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**AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ROLE
CONFLICT VARIABLES**

By

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A THESIS

**Submitted to Michigan State University in partial
fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of**

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

1961



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank Dr. John C. Howell for general assistance throughout the course of this study.

The statistical advice of Mr. T.N. Bhargava is sincerely appreciated.

The advice, inspiration, comments and criticisms of Dr. Howard Ehrlich of The Ohio State University have been particularly helpful.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Carol, for her constant patience and understanding.

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I

INTRODUCTION

During the past decade there has been a pronounced revival of interest in the concept of role. A result of this heightened interest has been a plethora of conceptual schemata for the more generic concept of role and for concepts derivative therefrom. Unfortunately these necessary attempts at theory construction have been undertaken with little or no subsequent empirical verification. The theories have been untestable or have remained untested. Part of the explanation for this paucity of empirical work lies in the imprecise manner in which the concept of role has been defined; part of it lies in the assumptions which role theorists have made.

Mieman and Hughes state that many times the concept of role is used bereft of any attempt to define it. Often the concept has been treated as a given. When the concept has been defined, the definition has often remained peculiar to the particular definer. Because the concept of role has been knit into the conceptualizations of investigators identified with diverse disciplines, the concept when defined at all, has been definitionally fit to the particular needs of the investigator.¹

Recently, however, students have attempted to lend precise definitions to the concept of role and its derivatives. These definitions appear not to be bound to one particular field of inquiry but are useful to students of various disciplines. Such definitional precision is a first step in the direction of adequate theory construction and its eventual empirical testing.²

There is one particular assumption which has blocked fruitful inquiry of the concept of role. It has been assumed that consensus exists among members of society or among groups of role definers as to what is expected of individuals who occupy particular positions in social systems. It was held that both the role definers and the individuals whose positions are being defined are in essential agreement concerning the role behavior appropriate to a given situation. That such consensus is not the case has been aptly pointed out by Gross and his associates.³

When consensus of expectations is assumed the focus of inquiry is directed away from sociological role conflict. Behaviors not in accord with the consensual expectations assumed by the scientific observer may well be treated as deviant. Investigation of conflict is confined to the difference between personality predispositions and role expectations.

Parallel with the increased interest in the more generic concept of role, students have become concerned with the theory and empirical testing of kindred concepts. Among those receiving special attention have been role conflict and role conflict resolution.

Some early students of role conflict carried out their theoretical and empirical analyses within the context of a very broad definition of the area of role conflict. A wide range of behaviors and types of conflict was subsumed under the rubric of role conflict. Any situation in which any individual was confronted with a dilemma of choice was regarded as role conflict.⁴

At a later date students began to delimit the area of role conflict

by focussing on the conflict which is engendered by an individual's occupancy of two or more positions. The positions are such that the fulfillment of the expectations of one position necessarily results in the non-fulfillment of expectations associated with the other position. Such conflicts have been traditionally labeled as role-role conflicts or interrole conflicts. Until recently the main concern of role conflict students has been interrole conflict.

Among notable recent exceptions to this emphasis on interrole conflict are Gross and his associates who focussed upon the conflicts engendered by an individual's occupancy of a single position.⁵ In this intrarole type of conflict the individual is exposed to conflicting expectations held by various individuals and groups who define his role. For example it may be the case that teachers and the school board hold expectations for the school superintendent that are mutually incompatible with reference to a particular situation, e.g., teacher salary increases. Ehrlich isolated potential intrarole conflict situations of state troopers. The analysis carried out herein is based upon the potential conflict situations introduced by Ehrlich.⁶

Although the foregoing overview has been cursory, it has only been intended to point to (1) the limited attempts to put role theory to the empirical test, (2) the increasing definitional precision which is necessary for both adequate theory construction and its subsequent empirical testing, (3) the existence of the assumption of consensus, which has blocked fruitful advances in the area of role conflict, and (4) the recent interest in role conflict, especially the conflict which results from an individual's occupancy of a single position.

Analysis of Diverse Operationalisations of Role Conflict Variables

With the increasing precision of key concepts in role theory there has been an attendant increase in the delineation and specification of variables deemed crucial for the prediction of role conflict resolution. Of particular concern are two concepts which have been utilized either explicitly or implicitly in various role conflict schemata, namely, legitimacy and sanctions.⁷

Parsons restricts role conflict to "conflicting sets of legitimized role expectations." For Parsons legitimized role expectations are expectations which have been institutionalized.⁸ Getzels and Guba refer to legitimacy as "'mutual acceptance' by ego and alter of expectations in a given situation."⁹

From this definitional background Gress and his cohorts treat legitimacy as follows: "A legitimate expectation is one which the incumbent of a focal position feels others have a right to hold. An illegitimate expectation is one which he does not feel others have a right to hold."¹⁰ It is expected that an individual will be predisposed to conform to an expectation which others have a right to hold and predisposed not to conform to an expectation which others do not have a right to hold. In other words the individual rejects his responsibility to conform to an illegitimate expectation. It is further contended that action not in accordance with a legitimate expectation results in negative internal sanctions. Legitimacy was operationalized in the following manner: "'Do you think the individual or group named has a right to expect you to do this?'"¹¹

In a study aimed at the validation of Gross's theory of role conflict resolution, Miller and Shull worked with samples from four populations of business and labor leaders. For purposes of their analysis legitimacy was operationalized as, "Assuming that you are the training director, do you think it was right and reasonable for the president to expect you to present a successful program under the conditions described above?"¹²

In an empirical investigation of role conflict Ehrlich operationalized legitimacy following the lead of Marion Levy. Levy states that responsibility is the accountability of an individual to another individual or group for his own acts and/or the acts of others.¹³ Ehrlich's sample was asked the following question: "Are you accountable to these persons for what you actually do?"¹⁴

It is entirely probable that the three operationalizations of legitimacy would evoke three distinct sets of responses. To clarify this point a concrete situational example will be related. The following situation was reported to the writer by Ehrlich, who passed three months as a participant observer at various State Police posts in Michigan. At a certain post troopers were obligated to wash their patrol cars at the end of each patrol. This washing was mandatory and took place whether the car needed it or not. This practice was not departmental policy but was initiated by the Post Commander.

If the troopers at this post were responding to this potential conflict situation in terms of the three operationalizations of legitimacy how would they react? It is first specified that we are concerned with the Post Commander's expectation that troopers wash

their patrol cars at the end of each day. Then we ask following Gross and his associates, "Do you think the Post Commander has the right to expect you to do this?"

The designation "has the right" refers to the authority vested in the position of Post Commander. By virtue of this authority the Post Commander has the right to expect the trooper to wash his patrol car. However, if "has the right to hold this expectation" is included we are not only referring to the authority of the position of Post Commander but also to the specific content of the expectation which he holds. It is neither the expectation as such which is legitimate, nor is it the position of Post Commander. Legitimacy assessments evoked by this question are a dual function of both the position of the holder of the expectation and the content of the expectation.

For the same situation let us ask the troopers their views on legitimacy as operationalized by Miller and Shull. "Do you think it was right and reasonable for the Post Commander to expect you to do this?" The respondents' attention is now directed to the specific content of the expectation. The emphasis of this operationalization is on the logic of the expectation. The question does not ask if the Post Commander "has the right" to hold this expectation but if it is "right and reasonable" for the Post Commander to hold this expectation. Undoubtably the distribution of responses would differ if the two questions were put to this single sample.

Finally, if we were to ask the troopers in Ehrlich's words, "Are you accountable to the Post Commander for washing your car?", the responses would undoubtably result from the troopers focussing on the

holder of the expectation, not the content of the expectation.

The three operationalizations of legitimacy may be visualized as lying on an expectation-audience continuum. At one end of the continuum we find Miller and Shull's definition which emphasizes the content of the expectation. Toward the midpoint of the continuum lies the construction of Gross and his associates, which takes into consideration both the content of the expectation and the authority of the audience or individual holding the expectation. At the other end of the continuum we find Ehrlich's definition, which focusses primarily upon the authority of the audience holding the expectation.

The concept of sanctions, an old friend in sociology, has not been neglected in the area of role conflict. Among others Gross and his associates systematically integrate the concept of sanctions into their theory of role conflict resolution.

Gross and his associates treat sanctions as "a role behavior the primary significance of which is gratificational-deprivational." It is assumed that an individual will act so as to minimize the negative sanctions that may result from not acting in accordance with a particular expectation. "Sanction" was operationalized in the following manner: The respondent was asked "to indicate how those who expected him to conform to expectation A, and then those who expected him to conform to expectation B, would react if he did not do what they expected of him."¹⁵

The concept of sanctions was utilized by Ehrlich in his analysis of role conflict, however, under the rubric of "obligation." Ehrlich defines obligation in these terms: "A role expectation will be said

to be obligatory if and only if failure to perform the role expected imposes negative sanctions upon the actor and the performance of the role expected does not incur negative sanctions."¹⁶ Obligation was then operationalized by two questions: (1) "Would they insist or demand that you do as they expect you to do?", and (2) "What would they do if you didn't do as they expect you to?"¹⁷

The second question above corresponds with the operationalization of sanctions by Gross and his associates. However, this question had to be eliminated from Ehrlich's role conflict schedule because the troopers in his sample simply could not respond to it coherently. We are left then with the introduction of another role conflict variable, viz., obligation or the insistence of an audience or individual to have its expectation performed.

Miller and Shull operationalized sanctions by a question which elicited (1) perception of audience reaction for failure to conform to the expectation and (2) perception of what would happen if the individual followed the expectation but failed to fulfill it.

It is apparent that the concept of sanctions, along with legitimacy, has been operationally defined in diverse manners. Already at this early stage in empirical role conflict analysis semantic difficulties appear. Indeed, diverse applications of key concepts are desirable at this time. However, the confusion which arises from grouping diverse operationalizations under the same nominal definition may, at some point in time, outweigh the positive contributions offered by the aforementioned analyses of role conflict. Students of role conflict must be aware of the diverse applications

of key concepts to accurately assess the results of role conflict analyses. They must also possess this awareness in order to enhance their potential contributions in the area of role conflict.

It is felt that pointing to semantic difficulties would have the additional function of serving as a frame of reference for the evaluation of certain sections of this study along with the work of past and future students of role conflict. Second and perhaps most important, the foregoing will serve as an introduction to many of the key concepts used in the following chapters.

FOOTNOTES

1. Lionel J. Nieman and J.W. Hughes, "The Problem of the Concept of Role - A Re-Survey of the Literature," Social Forces, Vol. XXX (1951-1952), pp. 141-149.
2. See for example John T. and Jeanne E. Gullahorn, "A Model for Role Conflict Analysis" (Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1959), and Neal J. Gross, Ward S. Mason and Alexander W. McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1958).
3. Gross, Mason and McEachern, op. cit., devote an entire chapter to criticism of the postulate of consensus.
4. See for example the statements in Alfred R. Lindesmith and Anselm L. Strauss, Social Psychology (New York: The Dryden Press, 1949), pp. 336-339, and F. Stuart Chapin, "Role Expectations and incompatibilities," in J.B. Gittler (editor), Review of Sociology (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1957), p. 267. For empirical analyses carried out within the framework of a broad definition of the area of role conflict see Jerome Laulicht, "Role Conflict, The Pattern Variable Theory and Scalogram Analysis," Social Forces, Vol. XXXIII (1954-1955), pp. 250-254, and Robert S. Ort, "A Study of Role Conflicts as Related to Class Level," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. XLVII (1952), pp. 425-432.
5. For an early empirical investigation of intrarole conflict see Melvin Seeman, "Role Conflict and Ambivalence in Leadership," American Sociological Review, Vol. XVIII (1953), pp. 373-380.
6. Howard J. Ehrlich, "The Analysis of Role Conflicts in a Complex Organization: The Police" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1959).
7. For analyses employing both sanctions and legitimacy as crucial variables in the theory of role conflict resolution see Gross, Mason and McEachern, op. cit., pp. 244 ff., and Howard J. Ehrlich, "Legitimacy, Obligation, and Ambivalence: An Empirical Evaluation of Some Neglected Aspects of Role Conflict" (Unpublished paper, The Ohio State University, 1960). An empirical analysis utilizing the concept of sanctions has been carried out by J.P. Sutcliffe and M. Haberman, "Factors Influencing Choice in Role Conflict Situations," American Sociological Review, Vol. XXI

(1956), pp. 695-703. For early usage of the concept of legitimacy in the area of role conflict see Samuel A. Stouffer, "An Analysis of Conflicting Social Norms," American Sociological Review, Vol. XIV (1949), pp. 707-717.

8. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), p. 280.
9. J.W. Getzels and E.G. Guba, "Role, Role Conflict, and Effectiveness," American Sociological Review, Vol. XIX (1954), p. 165, quoted in Gross, Mason and McEachern, op. cit., p. 247.
10. Gross, Mason and McEachern, op. cit., p. 248.
11. Ibid., p. 296.
12. Delbert C. Miller and Fremont A. Shull, "Role Conflict Behavior in Administration: A Study in the Validation of a Theory of Role Conflict Resolution" (Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1960), p. 10.
13. Marion Levy, The Structure of Society (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 468.
14. Howard J. Ehrlich, "The Analysis of Role Conflicts in a Complex Organization: The Police" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1959), p. 75.
15. Gross, Mason and McEachern, op. cit., p. 296.
16. Ehrlich, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
17. Ibid., p. 75.

II

THE PROBLEM

Knowledge of the empirical aspects of role conflict and role conflict resolution remains in a pristine state despite the success which Gross and his associates achieved in their prediction of role conflict resolution. There is both the need to replicate Gross's work and to explore the possibilities which his schema suggests. There is the additional need to expand and delineate variables which may be crucial in the determination of role conflict resolution.

The primary objective of this study is the determination of the empirical significance of selected role conflict variables. The establishment of such empirical significance implies continued usage of the variables under consideration, subject to continued refinement. On the other hand the determination of non-significance suggests the inadequacies of the selected role conflict variables. The determination of non-significance points to the reformulation of the variables or their withdrawal from subsequent role conflict analyses.

More specifically the problem of this inquiry is that of determining the relationship and strength of the relationship between the variables of legitimacy, obligation, sanctions access, sanctions exercise and ego's preference on the one hand and ego's reported probable behavior on the other. Perhaps the most appropriate method for such determination is to strive for the greatest research flexibility possible. This thesis then will take the form of an exploratory study which seems to offer such flexibility.

Because of limiting factors, this analysis is not exhaustive of the logical research possibilities. Some variables and combinations of variables seemed to warrant extensive consideration; some did not.

Research Setting and Procedures¹

As part of a larger study of the State Police Department, every member of the June, 1960 recruit school class ($n=58$) was administered a role conflict questionnaire.² The administration took place during the recruits' first week of training.

To enter recruit school an individual must (1) be from 21 to 29 years of age, (2) pass a written civil service examination, and (3) pass a rigorous physical fitness test administered by members of the State Police Department.

During the eight week training period the recruits learn various physical and mental skills necessary for successful performance as a state trooper. The rigor of the training is evidenced by the fact that only 35 of the original 58 recruits successfully completed the eight week program.

The role conflict questionnaire is built around five potential role conflict situations that are appropriate to the position of State Police trooper. The potential conflicts are those engendered by the individual's occupancy of the single position of state trooper.

Briefly, the conflict situations concern (1) whether the trooper should spend his time mainly on safety and traffic, spend his time mainly on complaint and criminal investigation or spend equal time on both; (2) whether the trooper should be a policeman twenty-four hours

a day or leave his job behind when not on duty; (3) whether the trooper should report another trooper he thought was not properly performing his duty or keep quiet about such negligence; (4) whether the trooper should be a "model citizen" and set a community example or whether he should be simply a "good citizen" not any different from anyone else; (5) whether the trooper should follow the rules and regulations of the State Police organization to the letter or overlook them occasionally.³

For each of the five potential conflict situations the recruit was asked to check which of three expectations he perceived each of nine audience groups to hold.⁴ Only in situation I (safety-traffic, criminal) was the recruit faced with the selection of three expectations. In the remaining four conflict situations the recruit was offered three alternatives. However, the third alternative or expectation "C", when chosen, constituted a perception of a particular audience as holding "no expectation."

After his selection of expectations the recruit was asked about the legitimacy, access to sanctions, exercise of sanctions and obligation that he perceived to be associated with each of the audiences and their expectations. Finally the recruit was asked to record which of the expectations he would personally prefer each of the audiences to hold.

At the end of the two part questionnaire the recruit was asked, for each situation, what, he as a general rule, probably would do once he got out on the job. The alternatives from which he chose corresponded to the particular expectations associated with the five different conflict situations.

The Selected Role Conflict Variables

The role conflict variables under observation were (1) perceived expectation of audience, (2) perceived legitimacy of audience's expectation, (3) perception of audience's access to sanctions, (4) perceived obligatoriness with which audience holds expectation, (5) perception of the probability of audience exercising sanctions if their expectation is not followed, and (6) expectation which the recruit prefers each audience to hold. The dependent variable was the recruit's reported probable behavior (as ascertained from his responses to the questions on the last two pages of the role conflict questionnaire: Manifest Behavior Section).

The operational definition of legitimacy used in our questionnaire paralleled that of Gross and his associates. The recruits were asked, "What right do you think this category has to hold this view?" The recruit was expected to take both the content of the expectation and the authority of the audience holding the expectation into account in making his assessment of legitimacy. The five point response category accompanying this question ranged from "has every right" to "has no right."

Next, following Ehrlich's lead, the rigor with which expectations are held seemed to constitute an area for exploration. How rigidly or flexibly are expectations held? Obligation has been operationalized in our questionnaire as, "How strongly do you think persons in this category generally insist that troopers act according to this view?" The response category ranged from "absolutely insist"

to "do not really care."

Sanctions was broken down into two distinct questions. First, the recruits were asked, "In what position are the persons in this category to apply pressure to try to make troopers do as these persons expect?" The recruits were then asked to check one point along a five point scale which varied from "in the strongest position" to "in no position." This variable was designated as sanctions access.

The second question concerning sanctions asked, "If troopers didn't act the way persons in this category who hold this view expect, what is the likelihood that such persons would actually do something to try to get troopers to act according to their view?" This variable was labeled sanctions exercise. Although not perfectly equivalent, this question corresponded to Gross's operationalisation of sanctions. The response category ranged from "every likelihood" to "no likelihood."

Finally the recruits were asked, "Which of the three views presented at the top of this page is the one which you would most like persons in this category to have about troopers?" This constituted an important addition to the analysis of role conflict in that a personality factor was introduced. However vague the question might be, it did allow assessments of the relationship of a purely personal dimension with recruits' reported probable behavior. This variable was labeled ego's preference.

On the last two pages of the role conflict questionnaire (Manifest Behavior Section) the question was asked for each conflict situation, "Which one of the following comes closest to describing

what, as a general rule, you will do once you get on the job?" The question was followed by three statements of behavioral alternatives which coincided with the three statements provided to ascertain a recruit's perceived expectations. The recruits' responses to this question were referred to as reported probable behavior, and they constituted our dependent variable.

FOOTNOTES

1. The research presented in this thesis constitutes a facet of a larger project: "Role Image of the State Police", project M-2957 supported by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health. Principal investigator of the project is John C. Howell.
2. The role conflict questionnaire is found in Appendix two.
3. The five potential conflict situations were originally developed by Howard J. Ehrlich and incorporated into his role conflict schedule. This schedule was later modified, enlarged and worked into the role conflict questionnaire by Dr. Howell. For a more comprehensive explanation of the five conflict situations see Howard J. Ehrlich, "The Analysis of Role Conflicts in a Complex Organization: The Police" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1959), pp. 26-43.
4. The audiences are adopted in modified form from Dr. Ehrlich's role conflict schedule. The nine audiences employed in this study are: Wives and/or Families of troopers, Troopers in general, Post Commanders, The General Public, Headquarters and District Command Officers, The Press, Personal Friends of troopers, Politicians, and Local and County Police.

III

RELATIONSHIPS OF THE ROLE CONFLICT VARIABLES AND REPORTED PROBABLE BEHAVIOR

This chapter focusses upon the variables of legitimacy, obligation, sanctions access and sanctions exercise and their empirical relationships with the recruits' reported probable behavior. The approach to the empirical testing of these role conflict variables presented in this chapter is different from previous analyses. For this reason a review of the basic method previously utilized to ascertain the efficacy of role conflict variables, that of Gross and associates, seems to be a necessary inclusion.

Gross's theory of role conflict resolution contains three elements: (1) the individual's perception of legitimacy, illegitimacy of expectations, (2) the individual's perception of the sanctions that result from nonconformity to an audience's expectation, and (3) the individual's orientation to legitimacy and sanctions.¹

From the logical possibilities of the combination of sanctions and legitimacy Gross posits sixteen types of role conflicts. These types range from expectation A and B both being viewed as legitimate and accompanied by negative sanctions for nonconformity to both expectations A and B being viewed as illegitimate and not accompanied by negative sanctions for non-performance of the expectation. Three types of individuals are then determined. One type responds primarily in terms of legitimacy; another type responds primarily in terms of sanctions; the third type takes both

sanctions and legitimacy into account when determining his course of behavior.

Gross further breaks down his theory into three models of role conflict resolution. The basic difference between the models and the theory is that, with the models, no knowledge of the individual's orientation to sanctions, legitimacy or both is necessary for behavioral predictions. The first model is labeled the "legitimacy model." It attempts to predict behavior simply from a knowledge of the individual's perception of audience-expectation legitimacy. The second, the "sanctions model," attempts to predict behavior from the knowledge of an individual's assessment of sanctions that result from nonconformity to an expectation. The third, the "legitimacy-sanctions model," predicts behavior from the knowledge of both the individual's perception of legitimacy and sanctions. Utilizing these models Gross was able to predict role conflict resolution with a high degree of accuracy.

In place of models for the prediction of reported probable behavior the chi square test has been used in this thesis to determine the relationship between the selected role conflict variables and reported probable behavior. In addition the coefficient of contingency has been employed to indicate the relative strength of the relationships between reported probable behavior and the various role conflict variables and combinations of variables.

In this analysis the value of chi square is reduced because the same expectation may be perceived to be held by audiences which are perceived to hold high access to sanctions, legitimate expectations

and so on, and simultaneously by audiences perceived as holding low access to sanctions, illegitimate expectations etc.² Furthermore two audiences assessed as holding high access to sanctions etc., may be perceived to hold incompatible expectations.³ Although this difficulty was not mentioned by Gross and his associates, it must have confounded his predictions to some extent. It is felt that despite the different techniques, the results of this investigation should be roughly comparable to those obtained by Gross and his associates.

With these considerations in mind the investigation of the relationship between obligation and reported probable behavior may proceed. Table 1 indicates that a highly significant relationship exists between obligation and reported probable behavior in every situation except IV, in which the relationship fails to attain statistical significance.⁴ However, the values of the coefficient of contingency, ranging from .063 in situation IV to .237 in situation II, point to a rather tenuous association. The strength of the relationship between obligation and reported probable behavior is moderately low. This relationship is not constant from situation to situation as evidenced by the fluctuation in the contingency coefficients. In general then, the obligatoriness with which expectations are perceived to be held manifests a moderately low association with the reports of probable behavior.⁵

In regard to legitimacy and reported probable behavior Table 2 shows that their relationship is significant in four of the five conflict situations. In the remaining situation the relationship, although in the expected direction, fails to attain statistical

TABLE 1

RELATIONSHIP OF OBLIGATION AND REPORTED PROBABLE BEHAVIOR IN
THE FIVE POTENTIAL ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

| SITUATION | CHI SQUARE | LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE | *CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENT | N |
|-----------|---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----|
| I | 12.25 | $p < .001$ | .148 | 522 |
| II | 26.32 | $p < .001$ | .237 | 443 |
| III | 17.93 | $p < .001$ | .207 | 405 |
| IV | 1.91 | n.s. | .063 | 490 |
| V | 15.41 | $p < .001$ | .179 | 462 |

df=1

*Interpretation of values of the coefficient of contingency is relative to the number of cells in a contingency table. The maximum value that C can attain in a 2x2 contingency table is .707. See Quinn McNemar, Psychological Statistics (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1949), pp. 181-182.

TABLE 2

RELATIONSHIP OF LEGITIMACY AND REPORTED PROBABLE BEHAVIOR IN
THE FIVE POTENTIAL ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

| SITUATION | CHI SQUARE | LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE | *CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENT | N |
|-----------|---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----|
| I | 3.37 | .10>p>.05 | .075 | 522 |
| II | 48.45 | p<.001 | .313 | 443 |
| III | 17.14 | p<.001 | .203 | 405 |
| IV | 5.73 | p<.05 | .109 | 490 |
| V | 19.08 | p<.001 | .200 | 462 |

df=1

*Maximum value of C is .707

significance. The contingency coefficients are, in general, low, and fluctuate from situation to situation. Interestingly the two situations in which the lowest association is found between legitimacy and reported probable behavior are situations I and IV. The highest association between the variables is found in situation II. This pattern coincides with that manifested between obligation and reported probable behavior. The legitimacy which audiences and their expectations are perceived to have manifests a moderately low relationship with reported probable behavior.

Table 3 reveals that the relationship between sanctions access and reported probable behavior is statistically significant at varying levels in four of the five conflict situations. Again the contingency coefficients are not as high as might be expected. The highest contingency coefficient, found in situation II, is only .167. Again too, the situational pattern of high association in situation II and low association in situations I and IV is evident. As has been the case with the relationships of the previous variables tested and reported probable behavior, sanctions access manifests a significant but moderately weak association with reported probable behavior.

Finally, Table 4 indicates that the relationship between sanctions exercise and reported probable behavior is significant in four of the five conflict situations. The pattern of high and low association in situations II and I and IV respectively is again evident. The contingency coefficients generally point to a rather weak association between sanctions exercise and reported

TABLE 3

RELATIONSHIP OF SANCTIONS ACCESS AND REPORTED PROBABLE BEHAVIOR
IN THE FIVE POTENTIAL ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

| SITUATION | CHI SQUARE | LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE | *CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENT | N |
|-----------|---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----|
| I | 4.04 | $p < .05$ | .089 | 522 |
| II | 12.92 | $p < .001$ | .167 | 443 |
| III | 5.53 | $p < .05$ | .114 | 405 |
| IV | .19 | n.s. | .000 | 490 |
| V | 11.95 | $p < .001$ | .158 | 462 |

df=1

*Maximum value of C is .707

TABLE 4

RELATIONSHIP OF SANCTIONS EXERCISE AND REPORTED PROBABLE BEHAVIOR
IN THE FIVE POTENTIAL ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

| SITUATION | CHI SQUARE | LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE | *CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENT | N |
|-----------|---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----|
| I | 4.38 | $p < .05$ | .089 | 522 |
| II | 28.20 | $p < .001$ | .244 | 443 |
| III | 14.54 | $p < .001$ | .187 | 405 |
| IV | .66 | n.s. | .031 | 490 |
| V | 10.76 | $p < .005$ | .152 | 462 |

df=1

*Maximum value of C is .707

probable behavior.

The relationships of the four role conflict variables and reported probable behavior are summarized in Table 5. It is immediately evident that these relationships are statistically significant in the great majority of potential conflict situations. In general, the strength of these relationships is moderately weak as evidenced by the values of the coefficient of contingency.

The coefficients of contingency may be used as criteria for comparing the relative strength of the relationships between the role conflict variables and reported probable behavior. In two of the five conflict situations, obligation manifests the greatest relationship with reported probable behavior. In the remaining three situations legitimacy and reported probable behavior are most intimately related. However, the differences in relationship strength are not great. Greater differences in the values of the coefficient of contingency are evident when we compare horizontally by any one situation than when we compare the coefficients vertically for the relationship between any one variable and reported probable behavior. For example, the greatest difference between contingency coefficients across situation I is $.148 - .075 = .073$. When the coefficients for the relationship of obligation and reported probable behavior are compared in the five conflict situations, the difference is $.237 - .063 = .174$. This pattern of greater differences by any one variable across situations is constant for all combinations.

No unequivocal conclusions may be drawn concerning the relative dominance of any one role conflict variable over another in regard

TABLE 5

SUMMARY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS OF OBLIGATION, LEGITIMACY, SANCTIONS ACCESS, SANCTIONS EXERCISE
AND REPORTED PROBABLE BEHAVIOR IN THE FIVE POTENTIAL ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

| SITU- ATION | OBLIGATION-RPB | | | LEGITIMACY-RPB | | | SANCTIONS ACCESS-RPB | | | SANCTIONS EXERCISE-RPB | | | N |
|----------------|----------------|--------|------|----------------|-----------|------|-------------------------|--------|------|---------------------------|--------|------|-----|
| | χ^2 | p | c | χ^2 | p | c | χ^2 | p | c | χ^2 | p | c | |
| I | 12.25 | p<.001 | .148 | 3.37 | .10>p>.05 | .075 | 4.04 | p<.05 | .089 | 4.38 | p<.05 | .089 | 522 |
| II | 26.32 | p<.001 | .237 | 48.45 | p<.001 | .313 | 12.92 | p<.001 | .167 | 28.20 | p<.001 | .244 | 443 |
| III | 17.93 | p<.001 | .207 | 17.14 | p<.001 | .203 | 5.53 | p<.05 | .114 | 14.54 | p<.001 | .187 | 405 |
| IV | 1.91 | n.s. | .063 | 5.73 | p<.05 | .109 | .19 | n.s. | .000 | .66 | n.s. | .031 | 490 |
| V | 15.41 | p<.001 | .179 | 19.08 | p<.001 | .200 | 11.95 | p<.001 | .158 | 10.76 | p<.005 | .152 | 462 |

df=1

Maximum value of C is .707

to the strength of their relationship with reported probable behavior. In situation II the relationship between reported probable behavior and the role conflict variables is found to be constantly greater than in any of the other conflict situations. The very fact that no variable escapes the adverse or beneficial situational affects lends credence to the interpretation that no one variable's relationship with reported probable behavior is significantly greater than the relationship between other variables and reported probable behavior.

Before leaving this line of inquiry, the notable similarity in the strength of the relationship between sanctions access and reported probable behavior on the one hand and sanctions exercise and reported probable behavior on the other is worthy of comment. Table 5 reveals that only very slight differences exist between the coefficients of contingency measuring the relationship strength between the two variables and reported probable behavior. These minute differences might be expected considering the common base of sanctions access and sanctions exercise.

Interrelationships Among The Role Conflict Variables

-If, in general, the selected role conflict variables all are related to reported probable behavior to the same extent, it might be expected that a high interrelationship would hold between them. It is expected then that an individual who perceives an audience and its expectation as being legitimate concomitantly perceives this same audience to hold high access to sanctions, an obligatory expectation and have a great likelihood of exercising sanctions.

In Tables 6 through 11 we find that the relationship between each pair of variables tested is significant at the .001 level. The contingency coefficients, being moderately high in every situation for each pair of variables tested, further attests to the high degree of dependency among the role conflict variables. The greatest relationship between the pairs of variables is that of sanctions access and sanctions exercise, as evidenced by the high values of the coefficient of contingency. This finding is, of course, not surprising. The operationalization of sanctions access deals with the latent aspect of sanctions. It is geared to determine the recruits' perceptions of the position of audiences to apply pressure for nonconformity to their expectations. The operationalization of sanctions exercise, the manifest aspect of sanctions, is aimed at the determination of the recruits' perceptions of the probable invocation of sanctions for failure to conform to their expectations.

In conclusion, the relationship between each pair of variables tested is highly significant. There is a strong tendency for individuals to concomitantly perceive audiences and/or expectations as being legitimate, obligatory, having high access to sanctions and as having a great likelihood of exercising sanctions.

Since the role conflict variables are not independent of one another, it might be expected that a combination of two variables would result in a significant increase in relationship with reported probable behavior over that which holds with single variables and reported probable behavior. On the other hand, the relationship

TABLE 6

RELATIONSHIP OF SANCTIONS ACCESS AND SANCTIONS EXERCISE IN
THE FIVE POTENTIAL ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

| SITUATION | CHI SQUARE | LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE | *CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENT | N |
|-----------|---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----|
| I | 234.59 | $p < .001$ | .557 | 522 |
| II | 214.78 | $p < .001$ | .571 | 443 |
| III | 200.93 | $p < .001$ | .576 | 405 |
| IV | 184.55 | $p < .001$ | .523 | 490 |
| V | 245.52 | $p < .001$ | .589 | 462 |

df=1

*Maximum value of C is .707

TABLE 7

RELATIONSHIP OF LEGITIMACY AND SANCTIONS ACCESS IN THE FIVE
POTENTIAL ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

| SITUATION | CHI SQUARE | LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE | *CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENT | N |
|-----------|---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----|
| I | 134.22 | $p < .001$ | .452 | 522 |
| II | 105.65 | $p < .001$ | .438 | 443 |
| III | 127.12 | $p < .001$ | .489 | 405 |
| IV | 120.81 | $p < .001$ | .445 | 490 |
| V | 184.52 | $p < .001$ | .534 | 462 |

df=1

*Maximum value of C is .707

TABLE 8

RELATIONSHIP OF SANCTIONS EXERCISE AND LEGITIMACY IN THE
FIVE POTENTIAL ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

| SITUATION | CHI SQUARE | LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE | *CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENT | N |
|-----------|---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----|
| I | 121.49 | $p < .001$ | .435 | 522 |
| II | 80.23 | $p < .001$ | .391 | 443 |
| III | 104.27 | $p < .001$ | .453 | 405 |
| IV | 102.27 | $p < .001$ | .416 | 490 |
| V | 153.92 | $p < .001$ | .500 | 462 |

df=1

*Maximum value of C is .707

TABLE 9

RELATIONSHIP OF OBLIGATION AND SANCTIONS ACCESS IN THE
FIVE POTENTIAL ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

| SITUATION | CHI SQUARE | LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE | *CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENT | N |
|-----------|---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----|
| I | 94.90 | $p < .001$ | .392 | 522 |
| II | 119.58 | $p < .001$ | .460 | 443 |
| III | 115.57 | $p < .001$ | .471 | 405 |
| IV | 117.45 | $p < .001$ | .439 | 490 |
| V | 159.19 | $p < .001$ | .506 | 462 |

df=1

*Maximum value of C is .707

TABLE 10

RELATIONSHIP OF SANCTIONS EXERCISE AND OBLIGATION IN THE
FIVE POTENTIAL ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

| SITUATION | CHI SQUARE | LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE | *CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENT | N |
|-----------|---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----|
| I | 123.82 | $p < .001$ | .438 | 522 |
| II | 137.73 | $p < .001$ | .487 | 443 |
| III | 138.91 | $p < .001$ | .505 | 405 |
| IV | 121.52 | $p < .001$ | .446 | 490 |
| V | 192.30 | $p < .001$ | .542 | 462 |

df=1

*Maximum value of C is .707

TABLE 11

RELATIONSHIP OF OBLIGATION AND LEGITIMACY IN THE FIVE
POTENTIAL ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

| SITUATION | CHI SQUARE | LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE | *CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENT | N |
|-----------|---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----|
| I | 102.44 | $p < .001$ | .405 | 522 |
| II | 137.38 | $p < .001$ | .487 | 443 |
| III | 128.47 | $p < .001$ | .491 | 405 |
| IV | 95.97 | $p < .001$ | .405 | 490 |
| V | 163.25 | $p < .001$ | .511 | 462 |

df=1

*Maximum value of C is .707

between role conflict variables is not perfect, therefore, we cannot account for the variance which remains unexplained. In other words it is possible that by combining two variables the weaknesses of each will be overcome in regard to their individual relationship with reported probable behavior. On a common sense basis alone it might be expected that the perception of an audience and/or expectation which is legitimate and backed by high likelihood of exercise of sanctions would be more closely related to reported probable behavior than would the perception of either singly.

To test the above notions legitimacy and sanctions exercise responses were paired to determine their combined relationship with reported probable behavior.⁶ Table 12 shows that the arbitrary combination of sanctions exercise responses and legitimacy responses has resulted in a significant relationship with reported probable behavior in four of the five conflict situations. Except for situation II the values of the coefficient of contingency are moderately low. Of course the important question is, has the association between a combination of two variables and reported probable behavior resulted in a significant increase over the association of single variables and reported probable behavior?

An examination of the contingency coefficients in Table 13 reveals that the combination of legitimacy and sanctions exercise is more closely related to reported probable behavior than is sanctions exercise alone in all five conflict situations. Only in situations II and IV, however, is this relationship more than .1 higher than that of sanctions exercise and reported probable

TABLE 12

RELATIONSHIP OF LEGITIMACY-SANCTIONS EXERCISE AND REPORTED PROBABLE
BEHAVIOR IN THE FIVE POTENTIAL ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

| SITUATION | CHI SQUARE | LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE | *CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENT | N |
|-----------|---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----|
| I | 7.65 | .10>p>.05 | .118 | 522 |
| II | 84.60 | p<.001 | .400 | 443 |
| III | 21.32 | p<.001 | .223 | 405 |
| IV | 14.34 | p<.005 | .167 | 490 |
| V | 21.30 | p<.001 | .210 | 462 |

df=3

*The maximum value of C for a 2x4 contingency table lies between .707 and .866. The precise value of maximum C cannot be computed when the number of rows and columns in a contingency table are not equal. See Quinn McNemar, Psychological Statistics (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1949), p. 182.

TABLE 13

SUMMARY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS OF LEGITIMACY, SANCTIONS EXERCISE, LEGITIMACY AND SANCTIONS EXERCISE COMBINED AND REPORTED PROBABLE BEHAVIOR IN THE FIVE POTENTIAL ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

| SITUATION | LEGITIMACY-RPB | | SANCTIONS EXERCISE-RPB | | LEGITIMACY-SANCTIONS EXERCISE-RPB | | N |
|-----------|----------------|---------------|------------------------|----------|-----------------------------------|-----------|-----|
| | χ^2 | p | \bar{c} | χ^2 | p | \bar{c} | |
| I | 5.37 | .10 > p > .05 | .118 | 4.38 | p < .05 | .140 | 522 |
| II | 48.45 | p < .001 | .492 | 28.20 | p < .001 | .383 | 443 |
| III | 17.14 | p < .001 | .319 | 14.54 | p < .001 | .294 | 405 |
| IV | 5.73 | p < .05 | .171 | .66 | n.s. | .049 | 490 |
| V | 19.08 | p < .001 | .314 | 10.76 | p < .005 | .239 | 462 |

df=1

df=1

df=3

The contingency coefficients have been corrected for purposes of comparison. The correction factor allows direct comparison of coefficients derived from contingency tables with different numbers of cells. See Thomas C. McCormick, Elementary Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company Inc., 1941), p. 207.

behavior. The differences between the relationship of legitimacy and reported probable behavior on the one hand and the combination of legitimacy and sanctions exercise on the other are extremely slight. In two of the five conflict situations legitimacy is more closely related to reported probable behavior than are legitimacy and sanctions exercise combined. Since the combination of legitimacy and sanctions exercise has resulted in only a slight increase in relationship strength with reported probable behavior, it is concluded that this procedure may be unwarranted in subsequent role conflict analyses, of course contingent upon improved statistical techniques and refinement of the variables.

In summary it has been empirically determined that:

- (1) Legitimacy, obligation, sanctions access and sanctions exercise all manifest a significant but moderately weak relationship with reported probable behavior.
- (2) The role conflict variables under consideration are interrelated to a moderately high degree. When an audience and/or expectation is perceived to be legitimate, there is a strong tendency for it to be concomitantly perceived as obligatory, having high access to sanctions and having a great likelihood of exercising sanctions.
- (3) The procedure of pairing two variables, viz., legitimacy and sanctions exercise did not result in a substantial relationship increase with

reported probable behavior over that which obtains between legitimacy and sanctions exercise singly and reported probable behavior.

Comparison With Previous Role Conflict Investigations

A brief comparison will be carried out of the results of this thesis with those of other empirical studies of role conflict. Unfortunately the statistical techniques utilized in this thesis represent a departure from those used in previous investigations of role conflict. However, it is felt that the results lend themselves to rough comparisons.

It has been determined that our role conflict variables manifest in general equivalent relationships with reported probable behavior. This finding differs from those of Gross and his associates. They received their highest predictive accuracy utilizing the "sanctions model." Compare for example the proportions of correct predictions given below. With the "legitimacy model" .84, .27, .65 and .66 correct predictions of role conflict resolution were attained. Employing the "sanctions model" Gross and his associates correctly predicted .87, .79, .75 and .87 role conflict resolutions.⁷ As was the case with the combination of legitimacy and sanctions exercise investigated herein, Gross and his cohorts did not improve predictions with their "legitimacy-sanctions model." Sanctions was found to be the best predictor of role conflict resolution by Gross and his associates. This finding was not replicated in this thesis.

The results of Ehrlich's investigation of role conflict are more in accordance with those of this thesis. This might be expected considering that both studies utilized the same potential role conflict situations. With legitimacy Ehrlich correctly predicted .45, .72, .00, .72 and .27 role conflict resolutions in the five potential conflict situations. Employing obligation Ehrlich correctly predicted .50, .63, .00, .66 and .24 role conflict resolutions. It is obvious that neither variable is "better" than the other in terms of correct predictions of role conflict resolution. It is also to be noted that the proportion of correct predictions is not nearly as high as that obtained by Gress and his associates. Ehrlich also combined legitimacy and obligation in an attempt to increase predictions. However, this procedure did not produce the desired results. The combination of obligation and legitimacy resulted in exactly the same proportions of correct role conflict resolution predictions as these obtained with the single variable of legitimacy.⁸

Taking both sanctions and legitimacy into account, Miller and Shull achieved overall predictive accuracy of .71 from seven samples of business and labor leaders.⁹ In summary, no investigators have achieved the high degree of correct predictions of role conflict resolution that were obtained by Gress and his associates.

FOOTNOTES

1. For a complete explanation of this theory see Neal J. Gross, Ward S. Mason and Alexander W. McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1958), pp. 281-318. It is to be noted that Gross and his associates analyzed only those persons who were determined as having role conflict - role conflict being defined as the perception of contradictory expectations. Those persons who perceived each audience to hold similar expectations for their behavior in a particular situation (role congruency) were excluded from their analysis. In this study no distinction is made between persons having role conflict and role congruency in the sense that both are included in the empirical analyses of the relationship between role conflict variables and reported probable behavior. In a very real sense the empirical focus of this thesis is not role conflict resolution.
2. The five point response categories were cut after the first two points. In other words if the recruit checks one of these first two points his response is considered to constitute a perception of obligation, legitimacy, high access to sanctions and great likelihood of exercise of sanctions. The remaining three points are regarded as non-obligatory, illegitimate perceptions etc.
3. In addition, whenever a recruit reported his probable behavior as "have no general practice on this matter" the value of chi square was reduced. It is incorrect to assume that the perception of expectation C or "no expectation" corresponds with the selection of reported probable behavior C or "have no general practice on this matter." If a recruit perceives an audience to hold "no expectation" for his behavior, it is reasonable to assume that he is relatively free to follow any of the three alternative behaviors listed in the Manifest Behavior Section. This discussion does not apply to situation I in that expectations A, B and C all constitute behavioral prescriptions, which correspond with the three alternatives listed for situation I in the Manifest Behavior Section. See the role conflict questionnaire in Appendix Two.
4. The 2x2 contingency table for any one situation in Table 1 was tabulated as follows: If a respondent perceived four of the nine audiences as holding an obligatory expectation that was similar to his reported probable behavior, cell 1 of the contingency table would receive four checks. If this same respondent perceived the remaining five audiences to hold a non-obligatory expectation not in accordance with his reported probable behavior five checks were placed in cell 4. (See Appendix One for the contingency table formats.) Thus, the responses of each recruit were assigned to

particular cells of the contingency table nine times for any one situation. While this procedure may inflate the value of chi square because of dependency of responses, it is felt that the factors contributing to the deflation of chi square outweigh this inflationary factor.

The differing N's in each situation are derived from the number of times 58 recruits respond to questions concerning legitimacy, obligation etc. N for any one situation becomes $9(\text{number of audiences}) \times 58(\text{number of recruits}) = 522$. However, only in situation I will there always be an N of 522. In situations other than I the recruits were instructed not to respond to questions concerning legitimacy etc., when they checked expectation C or "no expectation."

5. The raw data from which the statistical tests were computed are given in tabular form in Appendix One. The data do not allow an empirical explanation of the pattern of low relationships between all the role conflict variables and reported probable behavior in situations I and IV and high relationships in the remaining situations. The following explanations are only conjectural. The situations may have had differential meaning and salience for the recruits. Perhaps the recruits were not concerned with the distinction between being a "model citizen" or a "good citizen." Situations I and IV then may not represent pervasive and important conflicts for the recruits. The third expectation in situation I might have negated the exclusive aspect of expectations A and B. In other words the additional expectation offered a compromise selection which might have been conducive to this situation not being perceived as an important, pervasive conflict. This explanation is tenable in the light of "compromise" often being cited as a means for eluding role conflict.
6. The investigation of the relationship between two role conflict variables and reported probable behavior necessitates the use of a 2×4 contingency table. With an increase in the number of cells in a contingency table the maximum value which C can attain rises.
7. Gross, Mason and McEachern, op. cit., p. 314. The proportions cited are derived from the four role conflict situations employed in this study.
8. Howard J. Ehrlich, "The Analysis of Role Conflicts in a Complex Organization: The Police" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1959), p. 57.
9. Delbert C. Miller and Fremont A. Shull, "Role Conflict Behavior in Administration: A Study in the Validation of a Theory of Role Conflict Resolution" (Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1960), p. 18.

IV

INTRODUCTION OF EGO'S PREFERENCE AS A ROLE CONFLICT VARIABLE

In this section the relationship between ego's preference and reported probable behavior will be investigated. The investigation of what expectations recruits prefer audiences to hold and their reported probable behavior constitutes a departure from the previous investigations of legitimacy, obligation and the like. In the previous analyses personal dimensions were disregarded.

It is felt that the introduction of personal factors into the analysis of role conflict constitutes a significant contribution in the direction of a more comprehensive knowledge of role conflict and role conflict resolution. After all, the concept of role has been repeatedly lauded for its inter-disciplinary integrational possibilities. Yet, in the hands of investigators identified with various disciplines the concept has often remained rather esoteric to the student and his particular discipline.

It seems apparent that personal dimensions must be taken into account in any analysis of role conflict. Gross and his associates determined school superintendents' personal orientations to legitimacy, sanctions or both in order to enhance their predictive efficacy. However, this can hardly be construed as an investigation of the relationship of role conflict resolution and personal dimensions.¹

Table 14 shows the results of the investigation of the relationship of what expectation recruits prefer audiences to hold

and reported probable behavior. The differences in the chi square values for situations I and III on the one hand and II, IV and V on the other present an erratic pattern. In the latter situations the chi square values are extremely high, while in situations I and III the relationship fails to attain statistical significance.²

It is difficult to compare the relative relationship strength between ego's preference and reported probable behavior and the previously tested variables and reported probable behavior. From the chi square values alone the relationship between ego's preference and reported probable behavior appears to be greater than that between the other role conflict variables and reported probable behavior in three of the five situations. However, the overall stability of the relationship between ego's preference and reported probable behavior is not as great as that, for instance, between legitimacy and reported probable behavior. Such instability, of course, would reduce the predictive utility of this variable.

Because of the erratic pattern of significance manifested by the relationship of ego's preference and reported probable behavior, it is tentatively concluded that the strength of this relationship is, from an overall standpoint, roughly commensurate with the relationship between the other role conflict variables and reported probable behavior.

The results of the investigation of ego's preference and reported probable behavior must be interpreted with care. The role conflict questionnaire was administered during the respondents' first week in recruit school. For that particular point in time

TABLE 14

RELATIONSHIP OF EGO'S PREFERENCE AND REPORTED PROBABLE BEHAVIOR
IN THE FIVE POTENTIAL ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

| SITUATION | *CHI SQUARE | LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE | N |
|-----------|----------------|--------------------------|-----|
| I | 2.92 | .10>p>.05 | 522 |
| II | 139.86 | p<.001 | 405 |
| III | 1.07 | n.s. | 373 |
| IV | 71.16 | p<.001 | 502 |
| V | 107.80 | p<.001 | 449 |

df=1

*The chi square values were derived from a two cell contingency table. Expected frequencies were obtained by dividing each situation N by 2. See Morris Zelditch, Jr., A Basic Course in Sociological Statistics (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1959), pp. 281-282.

it might be expected that personal preferences would be a stronger determinant of role performance than would be the case at a later period in the respondents' careers.

The plausibility of the above point is attested to in a study by Ehrlich, Rinehart and Howell. In this study the recruits who successfully completed the June, 1960 recruit school and a six month on-the-job probationary period ($n=33$) were re-administered the role conflict questionnaire. The results of this study revealed that the variables of legitimacy, sanctions access and the like, were more effective predictors of role conflict resolution than ego's preference in all five potential conflict situations.³

Despite the qualifications placed upon the interpretation of the relationship between ego's preference and reported probable behavior, and despite the tentative nature of the conclusions drawn concerning the strength of this relationship, the results do point to the subsequent inclusion of personal dimensions in role conflict schemata.

Simultaneous Combination Of Social And Personal Dimensions

The previously reported investigations have indicated that the variables of legitimacy, sanctions access, sanctions exercise, obligation and ego's preference are all significantly related to reported probable behavior. However, the relationship between these variables and reported probable behavior is not as strong as might be desired, and in the case of ego's preference not as stable as might be desired. The above considerations immediately

suggest the possibility that the conceptual framework within which the empirical investigations have been carried out is inadequate.

In the previous chapter factors in the social situation, which some students have deemed crucial to the understanding and prediction of role conflict and role conflict resolution, have received the greater part of our attention. Specifically, dimensions of audiences and the content of their expectations were the focus. Those audiences and/or expectations viewed as legitimate, obligatory, backed by high access to and exercise of sanctions have been theoretically regarded as a cast into which individuals are automatically molded. While the socially patterned aspects of role conflict and role conflict resolution have been emphasized, the function of personal predispositions has been grossly neglected. Such a neglect led to the inclusion of an investigation of the relationship of personal preferences and reported probable behavior. In this analysis the social dimensions were disregarded.

It is felt that both investigations did not result in the desired close relationship with reported probable behavior because each was, in effect, segmentizing aspects of the total forces influencing individuals' decisions in the conflict situations. Each empirical investigation was carried out without benefit of a comprehensive conceptual framework. It is contended that only by the simultaneous integration of both personal and social dimensions will the understanding of role conflict and role conflict resolution be adequately approached.

The area of role conflict has not been completely bereft of

attempts at the inclusion of both personal and social dimensions into conceptual frameworks. Gullahorn points out that role represents "a point of interaction between the personality system and the social system." He further contends that personality influences role behavior as well as being influenced by it. In essence, the influence of both personal and social dimensions upon the determination of modes of behavior is attested to and integrated into Gullahorn's model for role conflict analysis.⁴

According to Getzels and Guba a social system entails two major classes of phenomena: (1) Organizations with certain statuses and roles that will fulfill the goals of the system and (2) individuals with their personalities and need dispositions. Two dimensions of activity are further specified: (a) The nomothetic dimension of activity, which is comprised of the organization, status and role and (b) the idiographic dimension of activity, which is comprised of the individual, personality and need dispositions. "A given act is conceived as deriving simultaneously from both nomothetic and idiographic dimensions."⁵ In general, this conceptual framework can be adopted as a guide for further empirical investigation of the role conflict variables.

Legitimacy, sanctions access, sanctions exercise and obligation, being dimensions of audiences and the content of their expectations, can be considered as aspects of the nomothetic dimension of activity. Ego's preference, which is a function of personality and need dispositions, can be considered as an aspect of the idiographic dimension of activity. It is felt that the

simultaneous inclusion of elements from both the idiographic and nomothetic dimensions of activity in the empirical investigation of role conflict variables will enhance the relationship with reported probable behavior. Specifically, it is hypothesized that the combination of legitimacy, for example, and ego's preference will result in a relationship with reported probable behavior that is stronger than that between either of these variables alone and reported probable behavior.

Table 15 indicates that the combination of ego's preference and legitimacy is significantly related to reported probable behavior in each of the potential role conflict situations. With the exception of situation I, the contingency coefficients are all moderately high. The important question of the relative strength of the relationship between the variables presently under consideration and reported probable behavior remains to be answered.

Comparing the contingency coefficients in Table 16, it can be positively asserted that the combination of ego's preference and legitimacy has resulted in an enhanced relationship with reported probable behavior over that of any single variable or combination of variables and reported probable behavior. Unfortunately the relative strength of the relationship between the variables presently under consideration and ego's preference and reported probable behavior cannot be directly compared. However, the relationship between this combination of variables and reported probable behavior is more stable than that between ego's preference and reported probable behavior. Because of the erratic nature of

TABLE 15

RELATIONSHIP OF THE COMBINATION OF EGO'S PREFERENCE-LEGITIMACY AND REPORTED PROBABLE BEHAVIOR IN THE FIVE POTENTIAL ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

| SITUATION | CHI SQUARE | LEVEL OF SIGNIFICANCE | *CONTINGENCY COEFFICIENT | N |
|-----------|---------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------|-----|
| I | 14.03 | $p < .005$ | .161 | 522 |
| II | 152.14 | $p < .001$ | .538 | 373 |
| III | 28.23 | $p < .001$ | .279 | 333 |
| IV | 60.38 | $p < .001$ | .333 | 482 |
| V | 110.69 | $p < .001$ | .454 | 426 |

df=3

*The maximum value of C for a 2x4 contingency table lies between .707 and .866.

TABLE 16

SUMMARY OF THE RELATIONSHIPS OF LEGITIMACY, SANCTIONS EXERCISE AND LEGITIMACY, EGO'S PREFERENCE AND LEGITIMACY AND REPORTED PROBABLE BEHAVIOR IN THE FIVE POTENTIAL ROLE CONFLICT SITUATIONS

| SITU- ATION | LEGITIMACY-RPB | | | LEGITIMACY-SANCTIONS EXERCISE-RPB | | | LEGITIMACY-EGO'S PREFERENCE-RPB | | | **EGO'S PREFERENCE- RPB | | |
|----------------|----------------|-----------|-------------|--------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|------------------------------------|--------|-----------|----------------------------|-----------|--|
| | χ^2 | p | * \bar{C} | χ^2 | p | \bar{C} | χ^2 | p | \bar{C} | χ^2 | p | |
| I | 5.37 | .10>p>.05 | .118 | 7.65 | .10>p>.05 | .162 | 14.03 | p<.005 | .220 | 2.92 | .10>p>.05 | |
| II | 48.45 | p<.001 | .492 | 84.60 | p<.001 | .548 | 152.14 | p<.001 | .737 | 139.86 | p<.001 | |
| III | 17.14 | p<.001 | .319 | 21.32 | p<.001 | .305 | 28.23 | p<.001 | .382 | 1.07 | n.s. | |
| IV | 5.73 | p<.05 | .171 | 14.34 | p<.005 | .229 | 60.38 | p<.001 | .456 | 71.16 | p<.001 | |
| V | 19.08 | p<.001 | .314 | 21.30 | p<.001 | .288 | 110.69 | p<.001 | .622 | 107.80 | p<.001 | |

*The coefficient of contingency has been corrected for direct comparisons.

**The coefficient of contingency is not applicable to a two cell contingency table.

the relationship between ego's preference and reported probable behavior, it is concluded that the relationship between ego's preference - legitimacy and reported probable behavior is greater than that manifested by any other variable or variables and reported probable behavior.

There appears to be ample grounds, both theoretical and empirical, to conclude that the inclusion of both personal and social dimensions represents a significant contribution to the understanding of role conflict and role conflict resolution.

FOOTNOTES

1. The method used by Gross and his associates to determine school superintendents' personal orientations to legitimacy, sanctions or both is one which does not lend itself to replication, even if it were desirable to do so. See Neal J. Gross, Ward S. Mason and Alexander W. McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis (New York: John Wiley and Sons Inc., 1958), pp. 289-295.
2. The coefficient of contingency is not applicable to a two cell contingency table.
3. Howard J. Ehrlich, James W. Rinehart and John C. Howell, "The Study of Role Conflict: Explorations in Methodology" (Paper to be read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1961).
4. John T. and Jeanne E. Gullahorn, "A Model for Role Conflict Analysis" (Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1959), pp. 4ff.
5. J.W. Getzels and E.G. Guba, "Social Behavior and the Administrative Process" (Revised version of paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, 1956).

SUMMARY

Five role conflict variables have been investigated. Two of the five, ego's preference and sanctions access, have been introduced for the first time. It has been empirically determined that the role conflict variables of legitimacy, obligation, sanctions access and sanctions exercise are significantly related to recruits' reported probable behavior in the majority of potential role conflict situations. However, the relationships between the aforementioned role conflict variables and reported probable behavior are moderately weak, as evidenced by the reported values of the coefficient of contingency.

The role conflict variables of legitimacy, obligation, sanctions access and sanctions exercise were examined to determine if any one was associated with reported probable behavior to a greater extent than were the others. Utilizing the coefficient of contingency as a test, it was found that the strength of the associations between each of the four role conflict variables and reported probable behavior was, in general, the same. No role conflict variable was dominant over any other in regard to their relationship with reported probable behavior.

Since none of the four variables was dominant in regard to its relationship with reported probable behavior, it was expected that the variables would manifest a high degree of interrelationship. An analysis aimed at the determination of the dependence or

independence of the role conflict variables revealed that they were definitely dependent. A moderately high relationship was manifested between each pair of variables tested. The closest relationship was that between sanctions access and sanctions exercise. This finding was not surprising in that both variables were operationalized to tap different aspects of the same underlying dimension.

Although the four role conflict variables were determined to be highly interrelated, there remained a sizeable proportion of the variance that was unexplained. Because the association between the variables was not perfect, it was felt that the procedure of combining two variables might increase the magnitude of the association with reported probable behavior over that which either variable manifested singly with reported probable behavior.

The variables of legitimacy and sanctions exercise were combined in an attempt to determine their association with reported probable behavior. The results of this investigation revealed that the relationship with reported probable behavior had not been substantially increased. The single variables of legitimacy and sanctions exercise were related to reported probable behavior to approximately the same degree as was the combination of legitimacy and sanctions exercise.

A personal dimension, ego's preference, was introduced in this study as a role conflict variable. The analysis of ego's preference and reported probable behavior revealed that these variables manifested an unstable relationship. In three of the five potential role conflict situations the relationship was found to be moderately high, while in the remaining two situations the relationship was found to

be moderately low. It was concluded that ego's preference was, in general, no more highly related to reported probable behavior than were the other role conflict variables and reported probable behavior.

Finally, empirical evidence was offered for the desirability of the simultaneous inclusion of both personal and social dimensions into role conflict schemata. The variables of ego's preference and legitimacy were combined. The results of this combination led to the conclusion that a significant relationship increase with reported probable behavior had been effected over and above that which had been previously manifested between personal and social role conflict variables singly and reported probable behavior.

Conclusions And Suggestions For Future Research

The following conclusions are drawn from the empirical findings of this study: (1) That the role conflict variables of legitimacy, obligation, sanctions access and sanctions exercise are not independent, (2) that none of these variables is dominant in regard to its relationship with reported probable behavior and (3) that a combination of two variables did not increase the relationship with reported probable behavior. It is concluded that these findings strongly suggest that subsequent role conflict schemata consider the possibility of using only one of the four role conflict variables mentioned above. This conclusion is of course contingent upon subsequent refinement of the role conflict variables and improved statistical techniques for their handling. Which variable should

be chosen would of course depend upon the particular concerns of the investigator, the nature of his sample and the type of information he is seeking. On the basis of this study the selection of legitimacy might constitute a wise choice, in as much as legitimacy as operationalized herein evokes both the content of the expectation and the authority of the audience holding the expectation.

A fourth conclusion is that the study's exploration of personal dimensions strongly suggests their subsequent inclusion in role conflict schemata. However, the results of the investigation of the combination of ego's preference and legitimacy led to the further conclusion that the combination of personal and social variables was more closely related to reported probable behavior than was either singly. It cannot be overemphasized that the separate analysis of personal and social dimensions only covers a segment of the total forces influencing individuals' behavioral decisions in role conflict situations. Only by the simultaneous inclusion and investigation of both personal and social dimensions will subsequent theoretical and empirical studies of role conflict approach the necessary requirements for explanation and prediction of behavior in role conflict situations.

In regard to future research, there is a need to validate and replicate the theory and models of role conflict resolution as introduced by Gross and his associates. If the theory of Gross and his associates is valid, investigators should be able to achieve the same degree of predictive accuracy that was first attained.

The results presented in this thesis do not create the degree of excitement as that engendered by the analysis of Gross and his associates, nor do the results of other investigations of role conflict give the impression that "all that is to be done has been done."

Second, the implications of the concept of sanctions can be more exhaustively probed. In this and previous analyses of role conflict only negative sanctions or the position of audiences to invoke negative sanctions for nonconformity to an expectation has been explored. It is suggested that knowledge of individuals' perceptions of the positive sanctions that result from conformity to an expectation might be highly related to behavioral decisions in role conflict situations.

Third, it goes without saying that both personal and social dimensions should be included in future role conflict schemata.

Finally, the determination of factors which reduce the relationship between the role conflict variables and reported probable behavior offers an interesting direction for research. For example, such concepts as visibility and commitment might be relevant within this context.

In general the area of role conflict is one which offers a multiplicity of research possibilities, both theoretical and empirical. The concept of role is one which is potentially capable of providing a necessary link to the integration of diverse disciplines. Only by continued theoretical and empirical work can the full potential of the concept of role be realized.

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APPENDIX ONE

To facilitate the presentation of the raw data given in this section, the following abbreviations will be employed:

| | | | |
|-----|------------------------------|----|----------------------|
| H | - high | L | - legitimacy |
| L | - low | SA | - sanctions access |
| PE | - perceived expectation | SE | - sanctions exercise |
| RPB | - reported probable behavior | EP | - ego's preference |
| O | - obligation | | |

TABLE 1 page 22

| SITUATION | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|---------------------|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|
| I | | II | | III | | IV | | V | |
| RPB-PE same | RPB-PE different | | | | | | | | |
| HO 125 | 72 | 188 | 67 | 134 | 155 | 149 | 133 | 182 | 81 |
| LO 155 | 170 | 94 | 94 | 29 | 87 | 123 | 85 | 102 | 97 |

TABLE 2 page 23

| SITUATION | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|---------------------|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|
| I | | II | | III | | IV | | V | |
| RPB-PE same | RPB-PE different | | | | | | | | |
| HL 167 | 126 | 214 | 69 | 133 | 151 | 203 | 141 | 198 | 88 |
| LL 112 | 117 | 68 | 92 | 30 | 91 | 69 | 77 | 86 | 90 |

TABLE 3 page 25

| SITUATION | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|-----|---------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|
| I | | II | | III | | IV | | V | | |
| RPB-PE same | | RPB-PE different | | | | | | | | |
| HSA | 151 | 111 | 192 | 79 | 115 | 143 | 174 | 134 | 188 | 89 |
| LSA | 127 | 133 | 93 | 79 | 48 | 99 | 99 | 83 | 96 | 89 |

TABLE 4 page 26

| SITUATION | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|-----|---------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| I | | II | | III | | IV | | V | | |
| RPB-PE same | | RPB-PE different | | | | | | | | |
| HSE | 137 | 141 | 176 | 109 | 117 | 128 | 141 | 131 | 166 | 117 |
| LSE | 98 | 146 | 56 | 102 | 46 | 114 | 121 | 97 | 77 | 102 |

TABLE 6 page 31

| SITUATION | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| I | | II | | III | | IV | | V | | |
| HSA | LSA | | | | | | | | | |
| HSE | 205 | 30 | 217 | 15 | 222 | 21 | 237 | 27 | 229 | 14 |
| LSE | 57 | 230 | 54 | 157 | 36 | 126 | 68 | 158 | 50 | 169 |

TABLE 7 page 31

| SITUATION | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| I | | | II | | III | | IV | | V | |
| | HL | LL | | | | | | | | |
| HSA | 216 | 46 | 228 | 42 | 230 | 30 | 270 | 38 | 242 | 35 |
| LSA | 84 | 176 | 64 | 109 | 50 | 95 | 74 | 108 | 46 | 139 |

TABLE 8 page 32

| SITUATION | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| I | | | II | | III | | IV | | V | |
| | HL | LL | | | | | | | | |
| HSE | 197 | 38 | 198 | 34 | 215 | 28 | 235 | 27 | 216 | 27 |
| LSE | 103 | 184 | 95 | 116 | 66 | 96 | 109 | 119 | 72 | 147 |

TABLE 9 page 32

| SITUATION | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| I | | | II | | III | | IV | | V | |
| | HSA | LSA | | | | | | | | |
| HO | 153 | 45 | 212 | 44 | 231 | 59 | 235 | 55 | 224 | 39 |
| LO | 108 | 216 | 59 | 128 | 26 | 89 | 65 | 135 | 54 | 145 |

TABLE 10 page 33

| SITUATION | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| I | | | II | | III | | IV | | V | |
| | HSE | LSE | | | | | | | | |
| HO | 150 | 47 | 195 | 61 | 225 | 62 | 211 | 70 | 211 | 51 |
| LO | 85 | 240 | 37 | 150 | 18 | 100 | 52 | 157 | 31 | 169 |

TABLE 11 page 33

| SITUATION | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| I | | | II | | III | | IV | | V | |
| | HO | LO | | | | | | | | |
| HL | 168 | 132 | 232 | 60 | 248 | 32 | 247 | 97 | 231 | 57 |
| LL | 28 | 194 | 33 | 118 | 42 | 83 | 35 | 111 | 34 | 140 |

TABLE 12 page 35

| SITUATION | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-----|----|----|----|
| I | | | | | II | | | |
| | HL&HSE | HL&LSE | LL&HSE | LL&LSE | | | | |
| RPB-PE same | 118 | 54 | 23 | 84 | 159 | 63 | 16 | 47 |
| RPB-PE different | 80 | 45 | 18 | 100 | 38 | 33 | 18 | 69 |

| SITUATION | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|----|----|----|-----|----|----|----|-----|----|----|----|
| III | | | | IV | | | | V | | | |
| 108 | 25 | 9 | 22 | 136 | 67 | 6 | 63 | 150 | 47 | 19 | 68 |
| 108 | 40 | 19 | 74 | 99 | 42 | 21 | 56 | 66 | 23 | 10 | 79 |

TABLE 14 page 44

| SITUATION | | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|--|--|---------------------|--|--|-----|----|--|-----|-----|-----------------|
| I | | | II | | | III | | | IV | | V |
| RPB-EP same | | | RPB-EP different | | | | | | | | |
| 281 | | | 241 | | | 322 | 83 | | 177 | 196 | 346 156 335 114 |

TABLE 15 page 49

| SITUATION | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------|--|-------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------|-----------------------------|-----|----|----|----|--|--|
| I | | | | | | II | | | | | |
| | | HL&PE- EP same | HL&PE- EP dif- ferent | LL&PE- EP same | LL&PE- EP dif- ferent | | | | | | |
| RPB-PE same | | 144 | 23 | 87 | 24 | 193 | 9 | 56 | 3 | | |
| RPB-PE different | | 106 | 25 | 66 | 47 | 33 | 20 | 11 | 48 | | |

| SITUATION | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------|----|----|----|-----|----|----|----|-----|----|----|----|
| III | | | | IV | | | | V | | | |
| 132 | 0 | 25 | 4 | 181 | 20 | 54 | 15 | 187 | 11 | 63 | 13 |
| 102 | 11 | 39 | 20 | 92 | 45 | 26 | 49 | 43 | 32 | 27 | 50 |

APPENDIX TWO

Only a sample of the two-part role conflict questionnaire is included in this section. The remaining pages of the questionnaire are identical to those included herein with one exception; the categories or audiences labeled at the top of each page change after every fifth potential role conflict situation (rules and regulations situation). The nine audiences and the five conflict situations result in a 45 page questionnaire.

4. Which one of the following comes closest to describing what, as a
general rule, you probably will do once you get on the job?

1. _____ Be a "model citizen," always setting an example for
everyone in the community.

2. _____ Be a "good citizen" but not any different from
anyone else in the community.

2- he a "good citizen" but not any different from

1
2
3
4
5

The following questions require that you look into the future--to the time when you finish recruit school and are assigned to a post as a trooper. When you read these questions try to imagine, as best you can, what you most probably will do at this time.

1. Which one of the following comes closest to describing what, as a general rule, you probably will do once you get on the job?

1. _____ Spend my time mainly with safety and traffic work.
2. _____ Spend my time mainly with complaint and criminal investigation.
3. _____ Spend my time equally on both.

Once on the job, how often will you make exceptions to the general rule you have just indicated above?

1. _____ Often
2. _____ Sometimes
3. _____ Rarely
4. _____ Never

2. Which one of the following comes closest to describing what, as a

TROOPERS IN GENERAL

Below are three views which persons in the above category may have about troopers. The first two questions require that you judge, as best you can, the one view which you believe is probably most generally held by persons in this category about troopers.

- A. Expect the trooper to follow the rules and regulations to the letter.
 - B. Expect the trooper to overlook the rules and regulations occasionally.
 - C. Expect nothing of the trooper, one way or the other, on this matter.
1. Of the above, which do you believe to be the one which is probably most generally held by persons in the Troopers in General category about troopers?

Check one: A. B. C.

NOTE: IF YOU CHECKED (C.) ABOVE, SKIP ALL REMAINING QUESTIONS ON THIS PAGE EXCEPT #6 AND #7

2. How strongly do you think persons in this category generally insist that troopers act according to this view? (Check the one below closest to what you believe is the case)

Absolutely insist Strongly insist Mildly insist Prefer but do not really care

NOTE: THE REMAINING QUESTIONS ARE ABOUT HOW YOU, AS A TROOPER,

— Absolutely insist — Strongly insist — Mildly insist — Prefer but do not insist — Do not really care

TROOPERS IN GENERAL

Below are three views which persons in the above category may have about troopers. The first two questions require that you judge, as best you can, the one view which you believe is probably most generally held by persons in this category about troopers.

- A. Expect the trooper to spend his time mainly with safety and traffic work.
- B. Expect the trooper to spend his time mainly with complaint and criminal investigation.
- C. Expect the trooper to spend equal time on both.

1. Of the above, which do you believe to be the one which is probably most generally held by persons in the Troopers in General category about troopers?

Check one: A. B. C.

2. How strongly do you think persons in this category generally insist that troopers act according to this view? (Check the one below closest to what you believe is the case)

| | | | |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|
| <u> </u> Absolutely insist | <u> </u> Strongly insist | <u> </u> Mildly insist | <u> </u> Prefer but do not really care |
|---------------------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------|---|

NOTE: THE REMAINING QUESTIONS ARE ABOUT HOW YOU, AS A TROOPER, SEE THIS VIEW

NOTES THE REMAINING QUESTIONS ARE ABOUT

DIRECTIONS:


The following questionnaire is not a test as such. There are no "right" or "wrong" answers. You are asked to pick out the answer which comes closest to your own belief and feelings about the matter. Place a X in front of this answer.


Sometimes, none of the answers will exactly fit your own ideas, but you can pick the one which comes closest to what you believe to be the case.

Please be sure to check only one answer to every question. Please do not skip any question.

The following questionnaire deals mainly with two questions:

WHAT DO YOU BELIEVE THAT PERSONS IN THE CATEGORIES BELOW
GENERALLY EXPECT OF THE TROOPER?





SPEAKING AS A TROOPER, HOW DO YOU FEEL ABOUT THE VIEWS
OF THE PERSONS IN THESE CATEGORIES?



3. Speaking as a trooper, what right do you think this category has to hold this view?

Has every ___ right Has consider- ___ able right Has some ___ right Has little ___ right Has no ___ right

4. Speaking as a trooper, in what position are the persons in this category to apply pressure to try to make troopers do as these persons expect?

In the ___ strongest position In a ___ good position In a ___ fair position In no ___ poor position In no ___ position

5. Speaking as a trooper, if troopers didn't act the way persons in this category who hold this view expect, what is the likelihood that such persons would actually do something to try to get troopers to act according to their view?

Every ___ likelihood Rather ___ likely As likely ___ as not Rather ___ unlikely No ___ likelihood

6. Speaking as a trooper, which of the three views presented at the top of this page is the one which you would most like the persons in this category to have about troopers?

Check one: ___ A. ___ B. ___ C.

7. Speaking as a trooper, how strong is your feeling that persons in this category should hold to the view which you have indicated in your last answer (# 6)?

Very ___ strong Quite ___ strong Fairly ___ strong Only ___ mild Do not ___ really care

2. _____ Leave my job when off duty.

3. _____ Have no general practice on this matter.

Once on the job, how often will you make exceptions to the general rule you have just indicated above?

1. _____ Often

2. _____ Sometimes

3. _____ Rarely

4. _____ Never

3. Which one of the following comes closest to describing what, as a
general rule, you probably will do once you get on the job?

1. _____ Report another trooper whom I thought was not properly performing his police duties.

2. _____ Keep quiet about such things.

3. _____ Have no general practice on this matter.

Once on the job, how often will you make exceptions to the general rule you have just indicated above?

1. _____ Often

2. _____ Sometimes

3. _____ Rarely

4. _____ Never



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