THE CONCEPT OF ETHNICITY IN POLITICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
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1977

ABSTRACT

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By

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The problem of power structure had been relatively
neglected in the ethnic studies before it became brought
into focus in the context of "nation-building" in the "new
nations." It is argued in this thesis that the explication
of the relationship between power structure and ethnicity
is a prerequisite to the construction of a unifying theory
of ethnicity; and a plea is made for the constructive
welding of the macro-level analysis of power structure and
the conventional anthropological study of ethnicity at the
micro-level.

The analogy between "nationalism" and "ethnicism"
(i.e., "ethnicity" as a macro-political ideology) is drawn
to indicate a new dimension of ethnic politics in modern
times. In order to substantiate this point, historical
development of power structure and its bearing upon
"objective" and "subjective" aspects of ethnicity are dis-
cussed. The impacts of the emergence of the "modern state"
are examined in terms of "nationalization," or the processes

of sociocultural homogenization and integration of the
population within the state boundaries for the sake of
administrative efficiency, and of emergence of "sociologi-
cal minorities" as a byproduct of these processes. A
distinction between the dimensions of "quality" and "exten-
sion" of ethnic boundaries is drawn in order to elucidate
the ethnic dynamics not only in the contexts of "accultura-
tion" and "assimilation," but also in the context of
national politics.

The presentation of the case study of Okinawa is
intended to illustrate the theoretical perspective summarized
above. Okinawa before and after its incorporation into the
"modern state" is discussed in terms of the mode of relevance
of "ethnicity" in its relationships to the power structure.

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A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Anthropology

1977

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PREFACE

One of the first sociologists who formulated a general theory of "race relations" was Park (1950). His theory has been criticized (particularly because of its unilineal, "assimilationist" biases) and reformulated by various subsequent scholars (e.g., Barth and Noel, 1972; Shibutani and Kwan, 1965; Yancey et al., 1976). Their theories, however, have been mainly focused upon ethnicity of immigrants in modern, industrial conditions because of their heavy reliance upon the American experience.

Another source of recent development of ethnic theory is the study of ethnic relations in "new nations." Ethnic theories in these contexts are formulated under various rublics; i.e., nationalism, nation-building, national integration, tribalism, etc.

One conspicuous difference between these two sources of ethnic studies is this: while ethnic studies in "old nations" take the state power structure for granted, one of the major themes of ethnic studies in "new nations" is the problem of state power structure itself. Although there are some attempts to bridge these two sources of

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ethnic studies (e.g., Bell and Freeman, 1974; Glazer and Moynihan, 1975; Enloe, 1973; Brass and van den Berghe, 1976), it seems that the construction of unifying theory of ethnicity requires, first of all, an explication of the relationships between power structure and ethnicity.

In spite of the crucial importance of the state power structure in modern social life, social scientists were rather indifferent to the problem of state. Nettle (1968:559) was able to write not so long ago that "the concept of state is not much in vogue in the social sciences right now." Since then, the situation has somewhat changed due to the vogue of nation-building theories (e.g., Eisenstadt and Rokkan, 1973). Yet, there seems to be still a great deal of confusion regarding what "nation-building" really means. One of the sources of confusion seems to derive from the very concept "nation"; why "nation-building"? why not "state-building"? Some scholars (e.g., Rejai and Enloe, 1969; Francis, 1967) try to de-mystify the "nation" by revealing its "artificiality." From the viewpoint of communication theory, some scholars (e.g., Deutsch, 1966) seem to imply that state-building is by and large identical to nation-building. Yet, as Conner (1972) points out, the development of communication and mobilization brings about not only "nation-building," but also the development of sub-national ethnic formation; hence, "nation-building or nation-destroying?" (see also Mowlana and Robinson, 1976; Hechter, 1975:25ff).

Although main efforts oa anthropologists were directed toward the study of micro-level social phenomena, the emergence of "new-nations" made them conscious of the conflict between "primordial attachments" and "unfolding civil order" (Geertz, 1963). Some of them began to consider it necessary to link the micro-level analysis to the macro-level structure of society (e.g., Fallers, 1974; Weingrod, 1967). One of the indicative signs of this trend was the debate concerning "colonialism and anthropology" (e.g., Marquet, 1964; Asad, 1973; Lewis, 1973), in which some scholars accused anthropology of neglecting the analysis of the larger power structure and thereby supporting the perpetuation of colonial system. Although the accusation of "colonialism" has become largely a matter of historical interest (except "neocolonialism," "development of underdevelopment," "internal colonialism," etc.), the relevance of macro-level analysis to the anthropological study seems to have become recognized by many anthropologists. Cohen (1976:129), for example, remarks that "the anthropologists must _deliberately_ formulate his problems in such a way as to make reference to the state as necessary part of his analysis."

Our task in this paper consists in inquiring into the problem of ethnicity in its relationship to the power structure. The first part of this paper is devoted to the theoretical discussions of ethnicity in its various dimensions, in its historical development, and in its modes of

existence in the modern state. In the second part, we would discuss "ethnicity" in Okinawa in historical perspective. This discussion is intended to illustrate how "ethnicity" appears in various power structures which developed historically, and how its political relevance varies according to changing political circumstances.

CHAPTER 1

THE CONCEPT OF ETHNICITY

Like all social phenomena "ethnicity" can be con-
ceived as a social product of an interplay of "objective"
and "subjective" factors. Van den Berghe (1976:242), for
example, defines an ethnic group as "one that shares a
cultural tradition <u>and</u> has some degree of consciousness of
being different from other such groups" (italics in orig-
inal). But, is "a cultural tradition" an objective aspect
of ethnicity? Is it not <u>both</u> objective <u>and</u> subjective? If
so, what is the "objective" aspect of tradition?

The myth of a social entity "that is a whole all by
itself" (Redfield, 1956:8) died hard. Anthropologists, as
comparative sociologists, however, were obliged to pay
attention to the units of their study, which were supposed
to be comparable. Naroll (1964) remarks that arbitrariness
and confusion of anthropological units used for comparative
purposes result from our lack of agreement about the criteria
which define the entities we describe. In order to delimit
"culture-bearing units," he discusses six criteria com-
monly used to demarcate ethnic units; namely, trait

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distributions, territorial contiguity, political organi-
zation, language, ecological adjustment, and local com-
munity structure. Although Naroll himself is aware of
specific shortcomings of each criterion, there are more
general sorts of difficulty. Moerman (1965:1215) points
out three major difficulties: Firstly, these criteria
often do not correlate. Secondly, units delimited by
certain combinations of these criteria are only occasionally
"culture-bearing units." Thirdly, it is often difficult to
discern discontinuities in terms of these criteria.

It seems that the difficulty in delimiting "objec-
tively" a cultural entity derives from a tacit assumption
which might be called "cultural atomism"; the assumption
that each culture has an indivisible "hard core" that exists
in itself. The main efforts of "traditional" anthropo-
logists were directed toward describing the functioning of
intra-societal structures. Partly as a reaction to a
narrow view of "functionalism," however, some of them began
to feel that "it is necessary to view every social entity
as but part of a larger system which includes its neighbours"
(Moerman, 1965:1216). Leach's study of the Kachin (1954)
illustrates this point.

Barth (1969:11) remarks that the sharing of a common
culture is "an implication or result, rather than a primary
and definitional characteristic of ethnic group organi-
zation." He proposes to see ethnic groups as "a form of
social organization" whose organizational principles are

self-ascription and ascription by others (1969:13).
Moerman (1965) also stresses the importance of self-identification. He maintains that a native name belongs
to a dimension different from those six criteria Naroll
lists as delimiters of ethnic units. The labels by which
people identify themselves and are identified by others are
sometimes the only means of determining ethnic units
(Moerman, 1965:1219). Then, the problem becomes: how these
native labels are related to other ethnographic facts and
over-all organizational arrangements. Moerman (1965:1219,
1223-24, 1226) suggests that tribal divisions in Thai were
political in origin. In the chronicles and oral histories
of Northern Thai, all supra-village units are called
myang, which also means the capital of such a unit. He
points out that the names of such political units and
ethnic entities exhibit parallel variation. This seems to
suggest that there are certain relationships between power
structure and ethnicity. (Similar interlocked relation-
ships between power and cultural structures would be
evident in the Great Tradition--Little Tradition phenomena
(Redfield, 1955).)

But, ethnicity is not simply a political organi-
zation. A general agreement seems to be that it has some-
thing to do with "origin." (According to Isajiw (1974:117),
among twenty-seven definitions of the term "ethnicity" he
examined, "common national or geographic origin or common
ancestors" is the attribute most frequently mentioned in

the definitions. "Some culture or customs" comes next.)
Some anthropologists (for example, Banton, 1976:145, Keyes,
1976:202-213) explicitly state that "ethnicity" refers to
"a mode of descent." Unfortunately, anthropologists are
not unanimous about the concept "descent" (Freeman, 1964,
Fortes, 1969:276-310). Although some anthropologists
argue that only the group which recruit its members by birth
on the unilineal principle should be called a descent group,
many "ethnic groups" do not seem to recruit its members
on the strictly unilineal principle. In many cases, more-
over, they do not appear to have any corporateness. In
what sense, then, can "ethnic groups" be called "a mode of
descent"?

Keyes (1976:204) argues that what is "primordial"
in human relations derives from "the fact of birth."
Certain elements of "the fact of birth," such as biological
features, place of birth, and "descent," provide people
with "the basis for making distinction among their fellow
humans since those believed to share features fixed by
birth are held to be of the same 'kind'" (1976:205). He
posits that, among the three elements mentioned above,
"descent" is the more basic and essential to all ethnic
groups, while other elements may reinforce the claim of
common descent. But, ethnic "descent" may not be based on
any genealogical connection since "members of an ethnic
group may validate their claim to share descent by making
certain attribute which they share (or believe they share)

as signifying common descent" (1976:205). In this respect, shared cultural attributes play an important role. But, they are operational _indicia_, rather than _criteria_ of identity (Horowicz, 1975:119).

Such "ethnic descent" is, however, quite different from "descent" which, according to Fortes (1959:207), "refers to a relationship mediated by a parent between himself and an ancestor . . ." "Ethnic descent" may be mediated by "certain attributes," and not necessarily by a parent. (A paradigmatic statement would be this: "If you knew me, you would know my father also.") It follows that membership in an ethnic group involves a problem of "probability of relationship" (rather than simple presence/ absence of relationship), so that there is a wide range of manipulation in the recruitment of members.

Another feature of ethnicity as a "mode of descent" concerns a problem of segmentation, of which Evans-Pritchard's study of the Nuer (1940) is most famous (see also M. G. Smith, 1956). As Banton (1976:145) puts it, "a descent line always breaks up into segments and people identify, in varying circumstances, with units of different scale." Although this phenomenon has been well known among the anthropologists for a quite long time, social scientists who studied ethnic relations, mostly in American situations, have generally assumed mutual exclusivity of ethnic group affiliations.

However, those anthropologists who studied ethnic relations in non-Western contexts were well aware of the importance of nesting taxonomies of ethnicity, even where the people concerned were not organized into segmentary lineages (Berreman, 1962:295-299, Moerman, 1965, Foster, 1974). These segmentary structures, moreover, may be expressed in terms of place of birth. Skinner (1971) has documented this for traditional China. Although in many cases segmentary structures in terms of "descent" and place of birth coincide, Keyes (1976:207) maintains that an analytical distinction between them should be made.

In some cases, however, various "ethnic" identities one assumes in different contexts do not seem to form a hierarchical or nesting taxonomy. The Chinese in Thai, for example, may be identified as "Chinese" for commercial purposes, while they may be recognized as "Thai" in other contexts, such as politics (Keyes, 1976:207). A more intriguing example of ambiguous ethnic identities has been documented by Nagata (1974), in which some individuals oscillate from one ethnic group to another rather freely. She argues that, among the Islam of Penang, Malaysia, ethnic groups are "special kinds of reference groups, the invocation of which may vary according to particular factors of the broader social situations, rather than a fixed anchorage to which the individual is unambiguously bound" (Nagata, 1974:333). Such an example warns us that, if ethnicity is "a mode of descent" at all, it must be a

very special sort of descent. Nagata's study, however, deals with intra-Islamic "ethnic" identity. The situations might be different at a higher level of ethnicity. As Nagata (1976:339) points out, "Islamic culture . . . in association with the adat, has created striking uniformities across ethnic lines." It would be plausible that salient ethnic boundaries have shifted from one level to another, so that intra-Islamic "ethnic" boundaries in Malaysia have been losing their social relevance as "ethnic" boundaries; they have become some sort of symbolic categories manipu- lated mainly for "expressive" purposes without serious social consequences. In other words, Malaysian intra- Islamic ethnic categories appear to be only potentially "ethnic." This problem will be pursued later in the con- text of the dynamics of ethnic formation and dissolution.

The similar ambiguities of "ethnicity" are evident in a case study in Urban India (Berreman, 1972). It seems that "ethnicity" is, after all, a non-emic concept in most anthropological contexts. According to Berreman, his informants did not consistently separate caste and religious groups from regional, language, and class categories. Béteille (quoted in Berreman, 1972:582) refers to this point in his discussion of the term jātī: "The word jātī may thus be applied to units based on race, language and religion as well as to castes in the narrower sense of the term. How easily these different kinds of identity are confused can best be illustrated by a common remark I used

to hear in Bengal where I grew up. It would be said of a person: 'He is not a Bengali, he is a Muslim (or Christian).'"

Although all these "social categories" used in a certain society could be organized into "an inclusive or maximal terminology," it would still be impossible to find consensus on the relationship between categories, so that "only the contexts of use could show this relationship" (Berreman, 1972:571).

Besides the problem of contexts, we might mention another dimension of ambiguity of ethnic identification; namely, self-identification, other-identification, and the interaction between the two (see, for instance, Horowitz, 1975:113, 131; Hannerz, 1976:433-434; Moerman, 1965:1223). This state of ambiguity, in its diachronic dimension, may be either "transitional" or "stable." Synchronically, there seems to exist a certain pattern: the dominant groups tend to lump their subordinate groups together, while the subordinate groups are well aware of the divisions within the dominant groups (Berreman, 1972:572-573; Hannerz, 1976: 433-434). In terms of social dynamics, these ambiguities of identification would provide a very interesting field of study.

As Berreman has demonstrated, various "social categories" actually belong to different dimensions, such as castes, religions, regions, languages, classes, etc. These multi-dimensional phenomena are, however, molded by the people themselves into a one-dimensional model, whose

paradigmatic form is, in India, caste. This may not be unique to India. In Europe in the nineteenth century, for example, the concept "race" seems to have provided a similar paradigmatic model: linguistic, religious, and political categories were reduced into the dimension of racial classification (i.e., "French, race," "Aryan race," etc.). After all, Boas was one of those first anthropologists who began to argue for the distinction between race, language, and culture (Stocking, 1968).

The "Ethnocentric" and the "Polycentric"

Levi-Strauss (1967) has demonstrated that the mode of classification of humans, whether collectively or individually, into a set of categories has to do with the classification of the "universe" itself, in which people find themselves. Although what Levi-Strauss has attempted to do is to abolish the concept "totemism" by universalizing it, it is still tempting to speculate, as totemists do, what analogies do or do not exist between "totemism," ethnicity, and other modes of classification of man.

If "nationalism" is the doctrine which holds that "humanity is naturally divided into nations . . ." (Kedourie, 1966:9), then "ethnicism" would be the doctrine which holds that humanity is naturally divided into ethnoses.

Smith (1971) makes a distinction between "ethnocentric" nationalism and "polycentric" nationalism:

> For an "ethnocentric" nationalist, both "power" and
> "value" inhere in his cultural group. Indeed, these
> dimensions are inseparable. . . . Whatever the factual
> distribution of power at a given time, real strength,
> being God-given, is not to the mighty of the earth, but
> to those who stand in a special relationhip with the
> divine. . . . In the Greek context, the hubris of a
> Xerxes, not Greek prowess, brings about the Great King's
> debacle. It is Zeus, who in Aeschylus' Persae over-
> throws Xerxex . . .
>
> "Polycentric" nationalism, by contrast, resembles
> the dialogue of many actors on a common stage. As the
> term implies, this kind of nationalism starts from the
> premise that there are many centers of real power. . . .
> "Polycentric" nationalism is of course no less concerned
> with the collective self: but it conceives its role in
> very different terms. It seeks to join the "family of
> nations," the international drama of status equals, to
> find its appropriate identity and part (Smith 1971:
> 158-159).

The distinction between these two types of nationalism is,

of course, purely analytical. According to Smith (1971:

160, 1971), however, "polycentric" nationalism was virtually

non-existent before the French Revolution.

An application of this distinction at the level of

ethnicity seems relevant. "Ethnocentric" ethnicism would

be the doctrine that both "power" and "value" inhere in

one's group because of its special relationship with the

devine. "Polycentric" ethnicism, on the other hand, would

be the doctrine which admits that there are many centers

of "real" power. We would further speculate that "poly-

centric" ethnicism, like its counterpart in nationalism, is

a historical type which emerged in modern times. Although

Geertz (1963:54) remarks that "the integrative revolution

does not do away with ethnocentrism; it merely modernizes

it," we feel it necessary to make an analytical distinction

between "modernized ethnocentrism" which we call "poly-centric" ethnicism, and pre-modern ethnocentrism or "ethnocentric" ethnicism. This is because we suspect that "mere modernity" of polycentric ethnicism involves a fundamental change in the over-all worldview which differentiates it from "ethnocentric" ethnicism.

This analytical distinction enables us to clarify certain confusion sometimes found in the definition of ethnicity. Aronson (1976), for example, attempts to define what is "ethnic" in terms of ideology. According to his definition:

> [E]thnicity is an ideology of and for value
> dissensus and disengagement from an inclusive socio-
> political arena, that is, for pursing major values
> deemed not shared by others in the arena (Aronson,
> 1976:14-15).

We suspect that this definition might be untenable in the light of numerous examples of multi-ethnic empires. Although there must have been "value dissensus" among various constituent units with an ancient multi-ethnic empire, it is doubtful whether ethnicity in such a context was always an ideology of and for "disengagement from an inclusive socio-political arena." In our terminology, "ethnocentric" ethnicism holds that <u>real</u> power and value inhere in one's own group regardless of <u>factual</u> distribution of power. Aronson (1976:15) himself points out that "this is not to say that ethnic ideologies do not entail strategies of behavioral involvement in a common political system, for they may direct that the system, as a set of means, be

played fully to capture resources sufficient for accomplishing the desired ends. . . . To be involved at the level of behavior is not necessarily to be engaged in ideologically." Different types of power structure, however, force ethnic groups to take various forms of "involvement in a common political system." Our distinction between "polycentric" and "ethnocentric" requires to consider whether "behavioral involvement in a common political system" may not be conceived differently by "polycentric" and "ethnocentric" ethnicists. Insofar as we do not understand others, there is, subjectively, neither agreement nor disagreement. In order that "value dissensus" appears as a subjective reality at all, both one's value and the value of others have to be recognized: both of them are "value," although they may be incompatible. It follows that "value dissensus" becomes subjectively relevant only in the context of "polycentric" ethnicity.

What is the connection between "value dissensus" and "disengagement from an inclusive sociopolitical arena"? Is there any necessary connection? There seems to exist a certain analogy between "ethnic ideology" and "divorce ideology." The "divorce ideology" is an "ideology of and for value dissensus and disengagement from an inclusive sociopolitical arena." Is it, however, not rhetoric of divorce, rather than a definition of it? A bad marriage, ipso facto, becomes, a result of "value dissensus": it seems to be our hindsight that produces "value dissensus."

We are afraid that Aronson's definition of ethnicity in terms of ideology might merely reify "ethnicity" which is, in fact, a human product. If "ethnicity" is a human product, then, what we have to do is to explicate the processes of the production of ethnicity.

We have argued that "value dissensus" becomes subjectively relevant in the context of "polycentric" ethnicity. Why does it become relevant at all? We suggest that one of the crucial factors that make "value dissensus" subjectively relevant is the nature of the power structure; it is the nature of "an inclusive sociopolitical arena," rather than "value dissensus" itself, that brings about the "ideology of value dissensus." If, as Aronson suggests, "disengagement from an inclusive sociopolitical arena" is simply to pursue "major values deemed not shared by others in the arena," his definition of ethnicity would not fit many cases of contemporary ethnicity, where competitive tendencies are more dominant than leave-us-alone tendencies. In other words, contemporary ethnic politicians are playing the same game in which "value dissensus" is a means rather than a cause, (whereas "ethnocentric" ethnicists simply play different games).

Our disagreement with Aronson is this: while he suggests that "a common political system" may be used as "a set of means" by ethnic groups, we argue that "ethnicity" may be used as a means in a common political system. We suspect that Aronson reifies "ethnicity" so that he assumes

that different "ethnic ideologies," which are given, are bound to disengage themselves from a common political arena. We, on the other hand, see "ethnicity" in its processes of formation within power structure. We argue that "ethnicity" as such is by no means an "ideology of and for disengagement"; it is rather a problem of power structure in which "ethnicity" appears in various forms. We pursue this problem of power structure and ethnicity in the following sections.

Ethnos, Nation, and State

Thus far, we have relied upon the anology between nationalism and "ethnicism." Yet, are they the same thing? We have been dealing with them in terms of ideology. Let us now turn to the objective and subjective conditions of "nationality" and "ethnicity."

Brass (1976) formulated a continuum of ethnicity and nationality. Three critical points on this continuum are, (1) ethnic category, (2) ethnic community, and (3) nationality. "Ethnic category" is "any group of people dissimilar from other peoples in terms of objective cultural criteria" (1976:226), but whose members do not have any subjective solidarity. "Ethnic community" is a group of people objectively distinct from their neighbors and subjectively conscious of this fact. In the political arena, the ethnic community may function either as an interest group or as a group which demands "corporate

recognition for the group as a whole with a right to control the public systems" (1976:226). "Nationality" is an ethnic community which has succeeded in controlling some of the public systems. This continuum is totally a-historical. The power structure of modern state is taken for granted. Although he, willy-nilly, refers to "modernization," change in the objective basis of ethnicity is not adequately related to this continuum. The sole variable of this con- tinuum seems to be "subjective solidarity": "the infusion of subjective and symbolic meanings into merely objective divisions between peoples" (1976:227).

In this scheme, "merely objective divisions between peoples" are treated as if they are static phenomena un- changed from time immemorial, ready to be activated whenver "subjective and symbolic meanings" are fused into them. This is because, in this scheme, the power structure of modern state is taken for granted so that the dynamic relationships between the power structure and the "merely objective divisions between peoples" do not appear to be relevant in his frame of reference. It seems necessary for us to inquire into the problem of power structure and its bearing upon ethnicity.

Francis (1976) is very explicit in her rejection of the "ethnicist" conceptualization of "nation." She "eventually realized" that "'nation' was a political con- cept, which became intelligible only in its relationship to the nation-state" (1976:xvi); and that "the nation,

which the nation-state subsists, was a "historical type"
in the sense of Max Weber, and a product of Europe, whence
it has spread to the other parts of the world" (1976:
xvi-xvii).

Smith (1971:186-191), on the other hand attempts to
define the term "nation," with reservations, "in the broad
'ethnicist' sense." He enumerates seven features of the
nation: (1) cultural differentiae, (2) territorial contiguity
with free mobility throughout, (3) a relatively large scale,
(4) external political relations of conflict and alliance
with similar groups, (5) considerable group sentiment and
loyalty, (6) direct membership with equal citizenship
rights, and (7) vertical economic integration around a
common system of labour (1971:186). He points out that the
first two features plus a common kinship network give a
working definition of the "tribe," while the first five
characteristics (minus the kinship basis) give the definition
of the large politicised "ethnie" (1971:186-187). He rightly
dismisses the definition in which group sentiment is taken
to serve as the sole definiens of the nation because this
cannot differentiate national sentiment from any other
group feelings. He distinguishes "nation-state" and "state-
nation" (1971:189). The former is a "nation" with de
facto territorial sovereignty, while the latter is a
"nation-state" without the features (1) and (5) mentioned
above. It was only after the French Revolution

that the people, not just "the first and second estates,"
has become the "nation" (Smith, 1971:191; Francis, 1976:56,
72).

But, what was the social environment in which this
type of (people's) nation emerged? Because the emergence
of "nation" is closely tied up with the advent of a parti-
cular type of political structure, it would be necessary to
turn briefly to the historical development of this type of
power structure.

Francis (1976:43-115) distinguishes two types of
political power structure: that is, "the demotic type" and
"the empire type." In the former type, people are linked
directly to the supreme authority through a system of
separate institutions. In the latter, groups of people are
linked collectively to the supreme authority through the
mediating elite. The modern states, including the pre-
national modern states and the nation-states, belong to the
former. Ancient and modern empires and feudal power
structures belong to the latter. The significance of
ethnicity varies in different types of power structure.
The crucial point of the distinction between the demotic
type and the empire type, in terms of its bearing on
ethnicity, is that, in the empire-type, ethnic differences
or similarities have no immediate political relevance
because social integration of an empire depends on the
mediating elite that shares a common "high culture." As
far as the empire can manage to deal with conflicting

interests among the elite, "the internal conditions of its
constituent units are of no immediate relevance to the
maintenance of the imperial super-structure" (Francis,
1976:57). Within the empire, therefore, we find two
distinctive layers of culture: "mutually exclusive homo-
geneous societies with separate traditions and folk
cultures" (1976:57), on the one hand, and a "high culture"
of the elite of various ethnic composition, on the other.
Latent ethnic divisions become politically relevant only
when some regional groups within the elite seek greater
autonomy vis-a-vis the central political authority.
However, since the lower layers of the empire consist of
multiplicity of mutually exclusive social units, the
"nations" are first formed within the circle of elite.
As the adoption of vernaculars (such as a regional koine)
within the elite circle illustrates (Francis, 1976:56),
the "national" culture is essentially a deliberate creation
of the regional elite. (It is interesting to note that the
organization of European medieval universities are divided
into "nations." "The University of Paris had four nations:
l'honorable nation de France, la fidèle nation de Picardie,
la vénérable nation de Normandie, and la constante nation
de Germaie" (Kedourie, 1966:13). The term "nationalism"
seems to have first used in reference to factionalism among
the Leipzig professors (Smith, 1971:167).

The "modern state" is characterized by its direct
and continuous exercise of power over the whole population

within its territorial boundaries. The early form of this type of power structure is represented by the European absolutist state (Francis, 1976:61-67). In this form of power structure, considerations for rational statecraft ultimately leads to a direct interference with the lower layers of "traditional" social structures. This direct state interference with the whole population from top to bottom initiate the processes of "nationalization," or "processes of demotic integration" (1976:114).

Smith (1971:230-236) presents two historical sequences of power structures that led to the emergence of first nation-states. In these two sequences, the key concept is the "scientific state," which immediately precedes the emergence of nation state, and which corresponds, by and large, to Francis' concept of the "prenational modern state." The "scientific state" is "a polity which seeks to homogenize the population within its boundaries for administrative purposes by utilizing the latest scientific techniques and methods for the sake of 'efficiency'" (1971:231). The first scientific states emerged, historically, from two types of power structure; that is, "empire" and "possessive state." Two elements of empires, which are later integrated into the structure of scientific state, are "conquest" segregation and "cosmopolitan" assimilation (1971:232). The third element integrated into scientific state derives from the possessive state: "a definite tendency to level down all intermediate structure between State and

individual and tie the influential elites to the State's
bureaucratic structure" (1971:234). It was the possessive
state of Western Europe that first transformed itself into
the scientific state. This technique of statecraft was
later adopted by the empires outside Western Europe. In
both cases, the above-mentioned three elements were com-
bined in varying degrees. But, the new, fourth element,
which differentiates the scientific state from its pre-
decessors, was introduced; that is, "the attempt to apply
the latest scientific methods and techniques to the problems
of government" (1971:234).

What are the effects of the emergence of "scienti-
fic state" (or "prenational modern state") in terms of its
bearing upon ethnicity? The application of universalistic
principles in direct state administration sets in motion
the processes of cultural homogenisation (or "nationaliza-
tion"). This trend comes into a direct contradiction with
the discriminatory principle ("conquest" segregation)
inherited from previous phase. The processes of homogeniza-
tion, at the same time, produce "sociological minorities."
The novelty in their situations are not simply that they
are culturally different from the core groups of the state,
but that the new socio-political environment makes the
difference more salient so that they are made conscious of
the fact. The adoption of a standard language and other
integration policies by the state works, more often than
not, against these "sociological minorities." Their

exclusion from social opportunities, which are supposed to open, according to the universalistic principles of the "scientific state," to the whole population, is felt intolerable "exactly because the usual legitimations for inequality are absent" (Smith, 1971:235) from the ideology of scientific state.

The above discussions lead us to a conclusion: even though "ethnic groups" existed before the advent of modern state, "ethnic problems" in a modern sense did not exist. These "problems" have not so much to do with "ethnic groups" as such. They are "problems" of the social environment which the power structure of modern state has brought about.

Before the emergence of modern state, the "cosmic image" and the society were coterminous. Even where some political power structure embraced heterogeneous constituent units, the flow of communication within the structure was such that the messages were molded, through the mediating agent, into terms of each respective constituent unit. (The mode of mediation, of course, varies. Bailey's study (1969:144ff) of various modes of "encapsulation" would be relevant here. Related to this is the problem of "Center-Periphery" relations. See, for instance, Lerner (1966), Shils (1961), and Staniland (1970).) The modern state, however, tended to abolish the mediators; so that the direct power of state would prevail within its boundaries. Moreover, the exercise of state power, in its ideal typical form, was based on "scientific rationality." It was not

simply a confrontation of different "cosmic images" at the same level. Every "cosmic image" has a "center" (Eliade, 1958:367-387) but, there is, as it were, no "center" in scientific rationality: or it is like a "sphere whose center is everywhere and whose circumpherence is nowhere." (One can, of course, read some "meaning" into scientific rationality, so that it would become "European." This, however, has nothing to do with scientific rationality itself.) The result was that the "traditional" cosmic image lost its protective barriers, and was no longer coterminous with the world that had come to be filled with "scientific rationality."

Nettle (1968:588) remarks that "one fruitful way of defining politics is to characterize it as the one social area of normlessness--where the very process of action is concerned not with implementation of, or deviation from, established norms but with the business of <u>establishing</u> norms in the first place." It seems therefore that the emergence of modern state <u>administration</u> opened up a large, new area of <u>politics</u> within the state boundaries. But, how can the boundaries of state themselves be justified if the state contains only a huge area of normlessness? If the state's sole function consists in the application of scientific rationality for the sake of administrative efficiency, what does it matter whether Englishmen govern America, or Americans govern the Phillipines? It seems that universalistic principles of state administration

contradict the existence of state boundaries itself. What is the _raison d'etre_ of the state boundaries? What is the "content" of the state? Once the "frame" is established, one has to fill it with norms--by means of "politics."

So long as the king is alive, "_L'état, c'est moi_." But, once the king is guillotined, the "nation" takes his place. Although the process of cultural homogenization was, at first, carried out for the sake of administrative efficiency, the end product of this process, the "nation," in turn, came to be regarded as the source of "values" and "meaning" of the state: hence, the "nation-state."

Once this pattern was established, later state-builders (especially, "ethnic nationalists") followed this sequence upside-down; the national values were presumed to be given; they, then, tried to construct the state as a promoter-protector of the national values. One of the contemporary witnesses of early "ethnic" nationalism, Friedrich Nietzsche, who despised the movement, (for that matter, any collectivist movement) made a perceptive remark in 1873:

> To ascribe predicate to a people is always dangerous; in the end, everything is so mixed up that a unity develops only late, through the language--or an illusion of unity. Germans, German _Reich_--that is something. Those speaking German--that is something too. But those of German race! What is German as a quality of artistic style--that is yet to be _found_, just as among the Greeks the Greek style was found only late: an earlier unity did not exist, only a terrible mixture (quoted in Kaufman, 1954:41).

The "ethnic nationalists" who strive to build modern states are, however, not "ethnocentric" nationalists in our

terminology: their barriers of closed cosmic image have
already been broken down by the intrusion of the idea and/or
the actual power of modern state. What they now try to do
is to establish <u>state</u> barriers, which are supposed to be a
protector-promoter of their actual or putative national
values. They cannot but accept a set of universalistic
principles upon which the functioning of modern state is
based. Their particularistic national values could be real-
ized only if they participate in universalistic principles.
Their mode of behavior could be characterized as, in the
words of Smith (1971:236-254), "dual legitimation."

Ethnicity in the Modern State

We shall now turn to the problem of ethnicity after
the advent of modern state. Historically, as we have seen,
the modern state first emerged in western Europe. Its
"defusion" into other parts of the world took several differ-
ent routes. But, we could safely say that the modern
state, (in theory, if not in practice), has become accepted
as the standard political power structure after decoloniali-
zation virtually throughout the world.

Francis (1976) distinguishes three categories of
ethnicity: "primary ethnic groups," "secondary ethnic
groups," and "ethnic categories." The primary ethnic group
is "a viable corporate unit," which functions as "a closed
subsociety able to satisfy the basic social needs of its
members," whose participation in the larger society "tends

to be indirect in all dimensions" (1976:167-208, 397). The
secondary ethnic group is a group in the larger society,
whose members participate directly in the larger society,
whose members participate directly in the larger society in
some dimensions (1976:215-250, 396). The ethnic category
is "a number of people who are identified with a particular
ethnic unit other than the national core . . ." (1976:296).

A key criterion of this classification seems to be
the level of "participation." Francis (1976:396) distin-
guishes three levels of participation: connubium (or,
affinal kinship ties), commensalitas (or, convivial
activities), and commercium (or, a purely functional,
particularly economic, cooperation). Since these three
"levels" can be seen as a continuum, the three categories
of ethnicity would also be regarded as forming a continuum.

In terms of formation of ethnic groups, "transfer"
seems to be a key concept of Francis' ethnic theory.
"Transfer" involves both endogenous and exogenous factors.
A main endogenous factor is "nationalization," which is
initiated by the emergence of modern state. In the process
of "nationalization," the relationships of groups to their
social environments are altered, so that some of them
become "national minorities," while others become assimilated
into the national core. Major exogenous factors are
"change in political boundaries" (such as annexation) and
"migration."

"Transfer" may be either collective or individual.
Migrations, by and large, tend to be individual, while
"endogenous transfer" and "change in political boundaries"
result in collective transfer. Francis (1976:169-1970)
remarks that collective transfer tends to bring about the
formation of primary ethnic group, while individual
transfer tends to result in the formation of secondary
ethnic group.

"Transfer" occurs either between "isomorphic"
societies or between "heteromorphic" societies. Francis
(1976:225) posits that "individual transfer" between
"heteromorphic" societies tends to result in the formation
of secondary ethnic groups, while "individual transfer"
between "isomorphic" societies does not result in any
formation of ethnic group. Therefore, she maintains, "it
is not the contents of a culture but its structural differ-
ences that bring about the formation of secondary ethnic
groups" (1976:241). As illustrations of this point, she
presents examples of "quasi-ethnic groups" which are
brought about as a result of transfer between "heteromor-
phic" societies: they are "Okies" in the Grapes of Wrath,
"hillbillies" in northern cities, the German expellees
after the Second World War, and the Poles in the Western
Territories (1976:241-247).

Although there are some exceptions such as the
Mennonites in Manitoba and the Mormons at a certain point
in history (1976:1972-189), the primary ethnic groups are

usually formed under preindustrial conditions, and culturally differentiated further in the process of "nationalization." They function "in a manner similar . . . to ethnic units in premodern society, notably in the empire" (1976:1971).

It seems that Francis' theoretical framework is able to deal only with "acculturation" (or, in her own term, "transculturation") and "external assimilation," i.e., "assimilation" without subjective factors (for this latter concept, see Johnston, 1963). Although she seems to be aware of the difference between "acculturation" and "assimilation" (for the discussions on this subject, see Teske and Nelson, 1974; Parenti, 1967), she fails to deal with subjective aspects of assimilation. This is most evident in her treatment of what she calls "ethnic categories," which are supposed to be a mode of existence of ethnicity between "ethnic group" and "absorption." In the end, she abandons the concept "assimilation" and shifts her emphasis to "integration," i.e., "the processes by which components of the social structure are assigned a status in such a way that no major social problems arise to threaten the social order" (1976:295). We could perhaps repeat the words she herself wrote with regard to the concept "nation": "integration" is "not a scientific but a political concept." Then, how can we deal with "subjective" aspects of ethnicity? We will touch upon this problem in

the following discussions concerning ethnic dynamics in the
modern state.

Let us clarify what we understand by the words
"ethnic change." First, there seems to be two modes of
ethnic change; individual and collective. Individual
ethnic change is relatively straightforward. If one crossed
or "passed" ethnic boundaries, one would change his
ethnicity. This, however, does not affect the ethnic
boundaries themselves. Barth (1969:22-26) documents some
cases in which, despite a constant flow of personnel
across the ethnic boundaries, the boundaries themselves are
maintained. In the classic study of the Nuer, Evans-
Pritchard (1940:221ff) already described these phenomena
in the context of the integration of Dinkas into the Nuer.
It is, however, logically possible that all the members of
an ethnic group cross over to another ethnic group so that
the ethnic boundaries disappear.

Is it, however, possible for an ethnic group to
change its ethnic identity collectively? (See Teske and
Nelson (1974:361-363.) They are not sure about this possi-
bility. Francis (1976:297-300) discusses only "collective
integration" which may not involve change in ethnic
identity.) Is it not self-contradictory to talk about a
collectivity and the non-existence of its boundaries at the
same time? This riddle seems to be concerned with some
sort of "ontology of sociology." Do the ethnic boundaries
really exist? Or, only members and non-members exist?

Yet, even if there was no member, the "boundaries" still
might exist. Even if we killed all the flies, we still
could not liquidate the idea of "fly."

It seems necessary here to distinguish two dimensions
of ethnic change. One dimension is change in "quality"
of ethnic boundaries. The other is change in "extension"
of ethnic boundaries. The former has to do with Francis'
three categories of ethnicity. It deals with the objective
solidarity of ethnic group, the degree of which would be
expressed in terms of individual participation in the
larger society; as the degree of participation increases,
the ethnic solidarity decreases. Change in "extension"
of ethnic boundaries, however, appears to belong to another
dimension. The "extension" of ethnic boundaries has to do
with the dimension in which individuals are related to an
"ethnic category" regardless of objective relationships of
the individuals concerned. Horowitz (1975) presents some
relevant empirical cases of the latter type of ethnic
change, in which groups change their ethnic identities
collectively.

Perhaps what is crucial here is to clarify the
relationship between "group" and "category." Francis
(1976) often appears to regard "group" and "category" as
mutually exclusive: if one is a member of a "primary
ethnic group," one is not a member of an "ethnic category."
But, this is a gross mistake. As Mair (1972:16) puts it,
". . . to say someone must belong to either a group or a

category is like saying he must live either in London or
Wednesday." Let us take a concrete example. "Italian
American" is, first of all, an ethnic category. But, are
the Italian Americans a "primary ethnic group," a "secondary
ethnic group," an "ethnic category," and/or none of them?
Yancey et al. (1976:392) remark that "the monolithic treat-
ment of ethnicity . . . has not paid attention to differences
within an ethnic group." It seems that "an ethnic group"
in the cited sentence above refers to an ethnic category in
our terminology. It follows that we have to imagine the
situations in which some members of the ethnic category
"Italian Americans" live in "primary ethnic" groups, while
others live in "secondary ethnic groups," and still others
do not belong to any ethnic group. But, why do all these
diverse members have to belong to the same ethnic category?
What is the relationship of formation and dissolution of
"ethnic groups" to those of "ethnic categories"? Francis
deals with the formation and dissolution of "ethnic groups"
but fails to do so with regard to "ethnic categories."
Are "ethnic categories" something irrelevant in the study
of ethnicity? Are they some sort of, as Francis seems to
imply, remnant of "ethnic groups"?

Francis' key variable in her theory of ethnic
formation and dissolution is, as we have pointed out,
"external assimilation" which is not concerned with sub-
jective factors of ethnic identity. In her theoretical
scheme, such "assimilation" occurs at three levels;

connubium, _commensalitas_, and _commercium_. This would be useful to inquire into the degree of solidality of ethnic boundaries at a micro-level. Such inquiries, however, would only reveal that the members of the same ethnic category form different types of "ethnic groups" from one place to another with varying degrees of solidarity. It seems that the inquiry at this level of "ethnicity" cannot deal with the existence of "ethnic categories" itself.

The fault of Francis' theory of ethnic formation and dissolution is that she tends to regard "ethnic group" and "ethnic category" as mutually exclusive and does not consider that they belong to different dimensions of ethnic phenomena. She seems to regard "ethnic categories" as a sort of remnant of "ethnic groups." We have, however, suggested that the formation and dissolution of "ethnic groups" have no necessary link to those of "ethnic categories." It seems that "ethnic categories" are essentially a macro-level phenomenon which is not necessarily dependent upon micro-level ethnicity. While the relationship of an individual to an "ethnic group" has to be mediated by objective ties, he can be linked to an "ethnic category" without objective ties. The former occurs at the dimension of "quality" of ethnic boundaries, whereas the latter occurs at the dimension of "extension" of ethnic boundaries. In other words, an individual is linked to an "ethnic group" and to an "ethnic category" in different modes.

If, as we have suggested, "ethnic categories" are
not simply a reflection of "ethnic groups," how are these
"ethnic categories" formed in the first place? We have
said that "ethnic categories" are a macro-level phenomenon,
that is to say, a phenomenon which cannot be deduced from
the lower levels of ethnic phenomena. We would suggest
that "ethnic categories" are <u>established</u> at the macro-level
of politics. The formation and dissolution of "ethnic
categories" are, therefore, essentially a political problem.
This is the point of view which Francis herself maintained
with regard to the concept "nation": "a political concept
does not serve to state facts but to express intentions"
(1976:69).

It seems that, in order to deal with "ethnicity,"
we have to be concerned not only with "factual reality" but
also "political reality." Even if we denied the existence
of "ethnic category" as an "illusion," it would not do away
with the "existence of illusion." (Or, as Mearns (quoted
in Jacob, 1975:67) versifies it: As I was going up the
stair / I met a man who wasn't there / He wasn't there
today, / I wish, I wish he'd stay away.) We are now in the
midst of nebulous labyrinth called politics. Before we
discuss the problem of "ethnic politics," however, let us
first turn to a brief discussion of the relationship of
"names" and "things."

It is said, in logic, that the "Morning Star," the
"Evening Star," the "Venus," and the "second planet from

the sun" have a different connotation, while they have the same <u>denotation</u>. But, this was not always so. It was only after the astronomers discovered that the "Morning Star" and the "Evening Star" were the "same thing," that they have come to have the same "denotation." If someone discovers another new planet between the sun and the Venus, then the "second planet from the sun" and the "Venus" will not have the same "denotation."

Ethnic politics seems to be concerned with essentially these denotation/connotation relationships. Ethnic politicians try to establish that some individuals are the "same thing." But, individuals have a different "connotation." In its highest specificity of connotation, it is identical to the subject itself. In its highest generality, it would be identical to "humanity," the "living creature," or simply, the "being."

Plax (1976:22-23) distinguishes two types of collectivity; noninstitutional collectivity and institutional collectivity. The noninstitutional collectivity is "a group not defined by the rules of the system." The institutional collectivity, on the other hand, implies the system of rules. Then, what are the criteria of this distinction at the level of behavior? Suppose the collectivity is A, and the collective behavior is A- behavior:

> In the case of the institutional group, A- behavior is that behavior which is manifested by (a, b, c, . . . n), i.e., the group members, together. A- behavior is what A, as a collectivity does; it is unified behavior.

Noninstitutional groups seem to have different characteristics. "A- behavior" in their case, means: "a- behavior," "b- behavior," . . . "n- behavior." This formulation refers not to a characteristic of a unitary group, not a group-oriented behavior, but to the behavior of specific individuals. A- behavior means "what it is that a, b, c, . . . n do as indi-viduals" (Plax, 1976:23).

In other words, institutional group behavior is "denotative," while noninstitutional group behavior is "connotative." As Plax points out, ethnicity in modern state cannot be regarded as an institutional collectivity. But, if so, how can "ethnicity" be a relevant concept in sociology? Plax (1976:25) suggests that ethnicity can be defined as the "excluded":

> That which links ethnicity to politics is the view that focuses on the shred consciousness of ethnic group members on their heathenness. In other words, to the extent that ethnicity is relevant, it can be defined in terms whose content emphasizes exclusion. . . . Ethnicity functions to relate individual to the system, ironically, by reminding individuals of their unrelated-ness. Ethnicity, then, reinforces a particular role-- the role of the outsider (Plax, 1976:26).

This gives ethnicity a character of quasi-institutional collectivity. However, it does not neces-sarily mean that the ethnic collectivity has positive rules of its own system. The consciousness of "exclusion" does not derive from ethnicity as such, it is primarily a function of the larger society, or, in the modern context, the state power structure.

Yet, the consciousness of exclusion may not be that of "ethnicity": it may be based on other more "formal" or "contractual" relations. Why, then, does the consciousness

of exclusion take the form of ethnicity at all; the form
which seems to be spreading throughout the world these
days? One reason commonly suggested is the development of
world-wide communciation networks which has brought about
the "diffusion" of this particular form of "consciousness
of exclusion." But, why is it accepted at all by so many
peoples in the world? One reason often suggested is psy-
chological: the combination of an interest and affective
tie, "primordial attachments," "basic group identity," etc.
Another reason we suggest here is the very vagueness of the
"denotation" of ethnicity as a fertile field of politics.
If one's role in the system is defined in terms of formal
and contractual relations, the extension of a category to
which one belongs would be unambiguous. Ethnicity in the
modern state, on the other hand, lacks (in most of the
cases) an over-all formal structure. Ethnic politics,
therefore, exploits a "connotation" of individuals. Ethnic
politics of connotation is based on an egocentric perception
of one's place in the world; it links individuals to the
"idea" of ethnicity without the medium of formal relations.

Cohen (1976) posits that the anthropologist's task
is to explicate the dialectial relation between "symbolic
order" and "power order." The "power order" primarily con-
sists of economic and political relations. The major
aspects of "symbolic order" anthropologists used to deal
with are "kinship" and "ritual." Both kinship and ritual
are "normative, governed by categorical imperatives . . .

that are rooted in the psychic structure ofmen in society
through continuous socialization" (1976:23). He further
argues that "social personality," as a collectivity of
roles, can be segmented only to a limited degree (1976:
54-55). The oneness of selfhood is necessary if the indi-
vidual could function normally in society. Such selfhood
is achieved only in the contexts of those personal inter-
actions which involve the totality of one's personality;
such as the contexts of symbolic order (1976:55). But, in
the modern state, the power order and the symbolic order do
not usually coincide. It follows that there are some areas
within the structure of modern state, where relations are
only formal. Cohen (1976:66) argues that what constitutes
the "bony structure of power" within the state is "interest
group." Interest groups can be organized formally. But,
when, "for some reason," the groups cannot organize them-
selves on formal principles, they exploit "the perennial
problems of man," i.e., the problem of selfhood: they
organize themselves on informal principles which are based
on "categorical imperatives," rather than contractual
relations.

His thesis on ethnicity (1976:91-98) is this: an
ethnic group in the modern state is an interest group that
exploits parts of traditional culture. He maintains that an
ethnic group is an essentially new social form which the
emergence of modern state has brought about. The study of

culture as such, therefore, has little relevance to the
elucidation of ethnicity in modern society:

> . . . culture is not an independent system, but is
> a collection of diverse types of norms, values, beliefs,
> practices and symbols which, through affecting one
> another, are largely systematised, or structured, in
> social situations. Ethnicity therefore can be under-
> stood only when it is analysed within the contexts of
> new social situations (Cohen, 1976:96).

From this point of view, ethnicity is a "funda-
mentally political phenomenon" (1976:97). It is an interest
group that has become ethnic, rather than "primordial
attachments" that have grown into an ethnic group. What,
then, differentiates "ethnic interest group" from other
types of interest group? Cohen (1976:97) answers to this
question by saying that "an ethnic group has no explicitly
stated aims and is not rationally and bureaucratically
organized." It follows that, if an ethnic group has come
to constitute part of the formal structure of the state,
it is "no longer an ethnic group, but a province or a region"
(1976:97). But, it should be noted that there is always a
possibility of forming "informal interest group" even within
a formally organized structure.

Although Cohen sometimes seems to imply the
existence of a certain normative system among all the
members of an "ethnic group," it would be more correct to
say that they constitute mobilizable individuals by appeal-
ing to the "connotation" of their identities. When the
generality of the connotation increases, the denotation
becomes large in extension. In its maximum, therefore, its

psychological potency as a mobilizing power would be low. When, on the other hand, the specificity of the connotation increases, the denotation become small in extension. In its maximum, it coincides with an individual, losing its political relevance.

We consider this formulation useful because ethnicity has so often been treated as if it is a closed cultural system. It is true that, in some contexts, ethnic conflicts appear in such a way that their "ideologies" are incompatible. But we suspect that such formulations of "conflicting ideologies" reflect a horizontal and uni-dimensional view of the world divided into units each of which is filled with consensus. Such a view does not seem to fit many modern multi-ethnic situations. We tried to avoid visualizing "ethnic boundaries" as if they are geometric lines fixed on space. This seems to be a necessary step to explicate the dynamics of ethnic politics.

Let us summarize our discussions on the subject of ethnic dynamics. We have distinguished two dimensions of ethnic change: change in "quality" of ethnic boundaries and change in "extension" of ethnic boundaries. We have suggested that the two types of change may occur indepen-dently. This point was illustrated by the fact that an ethnic category in the modern state normally includes diverse members in the category whose individual partici-pation in the larger society varies widely in degree. Social relevance of the ethnic category to which these

diverse members belong, therefore, has to do with the
macro-level social phenomena: change in "extension" of
ethnic boundaries is concerned with this level. Individuals
who are included within the extension may not be "objectively"
circumscribed by the boundaries. The inclusion of indi-
viduals in the extension may not necessarily be mediated
by one's "objective" relations to others. It is concerned
with a question whether one is the "same thing" as the
others who are supposed to belong to a certain ethnic cate-
gory. But an ethnic category is an elusive thing. The
villagers of a such-and-such village, for example, would be
defined in terms of "objective" relationships. But, all we
can say about "ethnicity" is that it has something to do
with "origin," and that individuals are linked to it through
the medium of "certain attributes." What are these "cer-
tain attributes"? We have introduced two concepts; "connota-
tion" and "denotation." We have pointed out that indi-
viduals have a different "connotation," and that the
question whether some of them have the same "denotation"
or not is subject to the macro-level social dynamics. That
the "Morning Star" and the "Evening Star" are the "same
thing" depends on the "agreement of the wise men." In the
case of astronomy, however, we could safely assume the
"objective existence" of the Venus. Baboons, gorillas,
and men have the same "denotation"; that is, "primate."
There is, however, no "objective existence" of primate:
"primate" is ideal. In the case of ethnicity, we cannot

assume the "objective existence" of ethnic category either.
But, the establishment of an ethnic category calls for
"certain attributes." The medium of "certain attributes"
through which individuals are linked to an ethnic category
may vary: one may be an Italian because of his "blood,"
or because of his general way of life, etc. Moreover, the
level of "ethnic category itself would vary: it might be at
the level of "primate," or at the level of "mammalian."
(We have suggested this in our discussions of "segmentation
of descent.") In the case of zoological systematics,
however, we could establish certain "objective attributes"
for each taxonomic unit; while, in the case of ethnic cate-
gory, the level of abstraction of these "certain attri-
butes" would remain unstable. All we could say would be
this: the ethnic category is established at the macro-level
of social dynamics regardless of its reference; and indi-
vidual relationships to this category are only connotative.

We have suggested "substructure" of ethnic dynamics.
The "ethnic category" may be utilized as a principle of ⟨
recruitment into an informal social organization where
formal organizations have failed to accommodate certain
segments of the populace within a modern state. As Cohen
suggests, it might be an interest group. However, it would
be wrong to suppose that all the members of an ethnic
category somehow share the same interests. In this
⟨ respect, Plax's suggestion that ethnicity is a quasi-
institutional collectivity due to the consciousness of

exclusion would be relevant. This formulation of ethnicity
does not call for a closed system of ethnicity.

CHAPTER 2

ETHNICITY IN OKINAWA

We are going to discuss "ethnicity" in an empirical
context; that is, Okinawan "ethnicity." However, it would
be necessary first to review general ethnic situations in
Japan. As Isaac (1975:185) has remarked, "by almost all the
definitions, Japan is probably the truest 'nation' on earth
and one of the few that can actually be called a 'nation-
state.'" This seems to be a widely accepted view of Japan.
But, how do the Japanese themselves think of "Japan"? For
the Japanese, "Japan" is so "natural" a social entity that
they can hardly think of what it really is. Is Japan a
nation, or a state, or a geographical unit, or something
else? "Is Japan a State?" was actually a title of a
symposium held in 1969 (Nakamura, 1970).

Before the end of the Second World War, it was said
that Japan was unique among the nations because of her
kokutai. Although the meaning of the kokutai was extremely
obscure, it was supposed to signify some sort of "essence"
of Japan. According to Anzu (quoted in Kitagawa, 1974:209):
"If you regard a State as a form or container the contents
that fill this form or container is the reality of a state,

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that is the kokutai." But, how is the "Japanese nation"
related to the kokutai? It is well known that, before the
Meiji Restoration in 1868, there was a very weak conscious-
ness of the Japanese as a "nation" (see, for example,
Craig, 1968; Steiner, 1968). Man was, first of all, either
a samurai or a commoner. A samurai was, in turn, a man of
such and such a han. Both vertically and horizontally,
therefore, there was no unity of Japanese as a "nation."
It seems that "nation" was a concept imported from the
West. It was Fukzawa Yukichi, a westernizer of Meiji
Japan, who remarked that there was only a government, but
not a nation, in Meiji Japan. The "people" failed to
appear as a carrier of "national values": it was the
"emperor system" (Tenno-sei) that became the "content" of
the Meiji State. (It should be noted that all such words
as socity (shakai), nation (kokumin), race (jinshi), etc.,
were coined in the process of Japanese modernization after
1868. Even the term Tenno was finally fixed as the
designation of the Japanese emperor well after the Meiji
Restoration (Kamei, 1974).)

In what sense, then, is Japan a nation? The
formation of "Japanese nation" cannot be separated from
the formation of "modern," Meiji state. Japan's entry into
the "family of nations" was a traumatic experience. There
were both "assimilationist" actions and "nativist" reactions.
The "assimilationist" tendency is most clearly represented
by Fukuzawa. He wrote in 1866:

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> Buddhism is a cult. Confucianism is also a cult.
> . . . In Japan there is another cult called something
> like the spirit of Yamato. . . . But if we would be
> civilized gentlemen, we must first broaden our know-
> ledge and familiarize ourselves with conditions in all
> the countries in the world. Let universal ethnical
> principles (sekai no dori) be determined by competitive
> bidding (nyusatsu); if that which the millions in the
> world say is true should be contrary to our cult, then
> we should resolutely change our religion and enter the
> gate of the cult called international law (quoted in
> Craig, 1968:104-105).

However, the advocates of "assimilation," including Fukuzawa

himself, gradually began to shift into "nationalist"

("polycentric nationalist" in our terminology) positions

(Craig, 1968).

Japanese scholars often distinguish two types of

nationalism; Kokuminshugi and Kokkashugi (see, for instance,

Havens, 1974:184ff; H. D. Smith, 1975:142ff). Kokuminshugi

nationalism is populist, anti-bureaucratic, and decentral-

ized, while Kokkashugi nationalism is bureaucratic and

centralized. Kokuminshugi nationalism holds that the

"essence" of nation exists at the grass-root level, so that

"parochialism" does not contradict the idea of nation.

Kokkashugi nationalism, on the other hand, holds that the

orthodoxy of state has to replace parochial heterodoxies.

The Kokutai ideology appears to be Kokkashugi nationalism,

while Yanagida Kunio's "New National Learning" seems to be

Kokuminshugi nationalism.

We have mentioned the name of Yanagida because of

the significant role which scholars of Japanese folk

culture played with regard to the problem of Okinawan

"ethnicity." These scholars were "parochial" people, yet

somehow they believed that all the heterogeneity of folk

culture derived from one source called "Japan." Just like

the "noble savages" appeared to the eyes of the Europeans

of the Enlightenment as the humanity before the Fall,

Okinawa appeared to these scholars as "pure" and "un-

corrupted" Japan: Okinawa became the "mirror for the

Japanese."

The incorporation of Okinawa into the "modern

state" of Meiji Japan was in parallel with Japan's entry

into the "family of nations." For the Okinawans of the

late nineteenth century, however, the "gate of the cult

called international law" was narrow. When Okinawan con-

sciousness was awakened, Japan had already begun to shift

to "nationalist" phase. Okinawan "assimilation," there-

fore, became not so much assimilation into the "inter-

national law," as assimilation into the Meiji State and its

nationalism. What is usually called "Okinawalogy" was a

product of this process of Okinawan incorporation to Japan.

Unlike Sinology or Japanology, Okinawalogy refers to the

study of Okinawa originated by Okinawan scholars them-

selves, such as Iha Fuyu, the "father of Okinawalogy,"

Majikina Anko, Higoanna Kanjun, Nakahara Zenchu, Higa

Shuncho, and so forth. These scholars tried to establish

that the Okinawans are "Japanese." This by no means

implies that there was no conflict between Okinawa and

Japan. ("Westernization" of Meiji Japan, after all, did

not mean the lack of conflicts between Japan and the West.)
As we have suggested above, one mode of the conflicts
between centralizing power of Meiji State and decentralizing
power at the local level appeared as the conflict between
Kokkashugi and Kokuminshugi. However, both Kokkashugi and
Kokuminshugi were "nationalism." In order that the conflict
took place at all, it was first necessary to establish that
the Okinawans were "Japanese." (Iha's "Essays on the Ryukyan
Race" was published in 1911, in which the author argued that
the "Ryukynan race" was a branched-off segment of the
"Japanese race." Recent studies in linguistics, archaeology,
etc., support this thesis, although it is, of course,
necessary to distinguish analytically "race," "language,"
"culture," etc. (Shinzato, 1970:82-128). But, what con-
cerns us here is not "historical truth," but the modes in
which "ethnicity" appears as a socially relevant phenomenon.)

        There are several themes which recurred again and
again with reagrd to Okinawa-Japan relations: (1) whether
or not the Okinawans are "Japanese," (2) whether or not
"Japanization" of Okinawa is "good," (3) whether or not the
incorporation of Okinawa into the Japanese state is "good,"
(4) why there is sabetsu (discrimination) against the
Okinawans. We can see that all these themes are essenti-
ally "political." Some historians today, for example,
argue that the delay of the admission of Okinawa Prefecture
to full political status and the policies of "preserving
old customs and procedures," etc. were sabetsu. However,

such policies may not have been thought of as <u>sabetsu</u> by
those who opposed the incorporation of Okinawa into the
Meiji State. The same is true with regard to the problem
of "whether the Okinawans are 'Japanese.'" Today, the
"national consensus" that the Okinawans are "Japanese" is
so firmly established (thanks to the mobilization during
the Okinawan Reversion Movement) that any suggestion to the
contrary has come to have a "revolutionary" political over-
tone. (This political strategem is employed among some of
the "New Radicals.") This suggests that such a statement
as "the Okinawans are Japanese" has little significance
outside the context of politics.

The vocabulary of Japanese politics, however, does
not include the word "ethnicity." First of all, there is
no Japanese word for "ethnicity." (Mabuch and Ogawa (1971:
11) use the term "ethnic sub-groups" in their discussion
of the Okinawan folk culture. The term is English in the
original Japanese text. They translate it as "<u>a-shuzoku</u>."
It sounds too technical to fit in with ordinary Japanese
prose.) As far as one is living in Japan, "Japanese
ethnicity" has only latent relevance. This does not mean
that the "Japanese" are insensitive to the subnational
divisions within Japan. On the contrary:

> For practically every district in Japan there is in
> Tokyo a Society of Men of . . . Prefecture (. . .
> <u>kenjinkai</u>) and still an almost inevitable question
> in the first few minutes of a new acquaintanceship in
> Tokyo is "Which is your province?" If the individual
> himself happens to be born in Tokyo he is as likely as
> not to answer by naming the district in which his

father or even his grandfather, was born (Dore, 1963: 219).

"Kenjinkai" seems to be a Japanese counterpart of association d'originaires in Africa (Wallerstein, 1960:11). It is difficult to assess the political relevance of Kenjinkai in post-war Japan, and its significance seems to vary from one Prefecture to another (see, for example, Sofue, 1971). During the Meiji period, however, one's place of birth had decisive political relevance. The high posts of government were monopolized by men from Satsuma and Choshu. Although the Japanese called it hanbatsu-seiji, Africanists may have simply called it "tribalism." (It should be noted that, in Japanese, Kuni signifies various politico-territorial units, so that "Japan" is a kuni, as well as a federation of several tens of kuni. For various politico-military confrontations between sub-national "ethnic" groups during the Meiji period, see Miwa, 1975.)

Above discussions would have made it easier, I hope, to understand why the Okinawans could claim that they are "Japanese." The "Japanese" is a "super-tribe" that has been formed as a result of the emergence of a "modern state"; that is, the Meiji State. It was not only the Okinawans but also all the "Japanese" that became "Japanese" after the emergence of Meiji State. This does not mean that Okinawa has melted into Japan and disappeared. "Okinawa" is still socially and politically relevant. First of all, as far as the "Fourth Interglacial" period

continues, Okinawa remains to be a geographical unit, the only region with sub-tropical ecology "within Japan." Politically, it is one of forty-seven Japanese Prefectures. Political demands of Okinawa Prefecture, therefore, take the form of prefectural government-central government relationships. (This does not mean that the relationships between local and central governments are fixed and stable. For increasing tension between local and central government in Japan after 1960, see Muramatsu (1975). Okinawa Prefecture has adopted various political strategies commonly used by other prefectural governments in order to put pressures upon the central government.) Then, how does the "Okinawan culture" fit the Japanese scheme of things? It is said that Okinawan culture is one of the two major branches of "Japanese" culture; that is, the Okinawan branch and the mainland Japanese branch. Generally speaking, the elements of continuity were emphasized before 1970, and the elements of discontinuity began to be emphasized after 1970. However, the conflict may not necessarily be expressed in terms of "Okinawan culture" vs. "mainland Japanese culture": it may also be formulated in terms of "grass-rooted folk culture" vs. "modernity." In terms of political potency, the latter formulation is much more powerful because the former could mobilize only the "people of Okinawa Prefecture," i.e., 1 percent of the total Japanese population, while the latter could mobilize a much larger portion of the Japanese population, including all the

Kokuminshugi nationalists. Of course, these two formula-
tions could be combined in various degrees. Thus, Okinawa
remains; and "Okinawa problems" continue to exist. Yet,
they may or may not be "ethnic."

Thus far, we have seen only one side of the coin:
we have taken "Okinawa" for granted. Yet, "Okinawa," like
"Japan," is a historically formed social entity. Let us
now turn to the historical development of "Okinawa" and
its relationships to "Japan."

Ethnicity in Pre-Modern Okinawa

We have argued that "ethnicity" is essentially a
political phenomenon that appears in various forms in
different political power structures. We have further
pointed out that, in the "empire type" structure, ethnicity
as such has little political relevance to the functioning
of macro-power structure.

Let us first describe historical changes in the
Okinawan power structure before it was incorporated into
the "modern state." (Our historical descriptions of
Okinawa are mainly based on Kerr (1958); Higa et al.
(1963); Shinzanto et al. (1972).)

Before the thirteenth century, in Ryukyu, there
were local territorial leaders called the _anji_ (the
toyomioya in Miyako, the _kawara_ in Yaeyama). Some of them
began to increase their power and, finally, in the early
fourteenth century, there appeared three major centers of

power configurations on the Okinawa Island (i.e., the main-

island of the Ryukyu archiperago). They were Hokuzan,

Chuzan, and Nanzan. Since 1372, Chuzan began to send

tributary missions to Ming China. The other two centers of

power also followed this. From 1372 to 1395, Chuzan sent

25 missions, while Nanzan sent 13 and Hokuzan sent 8

missions. This reflected their relative statuses of socio-

political strength and their future destinies. Chuzan

conquered Hokuzan in 1416 and also conquered Nanzan in 1429.

> In 1429 Okinawa was unified; henceforth "Chuzan" meant
> all of Okinawa, but the old divisions were perpetuated
> in new administrative names and offices, and the terms
> "Kunigami," "Nakagami" and "Shimajiri" in the twentieth
> century preserve a lingering memory of the three ancient
> principalities (Kerr, 1958:86).

However, the political configurations of the island

still seemed fluid. There were still many anji whose

loyalty to the king of Chuzan was suspected. The institu-

tional centralization of power structure was not firmly

established until the time of Sho Shin, who became the king

of Chuzan in 1477. His centralization policies included:

(1) all the anji of Okinawa were ordered to move into Shuri,

the capital of Chuzan, to take up residence near the palace.

All weapons were also brought into Shuri, (2) symbols of

status and privilege in the court hierarchy were elaborated,

(3) a religious hierarchy of the noro cult was established.

Hitherto independent noro priestesses were brought into

the hierarchy, at the top of which was the Kikoe-O-Gimi,

the chief <u>noro</u> priestress who was usually a close female relative of the king.

The socio-political conditions of the Outer Islands (<u>Sakishima</u> or <u>Hanare</u>) in the fifteenth century, however, were quite different from those of the Okinawa Island. A vivid account of these regional differences was given by three shipwrecked Koreans in the <u>Yijo Sillok</u> (or, <u>Licho Jitsuroku</u> in Japanese; see Tanaka, 1972). The three Koreans were rescued by the islanders of Yonaguni, where they stayed for about six months. They were then sent to Shuri, via Iriomote, Hateruma, Aragusuku, Kuroshima, Tarama, Irabu, Miyako. What they described was essentially the <u>rural-urban continuum</u> of the Ryukyu Kingdom of the fifteenth century, a continuum between "neolithic symplicity" of Yonaguni and the "cosmopolitan urban life" at Shuri.

There are some documents which record "tributes" to Chuzan in 1390 from some of the major <u>Hanare</u> islands. It seems that these "tributary relations" were at first purely economic. After the unification of the Okinawa Island in 1428, however, these relations between Okinawa and the <u>Hanare</u> islands began to shift into political relations; the impact of the centralization policies began to be felt in these <u>Hanare</u> islands. (see, for example, Nishizato, 1970.) Among the <u>Hanare</u> islands, Miyako increased its strength and wealth, presumably due to its close contact with Shuri. Both the rebellion of Akahachi in

Yaeyama and that of Onitora in Yonaguni were suppressed by Nakasone toyomioya of Miyako. However, Nakasone himself was subordinated by Shuri and brought into the centralized system of the kingdom. (Nakasone was recognized as kashira of Miyako.) Gradually, resident officers from Shuri began to be placed in these Hanare islands. The amami Island in the north was one of the last Hanare islands which were incorporated into the Kingdom.

What were impacts of these changes in power structure upon "ethnicity." Was there any "Okinawan ethnicity"? The most salient social cleavage in Okinawa at this time seems to have been that which divided the urban center and the countryside. There existed almost "neolithic" life of Yonaguni, as well as "cosmopolitan" urban life of Shuri, within the ambience of power structure of the kingdom. This cleavage was further reinforced by the concentration of the anji at Shuri. As a result, the regional differences came to coincide with the differences in political authority. (However, the anji still had some relationships with their native territories at this time.) The second salient social cleavage appeared between Jige (the Okinawa main-island) and Hanare (the off-shore islands). This cleavage was further deepened by the fact that all the anji at Shuri came exclusively from various territories of Jige, rather than Hanare. The local leaders of the Hanare islands remained on their home territories, and were incorporated into the power structure of the kingdom as a

mediator at the lower level of hierarchy. Moreover, as we have mentioned, the three divisions of the Okinawa main-island itself remained.

Given the low level of spatial mobility at this time, these spatial divisions could have been easily interpreted in terms of "ethnicity." However, these major divisions were in turn divided into many sub-units within themselves, so that they would not have developed subjective and objective unity. One of the definite trends was the differentiation between the people of Shuri and the people of the countryside, as the Shuri people were losing their close ties with their native territories and were developing a new mode of life among themselves. Although there was also a counter-trend, a diffusion of urban culture to the countryside, communities in the countrysides remained closed and, as a rule, endogamous, so that they were not able to develop multilateral relationships among themselves. (See, for example, Higa, 1971:139.) Francis' characterization of the "empire type" fits the picture of Okinawa up to the end of the nineteenth century; that is, "mutually exclusive homogeneous societies with separate traditions and folk cultures," on the one hand, and a "high culture," on the other.

We should mention here about the Kume village at Naha, near Shuri. The Kume village was a "Chinese" community founded by the so-called "thirty-six families of Bin" in 1393. The Kume villagers formed part of the

Okinawan elite class. As the China-Ryukyu trade (or

tributary) relationships grew in importance, they began to

form a sort of professional guild engaged in China affairs

of the kingdom. In 1686, however, there remained only

five families of the original thirty-six families (although

it is doubtful whether there were originally thirty-six

families (Kerr, 1958:75)). There were, however, later

Chinese immigrants who settled in the Kume village. Many

Okinawans were also adopted by the Kume villagers, and some

Okinawans simply joined in the Kume community "in order to

fill the vacancies of the Thirty-six Families" (see,

Toguchi, 1975:446). Thus, the "Chinese community" of Kume,

or Toei, was defined by Toguchi (1975:447) as a professional

guild composed of those who were fluent in Chinese, and who

had family registrations in Toei-shi, and were living in

the Kume village. When the Manchus took over China and

ordered Chinese to adopt the queue, the Kume villagers

instead adopted the Okinawan style of coiffure (Kerr, 1958:

178).

Besides the Toei, there were two main factions

within the Okinawan elite; Naha people and Shuri people.

There grew certain administrative divisions of labor

between Shuri people and Naha people (Toguchi, 1975:313-318).

The cleavage between the ruling elite and the masses

was, however, not necessarily unbridgeable. The adminis-

trative offices of the kingdom were open to the whole

populace. The people of the countryside (i.e., the

peasantry) were able to hold offices at the local levels of administration and, in theory, could climb up the ladder of the hierarchy. In other words, the peasantry was not a hereditary social status. After the Satsuma invasion in 1609, however, status differentiation began to be institutionalized. Satsuma carried out land surveys on the islands in order to determine tax responsibilities. This required the clear differentiation of the peasantry (No) and the ruling elite (Shi): those who were holding offices at the central government of the kingdom were recognized as the shi, while the rest of the population, including administrative officers at the local level, became the no (Toguchi, 1975:236). The shi and the no became hereditary statuses which were independent of the official positions in the administration. The shumon aratame (or fuda-aratame, the population registration which was originally carried out in order to prove one's nonallegiance to Christianity (and the Shin sect of Buddhism in the case of Satsuma).) in 1636 and the prohibition of the migration of peasantry in 1651, further consolidated the status differentiation (Toguchi, 1975:250-251). As social privileges began to be regulated according to hereditary statuses, the authentication of one's hereditary status became necessary among the ruling elite. In 1670, the gentry of Shuri and adjacent areas were ordered to submit genealogical records. In 1689, the Shuri government established a genealogical bureau (Higa, 1964:34; Sakai, 1968:128).

The result was the division of the Okinawan population into the Keimochi (possessing genealogy) and the Mukei (without genealogy). The establishment of the genealogical bureau was closely related to the subsequent development of the monchu ("lineage" or "descent group") (Toguchi, 1971a, 1971b). Those who were without official posts, but who were related to the familyl with a post, began to form a lineage organization in order to secure their shi status.

So far, we have reviewed "intra-Ryukyu ethnicity." We have argued that the most salient social cleavage in the kingdom was between the elite and the masses. This cleavage tended to be institutionalized in terms of "descent" and the place of residence. (The shi had their legal registrations in Shuri, Naha, and Tomari.) The masses, on the other hand, were bound to their own communities: their migration was prohibited and their marriages were, as a rule, village-endogamous. Under these circumstances, the supravillage "ethnic" identity would have been difficult to develop among the masses.

Among the elite, on the other hand, their social identity would have been status-bound, rather than "national." The role of the "Chinese" community among the Ryukyuan elite illustrates this point. The "Chinese" seem to have derived their identity not so much from their "national" origin, as from their membership in the Toei, the "professional guild." This was the reason why it could incorporate non-Chinese members, and why it could function

as a social unit even after the members adopted the culture of Okinawan elite.

We have suggested that the "national" consciousness among the Ryukyan elite was rudimentary, and it was almost nonexistent among the masses. Then, what was the "rudimentary national consciousness?" The "rudimentary national consciousness" could be understood only in the "international" context. First of all, the Ryukyu Kingdom was integrated into the Chinese World Order (Ch'en, 1968). For the Rykyuan elite, however, the Chinese culture was not "national" culture, but a universal cultural order. The Middle Kingdom was the model of high order for the Chuzan Kingdom (i.e., Middle Mountain, another name of Ryukyu Kingdom). The axis of the Middle Kingdom, as it were, went through the center of the Middle Mountain. The Ryukyu "nationality" was, therefore, not "polycentric" in our terminology.

This neat world-view was disturbed by the Satsuma invasion which transformed the Ryukyu Kingdom into a de facto fief of Lord Shimazu of Satsuma (Sakai, 1964, 1968). But the symbolic order is one thing and the power order is another, at least for the time being. For political and economic reasons, Satsuma carefully preserved the "facade of the Ryukyu Kingdom." This resulted in the so-called "dual subordination" of the Ryukyu Kingdom. The actual relationship between Satsuma and Ryukyu was concealed from the Chinese eye. Satsuma ordered the king of

Ryukyu to continue to receive the investiture from China, so that Satsuma would profit from the China-Ryukyu trade.

Although Satsuma integrated Ryukyu into its own power structure, it refused Ryukyu to be integrated into its own cultural ambience. For example,

> . . . the Shimazu authorities . . . proscribed the use of surnames that had "the flavour of Yamato (i.e., that were like Japanese names). Accordingly, Okinawans with surnames like those of Satsuma persons are said to have changed the Chinese characters used in writing their names . . . (Higa, 1964:34).

But, it was also this time that some of the Okinawan elite became conscious of the cultural similarities between "Japan" and "Okinawa." Haneji Chosho (Sho Sho-ken), for example, wrote in 1673 that the Okinawans originally must have come from the Japanese mainland because the Okinawan language is similar to Japanese (Shinzato et al., 1972:88).

What were the impacts of the Satsuma invasion upon the people of Okinawa? First of all, it should be noted that the Satsuma invasion was not a "total war," which was an invention of the nineteenth century. We would suspect that the invasion itself had little impact upon the majority of the people. It was not the war between "nations." It was the war between Lord Shimazu of Satsuma and the king of Ryukyu. Actually there were some "Japanese" who were serving the king of Ryukyu at the time of the invasion. (Those Japanese were of course not the retainers of Lord Shinazu.)

Although we have noted various social consequences in Okinawa that were brought about by such Satsuma policies as the land survey and the population registration, it seems that the "ideological" impact of the invasion was largely limited to the circle of the Okinawan elite. However, the essentially sino-centric and Confucian world-view of the Okinawan elite (which, after all, the Satsuma elite themselves shared), did not change very much. Satsuma did not see any necessity to change the ideological basis of the kingdom.

The Satsuma invasion, however, might have encouraged the development of "rudimentary national culture" of Okinawa. The first sign of "rudimentary national culture" of Okinawa appeared in 1532 when the first collection of omoro poems were compiled (the poems were written in "Japanese" Kana syllabaries). The second collection of omoro appeared in 1613, soon after the Satsuma invasion. Until 1623, there appeared 21 volumes of the Omorozoshi. The scope of this "national culture," however, was limited: the Omorozoshi included poems from Okinawa and Amami islands, but not from Miyako and Yaeyama islands (Shinzato, 1970:91).

Okinawa's Incorporation Into the Modern State

The emergence of Japan as a "modern state" was a sign of the beginning of the end of the Chinese world order. Japan began to follow the rules of the game called "modern

international law." One of the first problems was the definition of territorial boundaries in which the sovereignty of the modern state was to be exercised. The boundaries of the northern frontier was settled in 1875 by negotiation with Russia. The sovereignty problem of the Bonins (Ogasawara) was also settled in this year when the United States and Great Britain agreed to abandon all claims. The definition of the southern boundaries of Japan was a different matter; it involved a direct confrontation with China who seemed to be sticking to the rules of a different game.

The Meiji government abolished the fied (han) in 1871, and established in their place new units of government, the prefecture (ken). Okinawa tentatively came under the administration of Kagoshima Ken, which had replaced Satsuma Han. It was this time that the "abnormal" status of Okinawa became a problem. The so-called "dual subordination" as such was not a problem at all until the emergence of Japan as a modern state. (The term "dual subordination" (Ryozoku) seems to have first been used by the Meiji government in 1871 (Kinjo, 1970a:67). A similar problem occurred in the case of Lord So of Tsushima who had a "tributary relationship" with Korea.) It was, after all, Satsuma itself that deliberately developed this scheme of things; and China, too, may not have been offended by this scheme:

In traditional East Asia, dual subordination was not
so serious a problem as in modern times. . . . During
the Sino-Japanese dispute over Liu-chi'iu in the 1870s
the biggest thorn was that Japan forbade Liu-ch'iu to
send tribute to China. Had Liu-ch'iu continued the
tributary relationship, Peking might have had no
objection to her concurrent subordination to Japan.
But the dual subordination of Liu-ch'iu was possible
only when the East Asian world was isolated and while
Japan remained in seclusion. By the later nineteenth
century these conditions no longer existed (Che'n,
1968:164).

In 1871, the mariners from Miyako were murdered by
the natives of Taiwan. In the exchange of official views
between China and Japan, the Miyako victims of the incident
were referred to as "subjects of Japan" (Nihon-koku Zokumin).
In 1872, Sho Tai, the king of Ryukyu, was raised to the new
Japanese peerage (Kazoku) and designated as "king of the
Ryukyu han" (Ryukyu Han O). The imperial decree read as
follows:

We have here succeeded to the Imperial Throne of a
line unbroken for ages eternal, and now reign over
all the land. Ryukyu, situated to the south, has
the same race, habits and language, and has always been
loyal to Satsuma. We appreciate this loyalty, here
raise you to the peerage and appoint you King of
Ryukyu Han. You, Sho Tai, take responsibility in the
administration of the han, and assist us eternally
(quoted in Kerr, 1958:363).

It is significant that the decree states that Ryukyu has
"the same race, habits and language." This was the point
which China did not (and could not) claim. It should be
noted, however, that the claim of "the same race, habits
and language" was not based on any "scientific" investi-
gation: it was a merely political decision that was only
afterwards given a scientific basis.

In 1879, Ryukyu han was abolished and in its place
Okinawa Ken was established. This was the so-called
Ryukyu-Shobun which was an Okinawan counterpart of the
"hai-han-chi-ken" (1871) of Japan proper. The most crucial
point of this shobun was to end the Okinawan tributary
relationship with China. China, however, tried by all ways
and means to make the Okinawan issue alive. China feared
that Japan's establishment of sovereignty over Okinawa and
the end of Okinawan tributary relationship with China
might erode the whole order of traditional East Asia. This
fear is clearly stated in the letter from Ho Ju-Chang, the
Chinese minister at Tokyo, to Viceroy Li Hung-chan (see
Kinjo, 1970a:138). (For all the intricate Sino-Japanese
diplomacy in this period, see Hwa, 1975.)

Within Okinawa itself, the resistance to the new
Japanese order of the Meiji State was quite strong partic-
ularly among the Okinawan elite. For the traditional
Okinawan elite, Okinawa's incorporation into the modern
state of Meiji Japan meant the loss of traditional privileges
which they enjoyed under the system of "dual subordination."
Their resistance continued until the Sino-Japanese war
(1894-95) in which the defunct of the "Chinese world order"
became decisive. Before the Sino-Japanese war, however,
the Meiji government's attitudes toward the Okinawan elite
were those of appeasement. The government's subsidies to
the ex-privileged class (Shizoku) were more favorable in
Okinawa than in Japan proper. This period before the

Japanese war is sometimes called the "Do-Nothing" Era. The subsequent period was that of "assimilation." As Okinawan scholars often remark, the "assimilation" was another side of the coin of "discrimination." The formation of Okinawan "inferiority complex" during this period is one of the issues most intensely discussed among the Okinawan scholars (see, for example, Ota, 1969, 1976).

Although there were strong sentiments among the Okinawan elite against the new order of Meiji Japan, they were not able to form a "national front" against Japan. One of the most crucial factors in their failure of forming a "national front" seems to have been the cleavage between elite and masses. As we have suggested, pre-modern Okinawa had formed not a "people's nation," but a "rudimentary nation" of the elite, so that the elite could not mobilize the masses against the new order of Meiji Japan. The Okinawan elite were, moreover, materially too frail to fight against the united power of the elite of the Meiji government. These conditions led them to rely upon the influence of China in order to counterbalance the aggressive policies of the Meiji government.

The "enlightened" elements among the Okinawan elite who saw their future in the new order of Meiji Japan were a minority until the end of the Sino-Japanese War (Arakawa, 1973:66-96). However, these "enlightened" elements were bound to become politically dominant through the new school system established in 1880, the publication of the first

Okinawan newspaper in 1893, etc. During the Meiji period,
however, it was the newcomers from mainland Japan who
virtually monopolized the fields of economy, education,
administration, etc. in Okinawa. The task of the "en-
lightened" Okinawan elite was therefore to recover their
socio-political hegemony in Okinawa. There were two
possible means for them to achieve this goal; either
through "secessionism" or cooperation with the Meiji
government. Perhaps, the first, at the same time the last,
attempt by the "enlightened" Okinawan elite aimed at a
sort of "secessionism" was the Kodo-kai incident in 1896.

> A number of prominent men formed an organization
> called the Koko-kai. . . . In good faith the Kodo-kai
> proposed that Governor Narahara be recalled and that
> Marquis Sho Tai be sent down to take his place. . . .
> It was believed that if the king were granted to nominal
> title and honors of governorship, the most stubborn
> anti-Japanese elements in Okinawa would unite with the
> liberal advocates of modernization (Kerr, 1958:425).

This was actually not secessionism in a strict
sense because they intended to modernize (and "Japanize")
Okinawa within the frame of Meiji order. The Meiji govern-
ment, however, crushed this proposal at once as mere
anachronism. After this abortive incident, the "enlightened"
Okinawan elite began to attempt to increase their power in
close cooperation with Governor Narahara.

In Okinawa at this time, (and in Japan as a whole),
Kagoshima (Satsuma) men were dominant in almost all the
social fields, (Governor Narahara himself was a Kagoshima
man). In 1905, there were about 2,600 mainland Japanese in

Naha, engaged in various economic, administrative, and
educational activities (Kerr, 1958:447). However, once
Okinawa was granted participation in local as well as
national politics (convocation of a prefectural assembly in
1909, and Okinawan representation in the national Diet in
1910), these mainland Japanese were bound gradually to lose
their hegemony in Okinawa. To counterbalance this trend,
the mainland Japanese businessmen in Okinawa had begun to
publish a newspaper, the Okinawa Shinbun, in competition
with the Ryukyu Shimpo which was sponsored by the Okinawan
elite. But their decline as an exclusive interest group
was most clearly symbolized by the discontinuance of the
Okinawa Shinbun at the end of the Meiji period (Ota, 1976:
162-177). In the field of education, too, Okinawans began
to re-lace the mainland Japanese after 1910. (The pre-
fectural assembly cut down the salaries of the teachers so
that the mainland Japanese were forced to leave their posts
(see S. Higa, 1969:51). However, the recovery of the
Okinawan hegemony seems to have been limited only to the
local level. Their influence in the national politics was
negligible. Since the prefectural governor was appointed
by the central government, the weak Okinawan influence at
the national level of politics greatly restricted the
prefectural autonomy of Okinawa, and the leadership in the
Okinawan prefectural administration remained in the hand
of the mainland Japanese. The relatively easy recovery of
Okinawan hegemony in certain social fields at the local

level, on the other hand, seems to be related to the fact
that Okinawa was, after all, an economically insignificant
region within Japan, particularly after Japan's acquisition
of Taiwan from China.

The relationship between Okinawans and mainland
Japanese in terms of "ethnicity" at this time is difficult
to assess. Perhaps, one of the effects of Okinawa's
incorporation into the modern state of Meiji Japan was the
emergence of "Okinawa" as a social entity with unambiguous
boundaries. Although even today there still remain many
regional cleavages (overlapped with status differentiation)
within Okinawa (S. Higa, 1969:11-14), the establishment of
Okinawa Prefecture seems to have contributed to the forma-
tion of prefectural solidarity (see, for example, Kerr,
1958:447). The problem of the prejudice of mainland
Japanese towards the Okinawans has been extensively dis-
cussed by various people. Yet these discussions were,
particularly during the Reversion Movement, politically
motivated so that the "reality" of prejudice and discrimina-
tion during the Meiji period is difficult to assess. It
seems, however, that the discrimination against Okinawans
was not a "national" problem during the Meiji period.
(After all, many Japanese may not have known Okinawa at
all at that time.) S. Higa (1969:23-25) recalls his first
experience in 1906 when he was called Riki-jin during his
military training program in Kumamoto, Kyushu. (Riki-jin
was a term by which Kagoshima (Satsuma) people derogatively

called Ryukyu people when Satsuma was ruling Ryukyu.) A
group of people from Kagoshima at the Kumamoto Garrison
began to discriminate against Higa and his friends by
calling them Rikijin.

> Although the mainland Japanese in Okinawa during
> the Meiji period behaved arrogantly, I had never
> encountered such plainly prejudiced attitudes in my
> personal relations. . . . However, antagonism was
> only between Kagoshima people and Okinawa people;
> people from other regions were neutral (S. Higa,
> 1969:24).

It seems possible that the "prejudice towards Okinawans"
during the Meiji period was by and large a local phenomenon
which existed between Okinawa and Kagoshima, the former
"colonial" ruler of Okinawa. Once Japan's "nationaliza-
tion" began after the Meiji Restoration, however, Okinawa,
which lagged behind the "modernization" processes of Meiji
Japan, became more conspicuous in its local peculiarities.
Okinawan migrants to mainland Japan would have also contri-
buted to the diffusion of the notion that Okinawans were a
"sociological minority" in Japan. In other words, as the
"nationalization" of Japan proceeded, the nationalization
of Okinawans as a sociological minority also proceeded.
This process was aggravated by the fact that Okinawans
began to internalize their "inferior" or "peripheral"
status within Japan through a rapidly expanding primary
education system in Okinawa, which was strongly biased in
favor of mainland Japan. There is some evidence which
suggests that some of what the Okinawans took as

"prejudiced" attitudes were not so much "prejudgment" as "ignorance," about or "indifference" to, Okinawa on the part of mainland Japanese (Oshiro, 1970:233-236).

Although the economic backwardness of Okinawa must have been one of the factors which contributed to the formation of Okinawans as a "sociological minority," we have to be cautious of a simplistic economic determinism. Kagoshima (Satsuma), for example, was and is one of the most economically backward prefectures in Japan. Its local culture also shows strong provincial peculiarities. However, the poverty of Kagoshima men is regarded as Spartan frugality (worthy of Japanese samurai) and their provincial peculiarities are considered lovable. This is understandable when we consider the decisive role which Satsuma samurai played in the construction of the Meiji State. (By contrast, negative attitudes of the Japanese towards the people of the Tohoku region (the north-eastern part of Japan) may not solely be based on their economic backwardness. Tohoku was the last stronghold of the anti-Meiji power.) This suggests that not only economic, but also political factors play a crucial role in the formation of "sociological minorities."

Ethnicity and Post-War Okinawa

The battle of Okinawa in 1945 resulted in an utter chaos. Ninety-four thousand casualties were suffered by the Japanese military--including 28,000 Okinawan military

personnel. In addition, about 94,000 civilians also lost their lives. Americans suffered 12,000 dead (Shinzato et al., 1972:214). After the Japanese surrender, the American military continued to administer Okinawa directly, while the Japanese mainland was governed indirectly through the Japanese government (Watanabe, 1970:84). This "paternalistic differential treatment" of Okinawa by the American military seems to be related to the notion that the Okinawans are an ethnic minority exploited by the "Japanese," and are liberated by the American military. A leaflet which encouraged surrender of the Okinawan residents during the battle, for example, read: "Is this your war, or the war of the naichijin (mainland Japanese) who have ruled you for several decades?" (the leaflet is reproduced in Arasaki, 1969:18). However, this "liberation of the oppressed ethnic minority" by the American military seems to have been carried out in a rather half-hearted manner. Higa Mikio (1963:415) remarks that "during the first four years after the war, no definite overall policy toward the island was discernible." Binnendijk (1973:12) also agrees with this, although he points out two specific objectives of the U.S. military administration on Okinawa immediately after the war: "(1) the liquidation of political, social, and economic ties with the Japanese mainland, and (2) restoration of standards of living consistent with those existing prior to the war."

Fortunately or unfortunately, however, the late 1940s was a relatively "peaceful" period: Communist China did not complete its conquest of mainland China until 1949, and the Korean War did not happen until 1950. During this "peaceful" period, Okinawa became, in the words of James F. Auer, "a dumping ground for wartime supplies and a collection spot for American misfits" (quoted in Binnendijk, 1973:12. A similar, although more flamboyant, statement appears in Frank Gibney's article in Time Magazine, November 28, 1949). A dumping ground or not, the immediate concerns for most of the Okinawans at this time were food and shelter; and the American military seems to have given generally a favorable impression to the Okinawan residents. Some people, for example, suspect that if the Okinawans had a free choice at that time, they might have voted for American retention of the Ryukyus (see, for example, Emmerson, 1971:159; Bennendijk, 1973:12).

One of the groups in Japan, which applauded the "liberation of Okinawa," was the Japan Communist Party (JCP). The Secretary-General of the JCP was Tokuda Kyuichi ("Tokkyu"), an Okinawan, who was "liberated" from the prison by the Occupation Army. In 1946, the JCP published "a Message congratulating the Independence of the Okinawan Nation" (the message is reprinted in Arasaki, 1969:40-41). Some of the "progressive" Okinawans in mainland Japan were also sympathetic to the Communist (or American) view of Okinawa. This was a rather embarrassing event in the

history of Okinawan reversion movement which was later
strongly supported by the "progressive" elements (including
the JCP) in Japan.

Unlike some historical cases in which defeat
stirred the flames of nationalism, the word "nationalism"
became a taboo in Japanese politics immediately after the
war (see, for example, Maruyama, 1969:131-156). Japanese
leftists (including some opportunists) were full of optimism;
they regarded the Occupation Army as the "army of libera-
tion," and the world of "proletarian internationalism" was
supposed to be around the corner. It was under these cir-
cumstances that Foreign Minister Ashida Hitoshi in 1947
expressed his doubt whether the territorial provisions in the
Potsdam Declaration were applied to Okinawa. He remarked
that the national sentiment of Japan wished the return of
Okinawa to Japan. His statement, however, met strong
opposition from the leftist groups (Watanabe, 1970:23).
The general attitudes of many Japanese politicians toward
the problem of Okinawa were those of indifference. In any
case, there was little room for Japan, now under occupation,
to take the strong initiative on this problem. One of the
few status of Okinawa was Nakayoshi Yoshimitsu, a pre-1945
mayor of Shuri. He left Okinawa for Tokyo in 1946 and
devoted himself unswervingly to the cause of the return of
Okinawa to Japan.

By 1950, the international political and military
situations had greatly changed. Okinawa now became the

"keystone of the Pacific." Japan's position in the

international politics also changed. Japan became a country

which the United States sought as a new ally in their

struggle against the Communist bloc. Japanese opinions

over the problem of Okinawa began to take a more definite

stance.

> When Dulles visited Tokyo in January-February of 1951
> to discuss the problem of the Peace Treaty with Japanese
> leaders, he heard an almost unanimous expression of
> opinion from the Japanese government as well as from
> representatives of various quarters of Japanese society
> irrespective of party affiliation, calling for the
> return of Japanese sovereignty over some pre-war terri-
> tories, including Okinawa (Watanabe, 1970:139).

Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which

was signed in 1951, gave the United States the right to

exercise de facto sovereign powers over the Ryukyu Islands

and their inhabitants. Japan, on the other hand, was per-

mitted to retain "residual sovereignty" over Okinawa, "A

nebulous and unprecedented doctrine not included in the

treaty itself but enunciated by former Secretary of State

Dulles at the 1951 San Francisco Peace Conference" (M.

Higa, 1963:415). This diplomatic arrangement resulted in

an ambiguous legal status of Okinawa: ". . . although rule

by the United States was to be absolute and indefinite, it

was not to be permanent" (Emmerson, 1971:153).

Although there were some active individuals and

small groups in Japan and Okinawa who were committed to the

Okinawan reversion to Japan, the diplomatic arrangement

in the Peace Treaty with regard to the political status of

Okinawa had little to do with the wishes of the Okinawan
people themselves. It was at this time that the earliest
sign of the "reversion movement," which was characterized
by mass mobilization, appeared in Okinawa. The Association
for the Promotion of Reversion to Japan, which had close
ties with the Kiseikai, a reversion group in Japan under
Nakayoshi, sponsored a signature-collecting campaign. Some
199,000 signatures, representing 72 percent of the whole
electorate of the Okinawa Gunto, were forwarded to the San
Francisco Peace Conference (Watanabe, 1970:13; Binnendijk,
1973:25). (OShiro (1970:284), however, feels that the
figure 72 percent did not reflect the political reality of
Okinawa at that time. He suspects that many Okinawans
signed the petition because of otsukiai, that is, they were
obliged to sign because of some personal relationship to
someone who was committed to the campaign.)

It was only after 1955 that the Okinawan problem
became really an important "national" issue. The problem
originated in the requisition of Okinawan land for the
United States Forces. After the Japanese Peace Treaty came
into force in 1952, there were several unsuccessful attempts
by the American military to come to terms with the dis-
possessed landowners with regard to the length of lease and
the amount of money to be paid. Finally, the United States
tried to solve the problem by introducing "lump-sum pay-
ments." This was met by strong opposition from all quarters

of Okinawan society. The United States then sent a special committee led by Congressman Melvin Price to inspect the problem in Okinawa. When his report was made public in June 1956, it aroused active opposition not only in Okinawa but also in Japan (Watanabe, 1970:37-38; Hiyane and Gabe, 1975:27-46; M. Higa, 1965:122-148).

Insofar as the issue remained within Okinawa, it was a local problem, the Shima-gurumi-tochi-toso (All-Island-Land-Struggle). After the Price report was made public, however, the level of the "struggle" was escalated. As an Okinawan put it, "this struggle is not merely a struggle of 800,000 Okinawans, but also that of 80,000,000 Japanese" (Hiyane and Gabe, 1975:33). Once the issue was lifted up to the "national" level, the "land" problem became a "territorial" problem (Watanabe, 1970:156). In 1956, for example, an Okinawan delegation to Tokyo stated that "we are struggling not only for our land, but also for Japanese territory" (Hiyane and Gabe, 1975:37).

There were many ways to formulate the land problem of Okinawa. At the most "realistic" level, it was purely economic, that is, the problem of lease of land. At the most "idealistic" level, however, it was a problem of "human rights." Actually, one of the instrumental factors to escalate the Okinawan land problem to the "national" level came from America; it was a letter from Roger N. Baldwin, president of the American Civil Liberties Union and Chairman of the International League for the Rights of

Man, sent to the Japan Civil Liberties Union (JCLU), which requested further information on the Okinawan problem. The report of the JCLU received great publicity in Japan through the Asahi Shinbun (Watanabe, 1970:140).

The problem of Okinawa itself, however, had little political relevance to the most Japanese politicians during the 1950s; it was not a vote-raising issue. It became politically potent when the "Okinawan" problem was conceived as "our" problem. Yet, "our" problem, too, can be formulated in various ways. For the Japanese government and the ruling conservative party, the Okinawan problem was not a favorable political issue, because Okinawa was a very core of the U.S.-Japan alliance after 1951 and there was a great danger that the Okinawan problem might jeopardize Japan's weak international position at that time. For the Opposition, on the other hand, it was a great issue of which they could take advantage in order to attack the government. The government tried to deal with the Okinawa problem at a low, "realistic" level and within the existing framework of U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, whereas the Opposition exploited the issue of Okinawa at a high, "idealistic" level, demanding a fundamental change in the existing power structure. In either case, however, Okinawa was no longer "a forgotten island" in the seas of national politics.

The land problem itself was settled in 1958. However, the political organizations emerged from the mass mobilization during the All-Island-Land-Struggle paved the

way to the "reversion movement" in the 1960s. What was now left unresolved was the problem of "legitimacy" of the American administration on Okinawa.

We have pointed out that the de facto sovereignty of the U.S. over Okinawa was based on a rather peculiar diplomatic arrangement provided by Article 3 of the Japanese Peace Treaty. Although the sole significance of Okinawa for the United States was its strategic value, the adminis- trative control was considered inseparable from the main- tenance of military bases (M. Higa, 1967:151-152; Emmerson, 1971:164). The task of the American administration on Okinawa was to maintain a "spirit of reasonable acquiescence" among Okinawans. The former high commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, Paul Caraway (1961-64), admits in retro- spect, that "the United States had little to offer to Okinawans except economic expansion and eventual reversion" (quoted in Binnendijk, 1976:16). However, it was considered by the American administration well until the mid-1960s that the "reversion movement" was incompatible with the "spirit of reasonable acquiescence." Prior to 1966, for example, travel restrictions were applied to those who actively advocated the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. Besides such "negative" policies as travel restrictions, censorship of media, etc., there were "positive" cultural policies to create "a separate Okinawan identity" (Binnendijk, 1973:50).

We have pointed out that, immediately after the war, there were few signs that Okin-wans strongly identified

themselves with Japan. The American administration permitted and even encouraged the formation of a separate Okinawan identity. After some twenty years of the American administration, however, it had become all too clear that the Okinawan identification with Japan was by no means decreasing, if not increasing. From the mid-1960s to the ultimate reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972, the problem was not whether the reversion was desirable, but how it should be achieved.

Higa Mikio (1975:16-24) distinguishes three phases of the reversion movement. The first phase (up to 1964) was characterized by the "nationalist" tendency, or the emphasis of the "Japanese" identity of the Okinawans. The second phase (1965-1967) was characterized by the emphasis of the Japanese Constitution ("Sovereignty rests in the people," pacifism, fundamental human rights, etc.). The movement toward the expansion of Okinawan autonomy and the movement protesting the military bases were concrete expressions of the reversion movement of this phase. The third phase (after the Sato-Johnson communiqué in 1967, in which agreement of a date for the return of the administrative rights to Japan was said to be reached "within a few years") was characterized by the emphasis of elimination of sabetsu ("discrimination," "inequity," etc.). The most obvious sabetsu against the Okinawans was supposed to be the very status of the Okinawans under the American rule. It should be noted, however, that the sabetsu against the

Okinawans was conceived not necessarily vis-a-vis the Americans, but vis-a-vis the Japanese: the _sabetsu_ was supposed to exist not between Americans and Okinawans, but between Okinawans and Japanese. (Although it was known that some Americans did not treat Okinawans as equals, it did not become "political" problems. An American (Lammis, 1971:220-231), who discussed the problem of discrimination with members of the Okinawan labor union employed in the American military bases, was surprised when he found that they did not know the word "gook" in spite of the wide currency of the word among the American military on Okinawa.) The Okinawan consciousness of _sabetsu_ was closely related to the American administration of Okinawa:

> While American policy condoned the colonial status of Okinawa for 27 years, U.S. officials avoided blatant attempts to alter the political nature of Okinawan society. Their activities consisted of denying Okinawans certain rights within a political system parallel to that of Japan, thus highlighting the inadequacies in the Okinawan system (Binnendijk, 1973:30).

However, the anti-_sabetsu_ movement was more than a simple demand for the reform of existing inadequacies in the Okinawan system; it involved all the history of the Okinawan people from the Satsuma invasion onward. Kyan Shinei, one of the most active leaders of the reversion movement, told at the 1969 Japanese-American Kyoto Conference that:

> The past 100 years have been a clear testimony to the fact that the Japanese government invariably chose to overlook, if not openly discriminate against, Okinawans, whenever it was convenient to do so. . . . For about 70 out of the 100 years of Japan's modernization, Okinawans were mercilessly discriminated against and merely tolerated at best, holding Japanese citizenship in name only (quoted in Kampf, 1976:128).

It seems that the anti-sabetsu movement introduced
a "historical perspective" into the problem of "human
rights" which was emphasized during the second phase of
the reversion movement. This historical perspective pro-
vided the Okinawans with a critical standpoint toward the
reversion of Okinawa to Japan. Although a single-minded
"nationalist" aspect of the reversion had already come to
be questioned in the second phase of the movement, the uni-
versalistic idea of "human rights" itself could not justify
a particular movement in which the Okinawans were engaging:
why should the Okinawan demand for the human rights take
the form of the return of Okinawa to Japan?--if only
"human rights" were their objectives, it would not matter
whether they live under the "American" administration or
the "Japanese" administration. The anti-sabetsu movement
was a middle-range political strategy: it combined uni-
versalistic "human rights" with particular history of the
Okinawan people.

What was crucial in determining the Okinawan
identity seems to have been the political arena that was
available to the Okinawans. If Okinawa was completely
closed, as it was immediately after the war, it would have
been possible to develop a separate Okinawan identity. If,
moreover, the political arean in the United States was open
to the Okinawans, the movement of Okinawa reversion to
Japan may not have become so powerful a movement. Okinawa
was excluded both from Japan and from the United States.

Yet, Okinawa was linked to Japan through informal ties, while it was linked to the U.S. through formal ties. The political pressure the Okinawans could put upon the formal structure of the administration in Okinawa through formal channels was limited. This situation led them to exploit the available informal ties in the political arena in Japan. The Okinawans succeeded in presenting their issue in such a way that it became a "national" issue in Japan. As Oshiro (1970:22) remarked, Okinawa came to be more widely known in Japan when it became separated from Japan than it was within Japan.

The Okinawans became, in the words of Edwin O. Reischauer, "the most unambiguously patriotic of all Japanese," because the political circumstances under which they found themselves made it relevant to exploit their "Japanese" identity. This was, however, not simply "anti-Americanism." An opinion survey of the Ryukyu Shimpo in 1967, for example, shows that 53 percent of Okinawans gave "I am a Japanese citizen" as their main reason for favoring reversion, whereas only 9.7 percent gave "I dislike foreign control" as their reason (quoted in Binnendijk, 1973:81). "Anti- Americanism" was perhaps stronger in mainland Japan where the problem of Okinawa became more clearly linked to the criticism of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. It was rather Americans themselves who tended to equate the reversion movement with "anti-Americanism" (and "Communism") (see, for example, Binnendijk, 1973:45). It seems that it

was a bad conscience of the Americans that equated the reversion movement with "anti-Americanism."

Objectively, the Okinawans are neither more nor less "Japanese" than they were before the war. There was even certain revival of local Okinawan culture after the war because of the removal of the coercive assimilation policy of the pre-war Japanese government and the encouragement of "a separate Okinawan identity" by the U.S. administration (see, for example, Oshiro, 1970:146-153). However, it would be too materialistic a way of thinking to expect that revival of folk dances or preservation of old monuments would result in the formation of "a separate identity." The Okinawans do and did have "a separate identity." This does not mean that the Okinawan identity necessarily contradicts or negates the Japanese identity.

Does it mean, then, that the Okinawans are an "unmeltable ethnic group." The answer would be a yes and a no. First of all, the geographic boundaries of Okinawa will remain in the foreseeable future, so that as far as some people continue to live on the islands, there would remain "Okinawans." But, are they an "ethnic" group? We have distinguished two dimensions of ethnic boundaries. One is the "quality" of ethnic boundaries which has to do with the "objective" relationships of the individuals concerned. The other is the "extension" of ethnic boundaries which is concerned. The other is the "extension" of ethnic boundaries which is concerned with the dimension in which

individuals are linked to a certain ethnic category. It is likely that we can always discern some relatively closed, in "objective" terms, societal units within the larger society, which might be able to be called "ethnic." However, their "closedness" is only relative. Whether or not it becomes a socially relevant "ethnic category" cannot be deduced only from the fact of their closedness. We have pointed out that there is no one-to-one correlation between the two dimensions of ethnic boundaries, and we have suggested that the "discrepancy" may become greater at the macro-level of national politics. After all, it should be recalled that the category ("ethnic" or not) "Okinawa" did not mean much to the majority of the "Okinawans" until they were incorporated into the "modern," Meiji state, although Okinawa existed "objectively" before that time. Even today, some people of Naha say that the people of Itoman is a "different race," and some people of Itoman say that the people of Kyan is a "different race" (Ishida, 1968: 38-39. Itoman is several miles south of Naha, and Kyan is a few miles south of Itoman.) It is likely that before Okinawa's incorporation into the Meiji State, hundreds of these "races" were all-important social categories for the majority of the "Okinawans," (although they would not have used the word "race" in those days). The chance in the power structure of Okinawa after the Meiji Restoration, however, brought about an essentially new dimension in the Okinawan "ethnicity": the category "Okinawa" became

socially relevant at the macro-level national politics.
Simultaneously, social changes, that followed this change
in the power structure, in such fields as education,
communication, administration, etc., made the category
"Okinawa" subjectively relevant not only for a handful of
the Okinawan elite, but also the majority of the Okinawans.
It should be noted, however, that there was no "historical
necessity" that the category should be established in the
context of "Japanese" national politics: it could have also
been established in other political contexts, such as
"colonialization" by the Western power, "national integra-
tion" by China, or "national independence" of Okinawa. It
seems that there is no such thing as the inherent "content"
of the category "Okinawa": what determines the "content" is
the political circumstances in which Okinawa finds itself.

Although the notion that the "Okinawans" are a
branch of the "Japanese" is firmly established today, it
would be wrong to regard this as the ultimate end-product
of the "historical necessity of national unification."
Just like a prosperous bunke ("branch house") may eventually
become a honke ("main house") of its own, the relationship
of a "branch" to its "original stock" is always relative
and fluid. "We Japanese" may or may not embrace "Okinawans,"
depending on the political context: this is a problem of
the "extension" of ethnic boundaries.

There are many ways in which "Okinawans" and "Main-
land Japanese" are contrasted: Okinawa Minzoku, Okinawa

Jin, Okinawa Ken Jin, Uchinan Chu, etc., vs. Yamato Minzoku, Naichi Jin, Hondo Jin, Tafuken Jin, Yamaton Chu, etc. However, contrasts between all these categories involve the same confusion and ambiguities as those Berreman (1972) pointed out in his study of Urban India. Although, at the micro-level, these confusion and ambiguities would persist, it is likely that, at the macro-level, more or less stable formulations, with varying degrees of "ethnicity" involved, of the Okinawan-mainland Japanese relations would emerge. At present, the most common terms used by the Okinawans to designate the "mainland Japanese" seem to be Hondo Jin, Tafuken Jin, and Yamaton Chu. Hondo Jin (people of the mainland) is geographical; Tafuken Jin (people of other prefectures) is administrative; and Yamaton Chu is an Okinawan term signifhing people of the mainland. The mainland Japanese, however, do not have a category which distinguishes themselves from the Okinawans; Hondo Jin might be an acceptable term (it would, however, exclude the people of Hokkaido), while Tafuken Jin is a term relative to the speaker, and Yamaton Chu is a specifically Okinawan term. It seems to follow that, once the mainland Japanese accept that "the Okinawans are Japanese," the people of Okinawa tend to be contrasted not with the mainland Japanese as a whole, but with people of a specific Prefecture.

There seems to exist a certain tendency in Japan that people are classified according to geographical and

administrative units, rather than "ethnic" units. This is
particularly evident when a Japanese refers to third
persons. He may prefer the term Okinawa no hito (person of
Okinawa) to the term Okinawa Jin (Okinawan). This seems to
be related to the organizational pattern which Nakane
calls "frame." The term Okinawa no hito has little to do
with individual attributes which are "Okinawan"; it means
rather that the person is within the frame called Okinawa.
This point of view permits the person of Okinawa automati-
cally to become a person of Japan, once "Okinawa" is
included in "Japan." This mode of conceptualization is
logical and a-historical. There is, however, a time
dimension in any ethnic classification of man which involves
a problem of "origin." A-historical and historical aspects
of ethnic classification are mutually dependent; change
in one aspect would effect change in another. Those who
were classified into a category might find their common
"origin," whereas those who found a common "origin" might
organize themselves into a group. After all, most people
today would agree that all the mankind are ultimately
descended from a common origin. The common origin as such,
therefore, has no relevance in classifying people. It is
a tentative, precarious equilibrium between "history" and
"present" that manifests itself as a configuration of
ethnic classification on the surface of the earth.

CHAPTER 3

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The main problem to which we have addressed our-
selves in this paper was the relationship between power
structure and ethnicity. We considered that the expli-
cation of this relationship was a prerequisite to the
construction of a unifying theory of ethnicity. As we have
pointed out, ethnic studies in the industrialized societies,
particularly those focused upon the American experience,
tended to take the power structure of society for granted,
whereas the problem of power structure was one of the major
themes of the ethnic studies in the "new nations."

In Chapter 1, we have first discussed the "dimen-
sions of ethnicity." Our discussion made it clear that
there is no simple one-to-one correlation between "objective"
and "subjective" bases of ethnicity. This might seem to
be a truism if we realize that "ethnicity" is after all a
social phenomenon, which is a human product of an interplay
of "objective" and "subjective" factors. In order to
illustrate certain idiosyncrasies of "ethnicity," however,
we have compared "ethnicity" and "descent." We have

pointed out certain similarities between them, such as segmentation. At the same time, we have also found several factors which hinder "ethnicity" from being called "descent" in a strict sense. We have further argued that, in many ethnographic contexts, the distinction between "ethnic" and other social categories is often irrelevant in the subjective reality of the people concerned.

These arguments led us to look into the problem of "ethnicity" at its macro-ideological dimension. Our analogy between "nationalism" and "ethnicism" has brought into focus political factors in the formation of "ethnicist" ideology. The distinction between "polycentric" and "ethnocentric" ethnicism has, moreover, enabled us to introduce a historical perspective into our study of ethnicity. We have pointed out that, just like "polycentric nationalism" does not make much sense without reference to the emergence of "nation-state," there is a close relationship between "polycentric ethnicism" and the emergence of a particular type of power structure.

This historical perspective led us to see "ethnicity" and "power structure" in their dialectical relationships. We have tried to reconstruct the development of "modern state" and its relationship to "ethnicity." We have argued that the emergence of "modern state" has brought about fundamental changes, both objectively and subjectively, in "ethnicity." Objectively, the impact of "modern state" upon ethnicity is most obvious in the

processes which we have called "nationalization," or the
processes of socio-cultural homogenization initiated by
the "modern state" for the sake of administrative effi-
ciency. At the same time, the "modern state" also differs
from its predecessors in terms of ideology, because the
ideology of the "modern state" lacks any legitimation of
the discrimination of certain segments of the population
within its boundaries. The significance of socio-cultural
heterogeneity in the "modern state" is, therefore, quite
different from that of premodern state. Those segments of
the population in the "modern state," whose socio-cultural
distinctiveness has become more conspicuous as a result
of "nationalization," and who have become disadvantaged in
terms of social opportunities of the new "modern state,"
we have called "sociological minorities."

In the last part of Chapter 1, we have examined the
modes of existence of "ethnicity" in the "modern state."
We have introduced the distinction between the "quality"
and the "extension" of ethnic boundaries. In the context
of our criticism of Francis' ethnic theory, we have argued
that her three types of "ethnicity," whose key variable is
the degree of individual participation in the larger
society, can deal only with the "quality" of ethnic
boundaries; and that her confusion of "group" and "cate-
gory" has prevented her ethnic theory from recognizing
another dimension of ethnicity, i.e., the "extension" of
ethnic boundaries, in which individuals are linked to a

certain "ethnic category." Putting it into more concrete terms, the problem is this: why is a certain individual in the United States an "Italian American"?--why is he not a "Sicilian," a "Lombard," an "Italian Chicagoan," an "Italian New Yorker," etc.? We have pointed out that, as far as we deal with "ethnicity," as Francis does, in terms only of "individual participation in the larger society," the dimension of "extension" of ethnic boundaries cannot be explained. We have argued that there is no simple one-to-one correlation between the dimensions of "quality" and "extension" of ethnic boundaries. Those who are included in the "extension" of "Italian American" may participate in the larger society with varying degrees; some of them might form "ethnic groups," while the others may not. Those "ethnic groups," moreover, may not necessarily be "Italian American ethnic groups"; some of them might be "Sicilian," "Lombard," "Southern Italian," "Italian Chicagoan," etc. Those arguments illustrate why we cannot deduce the "extension" of ethnic boundaries simply from the "quality" of ethnic boundaries.

Then, what is the "extension" of ethnic boundaries? How is it formed? The "extension" of ethnic boundaries is not necessarily a "factual fact," but a "political fact" which also involves factors of human intension. If we agree that the "extension" of ethnic boundaries is a "political fact," it follows that it is inseparable from the political structure of the larger society, which is,

in the contemporary context, the "modern state" power
structure. We have pointed out that the "modern state"
brings about the processes of "nationalization" within the
state boundaries, which, at the same time, produce "socio-
logical minorities." Those "sociological minorities" are
not what they used to be before the advent of "modern
state." Firstly, their relationships to the larger society
are altered. Secondly, there seems to exist, in parallel
with "nationalization" of the majority of the population,
the processes of nationalization of "sociological minori-
ties" as sociological minorities, that is to say, the
processes in which "sociological minorities" acquire a new
dimension of relevance at the level of "national" politics
in the newly emerging "modern state." Let us take a con-
crete example to illustrate this point. Before the Meiji
Restoration (1868), there existed in Japan social groups
which were regarded as "outcaste." Although certain
policies of the Tokugawa government tended to provide these
"outcaste" groups with a common legal basis throughout
Japan, there actually existed a good deal of regional
variety with regard to their legal status because of the
"feudal power structure" of premodern Japan in which each
han maintained a certain degree of legal autonomy. In
certain han, the "outcaste" was virtually non-existent.
The concept and definition of "outcaste," moreover, varied
from one region to another, so that the "outcaste" groups
did not form a cross-han, "national" minority group. It

was only after the abolition of the Japanese feudal power structure that the "outcaste" <u>as a national minority</u> began to emerge, (as a result, ironically, of the abolition of the outcaste status by the national government). The national sensus of 1871 included three categories of "outcaste," namely, <u>Eta</u>, <u>Hinin</u>, and "miscellaneous" (Wagatsuma and DeVos, 1966:115). Today, all these fine distinctions have disappeared. What is relevant in the national politics today is the <u>Burakumin</u>. But, who are Burakumin and who are not? Before the concept of "Burakumin" was <u>nationally</u> established, villagers of X village would have looked down upon villagers of Y village, calling them by the local term which connotated the "outcaste" status whose concept varied from one region to another. These "local outcaste groups" did <u>not</u> "naturally" grow up into the <u>Burakumin</u>; the <u>Burakumin</u> was an essentially new dimension of "outcaste ethnicity" which has been brought about by the emergence of "modern state." Norbeck (1966:183-199), for example, documents some cases of "little-known minority groups" in Japan. Their "outcaste" statuses might have a "local" relevance even today; however, they may or may not be included in the "extension" of the <u>Burakumin</u>, which has been newly established, by the political activities of the "Burakumin" themselves and "non-Burakumin" Japanese, at the level of "national" politics. This example of Burakumin illustrates how the "modern state" brings about an essentially new dimension of "ethnicity" as a result of "nationalization."

In Chapter 2, we have attempted to apply our theoretical perspective in an empirical context, i.e., Okinawan "ethnicity." The Okinawan example illustrates our thesis that "ethnicity" exhibits a quite different significance in the "empire type" power structure and in the "modern state." We have pointed out that, before the emergence of Japan as a "modern state," both "Japanese ethnicity" and "Okinawan ethnicity" were not immediately relevant to the functioning of the power structure because neither "Okinawans" nor "Japanese" did form a "nation," which, as we have argued in Chapter 1, is a product of "nationalization" initiated by the "modern state."

We have described intra-Okinawan "ethnic" divisions. Since each local community of the masses and the privileged class tended to be defined in terms of "descent" and maintained its own "culture" and "tradition," there was little possibility that supra-village and trans-class "ethnicity" could develop in premodern Okinawa. Those intra-Okinawan "ethnic" divisions, however, did not hinder the unity of Okinawan power structure. On the contrary, they were the very basis of the functioning of the "empire type" power structure of premodern Okinawa.

We have also discussed premodern Okinawa in the "international" context. Our discussion has, however, made it clear that the "international" environment of premodern East Asia cannot be equated with the modern "international" environment in which "nation-states" are

political actors. In other words, we could not find any
significant sign of "polycentric nationalism" in premodern
Okinawa.

Our discussions of Okinawa after the emergence of
Japan as a "modern state" illustrate how "Okinawan ethni-
city" has acquired a new dimension of political relevance
in the arena of "national" politics in the "modern state."
This is mainly the problem of the "extension" of ethnic
boundaries, which cannot be explained in terms simply of
change in the "quality" of ethnic boundaries. The political
nature of the "extension" of ethnic boundaries is most
clearly demonstrated in the Okinawan reversion movement
after the Second World War. It should be noted, moreover,
that there is no "inherent necessity" that the "Okinawans,"
which itself is a category that has become politically
relevant in the context of "modern state," should become
"Japanese."

Our study has attempted to see "ethnicity" in its
relation to power structure. It is certainly true that man
has been essentially the "same thing" for the last several
thousand years; he _is_ a "primordial being." We have,
however, pointed out that what is essentially "new" in
"ethnicity" of the modern world, and argued that this new
dimension of "ethnicity" is intelligible only when we
consider it in its relationship to power structure.

Our distinction between the "quality" and "exten-
sion" of ethnic boundaries has enabled us to treat the

dynamics of "ethnicity" not only in the contexts of
"acculturation" and "assimilation," but also in the context
of national politics.

Our attempts to explore the political dimension of
"ethnicity" is, however, only at the beginning stage. Many
of the factors which are involved in this exploration have
been only incidentally touched upon. For example, the
"national politics" is inseparable from the context of
"international politics." It is not fortuitous that many
"ethnic" categories are actually those of "national origin"
(or those of "nation-state"). Ethnic classification,
therefore, has to do with the "world-order" (or the image
of "international order") of the people concerned. But,
the modern "international order" is that which has been
historically formed. We have pointed out that the "world
order" of premodern East Asia was something quite different,
subjectively and objectively, from that of the modern
world. It seems that many of the "ethnic problems" in the
contemporary world have to do with the "problems" of the
existing "world order."

Because of our emphasis upon the "extension" of
ethnic boundaries (which, we think, has been neglected, or
confused with the "quality" of ethnic boundaries, in many
ethnic studies), we have not adequately dealt with the
relationship between the "extension" and the "quality" of
ethnic boundaries. Although we have emphasized that the
dimension of "extension" is relatively independent of that

of "quality," it would be wrong to assume that there is no relation between them. In the context of Okinawa, we have not adequately dealt with the processes of "acculturation" and actual assimilation policies of the Japanese government. It would be of interest to broaden our perspective on Okinawa by comparing it with Korea and Taiwan which were also, at one time, under the administration of Japan.

Finally, it might be questioned whether our Okinawan case is an adequate example of "ethnicity." Is it not that Okinawa is a case which might be more adequately described by the terms other than "ethnicity," such as "localism," "regionalism," etc.? Why did we not take more "typical" cases of "ethnicity" in Japan, such as "Korean Japanese" and "Ainu Japanese"? We would respond to this question by answering that we believe that the very "un-typical-ness" of the Okinawan case of "ethnicity" could provide us with an insight into the elementary factors involved in the problem of "ethnicity." It is true that "color" and other "racial features" do not play a significant role in the case of Okinawan "ethnicity" in Japan. Moroever, the majority of the Okinawans are not "migrants" but "natives." Yet, if we define "ethnicity" in terms not of "race," but of "culture" and "tradition," the Okinawan case could claim to be "more ethnic" than many other cases of "ethnicity." It is obvious, moreover, that "ethnicity" is not a monopoly of immigrants. It could be said, however, that, although our Okinawan case may illuminate certain elementary

factors involved in the problem of "ethnicity," it cannot
provide all the specific cases of "ethnicity" with funda-
mental solutions. It is because we hold that "ethnicity"
is more a "dependent," rather than an "independent,"
variable. It is not without a grain of truth to say that
"ethnicity" is "essentially a problem of class," etc.,
since we consider that the relevance of "ethnicity" cannot
be understood without reference to the power structure.
Although our study did not attempt to reduce "ethnicity"
into the terms of "substructure," it was because we were
interested in the relevance of "ethnicity" in the context
of "politics." This does not, of course, deny the close
relationships between politics and the "substructure."
The above remarks would make clear our theoretical scope
and its limitation. We hope that our study is of some
contribution to the study of ethnicity.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Some Clarification of the Terms used in the Paper

A. Ethnicity and Ethnicism

Ethnicity: For various definitions of the term, see Isajiw
            (1974). Plax (1976:25) points out two aspects of
            the term, each with its own etymological origin:
            "ethnik-os" which means "heathen" or "goy" (in
            Hebrew) and "ethnos" which means "nation." We do
            not give any explicit definition for the term
            "ethnicity" because our main concern is to reveal
            "dimensions of ethnicity" in their relations to
            various types of power structure.

Ethnicism: The term is intended to signify an ideological
            aspect of "ethnicity." The relationship of "ethni-
            cism" to "ethnicity" is analogous to that of
            "nationalism" to "nationality." We hold that, just
            like "nationalism" often precedes the objective
            formation of "nationality," "ethnicism" may not
            necessarily depend upon the objective existence of
            "ethnicity."
_____, Ethnocentric: A type of "ethnicism" which holds
            that one's group has "real" power and value,
            regardless of "factual" distribution of power,
            because of its special relationship with the devine.
            The concept is used in contradistinction with
            "polycentric ethnicism."
_____, Polycentric: A type of "ethnicism" which holds that
            there are many centers of "real" power. We hold
            that "value dissensus" becomes subjectively relevant
            only in the context of "polycentric ethnicism,"
            and that it is inseparable from "factual" distri-
            bution of power. We agree with A. D. Smith (1971)
            in that the "polycentric" world-view emerged
            historically in the modern times.

B. Types of Power Structure

Demotic Type and Empire Type: In the "demotic type" power
            structure, individuals are directly linked to the
            central authority without mediation of subsocietal
            units, whereas the "empire type" is characterized
            by a dual structure of interlocking levels, that
            is, "mutually exclusive homogeneous societies with
            separate traditions and folk cultures," on the one
            hand, and "an ethnically heterogeneous mediating
            elite with a dynamic "national" civilization (or
            "high culture")," on the other (Francis, 1976:57).

Modern State: "A modern state is characterized by the
            continuous exercise of power over the population of
            a contiguous territory by a central authority
            through a bureaucratic administration" (Francis,
            1976:386). The formation of the "modern state" is
            divided into two phases; "prenational" and
            "national." The "prenational modern state" corre-
            sponds, by and large, with Smith's concept "scien-
            tific state" (q.v.), and initiates the processes
            of "nationalization" (q.v.).

Possessive State: A type of state historically found in
            western Europe, which is typically regarded as the
            personal possession of the ruler. "Possessive
            states" are "generally based on secular law,
            divorced from any theoretic (sic, presumably
            "theocratic," M.T.) notion; they are unified under
            a strong central government. . . . Their ultimate
            effect was to encroach upon and pare down the
            independence of local and occupational or religious
            institutions" (Smith, 1971:233).

Scientific State: A type of state which first evolved from
            the "possessive state" (q.v.). The "scientific
            state" is "a polity which seeks to homogenise the
            population within its boundaries for administrative
            purposes by utilizing the latest scientific tech-
            niques and methods for the sake of 'efficiency'"
            (Smith, 1971:231). The process of homogenization
            initiated by the "scientific state" corresponds
            with "nationalization" (q.v.) in Francis' termino-
            logy.

C. The Impacts of the Modern State Upon Ethnicity

Nationalization: The processes of demotic integration
            initiated by the "prenational modern state" (see,
            "modern state") for the sake of rational statecraft.
            These processes, at the same time, produce national
            minorities, or "sociological minorities" (q.v.).

<u>Sociological Minorities</u>: The term refers to groups "with a distinct culture within a large political unit, who, as a result of (the) policies of integration (initiated by the "scientific state"), became permanently oppressed . . . the novelty in their situation is that they are made to become conscious of the fact. . . . Moreover, their exclusion <u>en masse</u> (from the privileges of the new "scientific state") . . . is the more intolerable . . . exactly because the usual legitimations for inequality are absent" (Smith, 1971:235). When we regard the policies of integration and homogenization of the "scientific state" as "nationalization" (q.v.), these "sociological minorities" are called "national minorities."

D. Two Dimensions of Ethnic Boundaries

<u>"Quality" of Ethnic Boundaries</u>: The term refers to the objective ethnic solidality, the degree of which would be expressed in terms of individual participation in the larger society; as the degree of participation increases, the ethnic solidarity decreases. We hold, however, that the "ethnic boundaries" in this sense is essentially a micro-level phenomenon, which should not be confused with the macro-level ethnic phenomena. It is able to deal only with "ethnic groups" (q.v.), members of which are objectively related. We hold that the dissolution of "ethnic groups" at the micro-level may not necessitate that of "ethnic categories" (q.v.), and that the political dynamics of "ethnic categories" belongs to a macro-level dimension of ethnicity. In our terminology, change in "extension" of ethnic boundaries (q.v.) can be independent of change in "quality" of ethnic boundaries.

<u>"Extension" of Ethnic Boundaries</u>: The term refers to the subjective dimension of ethnicity, or the dimension in which individuals are related to an "ethnic category" (q.v.), regardless of objective relationships of the individuals concerned. We hold that this dimension of ethnicity becomes more dominant in the modern state where "ethnic groups" tend to lose an over-all formal structure and individual ethnics tend to become a political actor. It should be noted that there is no one-to-one correlation between the dimensions of the "quality" of ethnic boundaries and the "extension" of ethnic bounardies. For example, an "ethnic group" of "Italian Americans" in Detroit and that in Chicago may form separate "ethnic groups," while they may still belong to the same "extension" of ethnic boundaries, that is, "Italian Americans."

E.   Ethnic Groups and Ethnic Categories

Ethnic Group: By an "ethnic group," we understand a
           corporate body with a more or less permanent
           existence, members of which are recruited on
           recognized "ethnic" principles. We hold that the
           existence of "ethnic groups" has to do with the
           "quality" of ethnic boundaries (q.v.), and is
           discernible primarily in terms of objective
           relationships of the members.

Ethnic Category: The term refers to any aggregate of
           persons, which is expressed in terms of ethnicity.
           We have criticized and rejected Francis' use of
           the term "ethnic category," because she tends to
           regard "ethnic category" and "ethnic group" as
           mutually exclusive. We hold that any "ethnic group"
           may also have a dimension of "ethnic category,"
           although an "ethnic category" may or may not coin-
           cide with an "ethnic group." We further suggest
           that, in the modern state, the dimensions of
           "ethnic group" and "ethnic category" tend to become
           more discrepant, because of the tendency of dis-
           solution of "ethnic groups" at the micro-level as
           well as the acquisition of a new relevance of
           "ethnic categories" at the macro-level of politics
           in the modern state.

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