




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HISTORICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL WELFARE
SERVICES PROVIDED TO RESTRICTED
PERSONS (JAPANESE) DURING
WORLD WAR II

By

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Submitted to the Department of Social
Work, Michigan State College,
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree
of
MASTER OF SOCIAL WORK

August

1953

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I wish to express my deep gratitude to Mr. Gordon Aldridge, my project supervisor, whose helpful advice and constant encouragement made this study possible. I am also indebted to Miss Dorothy Zietz and Mr. Manfred Lilliefors for their unfailing interest and valuable assistance during the course of my project. Grateful acknowledgement must also be made to the staff of the Documents Collection of Michigan State Library, especially Mr. Richard Leach for his help in providing important materials and suggestions. Finally, I must express my deep appreciation to my wife for her encouragement and inspiration during the many difficulties encountered in the writing of this project.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Following the outbreak of World War II and towards the latter part of 1942, the United States placed some 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry in protective custody. Included were four groups: Issei, first-generation immigrants (aliens); Nisei, second-generation (American-born and American educated children) Kibei, second-generation (American-born and wholly or partly educated in Japan); and Sansei, third-generation (American-born children of American-born parents). Two-thirds of the evacuees were citizens of the United States by birth and the other third consisted of aliens who were forbidden by law to be citizens. Without being charged with any specific crime, without hearings, these people were evacuated under military guard to isolated barrack camps in the interior. Evacuation was on racial or, rather, on ancestral grounds.¹

During the time of uncertainty, the evacuation of the Japanese seemed merely a minor incident, but as the

¹McWilliams, Carey. What About Our Japanese-American? American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1944, p. 2.

war gradually abated, the nation began to be uneasy about many aspects of the evacuation. They began to ask whether it was consistent with our democratic ideals. If the issues were not clear at the outset, they became increasingly involved with each new step of the program. As the possibility of enemy invasion receded, measures were taken which no one had urged at the critical stage of uncertainty. For example, internment had not been planned originally by the authorities, but merely removal from certain restricted areas. Surprisingly enough, it was discovered that after all people of Japanese ancestry had been removed from the West Coast and placed in protective custody, agitation against them increased rather than subsided. The evacuation was seized upon as proof of disloyalty and used to justify further measures against them. Measures taken in the program began to involve entirely unforeseen consequences.

Statement of Problem:

The present study is designed not as an exhaustive analysis of the attitudes and organizations of the evacuees but rather as an outline of major developments. It seeks to report, through the survey of books, periodicals and documents, what seem to have been the most important

social effects of the crisis, and the social welfare services provided to these people during the movement from their homes to assembly and relocation centers, and also with the eventual movement from these centers back into the normal stream of American life.

Analysis of this program is significant in that it would have some bearing on general problems of administration and government in any time of future crisis.

In a mass movement of families involving thousands of individuals of all ages, there are necessarily many social problems. When the federal agencies, with authority vested in the Department of Justice, the War Department and the War Relocation Authority respectively, became organized to take action on the "descendants of the Japanese enemy," a significant part of the plan for the movement dealt with welfare aspects. In requesting that services related to the settlement of these persons be provided through the Federal Security Agency, the Attorney-General said:

" . . . Resettlement involves processes which are basically associated with the social services, including investigation of the needs and means of these people helping

them to obtain appropriate employment, and otherwise assisting those who are not able to resettle and re-establish themselves in other locations . . ."²

The fact that the need of these uprooted people arose from restrictive action of the federal government resulted in the decision that federal aid should be made available for the relief of their distress. The President, therefore, authorized the program under his war emergency power. This topic will be dealt with in Chapter III, but as more unforeseen consequences emerged the President revised and broadened the authorization for the services and assistance program.

The project survey, in brief, welfare services provided during a span of five years, 1941 to 1946, at which time persons of Japanese ancestry were made wards of the federal government.

Content of Study:

Chapter II presents background material of the evacuees. Brief mention is made of the three groups (Issei, Nisei, and Kibei) which composed the majority of the evacuees,

²From the Attorney-General's letter of January 31, 1942, to the Federal Security Administrator. Quoted in Margaret Leahy, "Public Assistance for Restricted Persons During the Second World War," The Social Service Review, The University of Chicago Press, No. 1, Vol. XIX, (March, 1945), p. 26.

and of their reactions to "forced migration." In Chapter III, evacuation is described under the Department of Justice and the War Department. The plans for providing welfare services as well as the work of various federal, state and local agencies are outlined. Chapter IV indicates social conditions, organization and administration in the Assembly and Relocation Centers. Chapter V deals with resettlement and the closing of centers. The procedures followed by the War Relocation Authority in hastening assimilation are brought out. Chapter VI expresses conclusions based upon the findings revealed in the study and also the writer's recommendations.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Following the signing of Executive Order No. 9066 by the President, culminating the mass evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry, one of the first significant findings of the War Relocation Authority in the spring of 1942 was that these people were divided into three major groups: (1) Issei, first-generation immigrants (aliens); (2) Nisei, second-generation (American-born and American educated children of the Issei); and (3) Kibei, second-generation (American-born but educated wholly or partially in Japan). There was also a fourth group called Sansei, third-generation (American-born children of American-born parents). This last group will not be dealt with because most were "in their cradles."

Although the W.R.A. was to discover later that the individual variations of personality within these three major groups were more important than the generalizations which could be made about each of them, the basic facts about the Issei, Nisei, and Kibei provided valuable introduction to the background, attitudes and behavior of the evacuees.

Issei:

Historically speaking the Japanese were late among immigrants to the United States.³ Prior to the turn of the century movement of Japanese to Continental United States was on a small scale. However, in the first decade of the twentieth century mass migration reached its peak, dropping sharply after 1908, when the Gentlemen's Agreement and later in 1924 the Oriental Exclusion Act denied admission to the United States of all immigrants ineligible for citizenship.⁴ Most of the immigrants were single men whose primary motive was one of making money and later returning to their homeland to live a better life.

Finding the situation to their liking, many of these immigrants decided to send for their wives and children. On the other hand, if unmarried, the individual faced a problem in the total absence of unmarried girls of his own race in the United States. Had he inclination to marry outside his racial group, he was prohibited in both California and Oregon by laws against miscegenation. However, since marriage was a family affair in Japan,

³McWilliams, op. cit. p. 3.

⁴Wartime Exile, The Exclusion of the Japanese-American from the West Coast, U.S. Department of the Interior, WRA, 1946, p. 16.

with the parents making all arrangements, it was possible and proper for a young man in America to ask his parents in Japan to select a bride for him. Photographs were exchanged - hence the term "picture bride" - and when these were mutually approved, the two families made plans to send the bride to the awaiting groom in the United States. Marriage took place fairly late in life, so that the Nisei or second-generation group did not appear in large number until after 1920. When World War II broke out the majority of the men were passing from middle life to old age, whereas the women who had come later averaged about fifty-two years at the time of evacuation.⁵

Coming mainly from the poorer classes of Japan, these people had started at the bottom of the American economic ladder as railroad workers, harvest hands in the sugar beet industry, fruit orchards, etc. As late as in 1941, there were some that labored in similar occupations. Others had acquired a stake in the land with title vested in Nisei (Californian law prohibiting ownership of land to aliens), or an equity in the whole-sale or retail marketing of agricultural products. A few had risen to positions of prominence and wealth.

⁵Thomas, D. S., and R. S. Nishimoto, The Spoilage, p. 4.

Demographically, they were indistinguishable from the majority group, with a high expectation of life and a low pattern of fertility. Socially, the group was cohesive, with a high degree of family solidarity. Delinquency rates were low and there was considerable pride in self-reliance and independence in never being on a relief roll.

In general, the West Coast Issei in the spring of 1942 were a tired and bewildered group of people who had a sentimental attachment for the homeland they had known as adolescents but who wanted to live the rest of their lives in comfort in the United States.

Nisei:

In contrast to their parents the Nisei, who entered the camps in 1942, were predominantly an adolescent and young-adult group; completely American in speech, dress and manner; and far more inclined than the average Issei to express their own opinions. Because most of the Issei married comparatively late in life, as mentioned before, the gaps in ages between them and their children were very great. A very high percentage of

the Nisei were between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five when they entered relocation centers; and an even more strikingly low percentage of them had passed the age of thirty.⁶

The Nisei for the most part were bicultural though their habits and attitudes conformed to the American way of life to a greater extent than to the Japanese. Finding little discrimination in the educational institution, the members of this group, in spite of their parents' wish, gradually acquired the democratic ideals which later led to further breaking away from the customs of their parents. Some conflicts and characteristics resulting from this were: (1) ill-feeling arising because of the lack of communication between the two groups; (2) difference in goals and ideals resulting in both groups looking down at each other; (3) instability of parent-child relationship leading to inconsistency in family solidarity and (4) inability to get ordinary parental guidance and support in their growth and development which led the Nisei to look for partial parent substitutes in white teachers, ministers and other older persons.⁷

⁶W.R.A., A Story of Human Conservation, p. 3.

⁷Leighton, Alexander. The Governing of Men, p. 76.

In only a few isolated communities were the Issei successful in forcing their children to attend in their spare time the privately operated Japanese language school. Some parents were more successful in sending their children to Japan to be educated. The latter, who upon returning to America were known as Kibei, frequently found themselves handicapped linguistically and culturally and even being displaced among their American-oriented brothers and sisters. The topic of the Kibei will be dealt with later.

During the initial stage of evacuation, the W. R. A. was impressed by the statistical fact that the Nisei in the original evacuated group outnumbered the Issei by nearly two to one. Later findings indicated that although there were over 70,000 American-born evacuees who passed under W. R. A. in 1942 as against less than 40,000 aliens, the Issei were still exerting much influence on the evacuee population irrespective of their number. The reason for this, on the one hand, was their greater maturity and stability as well as the prestige which age and parenthood traditionally brought in Japanese communities, and, on the other, that while nearly all of the 40,000 Issei were adults a great majority of the Nisei were under twenty-one.

The principal organization of the Nisei was the Japanese American Citizen's League, a group which had its beginnings in Seattle as early as the 1920's. It claimed some 20,000 members in nearly three hundred communities throughout the country with membership confined to American citizens. Having a different outlook towards life, that is, a more "American" way of looking at things than many of the Issei and the Kibei had, this group considered its function as that of helping the Nisei solve problems which could not be settled by individual effort, to help the Issei improve their status in America, and also to help protect their own civil rights as American citizens.

When the evacuation of all those of Japanese descent became a public issue, the leaders of this organization were faced with the most crucial problem. In the testimony before a Congressional committee which was exploring the evacuation problem at San Francisco, the national-secretary or the J.A.C.L. said:

"If, in the judgment of military and Federal authorities, evacuation of Japanese residents from the West Coast is a primary step toward insuring the safety of this Nation, we will have no hesitation in complying with the necessities implicit in that judgment. But if, on the other hand, such evacuation is primarily a measure whose surface urgency cloaks

the desires of political or other pressure groups who wants us to leave merely from motives of self-interest, we feel we have every right to protest and to demand equitable judgment on our merits as American citizens."⁸

Although the evacuation was carried out with as little protest as possible, it was questionable whether the statement made by the national-secretary of the J.A.C.L. reflected the attitude towards the evacuation held by the evacuees. For instance, the Issei felt that there was no future in America. The mass evacuation resulted in the few who still clung to the idea of returning to Japan in later years, giving more support to Japanese victory. The Nisei, believing that their citizenship would protect them, were hit hard when evacuation took place. To some, equal rights and opportunity were just words, and in the bewilderment there was a tendency for these people either to become more aggressive or to cling closer to the family than they had been doing for many years.

Thus as the Nisei filed through the gates of W.R.A. centers, many of them showed signs of being carefree and casual, while others were shy and uncommunicative. In the minds of nearly all there were, no doubt, trouble, confusion and conflicting emotions.

⁸W.R.A., Story of Human Conservation, op. cit., p. 5.

Kibei:

If there was one group of people among the evacuees that was least known to the W.R.A., it was the Kibei. Technically a sub-group of the Nisei, this group had lived in Japan for some years and having acquired much of the Japanese manners, language and habits, found it difficult upon returning to the United States to adjust to the American way of life.

With much of their formative years spent in Japan, the Kibei, more so than the other two groups, had been most suspected by American authorities in regard to espionage and sabotage. Rejected by most Nisei as "queer" and "Japanesy", regarded with distrust by governmental authorities, and also not fully understood even by a majority of the Issei, the Kibei were placed in an unfortunate situation. It is interesting to note that much of the rejection from the Nisei and Issei came about because of barriers and misunderstanding interposed by age differences and also the reputation Kibei had for being dissolute--gambling, drinking, going in gangs, ect. The suspicion by the governmental authorities had receded later when substantial numbers of Kibei proved their patriotism to the United States throughout the war period.

Those able to speak both languages volunteered as interpreters in the war against Japan.

When the mass evacuation took place, it was not surprising to find many of the Kibei hostile, viewing the other evacuees and administration alike with a disdainful air.

Of the 127,000 persons of Japanese ancestry in the United States there were in 1940 about 112,000 living in the three West Coast states.⁹ Unlike some of the immigrant groups, the Japanese, because of both external and internal pressure, did not do much spreading out. They were more densely concentrated on December 7, 1941 than they had been before. Concentration was not merely geographical but occupational with about forty-three percent of the gainfully employed west coast Japanese in agriculture--production of fresh vegetables and small fruits for the larger urban markets, and some twenty-six percent even to be found in the wholesale and retail trade which was confined to the distribution of Japanese-grown produce.¹⁰ Within this narrow orbit, the Japanese

⁹Community Government in War Relocation Centers.
U.S. Department of the Interior, W.R.A., U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1946, p. 1.

¹⁰McWilliams, op. cit., p. 3.

had done reasonably well. According to an estimate made by Russell T. Robinson, W.R.A. Chief of Evacuee Property, the evacuated people left behind them about \$200,000,000 worth of real, personal and commercial property.¹¹

Following the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 and the subsequent orders that followed, leading to the largest single forced migration in American history, these were the Japanese of different social strata with various degrees of Americanization who were brought together into the assembly centers and later transferred to the ten relocation centers established by the W.R.A.

¹¹People in Motion, The Post War Adjustment of the Evacuated Japanese Americans, p. 52.

CHAPTER III

EVACUATION

The critical situation created by the attack on Pearl Harbor brought about many federal regulations and control of the activities of enemy aliens and citizens of Japanese ancestry.

Before discussing why evacuation was brought about, a brief account of events that followed the attack will be helpful.¹² On December 11, 1941, the Western Defense Command was established with General J. L. DeWitt designated as military commander of the West Coast. Prior to this and immediately following the attack the Department of Justice arrested, upon presidential warrants, all "dangerous enemy aliens" known to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Naval Intelligence officers. Later, by a series of orders the Department of Justice ordered removal of all enemy aliens who were then living near strategic installations such as harbors, airports, oil fields and power-lines.

At the outset, it was merely the removal of all persons of Japanese ancestry that was contemplated. The

¹²Appendix VIII.

Japanese were asked to move voluntarily to areas either outside the strategic points or to some other states in the interior. Individuals who were able financially, departed, but there were many who, through lack of finance or fear, were unable to make the journey. Another obstacle confronting these migrations was the strong disapproval shown by the various states into which the Japanese were resettling. For example, some Rocky Mountain States were protesting vehemently that California was using them as "dumping grounds." Signs were placed in stores, restaurants, and along the highways reading: "Japs not allowed," "This restaurant poisons rats and Japs," "No services for Japs," etc. Some states went further by directing their police to turn back any Japanese trying to enter the state. From the military standpoint, the voluntary movement of the Japanese was not being accomplished as fast as had been hoped. Thinking that this delay may have been due to the opposition of the various states, the President issued Executive Order No. 9102, authorizing the establishing of the War Relocation Authority to help assist the evacuees to move to a new community and also to take responsibility for the maintenance and supervision of persons affected by the mass evacuation orders of the War Department.

Following the report made by the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, on Pearl Harbor and the work of the Fifth Columnists, public opinion which had already shown some form of aggressive behavior changed more noticeably and by the end of January a considerable demand from the people and the press appeared for the evacuation of all Japanese. Despite proof from various authorities that no acts of espionage or sabotage had been committed, the general consensus was that such acts had been committed in Hawaii.

During this campaign for the evacuation, the West Coast Congressional Delegation and General DeWitt sent letters to the President and the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, respectively, recommending the immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese ancestry. Since the Department of Justice had no authority for the regulation and control of citizens, the President, on February 19, 1942, signed Executive Order No. 9066 authorizing the War Department to set up military areas and to exclude all persons from these areas. On March 2, 1942, General DeWitt, with responsibility delegated to him by Mr. Stimson, established Military Areas 1 and 2, and on March 27, prohibited all persons of Japanese ancestry from leaving these areas. Followed by a multiple series of orders,

the Japanese were removed from Military Area No. 1 by July 5, and Area No. 2 by August 7, 1942.

There were various reasons given for the mass evacuation: military, political and economic. Political and economic necessities were not wholly publicized although a few leaders in the West Coast area did come out with statements comparable to one of self-interest. Irrespective of the many versions identified with the mass migration, the basic reasons submitted by General DeWitt and some comments on his reasons were:

1. Military necessity.

The explanation given at the time was that evacuation was ordered as a matter of military necessity. This term "military necessity" was not defined at first. However, in his Final Report in later years, General DeWitt did say that since the Japanese Army was conquering many of the far-eastern countries, the West Coast was in imminent danger of attack. Attributing the successful attack by the enemy on Pearl Harbor to the work of Japanese people had undoubtedly made the commander take precautionary measures by bringing about this mass migration.

2. Protection against mob violence.

The General said that he acted to protect the West Coast Japanese from mob violence. There were few reported

instances of violence, and experienced observers stated that there was no real danger of mob violence.¹³

3. Some Japanese known to be disloyal.

There were, no doubt, dangerous individuals among the Japanese, but, prior to the mass evacuation these individuals had been arrested by the Department of Justice. That the risk of keeping the Japanese in the West Coast was not serious can be shown by the fact that the military authorities had never contemplated mass evacuation until such time as there should be much public demand in favor of it.

4. Racial considerations.

Racial considerations were evidently regarded as part of military necessity. In his report, General DeWitt said, "The continual presence of a large, unassimilated, tightly-knit racial group, bound to the enemy by strong ties of race, culture, custom and religion, constituted a menace which had to be dealt with."¹⁴ "The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second

¹³McWilliams, op. cit., p. 8.

¹⁴Final Report, Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, p. 9.

and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become 'Americanized', the racial strains are undiluted."¹⁵

The reasons behind the evacuation seemed sound at the time the decision was made, but, as the years went by many findings came to the fore, and it is now more certain that the conclusions drawn by General DeWitt were not justified by the evidence. Despite the various elements entering in decision-making, it is significant to note that the racial consideration was strongly imbedded in the minds of the commander, and thus the many demonstrations of loyalty by the Japanese went unheeded.

The events of the month after Pearl Harbor were a surprise to both the Issei and Nisei. The restrictions suddenly interrupted their plan of living and brought about grave personal and family crises. Not only were enemy aliens taken into custody by the Department of Justice but the restrictions also included freezing of funds, closing down of Japanese newspapers and prohibition on travel beyond a few miles. During the latter part of December, fear began to spread through

¹⁵Ibid., p. 34.

the Japanese communities as the result of rumors of attacks by people of various nationalities. As stated before, these attacks were infrequent, but nevertheless, fear and inability to get reliable information led to more rumors. With the arrest of enemy aliens further disturbing situations occurred. For instance, not knowing why some people were taken into custody while others were not, led the arrested individuals to look suspiciously upon the latter as "inu" (dogs or informers). When the latter in turn were apprehended, they felt a sense of relief that at least the stigma such as "inu" had been lifted from them. The confusions entering the minds of the people interned were many. As one Issei father said:

"When I was first taken by the F.B.I., I felt very much ashamed. I thought, 'What have I done that this disgraceful thing should happen to me. Bad men will be interned and I will be among them.' I felt very sad. But when we got to jail I saw there all the leaders of the Japanese community, men who were respected and whom I knew would do nothing wrong. I felt that I was in good company and did not feel so bad about it any more."¹⁶

The people who were left behind suffered from lack

¹⁶Impounded People, Japanese Americans in Relocation Centers, p. 33.

of leadership. Many were wondering what action they could have committed which would seem suspicious and dangerous to a caucasian (member of the white race), and this led many to destroy anything from Japanese dolls to books that would suggest attachment to Japan. With the respected leaders lost, the people had no one to go to for advice and information. Later they turned to the Japanese American Citizens League group which the evacuation authorities were coming to regard as their liaison with the Japanese communities. Community solidarity and organization were disintegrating.

As the Department of Justice began designating various areas as essential for war efforts, the uprooted people felt more despair. No one knew which area would be next. The conflicting views between the authorities and the press brought further confusion. For instance, the authorities were denying that there would be mass evacuation, whereas the newspapers were printing that there would be. When the Western Defense Command announced that persons of Japanese ancestry were being encouraged to move voluntarily some of them took this opportunity. However, the opposition faced by these people from some inland states resulted in greater ill feelings. In regard to the day-to-day incidents and

the mass evacuation, one evacuee stated:

"I think some of us were a little relieved to be away from the minor irritations, the insults, slander, and the small humiliations that people heaped upon us after Pearl Harbor. Many people may say, 'Well, that's to be expected,' but to be unable to go out in the streets, or just to the corner store, without fear of being insulted, and being all tense inside with the same fear, was one of the most humiliating things. What could we do? Nothing. Just endure in silence. Those are the things that are locked in the hearts of many of us. Not big things, but many small things."¹⁷

An evacuee woman said:

"Everybody took advantage of us. Some people took things when we were not watching. While we were packing inside the house, these people would go around the back and take everything they saw. It was difficult to keep our tempers. For seventeen years, Dad and Mom had struggled to build up their business. Every profit they made was put into the store for remodeling and improving it little by little. At the same time they were raising four children and sending them through high school and even had one attending college. Boom, came evacuation and our prosperity crumbled to pieces. The precious forty-eight hours notice we had in which to pack passed like a nightmare."¹⁸

From late May till early August, the majority of the 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were evacuated

¹⁷Impounded People, Japanese Americans in Relocation Centers, op. cit., p. 35.

¹⁸Ibid, p. 36.

to the Army's sixteen assembly centers located in race tracks, fairgrounds, and stadiums.¹⁹ Here, living under crowded conditions and with no knowledge of what would happen to them, there was much speculation and rumor-spreading on the part of the evacuees.

Welfare Aspects

In the wake of expanding prohibited and restricted areas, there was much confusion and anxiety. Jobs were getting scarce for this minority group and the financial assistance to meet temporary needs in re-establishing themselves in other communities seemed uncertain. In many families, no member was entitled to categorical assistance under the Social Security Act (Old Age Assistance, Aid to Dependent Children and Aid to the Blind). If some member did qualify for assistance there were other obstacles such as legal residence and citizenship requirements confronting them; some counties were even setting up prohibitions against the use of county funds for the evacuees. The private agencies gave various services, but since their resources were limited many of the needs went unmet. The fact that the needs of the

¹⁹Appendix V.

evacuees were arising from the restrictive action of the federal government resulted in the decision that federal funds should be made available for the relief of their distress. The result was the establishing of the program, "Services and Assistance to Enemy Aliens and Others Affected by Restrictive Governmental Action," which was to be administered by the various existing public agencies under the authority of the Federal Security Board.

Under-Department of Justice. The application of this program under the Department of Justice required close planning with the Social Security Board. The initial plan called for the use of existing agencies to provide services, but owing to lack of time, the problem involved in dealing with many county welfare departments through the State Department of Social Welfare, and also the diverse points of view between the state and its counties on the handling of the alien situation, the Social Security Board decided to borrow workers and operate its own program. The staff resulting from this included representatives from the Bureau of Employment Security and Public Assistance with the latter having as its representatives many of the state and local social workers loaned by the West Coast State Department of

Social Welfare. Other agencies providing volunteer workers for consultant services were the various private agencies and also representation from the U.S. Children's Bureau and the Work Projects Administration.²⁰

During the short period in which the Social Security Board offices were in operation (February to March) the anticipated rush by the evacuees did not materialize. This resulted in the closing down of some of the Social Security Board offices and a month later in transferring the responsibility to the County department, through the State Department of Social Welfare, with the necessary financial assistance provided by the Social Security Board.

In the early phase of operation there was just a handful of Japanese seeking advice, information and assistance, thus making the problem seem unimportant. However, in actuality the "spot" evacuation undertaken by the Department of Justice was a preparation for the mass evacuation that was to follow under the War Department. The problems presented were quite similar from one evacuee to another and the complicating factors

²⁰Leahy, op. cit., p. 28.

with which the various agencies had to contend in the past also existed in the Social Security Board Offices. For example, it was difficult for the social worker to establish rapport with the Japanese. Among the alien Japanese, more so than the Nisei, receiving relief aid was a sign of weakness. Much of this feeling may have stemmed from their lack of knowledge of what the agencies stood for or from the fact that receiving aid was contrary to their mores, or both. Whatever the factors, there were hardly any applications during the first few days of operation. With the few that came for services, the social workers were having difficulty in conveying what they really wanted to say, despite the use of interpreters. They were faced with people who were hesitant in pouring out troubles or with evacuees such as wives of interned husbands who had never taken any responsibility as head of household. Often the workers even failed to recognize little things like the Japanese mannerisms, which led to further difficulty in establishing relationship.

Realizing that these families needed some sort of aid, the Social Security Board officials undertook the task of contacting the leaders of the community to explain to the people the function of the office.

Evacuees were coming in for services rather than for financial assistance. Through the efforts of these leaders, the people began using the services more frequently. The bulk of the help sought was in getting information on prohibited areas, housing, citizenship status, employment, etc. As one social worker stated:

"Our job was to give information and help in such a manner that the necessary adjustment could be made as easily as possible. Our job, in the face of the public clamor for rapid removal of all Japanese and of the rumors about what was to happen next, was to calm people, to slow down hasty action, to suggest careful advance planning, and to give accurate information."²¹

The skill utilized by some of the workers in undertaking their task helped relieve much of the anxiety, but in the wake of newspaper publicity, rumors, and the frequency with which orders were being changed, the effect was not a lasting one. Irrespective of the mounting confusion, the fact that the workers tried to do their best, and their admission that they did not know the answers to some of the questions posed by the evacuees, helped them win the respect and confidence of those involved in the evacuation.

²¹Nickel, George. "Evacuation, American Style." Survey Mid-monthly, Vol. LXXVIII (April, 1942), p. 99.

The various rules and regulations of public agencies complicated the handling of problems. Following the transfer of function from the Social Security offices to the state and county departments of social welfare, other complicating factors began entering in. For the families who had met the legal residence requirement or other requirements for county aid, it was difficult to decide whether a family was a county relief case or a Federal Security Agency case. When the Federal Security Agency decided to give aid to all families of the evacuees, authorities in Washington denounced such an act, saying that it was not the responsibility of the federal government. In the area of budgets, while the Social Security Board under Federal Security Agency operated the program, the Aid to Dependent Children budget of the State Department of Social Welfare was used, but when the function was transferred to the county level, the county relief budget, which was less, was used.²² Assistance was provided on the basis of need and it was made available for such purposes as transportation, medical care, subsistence payments for institutional and boarding-home cases.

²²Nickel, op. cit., p. 101.

In March, 1942 the Attorney-General wrote in a letter to the Federal Security Administrator:

"The U.S. Attorneys and others advise me that local relief agencies lack the funds and the disposition to assist the dependents, frequently American-born children of detained or interned aliens. I believe that the Federal Government may properly assume the responsibility for this relief problem. Unlike criminals, alien enemies are apprehended and detained, not because of proof that they have broken any of our laws but because of the Federal policy which makes national safety the paramount interest.

As a matter of international law, it is an accepted practice for sovereign States at war to protect themselves by deporting or detaining alien enemies but this does not charge the aliens with any criminal guilt . . . I feel that under the conditions of modern warfare, in which we can no longer return all alien enemies to their own country, the same dictates of humanity and national hospitality require the Federal Government to take reasonable steps to care for them."²³

Seeing that the voluntary evacuation was not being accomplished fast enough, and thinking that this might be due to lack of assistance from the existing agencies as well as to opposition from other states, the War Department requested that the services under the Federal Security Agency be broadened to include families of enemy

²³Leahy, op. cit., p. 30.

aliens. On the basis of these requests the President authorized, during the latter part of March, 1942, the War Department to provide services and assistance program.

Evacuation under War Department orders. In order to facilitate evacuation the War Department established the Wartime Civil Control Administration on March 18, 1942. These offices were staffed by representatives of the various Federal Agencies. For example, the Federal Reserve Bank and the Farm Security Administration were given responsibility in providing protection of property-personal and agricultural property respectively. It is significant to note that while the difficulty in dealing with property arose during the evacuation under the Department of Justice, there was no agency to give such services. This resulted in mass selling of properties by the evacuees at a great loss. Also the Federal Security Agency, through its various agencies, Bureau of Public of Public Assistance, U. S. Public Health Service, and U. S. Employment Service, agreed to provide the necessary assistance.

The task of the W.C.C.A. included evacuation, locating sites for the assembly and relocation centers, and re-settlement. As outlined in Appendix III, since one of

the policies followed by the W.C.C.A. was to use the minimum of military personnel, and also since it was difficult to evacuate people on the one hand and to resettle them on the other, the President on March 18, 1942 issued Executive Order No. 9102 establishing the War Relocation Authority. The War Relocation Authority, which will be discussed later, had as its main function the resettlement of the evacuees. Under the W.C.C.A. program, there was greater demand for social workers than were needed under the Department of Justice. Whereas approximately thirty-five social workers were loaned for the Department of Justice evacuation, almost four hundred were required for the main evacuation under the War Department. The key operating unit was the civil control stations which were staffed by social workers and representatives of the federal agencies and located in areas of concentration of Japanese people. Their main functions were to register all persons of Japanese ancestry, to provide services and assistance in preparing them for evacuation from the West Coast, and to assist in directing this movement to certain designated assembly centers. In bringing this about and to avoid any duplication of function by the various

agencies, the W.C.C.A. devised a plan calling for specific responsibilities on the part of each agency.²⁴

This mass evacuation assignment was, no doubt, a challenging one to the social workers assigned to the various groups. It is difficult to visualize how these groups were able to work cooperatively, but much of this teamwork may have come about from the more receptive attitude on the part of the Japanese, from agency pride on the part of the workers, and also from the competitive atmosphere existing within the control station. A brief account of the role played by the social worker will help bring out a clearer picture:

After the evacuee had come to the control station and had gone through the work of the receptionist, he was taken to a social worker who interviewed him for about twenty-five minutes and made assignments accordingly. The worker did not attempt to stick to fixed schedule, but gave each evacuee the time necessary to complete the registration, explained questions in regard to evacuation to the best of his ability, and if necessary, explained how to arrange for assistance in settling some of the problems of the evacuees. Each evacuee was then questioned about his property, personal and family affairs, to ascertain the problems brought about by evacuation. The services of the Federal Reserve Bank, and the Farm Security Admin-

²⁴Appendix IV.

istration were explained and every effort was made to bring out some responses in regard to the need for these services. Other questions asked were about his personal and family needs for clothing, food, and shelter prior to the date of evacuation. Much freedom was placed upon the evacuee in making his own decisions.

Following this interview the worker referred the evacuee to the agency equipped to handle the various problems. The functions of the Federal Reserve Bank and Farm Security Administration have already been mentioned. When the need arose from lack of finance, the evacuee was referred to the Public Assistance staff who gave assistance for the purchase of articles the evacuees were required to take to the centers, for provision of food and lodging until the exclusion date, etc. Medical examination was obligatory and so a definite appointment was made for the evacuee to report to the section operated by the U. S. Public Health Service. After having a complete medical examination, persons with contagious and infectious disease, maternity cases, tuberculosis cases, etc. were transferred to the appropriate public hospitals where they were deferred from the evacuation until such time as approval was given by the U. S. Public Health Service.

Following the various services received, the evacuee reported back to the social worker who made certain that all services had been received. Prior to leaving, the evacuee was informed of the date and hour of his departure to the assembly center.

The social worker assigned to the control station faced problems comparable to those presented under the

Department of Justice evacuation, but there was one significant problem that required special attention. Included among the evacuees were persons married to caucasians, or to people of other nationalities; others were people with as little mixture of Japanese blood. Many of them who were not raised among the Japanese group found life in the centers difficult. They were being ostracized by the evacuees and their presence in camps was the source of frequent irritation. Since the mass migration did not either include or exclude spouses of different nationalities, the trying experience in the assembly centers made many of them leave, thus breaking up the family group. This being one of the things that the W.C.C.A. tried to avoid, splitting the family group, a policy was initiated to exempt certain mixed-marriage families and mixed-blood individuals from evacuation.²⁵

Irrespective of the multiple problems confronting the W.C.C.A., the close working-relationship between different groups made possible the transferring of some 110,000 people within less than five months. During evacuation and while the evacuees were being settled in the assembly centers, the assistance program was modified to meet the needs of the restricted persons and

²⁵Appendix III.

their dependents living in the rest of the inland states to which they had migrated. The program "Services and Assistance to Enemy Aliens and Others Affected by Restrictive Action" which had been in existence only in the West Coast states was now in effect throughout the nation.

In reviewing what took place, it is clear that the experience of the Department of Justice helped tremendously in the work of the W.C.C.A. that followed. Despite the social problems that seemed unending, there is evidence that this experience helped the agencies - federal, state, county and private - to work harmoniously, thus making for better understanding of the persons served and of their problems. It also gave to some of the participating agencies a conception of the welfare problems as consisting of more than merely relief-giving.

CHAPTER IV

CONFINEMENT CENTERS

Assembly Center

Early procedures. By the middle of 1942, the majority of the 110,000 persons of Japanese ancestry were confined in race tracks, stadiums, and fair grounds that made up the sixteen assembly centers under the authority of the Wartime Civil Control Administration. The problems of living under conditions such as; overcrowdedness, community baths, latrines, mess halls; the smelly stalls of Santa Anita race tracks; and not knowing what to expect next, coupled with close surveillance by the military police, brought about many difficulties. While the evacuees were as yet unable to get reliable information, there were rumors that they would be forced to relocate to some eastern states that were hostile to them. There were more rumors of camps being built in isolated parts of the country where they could live peacefully until the war was over. Still other rumors spoke of the hot and terrible places where people who complained about the evacuation would be sent. Whatever the feelings were, there was without doubt much despair and intense speculation on the part of the evacuees.

At the onset, assembly centers were to be used for a very short period; their main purpose was to serve as "filling-in-the-gaps" between evacuation and until the War Relocation Authority could take over. However, due to wartime restrictions of various materials for construction and transportation, some of the assembly centers existed longer than six months. As General DeWitt stated, "For extended occupancy by men, women and children whose movements were necessarily restricted, the use of facilities of this character is not highly desirable."²⁶

During the early stages of assembly life, while the evacuees had been subject to various experiences they showed no sign of mass resistance to authority. One reason for this may have been because of the heterogeneous group that existed. Also, since the evacuees were busy finding a place and making it livable, other difficulties existing seemed of secondary importance. As they became more settled and their views diverted towards the restrictive aspect there were in many centers vague protests. Only in one center (Santa Anita) was there a disturbance of serious proportions.

²⁶Final Report, Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942, p. 152.

As stated in the final report:

"At Santa Anita on August 4, 1942, a routine search for various contraband was started immediately after the morning meal. A few of the interior security police became over-zealous in their search and somewhat over-bearing in their manner of approach to evacuees in two of the center's seven districts. Added to this was an order from the Center Manager to pick up, without advance notice, electric hot plates which had previously been allowed on written individual authorization of the Center Management staffs to families who needed them for the preparation of infant formulas and food for the sick. Electric devices, such as hot plates, were strictly controlled to prevent fire.

Poor liaison, or rather lack of liaison in this incident, between the Center Management and the heads of the interior security police resulted in the failure of reports of complaints to reach the chief of interior security police until mid-afternoon. Those complaints, based to a certain extent on solid ground, grew in the intervening four or five hours to rumors of all kinds of violation on the part of the police. When finally the complaints reached the chief of interior police, the search was promptly postponed just as the crowds were beginning to gather.

Two mobs and one crowd of women evacuees formed. One evacuee who had long been suspected by the disorderly elements among the population of giving information to the police was set upon and severely beaten though not seriously injured. The interior security police were harassed but none was injured. This is the single instance (in an assembly center) in which the military police was called into the Center and took complete charge upon entry.²⁷

²⁷Ibid., p. 218.

This incident is significant in that as these evacuees were later moved into the relocation centers, there were similar incidents arising in Poston and Mazanar centers.

Welfare services. Since the Assembly Centers functioned under the W.C.C.A., much of the welfare services provided by the agencies - federal to local - during evacuation also extended their services in the centers. As the Civil Control Station was the key operating unit during evacuation, this function was undertaken separately by the various federal agencies. The Service Division with responsibility to the Center Manager had general supervision and met non-medical needs of the evacuee.

As mentioned previously, assembly centers were to be used as temporary abodes until some complicating factors extended their purposes. In view of this, the services provided by the W.C.C.A. were concentrated around meeting the basic minimum necessities - housing, feeding, maintenance, sanitation, and medical care. Long-range programs such as education, recreation, establishing of canteens, were not contemplated, but when it became evident that there would be a delay in transfer, consideration was given to establishing these programs.

All medical care was provided by the U.S. Public Health Service and the medical department of the Assembly Centers. Assistance from the State Department of Health and the County Health Department was enlisted from counties in which the Assembly Centers were located. Included in the services were: prenatal and postnatal care, special diets for children and grown-ups with physical disorders, operation of center hospitals, medical programs, etc. In the beginning the center hospitals' role was one of infirmaries, with the more serious cases transferred to the local hospitals, but the delay in transfer of evacuees resulted in the expansion of medical services to include minor surgery, dental and optical care. Other federal agencies providing services to the evacuees were the Work Projects Administration under the Federal Works Agency, Post Office Department, the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, and the U.S. Office of Education.

Under the direction of the Service Section various non-medical programs such as: education, recreation, canteens or community cooperatives, newspapers, etc., were provided. (Like the center hospitals, these programs were not contemplated at first, but the delay made it a necessity that such programs be instituted.) Whereas

programs such as recreation, canteen and newspapers flourished more rapidly, the educational program which functioned under the direction of the U.S. Office of Education met with some difficulty. Students said that since there was no future for them, why bother to attend school. When school first opened in these centers there was, especially in high school, a great deal of unrest. Most of the young people were angry over what had happened to them and to their families. Yet there were those who adopted an attitude approaching self-sacrifice.

One such man wrote:

"I am an American citizen of Japanese ancestry and I, like countless other Nisei, pledge my loyalty to the United States without reservation, quite contrary to some people's beliefs. It seems to me, with what little experience I have, that that fact and statement never got me anywhere, but I am proud. Proud because my parents have handed me the code of Bushido, which included this standard of conduct: 'You must be loyal to your Master, even though it means turning against your own blood.' Of this heritage I am proud-proud of this race that could give me such a standard of conduct to guide my life as a loyal American citizen. For I deem the United States my Master.

"America means so much to me that I am ready to defend it. After all, who wouldn't be, for to America we owe all that we can ever hope to be . . ."28

A student who said that evacuation changed whatever he believed as an American wrote:

²⁸Glenn, Eunice. "Education Behind Barbed Wire." Survey Monthly, LXXC (December, 1944), p. 347.

"For thirty years my parents worked and worked to send us to school and to build a farm for us - to have the farm taken away in just one week! We were put into camp. The reason? Because we have brown skins.

"And the things I believed in - Democracy and the Constitution - left me right then. And now to have the damned fence around us and to have soldiers watch us with guns!

"We, the citizens of this country, the United State of America, are without freedom or justice. Why? Because we have brown skins, which we cannot wash away."²⁹

The insecurity and frustration manifested by these students made the task of teaching the meaning of democracy under these circumstances a trying one.

During the confinement of the evacuees in assembly centers, the War Relocation Authority, under the directorship of Mr. Milton Eisenhower, worked consistently to bring about a solution. As they realized that restriction and segregation might have unfavorable effects on these people, a conference with Governors of various states was called at Salt Lake City. The purpose of this conference was to correct some misunderstandings of the evacuees and also to explore more fully the resettlement program. The result was disappointing as most of the governors and attorney-generals reacted negatively. Some said they thought that the "Japs"

²⁹Glenn, Loc. cit.

should be in concentration camps, whereas a few stated that although some evacuees were citizens, they had no rights. Others reacted more vehemently by demanding that the federal government send all evacuees back to Japan.

This conference influenced a great deal the decision reached by the War Relocation Authority. The second forced migration into the newly constructed relocation centers proceeded in May and was not completed until November of 1942. It is interesting to note that while this migration was in effect the labor shortage in sugar beet and other agricultural industries became acute.

The requests of farmers to have the evacuees work for them increased so rapidly that the governors, who had been most against the idea, were now reversing their stand and demanding that the War Department release these people. Agreement was reached between the various states and federal authorities, resulting in some workers taking these opportunities. (This topic on jobs in outside communities will be discussed in the chapter on Resettlement).

Relocation Centers

Early Procedure. As compared to the evacuation from homes to assembly centers, the movement from assembly

center to relocation centers was a slow process. Under the direction of the U. S. Army the second migration got underway in May. By November, 1942, some 110,000 evacuees were transferred to the ten relocation centers located in California, Arizona, Arkansas, Wyoming, Colorado, Idaho and Utah.

Relocation centers Manzanar in California and Poston in Arizona (formally called Colorado River reception center) were reception centers. The people who moved into these two centers were relieved of the second migration. However, from the various reports published later, the length of time that people spent in the assembly centers had significant influence on their adjustment in the relocation centers. One reason was that there was a little more freedom of movement and less restrictions by the military police. Despite these improvements, the relocation centers as a whole could hardly be considered satisfactory. For instance, the evacuees were housed in barracks with either one family or two families per room, depending on the number of children. Community baths and toilets were placed in each block and the evacuees were fed in mess halls, thus lessening the effectiveness of family relationships. As John Powell stated in his article:

"These communities were suitable for young male soldiers in active field service. I can imagine no place less adapted to the living of a complex community of families, with all their necessities of work, of worship, of social life, of government and administrative service, of privacy and decency, morality and manners. When the residents moved in there was no stick of furniture in any house, no schools, no churches, but little water, and that undependable.

"Soldiers need little privacy. They can be efficiently fed in company mess halls, accommodated in common latrines and unpartitioned showers. But throw into such a naked camp whole families of people who regard privacy as precious. Take away the family dining table and throw the families into a common mess hall where the age groups tend to sit together, dissolving families, weakening the father's headship, destroying conversation and manners. The results are obvious."³⁰

During the early phase of confinement in the relocation centers there seemed to exist some unity of purpose. The evacuee volunteers worked cooperatively with the War Relocation Authority staff, and the evacuees were helping each other in getting settled. Jobs that had to be done by the evacuees such as working in mess halls, building hospitals, cleaning of the blocks, etc. were undertaken with less conflict. On the other hand

³⁰Powell, John. "America's Refugee, Exodus and Diaspora," National Conference of Social Work, LXX (1943), p. 302.

there were people who felt that since the government had deprived them of the essentials, it should provide for all maintenance in the centers. With the help of some authorities these volunteers, consisting mostly of Nisei, recruited their friends whom they knew were good men for particular jobs. It is important to note that the cooperative spirit varied with the center. In the majority of the centers this spirit existed throughout, but in centers such as Poston, Manzanar and Tule Lake, working relationships between the staff and evacuees were difficult. Many of these difficulties may have stemmed from the past experience of the evacuees and also the conflict that had existed among the administration staff. As Alexander Leighton had stated: "Like the evacuees, the members of the administration came from many walks of life and, also like the evacuees, they could be grouped and described in various ways. It seems most profitable to classify the War Relocation Authority staff into 'people-minded' and as 'stereotype-minded'."³¹

As the months went by this cooperative spirit seemed to be weakening. The staff began hearing stories of the

³¹Leighton, op. cit., p. 81.

dishonesty of the volunteers placed in responsible jobs. There were charges made that some of these volunteers were looked down upon prior to evacuation as "inu" or informers. Others said that the War Relocation Authority was not aware of the problems they had gone through and also why should a higher status be held by this younger generation (volunteers)? Many questions were asked to which even the authorities did not know the answers. Irrespective of the limitations facing the staffs during the early stages of operation, their appearing before the evacuees to explain to the best of their ability helped to ease some of the anxieties. In the other centers where no close relationships had been established, tensions grew to such an extent that the War Relocation Authority had to call the militia.

The objective of the War Relocation Authority staff was primarily resettlement, but in the face of opposition and fear by the evacuees much emphasis was placed in making the centers self-sufficient. Since the desire of the War Relocation Authority staff was to bring about some recognition of citizenship, the ruling that was set forth in establishing Community Councils was that only citizens were to be elected. Prior to this there were such organizations as the office of block managers

and the block council. The former was recognized by the authority, whereas the latter, composed of more Issei was not. The community life that flourished at this time centered in the blocks rather than in the center as a whole.

Thinking that more cooperation from the center would be forthcoming by organizing a community council, the W.R.A. staff emphasized that such a move was profitable. When the Council, which was to act as liaison between the administration and the evacuees, was formed there did exist some working relationship, but there also existed great oppositions from the Issei group which had always had a position as head of households in the community. In view of this the staff encouraged the formation of a group of older men, called the "Issei Advisory Board," to act in an advisory capacity to the council.

Since the inception of the Issei Advisory Board, there seemed to be no harmony between the Issei and members of the community council. The former believed in spending the remainder of the war in centers and voiced much distrust of the administration, whereas the latter thought in terms of resettlement and working closely with the administration. These frictions resulted in the group

favoring the Issei Advisory Board, doing bodily harm to some of the council men. This incident is important in that it caused a near riot in Poston and an all out riot in Manzanar.

The events that followed these upheavals were the segregation of all pro-Japanese to Tule Lake in California, greater awareness by the administration of the various social forces existing and of how to deal more effectively with them, and closer working relationships between the staff and the evacuees and between the Issei and the Nisei throughout the remainder of center life. The latter was accomplished when the W.R.A., after realizing the influence exerted by the Issei in community affairs, decided to combine both the Issei and Nisei groups by establishing a Central Executive Board.

Community consensus began developing and whereas in the past the community life had centered in the block in which one lived, esprit de corps began extending to larger areas. This feeling of community on the part of the evacuees can best be exemplified by a statement made by a woman in regard to the enlistment of Americans of Japanese ancestry into the armed forces in 1943-44. An Issei mother said:

"You know things are a lot different than they were a while ago. People really rebelled at the time of registration. They said awful things about the government, and they spoke of the boys who volunteered almost as if they were traitors to the Japanese for serving a country that had treated the Japanese so badly. When Selective Service was reinstituted all one heard was that the government had no right to draft men out of a camp like this. At first when the boys left, their mothers wept with bitterness and resentment. They didn't think their sons should go. This week five have gone from our block. I tell you I'm surprised at the difference. Wives and mothers are sorry and they weep a lot. But now they really feel it is a man's duty to serve his country . . . They feel more as they did before evacuation."³²

Welfare services. The relocation project, like any other newly established communities, showed some lag in certain areas of services. One of these areas was welfare. The elements retarding this development were many, and among them were: the general thinking among the W.R.A. staff that a division such as Internal Security could absorb the work; conflicts between the administrative staff as well as the shifting in policies which made for misunderstanding; lack of trained social workers coinciding with lack of knowledge by the evacuees as to what social work meant; the language barrier between the

³²Impounded People, Japanese Americans in the Relocation Centers, p. 190.

staff and the evacuees. Only as the staff became more aware of the mounting problems and how this restrictive atmosphere was affecting personality and family relationships, did they realize that some form of welfare counseling and other related services were needed. In view of this the Center Welfare Department was established by the W.R.A. throughout the relocation centers.

In contrast to the welfare agencies in normal communities where case loads are distributed among various agencies, all problems dealing with welfare aspects of the centers came under the Center Welfare Department. The primary services provided were: assistance in family welfare problems, financial assistance, social insurance, and community activities. Field service was provided to the center welfare staff by the various federal agencies, but with such factors as changes in center policies and infrequent visitation on the part of the field staff, much of the work was placed in the hands of a few trained social workers and their case aides (evacuees).

Family welfare problems. Although there were many problems regarding family relationships, at first only a few evacuees utilized the services of the Welfare Department. One reason for this, other than the resentment

shown toward the federal government and the unfamiliarity with welfare services, was the factor of racial and community pride. For instance, when pre-marital pregnancies occurred the father of the family group, the minister and a friend who acted as intermediary during marriage sought to bring about some solution. The general tendency of the evacuees was to conceal their problems. Also when they did come for service, the manner in which they expressed need was less direct.

During the early phase of the relocation center, the evacuees were not able to go to the near-by communities without an escort or special passes. Whenever such incidents as weddings or the need for certain commodities arose, the welfare staff was frequently called upon to help with the purchase. In the area of ill-health affecting the welfare of the family, casework interview was provided prior to referring them to the proper authorities. If in the course of interview the worker felt that help was needed in housekeeping, homemaker service was provided.

In regard to child welfare problems, the Welfare Department assumed responsibility for foster-home placement within the centers. However, where the problems

called for long-term care or adoption the case was transferred to the state approved child-caring agency. At Manzanar center a small group-care program was established for those children who were evacuated from the institutions in California.

Other responsibilities of the Welfare Department were: working with delinquents referred by the Juvenile Committee of the evacuee Judicial Commission with the project director acting as a center "court"; dealing with crippled, mentally ill and handicapped persons through cooperation with the various state institutions; and the few marital cases that came to their attention. Prior to evacuation there were few divorce cases among the Japanese people, but under the strains of center life there were more separations and divorces. Of the many elements entering in, one example was analyzed by a neighbor.

"Right in our block there is one middle age couple sharing a room with a very young divorcee, her brother and father. She is very modern and sociable. She brings in her young girl friends and practice new Poston dance steps. The middle age couple are very quiet type and the husband is sick person. There is always a big fight and quarrel because the wife understands the younger set and is too lenient to her roommate. Now the

wife and husband is separated just because of the roommate. It is not the fault of either side, merely because the extremes are put in same apartment."³³

The welfare staff also dealt with special problems relating to unattached persons and to aliens with enemy status. In the former, the group concerned were the bachelor Issei who had migrated from Japan; these men required help in planning their housing accommodation, resettlement of their affairs when they died, and assistance in communication with the Department of Justice. The latter group, people with alien enemy status, consisted of many families in which the heads of the household had been interned before or during the time of evacuation. Living under a patriarchal form of society, these wives and children were at a loss in regard to settling financial affairs and also in settling down in relocation centers. There were many questions asked regarding correspondence, visitation, etc. with which the welfare staff had to deal. When the W.R.A. decided to segregate all disloyal citizens and aliens, many of these families whose only desire was to be with their husbands failed to answer the loyalty test. To bring about some awareness on the

³³Ibid., p. 70.

part of these families in their decisions, interviews were given to help them decide their position with regard to segregation.

Financial assistance. Financial assistance in centers was relatively small. Since food, shelter, medical care, and education were provided, the necessary items for which the individual or family group needed financial help were purchasing clothing and incidentals. It is interesting to note that, in the early periods, persons receiving financial assistance were the needy and disabled, and families without employable members. However as center life progressed there were more able-bodied people asking for assistance. Self or family pride was not lost in the latter cases since they were now regarding financial assistance as a possible source of compensation for the damages done to them by the federal government.

Financial assistance was granted on a monthly basis following investigation made through interviews with family, relatives and block managers. There was much latitude in determining the amount of income. Verification of financial resources was rarely required by the welfare staff, and there was no requirement that personal resources

be utilized for living expenses by those unable to work. This was because of the general consensus that most families were evacuated with few worldly goods at best.³⁴ (Financial assistance was also given during resettlement, but this will be discussed in Chapter V.)

Social insurance. There were relatively few evacuees who were eligible for some form of social insurance, but the lack of familiarity with the changing programs made it necessary for the welfare workers to interpret these provisions. With the aid of the welfare staff and the field representatives of the Social Security Board, a substantial number of the aged people were helped to claim for their OASI benefits.

Unemployment compensation failed to materialize for many evacuees. The reason for this was that the various state unemployment compensation administrations were saying that the residents of the centers were not available for employment. Those who did go outside the centers found steady jobs and so were not entitled to the benefits. On the other hand, those who failed to

³⁴Nickel, George. "In the Relocation Centers," Survey Midmonthly, LXXVIX (January 1943), p. 4.

get a job and later returned to the center were placed on "unavailability for employment" status. In the light of these difficulties a job of the welfare staff was in explaining the laws as well as in giving information relating to the benefit.

In regard to workmen's compensation, every evacuee employed at the center was insured by the U. S. Employees' Compensation against injury received on the job. However, since benefits were computed on the basis of wages (\$12.00, \$16.00 and \$19.00 monthly depending on skill) and clothing allowance paid to the workers, the compensation was inadequate. Welfare services provided for family problems and financial need resulting from this inadequacy were limited. If help was forthcoming it was in the area of referral of cases and assisting the claimants to give the necessary information to the Employees Compensation Commission.

Community activities. Compared with the angry and fearful mass of people which came to the centers during the early stages of the war, the people who as yet had not journeyed to outside communities were more settled and calm. Although anxiety about the future was still keen, resentment toward the government and life in the

centers was weaker. As the majority of the people became more accepting of the total situation, they found themselves getting more involved in various aspects of center operations. For instance, the farmers were getting themselves involved in hog raising, poultry, or other operations in the centers dealing with agriculture. The council men and block managers began thinking in terms of the community rather than of specific groups. Also there was more cooperation from the former businessmen in regard to the operation of community canteens.

Recreation such as drama, movies, sports, singing classes, art, etc., were participated in by all age groups. There were few recreational leaders among the welfare staff, but many of these activities were undertaken by the evacuees themselves.

Education, like all other activities, was seriously handicapped by lack of equipment and teachers. The program developed in each center included nursery schools, secondary schools, Junior College and also an adult education program. As center life progressed pupils were taking more interest in this work. Through the effort of the

U. S. Office of Education, high schools in centers had been recognized as class "A" institutions by the respective state boards of education.³⁵

Throughout the center life the welfare section did not have frequent and extensive working relationships with local public and private social agencies. On the other hand, the agencies used most were federal and state agencies and institutions. One reason was that there were very few social agencies existing in the centers or in the immediate localities of the center.

³⁵Bogardus, Emory S. "Relocation Centers as Planned Communities," Sociology and Social Research, XXVIII (September, 1943), p. 227.

CHAPTER V

RESETTLEMENT

Although W.R.A. made possible the early resettlement of citizen evacuees through such means as short-term leave, seasonal-work leave and indefinite leave, the actual movement of the evacuees to take up residence outside the centers did not materialize in great proportion until the spring of 1943. This slowness was attributed to several reasons. For example, there was a delay in "leave clearance," due to lack of efficient communication between Washington and W.R.A.; bitter resentment by the evacuees towards evacuation as a whole; and opposition from the various communities in regard to resettlement.

To stimulate resettlement, every possible device was used. Prior to evacuation and throughout assembly and relocation centers, an organization called the National Student Relocation Council was formed by non-governmental bodies to help evacuee students continue their education at college level. This council, established with the approval of the W.R.A. and composed of a number of college presidents and other prominent educators, directed its efforts toward determining the academic and

financial status of interested students and also the various colleges and universities that would accept students of Japanese ancestry. Students who were courageous enough to take this opportunity continued with their education. On the other hand, there were students who were unwilling or unable to transfer to other institutions outside the evacuated areas. In view of this the W.R.A. and the National Student Relocation Council worked co-operatively in bringing extension or correspondence courses into the relocation centers.

During the latter part of 1942 and the spring of 1943, sporadic leaves such as seasonal-work leave in sugar beet fields, and indefinite leave for those who preferred living outside to being in the centers, were being granted. However, the difficulties that some evacuees were facing in terms of employer-employee relationships, community opposition, etc. were hampering the resettlement program. One of the important steps taken by the W.R.A. Employment Division, under which resettlement was undertaken, was the establishing of W.R.A. Field Offices in principal cities throughout the country to supervise resettlement activities. Resettlement in the southern part of the United States was limited

since W.R.A. did little to encourage it and also since the evacuees were voicing some reaction in regard to economic limitations and the fear of racial discrimination.

The functions of the Field Offices were many. They were made responsible for designating the areas of employment and for handling some phases of the negotiations with potential employers. They were responsible for referring evacuees in need to proper local and state welfare agencies operating under the special law, "to provide special welfare assistance to persons displaced by restrictive governmental action with funds allocated by the Social Security Board." In order to create more confidence among the evacuees, they were distributing pamphlets and periodic newsletters, or showing photographs and motion pictures of the various communities in which the evacuees could obtain jobs. Also special representatives from the field offices were frequenting the centers to give first hand account of the available jobs and community attitudes, and to interview all interested evacuees.

From the beginning, W.R.A. realized that if resettlement was to be successful, there would need to be much assistance from the local citizen groups. As the Employment

chief stated:

"It appeared to me quite possible that we could locate a small but effective group of people who were deeply interested in the problems growing out of the evacuation and were willing to give their support to doing something practical to solve them. It seemed fruitless to try to convince the whole population of the rightness and the necessity of a relocation program . . . It appeared to me that the most practicable way to relocate these people was to find the few sympathetic people in the community who were willing to put in their time and energy. In the larger places these people could most likely form a committee to coordinate their activities . . . We would spend most of our energy on locating interested people, advising on the organization of committees, providing educational material on evacuation and relocation, and supplying local sponsors with information about the occupational background of evacuees who wanted to relocate."³⁶

The first citizen committee was organized in Minneapolis during the early phases of center operation and by the end of 1943 there were some thirty local resettlement committee councils established in various cities where migration was most likely to exist. In many instances the impetus for these organizations came from such groups as the American Friends Service Committee, Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A., churches and from many other people

³⁶W.R.A., A Story of Human Conservation, United States Department of the Interior, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1946, p. 139.

not affiliated with any organization. These resettlement committee councils functioned in a liaison capacity as did the field offices. For instance, they helped in creating favorable public sentiment toward the evacuees by contacting the key persons of the community, by having meetings with various organizations, and by utilizing the available communication devices; they were helpful in placing children in proper schools as well as in helping the family adjust to the social life of the community; and also when housing was difficult to find, these groups helped by establishing "hostels" and contacting the local housing authorities and property owners to alleviate this difficult situation.

All of these efforts did help to a certain degree but they were not quite enough since some 80,000 evacuees were still in the centers by the end of 1943. In many cases those who left the centers were the younger and the more courageous Nisei between the ages of eighteen and thirty. They went alone or by twos and, later, if opportunities opened, they sent for the other members of their families. A great majority of these early resettlers migrated to the Rocky Mountain states in cities such as Denver and Salt Lake City. In the midwest,

Chicago, with its employment opportunities and comparative lack of racial discrimination received a large influx of evacuees. Although there were many economic opportunities in the east coast there were relatively few evacuees resettling in the eastern seaboard area. A most important reason was that the War Department was not in favor of resettlement in these areas where much of the war production and strategic installations were located.

This movement of the younger generation tended to change the composition of the center population. One found in the summer of 1943 a greater number of people who were either too young or too old. Center organizations were being disrupted since evacuees in responsible positions were moving out, thus leaving the burden of center life in the hands of the older generation. Other strenuous jobs held by the young, which now had to be carried out by the older people, were given consideration by the W.R.A. The relationship already existing between the various committees and the W.R.A. proved of great importance in bringing about cooperation from the evacuees. Also with the closing of Jerome center, the transfer of people into Gila, Rohwer, Heart Mt., Granada, and Minidoka centers helped in filling some of these vacated positions.

By the spring of 1944, enough people had left the centers to resettle so that the W.R.A. was able to make more definite plans for closing its relocation centers. In contrast to the majority of the evacuees who felt that the relocation centers should be open until the end of the war, the staff felt that termination of centers could come about with the lifting of exclusion areas. Working under the belief that living in the centers was doing more harm than good to the evacuee, the W.R.A. announced on December 18, 1944, following the revocation announcement by the War Department, that all centers would be closed a year following the revocation. The field offices were now being extended to the West Coast area since the evacuees were voicing their intention of returning to the communities from which they were evacuated.

Resettlement proceeded at a slow pace with varying amounts of opposition expressed by the evacuees. Many felt that, despite the W.R.A. announcement regarding closing of the centers, such an action could not happen. As a high school girl stated: "This is a town. You can't close a town."³⁷ On the other hand there were

³⁷United State Department of the Interior, Impounded People, Japanese Americans in the Relocation Centers, W.R.A., United States Government Printing Office, 1946, p. 196.

people who talked of a sit-down movement. Angry feelings were shown in block meetings, in family circles, and where people met to spend their evenings. For instance, a man said in a block meeting:

"If the evacuees would just stick together, if nobody would budge out of here, we would get somewhere. We could force the government to keep the centers open or give us some real assistance . . . a lot of softies leave here by railway fare and \$25.00. And now that W.R.A. has said it is going to close the centers, probably more will crawl out of the place like beaten animals."³⁸

Some of these statements were realistic, like the lack of assistance provided, but much of their feelings may have come about because of the dependency attitude developed in the centers, opposition against governmental action in termination of centers, and the reactions on the part of anti-Japanese groups. In alleviating some of this deep-seated resistance the W.R.A. organized relocation committees made up of W.R.A. staff and evacuee leaders. Also the community councils were brought into the picture in the hope that this would bring about greater responsibilities on the part of the evacuees themselves. The conference held at Salt Lake City by the relocation committees was successful in that although

³⁸Ibid., p. 197.

there were some strong opinions against the work of the W.R.A., attention was focused on more extensive and far-reaching relocation assistance. People who prepared themselves to resettle but hesitated in the face of strong criticism were encouraged by the council members to settle outside the centers.

By the beginning of 1945 more resettlement was taking place, thus leaving most of the evacuees who might be expected to require public assistance in the centers. The Center Welfare Department did not function in the capacity of interviewing for resettlement at first, but as resistance by the different members of the family group began appearing in regard to family resettlement, the Welfare Section was asked to extend its services in this area. The result was the establishing of family counseling programs whereby a staff of trained case workers was assigned to the job of interviewing evacuee families, analyzing their specific problems and helping them develop plans for future resettlement. Where investigation showed that the evacuees had some means of support outside the center, the problem was not too complicated. Those that needed welfare assistance required greater attention. For example, for those that needed temporary aid above the \$25.00 per person relocation

assistance grant for purposes such as purchasing essential household goods, meeting the first month's rent, etc., these expenses were met through the Social Security resettlement assistance program. As reported later the difficulty arising from the variation in standards used by local welfare agencies in the distribution of resettlement assistance brought about a new policy, whereby the W.R.A. began giving temporary aid. The local and state welfare agencies continued to provide all other assistance such as emergency help after resettlement, and help for those requiring continuous assistance with funds allocated by the Social Security Board and the W.R.A. (W.R.A. funds were later provided to augment the funds of the Social Security Board.)

Throughout this whole period, despite all the resistance and argument, the resettling of evacuees was mounting. Jerome center, as previously mentioned, was closed during the summer of 1944 with its remaining occupants transferred to other centers. All remaining centers except Tule Lake were scheduled to close by the end of 1945. Prior to this all-out closure, the resettlement movement was predominantly to the east of the Rocky Mountains. However, as the centers were being closed a great majority

of them were moving back to the West Coast. This movement brought about much opposition from the anti-Japanese groups who had hoped that the relocation centers would be open indefinitely. In Hood River, Oregon, an American Legion Post burned the names of Nisei soldiers who were on the community honor roll list. Economic boycott was being practiced against the returning evacuee farmer. Other terrorisms such as shooting, threatening phone calls and night-raiders were of such proportion that Secretary Ickes issued a public statement demanding more effective protection. He said:

"In the absence of vigorous local law enforcement a pattern of planned terrorism by hoodlums has developed. It is a matter of national concern because this lawless minority . . . seems determined to employ its Nazi storm trooper tactics against loyal Japanese Americans and law-abiding Japanese aliens in spite of the state laws and constitutional safeguards designed to protect the lives and property of all of the people of this country . . . Many of the evacuees' Nisei sons are fighting the Japanese enemy in the Philippines, at Okinawa, and in other Pacific combat areas. They are far more in the American tradition than the race-baiters fighting a private war safely at home."³⁹

The mayor of Berkeley, California was quoted as saying, "People in California, who are against the return

³⁹Op. cit., p. 127.

of evacuees to the Pacific Coast, and are urging their deportation to Japan, have either to change their views or to abandon the basic ideas of the Constitution as found in Amendment XIV which guarantees that citizenship rights shall not be abridged."⁴⁰

These public proclamations, plus the work of some caucasian officers of the 442nd. Infantry Battalian who spoke of Nisei valor and loyalty, the work of many other sympathetic groups, and the determination by the W.R.A. that resettlement in West Coast would be provided as scheduled, lessened the hostile forces and hastened the adjustment of the evacuees. As Tule Lake, the last of the centers, came to a close in March 1946, following the transfer of the remaining disloyal people of Japanese ancestry to the Department of Justice internment camps, so ended the largest single forced migration in American history.

The W.R.A. field offices continued to provide services after all the centers were closed, but as the Director felt that providing continuing assistance to one segment of the population was not the responsibility of the

⁴⁰Bogardus, Emory S. "Resettlement Problems of Japanese Americans," Sociology and Social Research, XXVIX (September, 1944), p. 224.

federal government, a deadline was set for its termination. When the last field office was closed on May 7, 1946, it was in the belief that the federal government had done as much as it could, and that the remaining problems such as employment, racial prejudice, housing, and financial assistance could be handled by established agencies and civic-minded groups already familiar with the evacuee and his problems.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

To those who had been conscious of the "forced migration" the evacuation of a particular minority group was considered regrettable. On the other hand, the experience obtained should be highly regarded by other governmental administrators and by all those concerned with the problem of safeguarding individual rights in time of future crisis.

This study was an attempt to bring out some of the social effects and the welfare services provided to the people of Japanese ancestry during time of evacuation, while in confinement, and during resettlement. The study revealed that many social problems existed and that the adequacy of the welfare services provided varied at different stages of development. For instance, during evacuation, welfare services under the Department of Justice seemed inadequate as compared to service offered by the War Department. These variations in the adequacy of services also prevailed when jurisdiction was placed with the W.R.A. Despite the limited trained staff that plagued the efficiency of over-all services in the centers,

one basic reason for successful operation in later years was the realization that consideration should be given to deeper and more basic factors affecting personality and social adjustment.

In reflecting on the relocation program, it seems evident that during time of war and especially when the enemy threatens our national security, people unquestionably place full responsibility on the military heads. The phrase "military necessity," as uttered by General DeWitt went unopposed. However, when the danger of enemy invasion of the continent receded, the phrase was shown to contain more fallacy than truth.

There seemed to be lack of careful advance planning by the Department of Justice, the War Department and the W.R.A. which resulted in much frustration and anxiety on the part of both the staff and the evacuees.

Although the various federal agencies dealt with the frequently recurring problems, they seemed to neglect the need for sufficient interpretation and clarification of events to the evacuees. As already mentioned, the center welfare department had a difficult time in the light of changing policies.

There was apparently some conflict and lack of mutual understanding between members of the W.R.A. staff as to what their functions were. This could have resulted from inefficiency in communication between Washington and W.R.A. and also in the line of authority. The conflict at Poston Center was attributed to divided authority between the Department of the Interior and the W.R.A.

Despite much cooperation between the War Department and W.R.A., some misconceptions led to unfavorable results. One problem in particular was the exclusion of the West Coast for resettlement during the early years of center life. This led many evacuees into losing initiative and self-reliance and to becoming dependent on the government.

Uniformity of center operation led to much difficulty. Differences in geographic factors and make-up of the population were not considered fully in community planning.

In spite of W.R.A.'s efforts to make the centers into some approximation to normal communities, such an undertaking was made fruitless by the large measure of supervision by the government plus the air which the centers had of being places of detention, with armed guards, watch towers, fences, and necessity for passes.

Lack of understanding on the part of W.R.A. caused much delay in resettlement. Towards the latter part of center operation, W.R.A. realized that providing employment, housing and financial assistance was only partially effective in resettling people. They had to deal with the deep-seated problems.

While the Authority sought and received the support of a number of the agencies, federal, state, and local there was some disagreement in the giving of assistance.

The W.R.A. was successful in the redistribution of the people of Japanese ancestry. At the time when the Authority closed its field office, approximately half of the Japanese relocated in this country had returned to the West Coast; the other half were widely distributed throughout the rest of the continent.

After consideration of the study's findings and conclusions, the writer makes the following recommendations:

1. That selective evacuation may be justified, but that mass evacuation should not be undertaken.

2. That there needs to be closer collaboration between the military heads and other governmental administrators for decision-making during time of crisis.

3. That the line of authority should be well organized if delay is to be prevented.

4. That the use of "isolated camp approach" should be avoided wherever there is any possibility of doing so.

5. That there should exist less governmental supervision and more participation on the part of the evacuees in community planning. Also the W.R.A. should make greater effort in acquainting themselves with the governed.

6. That there should be some enactment of legislation to consider property losses suffered as a result of evacuation. Also that evacuees be given special financial assistance beyond the assistance provided by the local welfare department.

7. That there should be closer working relationship between the welfare department in centers and the field representatives from national, state, and local agencies.

8. That there should be further expansion and continuation of activities by local citizens' committees and groups to aid in resettlement, adjustment, and reintegration.

9. That further study should be made of the aftermath of relocation of the evacuees.

APPENDIX I

Establishment of Military Control--Executive Order
No. 9066, the letter of authority, enclosing a copy of
the Order, from the Secretary of War was as follows:*

"February 20, 1942

"Commanding General,
Western Defense Command and Fourth Army,
Presidio of San Francisco, California.

"Dear General DeWitt:

"By Executive Order, dated February 19, 1942, copy inclosed, the President authorized and directed me, through the Military Commander whom I designate, to prescribe military areas for the protection of vital installations against sabotage and espionage. The cited Executive Order also authorized and directed the administering authority to impose such restrictions upon the right to enter, remain in, or leave any such areas as may be appropriate to the requirements in each instance. Accordingly, I designate you as the Military Commander to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed by said Executive Order for that portion of the United States embraced in the Western Defense Command, including such changes in the prohibited and restricted areas heretofore designated by the Attorney General as you deem proper to prescribe.

"In carrying out your duties under this delegation, I desire, so far as military requirements permit, that you do not disturb, for the time being at least, Italian aliens and persons of Italian lineage except where they are, in your judgment, undesirable or constitute a definite danger to the performance of your mission to defend the West Coast. I ask that you take this action in respect to Italians for the reason that I consider such persons to

*War Department, Final Report, Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1942, pp. 25-27.

be potentially less dangerous, as a whole, than those of other enemy nationalities. Because of the size of the Italian population and the number of troops and facilities which would have to be employed to deal with them, their inclusion in the general plan would greatly overtax our strength. In this connection it may be necessary for you to relieve Italian aliens from the necessity for compliance with the Attorney General's order respecting the California prohibited areas 1 to 88 (Category A). This may appropriately be done by designating, sufficiently in advance of February 24, the said areas as military areas and by excepting Italian aliens from the classes excluded.

"With due regard to your other missions you may use the troops you can now make available from your general command, but for this purpose the 27th Division and the 3rd Division reinforced are not to be considered as part of your general command as such troops are assigned to your command only for specific training.

"Your attention is invited to those provisions of the Executive Order under which you are authorized to call for assistance, supplies, and services from all Government agencies. It is desired that you take full advantage of the authority.

"Removal of individuals from areas in which they are domiciled should be accomplished gradually so as to avoid, so far as it is consistent with national safety and the performance of your mission, unnecessary hardship and dislocation of business and industry. In order to permit the War Department to make plans for the proper disposition of individuals whom you contemplate moving outside of your jurisdiction, it is desired that you make known to me your detailed plans for evacuation. Individuals will not be entrained until such plans are furnished and you are informed that accommodations have been prepared at the point of detraining.

"So far as practicable, fullest advantage should be taken of voluntary exodus of individuals and of the facilities afforded by other Government and private agencies in assisting evacuees to resettle. Where evacuees are unable to effect resettlement of their own volition, or

with the assistance of other agencies, proper provision for housing, feeding, transportation and medical care must be provided.

"I desire that from time to time you make report direct to me of important actions and events, particularly with respect to the extent and location of military areas, and the restrictions applicable thereto.

"Sincerely yours,

"/s/ Henry L. Stimson,
"Secretary of War.

"Incl.

Executive Order.

Executive Order No. 9066

AUTHORIZING THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO PRESCRIBE
MILITARY AREAS

"Whereas, The successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises and national-defense utilities as defined in Section 4, Act of April 20, 1918, 40 Stat. 533, as amended by the Act of November 30, 1940, 54 Stat. 1220, and the Act of August 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 655 (U.S.C., Title 50, Sec. 104):

"Now therefore, By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, I hereby authorize and direct the Secretary of War, and the Military Commanders whom he may from time to time designate, whenever he or any designated Commander deems such action necessary or desirable, to prescribe military areas in such places and of such extent as he or the appropriate Military Commander may determine, from which any or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to whatever restriction the Secretary of War or the appropriate Military Commander may impose in his discretion. The Secretary of War is hereby authorized to provide for

residents of any such area who are excluded therefrom, such transportation, food, shelter, and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgment of the Secretary of War or the said Military Commander, and until other arrangements are made, to accomplish the purpose of this order. The designation of military areas in any region or locality shall supersede designations of prohibited and restricted areas by the Attorney General under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, and shall supersede the responsibility and authority of the Attorney General under the said Proclamations in respect of such prohibited and restricted areas.

"I hereby further authorize and direct the Secretary of War and the said Military Commanders to take such other steps as he or the appropriate Military Commander may deem advisable to enforce compliance with the restrictions applicable to each Military area hereinabove authorized to be designated, including the use of Federal troops and other Federal Agencies, with authority to accept assistance of state and local agencies.

"I hereby further authorize and direct all Executive Departments, independent establishments and other Federal Agencies, to assist the Secretary of War or the said Military Commanders in carrying out this Executive Order, including the furnishing of medical aid, hospitalization, food, clothing, transportation, use of land, shelter, and other supplies, equipment, utilities, facilities, and services.

"This order shall not be construed as modifying or limiting in any way the authority heretofore granted under Executive Order No. 8972, dated December 12, 1941, nor shall it be construed as limiting or modifying the duty and responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with respect to the investigations of alleged acts of sabotage or the duty and responsibility of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice under the Proclamations of December 7 and 8, 1941, prescribing regulations for the conduct and control of alien enemies, except as such duty and responsibility is superseded by the designation of military areas hereunder."

Franklin D. Roosevelt

THE WHITE HOUSE, February 19, 1942.

APPENDIX II

"March 31, 1942

"Federal Security Agency,
"785 Market Street,
"San Francisco, California.

"Attention: Mr. Richard M. Neustadt:

"Dear Mr. Neustadt:

"Under authority of the Executive Order of the President, No. 9066, dated February 19, 1942, your Agency has been assigned certain functions and duties by me, to be performed in aid of the program for evacuation of German, Italian and Japanese enemy aliens and persons of Japanese ancestry, from strategic zones within the military areas established by my Public Proclamation No. 1, dated March 2, 1942, and Public Proclamation No. 2, dated March 16, 1942.

"Subject to my directions and instructions and in accordance with approved policies, your Agency is authorized and directed to incur obligations and make expenditures from any funds available to it in carrying out the duties and functions assigned. In this connection it is desired that you submit, for approval, without delay, a budget estimate of your funds requirements to May 1, 1942, broken down in such detail as is practicable at the present time.

"Payment for obligations incurred or funds expended under the approved budget estimate will be made from funds subject to May control and allocation.

"Yours very truly,
"J. L. DeWitt,
"Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Commanding."

APPENDIX III

WARTIME CIVIL CONTROL ADMINISTRATION*
(principles to guide movement)

1. It was determined that the areas to be evacuated would be handled so far as possible in the order of their relative military importance . . .
2. It was determined that the evacuation would not split family units or communities where this could be avoided . . . The basic principle of maintaining communities was adopted to maintain a natural community and economic balance and to preserve desirable institutions by moving each family with its relatives and friends.
3. It was determined that the program should entail a minimum of financial loss to the evacuees; that all possible advice and assistance be available to (but not forced upon) evacuees . . .
4. It was desired that a minimum of active military units and other military personnel be used in the program; that, instead, the evacuation should be accomplished as far as practicable by civilian personnel, making full use of Federal and State civilian agency facilities . . .
5. It was desired that the evacuated population not only be removed to areas outside of the critical military area as rapidly as practicable, but also to locations where the evacuees could be relatively self-supporting for the duration . . .
6. It was concluded that evacuation and relocation resettlement could not be accomplished simultaneously. This was the heart of the plan. It entailed provision for a transitory phase. It called for the establishment

*From the Final Report, Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942, pp. 77-78. Quoted in Thomas, D. S., and Nishimoto, R. S., The Spoilage, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1946.

of Assembly Centers at or near each center of evacuee population. These Centers were to be designed to provide shelter and messing facilities and the minimum essentials for the maintenance of health and morale.

APPENDIX IV

OPERATION OF CIVIL CONTROL STATIONS
PROTECTION OF EVACUEES AND THEIR FAMILIES*Responsibilities of the Army at each Control Station.

1. To receive and pass on requests for deferments made by individual evacuees, and recommendations for deferments made by the Control Station Manager, or by the participating civilian agencies. In routine cases, such as recommendations for deferments for health reasons made by the United States Public Health Service, temporary deferments were issued by the Acting Provost Marshal. All unusual requests and recommendations for deferment were referred by the Acting Provost Marshal to the Provost Marshal of the Sector, or to the Wartime Civil Control Administration for decision;
2. To issue travel permits to evacuees when the request for such travel came within the prescribed regulations.
3. To provide for the safety of all evacuees during the period of registration, processing, and movement, and to provide for the safety of all government records;
4. To keep the Sector Commander, the Commanding General and the Wartime Civil Control Administration informed by periodic reports of the registration, processing, and movement of evacuees;
5. To provide necessary military escort, and to supervise entrainment of evacuees.

Responsibilities of the Federal Security Agency.

1. To the United State Employment Service, the location, establishment, organization and management of Control Stations;

2. To the Bureau of Public Assistance, Social Security Board, the registration of all evacuees and the provision of social welfare service;
3. To the United States Public Health Service, the medical inspection of all evacuees, the providing of medical aid during the registration and processing period and while enroute to Assembly Centers, and the continued medical care and hospitalization of persons who could not be evacuated for medical reasons.

Responsibilities of the United States Employment Service.

1. The selection of a Station Manager for each Control Station;
2. The securing of space for each Station, and of all supplies and equipment necessary for its operation, except for that equipment which was furnished by other participating agencies;
3. The furnishing of all civilian employees essential for the operation of the Control Station, except those employees furnished by the other participating agencies;
4. The supervising and coordinating of the activities of all civilian agency staff sections within each Control Station to insure its successful operation so far as these agencies were concerned;
5. The transmitting of all orders and instructions pertaining to evacuation received from the War-time Civil Control Administration to the supervisors of the various sections within the Control Station;
6. The maintaining of necessary records and files, and the submission of required reports.

Responsibilities of the Bureau of Public Assistance of the Social Security Board.

1. To provide a staff of trained social welfare workers to function as interviewers and welfare supervisors in the Control Station;

2. To give an initial interpretation to all evacuees of Exclusion Orders and instructions pertaining to evacuation;
3. To register all persons of Japanese ancestry affected by the Exclusion Orders, and to complete all necessary social data records pertaining to these individuals;
4. To interview a responsible member of each family, and all individuals living alone, to ascertain what assistance they might require to enable them to comply with the Exclusion Orders;
5. To refer individuals and heads of families to the representatives of the appropriate participating agencies to secure the assistance necessary in settling personal and real property affairs, in securing travel permits, etc.;
6. To provide necessary financial assistance and other social welfare aids to individuals and families who required interim subsistence and those items essential to maintain a minimum standard of living at the Assembly Center;
7. To instruct evacuees in all matters pertaining to baggage and personal effects to be taken to the Assembly Centers; date and hour for medical examination; date and hour of departure for Assembly Center; and all other matters pertaining to the evacuation;
8. To provide all types of social welfare service required by the evacuees under the unusual circumstances created by evacuation.

Responsibilities of the United States Public Health Service.

1. To provide medical service in each Control Station during the entire period of registration and processing of evacuees;

2. To physically inspect all evacuees prior to induction into an Assembly Center;
3. To remove from the evacuee group all persons with detectable communicable diseases in the infectious stage prior to evacuation or induction;
4. To detect and remove from the evacuee group all persons whose physical condition indicated that evacuation at the scheduled time might be detrimental to their physical well-being, or to the physical well-being of other evacuees;
5. To provide for necessary medical attention, hospitalization or home care for all evacuees requiring such attention at any time during the registration and processing period, or subsequent thereto;
6. To provide for adequate medical attention and care for all evacuees while enroute from Civil Control Stations to Assembly Centers.

APPENDIX V

MAXIMUM JAPANESE POPULATION AND DATES OF OCCUPATION
OF ASSEMBLY CENTERS

ASSEMBLY CENTER	Maximum Population		Location	Occupied	
	Number	Date		From	To
Puyallup	7,390	May 25	Washington	April 28	Sept. 12
Portland	3,676	June 6	Oregon	May 2	Sept. 10
Marysville	2,451	June 2	California	May 8	June 29
Sacramento	4,739	May 30	California	May 6	June 26
Tanforan	7,817	July 5	California	April 28	Oct. 13
Stockton	4,271	May 21	California	May 10	Oct. 17
Turlock	3,661	June 2	California	April 30	Aug. 12
Salinas	3,586	June 23	California	April 27	July 4
Merced	4,508	June 3	California	May 6	Sept. 15
Pinedale	4,792	June 29	California	May 7	July 23
Fresno	5,120	Sept. 4	California	May 6	Oct. 30
Tulare	4,978	Aug. 11	California	April 20	Sept. 4
Santa Anita	18,719	Aug. 23	California	March 27	Oct. 27
Pomona	5,434	July 20	California	May 7	Aug. 24
Mayer	245	May 25	Arizona	May 7	June 2

War Department, Final Report, Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942, United States Government Printing Office, 1942, pp. 58-59.

APPENDIX VI

EXECUTIVE ORDER 9102

Establishing the War Relocation Authority in the Executive Office of the President and defining its functions and duties.*

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to provide for the removal from designated areas of persons whose removal is necessary in the interests of national security, it is ordered as follows:

1. There is established in the Office for Emergency Management of the Executive Office of the President the War Relocation Authority, at the head of which shall be a Director appointed by and responsible to the President.

2. The Director of the War Relocation Authority is authorized and directed to formulate and effectuate a program for the removal, from the areas designated from time to time by the Secretary of War or appropriate military commander under the authority of Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942, of the persons or classes of persons designated under such Executive Order, and for their relocation, maintenance, and supervision.

3. In effectuating such program the Director shall have authority to--

(a) Accomplish all necessary evacuation not undertaken by the Secretary of War or appropriate military commander, provide for the relocation of such persons in appropriate places, provide for their needs in such manner as may be appropriate, and supervise their activities.

*Federal Register, VII (March, 1942), p. 2165.

(b) Provide, insofar as feasible and desirable, for the employment of such persons at useful work in industry, commerce, agriculture, or public projects, prescribe the terms and conditions of such public employment, and safeguard the public interest in the private employment of such persons.

(c) Secure the cooperation, assistance, or services of any governmental agency.

(d) Prescribe regulations necessary or desirable to promote effective execution of such program, and, as a means of coordinating evacuation and relocation activities, consult with the Secretary of War with respect to regulations issued and measures taken by him.

(e) Make such delegations of authority as he may deem necessary.

(f) Employ necessary personnel, and make such expenditures, including the making of loans and grants and the purchase of real property, as may be necessary, within the limits of such funds as may be made available to the Authority.

4. The Director shall consult with the United States Employment Service and other agencies on employment and other problems incident to activities under this order.

5. The Director shall cooperate with the Alien Property Custodian appointed pursuant to Executive Order No. 9095 of March 11, 1942, in formulating policies to govern the custody, management, and disposal by the Alien Property Custodian of property belonging to foreign nationals removed under either of such Executive Orders in the management and disposal of their property.

6. Departments and agencies of the United States are directed to cooperate with and assist the Director in his activities hereunder. The Departments of War and Justice, under the direction of the Secretary of War and the Attorney General, respectively, shall insofar as consistent with the national interest provide such protective, police and investigational services as the Director shall find necessary in connection with activities under this order.

7. There is established within the War Relocation Authority the War relocation Work Corps. The Director shall provide, by general regulations, for the enlistment in such Corps, for the duration of the present war, of persons removed under this order or under Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942, and shall prescribe the terms and conditions of the work to be performed by such Corps, and the compensation to be paid.

8. There is established within the War Relocation Authority a Liaison Committee on War Relocation, which shall consist of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Labor, the Federal Security Administrator, the Director of Civilian Defense, and the Alien Property Custodian, or their deputies, and such other persons or agencies as the Director may designate. The Liaison Committee shall meet at the call of the Director and shall assist him in his duties.

9. The Director shall keep the president informed with regard to the progress made in carrying out this order, and perform such related duties as the President may from time to time assign to him.

10. In order to avoid duplication of evacuation activities under this order and Executive Order No. 9066 of February 19, 1942, the Director shall not undertake any evacuation activities within military areas designated under said Executive Order No. 9066, without the prior approval of the Secretary of War or the appropriate military commander.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House
March 18, 1942.

APPENDIX VII

JAPANESE POPULATION IN RELOCATION CENTERS*

Name	Location	Capacity
Manzanar	California	10,000
Tule Lake	California	16,000
Poston	Arizona	20,000
Gila River	Arizona	15,000
Minidoka	Idaho	10,000
Heart Mountain	Wyoming	10,000
Granada	Colorado	8,000
Topaz	Utah	10,000
Rohwer	Arkansas	10,000
Jerome	Arkansas	10,000
Total		119,000

*Thomas, D.S., and Nishimoto, Richard S. The Spoilage, Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1946, p. 27.

APPENDIX VIII

A CHRONOLOGY OF THE EVACUATION AND
THE W.R.A. PROGRAM*

- January 29: Attorney General Francis Biddle issued the first of a series of orders establishing limited strategic areas along the Pacific Coast and requiring the removal of all enemy aliens from these areas.
- February 13: West coast congressional delegation sent a letter to President Roosevelt recommending the "immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage****aliens and citizens alike" from the "entire strategic area" of California, Oregon, and Washington.
- February 14: Lt. General John L. DeWitt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, sent a memorandum to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson recommending the evacuation of "Japanese and other subversive persons" from the west coast area.
- February 19: President Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9066 authorizing the Secretary of War, or any military commander designated by the Secretary, to establish "military areas" and exclude therefrom "any or all persons."
- February 20: Secretary Stimson wrote to General DeWitt designating him as a military commander empowered to carry out an evacuation within his command under the terms of Executive Order No. 9066.
- March 2: General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 1 designating the western half of the three Pacific Coast States and the southern third of Arizona as a military area and stipulating that all persons of Japanese descent would eventually be removed therefrom.

*United States Department of the Interior, WRA, A Story Of Human Conservation, United States Government Printing Office, 1946, pp. viii-xiii.

- March 11: General DeWitt established the Wartime Civil Control Administration, with Col. Karl R. Bendetsen as Director, to carry out the evacuation program.
- March 18: President Roosevelt signed Executive Order No. 9102 creating the War Relocation Authority to assist persons evacuated by the military under Executive Order 9066. Milton S. Eisenhower named as Director.
- March 21: President Roosevelt signed Public Law 503 (77th Congress) making it a Federal offense to violate any order issued by a designated military commander under authority of Executive Order 9066.
- March 22: First large contingent of Japanese and Japanese Americans moved from Los Angeles to Manzanar Reception Center in Owens Valley of California.
- March 23: General DeWitt issued Civilian Exclusion Order No. 1 ordering the evacuation of all people of Japanese descent from Bainbridge Island in Puget Sound and their removal to the Puyallup Assembly Center near Seattle by March 30.
- March 27: General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 4 (effective March 29) forbidding further voluntary migration of Japanese and Japanese Americans from the west coast military area.
- April 7: Representatives from the governments of 10 Western States met at Salt Lake City with Director Eisenhower of W.R.A. and Colonel Bendetsen of WCCA to discuss resettlement plans for the evacuated people. Majority of conferees registered uncompromising protest against unrestricted migration.
- May 8: First contingent of evacuees arrived at Colorado River Relocation Center near Parker, Arizona.

- May 21: Group of 15 evacuees left from Portland Assembly Center for seasonal agricultural work in Malheur County, Oregon, under civilian restriction order of the Western Defense Command.
- May 27: First contingent of evacuees arrived at Tule Lake Relocation Center in northern California.
- June 1: Manzanar Reception Center was transferred from WCCA to W.R.A. and renamed Manzanar Relocation Center.
- June 2: General DeWitt issued Public Proclamation No. 6 forbidding further voluntary migration by people of Japanese descent from the eastern half of California and simultaneously announced that all such people would eventually be removed from this area directly to W.R.A. centers.
- June 17: President Roosevelt appointed Dillon S. Myer to succeed Milton S. Eisenhower as Director of W.R.A. after Eisenhower's resignation to become Deputy Director of the Office of War Information.
- July 20: W.R.A. adopted its first leave policy permitting American-born and American-educated evacuees to leave its centers for private employment in the Middle West. On the same day the first contingent of evacuees (from Turlock Assembly Center) arrived at the Gila River Relocation Center near Sacaton, Arizona.
- August 7: Western Defense Command announced the completion of the first phase of evacuation--removal of 110,000 people of Japanese descent from their homes in the military area either to WCCA assembly centers or W.R.A. relocation centers.
- August 10: First contingent of evacuees (from Puyallup Assembly Center) arrived at Minidoka Relocation Center near Twin Falls, Idaho.

- August 12: Heart Mountain Relocation Center near Cody, Wyoming, received its first contingent of evacuees from Pomona Assembly Center.
- August 13: W.R.A. began an agency conference in San Francisco to determine basic policies for the operation of relocation centers.
- August 27: Granada Relocation Center near Lamar, Colorado, received its first contingent of evacuees from Merced Assembly Center.
- September 11: First contingent of evacuees (from Tanforan Assembly Center) arrived at Central Utah Relocation Center near Delta, Utah.
- September 18: Rohwer Relocation Center near McGehee, Arkansas, received its first contingent of evacuees from the Stockton Assembly Center.
- September 26: W.R.A. issued its basic leave regulations to become effective October 1.
- October 6: First contingent of evacuees (from Fresno Assembly Center) arrived at Jerome Relocation Center near Dermott, Arkansas.
- November 3: Transfer of evacuees from WCCA to W.R.A. jurisdiction was completed with the arrival of the final contingent from the Fresno Assembly Center at the Jerome Relocation Center.
- November 14: Evacuees in Unit One of the Colorado River center staged a community-wide demonstration and strike against the W.R.A. administration in protest over the arrest of two residents suspected of beating up a third.
- November 23: The "Poston Incident" was settled by an agreement between the administration and a committee of the residents.

December 6: Evacuees at the Manzanar center staged a demonstration in protest over the arrest of one resident which was finally quelled by the military police and ended in transfer of the center temporarily to military control.

1943

January 4: The first W.R.A. field office was established at Chicago to facilitate relocation over a large area of the North Central States.

January 28: Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson announced plans to form a Japanese American combat team to be made up of Nisei volunteers both from the mainland and Hawaii.

February 8: Army enlistment and leave clearance registration began at most relocation centers.

March 11: Director Myer wrote a letter to Secretary of War Stimson recommending an immediate realization in the west coast exclusion orders against persons of Japanese descent. This recommendation was rejected by the Secretary in a reply dated May 10.

March 20: Director Myer took the first step in a decentralization of the relocation program by authorizing Project Directors to issue leave permits in cases where leave clearance had previously been given by the Washington office.

April 8: Senator Chandler wrote to Director Myer setting forth the tentative recommendations of his subcommittee regarding the W.R.A. program and urging that the "disloyal" evacuees be separated from the other residents of W.R.A. centers.

June 25: Director Myer wrote to Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy regarding the plans for a segregation program at W.R.A. centers and the selection of Tule Lake as the segregation center.

- October 11: Last group of evacuees in the major segregation movements arrived at the Tule Lake center.
- November 1: A mass demonstration was staged at Tule Lake for the benefit of the National Director who was there on a visit.
- November 4: An outbreak of violence occurred at Tule Lake between W.R.A. internal security staff and a group of dissident young evacuees; troupes were called in and the center transferred to military control.

1944

- January 14: Tule Lake center was transferred back by the military to W.R.A. supervision.
- January 20: Secretary of War Stimson announced that in view of the record achieved by Japanese Americans in the Army, they would thereafter be recruited through the regular Selective Service procedures.
- June 30: Jerome Relocation Center, last of the W.R.A. centers to open, was the first to be closed, with its 5,000 remaining residents transferred to other centers.
- July 1: President Roosevelt signed Public Law 405 (78th Congress) permitting United States citizens to renounce their citizenship on American soil in time of war under procedures approved by the Attorney General.
- December 17: War Department announced the revocation (effective January 2, 1945) of the west coast mass exclusion orders which had been in effect against persons of Japanese descent since the spring of 1942.
- December 18: Director Myer announced that all relocation centers would be closed before the end of 1945 and that the entire W.R.A. program would be liquidated by June 30, 1946. United States Supreme Court ruled (in the Korematsu case) that the west coast evacuation was



constitutional and (in the Endo case) that W.R.A. had no authority to detain a "concededly loyal" American citizen.

1945

- January 8: An attempt was made to burn and dynamite the packing shed of a returned evacuee in Placer County, California; this was first of the "west coast incidents."
- February 16: An "all-center" evacuee conference was held at Salt Lake City for the purpose of discussing the problems inherent in the liquidation of W.R.A. centers.
- April 30: Director Myer, appearing before a House Appropriations subcommittee, estimated that there would be approximately 44,000 "relocatable" evacuees left in centers by June 30.
- May 14: Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes publicly denounced the incidents of west coast terrorism and called for more vigorous local law enforcement."
- July 13: Director Myer announced a schedule of closing dates for all centers (except Tule Lake) between October 15 and December 15.
- July 16: Capt. George Grandstaff, a Caucasian officer with the all-Nisei 442nd Combat Team, began a speaking tour on the west coast to plead for tolerance toward the returning evacuees.
- August 1: Director Myer issued Administrative Notice 289 calling for the scheduled relocation of remaining residents during the last 6 weeks of operation at each W.R.A. center.
- August 15: VJ Day.

September 4: The Western Defense Command issued Public Proclamation No. 24 revoking all individual exclusion orders and all further military restrictions against persons of Japanese descent.

1946

March 20: Tule Lake Segregation Center, the last of the W.R.A. centers to remain in operation, was officially closed.

May 15: The last of the W.R.A. field offices were closed.

June 30: Official termination of the War Relocation Authority program.



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