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; myIm’lunzuylgmllwlwlm111W I

This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

presented by

Charles William Sargent

has been .acoepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

Has; ter MIL degree in_H.i.::_t.Q.n¥

f

Major professor

Date Ifovemter 27, 1951

 

0-169

lllllllllll

EFFORTS TOWARD ANGLO-GERMAN
RECONCILIATION, 1898-1901

by
Charles William Sargent

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan
State College of Agriculture and Applied Science
in partial fUlfilment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History
1951

‘IL‘ ‘ |\ {I . 2(ll1hllhu I‘ I'll /.ln\.r\l.l.£,lll\llllir

K Al l![.[.[l|l\i(l\l[|llll\lll[.{llltll Ill [ I'll

 

I wish to thank Professor Walter R. Fee for his
helpful supervision and guidance in the writing of this
thesis. I am also indebted to my wife, Nanette, whose

constant loyalty has made this thesis possible.

268385

.. [talk [l.ll[.rI-|I\tvrl illll [f ll lllllll lll‘

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FORE'L'VORDOIOOOOOOOOO00.00.000.000.00000000000CO

CHAPTER

I.

II.

III.

IV.

FIRST EFFORTS TOWARD AN ALLIANCE.......
A. The Beginnings
B. Eckardstein's Duplicity

C. Spanish-American War, Fashoda
and Anglo-German Relations

COLONIJE CONCESSIONSOOOOOCOOO0.00000...

A. Anglo-German Agreement on the
Portuguese Colonies

B. England Pays Blackmail

THE BOER WAR AND THE POSITION OF
GERMANY..............................
The Bundesrath Incident

LAST BID FOR A GERMAN ALLIANCE.........

A. The Boxer Uprising

B. The Yangtze Agreement

C. Last Attempt and Failure

CCNCLUSICNOO0000000000000...000.000.000.000...

BIBLIOGRAPEIYO00......O...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO.

APPENDIXCOOOO0.0.0.000...OOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOCO

MAPCOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOO0.0.00.00.00.00...O...

PAGE

37

74

103

154
140
147

150

Foreword

The victory of Great Britain and her allies in
the Crimean War was followed by almost fifty years of
abstention from any alliance ventures on the part of Eng-
land. By keeping her hands free she could enjoy the bal-
ance of power on the continent without making any military
commitments. It was only when some other Power threatened
her maritime supremacy or some part of her far-flung empire,
that Great Britain intervened actively in continental af-
fairs. EngLand adhered to this policy even after the
Franco-Prussian War deepite Bismarck's efforts to make an
alliance with her in 1879, 1885, and again in 1889. But
each time his efforts were unsuccessful, partly because
Lord Salisbury, who was the Foreign Secretary, feared that
he could not get Parliamentary approval for the project.1

England, however, did depart from her no-alliance

 

lLady Gwendolen Cecil, Life QQDRobert Margu;§_g£,8alisburz
(4 vols., London, 1921-525, II, 3644?; Die Grosse Politik
deg Euro afibhen Kabinette, 1871-1914 (40 vols., Berlin,
1922-275, IV, 1-4. Hereafter referred to as Grosse Politik;
E. T. S. Dugdale, ed., German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-
-l9l4 (4 vols., New York, 1928-30), I, 144-54, 207-16, 367-
86, Hereafter referred to as German Documents.

ii

policy somewhat in 1887 when she formed an entente with
Italy and Austria in which the three countries expressed
the desire to maintain the status ggg in the Mediterranean
and in Turkey. This agreement did not bind England to any
military obligations; however, it was an early indication
of Britain's predilection for the Triple Alliance.2 After
Bismarck's fall in 1890, this friendship for Germany seem-
ed to continue and was bolstered by the Heligoland-Zanzibar
Treaty by which England exchanged the small island off the
German coast for territory in Zanzibar. Moreover, the
young Kaiser’s family ties in England seemed to forecast
favorable relations between the two countries.

Toward the close of the nineteenth century, how-
ever England faced several serious problems throughout
the world which began to emphasize her need for allies.
Her position in Egypt was extremely weak and created a
perfect means by which the continental powers could
squeeze concessions from England. In addition England
and France were involved in difficulties over the
. Nigerian boundary; France was extending her influence

toward the upper Dale which was dangerously close to the

 

2Alfred Francis Pribram, The Secret Treaties g£.Austria-
Hgggary (‘2 vols., London, 1920-1), I, 94-102.

iii
British sphere of control, while in South Africa the
friction between the Boers and the English threatened to
break out into a full scale war. The situation in this
part of the world was not eased by the actions of Dr.
Leander Jameson who made a stillborn raid on the Boer city
of Johannesburg in an attempt to achieve by force what Eng-
land had attempted by diplomacy. Aside from the embarrass-
ment to the British government by this action, the famous
Kruhger telegram from the Kaiser had shown the British
that they must nullify any aid which Germany might
give to the South African Republics.

Finally in the Far East Germany had made attempts
to acquire a naval base in China. Moreover, Russia was
obtaining an economic hold on Manchuria through the ex-
tension of the Trans-Siberian Railroad; and if she obtain-
ed Port Arthur, she could menace Bekinfiand seriously
jeOpardize England's naval and commercial supremacy in
the Far East.I It was against this setting that England
and Germany began unofficial negotiations for an alliance.

In most discussions of the diplomatic negotiations
of the pre-World War I period much attention is focused
on the events after 1904.. Even in the studies of the
foreign policy of William II, the period before the

Anglo-French entente is treated as a prelude to the main

action.. This emphasis is perhaps natural, but it is also

iv

misleading and to a certain extent somewhat false. After
1902 events seem to have moved toward the debacle with
the inevitability characteristic of tragic affairs. The
forces were already drawn up and the time and place of
the break alone remained undetermined. In the late
nineties, however, international alignments had a
comparative flexibility which they did not have after
1904. The continent was already divided into two hostile
alliances, but the solidarity of the Dual Alliance, at
least, was yet to be proven. England, remaining aloof,
served as a balance wheel. After 1895, as British
statesmen began to realize that isolation was neither
splendid nor safe, the picture began to change. The
next few years are characterized by Britain‘s efforts
to effect an alliance with one or the other of the
continental groups. From 1898 to 1901 the dominant
element in the Conservative cabinet desired a union
with Germany, and it was only when these efforts met
with failure that they made their overtures to France.
In my Opinion these important negotiations give
the events of this period equal importance with.the years .
immediately preceeding the war. Although it may be idle
Speculation to say what the course of history might have
been if the Anglo-German negotiations had been successful,

it cannot be denied that their failure made inevitable

V

the rivalry which paved the way to war. It is the pur-
pose of this thesis to discuss this attempt at recon-
ciliation and to come to some conclusions as to why it
failed. The publication of both the German and British
documents made this task easier.

The documents from the German archives show,
deSpite a shifting and inconsistent German diplomacy,
that there was a certain unity in the policy of the
Wilhelmstrasse. The evidence which is now available
shows that the ultimate object of German diplomacy was
not the destruction of England, as has been frequently
stated, but a close alliance. As early as 1893 we find
this desire clearly formulated, and during the next ten
years this objective was never entirely out of sight.3
It is, moreover, safe to say that almost every German
statesman who had any important part in the formulation
of foreign policy during this period was convinced that
sooner or later England and the Triple Alliance must join.
forces.

This desire fbr British friendship by Germany was
frustrated by that combination of swaggering self-confi-
dence and almost abject fear which puzzled and angered

the diplomats of other countries. However, in strange

 

sGrosse Politik, VIII, 240-2, Hatzfeldt to Foreign Office,
July 31, 1893.

vi

juxtaposition with the confidence of the Berlin govern-
ment in the hegemony of Germany was a fear of the power
of the Dual Alliance. Germany appeared at times ready

to turn against England in order to win either France or
to wean Russia away from France. This concern over her
relationship with other continental powers placed Germany
in an unenviable position and had two important results.
In the first place the obvious effbrts by Germany to

effect a rapprochement with Russia and France naturally

 

alarmed the British and made them suSpicious of Germany's
protestations of friendship. Even more fatal was the way
that fear of Russia affected German attitude toward the
English alliance proposals.

The operation of these factors hostile to the
desired union is clearly evident in the events of the
years 1898 to 1901. For that reason, a study of these
years seems valuable. The next four chapters deal with
these negotiations from their inception in 1898 to their
ultimate failure in 1901. It has been necessary to bring
into this discussion a study of certain major events which
occurred in several parts of the world where English and
German interests met. Investigation has shown that both
British and German diplomacy were greatly influenced by
these crises. It was these threats to their national

security as well as to their commercial ventures that

vii

prompted the two countries to seek an all inclusive
agreement in 1898, and to continue that project until

its obvious defeat was assured.

 

la[[[[[[[li(l{ll\lfl[.(f \II ~[[[([[[[I’ ll 1' ‘ff

CHAPTER I

Early Efforts for an Anglo-German Alliance

In 1895, as a result of the general election,
Lord Salisbury was asked by Queen Victoria to form a
new cabinet. This he accomplished, but the new cabinet
which he.managed to put together struggled under three
difficulties. First, Salisbury combined the positions
of Premier and Foreign Minister--never a good working
plan under the English system.of government. Second,
it was a coalition, and one in which the minor party
had far more men qualified for high office. Third, the
strongest man in the cabinet, Joseph Chamberlain, was a
liberal unionist, and as such ineligible to be premier
or even to lead the Hbuse of Commons. It was only the
fine tact on the part of Balfour and Salisbury which
surmounted the last difficulty. They allowed Chamberlain

”... usually the power of a co-Premier and on some rare

occasions more."1 It is necessary to understand Chamber-

lain's position in the cabinet, for he was to play an

 

1James L. Garvin, The Life g£_Joseph Chamberlain_(4 vols.,
London, 1934), III, I. Hereafter referred to as J.L.
Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain.

important and intricate part in the efforts toward an
Anglo-German reconciliation. ~
The incongruity of Chamberlain's office as
Colonial Secretary and his attempts at foreign diplomacy
immediately strike the reader. However, this was not
entirely an expropriation of the Foreign Secretaries'
prerogatives, but a Juxtaposition of duties. Late in
*1897 Chamberlain received an advance from the German
embassy in London. The gist of the pavzgggers was that
the German Colonial Secretary, Baron Richthofen, wished
a private conversation with Chamberlain. The ostensive
reason given was that the German Government was fearful
that serious trouble would deve10p between England and
Germany in West Africa. This was a legacy left by Lord
Roseberry's government. Baron Richthofen was particularly
anxious to settle these differences before this trouble
occurred or before any official negotiations were made.
Chamberlain immediately asked Lord Salisbury's
consent. The Prime Minister replied that ”Your meeting
with Richthofen would probably be of value and it cer-
tainly would not hinder anything. The Germans have
evidently held onto the neutral zone in the hope that

they might use it to squeeze us about the Volta."2

 

BQuoted in J. L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 247.

Unfortunately foreign events were advancing so rapidly
that nothing more came of these negotiations. However,
we must take this as Chamberlain's early interest in the
affair. Chamberlain's necessary interest in British
colonial affairs, coupled with his own personal desire
to abandon isolation, seemed to indicate that it would
be Chamberlain who would play the more important part
for the English in any alliance negotiations.

The Colonial Secretary pursued these efforts at
an Anglo-German Alliance with forebearance and patience
as well as conviction. Until recently this passage of
his life work was the least known and appreciated; but
when the German archives were thrown Open and Eckard-
stein's memoirs were published--not to mention voluminous
subsidiary material-~the importance of his part was

realized.

The Beginnings

In 1897, by a culmination of events, England
faced the necessity of revising her traditional foreign
policy. Toward the end of 1897 Germany had descended
upon Shantung, China, forcing the Russians to set their
plans ahead of schedule and occupy Port Arthur. In the
disputes that followed, Great Britain was ignored and

her protests flouted. The Kaiser whose fervor for

colonial expansion knew no bounds did not caution
moderation but rather wrote, "We shall get nothing
willingly, but only what we can take for ourselves with
an armed fist.'5 Later, when Salisbury denounced the
old Belgian and German treaties which prevented the
colonies from giving preference to the mother country,
the German Kaiser's wrath burst forth and he wrote:
"This is the beginning of war against our flourishing
productive State."4 This was ominous enough on the part
of the head of a state, but William added: "Had we
fleet strong enough to enforce respect, the notice to
terminate the old treaties would not have been given;
our answer must be to keep in view a speedy and signifi-
cant increase of our new construction."5 Thus the
Colonial Secretary was faced with this problem in the
Far East while matters elsewhere in the world which
concerned the two countries threatened to come to a head.
Three distinct questions were involved. In West
Africa the Germans wanted a piece of British territory on

the coast, the Volta triangle which cut off their Togoland

 

3Grosse Politik, XIII, 27, Kaiser's footnote on a letter
from Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, May 12, 1897.

 

 

 

4Ibid., p.34, William II to Hohenlohe, August 1, 1897.

 

592. Cite. p.340

 

from the mouth of that river. They also wanted to
extend Togoland to the north by dividing a large neutral
zone; while the Kaiser along with Admiral Tirpitz,
German minister of marine, wanted, above all, Samoa.
Germany at first wanted England to Join with her and
demand that the United States abandon Samoa as compensa-
tion for its eeeent acquisition of Hawaii. When Salis-
bury refused to act on this request,6 Germany then began
her negotiations for British Samoa.

The British Colonial Secretary was cool toward
these preposals, for he disliked to cede any British
territory. If he must relinquish the Volta area to
Togoland, he wanted more than the Wilhelmstrasse would
offer. Chamberlain, also, knew that he would have to
face the antagonism of New Zealand and Australia if the
British withdrew from Samoa. However, he was willing
to face this ire if he could obtain the German share of
New Guinea. He expressed his views to the Prime Minister.
"We could not possibly offer Germany more than a free
hand in.Samoa in return for New Guinea, which is value-
less to them and which some day the Australians will
take by force if they do not get it otherwise. Even

 

EGrosse; Politik, XIII, 4o, Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe,
September 27, 1897.

this concession.will make the New Zealanders very angry.'7
Needless to say Berlin refused to exchange New Guinea for
Samoa.

At this time, which Chamberlain's biographer
places at the end of the autumn of 1897, the first pro-
posal for more direct negotiations with Chamberlain came
from Berlin. This first overture originated with the
same agent who was later to play an important part in
the alliance proposals, Baron Eckardstein, the secretary
of the German legation in London. Unfortunately Chamber-
lain was away at this time and nothing more came of this
opening. By the end of 1897 foreign events began to
move rapidly and the Colonial Secretary was faced with
a new world policy. Fortunately for German plans two
German missionaries were killed in the very region which
the Kaiser coveted--Kiao-Chau, China. Two years before
this crisis arose, the Kaiser had ordered all plans to
be prepared for a seizure of Kiao-Chau at a somewhat apt
time.8 Kiao-Chau was seized in late November and in a
few weeks the Russian fleet steamed into Port Arthur.
Upon the Russian request, two British ships were with-

drawn. Even the most sober element of the English

 

7Quoted in J. L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 246.

8 -
Grosse Politik, XIV, Part I, pp.46-7, footnotes.

public felt that this was an insult to his country.
Salisbury in.an interview with the German ambassador,
Hatzfeldt, stated that "the mode in which the purpose of
Germany had been attained impressed me more unfavorably
than the purpose itself."9 He further stated that he
could not reproach the Russians for their conduct because
they had acted with the utmost correctness, something
which he could not say of the German occupation of Kiao-
Chan. 10

It is not the purpose of this essay to discuss
at length the Far Eastern policy of the British govern-
ment, however, it graphically illustrates that by 1898
England realized that she had suffered a major diplomatic
defeat. This was especially disconcerting so soon after
the grand display made at Victoria's second Jubilee.
Chamberlain, as well as other cabinet members, realized
that this weakness lay in isolation. There was a Dual
Alliance and a Triple Alliance, and Britain was the sole
great power without an ally. Chamberlain, casting about

for an alliance, decided that it would be of mutual

 

9G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds., British Docu-

ments on the Ori ins of the war 1898-1914 (11 vols.,
London, .1926- 38 , Salisbury to Lascalles, January 12,
1898, vol. I, no. 3, p. 4. Hereafter referred to as
British Documents.

10
9.2. Cit. . p.40

advantage to effect one with Germany.

Here we enter into a controversy as to who made
the first overture for negotiations which were to last
for the next three years. Chamberlain‘s biographer
emphatically declared that 'The initiative came from the
German side. This must be well noted. When British
feeling was strongest and the perplexites of the British
Cabinet were extreme, Freiherr Von Eckardstein renewed
his recent efforts to bring Chamberlain into direct

11
contact with German diplomacy.“

Eckardstein's own words in his memoirs seem to
validate this assumption, for he reviewed Germany's
past attempts at an alliance:

... Germany needed a new ally. That

was the origin of the secret mission

of Lothair Bucher in December, 1875

to London, ... In the following years,

1876, 1877, Bismarck’discussed an alli-

ance with Lord Salisbury, then minister

of the colonies and with the foreign .

minister, Lord Derby. During the Berlin

Congress he entered into secret nego-

tiations with Lord Beaconsfield aslgo

an Anglo-German-Austrian Alliance.
However, we must early realize that Eckardstein, although

usually accurate in details, cannot be trusted in

 

11
J. L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 255.

l2Baron von Eckardstein, Ten Years 33 the Court _§ St,
gamg§,(New York, 1922), p.135. Hereafter referred to
as Eckardstein, Ten Years.

III‘I‘I" Ill“ Illlltl'l‘lll'l 'I‘l [I 'Illll‘ll‘l‘

 

interpretations. He had an obvious distaste for the
German Foreign Office officials whom he called the
"lesser live stock."13 This confessed dislike coupled
with the fact that he was married to an Englishwoman

help to eXplain his biased opinions. Also he was an
ardent admirer and friend of the Duchess of Devonshire
who avidly desired a closer agreement between the country
of her birth (Germany) and that of her adoption.

Bfilow wrote in his memoirs that it was Chamber-
lain who 'threw us the bait of an Anglo-German Alliance."l4
we cannot place too much confidence in this report as
Bulow was writing a justification of his actions as well
as those of Germany. Moreover, he takes liberties with
dates and events to make his own narrative more plausible.
We also have a letter written by Chamberlain and sent to
Salisbury which showed that Chamberlain placed the
responsibility directly in the laps of the Germans:

Colonial Office, April 29, 1898, Here-

with are the notes of some very curious

conversations I have had with the German

ambassador and Baron Eckardstein.
You.will see that in every case

the interviews were sought by the Germans

and the initiative was taken by them.
On every occasion I made it clear

 

13Ibid., p.29

 

l4Bernhard von Bfilow, Memoirs (4 vols., Boston, 1951),
I, 322.

10

that I only eXpressed my personal

Opinions and could not Speak for16

you or any of my colleagues. ...
It seemed quite evident that both sides desired an
understanding of some type. To what degree or to what
extent each side wished to go showed the extent of that
desire.

Taking Eckardstein's narrative as a guide, the
negotiations must have begun in the opening months of
1898. He was present at a small dinner party which was
given by Alfred Rothschild. The other guests present
‘were Chamberlain, the Duke of Devonshire [Lord PresidentJ.
and Henry Chaplin [President to the local government
board], all members of the cabinet. It does not seem
unlikely that this dinner was given eSpecially to bring
up the subject of an alliance. It may be true that
Eckardstein made the firSt actual Statement for a
rapprochement, but doubtless he had enough hints cast
his way to Justify his proposals. However,es further
documents prove, the alliance was as greatly deSired
by Chamberlain as by the Germans, if n0t more so.

Hatzfeldt, the Ger-an.Ambassador in.London,
telegraphed his foreign office in Berlin on Thursday,

 

15 J.L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 278-9.

11

March 24 that he had been invited by Baron Rothschild
to a luncheon the following Saturday to meet some cabinet
members. “I have an impression that the initiative is
not Rothschild's alone and that the main object is to
make a confidential attempt at a rapprochement with

16
Germany." This meeting was evidently the result of
the agreement engendered in the first conference at
which Eckardstein was present.

It is important to understand what the situation
was in Berlin at this point. For at this time the first
Naval Bill was in the Reichstag for passage. William II
and his advisers desired nothing so much as a binding
treaty with England which would curtail their plans for
naval expansion.

Yet, knowing their own far-reaching
calculations and fearing a premature
awakening in this country [England],
they desire nothing more than to
manage England prudently fer some
years to come. It seemed high policy
to keep Britain in play, to evade

entanglement, and to work for inci-
dental gains.l

Returning to the controversial point as to who

 

16922§§§_§9;;L;§, XIV, Part I, pp. 193-4, Hatzfeldt to
Holstein, March 24, 1898.

17J. L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 257.

12

made the first attempt at negotiations, we have Hatz-

feldt's dispatch to the German Foreign Office:

Mr. Chamberlain, whom I met today
explained to me in detail and
strictly confidentialbthat a turn
had come in the political situa-
tion, which no longer permitted
England to continue her policy,
hitherto traditionaonne of isola-
tion. The British Government was
faced with the need of soon making
far-reaching decisions and would
now be able to count on the support
of public Opinion if it gave up
its policy of isolatiig and looked
around for alliances.

This part of the dispatch is interesting when we
know that the Chinese situation was fast reaching a
climax and that England had sent her Far Eastern fleet
to the Gulf of Pechili in order to take Wei-hai-wei.
In the face of Russian.opposition, England needed a
strong ally in this area. Also, two major events were
added to the total which gave added impetus to the
negotiations. The day previous to the Chamberlain-
Hatzfeldt conversation the Chinese garrison had with-
drawn from Port Arthur and the Russian tr00ps had occupied
that strategic position. Furthermore, the German Reich-
stag on the same day had passed the bill founding the

new German.navy.

 

laJE.T. S. Dugdale, ed., German Diplomatic Documents

(4 vols., New York, 1930), III, 21, Hatzfeldt to German
Foreign Office, March 29, 1898. Hereafter referred to
as German Documents.

 

13

The German ambassador went on to relate how
Chamberlain reviewed Anglo-German relations which had
led to their late estrangement. Hatzfeldt stated that
Chamberlain eXpressed the opinion that the two countries
possessed the same political interests, and that the few
little colonial differences that existed could be settled,

"... if only gp_the same time agreement could be obtained

on the great political issues."19

Bulow's answer to Hatzfeldt eXpressed the current

fears and objections to such an alliance in Berlin:

I beg your Excellency to thank Mr.
Chamberlain for his confidential
overtures and say to him the follow-
ing which will show him that we also
entirely trust his personal reli-
ability and discretion.

Hr. Chamberlain desires to
avert the threat to England's peace
by making England, in alliance with
Germany, stronger than her rivals
and so force them to renounce their
hostile intentions against her. But
the weak point of such an Anglo-
German treaty would be that any such
agreement would only bind the British
Government for the time being. If
the enemies of the Anglo-German
group wished, after the ancient
principle of the Horatii, to fight
their rivals singly, and fell first
upon Germany, I must certainly say
that ... I have no faith that the
British party to the treaty would in

 

19 mg ., III, 21

14

this case Spring to our assistance.

It would be more in the Spirit of

the British policy up to the present

for the government, which has engaged

itself to us by this t'eaty, simply

to go out of power and be followed

by one, which, ..., would obey public

Opinion and confine itself 80 its

usual role of a looker-on.2
We can readily see that engendered in the German mind
was this suSpicion Of an English political movement
which would leave Germany in a diplomatic dilemma.
Bulow, when writing his memoirs still held to this posi-
tion, for he wrote his estimation of an English poli-
tician: "In no country is the borderrline between private
and political morality drawn so sharply and SO coldly
as in England; and Englishman of the highest personal
probity will resort to the most doubtful expedients in
politics as calmly as a doctor, if he thinks the case

21 Bulow made another

calls for it,7;“administer poisons.“
false assumption, for he believed that time was against
England for within ten years England would be in a worse
position (he believed) than at the present. By which
time the Siberian railroad would be finished and Russian
preparations would be completed on the Indian frontier,

and thus it would be less easy to deter Russia from

 

zoGerman Documents, III, 23-24, Bfilow to Hatzfeldt,

’March so, 1898.

leernhard von Bulow, Memoirs, I, 322.

15

taking part in an Anglo-French war "... whereas in ten
years time British feeling will still present the same
Obstacle to a British alliance with continental Powers
as it does today."22
It has been stated by several authors that this
decision and way of thinking was the outcome of a collab-
oration between Bfilow and Holstein. However, I am
inclined to believe, in the face of Bfilow's own.estima-
tion of Holstein whom he referred to as “the incorrigible
crank'zs that such a collaboration for all practical
matters did not exist. In fact, Bfilow says that Holstein
in the beginning was definitely pro-British. Further-
more, although he feared and hated the Bismarcks,24 he
followed their policy of trying to keep England friendly.
However, it is not possible to underestimate Holstein's
influence, for he remained in the German Foreign Office
for several years, making and unmaking diplomats almost
at will.25

Chamberlain did not take Bulow's answer as final.

He made another appointment with the German ambassador

 

22
23

German Documents, III, 24.

Bfilow, Memoirs, I, 530.
2
4Loc. cit.

25 '

Ihld.. pp. 575.4. An interesting and revealing account
of this mystery man of the Wilhelmstrasse is given in
G. {.lggoch, Studies i3 Modern History (London, 1932),
PP0 ' o

16

which was held at once. In his second memorandum Chamber-
lain took Bfilow's arguments one by one and defended
Britain's stability and power as an ally. He agreed that
the British parliamentary system held certain loopholes,
yet for this very reason any treaty would have to be
submitted to Commons, where he believed it would pass.

He admitted, also, that his opinion, though communicated
to his colleagues, did not in any way commit them.26

Hatzfeldt's account of this interview was more
dramatic but similar in content.27 But Chamberlain did
not show the necessary enthusiasm for a victorious war
with France, and Germany, while looking forward to
expansion in China was not prepared to force the issue
by arms.

The next Bulow dispatch foreshadowed the ultimate
failure of the first attempt for an Anglo-German alliance.
German policy now was directed toward waiting for time
and strengthening the fleet and keeping her hands free.
Bfilow's text was couched in a tone Of semi-hostility.

He asked how the German people could forget the recent
quarrels with England, especially British abuse of the
Kaiser. Germany had no wish to become embroiled with

 

25.1. L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 265-6.

27§g2§§g,29iitgg, Vol. XIV, Part I, pp. 202-4, Hatzfeldt
to the Wilhelmstrasse, April 1, 1898.

17

Russia and in event Of danger from that country common
action between England and Germany would come Of itself.
Bfilow regretted that existing circumstances forbade an
unnecessary alliance at that time, but the door to such
an agreement was not closed. What appeared impractical
at the time could in the future prove feasible.28
Hatzfeldt took this dispatch as indicative of the German
Foreign Office's attitude, and in a dispatch dated April 7,
he represented Balfbur as saying that Chamberlain some-
times wished to advance too fast and that he gave ”... the
impression thatthis personal ill-success of Mr. Chamber-
lain's in this matter was not altogether unwelcome to him."29
It was at this point that the diplomats of _
Germany decided to reveal the proceedings with England
to the Kaiser. They placed before him Hatzfeldt's April
seventh dispatch and one dated also on April seventh.
In the former communication Hatzfeldt made his incorrect
estimation of the English Colonial Secretary. This
characterization on the part of the German ambassador
points out what the further relations between the two

men would be. He wrote:

 

28m” pp. 204-7, Bfiiow to Hatzfeldt, April 3, 1898.

2992£E§QH2222g§g§§, III, 25, Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe,
April 7, 18980

18

In natural intelligence as in energy
and great parliamentary skill, he
assuredly does not fail, but in respect
to foreign policy he makes on me the
impression of a raw beginner who follows
the dictates of his personal vanity,
taking no sufficient account of con-
sequences, in what he does and says.
Obviously he would have regarded it

as a personal triumph, bringing him

a good step nearer the Premiership,
could he have succeeded in establish-
ing himself as the author of thesgng-
lish alliance with the Dreibund.

This estimation of Chamberlain was later ridiculed by

one of the more outstanding German historians who wrote:

Chamberlain thus laid his cards on
the table, which was characteristic
of the man and of his aversion to
diplomatic mystery-mongering. But
to Hatzfeldt ... this method of
pursuing politics seemed amateurish,
uncouth and ill-judged. He termed
Chamberlain haughtily an 'ignorant
novice,‘ which was certainly unjust.
Chamberlain acted like a shrewd
experienced business man who was
seeking to brgpg about a fusion of
intereSts o o o

The Kaiser was jubilant, for his past animosity toward
England was yet to give him some satisfaction, and he

wrote that John Bull is in a dilemma and wants someone

to get him out. Furthermore the Emperor had no inclination

 

O
3 Grosse Politik, XIV, Part I, 212-16, Hatzfeldt to
Hohenlohe, April 7, 1898.

31Erich Brandenburg, From Bismarcg pp the World War
(London, 1927), p.106. ‘

19

to help England merely on Chamberlainis promises.32
William II labored under a dual complexity. Deep
seated in him was a hatred for England and Englishmen: how-
ever, on the other hand, there was his obviously sincere
devotion to his grandmother, Queen Victoria. Partly justi-
fied in his resentment because of the attacks about him.in
the British journals, he complained to Lascallesz’éhat for
eight years after his accession to the throne, he had tried
his best to bring about friendlier relations with England,
but what had been his reward? On his last visit to England
he had been.so attacked personally in the English papers
that he had found it impossible to return to England.54
It is difficult to ascertain.to what extent the Kaiser was
informed by his ministers, but he remained from this point
a.key figure in the following negotiations.

Eckardstein's Duplicitz

With Bfilow's last rejection, this part of the
negotiations may be considered closed with the exception
Of one more event. At Alfred Rothschild's suggestion.and
with Hatzfeldt's evident approval, Eckardstein made a

 

32Gerngn,Dnonments, III, 25, Minute by the Emperor to a
dispatch of April 26, 1898.

33Frank Lascalles, British.ambassador to Germany, 1895-98.

34British Documents, I. No. 63. Po 43: Lascalles t0 53113‘
bury, February 1, 1898.

2O

trip to Homburg on supposedly private matters. The real
purpose of the journey was an attempt by Eckardstein to
approach the Emperor on the matter. After a lengthy
discussion with William II, Eckardstein left convinced
that the Kaiser was in complete sympathy with Chamberlain's
views.55 It is obvious from the evidence later revealed
that he was mistaken.

The next day William wrote to his foreign Office
giving an entirely different version of his ideas. He
said that an Anglo-German treaty at that time was highly
undesirable, but "... at the same time it is of great
importance to keep official sentiment in England favor-
able to us and hopefu . A friendly minded England puts
another card against Russia in our hands, as well as
giving us the prospect of winning from England colonial
advantages."56

The bewildered Eckardstein recorded that within
less than a week after his return to London, Hatzfeldt
told him that it was no good to go on with the negotia-
tions, as the Wilhelmstrasse and above all the Kaiser
was against an understanding with England. Eckardstein

injected a note of irony into this account. He wrote

 

55Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 94-5

3§Q£2§§2,22;;§;§, XIV, Part I, 217, William II to Wilhelm-
strasse, April 10, 1898.

21

that the Emperor seemed to be influenced by the last
person with whom he spoke.57 Despite the fact that
Eckardstein knew that the German foreign policy did not
include an agreement with England, he went immediately
to the office of Chamberlain to report his conversation
with the Kaiser. He neglected to mention that his news
was no longer valid. Chamberlain recorded this conversa-
tion in his third memorandum and was eSpecially impressed
by Eckardstein's statement that the Emperor wanted the
affair to be taken care of immediately.58 Eckardstein's
report to Chamberlain seems a direct misrepresentation
on his part and can only be explained by his own fervor
to see such an alliance become a reality. Whether he
was motivated by personal advancement or from patriotic
zeal, his misleading report put Chamberlain in a ludi-
crous position as he continued to work for the alliance.
The next step in the negotiations showed that
Eckardstein had also failed to reveal his conversation
with Chamberlain to Hatzfeldt. The German ambassador
telegraphed to Bfilow that Chamberlain still insisted upon
another interview on the subject of an alliance and gave

the impression that Chamberlain was pushing the matter.39

 

57
Eckardstein, Ten Years, p.95
38J. L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 271-2

59
Grosse Politik, XIV, Part I, 218, Hatzfeldt to the
Wilhelmstrasse, April 25, 1898.

22

Naturally Bfilow took the position that it was England who
was desperately in need of an alliance. He reiterated
his former theme that time was playing against England,
and if England desired an alliance, she would have to

pay for it in colonial concessions.4O There was no
mention of Eckardstein's glowing account of the Emperor's
eagerness to achieve a treaty with England. Nevertheless,
Hatzfeldt had Eckardstein arrange another meeting with
Chamberlain. At this meeting no one but Hatzfeldt and
Chamberlain was present. Hatzfeldt spoke at great length
of the difficulties which stood in the way of an alliance.
They centered around the German government‘s fears that
the information of the treaty would leak out before it
was completed, and the the public of both countries would
not favorably receive such an agreement. He was also
fearful that such an alliance would place Germany's
relations with Russia in jeopardy. He did not think

that an alliance was completely out of the question, but
it would have to be approached from another angle.
Hatzfeldt added that he thought that it was a little
premature for these negotiations for a direct defensive

41
alliance.

 

o .0
4 Ibid., pp. 218-21, Bulow to Hatzfeldt, April 24, 1898.

41J. L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 275-4.

23

Hatzfeldt's report of the meeting was identical
in essence with that of Chamberlain, but he added a note
Of warning which he attributed to the Englishman. He
stated that the ColOnial Secretary had replied to his
[Hatzfeldt'S] arguments that if England could not arrange
an alliance with Germany, "... it would be no impossibility
for England to arrive at an understanding with Russia or
France.”42 Furthermore Chamberlain did not "... hold it
advisable ... to settle the smaller questions by English
concessions except in connection with a simultaneous

43 In other words if Berlin were

general agreement.”
prepared for a complete understanding, there would be no
difficulty in settling smaller details of colonial con-
cessions.

Within twenty-four hours of this unfruitful
interview which he had arranged, Eckardstein hastened to
the Colonial Office to protest his bewilderment. He
could not understand the Emperor's change of mind and
insisted that Prince Hohenlohe44 had interferted and that_
the Emperor was unaware of how his foreign Office was

handling the matter. Eckardstein may have been entirely

 

42% M, XIV, Part I, 221-26, Hatzfeldt to
Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898.

43J. L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 276-7.

44Prince Chlowig Hohenlohe-Schillingffirst, German Chan-
cellor, October 29, 1894 to October 18, 1900.

24

misled, for his story was the Opposite of what the Kaiser's
reasoning represented. Despite his promise to Chamber-
lain, Eckardstein did not attempt another meeting with
the Emperor to discuss the question, but noted in his
memoirs that:

The pourparlers, which at first

concerned only the situation in

the Far East, eventually assumed

the form of negotiations for a

general alliance between Great

Britain and Germany. But although

the prospects were good, by the

middle of April, 1898, the nego-

tiations had been wrecked, through

the want of any purposeful and

practical policy in those ign-
ducting affairs in Berlin.

§paniSh-American War1
Fashoda and Anglo-German RéIations

The attention of the diplomats was turned else-
where by two events which were Of utmost importance--the
Spanish-American‘War and the so-called Fashoda incident.
Coming at a time when the Anglo-German negotiations were
pending, these international upheavals did nothing to
ease the situation between the two countries. Rather,
the opposite was true, for the feelings between the two
countries were greatly strained by the problems which

arose out of the crises.

 

45Eckardstein, Ten Years, p.95.

25

When the United States went to war with Spain in
April, 1898, it was England's friendly attitude toward
America which effectively blocked any collective anti-
American intervention in the EurOpean capitals. However,
Germany was not as friendly as England toward the United
States, for she diSpatched a cruiser squadron under
Admiral von Diederichs to Manila with the ostensible
purpose of protecting German nationals and their property.
Germany did not want a redistribution of Spain‘s colonies,
but if it did come about, she intended to obtain her
Share. As a matter of fact Germany hoped to receive at
least one coaling station,46 and great was Germany's
dismay when it became increasingly evident that the
Americans intended to remain in the Philippines. Attempts
were made by the German.ambassador in London to discover
whether England would consent to the Philippines being
neutralized. Salisbury showed no interest in the proposal
as it was a fixed policy of his government on no account
to antagonize the Americans. However, the news was

received in the continental capitals that Spain was

 

46Holstein to Hatzfeldt, August 6, 1898. In this letter
(not published in the Foreign Office Records) Holstein
says, "Bedides, as already said, a coaling station is
naturally expected as the result of our participation in
the protection of the Philippines.“ Fbotnote, Branden-
burg, From Bismarck_to the World war, p. 124.

26

seeking to diSpose of her colonies to the highest bidder.
Therefore, Germany decided to purchase the Mariana and
the Caroline Islands further to the south which also
belonged to Spain. England and Germany were Skating on
thin ice, for it was during this engagement that the
British naval commander at Manila Bay interposed his
ships between those of the American and German fleets to
discourage any high-handed action by the latter. It
would appear that England's position in this affair was
diametrically Opposed to her attempts at negotiations
with the Germans..

The British attitude toward the United States
may be explained by Chamberlainfis immense respect for
America. He realized that any adverse move on the part
of England would mean the loss of favor in America for
his country. He, also, knew what the outcome Of the
conflict would be, and it is always wiser to be on the
winning side in any argument.

When a movement by a concert of European nations
to register a moral protest to the Americans seemed
Emminent, Chamberlain cautioned Balfour, who was acting
Foreign Minister and inclined toward a moral protest:

Am convinced Message will do no good

and will be bitterly resented. Amer-
icans insist that Spain shall leave

27

Cuba. Nothing less will satisfy

them. Spain will rather fight.

Message practically takes part

with Spain at critical Juncture

and will be so undersigod in Amer-

ica and this country. .
This message seemed to be effective, for England's policy
in Washington was revised. The British Ambassador in that
capital withdrew from his risky association with the
ministers of other European countries. Chamberlain, as
well as other Englishmen,wame enamoured of the new racial
"isms” then becoming evident in European thinking. Anglo-
Saxonism was the particular interest of the Colonial
Secretary. He wished to include Germany, but he did not
want to lose the United States. He could not foresee,
however, that the British attitude meant more hard feelings
with Germany. The Kaiser's desire to acquire more naval
bases in the Pacific was a point evidently not considered
by Chamberlain. He was motivated by what he thought
politics ought to be. He wanted, at this Juncture,
closer ties with America, because he feared that England's
isolation meant danger. He hoped that if in event of
hostilities arising, blood would "... be found to be
thicker than water.“48 England had yet another problem

to face in world politics.

 

47
J. L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 299.

48Parliamentarerbateg, House of Commons, Official Report,
Fourth Series, Vol. 58, 1454-7, June 10, 1898. Hereafter
referred to as Parliamentary Debates.

 

28

At this point it is necessary to recapitulate.
In 1885 the English.ministry had decided to withdraw the
British forces from the Egyptian Sudan south of the Wadi
,Halfa. However, by 1896, under the direction of Generals
Grenfell and Kitchener, the Egyptian army was reorganized
and the Government of the Kbdive decided to reconquer
the Sudan. Under the leadership of Kitchener the force
moved slowly toward this goal. By September 1898 the
Dervishes were completely scattered and the British
general was everywhere victorious.

In June of 1898 the French ministry fell and a
new minister of foreign affairs, Théophile Delcassefl
was installed at the Quai d'Orsay. He and his prede-
cessor, Hanotaux, agreed on many policies, but on the
Egyptian question they did not. Delcassé, declaring that
the French had as much right in that area as the British,
dispatched an eXpedition under Captain Marchand. He
hoped that Marchand would reach the upper Nile before the
reconquest of Sudan brought the British further south.
On July 10, 1898 Marchand did reach a point in Sudan,
Fashoda, with eight officers and 120 men. Now Delcasse's
plan was to extend the boundaries of French Congo, and
he hoped that he could settle the situation to France's
advantage by negotiations with the English government.
However, Salisbury held firmly to the position that all

29

the territories, lately held by the Khalifa had passed

to the British and Egyptain.Governments by right of
conquest.49 The situation was allowed to drag on for an
extended period until the crisis became acute. War
seemed the only solution. However, as England held all
the cards (Kitchener's troops even had to rescue Marchand
from the Dervishes), France was forced to capitulate as
gracefully as possible. She recalled Marchand and signed
a comprehensive agreement with England in March of the
next year.

Germany's fate was also affected by the Fashoda
crisis. For had the war which threatened between England
and France materialized, a war of revenge--that old ever
present bugbear--would have been impossible for quite
some time; for France, even with the help of Russia,'
could not have fought both Germany and England at the
same time. There was even a party in France which advo-
cated an understanding with Germany and regarded England
as France's natural enemy. However, "By setting her
teeth and suffering the humiliation at Fashoda, France
was consciously making a great sacrifice so that she
might not forfeit that reckoning with Germany which.was

the inmost aim of every patriotic heart."50

 

49§gitigg Documents, I, no. 196, pp. 160.70, Monson to
Salisbury.

50
Erich Brandenburg, From Bismarck 32 the World War, p. 119.

3O

Throughout these proceedings Chamberlain had
not lost sight of an Anglo-German entente. In May 1898
he made a Speech at Birmingham whichhas since been labeled
"the long Spoon" speech. Unfortunately his real theme of
the growing disadvantages of isolation was lost by his

single reference to the Russians. He said:

Now the point I wish to impress Upon
you is this--it is the crux of the
situation--since the Crimean war,
nearly fifty years ago, the policy
of this country has been a policy of
strict isolation. We have had no
allies. I am afraid we have had no
friends. 0 o o

All the powerful States of
Europe have made alliances, and as
long as we keep outside of those
alliances--as long as we are envied
by all-~and as long as we have inter-
ests which at one time or another
conflict with the interests of all--
we are liable to be confronted at
any moment with a combination of

Great powers. ... We stand alone....51

He then passed on teethe breakdown in China and the
method of the Russian acquisition, and brought in his
parable of the devil and the long spoon using it to illus-
trate his warning against isolation.
He was immediately attacked n'om all sides. The
Opposition charged that he was Afi.variance with the
Premier. Chamberlain carried the attack into the enemy's

 

51Quoted in J. L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 282.

31

camp and declared in Commons "I have not resigned. I am
not cast out by my colleagues. I am not rejected by the
Prime Minister. ... perhaps they [the Opposition] are
thinking of some Government-~I have heard of such a
government myself-~in which the Prime Minister was said
to be not on speaking terms with one of his principal
colleagues; neither Prime Minister nor principal colleague
resigned.'52 However, the reaction in the world capitals--
Berlin, Paris, Vienna, Madrid, New York, St. Petersburg--
was a general commotion. In Germany the press was more
derisive than recriminating. They assumed that Chamber-
lain was revealing England's weakness. Needless to say,
there was no support for the alliance, although there
were speculations as to the advantages to be obtained
from the embarrassed Power. Evidently Chamberlain had
said too much for the diplomats and not enough for the
English public. He could not reveal what was going on
behind the scenes in London, and he did not know what
was going on behind the scenes in other capitals.

The diplomatic sequel was never known to Chamber-
lain. Both parties had stipulated complete secrecy, but
within a few days after Chamberlain's speech, the Kaiser

had revealed all the the Russian Czar. The German

 

52
Parliamentary Debates, Fourth Series, Vol. 58, 1426,

June 10, 1898.

32

Emperor evidently was moved by the idea that Chamberlain
really was the enemy of Germany. He first drew up a
secret memorandum in which he reasoned with himself. He
decided against England on the hypothesis of naval rivalry
and decided for Russia as he did not believe that the
Russo-French alliance would hold. He decided with mili-
tary aid from Russia he could destroy France and save his
Reich.55 To bring this about he decided to sell his
information to the Russian Czar. For sheer duplicity and
a misrepresentation of facts, his letter was unequaled

in diplomatic annals and I think it is important to dupli-

cate it here in part.

Berlin 30 May, 1898--Dearest Nicky.
With a suddenness wholly unexpected
t8 me I am placed before a grave
decision which is of vital import-
ance to my country, and which is so
far reaching that I cannot forsee
the ultimate consequences ...

About Easter a Celebrated
Politician propis motu suddenly sent
for my ambassador and ... offered
him a treaty of Alliance with England:
... After Easter the request was
urgently renewed, but by my commands
cooly and dilatorily answered in a
colourless manner. I thought the
affair had ended. Now, however the
request has been renewed for the
third time in such an.unmistakeable
manner, putting a certain short term
to my definite answer and accompanied

 

53Grosse Politik, XIV, Part I, 239-40, Secret Memorandum
of the Kaiser, May 22, 1898.

by such enormous offers for my
country that I think it my duty to
reflect before I answer.

Now before I do it, I frankly
and openly come to you, ..., to
inform you, as I feel that it is a
question so to say of life and death.
... I am informed that the Alliance
is to be with the Triple Alliance and
with the addition of Japan and America. ...

Now as my old and trusted friend
I beg you to tell me what you can
offer me and will do if I refuse. ...

Nicholas II's reply, written in English, was cold
water poured on the scheming Kaiser. He revealed that
three months previously England had offered to come to
full agreement upon all points where their mutual interests
clashed.55 The Russians were suspicious over an offer
from an entirely unexpected quarter and the Czar wrote:
"Without thinking twice over it, their proposals were
refused ... It is very difficult for me if not imposs-
ible to answer your question whether it is useful for
Germany to accept these often repeated English proposals,
as I have not got the slightest knowledge of their value."55
In other words Russia too could wait, and although
desiring good relations with Berlin, the Czar had no

 

54Isaac Don Levine, Letter§.from the Kaiser tg_the Czar
(New York, 1920), p. 43.49.

55This was true. In British Documents, I, no. 9, p.8,
Salisbury to O'Connor, January 25, 1898, we find that
Salisbury suggests a friendly demarcation of respective
Spheres of influence in China.

56Grosse Politik, XIV, Part I, 250-1, Emperor Nicholas II
to Kaiser William II, June 5, 1898.

 

34

intentions of giving up the French alliance for dependence
on a German one. Needless to say the Kaiser was greatly
upset by this unexpected reply. Meanwhile Chamberlain
continued to pursue the subject.

The English ambassador in Berlin, Lascalles,
broached the alliance once more to Bfilow. The German
Foreign Minister returned the query with one of his own
which proved fatal for the negotiations at this time.
Were Russia antagonized, what extent of support could
England guarantee against an attack on Germany by the
Dual Alliance?57 Lascalles brought this question home
to the Colonial Secretary. We have no record of what
went on at this meeting at which other cabinet members
were present, and must depend on a version given by the
Kaiser of a conversation held with Lascalles upon his
return to Germany. For the first time the Kaiser claimed
that he discovered that Chamberlain and several of his
ministerial colleagues were willing for a defensive alli-
ance on the basis that they would make common cause if
either were attacked by two powers together. The Emperor
appeared for a moment to be attracted by the idea, but
then he said that he would only attack France and not

Russia if a causus feoderis arose. The next day he sent

 

571g;g., pp. 255i5, Bfilow's memorandum, June 5, 1898.

55

the gist of this conversation to the Czar.58

Bulow next wrote a highly flattering letter to
William in which he said that war between England and
Russia must come and that Germany would never pull English
chestnuts from the fire; and, furthermore, England could
give no practical help in case of a war with Russia. By
carefully managing England, while not compromising his
relations with the Czar, William II could make himself
supreme among rulers. ”I hOpe to God ... that thus in
full independence towards both sides, Your Majesty, on
the eightieth birthday of Her Exalted Majesty Queen

Victoria, will be present as arbiter mundi.'59

With these words we come to the end of Chamber-
lain's first efforts for an Anglo-German Alliance. Com-
pletely outside of the sc0pe of his office, Chamberlain
had attempted to abandon England's traditional policy of
"Splendid isolation” by an agreement with Germany. This
overture had been rejected by the Germans with no little
insult to both England and Mr. Chamberlain. However, all
hope was not abandoned, for if England and Germany could
not make a defensive alliance at this time, they were

making headway in another field. In the subsequent

 

8
5 Ibid., pp. 555-8, Kaiser William II to Czar Nicholas II,

August 22, 1898.
5?;2;g.. pp. 559-42, Bfilow to William II, August 24, 1898.

36

chapter I would like to review the next step in the
tortuous diplomatic negotiations which had for its

basic purpose the realization of Chamberlain's hOpes.

CHAPTER II
Colonial Concessions

Chamberlain did not necessarily abandon his hopes
for an Anglo-German defensive alliance, but his attention
was for a period of time diverted elsewhere. With Salis-
bury and Balfour, the Colonial Secretary became involved
in another phase of Anglo-German relations. This matter,
which involved a third country, Portugal, threatened to
rupture diplomatic relations between Great Britain and
Germany. The Wilhelmstrasse appeared willing to abandon
its previous hostile attitude toward England in the African
question, but insisted upon compensation in the form of
colonial concessions.

At the outset this point of dispute concerned the
Portuguese colonies which were in danger of being lost
to the mother country. England's specific interest was
in the Portuguese possessions in Africa. The British
seemed interested in Portugal's keeping her colonies for
a very important reason. As the diplomatic negotiations
between England and the Boer Republics were seemingly

reaching a stalemate and a war seemed inevitable, the

38

British wished to consolidate their position in Africa.
Delagoa Bay, which was the most important outlet for the
Transvaal, was the only major harbor not in England's
possession. From its port, Lourenco Marques, ran the
shortest railroad route from the sea to Johnannesburg
and Pretoria. The use of the port facilitated the entrance
of supplies and munitions to the Boer Republics. It
seemed to the Salisbury government that the control of
this port under British lease or by outright purchase
might offer the best chance of settling the entire Afri-
can question without resorting to war.

The above mentioned railroad was built by an Amer-
ican, MacMurdo, who had raised the necessary funds in
London by forming an English company. However, in 1889
_the Portuguese government had seized the railroad by
armed force. Great Britain demanded restitution, and the
United States also lodged a similar demand on the behalf
of MacMurdo's widow. Portugal finally acquiesced and
submitted the case to the arbitration of a group of Swiss
jurists. At this point of the narrative the settlement
had not been reached, but it had long been certain that
the decision would go against Portugal. It was also

obvious that Portugal did not have the wherewithall to

59

meet the payments.1 To meet the indemnity Portugal
decided to raise the money on her colonial assets.

Thus a tense situation ensued while the Berne
award impended. Chamberlain, on his part, had considered
the question as early as 1896. He knew, as well as did
other diplomats, that any attempt to sell Delagoa Bay
outright would result in the overthrow of the Portuguese
government. However, he believed that, on liberal terms,
a lease might be managed.

In 1897 there were several interviews at the
Colonial Office between Chamberlain and Luis de Soveral,
the Portuguese minister to London. Portugal desired both
a large loan and a guarantee of her colonial possessions,
but the Lisbon government would not give its pledge that
no more concessions would be given to a third power.

They were afraid that this would greatly weaken their
colonial sovereignty which they passionately desired to
preserve.2 These negotiations proved fruitless, but
after the German occupation of’KiaLChau, Germany's solici-

tude in regard to Portuguese colonies alarmed the Lisbon

 

1In 1900 the Berne tribunal's judgement compelled Portugal

to pay nearly'1100,000 in compensation to the shareholders.
British Documents, I, note to No. 65, p. 44.
2

Ibid., No. 65, pp. 45-6. Mr. Bertie's memorandum on
Portugal in Africa.

40

government.3 They were ready to conclude an arrangement
with England.

Portugal wanted a loan of £8,000,000 at 5 per
cent. In return there would be a joint management of
Delagoa Bay, the harbor, and railroad. In the areas
adjacent to the Bay, no concessions were to be given to
a third power without England's consent. The British‘
navy was, also, to have use of the Portuguese ports as
coaling stations in time of war. Above all, the British
were to assume control of the harbor and railroad in case
of war.4

This was no small task to accomplish. In working
out the details, Chamberlain had the complete confidence
and support of the Prime Minister. Mr. Chamberlain, also,
kept the High Commissioner in Africa informed as to the
proceedings which concerned him. Milner, the High Commis-
sionen.was fully in harmony with the Colonial Secretary.
He wrote:

July 5, l898--... I look on possession
of Delagoa Bay as the best chance we
have of winning the great game between
ourselves and the Transvaal for the

mastery in South Africa without war.
I am not sure indeed that we shall

 

5Ibid.. p.45.

4Ibid., p.48.

41

ever be masters without a war.
The more I see of Sogth Africa
the more I doubt it.

It was at this point that the German government
became acquainted with the proceedings and intervened.
The German ambassador in Lisbon telegraphed to the Wilhelm-
strasse that M. de Soveral had been sent to London with
instructions to obtain money by mortgaging the revenues
of Mozambique, Angola and the other Portuguese colonies.
The German government at once decided to bring pressure
so as to be admitted as a joint lender to Portugal.

The motives prompting both England and Germany
seemed to be opposed to each other. The German govern-
ment pressed for a Speedy conclusion of an agreement by
forcing a loan secured on Portugal's colonies in the
thinly disguised hope of being able to foreclose on the
share of them which were to fall to Germany. England,
on the other hand, was anxious that Portuguese finances
recover sufficiently to remove the danger of that country's
losing her African possessions. England did not want a
third power strategically located in South Africa.

From the evidence it is not inconceivable that
Germany intended to use this predicament of the Portu-

guese government as a wedge to pry colonial concessions

 

5J. L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 311.

42

from England. In a dispatch from Bfilow to Hatzfeldt we
find an extensive list of what Germany would accept as

compensation for England's expansion in South Africa:

In west Africa:
l.'A naval station in the Canaries
or Cape Verde Islands;
2. Fernando Po;
5. The Volta down to its mouth as
the frontier between Togoland and
the Gold Coast Colony;
4. Angola including the southern
part of Mosamedes and Benguella;
50 Walfisch Bay.
In East Africa:
1. Zanzibar with Pemba;
2. The Zambezi and Shire’ as southern
frontier of German East Africa.
In Asia:
1. Portuguese Timor;
2. The Sulu Archipelago;
5. At least one of the Philippine
Islands (Mindanao).
In the Pacific:
1. The Caroline Islands;
. The Samoan Islands.

Bulow furthermore warned Hatzfeldt that he was to be

especially on his guard against the deve10pments which

concerned the Portuguese loan.

Hatzfeldt called almost immediately upon Lord
Salisbury and asked the Premier point blank to what extent
the negotiations between de Soveral and the English govern-
ment had progressed. Salisbury's reply was noncommittal

as he said that the Portuguese minister was dealing

 

6German Documentg, III, 28, Bfilow to Hatzfeldt, June 8,
1898, enclosure.

43

directly with Chamberlain. He himself knew nothing of
the proceedings.7

The German ambassador reported this conversation
the same day to the Wilhelmstrasse but in greater detail.
He wrote that Salisbury claimed ignorance of the proceed-
ings and had suggested that the German Ambassador contact
Chamberlain for his information.8 The Kaiser evidently
misunderstood the progress of the Anglo-Portuguese nego-
tiations and especially Chamberlain's role in it, for he
attached a marginal note to Hatzfeldt's report: ”It is
always the same. He wants to be taken by surprise by
Chamberlain. He knows perfectly well what is demanded.
Salisbury, and not Chamberlain, must decide this question,
for it is a political one."9

Bfilow's next move was in the form of a telegram
to Hatzfeldt and showed clearly what his plan of action
was to be. For by this time France had become aware of
the proceedings and was thoroughly disquieted. Bulow,
although reluctant to combine French and German interests
in South Africa, instructed Hatzfeldt to make known to
the British government that France was looking for help

 

7BritishiDocuments, I, No. 68, p. 48, Salisbury to Gough,

8German Documentg, III, 28-50, Hatzfeldt to the German
Foreign Office, June 14, 1898.

9
Ibid.. p. 29, Kaiser's note.

44

against England. He hoped that this knowledge would make
the English more amenable to German demands.

Evidently Hatzfeldt did not follow these instruc-
tions, for in his next interview, recorded by Salisbury,
he merely asked the Prime Minister if England would join
in a common action in regard to the financial operations
which the Portuguese government wished to carry through.
Salisbury replied that he considered any financial deal-
ings between England and Portugal a matter which exclusively
concerned the two powers involved and did not constitute
a subject for diplomatic discussion between England and
Germany. He further stated that England's motives were
to maintain the status qug,in reSpect to the Portuguese
colonies and prolong the life of Portugal. If England
failed, and if there was a danger that the colonies would
pass out of Portuguese hands, then it would be proper for
England and Germany to negotiate an understanding. But
not until then would it become necessary. Certainly the
loan then under consideration did not concern the German
government.11

Hatzfeldt reported this interview in full to
Bulow. He stated that he had explained to Salisbury that

 

O u
1 Ibid., p. 50, Bulow to Hatzfeldt, June 17, 1898.

11
British Documents, I, No. 67, p. 49, Salisbury to Gough,
June 21, 1898.

45

the transfer of the sovereign rights of Portugal over her
colonies to England would produce a very bad impression
in Germany unless she were consulted.12
The Kaiser's marginal comment on Salisbury's
attitude toward Germany's interference showed his dislike
not only for the English Premier but his inclination to
withdraw dom.any further attempts at a defensive alliance.
”This report and especially the last sentence is evidence
of the false and unreliable game Lord Salisbury is playing
against us; this is not the way to lure us into an alliance3"15
Evidently Bfilow shared his Emperor's predilec- A

tions and decided to abandon his earlier dislike for a
Franco-German joint action. He wrote to Count Munster,
the German Ambassador in Paris, to approach the French
Foreign Minister with his plan. He thought it necessary
to completely inform Count Munster as to the gravity of
the situation from the German point of view: I

If that Anglo-Portuguese agreement

came into being, it would in fact

cause a complete revolution to the

disadvantage of the Powers with

interests in Africa, or whose nationals

are creditors of Portugal. In both

these respects Germany and France
possess an identical interest whether

 

12% W, XIV, Part I, 220:1, Hatzfeldt to the
Foreign Office, June 21, 1898.

13W Documenge, III, so.

46

in preventing or having a say in
such an alteration of the Portu-
guese status gug both in politics
and business. If France is clearly
still hypnotized by the trouee deg
vos es and has in consequence no
eye free for observing the question
of the moment, the Russian alliance
will scarcely be able to prevent
England from expanding everywhere
outside Europe without considering
French interests.

Our gracious Master, the Emperor
commands you to speak to M. Hanotaux
emphatically in this sense. The main
object of the conversation, I think,
should be to ascertain clearly whether
all practical coeperation between
Germany and France in all individual
questions, whatever they may be, is
out of the question as a principle,
... I need not tell you that the
clearing up of this point will be of
wide importance in the guture shaping
of our foreign policy.1

Unfortunately for Bulow's plans, the Meline
ministry, in which Hanotaux was Foreign Minister, resigned
on June 14, 1898, and was succeeded by Brisson, with
Delcassé’as Foreign Minister. As Delcasse was an ardent
Germanphobe, Bulow soon concluded that under the new
ministry, there was little hope of practical cooperation
between France and Germany. He, therefore, decided to

return to his original plan of bringing pressure on the

governments concerned. In a diSpatch to MacDonell

 

l4I.e. the fear of a German invasion.

15923993 Documents. III, 51, Bulow to Munster, June 18,

1898.

47

Salisbury unfolded Germany's course of action as to
Portugal. M. de Soveral had shown the English Premier a
telegram from his government stating that the German
ambassador in Lisbon.had demanded an audience with.Dom
Carlos, the Portuguese king. Count von Tattenbach had
told the king that the Emperor could not continue on
amicable terms with Portugal if the negotiations now
carried on in London were continued without regard to
the “legitimate interests of Germany in her AfriCan
colonies."16

Naturally de Soveral was alarmed and asked Salis-
bury what his government should do. The Englishman's
answer was that it depended entirely on how much Portugal
needed the money. Salisbury still held that these nego-
tiations were no concern of Germany. He, furthermore,
assured the Portuguese minister that England still respected
her "ancient treaties” made with Portugal in the time of
Charles II. Salisbury repeated this in a dispatch to
MacDonell the next day in which he enclosed the correspon-
dence which had passed between England, Portugal and

Spain.in 1875.17

He reassured de Soveral that his govern-
ment assumed the same position as did Lord Granville

twenty-five years previously.

 

16British Documents, I, No. 68, p. 50, Salisbury to
MacDonell, June 22, 1898; German Documengg,III, 55,
Tattenbach to German Foreign Office.

1'7B
ritish Documents, I, No. 69, pp. 51-52, enclosures.

48

Hatzfeldt went to see Salisbury on the twenty-
third of June with two alternate proposals. The first
was to the effect that Germany and England would make a
loan to Portugal and agree upon the particular custom
revenues by which each power would guarantee its loan.
The second proposal was wider in scope and more detailed
in content. Hatzfeldt prOposed that if Germany abandoned
Delagoa Bay to England as well as the Mozambique Province
up to the Zambesi, then Germany should have the Portu-
guese provinces beyond the Zambesi up to the Rovuma and
the Shire. He also asked for Angola on the western side
of Africa. Salisbury replied that he thought that the
German demands were too extensive, but he would have to
think them over before he could reply. Hatzfeldt left
as a parting shot that it was only Germany that kept
Russia and France from attacking Britain in the Suez.
This was well-calculated to alarm the Premier and place
Germany in a better bargaining position.18

The negotiations moved along rapidly, and it.
appeared that the English intended to exclude Germany.

M. de Soveral made his definite overtures to Salisbury
on June 29. However, Salisbury believed that the disadvan-

tages outweighted the benefits, butfgoveral assured him

 

laggitigh Documents, I, No. 70, pp. 52-5, Salisbury to
Gough, June 25, 1898. Also see German Documengg, III,
54, Hatzfeldt to German Foreign Office, June 24, 1898.

49

that the Port of Delagoa as well as the railroad would
be included as security against the loan.19

Mr. Bertie, the Assistant Under-Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, drew up a memorandum for the Foreign
Minister, based upon the assumption that England would
include Germany in the Portuguese arrangements and exclude
France. He vividly showed the dangers which would be
involved, but he drew up a temporary plan as to what
Germany should receive. It was this plan that was later
used in the final negotiations with Germany. Bertie, too,
thought the Portuguese collateral was insufficient, but
he raised the question that it would be better to take
a general charge on the revenues of all the Portuguese
possessions than on the hypothetical estimations of those
of Delagoa Bay.20

Hatzfeldt continued to press for an Anglo-German
joint agreement, but Salisbury could or would not acceed
to German demands. However, on July 15, Salisbury did
make the German minister a proposal which Hatzfeldt all
but refused, but he promised to forward it to his govern-

ment. Then the affair seemed to be closed by the actions

of M. de Soveral.

 

19§£$£l§2 Documents, I. N0. 71, p. 55, Salisbury to Mac-
Donell, June 29, 1898.

201bid.. No. 72. pp. 53-4. Memorandum by ”r' Bertie’
June so, 1898.

50

On the same day as the above mentioned conversa-
tion between Salisbury and Hatzfeldt, the Portuguese
minister called on the English Premier. He informed
Salisbury that in view of all the difficulties which the
loan had produced, his government had decided to close
the negotiations. This involved the abandonment of all
ideas of a loan either from England or any other power.21

This decision by the Portuguese government came
at a time when the final outcome of the Spanish war with
the United States had reached its final catastrophe.

This naturally caused the Portuguese to be more sensitive
and more wary on the subject of foreign interference.

If Germany was dreaded in Lisbon, Anglo-Saxonism was not
in a better position. Portugal decided to raise the
necessary money on her home revenues. Although Downing
Street and the Wilhelmstrasse thought she could not do
it, Portugal could and did.

Nonetheless, the English Prime Minister, in
agreement with Chamberlain, decided that it would be
necessary and even the best thing under the circumstances
to face the German prOposals. One principle they accepted.
If Portugal relinquished, for any reasons, her economic

or political control over her possessions, her colonial

 

21%.. N03. 74 and 75. pp. 55-6.

5l

empire would be divided virtually and formally between
England and Germany. Everything,it will be noticed,
hinged on an "If." This word was interpreted differently
by the two countries. The treaty finally signed was one
of the most ironical of the period. It ended on the one
hand in an elaborate secret treaty which was stillborn;
and on the other hand by the Germans abandoning the Boers.
It can easily be seen that it was the British who received
the better part of the bargain.

The remainder of the negotiations was between

Salisbury and Balfour for the English and Hatzfeldt for
the Germans. On July 29 the German Ambassador laid his
government's demands before Lord Salisbury. They included
Walfisch Bay and the Volta triangle on one side of Africa
and for Blantyre and its surrounding part of Nytsaland on
the other. This was in addition to two-thirds of the
Portuguese colonies.22 Salisbury considered that these
demands were exhorbitant.

The next day, after consultation with his cabinet,
Salisbury gave his reply. The cabinet had flatly refused
to alienate any British territory. Salisbury did not
think that Germany's concessions in regard to Delagoa Bay

and the Transvaal equivalent to her demands. Salisbury

 

22Ibid., No. 77, pp. 57-8. Salisbury to Gough, July 19,

1898. Samoa was also demanded. See map.

52

based his reasoning on the fact that if he were to
alienate any British territories, he would have to deal
with the British colonies. Australia would object to the
cession of Samoa, whereas the Cape Colony would not stand
to lose Walfisch Bay. Furthermore Salisbury believed
that France and the Transvaal would raise objections and
demand a share. To this the Germans could offer no guar-
antee.25

Hatzfeldt eXpressed his regret at this decision
which he feared would bring the negotiations to an end.
He was fearful of the evil results to England and Germany
if this opportunity of establishing a hearty accord
between them should be lost. In this he referred to
Chamberlain's efforts for a general defensive alliance.
In parting Hatzfeldt left a warning that if Germany could
find no resource in the friendship of England, then she
must of necessity turn to Russia.24

Chamberlain, himself, was opposed to such extrav-
gant demands. He thought that the request for Blantyre
was in itself offensive as it was dear to the entire

missionary cause and the the memory of Livingstone. To

ask for it would be as though England had asked for

 

zélpig., No. 78, pp. 58-9, Salisbury to Gough, July 20,

1898.
24
Ibid., pp. 58-9. Also see Hatzfeldt's account in
Grosse Politik, XIV, Part I, pp. 501-2, Hatzfeldt to
Holstein, July 20, 1898.

55

Wittenberg. In his Opinion the Germans had asked for
many valuable somethings in return for a cool nothing.
He expressed his views to the Prime Minister in two
memoranda:

July 25, 1898--Memorandum to Salisbury.

-4... Germany must offer territory or

positions now in her occupation of equal

value to anything in British possession

which the Government of Germany may

desire to obtain. The present action

of the German Government appears to be

inconsistent ... with the reported

desire of the Emperor for a friendly

understanding with this country....

July 25.--To the same,... Unless they

[the Germans] are able to modify the

Opinion they have formed of the value

of their neutrality we musé certainly

look elsewhere for allies. 5
It is here we discern a possible rupture of Chamberlain's
plans. He loathed the abandonment of his cherished plans,
but he disliked the haggling and imperious German demands.
But for a complete settlement and a certain connection
with Germany he was willing to give much, but he was not
impressed with the Wilhelmstrasse's squeeze tactics.
However, we find him writing to Balfour in August: "...
the only advantage to us is the assurance of Germany's
abstention from further interference in Delagoa Bay and

the Transvaa1--in other words we pay Blackmail to Germany

 

25J. L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 514-5.

54

to induce her not to interfere where she has no right Of
interference. Well: it is worth while to pay blackmail
sometimes....26
There were several reasons that can be found
which changed not only Chamberlain's Opinion but Salis-
bury's as well. On July 27 Hatzfeldt approached Salis-
bury with a new plan.which the Prime Minister considered
a little more tenable.27 Furthermore, the trouble with
the Boer Republics was fast reaching the danger point,
and it seemed to Chamberlain.that Germany must be neutral-
ized at almost any cost. After all, there was the possi-
bility that the Portuguese could maintain their sovereignty,
which inzrtual fact, would negate any understanding with
Germany. There was the danger, too, as was pointed out
by Bertie, that if Germany were not appeased, she would
fulfill her covert threats and join France and Russia to
England's detriment throughout the world.28
As Lord Salisbury was going on a vacation, the
negotiations passed to Mr. Balfour. Hatzfeldt‘was not

entirely pleased with the new arrangements, but he believed

that Balfour would be completely fair with him. Hatzfeldt

 

26Ibid.. p.515.

27

British Documents, I, NO. 29, p. 59, Salisbury to
Lascalles, July 27, 1898.
281bid., No. 81, pp. 60-1, Memorandum by Mr. Bertie,
August 20, 1898.

55

then handed Balfour a memorandum which was an amplifica-
tion.of one which he had read to Lord Salisbury on August 5.29
He also stated that Salisbury had been in full agreement

in regard to Timor being included as part of the security

for the proposed German loan. Balfour was suSpicious at

this declaration and telegraphed to Salisbury fOr his

version. Salisbury replied that there had been no mention

of Timor between Hatzfeldt and himself. This information
Balfour revealed to the German Ambassador.

Hatzfeldt appeared both surprised and disappointed
at this answer, for he declared that he had Specifically
included it in his talk with Lord Salisbury. He said that
his government had placed great stress on this one point.
He thought that if the English changed their minds about
this, the negotiations would have to te broken Off. He,
furthermore, warned that a great bitterness would be
aroused in Germany.30

' Relations between the two countries seemed to be
reaching a deadlock, and a rupture in diplomatic relations

was eminent. The Kaiser, in a conversation with Lascalles

 

29Ibid., No. 82, pp. 62-5, enclosure, Balfour to Lascalles,
August 5, 1898.

30Ibid., NO. 85, pp. 65-4, BalfOur to Lascalles, August 11,
1898. Also see German Documents, III, 57-8, Richthofen to
Hatzfeldt, August 19, 1898. The instructions from Richt-
hofen were duly delivered to Bertie. It is in this com-
munique that we find a first reference to the abandonment
of the Boers. Cf. Baitish Documenpp, I, No. 85, p. 67,
Balfour to Lascalles.

 

56

said "... that unless the negotiations in progress during
the last few days between my Ambassador and Mr. Balfour
lead to no more acceptable result than they had up to
the present, the continued presence of my Ambassador in
London would be superfluous just now."31 It seemed that
the negotiations which had been entered into with such
high hopes and were the object of so much laborious effort
were to be lost. What seemed even more perilous was a
break with Germany at a most disadvantageous time. Hew-
ever, the matter was settled to the mutual advantage Of
both parties, for Hatzfeldt telegraphed to Berlin that
"Timor was settled, and I am convinced we owe it to Mr.
Balfour alone, for he urgently desires a conclusion.'32

As all difficulties were now removed, it but‘
remained to Sign the treaty. As Salisbury had been fearful
that Portugal would take umbrage because Germany and
England were dividing the Spoils before she had floundered,
two agreements were Signed. The first merely stated that
England and Germany would combine if a loan became necessary

to Portugal}:5 The second, which was a secret convention,

 

51Grosse Politik, XIV, Part I, pp. 555-8, William II to
Nicholas II, August 22, 1898. Lascalles' account may be
found in British Documents, I, No. 87, pp. 68-9, Lascalles
to Balfour, August 22, 1898.

33§2£E§2,2g22p§pp§, III, 58, Hatzfeldt to German Foreign
Office, August 20, 1898.

33W W, I, No. 90, pp. 71-2, enclosure, Balfour
to Lascalles.

57

provided that under no circumstances was either contract-
ing party to obtain any partial advantage under the

treaty without equivalent and Simultaneous compensation

by the other.54 The treaty remained unpublished for over

twenty-five years, until World War I.
The immediate result of the treaty justified an
earlier pessimism toward the bargain by Chamberlain.

He had earlier written to Balfour:

... this agreement could be assumed
to be the beginning Of a cordial
understanding with Germany. I should
think the price paid was not too high,
but I fear that the whole tone of the
negotiations shows that Germany feels
no particular gratitude to us for our
sacrifices, and accordingly on all
questions which still remained unset-
tled we are likely to find them as
unreasonable in the future as they
have been in the past. On these
grounds I cannot be entggsiastic
about the agreement....

Although from the beginning of the negotiations, the
Germans, as well as the English, had insisted upon
complete secrecy, a rumor of the proceedings leaked out
on the very day they were signed. The Pallepll Gazette

began a series of sensational articles landing the close

relations recently achieved by the statesmen. Speculation

 

5
4Ibid., p. 75. Both the English and German texts fOr

- both the convention and the secret note may be found in
Grosse Politik, XIV, Part I, pp. 547- 55.

553. L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 315.

58

arose as to whether an agreement had been reached between
England and Germany to block Russia in the far East.
This type of speculation was particularly embarrassing
to Germany where the results of the Anglo-German agree-
ment had been previously surveyed as damaging to the
Russo-German relations.36 It was, therefore, imperative
that this line of thought be effectively squelched.

On September 5 the KOlnische geitung published a
Berlin telegram flatly denying that there had been a
change in German policy. This same telegram appeared in

the Norddeutsche which gave it the weight of an official

 

pronouncement. Evidently this same information was given
to the other newspapers, for the rumors Of a secret alli-
ance ended.

However, curiosity as to the real nature of the
treaty did not abate. Newspapers and periodicals in
both England and Germany began to issue articles testing
the governments to see if they could draw them out to
give the agreement away. Finally only the hints as to a
South African, Delagoa Bay and Portuguese agreement
remained unconfirmed or denied. In October 1898 Lucien
Wolf (Diplomaticus) revealed the main outlines Of the

agreement in the FortnightlyReview.37 The German

 

56Grosse Politik, XIV, Part I, pp. 542-4.

7
3 Diplomaticus, "The Anglo-German Agreement," quoted in
Livipg Age, 219 (1898), pp. 590-5.

59

neWSpapers picked up this lead despite the German govern-
ment's firm denial. However, enough of the agreement was
known to raise a cry in colonial and Pan-German circles.
These forces which were represented in such papers as

the Lokal-Anzeiger, the Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten,
the Rheinisch-Westfalische Zeitung were extremely vocal
and the keynote was "abandonment of the Boers.“3

The German Foreign Office would and could not
give an explanation, for to do so would be publicly
disavowing the Kruger telegram and an admission of the
policy which it advocated. Also to admit that Germany
was withdrawing from South Africa would be impossible
without revealing what compensation had been received in
return. Diplomatic decorum forbade this as these com-
pensations were to be found in the colonial possessions
of a friendly power. Bfilow, therefore, remained silent.
Yet a course of action had to be initiated.

Bulow believed that the publicity had been inop-
portune and had created a disadvantage to German diplomacy.
He, therefore, urged Hatzfeldt to press the English
government for quick action in Lisbon to forestall the

possibility that Dom Carlos' government would make a

 

58
I have depended upon Oron James Hale, Publicity and

Diplomacy (New YOrk, 1910), pp. 168-189 for the German
reaction to the Anglo-German Convention.

6O

loan with any other country.39 Unforeseen by Bulow, or
even by the British Government, was the alarm created in
Portugal. The Portuguese king, whose throne was none
too steady, and his ministers abandoned the loan alto-
gether and arranged a loan in Paris guaranteed on the
domestic revenues. With this unpredicted develOpment,
the bottontdropped out Of the Anglo-German convention.
The net result of these negotiations, as far as
concrete gains were concerned, added up to zero. Germany
had won a "fight with shadows,“ but had gained nothing
by way of colonial acquisitions. She had abandoned her
protective and Pan-German policy toward the Boers and
had received in return the irate ill-will Of German public
Opinion. England had received the best of the bargain.
She had removed the threat that Germany or Pretoria, or
both, might obtain control of Delagoa Bay and the rail-
way but had raised suspicions at home and in Lisbon.
Furthermore, ill-will had been heightened and Old wounds
reopened between the English and German populations.
In addition, it rankled the British diplomats that the
Germans had used such high-handed methods to inject their
demands where they had no business. The possibilities of
an Anglo-German defensive alliance were materially damaged

and seemed remote even to Joseph Chamberlain now.

 

39% Documentp, III, 59, Bihow to Hatzfeldt, Sept. 5, 1898.

61
England Pays Blackmail_

The Anglo-German Convention had far from succeeded
in removing the sources Of friction between the two
governments. It became more pronounced as England's
troubles increased in South Africa. There were inter-
mittent clashes and crises. The Kaiser even threatened,
upon one occasion, to withdraw his ambassador. On another.
he wrote an undiplomatic,attack on the British Prime
Minister in a letter to his grandmother. This attack
was greatly resented by Queen Victoria.

This quarrel, which appeared for so many months
insoluble, began over the islands of Samoa. These islands
had been placed under the tripart: control of the United
States, England and Germany. This arrangement had never
been a happy one, neither for the natives nor for the
controlling parties. The situation was fast approaching
a climax. Germany desired to control all or at least a
larger share of the archipelago. When the United States
had annexed Hawaii, Germany‘new-wanted the American share
of Samoa as compensation. When the German foreign Office
approached Salisbury to get him to join in this demand,
he flatly refused.

The situation in the islands finally reached a
critical state when the native king, Malietoa, died.

62

The protecting powers were as Openly divided as to his
successor as were the natives. The Germans supported a
pretender who had been in exile, while the English and
the Americans supported a son of Malietoa. Through the
early months Of 1898 squabbles between the Americans and
the British.on.one hand and the Germans on the other
eventually resulted in the shelling of the Samoan capital
of Apia by the combined forces of England and the United
States. This was the event which precipitated the crisis
and which Bfilow so vividly describes in his Memoirs as
having in its solution much that attracted him.40

This crisis was as advantageous to Germany's
colonial prospects as had been the murder of the two
missionaries in the Shantung province. And Bulow intended
to make the most of it. Germany had no intention of losing
her foothold in the islands.

Why, it might be asked, was Germany so avidly
interested in this remote group of islands? This is not
very difficult to eXplain. It becomes increasingly clear
what Germany's interests were when we know that the harbor
Obtained in the Samoas back in 1879 by Bismarck was
Germany's initial colonial acquisition. On this account,

alone, Samoa would hold strong sentimental attraction.

 

4OBernhard von Bfilow, Memoirs, I, 550.

65

However, there were other reasons equally as potent.

It was a matter Of great pride to Germany that it had
been the Germans whose commercial success had been more
pronounced in the islands; that the firm of Godeffroy,
which was German, had put forth the most efforts to
develop the trade of the Samoas. Also, added to these
reasons, was the fact that to the Kaiser and Admiral Tir-
pitz the islands had become a means of stimulating naval
enthusiasm in Germany.

Berlin early conceeded that Salisbury would not
give in easily, fOr he was strongly biased against Germany
due to the Kaiser's personal attacks.41 As early as
September 1898 Salisbury had told Hatzfeldt that nothing
could be done because of the hostile attitude of Australia.42
As Salisbury seemed inclined to ignore the matter, it
would have to wait further developments.

HOwever, by January of 1899 Holstein took a hand
in the negotiations personally. He urged Hatzfeldt to
begin work immediately and bring the matter to a speedy

and profitable (to Germany) close.43 After several

 

41George Earle Buckle, ed., The Letters pf Queen Victoria
(Third Series, 5 vols., London, 1952), III, 575-9. Here-
after referred to as G. Buckle, Letters 92 gpeen Victoria.

4“aGerman Documents, III, 45, Hatzfeldt to German FOreign
Office, Sept. 8, 1898.

45
Ibid., p. 46.

64

attempts, Chamberlain and Hatzfeldt were brought together
very privately by Alfred Rothschild. According to Hatz-
feldt's account, he told Chamberlain that the results of
the situation could be disastrous and could only end in
enmity between the two countries. He believed that Sir
Pauncefote's suggestion of a revision of the earlier
Samoan division act would be the best solution for all -
parties concerned. Chamberlain accecdethhis, but evidently
Salisbury could not be moved.44 Hatzfeldt, therefore,
represented to his government that Salisbury was the one
who was holding up the proceedings.

Then German diplomacy gave way to violence which
threatened to turn the squabble into an international
crisis. Bfilow, his version of the episode in his Memoirs
notwithstanding, gave some very dangerous and imprudent
advice to the Kaiser. He counseled the Emperor to with-‘
draw his ambassador from London if the English insisted
upon pursuing their own course in the Barnes. Bulow
struck a chord dear to the Kaiser's heart by stating
that “what is happening in Samoa is a fresh proof that
an overseas policy can only be carried on with a suffie

ciently powerful navy."45

 

44on53.: Politik, XIV, Part II, pp. 585-7, Hatzfeldt to
Wilhelmstrasse, March 25, 1899. Also See, British Docu-
ments, I, 11, Salisbury to Lascalles, March 5, 1899.

4SQermanroumentg, III, 56-7. The Kaiser's hearty reply
'What I have been preaching for ten years to those thick-

heads in the Reichstag.‘

65

The situation now looked like a definite rupture
in the diplomatic relations of the two countries was
possible. This break did not come because Salisbury gave
up his original contention that the problem be settled
by a majority ruling Of a joint commission. Although the
German ambassador was not recalled because Of the fact
that Salisbury seemed to be relenting, Hatzfeldt found
his former welcome at the Foreign Office chilling. Because
Of the attitude prevailing, nothing could be arranged and
a deadlock again seemedinminent. Yet the Germans believed
that they had found a solution.

From an entirely unexpected source, a way out
seemed to be in the person Of the fabulous Cecil Rhodes.
Seeking a Cape to Cairo route for his continental tele-
graph which would have to go through German East Africa,
Rhodes was approaching the German Government. Holstein,
mistakenly, believed that Rhodes had a tremendous influ-
ence in London and sought to enlist his support in approach,
ing Salisbury and Chamberlain for a speedy conclusion to
the Samoan negotiations. In exchange for his aid, Rhodes
was to receive the telegraph route. Cecil Rhodes easily
promised what he could not deliver. Possibly he could
have Obtained Chamberlain's support, but over Salisbury

he had no influence whatever.46 We do know that the

 

46Grosse Politik, XIV, Part II, p. 581, Holstein to Hatz-
feldt, Feb. 24, 1898.

66

Colonial Secretary did meet with Rhodes, but nothing came
Of it. Thus a naive approach which seemed open to the
German FOreign Office proved to be a blind alley. Again
they had given something and received nothing.
Nevertheless the atmosphere had begun to clear up
by May of 1898, and the matter seemed about to be settled
with amiable relations restored. Unfortunately for Ger-
many the Kaiser, with typical impatience, charged like
the proverbial bull in the china shop and set the nego-
tiations back for months. He wrote a castigating letter
about Salisbury to Queen Victoria. In his undiplomatic

prose he wrote:

... Lord Salisbury has treated Germany
in the Samoan question in a way which
is entirely at variance with the
manners which regulate the relations
between Great Powers according to
European rules of civility. He not
only left my Government for months
without an.answer to our proposals,
dating from autumn last year, but he
even refrained from expressing his or
the Government's regrets after the
first acts of violence by Commander
Sturdee and the other ships had occur-
red at Samoa. A fact the more unin-
telligible, as the President Of the
United States Of America immediately
sent word to say how sorry he was that
such acts had happened on the part of
American Officers and men. The British
ships went on for weeks bombarding so-
called 'positions' of so-called 'rebels'
sethough no one knows against whom they
rebelled--and burning plantations and
houses belonging to German subjects,

67

without even so much as an excuse
being made, and that on an island
which by three fourth is in German
hands.

This way of treating Germany's
feelings and interests has come upon
the peOple like an electric shock;
... the feeling has arisen that Ger-
many is being despised by his [Lord
Salisbury' S ] Government, and this
has stung my subjects to the quick.
... A pleasure trip to Cowes after
all that has happened, and with re-
spect to the temperature of public
Opinion here, is utterly impossible
now. 0 O O4

The Old queen was not to be put upon by this grandson who
had already given her SO much heartache. She answered

him in a rebuking tone:

Your other letter, I must say, has
greatly astonished me. The tone in
which you write about Lord Salis-
bury I can only attribute to a tem-
porary irritation on your part, as
I do not think you would otherwise
have written in such a manner. And
I doubt whether any Sovereign ever
wrote in such terms to another about
her Prime Minister. I never should
do such a thing, and I never person-
ally attacked Or complained Of Prince
Bismarck though I knew well what a
bitter enemy he was to England, and
all the harm he did.

I naturally at once communicated
your complaints to Lord Salisbury,

 

47See footnote no.4l. Also compare German Documents, III,
p. 64-5. William II to Queen Victoria, May 22, 1899.
Queen Victoria to William, June 12, 1899.

68

and I now enclose a Memorandum
which he has written for my infor-
' nation, which entirely refutes the
accusations and which will Show
you that you are under a misappre-
hension.4
Thus after six months, the affair stood as previously with
no real settlement in view.
Chamberlain, however, wanted a public declaration
Of neutrality in South Africa from Germany, something
which had not been obtained in the Portuguese agreement.
Eckardstein again entered the picture, for he requested
and Obtained a meeting with Chamberlain for September 20.49

Before this meeting took place, however, Chamberlain had

made up his mind to pay whatever price was necessary for

German neutrality.50

AS‘Wa! with the Transvaal wasiwminent, Chamber-
lain admitted that time was Of utmost value. He drew up
two plans for Eckardstein to present to the Wilhelmstrasse.
Plan I Offered the Germans tempting compensations else-
where. Plan II was, in effect, a declaration that if
Germany still insisted upon Samoa, then she must relin-

quistithe Solomon Islands, her claims to the Tonga group

 

48G. Buckler, Letters g§.Queen Victoria, III, 375-9.

49J. L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 554.

5OIbid., pp. 554-5.

69

and eXpect nothing in the Volta triangle.51

Thus Germany was faced with a choice--sense or
sentiment. TO abandon her claims to Samoa was by far the
better choice for commercial Germany. But against cold
logic was the full force of feeling. Eckardstein mis-
represented Berlin's attitude to Chamberlain, for he
reported that not only the German Colonial Office but
Holstein and Bfilow were in favor of Chamberlain's personal
wishes--Plan I. However, this does not appear to be true.
There was a hitch in the proceedings. The Kaiser's imagi-
nation was entwined with Samoa. Strongly under the influ-
ence of Admiral Tirpitz, the tempermental Emperor was
wooed from his conciliatory attitude toward England.
Tirpitzm with “tears of blood,“ condemning the entire
convention.52 The Kaiser, therefore, informed Eckardstein
that he would have to cancel a projected visit to England
unless the Samoan situation was quickly settled on Ger-
many's terms.

Eckardstein returned to England with the distaste-
ful news that Chamberlain's "Plaan" would be impossible
and that “Plan II" was the only acceptable one to Germany.

Nothing but the exigencies of war could have forced

 

51Ibid., p. 337;

5‘caEckardstein, Ten Years, p. 111.

7O

Chamberlain to accept this. Yet he needed a neutral
Germany in South Africa and, if possible, an allied Ger-
many in Europe. The German Foreign Office, not content
with these extortions, thought that even further conces-
sions could be squeezed from the reluctant Chamberlain,
but the Colonial Secretary remained firm and refused to
discuss additional blackmail. After this blunt refusal,
the German Ambassador was instructed to offer Chamberlain's
terms to the English Prime Minister on the condition
that they would be accepted before the Kaiser's visit.
In a cabinet council of November 1 the settlement was

55

adopted. Nothing more was granted but what had been

included in Chamberlain's second plan.

As a diplomatic sequel, Salisbury kept the Kaiser
on tenterhooks. He had received gross provocation from
William II, and now he repaid in kind. For weeks he sur-

54 Hatzfeldt,

passed even himself in the tactic Of delay.
who was quite ill, found himself between two dilemmas.

He was under strict instructions to Obtain the agreement
as soon as possible, whereas, on the other hand, he found

that he could not approach the Prime Minister on the subject.

 

53Grosse Politik, XIV, Part II, p. 675, Hatzfeldt to
Wilhelmstrasse, Nov. 1, 1899.

54British Documents, I, No. 146, pp. 121-5, Salisbury to
Lascalles, Sept. 15, 1899. This dispatch is a.masterpiece

in the art of stating Objections and dissembling.

 

71

Finally Hatzfeldt asked Eckardstein to meet with Balfour
and Chamberlain and point out to them that the Kaiser's
visit was in jeOpardy if the agreement were not concluded
immediately.

For once Chamberlain seemed reluctant to associate
himself with.the proceedings. He replied that he regretted
the bad feeling between Salisbury and Hatzfeldt. He was
afraid that the Prime Minister did not like his [Chamber-
lain'aJ or Eckardstein's interference into Foreign Office
business. He further cautioned that the German govern-
ment must realize that the affair was strictly in the
hands Of Salisbury as Foreign Secretary.55

The following day the Kaiser treated the British
military attaché'in Berlin to a typical tirade against
the English "two-headed government." He reiterated his
former indictment of Salisbury who now added insult to
injury by delaying his sanction.bb Chamberlain's negotia-
tions. He warned that though he wanted to be friendly
with England, he must also remember that he was the German
Emperor. He could not "go on sitting on the safety valve

forever."56

 

55J. L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 540.

56
British.Documents, I, NO. 154, pp. 129-50, Grierson to
Gough, Nov. 6, 1899.

72

Two days after this unnecessary outburst, the
news that the agreement was assured together with a sum-
mary of its contents was published simultaneously in Lon-
don and Berlin. German congratulations showered upon
Bulow. Having secured Upolu and Savaii, and regarding
them as among the brightest jewels in his crown, William II
telegraphed his minister: ”Bravo, am most pleased andv
delighted. You are a real magician granted to me quite
undeservedly by Heaven in its goodness."57

The English were equally satisfied. Germany had
put sentiment before reason and had left Britain with the
best of the bargain. Chamberlain hoped that the agreement
would do much to unite the two countries in closer bonds
Of friendship. The Samoan agreement had, for the time,
removed existing friction which had greatly impaired
friendly relations of the two countries. Chamberlain,
unchanged in his contention that England must abandon
isolation, still held hopes for an alliance with Germany.
Now that the Kaiser's visit was assured, Chamberlain
stood to realize two Objectives. The visit publicly
announced Germany's neutrality in South Africa, and an
opportunity to talk with the Kaiser and Bulow about the

alliance was now possible. -At least to Chamberlain's

 

57Bernhard von Bfilow, Memoirs, I, 521.

75

way of thinking, the blackmail was well worth paying. It
would now appear that the difficulties which.had blocked
England's joining the Triple Alliance would be easily

removed.

CHAPTER III
The‘Boer War and the Position of Germany

The long awaited and Often delayed visit finally
took place. The German Emperor, accompanied by his reluc-
tant consort and two of his sons, arrived in England on
November 20, 1899 for a ten day visit.

Probably more than any Englishman, in or out of
the government, Chamberlain desired this visit. Amidst
the general anti-British feeling on the continent, the
Kaiser's visit was an Open declaration of German official
neutrality in South Africa. For the so-called Boer war
had broken out on October 11, over a month previous to
the Kaiser's visit. England needed a friend and an ally
in Europe. Although it was true that Britain had sought,
without Germany's knowledge, to gain immeasurable support
by a treaty with Portugal, She still needed Germany's
neutrality.

This agreement with Portugal was the so-called

Windsor Treaty of October 14, 1899. In spite of the fact

that the English had bought off German interests in

75

Delagoa Bay in the agreement of the previous year, this
did not give them immediate control of the harbor. In
fact, the Transvaal was importing large quantities of
armaments and supplies through Lorenco Marques. When

the British protested to the Portuguese government, they
received an unsatisfactory answer. The Portuguese claimed
that the Transvaal was entitled to these privileges under

1

an agreement Of 1875. The truth of the matter was that

Portugal was none too well-disposed toward England. The
facts of the Anglo-German convention had been allowed to
leak out and had caused justified alarm in Lisbon. It
was, therefore, to the interest Of Portugal to safeguard
her possessions in any way Opened to her.

On September 15, 1899KSOveral approached Salisbury
with the suggestion of a close alliance in event of war
with the Transvaal. This, he pointed out, would give
England control of the Bay and she could attack by rail-

2 Salisbury agreed almost immediately to an Offen-

road.
sive and defensive alliance with the Portuguese against
the Transvaal. After some discussion as to the form of
the agreement to be used, Salisbury's suggestion that the

wording of earlier treaties be used was adOpted. The

 

lBritishDocuments, I, No. 111, pp. 85-6, MacDonell to
Salisbury, July 15, 1898.

2;p;g,, No. 115, p. 88, Salisbury to MacDonell, Sept. 15,
1899.

76

Anglo-Portuguese Secret Declaration (this is the Official
title and there is no justification for the name Windsor
Treaty) was signed on October 14. It confirmed and renewed
the treaties of 1642 and 1661 between the two countries.
These included a mutual guarantee of territory, and a
Portuguese promise not to let arms pass through Lorenco
Marques to the Transvaal. They also promised not to
declare neutrality in case Of war as this would make it
impossible for British warships to use Portuguese ports
as coaling stations.3
It would seem, as revealed in the above negotia-.
tions, that the British foreign policy was paradoXial.
Sir Arthur Nicolson once described the Portuguese policy
of his government as "... the most cynical business that
I have come across in my whole experience Of diplomacy.”
It did not seem likely that England in 1898 could agree
with Germany to partition the possessions of a power which,
under previous treaties, she was bound to maintain. The
partition treaty was not in keeping with Britain's Obli-
gations to Portugal, and the declaration of 1899 was

entirely incompatible with it. It may be argued that

 

3For the negotiations of the convention together with the
text, see Bpitish Documentp, I, Nos. 115-121.

4Harold Nicolson, Portra_i_t_ 93 _a_ Diplomatist (New York,
1950), p. 595.

 

77

England never intended to partition the Portuguese colonies
but was, more or less, forced into the agreement by pres-
sure from Germany. Or it may be suggested that the situa-
tion in South Africa necessitated the Anglo-Portuguese
Declaration of 1899. However, even these considerations
do not completely exonerate Salisbury from the accusation
that he was playing a two way game. The net result of
this chicanery was that it had an adverse effect upon the
Anglo-German relations when it became known.
Unfortunately in the early 1890's, secret diplo-

macy was not very secret. Conversation had reached a
high point, and Often stupid, or at the least, indiscreet
men, divulged, in moments of loquaciousness, state secrets.
In any event, the German Foreign Minister, Bfilow, wrote
that at the turn of the century he had learned from an
indiscreet diplomat (presumably English) of the secret
agreement between England and Portugal. He said:

The conclusion of the Treaty Of

Windsor had largely been promoted

by the then Prince Of Wales, of

whom the Marquis Soveral, ..., was

a personal and intimate friend.

This treaty of Windsor was, of

course, in flagrant conflict with
the Spirit of the British-German
agreement concerning the Portuguese
colonies. It was not only a guar-
antee for Portugal, but actually
an encouragement to that country
not to mortgage her colonies.

78

It increased the old tendency of
the Portuguese to give preference
to Britain in all economic questions.
To say nothing Of the fact that the
Treaty of Windsor further substan-
tially increased the political
dependence of the Portuguese on
Britain.

At the end of the last century,
..., it was natural that after such
an experience I should have felt,
..., that caution was necessary when
Chamberlain threw us t e bait of an
Anglo-German Alliance.

Fortunately for Chamberlain, neither Bfilow nor
the Kaiser had yet learned of the Anglo-German Declaration.
Otherwise, it may be speculated, the visit would have been
cancelled. It was indeed in jeOpardy, from the misunder-
standings arising over the Samoan question as well as
those of a personal nature. The Prince of Wales refused
to receive the Emperor if a certain Admiral von Senden
were included in the Emperor's suite. Through Chamber-
lain's intermediaries, the Duke and Duchess Of Devonshire,
the matter was cleared.6 Unfortunately, the visit was

viewed with suspicion and distaste by the Emperor's

 

5Bernhard von Bfilow, Memoirs, I, 521-2. It is interesting

to note here that the Germans believed that Edward exercised
a vast amount of influence in English foreign policy. This
was a mistake of which the German government, and eSpecially
the Kaiser, long remained convinced. Edward, unlike his
mother, had neither the temperment nor the inclination to
delve in foreign documents. The influence of the monarchy
decreased rather than the Opposite after Victoria's death.
Also see A. W. ward and G. P. Gooch, The Cambridge Histopy

[pf British Foreign Policy (5 vols., New York, 1925), III, 615.

6Sir Sidney Lee, Kinngdward VII (2 vols., New York, 1925),
I, 746-7. Hereafter referred to as S. Lee, Edward VII.

 

'F

79

subjects. This journey to England appeared more unpopular

than anything the Kaiser had done since ascending the

Imperial throne.
Yet it was sound policy, in view, not only Of the
Samoan treaty, but for soothing British Opinions on an
even more dangerous question. The new and portentous
navy bill was pending before the Reichstag. William II
greatly resented his naval inferiority. On one occasion
he had said "Bitter is our need of a strong fleet.”7
After the Boer conflict had begun, he had reproached the
French ambassador in Berlin for France's failure to follow
him after the policy of the Krueger telegram. He admitted
that Germany's naval position made strict neutrality neces-
sary, but within twenty years he promised that his naval
program would have greatly enhanced his position and then
he could speak with a different voice.8
William was greatly under the influence Of the
German naval secretary, Tirpitz. Admiral Tirpitz's one
aim was to build a great German navy to Offset England's
superior force. He based his reasoning upon the fact that
without a great fleet Germany would be condemned to “...

vegetate as a small nation,“ economically as well as

 

7Kaiserreden (Leipzig, 1920), p. 268. Quoted in J. L.
Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, I, 497.

8Grosse Politik, XV, 406-8, William II to Bfilow, Oct. 29,
1899.

80

militarily.9 He firmly believed that England was Germany's
greatest enemy and that the situation had become one of
fighting for existence.10 He further believed that there
existed but one means of improving Germany's position--
the creation of a large fleet which would make an attack
on German trade and Germany a risky matter.11

The Emperor was easily persuaded, fOr he had long
harbored a grudge against England and had nurtured a grow-
ing feeling of inferiority to England's might. TO protect
his naval plans, therefore, was one of his prime objectives
during his stay in England. For if the British became
alarmed and began to increase their naval program, Germany
could not compete. It was, also, true that earlier in the
year at the First Hague Peace Conference Germany had
greatly alarmed the other powers by her refusal to discuss
disarmament.12 Therefore, one of the fixed ideas in Ger-
man diplomacy seemed to be that until Tirpitz had created
the new fleet capable of holding the balance Of naval
power, Britain must be kept persuaded that the goodwill

of Germany was genuine though conditional. The only fly

 

9Grand Admiral Tirpitz, My_MemOirs (2 vols., New Yong, 1919),
I, 145-4. Hereafter referred to as Tirpitz, Memoirs.

10Ibid., p. 257.

11Ibid., 255.

¥2The Hague conference is adequately cOvered in Frederick
W. Holls, The Peace Conference gp_the Hagpe (London, 1900);
British Documents, I, Nos. 261-84.

81

in the Ointment was the Kaiser.. His undiplomatic.out-
bursts Often proved embarrassing to his ministers. Mind-
ful of this, Holstein had prepared a memorandum which had
been checked by Hohenlohe as an outline for the Kaiser's
political talks while in England.15

Against this background of intrigue and counter-‘
intrigue, the Kaiser was received by the Prince Of Wales

at Portsmouth and conducted to Windsor.. The Kaiser was
accompanied by Bfilow as well as other top government.
officials.. AS Lord Salisbury was in retirement due to

the death Of his wife, Balfour and Chamberlain came up

to Windsor for political talks. Unfortunately Chamber-
lain left no record of these conversations and we are
dependent upon Bulow's reports in the German documents and

14 Naturally Bfilow gave all due credit and

in his Memoirs.
glory to himself.

After a state banquet given by Queen Victoria on
November 29, the Kaiser engaged Chamberlain in a long con-
versation.. Chamberlain repeated his well-known desire for

a general understanding between Germany and England as

well as America. The Emperor countered this by an argument

 

15Bernhard von Bulow, Memoirs, I, 364-6m

l4German Documents, III, 108-14.. Also Bernhard von.Bulow,
Memoirs, I, 567-85.

82

for keeping a "free hand." While it was not in the Brit-
ish tradition to formulate alliances, Germany's policy

was determined for some time to come by her excellent
relations with Russia. Yet, there were other points on
which England and Germany could agree as they turned up;
Both countries could use the Samoan arrangement as a model.
It would, also, assist good relations if the English would
remember that the Germans were a "touchy race." He evinced
a desire to see the Colonial Secretary at a later date. In
fact, he received him three days later. Several new points
were then brought up..

The Englishman said that he hoped British capital-
ists would support the Bagdad railroad projectl:a pet
project of the Kaiser).' Chamberlain would rather have
seen Germany in Asia Minor than the Russians or the French.
It would seem that Chamberlain hoped by this concession to
drive a wedge between Berlin and St. Petersburg thereby
drrVing Germany closer to England. Next Chamberlain
turned to Morocco. He said that though England must have
Tangier, Germany might have wide concessions on the Atlan-
tic Coast. The Emperor replied that confidential nego-
tiations on these matters cOuld be carried on through the
. German Embassy in London. Chamberlain, however, warned

the Emperor that he must avoid everything which would

85

excite the jealousy or mistrust of Lord Salisbury.15

That point was cast in a better and somewhat truer light
by Hatzfeldt at a later date when he wrote his own impres-

sions of Chamberlain and Salisbury:

Mr. Chamberlain ... who was already
coming more and more to the front
here, and showed the liveliest wish
for a close approach to Germany, let
me know that he was ready to negotiate
an understanding between Germany and
England on Morocco upon condition that
I gave him time for it, but especially
and above all that I left to him to
arrange with the Prime Minister. Mr.
Chamberlain indicated at the same time
that Lord Salisbury was difficult to
deal with. He,[Mr. Chamberlainl would
succeed sooner than I in influencing
him. 16

Strange to say, both the Kaiser and Bfilow seemed partic-
ularly uninterested in the possibilities of the Moroccan
question.

Bfilow gave a more substantial account of his sepa-
rate interview with Mr. Chamberlain. This conversation
was, indeed, the principle event of the Kaiser's visit.

It shed broad light on world politics at that time and
it soon led to reverberating consequences.

Fortunately, we have ample information about this

conversation. However, again we are dependent upon Bfilow's

 

15Grosse Politik, XV, 418. Compare, German Documents, III,
112.

lglth-a XVII. 504-7, Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, May 21, 1900.

84

versions. We must remember that then and later in all
his accounts of his political actions, Bfilow magnified
his own cleverness. He wrote that Chamberlain began by
stating that sooner or later England and Germany would
have to come to a general understanding since they needed
each other. He readily admitted that England needed
Germany, and a day would come when Germany would need
England. Bulow hedged with the comment that Germany's
need for England was not in the immediate future. Ger-
many's relations with Russia were excellent and those
with France were improving. France no longer was think-
ing in terms of a war Of revenge. This was not, of course,
Bulow's real Opinion;, for shortly after this conversation
he expressed a contrary Opinion to the Russians. When
Bfllow was discussing with the Russians the possibility
of continental intervention in.- the Boer war, he based
Germany's refusal to enter such an arrangement on her
lack Of security against French desires for revenge.
Bulow's emphasis upon the necessity of maintain-
ing good relations with Russia Should have indicated to
Chamberlain that his plans had little prospect of success,
for they hinged upon common action against Russia. How-

ever, Chamberlain pursued the subject deSpite these

 

17Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 164-5.

85

warning signals. The Colonial Secretary promised that
England would raise no Opposition to German aspirations
in Asia Minor, if Germany would be agreeable on other
points. Furthermore, good relations with the United
States were vital, and he could arrange such an agreement.
Bfilow answered that if Chamberlain were really interested
in an Anglo-German-American rapproachement, he ought to
see that misunderstandings did not recur between the
Germans and the Americans.

This inclusion of the United States in these
deliberations was a new and striking addition and had
scarcely been considered the previous Spring. However,
recent American action had placed her in a prominent
position in Eastern Asia and the South Seas, a position
which could not be ignored.

Chamberlain's failure to grasp the fact that
Germany could not risk the alienation of Russia, proved
to be of immeasurable injury to later negotiations. He
claimed that Bfilow had suggested that he make some public
pronouncement about the mutual interests of England, Amer-
ica and Germany to prepare public Opinion.18 However,
this could not have been interpreted as an invitation to
say what he did at his famous Leicester Speech. Presently

the talk took another turn.

 

18Ibid., p. 150.

86

The English.minister complained of the violent
Anglophobia in the German press. Chamberlain warned that
if this continued, the English people would come to
regard Germany as a settled enemy whose hostility must
be faced. Bfilow countered with an attack on the Berlin
correspondent for the London Tympp, Saunders. The German
government feared Saunders' knowledge. They accused him
Of collecting the worse attacks on England in the German
newspapers to forward to his own paper.

Bfilow was correct to a certain extent. There had
been, in times past, a strong anti-German feeling eXpressed
in the British papers. This had greatly pained Queen
Victoria, for many of her family as well as personal ties
were in Germany. Therefore, early in January of 1898 the
Queen dared to enter a closed field as far as the English
monarchy was concerned. She asked Sir Theodore Martin to
visit the different editors of the London papers. She
wished him to present her personal request that they abate
somewhat their anti-German attacks. Sir Martin soon re-
ported that he had assurances from the editors of all the
leading journals that they would adopt a more conciliatory

2
attitude toward the German Emperor and the German people.

 

19German Documenps, III, 112. Memorandum by Bfilow, Nov. 24,
1899.

20G. Buckle,_Queen Victoria's Letters, III, 224-5.

 

87

Bfilow had to admit, therefore, that the public Opinion
in England was less hostile to Germany than German public
Opinion to England.21

From these conversations Bfilow concluded that
Chamberlain was the ”... modern merchant, very decided,
very shy, very scrupulous, very much aware Of his advan-
tage, and yet sincere, for he knows that without sincerity
there can be no big business."22 However, well he liked
the Englishman, Bfilow felt that Germany's future policy
would be to possess herself of a strong fleet, maintain
good relations both with England and Russia and to await
further develOpments.

Looking back with hindsight so valuable in ration-
alizing, Bfilow wrote as justification for refusing Chamber-
lain's proposals at their meeting at Windsor:

How would events have shaped them-
selves if we had followed Mr. Cham-
berlain at the turn Of the century?
... if we had followed Chamberlain's
blandishments, we should have fared
as Japan did, only with the essential
difference that Japan was virtually
out of Russia's reach, which we were

not. Moreover, in the event of war,
Japan had only Russia to deal with.

 

21German Documents, III, 114.

221demo

88

... We had to reckon that, if we

were involved with war with Russia,

the French would assail us in the

rear25

Unfortunately, these exchange of views between

the two statesmen aroused great hoped in London. Chamber-
lain evidently misunderstood Bfilow and believed that they
had agreed on all cardinal points. Taking advantage Of
what he thought was an Overture from the German Foreign
Minister, Chamberlain delivered a Speech at Leicester on
November 50, just after the Emperor and his party had
left England. Chamberlain.was always ready for criticism,
but he did not fOresee the storm that this address would
raise. Prefacing his remarks with a warning to the French
neWSpapers to cease their attacks on the Queen and with
a compliment to the United States for its friendly atti-

tude, he finally turned to the relations with Germany.

Hesmd:

There is something more which I think

any far seeing English statesman must
have long desired, and that is that we
Should not remain permanently isolated

on the continent of Europe; and I think
that the moment that aspiration is

formed it must appear evident to every-
body that the natural alliance is betWeen

_—_—~

szernhard von Bfilow, Memoirs, I, 582.

89

ourselves and the great German
Empire. ‘We have had our differences,
our quarrels, misunderstandings, but
at the root of things, there has
always been a force which has brought
us together. What interest have we
which is contrary to the interest

Of Germany? I can foresee many things
which must be a cause of anxiety to
the statesmen of Europe, but in which
our interests are clearly the same,
and in.which that understanding Of
which.I have Spoken in the case of
America might, if extended to Ger-
many, do more perhaps than any
combination of armies to preserve

the peace of the world.

This remarkable appeal created somewhat of a
furor in England, and in Germany it was received with
Obvious hostility. This speech by Chamberlain was one
of the greatest disservices to Anglo-German.relations
that he could haven performed. In view of the embarrass-
ing position that the German Foreign Office found itself
as a result of the attitude taken by the German press
on the Boer War, the speech was a castastrophe. Bfilow
put it mildly when he called it a “gaucherie."25Under
the then existing circumstances, Chamberlain's use of the
Word "alliance" was certainly a bad choice. But just
what were the circumstances?

For weeks the German Foreign Office had been

 

24Quoted in Willem L. Langer, The Diplomacy pg Imperial-
ism, 1890-1902 (2 vols., New York, 1955), II, 658-9.

25Bernhard von Bfilow, Memoirs, I, 585.

90

giving out through the press that the Emperor's visit

was nothing more than a family affair. Furthermore, this
visit had been planned long before the Boer conflict, and
the Foreign Office promised that no political commitments
of a far reaching nature would be discussed. This was
necessary to make the visit more agreeable to a hostile
public. Thejvery fact that the visit had taken place was
highly significant, for it amounted to an Official announce-
ment that Berlin would remain neutral in the South African
conflict. Any attempt by British journalists to make
political capital of the visit was highly resented in
Berlin.

The Speech was received in England by the journal-
ists who had graSped the situation with some alarm. From
the Ppll_Mpll Gazette to the London Tipp§_the verdict was
the same. The general feeling was that Chamberlain had
made as grave a blunder as the funny gentleman who had
entered the drawing room on all fours, under the impres-
sion that he had been invited to a children's party.26

Indeed the Colonial Secretary had made a grave
blunder, for the German.papers were almost unanimous in

their denunciations. Typical of the reception was the

sarcastic editorial in the Lokal-Anzeiger which stated

 

26Quoted in Hale, Publicity and Diplomapy, p. 212, from
Pall Mall Gazette, Dec. 2, 1899.

91

that probably Chamberlain meant something nice when he
called the Germans his allies, but "... we wouldn't be
proud Of it if it were true.“27 It became increasingly
evident to the German Foreign Office that something must
be done to still the uproar. The final pppp,gp_gpgpp,
was administered by BfilOW.

The occasion was a Reichstag Speech delivered by
the German Foreign Minister. He appeared before the lower
house of the German.parliament on behalf of the second
navy estimate. Evidently motivated by fear of the intense
Anglophobia in Germany, Bhlow made capital of the situa-
tion for naval expansion. He spoke frigidly of England
by comparison with France, the United States and Russia.
He indirectly referred to England's envy as that of a
Sinking nation for a rising one. He continued by emphas-
ing Germany's dependence on a large army and navy. "In
the coming century the German nation will be either the
hammer or the anvil."28 He made his hearers feel that the
new navy was meant as a check on the British fleet. 'As
for England," he said, "we are ready and willing, on a
basis Of full reciprocity and mutual consideration, to

live with her in peace and harmony. But just because the

 

27Ibid.,p. 215.

28Bernhard von Bfilow, Memoirs, I, 415.

92

foreign situation is at present favorable, we must util-
ize it to secure ourselves in the future."29 Needless to
say, this address met with wide approval in Germany. For
with a few words Bulow had stilled the verbose opposition
to the pro-English policy of the German government. More-
over, the ill will over the Emperor's visit to England
evaporated. Unfortunately, the reception in England Of
Bulow's speech was of a different nature.

If the Leicester speech was an error, then Bulow's
response was almost fatal. From this moment the convic-
tion grew in the minds Of a growing school Of English
statesmen--Chamber1ain as yet was not one--that England
was in peril. The necessity Of settling differences with
France and Russia was forcibly brought forward. They
believed that England could not permit her fate to be
decided by a super-armed Germany. Furthermore, if the
projected new German navy became a reality, it would be
supreme in the North Sea and place the Island Kingdom in
jeopardy. It was known that Tirpitz believed that the
English fleet could not maintain supremacy in the North
Sea as long as her squadrons were diSpersed throughout
the world by existing and arising antagonisms.

Although Chamberlain did not lose for a moment

 

29Quoted in J. L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 511.

95

his prime objective, personally he was chagrined. He
wrote his version of the talks at Windsor in a letter to
the English ambassador in Berlin. This letter was written
immediately upon the publication of Bfilow's speech in the
London papers. Chamberlain repeated his former statements
that Bfilow had favored an AngloeGerman-American agreement,
and hoped that Chamberlain would use his vast influence

in America to bring it about. He concluded that he felt

that Bhlow had used him to pull his own chestnuts out of

the fire.30 Furthermore, Chamberlain was in complete

ignorance of his betrayal by the Kaiser to the Czar in
1898 and could not fathom the apparent duplicity of the
German government. However, Hatzfeldt's summary on the
Leicester speech showed definitely what line of action

the German Foreign Office was taking. He wrote:

If I may allow myself an Opinion, it
can only be useful for us if, without
our committing ourselves to any engage-
ment, Mr. Chamberlain clings to the
hope that we shall end by being per-
suaded to come in with his wishes for
an alliance or a close understanding.
At any rate as long as he clings to
this hope, he will be accomodating to
us in the colonial questions which
will probably continue to turn up,

and will--as in the Samoan question,
try to influence the Cabinet, and esgf-
cially Lord Salisbury, in our favor.

 

30J. L. Garvin, Joseph Chamberlain, III, 512.

31German Documents, III, 114-5, Hatzfeldt to German
Foreign Office, Dec. 20, 1899.

94

Even modern German historians have remarked that
this attempt to trade upon Chamberlain's frankness with-

out considering his other characteristics was bound to

52

result in ruin. .This was another miscalculation which

helped to doom the proposed alliance.

After Bfilow's Reichstag speech, Hatzfeldt real-
ized that irreparable damage had been done to Anglo-
German relations. He tried to convince Chamberlain,
through Eckardstein,that domestic politics had made the
Seemingly abandonment of England necessary.33 However,
Chamberlain remained unimpressed, for toward the end Of
December 1899 he wrote to Eckardstein in stern yet regret-

ful terms:

I will say no more here about the way
in which Bfilow has treated me: But
in any case I think we must drop all
further negotiations in the question
of the Alliance. Whether it will be
possible to return to them after the
end of the South African War that has
raised so much dust--must be left for
further consideration.

I am really sorry that all your
hard work should have been in vain;
but I am also sorry for myself. Every-
thing was going SO well, and even Lord
Salisbury had become quite favorable
and in entire agreement with us as to
future Anglo-German relations. But
alas it was not to be.34

 

32Brandenburg, From Bismarck pp World war, p. 159.

33Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 144-6.

54Ibid., p. 151.

95

These last words had more meaning than he guessed.
Bfilow had already written that ~.... the greater number of
soldiers here believe that the war in South Africa will
end in complete defeat for the British. NO one at the
moment believes in a British advance on Pretoria.”35It
would seem that Germany was ready to cast her influence
with the South Africans.

From this situation, and events which immediately
followed, Anglo-German relations never recovered. In the.
eyes of not only Germany but other continental powers as
well, British arms were already defeated and disgraced
when the first battles went against the English. Count
Mfinster soon reported from Paris that "... hatred for
the English is almost greater than it was for us."36 It
appeared certain that Germany was all too willing to lead
a continental clique to take adVantage Of a British defeat
in South Africa.

The English had never been too certain of Germany's
position in the Boer conflict. The sensational Kruger
telegram, after the ill-fated Jameson.raid, had fanned a
latent Germanphobia to fiery pitch. Yet the recent visit

 

352222§2 22£2§§§§§, III, 118, Minute by Bfilow on a dispatch
of Hatzfeldt, Dec. 26, 1899.

56% Politik, XVIII, 755, Munster to German Foreign
Office, Jan. 21, 1900.

96

of the Kaiser had seemed to alleviate this feeling and
had been interpreted as a public announcement of neutral-
ity. However, as Bfilow stated, the present situation
should be used to gain advantages for Germany. By
advantages, he meant more colonial concessions. On
Christmas Day. or 1899 Bfilow telegraphed his minister in
Lisbon to declare to the King's government that if the
Portuguese allowed Delagoa Bay to fall to a third party
he would consider it an unfriendly act.37Thus Germany
effectively vetoed England's acquisition of this important
port and now thought of gaining further colonial conces-
sions as the price of neutrality. However, Hatzfeldt
cautioned moderation, for he did not believe that the
British had been driven to the extremity of relinquish-
ing any crown property. He telegraphed: "I think we
must go slowly and get the British to meet us half way.
They are not yet reduced enough to think of giving up
Zanzibar.”38

Soon after this warning, Anglo-German relations
received another jolt, for England intended to stop the
importation of arms to the Boers which was being done
through Delagoa Bay., Salisbury hoped to effect a blockade

 

37German Documents, III, 117, Bfilow to Tattenbach, Dec.
25, 1899.

38Idem., German.note.

97

by searching each vessel which was bound for the port

to ascertain whether it was carrying contraband. As a
consequence of this order the German mail boats Bundes-
pppp, General and Herzog were detained. The latter two
were soon released, but the Bundesrath was brought before
an English Prize court. The case was important in Inter-
national Law as it raised the question as to how far
steamers carrying mail should be immune from detention
and search. This was a good occasion for the German navy
men to propagandize, and they made the most Of this unex-
pected Opportunity.

According to Eckardstein, detailed and exhaustive
research finally proved conclusively that the original
information given to the British about the Bppdesrgth
was false. It was believed to have been the work of the
Boer propaganda agent, Dr. Leyds.39 His purpose to en-
tangle Germany in the dispute on the Side Of the Boers
was so Obvious that it almost succeeded. Nevertheless,
during the first weeks Of January, the incident threatened
to reach the prOportions of a first rate crisis. When
Salisbury did not immediately reply with satisfaction to

the German protests, Holstein tried to frighten him.

 

39Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 152-65.

98

He telegraphed Eckardstein that the Kaiser was consider-
ing the possibility of sending a special envoy to London
to obtain satisfaction. If this envoy did not Obtain a
Speedy answer, he was to break off diplomatic relations

with England.40

However, such threats were unnecessary,
for on January 16, 1900 the British government acquiesced
tmothe German demands. It admitted that no contraband
had been found and promised that the Bundesrath would
be released. Furthermore, the English agreed to pay an
indemnity, not to stop other ships at a great distance
from the scene Of combat and not to detain mail steamers
on mere suspicion.41

This settlement came just in time, for Bulow had
postponed as long as possible explanations in the Reich-
stag. On January 19 he spoke on the matter, and to ap-
pease German public opinion, stressed the fact that Eng-
land had given in on all points to the German demands.
These remarks were very impolitic for they drew forth so

much criticism in England that the government felt con-

strained tO publish a Blue Book. The strong German notes

 

40Ibid.. p. 121. There seems to be no evidence that the
Emperor really proposed such a mission,.... From what can

be found in the Records, the Foreign Office appears not to
have laid the documents before the Emperor at all, the Object
being to avoid unconsidered steps by him. German note.

41Grosse Politik, XV, Chapter 102; British Documents, I,
Nos. 504 and 506; Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 152-161.

99

42 Although

were reproduced in detail in this publication.
the British statesmen were thankful for Bfilow's earlier
handling Of the Bpndesrath incident, the Reichstag speech
caused many English, Chamberlain included, to complain of
the Sharp treatment England had received. Particularly
were the ministers concerned with the rather unnecessary
ultimatums. Chamberlain, himself, declared that as long
as such a feeling existed, better relations would be
impossible}3

The Bundesrath incident was a most unfortunate

 

affair. However, it did illustrate the tenuity of Anglo-
German friendship. The Prime Minister admitted in a
letter to Queen Victoria that the ship had been stopped
”... on very inadequate evidence," and that the mistake
might prove a costly one.44 He was right, for it not only
injected a further cause of friction into the Anglo-German
relations, but greatly facilitated the passing of the new
German naval bill. Also, the stopping of the German.ships

revived the question of international action against England.

 

42Harold Temperley and Lillian.M. Penson, A Centur .gf
Qiplomatic Blue Books, 1814-1914 (London, 1958), p. 465;
"Africa No. 1, Correspondence respecting the Action of
H. M.'s Naval Authorities with regard to Certain Foreign
Vessels," Parliamentary Debates, Series Four, Vol. 80,
547, 1177.

45 u
Grosse Politik, XV, 484-91, Metternich to Bulow, March
19, 1900.

44G. Buckle, Letters pf Queen Victoria, III, 462.

100

Since Chamberlain's Leicester Speech, the French press

had become increasingly more anti-British. The entire
country, wrote the British ambassador in Paris ”... ap-
pears to have gone mad with jealousy, spite and resent-
ment."45 Many Frenchmen thought that this was the Oppor-
tunity to take revenge for Fashoda. The German ambassador
in France reported that in January of 1900 the French now
hated the British with the same intensity that they once
held for the Germans.46 England was in a more perilous
position than she realized.

Although many members of the English Cabinet were
not fearful of hostility on the part of the continental
powers, precautionary measures were taken to protect the
colonies. Some consternation was felt by the Opposition,
however, for Lord Roseberry warned of the danger and urged
that conscription be considered. The entire matter rested
upon what decisions were made in Berlin. It was unlikely
that France would move unless she were certain of the
safety of her eastern frontier. For these reasons the

Bundesrath incident was fraught with danger.

 

4{British Documents, 1, No. 500, p. 242, Monson to Salis-

bury, Dec. 1, 1899.

 

46Grosse Politik, XVIII, Part II, pp. 765-6, Munster to
Hohenlohe, March 5, 1900.

101

During the height of the crisis Bfilow had sug-
gested the possibility of Germany's joining a combination
against England. Russia particularly was interested in
making some gains at the English.expense. The Russian
Czar was very interested in joining a combination against
the British, for he believed that the combined fleets of
Germany, Russia and one more North Sea power would be

47 It was con-

more than a match for the British fleet.
sidered an opportune time to attack England either in
open battle or by more subtle means. The favorite game
of twisting the lion's tail never appeared more fascinat-
ing. Although nothing materialized, the danger remained
imminent. England's relations with Germany were definitely
and irreparably damaged by the Bundesrath crisis.
Anglo-German relations had reached a new low.
There seemed little possibility that the statesmen of the
two countries could meet on a middle ground. The Lei-
cester speech had been received with hostility and antago-
nism in Germany. Bfilow had permitted Chamberhain to
believe that an understanding was possible and then had
abandoned him. Furthermore Bdlow's aggressive telegrams
sent after the seizure of the Bpndesrath had moved Lord

Salisbury to such a resentment as he had ever evinced.

 

47Lee, Edward VII, I, 762-5; British Documents, VI, NO. 129.

102

Evidently, definite security for Britain must be found in
a settlement with France and Russia if Germany continued
to prove more aggressive than reliable. However, the
opening of a new century brought not only new problems

but another Opportunity for England and Germany to work

for reconciliation.

CHAPTER IV

The Last Bid for a German Alliance

Between the years 1890 to 1904 many problems
faced the European governments. Of all these problems,
the Far Eastern question proved to be the most dangerous
and complex, for the integrity of the Chinese Empire was
in jeopardy. Unlike other trouble spots, there were no
Spectacular characters to deal with if we eliminate the
Empress Dowager, Tsze Hsi, but the conflicting interests
of no less than five major powers threatened at any
moment to disrupt the peace of the world.

After the occupation of KiaO-Chau, Port Arthur,
Wei-hai-wei and Kuang-Chow in 1898, there had been a
general scramble by the major powers for further conces-
sions. The utter helplessness of the Chinese government
to thwart these foreign enroachments was apparent to all.
Even the Emperor Kuang-hsu could no longer shut his eyes
to the situation. It was Obvious that he would have to
do something drastic in order to forestall the partition
of his empire. His solution was a westernizing reform

of China along the lines which Japan had earlier taken.

104

However, he advanced entirely too fast. Like all reformers
the Emperor had more zeal than caution. He had failed to
reckon with the Dowager Empress, Tsze H51, and her Manchu
followers who were all conservatives. A plan was insti-
gated to remove the Old Empress, but she Obtained know-
ledge of it and overturned the government. The European-
powers had given no support to the Emperor's reform move-
ment, for they were chiefly interested in gaining more
and more concessions. This oversight was to cost the
European powers dearly in the future. They had allowed
the Dowager Empress to gain control of the Chinese govern-
ment, not realizing that of all people she held the most .
bitter emnity toward them.

The Far Eastern crisis of the winter of 1897-
1898 had left as the two chief rivals Russia and England.
Both the Russians and the English had joined in the race
for commercial and territorial concessions but had not
arranged a compromise between themselves. Furthermore,
as we have seen, the British had been unsuccessful in
Obtaining allies to assist them in blocking Russia's
advance into China. The Russians had not only planted
themselves securely in Manchuria, but were now invading
central China. On June 27, 1898 the Franco-Belgian
syndicate, which was backed by the Russo-Chinese Bank,

secured the all important concession for the Peking to

105

Hankow railroad. When this line was completed, it would
bring the Russian influence and interests to the Yangtze
River which England considered her own Sphere of influ-
ence. British protests were ignored by the Peking govern-
ment which ratified the concession.. Therefore, the
British did the next best thing.

The English government gave its support to the
Hongkong and Shanghai Bank which was trying to finance a

railroad from Tientsin to Shankaikwan and thence to Man-

churia. The road was to be built by the Chinese but the
Bank was to hold a mortgage on it. The Russian minister
in China immediately registered a protest against the
agreement. However the British were determined to remain
firm. They intended to make an issue Of it if possible.

Lord Salisbury telegraphed to his minister at Peking:

If you see no Objection to doing so
you may inform Yamen that Her Maj-
esty's Government will support them
against any Power which commits an
act of aggression on China because
China has granted to a British sub-
ject permission to make or support1
a railroad or similar public work.

However, this assurance proved Of no avail for the Russians

Obtained an agreement to stop the railroad at Shanhaikwan.

 

1British Documents, I, No. 55, p. 56, Salisbury to Mac-
Donald, July 22, 1898.

 

106

However, as Russia was unprepared to fOrce the
issue to the point of an international crisis, she ap-
proached the British Foreign Office with a plan for con-
ciliation. It soon became evident that the British no
longer had hopes of maintaining an Open DOor in China.
They were almost equally interested in obtaining spheres
Of influence and more concessions. The Russians were
willing to recognize the Yangtze Basin as a British sphere
if the British in return would recognize Manchuria as a
Russian sphere. Negotiations between the two countries
began in February 1899 and concluded with an exchange of
notes in April 1899. The two powers agreed on three

major points as follows:

1. Russia engaged not to seek for
herself or on behalf Of Russian sub-
jects or other railroad Concessions
in the Yangtze basin2 and not to
place obstacles either directly or
indirectly in the way of railroad
enterprises in that region supported
by the British government.

2. Similar engagement, mutatis
mutandis by Great Britain with regard
to railway concessions north of’the
Great Wall.

 

2In answer to a question in the House of Commons on May 18,
it was stated that "... the Yangtze Bashl has been defined
as the provinces adjoining the Yangtze River, and Honan
and Chekiang.” Parliamentapy_Debates, Fourth Series,

Vol. 71, 20.

107

5. The two powers having no intention
of infringing in any way on the sover-
eign rights of China or existing trea-
ties, agreed to communicate to the
Chinese Government the present arrange-
ment, which, by averting all cause Of
complications between them, is of a
nature to serve the interests of China
herself.5

It will be noticed that this agreement covered
only railroad concessions. As no other power had recogn-
ized the agreement, the Russian acceptance was of little
value. No guarantee, furthermore, had been received for
trade Opportunities. The weakness Of this agreement was
apparent to all. It soon necessitated further understand-
ings with Russia which were not forthcoming. England
realized that She had obtained no material advantage from
this arrangement. She soon had to cast about for new
securities.

Not long after this agreement was signed, Russia
made moves to acquire more concessions in China which
would represent a definite threat to British interests.
England's only hOpe was to set aside the Yangtze Valley
' as a sphere of influence. However, the seemingly inade-

quate policy of the British government gave rise to severe

criticism in Parliament. Sir Charles Dilke accused the

 

3British Documents, I, No. 61, pp. 40-41, Salisbury to
Bax-Ironside, April 50, 1899.

108

government of trying to "ride two horses.“ He said that
the attempts by the government to hold to the Open Door
policy while at the same time working for the Yangtze
sphere had caused confusion and failure of both policies.4
Much the same attitude was taken in the periodical press.5

The government's reply was not very reassuring.
Broderick, who soon was to be the new Secretary for war,
stated that ”We cannot make the Yangtze Valley a province
like Shantung or Manchuria, first because it is infinitely
larger, and secondly, we are not prepared to undertake the
immense responsibility of governing what is practically a
third Of China."6 In other words the government was con-
tinuing its two way policy. Nonetheless, the situation
still remained tense, whereas new problems appeared in a
neighboring state.

Since the seizure of Port Arthur, Japanese influ-
ence had replaced that of Russia in China. Therefore,
the Russians turned their interests to Korea. Since 1895
the Russian naval authorities had been interested in

Nasampo and the nearby island of Kargodo as a possible

 

4Parliamentary Debates, Fourth Series, Vol. 72, 778 ff.

5Senex, "The White Man's Burden in China," Contemporgpy
Review, LXXVI (1899), pp. 518-22. R. S. Gundry, "The

Yangtze Region," Fortnightly Review, Vol. 66 (1899), pp.
448-64. R. S. Gundry, "China: Spheres of Interest, and

the Open Door," Fortnightly Review, Vol. 66 (1899), pp. 57-52.

6Parliamentary Debateg, Series Four, Vol. 72, 805 ff.

109

naval base. For several months during the year 1899,
Russian attempts to obtain the base had failed, because
Japan had interfered. However, on March 16, 1900 a
Russian squadron anchored off the coast of Korea. The
admiral went to Seoul and there Obtained the desired con-
cession. News of this success caused great consternation
not only in Japan but in England as well. The British
ambassador in Tokyo reported that "... this establishment
unimportant in the beginning, might later on assume a
more formidable character, constituting a permanent menace
to Japan."7 The situation nearly brought on war, for the
Japanese navy wasmobilized and part of the army placed in
readiness.

It is necessary to understand this brief sketch
of how affairs stood in the Far East. For the events had
direct bearing upon Anglo-German alliance which began in

1898. A breakdown which was to be complete and irrevocable.

The Boxer Uprising

Against this background ofbmminent disaster, a
storm of an entirely different nature broke. This was
the so-called Boxer Rebellion. There seems little doubt

that the Chinese Government, and especially the Dowager

 

7British Documents, II, No. 59, p. 52, Satow to Salis-
bury, March 51, 1900.

110

Empress, had a hand in the uprising. It was, in fact,

not an uprising against the government SO much as an
active protest against the foreigners. The result was
that the foreign legation was surrounded and besieged with
loss of life to the foreigners. It was against this back-
ground that Chamberlain decided tO make a final bid for
an Anglo-German alliance.

The question of relieving the besieged legation
became Of paramount consideration in the European capitals
and in the United States. This emergency momentarily
united the great powers of EurOpe with each other as well
as with the United States. The selection of a supreme
commander of the forces Of the allies proved a ticklish
one. The German Emperor demanded that his candidate,
Count Waldersee, should have the position. The Kaiser
had grandiose hopes that his field marshal would rescue
the foreigners. He hOped, thereby, to add more laurels
to his great army by a victory over the "Yellow Peril.”
Bfilow obtained the somewhat reluctant consent of the other
powers, and Waldersee became the Supreme Commander.8 All
these fancies and hopes on the part of William II were
annulled by actual events. Count Whldersee did not arrive

in China until September 27, whereas the allied troops had

 

8Bernhard von Bulow, Memoirs, I, 427.

111

entered Peking and rescued the ministers on August 15.
The German Emperor's demands and boasts had greatly irri-
tated the other powers, and now they took comfort in his
obvious embarrassment. Later events placed him in a
ludicrous position.

Hardly had the legations been relieved than the
Russians decided to withdraw their troops. Count wald-
ersee found himself in an invidious position. The French
would in all events follow their ally, Russia, and the
United States, on the eve of a presidential election,
wanted to escape from their unpopular position. The

Germans had from the start been the driving force in the

fl

‘ International Relieving Force. However, they had gone

into the affair with more greed than caution; they now
found that their whole position in China depended on
England. With the support Of the British, they might be
able to maintain themselves, but if the British withdrew
along with the other allies, the Germans faced a humiliat-
ing defeat. This was important in a country where prestige
counted for so much.

Chamberlain saw a golden opportunity to use the
predicament of the Germans to advantage and Obtain his
long desired alliance. As the minister reSponsible for
Malaya and Hongkong, Chamberlain was very interested in

the British policy in China. Although the South African

112

War made any fresh commitments in the Far East impossible,
Chamberlain decided to cooperate with the Germans in
China. He believed that it was only by combination with
Germany that Russia could be prevented from consolidating
the occupation of Manchuria with further gains.

Several of Chamberlain's colleagues in the cabinet
agreed with him. They found fault with Salisbury's hostile
attitude toward Berlin and his acceptance of Russian en-
croachments. They also criticized his failure to give
more sympathetic support to Waldersee, whose difficulty
seemed a golden opportunity for Britain to improve rela-
tions with Berlin. Several of the more prominent cabinet
members expressed their feelings in letters to Chamberlain.
These men were afraid that Salisbury would let his personal
dislike for the Emperor and for the Germans overrule his
better judgment, and thereby fail to make political capital
of the situation in‘China.9

Prompted by these letters, Chamberlain stated the
views of the dissident ministers in a lengthy memorandum

at a cabinet meeting (September 10). He pointed out that

 

9Julian Amery, Tpp_Life pf Joseph Chamberlain, (New York,
1951), IV, 158-40. Goschen was First Lord of the Admir-
alty and Broderick became Secretary for War in October,
1900. See Appendix for text of letters.

115

Russia by withdrawing her troops from Peking would place
the Emperor in a very humiliating position. If Britain
would stand by him, his position would be more tenable.
England could thereby do a great service to Germany and
receive in return satisfactory assurances. Chamberlain
stressed the fact that England was not strong enough by
herself to contain Russia in China. In the long run
England and the United States would have to work for the
Open Door, but this would take time. Meanwhile, by work-
ing closely with Germany (and Japan), England could meet

the immediate threat of Russian eXpansion.lo
The Yangtge Agreement

Not all of the government shared Chamberlain's
optimism. Mr. Bertie in a memorandum of September 15, 1900
stated that "As to making use of Germany to come between
the Russians and ourselves in China, we are not likely to
have much success?11 Disregarding this warning, and out-
numbered by his colleagues, Salisbury reluctantly yielded
tO pressure. Negotiations began for an Anglo-German agree-
ment to maintain the principle Of the Open Door in China.
The course of events seemed to confirm Salisbury's mis-

givings. The Germans wanted to confine the agreement

 

10Ibid., p. 140.

11British Documenth II, NO. 12, p. 11.

114

solely to the Yangtze Valley, but Salisbury told Hatz-
feldt that he "... could not accept any special stipula-
tion in favor of the principle of free trade in the Yang-
tze Valley or in any other particular part of China, for
its effect would be held to be, and, in fact, would be to
abandon free trade in the other parts of the Chinese
dominions."12

The German request was all too plain. They were
not prepared to resist Russia's advance in the northern
provinces. However, they proposed a rigid, but local,
application of the Open Door principle, and thereby exclude
England from Central China. This was not what Chamberlain
had intended, but rather the opposite. Needless to say
Salisbury refused this proposal. Finally the two coun-
tries agreeded to maintain the Open Door policy through-
out the territories Of China "... as far as they can

15

exercise influence." When the agreement was made

public, John Hay, the American Secretary of State, wrote:

When the Anglo-German Pact came out,
I took a day or two to find out what
it meant. I soon learned from Berlin
that it meant a horrible practical
joke on England. From London I found

 

12Ibid., p. 12.

‘lélpig., No. 17, enclosure, pp. 15-16. Oct. 15, 1900.
I have included the English draft of the agreement in
the appendix.

115

out what I had suspected, but what

it astounded me after all to be

assured Of--that they did not know:

When Japan joined the pact, I asked

them why. They said, 'We don't

know, only if there is any fun going

on we want to be in.‘14

Although Hay's comment was somewhat exaggerated,

there was a great deal Of truth in it. The agreement
was so vague that trouble was bound to be forthcoming.
Salisbury wrote to the German ambassador: "I confess
that since you have altered it to make it more agreeable
to Russia, I am not very much in love with this agreement.
It is liable to so much misunderstanding."15 Furthermore
most Of the English statesmen were dissatisfied with the
agreement. They did not think that it would in any way
deter Russia from her advance on China. In addition the
agreement contained no guarantee that Germany would take
a firm stand against Russia. The Duke of Devonshire, one
of Germany's best friends in England, wrote that he could
not understand why Salisbury had permitted Manchuria's

being excluded from the agreement. "In consequence of

this restriction the whole agreement is not worth the

 

14William R. Thayer, Life and Letters p§_John Hgy (2 vols.,
Boston, 1915), II, 248.

15British Documentp, II, NO. 58, p. 51, enclosure 6,
Salisbury to Hatzfeldt, Oct. 6, 1900.

116

16

paper it is written on." It was Obvious that if any

gains were made they were made by Germany. The Germans

had succeeded in stOpping England from establishing her-
self in the Yangtze, while securing British assurance of
the maintenance of the Open Door in the important areas.
All this had been.achieved without committing Germany to
Oppose Russian designs.

Salisbury's and other Englishmen's fears that the
agreement would prove ineffectual in stopping Russia soon
proved well founded. The reply from the Russian capital
regarding the agreement was evasive but the meaning was

clear:

The arrangement concluded between
Germany and England does not per-
ceptibly modify from our point of
view, the situation in China.

The first point of this agree-
ment, stipulating that the ports on
the rivers and littoral of China
wherever the two Governments exer-
cise their influence should remain
free and open to commerce can be
favorably entertained by Russia,
this stipulation not prejudicing
in any way the status gpp_estab-
lisheg in China by existing trea-
ties. 7

In other words the Russians chose to interpret this

 

16Eckardstein, Ten Years, p. 177.

”British Documents. II. No. 20, p. 17, Hardinge to
Salisbury, Oct. 28, 1900.

117

article as restricting the Open Door to those areas in
Which England and Germany had Special interests. Evi-
dently Russia did not intend to be forestalled by the
agreement.

The New Year brought matters to a head and set-
tled the worth of the Yangtze Agreement. On January 5,
1901 Russia had extorted the so-called Alexieff-Tseng
agreement from China. This agreement gave Russia the
right to virtually annex Manchuria under a thinly dis-

guised protectorate. Actually Russia was to Obtain con

trol of the Manchurian railway system, which would mean

a considerable extension of Russian influence. Britain
now had every right to call upon Germany to join her in

a joint protest against this encroachment. This Germany
did not do. In fact Bfilow declared Openly in the Reich-
stag that "... we shall take good care not to do other
peOple's business in China. We have no thought of serv-
ing as a lightning rod for any other power."18 This
reply coupled with Waldersee's Obvious inclination toward
the Russians to England's detriment, created a very unfor-
tunate impression in London. The grave and urgent nature

of the Far Eastern Situation caused Chamberlain to attempt

another bid for reconciliation.

 

18Grosse Politik, XVI, pp. 259, 281-6, Bfilow to the
Kaiser, Nov. 19, 1900.

118

Last Attempt and Failure

Two considerations seemed to have encouraged
Chamberlain to make his final efforts toward Anglo-
German reconciliation. After a tremendous ovation and
welcome in France, President Kruger had reached Germany
in the first week of December 1900. He proceeded to
Berlin expecting a similar reception. However, on the
advice of Bulow, the Kaiser declined to receive him.
Bfilow was fearful that if Kruger were received, it would

19 This

have an adverse effect Of Anglo-German relations.
seemed to Chamberlain a good sign.

The second consideration concerned the conduct
of British foreign policy. In October of 1900 a general
election had taken place in England. Salisbury's major-
ity fell from 152 to 128. As a result, the Prime Minister
reconstructed his cabinet. Nearing his seventy-second
year, he at last relinquished the Foreign Office to Lord
Lansdowne who had been in the war Department. This was
a happy change, for Lansdowne was known to sympathize
with the pro-German element of the Cabinet.

However, these were only incidental considera-
tions. The primary cause of Chamberlain's decision still

concerned as always with the urgent need for Britain to

abandon isolation which no longer was Splendid or secure.

 

19 a
Bernhard Von Bulow, Memoirs, I, 544.

119

On January 9, 1901 Eckardstein, who had again
been chosen as intermediary, received a 1etter.from the
Duchess of Devonshire. She invited him to the Devon-
shire estate, Chatsworth, for a weekend visit. "Pray
come without fail," she wrote, "as the Duke has several
urgent political questions to discuss with you. You will
also find here Joseph Chamberlain."20 Eckardstein was
then in active charge Of the German Embassy due to the
protracted illness of Hatzfeldt. He seemed a good choice
as an intermediary for two reasons. He was sincerely
anxious to bring England and Germany together, and his
personal ambition to succeed Hatzfeldt as ambassador.

The conversation between Chamberlain and Eckard-
stein took place in the library of the Devonshire home on
the evening of January 16. NO mention of the meeting
has been found among the Chamberlain papers, and our in-
formation is based upon a version framed by Eckardstein

and Hatzfeldt.

At a recent meeting of Freiherr von
Eckardstein with Mr. Chamberlain at
the country house of the Duke of
Devonshire, the Colonial Minister
made among other statements the fol-
lowing important declaration:

 

20Eckardstein, Ten Years, p. 184.

120

He and his friends in the Cabinet had
made up their minds that the day of
"splendid isolation“ was over. Eng-
land must look about for allies for

the future. The choice was either
Russia and France or the Triple Alli-
ance. Both in the Cabinet and in the
public there were those who wished for
and eagerly worked for an understand-
ing with Russia; and who were moreover
ready to pay a very high price to Ob-
tain this Object. He himself did not
belong to those who wished for an asso-
ciation with Russia; he was rather con-
vinced that a combination with Germany
and an association with the Triple Alli-
ance was preferable. He himself would
do everything to bring about a gradual
advance in this direction. For the
present he was in favor of arranging a
secret agreement between Great Britain
and Germany with reference to Morocco
on the basis that had already been put
forward. His advice was that the mat-
ter should be taken up as soon as Lord
Salisbury left for the South, and that
details should be negotiated with Lord
Lansdowne and himself. SO long as he,
Mr. Chamberlain, was convinced that a
permanent partnership with Germany was
possible he would absolutely oppose any
idea of an arrangement with Russia. But
should a permanent partnership with Ger-
many prove unreliable, he would then sup-
port an association with Russia in Spite
Of the excessive price that England
would probably have to pay for it in
China and the Persian Gulf. He wished
these remarks of his, except in so far
as they bore on the Morocco question,

to be considered for the present not

as an overture but only as an academic
subject for discussion.‘

 

211912.. pp. 185-6. Grosse Politik, XVII, 14-15, Hatz-
feldt to the Foreign Office, Jan. 18, 1901.

121

It was plain from this message that Chamberlain's
purpose was to ally England with the Triple Alliance.
However, as he knew that it would be impossible to Obtain
either the public's approval or the Cabinet's consent,
he suggested another point as a beginning. This was to
be a secret treaty over Morocco, a transaction to which
he and Lansdowne could bring the Cabinet in the absence
of Salisbury. Furthermore public opinion need not be
consulted. Chamberlain knew that an immediate alliance
was out of the question for two reasons, Salisbury was
still Premier and there was too much hostility between
the two countries over the Boer war. But the Colonial
Secretary hoped that from a Moroccan agreement, the gen-
eral alliance would eventually grow.

Anticipating that the dreaded Holstein would
Object to Chamberlain's proposals, Hatzfeldt sent a sep-
arate telegram to him along with the dispatch to the
German Foreign Office.

You and I are entirely in agreement

that the idea of an Alliance is still
premature. Chamberlain, however, seems

to share this view, desiring that parti-
cular agreements about Morocco etc. shall
lead up to the later general understanding.
That might suit us. Meanwhile, it is to
be hoped that the coolness between Eng-
land and America, resulting from the
growing intimacy of the latter with Russia,
will still increase, and that then, more

and more, England will have to depend on
us.

122

The hope Chamberlain almost
Openly expresses of soon becoming
free Of Lord Salisbury and remain-
ing master of the situation is worthy
of careful note. It seems likely
that when Salisbury goes South, as
he will for several months, Chamber-
lain and his friends--Lansdowne is
one of thg chief-- will take the ini-
tiative. (

This telegram is very important, for it repre-
sents the clearest approach to Chamberlain's prOposal that
would be made by the Germans. However, Bfilow, who by now
was German Chancellor, saw only difficulties in the pro-
posal. His first reply to it was evasive. He thought
that it would be better to wait and leave the initiative
to England. He did not think England could be trusted
in a new agreement after the experience over the Portu-
guese colonies. The Chancellor did not believe that Eng-
land and the Dual Alliance would ever come to an.under-
standing. He hoped to gain by later English discomforts.25
Although this reply was in the negative, it did leave the
matter open for further discussion.

While these negotiations were getting under way,

the Kaiser was celebrating the two hundredth anniversary

of the Prussian Kingdom. However a telegram from

 

22Grosse Politik, XVII, p. 17, Hatzfeldt to Holstein,
Jan. 18, 1901. Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 186-7.

2
sGrosse Politgg, XVII, pp. 17-18.

125

Eckardstein caused the Emperor to cut short the celebra-
tions and make preparations to leave immediately for
England. Baron Eckardstein had telegraphed the news that
Queen Victoria was dying. With characteristic impulse,
William II booked passage on a channel boat immediately.
Accompaniedby his uncle, the Duke of Connaught, the duti-
ful grandson rushed to the dying Queen. All the Kaiser's
advisers were against the trip. They knew that the jour-
ney would be unpopular with the German public. Bfilow
attempted to get his master to delay his departure but

24

without success. Even the Kaiser's consort was fearful

that his stay in England would be misinterpreted at home.25
Nevertheless, the Emperor did reach his grand-

mother in time to see her before she died. His action in

rushing to the bedside of the Queen was appreciated tre-

mendously by the English people. For some days to come

he was the center Of the nation's affection.

It was while he was in London that he learned for
the first time of the Chatsworth proposal. Evidently
moved by his kind reception in England, he was inclined
to accept the offer. However, his ardor was soon damp-

ened by Bulow who cautioned that a waiting policy was

 

24Bernhard von Bfilow, Memoirs, I, 578.

25Ibid., p. 581.

124

best. The Kaiser obeyed and in a long conversation with
Lord Lansdowne, he warned against both Russia and the
United States. The best hope for Europe was to work

26 But he made no

together against Russia and America.
commitments.

The day after Victoria's funeral, the Kaiser left
for Germany. His visit marked a turning point in the
negotiations. Had he been wise enough to follow his own
instinct and encourage; Chamberlain, something would have
come of the proposal. Had he and Chamberlain reached an
understanding then on China and Morocco, possibly they
might have concluded a full alliance. Here seems to have
been a wonderful Opportunity. However, the Wilhelmstrasse
had decided against such an alliance. Influenced by
Bfilow's advice, the Kaiser made no attempt to see Chamber-
lain. This omission On the part of the Emperor appeared

as a direct rebuff to the proposals. There never appeared
another chance to repair the damage done.

After the Kaiser left England, the affair seemed
for awhile to have been drOpped. But in March the two
countries entered into direct negotiations for an alli-

ance. According to Chamberlain's biographer, the

 

26Lord Thomas W. Newton, Lord Lansdowne (London, 1929),
p. 199.

125

responsibility for this movement lay with Eckardstein.27
Hoping to effect an alliance between Germany and England,
he took a personal initiative. Although his motives may
have been high, his methods were dubious. His first Step
was to see Chamberlain. A meeting was finally arranged
for March 18, 1901. In a telegram to Holstein, Eckard-
stein reported the conversation. The telegram read in

part:

The efforts that are being made in
Russian official quarters are shown
by what Chamberlain said to me today:
'We would gladly approach Germany
with far-reaching proposals which
would assure it as great advantages
as, or even greater advantages than
ourselves. But as we know for a fact
that everything that Berlin hears is
at once passed on to Petersburg, no
one can wonder if in the future we
maintain the greatest reserve towards
Germany.'

In the further course of con-
versation, Chamberlain said that he
held in principle the same views about
Germany that he had eXpressed to the
Kaiser and Count Bfilow at Windsor the
year before; but that he was not parti-
cularly anxious to burn his fingers a
second time over the same business.28

From this unrewarding meeting, Eckardstein went

to one with the Foreign Minister. The German was careful

 

27J. Amery, Joseph Chamberlain. IV: 155-

28Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 204-5.

126

to emphasize that he spoke only for himself. He sug-

gested that:

... the German Government, ..., would
entertain favorably the idea Of an
understanding ... with this country.

The kind of awarrangement which
he contemplated might be described as
a purely defensive alliance between the
two powers. directed solely against
France and Russia.

So long as Germany or England
were attacked by one only of the other
two Powers the Alliance would not
Operate, but if either Germany or
England had to defend itself against
both France and Russia, Germany would
have to help England or England Germany
as the case might be.29

Eckardstein in his Official report to Holstein
states that Lansdowne suggested the alliance. However,
the Foreign Minister emphatically concludes a letter to
Lascalles with the words ”... I feel no doubt that he

30 It is

[Eckardstein] has been desired to sound me."
Obvious from Eckardstein's memoirs that LanSdowne's

version was the true one. For the German wrote that on
the sixteenth of March he had given Lansdowne a strong

hint to approach "... us with an offer of alliance."3l'

 

2
9British Documents, II, NO. 77, p. 61, Lansdowne to
Lascalles, March 18, 1901.

Idem.

51Eckardstein, Ten Years, p. 208.

127

He also shows that the idea Of a defensive alliance had
been suggested by Holstein in a communication of a few
days earlier.32

As before, Eckardstein's deception mislead both
the German and British foreign Offices. Each thought the
other side was eagerly seeking the alliance. In London
the Cabinet was none too enthusiastic. Although they
wanted an understanding, they feared any far reaching
international arrangement.33 The German government,
however, thought that now was the moment of England's
extremity. It was a propitious opportunity to raise the
terms. Not only must England join the Triple Alliance
and this agreement be ratified by Parliament, but all
future negotiations must be directed to Vienna.34 This
was by way of reassuring Austria that she was still an
important member Of the Alliance.35

Negotiations, however, with Germany be way of
Austria were impossible. It was hardly feasible that
Parliament would agree to Britain's joining the Triple

Alliance, and even less likelytwr. that a guarantee by

 

32Ibid., p. 205.

35British Documents, II, No. 79, p. 62, Lansdowne to
Lascalles, Mar. 29, 1901.

54Eckardstein, Ten Years, p. 209.

35German Documents, III, 144, Richthofen to Hatzfeldt,
April 14, 1901.

 

128

the internally discordant Dual Empire would be acceptable.
Diplomatically such an.arrangement would, no doubt, have
embroiled Britain more deeply with Russia.

Eckardstein did not mention this Vienese proviso
in a subsequent conversation with Lord Lansdowne. Nego-
tiations were held up at this point by Germany's demands
for compensation for the destruction of German private
property and loss Of trade in South Africa as a result
of the Boer War. Also the Germans were trying to exact
a larger war indemnity from China. Many of these demands
were considered unjustified and extravagant.36 Matters
seemed to have reached another stalemate.

However, by mid-April Lansdowne told Eckardstein
that he was consulting with Chamberlain and Devonshire
about the alliance. He gave the German the most encourage-
ment he was to receive. Lansdowne said that he, Cham-
berlain and Devonshire were for the alliance and "As for
Lord Salisbury, I do not doubt that he will also decide
in favor. Times have changed."57. Eckardstein was the
narrator of this conversation and even its authenticity
is doubted. Having embarked on a program of deception,

he had to make his story as good as possible. Contrary

 

36Eckardstein, Ten Years, pp. 212-215.

57J. Amery, Joseph Chamberlain, IV, 156.

129

to his instructions from Berlin, Eckardstein was also
prodding the Japanese minister in London, Count Hayashi,
to take the initiative in proposing an Anglo-German-
Japanese alliance. Eckardstein told him that Lansdowne,
Balfour, Chamberlain and Devonshire had for some time
desired such an alliance and recently Salisbury had also
accepted the suggestion.38
The final crisis came in May. Hatzfeldt who had
returned to London.after a visit to Germany for his health,
took personal control of the negotiations. He knew that
to mention that the negotiations should betcarried on
through Austria would be fatal to the alliance. However,
he did appreciate why the Wilhelmstrasse should adhere
to the demand that England should join the Triple Alli-
ance. Therefore, he asked Lansdowne for a meeting in
order to discuss fully the alliance. A fruitless con-
versation took place. The German ambassador insisted that
unless England joined the Triple Alliance, there could
be no agreement. Without this conditio sine duo non,

Germany would be compelled to look elsewhere for an

alliance.39

 

38E. A. Pooley, ed., The Secret Memoirs pf Count Tadasu
Hayashi (New York, 1915), p. 119.

5
9British Documents, II, NO. 82, pp. 64-5, Memorandum
by Lansdowne, May 24, 1901.

150

In the course of the conversation, Lansdowne
indicated that he was interested in getting something
down on paper. This is proved by his request to one of
his undersecretaries, Lord Sanderson, to draw up a draft
outlining the possible terms Of the projected alliance.4O
Far more important was the memorandum drawn up by Lord
Salisbury himself on May 29. In it he questioned the

advantages of an agreement for England:

The liability of having to defend the
German and Austrian frontiers against
Russia is heavier than that of having
pp_defend the Epitish Isles against
France. Even, therefore, in its most
naked aspect the bargain would be a
bad one for this country. Count Hatz-
feldt speaks of our "isolation" as
constituting a serious danger for us.
Have pg ever felt that danger practi-
cally? ... It would hardly be wise
to incur novel and most onerous Obli-
gations, in order to guard against g
danger gp whose existence yg_have pp,
historical reason for believing.

But though the proposed arrange-
ment, even from this point of view,
does not seem to me admissible, these
are not by any means the weightest
Objections that can be urged against
it. The fatal circumstance is that
neither pp nor the Germans are com-
petent pp_make the suggested promises.
The British Government cannot under-
take to declare war, for any purpose,
unless it is a purpose of which the
electors of this country would approve.
If the Government promised to declare
war for an object which did not commend

 

401331-999 NO. 85’ pp. 66-8.

151

itself to public Opinion, the pro-

mise would be repudiated, and the

Government turned out.... We might,

to some extent, divest ourselves of

the full responsibility Of such a

step, py_1ayingour Agreement with

the Triple Alliance before Parliament

as soon as it is concluded. But there

are very grave Objections to such a

course, and I do not understand it to 41

be recommended by the German Ambassador.

Germany's terms were unacceptable to the inner
Cabinet consisting of Salisbury, Lansdowne, Chamberlain,
Balfour and Hicks Beach [Chancellor of the Exchequer].42
Salisbury would not guarantee such an agreement. He did
not believe that Parliament would sanction an open con-
nection with the Triple alliance. Neither would he
undertake a secret contract which might not be upheld by
a later government. It seems apparent that Lansdowne had
been promised a memorandum by Eckardstein on just exactly
what the German terms were to be. However, the Foreign
Minister never received this memorandum. The Salisbury
memorandum and the failure to receive the promised German
draft spelled finis to the negotiations.
This was the end of the attempts to revive an

alliance between the two countries. It was true that

 

41Ibid., no. 86, pp. 68-9, Memorandum by Salisbury, May 29,

1901.

42Ibid., pp. 64-71.

152

Germany, under the misrepresentations created by Eckard-
stein, continued to press the issue. However, Lansdowne
met each prOposal with courtesy, but the matter was
closed. As Bertie wrote "If once we bind ourselves by a
formal defensive alliance and practically join the Tri-
plice, we shall never be on decent terms with France our
neighbor in Europe and in many parts of the world, or
‘with Russia whose frontiers are coterminous with ours.r.
over a large portion Of Asia.”45 This was indeed the end.
Eckardstein had received in June his last communication
revealing that Chamberlain had lost all heart for the
alliance and would have nothing more to do with the Ger-

man government.

Chamberlain's last bid for a German alliance pro-
bably marked a great turning point in history. Had it
cOme about, no doubt history would have been greatly altered.
The greatest sea power would have been allied with the
greatest land army. Together their combined industrial
might was unmatched. Behind Germany were her two allies,
Italy and Austria; behind Britain would have been Japan.
The support of the United States would hardly have been

withheld. This grouping, inclined by its interests and

 

45Ibid., no. 91, p. 76, Memorandum by Mr. Bertie, Nov. 9,

1901.

4
4Ediardstein, Ten Years, p. 221, Alfred Rothschild to
Eckardstein, June, 14, 1901.

 

155

backed up by its power could have maintained peace in the
world and have controlled the events which led to the first
World War. It remains but to draw some conclusions as to

why this momentous project failed.

CONCLUSION

When the German government evaded the advances
made by Chamberlain, the negotiations came to an end. It
would appear, from all the evidence, that both England
and Germany had much to gain by such a partnership and
very little to lose. The failure of the negotiations
described in the preceeding chapters had several causes,
and it is difficult to assign a definite pattern to them.
However, I think that primarily we must consider the wide
divergence in the aims Of the two countries.

Chamberlain had come to the realization that iso-
lation was a dangerous luxury which England could no
longer afford. However, he never considered for a moment
that England's sun was setting. Nor did he contemplate
surrendering British supremacy as the price for an alli-
ance. He had approached the Germans with two purposes in
mind. He wanted Germany's aid in those regions where the
Situation seemed uncertain; China, the Middle East and
the Moorish Empire. He, also, desired an alliance with
Germany to forestall the formation of a hostile coalition

of Russia, Germany and France against Britain. It is

155

obvious that Chamberlain wanted Germany's aid to help
England out of her difficulties. Bulow and Holstein

were sharp enough to recognize the Englishman's purpOse,
but they made a drastic mistake when they assumed that it
was his sole purpose. Chamberlain knew that Germany
would not enter such.an arrangement and receive nothing
in return. Therefore, as he told Eckardstein at Chats-
worth, his ultimate goal was a complete juncture with the
Triple Alliance.

Herein lies the prime weakness of the entire pro-
ject. Chamberlain was not in control of British policy
when the crisis in China arose. Therefore, he was not
in a position to grant a full alliance, which is what
the Wilhelmstrasse demanded. All that lay in his power
he did. He offered a mediation of local issues in Morocco
and China. He was certain that he could get the Foreign
Office to support this project. He hoped that this in
turn would lead to the general alliance. In setting forth
this plan, he was, in reality, asking the Germans to take
two things on trust. First, he was sincere in declaring
for the alliance, and second, the British government would
come around to a full alliance eventually. However, to
have accepted Chamberlain's proposals with so little

guarantee would have taken a great deal of faith on the

156

part of Berlin. In fact, too much faith was needed, for
the Kaiser's counsellors vetoed the project. Mistrust
was one motive, but it was not their primary one.

We must recognize that Germany was never in a
position to reject an alliance Offer, for none was ever
made. I, furthermore, believe that they never wanted
one, certainly not for the same reasons that Chamberlain
wanted it. Their primary political aim, which was ill-
concealed, was to succeed England as the supreme power in
Europe. They already had the strongest army. Had not
this been proven. in the Danish, Austrian and French wars?
They already had a powerful industrial development which I
rivaled and even surpassed that of the British.1 The
Germans were also building a fleet. Once it was launched,
Germany, indeed, would have surpassed England materially.
However, the building of the fleet would take time. There-
fore, it was to Germany's interest to avoid any commit-
ment which might embroil her in a war with France or
Russia. This possibly eXplains the apparent reluctance
to take up Chamberlain's proposals concerning Morocco
and China. They needed time; time in which to build up
a fleet.

The German government was certain that they were

 

lSee appendix.

137

following the right policy. For they believed that they
were safe from any hostile coalition and, therefore,
needed no more allies. Having stirred up Anglophobia in
Germany in order to gain passage for the Navy Bill in the
Reichstag, an English alliance would have been politically
embarrassing. Furthermore, beset with the idea of a
decadent England, they were convinced that the future
would bring Britain to her extremity. Then Germany could
exact an immense price in colonial concessions in return
for the alliance. This brings us to the duplicity of
Eckardstein.

The misapprehension of the German Foreign Office
was due largely to the reporting of Eckardstein. Without
documentary evidence to prove his flagrant violation of
diplomatic traditions, it would be difficult to believe.
I am convinced that his actions were well meant, but
inexcusable. He violated everything which good diplomacy
stood for.

Eckardstein deliberately led his government to
believe that England was making the advances for a general
alliance and that even Lord Salisbury was in favor of it.
It is apparent that this was a gross fabrication, for
Salisbury was as much an isolationist in 1900 as he was
after the Crimean War. It is a conjecture, but supported

by his action, that Salisbury, if forced by extremities

138

which he could not control, would have preferred an alli-
ance with either Russia or France rather than with Ger-
many. He sincerely distrusted and personally disliked the
Germans. We can see that it was not good will that was
lacking in Germany but understanding. The Wilhelmstrasse
believed that England had projected an alliance and then
had abruptly dropped negotiations. Bfilow felt that since
England had made the first overture, she should make the
second.

In London, however, the government thought that
Germany had launched the idea only to follow it with
impossible conditions. They became convinced that Germany
was playing a questionable game. The net reselt was that
both sides were left suspicious and distrustful.

It seems that, as far as the Germans were concerned,
they had gambled on one conjecture and had lost. They
did not believe that England would ever pay the price for
an alliance with Russia. At least, never while the hope
of a German alliance was possible. As Bfilow wrote, reveale
ing his plan: "We must let hope shimmer on the horizon.
In this hope lies after all the surest guarantee that

the English will not surrender to the Russians."2

 

2Grosse Politik, XVII, 109, Marginal note to'a memorandum
by Holstein, Nov. 1, 1901.

 

139

This, I think, was a blunder for which Bulow has received
the most blame. For as he, himself, later confessed,

the Germans had completely underestimated the English.
Bfilow's scheme to raise the price for an alliance never
materialized, for as we know the British and the Russians
did come together.

In retrospect we can see that Germany's diplomats
made a serious blunder. Yet, misledby Eckardstein and
convinced that Salisbury was entirely too anti-German to
give his support to such an agreement, they were not
entirely to blame. Had the Wilhelmstrasse followed Hatz-
feldt's advice and changed their methods without changing
their ultimate goals, they might have gained in peace the
supremacy they lost through war. Had they taken their
share of China, Morocco and the Middle East in conjunc-
tion with England, they would have blocked England's
approach to the Dual Alliance. Increasing their fleet
in the meanwhile and eXpanding their trade might have
made them the dominant party in any Anglo-German alliance.
I think that we may justly conclude that Bulow and his
counsellors would have been well advised had they responded

with more warmth to Chamberlain's proposals.

 

5Bernhard von Bulow, Memoirs, I, 494.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

In writing history, it is of prime importance to
have afiailable the best and most reliable materials with
which to work. Such sources of information are published
documents, monographs and special historical studies,
memoirs, and periodicals. I have been fortunate in find-
ing these available in the Michigan State College and the
University of Michigan.Libraries.

The most important source available is published
documents, and for this particular essay the British
Documents 9g the Origin.g§_§hg fig; 1871-1914, edited by
George P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (ll vols., London,
1926-1938) proved of inestimable value. These volumes
contain not only the official dispatches but also con-
fidential minutes written on them, together with letters
and intimate papers of various kinds. These are arranged
on the basis of topics for easy reference. In writing
this paper, I have used Volumes I and II almost exclu-
sively.

Another publication which preceeded the British
Documents and upon which they were to a considerable

extent modelled, reveals the German side of the story.

141

This was Die Grosse Politik der Europafimhen Kabinette
1871-1914, edited by Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendels-
sohn Bartholdy and Friedrich Thimme (4O vols., Berlin,
1922-27). These greatly amplified the information given

in the British Documents and help reveal German policy

from the Franco-Prussian War to the outbreak of World War I.
A selection of some of the more interesting documents in
Die Grosse Politik has been translated into English by

E. T. S. Dugdale entitled German Diplomatic Documents

 

1871-1914 (4 vols., New York, 1928-1930). I have used
_these whenever possible.

A number of memoirs and official biographies threw
a great deal of light upon Specific points and issues of
this period and revealed opinions of the various leading
English and German diplomats. For the English my best
source was James Louis Garvin's, pig; 2; Joseph Chamberlain
(3 vols., London, 1955-34) of which the fourth volume is
by Julian Amery and published in September of 1951. Another
volume which must be used with great caution was Hermann

Frieherr Von Eckardstein's, Ten Years g; the Court 9; St,

 

James (New York, 1922) which is the English version of his
Lebenserinnerungen und Politsche Denkwurdigkeiten (2 vols.,
Leipzig, 1919). These are the recollections of the coun-

sellor of the German embassy in London. Although well

142

written, it is in the main unreliable. However it does
contain material unavailable elsewhere. Lady Gwendolen
Cecil's, Linggf Robert Marguis‘gf Salisbury (4 vols.,London,
1921-52) is an excellent source for revealing Lord Salis-
bury's previous career up to the year 1892, but they are
of little direct use to this thesis. Because of the dearth
of British source material, Egg Letters 9; nggg‘Victoria,
edited by George Earle Buckle (5rd. Series, London, 1952)
were of special interest and value. Sir Sidney Lee's,
KingEdward.Vll (2 vols., New York, 1925) contain a dis-
cussion of the Anglo-German problem, but the account is
incomplete, and extremely biased.

One could not get a clear idea of the German view-
point without consulting the Memoirs 92 Prince Von Bfllow
(4 vols., Boston, 1951-52). Volume I deals with this
period, but does not contain as much of his political
thought as is revealed in Die Grosse Politik. Grand Admi-
ral Tirpitz', My Memoirs (2 vols., New York, 1919) reveal
much which lay behind the scenes of German naval diplo-

macy. Isaac Don Levine's, Letters from the Kaiser t9 the

,Qggg (New York, 1920) reveal hitherto unpublished letters
as well as some contained in previous publications.

There were several biographies which gave inter-
esting glimpses of some of the contemporary figures as

well as their political thought. These included,

143

Harold Nicholson, Portrait gfig Diplomatist (New York,
1950), an account of the life of Sir Arthur Nicholson,
first Lord Carnock; J. A. Spender, Life, Journalism and
Politics (2 vols., New York, 1927), an account of these
vital pre-war years by the editor of the Westminister

Review; H. H. Asquith, The Genesis g£_the war (London,

 

1925), although not of much direct value to this paper,
revealed some interesting conclusions; Viscount Grey of
Fallodon, Twenty-Five Years 1892-1916 (2 vols., London,
1925), although covering the period with which this thesis
deals, does not impart any substantial evidence as Grey
was not in office; E. A. Pooley, ed., The Secret Memoirs
g£_Count Tadasu Hayashi (New York, 1915) revealed much of
Eckardstein's misrepresentations as well as the Japanese
ambassabor's efforts to draw England into an alliance
with his country; William Roscoe Thayer, The Life and
Letters 9; Jghg flay (2 vols., New York, 1915) was important
in revealing Hay's attitude toward England's Far Eastern
policy; G. P. Gooch, Studies in Modern History_(London,
1952) contains a comprehensive and revealing chapter on
Holstein; Thomas Newton, Lord Lansdowne, g Biography

(New York, 1929) merely duplicates material found else-
where, but is a well written account of the man who suc-

ceeded Salisbury in the Foreign Office.

144

Some histories of England were valuable in show-
ing the policy of the nation and giving a good general

background. Also, they were valuable as bibliographic

sources. These were Hector Bolitho, The Reign 9; Queen

 

113322;; (New York, 1948); Alfred Francis Pribram, England
and the International Policy g§_the European Powers 1871-
1914 (London, 1951), R. H. Gretton, A Modern History g;

the English PeOple 1880-1902 (5 vols., London, 1950),

 

Robert William Seton-Watson, Britain in Europe 1789-1914.
(New York, 1957), R. C. K. Ensor, England 1870-1914

(London, 1956), Joseph Hendershot Park, British Prime

Ministers g; the Nineteenth Century (New York, 1950).

 

Several secondary works dealt with specific sub-
jects and were important for that reason. They were
Frederick W. Holls,'1hg'£gggg Conference a; the Hague
‘(London, 1900), Morris Beall Giffen, Fashoda thg Incident

and its Diplomatic Setting (Chicago, 1950), A. Conan Doyle,
The Great Boer War (New York, 1900), J. A. Hobson, The

 

War ig South Africg (New York, 1900), J. P. Fitzpatrick,
The Transvaal from Within (New York, 1900), Philip Joseph,

Foreign Diplomacy in_China 1894-1900 (London, 1928),

Charles Beresford, The Breakup 9; China (New York, 1899),
Harold Temperley and Lillian Penson, A Century 2; Diplo-
matic Blue Books 1814-1914 (London, 1958), and Alfred

145

Francis Pribram, The Secret Treaties, f Austria-Hungary
(2 vols., New York, 1921).

Other secondary works that were used fer back-
ground material and proved of inestimable value are
William L. Langer, The Diplomacy_g§_lmperialism 1890-1902
(2 vols., New York, 1955), Sidney B. Fay, Origins g£_£hg

World War (2 vols., New York, 1951), M. P. Price, The

 

Diplomatic History 9: 229 fig; (London, 1914), G. P. Gooch,
Before the War, Studies in_Diplomacy_(2 vols., London,
1956), Parker Thomas Moon, Imperialism and World Politics
(New York, 1942), G. P. Gooch, Studies in_Diplomacy and

Statescraft (London, 1942), A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch,

 

The Cambridge History gf Britisthorei n Policy 1785-1919
(5 vols., New York, 1925), volume III, Oron James Hale,
Publicity and Diplomacy 1890-1940 (New York, 1940)

A number of monographs and magazine articles
proved of great value in supplying information on specific
points and problems. For immediate background G. N.
Johnson and J. D. Beckfor, "The Contemplated Anglo-German
Alliance 1890-1901," Political Science Quarterly, 42 (1927).
Another work of equal importance was Frank Goodman Willi-
ston, Egg Egg_q§ British Isolation: The Origin 9; Egg
Anglo-Japanese Alliance (Chicago, 1957). Contemporary

magazine articles which revealed public sentiment of

146

this period were Senex, "The White Man's Burden in China,"
Contemporary Review, 76 (1899), R. S. Gundry's two articles,
"The Yangtze Region," and "China: Spheres of Interest and
the Open Door," Fortnightlpreview, 66 (1899) and the
article "The Anglo-German.Agreement," by Diplomaticus

quoted in Livinngge, 219 (1899).

APPENDIX

YANGTZE AGREEMENTl

Agreement between England and Germany, Signed at London,

October 16, 1900.

Article 1. It is a matter of joint and permanent
international interest that the ports on the rivers and
littoral of China should remain free and open to trade
and to every other legitimate form of economic activity
for the nationals of all countries without distinction;
and the two governments agree on their part to uphold the
same for all Chinese territory as far as they can exer-
cise influence.

Article 2. The Imperial German Government and
Her Britannic Majesty's Government will not, on their
part, make use of the present complication to obtain.for
themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions,
and will direct their policy towards maintaining undimin-
ished the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire.

Article 5. In case of another Power making use
of the complications in China in order to obtain under
any form whatever such territorial advantages, the two
contracting Parties reserve to themselves to come to a
preliminary understanding as to the eventual steps to be
taken for the protection of their own interests in China.

Clause 4 simply provided for the communication
of this agreement to the other powers and for an invita-
tion to them to accept the principles recorded in it.

LETTERS FROM THE CHAMBERLAIN PAPER82

Goschen to J. C.--Confidential--Hawkhurst, September 1,
1900.--I sent you a telegram, thinking you would be
wondering whether any attempt was being made to induce
Salisbury to reciprocate to some extent the Emperor's
advances. fI.e. requests for support for Waldersee]

 

lBritish Documents, II, no.58.

2J. Amery, Joseph Chamberlain, IV, 158-40.

148

... I enclose his reply to the letter. It makes
one despair. A non-possumus in every direction. It is
quite possible the Emperor has some designs that are not
clear: but we shall not thwart them by standing aloof.

I do not know what more can be done. If some
policy is forced on Salisbury, which he disapproves of,
it breaks down in execution.

... The latest Russian move as to retreating from
Peking which is distasteful to Germany, furnishes a good
Opportunity for Opening of conversations and exchange of
ideas with the Emperor, but we hang back, are Open with
nobody, and shall practically stand alone, or come in at
the tail of other Powers on every occasion.

If I see any Opening that may be utilized I
would ask you and Balfour to come to London to meet
Lansdowne and G. Hamilton, who, like myself, are in
despair of our present attitude. But the difficulty
lies not in any one step which we might jointly persuade
Salisbury to take, but in his whole attitude in this
question. He himself views the situation, as he wrote to
me, "with the gravest apprehension."

Goschen to J..C.--Secret.--Admira1ty, September 2, 1900--
I am troubled about much graver things. Salisbury, as
you will have seen, sent some kind of answer to Berlin,
but it was almost worse than silence.

... Whatever harm might come from pourparlers at
Berlin, our present attitude does more harm; but pressure
on Salisbury does not produce any real change of attitude,
though he may take some small step.

I cannot help exresssing myself strongly....

Absolute isolation is playing the devil....

Goschen to J. C.--Sunday, September 4, 1900.--... Salis-
bury's answer to our joint telegram was not satisfactory.
He agrees to our troops not being withdrawn from Peking,
but will make no capital of it. And, so far as I can see,
he has not notified this decision to Germany or to any
other power....

Broderick to J. C.--Dartmouth, September 7.--Yacht Mera.--
Private.--One line to say Arthur Balfmur generally
concurs with you re Peking and Germany. I have sent his
letter to Goschen with a request to forward to you....

The latter part of Salisbury's reply is charac-
teristic and I think unlucky. We do what is needed and
get nothing for it. We could surely get some credit, if
nothing else.

149

I feel assured we shall ultimately have to make
some overtures to Germany when the grace of them is
p831). 0-0 0’

3
INCREASES PER CENT. 1893-1913

 

 

United Kingdom Germany_

Population 0 o o O 0' 20 32
Coal production ... . . 75 159
Pig iron 0 o o. c- o- g. .. g 50 287
Crude steel . ..... . . . 156 522
Exports of raw materials 258 245
Exports of manufactures . 121 259
Receipts from railway

goods traffic . ... . ... 49 141

 

 

5R. c.. K. Ensor, England, 1870-1914 (London, 1956), p. 503.

150

 

 

 

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