) must be fully admitted (1:54).

Allport's conception of the proprium is critical to clarifying the nature of the "self" or "personality." It is from this concept of personality that we may find insights into the origin and essence of self-expression. It is also from like conceptions of personality that we can trace man's inherent uniqueness of expression.

A conception of personality as unique to that individual, capable throughout life of growth and change, as a source of inward unity, and as motivated to continually maintain, actualize, and enhance that individual is not

Allport's alone. As he points out, there is a tradition in psychology (the Leibnitzian) that views the individual as the locus of acts, the source of acts. Activity is purposive and continually pointed in the direction of future possibilities. Moreover, a characteristic feature of each individual is his resistance to equilibrium: tension is maintained rather than reduced. Maslow proposes motives of two orders, deficit and growth motives. Deficit motives do reduce tension and restore equilibrium. Growth motives go beyond to distinguish humans from animals, by maintaining tension in the interest of long range goals (18).

Maslow's conception of "self-actualization" and Allport's conception of "propriate striving" are similar in their future reference, resistance to equilibrium, and continual struggle toward growth and maturity. Carl Rogers' conceptions of personality and motivation are compatible here. Rogers' concept of personality is important for consideration because of its emphasis on the function of perception in human growth and responding. It is the subjective influences of perception that accounts for much of man's inherent uniqueness and a major influence on his expressive acts.

Rogers' theory of personality is called "phenomenological" because it views the individual as the center of his reality. Reality is what the individual experiences it to be. It is congruence between the phenomenal field of

experience and the conceptual structure of the self that facilitates personal growth and health.

Several aspects of Rogers' theory of personality and behavior are important for clarifying the subjective nature of self-expression. He maintains that every individual exists in a continually changing world of experience of which he is the center. This world is private and includes all that is experienced by the organism even if these experiences are not consciously perceived. Many impulses, experiences and sensations are never permitted into consciousness. Thus one's actual knowledge of his phenomenal field may be limited. Yet, because his world is private, only the individual can truly know in its completeness his own experiences. The individual alone, has the most complete potential for knowing himself (26:206).

The organism reacts to the field as it is experienced and perceived and this for the individual is reality. What the individual reacts to is his perception of reality, not some absolute reality as such. Along with our private world are those perceptions which for social purposes have a high degree of commonality among various individuals (26:206).

The organism is characterized by its reactions as an organized whole to this phenomenal field. This unity is true both physiologically as well as psychologically. The organism is at all times a total organized system. Change in one part may produce changes in any other part. Thus

there is a total, organized, goal-directed response by the organism (26:207).

Rogers also asserts that the organism has one basic tendency and striving. That is to actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing organism. Thus, there is one fundamental need of which all organic and psychological needs are partial aspects. The organism is in a continuous struggle toward enhancement and growth (26:208).

Behavior is basically the goal-directed attempt of the organism to satisfy its needs as experienced, in the field as perceived. Behavior is a reaction to the field as perceived, and this perception is for that individual his reality. This perception may have a high degree of correspondence with reality, but it remains the perception, not the reality, which is determining the behavior. The behavior is not caused by something in the past, but is a response by the organism to present needs. Certainly past experience will modify the meaning perceived in present experiences, yet there is no behavior except to meet present need (26:210).

As the infant develops a portion of the total perceptual field becomes differentiated as belonging to the self. As a result of evolutional interaction with the environment, and with others, the structure of self is formed. This structure is organized yet fluid, and consists of conceptual patterns of perceptions of characteristics and relationships of the "I" or the "me," along with the

values attached to these concepts. The value attached to experiences and the self-structure may be experienced directly or taken over from others. Thus the structure of self develops through direct experience by the individual and through distorted symbolization of sensory reactions resulting in the introjection of values and concepts as if experienced. The relationship with the environment is a transactional one. If the individual's experiences contradict his initial perceptions, over time his perceptions will change. The effective reality which influences his behavior remains at all times, however, his perception of reality (26:224).

Rogers' position on the development of self has three aspects. The individual's experiences may be symbolized, perceived, and organized into some relationship to the self. These experiences may be ignored because they have no apparent relationship to the self. They may be denied symbolization or given distorted symbolization because the experience is inconsistent with the structure of the self (26:212).

The awareness of self does not automatically occur at birth. Rather it evolves as the infant experiences his environment. Portions of the infant's experiences become differentiated and symbolized in an awareness of being, awareness of functioning. Through interaction with significant others and the environment the concept of self is elaborated. As the self emerges, the individual develops a

reciprocal need for positive regard by, and for others. Out of the association of self-experiences with the satisfaction or frustration of the need for positive regard develops a learned need for self-regard (26:225).

Rogers' theory is based on a concept of "self" as the center and creator of individual reality. This phenomenon can and does occur because of the tremendous influence and affective nature of individual perception. Behavior is an outward manifestation of inward processes. The major portions of his concept of personality that helps clarify the nature of self-expression are those that look to the subjective origins of personality and behavior. (1) The individual is both the center and creator of his reality. (2) Thus reality is private, it is what the organism perceives it to be. (3) The individual alone can know himself in any real completeness. (4) The "self" reacts as an organized whole to the perceptual field. (5) The individual reacts to this perceptual field with one basic tendency and striving: that is to actualize, maintain, and enhance the phenomenal self.

The previously sighted works support a concept of self. This concept is essential to understanding the development of personality and expressive behavior. This concept allows for the uniqueness and subjective nature of man's existence. What one expresses has its origin within the individual and is unique to him. Expressive behavior is more than passive adaptation, it is purposive, forward

striving and instrumental in maintaining tension and growth. A concept of "self" alone, however, does not suffice to understand the origins and nature of self-expression. Having established the concept of a unique "self" we must look now to the characteristics of the ways in which that "unique self" is expressive. And to what the expression means to the organism.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE AND MEANING OF SELF-EXPRESSION

A concept of "phenomenal self" or "proprium" has been employed to account for the origins of self-expression. This alone, however, does not complete the inquiry. Specifically, we must look now to the forms that self-expression may take, and to what these forms mean to the individual or personality. What is the relation between the personality and these expressive acts?

Part of the answer may be found by considering the problem of individual consistency. Studies in Expressive Movement by Allport and Vernon addresses this problem. This is an empirical study designed to determine the level of consistency of expressive movement within an individual. Expressive movements are defined by the authors as those aspects of movement which are distinctive enough to differentiate one individual from another.

They focus on two distinct issues. Is personality self-consistent? If so, then its expressions must in turn be consistent among themselves. The assumption may be that

if an individual is essentially self-consistent in his personality, this self-consistency of personality is reflected in some direct and uniform fashion in his actions. Then self-consistency of expressive acts, is logically prior to the first.

> Specifically, one would wish to know to what extent the inner personality itself is consistent, to what degree movement is expressive of personality, and whether movement is consistent in the same sense that inner traits are consistent. The last question can be made clearer by asking whether expansive and centrifugal motor tendencies, for example, have exact counterparts in the inner nature of a man and whether such inner traits as insight (self-knowledge) and social intelligence have exact motor counterparts (2:166).

Personalistic theories of behavior hold that problems of expression can not be treated separately from problems of the self. Movement must be regarded as consistent because personality is consistent. Even simple adaptive responses which serve the temporary ends of volition, show more than momentary purpose: they show personality (2).

How does expression through movement and consistency of personality occur? The authors say

> . . . the course of development in general is from the diffuse responses of the whole body to the more specialized expression of specific organs or "segments." Therefore it appears that we must allow for the influence of certain general psychomotor factors which operate to maintain a "temperamental" consistency in behavior during the course of increased specialization in skill. To borrow Dodge's Terminology, we must recognize that certain qualities of the original "protoplactic" mass-action seem to remain in each of the new "epicritic" responses (2:18).

> Sometimes, as Holt has shown, vestigial infantile movements persist throughout life and become motor idiosyncrasies of the individual. Many of these idiosyncrasies, of course, are quite specific and persist merely as "symbolic gestures," but they are at the same time further evidence that adult expression is not completely specialized or entirely free from its early ties (2:19).

This genetic approach implies consistency in the expressive acts of adults because it maintains that in the beginning of life, movement shows a striking degree of unity and this unity is not completely broken down and differentiated. This study lends support to the contention that there is some degree of unity in personality, that this unity is reflected in expression and that for this reason, acts and habits of expression show a certain consistency among themselves (2).

From the results of their study the authors form a hypothesis that there are organized psychomotor dispositions or expressive traits. By assembling case studies for each of the twenty-five subjects, including experimental records of his movement, ratings by associates, a graphologist's study of his handwriting, and the outstanding facts concerning his intellectual and social behavior, the researchers achieved a psychomotor portrait of each individual believed to be adequate. The case study disclosed patterns of consistency which could not be revealed by correlational studies. Even where measures do not correspond statistically they may nevertheless be congruent psychologically. Consistency is not always apparent to the

casual observer. Yet, consistency may be demonstrated when viewed in the light of the total personality. There are degrees of unity in movement, just as there are degrees of unity in mental life, and in personality. Thus, in so far as personality is organized, expressive movement is organized, expressive movement is harmonious and self-consistent, and in so far as personality is unintegrated, expressive movement is self-contradictory (2).

> From our results it appears that a man's gesture and handwriting both reflect an essentially stable and constant individual style. His expressive activities seem not to be disassociated and unrelated to one another, but rather to be organized and well patterned. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that there is congruence between expressive movement and the attitudes, traits, values, and other dispositions of the "inner" personality (2:248).

Studies in Expressive Movement uses an empirical methodology to determine the level of consistency of the individual's expressive movement. They found this self-consistency of expressive acts to be a more accessible problem for verifiable study than the complex structure of personality as a whole. Where they found "reliability" or "internal consistency" they presumed there was some kind of "harmony" or "integration" in the expressive (peripheral motor or psycho-motor) behavior of the subject (2:97).

"This consistency is shown both in the correspondence between objective measurements, and in the congruence of habits of movement when these habits are viewed in the light of the total personality" (2:152). Thus, the authors

favor a hypothesis that there are organized psychomotor dispositions or expressive traits, and these traits are congruent with the "inner-personality" or "self."

A second study that supports a hypothesis of congruence between expressive traits and inner personality is Werner Wolff's The Expression of Personality. Personality is explored through an analysis of expressive acts. Along with the experimental methodology, the psychoanalytic approach is employed, to varying degrees, to draw upon the unconscious dynamics of personality. The experiments (which included self-confrontation, memory and association) developed were designed to clarify whether the inner personality is reflected in external behavior. The issue being, whether or not various structural and behavioral traits are "expressive" of personality characteristics. The major premise arising from the study is that all personality dynamics stem from the organism as a whole. Thus personality is the collective name for the total manifestation of man. It is in intimate relationship with body features, physiological processes, and the whole chemistry of the organism (29).

The term personality includes the fusion of three types of problems: individual differences, general type, and structural features.

> Individual differences, "are in this case the individual ways of acting and reacting, imagining, feeling, and wishing" (29:6).

> General type, "refers to the general dynamics of human behavior determined by the nature of the organism on the one hand and by the culture background on the other hand" (29:6).
>
> Structural features, "are the dynamics interrelations through which appears, in diverse manifestations, the basic personality" (29:6).

The three types of problems are considered in this study in relation to the individual's personality and expression.

The authors consider expressive behavior to be an individual's actions in response to different internal and external stimuli, his handling of objects, and the posture of his body. Expression is the degree of inner tension which becomes visible in the form. Tensions can be stimulating or inhibitory, it can be rapid or slow, with greater or lesser momentum (29:235). Hence, along with these dynamic forms are static forms of expression such as photographs of faces and hands which can express personality.

> We cannot exclude from the study of man's personality what is self-evident in the study of art, that certain static froms have their own expressive value which is more or less understood by all men in a similar way; that not only the language of dynamic action but also that of static forms seems to be a common language of man (29:57).

The experiments conducted for this study indicate that personality traits are revealed in both forms of expression and that these traits are well integrated within the personality of the subject. Expressive forms are then, a "mark of personality." In addition each form reflects special characteristic traits (29:32).

Participants in these experiments were essentially asked to do one of two things: Judge the expressive characteristics of both static and dynamic forms of others. Judge the expressive characteristics of both static and dynamic forms of themselves, either consciously or unconsciously. Over the course of the experiments judgments were made on the voice, the profile, the hands, the narrative style, the gait, the handwriting, and the right and left part of the full face. Conscious judgments of epxressive characteristics were obtained when the subject was asked to rate or interpret the meaning of several forms of expressive behavior by themselves and/or others. Films and recordings were used for dynamic forms, photographs for the static forms. In most cases the subjects did not know they were being recorded, filmed, or photographed. The procedure and occasion for rating the expressive forms was handled in such a manner as to discourage the subject from making a relation between the two events. This was done in the interest of spontaneity of response, and in an effort to draw upon the subject's unconscious dynamics of personality. Thus the subjects knew on some occasions that their own forms were among those presented. At other times they had no idea their own form was included. In this latter instance, the researcher was able to obtain unconscious self-ratings from the subject. These ratings, both conscious and unconscious, were compared with the ratings

of other participants to determine the congruence between ratings.

Wolff found that unconscious self-judgments apprehend the personality in a more complete way than did conscious judgments or judgments by others. The unconscious judgments were more "extreme" in all respects, more "emotional," more "penetrating," and more complete than the judgments made by other (29:71). Also, the response is faster for self-judgments than for judgments of others. Desirable traits were also judged faster than undesirable traits. Wolff states,

> . . . we may infer that his own form of expression is more attractive for the self-judge than the forms of other people. We also drew this inference from the contents of self-descriptions. Association experiments are confirmatory, the reaction time being longer for disagreeable associations and shorter for agreeable ones (29:82).

Study of both photographs of the profile and recordings of the voice indicate that both reveal distinct personality features. The subjects, however, were more able to recognize their own profile, and less likely to recognize their own voice. Whether the subject failed to recognize either his own voice or profile, his self-judgment tended to show the same peculiarities. One's own form of expression ". . . evokes a higher emotional interest than that of others, inducing a characterization which is either excessively favorable or excessively unfavorable and also more extensive than the characterizations of others" (29:83).

The absence of self-recognition caused similar reactions in rhythmical patterns of expressive movement. Unconscious self-judgments were, again, accompanied by emotional factors. The only exception was high incidence of recognition of one's own gait. It was assumed that the rhythmical factor in the gait provoked its recognition. Yet this proved to not be the case. Wolff states,

> Thus we find no explanation for the peculiarity of the gait as the only form with which self-recognition succeeded, we can only observe that all features of man, whether rhythm is present in them or not, serve as channels of personality and as receptacles for the dynamics of self (29:109).

Wolff explored the concepts of wishful thinking through unconscious self-judgments with handwriting. Wishful tendencies were found if these judgments were made in the absence of recognition. How the absence of recognition is related to the emotional self-judgment was investigated through self-judgment made in complete recognition. The question is, is there an emotional resistance to the recognition of one's own handwriting, or is this simply a more difficult perceptual task? Three subjects in this experiment who knew the handwriting in some of the specimens recognized them more easily than their own, negating this last possibility. Throughout the experiments the cause for lack of self-recognition was not caused by external factors or the manner of presentation of the forms. Subjects who failed to recognize their own forms were often able to identify those of their friends.

> In general, the classification of characterizations seems to depend on two factors: the subject knows what his behavior is toward other people, he knows how he "is," but the way he "likes to be" is different from the way he is. Both factors evoke an "intra-individual tension" which become manifest in the self-judgment. This tension appears if the subject ranks his unconscious self-judgment in an extreme way. An intra-individual tension appears also if the unconscious self-judgment itself is extreme. Neither reaction occurred in judging other persons (29:136).

Because the unconscious self-judgment is also accepted consciously, it is assumed that in unconscious self-judgments all personal affectivity and interpretation are present.

Expressions of personality includes the expression of wishes. What and how we perceive depends to a large degree on our preferences. On what we like, or wish to perceive. What we do depends in turn, largely on what we wish to do. And for the same reasons, what we express also seems to be determined partly by our wish to express (19:139). Forms of graphic expression revealed that expressive behavior clearly indicates traits referring to an actual state of mind as well as a desired one.

> The world of wishes and the world of facts are confounded in man's personality, and both regions, can be separated only by an investigation of relationships that focus upon the whole personality, in which actual state and projected are integrated (29:139).

Self-judgments differed distinctly from the judgments made by others. Self-judgments involved emotional factors indicating the self-interpreter is not an objective judge. On the other hand, the self-interpreter may be more

familiar with his own expression, as self-judgments were more comprehensive and more detailed than those made by others. Man's self-knowledge then is both comprehensive and detailed, yet emotional and unobjective. Wolff believes that the attitude towards oneself to be based on innate factors since it appears in his experiments in small children (19:42).

Allport supports this contention in the sixth aspect of the proprium. Self-image, or the phenomenal self has two aspects:

> the way the patient regards his present abilities, status, and roles; and what he would like to be, his asperations for himself. The latter aspect, which Karen Horney calls the "idealized self-image," is of special importance in therapy. On the one hand it may be compulsive, compensatory, and unrealistic, blinding its possessor to his true situation in life. On the other hand, it may be an insightful cognitive map, closely geared to reality and defining a wholesome ambition. The ideal self-image is the imaginative aspect of the proprium, and whether accurate or distorted, attainable or unattainable, it plots a course by which much propriate movement is guided and therapeutic progress achieved (1:47).

Wolff states, "Both tendencies, the positive (overestimation) and the negative (underestimation), seem to be characteristic of a wish which points in one case to the desired thing and in the other to the lack of it" (29:143). In all the experiments conducted, unconscious self-estimation exhibited the same results. Self-judgments are:

1. More favorable or unfavorable than the judgments by others.
2. More favorable or unfavorable than the judgments of others.

3. More emotionally emphasized than all other judgments--even violent rejections sometimes included.
4. Unconscious self-judgments are more extreme than judgments made in the state of self-recognition (29:143).

The reasons for this lack of self-recognition were not found in external conditions. Also, it cannot be attributed completely to a lack of familiarity with our own forms of expression. Unrecognized self-judgments were more emotional, comprehensive, and detailed, indicating a real familiarity with our own forms.

> It may be that the form of expression is so familiar to the self-judge that he is stimulated to speak about it more emphatically and in greater detail. This familiarity must not go so far as to evoke self-identification because the subject cannot imagine the strange fact of being confronted with one of his own forms of expression. If we tell him that one of three forms of expression is his own, we may expect that the familiarity which was manifest in his unconscious self-judgment will enable him to make an immediate self-identification. But a control experiment to test this supposition did not confirm it (29:147).

Familiarity does not explain the lack of self-recognition. How about the emotionality of the self-judgment? Does a person react emotionally when he perceives expressions with which he is familiar whether they are his own forms or those of others? Wolff found that an emotional reaction is by in large confined to traits perceived in one's own sample. Similar traits perceived in the samples of others did not evoke the same emotionality. Self-judgments remained more emotional no matter how familiar the particular trait was. The conclusion

remained, both conscious and unconscious self-judgments are more emotional than judgments of others (29:148).

Wolff interprets the high degree of emotion in unconscious self-judgments to intra-personal dynamic factors which hinder the self-identification and are a force propelling the self-judgment. One factor may be that the individual sees himself much more as a unit than he sees others. Thus the individual's intense reaction is related to the degree of distortion of the judged form of expression. This distortion seems to evoke the "projection of the self" (29:148).

> Another possible factor is the fact that the subject suspects that one of these forms is his own; however, he has developed a certain image of his personality and when he sees his own forms of expression they are so different from his own ideas of himself that astonishment or delusion are dynamic factors inhibiting any identification. This phenomenon is found in other familiar conditions, as when a person is much surprised by his own photograph, either agreeably or disagreeably (29:149).

This lack of congruence between the internal image and reality is expressed by emotional tension. Perhaps the absence of self-recognition actually means resistance to self-recognition. During the course of the experiments such tension was exhibited by subjects who grew exhausted, became aggressive towards the experimenter, or refused to continue with the experiment (29:149).

> The reason for this resistance expressed in internal and external emotions seems to be the same as was observed in conscious self-ratings, i.e., the influence of an ego ideal. In the face of reality

> this ideal would be disturbed; thus reality might be emotionally neglected or surpressed. The influence of this ideal also appears in the positive or negative character of self-judgments. Conscious self-ratings showed that in general the self-judgment indicates a higher estimation than do judgments by others. Comparing conscious with unconscious self-judgments we even mark an increase of this extremeness in the unconscious judgments (29:149).

The supposition arises then, that inner-dynamic factors cause the lack of self-recognition and the emotional self-judgment. Three possible reciprocal influences of this dynamic relationship are:

1. Lack of self-recognition causes an emotional self-judgment.
2. An emotional self-judgment, conditioned by another factor, causes the lack of self-recognition.
3. Lack of self-recognition and emotional self-judgment are two homogeneous reactions dependent on a third factor (29:149).

The study of personality is concerned with both those factors that are common to all persons, (general psychic laws) and the factors that vary from person to person (individual differences). These two factors are related and cannot be easily separated. Rather the relationship between the two must be discovered. There are structural differences in man's reactions, attitudes and behavior. Thus, expressive movement reflects personality in general, yet the particular form is variable and peculiar to each individual. These inner personal tendencies may correspond in the adequacy of mental channels of expression. The complex structure of personality enables us to isolate a relationship between personality traits and

a particular mental process only if the latter is a significant means of expression for that individual (29:194).

Memory is strongly influenced by personality because of emotional factors. Both interest and personal experience influence what we remember. The findings in experiments on memory suggest that recall and perception are not determined merely by attention or by neurological factors. We forget those items whose recall is emotionally unpleasant. "These indications coincide with the Freudian theory of repression, which points out that those things are forgotten whose recall is disagreeable" (29:203).

Both subjective and objective factors influence recall. The process of forgetting allows the object remembered to be not less but more distinct. This process of structuration causes simplification and clarification of details. This process is influenced by intra-personal factors as what is remembered differs with each person and is dependent on individual projections.

> Structuration depends on the subject's degree of participation in the memorized contents. Learning memory (school or fact) and experience memory (life or personality) are two different things. Learning memory does not demand personal participation, whereas in experience memory the recollected facts are incorporated into the personality. The dominance of one of these two kinds of memory is significant for the type of personality (29:207).

In neither case does intellect appear to play a deciding role.

The experiments with free association as well as the retelling of a proverb indicate that things which fit negatively into the emotional tendency of the personality are not as well recalled or are replaced by neutral elements. Those parts that are eliminated from recall appear to disturb the personality balance. Again, emotional factors in memory become evident (29:15). Requiring the subject to react caused negative emotional reactions. Also, the time was prolonged, evidently to overcome resistance to an unpleasant association. In most cases the association experiments and in the reproduction of a story, subjects showed an individual constancy of reaction. An individual's forgetting then, depends not only on accidental inattention but also upon his personal affective experience. Connections can be established between what a subject forgets and his emotional experience because he omits data that arouse emotional reminisences. It appears that the capacity to reproduce a fact is influenced by the degree of freedom from inhibitory effects of personal determinants (29).

Underlying motivational trends influence the process of recall. Not only what we remember, but how we remember seems to be determined by personality trends (29:270). Perception, like memory, is influenced by selective principles. Both what we remember and perceive is more exact in those things to which our interest is directed. The memory experiments indicate that the recall and forgetting of

certain items are due to emotional factors related to a subject's association with regard to the meaning of an item (29:271).

Wolff concludes from his research that "forms of expression involve inner tendencies which determine overt and also private behavior" (29:295). In many cases the subject did not recognize his own forms of expression. This unconscious self-judgment includes an individual's inner personal tendencies. A comparison of characterizations made by others of an individual were usually in agreement with his own unconscious self-judgment. The self-judgments were, however, more extreme than those by others (29:295).

The expressive value of overt behavior is determined by intra-individual tensions. "The behavior of different persons, although its outward form is similar, may originate from different individual tensions, and the behavior of different persons, although it is manifest in different ways, may originate from similar individual tension" (29:296). For this reason it is important to distinguish between behavior and tendency. Apparent behavior may be caused by different or even an opposite tendency. "A keep smiling exterior, for instance, may hide the psychic pressure of a deep affliction; behind the outward appearance of deep affliction there may be inner indifference" (29:300).

Along with the various specific determinants to be considered individually, is a basic triple form of determination common to all personality traits (29:300).

1. Objective factors
2. Collective factors (heredity, including sex and race, culture, and physical environment.
3. Subjected factors.

> We may attribute to this triple determination not only our personality but also our specific acts and interests in every hour of daily life. If we buy clothes, their "objective value" is to protect us. Their choice depends on "collective" factors such as fashion; our "subjective value" determine the specific selection from those otherwise acceptable (29:300).

Wolff has used a stimulus-response method to study forms of expression and their relation to personality. Reaction experiments facilitated exploration and interpretation of inner personal tendencies and the dynamics of the self. Exploring the subjects unconscious auto-evaluations gives an apprehension of his internal tensions. The technique of exploring his unconscious tendencies toward his environment by means of memory and association experiments give a hint to his probable way of acting.

In conclusion Wolff states,

> We found that inhibitory effects act upon the memory when a person perceives and recognizes his own form of expression, and that stimulating effects act upon his associations when he gives a self-judgment in the absence of recognition. We may assume that stimulating effects are based on emotions. It appears that the subject's own form of expression has the same effect on him as a stimulus word which provokes an emotional association.

> We may compare the lack of recognition or the retarded self-recognition with the suppression of associations or with the prolonged association time caused by "complex words." Furthermore, we found that in the absence of recognition the subject uses an emotional vocabulary in judging his own forms of expression. This vocabulary is similar to emotional associations about a complex word (29:301).

Wolff's extensive research with self-confrontation and memory supports the contention of congruence between expressive traits and personality. Like Allport, he found these expressive traits to be consistent within the individual, characteristic of that individual and unique to that person. This congruence can best be explained in terms of a concept of the complex structure of self. The self as a unified whole, as the source of acts and as an active thinker. Self-expression is more than a simple adaptive response to external stimuli. It is one's manner or style of behaving and an oblique mirror of personal traits (3). No matter how conventional, ordinary or inconsistent behavior may appear, ultimately a human being "reveals through the accumulation and variety of his movements his own personality" (20).

CHAPTER IV

THE CONCEPT OF EXPRESSION IN ART: PHILOSOPHY

Thus far, this inquiry has dealt with the psychological interpretation of self-expression, through the establishment of the concept of "self" to its influence on overt behavior and covert mental processes. This has been an effort to establish the source and nature of self-expressive behavior. It is believed, however, that psychology alone cannot answer for the complexity of human expression. Self-expression is ultimately a fusion of overt manifestations and subjective mental processes that can culminate in the most subtle and complex expressive form--art.

The studies sighted previously are invaluable in assisting us to comprehend the most common forms of self-expression. These sources are limiting however. Another source, one that transcends measurement and observable features, is necessary for apprehending self-expression. Artistic activity and the products of that activity are of a nature that tends to defy precise measurement, observation

or prediction. Yet comprehending the function of expression in art is critical to an inquiry into self-expression in child art. Hence, we may also look to philosophy for the insights we seek.

Philosophical inquiries into the nature of art and expression are many. Among these are the works of Susanne Langer. She has pursued the problem of the nature of art, and its relation to human feeling in numerous books and essays. Her theories on expression in art will be reviewed here. Her work is chosen because of her tremendous sensitivity to works of art, and her human and wholistic approach to artists. Her articulate and thoughtful concepts can most readily be related to the child and his art.

All art is, Langer believes, a perceptible form that expresses the nature of human feeling. It is an expressive form created for our perception through sense of imagination. By "feeling" she means everything that can be felt, from physical sensation, pain and comfort, excitement and repose, to the most complex emotions, intellectual tensions, or the steady feeling--tones of a conscious human life. These feelings are what Langer calls "inner life"--the inside story of one's own history or the way living in the world feels, the stream of direct experience, life as it feels to the living. And what is expressed in the particular work of art is an idea, and idea of the way

feelings, emotions, and all other subjective experiences come and go.

Subjective existence has a structure which can not only be met from moment to moment but can be conceptually known. It can be reflected on, imagined and symbolically expressed in depth and detail. Discourse, our usual medium of communication by language does not express what we know of the life of feeling however. Language does not readily present the nature and patterns of sensitive and emotive life as do works of art. Works of art are expressed forms, and what they express is the nature of human feeling (15).

What does it mean to express one's idea of some inward or "subjective" process? Langer says,

> . . . it means to make inward process, for one self and others to see. That is to give the subjective events an objective symbol. It is an outward showing of inward nature, an objective presentation of subjective reality; and the reason that it can symbolize things of the inner life is that it has the same kinds of relations and elements. Therefore, it is an objectification of subjective life, and so is every work of art.

There are few principles that obtain wholly and fundamentally in every kind of art. Yet these few decisive principles determine what is art and what is not. In one definite and appropriate sense, expressiveness is the same in all art works of any kind. What makes each kind of art distinct is the fact that what is created is not the same, but the principle of creation is the same. And "living form" means the same in all of them. Every work of art is

a creation, it does not have illusory and actual elements commingling in it. The materials are actual but art elements are always virtual. It is the essence of the elements the artist composes into an apparition, an expressive form (15).

An expressive form is any imaginable or perceptible whole that exhibits relationships of parts, points, qualities, or aspects within the whole, which may be taken to represent some other whole whose elements have analogous relations.

Much of experience that is knowable defies discursive formulation and therefore verbal expression. This is often called the subjective aspects of experience, the direct feeling of it. Subjective reality composes what is called the "inward life" of human beings. Thus, Langer says, the symbolic presentation of subjective reality for contemplation is not only tentatively beyond the reach of language--that is, not mrely beyond the words we have, but it is impossible in the essential frame of language (15).

A work of art presents feeling for contemplation, thus making it visible or audible, or in some way perceivable through a symbol, not inferable from a symptom. The expression of feeling in a work of art, the function that makes the work an expressive form is not a symptom. Self-expression does not require composition and lucidity (15).

> An artist, then, expresses feeling, but not in the way a politician blows off steam or a baby laughs and cries. He formulates that elusive aspect of reality that is commonly taken to be amorphous and chaotic, that is, he objectifies the subjective realm. What he expresses is, therefore, not his own actual feelings, but what he knows about human feeling. Once he is in possession of a rich symbolism, that knowledge may actually exceed his entire personal experience. A work of art expresses a conception of life, emotion, inward reality. But it is neither a confessional nor a frozen tantrum; it is a developed metaphor, a nondiscursive symbol that articulates what is mentally ineffable--the logic of consciousness itself (15:26).

By artistic perception Langer means the perception of expressiveness in works of art. Expressiveness belongs to every successful work of art. Representation of feeling is one thing, the specifically artistic expression of it is another. It is what life feels like and thus she calls it "vital import." Vital because it is always some mode of feeling, sense, emotion, or consciousness that is conveyed. Import because it is conveyed by being objectified in the work, and thus understandable. It is in this way that a work of art is a symbol (15).

Artistic expressiveness cannot be pointed out, it is apprehended or it is not. It cannot be demonstrated or shown to be embodied in the piece. This feeling is not represented, but composed and articulated by the entire apparition, the art symbol, found there directly, or not at all. The finding of a vital import is what is meant by artistic perception. Artistic perception is intuitive or insight and cannot be stated in discursive language.

> A work of art is an expressive form, and therefore a symbol, but not a symbol which points beyond itself so that one's thought passes on to the concept symbolized. That is why I do not call the conveyed, or rather presented, idea the meaning of the sensuous form, the work of art, expresses (15:67).

Discursive symbolism, language in its literal use, can make us aware of things about us and our own relation to them. The arts function in the same way to make us aware of subjective reality. We can envisage vital movement only in artistic terms. It cannot be discursively talked about above a very general level. But they can be known--objectively set forth, publicly known--and there is nothing necessarily confused or formless about emotions (15).

When the forms of subjective experience are abstracted to the point of symbolic presentation, we can use those forms to imagine feeling and understand its nature. This is the cognitive value of the arts.

The influence of art on human life goes deeper than the intellectual level. The arts can actually form over emotive experience.

> Essentially, then, all the arts create forms to express the life of feeling (the life of feeling, not the feelings an artist happens to have); and they all do it by the same basic principles. But there the simple sameness ends. When we look at what the various arts create, we come to the source of their differentiation, from which each art derives its autonomy and its problems (15:80).

But in each case what we call a work of art is made for the ultimate purpose of achieving certain qualitative effects, which have expressive value. What the work of art expresses

are the feelings and emotions which the artist knows, his insight into the nature of sentience, his picture of vital experience, physical and emotive and fantastic.

> Such knowledge is not expressible in ordinary discourse. The reason for this ineffability is not that the ideas to be expressed are too high, too spiritual, or too anything else, but that the forms of feeling and the forms of discursive expression are logically incommensurate, so that any exact concepts of feeling and emotion cannot be projected into the logical form of literal language. Verbal statement, which is our normal and most reliable means of communication, is almost useless for conveying knowledge about the precise character of the affective life. Crude designations like "joy," "sorrow," "fear," tell us as little about vital experience as general words like "thing" "being," or "place," tell us about the world of our perceptions. Any more precise reference to feeling is usually made by mentioning the circumstance that suggest it (15:91).

Langer says the aim of art is insight, understanding of the essential life of feeling. But all understanding requires abstraction. Abstractions made by literal discourse are useless for art. They obscure rather than communicate our ideas of vitality and sentience. There can, however, be no understanding without symbolization, and no symbolization without abstraction. Anything about reality that is to be expressed and conveyed must be abstracted from reality. To understand we must conceive, and conception always involves formulation, presentation, and therefore abstraction.

The arts abstract from experience, but these abstractions are not concepts that have names. These abstractions have to be presented to sense and intuition

rather than to a word-bound, note-taking consciousness. The elements of the work convey ideas of such nameless realities. This is not to say the work symptomizes the feeling it conveys. Rather it presents a feeling for our contemplation. Art is not stimulation or catharsis of feeling, it is the articulation of feeling. The height of technique is simply the highest power of this sensuous revelation and wordless abstraction to present feeling (15).

The art symbol is the expressive form and does not convey something beyond itself. Thus it does not have meaning in the familiar sense. Rather it has import.

> It is a symbol in a special and derivative sense, because it does not fulfill all the functions of a true symbol; it formulates and objectifies experience for direct intellectual perception, or intuition, but it does not abstract a concept for discursive thought. Its import is seen in it; not, like the meaning of a genuine symbol, by means of it but separable from the sign. The symbol in art is a metaphor, an image with overt or covert literal signification; the art symbol is the absolute image--the image of what otherwise would be irrational, as it is literally ineffable: direct awareness, emotion, vitality, personal identity --life lived and felt, the matrix of mentality (15:139).

Langer's views are essentially supported by those of Harold Rugg. Rugg's work Imagination is focused toward comprehension of the creative act itself. He draws upon a wealth of research, theory, biographies and personal statements by creative persons to pursue the origins of creativity. Self-expression is an integral aspect of creativity, particularly in the arts and thus must be considered here. Rugg's work is too elaborate to be covered in any great

detail. Hence, an effort will be made to review those of Rugg's concepts that bear most directly on points included in this inquiry.

Rugg believes the creative act and the expressional act of the artist has three stages. First is a period of deep feeling, a long search or deep absorption, preparing and involvement. Second is a period of perception-in-depth or cutting through and under conventional ways of seeing. Last, the artist puts down what he sees, striving to make his statement equivalent to his created forms of feeling. This act is the artist's way of organizing his inner-experience and expressing it in non-verbal forms (25).

The artist sets his own problems, internally. The orienting attitude initially is created by the artist's drives and personal subjective experience. The artists goal, through the expressional act, "is the objectification of his imagined conceptions, he strives to say what he sees, his way. Moment by moment the goal changes because both vision and product change. The nature of the expressional process is basically tentative and experimental" (25:34). Art is then the formed expression of imagined conceptions.

Rugg believes the "primordial stuff of mind is perceptual, registered continuously in the nervous system" (25:78). He states,

> Each act of perception is a conscious, integrated, bi-polar response to stimuli from the outer scene and the inner tension system. Each response is formed by

> what the total, two-fold situation demands. Man must live in two worlds--the external world of other men and events and his inner psycho-physiological world of sensations, images, and ideas, moods and fantasies, wishes and needs. From birth to death the primary raw material of his inner life is the dynamic deposit in his nervous system of his percepts of that outer world.
>
> Every act of man is anchored in the integration of stimuli from the outer scene with the inner stresses of the body. As Kubie phrased it: 'Every symbol must have roots simultaneously in the internal perceptual experiences of the body and in the external perceptual experiences of the outer world' (25:79).

Thus, every act of response constitutes an integration of the bi-polar action of outer situation and inner stress system. The perceptual field is the union of forces of all the sensory channels through which the perceiver can reach to the outside world and all the unconsciously stored experiences that bear upon it. The perceiver has his inner stress system and an external culture as well (25).

> Each individual sees and feels the world in his own way, because each has built a unique body of traces in his organism by having lived his life and interpreted objective events in his own individualistic way throughout infancy, childhood and youth (25:81).

Thus Rugg says,

> Perception is much more than imprinting. It is a creative process in itself. The perceiver creates the field from which his percepts, signs, and symbols emerge (25:82).

Along with the impact of the external world on perception is the pressure of intraorganic needs.

> A person sees in part what he wants to see or needs to see in any situation; this holds true in respect to the other senses as well. What he sees and feels is the product of the life style and temperamental

> outlook developed by his unique life history (25:87).

Rugg believes there is a two-fold way of knowing. An inside identification with the object and an outside measured observation of it. This two-fold way of knowing allows the individual to be active and self-directed, and not to be a reactive automaton controlled by stimuli from the outside. The individual will respond as the situation demands but with meaning. This meaning is the "very process of conceiving, of idea forming. Conceiving is always accomplished in the matrix of a general conception or orienting attitude or motor set" (25:266). We behave first via our conceptions, primarily feeling, second through our concepts or ideas.

> The key seems to lie in the generalizing nature of the act, which we have variously described as feeling-tone, orienting motor attitude, set, or mood of understanding. I shall, therefore, employ the term "conceptualizing" to stand as general label for any and all of these. It is, moreover, of the greatest importance to distinguish conception from concept, that is, the general shotgun, non-verbal response of conceptualizing from the specific rifle-shot use of the verbal label or concept (25:267).

Rugg views conception then as more organismic, mood-like in quality and prior to concept which is linguistically significant, sharper and in the verbal sense, specific.

Conceptualizing is feeling, or felt-thought projected either from and by the non-conscious or solely by the off-conscious organism. Langer terms this "fantasy-imagery."

"Every process we perceive, if it is to be retained in memory, must record itself as a fantasy, an envisagement, by virtue of which it can be called up in imagination or recognized when it occurs again" (25:268).

Feeling, says Rugg, is primarily non-verbal and the very foundation of the act of response. Feelings are private and personal whereas thinking is necessarily public. "Thoughts can corroborate or contradict each other, but feelings cannot" (25:270).

Rugg states:

> There are several senses in which we all use "feeling" as "sensation" or as "emotion." Using feeling to mean sensation one says: "This room feels hot," or "the radiator feels stone cold," one speaks of feelings of texture, colors, sounds, odors. The carpenter enjoys the feel of his wood as the sculptor does his stone, the tailor the texture of his cloth. As emotion, one speaks of feelings of rage or anger, delight or depression, pleasure or pain. The everyday experience of feeling can be either sensuous or emotional and the two are often fused together, unified (25:269).

Feeling, as such, is indispensable to the aesthetic act, be it creative or appreciative. Emotion on the other hand, is a product of the endocrine in the blood stream. It is a name given to body excitement, and while it may accompany an aesthetic act it is not a determinative factor. Feeling and emotion, then, are not synonymous. Emotion is the power-factor revealed in body excitement, primarily the fusion of endocrine action in the blood stream with mid-brain-mind controls. Feelings on the other hand are the qualities of body-mind gesture indispensable to the imagined conception (25).

Another dimension that must be considered here is articulated by John Dewey in Art As Experience. Dewey delineates what it is to have an experience, and what components within the individual and situation can cause this to occur. As with Langer and Rugg, Dewey's thoughts are unique. We consider them here as we further seek comprehension of the relation between art and self-expression.

Dewey believes first of all that the function of art is to organize experience more meaningfully, more coherently, more vividly, than ordinary life permits. Art then, is experience in its most articulate and adequate form (22).

> The union of sense, mood, impulse, and action characteristic of the live creature. It is not differentiated by the predominance of any one mental faculty, such as emotion or imagination, but by a greater inclusiveness of psychological factors. It has no highly restricted subject matter: anything vividly and imaginatively realized, indeed, may be the source of 'an experience that is an experience'--the kind of experience that is art (22:170).

This is a doctrine of the oneness of art and life, a convication that means and ends cannot be sharply separated. When means and ends interpenetrated, experience is most satisfactory, and art is experience when it reaches this peak (22).

Living is the process of interaction between live creature and environment. Experience occurs continuously within this interaction. This ongoing experience is not in and of itself composed into an experience. We have an

experience when the material experience runs its course to fulfillment. Then, and only then is it integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experience from other experiences. Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience (22).

Such experience has a unity, a unity that is constituted by a single quality that prevades the entire experience and gives it its name. This unity is neither emotional, practical, nor intellectual in any one sense. Rather they are underlying qualities, moving variations.

> Because of continuous merging, there are no holes, mechanical junctions, and dead centers when we have an experience. There are pauses, places of rest, but they punctuate and define the quality of movement. They sum up what has been undergone and prevent its dissipation and idle evaporation. Continued acceleration is breathless and prevents parts from gaining distinction. In a work of art, different acts, episodes, occurrences melt and fuse into unity, and yet do not disappear and lose their own character as they do so--just as in a genial conversation there is a continuous interchange and blending, and yet each speaker not only retains his own character but manifests it more clearly than is he wont (22:173).

The esthetic cannot be sharply marked off from intellectual experience since the latter must bear an esthetic stamp to be complete. Thus, the materials of the fine arts consist of qualities. Experience having intellectual conclusion are signs or symbols which have no intrinsic quality of their own, but stand for things that may in another experience be qualitatively experienced. No

intellectual activity is an integral event (is an experience) unless it is prevaded with this quality.

The same notion holds true of practical action. "It is possible to be efficient in action and yet not have a conscious experience. The activity is too automatic to permit of a sense of what it is about and where it is going. It comes to an end but not to a close or consummation in consciousness" (22:174). We are not concerned, in much of our experience, with the connection of one incident with what went before and what comes after. Experience, whether dominantly intellectual and practical is not a unit unless it has esthetic quality.

Esthetic quality in an integral experience is there because such experience moves toward a close, an ending. There is an element of undergoing in every experience. The esthetic quality rounds out the experience into completeness and unity as emotion. Emotions are qualities, when they are significant, of a complex experience that moves and changes. "Experience is emotional but there are no separate things called emotions in it" (22:177).

> By the same token, emotions are attached to events and objects in their movement. They are not, save in pathological instances, private. And even an "objectless" emotion demands something beyond itself to which to attach itself, and thus it soon generates a delusion in lack of something real. Emotion belongs of a certainty to the self. But it belongs to the self that is concerned in the movement of events toward an issue that is desired or disliked (22:177).

There is then a commonality to much experience as it arises out of the interaction between individuals and their world. Such experience has pattern and structure, because it consists of the relationship between doing and undergoing. It is the relationship which gives the experience meaning and to grasp it is the objective of all intelligence. The scope and content of the relations measure the significant content of an experience.

Dewey discusses the function of intelligence in the making of a work of art.

> Because perception of relationship between what is done and what is undergone constitutes the work of intelligence, and because the artist is controlled in the process of his work by his grasp of the connection between what he has already done and what he is to do next, the idea that the artist does not think as intently and penetratingly as a scientific inquirer is absurd. A painter must consciously undergo the effect of his every brush stroke or he will not be aware of what he is doing and where his work is going. Moreover, he has to see each particular connection of doing and undergoing in relation to the whole that he desires to produce. To apprehend such relations is to think, and is one of the most exacting modes of thought. The differences between the pictures of different painters is due quite as much to differences of capacity to carry on this thought as it is to differences of sensitivity to bare color and to differences in dexterity of expression. As respects the basic quality of pictures, differences depends, indeed, more depends upon the quality of intelligence brought to bear upon perception of relations than upon anything else--though of course intelligence cannot be separated from direct sensitivity and is connected, though in a more external manner, with skill (22:179).

Dewey goes on to say:

> Any idea that ignores the necessary role of intelligence in production of works of art is based upon identification of thinking with use of one special kind of

> material, verbal signs and words. To think effectively in terms of relations of qualities is as severe a demand upon thought as to think in terms of symbols, verbal and mathematical. Indeed, since words are easily manipulated in mechanical ways, the production of a work of genuine art probably demands more intelligence than does most of the so-called thinking that goes on among those who pride themselves on being "intellectuals" (22:180).

Dewey believes it is the "esthetic" that clarifies and intensifies development of traits that belong to every normally complete experience. "Esthetic," then refers to experience as appreciative, perceiving, and enjoying. This however implies the consumer's, rather than the producer's viewpoint. "Artistic" refers to the act of production or creation.

> Sometimes, the effect is to separate the two from each other, to regard act as something superimposed upon esthetic material, or, upon the other side, to an assumption that, since art is a process of creation, perception and enjoyment of it have nothing in common with the creative act (22:180).

Dewey seeks to "show how the conception of conscious experience as a perceived relation between doing and undergoing enables us to understand the connection that art as production and perception and appreciation as enjoyment sustain to each other" (22:180).

Art denotes a process of doing or making which culminates in something visible, audible, or tangible. This is the form of art and must be united in the very same relation of doing and undergoing that makes an experience to be an experience.

> The doing or making is artistic when the perceived result is of such a nature that its qualities as perceived have controlled the question of production. The act of producing that is directed by intent to produce something that is enjoyed in the immediate experience of perceiving has qualities that a spontaneous or controlled activity does not have. The artist embodies in himself the attitude of the perceiver while he works (22:181).

The esthetic experience, in art, does not stand alone but is linked to the activity of which it is the consequence. Hence the distinction between what is art and what is natural phenomenon. The difference lies in appreciative perception, the making. Art, as production, must absorb into itself qualities of the product as perceived and be regulated by them (22).

> Until the artist is satisfied in perception with what he is doing, he continues shaping and reshaping. The making comes to an end when its result is experience as good--and that experience comes not by mere intellectual and outside judgment but in direct perception. An artist, in comparison with his fellows, is one who is not only especially gifted in powers of execution but in unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things. This sensitivity also directs his doings and makings (22:182).

> The consequences of the act of making as reported in sense show whether what is done carries forward the idea being executed or marks a deviation and break. In so far as the development of an experience is controlled through reference to these immediately felt relations of order and fulfillment, that experience becomes dominantly esthetic in nature. The urge to action becomes an urge to that kind of action which will result in an object satisfying in direct perception (22:183).

The artist then builds up an experience that is coherent in perception. What he has done and what he is

undergoing is thus reciprocal, cumulative, and continuously instrumental to one another.

The perceiver and appreciator is in a process of doing and undergoing just as was the maker. His taking in requires activity, a responsive act that accumulates toward objective fulfillment. This activity is more than bare recognition, it is perception.

> But an act of perception proceeds by waves that extend serially throughout the entire organism. There is, therefore, no such thing in perception as seeing or hearing plus emotion. The perceived object or scene is emotionally pervaded throughout. When an aroused emotion does not permeate the material that is perceived or thought of, it is either preliminary or pathological (22:185).

The esthetic or undergoing phase of experience in art is an act of perception, an act of the going-out of energy in order to receive or surrender. The perceiver must create his own experience. Dewey states:

> And his creation must include relations comparable to those which the original producer underwent. They are not the same in any literal sense. But with the perceiver, as with the artist, there must be an ordering of the elements of the whole that is in form, although not in details, the same as the process of organization the creator of the work consciously experienced. Without an act of re-creation the object is not perceived as a work of art (22:186).

Experience is esthetic then, when its qualities are rounded out into a single coherent whole. It is impossible to divide the practical, emotional, and intellectual from one another in a vital experience.

> The emotional phase binds parts together into a single whole; 'intellectual' simply names the fact

> that the experience has meaning; 'practical' indicates that the organism is interacting with events and objects which surround it (22:186).

In a purely intellectual experience the conclusion has value and independent in its own right. In a work of art, however, the terminus is significant not by itself but as the integration of the parts. It has no other existence. In every integral experience then, there is form. In art, the form is an integration of its parts, as in an experience.

> An object is peculiarly and dominantly esthetic, yielding the enjoyment characteristic of esthetic perception, when the factors that determine anything which can be called an experience are lifted high above the threshold of perception and are made manifest for their own sake (22:188).

CHAPTER V

SELF-EXPRESSION AND CHILDREN'S ART

Thus far this study has attempted to accomplish two things. The first was to establish the concept of "self" or "personality" as a framework for the individual's self-expression. Research in psychology is employed to illustrate in what ways behavior is expressive and what meaning these expressions may hold for the individual and for others.

The second portion sought to present a concise illustration of the function of self-expression in art. The concepts of Langer, Rugg and Dewey have been drawn upon for this purpose. In the brief review of their thoughts several primary points were presented. One being the feeling or motivation that impels the artist, another being how he carries this urge from within to fruition, and how the completed work relates back to the artist and out to its appreciator. This is the duality of all expression. There is something inside which is "forced out" or "expressed." What has been expressed relates back to its originator and outward to its perceiver or appreciator (27).

The focus will now be turned to self-expression and the art of the young child. The time span under consideration is from the childs' first graphic attempts (generally from age two to three years) to early adolescence. The onset of adolescence has been long recognized as a critical changing period in the child's art. Some thoughts on the reasons and meaning for this change will be dealt with briefly. The major emphasis will remain with the young child however.

It is a common phenomenon for adults to respond to the expressive qualities contained in the spontaneous art works of the young child. It is generally believed that these qualities exist because of some activity or process of self-expression on the part of the child, done either deliberately and consciously or unconsciously. This raises the question: are the expressive qualities commonly observed in child art, a direct consequence of some prior process or activity of self-expression?

This study will seek insights into this question. To do so it will be necessary to consider both external factors and internal components that come into play during the process or activity of making art. A survey of research pertinent to the child's behavior during the activity of making art will be drawn upon for this purpose. This research will be compared and contrasted with previously sighted theory and data.

Children's drawings, as their work with other art mediums, have great psychological complexity. They delineate perceptual experience and conceptual formation, represent fact and project fantasy, progress through clear developmental trends and permit innumerable idiosyncratic expressions. Many factors come into play as the child engages in the art making process.

The first of these factors is the developmental stages, or trends each child passes through in his mental development. Piaget's extensive research in the four basic stages of mental development will be briefly reviewed here. The first of these, the sensorimotor stage, is from birth to 18 to 24 months. This is a preverbal, presymbolic period characterized by direct action. From the first spontaneous and uncoordinated actions the infant develops coordinations of movement with his eye. There is a gradual shift to acquired habits and from these to intelligence. These habits are a result of both the child's actions and his environment. During this period the child comes to know that objects exist, even apart from his perception of them, and that they can be viewed from different perspectives (21).

The next phase reaches from the development of language to approximately age six. This is known as the preoperational stage. At this time the child comes to represent objects and events by symbols, yet he seldom

distinguishes between himself as agent and his goals as the effect of action. He is still incapable of reversible thought processes. From approximately seven to 11 years the child is in the stage of concrete operations. Piaget defines "operations" as actions, overt or covert, that transform data about the real world in terms of functions, to be used in the solution of problems. Thought is based in part on the physical manipulation of objects (21).

The last phase occurs anywhere from 11 to 15 years. The child shifts from concrete operations to formal operations. The child now reasons or hypothesizes with symbols or ideas rather than needing objects in the physical world as a basis for his thinking. He can operate with the form of an argument and ignore its empirical content. He is now able to use the procedures of the logician or scientist; a hypothetic-deductive procedure that no longer ties his thoughts to existing reality (10).

Piaget's stages of mental development correspond rather closely with those observed by many researchers in childrens drawing behavior. Dale Harris points out,

> It is important to understand that these investigators do not think of such steps as discontinuous with each other. Stages are merely convenient ways of describing perceptibly different orientations and organizations of the drawing act as the child moves from his first pencil strokes to quite elaborate productions. That different investigators have located similar stages, that these stages can be established against an age scale, and that the succession is notably similar for most children, has been sufficiently well validated to establish the usefulness of the concept of stages

> or phases in describing the course of development (10:19).

Among the researchers who have used the format of stages to trace the child's art development is Lowenfeld. He starts with the scribbling stage at approximately two to four years of age. This stage is characterized initially by disorderly or uncontrolled scribbling. With experience and motor development the child develops control over the marks he makes. Next he will name his scribbles, starting with the name following the activity, then during the activity and ultimatehy prior to the activity. Lowenfeld believes this process marks the childs transition from a pure kinesthetic experience to imaginative thinking (16).

The second phase is roughly from four to seven years and is termed the pre-schematic stage. Lowenfeld believes this stage is characterized by the discovery of the relationship between drawing, thinking, and reality. It is a period of constant change as the child controls and combines his longitudinal, horizontal and circular marks into specific identifiable forms. The human figure predominates as the child searches for a schema or symbol to represent his concepts. As with the previous stage, Lowenfeld feels the child's endeavors to be highly influenced by affective components (16).

A definite symbol or schema is generally achieved around seven years. This phase, seven to nine years, is

termed the schematic stage for this reason. The schema or concept the child develops for both man and environment is repeated over and over. Lowenfeld asserts that the child deviates from his schema, adds to it, or omits parts from it, for emotional reasons. The schema does however undergo gradual alterations as the child grows and matures. Slowly the child includes more details, appearing irregularly at first and then ultimately invariably as they come to represent his complete concept.

From nine to 11 years, the stage of dawning realism, the child draws with increasing realism and detail. Lowenfeld believes affective components to be of major significance here as the child becomes aware of sex differences, sex roles and his or her place within the environment. He also terms this the gang-age, as there is a characteristic lack of cooperation with adults and more influence by peer groups. At around 11 years the child enters the pseudorealistic stage of reasoning. It is at this point that a major shift occurs in the child's thinking. He becomes increasingly dissatisfied and critical of his artistic productions. He demands more technical skill of himself and is increasingly aware of the esthetic merit in works of art (16).

This classification into sequences or stages of children's drawing behavior illustrates that such behavior is developmental in character. Researchers over many years,

with numerous children from all over the globe have arrived at very similar conclusions. Discrepancies arise however, when these researchers and educators attempt to use these stages as a means to personality assessment. Determining the affective significance of the child's work, as does Lowenfeld, remains controversial.

A child's art work does reflect his idiosyncratic view of his environment and experiences. Harris warns against the use of such works as "projective techniques," however.

> The problem appears to be essentially that of the 'nomothetic' vs. the 'idiographic' approaches in personality evaluation. If we use the child's drawing as a normative psycho metric instrument in the study of personality, we find that validity coefficients are so low as to make individual prediction impossible. On the one hand, intimate knowledge of a child's experience and attitudes makes many of the details and special features of his drawing quite meaningful. However, the great variety of ways in which possible drawing elements can be (and are, in fact), combined by children makes it virtually impossible for one to read predictively from the drawing to the child, despite the seeming success of occasional 'blind interpretations.' Drawings many times confirm or throw light on suspected trends in the detailed clinical study of cases; they are not psychometric instruments (10:25).

Attempts at the clinical and projective uses of the child's art works have taken two basic directions. The first is based on the hypothesis that unverbalized feeling states are projected into the procedure by which the child manipulates and arranges a medium into form and pattern. Thus researchers seek evidence of psychological traits,

qualities, or states in the formal attributes or the stylistic features of the work. The other direction is based on the hypothesis of a projected ego or self-image that the child presumably portrays. Interest here is not in general features, but in specific treatment of parts or features, particularly in the graphically portrayed human figure (10:37).

Study of children's art work, from many theoretical positions reveal psychologically important aspects about their makers. Yet an overview of research in this area implies that there is no specific universal symbolic language of feelings, desires, beliefs and fantasies in child art. Generalizations appear to be possible in principle but not in specific symbols. Such symbols, contained in line, form and color, differ from child to child. What may be true for the individual may not be characteristic of the group. Thus, an elaborate universal symbolism in the interpretation of the psychological significance of children's drawings has not been devised (10).

If such a symbolism exists and can be determined, its educational and therapeutic significance would be considerable. Children's art work remains however, unique to them as individuals. Both in terms of what they choose to depict and how they do it.

When the child's art work is a spontaneous behavior it has often been believed to reveal the child's feelings

and desires at a given moment and lasting characteristics (personality). Hence, attempts to determine a universal symbolism of affect are attempts at interpreting the psychological significance of drawings in terms of a system or language of signs. Drawings of the human figure, that of the individual and/or the opposite sex are assessed. The psychological interpretation relies on the presence or absence of specific body parts, qualitative features, and details.

> The concept that drawings of the human figure are useful for the study of personality, or as diagnostic tools in clinical assessment, finds its theoretical justification in self-image psychology as well as in the psychoanalytic theory of projection (10:42).

The concept of "body-image" as the person's self-concept, a configuration, or gestalt is believed to reflect the unconscious. This gestalt is thought to compose many physical, organic, and physiological sensations and experiences with one's body. Hence, a drawing of the human figure may be a drawing of the individual's image of his own body. He is unconsciously portraying his own body or "self."

The psychological self-image theory was presented in Chapters II and III. Investigators sighted there argued for the significance of the world as perceived, as contrasted with objective reality. It is the psychological self or phenomenological world that is of value as only this subjective world has true meaning and relevance for the

individual. Only the child then, can truly know his own world and it's significance for him (24).

Numerous attempts have been made to use the self-image consciously or unconsciously projected, in the analysis and interpretation of figure drawings. Among these are Machover's Draw-A-Person Technique. She states in Personality Projection In The Human Figure,

> When an individual attempts to solve the problem of the directive to 'draw a person,' he is compelled to draw from some source. External figures are too varied in their body attributes to lend themselves to a spontaneous, composite, objective representation of a person. Some process of selection involving identification through projection and introjection enters at some point. The individual must draw consciously, and no doubt unconsciously, upon his whole system of psychic values. The body, or self, is the most intimate point of reference in any activity. We have, in the course of growth, come to associate various sensations, perceptions, and emotions with certain body organs. This investment in body organs, or the perception of the body image as it has developed out of personal experience, must somehow guide the individual who is drawing in the specific structure and content which constitutes his offering of a 'person.' Consequently, the drawing of a person, in involving a projection of the body image, provides a natural vehicle for the expression of one's body needs and conflicts. Successful drawing interpretation has proceeded on the hypothesis that the figure drawn is related to the individual who is drawing with the same intimacy characterizing that individual's gait, his handwriting, or any other of his expressive movements (17:5).

Machover is not alone in a theory of projection of the self-image in the drawing of the human figure. Research has been conducted along several different lines. They include: the differentiation of sex in figure drawing,

preferred sex, drawings made by persons who are physically atypical, and drawings done by subjects with known neurological damage that interferes with cognitive processes. Harris, in Children's Drawings As Measures of Intellectual Maturity, reviews this and other extensive research conducted in an effort to determine if children's drawings do provide significant cues for personality diagnosis. He concludes the work is promising yet no complete characterological system based on this research has appeared and more extensive work is required. He states,

> Thus, the case for unconscious representation of the 'self' in human figure drawing has not been firmly established. But the very nature of the concept defies objective validation. The weight of evidence strongly suggests that children put into their drawings their cognitive concepts, especially the visual ones, and that distortions in size and proportion represent psychological and conceptual inadequacies and immaturities as well as they do affective conditions or unconscious dynamics.

He goes on to say,

> Furthermore, child self-portraits, when such are explicitly requested, do portray the drawer's appearance as it is visibly given to the world, within the capacities of the child to represent. A child's symbolism is a logical one, quite explicable in terms of his understanding and concepts. Too few clinical studies have carefully controlled the psychological and social variables operating selectively in their samples which are known to affect art productions. Until this has been done the 'evidence' adduced from drawings in favor of the self-image theory (in the projective sense) must be regarded with caution (10:46).

Children's drawings do give outward expression to inner, covert thoughts and feelings. The use of such

drawings as tools in clinical diagnosis has not been completely supported in the research data however. Harris states several generalizations that have arisen concerning the psychological study of drawings. He presents eight affirmations that represent wide practice or opinion but have not been proved scientifically. In condensed version they are:

> 1. Drawing interpretation is more valid when based on a series of a subject's protocols than when based on one drawing.
> 2. Drawings are most useful for psychological analysis when teamed with other available information about the child.
> 3. Free drawings are more meaningful psychologically than drawings of assigned topics. Thus, if one seeks new ideas and insights about the individual, or if one explores the range of ideas and techniques of which children are capable, he will want free drawings--many of them. If one seeks to compare children systematically as to abilities, stylistic trends, use of symbols, and the like, he will want to control the production by setting the task or assigning the subject.
> 4. When a human figure drawing is assigned, the sex of the figure first drawn relates to the image the drawer holds of his own sex role.
> 5. A child adopts a schema or style of drawing which is peculiar to him and which becomes highly significant psychologically. That many individuals also adopt a unique expressive style or schema of drawing is also undoubtedly true, but the psychological meaning of such a schema for personality study is less clear.
> 6. The manner in which certain elements are portrayed in drawings may be used as signs of certain psychological states or conditions in the artist. Whether or not "signs" are selected by an empirical or deductive procedure, there is still the question of whether form or content will provide the cues. There is little evidence for the validity of signs beyond that of selected case studies using small clinical groups. The drawings made by these selected cases may or may not be representative of those made by others whose behavior is similar. Drawings similar in style or symbolism may be common among persons who show no indications at all of the behavior such drawings have been assumed to symbolize!

> Few clinical studies have clearly recognized the great many ways in which children can represent a particular body part or detail. Despite the clear-cut developmental patterns which have been found repeatedly, there are many, many ways in which children can depict a particular concept. This fact militates against a too-detailed schedule of specific forms with corresponding interpretations.
> 7. Drawings must be interpreted as wholes rather than segmentally or analytically. Undoubtedly, the generalization that drawings be interpreted as wholes grows out of the impression, very common among those who work extensively with drawings, that any analytical or measurement approach fails decisively to convey all the researcher's impressions from the product. A similar position is frequently taken in art education; that the very nature of "art" is such as to defy identification by analytical procedures but may be apprehended directly, by intuition.
> 8. The use of color in drawings can be significant for studying personality. Much more adequately controlled observations must be made before firm generalizations concerning the psychological meaning of color can be drawn. It may be that situational factors are crucial also (10:52-57).

The fundamental questions of validity and reliability of assessment apply to the projective use of drawings. Such techniques are only truely useful if they are accurate. To assign symbolic meaning to, or attempt an interpretation of a child's art work has considerable consequences. Too frequently adult associations and concepts are projected into the interpretation of the child's "projections." Hence poor definition of criteria, inaccuracy of interpretations and poor methodological procedures all affect outcomes in such research. Unless rigorous conditions are observed in such experiments, caution must be exercised in terms of conclusions gained from them. Harris states:

> Judges may consistently apply definite or objective criteria in their assessments of drawings, and thus consistently locate certain elements or features, and children may use these same features in subsequent drawings. But are affective states of the "artist" carried into his graphic productions? Great art often profoundly stirs the viewer; the artist who produced the work presumably worked from an emotional state. Something of the artist's feeling is conveyed to his public; but whether it is always the same feeling state is a point of debate even among art theorists. But whether untrained artists, particularly children, convey their personalities to their audience or represent them to the psychologically skilled interpreter, is the question . . . (10:59).

From a very thorough review of the literature pertinent to personality assessment of drawing behaviors Harris concludes:

> While undoubtedly drawings contain "projective features"--i.e., exhibit a number of cues relating to affect, interest, typicality of personality, and the like, they cannot as yet be used alone as predictive or even as selective instruments (10:65).

> A survey of the research and clinical literature is persuasive; the projective hypothesis as it applies to human figure drawings has never been adequately or consistently formulated, and systems for the evaluation of such drawings have, for the most part, been exceedingly loose. Consequently, the assessment of drawings by such methods very often shows modest reliability and low validity. The more rigorous the conditions of the experiment--control of variables, matching of control samples, and the like--the lower the validity of the human figure drawings as a measure of affect and personality (10:67).

In conclusion Harris regards the clinical or projective use of children's drawings with caution. He apparently bases this on the fact that no universal symbolism has as yet been determined in children's drawings and no universal system for interpretation of signs in such

drawings has been developed. Still, children's drawings seem to reflect both their conceptual maturity and something else. This something else is demonstrated through each child's unique and consistent style of drawing. As with his other expressive behaviors, the child comes to be known and identified by his style of drawing. Children's drawings then, have two characteristics. One that allows identification of intellectual maturity and developmental stage such as is accomplished by the Goodenough-Harris Drawing Test (10). The other characteristics include the child's unique drawing style and choice of subject matter and depiction of details.

It is the idiosyncratic quality of each child's drawings that is the focus of attention for this study. It appears that determining the significance of such qualities can only, thus far, be successful in small groups or on a one-to-one basis. In such settings the adult comes to know the child as an individual and rests his conclusions on specifics about that child and not on an a priori system of symbols and/or signs. The nature of the problem of interpretation does defy objective validation on a large scale.

The Wolff study sighted earlier is worthy of mention here in terms of the concept of "body-image." Wolff's research revolved around the expression of inner personality in external behavior. His major conclusion is that there

is congruence between expressive traits and personality. He found emotional or personality factors significantly influenced a subject's willingness to recognize his own forms of static and dynamic expressions. Unrecognized self-judgments were more extreme, faster, more extensive and detailed than judgments by others. He also found a reoccurrence of wishful tendencies and emotional influences on association experiments, memory and recall.

Wolff used self-judgments that lacked recognition to uncover unconscious components of personality. When the subject recognized himself or felt his own expression was included his judgments were much different. Environmental or situational factors definitely influenced the judges response. Those that recognized themselves modified their response and contained its emotional qualities. Perhaps these factors are an influence on the child in the act of drawing also. A drawing made upon a specific adult request may simply be very different than a drawing made spontaneously and self-initiated. If this is the case it becomes very difficult to assess children's drawings in the experimental environment.

Research, such as has been done by Harris, illustrates that drawings are definite indices to certain aspects of intellectual or conceptual development in all children. He observed notable sex differences and the considerable impact of education on scores in the Goodenough-Harris Drawing Test. Such differences observed in

children's drawing increases our comprehension of child development.

Yet, children are clearly idiosyncratic in their drawing in terms of style, subject matter and details included. Because of this the search for idiopathic signs in drawing has not been particularly successful. Whether this uniqueness recorded in a child's graphic products reflect his temperament, his personality, his interest, or something else entirely has not been proven. Hence, it is important to consider non-intellectual and cultural influences on drawings.

Goodenough's work and present studies indicate slight but consistent sex differences in mean score, favoring girls, and marked sex differences in the treatment of certain qualitative features of the drawing. These sex differences in total score appear at an early age. For the drawing of a man, girls exceed boys at each year of age by about one-half year of growth. For the drawing of a woman, this difference is roughly equal to one year of growth (10:127).

> On the drawing of a man, girls do consistently better on eye detail and proportion items. Boys are considerably more likely to get the nose in two dimensions. Girls definitely excel on indicating the lips and giving the line of the jaw. Girls do better on hair items and on proportion of the ears. Boys excel consistently on the proportion of the foot and indication of the heel. Girls do better on arm proportion. Girls solve the problem of clothing or figure transparencies sooner than boys, but do not otherwise tend to do better on clothing items. While girls definitely

> do better on motor coordination items, boys are more likely to portray action in the arms. Most of thse observations confirm Goodenough's earlier work (10:127).

Interpretation of these sex differences is less easy than itemizing their existence. It has been customary in mental testing to construct scales so that no real sex differences in intelligence appear. Harris points out,

> The analytical approach to abilities, however, has consistently turned up small differences in a number of dimensions, which appear at early ages and persist through childhood and into adolescence. Girls show a slight but consistent acceleration in general development and perhaps in verbal performance. Boys seem to excel in arithmetic performance, particularly reasoning. Girls do slightly better on fine motor coordinations and on tests of number and name checking. As early as age five, girls show more esthetic interests, and more interest in painting and modeling activities. Girls are often found to show greater awareness of people and personal relationships. Regardless of whether these differences arise from psychobiological or culturally derived origins, they are consistently noted from early ages in our culture and probably should be taken into account in test building (10:129).

One's theoretical bias will obviously influence the nature of how these differences are interpreted. One possibility may be in terms of dynamic theories of personality organization. Culturally reinforced sex differences in libidinal investment of body parts, differences in the significance of the body image, and differences in sexual symbolism may be influences. Undoubtedly more than one factor is involved in the girl's superior drawing performance. Harris notes the greater relative sex differences in drawing the female figure.

> It may be that girls have a greater identification with sex role than do boys. Certainly there is no indication that girls reject the feminine sex role in their drawings; they do not 'masculinize' the female figure. Moreover, it has often been observed that social values in Western cultures emphasize the male role. The fact that boys and girls are less likely to exhibit characteristic sex differences in drawing the male figure than in drawing the female figure is not surprising. A majority of both boys and girls of all ages characteristically draw the male figure when only the drawing of a person is called for. Another possibility is that girls excel in drawing the human figure because of a greater awareness of and concern with people and personal relationships (10:130).

Sex differences in drawing cannot be separated from cultural influences. Similar research in other cultures and with minority groups within this country found that sex and cultural differences in drawing are complexly related. Also, Harris' research found that depiction of the most general features of the human figure shows no differences over time. Depiction of specific body parts has however shown some changes from the 1920's to the mid 1950's (10).

Children in the 1950's draw the features of the face, particularly chin, nose and mouth and the suitable proportions of the legs more poorly than those of the 1920's. They excel on the presence of arms, trunk, attachment of limbs, correct number of fingers, depiction of hand, head and two dimensional arms. They also excel on hair, finger detail and absence of transparencies. Thus children of the 1950's are more successful in handling a number of body and limb details. Again, the reasons for these changes are

complex. Perhaps changes in general health, prevailing cultural attitudes at a given point in time, changes in art education and changes in the general attitude toward handling children contribute to these differences over time (10:139).

It has already been indicated that drawings are not generally useful as diagnostic devices for personality assessment. The vast range of items included by the child in his drawings, along with the idiosyncratic method of depicting such detail defies standardization of this point. All attempts at diagnosis must include background information about the child in question. Frequently what appears as unusual or atypical to the adult eye is perfectly logical upon questioning the child.

There have also been attempts to use "self drawings" as indicators of non-intellectual aspects of personality. By-in-large the children took this assignment very seriously and made a sincere effort to depict themselves as they felt they must appear. This would include both realistic features as well as concepts suggested or symbolized more indirectly.

> Realistically portrayed features take the form of general indications of child or youth status, such as a baseball cap, or a hair ribbon or barrette' or they include features unique to a particular child, such as glasses or freckles. The general juvenile features may reveal something of the child's developing idea of age or sex role; the unique or idiosyncratic features may reveal something of the child's self-concept (10:151).

The child may represent directly, or through accessory items, activities of considerable interest or significance. He may also reflect something of his sense of self worth.

1. Exaggerate a particular feature when he has not done so on other figure drawings.
2. Attach a derisive nickname as a label.
3. Use a cartoon technique to minimize the demands such an assignment makes on him (10:151).

In many cases the child is conscious of and can verbalize about his drawing. An elaborate theory of symbolism is not required for comprehension. In all cases, there are considerable non-intellectual and cultural influences on children's drawings. Included in these would be the triple behavior determination of objective, collective and subjective factors sighted by Wolff.[29]

He attributes to this triple determination not only personality but more specifically our acts and interests as we confront our daily life. Such acts and interests are directly reflected in the child's art.

Research on children's drawings has taken a variety of directions. In an effort to establish a foundation for a theoretical approach to drawing behavior, Harris has organized this diverse literature into a series of empirical generalizations. It is important to include these generalizations here as they may be of aid in the comprehension of the function of self-expression in the child's art. Each generalization will be stated, but only those believed

to be specifically relevant here will be considered in detail.

> 1. The earliest scribbles are more than random markings. They are patterned by the mechanical arrangement of the hand, wrist and arm as a multiple jointed lever; they are probably modified by the scribbler's visual observations and to a very limited degree by relations within the drawing field (10:155).

The universality of children's scribbles was noted previously as termed the scribbling stage by Lowenfeld. From sweeping motions of the entire arm the child progresses to use of the wrist and forearm producing slightly curved lines. Perceiving his marks reinforces the child to produce more and increasingly complex marks. Rhoda Kellogg, What Children Scribble And Why, identified 20 basic scribbles common in all two to five year olds. She also stresses the fundamental pleasure children obtain from this process. Harris notes,

> Apparently, the effects produced by action become important reinforcements in all types of learning, perceptual and cognitive as well as motor, giving manipulative behavior an additional "drive" quality. The generalization of such responses to non-associated stimulus conditions must be considered to be independent of "expectation" and "purpose" and remains one of the most difficult aspects of learning to explain. "Expectation," or set, may itself be a learned response (10:157).

> 2. The majority of young children show a common directionality in drawing simple forms. This directionality in the drawing act is probably influenced by components of motor development. The way the object drawn is oriented on the page is also predictable for most children, and likewise may be related to motor development (10:159).

The motor components of such a complex expressive act, such as drawing, are very significant, especially in the early phases. It is a common observation that young children name their drawings according to fancied resemblances after completion. Next they will name the work while engaged in the activity and still later previous to the act of drawing. Older children do not draw solely from a mental picture of their subject either, but are influenced by the drawing process itself. Children respond to cues as the work progresses and are thus guided to make further strokes. "The drawing act is thus governed by factors intrinsic to the process, and some of these may reflect Gestalt principles" (10:162).

> 3. Children's drawings represent objects as they perceive them. Even the simplest, most 'primitive' drawings are wholes, yet contain discernible parts. With increased age this whole or Gestalt quality of drawings shows a progression; it is more detailed, and at the same time more complexly organized (10:163).

Representation of features of objects increase with mental growth. Also, appreciation of abstract properties of an object develops much more slowly than the existence of parts.

> Goodenough, as well as others, long ago observed that children seem to depict first the parts which have a particular significance for them at the time. It may be that this increase in detail is related to the visual process itself; children may perceive the whole or the largest masses earliest, and then supply the detail as visual experience increases (10:163).

Young children may depend on tactual and kinesthetic cues to comprehend the concrete features of objects. The young child seems to live closer to his sensory and motor experiences than do older children and adults. The young child uses emotional referents and identifies aspects of objects with immediate sensory experience as he possesses fewer abstractions and less complex structures of meaning for classifying his perceptions.

As he matures, the child draws objects as increasingly differentiated, yet the parts always fit the representation and function as a unit. Harris believes two theories may account for this. First, "Children's drawings present a progressively differentiated conception, regardless of the children's immediate perceptual experience." Two, "increasing skill in technique enhances the represented conception" (10:165).

4. Central or cognitive factors appear to be crucial in determining developmental features of children's drawings (10:166).

Research on drawing of a model indicates that changes appear with age and presumably mental level. Also, when a time interval occurs between viewing the model and drawing it, systematic rather than random modications take place. This includes a tendency to simplify or concretize the model.

Investigators have also found a tendency to amplify or "interpret" a model drawn from memory when amplification

serves to give concrete meaning to a relatively abstract symbol. This tendency to simplify or amplify, "interpret," also occurs when drawing from a model. Harris states,

> Apparently, no universal statement can yet be made with respect to the tendency to add or omit elements in drawings made from memory or from examples' this varies with the difficulty and meaningfulness of the material. Moreover, difficulty with meaningfulness are not absolute factors, but depend on the maturity and knowledge of the subjects. Complex figures, especially those that are not familiar, tend to be simplified by children as well as by adults. Under some conditions, amplification, by the addition of details necessary to give a more obvious meaning, may occur (10:172).

Harris concludes,

> It is hard to escape the conclusion that the person's cognitive content is fundamental; both simplifications and amplifications usually lead to "meaningfulness" --the incorporation of the object into a familiar body of concepts (10:172).

This review of four empirical conclusions, based on a range of research, assists in comprehending certain aspects of the child's drawing behavior. Both cognitive and motor aspects influence the child's art works. Even the child's earliest marks have form, which is partly due to the mechanical arrangement of the hand and developmental trends in the achievement of complex motor control. Cultural conventions also influence this development.

From the beginning the child's drawings have meaning for him. He progresses from the simple to the complex. The young child seems to derive meaning from the motor and kinesthetic experience, the older child becomes

increasingly visual. During this progression to more differentiation the drawings remain organized wholes. Harris concludes:

> Children never portray objects exactly as they appear. In their drawings, they select, modify, and even add to what may be perceived in the object. These tendencies occur whether objects are copied from models or drawn from memory. The 'meaningfulness' of the object to the child, even more than its difficulty (complexity and amount of detail), influences the drawing that is made. This can be noted regardless of the maturity of the child. Language seems to be closely related to the child's ability to draw; this fact adds strength to the conclusion that drawing for the child is primarily a cognitive process (10:173).

Interpretation of research data, as with the devising of methodology, choosing of a population to study and other research factors are often subject to the investigators bias. These four empirical conclusions do illustrate the considerable importance of cognitive processes in children's art. To conclude from them that "drawing for the child is primarily a cognitive process" (10:173) is questionable. The major criticism of such a conclusion rests on the methodology used to obtain the data.

The previous discussion of the Lockean and the Leibnitzian traditions of psychological assumptions concerning man's becoming are raised here. The methods used to arrive at these four empirical assumptions were essentially Lockean in persuasion. Where a wholistic approach was sighted the data was considered inconclusive. Yet the issue remains; in the controlled experimental situation, do

researchers obtain a full and complete understanding of both overt behaviors and covert components?

Certainly the behavior, per se, was isolated and documented. Motivation in a controlled experiment remains questionable. It is believed that methodology must be devised that can ascertain affective components as well as observable behaviors before truely accurate conclusions on "primary" processes can be fully determined.

The complexity of the phenomenon under question tends to imply no one primary process. For example, the emotional quality of motor components is considerable in the very young child and appears to remain an influence on the older child as well. Harris also notes the child's inclination to simplify or amplify a model drawn from memory. He believes this tendency to "interpret" serves to give concrete meaning to the child's concepts. This is probably true, particularly in an experimental setting where the child's personal involvement with the previous model is minimal and/or geared toward the expectations of the examiner.

Wolff's work shows clearly that there are emotional influences on memory. Hence both objective and subjective factors influence what the individual remembers or forgets. Wolff claims the process of forgetting allows the object remembered to be not less but more distinct. This process of structuration causes simplification and clarification of details. He states,

> Structuration depends on the subject's degree of participation in the memorized content. Learning memory (school or fact) and experience memory (life or personality) are two different things. Learning memory does not demand personal participation, whereas in experience memory the recollected facts are incorporated into the personality. The dominance of one of these two kinds of memory is significant for the type of personality (29:207).

In neither case did Wolff find intellect to appear to play a deciding role. Connections can be established between what a subject forgets and his emotional experience because he omits data that arouse emotional reminisences. Wolff concludes that the capacity to reproduce a fact is influenced by the degree of freedom from inhibitory effects of personal determinants (29). This view is supported by Combs and Rogers. Both assert that all our perceptions are influenced to some varying degree by affective components. We tend, in their view, to perceive what we want or need to perceive to maintain and enhance our phenomenal self. In this sense, "meaning" has affective as well as cognitive aspects. In the experimental setting, cognitive components are more likely to dominate.

There are an abundance of theories on the psychology of children's art. A brief description of several major theoretical positions will be given here as they pertain to self-expression in children's art.

Gestalt theorists hold that drawings are governed by laws of structure and form in the stimulus field. Drawing requires perceptual (visual sensory) and expressive

(motor) processes plus the third process of cognition.

> The Gestaltists hold that perceptual processes, controlled by hypothesized neural actions in the brain, cause all stimulus situations to be experienced as 'patterned' into figure-ground relationships. The responding organism is thus selectively oriented to the stimulus field (10:175).

Thus the qualitative and subjective aspect of art are expressed by Gestalt theory because of its emphasis on wholes, organization, and phenomenalism generally.

Another theory that stresses the inherent features of children's physical and mental development has been termed "Organismic." This view stresses continuing interaction between the organism and environment as a developmental, adjustive process. These theories are phenomenological, describing behavior from the viewpoint of the experiencing organism. Cognitive processes are central to the organismic approach to children's drawing.

Both of these theories stress the prepotency of the global over the particularized, the closed or completed over the open or incomplete. When the dominant total qualities have a particular emotional significance for the child, Werner speaks of emotional perspective (28). Emotional perspective refers to the exaggeration of those features of an object or an experience that have affective rather than cognitive significance. It has been noted that in language development, the vocabulary of the young child

is heavily weighted with words having affective rather than cognitive meaning.

In terms of the physiognomic mode of perception, the object is understood first and most fundamentally through motor-affective attitudes of the observer, who projects his own kinesthetic and visual cues onto the object. Objects thus known through their actual or dynamic qualities contrast with objects known through their "geometrical-technical," or matter-of-fact qualities (28). Werner thus holds that, as in language, drawings express affective, kinesthetic motor and "concrete" meanings before they express cognitive, abstract ideas (28:75).

It is important to note Lowenfeld's concept of haptic perception here. This haptic mode draws heavily on tactual and kinesthetic modalities and is gradually displaced by the visual mode with maturity. This is similar to Werner's physiognomic perception. Lowenfeld recognized that there are various styles for the expression of concepts as long as they are through the experience of the child, and not through techniques for visual presentation. His theory draws upon both Gestalt laws and yet is organismic when he emphasizes the growth of the child through his continuing experience. He also emphasizes, as stated previously, a progression through stages of development.

> Although Lowenfeld agrees with Werner that drawings express concepts or meanings, Werner is more concerned with how perception modifies concept formation;

> Lowenfeld with how concept formation modifies the drawing product (10:183).

Lowenfeld's position is primarily related to personality development. It is not so much to bring to awareness the content of the unconscious, as to activate passive knowledge. Hence, the development and enhancement of the self, or ego, through art experiences that express the child's highly individual way of viewing his world (16). Harris concludes that more than other investigators,

> Lowenfeld has discerned the developmental character of children's concepts, the great variety of ways in which children meet and solve problems, the desirability of encouraging individual patterns of growth in assuring strong ego development, and the essentially unique character of personality. Psychologically, Lowenfeld's emphasis on observation of the child at work, as a key to understanding individual patterns of growth, is sound. Motor and kinesthetic, as well as visual and cognitive, aspects of experience have educational significance (10:183).

In contrast to theories of drawing that imply an inherent organization are those that attempt to be rigorously empirical. "These theories account for organized behavior in terms of the organism's repeated contacts with its environment, mediated by sensory processes" (10:185). Hence the organization of visual perception has been a focus of research in psychology. From this research it has been concluded that: children perceive from very early; comprehend simple more readily than complex forms, and familiar more readily than unusual or unfamiliar forms. Children's perceptual performance varies greatly. Such

variations in both perception and in drawing belies the notion of innately patterned visual-motor Gestalts, except in the most general sense. Very early the child's drawing depict familiar, meaningful forms (10).

One of the most complete theoretical analysis of perception and object recognition has been done by Piaget. His position is that the child first distinguishes and recognizes stable groups of impressions in the form of subjective dispositions or attitudes. The infant recognizes his own reaction rather than the object itself. Simple reflexes are basic in this process (21).

> Piaget links the concept of object with the concept of space, and the concept of causality with the concept of time. These four primary concepts are essentially preverbal and are fundamental to the capacity for object recognition. They grow out of primitive assimilative and accommodative relationships between the infant and his environment. With these four concepts, and the consequent capacity for object recognition, and with the assistance of the language system, the child constructs the elaborate structure of verbalized concepts involved in cognition (10:191).

Goodenough held that a child's drawing was a form of language--a cognitive expression--the purpose of which was not primarily esthetic. From her analysis of drawings she hypothesized certain higher thought processes, involving discriminations, associations and generalizations of details and of relations. Thus the development of concepts and the ability to manipulate these concepts. A child's ability to draw an object then was dependent upon his concept of the

object rather than the immediate visual image. She states,

> It may thus be said that at any given time a child's drawing will consist of two parts--the first part embracing those characteristics which have already become an integral part of his concept of the object drawn, and consequently appear invariably; the second part including the elements which are in process of becoming integrated and are therefore shown with more or less irregularity. The frequency with which any given characteristic tends to appear is a function of the extent to which it has become integrated into the developing concept, and a measure of the weight which should be given to it as an index of concept development (9:75).

Concept development cannot be separated from environmental factors. The differences among children emphasize this. Emotional disturbances also influence the child's drawing performance. Humans are not essentially passive, but remain active. Constantly striving for meaning, assessing and comparing, reassessing experience in terms of past experience. This emphasizes both the dynamic and complex character of human responding, along with the complexity of each social situation.

It has been noted that children do not include all that they know about a given object in each drawing, or depict what concepts they do include accurately. The distinction seems to be between "knowledge of facts and appreciation of their relative significance" (9:78). Harris and Goodenough attribute this primarily to lack of specific motivation to be accurate, carelessness, or lack of skill in handling the medium. This may be an over

simplification however. All three factors can play a part dependent upon the specific situation and child.

It may be that aspects of personality and specific affective states also influence the omission or distortion of details. Very frequently this can be determined by asking the child to verbalize about the work. At other times the reasons may be inherent in the situation or environment. Much of the research sighted previously points to emotional or affective influences on memory and recall. Also, the idiosyncratic quality of children's art has been noted. It may be that the child, when making a drawing, has several different influences on him. He may:

1. Invariably include those features that represent his completed concept.
2. Irregularly include those features or details as he comes to perceive them and is able to incorporate them into his completed concept.
3. Utilizes features or details irregularly as they represent a particular affective state and thus complete his personal vision of a particular experience or concept.

All three factors would be dependent on the child's motivation to complete the task and his ability to manipulate the medium.

From his extensive synthesis of research on children's drawing behaviors and review of psychological theories of children's art Harris arrives at several general conclusions. His conclusions and observations bear discussion here as they affect interpretation of children's art. He notes the contention between the major theoretical positions, the analytical and the holistic, and states,

> In general, it appears that the analytic method has yielded more fruitful results and has built up the more scientifically impressive literature. This literature has firmly established the major psychological correlates of children's drawings in the area of concepts and cognitive processes. Wholistic, interpretative approaches, however, have called attention to persisting problems which the analytically inclined have tended to brush aside. Wholistic approaches have emphasized the complexity of the drawing process and its essential relationship to the child's maturity in other respects. They have thus catalyzed, corrected, and returned research to the level of observed phenomena (10:227).

It is acknowledged that one's theoretical position influences how one interprets data or observes phenomena. One can generally find evidence for any position taken. Thus, the analytic method views drawing as signifying cognitive content. The educator or therapist is more likely to view drawing in terms of its emotional-expressive components.

In reality, drawing appears to be a combination of many components with the emphasis shifting with development. Based on his research Harris concludes,

> The very young child seems to gain an intense satisfaction, largely affective in nature, from the

> motoric expression involved in scribbling and drawing. Then, for a short time, around age six or seven, an interest in form and pattern as such may appear. Increasingly, however, his drawing becomes a form of language--a way of expressing concepts and ideas. It is thus a form of calligraphy, a kind of elaborate and stylized writing. At the same time, however, the child becomes increasingly adept at handling line, mass, and space, and interelating these to produce shape, form, proportion, balance, and design in his drawings of familiar objects. In effect he is discovering the techniques of graphic art. But primarily his drawings at this time express the growing complexity of his concepts of concrete objects and their interrelationships.
>
> With increasing skill in and dependence on verbal communication, the calligraphic aspect of drawings tend to be displaced. Most children become so dependent upon verbal techniques, so aware of the criterion of visual realism which is forced on them by an overwhelmingly visual, even pictorial, culture, and so critical of their inability to achieve visual effects commensurate with this criterion, that they give up drawing altogether (10:228).

The major criticism of Harris' conclusions rests with his heavy emphasis on cognitive components as primary to the drawing process. Interpreted in the analytical sense, cognitive components are divorced from their affective qualities. Viewed in the holistic sense, cognitive components may have a feeling quality that can be illustrated by the child's intense motivation and satisfaction from the drawing process.

The influence of all components is not evenly distributed at all times. As the child matures he is in a constant state of change. Yet all components play some part in the drawing process, as do certain aspects of personality, at all times. The child is never fully divorced

from his past experience nor his present need. Thus the major components, such as the cognitive, perceptual, motor-kinesthetic and affective will probably shift in dominance according to maturity, environment, personality and experience. All such components and influences play some role in the child's art at each point in time.

This is not to underestimate the importance of cognition in personality development and integration. It is rather an attempt to see the child's drawing behavior in its totality. The research Harris sights supporting his hypothesis is too frequently done in the controlled experimental situation to make necessarily accurate and all encompassing statements about children's spontaneous and self motivated drawing behaviors.

Another of Harris' conclusions that is worth mentioning here concerns the "adolescent crisis." He states,

> All authorities recognize that something occurs at adolescence which, for many children, puts an end to representative drawing. Some discern in this cessation evidence of increasing psychological and motivational conflicts, particularly over sex and body. Others attribute this cessation to the increasing preeminence of language in usefully delineating cognitive content, or concepts. Still others point out the child's increasing ability to judge his drawing as a conceptualization and representation of visual reality, and his increasing self-criticism of technique. For the first position, there is very little positive, and some negative, evidence. There is some psychological and social evidence for the second. For the third position, there is persuasive psychological evidence that when visual representation assumes an inordinate significance, as it does in a technological society with its emphasis on pictures and diagrams, the child becomes markedly aware of the photographic or visual

> image, grows self-critical and gives up his drawing, unless he is able to master techniques for achieving effects that he understands and wishes to achieve (10:230).

Harris minimizes the importance of psychological and motivational conflicts, particularly over sex and body as a reason for cessation of drawing in adolescence. In part, he bases his position on the inability of investigators to use drawings successfully in personality assessment with large groups. Also, no universal symbolism in child art has been devised. Combined with this is the fact that empirical methodology frequently fails to explain many components of personality and motivation.

Rather, he feels the research evidence points to a technological society that emphasizes pictures and diagrams and forces visual realism on the child. With the development of technical drawing skills and increased conceptual content the child will be able to achieve the effects he understands and desires. It is presumably from this point that the child can develop esthetic quality in his art works.

In reality, the transition is not easily made. The child seeks technical skill to assist his drawing yet very frequently clings to such skills in a rigid manner. He is dissatisfied with his work as he is with much of himself and his environment. Because this is a time when most schooling no longer requires participation in art, he may stop drawing altogether.

Adolescence is then a time of great stress for most children. Not only art work, but many activities the child engages in are met with self-criticism. It is also a period of significant physiological and social change. Stress at this period cannot be attributed to cognitive or environmental factors alone. This is a period of transition with both observable and covert influences on the child. The tendency to withdraw and be self critical is common. Children engaged in art work at this time feel dissatisfied with their product. Even when they are not dissatisfied per se they may still hide or destroy their work. No one component seems to be of major influence to cause this.

Again, interpretation of research data influences the nature of one's conclusions. If one takes an empirical approach then cognitive factors would appear to predominate because they are accessible in the testing situation. If one takes a more wholistic approach, or seeks research of the nature done by Wolff, then other factors are allowed into consideration. Art embraces many indefinable elements that appear to include interpretation of experience as much as being the result of observable behavior. Harris does address this problem when he says,

> Science is analytical; analysis seems to destroy the completeness of the esthetic experience, and to lose the essential quality of the artistic product. But psychology has both humanistic and scientific aspects. A psychology of art and drawing in the rational or the intuitive, effective sense of the discipline would yield one form of truth. A psychology of art and drawing

> in the research tradition of behavioral sciences would yield quite a different form of truth. The two would be supplementary, but they would probably defy reduction to common terms (10:212).

The humanistic and analytical may thus never be reduced to common terms. Yet it appears that both persuasions render insights that are crucial to comprehending the child and his art. To totally isolate the phenomena to one theoretical position simply limits this comprehension. A genuine effort must be made to see the child and his art behavior in its totality by employing those aspects of each position that most illuminate the problem. Hence, we return to interpretation of theory and data in the absence clear empirical answers. In the form of conclusions, we seek a synthesis of interpretation.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This inquiry has been an effort to discern the source along with the nature of self-expression in children's art. Such expression cannot be isolated from the whole child as a personality. Thus an effort has been made to develop the concept of "self" or "personality" as a framework from which the impetus for self-expression in art may be determined. Research in expressive behavior and its relationship to personality has been employed to illuminate covert influences on self-expression. Specific research was sighted to establish possible affective meanings for overt behaviors.

From this general review, philosophical inquiry has been utilized to account for the relation between the act of the artist as a process of self-expression and the role of the expressive qualities perceivable within the art product. The later portion of the inquiry sought specifics concerning the various factors in children's development and behavior in art.

Among these factors are the components or processes such as perception, cognition, and motor development. Each has been dealt with in terms of how it is influenced by, or influences affective components. Where pertinent, previously sighted data has been utilized to evaluate or interpret the conclusions drawn from research. An effort has been made to review these conclusions and interpret them in an open-ended manner. The issue has not been as much to present one view, as to attempt to look at the problems presented openly and in the further interest of understanding the child's art.

The nature of what theory and data that has been included or excluded defines the nature of what conclusions may be drawn. If an entirely empirical approach had been taken, hence attention to only observable, external and verifiable behaviors, the conclusions would rest completely on such and exclude or reduce affective components such as motivation for consideration. If an entirely wholistic or phenomenological approach had been taken this also would influence such conclusions. Hence influencing interpretation of observable and verifiable components.

Initially it was stated that the Lockean presuppositions were inadequate to the task, particularly of determining the sources of self-expression. This tradition does, however, offer a rich epistemology of certain aspects of the inquiry. Particularly in examining overt behaviors

by children in art. Through such techniques we are able to discern developmental trends in mental growth and isolate certain typical behaviors during the drawing process that appear to be universal amongst children, particularly in cognitive and motor development. We find this tradition to be more inadequate when attempting to supply comprehension of covert and affective components however.

In this area, the Leibnitzian tradition is more useful. Viewing perception as both an objective and a subjective phenomenon is more useful in terms of explaining the idiosyncrasies of children's art. Viewing the individual and his unique experience as the source of his acts explains apparent affective meanings. Not in a universal symbolic sense, but in the sense of individual differences which are readily apparent in the child's art. Viewing the individual as active versus passive, as seeking continually to both maintain and enhance the phenomenal self is more useful in efforts to explain the child's motivation to make his art. Not only the spontaneous urge that impels him to do so, but the specifics in terms of what he chooses to make and what he chooses to include and/or exclude. Also, in terms of how, not the mechanics, but his unique style of depiction.

Reducing these two traditions to a common denominator for the purpose of specific conclusions would necessarily be arbitrary, probably rest on inaccuracies and defies the

notion of an open-ended inquiry. Hence, a continuation of using theory and data to interpret and comprehend rather than conclude per se. Conclusions, when given, are with the full understanding that they are by necessity more in the way of subjective interpretation. This is done because neither tradition in psychology explains the phenomenon fully or one tradition seems more adequate to the task at a given point.

The study asks initially, what is the source of an individual's self-expression? From an interpretation of the data previously sighted, it appears that the source for self-expression lies within the individual or personality that is being expressive. Allport reduces all observable behavior to two components, coping and expressive. Coping behavior is "what" we do, expressive behavior is "how" we do it. How we do something, anything, appears to be predicated on past experience and present perceptions. It seems to arise out of what the individual perceives his needs and how he can maintain and enhance himself from moment to moment. Because each of us lives in a private world of our own perceptions and needs, each behaves differently in any given situation. Hence, our individuality is expressive.

Wolff hypothesizes a triple determination of behaving; "objective factors" or what we do in terms of basic needs (food, shelter), "collective factors," or those

external influences (sex role, culture) that influence both what we do and how we do it. "Subjective factors" are the specifics of individual behavior. They are based on what we perceive our need and desires to be and cause our unique behavior out of a range of possible behaviors.

The source for self-expression in the child's art is of the same origin. The child perceives the objective features of the environment in continuing detail, making finer and more complex discriminations as he matures. Perception in this sense is an aspect of cognition, and a primary one. Children do come to recognize objective features commensurate with intellectual maturity. Yet perception has affective components also. The child lives, as we all do, in a private world of past experience and present expectation. He will utilize his perceptions as he interprets them based on his need. This appears to be a major explanation for the uniqueness of the individual as well as the idiosyncrasies in all children's art. The child draws from some source, and the source appears to include the self. He will include, exclude and distort details often for private reasons.

Attempts to reduce his choices to cognitive components alone have been unsuccessful as the child frequently does not draw all that he knows, or he distorts common aspects when he has accurate information at his command. Other factors such as temperament, interest, environment

and specific motivation all appear to influence the child's art. The most pivotal influence on the child is the self. All that guides his behavior in an art activity is mitigated by his unique experience of his private world, his perception and interpretation of that experience, and his need to utilize it. The impetus to express one's self arises from within the responding personality.

Are the expressive qualities observable in a child's art work a direct consequence of some process or act of self-expression on the child's part? Again, based on the previously sighted material, it does appear that children express themselves directly and indirectly through their art. Many of the child's productions do express his feeling states, likes and dislikes, temperament and cultural, environmental conditions. Still, no universal system of signs and/or symbols in child art has been devised and analytical, projective techniques have limited use on a large scale. This fact has been used to refute the notion of affective states being contained in a child's art work. This fact could be used to support such a contention also. Perhaps this inability to devise a truely accurate and universal symbolism is a direct consequence of the uniqueness of children and their idiosyncratic view of their world. The affective states are projected in the work yet each is done so privately and uniquely and this defies reduction to common sign or symbol.

Another reason may be found in the interpretation of the concept "affective states." Harris states,

> Great art profoundly stirs the viewer; the artist who produced the work presumably worked from an emotional state. Something of the artist's feeling is conveyed to his public, but whether it is always the same feeling state is a point of debate even among art theorists. But whether untrained artists, particularly children, convey their personalities to their audience or represent them to the psychologically skilled interpreter, is the question (10:59).

This issue is a point of argument amongst art theorists and perhaps a valid argument to raise here. Part of the argument lies in defining what is an "emotion" and what is a "feeling" and how each relates to the artist as he creates his work. The other aspect concerns whether the "feeling" the artist has, is, or has to be identical with that of his viewer. This is essentially the aspect of Langer's views presented previously. Her notions are basically supported by Dewey and Rugg. What they imply first of all is that there is a substantial difference between expressing an emotion as catharsis, and having a feeling.

If you are seeking evidence of strong emotion within a child and contained in his drawing you will not consistently find it. Severely emotionally distrubed children do depict, by omission, or inclusion, aspects of their problems in their art. One doesn't generally need the art to diagnose this however. There are numerous symptoms and clues for a therapist to go on. In these

cases, art is used more as therapy and is less crucial as a diagnostic tool.

On occasion all children experience strong emotion and when they do they frequently draw about it. This is an irregular occurrence however and thus not subject to a systematic system of signs or symbolism. The problem does not lend itself to systematic research of the sort required to develop such a sign/symbol system.

Perhaps the phenomenon is simply more subtle and complex than has generally been considered by researchers. If one considers the philosophical inquiries reviewed earlier one has a different notion of what it is that an artist expresses. One has a different notion of what it is that a viewer perceives and responds to in a given work. Neither is universally cathartic in intensity. The artist uses all his potentiality; cognitive, perceptual, motor and his range of human feeling and sensitivity to state his vision of his world, his way. This is a projection of his personality in the subtlest sense. The viewer responds to this vision via his own unique experience and capacities. He sees simplicity, complexity, drama, fantasy or combines whatever he has within him along with what is contained in the work that allows him to respond.

The response of the viewer and the intent of the artist need not be the same in the verbal, descriptive sense. The argument exists simply because there is no

means to resolve it. How would one be able to determine precisely what the artist intended. His feeling may have been so diffuse as to defy discursive formation and is knowable only in the intuitive, expressive form. How would one determine precisely what the viewer responds to? Again, this response may defy discursive formation beyond the simplest means.

If one looks at a child's art as having the same basic source as adult art then perhaps deeper comprehension can occur. Certainly not all child art is expressive, or has artistic merit. But many children do make esthetically pleasing works that are very personal in origin. Perhaps the complexity and texture of adult feeling is potentially beyond that of a child. Years of maturing and experience account for this. But, children do feel and respond to a vast range of experiences and with considerable depth. Indeed, it may be in certain circumstances the child's freshness and spontaneity allows him to respond with more depth than the adult. This may be particularly true if one considers Dewey's notions on what it is to have an experience.

Resolution of the issues raised here seems to lie in one's interpretation of what the artist's activity means to him, and what the viewer's response mean to him. It does not appear to be required that these two sets of meanings be the same. Hence, it may be concluded that children can and do include in their art productions a

range of subtle human feeling, and on occasion strong emotions. Because of this, the child's art is responded to by a viewer as expressive. These expressive qualities have perceivable esthetic merit in their own right.

An issue raised earlier dealt with the influence of cognitive components on the child's art. Many researchers find cognitive components to predominate the child's work. Thus, Harris and others, claim that children's art is primarily a cognitive process with other components having lesser and irregular influence. Educators working with children in spontaneous situations however continue to respond to the feelings conveyed in the child's work.

Greater sensitivity to the role of intelligence in a child's art may be found to be contained in theories such as Langer and Dewey's. Neither denies the very significant role of intelligence in the making or the appreciating of art. Intelligence is integral to both aspects of the artistic experience. Both view intelligence as being integrated within all the components of both aspects however. They state that no one component or characteristic can dominate in such experience. Rather, all characteristics are in a synthesis, an organic shifting that has unity and perceivable quality.

Rugg's notions of conception (feeling) as prior to concept (ideas) is supportive of this view. That one responds essentially with the whole of the mind and the body

in one gesture. Viewing the components within the child, that combine to make his art, as separate entities appears to inhibit comprehension of the process he passes through. It also inhibits comprehension and interpretation of the product of that activity. If one defines intelligence as solely verbal, logical, observable and specific then its role in child art is very different than a definition of intelligence as thinking fused with feeling. Thinking as responding, perceiving and containing organic sensuous elements.

In this sense, intelligence is integral to having an experience. Is it stretching Dewey's point to say a child can also have an experience? Is there such a schism between the early years of human life and the later years, or adult life, that children are incapable of experience that is pervaded with quality and unity? Children do not live in a blind stream of events that are meaningless to them other than moment to moment adjustment. They are not empty passive organisms that experience life simply as a matter of minor adjustments to stimuli. Meaning occurs for the child by his grasping and interrelating cognitive structure within his private environment. Meaning is a broader phenomenon for the child that includes ego-enhancement and ego-extension. A process where the child not only realizes the cognitive and its relation but his place and relationship within it. His self-identity within

experience. With the concept of self and propriate striving the child is increasingly able to have an experience and to value and identify with it in his unique manner.

The issue is not entirely one of acquiring cognitive content. Such content must be viewed within the framework of a full yet developing personality. A process that never ceases. If the function of art is to organize experience vividly, coherently and meaninfully it may function in this manner for a child also.

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