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ABSTRACT

RADIO AND POLITICS: THE EFFECT OF NETWORK
RADIO ON PRESIDENTIAL COMPAIGNS,
1928-1948

BY

Nicholas William Dedi

With the advent of radio broadcasting in the early
19203 came many claims of future social change by proponents
of the medium. Being a tool of high potential for reaching
the masses, radio was soon used to a great extent by
political parties and candidates. It is in the political
arena that many changes were predicted; changes brought
about in the style of campaigning through use of the new
medium. Radio would end old-style oratory, mass rabble-
' rousing and emotional appeals. It would accurately reflect
the speakers' personality, allow candidates to reach
thousands of people without travel, and thus halt barn—
storming and shorten appreciably the length of campaigns.

The presidential politicking of the "radio age,"
1928 to 1948, was examined in this light. Research con-
sisted of library work, centered on radio and political
history, with a careful examination of newspapers of each

election year. Issues of the day, campaign strategies, and

Nicholas William Dedi

special campaign radio programs were recalled. When the
information was compiled, it was found that radio use had
not substantially changed the style and substance of
campaigns over time. A few claims were validated--radio
accurately projected personalities (for better or worse),
did halt old-style platform oratory, and campaigns in the
19403 were two or three weeks shorter than previous ones.
It became clear, however, that emotional appeals were
certainly not halted, that barnstorming as a campaign tool
flourished throughout the era, and that the broadcast
speech from various points on the map, not the special
productions, carried the bulk of the campaign weight.
There were a number of cleverly conceived productions
throughout the years covered, and these are examined as
historial footnotes to the campaigns and to the development
of the art of the radio medium itself.

Many of the conclusions drawn concerning the lack
of change over the years can be carried further into the
television age, and this aspect is mentioned in the final

section of the work.

RADIO AND POLITICS: THE EFFECT OF NETWORK
RADIO ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS,

1928—1948

BY

Nicholas William Dedi

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Television and Radio

1975

Accepted by the faculty of the Department of
Television and Radio, College of Communication Arts,
Michigan State University, in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the Master of Arts degree.

,/

 

Director of Thesis

ii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to thank Mr. Arthur Weld of the

Department of Television and Radio for his guidance and

assistance in the preparation of this work.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter Page
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . 1
II. RADIO AND POLITICS: THE BEGINNING. . . . 3/
III. THE 1928 CAMPAIGN . . . . . . . . . 6
IV. 1932 AND THE EMERGENCE OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT . . . . . . . . . . . 9
V. THE "RADIO PRIEST" AND "THE KINGFISH". . . 13
VI. THE DRAMAS OF 1936 . . . . . . . . . 22
VII. THE QUIET CAMPAIGN OF 1940 . . . . . . 32
VIII. "THE CHAMP" AGAIN . . . . . . . . . 37
IX. THE UPSET OF 1948 . . . . . . . . . 44
x. CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . 53/
FOOTNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

iv

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The use of the airwaves by candidates seeking
election has been an important part of American political
life since the early 19205. The rapid growth of radio,
leading to the establishment of the networks in 1926 and
1927 paralleled the interest among politicians in this new
method of reaching the electorate. With the emergence of
the National Broadcasting Company and the Columbia Broad—
casting System came the development of a new style of
campaigning; an increasingly creative one which sought to
transcend regional differences and appeal to the citizens
on a nationwide basis. New voices and personalities
appeared. Radio served the political process and in turn
was served by it--the medium's potential for growth and
influence was realized. The boom years of 1928 to 1948
saw network radio illuminate both problems and personalities
nation-wide, providing listeners with information and
exposure to candidates for office.

Though radio was used in many state and local

elections, the Presidential campaigns and network

broadcasts provided the important innovations and techniques.
Many claims were made for radio--its use would streamline
conventions and shorten campaigns; end mass rabble-rousing
and emotional appeals; halt barnstorming and old—style
oratory; project personalities more effectively. By
examining the radio campaigns of the network era, it can
be determined which of the claims were realized, and to
what degree. The presentations and programs can also be
viewed in an historial light as contributors to the

development of the medium itself.

CHAPTER II

RADIO AND POLITICS: THE BEGINNING

On the night of November 2, 1920, radio station
KDKA in Pittsburgh broadcast the returns of the Harding-Cox
presidential election. This was the first pre-scheduled,
pre-advertised radio program in American history.1 By
September of 1922, WEAF in New York had broadcast the first
commercial program. WEAF had been set up by American
Telephone & Telegraph for the express purpose of "toll"
broadcasting, by which any interested party could pay for
use of the station and deliver his message to the audience.2

In October 1923 the first hookup for the broadcasting
of a program took place, linking WEAF with WJAR in
Providence, Rhode Island.3 The trend toward such "chain
broadcasting" was stimulated by the upcoming national
political conventions. The Republican meeting came and
went with little out of the ordinary; the Coolidge-Dawes
ticket was chosen quickly. In contrast, the Democratic
convention in Madison Square Garden lasted 15 days and

took 103 ballots to nominate the compromise candidate

John W. Davis. Carried by eighteen stations fed by WEAF

and linked with AT&T cables,4 the convention was a dramatic
one, with angry battles over the Ku Klux Klan and peace—
making efforts by the aging William Jennings Bryan. There
were also humorous moments, as the gallery soon began to
join in the chant "Alabama casts twenty—four votes for
Oscar W. Underwood!" which Opened each roll call.

The campaign of 1924 marked the first of many future
voice comparisons of Presidential candidates. The differ—
ences between a good platform Speaker and a good radio
speaker were noted. Democrat Davis had a voice with a good
"bell-like quality" but "which over the radio muffles and

5 Davis himself felt that radio was

fogs to some extent."
changing politics in that "it will make the long speech
impossible or inadvisable . . . the short speech will be
the vogue." Though this was true to some extent, Davis
erred in his statement that "almost anyone has a good radio
voice if he remembers to speak slowly and does not shout."6
Predsident Coolidge, his slow measured tones effective on
radio, campaigned successfully from Washington, speaking
often on hookups of over twenty stations coast-to-coast to
get his message across to the peOple.

At an early age, radio had started to play an
important role in American politics, attracting millions of
listeners to conventions and campaign speeches. Though
changes in politicking were not yet evident, radio itself

benefitted through its association. Coast—to-coast

-broadcasting through use of long-distance lines was proved

feasible. The desire to broadcast political proceedings to
as many listeners as possible Speeded up network develop-
ment, which otherwise might not have become reality for a
number of years.7

The first official radio network made its appearance
when the Radio Corporation of America purchased WEAF from
AT&T and formed the National Broadcasting Company (NBC).
NBC debuted on November 15, 1926, with "the most pretentious
broadcasting program ever presented."8 On that night over
one thousand peOple gathered in the Grand Ballroom of New
York's Waldorf Astoria to hear a short address by NBC
president Merlin Aylesworth, performances by the New York
Symphony and the Oratorio Society, and remote pickups from
Chicago and Kansas City.

A second network, the Columbia Phonograph Broad-
casting System, entered the field on September 18, 1927
with uncertain and insufficient financial backing.9 Sorely
lacking the established prestige of NBC, CBS had trouble
finding sponsors. Finally in 1928, the network (now
renamed the Columbia Broadcasting System) acquired capital
and a new president, cigar manufacturer William S. Paley.
Paramount Corporation then became a 49 percent partner in

CBS and the network acquired solid footing.

CHAPTER III

THE 1928 CAMPAIGN

The 1928 Presidential candidates, Republican Herbert
Hoover and Democrat Alfred Smith, had a much greater
Opportunity to reach the voters through radio than their
counterparts had in 1924. Set sales had skyrocketed and
more stations were in operation. Radio was capable of
reaching forty million people as compared with only a few
million in the previous election. In 1928, forty—two
stations carried the Democratic convention and forty-four
the Republican one; in 1924 there had only been twenty-four
stations Operating in the country. There was one negative
factor for candidates, however--the practice of charging
them for radio time once they had accepted their party's
nomination began during this campaign.10

Analyses of the candidate's voice were many--
Hoover's, it was said, "lacked emotional warmth" but
alienated few, while Smith's East Side accent (he
pronounced radio "raddio") hurt him in rural areas.

Several radio innovations were introduced in the

1928 race. The GOP prepared thirty-five—minute talks

covering main areas of campaign interest. These talks,
covering Prohibition, farm policy and other issues were
delivered by well-known local individuals such as the
mayor, barber and grocery-store owner. The Democrats
presented a play on the life of Al Smith, the "Happy
Warrier," on CBS October 20. Smith himself took to the
road and covered a large part of the country with major
speeches. He reached the nation-wide audience with a
series of talks aimed at the locality in which he was
speaking. Smith touched on farm policy at Omaha,
prohibition at Milwaukee, religious intolerance at Oklahoma
City. Speaking extemporaneously, he captivated his visible
audiences but unfortunately,nuufllof his colorful personality
was lost over the radio.

Both candidates spoke on the eve of the election,
and on the following day Hoover triumphed with twenty-one
million votes to Smith's sixteen million, and with a margin
of 444 electoral votes to 87.

Network presentations cost the GOP $435,000 and the
Democrats $650,000. These totals accounted for only 18
and 10 percent of Democratic and Republican campaign
expenses,ll a rather low figure given the potential
audience available at the time. The planners of the radio
campaign searched for more personal ways to sway the voters
they needed. The GOP local delivery of national issues and
the Al Smith radio strategy evidenced this. Through

drama, either a long play (such as the program on Smith's

life) or a short skit, the listener could be drawn in in a
different way, rather than being turned off by campaign
rhetoric. Speeches played a large part, however, and would
do so for years. The voice analyses of candidates
expressed the importance of a good radio style. Such a

style would be embodied in the next decade, in the

speeches of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

CHAPTER IV

1932 AND THE EMERGENCE OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The 1932 campaign was waged during a time of
depression and hardship. The Republican Party rested
their hOpes on the incumbent, Herbert Hoover, while the
Democrats chose New York Governor Franklin Delano Roosevelt.
A Democratic victory seemed almost inevitable, regardless
of the candidate and his abilities as a radio performer,
yet Roosevelt was regarded as excellent in this respect.

Roosevelt broke precedent when he traveled to
Chicago to accept the party's nomination of him personally.
The parties had begun in 1932 to tailor their conventions
to the availability of the radio audience. Important
speeches and appeals were slated for prime time. Still,
the length of the conventions and the Speeches during them
stayed as they had been for years, and some party chiefs
worried about voter irritation developing into a backlash.
This irritation would continue to be expressed for a
number of years in many forms of protest, but did not
result in much change——the conventions remained a bastion

of long-windedness.

10

The facilities available for campaign presentations
had again grown over the previous four years. Radio
covered over seventy—five major cities and their environs,
and wide use by both parties was predicted. Senate
Majority Leader Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas felt that
"nation-wide hookups are the speediest means of carrying
first-hand information directly to the people. They tend
to stimulate interest in public issues and measures. The
power of radio to influence public opinion is very great
. . ."12 The major parties were willing to Spend great
sums to capture that public opinion-—a total of $1.25
million for national broadcasts.13 The GOP used seventy-
three hours of network time as compared to forty-eight in
1928; the Democrats used fifty-one hours, one less than in

1928.14

This was another year in which the party Spending
less won the election; however, the Democrats were so
heavily favored in 1932 that it is unlikely the radio
campaign had much effect one way or another. Yet Roosevelt
had as great a margin over Hoover in radio proficiency as
he had in the vote columns. This factor allowed the
Democrats to spend less for radio time in future elections
and not suffer for it due to the quality of Roosevelt's
Speeches.

Roosevelt won the election with twenty-three million
votes to Hoover's Sixteen million. The electoral college

count favored FDR 472 to 59. It is plain that if Hoover

indeed had a plan to pull the country out of the Depression,

11

his lack of skill as a radio Speaker did nothing to rally
an already hostile electorate behind him. Though Hoover
had the edge on Smith, he suffered greatly in comparison
with Roosevelt, eliciting such comments as, "the tonal
characteristics of his voice approximate the effect of an
old-fashioned phonograph in need of winding."15
The reasons for the effectiveness of Roosevelt as a
radio speaker have long attracted the attention of political
and voice analysts. Many of these cited the President's
ability to create a feeling of intimacy with his audience.
Roosevelt was able to explain complicated issues in Simple
yet uncondescending terms, and to give the impression that
he had full mastery of these issues. Broadcasters also
admired these qualities. John Carlile, production manager
of CBS, believed that Roosevelt's voice was "a well-trained
instrument, capable of reflecting his moods and the color
of his thoughts. To have heard him and never to have seen
him would be enough to convince the listener that he was
sincere."16
The campaign of 1932 furthered the development of
radio in defining the needed characteristics of a strong
radio speaker. Franklin D. Roosevelt epitomized the ideal,
and was to use his talent to great advantage in his first
term. Radio itself benefitted from its use as an instrument
of Presidential communication; the "fireside chats" helped

tie Washington and the nation together in a time of crisis.

Though political dramatizations--using actors and actresses

12

to portray American citizens and illustrate their
difficulties--were to create a furor in 1936, the first

term of the "New Deal" was dominated by the political
Speech. There were other voices heard besides Roosevelt's.
The challenges of Father Charles Coughlin and Senator

Huey P. Long, issued in an age of burgeoning radio interest,
swelled their power and deeply worried the Administration.17
Coughlin and Long seemed to disprove many of the claims of

political change made by radio in the earlier years, and

their use of the medium deserves attention.

CHAPTER V

THE "RADIO PRIEST" AND "THE KINGFISH"

The period of 1932—1936 was one of agonizing steps
toward rebuilding of the American economy. President
Roosevelt's legislation and programs moved at a slow
bureaucratic pace, however, and many Americans despaired
of ever regaining a decent condition of life. They harbored
feelings of distrust and resentment toward the Roosevelt
Administration. Though a majority of voters supported the
President, there were men whose words attracted the down-
trodden eager to grasp at solutions. Two such men were
Father Charles Coughlin of Michigan and Senator Huey Pierce
Long of Louisiana.

Father Coughlin first began broadcasting in 1926
over WJR in Detroit on behalf of his Shrine of the Little
Flower in a Detroit suburb. He felt that radio appeals
would be useful in improving the financies of his church.
Coughlin broadcast directly from the Shrine, paying WJR
$58 weekly in line costs. His early talks were aimed
primarily at children and included no references to

politics or economics. In time he turned his attention

13

CHAPTER V

THE "RADIO PRIEST" AND "THE KINGFISH"

The period of 1932—1936 was one of agonizing steps
toward rebuilding of the American economy. President
Roosevelt's legislation and programs moved at a Slow
bureaucratic pace, however, and many Americans despaired
of ever regaining a decent condition of life. They harbored
feelings of distrust and resentment toward the Roosevelt
Administration. Though a majority of voters supported the
President, there were men whose words attracted the down-
trodden eager to graSp at solutions. Two such men were
Father Charles Coughlin of Michigan and Senator Huey Pierce
Long of Louisiana.

Father Coughlin first began broadcasting in 1926
over WJR in Detroit on behalf of his Shrine of the Little
Flower in a Detroit suburb. He felt that radio appeals
would be useful in improving the financies of his church.
Coughlin broadcast directly from the Shrine, paying WJR
$58 weekly in line costs. His early talks were aimed
primarily at children and included no references to

politics or economics. In time he turned his attention

13

14

to the adult audience, and found he could produce a steady
flow of contributions by speaking on certain topics; among
them the perils of communism and unregulted capitalism.l8

Coughlin's talks were of no single ideological
stand, and soon he was delivering them to a larger
audience. He added stations WMAQ Chicago and WLW Cin-
cinnati in 1929, effectively blanketing a large segment of
the midwest. His affiliation with WMAQ led to the purchase
of time on the CBS network starting in 1930. On January 12
of that year, he delivered an attack on the evils of
communism, the "red serpent," and was Shocked at the
resultant outcry by many educational and government peOple
against his stand. This aroused him to step up his anti-
communist campaign, but did not stop him from delivering
equally strong attacks against unbridled capitalism. He
called for American businessmen to stOp the Spreading
appeal of communism by acknowledging their own duty to
raise the standard of living for all Americans, not merely
a privileged few.

Many members of Coughlin's audience were now paying
a dollar a year to the Radio League of the Little Flower,
keeping Coughlin supplied with funds for air time. Though
the man now known as the "Radio Priest" attracted millions
of listeners, CBS grew increasingly uneasy as Coughlin's
talks became more and more controversial. In the fall of
1930, he spoke of "the quicksand of radical socialism" and

also of the rich, "dulled by the opiate of their own

15

contentedness to such a degree that they possess no
prospect of what future years hold for our nation."19
CBS balked when it learned of Coughlin's plan to attack the
economic provisions of the Versailles Treaty, however, and
asked him to refrain from any "objectionable" statements.
He told the network that he would Speak instead on an
entirely different subject, and did-—CBS' attempt to censor
him.

The incident marked a turning point in Coughlin's
career. He asked his listeners whose position they favored
--his own or that of CBS. The response came in a flood of
mail (estimated at over a million pieces) favoring
Coughlin. This convinced the priest of his license to
speak out on anything he desired. So convinced, he
delivered his Versailles Treaty speech on January 11,
1931.20

CBS eventually eased Coughlin off the air with some
administrative program juggling, and NBC refused him,
couching their refusal in unspecific terms. Undeterred,
Coughlin formed his own linkup of twenty-Six stations from
Maine to Colorado at a weekly line cost of $14,000.21

Father Coughlin was a firm supporter of Franklin D.
Roosevelt from before the latter's election. Roosevelt's
reform programs appealed to Coughlin, and the priest liked
to align himself personally and politically with the

Administration. He felt that FDR was a "President who

thinks right, lives for the common man, knows patience and

16

suffering . . . and that human rights are more sacred than

22 These feelings were not to last;

financial rights."
Coughlin's impatience with the legislative pace and the
President's own coolness toward the priest precipitated a
gradual breakdown of relations. When the Secretary of the
Treasury in 1934 published a list of silver owners,
designed to question the motives of those pressing for
silver monetization (Coughlin among them), he included on
the list the Shrine of the Little Flower. Coughlin,
astonished at the treatment of him from an Administration
he supported, denied owning silver and pointedly praised it
as a "gentile" metal. Though the priest doubted that
Roosevelt himself had anything to do with the published
list, the incident heralded a final break with the
Administration. Though Coughlin vacillated for a time, he
eventually found himself totally at odds with Roosevelt.23
He was joined in this respect by another man, far removed
in distance and background: Senator Huey Long of Louisiana.
Long came to Washington after four years as
Louisiana's governor. He was already a legend in his home
state; his flamboyance, his record and his methods insured
it. He had built more roads, schools and hospitals than
any previous governor, and thus had a wedge against
criticism of his strongarm methods of control.24 Like
Coughlin, Long appealed to many people who were suffering

greatly during the Depression. Like Coughlin, he first

supported Roosevelt and later broke with him; but unlike

l7

Coughlin, Long had the prestige of the office of United
States Senator to lend credence to his performances.

Long used radio to build his power base in
Louisiana. As governor,tjmeman known as the "Kingfish"
received much free time from his friend W. K. Henderson,
the owner of powerful KWKH in Shreveport. Long's style
was one of Bible-quoting informality and unbridled attack
on his enemies, whose numbers dwindled throughout the state

through the Governor's intimidation.25

Though a few still
opposed Long, they were unable (due mostly to their own
inefficiency) to combat him effectively.

In his early days in the Senate, Long was enthused
by Roosevelt's programs but deeply suspicious of some of
his associates. He soon began attacking the Administration
for its ties with the bankers who had controlled Hoover,
and he was further alienated by some of the President's
more conservative measures. Roosevelt widened the gap by
calling Long one of the most dangerous men in America. The
President, able at this point to tolerate Father Coughlin,
obviously felt that any Presidential patronage of Long
would strengthen the renegade Senator.26

Though Huey Long was busy in Washington, he con-
tinued to pull the strings in Louisiana. He controlled
literally everything down to the appointment of local
officials. Corruption and power politics ruled the day.

Long defended himself by pointing to his record and speaking

on a new theme—-"Share—The-Wealth." Though Long had little

18

knowledge of economics and a tenuous grasp of the mechanics
of his plan, the idea of making the super-rich share their
wealth with the rest of the Depression-ridden populace was
appealing. It was felt by some, however, that Long, while
truly believing in the plan, used it more as a tool for
political appeal than one for social reform. For a while
Long had accomplished much in the physical sense, he had no
record of wage hikes, union support, pension plans, or

27 Still he was convinced that

abolition of child labor.
his power and appeal would grow to Presidential proportions,
if not by 1936 then surely by 1940. He felt that public
support would eventually win him the Presidency. He soon
had a national audience to which he could preach his
gospel-~the audience of the NBC network during the spring
and summer of 1934.
Huey Long kept his unique style in his network
addresses, and used a trick he had developed in Louisiana
to help increase his audience:
Hello, friends, this is Huey Long speaking. I have
some important things to tell you. Before I begin, I
want you to do me a favor . . . I want you to go to
the telephone and call five of your friends and tell
them Huey is on the air.28
NBC kept Long supplied with time, giving him three
network periods in one two-week span. Frank Russell, a
network vice-president, felt that Long was a good drawing
card who could fill unsponsored time, and whose controversial

nature could help dispel any notions that radio was censored.

The Senator certainly helped in that respect—-he once

19

called President Roosevelt "a liar and a faker" and
challenged someone to "indict me if they want me to prove
it."29
The Administration was more worried about the
political pull of Huey Long than his attacks, and the
specter of a third-party coalition of Long and Father
Coughlin (who had started to attack the President)
frightened many Democrats. Certainly the two men were
powerful enough to siphon off many votes. Long, helped by
his network exposure, had formed "Share-The-Wealth" clubs
which claimed seven million members nation-wide; and
Coughlin, with his followers supporting Long, could
transcend the barriers hindering serious political action
by an Irish-Catholic priest. The President himself seemed
worried; in February 1935 he wrote that "in normal times,
the radio and other appeals by them would not be effective.
However, these are not normal times; the peOple are jumpy

30

and very ready to run after strange gods." In March,

General Hugh Johnson, former head of the National Recovery
Administration, attacked the demogogues in a speech over
NBC from the Waldorf Astoria in New York. While speaking
out on the dangers, Johnson also linked the names of Long
and Coughlin for the first time:
You can laugh at Huey Long-—you can snort at Father
Coughlin--but this country was never under a greater
menace. Long is a dictator by force of arms and Adolf
Hitler has nothing on him any way you care to look at
both. Added to the fol-de-rol of Senator Long, there

comes dripping over the air the burring brogue of the
Irish-Catholic priest . . . musical, blatant bunk from

20

the very rostrum of religion . . . we can neither

respect nor revere what appears to be a priest in

Holy Orders entering our homes with the Open sesame

of his high calling and there, in the name of Jesus

Christ, demanding that we ditch the President for

Huey Long.
Johnson felt that an Open alliance had been formed between
"the great Louisiana demagogue and this political padre."31

The speech caused consternation at the White House.

Democratic leaders felt that such a coalition could draw
three or four million votes away from Roosevelt, possibly
ending the New Deal which had made much progress. Further,
the Johnson Speech gave Coughlin and Long added Opportunity
for national exposure. Huey Long spoke over the networks
and instead of delivering the expected blast at Johnson,
calmly spoke of the Administration's effort to destroy him
and suppress "the truth." He then set forth his "Share-

The-Wealth" program to the largest audience of his life.

The New York Times reported that Roosevelt and Johnson

 

"had turned Huey Long into a real political menace."32
Coughlin's reply to Johnson was to try and match him

in abuse. Johnson felt that the priest's statements

could not be told apart from Hitler's, including the anti—

Semitism. He likened Coughlin's Union for Social Justice

with fascism. Though Father Coughlin himself was still

wary of formally aligning himself with the brusque Long,

the Senator for his part said he "liked Father Coughlin

. . . I think his ideas are sound" and later that "Father

Coughlin has a damn good platform and I'm 100 percent for

21

him . . . what he thinks is right down my alley." But the
vacillating priest's alliance with the Long forces was not
to take place in the Senator's lifetime. On September 8,
1935, the "Kingfish" was gunned down outside his Louisiana
capital. He clung to life for thirty hours, gaining and
losing consciousness. He was heard to say, “please Lord,
don't let me die--I have a few more things to accomplish."
He expired on September 10, a dozen days past his forty—
second birthday.33
To Coughlin, the assassination of Long seemed "the
most regrettable thing in modern history." That fall, the
priest finally broke irrevocably with the New Deal, and
soon formed an uneasy alliance with Long's lieutenant--
Gerald L. K. Smith and pension proponent Dr. Francis
Townsend. This Union Party backed Representative William
Lemke for President, but was doomed to fall apart from the
pull of its own strong personalities as the election of
1936 approached. Coughlin himself promised to leave the
air if Lemke did not poll nine million votes. The
Republicans were pleased by the goings-on and nominated
Kansas Governor Alfred M. Landon, a strong vote-getter in
the otherwise poor GOP showing of 1934. Roosevelt was
renominated by acclamation, setting the stage for a bitter
campaign which featured hard politics and radio fireworks,

and led to a surprising mandate for the Second New Deal.

CHAPTER VI

THE DRAMAS OF 1936

The radio campaign of 1936 started at the turn of
the year, long before the conventions were held and candi-
dates chosen. The GOP correctly recognized the need for a
strong and early start. In mid-January, the Republican
National Committee approved a million dollar budget for
radio. Thomas G. Sabin, director of the party's radio
division, envisioned a series of programs "dramatizing the
country's current problems and the evils of the New Deal."34
The networks were alarmed at this mention of "dramatization,"
feeling that political appeals in the form of plays or skits
would not constitute an intellectual appeal; rather, it
would be a sort of "cheapening" of the political campaign.
NBC and CBS decided not to allow such programs.

The GOP responded angrily. Harrison E. Spangler, a
director of the Republican National Committee, believed
that "the two great broadcasting companies are attempting
to prevent the GOP from having freedom of the air . . .

whatever may be the cause of their attempt to censor a

political party, they have abandoned their function as

22

23

servants of the people, surrendered their independence and
joined the dictators of the New Deal." The networks stuck
to their position: dramatic skits "did not constitute an
intellectual appeal to the electorate" and might serve to
"overemphasize minor things strictly through dramatic
value." NBC president Lenox Lohr feared that the skits would
appeal to emotion, passion and prejudice. The Republicans
overcame the network roadblock, however, when they acquired
time over powerful WGN Chicago, owned by Roosevelt-hater
Colonel Robert McCormick.35

Entitled "Liberty at the Crossroads," the Skits
constituted a brilliant use of radio as a campaign tool.
They juxtaposed familiar historical episodes with actions
of the Roosevelt Administration, and featured actors and
actresses playing everyday people confronted with the
"problems" of the New Deal. In one sketch, a young couple
buying meat object to the high price, and is told in no
uncertain terms by the butcher about the processing tax.
Another scene depicted a group of oldsters in a country
store arguing about the Constitution and what it meant
"before the days of Roosevelt."36

Two of the most famous skits dealt with government
spending. One of these featured ”John and Mary" at the
Marriage License Bureau:

CLERK: Now what do you intend to do about the national

debt?
JOHN: National debt . . . me?

24

CLERK: You are going to establish a family, and as the
head of an American family you will shoulder a
debt of more than $1,017.26 . . . and it's
growing everyday. Do you still want to get
married?

JOHN: You . . . er . . . I . . . what do you say,
Mary?

MARY: Maybe . . . maybe . . . we'd better talk it
over first, John. All those debts. When we
thought we didn't owe anyone in the world . . .

JOHN: Somebody is giving us a dirty deal. It's a
mean, lowdown trick.

VOICE OF DOOM: And the debts like the Sins of the
father; Shall be visited upon the children

Another starred "John and Esley" at a grocery store:

JOHN: We gotta figger out how we kin start spendin!

ESLEY: Huh?

JOHN: We gotta make money flow out of our hands like
water.

ESLEY: What?

JOHN: Spend yer way to prosperity--it's the new law!

ESLEY: New law?

JOHN: It's the New Deal, new times, new ideas. All
them old saws about "pay yer debts," "a penny
saved" and such has got to go overboard. They
belong to the boss 'n' buggy age.

Thomas Sabin defended the presentations, saying that "no
political facts have been sacrificed to achieve drama. The
word-picture presents the facts in an easily understandable
way."38

On March 5, 1936, another controversy arose when
American Communist Party leader Earl Browder used free CBS
time for a campaign Speech. The incident precipitated a
furious debate in the House, where the Conservative
Representative McClellan of Arkansas blasted CBS for "making
its facilities free to public enemies of the peOple. The
action . . . is nothing more or less than treason."

McClellan was cautioned by Representation Pierce of Oregon

25

to "take it easy." Pierce expressed an Opinion that
McClellan "doesn't know what he is talking about" and
reminded him that free speech played an important part in
the founding of the United States. In this connection,
some New England stations who refused to carry Browder did
broadcast a reply by the conservative Republican Hamilton
Fish of New York; citing "a belief in the American form of
government."39
The national conventions of 1936 were planned with
radio in mind. The ethnic vote drew attention, with the
GOP planning to use Negro, German, Scandinavian, and
Italian choirs and choruses and the Democrats favoring
"jubilee singers, more choruses, perhaps even a symphony
orchestra and certainly more traditional brass bands."
The Roosevelt acceptance speech was planned for a massive
outdoor rally; the Republicans were to do the same.40
The GOP nominated Governor Alfred M. Landon of
Kansas on June 11 in Cleveland. Father Coughlin's candidate
William Lemke announced on June 19. That week also saw the
renomination of Franklin D. Roosevelt in Philadelphia.
Strategists planned a night meeting of the convention so
the renomination itself could be heard by a larger radio
audience. The convention pr0per dragged on for five days,
but Roosevelt's acceptance speech, delivered on the evening
of June 27 at Franklin Field, proved to be one of the

greatest political speeches of all time. Speaking to the

nation on their "rendezvous with destiny," Roosevelt was

26

at his best. The proceedings rose above the usual cheap
political atmosphere, and in retrospect, foretold the events
of the campaign--the ramblings of Coughlin and the confused
positions of Landon had more rhetorical bark than vote-
getting bite.

In the summer months, however, the Republicans were
confident. The moderate Landon Spoke sensibly and was
well-received. Soon, however, the party's right—wing
asserted itself and pushed Landon into making uncharacter—
istic Hoover-like statements on the destruction policies of
the New Deal. As the campaign wore on, Landon began to
believe his own inflated warnings, and his coherence and
believability paled in the light of Roosevelt's calm
approach.

Coughlin, meanwhile, raged on, attacking the
President with new vigor. His boast of attracting nine
million Union Party votes drove him on. He called
Roosevelt "the dumbest man ever to occupy the White House"
and pronounced the choice between Landon and FDR to be
"like a choice between rat poison and carbolic acid." He
called Roosevelt "anti-God." The unlikely coalition of
Coughlin, Townsend and the followers of Huey Long soon
began to break apart, a victim of its own explosive per-
sonalities. Gerald L. K. Smith went further into fascist
fanaticism and the appalled Dr. Townsend broke completely
away. In Coughlin's last rally, he did not even mention

his candidate Lemke by name.41

27

In mid-October, the GOP promised that a "radio
innovation" was forthcoming. Two days later, a new form of
"dramatization" was undertaken--Senator Arthur Vandenberg
of Michigan "debated" with a phonograph recording of
President Roosevelt. This broke the networks' rules against
the use of transcriptions and did not set well as an example
of fair debate. The affair began on October 17, 1936 when
Vandenberg went on the air over Sixty-six CBS stations.
Sixteen minutes before air time, network vice—president
Leslie Atlass learned the nature of the broadcast and
ordered it off the air, but then changed his mind. In the
confusion, some stations cut it off, others continued and
others were undecided. The incident angered Vandenberg,
who stated that

competent and conclusive experts said we complied
with the rules . . . but we have come to a pretty
pass in the United States when radio censors or any
other overlords can tell us we cannot confront other
candidates for high office with their own words, own
voice and own broken promises. We have a new issue
. . . the jeopardy of legitimate freedom.

It is worth examining a portion of the broadcast:

VANDENBERG: . . . how can one ignore Constitutional
doubts, however reasonable, and yet preserve, protect
and defend the Constitution of the United States?
VOICE OF ROOSEVELT: Let it be from now on the task

of our party to break foolish traditions and leave

it to the Republican leadership, far more skilled in
that art, to break promises.

VANDENBERG: Which of our traditions do you consider
"foolish"? How about the "traditions" of free enter-
prise and free men? The "traditions" of maximum local
self-government and minimum Federal interference with
it? How about the "traditions" of checks and balances
in government, set up to save us from the tyrannical
dictations of government by Executive decree?42

28

The Republican Party immediately demanded a rebroad-
cast of the entire production. Hill Blackett, director of
the public relations division of Republican headquarters,
telegrammed CBS president William S. Paley and took issue
with the network ban on transcriptions:

As I understand it, Columbia's original policy banning
the use of transcriptions on your network was made to
protect artists against use of their talents without
pay. This is a political campaign, in which it is not
contemplated that the artists involved will ever seek
renumeration for air appearances.
Blackett also asked, "Can it be true that this broadcast
was kept off the air through the intimidation of all
broadcasters by the New Deal administration?" The
Republican cry of "censorhip" had been resurrected from the
earlier months of "Liberty at the Crossroads."

CBS did not waver, however. Executive vice-president
Edward Klauber said, "we will neither give nor sell time to
the Republican party to broadcast a program in which the
President's voice, or any other person's voice, is either
reproduced on a phonograph record or simulated by an actor
. . . we intend to maintain the completely non-partisan
attitude which has marked our network throughout its
existence." Klauber also maintained that

there is no issue of free speech here. Senator
Vanderberg may quote from President Roosevelt's
speeches or writings as much as he pleases. He may
make any comments or criticisms he pleases. So may
any speaker or any party as long as the speaker and
the party refrain from dramatization or simulation
which, in the case of political discussions, we

believe would injure radio's usefulness to the
public.

29

Klauber did cancel the charge for the aborted broad—
cast.43

The Democrats were not amused by the proceedings.
They attacked the "abuse of the radio" by the GOP in a
letter to the Federal Communications Commission. The
party felt the production was unfair in taking quotes out
of context and creating the impression that an actual debate
was in progress. Postmaster General James Farley said the
Vandenberg incident proved his predictions of a dirty
campaign.

To be sure, the campaign was bitterly fought.
While the Democrats relied on the smooth calmness of the
Roosevent Speeches, Governor Landon resorted to hard-line
tirades against the "dangers" of the New Deal. As Election
Day grew nearer, the GOP's conservatives pushed Landon into
more and more unrealistic statements. The New Deal was
pilloried as "Communistic" and "un-American." In an attempt
to influence the heavily-Democratic labor vote, Roosevelt's
Social Security Act was branded a "pay-reduction" measure
by the Republicans. The Democrats' strategy was to
emphasize the reactionary nature of the GOP and its
supporters, and to point to the gains made under the first
New Deal. The GOP led in radio time with ninety-two hours
to the Democrats' seventy,44 but the quality of Roosevelt's
Speech work was counted upon to bridge the gap. On

election eve, the Democrats tied up the "last word"; the

11:00 p.m. to 12 midnight network Slot. Landon held down

30

the previous hour. No one was predicting the outcome of
the election, but the contest was not even close.
Roosevelt routed Landon in the popular vote with 27.4
million to the Republican's 16.6. The President carried
every state but Maine and Vermont, amassing 523 electoral
votes to 8 for Landon. Lemke polled 900,000 votes, far
below the nine million expected by Coughlin. The priest
did fulfill his promise to leave the air, but eventually
returned with little effectiveness.

The results of the election Shed light on radio.
Its claim as a purveyor of personality was upheld. Again,
FDR held a wide edge in radio expertise and the Democrats
used him wisely. Radio's claim to end emotional appeals
was put to the test in 1936. Coughlin and Huey Long had
built huge audiences on the strength of their demagoguery,
but this did not translate into votes for Lemke. Though
Long's death and the traditional weakness of third parties
(greater strength in May than in November) undoubtedly were
factors, the uncertainty over the drawing power of the
rabble-rousers was a cause for concern right up to Election
Day. The voters, however, eschewed the antics of Coughlin
and the "either-or" scare tactics of the conservative
Republicans. The networks themselves tried to hold the
line on unfair practices, and in so doing often cited
their desire to keep politics in an intellectual rather

than emotional atmosphere.

31

The domestic turmoil of 1936 eventually gave way to
concern over happenings in EurOpe. The 1940 campaign was

waged cautiously in a period of great uncertainty.

CHAPTER VII

THE QUIET CAMPAIGN OF 1940

The campaign of 1940 was waged largely with speeches.
The great flap over dramatizations in 1936 and the sobering
dangers of the European situation combined to give the
campaign a more subdued atmosphere. The Republican can-
didate was Wendell L. Willkie, a political newcomer with
previous exposure on a number of network radio programs.

The Republicans had made a cautious selection--the other
leading candidates, Taft, Dewey, and Vandenberg, were
committed isolationists. The GOP did not want to be tied
to that position in a time of uncertainty.

Television made its appearance at the 1940 Republican
Convention. Experimental station W2XBS in New York beamed
the proceedings to an area with a fifty-mile radius using
what were then called "radio-cameras."45

The Democratic convention in July renominated
Franklin D. Roosevelt for an unprecedented third term over
the protests of former supporters James Farley and John

Garner. Radio listeners were growing increasingly weary

of the drawn-out affairs, and when a New York station

32

33

carried the convention instead of the usual prizefight, it
was deluged with over a thousand irate phone calls.46
Again, such demonstrations bothered party chiefs with the
possibility of a backlash, but still the conventions
dragged on. The only change over the years had been a more
strict adherence to starting times, mainly to insure prime
time audiences for important Speeches. The speeches them—
selves remained overlong. In one instance, Democratic
chairman Alben Barkley held his audience with a "teaser"--
the promise of a message from Roosevelt to come soon after
midnight. Those who stayed turned heard Barkley read a
Presidential statement which confirmed that Roosevelt would
accept a nomination for a third term.

In the 1940 campaign, voice and style comparisons
took on great importance. The evolution of style was noted
by Columbia University professor Dr. Henry Lee Smith, who
said, "the technique developed by President Roosevelt has
profoundly influenced all political speakers. The day of
the old-fashioned political orator, with his bombastic

47 This did not mean

platform manner, is virtually extinct."
that candidates must try and imitate Roosevelt, however.
Wendell Willkie was thought to be a worthy radio speaker,
and his style was far removed from that of the President.
He had a friendly Midwestern tone on the air, conveying an
eagernesss and Openness which his listeners liked. He gave
the impression that he was not a polished, pre-packaged

smoothie.48 One analyst Observed,

34

A good general American voice, but a speech pattern

with elements of Southern and Eastern coloring. His

middle-west background is evidenced by his nasal

coloring of such words as "many," "any" and "on."

His voice is particularly good for radio because it is

so conversational, although he has not the finesse

of President Roosevelt.

Willkie, however, did not fully utilize this
quality. He was troubled over the differences of radio and
platform speaking and often desired personal audience
contact. He delivered his acceptance speech in lOZ-degree
heat in Elwood, Indiana. Tightening his throat and shouting,
his voice cracked no less than eight times. Many additional
Speeches were delivered to a live audience as well as
broadcast, and it was necessary to keep both audiences in
mind. Playing only to the live audience hurt Willkie with
the greater amount of radio listeners. He often shouted
himself hoarse. The GOP eventually enlisted the services
of a Hollywood voice Specialist, but the candidate further
damaged his voice by undertaking extensive stumping tours.49
He travelled more miles than any candidate before the age
of the airplane campaign (1952—).50
Willkie's stand in 1940 was to attack the weaknesses

of the New Deal and the "arrogance" of a bid for a third
term.. He gained the support of many influential people and
publications but was frustrated by the low-profile stance
of Roosevelt, who, as in 1936, planned an October campaign.
Willkie's cries of "bring on the champ!" went unheeded.

During the summer, the Republican avoided mentioning the

isolationist issue, though he had the tacit backing of the

35

isolationist forces. Roosevelt, however, attacked Willkie's
Silence on the issue and lumped him right along with the
rest of the isolationists. He carried this theme right up
to Election Day.51
Toward the end of the campaign, the GOP became
angered at FDR's constant requests for free airtime as
chief executive. The Democrats were low on radio money and
naturally wished to keep the President before the public in
the crucial stages of the race. The networks declared that
the Republicans would have to prove that the President's
"chats" were political before they would receive free time

52 In 1940, the two major parties Spent less

in return.
money on radio than in 1936, due mostly to the Hatch Act
limiting campaign expenditures. The Democrats used fifty—
eight hours of network time; the Republicans sixty-eight.53
Here again the party purchasing the most time lost the
election. On Election Day, Roosevelt polled 27.2 million
votes to Willkie's 22.3 million. The electoral vote margin
was 449 to 82, indicating the President's strength in

more populous states. (

The campaign of 1940 lacked much of the controversy
and fireworks of earlier ones.‘ The nation was perilously
close to the war which would draw her in in 1941. Roosévelt
would again be the nominee in 1944, forcing the GOP to COpe
with the task of unseating a popular President in wartime.

The year 1944 would also bring dramatizations back to the

campaigns; productions both serious and feStive. Television

36

was on the horizon, but radio still held the attention of
the planners and the listeners. Democratic and Republican
Spokesmen were premature in their predictions that the next

campaign would be waged with television.

 

 

 

CHAPTER VIII

"THE CHAMP" AGAIN

The midterm elections of 1942 provided the Republi-
cans with three contenders for the Presidency in 1944:
Governors John W. Bricker of Ohio, Harold E. Stassen of
Minnesota, and Thomas E. Dewey of New York. The 1940
candidate Wendell Willkie still hoped for consideration,
but his poor Showing in the Wisconsin primary of April 4,
1944, and he soon withdrew from the race. Willkie had come
to support New Deal objectives (if not methods) after the
1940 election, and his newfound internationalism and more
liberal viewpoint doomed him in the GOP.

By the time the Republican convention was held in
Chicago June 26—28, Dewey seemed to have the nomination
locked up. The poor showing of Stassen in the primaries
and the edge Dewey held over Bricker in public Opinion
thrust the New Yorker to the tOp of the class. He was
nominated on the first ballot with the second position
going to Governor Bricker. Dewey appeared before the
convention and pledged new leadership to replace the "tired

and old" Roosevelt Administration. The party as a whole

37

38

was optimistic with one exception-—Willkie. He did not
like the platform, with its attack on the aims of the New
Deal. Willkie still had a hard-core of support, and some
GOP men had second thoughts about their tough repudiation
of him. It made no difference. Willkie died on October 8,
still outside his own party. Its conservatives, who had so
changed Landon four years earlier, were in control.54
With Dewey, the Republicans had nominated their best
radio Speaker in years. It was felt by many that the New
York Governor could hold his own with Roosevelt: "Dewey's
deep voice and clear diction make him the strongest
opponent the old Democratic master of radio technique has
faced." The GOP nominee projected "ringing tones . . . not
marred by rough edges or fuzzy overtones," although he
had "a degree of monotony in intonation." The Republicans
took advantage of these qualities, with Dewey touring the
nation broadcasting from a number of cities. The party
hired veteran radio announcer Ford Bond to introduce Dewey
and fill any time remaining at the end of speeches.55
Again in 1944, the Republicans tried to present a
series of half-hour dramatizations on network radio, and
were again turned down. The series was to make use of
professional actors and actresses presenting the un-
fortunate experiences of citizens trying to deal with
various war agencies. The networks quashed this attempt

on the grounds that it would lead to name—calling and

assorted other undesirable practices. The GOP then turned

39

to one-minute and chain-break announcements "to set before
the electorate, to pound home, drill in and instill by
repetition, strong and irrefutable reasons to vote for
Thomas E. Dewey, or against Franklin D. Roosevelt."

This was according to the 1944 Republican Radio Report.

On the Democratic side, the renomination of FDR was
assured when the President's receptiveness to a fourth term
bid was made public just before the convention met. Chicago
was again the Site; the delegates convened on July 19. The
only question was the selection of a vice—presidential
candidate. The honor went to Missouri Senator Harry S.
Truman, who was backed by northern organizations as well as
southern conservatives (as an alternative to Henry Wallace).

Television made another appearance at the 1944 con—
ventions. Stations WNBT New York, WGRB Schenectady, and
WPTZ Philadelphia beamed newsfilm of the Chicago proceedings
to their viewers. The film was rushed to New York and the
telecast fed from there to Schenectady and Philadelphia.56

The campaign started later than had been customary.
The Dewey speaking tour began September 9, and the
President, as he had done previously, campaigned quickly
and vigorously. The main GOP worry was the progress of the
war, and the possible unwillingness of the people to change
leaders at such a time. Dewey avoided the war issue,
although the GOP Slogan was "End the war quicker with
Dewey and Bricker." The Republican candidate concentrated

on his "tired and old" theme, and also launched an eleventh

40

hour attack on the Administration's alleged consorting with
Communists. This referred to Sidney Hillman of the liberal
Political Action Committee, and Earl Browder of the Com-
munists, who were linked as "Hillman, Browder and Co." The
GOP and its supporters in the press sometimes went over-
board in their attacks, assailing Hillman as a "foreigner"

with "rabbinical education."57

This attack on a strong
labor leader, with its Klannish overtones, backfired when
the Democrats used it as an example of the GOP's anti-
foreign-born nature.

The Democrats in general and Roosevelt in particular
felt the campaign was becoming a mean one. Though Dewey
steered clear of making personal attacks, the press and
some radio stations did not. Party leaders pressed
Roosevelt into answering the many vicious charges. The
President did so in his own way, referring to his dog Fala
in a speech to the Teamsters Union, broadcast over NBC:

When he learned that the Republican fiction writers
had concocted a story that I had left him behind on an
Aleutisn island and had sent a destroyer back to find
him at a cost to the taxpayers of two or three or
eight or twenty million dollars, his Scotch soul was
furious. He has not been the same dog since. I am
accustomed to hearing malicious falsehoods about
myself, but I think that I have the right to object

to libelous statements about my dog.58

As in previous years, the Democrats relied heavily
on the strength of Roosevelt's radio speeches. In 1944,
however, some new wrinkles were added. The party purchased

five-minute blocks of time between many popular network

radio shows. The Democrats felt that this strategy would

41

give them a "captive audience" without alienating listeners
by pre-empting entire thirty-minute shows. These periods
were filled by speeches from party Spokesmen, national
chairman Robert Hannegan, and Vice-President Truman.
Truman opened the series on October 2, and the party bought
these Spots right up to Election Day.59
Dramatizations were still taboo, so the party also

made use of one-minute skits rather than attempt longer
presentations. These spots refuted the Republican claims
of hardship under Roosevelt and reverted to the theme of
the GOP as the party of depression. One such spot:

TRAFFIC NOISE IN BACKGROUND, FADES UNDER VOICE OF MAN

ON STREET CORNER.

MAN: Buy an apple, mister?

SECOND MAN: Yeah, give me a couple of 'em.

MAN: Okay, here you are . . . thanks very much.

(Laughing) Just like 1930, isn't it?

SECOND MAN: Buddy, this makes 1930 look like the

good old days—-this is really a depression. But

whad 'ya expect? We never should have elected Dewey.

But we don't seem to learn, do we?

TRAFFIC NOISE UP, FADES OUT.

ANNOUNCER: This doesn't have to happen again. Keep

men with 1929 ideas out of office in 1944160

Another Democratic presentation, in a lighter vain,

aired on Election Eve. The dramatist Norman Couvin
produced the program with an awareness of the network ban
on political dramas. Instead of a long play, Couvin
decided to use statements by a number of different peOple-—
a farmer, a soldier, a housewife, a small businessman, an
old-timer and a young girl about to vote in her first

election. These statements were followed by even shorter

ones--from Hollywood stars and other well-known people--

42

backed by a "train" orchestral effect and a chorus speaking
and singing in locomotive rhythm. This was the "Roosevelt
Special," which exhorted supporters to get out and vote for
the President:

CHORUS: All aboard for tomorrow!

LUCILLE BALL: This is Lucille Ball. I'm on this train.

CHORUS: Vote!

TALLULAH BANKHEAD: This is Tallulah Bankhead. So am I.

CHORUS: Vote!

JOAN BENNETT: Joan Bennett—-for the champ.

CHORUS: Vote!

IRVING BERLIN: Irving Berlin-—

MRS. BERLIN: and Mrs. Berlin--

CHORUS: For Roosevelt!

The program itself was brilliantly conceived, and
what happened afterward may have been even more helpful to
the Democratic cause. The GOP had network time immediately
after the "Special," and the Democrats worried that they
had helped build an audience for their rivals. Their Show
ended early, however, and the time was filled with organ
music suggesting bed—time to many listeners. It was
thought originally that the Democrats had planned this,
but the gap was actually caused by a pullout of a comedian
due to Republican Sponsor pressure.61

On the following day, President Roosevelt won his
fourth term, although the margin of victory was his
slimmest. He polled 25.6 million popular votes and 432
electoral votes to 22 million popular and 99 electoral
votes for Dewey. The major parties had both spent approxi—

mately $700,000 for network time.62

43

The radio campaign of 1944 again featured innovations
in radio technique but did not alter the form or style of
presidential campaign. The broadcast speech remained a
staple, and although the proceedings were enlivened by the
Democratic Skits and the "Roosevelt Special," the basics
remained the same. Dewey relied on the combination of
barnstorming and radio as his predecessors had; Roosevelt's
excellence as a speaker was again used wisely by the
Democrats. The next election, however, would lack both the
familiar presence and pOpularity of FDR. Harry S. Truman
would face postwar problems of great magnitude as well as
a victory-starved Republican party. The President would
react in energetic fashion, whistle-stopping across the

nation, barnstorming as many before him had done.

CHAPTER IX

THE UPSET OF 1948

Radio made an early entry into the 1948 campaign.
Republican hopefuls Thomas E. Dewey and Harold Stassen met
in a primary debate on May 17, 1948 which was broadcast

63 The issue was the

nation-wide by over 900 stations.
status of the U.S. Communist Party. Held in the studios

of station KEX in Portland, Oregon, the debate pitted the
hard-liner Stassen against the more prudent Dewey. Stassen
favored the strict outlawing of the Party, while the New
York Governor wished to keep it "everlastingly out in the
open so that we can defeat it and everything it stands

64

for." It was generally felt that Dewey won the debate,

and on May 21 the Oregon voters made Dewey the primary
winner as well. He won 53 percent of the votes,65
boosting his chances and virtually eliminating Stassen,
who had previously shown surprising strength.

Dewey was nominated after three ballots at the
Republican convention of June 21-24. The moderate Governor

of California, Earl Warren, was chosen as the running mate.

The choice meshed well with the Dewey image, and the

44

45

popular Warren was considered a solid help to the GOP.

The platform adOpted by the Republicans was to be used
against them by the embattled President Truman. He
challenged the GOP to live up to their promises with some
Congressional actions. The most Spectacular platform
battle took place at the Democratic convention, where left
and right wing elements struggled Openly. The convention
of July 12-16 was attended by delegates having little
confidence in Democratic chances. Their attitude was a
product of many things—-shortages of goods, labor strife,
high prices--all attributed to Truman. The Republican
slogan, "Had enough?" seemed to fall on receptive voters'
ears. Thus, many Democrats did no more than pay lip
service to Truman and the party's hOpeS. Truman himself
was not an overwhelming choice of party leaders, who saw
his nomination as a sure-fire way to resounding defeat.
The hue and cry over the tough civil rights plank, which
liberal Democrats pushed through to approval, belied the
defeatist, lazy attitude which most party members held
toward the upcoming campaign. This civil rights battle
was seen as a further blow to Democratic chances, since it
precipitated a split of southern states away from Truman,
states that were usually solid for Democrats. This southern
bloc called themselves the States' Rights Democrats and
nominated Governor Strom Thurmond of South Carolina for
President. Their highest goal was to win enough votes to

send the election into the House of Representatives, but a

46

desire to insure the defeat of Truman was evident also.
The emergence of the liberal Progressives led by former
Vice-President Henry Wallace, further hurt the Democrats.
It was believed that Wallace would lure liberal votes away
from Truman. This, combined with the loss of the south,
would lead to a big Dewey victory. It is evident that
Democratic chances were anything but rosy. Harry Truman
was no defeatist, however--he campaigned hard and long,
lashing out at the Republican Congress for their "do-
nothing" ways; calling them back into summer session to
make good on their platform; traveling all over the country,
battling all the way.

Television had grown greatly over the previous four
years, and this was reflected in coverage of the Philadel-
phia conventions. The proceedings were broadcast to nine
major cities over eighteen stations, reaching ten to twelve
million viewers in the eastern part of the country.66
The fact that television exposed faces and actions as well
as voices was noted by Kenneth D. Fry, radio director of
the Democratic National Committee:

Conventions geared themselves to radio; it is obvious
that they must now be geared to television. Do not
forget at any time that the merciless and all-
encompassing eye is on the convention floor, the
p1atform--and everywhere. The camera Shifts instantly
and often . . . major speakers should, in their
introductions, address themselves not only to the
convention audience, but to the radio and television
audiences as well . . . reading of newspapers, yawning,
and other evidences of boredom are pointed. Remember,
the camera emphasizes what it is covering, and seldom

presents an overall View of the Convention Hall. It
accentuates detail.67

47

The 1948 race is best remembered for the "whistle-
st0p" campaign of Truman. Dewey also follOwed this plan.
The two candidates' speeches from major stops along the
route were broadcast nationally. This comprised the bulk
of the Republican radio expenditure. Often, the campaign
trains stopped in more remote areas if a crowd had gathered.
Speeches to these audiences were not broadcast.

The Democratic Party utilized a number of radio
innovations in 1948, most of which were made tougher by the
low amount of party campaign funds. Many analyst feel that
Dewey's overriding cautiousness, contrasted with Truman's
feistiness and the clever Democratic radio rise, was a
campaign blunder. This, of course, is hindsight. So cut-
and-dried was the election of 1948 (in the eyes of the
pollsters) that the GOP believed rocking the boat or
striking back was unwise. The party felt that Dewey had
already won; he should not risk losing votes by making
combative statements. GOP strategists felt that Dewey
should not create the impression that Truman was making
points--rather, they would let the President play the role
of the underdog. This phiIOSOphy was carried to such an
extreme that Dewey did not even mention Truman's name in
many speeches. He stuck instead.bo lOfty'phrases-and.a
library of political cliches, never defending the Republi—
can Congress, never "rocking the boat."

The Democrats, as noted previously, relied on

Truman's speeches and some new radio ideas. One of these

48

was the "Democratic Record Man." The program utilized a
disc-jockey, recorded music and slashing humor, and it was
intended to reach the nation's housewives. The program ran
three times weekly at 3:45 to 4:00 p.m. on the ABC net-

69 The first show

work68 from October 12 to November 1.
Opened with ”The Missouri Waltz." After deejay Galen Drake
announced that the show was a political program for the
entertainment of women, he played Eddie Cantor's recording
of "Now's the Time to Fall in Love." When Cantor sang the
line, "Tomatoes are cheaper, potatoes are cheaper," Drake
shouted "Stop the music!" This was the title of 1948's
most popular radio program. Drake then told his audience
that the song was all wrong; that all prices were higher
due to Republican-induced inflation. A New York housewife
then related that she could not make ends meet for her
family of six, despite the fact that there were three wage
earners in her family: "Prices are too high as a result of
knocking out price controls by the Republicans."70
The program also touched on the radio trend of
giveaway shows. It gave away "booby prizes," the first of
which went to Senator Kenneth Wherry as an outstanding
headache to housewives. Wherry had been a prime force
behind the lifting of price controls. His "prize" was a
personally conducted tour of the nearest butcher shop.71
Another featured presence was the "Ghost of the

80th Republican Congress," who complained that the wails

of the hungry and homeless abandoned by big-business

49

Republicans kept him awake. He pleaded with the audience
to vote for Truman so the cries would cease.72

The Democrats relied on their own grass-roots
organization to combine with their radio presentations.
The broadcast of September 3, 9:30-10:00 p.m. over ABC,
was heard by thousands of small Democratic meetings
throughout the country.73 The party had petitioned local
groups through press releases, phone calls and telegrams
to gather and listen to the show. The broadcast utilized
seven Democratic leaders from around the country. Mayor
William O'Dwyer of New York City Opened the show and gave
way to Helen Gahagan Douglas in Los Angeles, who attacked
Congress for "ordering an investigation to see if prices
were too high when every newspapers' advertisements told
the truth." Minneapolis mayor Hubert H. Humphrey, Senator
John Sparkman of Alabama, Young Democrats President Marshall
Hanley of Indianapolis, Senator Myers of Pennsylvania and
Senator McMahon of Connecticut also read statements.74

The Democrats were pleased with the impact of their
radio shows and also with the lack-luster campaigning of
Dewey and the GOP. The Democrats steadily slammed Congress,
vilified the Republicans, cajoled and pleaded with the
voters and worked hard across the country to close the gap
held by Dewey in the polls. It must be remembered that
this was a small staff of Democrats; many party members

across the country were resigned to Presidential defeat

and spent their time working for local candidates only.

50

Truman and Dewey crossed the nation by train and car,
with Truman drawing larger and larger crowds. Occasionally
the size of the crowds would cause newsmen to ponder--
could they be wrong about the election? The GOP had no
doubts, however; they talked Dewey and Earl Warren into
holding the line on counterattacks, even when Truman made
some unfair accusations. The President blasted the GOP in
a Chicago speech, comparing its right—wing tendencies to
those of a Hitler. He attacked Dewey as having no regard
for human beings, citing the Dewey remark about the
"lunatic engineer" who had backed the GOP train into a
crowd.75 The Republican was angered but said nothing,
unlike 1944 when he and especially his party's spokesmen

hit back hard in the last few months.76

In 1944, however,
the GOP was the underdog party.

The Democrats worked hard producing their radio
spots and also in paying for them. On October 31, they
presented a short statement by Eleanor Roosevelt which they
felt would give a huge boost to Truman's chances. ABC was
reluctant to have the Democrats use the 8:45-9:00 p.m.
Sunday night slot, since that period was occupied by the
popular "Stop the Music." The network agreed, however,
when the Democrats arranged to pay for the time by noon on
Saturday. The met the deadline--with $25,721 (including
change) in a paper bag.77 Mrs. Roosevelt stressed the need

for the election of liberals. She met the charges of

conservative Republicans by noting, "I am quite aware that

51

Communism challenges Democracy, and unless we make our

democracy meet the needs of the peOple, we have not met

that challenge."78
The Democrats often used their lack of funds to

gain sympathy and/or contributions. Many times a Presiden-

tial broadcast would have to be cut short because the party

lacked the money for an extension of time. Party publicists

would mention this fact to reporters--and the resultant
stories would often bring a number of contributions.
Letters accompanying the money often explained the purpose
of the donation: "So the President can finish his
Speeches."79
On November 2, Truman drew 24.1 million votes to
Dewey's 21.2 million. The election has been called one of
the greatest upsets in history, and of this there is no
doubt. What caused the upset? That is the question which
embarrassed newspapers, pollsters and other predictors.
The cautiousness of the GOP has often been blamed for the
defeat of Dewey, and certainly the party did little to
slow the Truman bandwagon. It must also be noted that the
candidacies of Strom Thurmond and Henry Wallace did not
hurt Truman as badly as expected. The presence of Wallace
removed the taint of "radicalism" from Truman; Thurmond
removed the poison of bigotry. The President's attacks on
farm policy helped him win three heavily Republican mid—
. west states, and Earl Warren did not sway California into

Dewey's column. It is clear, however, that the 1948

-52

campaign differed from earlier ones only in candidates--
the style and pattern had not changed. Radio innovations
were used by the Democrats, but speeches still comprised the
bulk of radio fare. Truman and Dewey continued the
tradition of barnstorming, racking up miles in the effort
to reach the voters personally. Their radio speeches
projected their personalities--Dewey the smooth but vague
speaker; Truman, the no-nonsense, hard-hitting "plain
speaker." The conventions and the campaigns were as long
and drawn-out as ever. Demagoguery was not dead by any
means--President Truman said many things about many
Republicans, secure in the knowledge that retaliation in
kind would not be forthcoming.

The GOP spent a half—million dollars for network
time, down $200,000 from 1944. The Democrats spent $650,000,

80 The 1948 campaign, however,

the same as they had in 1944.
was the last time that radio would be the prime element for
mass appeal. The years 1948-1952 saw the burgeoning of
television and the decline of network radio.

Throughout the network era, parties used the medium
in various ways--as an adjunct to the mainstream Speech-
making of the campaign; as an audience booster for these
Speeches; or as a flexible means of presenting new vote-
getting techniques (dramatizations, skits, etc.). In
conclusion, the never changing aspects of political

campaigning will be traced throughout the network radio

era.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

We are now at the point where examination of the
campaign trends over time will shed light on the claims
made by proponents of radio in the early 19205. These
c1aims--that radio would Shorten conventions, streamline
campaigns, end barnstorming, project personalities
accurately and end emotional appeals--can be considered
individually and traced over the years 1928 to 1948.
Although radio after 1948 ceased to be the major medium of
campaigning, many conclusions drawn concerning radio are
also valid in the television age.

Did radio streamline conventions? The answer to
this is obvious--no. Conventions were four or five days
long before the radio age, during it and after it, right to
the modern day. A change of sorts was noted in the thirties
--conventions were tailored to fit important speeches into
prime radio time; schedules were adhered to more strictly.
Conventions remain events where politicians can take a deep
oratorical breath and not worry about upsetting the

routine.

53

54

Campaigns themselves were shortened slightly over
the years. This can be seen by examining the convention
starting dates, and considering the conventions as the

campaign starting point:

 

 

Democratic Republican
1928 June 26 June 12
1932 June 27 June 14
1936 June 23 June 9
1940 July 15 June 24
1944 July 19 June 26
1948 July 12 June 25

The later Democratic dates may be attributable to the fact
that President Roosevelt, a traditional "late" campaigner
and overwhelming favorite, was the nominee in 1940 and 1944
(as well as 1932 and 1936). Roosevelt usually held his
fire until September and October. Truman in 1948, however,
campaigned strenuously from the date of his nomination.
The potential audiences available in the radio age seem to
have influenced the slight shortening indicated. Radio
gave the parties a greater opportunity to reach the
electorate; overlong campaigns would be drudgery for
candidates and voters alike. It is interesting to note
that although radio made millions of listeners available,
the tradition of barnstorming to meet a much smaller number
personally continued through the radio years and survives
to this day.

For years politicians have traveled thousands of

miles, seen thousands of peOple and driven themselves to

55

the point of exhaustion when the mass media were available
for easier and greater contact. Even President Roosevelt,
who needed a wheelchair, campaigned on the road. Radio,
for the most part, was simply a transmitter of regularly
scheduled speeches from around the country. A number of
special productions were used and have been noted, but
these were used much in the manner of today's TV spots and
infrequent half-hour political programs. The vast majority
of radio time was filled with speeches, the lifeblood of
yesterday's (and today's) campaigns. Willkie in 1940 is a
prime example of a candidate who desired more personal
contact.' His rough schedule ruined his voice and thus hurt
his effectiveness on radio, where the much larger audience
was listening. Truman and Dewey in 1948 carried on a
barnstorming campaign. Even today in the jet age, the so-
called "prop-stop" campaign is a favorite. Goldwater in
1964 and Nixon in 1968 relied heavily on this approach.
Nixon in 1972 took the Opposite extreme, relying on broad-
cast news coverage of White House statements and selected
speeches (a typical plan in the TV age) for the bulk of
that campaign. A "happy medium" has yet to be reached.
It is clear that network radio did not end the barnstorming
campaign--and neither has network television.

Radio as a purveyor of personalities is related to
the barnstorming issue. Roosevelt, the great radio talent,
did not need a strenuous travel schedule to effectively

present his case. The Democrats wisely used his speeches

56

as a large part of their effort. Of course, his physical
condition limited the possibility of rough, extensive tours.
FDR's personality was effectively projected by radio, as
was Willkie's, Dewey's and Truman's. Still, these men
undertook a great amount of travel. The personalities of
Hoover and Landon came across on the radio, but this may
have been more harmful than helpful. This was an added
factor in their undertaking a traveling campaign. Radio
hurt Al Smith in 1928; his personal appearances were needed
to compensate also. Obviously those who came across better
in person would choose to do more public Speaking; however,
it has been noted that the majority of speeches were also
carried on radio. This points up the advantage of a fine
speaker like Roosevelt--he could impress a personal audience
and the greater radio audience as well.

The use of network radio did not put an end to
emotional appeals on mass "rabble-rouSing." The best
examples are those of Father Coughlin and Huey Long.

Though these two men did not win or influence the outcome
of an election, this failure was the result of political
shortcomings. Radio helped build the power base that they
did possess. Theirs was not the hallowed "old—style"
oratory which radio effectively put to rest; rather, it

was a powerful rise of hard-hitting language to peOple that
were willing to hear. Undoubtedly the times of Coughlin
and Long contributed to their effectiveness, but there

were other appeals to "passions and prejudices"--those of

57

Landon in 1936, Truman in 1948 and "Liberty at the Cross-
roads." Radio did not have a tube or filter to stOp such
appeals. It merely gave the presenter a greater audience.
The medium forced a change in speaking style, but not in
the messages Spoken. The network brass fought to keep
inflammatory productions off the air, but these were legal
battles which could be circumvented (i.e., the GOP alter-
native outlet for "Liberty at the Crossroads").

Similarly, television has been used for some famous
appeals, some of them questionable but memorable. The 1964
Democratic "daisy girl" and "ice-cream girl" (which
depicted Barry Goldwater as a nuclear menace) are the most
frequently cited examples.81 It is evident that emotional
appeals have not been ended by the advent of network radio
or television.

The final conclusion to be drawn is that the insti-
tutions of politics are too firmly established to be
changed substantially with the advent of mass communications
media. Parties will strive for votes with all their
knowledge and wiles; the media have given them greater
Opportunity for effectiveness. Political campaigns,
though faces, strategies and ideas change, remain
relatively set in their ways. The changes foreseen in the
radio age did not materialize; nor did television bring
them about. The traveling candidate and the political

speech are firmly entrenched.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTES

Chapter II

 

1Edward W. Chester, Radio, Television and American
Politics (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), p. 3.

 

2Eric Barnouw, A Tower in Babel (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1966), p. 106.

 

3Chester, Radio, Television and American Politics,
p. 3.

4Barnouw, A Tower in Babel, p. 148.

 

5Chester, Radio, Television and American Politics,
p. 18.

6Ibid.

7Lewis E. Weeks, "The Radio Election of 1924,"
Journal of Broadcasting (Summer l963):243.

 

8Ben Gross, I Looked and Listened (New York:
Random House, 1954), p. 100.

 

9Barnouw, A Tower in Babel, p. 222.

 

Chapter III

 

10
p. 27.

Chester, Radio, Television and American Politics,

1Eugene Roseboom, A History of Presidential Elections
(New York: MacMillan Co.{II957), p. 4261

58

59

Chapter IV

 

l2"Wide Use of Radio Effected In Campaign," New York
Times, 14 February 1932, sec. 8, p. 14.

13"$% Million Spent On Radio," New York Times, 8
November 1932, p. 7.

 

 

14Chester, Radio, Television and American Politics,
p. 32.

15Ibid., p. 31.

16

"Political Voice Personalties," New York Times, 6
November, 1932, sec. 8, p. 6.

 

7Ernest G. Bormann, "This Is Huey P. Long Talking,"
Journal of Broadcasting (Spring l958):ll6.

 

Chapter V

 

18Eric Barnouw, The Golden Web (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), pp. 44—45.

 

19Charles J. Tull, Father Coughlin and the New Deal
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965), pp. 4-5.

 

20Louis B. Ward, Father Charles E. Coughlin (Detroit:
Tower, Inc., 1933), pp. 83-86.

 

 

21Tull, Father Coughlin and the New Deal, p. 8.
221bid., p. 30. 23Ibid., p. 56.
24

Barnouw, Golden Web, p. 49.

 

25Bormann, "This Is Huey P. Long Talking," pp. 114-15.

26Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Politics of Up-
heaval (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960), p. 55.

 

27Ibid., p. 60.

28Barnouw, Golden Web, p. 49.

 

6O

29

 

Bormann, "This Is Huey P. Long Talking," pp. 116-21.
30Schlesinger, Politics of Upheaval, p. 243.
3lIbid p 244 32
" ' ° Ibid., p. 247.
33

Ibid., p. 340.

Chapter VI

 

34"Radio Chains Bar Republican Skit But Party Gets
Chicago Outlet," New York Times, 14 January 1936, p. l.

 

BSIbid.

36$1,000,000 On Air For GOP," New York Times, 13
January 1936, p. 2.

 

37Barnouw, Golden Web, p. 52.

 

38"Republican Skit Assails Spending," New York Times,
15 January 1936, p. l.

 

39"Browder Radio Bid Stirs House Debate," New York
Times, 5 March 1936, p. 16.

40"Parties Plan Racial Songs As Vote Lures," New
York Times, 15 May 1936, p. l.

 

41Schlesinger, Politics of Upheaval, p. 630.

 

42"Campaign 'Debate' On Radio Is Cut Off," New York
Times, 18 October 1936, p. 1.

43"Ask Rebroadcast for Vandenberg," New York Times,

19 October 1936, p. l.

 

44Chester, Radio, Television and American Politics,

 

p. 40.

 

61

Chapter VII

 

5"Eyes And Ears On The GOP," New York Times, 23
June 1940, sec. 9, p. 10.

 

46"Broadcast of Convention Instead of Fight Brings
Blood of Phoned Protests by Fans," New York Times, 18 July
1940, p. 6.

 

47"Presidential Voices," New York Times, 23 June
1940, sec. 9, p. 10.

 

48Barnouw, Golden Web, p. 142.

 

49
p. 44.

Chester, Radio, Television and American Politics,

 

50Jules Abels, The Degeneration of Our Presidental
Election (New York: MacMillan Co., 1968), p. 32.

 

51Barnouw, Golden Web, p. 144.

 

52"Candidates to Get Equal Time On Air," New York
Times, 8 August 1940, p. 14.

53
p. 48.

Chester, Radio, Television and American Politics,

 

Chapter VIII

 

54
p. 482.

Roseboom, History of Presidential Elections,

 

55
p. 48.

Chester, Radio, Television and American Politics,

 

S6Broadcasting, 19 June 1944, p. 14.

 

57
p. 488.

Roseboom, History of Presidential Elections,

 

58
p. 148.

Abels, Degeneration of Our Presidential Election

 

62

59Broadcasting, 2 October 1944, p. 16.

 

60"Various New Devices to Capture the Vote,"
New York Times, 2 November 1944, p. 18.

 

61Barnouw, Golden Web, p. 209.

 

62"Costs of Two Parties Nearly Equal," New York
Times, 8 November 1944, p. 8.

Chapter IX

 

63Irwin Ross, The Loneliest Campaign (New York:
New American Library, 1968), p. 51.

 

64Ross, The Loneliest Campaign, p. 53.

 

65Ibid.

66Broadcasting, 28 June 1948, p. 21.

 

67Broadcasting, 19 July 1948, p. 62.

 

68The American Broadcasting Company had been formed
in 1943 after an FCC ruling that NBC must sell either its
Red or Blue network. NBC Red became ABC after its sale to
Edward Noble. Barnouw, Golden Web, p. 189.

 

69Jack Redding, Inside the Democratic Party_(New
York: Bobbs, Merrill and Co., 1958), p. 239.

 

7OIbid., p. 240. 7lIbid. 721bid.
73Ibid., p. 82. 74Ibid., p. 84.
75

Jules Abels, Out of the Jaws of Victory (New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1959), p. 227.

 

76Ross, The Loneliest Campaign, p. 167.

 

77Redding, Inside the Democratic Party, p. 231.

 

63

78"Mrs. Roosevelt Backs Trumand and Party," New York
Times, 1 November 1948, p. 17.

79Redding, Inside the Democratic Party, p. 279.

 

80
p. 56.

Chester, Radio, Television and American Politics,

 

Chapter X

 

81The "daisy girl" pictured a small child plucking
petals from a daisy and counting as She went along. Her
voice faded into another, that of a man intoning a count-
down. The countdown ended with a nuclear explosion. An
announcer then warned viewers about Goldwater's views of
nuclear weaponry. The Spot was run only once, on NBC, then
withdrawn after an outcry of GOP protest. The "ice cream
girl" followed the theme, with a mother's voice explaining
how strontium 90, a by—product of nuclear explosions, had
been found in milk. She then related that Goldwater was
against a nuclear test-ban treaty. This Spot also ran only
once.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Abels, Jules. Out of the Jaws of Victory. New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1959.

 

Abels, Jules. The Degeneration of Our Presidential
Election. New York: MacMillan Co., 1968.

 

Barnouw, Eric. A Tower in Babel. New York: Oxford Uni—
versity Press, 1966.

 

Barnouw, Eric. The Golden Web. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1968.

 

Chester, Edward W. Radio, Television and American Politics.
New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969.

 

Gross, Ben. I Looked and Listened. New York: Randon
House, 1954.

 

Redding, Jack. Inside the Democratic Party. New York:
Bobbs, Merrill and Co., 1958.

 

Roseboom, Eugene. A Histopy_of Presidential Elections.
New York: MacMillan and Co., 1957.

 

Ross, Irwin. The Loneliest Campaign. New York: New
American Library, 1968.

 

Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. The Politics of Upheaval.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1960.

 

Tull, Charles J. Father Coughlin and the New Deal.
Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965.

 

Ward, Louis B. Father Charles E. Coughlin. Detroit:
Tower, Inc., 1933.

 

64

65

Journals

Bormann, Ernest G. "This Is Huey P. Long Talking."
Journal of Broadcasting (Spring l958):116.

 

Weeks, Lewis E. "The Radio Election of 1924." Journal of

 

Broadcasting (Summer 1964):243.

 

Magazines

 

Broadcasting, 19 June; 2 October 1944.

 

Broadcasting, 28 June; 19 July 1948.

 

Newspapers

 

New York Times, 14 February; 6, 8 November 1932.

 

New York Times, 13, 14, 15 January; 5 March; 15 May; 18,
19 October 1936.

 

New York Times, 23 June; 18 July; 8 August 1940.

 

New York Times, 2, 8 November 1944.

 

New York Times, 1 November 1948.

 

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