o v .< 4..
.g;;§}q:r:y;rr-.~.:'--v- '1". '

xiii:

.,...¢uu..;:

:- ’.
. LJL'
3'
.—

THE VIEWS OF LORD SALISBURY
ON FOEEIGN POLiCY

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE COLLEGE

Leonard Eugene Hill
1947

 

 

 

 

llllllllllllllllg|||!||||!!|||

1293 14

MAY 2 9 19%

 

il 49 «3'

 

 

COPIES OF THIS DOCUKtll-FT ARE AVAIL’XESLE Oi}? liICI-lOFIIJLI "fY COIJT'CTEG

AIR DOCUI‘IEE‘JTS DIVISION, DITELLIENCE T-2, AIR m2?

.5)

7:23
Am HEQUESTDEG at; NC. /6/( w

 

This is to certify that the
thesis entitled
alisbury's Views

‘CLlCIy'o

presented b1]

- "I

‘ - *1." n ‘ ,“"
LL.'\_..r*.f1.~.J LUJL! ._ til.

has been accepted towards fulfillment

oi the requirements for

’\ . c- i‘rw 1v
‘ .11 °_ __ ”degree 1n_‘11_s’1""1_.d_

 
 

i '\

Date__7;ay 17 r- L" l

M-795

IV a or professor

 

 

A”?

 

pun-n.

 

1‘»
,i

1

TKJ VIJWS OF LORD SALISBURY

ON EORBIGN POLICY

THE VIEWS OF LORD SALISBURY
ON FOREIGN POLICY

Leonard Eugene Hill

a THESIS
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan
State College of Agriculture and Applied Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1947

Acknowledgment
The writer of this essay wishes to express
his appreciation for the helpful guidance
and many constructive criticisms given during

the writing of this essay by Doctor H.H. Kimber

,1 ( Ff" "‘46)
."-.-‘“ o" ‘ .~
.JL-".J‘ J u. .1 V»)

Approved for the Department of

History and Political Science

 

 

A.
B.
C.

A.

B.

C.

D.

TABLJ OF CONTJRTS
1. INTRODUCTION
Basis of British Foreign Policy
Aim of this essay
Lord Salisbury, bibgraphical sketch to 1874
II. CHaNGIHG IHTJRJSTS CF BRITAIN'S POLICY
New Factors Affecting Policy
l. A weak Turkey, a new Germany
2. Threat to Suez Canal and Gateway to India
3. Purchase of Additional Shares in Suez Canal
3. Value to England
b, Reaction of Continental Powers
Berlin memorandum (May 1876)
1. Rejected by England
a. Meant virtual dismemberment of Turkey
2. England strives to safeguard Constantinople
Russian Pr0posal to Occupy ConstantinOple
1. Austria to receive Bosnia
2. Russia initiates military plans
Conference at Constantinople (December 1876)
1. Salisbury's initial steps
2. Ports becomes obdurate and will not reform
5. Russian threatens renewed warfare
4. Salisbury advocates an active policy
a. Cabinet delays action

b. Dissension within the cabinet

E. Russian Declares War (April 24, 1876)
1. The early success of Russian arms
2. England continues to activate for War
3. The British diplomatic phase
4. The Choice of Cyprus as a British base
III. CONSTRUCTING A POLICY
A. Lord Salisbury as Secretary of Foreign Affairs
B. His Policy
l. The Salisbury Circular of April I
a. Status quo in the Mediterranean
b. An independent Bulgaria
c. The Straits internationalized

d. To acquire territorial compensation of Turkey
as means of safeguarding British interests

2. The Reaction of the Powers
C. Negotiations Prior to the Congress of Berlin
1. Advances to Russia by Lord Salisbury
2. The Cyprus Convention prOposed to the Sultan
a. Reforms in the Government of Turkey

b. Cyprus to be given England as compensation
for support

8. Concessions To Russia
a. Kara and Batoum to be retained
b. The Straits to be neutralized
4. Austria supports England
IV. THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN
A. Th; British Representatives
B. The 'Globe Revelation'

1. Lord Salisbury's prOposal to Turkey

C. The Final Convention signed (July 13, 1878)

D. Summary of the Cyprus Convention

A.
B.
C.
D.

1. Advantages of defense before Parliament
a. Maintenance of the Ottoman Empire
b. Acquisition of Cyprus as naval and commercial base

0. The retention of 'status quo' in the Rediterranean

.2. Weaknesses

a. Vain attempts to interest Sultan in reform

b. Obstacles to reform

0. England gains the distrust of the Powers
V. TH; BGEPTIaN aUJS‘ICR

England buys Khedive's shares, thus gaining paramount
interest in the Suez Canal

France continues to demand parity of control in Egypt
Native revolt of 1881

1. France and Italy decline to intervene, England puts
down the rebellion in 1882

Gladstone Intervenes in the Sudan
1. Five Anglo-Egyptian expeditions massacred
2. The failure to aid General Gordon
5. Gladstone Ministry falls in 1885
VI. SALISBURY MINISTRY 1885-1892
Trouble with Germany in Bg'pt
Balkan Crisis

Prince Alexander makes a united Bulgaria a 'Fait accompli'

Salisbury's plan to hold Egypt and the Sudan to combat

French designs

E.

A.

B.

C.

Clashes with Portugal and Germany in East Africa
1. Delagoa Bay Controversy
2. Colonial Settlement of 1890; cession of Heliogland
VII. SALISBURY'S LAST MINISTRY 1895-1902
Fashoda Incident
1. Kitchener and Marchend meet at Fashoda
2. Diplomatic negotiations, threat of war by France
3. France withdraws, Sudan left under Anglo-Egyptian control
THE FAR EAST
1. Salisbury advocates 'open door' policy

2. Gains territory to offset influence and gains of Russia
& Germany

THE MEDITERRANEAN
1. Italy desires expansion into Tripoli

2. England advocates retention of balance of power and
'status quo'

THE BOER WAR
1. Jameson Raid
2. Kaiser sends famous 'Kruger telegram'
3. Concert of Europe prOposed against England
4. England's isolation
a. Diplomatic threats and prOposals of Germany

b. French remember the 'Fashoda Incident'

E. Alliance Offers by Germany
1. Secret Treaties of 1887

2. Proposed Advantages to England; Reasons for Rejection of
German Offer of Alliance

a. Policy of no commitments
b. German 'stupidity' in diplomacy
c. Threat of new German naval program
d. German aggressiveness tends to future conflict
e. Distrust in strength of Germany's allies
f. Necessity of subordinating English policy to Germany's
g. Salisbury's Formal Rejection of Alliance with Germany
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
A. Protection of Great Britain
1. In her insular position
2. As center of a world empire
a. Hold the lifelines as, Suez, Gibraltar, malts
b. Maintain and increase 'facility for trade'
c. Ready access to markets and raw materials
B. Retention of 'status quo' in the Mediterranean
1. Upheld existing treaties, consistent as to points of honor

2. Avoidance of alliances which would involve or commit England
to action or support of Continental powers

8. Power not only to gain; but power to Fold

IX. BRITISH SEA POWER AND THE PRESENT EMPIRE
A. Basis of British Naval Power
1. Position, strategy and possessions
B. Britain's changing World Position
1. Rise of American and Japanese Naval Strength
2. Threat of New Weapons .
a. The submarine and the aerOplane
C. BritAin's World Role Today
1. Lost economic superiority
2. The loss of Export trade
3. Britain's strengths and weaknesses
X . APPENDIX

XI . BI BLI O GRA I’HY

I. INTRODUCTION
The basis of British foreign policy has been largely
determined by her geographical poition. Through an island she

H '1'!"

is separated by only a narrow streak of water from the contin-

. \‘\-. .
q,

ent of EurOpe; thus she is a neighbor of every country of the

continent. Because of her insular position England has been

dependent upon the seaways of the world to transport to her

‘ub I”! e‘r‘A "dw! 4.... Mil F.

homeland essential foodstuffs and.raw materials.) On these same
waterways Britain sends her manufactured goods to the markets
of the world. It was to insure her coasts against attack, to
protect her communications with her colonies and dependencies,
and to provide her merchant men access to all the seas, that
England deveIOped a two power navy. Harbors for refitting and
refuge and at a later time, coaling stations were acquired

through the years. These strategic bases of naval power served

to control the seas; Gibraltar guarded the gate to the Atlantic,

Suez Canal and Alexandria to Red and Hediterranean Seas, the Cape

of Good Hope was a protection to India and a starting point for

later colonization.

England is concerned with the independence and territorial

integrity of all the continental powers for in the maintenance of

peace and the 'status quo' are the commerce and lifelines of
Britain best preserved. Britain has ever been ready to aid any
country that demonstrated itself definitely interested in main-

taining the peace of Europe. England has never feared a land

power but when that same land power sought to also become a
naval power, she has fought that power by both diplomatic and
military means, for she can never permit the highways of the
seas to fall into the hands that may close them.

. Throughout the years British ministers have endeavoured
to avoid alliances which would involve or commit England to
action or support of continental powers in recognition of the
fact that 13:1,.ieiej33,,”d..P_aF.1.._i.aF?9‘§_arsgovermentdependenton
the will of the people.
w"WWWWIthNthese Tactors of British policy in mind I have
sough to discover Lord Salisbury's views on foreign policy, as
expressed in his writings, concerning the following points.

1. Lord Salisbury's attitude toward alliances
2. The maintenance of peace and the 'status quo'

3. The acquisition of new territories

4. The retention of Britain's commercial and
naval superiority

The better to understand and to appreciate the contribu-
tion of Lord Salisbury to British history we need to know his
background prior to his appearance at the Constantinople Con-
vention in 1876.

Lord Robert Cecil, :prime minister, the lineal descendant

—r .W‘n-rwn" m" m “v"

 

Of Robert 06011.f1rst Earl of Salisbury, was born at Hatfield

n....m.h1&'m‘ ’““‘
m ‘4 _ ;w—v-~:‘.-wv-W.V' —v—--.W- "1."... Aura-WU:

on February 3,1830. His father James, William, Gascoyne, Cecil,
second marquis, held the offices of lord privy seal and lord
president of the council in the administrations of 1852 and

1858. Cecil's mother was the friend and frequent correspondent

('51

of the first duke of Wellington. Of Cecil's brothers the
elder James, Viscount Cranborne was an historical essayist
and writer of international fame; the younger brother Lieutenant-
colonel Eustace Cecil was a surveyor-general. Robert Cecil's
youngest sister Lady Blanche, married James Maitland Balfour
Salisbury's successor in the premiership.

Robert Cecil while at Eton became greatly interested in
the Oxford movement. He made his maiden Speech as a H.P.
from Stamford On April 7, 1854, on the question of property
rights. This speech was followed within the year by speeches
on prOperty, religious education, and foreign policy. It was
along these three lines of political thought that his mind was
principally to travel. On July 11, 1858 Robert Cecil married
Georgian Caroline the eldest daughter of Sir Edward Hall Anderson,
baron of the exchequer. Owing to his father's disapproval he
started his married life on a limited income and was at this
time partly dependent upon the income from his pen. He gained

public recOgnition with his frequent articles in the Quarterly_

 

Review, written for the most part as criticisms of the govern-
ment and views on foreign policy. From the years 1859-1866
Robert Cecil was prominent as the leader and spokesman for the
Opposition.

Cecil (who by the death of his elder brother in June 14,
1865 became the Viscount Cranborne) was appointed to the Indian
Secretary-ship in the Derby government. Cranborne resigned
nine months later on the question of suffrage reform and re-

turned to his father's home.

The death of his father April 12, 1868 made Viscount
Cranborne a member of the House of Lords. With the return of
Disraeli to office in 1874, Lord Salisbury, as he then was, re-
sumed his place at the Indian office. The Eastern question owing
to a rebellion attended by atrocities in Bulgaria, had become
acute in 1876, and a conference of the great powers was arranged
to meet at Constantinople. Lord Salisbury was sent out in
December as British plenipotentiary. He brought to this mission
a willingness to tryémethods and to strike out upon the unbeat-
en paths which an objective study of the facts had indicated.
While he was eager to maintain peace among the EurOpean great
powers, he detested inactivity and a negative policy. To Lord
Salisbury was left much of the actual working out of the de-
tails and solutions to the critical problems of foreign policy
concerned in the Eastern Question. In July 1878, the nations
interested in the Balkan situation were invited by Bismarck to
a congress at Berlin for the purpose of revising the provisions
of the Treaty of San Stefano. The Earl of Beaconsfield, Lord
Odo Russell, and Lord Salisbury were chosen as representatives

for the British government.

OI

II
CHANGING IN‘BRBSTS OF BRITAIN'S POLICY

The interests of England in the near East were essentially
what they had been in 1856 but other factors had changed. First,
Turkey had failed to set its house in order, and was fast approach-
ing disintegration due to misgovernment, a huge debt, and the loss
.of foreign sympathy, Also in 1875, England and the Continent faced
a different Russia-~one who held the provinces of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, who threatened the control of the Straits and Constant-
inople and now held control of the Black Sea. In the background
was a new Germany interested in the Berlin-to-Bagdad railroad and
in gaining a substantial portion of the trade of the near East which
England had always considered her own.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the constantly in-
creasing use of it by British shipping had made the Eastern question
more than ever before, one of imperial defense because of the imf
portance this short all-sea route had quickly assumed in the public
mind of Englishmen . While the fate of Constantinople and the
Euphrates Valley was still occasionally mentioned as being vitally
connected with the safety of India, Englishmen in 1875 directed
their gaze toward Egypt as the real center of British interest and
the best compensation for Britain in case Turkey should be parti-
tioned.

On November 26, 1875, the British government accounced the

purchase of the Khedive's shares in the Suez Canal. The Times

commented,

"It is impossible to separate in our thoughts of the
purchase from the question of England's future relations
with Egypt, or the destiny of Egypt from the shadows which
darken the Turkish Empire. The purchase seemed to fore-
shadow a policy of abandoning the independence and integrity
of Turkey and at the same time of safeguarding Britain's
vital interests in a manner compatible with her imperial
greatness. Indeed the opinion was expressed both at home
and abroad that England had begun the partition of the
Ottoman Empire by an act which indicated her intention of

taking Egypt."l.

Concerning the value of the Canal, Salisbury remarked, "Our
power over the Suez Canal and our route to India depend on our
command of the Mediterranean. If we have that, the shares in the
Suez Canal are superfluous. If we do not have that, shares in
the Canal are of no use."2 This was an indirect way of saying that
the balance of power in the Near East was more important to England
than the Canal or Egypt. The control of either, however, was part
of the problem; what to do with Turkey?

The reaction of the continental powers was varied; France
and Russia were very cool, Bismarck was lavish in his praise of
the wisdom of England's move and spoke quite freely of the desire
for further friendly advances and understandings between mutal friends
From.the remarks of Bismarck it was understood that he was ready for

the complete dismemberment of the Turkish Empire.3 The British

cabinet began to wonder if their move had been such a wise one after

 

 

1° Ime., D.W. "Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878,

2' iFrasers Magazine, day 1876,"English Foreign Policy and the Eastern
‘ ‘ ' Question", p88

3° fSeymour, C. "Diplomatic Background of the War", p.27.

all. England was willing to gain some territory or concessions
to maintain the 'status quo' in the Mediterranean but she was not
ready as yet for the complete dismemberment of Turkey.

On December 30, 1875 Count Andrassy the Austrian premier
drew up and presented a plan of reform fer the Turkish govern-
ment and submitted it to the powers. Though England readily sup-
ported this preposed reform the plan was not accepted by the other
powers and not until May 1876 was an alternate plan, known as the
Berlin Memorandum, submitted by Bismarck and Andrassy. This plan,
however, amounted to paving the way for intervention in Turkey
which would have resulted in the breakup of that empire. The
British cabinet objected to this second plan and at the same time
decided to send the fleet to Besika Bay, just outside the Dardenellsg
because they had been led to fear that Russia intendedto take ad-
vantage of the turbulent situation accompanying the overthrow of
Sultan Abdul Aziz in order to gain control of Constantinople and
the Straits. The rejection of the Berlin Memorandum and the des-
patch of the fleet to Besika, the despotism of the Sultan and the
beginning of the Bukprian insurrection made the month of may a
turning point in the Eastern situation. Nowhere was this more
evident than in England and in British policy. England now took
the leading role in the attempt to bring about peace and reforms
in the Turkish Empire, for the first time, the press and the

8°Vernment directed their policy toward safeguarding ConstantinOple,

\

4. (3ecil, Ladytflwendolyn. "Life of Robert CeciIJHarquis of Salisbury,V
p. 15

e
02004.9 53/1; LUV):
admitted that there was now no alternative to the policy that

England was following, except the partition of Turkey, and he

0.
thought it probable that this alternative would have to be adepted.

The climax was reached in late September and early October
when Russia Openly prOposed that in case the Sultan did not accept
reforms that Austria should occupy Bosnia, Russia to enter Bulgaria,
and all the powers join in a naval demonstration at Constantinople.b.
This was shortly followed by the news that the Russian army was be-

ing prepared for the immediate attack on Turkey, and renewed advices

from Germany that everyone should take a share of the Ottoman Empire

and be happy.

While Lord Derby, Secretary of State, for Foreign Affairs,
participated in negotiations which brought about the arrangement
of an armistice between Turkey and her rebellious subjects and
prepared the way for the Conference to meet in Constantinople in
December, he also turned his attention to the problem how best to
safeguard the integrity of Turkey and protect the British interests.
The most pressing problem seemed to be the defense of ConstantinOple
against the inevitable Russian attack and he put the War Office to
work on a series of studies and plans which led eventually to the
occupation of Cyprus as the {place d'armes' from which to protect
the route to India. .

Lord Salisbury, who was chosen as British Plenipotentiary

'W3 the Conference, had become convinced that England should adept
x

5. I_b1d p. 130, To Lord Lytton Liar. 9, 1877
t). Seton--Watson, "Britian in Europe," p.521
'7. Seton-~Watson, "Britian in Europe," p.522

'-

ti. Danger, w. L.,"Franco--Russian Alliance} p.26

 

 

a policy of c00peration with Russia in order to bring about
reforms in Turkey. His conversations with Bismarck, Andrassy
and the foreign ministers of France and Italy whom he visited
in November on his way to the East confirmed him in this view
and in his Opinion of the hopelessness of upholding longer the
integrity of the Ottoman Empire.9

Upon his arrival at the conference early in December, he
at once came to an agreement with Ignatiev, Russian Premier, much
to the disgust of Sir Henry Eliot, ambassador and second
plenipotentiary, and of Beaconsfield who complained that Salisbury
seemed to forget his main object at the Conference, which.was to
keep the Russians out of Turkey. Oneethe two first plenipoten-
tiaries of England and Russia were in accord, it was an easy
matter to formulate a set of conditions providing justice and
security for the Christians of Turkey. But the Porte now became
obdurate and wrecked the work of the conference by resolutely
refusing to: accept the measures which the representatives of
EurOpe had drawn up.10 Despite this failure, which he more than
half expected, Lord Salisbury concluded that the Conference had
done good because it had made it impossible for England to spend
any umre blood in.sustaining the Turkish Empire and he heped that
'it would make the English statesman buckle to the task of devis—

ll
ing some other means of securing the road to India.’

 

 

13' Lady Cecil, "Marquis of Salisbury" p. 94 - 107
11- Ibid., Vol. II p.122
' (36011, II p,118, Letter to Lord Lytton, Dec. 11

10
During the months of January and February the Russians
were making secret plans for a continued advance into Turkey
but England too laid plans. Despite orders and counter orders
a Mr. Home sent British officers to various strategic points
in.Asia Minor and the Balkans with the view of making a defense
against the Russians. Other foreign powers began to complain

for they intimated that England was 'too eager to seize and
13
appropriate territory to herself.

Lord Salisbury now advocated in active policy, a policy
that called for action, in a diplomatic and military measure.

"The object most desirable is, if possible to
keep Russia out of the war for the present. If it can
be done for twelve months more, France's preparations
will be sufficiently complete to make a coup do main
from Berlin impossible. Till that time the dangerflis
serious. Nothing but the counterweight of Russia pre-
vented it in 1875, and if that counterweight is removed,
the policy or the terrors of Bismarck may again become
uncontrollable. Of course, the Unreasonable despostion
of the Turk or rather the total disorganization of his
Government, is the difficulty....The crisis is an anxious
one, for it is quite conceivable that if things go wrong,l4.
we may be fighting for Holland before two years are out."

All the time Salisbury wanted to adapt a policy of accept-
ing the partition of the Ottoman Empire. His remarks both private
and public and the plans and suggestions worked upon began to re-
flect the germ of the idea of what became the Cyprus policy, in-
oinding as they did not only the effort to establish a base of

—_‘

 

i3. Iee., "Cyprus Convention, " p.24
14- Op. Cit., p.129, Letter to Lord Lytton.
50 Seton-Watson, p.522

ll
operations in the eastern Mediterranean both as a means of
guarding British interests and as compensation for the gains
of others, but also the idea of protection or a protectorate
over Turkey in order to make her reform.

The British Cabinet however devoted its energies to the
discoveny of the means by which peace could be maintained be-
tween Turkey and Russia. On the Larger issue of what was to be
eventually done about the obvious decay of the Ottoman power
they seemed to adopt Derby's motto, "to wait, say little, and
pledge ourselves to nothing." Lord Salisbury was led to remark,
"English policy is to float lazily downstream, occasionally
putting out a diplomatic boathook to avoid collisions." Lord
Salisbury, commented further on the lack of definite policy of
the Cabinet at this time to Lord Lytton,

"Defending English interests by sustaining the

Ottoman dynasty has become impracticable.....I fear

that when we come to do the same things some years

later, one of two things will_have happened. Either

France will have recovered her positions and be jealous

of any extension of our power in the Mediterranean,--

or Germany will have become a naval power. Either of
these contingencies will make it difficult for us to
provide ourselves with a ied-a-terre, in place of that
which we shall infallible ose atficonstantinOple.

Arrangements may be easy now that will be impossible
five years hence.

 

In the next few days a flurry of notes was exchanged
between the powers on the issue; was England willing to go to
war to protect the Ottoman Empire? On March 10, the Russian

\

5E. Seton--Watson, 'p. 522
6- Cecil., vol. II, p.130

12

government offered what seemed a way out, Lord Salisbury alone

was willing to accept the note.

"If we reject the note, it is pretty clear the
Czar must go to war. We shall then come before Parliament
under these conditions, we shall be alone against the
five powers. We shall have bought on a war by this iso-
lation. And we shall have done this to avoid accepting
a note which pledges us to hardly anything to which.we
are not already pledged, and which can at all events be
plausibly described as a note of extreme moderation.....
Schouvalof‘ tells me they have squared Vienna. I believe
it--not so much because he tells me, but because I be-
lieve Andrassy to be for the moment in Bismarck's pocket,
and Bismarck's consent implies Andrassy's. But what does
the assent of Vienna to the Turkish campaign mean? It is
ominous to England. It means that Russia will not threaten
Constantinople, and will not permanently occupy Bulgaria,
but that the national feeling will insist on some teisitorial
result and she can only find it on the side of Asia. '

In the meantime Russia believed herself as having waited
long enough, and on the 2490f April she entered on the long dis-
cussed war with Turkey. England Temporarily had thrown away her
advantage and now could do nothing but sit back and wait upon
events.18.

Russia contined in the early part of the renewed campaign
to make substantial gains into Turkish territory. The nations
0f EurOpe while watching made feeble diplomatic expressions of
disapproval. England, however, requested that the Russian
government give assurances that her troops would not enter
ConstantinOple. On receipt of the Russian refusal to make this

guarantee, or to limit the territory acquired, the British cabinet
Voted for war on July 21. Fortunately Russia was halted by the

\

ig- Cecil, II., p.lSl--I.etter to Lord Beaconsfie ld.
‘- Seton Watson., "Britain in EurOpe." p.024

13

Turkish army at Plevna giving the British a four month's
respite in which to pursue a settlement between the Turkish
and Russian governments.

The Earl of Beaconsfield and Er. Layard, the Turkish
ambassador reluctantly gave up their efforts to bring the rest
of the cabinet and the foreign office to accept their views re-
garding the necessity Of maintaining Turkey. Public Opinion was
swinging to the side Of Salisbury and his idea of acquiring a
'place d'armes' in the eastern Mediterranean and the realization
of England's special interest in Asia Minor and Armenia. Ever
since the autumm of 1876, the need for some post nearer the
scene Of'action than Malta had been bought forward for one of
two reasons, either as a coaling station or refitting place
in case England should undertake military measures against
ConstantinOple or GallOpoli, or as compensation which would serve
as a means of guarding the route to India if the Ottoman Empire
was threatened with dismembermemt.19.

Lord Salisbury during these four months of armistice was
striving for peace but he made it clear to Russia that England
was willing to go to war to protect Brittish interests in the near
East. In a note Of May sixth to the Russian government, Salisbury
defined the interests which Russia was called upon to respect, .
"these were the Suez Canal, Egypt, Constantinople and the Straits."20.

if). Seton-Watson., "Britain in Europe," p. 534
-* Cecil., VOl. II, p.143--Letter to Lord Lytton, May 18, 1871.

14

On May 18, Salisbury wrote to Lord Lytton to the effect that
a diplomatic request had been sent to Russia stating that England
was prepared to stand by her request that Constantinople not be
entered by Russian troops. Austria had signified that she would
support Emgland in her demands and the chance of Russia defying
the combination of the two powers is very small indeed. "Of course,

if we fail diplomatically we shall have to undertake the task
21. '
ourselves."

Russia would not commit herself as to her future military
actions, consequently Lord Beaconsfield went before Parliament.
and requested an added sum for military preparations and he ex-
ressed the hOpe that England would soon be in an active struggle
in the Mediterranean.a2. The Prime miniter prOposed that Par-
liament should be immediately called tOgether, a vote of credit
for an increase Of our military force demanded and mediation
simultaneously undertaken.zu. Lord Derby refused consent and
intimated resignation. Lord Salisbury supported him in his
protest and the Cabinet broke up without coming to any decision.
In a letter to Sir S.Northcote Salisbury wrote, "It is prOposed
to summon Parliament in great haste to ask for money wherewith
130 arm. But money which cannot be waited for until the regular
session of Parliament Opens in three weeks is bound to cause some

questions, both in this country and in Turkey. The proposal of

Yesterday seems to me to place us on the steep slope that leads
4

l\')

W War. Is there any justification or danger to 'British interests?"

 

\ _i

$- 06011., Vol. II, p. 143 -- Letter to Lord Lytton
23' ILee., p.159, Monypenny and Bucfle II 1032-33
° .Mbnypenny and Buckle, "Life Of Disraeli" Vol. VI p.201

15

The Cabinet separated for the Christmas recess with the
members still divided on the question. Lord Beaconsfield wrote
to Lord Salisbury on the 24th of December asking for support in

carrying this request for funds to arm against the 'inevitable

24
war with Russia'. Salisbury replied on the 26th in a short

note,

"I do not think Wellesley's (Military attache/at
St. Petersburg) advice' to fight Russia now' is sound.
She is exhausted in the sense that she cannot go on fight-
ing without great sacrifices. But she is not so exhaustedau
to be unable to make head against any great national danger--
such as a war with England. Nor would the Turks be of any
great value as allies. Enrolled as troops under our Officers
they would fight admirably, but such an arrangement on an
extensive scale would never be permitted, so long as the
Turkish Government retains the shadow of independence. I
see therefore, no reason for agreeing with Wellesley that
this is a good moment for seeking to bring on the inevitable
collision with Russia, if it be inevitable."25

During the winter the roads were impassable for Russian
artillery, so little was accomplished in a military way by either
the Turks or the Russians. 0n the diplomatic front all the ele-
ments of the policy to accompany the acquisition Of Cyprus had been
introduced. By far the most prominent Of them was still the desire
to establish a commanding position in the Eastern Mediterranean
by the means of a convenient naval base from which the Dardenelles .
could be watched on the one hand and the Suez guarded on the other.2b
AB early as 1818 an Indian Officer J. M. Kinneir had written;"
Th9 possession Of Cyprus would give England a preponderating in-

fluence in the Mediterranean, and place at her disposal the future

destinies Of the Levant.
._____

3%. Ibid., p. 210
' Cecil., "marquis of Salisbury, Vol. II, p.169

25,
Lee., p. 61, Monypenny and Bueide II, 1032-33

16

Egypt and Syria would soon become tributaries, and we would acquire
an overawing position in respect to Asia Minor, by which the Porte
might at all times be kept in check, and the encroachments of Russia,
in this quarter, retarded, if not prevented. It would increase the
commerce to an considerable extent, and it is of easy defense, and
affordsthe most abundant supplies to our fleets at a trifling ex-

27
pense,"

\

27

- Ibid. , p. so

17

III
CUHSTRUCTIRC A POLICY

Through the winter of 1878 Disraeli continued to advise ~

early military action against Russia and the dismemberment Of

Turkey. Lord Derby of the Foreign Office who had objected to
this policy for the last year tenhred his resignation. Lord
Salisbury accepted the office Of Secretary of State For Foreign]
Affairs on March 28th. He hurried up to London from his home
at Hatfield and spent the last hours of March 31, in preparing‘
the document later known as the Salisbury Circular issued on
April 1. The Circular was telegraphed out, either verbatim or
in substance, to the capitals of Europe. It was not a long
document; exclusive of the recital of the recent negotiations
with which it Opens, it contains some fifteen hundred words.
The formal occasion of its issue was to explain the refusal of
England to enter into the prOposed Congress of Berlin until
the Russian government had withdrawn its reservations. The
Document in its essential features were--an insistence that the
validity Of the treaty must depend on the assent of the Powers,
a criticism of the excessive cessions made to Bulgaria, as a
Istrong Slav state,-- under the auspices and control Of Russia,
an advocacy of Greek rights against the Slave, Opposition to
the "compulsory alienation of Bessarabia" and Russia's acquisition
“f Batoum and Armenia, and anxiety as to the "political indepen-

‘kflflce of the government of Constantinople." Britain it declared,

\ .
._.*—_-—.—n 7- - w» v—- H— - -._~‘ F - v —-————-v-_ — — ”- ._-._: . ,.-

18

would not enter a Congress unless all the changes in the treaties
of 1856 could be freely discussed there.é7a

France and Italy hailed the Salisbury Circular for its
defence of the Mediterranean'status quo,‘ Germany and Austria its
protest against the extension of Slav domination. Its appearance
was followed by a rapid transformation in the continental attitude
towards England, Lord Disraeli remarked, "though we were still
recOgnized as standing apart, in this very utterance we have
sought no support through preliminary consultations with others.
But the isolation which had hereto witnessed to the indifference
Of other nations, dangerously verging upon contempt, now appeared
as a circumstance of leadership." A week or two later Count
Andrassy was plantively noting that though Austrian interests
.were those most immediately involved, England was now treated
everywhere as the neutral power to be first consulted. In fact,
from this date until the Congress met at Berlin, the course Of
EurOpean diplomacy became almost continously dependent upon the
action initiated in Downing street."28

In letters to Lord Odo Russell, Lord Salisbury re-emphasizes
the British aspect of this whole negotiation; "we Object to Russia
under the mask either of Slav or Turk domination on the various
coasts, Persian, Arabian, Syrian, or Greek, where we now have
friends, clients and interests. How that domination is to be

"as
met~-whether by diminution or by counterpoise--is another question.

\"— --. - ._ -—~__- -—— . - —*———- - c——— — , a- . m .-

 

 

37a. Seton-Watson, "Britain In Europe," p 535
28. Cecil., II p. 2:51
9. Ibid., p. 239

19

This attitude of England witnessed by the Circular and the
subsequent unfavorable aspect of other European powers gave
Salisbury an Opportunity to negotiate with Russia with some hOpes
of an early settlement.

Some have accused Lord Salisbury of issuing the Circular
just for an impression, but he writes in his letter Of April 10th
to the Russian ambassador, "As he likes frank diplomacy (referring)
to Count Shuvalo$, the Russian premier), it may be useful for you
to tell him exactly what we want." Certain Objects of British
policy were briefly summarized; that an independent Bulgaria
would not reach south of the Balkans; that either Russia should
surrender her Asiatic conquests or England should acquire "some
post which would safeguard her Asiatic interest," that the Straits
should either be neutralized and their fortification forbidden
or that the blockade of them in time Of war should be considered
as legitimate."30.

On this same line of thought Salisbury wrote to Lord Odo
Russell on April 17, "I still think that the division Of Bulgaria
in Europe and the provision for compensation for England in Asia
are the two keys of the same look. Thus the putting of the in-
demnity into a precise form, and the arrangement of the Straits
question in this manner shall not put England into a worse position
than at the beginning of the war. Of course, we shall be glad if
the Straits could be declared as Open as the Sound; but, even

31
ShOrt Of that, some accommodation may be possible.

\_ - - -

‘— ~—

30. Cecil, II, p.239., Letter to Lord Odo Russell
1. Ibid. , p.‘ 242

20

On May I, Lord Salisbury informed Count Shuvalow that he was
ready tO initiate negotiations with St. Petersburg looking to the
modification Of the San Stefano treaty. On May 4 he deepatched
a plea to Austria for support in pushing the future Bulgaria back
from the Aegean Sea.

On May 9th and 10th he finally laid down the general terms
upon which an alliance with Turkey might be made and also the
indications that England objected to the extension Of Russian

boundaries in Armenia and hoped for concessions in this region
32.

to British feeling.
While waiting for the answer from Russia he wrote further
to Mr. Layard, British ambassador to Constantinople as of May lo,

“to meet the threat of Russian advance, the Porte
should concede to us the occupation of Cyprus, it has the
double advantage of vicinity both to Asia Minor and Syria;
it would enable us without any act Of overt hostility and
without disturbing the peace of Europe to accumulate
material of war, and if requisite, the troops necessary
for Operations in Asia Minor or Syria, while it would not
excite the jealousy which other powers would feel at the
acquistions of territory on the mainland. We should not
desire to acquire it in any way that could indicate hos-
tility to the Porte, or any acquiescence in partition. We
should therefore propose to hold it as part Of the agree-
ment by which we undertook to defend the Asiatic Empire _
against the Russians, and that we should distinctly stipu-
late that, as both these engagements were consequent on
the Russian annexations in Armenia, as soon as these
should cease, both our defensive alliance and our occupa-
tion of Cyprus should cease also.53-

However, on May 24 England was informed that Russia was
unWilling to give up her conquests in Armenia. Discussions with
Gaunt Shuvalof led to the announcement by Salisbury that he was
abOut to complete an arrangement by which the Russian army would

bewithdrawn from the vicinity Of Constantinople and the Autonomous
\ww _— - .___ -- -

’1 fl
:2' C9011: 11. P. 254. Salisbury Memorandum,Draft to Loftus #350
‘45‘ Ibid., P.269, Letter to Mr. Layard

 

 

21
Bulgarian principality would be limited to the north of the
Balkans.y4. Layard was to warn the Sultan that if he did not
consent to the terms of the alliance which England had offered
to him, "it will not be in the power England to pursue ne-
gotiations any further, the capture of Constantinople and the
partition of the Empire will be the immediate result." England
alone had saved the Sultan but would desist inqthe future unless
he made a written agreement by Sunday (May 26)U5.

In brief, the convention now urged upon the Sultan was;
"that if Batoum, Ardahan, Kara, or any of them were retained by
Russia, and if Russia should take further territories of the
Sultan in Asia, England would join the Sultan in defending -
them by force of arms. In return, the Sultan promised England
to introduce reforms, to be agreed upon between them,and consent
to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and‘administered
by England."5b.

While Layard was struggling with an obstinate Porte to
get his signature to a Cyprus convention, Salisbury and the
Cabinet were dealing with Russian and Austria. As a result
Of these negotiations with Russia, Two memorandums were signed
on May 30 * which registered the points upon which they were free
to raise further discussion at a EurOpean Congress. So far as
Turkey in Asia was concerned Russia agreed to give up Bayazid

‘

"4- 00011., Vol. II, p 269--Letter to Mr. Layard
20- Iee., p.83--Telephone to Mr. Layard
:5 Ibid. p.84

Appendix Note #1

and theqvalley Of Alashkert but refused to yield Ears or
Batoum.y7. On June 6 another supplementary agreement was con-
cluded with Austria. According to the understanding reached
with Count Andrassy, Austria and England were to support
each other inrtheir reSpective views concerning Bosnia and
Bulgaria although Andrassy intimated that he considered the
pledges to beaonly a gentleman's agreement and subject to
modification.98.

Thus the secret agreements negotiated with Russia,
Turkey and Austria cleared the way for the acceptance on June
Z“bf Bismarck's invitation to a congress at Berlin. Taken to-
gether they represent a pOlicy though not the complete whole
that the English cabinet wanted, it was nevertheless something
definite and marked an advance of that of a year ago. This
policy had now elevated England to a central place in the

39.
settlement of the Eastern Question.

K

 

37. Lee., p.85--Parliamentary Papers 0 2057 (1878, #2)
38. Ensor's, "England 1870--l9l4", p.49
39. Seton-Watson, p.537

IV
THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN

The Earl of Beaconsfield, Lord Salisbury, and Lord
Odo Russell, the ambassador to Germany, were chosen to repre-
sent Britain at the Congress~of Berlin which was formally Opened
on June 13, 1878. Despite the secret agreements by which the
ground had been prepared, there proved to be many difficulties
in the path Of the British delegation. The principal problems
involved were the removal of Russian influence as far as possible
from the shores of the Aegean and the assurance of Turkish
control over the regions north of it at least up to the crest of
the Balkans.4o.

The other difficulties encountered by England at the Con-
gress concerned her interest even more directly and zarose in
connection with the disposition of Batoum, Turkey's Asiatic
boundaries, the Straits, and arrangement for the actual occu-
pation of Cyprus. The negotiations over these points were
oOmplicated for the English plenipotentiaries by the unfortunate
revelation in the 'Globe' on June 14, the day after the Congress
°Pened, of the secret memoranda which had been signed by Lord
Salisbury and Shuvalof on may 50.

While Andrassy did not, depite the feeling in Vienna,

.waver in his promised suppOrt of England at Berlin, the reaction

\_

W __V -- -— 'W“ - - — — , ---—.—_.“

40. Moneypenny a Buckle., Vol. II, 1187
- Layard., "Memoirs," VIII F. O. p.143

24

in Turkey greatly endangered the good relations established
between England and the Porte where the disclosure was being
represented, said Bayard, "as a secret arrangement for the
partition of Turkey, and as proving that the British Government
had been from the first in league with Russia and Austria for

41
the division of the spoils."

Lord Salisbury decided to make capital Of the 'Globe
revelation' either to get a Russian renunciation of Batoum or
to gain the freedom Of the Straits for the British Fleet. His
first move was to telegraph to Mr. Layard on June 15 asking
him to secure, if possible, the Porte's consent to the following
agreement:

"In case Russia should seek to acquire, or having

acquired to retain Batoum, and England should be

of the Opinion that the presence of a naval force

in the Black Sea is expedient with a view to pro-

tecting the Sultan's interests in regard to H. M's.

territories as defined in the preliminary Treaty Of

San Stefano; His Majesty will not Offer forcible

Opposition to the passage at any time Of the English

fleet through the Straits of the Dardenelles and the

Bosphorus for that purpose.”42

This was indeed a bold step which Salisbury in his
telegram to Layard justified. by the explanation that such
an agreement would probably prevent Batoum from being taken,
or if it was taken, would enable England, "to provide for
the Porte." To Mr. Gross, left in charge of the Foreign
office of London, he pointed out that since England was much
the stronger naval pdbr, her exclusion from the Black Sea was

a greater loss to her than the gain Of Russia's exclusion

‘-

41. Layard., "Memoirs," VIII F.O. p.145
42. Cecil., p.290

43
from the Hediterranean.

On June 25 Salisbury wrote to Layard, "Against the
danger resulting from the capture Of Kara and Batoum the
Convention (of June 4) you have signed is a sufficient
guarantee, it will bring little real advantage to Russia with-
_out a large expenditure Of money; it will not enable her to
threaten or injure Turkey. We may be able to use this in-
cident to apply for more leeway concerning the Straits
'question."44

Meanwhile the English cabinet now began to admonish
Salisbury to the effect that public Opinion in England would
not permit the abandonment of Batoum. Salisbury looked at
the question in this light however; "If we reserve to our-
selves the practical power Of entering the Straits whenever
the independence of Turkey is threatened, we shall have done
enough even if we are not able to recover Batoum."45 The
fact that Cyprus was to be given tO England and that England
also advocated that Austria take over Bosnia, Temporarily
that is, led to grave suspicions Of British self-interests
by the Porte.

July 9th, the day on which it was hoped to settle the
remaining questions concerning Batoum, was set for the
announcement of the Cyprus convention. Late on July 6th, the
word came that the firman authorizing the transfer of the

island to British rule was being prepared and on July 7, that

it had been granted. On the same day, Mr. Baring and a

43. Ibid., p.291
44. Salisbury Deep #10 Berlin, June 19, 1878, F.0. 78/2899
45. Lee., p.96--Memorandum to Cross

26

Turkish Pasha carrying the firman left ConstantinOple for
Cyprus and orders were issued to Sir John Hey to proceed
'with some warships under his command to the island, although
iLord Salisbury asked that troops be held back a few days to
avoid the appearance Of force to other powers.4b0n the night
of July 6, Lord Salisbury wrote a long personal letter to Mr.
Waddington, the French minister, explaining the Convention and
the circumstances that had made it necessary, and sent a much
shorter one to Bismarck to whom the English policy had already
been explained.47

In the final convention signed at Berlin on the 13th of
July, England had gained all her points with the exception of
the commercializing of the port of Batoum and the inclusion of
the Mohammedan lazes by Turkey.48 In accomplishing her aims;
holding back Russia, acquisition of a port to protect British
interests, an alliance with Turkey; she had gained the distrust
of the other powers. Lord Salisbury now sought to placate
France first of all.49 In a series of letters to hr. Cross he
reveals his ideas on the entire question of the Cyprus Conven-
tion; "The Congress of Berlin fulfilled its immediate Object
in bringing a dangerous crisis to a peaceful close. Its
permanent importance lay in the purpose which it represented,--

the unanimous refusal of the rest of EurOpe to allow Russia's

claim to predominate in the Near East. The part which her two

 

46. Ibid., p.97--98 Telegram (per) to Layard
47. Cecil., Vol. II. p.294., P.O. 365/4 & 363/5
48. Seton-Watson., p539-4O

49. Lee; p.100 F. o. 363/4

27
Imperial allies took in this refusal and the enduring resent-
ment which their action aroused in her . . . made the
Congress a point Of vital departure in the history of the
world."50 The actual provisions of the Treaty which it
formulated Offered no permanent solution to the problems dealt
with. Finality was, in fact, impossible while the Turkish
Empire endured, and in his private correspondence Lord Salisbury
never claims for his own proposals more than a prospect of
transitional stability.

In the House of Lords the Convention was attacked mainly
for the vagueness and largeness Of the commitments which were
involved in the pledge of resistance to further Russian advance.
"The question we have to ask ourselves is concerning the res-
ponsibility which we should have incurred if we had left the
whole thing alone,i Once the government had come to the con-
clusion that it could not safely allow heSOpotamia and Asia
Minor to fall into Russian hands, its only wise and prudent
course was to announce the fact beforehand. A similar frank-
ness would have averted the Crimean war. In recording a
pledge which made it clear beyond the possibility of doubt that
further annexations would not be tolerated, we were playing
into the hands of Russians more prudent counsellors and taking

51
the strongest security for future peace."

 

$0. Cecil., Vol II, p.297-- To Hansard July 18, 1878
51. Ibid., p.301.

28

THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION

Beaconsfield and Salisbury now hurried home to defend
their policy before Parliament. Already the issues‘ in the
press and Barliament-resolved themselves into three main
divisions: Was England's promise tO protect Turkey against
Russia a necessary and a wise policy? Was Cyprus valuAble
because of its position and its fitness for a military and
naval station? Was Turkey's promise to reform worth any-
thing; was England justified in assuming the burden of res-
ponsibility for the carrying out of reforms in Asiatic
Turkey? Lord Salisbury based his defence of the Cyprus
Convention on the premise that for the sake of the Indian
Empire, Russia must be prevented from further encroachments
upon Asiatic Turkey and that the Ottoman Porte was too weak
to perform that task alone. England's task was therefore to
take a position which would enable her to better defend
Turkey and to influence the improvement of economic and po-
litical conditions in the Asiatic portions of the Sultan's
dominions. England was not only to take the responsibility
Of defending Turkey, which was thrust upon her by her imperial
interests and not the caprice of the government, but also to
perform a civilizing influence in a backward region where

trade and commerce were to be develOped for the benefit of its

29
inhabitantthhe Ottoman Empire and the world in general. For
both of these purposes Cyprus was excellently adapted, as
although it was admitted that there were other locations equally
as good or better which had been avoided out of the considerations
for the feelings for France.52

"We do not, my Lords, wish to enter into any unnecessary
'responsibility, but there is one responsibility from which we
certainly shrink; we shrink from the reaponsibility of handing
to our successors a diminished or weakened Empire.----In taking
Cyprus the movement is not Kediterranean; it is Indian, we have
taken a step there which we think necessary for the maintenance
of the Empire and for its preservation in peace."'?3 From the
very first of the negotiations and hOstilities it seemed that
England would have to submit to the demands Of the three
emperors, or to some settlement which had been prearranged by
them. It is true that some concessions were mAde to Russia
and to Austria to win her over but the result was the breakup
of the Dreikaiserbund and the establishment of England as the
commanding figure and power at the end of the convention.54
England was thus given a freer hand to work out her policies in
Turkey than if she had not isolated Russia and won the friendship
of Bismarck and Andrassy. Lord Salisbury later declared, "Men

are much more readily persuaded by acts than by words, and there-

 

52. Cecil., Vol II., p.801-304--Letter to Laysrd
53. Monypenny a Buckle., Vol II, p.1224
54. Lee., p.122

30

fore we occupied the island of Cyprus to show our intention
of maintaining our hold in those parts....When the interest
of Europe was centered in the conflicts that were waged with
Spain, England occupied Gibraltar. When the interest of
EurOpe was centered in the conflicts that were being waged
in Italy, England occupied Malta; and now that there is a
chance that the interest of Europe will be centered in Asia
Mdnor or Egypt, England has acquired Cyprus."b5

No one was more fully aware of the immense difficulties
{ still to be overcome than Salisbury who had borne the major part
of the work of salvaging England's interest, so long jeOpardized
by hesitation and indecision. "But had we any other choice? he
asked "Battle there must be--for there are rival interests to
satisfy; and we had to choose between the immediate appeal to
arms, or postponing, with the chance Of avoiding, that arbitra-
ment by substituting for it a protracted diplomatic struggle."56

Although Lord Salisbury stoutly denied that he had any
intention of acquiring Territory in Asia Minor, it is probably
true that few Russians, Germans, or Frenchmen in 1878 believed
him and that everyone in Asia Minor was forecasting the passage
of that country into British hands. While Salisbury's corres-
pondence with Layard does not altogether bear out this Opinion,

except at moments of exasperation with the dilatory tactics of

 

55. Lee., "Cyprus Convention“, p.124 Salisbury to Layard (Private)
56. Ibid., p.147, Salisbury to Layard

31

the POrte, he . certainly hOpedto see EurOpeans employed
in the highest governmental posts in Turkey and explained that
unless this were done, very little would be accomplished.
"WOuld it be possible, he asked Layard, "to begin with some
province and appoint some Indian Officer or civil servant, who
would be selected with great care?"57 Salisbury wished to work
through the Sultan, however, and realized the difficulty of
persuading a sovereign to place power in the hands of men who
would not be likely to let it slip back again.

The fundamental assumption upon which Salisbury and
Layard based their hOpe of success was that the Sultan and the
Porte were sincerely desirous Of reforming their empire. The
method which they adopted, therefore was to use the Sultan as
a 'fulcrum' upon which the lever of advice and admonition was
to work in order to stir the slow moving Turkish government
into action. But Layard also agreed with Lord Salisbury that
the "authority and influence of Britain at ConstantinOple is
one of the vital objects of English policy, perhaps the most
important of all," and that he was keenly aware how he might
Jeopardize that influence by pressing the Sultan too strongly
to do what he feared would weaken the sovereign's authority. 58

By the end of July it had been agreed that the program
which England should demand should be a mild and inoffensive

one, involving the institution of a gendarmerie in Asiatic

 

 

57. Cecil, II p.313, Letter to Sir Henry Layard
58. Cecil, II, p.315

32

Turkey to be organized and commanded by EurOpeans, the Establish-
ment of central courts of justice likewise to be supervised
by European lawyers, the reform Of tax collections by the
abolishing of tithe farming and again introducing EurOpeans
into the system, and the appointment of strong men as governors
of the provinces upon definite terms of office instead of the
Sultan's pleasure.59 The Sultan and the Porte professed them-
selves to be well pleased with these proposals when they were
presented in early August and after a delay of two months
finally accepted them.60

The Obstacles to both the acceptance and the application
of the reforms was overwhelming. The greatest of these was the
virtual bank-ruptcy of the Ottoman Empire and the inability
Of Britain to remedy the situation. The British government
found, however, that there was no hOpe of guaranteeing a loan
to Turkey because Of the temper of Parliament, whose members
believed that England's financial Obligations were already
too great and that'Turkey was unworthy of confidence.61

On August 22 in a letter to Sir S. Northcote, chancellor
of the Exchequer,Lord Salisbury suggested, "The principle of it
is to offer-~money to Turkey and peace with Greece, some chance
Of indemnity to Russia, something to the creditors and reforms

to the Asiatic pOpulation. I hope to work out the figures for

you more closely. Whenver a railway or other undertaking has

 

59. Lee, "Cyprus Convention", p.150, Salisbury to Layard
60. Ibid., p.153

61. Lee, p.153, Salisbury to Layard (Telegram)

come to grief, it has always been found necessary to raise a
certain amount of money in the first instance to restore its
money-earning power. It is the same with a bankrupt state.62
Another obstacle in the way Of pressure upon the Porte
was the fear almost constantly present of Russia's aims in re-
gard to Constantinople and Turkish Armenia. Her army had not
been withdrawnfrom the vicinity of Constantinople although in
September it had been withdrawn beyond the Chataldje lines.
However, Salisbury feared in October that the Russians would
not evacuate Eastern Rumelia at the stipulated time. What
alarmed Salisbury is that Russia might again win the favor of

Austria and Germany and by the means of the renewed Dreikaiserbund

 

feel free to do as she pleased. accordingly the British Govern;
ment authorized Layard to inform the Sultan that "the Queen
is fully resolved to insist on the evacuation of the Balkan
peninsula by Russia next May, in accordance with the treaty,
and if force is necessary will OOOperate with the Sultan for
that purpose."bz

In this extract from a letter to Lord Loftus, Ambassador
to St. Petersburg, we see some of these fears of Russia re-
vealed, but Of more importance we see revealed Salisbury's

concept of Honor as regards Turkey, for that matter, any other

country with which England was dealing with at that time;

 

a...

62. Cecil., II, p.311. Letter tO Sir S. Northcote.
68. Lee., p.153 Salisbury to Layard

34

"The usual duality of Russian policy is again
making itself apparent. In Turkey they are con-
ducting themselves as if their one object was to go
to war with England. Every trick which it is possible
for imagination to conceive, every subtle misconstruction
of the treaty is being used for the purpose of hinder-
ing the prOper execution of the treaty. Our policy
seems to me to be simple. All kinds of difficulties
will be placed in our way during the organizations
and delimitations prescribed by the treaty. We do
not intend to quarrel on any Of these subsidiary points.
The great question is, will they evacuate on the 5rd
of May all the territories south of the Danube,--or
rather Roumania? If not I do not see how peace can
be preserved, for, having induced the Turk on the
faith Of the Treaty to evacuate Batoum, Varna and
Schumla, it is impossible that we can leave him in
the lurch. The Czar understands the meaning Of a
point Of honor, and I am hOpeful that he will recOgnize
this as one which we should be disgraced if we gave
up. 64

Now in Summary, what was accomplished by the Cyprus
Convention? "The upshot of the labours of the last;year and
a half has been, besides the Anglo Turkish convention, a very
considerable incréhe in the authority and influence of England
at Constantinople. And this, so long as the Turkish Empire
endures, is one Of the most important Objects of British policy,--
perhaps the most vital of all. It will have to be maintained as
it has been achieved, by constant labour and vigilance on the

65
part of the ambassador." I
On the other side of the ledger, The whole reason for
England's failures in 1878 to 1880 came to this; The Sultan and

those who shared the spoils of the old regime were not interested

 

64. Cecil., II, p.344, Letter to Lord Loftus
65. Cecil, II, p.315, Letter to Lord Odo Russell

35

in reform or in any policy other than that of maintaining the
system which fulfilled their selfish desires regardless of the
cost to the mass of peOple whose welfare, after all, was more
often than not an excuse offered by self-proclaimed reformers
who sought gains quite as selfish as those of the Porte and
the Sultan.b6

In fact in 1875 England had stood at the parting of the-
ways in her policy toward Turkey. Was she to bolster up the
Ottoman Empire or partition and take her share? The needs of
imperial interests and the unity of the other foreign powers
had led the British representatives to proclaim the traditional
policy of maintaining Turkish integrity, but this had not pre-
vented partition of territory, although England's share was
disguised by the Cyprus Convention. Men like Lord Salisbury,
Er. Heme and Mr. Layard had dreamed dreams of England's mission
to civilize the backward regions of Turkey and thereby strengthen
and protect British imperial interests. This view formed a part
of the Cyprus policy but was incompatible with the other part
which made it a necessity to work through the existing Turkish
institutions.67

Great Britain failed in the great objects which Salisbury

set before her because she was compelled to adopt a compromise

and this compromise would not work. The election of 1880 changed

 

66. Seton-Watson, “Britain in Europe", p.539
67. Seton-Watson, p.546

the political picture for a short time but the problem which
was not solved at Cyprus was the beginning of a policy which

was solved by Lord Salisbury to a better degree in the occupation
68
of Egypt.

 

68. Lee, "Cyprus Convention", p.160 J

37

VI
SALISBURY MINISTRY-1885-1892

In 1880 an election was held and the Conservatives
lost their majority in the House and Gladstone agreed to
form a new Cabinet. On may 9, 1881 it was announced that
Lord Salisbury had been unanimously elected as the leader
of the Consévatives in the House of Lords. As leader of
the Opposition Salisbury did much to influence public
Opinion and had ample opportunity to express his views as
to the foreign policy to be followed by Her Majesty's
Government. Four years later, the Queen selected him for
the post of first authority. Lord Salisbury accepted the
office of prime minister and as he tooKup his duties he was
confronted with the problem; what to do with Egypt?69 First
let us trace in brief, the factors leading up to the Egyptian
crisis; In Egypt Gladstone not only failed to reverse
Disraeli's policy of imperialism but even extended it. The
Khedive of Egypt by his own extravagance had been forced to
sell his shares in the Suez Canal. Furthermore his prodigality
continued to the alarm of his French and British creditors.
In 1876 the French and the British sent representatives to
Egypt, who eventually assumed charge of the national finances

__

69. Cecil, II, p.348-356

38
in order to secure the payment of the debt.
In 1878 the French foreign minister H. Waddington had
pressed hard for a written convention concerning Egypt.

"Waddington pressed me STRONGLY TO CALL ON HIM,
so I went yesterdéy morning and had nearly an hour
and a half of it,.....the matter on which I think he
was most anxious was that we should put into an
obligatory shape the parity of influence between
England.and France in Egypt. He first proposed that
I should put into the form of a convention the assurances
which I had given him with respect to Egypt in our
dépatch. I said that I thought such a proposal would
be inadmissable on the ground that it was too plain
spokqaa claim to make the Khedive the vassal of
England and France. It does not seem to me to be
expedient to bind ourselves formally in this matter.
As matters now stand we have no choice but to admit
in some sort a parity of influence between England
and France. But the state of affairs may change and
it may suit us at some future period to push ahead;
and then an obligatory engagement would be highly
inconvenient.70

Salisbury was willing to give parity to France and was :
willing to work with France but the interests of Britain were
to come first as evidenced by this correspondence of April 10,
1879 to Lord Lyons, the ambassador to Paris,

"It may be quite tolerable and even agreeable to the
French government to go into partnership with the bond-
holders, or rather, to act as the sheriff's officer for
them, but to us this is a new and embarrassing situation.
Egypt can never prosper as long as 85 percent of her re-
venue goes in paying the interest of her debt. We have
no wish to part company with France; still less do'we
mean that France should acquire in Egypt any special
ascendancy; but, subject to these considerations, I shall 71
be glad to be free of the companionship of the bondholders.

 

70. Cecil, II.,9334-55, Letter to Lord Beaconsfield, Oct. §,1878
71. Ibid., p.335, Letter to Lord Lyons.

()3
(I)

In 1881 a group of Egyptians, who objected to the native
misgovernment and the intervention of foreigners, rose in revolt
with the war cry of 'Egypt for the Egyptians'. Eventually the
movement became fanatical and resulted in the death of many
EurOpeans. The British government invited France and Italy to
Join in intervention, but both declined. Finally in 1882 the
British entered Egypt in force and put down the rebellion alone,
Subsequently British agents assumed responsibility for a large
part of the government in Egypt. No protectorate was declared,

and Gladstone announced his intention of withdrawal as soon
72.
as good order should have been restored.

It is interesting to note the change, though slight, in
Salisbury's vieWpoint concerning Egypt. Writing to Layard on
October 29, 1878 he states:

What happened was this;--In the course of our
intercourse at Berlin, which was necessarily familiar,
Waddington and I often discussed the events which were
taking place in the Mediterranean and their effect on
the balance of power in the EurOpean states. While I
maintained our right to a dominant influence in Western
Asia and especially MesOpotamia, I disclaimed any in-
tention of establishing an exclusive foothold in Egypt,
and with respect to Tunis, I said that England was whodly
disinterested and had no intention to contest the in-
fluence which the geographical position of Algeria
naturally gave to France. Sometimes we discussed the
possibility of the Turkish Empire going to pieces entirely.
In that case, I told him, he must not hold us to any
promise as to Egypt; but that, as to Tunis, England
would not hold herself bound to interfere with any course
which France in such and event might choose to take."73

Salisbury wrote to Sir Stafford Northcote, on September 16,

_

72. Ensor, "Britain 1879-1914", p.75-77
73. Cecil, II, p.332, Letter to Sir Henry Layard.

39

1881; "asmo our policy--the defence of it lies in a nutshell.
When you have a neighbor and faithful ally (France) who is
bent on meddling in country in which you are deeply interested,
you have three courses open to you. You may renounce--or
monopolize-~or share. Renouncing would have been to place the
French squarely across our road to India. MonOpolizing would a
have been very near the risk of war. So we resolved to share."7y

A few months later Gladstone soon discovered that the
assumption of power carried with it responsibilities that he
had not forseen. A rebellion in the Sudan (1881) involved
the British government in Egyptian affairs far more deeply than
he had intended. The Sudan was an Egyptian province to the
south of Egypt. It had never been thoroughly conquered, and
it had always been subject to misrule. In 1883 thenative
tribesmen rose, drove the Egyptian troops into the fortresses,
and out to pieces an Egyptian army commanded by Hicks sent
against them by the Khedive.74 The resident British officials
advised the cabinet that the Egyptians could not hold the Sudan
without some help. The cabinet decided that it was not business
of the British govern ment. At the same time, the Egyptian
garrisons cornered in the Sudan could hardly be left to their
fate. In 1884 General Charles Gordon who had previously acted
as the governor of the Sudan under the Egyptians was sent to

Khartoum, the capital of the Sudan, to facilitate the evacuation.

 

73. Cecil, II, p.331, Letter to Sir Stafford Northcote.
74. Ward, A.W. &'Gooch, C.P., "Cambridge History of British
Foreign Policy" p.177

40

or merely to report on what was necessary to be done was not
clear in his orders and when he arrived at Iihartoum he attempted
to restore order. He too, was seen out off. A relief expedition
was necessary if he was to be saved. The cabinet delayed, since
an expedition so the cabinet thought, would bring upon Britain
more responsibility than she wanted to take. The delay was fatal.
The expedition which the British government finally despatched
arrived at Khartoum two days after the garrison had been
annihilated by the Sudanese. A public furor arose in England
and Gordon's death was attributed to the criminal negligence of
the Gladstone cabinet and let to its downfall in 1885. 75

In April of 1884 three months before thedeath of Gordon,
Lord Salisbury wrote to Hansard; "no deeper, no more vital
disgrace can befall this country than that General Gordon
should be allowed to perish in his undertaking without the
assistance from the English Government. Already there is
sufficient of Egyptian blood to be laid at the door& of this
present government; already we have made sacrifices enough of
those whose kingdom we have taken over, whose responsibilities
we have undertaken and to whose safety we are practically and
substantially pledged. we have now had five massacres of
Egyptian trOOps, massacres caused by the neglect of Her
Majesty's Government,--Hicks Baker, Sinkat, Moncrieff, and
Shendy, if the English cabinet are resolved to make no effort
to save this gallant man they will not only be covering the

75. Ward & Gooch, "Cambridge History" III, p.178-184

41

English name with dishonor, but they will be destroying that
belief in English prowess which is the only hOpe they have of
being successfully able to discharge their responsibilities
in Egypt. By their neglect they are paralyzing the power of
this country.76

After the death of Gordon the Gladstone cabinet lasted
only a few months, and just prior to the new election Lord
Salisbury was pressed for a statement of policy; "There is a
great pressure from our men for the declaration of a 'Policy'
.....I take the general objects of our policy to be to keep
Egypt from EurOpean interference on the one side and from
anarchy on the other.'::7 I do not believe in the plan of '
moulding the Egyptians to our civilization. As long as they
are Mohammedans that is impossible. The only place in which
we have tried-it is Afghanistan, and then it was not precisely V
a success."78

On February 26, 1885 Lord Salisbury made a speech in
the House of Lords, "On Abandonment of General Gordon", which
further defined his policy."

"With Mediterranean politics, as such, we have

no great cause to concern ourselves, France may be the

mistress of Algeria and Tunis..but Egypt stands in a

peculiar position. It is the gateway to India. The

condition of Egypt can never"be indifferent to us, and

more than that, after all the sacrifices that we have

made, after all the efforts that this country has put
forth, after the position that we have taken in the

 

 

76. Cecil, "Marquis of Salisbury", III, p.102 Letter to Hansard,
77. Cecil, III, p.102, Excerpt from Letter to Hansard
78. Ward & Gooch, "Cambridge History" III, p.184

42

eyes of the world, we have the right, and it is our
duty to insist upon it, that our influence shall be
predominate in Egypt. England is the only power in
the position to give this new infant government the
help and the aid that it needs and must have if it is
to sustain itself, and with all due regards to the
rights of the suzerain, the influence of England

must be predominate.79

 

79. Op. cit. p.127

43

VII
SALISBURY'S LAST MINISTRY 1895-1902

At the request of the Queen on the resignation of the
Gladstone Cabinet, Salisbury accepted the task of making a
ministry in the summer of 1885.80 AS he began to examine the
actual reports of the diplomatic situation he found them to
be even more forboding than what had been published. Prince
Bismarck had been discussing amicably with the French Govern-
ment preposals for insisting upon the 'Eur0peanising' of \
Egypt and its removal from England's exclusive control.
Austria had come to an understanding with her age-long rival
Russia, as to conditions in the Balkan peninsula by which
her neutrality would be engaged in the event of a Russian
quarrel with England.81 The latest develOpment was the
drawing of Turkey, "Britain's ancient and peculiar ally,"
to this combination. Russia had been seeking her friendship,
had even offered the retrocession of Kara and Ardhan, in-
volving under the terms of the Anglo-Turkish Convention that
of Cyprus also. Turkey had appealed to the two German powers
for advice, and they had counselled her, in the event of an

Anglo-Russian war, to proclaim neutrality and rigidly close

the Straits against the fleets of both belligerents-action

 

80. Cecil., Vol. III., p.186, Speech in Parliament, Feb. 26, 1885
81. Seton-Watson., p.062

44
which, in the disability inflicted, would have been almost wholly
one-sided.

Russia had insisted that the prohibition should be more
than verbal and had offered assistance in arming the Straits
against the passage of British warships. Turkey was herself act-
ually engaged in preparations for making their defence effective.82
Lord Salisbury's comment caustic though appropos;

"The (the Liberal Gov't) have at least achieved their
long desired 'Concert of EurOpe." They have succeded in
uniting the continent of Europe--against England."83
In 1878 no one hardly knew where or what Bulgaria was,

but by 1880 it was evident that this new Balkan country was not

to become a Russian Satrapy. Prince Alexander, the ruler, was
making himself felt as an influence and a power. In 1885 just

at the beginning of the Salisbury ministry events took another
turn; at Philipoplis, the eastern Rumelian capital, a band of
Christian officers forced themselves into the Pash's palace and
infermed him that his rule was at an end. Eastern Rumelia had been
set off as an "Autonmous province of the Turkish Empire," but had
used its partial freedom to promote complete union with Bulgaria
proper. The Sultan of Turkey was taken by surprise, but did noth-
ing. All eyes were turned to Prince Alexander at Sofia. The
prince hesitated to defy Russia and Turkey. His ministers and public

84
Opinion advocated advance and the holding of eastern Rumelia.

 

82. Cecil., Vol. III., p.125-134
83. Ibid., p.136
84. Coach & Ward., "Cambridge History," p.149

45

In 1878 England had been willing to fight Russia to
prevent the union of Bulgaria. How in 1885 the situation

was reversed; public opinion in England desired the union
85

of Bulgaria at the expense of Russia, Whatvgalisbury's
attitude concerning this question? He has been accfhd of
inconsistency but let us examine his own letters of this
period. In a telegram to the Queen, Sept. 24, 1885--

"In considering the attitude of England as to the
breadth of the treaty of Berlin, it must be remembered
that the maintenahe of the Balkan frontier was one

of the provisions on which Lord Beaconsfield insisted
at Berlin at the risk of war. If England now takes

the lead in tearing up the agreement which was forced
on Europe seven years ago, her position will not be
honorable and her influence will be much diminished.
Wish for the Bulgarians for union was as well known
then as it is now, and the danger of the big Bulgaria
is not at allevents diminished. Situation is embarrass-
ing because 0 the extreme weakness of Turkey. Prob-
ability is that the monarchies will not restore separa—
tion, but if they do, Great Britain cannot honorably
Oppose them..She would be stultufying herself. If the
union is upheld, best practical issue will be that of

a personal union in the Prince, institutions on each
side remaining without change."86 '

Lord Salisbury saw also in strong and independent
Bulgaria the addition of a buffer between the Turkish Empire
and the aggressive attitude of the Russians in the Balkans.87
All EurOpe was amazed at the moderate actions of the Balkan
peOples and Lord Salisbury early recognized this fact; that
despite the anger and passion of the emperor of Russia and

the panic alarms of the Sultan--"that a united Bulgaria had

passed from a debatable political project into anaccomplished

 

85. Ibid. p.150
86. Letters of Queen Victoria 11., Vol III, p.692
87. Ibid. p.242

46
88
and irremovable fact.

Greece now threatened to over step her bounds in an
effort to wrest territory from the Porte. Only the determined
89
stand of England.st0pped this move. Salisbury used his in-
fluence to stop Greece from declaringiwar on Turkey. In a
telegram to the Turkish Government on January 25, l886,--
"Inform the Porte that England has procured joint actions
of the powers to forbid attack by Greece on Turkey by sea.
But the vigor of our support entirely depends on Turkey com-
ing to an immediate agreement with Bulgaria and insisting
from Prince Alexander that he not demand extravagant terms...
take it clearly understood that Turkey must not count upon
our support unless she agrees with Bulgaria. Germéy, I have
good ground for believing, takesthe same view.90
Turkey yielded and an other part of her territory was re-
linquished.
Salisbury believed it necessary for Turkey to make this
concession which had been a realization for many years, to gain
the greater advantage of establishing a buffer against Russia.
This view was not shared by all the Cabinet as written in a note
to the Queen, "Lord Salisbury with his humble duty respectfully
submits that a cabinet was held today, chiefly on foreign affairs.
A large question was dealt with, which in the future, may be of
supreme importance. A section of the cabinet showed a strong in-
clination to depart from the traditional policy of this country of
resisting theiiesigns of Russia upon the Balkan peninsula. Lord

Randolph Churchill,

 

88. Cecil., Vol. II p.245
89. Ward & Gooch., Vol. III, p.150
90. Cecil., Vol. III, p.225, Telegram to the Porte, Jan. 26, 1886

47

Lord Hamilton and Mr. Smith were the three who took this
stand. It was not shared by the majority of the cabinet and_
myself, and therefore will not affect the policy of this
government. But it may at any moment produce difficulties
within the cabinet, of a serious kind."91

Another of Salisbury's actions on coming to the ministry
was an attempt to decrease some of Britain's imperial responsi-
bilities. He sent Sir Henry Drummond to arrange for the
evacuation of Egypt withha specified time. Specific reservations
and conditions were to be included in the agreement however, I
such as--"we must not leave Egypt until we have restored to her a
solvent and matured administration and a settled frontier} and
in leaving her, we must insure as against the other powers
those imperial interests of our own which were involved in her
geographical position as protection to the Suez Canal." For
the achievement of these purposes freedom from interference
while the control lasted, and freedom in determining the date
and terms of the withdrawn, were necessary conditions.92 4

Writing to Sir Henry Drummond, an ambassador to Cairo,
on August 13, 1886, Salisbury further enlarged on these
conditions, "The end to which I work is evacuation, but with

certain privileges reserved to England. I should like a

treaty right to occupy Alexandria when we pleased,--and a

 

91. Buckle, G F., letters of Queen Victoria, Third Series,Vol. I, p.20
92. Cecil., Vol. III, p252

48

predominance in the control of the railways,-- and perhaps one
of two other things. These terms may seem hard to obtain, but
I would not out myself off until the state of Europe had cleared
up. If we come back strong from the elections and if we can
persuade Germany to go along with us the results of which I
speak are possible. I am quite content that the Turk shall be
in Egypt as long as we are; but if possible no fixed date for
our evacuation.98

Finally in 1877, a convention was formulated whereby
British tr00ps should be withdrawn in three years. However
German, France, and Russia objected so violently that Turkey
was persuaded not to ratify.94 Not long afterward the
appearance of French designs upon the Sudan convinced Salisbury
that not only Egypt should be retained but that the Sudan
should be occupied also.gb On the diplomatic fronfSalisbury
was led to state after this rebuff by France and Russia,--"I
think that for some time to come England will remain comparatively
isolated and her word will weigh less in the councils of EurOpe'
than it did twenty years ago."96

The colonial rivalries which gave Salisbury the most
trouble were in Africa. While Gladstone cabinet was stillmin

WW8? nu“ It‘w’flmig Juli-law

power in 1885, gt created a new method of advancing British

'3;- 5.7.;ng «35’! ,;- L53“ and: 9?.” ‘A iii-Q“- whmih‘?‘ Many-.5681

imperialism in Afrlm‘;

I WJWV'QM’H can.» EM»!

’Private trading companies were established

'W%KW
“‘7' “a but-wens: imam new data-- .it awn 'l; ”“8“” “V i’“ “l" bis-‘1»: like.» m: a

which relieved the government of the heavy expense of administer- '

..a—-1P'-- a. ‘wm-M;

 

 

‘7“

93. Ibid., p.235, Telegram to Sir H. Drummound.
94. Ward & Gooch., Vol. III, p.244

95. Ibid. p.247

96. Op. Cit., p.160

49

ing the new territories gained. The East and South African

‘1‘le was]. ”3}“ was:

 

 

_ A - x .. ___-I "f’wm "L’s”,3ankV'i “-1. if... ,-..‘ .K..l-‘.- :\a._1-_ “11’s.;fi

Companies were formed and were able to enter large territories,

but trouble with the natives led the British Government to

A,-uh_‘
.~.

I i 0‘ I'M‘myhiiii- .ch. -

take over the obligations ofI each of these companies. The

.quwwhmxamkaa-k in 7». 'c.-‘ Viruw‘ ‘1‘1 It“ 4...: e. p:. 211.51. L.- k-i Law-1» n. 1.4.):

most pressing problems were the clashes with the African agents
of the other European powers who were also players in the game

of expansion. Salisbury' a chief work was to negotiate treaties

‘ l r. . __q{‘
A‘s‘?‘ ‘ .‘ 5603;. - Ha

which established recOgnized boundaries of the territories
memfiw 1».- ~- 1:1
claimed by the several Powers and so brought an end to some Iof

Raw-text 3v: as”: ”-1” ~1_-

the rivalries which had attained dangerous proportions in

it ‘a’ “fifty"
.‘I'.“I“’meV‘s-,1qril1‘v'):kfifirt.'-.‘fur'“'1‘!- an 4 3.1.,

sevexglmnegrens. Portugalgrwhieh.had,contested the occupation

I' '3‘“ VII-H lrépV-zt Pfifxxa v ‘w ,3

of Rhodesia, was forced to forgo its claims by the use of a

A: 4“» 2,..K J. 2 'U k- 1..: “I! Q‘,’"‘”lfi>" Qfi’b‘, Swag-V‘f‘ ‘Jhfikhwiil ud‘*’

writi-
azighgghggg. In 1890 Salisbury demanded the Withdrawal of
“Mating-3W1? 1'.“ '33:: 95: .b'fm I..." .431“ 1.» ~~ ‘T'Q‘i- 5;):5'1- '1.” 11'1" ~" '1'.’- Jr ”5“ 1:13" N «WEF'PLVV
Portugese trOOps from the territories claimed by Great Britain.
WIS-i nice-{talc “11,1”... t-.sr"l..'tne ,...'.j,-.,-1-ni1we...“,wr.,_:.1132»11s....agvxmwfiwmwvflIIIIIII II ,
Portugal was obdurate, but the issue of an ultimatum caused
defi‘cav‘VV" It" 973-1. ‘ . a.- -.a.. 1,51. IL w

herI to_givewwayg
Salisbury had warned Portugal that the British Govern-

 

ment could notI "recognize Portugese sovereignity inI territories

"”31 we W15“! “Aardf-s‘ltuxr m 'V#‘" l 71wa TVVfirfi-fi‘.’ ”1,31“ I55“, "3"“! hum "‘3'1'9"

not occupied by her in sufficient Istrength to gp,-pmgfiu

0 ml?“

4..-- _ , . . . _- ~1- 98
maintain order, protect foreigners, and control the natives."

M‘L £u\m :h‘m
”1

nuk- ‘31—»: .HWW:.M13I‘9‘R% ihfl- _... 3:" -- W" *‘W ' V "'

 

“.9...
v

rm

On June III: 1891, man Anglo-PortugenwgCongentign, wag
815116911 inWhichV.§89...§P¥19¥9.§.-Qf...11?lfJ-H9RQ.9.8.9!.8-...S.1.§}}T§39d "W
the extent  tha-t Portugal received.a portion of the disputed
Zambesi territory while England retained control of Nyasal nd

k,“ HmL,-\1.;.M4

F...

 

97. Lunt, H.E., "History of England . p-724-6
98. Ward & Gooch., "Cambridge Hist. of B. F. Pol., Vol.III. p.211

50
99
and Mashonland.

On the other hand Salisbury saw it was good to make
concessions in one directions at least, in favour of Germany,
Vin the colonial field. A proposal aired by Bismarck in 1886
now took definite form and ripened into the Anglo-German
convention, by which Uganda and Zanzibar were transferred to 1
the British sphere of influence in return for German's
access to Zambesi river by the so called 'Caprivi Tail', and
above all for the little North Sea island of Heliogoland,
which had been England's since 1814.* The increased value of
HeliOgoland to Germany after the completion of the Kiel Canal
(already begun in 1887) seemed to be less apparent than the
possibility of a French naval attack upon it after it had
passed into German hands. The explorer Stanley saidi, "con-
cerning the transfer of Uganda and Zanzibar for Heliogoland
was like exchanging a suit of clothes for a trouser button."100

The Queen did not like the idea of this exchange and
said so. Salisbury defended his decision to the Queen by
arguing, "that any indefinite postponement of a settlement in
Africa would render it very difficult to maintain terms of
amity with Germany and would force us to change our system of
Alliances in EurOpe" and this he addediohould "necessarily

involve the early evacuation of Egypt.

Salisbury was hopeful that this new Convention of 1890

99. Ibid. p.212

* Appendix., Note #4

100. Seton-Watson., "Britain in Europe, "p.567-8
101. C3011. V01. IV. P'de

51

might settle definitely all colonial differences and wrote to
the Queen, "We have made an agreement which removes all danger
of conflict and strengthens the good relations of the two

nations, who by their sympathies, interests and origins should
102
always be good friends."

On August 51dl§gQWSalisbury signed a Convention with
France which reCOgnized Britain's position in Zanzibar and

in Nigeria, in return for the recognition of France's para-
103
mount interest in.Madagascar. August 20 a similar agreement

A- V“... M A . Ar.»- ”:5; ‘J‘L \_..; vfl‘lkHM’V“

“v

humauflAHuwm“WW

was signedxwith.Portugal renewing the pledge of the integrity

1; .31M‘hf-Wv‘1h7‘1-l‘ ”Mk, r-‘v ”" ”51:51'1"

of Portugese territory and Portugal recOgnizing the claims of

M .._‘-l_ .mm... :“Mfimwvlmmhvw-‘W‘l ngmwm flunk“ “aw-I MW wruwu My new 1v} MRI-{ML'H elf-“1......" “k “9,2...

Britain in Zanzibar. These three agreements taken tOgether

represent the most positive achievementsfiLord Salisbury's
104
diplomacy'during his second ministry.

The colonial agreements of 1890 led to the scramble for

1 . M11” J33 5‘
~.-\,,...r-I..NE no“ hwaeherlt‘ut. “run—5‘1!“ HID Vow 'fiv‘S-f 3M ”M Mr“: ”~' ‘i'sw‘s. :3‘1.‘ 1'9. ..-.: Kiri“ “‘5‘ '3 ”fl-‘N WWW“. DWI #5

African concessions ”to the ezwenj that in ten years Africa had
WW“

‘Pct’ W5 WM v

been divided.and apportioned ameng the various EurOpean nations.
W8“ ”QPP‘Pqu W“ :11 '5J‘Vr‘MV"“7

Lord Salisbury cautioned the English people and the Government,

"That colonial expansion in itself is undesirable unless dictated

by imperative considerations of public welfare and imperial
105
safety."

During the later part of this decade Germany challenged.
Britain's ability to hold what she had gained; the excuse that
'was found was the desire of the little country of Portugal to

mmaarw~a~MHWAIrnmmaam~1m11. 01‘35u‘4‘mfl‘

 

 

102. Priebram, F.F., "England. and. France." p.49

10%. Seton-Watson., "Britain hn Europe." p. 568

104. Ensor, "EurOpe 1870-1900, p. 191

. 105. Quarterly Review October 1902 F. S. Pulling, p.607

02

bolstz-r her sinking economy. The question of Portugal's need

‘fi-‘l-fl.‘ mar-11"; . . ‘
-.._ —-w .«hlm 1.3,HI'7 -,,u'_, __1.“‘ .‘x_ 'n" '1'

of money soon became the minor issue which in reality was
a series of manoeuvers turning mainly around Belagoa Bay, _

admittedly the key to the Transval--'the key of peace in South

w. W31" WW“ 11“?“

‘tr— I:

Africa.‘ - Britain would have likedto leaee it from Portugal but
3"”? «in; ..-~-*"106
Germany blocked the plan.

u—uw .- .wwgmnir ’1“

As early as 1895 Salisbury had declared in a speech dd-
livered before Commons,

"many men have though that we have expanded far enough.
Let us draw a line they say, and never go beyond it. But
that is not the conditions which fortune or the evolution
of the world causes has imposed upon the develOpment of
our prosperity. If we mean to hold our own against the
efforts of all civilized powers of the world to strangle
our commerce, by their prohibitive finance, we must be
prepared to take requisite measures to Open new markets
for ourselves among the half civilized nations of the
world, and we must not be afraid of the effort, which is
vital to our industries, should it bring with it new
responsibilities of Empire and government."107

In the midst of the conflict over Delagoa Bay Salisbury
caused to be printed in the 'Time§ of January 31, 1898 this

statement, "Our policy is, first to defend our possessions

and our colonies; secondly, it is to open new markets whenever
WWW N

it is possible; thirdly, it is to prevent the old markets from

MW“ 1600!:1 1U“?

being closed against us, and being transformed in the exclusive
108
monOpoly of some single state." Despite the above statement

Count Hatzfeldt wanted a share of Portugal's colonies and con-

an :1- Igu' ..... ‘ 1‘1) 0’11)va

tinneg negotietiaae algae that line.-.1t is best to examine the

 

 

106. Seton-Watson., "Britain in EurOpe." p.584
107. Forth. Review April 1, 1898 Vol. 69:516
108. Ibid., p.517

 

53
instructions of Salisbry to his various foreign ministers to
trace his views in this matter. Writing to Viscount Cough,
Portugese minister;

"Count Hatzfeldt asked to see him today with reference

to the matters of a loan to Portugal which we discussed
last Friday. The Count asked whether we would join

Germany in a common action in regard to the financial
Operations with the government of Portugal, a matter which
exclusively concerned the two powers in the question,

and that therefore, even if I knew the precise demands

of M. de Several (Minister from Portugal) which I did

not, I should think that they could not form the subject
of communication between Germany and this government.

Our motive for action was to maintain the 'status quo'
in respect to Portugeses possessions, and to prolong the
life of Portugal. If we should fail, and the question
of Portugese African territory passing under new owners
should arise, then it would be quite prOper and most
desirable that full communication should take place be-
tween the two governments who possessed adjacent territory,
I did not, admit any right. of claims which would then
come under consideration would be at all prejudged by
designating any special revenues of Portugal as security
for a loan.

In the course of the discussion. I took occasion to
intimate to Count Hatzfeldt that the Cabinet were fully
alive to the importance of the ancient treaties between
Portugal and Britain which had been confirmed in 1873,
533 in some de ree by Lord Derby in 1876. WithOut bind-
ing*ourse1ves %6 details WhICh might become antiquated,
we held, as Lord Granville did, that the treaties con—‘
ta1nedԤtipulations which, in suestance, were still bind-
ing uppon' Great Britain."109

unaware fiw.1;l.s-Mflflr’“5h,,a;-

On the following day the Portugese minicter communicated
a telegram to Lord Salisbury to the effect that the German
Emperor had infbrusd.the king of Portugal that amicable relations
would be broken unless the negotiations now being carried on by
M. de Several in London were pursued with due regard to the leg-

itimate interests of Germany and her African Colonies;

 

I09. Gooch & Temperley, "British Documents on The Origins of
The War." II, p.49

54

"M. degeveral thenasked me what to do. I replied,
”that it epended upon whether their want of money was
very urgent or not. I had informed Count Hatzfieldt
that, in our Opinion, financial negotiations between
this country and Portugal, having for their object the
raising of a loan by Portugal, and finding security for
that loan for Great Britain were not matters which in-
terested anyone but the two powers concerned. But if
the negotiations should take the form of territorial
alienation in any sense, I quite well recognized that
Germany as a neighbor would and should be concerned.

M. de Several, in replying, denied that any alienation
was in prospect or probable. We did not believe that
the pledging of the customs revenue partoek of the
nature of an alienation of territory; because in
Turkey, Brazil and in several other countries the mort-
gaging of customs had been arranged for the purpose of
securing the interest on an external lean without the
slightest intention of carrying with it at any time

any territorial cession."110

Portugal was still in need of money so she now approached
France rather than cause difficulties between Germany and Great
Britain. However France wanted more than Just the collection
of revenue. Salisbury applied diplomatic pressure to step the
loan by France, he wrote to Sir. H. Mac Donnell, the British
Ambassador at Paris,

"The inclesure in your despatch #99, secret of the
15th instant, shows that among the revenues to be assigned
to the service of the loan which the Pertugese Government
is negotiating' in Paris are included those of the islands
adjacent to Portugal.

The expression 'adjacent islands' may include the Azores.
If it does, the matter assumes an aspect to which Her
Majesty's Government cannot be indifferent. They have no
desire to interfere unduly with the arrangements which
the Portugal Government may make with the view to placing
their finances on a satisfactory basis. In the treaty
engagements between the two countries, however, lay an

 

110. Gooch & Temperley,"British Documents" II, To Sir H. MoDen p.50

55

obligation on Great Britain to defendaPQrtugaliagainst
extegfidl.a$$ank,mhnfi.itm rlncumbent on Portugal not

to modify the general conditions under which the cen-
tinund ex1stence of the engagements has been acknow-
led ”“”*“"”“”" W”
“W The conditions to which I refer would be seriously
modified if the Azores passed directly or indirectly
under the control of a third power. The creation of

a lien on the revenues of the Azores might conceivabl-
ably lead to the establishment in them of conditions
which would hamper this government from carrying out
their obligations to Portugal. I feel bound to ask the
Portugeses Government to give an undertaking in writing
that the Azores shall not, without the written consent
of this country, pass under the control of any third
party. Portugal wisely stopped all attempts at pro-
curing a loan. 111

f"— w

 

———

111. Ibid., p.80. F 0 Genman.(Africa) 1467

56

VII

SALISBURY'S LAST MINISTRY 1895-1902

During the three years of Lord Roseberry's amninstration
(1892-1895)conflicts with other powers grew more frequent.112
0n the return of Lord Salisbury to the ministry in 1895 with a
coalition Cabinet, the first problem to be faced was the rumor
of French designs in the Sudan. In the English mind was new
the dream of a 'Cape to Cairo' railway and the Sudan was to be
the link with the northern and southern possessions. In 1896
Kitchener, in command of an Egyptian army led by British officers,
was despatched by the Anglo Egyptian.government to conquer the
Sudan.113 The French government immediately asked that
negotiations concerning the Sudan be considered, to which Salisbury
wrote in a letter to Sir E. Monson, the British minister to
France; "point out to the minister of Foreign Affairs that the
course which we shoulitake in the present negotiations would
largely be influenced by the fiscal policy which the French.
Government intended to adopt. Our object is, as we have more
than once declared not territory, but facility for trade. The

settlement of territorial controversies would be enormously

promoted by a knowledge that our trade would not be injured by

 

112. Ward 1 Gooch, III, p.244
11c. Ibid., p.249

57
114
any concession that we might make."

The French government still was insistent in demands
for territorial grants in the valley of the Niger and the Nile.
Salisbury parried with this thought,

"If Her Majesty's Government are unable to grant
access to the Niger, it is from no feeling of unfriend-
liness to the French Republic, and from.no desire to
hamper the work which France is accomplishing in West
Africa. It is their sincere conviction that such a con-
cession besides being incompatible with the position
secured to Great Britain at the Berlin Conference; would
defeat the Objects which the two governments have at
heart of securing an arrangement in West Africa which
will admit of their working side by side in their own
spheres of influence without friction and to their mutual
advantage.ll5 ,?

On August 2, 19S9 Salisbury sent a telegram to Lord
Cromer at ConstantinOple so that he too would be well informed
concerning the policy of the English government;

"It is desirable that you should be placed in possess-
ion of the views of Her majesty's Government in respect
to the line of action to be followed in the event Of
Karteum being occupied at an early date by the forces
new in Operation in the Sudan under the Command of Sir.
Henry Kitchener.

In view of the substantial military and financial
OOOperation which has been recently afforded by Her
Majesty's GO rnament to the Government of the Khedive
it has been 'ecided that at Khartoum the British and
Egyptian flags should be hoisted side by side. This
decision will have no reference to the manner in.which
the occupied countries will be admdnistered in the future.
Yeu will, heweveg, explain to the Khedive and his min-
isters that the procedure I have indicated is intended

 

114. Gooch and Temperley, II, p.139 F. 0. France (Africa) 5416
115. Gooch and Temperley, p.141

58

to emphasize the fact that this government consider
that they have the predominant voice in all matters
connected with the Sudan, and that they expect that
any advice which they think fit to tender to the
Egyptian government, in respect to Sudan affairs will
be followed."116

In the meantime Kitchener arrived at Fasheda and there
found the French Captain marchand who had marched in from the
west and had planted the French flag. Kitchener raised the
British flag and asked for the French withdrawal. The French
refused to retire without orders from the French government.
Wisely Kitchener turned the matter over to the diplomats of
each country and the two forces camped side by side in the
Sudan.117 French compliance was delayed to Salisbury's de-
mand for withdrawal and war was imminent. After several weeks
the French government gave way and their trOOps were withdrawn.
Delcasse} the French minister had made sure that neither
Russia or Germany would back him and that contrary to expect-
ation Lord Salisbury would not this time be squeezed to any
concession.118 .A Joint Egyptian and British rule was established
over the Sudan.119

In the diplomatic correspondence we find the views of
Salisbury who wrote to Sir E. Henson, the minister to Paris,--

"I request your Excellancy to inform the French Minister
of Foreign Affairs that, in accordance with his wish, his
message to M. Marchand has been transmitted to Khartoum
and will be forwarded thence to its destination. In order

to avoid_any mic-understandings, you should state to M.
Delcasse that the fact

 

116. Ibid., p.180, F. 0. Turkey (Egypt) 5050 to Lord Cromer
117. Ward & Gooch, "Cambridge History", p.251
118. Ensor, "Britain 1870-1914", p.134-45

_._- ARA. .. OIL/3

59

Of our having complied with his wish to transmit the
message does not imply the slightest modification of
the views formerly expressed by Her uajesty's Govern-
ment. You should add however, whether in times of
Deverish of Eghyptian dominion, the region in which

M. Marchand was found has never been without an Owner,
and in the view of this government his expedition

into it with an escort of one hundred Sengalese troops
has no political effect, nor can any political signifi-
cance be attached to it.120

Two days later the French ambassador called personally
upon Lord Salisbury. In reporting the results of the interview

of two hours length, Salisbury informed Sir E. Menson:

"I repeated the arguments on the British side of the
question. I pointed out to him that the Egyptian title
to the banks of the Nile had certainly been rendered
dormant by the military successes of the Mahdi; but
that the amount of right, what ever it was which by
these events had been alienated from Egypt, had been
entirely transferred to the conqueror. How much title
remained to Egypt, and how much was transferred to the
Mahdi, and the Kalifa, was of course, a question which
could be only practically settled, as it was settled,
on the field of battle by the success of Kitchener's
arms. But this controversy did not authorize a third
party to claim the land as a derelict.

But for the arrival of the British flotilla, M.
Marchand's escort would have been destroyed by the
Devirishes. M Harchand's was a secret expedition
into a territory already owned and occupied and con-
cerning which France had received repeated warnings
that a seizure of land in that locality could not be
accepted by Britain. The first warning was the Anglo
German Agreement,'122 which was cemmunicated to the
French Government and the provisions of which, as
regards the Nile, were never formally contested. The

 

122. Gooch & Temperley, p.174 F. 0. Turkey, 5101
Appendix

60

next warning was given by the agreement with the King
of Belgium, which gave him for his lifetime occupation
up to the Fashoda, and which agreement is in existence
and full force still. It is also true that the note
of Sir Edward Monson in 1895 and the speech of Sir E.
Grey in 1897 emphsized these same points. If France
thought fit to try in face of all these warnings, to
establish title over the vast territory to which they
applied their secret expedition of a handful Of men,
she must not be surprised that the claim would not be
recegnized by us."-K-U
The French diplomats made one more bid to achieve some-
thing from the expedition of M. Marchand. M. Camben called on
Lord Salisbury and intimated that M. merchand and his party
had evacuated the Fashoda and that he now assumed that Salisbury
should be disposed to discuss the differences which separated
the two countries at the time. Lord Salisbury stated that he
was, but thought it better to also add "that there was one point
upon which the Opinion in England was very strongly and sepecially
fixed and that was the objection of this country to share with
France political rights over any portion of the valley of the
Nile. At the same time I assured M. Camben that the commercial
outlet desired by his country was possible by the uniform tenor
"123
of English policy in all countries. Thus ended the Fashoda
incident a diplomatic victory achieved.without the shedding
of blood, however French-English relations remained strained
for a long time, only the threat of German aggression let the

. 123a
two counttres into a friendly entente.

123. Gooch & Temperley, p.198, F. 0. France #3454
123.. Ibid., p. 198

61

During the close of the century Britain's position in
the Far East was also threatened. England had exercised a
predominate influence in that part of the world since the
second Chinese war had forced China to Open her doors partially
to foreign commerce.124 A war fought between China and Japan
in 1894-95 for the possession of horse, began the scramble of
the western powers for possession of parts of China, and this
changed the Far Eastern situation entirely.125 Japan had secured
Port Arthur and other concessions which cut across Russian
desires. Russia with the help of Germany and France had forced
Japan to restore her conquests on the mainland.126 Britain re-
fused to be a party to the transaction and thus gained a friend
in Japan with whom she made a alliance in 1902.127 At this
juncture Britain stepped into the picture to protect her
commercial rights, for Lancashire, England risked losing one of
its largest markets if Russia and other conquering powers
absorbed the country of China.128

Two years later (1898) the murder of two German mission-
aries gave the opportunity for Germany to execute a seizure
which had been previously planned. In 1898 China was forced to
lease the port of Kiaochow to Germany, and in the same year
Russia arbitrarily seized Port Arthur, which she had earlier
forced Japan to restore to China on the basis of maintaining
Chinese integrity. Lord Salisbury first tried diplomatic

methods to protect British interests. His litters and Tele-

 

124. Ward a Gooch, "Cambridge History", p.257 .
125. Hubbard, T. M., "British Far Eastern Policy", p.13;
1260 Ibid., p.19

127. HcCordock, C. M. "British Far Eastern Policy", p192

128. tz annrdnnk n- M "an; oh man monfnun Dn1inv" n 104-08

62

grams are directed to Sir N. O'Conner the British minister.

On January 19th he informed him thus; "If practicable ask

M. Witte whether it is possible that England and Russia

could work tOgether in China. Our Objects are not antagonistic
in any serious degree; on the other hand we can both Of us do
each other a great deal of harm if we try. It is better there-
fore we should come to an understanding. We could go far to

further Russian commercial objects in the North, if we could
129

regard her as willing to work for or with us.”
Five days later Salisbury wrote again to Hr. Witte, the

Russian Ambassador:

"Our idea is this, The two empires of China and
Turkey are so Weak that in all matters of importance
they are constantly guided by the advice of foreign
powers. In giving this advice Russia and England
are constantly opposing, neutralizing each other's
efforts much more frequently than the real antagonism
of our interests would justify; and this condition
of things is not likely to diminish but to increase.

"We contemplate no infraction of existing rights,
we would not admit the violation of any existing
treaties, or impair the integrity of the present
empires of either China or Turkey. These two con-
ditions are vital; we aim at no partition of territory,
but only a partition of Preponderance. It is evident ’
that in respect to both Turkey and China there are
large portions which interest Russia much more than
England and vice versa."150q‘

Russia seemed to be intent on gaining territory more
to bolster her prestige than for an beneficial commercial
rights. Russia seized Port Arthur despite the protests Of
both Japan and England. Port Arthur was wholly useless as

a commercial port and had no significance except as a

 

129. Ward A Gooch, "Cambridge History", p.292
130- Gooch & Temperly, Vol 1, p.8, F.0. Russia #1557

63
military stronghold, Salisbury wrote, "they (Russia) would
in effect be commencing the dismemberment of China and
inviting other powers to follow their example. The possession
of Port Arthur was not desired by England; but on the other
hand its occupation by another nation would have an effect upon

the balance of power at Peking, which Her majesty's Government
131
could not but regard with grave Objection."

Russia went right on with her occupation of Port Arthur
while Salisbury for the present stated his objections in a
little stronger language;

"The interests of this country in China are not,
indeed, in the Opinion of this government, different
in kind from those of other countries, but they are
greater in extent, and have a greater relative im-
portance, in preportion as the volume of British
trade exceeds that in the hands of other nationals.
Speaking generally it may be said that the policy of
this country, is to effectively Open China to the
commerce of the world, and that our estimate of the
action of other powers in the Far East depends on the
degree to which it promotes or hinders the attainment
of this object.

It follows from this that the occupation of territory
by foreign powers is to be judged by the results, direct
and indirect, immediate and remote, which it is likely
to have upon the commercial interests of the world, and
the right of all nations to trade within the limits of
the Chinese Empire upon equal terms."l32

China was in need of help and turned to England with an
Offer of territory in return for aid. Salisbury wrote in re-
ply, "The present policy Of this government is to discourage

the alienation of territory. It is therefore premature to

discuss the lease of Wei-Hei-Wel unless the action of other
135
powers materially alters the position."

 

l31,Ibid., p.38

1320Gooch a Temperley, II. P.27
133.Ibid., p.18 '

 

64
However diplomacy failed and Salisbury made haste to
secure the lease of Wai-hai-wei, a port so placed as to give

Britain strategic equality with Russia and Germany in relation
134
to Peking. Salisbury followed this with treaties defining

'spheres of Influence'. The significant portions of the
treaty signed on October 26, 1901 were as follows;

The Imperial German Government and Her Britainic
Majesty's Government being desirous to maintain their
interests in China and their rights under existing
treaties, have agreed to observe the following prin-
ciples;-l. It is a matter of joint and permanent in-
ternational interest that the ports on the rivers
and coast of China should remain free and Open to
trade and to every form of legitimate or legal economic
activity for the nationals of all countries without
distinction. 2. The two governments will not, on their
part, make use of the present complications to obtain
for themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese
dominions, and will direct their policy towards main-
taining undiminished the territorial condition of the
Chinese Empire. 3. The two governments will communicate
this agreement to other interested powers, and especial-
ly to Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Japan, Russia and
the United States of America, and will invite them to
accept the principles recorded in it."135

0f greater value than the actual provisions of the con-
vention was the visible demonstration it furnished of an under-
standing between the two governments at a time when the relations
between Britain and Germany were subjected to great strain by
the Boer War.

Germany had given hostages to fortune by sending to

Northern China a large expeditionary force dependent for its

 

134. Ward & Gooch, III, p.233
135. Op. Cit., p.15

’3 V "-'-I—-——!
K»: E

65
communication and its safety upon goodwill of Great Britain,
who was in possession of all the chief cealing stations bet—
ween German and Far Eastern waters, and still undisputed
mistress of the seas. In these circustances, the Convention
served actually to bind Germany over to abstain from any in-
terference in South Africa, while the German Government con- .
strued it as a recegnition of the community and equality of

German and British rights in China, and notably in the Yang-

 

tsze valley, which the British heretofore had regarded as
their own particular sphere. Japan was the first Power to I
adhere, on October 29th, to the principles embodied in the I
Convention, and France, Austria-Hungary, Italy and the
United States followed suit, while Russia accompanied her
acceptance of the principles with the caustic comment, "that
the Convention had not perceptitidg modified the situation
in China or infringed in any way on the 'status quo' in
China."136 Thus ended another incident in the Far East with
Salisbury holding a balance of Power.137
S Meanwhile Italy who had no designs in China was desirous
of expansion in Africa. Italy was promised Tripoli by an
French Agreement (1900) and Bismarck in the 1880's had on
several occasions suggested that Italy take Tripoli. Italy ‘
was still smarting from the severe defeat in Abyssinia in

1896 but she now turned to England desirous of at least so-

quiring Tripoli and thus to salve some of her wounds of the

 

136. Gooch & Temperley, "Cambridge Hist. of Foreign Policy,
III, p.17, Salisbury to Loftus _
137. SproutJHarold & Margaret, "Foundations of Naval Power, p.201

66

Abysinian campaign and also to still some of the public
138
clamor for Italian colonies.

Lord Salisbury writes,

Yesterday the Italian Ambassador asked to see me
and when he came it was apparently for the purpose of
asking two questions, which were put by Admiral Canero
on leaving the office. The Ambassador explained that
the Admiral wished to leave nothing with which he had
been concerned in a position that should expose his
action to any uncertainty or doubt.

The first question he asked me was in regard to
the recent agreement between England and France. He
wished to know whether we were willing to give any
assurances as regards our future action in the hinter-
land Of Tripoli.

Without inquiring how far we were at the present in
a position to discuss future destination of a country
or region whose ownership at present was not doubtful,

I pointed out to him that the terms of the Anglo-French
agreement had been so arranged as to convey no state-
ment on our part except that Of a negative character.
We simply stated that beyond a certain line south of
the Tropic of Cancer we would not increase our dominion
or influence westward. In this manner we avoided deal-
ing in a positive sense with the future of Tripoli or
its hinterland.

While, however, giving this explanation, I was not in
a position to bind Her majesty's Government by any
assurances of engagement with regard to Tripoli.

To declare, as had been, I believe, prOposed, that we
should under no circumstances occupy any part of Tripoli
or the Fezzan would be a step for which there would be
no justification. It might be that the Turkish Empire
should fall to pieces at a time when Italy was incapaci-
atated by some accidental circumstances from taking any
part in the Operations or negotiations by which its
division would be determined. It might be that Tripoli
or the Fezzan were threatened by some other Power whose
claims have not yet been brought forward, and that in
the action of Her thesty's Government would be the sole
resource for averting an arrangement which would largely
qgalify the present balance of Hediterranean_power.

It wouldfinet be fer the peace or advantage of the
world, or of England especially, that she should in such

 

138. Ward & Gooch, "Cambridge History", p.246

67

a crisis find herself fettered by a promise of inactiOn

undertaken in different circumstances at a previous

time. While, therefore, I was ready to give any explana-

tion the Italian Government desired with regard to our

present intentions, I could not bind the Government with

regpect to the future."139

A few days later Salisbury again wrote to Lord Curie the
British Ambassador to Rome further outlining the British policy
in regard to Italy, "The sympathy of Her Majesty’s Government
and Of the British nation is well known and undiminished. We
have a strong interest in Maintaining the 'status quo' in the
mediterranean.

Beyond this we cannot predict our policy in the event of
a war, unless we can see what the 'casus belli' will be.

The Public Opinion here will be guided by the cause of
the quarrel; and in the question of peace and war the action

140

of the Government is entirely dependant on that Opinion."
Not until 1912 did Italy feel free to go ahead and take Tripoli.

England's Navy was still a force to be considered in the
141
Mediterranean.

 

139. Gooch & Temperely, "Diplomatic British Documents," Vol II,
p.207, Letter to Lord Curie. F. O. Taly, 797, May 13, 1899

140. Gooch a Temperley, I p.282
141. Ward A Gooch- TTT- n-454-5

 

68

The storm which broke over South Africa in the autumn
of 1899 had been breeding for several years. The British had
emigrated to the Boer territories of the south Transvall, led
by the discovery of gold and the opportunities for profitable
trade. The Beer president, Kruger, while heavily taxing these
British 'Outlanders' would give them no voice in the government.
Another factor was the vision of Cecil Rhodes to unite all of.
South Africa into one British possession. A secret military
force was collected near Johanesburg led by a Doctor Jameson,
friend of Rhodes. The plot to seize the Boer government was
discovered, but Jameson went ahead without sufficient backing,
causing his raid to fail. Rho.ies disclaimed any part in the
affair but was removed from his position as governor of the
British territories.l42 Here important was the result in Anglo-
German.relatiens which centered in the greatly publicized
Kruger telegram sent by the German Emperor; the Emperor con-
gratulated.Kruger on "successfully without appealing for help
from friendly Powers" in repelling by his own might and with
his own people "the armed hordes which had burst as disturbers
of the peace" into his landfill“5

Negotiations were entered into between the Boers and

England but to no avail, on October 9, 1899 President Kruger

 

142. Ward, & Gooch, Vol. II, p.267
143. Balevy , Elie, "A History of the British People", p.31

69
broke Off diplomatic relations and entered into a period of
war which lasted for two and a half years and resulted in the
annexation of the Beer republics and the complete supremacy
of the British in South Africa. Kruger had hoped for aid
from other large Nations in Eurppe but despite the coolness ‘

of the Continetal Powers none as yet felt themselves in a

W

position to challenge England's naval might. An important 1
result to England was the fact that some of her statesman
saw the necessity of closer ties with either the Entente or ‘
the Triple Alliance in Europe. From this time on, until
Lord Salisbury left Office, German diplomats kept urging
an Anglo-German understanding.144

The Boer War despite the Kruger Telegram and the
violent criticisms of the German press helped to bring about
friendlier relations between the diplomats of the two
countries.140 Germany Opposed the concert of Powers in
EurOpe against England for she was dependent upon English
cealing stations and harbors to carry on her expansion in
China. The colonial Agreement of 1898 placed this exchange of
mutual benefits in official forum“:6 ‘In considering the
question of Anglo-German relations it is necessary to go
back to the events of 1885 and 1887. France at this time led
by the visions portrayed by General Boulanger was casting

longing eyes across the Rhine toward the lost provinces of

 

144. Seton-Watson, p.578
145. Seymour , "Diplomatic Background of The War," p.119
146. Appendix, Note #5

7O

Alsace-Lorraine. In Egypt the friction between France and
England was increasing. The alliance of Germany with Austria-
Hungary, Italy and the Balkan «satellites left England quite
isolated. If war was to break England was certain to be in-
volved however.147

Bismarck was fully aware of Salisbury's dilemma, and
spared no pains to draw Britain into the orbit of the Central
Powers. Already on February 12th a Secret Convention was
concluded between Britain and Italy, by which the two Powers
undertook to uphold the 'status que' in the Mediterranean,
Aegean, and Black Seas, while Italy accepted the British
partition of Egypt, and Britain bound herself to the support
of Italy in the event of "encroachments" in North Africa by
another power which though not named could only be France.148
In signing such a document Salisbury gave to Italy, "the
widest guarantee which a parlimentary state could give, namely,
that in the event of a Franco-German war England would actively
join the group of states which forms the peace police in the
East. No English government can give an absolute guarantee
for military or naval cooperation in a future conflict,
simply because it is not certain whether Parliament will ful-
fill these promises. But so far as Lord Salisbury is able to
judge he is convinced that England, jointly with Austria, and
Italy, will make front against Russia, if Turkey and especially

Constantinople should be threatened. He thinks that he can

 

147. Seton-Watson, p.563
148. Piebram, W. T., "England A France", p.95

 

71

assume the same, if Austria is attacked by Russia. In this
case it would be harder for England to give effective support:49
Austria speedily announced her adherence to the Mediterranean
agreement, and later in the year it was rendered still more pre-
cise by a triangular agreement between London, Vienna and Rome,
for the maintenance of the 'status que' in the Near East, and
for joint action to prevent any cessien of Turkish territory
by Turkey, even to the point of provisional occupation of
Turkish territory. Meanwhile Spain had entered in to a special
agreement with Italy to maintain the Mediterranean 'status que'
and not to lend herself to any action aimed against italy,
Germany and Austria-Hungary.150
Salisbury in writing to Bismarck stated, "The grouping
of states which has been the work of the last year will be an
effective barrier against any possible aggression of Russia,
and the construction of it will be among the least services M
which your Highness has rendered to the cause of European peace."101
The agreements of 1887 marked the high tide of Anglo-
German cOOperation. The Germans had made them selves irritating
in doing all they could to strain relations in Egypt. Salisbury
soon tired of leaning for support in Egypt on the consent of
Germany and, eventually assumed complete control there.152

Returning new to the Boer war, the Kruger telegram had

 

149. Piebram," England a France"., p.125

150. Ibid., p. 117

151. Cecil., IV, p. 21-22

152. Seymor Charles, "Diplomatic Background of the War", p.15

72

been sent and no sooner was this blunder made then the kaiser
continued to make some more. He wrote long letters to his
Grandmother, inciting the Tzar of Russia against England, and
sounding Paris and St. Petersburg as to the possibility of a
triple intervention in favour of the Transvaal. The Italian
minister warned Germany that a permanent estrangement of
Germany and England must force Italy on to the side of France
and Russia. Holstein, the German minister, doubted whether
even the 'Transvaal experience will suffice to convince England
of the necessity of a continental attachment.153 Salisbury re-
cegnized that in the stability of the Triple Alliance lay the
best guarantee of EurOpean peace and the surest security for
British interests. Nevertheless Lord Salisbury was too prudent
and toe conscious of his own resourcefulness to bind himself
formally and exclusively to the Triple Alliance. He took the
wiser and wider view of a British Foreign minister and descrim-
inated between the necessity of assuring the stability of the
Triple Alliance and becoming a pledged party to it.154
Salisburyhthe German Ambassader to Britain,
Eckardstein in 1899, that the telegram was a blunder even more
foolish than the raid itself, and the cloud which it cast upon
the Anglo-German relations was to grow year by year more menacing.

Salisbury was new set to act on the accepted lines of British

policy "to keep absolutely clear of engagements and to leave the

 

1153. Seton-Watson,, p.579
154» Quarterly Review., Oct. 1900 p.663

I... n-
'l

73

country free to take any action which it might think fit in

the event of a war. The growth of tension with Germany and

the avowed purpose of Germany to build a powerful navy led
Salisbury in February 1896, to refuse the renewal of the?
Mediterranean Agreement with Austria-Hungary and ltaly.105
Moreover, while a colonial conference and a naval review

formed the most striking features of Queen Victoria's Diamond
Jubdee, William II set himself the goal of making Germany a
world power, based upon a Navy "raised to the same standard as
that of my army". "The trident," he declared, "belongs in our
hands" and with the help of his new adviser Admiral Von Tirpitz
he introduced the first of a series of Navy Bills which soon
upset all the calculations on which Britain naval strategy
rested. On October 1898 the Kaiser declared to all the world,
"our future lies on the water."1‘)6 From that point on Anglo-
Germanvapproachément was a foregone failure but the German
Statesman were so sure of themselves that they believed England
would be forced to Join their alliance. As to the British
attitude of this alliance we can again find the Salisbury's
reaction in the diplomatic files.

The German Emperor and the Government have for some-
time past urged H.,M. Gov't to enter into a defensive
alliance with Germany, and recently they have been very
insistent that we lose no time in coming to terms with

them, stating that otherwise we shall be too late as they
have other offers.

 

155. halevy, Elie, "A History of the English People", p.245
156. Seton-Watson, "Britain in EurOpe", p.578-9

74

The German government lays stress on the danger to
England of isolation, and enlarge on the advantages to
her to be secured by an alliance with Germany. They
have constantly in years past used these threats and
blandishments.

There may be some danger but there are also advantages to
us in isolation. On the other hand it would be great
relief to be able to feel that we had secured a power-
ful and sure ally for the cmntingency of an attack on
the British Empire by the two Powers such as Russian
and French combined; but in considering offers of
alliance from Germany it is necessary to remember the a
history of Prussia as regards alliances and from the
conduct of the Bismarck government in making a treaty
with Russia concerning and behind the back of Austria, .
the ally of Germany, and also to bear in mind the A:
position of Germany in EurOpe as regards France and
Russia, and her position in other parts of the world
as regards the British Empire.

Germany is in a dangerous position in EurOpe. She
is surrounded by governments who distrust her and by
peeple who dislike her. She is constantly in a state
of Tariff war with Russia, she has beaten and robbed
Denmark, and for that purpose she took as a partner
Austria and then turned around on her confederate
and drove her out of Germany, eventually making her
a rather humble ally. She has beaten and taken money
and territory from France. She covets the seaboard
of Holland, and the Dutch know it; and, as the Beligians
are well aware she has designs on the Belgian Congo.

The Pan-German agitation in the Austrian Empire and
commercial questions may before very long bring about
complications between Germany and Austria, and the in-
ternal troubles of the Astra-Hungarian Empire detract
from its value to Germany as an ally, while the state
of Italy politically, militarily, and financially, is
‘not such as to inspire the German Government with

much trust in effective Italian support.

In these circumstances it is essential for the German
government to endeavour to obtain the certainty of armed
support from England for the contingency of an attack
on Germany by France and Russia combined, for if England
be not bound to Germany and His MaJesty's government

'7-
fi...

 

 

75

come to a general understanding with France and Russia,
or either of them, the position of Germany in EurOpe
will become critical.
The interests of England and Germany are not every—
where identical as she claims. In some parts of the
world they are irreconciliable. For instance, Germany
whose intention is to become a great naval power, re-
quires coaling stations which she can fortify. Good
ones on the highways of trade can only be got in the
great seas by purchase from Spain; Holland by force --
for she would not sell--by the spoilations of Portugal, L
which we should be bound to resist; from Siam whose !‘
integrity within certain limits we have guaranteed; 3
or from France as the outcome of a successful war. ,
If Germany should seek a station in the Mediterranean f%
it must be obtained from Morocco, Spain, Greece or '*
Turkey and to the detriment of our naval position.
I do not mention her interests in the American seas.
The U. S. may be counted upon to deal safely with any
question there.
In the Indian and Pacific Oceans our colonies of
Australasia have interests which they sometimes con-
sider to be greatly affected by the proceedings of
Germany and France. In view of the effective assistance
given us by the British colonies on the Boer war they
will expect their desires to prevail in questions be-
tween His Majesty's Government and Germany, whenever
colonial questions are concerned.
If we had a formal alliance with Germany we should
either have to shape our conduct over a large extent
of the globe in accordance with her views and subordinate
our policy to hers as is the case with Austria and Italy,
or, if we acted independently, whenever we took measures
necessary for the protection of our interests in some
distant part of the world we might be told by Germany
that we were bringing about a situation which might
lead to an attack on us by France and Russia obliging
Germany without sufficient cause to take up arms in our
defence, or Germany might find some moment opportune
for herself, but inconvenient for us, for bringing on
a war on a question on which we might not have a great
interest. Discussions on these questions would cause
bickerings and differences and might lead to estrange-
ment and end in an Open quarrel.
The best proof that isolation is not so dangerous as
the German Government would have us believe, is that
during our two years of war, when we had nearly a quarter
of a million men locked up in South.Africa, and we have
had the Opinion of the educated classes abroad, as ex-

76

pressed in the Press, and the sentiment of the peoples
of most countries against us, and when more than one
Power would have been glad to form a coalition, to call
upon us to desist from war or to accept arbitration; we
were able to conclude the Boer War without outside in-
terference.

If we had an alliance making it incumbent on each ally
to come to the aid of his partner when attacked by two
Powers it might be difficult to decide where in some
particular case the cause of conflict had arisen; for the
attacking parties are not necessarily the real aggressors.

It would be much safer to have a declaration of policy
limited to Europe and the Mediterrainean, defining the
interests which we shall jointly defend as we have with '
Italy and Austria, if we bind ourselves bya formal de- .7
fensive alliance and practically Join the Triplice we
shall never be on decent terms with France our neighbor
in Europe and in other parts of the world, or the Russia 9:
whose frontiers are coterminous with ours, or nearly so 5
over large portions of Asia.

- In our present position we hold the balance of power
between The Triple and Dual Alliances. There is but
little chance of a combination between them against us.
Our existence as a Great State is necessary to all in
order to preserve the balance of power, and most of all
to Germany whose representations as to the disasters
which await the British Empire if Her Majesty's Govern-
ment do not make an alliance with her have little or no
foundation. Treaty of no treaty if ever there were
danger of our destruction or even defeat by Russian or
France; Germany would be bound in order to avoid a like
fate for herself to come to our assistance. She might
ask a high price for such aid, but could it be higher
than what we should lose by the sacrifice of our liberty
to pursue a German world policy, which would be the re-
sult of a formal defensive alliance with the German Empire."l57

During the winter of 1901 Count Hutzfeldt continued
to urge any alliance. In March 29, 1901 Lord Salisbury
sent a formal note to Britain; ambassador at Berlin stat-
ing his reasons for rejection of the offer of a German
alliance:---

 

157. Gooch & Temperley, II p.74-75- memorandum to mr. Bertie,
from the Sanderson M.S.S.

77

MEMORANDUM by the marquess of Salisbury March 29, 1901

"This proposal for including England with in the bounds of
the Triple Alliance. I understand its practical effect to
be:-l. If England were to be attacked by two powers--say
France and Russia-~Germany, Austria and Italy would come
to her aid.2. Conversly, if either Austria, Germany, or
Italy were attacked by France and Russia or it Italy were
attacked by France andepain, England must come to the
rescue. .

Even assuming that the powers concerned were all despotic
and could promise anything they pleased, with the full con-
fidence that they would be able to perform the promise, I
think it is Open to much question whether the bargain would
be for our advantage. The liability of having to defend
the German-Austrian frontiers against Russia is heavier
than that Of having to defend the British Isles aganist
France. Even, therefore, in its most naked aspect the
bargain would be a bad one for this country. Count
Hatzfeldt speaks of our "isolation" as constituting a
serious danger for us. Have we ever felt that danger
practically? If we had succumbed in the Revolutionary
War, our fall would not have been due to our isolation.

We had many allies, but they have or would not saved us

if the French Emperor had been able to command the

Channel. Except during his reign we have never been in
danger and, therefore, it is impossible for us to judge

‘ whether the isolation under which we are supposed to
suffer, does or does not contain in it any elements of
peril. It would hardly be wise to incur novel and most
onerous obligations, in order to gain against a danger

in whose existence we have no historical reason for believ-
ing. '

But though the prOposed arrangement, even from this
point of view, does seem to me admissable, these are not
by any means the objections that can be urged against
it. The fatal circumstance is that neither we nor the
Germans are competent to make the suggested promises.

The British Government cannot undertake to declare war

for Just any purpose, unless it is a purpose of which

the electors Of this country would approve. If the
Government promised to declare a war for an object

which did not commend itself to public Opinion, the
promise would be repudiated, and the Government would

be turned out. I do not see how, in common honesty,

we could invite other nations to rely upon our aids in

a struggle, which must be formidable and probably supreme,
when we have no means of knowing what may be the humor

of our peOple in circumstances which cannot be forseen.

We might, to some extent, divest ourselves of the full
responsibility Of such a step, by laying the Agreement
with the Triple Alliance before Parliament as soon as it is

78

concluded. But there are very grave Objections to
such a course, and I do not understand it to be Re-
commended by the German Ambassador.

It would not be safe to stake any important national
interest upon the fidelity with which, in case of
national exigency, either county could be trusted to
fulfil the Obligations of the Alliance, if the Agree-
ment had been concluded without the assent of its
Parliament.

Several times during the last sixteen years Count
Hatzfeldt has tried to elicit from me, in conversation,
some Opinion as to the probable conduct of England if
Germany or Italy were involved in a war with France. I
have always replied that no English minister could
venture on such a forecast. The course of the English
Government in such a crisis must depend on the view
taken by public Opinion in this country, and public
Opinion would be largely, if no exclusively governed
by the nature of the 'casus belli'.l58

 

 

 

158. Gooch & Temperely., III, "British Documents on the
Origins of the War", p.68, Memorandum by the Marquis
of Salisbury May 29, 1901.

79

VIII
CONCLUSIONS

In considering the views of Lord Salisbury as revealed
in his writings as well as to the actual conditions and problems
of his period, several Observations and conclusions can be drawn.
These are herewith briefly presented;

The general character of Lord Salisbury's foreign policy
was determined by the unchangeable conditions of Englands geo-
graphical situation On the ocean flank of EurOpe as an island
state with vast overseas colonies and dependencies, whose very
existence and survival as an independent country are inseparably
bound up with the possession of a dominant sea power. The small-
ness of the British Isles themselves limit her from becoming a
large land power. The fact that England is a sea power at the
same time makes her the neighbor to every nation that borders on
the sea. It would be natural that the power of a nation supreme at
sea should inspire universal jealousy and fear, and thus be ever
exposed to the danger of being overthrown by a general combination
Of the world powers. This danger could only be averted as it
was in the case of England\on the period under discussion on the
condition that her national policy be so directed as to harmonize
with the general ideals and desires common to man and the majority

of nations.

 

 

80

Now the first desire of all countries is the preservation
of national independence. It follows that England, as an insular
and naval power had a direct p§itive interest in the maintenance
of the independence Of nations, and therefore must be the natural
enemy of any country which threatens the integrity of others, and
the natural protector of the weaker communities.

It has been the fashion to regard Lord Salisbury's bell-
igerent attitude toward Germany on the Schleswig-Holstein question
in 1864 as an outbuft of youthful and irresponsible intemperance.
By 1900 it was recegnized that his attitude was governed by a
thoughtful and far-sighted purpose, and that Lord Salisbury at
that early period had perceived that the possession of good
harbors on the Baltic and North Sea would eventually help a
united Germany to become a great naval power. Also, violation
Of contracts and treaties and the over running of such small
countries as Schleswig would be threatedfl, as was the general
peace of Europe. Peace in Europe was essential to Britain's
trade and commerce.

In the Eastern Question Of 1876-78 Lord Salisbury was
faced with the problem, should the integrity Of the Ottoman
Empire be sustained as in the Crimean period or should the
weak and debt-ridden country be partitioned among the powers?
Lord Salisbury took the view that previous agreements with
\Turkey must be upheld and that only in sustaining the Turkish

Empire would it be possible to retain her as a buffer against

81

Russian expansion in the Balkans. A strengthened Turkey would
serve the purpose of protecting the Suez Canal which was one Of
England's lifelines to India. Lord Salisbury had persuaded
Turkey in 1878 to cede the territories of Kara and Batoum to
Russia. on the condition that the Russian armies be evacuated
from Turkey at a given date. Both mr. Layard the British
ambassador, and Lord Salisbury recognised this tO be a point of
honor and were willing to use British arms to uphold Turkish
territorial integrity and Britain's committments. In 1887
Lord Salisbury became the champion Of another small country,
Bulgaria. Earlier in 1878 he had contested the union of
Bulgaria for at that time she would have been completely
under the control of Russia. But ten years later the threat
of Russian control of Bulgaria had vanished and Lord Salisbury
saw inihis stronger country a buffer state to hold Russia
within the Black Seavghd from further expansion to the west,
thus he did everything in a diplomatic way to aid Bulgaria
attain union with eastern Rumelia. Lord Salisbury wrote to the
Queen, "in a strong and independent Bulgaria we will have the
addition of a buffer between the Turkish Empire and the aggressive
attitude of the Russians in the Balkans."159

In two other instances do we find Lord Salisbury striving
to maintain the independence of weaker countries, the first con-
cerning Portugal in 1898 and the second in regard to China in the
late 1890's. Portugal was in need of money to bolster her failing
economy and first approached England for a loan. The German

Government Objected to the loan by intimating that she feared

82

alienation of Portugese territory. Lord Salisbury suggested
that Portugal seek elsewhere for her loan but at the same time
he stated, "Our motive for action was to maintain the 'status
quo' in respect to Portugese possessions and to prolong the
life of Portugal."160 The Prime Minister informed the German
Government that Britain was still bound by ancient treaties
to maintain the integrity of Portugese possessions. Portugal
then turned to France for a loan but France asked for a lien
on the Azores and its customs as surety for the loan. Lord
Salisbury objected on the basis that the alienation of the
Azores to France would hinder Britain from fulfilling its
Obligations to Portugal for in the treaty arrangements with
Portugal lay the Obligation of Great Britain to defend
Portugal against external attack. A third power having con-
trol Of the Azores would seriously hamper Britain in carry-
ing out her part of the treaty. Portugal wisely refrained
from all attempts at procuring a loan. In China the situation
assumed more grave proportions for both Germany and Russia
seemed intent on the complete dismemberment of China. Germany
had used the murder of two missionaries as the excuse to seize
territory in the Shantung peninsula while Russia had taken
over Port Arthur which she had earlier forced Japan to re-

linquish. The success of Lord Salisbury's diplomacy was placed

159. Buckle G.E., "Letters Of Queen Victoria", III p.242
160. Gooch C. F. & Temperley H., "British Documente;" p.49, Vol II

in an Anglo-German convention of 1901, to which agreement the
other powers were invited to sign. This Convention served to
halt temporarily at least the partitioning of China. In connec-
tion with these negotiations in China Lord Salisbury declared

his policy to be, "it may be said that the policy of this country
is to effectively Open China to the commerce of the world. We
contemplate no infraction of existing rights, we would admit no
violation of any existing treaties, or impair the integrity

of the present empire of China."1bl The possession of Port
Arthur was not desired by England; but the Prime Minister saw

on the other hand that its occupation by another nation would
have an effect upon the balance of power at Peking, and it was on
this ground that he objected to Russia's acqusition of Port
Arthur.

In order to maintain the peace of EurOpe and the territor-
ial integrity Of smaller nations the policy of Lord Salisbury
was first anti-Russian, then anti-French and lastly anti-German.
Each of these nations was a great land power and as such England
did not fear them, but as each of these powers sought to become
a naval power they were then placing themselves in a position
to challenge British naval spremacy. Only in retention Of this
naval superiority was Lord Salisbury able to protect smaller
nations from the aggressive larger powers. In 1878 Lord
Salisbury supported Turkey as against Russia for Turkey even
then a weak empire would never be in a position to injure

Britain's control of the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean waters.

-

I61. Gooch & Temperley, "British documents".. Vol. II.n.8

84

But Lord Salisbury by sustaining Turkey was thus able, to

bottle up the Russia fleet in the Black Sea, to guard the

exit to the Dardenells by the acqusition of Cyprus, and to

step Russia from acquiring a warm water outlet which she

might later fortify as a threat to England. Russian naval

expansion was thus stepped and Lord Salisbury could now turn

his attention to France who was making a bid for naval eq-

uality. France was interested in obtaining possessions along

the northern African coast, she would then be a menace to

the Suez Canal and Britain's Levantine trade. Diplomatic

methods were used to stOp Frances expansion in the Mediterranean.

Lord Salisbury made an alliance with Italy in 1887 to insure

the retention of the 'status qup' in the mediterranean.

Italy was given the assurance that if she were smacked by

France Britain would come to her aid with naval and land forces.

Austria-Hungary became a party to this agreement and France thus

hedged about by Italy, Austria, and England had to relinquish

her plan to challenge British naval strength in the Mediterranean

and to desist from territorial expansion on the coast Of Africa.
From the years 1890 until he left office in 1902 Lord

Salisbury was faced not only by the threat but the actual

growth of a German navy. Bismarck had been removed from Office

and the Kaiser embarked on a naval program of at least equality

with England. As he had built a powerful army he was now

-‘

85

desirous of creating a navy which would aid German in acquir-
ing her place in world affairs. During this period of ten
years there were in reality three nations building navies

and merchant shipping, the United States, Japan and Germany.
Lord Salisbury had a decision to make; intervention, combat,
division of power, or alliance with these three powers. He
believed Germany a continental nation as presenting the
greatest threat to England, for she by virtue Of her position
could endanger England's control of the Channel and thus not
only the smaller low countries but she could invade England
itself if she controlled the Channel. He consequently made
an defensive alliance with Japan in which Japan agreed to
protect British interests and territories in the Far East.

To meet the rising German threat required the utmost concen-
tration of British naval strength in EurOpean waters.
Simultaneously to contest in the American seas the rapidly
growing naval power of the United States was out of the
question. Lord Salisbury had no choice but to recognize American
primacy in the Western Atlantic. Disputes were amicably settled
with America in order that America might be stricken from
Britain's list Of potential enemies. In the Hay-Pannceforta
Treaty of 1901, Lord Salisbury and other British statesman
even relinquished their long-cherished ambition to share in
the control of the future Isthmian Canal. By this move the

British government was able to speedily reduce British naval

86
squadrons in the western Atlantic and concentrate them in the
North & Baltic Seas.

As a requisite to maintaining Britain's commerce and
trade and the ability to give military aid to her own dominions
and the smaller countries of the world it was necessary to gain
and to hold certain key possessions, islands and ports having
strategic value such as Gibraltar, Cape of Good Hope, Alexandria,
Malta and Cyprus. Lord Salisbury recOgnized this need and England
is indebted to him for the acquisition of Cyprus, Alexandria
and the peninsula on.which Wei-hai-wei is located. Cyprus served
the purpose of a sentinel to the Suez Canal, the gateway to
India, and from this post Britain was able to lend military
support to Turkey as she needed it in the several difficulties
with her vassal states. From Cyprus also Russia could be_
carefully watched in her comings and going through the Dardenelles
and any threats to the Balkan states could be easily checked
from Cyprus. During the ministry of Lord Salisbury Alexandria
‘was added as a fortified port, further to bolster Cyprus and
malts as defensive positions against either Russia or Italy
and as an added defense for the Suez Canal. 9,7 In 1898 Wei-Hai-Wei
was obtained by lease from China to protect the commercial
interests of Britain in China. Lord Salisbury recognized this
lease as essential to keeping the balance of power between

Germany and Russia. The possession of these key possessions
served as commercial and military bastions, England without

her food imports would stave in a few weeks, thus Lord Salisbury's

87

colonial acquisitions in China, India, Burma and Africa were
designed to give to Britain access to needed raw materials and
to provide markets fer the sale of manufactured goods. As early
as 1880 Lord Salisbury had remarked in Commons.

“If we mean to hold our own against the efforts of all
civilized powers of the world to strangle our commerce,
by their prhibitive finance, we must be prepared to take
requisite measures to Open new markets among the half
civilized nations of the world, and we must not be afraid

of the effort, which is vital to our industries, should
it bring with it new responsibilites of empire and govern-

ment."162 1

As only one tenth of the people of England are engaged
in agriculture Britain must be able to make and sell her products,
and thus, be able to buy the needed food and raw materials to
maintain her economy. The possession of a two power navy is not
then only a matter of prestige but a question of survival. This
question of facility for trade was closely bound up with the
problem of Mediterranean strategy for in this sea it was essential
for Lord Salisbury to maintain Britain's position as a guarantee
to her Levantine trade and as a vital stage upon the route to
India. He adhered to Britain's essential aim and need to pre-
venting any single power from dominating the Mediterranean,
his policy was to live and let live, but rested on the clear
desire for peace.’ Lord Salisbury as Prime Minister played an '
important part in several of the crisis involving Turkey and
her former vassals. He was now on one side and then on the 7

other but always on the side to protect the world-wide

 

162. Fort. Review April 1, 1898., Vol 69:516

 

 

88

Character of England's committments, and gave close concern f
to anything which might endanger the Suez Canal or the land .
or sea routes to India. In 1878 Lord Salisbury had Opposed;
Bulgarian unity for he feared the domination of Russa; ten
years later he urged Turkey to grant unity to Bulgaria for
this new country would act as a buffer between Turkey and
Russia. In the same year 1877 Lord Salisbury through threat
of force aided Turkey in suppressing a revolt in Greece for
she too had demanded new territories. Each apparent change
of front was determined by the policy of maintaingng the
peace and retention of the 'status quo' in this area.

On the question of alliances we find Lord Salisbury
willing to collaborate with any country, irrespective of
political creed or system, who was interested in maintaining
the basis of international peace and cOOperation. In 1887
Alliances were made with Italy and Austria-Hungary to insure
the retention of the 'Status quo' in the Mediterranean and to
curb France's growing naval power. Earlier in 1878 an
alliance was consumated by Lord Salisbury with the Ottoman
Empire to maintain its integrity and to stop the aggression
and expansion of The Russian Empire in the Balkans and in
Asiatic Turkey. Then again in 1890 and 1898 alliances in

the form of conventions were made with Germany; the first

agreement concerning colonial possessions of the two powers

 

89

in Africa, concessions being made on both sides, the second
agreement was the defining of 'spheres of influence' in
China. Lord Salisbury's aim in these two agreements was
facility of trade for Britain. England must continue to Open
new markets among the backward peoples of the world while at
the same time she must hold the old markets never letting any
power or single state gain a monOpoly in trade over a certain
area. Lord Salisbury though willing to make alliances to
further trade and even willing to concede some territories in
an effort to have peace he also declared; "that there was one
thing he would never do and that was to leave to his successor
a weakened or a diminished empire."l6v Repeated invitations
were given to Lord Salisbury to join the Triple Alliance but
he would not commit himself to it for he recOgnized that such
an alliance would not be to England's advantage since the
liability of defending the German and Austrian frontiers was
greater than that of having to defend the British Isles against
France. Lord Salisbury very ably discriminated between the
necessity of assuring the stability of the Triple Alliance
and becoming a pledged party to it. By becoming a pledged
party to the Triple Alliance Lord Salisbury would have shut
the door in friendly relations with the other great powers
and jeepardized Britain's freedom of action in dealing with

them. He also threw doubts on the danger of isolation by

arguing and rightly so, that even in a war with France or

 

 

'TBS. Mbnypenny & Buckles, "Life ofDisraeli", II, p.1224
164. Gooch, C.P, & Temperley, H., "British Documents", II p.74

90

Germany, "our fall would not have been from our isolation,
. 164
but to failure to command the “hannel.” But his main

objection was the "fatal circumstance that neither the German
or British Governments are competent to make the suggested
promises.165 Lord Salisbury recOgnized that the British
Government can not undertake to declare war for any purpose
not approved by the electors. No British minister Lord
Salisbury concluded, "could venture to forecast Britain's
probable conduct if Germany and Italy were involved in a
war with France."166Lord Salisbury was thus able to throw
his countries influence and naval might first on one side
of the scale and then on the other to aid in maintaining
the balance of power so that from 1876-1302 no major continental
conflict ensued. Peace on the continent was Salisbury's aim and
the essential to Britain's trade and prosperity.

Much has been written concerning the isolationist
policy of Lord Salisbury, but I do not believe he was an
isolationist for the following incidents demonstrate his
willingness to support other nations;
1. In 1878 Lord Salisbury made a secret agreement with Austria,
with the consent of Germany, the Cyprus convention with Turkey,
and with the aid of these two agreements and the concert of
powers as assembled at Berlin, Russia was forced to accept

the terms of the Congress and peace was obtained by England

acting with a concert of powers, not as an isolated power.

 

164. Gooch, C.P. a Temperley, H., "British Documents",II p.74

165. Ibid., p.75
166. Ibid., p.75

pl

2. In 1887 when Turkish subjects in Rumelia revolted and
sought to Join themselves to Bulgaria, England this time

Joined with Germany, Austria, France and Italy to use dip-
lomatic pressure to hold Turkey from interfering in Bulgaria,
then with the aid of these same powers Greece was informed

that no territorial changes could be made by her at the expense
of Turkey. Peace was again retained.

3} Also in 1887 formal, written, secret agreements were made
with first Italy and then Austria-Hungary concerning the re-
tention of the 'status quo' in the Mediterranean. Italy re-
cegnized the claims of Britain in Egypt while England agreed

to come to the aid of Italy if she were to be attacked by
France.

4. In 1890 Lord Salisbury through his Ambassadors reaffirmed
the binding nature of the existing treaties with Portugal to
maintain the integrity of the Portugeses territories when

the little country was threatened by first Germany and then
France with the alienation of her colonies.

5. In the year 1890 Lord Salisbury affixed his signature to
an Anglo-German colonial agreement which straightened the
boundaries of each of their possessions in Africa. Concessions
were made by both countries and this agreement set the pattern
for the later relations between the two countries in regard to
their colonies.

6. 1898 another Anglo-German convention was signed defining the

'spheres of influence' in China. The other major powers were

92

invited to Sign, and quickly eoniiftd the agreement. This
agreement gave Lord Salisbury freedom in Africa to prosecute
the Boer war without interference and at the same time Germany
was given the protection of the British navy and the use of her
cealing stations. Germany was to use her influence to guard
against Russian aggression in the Far East.
7. The Hay-Paunceforte Treaty of 1901 with the United States
likewise demonstrated Lord Salisbury's willingness to ally the
British government with other nations. This treaty divided
the supremacy of the Atlantic with the United States taking
the Western half. England at this time renounced her interest
for Participation in an Isthmwan Canal, this treaty served
to bind more closely the ties between the two countries.
8. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of l902-—each nation agreed to
support and protect the mutual interests in Far Eastern waters.

Because of the fact that Lord Salisbury refused to join
the Triple Alliance he has been accutied of isolationism. Let
us examine the Triple Alliance through his eyes, its inherent
weaknesses, his alternative, and his reasons for failure to
ally the English government with the Triple Alliance. We have
already seen that he was willing to make alliances with other
countries,
Weakness of the Triple Alliance

"Germany is in a dangerous situation in EurOpe.

She is surrounded by Governments who distrust her

and pe0ples who dislike her or all events do not like

her. She is constantly in a state of tariff war with

Russia. She has beaten and robbed Denmark,(1864)

and for that purpose she took as a partner Austria

and then turned around on her Confederate and drove

her out of Germany (1866), eventually making her a
rather humble ally. She has beaten and taken money

93

and territory from France (1870). She covets the
seaboards of Holland and the Dutch know it; and,as
the Belgians are well aware, she has designs on the
Belgian Congo. The Pan-German agitation in the
Austrian Empire and commercial questions may before
long bring about complications between Germany and
Austria and the internal troubles of the Austria-
Hungarian Empire detract from its value to Germany
as an ally, while the state of Italy, politically,
militarily and financially, is not such as to in-
spire the German Government with much trust in
effective support.“l67

Lord Salisbury offered as an alternate policy to
the offer of Germany to have a declaration of policy limited
to Europe and the Mediterranean, in which agreement the in-
terests which should be Jointly defended would be expressly
given. This agreement was to follow the pattern of those
previously made with Italy and Austria.

In summary these reasons were given for refusal to
become a pledged party to the Triple Alliance;
1. German agressiveness was sure to lead her into a con-
flict in which England would have no interest or cause for
Joining.
2. Neither Germany or England.are competent to make or
fulfill the suggested promises.
Z. The British government cannot undertake to declare a
‘war, for any purpose, unless that purpose be approved by
the electors.
4. The liability of having to defend the Austrian and
German frontiers against Russia is heavier than that of

.having to defend the British Isles against France,

167. Gooch & Temperley, "British Documents" Vol. II, p.74
{emorandum to Mr. Bertie (from Sanderson USS)

94

Lord Salisbury recognized that in 1901 Britain held
the balance of power between the Triple and Dual alliance.
There was little or no chance of a combination between the
two as against England. Britain's existence as a strong
state was essential to all in order to preserve the balance
of power, and most of all to Germany who had represented the
disasters which awaited the British government if she did not
sign the alliance with her. Lord Salisbury believed these
suggested disasters to have little or no real foundation.
Treaty or no Treaty if there were danger of Britain's des-
truction at the hands of France and Russia, Germany would
be bound to come to England's aid in order to avoid a like
fate herself. "She might ask a high price for that aid", re-
marks Lord Salisbury, "but could it be higher than what we
should lose by the sacrifice of our liberty to pursue a
British world policy, which.would be the result of a formal

168
defensive alliance with the German Empire."

 

2168. Gooch & Temperley, "British Documents", p.78 Extract
from Sanderson MSS.

99

11:
BRITISH SEA POWER AND THE PRESENT EMPIRE

The growth and achievements Of British Power, especially
British naval power, made a deep impression upon the thinking
of Captain A. T. mahan, U.S.N., who in the early 1890's became
the world's foremost writer on sea power and the influence of
sea power uponJHistory. History teaches that nations rise or fall
never stand still. Expansion-political, economic, cultural-was
the essence of national greatness. To support a prOgram of ex-
pansion, a government must have access to accumulated wealth.

A large and flourishing foreign commerce was the surest means Of
accumulating wealth. To compete successfully in a world-wide
struggle for markets a country must maintain a large merchant
marine. A strong navy was necessary to guarantee security to

a country's shipping, a prosperous merchant marine was, at the
same time, the backbone Of its naval power.161

Furthermore in time Of war the primary object Of the
British Naval forces was to search out the enemy's forces, and
to destroy or drive them from the seas, as a necessary pre—
liminary to the wholesale destruction of enemy commerce, and to
the protection of England's own merchant shipping upon the high
seas. Mahan also advocated as his fundamental principle; the
doctrine Of concentration Of power-- or battle-fleet supremacy.

The command Of the sea was essential by a massed fleet of line

of battle ships capable of destroying the enemy's armed forces

W"

161m Sprout, Harold & Margaret, "Foundation Of National Power." p166

100

or of driving them to cover; of blockading their ports and there-
by disrupting their overseas communications at the source, and
of supporting one's own cruisers patrolling the sea lanes and
escorting one's own transports and cargo shipping through zones
of special danger.162

England had gained naval supremacy by 1805 and held it
until 1898, this suppremacy had been gained through a combination
of factors, geographical, economic, political and the know-how
of industry. The first requisite of military power is a secure
primary base. England alone among the EurOpean powers enjoyed
the decisive advantage of insularity. The British Isles pro-
vided a national seat Of military power of great strength, one that
could be made secure without the continuous and heavy outlays
that were necessary for the defense of European land frontiers.
Mahan declared; "History has conclusively demonstrated the in-
ability Of a state with even a single continental frontier to
compete in a naval development with one that is insular, al-
though Of a smaller pOpulation and resources."163

Great Britian also enjoyed secure havens overseas, con- '
cerning these havens Lord Fisher once declared that England held
the five "keys that lock up the world,"--Dover, Gibraltar, Alexandria,
the Cape Of Good Rape, and Singapore. Through the control of her

homeland and these five keys England had forced the ships of all

 

162. Ibid., p.167
163. Ibid., p.168

101

all nations to pass under the guns of the British Navy. Through
the holding of these keys England was able to dominate the narrow
seas through which foreign commerce had to pass to get to the
several oceans.--the Suez canal, The English Channel, The North
Sea. the Mediterranean-~Great Britain could virtually dictate
the terms of EurOpés access to the 'Outer world.‘ As long as no
important center of naval power existed outside Europe, England's
grip on the ocean portals Of that continent constituted in effect I
a global command Of the seas.164

In 1911 Mahan stated, "so long as the British fleet can
maintain and assert superiority in the North Sea and around the
British Isles, the Entire imperial system stands secure."165

Several factors now combined to remove this naval supre-
macy of England. The great growth of nationalism and imperialism
necessitated and fostered the pace of naval expansion in other
oountriea‘than Britain. And this in turn undermined the world-
wide naval dominance Of Great Britain. That dominance rested
not only upon British ships and sailors, but also upon the in-
comparable strategical position Of the British Isles,-Battle-
fleet supremacy in the North Sea, in the English Channel, in the
Mediterranean, and in the adjacent reaches of the eastern
Atlantic, gave England dominance over the powers Of continen-
tal EurOpe.1 As long as those continental European powers

were the only rivals possessing strong navies, this local

primacy gave Britain virtually world-wide control Of the seas.

_

164. Sprout Harold, "Toward A New Order of Sea Power p.18
165. Commonwealth, 1946, chap. 29 p.95
166. Ibid., p.46

 

102

The rise Of Japanese naval power undermined England's
strategic dominance and hence political influence in the Far
East. Through one of the ironies of history, Englishmen con-
tributed to their own eclipse in the Pacific, British ship-
yards in the 1880's built one warship after another for Japan.
And British Naval officers were loaned to the Mikado's govern-
ment to teach the elements of naval science.167

Meanwhile, parallel developments were taking place in
the Western Hempishere. Prior to the Civil War the United States
had a navy and a naval policy. But neither one had affected
the main currents of world politics in any large or continu-
ing manner. By 1898 however, the United States Navy had evolv-
ed from a handful of commerce-raiding cruisers and coast-defense
monitors into a rapidly growing fleet Of first class sea-going
battleships. ContrOl of EurOpe's narrow seas no longer assured
to Great Britain the command of the American Seas. To meet the
rising German Ship-building threat required the utmost concen-'
tration of British naval strength in EurOpean waters. At the
same time to contest in the American seas the rapidly growing
naval power of the United States was out of the question.
Britain had no choice but to recognise American primacy in the
‘western Atlantic, and British statecraft proceeded with con-
siderable finesse to derive from this necessity as much benefit
as possible. A successful effort was made to settle outstanding

(disputes with the United States and to cultivate American

 

167. Op. Cit., p.171

103

goodwill in order that the country might safely be stricken from
Britain's list of potential enemies, in the Hay-Paunceforte
Treaty of 1901, British statesman relinquished their long-
cherished ambition to share in the control Of the future Isthmian
CanaL By 1904 the British Admiralty had begun reducing its
squadrons in American waters.168

The German menace had the further effect of suppressing
at least temporarily the ancient rivalry between Great Britain
and France.lbg The Anglo-French Entente Of 1904 left Britain
free to develOpafleet base at Alexandria near the Mediterranean
terminus of the Suez Canal; and recOgnised a French protectorate
over Morrocco. This understanding was accompanied by marked
improvement in Anglo-French relations, permitting withdrawl of
British fleet units from the Mediterranean, The entente thus
brought about a further strengthening of the North sea frontier;
but like the Anglo-Japanese agreement and the parallel. if less
formal understanding with the United States, this step too,
represented a dissipation of that exclusive command Of the
Atlantic which had once been the cornerstone of British naval

170-
policy.

While bargaining for allies and simplifying their
strategic committments, British statesmen stédily enlarged and
strengthened the Royal Navy. Despite Germany's utmost efforts,
the Royal Navy held its lead, the British fleet out ranked

171
Germany's in 1914 by the ration Of three to two.

 

168. Sprout "Foundations Of National Power", p.171
169. Ensor, "Britain in EurOpe", p.401
176. Sprout, "Foundation Of Naval Power," p,172

104

The victory of 1918 completely altered the balance of
naval forces in the Atlantic. The destruction of the German
Navy removed the threat which had chained the Royal Navy tO
EurOpean waters. Temporarily at least, British sea power
held exclusive Sway over the eastern Atlantic and the adjoin-
ing narrow seas. and following the victory over Germany there
were accumulating indications that British statesmen and their
naval advisers looked forward to early restoration of their
former global command Of the seas. But each country involved,
of the Allies, was intent on increasing their naval strength.
'The deadlock among the Naval Powers continued until the
Washington Naval Arms conference of 1921-22. The anglo Japanese
Alliance was abrOgated, several Older ships of the Powers
scrapped and the building prOgram curtailed; the British,
American and Japanese battleship fleets were stabilized in
the ratio Of 5-5-3.208

The United States, in effect, recognized Britain's
strategic interest throughout the eastern Atlantic and
European narrow seas. Britain, in turn, tacitly acknowledged
‘American control of the American Seas. Great Britain central-
ized her fleet then in EurOpean waters and the United states
gradually shifted her units to the Pacific waters. The British
ideal was still avoidance of military guarantees, a balance

of power on the Continent, and a two power naval standard for

 

208. Ibid., p.175

105

EurOpean waters. NO power was disposed in 1922 to contest
Britain's two power standard in the capital ship class. But
capital ships had ceased to be the index of naval power. The
late war and more so the conflict Of 1939-45 has hastened the
development of two new weapons which played an increasing role
in the control of the narrow seas. One of these was the sub-
marine which has now twice forced Britain to the brink Of
disaster despite the Royal Navy's control of the ocean's sur-
face. The other new weapon, the aeroplane has develOped into
even a greater threat not only to shipping, but to port in-
stallations and industrial centers of Britain and its empire.209
We today remember only too vividly the bombing of Manchester,
London, Singapore, Pong-Kong and the sinking of the Prince Of
Wales and the Repulse. Today one must control not only the
sea but under the sea and the very air itself. Britain has
the necessary bastions well placed to hold this new air super-
iority. Does she have the initiative to assure the predominant
control? 1

Great Britain with the aid of the United States and her
own dominions was able to wrest the victory from Germany and
Japan. Together Britain and America possess in a large degree
the fundamental requisities for continued command Of the Atlantic

and the narrow seas. Today the problem Of the control of the

 

209. Ibid., p.177, 180

107

The fact that Egypt commands in the Suez Canal the main artery
of communication between England on the one hand and India and
Australia on the other is what took England into Egypt and what
keeps her there. Britain cannot afford to see Egypt and the
Canal dominated by another country any more than the United
States could tolerate the domination Of the Panama Cana1.2ll

In the Near East Britain's interest lies in the main-
tainence Of peace and the 'status gup' Stable governments, able
to defend their independence and to preserve their territory
from attack best serve the British interests alike in Iraq,
Persia, and Afghanistan.212

In China the interests Of Britain are purely commercial.
There more than anywhere else, her policy is the policy of a
'nation of shopkeepers.' At no time has she cherished territor-
ial ambitions, and here as elsewhere British interests will
best be served by the establishment Of a strongnational gov-
ernment able both to preserve internal order 2nd to protect
Chinese territory from external aggression.2lv

Concerning America it has been an axiom of British policy
that British ministers should always seek to preserve the most
friendly relations with America. Sentiment and interest combine
to impose this attitude upon England. It can safely be said
that no British government will ever command or retain the
support of the British peOple which is thought for a moment

214
needlessly to jeopardize the good relations of the two peOples.

g

211. Ibid., p 542 215. Ibid., p 544
212. Ibid., p 545 214. Ibid., p 546

106

seas has merged into the larger problem of future air power and
Sea power relationships within Burcpe and between Burcpe and
other continents facing the Atlantic. On the trend of Anglo-
American relations, the English-speaking countries facing the
Atlantic might come to a coalition of sea and air power as form-
idable, as stable and as useful in the future as has been
British sea power in the past. Sir Austen Chamberlain writing
on this problem said, "the develOpment of aeronautics has
further impaired our insular security and has given fresh
impetus to the secular principle of British policy that the in-
dependence of the Low Countries is a British interest, that
their frontiers are in fact our frontiers, their independence
the condition of our independence, their safety inseparable
from our own. It was to secure the independence of the Low
Countries that we fought Spain in the sixteenth century, that
we fought Napoleon in the nineteenth and that we fought Germany
in the twentieth. Here, at any rate, we find a permanent basis
of British policy."210

Outside Europe the maintenance of her imperial communications
and the interests of the Dominions, colonies and dependencies
become dominant. But for India, the Dominions of Australia, New
Zealand, there would be no occupation of Egypt, no reconquest
of the Sudan for civilization and the great work accomplished by

Lord Cromer and his assistants would have remained unattempted.

 

210. Foreign Affairs July 1931, Vol. 9 p.538

108

BRITAIJ'S ROLE In T15 POST WAR WORLD

The world politics of the post war years will be shaped
primarily in terms of the relations between three or four great
world powers; and this is the fact which must determine the
outlines of the new international system which we aim to create.

To qualify for the role of a world power a nation must
possess a formidable combination of resources. It must possess
an extensive and highly develOped industrial potential; the
ability to control or ensure the supply of vast quantites of
raw materials, often from sources scattered throughout, the
world; a high order of technical and administrative skill;
and last but not least, the ability of its leaders to command
the continued and active support of the increasingly powerful
and politically conscious masses.215

But first we must analyze in greater detail both the
weaknesses and the strength of Britain's world position in the
light of these new conditions. Of her weaknesses, the first and
foremost is that her material power has declined and is de-
clining relatively to that of other world powers. The material
preeminence which was Britain's in the nineteenth century has
passed once for all. England's now almost stationary and aging
population of less than fifty millions is less than half of
the United States and barely a quarter that of the U.S.S.R.

The days of the two-power naval standard based on a navy which

 

215. Sprout p.208

109

was the mistress of the seas are gone for good, and unlike the
U.S.S.R. Britain only contains within her own island territory
a small pmnportion of the vital raw materials upon which industrial
power is builit.216 The rest, together with the greater part of
her foodstuffs, Britain must draw from the four corners of the
world over long and vulnerable lines of communication from sources
often not in her own control.2Iba
Even more important is the passing of England's preeminance
as the workshOp of the world, the mainSpring of the world's
commerce and capital investment, and the master mechanic of the
world's financial machinery. The centers of gravity of the
worlds heavy industry have shifted eastward to Russia and west-
ward to the United States. Today the medium'or financial exchange
is no longer the 'pound sterling' but the 'almighty dollar'. A
basic weakness in another field is that though second to none in
inventiveness, England has been shy in the application of new
methods and techniques, whether in the sphere of warfare, industry,
or social organization. In the field of diplomacy she has only
offered negative appeasement and the stale appeal of past ideals.217
Against these weaknesses Britain can balance these elements
of strength; first, there is her geographical position between
EurOpe and America, a position reinforced by the historical role

as the bridge between the old world and the new. There is also

'the British position as the neucleus of a world-wide commonwealth

 

216. Ibid., p.209
.216.a Foreign.Affairs, April 1946 p.411
21?. Ibidi, p.427

110

of free peoples and association of peoples whose cohesiveness
in the Boerfwand last two conflicts has been strikingly demai-
strated. This combination of peOples has a great potential
also in times of peace. In the line of industry Britain has a
high degree of technical skill coupled with the experience and
knowledge gained during the war will qualify her to play a
leading role in a world economy directed toward rising living
standards.218

It is in the social and political field that Britain's
greatest strength lies. Here geOgraphy and history has endowed
her with an exceptional wealth of experience, expressing it-
self in her capacity for tolerance and compromise and for comb-
ining change with continuity; and the develOpment of free institu-
ions and associationdwhat give vigor and variety to a modern
community. She has learned through the years the art of hand-
ling peOples from the most advanced to the most backward; but
greater than all these the British people have begun to learn,
as so many other nations of the world have failed to 1earn,--
the necessity of harmonizing their own national aims and aspira-
tions with the basic needs, aims and aspirations with the basic

219
needs, aims and values of civilization.

 

fiw _'

218. Sprout, p.210
219. The Nation Dec. 22, 1945 "Future Role of Great Britain" p.679

APPLQNDIK

111

APEJEDIX

worn #1.

Extract from SalisburyJShuvalov kemorandum of hay 30,
1878
e. Le Gouvernment Anglais se reserve de discuter au Congres
toute question Touchant aux Detroits.

(The English Government reserves for discussion in the Congress

all the questions concerning the Straits.)

f. The existing arrangements made under European sanction,

which regulate the navigation of the Bosphorus, and the Dardenelles,
appear to them {the British Government) wise and salutary, and
there would be in their judgment, serious objections to their
alteration in any material particular.

Et le Plenipotentaire Russe insistera au Congres,sur le
'status quo' (And the Russian representative will insist in the
Congress on the retention of the 'status quo'.

NOTE #3 May 31, 1878

Se Majestie L'Empereur de Russia, ayant consenti a restituer
a sa majestie le Sultan la vallee d'Alaschkert at la ville de
Bagzid, et n'ayant pas l'intention de'entendr ses coguetes en Asie
au dela do Kare, Batoum, et des limites posees par le Traite

Préliminaire de San Stefano, et rectifiees par la retrocession

 

? Lee,Dwight, "Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of
1878)p.195

112

susmentionnee, 1e Gouvernment Imperial ne se refuse pas a conclure
avec la Gouvernement Britannique un engagement secret a le'effet
de la rassurer a cat egard.

(His Majesty the Emperor of Russia having consented to
restore to the Sultan the valley of Alaschkert and the city of
Bayazid and does not have the intention of extending his con-
quests in Asia beyon Kars, Batoum and the limits as stated by
the preliminary treaty of San Stefano, and rectified by the
following conditions, the Imperial government has not refused
to conclude ‘with the British Government a secret agreement to
this effect. .
NOTE #2
Anglo-French Declarations of 1890

On August 5, by an exchange of declarations France re-
cOgnized the British Protectorate over Zanzibar and Pemba, in
return.for concessions of far greater importance by Great Britain
who accepted the French Protectorate in Madagascar and acknow-
ledge extensive claims by France in Central Africa.
moms #3
CONGO CONV“NTION OF FEBRUARY 26, 1885

This Convention affirmed the principle of freedom of
navigation and trade for all nations in the regions forming

the basins of the Congo and the Niger, provided for the adep-

 

2. Ward & Gooch V01., III, p 217

113

tion of Joint measures for the suppression of slavery and the
salvetrade, and laid down rules relating to the future apprOpri-
ation of territory on the african coast.

NOTE# 4

Anglo-German Agreement of 1890

Germany renounced in favour of Great Britain all claims
to the Somiland coast, Witu, and Uganda; her western boundary
was stablized with Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa, with the Congo
State and British Central Africa, respectively on the other side
of her boundaries. Germany, also, acknowledged a British
Protectorate over Zanzibar and Pemba.

In 1893, November 15th, a Western African Agreement with
Germany stipulated that her sphere of influence should not extend
eastward beyond the basin of the Shari; Darfur, Kordofan, and
Bahr-el-Ghazal being excluded from it. In Germany's favor a
rectification of the Boundaries in West and South-west Africa
was agreed upon involving in this latter case the cession to her
of a stlp of territory (the Caprivizipfel) giving access from
her territories to the Zambesi. Germany was also ceded the
Island of Heligoland, lying in the estuary of the Elbe.

NOTE #5
Anglo-German.Agreement - 1898
‘On.August 30, 1898, Mr. Balfour and Count Hatzfeldt

signed two conventions. The first of these Conventions provided;

 

3. Ward & Gooch, Vol. III, p 209
4. Ward & Gooch, Vol. III, p 217

114

that whenever either Government thought it expedient to accede

 

to a request by Portugal for an advance on the security of the
WM * :- r“ tewenwma-m ,, >\‘TI-‘-'Z*;--. New name; 5,4izenlhzsne-nry Hm r... ..~..

 

4‘... ‘ ‘I‘W‘*‘ ”MIA; Wt»-

revuneues of Angola, mozambique, or Timer, they should inform
MW

WW”MAM“meI ”huwwwfii‘m rv- guy-9“ H... JV“ «'0‘. _ng. .«mfld ._~.-. Hr. :u«_-.;a:.nv. «rt «mat/AW: “Mane-.2 “Mr. Mfi’hw (1"

the other Government which should have the right of participation,

”3141‘ _—-“_...,~. v-_~__=;;',* 1' H! ‘_ .2793 ;,. '“f‘. ”F 1".U .“kv¢~ “iij- H; l._"...‘\" '_"=‘_:.\1N- .v- “3 4“, a“, .‘3 ”watt" ’. 53.3"”: “J, “pkg-“V ‘mMWS‘t-f. H‘ i,‘ ..

that the revenues of.MQzambique south of the Zambezi and of that

“m“‘ 1w 3E.”

 

”“1. V‘,‘ “'31 “0- IM ,1. 'WS‘ ‘qo‘.u‘J;-13:>,I;-:g.d~'-=,u,a

part of the province lying on the left bank of the Zambezi above

“trawl“!- v‘s‘V‘M‘m‘ J A f
3 A . 5 '- 1‘13

its confluence with the Shire, and those of the province of

fists-1x: . y W"

Angola, between latitude 8 and a point 5 miles nort of Agito
u aflwufi‘“ 9‘3“" w “h. 3:9 ”kw Mr?" 4. 4.. “Liking. ~ , L 51w“ '

should be assigned to the nglish loan, and the remainder to the

.‘,'-. . ‘ \. , 4 'a '4‘.“ _‘1 2,"
a...” “a", (“um 1,)». N‘ .U, um -. m. if"; K «rt: 7.,- 1m, ;..»_~ 7}» -:,‘.*«~L...~,.. ."-,J 59/:‘12-701 ~, , ~32“! \
WQW

German loan, in case of default the customs-houses of the disesk

....

W—(‘n‘ HM“

tricts thus defined to be handed over tenths two Powers respective-

WV‘Q‘VW .‘Trvin" cu!“

1y; negther Power to endeavour to obtain concessions except in

its own sphere.

W‘fl

The second convention., which was secret was not made known
to the Portugese Government, provided for the contingency.nim£l$§«

unfortunately not being found possible to maintain the integrity

‘- '3‘“
4...,» 3.45” magma" J‘f'l new)?" “:2 Qq~Pdflma$7thf+~ W~d§z%m&¥hv Why-$15.5.) an...

2.!“
r ”3”“ ““‘W “W L‘Ft‘mfiui‘rk sin". 2"“ ‘3“

of the African possessions of Portugal south of the nquator as

 

‘L. - : 7:33.”...W‘ 4-’¢da,h W1".\"'”;U~“" 45* ’I -- “ " ‘ "‘ ‘V ‘ ' 3 a -\ -.‘~..-‘.-:.-.-...u.4
well as those in Timor."
Mug.» idle-Q. 2'4"”4’3' T'urrF Vgxt’z‘ ~+1f ms .pnz" “ffq‘T” gin-i;-
Thg Powers agreed Jointly to oppose intervention of any
.- ',{" _‘w 4 7:4. 31 m5”, mr‘ 3.4;, 3,.-ng3:» ~i‘ 2...: AL‘ .4 ,"TN, 3‘0an» Mags: 2*». x
kind by a third Power in the Portugese possessions, that neither
M awxw z, 1.3433“: ‘rr '_’«, ,3... ' ; ing-'n- a-‘r'gfi “J- .h;,___;;-;;_, '4‘ ..~ 34"?‘55 ~4...a,~,,.-a Aka "395'
would advance any claim to the possession of or the exercise of
I '-"-“ ,. ~-'~ ”3'33"" -‘\¥.\ ’3 Hm

. L'r
Mfipén-‘p 11“ a ‘ H143; 2..

political influence in the district of which the customs had been

4345.12. 7
v van-‘3‘" ’5‘ " w“. 't’i'fi. ..“VI'

assigned to the other.

.5le 1hrfim , , . ,. - > -
figuwz'tm“ ' ' ”WWI-gantwaqa 35.5,“ W45. 5:. .1 : r_ 3 3y;

 

5. Gooch & Temperely Vol., p 329

BI BLI O GRAPHY

115

BIBLIOGRaPHY

Primary Sources

Buckle, George Earle, "Victoria Her Letters "Vol. I,
II., Longman, New York, 1926 ‘

 

Grey, Sir Edward, "Speeches on Foreign Affairs
1904-19149 edited by Paul Khaplund, George Allen
Cb.,‘Londbn, 1931 p.15, 20, 21, 222.

 

 

Oxford, the Earl of Asquith, K.G. "Fifty Years of British
Parliaments", Vol. I, Boston, Little, Brown and Co.{l926

 

Temperley, Harold and Coville Alfred., "Studies in
Anglo French History 18th to 20th Centuryéf Gambfidge
Press, London, 1955, p‘l254I42‘

 

Temperley, Harold and Gooch, George P. Vol., I, II
"British Documents On The Origins of The War 1898-
IgI4,"Cambridge‘Press, London,‘l925, I928.

 

Temperley, Harold and Pension,Lillian m., "Foundations
of British Foreign Policy,fi Cambridge University Press,
1938, p 350-500. -

 

Temperley, Harold and Pension, Lillian M., "A Century.
of Diplomatic Blue Books 1814-1914,} Cambridge Press,
London, 1938, - 1-5, 68-70,149-l80‘

 

116
PERIODICALS

Chautaugua,. Vol. 22, p 703-711, "Lord Salisbury
‘fifi as Premier or England," H. M. Stephens.

 

L’Contemporary Review Vol. 68, p 609, "Our Foreign Policy,"
E. J. Dillon.
Vol. 73 p 457-80, "Failure of Our
Foreign Policy," Editorial.

» Vol. 73, p 795-803, "Our Policy In The
Far East," W. Pes Voeux

 

V Essays: Foreign Politics Vol. 22, p 105, "Marquis of Salisbury,"

Fortnightly;Heview Vol. 41, p 241-3, "Our Colonial Policy,"

‘ St. Leger Herbert,
Vol. 42, p 149-50 "Marquis of Salisbury"
(Editorial)
V01. 42, p 528-9 "Lord Salisbury as
Foreign Minister," (Editorial)
Vol. 43, p 375-6, "Bulwarks of Empire,"
(Editorial)
V01. 50, p 1, "Our True Foreign Policy,"
(Editorial)
Vol. 64, p 355-57, "Lord Salisbury's
Triumph," H. D. Traill,

w—Vol. 64, p 544-46, "The Foreign Policy
of England," J. W. Gambler,
Vol. 64, p 804-807 "Lord Salisbury
from A French Point of View," Augustin
Filon,
Vol. 66, p 91-96, "Development of Lord
Salisbury," T.H.S. Escott, ,
Vol. 61 p 91-9, "Defects of Lord Salis-
bury," (Editorial)
Vol. 67, p 456-60, "Lord Salisbury and
the Eastern.Question," Diplomaticus
V01. 69, p 1029-31, "Lord Salisbury and
the Far East,"‘(Editorial)
Vol. 69, p 513-514, "Where Lord Salisbury
has failed," Diplomaticus.

 

Nation Vol. 10, p 591, "Foreign Policy of
, Lord Salisburyfl'(Editorial)
Vol. 42 p 123 "Fall of Salisbury Ministry,"
1886 (Editorial)
Vol. 62, p 346, "British Foreign Policy,"
(Editoria1)'

North American
Outlook

Quarterly Review

 

 

Spectator

11?

Vol. 152, p.453-4, "Men of Salisbury's
Parliament," H. W. Lacy. '

Vol. 66, p.636, "Foreign Policy of
Lord Salisbury," Editorial.

Vol. 165, p.438-467, "The Suez Canal
and the Egyptian Question,"

Vol. 167 p.543-45, "Parliamentary
Debates," Aug. 1888.

Vol. 171, p.212, "Chinadlts Products,"
Vol. 174, p.256-7, "Speeches During
Recess By Lord Salisbury" Nov. 1891.
Vol. 175, p.563, "New Government,"
Vol. 183, p.544-47 "The Queen's Prime
Minister,"

Vol. 185 p.167-56l-3, Cosmopolitans

In The House of Commons"

Vol. 194, p.607, "Paralysis of Parlia-
ment,"

Vol. 196, p,654, 656, 661-4, 668-70,
671, 672-5, "Marquis of Salisbury"
Vol. 199, p.296-322, "Lord Salisbury
And The Quarterly Reviewm" L. Wolf.

Vol. 57, P.1064-66, Lord Salisbury
Educating His Party, "

Vol. 58, p.1137-39 Life and Speeches
of Lord Salisbury,"

Vol. 58., p.1330-3, "Lord Salisbury
Foreign Policy,"

Vol. 58, p,l464, "Economics of Lord
Salisbury,"

Vol. 58, p.1507-10, "Foreign Policy
of Lord Salisbury"

Vol. 58, p;1728, "Lord Salisbury's
Position."

V01. 66, p.582-3, "Lord Salisbury,
Vol. 68, p432-3, "Lord Salisbury's
claim to Coniidence.

Vol. 69, Pé212-15, "The Salisbury
Administration"

Vol. 73, p3134-5, "Lord Salisbury's
Merits (Editorial)

Vol. 77, p.421-2 (Editorial)

Vol. 81 p.936-7, "Lord Salisbury's
Ap010gia,F3

Review of Reviews

 

Living Age

 

Saturday Review

Neyspapers Time'

118

Vol. 17, p.595-6 (Excerpt) "Failure
of Our Foreign Policy."

Vol. 231, p.665 (Editorial)
Vol. 240, p.387 (Editorial)
Vol. 162, p.687 (Editorial)
Vol. 210, p.486 (Editorial)

Vol. 79, p.470 (Editorial)

May 24, 1895 p.1
January 31, 1898 p.517

119

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Secondary Sources

Adams, James Truslow; "Empire On The Seven Seas."
Chas. Scribners, 1938

 

Allen, W. E. D., "The Turks in Europe "London, Chas.
Scribners Co., l920’p._l49-190

 

Angell, Norman, "The Defence of the Empire" New York
Appleton Century Co,“1937

 

Buckle, George and Monpenny, W. F. "Life of Disraeli",
Vol. III, Macmillan Co., New York, 1913-20

 

Cecil,Lady Gwendolyn, "Life of Robert Cecil,Marquis
of Salisbur " Vol. I, II, III, Hodder and Stoughton,
London I9ZI-I93l

Chamberlain, Sir Austin, "The Foreign Policy of the -,
Powers " New York Council on Fereign Relations 3 ,
P 54-V3

 

 

Clayden, P.W., "England Under Lord Beaconsfield"
London, Keagn Paul &:Cb, 1880’, p 490-520.

 

Dugdale, E.T. S., "The Growing Antagonism", Vol. III, ~\
New York, Harper Brs. 1927

Ensor, R. C. F., "England 1870-1914" Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1936, p 90:245

Fuller, Joseph Vincent, "Bismarck's Diplomacy at Its
Zenith"I Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1922

120

Gooch, G. P., "Studies in Diplomacy and State Craft."
Longmans, New York7'1942

Halevy, Elie, "A History of the English People; Vol. 1
London, EarnestIBenn,‘l929

Hardie, Frank, "The Political Influence of Queen Victoria
1861-1901." London, Oxffird'UniversIty‘Press,1938

 

Herbert, Paul, "A History of modern England". Vol. III
London, Macmillan & Co. 1905

Knaplund, Paul "The British Empire 1815-1939" New York,
Harper Bros. Co.,‘l94l

Kraussie, Alexis, "Russia in Asigl" Henry Holt & Co.,
1900 - 268-280.

 

Langer, W. L., "Franco-Russian Alliance", Cambridge
University Prees.fil929

Lee, Dwight E., "Great Britain and The Cyprus Con-
vention Policy of 1878", Harvard University Press,
London, 1934, p’3, 2GI

 

McCarthy, Justin, "Histquof Our Own Times", Vol._III,
New York, Harpers & Co.,91897

 

McCordock, J.C.,"British Far-Eastern Policy 1894-1900", v
London, Columbia University Press, 1931 ,

Morbat, R. R. "Di lomatic Relations of Great Britain
and the United States",‘LondOn, ArnOId Edward and‘CE.,
‘I925.

 

121

Maurois, Andre, "The Edwardian Era", New York, Appleton
Century Co., 1933 p. 110-115

 

Oron, James Hale, "Publicity and Diplomacy" 1890-1914
Appleton Century Co., New York, 1925, p 90, 112, 123,
125, 141, 170.

 

Piebram, Alfred Francis, "England and France 1871-1914",
London, Oxford Press, 1935

Seely, Sir J. Robert, "Growth of British Policy", Cambfidge
UniversitngressJ 1922 . .

 

Seton-Watson, "Britain In Europe",_1879-19l4, New York,
macMillan & Co.,—1937

 

Seymour, Charles, "The Diplomatic Back round of the War
1870-1914", London, Oxford University ress, 1916.

 

 

Snaps, R. H., "Britain and the Empire 1867-1945",
Cambridge University—Press,’l945.

Sprout, Harold and Margaret, "Foundations of National Power",
New Jersey, Princeton'UniversIty Press, 19457'

 

Townsend, Mary Evelyn, "EurOpean Colonial Expansion since
.1871", Chicago, J. P. Lippincott. p. 156-183, 437-554

Trevelyan, G. M., "British Histor in the 19th Century and
After", Longmans, New YorE7I937.

Ward W. W. & Gooch, G. P., "The Cambridge History of British

Foreign Policy", Vol. III, I735-I919", NewYDrk,‘MacMiIIan
00, o

\

 

 

ROOM USE ONLY

Deal?

revue"? [39%;“Xf g“.
A; I.'I $1.4 .l‘ll thl‘u

Apr 13 ’48
May 6 '43
M‘ $.48 3‘
.“0‘ 29. £8" .
- la)“ 31 ‘9 .. .1.
tab 1'9 ‘Jz’
In] 31 -.9
Aug3 q'~

‘5! 9! ti"!

W64 a»
"m, ._.'m|37/

 

I
"1‘13". ‘u’
:93”: .-

 

MICHIGAN STRTE UNIV. LIBRQRIES

31293104320803