

THE POLICE SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

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Chung-sok Myong

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**THE POLICE SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

by

**Chung-sok Myong**

**AN ABSTRACT**

**Submitted to the College of Business and Public Service  
Michigan State University of Agriculture and  
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## ABSTRACT

The objectives of this study are to present a brief historical study and a description of the present structure of the Korean National Police in addition to a discussion of the various problems confronted by the organization. Possibilities of applying the technological and ideological advances of modern police administration in its future development will be analyzed, and recommendations for implementation of advanced methods within the present Korean situation will be made.

Because of the nature of this study, it was inevitable that source materials were extensively selected from Korean and Japanese literature most of which was made available at the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

In the first chapter, a chronological presentation is made regarding the evolution of the police system in Korea which follows very much the same pattern as her history -- autocratic king's police, Japanese colonial police, and then democratic national police.

Korea, because of her geographic location in the heart of the Far East, has frequently been subjected to domination by foreign powers and to their long-lasting influences. The flourishing Chinese civilization and philosophy furnished Korea with an autocratic monarchy for centuries. The ambitious and imperialistic Japanese colonized Korea for thirty-five years in the course of their Asiatic expansion. Since World War II Korea has become the first testing ground of the fierce competition and open war between two evolving ideas -- Democracy and Communism.

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The second chapter describes the present organizational structure of the police system in Korea, and explains the functions and activities of the various law enforcement agencies.

In the following chapter an attempt is made to point out the most critical problems faced by the Korean National Police; these are discussed in two parts: organizational problems, and technical and operational problems.

Democracy is a new emerging idea in Korea, introduced by Western civilization since World War II. It conflicts with the traditional philosophy which is deeply embedded in the people. The social innovations of democracy have resulted in ideological conflicts not easily resolved; but it is the responsibility of administrators to subscribe to and develop organizations and concepts appropriate to the times.

The final chapter is devoted to the recommendations for future development which have been derived from the analysis made on the basis of the data presented in the preceding chapters and a considered opinion of the author.

It is not an easy task to convince many who would evade the challenge of the problem and reject the challenge of the future. But the Korean National Police must not permit bigotry, prejudice and obstinacy born of limited ability and imagination to obstruct progress. They must determine to give the public the most effective, efficient and considerate police service which past experience, modern training, expert planning, new techniques and enlightened thinking can provide.



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ABSTRACT

If the Korean National Police is to be successful, it must develop constructive and creative programs that will capture the imagination and enlist the support of the multitude. And it must develop a proper attitude in the democratic principle of law enforcement.

It is found in this study that a full-scale absorption of the western democratic concept of police service by the Korean National Police is not likely to take place in the immediate future. The police system is a product of the history and culture of the country, and in its reform it cannot be changed too rapidly. Koreans need more time to truly appreciate the democracy and to build one for their own.

It is further found in this study that a substantial amount of technical development will be forthcoming in the foreseeable future, and it will surpass that of the philosophical development. Rapid changes in social conditions and imperative operational needs will undoubtedly generate advancement of the police technology in the Korean National Police.

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C. S. M.  
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FIGURE 1

MAP OF KOREA

1



## CHAPTER I

### HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Despite Korea's four thousand years of history, the development of a modern police system per se is comparatively new. Chinese influence contributed centuries of autocratic government throughout the land. And Japan, during her thirty-five years of Korean annexation, exercised unlimited police control as an instrument of colonization.

Divided into north and south, between the ideologies of Communism and Democracy, Korea became the first battleground of East and West after World War II.

#### I. PRIOR TO 14TH CENTURY

Like the histories of all the ancient lands, Korea's early days are shrouded in clouds of mythological stories. It was twenty-four centuries before the birth of Christ when Tangun, a semi-deitic figure, amalgamated the various primitive tribes of Puyo into a single kingdom, which later came to be known as Chosun(Land of the Morning Calm).<sup>1</sup>

Until 668 A.D., when most of Korea was under the Shilla kingdom, there was a continual contest for power among what are known as Three Kingdoms, Paekche(18 B.C. - 600 A.D.), Koguryo(37 B.C. - 668 A.D.), and Shilla(57 B.C. - 935 A.D.). During this period of consolidation, each kingdom developed an autocratic government. The government structures differed slightly from one kingdom to another. However, they were

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<sup>1</sup> Byong-to Yi, Kuksa Taekwan, General Survey of National History (Seoul, Korea: Paekyong Publishing Company, 1953), pp. 11-23. In Korean.

similarly organized and highly centralized.<sup>2</sup>

Each kingdom had its penal code, but there was no separate government agency at this age for the sole purpose of enforcing law or policing. Consequently, the maintenance of law and order was the responsibility of military authority.<sup>3</sup>

The later period of Shilla's reign was filled with bitter feuds among rival overlords, which resulted in the triumph of the conqueror Wangkum. His kingdom was called Koryo, from which Korea, the western name for the land, was evidently derived. This kingdom lasted until 1392.<sup>4</sup>

During the Koryo Dynasty(918 - 1392) the civilization stood on a high plane for many centuries. It inaugurated Korea's first civil service examination, established schools and instituted taxation laws.<sup>5</sup> The political system was patterned along Confucian lines, and it allowed considerable regional and local autonomy.<sup>6</sup>

The police system in this dynasty had no significant difference from that of the previous era for it was an autocratic military administration, however, it has created the first separate police force in Korea.

Starting in 1231, the mighty Mongol under the leadership of Genghis Khan invaded Korea several times in thirty some years. This

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<sup>2</sup>Shannon McCune, Korea's Heritage (Tokyo, Japan and Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1956), pp. 26-27, pls. 42.

<sup>3</sup>Republic of Korea, Ministry of Home Affairs, National Police College, Hankuk Kyongch'al Chetosa, History of the Korean Police System (Seoul, Korea: National Police College, 1955), pp. 17-21. In Korean.

<sup>4</sup>McCune, op. cit., p. 29

<sup>5</sup>Yi, op. cit., pp. 164-167.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., pp. 160-161.

resulted in a notable increase of crime and disturbances of the public order. It was during this period that the army general Ch'oi U established a separate police force called Yapyolch'o,<sup>7</sup> and assigned it the duties of night patrol and convoy of vehicles. In the capital city, there was an office entitled Sunmaso<sup>8</sup> which carried out the responsibilities of patrol and convoy in addition to safeguarding the palace grounds and facilities. Separate from these two, was an agency called Osatae,<sup>9</sup> which conducted the functions of correcting and controlling of public moral as well as inspections and investigations of the government officials.<sup>10</sup>

For many years the Koryo kingdom failed to meet the needs of the Korean people and was much beset by court intrigue and outside pressure. Finally, in 1392, one of the generals, Yi Sung-ke, overthrew the kingdom and seized the throne thereby establishing the last dynasty in Korea, then moved the capital from Songdo to what is now the city of Seoul.<sup>11</sup>

## II. YI DYNASTY

Between 1392 and 1894. An autocratic monarchy continually prevailed in this period, and policing was regarded as a branch of the military authority. As in the past, the people enjoyed little security of life and property, owing to the abuse of police powers under the

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<sup>7</sup>(夜別抄), Literal translation: Special night detail.

<sup>8</sup>(巡馬所), Literal translation: Office of the horse patrol.

<sup>9</sup>(御使台), Literal translation: Secret inspector's office.

<sup>10</sup>National Police College, op. cit., pp. 35-38.

<sup>11</sup>Yi, op. cit., pp. 269-272.

autocratic system of governing.

In Hansong-pu, the city of Seoul, an office called Potoch'ong (Thief Catching Office) discharged the function of the police. The city was divided into two districts and each Potoch'ong had a strength of sixty-four persons under the command of a chief who was an army general. Other officials of this metropolitan force were all soldiers called Potori, a thief-catcher. They carried clubs and catching-ropes while they were on duty. It was also in this period that the badge and pass system for the police personnel were initiated. In each of the provinces and counties, the Potoch'ong was established and given the limited police function of night patrol and the apprehension of thieves.<sup>12</sup>

As a device of central control and crime prevention, there was a nationwide organization of the citizens called the Five-family system. Each five families were organized into a unit and given the responsibilities of crime prevention and the obligation of reporting all crimes to the higher unit. When this was violated a collective punishment was inflicted on the entire membership of the unit.<sup>13</sup>

In Seoul, the curfew was enforced in order to prevent night time crimes. The first fire fighting brigade is believed to have been originated during the era of Saejong the Great(1419-1450) who established a fire station in the capital and appointed a fire marshal. It was a customary procedure to ring bells to inform citizens when fire was reported.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Paek-nam Yun, Choson Hyongchongsa, History of the Penal Administration in Korea (Seoul, Korea: Munye Book Company, 1948), pp. 169-170. In Korean.

<sup>13</sup> National Police College, op. cit., pp. 55-61.

<sup>14</sup> Yi, op. cit., pp. 298-299.



From 1894 to 1910. This period is important in the history of the Korean police system not only because the police function was separated from the military authority but also Korea had permitted the Japanese to gain control of the police administration which eventually became the nucleus of the colonial power for years to come.

In 1894 Korea undertook an administrative reformation chiefly due to Japanese pressure. This reformation undoubtedly led Korea to a new concept of administration along the line of constitutionalism, and contributed to political, economic, social, and cultural developments. Nevertheless, Japan already had a plan of taking over Korea as one step toward her aim of Asiatic Empire.

Japan after the Meiji Restoration, imported a great deal of western civilization, and had a highly bureaucratic central police system. Consequently, much of the reorganization of the Korean police system was patterned after the Japanese, despite the fact that Korea had police advisors from Britain, France, and Russia immediately following the reformation of 1894.<sup>15</sup>

In July 1894, Potoch'ong was abolished when Kyongmukuk (Bureau of Police Affairs) was established under the Ministry of Interior. All police, fire and jail administration, was made a responsibility of the minister of interior. In Seoul, a metropolitan police was organized directly under the minister, and a director supervised five police stations and a jail in the capital. Headquarters of the metropolitan police was organized into three divisions; Administration, Uniform, and Interrogation, with a strength of fifty-six personnel. In 1905, Korea's

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<sup>15</sup> National Police College, op. cit., p. 95.

FIGURE 2

## POLICE OFFICERS IN YI DYNASTY



Potori, a thief-catcher, at work.



A full-dressed police chief.

Source: The Korean Republic, October 21, 1957.

first police school was initiated under the administration division of the metropolitan police. A new rank system became effective. In the beginning there were four ranks which were equivalent to director, superintendent, captain, and policeman of today. Later, a rank of lieutenant was added. In each province, the police and fire function was discharged by a provincial inspector who was directly under the command of the interior minister. Under each provincial inspector, there were directors, superintendents, captains and so on down to the lowest echelon of policemen. In 1906 Korea had a total number of thirteen provincial police bureaus, thirty-eight police stations, and 199 sub-stations. Each bureau was manned by twenty-five officers. The stations had twelve to thirty personnel, and each sub-station six to four policemen.<sup>16</sup>

The selection of policeman was made from applicants (age: 20 to 35) on the bases of physical examination and written test. The written test was composed of geography, composition, and an outline of the police administrative law. All recruits underwent a two-month training in the police school before they were assigned to the field unit. The courses given in the school were: laws regarding police, physical training, Japanese language, and field training. Later first aid and roping courses were added.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Ibid., pp. 102-103, 148, 149.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 149.

Note: In 1870, Japan sent Toshinaga Koji, who later became the first police general of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police, to Europe with a mission of surveying police systems in France and Germany. At the time of his return after one year study he recommended: (1) Establishment of the police bureau under the Interior Department; (2) Separation of the judicial police and the administrative police function; (3) Abolishment

The uniform was very much the same as that of the Japanese police at that time. The policeman wore a long sword hanging down from his left waist, and carried a note book, catching rope, and a whistle in his pocket. During the night patrol, they carried a lantern on which their rank was indicated.<sup>19</sup>

Korea's first police communication system by telephone was established in 1906.<sup>20</sup>

In 1907 another administrative revision took place. This resulted in the establishment of four bureaus in the Ministry of Interior; Bureaus of Provincial Affairs, Police Affairs, Public Works, and Sanitation. Then jail administration was separated from the police and more responsibilities such as residence and birth registration, control of publication, immigration, sanitation, and palace guard, were added to the police function. The number of police personnel increased as more police stations were established throughout the provinces, thereby totaling 13 provincial police bureaus, 101 stations, and 392 sub-stations.<sup>21</sup>

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of the old guard system; (4) Recruitment of the police personnel from the warrior class; (5) Integration of the fire and police service; and (6) Establishment of a metropolitan police in the capital city. Thus the modern Japanese police system in its cradle period had applied much of Koji's recommendation, and followed a definite line of the Continental system of police organization until very recent years.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> Hidenori Nakahara and others, Keisatsugaku no Shomondai, Problems in Police Studies (Tokyo, Japan: Tachibana Book Company, 1950), pp. 25-43. In Japanese.

<sup>19</sup> National Police College, op. cit., pp. 104, 132.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., p. 136.

<sup>21</sup> Yun, op. cit., p. 171.

At this time, several foreign police agencies such as Japanese Residency-General's police, Japanese gendarmerie, and Russian consulate police, were also exercising police authority in Korea. Furthermore, many Japanese police personnel were placed in various important positions in the Korean police and they practically had a full control of the organization,<sup>22</sup> Then an agreement signed on July 12, 1909, resulted in a complete transfer of judicial police function and jail administration to Japanese Residency-General's Office, which virtually made the Korean police a powerless skeleton.<sup>23</sup>

### III. JAPANESE DOMINATION

For three and a half decades(1910-1945) Korea was under Japanese domination. The police system was given a unique position in the colonial administration. It was, as a whole, "self-contained and highly centralized" under the control of the Governor-General. Its task was not limited to the maintenance of peace and order and the prevention and detection of crimes but, extended into the field of politics, economic activity, education, religion, morals, health, public welfare and fire control.<sup>24</sup>

In June 1910, two months prior to the formal annexation, the Japanese took over the entire Korean police system, and at the same time

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<sup>22</sup> National Police College, op. cit., p. 135.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 147.

<sup>24</sup> George M. McCune, Korea Today (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 25.

placed the civil police under the direct command of major general Genjiro Akashi, the provost marshal general in Korea. This marked the beginning of the most brutal gendarmerie police actions that ever prevailed in this land.<sup>25</sup> During the first ten years of colonial administration the militaristic police system suppressed the public with unlimited power in every aspect of life and thought. In a number of large cities Japanese mayors were placed in control of affairs, and in other cities, the local gendarmerie conducted the administration.

The power of gendarmerie had extended not only to summary jurisdiction, prosecution, bailiff functions, but also to various administrative areas of highway, forest, postal matters, fishing, border control, customs, taxation, railroads, harbor control, communications, monetary control, weights and measures, and education in the Japanese language.<sup>26</sup>

During this period a total of 1,826 police and gendarmerie offices exercised control over the public with a total of 14,501 personnel of which 6,322 were civil police.<sup>27</sup>

On March 1, 1919, a well-organized uprising broke out first in Seoul and then spread all over the country almost simultaneously, participated in by hundreds of thousands of non-violent demonstrators

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<sup>25</sup>U-hun Han and Ch'ol-chun Kim, Kuksa Keron, Introduction to Korean History (Seoul, Korea: Myonghak Company, 1954), p. 485. In Korean.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid.

<sup>27</sup>See Table I, Page 12.



TABLE I

12

NUMBER OF POLICE OFFICES AND PERSONNEL  
UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION

<u>OFFICES</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>1910-1919</u>	<u>1919-</u>	<u>1939</u>
		<u>Gendarmerie</u>		
Bureaus	13	13	13	13
Stations	100	176	247	254
Sub-stations and Boxes	107	7	121	285
Detachments	533	877	1,438	2,382
TOTAL	753	1,073	1,819	2,934

<u>PERSONNEL</u>	<u>Police</u>	<u>1910-1919</u>	<u>1919-</u>	<u>1939</u>
		<u>Gendarmerie</u>		
Police General	-	1	1	1
Director	-	1 K 2 J	-	-
Bureau Director	-	13 J	13 J	13 J
Superintendent	9 K 26 J	12 K 96 J	14 K 34 J	9 K 73 J
Captain	144 K 187 J	- 780 J	132 K 308 J	85 K 465 J
Lieutenant	-	-	266 K 596 J	136 K 894 J
Policeman	3,339 K 2,617 J	4,749 K 2,525 J	8,088 K 7,445 J	8,414 K 13,178 J
TOTAL	6,322	8,179	16,897	23,268

K: Korean, J: Japanese

Source: Government-General of Chosen, Bureau of Police Affairs, Chosen Keisatsu no Gaiyo, Summary on the Police of Korea (Keijo, Korea: Bureau of Police Affairs, 1936), pp. 3-4, Appendix. In Japanese.

Government-General of Chosen, Chosen Sotokufu Sisei Nempo, Annual Report on the Administration of Chosen: 1938 (Keijo, Korea: Office of the Governor-General, 1940), p. 338. In Japanese.

Republic of Korea, Ministry of Home Affairs, National Police College, Hankuk Kyongch'al Chetosa, History of Korean Police System (Seoul, Korea: National Police College, 1955), pp. 173-174. In Korean.

## RATE OF THE POLICE PERSONNEL TO POPULATION, 1910-1956

<u>Year</u>	<u>Police Personnel</u>	<u>Population</u>	<u>Population per 1 Police Personnel</u>
1910	5,694	13,300,323	2,335.8
1930	18,811	20,438,108	1,086.5
1935	19,409	22,208,102	1,144.2
1940	23,267	23,547,465	1,012.1
1946	25,000	..	..
1949	50,499	20,166,756	399.3
1950	48,010	20,166,756	420.0
1951	63,427	20,166,756	318.0
1952	63,427	19,104,192	301.2
1953	50,731	19,061,863	375.7
1954	50,731	18,852,954	371.6
1955	47,250	19,602,141	414.9
1956	39,037	20,039,449	513.3

- Note:**
1. Data up to 1940 represent all Korea under Japanese occupation, while the data after 1949 are for south Korea only.
  2. Police personnel figures include all fire officers, technicians, and civilians.
  3. Number of military police personnel is not included in the above figures.
  4. Population estimate for 1950 and 1951 was not made because of the war.
  5. 1946 figure is under United States army occupation.
  6. .. denote figures not available.


**Source:** Kyu-pyong Hyon, "Introduction to Comparative Police System," Popchong, The Law and Administration, Vol. 13, No. 3 (March, 1958), p. 47. In Korean.

Kyong-chin Ch'oi, "A Review on the Police System," Popchong, The Law and Administration, Vol. 1, No. 1 (September, 1946), p. 15. In Korean.

FIGURE 3

14

## ORGANIZATION OF THE POLICE IN KOREA UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION



\*Only in Kyonggi-do Province.

Source: Government-General of Chosen, Bureau of Police Affairs, Chosen Keisatsu no Gaiyo, Summary on the Police of Korea (Keijo, Korea: Bureau of Police Affairs, 1936), p. 17. In Japanese.

seeking Korea's independence from Japanese rule. The Japanese gendarmerie police frantically attempted to rout the movement with the most atrocious methods of repression, killing thousands of innocent and non-violent civilians on the spot or hurrying them off to prisons.<sup>28</sup>

As the result of this movement, the Japanese, hoping to appease the enraged populace, announced the inauguration of so-called a "liberal administration," the first sign of which was replacement of the gendarmerie with a civil police force which, under the pretext of maintaining peace and order, prohibited all political associations and similar bodies from being organized by the Koreans. Meetings, speeches and printed matter had to undergo scrupulous police censorship.<sup>29</sup>

In September 1919, the new Governor-General Minoru Saito reorganized the police and made the provincial governors responsible for police operations in each provinces, although much of the power and control remained in the central headquarters.<sup>30</sup> The Bureau of Police Affairs, which was directly under the Governor-General, contained four sections; Police Affairs, Public Peace("thought control"), Publication(censorship), and Sanitation. At the provincial level, the Department of Police Affairs performed as the regional headquarters under the Bureau of Police Affairs.<sup>31</sup> This organization remained

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<sup>28</sup> Republic of Korea Office of Public Information, A Handbook of Korea (Seoul, Korea: Office of Public Information, 1955), pp. 39-40.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 41.

<sup>30</sup> Han and Kim, op. cit., p. 505.

<sup>31</sup> See Figure 3, page 14.

basically the same until 1945 except for some minor revisions undertaken during World War II in establishing sections of Civil Defence, and Economic Policy.<sup>32</sup> The number of police stations and sub-stations was substantially increased in order to place a police office in every sub-division of the administration throughout the country. By the end of 1920, 10,000 new policemen were recruited from Japan to replace gendarmerie. In 1939, the number of police personnel had reached 23,268(one policeman to every 1,012 persons), of whom approximately 40 per cent were Koreans. The total number of civilian and military police in Korea was estimated at 60,000 in 1941(one to every 400 persons).<sup>33</sup>

Training of the personnel was carried out in both recruit and in-service programs. In addition to the Institute of Police Training each province had a recruit school where only Korean personnel were trained for three- to four-months periods. All Japanese recruit training and in-service training was carried out in Seoul. A group of 350 Japanese recruits underwent the training in a four month period. Training subjects also differed according to the nationality; however, the general subjects were police law, criminal law, first aid, fire fighting, geography, language, police procedure, physical training, and self-defense tactics. The in-service training was divided into two parts: the long course held annually for 30 selected staff personnel, and the short courses for training Japanese personnel in special subjects such as crime detection, finance, language, explosives, motor vehicle

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<sup>32</sup> National Police College, op. cit., p. 162.

<sup>33</sup> George M. McCune, op. cit., p. 25. Also see Table I and II, pages 12 and 13.

operation, and military affairs.<sup>34</sup>

The fingerprint method in police work was first introduced into Korea by the Japanese in September 1920 when they established the file in the Bureau of Justice in Seoul.<sup>35</sup>

In general, the police were successful in forestalling the Korean public, despite the hostile attitude of the people towards police control and its methods. Fear of police penetrated so deeply into the public that it produced a common saying for mothers to stop their crying children, saying "Shi.....hi the policeman will come and get you." And many of them did stop crying.

The conditions under Japanese domination may be clarified by the following summary of judicial process during that period taken from an unpublished manuscript prepared by an American who had been a long resident of Korea, and who had witnessed the workings of the Japanese legal machinery in Korea. It vividly illustrates some of the injustice the Japanese exercised under the name of justice.

The right of the police to arrest without due process of law. No warrant is required for arrest. No bail allowed at all during the preliminary investigation. The right of habeas corpus is unknown . . . . . Presumption of guilt.

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<sup>34</sup>National Police College, op. cit., pp. 164-165.

<sup>35</sup>Government-General of Chosen, Annual Report of Government-General on the Administration of Chosen: 1936-1937 (Keijo, Korea: Office of the Governor-General, 1938), p. 200.

Note: The Japanese adopted their fingerprint system from Germany in 1908. It is the "Hamburg System" or "Roshier System" which represents a goodly part of the Henry system with some elements of the Vucetich and Daase system.



Instead of following the true legal maxim that "every man is considered innocent until proven guilty," the official and popular attitude is the very reverse of this, and the Japanese newspapers refer to the accused as criminals.

. . . . Right of counsel is denied. An accused person is not allowed to have defense until after the police investigation and the hearing before the prosecutor has been concluded. During this period of investigation the accused is in the hands of the police with all access to the outside world completely cut off, and the sole object of the police is to make a case that will insure conviction. . . . . Secret police investigation. Here is the very citadel of this iniquitous system. It is beyond dispute that the police use threats, deception and all forms of physical and mental torture to secure admissions of guilt or in their efforts to gain incriminating evidences against others . . . . It is almost impossible to get the judges to give credence to evidence tending to overthrow false admissions made under the pressure of the secret police investigation. The police can and do hold accused persons in their custody for months without trial or give them an opportunity to consult with counsel. The one official reply to the charge that torture is practiced during police examination is that the law does not permit of such practice, and therefore, it cannot exist. When "police" are thus mentioned it should be recalled that this term includes the vast secret service and espionage system built up by the Japanese in Korea, than which a more extensive or oppressive system, it is safe to say, does not exist anywhere else in the world.<sup>36</sup>

Above all the worst feature of the Japanese legal system in Korea was the judiciary power given to the police. It is estimated that more than 100,000 cases were tried in police courts each year under the summary jurisdiction.<sup>37</sup>

On August 15, 1945, the long-sought freedom finally came for the suffering Koreans when Japan surrendered to the World War II allies. The liberation and the democracy has opened a new era in the Korean history.

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<sup>36</sup> Henry Chung, The Case of Korea (New York and London: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1921), pp. 68-70.

<sup>37</sup> George M. McCune, op. cit., p. 26.

## IV. U. S. MILITARY OCCUPATION

As the result of World War II the occupation of Korea south of the thirty-eighth parallel by the United States Army began on September 8, 1945.

One of the first American acts was to seize control of the machinery used by the Japanese to carry out their policies in Korea — the Bureau of Police. The provost marshal general of the XXIV Corps, Brigadier General Lawrence E. Schick, was assigned to the task, and this he began by purging the police bureau of its Japanese office holders. All functions normally considered to be outside the scope of police activity, such as those of the Economic, Welfare, and Thought Control Sections, were abolished, and Japanese officials and policemen were removed as rapidly as possible. By November, 1945 a new national police organization for South Korea began to take shape. However, the Korean National Police Bureau was not yet forceful instrument of law and order, for the country was beset by much postwar restlessness and agitation which the fledgling police force was hard-put to control. United State tactical troops performed many civil police duties.<sup>38</sup>

At the beginning of the occupation the police bureau was placed under the Office of the Director of National Defense, then later, in March, 1946, the military government established a separate body of national police. Reorganization of USAMGIK(United States Army Military Government in Korea)<sup>39</sup> redesignated the national police as the Department of the National Police on April 8, 1946.

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<sup>38</sup> Robert K. Sawyer, Captain, United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, n.d.), Monograph. Part I(pp.1-71), pp. 5-6.

<sup>39</sup> See Figure 4, page 21.

"The mission of the Department of National Police, under Military Government," was "to establish a system of National Police for Korea, trained and equipped to live by their motto — "SERVICE AND ORDER" — serving to protect the citizen from harm, helping the injured, and safeguarding the public from the lawless, preserving order by controlling crowds and traffic, and public conduct and enforcing the law."<sup>40</sup>

Thus a newly born Korean National Police was founded upon the principle of democratic police administration; however, the practice became far from ideal when the military government organized a drastically centralized police force under the Department, manned by those Koreans who had faithfully served the Japanese in the notorious colonial police. The provincial police chief was made responsible, not to the provincial governor, but to his department chief at Seoul by a direct chain of command.

The organization of the Department of the National Police shown in Figure 5, page 22 includes five bureaus under the chief who commands three regional headquarters and ten district(provincial) headquarters located in the occupied zone. Functions of the bureaus were as follows:

Administration Bureau includes Personnel, Finance, and Supply Sections, and responsible for all personnel matters, performing liaison between the Department of Police and the other personnel agencies(Korean Civil Service and Army Administration), supervises committee on police award; prepares the budget, allocates funds, and maintains records of expenditures; procures, designs, stores, manufactures and distributes police supplies for all echelons of the National Police.

Uniform Police Bureau contains Planning, Public Peace, Patrol, and Woman Police Sections, and responsible for planning all police procedures and methods, establishes rules and regulations for police personnel; regulates traffic movements and enforce laws


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<sup>40</sup>United States Army Military Government in Korea, Manual of Military Government Organization and Function (Seoul, Korea: USAMGIK, n.d.), Mimeographed. p. 41, Part I.

FIGURE 4


ORGANIZATION OF  
THE UNITED STATES ARMY MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN KOREA

21



Source: United States Army Military Government in Korea, Manual of Military Government Organization and Function (Seoul, Korea: USAMGIK, n.d.), Mimeographed. Insert.

**ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NATIONAL POLICE  
UNDER THE U.S. MILITARY OCCUPATION, 1946**



Source: United States Army Military Government in Korea, Manual of Military Government Organization and Function (Seoul, Korea: USAMGIK, n.d.), Mimeographed. p. 42A.

concerning public peace; plans patrol operations and supervises the patrol and the woman police.

Detective Bureau includes General Affairs, Intelligence, Special Operations, Identification, Crime Laboratory, and maintains centralized control of the Detective Bureau of the National Police of Korea by means of periodic inspections, preparation of directives for the Police College and the Provincial Police Schools; collects, evaluates and disseminates criminal intelligence and information, and maintains central criminal identification records; investigates cases directly concerning the National Government and such other cases as may be referred by the Bureau Director; and maintains a Criminal Investigation Laboratory.

Training Bureau has Training and Training Aid Sections, and responsible for the staff supervision of national police college and provincial police schools, and all advanced and specialized training of police, and for assisting in preparation of training curricula, prepares training literature for "on the job training" of police.

Communication Bureau is divided into Radio and Telephone Sections, and provides centralized control, overall planning and procurement of technical supplies for all police communications systems (telephone, voice and code radio), maintains daily contact with each provincial police headquarters for routine as well as special reports, provides emergency communications service to other departments and offices of Military Government when necessary.<sup>41</sup>

Although the U. S. Military occupation was transitional it contributed a great deal to the development of Korean police system, for it imported many new methods of police administration. The following is a chronology of important developments that took place during the occupation period.

October 4, 1945	Abrogated and immediately suspended the operation of all provisions of laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations listed below: <sup>42</sup>
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<sup>41</sup>Ibid., pp. 41-42.

<sup>42</sup>USAMGIK (United States Army Military Government in Korea) Ordinance No. 11 issued on October 9, 1945. The same order was issued in Japan on October 4, 1945 by SCAP (Supreme Command Allied Power).

1. Act of punishing political convicts.  
(Defines un-Japanese activities.)
2. The preliminary imprisonment act.  
(Defines police power to arrest upon suspicion.)
3. Act of preserving public order.  
(Defines public assembly and gathering.)
4. Act of publication.  
(Defines press and publications censorship.)
5. The decree for the protection of political convicts.  
(Defines surveillance of political convicts.)
6. The act of shrine.  
(Defines mandatory national religion of Japan, Shinto.)
7. The judicial power of police chiefs.

October 20, 1945

The economic police was abolished and all price control functions transferred to the newly established Office of Price Control.

November 8, 1945

Abolished the old time Japanese tradition of wearing sword as police arms and replaced it with the night stick. At the same time designed a new uniforms with a modern appearance. One of the new additions was the "SERVICE AND ORDER" shoulder patch that spelled out what the police stand for.

January 24, 1946

The Identification Section was established in the Detective Bureau. This was another new development since there had been no such section in the Korean police to provide for

scientific identification.

February 1, 1946        The National Police College was established in place of the Police Training School, and Provincial Police Training Schools were organized in each province to train new recruits.

February 25, 1946       Mounted police were organized in each provincial capital under the Uniform Police Division. This was an expanded reactivation of the old mounted police units which controlled crowds and the traffic during the Japanese occupation.

March 5, 1946        The Railroad Police, which had been separately organized under the Department of Transportation on January 25, 1946, was incorporated into the National Police. A Railroad Police District Headquarters was established.

April 1, 1946        A numerical district system became effective which designated numbers for provincial bureaus, districts, and station.

A Public Information Office was established in each provincial bureau.

A new rank system was adopted. Eight ranks were designated: Director, Deputy Director, Superintendent, Inspector, Captain, Lieutenant,



Sergeant, and Policeman.

July 1, 1946

For the first time in Korean history a woman's police force was established in the four largest cities in south Korea.

May 5, 1948

All police stations were classified under two categories: Class I Stations, manned by a superintendent as the chief, and Class II Stations by captain.

July 5, 1948

The Special Police Unit (a reserve force) was organized in major cities to meet any emergency need.

The occupation ended officially on August 15, 1948, with the proclamation of the Republic of Korea. And on August 24, President Syngman Rhee and General John R. Hodge, the Military Governor, signed an interim military agreement providing for the transfer of jurisdiction over the security forces, including police, to the new government. The agreement also provided that the United States Army would assist the south Korean government in training and equipping its security forces.

Subsequently many U.S. military personnel were transferred to civilian administrative duties to assist Koreans in an advisory capacity as part of the Provisional Military Advisory Group(PMAG).<sup>43</sup>

## V. THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

First Two Years: 1948-1950. The new Government Organization Law

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<sup>43</sup> Sawyer, op. cit., pp. 51-53.

was enacted on July 17, 1948, prior to the formal inauguration of the Republic, and the Department of the National Police was reorganized under the Ministry of Home Affairs. The law assigned to the minister of home affairs responsibilities over matters pertaining to internal security, general administration on the provincial level of government, public works and fire prevention.<sup>44</sup>

Following the diplomatic recognition of the Republic of Korea by the United States on January 1, 1949, the U. S. National Security Council concluded that further support and assistance to Korea should not depend upon the presence of American occupation forces, and that a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces was desirable. The Council further concluded that there should be established forthwith a U.S. Military Advisory Group which would be responsible for the training of the ROK Army, Coast Guard, and National Police.<sup>45</sup>

With the departure of Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in Korea, the Provisional Military Advisory Group emerged on July 1, 1949 as an official entity called the United States Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea (KMAG - pronounced KAY-MAG). The group further became an integral part of the American Mission in Korea (AMIK), along with the United States Embassy at Seoul, and the local agency of the Economic Cooperation Administration.<sup>46</sup>

The advisory activities of KMAG given to the Korean National Police from the time of KMAG's activation to the outbreak of the Korean

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<sup>44</sup> Republic of Korea Office of Public Information, op. cit., p. 110.

<sup>45</sup> Sawyer, op. cit., p. 62.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., pp. 70-71.

war on June 25, 1950, were generally ineffective mainly due to the shortage of personnel. The situation at that period is described by Captain Sawyer as follows:

American assistance to the Korean National Police was also limited. The police force had grown by 1949 to a strength of approximately 48,000, and was distributed by divisions according to population and guerrilla activity throughout the eight provinces of South Korea and on the islands of Cheju Do and Ullung Do. Since the police force was a national organization it nominally came under the Minister of Home Affairs; actually, each police division was directly responsible to the governor of its province for operational control. The police were equipped with a miscellaneous assortment of weapons, including the Japanese Model 99 rifle, a limited number of U.S. carbines, and pistols of various makes and calibers, all of which complicated enormously problems of supply and maintenance. For this organization, KMAG's table of distribution authorized ten American advisors — one for each police division and two for the main headquarters of the police in Seoul. As was the case with most other KMAG advisory elements, there were seldom if ever that many advisors on duty at any one time. Between February 1950 and 25 June 1950, for instance, there were only four KMAG police advisors, with each advisor responsible for at least two provinces.<sup>47</sup>

Korean War Period: 1950-1953. Soon after the Korean war broke out, the police formed two battalions of combat troops, and attached them to the United Nations Command. The police engaged in military activities, including guarding of key supply routes and communication networks of U. N. troops and the evacuation of refugees from combat areas. In addition to the normal police duties in rear area, the mopping up of the Red guerrilla forces was one of the many responsibilities vested in the police during the war.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>47</sup>Ibid., pp. 155-156.

<sup>48</sup>The Korean Republic, August 15, 1958, Section D, p. 7.

During and after the Korean war KMAG advisors were assigned to the National Police and performed various liaison duties between the police and the U.N. Command. In many cases the Korean police were not in a position to perform their function without close coordination and support from the military organizations in Korea. There were many problems which required joint operation of two authorities during the war, such as (1) policing of martial law areas, (2) refugee control, (3) counter-intelligence activities, (4) military and civilian traffic control, (5) suppression of wartime crimes committed by military personnel, such as AWOL and blackmarketing of military supplies and currency, (6) investigation of prisoners of war, and (7) anti-guerrilla operations.

Throughout the war the police force suffered heavy casualties, including 10,710 killed in action and 6,942 wounded.<sup>49</sup>

Post-War Period: 1953-1957. The war took millions of lives and it also resulted in immeasurable social disintegration in Korea.

Waves of post-war crimes swept over the country because of economic distress and social disorder. Crimes of violent nature and property loss have increased significantly. Vice became one of the major problems for the police to control as gambling and prostitution prevailed in cities and in the vicinity of military areas. The rate of juvenile delinquency went up sharply. Traffic congestion caused by the voluminous increase of both military and civilian vehicles in the large cities became another police problem.

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
<sup>49</sup>Ibid., October 21, 1957.

Soon after the ceasefire was signed the maintenance of internal security became an increasingly important part of the police responsibility as the Communist regime in north Korea intensified its intelligence and subversive activities in south Korea.

Despite unfavorable post-war conditions the police are striving for its betterment, and there are so many things to be done. In the following chapter the author will present the organization of police system in Korea today.

FIGURE 6

ORGANIZATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
January 1958



## CHAPTER II

## ORGANIZATION

The police system in the Republic of Korea is a centralized single body directly controlled by the national government from general headquarters to the lowest police offices -- the police box, sub-station, and detachment.

The Bureau of Public Safety (national police headquarters) is placed under the Ministry of Home Affairs which supervises local governmental units through the provincial governors and is directly responsible for police and fire protection. The ministry establishes election regulations and also handles such public works as city planning; the construction and maintenance of harbors, canals, highways; flood control; and land reclamation. It is responsible for the compilation of statistics on various subjects, including the vital statistics and the population census.<sup>1</sup>

The Bureau of Public Safety is one of four bureaus located in the Home Ministry and its director is responsible to the minister of home affairs who is a member of the State Council under the President.<sup>2</sup>


Other than the Bureau of Public Safety there are agencies vested with limited police power under the various ministries of the government in order to enforce laws relating to specific matters such

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<sup>1</sup> Republic of Korea, Office of Public Information, op. cit., p. 110. Also see Figure 6, page 31.

<sup>2</sup> See Figure 7, page 33.

**ORGANIZATION OF THE MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS  
REPUBLIC OF KOREA**




Source: United States Army Korean Civil Assistance Command,  
Reference Handbook: Government of the Republic of Korea (Seoul,  
 Korea: USAKCAC, 1953), Mimeo-lythographed. p. 49.



FIGURE 8

ORGANIZATION OF THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC SAFETY  
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS  
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

34



as taxation, government monopoly, postal regulations, custom duties, and weight and measurements.

Each branch of the armed forces has its own military police force under the provost marshals and they are directly responsible to the minister of national defense. Military police has no jurisdiction over the civilian personnel except for the cases in which one is charged with crimes involving espionage activities and military property or personnel.

## I. THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC SAFETY

National Headquarters. The organization of the Bureau of Public Safety is shown in Figure 8, page 34. Under the command of the Director there are six divisions (total 533 persons) each administered by a superintendent; these are: Administration Division, Uniform Division, Public Security Division, Directive Investigation Division, Special Intelligence Division, and Communication Division.

A. The Administration Division consists of nine sections and sixteen sub-sections. Sections are commanded by a captain while the sub-sections are administered by lieutenants. The functions of the sections are as follows:

1. General Affairs Section: responsible for police organization, education of personnel, statistics, public information, budgeting, auditing, employee welfare, quartermasters, police equipment, and duties not specifically assigned to other sections.

2. Personnel Section: handles matters concerning promotion, transfer, reward and punishment of police and fire personnel, promotional examinations, and other personnel management.
3. Inspection Section: investigates morale and conduct of personnel and makes recommendations on cases.
4. Finance Section: responsible for budgeting, accounting, and auditing of the entire national police expenditure.
5. Supply Section: procures, stores and maintains supplies of uniforms, equipment, and other supplies such as food for police use.
6. Public Information Section: responsible for press releases, police publications, and other public relations.
7. Military Affairs Section: handles matters of selective service and other civilian-military affairs.
8. Arts Section: deals with the development of police defense tactics such as Judo, fencing, marksmanship and hand-to-hand combat. Manages the Police Defense Tactics Society.

B. The Uniform Division consists of three sections namely:

Public Peace Section, Traffic Section, and Woman Police Section. The Public Peace Section is broken down into four sub-sections. Functions of each section are:

1. Public Peace Section: responsible for conducting residence investigation (It is routine check made on house-holders and residents registration.), sanitation, second-hand dealers, pawnshop control, firearms and explosives,

protection of animals, game laws, and other duties assigned by the minister of home affairs.

2. Traffic Section: responsible for all traffic matters and operates the Traffic Safety Association.
3. Woman Police Section: in charge of handling woman and juvenile offenders, guidance of juveniles, protection of lost children, and the aged.

C. The Public Security Division includes five sections: Police Defense, Operations Intelligence, Fire and Flood Prevention, Weapons, and Vehicles. The following are functions of the sections.

1. Police Defense Section: responsible for police guard, escort, mounted police, and anti-guerrilla operations. The section is also in charge of dispatching and controlling police officers attached to the United Nations forces, and supervises the police airplanes.
2. Operations Intelligence Section: collects operations intelligence on enemy guerrillas.
3. Fire and Flood Prevention Section: plans and executes matters pertaining to fire fighting and disaster control, education of civil defense, inspection of facilities and equipment. Also responsible for operating the Civil Defense Committee and the Civil Defense Corps of Industry. The section maintains civil defense communications and collects information.
4. Weapons Section: responsible for procurement, maintenance and repair of police weapons and supply of ammunitions.

5. Vehicle Section: in charge of procurement, control, maintenance and repair of all police motor vehicles, and fuel supplies.

D. The Directive Investigation Division consists of four sections which are divided into eight sub-sections. Sections are: Investigation Section, Detective Section, Economic Section, and Identification Section. Function of the sections are as follow:

1. Investigation Section: responsible for planning for crime prevention, protection and control of parolee and probationee, collection of crime statistics, crime investigation, and studies on crime investigation.
2. Detective Section: investigates special crimes such as vice, and narcotics offense.
3. Economic Section: handles matters concerning economic crimes such as smuggling, illegal transactions, bad checks, counterfeiting, and collects statistics on commodity prices.
4. Identification Section: responsible for collection, identification, classification, and preservation of fingerprints, and collection of physical evidence at the crime scene.

E. The Special Intelligence Division is organized into five sections which are divided into eleven sub-sections. Sections are named by number and functions as follows:

1. No. 1 Section: responsible for planning, research and direction of matters concerning with crimes of a political nature, collection of such statistics, prisoners of war, and war criminals.
2. No. 2 Section: responsible for matters pertaining to general intelligence on national assembly members, political parties, social organizations, governmental agencies, press, educational institutions, religious organizations, publications, cultural organizations, and election matters.
3. No. 3 Section: collects intelligence on foreigners and diplomatic representations, and espionage activities of aliens.
4. No. 4 Section: detects, investigates, and apprehend offenders of political crimes, and protects parolee and probationee of such crimes.
5. No. 5 Section: responsible for collecting anti-Communist special intelligence, and conducts special operations of counter-intelligence against Communist activities.

F. The Communication Division includes three sections and divided into seven sub-sections. Name and function of each section as follows:

1. Control Section: responsible for planning of the police communications system, equipment, supplies, and operates the Communications Association.

2. Wire Communications Section: controls, directs, inspects and maintains all police wire communication facilities.
3. Radio Communications Section: responsible for maintenance, and operation of all radio communication facilities, and cypher codes.

G. Related Organizations.

1. The Police Hospital: established under the control of the minister of home affairs in Seoul with two branch hospitals in cities of Pusan and Taegue for the purpose of providing medical treatment to police officers and their families.
2. The National Police College: established separately under the control of the minister of home affairs prepares training materials and conducts recruit training, officers' candidate trainings, and in-service trainings including various types of special training. The college includes a total of 158 uniformed personnel in addition to a varied number of part-time instructors from universities.
3. The Scientific Investigation Research Center: under the direction of the minister of home affairs it conducts researches on scientific investigations and criminalistics, and maintains the Scientific Crime Laboratory. It also provides identification service to the police and other agencies of the government.

Provincial Organization. As shown in Figure 9, page 42, the provincial headquarters are organized under a pattern similar to that of the national headquarters and each are headed by a Director appointed by the minister of home affairs. Administratively the provincial headquarters(The Provincial Police Bureau) are under the governor's control in provinces, and under the mayor in the Special City of Seoul. There are ten provincial bureaus including one in Seoul.

Under the provincial bureaus are police stations, sub-stations, boxes, and detachments. Police stations are divided into two classes; Class I Stations which are commanded by a superintendent, and Class II Stations headed by a captain. Sub-stations and boxes are usually administered by a lieutenant or a sergeant according to the size of the office. Detachments are headed by a sergeant. Police offices are strategically located throughout the country on the basis of at least one station in each administrative sub-division.<sup>3</sup>

The police box system is used exclusively in cities where the population is dense. A police station usually has an average of ten to twelve sub-stations or boxes. The sub-stations and the boxes are permanent establishments whereas detachments are of a temporary nature and are closed when they are no longer needed.

Special City(Metropolitan) of Seoul. In the capital city of Seoul (166.17 sq. miles; population 1,486,238 in 1956) the police force (5,328 officers) is organized into nine precinct stations and two special stations under the command of the Director of Seoul

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<sup>3</sup>Note: Provinces are divided into GUNs(counties) which in turn are made up of MYONs(townships) and further sub-divided into RIs(villages). In Seoul, the KU(ward) is the counter part of the GUN.



FIGURE 9

ORGANIZATION OF THE KOREAN NATIONAL POLICE  
January 1958

42





FIGURE 10

43

**JURISDICTION AREA AND LOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS  
NATIONAL POLICE, REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
January, 1958**



**Hqs. (Location)**

1. Bureau of Public Safety, Ministry of Home Affairs (Seoul)
2. Seoul Special City Police Bureau (Seoul)
3. Kyonggi-do Police Bureau (Seoul)
4. Kangwon-do Police Bureau (Ch'unch'on)
5. Ch'ungch'ong-pukto Police Bureau (Ch'ongju)
6. Ch'ungch'ong-namdo Police Bureau (Taejon)
7. Kyongsang-pukto Police Bureau (Taegu)
8. Kyongsang-namdo Police Bureau (Pusan)
9. Cholla-pukto Police Bureau (Chonju)
10. Cholla-namdo Police Bureau (Kwangju)
11. Cheju-do Police Bureau (Cheju)

### Special City Police Bureau.

The bureau consists of seven divisions each of which is staffed by superintendent. Divisions and sections are organized on a pattern similar to that of the national headquarters except that the Traffic Division was separated recently from the Uniform Division.

There are two special stations under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan police bureau; they are the Kyongmudae Police Station and the Woman Police Station. The Kyongmudae station is responsible for safeguarding the President and the presidential mansion. The Woman Police Station(106 policewomen) is commanded by a woman superintendent and is responsible for handling police matters concerned with juvenile, female and aged persons.

In addition to the above there are two separate units which are commanded by the Public Security Division. They are the National Assembly Guard which protects the assembly building and safeguards the members of the assembly, and the Mounted Police of forty men that regulate traffic and controls crowds.

Fire Services. The fire services are an integral part of police organization in Korea and they include a total of 63 offices of which 13 are Class I Stations, 11 Class II Stations, 37 Sub-stations, and 2 Detachments. Fire Stations are established only in the important areas throughout the country and they are administered by a police captain who is appointed by the national headquarters. In the area where no fire office is established the police chief has responsibility of fire protection.

All fire personnel other than those who are appointed by national headquarters wear different uniforms from those worn by the police. Fireman are classified into four ranks: Fire Lieutenant, Fire Sergeant, Fire Corporal, and Fireman. There were 565 regular fire personnel in 1956. Police districts with no fire offices depend on voluntary part-time fire personnel.

## II. OTHER ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES

While the Bureau of Public Safety administers most police functions there are other governmental agencies with some form of enforcement functions. They come under the jurisdiction of the ministers whose ministries are given the pacific duties. The following are the agencies and their enforcement functions:

Bureau of Prosecution, Ministry of Justice: directs extradition proceedings, investigates criminal cases for prosecutions, summons state witnesses, supervises probationees and parolees.

Bureau of Penal Administration, Ministry of Justice: administers penal institutions; apprehends escapees from custody.

Military Police Headquarters, Ministry of National Defense: supervises military police forces of each branch of the armed forces, maintains service discipline and police activities for military personnel.

Counter-Intelligence Corps, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Ministry of National Defense: each corps separately detects and investigates, espionage activities and apprehends enemy agents.

Bureau of Custom, Ministry of Finance: maintains offices at all open ports for the enforcement of the customs laws and to collect the

tariffs, and incident to this, prevent any smuggling activities.

Bureau of Tax Administration, Ministry of Finance: enforces the internal revenue laws, and controls liquor production and consumption by licensing.

Office of Monopoly, Ministry of Finance: enforces the government monopoly laws which control the production and sale of tobacco, salt and ginseng. Confiscate contraband of monopoly products.

Bureau of Postal Administration, Ministry of Communication: has jurisdiction over violations of postal laws, conducts criminal investigation of the postal establishment, maintains liaison with other investigative or law enforcement agencies of the government.



Bureau of Commerce and Trade, Ministry of Commerce and Industry: responsible for enforcing the patent law and weight and measures laws.

Bureau of Drug Administration, Ministry of Public Health and Social Affairs: regulates import, sale and consumption of poisonous and narcotic drugs.


FIGURE 11

UNIFORM AND INSIGNIA OF THE KOREAN NATIONAL POLICE  
March 1958

47



A Uniformed Traffic Policeman.



NUMBER OF POLICE OFFICES  
IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 1956

<u>Province</u>	<u>POLICE STATIONS</u>					<u>FIRE STATIONS</u>				
	<u>Station</u>		<u>Sub-</u>	<u>Box</u>	<u>Detach-</u>	<u>Station</u>		<u>Sub-</u>	<u>Detach-</u>	
	<u>Class</u>	<u>Class</u>				<u>Class</u>	<u>Class</u>			
	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>Station</u>		<u>ment</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>II</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>ment</u>	
Seoul	11	-	29	100	-	4	-	23	-	
Kyonggi-Do	7	15	194	47	4	1	1	3	1	
Kangwon-Do	5	12	106	35	11	1	-	-	-	
Chungcheong- Pukto	4	6	96	23	-	1	-	-	-	
Chungcheong- Nando	8	7	159	32	3	1	-	-	-	
Kyongsang- Pukto	10	15	228	68	6	1	3	-	-	
Kyongsang- Nando	11	14	231	72	5	2	2	10	1	
Cholla- Pukto	6	8	164	41	4	1	2	1	-	
Cholla- Nando	6	17	221	61	1	1	3	-	-	
Cheju-Do	1	3	16	8	2	-	-	-	-	
TOTAL	69	97	1,444	487	36	13	11	37	2	

Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of Home Affairs, Bureau of Public Safety, Kyongch'al T'ongke Nyonpo, Police Annual Report: No. 4 (Seoul, Korea: Bureau of Public Safety, 1957), p. 25.  
In Korean.

TABLE IV

49

NUMBER OF POLICE OFFICERS IN THE  
REPUBLIC OF KOREA, 1956-1957

PROVINCE & HEADQUARTERS	<u>R A N K</u>						Sub Total
	Director	Superin- tendent	Captain	Lieute- nant	Sergeant	Policeman	
National Headquarters	1	31	62	124	185	130	533
National Police College	1	5	11	26	38	87	158
Seoul	-	23	83	265	756	4,201	5,328
Kyonggi-Do	1	13	59	368	824	3,322	4,587
Kangwon-Do	1	10	45	235	612	2,413	3,316
Chungchong- Pukto	1	9	36	170	430	1,454	2,100
Chungchong- Nando	1	13	51	296	616	2,425	3,402
Kyongsang- Pukto	1	16	70	382	995	3,728	5,192
Kyongsang- Nando	1	17	78	383	1,067	3,972	5,518
Cholla-Pukto	1	12	46	230	654	2,420	3,363
Cholla-Nando	1	13	60	326	945	3,423	4,768
Cheju-Do	1	4	11	43	96	454	609
TOTAL	11	166	612	2,848	7,218	28,029	38,884

Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of Home Affairs, Bureau of Public Safety, Kyongch'al T'ongke Nyonpo, Police Annual Report: No. 4 (Seoul, Korea: Bureau of Public Safety, 1957), p. 33.  
In Korean.



## CHAPTER III

### THE PROBLEMS

As in many other small nations born after World War II, social changes requiring a vast amount of human energy and ingenuity are now taking place in Korea. Never before in the history of this country, have human energy and know-how been so valuable to the entire society.

A sudden surge of democracy following centuries of autocratic government system and foreign exploitation, not only brought new ideas into the land but also created confusion in the social system. Many problems arise when old and new ideas meet. The Korean police system too is confronted with numerous problems in facing the challenges of the new age.

#### I. ORGANIZATIONAL

The Police Objectives, Duties and Tasks. Compared with the many countries that have the Anglo-American police system, the police objectives in countries which follow the Continental police system are generally broad in nature. There are more duties to be performed because the police force is placed directly under the supervision of a single head responsible for internal affairs of the entire country.

There is no document which defines the objectives of the Korean National Police, however, it is clear that the organization has the responsibilities of maintaining the public peace and the internal security. In this type of organization often the police are assigned

some additional services and administrative duties of a non-police nature which obviously impair effectiveness and efficiency of the force in carrying out the principal duties.

When the police organization is given a broad responsibility such as the maintenance of internal security, it is extremely difficult to draw a clear line between the principal duties and the secondary tasks of the force for all problems ultimately contribute to peace preservation.

The Korean National Police today is charged with so many administrative duties and tasks which would normally be executed by other agencies of the government that it is almost impossible to deploy adequate manpower into the principal duties. According to an official figure approximately 30% of uniformed personnel are on full-time administrative duties, and 16% are assigned to various guard duties.<sup>1</sup>

The list below illustrates various extra duties and tasks the police have to perform in addition to routine police activities.<sup>2</sup>

A. Registration of:

1. Residences.
2. Civil Identification.

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<sup>1</sup> Republic of Korea, Ministry of Home Affairs, Bureau of Public Safety, Kyongch'al T'ongke Nyonpo, Police Annual Report: No. 4 (Seoul, Korea: Bureau of Public Safety, 1957), p. 127. In Korean.

<sup>2</sup> Republic of Korea, Ministry of Home Affairs, National Police College, Kyongch'al Rukpop, A Compendium of Laws for Police (Seoul, Korea: National Police College, 1957), pp. 214-263, 278-292, 307-478, 485-584. In Korean; and Statement by Captain Ill-ho Seung of the Korean National Police, personal interview, on 20 May 1958, at East Lansing, Michigan.

3. Draftee and travel permits.
4. Motor vehicles.
5. Entertainers and service girls.
6. Dogs and horses.

B. Guard duties:

1. Guard and protect all cash transportation of  
national treasure, including Bank of Korea notes.
2. Protection of monopoly bureau's facilities.
3. Safeguarding of historical places and palace grounds.
4. Protection of parks and public recreation areas.
5. Key railroad facilities, including bridges, tunnels  
and communication centers.
6. Communications facilities, including telephone, radio  
and TV stations.
7. International airport.
8. Important government buildings.
9. Diplomatic missions.
10. United Nations forces facilities.

C. Licensing and inspection of public facilities:

1. Hotel and lodging houses.
2. Public bath houses, barbershops, and beauty saloons.
3. Restaurants, bars, coffee shops, and dance halls.
4. Theaters and other public entertainment facilities.
5. Outdoor and indoor recreation facilities.

D. Licensing and inspection of sanitary conditions of:

1. Butcher shops.

2. Dairy product manufacturers.
3. Soft-drink manufacturers.
4. Fruit growers.
5. Popcorn and cotton candy manufacturers.
6. Hard and soft candy manufacturers.
7. Sea products dealers.
8. Other food markets.

**E. Licensing and inspection of commercial establishments:**

1. Used-goods dealers.
2. Pawn shops.
3. Gold and silver jewelers.
4. Print shops.
5. Paper dealers.
6. Second hand book dealers.
7. Laundry shops.
8. Seal and chop engravers.
9. Photo studios.
10. Camera shops.
11. Street markets.
12. Undertakers and tomb stone makers.

**F. Licensing of explosives, dangerous chemicals, and high voltage users:**

1. Inflammable and explosive products dealers.
2. Match manufacturers.
3. Iron works.
4. Textile manufacturers.

5. Textile dyers.
  6. Grain mills.
  7. Saw mills.
  8. Construction firms.
  9. Users of gasoline, steam or diesel engines.
- G. Licensing and inspection of transportation facilities:
1. Ferry operation.
  2. Horse and ox cart.
  3. Row boat and motor boat.
- H. Safety inspection of:
1. Motor vehicles.
  2. Bicycles.
- I. Other licensing and inspection:
1. Licensing of motor vehicle operator's permit.
  2. Issuing of construction permit for all types of buildings.
  3. Inspection of highway and roads.
  4. Inspection and control of posters and billboard advertisements.
  5. Lottery permit.
  6. Issues permit to cut wood from forest.
  7. Inspection of government rice collections.

The Chain of Command. One of the critical problems in the organization is the existence of a conflicting chain of command in the level of supervision. As shown in Figure 9, page 42, the Provincial Police Directors are placed under the control of the respective

provincial governors and Seoul city mayor, yet they are also subjected to the direct command of the Director of the Bureau of Public Safety. Thus the provincial directors are to receive directions and supervisions from two superiors.

In this type of administrative structure there is inherent danger of power struggle over authority, and consequently resulting confusion in the lower levels of activity. However, when one channel is equipped with operational capability it tends to dominate the other and make it obsolete. Duplications in administrative procedures are almost inevitable and the waste of manpower is high. Conflicting orders and directions impairs the morale of the personnel, and destroys administrative responsibility.

The Span of Control. Under the present system wide span of control is seen in various levels of activity in the organization. In general headquarters six Division Chiefs directly report to the Director who has no aides but a small secretarial staff. Each Division Chief separately supervises functional divisions located in eleven provincial bureaus. At the provincial level the Director supervises an average of 16.6 Station Chiefs (from 4 to 25 according to the size of province). At the local level, the average number of lower stations commanded by each Station Chief is 11.8 (from 7 to 14 sub-stations or boxes).

It is impossible to estimate accurately the maximum number of subordinates that one superior can adequately control, however, with the unfavorable conditions that now prevail in Korea it is safe to say that the span of control is so wide as to destroy the possibilities of

unity of action.

When provincial headquarters are located in far from one another without adequate communication facilities and means of transportation, the control problem becomes immensely difficult. Coordination becomes impossible and result ineffective supervision.

Politics and Police. The greatest obstacle to efficient law enforcement today in Korea is the political pressure and manipulation which derives from partisan politics. A strong executive branch of the government dictates the appointments of personnel at practically all levels. Without having a partisan affiliation or support an officer is severely handicapped when promotion or transfer is in consideration.

The police are often used as an instrument against the opposition parties. The orders from higher authorities to render favoritism in election and political rallies, cannot be rejected or ignored even when chief is reluctant to follow them because his position is in stake at general headquarters. For the police administration to be supported by the people it must be separated from partisan politics which makes law enforcement inconsistent, unjust, and unequal.

Public and Police. There is a fundamental difference between the concept of public administration inspired by pioneers of the western democratic society and that understood in the autocratic society of Korea. Instead of the government serving the people, it had ruled the people for centuries only for the benefit of a power elite. The police had been one of ruler's power instruments for suppressing the

opposition under the guise of controlling lawlessness.

The public still has vivid memories of the days when the dreaded Japanese police could arrest and torture them as part of the government's thought control. People still fear the police, despise and distrust them. Yet, deep in their heart, the public wishes for the day when the police can become their trusted servant and will respect all the rights of the individual.

This is the situation police faces today in Korea. How much can police increase their prestige and be trusted by the people will be a yard stick to measure the degree of progress in the future.

Supervisory Personnel. Although no official statistics are available it is very conceivable that approximately 20 to 25 per cent of the total personnel of the Korean National Police is composed of those who have served in the Japanese police. According to an official figures compiled in 1956 the number of police personnel with more than ten years service (i.e. they were already in the Japanese police before 1945) totals 6,422 which is approximately 24% of the entire strength.<sup>3</sup>

Shown in Table V, page 58, 63.1% of the entire personnel are age over 31. Of the personnel with the rank of lieutenant or higher, 1,818 are age over 36 which is 50% of the group. The rate is increased as it moves to the higher ranks. This presents another difficult problem in administration. An impressive number of high ranking officers were trained by the Japanese and have experience in the colonial police organization.

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<sup>3</sup>

Bureau of Public Safety, op. cit., Annual Report: No. 4, p. 31.



TABLE V

58

POLICE OFFICERS BY AGE GROUP AND EDUCATION  
1956--1957BY AGE GROUP

	<u>Director</u>	<u>Superin- tendent</u>	<u>Captain</u>	<u>Lieute- nant</u>	<u>Sergeant</u>	<u>Policeman</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
Under 20	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	
21 -- 25	-	-	-	1	31	994	1,026	2.6
26 -- 30	-	4	7	212	1,531	11,531	13,285	34.3
31 -- 35	1	15	146	1,433	4,207	12,244	17,866	45.9
36 -- 40	3	47	208	784	1,325	2,778	5,145	13.2
41 -- 45	2	51	162	347	252	441	1,255	3.2
46 -- 50	2	44	84	69	46	33	278	0.7
Over 51	3	5	5	2	6	5	26	0.1
TOTAL	11	166	612	2,848	7,218	28,029	38,884	100.0

BY EDUCATION

	<u>Director</u>	<u>Superin- tendent</u>	<u>Captain</u>	<u>Lieute- nant</u>	<u>Sergeant</u>	<u>Policeman</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>
University Graduated	4	66	140	199	97	90	596	1.5
University Unfinished	-	3	23	129	104	145	404	1.0
Jr. College Graduated	2	22	6	169	147	210	614	1.6
Jr. College Unfinished	-	-	12	71	114	246	443	1.1
Sr. High Graduated	3	39	172	765	1,404	3,392	5,775	14.9
Sr. High Unfinished	-	6	22	141	524	2,151	2,844	7.3
Jr. High Graduated	2	15	65	562	1,734	5,943	8,321	21.4
Jr. High Unfinished	-	-	20	172	919	5,080	6,191	15.9
Grade School Graduated	-	15	94	640	2,175	10,772	13,696	35.3
TOTAL	11	166	612	2,848	7,218	28,029	38,884	100.0

Source: Bureau of Public Safety, op. cit., Annual Report: No. 4, pp. 42-43.

Table V also shows that only about 28% of officers above the rank of sergeant had received education higher than junior college graduation. Hence there is a strong indication that the majority of supervisory personnel are dominantly conservative and tend to insist on maintaining status quo ante. The rigid and strict bureaucratic rank system in the police force further provide them an excellent opportunity to resist against innovations.

## II. MANAGEMENT

Personnel. Korea has a Government Employee Law which outlines overall regulations on examinations, classifications, appointments, wages, protections and disciplinary measures for civil servant. Other than classifications of job and wages, for which the Civil Service Commission is responsible, each minister has authority over personnel management.

The Civil Service Commission administers regular civil service examinations (junior and senior civil service examinations) which merely qualify the passers to apply for employment in the desired ministry. The commission also holds special civil service examinations for a particular ministry at the request of the minister.

Consequently all police personnel matters except job and wage classification are administered by the Personnel Section, Administration Division, Bureau of Public Safety.

Obviously one of the reasons reducing the effectiveness of Korean police administration is that frequent changes take place in the

level of top management. The twelve home ministers who served during the period of August 1948 to May 1956 averaged only nine months in office, and the range was from one month to a maximum of twenty-two months. As for the director of Bureau of Public Safety, eleven men served an average of 8.1 months between January 1949 and May 1956, and the length of their services ranged from one to twenty-six months.<sup>4</sup>

The above figure signifies the amount of changes that occur in supervision when the top management is politically manipulated and has the appointive power for the entire personnel. Station chiefs are so frequently rotated around that it is not unusual for them to leave a new post before they can grasp the local situation. And no police administrator can achieve a superb performance without having a comprehensive knowledge of the locality he commands. Therefore frequent changes produce irresponsible, inconsistent, and ill-executed administration.

The welfare of employee is an important consideration in personnel administration for it influences the service, affects the morale of the force and the desire of individuals.

Generally speaking government employees in Korea are underpaid compared to those in private industry. The police service do not guarantee tenure, annual leaves, nor retirement pensions. Police salaries are based on a 48-hour workweek, and there is no compensation for any additional work performed. The only fringe benefits they receive are uniform, a monthly rice ration, and hospital treatment for their families.

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p. 8.

The annual report for fiscal year 1955-1956 states the average monthly pay received by police officers was 7,713 Hwan (i.e. approximately \$15.42 at the rate of 500:1 dollar).<sup>5</sup>

Under such working conditions it is almost impracticable for the administration to expect a high quality performance from employees. Low pay multiplied by other factors encourages corruption in the organization. The administrators must realize that mooching and corruption can be eliminated only by rigid supervision and control.

The turnover rate of personnel is unbelievably high. During the fiscal year of 1956-57, 12,033 persons (i.e. approximately 31% of the total strength) left the organization for various reasons. The rate is highest at the lowest rank. A breakdown by rank is as follows:<sup>6</sup>

Superintendent	24 ( 0.2%)
Captain	106 ( 0.9%)
Lieutenant	675 ( 5.6%)
Sergeant	1,596 (13.3%)
Policeman	9,632 (80.0%)

Training. All training other than on-the-job training are handled by the National Police College located in the vicinity of Seoul.

One of the major problems in police training is the shortage of qualified instructors. Because of its short period of independence Korea lacks educators particularly in technical and specialized fields like police. To overcome this problem the college uses a pool system

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 49.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 38.

which is composed of professors from various universities. But only less than 23% of total hours of recruit training, and 21% of the officers' candidate training are devoted to the subjects related to police administration and science.<sup>7</sup> Therefore the most needed training is least given.

Outdated methods of teaching and the instruction materials now being used need revision to fit the needs of present day education. Many of the courses taught at the college merely present philosophical aspects rather practical usages. For instance, recruits learn classroom theory in office procedures, but not many of them able to write reports when they are assigned to the field.

The college also conducts retraining of the personnel, but the results are poor. Because of college being located in Seoul, all trainees must leave their post and family for at least one month and up to one year depending on the kind of training they receive. Trainees do not appreciate this opportunity and a majority of them reluctantly come to the school under orders. The in-service training program needs a careful review and reorganization in order to achieve its goal.

So far, a total of 47 police officials have been to the United States on a study and observation tour under the sponsorship of the International Cooperation Administration, the Korean government, and the U. S. State Department.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> See Table VI, page 63.

<sup>8</sup> The Korean Republic, May 23, 1958, p. 3.

TABLE VI

63

**TRAINING PROGRAMS OF THE KOREAN NATIONAL POLICE COLLEGE  
AND THE CURRICULA ASSIGNMENTS**

<u>Training Programs*</u> :	A-1	A-2	A-3	A-4	A-5	B-1	B-2	B-3
Training Period(Month):	12	6	3	2	3	3	2	3
<u>Curricula**</u>	<u>Percentage of Training Hours Devoted</u>							
Part I	21	25	21	21	15	17	17	15
Part II	22	24	27	26	9	23	28	6
<u>Part III</u>	21	21	26	27	-	23	23	-
Part IV	2	2	2	2	58	3	3	58
Part V	25	15	5	5	-	2	2	-
Part VI	29	23	19	19	18	32	27	21
TOTAL	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

\* A-1: Candidate for lieutenant; A-2: Candidate for lieutenant selected from sergeants; A-3: Lieutenants in service; A-4: Captain and higher ranks in service; A-5: Fire sergeants in service; B-1: Policeman recruits; B-2: Sergeants and policemen in service; B-3: Firemen in service.

\*\* Part I: Ethics; Korean; History; English; Philosophy; Logic; Sociology; Political Science; Economics; Statistics; Finance; Mathematics; Bookkeeping.  
 Part II: Introduction to Law; Civil Law; Procedure Law; Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Police Law; Commercial Law; Policy in Criminal Justice.  
 Part III: Administrative Procedure; Legal Procedure; Criminal Investigation; Criminal Psychology; Legal-Medicine; Fingerprints; Identification; Sanitation; First Aid; Automobile; Steam Engine; Communications.  
 Part IV: Fire Service Administration; Flood Prevention; Architecture; Fire Fighting; Fire Meteorology; Fire Equipment; Air Defense; Biochemistry.  
 Part V: Military Science; Tactics; Weapons and Arms.  
 Part VI: Military Drill; Jujutsu; Karate-jutsu; Fencing; Bayonet Fighting; Self-defense; Horsemanship; Ceremony and Inspection; Lectures on Current Topics; Special Guest Lectures; Rope Knotting.

Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of Home Affairs, National Police College, Kyongch'al Kyoyuksa, The History of Police Education (Seoul, Korea: National Police College, 1956), pp. 36-39, 52-56, 64-67. In Korean.

Office Procedures. The office procedures now being used by the Korean National Police are almost entirely those which had been in use during Japanese occupation. The Police Office Procedure Regulation drawn by the Japanese in 1923 is still effective throughout the organization. There is no doubt that these procedures are out-dated and cannot adequately meet the need of today's complex administration.

The organization has grown tremendously in size and volume since that time, and the complexity of modern administration requires far more efficient office procedures. Many of these old methods and procedures should be improved by revisions or new designs.

One of the critical problems in this area is the outmoded and inadequate police records. The Korean police does not have a centralized record system; various documents and records are kept by responsible sections of the police offices. Records are not cross-indexed or related to the other records in any way for future references.

A good records system serves the organization in many way and without it no police can efficiently function in the modern administration that requires high degree of coordination and speed.

Communications and Transportation. The police communication facilities are generally poor. Only the cities of Seoul and Pusan have dial telephone systems. Therefore all police offices in the country (other than these two cities) are connected by special lines equipped with military type hand crank telephones and two or more stations are partied on a single line.

Each provincial headquarters and all 1st and 2nd class stations have wireless stations. These stations have direct contact with general headquarters in Seoul and can relay messages to lower stations, but has no channels between the various provincial headquarters or the various stations. This makes the horizontal communication immensely difficult especially at the lower levels of the organization.

The Seoul City Police Bureau is the only bureau with voice radio communication system. It also has limited number of patrol jeeps with two-way radio.

The number of vehicles in use by the police totals 1,182 of which 375 are cars, 574 trucks, and 230 fire vehicles.<sup>9</sup> The majority of these vehicles are World War II surplus and need replacement.

Other Equipment. The principal police weapons are automatic U.S. M-30 carbines and M-45 pistols. Although required during the Korean war period, it is now a debatable question whether the present weapons are suitable, especially from the viewpoint of public relations.

One of the needs is investigator's equipment. At present no provincial bureau or any station has fingerprint-kits nor equipment to preserve physical evidence in a satisfactory condition.

Other equipment such as office machines, emergency equipment, anti-riot equipment are scarcely in use.

Quality of the service and success of many operations will be increased by improvement of these many types of police equipment.

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<sup>9</sup> Bureau of Public Safety, op. cit., Annual Report: No. 4, p. 148.



### III. TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

Security. The security program of a nation generally consists of various measures against hostile actions from within and without its territory. The police are usually responsible for the internal aspect of the entire security program and engaged in suppression of sabotage, espionage, and subversive activity. Today, a great threat to the free world is continuous challenge of the Communists to fulfill their objectives of world subjugation through unconventional warfare.

Ever since the division of Korea, the Communist elements have infiltrated the various political, economic, social, cultural, and educational organizations in South Korea. During the Korean war a large number of communist agents were sent to South Korea disguised as refugees. Since the war the communist effort has been intensified. Agents enter South Korea over the mountains along the demarcation line or along the coasts. Many of them are well-trained and equipped with radios and both Korean and U.S. currency.

There are no general statistics available on communist activities in South Korea, however, in 1956 the police alone made 360 arrests for crimes of a security nature in which 570 communists were apprehended (the figure includes 204 espionage agents).<sup>10</sup>

The Bureau of Public Safety is responsible for a major portion of the internal security in Korea and its activities include domestic and foreign intelligence; counter-espionage operations; anti-guerrilla

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<sup>10</sup>

Ibid., p. 217, and The Korean Republic, January 7, 1958.

operations; and investigation of security crimes. The Korean Armed Forces and the United Nations Forces are also engaged in security activity. Each has their own intelligence corps and separately conduct intelligence operations and counter-espionage activities against North Korea.

It is rather difficult for an outsider to estimate efficiency of the security program in South Korea because of its highly guarded secrecy. However, the most crucial problem is probably that of coordination.

A nationwide security program cannot perform its objectives effectively and efficiently without a high degree of coordination. For successful planning, organization, direction, and execution of the program, it is highly desirable to have an agency established with responsibility of coordinating the overall security activities of the nation. Ideally every piece of vital information and intelligence concerning the nation's security should be collected, collated and evaluated at central headquarters for dissemination to the proper authorities. Unfortunately this is not the situation in Korea.

Another problem in this area is the difficulty in identifying agents and communist sympathizers. Many important identification records such as birth registration, school records, employment records, and business transactions were destroyed during the war. The decentralized and inadequately maintained police records seldom can provide an accurate and prompt identification services.

In many cases the detection of clandestine subversive organization requires secret investigation in which under-cover agents

and informers are used. This type of investigation takes an enormous amount of money and painstaking efforts of competent investigators.

Crime. One of the major responsibilities of the police is the suppression of crime.

According to official statistics adult crime increased 57.2% in two years following 1954. The adult crime reported to the police increased from 111,818 cases in 1954 to 175,942 in 1956. Shown in Table VII, pages 69 and 70 are the number of adult crimes reported to the police in 1956, cases resulting in arrests, number of persons arrested, cases closed by a conviction, and number of persons convicted. Of 175,942 reported offenses, the police made 167,282 arrests(95%) in which 192,104 persons were arrested. Of 167,282 arrests 167,047 cases were convicted.

Among the statutory offenses, about 60% are the crimes against property and 24% were against person. It is presumed that the actual occurrence of crimes against property are far beyond the statistics because of the victim's reluctance to report minor losses.

Crimes committed by juveniles increased 273.7%, from 6,490 cases in 1955 to 18,769 in 1956.<sup>11</sup> A reported 18,804 arrests were made and 22,117 juveniles were arrested. And 21,780 of them were convicted in 18,502 cases.<sup>12</sup> Some 68% of the statutory crimes were against property and 20% were against person.

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<sup>11</sup> Hankuk Nyonkam, The Korea Annual, 1956 (Seoul, Korea: n.n., 1955), p. 247. In Korean.

<sup>12</sup> See Table VIII, pages 71 and 72.

TABLE VII

NUMBER OF ADULT CRIMES REPORTED, ARRESTS MADE, PERSONS  
ARRESTED, CASES CONVICTED, AND PERSONS CONVICTED, 1956

**PART I. STATUTORY CRIMES**

<u>Crime Classification</u>	<u>Crimes Reported</u>	<u>Arrests Made</u>	<u>Persons Arrested</u>	<u>Cases Convicted</u>	<u>Persons Convicted</u>
Murder	219	208	267	201	259
Attempted Murder	109	107	138	107	138
Infanticide	107	96	109	96	109
Manslaughter	188	183	263	179	259
Negligent Manslaughter	1,532	1,517	1,623	1,497	1,599
Assault and Battery	9,495	9,345	15,860	10,184	15,601
Negl. Assault & B.	2,031	2,019	2,192	1,971	2,130
Rape	205	202	228	191	213
Abortion	80	78	122	76	118
Kidnap, Abduction	51	51	58	50	56
Intimidation	317	314	394	313	394
Illegal Arrest	125	124	208	125	211
Desertion	393	242	228	240	225
Arson	78	76	81	73	78
Negligent Fire	716	709	790	703	772
Armed Robbery	157	136	181	151	181
Robbery	884	798	1,452	783	1,431
Burglary	1,623	1,301	2,097	1,306	2,094
Larceny	19,505	12,677	16,191	12,542	16,073
Extortion	725	684	1,022	669	999
Fraud	5,314	5,030	5,944	4,935	5,840
Embezzlement	3,620	3,528	4,475	3,403	4,331
Trespass	2,352	2,223	2,109	2,202	2,087
Possess. of Stolen Goods	3,560	3,510	4,350	3,409	4,316
Wilful Destruction	763	708	919	712	902
Counterfeit	31	10	26	10	26
Forgery	1,340	1,324	1,585	1,308	1,550
Libel	417	417	596	399	576
Credit Offense	200	200	335	198	309
Narcotics Offense	605	586	810	586	813
Gambling	870	862	3,510	743	3,481
Bigamy, Adultery, Obsenity	2,528	2,526	2,768	2,521	2,762
Public Nuisance	163	160	238	160	238
Obstructing Public Right	246	243	350	241	353
Religious Offense	51	51	84	49	81
Water Utilization Offense	21	21	38	21	38
Obstructing Traffic	47	47	83	46	81
Drinking Water Offense	5	5	4	5	4
Explosives Offense	5	5	9	5	9

Continued to next page.

TABLE VII, Continued.

<u>Crime Classification</u>	<u>Crimes Reported</u>	<u>Arrests Made</u>	<u>Persons Arrested</u>	<u>Cases Convicted</u>	<u>Persons Convicted</u>
Escape	38	38	49	38	49
Harboring Criminal	11	11	13	11	13
Perjury	91	91	136	93	137
Evidence Destruction	5	5	8	5	8
False Accusation	135	133	195	131	193
Revealing Secret	6	6	8	5	7
Treason	2	2	7	2	7
National Flag Offense	2	2	2	2	2
Diplomatic Offense	47	47	54	47	54
Bribery	298	292	502	288	488
Abandoning Duties	64	63	88	63	88
Abuse of Authority	11	11	20	11	20
Obstructing Duties	405	404	588	396	574
<b>Total</b>	<b>61,793</b>	<b>53,428</b>	<b>73,407</b>	<b>53,502</b>	<b>72,377</b>

**PART II. CRIMES OF SPECIAL LAWS**

<u>Laws</u>	<u>Crimes Reported</u>	<u>Arrests Made</u>	<u>Persons Arrested</u>	<u>Cases Convicted</u>	<u>Persons Convicted</u>
National Security Law	168	168	219	169	220
Military Code	191	189	185	190	185
Conscription Law	5,719	5,723	5,737	5,561	5,584
Grain Control Law	118	121	126	117	124
Ordinance No. 119*	1,016	1,016	1,170	1,014	1,170
Forest Conservation Law	2,037	2,044	2,295	2,033	2,301
Minor Offenses Law**	63,986	64,000	66,836	63,960	66,838
Election Law	8	8	9	8	9
Taxation Law	89	88	90	68	70
Others***	40,817	40,497	42,030	40,425	41,971
<b>Total</b>	<b>114,149</b>	<b>113,854</b>	<b>118,697</b>	<b>113,545</b>	<b>118,472</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL . . . . .</b>	<b><u>175,942</u></b>	<b><u>167,282</u></b>	<b><u>192,104</u></b>	<b><u>167,047</u></b>	<b><u>190,849</u></b>

\* USAMGIK Ordinance issued on November 11, 1946, defines activities connected with narcotic drugs.

\*\* Defines forty-five minor offenses not included in the criminal code and other laws.

\*\*\* Includes all other offenses of laws, decrees, ordinances, and regulations, not specified in the statistics.

Source: Bureau of Public Safety, op. cit., Annual Report: No. 4, pp. 158-175.

Republic of Korea, Ministry of Home Affairs, Bureau of Statistics, Taehaminkuk T'ongke Nyonkam, Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Korea: 1957 (Seoul, Korea: Bureau of Statistics, 1957), pp. 400-405. In Korean.

NUMBER OF JUVENILE CRIMES REPORTED, ARRESTS MADE, PERSONS ARRESTED,  
CASES CONVICTED, AND PERSONS CONVICTED, 1956

PART I. STATUTORY CRIMES

<u>Crime Classification</u>	<u>Crimes Reported</u>	<u>Arrests Made</u>	<u>Persons Arrested</u>	<u>Cases Convicted</u>	<u>Persons Convicted</u>
Murder	34	34	44	30	40
Attempted Murder	8	8	8	8	8
Infanticide	13	13	13	9	9
Manslaughter	18	18	26	18	26
Negligent Manslaughter	89	89	97	87	95
Assault & Battery	1,184	1,183	1,852	1,102	1,678
Negl. Assault & B.	85	85	87	84	86
Rape	15	15	20	15	20
Abortion	8	8	8	5	5
Kidnap and Abduction	2	2	2	2	2
Intimidation	14	16	24	16	24
Illegal Arrest	2	2	2	2	2
Desertion	10	10	9	10	9
Arson	10	10	13	10	13
Negligent Fire	108	108	121	102	115
Armed Robbery	32	32	53	30	50
Robbery	252	252	423	250	417
Attempted Robbery	5	5	15	5	15
Burglary	366	347	596	331	575
Larceny	3,532	3,599	4,906	3,466	4,825
Extortion	104	104	170	100	160
Fraud	82	82	98	79	95
Embezzlement	42	42	43	42	43
Trespass	233	233	246	229	240
Possess. of Stolen Goods	184	184	211	180	214
Wilful Destruction	36	36	58	35	56
Counterfeit	3	3	5	3	5
Forgery	35	36	39	31	34
Libel	2	2	2	2	2
Credit Offense	2	2	2	2	2
Narcotics Offense	9	9	10	9	10
Gambling	48	48	83	48	83
Morality & Decency	679	679	680	679	680
Public Nuisance	7	7	9	7	9
Obstructing Public Right	1	1	1	1	1

Continued to next page.

TABLE VIII, Continued.

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<u>Crime Classification</u>	<u>Crimes Reported</u>	<u>Arrests Made</u>	<u>Persons Arrested</u>	<u>Cases Convicted</u>	<u>Persons Convicted</u>
Obstructing Traffic	9	9	15	9	15
Explosives Offense	1	1	1	-	-
Escape	6	6	6	6	6
Harboring Criminal	1	1	1	1	1
Perjury	1	1	1	1	1
False Accusation	2	2	2	2	2
National Flag Offense	1	1	1	1	1
Bribery	3	3	3	3	3
Obstructing Duties	25	25	44	25	44
<b>Total</b>	<b>7,303</b>	<b>7,353</b>	<b>10,050</b>	<b>7,077</b>	<b>9,721</b>

**PART II. CRIMES OF SPECIAL LAWS**

<u>Laws</u>	<u>Crimes Reported</u>	<u>Arrests Made</u>	<u>Persons Arrested</u>	<u>Cases Convicted</u>	<u>Persons Convicted</u>
Military Code	2	2	2	2	2
Conscription Law	22	22	22	22	22
Ordinance No. 119	17	17	17	17	17
Forest Conservation Law	194	194	203	194	203
Minor Offenses Law	9,282	9,282	9,827	9,282	9,827
Others	1,949	1,934	1,996	1,908	1,988
<b>Total</b>	<b>11,466</b>	<b>11,451</b>	<b>12,067</b>	<b>11,425</b>	<b>12,059</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL . . . . .</b>	<b><u>18,769</u></b>	<b><u>18,804</u></b>	<b><u>22,117</u></b>	<b><u>18,502</u></b>	<b><u>21,780</u></b>

Source: Bureau of Public Safety, op. cit., Annual Report: No. 4,  
pp. 158-175.

TABLE IX

NUMBER OF ADULT CRIMES REPORTED,  
ARRESTS MADE, AND PERSONS ARRESTED  
1925 - 1956

<u>Year</u>	<u>Statutory Crimes</u>	<u>Special Law Offense</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Arrests Made</u>	<u>Persons Arrested</u>
1925	121,981	11,349	133,330	121,557	135,649
1935	145,097	54,623	199,720	188,170	206,214
1936	147,262	50,142	197,404	181,267	193,129
1937	153,028	43,693	196,721	175,320	184,645
1938	145,561	37,497	183,058	167,165	165,350
1939	143,578	24,336	167,914	144,802	141,124
1940	144,109	37,086	181,195	147,068	154,141
1941	124,877	39,908	164,785	132,195	142,145
1942	126,283	42,655	168,938	134,754	133,611
1943	137,543	41,451	178,994	138,400	130,263
1944	130,517	55,506	186,023	151,180	..
1945	..	..	14,466	9,827	12,282
1946	115,936	..	115,936	72,611	98,341
1947	75,874	28,455	104,329	81,226	115,032
1948	71,674	20,637	92,311	73,600	108,877
1953	55,638	62,233	117,871	..	..
1954	45,421	66,397	111,818	..	..
1955	57,711	86,069	143,780	..	..
1956	61,793	114,149	175,942	167,282	192,104

- Note:**
1. Figures up to 1940 are all Korea under Japanese occupation, while the after 1945 are for South Korea only.
  2. 1945 figures are from August to December excluding offenses against proclamatory ordinance.
  3. .. denote figures not available.

**Source:** Bank of Korea, Research Department, Kyongchae Nyonkam, Annual Economic Review: 1949 (Seoul, Korea: Bank of Korea, 1949), p. 243, Part IV. In Korean and English.

Bureau of Public Safety, op. cit., Annual Report: No. 4, pp. 158-175.



Although no data are available the number of crimes committed by military personnel is believed to be substantially high in Korea.

The sharp increase in the Korean crime rate is believed to be the result of social disintegration and the economic conditions following the division of country and the Korean war. Hundreds and thousands of families were split into pieces when Korea was divided into north and south. Then a mass movement of refugees took place before and during the Korean war. Vast destruction of the property and life in the war caused economic hardship and family disintegration. Displaced persons, orphans, disabled war veterans, and the unemployed have contributed to the increase of crimes.

Regardless of the cause the police are directly responsible for combating crime. But the police has its own problems. Probably the most crucial of all is the shortage of operational personnel available for police patrol duties. The patrol system employed by the Korean police is extremely inadequate to cover all the potential crime area. Due to the amount of various administrative duties given to the police, only approximately 54% of the strength are on operational assignments. And a very small portion of this number are on patrol duties at any given moment because the Korean police uses the box system in combination with a limited amount of foot patrolmen in the cities, and employs no patrol at all in the rural and remote areas. The only motorized patrol (in Seoul City) is exclusively used for traffic control.

Inadequate police communications and transportation facilities impair the mobility of the force. It is virtually impossible to expect

a high degree of police performance under such conditions.

The present police records system can hardly provide an accurate or substantial amount of service in detecting, investigating, and apprehending of criminals. Hence most investigation depends on interrogation of the suspected person and informer's tips.

The amount of the police crime prevention being done is very insignificant to what is needed today. And it requires more coordination of the agencies and institutions involved in the crime prevention program.

Traffic. Increasing traffic volume and its control is one of the major problems police have to deal with today, at least the enforcement aspect of the whole problem. As shown in Table X, page 76, the number of registered motor vehicles in 1957 is as much as four and a half times as it was in 1945. This figure does not include the number of military vehicles and those owned by the diplomatic missions stationed in Korea.

A total number of motorless vehicles such as bicycles, horse cart, was 173,927 in 1956. In the same year there were 58,647 licensed drivers including 144 female.<sup>13</sup>

Table XI, page 76 indicates that the number of automobile accidents in Korea during 1956 was 4,868 in which 1,796 persons died and 6,865 injured. It is interesting to note that 45.3% of the accidents were caused by the Korean armed forces.

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<sup>13</sup> Bureau of Public Safety, op. cit., Annual Report: No. 4, pp. 116-117.

TABLE I

76

NUMBER OF REGISTERED MOTOR VEHICLES  
1945 - 1957

<u>Year</u>	<u>Cars</u>	<u>Trucks</u>	<u>Buses</u>	<u>Other</u>	<u>Total</u>
1945	1,311	3,309	1,156	1,220	6,996
1946	1,434	5,737	766	1,224	9,106
1947	2,323	8,285	684	1,711	13,003
1948	3,012	9,236	723	1,737	14,708
1949	3,880	9,675	1,002	1,794	16,351
1951	1,745	5,684	736	490	8,665
1952	2,449	6,845	1,470	779	11,543
1953	3,661	6,830	2,170	846	13,507
1954	5,017	7,466	2,542	925	15,950
1955	6,556	8,103	2,953	744	18,356
1956	8,428	12,740	3,312	853	25,333
1957	9,743	13,679	3,847	817	28,086

Source: Bank of Korea, Research Department, Kyongchae Nyonkam, Annual Economic Review: 1958 (Seoul, Korea: Bank of Korea, 1958), p. 206, Part III. In Korean.

TABLE XI

NUMBER OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES  
1956

<u>Vehicles Classified Under</u>	<u>Number of Accidents</u>	<u>Per Cent</u>	<u>Casualties</u>	
			<u>Died</u>	<u>Injured</u>
Government	147	3.0	64	187
Privately owned	310	6.3	96	379
Commercial use	1,865	38.3	637	2,974
United Nations Forces	285	5.8	86	216
ROK Armed Forces	2,207	45.3	896	3,073
National Police	54	1.3	17	36
Total	4,868	100.0	1,796	6,865

Source: Bureau of Public Safety, op. cit., Annual Report: No. 4, pp. 112-113.

Table XII below illustrates that 61.8% of accident were the driver's fault, and again the Korean armed forces dominate the figures. As to the type of accident, the pedestrian accident occupies a major portion which totals 3,016(60.7%).<sup>14</sup>

TABLE XII  
MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS BY CAUSATION  
1956

<u>Vehicles Classified Under</u>	<u>Defective Vehicle</u>	<u>Fault of Drivers</u>	<u>Fault of Pedestrians</u>	<u>Total</u>
Government	29	89	83	201
Privately owned	25	144	141	310
Commercial use	258	1,116	491	1,865
United Nations Forces	13	215	57	285
ROK Armed Forces	294	1,446	467	2,207
<b>Total</b>	<b>619 (2.8%)</b>	<b>3,010 (61.8%)</b>	<b>1,239 (25.4%)</b>	<b>4,868</b>

Source: Bureau of Public Safety, op. cit., Annual Report: No. 4, pp. 108-111.

In general, none of three important areas of traffic control (i.e. enforcement, engineering and education) is adequately planned or efficiently administered.

Enforcement is probably the most emphasized area of all but has shown less effectiveness. There are 909 police officers trained

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<sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 108.

specially for traffic duties, and 305 of them are assigned to Seoul where 68 traffic control points are located.<sup>15</sup>

Traffic enforcement is almost exclusively carried out by control points installed at intersections and other key traffic points. Very few patrol cars are used for traffic control. Only a few intersections are equipped with manually operated traffic signals.

The violation ticket system is in use, however, it has not shown significant results. It is commonly understood among the drivers that tickets can be fixed by cash payment to the officers before they are written. The low pay and inadequate supervision are major factors making this system ineffective.

The joint traffic patrol composed of the police, military police of Korean and United Nations forces enforces the traffic law against military personnel.

Engineering is needed badly but neglected. Streets and highways in Korea were mostly built early in the century and are not designed to accomodate today's traffic. The majority of them are narrow gravel roads. Many of them need to be redesigned for the increased volumn and speed of today's traffic. Traffic signs and signal devices are inadequate and requires better maintenance.

Especially in congested cities the engineering is one of urgently needed to solve traffic problem.

Education is considered the most important of three methods of traffic control and great efforts are made in this area, however, it is

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<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 116.

yet far from successful. The police are alone responsible for traffic education. All programs are directed under the Traffic Safety Association operated by the Traffic Section of the National Police.

At present most of the programs are directed toward the general public rather than aimed for specific groups such as the drivers who are responsible of 61.8% of the accident. No emphasis is made for re-educating the drivers. As statistics indicate the quality of military and commercial vehicle drivers are low. Re-education of these groups should contribute a great deal toward the reduction of accident rate. The violator's school similar to that conducted in the United States would be extremely valuable.

Traffic education in Korea lacks long range programs. Neither traffic safety classes nor driving taught in the school system. As the young people of today will be the drivers of the future(many in the armed forces), it is very important to give them a basic traffic education while they are in school. Therefore a carefully designed long range safety education program is a must in this area, and it would undoubtedly lower the accident rate in long run.

## CHAPTER IV

## OUTLINES OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENT

The preceding two chapters have presented a general view of the Korean police system and provided some of the basic data needed to understand its problems. Each problem has its causations and many of them are related to one another. ;

The author believes solutions to the problems require a new ideology and the use of modern techniques. Koreans must learn that democracy is not something which they can take for granted. They must strive hard to gain it. Koreans must also realize that their science and technology trails far behind that of many other nations in the world. They must study hard to catch up. And they must intelligently use what others provided to them.

The author believes the Korean police system in the forthcoming decade or two will not improve greatly. As there are a number of factors which contribute to the development of the police system, there is a limit to the extent which the police alone can make improvements. It is extremely difficult for the police to achieve drastic improvements when surrounding conditions work against them.

Today Korea is a divided country and its unification is still an unsolved question of international politics. Korea suffered a costly war, after four years of World War II and only two years of her independence. South Korea is over-populated because 2,000,000 refugees have fled from the Communist North since 1945. South Korea has the second largest army in the free world, numbering over 700,000

men. These are only a few of the factors which directly affects the development of the police system in Korea.

Above all the police are generally considered to be the one strongly cohesive force in Korean political life, and in its reform it cannot be weakened too rapidly. Reforms can be achieved only by hard, slow, careful, intelligent effort.

In the immediate future the technical development of the Korean police system will likely surpass its philosophical development.

The author's attempt in this final chapter is to analyze critical areas of the future development and to present constructive opinions and suggestions immensely important to the progress of the Korean police system.

## I. PHILOSOPHICAL DEVELOPMENT

The Powers of Police. The police power is an authority given to the state as a portion of the sovereignty of the nation. The state has this authority whether it is a democratic society or a totalitarian state. However, a difference is seen in its use. In a totalitarian state the power is exercised for the benefit of the ruler rather than for the people. In a democratic society the police authority is used in order to safeguard individual rights and freedom, and the police is an organization of democratic authority belonging to the people.

It is safe to say that the present government of Korea is exercising a relatively rigid police control over the populace for many reasons. Under this extreme centralization the police officials comprise a large segment of the governmental bureaucracy. The police



control influences many parts of the citizen's daily life beyond the need for maintaining peace and order. The police which is largely manipulated by politics and a strong executive branch of the government has influences over various profit making commercial and industrial enterprises through its licensing and inspection powers. It has authority over a number of registrations and permits which restrict movements and activities of the citizen.

The government of the Republic of Korea is founded upon democratic principles at its inauguration in 1948. Prior to this, during the United States military occupation, reformers of civil and military administration attempted to install a democratic police system in South Korea. One of the important changes in the police power was the transfer of many licensing functions away from the police and the abolition of other licensing requirements.<sup>1</sup>

Another change was the establishment of the National Police Board to initiate major policy and procedures in matters affecting the police and approve appointments and dismissals of police officials.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>U. S. Army Forces in Korea(USAFIK), South Korean Interim Government Activities, No. 26 (Seoul, Korea: USAFIK, November, 1947), p. 205.

Note: The police retained the power to issue licenses only in the following cases: (1) permit to wear arms; (2) to organize detective agencies; (3) to operate motor vehicles; (4) pawn shop; (5) seal engraving; and (6) permit to engage in shipping.

<sup>2</sup>U. S. Army Forces in Korea, South Korean Interim Government Activities, No. 20 (Seoul, Korea: USAFIK, May, 1947), p. 23.

Note: The Board was directly responsible to the Military Governor and included, in addition to the Civil Administrator as chairman, the governors of Kyonggi-do and Chungchong-namdo, the mayor of Seoul, the directors of Korean Civil Service, Department of Justice, Department of Transportation, Department of Police, the deputy director, and chief of Uniform Bureau of Department of Police.

Unfortunately these measures and organization did not survive for long as they were unable to function satisfactorily in the subsequent political situation. Many of the licensing functions which had been transferred to other governmental agencies were gradually restored to the police since 1948. And today the police are loaded with non-police duties and administrative functions.

There is no doubt this tremendous administrative burden vested in the police inevitably creates a great obstacle in the development of the Korean police system. However, there are some justifications as to why so many administrative functions which would normally be carried out by other governmental agencies are given to the police. The reasons that resulted this are: (1) lack of experience in democratic public administration, (2) unreadiness of the public to participate in democracy, (3) unstable domestic conditions following World War II and Korean War, and (4) shortage of well-trained competent government civil service employees.

These factors which directly contributed to a concentration of police powers in Korea are not likely to change markedly in the immediate future. It takes painstaking effort, testing, and time to improve them.

When it may be, it is a question, however, some day the powers of police must be reduced to a minimum degree required to control lawlessness and to protect life and property of the citizen. All non-police functions should be exercised by non-police representatives of the particular ministry having responsibility for such matters, and wherever proper should be decentralized to local public entities.

As to an appropriate control organization, the author believes that there should be created directly under the authority of the cabinet a Public Safety Commission composed of five members who have not been career officials, either in the police or the civil service. Such commission should be appointed by the President, with the consent of the National Assembly, and should hold office for a fixed term of years.

Regardless of the type of control, the administrators should bear in their mind that police power in the preservation of law and order in a democratic society does not attain its maximum strength through oppressive controls imposed upon the people from above, but rather does it find infinitely greater strength in its relationship as a servant of, and answerable directly to, the people. Thereby, and thereby alone, may it encourage respect for the people's laws through confidence and paternalistic pride in the police as the law enforcement agency of the people themselves.

Education of Personnel. The most important is the education of personnel because both the success of the individual policeman and that of the department depends on the proper foundation each member gets in training.

Today nearly all police service, even of the simplest kind, requires special knowledge if it is to be performed well. It requires not only technical know-how to provide commendable law enforcement services to the public but also a high degree of philosophical refinement in each individual policeman. And both are indispensable elements in modern police administration. Thus the future of the Korean National

Police will largely be dependent upon the quality of the training provided for its personnel.

The author's view on each type of training needed by a police officer -- pre-service, basic, in-service, technical, supervisory and self-training -- will be discussed below.

Unfortunately there is not a single university in Korea today that offers subjects for students who intend to enter police service although Korea has more than 42 public and private universities and colleges(enrollment approximately 34,000 in 1955) of which 36 are degree granting institutions.<sup>3</sup>

It will be highly desirable in the future if some of the higher institutions provide courses in criminology and related social sciences, in police and public safety administration, in criminal investigation and personal identification, in criminal psychology, in traffic administration, and juvenile crime control. Since most of the recruits are selected from high school graduates, this particular type of pre-service training can be designed for those who wish to become supervisory personnel in the future. Even better would be the establishment of the four-year bachelor's degree program at Seoul National University under joint sponsorship with the National Police College. And it would improve the ability of the police service to recruit competent young men for prospective top-ranking and supervisory positions.

Basic training programs for police cadets(candidates for lieutenant) and recruits(candidates for policeman) should be reorganized so as to provide a more substantial foundation in police work.

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<sup>3</sup>Republic of Korea Office of Public Information, op. cit., pp. 307-308.

The training period is relatively short at present(see Table VI, page 63) and should be extended to the length which can provide adequate training to those selected to take positions in the future. Training should be at least two years for police cadets and eight to twelve months for recruits. Ideally there should be an entirely new police cadet's training program equivalent to that of the military academy's four-year cadet program with a bachelor of science degree. It should be designed to train able leaders for the police service.

The basic training program should emphasize the more practical and technical training which is and will be needed in the Korean police, especially in connection with the modernization of the force. It should also cover the theoretical aspects of the many useful subjects in police administration and science and teach the trainees how to apply them later at their work.

Heavy emphasis should be made in the Part III curricula(see Table VI, page 63). And subjects such as public relations, police patrol, record administration, report writing, typing, traffic control, crowd control, geography, interrogation and interviewing, public speaking, photography, and driving should be included in the basic training program.

Although it is a very important part of the entire police training, on-the-job training should not be over-emphasized because it alone cannot provide the adequate working knowledge a policeman needs to carry out his duties. Many subjects in the police training require on-the-job experiences plus formal training, and there should be a close relationship between training institution and the field in order

to obtain a successful result in the police training. In this respect re-training of supervisory personnel is extremely important, and they must not only be educated adequately in various subjects but also promote their ability to impart this knowledge to others.

A considerable amount of re-training is conducted in Korea especially since the Korean war. However, there are many difficulties involved(see page 62). As one solution to this problem, groups of traveling short-courses equipped with proper training materials and aids should be organized in addition to the regular re-training program of the National Police College. Another suggestion is to decentralize some portion of the present training program on a regional basis to handle re-training and continuation training. There are advantages in centralization; however, it must be evaluated carefully under the conditions prevailing at present.

Roll call training is being conducted in the Korean police today; however, its effectiveness is doubtful. It lacks uniformity, and quality is believed to be low. There is no unit specifically assigned to promote this type of training in the organization. There should be a responsible section or special committee established in the national headquarters to conduct research in in-service training, prepare teaching materials, and most of all to coordinate fully with the National Police College and personnel officer in all phases of police training.

Publication of a training bulletin(perhaps weekly at the start then increased to twice a week) will be extremely valuable in supplementing the instructions given at the roll call training.

Technical training is extremely important for Korean police especially in connection with the future advancement of the force in many area of police operations such as communication, scientific identification service, records operation, purchases and supply, property management and maintenance, etc. Employment of civilian personnel and training them in these technical service fields will release uniformed personnel from such duties and at the same time reduce operating costs.

In addition to regular in-service training, special technical and supervisory training are needed in the police service. The nature of the many duties assigned to Korean police today requires extensive training in special subjects such as intelligence and counter-intelligence operation; subversive and espionage activities; civil defense and disaster control, forest conservation, and sanitation.

It is increasingly important for the Korean police to train its officers in supervisory and commanding ranks because they are the core of the force which administers the organization. And they all need training in supervisory principles as the instinct for good leadership must be developed by both training and experience. These men need to be the first to be educated in every aspect of the philosophical and technical developments in police administration and allied subjects.

Consequently the education of supervisory and technical personnel at the various police training institutions in the United States and some other countries should be planned carefully and carried out more extensively than it has been so far. Under the ICA(International

Cooperation Administration) technical assistance program, an increasing number of police officer are given opportunities to study and observe police systems in the United States(training periods range from three to twelve months). Most of the training program are being arranged through the International Association of Chiefs of Police which further assigns trainees to various police organizations, academies, and universities.

The author strongly believes this program as a whole needs reappraisal by all concerned. A considerable amount of the entire training period is being devoted to what is known as "orientation courses" after trainees arrive in United States. Ideally they should be fully prepared to take up special police subjects as soon as they arrive in the U.S. or any other country. For this purpose the National Police College should establish preparatory training courses in cooperation with Korean universities and the ICA mission in Korea for those will study abroad. Trainees should be selected through competitive examination and given an intensive training in language, government system, police system, social life, and etiquette of the country they going to study.

Trainees should be grouped(3 to 5 men) under a senior officer and at least one specific research project should be assigned to the group in addition to general study and observation while they are in abroad. This way trainees can make some constructive recommendations in a specific area of police work at the time of their return.

After all no police officer ever learns all there is to be learned about police work. He must continually devote his time in



self-training. And the Korean National Police should play a positive role in this by continually encouraging its men to improve themselves in every way possible.

Research for Betterment. The Korean police, trailing behind many other countries in its technical and philosophical developments, must quickly adopt them so as to be able to do its job better. To fulfill this objective there is no alternative to the application of scientific management in the police administration.

Successful administration depends to a large extent upon comprehensive planning, which is a necessary element and fundamental function of administration. Every phase of police operation and administration requires planning in varying degrees depending on the objective and its complexity. Especially a large organization like the Korean National Police with many headquarters, divisions, and sub-division in various levels of organization performing a multitude of activities, requires exhaustive and minute planning to effectively, efficiently and economically perform the police services.

The accomplishments of the Los Angeles Police Department's Planning and Research Division in recent years has clearly demonstrated the potentiality of such applications in modern police administration.<sup>4</sup>

The author believes the establishment of a planning and research division comparable to that of the Los Angeles Police Department is

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<sup>4</sup>Richard Simon, "The Planning and Research Division of the Los Angeles Police Department," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science, Vol. 44, No. 3, September-October, 1953, pp. 365-373.

an imperatively needed by the Korean National Police to facilitate its development.

At the present time there is a unit in the General Affairs Section of the Administration Division, charged with responsibility of planning for the entire organization. This unit not only formulates plans but also engages in direct management thereby failing to provide strict staff service to the commanding personnel.

According to O. W. Wilson, "the duties of a planning unit may be best described by saying that it performs planning duties that would be performed by chief if he had sufficient time." He further lists the duties of the planning officer or unit as follows:<sup>5</sup>

To review and analyze periodically all department plans (including operational plans) in order to assure that they are suitably recorded and up-to-date.

To modernize and improve plans that are department-wide in scope.

To suggest, either directly to the heads of operating divisions or to the chief, the modernization and improvement of operational plans.

To lend such assistance to the operating divisions in the preparation and improvement of their plans as they may desire.

To obtain assistance from operating personnel, either directly or through the chief, in the preparation or improvement of plans.

To analyze the operation of plans to ascertain their suitability; when a new plan is placed in operation, to discuss its weaknesses with operating personnel and to effect needed improvements in it.

Therefore the planning unit should not engage in direct management of the organization in order to best perform its duties objectively.

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<sup>5</sup>O. W. Wilson, Police Planning (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1952), p. 8.

It is author's opinion that the present planning unit should be completely reorganized into a section under the direct control of the Director of the Bureau of Public Safety. And it should be given full authority in over-all planning with unlimited free access to all data needed for the formulation of planning. Such an independent planning unit placed under the director can provide not only an exhaustive staff services to executive personnel but also create a means of coordination between divisions which are presently over-compartmented.

The reorganization of the planning and research unit is an indispensable and decisive step of the Korean National Police toward improved police services, more efficient and economical operation, effective administration, and the professionalization of the police service.

The Law and Police. The police as an integrated part of the judicial process, are the machinery of law enforcement, and in this role they are also bound by scores of laws which define the legal powers of the police.

In Korea the restrictions are spelled out in three laws: the Constitution, the criminal code, and the code of criminal procedure.

Article nine of the Constitution of Korea guarantees that no citizen shall be arrested, detained, searched, tried, punished or subjected to compulsory labor except as provided by law. The same article further provides that, except in case of flagrante delicto or where there is danger of escape or that evidence may be destroyed, a warrant shall be obtained prior to arrest, detention or search.

The new Criminal Code -- effective since October 3, 1953 -- includes a number of provisions that prohibit abusive acts of public officials including police officers. Articles are: impersonation of public official(Article 118), abandonment of official duties(Article 122), obstruction of civil rights by public official(Article 123), illegal arrest and detention(Article 124), use of force and cruelty by an official on criminal suspects(Article 125), premature publication by an official in charge of an investigation of facts of suspected crime(Article 126), revealing of an official secret(Article 127), obstruction of suffrage by a public official(Article 128), receiving, offering, arranging, promising or transporting a bribe(Articles 129-133), and obstruction by a police officer of the public prosecutor's function of protecting human rights(Article 139).

Details of laws of arrest and search and seizure are given in the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to provisions in the code, an arrest for offenses in the presence(flagrante delicto) may be made with or without a warrant: a public prosecutor, or a police officer, or a citizen may arrest without a warrant if he actually sees an offense committed or if he has reasonable grounds for believing the person has just committed the offense(Articles 211-212). A person suspected of having committed a crime may be summoned before (a) a judicial police official<sup>6</sup> (b) a public prosecutor or (c) before the court directly

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<sup>6</sup>Article 196, Korean Code of Criminal Procedure: (Judicial Police Officials) (1) Investigators, police administrative officials, police superintendent, police captains or police lieutenants shall investigate crimes as judicial police officials under instructions of a public prosecutor.

(2) Police sergeants or policemen shall assist in the investigation of crimes as judicial police assistants under the instruction of a public prosecutor or judicial police official.

(Article 200). If the judicial police official or the public prosecutor have reason to believe that a summoned suspect has committed a crime he may obtain a warrant for his arrest and detention (Article 201).

Judicial police officials may detain a suspect for 10 days after which time the suspect must be released or turned over to the public prosecutor (Article 202). The prosecutor must initiate public action within 10 days (Article 203) -- a renewal period of 10 days for course may be granted (Article 205) -- or release the suspect. When there are sufficient grounds to suspect the commission of an offense punishable by death penalty or penal servitude or imprisonment for an indeterminate period or for three years or more, and if, in addition, because of great urgency, a warrant of arrest cannot be obtained beforehand from a judge, then a public prosecutor or judicial police official may, upon statement of reasons therefor, apprehend the suspect (Article 206).

When an official deems it necessary to detain a suspect after an urgent arrest, he must obtain the issuance of warrant of arrest within 48 hours counting from the time of the arrest in City or Gun (see page 41, footnote) in which there is judge of a district court or in 5 days if in area where there is no judge of a district court (Article 207).

A public prosecutor or judicial police official, if necessary for the investigation of an offense, may seize or search according to the warrant of search and seizure issued by a judge of a district court (Article 215). Search and seizure without warrant may be made at the scene of arrest (including urgent arrest), and on abandoned articles (Articles 217-218).

Thus the Korean police are vested with a substantial amount of

legal authority in arrest, search and seizure. However, there is an inherent danger of abuse or misuse when the police are given such authority as 10 day detention period, and 48 hours urgent arrest and urgent search and seizure. It is hoped that a future revision of the code will reexamine these provisions and consider the questions in relation to civil rights.

For the days to come, not only criminal legislation but also intelligent application of criminal law must develop from a clear understanding of two basic elements of criminal law, crime and punishment, in the light of a sound democratic philosophy. And we must realize the higher value of human dignity in the construction of legal machinery.

## II. TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT

Centralized Police Records System. Without an accurate and complete records system no organization can function properly. Especially in police work it is impossible to coordinate fully large masses of facts unless data are recorded in a logical and systematic manner. A centralized records system is considered one of the indispensable facilities in a modern police force because most of the information which enable a police department to find the offenders of the crimes would be useless if not integrated by a system of records.

There is a trend in the modern administration to centralize the records along with progress of the communications media because it provide better supervision and control of the organization.

The author believes that an establishment of the central police

records system for the Korean National Police is one of the most urgently needed tasks to be undertaken in the immediate future. With good maintenance and sound management it will serve the organization in enormous ways and facilitate development of the police administration.

Presented below is an outline of a suggested organization, development and installation for a possible central records system in Korea.

## I. Organization

### A. General

1. The Records Division shall be established in the Headquarters of Bureau of Public Safety at the same level of other divisions under the supervision of an officer with a rank equivalent to other division commanders.

2. The Records Division similar to that of the national headquarters shall be established in each headquarters of the Provincial Bureaus.

3. The Records Section shall be established in all 1st and 2nd class stations, and the section chiefs shall not be outranked by officers of the other sections.

### B. Division

1. Divisions shall be consisted of four sections: Control and Management, Criminal Records, Civil Records, and Fingerprints Section.

2. The Control and Management Section shall be responsible for receiving, classifying, indexing, and controlling the records, as well as planning and

research concerning the records operation.

3. The Criminal Records Section shall include the following records: (1) Master Name Index, (2) Case Records, (3) Biographic Information Jacket File, (4) Arrest and Disposition Records, (5) Modus Operandi File, (6) Stolen Property File, (7) Criminal Photograph File, and (8) Radio Log.

4. The Civil Records Section shall maintain (1) Motor Vehicle Registration, (2) Driver's License Records, (3) Traffic Violations Records, (4) Weapons Registration, (5) Security Clearance Records, and (6) other necessary civil records.

5. The Fingerprints Section shall include (1) Criminal Fingerprints File, (2) Civil Fingerprints File, (3) Criminal History File, and (4) Latent Fingerprints File.

#### C. Section

1. The Records Section shall maintain (1) Case Records, (2) Name Index, (3) Arrest and Disposition Records, (4) Modus Operandi File, (5) Criminal History File, (6) Photograph File, (7) Stolen Property File, (8) Security Clearance Records, (9) Motor Vehicle Registration, (10) Driver's Records, (11) Weapons Registration, and (12) Radio Log.

### II. Development and Installation

#### A. Phase I



1. Survey and estimates shall be made on the prospective system and decisions made for its installation.

2. Commanders of the Records Division for the national headquarters shall be appointed.

3. Necessary personnel shall be assigned to each division and trained for their assignments.

#### B. Phase II

1. Filing system shall be developed to meet particular domestic needs.

2. Forms shall be analyzed, designed and printed.

3. Procedures manual and instructions shall be prepared for the entire system.

#### C. Phase III

1. The records staff shall be selected for the entire organization and given an adequate training as to procedure, installation, and operation of the system.

2. Chiefs of the Records Section shall be appointed and personnel be assigned.

3. Any departmental reorganization shall be made effective.

#### D. Phase IV

1. Adequate office space shall be allocated for records installation and the layout be arranged.

2. Communications, files, typewriters and other

necessary equipment shall be installed.

3. The entire police personnel shall be trained in records procedures and in the use of the records system.

#### E. Phase V

1. Orders and instruction shall be issued to the entire forces as to the working of the new system.

The organization suggested above is a centralized-duplicate records system as each provincial bureau will also maintain all the records being kept at the national headquarters. This duplication will be necessary in Korea until such time as the communications and transportation system can render all the needed services for effective and efficient records operation throughout the entire levels of organization. However, it is recommended that this duplication be eliminated as soon as the conditions will permit.

No doubt that numerous difficulties lie ahead in the planning, installation and operation of the system. It requires a tremendous amount of education and years of intelligent effort to accomplish this project.

High ranking officers in the organization must be convinced of the importance of new system and its ultimate value to the Korean National Police. Without a strong support of top-ranking personnel the task will be impossible one.

A cohesive and determined leadership will be required to smooth out many anticipated oppositions and inter-departmental disputes which will arise in the phases of reorganization and transition.

Sufficient amount of budget must be approved for planning and

installation of the system, and substantial funds be allocated thereafter for the operation and maintenance.

Selection of personnel for this particular task must be made with extreme care for it will greatly affect the success of system. The records personnel should be selected on the basis of clerical ability with the exception of persons assigned to jobs that require the exercise of judgment based on police experience.

It is also advisable that as many civilian personnel as possible to be used at the headquarters and provincial divisions.

Many other details and changes will be required during the planning stage to make the new system effective and efficient. The new system will require drastic innovations in the police procedure law which defines many office records work. An entirely new methods of classifying crimes and collection of such statistics should be developed so as to meet needs of today's police administration and the proposed records system. More progressive and simplified report writing system should be adopted by using only the Korean alphabet (Koreans still use many Chinese characters) and typewriters instead of the hand writing. A careful study should be conducted on office equipment and machines available in the world market and their suitability for Korean use. Various records and filing system being used in other countries should be studied and analyzed for possible adoption to the Korean records system.

As a major component of the police records originates at lower levels of the organization, training of the line personnel on records procedures and report writing will be an especially important part of

the entire program. All personnel must be fully educated and clearly orientated in new system before it will become effective.

These are the only few of the problems, and there is no doubt that many more will arise in the process of development. It may take years of preparation before even a centralized records system is to be considered by the top-ranking official. But the author strongly believes that the Korean National Police will never be able to attain a high degree of police performance or can serve the public adequately without having its records system modernized.

Mechanization and Applied Science in Police Work. Despite the remarkable scientific achievements throughout the world, their application in the police work in Korea has been suprisingly slow.

At present the United States has the most impressive applications in the world and new and more ingeneous features are added with each passing year. There is no doubt that in the past two decades American police have attained revolutionary development through the adoption of modern communication media, modes of transportation, laboratory science and investigative aids, traffic control devices, and other electronic and mechanical devices.

In author's conviction the application of applied science and the mechanization of the force are one of challenging areas of future development in the Korean National Police.

Communications. Present telephone and radio facilities should be radically improved by adopting more modern equipment and methods with increased number of dial circuits especially for the horizontal communi-

cations. The radio system should be greatly expanded in the cities and remote areas. Each sub-station and box should be equipped with radio to enable them to communicate with any district stations in the area and headquarters. Stations located in remote areas should be equipped with at least one channel of radio communication open to the district station and other stations in the vicinity. In the cities where patrols are used, some means of direct communication between patrolling officers and the station should be installed. In the case of motor patrol, cars should be equipped with two-way or three-way radio systems.

Installation of teletype system linking each headquarters and all 1st and 2nd class stations is extremely important for it would provide means of direct and simultaneous communications to all such stations from the national headquarters.

Also improvement in the field communications equipment such as portable transmitter-and-receiver, public addressing system, and other signal devices will be valuable in various types of police operations.

Installation of modern office inter-communication systems in each headquarters building and many of larger stations will tremendously increase administrative efficiency.

There should be a great improvement made in the public-police communication system to provide the public with readily available means of contacting police in emergencies. Installation of an emergency telephone and signal system in the cities is a great necessity at present time. Police should also encourage the Ministry of Communication (all communication facility is a government monopoly in Korea) to install more public telephone throughout the country.

**Motorization.** Motorization of men and equipment will be a key factor in improving the patrol method for the Korean National Police because it provides greater mobility and possibility of an extended coverage of the patrol territory. An enthusiastic effort should be made toward drastic increase of police vehicles (for present figures see page 65) of various types.

Every lower police office should be equipped with at least one motor vehicle with radio and other police emergency equipment. In author's opinion, the most suitable type of vehicle for general patrol and all-purpose uses for the Korean National Police will be the "Jeep" station wagon with four-wheel drive transmission.

Along with the addition of the police vehicles maintenance and repair facilities also should be improved. And it will be highly desirable to train every policeman how to drive.

**Laboratory science.** Immensely important in improving criminal investigation methods is the adoption of advanced laboratory science and its practical use by all members of the force in the collection and preservation of physical evidence. The conventional concept of depending on the detective's memory and judgment should be replaced by scientific inquiry and reconstruction of the facts in criminal investigation.

Facilities of the crime laboratory at the national headquarters should be greatly improved. Each provincial headquarters should be equipped and manned chiefly to meet the urgencies of the ordinary routine work of the detective, with facilities for making preliminary analysis, collection and preservation of the evidence. Such provincial laboratories should at least include facilities for fingerprint develop-

ment, firearms identification, document examination, and complete photographic work. Also the laboratory should possess at least several mobile laboratory units equipped with photographic equipment, fingerprint kits, blood testing kits, casting kits, tools, and other necessary equipment for the collection and preservation of physical evidence left at the scene of a crime. Eventually all 1st and 2nd class stations should be equipped with at least one mobile laboratory unit and complete photographic facilities. Every police office should have fingerprint kit and camera.

Another important scientific application needed in criminal investigation is the lie detection method through use of polygraph and the use of applied psychology in criminal interrogation.

The above mentioned are the minimum facilities needed to improve police work in criminal investigation in Korea. However, the facilities alone cannot do the work, and there should be tremendous amount of time and effort devoted to train the personnel in scientific criminal investigation.

Other electronic and mechanical devices. Other than described in the above various electronic equipment and devices are extremely valuable in modern police work. Improvement of electronic traffic control devices in Korea is urgently needed to meet the ever increasing traffic problem especially in the cities and major routes throughout country.

Various types of alarm system(including fire alarms) are another important electronic application needed in order to improve police work in Korea. Installation of the protective alarm system in larger

cities will be extremely valuable.

Other office machines such as electric-typewriter, duplicating equipment, punch-card sorting and tabulating equipment will be definitely needed in the days to come.

Police Patrol. No police administrators in western democratic countries would disagree with the statement that patrol force is the nucleus of the police department. However, it is most unfortunate fact that this is not the situation in Korea today.

Despite of the tremendous necessity the patrol service is probably one of the most neglected functions of all in the Korean police system. The Korean National Police must undergo an extensive reorganization of its patrol service so as to perform the primary duties of the police force effectively and efficiently.

Some of the major contributing factors which in long past period made the patrol function obsolete in the Korean police force are: (1) the use of the police as colonial administrative agent by Japanese rather than for law enforcement objectives, (2) over-specialization of detective function and secret police, (3) intensive use of sub-station and box system, and (4) inadequate communications and transportation facilities.

The factors mentioned in the above have continuously remained within the new Korean police since Japanese occupation ended in 1945, and are still in existence today in varying degree. As the author repeatedly points out in this thesis, the Korean police today has more auxiliary administrative duties than ever before in addition to the routine police work which is rapidly increasing in recent years.



There are no official statistics on the detective force, however, it is believed that the number of detective exceeds that of the uniformed officers on patrol at any given time because only limited patrol is in effective in the cities while no patrol is done in the rural areas.

It is impossible to build an effective patrol service in the Korean police system unless the obstructive factors be improved. Discussed in the following is an outline of future development of the patrol service which should be concurrently carried out in conjunction with improvement of many other areas that the author has already described in this chapter.

Development of an effective patrol service in Korea involves three fundamental factors: (1) an understanding of the importance of police patrol and recognizing the problems of patrol, (2) training of personnel and proper instruction in the duties and techniques, and (3) application of best suited patrol methods, communications, and mode of transportation.

Most of all the imperative need of the effective and efficient patrol service should be recognized by the top-ranking personnel, and various problems involved in this function must be understood by them. At the same time these problems should be studied, analyzed and practical solutions formulated through the scientific approach.

There should be deep understanding by the personnel of entire organization in the objectives of democratic policing which must provide the public with a sense of "protection and security" by intensive and efficient patrol service rather than of "being watched" by an inconspicuous detective force. The modern concept of the police patrol,

preventive nature by repressing crime instead of suppressing it, should become the objective of the patrol service in Korea.

Reorganization of the detective function will be necessary in the course of improvement and expansion of the patrol function and there should be far closer coordination between uniform and detective force than it exist today.

Zoning of the patrol districts based upon scientific data such as population, crime rate, geography, and special conditions, is one of the requirements in the modern police patrol. The author firmly believes that the present box system in the cities can be revolutionarily improved by rezoning, and adoption of modern communications and transportation facilities in the patrol service. With improved communications and transportation several of the present box districts can be combined into one sub-patrol district of which three or four of will form a patrol precinct district.

Patrol service in Korea will never be able to perform its duties effectively without substantial amount of foot beat patrol because of the geographic pattern of the dwellings and building especially in cities. There are many small alleys and side roads which do not permit direct access by motor vehicles. For this reason it will be most desirable to use the combination of foot and motor patrol. In either case one-man for the day duty and two-men for the night patrol should be used.

As to the appropriate methods of patrol, the "flexible" team policing should be adopted in place of the present fixed beats system. In the cities a patrol team should consists of five(day shift) to eight

or ten(night shift) men with a sergeant in charge. With a police car fitted with radio system it can cover a wider area, and at the same time serves as a mobile police box.

All such patrol teams should be operated under the direction of a patrol commander in the district station where the communications system is linked with the city headquarters and the provincial headquarters.

In the smaller cities and rural areas where fewer patrol activities are required the smaller number of patrol teams should be employed under the direct command of the 1st or 2nd class station.

Above all the development of the patrol force in Korea can never achieve high esteem without improving the quality of the supervisory personnel -- especially that of the patrol sergeant because the success or failure of the patrol force is practically on his qualities of leadership and performance.

The faster the Korean National Police can build up effective and efficient patrol force, the sooner modern policing can be provided to the citizen, and the police become closer to the people.

Human Relations. The problem of human relations began with the history of mankind and it will continue to exist so long as human beings live. A casual look at the world in almost any period of history will disclose tragic results of poor human relations.

The human relations problem in the police force encompasses two areas: they are the internal relationship between police officers themselves, and the external relationships between the police and the

public known as "police public relations." Both areas are extremely important to the success of department and are not separable from one another as they are closely interrelated each other.

As the complexity of organized society increases the role of human relations become more important than ever. Today the Korean police system imperatively needs wholesome and healthy human relations within and without its organization in order to become a dedicated body of public servants in the democratic process.

Unfortunately, the Korean National Police is far from the point at which the public will accept them as a professional body of men and women operating by democratic means within the framework of a free society, and dedicated both to the security of the nation and to the preservation of the rights of every individual.

In a democratic society, the police need the support of the people more than anything else, and support is much more than just half-hearted approval. The Korean National Police must break through the wall of apathy, of indifference, with which they are faced today.

And if they are going to hope for success in that direction they must stand apart and observe themselves objectively and must admit they are wrong in some of their attitudes and traditional practices, and they must seek frank criticism from people. They must get rid of any men in the profession who will not or cannot do a good police job. They must demonstrate that they are free from partisan politics. They must end graft and brutality. They must show the public they are constantly striving for the betterment. And above all they must sincerely pledge themselves to the democratic principle as

servant of, not as "ruler" of the public.

The author is firmly convinced that a proper concept of police service can never be conceived without a proper attitude. If the attitude of the police is consistently wholesome, considerate and constructive -- from the chief director down to the policeman on the beat -- if arbitrary measures in handling the public are minimized, if positive, scientific and educative means are employed in the police administration, then the Korean police may say they are approaching a proper concept of police service. Thereby, and thereby alone, the Korean National Police may enjoy their new status in the democratic society as a dedicated group of an indispensable profession.

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