ABSTRACT ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MICHIGAN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION By Donna Sweeny The focus of this study concerns the effectiveness of one area of a farmers' marketing association. The specific purpose is to determine the consensus problems as perceived by members and other closely-related individuals. Such determination includes industry matters as well as those of goals, roles and norms. The over-all purpose is to compare members' perceptions with established organiza- tional principles in an attempt to evaluate the associa- tion's ultimate potential for success. Two methods are used to accomplish the stated purposes: a Key Informant and Consensus interviewing method and a consensus-oriented mailing survey. Studies were conducted— over a year apart. The Key Informant method involves identifying know- ledgeable people in and related to the target organization, ... u—I .4- .IVI .,. n.‘ .H .h . Q ~ Donna Sweeny and discovering their perceptions of it through non- directive interviews. Constant search for nexus points of consensus on organizational matters is maintained. Effect- iveness is primarily determined by the degree of consensus existing around goals, roles and norms. A comparison of results against principles on extant literature on organizations is undertaken, with analysis and conclusions following. Bargaining activities emerge as a major consensus problem area. Respondents urge increased bargaining activities and show dissensus with the organization's perception of itself as furnishing bargaining programs adequate to its present structural and legal capabilities. Relations between growers and processors is a second consensus problem area. Growers want to have more strength against processors in determining price bases, and tend to view their organization as ineffective in their relation- ships with them. Another consensus problem concerns commodity control and problems related to the voluntary nature of the organi- zation which render significant commodity control an impossibility. The organization's self-perception is of effectiveness to the extent of such limitations, while growers tend to blame low incomes on their staff,not on incomplete control of commodity. Donna Sweeny A significant finding applicable to all marketing associations pertains to the matter just mentioned--commodity control. A marketing association can be effective only as it exercises significant controls over the commodity. Although other factors are involved, when the association has a voluntary structure, an immediate limitation on organizational effectiveness is imposed. Over-all, the two studies showed high goal consensus between members and the formal organization, and a reasonable degree of role and normative consensus. Its members view their association as being a reasonably effective organiza- tion, limited by certain conditions difficult to alter, but moving toward a state of greater effectiveness with present plans for increased bargaining and related activities. Comparing findings against basic organizational principles bears out the above conclusions. The target organization has certain limitations imposed by structure and related problems, but is striving to handle such problem areas as capably as possible and exhibits a positive degree of organizational effectiveness. ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MICHIGAN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION By Donna Sweeny A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE College of Social Science 1971 Part INTRODUCTION TABLE OF CONTENTS I HISTORY, STRUCTURE AND GOALS OF M.A.C.M.A. II OVERVIEW OF BARGAINING ASSOCIATIONS, SOME PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THEM, AND SOME PARTICULAR PROBLEMS FACING M.A.C.M.A. III METHODS AND PRINCIPLES . . . . . . . . . . . . Section A. Section B. IV 1970 STUDY . Methods and Their Interpretation in the Study Principles and Their Interpretation in the Study . . . . . . . . . . . PERCEPTIONS GAINED THROUGH THE KEY INFORMANT AND CONSENSUS METHODOLOGY . Section A. Section B. Section C. Perceptions of M. A. C. M. A. Held by Growers . . . Perceptions of M. A. C. M. A. Held by Other Industry- Related Influentials Analysis and Conclusions . . . . V 1971 STUDY--PERCEPTIONS GAINED THROUGH A MAILING SURVEY . . . . . . . . Section A. Section B. VI ANALYSIS OF Section A. Section B. Section C. BIBLIOGRAPHY . APPENDICES . Quantitative Data and Perceptions from the Survey . . Perceptions Gained Through Informal Comments Accompanying the Survey RESULTS . Comparison of Results of 1970 and 1971 Studies . . Analysis of Principles of Organiza- tions as Applied to M. A. C. M. A. Final Conclusions . . . ii Page 21 21 25 33 33 38 47 S7 S7 85 96 96 106 115 120 121 Figure 1 2 10 11 12 13 14 15 LIST OF FIGURES M.A.C.M.A. organizational chart Organizational expectations of large growers Organizational expectations of small growers Percentages Growers) Percentages Growers) Percentages Growers) Percentages Growers) Percentages Growers) Percentages Growers) Percentages Growers) Percentages Growers) Percentages Growers) Percentages Growers) of response of response of response of response of response of response of response of response of response of response to Question to Question to Question to Question to Question to Question to Question to Question to Question to Question 1 8 Summation of consensus of problems of M.A.C.M.A. as viewed by growers--in descending order of importance (Cherry (Apple (Cherry (Apple (Cherry (Apple (Cherry (Appl (Cherry (Apple Deviance in goal, role and norm consensus between formal and informal organizations from M.A.C.M.A.'s inception to present time iii Page 51 S3 59 60 62 63 66 67 71 72 78 79 105 108 INTRODUCTION Organizational Study of M.A.C.M.A. The subject of the study is the Michigan Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Association. This organization, generally referred to as "M.A.C.M.A.," is an affiliate of the Michigan Farm Bureau and is established as a farmers' marketing-bargaining association. The purpose of the study is to take an in-depth look at the organization, using methodologies which discover how its members perceive it. It is an attempt to determine the extent to which it has accomplished a potential for survival and ultimate success in attaining its goals. Members' perceptions are analyzed in view of the sensitive areas in which bargaining associations, due to their nature, must operate. The focus of this study concerns the organizational effectiveness of two divisions of M.A.C.M.A. The specific purpose is to determine the organizational consensus problems as perceived by members and other closely-related individuals. Such determination includes areas of industry matters as well as those of goals, roles and norms. The over-all purpose is to compare members' perceptions with established principles of organizations in an attempt to evaluate the association's ultimate potential for success. 1 PART I HISTORY, STRUCTURE AND GOALS OF M.A.C.M.A. In the late 1950's a group of Michigan vegetable and fruit growers approached their local Farm Bureau leaders. They said that they were concerned over their lack of bargaining power with the large processing companies, and the resulting difficulties of realizing a reasonable return on their investments in their farms. They asked if Farm Bureau would look into the situation and attempt to help them. At that time there were no effective fruit bargaining associations except in the cherry industry to whom growers could turn for help. Cherry growers did not seek help from Farm Bureau until after the demise of the Great Lakes Cherry Bargaining Association. The Michigan Farm Bureau responsded with a preliminary investigation of the situation which ultimately resulted in the establishment of a board whose purpose was to thoroughly discover the situation and to determine if Farm Bureau might attempt direct aid to the growers. In brief, the board felt the complaints were justified and proceeded to initiate action. They contacted producers and processors to evaluate their views, and on the basis of their information, Farm Bureau subsequently acted as agent, to faciIitate the establishment of a bargining-marketing association. Growers agreed to pay a certain percentage of the gross sales value of their product, and/or (in the case of specified commodities) a flat membership fee. (Contracts vary with the commodity.) The Michigan Farm Bureau gave financial Sponsorship to M.A.C.M.A. from its inception in 1961. At a later time the Michigan Apple Committee also furnished some subsidization with the belief that a marketing-bargaining program in processing apples (backed by the stability and resources of Farm Bureau) could help to fulfill a known lack in bargaining power among apple growers. By the end of its first operating year, M.A.C.M.A. had programs in processing apples, pickling cucumbers and asparagus, with a membership of approximately 350 growers. (In 1970, M.A.C.M.A. carries programs in processing apples, asparagus, red tart cherries, grapes, "vegetable crops," "multi-fruits," feeder pigs, feeder cattle and an order— buyer program for out-of-state feeder cattle, with a total membership of approximately1850 members.) The processing apple membership is approximately 430, and the red tart cherry membership is approximately 800, at the present time, fall, 1971. Ordinarily, membership in M.A.C.M.A. is limited to Farm Bureau members. However, in specific instances non- members may be admitted to M.A.C.M.A. on an individual basis. Such action requires a determination by the State Farm Bureau board and the payment of a service fee beyond commodity fee requirements. The general guideline which was used to establish M.A.C.M.A. was an American Farm Bureau publication which stated, in part, . . . state marketing associations should be an affiliate of the State Farm Bureau with the necessary legal controls in its corporate structure to assure a continuing, iatisfactory relationship_with the Farm Bureau. (Under- linings are mine.) The necessary legal structure was formed and M.A.C.M.A. was incorporated as an affiliate of Michigan Farm Bureau in February of 1961. The organizational structure of M.A.C.M.A. includes a Board of Directors, composed of eleven members, of which at least six must be members of the Michigan Farm Bureau Board. These men are elected by the members. There is an Administrative Board which consists of the Farm Bureau president, the Farm Bureau Vice President, and the legal counsel of the Farm Bureau. A General Counsel and a Treasurer are also a part of the formal S tructure . 1"Fundamental Principles for the Corporate Structure and Operation of a State Marketing Association," American Farm Bureau (Chicago, 1960). At the Operating level, the General Manager runs the organization with the Division Managers and field men working directly under him. At the present time, M.A.C.M.A. maintains nine commodity divisions but does not use a separate field man for each division. Rather, one man covers more than one division, based on geographical areas. M.A.C.M.A. also uses the Farm Bureau research staff for their needs. In addition to the structure outlined above, each commodity division has an elected committee of grower- members which acts as a board of directors. Membership in these varies from five to fifteen members, depending on the extent of involvement in the particular areas. (See Figure l.) The description above of the close legal ties between the parent Farm Bureau and its affiliate, M.A.C.M.A., should be borne in mind. Later in the study it will be reported that certain M.A.C.M.A. members feel that Farm Bureau's "conservatism,” as they perceive it, acts as a limitation to the effectiveness of M.A.C.M.A. They go further and recommend that M.A.C.M.A. "break away" entirely from Farm Bureau. The information above shows that to dis- solve the connection with Farm Bureau would necessitate the formation of a completely new legal structure. It would include a beginning from zero point again, without the financial support and other intangible benefits which result from the present association with Farm Bureau. Figure l. M.A.C.M.A. organizational chart. General Counsel (Attorney) Treasurer C O M M O D I T Y M.A.C.M.A. Board of Directors ll eenbers Adainistrative Board Fara Bureau President and other ' Fara Bureau Officers 3 members General Field Manager _— Representatives D I V I S I O N S Asparagu. Division 'recessin' Apple Division P Division (Acting M (Acting “3 cf \ I Vegetable Crap Con-ittee (S Grape Division Con-ittee (12 Red Tart feeder Pig Hulti- Feeder Cherry Division Fruit Cattle Div1sion Division Division (Acting (Acting (Acting Feeder Cattle (S (in-state Feeder Cattle) Coeeittee L— Order- Buyer Division (Acting \ . . Order- Buyer Connittee (5 (Out of- state Feeder Cattle) Hence, this illustrates that there are advantages as well as disadvantages to the idea of beginning over again. M.A.C.M.A.'s stated purpose was to help farmers gain strength in bargaining with processors. Their intention was to accomplish this in several ways, but predominantly through: 1. establishment of bargaining-marketing programs pertaining to specific commodity areas, 2. a pertinent marketing information service, and 3. representing members with actual bargaining table confrontations with processors. The marketing information service has been organized in a manner which is kept as current, accurate and easily assessible to members as circumstances permit. This is accomplished through publication of a newsletter whenever need dictates (including daily publications in the stress of harvest), and through constant availability of staff to members by telephone. From its inception, M.A.C.M.A. has attempted, through its staff, as much actual bargaining as its members were willing to support. The voluntary nature of the organi- zation has been a serious drawback in M.A.C.M.A.'s bar- gaining efforts, but it has continued to be committed to bargaining activities. PART II OVERVIEW OF BARGAINING ASSOCIATIONS, SOME PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THEM, AND SOME PARTICULAR PROBLEMS FACING M.A.C.M.A. In order to understand the reasons for the formation of an organization such as M.A.C.M.A., and the types of problems incurred by bargaining associations, the follow- ing definitions of agricultural bargaining are included at this point. In discussing bargaining and bargaining power, Babb, Armstrong and Ward state that, Bargaining is an attempt by an individual or a group to enhance its position relative to those with whom it trades. Bargaining power refers to the ability of a person or grgup to gain advantage- ous prices or terms of trade. In an article entitled, "What is Bargaining," Daniel W. Sturt says, Bargaining power is the ability to influence the course of events--that is, influence others to accept one's terms. . . . Bargaining assumes: 2E. M. Babb, J. H. Armstrong and N. E. Ward, "Bar— gaining Power for Farmers," leaflet, published by Coopera- tive Extension Service, M.S.U. (East Lansing), no date. 10 l. A conflict of interests--recognized by Opposing forces; 2. A convergence of these forces which focus upon the interests of each party; and 3. A decision which determines the outcome or flow of consequences. Sturt ties this to bargaining as it related to farm prices and income by saying, . . . bargaining may be defined as the process by which the price-making forces converge and inter-act in order to establish the price and also the conditions whegeby titles to goods or services are exchanged. In a paper entitled "Fruit Bargaining,” Donald Ricks defines bargaining "in its broadest context" as including, . . . a wide variety of marketing activities which are undertaken by agricultural groups to influence the pricing and marketing of their products. To carry these definitions one step further, the following is another economist's definition of a bar- gaining association: . . [a bargaining association is] a combination of farm Operators, often organized along commodity lines, for purposes of negotiating farm prices. Such associations' activities are often synonymous with those of general farm interest organizations.5 3Daniel W. Sturt, "What is Bargaining," Background ibr Bargaining (Extension Bulletin 407, Cooperative Exten- siOn Service, M.S.U., Jan. 1965), p. 5. 4Donald Ricks, "Fruit Bargaining," from a talk given July 26, 1967, at Extension Summer School, Boyne Mountain. 5Randall B. Torgerson, Producer Power at the Bargain- in; Table (University of Missouri’Press, Cqumbia, Mo.), 11 If a general summation is possible from the above definitions, it would be that bargaining refers to attempts at a variety of activities by which prices and terms of trade are potentially affected in favor of those who bargain. The coming together to engage in these activi- ties constitutes the formation of a bargaining association, such as M.A.C.M.A. Bargaining associations have many problems to face. One is a consensus conflict which arises from a long tra- dition of personal independence on the part of American farmers. The mid-western farmer would, traditionally, sacrifice almost any principle before that of his right to act as an individual in making vital decisions concerning his life. It is difficult for him to surrender his inde- pendence of action even to increasing economic demands. However, he is pressed to consider this possibility when he faces continual low prices for his produce and the resulting low incomes. Joining a bargaining association may appear to provide a possible solution, even at the expense of his cherished independence. Sower, 33 31., in Community Involvement,6 discuss the rural American ethic of individualism. They say, Although the American philOSOphy has been a rather rudimentary one, it has been distinguished by one basic theme which has run constantly through the growth of the nation: the concept of individualism and the glorification of such 6Christopher Sower, et 31., Community Involvement, Free Press of Glencoe, 1957. U cnpw a on). . a.“ a.‘~ IA]- (1) ’. Nil 12 a belief. Jefferson's beliefs concerning the individualism of mankind were set in an environ— ment of a natural struggle. The belief in individualism accepted man as a free agent who is faced with a set of problems in his natural environment. The authors go on to discuss that although this "Jefferson- ian" ideal thoroughly permeated early American thought, another fact has been accepted by American society which seems to contradict the first. This is the idea of collec- tive controls. Regardless of the firm adherence to the belief in individualism, "collectives" have been a tradi- tional part of American society for some time. A major point to understand in this context, however, is the source of the collective controls. It has been a common belief that the least-desired, most threatening collective acts are those imposed by the federal government, while those of local origin which evolve from community-perceived need are least threatening. Thus, a local farmers' coopera- tive is tenable to those farmers who would traditionally reject federally-dictated marketing orders, for instance. As Sower, 33 31., point out, . . . it is seen that the American believes in both individualism and collectivism, Often when the two are not entirely consistent. Farmers and businessmen in particular talk extensively about the advantages of individualism, but either would be aghast if their government suddenly left them with a system which did not protect their individualism with7collective measures of protection or advantage. Ibid. 13 Another problem would appear to be the opposite side of the coin in considering joining a bargaining association to raise prices and income, however. This is the fact that non-members of a farmers' bargaining association are in a position to reap all the benefits of membership, without having to put forth any of the efforts or money which the members invest. If the individual farmer decides to join a bargaining association hoping to improve his over-all income he may find he is also improving the income of his non-member neighbors who will profit if his association is successful, while sacrificing none of their profit through fees to the organization. As the majority of bargaining associations are voluntary, the non-members (who can benefit with no personal financial or contractual commit- ment) can eventually render the association ineffective to the point of killing it entirely. A third major problem that bargaining associations face is that of controlling the supply. The extent to which a bargaining group can control supply is related to the size of its membership.8 When it can appear more profitable not to join and still reap the benefits, as was just dis- cussed, such groups seldom include a really major portion 8To give an idea of M.A.C.M.A.'s position in the apple and cherry industries in Michigan, the following figures may be of value: as stated on page 3, M.A.C.M.A. has approximately 430 apple division members and 900 cherry division members. According to the Michigan Apple Committee 14 of potential membership. Thus it follows that they also do not control a major portion of the supply. Such control techniques as postponing harvest or threatening non-harvest are extremely difficult to accomplish due to the high risk of crop loss, so--in all--lack of control of supply remains a serious problem. Although there are other industry-oriented problems which bargaining associations must face, the three dis- cussed above give the flavor of the factors farmers must consider when making a decision about joining such a group. It is easily understood that it usually requires a series of unusually poor-income years to bring about the formation of a new bargaining association. In addition to the problems just discussed, inherent in all bargaining associations, M.A.C.M.A. has a unique feature which compli- cates the total picture. This is the fact that it is an affiliate organization of the Michigan Farm Bureau. Be- cause the Farm Bureau, in the past, maintained a conservative, "grass roots" organizational outlook, it has served as a reassuring organization to those farmers who have also and the Michigan Association of Cherry Producers, respec- tively, the total commercial growers of apples in Michigan is about 1800 and of cherries, about 2800. These are approximate figures. According to the September, 1971 issue of "Fruit Situation," a quarterly report of the Economic Research Service of United States Department of Agriculture (T.F.S.-180), using over-all apple production figures in the United States for 1969, 1970 and indications for 1971, Michigan ranks third in the total picture. By the same report, Michigan is first in cherry production in the United States. 15 been conservative and have watched with some alarm the inroads of urban labor union action techniques in certain other farm organizations. So, while joining a bargaining association brings to the farmer a threat of losing personal independence (as well as the possibility of adding to his non-member neighbors' income) the threat may be somewhat alleviated by the bargaining group being sponsored by the Farm Bureau. To those farmers, however, who hold the older image of Farm Bureau as a conservative organization, such a relationship is perceived as a limitation. They feel it constitutes a drawback in meeting the needs of today's changed economic demands. As a consequence, M.A.C.M.A.'s organizational problems are made more complicated by its basic association with Farm Bureau. On the basis of preliminary research, M.A.C.M.A.'s major specific industry problems appear to involve a combination of several factors. These include the three basic bargaining association problems discussed earlier: the grower knows he needs higher prices and increased bar- gaining power if he is to realize greater over-all profit. Yet joining a bargaining group is threatening to his traditional sense of personal independence in decision- making. At the same time, he recognizes that if he joins, he is potentially supporting his non-member neighbors to the same higher incomes he hOpes to enjoy. He also knows that the history of bargaining associations has shown that 16 due to their voluntary nature it is very difficult to control enough of the supply of particular commodities to make bargaining attempts really effective. M.A.C.M.A. faces these and other more technical economic problems, plus certain problems inherent in its organizational ties to the parent Farm Bureau. The effect of these ties has been discussed with the suggestion that what con- stitutes reassurance for one farmer may be restrictive to another. A further problem concerns the fact that for the past several years both the cherry and apple crops have had atypical growing years. Although growing conditions in the two crops have been quite different from each other, both have fluctuated to such extremes in size, quality and resulting prices, as to make very unstable market conditions (and resulting incomes) for the growers. 17 The cherry industry responded to their supply problems by developing and enacting a Federal Marketing Order for their commodity. According to a paper by the Michigan State University, Department of Agricultural Economics, The primary purpose of the Marketing Order is to overcome the problems caused by widely fluctuating cherry supplies. It is also designed to reduce pricing uncertainties at harvest time. The Marketing Order is intended to: 3. Strengthen price-making conditions at harvest time by reducing guess work regarding crop size. b. Increase grower incomes, by raising prices in large crop years and providing more cherries to sell in short crOp years. c. Enable cherry users to increase demand by expanded merchandising programs and new product development. d. Provide favorable conditions for increased pro- motional efforts such as that of the National Red Cherry Institute.9 In simple summation, the Marketing Order is intended to establish a reasonable price base which should serve as a stabilizer to insure growers that although they probably won't get top prices for cherries they will have less threat of no profit at all through very low prices. The enactment of the Cherry Marketing Order has been of considerable aid to M.A.C.M.A. in coping with recent uddely-fluctuating cherry crOps, but they are feeling 9"The Federal Marketing Order for Tart Cherries, etc.,” (M.S.U. Dept. of Agricultural Economics, 1969) leaflet. w- n “531. :ian. U?! m 17‘ vi; :1 uIZ: ‘ .‘h “an T 11 a 18 great pressure from apple growers who are not able to command adequate price supports for their crops, due to an over abundance in recent years. M.A.C.M.A. members are looking to their organization for help. They are demanding "stronger marketing—bargaining" policies and actions, yet are not able to define what exact actions they want their organization to engage in to attempt to relieve the situa- tion. Another problem which M.A.C.M.A. faces includes what is suggested in the final sentence of the previous paragraph. This may be put into colloquial language as: M.A.C.M.A. becomes the scapegoat for many unfavorable economic condi- tions. In other words, as the reports of grower percep- tions of M.A.C.M.A. will indicate in this paper, members would like M.A.C.M.A. to solve all their marketing-economic problems, regardless of whether they are legally able to or not. Growers make highly unrealistic demands on their organization with apparent lack of awareness that these demands are often simply unattainable under present laws. It appears that M.A.C.M.A.'s staff recognizes these needs and demands and is making every effort to meet them, but is often literally unable to do so. At this point one disadvantage of a voluntary association becomes clear; growers whose demands are not met are prone to either (1) publicly criticize their organization for being "in- effective," or (2) to drop out. Both these actions have DA ab and. 0‘“ \ i‘uii R51 '5 ’1 (I! D ‘ “A .q 19 an obvious deleterious effect on the total progress of a young organization. An interesting aspect of this situation is that some who criticize M.A.C.M.A. as being ineffective tend to tie the ineffectiveness to its affiliation with Farm Bureau. In other words, they believe that the traditional conservative policies of Farm Bureau, as such, are detri- mental to the purposes of bargaining associations. (Examples of "traditional conservative policies" might include such as: (1) In the past, Farm Bureau officially encouraged the formation of bargaining associations, but immediately limited their potential by insisting their membership be on a voluntary basis. (2) Farm Bureau tra- ditionally held a strong aversion to any kind of assistance by the federal government, sometimes deeming it as "inter- ference," rather than assistance. (3) Farm Bureau has been traditionally highly critical of the action tactics of the labor unions, apparently perceiving of them as rather "ungentlemanly behavior.") This idea must be con- sidered, of course, but it would appear to have less merit in Michigan than in many other states, as the Michigan Farm Bureau is demonstrating itself to be deeply involved in up-dating kinds of changes. Regardless of past history and policies, today's Michigan Farm Bureau is perceived by informed peOple throughout the mid-west as being one of the most liberal 20 of state Farm Bureaus. So for growers to lay their organi- zational dissatisfactions at the door of Farm Bureau may be inappropriate in this situation. It might even be suggested that growers form a more solid organizational support for M.A.C.M.A. and use their critical energies in developing positive suggestions for change which are within the legal and organizational capabilities of their association. The reasons for studying M.A.C.M.A. involve a combina- tion of factors: 1. It is structured in a traditional manner which gives adequate exemplification of the basic principles of organizations, 2. it is made more interesting by containing the problems unique to bargaining associations, which were discussed earlier, and 3. the fact of M.A.C.M.A.'s relationship to Farm Bureau and the resulting influence on members and potential members. The combination of these conditions provided an intriguing subject for study. In order to limit the sc0pe of study only the Red Tart Cherry and Processing Apple divisions of M.A.C.M.A. were viewed. They appear to adequately typify the whole organization. PART III METHODS AND PRINCIPLES Section A. Methods and Their Interpretation in the Study Two methods of research were used to develOp the study. First the Key Informant and Consensus interviewing methodology, as a part of Sower's Normative Sponsorship Theory,10 and then a consensus-oriented mailing survey. To develop an understanding of the Key Informant and Consensus method it is helpful to review some of the literature on roles and consensus. In quoting from Kingsley Davis' Human Society, Neal Gross states that Davis infers he would agree that consensus on role expecta- tions is a "phenomenon of central importance to an under- standing of interaction situations." Davis' statement in this context is: . . . the interacting situation [is] the meeting ground of all sociological abstractions . . . [and] . . . the essence of any social situation lies in the mutual expectations of its participants. 10Christopher Sower, "The Normative Sponsorship Theory of Updating Organizations," Unpub. manuscript, M.S.U. (East Lansing, January, 1969). 21 22 It is through a chain of overt responses (either symbolic or literal) that the process of inter- change moves along, each act testing the various mutual expeifations and forcing a constant re- definition. In the same context, Gross refers to a discussion by Talcott Parsons in which Parsons suggested the consensus postulate when he defined a social system by the evaluative standards applicable to group members. He said, . . . a social system consists in a plurality Of individual actors interacting with each other in a situation which has at least a physical or environmental aspect, actors who are motivated in terms of a tendency to the "optimization of gratification," and whose relation to their situations, including each other, is defined and mediated in terms of a sysfsm of culturally- structured and shared symbols. The last section of that definition of a social system clearly refers to an acceptance of the concept of role consensus. Gross also quotes Norman Cameron who discussed role consensus saying a role is, . . a comprehensive and coherent organization in behavior of functionally related, interlocking attitudes and responses . . . a product of social learning which has been culgurally defined by the behavior of others . . . 11Neal Gross, Explorations in Role Analysis (New York, J. Wiley and Sons, 1958), Chapter 10, p. 164} 12Gross, Ibid., chapter 3, p. 39. 13Gross, Ibid., chapter 3, pp. 38-39. 23 Cross summarizes these and other definitions of role and role consensus by saying that the "postulate of consensus" is a basic part of the analysis of social behavior. He also states that, . . . during the past decade there has been an increasing tendency to consider role consensus an important variable for the study of individual social behavior, the functioning of social systems and cultural organization. That the members of a social system . . . must agree among themselves to some extent on values or expectations is a matter of definition. Gross emphasizes that the point is that until recently this vital variable of the degree of consensus on expectations associated with positions has remained untapped in its theoretical possibilities. It is during this same decade of time to which Gross made reference that Sower developed his Key Informant and 1 . Consensus methodology,"5 wh1ch was employed as a part of the methodology employed in this study. By this system not only the degree of consensus pertaining to roles and role expectations is assessed, but also that pertaining to goals and norms. A basic premise of Sower's theory is that of "dynamics at the end points." This refers to his concept that an organization is best studied from its lower echelon and 14Gross, Ibid., chapter 3, pp. 42-43. 1592. cit., Sower. 24 externally-related points first--where the action is-- with subsequently viewing of the areas which gradually approach the top administrative levels, where the organi- zational self-perceptions may be more clouded by policy statements and formal role perceptions. Using the Key Informant and Consensus methods, the researcher begins non-directive interviews with "end point" employees or members, prospective members, people in organizations which are involved with the organization under study. The non-directive interviewing technique does not employ a pre-determined list of queries. Rather, questions of a general nature about roles, goals and norms are asked in a way to encourage the respondent to freely express his views. As the interviews proceed up the hierarchy of positions within the organization, perceptions are checked from the lower levels to those higher in the scale. When inconsistencies are discovered this is noted as a possible area of dissensus or organizational pathology. The inter- viewer constantly searches for the nexus points of con- sensus concerning roles, role expectations and fulfillment, goals, norms and also the degree of consensus pertaining to the operation of the formal organization (its stated policies and activities) and the informal organization (its day-to-day normative structure and resulting activi- ties, etc.). ...1 file. 25 After a representative number of such interviews and observations are made, with a constant view toward the degree of consensus present relating particularly to roles, goals and norms and to the formal and informal structure, certain analyses and conclusions can be made concerning the total effectiveness and "state of health" of that social system. Section B. Principles and Their Interpretation in the Study Any specific methodology is valid only as it is re- inforced by a broad base of knowledge of principles which an understanding of extant literature in the selected research area provides the researcher. In this context the following are offered as the principles of Organiza- tional Sociology which were used as a general guide in the research: 1. An organization is a social system which is effective to the degree that its members share like perceptions concerning its goals, roles and norms, and affect these perceptions in the daily life of that organization. 2. Every formal organization contains certain informal organizations which constitute the arena from which actual leadership and decision- making evolves, and which must be seen and understood to understand the total organization. 3. Organizations contain certain prescriptions for positions, positions incumbents, and the expected behavior of these areas, as seen by the incumbents and other members of the organizations. 1'1 ,- Vt 26 4. The normative behavior within an organization is a major determinant of goal and role expecta- tions. 5. The inputs of an organization should be justified by its outputs, in terms of tangibles (outlay of funds, amount of staff, etc.) and intangibles (expenditures of energy, inter and intra group relations, etc.). 6. The "state of health" of an organization can be determined by gauging the amount of consensus concerning the goals, roles and norms, as viewed in both the formal and informal (or natural) social structures of the organization. 7. Innovation (to update the organization)will almost always require an external force for its design as well as its initiation. (The exception to this can occasionally be use of a member of the organization whose position is "non-threatening" in the perceptions of both his superiors and his peers.) Of the seven main principles enumerated above, the second (which refers to the necessity of discovering the informal organization and understanding its functions in relation to the formal organizational structure) and the sixth (which refers to discovering the organizations' normative structure and determining consensus through that structure) were the two which furnished the most help in the study. As a means of better understanding M.A.C.M.A., a survey of the literature was conducted in relation to Itheories concerning organizational structure and about goals in particular. The references which follow are those which seemed most pertinent and valuable to the present study. “:1 I 27 Georgopoulus and Tannenbaum, in "A Study of Organiza- tional Effectiveness,"16 reflect that the most general and most important objectives of organizations are: l. a high output in achieving the end results of the purpose of the organization 2. the ability to absorb and assimilate relevant endogenous and exogenous changes (keeping up with the times without jeopardizing their integrity) 3. preservation of organizational resources, the human and material facilities. They feel that "organizational effectiveness" is defined as the extent to which an organization (as a social system), given certain resources and means, fulfills its means and resources without placing undue strain upon its members. The acceptance of their concept of "effectiveness" subsumes the acceptance also of the following criteria: 1. organizational productivity 2. organizational flexibility in the form of a successful adjustment to internal organizational changes, and the successful adaptation to externally- induced change 3. the absence of intra-organizational strain or tension, and of conflict between organizational subgroups. The first of Georgopoulus and Tannenbaum's criteria relates to movement of the organization toward its goals, 16Basil S. Georgopoulus and Arnold S. Tannenbaum, "A Study of Organizational Effectiveness," AmeriCan Socio- logical Review (Vol. 22, pp. 534-40), 1957. 28 while the others relate to requirements of the organiza— tions' survival in the face of external pressures and strains. The only area that is possibly questionable here is hgw_the organization fulfills its organizational effective- ness. It is important that the existing balance of inter- organizational harmony is not seriously affected by their (1) high output, (2) ability to absorb change, and (3) preservation of resources, etc. Georgopoulus and Tannen- baum seem to imply the need for such balance, but it could be stated in more overt and positive terms. If such bal- ance of harmony (between the human and material components) is not maintained the organization could easily become "effective" at the risk of crumbling its total structure, in which case there would result a "win the battle, but lose the war" situation. In "The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations,"17 Charles Perrow discusses "official" and "Operative" goals. He designates "official" goals as public statments by key executives, and other kinds of "authoritative pronounce- ments." Perrow states that official goals are purposely vague and general, and do not indicate the two major 17Charles Perrow, "The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations," in Amatai Etzioni, editor, Readings on Modern OrganizatIOns, pp. 65-79. 29 factors which influence organizational behavior: the host of decisions which must be made among alternative ways of achieving the Official goals, and the many unofficial goals which are pursued by groups within an organization. The "operative" goals Perrow discusses cover the final two aspects mentioned above which are not covered by official goals. That is, ends sought through actual operating policies of organizations: they tell what the organization is actually trying to do, regardless of what the official goals may state as their aims. Operative goals may be justified on the basis of an official goal, even though they may subvert another official goal. The "means" become ends in themselves when the organization is the object of analysis. These are tied more directly to group interests (within the organization) and whether or not they support the Official goals, they bear no necessary connection with them. Perrow wisely warns his readers that the discernment of the operative goals is difficult, and subject to error. It is obvious that in defining official and Operative goals, Perrow is discussing the same kinds of organiza- 18 tional phenomena which Sower refers to in his discussions of the need to find goal consensus between the formal and 18Sower, pp, cit. 30 informal (or natural social) organizations. Perrow's "official" in contrast to "operative" goals are clearly found in Sower's "formal" structure in contrast to the "informal" structure. Both theorists are expressing con- cern for the need of the organizational analyst to recog- nize the difference between what is said to be and what really is, in terms of organizational structuring and 19 functioning. Georgopoulus and Tannenbaum refer to the same area of potential dissonance when they discuss criteria for organizational effectiveness, and include a criterion dealing with the ability to make "successful adjustment" to internally or externally induced changes without reflecting tension or conflict within the "organizational subgroups"-- again, the "operative" or "informal" units within the organization. It seems clear that the recognition of the existence 0f informal units of thought, action, behavior, etc., within the greater structure of an organization, and . . . more importantly . . . the acceptance of the importance of these informal units in the life of the total organization, ref1e<:ts wisdom and a healthy organizational viewpoint on the part of the four sociologists discussed above. It 15 a <1ecisive step away from the impersonal limitations \ 19GeorgOpoulus and Tannenbaum, op. cit. G L Vi 31 of the traditional bureaucratic structure as it was origin- ally conceived. In "Beyond Bureaucracy," Warren Bennis quotes Max Weber, who developed the principally-accepted theory of bureaucracy, when, eventually, Weber despaired of the "limiting propensities" of his theory, saying, It is as if in politics . . . we were deliberately to become men who need "order" and nothing but order, who become nervous and cowardly if for one moment this order wavers, and helpless if they are torn away from their total incorporation in it . . . . It is such an evolution that we are already caught up in, and the great question is therefore not how we can promote and hasten it, but what can we Oppose to this machinery in order to keep a portion of mankind free from this par- celling—out of the soul, from th§3 supreme mastery of the bureaucratic way of life. It would appear that the recognition and inclusion of informal subgroups and their normative belief systems is one thing that opposes the machinery of formal bureaucracy. Thus such groups and their roles, goals and norms were a Vital concern in this study. One more reference is included from the literature Which served as a guide by way of methodology. This is a contribution by John Ladd, in The Structure of a Moral 3’93- 21 Ladd lists six areas of information to search for ill studying an organization: \ Izowarren Bennis, "Beyond Bureaucracy," Trans-Action, 1959. Vol. 2, pp. 31-35. 21John Ladd, The Structure of a Moral Code (Cambridge, MaSS-, Harvard University Press, 1957). 32 1. What are the prescriptions of expected behavior? 2. Who makes these prescriptions? 3. To what extent is there consensus about these prescriptions? 4. Who enforces them? 5. What are the rewards for compliance? 6. What are the punishments for deviance? These questions were kept in mind as the identity of the Key Informants was established, as the interviewing progressed, and as the search for the degree of inter-organizational consensus was undertaken. (J 'D :1) r l 165. PART IV 1970 STUDY . . . PERCEPTIONS GAINED THROUGH THE KEY INFORMANT AND CONSENSUS METHODOLOGY Section A. Perceptions of M.A.C.M.A. Held by Growers22 Early in the study it was stated that only the Pro- cessing Apple and Red Tart Cherry divisions of M.A.C.M.A. were studied. Whenever the name "M.A.C.M.A." is used in reporting perceptions and in subsequent analysis and conclusions, it refers only to those two divisions of the total organization. The interviews reported in this section (using the Key Informant and Consensus methodology) included talking with approximately thirty growers (of both apples and cherries), as well as four processors, an American Farm Bureau official, staff personnel from the Michigan Farm Bureau, M.A.C.M.A., the Michigan Association of Cherry 22As was mentioned earlier in this study, the per- ceptions of M.A.C.M.A. as included in this section and the following one are presented simply as "perceptions" with no value judgements placed on them. At a later place, these perceptions will be analyzed and the misinformation and invalidity which are included and presently give quite negative impressions of the organization will be brought out and clarified. 33 34 Producers, the Michigan Apple Committee and Michigan State University's Departments of Horticulture and of Agricultural Economics. Growers interviewed were those recommended by key industry officials as having wide know- ledge and experience and a broad view of the total problems of the fruit industry as well as firsthand knowledge of M.A.C.M.A. They included those perceived by industry officials and M.S.U. staff as being pro-M.A.C.M.A. and those perceived as con-M.A.C.M.A. The most repeated comment about M.A.C.M.A. expressed by key informant growers in 1970 was that although M.A.C.M.A. provides an excellent market information service, it does not sufficiently serve grower-members in programs of actual bargaining. This is an area of normative dissensus, in that M.A.C.M.A. staff perceive of themselves as furnishing at least limited bargaining to the degree to which their members will back them. Many growers felt that augmented bargaining activities, with the necessary aggressive be- havior which must accompany them, are needed in M.A.C.M.A. The "key informant" growers who have extensive industry sophistication perceive of the organizational conflicts facing M.A.C.M.A. as due to its voluntary membership and ties with the conservative parent organization. Although nearly all are long-term members of Farm Bureau, their perceptions apparently are that structural changes away from Farm Bureau may be imminent. Although many of these 35 men are policy makers on Farm Bureau Board and/or commit- tees, the possible need for basic change did not appear to alarm them. When these so-called ”militant" views (a term used by an American Farm Bureau official to describe them) advocating change first came to my attention, the tendency was to discount them as extreme, in that they came only from the informal organization, with no recognition at all of their existence by the formal organization. But when it was expressed by the American Farm Bureau official mentioned above, it obviously demanded serious considera- tion. In checking it out with industry resource people, it was apparent that they all were aware of these strong voices for change, and did not dismiss them as unimportant. In effect, these "militant" growers, by the older, tra- ditional Farm Bureau standards, advocated in 1970 a Wagner Act for agriculture. (By 1971, Farm Bureau is deeply involved in this kind of legislation in Congress. See page 117.) Indications in 1970, point to a "closed shop" demand in which membership in M.A.C.M.A. would be mandatory to all growers of M.A.C.M.A.-program commodities when the voluntary membership reaches a significant proportion which would need to include a minimum of 60% to 70% of total growers, although even more would probably be necessary for real effectiveness. This would be followed by a legisla- tive referendum to legally make M.A.C.M.A. the sole bar- gaining agent with mandatory control over a clear majority of total tonnage. This would seem to be the direction 36 certain growers are thinking toward, and--if indications are correct--will demand great changes in both phiIOSOphy and policy in M.A.C.M.A. At the time of this study, early 1970, the manner in which M.A.C.M.A. would respond to this situation was a vital determining factor for its future success or failure. Since that time, as was mentioned, Farm Bureau has involved itself with the Sisk Bill and other bargaining efforts. Another dominant perception of M.A.C.M.A. relates to grower-processor relations, and M.A.C.M.A.'s role in them, whether or not with validity, many growers view the pro- cessors as a major contributor to their industry problems. In relation to M.A.C.M.A., the key informant growers want their organization to exert greater control in bargaining over processors, although they do not have clear-cut suggestions to effect this. They perceive of M.A.C.M.A. as "backing down" to processors at the bargaining table. They feel that their own position in terms of the processors needs strengthening and that they definitely need stronger bargaining support from M.A.C.M.A. in order to effect that strength. Many of these growers realize that the general membership does not give adequate support on bargaining attempts by M.A.C.M.A., while others place the blame for failure with processors fully on M.A.C.M.A.'s staff. In reality, M.A.C.M.A. appears seriously limited in bargaining by lack of a sufficient number of members, by lack of solid support from its present membership and--more crucially ref 37 perhaps-~by the restrictions of current federal bargaining laws. The growers interviewed were aware that M.A.C.M.A. is unable to limit its benefits to members. (The problem of non-members "riding along," as discussed in an earlier section.) They express concern over this situation, although there is no consensus of positive suggestions for change. Key Informants spoke positively of M.A.C.M.A.'s efforts concerning the recently-passed Federal Marketing Order for Red Tart Cherries. M.A.C.M.A.'s active support of the Marketing Order is highly regarded in itself, and as an indicator of future trends in M.A.C.M.A. The growers whose perceptions were gathered by the Key Informant method are perceived as industry-influentials by their peers and who are thus in positions to hear many reflections of industry problems from other growers. As such, they realize the ease with which less-knowledgeable members can blame M.A.C.M.A. for everything less than per- fection concerning industry matters. However, in their view, as a further area of perceptions, M.A.C.M.A.'s staff is aware of and concerned about grower needs, tries earnestly to meet industry problems and cannot be blamed for effects of repeated long crop years, as that is in the province of "God and the elements." q 5 F “an 38 In general, these informants feel that M.A.C.M.A. should be more aggressive, should face the possibility of some future separation from Farm Bureau, but that it justifies its existence at this point in time, if the future goes toward the above two suggested areas. Section B. Perceptions of M.A.C.M.A. Held by Other Industry- ReIatediInfluenfials. The literature on organizational behavior makes a clear point that dedication to the roles, goals and norms of the organization by its staff is a good indicator of the health of the organization. In nearly every area of my concern with M.A.C.M.A., its staff emerges as very dedicated to its stated raison d'etre, and carries out that dedication in its daily functioning. (This is expected behavior for a Farm Bureau organization. Both staff and members of Farm Bureau organizations have traditionally been highly loyal and dedicated. This has served to offset some of the disadvantages inherent in voluntary organiza- tions of this type.) Industry influentials voice lack of marketing- bargaining aggression as their strongest criticism of M.A.C.M.A. They recognize, however, that the staff is not backed by its members, and they realize that M.A.C.M.A. has no real assurance that growers would even support the changes they are voicing (which have been discussed), if came to a test. But still they feel that M.A.C.M.A. 39 must take the risk and initiate reinforced bargaining programs. Some industry people view M.A.C.M.A.'s affiliation with Farm Bureau as a limitation, believing that Farm Bureau represents a conservatism which is detrimental to the purposes of a bargaining association. Others see the relationship with Farm Bureau as an advantage, in that it furnishes solid financial and moral support to M.A.C.M.A. Generally, it is felt that Farm Bureau in Michigan has shown the ability to change in recent years. If such change were to continue, M.A.C.M.A. could reap the benefits of its support without incurring the effects of its perceived 'tonservatismg'as any form of organizational conservatism is in Opposition to the nature of a bargaining association. Another area of concern to industry influentials is M.A.C.M.A.'s lack of control of growers, commodities and processors. The key informants interviewed sense that M.A.C.M.A. needs to work toward tighter control of its members. Some suggest enforcement of the sales agent section of their M.A.C.M.A. contracts, which sets a penalty on growers who do not comply with M.A.CM.A.'s directives. This, in turn, would give a tighter control of the commodity. Once M.A.C.M.A. has greater control of the commodity they will be in a position of strength from which to bargain with the processors. Until M.A.C.M.A. can facilitate this, they will be perceived by some as 40 Operating from a position of weakness. This is a very naive view on many counts. A major reason is that M.A.C.M.A. is a voluntary organization by its legal structure. An attempt at the action suggested above would immediately lose them many members and thereby "weaken their position" even more. Industry influentials reflect an awareness of an area of dissensus in the normative structure of M.A.C.M.A.: This refers to the high incidence of factionalism between growers, and of M.A.C.M.A.'s apparent lack of action to- ward alleviating the situation. This factionalism is a geographical problem, found particularly among cherry growers. The two main cherry growing areas (northwest and southwest Michigan) have long been at odds with each other. Many people consider this simply a "local clan" type of attitude and give it no importance. They admit that it may be disturbing, but not serious. However, with the seriousness of present fruit industry problems, any degree of factionalism takes on a more important aspect. As long as these deep-seated, often virulent antipathies,(which pit one growing area against another), continue to exist, consensus in norms, roles and goals which is vital to an effective organization will never be achieved. Key infor- mants with a total-industry view feel that this is an area in which M.A.C.M.A. should try to exert a positive and cohesive influence in bringing the two areas to an awareness h’hiC] ate ‘ role {TL a1 41 of mutual concerns and the benefits of cooperation. How- ever, the criticism is 1eveled,(whether or not with any validityL that M.A.C.M.A. avoids entering these internal, disruptive conflicts simply by ignoring them, as far as public policy is concerned. While this may be protective wisdom for the organization, if indeed M.A.C.M.A. does avoid the conflicts, it is also avoidance of a role which M.A.C.M.A. could legitimately assume. If M.A.C.M.A. could offer methods or alternatives of structure or behavior which would affect cherry growers, it would help to allevi- ate the situation, and also make M.A.C.M.A.'s own total role easier to accomplish, thus offering two-fold rewards. In discussing the effectiveness of M.A.C.M.A., one industry association official stated that he felt it "should have better control of both the grower and the commodity," although he had few positive suggestions for producing this change. Another said M.A.C.M.A. was as "good as Farm Bureau would let it be," and another said M.A.C.M.A. should "get the Farm Bureau off its back and do what is right." These industry influentials believe that the informal organization within M.A.C.M.A. is well aware of what they feel are "limitations" imposed on M.A.C.M.A. by Farm Bureau philoSOphy, but that--because of the official relationship between the two organizations-- the formal organization of M.A.C.M.A. must minimize or rationalize the suggested limitations. 42 In looking at the nature of the relationship between M.A.C.M.A. and its sub-units, and of M.A.C.M.A.'s own position as a sub-unit in the greater Farm Bureau struc- ture, one informant referred to the now-defunct Great Lakes Cherry Bargaining Association for a comparison of organizations. This bargaining association was considered by many peOple in Michigan's fruit industry as having been a very strong, effective association. Although others do not agree, many of these informants did hold that perception. The main structural difference between that group and M.A.C.M.A. is that while the Great Lakes Cherry Bargaining Association was a single commodity organization, M.A.C.M.A. is a multi-commodity organization. Being multi-commodity oriented has both advantages and disadvantages. The positive aspects are its ability to hire a large staff, including research people, and in being able to borrow staff back and forth between the various commodity areas to serve specific needs. However, a disadvantage is that this borrowing can sometimes interrupt one specialist's work to put him in another area, and thus lessen his value to his original work. Where the Great Lakes Cherry Bar- gaining Association concentrated all its efforts, staff, finance, etc., on one particular effort at a time, the .structure of M.A.C.M.A. necessitates a diversification C f efforts, staff and finance with the concomitant 3% : $ an' 5“ b 43 possibility of simultaneous success in some areas and failure in others. As M.A.C.M.A. continues to expand into diverse areas, this possibility will increase. Another disadvantage to the practice of switching staff members from one commodity to another is in the area of inter-personal relationships. One informant who has been close to M.A.C.M.A. since its inception has observed the following situation concerning the switching of staff: when a grower has had a strong disagreement with a staff member about pricing, when to sell, where to sell, etc., and the same staff member comes to make decisions about a different commodity for that grower, the earlier resentments may color the grower's thinking until he resents or even rejects the advice or decisions of that staff member. This has caused growers to influence others against a particular field man or researcher. Such inter-group contest would certainly cause organizational dissensus that could damage M.A.C.M.A. Before reporting perceptions of industry influen- tials regarding M.A.C.M.A.'s relationships with sub-units and the related cluster organizations, it is necessary to explain these relationships. The sub-unit structure of M.A.C.M.A. goes from the local area to county level, dependent upon the particular commodity involved, to the .state level of M.A.C.M.A. itself. It has extensive rela- txionships with independent bargaining groups, farmer 44 cooperatives, grower-processors, processors, representa- tives of large buying organizations, farm insurance groups (primarily Farm Bureau Insurance, but not limited to that) and companies who sell growers such things as farm equip- ment, sprays, etc. M.A.C.M.A. has a particularly intensive "cluster of organizations" around it, due both to its relationship to the multi-faceted parent Farm Bureau, and to its own multi-commodity structure. In the larger view, an informant stressed that M.A.C.M.A.'s relationship to Farm Bureau, as a sub-unit, is vital. As a sub-unit (affiliate) of the Michigan Farm Bureau, M.A.C.M.A. automatically has a close relationship with the American Farm Bureau Federation, with the American Agricultural Marketing Association, with the other state Farm Bureaus, and with the other state marketing-bargaining associations also affiliated with Farm Bureau organizations. It must not be forgotten that no matter how strongly M.A.C.M.A. might wish to push ahead into grower-demanded areas, they still must clear vital policies through the Michigan Farm Bureau, through American Agricultural Market- ing Association, and--ultimately—-through the American Farm Bureau Federation. After this, M.A.C.M.A. must rely on A.A.M.A., as concerns bargaining efforts, to do the job in other states, where policies are effective only on a Inulti-state or particular commodity growing area. In 45 that the A.A.M.A. and A.F.B.F. share the same headquarters in Chicago, A.A.M.A. is necessarily very closely allied to official A.F.B.F. views and actions. This inter-relatedness is necessary to understand in any attempt to gauge M.A.C. M.A.'s potential for independent action. In viewing M.A.C.M.A.'s over-all importance to Michigan's fruit industry, an informant close to the cherry industry made reference to the abandonment of the Great Lakes Cherry Bargaining Association. He said that the loss of this organization was keenly felt in the industry and that the formation of M.A.C.M.A. helped to fill the need which Great Lakes Cherry Bargaining Associa- tion had met. Although the recent reorganization of the Michigan Cherry Commission, the Michigan Association of Cherry Producers and the National Red Tart Cherry Institute under one management has been a valuable step toward industry cohesion and efficiency, it does not fill growers' needs for a bargaining association. This informant feels that although M.A.C.M.A. is working basically in the marketing area at this time, it has great potential for a successful bargaining organization, if it moves in the direction of increased bargaining. With strong leadership and (he emphasized this as important) an adjusted salary schedule that could attract really top staff people, BILA.C.M.A.--by his view--could be a "top notch contributor tCJ the cherry industry." 46 Due to the more complex demands of the processing apple industry, M.A.C.M.A. has had more Obvious successes in their cherry program, by my informants' views. However, at this time M.A.C.M.A.'s efforts in meeting the needs of the apple industry are being accelerated. One major limita- tion to M.A.C.M.A.'s effectiveness, by one informant's view, is that some of the processors and user firms are head- quartered in other states, and so make their decisions out of Michigan. Thus, any decision-making abilities of M.A.C.M.A. are necessarily limited from the start. All informants reserve judgement on the over-all effectiveness of M.A.C.M.A. in the apple industry because of the series of abnormal growing years recently experienced. The crOps have been so unusually big that there has been a very poor market--a fact which M.A.C.M.A. cannot change. In spite of these limitations, M.A.C.M.A. claims it has successfully raised apple prices over-all by 22¢ per bushel, in certain years of their operations. There is substantial evidence to support this claim. This is a figure which amounts to between 1.5 and 2.0 million dollars in the state, certainly a worthwhile accomplishment. (Major credit is given M.A.C.M.A. for gains of 4.0 million dollars in the cherry industry in certain recent years, and this is only the third year of their cherry program.) 47 Section C. Analysis and ConclusiOns In reviewing material from the interviews in 1970, it is interesting to note that the three men of greatest knowledge of the cherry and apple industries whom I inter- viewed all stated that they felt that any official recog- nition and action by M.A.C.M.A. of the so-called "mili- tant" growers' demands for harder, more extensive bargain- ing programs would not soon occur. They all concurred that it would take "a great deal of adversity, in the form of successive short years," as one man said, to cause sufficient pressure for M.A.C.M.A. to react. One informant felt that a marketing order in apples may be imminent, but not before at least two years have passed with continued long crops and resulting grower dissatis- faction. In view of information gained a year later, these Opinions are interesting to review. Poor industry condi- tions are forcing the idea forward sooner than the experts could have anticipated. Growers viewed as "militant" a year ago, represent the typical view at this time, as the 1971 study will show. The question of role-goal consensus in M.A.C.M.A. was not perCeived as quite the same by my different in- dustry infOrmants. There was general agreement that M.A.C.M.A. evidences consensus in the area of organizational goals, but little agreement concerning roles and norms. Some informants see M.A.C.M.A. in conflict with itself 48 in the areas of roles and norms. They account for this by an awareness of conflict in ideology with Farm Bureau and in terms of recognition of grower demands for action in bargaining programs. Others who see reasons for dissensus (for the same reasons just mentioned) feel that this disquieting evidence is kept so invisible that it does not actually cause any dissensus. There seems to be little internal conflict within the informal organization of M.A.C.M.A., or in their relations with cluster organizations around M.A.C.M.A. "Boundary maintenance," or protection of one's own interests, seems very limited. Indeed, closely related organizations seem to display this sort of "territorialism" toward M.A.C.M.A., rather than the reverse. There is one situation in the informal organization which causes some degree of conflict with small-quantity growers. In the state apple and cherry commissions there are board members who are also M.A.C.M.A. members. These men are large growers and have a great deal of industry influence. One very know- ledgeable informant discussed this situation saying that these committees are composed of growers from the different areas, all having equal (official) voice in decision- making. However, in the informal organizational structure, four or five influentials will get together and agree on a policy or decision under discussion, and the final decision will come in direct relation to their desires, with the smaller growers actually having had little 49 influence. When these influential committeemen are ardent M.A.C.M.A. supporters, inevitably their decisions will be advantageous to M.A.C.M.A. My informant was in no way suggesting unethical collusion, but simply illustrating an example of how the informal organizational structure works, and how it influences the normative structure of the total organization. (See Figures 2 and 3.) In an objective view of the apple and cherry programs of M.A.C.M.A., certain things are obvious. This young organization, working in so sensitive an arena, has four intrinsic and disparate areas of difficulty to deal with: (1) it is a voluntary organization, and thus cannot have a controlled membership which would give it many advan- tages in the bargaining arena; (2) it must work around uncontrollable facts of weather and climate conditions; (3) it has a membership which is traditionally prone to factionalism and resistive to unifying attempts; (4) it has certain limitations of policy and philOSOphy as an affiliate of a traditionally conservative parent organi- zation. Of the four areas, difficult though they may be to deal with, I believe only the second one (weather-growing conditions) is impossible to cope with--at least at this point in the development of human knowledge. As regards the first area, its voluntary nature, I believe it is possible that M.A.C.M.A. may, at some future point, cease 50 .mpozopm omuwa mo macawmuoomxo Hmeowumnflcmmuo .N opswfim 51 pmuawwo ho noose: moou amuoq powwow: no coczo unmam cemmououd -pozopo twosome MO dense: :ofiu -mnwcmwuo xaoccmu Hoseaumz H posse: <2<< HOOmeo no dense: :ofiu -mNficmmuo xufipoesou HmcoHumz twosome ho posse: COMO -m~w:mmuo xuwposeou cmmuzou: poouuoo HO posse: :OMu -mnwcmwuo xpwpoesou Hchwmom .* popuueo HO conEoz venom wummocv posses. '-H O 4 ,3 8 E u 3 o no 4. :3 2 W t, I; IL ‘ 01‘ \ ,‘ \ —‘ ‘ 1F'-F-'1'-'€ 1961 19 l Inception of M.A.C.M.A. Present Figure 15. Deviance in goal, role and norm consensus between formal and informal organizations from M.A.C.M.A.'s inception to present time. 110 M.A.C.M.A. members (with the minimum influence of one vote, in that capacity) but who are also members of other organi- zations within the fruit industry that often extends their influence through every local, state, regional and national organization. Thus, in fact, these large growers exercise extensive overall influence in industry matters. Here is E: where M.A.C.M.A.'s "informal organization" exists, in large part, and it is easily seen that it is a very powerful informal organization. One thing that is evident, in ': 2,..ka l- ,1 as " dealing with such an influential organization, is that large growers do not npgn M.A.C.M.A., ultimately. If M.A.C.M.A. does not live up to their expectations and meet their needs, with the state and national associations and influence that they have, they can easily go on without M.A.C.M.A. They would like to see M.A.C.M.A. succeed, they believe in the Farm Bureau concept, and they have a certain faith in M.A.C.M.A. But they do not nppn_M.A.C.M.A. in the way of the small growers who have no industry influence. With these facts in mind, I would postulate that this particular informal organization does not exert as much normative decision-making influence on an inter-organizational basis as would be expected in most industry situations. The people who constitute the informal decision-making cadre certainly exercise considerable decision-making abilities, but it is on an intra-organizational (cluster of organiza- tions) level, rather than exclusively on an inter- organizational level. 111 The third organizational principle listed early in the study is demonstrated very clearly here, also. It states, Organizations contain certain prescriptions for positions, "position incumbents," and the expected behavior of these areas, as seen by the incumbents and other members of the organizations. A year ago, it was apparent to one outside the organization that there was not consensus within the organization in terms of prescriptions for behaviors of certain positions. Staff were behaving as they believed they were expected to, but not as many members actually perceived them as needing to behave. As industry pressures on growers became greater and with a vehicle for expression of dissensus, available to them, such as this organizational research, they have made M.A.C.M.A. staff increasingly aware of the needs for change they are expressing. M.A.C.M.A. staff is attempting to respond, thus putting the overall normative structure in far better alignment than in 1970. This result demonstrates the fourth principle stated early in this study: The normative behavior within an organization is a major determinant of goal and role expecta- tions. There appeared to be high goal consensus and a reasonable role consensus from the beginning of the study of this organization. However, there was little normative con- sensus between the units and sub-units and between formal 112 and informal organizations. This lack of normative con- sensus, particularly between formal and informal organi- zations colored the role expectations and caused oblique role dissensus. The fifth organizational principle listed as guiding this research stated that, The inputs of an organization should be justified by its outputs, in terms of tangibles (outlay of funds, amount of staff, etc.) and intangibles (expenditures of energy, inter and intra group relations, etc.). J The dominant perception concerning this matter, as gained through all the research on M.A.C.M.A., is that most of the staff expend far more energy than is justified by the outlay of funds. The salary structure of Farm Bureau is not commensurate with the amount of energy which these particular staff members willingly expend. The Key Informant interviews and the abundant commentary accompany- ing the surveys amply illustrate that grower-members of M.A.C.M.A., as well as associated industry influentials, are well aware that (1) present efficient, hard-working staff members should be remunerated at a level more com- mensurate with their work and ability levels, and (2) that other staff of high ability must be hired, to increase M.A.C.M.A.'s efficiency, but will be Obtained only by offering high salaries. This is another illustration of an area where Farm Bureau may well be a limitation to M.A.C.M.A. In line with traditional, conservative policies 113 Farm Bureau has a conservative salary structure, and this extends to its affiliate organizations. There is dissensus evident regarding this area of outputs versus inputs. Many grower-members feel strongly that M.A.C.M.A. must offer high salaries in order to attract, as well as hold, the highest caliber professional staff. However, staff members FE themselves perceive members as ”only talking," and not having given any evidence of willingness to back their own statements by necessary changes in policies in Farm I Bureau which would result in higher salaries. More re- search would be necessary in this specific area, in order to clarify the issue. As a side issue regarding organizational inputs justifying outputs, the over-expenditure of energy by staff discussed above is an interesting phenomena. Certainly motivation is a major contributing factor in such energy expenditures. However, Farm Bureau has long been viewed by many people as an organization which tends to engender a high level of dedication in its staff. Whether or not such outlays of intangibles are actually justified by organizational inputs, 114 however, is a complex and difficult matter to assess. In terms of individual human worth, it would seem that they are not. But the system continues to perpetuate itself with apparent success, so this may be the exception to the rule. The sixth ppinciple was one of the major guiding forces in the determination of the purpose of this research. It states: The "state of health" of an organization can be determined by gauging the amount of consensus concerning the goals, roles and norms, as viewed in both the formal and informal structures of the organization. The demonstration of this principle has been included, informally, in every section of analysis in this study. In simple summation, M.A.C.M.A. is at present attaining a higher "state of health" than it enjoyed in 1970, at the beginning of this research. This is due to a greater present consensus in areas of goals, roles and norms, as reflected both within and between the formal and informal organizations. The previous statement leads to discussion of the seventh principle listed early in this paper. A major 25 tenet of C. Sower's Normative Sponsorship Theory is that 25Sower, pp, cit. 115 which is referred to in the name of the theory--"normative sponsorship.” The principle was stated thus: Innovation (to update) will almost always require an external force for its design as well as its initiation. (The exception to this can occasionally be the use of a member of the organi- zation whose position is "non-threatening" in the perceptions of both his superiors and his peers.) Acceptance by M.A.C.M.A. of the results of this research, which indicates the normative compliance involved, and action on the innovations suggested through the analysis, was evidenced by this researcher's invitation to address the Apple Committee, by the invitation to address the M.A.C.M.A. Board of Directors, by the attitudes, acceptance and COOperation expressed in many informal conferences with the staff of M.A.C.M.A., and in conference with the president of the Michigan Farm Bureau. Sower's principle is amply illustrated as a successful idea with this organi- zation, which is generally perceived to be highly tra- ditional and resistive to outside influences. As further substantiation of cooperation in efforts by this researcher to offer viable suggestions for updating, I quote the July 1, 1971, ”Processing Apple Newsletter," published regularly by M.A.C.M.A., and sent to all Apple Division members: Your Marketing Committee (also) spent two hours at its last meeting reviewing the results of the M.S.U. Sociology Department survey sent to all M.A.C.M.A. Apple and Cherry members last II. 116 March. Although in many cases their questions were less pointed and specific than those in the (recent) M.A.C.M.A. questionnaire, the results were the same. Three-quarters of the members are looking for more vigorous programs. (That final statement was entirely underlined for emphasis.) The Newsletter went on to say: With these mandates for vigorous action, your Marketing Committee is moving aggressively ahead. Then they outline new programs they are planning as evidence of "vigorous action." All evidence shows that although at times this research seemed threatening to M.A.C.M.A., and had to be carried out with extreme adherence to the normative structure, never- theless when it was finished, it was accepted completely, with no delineations of negative materials. As evidence of this, I was encouraged to say to the Processing Apple Committee whatever my research showed, regardless of con- tent, negative or positive. Because the normative structure of M.A.C.M.A. was respected in the research, ideas for innovation could be and are being accepted by M.A.C.M.A. and the Farm Bureau. Section C. Final Conclusions After an examination of the Michigan Agricultural COOperative Marketing Association, using two methods with a member-consensus orientation, it is necessary to attempt a determination of the original purposes of this study, as stated in the Introduction. 117 In attempting to formulate conclusions in a final summation, the temptation is to say "if . . . certain things continue as they have been begun," "if . . . present proposed policies are not too late," and other related "ifs." But that kind of projection does not deal with the NOW of M.A.C.M.A. At the present time, with present policies, M.A.C.M.A. has accomplished a potential for survival and ultimate success--success in terms of pro- viding a valuable contribution to the fruit industry of Michigan, not success only in terms of organizational survival. M.A.C.M.A. will survive, unless the future of Michigan agriculture is to be completely deviant by present expectations. But it has developed the potential to survive as was just stated; as an organization of real value to Michigan's farmers. Probably the major factor in the realization of this organizational potential is its association with the Michigan Farm Bureau. This association constitutes a variable that cannot be accurately measured in an immediate view. The long view of time will be necessary to this kind of assessment. Again, at the present the Michigan Farm Bureau is seen as attempting to keep pace with M.A.C.M.A.'s changes in response to grower demands. The administration of Farm Bureau clearly supports the need to try to meet grower demands, thus giving solid support to M.A.C.M.A., whether or not all growers realize this Aim 1.4V... r. : .,._..lr|p. ‘.-L.I.‘. e9... 118 support. At this time, the principles which govern effective organizations are being demonstrated to a far higher degree than they were at the beginning of the study. The norma- tive consensus between the formal and informal organiza- tions is in much greater alignment than in late 1969. As a consequence, there is greater role consensus apparent. It is too early to know whether the "like perceptions" (Farm Bureau's, M.A.C.M.A.'s and growers, as individuals) of the organization will actually be put into action in viable new programs, as well as in changed policies and basic attitudes. All indications are positive at this time, however. The recent involvement by Farm Bureau in passage of the Agricultural Fair Practices Act, of efforts around the Sisk Bill involving bargaining legislation and of enactment of various marketing orders all point to solid "parental" support for M.A.C.M.A. and auger well for future needs?6 As was suggested early in the paper, with solid support from membership and with the liberalizing changes in Farm Bureau, M.A.C.M.A. can move with the times. With— out these basic changes, the future success of M.A.C.M.A. is not as assured. It is clear that the organization is too closely allied with Farm Bureau, both legally and philosophically, to perceive of itself as being able to sever its connection. As long as these role perceptions remain constant, and growers continue to push for aggressive changes, then IM.A.C.M.A. must continue to attain support from Farm Bureau zfiFarm Bureau has been the major supporter and driving force behind the Sisk Bill from its inception. fl. 3.....in ‘rlj! . .3 . ‘i ' 119 in order to effect such changes. (The very fact that Farm Bureau, despite its widely-held image as being resistive to change and a bastion of conservatism, is clearly per- ceived as effecting liberalizing changes in its own policies, is itself an area worthy of a thorough study.) As was stated above, role, goal and norm consensus has been accomplished to a far more significant degree at this time in M.A.C.M.A. than at the beginning of the study. However, this consensus is still tenuous, pending the effecting of proposed vigorous new bargaining policies. The effecting of these policies depends a great deal upon grower cooperation, which leads to a vital final point to consider in an assessment of the success of M.A.C.M.A. As was stated at the beginning of this study, one of the limitations of M.A.C.M.A. is that it is a voluntary organization, which immediately affects its potential success. No hardened bargaining programs, proposed referendums, enabling acts or any suggestions for change actually are going to be carried out unless they receive member support. Member support in a voluntary organization is always an "after the fact" situation. The organization can never know, previous to committing itself, exactly how its members will react. Thus, no matter what changes are attempted, M.A.C.M.A. has an inherent weakness due to its voluntary nature. The positive changes it is attempting 120 are--at a talking level-~bringing the goals, roles and norms into a state of greater consensus. But whether or not this will be carried through on an action level re- mains to be seen. Despite its present good intentions, M.A.C.M.A. must still bargain from a position of weakness, because they cannot be sure of member support in action for what they are supporting in talk and on paper. M.A.C.M.A. is still in the position of choosing between being safe by remaining with policies that experience has shown a certain percentage of growers will support, or forego safety for new aggressive policies-—as they appear to be doing now--and risk being left unsupported by growers, when the time comes for more than verbal support. As long as M.A.C.M.A. is a voluntary organiza- tion, this situation will exist and will continue to limit their effectiveness. With these limitations understood, however, if M.A.C.M.A. can successfully affect proposed new bargain- ing programs, significant deviant behavior in the total organization will be reduced and M.A.C.M.A. can show itself to be on the way toward being truly an effective organization. BIBLIOGRAPHY Babb, E. M., J. H. Armstrong and H. E. Ward. "Bargaining Power for Farmers." COOperative Extension Services leaflet, Michigan State University (no date). Bennis, Warren. "Beyond Bureaucracy." Trans-Action, 1959, Vol. 2, pp. 31—35. Etzioni, Amatai. Readingn on Modern Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1969. ”Fundamental Principles for the Corporate Structure and Operation of a State Marketing Association." American Farm Bureau Publication, Chicago (no date). GeorgOpoulus, Basil S., and Arnold S. Tannenbaum. "A Study of Organizational Effectiveness." American Sociological Review, 1957, Vol. 22, pp. 534-540. Gross, Neal. Explorations in Role Analysis. New York: J. Wiley andISOns, 1958. Ladd, John. The Structure of a Moral Code. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957. Michigan State University Department of Agricultural Economics. "The Federal Marketing Order for Tart Cherries," leaflet, 1969. Perrow, Charles. "The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations." in Etzioni, Amatai, editor, Readings on Modern Organizations. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Ha11, 1969. Ricks, Donald. ”Fruit Bargaining." Lecture, July 26, 1967. Extension Summer School, Boyne Mountain, Michigan. 121 APPENDICES APPENDIX I BY-LAWS Michigan Agricultural COOperative Marketing Association (As adopted February 21, 1961 and as amended through April 24, 1969) ARTICLE 1. Membership Qualifications Section 1. Any person, partnership, firm, association or corporation engaged in the production of agricultural and/or horticultural products who fulfills the qualifications for eligibility of ownership of Common stock of this cor- poration as are defined in Article V of the Articles of Incorporation and who has executed a Marketing Agreement with this corporation and whose application as a Common stockholder of this corporation has been accepted by authority of its board of directors may become a member of this corporation. The Michigan Farm Bureau shall not be required to enter into a Marketing Agreement, nor shall it be required to be engaged in agricultural production, its sole qualification to be met is that the majority of its members shall be agricultural or horticultural pro- ducers. Section 2. Membership in this corporation shall con- tinue only during the term of the Marketing Agreement, and upon its termination, such stockholder shall no longer be considered eligible to hold Common stock Of this corporation. Section 3. Any member of the association whose member- ship 3hall terminate for any reason whatsoever, shall not be entitled to any part of the assets of this corporation upon such termination, except such patronage refunds as may have been issued to him prior to such termination. He shall be entitled to receive such refunds in their regular order of retirement. ARTICLE III. BoardIOf’Directors Section 1. All the corporate capacity Of this corpora— tion shall be vested in, and all the corporate powers shall be exercised by a board of directors, not exceeding eleven (11) in number, who shall be members of the Michigan Farm 122 BY-LAWS (Cont.) Bureau. At the annual meeting held on May 29, 1962, there shall be elected eleven (11) directors, not less than a majority of whom shall be at all times Common stockholders of this corporation and district and/or at large directors of the Michigan Farm Bureau. The remaining directors shall be Common stockholders of this corporation and a member of one of the following Commodity areas: (1) fruit, (2) vegetables, (3) livestock, (4) poultry, (5) field crops, (6) dairying and (7) other. Each of these areas which has an operating division shall be entitled to nominate one (1) person for director. The board of directors shall assign each division to its commodity area. Such district and at large directors as aforesaid, shall be required to execute marketing agreements only in the event they are producers of commodities subject to Marketing Agreements currently operative and in effect. All directors elected from Commodity areas shall be required to execute Marketing Agreements currently in effect in order to serve as directors. flpih. hr.fl..~ I. z w. Keene 15N.*‘ .. . “We APPENDIX II EXPLANATION OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS On the next pages are questions that I prepared previous to interviewing: a. grower-members of M.A.C.M.A., and b. industry influentials. These questions are used as a guide in my mind. Very Often I don't actually ask many of them, as such, but gear myself to the individual and the situation, and go from there. One formal question may elicit the information desired from that question and several more. Sometimes the discussion immediately gets into an area I didn't expect, but is just as valuable as my original interest. What I'm saying is that my methodology relies heavily on sensitivity to the individual and a quick grasp of his abilities, background, perceptions and biases. I try to let him give, rather than me take. 124 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 125 TYPICAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ASKED OF SIGNIFICANT GROWER-MEMBERS OF M.A.C.M.A. What fruit industry organizations do you belong to? Are you an officer? A member? For how long? DO your local organizations have a direct relationship to larger industry organizations? Do you feel that grower needs are well-served by your local and broader industry organizations? How did local growers feel about last year's prices and M.A.C.M.A.'s involvement in that pricing? How would you characterize the most vital total- industry problems of apple and/or cherry growing in Michigan at this time? What role is M.A.C.M.A. playing in solving these problems? How do you view their success in this problem solving? DO you see M.A.C.M.A. as being a force that growers can look to for help? To what extent? Do you feel there is a significant gap between large and small growers in: a. ability to compete for price of product? b. amount of organizational representation? Please discuss. How do you view M.A.C.M.A.'s influence concerning the above question? What industry—wide changes--if any--would you like to see initiated? Where do you feel such changes should originate from? (Top-down, bottom-up, from inside, from outside?) In what areas has M.A.C.M.A. been beneficial to members? In what areas do you feel M.A.C.M.A. could or should be beneficial? What is M.A.C.M.A.'s greatest strength? 126 16. What is M.A.C.M.A.'s greatest weakness? 17. In an over-all view, do you see M.A.C.M.A. as an effective organization? Please explain. 127 TYPICAL INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ASKED OF INDUSTRY INFLUENTIALS What percentage of Michigan's processed apple and cherry crop is marketed through M.A.C.M.A.'s efforts? Significant growers disagree with M.A.C.M.A.'s view of itself as an effective organization. What is your view of this disparity? Were you aware of the dis- crepancy of attitude? Is M.A.C.M.A.'s organizational structure as effective as is possible? DO you see growers as thinking it is? Should there be more effective commodity and grower controls? Would M.A.C.M.A. be more effective if it was more aggressive in its marketing, bargaining efforts? Do you think M.A.C.M.A. members generally see this as a need? Does M.A.C.M.A. maintain F. B. philosophy? a. Do you see this as an advantage or disadvantage? b. DO you think growers see this as an advantage or disadvantage? Have you heard of a "closed-shop" type policy being advocated by certain so-called "militant" growers? a. Do you think this is a force M.A.C.M.A. will have to reckon with? b. Do you feel M.A.C.M.A. officials are aware of these undercurrents of desire for stronger action on the part of their organization? What percent of Michigan's processed apple and cherry growers are in M.A.C.M.A.? Is M.A.C.M.A.'s price-marketing information service any better than U.S.D.A.'s? Does M.A.C.M.A. make unreal price demands? Do you think a significant number of growers believe this to be true? 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 128 Would you discuss your views on: a. the need for a Federal Marketing Order in Cherries? b. the chance for its being enacted? c. what M.A.C.M.A.'s action means, in this reference, in view of A.F.B.F.‘s opinion against such action? What is your Opinion of the over-all effect of M.A.C.M.A. on Michigan's processed apple and cherry industry? a. Do growers agree? b. Do processors agree? What is the nature of the organizational structure of M.A.C.M.A. and its different units? What is the relation of the sub-units to M.A.C.M.A., and the whole organization to its surrounding "cluster of organizations”? Do you view M.A.C.M.A. as having (sociological) role- goal-norm consensus? To what degree? (Explain concept of "natural social organization within formal structure," etc., to him.) Would you care to comment on your observations of such a natural social organization as you (may) see it working in M.A.C.M.A.? Do you feel that M.A.C.M.A. will become a more signifi- cant force in the fruit industry in the future? Ex- plain and evaluate. APPENDIX III QUESTIONNAIRE SENT TO ALL M.A.C.M.A. PROCESSING APPLE AND RED TART CHERRY DIVISION MEMBERS Percentages Based on 177 Apple Growers and 205 Cherry Growers Dear M.A.C.M.A. Apple or Cherry Division Members: The enclosed questionnaire is an attempt to determine how the members of an organization view their organization: for instance, do they see it the same way the professional staff sees it, in terms of its purposes and the ways to accomplish them? Do they fully recognize the benefits they receive from their organization? Do they understand the areas in which their organization by its nature is limited in its benefits? By using questions about specific industry matters, we hope to discover answers to these kinds of questions. The questionnaire comes to you with the knowledge of your organization, and we would appreciate your completing and returning it at your earliest conveni- ence. You do not need to sign your name. Please check the response or responses you feel are the most apprOpriate. Cherry Apple Growers Growers 17% 29% a. Strongly agree DO you feel M.A.C.M.A. has supplied marketing 62 59 b. Agree information to members which has significantly 5 3 c. NO opinion benefitted the total industry? 5 7 d. Disagree 1 2 e. Strongly disagree 57 55 a. Strongly agree DO you feel that M.A.C.M.A. should be 30 35 b. Agree more forceful in its marketing activities? 6 7 c. No comment 0 2 d. Disagree 0 0 e. Strongly disagree 129 Cherry Apple Growers Growers 49% 53% 35 40 3 5 4 2 O O 20 24 56 62 54 56 22 24 12 17 40 41 39 43 6 9 4 5 l 2 130 Page 2 Strongly support How would you react if the M.A.C.M.A. Apple Support and Cherry Divisions were to undertake actual NO comment bargaining programs, rather than primarily Oppose furnishing marketing information? Strongly Oppose Have M.A.C.M.A. If you would support operate its own M.A.C.M.A. in such a processing bargaining program, facilities which of the following tools would you approve Have M.A.C.M.A. and support in order provide a central to effect it? (Check selling organi- as many as you want.) zation for pro- cessed fruits Have M.A.C.M.A. negotiate multi- year full supply contracts Strike at harvest time (delay har- vest until accept- able price can be negotiated) Strike processors after harvest, to prevent shipment of processed fruits Strongly approve Would you approve changes in the laws Approve affecting farmer bar- gaining which would No comment permit M.A.C.M.A. to bargain for all growers Disapprove when supported by 2/3 of the production of Strongly its commodity in the disapprove grower referendum? Cherry Growers 10% 45 22 7 2 48 52 54 22 47 Apple Growers 16% a. 46 b. 22 c. 12 d. 4 e. 53 a. 57 b. 52 c. 35 d. 50 e. 131 Page 3 Strongly agree Do you think that the structure of Farm Agree Bureau is in support of the purposes of a No comment bargaining association? Disagree Strongly disagree obtaining prices Do you think that which will return M.A.C.M.A., with average growers present organizational a profit and industry conditions, should have as a goal: obtaining prices (check as many as you which are the wish) best possible with conditions of supply and demand the welding of an effective market- ing organization for particular commodities, to assure members full market value for their crop improvement of non-price terms of trade or basis for buying, by container allowance, hauling allowance, prompt payment reducing risk to processors by establishing a uniform price for the entire industry 10. Cherry Apple Growers Growers 20% 29% a. 32 40 b. 25 16 c. 4 10 d. 2 5 e. 53 48 a. 8 11 b. 15 19 c. 16 12 d. 62 56 e. 13 21 a. 57 50 b. 28 29 c. Strongly support Support No opinion Oppose Strongly oppose develOp full supply contracts with processors supply containers to members provide members with processing facilities obtain members special sources of credit (such as the St. Paul Bank of Co-ops) legislation to require support of a marketing association by all producers when supported by a referendum vote A great deal Moderate Little or none Page 4 Would you support a wider use of Federal Marketing Orders for apples in order to balance supplies with demand, realizing that some excess would need to be diverted or abandoned? Which of the following would you support as possible ways to over- come the problem of non-members obtaining members' benefits: How much has your M.A.C.M.A. membership benefitted you? 11. 12. 13. Cherry Apple Growers Growers 42% 50% a. 33 32 b. 22 18 c. 17 23 a. 54 54 b. 17 16 c. 7 6 d. l l e. 133 As much as possible within its limita- tions Moderate Little or none Very satisfied Satisfied No comment Dissatisfied Very dissatisfied Page 5 How much has your M.A.C.M.A. member- ship benefitted you relative to factors such as the weather, the market and the fact that not all growers belong? Are you generally satisfied with M.A.C.M.A.'s staff? Please list any suggestions for changes you would like to see in M.A.C.M.A. a. Thank you very much for your cooperation. Donna Sweeny 2 1971 OH Cu n9 "I! III'LIIIIIIIIIIIIII!!!I