HISTORIANS OF THE WAR OF 1812 Thesis far Hm Dogma» c! M. A. MICHIGAN STATE UNF‘VERMTY Roger N. Parks 1961 ', IlllllllllIll’llllllllllllllllllllllIlllUllllflllllllllllllll 3H10373 9573 LIBRARY Michigan Stan University is in varyinQ 13131 4- ts own t OD. .~ 11 U C ‘ * 1 t inc 77“. -4‘, O 4- c u L; n attomot fro a we di 131.011 2 terrretat t 9 Q1 rst, Q l 1 in “a H A I x 4‘ 1:, "I 'Nar 01 in 8 an 1 conta in role CTL *. O; .31 T..'.‘. . {.12.}. ...‘ ,- ‘ T" -old. ILA-S one re have been "";'V'| L mm .' iree tools are used 0 - .Lf‘ .L .2; .,° three t1 vile a . source 8 CM?) Cir) rfijfr“ 4-7rwo U.lv I‘ - U is t AD *3) '_ A a. l ‘ —§ 9 I an; 4.1 1L) t ‘ I - - t, and ;nese -. ~vn Re 5 ta 2,70 l ' " D 4'5.‘o ‘ ,7 9? 01 f3“ V¢J used 1' 1.. ‘4 -1, n— 7\ C‘ n) ’F» on” "-V“.’-) '.L v 0110:). W9 0 “A" lLIN )Or ’3". Vre discwced e‘d during and aft er the war because of the activ¢1tieoz some 0: t' nest outspoken of heir number. Eut their Views have exerted a . P11- strong influence on the historiography of the ear. liey have tenred lands of} storians than have those who supported f-l to fare better at the the war. .p-l- /‘. LV- 1 lo. Ia::‘.~lo ’ II, D. 31- 0 ll. Ibid., II, pp. 710, 311. ification is onl‘r a rourn 011 However. Some of them accepted maritime ri5Hts unquestionin 15/ as the re 31 ceu of the war. Cthers accepted it only with qualifications. The e tre 1es in point of View within the me 'i time rights school 12 are illustr {ited DJ J. T. I'iesdleJ and Theodore DLL 5Ht. Headley claimed t1st s Hit in st Hrt'd the war a sinst France without provocation, and thus: In order to sHield Herself from the inism5r wr 1011 should follow such a violation oi‘ the ri5Hts of ‘ nations and waste of reasure and of blood, sHe olaxlted 11erself on the 5r: dplatform of prilMCl ml , and in31 isted that she went to war to preserve Human libertv and the integrity of governments....... "ith t11e se she turned declarations on her lips, and deliocrctely arnulled 11er a¢5 reaments with the United tates, and invzded 1:er most sacred rights. She impressed our seamen, plundered our commerce, held fortresses on our soil, and stirred up the savn'es to merciless warfare egainst the innocent inhaoitants of our frontier. Because of; rmt in' s actions, said Headley, the United States was compelled "to decls war, or for cit all claim to tHe resoect of ‘1‘ n I O -- V“ IN .L‘ . n. o “s _o a _ w . 1' o ‘ .- l cHe nst10ns of tuC eertn, and all ribnt to an inocpen ent elistence. Dui5Ht, writing in defense of tHe Hartford Conventioz: said that the stitgd grounds u n unich We was dcclarsa were lH1r ssmen. red violation of leutrslr rL Hts.15 Tm; se may Have besn the 5rounds ’3 "1 Mi... (1‘ \ T.T '73:: 1.3 '1 ._. - 5 v 1.14. J. lo Let-11.18:)”, .Li-ue UCCOAQ “a ul‘vfl uni-J 111d, 2 V0150 (hen! York,11353), I; Theodore Dwi5ht, Hisso:1_o th Hartford stntcrsion (:TS‘W lOI'A, 1833' o 13. Headlej, Second Her, I, pp. 37, 33. 14. Ibid. I, ,, 55. “—r- 1 . ’ C TV—' M.“ -rr-w- a. ,- ‘ - 13. Du. 't, rsis_cri.ocrv‘r*ion, 9. .:le. ‘0 *Q GCCOPQlI . x Y ‘Juu’ I N V LAA h a I 0. ‘m4‘ 113 5.3 a '3'“ 303 P V \ L180 u. A r (. +2 1 i F n.“ «J Lu -u-Q- K4! ‘4 ‘ a ‘r’a'wll -4. § 3 e ". ri'w '=1 J .-‘U.‘.\’ 1 .4. '! VIVQ J..'L\r ' mam 1N0 Tifif‘, (J ‘L ‘.\_» \A 0 (“1'1 I ‘ “(1‘ n t '3) Y1 xv .L A 0 ts; inuflr- a —’ Jn. Utin at d the a if e ( It .',.\ A . 4.1j.53.t;3? *1- C: a taro 51:115. CC ll '7" L. '~/ '5 \1. ULA‘ .L ‘f‘ “:3 ‘M' I as 1 ts, a ‘ . -A_’.'. 0 ll A -c...“ Wfi v ‘1 rs v3310r 18 us t Y 43 1n C V qera n'g AA ae F0 I- 4.1 V 30100 8 AE- .1 t and Head‘ ‘u'(\ 3 A‘ i... n: rhi ' Y in ovnird VI .' Vr" \. p_ o .as an of&gn51ve war, v07un Islam L_L* .363 ha lnCl! f) ~4 ,.11 LJL‘ n. -\l 1 bAL 0 ii“. p‘rw of E t n *3 ’5 v .L- '"“ to co .I'LO S t O U (.~‘ the I F3 v tim TSSDGCE our marl to tori i J- \ an be 1‘]? r\ .l fiflv. nu Ad Pu l o 198 ’ T‘ {a 10 .v% o. U—A—A r‘ u.) w'h I‘. d ‘33 her 901 5 ¥ a; ‘ to CL ,1 ~ ,~ 13 count 0 to war aiainct Britain 0 t1 5 4- 4- L4 L1 ad to a. made 'en ha‘ (l .v ent for “he be _ 1 car t n5: ) .S '08, V exned at‘ 1, must 1 r exyedi 11y JEi, ‘V' economlca nolitic“ll e dostro D .' mg to Bil d “A. O ”7 a. r\~\€3‘w yaravq * (4.. VM LL, ”O t‘; I" 130 -rce a fiJ so would be -4 w t, accorr 2“ do W 511‘ 0133 Cam row 11 L 4. v; OVCT' to a) my ,3 m; rranny. 4” L’v n0 1 q, . .Ll',A; v Jould be to L! m Vii, ‘ «U .;].1 vv. 9 England was to help in preparing a terriole yoke for ourselves"22 Thus, according to Hildreth, while maritime grievances might have argued for the justice of the war, inexpediency argued more strongly against it. 7? c o I O 23 Y Herman von nolst took a Similar p051t10n. He saw the coming of the war of 1812 as an example of the tyranny of majorities. The majority, he said, knew the strong moral objections of the Feder- alists to a war with England and should not have undertaken a course of action that threatened to strain the bonds of the Union. Wisdom and expediency argued against war, even though there was legal justifi- O O 24 cation for 1t. James Schouler, on the other hand, called the war a maritime rights measure, but said that while it might have been undertaken rashly, it was strongly provoked and was preferable to "dishonor- . a 25 :- able subm1ss1on." And A. T. hahan, who saw the war as an example of the necessity for naval power, believed that the maritime differences between Britain and the United States involved questions of funda- mental principles and of necessity. The war was not only "justifiable," 2 but impera ive. " O 22. Ibid., VI, p. 324 23. Herman von Holst, The Consti+utiona1 and Political History 9: the United States ,8 vols. (Chicag o 1889), I. 24. Ibid., I, pp. 2’2 5- 238. 25. James Schouler, Histcrv of the U; ited States of America, 7 vols., (New York, 1882), II, p. 395 —*.*— 2 vols., (London, 1905771, pp. viii, 2-4. Other historians of the period who accepted the maritime rights interpretation included Nicholas Butler, The Effect 9__th§ Egg g£_ 1812 gppn the Consolida+ ion of the Union (Johns Hookins University S oudies in Historical and Political Science, Baltimore, 1887), Fifth Series, Part VIII, pp. 22 ,23; Benson J. Lossing, The Pictorial Field-Book of the Lar of 1812 (new York, 1869), pp. 212, 226, 230; Theodore Roosevelt, The Naval far of 1812 (New York, 1889), 6. 10 Thus nineteenth century historians were in fairly close agree- ment as to what the causes of the war were. They differed principally as to whether those causes were so great as to make the war both justifiable and necessary. A question that was to bother later historians was why the South and West supported_a war for protection of maritime rights, 1 o 1 o o o ‘F‘ o 27 , I a while tne maritime section oi the country Opposed it. The maritime rights historians, however, saw no paradox in this. As Headley said, "The peOple of the South and west, between whom and their country's honor and rights selfish interests and bitter party hate did not come, 28 nobly sustained the war sentiment." Nicholas Butler, Schouler, and Lossing also accepted the idea that the South and West were more 0 o n V 1 2 o u o o a patriotic than the Lortneast. 9 Hildreth, a bitter critic of slavery, saw the war spirit as the manifest desire of young men, idled by ’3 slavery, to win glory/O And both he and von Holst believed political 31 ambition partially motivated the CongreSSional war hawks. But with the exception of Hildreth, there is little indication that maritime rights historians sensed that anything besides maritime grievances lay behind Southern and western war spirit. The maritime rights historians tended to believe that "history is past politics." They were later to come under attack for failing to see that social and economic problems of the South 27. See below, Chap. V, p.54. 28. Headley, Second.War, I, p. 66. 29. Butler, Effect g§_thg_§§§, pp. 22,23; Schouler, II, p. 395; Lossing, Field-Book, p. 230. 30. Hildreth, VI, p. 318 Bl. Hildreth, VI, p. 225; von Holst, I, p. 229. 11 and West contributed to the desire for war in those sections. Their failure was due primarily to the fact that they viewed history through a particular philosophical framework, just as their critics were to View it through another. Within their framework, the maritime rights writers saw politics as the most important element of history. And as one of their critics was to point out, a political stu v of the period indicates that maritime grievances were decisive ’) l... in the coming of the war.3 32. See below, Chap. III, p. 22. CEAPTflR II During the 1890's the work of two historians led the way to a gradual revision of the maritime rights interpretation. The first of these historians, Fredrick Jackson Turner, did not deal specifically with the causes of the war of 1812. But his frontier thesis had a pronounced effect on the historiography of the war, just as it had on the writing of most phases of American history. Turner rejected the germ theory, which taught that the course of American development was a result of the planting of Anglo-Saxon values in the early colonial settlements, from whence they were carried inland along the advancing frontier. Although he did not discount the importance of old—world institutions, Turner believed of free land on a vast, ever-moving frontier, and by the consequent necessity for strong; self-reliant men to adapt themselves to life in the wilderness. He and his followers saw the frontier as the dominant factor in American history and the focal point from which American history should be studied. They rejected the long-held theory that politics and diplomacy are at the core of history. Instead, they said, politics and diplomacy are merely reflections of the conflict of large social forces, which must be understood if history is to be meaningful. Under Turner's influence, a number of American historians began to change their point of view from the seaboard to the wilderness, from political and diplomatic to social and economic history. Julius'w. Pratt, whose B‘ieansionists 9; 1812 (1925) became the most influential revisionist interpretation, expressed the contribution of Turner to 12 13 the historiography of the War of 1812 in saying that Turner had led him and his colleagues "to View the IIe st - particularly the 'Northwest - with more scrutiny," and to reach new conclusions about the causes of the war. But fror tier-oriented historians ale turned their at ention to he war of 1812 probably found confirmation of their point of view' in Henry Adams' nine-volume stud.y of the Jefferson and Madison administrations, the first volume of which appe eared in 18902 The el feet of Adams on the revisionists was indirect. For, like the maritime rights historians, he treated political, rather than social factors as primary causes of the war. But he placed firmer emphasis on the sectional character of the war party than had his predecessors. And he attributed net motives to the lead aers of that party, making it apparent that their actionsoould not be explained in terms of disgust at Britain's maritime restrictions or even their own desire for political popularity alone. Adams thus demonstrated the possibility of re- interpreting the war fros‘a a frontier point of view. According to Adams, patriotism played a part in war-hawk thinking. But he implied other motives, too. After all, he said, the 1. Julius W. Pratt, Exoansionists 9§_l§1§ (New York, 1925), pp. 9, 10. The influence of Turner on revisionist thought also is particularly apparent in John F. Cady, "western Opinion and the war of 1812," Ohio Archaeological and historical Society Publications, XYVIII (1924), pp. 427-476. Claude H. Va n lyne, who accepted essentially the maritime rights interpretation, also noted that Turner had demonstrated the significance of the frontier to students of the war. See "Why Did we Fight in 1812? The Causes an Signific nce of our Last war with Great Britain," Independent, LL(IV (1913), p. 1331. 2. Ad dams, Historv. M l4 United States had seethed over the Chesapeake affair and the failure of the Erskine agreement, and yet had failed to carry out its threats of war. In 1811-12, on the other hand, the war hawks had no new grievances to allege. At tiis time, with the country divided over the question of war or peace, the treasure nearly empty, and_Britain's policy no longer as belligerent as it had been under George Canning, there seemed to be some basis for hepe that the orders in council ' 3 . . . would be revoked.“ dot only were the reasons for geing to war with Britain no longer as clear-cut as they once had been, but the war hawks, who talked/bf going to war to recover the nation's honor, ignored the fact that war with Britain meant "continued submission to one robber (Hapoleon) as the price of resistance to another.”r These observations led Adams to conclude that the war party tried to arouse he nation by appealing to the justice of a war at a time when the only relevant question was whether or not war would be expedient. The justice of war long had been apparent, he said, but war previously had been rejected on the grounds of inexpediency, which grounds he said the war hawks now ignored.5 To illustrate this point he rejected a number of arguments that were raised from the point of view of expediency. He dismissed for example, the arguments that the nation would profit, from driving a hostile power from the continent and that farmers again would be able to 3. Ibid., VI, pp. 122, 123, 223-225. h. Ibid., VI, 113. See above, pp. 6, 8. 5 b. . Ibid., VI, p. 223. See above, pp. 6, 8. 15 rofit. Adams, who made a 5) export their surplus crops at a lair *U number of caustic comments about the mental capacities of most of n. the leading ii ures o 10 7w the war period, called such arguments "declamation." Probably these appeals carried weight wit h the western pee; 71a; but even earnest supporters of war 7 mi ght doueti rhether men of sense could be concil- iated by such 0 tory.6 lne orators, said Adams, were nationalistic young Republicans from the newer parts of the country, who had become dissatisfied with the whole Jeffersonian system of weak government, as well as Jefferson- ian foreign policy, which was based on peaceful coercion. They tried to effect a political revolution in order to replace that system with one based on old-world.models. Thus, according to Adams, war was to have been a vehicle for a political revolution much like the one older Repuolie ans had ac u-sed Hamilton of plotting in 1798 - a revolu ion whereby ‘overnnene woulda sume the function assigned to it by John Calhoun. In what Adams called an unprecedented speech for a 7 Ca Republican, houn said: 6. Ibid., VI, pp. 142, 143. Adam's sarcasm was not directed at war hawks alone. He found the actions of Hew England Federalists irrational and.at times almost treasonous. (VI, pp. 153, 170-173) And the Jeffersonian system of peaceful coercion seemed insipid. Discus sing Jefferson's embargo, he said, "if war made men brutal, at least it made them strong; it called out the qualities best fitted to survive in the struggle for existen e. To risk life for one's country was no mean act even when done for selfish motives; and to die that others might more happily live was the highest act of self-sacrifice to be reached by man. war, with all its horrors, could purify as .rell as deease; it dealt with high motives and vast interests; taught courage, disciplin no, and a stern sense of duty. Jefferson must have c.sked himself in vain» what 1es sons ofl heroism or duty were taught by his system of peae eea ble coercion." See Harvey wish, The American Historian (He: York, 1960), p. 170. 7. Ibid., VI, pp. 143, 144, 170, 171, 210, 211. 16 I know of but one principle to make a nation g eat, to produce in this country not the form but the ca spirit of urion, and that is to protect every citizen in the lawful pursuit of his eusiness....Protection and patriotism are reciprocal. This is the road that all great nations have trod.S To Ad°“*1s the important point about the revolution was its political manifestations. war hawks seeking to oringi it about tried to persuade Cld Republicans, who previously had resisted any measure J. more belligerent than economic coercion, "to do in a single session at required half a century or more of time er d er nerience, — to create a new government and to invest it with the attributes of old- . 4- 1 4- .9 7 __ "Q a 11- c o J_ w rld sovereignty uncer pretext 01 the war poker. ’ These nationalists succeeded to the extent of securing a declaration of war. Adams believed the question of war or peace finally was settled in Congress, by Old Republicans, who held the balance of power in the war vote and were motivated by different considerations than those that caused the n 1 ’ ., .t' , r10 .01" ' 1.. °. 5 .L var hawks to press 1or wa The Je11ersonians were persuaded in part by patriotic "declamation" and pressure from war men in key chair- '4. manships n the House of Representatives, he said, and in part by hadiso n, who "thorou hly tw iste d" the threads of negotiation with England in an effort to get a settlement on his own inflexible terms, and also pressed for a declaration of war when his e1 forts f ailed.ll Even at the time of the vote, said Adaa1s, there probably would have een no war if the Old Aepublicans had known Britain was revoicing 8. Annals., 12, I, p. 479. 9. Adams, VI, pp. 170, 171. 10. gpgg., VI, pp. 142-144. 146. 158, 159, 170, 171. 11. Ibid., VI, pp. 62, 117, 118, 175, 193-198, 205, 206, 220—229. See below, Chap. VII. 17 her orders in council in what seeme to be an effort to conciliate the United States.12 Thus Adams, although attributing different motives to the war hawks than did his predecessors, interpreted the decisive causes of the‘Var of 1812 in a political and diplomatic context. And thus he differs from the revisionists, whose interpretations were based on the assumption that the decisive causes are to be found in the social and economic problems of the frontier. That assumption, as Pratt indicated, was rooted in Turner. But sucn an assumption does not necessarily preclude the possibility that frontiersmen we genuinely concerned about the honor the United States was sacrificing to the belligerents on the seas. The insignificance of such concern, however, is another assumption of most revisionist writings, and seems to be a logical implication of Adams' interpretation. For Adams also differed from the maritime rights school in the amount of emphasis he placed on war-hawk concern with national honor. Adams' predecessors had assumed that the Nest and South "felt the humiliation if not the pecuniary loss occasioned by the 13 British measures." But Adams scoffed at the idea that maritime grievances had an important influence on frontier sentiment. The war-haw: argument that Britain's persistence in the orders in council 0' 1 o n V 14 1 n I meritee.war "was not skilllully mace." And as for impressment - ”the 12. Ibid. ’ , 13. Pratt, Emma o — 1M. Adams, VI, p. 13 . 13 worst of all American grievances" - war men began to denounce it in earnest as a political maneuver, which they undertook only after they had determined to have a war. They hope d tiereo to underscore the justice 0; their position.15 Such an interpretation, if accepted, makes it doubtful that wa men had any concern for national honor and that their statements can be trusted. Adams him }__I f continued to put / a degree of emphasis on concern for honor.lo And three of his 17 V successors teen a similar point of View. But woodrow Wilson, eramining the maritime rights interpretation in View of Adams' work "18 It is N .. found the caml es 01 the war of 1312 “singularly uncertain. not surprising, then, that revisionist writers were to generally nore the importance of maritime grievances and seek the tr e causes of the war in only those proole sis tEat affected the frontier materially. Adams influenced tile development of the revisionist school in another J37 also. is viii h: seen in succeeding eha_fters, He pointed to the spa c:Li ie fr ntier proelems from which revisionists were to infer the causes 01 the war. hildreth and other maritime rights historians had known that frontiersmen talked of conquering Canada arid East Florida and the t the‘ were anoittered by the belief that the :ritish in Canada were eehind their trou3les with the Indians.19 But thes earlier wrlters, although not always without misgivings as to war-hawk motives, never connected such proole ms with frontier war sentiment. 15. I_:’:____\id° , VPI, I33. 117, :1.1 3 16. :T:d., v1, 3p. 115, , 21 43, 144, 155,: o, 211 J, 17. Van Tvne, "Causes an Si; ni; icsnce, p. 1331; :Lloe Ht .Hart, 233:“:lpn of the Union,lLCG—1333 ( ;ew York,l 1333), no. 204, 205. Kendric C. Babcock, The Rise of American Nationality (l ew York, 1906), pp. 3. 3 . 50— 53. 34. 85. 30. f) IT. e. Hoodr ow Jilson, g LlStCTV of the American Pee £1 ,5 vols., (Iew York,l 1906), 111, p. 2 2. 19. See, for example, nildreth, VI, pp. 251-255, 267, fill, 313, 322. 19 Adams actually did not do so, either. But he came close at times. He said war hawks were willing to risk war with Ln land "on the chance of creating a nation, of conquering Canada and carrying the American 5+ "20 '- flag to Iooi1eand Keyh .. he also said they sought to over- throw the? enuolice n oart5r's stand against a strong arhnr at a time J. "when no foreign nation threatened attack, and...avowedly for the purpose of conquest."41 And, he said, William Lenrv Harrison's It *ainst the Indians in Indiana ter rritory was a“*res wivoly uh) undertaken and ”begun for no other object than to win the valley of the'waba sh. "23 How much signi Hf canoe Adams personally placed on these statenerts is difficult to say. In the context of his interpretation, they aspear to indica esteps the war pa ty wished to take in bringing about a general nationalization of the country. The reasons behind this program were of less interest to Adams than the political maneuvers undertaken to carry it out. But to the revisionis ts, who were more interested in social and economic causes than in political effects, these state‘ents conce1 vahly coald have appeared to point to the real causes of the war. Adams' Historv did not necessarily lead to the revisionist interpretations. In fact, some recent non- evisionist interpretations are related more closely to AdaLS' work than are those of Pratt, Howard Lewis, and Louis Hacker, which nevertheless seem to have developed from it. On the other hand, the revisionists, who were oriented towards a frontier-social approach to American history, might 20. Adams, VI, p. 123 21. -oid., VI, p. 154. 22. Ibid., V1, p. 140 20 have develooed cheir interpretations independently of Adams’ work had there been reason to suppose the'Uar of 1812 would be a good subject for re-interpretation. But the war is a fairly obscure event in American history. And if they saw such reason, it is probably because of ’dans' respected study, which presented evidence of the inadequa y of the maritime rights interpretation and implied that he frontier had ‘easons of its own for wanting CELQ III The veer 1911, the 100th anniversary of the meeting of the Mar Congress, saw two important develonnents. One was the intro— duction of the monograph as a vehicle for studying the causes 0 the war. The other was the puolication of the firs t of the revision- ist interpretations. Revi H10 ism dominated writinr on the subject for 20 years, and remains inf uential today. With thee exce2tion of rqilitany or naval histories, such as Benson J. Lossing's or Mahan's, historians previously wrote of the war as an episode in the larger panorama of American history. how began a snec ialised treatmento the coming of the war. Howard Lewis' "A Re-anal3 sis of t11e Causes of tLe Efar of 1812" marks a turr ing point.1 The more intensive studies stemmed from a series of new approaches, from Progres ive deflation of nationalism, from the Turner frontier school, and from Marxism. The n no: raphic approach to the war of 1812 sacrificed a well rounded explanation of causes to a study of one or more causes fitting revisionists' points of view.. 11neteerth century historians such as Hildreth, at less mentioned both the problems of the frontier and those connected with the war in Europe. In the major revisionist W monographs, however, the spotlight was focused a.lmost entire3 ' on frontier causes, and rarely, if ever, on more tr an one or t :o of the important :ror Mticr procle ns. Thus the historian who thinks, as 1. Howard T. Lexis, "A31e-ana1ysis - 0‘" 1:31:39 Pg‘loflcang, VI (1911), pp. 506-51 , 577-585. I0 [\3 Pratt himself conceded, that maritime causes may have been as important as frontier ones,2 no ot only finds no rlention of maritime auses in these studies, but finds little evidence to help him gauge the relative importance of various frontier causes. The impression usually gained from these studies, if college te: Htooo 5 may be considered an accurate gauge, is that the only factors relevant to the coming of the war are selected economic and social problems of the sparsely settled frontier. Lewis, who arote t11e first of these monographic studies, recognized the implications of Adans' findings and concluded: The war of 1812 was not waged primarily over the question of neutral rights and impressment, but was rather forced on by men who were prompted by other motives using this excuse.3 e of the "ezicuse" he said, makes it appear in a study of the F— ,J CD :1" U) Ann a1 f Conrress that neutral rights were the most important causes fi—w ‘ I. 1 ' ° 1 ‘ 1 o 3? 7'1 of tne war.* Eat, if this was so, he asked, why did new sngland, the section most vit& ly interested in Britain's maritime restrictions, I o 5 1 o o ‘ vote alt.n st solidly against war, wn1le "Pennsylvan1a and the states / to the Nest and South of it" voted almost solidly for war?0 n Although other historians had been struck by this paradox,( none had offered the solution to it that Lewis did. He concluded that with the xception of possibly six votes cast by members of the anti-British Society of United Irish1en, and a few others cast L4- T‘wr 3% ,A . 1‘an cal—s '321310111 ’ S 3 ts p. 14. , "Re-anal3 s, 2 s 3 i " p. 583. a ., p. 506 5. Ibid. p. 507.1.ew England cast 12 votes in favor of war 0 6 7 ’ st it in the house of Representatives. (Appendix I.) se states voted for war, 62 to 14. (Appendix I.) . Schouler, II, p. 395. 23 by Congressmen who represented manufacturing interests, the majority of votes for war we e cast by representatives (including some from Pennsylvania and flew York), whose interests were ”as thoroughly 3 'Western....as those of Kentucky or Ohio.“ The western interests they represented had little to do with impressment or orders in council, Lewis implied. Western interests, he said, centered upon desire for land. What Henry Adams saw as one factor, Lewis saw as the whole explanation. According to Adams, although the west blamed the Britisn in Canada for inciting and arming Tecumseh's Indian federation, it was Tecumseh's +s veto of the cession o the habash valley to the United States that led to war.9 The white population of the Indiana territory, said Adams, "wanted the lands of the habash even at the risk of war. Lewis took a similar position. He said the conflict between whites and Indians, thich led to conflict with England, was the result of _ 1 American settlers' need for Western land.l* There were three possible wave to bring about an "absolutely necessary" expansion and make land available for the country's growing pOpulation, according to Lewis. Americans could acquire land from the Indians, "peacefully or otherwise," could move into Spanish Florida, ’3 or could expand into Canada.l“ Because they wished to live under the jurisdiction of the United States, hey took the first course and purchased land from the Indians until the rise of Tecumseh threatened 8. Lewis, ”Re-analysis," pp. 507, 510. Hildreth also mentioned the number of Irishmen in politics and in editorial positions. He attributed the observation to August Foster, the British envoy. (Hild- reth, VI, pp. 316, 317.) 9. Adams, VI, pp. 83, lQO. lO. gp;g,, VI, p. 140. ll. Lewis, "Re-ana ysis," p. 511. 2. Lbid., pp. 511, 512. 24 the arrangement.13 Thenceforth, a fear that Tecumseh, with British eneoura SGZHGII‘L b, I-rhite man off the frontier became a driving force. also 14 believed "Er gli sh gold and English duplicity" had prevented the United States from acquiring East Florida from Spain.15 Thus, Frontiersmen might unite Northern and Southern tribes to drive the according to Lewis, conflict with Britain we 5 the indirect result of American efforts to acquire territories held by allies of Americans bitterly looked toward Canada a tnense l/ lves of a tormenter by conquering it. They also anticipa Britain. ted - 1 o o O o a q o -. deSiraele political results. As Felix uruncy of Tennessee said: I am willing to receive the Canadians as adopted brethren; it will have oene ficial political effect; it will preserve the equilibrium of the government. Jhen Louisiana shall be fully peopled, the Horthern states will lose their power; they will be at the discretion of others, they can be depressed at pleasure, and then the union might be endangered. - I therefore feel anxious not only to add the Flori to the Ceuth, but the Canadas to the horth to he empire. Louis Hacker, the only other major exponent of the land hunger interpretation, read an en ely dif fercr t motive into the proje cted conquest of Canada. hacker at t1 mi time accepted the mark 3,- and saw an Opportunity to rid i interpretation of history, and srw the Bar of 1812 as an illustration . . . . lo of ca.1talistic waste making iiupe rialistic expansion necessary. A pioneering society is always on the move because its primitive agricultural techniques rapidly wear out the land, tile pioneers who eXploited the Ohio River valley during said Hacker. the early ,0 But 13- Lean pp. 510-512- 14. Ibid., .p. 513-516. 15- IPA-A. p- 578. 579. 16. Ipid., . 577. 17. Annals, 2, I, p. 426. 18. Wish, American Historian, p. 203. i-O ror st part of the nineteenth century faced a dilemma. If they continued to move west the; would run into the prairie, where lumber, fuel, 1» . . . . and.water were scarce. 9 On the other hand, tne agricultural lands of Canada were lush and invitin" but under the control of a foreign ng ’ power, Hacker believed the frontier pressed for war with Great 0 I O 0 IO U ’5 Britain in order to seize these lands.“ Despite the "lOity pretenSions in which war sentiment was wrapped," he said: The War of 1812 w as ordered by an agricultural peOple interested and sustained by the soil and was to have as its goal the acquisition of Canada, not so much because that meant the cutting off of the living threat of England, as because Canada stood for great re serves of agricultural land. In short, the u'est desired Canada and...sought war with Eng land. 21 Hacker's arguments can be criticized.in several ways. First, his interpretation implies that the West brought about the war by itself. It had he . er the Opulation nor the representation in '(3 id , 22 Congress to do so. Secondly, although he claimed.that white settlers only pre- tended to fear the Indian menace as a means of justifying war, his evidence fails to show that the fear was not real. He based his contention on the fact that white settlers brought much of the \)J 2 trouble upon themselves ey treating the Ilm' mis like wild animals. Adar us had been aware of this, but nevertheless maintained that the ’5 l n . L , , , iear of the Indians was ge enuine. hacxer, however, sought to support 1...] 9. Louis M. Hacker,‘ “aestern Land Hunger and the war of 1812," I-Iissi. uni Valley historic: 1 Review X (1924), pp. 365-395. laid” 3-31.0— 371. 392+- laid. p. 366- See below, Chap. IV, p.jfl+ :mcler, "Land Hunger," pp. 372-374. See f.n. 9, this chapter. Ho dFJI—JOC) 0 m \N to to m to I 41/ (.0 his contention by setting up a false standard to judge the problem. Should not the question be, not were the Indians a menace to some isolated a eas of settlement, w ere both sides erred in their conduct, but, rather, ’id the Indians as a host threaten the existence of the white civilization in the Ohio Valley725 This should not be the question. As Adams said of the Indian problem following Tippecanoe: "A general panic seized the peeple. The militia dared not turn out, for while they collected at one spot, the Indians mi ht attack their isolated cabins. Even Vincennes was thought to be in denser, and the stream of fugitives passed through it as "26 rapidly as possible until depopulation threatened the territory. The Lidian co" Ld strike quickly and disappear quickly. The individual .1. ‘ set uler had reason to fear for his own safety and that of nis family, rather than about the future of the white race. Blacker took statements out of context in order to illustrate western de efor Canada. He said, for example, that Jolm Randolph of Virginia uncovered the real motive of the 'rar hawks in his state- ment that "agrari an cupidity, not maritime rights, rges the war."27 But Randolph, at one time or another, attributed various motives a . 8 . to thei.“ Hacker also ignored evidezlce in travel accounts tmi t the rairi es were considered a desirable place to live He claimed that ‘O "returning travelers could write only of the possibilities of gran ing 25. Hacker, ”Land Hunger," p. 373. 26. Adams, VI, p. 110. 27. Hacker, "Land Hunger," pp. 387, 333. 28. At other tines, Randolph said the war was to be fought for he benefit of hemp growers, for those wh wished to make profits selling to the Army, and to give the North political dominan e. (Annals, 12, I, pp. 450’ 55').) #117- in this region. However, there was no likelihood that the poor immigrant would.be tempted on this score, for herds needed capital."49 As Julius Pratt has no oin ted out, however, Jom 3r r1: ibury, one of .n Ha ker' 5 sources for this statement, called t1“.e lands bordering u 30h tne prairies the best1 in t% Unite d States and de son 'bed Kiss ouIi o o 1 a o 0 Q ' territo-J as unsurnassed 1n the Opportun1t1es it offered settlersHO Pratt also has noted that in 1812 the United 8+ ates still containec within its borders, vast amounts of virtually unpeopled timberland, including about one-third of Ohio, most of Indiana, parts of Illinois, ‘ all of Hichigan and_Hisconsin, much of Minnesota and ' hardfood belt 100 miles wide stretching from the Hississinoi throu h Lissouri and ’3. arkansas into Oklahoma.” Final y, Hacker read unwarranted meanings into his evidence. For example in commentiLg on an article in the Hational Intellisencer, LAJ he said: The writer, in talking of the ands beyond the Mississippi, of course declared that the river bottoms were most desirable. But he went on t say (the orairies) are by no me: ns coatemutible.... Grass, grain, and even hemp and corn, may be raised in abundance. Hater is easily obtained by liggin and there are coals for fuel. Bences may 7 be of? ct:d DJ hechn" or by plowing up the tough svard of the prairies a, cutting it into chunks, and laying then up li L:e stone or brick. As for buildings, earth houses Jould do very nicely.32 inis state1aent, according to Hacker, illustrated the contempt in ‘ ,0 which the idea 0 settling the o airie {Jae held. It is "an excellent example of.:hat1 do- n psychology has so aptly named the deiense 29. Hacker, ”Land Elunger," pp. 391, 392. 30. Julius H. Pratt, ".estern'T r Aims in the war of 1312," His issiopi Val qgi istori al Revie”, XII (13 25), .Q9. 31.. Dido qm ’ )2. Hacker, "Land H 15er," 99- 339.399- connlex. ”33 Perhaps it is a nethedolo;y. Hacker disagreed 1 Canada in the coming of the n been content to continue nevi “een blocked by the In ciians. nada o'“e into focus onlJ a Z" (~.R L ) 9; 31+ accuaulated \A. Britain had H men he going to war was lust for Can Desoite this import are vulnerable on similar gro of a compelling land hunger. this ass no ion, which neithe evidence. Lewis inferred the that the center of popu ation adoote d the hytothe is t1 at 1 ad no intention of moving better examole of Hae'ar's littorical th LOU1° as to the importance of 1r. Lexis thou ht Americans could have n; westward if their progress had no He implied that desire to conquer :ter a long list of grievances against cker , on the other hand, said frontiers- fartner Lest. Tr eir real reason _or adhnifanalends. ant difference, however, Lewis and Hacker unds. For both assumed the skistence Their interpretations both rest on r of them su eorte ed with concrete reality of land hunger from the fact 0 . I ’3‘: T‘.‘ ‘ u we nov1n: VGSEWQFQ.’J nacxer Simply and hunger is a characteristic of a nioneerin; society. He tried b0 :it the evidence to that hyrgaothesis. Lack of ev1dence, together with efindink' s 01 UQOT‘ Rogers Taylor, indicates that the assumption is ialse. iarlor has sncrn tan a brief no ula+ io on £001 immediately 50110 in‘ the Louisiana purchase slowed to a trickle v loO7 - at least three years before Tecumseh became a threat and four years before the Hest started ..< talkings eriously about the conexme of Canada.“” Thus it seems 33. Ibid., 390. 3#. Lewis, "He-analysis," PP- 513-516. 35. Ibid., no. Sll, 512. 36. George no:ers avlor, " ngrcrian Discont er t in the Kississ- inai Valley Preceding the far of 18-2,” gournal 9; Political Scenenv, 12:11.1: (19:31), on. 72, 12.73. improbable that expansionist pressure was great enough during the ore-war oe-iod to explain western moti1es. The land.hun;cr thesis aopears inarequate, even as an explanation of frontier .e 1 1.. a Q 0 causes 01 the Jar o1 lol1. GIL u1PTER IV The land-hunger interpretations of Lewis and Hacker have 1 0 I ‘ ‘ I won 1ew f01101vers. But some writers have Cited Pratt as tne authority for statements that contain Hacker's interpretation, as well as q Pratt's. For example, Charles and Mary Beard sai 1a in The Rise 2: American Civilization: If in form the war on England was declared for commercial motives, it was in reality conceived primarily in the interests of agriculture..... This fact the scholarly researches of Julius w. Pratt have demonstrated in a convincing fashion.. ..The men who voted in 1812 for the declaratinn of war on England represented the agrarian constituencies of the interior and their prime object was the annexation of Florida and Canada. ... for the purpose of adding more farmers and planters to the over-balancing majority.Z And according to Richard Hofstadter, the war of 1812 was caused by: Expansionism - what John Randolph called 'agrarian cupidity' .... Southern planters wanted the Floridas and Kort11ern farmers wanted Canada....As Julius W. Pratt has shown, enthusiasm for war with England raged along the broad arc of the frontier; resistance to war was hottest in the old Federalist and mercantile sections.3 These statements are misrepresentations of Pratt's position. Despite the title of his book - Expansionists g: 18l2 - Pratt did not say that e) szansionism, at least insofar as it manifested itself in desire for Canada, was the primary cause of the war. He fid char rge 1. One exception to this is Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Steele Commager, The Growth 9; the American Republic (Kew York, 1937), I. pp- 307-310 2. Charles andl Iary Beard, The Pisa 9: American Civil tion, 2 vols. (New York, 1920), I, p. 393. 3. Richard Hofstadter, The anerican Political Trad ti on (New York, 1951), pp. 39’ LL00 that the men of the Southwestern frontier, who wanted Florida, were primarily xpansionists. But he connected xpansionism with a feeling of manifest destiny, rather than 'agrarian cupidity.‘ The latter interpretation is that of Hacker. Pratt disagreed with it and wrote an article in which he attempted to disprove it.” Before Pratt's interpretation can be appraised properly, it is necessary to know its sources and its contents. As Kendric Babcock pointed out in reviewing the book, it contained few new ideas.5 A re-interpretation of previously develope‘ ideas, it wove together three main strands: The Indian problem of the Northwest, Southwestern dreams of expansion, and the political problems arising out of the conflicting qar aims of these two sections. The Indian problem had been stressed by several of Pratt's revisionist predecessors. It was an important part of Lewis' land- hunger interpretation.6 Dice R. Anderson called the conflict between whites and Indians a natural outcome of western expansion, but put less emphasis on the critical nature of the expansion than didLewis.7 Christopher Coleman likewise stressed the Indian problem.8 So did John F. Cady, who said Canada became the center of hostilities between Indians and.American settlers following the battle of Tippecanoe, because: 4. Pratt, "western war Aims." See above, Chap. III, p. 273 ‘. 5. American Historical Review, ‘KXI (1926), p. 3/'. 6. See above, Chap. III, p. 23, 24. 7. Dice R. Anderson, "The Insurgents of lBll," American Historical Association Annual Report, 1911 (hashington, 1913), I, pp. 171-176. 8. ChristOpher B. Coleman, "The Ohio Valley in the Preliminaries of the war of 1812," Kississippi Valley Historical Review, VII (1920), pp. 41, '2, 48. There was no longer an Indian town to attack; it was no longer possible to strike at the hostile Indians except in connection with their British allies in Canada....Great Britain, in one of her choicest possessions, was Open to attack; and the west suddenly became interested in it as a future field for expan sion.9 As for desire for the Floridas, both Hildreth and Adams were ' ' ' ' 1° 0 "ts w aware of American intrigues in that area preceding the war r.l aeware Channing called the nos Mi‘ili ty of con uering the Floridas a motive A .D m 1or war among Southern frontiersmen, and implied there was a conflict in war aims between those who wanted Florida and those who wanted Canada.ll These ideas form the structure Upon which Pratt deveIOped his interpretation. But he went into more detail than did his predecessorsa and did a better job of documenting his assertions. His work also has been better accepted than any of th .e others. For these reasons, is ar’ument deserves consideration in some detail. Pratt devoted the first chapter of his book to the Indian pro elem and to the war fever he said developed out of it. The primary cause of desire for war in the Korthwest, he decided, was "the conviction that the British in Canada were in unholy alliance with the'Nestern Indians, and that only by cutting off the Indians 12 from :ritish support could tie 1. est gain peace and security. “ 9. Cady, "Test rn Cpi nion, " p. 454. 10. adans, VI, up. 23; Hildreth, VI, p. 311. ll. Edward Cha nning, g Histo1[ of the Lnited States, 7 vols., (few York,1935), IV, p. 456. 2. “ratt, ~xnans ionists, n. 53. A 33 Other motives - commercial, political, punitive - played a part, but the overwastlrin' desire of the people of the Emortk we t was to feel iree to develop eir country without re ril from those Indian conspiracies which were univer: :ally believed to have their ori igin in British Canada.l3 Pratt traced the origin of this is: ing to the days of the Revolution, when Britain had enlisted the military aid of the Indians. During the period between the peace of 1783 and Jay' s treaty, the Indians had resisted American attemets to settle the horthwest territory in order to protect their allies'monopoly of the - 1 fur trade. Even at this early time, he Said, "relations between the . . .. . . - . , 14 British and Indians became astandin3 grievance to tne Lnited States." Tension eased temporarily along the bor or after Britain turned over the Northwest posts to the Uni ted tates in 1796, but began to increase ' PL 1 1 °. .0 ‘1 T‘ .p \ o 0 f1 15 a again a1ter tne breaning 01 the :eace o1 amiens in nurope. such war-like talk as cane from the frontier between 1807 and 1310 was the result of impressnent and other British maritime offenses, said Pratt, but gradually the fear of renewed Indian attacks in case of , . . 16 war oecane uppermost in western minds. Also, increaSing conilict with the Indians sloxrly helped ofo rm new Western grievanceSa agai inst Britain and to brin3 demands that, instead of fighting a defensive, naval war against Britain, he United St ates should ta” he the offensive, drive Britain iron Canada, and thus end the Indian menace for all time.17 1°. Ibi-., pp. 58, 59. 14. loid., p. 19, See also pp. 20, 27, 23. 15. Ibid., pp. 13, 2Q. 16. laid., pp. 24-33. 17. Ibid., pp. 31-42. 34 Pratt said this change in attitude was the result of "the rise of Tecumseh and the Prophet, the oat le of Tippecanoe, the outspoken position of their Congressmen, together with the current belief that n the British were behind all their Indian troubles." Thus far Pratt's int er~3re ation resembles that of Cady and others. But the problem of Indian-British relations was important 19 primarily in the Ohio Valley, which at this time contained only two states. 0 LiO and Kentucky had a combined total of seven seats in the House of Representatives and cast only sL J of the 79 votes for war.20 Among their representatives were such outspoken advocates of war as Henry Clay and R. M. Johnson of Kentuckv. But earlier revision— ists obviously took too narrow a perspective when they said, "that section of the coutry, aided by elements in the South, virtually brought on the war."21 Af er all, thos "elements" in the South east nearly half the votes for war. Pratt realized this. He also realized that the Indian problem could not explain the Southern votes. Casting about f a peculiarly Southern reason for wanting war, he hit upon desire for the Floridas and concluded th a:t If the frontierslan of the Korthwest demanded war with Grea.t Britain as indispensable, his kinsman of the Southern border at least saw in it a means of fulfilling his expansionist dreams.2~ 18. Ibig., p. 54. 19. Pratt, ”mar Ailns, pp. .6, 37. 20. gnnalg, 12, I, p. "1637. Cla;r, the Speaker of the House did not vote. 21. Colemq n, "Ohio Valley," p. 40. See Appen 't I. 2. Pratt, Exeans ioni sts, p. 120. °5 I / Southern frontiersmen wanted war in order to conquer not 3 a q n ‘1 - —. o o 2" only the Floridas, but the nexican hmp1re as well, said Pratt. ) But he could show evidence of this desire only in the states of Tennessee and Georgia, which sent such war men as Felix Grundy, James Rhea, and George Troup to the Twelfth Congress. This added six more votes to the total cast for war, making a total of only 12 votes for war from the Eorthwestern and Southwestern frontier states. These states, it may well be noted are the ones which best fit Turner's definition of the frontier as the territory on the hither edge of free land. The relative insignificance of the frontier, as Turner 0.. efined it, in the coming of the war is thus obvious. Pratt, however, called the war a frontier measure, and partially solved the problem of a lack of frontier votes by claiming under this category :ost of the war votes of New Pameshire, Vermont, New York,24 western Pennsylvania and S uth Carolina. Under his definition, the frontier consisted of the rim of a huge crescent stretching from New Hampshire to Georgia. It included all the territory bordering on Canada, Indian country, and Spanish holdings.25 Along this rim lived those representatives who were most outspoken in demanding war and in desiring expansion.26 (Pratt implied that Ohio Valley Congressmen had been ahead of their constituents in desiring the annexation of Canada.)27 A vote cast by a representative living on the rim of 2 . Ibid., p. 225. 2 . Some border constituencies in Vermont and haw York did not vote for war, however, while one of the three hew York votes was cast by a representative from maritime Long Island. See voting map in Samuel F. Bemis, g Diplomati History 2f the United Stat—s, (Jew York, 1955), p. 157. 25. Pratt, Expansionists, pp. 126, 127. 26. gp;g., pp. 126-128. 27. Ibid., p. 54. O fi/ )0 ' 1 the crescent generally was a vote for expansion, he sa1d, while Congressmen living closer to the center of the crescent tended to be 08 I _ disinterested in expansion.“ Even under Pro th' inition tie war of 1812 does not “near an overwhelmingly frontier—expansionist enterprise. The votes from the "rim of the cre sc ent" included three each from I.ew Hampd ire and Vermont, two from New York the other vote for war in that state was ca st by the representative from 1Long Island), 29 .D' one from Ohio, perhaps eight from Pennsylvania, live from Kentucky, three from Tennessee, possibly six from South Carolina (two other South Carolina votes were cast by Charlestonians whom Pratt admitted were not expansionists), an 1d three from Georgia. The total is 34, or 31 less than the 65 votes that would have given the war measure a bait majority. Even with the possible addition of two votes from what was then the Hassa husett sdistrict of haine, plus the votes of Henry Clay and Peter Porter - wa men who did not partic cipat ein the voting - less than half the votes cast for war can be interpreted as representing frontier interests. Further1nore, the total is even les impress1ve if the six South Carolina votes are subtracted, as the findings of Hargaret Latimer suggest they should be.) 29. gpgg., pp. RS- 128 2~. This is based on an estimate by warren H. Goodman, "Te Crigirs of the War of 13' 2; A Study of Chan3ing Interpretations," Kiss Vallev Historical Review,& '"VIII (1941), pp. 171-186. 30. Margaret K. Latimer, ”South Carolina - A Protagonist of the war of 1812," finerican Historical Review,L (1 ”9 C‘), pp. 914-929. According to Kiss Latimer, SouthC arolina alrea y: was ahomogeneous state. Tidewater planter and upland farm er both 1a aced the same major problem- the price of cotton. The effect of Britain' 5 maritime restrictions on tha t price influenced Sou Mti Carolina sattitude toward war, according to hiss Latimer. 37 Thus aSS“nin:3 for the moment tm even 34 or 36 votes did represent expansionist sentiment, it seems c ear that the outcome of the vote on war cannot oe e: {plained in terms of expansion alone. At least #3 votes for war were cas t by Congressmen livin3 toward the center of the crescent, who, oy Pratt's admission, were not interested in expansion. At least four of these votes were cast by Hassachusetts men, one was from Kew York, two from New Jersey, at least eight from Pennsylvania, 14 from Virginia, and six each from Maryland and Korth Carolina. Thus it would seem reasonable that a meaningful analys _s of the vote should consider their motives, as well as those of frontiersnen, since it is evident that the men from the rim of the crescent, who adnitted y included in their number most of the talent q of the 1m rpartV, 2id not have enough votes to pass the war measur— O H by themselves.3 Pratt's analysis of the proceedings of the Twelfth Congress does not take the motives of non-e1 :pansionis ts into account. Pratt believed that the her of 1812 was the result of a deal between Eorthern and Southern frontiersmen, who entered the Twelfth Congress in a mood to fi31 ht a war for expansion but nearly changed their minds after the debate over Congressional reapportion- ment underscored the differences between Nor thern and Southern interests. They finally agreed to declare war only on the condition th.t both Canada and th ne Floridas would ‘ eincorporated into the ’3’) Union to preserve tne sectional balance of power.’“ 31. war eade rs who did not represent frontier interests in- cluded Roperc‘Wrignt of Haryland, Lan 3don Cheve s and William Lowndes Charleston, South Carolina, and perhaps John C. Calhoun, if Kiss Latiner's analgrsis of -flout1 Carolina causes is correct. 22. Pratt, 313;;e onists, Chap. III. ./ 38 Even if this analysis were correct, a full explanation of the war vote would still reouire a study f the motives of the more than 40 men who apparently voted for war for some reason other than exeansionism. Hovre ver even this partial e: :planation cannot be _. ’ The Congressional apportionment of 1811 was the one bit of concrete evidence which Pratt could present to support his interpretation. zpsortionment in the Tt-relfth Congress (1811-13) had been based on the ratio of one representative to ever;r 33,000 residents the census of 1810, several other ratios were 0 H) 0) U) cf- (+- (D *1] O H H 9 proposed, including 35,000, 37,000, 38,000, and 40,000. The one finally decide d upon in th e H use 0; Fe oeresentatives was 37,000 {'7‘ the highest ratio at shich no state would lose a r-p oresentative. the Senate, however, changed the ratio to 35,000, which would give flew York, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania two extra seats each, and New Hampshire, Vermont, Delaware, Virginia, and Georgia one additional seat.)3 The IIouse turned down this ame ndrlent but voted again when the Senate refused to yield. This tilne it approved the 35,000 ratio, 34 J r ‘, I l (\D to 62. Pratt saw this vote as evidence of a serious north-South cleaveage in the country, with Northern Republicans and Federalists voting together against their Southern counterparts and Northwestern frontiersmen voting with the horth against the South and Southwest. An 31 most solid North faced an almost solid South across the Po ona c, 96:37. 3 e ”tar, I, (10v. 30,1181 L". rflido, I, EEC. 21,1811), pp. 2/ l Q \‘.'3 b) ). 5 (H .1 illustratiig a “cleavare oetueen the commercial and nlanter states, - Q L the free and the slave states."“ As a result, the war party split If nolitical leaders of each section, regardless of eartv, distrusted any addition to the power of the other, it u uld seem natural that Sorthern and Southern Republicans should have viewed different the or gram of territorial expansion now before t;1e coun r3. Lorthern Reeubl ieans, though till now thev had suneor te d t11e occu1ation of Florida and the admiss ion 0: new sta es to the Southwest 9 would :ear the addit ions. for r th.t such measures would eventuall3r give the South. And on the other h nd, could a sou* ern Re sublican...favor wholeheart- edly the annexation of Ca Md shich LOdld mean se ver ral northern sta.tes ? eventually the adoition of Kentuckians, oer.aps, mi ght wisl1 with ecual zeal for expansion north and south,....3ut the states north and northeast of Kentuckv could hope to .L U receive no oone efi , and must see a political danger in annenin“ Florida, while the states to the south and southeast must feel a sir ilarly 1uke1rarm interest in the annexation of Car1ad .30 *4. O :5 k!) C) H (D *3 This ilternre tation is highly cues t evidence that other interests were at least as in ortant as sectional ones in dcternining the re1noort1onreno vote. If the vote was strictly a sectional one, it would mean that Georgia, Maryland, and telepare, w11ich voted for the azendmene, must have iden ified their interests with those of the North, while her Jersey and onio, which u voted asainst it, appa ently were alianin” themselves with the South. xith tne excention of Har31a11d, however, the vote of each of these states coincided 1:it h the states own 111terest.- In the case of eeorgia and Delaware, each stood to gain an additional seat under 1e 35. Pratt, Expansionists, pp. 135-138. 36. Ibid., p. 139 37. Statistics relating to the reapportionment vote are to be found in Appendix II. Q0 amendment, which was introduced by Senator James A. Bayard of Deleuoarefi'8 Chic and flew Jersey, on the other hand,faced larger unI'Epresented fractions if 35,000, rather tha 37,000, were divided into their nosulations. This :aeant they would be relatively less well represented than states 1.'h so fractions were smaller, and (—1 ’20 A. would have to pay hi her tetesr per re res entative.// 1nus sell-interest, rather th an sectional feeling, probably governed the votes of these Self-interest may have influenced the vote of every frontier state, as well. In addition to Weorgia, the states of Vermont and New Hannshire each stood to gain a seat. Each voted for the amendment. L 50 did: Ilork and Pennsylvania , which had frontier districts, and which stood to gain two seats each. Kentucky, Tennessee, and South ‘ Carolina, which face a much higher unrepresented frantions at 35,000 than at 37,000 voted against the amendment. Thus it is ee~haps .5 significant that the votes of every frontier state excer t Ge r is and Ohio coincided with both state and sectional interests, but that ‘ I O in tnose two 1nstances, it was state interest that took precedence f‘ In addition, Ohi o' 5 vote can as seen as 1ailing to coincide with sectional interest only if one assumes that Ohio consi ice red itself a Hort z1ern, ra eh er than a western state. There is no evidence that it did. f’T‘ his is not to sa'r that sectiona Me lin~s played no demon— Q.“ strable role. If the liscussion is expanded to include non-frontier fl 1‘ 0 states, it will be noted that both Rhode Island and onnecticut )u. Liles Regfster, I (December 7,1312), p. 252. ‘ 1 ‘ .9 ' . n or unrepresented 1ractions1der the amenene nt, 1 nevertheless voted for it. But Sew finglanders had objected stren- J \ uously to the id:a 01 admittin3 Louisiw na and other new a rarian U 2 tates to the Union, out of fear tlat thei own section would be c: *3 *4 0 Q; tr ofi spoliticalp ower. Under the amendment, flew England 0‘08 (0 stood to gain four seats, which would increase its repre esen tation in r 1 1 bro the douse oy more tian 10 per cent. Virginia,1-:hich voted unanimously against the amendment, may also have been motivated by fear of losing political power. The "cradle of Pre sic lents" was in some d n3e r of losing its near- nonoooly of that of1ice. DeJitt Clinton, a Ne w York Republican, was attempting to rally Horthern and western support to end Vir3inia's Ml domination. And the 1epublican faction that included Senators Samuel Smi' ch of Harvland and Hie in el Leibo Penn sylvania andE itor P... ('2- I)" William Chane of the Philadel :hia Aurora, alreacy had bro Len hdison over his dis1mi sal of Smith's brother as secretary of state and his retention of Albert Gallatin as secretary of the treasury. .. . 1L7 , This group was moving into the Clinton cano.'“ T11omas Gnolson of Virginia pointed out that the Korthern and aste n states stood to 0 1 3a in nine seats under the “erdnent while the South and.West would only gain two. Gholson nay well have been referring to the b1ackers 40. At a ratio of 37, 000, Yew 3n3land would have ha reeresentatives in the Thirteenth Con res s; at 35,000 it w have Pl. #1. Irving“ Brant, Jen es gadi son, The r1r1eent, 180Q —lC12 (Iew York and Indiana1oli ,1950 , pp. 52, 455. Clinton was unsuccessiul in his efforts to gain the supoort of nestern Republicans. However, it is ironic that tile Erie Canal, the construction of which Clinton w: s urring in lCll, was to slay an imoorta nt role two or tlm decades later in helping to galvanize the Jest to the Lortheast politically and economically. 2. Ibid., p. 455. I 4,2 of Clinton when he char ed the Northern states with seeking political mevonderance. For Charles Cutts of New Ianpshire, a Eadison supporter, interpreted the Senate amendment as an atte1npt ey lortherners 5.1411, JDLL; any rate, Virginia was the only state ainst the amendment in the face of a potential e1 tra LL 0 0 seat. 5 11e amendment would have given her 23 representatives. But according to Gholson, Vir3inians originally favored making the ratio 40,000 even though that would h vs given them 20 seats - two fewer 3 a 1 1 46 ? V | l 0 o 1 than they alrea d;f oss es eo. Lnaer that particular ratio, the states to the north and east of Virginia would have gained only five seats over their representation in the Twelfth Con3ress, wLile the ' 1 South and west would have gained nine seats, despite Virrinia's 1035.47 Thus the South and West would have made a net gain of four seats. it the ratio of 37,000, the South and.hest would have had a net gain three seats. But at 35,000, the ’zforth and East were to gain a PI \. '1 14".) 1' o o o o a iour seats. Virginia's vote thus may represent a sectional .L 0 net 0;. 3 interest. But her own anoition to remain the home of Presidents may .. . 1 . . . 4 have caused her to identify herself with a certain section. 9 Other than in Virrinia and the tw Iew Ensland states Q 0 pre"iously mentior ed, the vo tes on rea1rort1onn-nt in only tJo other states seem to just fy the conclusion that any factor beside state .3. 333333, 12, I, pp. 411, 412. 44. Erant, The President, p. 384. 45. See Appendix II. 46. gnnals, 12 I, pp. 411, 4 2. 47.1 1 er, I (Iov. 30, 1811), p. 237. 4’8 0 Ibis)“, 49. Perhaps it is not entirely coincidental that Vir°inia and the states to the south and Icest of her all voted for Ladison in 1812. Only three other sta -Vernont, Pennsylvania, and Lany- land - joined them. in erest was decisive. Maryland cast only one vote against the amendment, despite the fact that she was thereby voting for a larger unrepresented fraction. And Pennsyl ania voted for the amendment only V by a vote of 11 to 7, despite the fact that it offered her two additional seats.SO Both of these votes, however, may reflect the quarrel of the political leaders of Maryland and Pennsylvania with the administration. It is interesting to note in this regard, that the House of Tepresentatives, which turned down the Senate amendment Dec. 5, voted to accept it Dec. 18 primarily beca se three represent- atives from haryland and one from Pennsylvania changed their votes in favor of it, while two other PennSVlvanians who failed to vote 1 n c .L o J. o 5]- , ‘ o if 1 the lirst time also voted for 1t. The Pennsylvania and narylana votes thus apoear to rew)r sent political maneuvering, rather than the deep-seated, sectional in erests sug._e sted by Pratt. Pennsy vania ' 0 ‘ o o 52 l 1 was still a strong-hold of Jeffe sonian Repuolicanism. and Pennsylvania and Haryl nd were to join Virginia in voting for Hadis on in 1812, thus thwarting the Clintonians and other opponents of Hadison, "’3 10 could have defeated him with their co-Operation.DJ (a Cold Is for the states on the edge of Pratt's Crescent, there is little to indicate that they would have voted against state interest if sectional or factional interests had failed to coincide with it. 50. Appendix II. 51. Hiles' Refiister, I, pp. 256 defeated Dec. 5, 05 to 04; it mic na , ” e anendne nt was A s . 18, 72 to 62. Thos who changed their votes in favor of i J seph Kent, Peter Li and S muel Ringgold, of Karyland, and Aaron Lyle of Penna iJa.la. P William Rodman and Adam Siybert, of ennsvlvania, ver e the two who 0 IX) _. \O \A O {“3 \D G\ t- s—d De .L e ttle, had.not voted the Hi st tine. &l were P epuolicans. 52. JL 185.18, XJI’} 1‘1). 1,70, l '7;le 3.123dison defeats Clinton in the electoral college, 123 to O rm U 3. lne 3o electoral votes of PennseriJia and Maryland w necessaif for his victory. 1 1_ did Ja .1cs Fisk and the rest 01 the Vermont celer- onlv Sew England state to vote for Hadison in 1312, also stood to U ,.. '. ~ .1. 1“ - ‘ . in 2 -L'1"' 4.1 ..N. . 1. J- 03131 0.33 SBQU. 21.33, WHO WctS a 1?er 1111-111, JLlellle . USO uuGIlFLJCI’lu the ground tn‘ at it pr ovidcd Hell-d eserved seats for Vermont and Federalist Delaware, both of which wr viously had had lac L) Q inia, nevertheless lumped - of which state coincided with that of Virf Virsinia with the other lar tates - few York, Lcnn'"lvanLa, and 0-!— U) ' 1 I - assacausetts - denouncing a measure that would give I—I fraction larger than the combined total of these iour states.55 From a study of he Congressional debates and the results of the vote on reaoportionhent, it is evident that state interest was the dominant issue. There is no evidence that this vote illustrat osectinnsl interest in any of the states which Pratt claimed were represented by expans ionists. Thus there seems to be no basis for Pratt's conclusion that the reapportionnent vote proves the existence of a split within the war part;' which had to be mended before war could be declared. whether one accepts Pratt's interpretation of a split in the war party thus depends largely on whether he is convinced that the apportionment vote proves the eXistezce of such a split. host of his other evidence is circumstanti a1 end, as Pratt adzli ted, would r\ , ’1 Q 514’ O 311:.1: ”#4. 5:: ’ I ’ 3‘ O k“) . 55. loid., p. 40?. 1+5 prove little ex apt for the "knozzl situation" tin the claimed his analysis of this one vote demonstrated. This evidence consists prima'ily of a statement by Grundy, replies to it by John Randolph, the results of the debate over use of militia, and the conjectures erundy's statement is the often-quoted one in which he said he was willing to receive both Canada and the Floridas into the Union in order to preserve the political balance.50 It may be significant that this statement was made while thea lortion1ent bill wa seeing ...-u decided and was presum1 blv of reat ivportance in the minds 0 Congres glen. It would be even more significant to know to when the statement Las directed. If it was intended for fellow members of the frontier war partv, this is evidence of a split. However, if Henry Adams I-ras correct in assuming that this and all other remarks of the war hawks were dim“ cte d at the "40 or 50" House members who "would vote for war onl;.r if the J must," this does not indicate that members of the war partv we e Iorlied about anne ecation. 57 A studv of the aeportionment debates and vote indicates, as has been stated previously, that representatives from the "center of the Cresc ent," such as Robert Wright of - leand and Gholson of Virginia were more concerne ab out 'hc sectional bala ince 0: power than were frontiersnen, who tended 53 to think in terms of their own states' interests. Thus if there was anv fear at this time as to the consequences 01 a war for expansion, '4. a '1- - 1 u... v. , 1., - n. 1 4. ... lb prooa01y has oe1n; eapressed by members of a Qroup that has not interested in evoans1on nvvav. 56. See above, Chap. III, p. 24. 57. Adams, 1I, pp. 153, 159. 58. Annals, 12, I, pp. 0“ -412. 2+6 If the "school of Virginia and Ye nnSVIvania" actua.lly was the tarfet of this and other Con1res31onal speeches, Randolph's reply zucdies more sense than it otherwise would. There would be advantages 1n '4 var for men from goth lennessee and Genessee," he said. 293g the Korthwest and the Southwest Lould psoiit from the acquisition 0? Canada. t was the eastern seaboard, said Randolph, that had nothing to gain and much to lose from war. It would be desenseless in the face of British invasion and probable slave 1’1 uprisings, while n said 19 could so ethe capital m ving prO'ressivelv J. Randolph, as P‘att admitted, stood alone at the time and ' 60 p1cked any argument he could.find to discredit he war part;. This does not mean, however, that he hOped or attempted to discredit these men in their own eyes. His chief hope of preventina war \J lay in convin i1g the "he or 50" that war was not in their interest. t was probably to then that he addressed these remarks. Pratt, however, concluded that for once Randolph's remarks made such an impression on Southern war men that they refused to Grant permission to the President to use militia for the conquest of Canada.61 The vote on that issue is not recorded in the A11 nals O ‘ ‘3 Conrr ress, but the "wearying debate," which Pratt neglected to Aw analyze, gives sone indication of.the reasons permission was not ts, p. 144. See above, Cnao. IV, f.n. 28. L3, 7 A F’) ew speakers - no otaslj,r Cheves of South Carolina, wright of Karyla nd, and_Samuel McKee f Km tuckv, argued that although the 1iliti a to executin3 the laws of the .J Constitution li1its the use 051 nation, suppressing insurrection, and repelling invasion, the section that grants Congress the ri3ht to declare war andr ise armies permits it to desi1m ate other uses to which the militia may be out, as long as those uses are ”necessary and proper.”62 Federalists and Old Reeublicans, on the other hand, took the View that Con ress must limit the use of mi itia to the specific situations prescribed by the Constitution, rather than re ad implied powers into the right / h V K») to declare war. The qu.e tion thus was a const itutior .al one and Crundv, who oelieved it would be unconstitutional to use the militia I to invade Canada, said he favored keeping it within the Uni ted States to release volunteers for the invasion. The actiono f Con 3ress, he said, could not make an unconstitutional measure constitutional. Therefore, the decision as to how to use the militia should be left up to Madison.64 There is no evidence that any member of the war party was trying to prevent the conquest of Canada. The party traditionallv had char1pioned strict interpretation of the Constitution, and most of its members undoubtedly found it difficult to see how implied pOLers could be re ad into the use of militia, when th e Constitution snec1fically listed the conditions under which militia could be employ ed. Again a "lenown situation" would have to be assumed in oreer to read anvthing more han an honest di: fe1mnce of Constitu- __‘ 62. Annals, 2, I, pp. 7315,739, 743, 792. 63' Ibid-‘a pp' 740 7UO: 765-768, 7741 775:7 777 7789 701’ 79 CO Q\ 4.: C H Mir; 4. , no. 728’ 77 .L; . k1.) 48 ti01a interpretation into the debates on this matter. The remainder of Pratt's evidence consists primarily of guesses by Bayard and.William Hunter as to the motives of the war men. Bayard wrote to his nephew in Kay, 1812, that the war vote had been held up by a split in the war partJ over incorporating Canada into . 6 . . . the United.Sta+ es. 5 Hur ter, speakinr a ainst a declaration of war V unon Spain in 1813, charged that Iortnerners and Southerners had made deal to split the spoils of war. ":fe consent the you me V conquer Canada, permit us to conquer Florida."66 Bayard admitted that his conjecture was based on rumor, although "I am inclined to think it true."67 But it may be signif- icant that he said no more about the matter, although he could write on June ll, "there is no secrecy between the members of the two houses." In the same letter, he said: You will perceive the prOpri iety of not quoting my name for an3 Opinions you. r;aJ form inferred from my letters. What I suggest is conjectural and has no advantag e over Jour or:n conjectures......03 As for Hunter's charge, Pratt noted that Hunter "was a Federalist, d his testimony relative to Republican log—rolling is to be received with caution, but this statement fits so neath with the (‘\ \0 known situation that :Ie cannot disregard it." be stressed that Pratt never successzullJ established the- existence of this "known situation." 65. Paners of Jares A. nPVard annual Renort f the American HistOI C' anOC-_J-Ol,—(1913) II, en. 136, 197. * > so. annals, 12, II, pp. 520, 52-. 67.: """" ard, p. 197. / ‘ . 08. Ibid., p. 200. 69. Pratt, an"r°lolists ’6 k5 H ?' hf) Thus far the discussion has been concerned IL th de11onSWating the lack of evideice for Pratt's interpretation of a split between northern and souther: :gran_ioniste. low a further question must be as hed. Did the war party want war primarily as a means of bringing about territorial expans Qion? As Pratt said, Congressmen from the Hortin: est gradually came to call for an offensive war a*ainst Britain, "perhaps most of all [because of) sheer exaseeration at the long continued dilatory fashion handling the nation's foreign affairs."70 Furthermore, according to his testimony, if Zorthve stern Congressmen wanted war for expansion, th sey evident y did not reflect the attitudes of their consti Muen 8.71 Thus on the basis of his own admissions, it is difficult to se h w ya rratt could justiiv his expansionist interpretation of the causes 0 rs the war. It should be re embered in this conrlection that there had seen war Lawns in Congress before lBll. As horman Risjord has shown, the elections of late 181 O and 1811 added considerably to the talent the war party in the persons of Calhoun, John Harper of New Hampshire, Peter Porter of Le :Iork, and 0+ hers. But this party was no stronger numerically than it had been in the Eleventh Congress, from Irhic h Pratt citea only three speeches urging the conquest of Canada or expounding manifest destini.72 In one of those Speeches Clay told the Senate, "the conquest of Canada is in your power," and said he saw a "Zen United States...enbracing not only tie old 70. Ibid., p. #2. This is similar to what Adams had said. See Adams, VI, pp. 115, 123, 155. 71. See asove, Chap. IV, pp. 33, BL. 72. horman K. Risjord, "1012 : Conservatives, Ear Ha ks, and tr1e i.ation's Honor," Killian and lazy Quarterly, XVIII (1901), p. 200. v 0 U1 nirteen states, but the entire country'east of the hississ in i, includins East Florida, and some of the territories to the north of Vir3inia Senator Hillian Giles, who later voted a3ainst a resolution callin; for the invasion of both Canada and East Florida, urged du‘ing the Eleventh Congiess the expulsion of the aritish iron V Canada. So did Johnson of Kentucky, who saw the cor Guest of Canada the nation. 75 Other than these three saeeches, all the s Pratt cited as indicating desire for Canada were made after the battle of Tippecanoe in Iov exoer, 1811. Nor did Pratt show any evidence of such sentiment in the horthuestern press before Tieoecanoe. Yet a Irar part;r ezc sted for sons reason in the Eleventh Congre ss and was elected to the Twelfth Con} ss as much as a year bei" ore the nest and an to call seriously for the conQ‘est of anada. ‘t apnears, then, the t even as an explanation of th- .L‘I actions of Con'ressnenf rem the nor n ern frontier, Pratt's exw> nsionist interpretation is sneer_ic1al. rm ~ 1 (J The sane statement can oe mad aoout his explanation of causes of war in the South, wher re he claimed both Con3ressnen and_ their constituents waited -:ar for e2: (ansion. A recent article by J'lliam A. walker, jr. supports Pratt's contention the t Ternesseeans, q 76 a at least, were ex ansion—ninded prior to the Bar of 181a. sut neither walker nor Pratt has shown that Tenless seeans needed or even 74. Pratt, Exaansiorist . J 750 31:11 381.8, 11,1,13130 J'/9, 53.3. 76. 411119] A. walker, jr., "Ha' the Ear of 1312," Tennessee Iistorical Quarterly, II (lQal) 20—37. 73. Anzals, ii, I, in. 579 h c: 5‘) O '1 ‘0 x) C 51 .0 though t ey needed a Uar in 0.‘ der to lulfill the destin from certain that the United States Uould have to ipil it the m st pOUerful na tion in the Uorld in order to take the Floridas from a Ueak Sgain. Rest Florida revo ted and Uas incorporated into the ‘ --- .z. . ,. V3,- 7., .L' . . n v, .-- n .L- ,.. Lniced S.ates o; shecutivc order even beiore the tar partf Was r'v" A elected to the $7311 til Congress./0 In Januargr, loll, Con3ress gave Eadison authority to occuny East Florida either as a result of neace;ul ne otiations Uith the S‘Wani h authorities or as a means 79 of nreve ch; n3 British occupation. the neutrality laUs of the United States so flagrantlir as to bring str n3 rotests from both Spain and he Eritish ally, there is no eVidence that the America an polio cy of supportin; insu 3ent factions, as continued by D. B. witchell, Uas not expected to bring allo oi Florida under control of he united Sta As it Uas, Pratt showed no evidence that the press 0 and Geor3ia linked the conquest of Florida with a war Uith Brita in oefore the -xel‘th Con3rcs s met, at which time, as Adams put it, . n - -- ..4. v, ,4.- Uar lever s ego the nation. - 4.1d ,1 . v ,. - -,, * .LJ- - 4.- 4.3.1.- In V18” 0 the aoone discusSioh, Pratt's in.crprecation .- . - la ., .0 .. . , 2.. 'r .L .z . ' -- - i- -. $03.13 I181 one? 11 ., _L31"O_O'Lu'ld, HOT COI‘I‘BCL” 3.9L; -Lt GEJOJS QTGSolbO mr r 3.. .1. or ' a i. ,3. C‘LFJ. I r‘. 4. h- 3, 4. .: - -1 . ° J. ' ,0- ‘/0 Apt. L. Jkllav’ ll-3 V.$..~L/3"J. UJ'V VJS’ UAaQ'S-U ant ..anv——L-ld, 3:1- walk}- Ult.‘ L n, - La .. - . , 7-,“ V - I)’\.’. Loren Inerica (L3H haven, 19¢0/, 0. Joe. "“3 m, 'Z- ...' ... - CA 0/ (o. hrant, The iresidenc, pa. lot-loo. '7 D ' ’LJ' “‘ 1 . ,J. \ I", ' [9. '. rdub, .44- LILIU._~)L._:_\JU:J, p0 {L30 U o I‘lldo , 13:3 0 11.5-11.9 0 3‘ " ‘ .- ,... ,. ’ —. ’3 O O hQLL-.LQ , “I , I) 0 ll) 0 ., J— ._ 1 u - '.L,.- - 8.111051: o0 {IL-000;; lul’l odl‘S, Will ‘0 fig". L I - ... flt‘ 'f“ ‘ n I 4-" J“,‘ 0 v _ 1111erenc interprecat10ns have “cce>ted ports 01 loo c.3313 without me GdGSE‘Ofl. m' 'V vs ‘- 1 - (w . 7- 5- h-y w . - ~ 4" l 1Le reasOn 1or this prestige 1 r l1e 1n the 1act tjdt "‘—\n-.r\ n; Aw . r" n A .fil I...) ‘r 1" r~ fi \r ' ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ' #- ~r ‘r f'v' 1' E131111ouiets v. 1311 1e1lecto an approacn to fllSuOrJ that was .... l .. . r... ....3 1° _n-.,11 . ». r. .~.'.J. ,—.L. pepular 40 years aQo and stil iihcs supporters. Pratt's Loner-c103 -‘ 1-. N. . ' v- ‘-\ ‘I J-‘, Nfi 1f‘F-N D .j v A "v'i L -l~1~1- T‘, O J- ‘ fi-Lr-+- r1 ‘ r ' has cisillusioned o the co 3e 01 QGJJlOgHGJb the unloe‘ acaces :1 taken since the Civil Jar. American society11 ad hec one class-riden w .:"1 " J- ana comi1x.te a by irre s on31o1eca31talists. The c antry had liken a .7 1 _I n _»_'\ I ‘ .... or1e1 111n5 at imperialism. 1ne war to "make the world safe for democracy" had_ended in anot11er rao for spoils and in the 1ailure of J‘"\ "1 3““ o '3.“ ‘3- -\ ' r '5‘ r- . -'1 T‘!‘ . 'L - n '1 J- 7 -n an senate to rat11y the Treatr o1 Versailles. The Lulbed otaces gas (I) (D ( i- L I i—J Ho 5 J 5—) Ho nto smug complacency, with the zeal of the pro~re551ve movement apf'rently gone and its goal of a more democratic society apparently forgotte.. 11e intellectue s 01 Pratt's enerati on saw no reason for Americans to feel morally superior to the rest of the world and to absolve themselves from a she e in the blame for the world 31 ituation. 1he historians oi Mli generation, who looked at ‘ hiStorv throu h the disillusioned eyes of the 1920's, attacked much of what they found in American historiography as pious, nationalistic mythology. Thef attacked lone-standi13 inte 1retations of colonial .fl society and the A erican Revolution, as well as interpretations of Denis, Diplomatic :istorg, p. 150; William Killer , A ch Kitty}; 9; the Unite-:1 Sites (;:c:r1or, 1953), pp. 147- 149; Zienry 3.351193, 1‘29 11:11:33 states __;"_ imp-122:1 (Lieu loric, 1959), p. 153.; Georre I. oteeherson, Averican Histr vt_135 (Lew York, 1940), pp. ”l7-cl~; J. E. Joodvard, é Se: A;e1mi alistcrlp ” U York, 1936), p. 32!. o). Sranc The T're:‘3’.cl_«~,_ggw, p. 112. See als below, Chap. VI. p.66. _ .L If... 0 '.' I .‘ Pr -v '0 a sosu-V1V1l aar rents. lacy here also willin - J-r-"p ‘ r ‘ ‘p to bdAe a mare 1001 at the Jar oI lcl~,Ia1cn, next to the Revolution, "has oeen...most co {a 1 exploited by the patriotic t3rpe of zlistorians." I‘. T" - 1'1 , *- . .. 1-,- 1arry .lee sarnes rat hlS ) (I C) v a..- 0”“; o _ 4—. 5 a. o o nar1t1me rl¢noS interpretat on 11 an early-tIIs -n 1 ‘.L "Anyone who holds todav that 3n land we 3 extortiona __ - n 0 ~ ‘ o -1 J.’,. eneration's quarrel witn cue te in exoloitin f“ h our weakness should delvei into the history of American iinancial and L‘ commercial negotiations in satin Pnerica and tee Fa id, r‘;erely "looked H i J U) (If (D ( -.) ’ 5 {13“ (+ H C) Li 0 L- ...) H E .. J {W I.) (D U) {D r east durinc the 0 upon the Uni ed States aiter 1733 Tith the sen amused and.seni-benevolent contempt '-'—I -J' r‘ ”a.“ 43 "J'J- ‘ '34- Ulun ndlCh, or clangle, Lac ”ices sea 0 {J5 Rico in 189o.' ‘ .1- .L causes of the war than simfl to deflate American n~ ens expressed in lx1ansienists _§Illl?, 0 course into such an iconoclastic atmosphere. Pr: -tt .Iork L 0 well documented in con aarison with other revisionis CI\ . , 8 union 1t oorrouea. Bear dcalled itu ' holarly. that Beard arl others Lave miscontrued Pra tt's into 1 itself inlicates tnat 1"1snsi nis (“F U) C ‘x n ‘r‘oc of l 12 nae uvz o 1 o D -L‘ “G p,.'- _c '-_: fi' .F -7) c “.‘ as an iilustration 01 gas Materialiscic and scliisn American na. tionalisn than as an example of accurate res arch. As an interpretation of the causes of the “* J-J- .,.1' -n . H AI 1. :ratt's norm 18 1 accurate aid Hialeadin . tes Viered Cuba and Puerto discover the actual I") H' C’*‘ {J ('7 H' *3 {K1 -‘J-’ M .1" . t Wflolngs iron But the fact rvreta tion n more valuable historical I?" .e '1 21’; [“L;r 0; *LJ w, , ”The See one‘fiar for In 409. 9 50 Ifildo, pp. bf 9, 4‘ lo 0. See aoove, Cnae. IV, a. 30. CG:\311d3110:3, H {1" r Tar-vi '3 VIth 1.14-» . T1085 '1) an unconvincin3 ar; Win nt,2and Pratt ar have discounted low fa o ‘11 -, :- COL-4.5.10 m1 ‘ I 311 3 I‘IC‘J‘ section of the nation a r) scarcely affected?" J Such a question implies is that Ken En3land opposition to in economic tenns. The secor -d is interest in commerce and therefore was not ...) (D Q. John Adams, who time the "calves John Bull," opposition to war measures which ex- Sena tor Timothy ’rit of disunion in the Horthea tain a3ricultural pr 0e would be one result of war. rm prices ineir attitude has been tlat "if the real evances Opposea‘ d ur ed by tile inland sec that the on commercial Pickering British commercial restrictions for the ‘ cts and argued that improved 'denry Adams, however, found this and many other historians of the as an important factor in the bi. aportant factor on the i‘ronJr ier. ,4 ('5 ' S (D H. ...) S (u ..S O (D (3" C) 2+ (g; E- 2', ,3. Li S! ’04 Ft L) E 65 F: H O {‘3 D‘ C) O L-_. b (0 O O 1 emeritine tion, which they (‘I two ialse assumptions. The first the war can be explained primarily Q west had no economic genuix elv interested in m‘l and Feds rali sof th letter to Jezierson that uncle was a pretense upon and others to build a L, hOped st. .;4, 470, 471, 482, 503, 517, 518, l. « I, , 647, 636, 805, 836, 977. 2. Adams, VI, pp. 139, 140. 3. Pratt, 3x:ansionists, p. 9. '. Lester J. canwor, editor, Tie Adams-'eILQrson Letters, h vols. (Chapel Hill, 1959}, II, p. 303. I ha but t1 1 1 1e inportations, non-intercourse opposition to ulavint ‘ Q Thus, 3145,1011 rallri were other motives the political climate of the dadison administra national honor dictate «L1 one would unalte ve long Opaose d. these 3h c m_cr01al con N , ' w.- 1‘ ‘ .‘r v- ‘JE-IOlnLJ -Or 1.911 dd "bitter" Federalists were rably Oppose rr: )J peosle in all such orojects; nt 03* m1bar 3oes, non- s, and above all, by the any na.val p0"er, have been constantly into their hands.5 national orernl ~ »‘ '1 4-1 - -\ .- ~,' ~ ! -' - apparently were a gopalar -‘." war, there evidently also, which can be enslained n-y in li 3ht 01 of net: snel- a. At any ra e, a recent stuiy ti on indicates that while ladison believed d a defense 01 commercial ri3hts, he realized the one faction in the country that such Feelings of l n 11p for ”ritain and hatred for France probably helued 0 cause hen England Opposition. As Hild cth To the Federalists of this school a war with England was e) :ceedingly abhorrent; not merely as a throwing away ofgreat connorcia op1ortunitiees; nor solely nor chiefly by reason of the alarm and the danger to whi ch it of+ she countly, uselessly co eratione, moral and France in A JV e the whole maritime section t11e blood and nonc;r it "osld on 1ar more :undamental consid- political. To take sides with would ex and (‘4' O ‘Dut tJU, th~ nendin “ astruggle - and to make we on England."ould be to take sides with .nCc - “speared U0 then a h'gh crime a ainst the best interests of humanity, the aking sides with a tyrant hostile ali 1 K3 .) to the rights of nations and ri hts th a: 3 of men, whom to heln to overthrow En: land was to help 0 I .-1 '7 1n prepar1n3 terrible yoke or ours alv 05.1 It is therefore apparent that hes England Opposition to the ”er of 1812 cannot be explained_solely in economic terns. But on the Ibid. (’1 Brant, 111 Drwir a «4- V‘AU, 111, 112. “a 1N}. O filldredq U11 ‘JrI , 4 -l\~ b E“ I b .L Q .1] L_. ’\ Iv 4‘ ‘MI‘ . 4“. ~ ['3 TA T-j‘fl 1"‘1 fi‘, (3; ."\"\. flr\ f: 1‘ '1': If“ ‘. A ('i :3 U A AJrl ‘JJ-Ii1C’ .- V 30‘]. A-J -Qélu O ‘4 -/OC)1\J‘M 1"":A‘. (LOU I.) it oartlv 1‘ecause of maritime grievances. Pratt erred in dismissing the possibility that ..esacrhc s "felt the humiliation if not the pecuniarv loss" brought about ov the belligerents' aaritime U restrictions. To suppose that depth 0‘ patriotic feeling can be rea- mu red in tonne of economic ixfi cerests is to set us a false standard.9 However, even if such a standard 18 sed, there is reason to believe that the West was concerned over what vas racaenin to American commerce. it haa an interesc in the export trace. Grundyr ut it this 1:31;- r “‘1" It is not the carrying trade, properly so called, abet which th' s nation and. Great Britain are now contending. were th's the only Hue stion now under consideration, I should feel 5 eat nrillin.< noes (however clear our Claim night be) to invoke the nation in var «or the assertio1 of a ri.ht in the enjoyment of which the community at large are not more dteply cohcerned. The true qua tion in controvc r v is of a very ifierent J. character; it invol1es tl1e right of Uhe '.:hole nation: It is the ri;ht of e: :porting the arocuctions of our own soil a11d incustry to 1orei n markets. rm- 3,... .. '. 1. ..1 a --, ,1 1n .. .11 .. 1ae Carryinb ana re- unpOTt tr mu snad CCCOJflch lor naC1 f. the growth of anerican commerce b tween 1790 and 180?. 'nhile the (I) value 0; doxestic exoorts merelv doa‘lc duling th period, the earnings of the caliyia; trade incrrased from $5.9 willion to "”2. Mil ion, and .K n , f! w the re-export trader usrroomed from 9300,000 to o39.o WllllOU. ine 8. Pratt, Exeensipnism , p. 9. Pratt conceded in his introduction that the above night be a 1 Mi 1 exolc.nation of Hestesn sentiments. But he thereafter ignored,such a possioility. 9. By analosv, it might be wondered if tae or Americans genuine ly disturbefl b' Fidel Castro's 11cent seizrre o“ Ahericaa orOperti s in Cuba were those “ho held stock in the companies i volvcc. lO. fim11.ls, 12, I, p. 424. .4..- last ficure exceeded the value of domestic eXports by 311 mi.llion in 1807.11 The re-exoort trade brou 3ht to c "n -rce a. te”oor3rn v- V" '- -r'— -L‘~,I'"L v ‘ . f‘ " -.‘ ‘r‘ .‘ war-borne TOSperltJ that eoulc eis3spea r as soon as the ear in fl V3.1.0:): o O o 1 surope ez1d.w 'r1“e 11y it involved trade in sucn products as coffee, cocoa, sugar, and pepper, from the Test Indian and South Anzerican colonie sof France, Spain, and, to a lesser degree, England. with their colonies. The war also had created a burden which Eng commerce CO“ d rot 1‘ear alone. Altluou h the belli :erents l1ad lish ”en a large amount of it to neutrals during the var. American merchants, in order to comp y eith a liberal interpre- I O O tation of the Britis h Rule of l75o,. hich procla1u1ed that a country which excluded other nations from its colonial trade in time of could not Open tM1 t t~ade to neutrals in tizne of we '1 to land color ial gooo s in the United States 513 before -shipping to Eurooe. Thus the re-export trade got its [I name. "his trace ore uced the iirst Anerican millionaires, for '0" My D 1' -L 0 D IDrfi + . -Q - . .- u h «L1 J- 1. ' e12u.;- e, assert Oliver 01 231o1uore, I-rho quickly. earned a -orsune from a conglicatod seri (D French merch1 nts, which resul ed from S1ein' sneed of spec1e from nd pav duty on then s of trazsaction31molring ooth British peace , 1-:ere required and 3 He 1" v I v I 0* 1" T‘. South American 00101 mi to par t o te to- nucleon. 3 yortunes earne “d 11. Douglass C. Eorth, 2:3 Econ .. O 323 _1e 60 (in; letood 011253, E.J., lOol), op. 25, 22 , / “LC Gr0"th of the United St 4 12. ts value sliojed iron 3&0. 6 million to 313.6 taillio n during the period of peace between 1801 and 1303. (Hort eh, 3c nomic Cro;:th, p. 221.) 13. Stuart M. Eruchev Resort 01 iver, Kerchant of Ee.ltinore, 4—{ 1y ‘- ~rvr-vr , . 7'. .-.: '1 . u. .. 1r:- , 10 . uuALV, Eunoer 1, Chap. 11. f‘ L i so one e, palblflbre, 1&50 9 'ersitv Studies in_historical and Political \ J 1 r‘y’jfi ‘ W- V4 in the re- ex30°t trade (I’- As Grun dg-r with the re—export eelli er rent Before 1931, historie the eonestic export trs.de Les large. outaern nlintors, of Robert 91 i5 0.. O O (1" d" O S ') ‘1 H- O (D U 0 on Heloleo on' s continent elec! cede of the British Is les to enter Eerooecn ports, council, which first sought .1. ports and tilen selght to lice The price of and co rr"1c~ . v ‘¢~. ‘ '5 W v-v 1n MulCfl proeucers as well a 'L-Iri 3 and on tie -etelietory to cotton d3;endc d on the no 2;) (1" (L) Q; Ho *3 new Kern, :hileeelphia, Los ton, and e” was not greetly the community at lsr tra ’ ‘ was more interested rest rictions on shippers were concernee. ns evidentlv did not believe that even U of importance to the connuzitv at 9. course, had an interest in it an t of Inr;rlend olsn ed hese felling 1 system, Inich created a never “1 _ Q 1'1, - .L 1 I r.‘ V I _ 7. ’n -, '_" ~.. A 9 ufld pronioised Sfllgs coniné iron snulane 131']. 1 .L Q0; menufe tures 01:” the article; he English-made cottons +otoneod on tile continental markets, from which British manufactu es -:ere xcluded. The price of tooeeco never w s materially varied by the consumption in en; e;c, but ceneqded on the Her in derlan d from Jhi h, by their e"clusi en fr ;u the Great Brit mi}, continent, i John Each Acuistcr, writing inplie that economic ? -~ V l . srucney, Cliver r, so. '1 .A. 1:23, I, toward the end of -istress influenced Southerner t entirely arrested.13 the nineteenth century, ste seen a Var, vnioh, if success1ullv prosecuted, H uld force the re—Opening of old-world markets.— But neitner he not any other writer sew auy truth 1n Zruney's coxpla1nt W -: -:‘ ’r‘" 7'. ’ "N 1 1 v‘ - -L“ . Inqu1re oi tne western Peop1e :3; Udelr c ‘- -- — '- «P - n . twu» 12338 1n 10131101" ”8:13: C‘ U QJCES neve no :arkets. .' 1,. - . . , ‘v ' - 4.‘ «~14— .L‘ ' ° ' J. .— 3V1oontlr no one coald oel1e¢e Lflub oflC pr111H1v HCSU hid been (R w .‘n . n . , .1. -.. - , ,5-“ .1 .0 - dale to yTOudCG enoug1 of a surplus yo worry c11.0111, 10331 T. A 1 -. n , , . D ,. .. on -.. . 31-1, 1- n ', 2., .. 1m 1931, Louover, eeor e lQQG o 1aélor uneartooA a stuo, 1 1" - I -‘n ‘.'. . ‘ ‘. 3 ~'\’ .I ~ D- r r J“ 7 71“ *C‘ C I) ‘, 'rrloes 1n tge 11331351391 Jelleg lrec o1nr the Her 01 lol1," on .1 . -L'? ,. . . . ' . 11‘ .1.-- ., n. .7113..-‘ .3. ...OJ. bilc~b 40:10 I‘e ht~d1JCI1 a. C ‘fll’lCCthfl VGUUQG-1 liar 831$ v.1..18nU n- ‘r‘ll .1 . M 0" . ‘ -. I .‘ 4 f" n n V 1 (V . '.'L 'L l gno 1: 11n; 11:; pr1oes 1n that area as ue1l ao 1n the Souoleaso. 9 .-.,3 {V 1‘ r7 '11.-.-:- “or 1‘ cotton fired tobonco nlronrz'v warn Twain’s who-.311 in LAV .... k) ‘ll‘m. c-1b’» U Lb-‘]*~} , LI LJ ‘ , CALL JLAIV (.4. bay") "AV ‘4 LJV L) 04L §\., a. h "a F q‘. -'-'—-13<- 4'. +1”) H '1' 4‘ 4‘13 7“ ".lr‘D VD tLJC‘D " ‘ c.1231. \A.uk~.’lulb+bd ..I]. 9.1:; JOUQLI.3 St c.f1 1.11.11.91.11» 191‘...qu 0.1. LCQ'V ul’lCl ‘ all oth—r Lestern fern proeucts at tne port of How Crleans followed l a. H ' _L ' A . 1.71 4 -. a ste311ly eovnwe d tre nd from 1805 un3il late 1- loll. A Sllbut rlse Vii"; at that time was not large er moa to help owo1ucs1u. Cotton prices . ‘ A -v r‘.’ x n . N . --‘1—- --\14\—= -. 7 1n Decemoer, loll, were eoout one-th1rd of the r111“; i“we lJ “ - “41'\ C M r'\ ‘ “ ‘4 . J. " 1 ~ v ‘ ‘5 ~ I ‘x , on . < -"o . oeeam or, lqu, uflfl sad n1» a low tneg uoeld not rB&Ch a*. n unt1l 00£ ’ . w~ ~ 4 - . 1 1. m '.. "L. .n‘ .- f lamb. ”’hllo engort nrlcos droeoec, yroedctlo“ CO‘bo &uQ p11oos 01 ‘q .1- 7. r'. o _' j 1 O ".‘V g 11113103." 'oS T3-.I:.;.l11'3(l 111 .1. L) h ‘4...- T"IN ‘- v ’ ... n~L ‘ ~v- 4‘ —L“ ..-: '. ‘ ‘- fi -. _.'.. ‘ lf. JOun 1ecn 10L;13't 'er, A L13torx 0. egg 100313 01 tme .n1teo - H"- -..- m-‘— ”-‘b'- ..— —-— _.I -- r" O - "' -- ,. f,'\-, 7-7-— StmoCQ U ‘fOl S. (1.9?! fOI‘L,19\3\J/, .LJ...L, , 1 Q --.. 1 '1 .. -..L). A; li.:1].$’ 4.5;, I, T). LP»::/ 0 n -. '3 Mb m __- ' . _' 1.1 "3 . ' s ' ' ‘ - y. Geor e no ers 11Jlor, "Pr1ees 1n :1: “133 s1pp1"valleg 5:“ - r‘ f -" .--a V' N ‘--' O (5 I! ~“ 1" .1 9" -— ‘ - Um -. ‘ .. . 7% F‘ 2:}. J- O ireoee1ud gee "er of lulu, Jolrha- 01 30030110 :3; on: “331 118v Fl, _— M‘m- ...—..— ‘PT‘ A _ ..L.L.L (lg/4 ), f). l‘fi'l’B o 0 *tr‘ . m L, o .L'V...’:lo , 133.15,”,15/0 r} w _o ,3 _‘_ kl. Iu_1., p. 157. r) 1 1.1.2. 33.1.0.0, I). ]-Ulo C \ n n- q -, -L . ‘—'.'r~vrv- ~ . ‘1', J- ~,r-‘. a —. ~ - V7.-.~P Jir . -r— a In a seCOno article, -quOf SOUQJU to ehblain JhJ lallih; 3 n ‘ ‘, r J—n-z— . .‘ "1"! J- .Ilfifl q ‘ v, w $.1-v- ': .-\. Dp_,« . a prices has a cevascacinu e-lecc Lyon tne Jest and I the ellect is v- . .5 J- r" '9 ‘V ‘1 - j r ‘ 1 1313 oi the causes oi the war. J Lien uorla - 3 w v 4‘, j - . . ., f1. .1. 1 1 3i , 1 .-4. ‘ ..o-i. prices were hi3n, as sale, “ester; or Laces coals be solo at a prolic n .1. 1. '1 3.. .L -. k “broaa no in a call narhet, sucn a e 013 Moa ht alflout the _’_ _a .L’,‘ “L o 0 ('1- («J- i) o J- o n .L ‘7'! o .L. 1 T-L naricine me orlCthDS oi rrahc,, treat JlLleu, ald the bjlbea states, “.3, r.J. D - .. .a ,L ".2. m, 7.7 .L ..., —, .. ”estern iarners obcrated at a loss. the Less has a marginal a‘ea for a nunoer of casons, includin3 h'3h transaortation costs, long to markets, lack of marketing organizations and.mark3t data, a shorta e or cash and capital, infr iority of agricultural wroducts, and Door methods 01 ‘achagiLg. szor t good 5 ha d to he snipced down the hissiSSipci “ecausc of the prohibitive costs of overland tron saortation, but imports had to be Hrou ht in across the mount Ml suntil the introduction of the steamboat ,ermitted upriver A J. naVigation. :urthernore, because of the lack of marketing organizations farmers often had to tahe their own goods to Lew C rle ans on flat boats. :ecause 01 the great aistances involved, Lew Orleans ma rhe t news often was two months old before it reached the farne and he could reach hex O-leans. Once a‘rive , he usually was forced to sell his products as soon as pOSSiClG, rewardless of tie type of market he found, because of the unlealthy clir,m mt . Final y, Jestern goods 1 - ‘ snicueo froml .eJ Crleans, such as cotton to ca cco, hemp, sugar, n. {‘3 corn, not only were inferior to the same ero\ucts gwrorn elsevse re in the country, but often spoi" le d en; cute to narket cecause of incorrect ’34 L. Ta;lor, "a 3rcrian Disconte;' t." Icid., pp. Q’Fl-Lfl .1: \o O I\) (O O 61 n :L ‘ . -- M: - L n° m - u seeiite tacos pro: it c-lillitlf -dctoro, sui’ -z3lor, tug Yr ~Ffl"- o A ' Q - o -“ v~ “ _o‘ ‘. u x- I. ~~ ’. _I o uGSt suhc‘thCcd a DflCl youulation OOOJ lollouin. the Louis one ‘4 |_ . r‘ I _;_ I 4- ’3‘ J. O '1 N“ _O purcneso. Dut then meritime resorictions cousoo grLCCS all the boom collapsed and ”acute depre ’5‘ .-~r .\ 1:9-1 bylbi‘ws r- ‘.,.\_~ ..- ,, ' .‘ -,._r~ \ . ior new» 3rouers in ano inlert nu.nuf: ;on, practically (I) .0. O T \ Taylor, aeste rwi rs bel' . n _' . ...-LL force it even after Lot for long, ho Slre "”ron*ier"‘°n sho"3d no dc ‘ o“" 1 o L1H f4) t :‘lures ml shzkon (3 v , T; rev-r we re s 3 ready to pr admission, his work of.) 4A.) .A ~18 3n 0 - o l V..- I ton/'1 falling ,-ices in r kJ. ' riotions on trade C) ci‘ cct in by _" -EV \J leved t their restrictions. T'fl‘ffi vow I V 11"“ in (1 4-1_ ‘1 -‘.\ oxirou‘ba the u. 0 L4- CCA‘IL u we lice n dislike of Britain, and re LCtiOfl to impres other maritime grievances, all of Lhich he 99 feetor" is the coming of tee mar. ”hus his a O ‘Q‘ U. uring int c4" .‘lCS u long prices eventually dropned, too. the I". *7 v 9 an anal"s's of onl 9.8 He made no attempt to tion to such other +np thv 1'1 . rloridas, 3 AL ent gold t'le "n “AA oth-e A ...4- 3-: y u:- 9' , L J— . 'n . .-o J- r‘fl ('V iroic-cr cause of toe *ar or tie scale :lcflOUb atteuvtin3 b0 assess _. .L a “ _ c v o ..L‘ its re ative nei34 . f) - ' V _‘ ’ q, ’1 - 4,5. 12110.0 , 12}. W4, %)50 '3" 2: . .77. ' ’20 tL'Do Itch}. u. , r31 -.‘7-L:‘KJ‘ o ") "" ‘l V“ i; o —L\,)_LO. , 13'. 1+9 (/0 no 7-: "A, no. .LQ.‘._do , ‘3. BUR". r‘ T‘ - w LL90 .g.“1.Cio -. “1,.- -.f. ' -.L - ' ' . flea-y J—‘.- \ \ 1‘ -. ”'2" -ae enact usl is o: t11s or QLJ other cause Lerooasl3 cw. ‘A ..--, . -—« -- .1 - v .1 -,L ‘— . ‘ L . 1 ne‘er will ea hno h. LOHCJGT, lu seens possiole b0 reach tie nsortan e in the l H. — -:-r-'-. \. "\ ‘.'\ J- .J' 'V‘F‘ fl ‘ ‘- f~ '\ ten bail clVC 0011011131011 ti). 'o 1 c Ina-Q 01 COHSluBlfiLlC ‘Uast. That section res still sparselv settled and ““0o1o1; majority of its inhabitants was not producing for the export market regularl".30 Iove-the ess, th East already was osconin important as an ex orter. In 1739, doenriver trade reaching flew Orleans (n unted to earoi nately *1 million; eight years later the tot: 31 J. o n 1 no n1 w . was $5.4 million. In View 01 tne obstacles to ero11t aole proeuction, th's was a sizeable increase. Ha‘ qorld p ices re .na ined high, it ole that the pepulation boom w uld have continued and that many :arners wee remains ericw ral to the market would have r Taylor indicates 1 t was bitter over falling prices and plac ced the blanc on the bellisersnts - particularly on Great Britain. Thus as ' ‘ "1.7 n .2..°' ,L. T 1 . 4.3.3 n ‘ .. 1 ._ h' " sa1d, tee atelttee oi ere ”escern sessler can hardl3 oe e‘aluated f‘l‘. without an unde m‘andin" of his 001011 oosition."’” It probably would be a mistake, hoxever, to assume the existence of axgthin; rescnsliis a direct, one-for—one relationsh'p n prices and re sentirer t. lapole n announced his contine1tal q svssem in aovember, 1306, and the total value of unerican denestic ~xports did not decline until 13381 large drog in Yeste rn puuolic land 5? es during th fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 1806, however, Lb LU n a r...“ 01 O 9 C d C .l . -E V“ .1 M s .. ..a .... ,. . ...... .... ... . 1 e .— . ...u «U Q . n cal- l r .1 ...... d 3 l h _ n u e e e ...... S e e _ n O a... r l v u .4 O ...... .1 d e O .n U T . a .1 .J a .... e .1 .1 C .1 1... 1... C e .1 -. V l e C _. s. t .-. V t n S O t O 8 VJ d S 8. h .l n O t e a O n n ...u e e e ..u l n t .... a O n .n. L r O p... .1 e h C h u S m .1 O r .1. a ,. n _ C "J t .1 1c 2. 9 L is O .1. 1e . l t .... O 8. 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I have V ‘ 14/131 ... 811000 8801“?» wanna“ VI V-.«-L L4 [11,) IWe Tirst decade following the publication of -a; rlor 8 articles saw a return to older points of view. Two major interpreta- tions appeared during the period. In one of then, Bernard fiayo ree m1H1asiz d the imeortance of frontier nationalism in the coming of the war. In the other, A. L. Burt re turne d to a maritime rights intereretation. Both writers made use of the findin;s of the revisionists, although Burt did so to a lesser degree than did Mayo. But each stressed a point that had been emphasized by maritime rights historians — thee emotional sensitivit;r of Jesterners and the importaIce of maritime grievances. Neither 1ay,o nor Burt used tIe vehicle of the monograph, which had been pOpular with the revisionists.3 Nor did either write solely to explain the causes of the war. kayo was interested primarily in the role ola ed by Henr; Clay, while Burt's - l- study covered american-b Writi relations during the period between 1776 and 1820 Ha; r0' 5 interpretation of fr01tier nationalism contained ele- ments of both the revisionist and maritime rights inter retations. Frontiersmen were so sensitive to insults against the nation's honor L7 .D J. .0 . LL " bflat they lelt outra 3e at thet 11 She 01 far-away seamen. however, he implied that he thought the war was not fou tprimarily for maritime rights.5 Rather, local problems were a more direct cause of frontler Bernard hayo, I-Ienrv Clay Boston, 1937). Burt, United States (Jew Haven, l9QO). See above, Chap. III, pp. El, 22. Ibid., n. 326. SEES, Clav, p. 328. m {:k-J N H 65 sensitivity. hayo relied on the findin s of Pratt, Taylor, and U 1__ others as explanations of base frooelen1s. He accepted Pratt's con~ clusions concerning the Indian situation, expansion, and conflict with- in the war party. He also made use of 'aylor's interpretation of the causale ffect of falli " farm prices upon var sentiment. But whereas most revisionists had put prime rgr enchaSis on the importance of “interest" and 011ly paid li service to the role played by "honor", in the coming of the war, Kayo attributed as much importance to the latter as to the former. The Jar oi lolZ was not- ought orimarily for material gain, he sai?. Fe tlzer, it was brought about by “Free Sons of the west," who were "uncontauinated by the seaboa rd' 5 intimate British ties,” and "had a deem er uno erstanding of nationalism and democracy" han did the European-oriented :Jasterners.7 The Lest's nationalism was emotional, rather than rational and calculating. And hesterners felt that Outrig ht1-.'ar w’s preferable, and even desirable, to a n no relo oeace in which America, eft naked and unarmed e; a lo:ocratic Congress, was assa ted and robbed with impunity, subjected to a Ca nnin3-Jackson insolence, and taunted by Pickeronians (.rh frustrated all efforts to avoid eoth tar and outri 3ht submission) without oein' so craven that she could never even be V O I _ ...iCjed lilto Xvi-RINS Although the influence of Turner and Adams can be seen in these statements, Kaye's oosition also resembles that of the maritime ri3h s writers.9 ' .3 . _ QI‘A r) a Q I O O *Olgo ’ pi). 329-1) “)4, )9‘3, 294" ”do. 7-“ 3 1a nr- / 4.1.1:. , :10 ‘40. I-Dido , p. 3270 See above, Chap. I, ppu 9, 10. \O CO“ 0\ g- (T\ 7 Each of the revisionist writers whose findin had attempted to prove that one particular cause was dec isiv ve. layo, however, was unwilling to call one frontier cause decisive or even to call one more important than another. Kany factors played a part 1" in the coming 0; war. All were important, he implied. It may well be that the conin3 of the Jar of 1812 can be explaine .only in tenns of a multiplicity of causes. But it is also erobably true th at some factors weished more heavily than i J others. Thus hayo' s aeproa ch would seem to be valid only if it Jere impossible to differe-1tiate between factors. As Reginald 1 Horsman has sug3es ted, however, it probably is possible to difler— lO 1 entiate. The historian can set up a critical standard to jucge v1 any cause and compare it with others. 5v asking questions about the number of votes in Congress it could have influenced, the number ’1 o: Jeorle affected by a particular grievance, its importance at b-v—J critical times when war was being advocated most strenuously, and the importance which contemporaries seemed to attribute to it, he can begin to understand which causes were of major importance and which were not. Such an approach admittedly would work best in analyzing these grievances in which interest, rather than honor, was at stake. But having checked the validity of war-hawk statements in re rd to those grievances in which material interests were meas- urably affected, one would also have an improved basis for judging the trustworthiness of pronouncemen s in regard to inpres r1ent and (0 other non-economic grievances. lO. Horsnan,'fika‘éims," p.1+. Iayo, in assertin the equal ix1portance of many causes, nav have been reacting against the tendency of revisionists (and other historians of the war as well) to be uncritical of the particular causes whose importance they stressed. Revisionists had failed to take into consideration such evidence as might disprove the de- cisiveness of their causes, and confusion had resulted. However, ., o n it might oe wondered 11 Kaye's approach is any less confusing. To make no effort to differentiate Lhen differentiation is seemingly 1e ossible is to give undue importance to some causes and too little importance to others. Such an approach steps far short of the L knowable truth about the causes of the war. ‘ e of failing to differentiate cannot oe made against Ha yo's successor, Burt. A dl‘lOma ic historian, Burt viewed the coriin3 of the we r rJlafllV from a maritime- ri: 3hts point of View. During the previous 30 years or so, ma ritime causes had been largely ignored. Those} istorians rho discussed them at all, such as Harry Barnes, All n Johnson, and.Ralph Paine, consi de ered maritime factors less im310rtant tha' n the Indian problem and desire for Canada. Burt, on the other hand, discussed the problems of the frontier only briefly and dismissed then as of decidedly less inportance tml 1 maritime causes. According to Burt, the woolezn of maritile ri3r ts Opened a.d continually widened the rift oe t1;t een the United States and great .1. Britain. The one nations had conlllccir‘ interare ati011s of national C4 ll. Barnes, ”War for Independence, " pp. 47,,V /‘; Allen Johnson, e;fg rson and Pie Colleagues (23fon1cles of America Sve ries ..-———.-- .ev-I ’ For I - ..r- . . I“. '“ I f .f‘\ . :- .“n .1 ' h ‘- Have n, 19231), Av, p3. Ace, rt , .Alg1 D. kaine, The ri' ht a Free A .’ A ..'. « _. _ l Sea (Cl ronicles of Amer- ca Series, Sew haven, 19:1 , «11 pp. 3, 4. rights to jurisdiction on the hi”h seas, and these interpretations 9 1 , , mflecte d vital interests Unich could not be cemprom1sea.l” srltain (‘1 the ri3hts to U‘.1ich the superiority of her navy entitled her. she previously had accepted the prin01ph that neutrals could trade with belli3erenta in any articles except contraband. But now she claimed ave her the i::ht to stop any vessel attenptin; to . n l? n .- 1 seen a continenta port, regardless o: car3e. J :urtnermore, ne cla ined that the nec ssitv of maintainin her to board neutral ships at sea in search of eeserters, Ame1icans, on the other hand, believed Br it a1n Uas us1nv Uartime necessitv as an excuse for sainin a monOpely over the commerce of the Uerld.15 Lac chin; a peUer1ul na.vy to protect her merchant marine, he United States insisted upon Uh at Uas then a new principle: That American private ships, as Uell as public ones, Uerc sueject only to American law at sea.16 If Brit'sh laU and practice were to rule ’ 1 the waves because of Britisn power to enforce them, Americans believ ed their comuerc ecould not be indevendent. . 7‘ 4- r I\ ‘1‘. ‘ I . "II ' 1' r~ v‘ . " ‘ J' l"‘\J‘ " n " ’ Leutral tracing r13nts Le a an inpertant aspect 01 the stru“"le :e rjurisdi etion, accordin; to Burt, and the United States U4 had a greater grievm mce agm nst Britain in this respect than.a< 1a Fran nee. For most of Britain's seizures were made at sea, there, 12. 3111‘ UTAl-tj 3'53. V35, 1:). 21.2. t. 13. aid., p. 214. 14. :bid., n. 2 2. 15. Ibid., 0. 223. 16. l2;§., p. 212. 17. ~g1§., p. 22%. 1 *1... ' on according to her former nractice, 810 nad no r1 neutral sit ins not carrying contraband. 1a oleon, on the ther hand, usually made his seizures in continental ports, where his jurisoiction could not be di Wit ‘ .19 In addition, French seizures could not be construed as an effort to injure American shiéning in orcer to aid Frencn connerce since France's ner hant me.r rine had virtually ceased But England's seizures could be and were thus construed. lne orders in council se e_ed to be "designed to establish the , . _ . ,+ p a , _. 21 economic SU§eFlOTlay oi sn3lane." ‘Veie the nroblems associated with the right to trade, however, the problems esultin? from impressnent were even greater. Lives, rather than goods, were touched_by impressnent. And abuses on both sides continua ]_lv contributed to international DJ. ill-will. British boardin3 parties 0 en were brutal in their treatment of American crews, zhile the American eractice of providing ion "hich our sailors could easilr sell to British H. (L k) S ( i- H. H) H. O )3 c + deserter shceft the British suseicious oi the Unites States. ‘ any time Cinnressment] might cause violent clashes, and all the tine 70 '5 it was producing li otle inc cidents shich had a cum ative effect. / hese incidents, according to Burt, influenced the American decisions to invoke embargo, non-intercourse, and other forns of economic coercion . With its roots in the American vaolution, H ‘3 o r-=‘ (N U .;. G . ...—..— 2 . 3233. 21. gglg. 22. gggg., p. 213 71 economic coercion appeared.to be a weaeon that nature "had pla ed at "Jr 'T' in the “nerican armors. 1t1i1volved less danger than war, and was the only compromise that could be reached between those who ’) 1 n q 1 a o L: . 1 o a wanted war and those wn :avorea suom1531on. 5 ACCOTang to Alexander Balinkv, the fiscal eolicies of Jefferson and his secretary of the ecisive role in the choice p. treasury, Albert Gal atin, play d a . I that was made. Their emonasis on the prilnary importance of debt C l ‘ retirement had not only deprived the nation 5 def nses of ades uate 3 iinancial sueport, out had also swept away the legislative and '3’ administrative machinery whereby needed revenue might be recovered.”0 FT” inus when economic coercion failed to force Lritain to revoke the orders in council or relinquish the ri ht of inpressment, Americans nad to choose bettm en suo1m1 sion and a war for which thev were ,27 unereparee. According to Burt, Britain's refusal to revoke the orders in council until the week that war was decl= red 1.35 the immedia te cause 28 of var. A51 arjison said in la aer years, the dec1sion to ask for war was based on a letter from Castlereagh to Foster, read 07 T. W. ‘,' ’23 o 1. 1 "a; 10 yo +_\1 Aan son say 27, 18121n WHlCJ lb was distinctly and e‘.n natio ”ll .4 state .that the orders in council, to which we had declare we Would not submit, would not be repealed....flith this formal notice, no choice remained but oet"een war and de11ecation, a decre dation r w inviting fresh provocations and rendering war sooner or later 21+. Egg” p. 255. 25. “id., p. 231. 26. Ale} tender Balinky, Elbert Gallatin, Fiscal Theories and Policie" (flew Brunsrick, H.J., iQJJ) pp. 130, ff. “ r t p 0 (”U "5 Cf. t United States s, pp. 3l5, 316. The President, p. 466. {\D to (Di: a “Q I) (N ' ' ‘ 5.0 138V1taole." / Had the repeal of the orders been suostit uted for the declaration that they. ,*ould not be reseale‘, or had they seen repealed but a few weeks sooner, our declaration,o- :ar as proceeding from that cause would have ”ea: stayed,a and negociations on the suo‘ect of 1m1ress:1ent), that other great cause, would have seen purs sued wit h fresh vigor and hoses, under the aus_eices o: success in the case of the orders in council. However, desyite the repeal of the orders in council, it was impress— ment that prevented an early armistice. Lore Cartlereagh told Jonathan Russell, the American gharfie d'affaires, who had. ”een instructed to make Britain's abandonn: ent of iripressment a necessa .ry ‘0 o o o ql condition of armistice:“ You are not aware of the great sensibility and jealousy of the peOple of England on the subject; and no administration could expect to remain in power that should consent to renounce the right of inpressnent, or to susaend the practice, without the certainty of an arrang-ment which should obviously be calculated to most unequivocally secu e its object.33 V Like a number of historians of tne War of 1812, Burt seems to have gone too far in atte mitins to portray ma ritix1e causes as the ,3 decisive ones. The national—rights implications of the orders in council were extremely important to American di olomats. But Burt's ‘ ar3 nent that Inaritine causes were the decisive one in the minds of westerners were 8W1 tionally in nvolved.in the problems of anerican commerce and seamen. But it r.1:1_t be wondered how Burt COL d 29. Gaillard Hunt, editor, -ne LJriti rs 9 vols. (few York, 1910), II, p.. 272, 273. 30. ;p;g,, II, p. 273 See also, up. 195, 106. 31. American State Pads rs: Q_gs§ I: Fore 3n Relations (Washington, 1832), Vol. II I, p. "85. 32. I‘fi 1d., III, p. 594. 73 justify his dismissal of the Indian problem because its roots were DO I‘ "in a remote corner“ u-ich had 1 ew renre entatives in Congress.)3 (D For he contended, on the other hand, that ass sterners felt the shame occasioned by British maritime restr'ctions more deeply than did a masterners, primarily because they were farther removed from the ’31" dangers of a maritime war and”. dad no direct interest 1n commerce.) In ad: ition , Burt's assertion that the problem of fallin.-I.KJ.. ’ II, I). LLyQO rwnr' fir ~' I 6. Von Holst, I, pp. L/J- 230 Lenas ter, III, p. “W3; Schouler, 76 to revoke the orders in council.10 When the British refused to comply, Madison saw no choice but to call for war. In order to win votes for war in Congress, he designed his war message to make it appear that impressment, rather than Britain's refusal to revoke the orders, was the casus belli.11 Thus: If students of national history can bear with patience the labor of retaining in mind the threads of negotiation which President Madison so thoroughly tangled before breaking, they can partially enter into the feelings of citiiens who held themselves aloof from.Madison's war. 2 This interpretation of Madison made little impression on Adams' immediate successors. Francis walker said the charge that Madison sold out to the war hawks in return for their political support could neither be proved nor disproved.13 Babcock, who withheld the charge that a deal had been made, implied that Madison had gradually been won over by the war hawks.14 And D. R. Anderson, one of the first revisionists, implied that if the war hawks did not actually put pressure on Madison, at least he recognized the importance of politics in the coming of the war. Pratt, the one notable exception, confined his discussion to sectional politics within the war party.16 Madison's role was largely ignored. In 1932, however, Theodore Smith sought to revive interest in Madison as a progenitor of the war.17 Like Adams, he believed Madison 10. Ibid., VI, pp. 117, 118. 11. Ibid., VI, pp. 220-224. 12. Ibid., p. 225. 13. Frances walker, Making 2£.£E§ Nation, 1783-1817 (New York, 1895), p. 224. 14. Babcock, American Nationality, pp. 51, 52. 15. Anderson, "Insurgents," p. 170. 16. See above, Chap. IV. 17. Theodore C. Smith, "war Guilt in 1812," Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, LXIV (1932), pp. 319-345. 77 should be censured, rather than praised for his role. But Federalists and historians had blamed Madison for the wrong reasons, he said. According to Smith, the standard interpretation of Madison, first stated by Hildreth, was based on several false conjectures. Hildreth read an unwarranted meaning into the fact that the Republican caucus, which ordinarily met in April of a presidential election year to endorse a candidate, did not meet to endorse Madison until May 18, 1812. He also accepted a rumor, begun by Foster and Federalists Alexander c. Hanson of Maryland and Josiah Quincy of Massachusetts, that the war hawks forced Madison to accede to their demands.18 And Hildreth incorrectly supposed, as Smith put it, that "Madison was known in the winter and spring of 1812 to be positively averse to war and that some form of coercion, Open or veiled, was needed to overcome his reluctance."19 Smith, asserted that Madison's actions had been mis- interpreted. Quiet and aloof, the President never bothered to answer his attackers. He permitted himself to be misunderstood.20 But according to Smith, a study of Madison's letters and papers indicates that the President was neither indifferent nor hostile to the war spirit. 0n the contrary, Madison was privately impatient with the slowness of the nation to act. Smith cited a letter written to Jefferson in February, 1812, in which Madison criticized the recently passed army bill as inadequate.21 In another letter to Jefferson, Madison wrote that the House finally had "got down the dose 18. bid., p. 338. 19. Ibid., p. 329. 20. Ibid., p. 320. 21. Ibid., pp. 329, 330. d n. o 3 .3 n1 1 o ..u. 0 15 . r . n An 1 n m n n e 1d .1 a 0 vs "u .H .l .11 t G 9 .18 10 Lo 11 o o t 0 z a s l n ,1 n . 1.-. n 1.1 s .1 . .Q a 11 n .1 -2 O a 11 O O S . vo & r A e e C 11 ?. o Qo no “a 1.o M P n u e .3 G n.o “1 “1 “1 co n1 2. 1.1 no 1. 1o .11 1o no .1. 11o .no A; e nu C T. no .0 3 r .1 .1.“ V 0 LL 1... 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(.J , I ~v .1K.. 0'. c'\ (C / excent 8' Con .oss to v0 " 0 f‘ U Q Q (1 'AJ \1 U ..‘.. 1, 1;}. 13.10 I‘ w. c: C? .5- O ‘l 'Onoz" 5.1 -— O 1.1]. 10 .r o (”"1 Y..- H u a ’ J. U 3.. .L- c301 ’xlt ‘ J ell as all ot' ed his SEC 9 II ' JCT L .8 LI- ~ L; J- '7‘? force in IE ma 0 D vn hnir ons. I .‘ A 3 note, at L” l. \ 1101.11 -t ‘ :tio. .1 hr: TIT-1. \4 n] ared, ll ut: Gu1 P N JAU “11* 2'. _ -.~ 1 . 1 J I‘ Prv V v C“! 4-1 'u :81“ 21'." IL.~ “VI "0.1-3 . ‘G CO U11 d" VC" L I"‘ ,\ f' k s.‘ ‘ inme, question to t ”‘1"."I U ‘JV A V 81101-3". - A ted tiIC war was doc 0110 Vic? avw ouo 13 4‘ 1 a.-- A v7 "1 L O (.1 MI. .1 L. (2 j. n ‘L 3‘ ‘ C‘*'J‘~' .J- ‘ '1‘,» n. .~' ') TV‘ '7'" "‘0‘ l‘.r_" \ attrioutee.to C31h0d1, quufl Give the testimonJ 01 Jhle -s dcnce 4-, r‘L 3‘ o v . ‘ rNL. -.I - A . J- r‘ - oflcu tn adniiistr tion pregarcd is. "It wis . el: oorate manife sto.. n no - Am r‘ —- -v‘ . ‘ - 1- ~ 1 A ~ . ’ ..1nd oneludin in...11n_1 1e hnicn no one WJO had ever nesrd hr. ’3‘ Hunroe (sic) discourse up nthe subject could doubt to nave oeen nis."/ '- ~. ‘ “'.n t. e '\ ~ . ‘ a h‘ ‘1 .Ll v 0 Smith, “galSOfl helped to bring uOOut one ear of t- i} S3 L 1 (o O O O ('3 :3 ci‘ ‘0 J o .a ‘ a o _‘ an 1 '. _ Hedi: on -ad the kind Ol tenacitr stu oornness O S i ‘q “ snall,cr-Led-u1 I‘.2 (‘1. . “3" W F Cs.‘\.,. 8 UC _-‘3..I~f10 N SO. 4..., c4. ,0 . I413 mi? 1710 L: VOCl llC I‘Od ~ - J- deJeles, a uil s .L ' . .. _ f. ‘ 'ILT . .... - n89 Uln :J ;)Or\DO:-1‘:‘ L114- VU *5". 1-8 LJg~S .10 r. \J 91" _ U (3“n .H-cr '9 n rJ "'1 .4.- vs OJ. c. quu C 1 bu .3. U v0 0 N " 7 . -— . . ’ . ‘A‘ 'pr9331ve, 1 t e x: a oecxoone, and leCfehCL‘le ‘ . a. - 1 x v vr‘ ‘ v . ' ~— 15 n13 dioi men] has, ne w—nt to war ui eves d V U ' ‘2‘ fl r. v a ‘\ O as one necesshrf c01.seque nee 0: hi .1. 4- Trent agreed Irit11 Adams and Smith hat erison pl; TGd 1n act1ve, Killing role in the coming of the‘War of 13 2. But ;e {id not a roe that 31 lis on spolic1es were indefensible. Brant departed from his predecessors primarily in natters of interpr etation. Although his arguncnt was more fully COO” :nte than or Smith, its factual basis was similar to theirs. Brant internreted s in a manner ch reble to Kadison. According to Bren , Hcdison Iras decicated to peace, but was extreme y sensi its upon the character of his countr; He :-.'18 willing to ri “A war if war was needed to make the United States resoectco 0y other netioxs.' Thus, although he honed war U of the nsniiesto - in Konroe's c1 ired by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1914. See t, illustration facing 0. 41h. Y‘ )1. 3.114011, 'rtJVELr3i1w1-t, Do 3+5. )1. Brent, The President, 9. 112 ....vp‘ra . a 11331;? TTI‘i o1; - res 8. h rm sident until the decision was made to ask for war, nadison sought to play one eelli erent ase’nst the other in an effort to 5. O ( f‘ idle 0 Li (.0 0 get them to remove their maritine rest :efore Eadie n had been two Heel;s in office he he: nut the full I-reir-fht of ti e Pre id eency behind a ecret unders ending Jith either England or F1:nce, involvinga a call for war against the other unless it too stepped molesting American commerce.. ..This does not: neen that he either wished for or ezpected war in 1309. His he re was to use an agree- ment witl Mi zler belli>:e rent to oetain one with the other.34 About s’t n eks afterh.1e entered office, Madison became a 1" b7 si igning the ; shine J E: 01 ci‘ U) D E; VI (D hero to Republicans and Federe greg ement. Under this Treement Britain was to revoke the orders in council insofer as they eifecteetnnericen iiuv1n and the United States was to withdraw non-intercourse a ainst Britain and lcee ep it in effect against Trance.99 However, England's envoy, David H. Er L_n a1lod to inform hddis on th:% the Bri tis h government hc.d O K O O ' ‘ navy.JQ Britain's sub sequent re‘udietion of the agreement orou4ht quicx disillusionnent. Madison belie*ed the British had "reverte d to 1ne failure of the Erskine agreement brought about two develonnents in nadison's @01303. accorci H 33. Ibid. Oi." rifld.’ 1,". sr p.153. 6. Brent, The !resident, pp. 73, 7%. n 3 1 hr) _- _ r ){0 $3152., r). (710 fl, fir! ‘ .-. c .. r L. p). BGMlS, Dieleniti fl ’3 ‘- 1‘ -.« +‘qn-L o 0— .' ,. 1 ... o ‘- “ n o . ceased v0 no.e one. eieier sellipere1tm1ld r3‘0-101to .'.._' 4. r“: IILO J. 4.... restric tions CL. once. 111ere1o ‘9, he ten; ted s_;.ur the we belligerents to a series of alternate jumps," in which they would remove their restric HlOIS gradually. "Th diffi ulty 1P 3 to make either of them jumo fiust."93 n“t he in order to win subvert for HI 0) 9 “g 0 "3 (D ,1 of}. ign colicye ‘based on the economic self-interest and Chest” pride of a younr and growing nation," he be an advocatir : \J development and national self-sufficiency.“i His aim was to unio— eehind him "all1 actions, except the bitter neeeralists led by I "we Pickerin:. Politically this meant that the Iadi son ad: inistration ceild safelr accent increasing 1tzards in a 'risk of war' poli cy. If it succeeded in Jrotecting cert-neree by ne otiat ion, all but the most fanatic Eederalis would be won over. If ne30tiation ;-ailed, every st:p .L'. L; that led toward war would be be .elm dby 1: self -inter st and hi h nationali— an of the fast-shreaeilg naxau;act- uring element and the territorial ex nsienists. Every boliti cal loss gr0"ing out of oana,3 to foreign trsle would be oifset among the new industrialists. :ar 3 - C.) . O _tse f - fatal to overseas trade - would bring c me those 1r Ju red Ly nt to a Climax, sustainin" the govern- tile di sription of counere e.‘i a- '. n _‘ .51 \- 1.- v1 .‘ o n.‘- V‘ 3 vb f _o 1‘" ..1 o .. “’2: ~- 53 a means 01 1mg CMChtlhb his 1ore1 n yOliCj, n1e1.on tOOn ' 'L r- V 'L F V . I‘ "\ ‘ r‘ an extraordinary step for a Ranuelican. He asxed tile eleventh Con ress I P v1: -. v— ~‘r‘~\(, 1" ‘9 w~. ‘.h '3 '. P! vr. ' Lor increa on fun 1or m1litarg spendin,, 'es\1te Lullutln'o advlCC 'J) , c 1 r LI ,3 fl “" . x V . ‘« q-J- . ‘ fl .fifl ‘.0- vv ». vr‘ that defense aEpro)rlitwohU U9 Gap in nal1. oon_res , he ever, has a A. ,\ _; 0 ...s'j.do , - 0 1L0. " a . J' 'LLL... , 1C. 11.]... 1 . T”: r7 *\/——-VL. ‘T“' - w 11 I: I l‘ '1 Y‘ 1' 1‘ ' (l. 9 I- 0 ~ 0 . i r I (‘3 t4 C) \0 OD O I l 7‘— "a" .‘C'. 1" . . U , 1 O 4 O F L I4 C“ O 0' L. m .e- ....A F \a O a not ready 10? such a step.42 her was it ready to replace the aginfi non-intercourse bill with a stren er form of as no ic coercion, as Iadison wished. E t it did pass nacon's Bill Iunber Two, which rn gave Kadison a small lever to use a gainst the belligerents. 1he ll restor~d t3ace With both England and Vrru-ce, out provided that 0‘ FJ. if either of them should revoke its re stricti ens betore Harch 5, lSll, ainst the other in the event 45 non-intercourse would be restored a that it did not follow suit within three months. After hovezher, 1810, Madison sought to use the lever provided ty theI con oill against Britai1. The Due de Cadsre, Kanoleon's minister of foreign affairs, had announced August 5 that as of hover user 1, France's dc rees would ease to have effect, "it being urderstood tha in consequence of tl's declaration, the En'li sh shall revoke their orders in counci and ren unce the new principles of blockade....or that the United States...shall cause their rights to be respected by the En:lish."46 Madison had rese ations as to the rea.litv cf the repeal. Ere11ce still claired.the right to license Euneriean ships and to lin1 it tlm nuqber admitted to continental ports. ‘ She also continued to seize ships under the guise of the right to m:“ee munic inal regulations, rather tin under international [11" __ ' -. _ . law.’Q nut, accor61ng to irant, M{.d1son was ui ‘..J H I... u I (I'- O {‘7 O C) (J h) (+- F? ,..J (D F‘) iction of repeal because his only hepe of gettin: Britain to mane the'hext jump" was to do so, and because America's grievances I W". . ‘. p-l / #3. 191e., pp. 133, 130. o d., p0. 120, 117. its. .LDido, p0 13¢). “1" a 1 11 . e/ o 1 3.2.1.1., Ill, p0. 3o“, 3o7. 47. brant, fhg_firesissnt, p. ~17. ’1 U o r“: 48. Ibid., p. 131. See above, 2 KO a '\ u o ' ‘ . 3 3 : 3—, . (- ~o ' . ..- -- agairst srntain we e greater tzan ner grieranCes a3ainst trance. m x r p- (-1: ‘a-r o ‘. , r- - ’6 ‘4 a: L ereal ter, he cons isten' ly worked to gain tne repeal oi the oreers in council. Hhen Cong ess voted to declare war in June, 1312, no one in the United States realized that do dison finall r had succeeded.“ rant's interpretation fortifies th- contention of Adonls and Smith that Laaison ias been misunoerstood. He presented evidence to sho on t at it was Hadison who HP te tough diplomatic notes over the signature of his incompetczlt first secretary of state, who putlished diolomatic dispatches containing news of new belligerent outrages in order to encoura3e the election of a niliteit Twelfth Congress, and who time and again warned English and rrench ministers ‘ sole consequences 0:. their governments' actions. as O F}, g' (D 15 O ("I H 0 Brent also pointed out, if Madison ac sally had been at the mercv of the Welfth Conglcss, he could not have assured Lester in Lov- enber, 1511, that there would be no serious change in relations between the lnited Strtes "ed Great Britain before the return of the Hernet with Britain's answer to the demand that she revoke the orders in council. (This) was in effect an assurance a be no declaration of var ee fore Anril cr Ear. Coualed with other rem rcs...it Lurnis c; proox that the President re3e.rded n ms lf as guiding national policy. This vas made even n_air r by his blunt refuse to let the cent over sy with 3n3 3rd hin:e on the misconduct of France. “adison was if in? Gree.t Lrite in a period 0: grace in which \1 (D 0 or to CI» ange her policies without a sacrifice of pride and er cane an otherwise inevitable war.“w . . 1 Y F." A, q ' ‘. rd ' *3 w-J- T- « ~\»-\ —. v r \ o .5010. r‘:‘. 3/9, 734’Uo lLCCOI‘QiY‘ LO LIT-like, lIFILI‘GSE-Ilupht VIC. 4 , , n3 5 tne grievance that set off Lritain i‘ronx trance. 50. Britain re znover the orders in council June lo; the Unit ed States declared war June 18. 51. eront, The President, Pessin. f? 7"k3 3, - ’jr‘fl Om 56v. .1. LL’, 1:3}. J/U, )"llo ( \: lesnite the evidence that Isdison has seen misuz1derstood, ‘ it may still he "ondered if the 4*act that he was misunderstood was not in itself a factor in the cominr of the'Nar 01 1812. The 9,) 1 -ilure of Con; ress to pass a strong coercive bill in l310, for exam wl may have been Partly due to the fact that Congrzssmen did not know where Madison stood.ij Erant could say: From Foster's own disratches it is clear that the President laid down a policy with full knowledge that it would lead to war if Great Britain did not change her course....fiad the hritishe envoy trv n13- mitted the bare verbal records of his talks hi bh Hadison and Honore, and had no Fedcr.list soeeches or editorials reached England, the british cabinet might have been able to discern American intentions and act on the De sis of its knowled e.34 But Foster,1 fl1o he d dire ct can act with Madison, nevertheless acce ted the Federalists' interpretation of him as weak and in- decisive and tonsered his diseatches according y. He interoreted the “period of grace" as evidence tha+ u Ladis .cn want: d to delay the actions of a Congress he was too weak to resis . J Federalists who convinced Foster that their interpretation of Xadison was the correct one, were prejudiced and undoubtedly guilty of wishful tr linking But even V? r harks were sometimes unsure of the Free- ident's leaders his. "If the trumpet give an uncertain sound," said Calhoun of Madison, ”rho shall prepare for the battle?”(3 Mb rue coming of the war probably cannot oe exelained with- Q "av: ’v‘fifi‘ no=~w"'vs 3 .3911 e t‘o Y1 ”'1‘“ 3 an“ TNecrt U 4.. 1L9.“ va, cal La 0 S as p as $.v tOQ~ULV~J Otlv a—J‘ 4 HA 1 / P 3:. 111:, 131’). l .0, 1r-,. :3" Tx1r‘u I'xf‘v J11. *44—J.’ [\. 3‘4. T ’3' ’L‘ ’3 55. --d., p1. 171, ,7m. L” .. ,iO/ J3. ..«ZJO, Cliq r, n. JV. stressed. iadison lacked leadershio. Contemporaries Oiten were unaware of his true feelin 5. he see unable to convince his own party in the Eleventh Con "Jress of the necessity for military preparedness. It would seem that Brant failed to emonasize these Erant emnnasized one of the two key f ctors 1n henry Adams' interpretation of the causes of war - the role of ha dison. Lornan in the Trelf th Co nsres s. Risjord's lindings supported those of Adams. the contests :or indiV1dua Congressional seats in the South in 1810 and lound no evidence tin tthe winners were given a manda e to vote for var. Host of the Soutzern repr e- Twelfth C no see were hold vers iron previous C) (0 (O :5 cf- go ( f" H. < (D C) H. :5 F‘ 5 Congressess, and na11y of then Here re- ele cted without op1osition. Some of the new nerabers replaced like-minded represeuta chosen not to seek re-election. Even in these case where a seat was closelv contested, ”the election seldom turned on the issues km 0 U 1 Of foreign FOliCY-" Some of tne Southern rs she entered the Twelfth Conrress did so with a decide d preference for war. Others, 0 - q. 7 _L J. n ‘ . ‘ 1" (‘9 1ncluc1ng some who later voted 10r war were cec1deoly ior peace.“ Thus, although he Southeastern states ofl - Iaryland, V11-ginia, North Carolinr, and south Carolina were to cast J votes for war and only 11 against it, Risjord found no evidence that the vote reflected wicescale “is ontent with the status one among the electorate of E? sjcrd, "Conservatives ," p. 197. Kn \Jj \n \0 CL) \) :1 IL). 0 9 H O. ~id., pp. 197-200. 0 F' C 4-“h u \-L& e reluc t ~ .- J- ' It... c1011 “ j _ '1 v? v . _ 1': ‘ 1.1.”. . ., ._. -_- Jere oelieved ARR? -ouuncrn Jon 1‘ss1en here go to var ,ox'r‘ '1: ~‘ '— ~v11 W ‘ «pn'x‘. ”N’i run-eve? $1-n 1y"- Y‘fin "vn'r'4-"1clfi 3',fi(3'1\'*3 “ - .... l ofc'C L5. "9' CK; 461.1111; 0011 'I _L..ux-'4 b--u . Ml" .‘aL-Q l;LV\I.LlJ\J. (I) vadktCL 0L (’1. t . 1‘ ’32 ‘P «an r" n .., ‘1 Mr: J" . 1“ “cc: "(“3“- wn f 9' C -.' ~‘-- ' - L' 119 1---l Jr 0; P‘vwn 0-11» C3-;:I‘C...On (1-1.... ufle lubrauulb “Lg. 0.x. “1.1.0.13.le [‘"L‘ ‘4 ‘ I" w '1 J. . —rs ~ '0 r ‘ 4‘ ‘1‘. ‘ 1 . toners, 513: s n.1nan1el hbcon o1 ortl .a‘oliia, ¢h3 to oelieve ctill an L1: «L‘J fur 1.. .2 ' . 4.‘ ' cheir minds on one issue . no— \ - 2 .L T1113 $-01” finally voted ti- er nari 6,. % H. C‘- p H. ¢.- +Qwr J‘~J. y: Yo. wh- mili 1- ., A .. ,,1.. ,. .1 J. _.,‘-- the .m,r 1;; .s, ‘zut "cvuflrj.hot r111; L» O 01 war or pencem mtcil tile 133 h v n -L 13" j 01 lx>5u b0 » r‘ \ly ‘ +1v ‘v‘ V , 1 h r v n. “ J- f‘rs .', 'Lifi oecause 1e5 b-z liev ed t.1e country had alread5 moved too .ur in 440 ’1’1" rt}, “A “J“; . m‘ A “.- ‘ T“ .L I") 1” a ‘_ ‘\ __-' +w w+ “yo («I "3 ‘_: ,-. . J. “'1 _\ U1"? «"1 a \n “-4. ‘V 91-13;; 0. {.11 DO Q1104 Cl'h's‘j‘ I..; uL.OLLu Lula-Jr r. 1.; iv... ‘-.‘..o Ludo blie . . J 1 ... 4.‘ 1 1'. ~ 11.11. .-.. H, 1. .,_ , 1 ..w, .0; vouca o“ Ler in the oelie_ the. “1‘ his the ohl5 nonoraole .. '1 0 V- w: o o - n J.‘,. TTm'J. CL: _L h p011c3 TOAllan' ior 1e united uudbcu. r“! - .z. a; .r- 1A ’1 . 4.} .A 1 ; -ue mar, at 191 t as lar as the begun as cor cerncu, ... 1- --xx. 1,- .. 1 ,j ._ v. ,-_ w ~ -5.“ 0 Las uFOu;nb on o] men mno had HJQ a oell¢1ul oi fl 0-] A r. -L .-- » v‘n . J- + 0 v~/. Jp- Zzaiznn nousoramn Lno THE lnoCTBSJB leuestern lands, . /~ I“ Valley. “J *3- a 13.57 L‘. 0rd (.1. to believe that the +1 ,’ '- J- ‘ . f 9J3 he5 to tne coming of .L 1_ v 1‘ so the duraoili tr 0' the I L“ V. J) —!-‘. 1n general so dies oi the _ fl.” (flr‘ I ’g “L recte $00131 1‘. n r‘ . -. .- - r (v -. "‘ -. <'-\ a . .QLQLc, or nr ice. 1n the 10 er Lies; Slygl ‘ . u .~—‘| ~§ -. x -L :1 vv, - d n13 ar11ncn ugalhsb those ”he contir.1ed , . - - _ 1 .. o 1. 9 . .1; and econonic “coolens o- the .roncier ase :3. m1. 1 4., 1° an..- ..- 1.-. one "er. .an ne indirecclJ nald tiloute 7| ‘~ ~-: ~ ' mt \ 3*. 4- f -' q v ~ A 73" “...-’1 (~4-r‘ 1.0 [Lu40l'llb “0.1.; u 0 V1341}, 1.... Cu. 1. Jr. 91.119.) *n A '3‘“ Y‘ J“ 'N "n T"~-'- "3' 'rr‘ :- "r '- (-erOJ.’ 1.1. 1LOU 111 11:10 ' .Lu._;.V.-;) 0.. RlUCQI‘ ‘ pp. 1.70 , l7]. 0 ’ / ' ' H1 - n e / _. ~ fi-y‘ x ‘ - e n -- .‘ . 4‘ cl. ..sJo ~ uLLSCCVutLVGL, n. l c. 1: ", T1_ 0 - A0"? Las-:0 J. ‘ldo , Lo .1, f o .—*_ .L (A ‘7 . .- 1 U_‘o .-.-lfio K W” 7‘ -' —-‘ . ’7“: "."ur e4. w;1u., =3. .-oe, .119. r’ -' _ 1 , O"). T-' LOJ 1'. L..\./ o -- ‘ * ‘1, 4.‘ -.: ' ' ' . _, '. 'n,' a tne ccuces c1resset cg bfle “cwisionists Acre not luuortalt cfwn 1c .1 1'.‘ . .. 1,, 1, 1.11 .1, ,. ' ..-.. :1 L ,- 1 -1. tne nest, and assertcj tnat 'tne Only unifging -actor, or SQUU 13 -u ' . ‘6 ‘V -'—- 9 vvn 1, - .-.- ‘fi 1“ . -.-'. ‘n '\q- . ' . all seetions ol the COuntn}, Las tgc growinU lecliub oi putriotism, the ealization that something must be done to Vinuicctc the 1T1", o '11 1.qu "‘ '1 C -= fl 3” . ‘ rs J- r L nat1oncl non03. ' r “321130 plnc=1d rcz1t e1_ E9110 on one 11:13 Luau r1 1.. ._, r- . 4.1 1 11, U: ,3 _.1. ., .L-‘ 4!..- 1. ' ,3.. ,1 oonvrcssxcn 1ron one 3011t1 3mg bJG uinlc Atlantic st1tcs Hur .101 the Lajor sut,ort for war," and "1nd little to gain econ onical 1y (Q ‘1‘ ‘ L1} .1 1ron no conil ict. " if :1 ‘ J- ' -. 4~~.- . r ‘ u .- 4 ~ 7 '1 ~ --.J- 1‘ ‘— ‘ so“; 01 t11c1 SLQCQKSUtS m-ce by ulSQOFC 1n suLLOLt 01 tnctc m m -. '- - . . \u, f ~ ~ g I h - ~ ‘,~ Hr — , . - Vr . ‘5‘ .3 ‘.~. -ocrt1ons unoccr inaccurate ano poorly CuOth. 1o: e11ntlc Le . ‘ 'L" J” w - .‘-' ‘ O I) -c 4-” »-4 . - '. ; ‘-. “v . a scio udat ”the war of lcli Lao ode uOSt unec LOnic War - ~o .1 ,. 1- .0 .1 1U 1:..4. ”4. n, .1. — ,3 ° - 4.x" -.- otcto~ .cs ever 1ouunt.' / nut ne l1tcr Had b0 q11111v unis LJ 0""— . r‘ ‘I‘V 0 w 0 fi‘ .. u,‘ -‘~.‘ J... odflnb that econ uic i1ctors ere pres ent, cxocc1c l; in tne nest. And although economic factors cannot by t.cmc lvo s acco nt for ' P ”tho gc1’1ercl dc: and 101‘ 1:5.r,"hc said that ”ti-1e final synthes is 01 the causes of t}1e war 1.'ill ha a to tak into account various material 9 on n L Y "zar ~ ‘ 1cctors. ‘ Le QLQALSDQC m l n '- . x L' »~ r ' w "ré $‘ y or's interpretation or 5131 o tout tnc cxtent of British rcsoo nsi lity ior fallin1; prices cannot be L W'. 3 l ? n r m m - . Kn T ’+n’~ determ1nco. LOLchr, 1aglor's into e-t Las not n Lhotncr trituin 4"“P‘ jvc v ~- -’- -.“\ -‘~1-L- ~v‘~ L‘sn- 3“» so» cct11liJ was soo0431cle, b1t Lnetncr ..JStQT ors t1ou-nt she Lcs. Also, in criticizin“ Pratt, Risjord said t}1ct the ioec of the 3 - o +1 1 n «A' a '1 n . ' ma 06. che 1 use most TBCCut s uuies of tnc csrlf nation 1 . n 1 11 1 c. ~1V V’ :1, ma 1 " gOTlOdE w;ts the rrctt cn-s s. see u Jar A. ”11503, 119 Le” 7,-fl '4‘ . ".l‘ ‘.5 -.v 7 w", ‘ I- f‘a -’- -y ‘- 4“... $43.92, 11.32., Mil- 1;;3112 ($.81? .1. n1\ , lkj U1. ) ’ ‘31). 41-?1’8‘ / U 0?. iLlSJOI‘d, "CO" 6U. Ibid., D9 ZJW 690 igiéf’ p. 196 70. Ibid., pp. 20%, 2.5. O U lhf? 1“ A {10 lpLQo, PU. L m-- > 1‘ OJ. A "'1 611‘ -. 1 C) J l 1. 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C n; l O c O r f .1. a t L- P. _ o L 00 a r s r kv a” O C .0 n 8 . ‘H o n O at; “v 0 1N1“ ¢b O h. .1 W Lu 9 T O .t m d .4 O h“ 1 O t Z a r 0 1D .1. l 3 C .0 a; n* 12 Lu .hu .Hu 0 hr. . 01* t a r O O S O ...“ S G ¢ u JC n n O n n O n .1; ”a my nan cu nu ma -.C 4 * “Q r .1 C a r a O 70 nu nu "cg Lo ;u v. .1. ;u ;b my T; a“ na 1. ”Q r .1 V a .1 .d P .n n n . fl 3 my nu .1; .TU 55 um“ 1“ «é R .H .t 3 n S S 3 .1 VV 0 C 3v C a. m S n .1 3 0 an an mu .1; n.L .”u I a 4 .1 Q. a o .0 Va C n n -E n “L C .7. u. .. 01% O .u DJ. f .1 1L PM .1ru a, nu cu 1a+ ad a ~C. S .1. C .M H .3 .l 9 H «J G a ”n ~D e .. u S r h 0 a . . fl 3 . .t W O ..h S “H.“ O “A H‘ C 0 VI. AU n1“ XII“ t C V9 .t 3 .t n C 1' c ..u. ‘ n ~ 3 0 n; a O n; V 31 (:4 )1 '1‘ ‘5‘ “5‘0 J- uO (‘1 NA an W30 Lr Sud n 1“ :3 v D . . a '7‘ luquLu , fin L4...- I; \" q 3- (‘ OJ. 1044 O L; 4— 't it u .LJLA ri LvaP,- r ‘l c H gr th ‘I’ U. ull In .5- Hi i the ‘ wr LOT in a Hm I‘ O; 1 b " r’F .1 L 7‘ V0 L9 L3 FOL? ‘ _:\ 6Q -OT 1 .. , \ ‘w... ,rr. LLV A ..A C? L5 U .W Liv \Oo .'.‘ V ,. val l ' ... i 1 order to rho a ..A s w- 3. to t Ir 1 'noer t 1 nt r "‘ “~- A \J of 1; Ch u i (3 Q» {2:11. .rI‘O V1 .- 1 T FTGClQG “13* fl Vfirfi u. D803 me Q Q .3 v _n 4. 7v, ‘1 V ,\| r‘ 1.-.». A.“ .L s.) —< 1‘ .vs -Ln'.~-L Jed ~fi luboruuuu role. uses 0 ,— ILA. 18 C Y L ‘ t “130 via 01 {:1 O v I11 ELLV I n..- I .3. .A— | “To ~ C &l e»: 1 ~ A (1 r1 ’3 A H'LlC H F“ ._ s." 811 {31‘ u 'u LU} C. ar- I 1;!“ q CA. I-JVU '1'?" 'Q 1'“ Q .1' ._ O ..L . '1 .1— L’;O . r ’ n.'1 10: l . r' .gd d0" “vi ‘lOIl —A—L— O a. 1 l w VJ. C‘ .L L) U Ft 0 3‘ .Ad I“ J \u’ l r {3 V y 0 5\ i; Cl IUV (:J' ‘1 n. U“ 'l D I Q ) 0"" ii. 7-? we ‘ r< LANA ‘ -‘Q (‘ LEAK '1 {1'3 C J I 1 r‘ 1 ("I 1‘ ft r - “V613? - l «7 tr 1 .LJ LL. V: '7 {a ‘ rv‘lf Q '. “o n by , f. LA. 110 gout all L)U.V.'.- CA.» "\ m - .1, V“ \' +rv t 91.39 r3 3 n1 g-H ; x ‘J C‘ UL.) O 7231’]. ' O I‘ .- ~ I " -‘_,.. a .‘1 :._; lrs GOSH v IV-»\J.IL_JU “AK“. . . 1f. '. .41.}. I) (t. r more @1195 t )1 v \‘n-r fr 1?!‘ H I o 1- M , ._ 7’? O 2 v firm V—hk J- J. 131.21 a J u 3 S“ 10 ‘. V A.‘ 7.7.760 any .5 ..ma J\.>¢A S If .E" J. n. ‘- WHO . u 10!] b". 1")“ ‘qu‘ #1 u r... cl “QM. ‘ 1 ‘ A? c..I‘ 0 R; f‘ I‘l‘JI n h n J- ngC k4 . ‘ r» nus.) I C ould r 103 e 08. '0 v ‘1‘ vuo I go 11 Av lab \-. -..1. - n ILL 12 uCrLun I A .I‘ 1.. no In§~ l"; 3 Y‘o‘l , ”ourcr “1" , O‘- I O V my .. LA; , A outher- , TALE I 'L} C I” S b J. ’zn (.«V r‘ n J— 01 0 g .1 '. A ('5‘. othmr .0 1e .'.~ pr1nc1 0:) J -~ 9 O ‘3 13 k l ”1‘. ,-« a. .. 1 L '. 01" bed-1C ' o . , a , “ 11 t l ‘f‘i s ueasul ‘fit to ”W1‘xr‘ J;1.u LC' QI‘ C "I KAJ. q 'OOOIT] ('1 V l. . . _.‘ ,J .. ' - ~ o.‘ a - T" v; . - I ' w x n‘y‘ in u nuulthH go ulcowcrun dun Alon V5.3 about a -\ ‘.‘4V‘b."1ir 'I V ‘m 7 ~7- .‘ o i ,. ’« \ ~~V._r A v -‘ - ~,-\ f‘ h 1 ._ '-~‘ ‘ , ' ~ -— rfi y‘ f 1 4- v r. donolo e; Calieu anc oeshin. to eSL131 rclnbwonvllws oeochn U L them, the author 0; a delimitive stWfiy till hove to do a wroat J-V 41:": ' . D J.‘ _‘ _ - ° ‘ " A . l "\ ‘ . (J . '2 ‘ .’ " "- 7 ‘n" : HOP If“) ' . C‘QPIlI:-~ CL Uild ELI}. rxjulw-J_IX ‘NAVoL: lCilds.v 4L. :OI‘ e4.L.'-J;’. e ’ u‘iv (3 t.) ‘4 L [A f.) 5 $04 9.: }_J (L- "S 3 '3 (3 C’) Q (‘1‘ 33 q. <; O C" o C ',- O *S 3'] .“r are still J QCLOTS 1n fine I“? '3 -SOIZS _ F'T‘ ' ' " - .‘ .L ’5‘ .0 V1. .‘f‘ V , . . . - " \I’)"‘ 7?.) )3 r: A . ‘.\’1_ .N') r‘ " '"T‘w .0 . 15' Q " ‘r‘J IAELAA ”1;. ll.0re 1‘.) 9"].(i3laL-L 11.-.}.L; r)” ‘n \ VLviAJ- ~LLI-«E3‘I -’ \.‘nuou LO r5 7‘.“ “Mn?" *v -'- "1 J" ‘3 n'rv. 1'” “in ~" n no L’ "”3": A ' 0 “10 y-fi (-1—. - up '1 r» .;. ..4. 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' _ ‘ J.‘ /‘ . o~o \fi»\ 4 “(3" - ‘ \ 1. h g r~ [.40 T1 ..L. 0.. 1.." v-9omu 10h». “11’; -381 3 15 CVlQuIZCG Lulu“. D '. .N-, “H a» . -- D -‘ \fl" v.7“. w *vl‘ ~ ' lor .ufiOlQOh'S oolzure o; fixer loan 33 93 was L15 need \ T- =6 Opocsitlon to war. I , 11:15 c? O CCOI’iO‘I' 13.0 recs; LS. of evid‘-n o + on: roa: n ““ money. " 'l- v ‘n r- ‘ ,- 4-‘\ ‘. -- - v“ : ‘u ' , o . I-r, - 1 uft'S s-uug Mia snow; one course to unlcn toe nl‘ou o d.os -I v- -~-. 'l-L h -‘ -L .‘ -L1' r‘ -I ' . - J-‘ -. .-. I r‘ :LV' j. ‘ 4—» J- QO "3?. bio-1 U 1‘55" IJC'J p-18 1710.111 Cl 1-: ‘8 S u 1LCTJ-L041L}. U Uvsueb 1‘81 3. L150 ‘90 .u, r .9 . .-L~ ° 4.- ' .* 4. ”A. , o. .‘w .1. one TCJSOLS lor reso*1cvlals m1QAp Qo L-r 1H ”J «1r. to hhflb A "N. ’: ‘ n 1"" . " -‘ 'u " "‘\ AlfiI' a. ZlSJOTQ, "Cozservlrlwuo, U. How. '~ :‘r “'\ '.‘~ \ TY )0 «1‘38 EA'JOKrC , «It-.93). ..L' y 1‘ '5- -- r“ -' . r: r' -' .. ooe CuOve, gnaw. 3, yo. ;+, ‘3. 5‘ C . -. - - lfl.\ - .\'. J. oeo above, Jump. 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'5 '1 C4 J‘p‘.f '3,.;,. f T‘P IRQmION w; ~.. ----.. —h..JiJ_.--_.A‘~-.LV.J_/' U-- -u—J'JA—IA ‘ J- “ k!— / ‘11- (win. \T.‘\, "f. ,1‘ ".\ fur) , “ '. ‘_'\\‘ \41 u...ul.:.K.-...J 42-4, V‘lnloq/ ~ f‘. - 'w '."!‘ w‘m l - >- - \tou .4. 3.".-- 44. —.- -——~-.- I A. {V ‘3 L1 U ’3 A, “ 1 fi _/ W 7 I 0 ° (1.. _— .* A f\ 1.. ’1' ll 0 FA IO\ N \J) L_.! .O CO O‘x {7 C) C’.‘\ L \v) \o L) Hm -.J \D '0 0 \JJ \n H '\-I) I—" I") loco O 1950) pp. “ v (.LL45 I. +~wrx U-L'~.a H (717) "7, /’ 4/ "le . \ \ I Ill 1 ) 4 «ll 14 .4 0C“: muffin» («O “0.32%. $011.00 P'HJQCU _/ “11,4 ) I1 I. 4 I.) 4”; 4‘ )\\\« 1‘. \.«.1.. . \J .) )41~\ ..IIuI' final.J\J I4...“ m . O 01% pkKV Why bro T4059Hh... nxnxk HO CKKC mH my V. I\« C((W. AINH\ kbruLPfiCHu bran... Pmflfldki M®M.U”.de. N 341. )_ «Ii-a 41.. ..ICJr ‘4. .5! .).w,.- \flk )..)\:l~ ‘14. A“ :~ )5 41.44”“ «ldJJHIfl'HMfl .xct( :rLr .L- +mUU 0v. ; CC (V... _ C 0 W «low. ; NHC a... .... 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Hawa mo BHHHH Humommdwm Oh 0. thmm mnH "4| \Q 5 ) ommfiNHm «wwwwam mflm4m:m 0\ mmmwwmm. www.mN. www.mmm owm.onw Hmm4ww¢ «H on, ooo.mm 0H ooo.nm wmum QHE<< -.u:mo oe.wswqau2 nmmmqm mo nao> ...m mo m mum Amsosacwgmv .lemmm pmcamm< mpofl mzo Andogafimspv pwmm gem whom mso AmdoSflzmca cowpomhm pmnfimmq pmmhmq AmSQEHchDV somwmdnm prHdm¢ hm ogmq mmsogflsmcp coapowhm ppm pmmamq .dm,0p va pmwm mom mach 3m GNHQm,mpo> mcov coapodnm pmcafia: uthmq .I and :42wm min Oman pncawsfi hmmhwq mmSO Haas: I. npdom (HHMGW h\\ 000 ur .O Howmmm A.pgoov HHQH mo 9. nQHmerdmm 1 a 4N N (#0 Fuo .0H.flrmm HQHB....H... «mom oama .HH dH- Nomi mmmmmzmme msflfiogmo sysom 9.3g 82.... 99 mflamm.:.mrm~H.o_ VALUE I AIIRICAI DCIISTIS III ’TS, 1790-1815 (Tnousands of Dollars) 1r "1 ‘V "‘ 9. ;Cdr anorts fear 9K arts ~— W— * 1790 19,905 303 92,406 1791 18,512 1334 u1,ué7 1792 19.753 1805 43»3 7 79’ 39,260 1306 41,353 179 26,549 1337 40 099 1795 39.689 303 9:434 1796 40,764 1-3 9 31,405 1797 29,850 1816 («.307 179, 33,527 1811 45.374 1790 31,l@3 1312 30 028 130 47,973 1313 25,C‘03 1302 35,7C3 lSlQ 6,702 1315 45.975 c D a, - . fl v v IN r: yource: horth, -cononlc uro in, p. 241 100 1302 Cn_ 1513 190M 1805 C) ”x /. Q UL} 1807 1d35 1309 1310 Source: APPEEDIX 1V LV"”WTTVW Lfi‘fi‘ Q‘IIN: lQ.’T .AD-JA3 nflq u: 4g, Q ~ (-nousaAds of acres) A res Year Acres 340 1811 20? 199 1812 392 31@ 1813 256 619 1814 123 '73 1815 l,C93 28’ 1810 — 196 1617 1,415 1&3 15- fimer101n ggfite Eggers, Class III, Fitagcg, Vol. I, p. 715; Vol. II, pp. 7, ff.; ‘01. III, Ep. 39, 229. 101 f: l“‘ ‘1‘! Law .1 1,- _";j H 9U;‘- C kt! huh-h \