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ABSTRACT

PIETY AND POLITICS: EVANGELICISM IN THE
MICHIGAN HOUSE (1838-60)

BY
John F. Reynolds

This paper utilizes simple quantitative analysis of
roll call votes in the Michigan House of Representatives
to discern the impact of "evangelical" issues in state
politics during the Jacksonian Era. According to historian
Ronald Formisano, moral and religious attitudes forged the
state's Democratic and Whig parties at the mass level.
Democrats were opposed to legislation touching on public
morals; Whigs, and later Republicans, were more favorable.
An examination of party behavior in the House on "evangeli-
cal" issues (slavery, prohibition, dueling etc.), will
reveal that partisan identification has only limited influ-
‘ence in determining legislative voting behavior on these
issues. It will be seen that other nonevangelical influ-
ences, roughly summarized as political expediency, were the
main determinants of partisan legislative behavior on these
issues. More intensive analysis will leave Formisano's

ideological construct of evangelicism in some doubt as it

“b R John F. Reynolds

Q7 applies to party elites. This study of party elite behavior
in Michigan also introduces another dimension to Formisano's
earlier study of mass political behavior. As separate
levels of the party organization, the attitudes and
behavior of Michigan's party electorate and elite were
often not analogous. Various secondary and primary sources

will be utilized throughout this work.

PIETY AND POLITICS: EVANGELICISM IN THE

MICHIGAN HOUSE (1838-60)

BY

John F. Reynolds

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
Department of History

1974

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to be able to take this opportunity
to thank some of the individuals who so ably assisted in
the preparation of this manuscript. First and foremost, I
must credit Dr. Peter Levine. It was he who initiated and
directed this study. Dr. Levine's knowledgeable mind and
intellectual grasp of the rudiments of researching,
developing, and writing this paper have left me much ,
enlightened and a little humbled. I must also thank Dr.
Ronald Formisano, who graciously contributed his time in
advising me during the preparation of this study. I hope
he finds this a suitable supplement to his own eminent
study of Michigan politics. Special thanks must also be
accorded to Dr. Norman Pollock and Dr. James Soltow who
took the time to read and criticize earlier drafts of this
paper. Finally, I wish to recognize the attention and
inspiration I received from Dr. William Hixson. He, more
than anyone else, got me into this whole damn business of
political history.

C. J. Reynolds

August, 1974

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
LIST OF FIGURES. . . . . . . . . . . . . v
INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chapter
I. METHODOLOGY. . . . . . . . . . . . 7
II. EVANGELICAL ISSUES AND PARTY BEHAVIOR . . . 10
III. EVANGELICAL BEHAVIOR BY COUNTY . . . . . 40
IV. CONSISTENCY OF EVANGELICAL VOTES AS A BELIEF
SYSTEM. . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
V. CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . 62
BIBLIOGRAPHY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

iii

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page
1. Party Affiliation in the Michigan House . . . 8
2. Roll Call Votes on Anti-slavery Resolutions. . ll
3. Roll Call Votes on Temperance Legislation . . 22

4. Roll Call Votes on Inviting and Paying the

Clergy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
5. Roll Call Votes on Minor Evangelical Issues. . 34
6. Evangelical Index by County .. .. . . . . . 43
7. Nine High and Low Evangelical Counties . . . 47

8. Nine High and Low Democratic Evangelical
counties 0 O O O O O O O O O O O I 49

9. Revised Evangelical Index--Without Slavery--

By County . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
10. Nine High and Low Revised Evangelical--

Without Slavery--Counties . . . . . . . 54
ll. Evangelicism of Ten High and Low Democratic

Counties. . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
12. Consistency Index . . . . . . . . . . 59

iv

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Page

1. Legislative Evangelicism and Presidential
vote-“1840 o o o o o o o o o o o 45

2. Legislative Evangelicism and Presidential
VOte"-1860 o o o o o o o o o o o 46

3. Revised Legislative Evangelicism--Without
Slavery-~and Presidential Vote--184O . . 51

4. ReVised Legislative Evangelicism--Without
Slavery-~and Presidential Vote--1860 . . 52

INTRODUCTION

American political parties have been the subject of
considerable research and controversy. Historians and
political scientists, seeking to uncover the essence or
role of a particular party, have not often arrived at
agreement. For instance, the Democratic party in the
Jacksonian era has been viewed as an organization promoting
democracy by Arthur Schlesinger, an organization promoting
individual self-realization by Ronald Formisano, and one
for promoting politicians by Richard McCormick.1 Frank
Sorauf has suggested that much of this disagreement stems
from the emphasis each observer has placed on different
branches of the party: the party organization, the party
in office, and the party in the electorate. Each branch
contains separate personnel with "differing goals and
incentives" that make each a different entity than the

party as a whole. Only when we examine the interactions of

 

1See Arthur M. Schlesinger, The A e of Jackson
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 19455; RonaId F. Formisano,
The Birth of Mass Political Parties Michi an 1827-1861
TRrinceton: Princeton UnIVersity Press, I37I‘; RicEard P.
McCormick, The Second American Part S stem Part Formation
in the Jacksonian Era lCHapeI HiII: UnIversiEy OI Nortfi

Carolinafiress,1§3371

 

each of these branches, Sorauf warns, can we begin to
understand the party in holistic terms.2

A study by Herbert McCloskey reinforces Sorauf's
concept of party heterogeniety. After polling members of a
party organization (convention delegates), and party in the
electorate (voters identifying with a party), McCloskey
found significant differences between the two on political
issues. Members of the party organization were signifi-
cantly more "ideological" than members in the electorate of
the same party.3 Sorauf and McCloskey suggest that the
American political party must be understood as a conglomer-
ate containing separate, dissimilar, and sometimes competing
interests.

This paper will compare the behavior of two branches
of a state political party: the party in office and the
party in the electorate. As a basis of study I have
selected Michigan in the Second American Party System
(1824-1860). Michigan was choosen because Ronald Formi-
sano's political history of the state, The Birth of Mass
Political Parties: Michigan 1827-60, provides a useful

conceptual framework for this study. Using a variety of

 

 

 

2Frank S. Sorauf, Political Parties in the American
System (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., I933).
3

Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffman, and Rosemary
O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders
and Followers," American Political Science Review, LIV,

No. 1 (Spring 1977). pp. 46'6‘2‘7— .

census tracts, electoral data and other records, Formisano
found little class voting in Michigan; wealthy or im-
poverished villages might as easily be found voting for

the Whig or Republican party as the Democratic. Partisan
divisions on an urban-rural axis, or industrial-agricultural
cleavage, were no more revealing. It was only when he
examined the religious affiliation of electoral units that
Formisano perceived a surprisingly strong partisan cleavage.
Wards or townships populated by Roman Catholics, Uni—
versalists, or Unitarians returned heavy Democratic
majorities; voting units containing a high percentage of
Presbytarians, Baptists or Congregationalists returned

Whig and later Republican majorities. Formisano hypothe-
sized that the religious doctrines of these groups instilled
divergent belief systems on the functions of the state.

The religious doctrines of those sects voting Whig demanded
constant vigilance of their adherents in maintaining a
strict moral code within the community. They were sensitive
to behavior that violated such virtues as temperance, piety
or chastity. Not only was the individual responsible for
his own proper behavior, but the community's as well. For
Baptist, Congregational and Presbytarian sects, the com-
munity, in the form of its religious and political insti-
tutions, must take an active role in enforcing piety among
its members. Formisano labeled these and like sects
"evangelical," and argued that they made up the consti-

tuency of the Whig party. On the opposite end of the

spectrum were the "antievangelicals," individuals more
tolerant of impiety or at least less concerned that the
community enforce properly religious behavior. In Michigan,
antievangelicals were Democratic. For Roman Catholics,
Unitarians and free thinkers the individual bore sole
responsibility for his behavior. Governmental action
seeking to enforce some moral code was detested because it
restricted the realm of individual freedom. Formisano then
observed an evangelical appeal in Whig and Republican
rhetoric, elite and program. Their propaganda pressed for
a union of church and state; their leaders exhibited pious
behavior; and their political programs included laws to
keep the Sabbath and outlaw such sinful practices as
slavery and intemperance. Democrats, while obviously not
advocating sin, were skeptical of attempts to enforce
proper behavior, placed a premium on individual freedom of
choice, and were sensitive to rhetoric and policies that
implied a union of church and state. Thus, in mobilizing
their respective constituencies, evangelical issues proved
highly salient.4
Assuming that the parties' electorate were divided
on evangelical lines, can the same be said on the parties'
officeholders? Formisano conducted limited research on
the Michigan legislature and tentatively concluded that it

could. Whig and Republican legislators were more favorable

 

4Formisano, Birth of Mass Political Parties,
PP. 126-270

to evangelical legislation than their Democratic peers.
This included such issues as anti-slavery resolutions,
temperance laws and fornication and adultery statutes.5

Formisano presents an intriguing thesis. It does
seem plausible that mass attitudes toward newly created
political parties were influenced by earlier religious
attitudes. Yet, the validity of this evangelical-
antievangelical construct of partisan division is less
compelling under further scrutiny. Lacking official
church records, Formisano was forced to extrapolate the
religious affiliation of voting units by computing the
church seats of different denominations. Can we be sure
that each of a locality's major religious sects were
represented by a church of its own? Furthermore, can the
issues that divided the parties be labeled distinctly
evangelical ones? Formisano identified two major evangeli-
cal reforms--anti-slavery and prohibition; but these may
also have incorporated nonevangelical appeals. Slavery in
the territories, as Eric Foner pointed out, was viewed as
a threat to the economic welfare of many Northern yeomen.6
Many historians, including Formisano, have recognized

prohibition as a nativist program to curb the intemperate

 

51bid., pp. 122-25.

6See Eric Foner, Free Soil Free Labor Free Men
(New York: Oxford University Press, I975}, pp. II-55.

habits of immigrant groups.7 Formisano's other evangelical
issues received less attention in the state's political
activity. At the very least, it is to be questioned if
various attitudes on different "evangelical" issues can be
systemized into evangelical belief system. Finally, if
Sorauf and McCloskey are right, is Formisano correct in
assuming that these same evangelical influences operated

in the Michigan legislature? Were the attitudes and
behavior of a party's legislators similar to those of its
electorate? These are the questions that will provide the
focus of this study. Obviously, any conclusions this paper
arrives at will be restricted by the fact that they are
based on research in one state for a limited time period.
It is also to be admitted that the few roll call votes to
be considered in this paper present only a very limited

picture of evangelicism and Michigan politics.

 

7Formisano, Birth of Mass Political Parties,
p. 233.

CHAPTER I

METHODOLOGY

This study is based on exhaustive research of all
the evangelical bills and resolutions that were considered
in the Michigan House of Representatives. I have choosen
the House because its greater size, relative to that of the
Senate's, provides a more reliable estimate of party
attitudes as revealed in roll call votes. The House member-
ship was elected annually from 1837 to 1851. After that
date the legislature was elected biennually, with only one
major session on odd numbered years. Political parties did
not appear in the House until 1838. For most of the
Jacksonian period the Democratic party held majority status
(Table 1). The Whigs held majorities only in 1840 and 1841.
After 1854, the Republicans controlled every ante bellum
session.

The data for this paper were drawn from the
proceedings of the Michigan House Journal. I have examined
the disposition of every evangelical bill or resolution

presented in the House. Evangelical bills were classified

Table l.--Party Affiliation in the Michigan House.

 

 

Democratic Whig Republican
Year Representatives Representatives Representatives
1838 28 21
1839 31 22
1840 16 36
1841 21 33
1842 46 5
1843 48 5
1844 48 7
1845 4S 8
1846 37 16
1847 51 19
1848 52 14
1849 46 19a
1850 46 20
1851 41 27
1853 50 20
1855 23 49b
1857 16 64
1859 25 56b

 

aIncludes three Free Soilers.

b

Includes one Independent.

as those dealing with religious or moral concerns of en-
forcing moral behavior (prohibition laws), or asserting a
moral position on a current moral issue (resolutions

aginst slavery and dueling). In every case where a bill
was passed or killed in a roll call vote, I have recorded
the support each of the parties rendered to the measure.

In order to assist in the analysis on these roll calls I
employed a simple statistical device called the index of
likeness. The index is computed by calculating the differ-
ence between the percentile support (per cent voting
"yea"), each of the parties' legislators registered on the
roll call in question. The resulting differentials between
the parties is then substracted from 100 to produce the
actual index of likeness. For example, if 80 per cent of
the Whigs and 55 per cent of the Democrats vote "yea” on

one roll call the differential of 25, substracted from 100,

produces an index of likeness of 75. It follows that a vote
manifesting great disagreement between the parties (one
party highly favorable and the other strongly opposed to a
particular bill), will produce a high differential that

will in turn produce a low index of likeness. Thus, when

the index approaches 100 the parties appear in agreement.

CHAPTER II

EVANGELICAL ISSUES AND PARTY BEHAVIOR

The many resolutions concerning slavery in the
territories were undoubtedly the most important evangelical
issue to come before the House. The division that
accompanied this controversy would disrupt a loose coalition
of Democratic legislators and later form the Republican
party. Originally, both parties were opposed to slavery,
but concerns over national unity and party interest led
Democratic and non-Democratic legislators to take opposing
views. By the end of the Mexican War, Democratic leaders
presented their party as one promoting national unity and
popular sovereignty. The Whigs developed a position on
the issue that was identical to that later endorsed by the
Republican party.

Indexes on anti-slavery resolutions can be found in
Table 2. In the era before the Mexican War both parties
in the legislature sought to remove the slavery controversy
from public debate so as to safeguard the Union. Michigan's
first partisan legislature met the issue in 1838 with a

resolution condemning even the discussion of slavery in

10

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12

the U.S. Congress. The state's major Democratic newspaper,
the Detroit Free Press, claimed that Whig officials were
attempting to make opposition to this measure party

policy.8 This attempt failed since 75 percent of the Whigs
supported the resolution along with 90 percent of the
Democrats. The foregoing was probably passed as a reprimand
to abolitionist agitators, but neither party wished to be
misinterpreted as apologists for slavery and both feared

the divisive ramifications of the issue. The same legis-
lature passed a resolution by 44 to 4 against the annexation
of Texas since "extending the territory of the U.S.” would
"create dissent" and "endanger the stability of the Union."
All four voting against the resolution were Democrats, and
they were overruled by 21 members of their own party.9 At
no time during the pre Mexican War period did either party
entertain further resolutions on slavery. Petitions on

this topic were abruptly tabled.

Whig propaganda, as represented in the Detroit
Advertiser before the Mexican War, often directed itself
against the abolitionists, using the same arguments the
Democrats would later wield against the Republicans.

What assurance do they hold out for any reunion of the
states? How steadily do they conceal from their

 

8Detroit Free Press, Jan. 17, 1838.

9Journal of the Michigan House of Representatives,
1838, pp. 88-91

 

13

followers the horrors of dissolution? To what power
gill they refer us £35 a disestablishment of the
ational Prosperity.
The Democratic Detroit Free Press avoided the issue at all
turns, but by 1845 the paper had aligned itself with the
3 policy of the national administration on Texas and slavery.
However, it assured its readership, as soon as Texas is
placed "in a position of stability and security, the region
must soon pass from the dominion of slavery to that of
freedom." This was an argument the paper would employ
throughout the debate over the territories.11
The election of Polk and the Mexican War introduced
a wrenching decade and a half for both state parties. The
state Democratic party found its interests tied with those
of Polk, though they had originally supported Van Buren.
As the out party the Whigs made numerous attempts to
embarrass the Democrats on their national coalition, while
propagating their own anti-slavery and anti-southern
rhetoric. Table 2 indicates how remarkably solid Whig

opposition to slavery was. In the legislatures of 1845,

1847, and 1848 Whigs votes unanimously and consistently

 

loDetroit Advertiser, April 2, 1842.

11Detroit Free Press, Jan. 7, 1845. See also
Jan 1, 1846; Feb. 2, I849; June 28, 1854; and Sept. 25,
1858. And see Justin E. Walsh, "Radically and Throughly
Democratic: Wilbur F. Story and the Detroit Free Press,"
Michigan History, XLVIII, No. 3 (SeptemBer I935): PP.

14

against the introduction of further slave territory.12

Democratic opposition to new slave territory grows dra-
matically during this period, raising the index of likeness
from 15 to 63. Despite this shift in the sympathies of its
own legislators,(the Free Press would continue to proclaim
opposition to policies such as the Wilmot Proviso to be
"Democratic Creed." As trustees of Lewis Cass' presidential
campaign, state Democratic leaders enunciated a conciliatory
policy to bolster Cass' popularity in the South. In 1848
Cass' Nicholson letter, in which he introduced popular
sovereighty as a solution to the territories question, was
embraced by the Free Press as the proper state and national

Democratic policy.13

The Whig Advertiser berated the
Democrats for this policy and their association with a
slave aristocracy. When Democratic opposition killed the
anti-slavery resolution of 1845 the Advertiser first raised
the spectre of "doughface" Democrats.
We hope we shall hear no more canting pretenses from
them [Democrats] on the subject of slavery and a
southern ascendancy. They stand before the world in
their own recorded votes as the open advocates of both.
Opposition to further slave territory was soon recognized
as state party policy, and the paper derived considerable

satisfaction from the discomfort of the Democrats on this

issue. The Advertiser observed of the Nicholson letter:

 

12

Journal of the Michi an House of Representatives,
1845, p. 69; I847, p. 78; I848, p. I55.

13

 

Detroit Free Press, Jan. 29, 1848 and Jan. 8,
1848.

15

The Whigs of Michigan need no further discussion on
this question. Their minds are made up. When they
abandon the principle of no more slave territoiy they
W111 have forgotten their own righteous cause.
Fully six years before the Kansas-Nebraska Act the state's
Whig legislators and newspapers had developed a slave
policy and rhetoric later to be expounded by the Republican
party.

Only a year before the Compromise of 1850 the House
voted down an amendment that would have permitted slavery
below 36 30'. The amendment was defeated 46 to 15, all the
Whigs and two—thirds of the Democrats voting against it.15
In the same legislature an abortive attempt was made by
about a dozen Democrats to replace Senator Cass with
Epaphroditus Ransom, the then Democratic Governor who made
no secret of his opposition to any additional slave
territory. Most historians dismiss this struggle as an
uprising by Democrats from the western portion of the state
to gain better patronage for one of their own. However
true this is, Democrats from counties supporting Ransom had
been significantly more sympathetic to anti-slavery
resolutions in the past than those counties supporting

Cass.16 While the effort to unseat Cass failed, the

 

14Detroit Advertiser, Jan. 18, 1845; Jan. 16, 1847;
Jan. 11, 1818;

15Journal of the Michigan House of Representatives,
1849, p. 52}

16In ten roll calls on slavery resolutions 21 per-
cent of the Democrats from counties represented by pro-Cass

16

insurgents did delay his re-election by several ballots,

and the Free Press betrayed considerable consternation on
the part of Democratic leaders. Following this conflict
articles in the Free Press and the Advertiser suggested

a minor purge was afoot in the Democratic party to eliminate
those who had disrupted the party over slavery. Wilber
Story, soon to become editor of the Free Press, wrote in

the Pontiac Jacksonian:

If it has really come to this, that the great mass
of the party must yield to a most limited minority, the
sooner we disband and submit to dismemberment the
better. . . . [W]e shall thank God that the crisis has
arisen that has driven from us into the Whig or
Abolition ranks, that class of politicians who only
adhered to the party for selfish motives, and the views
of self interest or aggrandizement.

The crisis on 1850 seemed to be a boon to the state
Democratic party, proving everything they had warned con-
cerning slavery and disunion. Said the Free Press: "We
are rejoiced to see the people awakened and are [sic]
rebuking the fanatical efforts of those who have been
attempting to prostrate the honor and welfare of our

«18

country to the shrine of an ideal abstraction. The

purge of 1849 and the national reconciliation that

 

men voted against the extension of slavery as compared to
35 percent of the Democrats from counties supporting
Ransom.

17Detroit Free Press, Feb. 2, 1849. For other
articles on the Democratic split see: Detroit Free Press,
Jan. 6; April 5; and April 7, 1849. Also Detroit Advertiser,
Jan. 10, 1849.

18Detroit Free Press, March 8, 1850.

17

accompanied the Compromise seemed to have cleaned the party
of anti-slavery legislators. After 1849, roughly 90 percent
of the Democrats in the House would vote against any anti—
slavery resolution. The Whig Advertiser also expressed
satisfaction that the Union had been saved, but its position
on the compromise and territories question was ambiguous.
The paper identified itself with the Fillmore adminis-
tration, but frequently published speeches and articles
unfavorable to the Compromise. The Advertiser no longer
agitated on the question, but it did not retract the
earlier state party position on slavery:
Considering slavery an evil, and its extension a direct
act of injustice to the North politically, the Whig
party has uniformly lifted its voice against such
extension. . . . The danger of disunion, if any exists,
comes not from the Whigs; the South knows well what the
Whig sentiment is.
This ambiguity is reflected by Whigs in the House. They
unaimously opposed the passage of resolutions favorable to
the compromise in 1850, but thereafter joined the Democrats
in quietly tabling further anti-slavery petitions.20
The ascendancy of the Republicans after 1854
presented the House with at least one anti—slavery petition

in each session. Introduced as "instructions" to the

state's U.S. Senators, these resolutions were presented

 

19Detroit Advertiser, Feb. 9, 1850.

20Journal of the Michi an House of Re resentatives,
1850, p. 852 and p. 489. Petitions against sIavery or tHe
Fugitive Slave Law were tabled without roll calls. Journal

of the Michigan House of Representatives, 1851, p. l ;
, p. 6.

 

18

with the hope of forcing these Democrats to resign. The
resolutions registered very low indexes of likeness. The
1855 resolution branded slavery a "great moral, social and
political evil," and instructed the state's U.S. Senators
to keep slavery out of Kansas and Nebraska and to repeal
the Fugitive Slave Law. This resolution passed on a very
nearly straight party vote with an index of 8. When
Republicans introduced a measure forbidding the use of
common jails for persons claimed as fugitive slaves, enough
Democrats voted with the Republicans to produce an index of
34. Succeeding legislatures passed anti-slavery resolutions
with equal polarization.21
In 1855, Michigan's first Republican governor,
Kingsley Bingham, devoted the greater part of his inaugural
address to the controversy. Bingham presented the slavery
question as the dark conspiracy of arrogant Southern
aristocrats and ambitious politicans seeking to make
"slavery national and freedom sectional." The Free Press
attempted to establish its own independence by attacking
disunionists of the North and South. But most commonly the
Democratic paper counterattacked by associating the
Republicans with "negroism," often decrying the "nigger

22

government in Lansing." Most of the slavery propaganda

 

21

Journal of the Michigan House of Representatives,
1855, p;. 1 p p 3 I PP. I 3 I PP.

130-31.

 

22Detroit Free Press, Feb. 16, 1859. See also
Justin E. WaIsE, "Radically and Thoroughly Democratic:

19

for this ante bellum period was a vigorous attempt to
associate the opposition with some negative reference group,
either the black man or his master.

Anti-slavery was a vexing problem for both the Whig
and Democratic legislators. Both were opposed to the
extension of slavery in the period of early statehood, but
their affiliation with a national union and a national
party also required that they be against anti-slavery
agitation. Recognizing the divisive ramifications of this
issue for themselves and the Union, members of both parties
attempted to ignore the slavery question. Yet, even
fifteen years before the "meeting under the Oaks," Whig
legislators appear more anti-slavery inclined than their
Democratic counterparts. The Mexican War and the resulting
territories fomented such state concern that it was diffi-
cult for either party to ignore the issue. By 1847 the
Advertiser and the legislature advocated an anti-slavery
program identical to that later espoused by the Republicans.
Democrats, standing in the shadow of Lewis Cass, continued
to take the "middle road" on the slavery question. A
growing portion of the party voted against Cass' position,
but these iconoclasts were tolerated in the interest of
party harmony. It was only when this anti-slavery wing

voted against General Cass himself that their apostasy

 

Wilbur F. Storey and the Detroit Free Press," Michigan
History, XLVII, No. 3 (September 1963), p. 215.

20

triggered a party response. Thereafter Democratic anti-
slavery sentiment virtually disappeared. The Whigs remained
opposed to the extension of slavery and much of the Compro-
mise of 1850, but general anxiety over disunion repressed
this impulse. The state Republican party was not formed
from a sudden opposition to slavery or even slavery in the
territories. Rather, the Republicans were a response to the
Kansas-Nebraska Act that heightened hatred of southern
slavemasters and mitigated concerns of national unity.

The political catalysm that first brought the
Republicans to power coincided with a wave of prohibitionary
laws that restricted or outlawed liquor in many Northern
states. Some historians have suggested that this associ-
ation was not coincidental but that the Republican party

23 In Michigan however,

was allied to the temperance cause.
the temperance movement took place outside all of the

states political parties and succeeded in imposing its
reform on the political system only through its own efforts.

Over the time span of this study temperance petitions easily

outnumbered all other evangelical petitions combined, both

 

23See Andrew Wallace Crandall, The Earl History of
the Resublican Part (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith
PEBIis ing 0., ), p. 15.
Eric Foner claims that Republicans abandoned
temperance by 1856, a conclusion that generally concurs

with this study. Eric Foner, Free Soil Free Labor Free

Men (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 24I-42.
Formisano emphasizes the disruptive effects of

temperance on older party loyalties though claiming that

the Fusionists of 1854 were viewed as the "Maine Law Party,"
p. 243.

 

21

in terms of signatures and sheer number. The mass grass
roots activism on temperance's behalf forced the political
parties to come to grips with the issue, though they avoided
it as much as possible.

Temperance had been a controversial and popular
issue in Michigan for some time preceding statehood. Up
until the 18405 however, the focus of the drive was not
political but exhortatory--an attempt to win converts by
personal appeals and local pledge drives. In the 1840s
temperance advocates began turning to the political process.
It is indicative of temperance's limited influence among
political parties that the movement found it necessary to
deluge the legislature with petitions in the forties and
fifties. Whig and Republican legislators were more
favorable to temperance legislation than their Democratic
counterparts; but it would be a mistake to label either of
them as pro-temperance parties. The similarity of Demo-
cratic, Whig, and Republican attempts to kill the reform
is the striking feature of legislative activity in this
area.

Indexes of likeness for temperance legislation can
be found in Table 3. In all but one of these roll calls
the non-Democratic legislators appear more sympathetic to
temperance reform. But the index is often not very small.
Up until 1853 no strict prohibitionary law had been passed.
Votes on the passage of the five temperance bills passed

before 1853 produced and average index of 74.2. It was

22

 

 

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.aacasowv Achammwv Ahmcawumv
mausoxaq ouo> ouo> ouo> ouo> mo cowumauomoo snow
mo xoch .Eooncoz .Eoo .uoe

 

.cowusauwooq cocuuomeoe co mouo> dado Haomll.n canoe

23

not until 1853 that the state's first prohibition law was
passed. Passage was no doubt aided by petitions bearing
70,000 signatures. The aim of almost all these petitions
was a prohibition law similar to that passed in Maine,
thereafter called the Maine Law. The report of the
Democratic Committee on the Petitions for the Maine Law was
as fiery and righteous as any temperance cause could wish.
The "certain and evident devastation" of liquor could only
"corrupt and debase the morals of society to an alarming
extent."

It is indisputable that individual rights must be
surrendered for the public good and benefit; that a
minority must submit to the majority when constitu-
tionally expressed. That we have an undoubted right
to prohibit the manufacture and sale of any poisonous
decoction or substance, calculated to enter into the
general consumption, the too free use of which would
surely but slowly terminate life.24

A stringent bill was presented to the House prescribing the
sale of all liquor for all but medicinal and mechanical
purposes. An amendment permitting the sale of "highwines"
was defeated 40 to 28: half the Democrats and a quarter

of the Whigs voting in the affirmative. Despite this

defeat the opponents of temperance found means to kill the
statute. The original bill called for enforcement beginning
in the fall, but this provision was defeated in a close vote

with a fourth of the Whigs and three-fourths of the

Democrats opposed. In its stead it was proposed that the

 

24

Journal of the Michi an House of Re resentatives,
1853, pp. 600-01. Aid Laws of MicHIgan, I853, pp. 306-II.

24

law be first voted in a popular referendum. The new
Michigan Constitution contained no provision for a popular
referendum. And this rendered the bill legally dubious as
at least one legislator and the Free Press pointed out.25
Whether this was a conscious ploy to kill the bill by anti-
temperence legislators can only be surmised, but a break-
down of legislative votes on the amendment to permit the
sale of "highwines" with that requiring enforcement in the
fall presents intriguing results. Those who opposed
complete prohibition (voted to permit the sale of "high-
wines"), voted overwhelmingly against automatic enactment
(25 to 3). The crucial swing group were the twenty-four
legislators voting favorably toward total prohibition but
against automatic enactment of the law. Eighteen of these
swing legislators were Democrats. A majority of those
voting for total prohibition and for automatic enactment
were Whigs. Following this, the bill passed without

26

difficulty, 57 to 12, and an index of 91. The 1853

referendum later passed the measure overwhelmingly. But,

reported the Advertiser, "The friends of temperance are by

27

no means pleased with the bill." And with good reason,

 

25Detroit Free Press, Feb. 11, 1853.

26Journal of the Michigan House of Representatives,

27Detroit Advertiser, Feb. 7, 1853.

25

within a year the State Supreme Court would strike down the
law because of the referendum.

The convening of the first Republican legislature
seemed to bode well for temperance interests. The Republi-
cans had campaigned on the promise to enact a Maine Law,
and they had healthy majorities in both Houses. The result
was the presentation of two prohibitionary bills, each
advanced by one of the political parties. The Democratic
program called for liquor to be sold in quantities of more
than a gallon not to be drunk on the premises of sale.

None was to be sold to "known intoxicants." The Republi-
cans convened without any settled program. The Free Press
reported division in the Republican ranks, some wanting the
"whole hog" Maine Law and others a more moderate statute

28 Only after a week of caucus

permitting wine and beer.
meetings was a consensus reached on a Republican measure.
One finds no evangelical or antievangelical polemics on
the right of the government to impose prohibition during
the House debates. The issue revolved solely on the most
expedient means by which it could be enforced. Super-
ficially, there was considerable division between the
parties. The Democratic bill was defeated producing an
index of 9; the Republican bill passed with an index of 19.

But in depth analysis of the creation of this Republican

bill reveals considerable party consensus on key points.

 

28Detroit Free Press, Jan. 4; Jan. 7, 1855.

 

26

An important amendment to this law permitted the sale of
wine and hard cider. It was incorporated into the bill in
a 39 to 32 split with an index of 96. An additional
amendment permitted sale in quantities of ten and one
gallons respectively and was passed with an index of 92.29
Despite the nonpartisanship which wrote the most important
segments of the bill, both the state's political parties
campaigned on the fact that it was a Republican measure.
Democrats did not attack "prohibition" or "temperance
legislation," but devoted their criticism to "Maine
Lawism," that it claimed to be unconstitutional and unen—

30 Time soon proved the Democrats right. In

forceable.
Wayne County bars turned into "drug stores" and complaints
of lack of enforcement flooded the state. Governor

Bingham's address to the legislature of 1857 failed to make

any mention of and Maine Law and the Free Press claimed this

 

was a confession,

. . . that black Republicianism embraced the Maine Law
not as a genuine temperance measure, but as a temporary
element of popular strength, without regard to its
consequences to temperance, and that the law itself has
turned out a failure. . . . No person in his senses
doubts that the act of 1855 is dead as though it were
repealed.31

 

29

Journal of the Michigan House of Representatives,
1855' pp. 1 I I p - 6.

30Detroit Free Press, Jan. 23, Jan. 25, 1855;
Jan. 9, 1857; Feb. 8, 1859.

 

 

31Detroit Free Press, Jan. 7, 1857.

27

In the same legislature a Republican introduced a bill
exempting beer from the Maine Law and abrogating certain
enforcement measures. Yet, so partisan an issue had the
Maine Law become at this point, that the Democrats opposed
passage of this bill weakening the Maine Law. Republican
support carried it through with an index of 34. The 1859
legislature found itself met with 20 more petitions asking
for a stronger Maine Law more vigorously enforced. Instead
the House considered a Democratic bill to permit the state
to re-issue liquor licenses. The bill was killed after it
was postponed on a vote of 38 to 33 with an index of 22.32
If the mass electorate was motivated by evangelical
and antiangelical belief systems toward temperance legis-
1ation, this general concern did not permeate the state's
party elites. Both the Whig and Democratic legislators

sought to undermine stiff legislation prior to 1855. Both

the Advertiser and the Free Press seemed sympathetic to

 

temperance, perhaps the latter a little more so. But
neither paper endorsed a strong prohibitionary enactment.33
After 1855 both parties present themselves as favorable to

some sort of temperance legislation, though the Republicans

endorsed a stricter law than the Democrats. The public

 

 

 

32Journal of the Michigan House of Representatives,
1857, p. 665; 1859, p. 649; and Laws ofiMichigan, p. 442.
33

Detroit Advertiser, March 30, 1841. See also
Detroit Advertiser, March 23, 1849; Feb. 8, 1851; Jan. 11,
. Detroit Free Press, March 8, 1847; Jan. 25, 1855.

 

 

28

debate then shifted to the most expedient means of
enforcing temperance, not over the issue of temperance
itself. Much unanimity is seen between the parties on
crucial amendments that substantially defined these
statues. Despite this agreement between two wings of the
party legislators, the parties rejoiced in the opportunity
of manifesting partisan divisions in votes on formal
passage and propaganda that praised or condemned the Maine
Law. Flabby enforcement and a loosening of the law in 1857
leave the sincerity of the Republicans dubious. At least
it cannot be said that either party was interested in
transforming public sentiment for reform, indicated by the
1853 referendum into public enactments. Legislative elites
seemed much more interested in protecting party identity

and interest.

Formisano points to one incident during the 1835
State Constitutional Convention that exemplified partisan
evangelical cleavage. This was a debate over inviting the
clergy to officiate with opening prayers.34 Occasionally,
the House membership divided on this same issue. Such
invocations are the norm at political meetings and cere—
monies today. But in a time when infrequent legislative
meetings were a novel experience in a new state, such

resolutions created debate and voting patterns strikingly

 

34
p. 106.

Formisano, Birth of Mass Political Parties,

29

similar to that which we would expect given an evangelical
cleavage. No other issue debated in the legislature so
clearly elicited evangelical and antievangelical arguments.
Democrats were sometimes dubious of the propriety of such
prayers in a government presumably separated from the
church; Whigs were abashed that any body of men would
undertake such important work without calling for Divine
guidance (Table 4).

In the 1839 session a bill providing token reim—
bursements for officiating clergymen out of the state
treasury failed in two attempts at passage. These two
attempts registered low indexes of 34 and 28.35 When the
clergy were invited in 1841 one Democrat moved to amend the
invitation with the warning that the clergy expect no
contribution from the legislature. The State Constitution,
he pointed out, "declares that every person has the right
to worship Almighty God according to the dictates of his
own conscience, and that no person can of right be com-
pelled to attend, erect, or support against his will, any
place of religious worship, or pay any tithes, taxes or
other rates; for the support of any minister of the Gospel

"36

or teacher of religion. This resolution angered the

Advertiser:

 

35Journal of the Michigan House of Representatives,
1839, pp. 553, 624.

36Journal of the Michigan House of Representatives,
1841, p. 46.

30

 

 

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or knm Hmnpm mmumm .smuoso or» maeus>cH were
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on one oaunm oasav .mmuoao 0:» mcwufl>cH mama
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mcflwmm Hash mmmm ou moans psommsm on o>oz
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Ammclmmmv A>mc1mowv AwmcummSV
mmocmqu muo> muo> ouo> muo> mo coaumwuommo snow
mo xwocH .Eoolsoz .Emo .uoa

 

.mosmmH Hobaaoqcs>m Hose: so mmuo> HHMU Haomul.v manna

31

It argues well for the good sense and good morals
of the House, that it would not, for a moment, enter-
tain this infidel insult. If those entertaining
principles sufficiently diabolical to wish to dispense
with daily invocations to Almighty God, have the
unblushing effrontery to avow those principles, we are
glad to find sufficient firmness in those who have the
power to do so, to rebuke those by whom they are
avowed.

It is noteworthy that the Advertiser chose not to mention
the fact that the source of the amendment was a Democrat or
that Democrats were more sympathetic to such resolutions.
The amendment failed without a vote, but the clergy were
not granted remuneration.

In legislative sessions after this the Democrats
became more favorable to inviting the clergy. The indexes
for 1843, 1847, and 1848 were 79, 90, and 86 respectively.38

The 1850 State Constitution specifically prohibited
the expenditure of state funds to religious officials
serving at government functions. This left the propriety
of such inovations also in doubt, and when the 1851
legislature convened the issue was raised again. When one
Whig introduced a resolution inviting the clergy, a Demo-
crat asked that it be amended "that they be requested to

make such prayers as short as possible." The latter

amendment failed 53 to 9, with an index of 82. The former

 

37Detroit Advertiser, Jan. 9, 1841.

38

Journal of the Michi an House of Re resentatives,
1843, p, 38; 1847, p. 2T; I848, pp. 25, 81, 92.

 

32

resolution was passed 44 to 22 with an index of 70. Later
this same resolution was reséinded leaving an index of 57.39
The Advertiser was incensed at this latter vote, wondering

how any governmental body could ever hope to function

without Divine guidance. The EEBe Press was also favorable

 

to opening prayers since they would "hurt no one" and were
"exceedingly appropriate." Unlike the Advertiser, the

Free Press would not castigate those who voted against the

 

resolution. "They have acted, we believe, honestly and
conscientiously." Once again, neither party ascribed a
40

position on the issue to itself or to its opposition.
After 1851 the clergy problem no longer troubled the
legislature and the clergy were invited to each session
thereafter.

The fact that legislators argued over inviting the
clergy implies that tension over the church and state
relationship did divide that body. Democrats were indeed
less evangelical than the Whigs, and the index of 1839 is
surprisingly low. But after 1842, when the Democrats gain
almost complete control of the House, the controversy
continued with the Democrats so split as to create much
higher indexes of likeness: 79 in 1843, 90 in 1847, and

86 in 1848. When the Whigs become a more powerful

L‘

39Journal of the Michigan House of Representatives,
1851, pp. 34, 35, 48.

40Detroit Advertiser, Feb. 13, 1851; Detroit Free
Press, Feb. 157 I851.

33

minority this index dips again to 57. Simple partisan
identification was not always the crucial determinant in
legislative voting on this issue. Other possible factors

will be explored later in this paper.

A variety of other evangelical bills and resolutions
were considered in the House, and these are summarized in
Table 5. The expeditious manner in which they were passed
or defeated suggests they were considered too unimportant
to stir up evangelical or antievangelical fervor. At
most, this legislation attracted only passing attention in
the Advertiser and the Free Press. In most instances the
Whigs are more evangelical, but the index is low in only
one instance. In 8 of 14 roll calls the index is above 70.

The only low index was passage of a bill abolishing
the death penalty. According to Formisano, party lines
were less distinct on this than on other reforms, "but
evangelicals and Whigs did occupy the vanguard of oppo-
sition to abolition to capital punishment, and anti-

41 The

evangelical Democrats led in the fight for it."
Whigs were opposed to abolition in 1843 and 1844, but

Democratic support is favorable one year and divided the
next. By 1846 the abolition bill was approved without a

roll call. The only divisive issue concerned its substi-

tute. One Democrate sponsored an amendment calling for

 

41
p. 125.

Formisano, Birth of Mass Political Parties,

 

34

 

 

 

 

 

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mcuaoso

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oouo>uo

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uncannusam Hmuummu

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mmocoxuq muo> wuo> ouo> ouo> mo couumuuomoo know
no xoocH .Eooncoz .Emo .uoe

 

.mwsmnH Hoowacmcu>m nose: so uouo> Hauo Haomnn.m ounce

35

imprisonment, but the sentence that was adopted specified
”solitary confinement at hard labor for life." Whigs were
more favorable to the more astringent substitute.42
Despite the partisan voting pattern it is not clear that
this reform was viewed as an antievangelical accomplish—
ment. Two Michigan historians ascribe abolition to a
desire to obtain more convictions for first degree murder.43
Concerns about the barbarity or righteousness of the issue
were rarely raised in the Advertiser or the Free Press.
Said the latter of abolition in 1846:
Where the penalty was death, it was almost impossible
to procure a conviction. Under the revised code we
hesitate not to say that fewer murders will be com-
mitted, and more convictions be had, for it is the
certainty of punishment, more than its cruelty, that
prevents crime.

The divorce laws are singled out as evangelical
issues because it is assumed that legislation loosening this
important socializing institution would not be viewed
favorably by evangelicals. Formisano makes no mention of

the issue. The two bills listed on Table 5 attracted no

notice in the party presses. In both cases the Whigs are

 

42Journal of the Michigan House of Representatives,
1843, pp. 199, 235; 1844, pp. 442, 461.

43See Utley and Cutcheon, as quoted from Jean Jay
Fennimore, "Austin Blair: Political Idealist, 1845-60,"
Michigan Histoiy, XLVIII, No. 2 (June, 1964), p. 136.

44Detroit Free Press, May 5, 1846.

36

the more opposed to legislation widening the grounds for
divorce.45
The only issue on which Democrats appear more
evangelical than non—Democrats is on resolutions condemning
dueling and calling for the removal of government officials
who participated in them. The origin of the resolutions
explain this anomaly. The resolutions were presented in
response to a much publicized duel in which one Whig con—
gressman killed a Democratic peer. However evangelical the
Whigs may have been, they were reluctant to censure a
member of their own party. Party interest tempered Whig
evangelicism.46
Keeping the Sabbath was one reform in particular
vogue in the 18408. The Whig House of 1840 passed a
Sabbath Law that prohibited the operation of passenger
railroad cars on Sunday. An earlier bill that would have
prohibited passenger service when it was "expedient"
failed. Formisano implies these were largely Whig measures,

47 In 1842 this bill

48

but indexes of 93 and 91 dispute this.

was abrogated over Whig opposition, but the index is 63.

 

45

Journal of the Michigan House of Representatives,
1849' pp. '- 3 p p. 0

46Journal of the Michigan House of Representatives,
1838, pp. I3U:35:

 

47Formisano, Birth of Mass Political Parties,

p. 124.

48

Journal of the Michigan House of Regresentatives,
1840I PP. I I ' I 3 I PPO ' °

 

37

Neither the Free Press or the Agvertiser devoted much

 

attention to this bill, nor did either describe it as a
Whig measure.49 In 1841 the Advertiser called for the
suspension of all mail delivery on Sunday claiming that
"no nation would ever be ruined by the observance of the
Sabbath." The Free Press was also amenable to the

50 Three House votes and the pronouncements

prescription.
of party newspapers present no great partisan division on
this issue.

No action of the Michigan House appears quite so
scandalous as the tabling of a law prescribing penalties
for the crime of fornication and adultery. Formisano
surmises that "the capacity of Democrats to encourage evil
doers must have seemed limitless" to the state's evangeli-

51

cals after this vote. Actually, the bill was killed when

a motion to strike out everything after the enacting clause

52 The defeat of this bill provided

passed 29 to 16.
evangelicals with a potent propaganda weapon, so it is

surprising that neither the Fiee Press nor the Advertiser

 

49The Detroit Free Press blandly reported: "The
House of Representatives yesterday passed a bill to stop the
running of railroads on the first day of the week,"
March 13, 1840. The Detroit Advertise£_said nothing.

50Detroit Advertiser, March 9, 1841; Detroit Free
Press, March 15, 1841.

51
p. 124.

Formisano, Birth of Mass Political Parties,

52Journal of the Michigan House of Repiesentatives,
1843, p. 182.

38

commented when the bill was lost. The Advertiser really
had little reason to appear righteous, two 6f five Whig
legislators helped kill the bill. Passage of a new law in
1844 received the approbation of both party presses.S3
Initial Democratic opposition to the 1844 bill faded as the
bill neared passage. Once again neither of the parties
appear strikingly evangelical or antievangelical.

Analysis from Tables 2 through 5 has not presented
either of Michigan's parties as distinctly evangelical or
antievangelical. With the exception of slavery resolutions,
real partisan differences, creating low indexes of like-
ness, are rare. Forty—two roll calls on various non-
slavery evangelical issues created only sixteen indexes
that fell below seventy. In only five instances is the
index below 30. The consistency by which non-Democrats
remain more evangelical than Democrats is noteworthy, but
many votes do not seem to be properly evangelical test
cases. Only the clergy issue initiated a legislative
struggle publicly debated in evangelical terms. Other
evangelical issues were favored or opposed on largely non-
evangelical grounds. Capital punishment was passed to
reduce crime; slavery resolutions mainly concerned them-
selves with its extension to the territories; the enforce-

ment of prohibition, not prohibition itself, was the point

 

53Detroit Free Press, Feb. 29, 1844; Detroit
Advertiser, Jan. 18} 1844.

 

39

of the debate on the Maine Law. Obviously, further
analysis of evangelicism and the House is necessary before

any compelling conclusions on the subject can be enter-

tained.

CHAPTER III

EVANGELICAL BEHAVIOR BY COUNTY

One possible factor was locality, and this will be
studied separately and as it influenced party behavior.
Research indicates that local influences were important
and were in many instances independent of partisan influ-
ences. Certain counties were evangelical, no matter which
party represented them, and these often made up the con-
stituency of non—Democratic parties. In analyzing the
vote of legislators by county another link will be con-
structed between Whig electoral support and legislative
evangelicism. It will be further seen that the slavery
issue interrupted this coalition. Anti-slavery was also
embraced by antievangelicals and this created a political
realignment that partially eclipsed the earlier partisan
evangelical cleavage. In brief, locality will prove a
useful variable in examining evangelicism and Michigan
politics in the Jacksonian era.

To analyze the influence of locality, I have

prepared an Evangelical Index that compares the evangelical

40

41

voting pattern of legislators by county. To create the
index, I have first designated the votes tabulated on each
roll call as either evangelical or antievangelical votes.
Next I have tabulated the voting records of individual
legislators separating them by county (i.e., a Wayne
County's legislator's evangelical and antievangelical

votes are added with those of other Wayne County legis-
lators). The Evangelical Index this produces is nothing
more than the totaled evangelical votes divided by the sum
of the totaled evangelical and antievangelical votes. The
preparation of such an index does present some problems.
The most vexing one asks which and how many roll calls will
be used for each issue? On the one hand, one roll call per
issue could be selected, but this only leads to a double
problem. First, on measures such as inviting the clergy,
temperance legislation and anti-slavery resolutions, which
of numerous votes, in different legislatures, do we choose?
Secondly, such an index lends to divorce and Sabbath laws
an artificial equivalence to slavery and temperance. The
chronic and discordant legislative struggles over the
latter do not seem to make this justified. On the other
hand, all the votes on all the issues could be tabulated,
but this would drown out the influence of lesser issues in
the numerous votes that were recorded on slavery and
temperance in one and several sessions. I have choosen
instead to strike a balance. I have recorded one roll call

per legislative session in every vote that has more than

42

15 percent of the legislators voting in the minority. One
slavery resolution from 1850 and one from 1859 were
eliminated because the disunion sentiments they expressed
made their validity as evangelical test cases less certain.
Three votes on paying the clergy were dropped because they
introduce economic matters to what should be a purely
evangelical index. In cases where one or more roll calls
preceded passage or defeat (efforts to kill a bill by
tabling or indefinately postponing it),'I have selected the
roll call that most nearly creates a tie vote. So formed,
the index contains the following: eight votes on slavery;
six on temperance; three each on capital punishment and
inviting the clergy; two each on fornication, divorce and
Sabbath laws; and one dueling resolution. Only those
counties formed by 1838 were studied so as to be assured
that every county's representatives voted on the same
issues.

Table 6 presents this Evangelical Index. It is
apparent that some counties were represented by more
evangelically voting legislators than others. Such local
influences often overrode party influences. This is to say
that some counties were evangelical not only because they
were often represented by Whigs, but also because their
Democratic representatives were evangelical. The reverse
is also true. For example, antievangelical counties, such
as Wayne, Lapeer, and Chippewa, have Whig legislators with

antievangelical voting patterns. Democrats in evangelical

43

Table 6.--Evangelical Index by County.

 

 

Non-
Total Dem. % Dem. Non-
Anti- Total % Anti- Dem. Dem. Anti- Dem.
County Evan. Evan. Evan. Evan. Evan. Evan. Evan. Evan.

Machinac 15 9 38 14 7 33 1 2
Oakland 82 61 43 78 48 38 4 13
Ottawa 15 17 53 13 11 46 2 6
Livingston 24 23 49 23 20 47 1 3
Monroe 42 22 34 38 17 31 4 5
Macomb 35 32 48 31 23 43 4 9
Berrien 20 16 44 19 11‘ 37 1 5
Wayne 92 58 39 78 44 36 14 14
Chippewa 12 9 43 9 7 44 3 2
Ionia 8 17 68 6 8 57 2 9
Kent 20 21 51 17 ll 39 3 10
Ingham ll 8 42 ll 2 15 0 6
Branch 15 23 61 10 13 57 5 10
Shiawassee 7 15 68 7 8 53 O 7
St. Clair l8 18 50 13 10 43 5 8
Van Buren 15 19 56 12 12 50 3 7
St. Joseph 19 29 60 l3 14 52 6 15
Cass 25 28 53 20 13 39 5 15
Lenawee 35 63 64 26 27 51 9 36
Saginaw ll 15 58 9 6 67 2 9
Hillsdale 18 33 65 16 10 38 2 23
Allegan 10 15 6O 9 7 44 l 8
Jackson 29 40 58 25 22 47 4 18
Clinton 7 14 67 4 7 64 3 7
Calhoun 22 37 63 ll 13 54 ll 24
Washtenaw 46 82 64 27 34 56 19 48
Barry 6 13 68 4 5 56 2 8
Genessee 8 25 76 4 8 67 4 l7
Lapeer 12 10 45 6 4 40 6 6
Eaton ll 12 52 9 3 25 2 9
Kalamazoo 10 35 78 4 9 69 6 26

 

44

counties, such as Washtenaw, Kalamazoo, and Clinton, show
a decided strain of evangelicism. As we would expect Whigs
seem more immune to these influences than Democrats.

Figures 1 and 2 correlate each of these counties'
legislative Evangelical Index with the percentile support
its electorate gave to non-Democratic parties in the 1840
and 1860 presidential elections. The general line of both
figures indicates a positive relationship-~the higher the
percentage of Whig or Republican electoral support the more
inclined a county's legislators, of both parties, to vote
evangelically. This reinforces Formisano's thesis of Whig
evangelicism in the electorate and the House. Note that
the 1860 vote presents a more orderly curve-~does this
indicate a more "evangelical" realignment at the mass base
with the formation of the Republican party?

We can compare evangelical and antievangelical
counties in another manner. Table 7 compares the votes of
glegislators from the nine most evangelical and nine least

54 Both Democratic and non-Democratic

evangelical counties.
legislators reflect their counties evangelicism. But,
while Democrats are sometimes evangelical and sometimes
antievangelical, the non-Democrats remain evangelical in

even the least evangelical counties. In the presidential

election of 1840 evangelical counties are strongholds of

 

54Nine counties were selected because there was a
four-way tie for tenth place in the Evangelical Column.

45

 

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Table 7.--Nine High and Low Evangelical Counties.

 

 

Non— % %
Dem. Dem. Temper- Dem. Dem.
Evan. Evan. Evan. Slavery Clergy ance 1840 1860
Least
Evan. 41% 36% 63% 35% 50% 40% 49 51
Most
Evan. 67% 54% 79% 72% 74% 79% 43 41

 

Whig electoral support and antievanglical counties are
competitive. By 1860 the partisan difference between
evangelicals and antievangelicals is more pronounced: a
ten point spread instead of a six point one. In both the
graphs and the table the election of 1860 produces the more
polarized vote between evangelical and antievangelical
counties. Richard McCormick argues that national parties
in the Second Party System were "artificial" because they
divided on nebulous and national issues--such as "Monster
Banks." Sectional and divisive issues were avoided to
maintain national unity. Rising agitation on the slavery
question later made this impossible. Slavery confronted
the parties with a serious issue. The realignment that
brought the Republicans to power signified a more rational

55

or ideological system. My study does not suggest that

 

55Richard P. McCormick, "Political Development in
the Second Party System," in William Nisbet Chambers and
Walter Dean Burnham, The American Part S stemsL Sta es of
Political Development (New York: x or University ress,
, p.'ll2:

48

the 1840 state party system was "artificial," Whig voters
did tend to send evangelicals to the House. But the
Republican party's formation did seem to lead to more
political polarization between evangelicals and antievangeli-
cals. As additional insight into this evangelicism Table 7
also examined how three issues created this evangelicism:
votes on temperance, on the clergy controversy, and on
slavery. Prohibition and slavery are highly divisive

issues between the groups, more so than other issues com-
puted in the Evangelical index. Temperance is the reform
most uniting the evangelicals; anti-slavery agitation is the
concern most uniting the antievangelicals. The abstract
problem of inviting the clergy did not present the same
degree of polarization-~even the antievangelicals were

split on the matter.

Democratic representatives are a heterogenous group,
sometimes voting evangelically and sometimes antievangeli-
cally. This duality is examined in Table 8, which contains
the nine counties wherein Democrats are the most evangelical
and nine in which they are the least evangelical. Wide
disagreement divided them on the clergy and temperance
issues, but much party unity was maintained on slavery;
even evangelical Democrats will lend it only 37 percent of
their votes. Apparently concerns of national party
identity made party regularity on this issue a high
priority. Ransom's revolt in 1849 violated this party

precept, and a general purge resulted. Thus, for many

49

Table 8.--Nine High and Low Democratic Evangelical Counties.

 

 

Non- % %
Dem. Dem. Temper- Dem. Dem.
Evan. Evan. Evan. Slavery Clergy ance 1840 1860
Least
Evan. 35 74 44 16 48 36 48 46
Most
Evan. 57 75 61 37 58 7O 48 41

 

Democrats, it was possible to be generally evangelical while
being against anti-slavery agitation.

As an issue highly influenced by partisanship,
anti-slavery was different from other evangelical reforms
where party support, at least among Democrats, varied
greatly. Since it is an atypical issue, and since it makes
up a third of the earlier Evangelical Index, another index
has been prepared that deletes all anti-slavery resolutions.
Table 9 presents this revised Evangelicism by county, and
again, evangelical and antievangelical counties are very
apparent. Now the influence of local institutions is more
obvious, whether one notes the Evangelical Democrats in
Shiawassee, Kalamazoo, and Livingston or the antievangelical
non-Democrats in Wayne, St. Clair, and Lapeer.

Figures 3 and 4 compare this revised evangelicism
with county presidential vote, as in Figures 1 and 2. In
Figure 3 a direct relationship between legislative evangeli-
cism and non-Democratic electoral support in 1840 is

observed again, perhaps even more strongly than in Figure l.

50

Table 9.--Revised Evangelical Index--Without Slavery--By County.

 

 

Non-
Total Dem. % Dem. Non-
Anti- Total Anti- Dem. Dem Anti- Dem.
County Evan. Evan. Evan. Evan. Evan. Evan. Evan. Evan.

Mackinac 9 9 50 8 7 47 l 2
Oakland 49 48 49 45 43 49 4 5
Ottawa 10 ll 52 9 7 44 l 4
Livingston 15 18 55 14 17 55 l 1
Monroe 32 14 30 28 12 30 4 2
Macomb 21 24 53 18 21 54 3 3
Berrien 9 ll 55 9 9 50 O 2
Wayne 57 47 45 49 39 44 8 8
Chippewa 8 6 43 6 5 45 2 1
Ionia 5 12 71 3 7 7O 2 5
Kent l3 14 52 10 7 41 3 7
Ingham 10 4 29 10 2 l7 0 2
Branch 9 17 65 6 ll 65 3 6
Shiawassee 3 13 81 3 8 73 0 5
St. Clair 11 ll 50 6 10 63 5 1
van Buren l2 14 54 9 10 53 3 4
St. Joseph 12 21 64 9 14 61 3 7
Cass 16 22 58 12 12 50 4 10
Lenawee 24 46 66 17 25 60 7 21
Saginaw 6 12 67 5 6 55 l 6
Hillsdale 11 24 69 9 10 53 2 l4
Allegan 6 12 67 6 6 50 4 10
Jackson 22 27 55 l9 17 47 3 10
Clinton 4 ll 69 2 6 75 2 5
Calhoun 21 21 50 10 9 47 ll 12
Washtenaw 37 57 61 19 29 60 18 28
Barry 6 8 57 4 4 50 2 4
Genessee 8 14 64 4 7 64 4 7
Lapeer 9 5 36 4 3 43 5 2
Eaton lO 7 41 8 3 27 2 4
Kalamzoo 7 22 76 3 8 73 4 l4

 

51

 

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53

But twenty years later (Figure 4), this relationship
breaks down. A slightly positive line might still be
drawn in Figure 4, but the Republican party and the slavery
controversy plainly disrupted the evangelical voting
alignment of the Second Party System in Michigan. Even
counties generally antievangelical make a slight swing
toward the Republican party. The comparison of these two
figures differs with the previous pair where the 1860
alignment led to a more structured system. The implication
is that the Third Party System in Michigan partially erased
the older evangelical cleavage with an issue, presumably
slavery, that could win the support of many antievangelicals.
Table 10 makes the same presentation on Evangelicism
as did Table 7 with the first Evangelical Index. Certain
comparisons are striking. First, while the general
polarization on evangelicism remains largely the same,
partisan polarization is much less distinct. Whereas
earlier there had been a 16 point spread between the
evangical and antievangical non-Democrats, there is now a
33 point one. Non-Democrats remain more evangelical than
Democrats, but the partisan polarization of Table 7 has
been mitigated in Table 10. Temperance is still an impor-
tant source of friction between the evangelicals and the
antievangelicals, but the clergy issue is much less so.
One other point is very significant, while the anti-
evangelical counties in Table 7 swing toward the Democratic

party in 1860, the antievangelical counties in Table 10

54

Table lO.--Nine High and Low Revised Evangelical--without Slavery--

 

 

Counties.
Non- % %
Dem. Dem. Temper— Dem. Dem.

Evan. Evan. Evan. Slavery Clergy ance 1840 1860
Least
Evan. 44 43 47 44 49 4O 47 45
Most
Evan. 69 62 80 64 7O 77 45 4O

 

swing toward the Republican party. The slavery issue makes
a difference. In the earlier Evangelical Index the differ-
ential between evangelical counties and antievanglical
counties in the 1860 election is 10; counties selected by
the second Evangelical Index produce a differential of only
5. Both the figures and the tables agree that a signifi-
cant amount of Republican support was garnered from anti-
evangelical counties opposed to the extension of slavery
and a slave aristocracy.

So far we have utilized electoral data from
1840 and 1860 as dependent variables. If we analyze the
evangelicism of high and low Democratic counties we can
verify the preceding evidence. This is done in Table 11.
As expected, the 1860 election presents a more polarized
profile: an evangelical differential of 11 between high
and low Democratic counties in 1840, and a differential of
22 in 1860. The Republican counties emerge as slightly

more evangelical than the Whig counties (64 to 61), and

55

Table ll.--Evangelicism of Ten High and Low Democratic Counties.

 

 

Evan.
w/o
Evan. Slavery Slavery Clergy Temperance
Low Dem. 1840 61 61 68 72 68
Low Dem. 1860 64 6O 78 67 68
High Dem. 1840 SO 50 55 58 55
High Dem. 1860 42 45 35 51 41

 

the Democratic ones become significantly less evangelical
(50 to 42). It is obvious that slavery is a crucial factor
in fomenting this realignment. Without slavery the
Republicans are no more evangelical than the Whigs, and the
Democratic swing toward antievangelicism is less pronounced.
The temperance crusade reflects this same shift. Again

the Republicans are no more evangelical than the Whigs and
the Democrats become more anti-temperance. On the clergy
issue the Republicans are significantly less evangelical
than the Whigs, and Democrats undergo another shift toward
antievangelicism. Thus, if we assume that legislators
reflected local attitudes in their voting behavior on
evangelical issues, we arrive at two observations on the
realignment of the 1850s. First, it appears that its major
impact shattered the Democratic party especially loosening
many evangelical and anti-slavery counties. The result was
a Democratic party significantly more antievangelical than

earlier, creating greater evangelical polarization between

56

the parties. Yet, if there was any difference between the
Whig and Republican counties, the latter were less evangeli-
cal except on matters concerning slavery. It is signifi-
cant that while Whigs exhibit the most consensus on the
clergy controversy, the Republicans achieve the most
consensus on slavery and significantly less on the clergy
matter. Anti-slavery seems to have diluted the evangelicism
of the Republican party.

Evangelicism has some validity as a concept
analyzing Michigan politics before the birth of the_
Republican party. Some important evangelical issues were
debated in this period and Whig legislators are almost
always more evangelical than Democratic ones. But in
utilizing this concept it is important to note its limita-
tions. Evangelicism did not represent a strictly partisan
division. Iconolasts could be found in all parties when
party attitudes conflicted with local attitudes. Moreover,
while slavery was the crucial element in the formation of
the Republican party, the anti-slavery appeal was not
strictly evangelical. The earlier partisan polarization
was mitigated by a new non-Democratic majority including
many antievangelicals. This fact is further evidence that
evangelical issues encompassed a broad appeal that
transcended strictly evangelical attitudes. Legislators,
and presumably their constituencies, could agree with
evangelicals on slavery and remain otherwise antievangeli-

cal.

CHAPTER IV

CONSISTENCY OF EVANGELICAL VOTES

AS A BELIEF SYSTEM

Given the results of this study up to now, it is
pertinent to wonder how well evangelicism operated as a
belief system among House members. That is, how many
representatives seem genuinely evangelical from their
voting records. Philip Converse defines a belief system
as a "configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the
elements are bound together by some form of constraint or
functional interdependence."56 Converse claims that the
crucial element in a belief system is "constraint" which
compels an individual having a particular opinion on one
issue to have a particular opinion on another different but
related concern. Formisano has developed an evangelical
belief system that identifies certain attitudes evangelicals

shared on Sabbath laws, slavery, temperance, etc. The

conclusions of the previous section dispute Formisano's

 

56Philip P. McCormick, "Political Development in
the Second Party System," in William Nisbet Chambers and

Walter Dean Burnham, The American Part S stems, Sta es of
Political Development INew York: Oxford University gress,
I967T7 p. I12.

 

 

57

58

construct. Republicans could be more anti-slavery and less
evangelical than their Whig predecessors.

Table 11 presents what I call a Consistency Index.
If evangelicals or antievangelicals represented the parties
in the House they should maintain a consistent voting
record. In every House session in which two or more
evangelical issues resulted in roll call votes, I have
paired the votes of each representative to determine if he
voted evangelically on both issues, antievangelically on
both issues, or split his vote (voting evangelically on one
and antievangelically on the other). Table 11 compiles
the results of this survey first for all representatives,
and then for Democratic and non-Democratic legislators
separately. For the House members as a whole the voting
pattern that emerges is not very different from what it
would have been had the legislators been voting randomly.
In only 7 of 17 pairings do the sum total of evangelical
and antievangelical votes outnumber split ones. When the
political parties themselves are examined an expected
polarization does develop. The Whigs appear slightly
evangelical and the Democrats much more splintered:
evangelical pairs outnumber antievangelicals by 27 to 1
among non’Democrats; antievangelicals outnumber evangeli-
cals 4 to 1 among Democrats. The large number of split
voters in both groups, however, would have to disappoint
anyone hypothesizing evangelical or antievangelical

parties in the House. Research in this and other studies

59

 

 

 

 

 

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60

has identified various nonevangelical factors that could
influence a legislators votes on an evangelical bill. Votes
on slavery were accompanied by racist or pro-union argu-
ments. Expedient concerns of reducing crime affected the
abolition of capital punishment. Prohibition, as many,
including Formisano have pointed out, was for some an illy
disguised nativist attack on the presumed indulgence of
immigrant groups.57 Political concerns, exemplified by
Whig reaction to the dueling resolutions, were also at
work. Legislators were subject to a variety of sometimes
conflicting interests. Few issues presented a solely
evangelical or antievangelical alternative. Table 11
indicates that non-Democrats were more susceptible to
evangelical influences than Democrats, but both groups were
heavily influenced by other concerns. On an individual
level these nonevangelical influences disrupted ”con-
straint." But on a party level "constraint" was maintained
since non-Democratic legislators are more evangelical.
Rather than being staffed by evangelicals, the legislative
parties were conglomerates of indiviudals holding one or
another of evangelical attitudes. The legislators of
particular parties were not interested in instituting an
evangelical program because they did not share a belief

system.

 

57Formisano, Birth of Mass Political Parties, p.

243.

61

Party unity on evangelical bills also seems influ-
enced by party competition. Comparisons of Tables 1 and 11
indicate that the emergence of evangelical Democrats and
split or antievangelical non—Democrats is directly related
with party success. When the Democrats had overwhelming
control of the legislature (1842-49), a more evangelically
inclined group of Democrats can be observed. The Democratic
purge of 1849 seems to have eradicated this wing of the
party. After 1854, when non-Democrats capture overwhelming
control of the House, a significant body of Republicans
voted against both slavery and prohibition. The non-
Democrats before 1854 and the Democrats after that date
are able to maintain greater party regularity on evangelical
issues. Party unity tends to deteriorate whenever a party
holds an inordinate percentage of legislators. It seems
plausible that the same county influences identified in
Section III are at work here. Whig and evangelical
counties, when sending a Democratic legislator to the
House, sent an evangelical. Where there was party com-
petition, or especially where one party was a distinct
minority, unity reappeared because the party was dependent
on its true believers. Since evangelical attitudes were
often local in character and did not always divide the
parties, massive electoral success could only be achieved

at the expense of doctrinal purity.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

This paper neither fully confirms nor categorically
refutes Formisano's thesis of evangelicism in Michigan in
the Second Party System. Evidence of party behavior at
the elite level affirms the existence of evangelical
attitudes.

The fact that Whig legislators emerge as more
evangelical on all but one issue is significant and suggests
that they did represent a more evangelical constiuency.
Yet, evangelicism did not have quite the salience or party
polarity that Formisano ascribes to it. The party presses
said very little about these reforms, and only two or three
stirred up partisan rancor in the House. The Consistency
Index does not unearth an overbearing body of evangelicals
or antievangelicals in any party. As a group Whig legis-
lators were sympathetic to evangelical appeals; as indi-
viduals they did not exercise the "restraint" of an
evangelical belief system but were each influenced by such
nonevangelical influences as practiality and party inter-

est. This explains why legislative parties can appear

62

63

"evangelical" in House votes while "evangelical" legislators
were few.

Of course, no party can be labeled evangelical or
antievangelical if the term is to mean a fixation on moral
reform. Issues that most closely reflect the evangelical
ideal, such as Sabbath laws and inviting the clergy, rarely
created great partisan cleavages. Those that fostered the
most partisanship, slavery and prohibition, also held
strong nonevangelical appeals. A review of each of the

political parties will make these points more clear.

Whig representatives appear more evangelical than
Democratic ones, but they never attempted to "moralize"
the state. When they controlled the legislature (1840-41),
only one evangelical measure was passed: a Sabbath Law.
Whigs are rarely much more evangelical than the Democrats
on non-slavery issues. The legislators muted their
evangelicism when dueling or temperance legislation made
it in their party's interest to do so. The Detroit
Advertiser reflects this limited evangelicism. When it
concerned itself with an evangelical issue it spoke
evangelically. But the only matter that ever acquired
regular notice in the paper was slavery. Even when the
legislature committed grave acts of immorality (defeat
of the fornication and adultery law or motions to abandon
opening prayers), the Advertiser's temper was shortlived.

It associated the Democrats with antievangelicism only on

64

the issues of slavery and prohibition. Most of the non-
slavery bills and resolutions considered by the House
received no notice in the Whig journal. The Advertiser
and the legislators preferred to concern themselves with
very concrete matters such as banking, patronage, currency,
and honest, efficient and limited government. In 1843

the Advertiser greeted the incoming legislature with what
it believed to be the major business for the House:

Some disposition . . . must be made of our state
debt. . . . The claims too of our domestic creditors
will require prompt and earnest attention. Our internal
improvements must at any rate be provided for. . . .
Some system must also be devised for the management and
disposition of the lands of the state. . . . [T]he
judiciary, militia and tax systems are to be revised,
and they certainly need it. Some reduction in public
expenses and especially in the pay of members would
certainly be desirable.58

It was on issues such as these that the national party's
image was drawn, and the state party adjusted its own
propaganda accordingly. The Advertiser never seemed
concerned with who the Whigs were or what they stood for,
but preferred to identify the party with certain national
figures such as Henry Clay. Evangelical issues, were not
highly salient for the Whig elite because they presented
none of the rewards of patronage and economic programs and
did not bolster party identity. Perhaps the Whigs even

feared the unambiguous nature of evangelicism. If we

assume that the average voter was not well educated or

 

58Detroit Advertiser, Jan. 2, 1843.

 

65

well informed, party spirit could be reinforced by cam-
paigning on nebulous and abstruse issues such as "Banks,"
"Clay," "Corruption," etc. These are concerns that are so
distant and complex for the common man that it was easy
for him to assimilate his attitudes with those of his
party. But evangelical issues were quite another matter
in that they directly intruded into his day to day
activities. Whigs who were habitually intemperate may have
been forced to reasses their own party affiliation had
their party sided so unmistakably with temperance as it did
with Clay. Evangelical reforms were not distinctly
political issues little influenced by personal attitudes,
but ones that affected the values and lifestyles of much
of the electorate. An isolated farmer could believe
almost anything he was told about "Clay" or "Banks," but
he held certain religious and ethnocultural attitudes more
deeply rooted and independent than his political identifi-
cation. Slavery was likewise early perceived by Whigs as
an evangelical issue, one that could only summon up the
moral wrath of abolitionists or invite mass anxiety over
disunion. This explains the efforts of both parties in
the legislature to keep the contoversy offstage. But the
Mexican War and the territories question publicized the
issue to an extent that it could no longer be tolerated by
anti—slavery Whigs. To assist in "politicizing" this
issue the "slave master" or "slave aristocracy" were

introduced to provide a democratic, not purely evangelical,

66

appeal. Like "Clay" or "Banks," the "slave master" was an
individual distant from the common Michigander's experi-
ence, but one offensive to his democratic spirit. (Formisano
also identified a new democratic impulse with the birth of
the Republican party.)59 Temperance reform gained similar
popularity when it moved beyond its evangelical appeal to
become a nativist attack on immigrants. The two most
popular and partisan of the evangelical issues succeeded
because their appeal was not strictly evangelical. Whig
representatives may have individually incorporated
evangelical attitudes, but they did not espouse evangelical

politics.

The Democrats are far more divided on evangelical
matters than the Whigs. Electoral success for the Demo-
crats in the House did not lead to a substantially more
antievangelical legislature since evangelically inclined
Whigs were replaced by evangelically inclined Democrats.
Evangelicism was not a divisive party issue at this level
of political conflict. Democratic legislators who
occasionally voted evangelically did not seem to disturb
the party hierarchy probably because antievangelicism in
the Democratic party was even less important than evangeli-
cism in the Whig party. The Egee Preee often advocated

evengelical positions on inviting the clergy, capital

 

59Formisano, Birth of Mass Political Parties,

p. 330.

67

punishment, the Sabbath Law, and the fornication and
adultery law. Like the Whigs it is the abstruse issues of
"Banks," "the tariff," and "Jackson" around which the party
centered its major appeal. An 1841 pamphlet titled
"Address of the Democratic Members of the Legislature"
attacked the Whigs as lackies of banking interests, accused
them of general mismanagment of state interests, and
charged Whig corruption in state printing, apportionment
and disputed elections. Nowhere in the sixteen page

60 Given,

indictment are evangelical issues even mentioned.
as we have seen, that some Democrats were from evangelical
districts this neutrality was surely the wisest policy for
party unity and electoral success. Even anti-slavery men
could be found within its ranks. The greatest part of the
Democratic legislators shbuld be labeled nonevangelicals,
unconcerned with establishing any consistency on evangelical
matters. Assuming that the most important concerns of the
party elite were those that directly affected the fortunes
of the party (patronage, apportionment, state printing),
party regularity on these matters was probably all that was
demanded of Democratic legislators. The slavery issue

intruded on this modus vivendi by disrupting the state

party's ties with the national party and by proving an

 

60"Address of the Democratic Members of the
Legislature," pamphlet in the Michigan State Library.
Printed as a supplement to the Detroit Free Press, May 1,
1841.

68

embarrassment to Lewis Cass. This tenuous coexistence in
the party is exemplified by the 1848 election in which

some counties voted Lewis Cass for president and certain
anti-slavery Democrats to the House. The 1849 legislature
was a critical turning point for the state's Democratic
party. The attempt of the anti-slavery group to overthrow
Cass ostensibly over the slavery issue alarmed more

moderate or regular Democrats enough to initiate a purge.
What concerned the regular Democrats was not the anti-
slavery attitudes of the Ransom men so much as their
willingness to disrupt party harmony for the benefit of
their cause. Such Democrats would be of no more use to the
Democrats than their Whig opposition. It is after this that
the Free Press begins its condemnation of "higher Lawism."
Such reaction from regular Democrats, and the formation of
the Fusion party, altered the balance of power in the
Democratic party as early 1849. The lack of a national
party organization and the reconciliation that followed 1850

killed this first attempt at fusion.

The Republican party emerges as less evangelical
than its predecessor, its ranks swelled with antievangeli-
cals voting against the extension of slavery. Recognizing
this heterogeneity, the party eschewed evangelical issues.
No evangelical issues were raised in any of the three
Republican legislatures after 1855 except slavery and

temperance. The Republicans could have altered the

69

antievangelical measures of previous Democratic legis-
latures by tightening the Sabbath and Divorce laws and
reintroducing capital punishment. While the Republicans
did pass a Maine Law in 1855, they subsequently loosened

it in 1857, and in 1859 some members opted for the earlier
license system. Electoral success was diluting non-
Democratic evangelicism. While anti-slavery remained a
uniform concern of the state's Republicans, other party
issues were more temporal in character. When Kingsley
Bingham stepped down from the governorship, he summarized
the following as the major achievements of his party's four
years in office: railroad and banking laws, the St. Mary's
canal, disposal of state swamp lands, resolutions against
slavery, and the establishment of a state House of
Corrections and Agricultural College (the latter were
originally designed as separate institutions). The
governor nowhere implied that the adminstration had protected
or uplifted public morals. He did.not even mention the

Maine Law.61

The foregoing is not to suggest that evangelicism
was a false or nonexistent issue. Certain legislators
had evangelical attitudes, and they were~most often Whigs
or Republicans. Glimpses of this evangelicism can be

found in debates over the clergy and certain other matters.

 

61Detroit Free Press, Jan. 6, 1859.

70

But the evidence presented in this paper strongly suggests
that the party's elite were far more interested in advancing
temporal party and state interests than those of evangeli-
cism. Like McCloskey, this paper has identified distinct
differences between the party elite and its electoral
base. The electorate might support or oppose a party
because it perceives it as holding a distinct or amorphous
position on some belief system or issue; the party in
office is predisposed to accept all into the party's ranks
who will advance the party's own interests in such areas
as patronage and power. Both the Democrats and the
Republicans seemed to have tolerated a significant degree
of evangelical or antievangelical iconoclasm within their
organizations. As a result, no party instituted an
evangelical or antievangelical program or propaganda for
fear of contracting the party's heterogenous constituency.
Democratic leaders were even tolerant of anti-slavery until
it threatened to disrupt the party.

This finding does not contradict McCloskey's study
which found stronger ideological attitudes in the elite.
McCloskey examined attitudes and belief systems; this
paper analyzed the actual political behavior of the elite
that had real ramifications on their personal or partisan
interests. Even McCloskey's "conservative" Republicans
and "liberal" Democrats supported the "middle of the road"
candidacies of Eisenhower and Stevenson. Party elites may

be better informed, more committed, and even more

71

ideological than the electorate. However, a separate
incentive of maintaining and nurturing a party organization
requires them to blunt that ideology or at least tolerate

a wide spectrum of alternate and even opposing views. In
analyzing elite party behavior for the Second Party System
in Michigan, temporal concerns of party welfare are more
important determinants of party behavior than abstract

evangelical ones.

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