THE POTENTIAL FOR CLASS CONFLICT IN THE UNITED STATES

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ABSTRACT

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This essay proceeds in two stages. The first is an attempt to describe concisely the political economy of the United States. It is argued that there are sufficient devices available to the economy to make us think that economic breakdown, while possible, is not historically necessary. This conclusion motivates the second part of the essay, which is an attempt to discover likely sources of class conflict other than economic breakdown. Therein it is argued that such sources do exist--both in the facts of American racism and in the transformation of the working class, which is producing "intellect workers" who have needs unsatisfiable under the present order.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

What follows is an attempt to examine the potential for class conflict in the United States. While it has long been the position of leftist analysts and opponents of the established order that class conflict is the sure outcome of the forseeable breakdown of our capitalist economy, a different approach is taken here. In the first part of the essay, starting with surplus value, the most orthodox of Marxist conceptual tools, an effort is made to describe and analyze the workings of our contemporary monopoly-capitalist economy. The purpose of this is to show first that our economy tends toward stagnation; and second that this tendency is ameliorated through state intervention in the economy, waste production, and various other means. While this perspective gives no assurance that economic disaster will be avoided, it makes plain that a realistic discussion of class conflict should not assure that such disaster is a necessary consequence of the operation of our political economy.

Now from the traditional point of view this analysis presents the worst possible case for those anticipating the development of class conflict. This was intended--not because it is pleasant to play the devil's advocate--but because the elimination of orthodox expectations forces us to make a closer examination of our society to see if there exist other kinds of conditions which might generate class conflict. It is the argument of the second half of this essay that--even if economic collapse is assumed to be impossible--such conditions exist because of the development of the forces of production on the one hand and the facts of American racism on the other. For its part, the development of the forces of production has created a greatly increased

demand for "intellect workers". These new workers, university-trained and destined for an affluent existence, are potentially organizable into the opposition. This seems likely if we recognize that they are enough like the members of the student movement, with whom they share educational background, life conditions, and in some instances social background, that, like movement people, they can be expected to be conscious of needs which cannot be satisfied by this society. The fact that these needs, such as the need for a non-authoritarian environment, are of a social rather than a biological origin, makes them none the less real and none the less strong. The racist structure of our society has put the majority of the black population into an entirely different position, wherein even their basic biological needs go unsatisfied or are satisfied in the most minimal fashion. Although it is certainly possible that this situation could be remedied, it does not seem probable that it will. And in the meantime many black people have already been drawn into conflict with the ruling class in the United States.

Given this perspective it takes little to suggest that there is a chance for an alliance between these two very different segments of the working class. Nor is it difficult to see why the rest of the white working class, lacking the unsatisfied needs of the "intellect workers" and easy targets for racist appeals, are the least likely to participate in the opposition. There is no escape from the irony of an alliance between a very privileged group and one struggling for its survival, but it is none the less possible if white organizations take the initiative to form the alliance.

Having said all this, one qualifying note is necessary. As has been pointed out, the second half of this essay assumes the rulers of the United States have sufficient economic and political adroitness to prevent

our economy from falling apart. That, however, may be too great an assumption. The current inability to handle wisely problems of unemployment and inflation show how theoretically simple difficulties can be mishandled by artless but powerful men. Should we witness a repetition of the great depression, everyone including "intellect workers", will have to struggle for survival. In that case the ideas developed in this essay would have value only insofar as they can be seen as evidence that a large, privileged segment of our working class will probably be more amenable to class-conscious political activity than have privileged segments of the working class in the past.

Methodology

It is to be hoped that the method of this paper, insofar as it has one , comes close to the Marxist method, as described by Paul A. Baran:

> "For what is, in my opinion, central to the Marxian position is the capacity and willingness to look beyond the immediately observable facts and to see the tree of the future in the tiny shoots barely perceptible in the present. It is the combination of historical vision and the courage to be utopian--with the vision sternly disciplined by the analysis of tendencies discernible at the present time, and with the utopia rendered concrete by the identification of the social forces thay may be expected to further its realization."

CHAPTER II

In Marx's view "The wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as 'an accumulation of commodities', its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity."[1] Looking about him, Marx saw that commodities are those things which have both use-values and exchange-values. To have use-value a thing need only satisfy some sort of human want. But to have exchange-value an object must be tradable for another object or objects. For this reason many things such as air and (until recently) water are not commodities: they can command nothing in exchange.

Closer examination of the exchange relationship reveals something more about commodities. For when we ask what determines the proportions in which commodities are exchanged, we are unable to see the common "somethings" by which quantities of disparate objects are equated. Surely it is not the amount of the particular chemical components of each thing. That would mean equating an equal mass of carbon and diamonds. And it would also leave us with the problem of isolating a common "something" in a quantity of carbon which is traded for a quantity of tungsten. Nor can it be the utility of a commodity that determines its exchange-value. Use-values are determined in an entirely subjective manner and differ widely from individual to individual, but in the market there seems to be an objective criterion by which quantities of different objects are equated. By proceeding with this philosophical reduction Marx reaches the conclusion that the "something" common to all commodities is the labor which is embodied or "crystalized" in them, and therefore the exchange-value of a commodity is equal to the number of units of labor embodied in it.

Marx of course recognized that not all laborers have equal abilities or skills and that these two factors complicate the exchange relationship. He pointed out that the market deals with the first of these by equating the value of a commodity with the socially necessary labor time required to produce it, i.e. "the labor time necessary to produce an article under normal conditions of production and with the average degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the time."[2] The market accounts for the second factor by equating skilled labor with a multiple of simple unskilled labor.

Given this analysis of commodities and commodity exchange, Marx is prepared to proceed to the analysis of the process of capitalist production. He points out that under the capitalist economic system "labor power"--the ability of a worker to porduce commodities--is itself a commodity. But it is unique. Like other commodities its value is equal to the labor time necessary to produce it:

> "The value of labor power is determined, as in the case of every other commodity, by the labor time necessary for the production and consequently also the reproduction of this special article.... Given the individual, the production of labor power consists in his reproduction of himself or his maintenance. Therefore the labor time requisite for the production of those means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of the laborer.... His means of subsistence must... be sufficient to maintain him in his normal state as a laboring individual. His natural wants, such food, clothing, fuel, and housing vary according to the climatic and other physical conditions of his country. On the other hand the number and extent of his so-called wants...are themselves the product of historical development and depend, therefore, to a great extent on the degree of civilization of a country...." 3

But unlike other commodities labor power produces value greater than that required for its own production. Depending on the level of technology of an economy, a worker need only work 3 or 4 of the 8 or 12 hours he agrees to work in order to provide for his needs. Therefore, when a capitalist purchases labor power to operate the means of production which he owns,

he knows that it will produce more value than he must pay the worker for. The difference between the value produced by labor power and the value required to purchase that labor power is called surplus value. This surplus value--when realized in the form of money by being sold--is the source of capitalists' consumption, capital accumulation, and, ultimately (because in capitalist society ownership of the means of production translates into power) the source of capitalist power.

Marx resolves the value of all commodities produced in a given time period in a capitalist economy (and the value of any particular commodity in such an economy) into three component parts: (1) constant capital--the raw material, machinery, etc. used up in the process of production--symbolized by c; (2) variable capital--the labor power used in the process of production--symbolized by v, (3) surplus value--the value produced by laborers but appropriated by the capitalists--symbolized the rate of surplus value is expressed by the ratio $\frac{s}{v}$, the rate of profit by the formula $\frac{s}{c+v}$; and the organic composition of capital by the ratio $\frac{c}{c+v}$.

These last three formulae are important in understanding Marx's analysis of the development of capitalist economics. As he (and numerous others) recognized, the reason why capitalists participate in commodity exchange is not to increase the quantity of use-value in their possession, but rather to increase the amount of money which they possess. Because of the competition for consumers (to whom they can sell their goods and thereby transform into money the surplus value they have extracted from workers) capitalists in a competitive situation are under pressure to introduce new production methods which will reduce the cost of their goods. In practice and in the long run this means using plant, equipment, etc.

(all part of c), the value of which is greater than that used before, but which is more highly productive per unit of labor (v), thereby reducing the exchange value of the commodity produced and giving the producer a temporary competitive advantage. For example, at time-1 it is possible to produce one lathe for 300 units of labor, the composition of which is 100c+100v+100s. But having introduced more advanced and more expensive technology, it is possible to produce two lathes at time-2 for 400 units of labor, the composition of which is 200c+100v+100s. Thus, changing the organic composition of capital from $\frac{100c}{100c+100v} = \frac{1}{2}$ to $\frac{200c}{200c+100v} = \frac{2}{3}$ allows the competing capitalist to sell his lathes for 200 units of labor instead of 300 units--and for a time to capture a larger share of the market.

As this example demonstrates, however, there is a problem inherent in the changing of the organic composition of capital. The problem is that, with the rate of surplus value remaining the same, an increase in the orgainc composition of capital will lower the rate of profit. (In our example the rate of surplus value remains at 1, but the rate of profit falls from $\frac{100s}{200c+100v} = \frac{1}{2}$ in time-1 to $\frac{100s}{200c+100v} = \frac{1}{3}$ in time-2.) This tendency of the rate of profit to fall, Marx pointed out, is potentially a cause of crisis in capitalist society. A declining rate of profit will cause further competition among capitalists who will try to restore the old rate by increasing the organic composition of their capital, which, if it allows them to produce their commodities for less than the socially necessary labor cost at which they will sell in the market, will give them a rate of profit higher than that enjoyed by other capitalists, and/or a larger share of the market. Once this change in the organic composition of capital is generalized throughout the economy, however, a new and lower rate of profit will prevail for all capitalists. This, in

turn, will stimulate a new cycle of competition with similar effects. Eventually the rate of profit will be so low that capitalists will choose to go out of business. This will cause a decrease in aggregate demand, additional unemployment, more decrease in demand, etc. and ultimate breakdown.

Since changes in the organic composition of capital are unavoidable, the obvious key to averting economic crises caused by the falling rate of profit lies in changing the rate of surplus value. If in our example the surplus value produced in time-2 during the manufacture of our two lathes had been 133 1/3 and the variable capital required only 66 2/3, then the rate of profit would have remained unchanged (since $\frac{133\ 1/3s}{200c+66\ 2/3v} = \frac{1}{2}$). Marx saw several developments which would help counteract the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Among them are: (1) cheapening the elements of constant capital by raising the productivity of labor per unit of constant capital employed (accounted for in our example). This is actually a way of lessening or negating the change in organic composition through judicious use of technology; (2) foreign trade which allows a capitalist to purchase raw materials and goods at prices lower than those in the home country; (3) depression of wages beoow their value by (a) capitalist combination; (b) technological unemployment which raises the competition for jobs and therefore lowers the wages; (c) increasing the intensity of exploitation by lengthening the working day or speeding up the pace of work. It is because of these countervailing forces that Marx saw the falling rate of profit as a tendency rather than a law.[4]

To this list should be added two developments which Marx did not entirely foresee. The first is the emergence of a world-wide system of imperialism which exports capital, supports foreign governments, and

deploys military forces in such a way to insure control of raw resources, cheap labor, and markets for the imperialist country. Cheap labor and raw materials support the rate of profit by decreasing the cost of the elements of constant and variable capital. Market control prevents competition on the part of capitalists of other nationalities from lowering the price of goods sold in the controlled market, and thus allows the rate of profit on those goods to be kept artificially high. The importance of imperialism to the U.S. economy can be seen at a glance. For all but one non-military industry, 20 to 50 percent of sales comes from export plus military demand. In many firms--because of the necessity to fully utilize economies of scale--this accounts for 80 to 100 percent of these firms profits.[5] Foreign investments also prove extremely profitable.[6]

A second development of great importance has been the appearance of "oligopolic" capitalism in advanced capitalist countries, wherein giant corporations comd to dominate large segments of the economy. Oligopolists are not forced to buy new capital goods as rapidly as are capitalists in a competitive situation. Their existing control of an already large share of the market, and their ability to slow or suppress the introduction of technical innovations allows long range planning of investment.[7] In addition, oligopolic control of the market means that prices reflect corporate needs rather than supply and demand. Thus every wage increase is erased (or over-compensated for) by a price increase; and while workers suffer from inflation, corporations inflate their prices proportionately. The system of "prices leadership" further decreases the likelihood of competitive pricing and reduces

competition to "product differentiation" through advertising and internal cost reduction programs. So arbitrary has pricing by large corporations become that it is now possible to have inflation and economic recession at the same time, a phenomenon we have been observing in the United States for the past year or so.[8]

Another development of significance has been the expansion of the domestic economic role of the state. As James O'Connor has argued in "The Fiscal Crisis of the State", the development of the forces of production of the United States has transformed the economic role of government, creating a "state capitalism" in which the state takes on the burden of those kinds of spending which individual corporations need but cannot handle and which groups of corporations are unwilling or unable to finance. There are roughly four such types of state expenditures: (1) Spending to complement private investment--e.g., elaborate highway systems which make transportation of goods and materials fairly cheap, make available distant sources of labor; (2) Spending to encourage fresh private accumulation--e.g., the research and development financed by NIMH, NSF, DOD, or the facilities consequently turned over to private capital by the AEC; (3) Spending to recreate profitable opportunities in urban areas--e.g., model cities programs, which if successful would make cities profitable for service industries if not manufacturing; (4) Spending to train the labor force--e.g., support of universities through direct grants, indirectly through support of faculty research.[9]

Now these kinds of spending would be unimportant to the maintenance of the rate of surplus value if they were being financed by corporate capital. But they are not. Again as O'Connor has argued, taxed which financed these and other forms of state spending fall primarily on workers. There is no tax on accumulated wealth in the United States (only

on its transfer), and corporation owner-managers are able to shift property and income taxes to the consumer through control of the price level.[10] Thus the real sources of state spending are the income, property, and numerous hidden taxes paid by workers. Because of this fact, and because the kinds of spending being discussed pay part of the cost of constant and variable capital which would otherwise fall on corporations, these forms of state spending help to maintain the rate of surplus value.

Placing the burden of state expenditures on workers is not without political consequence, however. If the level of taxation is too high, there is political resistance. Hence the current "taxpayer's revolt". But if the level of taxation is not increased, social needs will remain unsatisfied. For example, the Kerner Commission writes: "Increasing concentrations of urban growth have called forth greater expenditures for every kind of public service: education, health, police protection, fire protection, parks, sanitation, etc. These expenditures have strikingly outpaced tax revenues."

The story is summed up in a table from the Kerner Report:

TABLE 1

Local Government Revenues Expenditures and Debt

(Billions of Dollars)

	1950	1966	Increase
Revenues	11.7	41.5	+29.8
Expenditures	17.0	60.7	+43.7
Debt Outstanding	18.8	77.5	+58.7

And as the Report notes, "Despite the growth of federal assistance to urban areas under various grant-in-aid programs, the fiscal plight of many cities is likely to grow even more serious in the future...."[11]

In fact (and despite unions and minimum wage laws) the rate of profit has remained approximately the same over the past several decades; and, with the increase in capital accumulation, the quantity of surplus value which accrues to capitalists each year is enormous and continues to grow. Ironically, however, it is in this ability to garner surplus that monopoly capitalism finds another serious problem. For while workers can live well when they are paid an ever-smaller fraction of the value they produce, who is to demand the large quantities of goods now in the hands of the various monopoly capitalists? Workers can consume only a part of the goods produced; capitalists even less. Clearly the level of demand for goods must be raised if capitalists are to be prevented from discharging workers in the future. The monopolistic business structure, however, reduces investment as a source of the necessary increase--both because monopolists are slow to expand their facilities to capture a larger part of the market since they already have a good part of it and because new investors, even if their production processes are potentially more efficient and more profitable than those of monopolists, have a difficult time raising sufficient capital to begin and to survive the inevitable cut throat reaction on the part of monopolists. Thus there is a tendency toward underconsumption (overproduction) and chronic unemployment in advanced capitalist countries. And the instability caused by this kind of unemployment can cause general economic crisis.

Although Marx defined overproduction as the consequence of uncontrolled competition which resulted in the expansion of constant capital beyond the margin of efficiency, resulting in a decrease in the rate of profit, his remarks on the phenomenom of overproduction are still illuminating and applicable to the present time. They clearly expose the

self-contradictory outcome on an economy organized for profit, whether it be monopoly capitalist or not:

> "There are not too many means of production produced to employ the able-bodied portion of the population. Quite the reverse. In the first place, too large a portion of the produced population is not really capable of working, and is through force of circumstances made dependent on exploiting the labour of others, or on labour which can pass under this name only under a miserable mode of production. In the second place, not enough means of production are produced to permit conditions, so that their absolute working period could be shortened by the mass and effectiveness of the constant capital employed during working-hours.
>
> On the other hand, too many means of labour and necessities of life are produced at times to permit their serving as means for the exploitation of labourers at a certain rate of profit. Too many commodities are produced to permit a realization and conversion into new capital of the value and surplus-value contained in them under the conditions of distribution and consumption peculiar to capitalist production, i.e., too many to permit the consumption of this process without constantly recurring explosions.
>
> Not too much wealth is produced. But at times too much wealth is produced in it capitalistic, self-contradictory form." 12

Three tendencies have helped monopoly capitalist economies to mitigate the tendency to economic stagnation. First, there has arisen a surplus class--i.e., a class of workers who do no productive work but live off a portion of the huge surplus which the giant corporations accumulate. In this category fall employees of the large banking, credit, advertising and distribution systems now in existence. Much of what they do is unnecessary, as can be seen from an examination of socialist economies.

Second, there is the well-known process of waste production, where products purposely designed to disintegrate in short order are foisted on consumers. These individuals are forced to buy goods more frequently than they would in a more rational economy.

Third, the large amounts of government spending raises the level of aggregate demand. Now it must be admitted that some government

spending is necessary if there is to be any government at all; and other government spending is necessary if the economy is to keep pace with the increasingly social character of the forces of production, as has been argued above. But the largest item of government expenditure--"National Defense", which will cost $80.295 Billion in fiscal 1972[13] is not necessary in either of these senses. Certainly some military outlays are required to defend the imperial holdings of the economy. Vietnam is a clear demonstration for those who will not accept subtler proofs. The incredible volume of these outlays, however, cannot be accounted for on the basis of military need. The tolerance of huge cost overruns[14], the willingness of the government to provide much of the capital from which private military contractors derive profits[15], and the incredible lengths to which the government goes to save to most disastrously inefficient contractors from well deserved bankruptcy[16], indicate a recognition by the state that the level of aggregate demand must be maintained, no matter how artificially. The fact that demand is maintained only with a great measure of socially wasteful spending indicates a serious weakness of American society which will be examined more thoroughly.

Though it might be objected that government's diversion of surplus value into military spending is not necessary, that it might be spent on more socially useful goods or invested in 'public corporation', thereby eliminating "tax revolts", and satisfying social needs, political reality makes this improbable. As Reich and Finkelhor convincingly argue, corporations have very strong motives for opposing social spending. They first of all fear the development of competing state supported enterprises:

> "First many kinds of social spending put the government in direct competition with particular industries and with the private sector as a whole. This is taboo in a capitalist economy. For example, if the government built low-cost housing in large amounts, it would heavily but into profits of private

> builders and landlords who own the existing housing stock. It would add to the supply of housing and take land away from private developers who want to use it for commercial purposes. Similarly, building effective public transportation would compete with the automobile interests.
>
> Any one of these interests taken by itself might not be sufficient to put insurmountable obstacles in the way of social spending. Most social service programs affect only one particular set of interests in the private economy. But there are so many forms of potential interference. Each of the vested interests are aware of this and so work to help one another out. They fuel a general ideology that says that too much social spending is dangerous. They refer to creeping socialism, the dangers of bureaucracy, the faith in individualism and self-help, and the unpleasant image of giving hand-outs to those who don't deserve it. Furthermore, the spector of interference haunts all those in the private sector. So they engage in the practice of "log-rolling". You oppose interference with me, and I'll oppose interference with you. Massive political opposition to rather minor increases in social spending is thus forged. Furthermore, the capitalist system as a whole is threatened by massive governmental social spending because the very necessity of private ownership and control over production is thereby called into question. The basic assumption in any capitalist society that goods and services should be produced by private enterprise according to criteria of market profitability thus also fuels the general ideology limiting social spending."

Second they fear that social spending will transform the labor market in a disadvantageous fashion:

> "Public expenditures on an adequate welfare program would make it difficult for employers to get workers. If the government provided adequate non-wage income without social stigma to recipients, many workers would drop out of the labor force rather than take low-paying and unpleasant jobs. Those who stayed at jobs would be less likely to put up with demanding working conditions. The whole basis of the capitalist labor market is that workers have no income source other than the sale of their labor power."

They also fear that adequate spending on social services will partly eliminate the unequal distribution of privilege in capitalist society and serve to call the remaining inequalities into question:

> "Education, for example, is a crucial stratification mechanism, determining who gets to the top and legitimizing their position there. Good universal education, extending through college, would put the whole system of inequality into question. Moreover, having the possibility to get an advanced education would undermine

> the labor market as well. Few workers settle so willingly for the miserable, low-paying jobs they now do."

Also, social spending threatens to provide full satisfaction to needs which are now partly met or totally unsatisfied, but which are exploited to stimulate individual consumer spending:

> "Corporations can only sell people goods in an economy of abundance by playing on their unsatisfied needs and yearnings. In an era when most basic necessities have been provided, these new needs are mostly artificially created; the need for status, sex appeal, etc. They are based on fears and anxieties and dissatisfaction that people have and that are continually pandered to by the commercial world. But if people's needs were being fulfilled by the public sector, that is, if they had access to adequate housing, effective transportation, good schools, and good health care, they would be much less prey to the appeals of the commercial hucksters. These forms of collective consumption would have interfered with the demand for consumer products in the private market." 17

Thus far the analysis of value and a rather cursory investigation of the political enonomy of advanced capitalist society have allowed us to discern the weaknesses and contradictions in that society. The desire to accumulate surplus value has produced a complex productive technology, but has prevented it rational use. While there exists the potential for material well being for everyone in our society, we have instead gross disproportions in wealth. While there is incredible need for growth in the production of social wealth, monopoly capitalism resists such production even though the internal economy must elude crises in the most artificial and useless manner. And where there is vigorous economic expansion it is often imperialistic expansion--more profitable to be sure, but certainly not the most reasonable solution to the economic problems of the United States.

But this analysis also indicated that, contrary to the beliefs of many of the opponents of this system, economic collapse is not necessarily on the historical agenda. The strategies which have thus far

ameliorated the tendency to stagnation, if cleverly executed and extended, are potentially capable of doing the same in the future. If we are therefore to take a meaningful look at the possibilities for class conflict in our society, we will need to probe its contradictions without the assurance that a soon to be experienced economic disaster will be the source of such conflict. Although this seems a more difficult road, it is less likely to lead to illusion. The next part of this essay therefore assumes that economic collapse will not occur, and looks elsewhere for the genesis of class conflict.

CHAPTER III

Admittedly our analysis of the advanced capitalist society which is the United States does not in itself show social change to be likely. In fact some people, with similar analyses of U.S. society, have seized on the existence of relative economic stability as conclusive evidence that the Marxist perspective is no longer useful. Thus C. Wright Mills wants to dismiss Marxism as "essentially the politics of hunger", now invalid since it premised its anticipation of revolution on an approaching economic cataclysm in which the masses would be plunged into misery so deep and turmoil so pervasive that they would finally decide that they really had nothing to lose but their chains. In fact this was not the essence of Marx's position, and is not an accurate statement of the standpoint of modern writers who take his insights as a point of departure. Rather it was Marx's achievement to have discovered that the revolutionary transformations of society, when they occur, are generated from a particular source of tension within that society: the conflict between the development of the forces of production and the existing relations of production, which prevented the fullest use of that development. While it is true that the proletarian revolution which Marx anticipated in capitalist society has not occured, it is also true that there is an irrational system of social relations in advanced capitalist society which prevents the best possible use of the forces of production which have developed. That much, it seems safe to say, has already been demonstrated. The remaining task therefore, if we are to stay within the Marxist tradition, is to see if this pervasive social conflict is capable of generating revolutionary opposition within this soicety. The hypothesis being advanced here is that it does; and it will be argued that this is the case even if the corporate ruling class be conceeded the

ability to control the national economy without causing depression or disaster through ignorance or incompetence, which is no mean concession. The strategy for examing this hypothesis is to examine segments of the working class for already apparent revolutionary activity, to try to explain why it exists, and to try to discover if it is likely to grow to more significant proportions.

It seems likely that the middle class white collar worker is going to develop into a force for social change. First it is important to recognize that the middle class white collar workers are becoming a relatively and absolutely more numerous segment of the working class. Between 1950 and 1960, for instance, white collar employment increased 27.6% while blue collar employment rose 5.8%. According to government estimates, white collar workers will comprise 47% of the total work force by 1975, having risen from 15% in 1910, 28% in 1950, and 32.3% in 1960. Of this projected increase the most rapid will be among professional and technical workers, though the largest single segment of the white collar work force will still be clerical personnel.[18] Even manufacturing, the grand redoubt of the blue collar worker, is being invaded by a new kind of worker. Between 1952 and 1963 the percent of manufacturing employment comprised by professional-technical-kindred, clerical and sales occupational categories grew from 19.9% to 24.8%, while blue collar categories shrank or increased by relatively much smaller amounts. (See Tables 3, 4, 5)

The reason for this transformation of a large part of the working class is the changing nature of work in advanced capitalist economies. As Herbert Gintis has pointed out, work in economies such as ours is becoming primarily cybernetic, requiring less physical human participation in labor and more facility in the transfer and manipulation of

information.[19] As a consequence, the growth of white collar occupations has been paralleled by a remarkable growth in university education. Between 1954 and 1964 the university population rose from 2.452 to 4.951 million; the number of degrees earned rose from 285,841 to 525,000; and university expenditures rose from $4.6 to $11.9 Billion. If government projections are realized, the number of people earning bachelor's degrees will have risen 314% in two decades. (See table 2)

Now in itself all this data merely tells us that the nature of work is changing and that an increasingly large proportion of the working class, having been given university educations, will become "intellect workers" and enjoy the increased incomes and more affluent lifestyle of the middle class. It takes on greater significance, however, when we realize that the educations they will receive, and the lives which they and their children will subsequently lead, have produced, among the members of the student movement, needs for a qualitatively different kind of society--not needs for increased consumption goods, but needs for community, rational social organization, and aesthetic satisfaction. That is to say, the processes which have produced the unsatisfied needs which have in turn produced the student movement, can be expected to become generalized through an increasingly large segment of the working class, and hence we can regard the student movement as the harbinger of changes within the working class. And, just as in the case of the student movement, we can expect this growing segment of highly trained workers also to come into conflict with the ruling class.

That the student movement has been primarily an upper middle class phenomenon is generally agreed. For instance, Kenneth Keniston writes:

> "...a disproportionate number are drawn from professional and intellectual families of upper middle-class status. For example, compared with active student conservatives, members of protest

> groups tend to have higher parental incomes, more parental education, and less anxiety about social status (Westby and Braungart, 1966). Another study finds that high levels of education distinguish the activist's family even in the grandparental generation (Flacks). In brief, activists are not drawn from disadvantaged, status-anxious, underprivileged or uneducated groups; on the contrary, they are selectively recruited from among those young Americans who have had the most socially fortunate upbringings." 20

His remarks are echoed elsewhere.[21]

That these students have new needs is at least implicitly recognized in the work of several social scientists. In attempting to describe the nature of contemporary radicalism some social scientists have focused on personality. Charles Hampden-Turner has done a comparative analysis of data on students who may be classified politically as old-left (communist), center, non-activist, right, and "new left". His results show that student radicals (new leftists) have personalities which are the antithesis of those necessary to the acceptance of things as they are. Among other characteristics, he found that "new leftists" are "least constrained by conventional codes and the most likely to choose for themselves according to the particular circumstances", while at the same time being most free from each other's opinions[22]; most inner directed and independent[23]; most oriented toward self-actualization[24]; least likely to have an "authoritarian belief in a great cause"[25]. In other words, because they are so "psychologically healthy"[26], radicals find it easiest to advocate courses of action which are socially prescribed.

Others have had more to say about their values. In a very perceptive study of radical students at the University of Chicago, Richard Flacks listed the themes he found characteristic of the student movement. They describe, in a schematic fashion, the new needs (and hence needs for social change) generated in the radicals of the middle class: (a)

"Romanticism: there is a strong stress among movement participants on a quest for self-expression, often articulated in terms of leading a "free" life--i.e. one not bound by conventional restraints on feeling, experience, communication, expression." (b) "Anti-authoritarianism: a strong antipathy toward arbitrary rule centralized decision making, 'manipulation'." (c) "Egalitarianism, populism: a belief that all men are capable of political participation, that political power should be unduly dispersed, that the locus of value in society lies within the people and not elites." (d) "Anti-dogmatism: a strong reaction against ideological interpretations of events." (e) "Moral purity: a strong antipathy to self-interested behavior, particularly when overlaid by claims of disinterestedness." (f) "Community: a strong emphasis on a desire for human relationships, for a full expression of emotions, for the breaking down of interpersonal barriers and the refusal to accept conventional norms concerning interpersonal contact (e.g., norms respecting sex, status, race, age, etc.)." (g) "Anti-institutionalism: a strong distrust of involvement with conventional institutional roles."[27]

These values are remarkable for two reasons. First because many of them--especially anti-authoritarianism, egalitarianism, and community--signify the emergence of "public needs", i.e., desires which can be satisfied only if individuals are allowed the freedom to participate in a public life in which there are not significant disproportions in the degrees of power and authority possessed by different people. And more generally because these values conflict with the predominant ideology of possessive individualism[28], and as a result student radicals find themselves opposed to the social order which is both described and justified in that ideology.

Now the explanation of why student radicalism developed when it did is significant to our contention that the middle class is likely to continue producing radicals in the future. At least part of it lies in the fact that the generation of white upper middle-class students who began the student movement by participating in SNCC, starting the FSM, and founding SDS, was the first truly affluent generation in an advanced capitalist society. While previous generations of the middle class had undoubtedly attained comparable levels of privilege, that generation born around 1940 was the first to grow up in a world in which such great quantities of consumer goods were supplied to them with such relative ease. In short, the development of the forces of production had progressed to such a degree that full satisfaction of one's material desires was, at least potentially, no longer dependent on the deprivation of some other person. And not being part of the ruling economic class, they had no interest in preserving inequalities in the distribution of material wealth. Thus, given that needs for goods were satisfied, others received more psychic energy, became more significant.[29]

Material affluence had other consequences for this generation of the middle class. Its existence, it would seem, was an important reason why their parents were well educated and family lives were characterized by non-authoritarian interpersonal relations, permissiveness, liberal political values, emphasis on intellectual and aesthetic pursuits, humanitarianism, or self-expression rather than achievement.[30] After all, in a society that rewards the opposite of these characteristics, a large amount of economic and status security is necessary to the family that permits them to exist.

And it would be incorrect to omit the influence that university education, made available in part by family afluence, has on the development of radicalism. For while it is in many regards quite wretched, some students manage to develop the capacity for critical thought. The importance of ths capacity is indicated by the disproportionate representation of humanities and the social sciences in the ranks of the left[31] since those disciplines are more given to the criticism of ideology and examination of social and individual values than, say, to the natural sciences or professional schools.[32]

It would be a serious misinterpretation of what has been said so far if the political activity of left radicals were not viewed as reasonable attempts to satisfy their new and distinctive set of needs. The evidence indicates that their needs deviate from the norm in numerous ways, that they have a higher need for among other things, egalitarianism and an anti-authoritarian environment than their fellow citizens. But it is also true that political-economic power in our society is in the hands of a corporate ruling class[33], and that our schools and political institutions[34] are characterized by authoritarian relationships. Therefore vigorous attempts to establish neighborhood control of political power, to give students control over their educations, to end an imperialist war, and to combat racism are all in their interest, since their success would make American society better able to satisfy their needs.

Thus far we have argued the lives of the affluent middle class are producing qualitatively different needs in its members, and that as their conditions of life become generalized through an increasingly large segment of the working class, the militant radicalism of the student movement will expand correspondingly. But a student movement

is in itself insufficient to effect radical social change; hence we must ask whether the "new working class" outside the universities will be able to mobilize for collective political action as students have in universities.

There are two developments which suggest an affirmative answer to this question. The first, pointed out by Tom Hayden in The Trial, is an increasing concentration of radically committed members and former members of the "new working class" around universities. No longer students, but still radicals, they do have the potential to turn their territory into "liberated zones", taking political power in the local communities and making sure that the university efforts to make students less politically active and more amenable to the Happy Consciousness do not succeed. Second, there is the growth of employment of the new working class by the state at a time when all levels of government are in the midst of a fiscal crisis. For example, local governments employ about 2.588 million teachers and about 232,000 social and welfare workers.[35] The inability of these governments to meet the financial needs of these and other workers have caused rapid growth in unions such as the American Federation of Teachers (115% increase 1955 to 1965) and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (130% increase 1955 to 1965)[36]. As O'Connor has pointed out, mere trade union activity will not provide a solution to difficulties, since apolitical strikes for wage demands will meet increasing resistance from already over-taxed workers. Therefore, the self-interested efforts of these workers will have to become explicitly political--i.e., they must seek support among the people they are supposed to administer and control--if they are to succeed at all. The possibility of such alliances has already been demonstrated in situations

where financial crises of the type being discussed had not yet developed. Thus, for example, the 250 member chapter of the AFT at San Francisco State College, whose job security was threatened by the reactionary caprice of California school administrators, joined the 1968 student strike there. They took the position that negotiations on their demands could not take place until student demands were met. Though the strike itself was broken, this was a significant deviation for a group of professionals. There have also been instances of cooperation between welfare workers and their clients, as in New York in 1968 where they marched with members of MDS and MWRO to oppose state cuts in welfare and Medicaid.[37]

One problem which may interfere with the expansion of oppositional force in the middle class is the hesitance of the materially privileged to admit that the other needs which they feel are legitimate and deserve satisfaction. Some of the changes in the self-concept of SDS exemplify this contradiction. Initially its members (or at least the more articulate of them) were aware of themselves as middle class. The Port Huron Statement begins with the well known sentence: "We are people of this generation, bred in at least modest comfort, housed now in universities, looking uncomfortably to the world we inherent"[38]. In the year or so before the organization's breakup, however, there was much greater concern with the revolutionary potential of blue collar workers and with creating a "white fighting force" to aid an anticipated black revolution. Thus the Progressive Labor Party pamphlet "Students and Revolution" argues:

> "In waging these fights for various campus reforms, the question of who to ally with is a major question of principle. Begging favors from the ruling class or hoping for favorable publicity from the middle class will inevitably lead to defeat. Only the working class (by which PL apparently means production workers) which is in antagonistic conflict with our common enemy the ruling class, has the strength to help us win our

> demands. As a matter of fact there are only two sides with which to ally, the workers or the ruling class." 39

The "Weatherman" statement focuses a good bit of its analysis on racism, and sees revolutionary activity among whites as essentially ancillary to it. In a famous and tortured passage,its authors write:

> "It is necessary to defeat both racist tendencies: (1) that blacks shouldn't go ahead with making the revolution, and (2) that blacks should go ahead alone with making it. The only third path is to build a white movement which will support the blacks in moving as fast as they have to and are able to, and still itself keep up with that black movement enough so that white revolutionaries share the cost and the blacks don't have to do the whole thing alone. Any white who does not follow this third path is objectively following one of the other two (or both) and is objectively racist." 40

While such analyses were part of attempts to arrive at a political strategy for revolution,the neglect of the material conditions which had created SDS itself certainly showed elements of "bad faith".

Even with the increase of oppositional consciousness and activity among the burgeoning middle class, significant transformations of American society (i.e., transformations of control of the economic surplus and ultimately therefore of control of the means of production) cannot be achieved by the middle class alone, though they are the most recently developed and most rapidly growing segment of the working class in advanced capitalist society. They clearly need allies. And the most likely prospects are black people, a group already recognized by the New Left, if not the entire student movement, as natural allies.

That the consciousness of black workers is suited for this kind of alliance is borne out in a study of Detroit industrial workers done by John C. Leggett and others. One of his conclusions was that "On the whole, race is the most important influence on class consciousness, although nationality differences help to account for variations in attitudes within the mainstream working class."[41] Thus for example, of the black

union members interviewed who made over $5,000, 35% were militant egalitarians and 26% were militant radicals; among non-union black workers who made over $5,000, 20% were militant egalitarians and 40% were militant radicals. Of those who made less than $5,000, 18% of the union members were militant egalitarian and 41% were militant radicals; and of the non-union member in this income category, 5% were militant egalitarians and 45% were militant radicals.[42]

In conjunction with the development of these class conscious attitudes, the progressive deterioration of the material existence of black workers will certainly heighten the tempo of their opposition. Advanced capitalist society, it has been argued, tends to underutilization of resources, both inanimate and human. Although there are techniques for blunting this tendency, they are not completely successful. And therefore there is significant unemployment and underemployment, with its concomitant suffering, in American society. Because of the racism of this society, much of this un- and underemployment is concentrated among black workers. Overall, the black unemployment rate is about twice that of white workers, and in urban areas it averages about 8.7% (though the rate for urban whites was 5.7%). Underemployment in major urban areas is running at rates of 24 to 47%; and there are also large numbers of workers who are unemployed but never counted because they have given up looking for work. Because of population growth are continued deterioration of the urban economy, urban black employment problems should become worse.[43] Since about 73% of the black population is concentrated in cities[44], this is of the utmost significance. In addition, because of their urban concentration black workers are also bound to suffer severly from the fiscal crisis of the state, since social services, which are painfully inadequate already, are declining at a rapid rate.[45]

But if the future working class-consciousness of black peoples seems likely, that of the white lower-middle class and blue-collar workers is anything but certain. They are, if we can judge from the scanty information available, significantly less class conscious than black workers. Turning again to Leggett's study of Detroit workers, we find that of the white union members making over $5,000, 5% were militant egalitarians and 28% were militant radicals; of those making less than $5,000, the percentages were 6% and 15% respectively. The consciousness among non-union members was even lower, with no militant egalitarians in either income classification, and with only 9% of the over $5,000 group and 6% of the under $5,000 group qualifying as militant radicals. Leggett also found that "In Detroit, increases in class consciousness fail to be accompanied by decreases in inter-ethnic hostility"[46], suggesting a further obstacle to the hope of dissolving the political problems of white racism by appeals to class interest. (While this is also true of black workers, it is white workers who are in a position to act against the black; and their activity is therefore decisive for the furure of the blue collar workers). That blue collar whites are amenable to racist appeals is also evident. The Wallace campaign of 1968, while not victorious, showed that working class racism runs deep. Lipset and Raab estimate that 20% of all manual workers and 19% of those making $3,000 to 6,999 and 17% of those making $7,000-9,999 were Wallace sympathizers[47]. As Lipset and Raab say, "What has happened is that increasing numbers of white young people in the South and in many working-class districts of the North have been exposed in recent years to repeated discussions of the supposed threats to their schools and communities posed by integration. They have been reared in homes and neighborhoods where anti-Negro sentiments became increasingly common.

Hence, while the upper-middle-class scions of liberal parents were being radicalized to the left by civil rights and Vietnam war issues, a sizeable segment of southern and northern working-class youths were being radicalized to the right. The consequence of such polarization can be seen in the very different behavior of the two groups in the 1968 election campaign."[48] For this reason, blue collar and lower-middle-class whites seem the most likely supporters of reaction, since reactionaries would feel no compunction against appealing to their racism.

Essentially this discussion of developing opposition can be reduced to the following: The political economy of advanced capitalist society, though it still functions by the appropriation of surplus value, provides for the satisfaction of the material needs of many of its citizens. Among the upper middle and middle classes it does this fairly well but in the process provides large numbers of people with sufficient satisfaction that they recognize the existence of other significant needs which are yet unmet. And because of the nature of these newly developing needs, opposition to the present social order is developing in the middle class. At the same time most black people, the historic victims of racism, find that their position in the political economy is miserable and declining. Many of them are already in active opposition to the social order, and many more will be. The coalesence of these forces with subsequent radical social change is thus a fair possibility, if not a certainty.

To this low-level optimism must be added two cautionary notes. First, the monopoly on the means of violence now enjoyed by the government is overwhelming. Any activity which threatens the existing distribution of wealth and power certainly risks being crushed decisively. The mere existence of such activity is possible only if carried out in an extremely intelligent manner. Second, we must remember that the United States is an imperialist country, and the defense of her empire is paramount in the minds of our ruling class. They are willing to wage genocidal warfare for that defense. But even that has not succeeded, and two or three more Vietnams, perhaps a war with China are in the making. This can only bring crisis at home, perhaps before the revolutionary forces are ready to wage a protracted struggle against the state. If they are repressed and attacked when they are weak

it is possible, as the facist experience has shown, to forestall their development for a very long time. While it seems unlikely that the U.S. will be able to successfully defend her empire, it is very likely probable that we are headed for a long, grim era of reaction inside her borders.

FOOTNOTES

1. Marx, Karl, Volume I, p.35.

2. Ibid, p.39.

3. Ibid, pp. 170-71.

4. Sweezy, Paul, pp. 98-100.

5. Magdoff, Harry, pp. 190-91.

6. "In 1964, foreign sources of earnings accounted for about 22 percent of domestic non-financial corporate profits." Ibid, p.182.

7. On this point Galbraith writes: "In western economies, markets are dominated by great firms. These establish prices and seek to insure a demand for what they have to sell. The enemies of the market are thus to be seen...(they are) advanced technology and the specialization of men and process that this requies and the resulting commitment of time and capital. These make the market work badly when the need is for greatly enhanced reliability--when planning is essential. The modern large corporation and the modern apparatus of socialist planning are variant accomodations to the same need." (New Indust. State, p.44).

   Such an invocation of the "technological imperative" needs qualification. The aim of planned technological change in monopoly capitalist society is long run maximization of profits. (cf. Monopoly Capital, pp. 93-96). This, as has been pointed out, produces incredible irrationality throughout the society. Socialist planning, one would hope, would have as its goal the maximization of use values for the society.

8. Monthly Review, pp. 1-13.

9. An obvious fifth type is defense spending. O'Connor of course recognizes it, but it is omitted here because it is discussed below.

10. O'Connor, James, Part II, p.68.

11. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, pp. 393-394.

12. Marx, Karl, Volume III, pp. 252-253.

13. New York Times, "President's Budget Message".

14. A good example is the F-111 airplane, which had a cost overrun of $9.7 million in 1968, probably more by now. (Melman, p.64).

15. "From 1957 to 1961 thirteen major contractors made use of $1.5 billion of government property as against $1.4 billion of privately owned fixed capital." (Melman, p.47)

16. A recent example is the D.O.D. rescue of Lockheed.

17. Reich and Finkelhor, pp. 18-19.

18. Bonnell and Reich, pp. 5-6.

19. For a lucid examination of the material discussed in this paragraph, see"Revolutionary Youth and the New Working Class" by Herb Gintis.

20. Kenniston, p.117

21. See Peterson, p. 304; Flacks, p. 66.

22. Hampden-Turner, p. 235.

23. Ibid, p. 243.

24. Ibid, p. 250.

25. Ibid, p. 258.

26. Cf. Kenniston, p. 127.

27. Flacks, pp. 56-57.

28. "Possessive individualism" is a term used by C.B. MacPherson to designate the ideology which developed along with capitalism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and persists today in spite of the development of monopoly capitalism. The essence of possessive individualism is roughly that each person has an alienable right to the control of his own person, with his property being part of his personage. This sounds perfectly acceptable until we recognize that it justifies both the continued existence of the Rockefeller fortune and the "right" of each worker to have his surplus labor expropriated by capitalists. It is, in other words, the premise of the ideology which justifies the status quo. (see The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, p. 3)

29. In An Essay On Liberation, Marcuse writes: "Capitalist progress thus not only reduces the environment of freedom, the 'open space' of human existence, but also the 'longing', the need for such an environment. And in doing so, quantitative progress militates against qualitative change even if the institutional barriers against radical education and action are surmounted. This is the vicious circle: the rupture with the self-propelling conservative continuum of needs must precede the revolution which is to usher in a free society, but such rupture itself can be envisaged only in a revolution--a revolution which would be driven by the vital need to be freed from the administered comforts and the destructive productivity of the exploitative society, freed from smooth heteronomy, a revolution which, by virtue of this 'biological' foundation, would have the chance of turning quantitative technical progress into qualititively different ways of life--precisely because it would be a revolution occurring at a high level of material and intellectual development, one which would enable man to conquer scarcity and poverty." (pp. 18-19) It is my argument that this precondition for change is now developing. Marcuse does not agree, because he still indentifies the source of revolutionary opposition with the industrial working class. (see Essay, pp. 55-6)

30. Kenniston, p. 68.

31. See Peterson, Kenniston.

32. The foregoing discussion of the "new working class" was suggested to me by a passage from the Grundrisse translated by Martin Nicolaus. See New Left Reader, pp. 106-107.

33. See Mandel, Mills

34. See Marcuse, 1964

35. U.S. Dept. of Labor, p.9.

36. Sturmthal, p.340.

37. National Guardian

38. SDS, 1966, p.3.

39. Progressive Labor Party, p.34.

40. SDS, 1969, p.4.

41. Leggett, p.117.

42. Ibid, p.102 [We should note here that on Leggett's criteria, someone is militant if he is willing to take aggressive action to advance the interests of his class (e.g. picketing). Someone is an egalitarian if he wants to see an equal distribution of wealth in the country.]

43. Fusfeld, p.176.

44. Bogue, p.176.

45. Kerner, pp. 266-273

46. Leggett, p.126.

47. Lipset and Raab, p.28

48. Ibid, p.38.

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APPENDIX

TABLE 2

Higher Education in the U.S.

number enrolled (in thousands)	number enrolled as percent of pop. aged 18-21	number of earned bachelor's degrees	amount spent on education (in Billions)	
2,452	29	285,841	4.6	1954
4,951	43	525,000	11.9	1964
8,689	55	899,000	22.5	1974 (Projected)
354	89	314	489	percent increase 1954 to 1974

Source: Projections of Educational Statistics, 1974-5

TABLE 3

Actual and Projected Employment for Persons 16 Years and Over, by Occupation Group, 1960 to 1975

	Actual				Projected[1]		Number Changes (millions)[2]		Percent Change[3]	
	1960		1965		1973					
	Number (thousands)	Percent distribution	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	1960-65	1965-75	1960-65	1965-75
Total employment[3]	65,777	100.0	71,068	100.0	87.2	100.0	5.3	16.1	8.1	22.7
Professional & Technical Workers	7,474	11.4	8,883	12.5	12.9	14.8	1.4	4.0	18.9	45.2
Managers, officials, and proprietors	7,067	10.7	7,340	10.3	9.0	10.4	.3	1.7	3.9	23.3
Clerical workers	9,759	14.8	11,129	15.7	14.8	16.9	1.4	3.6	14.0	32.5
Sales Workers	4,216	6.4	4,497	6.3	5.6	6.4	.3	1.1	6.7	25.0
Craftsmen & foremen	8,560	13.0	9,222	13.0	11.4	13.0	.7	2.1	7.7	23.1
Operatives	11,950	18.2	13,336	18.8	14.7	16.9	1.4	1.4	11.6	10.5
Service workers	8,031	12.2	8,936	12.6	12.0	13.8	.9	3.1	11.3	34.4
Nonfarm laborers	3,557	5.4	3,688	5.2	3.6	4.1	.1	-.1	3.7	-2.4[4]
Farmers & farm laborers	5,163	7.8	4,057	5.7	3.2	3.6	-1.1	-.9	-21.4	-21.6

1 These projections of civilian employment assume 3 percent unemployment whereas the projections of total labor force shown in the preceding tables are consistent with 4 % unemployment. The lower unemployment assumption implies a slightly larger labor force; e.g., total labor force in 1975 at 3% unemployment would be about 92.6 million as compared with 92.2 million at 4% unemployment.

2 Based on date in thousands.

3 Represents total employment as covered by the Current Population Survey.

4 Employment is projected at about the level of the past decade; however, because 1965 employment was unusually high, reflecting a sharp increase in manufacturing, the projected percent change from 1965 indicates an apparent decline.

SOURCE: Bonnell and Reich

TABLE 4

Total Labor Force and White-Collar Components, 1870-1960*

	1870		1910		1950		1960		Percent Increase	
	Gainful Workers (000's)	Percent of Total	Gainful Workers (000's)	Percent of Total	Em-ployed (000's)	Percent of Total	Em-ployed (000's	Percent of Total	1870-1960	1950-1960
Total Labor Force	12,925	100.0	36,720	100.0	56,225	100.0	64,639	100.0	400	15.0
Total White Collar+	740	5.7	5,515	15.0	15,730	28.0	21,178	32.8	2,762	34.6
Profession, tech-nical, and kindred	341	2.6	1,698	4.6	4,909	8.7	7,232	11.2	2,021	47.3
Clerical & kindred	98	0.8	2,016	5.5	6,894	12.3	9,307	14.4	9,397	35.0
Sales	302	2.3	1,800	4.9	3,927	7.0	4,639	7.2	1,436	18.1

Source: Bonnell and Reich

* Source: Adapted from Census decennial data.

+The professional and sales groups include a number of self-employed (as, e.g., fee-practicing doctors or many real estate agents). The proportion declines in later years. In 1950, 13.3 percent of the professional and technical group and 10.9 percent of the sales workers were self-employed.

TABLE 5

Persons Employed in Manufacturing by Major Occupational Groups (in Thousands), 1952, 1960, 1963, April of Each Year

	1952	1960	1963	Percent Change 1952-63
Total Employed	16,270	17,400	17,952	+10.3
Professional,technical, & kindred	858	1,415	1,663	+93.8
Manager,officials,and proprietors	858	1,076	1,147	+33.7
Clerical and kindred	1,922	2,180	2,190	+13.9
Sales	462	575	597	+29.2
Craftsmen, foremen	3,226	3,318	3,353	+ 3.9
Operatives	7,304	7,331	7,763	+ 6.3
Service	330	366	303	- 8.2
Laborers	1,304	1,144	935	-28.3

Selected White-Collar Occupations as a Percent of Total Manufacturing Employment, 1952, 1960, and 1963

	1952	1960	1963
Professional and technical	5.3	8.1	9.3
Clerical and kindred	11.8	12.5	12.2
Sales	2.8	3.3	3.3

Source: Bonnell and Reich