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THE EFFECTS OF TRANSCENDENT A1.
MEDITATION 0N PERCEPTION
OF AN INCDNGRUITY

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
RICHARD WILLIAM INCE
1974

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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECTS OF TRANSCENDENTAL MEDITATION
ON PERCEPTION OF AN INCONGRUITY

By

Richard William Ince

The purpose of this study was to test the hypothesis that
Transcendental Meditation practice facilitates perception which is
more sensitive to color and features of a stimulus which are contrary
to expectation and common conception. Two measures were used to test
these hypotheses. One measure consisted of an auditory stimulus
word which became louder relative to three masking words over nineteen
trials. A second measure consisted of a normal playing card and an
incongruent playing card in which the normal black or red color was
reversed. Each card was tachistoscopically presented with exposure
time increased over trials.

Sixty-one subjects were divided into three groups matched
for age, sex and education. Each subject in these groups was tested
on the auditory measure immediately prior to a twenty minute treatment
condition and then tested on both the auditory and visual measures
immediately following their treatment. One group (control group) con-
sisted of subjects who attended an "introductory lecture" on transcen-

dental meditation and said they planned to take the transcendental

meditation course and begin meditation practice in the near future.
This group engaged in twenty minutes of light, presumably relaxing
activity (i.e., reading of a light and popular health magazine or
rest as they chose), between the pre and post testings. A second
group consisted of beginning meditators (BTM1) who had been prac-
ticing transcendental meditation for 4 1/2 to 7 weeks but had not
meditated for at least five hours. Between pre and post testing, this
group engaged in the same light activity as the control group. A
third group consisted of beginning meditators (BTMZ) who also had been
practicing transcendental meditation for 4 l/2 to 7 weeks but had not
meditated for at least five hours. Unlike the other two groups, the
BTMZ group meditated for twenty minutes between the pre and post
testing.

The results of the statistical analyses indicated the follow-
ing: 1) no differences between groups on the auditory measure;
2) subjects who had been practicing meditation but had not meditated
for at least five hours (BTMI) performed significantly better on the
visual measure than did subjects who had just meditated (BTMZ) and
subjects who had never meditated (control group); 3) no differences
between groups in sensitivity to color. Various explanations of the
above results were discussed. Results on the visual measure supports
the hypothesis that meditation experience over time (and not right
after a meditation session) facilitates the ability to identify and

perceive features of a stimulus which are contrary to expectation,

while a meditation session has the immediate effect of decreasing
this ability. Nevertheless, in light of the results on the auditory
measure this conclusion is tentative. The possibility that medita-
tion practice affects auditory and visual systems differently and
that the hypothesis may be valid for the visual but not for the
auditory measure was discussed. Contrary to previous self-report
and research literature meditation does not seem to increase sensi-
tivity to color. Implications of these results in terms of past
theories and research were discussed, as well as suggestions for
future research. Lastly, this study suggests that contrary to much
meditation theory and research the changes which occur during.
immediately after, and hours after a meditation session may not lie

on a simple continuum or progression from lesser to greater effect.

THE EFFECTS OF TRANSCENDENTAL MEDITATION
ON PERCEPTION OF AN INCONGRUITY

By

Richard William Ince

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Psychology

1974

DEDICATION

To my parents

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Having concluded this thesis, one of the finer rewards has
been the opportunity to take stock and reflect on the satisfaction
of a job well done and contemplate eagerly the tasks ahead. During
this reflection, I have become most aware of the important contribu-
tions that numerous individuals have made to this thesis. Because
I have often found it difficult to ask for and receive help from
others, this realization brings me special joy. Thus, it is with
a genuine relish and gratefulness that I acknowledge those who have
been important in helping me through this project.

To Art Seagull for his encouragement in the earliest stages
of this project, for serving on my committee, and for his editorial
and stylistic advice which will stay with me beyond this project.

To Dave Nessel for his aid in creating the complex instru-
ments needed for this study and for serving on my committee.

To Larry Messe and Ken Salzman for their time and advice on
experimental design and statistical analysis. Thanks to them, the
mysteries of experimental designs and statistical analysis are no
longer the mysteries they once were.

To Jonathan Smjth for the many hours we shared together in

discussing meditatiofi and research. His encouragement, analytic per-

ception and understanding of research repeatedly proved helpful.

iii

To Sue Weesner and Anna Toth who helped in the typing and
editing of the thesis drafts.

To Martha whose companionship, love, and patient tolerance
during this project and otherwise have made my life something better
than it otherwise would have been.

Lastly, but especially, to Gordon Williams, my thesis chair-
man, for his advice, encouragement and support of this thesis. His
willingness to work with me in an area which interested me is truly

appreciated.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
LIST OF TABLES ...................... vii
INTRODUCTION ....................... 1
Overview of Meditation .............. l
Transcendental Meditation ............. 5
Review of Meditation Research ........... 7
Traditional and Modern Views of Perception . . . . l4
Some Modern Psychological Views of Perception--
Theory and Research ............... l5
The Perceptual Mode in Meditation ......... 23
Reports and Research Relevant to Perceptual
Effects of Meditation .............. 25
STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES .................. 33
METHOD . .‘ ........................ 35
The Visual Recognition of Incongruity Task . . . . 35
The Recognition of a Masked Auditory Stimulus
Task ...................... 36
Subjects ..................... 38
Recruitment of Subjects .............. 39
Experimental Procedure and Instructions ...... 42
Scoring Procedures ................ 47
RESULTS .......................... 49
Hypotheses l and 2 ................ 49
Hypotheses 3 and 4 ................ 5l
Hypotheses 5 and 6 ................ 53
Supplementary Analyses .............. 54
DISCUSSION ........................ 56
Overview ..................... 56
Measures ..................... 57
Weakness of Experimental Design .......... 58
Meditation Experience of Sample .......... 60

TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont'd.)

Page
Dates of Testing .................. 6l
Assumptions .................... 62
Concluding Remarks ................. 71

Are These Results Inconsistent with a

Deautomatization Process? .......... 72
Can the Inconsistency Between This Study's

Results and Meditators' Common Self-

Reports be Explained? ............ 74
What Do This Study's Results Mean in Terms

of the Hypotheses That This Study Origi-

nally Attempted to Test? ........... 75

Implications and Conclusions Concerning Present
Meditation Theory and Research .......... 77
Areas for Future Research ............. 78
APPENDIX A ......................... 80
REFERENCES. . . . . . . . . . ............... 82

vi

Table

LIST OF TABLES

Analysis of Variance of Performance on the
Auditory Measure: Group by Treatment .......

Sample Sizes, Means and Standard Deviations
for Each Group on Pre and Post Treatment
Tests on the Auditory Measure ...........

Sample Sizes, Means and Standard Deviations
for Each Group on Post Treatment Tests on
the Visual Measure .................

A Comparison of the Number of Color Dominant

and Form Dominant Responses in Each of the
Three Groups on the Visual Measure .........

vii

Page

50

51

52

54

INTRODUCTION

Transcendental Meditation is only one of many forms of medi—
tation. Despite this diversity of meditation techniques, the tech-
niques seem to be similar when viewed in terms of operation, phenom-

enology, and outcome (Naranjo and Ornstein, 1971; Smith, l973).

Overview of Meditation

In most schools of meditation the practitioner sits quietly
in an area where external stimulation is minimal and focuses on a
single object. This focus may be upon a thought, a constant sound
(such as a waterfall), a word repeated internally, a visual object
(such as a vase), an image, a phrase, a paradoxical riddle, a
repetitive body process (such as breathing or heartbeat), or a
voluntary physical movement constantly repeated, as evidenced by
the whirling dervishes. The important point is that the object
serves as a constant, single source of stimulation.

The practitioner is instructed to attend to the focal object
without deliberately engaging in cognitive or affective activity.
Nevertheless, thoughts, feelings, fantasies, internal and external

stimulation inevitably distract the meditator's attention from the

focal object. Once attention drifts off the focal object, the
meditator is instructed, in different ways depending upon the par-
ticular school of meditation, to re-establish focal attention upon
the central stimulus.

Phenomenologically, meditators' experiences seem remark-
ably similar across schools. Meditation is usually described as an
experience of relative stillness which occurs as the usual cog-
nitive, affective, and daily activity diminish as a result of atten-
tion focusing on a single point of stimulation. However, the
beginning meditator usually finds emotions, thought, fantasies,
images, external stimulation and bodily sensation repeatedly dis-
tracting his attention from the focal object. At times, the dis-
tracting stimulus can be powerful and uncomfortable. Strong anxiety,
anger, sexual desires, despair, joy and bodily sensations are some
of the more powerful distractions documented (Maupin, l965; Coleman,
l972). Often the beginning meditator's experience seems anything
but still as his attention shifts repeatedly from the focal object
to a series of changing stimuli, back to the focal object and so on.
Nevertheless, he may be in a state of relative "stillness." Many
theorists maintain that these discomforts or distractions were
always present, but the meditator has been so busily engaged in
incessant physical, cognitive and affective activity that he has
never noticed them before.

Over time the meditator's experience becomes increasingly

still and uninterruptedly focused upon the focal object. Advanced

and even some beginning meditators describe the experience of
remaining alert while sinking into ever deeper levels of stillness
until awareness of the focal object and even awareness of being
conscious at all ceases. This state is often described as the
experiencing of "the void," “nothingness,” or in terms of
Transcendental Meditation, "pure consciousness."

Physiological research supports advanced yoga meditators'
claims that during meditation no stimulus other than the unchanging
focal object enters consciousness. While meditating, advanced
yoga meditators, unlike non-meditators, showed no reactivity to
different experimentally induced stimuli as measured in terms of
respiration rate, palmar skin conductance, heart rate and blocking
of EEG/alpha activity (Anand, Chhina, and Singh, l961).

In the preceding, the purpose has not been to deal with the
varieties of meditation in depth but to give the reader a brief
description of the essential aspects of meditation among many
schools. In this approach, there is the danger that the differences
between schools may be underemphasized. Thus, some qualifying
remarks are necessary. First, as Smith (1973) and others have noted.
some schools of meditation have the meditator focus upon the focal
stimulus in a more consciously deliberate manner than do other
schools. Secondly, some schools attach more importance to such
meditation experiences as uninterrupted stillness, freedom from
intruding stimuli, and particular visual or affective occurrences.

Thirdly, some schools of meditation emphasize the importance of

adherence to a particular, often complex, belief system. Lastly,
most schools of meditation instruct the meditator to focus his
attention on a single source of stimulation while some, such as that
of some Zen schools, involve just the opposite. Instead of having
just one focal object, the advanced Zen meditator is instructed to
attend to each external stimulus as each individually enters con-
sciousness. Similar to other forms of meditation, the advanced

Zen meditator focuses on a stimulus or set of stimuli in a constant.
consistent, attentional manner. As in other forms of meditation,

he experiences the immediate stimulus at hand with whole-hearted,
single-pointed, uninterrupted attention.

Research has shown that advanced Zen meditators' alpha
blocking response continues to respond to an experimentally induced
stimulus, such as a clicking sound, over a high number of trials
and does not habituate as it does with non-meditators (Kasamatsu,
Hirai, and Izawa, l962, l965). In contrast to the earlier cited
yoga meditators, the advanced Zen meditator will report having
experienced a repetitive, monotonous external stimulus clearly
while meditating as if he were hearing the stimulus for the first

time each time it was presented.

Transcendental Meditation

 

Because it is simple and can be practiced in almost any
setting, Transcendental Meditation (TM), its proponents maintain,
is one of the easiest forms of meditation to learn and practice.
The meditator is to sit comfortably with eyes closed for twenty
minutes in the morning and again eight hours later. During the
meditation period the meditator continually and silently repeats
his “mantra" (a sanskrit word). The repetition of the mantra may
take some conscious effort in the beginning but quickly becomes
effortless and automatic. The meditator is to continue repeating
it simply and effortlessly even if it changes in sound or volume.
If such stimuli as thoughts, feelings, desires, bodily sensations or
external stimuli enter consciousness and distract attention from the
mantra the novice is instructed to regard these intrusions passively
and effortlessly without concern, criticism, suppression or thought.
The meditator merely lets them drift out of consciousness at which
point he exerts absolutely no effort but "favors" the mantra and
waits for the cycle of repetitiOn to begin again. Experiences,
thoughts, feelings, desires and sensations which may arise in addi-
tion to the mantra are to be regarded as meaningless and unimportant;
they are only to be watched without attendant cognitive activity.
As one TM teacher said, "Consider all thoughts and distractions as
if they were meaningless words from some foreign language" (cited in

Smith, 1973).

As the reader has probably guessed, effort exerted in any
way is inimical to the meditation process. TM instructors reiterate
that the worst thing one can do in meditation is to try to meditate.
Meditation should always be effortless and easy even if it is not
always comfortable.

The theory of TM says that in meditation there will be both
periods of relative calmness free from distractions and periods of
"roughness of awareness" in which one's attention is continuously
distracted from the mantra. The meditator is to treat these dis-
tractions as described above. According to the theory of TM, no one
kind of experience is more valuable than another, and that during
these "rough" periods the meditator should behave in the same obser-
vant, effortless fashion.’ Although these periods do not feel tran-
quil, they are just as beneficial and important as the calm periods.
In fact, this roughness is said to be symptomatic of "stress release"
which is an integral phase of the meditation process.

The formal TM instructional period takes about eight hours
spread over a five-day period. Before receiving instructions the
initiate hears two ninety-minute introductory lectures which describe
the technique and theory of meditation, the detrimental effects of
drug usage on the meditative process, the ease of meditation, and
the claimed healthful benefits of TM as evidenced by meditators'

reports and scientific research.

A personal instructor teaches the beginning meditator how to
meditate. This takes less than one hour. Over the next three days,
the initiate meets with the TM instructors and his fellow initiates
for two hours each day. During these periods, the instructor answers
questions, elaborates the correct method of meditation, and encourages Fri
the initiates to share their meditation experiences with the group.
During this sharing, the instructor continuously reassures the group
that all meditation experiences are normal and uses these experiences

to explain further the proper method of meditation. This often means

 

ll‘ 4

re-emphasizing the importance of not trying to meditate and just
attending to the stimuli without effort. Learning this attitude of
effortless, simple attention seems to be most difficult for the

beginner.#

Review of Meditation Research

What about the reported effects of meditation? Physiological
research suggests that meditation induces a relaxed hypometabolic
state. During meditation brain wave activity slows and prolonged
alpha and sometimes theta and delta wave activity occurs (Banquet,

1972; Brown, Stewart, and Blodgett, l97l; Wallace, l970; Wallace,

 

#See Appendix A for more information concerning the initiation,
instruction and implicit belief system communicated to initiates during
the instructional lectures.

8

Benson and Wilson, 1971; Anand, Chhina and Singh, 1961;* Askishige,
et al., 1962, 1963;* Kasamatsu, Hirai and Izawa, 1962, 1963;* Kambe
and Sato, 1962*). This type of prolonged alpha activity has been .
associated with mental relaxation which is relatively undisturbed by
thoughts and cognitive activity and is alert rather than drowsy
(Kamiya, 1966; Wallace, Benson and Wilson, 1971). On the average,
there is less oxygen consumption (Wallace, 1970; Wallace, Benson, and
Wilson, 1971; Wallace and Benson, 1972) and carbon dioxide elimina-
tion (Anand, Chhina, and Singh, 1961*) during meditation than sleep
(Wallace and Benson, 1972). Respiration during meditation is both
shallower and half the rate found in wakeful resting. In fact,
respiration rate falls as low as four breaths per minute with no com-
pensatory overbreathing (Allison, 1970). On the average, heart rate
decreases three to five beats per minute depending on the research
study (Wallace, 1970; Wallace, Benson and Wilson, 1971; Wallace and
Benson, 1972), and cardiac output decreases 25% compared to 20% dur-
ing sleep (Allison, 1965, cited in Kanellakos, 1971; Wallace, 1972).
At the same time, blood volume in the forearm may increase during
meditation as much as 300% (Reichert, 1967), indicating that while
the heart works less, more blood is delivered to the extremities with
muscles and blood vessels more relaxed and less resistant to blood
flow (Kanellakos, 1971). Indeed, meditators' spontaneous muscle

activity was found to drop significantly (Koike and Yumaoke, 1963*)

 

*This indicates that this research was done using non-TM
meditation subjects.

and muscle tension was found to decrease more than in sleep
(Askishige, et al., 1963;* Kambe and Sato, 1962*).

Another study showed that while transcendental meditators
evidenced lower blood pressure than controls while resting prior to
meditation, during meditation blood pressure did not decrease 6"“
(Wallace, Benson, and Wilson, 1972). During meditation, skin resis-
tance (GSR) dramatically increases anywhere from two to eight times

its usual level depending upon the subject (Wenger, Bagchi, and

 

Anand, 1961;* Wallace, Benson, and Wilson, 1971). In sleep, skin E I
resistance only doubles. An increase in skin resistance has been I j
inversely correlated with tension and emotionality.
Meditators' GSR's both in and out of meditation, habituate
significantly more rapidly to an irregularly presented loud auditory
stimulus than do non-meditators' GSR's, both in and out of closed-
eyed rest (Orme-Johnson, 1971, 1972). Also, meditators emit fewer
spontaneous GSR fluctuations both in and out of meditation than do
non-meditators in or out of close-eyed rest. Such GSR results that
meditators show while meditating have at times been associated with
low anxiety, rapid habituation to stress, ego strength, low motor
impulsivity, and greater autonomous stability which has been corre—
lated with greater field independence which is associated with the
ability to perceive quickly the essential characteristics of the

environment (Orme-Johnson, l97l).

 

*This indicates that this research was done using non-TM
meditation subjects.

10

Blood lactate level decreases an average of 30% during medi-
tation. This reduced level lasts at least for twenty minutes after
the meditation period (Wallace, 1970; Wallace, Benson, Wilson, and
Garrett, 1971; Wallace, Benson and Wilson, 1971). Preliminary
research suggests that lactate level may positively correlate with
anxiety level.

In summary, we may say a number of things about TM as a
result of the physiological research. Meditation is correlated with
numerous indicators of decreased anxiety and the meditative state
is different from hypnosis, sleep, and ordinary rest with eyes closed
(Wallace, Benson and Wilson, 1971). EEG brain wave patterns, the
rapid reduction in oxygen consumption, carbon dioxide elimination,
volume and rate of respiration, blood lactate level, the slight
increase in blood acidity due to metabolic slowdown and rapid
increase in skin resistance, the low level of spontaneous GSR fluc-
tuations, and rapid GSR habituation to stimuli are some of the signs
of decreased anxiety and are all greater or different kinds of
. changes from those that occur in sleep, hypnosis and ordinary rest.
Furthermore, brain wave activity shows the mental state of meditation
to be alert, relaxed, and devoid of attendant cognitive and thought
activity.

Studies utilizing questionnaire measures suggest that medi-
tation decreases anxiety and psychopathology. Otis (1972) found that
regular practice of TM has beneficial effects in the treatment of

anxiety neurosis, hypertension, and migraine headaches. Using various

11

questionnaire measures of anxiety and psychopathology, Fehr et al.
(1972), Orme-Johnson et a1. (1973), Hjelle (1972), Wallace and Benson
(1971) and Shelley (1972) found experienced meditators to be less
anxious than beginning meditators and non-meditators. In these
studies, however, self selection and social desirability response Irma
set were left uncontrolled. Lack of control for self selection
becomes especially troublesome in light of research which shows that

individuals who choose to meditate and continue to practice medi-

 

tation show greater tolerance for unrealistic experience and greater

II“. v-

capacity for adaptive regression (Maupin, 1962) and score signifi-
cantly higher on the Fitzgerald Experience Inquiry, a measure of
adaptive regression in service of the ego, and Shostrom's Personal
Orientation Inventory, a measure of self-actualization (Lesh, 1970).
Using the Cattell Anxiety Scale, Spielberger Anxiety Inven-
tory and Northridge Developmental Scale in pre and post testing,
Ferguson and Gowen (1973) found that after six and a half weeks of
meditation, meditators, unlike controls, showed a significant
decrease in anxiety and neuroticism. In a three month longitudinal
study using a self report measure, Brautigam (1973) found that medi-
tators, unlike controls, became less anxious (p_< .10) and more
emotionally stable (p.< .10). Moreover, in pre and post ratings,
three psychologists judged meditators' behavior to be less tense and
restless (p_< .001) after the three months of meditation. Using the
Spielberger Anxiety Inventory, Ballou (1973) found that over the first

ten weeks of meditation practice, anxiety drops significantly the

12

first week of practice and stays at, but does not change from, that
reduced level with further practice. In pre and post testing Orme-
Johnson (l973) found that prisoners who meditated at least half of
the prescribed times decreased significantly more on spontaneous

GSR, which is an indicator of decreased anxiety, than "irregular" -r-—
meditators (p_< .0005) or controls (p_< .05). Unlike the other above
longitudinal studies, Orme-Johnson used a physiological measure which

is less susceptible to the confounding influence of social desirability

A ' .

 

response set. E -

Numerous TM studies show the meditative state to have effects
on perceptual ability. Meditators show significantly faster reaction
times by about 30% than non-meditators on a one-point reaction time
measure. In addition, meditators' reaction times improved 12% after
20 minutes of meditation while non-meditators' reaction time slowed
10% after 20 minutes of rest (Shaw and Kolb, 1970).

In an unpublished manuscript, Graham (1971) found that after
20 minutes of meditation, meditators improved by 37% in auditory fre-
quency discrimination and by 25% in auditory amplitude discrimination.
The same thresholds decreased slightly for non-meditators after read-
ing a book for 20 minutes.

Another study utilizing four perceptual measures--two point
threshold determination of skin sensitivity, visual brightness dis-
crimination, simple and complex, or four-choice, visual reaction time
determination--showed no significant differences on any measure

between meditators after 15 minutes of meditation and non-meditators

13

after 15 minutes of closed-eyed rest (Brown, et al., 1971). However,
various biochemical and physiological measures of both meditators

and non-meditators were taken during the 15 minute periods; only
three of the eleven meditators had actually shown the physiological
changes that operationally define meditation according to the
physiological research. These three all had significantly improved
on all four perceptual measures after meditation.

Pelletier (1972) found that after three months of meditation,
meditators, unlike controls, significantly increased their perceptual
scanning ability on the autokinetic effect and significantly improved
their performance on the embedded figures test and rod and frame test.
According to Pelletier, these changes indicate that meditators had
become better able to focus attention upon a point of light in a
dark field, which is indicative of improved ability to focus visual
attention, and more field independent.

Lastly, Lesh (1970) found that after eight weeks practice of
meditation, meditators improved significantly on the Affective Sensi-
tivity Scale (an empathy measure in which the subject views video
tapes of psychotherapy client-counselor interactions and chooses

what the client is feeling). From this, Lesh concluded that medi-

tation facilitates clear and accurate perception of another's feelings.

v '. {NZ-L aw. .‘ ‘IL‘ ._\]_

 

14

Traditional and Modern Views
of Perception

 

Many esoteric philosophies that utilize meditation see ordi-
nary awareness as a personal construction. The Sufi antidote "offer
a donkey a salad and he will ask what kind of thistle it is" Tm...
(Naranjo and Ornstein, 1971, p. 191) illustrates the notion of many
meditation traditions, as in those of India, the Sufis and the Zen

Buddists, that learned constructs or categories limit one's aware-

 

ness. This view has been reiterated through history. Plato has

If'

stated it in his cave analogy which illustrates how man usually
takes for reality only that which he is able to see and rejects all
else as being illusionary. More recently, the philosopher Suzanne
Langer (1951) has called ordinary perception "abstractive seeing."
She means that one tends to "organize the sensory field into . . .
patterns . . . to perceive forms rather than a flux of light impres-
sions" (p. 72). Rather than experiencing and perceiving sense data,
one habitually and unconsciously abstracts a form from each sensory
experience and thus "conceives'or constructs the experience as a
whole. In linguistics, Benjamin Whorf (1952) has impressively
argued that the contents of human awareness is influenced by lan-
guage. For example an Eskimo with many different words for that
which is called snow in the Continental U.S. perceives "snow"
differently than one raised in the Continental U.S. Aldous Huxley
(1954) echoes the above theories from the Sufis through Whorf in

the following passage:

15

Every individual is at once the beneficiary and the
victim of the linguistic tradition into which he has
been born--the beneficiary in as much as language
gives access to the accumulated records of other
people's experience, the victim insofar as it con-
firms him in the belief that reduced awareness is

the only awareness and as it bedevils his sense of
reality so that he is all too apt to take his con-
cepts for data, his words for actual things. That
which in the language of religions is called "this
world" is the universe of reduced awareness ex ressed,
and, as it were, petrified by language (p. 23)

Some Modern Psychological Views of
Perception--Theory and Research

The above cited views, from the Sufis through Huxley, have
also been reiterated in modern psychology. There are many examples
and much research showing how a person'a awareness is influenced and
limited by his categories, or constructs, and past experience. The
value and validity of projective techniques rests on the premise
that needs, motivations, and past experience influence human percep-
tions. In his concept of transference, Sigmund Freud (1933) has
illustrated that past experience with significant individuals influ-
ences one's experience and perception of others.

Adelbert Ames (1953) and the transactionalist theorists see
unconscious inferences or presumptions built up from past experience
as the basis of perception. Ittelson and Cantril (1954), two trans-
actional theorists, state that "assumptions . . . which are brought
to the present occasion . . . play a principle role in determining

how the occasion is experienced" (p. 23). For example, in Ames'

16

famous distorted room experiment, subjects' ingrained, unconscious
assumption based on past experience with usual (i.e., rectangular)
rooms led them to see a person in one corner of the distorted room
as considerably bigger and taller than a person of equal size in
another corner. George Kelly (1955) based his psychological and
clinical theories on the hypothesis that one's "personal constructs"
and anticipations of events based on past experience influence one's
experience and perceptions. In his view, no person ever reacts to a
stimulus--he reacts to his conception of the stimulus. Schachtel
(1966) speaks of ordinary perception as “cliche recognition." That
is, one usually reacts to, experiences, and perceives one's environ-
ment in a routine, stereotyped manner. This has the effect of pre-
venting one from experiencing aspects of his environment. Schachtel
(1966) says: "Familiar objects remain unknown because their familiar-
ity becomes an easy and convenient way of disposing of them . . .
(through) labelling, categorizing or otherwise" (p. 46).

In this discussion of modern psychology's view as to the
limited nature of human awareness, it is appropriate to focus on the
work of Jerome Bruner and his associates. Bruner and his co-workers
have done extensive research which seems to provide strong support
for Bruner's theory that expectations shape human awareness.

Bruner (1957) maintains that perception involves acts of
categorization. That is, "all perceptual experience is necessarily
the end product of categorization processes" (p. 124). He says that

if able to perceptually experience stimuli without a categorical

17

filter, the experience would be unorganized and difficult if not
impossible to communicate.

Bruner says that in an attempt to make sense of the impinging
mass of stimuli, one learns categories into which all input is
sorted. Stimuli is seen in terms of properties of objects as they
are conceived to be. In a sense, Bruner says that a person normally
ceases to see the stimulus properties of the object and only responds
to the category activated. Because of his conceptions and expecta-
tions based on past experience, one is set for a limited range of
characteristics and events. These predispositions or hypotheses, as
Bruner calls them, operate to select, organize and transform the
stimulus input. These expectations continue to operate as long as
they are confirmed by the outcome of events. Once categorized into a
high probability, good fit category, the threshold for recognizing
cues contrary to the category is markedly increased; openness to cues
and recategorization is drastically reduced, and incongruous cues are
normalized or gated out. The stronger the inappropriate expectation,
which is partly a function of consistency of past confirmation, the
greater the redundancy of stimulus presentation necessary for correct
identification.

Evidence consistent with Bruner's theory can be found in
physiological research. Spinelli and Pribram (1967) have provided
evidence of a physiological mechanism that selectively tunes our
awareness. They found that stimulation of different areas of the

cortex alters the configuration of the receptive field. Furthermore,

18

they showed that the brain can rapidly alter the way stimuli are
received on the retina. This study gives added support to other
research which has shown that efferent (output) traits can suppress
or alter information sent toward the brain. Thus, the central
nervous system can select and turn on or off incoming sensory infor- Ire
mation in virtually all sensory modalities (Thompson, 1967; Isaacson,
et al., 1965; Butter, 1968, 1969). ?

Bruner and his co-workers as well as others have produced a

 

good deal of experimental support for his theories. In an experiment
performed by Bruner and Postman (1949) and replicated by Lasko and
Lindauer (1968), playing cards were tachistoscopically presented to
subjects. Some of these cards were incongruent in that the normal
black color of the spade or club was changed to red or the red color
of the heart or diamond to black.

When presented in a mixed series the average identification
threshold was 28 milliseconds for normal cards and 360 milliseconds
for the incongruous cards. However, on the first encounter with an
incongruous card the average recognition threshold was 420 milli-
seconds. Some subjects never correctly identified an incongruous
card even when it was exposed for one thousand milliseconds.

In this experiment, Bruner attempted to show that a subject's
expectation or set based on past experience biases his awareness.
That is, perception is a process that occurs in a prepared, biased
organism, and perception consists of the experience of an activated

category and not of the input per se.

19

Haber (1965, 1966) and Harris (1969) among others have criti-
cized Bruner's conclusions. They say that his results may have been
the product of a response bias and not a perceptual effect. That is,
expectancy and experience might just create biases in subjects to
refrain from reporting an "impossible" card. Thus, Bruner's results
may have nothing to do with perception.

However, the subjects' responses to the stimuli seem to
indicate that a perceptual effect was operating. Many subjects evi-
denced what Bruner called a "compromise reaction.“ Often subjects
reported a red six of spades as a purple six of hearts or a purple
six of spades. A black four of hearts was sometimes reported as a
"grayish" four of spades or hearts. A red six of clubs was often
reported as a six of clubs "illuminated by red light." A response
bias interpretation does not explain this effect. In his discussion
of the response bias versus perceptual set debate Neisser (1967) con-
cludes that resolution must rest on subjects' phenomenological
report. Using this criterion, subjects' reports confirm the presence
of a perceptual effect in the Bruner experiment.

Bruner, Postman and Walk (1951) conducted an experiment in
which subjects were run under different conditions, each subject
being used in one group only. 'For one group the stimulus was a card
on which was printed seven capital letters in a row, with one letter
reversed. In another condition, the stimulus had the word "PLASTER"
printed on it but with one of its letters reversed. In this second

condition, subjects were divided into three groups. For one group

20

the "P" was reversed; for another "S" was reversed; and for another
"R" was reversed. In each of these four groups the stimulus was
presented tachistoscopically at a subthreshold exposure. With each
succeeding trial, exposure time was systematically increased until
all elements of the stimulus were correctly reproduced. In each
group the reversed letter was the last one correctly identified. In
addition, analysis of responses preceding total correct identification
showed that the identification of the reversed letter in PLASTER did
not always result from an inference from a meaningful context, i.e.,
result from recognizing the word to be PLASTER and then correctly
identifying the reversed letter from inference. For instance, the
reversed letter in PLASTER was often incorrectly rectified in some
interesting ways before it was correctly recognized. Thus the
reversed P was sometimes reported as T, G, and Q; reversed A as

D, E, B, R; and reversed R as E and A. The most striking evidence
for the directive influence of a strong hypothesis or expectation
comes from responses in which all the letters were reported as
reversed. That is, once the hypothesis of reversal is aroused, it
may generalize to the whole field, i.e., a subject guesses that all
letters of the word are reversed. Similar experiments capitalizing
on our past experience with and expectancies of color-object associ-
ation (Bruner, Postman, and Rodrigues, 1951) the speed, extent, path
and consistency of movement of various objects (Jones and Bruner,
1954), and experimentally induced experience with closure (Bruner

and Postman, 1952) show similar results.

21

Bruner and Minturn (1955) showed how a perceiver's past
experience as well as the nature of the situation in which the per-
ceiver is operating biases his awareness. Two groups of subjects
were shown a broken B stimulus ((3) for short exposure in a tachisto-
scope. When the stimulus was presented to one group in a series
between A and C, it was drawn and presumably seen as B. When it was
presented to the other group between a 12 and 14 it was seen as 13.

Two experiments (Postman and Bruner, 1948; and Smock, C. D.,
1965) have shown that anxiety or stress inhibit correct identification
of an ambiguous stimulus. A visual stimulus object was presented
either in an ambiguous stage of formation or at a subthreshold level
and was made clearer or exposed longer over successive trials.
Subjects under stress showed a tendency to strive for early closure
by making premature often nonsensical hypotheses and, consequently,
took significantly more time and trials to correctly identify the
stimulus than did subjects under relaxed conditions.

From his experiments, Bruner (1964) concluded that although
individuals differ in their ability to abandon a well-established,
frequently confirmed hypothesis and to shift to a new one, all indi-
viduals show resistance in making this shift. The experiments of
Galloway (1946), Wyatt and Campbell (1951), Bruner and Potter (1964)
and Frederiksen (1967) illustrate this resistance. Their experiments
show that initial misinterpretation of an ambiguous stimulus inter-
feres with veridical perception. In their experiments a word was

presented in blurred focus. On each trial the stimulus word was

22

made systematically less blurred, and each subject could guess the
stimulus word. In each experiment two groups of subjects were run.
In one group, subjects were exposed to the stimulus through fifteen
trials, if necessary, in which the word was made clearer on each
trial. The second group began their exposure at a later, more inter-
mediate stage of focus. In each experiment, the group beginning at
the later stage of focus correctly identified the stimulus word on a
significantly earlier trial. In other words, those subjects who had
been experimentally manipulated to hold an incorrect hypothesis over
fewer trials were able to correctly identify the stimulus on an
earlier trial. Using a masked auditory stimulus word in which the
masking sound was reduced one decibel each trial, Frederiksen (1967,
1969) again illustrated this effect of early incorrect hypothesis per-
severation so as to delay correct recognition. As before, the later
starting group correctly identified the masked auditory stimulus at

a significantly earlier trial. The degree of significance in dif-
ferences between the early and late starting groups was greater in
Frederiksen's experiment utilizing a masked stimulus than in
Frederiksen's experiments utilizing a blurred visual stimulus.

In a massive factor analytic study in which he used subjects'
performance in 27 cognitive-perceptual tests and performance on the
above visual and auditory recognition tasks, Frederiksen (1967) found
that the factor, "cognitive flexibility-rigidity," which he defined

as the "capacity to overcome set," significantly correlated with

23

early identification of the masked stimulus on the auditory tests and

the visual test when a wide range of ambiguity was covered.

The Perceptual Mode in Meditation

Meditation seems to be inimical to our habitual mode of per-
ception. TM, as do other schools of meditation* speaks of moving the
practitioner away from his habitual mode of perception. Mahareshi
(1969), the expositor of TM, describes TM as bringing the individual
closer to an aconceptual center from which he can experience the
world without preconceived ideas and structures.

The aim of the meditative process is to suspend the ordinary
flow of thought and cognitive activity while remaining in a state of
receptive, nonreactive detached stillness as one observes one's men-
tal activity. In the process, the percept receives thorough attention.

The use of attention for abstract categorizing and thought is

 

*In his review of meditation, Naranjo (1971) talks about the
practice of meditation as an attempt "to detect and become free from
all conditioning, compulsive functioning of mind and body, and habitual
emotional reactions that may contaminate the utterly simple situation
required by the participant" (p. 9). Ancient schools of meditation
talk of seeking to remove the blindness of our usual perceptions, and
meditators of all schools speak of a primary aftereffect of "an opening
up of awareness," a fresh perception, seeing as a child, or seeing
something the 500th time as it was seen the first. The Sufis in
effect speak of being free of both the constructs by which we have
learned to perceive and the selected, restricted nature of awareness.
Zen speaks of meditation as directed toward "casting off the false
mask of conceptualization," thereby enabling a different, more direct
contact with experience (Maupin, 1963).

24

prohibited. This attitude, it would seem, facilitates the register-
ing of sense impressions, feelings or mental activity "without
reacting to them in action or thought by deed, speech, or mental
comment" and enables the meditator to see without the masking of
simplifying constructs. As Mahareshi (1969) explains, continuous,
effortless focusing on the mantra enables the meditator to "transcend
the experience of the subtlest state of the thought and arrives as
the source of thought which is pure consciousness" (cited in Coleman,
1971, p. 2), i.e., consciousness without attendant thought activity.
The meditative attitude seems similar to that which Schachtel
(1966) hypothesizes is necessary for perception which is more acute
and vivid than our usual.- This attitude involves "an openness
instead of fixed, accustomed perspective, . . . (a) staying with
(the object of perception) long enough to come to know it more fully
for what it is rather than disposing of it in a familiar way by
categorizing it" (p. 46). Thus, it seems reasonable to hypothesize
that rather than experiencing an abstract category, a meditator per-
ceives more freshly and clearly and with less bias the stimulus
itself and more readily notices features that deviate from the usual.
Furthermore, since meditation is a state of low anxiety it seems I
logical that a meditator would see these deviations quicker because
he would have less anxiety to interfere with perception. Opera-
tionally, then, it seems that because meditators would be less
anxious, set, biased by expectation and inflexible, they would both

perceive an incongruity in a familiar stimulus sooner and perseverate

25

less over trials with an incorrect hypothesis; therefore they would
correctly identify a masked stimulus sooner than non-meditators.
Moreover, it seems that in the ability to perceive an incongruity
and to discard a non-veridical perception meditators after, compared
to before, twenty minutes of meditation will improve more than non-
meditators after, compared to before, twenty minutes of low arousal

voluntary activity. These ideas need to be tested.

Reports and Research Relevant to
Perceptual Effects of Meditation

Meditators' phenomenological reports and current research
support the above claims. After meditating, meditators often report
that they experience a fresher and sharper perception as evidenced in
more vivid color perception and greater awareness of beauty and
details not previously noticed. The research of Kasamatsu and Hirai
(1966) and Wallace (1970) support meditators' reports of clear aware-
ness each time a stimulus is perceived during meditation, and yet the
stimulus hardly disturbs them. Both researchers found that in the
hypometabolic meditation state almost all meditators, unlike non-
meditators, showed no habituation of the alpha blocking response to
a repeated sound or light stimulus. The alpha blocking response is
part of the orienting reaction. Other physiological correlates of
the orienting reaction, however, such as increased spontaneous GSR

fluctuation, respiration, and heart rate and decreased skin resistance

26

(GSR), did not occur along with the alpha blocking in response to
the stimulus. Thus, meditators seem to continue to perceive a
repeated stimulus without being aroused or disturbed by it.

This research led Tart (1969) to describe meditation as a
state of "relaxed awakening with steady responsiveness." Similarly,
it led Kasamatsu and Hirai (1966) to describe meditation as a "special
state of consciousness in which the cortical excitatory level becomes
lower than in ordinary wakefulness but is not lowered as in sleep,
and yet outer and inner stimulus is precisely perceived with steady
responsiveness" (p. 500). Kasamatsu and Hirai's contention is sup-
ported by their subjects' reports that they perceived each stimulus
more clearly during meditation than during ordinary wakefulness.
Subjects' reports led Kasamatsu and Hirai to describe the perceptual-
cognitive mode during meditation as follows:

(the meditator) perceives the object, responds
to it, and yet is never disturbed by it. Each stimulus
is accepted as stimulus itself and is treated as such.
One Zen master described such a state of mind as notic-
ing every person one sees on the street but of not
looking back with emotional curiosity (p. 499).

As mentioned before, an opening up of awareness traditionally
has been a commonly reported and sought meditation effect. This non-
habituation of the alpha blocking response may help explain medi-
tators' claims of greater awareness and clarity of perception which

may be the product of seeing a stimulus without expectation, set and

categorizing activity.

27

Deikman (1963) has produced experimental evidence which is
most relevant to and generally consistent with our two hypotheses.

In his research, Deikman (1963) documented that meditation
alters perception. Deikman used subjects between the ages of 30 and
40 who were relatively naive in the theory and practice of meditation.
He taught four subjects a form of meditation similar to TM in which
a vase served as a visual focal object. He had these experimental
subjects meditate together for 15 to 30 minutes over 12 sessions.
After each session, he had subjects fill out a questionnaire concern-
ing their affect during meditation, perception of the vase, awareness
of experimentally-induced background stimuli and perception of the
landscape outside. Deikman also used a control group which sat under
circumstances similar to the experimental subjects but did not
meditate.

Reactions common to his four experimental subjects were
(a) perceptual changes relating to the vase (such as changes in vase
size and shape, blurring and dissolving of outlines and movements,
and increased color, "vividness," "luminosity," and brightness of
the vase while all else in the visual field became dark and indis-
tinct), (b) time shortening, (c) difficulty in describing meditation
experiences in words, (d) development of stimulus barriers to experi-
mentally induced stimuli, (e) development of personal attachment to
the vase, and (f) a feeling that meditation sessions were pleasurable
despite occasional anxiety during meditation. Perceptual phenomena

which were reported by at least one of the four subjects were

28

(a) merging with and perceptual internalization of the vase, (b) radi-
ation of particles from the vase which sometimes led to heat or

sexual stimulation, and (c) de-differentiation of the landscape such
that all the stimuli of the landscape appeared at equal intensity and
equally called for attention making it difficult to focus selectively
and to organize the visual field into meaningful patterns and normal
figure-ground relationships.

Deikman explains these results by hypothesizing that meditation
serves to "deautomatize" those psychological structures that organize,
limit, select and interpret perceptual stimuli. Hartman (1958) advanced
the concept of automatization as follows:

In well-established achievements they (motor apparatises)
function automatically: the integration of the somatic
systems involved in the action is automatized, and so

is the integration of the individual mental acts involved
in it. With increasing exercise of the action its
intermediate steps disappear from consciousness . . .

not only motor behavior but perception and thinking,

too show automatization . . . .

It is obvious that automatization may have eco-
nomic advantages, in saving attention cathexis in
particular and simple cathexis of consciousness in
general . . . . Here as in most adaptive processes,
we have a purposive provision for the average expect-
able range of tasks (pp. 88-91).

Gill and Brennan (1959) explain deautomatization as follows:

Deautomatization is an undoing of the automatizations--
both means and goal structures--directed toward the
environment. Deautomatization is, as it were, a shake-up
which can be followed by an advance or retreat in the
level of organization . . . . Some manipulation of the
attention directed toward the functioning of an appa-
ratus is necessary if it is to be deautomatized (p. 178).

Thus, we may say that with repeated performance or perception of

some set of stimuli, automatization operates so that consciousness of

29

"intermediate steps" and details disappear from consciousness. In
Deikman's view, deautomatization is an undoing of automatization by
"reinvesting actions and perceptions with attention" (1966, p. 33).
Meditation with its emphasis on focused attention, not thinking and
attentive receptivity seems to involve such "manipulation of atten-
tion." In contrast to our usual thinking activity that carries us
into abstractions and fantasies, the meditative attitude keeps one
in close contact with the here and now required to produce at least
partial deautomatization. In Deikman's view, this means that cog-
nition is inhibited in favor of perception. While automatization
involves the transfer of attention from a percept of action to
abstract thought activity or to total unawareness of a percept or
action, deautomatization and meditation involve a shift of attention
toward perceptual, cognitive and motor experience preceding the
analytic, abstract, intellectual mode typical of adult thought.

As Deikman says, a developmental concept is implied. In
discussing perceptual development and particularly eidetic imagery
in children, Werner (1957) states that developmentally the image:

. . gradually changed in functional character. It
becomes essentially subject to the exigencies of
abstract thought. Once the image changes in function
and becomes an instrument in reflective thought its
structure also changes. It is only through such
structural changes that the image can serve as an
instrument of abstract mental activity. This is why
of necessity the sensuousness and fullness of detail,
color, and vividness of the image must fade (p. 152).

Von Senden's study of the visual experiences of congenitally

blind persons after surgery supports the concept of "selective

3O

automatization" and loss of vividness and detail resulting from
formal organization and automatization as perceptual learning occurs.

Following Deikman's lead, we may say that as we develop a
process occurs in which stimuli and percepts are functionally organized
toward a higher level of differentiation at the expense of vividness
and variability of perceived sensory stimuli which are characteristic
of earlier stages of development. If, as it seems, "developed"
perceptual and cognitive organization necessitate increasing selec-
tivity of stimuli, then deautomatization, through meditation, might
lead us to an awareness of stimuli that were formerly unavailable to
us.

In support, the visual experiences of Deikman's meditation
subjects seem to "represent a shift of the normal perceptual pro-
cesses to aspects of the stimulus array previously screened out--or
it may be that these percepts are registered through the operation of
new perceptual processes" (Deikman, 1966, p. 113). Moreover, from
meditators' reports it seems that meditation allows regression to a
primitive cognitive state postulated for the infant in which dis-
tinctions between thoughts, actions and objects are relatively
blurred. Body immobilization, lack of analytic thought, both rela-
tively little and relatively stable stimulus input (i.e., the vase)
are all factors which might facilitate perceptual and cognitive
disorganization (to experience this yourself: sit down and repeat

a word 100 times to yourself).

31

In Deikman's research, meditation seemed to produce shifts
toward a "primitive" perceptual and cognitive organization preceding
the analytic, abstract, intellectual mode typical of adult thought.
However, this regression is not back to childhood but seems to
represent an adult mind experiencing the world from a different view.
As Deikman (1966) says, "rather than speaking of a return to child-
hood, it is more accurate to say that the undoing of automatic per-
ceptual and cognitive structures permits a gain in sensory intensity
and richness at the expense of abstract categorization and differ-
entiation" (p. 34).

In summary, we may say that the perceptual and cognitive
organization and automatization functions to select some stimuli
qualities to the exclusion of others. When automatization is
reversed or suspended, stimuli formerly not noticed might enter con-
sciousness. In Deikman's (1963) words:

Deautomatization is here conceived as permitting the

adult to attain a new, fresh perception of the world

by freeing him from a stereotyped organization built

up over years and by allowing adult synthetic and

associative functions access to fresh materials to

create with them in a new way (p. 217).
Meditation, in which non-analytic attention is diverted from its
usual channels and restricted to a monotonous focus, may enable the
individual to function without "automatic" perception, automatic
affective or cognitive structures or controls and enable him to per-

ceive stimuli differently and anew. Indeed, Deikman's experimental

evidence consistently supports this contention.

32

Because meditation seems to unstructure or deautomatize our
developed perceptual processes, we may hypothesize that after medi-
tation a meditator will experience more vividness and details in his
perceptions, will be more sensitive to and aware of color, and will

more readily perceive a stimulus as it is. 5““
s

 

STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES

The purpose of this study is to test the assertion that medi-
tation practice facilitates unbiased perception. The following
hypotheses were tested:

Hypothesis 1: Identification of a masked auditory stimulus
made clearer over trials will occur earlier for
subjects who practice meditation than for sub-
jects who do not.

Hypothesis 2: Identification of a masked auditory stimulus
made clearer over trials will occur earlier for
subjects who have meditated immediately prior
to testing than for subjects who have not medi-
tated for at least five hours or for subjects
who do not practice meditation.

Hypothesis 3: Identification of an incongruity in a familiar
visual stimulus will occur earlier for subjects
who practice meditation than for subjects who do
not.

Hypothesis 4: Identification of an incongruity in a familiar
visual stimulus will occur earlier for subjects
who have meditated immediately prior to testing
than for subjects who have not meditated for at
least five hours or for subjects who do not
practice meditation.

From the above discussion of Deikman's study, it seems reason-
able to speculate that meditation increases sensitivity to color as
opposed to form. Thus, the following two hypotheses were also tested.

Hypothesis 5: Sensitivity to color as opposed to form will be

greater for subjects who practice meditation than
for subjects who do not.

33

 

Hypothesis 6:

34

Sensitivity to color as opposed to form will be
greater for subjects who have meditated immedi-
ately prior to testing than for subjects who have
not meditated for at least five hours or for
subjects who do not practice meditation.

 

METHOD

The Visual Recognition of
Ihcongruity’Task

The visual recognition of incongruity task was modeled after

Bruner's test. The MSU Graphics Department produced the normal and

"K‘I' M35. '31; I '.1

trick, or incongruent, playing cards by Diazo process. Eight normal

cards (3H1 AH: 75. 35: 3C. 20. GD. 20) and four trick cards ...I

 

(4H(B), 4S(R), 5H(B). 55(R)) were prepared. Each card was mounted on
a thin piece of black cardboard. Trick cards had the normal red or
black color reversed. Because the tachistoscope's window was smaller
than the usual playing card size, the playing cards used measured

2 1/8" by 1 1/2". Nevertheless, the normal playing card length to
width proportions remained the same. When seen in the tachistoscope
the reduced size did not appear incongruent to §_and no §_ever com-
mented on its size during the experiment.

For any § only one normal and one trick card was used. Each
card was presented for three trials at each exposure level until
correct recognition occurred on three successive trials. Exposure
levels were 10ms., 30 ms., 50 ms., 75 ms., 100 ms., 150 ms., 200
ms., 250 ms., 300 ms., 350 ms., 400 ms., 450 ms., 500 ms., 600 ms.,
700 ms., 800 ms., 900 ms., and 1000 ms.

35

36

The Recognition of a Masked
Auditory Stimulus Task

 

The recognition of a masked auditory stimulus task was
modeled after Frederiksen's test (1967). The five single, poly-
syllabic words which were used as items to be recognized were words 'F-fi
that had an above average number of prerecognition responses among
the 84 words Blake and Vanderplas (1950) investigated and had high
correlations with Ss' cognitive flexibility scores in Frederiksen's

study (1967).

 

The masking noise consisted of four voices speaking the
masking words and stimulus word simultaneously. The masking was
accomplished in the following manner. A master tape was prepared
using a four track Sony tape recorder and a Wollansak tape recorder.
A 45" tape loop was constructed so that the loop would make one
revolution every six seconds through the play back or recording
device of the four track recorder. In this way the stimulus word
could be recorded on one track and a masking word(s) could be
recorded at the same spot on the loop on the other three tracks.
Thus, one tape loop had four voices speaking a different word or
words (sometimes two short words were used as a masking sound on one
or two tracks) at the same time. This procedure was done on a dif-
ferent 45" loop for each of the five sets of masked stimulus words.
To ensure that the stimulus word was totally masked by each of the

masking words, each masking word(s) began no later and ended no

37

earlier than the stimulus word. The masking word(s) were randomly
selected from a research article.

After the five tape loops were made, each loop was played
back on the four track recorder and recorded on the Wollansak
recorder. Each loop was allowed to make 19 revolutions. In this !__.
way each masked stimulus (i.e., stimulus and three masking word(s)
all spoken at the same time) was recorded 19 times with a five second

pause between each repetition; the final tape contained five masked

 

stimulus words, each word repeated 19 times with a five second

'Mii.‘ '-
I

interval between trials.

The same speaker was used to record the entire tape. The
speaker attempted to say masking and stimulus words at equal volume.
A Sony six channel stereo mic mixer was also used in an attempt to
equalize the volume of stimulus words relative to each of their mask-
ing words. The §_used both the mixer's sound level indicator and his
own ear to adjust the volume of each stimulus word relative to its
masking words such that the masking and stimulus words were of
approximately equal loudness and the stimulus word could not be
easily discerned. A Hewlett-Packard attenuator capable of one
decibel attenuation levels was used to attenuate the volume of the
masking voices.

To get maximum information from the experiment, it was neces-
sary that each of the five masked stimulus words be neither too diffi-
cult nor too easy to identify. If too easy or too difficult there
might be so little variability in performance that any differences

 

between S; might not appear. To prevent this, approximately forty
non-meditator, college population practice §s were run in an attempt
to find attenuator rates and volume mixes of stimulus and masking
words which would enable the practice S; to identify each stimulus
word between trials 10 and 13 (on the average). .w—j
In the experiment all five series of masked stimulus words
were presented to each Ss. The §_1istened to them through a set of

Superex stereo headphones. The sound he heard passed from the

 

3'7“ ."

recorder through the attenuator through the mixer through a Scott E_—
stereo amplifier and into the headphones. A random numbers table
was used to determine the order of masked stimulus word presentation.

The first selected masked word was used as a sample.

Subjects

Sixty one subjects matched on age, sex, and educational level
and ranging in ages from 18 to 24 participated in this experiment.
All §s were volunteers, were paid for approximately one hour's partici-
pation and were recruited through local TM instructional lectures.
The S; were divided into three groups. The first group (pre-TM) con-
sisted of §s who were to begin TM instruction within two weeks. Both
the second and third groups consisted of beginning meditators (BTM1
and BTMZ) who had been regularly meditating for 4 1/2 to 7 weeks.
Although sixty-one S; were run in the experiment, for various reasons

some S; could not be used. Equipment malfunction, lack of sufficient

39

playing card experience, which became apparent during the experiment,
or an uncorrected visual or auditory infirmity that was previously
overlooked were some of the reasons for the reduced N in the final
samples. Thus, the final samples consisted of fifty-six subjects

on the auditory measure and fifty-two subjects on the visual measure.
In the color sensitivity sample, there were no score for two subjects

because they did not give a scorable dominance response.

Recruitment of Subjects

Pre-TM S; were recruited after the first TM introductory
lecture from among those who intended to begin TM. The §_announced
the following: "Research on TM is being conducted at Michigan State
University. We are interested in learning about the perceptual
abilities of people who meditate and who choose to meditate. We
think that people who choose to meditate may already have special
abilities even before they begin meditating. In order to verify
this, we need people to participate in our experiment who are plan-
ning to begin TM but have not yet begun. The experiment will take
about 45 minutes and each of you who participate will be paid $1.75
for your time. If you would like to participate you can make an
appointment for any hour morning, noon or evening over the next two
weeks. Besides earning some money, I think that you will find the
experiment both interesting and fun. To make your appointment, either

see me after this meeting or fill out one of these forms and a

4O

researcher will call you in the next couple of days to make an

appointment at a convenient time for you."
If there were any questions about what the experiment was

about, §_said: "I'd rather not tell you more about the experiment

now because it might inadvertently bias your performance. After

you participate, I will be glad to answer all your questions." r-_W
BTM S; were selected as follows. After the second intro-

ductory lecture, §_announced the following to those who had chosen

 

to begin TM: "We are doing research at Michigan State University on E
the perceptual effects of TM. To do this research we need volunteers T
to participate in the research. Each volunteer will be paid $1.75,
and the testing will take about 55 minutes. If you are interested
in volunteering for pay, I would like you to fill out one of these
sheets that I will pass around. A researcher will call you in about
five weeks and an appointment for any hour morning, afternoon or
evening at your convenience can be arranged. Filling out your sheet
and saying that you are interested in participating puts you under
no obligation to participate; you can say no if you wish when the
researcher calls. Besides earning some money, I think you will find
the experiment both interesting and fun."
If §s had questions concerning the purpose of the experiment
these questions were handled as described above concerning the pre-
TM group except that the BTM group was told that the researchers

were interested in learning about some perceptual effects of TM.

41

At the time appointments were made with either pre-TM or
BTM Ss, §_asked each §_the following. He asked §_to bring glasses
or contact lens with him if he wore them. Secondly, to ensure §s
familiarity with playing cards, §_asked §_if he had ever played cards
regularly during some time in his life or played cards regularly re
now. If §_answered anything but a firm yes, he was asked about his
experience with playing cards; he was asked how many card games he
knew how to play. If he said two or more he was used. Thirdly, §_
asked §_if he had heard about the procedures of this experiment from
another person. If §_had heard any information which might bias his
performance he was not used. In addition, §_asked BTM §s two other
questions. To ensure that all BTM §s were regular meditators, g
asked §.how many of the 14 recommended sessions per week he missed
last week. If §_had missed more than three sessions the last week
or missed more than three sessions most weeks, §_was not used. In
making an appointment, §_asked each BTM §_to make sure that he had
not meditated for at least 5 hours before his appointment.

BTM S; were recruited from lectures of courses beginning
lO/12/73, 10/26/73 and 11/30/73. The two groups of BTM §s were
matched for age, sex and educational experience. Pre-TM‘Ss were
recruited from initial introductory lectures (which take place two
weeks before the beginning of the course) which were given 11/29/73

and 1/9/74.

42

Experimental Procedure
and Instruction

 

 

There was a sign on the testing room door asking §_to wait
in a designated waiting room if he arrived early. The experiment was
done in a room approximately 12' by 15'. A two channel Dodge
tachistoscope and Scott stereo amplifier was on one table and a Sony F_-1
six channel stereo mic mixer, a Hewlett-Packard attenuator and
Wollansak tape recorder were on an adjacent table.

The §_met §_outside the testing room and asked him to enter

 

and have a designated seat. Before beginning the testing §_asked

each §_who wore glasses if he had them with him. The §_also asked
each §_if he had heard about this experiment's procedure from another
participant. No §_said he had heard about the experiment's proce-
dures. In addition, §_asked each BTM §_the last time he had medi-
tated. If it was within the last 4 1/2 hours §_was not used. Lastly,
.E asked each §_not to discuss this experiment with anyone over the
next few weeks.

The auditory measure was presented to each §_twice; for BTM1
and pre-TM groups, two masked stimulus words were presented before
20 minutes of rest, light reading or daydreaming (whichever §_pre-
ferred) and for the BTM2 group, two masked stimulus words were pre-
sented before 20 minutes of meditation. For all groups, the last
two masked stimulus words were presented after the 20 minute periods.

The visual measure was used only after the 20 minute periods. Thus,

two test presentation orders were possible: 1) auditory test -

43

(treatment) - auditory test - visual test, or 2) auditory test -

(treatment) - visual test - auditory test. Each order was used as

close to an equal number of times as possible within each group.

For the auditory part of the experiment, §_sat in front of a table

supporting the attenuator and sound mixer. On a table to Efs left .a
was the amplifier and on a chair to his right was the tape recorder.

The §_sat about three feet directly behind E, The S; was given a

pen, a score sheet on which he wrote his responses and a 1/2" thick

16" by 24" piece of cardboard which served as a convenient surface

on which to write.

The §_said the following instructions to S; "You are going
to hear a tape through these earphones. On this tape you will hear
four voices speaking at the same time. Each voice will be saying a
single word or two words. The voices will repeat themselves nineteen
times saying the same thing each time. There will be a five second
pause between each time the voices repeat themselves. One thing will
change over the nineteen presentations. As we go along, one voice
saying one word--and it will be the same voice saying the same word
each time--will become louder and clearer relative to the other
voices. I want you to try to identify the word that is becoming
relatively louder and clearer. Since the voices begin at approxi-
mately equal loudness, in the beginning it will probably be difficult
to hear which word is loudest or clearest. Nevertheless, on each
trial I want to encourage you to guess or wild guess about what that

louder word is. If you think you hear a word in the very beginning,

44

mark it down. A guess cannot hurt, it can only help. The point is
for you to identify the word which is becoming louder any way you
can--even if it is by wild guessing. If you really are not able to
make any guess, then mark a check on your answer sheet. If your
guess is the same as on the previous trial, you may mark a ditto
mark ("). In any event, be sure to mark something on your answer
sheet each time the voices speak so that by the time the voices have
repeated themselves nineteen times, you will have marked something
after each of the numbers 1 through 19 on your answer sheet. Let's
begin by trying a sample. Notice that there are three columns on
your answer sheet. For the sample, write down something each time
you hear the voices in the column marked SAMPLE (§_points to column).
Remember, write down a guess, a check or ditto mark each time you
hear the voices just as if these were an actual word in our experi-
ment. Also remember, I want to encourage you to make guesses but a
check is alright too. Ready? The §_then ran the sample. After
completion of the sample §_said: "How did it go? The word was

(§_tells §_the correct stimulus word). 00 you have

 

any questions? Now let's do the same thing for two more words."
Following the completion of the auditory pre-test §_said the
following to pre-TM and BTM] groups: "Before doing the second part
of the experiment I would like to take a 20 minute break. During
this time feel free to relax, rest, daydream or read a magazine
(§_pointed to two copies of Today's Health which is a popular, non-

technical magazine). However, there are four things I would like to

45

ask you not to do. Please do not leave the room, do not do any
physical exercise, do not meditate and do not look at any papers on
these shelves because they might contain some information concerning
the experiment and might therefore bias your performance. I will
be back in about 20 minutes at the end of the break."

Following the completion of the auditory pre-test §_said the

following to the BTM group: "Before doing the second part of our

2
experiment, I would like you to meditate for 20 minutes. I would

like you to begin meditating as soon as I leave the room. How long

do you usually take to come out of meditation?" The §_would say
anywhere from one to three minutes. The §_continued: "In 20 minutes
I will knock lightly on the door; before coming in I will wait 2
minutes (or g said 2 1/2 to 3 minutes depending on how long § said

he usually took to come out of meditation) so that you may come out

of meditation and open your eyes undisturbed and at your leisure.

Are there any questions?"

Depending on which test order was being used, after the break
§_said either that he would like to test §_again on the word recog-
nition problem, handed §_a score sheet and ran through two more masked
stimulus word series or read the instructions for the visual exercise.
When the word recognition test was used again, g said: "I would like
,you to try to identify twb more words on the tape just as you did
before. Ready?" When the playing card experiment was used, §_read
the following instructions: "I would like you to sit here." The p

pointed to seat in front of the tachistoscope so that §_could see

46

clearly the blank illuminated screen on which the stimulus was to be
presented. The §_continued: "This is an experiment in visual infor-
mation processing. If you put your head here, you will be able to
see an illuminated screen in front of you. A playing card will be
flashed on the screen only when you press this button. Please do
not press the button until I say 'ready.' Then feel free to press it
at your convenience. The card will flash Onto the screen once the
moment you press the button. I would also like you to keep your
eyes focused on the dot in the middle of the screen before pressing
the button each time. Do you see the dot?"

"As you probably know, there are three major identifying
characteristics of playing cards--suit, color and number. I will be
presenting the playing cards one at a time at varying exposure dura-
tions. Some presentations will be rapid, and the card will probably
appear blurred. Sometimes the presentations will be more lengthy,
and the card will be more clear. Sometimes the presentations will
be so fast that you will only be able to see one or two of the three
identifying characteristics. That is alright. Just tell me exactly
how you see the card in terms of the three identifying characteristics.
For’instance, a card may be presented so quickly that you may only
see its color or maybe its suit or number. In these cases tell me
only'its color or suit or only its number if that was only what you
saw. To keep responses uniform, I want you to tell me what you see

as best you can in terms of all three identifying characteristics--

47

suit, color and number. Also, some cards may be presented only a
few times; some may be presented many times in succession."

This part of our experiment is asking you to do the opposite
of the auditory part. In the auditory part you were encouraged to
guess about the word. In this part I want you only to tell me what a.
you actually see or think you see and not to guess. -Do you have any
questions?"

The §_continued: "For this part of the experiment, I am
going to turn off the overhead lights and turn on a small light in
the corner of the room." The §_turned on the small tensor light
beneath the table supporting the tachistoscope and turned off the
overhead lights. The §_sat opposite §_behind the tachistoscope. From
this position §_was easily able to place cards in the tachistoscope,

manipulate exposure durations and record §_responses without §_seeing.

ScoringpProcedures

For each test the stimulus identification point was defined
as the first trial on which §_correctly identified the stimulus with-
out returning to an incorrect hypothesis on a later trial. The trial
number on which this occurred constituted §fs score for that test.

If §_did not identify the card or word in the allotted trials, he
was given a score one higher than the allotted number of trials for
that item (55 on the playing card measure and 20 on the auditory

Ineasure). On the word recognition test, §fs pre-test and post-test

48

scores were the sum of the two pre-scores and the sum of the two
post-scores. On the playing card test, each §_was scored in two ways.
One score was simply the score, or trial of identification, for the
incongruent card. In addition, each §_was classified evidencing

color or form dominance or sensitivity. As Bruner and Postman (1949) m.
noted, when tachistoscopically presented with an incongruent playing
card, Ss' responses prior to correct identification are either color
or form dominant; that is, §_denies either the form or the color of
the card's suit and either the color dominates and the form is
"corrected" to match the color or the form dominates and the color is
"corrected" to match the form. By looking at each §fs first response
which included both form and color each §_could be classified as color

dominant (i.e., sensitive) or form dominant.

 

RESULTS
Hypotheses 1 and 2

Pre and post treatment scores for each subject on the audi-
tory task were the dependent variables relevant to Hypotheses 1 and
2. To compensate for the fact that each of the five sets of masked
stimulus words were of different difficulty, scores were converted
to Z-scores. A 3 x 2 analysis of variance with repeated measures
was used to compare groups' pre and post treatment scores.

Hypothesis 1 states that subjects who practice meditation
(BTM1 and BTMZ) will perform significantly better on the auditory
pre-test, which measures ability to identify a masked stimulus made
clearer over trials, than subjects who do not practice meditation
(pre-TM controls). Operationally, Hypothesis 2 states that subjects
who have meditated immediately prior to post-testing (BTMZ) will
show the greatest improvement from pre to post-testing.

If these hypotheses are valid, results should have yielded:
a) a significant group main effect (with pre-TM controls' performance
< BTMI's performance = BTMz's performance); b) a significant pre-
post main effect (overall pre-treatment performance < overall post-
treatment performance); and c) a significant interaction effect (in

the pre-testing, controls' performance < BTMl's performance = BTMZ's

49

50

performance while in the post-testing controls' performance <
BTMl's performance < BTMZ's performance).

Table 1 shows that neither the main effects nor the inter-
action effect are significant; thus, neither Hypothesis 1 nor 2 is

supported.‘

Table 1.--Analysis of Variance of Performance on the Auditory
Measure: Group by Treatment.

 

 

 

 

Source SS df MS F P
Group (A) .87 2 .43 .22 .81
Subject within 105.61 53 1.99
Pre-post (B) .26 l .26 .ll .74
AB 5.40 2 2.70 1.17 .32
B x subject within 122.81 53 2.32

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

While comparisons of the pre-treatment scores in Table 2
indicates that performances tended to be in the direction predicted by
Hypothesis 1, comparisons of the difference (post minus pre-treatment)
scores indicate that performances tended to be in the opposite direc-

tion predicted by Hypothesis 2.

 

1Winer (1962) suggests that even if the overall F test is
insignificant, specific comparisons which are suggested by the experi-
ment's theoretical basis can be made individually. Thus, appropriate
tests were performed, but no significant differences were found.

51

Table 2.--Samp1e Sizes, Means and Standard Deviations for Each Group
on Pre and Post Treatment Tests on the Auditory Measure.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Groups Pre- Post- Difference between

treatment treatment post & pre scores

Pre-TM Control Group N.= 21 N_= 21

(rest treatment) X = .25 X = -.46 -.72 (p = ns)*

SD = 1.77 SD = 1.42

BTM] fl.= I7 fl_= 17

(rest treatment) X = -.06 X = .17 +.23 (p = ns)
SD = 1.39 SD = 1.20

BTM N_= 18 N_= 18

(meaitation treatment) X = .00 X = .20 +.20 (p = ns)
50 = 1.53 SD = 1.27

*Positive scores are inversely correlated with ability on this

measure.

Hypotheses 3 and 4

Each subject's post-treatment score on the visual task was

the dependent variable relevant to Hypotheses 3 and 4.

A one-way

analysis of variance yielded a significant difference between the

three groups (§_= 4.83; M§,= 1138.61; g:,= 2/48; p_< .02).

Table 3

shows the mean and standard deviation for scores in each of the

three groups.

52

Table 3.--Sample Sizes, Means and Standard Deviations for Each
Group on Post Treatment Tests on the Visual Measure.

‘- .

 

 

 

 

 

Group Post Treatment
N_= l9
Pre-TM Control Group X = 25.21
SD = 18.33
N_= 16
BTM1 (rest treatment) X = 11.19
SD = 5.08
. N_= l7
BTM2 (rest treatment) X = 26
SD = 18.06

 

 

 

 

A Newman-Keuls analysis was used to clarify the significant
differences between groups. This analysis showed that the BTM1 group
did significantly better than the pre-TM control group (g_= 3.74;
g:_= 2/48; E < .05) and thus confirmed Hypothesis 3 that subjects who
practice meditation will be able to identify an incongruity in a
familiar stimulus sooner than subjects who do not practice medi-
tation.2

Contrary to Hypothesis 4, subjects who meditated immediately
prior to testing (BTMZ) were not able to identify an incongruity in

 

20n the visual measure, unlike the auditory measure, there
was no pre-treatment testing; thus, the BTMZ subjects, who had just
meditated prior to testing on the visual instrument, were not included
in the sample consisting of "subjects who practice meditation" which
was de51gned to examine the longitudinal effects of meditation practice.

53

a familiar visual stimulus sooner than either the pre-TM control
subjects (g_= .21; gf_= 2/48; p_= n.s.) or BTM1 subjects. In fact,
directly opposite to prediction, the BTM1 group did significantly
better than the BTMZ group on the task (g_= 3.96, g:,= 3/48;

p.< .05).

Hypotheses 5 and 6

 

The type of error, whether of a color or form dominant type,
that a subject first made prior to correct identification of the
incongruent card in the post-treatment testing was the dependent
variable relevant to Hypotheses 5 and 6. A chi-square analysis was
used to determine if the groups differed significantly in their color
to form ratio.

Table 4 shows no differences in ratios between the three
groups (X2 = 1.45; gj,= 2; p_= n.s.). Thus neither Hypothesis 5,
which states that subjects who practice meditation (BTMI) will be
relatively more sensitive to color as opposed to form than subjects
who do not practice meditation (controls) nor Hypothesis 6, which
states that BTMz subjects will be relatively more sensitive to

color as opposed to form than either BTM subjects or controls, was

1
confirmed.

 

54

Table 4.--A Comparison of the Number of Color Dominant and Form
Dominant Responses in Each of the Three Groups on the
Visual Measure.

 

 

 

 

 

Group Color Dominant Form Dominant
Pre-TM Control Group 6 12
BTM1 8 8
BTM2 5 ll

 

 

 

 

 

Supplementary Analyses

In an attempt to clarify results on the auditory task, the
results for each group were graphed. Inspection of the graphs shows
that there was a high within group variance in each group and that
there is no consistent pattern of results in any of the three groups.

It was thought that perhaps some pattern on the auditory
task might emerge if word order presentation was inspected. Perhaps
particular word order presentations consistently produced good or
poor performances. Due to a preponderance of particular word orders
in a particular group, a group's performance may have been inordinately
helped or retarded. Scores for each word order and the sum of scores
in the pre and post testing for each §_of the pre-TM control group
were examined; no word order, however, was found to be particularly

helpful or detrimental to performance.

 

55

The results of the visual task suggested that meditation
experience facilitates visual perception of an incongruity while the
immediate short-term effects of a meditation session inhibits this
ability. It was thought that perhaps the effect of a meditation
session serves to disorganize cognitive-perceptual functioning. If
this were true, BTM1 §s would have identified normal cards sooner
than BTM2 Ss. Although the BTM1 group had lower thresholds as pre-
dicted, a t-test showed that the difference was not significant
(t_= 1.68, g:,= 28, p_= .15).

It was also thought that if the short-term effects of a
meditation session are disorganizing to cognitive-perceptual
functioning, perhaps BTM2.§§ who were tested on the visual measure
immediately (3 to 5 minutes) after a meditation session would per-
form more poorly than §s who were tested on the visual measure after
the auditory measure and approximately 8 to 10 minutes after their
meditation session. A t-test was run comparing normal card thresholds
for BTM2.§S who were tested immediately after their meditation
session and BTMZ §s who were tested 8 to 10 minutes after their

meditation session. A second t-test compared these groups on trick

card thresholds. No significant differences were found.

DISCUSSION

Overview

A task of this discussion must be to answer why five of the

six hypotheses were not supported, why one particular hypothesis was

supported, and lastly, what these results mean in terms of the major

hypothesis that meditation practice facilitates perception which is

unbiased by constructs and expectations.

There are several possibilities as to why five of six

hypotheses were not supported while one was:

1.
2.

The measures were insensitive or inappropriate.

A weak experimental design inappropriately permitted the
confirmation of the supported hypothesis.

The meditators were not experienced enough to evidence the
hypothesized effects.

Since most of the non-meditators were tested at a different
time in the year than most of the meditators, the meditation
groups cannot be legitimately compared with the control
group.

The basic assumptions underlying the hypotheses and much
of the literature from which they were derived are in error.

56

57

Measures

There is some question as to the appropriateness of the
auditory measure. Within each group the variance was so high that
any real differences between groups would be minimized and possibly
not discovered.

The validity of the visual instrument as a measure of visual
perception must also be examined. In this and other studies
(Bruner and Postman, 1949; Lasko and Lindauer, 1966) the existence of
"compromise responses" and subjects' self-reports suggest that this
instrument is at least in part measuring a perceptual effect.

Some subjects, however, reported a response bias effect;
that is, they said that they had seen and were aware of the incon-
gruity but had consciously decided not to report it at least for a
few trials. Other subjects reported that although they had come to
see the incongruity, they had not become aware that their perception
of the card had changed, and they did not think to change their
response to match what had become a new perception. Thus, they
perseverated with their incorrect response. From their reports, it
seems that these subjects had perceptually "corrected" the incon-
gruity as expected and then came to perceive the card as it actually
was, incongruity and all, but had not become aware of the change,
and the new, accurate perception was not reported when first seen.

Another possible problem in the visual measure was that the
red of the playing cards was slightly darker than the red of normal

playing cards. A few subjects commented on this after the experiment,

58

and one subject, after incorrectly perseverating with a "black
spade" response to a red spade card, continued to say that the red
spade looked more like a black spade when he was handed the card
and'continued to look at it at his leisure. This problem, however,
does not seem to be serious. Only two subjects commented on the

discrepancy of the red color from the red of normal playing cards.

Weakness of Experimental Design

The experimental design used in this study did not permit
as strong a test of the hypotheses as one might normally like.
Although the three groups were matched on age, sex, and educational
experience, there may be other relevant variables on which these
groups were not matched and which influenced groups differently.

If true, the significant result may have been an artifact of dif-
ferences between groups which were independent of meditation practice
effects.

A repeated measures design or longitudinal study would have
controlled for this possibility. However, due to severe and unpre-
dictable practice effects on the visual measure, a repeated measures
design or longitudinal study would not have been appropriate.

A second weakness in the experimental design was that almost
one-half of the pre-TM control subjects did not begin the TM course
which two weeks earlier they had said they intended to begin. Most
of these subjects said that while they intended to take the course

 

59

at a later date, they lacked the financial means or were too busy

to begin the course now. Only two pre-TM control subjects said

they were no longer interested in beginning the course. As men-
tioned before, Maupin (1962) and Lesh (1971) found that people who
choose to begin meditation and stay with it show greater tolerance
for unrealistic experience, greater capacity for adaptive regression
and score higher on the POI, a measure of self-actualization. To

the extent that the control group was actually less inclined toward
meditation than the meditation groups, self selection may have biased
this study's results.

A third weakness in the experimental design may lie in the
fact that unlike the BTM2 group, the BTM1 and control groups did not
have their eyes closed during their twenty minute rest period. This
variable, and not meditation, may account for the superior perfor-
mance of the BTM1 group on the visual measure. Perhaps having eyes
closed before being tested on the visual measure decreases perfor-
mance. If true, this would mean that the scores of the BTM2 group
were artificially depressed relative to the scores of BTM1 and
control groups. If true, this would mean that immediately following
a meditation session performance on the visual measure would be
enhanced as Hypothesis 4 suggests.

There would be disadvantages, however, to having the control
and the BTM1 subjects spend their twenty minutes rest with eyes
closed. First spending twenty minutes alone with eyes closed would

be a novel, and possibly anxiety-provoking, experience for control

60

subjects but it would not be for meditators. Thus, it was thought
that having the control subjects spend their rest period with their
eyes closed might create uncontrolled problems in this research.
Secondly, to have the BTM1 subjects close their eyes during their
rest period might spontaneously trigger meditation and uncon-

trollably affect the results.

Meditation Experience of Sample

It is possible that if meditators were more experienced, then
more hypotheses would have been confirmed.

This, of course, is possible but, not very probable. The
fact that significant results were found on the visual measure sug-
gests that 4 1/2 to 7 weeks experience is enough to show the effects
of meditation practice. However, it may be questioned that although
4 1/2 to 7 weeks is long enough to show meditation effects on the
visual measure, it is not long enough to show effects on the auditory
measure. This is possible but there is no apparent, reasonable
explanation to support this contention.

Secondly, past meditation research suggests that 4 1/2 to
7 weeks is adequate for validating the effects of meditation practice
and a meditation session (Ballou, 1973; Ferguson and Gowan, 1973;
Deikman, 1963; Wallace, 1973). Ballou's study suggests that over the
first ten weeks of meditation practice, a significant drop in

anxiety occurs the first week of practice and remains at that level

61

over the next nine weeks of practice. Moreover, Wallace found that
the physiological changes which occur during meditation are just as
great the first weeks of practice as they are a couple of years later.
Lastly, in light of the above mentioned research by Maupin
(1962) and Lesh (1970) it seemed important to control for self-
selection when comparing meditators with non-meditators. Therefore,
it was important to test the meditation groups before any appreciable
number of the meditation group had dropped out. In a group of 15
meditators, which §.had followed prior to this research, over 90%
continued to practice TM for at least eight weeks after instruction.
At twelve weeks 20 percent of the beginners had dropped out. Thus,
to safely control for self-selection, it was thought that the medi-

tation groups should be tested prior to eight weeks of experience.

Dates of Testing

 

About three-fourths of the meditation groups were tested
during the last five weeks of Fall term at Michigan State University.
The other one-fourth and 18 of the 21 pre-TM control subjects were
tested between the second and fifth weeks of the winter term. That
is, most meditation subjects but only a few control subjects were
tested close to or just before an exam period which is presumably a
period of greater stress. Since Postman and Bruner (1948) and Smock
(1965) have shown that experimentally induced stress inhibits correct

identification of an ambiguous stimulus, it may be that the predicted

62

differences between the control group on the one hand and the medi-
tation group on the other may have been minimized due to the period

in the school year each group was tested.

 

Assumptions

Similar to most meditation literature, this study assumed,
erroneously it seems, that the effects of meditation practice would
be of the same nature immediately following a meditation session as
compared to four to six hours after a meditation session. That is,
it was assumed that regular meditation practice would have a unitary
effect which was merely intensified immediately following a medi-
tation session. The results of this study, however, suggest that
distinctions must be made between effects occurring during a medi-
tation session, immediately following a meditation session, and the
longitudinal effects of meditation practice; this study found that
the immediate effects of a meditation session seem to be of a dif-
ferent nature than the longitudinal effects of meditation practice.

The fact that results were discovered on the visual but not
on the auditory measure needs explanation. Perhaps meditation
practice affects visual and auditory perception differently or per-
haps the ability to identify an ambiguous auditory stimulus entails
different cognitive factors than the ability to identify an incon-
gruity in a familiar visual stimulus, thus, there would be no reason

to expect that performance on the visual and auditory measures are

63

correlated. Indeed, Frederiksen (1966) found no significant corre-
lation between the ability to identify a masked auditory stimulus

made clearer over trials and the ability to identify a blurred visual
stimulus made clearer over trials. He found that this low correlation
could be partially explained by the existence of factors such as
spatial orientation and visualization which significantly related to
the visual recognition task only and spatial scanning which signifi-
cantly related to the auditory task only.

In addition, in his factor analysis of 27 cognitive tests and
subsequent analysis of intercorrelations between the resulting factors
and performance on the auditory and visual tasks, Frederiksen (1966)
found two cognitive flexibility factors, flexibility of closure and
cognitive flexibility-rigidity (hereafter referred to as cognitive
flexibility) which affected performance on his visual and auditory
tasks differently. In each of his two auditory task conditions and
two visual task conditions Frederiksen found that while one type of
flexibility, whether it be flexibility of closure or cognitive flexi-
bility, was associated with early recognition, the other type of
flexibility would be associated with late recognition. Moreover, in
the auditory measure which was nearly identical to the one used in
this study, Frederiksen found that the flexibility factors served
opposing functions. While flexibility of closure, which may be
defined as the ability to pick out and perceive a particular item
embedded in a field (Frederiksen, 1966) and is functionally equivalent
to Witkins' (1964) field dependence-independence factor, was

64

associated with late recognition, cognitive flexibility, which is
defined as the ability to overcome a "set" (Frederiksen, 1966), was
associated with early recognition. Thus, a subject high in both
flexibility of closure and cognitive flexibility would tend to have a
mediocre score on the auditory task because the effects of these two
abilities would cancel each other. As Frederiksen points out, high
flexibility of closure enables a subject to hear embedded words
contained in the masking noise which, in turn, interferes with sub-
sequent recognition of the masked word and thus works against cog-
nitive flexibility.

As mentioned before, Pelletier (1973) has shown that a
longitudinal effect of meditation practice is increased field inde-
pendence. Pelletier did not document the immediate effects of a
meditation session. Frederiksen's study shows that a field inde-
pendent style, or high flexibility of closure, contributes to poor
performance on the auditory task. In our study, while the BTM1 and
the BTM2 groups did not differ on the auditory task, the BTM1 group
significantly out-performed the BTMZ group on the visual task. From
this it seems that regular meditation practice or a meditation ses-
sion influences some other factor(s) which counterbalances the hinder-
ing effects of increased field independence on the auditory measure
(and thus accounts for the lack of difference between the BTM] and
BTM2 groups on the auditory measure) but facilitates performance of

the BTM1 group on the visual measure (and thus accounts for the

superior performance of the BTM1 group on the visual measure).

65

If meditation practice increases cognitive flexibility while
a meditation session decreases it, the results on both the auditory
and visual measures would be explained. Restated in terms of our
previous discussion, if meditation practice facilitates both field
independence, as Pelletier has shown, and cognitive flexibility while
a meditation session either does not or immediately decreases both
of these abilities, this would lead to the results found in this
study--no differences between the pre-TM control, BTM1 and BTM2
groups on the auditory measure and the superior performance of the
BTM1 group as compared to the BTM2 and control groups on the visual
measure. This explanation would also mean that the two flexibility
factors affected the visual and auditory measures differently.
Another look at the performances on the visual task and at the cog-
nitive flexibility factor show that this is likely.

Unlike the auditory measure, the visual measure did not pre-
sent an embedded figures situation. Thus, on the visual measure it
would seem that the field dependence-independence factor had less
effect on performance. On the other hand, in light of Frederiksen's
discussion of cognitive flexibility the cognitive flexibility factor
seems to have had more effect on the visual than on the auditory task.

From his study Frederiksen concluded that cognitive flexi-
bility is a primary factor in perceptual recognition "where an
opportunity is given for an erroneous initial perception of the
ambiguous stimulus." In response to the trick card during the early

stages of rapid exposure almost all subjects gave a normal card

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response which matched the trick card on one or two of the three
card characteristics. That is, for almost all subjects, regardless
of whether they were field-independent, the visual measure elicited
a similar, common erroneous set in the first few trials. This
coupled with the fact that the visual measure did not present an
embedded figures situation suggests that in contrast to the auditory
measure the visual measure was less susceptible to the confounding
influence of field independence and was a more valid indicator of
cognitive flexibility and the ability to perceive and identify fea-
tures of a stimulus that are contrary to expectation.

One might argue that the immediate effects of a meditation
session also increase field independence and that this explains the
lack of difference in performance between the BTM1 and BTM2 groups
on the auditory measure. This possibility, however, does not seem
to fit the facts. First, if this were true, it does not explain the
results of the visual measure. Secondly, the meditation literature
suggests that immediately after a meditation session a subject is
more field dependent.

Witkin (1964) defines field dependence as a tendency to
perceive "surroundings in a relatively global (and non-analytic)
fashion, passively conforming to the prevailing field or context
(p. 35) and to "experience items as fused with their background"
(p. 80). Meditators, including Deikman's meditation subjects, seem
to have experienced this. Mahareshi, the leading teacher of TM,

talks of experiencing the world without preconceived ideas and

67

structures; Zen speaks of meditation as directed toward "casting

off the false mask of conceptualization;" and the Sufis speak of
meditation as facilitating freedom from constructs by which we have
learned to perceive. During meditation Deikman's subjects reported
visual phenomena such as blurring and dissolving of outlines and
movements, changes in vase size and shape, merging with the per-
ceptual internalization of the vase, and immediately after the medi-
tation session such changes as dedifferentiation of the landscape
such that all stimuli of the landscape appeared at equal intensity
and equally called for attention making it difficult to focus
selectively and organize the visual field into meaningful patterns
and normal figure-grouped relationships. Based on these reports
Deikman hypothesized that a process occurs which serves to deauto-
matize those psychological structures that organize perceptual
stimuli. Thus, from the claims of meditation schools and the evi-
dence in Deikman's research it seems that a meditation session
facilitates a field dependent perceptual style and that increased
field independence immediately following a meditation session cannot

explain the matching performances of the BTM.I and BTM groups.

2
Another possible explanation of the results is that medi-
tation practice and a meditation session differently affect various
factors in such a way as to result in no differences between the
BTM1 and BTMZ groups on the auditory measure but a superior perfor-
mance by the BTM] group on the visual measure. Although this is

possible, at this point there is little evidence to explain which

68

factors would be so affected and how they would combine to give
the results found in this study.

While the most reasonable explanation of this study's
results concerning Hypotheses 1 through 4 is that meditation practice
increases cognitive flexibility while a meditation session immediately
decreases it, the introduction of this paper implies just the oppo-
site. It implies that deautomatization and an aconceptual, less
structured, biased perception, and a more flexible cognitive-
perceptual style occurs during a meditation session. In terms of
Deikman's discussion, since a meditation session serves to deauto-
matize or unorganize psychological structures which limit our aware-
ness of unexpected as well as color aspects of a stimulus, medi-
tation practice and, even more, a meditation session would facili-
tate perception of unexpected stimulus aspects and stimulate color
sensitivity as stated in the six hypotheses. It may be, of course,
that the reasoning in the introduction is wrong. Or it may be that
it is correct but that the deautomatization process may have con-
sequences which are different from those that this study hypoth-
esized.

One unexpected consequence may be that the deautomatizing or
unstructuring effect of a meditation session would immediately dis-
organize perception such that it would disorganize and retard form
perception and make it more difficult to perceive an incongruity in
a familiar visual stimulus. Deikman's report of his subjects' per-

ceptual distortions, such as changes in vase size and shape,

69

blurring of outlines and movements as well as dedifferentiation of
the landscape such that it becomes difficult to organize the field
into meaningful patterns, suggest that this may be true. Over time,
however, the deautomatization effect may dissipate such that it

would be more helpful, rather than detrimental, in perception of an
incongruity. This would explain the findings that meditation
experience facilitates, while a meditation session immediately
hinders, perception of an incongruity in a familiar stimulus. Con-
sistent with the above explanation is the finding that identification
thresholds for normal cards tend to be lower for the BTM1 group than
the BTM2 group (t_= 1.68, gf_= 28, p_= .15). This explanation,
however, does not explain the lack of support for both hypotheses
tested on the auditory measure. Other possibilities which were dis-
cussed above, such as meditation practice affects visual and auditory
perception differently or that the auditory and visual measures tap
different and unrelated abilities, may explain this.

A second unexpected consequence may be that while deauto-
matization occurs during a meditation session, due to a "rebound
effect" the effects of deautomatization cannot be seen immediately
after a meditation session. For example, previous meditation
research suggests that after having decreased during a meditation
session from the pre-session level, some variables such as spontaneous
fluctuation of GSR (Orme-Johnson, 1973) "rebound" immediately after
the session to a level which is higher than before the session.

The results on the visual measure show this pattern and suggest that

7O

deautomatization may occur during a meditation session but that the
effects cannot be seen immediately after a meditation session. For

a number of reasons, however, this explanation does not seem likely.
First, it does not explain the lack of support for both hypotheses
tested on the auditory measure. Other possibilities, however, which
are mentioned above may explain this. Secondly, because most of the
physiological research does not show this rebound effect, it may be
concluded that although a rebound effect might have occurred in

this research, it is not likely. Thirdly, some of Deikman's subjects
sometimes reported supposed deautomatization effects immediately
after meditating. Thus, the possibility that deautomatization occurs
during meditation but that its effects cannot be seen immediately
after a meditation session because of a rebound effect is not entirely
consistent with Deikman's evidence.

A third possible unexpected consequence of deautomatization
which may explain the apparent contradiction between the introduction's
discussion of meditation and this study's results is that deauto-
matization occurs only in some sessions and even then occurs in
different degrees across subjects. It may be that deautomatization
occurred in too few subjects to show up in this study's results.

Past research strongly suggests this. In Deikman‘s research no
subject reported effects which were supposedly indicative of deauto-
matization every session. Similarly, Maupin (1962) found that
subjects differed greatly in their ability to experience significant

effects while meditating. Those subjects who did experience

71

profound changes during some meditation sessions tended to continue
meditation practice while those subjects who reported few or no such
effects chose not to continue meditation practice. If as Deikman's
and Maupin's evidence suggest, only some individuals experience the
traditionally reported effects of meditation and that these effects
are not experienced in every session, it is possible that both the
traditionally claimed effects of meditation practice and this study's
results are valid. That is, although the traditionally claimed
effects of meditation practice may occur in some individuals, too
few subjects may have experienced these effects for these effects to
appear in this study's results.

Of the above three possible unexpected consequences of deauto-
matization this last one seems to be the most logical and consistent
with past research and thus the most probable. However, there is
also a serious piece of evidence which argues against the validity
of this possibility. If, indeed, meditation practice affects two
few subjects in the hypothesized ways to create a significant group
difference, then none of this study's hypotheses should have been

confirmed.

ConcludinggRemarks

At this point, there are three important questions still to
be answered: 1) Are this study's results inconsistent with a deauto-

matization process? 2) Can the inconsistency between this study's

72

results and meditators' common self-reports be explained? 3) What
do this study's results mean in terms of the hypotheses that this
study originally attempted to test?

Are These Results Inconsistent
with a Deautomatization Process

The results of this study clearly fail to support but not
disprove Deikman's explanation of meditation as a deautomatization
process. First, as Deikman said, a major corrollary of a deauto-
matization process is that actions and aspects of a stimulus pre-
viously screened out are reinvested with attention and are perceived.
The results of Hypotheses 2 and especially 4 suggest that immediately
following a meditation session this does not happen. Secondly, the
results of Hypotheses 5 and 6, which suggest that neither meditation
practice nor a meditation session facilitates color sensitivity,
calls into question Deikman's explanation of meditation and deauto-
matization.

Deikman suggests that deautomatization implies and medita-
tion sustains a shift of attention to perceptual and cognitive experi-
ences preceding the analytic, intellectual mode typical of adult
thought, thereby increasing color sensitivity. While the absence of
increased color sensitivity immediately following a meditation
session is not inconsistent with the concept of deautomatization,
it seems to be inconsistent with the developmental implications

which Deikman draws from the concept of deautomatization.

73

While the results of this study fail to support Deikman's
assertion that meditation involves a deautomatization process, the
results do not disprove Deikman's hypothesis that deautomatization
occurs during meditation. The most that can be firmly concluded
from this study's results is that as Deikman describes the deauto-
matization process and as this study attempted to measure the sup-
posed effects of a deautomatization, the results fail to support the
assertion that meditation involves a deautomatization process. This
study's results raise a number of possible conclusions: either
Deikman is not justified in his assumptions about deautomatization,
deautomatization does not occur during meditation, deautomatization
does occur but, as discussed above, has consequences which are
different than this study supposed, subjects were not meditating
properly as happened in Brown's study (1971), or due to weaknesses
in the experimental measures or design or due to chance the null
hypothesis was not rejected. Because