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THE POTENWAL FOR CLASS CONFLi-CT
EN THE UNITED STATES.

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
MARC )ARSULSC
1971

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ABSTRACT

THE POTENTIAL FOR CLASS CONFLICT IN THE UNITED STATES

By

Marc Jarsulic

This essay proceeds in two stages. The first is an attempt
to describe concisely the political economy of the United States.
It is argued that there are sufficient devices available to the
economy to make us think that economic breakdown, while possible,
is not historically necessary. This conclusion motivates the second
part of the essay, which is an attempt to discover likely sources
of class conflict other than economic breakdown. Therein it is
argued that such sources do exist--both in the facts of American
racism and in the transformation of the working class, which is
producing "intellect workers" who have needs unsatisfiable under

the present order.

THE POTENTIAL FOR CLASS CONFLICT IN THE UNITED STATES

By

\Q‘ .
MarcVJarsulic
h

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
Department of Sociology

1971

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the members of my committee,
Vincent Salvo, Ruth Hamilton, and Alan Shelley. In addition
I must thank Susan Thomas, whose help has been invaluable, and
Elayne Magnan, who skillfully and graciously helped in the

preparation of this manuscript.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter
I Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A note on methodology . . . .
II On the Political Economy of the U.S. .
III Potential Sources for Class Conflict in
IV Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Footnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Appendix: Data on the working class . . . . .

iii

the

18

31

33

36

38

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page
1 Local Government Revenues Expenditures and Debt . . . . ll
2 Higher Education in the U.S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
3 Actual and Projected Employment for Persons 16 Years

and Over, by Occupation Group, 1960 to 1975 . . . . . 39
4 Total Labor Force and White-Collar Components, 1870-

1960* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4O
5 Persons Employed in Manufacturing by Major Occupational

Groups (in Thousands), 1952, 1960, 1963, April of

Each Year and Selected White-Collar Occupations as a

Percent of Total Manufacturing Employment, 1952, 1960,

and 1963 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

iv

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

What follows is an attempt to examine the potential for class
conflict in the United States. While it has long been the position
of leftist analysts and opponents of the established order that class
conflict is the sure outcome of the forseeable breakdown of our capi—
talist economy, a different approach is taken here. In the first part
of the essay, starting with surplus value, the most orthodox of Marxist
conceptual tools, an effort is made to describe and analyze the work-
ings of our contemporary monopoly-capitalist economy. The purpose of
this is to show first that our economy tends toward stagnation; and
second that this tendency is ameliorated through state intervention in
the economy, waste production, and various other means. While this
perspective gives no assurance that economic disaster will be avoided,
it makes plain that a realistic discussion of class conflict should not
assure that such disaster is a necessary consequence of the operation
of our political economy.

Now from the traditional point of view this analysis presents the
worst possible case for those anticipating the development of class
conflict. This was intended--not because it is pleasant to play the
devil's advocate--but because the elimination of orthodox expectations
forces us to make a closer examination of our society to see if there
exist other kinds of conditions which might generate class conflict.

It is the argument of the second half of this essay that--even if eco-
nomic collapse is assumed to be impossible-~such conditions exist be-
cause of the development of the forces of production on the one hand

and the facts of American racism on the other. For its part, the devel-

opment of the forces of production has created a greatly increased
1

demand for "intellect workers". These new workers, university-trained
and destined for an affluent existence, are potentially organizable into
the opposition. This seems likely if we recognize that they are enough
like the members of the student movement, with whom they share educa-
tional background, life conditions, and in some instances social back-
ground, that, like movement people, they can be expected to be conscious
of needs which cannot be satisfied by this society. The fact that these
needs, such as the need for a non—authoritarian environment, are of a
social rather than a biological origin, makes them none the less real

and none the less strong. The racist structure of our society has put
the majority of the black population into an entirely different position,
wherein even their basic biological needs go unsatisfied or are satis-
fied in the most minimal fashion. Although it is certainly possible that
this situation could be remedied, it does not seem probable that it will.
And in the meantime many black people have already been drawn into con-
flict with the ruling class in the United States.

Given this perspective it takes little to suggest that there is a
chance for an alliance between these two very different segments of the
working class. Nor is it difficult to see why the rest of the white
working class, lacking the unsatisfied needs of the "intellect workers"
and easy targets for racist appeals, are the least likely to participate
in the opposition. There is no escape from the irony of an alliance
between a very privileged group and one struggling for its survival, but
it is none the less possible if white organizations take the initiative
to form the alliance.

Having said all this, one qualifying note is necessary. As has been
pointed out, the second half of this essay assumes the rulers of the

United States have sufficient economic and political adroitness to prevent

3

our economy from falling apart. That, however, may be too great an
assumption. The current inability to handle wisely problems of unem-
ployment and inflation show how theoretically simple difficulties can
be mishandled by artless but powerful men. Should we witness a repeti—
tion of the great depression, everyone including "intellect workers",
will have to struggle for survival. In that case the ideas developed
in this essay would have value only insofar as they can be seen as
evidence that a large, privileged segment of our working class will
probably be more amenable to class—conscious political activity than

have privileged segments of the working class in the past.

Methodology

 

It is to be hoped that the method of this paper, insofar as it
has one , comes close to the Marxist method, as described by Paul
A. Baran:

"For what is, in my opinion, central to the Marxian position
is the capacity and willingness to look beyond the immediately
observable facts and to see the tree of the future in the tiny
shoots barely perceptible in the present. It is the combina-
tion of historical vision and the courage to be utopian--with
the vision sternly disciplined by the analysis of tendencies
discernible at the present time, and with the utopia rendered
concrete by the identification of the social forces thay may
be expected to further its realization."

 

CHAPTER II

In Marx's view "The wealth of those societies in which the capital-
ist mode of production prevails, presents itself as 'an accumulation of
commodities', its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must
therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity."1 Looking about him,
Marx saw that commodities are those things which have both use-values
and exchange-values. To have use-value a thing need only satisfy some
sort of human want. But to have exchange—value an object must be trad—
able for another object or objects. For this reason many things such
as air and (until recently) water are not commodities: they can command
nothing in exchange.

Closer examination of the exchange relationship reveals something
more about commodities. For when we ask what determines the proportions
in which commodities are exchanged, we are unable to see the common "some-
things" by which quantities of disparate objects are equated. Surely it
is not the amount of the particular chemical components of each thing.
That would mean equating an equal mass of carbon and diamonds. And it
would also leave us with the problem of isolating a common "something" in
a quantity of carbon which is traded for a quantity of tungsten. Nor can
it be the utility of a commodity that determines its exchange—value. Use—
values are determined in an entirely subjective manner and differ widely
from individual to individual, but in the market there seems to be an ob-
jective criterion by which quantities of different objects are equated.

By proceeding with this philosophical reduction Marx reaches the conclusion
that the "something" common to all commodities is the labor which is em-
bodied or "crystalized" in them, and therefore the exchange—value of a

commodity is equal to the number of units of labor embodied in it.

5

Marx of course recognized that not all laborers have equal abili-
ties or skills and that these two factors complicate the exchange rela-
tionship. He pointed out that the market deals with the first of these
by equating the value of a commodity with the socially necessary labor
time required to produce it, i.e. "the labor time necessary to produce
an article under normal conditions of production and with the average
degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the time."2 The market ac-
counts for the second factor by equating skilled labor with a multiple
of simple unskilled labor.

Given this analysis of commodities and commodity exchange, Marx is
prepared to proceed to the analysis of the process of capitalist produc-
tion. He points out that under the capitalist economic system "labor
power"--the ability of a worker to porduce commodities—-is itself a com-
modity. But it is unique. Like other commodities its value is equal
to the labor time necessary to produce it:

"The value of labor power is determined, as in the case of

every other commodity, by the labor time necessary for the

production and consequently also the reproduction of this

special article.... Given the individual, the production of

labor power consists in his reproduction of himself or his

maintenance. Therefore the labor time requisite for the pro—

duction of those means of subsistence necessary for the main-
tenance of the laborer.... His means of subsistence must...

be sufficient to maintain him in his normal state as a laboring

individual. His natural wants, such food, clothing, fuel, and

housing vary according to the climatic and other physical con-
ditions of his country. On the other hand the number and ex-

tent of his so-called wants...are themselves the product of

historical development and depend, therefore, to a great ex-

tent on the degree of civilization of a country...." 3
But unlike other commodities labor power produces value greater than that
required for its own production. Depending on the level of technology of
an economy, a worker need only work 3 or 4 of the 8 or 12 hours he agrees

to work in order to provide for his needs. Therefore, when a capitalist

purchases labor power to operate the means of production which he owns,

he knows that it will produce more value than he must pay the worker
for. The difference between the value produced by labor power and the

value required to purchase that labor power is called surplus value.

 

This surplus value--when realized in the form of money by being sold—-
is the source of capitalists' consumption, capital accumulation, and,
ultimately (because in capitalist society ownership of the means of
production translates into power) the source of capitalist power.

Marx resolves the value of all commodities produced in a given time
period in a capitalist economy (and the value of any particular commodity
in such an economy) into three component parts: (1) constant capital-—
the raw material, machinery, etc. used up in the process of production--
symbolized by c; (2) variable capital--the labor power used in the pro-
cess of production-—symbolized by v, (3) surplus value--the value pro—
duced by laborers but appropriated by the capitalists--symbolized the
rate of surplus value is expressed by the ratio 3, the rate of profit

by the formula EEG; and the organic composition of capital by the ratio

c+v°
These last three formulae are important in understanding Marx's

analysis of the development of capitalist economics. As he (and numerous
others) recognized, the reason why capitalists participate in commodity
exchange is not to increase the quantity of use-value in their possession,
but rather to increase the amount of money which they possess. Because

of the competition for consumers (to whom they can sell their goods and
thereby transform into money the surplus value they have extracted from
workers) capitalists in a competitive situation are under pressure to
introduce new production methods which will reduce the cost of their goods.

In practice and in the long run this means using plant, equipment, etc.

7
(all part of c), the value of which is greater than that used before,
but which is more highly productive per unit of labor (v), thereby re-
ducing the exchange value of the commodity produced and giving the pro-
ducer a temporary competitive advantage. For example, at time-l it is
possible to produce one lathe for 300 units of labor, the composition
of which is lOOc+lOOv+lOOs. But having introduced more advanced and
more expensive technology, it is possible to produce two lathes at

time-2 for 400 units of labor, the composition of which is 200c+lOOv+lOOs.

. . . IOOc _ 1
Thus, changing the organic comp031tion of capital from I00c+100v - 2 to
-—ZQQE--- = 2 allows the competing capitalist to sell his lathes for 200

200c+100v 3

units of labor instead of 300 units-—and for a time to capture a larger
share of the market.

As this example demonstrates, however, there is a problem inherent
in the changing of the organic composition of capital. The problem is
that, with the rate of surplus value remaining the same, an increase in
the orgainc composition of capital will lower the rate of profit. (In
our example the rate of surplus value remains at l, but the rate of profit
falls from ifiéggIGGG = % in time—l to 56%22§66; = % in time-2.) This
tendency of the rate of profit to fall, Marx pointed out, is potentially
a cause of crisis in capitalist society. A declining rate of profit
will cause further competition among capitalists who will try to restore
the old rate by increasing the organic composition of their capital,
which, if it allows them to produce their commodities for less than the
socially necessary labor cost at which they will sell in the market, will
give them a rate of profit higher than that enjoyed by other capitalists,
and/or a larger share of the market. Once this change in the organic

composition of capital is generalized throughout the economy, however, a

new and lower rate of profit will prevail for all capitalists. This, in

8
turn, will stimulate a new cycle of competition with similar effects.
Eventually the rate of profit will be so low that capitalists will
choose to go out of business. This will cause a decrease in aggregate
demand, additional unemployment, more decrease in demand, etc. and
ultimate breakdown.

Since changes in the organic composition of capital are unavoidable,
the obvious key to averting economic crises caused by the falling rate
of profit lies in changing the rate of surplus value. If in our example
the surplus value produced in time-2 during the manufacture of our two
lathes had been 133 l/3 and the variable capital required only 66 2/3,

' 13; 1/3s _ 1

200c+66 273v ' §)°

Marx saw several developments which would help counteract the tendency

 

then the rate of profit would have remained unchanged (since

of the rate of profit to fall. Among them are: (l) cheapening the
elements of constant capital by raising the productivity of labor per
unit of constant capital employed (accounted for in our example). This
is actually a way of lessening or negating the change in organic compo-
sition through judicious use of technology; (2) foreign trade which allows
a capitalist to purchase raw materials and goods at prices lower than
those in the home country; (3) depression of wages beoow their value by
(a) capitalist combination; (b) technological unemployment which raises
the competition for jobs and therefore lowers the wages; (c) increasing
the intensity of exploitation by lengthening the working day or speeding
up the pace of work. It is because of these countervailing forces that
Marx saw the falling rate of profit as a tendency rather than a law.4

To this list should be added two developments which Marx did not
entirely foresee. The first is the emergence of a world-wide system of

imperialism which exports capital, supports foreign governments, and

9

deploys military forces in such a way to insure control of raw re-
sources, cheap labor, and markets for the imperialist country. Cheap
labor and raw materials support the rate of profit by decreasing the
cost of the elements of constant and variable capital. Market control
prevents competition on the part of capitalists of other nationalities
from lowering the price of goods sold in the controlled market, and thus
allows the rate of profit on those goods to be kept artificially high.
The importance of imperialism to the U.S. economy can be seen at a
glance. For all but one non-military industry, 20 to 50 percent of
sales comes from export plus military demand. In many firms--because
of the necessity to fully utilize economies of scale--this accounts for
80 to 100 percent of these firms profits.5 Foreign investments also
prove extremely profitable.6

A second development of great importance has been the appearance
of "oligopolic" capitalism in advanced capitalist countries, wherein
giant corporations comd to dominate large segments of the economy.
Oligopolists are not forced to buy new capital goods as rapidly as are
capitalists in a competitive situation. Their existing control of an
already large share of the market, and their ability to slow or suppress
the introduction of technical innovations allows long range planning of
investment.7 In addition, oligopolic control of the market means that
prices reflect corporate needs rather than supply and demand. Thus
every wage increase is erased (or over-compensated for) by a price in-
crease; and while workers suffer from inflation, corporations inflate
their prices proportionately. The system of "prices leadership"

further decreases the likelihood of competitive pricing and reduces

10
competition to "product differentiation" through advertising and internal
cost reduction programs. So arbitrary has pricing by large corporations
become that it is now possible to have inflation and economic recession
at the same time, a phenomenon we have been observing in the United States
for the past year or so.

Another development of significance has been the expansion of the
domestic economic role of the state. As James O'Connor has argued in
"The Fiscal Crisis of the State", the development of the forces of pro-
duction of the United States has transformed the economic role of govern-
ment, creating a "state capitalism" in which the state takes on the
burden of those kinds of spending which individual corporations need but
cannot handle and which groups of corporations are unwilling or unable
to finance. There are roughly four such types of state expenditures:

(1) Spending to complement private investment——e.g., elaborate highway
systems which make transportation of goods and materials fairly cheap,
make available distant sources of labor; (2) Spending to encourage fresh

private accumulation—-e.g., the research and development financed by NIMH,

 

NSF, DOD, or the facilities consequently turned over to private capital
by the ABC; (3) Spending_to recreate profitable opportunities in urban
aggggf-e.g., model cities programs, which if successful would make cities
profitable for service industries if not manufacturing; (4) Spending to

train the labor force--e.g., support of universities through direct

 

grants, indirectly through support of faculty research.9

Now these kinds of spending would be unimportant to the maintenance
of the rate of surplus value if they were being financed by corporate
capital. But they are not. Again as O'Connor has argued, taxed which
financed these and other forms of state spending fall primarily on

workers. There is no tax on accumulated wealth in the United States (only

11
on its transfer), and corporation owner-managers are able to shift pro-
perty and income taxes to the consumer through control of the price
level.10 Thus the real sources of state spending are the income, pro-
perty, and numerous hidden taxes paid by workers. Because of this fact,
and because the kinds of spending being discussed pay part of the cost
of constant and variable capital which would otherwise fall on corpora-
tions, these forms of state spendingghelp to maintain the rate of surplus
Kelse-

Placing the burden of state expenditures on workers is not without
political consequence, however. If the level of taxation is too high,
there is political resistance. Hence the current "taxpayer's revolt".
But if the level of taxation is not increased, social needs will remain
unsatisfied. For example, the Kerner Commission writes: "Increasing
concentrations of urban growth have called forth greater expenditures
for every kind of public service: education, health, police protection,
fire protection, parks, sanitation, etc. These expenditures have stri-
kingly outpaced tax revenues."

The story is summed up in a table from the Kerner Report:

TABLE 1

Local Government Revenues Expenditures and Debt

(Billions of Dollars)

1950 1966 Increase
Revenues 11.7 41.5 +29.8
Expenditures 17.0 60.7 +43.7
Debt Outstanding 18.8 77.5 +58.7

And as the Report notes, "Despite the growth of federal assistance

to urban areas under various grant-in-aid programs, the fiscal plight of

11
many cities is likely to grow even more serious in the future...."

12

In fact (and despite unions and minimum wage laws) the rate of
profit has remained approximately the same over the past several de-
cades; and, with the increase in capital accumulation, the quantity
of surplus value which accrues to capitalists each year is enormous
and continues to grow. Ironically, however, it is in this ability
to garner surplus that monopoly capitalism finds another serious pro-
blem. For while workers can live well when they are paid an ever-
smaller fraction of the value they produce, who is to demand the large
quantities of goods now in the hands of the various monopoly capitalists?
Workers can consume only a part of the goods produced; capitalists even
less. Clearly the level of demand for goods must be raised if capit-
alists are to be prevented from discharging workers in the future.

The monopolistic business structure, however, reduces investment as a
source of the necessary increase—-both because monOpolists are slow to
expand their facilities to capture a larger part of the market since
they already have a good part of it and because new investors, even if
their production processes are potentially more efficient and more pro-
fitable than those of monopolists, have a difficult time raising suf-
ficient capital to begin and to survive the inevitable cut throat re-
action on the part of monopolists. Thus there is a tendency toward
underconsumption (overproduction) and chronic unemployment in advanced
capitalist countries. And the instability caused by this kind of un—
employment can cause general economic crisis.

Although Marx defined overproduction as the consequence of uncon-
trolled competition which resulted in the expansion of constant capital
beyond the margin of efficiency, resulting in a decrease in the rate of
profit, his remarks on the phenomenom of overproduction are still illu-

minating and applicable to the present time. They clearly expose the

13
self-contradictory outcome on an economy organized for profit, whether
it be monopoly capitalist or not:

"There are not too many means of production produced to employ
the able—bodied portion of the population. Quite the reverse.
In the first place, too large a portion of the produced popu-
lation is not really capable of working, and is through force

of circumstances made dependent on exploiting the labour of
others, or on labour which can pass under this name only under

a miserable mode of production. In the second place, not enough
means of production are produced to permit conditions, so that
their absolute working period could be shortened by the mass

and effectiveness of the constant capital employed during working-
hours.

On the other hand, too many means of labour and necessities

of life are produced at times to permit their serving as

means for the exploitation of labourers at a certain rate of
profit. Too many commodities are produced to permit a reali-
zation and conversion into new capital of the value and surplus-
value contained in them under the conditions of distribution

and consumption peculiar to capitalist production, i.e., too
many to permit the consumption of this process without con-
stantly recurring explosions.

Not too much wealth is produced. But at times too much wealth
is produced in it capitalistic, self-contradictory form." 12

Three tendencies have helped monopoly capitalist economies to mitigate
the tendency to economic stagnation. First, there has arisen a surplus
class--i.e., a class of workers who do no productive work but live off a
portion of the huge surplus which the giant corporations accumulate. In
this category fall employees of the large banking, credit, advertising
and distribution systems now in existence. Much of what they do is un-
necessary, as can be seen from an examination of socialist economies.

Second, there is the well-known process of waste production, where
products purposely designed to disintegrate in short order are foisted
on consumers. These individuals are forced to buy goods more frequently
than they would in a more rational economy.

Third, the large amounts of government spending raises the level

of aggregate demand. Now it must be admitted that some government

14
spending is necessary if there is to be any government at all; and
other government spending is necessary if the economy is to keep pace
with the increasingly social character of the forces of production, as
has been argued above. But the largest item of government expenditure—-
"National Defense", which will cost $80.295 Billion in fiscal 197213 is
not necessary in either of these senses. Certainly some military outlays
are required to defend the imperial holdings of the economy. Vietnam
is a clear demonstration for those who will not accept subtler proofs.
The incredible volume of these outlays, however, cannot be accounted
for on the basis of military need. The tolerance of huge cost overrunslA,
the willingness of the government to provide much of the capital from
which private military contractors derive profitsls, and the incredible
lengths to which the government goes to save to most disastrously inef-
ficient contractors from well deserved bankruptcyl6, indicate a recogni-
tion by the state that the level of aggregate demand must be maintained,
no matter how artificially. The fact that demand is maintained only
with a great measure of socially wasteful spending indicates a serious
weakness of American society which will be examined more thoroughly.
Though it might be objected that government's diversion of surplus
value into military spending is not necessary, that it might be spent
on more socially useful goods or invested in 'public corporation', thereby
eliminating "tax revolts", and satisfying social needs, political reality
makes this improbable. As Reich and Finkelhor convincingly argue, cor-
porations have very strong motives for opposing social spending. They
first of all fear the development of competing state supported enterprises:
"First many kinds of social spending put the government in
direct competition with particular industries and with the
private sector as a whole. This is taboo in a capitalist

economy. For example, if the government built low-cost housing
in large amounts, it would heavily but into profits of private

15

builders and landlords who own the existing housing stock.
It would add to the supply of housing and take land away
from private developers who want to use it for commercial
purposes. Similarly, building effective public transporta-
tion would compete with the automobile interests.

Any one of these interests taken by itself might not be
sufficient to put insurmountable obstacles in the way of
social spending. Most social service programs affect only

one particular set of interests in the private economy.

But there are so many forms of potential interference.

Each of the vested interests are aware of this and so work

to help one another out. They fuel a general ideology that
says that too much social spending is dangerous. They refer
to creeping socialism, the dangers of bureaucracy, the faith
in individualism and self-help, and the unpleasant image of
giving hand—outs to those who don't deserve it. Furthermore,
the spector of interference haunts all those in the private
sector. So they engage in the practice of "log-rolling".

You oppose interference with me, and I'll oppose interference
with you. Massive political opposition to rather minor increases
in social spending is thus forged. Furthermore, the capitalist
system as a whole is threatened by massive governmental social
spending because the very necessity of private ownership and
control over production is thereby called into question. The
basic assumption in any capitalist society that goods and
services should be produced by private enterprise according

to criteria of market profitability thus also fuels the
general ideology limiting social spending."

Second they fear that social spending will transform the labor market in a

disadvantageous fashion:

"Public expenditures on an adequate welfare program would make
it difficult for employers to get workers. If the government
provided adequate non-wage income without social stigma to re-
cipients, many workers would drop out of the labor force rather
than take low-paying and unpleasant jobs. Those who stayed at
jobs would be less likely to put up with demanding working con-
ditions. The whole basis of the capitalist labor market is that
workers have no income source other than the sale of their labor
power."

They also fear that adequate spending on social services will partly elim-
inate the unequal distribution of privilege in capitalist society and
serve to call the remaining inequalities into question:
"Education, for example, is a crucial stratification mechanism,
determining who gets to the top and legitimizing their position
there. Good universal education, extending through college,

would put the whole system of inequality into question. Moreover,
having the possibility to get an advanced education would undermine

16

the labor market as well. Few workers settle so will-
ingly for the miserable, low-paying jobs they now do."

Also, social spending threatens to provide full satisfaction to needs
which are now partly met or totally unsatisfied, but which are exploited
to stimulate individual consumer spending:

"Corporations can only sell people goods in an economy of

abundance by playing on their unsatisfied needs and yearn-

ings. In an era when most basic necessities have been

provided, these new needs are mostly artificially created;

the need for status, sex appeal, etc. They are based on

fears and anxieties and dissatisfaction that people have

and that are continually pandered to by the commercial

world. But if people's needs were being fulfilled by the

public sector, that is, if they had access to adequate

housing, effective transportation, good schools, and good

health care, they would be much less prey to the appeals

of the commercial hucksters. These forms of collective

consumption would have interfered with the demand for con-

sumer products in the private market." 17

Thus far the analysis of value and a rather cursory investigation
4 of the political enonomy of advanced capitalist society have allowed us
to discern the weaknesses and contradictions in that society. The desire
to accumulate surplus value has produced a complex productive technology,
but has prevented it rational use. While there exists the potential for
material well being for everyone in our society, we have instead gross
disproportions in wealth. While there is incredible need for growth in
the production of social wealth, monopoly capitalism resists such produc—
tion even though the internal economy must elude crises in the most arti-
ficial and useless manner. And where there is vigorous economic expansion
it is often imperialistic expansion--more profitable to be sure, but
certainly not the most reasonable solution to the economic problems of
the United States.

But this analysis also indicated that, contrary to the beliefs of

many of the opponents of this system, economic collapse is not neces-

sarily on the historical agenda. The strategies which have thus far

l7
ameliorated the tendency to stagnation, if cleverly executed and ex-
tended, are potentially capable of doing the same in the future. If
we are therefore to take a meaningful look at the possibilities for
class conflict in our society, we will need to probe its contradictions
without the assurance that a soon to be experienced economic disaster
will be the source of such conflict. Although this seems a more dif-
ficult road, it is less likely to lead to illusion. The next part of
this essay therefore assumes that economic collapse will not occur,

and looks elsewhere for the genesis of class conflict.

CHAPTER III

Admittedly our analysis of the advanced capitalist society which
is the United States does not in itself show social change to be likely.
In fact some people, with similar analyses of U.S. society, have seized
on the existence of relative economic stability as conclusive evidence
that the Marxist perspective is no longer useful. Thus C. Wright Mills
wants to dismiss Marxism as "essentially the politics of hunger", now
invalid since it premised its anticipation of revolution on an approaching
economic cataclysm in which the masses would be plunged into misery so
deep and turmoil so pervasive that they would finally decide that they
really had nothing to lose but their chains. In fact this was not the
essence of Marx's position, and is not an accurate statement of the
standpoint of modern writers who take his insights as a point of depar—
ture. Rather it was Marx's achievement to have discovered that the re-
volutionary transformations of society, when they occur, are generated
from a particular source of tension within that society: the conflict
between the development of the forces of production and the existing
relations of production, which prevented the fullest use of that devel-
opment. While it is true that the proletarian revolution which Marx
anticipated in capitalist society has not occured, it is also true that
there is an irrational system of social relations in advanced capitalist
society which prevents the best possible use of the forces of production
which have developed. That much, it seems safe to say, has already been
demonstrated. The remaining task therefore, if we are to stay within
the Marxist tradition, is to see if this pervasive social conflict is
capable of generating revolutionary opposition within this soicety. The
hypothesis being advanced here is that it does; and it will be argued
that this is the case even if the corporate ruling class be conceeded the

18

19
ability to control the national economy without causing depression or
disaster through ignorance or incompetence, which is no mean concession.
The strategy for examing this hypothesis is to examine segments of the
working class for already apparent revolutionary activity, to try to
explain why it exists, and to try to discover if it is likely to grow
to more significant proportions.

It seems likely that the middle class white collar worker is going
to develop into a force for social change. First it is important to
recognize that the middle class white collar workers are becoming a
relatively and absolutely more numerous segment of the working class.
Between 1950 and 1960, for instance, white collar employment increased
27.6% while blue collar employment rose 5.8%. According to government
estimates, white collar workers will comprise 47% of the total work
force by 1975, having risen from 15% in 1910, 28% in 1950, and 32.3% in
1960. Of this projected increase the most rapid will be among profes-
sional and technical workers, though the largest single segment of the
white collar work force will still be clerical personnel.18 Even manu-
facturing, the grand redoubt of the blue collar worker, is being invaded
by a new kind of worker. Between 1952 and 1963 the percent of manu-
facturing employment comprised by professional-technical-kindred, clerical
and sales occupational categories grew from 19.9% to 24.8%, while blue
collar categories shrank or increased by relatively much smaller amounts.
(See Tables 3, 4, 5)

The reason for this transformation of a large part of the working
class is the changing nature of work in advanced capitalist economies.
As Herbert Gintis has pointed out, work in economies such as ours is

becoming primarily cybernetic, requiring less physical human participa—

 

tion in labor and more facility in the transfer and manipulation of

20

information.19 As a consequence, the growth of white collar occupations
has been paralleled by a remarkable growth in university education.
Between 1954 and 1964 the university population rose from 2.452 to
4.951 million; the number of degrees earned rose from 285,841 to 525,000;
and university expenditures rose from $4.6 to $11.9 Billion. If govern-
ment projections are realized, the number of people earning bachelor's
degrees will have risen 314% in two decades. (See table 2)

Now in itself all this data merely tells us that the nature of
work is changing and that an increasingly large proportion of the working
class, having been given university educations, will become "intellect
workers" and enjoy the increased incomes and more affluent lifestyle
of the middle class. It takes on greater significance, however, when
we realize that the educations they will receive, and the lives which
they and their children will subsequently lead, have produced, among
the members of the student movement, needs for a qualitatively different
kind of society--not needs for increased consumption goods, but needs
for community, rational social organization, and aesthetic satisfaction.
That is to say, the processes which have produced the unsatisfied needs
which have in turn produced the student movement, can be expected to
become generalized through an increasingly large segment of the working
class, and hence we can regard the student movement as the harbinger of
changes within the working class. And, just as in the case of the
student movement, we can expect this growing segment of highly trained
workers also to come into conflict with the ruling class.

That the student movement has been primarily an upper middle class
phenomenon is generally agreed. For instance, Kenneth Keniston writes:

"...a disproportionate number are drawn from professional and

intellectual families of upper middle-class status. For example,
compared with active student conservatives, members of protest

21

groups tend to have higher parental incomes, more parental

education, and less anxiety about social status (Westby and

Braungart, 1966). Another study finds that high levels of

education distinguish the activist's family even in the grand-

parental generation (Flacks). In brief, activists are not

drawn from disadvantaged, status-anxious, underprivileged or

uneducated groups; on the contrary, they are selectively

recruited from among those young Americans who have had the

most socially fortunate upbringings." 20

His remarks are echoed elsewhere.2

That these students have new needs is at least implicitly recog-
nized in the work of several social scientists. In attempting to des-
cribe the nature of contemporary radicalism some social scientists have
focused on personality. Charles Hampden-Turner has done a comparative
analysis of data on students who may be classified politically as old-
left (communist), center, non-activist, right, and "new left". His
results show that student radicals (new leftists) have personalities
which are the antithesis of those necessary to the acceptance of things
as they are. Among other characteristics, he found that "new leftists"

are "least constrained by conventional codes and the most likely to choose

for themselves according to the particular circumstances", while at the

same time being most free from each other's opinionszz; most inner directed
. 23 . . 24

and independent ; most oriented toward self-actualization ; least

likely to have an "authoritarian belief in a great cause"25. In other

'26, radicals find it

words, because they are so "psychologically healthy
easiest to advocate courses of action which are socially prescribed.
Others have had more to say about their values. In a very percep-
tive study of radical students at the University of Chicago, Richard
Flacks listed the themes he found characteristic of the student movement.

They describe, in a schematic fashion, the new needs (and hence needs for

social change) generated in the radicals of the middle class: (a)

22

"Romanticism: there is a strong stress among movement participants

 

on a quest for self-expression, often articulated in terms of leading
a "free" life--i.e. one not bound by conventional restraints on feeling,

experience, communication, expression." (b) "Anti-authoritarianism: a

 

strong antipathy toward arbitrary rule centralized decision making,

'manipulation'." (c) "Egalitarianism, populism: a belief that all men

 

are capable of political participation, that political power should
be unduly dispersed, that the locus of value in society lies within the

people and not elites." (d) "Anti-dogmatism: a strong reaction against

 

ideological interpretations of events." (e) "Moral purity: a strong

 

antipathy to self—interested behavior, particularly when overlaid by
claims of disinterestedness." (f) "Community: a strong emphasis on a
desire for human relationships, for a full expression of emotions, for
the breaking down of interpersonal barriers and the refusal to accept
conventional norms concerning interpersonal contact (e.g., norms
respecting sex, status, race, age, etc.)." (g) "Anti—institutionalism:
a strong distrust of involvement with conventional institutional roles."
These values are remarkable for two reasons. First because many
of them--especially anti-authoritarianism, egalitarianism, and community--
signify the emergence of "public needs", i.e., desires which can be
satisfied only if individuals are allowed the freedom to participate in
a public life in which there are not significant disproportions in the
degrees of power and authority possessed by different people. And more
generally because these values conflict with the predominant ideology
of possessive individualism28, and as a result student radicals find

themselves opposed to the social order which is both described and

justified in that ideology.

23

Now the explanation of why student radicalism developed when it
did is significant to our contention that the middle class is likely
to continue producing radicals in the future. At least part of it
lies in the fact that the generation of white upper middle-class students
who began the student movement by participating in SNCC, starting the
FSM, and founding SDS, was the first truly affluent generation in an
advanced capitalist society. While previous generations of the middle
class had undoubtedly attained comparable levels of privilege, that
generation born around 1940 was the first to grow up in a world in
which such great quantities of consumer goods were supplied to them
with such relative ease. In short, the development of the forces of
production had progressed to such a degree that full satisfaction of
one's material desires was, at least potentially, no longer dependent
on the deprivation of some other person. And not being part of the
ruling economic class, they had no interest in preserving inequalities
in the distribution of material wealth. Thus, given that needs for
goods were satisfied, others received more psychic energy, became more
significant.29

Material affluence had other consequences for this generation of
the middle class. Its existence, it would seem, was an important reason
why their parents were well educated and family lives were characterized
by non-authoritarian interpersonal relations, permissiveness, liberal
political values, emphasis on intellectual and aesthetic pursuits, humani-

30 After all, in

tarianism, or self-expression rather than achievement.
a society that rewards the opposite of these characteristics, a large

amount of economic and status security is necessary to the family that

permits them to exist.

24

And it would be incorrect to omit the influence that university
education, made available in part by family afluence, has on the devel-
opment of radicalism. For while it is in many regards quite wretched,
some students manage to develop the capacity for critical thought.
The importance of ths capacity is indicated by the disproportionate
representation of humanities and the social sciences in the ranks of
the left31 since those disciplines are more given to the criticism of
ideology and examination of social and individual values than, say,
to the natural sciences or professional schools.32

It would be a serious misinterpretation of what has been said so
far if the political activity of left radicals were not viewed as
reasonable attempts to satisfy their new and distinctive set of needs.
The evidence indicates that their needs deviate from the norm in numer-
ous ways, that they have a higher need for among other things, egali-
tarianism and an anti-authoritarian environment than their fellow citizens.
But it is also true that political-economic power in our society is in
the hands of a corporate ruling classB3, and that our schools and political

institutions34

are characterized by authoritarian relationships. There-
fore vigorous attempts to establish neighborhood control of political
power, to give students control over their educations, to end an im-
perialist war, and to combat racism are all in their interest, since
their success would make American society better able to satisfy their
needs.

Thus far we have argued the lives of the affluent middle class are
producing qualitatively different needs in its members, and that as
their conditions of life become generalized through an increasingly

large segment of the working class, the militant radicalism of the

student movement will expand correspondingly. But a student movement

25

is in itself insufficient to effect radical social change; hence we
must ask whether the "new working class" outside the universities will
be able to mobilize for collective political action as students have
in universities.

There are two developments which suggest an affirmative answer
to this question. The first, pointed out by Tom Hayden in The Trial,
is an increasing concentration of radically committed members and
former members of the "new working class" around universities. No
longer students, but still radicals, they do have the potential to
turn their territory into "liberated zones", taking political power in
the local communities and making sure that the university efforts to
make students less politically active and more amenable to the Happy
Consciousness do not succeed. Second, there is the growth of employ-
ment of the new working class by the state at a time when all levels
of government are in the midst of a fiscal crisis. For example,
local governments employ about 2.588 million teachers and about 232,000
social and welfare workers.35 The inability of these governments to
meet the financial needs of these and other workers have caused rapid
growth in unions such as the American Federation of Teachers (115% in-
crease 1955 to 1965) and the American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees (130% increase 1955 to 1965?6 . As O'Connor has
pointed out, mere trade union activity will not provide a solution to
difficulties, since apolitical strikes for wage demands will meet in-
creasing resistance from already over-taxed workers. Therefore, the
self-interested efforts of these workers will have to become explicitly
political--i.e., they must seek support among the people they are sup-
posed to administer and control--if they are to succeed at all. The

possibility of such alliances has already been demonstrated in situations

26

where financial crises of the type being discussed had not yet developed.
Thus, for example, the 250 member chapter of the AFT at San Francisco
State College, whose job security was threatened by the reactionary caprice
of California school administrators, joined the 1968 student strike
there. They took the position that negotiations on their demands could
not take place until student demands were met. Though the strike itself
was broken, this was a significant deviation for a group of professionals.
There have also been instances of cooperation between welfare workers
and their clients, as in New York in 1968 where they marched with members
of MDS and MWRO to oppose state cuts in welfare and Medicaid.37

One problem which may interfere with the expansion of oppositional
force in the middle class is the hesitance of the materially privileged
to admit that the other needs which they feel are legitimate and deserve
satisfaction. Some of the changes in the self-concept of SDS exemplify
this contradiction. Initially its members (or at least the more articu-
late of them) were aware of themselves as middle class. The Port Huron
Statement begins with the well known sentence: "We are people of this
generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in universities,
looking uncomfortably to the world we inherent"38. In the year or so
before the organization's breakup, however, there was much greater con-
cern with the revolutionary potential of blue collar workers and with
creating a "white fighting force" to aid an anticipated black revolution.
Thus the Progressive Labor Party pamphlet "Students and Revolution"
argues:

"In waging these fights for various campus reforms, the question

of who to ally with is a major question of principle. Begging

favors from the ruling class or hoping for favorable publicity

from the middle class will inevitably lead to defeat. Only

the working class (by which PL apparently means production

workers) which is in antagonistic conflict with our common
enemy the ruling class, has the strength to help us win our

27

demands. As a matter of fact there are only two sides with
which to ally, the workers or the ruling class." 39

The "weatherman" statement focuses a good bit of its analysis on racism,
and sees revolutionary activity among whites as essentially ancillary to
it. In a famous and tortured passage,its authors write:

"It is necessary to defeat both racist tendencies: (1) that

blacks shouldn't go ahead with making the revolution, and (2)

that blacks should go ahead alone with making it. The only

third path is to build a white movement which will support the

blacks in moving as fast as they have to and are able to, and

still itself keep up with that black movement enough so that

white revolutionaries share the cost and the blacks don't have

to do the whole thing alone. Any white who does not follow

this third path is objectively following one of the other two

(or both) and is objectively racist." 40

While such analyses were part of attempts to arrive at a political
strategy for revolution,the neglect of the material conditions which had
created SDS itself certainly showed elements of "bad faith".

Even with the increase of oppositional consciousness and activity
among the burgeoning middle class, significant transformations of
American society (i.e., transformations of control of the economic
surplus and ultimately therefore of control of the means of production)
cannot be achieved by the middle class alone, though they are the most
recently developed and most rapidly growing segment of the working class
in advanced capitalist society. They clearly need allies. And the
most likely prospects are black people, a group already recognized by
the New Left, if not the entire student movement, as natural allies.

That the consciousness of black workers is suited for this kind
of alliance is borne out in a study of Detroit industrial workers done
by John C. Leggett and others. One of his conclusions was that "On the
whole, race is the most important influence on class consciousness, al-

though nationality differences help to account for variations in attitudes

within the mainstream working class."41 Thus for example, of the black

28

union members interviewed who made over $5,000, 35% were militant
egalitarians and 26% were militant radicals; among non-union black
workers who made over $5,000, 20% were militant egalitarians and 40%
were militant radicals. Of those who made less than $5,000, 18% of the
union members were militant egalitarian and 41% were militant radicals;
and of the non-union member in this income category, 5% were militant
egalitarians and 45% were militant radicals.42

In conjunction with the development of these class conscious
attitudes, the progressive deterioration of the material existence of
black workers will certainly heighten the tempo of their opposition.
Advanced capitalist society, it has been argued, tends to underutili—
zation of resources, both inanimate and human. Although there are
techniques finrblunting this tendency, they are not completely successful.
And therefore there is significant unemployment and underemployment,
with its concomitant suffering, in American society. Because of the
racism of this society, much of this un- and underemployment is con—
centrated among black workers. Overall, the black unemployment rate is
about twice that of white workers, and in urban areas it averages about
8.7% (though the rate for urban whites was 5.7%). Underemployment
in major urban areas is running at rates of 24 to 47%; and there are
also large numbers of workers who are unemployed but never counted be-
cause they have given up looking for work. Because of population growth
are continued deterioration of the urban economy, urban black employment
problems should become worse. 3 Since about 73% of the black population
is concentrated in cities44, this is of the utmost significance. In
addition, because of their urban concentration black workers are also
bound to suffer severly from the fiscal crisis of the state, since social
services, which are painfully inadequate already, are declining at a rapid

rate 0

29

But if the future working class-consciousness of black peoples
seems likely, that of the white lower-middle class and blue—collar workers
is anything but certain. They are, if we can judge from the scanty
information available, significantly less class conscious than black
workers. Turning again to Leggett's study of Detroit workers, we find
that of the white union members making over $5,000, 5% were militant
egalitarians and 28% were militant radicals; of those making less than
$5,000, the percentages were 6% and 15% respectively. The conscious-
ness among non-union members was even lower, with no militant egali—
tarians in either income classification, and with only 9% of the over
$5,000 group and 6% of the under $5,000 group qualifying as militant
radicals. Leggett also found that "In Detroit, increases in class
consciousness fail to be accompanied by decreases in inter-ethnic hos-
tility"46, suggesting a further obstacle to the hope of dissolving the
political problems of white racism by appeals to class interest. (While
this is also true of black workers, it is white workers who are in a
position to act against the black; and their activity is therefore de-
cisive for the furure of the blue collar workers). That blue collar
whites are amenable to racist appeals is also evident. The Wallace cam—
paign of 1968, while not victorious, showed that working class racism
runs deep. Lipset and Raab estimate that 20% of all manual workers and
19% of those making $3,000 to 6,999 and 17% of those making $7,000-9,999
were Wallace sympathizers47. As Lipset and Raab say, "What has happened
is that increasing numbers of white young people in the South and in
many working—class districts of the North have been exposed in recent
years to repeated discussions of the supposed threats to their schools
and communities posed by integration. They have been reared in homes

and neighborhoods where anti-Negro sentiments became increasingly common.

30
Hence, while the upper-middle-class scions of liberal parents were
being radicalized to the left by civil rights and Vietnam war issues,
a sizeable segment of southern and northern working-class youths were
being radicalized to the right. The consequence of such polarization
can be seen in the very different behavior of the two groups in the
1968 election campaign."48 For this reason, blue collar and lower-
middle-class whites seem the most likely supporters of reaction, since
reactionaries would feel no compunction against appealing to their

racism.

CHAPTER IV

Essentially this discussion of developing opposition can be re-
duced to the following: The political economy of advanced capitalist
society, though it still functions by the appropriation of surplus
value, provides for the satisfaction of the material needs of many of
its citizens. Among the upper middle and middle classes it does this
fairly well but in the process provides large numbers of people with
sufficient satisfaction that they recognize the existence of other
significant needs which are yet unmet. And because of the nature of
these newly developing needs, opposition to the present social order
is developing in the middle class. At the same time most black people,
the historic victims of racism, find that their position in the poli—
tical economy is miserable and declining. Many of them are already in
active opposition to the social order, and many more will be. The
coalesence of these forces with subsequent radical social change is
thus a fair possibility, if not a certainty.

To this low-level optimism must be added two cautionary notes.
First, the monopoly on the means of violence now enjoyed by the govern—
ment is overwhelming. Any activity which threatens the existing distri—
bution of wealth and power certainly risks being crushed decisively.
The mere existence of such activity is possible only if carried out in
an extremely intelligent manner. Second, we must remember that the
United States is an imperialist country, and the defense of her empire
is paramount in the minds of our ruling class. They are willing to
wage genocidal warfare for that defense. But even that has not suc—
ceeded, and two or three more Vietnams, perhaps a war with China are
in the making. This can only bring crisis at home, perhaps before the
revolutionary forces are ready to wage a protracted struggle against
the state. If they are repressed and attacked when they are weak

31

32
it is possible, as the facist experience has shown, to forestall
their development for a very long time. While it seems unlikely
that the U.S. will be able to successfully defend her empire, it
is very likely probable that we are headed for a long, grim era of

reaction inside her borders.

10.

ll.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

FOOTNOTES

Marx, Karl, Volume I, p.35.
Ibid, p.39.

Ibid, pp. 170—71.

Sweezy, Paul, pp. 98-100.
Magdoff, Harry, pp. 190-91.

"In 1964, foreign sources of earnings accounted for about 22 per-
cent of domestic non-financial corporate profits." Ibid, p.182.

On this point Galbraith writes: "In western economies, markets are
dominated by great firms. These establish prices and seek to insure
a demand for what they have to sell. The enemies of the market are
thus to be seen...(they are) advanced technology and the specializa-
tion of men and process that this requies and the resulting commit-
ment of time and capital. These make the market work badly when the
need is for greatly enhanced reliability—-when planning is essential.
The modern large corporation and the modern apparatus of socialist
planning are variant accomodations to the same need." (New Indust.
State, p.44).

 

Such an invocation of the "technological imperative" needs quali-
fication. The aim of planned technological change in monopoly
capitalist society is long run maximization of profits. (cf. Mono—
polyggapital, pp. 93-96). This, as has been pointed out, produces

 

incredible irrationality throughout the society. Socialist planning,
one would hope, would have as its goal the maximization of use values
for the society.

Monthly Review, pp. 1—13.

 

An obvious fifth type is defense spending. O'Connor of course recog—
nizes it, but it is omitted here because it is discussed below.

O'Connor, James, Part 11, p.68.

Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders,

 

pp. 393—394.

Marx, Karl, Volume III, pp. 252-253.

 

New York Times, "President's Budget Message".

 

A good example is the F—111 airplane, which had a cost overrun of
$9.7 million in 1968, probably more by now. (Melman, p.64).

"From 1957 to 1961 thirteen major contractors made use of $1.5 billion
of government property as against $1.4 billion of privately owned
fixed capital." (Melman, p.47)

A recent example is the D.O.D. rescue of Lockheed.

33

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

34
Reich and Finkelhor, pp. 18-19.
Bonnell and Reich, pp. 5-6.

For a lucid examination of the material discussed in this para-
graph, see"Revolutionary Youth and the New Working Class" by
Herb Gintis.

Kenniston, p.117

See Peterson, p. 304; Flacks, p. 66.
Hampden-Turner, p. 235.

Ibid, p. 243.

Ibid, p. 250.

Ibid, p. 258.

Cf. Kenniston, p. 127.

Flacks, pp. 56-57.

"Possessive individualism" is a term used by C.B. MacPherson to
designate the ideology which developed along with capitalism in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and persists today in spite of
the development of monopoly capitalism. The essence of possessive
individualism is roughly that each person has an alienable right to
the control of his own person, with his property being part of his
personage. This sounds perfectly acceptable until we recognize that
it justifies both the continued existence of the Rockefeller fortune
and the "right" of each worker to have his surplus labor expropriated
by capitalists. It is, in other words, the premise of the ideology
which justifies the status quo. (see The Political Theory of P088-
essive Individualism, p. 3)

 

 

In An Essay On Liberation, Marcuse writes: "Capitalist progress

thus not only reduces the environment of freedom, the 'open space'

of human existence, but also the 'longing', the need for such an
environment. And in doing so, quantitative progress militates against
qualitative change even if the institutional barriers against radical
education and action are surmounted. This is the vicious circle: the
rupture with the self-propelling conservative continuum of needs must
precede the revolution which is to usher in a free society, but such
rupture itself can be envisaged only in a revolution--a revolution
which would be driven by the vital need to be freed from the admini-
stered comforts and the destructive productivity of the exploitative
society, freed from smooth heteronomy, a revolution which, by virtue
of this 'biological' foundation, would have the chance of turning
quantitative technical progress into qualititively different ways of
life--precisely because it would be a revolution occurring at a high
level of material and intellectual development, one which would enable
man to conquer scarcity and poverty." (pp. 18-19) It is my argument
that this precondition for change is now developing. Marcuse does

not agree, because he still indentifies the source of revolutionary
opposition with the industrial working class. (see Essay, pp. 55-6)

 

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

48.

35

Kenniston, p. 68.
See Peterson, Kenniston.
The foregoing discussion of the "new working class" was suggested

to me by a passage from the Grundrisse translated by Martin Nicolaus.
See New Left Reader, pp. 106—107.

 

 

See Mandel, Mills
See Marcuse, 1964
U.S. Dept. of Labor, p.9.
Sturmthal, p.340.

National Guardian

 

SDS, 1966, p.3.

Progressive Labor Party, p.34.

SDS, 1969, p.4.

Leggett, p.117.

Ibid, p.102 [We should note here that on Leggett's criteria, someone
is militant if he is willing to take aggressive action to advance the
interests of his class (e.g. picketing). Someone is an egalitarian
if he wants to see an equal distribution of wealth in the country.]
Fusfeld, p.176.

Bogue, p.176.

Kerner, pp. 266-273

Leggett, p.126.

Lipset and Raab, p.28

Ibid, p.38.

REFERENCES

Baran, Paul A. and Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital, (New York:
Monthly Review Press, 1966).

 

Bogue, Donald 1., Principles of Demography, (New York: John Wiley
and Sons, Inc., 1969).

Bonnell, Victoria and Michael Reich, "Workers and the American Econ-
omy", (Boston: The New England Free Press, 1969).

Flacks, Richard, "The Liberated Generation: An Exploration of the
Roots of Student Protest", Journal of Social Issues, Volume xxiii,
No. 3, 1967.

 

Fusfeld, Daniel R., "The Basic Economics of the Urban and Racial Crisis",
Conference Papers of the Union for Radical Political Economics,
December, 1968.

 

Galbraith, John Kenneth, The New Industrial State, (New York: The New
American Library, Inc., 1967).

 

Gintis, Herbert, "The New Working Class and Revolutionary Youth",
Continuum, Volume 8, Spring—Summer, 1970.

Hampden-Turner, Charles, Radical Man, (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman
Publishing Co., 1970).

 

Kenniston, Kenneth, "The Sources of Student Dissent", Journal of Social
Issues, Volume xxiii, No. 3, 1967.

 

Leggett, John C., ClasslpRace and Labor (New York: Oxford University Press,
1968)

 

Lipset, S.M., and Earl Raab, "The Wallace Whitelash", Trans-Action,
Dec., 1969.

 

Mandel, Ernest, Marxist Economic Theory, Volume 2, (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1969).

 

Marcuse, Herbert, An Essay On Liberation, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).

 

, One-Dimensional Man, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

 

Marx, Karl, Capital, Volume I, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing
House, 1961).

 

, Capital, Volume III, (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing
House, 1959).

Melman, Seymor, Pentagon Capitalism, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970).

 

Mills, C. Wright, The Power Elite, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1959). .

 

36

37

Monthly Review, "Notes on Inflation and the Dollar", Monthly Review,
Volume 21, No. 10, March 1970.

 

 

National Guardian, December 18, 21, and 28, 1968.

 

National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the
National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, (New York:
Bantam Books, Inc., 1969)

 

O'Connor, James, "The Fiscal Crisis of the State, part I", Socialist
Revolution, Volume 1, No. 1, January-February, 1970.

 

, "The Fiscal Crisis of the State, part II", Socialist
Revolution, Volume 1, No. 2, March-April, 1970.

 

 

Peterson, Richard E., "The Student Left in American Higher Education",
Daedalus, Volume 97, No. 1, Winter 1968.

Progressive Labor Party, "Students and Revolution", Cambridge, Mass.
Reich, Michael, and David Finklehor, "Capitalism and the 'Military-

Industrial Complex': The Obstacles to Conversion", The Review
of Radical Political Economics, Volume II, No. 4, Fall, 1970.

 

 

Students for a Democratic Society, The Port Huron Statement (Chicago:
Studentsfor a Democratic Society, 1966)

 

Students for a Democratic Society, "You don't need a Weatherman to
know which way the wind blows", New Left Notes, Volume 4, No. 22,
June 18, 1969.

 

Sturmthal, Adolf Fox ed., White Collar Trade Unions, (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1966)

 

Sweezy, Paul M., Theory of Capitalist Development, (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1966)

 

U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education,
Projections of Educational Statistics, 1974-5, (Washington, D.C.,
1965)

 

U.S. Department of Labor, Public Employment in 1969, (Washington, D.C.,
1969)

 

"Text of President's Message to Congress on Federal Budget for Fiscal
Year 1972", New York Times, January 30, 1971.

 

APPENDIX

TABLE 2

Higher Education in the U.S.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

number number number amount
Enrolled enrolled as of earned spent on
(in thous- percent of bachelor's education
ands) pop. aged degrees (in Bil-
18—21 lions)
2,452 29 285,841 4.6 1954
4,951 43 525,000 11.9 1964
8,689 55 899,000 22.5 1974
(Projected)
354 89 314 489 percent
increase
1954 to
1974

 

Source: Projections of Educational Statistics, 1974-5

 

38

 

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TABLE 5

Persons Employed in Manufacturing by Major Occupational Groups
(in Thousands), 1952, 1960, 1963, April of Each Year

 

Percent

Change

1952 1960 1963 1952—63

Total Employed 16,270 17,400 17,952 +10.3
Professional,technica1, & kindred 858 1,415 1,663 +93.8
Manager,officials,and proprietors 858 1,076 1,147 +33.7
Clerical and kindred 1,922 2,180 2,190 +13.9
Sales 462 575 597 +29.2
Craftsmen, foremen 3,226 3,318 3,353 + 3.9
Operatives 7,304 7,331 7,763 + 6.3
Service 330 366 303 - 8.2
Laborers 1,304 1,144 935 -28.3

 

Selected White-Collar Occupations as a Percent of Total
Manufacturing Employment, 1952, 1960, and 1963

 

 

1952 1960 1963
Professional and technical 5.3 8.1 9.3
Clerical and kindred 11.8 12.5 12.2
Sales 2.8 3.3 3.3
Source: Bonnell and Reich

41

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