

THE VIEWS OF LORD SALISBURY
ON FOREIGN POLICY

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.
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Leonard Eugene Hill
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THE VIEWS OF LORD SALISBURY
ON FOREIGN POLICY

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ON FOREIGN POLICY

Leonard Eugene Hill

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I. INTRODUCTION

The basis of British foreign policy has been largely determined by her geographical position. Through an island she is separated by only a narrow streak of water from the continent of Europe; thus she is a neighbor of every country of the continent. Because of her insular position England has been dependent upon the seaways of the world to transport to her homeland essential foodstuffs and raw materials. On these same waterways Britain sends her manufactured goods to the markets of the world. It was to insure her coasts against attack, to protect her communications with her colonies and dependencies, and to provide her merchant men access to all the seas, that England developed a two power navy. Harbors for refitting and refuge and at a later time, coaling stations were acquired through the years. These strategic bases of naval power served to control the seas; Gibraltar guarded the gate to the Atlantic, Suez Canal and Alexandria to Red and Mediterranean Seas, the Cape of Good Hope was a protection to India and a starting point for later colonization.

England is concerned with the independence and territorial integrity of all the continental powers for in the maintenance of peace and the 'status quo' are the commerce and lifelines of Britain best preserved. Britain has ever been ready to aid any country that demonstrated itself definitely interested in maintaining the peace of Europe. England has never feared a land

power but when that same land power sought to also become a naval power, she has fought that power by both diplomatic and military means, for she can never permit the highways of the seas to fall into the hands that may close them.

Throughout the years British ministers have endeavoured to avoid alliances which would involve or commit England to action or support of continental powers in recognition of the fact that Britain is a parliamentary government dependent on the will of the people.

With these factors of British policy in mind I have sought to discover Lord Salisbury's views on foreign policy, as expressed in his writings, concerning the following points.

1. Lord Salisbury's attitude toward alliances
2. The maintenance of peace and the 'status quo'
3. The acquisition of new territories
4. The retention of Britain's commercial and naval superiority

The better to understand and to appreciate the contribution of Lord Salisbury to British history we need to know his background prior to his appearance at the Constantinople Convention in 1876.

Lord Robert Cecil, prime minister, the lineal descendant of Robert Cecil, first Earl of Salisbury, was born at Hatfield on February 3, 1830. His father James, William, Gascoyne, Cecil, second marquis, held the offices of lord privy seal and lord president of the council in the administrations of 1852 and 1858. Cecil's mother was the friend and frequent correspondent

of the first duke of Wellington. Of Cecil's brothers the elder James, Viscount Cranborne was an historical essayist and writer of international fame; the younger brother Lieutenant-colonel Eustace Cecil was a surveyor-general. Robert Cecil's youngest sister Lady Blanche, married James Maitland Balfour Salisbury's successor in the premiership.

Robert Cecil while at Eton became greatly interested in the Oxford movement. He made his maiden speech as a M.P. from Stamford On April 7, 1854, on the question of property rights. This speech was followed within the year by speeches on property, religious education, and foreign policy. It was along these three lines of political thought that his mind was principally to travel. On July 11, 1858 Robert Cecil married Georgian Caroline the eldest daughter of Sir Edward Hall Anderson, baron of the exchequer. Owing to his father's disapproval he started his married life on a limited income and was at this time partly dependent upon the income from his pen. He gained public recognition with his frequent articles in the Quarterly Review, written for the most part as criticisms of the government and views on foreign policy. From the years 1859-1866 Robert Cecil was prominent as the leader and spokesman for the Opposition.

Cecil (who by the death of his elder brother in June 14, 1865 became the Viscount Cranborne) was appointed to the Indian Secretary-ship in the Derby government. Cranborne resigned nine months later on the question of suffrage reform and returned to his father's home.

The death of his father April 12, 1868 made Viscount Cranborne a member of the House of Lords. With the return of Disraeli to office in 1874, Lord Salisbury, as he then was, resumed his place at the Indian office. The Eastern question owing to a rebellion attended by atrocities in Bulgaria, had become acute in 1876, and a conference of the great powers was arranged to meet at Constantinople. Lord Salisbury was sent out in December as British plenipotentiary. He brought to this mission a willingness to try ^{new} methods and to strike out upon the unbeat-en paths which an objective study of the facts had indicated. While he was eager to maintain peace among the European great powers, he detested inactivity and a negative policy. To Lord Salisbury was left much of the actual working out of the details and solutions to the critical problems of foreign policy concerned in the Eastern Question. In July 1878, the nations interested in the Balkan situation were invited by Bismarck to a congress at Berlin for the purpose of revising the provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano. The Earl of Beaconsfield, Lord Odo Russell, and Lord Salisbury were chosen as representatives for the British government.

II

CHANGING INTERESTS OF BRITAIN'S POLICY

The interests of England in the near East were essentially what they had been in 1856 but other factors had changed. First, Turkey had failed to set its house in order, and was fast approaching disintegration due to misgovernment, a huge debt, and the loss of foreign sympathy. Also in 1875, England and the Continent faced a different Russia--one who held the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who threatened the control of the Straits and Constantinople and now held control of the Black Sea. In the background was a new Germany interested in the Berlin-to-Bagdad railroad and in gaining a substantial portion of the trade of the near East which England had always considered her own.

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 and the constantly increasing use of it by British shipping had made the Eastern question more than ever before, one of imperial defense because of the importance this short all-sea route had quickly assumed in the public mind of Englishmen. While the fate of Constantinople and the Euphrates Valley was still occasionally mentioned as being vitally connected with the safety of India, Englishmen in 1875 directed their gaze toward Egypt as the real center of British interest and the best compensation for Britain in case Turkey should be partitioned.

On November 26, 1875, the British government announced the purchase of the Khedive's shares in the Suez Canal. The Times

commented,

"It is impossible to separate in our thoughts of the purchase from the question of England's future relations with Egypt, or the destiny of Egypt from the shadows which darken the Turkish Empire. The purchase seemed to fore-shadow a policy of abandoning the independence and integrity of Turkey and at the same time of safeguarding Britain's vital interests in a manner compatible with her imperial greatness. Indeed the opinion was expressed both at home and abroad that England had begun the partition of the Ottoman Empire by an act which indicated her intention of taking Egypt."¹

Concerning the value of the Canal, Salisbury remarked, "Our power over the Suez Canal and our route to India depend on our command of the Mediterranean. If we have that, the shares in the Suez Canal are superfluous. If we do not have that, shares in the Canal are of no use."² This was an indirect way of saying that the balance of power in the Near East was more important to England than the Canal or Egypt. The control of either, however, was part of the problem; what to do with Turkey?

The reaction of the continental powers was varied; France and Russia were very cool, Bismarck was lavish in his praise of the wisdom of England's move and spoke quite freely of the desire for further friendly advances and understandings between mutual friends. From the remarks of Bismarck it was understood that he was ready for the complete dismemberment of the Turkish Empire.³ The British cabinet began to wonder if their move had been such a wise one after

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1. Lee., D.W. "Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878,
 2. Frasers Magazine, May 1876, "English Foreign Policy and the Eastern Question", p38
 3. Seymour, C. "Diplomatic Background of the War", p. 27.

all. England was willing to gain some territory or concessions to maintain the 'status quo' in the Mediterranean but she was not ready as yet for the complete dismemberment of Turkey.

On December 30, 1875 Count Andrassy the Austrian premier drew up and presented a plan of reform for the Turkish government and submitted it to the powers. Though England readily supported this proposed reform the plan was not accepted by the other powers and not until May 1876 was an alternate plan, known as the Berlin Memorandum, submitted by Bismarck and Andrassy. This plan, however, amounted to paving the way for intervention in Turkey which would have resulted in the breakup of that empire. The British cabinet objected to this second plan and at the same time decided to send the fleet to Besika Bay, just outside the Dardenelles, because they had been led to fear that Russia intended to take advantage of the turbulent situation accompanying the overthrow of Sultan Abdul Aziz in order to gain control of Constantinople and the Straits. The rejection of the Berlin Memorandum and the despatch of the fleet to Besika, the despotism of the Sultan and the beginning of the Bulgarian insurrection made the month of May a turning point in the Eastern situation. Nowhere was this more evident than in England and in British policy. England now took the leading role in the attempt to bring about peace and reforms in the Turkish Empire, for the first time, the press and the government directed their policy toward safeguarding Constantinople,⁴

4. Cecil, Lady Mwendolyn, "Life of Robert Cecil, Marquis of Salisbury," p. 130

Lord Salisbury

admitted that there was now no alternative to the policy that England was following, except the partition of Turkey, and he thought it probable that this alternative would have to be adopted. 5.

The climax was reached in late September and early October when Russia openly proposed that in case the Sultan did not accept reforms that Austria should occupy Bosnia, Russia to enter Bulgaria, and all the powers join in a naval demonstration at Constantinople. 6. This was shortly followed by the news that the Russian army was being prepared for the immediate attack on Turkey, and renewed advices from Germany that everyone should take a share of the Ottoman Empire and be happy. 7.

While Lord Derby, Secretary of State, for Foreign Affairs, participated in negotiations which brought about the arrangement of an armistice between Turkey and her rebellious subjects and prepared the way for the Conference to meet in Constantinople in December, he also turned his attention to the problem how best to safeguard the integrity of Turkey and protect the British interests. The most pressing problem seemed to be the defense of Constantinople against the inevitable Russian attack and he put the War Office to work on a series of studies and plans which led eventually to the occupation of Cyprus as the 'place d'armes' from which to protect the route to India. 8.

Lord Salisbury, who was chosen as British Plenipotentiary to the Conference, had become convinced that England should adopt

5. Ibid p.130, To Lord Lytton Mar. 9, 1877

6. Seton--Watson, "Britian in Europe," p.521

7. Seton--Watson, "Britian in Europe," p.522

8. Langer, W. L., "Franco--Russian Alliance", p.26

a policy of cooperation with Russia in order to bring about reforms in Turkey. His conversations with Bismarck, Andrassy and the foreign ministers of France and Italy whom he visited in November on his way to the East confirmed him in this view and in his opinion of the hopelessness of upholding longer the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.⁹

Upon his arrival at the conference early in December, he at once came to an agreement with Ignatiev, Russian Premier, much to the disgust of Sir Henry Eliot, ambassador and second plenipotentiary, and of Beaconsfield who complained that Salisbury seemed to forget his main object at the Conference, which was to keep the Russians out of Turkey. One the two first plenipotentiaries of England and Russia were in accord, it was an easy matter to formulate a set of conditions providing justice and security for the Christians of Turkey. But the Porte now became obdurate and wrecked the work of the conference by resolutely refusing to accept the measures which the representatives of Europe had drawn up.¹⁰ Despite this failure, which he more than half expected, Lord Salisbury concluded that the Conference had done good because it had made it impossible for England to spend any more blood in sustaining the Turkish Empire and he hoped that 'it would make the English statesman buckle to the task of devising some other means of securing the road to India.'¹¹

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- ⁹. Lady Cecil, "Marquis of Salisbury" p. 94 - 107
 - ¹⁰. Ibid., Vol. II p. 122
 - ¹¹. Cecil, II p, 118, Letter to Lord Lytton, Dec. 11

During the months of January and February the Russians were making secret plans for a continued advance into Turkey but England too laid plans. Despite orders and counter orders a Mr. Home sent British officers to various strategic points in Asia Minor and the Balkans with the view of making a defense against the Russians. Other foreign powers began to complain for they intimated that England was 'too eager to seize and appropriate territory to herself.¹³

Lord Salisbury now advocated in active policy, a policy that called for action, in a diplomatic and military measure.

"The object most desirable is, if possible to keep Russia out of the war for the present. If it can be done for twelve months more, France's preparations will be sufficiently complete to make a coup de main from Berlin impossible. Till that time the danger is serious. Nothing but the counterweight of Russia prevented it in 1875, and if that counterweight is removed, the policy or the terrors of Bismarck may again become uncontrollable. Of course, the Unreasonable desposition of the Turk or rather the total disorganization of his Government, is the difficulty....The crisis is an anxious one, for it is quite conceivable that if things go wrong,¹⁴ we may be fighting for Holland before two years are out."

All the time Salisbury wanted to adopt a policy of accepting the partition of the Ottoman Empire. His remarks both private and public and the plans and suggestions worked upon began to reflect the germ of the idea of what became the Cyprus policy, including as they did not only the effort to establish a base of

13. Lee., "Cyprus Convention, " p. 24

14. Op. Cit., p.129, Letter to Lord Lytton.

15. Seton-Watson, p.522

operations in the eastern Mediterranean both as a means of guarding British interests and as compensation for the gains of others, but also the idea of protection or a protectorate over Turkey in order to make her reform.^{15.}

The British Cabinet however devoted its energies to the discovery of the means by which peace could be maintained between Turkey and Russia. On the larger issue of what was to be eventually done about the obvious decay of the Ottoman power they seemed to adopt Derby's motto, "to wait, say little, and pledge ourselves to nothing." Lord Salisbury was led to remark, "English policy is to float lazily downstream, occasionally putting out a diplomatic boathook to avoid collisions." Lord Salisbury, commented further on the lack of definite policy of the Cabinet at this time to Lord Lytton,

"Defending English interests by sustaining the Ottoman dynasty has become impracticable.....I fear that when we come to do the same things some years later, one of two things will have happened. Either France will have recovered her positions and be jealous of any extension of our power in the Mediterranean,-- or Germany will have become a naval power. Either of these contingencies will make it difficult for us to provide ourselves with a pied-a-terre, in place of that which we shall infallible lose at Constantinople. Arrangements may be easy now that will be impossible five years hence.^{16.}

In the next few days a flurry of notes was exchanged between the powers on the issue; was England willing to go to war to protect the Ottoman Empire? On March 10, the Russian

15. Seton--Watson, p. 522

16. Cecil., Vol. II, p.130

government offered what seemed a way out, Lord Salisbury alone was willing to accept the note.

"If we reject the note, it is pretty clear the Czar must go to war. We shall then come before Parliament under these conditions, we shall be alone against the five powers. We shall have bought on a war by this isolation. And we shall have done this to avoid accepting a note which pledges us to hardly anything to which we are not already pledged, and which can at all events be plausibly described as a note of extreme moderation..... Schouvalof tells me they have squared Vienna. I believe it--not so much because he tells me, but because I believe Andrassy to be for the moment in Bismarck's pocket, and Bismarck's consent implies Andrassy's. But what does the assent of Vienna to the Turkish campaign mean? It is ominous to England. It means that Russia will not threaten Constantinople, and will not permanently occupy Bulgaria, but that the national feeling will insist on some territorial result and she can only find it on the side of Asia.¹⁷

In the meantime Russia believed herself as having waited long enough, and on the 24th of April she entered on the long discussed war with Turkey. England temporarily had thrown away her advantage and now could do nothing but sit back and wait upon events.¹⁸

Russia continued in the early part of the renewed campaign to make substantial gains into Turkish territory. The nations of Europe while watching made feeble diplomatic expressions of disapproval. England, however, requested that the Russian government give assurances that her troops would not enter Constantinople. On receipt of the Russian refusal to make this guarantee, or to limit the territory acquired, the British cabinet voted for war on July 21. Fortunately Russia was halted by the

¹⁷. Cecil, II., p.131--Letter to Lord Beaconsfield.

¹⁸. Seton Watson., "Britain in Europe." p. 524

Turkish army at Plevna giving the British a four month's respite in which to pursue a settlement between the Turkish and Russian governments.

The Earl of Beaconsfield and Mr. Layard, the Turkish ambassador reluctantly gave up their efforts to bring the rest of the cabinet and the foreign office to accept their views regarding the necessity of maintaining Turkey. Public opinion was swinging to the side of Salisbury and his idea of acquiring a 'place d'armes' in the eastern Mediterranean and the realization of England's special interest in Asia Minor and Armenia. Ever since the autumn of 1876, the need for some post nearer the scene of action than Malta had been brought forward for one of two reasons, either as a coaling station or refitting place in case England should undertake military measures against Constantinople or Gallipoli, or as compensation which would serve as a means of guarding the route to India if the Ottoman Empire was threatened with dismemberment.

Lord Salisbury during these four months of armistice was striving for peace but he made it clear to Russia that England was willing to go to war to protect British interests in the near East. In a note of May sixth to the Russian government, Salisbury defined the interests which Russia was called upon to respect, "these were the Suez Canal, Egypt, Constantinople and the Straits."

19. Seton-Watson., "Britain in Europe," p. 534

20. Cecil., Vol. II, p. 143--Letter to Lord Lytton, May 18, 1871.

On May 18, Salisbury wrote to Lord Lytton to the effect that a diplomatic request had been sent to Russia stating that England was prepared to stand by her request that Constantinople not be entered by Russian troops. Austria had signified that she would support England in her demands and the chance of Russia defying the combination of the two powers is very small indeed. "Of course, if we fail diplomatically we shall have to undertake the task ourselves."^{21.}

Russia would not commit herself as to her future military actions, consequently Lord Beaconsfield went before Parliament and requested an added sum for military preparations and he expressed the hope that England would soon be in an active struggle in the Mediterranean.^{22.}

The Prime minister proposed that Parliament should be immediately called together, a vote of credit for an increase of our military force demanded and mediation simultaneously undertaken.^{23.} Lord Derby refused consent and intimated resignation. Lord Salisbury supported him in his protest and the Cabinet broke up without coming to any decision. In a letter to Sir S. Northcote Salisbury wrote, "It is proposed to summon Parliament in great haste to ask for money wherewith to arm. But money which cannot be waited for until the regular session of Parliament opens in three weeks is bound to cause some questions, both in this country and in Turkey. The proposal of yesterday seems to me to place us on the steep slope that leads to war. Is there any justification or danger to 'British interests?'"²⁴

21. Cecil., Vol. II, p.143 -- Letter to Lord Lytton

22. Lee., p.159, Monypenny and Buckle II 1032-33

23. Monypenny and Buckle, "Life of Disraeli" Vol. VI p. 201

The Cabinet separated for the Christmas recess with the members still divided on the question. Lord Beaconsfield wrote to Lord Salisbury on the 24th of December asking for support in carrying this request for funds to arm against the 'inevitable war with Russia'.²⁴ Salisbury replied on the 26th in a short note,

"I do not think Wellesley's (Military attaché at St. Petersburg) advice 'to fight Russia now' is sound. She is exhausted in the sense that she cannot go on fighting without great sacrifices. But she is not so exhausted as to be unable to make head against any great national danger--such as a war with England. Nor would the Turks be of any great value as allies. Enrolled as troops under our officers they would fight admirably, but such an arrangement on an extensive scale would never be permitted, so long as the Turkish Government retains the shadow of independence. I see therefore, no reason for agreeing with Wellesley that this is a good moment for seeking to bring on the inevitable collision with Russia, if it be inevitable."²⁵

During the winter the roads were impassable for Russian artillery, so little was accomplished in a military way by either the Turks or the Russians. On the diplomatic front all the elements of the policy to accompany the acquisition of Cyprus had been introduced. By far the most prominent of them was still the desire to establish a commanding position in the Eastern Mediterranean by the means of a convenient naval base from which the Dardenelles could be watched on the one hand and the Suez guarded on the other.²⁶ As early as 1818 an Indian officer J. M. Kinneir had written; "The possession of Cyprus would give England a preponderating influence in the Mediterranean, and place at her disposal the future destinies of the Levant.

24. Ibid., p. 210

25. Cecil., "Marquis of Salisbury, Vol. II, p. 169

26. Lee., p. 61, Monypenny and Buckle II, 1032-33

Egypt and Syria would soon become tributaries, and we would acquire an overawing position in respect to Asia Minor, by which the Porte might at all times be kept in check, and the encroachments of Russia, in this quarter, retarded, if not prevented. It would increase the commerce to an considerable extent, and it is of easy defense, and affords the most abundant supplies to our fleets at a trifling expense,"²⁷

²⁷ . Ibid., p. 80

III

CONSTRUCTING A POLICY

Through the winter of 1878 Disraeli continued to advise early military action against Russia and the dismemberment of Turkey. Lord Derby of the Foreign Office who had objected to this policy for the last year tendered his resignation. Lord Salisbury accepted the office of Secretary of State For Foreign Affairs on March 28th. He hurried up to London from his home at Hatfield and spent the last hours of March 31, in preparing the document later known as the Salisbury Circular issued on April 1. The Circular was telegraphed out, either verbatim or in substance, to the capitals of Europe. It was not a long document; exclusive of the recital of the recent negotiations with which it opens, it contains some fifteen hundred words. The formal occasion of its issue was to explain the refusal of England to enter into the proposed Congress of Berlin until the Russian government had withdrawn its reservations. The Document in its essential features were--an insistence that the validity of the treaty must depend on the assent of the Powers, a criticism of the excessive cessions made to Bulgaria, as a strong Slav state,-- under the auspices and control of Russia, an advocacy of Greek rights against the Slavs, opposition to the "compulsory alienation of Bessarabia" and Russia's acquisition of Batoum and Armenia, and anxiety as to the "political independence of the government of Constantinople." Britain it declared,

would not enter a Congress unless all the changes in the treaties of 1856 could be freely discussed there.^{27a}

France and Italy hailed the Salisbury Circular for its defence of the Mediterranean 'status quo,' Germany and Austria its protest against the extension of Slav domination. Its appearance was followed by a rapid transformation in the continental attitude towards England, Lord Disraeli remarked, "though we were still recognized as standing apart, in this very utterance we have sought no support through preliminary consultations with others. But the isolation which had hereto witnessed to the indifference of other nations, dangerously verging upon contempt, now appeared as a circumstance of leadership." A week or two later Count Andrassy was plaintively noting that though Austrian interests were those most immediately involved, England was now treated everywhere as the neutral power to be first consulted. In fact, from this date until the Congress met at Berlin, the course of European diplomacy became almost continuously dependent upon the action initiated in Downing street.²⁸

In letters to Lord Odo Russell, Lord Salisbury re-emphasizes the British aspect of this whole negotiation; "we object to Russia under the mask either of Slav or Turk domination on the various coasts, Persian, Arabian, Syrian, or Greek, where we now have friends, clients and interests. How that domination is to be met--whether by diminution or by counterpoise--is another question."²⁹

^{27a}. Seton-Watson, "Britain In Europe," p 535

²⁸. Cecil., II p. 231

²⁹. Ibid., p. 239

This attitude of England witnessed by the Circular and the subsequent unfavorable aspect of other European powers gave Salisbury an opportunity to negotiate with Russia with some hopes of an early settlement.

Some have accused Lord Salisbury of issuing the Circular just for an impression, but he writes in his letter of April 10th to the Russian ambassador, "As he likes frank diplomacy (referring) to Count Shuvalof, the Russian premier), it may be useful for you to tell him exactly what we want." Certain objects of British policy were briefly summarized; that an independent Bulgaria would not reach south of the Balkans; that either Russia should surrender her Asiatic conquests or England should acquire "some post which would safeguard her Asiatic interest," that the Straits should either be neutralized and their fortification forbidden or that the blockade of them in time of war should be considered as legitimate.³⁰

On this same line of thought Salisbury wrote to Lord Odo Russell on April 17, "I still think that the division of Bulgaria in Europe and the provision for compensation for England in Asia are the two keys of the same lock. Thus the putting of the indemnity into a precise form, and the arrangement of the Straits question in this manner shall not put England into a worse position than at the beginning of the war. Of course, we shall be glad if the Straits could be declared as open as the Sound; but, even³¹ short of that, some accommodation may be possible.

³⁰. Cecil, II, p. 239., Letter to Lord Odo Russell

³¹. Ibid., p. 242

On May 1, Lord Salisbury informed Count Shuvalow that he was ready to initiate negotiations with St. Petersburg looking to the modification of the San Stefano treaty. On May 4 he despatched a plea to Austria for support in pushing the future Bulgaria back from the Aegean Sea.

On May 9th and 10th he finally laid down the general terms upon which an alliance with Turkey might be made and also the indications that England objected to the extension of Russian boundaries in Armenia and hoped for concessions in this region³².
to British feeling.

While waiting for the answer from Russia he wrote further to Mr. Layard, British ambassador to Constantinople as of May 16,

"to meet the threat of Russian advance, the Porte should concede to us the occupation of Cyprus, it has the double advantage of vicinity both to Asia Minor and Syria; it would enable us without any act of overt hostility and without disturbing the peace of Europe to accumulate material of war, and if requisite, the troops necessary for operations in Asia Minor or Syria, while it would not excite the jealousy which other powers would feel at the acquisitions of territory on the mainland. We should not desire to acquire it in any way that could indicate hostility to the Porte, or any acquiescence in partition. We should therefore propose to hold it as part of the agreement by which we undertook to defend the Asiatic Empire against the Russians, and that we should distinctly stipulate that, as both these engagements were consequent on the Russian annexations in Armenia, as soon as these should cease, both our defensive alliance and our occupation of Cyprus should cease also."³²

However, on May 24 England was informed that Russia was unwilling to give up her conquests in Armenia. Discussions with Count Shuvalof led to the announcement by Salisbury that he was about to complete an arrangement by which the Russian army would be withdrawn from the vicinity of Constantinople and the Autonomous

³². Cecil, II, p. 254, Salisbury Memorandum, Draft to Loftus #350

³³. Ibid., p. 269, Letter to Mr. Layard

Bulgarian principality would be limited to the north of the Balkans.^{34.} Layard was to warn the Sultan that if he did not consent to the terms of the alliance which England had offered to him, "it will not be in the power England to pursue negotiations any further, the capture of Constantinople and the partition of the Empire will be the immediate result." England alone had saved the Sultan but would desist in the future unless^{35.} he made a written agreement by Sunday (May 26)

In brief, the convention now urged upon the Sultan was; "that if Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, or any of them were retained by Russia, and if Russia should take further territories of the Sultan in Asia, England would join the Sultan in defending them by force of arms. In return, the Sultan promised England to introduce reforms, to be agreed upon between them, and consent to assign the Island of Cyprus to be occupied and administered^{36.} by England."

While Layard was struggling with an obstinate Porte to get his signature to a Cyprus convention, Salisbury and the Cabinet were dealing with Russian and Austria. As a result of these negotiations with Russia, Two memorandums were signed on May 30 * which registered the points upon which they were free to raise further discussion at a European Congress. So far as Turkey in Asia was concerned Russia agreed to give up Bayazid

^{34.} Cecil., Vol. II, p 269--Letter to Mr. Layard

^{35.} Lee., p. 83--Telephone to Mr. Layard

^{36.} Ibid. p. 84

* Appendix Note #1

and the valley of Alashkert but refused to yield Kars or Batoum.^{37.} On June 6 another supplementary agreement was concluded with Austria. According to the understanding reached with Count Andrassy, Austria and England were to support each other in their respective views concerning Bosnia and Bulgaria although Andrassy intimated that he considered the pledges to be only a gentleman's agreement and subject to^{38.} modification.

Thus the secret agreements negotiated with Russia, Turkey and Austria cleared the way for the acceptance on June 3rd of Bismarck's invitation to a congress at Berlin. Taken together they represent a policy though not the complete whole that the English cabinet wanted, it was nevertheless something definite and marked an advance of that of a year ago. This policy had now elevated England to a central place in the^{39.} settlement of the Eastern Question.

37. Lee., p. 85--Parliamentary Papers C 2057 (1878, #2)
 38. Ensor's, "England 1870--1914", p. 49
 39. Seton-Watson, p. 537

IV

THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN

The Earl of Beaconsfield, Lord Salisbury, and Lord Odo Russell, the ambassador to Germany, were chosen to represent Britain at the Congress of Berlin which was formally opened on June 13, 1878. Despite the secret agreements by which the ground had been prepared, there proved to be many difficulties in the path of the British delegation. The principal problems involved were the removal of Russian influence as far as possible from the shores of the Aegean and the assurance of Turkish control over the regions north of it at least up to the crest of the Balkans.^{40.}

The other difficulties encountered by England at the Congress concerned her interest even more directly and arose in connection with the disposition of Batoum, Turkey's Asiatic boundaries, the Straits, and arrangement for the actual occupation of Cyprus. The negotiations over these points were complicated for the English plenipotentiaries by the unfortunate revelation in the 'Globe' on June 14, the day after the Congress opened, of the secret memoranda which had been signed by Lord Salisbury and Shuvalof on May 30.

While Andrassy did not, despite the feeling in Vienna, waver in his promised support of England at Berlin, the reaction

40. Moneyppenny & Buckle., Vol. II, 1187

41. Layard., "Memoirs," VIII F. O. p. 143

in Turkey greatly endangered the good relations established between England and the Porte where the disclosure was being represented, said Layard, "as a secret arrangement for the partition of Turkey, and as proving that the British Government had been from the first in league with Russia and Austria for the division of the spoils."⁴¹

Lord Salisbury decided to make capital of the 'Globe revelation' either to get a Russian renunciation of Batoum or to gain the freedom of the Straits for the British Fleet. His first move was to telegraph to Mr. Layard on June 15 asking him to secure, if possible, the Porte's consent to the following agreement:

"In case Russia should seek to acquire, or having acquired to retain Batoum, and England should be of the opinion that the presence of a naval force in the Black Sea is expedient with a view to protecting the Sultan's interests in regard to H. M.'S. territories as defined in the preliminary Treaty of San Stefano; His Majesty will not offer forcible opposition to the passage at any time of the English fleet through the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus for that purpose."⁴²

This was indeed a bold step which Salisbury in his telegram to Layard justified. by the explanation that such an agreement would probably prevent Batoum from being taken, or if it was taken, would enable England, "to provide for the Porte." To Mr. Cross, left in charge of the Foreign office of London, he pointed out that since England was much the stronger naval power, her exclusion from the Black Sea was a greater loss to her than the gain of Russia's exclusion

41. Layard., "Memoirs," VIII F.O. p. 143

42. Cecil., p. 290

from the Mediterranean.

On June 25 Salisbury wrote to Layard, "Against the danger resulting from the capture of Kars and Batoum the Convention (of June 4) you have signed is a sufficient guarantee, it will bring little real advantage to Russia without a large expenditure of money; it will not enable her to threaten or injure Turkey. We may be able to use this incident to apply for more leeway concerning the Straits⁴⁴ question."

Meanwhile the English cabinet now began to admonish Salisbury to the effect that public opinion in England would not permit the abandonment of Batoum. Salisbury looked at the question in this light however; "If we reserve to ourselves the practical power of entering the Straits whenever the independence of Turkey is threatened, we shall have done⁴⁵ enough even if we are not able to recover Batoum." The fact that Cyprus was to be given to England and that England also advocated that Austria take over Bosnia, temporarily that is, led to grave suspicions of British self-interests by the Porte.

July 9th, the day on which it was hoped to settle the remaining questions concerning Batoum, was set for the announcement of the Cyprus convention. Late on July 6th, the word came that the firman authorizing the transfer of the island to British rule was being prepared and on July 7, that it had been granted. On the same day, Mr. Baring and a

43. Ibid., p. 291

44. Salisbury Desp #10 Berlin, June 19, 1878, F.O. 78/2899

45. Lee., p. 96--Memorandum to Cross

Turkish Pasha carrying the firman left Constantinople for Cyprus and orders were issued to Sir John Hay to proceed with some warships under his command to the island, although Lord Salisbury asked that troops be held back a few days to avoid the appearance of force to other powers.⁴⁶ On the night of July 6, Lord Salisbury wrote a long personal letter to Mr. Waddington, the French minister, explaining the Convention and the circumstances that had made it necessary, and sent a much shorter one to Bismarck to whom the English policy had already⁴⁷ been explained.

In the final convention signed at Berlin on the 13th of July, England had gained all her points with the exception of the commercializing of the port of Batoum and the inclusion of the Mohammedan lazes by Turkey.⁴⁸ In accomplishing her aims; holding back Russia, acquisition of a port to protect British interests, an alliance with Turkey; she had gained the distrust of the other powers. Lord Salisbury now sought to placate⁴⁹ France first of all. In a series of letters to Mr. Cross he reveals his ideas on the entire question of the Cyprus Convention; "The Congress of Berlin fulfilled its immediate object in bringing a dangerous crisis to a peaceful close. Its permanent importance lay in the purpose which it represented,-- the unanimous refusal of the rest of Europe to allow Russia's claim to predominate in the Near East. The part which her two

46. Ibid., p. 97--98 Telegram (per) to Layard
 47. Cecil., Vol. II. p. 294., P.O. 363/4 & 363/5
 48. Seton-Watson., p. 539-40
 49. Lee; p. 100 F. O. 363/4

Imperial allies took in this refusal and the enduring resentment which their action aroused in her . . . made the Congress a point of vital departure in the history of the world."⁵⁰ The actual provisions of the Treaty which it formulated offered no permanent solution to the problems dealt with. Finality was, in fact, impossible while the Turkish Empire endured, and in his private correspondence Lord Salisbury never claims for his own proposals more than a prospect of transitional stability.

In the House of Lords the Convention was attacked mainly for the vagueness and largeness of the commitments which were involved in the pledge of resistance to further Russian advance. "The question we have to ask ourselves is concerning the responsibility which we should have incurred if we had left the whole thing alone. Once the government had come to the conclusion that it could not safely allow Mesopotamia and Asia Minor to fall into Russian hands, it's only wise and prudent course was to announce the fact beforehand. A similar frankness would have averted the Crimean war. In recording a pledge which made it clear beyond the possibility of doubt that further annexations would not be tolerated, we were playing into the hands of Russians more prudent counsellors and taking the strongest security for future peace."⁵¹

50. Cecil., Vol II, p. 297-- To Hansard July 18, 1878

51. Ibid., p. 301.

V

THE EGYPTIAN QUESTION

Beaconsfield and Salisbury now hurried home to defend their policy before Parliament. Already the issues in the press and Parliament resolved themselves into three main divisions: Was England's promise to protect Turkey against Russia a necessary and a wise policy? Was Cyprus valuable because of its position and its fitness for a military and naval station? Was Turkey's promise to reform worth anything; was England justified in assuming the burden of responsibility for the carrying out of reforms in Asiatic Turkey? Lord Salisbury based his defence of the Cyprus Convention on the premise that for the sake of the Indian Empire, Russia must be prevented from further encroachments upon Asiatic Turkey and that the Ottoman Porte was too weak to perform that task alone. England's task was therefore to take a position which would enable her to better defend Turkey and to influence the improvement of economic and political conditions in the Asiatic portions of the Sultan's dominions. England was not only to take the responsibility of defending Turkey, which was thrust upon her by her imperial interests and not the caprice of the government, but also to perform a civilizing influence in a backward region where trade and commerce were to be developed for the benefit of its

inhabitants, the Ottoman Empire and the world in general. For both of these purposes Cyprus was excellently adapted, although it was admitted that there were other locations equally as good or better which had been avoided out of the considerations for the feelings for France.⁵²

"We do not, my Lords, wish to enter into any unnecessary responsibility, but there is one responsibility from which we certainly shrink; we shrink from the responsibility of handing to our successors a diminished or weakened Empire.-----In taking Cyprus the movement is not Mediterranean; it is Indian, we have taken a step there which we think necessary for the maintenance of the Empire and for its preservation in peace."⁵³ From the very first of the negotiations and hostilities it seemed that England would have to submit to the demands of the three emperors, or to some settlement which had been prearranged by them. It is true that some concessions were made to Russia and to Austria to win her over but the result was the breakup of the Dreikaiserbund and the establishment of England as the commanding figure and power at the end of the convention.⁵⁴ England was thus given a freer hand to work out her policies in Turkey than if she had not isolated Russia and won the friendship of Bismarck and Andrassy. Lord Salisbury later declared, "Men are much more readily persuaded by acts than by words, and there-

52. Cecil., Vol II., p. 301-304--Letter to Layard

53. Monypenny & Buckle., Vol II, p.1224

54. Lee., p.122

fore we occupied the island of Cyprus to show our intention of maintaining our hold in those parts....When the interest of Europe was centered in the conflicts that were waged with Spain, England occupied Gibraltar. When the interest of Europe was centered in the conflicts that were being waged in Italy, England occupied Malta; and now that there is a chance that the interest of Europe will be centered in Asia Minor or Egypt, England has acquired Cyprus." ⁵⁵

No one was more fully aware of the immense difficulties still to be overcome than Salisbury who had borne the major part of the work of salvaging England's interest, so long jeopardized by hesitation and indecision. "But had we any other choice?" he asked "Battle there must be--for there are rival interests to satisfy; and we had to choose between the immediate appeal to arms, or postponing, with the chance of avoiding, that arbitrament by substituting for it a protracted diplomatic struggle." ⁵⁶

Although Lord Salisbury stoutly denied that he had any intention of acquiring Territory in Asia Minor, it is probably true that few Russians, Germans, or Frenchmen in 1878 believed him and that everyone in Asia Minor was forecasting the passage of that country into British hands. While Salisbury's correspondence with Layard does not altogether bear out this opinion, except at moments of exasperation with the dilatory tactics of

55. Lee., "Cyprus Convention", p.124 Salisbury to Layard (Private)

56. Ibid., p.147, Salisbury to Layard

the Porte, he certainly hoped to see Europeans employed in the highest governmental posts in Turkey and explained that unless this were done, very little would be accomplished.

"Would it be possible, he asked Layard, "to begin with some province and appoint some Indian officer or civil servant, who would be selected with great care?"⁵⁷ Salisbury wished to work through the Sultan, however, and realized the difficulty of persuading a sovereign to place power in the hands of men who would not be likely to let it slip back again.

The fundamental assumption upon which Salisbury and Layard based their hope of success was that the Sultan and the Porte were sincerely desirous of reforming their empire. The method which they adopted, therefore was to use the Sultan as a 'fulcrum' upon which the lever of advice and admonition was to work in order to stir the slow moving Turkish government into action. But Layard also agreed with Lord Salisbury that the "authority and influence of Britain at Constantinople is one of the vital objects of English policy, perhaps the most important of all," and that he was keenly aware how he might jeopardize that influence by pressing the Sultan too strongly⁵⁸ to do what he feared would weaken the sovereign's authority.

By the end of July it had been agreed that the program which England should demand should be a mild and inoffensive one, involving the institution of a gendarmerie in Asiatic

57. Cecil, II p. 313, Letter to Sir Henry Layard

58. Cecil, II, p. 315

Turkey to be organized and commanded by Europeans, the Establishment of central courts of justice likewise to be supervised by European lawyers, the reform of tax collections by the abolishing of tithe farming and again introducing Europeans into the system, and the appointment of strong men as governors of the provinces upon definite terms of office instead of the Sultan's pleasure.⁵⁹ The Sultan and the Porte professed themselves to be well pleased with these proposals when they were presented in early August and after a delay of two months⁶⁰ finally accepted them.

The obstacles to both the acceptance and the application of the reforms was overwhelming. The greatest of these was the virtual bank-ruptcy of the Ottoman Empire and the inability of Britain to remedy the situation. The British government found, however, that there was no hope of guaranteeing a loan to Turkey because of the temper of Parliament, whose members believed that England's financial obligations were already too great and that Turkey was unworthy of confidence.⁶¹

On August 22 in a letter to Sir S. Northcote, chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Salisbury suggested, "The principle of it is to offer--money to Turkey and peace with Greece, some chance of indemnity to Russia, something to the creditors and reforms to the Asiatic population. I hope to work out the figures for you more closely. Whenever a railway or other undertaking has

59. Lee, "Cyprus Convention", p.150, Salisbury to Layard

60. Ibid., p.153

61. Lee, p.153, Salisbury to Layard (Telegram)

come to grief, it has always been found necessary to raise a certain amount of money in the first instance to restore its money-earning power. It is the same with a bankrupt state.⁶²

Another obstacle in the way of pressure upon the Porte was the fear almost constantly present of Russia's aims in regard to Constantinople and Turkish Armenia. Her army had not been withdrawn from the vicinity of Constantinople although in September it had been withdrawn beyond the Chataldje lines. However, Salisbury feared in October that the Russians would not evacuate Eastern Rumelia at the stipulated time. What alarmed Salisbury is that Russia might again win the favor of Austria and Germany and by the means of the renewed Dreikaiserbund feel free to do as she pleased. accordingly the British Government authorized Layard to inform the Sultan that "the Queen is fully resolved to insist on the evacuation of the Balkan peninsula by Russia next May, in accordance with the treaty, and if force is necessary will cooperate with the Sultan for that purpose."⁶³

In this extract from a letter to Lord Loftus, Ambassador to St. Petersburg, we see some of these fears of Russia revealed, but of more importance we see revealed Salisbury's concept of Honor as regards Turkey, for that matter, any other country with which England was dealing with at that time;

62. Cecil., II, p. 311. Letter to Sir S. Northcote.

63. Lee., p. 153 Salisbury to Layard

"The usual duality of Russian policy is again making itself apparent. In Turkey they are conducting themselves as if their one object was to go to war with England. Every trick which it is possible for imagination to conceive, every subtle misconstruction of the treaty is being used for the purpose of hindering the proper execution of the treaty. Our policy seems to me to be simple. All kinds of difficulties will be placed in our way during the organizations and delimitations prescribed by the treaty. We do not intend to quarrel on any of these subsidiary points. The great question is, will they evacuate on the 3rd of May all the territories south of the Danube,--or rather Roumania? If not I do not see how peace can be preserved, for, having induced the Turk on the faith of the Treaty to evacuate Batoum, Varna and Schumla, it is impossible that we can leave him in the lurch. The Czar understands the meaning of a point of honor, and I am hopeful that he will recognize this as one which we should be disgraced if we gave up." 64

Now in Summary, what was accomplished by the Cyprus Convention? "The upshot of the labours of the last year and a half has been, besides the Anglo Turkish convention, a very considerable increase in the authority and influence of England at Constantinople. And this, so long as the Turkish Empire endures, is one of the most important objects of British policy,--perhaps the most vital of all. It will have to be maintained as it has been achieved, by constant labour and vigilance on the part of the ambassador." 65

On the other side of the ledger, The whole reason for England's failures in 1878 to 1880 come to this; The Sultan and those who shared the spoils of the old regime were not interested

64. Cecil., II, p. 344, Letter to Lord Loftus

65. Cecil, II, p. 315, Letter to Lord Odo Russell

in reform or in any policy other than that of maintaining the system which fulfilled their selfish desires regardless of the cost to the mass of people whose welfare, after all, was more often than not an excuse offered by self-proclaimed reformers who sought gains quite as selfish as those of the Porte and the Sultan.⁶⁶

In fact in 1875 England had stood at the parting of the ways in her policy toward Turkey. Was she to bolster up the Ottoman Empire or partition and take her share? The needs of imperial interests and the unity of the other foreign powers had led the British representatives to proclaim the traditional policy of maintaining Turkish integrity, but this had not prevented partition of territory, although England's share was disguised by the Cyprus Convention. Men like Lord Salisbury, Mr. Home and Mr. Layard had dreamed dreams of England's mission to civilize the backward regions of Turkey and thereby strengthen and protect British imperial interests. This view formed a part of the Cyprus policy but was incompatible with the other part which made it a necessity to work through the existing Turkish institutions.⁶⁷

Great Britain failed in the great objects which Salisbury set before her because she was compelled to adopt a compromise and this compromise would not work. The election of 1880 changed

66. Seton-Watson, "Britain in Europe", p. 539

67. Seton-Watson, p. 546

the political picture for a short time but the problem which was not solved at Cyprus was the beginning of a policy which was solved by Lord Salisbury to a better degree in the occupation of Egypt.⁶⁸

68. Lee, "Cyprus Convention", p.160

VI

SALISBURY MINISTRY-1885-1892

In 1880 an election was held and the Conservatives lost their majority in the House and Gladstone agreed to form a new Cabinet. On May 9, 1881 it was announced that Lord Salisbury had been unanimously elected as the leader of the Conservatives in the House of Lords. As leader of the Opposition Salisbury did much to influence public opinion and had ample opportunity to express his views as to the foreign policy to be followed by Her Majesty's Government. Four years later, the Queen selected him for the post of first authority. Lord Salisbury accepted the office of prime minister and as he took up his duties he was confronted with the problem; what to do with Egypt?⁶⁹ First let us trace in brief, the factors leading up to the Egyptian crisis; In Egypt Gladstone not only failed to reverse Disraeli's policy of imperialism but even extended it. The Khedive of Egypt by his own extravagance had been forced to sell his shares in the Suez Canal. Furthermore his prodigality continued to the alarm of his French and British creditors. In 1876 the French and the British sent representatives to Egypt, who eventually assumed charge of the national finances

69. Cecil, II, p. 348-356

in order to secure the payment of the debt.

In 1878 the French foreign minister M. Waddington had pressed hard for a written convention concerning Egypt.

"Waddington pressed me STRONGLY TO CALL ON HIM, so I went yesterday morning and had nearly an hour and a half of it,.....the matter on which I think he was most anxious was that we should put into an obligatory shape the parity of influence between England and France in Egypt. He first proposed that I should put into the form of a convention the assurances which I had given him with respect to Egypt in our dépatc. I said that I thought such a proposal would be inadmissible on the ground that it was too plain spoken a claim to make the Khedive the vassal of England and France. It does not seem to me to be expedient to bind ourselves formally in this matter. As matters now stand we have no choice but to admit in some sort a parity of influence between England and France. But the state of affairs may change and it may suit us at some future period to push ahead; and then an obligatory engagement would be highly inconvenient.⁷⁰

Salisbury was willing to give parity to France and was willing to work with France but the interests of Britain were to come first as evidenced by this correspondence of April 10, 1879 to Lord Lyons, the ambassador to Paris,

"It may be quite tolerable and even agreeable to the French government to go into partnership with the bondholders, or rather, to act as the sheriff's officer for them, but to us this is a new and embarrassing situation. Egypt can never prosper as long as 85 percent of her revenue goes in paying the interest of her debt. We have no wish to part company with France; still less do we mean that France should acquire in Egypt any special ascendancy; but, subject to these considerations, I shall ⁷¹ be glad to be free of the companionship of the bondholders.

70. Cecil, II., p.334-35, Letter to Lord Beaconsfield, Oct. 5, 1878
 71. Ibid., p.335, Letter to Lord Lyons.

In 1881 a group of Egyptians, who objected to the native misgovernment and the intervention of foreigners, rose in revolt with the war cry of 'Egypt for the Egyptians'. Eventually the movement became fanatical and resulted in the death of many Europeans. The British government invited France and Italy to join in intervention, but both declined. Finally in 1882 the British entered Egypt in force and put down the rebellion alone. Subsequently British agents assumed responsibility for a large part of the government in Egypt. No protectorate was declared, and Gladstone announced his intention of withdrawal as soon as good order should have been restored.^{72.}

It is interesting to note the change, though slight, in Salisbury's viewpoint concerning Egypt. Writing to Layard on October 29, 1878 he states:

What happened was this;--In the course of our intercourse at Berlin, which was necessarily familiar, Waddington and I often discussed the events which were taking place in the Mediterranean and their effect on the balance of power in the European states. While I maintained our right to a dominant influence in Western Asia and especially Mesopotamia, I disclaimed any intention of establishing an exclusive foothold in Egypt, and with respect to Tunis, I said that England was wholly disinterested and had no intention to contest the influence which the geographical position of Algeria naturally gave to France. Sometimes we discussed the possibility of the Turkish Empire going to pieces entirely. In that case, I told him, he must not hold us to any promise as to Egypt; but that, as to Tunis, England would not hold herself bound to interfere with any course which France in such an event might choose to take."⁷³

Salisbury wrote to Sir Stafford Northcote, on September 16,

72. Ensor, "Britain 1879-1914", p. 75-77

73. Cecil, II, p. 332, Letter to Sir Henry Layard.

1881; "as to our policy--the defence of it lies in a nutshell. When you have a neighbor and faithful ally (France) who is bent on meddling in country in which you are deeply interested, you have three courses open to you. You may renounce--or monopolize--or share. Renouncing would have been to place the French squarely across our road to India. Monopolizing would have been very near the risk of war. So we resolved to share."⁷³

A few months later Gladstone soon discovered that the assumption of power carried with it responsibilities that he had not foreseen. A rebellion in the Sudan (1881) involved the British government in Egyptian affairs far more deeply than he had intended. The Sudan was an Egyptian province to the south of Egypt. It had never been thoroughly conquered, and it had always been subject to misrule. In 1883 the native tribesmen rose, drove the Egyptian troops into the fortresses, and cut to pieces an Egyptian army commanded by Hicks sent against them by the Khedive.⁷⁴ The resident British officials advised the cabinet that the Egyptians could not hold the Sudan without some help. The cabinet decided that it was not business of the British government. At the same time, the Egyptian garrisons cornered in the Sudan could hardly be left to their fate. In 1884 General Charles Gordon who had previously acted as the governor of the Sudan under the Egyptians was sent to Khartoum, the capital of the Sudan, to facilitate the evacuation.

73. Cecil, II, p. 331, Letter to Sir Stafford Northcote.

74. Ward, A.W. & Gooch, C.P., "Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy" p.177

or merely to report on what was necessary to be done was not clear in his orders and when he arrived at Khartoum he attempted to restore order. He too, was soon cut off. A relief expedition was necessary if he was to be saved. The cabinet delayed, since an expedition so the cabinet thought, would bring upon Britain more responsibility than she wanted to take. The delay was fatal. The expedition which the British government finally despatched arrived at Khartoum two days after the garrison had been annihilated by the Sudanese. A public furor arose in England and Gordon's death was attributed to the criminal negligence of the Gladstone cabinet and led to its downfall in 1885.⁷⁵

In April of 1884 three months before the death of Gordon, Lord Salisbury wrote to Hansard; "no deeper, no more vital disgrace can befall this country than that General Gordon should be allowed to perish in his undertaking without the assistance from the English Government. Already there is sufficient of Egyptian blood to be laid at the door of this present government; already we have made sacrifices enough of those whose kingdom we have taken over, whose responsibilities we have undertaken and to whose safety we are practically and substantially pledged. we have now had five massacres of Egyptian troops, massacres caused by the neglect of Her Majesty's Government,--Hicks Baker, Sinkat, Moncrieff, and Shendy, if the English cabinet are resolved to make no effort to save this gallant man they will not only be covering the

75. Ward & Gooch, "Cambridge History" III, p.178-184

English name with dishonor, but they will be destroying that belief in English prowess which is the only hope they have of being successfully able to discharge their responsibilities in Egypt. By their neglect they are paralyzing the power of this country.⁷⁶

After the death of Gordon the Gladstone cabinet lasted only a few months, and just prior to the new election Lord Salisbury was pressed for a statement of policy; "There is a great pressure from our men for the declaration of a 'Policy'I take the general objects of our policy to be to keep Egypt from European interference on the one side and from anarchy on the other."⁷⁷ I do not believe in the plan of moulding the Egyptians to our civilization. As long as they are Mohammedans that is impossible. The only place in which we have tried it is Afghanistan, and then it was not precisely a success."⁷⁸

On February 26, 1885 Lord Salisbury made a speech in the House of Lords, "On Abandonment of General Gordon", which further defined his policy."

"With Mediterranean politics, as such, we have no great cause to concern ourselves, France may be the mistress of Algeria and Tunis..but Egypt stands in a peculiar position. It is the gateway to India. The condition of Egypt can never be indifferent to us, and more than that, after all the sacrifices that we have made, after all the efforts that this country has put forth, after the position that we have taken in the

76. Cecil, "Marquis of Salisbury", III, p.102 Letter to Hansard,
 77. Cecil, III, p.102, Excerpt from Letter to Hansard
 78. Ward & Gooch, "Cambridge History" III, p.184

eyes of the world, we have the right, and it is our duty to insist upon it, that our influence shall be predominate in Egypt. England is the only power in the position to give this new infant government the help and the aid that it needs and must have if it is to sustain itself, and with all due regards to the rights of the suzerain, the influence of England must be predominate.⁷⁹

⁷⁹. Op. cit. p.127

VII

SALISBURY'S LAST MINISTRY 1895-1902

At the request of the Queen on the resignation of the Gladstone Cabinet, Salisbury accepted the task of making a ministry in the summer of 1885.⁸⁰ As he began to examine the actual reports of the diplomatic situation he found them to be even more forboding than what had been published. Prince Bismarck had been discussing amicably with the French Government proposals for insisting upon the 'Europeanising' of Egypt and its removal from England's exclusive control. Austria had come to an understanding with her age-long rival Russia, as to conditions in the Balkan peninsula by which her neutrality would be engaged in the event of a Russian quarrel with England.⁸¹ The latest development was the drawing of Turkey, "Britain's ancient and peculiar ally," to this combination. Russia had been seeking her friendship, had even offered the retrocession of Kars and Ardhan, involving under the terms of the Anglo-Turkish Convention that of Cyprus also. Turkey had appealed to the two German powers for advice, and they had counselled her, in the event of an Anglo-Russian war, to proclaim neutrality and rigidly close the Straits against the fleets of both belligerents-action

80. Cecil., Vol. III., p. 136, Speech in Parliament, Feb. 26, 1885

81. Seton-Watson., p. 562

which, in the disability inflicted, would have been almost wholly one-sided.

Russia had insisted that the prohibition should be more than verbal and had offered assistance in arming the Straits against the passage of British warships. Turkey was herself actually engaged in preparations for making their defence effective.⁸² Lord Salisbury's comment caustic though appropos;

"The (the Liberal Gov't) have at least achieved their long desired 'Concert of Europe.'" They have succeeded in uniting the continent of Europe--against England."⁸³

In 1878 no one hardly knew where or what Bulgaria was, but by 1880 it was evident that this new Balkan country was not to become a Russian Satrapy. Prince Alexander, the ruler, was making himself felt as an influence and a power. In 1885 just at the beginning of the Salisbury ministry events took another turn; at Philipopolis, the eastern Rumelian capital, a band of Christian officers forced themselves into the Pash's palace and informed him that his rule was at an end. Eastern Rumelia had been set off as an "Autonomous province of the Turkish Empire," but had used its partial freedom to promote complete union with Bulgaria proper. The Sultan of Turkey was taken by surprise, but did nothing. All eyes were turned to Prince Alexander at Sofia. The prince hesitated to defy Russia and Turkey. His ministers and public opinion⁸⁴ advocated advance and the holding of eastern Rumelia.

82. Cecil., Vol. III., p.125-134

83. Ibid., p.136

84. Gooch & Ward., "Cambridge History," p.149

In 1878 England had been willing to fight Russia to prevent the union of Bulgaria. Now in 1885 the situation was reversed; public opinion in England desired the union of Bulgaria at the expense of Russia,⁸⁵ What^{was} Salisbury's attitude concerning this question? He has been accused of inconsistency but let us examine his own letters of this period. In a telegram to the Queen, Sept. 24, 1885--

"In considering the attitude of England as to the breadth of the treaty of Berlin, it must be remembered that the maintenance of the Balkan frontier was one of the provisions on which Lord Beaconsfield insisted at Berlin at the risk of war. If England now takes the lead in tearing up the agreement which was forced on Europe seven years ago, her position will not be honorable and her influence will be much diminished. Wish for the Bulgarians for union was as well known then as it is now, and the danger of the big Bulgaria is not at all events diminished. Situation is embarrassing because of the extreme weakness of Turkey. Probability is that the monarchies will not restore separation, but if they do, Great Britain cannot honorably oppose them..She would be stultifying herself. If the union is upheld, best practical issue will be that of a personal union in the Prince, institutions on each side remaining without change."⁸⁶

Lord Salisbury saw also in strong and independent Bulgaria the addition of a buffer between the Turkish Empire⁸⁷ and the aggressive attitude of the Russians in the Balkans. All Europe was amazed at the moderate actions of the Balkan peoples and Lord Salisbury early recognized this fact; that despite the anger and passion of the emperor of Russia and the panic alarms of the Sultan--"that a united Bulgaria had passed from a debatable political project into an accomplished

85. Ibid. p. 150

86. Letters of Queen Victoria II., Vol III, p. 692

87. Ibid. p. 242

and irremovable fact.

Greece now threatened to over step her bounds in an effort to wrest territory from the Porte. Only the determined stand of England stopped this move.⁸⁹ Salisbury used his influence to stop Greece from declaring war on Turkey. In a telegram to the Turkish Government on January 25, 1886,--

"Inform the Porte that England has procured joint actions of the powers to forbid attack by Greece on Turkey by sea. But the vigor of our support entirely depends on Turkey coming to an immediate agreement with Bulgaria and insisting from Prince Alexander that he not demand extravagant terms... Make it clearly understood that Turkey must not count upon our support unless she agrees with Bulgaria. Germany, I have good ground for believing, takes the same view.⁹⁰

Turkey yielded and an other part of her territory was relinquished.

Salisbury believed it necessary for Turkey to make this concession which had been a realization for many years, to gain the greater advantage of establishing a buffer against Russia. This view was not shared by all the Cabinet as written in a note to the Queen, "Lord Salisbury with his humble duty respectfully submits that a cabinet was held today, chiefly on foreign affairs. A large question was dealt with, which in the future, may be of supreme importance. A section of the cabinet showed a strong inclination to depart from the traditional policy of this country of resisting the designs of Russia upon the Balkan peninsula. Lord Randolph Churchill,

88. Cecil., Vol. II p.245

89. Ward & Gooch., Vol. III, p.150

90. Cecil., Vol. III, p.225, Telegram to the Porte, Jan. 26, 1886

Lord Hamilton and Mr. Smith were the three who took this stand. It was not shared by the majority of the cabinet and myself, and therefore will not affect the policy of this government. But it may at any moment produce difficulties within the cabinet, of a serious kind."⁹¹

Another of Salisbury's actions on coming to the ministry was an attempt to decrease some of Britain's imperial responsibilities. He sent Sir Henry Drummond to arrange for the evacuation of Egypt within a specified time. Specific reservations and conditions were to be included in the agreement however, such as--"we must not leave Egypt until we have restored to her a solvent and matured administration and a settled frontier; and in leaving her, we must insure as against the other powers those imperial interests of our own which were involved in her geographical position as protection to the Suez Canal." For the achievement of these purposes freedom from interference while the control lasted, and freedom in determining the date and terms of the withdrawal,⁹² were necessary conditions.

Writing to Sir Henry Drummond, an ambassador to Cairo, on August 13, 1886, Salisbury further enlarged on these conditions, "The end to which I work is evacuation, but with certain privileges reserved to England. I should like a treaty right to occupy Alexandria when we pleased,--and a

91. Buckle, G F., letters of Queen Victoria, Third Series, Vol. I, p. 20
 92. Cecil., Vol. III, p. 232

predominance in the control of the railways,-- and perhaps one of two other things. These terms may seem hard to obtain, but I would not cut myself off until the state of Europe had cleared up. If we come back strong from the elections and if we can persuade Germany to go along with us the results of which I speak are possible. I am quite content that the Turk shall be in Egypt as long as we are; but if possible no fixed date for our evacuation.⁹³

Finally in 1877, a convention was formulated whereby British troops should be withdrawn in three years. However German, France, and Russia objected so violently that Turkey⁹⁴ was persuaded not to ratify. Not long afterward the appearance of French designs upon the Sudan convinced Salisbury that not only Egypt should be retained but that the Sudan⁹⁵ should be occupied also. On the diplomatic front Salisbury was led to state after this rebuff by France and Russia,--"I think that for some time to come England will remain comparatively isolated and her word will weigh less in the councils of Europe⁹⁶ than it did twenty years ago."

The colonial rivalries which gave Salisbury the most trouble were in Africa. While Gladstone's cabinet was still in power in 1885, it created a new method of advancing British imperialism in Africa. Private trading companies were established which relieved the government of the heavy expense of administer-

93. Ibid., p. 235, Telegram to Sir H. Drummond.

94. Ward & Gooch., Vol. III, p. 244

95. Ibid. p. 247

96. Op. Cit., p. 130

ing the new territories gained. The East and South African Companies were formed and were able to enter large territories, but trouble with the natives led the British Government to take over the obligations of each of these companies. The most pressing problems were the clashes with the African agents of the other European powers who were also players in the game of expansion. Salisbury's chief work was to negotiate treaties which established recognized boundaries of the territories claimed by the several Powers and so brought an end to some of the rivalries which had attained dangerous proportions in several regions. Portugal, which had contested the occupation of Rhodesia, was forced to forgo its claims by the use of a strong hand. In 1890 Salisbury demanded the withdrawal of Portugese troops from the territories claimed by Great Britain. Portugal was obdurate, but the issue of an ultimatum caused her to give way.

Salisbury had warned Portugal that the British Government could not "recognize Portugese sovereignty in territories not occupied by her in sufficient strength to enable her to maintain order, protect foreigners, and control the natives."

On June 11, 1891, an Anglo-Portugese Convention was signed, in which the spheres of influence were delimited to the extent that Portugal received a portion of the disputed Zambesi territory while England retained control of Nyasaland

97. Lunt, H.E., "History of England " p. 724-6

98. Ward & Gooch., "Cambridge Hist. of B. F. Pol., Vol.III. p. 211

and Mashonland.

On the other hand Salisbury saw it was good to make concessions in one directions at least, in favour of Germany, in the colonial field. A proposal aired by Bismarck in 1886 now took definite form and ripened into the Anglo-German convention, by which Uganda and Zanzibar were transferred to the British sphere of influence in return for German's access to Zambesi river by the so called 'Caprivi Tail', and above all for the little North Sea island of Heligoland, which had been England's since 1814.* The increased value of Heligoland to Germany after the completion of the Kiel Canal (already begun in 1887) seemed to be less apparent than the possibility of a French naval attack upon it after it had passed into German hands. The explorer Stanley said, "concerning the transfer of Uganda and Zanzibar for Heligoland was like exchanging a suit of clothes for a trouser button."¹⁰⁰

The Queen did not like the idea of this exchange and said so. Salisbury defended his decision to the Queen by arguing, "that any indefinite postponement of a settlement in Africa would render it very difficult to maintain terms of amity with Germany and would force us to change our system of Alliances in Europe" and this he added, would "necessarily involve the early evacuation of Egypt."¹⁰¹

Salisbury was hopeful that this new Convention of 1890

99. Ibid. p.212

* Appendix., Note #4

100. Seton-Watson., "Britain in Europe, "p. 567-8

101. Cecil, Vol. IV. p.298

might settle definitely all colonial differences and wrote to the Queen, "We have made an agreement which removes all danger of conflict and strengthens the good relations of the two nations, who by their sympathies, interests and origins should always be good friends."¹⁰²

On August 5, 1890 Salisbury signed a Convention with France which recognized Britain's position in Zanzibar and in Nigeria, in return for the recognition of France's paramount interest in Madagascar.¹⁰³ August 20 a similar agreement was signed with Portugal renewing the pledge of the integrity of Portugese territory and Portugal recognizing the claims of Britain in Zanzibar. These three agreements taken together represent the most positive achievements¹⁰⁴ Lord Salisbury's diplomacy during his second ministry.

The colonial agreements of 1890 led to the scramble for African concessions to the extent that in ten years Africa had been divided and apportioned among the various European nations. Lord Salisbury cautioned the English people and the Government, "That colonial expansion in itself is undesirable unless dictated by imperative considerations of public welfare and imperial safety."¹⁰⁵

During the later part of this decade Germany challenged Britain's ability to hold what she had gained; the excuse that was found was the desire of the little country of Portugal to

102. Priebram, F.F., "England and France." p. 49

103. Seton-Watson., "Britain in Europe." p. 568

104. Ensor, "Europe 1870-1900, p. 191

105. Quarterly Review October 1902 F. S. Pulling, p.607

bolster her sinking economy. The question of Portugal's need of money soon became the minor issue which in reality was a series of manoeuvres turning mainly around Delagoa Bay, admittedly the key to the Transval--'the key of peace in South Africa.' Britain would have liked to lease it from Portugal but Germany blocked the plan.¹⁰⁶

As early as 1895 Salisbury had declared in a speech delivered before Commons,

"Many men have thought that we have expanded far enough. Let us draw a line they say, and never go beyond it. But that is not the conditions which fortune or the evolution of the world causes has imposed upon the development of our prosperity. If we mean to hold our own against the efforts of all civilized powers of the world to strangle our commerce, by their prohibitive finance, we must be prepared to take requisite measures to open new markets for ourselves among the half civilized nations of the world, and we must not be afraid of the effort, which is vital to our industries, should it bring with it new responsibilities of Empire and government."¹⁰⁷

In the midst of the conflict over Delagoa Bay Salisbury caused to be printed in the 'Times' of January 31, 1898 this statement, "Our policy is, first to defend our possessions and our colonies; secondly, it is to open new markets whenever it is possible; thirdly, it is to prevent the old markets from being closed against us, and being transformed in the exclusive monopoly of some single state."¹⁰⁸ Despite the above statement

Count Hatzfeldt wanted a share of Portugal's colonies and continued negotiations along that line. It is best to examine the

106. Seton-Watson., "Britain in Europe." p. 584

107. Fortn. Review April 1, 1898 Vol. 69:516

108. Ibid., p. 517

instructions of Salisbury to his various foreign ministers to trace his views in this matter. Writing to Viscount Gough, Portugese minister;

"Count Hatzfeldt asked to see him today with reference to the matters of a loan to Portugal which we discussed last Friday. The Count asked whether we would join Germany in a common action in regard to the financial operations with the government of Portugal, a matter which exclusively concerned the two powers in the question, and that therefore, even if I knew the precise demands of M. de Soveral (Minister from Portugal) which I did not, I should think that they could not form the subject of communication between Germany and this government.

Our motive for action was to maintain the 'status quo' in respect to Portugeses possessions, and to prolong the life of Portugal. If we should fail, and the question of Portugese African territory passing under new owners should arise, then it would be quite proper and most desirable that full communication should take place between the two governments who possessed adjacent territory, I did not, admit any right of claims which would then come under consideration would be at all prejudged by designating any special revenues of Portugal as security for a loan.

In the course of the discussion. I took occasion to intimate to Count Hatzfeldt that the Cabinet were fully alive to the importance of the ancient treaties between Portugal and Britain which had been confirmed in 1873, and in some degree by Lord Derby in 1876. Without binding ourselves to details which might become antiquated, we held, as Lord Granville did, that the treaties contained stipulations which, in substance, were still binding upon Great Britain."109

On the following day the Portugese minister communicated a telegram to Lord Salisbury to the effect that the German Emperor had informed the king of Portugal that amicable relations would be broken unless the negotiations now being carried on by M. de Soveral in London were pursued with due regard to the legitimate interests of Germany and her African Colonies;

109. Gooch & Temperley, "British Documents on The Origins of The War." II, p. 49

"M. de Soveral then asked me what to do. I replied, 'that it depended upon whether their want of money was very urgent or not. I had informed Count Hatzfeldt that, in our opinion, financial negotiations between this country and Portugal, having for their object the raising of a loan by Portugal, and finding security for that loan for Great Britain were not matters which interested anyone but the two powers concerned. But if the negotiations should take the form of territorial alienation in any sense, I quite well recognized that Germany as a neighbor would and should be concerned. M. de Soveral, in replying, denied that any alienation was in prospect or probable. We did not believe that the pledging of the customs revenue partook of the nature of an alienation of territory; because in Turkey, Brazil and in several other countries the mortgaging of customs had been arranged for the purpose of securing the interest on an external loan without the slightest intention of carrying with it at any time any territorial cession.'"110

Portugal was still in need of money so she now approached France rather than cause difficulties between Germany and Great Britain. However France wanted more than just the collection of revenue. Salisbury applied diplomatic pressure to stop the loan by France, he wrote to Sir. H. Mac Donnell, the British Ambassador at Paris,

"The inclosure in your despatch #99, secret of the 15th instant, shows that among the revenues to be assigned to the service of the loan which the Portugese Government is negotiating in Paris are included those of the islands adjacent to Portugal.

The expression 'adjacent islands' may include the Azores. If it does, the matter assumes an aspect to which Her Majesty's Government cannot be indifferent. They have no desire to interfere unduly with the arrangements which the Portugal Government may make with the view to placing their finances on a satisfactory basis. In the treaty engagements between the two countries, however, lay an

obligation on Great Britain to defend Portugal against external attack, but it is incumbent on Portugal not to modify the general conditions under which the continued existence of the engagements has been acknowledged.

The conditions to which I refer would be seriously modified if the Azores passed directly or indirectly under the control of a third power. The creation of a lien on the revenues of the Azores might conceivably lead to the establishment in them of conditions which would hamper this government from carrying out their obligations to Portugal. I feel bound to ask the Portugesees Government to give an undertaking in writing that the Azores shall not, without the written consent of this country, pass under the control of any third party. Portugal wisely stopped all attempts at procuring a loan. 111

VII

SALISBURY'S LAST MINISTRY 1895-1902

During the three years of Lord Roseberry's administration¹¹²
(1892-1895) conflicts with other powers grew more frequent.

On the return of Lord Salisbury to the ministry in 1895 with a coalition Cabinet, the first problem to be faced was the rumor of French designs in the Sudan. In the English mind was now the dream of a 'Cape to Cairo' railway and the Sudan was to be the link with the northern and southern possessions. In 1896 Kitchener, in command of an Egyptian army led by British officers, was despatched by the Anglo Egyptian government to conquer the¹¹³ Sudan. The French government immediately asked that negotiations concerning the Sudan be considered, to which Salisbury wrote in a letter to Sir E. Monson, the British minister to France; "point out to the minister of Foreign Affairs that the course which we should take in the present negotiations would largely be influenced by the fiscal policy which the French Government intended to adopt. Our object is, as we have more than once declared not territory, but facility for trade. The settlement of territorial controversies would be enormously promoted by a knowledge that our trade would not be injured by

112. Ward & Gooch, III, p. 244

113. Ibid., p. 249

any concession that we might make."¹¹⁴

The French government still was insistent in demands for territorial grants in the valley of the Niger and the Nile. Salisbury parried with this thought,

"If Her Majesty's Government are unable to grant access to the Niger, it is from no feeling of unfriendliness to the French Republic, and from no desire to hamper the work which France is accomplishing in West Africa. It is their sincere conviction that such a concession besides being incompatible with the position secured to Great Britain at the Berlin Conference; would defeat the objects which the two governments have at heart of securing an arrangement in West Africa which will admit of their working side by side in their own spheres of influence without friction and to their mutual advantage.¹¹⁵ ?

On August 2, 1899 Salisbury sent a telegram to Lord Cromer at Constantinople so that he too would be well informed concerning the policy of the English government;

"It is desirable that you should be placed in possession of the views of Her Majesty's Government in respect to the line of action to be followed in the event of Kartoum being occupied at an early date by the forces now in operation in the Sudan under the Command of Sir. Henry Kitchener.

In view of the substantial military and financial cooperation which has been recently afforded by Her Majesty's Government to the Government of the Khedive it has been decided that at Khartoum the British and Egyptian flags should be hoisted side by side. This decision will have no reference to the manner in which the occupied countries will be administered in the future. You will, however, explain to the Khedive and his ministers that the procedure I have indicated is intended

114. Gooch and Temperley, II, p.139 F. O. France (Africa) 3416

115. Gooch and Temperley, p.141

to emphasize the fact that this government consider that they have the predominant voice in all matters connected with the Sudan, and that they expect that any advice which they think fit to tender to the Egyptian government, in respect to Sudan affairs will be followed."116

In the meantime Kitchener arrived at Fashoda and there found the French Captain Marchand who had marched in from the west and had planted the French flag. Kitchener raised the British flag and asked for the French withdrawal. The French refused to retire without orders from the French government. Wisely Kitchener turned the matter over to the diplomats of each country and the two forces camped side by side in the Sudan.¹¹⁷ French compliance was delayed to Salisbury's demand for withdrawal and war was imminent. After several weeks the French government gave way and their troops were withdrawn. Delcassé, the French minister had made sure that neither Russia or Germany would back him and that contrary to expectation Lord Salisbury would not this time be squeezed to any concession.¹¹⁸ A joint Egyptian and British rule was established over the Sudan.¹¹⁹

In the diplomatic correspondence we find the views of Salisbury who wrote to Sir E. Monson, the minister to Paris,--

"I request your Excellency to inform the French Minister of Foreign Affairs that, in accordance with his wish, his message to M. Marchand has been transmitted to Khartoum and will be forwarded thence to its destination. In order to avoid any mis-understandings, you should state to M. Delcassé that the fact

116. Ibid., p.160, F. O. Turkey (Egypt) 5050 to Lord Cromer

117. Ward & Gooch, "Cambridge History", p.251

118. Ensor, "Britain 1870-1914", p.134-45

of our having complied with his wish to transmit the message does not imply the slightest modification of the views formerly expressed by Her Majesty's Government. You should add however, whether in times of Deverish of Eghyptian dominion, the region in which M. Marchand was found has never been without an owner, and in the view of this government his expedition into it with an escort of one hundred Sengalese troops has no political effect, nor can any political significance be attached to it.¹²⁰

Two days later the French ambassador called personally upon Lord Salisbury. In reporting the results of the interview of two hours length, Salisbury informed Sir E. Monson:

"I repeated the arguments on the British side of the question. I pointed out to him that the Egyptian title to the banks of the Nile had certainly been rendered dormant by the military successes of the Mahdi; but that the amount of right, what ever it was which by these events had been alienated from Egypt, had been entirely transferred to the conqueror. How much title remained to Egypt, and how much was transferred to the Mahdi, and the Kalifa, was of course, a question which could be only practically settled, as it was settled, on the field of battle by the success of Kitchener's arms. But this controversy did not authorize a third party to claim the land as a derelict.

But for the arrival of the British flotilla, M. Marchand's escort would have been destroyed by the Devirishes. M Marchand's was a secret expedition into a territory already owned and occupied and concerning which France had received repeated warnings that a seizure of land in that locality could not be accepted by Britain. The first warning was the Anglo German Agreement,^{*122} which was communicated to the French Government and the provisions of which, as regards the Nile, were never formally contested. The

122. Gooch & Temperley, p.174 F. O. Turkey, 5151

* Appendix

next warning was given by the agreement with the King of Belgium, which gave him for his lifetime occupation up to the Fashoda, and which agreement is in existence and full force still. It is also true that the note of Sir Edward Monson in 1895 and the speech of Sir E. Grey in 1897 emphasized these same points. If France thought fit to try in face of all these warnings, to establish title over the vast territory to which they applied their secret expedition of a handful of men, she must not be surprised that the claim would not be recognized by us."¹²³

The French diplomats made one more bid to achieve something from the expedition of M. Marchand. M. Cambon called on Lord Salisbury and intimated that M. Marchand and his party had evacuated the Fashoda and that he now assumed that Salisbury should be disposed to discuss the differences which separated the two countries at the time. Lord Salisbury stated that he was, but thought it better to also add "that there was one point upon which the opinion in England was very strongly and especially fixed and that was the objection of this country to share with France political rights over any portion of the valley of the Nile. At the same time I assured M. Cambon that the commercial outlet desired by his country was possible by the uniform tenor of English policy in all countries."¹²³ Thus ended the Fashoda incident a diplomatic victory achieved without the shedding of blood, however French-English relations remained strained for a long time, only the threat of German aggression led the two countries into a friendly entente.^{123a}

123. Gooch & Temperley, p.198, F. O. France #3454

123.a Ibid., p.198

During the close of the century Britain's position in the Far East was also threatened. England had exercised a predominate influence in that part of the world since the second Chinese war had forced China to open her doors partially to foreign commerce.¹²⁴ A war fought between China and Japan in 1894-95 for the possession of Korea, began the scramble of the western powers for possession of parts of China, and this changed the Far Eastern situation entirely.¹²⁵ Japan had secured Port Arthur and other concessions which cut across Russian desires. Russia with the help of Germany and France had forced Japan to restore her conquests on the mainland.¹²⁶ Britain refused to be a party to the transaction and thus gained a friend in Japan with whom she made a alliance in 1902.¹²⁷ At this juncture Britain stepped into the picture to protect her commercial rights, for Lancashire, England risked losing one of its largest markets if Russia and other conquering powers absorbed the country of China.¹²⁸

Two years later (1898) the murder of two German missionaries gave the opportunity for Germany to execute a seizure which had been previously planned. In 1898 China was forced to lease the port of Kiaochow to Germany, and in the same year Russia arbitrarily seized Port Arthur, which she had earlier forced Japan to restore to China on the basis of maintaining Chinese integrity. Lord Salisbury first tried diplomatic methods to protect British interests. His letters and Tele-

124. Ward & Gooch, "Cambridge History", p. 257.

125. Hubbard, T. M., "British Far Eastern Policy", p. 13.

126. Ibid., p. 19

127. McCordock, C. M. "British Far Eastern Policy", p. 192.

128. McCordock, C. M. "British Far Eastern Policy", p. 194-95.

grams are directed to Sir N. O'Conner the British minister. On January 19th he informed him thus; "If practicable ask M. Witte whether it is possible that England and Russia could work together in China. Our objects are not antagonistic in any serious degree; on the other hand we can both of us do each other a great deal of harm if we try. It is better therefore we should come to an understanding. We could go far to further Russian commercial objects in the North, if we could regard her as willing to work for or with us."¹²⁹

Five days later Salisbury wrote again to Mr. Witte, the Russian Ambassador:

"Our idea is this, The two empires of China and Turkey are so Weak that in all matters of importance they are constantly guided by the advice of foreign powers. In giving this advice Russia and England are constantly opposing, neutralizing each other's efforts much more frequently than the real antagonism of our interests would justify; and this condition of things is not likely to diminish but to increase.

"We contemplate no infraction of existing rights, we would not admit the violation of any existing treaties, or impair the integrity of the present empires of either China or Turkey. These two conditions are vital; we aim at no partition of territory, but only a partition of Preponderance. It is evident that in respect to both Turkey and China there are large portions which interest Russia much more than England and vice versa."¹³⁰

Russia seemed to be intent on gaining territory more to bolster her prestige than for an beneficial commercial rights. Russia seized Port Arthur despite the protests of both Japan and England. Port Arthur was wholly useless as a commercial port and had no significance except as a

129. Ward & Gooch, "Cambridge History", p. 292

130. Gooch & Temperly, Vol I, p. 8, F.O. Russia #1557

military stronghold, Salisbury wrote, "they (Russia) would in effect be commencing the dismemberment of China and inviting other powers to follow their example. The possession of Port Arthur was not desired by England; but on the other hand its occupation by another nation would have an effect upon the balance of power at Peking, which Her Majesty's Government could not but regard with grave objection."¹³¹

Russia went right on with her occupation of Port Arthur while Salisbury for the present stated his objections in a little stronger language;

"The interests of this country in China are not, indeed, in the opinion of this government, different in kind from those of other countries, but they are greater in extent, and have a greater relative importance, in proportion as the volume of British trade exceeds that in the hands of other nationals. Speaking generally it may be said that the policy of this country, is to effectively open China to the commerce of the world, and that our estimate of the action of other powers in the Far East depends on the degree to which it promotes or hinders the attainment of this object.

It follows from this that the occupation of territory by foreign powers is to be judged by the results, direct and indirect, immediate and remote, which it is likely to have upon the commercial interests of the world, and the right of all nations to trade within the limits of the Chinese Empire upon equal terms."¹³²

China was in need of help and turned to England with an offer of territory in return for aid. Salisbury wrote in reply, "The present policy of this government is to discourage the alienation of territory. It is therefore premature to discuss the lease of Wai-Hei-Wel unless the action of other powers materially alters the position."¹³³

¹³¹.Ibid., p. 38

¹³².Gooch & Temperley, II, p. 27

¹³³.Ibid., p. 18

However diplomacy failed and Salisbury made haste to secure the lease of Wai-hai-wei, a port so placed as to give Britain strategic equality with Russia and Germany in relation to Peking.¹³⁴ Salisbury followed this with treaties defining 'spheres of Influence'. The significant portions of the treaty signed on October 26, 1901 were as follows;

The Imperial German Government and Her Britannic Majesty's Government being desirous to maintain their interests in China and their rights under existing treaties, have agreed to observe the following principles;-1. It is a matter of joint and permanent international interest that the ports on the rivers and coast of China should remain free and open to trade and to every form of legitimate or legal economic activity for the nationals of all countries without distinction. 2. The two governments will not, on their part, make use of the present complications to obtain for themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions, and will direct their policy towards maintaining undiminished the territorial condition of the Chinese Empire. 3. The two governments will communicate this agreement to other interested powers, and especially to Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States of America, and will invite them to accept the principles recorded in it."¹³⁵

Of greater value than the actual provisions of the convention was the visible demonstration it furnished of an understanding between the two governments at a time when the relations between Britain and Germany were subjected to great strain by the Boer War.

Germany had given hostages to fortune by sending to Northern China a large expeditionary force dependent for its

134. Ward & Gooch, III, p. 223

135. Op. Cit., p. 15

communication and its safety upon goodwill of Great Britain, who was in possession of all the chief coaling stations between German and Far Eastern waters, and still undisputed mistress of the seas. In these circumstances, the Convention served actually to bind Germany over to abstain from any interference in South Africa, while the German Government construed it as a recognition of the community and equality of German and British rights in China, and notably in the Yangtze valley, which the British heretofore had regarded as their own particular sphere. Japan was the first Power to adhere, on October 29th, to the principles embodied in the Convention, and France, Austria-Hungary, Italy and the United States followed suit, while Russia accompanied her acceptance of the principles with the caustic comment, "that the Convention had not perceptibly modified the situation in China or infringed in any way on the 'status quo' in China."¹³⁶ Thus ended another incident in the Far East with¹³⁷ Salisbury holding a balance of Power.

Meanwhile Italy who had no designs in China was desirous of expansion in Africa. Italy was promised Tripoli by an French Agreement (1900) and Bismarck in the 1880's had on several occasions suggested that Italy take Tripoli. Italy was still smarting from the severe defeat in Abyssinia in 1896 but she now turned to England desirous of at least acquiring Tripoli and thus to salve some of her wounds of the

136. Gooch & Temperley, "Cambridge Hist. of Foreign Policy, III, p. 17, Salisbury to Loftus

137. Sprout, Harold & Margaret, "Foundations of Naval Power", p. 201

Abysinian campaign and also to still some of the public
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 clamor for Italian colonies.

Lord Salisbury writes,

Yesterday the Italian Ambassador asked to see me and when he came it was apparently for the purpose of asking two questions, which were put by Admiral Canero on leaving the office. The Ambassador explained that the Admiral wished to leave nothing with which he had been concerned in a position that should expose his action to any uncertainty or doubt.

The first question he asked me was in regard to the recent agreement between England and France. He wished to know whether we were willing to give any assurances as regards our future action in the hinterland of Tripoli.

Without inquiring how far we were at the present in a position to discuss future destination of a country or region whose ownership at present was not doubtful, I pointed out to him that the terms of the Anglo-French agreement had been so arranged as to convey no statement on our part except that of a negative character. We simply stated that beyond a certain line south of the Tropic of Cancer we would not increase our dominion or influence westward. In this manner we avoided dealing in a positive sense with the future of Tripoli or its hinterland.

While, however, giving this explanation, I was not in a position to bind Her Majesty's Government by any assurances of engagement with regard to Tripoli.

To declare, as had been, I believe, proposed, that we should under no circumstances occupy any part of Tripoli or the Fezzan would be a step for which there would be no justification. It might be that the Turkish Empire should fall to pieces at a time when Italy was incapacitated by some accidental circumstances from taking any part in the operations or negotiations by which its division would be determined. It might be that Tripoli or the Fezzan were threatened by some other Power whose claims have not yet been brought forward, and that in the action of Her Majesty's Government would be the sole resource for averting an arrangement which would largely qualify the present balance of Mediterranean power.

It would not be for the peace or advantage of the world, or of England especially, that she should in such

a crisis find herself fettered by a promise of inaction undertaken in different circumstances at a previous time. While, therefore, I was ready to give any explanation the Italian Government desired with regard to our present intentions, I could not bind the Government with respect to the future."¹³⁹

A few days later Salisbury again wrote to Lord Curie the British Ambassador to Rome further outlining the British policy in regard to Italy, "The sympathy of Her Majesty's Government and of the British nation is well known and undiminished. We have a strong interest in Maintaining the 'status quo' in the Mediterranean.

Beyond this we cannot predict our policy in the event of a war, unless we can see what the 'casus belli' will be.

The Public opinion here will be guided by the cause of the quarrel; and in the question of peace and war the action of the Government is entirely dependant on that opinion."¹⁴⁰
 Not until 1912 did Italy feel free to go ahead and take Tripoli. England's Navy was still a force to be considered in the
¹⁴¹
 Mediterranean.

139. Gooch & Temperley, "Diplomatic British Documents," Vol II, p. 207, Letter to Lord Curie. F. O. Taly, 797, May 13, 1899

140. Gooch & Temperley, I p. 282

141. Ward & Gooch. III. p. 454-5

The storm which broke over South Africa in the autumn of 1899 had been brooding for several years. The British had emigrated to the Boer territories of the south Transvaal, led by the discovery of gold and the opportunities for profitable trade. The Boer president, Kruger, while heavily taxing these British 'Outlanders' would give them no voice in the government. Another factor was the vision of Cecil Rhodes to unite all of South Africa into one British possession. A secret military force was collected near Johannesburg led by a Doctor Jameson, friend of Rhodes. The plot to seize the Boer government was discovered, but Jameson went ahead without sufficient backing, causing his raid to fail. Rhodes disclaimed any part in the affair but was removed from his position as governor of the British territories.¹⁴² More important was the result in Anglo-German relations which centered in the greatly publicized Kruger telegram sent by the German Emperor; the Emperor congratulated Kruger on "successfully without appealing for help from friendly Powers" in repelling by his own might and with his own people "the armed hordes which had burst as disturbers¹⁴³ of the peace" into his land.

Negotiations were entered into between the Boers and England but to no avail, on October 9, 1899 President Kruger

142. Ward. & Gooch, Vol. II, p. 267

143. Halevy, Elie, "A History of the British People", p. 31

broke off diplomatic relations and entered into a period of war which lasted for two and a half years and resulted in the annexation of the Boer republics and the complete supremacy of the British in South Africa. Kruger had hoped for aid from other large Nations in Europe but despite the coolness of the Continental Powers none as yet felt themselves in a position to challenge England's naval might. An important result to England was the fact that some of her statesmen saw the necessity of closer ties with either the Entente or the Triple Alliance in Europe. From this time on, until Lord Salisbury left Office, German diplomats kept urging an Anglo-German understanding.¹⁴⁴

The Boer War despite the Kruger Telegram and the violent criticisms of the German press helped to bring about friendlier relations between the diplomats of the two countries.¹⁴⁵ Germany opposed the concert of Powers in Europe against England for she was dependent upon English coaling stations and harbors to carry on her expansion in China. The colonial Agreement of 1898 placed this exchange of mutual benefits in official form.¹⁴⁶ In considering the question of Anglo-German relations it is necessary to go back to the events of 1885 and 1887. France at this time led by the visions portrayed by General Boulanger was casting longing eyes across the Rhine toward the lost provinces of

144. Seton-Watson, p. 578

145. Seymour, "Diplomatic Background of The War," p. 119

146. Appendix, Note #5

Alsace-Lorraine. In Egypt the friction between France and England was increasing. The alliance of Germany with Austria-Hungary, Italy and the Balkan satellites left England quite isolated. If war was to break England was certain to be in-
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 volved however.

Bismarck was fully aware of Salisbury's dilemma, and spared no pains to draw Britain into the orbit of the Central Powers. Already on February 12th a secret Convention was concluded between Britain and Italy, by which the two Powers undertook to uphold the 'status quo' in the Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Seas, while Italy accepted the British partition of Egypt, and Britain bound herself to the support of Italy in the event of "encroachments" in North Africa by
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 another power which though not named could only be France. In signing such a document Salisbury gave to Italy, "the widest guarantee which a parliamentary state could give, namely, that in the event of a Franco-German war England would actively join the group of states which forms the peace police in the East. No English government can give an absolute guarantee for military or naval cooperation in a future conflict, simply because it is not certain whether Parliament will fulfill these promises. But so far as Lord Salisbury is able to judge he is convinced that England, jointly with Austria, and Italy, will make front against Russia, if Turkey and especially Constantinople should be threatened. He thinks that he can

147. Seton-Watson, p. 563

148. Piebram, W. T., "England & France", p. 95

assume the same, if Austria is attacked by Russia. In this case it would be harder for England to give effective support.¹⁴⁹ Austria speedily announced her adherence to the Mediterranean agreement, and later in the year it was rendered still more precise by a triangular agreement between London, Vienna and Rome, for the maintenance of the 'status quo' in the Near East, and for joint action to prevent any cession of Turkish territory by Turkey, even to the point of provisional occupation of Turkish territory. Meanwhile Spain had entered in to a special agreement with Italy to maintain the Mediterranean 'status quo' and not to lend herself to any action aimed against Italy,¹⁵⁰ Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Salisbury in writing to Bismarck stated, "The grouping of states which has been the work of the last year will be an effective barrier against any possible aggression of Russia, and the construction of it will be among the least services which your Highness has rendered to the cause of European peace."¹⁵¹

The agreements of 1887 marked the high tide of Anglo-German cooperation. The Germans had made them selves irritating in doing all they could to strain relations in Egypt. Salisbury soon tired of leaning for support in Egypt on the consent of Germany and, eventually assumed complete control there.¹⁵²

Returning now to the Boer war, the Kruger telegram had

149. Piebram, "England & France"., p.125

150. Ibid., p.117

151. Cecil., IV, p.21-22

152. Seymour, Charles, "Diplomatic Background of the War", p.15

been sent and no sooner was this blunder made than the Kaiser continued to make some more. He wrote long letters to his Grandmother, inciting the Tzar of Russia against England, and sounding Paris and St. Petersburg as to the possibility of a triple intervention in favour of the Transvaal. The Italian minister warned Germany that a permanent estrangement of Germany and England must force Italy on to the side of France and Russia. Holstein, the German minister, doubted whether even the 'Transvaal experience will suffice to convince England¹⁵³ of the necessity of a continental attachment. Salisbury recognized that in the stability of the Triple Alliance lay the best guarantee of European peace and the surest security for British interests. Nevertheless Lord Salisbury was too prudent and too conscious of his own resourcefulness to bind himself formally and exclusively to the Triple Alliance. He took the wiser and wider view of a British Foreign Minister and discriminated between the necessity of assuring the stability of the Triple Alliance and becoming a pledged party to it.¹⁵⁴

Salisbury^{151d} the German Ambassador to Britain, Eckardstein in 1899, that the telegram was a blunder even more foolish than the raid itself, and the cloud which it cast upon the Anglo-German relations was to grow year by year more menacing. Salisbury was now set to act on the accepted lines of British policy "to keep absolutely clear of engagements and to leave the

153. Seton-Watson., p. 579

154. Quarterly Review., Oct. 1900 p. 663

country free to take any action which it might think fit in the event of a war. The growth of tension with Germany and the avowed purpose of Germany to build a powerful navy led Salisbury in February 1896, to refuse the renewal of the¹⁵⁵ Mediterranean Agreement with Austria-Hungary and Italy. Moreover, while a colonial conference and a naval review formed the most striking features of Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee, William II set himself the goal of making Germany a world power, based upon a Navy "raised to the same standard as that of my army". "The trident," he declared, "belongs in our hands" and with the help of his new adviser Admiral Von Tirpitz he introduced the first of a series of Navy Bills which soon upset all the calculations on which Britain naval strategy rested. On October 1898 the Kaiser declared to all the world,¹⁵⁶ "our future lies on the water." From that point on Anglo-German rapprochement was a foregone failure but the German Statesman were so sure of themselves that they believed England would be forced to join their alliance. As to the British attitude of this alliance we can again find the Salisbury's reaction in the diplomatic files.

The German Emperor and the Government have for some-time past urged H. M. Gov't to enter into a defensive alliance with Germany, and recently they have been very insistent that we lose no time in coming to terms with them, stating that otherwise we shall be too late as they have other offers.

155. Halevy, Elie, "A History of the English People", p. 245

156. Seton-Watson, "Britain in Europe", p. 578-9

The German government lays stress on the danger to England of isolation, and enlarge on the advantages to her to be secured by an alliance with Germany. They have constantly in years past used these threats and blandishments.

There may be some danger but there are also advantages to us in isolation. On the other hand it would be great relief to be able to feel that we had secured a powerful and sure ally for the contingency of an attack on the British Empire by the two Powers such as Russian and French combined; but in considering offers of alliance from Germany it is necessary to remember the history of Prussia as regards alliances and from the conduct of the Bismarck government in making a treaty with Russia concerning and behind the back of Austria, the ally of Germany, and also to bear in mind the position of Germany in Europe as regards France and Russia, and her position in other parts of the world as regards the British Empire.

Germany is in a dangerous position in Europe. She is surrounded by governments who distrust her and by people who dislike her. She is constantly in a state of Tariff war with Russia, she has beaten and robbed Denmark, and for that purpose she took as a partner Austria and then turned around on her confederate and drove her out of Germany, eventually making her a rather humble ally. She has beaten and taken money and territory from France. She covets the seaboard of Holland, and the Dutch know it; and, as the Belgians are well aware she has designs on the Belgian Congo. The Pan-German agitation in the Austrian Empire and commercial questions may before very long bring about complications between Germany and Austria, and the internal troubles of the Astro-Hungarian Empire detract from its value to Germany as an ally, while the state of Italy politically, militarily, and financially, is not such as to inspire the German Government with much trust in effective Italian support.

In these circumstances it is essential for the German government to endeavour to obtain the certainty of armed support from England for the contingency of an attack on Germany by France and Russia combined, for if England be not bound to Germany and His Majesty's government

come to a general understanding with France and Russia, or either of them, the position of Germany in Europe will become critical.

The interests of England and Germany are not everywhere identical as she claims. In some parts of the world they are irreconcilable. For instance, Germany whose intention is to become a great naval power, requires coaling stations which she can fortify. Good ones on the highways of trade can only be got in the great seas by purchase from Spain; Holland by force -- for she would not sell--by the spoillations of Portugal, which we should be bound to resist; from Siam whose integrity within certain limits we have guaranteed; or from France as the outcome of a successful war.

If Germany should seek a station in the Mediterranean it must be obtained from Morocco, Spain, Greece or Turkey and to the detriment of our naval position.

I do not mention her interests in the American seas. The U.S. may be counted upon to deal safely with any question there.

In the Indian and Pacific Oceans our colonies of Australasia have interests which they sometimes consider to be greatly affected by the proceedings of Germany and France. In view of the effective assistance given us by the British colonies in the Boer war they will expect their desires to prevail in questions between His Majesty's Government and Germany, whenever colonial questions are concerned.

If we had a formal alliance with Germany we should either have to shape our conduct over a large extent of the globe in accordance with her views and subordinate our policy to hers as is the case with Austria and Italy, or, if we acted independently, whenever we took measures necessary for the protection of our interests in some distant part of the world we might be told by Germany that we were bringing about a situation which might lead to an attack on us by France and Russia obliging Germany without sufficient cause to take up arms in our defence, or Germany might find some moment opportune for herself, but inconvenient for us, for bringing on a war on a question on which we might not have a great interest. Discussions on these questions would cause bickerings and differences and might lead to estrangement and end in an open quarrel.

The best proof that isolation is not so dangerous as the German Government would have us believe, is that during our two years of war, when we had nearly a quarter of a million men locked up in South Africa, and we have had the opinion of the educated classes abroad, as ex-

pressed in the Press, and the sentiment of the peoples of most countries against us, and when more than one Power would have been glad to form a coalition, to call upon us to desist from war or to accept arbitration; we were able to conclude the Boer War without outside interference.

If we had an alliance making it incumbent on each ally to come to the aid of his partner when attacked by two Powers it might be difficult to decide where in some particular case the cause of conflict had arisen; for the attacking parties are not necessarily the real aggressors.

It would be much safer to have a declaration of policy limited to Europe and the Mediterranean, defining the interests which we shall jointly defend as we have with Italy and Austria, if we bind ourselves by a formal defensive alliance and practically join the Triple we shall never be on decent terms with France our neighbor in Europe and in other parts of the world, or the Russia whose frontiers are coterminous with ours, or nearly so over large portions of Asia.

In our present position we hold the balance of power between The Triple and Dual Alliances. There is but little chance of a combination between them against us. Our existence as a Great State is necessary to all in order to preserve the balance of power, and most of all to Germany whose representations as to the disasters which await the British Empire if Her Majesty's Government do not make an alliance with her have little or no foundation. Treaty or no treaty if ever there were danger of our destruction or even defeat by Russian or France; Germany would be bound in order to avoid a like fate for herself to come to our assistance. She might ask a high price for such aid, but could it be higher than what we should lose by the sacrifice of our liberty to pursue a German world policy, which would be the result of a formal defensive alliance with the German Empire."¹⁵⁷

During the winter of 1901 Count Hatzfeldt continued to urge an alliance. In March 29, 1901 Lord Salisbury sent a formal note to Britain; ambassador at Berlin stating his reasons for rejection of the offer of a German alliance:---

157. Gooch & Temperley, II p. 74-75- Memorandum to Mr. Bertie, from the Sanderson M.S.S.

MEMORANDUM by the Marquess of Salisbury March 29, 1901

"This proposal for including England with in the bounds of the Triple Alliance. I understand its practical effect to be:-1. If England were to be attacked by two powers--say France and Russia--Germany, Austria and Italy would come to her aid.2. Conversely, if either Austria, Germany, or Italy were attacked by France and Russia or if Italy were attacked by France and Spain, England must come to the rescue.

Even assuming that the powers concerned were all despotic and could promise anything they pleased, with the full confidence that they would be able to perform the promise, I think it is open to much question whether the bargain would be for our advantage. The liability of having to defend the German-Austrian frontiers against Russia is heavier than that of having to defend the British Isles against France. Even, therefore, in its most naked aspect the bargain would be a bad one for this country. Count Hatzfeldt speaks of our "isolation" as constituting a serious danger for us. Have we ever felt that danger practically? If we had succumbed in the Revolutionary War, our fall would not have been due to our isolation. We had many allies, but they have or would not saved us if the French Emperor had been able to command the Channel. Except during his reign we have never been in danger and, therefore, it is impossible for us to judge whether the isolation under which we are supposed to suffer, does or does not contain in it any elements of peril. It would hardly be wise to incur novel and most onerous obligations, in order to gain against a danger in whose existence we have no historical reason for believing.

But though the proposed arrangement, even from this point of view, does seem to me admissable, these are not by any means the objections that can be urged against it. The fatal circumstance is that neither we nor the Germans are competent to make the suggested promises. The British Government cannot undertake to declare war for just any purpose, unless it is a purpose of which the electors of this country would approve. If the Government promised to declare a war for an object which did not commend itself to public opinion, the promise would be repudiated, and the Government would be turned out. I do not see how, in common honesty, we could invite other nations to rely upon our aids in a struggle, which must be formidable and probably supreme, when we have no means of knowing what may be the humor of our people in circumstances which cannot be foreseen. We might, to some extent, divest ourselves of the full responsibility of such a step, by laying the Agreement with the Triple Alliance before Parliament as soon as it is

concluded. But there are very grave objections to such a course, and I do not understand it to be Recommended by the German Ambassador.

It would not be safe to stake any important national interest upon the fidelity with which, in case of national exigency, either country could be trusted to fulfil the obligations of the Alliance, if the Agreement had been concluded without the assent of its Parliament.

Several times during the last sixteen years Count Hatzfeldt has tried to elicit from me, in conversation, some opinion as to the probable conduct of England if Germany or Italy were involved in a war with France. I have always replied that no English minister could venture on such a forecast. The course of the English Government in such a crisis must depend on the view taken by public opinion in this country, and public opinion would be largely, if not exclusively governed by the nature of the 'casus belli'.¹⁵⁸

158. Gooch & Temperley., III, "British Documents on the Origins of the War", p. 68, Memorandum by the Marquis of Salisbury May 29, 1901.

VIII

CONCLUSIONS

In considering the views of Lord Salisbury as revealed in his writings as well as to the actual conditions and problems of his period, several observations and conclusions can be drawn. These are herewith briefly presented;

The general character of Lord Salisbury's foreign policy was determined by the unchangeable conditions of Englands geographical situation on the ocean flank of Europe as an island state with vast overseas colonies and dependencies, whose very existence and survival as an independent country are inseparably bound up with the possession of a dominant sea power. The smallness of the British Isles themselves limit her from becoming a large land power. The fact that England is a sea power at the same time makes her the neighbor to every nation that borders on the sea. It would be natural that the power of a nation supreme at sea should inspire universal jealousy and fear, and thus be ever exposed to the danger of being overthrown by a general combination of the world powers. This danger could only be averted as it was in the case of England on the period under discussion on the condition that her national policy be so directed as to harmonize with the general ideals and desires common to man and the majority of nations.

Now the first desire of all countries is the preservation of national independence. It follows that England, as an insular and naval power had a direct positive interest in the maintenance of the independence of nations, and therefore must be the natural enemy of any country which threatens the integrity of others, and the natural protector of the weaker communities.

It has been the fashion to regard Lord Salisbury's belligerent attitude toward Germany on the Schleswig-Holstein question in 1864 as an outburst of youthful and irresponsible intemperance. By 1900 it was recognized that his attitude was governed by a thoughtful and far-sighted purpose, and that Lord Salisbury at that early period had perceived that the possession of good harbors on the Baltic and North Sea would eventually help a united Germany to become a great naval power. Also, violation of contracts and treaties and the over running of such small countries as Schleswig would be threatened, as was the general peace of Europe. Peace in Europe was essential to Britain's trade and commerce.

In the Eastern Question of 1876-78 Lord Salisbury was faced with the problem, should the integrity of the Ottoman Empire be sustained as in the Crimean period or should the weak and debt-ridden country be partitioned among the powers? Lord Salisbury took the view that previous agreements with Turkey must be upheld and that only in sustaining the Turkish Empire would it be possible to retain her as a buffer against

Russian expansion in the Balkans. A strengthened Turkey would serve the purpose of protecting the Suez Canal which was one of England's lifelines to India. Lord Salisbury had persuaded Turkey in 1878 to cede the territories of Kars and Batoum to Russia on the condition that the Russian armies be evacuated from Turkey at a given date. Both Mr. Layard the British ambassador, and Lord Salisbury recognised this to be a point of honor and were willing to use British arms to uphold Turkish territorial integrity and Britain's commitments. In 1887 Lord Salisbury became the champion of another small country, Bulgaria. Earlier in 1878 he had contested the union of Bulgaria for at that time she would have been completely under the control of Russia. But ten years later the threat of Russian control of Bulgaria had vanished and Lord Salisbury saw in this stronger country a buffer state to hold Russia within the Black Sea^{and} and from further expansion to the west, thus he did everything in a diplomatic way to aid Bulgaria attain union with eastern Rumelia. Lord Salisbury wrote to the Queen, "in a strong and independent Bulgaria we will have the addition of a buffer between the Turkish Empire and the aggressive attitude of the Russians in the Balkans."¹⁵⁹

In two other instances do we find Lord Salisbury striving to maintain the independence of weaker countries, the first concerning Portugal in 1898 and the second in regard to China in the late 1890's. Portugal was in need of money to bolster her failing economy and first approached England for a loan. The German Government objected to the loan by intimating that she feared

alienation of Portugese territory. Lord Salisbury suggested that Portugal seek elsewhere for her loan but at the same time he stated, "Our motive for action was to maintain the 'status quo' in respect to Portugese possessions and to prolong the life of Portugal."¹⁶⁰ The Prime Minister informed the German Government that Britain was still bound by ancient treaties to maintain the integrity of Portugese possessions. Portugal then turned to France for a loan but France asked for a lien on the Azores and its customs as surety for the loan. Lord Salisbury objected on the basis that the alienation of the Azores to France would hinder Britain from fulfilling its obligations to Portugal for in the treaty arrangements with Portugal lay the obligation of Great Britain to defend Portugal against external attack. A third power having control of the Azores would seriously hamper Britain in carrying out her part of the treaty. Portugal wisely refrained from all attempts at procuring a loan. In China the situation assumed more grave proportions for both Germany and Russia seemed intent on the complete dismemberment of China. Germany had used the murder of two missionaries as the excuse to seize territory in the Shantung peninsula while Russia had taken over Port Arthur which she had earlier forced Japan to relinquish. The success of Lord Salisbury's diplomacy was placed

159. Buckle G.E., "Letters of Queen Victoria", III p.242

160. Gooch C. F. & Temperley H., "British Documents," p.49, Vol II

in an Anglo-German convention of 1901, to which agreement the other powers were invited to sign. This Convention served to halt temporarily at least the partitioning of China. In connection with these negotiations in China Lord Salisbury declared his policy to be, "it may be said that the policy of this country is to effectively open China to the commerce of the world. We contemplate no infraction of existing rights, we would admit no violation of any existing treaties, or impair the integrity of the present empire of China."¹⁶¹ The possession of Port Arthur was not desired by England; but the Prime Minister saw on the other hand that its occupation by another nation would have an effect upon the balance of power at Peking, and it was on this ground that he objected to Russia's acquisition of Port Arthur.

In order to maintain the peace of Europe and the territorial integrity of smaller nations the policy of Lord Salisbury was first anti-Russian, then anti-French and lastly anti-German. Each of these nations was a great land power and as such England did not fear them, but as each of these powers sought to become a naval power they were then placing themselves in a position to challenge British naval supremacy. Only in retention of this naval superiority was Lord Salisbury able to protect smaller nations from the aggressive larger powers. In 1878 Lord Salisbury supported Turkey as against Russia for Turkey even then a weak empire would never be in a position to injure Britain's control of the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean waters.

161. Gooch & Temperley, "British documents".. Vol. II. p. 8

But Lord Salisbury by sustaining Turkey was thus able, to bottle up the Russia fleet in the Black Sea, to guard the exit to the Dardenells by the acquisition of Cyprus, and to stop Russia from acquiring a warm water outlet which she might later fortify as a threat to England. Russian naval expansion was thus stopped and Lord Salisbury could now turn his attention to France who was making a bid for naval equality. France was interested in obtaining possessions along the northern African coast, she would then be a menace to the Suez Canal and Britain's Levantine trade. Diplomatic methods were used to stop France's expansion in the Mediterranean. Lord Salisbury made an alliance with Italy in 1887 to insure the retention of the 'status quo' in the Mediterranean. Italy was given the assurance that if she were attacked by France Britain would come to her aid with naval and land forces. Austria-Hungary became a party to this agreement and France thus hedged about by Italy, Austria, and England had to relinquish her plan to challenge British naval strength in the Mediterranean and to desist from territorial expansion on the coast of Africa.

From the years 1890 until he left office in 1902 Lord Salisbury was faced not only by the threat but the actual growth of a German navy. Bismarck had been removed from office and the Kaiser embarked on a naval program of at least equality with England. As he had built a powerful army he was now

desirous of creating a navy which would aid Germany in acquiring her place in world affairs. During this period of ten years there were in reality three nations building navies and merchant shipping, the United States, Japan and Germany. Lord Salisbury had a decision to make; intervention, combat, division of power, or alliance with these three powers. He believed Germany a continental nation as presenting the greatest threat to England, for she by virtue of her position could endanger England's control of the Channel and thus not only the smaller low countries but she could invade England itself if she controlled the Channel. He consequently made an defensive alliance with Japan in which Japan agreed to protect British interests and territories in the Far East. To meet the rising German threat required the utmost concentration of British naval strength in European waters. Simultaneously to contest in the American seas the rapidly growing naval power of the United States was out of the question. Lord Salisbury had no choice but to recognize American primacy in the Western Atlantic. Disputes were amicably settled with America in order that America might be stricken from Britain's list of potential enemies. In the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, Lord Salisbury and other British statesmen even relinquished their long-cherished ambition to share in the control of the future Isthmian Canal. By this move the British government was able to speedily reduce British naval

squadrons in the western Atlantic and concentrate them in the North & Baltic Seas.

As a requisite to maintaining Britain's commerce and trade and the ability to give military aid to her own dominions and the smaller countries of the world it was necessary to gain and to hold certain key possessions, islands and ports having strategic value such as Gibraltar, Cape of Good Hope, Alexandria, Malta and Cyprus. Lord Salisbury recognized this need and England is indebted to him for the acquisition of Cyprus, Alexandria and the peninsula on which Wei-hai-wei is located. Cyprus served the purpose of a sentinel to the Suez Canal, the gateway to India, and from this post Britain was able to lend military support to Turkey as she needed it in the several difficulties with her vassal states. From Cyprus also Russia could be carefully watched in her comings and going through the Dardenelles and any threats to the Balkan states could be easily checked from Cyprus. During the ministry of Lord Salisbury Alexandria was added as a fortified port, further to bolster Cyprus and Malta as defensive positions against either Russia or Italy and as an added defense for the Suez Canal. In 1898 Wei-Hai-Wei was obtained by lease from China to protect the commercial interests of Britain in China. Lord Salisbury recognized this lease as essential to keeping the balance of power between Germany and Russia. The possession of these key possessions served as commercial and military bastions, England without her food imports would starve in a few weeks, thus Lord Salisbury's

colonial acquisitions in China, India, Burma and Africa were designed to give to Britain access to needed raw materials and to provide markets for the sale of manufactured goods. As early as 1880 Lord Salisbury had remarked in Commons.

"If we mean to hold our own against the efforts of all civilized powers of the world to strangle our commerce, by their prohibitive finance, we must be prepared to take requisite measures to open new markets among the half civilized nations of the world, and we must not be afraid of the effort, which is vital to our industries, should it bring with it new responsibilities of empire and government."162

As only one tenth of the people of England are engaged in agriculture Britain must be able to make and sell her products, and thus, be able to buy the needed food and raw materials to maintain her economy. The possession of a two power navy is not then only a matter of prestige but a question of survival. This question of facility for trade was closely bound up with the problem of Mediterranean strategy for in this sea it was essential for Lord Salisbury to maintain Britain's position as a guarantee to her Levantine trade and as a vital stage upon the route to India. He adhered to Britain's essential aim and need to preventing any single power from dominating the Mediterranean, his policy was to live and let live, but rested on the clear desire for peace. Lord Salisbury as Prime Minister played an important part in several of the crisis involving Turkey and her former vassals. He was now on one side and then on the other but always on the side to protect the world-wide

character of England's commitments, and gave close concern to anything which might endanger the Suez Canal or the land or sea routes to India. In 1878 Lord Salisbury had opposed Bulgarian unity for he feared the domination of Russia; ten years later he urged Turkey to grant unity to Bulgaria for this new country would act as a buffer between Turkey and Russia. In the same year 1877 Lord Salisbury through threat of force aided Turkey in suppressing a revolt in Greece for she too had demanded new territories. Each apparent change of front was determined by the policy of maintaining the peace and retention of the 'status quo' in this area.

On the question of alliances we find Lord Salisbury willing to collaborate with any country, irrespective of political creed or system, who was interested in maintaining the basis of international peace and cooperation. In 1887 Alliances were made with Italy and Austria-Hungary to insure the retention of the 'Status quo' in the Mediterranean and to curb France's growing naval power. Earlier in 1878 an alliance was consummated by Lord Salisbury with the Ottoman Empire to maintain its integrity and to stop the aggression and expansion of The Russian Empire in the Balkans and in Asiatic Turkey. Then again in 1890 and 1898 alliances in the form of conventions were made with Germany; the first agreement concerning colonial possessions of the two powers

in Africa, concessions being made on both sides, the second agreement was the defining of 'spheres of influence' in China. Lord Salisbury's aim in these two agreements was facility of trade for Britain. England must continue to open new markets among the backward peoples of the world while at the same time she must hold the old markets never letting any power or single state gain a monopoly in trade over a certain area. Lord Salisbury though willing to make alliances to further trade and even willing to concede some territories in an effort to have peace he also declared; "that there was one thing he would never do and that was to leave to his successor¹⁶³ a weakened or a diminished empire." Repeated invitations were given to Lord Salisbury to join the Triple Alliance but he would not commit himself to it for he recognized that such an alliance would not be to England's advantage since the liability of defending the German and Austrian frontiers was greater than that of having to defend the British Isles against France. Lord Salisbury very ably discriminated between the necessity of assuring the stability of the Triple Alliance and becoming a pledged party to it. By becoming a pledged party to the Triple Alliance Lord Salisbury would have shut the door in friendly relations with the other great powers and jeopardized Britain's freedom of action in dealing with them. He also threw doubts on the danger of isolation by arguing and rightly so, that even in a war with France or

163. Monypenny & Buckles, "Life of Disraeli", II, p.1224

164. Gooch, C.P., & Temperley, H., "British Documents", II p.74

Germany, "our fall would not have been from our isolation, but to failure to command the Channel."¹⁶⁴ But his main objection was the "fatal circumstance that neither the German or British Governments are competent to make the suggested promises."¹⁶⁵ Lord Salisbury recognized that the British Government can not undertake to declare war for any purpose not approved by the electors. No British minister Lord Salisbury concluded, "could venture to forecast Britain's probable conduct if Germany and Italy were involved in a war with France."¹⁶⁶ Lord Salisbury was thus able to throw his countries influence and naval might first on one side of the scale and then on the other to aid in maintaining the balance of power so that from 1876-1902 no major continental conflict ensued. Peace on the continent was Salisbury's aim and the essential to Britain's trade and prosperity.

Much has been written concerning the isolationist policy of Lord Salisbury, but I do not believe he was an isolationist for the following incidents demonstrate his willingness to support other nations;

1. In 1878 Lord Salisbury made a secret agreement with Austria, with the consent of Germany, the Cyprus convention with Turkey, and with the aid of these two agreements and the concert of powers as assembled at Berlin, Russia was forced to accept the terms of the Congress and peace was obtained by England acting with a concert of powers, not as an isolated power.

164. Gooch, C.P. & Temperley, H., "British Documents", II p. 74

165. Ibid., p. 75

166. Ibid., p. 75

2. In 1887 when Turkish subjects in Rumelia revolted and sought to join themselves to Bulgaria, England this time joined with Germany, Austria, France and Italy to use diplomatic pressure to hold Turkey from interfering in Bulgaria, then with the aid of these same powers Greece was informed that no territorial changes could be made by her at the expense of Turkey. Peace was again retained.
3. Also in 1887 formal, written, secret agreements were made with first Italy and then Austria-Hungary concerning the retention of the 'status quo' in the Mediterranean. Italy recognized the claims of Britain in Egypt while England agreed to come to the aid of Italy if she were to be attacked by France.
4. In 1890 Lord Salisbury through his Ambassadors reaffirmed the binding nature of the existing treaties with Portugal to maintain the integrity of the Portugeses territories when the little country was threatened by first Germany and then France with the alienation of her colonies.
5. In the year 1890 Lord Salisbury affixed his signature to an Anglo-German colonial agreement which straightened the boundaries of each of their possessions in Africa. Concessions were made by both countries and this agreement set the pattern for the later relations between the two countries in regard to their colonies.
6. 1898 another Anglo-German convention was signed defining the 'spheres of influence' in China. The other major powers were

invited to sign, and quickly confirmed the agreement. This agreement gave Lord Salisbury freedom in Africa to prosecute the Boer war without interference and at the same time Germany was given the protection of the British navy and the use of her coaling stations. Germany was to use her influence to guard against Russian aggression in the Far East.

7. The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901 with the United States likewise demonstrated Lord Salisbury's willingness to ally the British government with other nations. This treaty divided the supremacy of the Atlantic with the United States taking the Western half. England at this time renounced her interest for participation in an Isthmian Canal, this treaty served to bind more closely the ties between the two countries.

8. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902--each nation agreed to support and protect the mutual interests in Far Eastern waters.

Because of the fact that Lord Salisbury refused to join the Triple Alliance he has been accused of isolationism. Let us examine the Triple Alliance through his eyes, its inherent weaknesses, his alternative, and his reasons for failure to ally the English government with the Triple Alliance. We have already seen that he was willing to make alliances with other countries,

Weakness of the Triple Alliance

"Germany is in a dangerous situation in Europe. She is surrounded by Governments who distrust her and peoples who dislike her or all events do not like her. She is constantly in a state of tariff war with Russia. She has beaten and robbed Denmark, (1864) and for that purpose she took as a partner Austria and then turned around on her Confederate and drove her out of Germany (1866), eventually making her a rather humble ally. She has beaten and taken money

and territory from France (1870). She covets the seaboard of Holland and the Dutch know it; and, as the Belgians are well aware, she has designs on the Belgian Congo. The Pan-German agitation in the Austrian Empire and commercial questions may before long bring about complications between Germany and Austria and the internal troubles of the Austria-Hungarian Empire detract from its value to Germany as an ally, while the state of Italy, politically, militarily and financially, is not such as to inspire the German Government with much trust in effective support."167

Lord Salisbury offered as an alternate policy to the offer of Germany to have a declaration of policy limited to Europe and the Mediterranean, in which agreement the interests which should be jointly defended would be expressly given. This agreement was to follow the pattern of those previously made with Italy and Austria.

In summary these reasons were given for refusal to become a pledged party to the Triple Alliance;

1. German aggressiveness was sure to lead her into a conflict in which England would have no interest or cause for joining.
2. Neither Germany or England are competent to make or fulfill the suggested promises.
3. The British government cannot undertake to declare a war, for any purpose, unless that purpose be approved by the electors.
4. The liability of having to defend the Austrian and German frontiers against Russia is heavier than that of having to defend the British Isles against France,

167. Gooch & Temperley, "British Documents" Vol. II, p. 74
Memorandum to Mr. Bertie (from Sanderson MSS)

Lord Salisbury recognized that in 1901 Britain held the balance of power between the Triple and Dual alliance. There was little or no chance of a combination between the two as against England. Britain's existence as a strong state was essential to all in order to preserve the balance of power, and most of all to Germany who had represented the disasters which awaited the British government if she did not sign the alliance with her. Lord Salisbury believed these suggested disasters to have little or no real foundation. Treaty or no Treaty if there were danger of Britain's destruction at the hands of France and Russia, Germany would be bound to come to England's aid in order to avoid a like fate herself. "She might ask a high price for that aid", remarks Lord Salisbury, "but could it be higher than what we should lose by the sacrifice of our liberty to pursue a British world policy, which would be the result of a formal defensive alliance with the German Empire."¹⁶⁸

168. Gooch & Temperley, "British Documents", p. 78 Extract from Sanderson MSS.

IX

BRITISH SEA POWER AND THE PRESENT EMPIRE

The growth and achievements of British Power, especially British naval power, made a deep impression upon the thinking of Captain A. T. Mahan, U.S.N., who in the early 1890'S became the world's foremost writer on sea power and the influence of sea power upon History. History teaches that nations rise or fall never stand still. Expansion-political, economic, cultural-was the essence of national greatness. To support a program of expansion, a government must have access to accumulated wealth. A large and flourishing foreign commerce was the surest means of accumulating wealth. To compete successfully in a world-wide struggle for markets a country must maintain a large merchant marine. A strong navy was necessary to guarantee security to a country's shipping, a prosperous merchant marine was, at the same time, the backbone of its naval power.

Furthermore in time of war the primary object of the British Naval forces was to search out the enemy's forces, and to destroy or drive them from the seas, as a necessary preliminary to the wholesale destruction of enemy commerce, and to the protection of England's own merchant shipping upon the high seas. Mahan also advocated as his fundamental principle; the doctrine of concentration of power-- or battle-fleet supremacy. The command of the sea was essential by a massed fleet of line of battle ships capable of destroying the enemy's armed forces

or of driving them to cover; of blockading their ports and thereby disrupting their overseas communications at the source, and of supporting one's own cruisers patrolling the sea lanes and escorting one's own transports and cargo shipping through zones of special danger.¹⁶²

England had gained naval supremacy by 1805 and held it until 1898, this supremacy had been gained through a combination of factors, geographical, economic, political and the know-how of industry. The first requisite of military power is a secure primary base. England alone among the European powers enjoyed the decisive advantage of insularity. The British Isles provided a national seat of military power of great strength, one that could be made secure without the continuous and heavy outlays that were necessary for the defense of European land frontiers. Mahan declared; "History has conclusively demonstrated the inability of a state with even a single continental frontier to compete in a naval development with one that is insular, although of a smaller population and resources."¹⁶³

Great Britain also enjoyed secure havens overseas, concerning these havens Lord Fisher once declared that England held the five "keys that lock up the world,"--Dover, Gibraltar, Alexandria, the Cape of Good Hope, and Singapore. Through the control of her homeland and these five keys England had forced the ships of all

162. Ibid., p.167

163. Ibid., p.168

all nations to pass under the guns of the British Navy. Through the holding of these keys England was able to dominate the narrow seas through which foreign commerce had to pass to get to the several oceans.--the Suez canal, The English Channel, The North Sea. the Mediterranean--Great Britain could virtually dictate the terms of Europe's access to the 'outer world.' As long as no important center of naval power existed outside Europe, England's grip on the ocean portals of that continent constituted in effect
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a global command of the seas.

In 1911 Mahan stated, "so long as the British fleet can maintain and assert superiority in the North Sea and around the
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British Isles, the Entire imperial system stands secure."

Several factors now combined to remove this naval supremacy of England. The great growth of nationalism and imperialism necessitated and fostered the pace of naval expansion in other countries than Britain. And this in turn undermined the world-wide naval dominance of Great Britain. That dominance rested not only upon British ships and sailors, but also upon the incomparable strategical position of the British Isles,--Battle-fleet supremacy in the North Sea, in the English Channel, in the Mediterranean, and in the adjacent reaches of the eastern Atlantic, gave England dominance over the powers of continental Europe.
166
As long as those continental European powers were the only rivals possessing strong navies, this local primacy gave Britain virtually world-wide control of the seas.

164. Sprout Harold, "Toward A New Order of Sea Power p.18

165. Commonwealth, 1946, chap. 29 p.95

166. Ibid., p.46

The rise of Japanese naval power undermined England's strategic dominance and hence political influence in the Far East. Through one of the ironies of history, Englishmen contributed to their own eclipse in the Pacific, British shipyards in the 1880's built one warship after another for Japan. And British Naval officers were loaned to the Mikado's government to teach the elements of naval science.¹⁶⁷

Meanwhile, parallel developments were taking place in the Western Hemisphere. Prior to the Civil War the United States had a navy and a naval policy. But neither one had affected the main currents of world politics in any large or continuing manner. By 1898 however, the United States Navy had evolved from a handful of commerce-raiding cruisers and coast-defense monitors into a rapidly growing fleet of first class sea-going battleships. Control of Europe's narrow seas no longer assured to Great Britain the command of the American Seas. To meet the rising German ship-building threat required the utmost concentration of British naval strength in European waters. At the same time to contest in the American seas the rapidly growing naval power of the United States was out of the question. Britain had no choice but to recognise American primacy in the western Atlantic, and British statecraft proceeded with considerable finesse to derive from this necessity as much benefit as possible. A successful effort was made to settle outstanding disputes with the United States and to cultivate American

167. Op. Cit., p.171

goodwill in order that the country might safely be stricken from Britain's list of potential enemies, in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901, British statesman relinquished their long-cherished ambition to share in the control of the future Isthmian Canal. By 1904 the British Admiralty had begun reducing its squadrons in American waters.¹⁶⁸

The German menace had the further effect of suppressing at least temporarily the ancient rivalry between Great Britain and France.¹⁶⁹ The Anglo-French Entente of 1904 left Britain free to develop^a fleet base at Alexandria near the Mediterranean terminus of the Suez Canal; and recognised a French protectorate over Morocco. This understanding was accompanied by marked improvement in Anglo-French relations, permitting withdrawal of British fleet units from the Mediterranean. The entente thus brought about a further strengthening of the North sea frontier; but like the Anglo-Japanese agreement and the parallel if less formal understanding with the United States, this step too, represented a dissipation of that exclusive command of the Atlantic which had once been the cornerstone of British naval policy.^{170.}

While bargaining for allies and simplifying their strategic commitments, British statesmen steadily enlarged and strengthened the Royal Navy. Despite Germany's utmost efforts, the Royal Navy held its lead, the British fleet out ranked Germany's in 1914 by the ration of three to two.¹⁷¹

168. Sprout "Foundations of National Power", p. 171

169. Ensor, "Britain in Europe", p.401

170. Sprout, "Foundation of Naval Power," p. 172

171. Ibid. p. 173

The victory of 1918 completely altered the balance of naval forces in the Atlantic. The destruction of the German Navy removed the threat which had chained the Royal Navy to European waters. Temporarily at least, British sea power held exclusive sway over the eastern Atlantic and the adjoining narrow seas. And following the victory over Germany there were accumulating indications that British statesmen and their naval advisers looked forward to early restoration of their former global command of the seas. But each country involved, of the Allies, was intent on increasing their naval strength. The deadlock among the Naval Powers continued until the Washington Naval Arms conference of 1921-22. The Anglo Japanese Alliance was abrogated, several older ships of the Powers scrapped and the building program curtailed; the British, American and Japanese battleship fleets were stabilized in the ratio of 5-5-3.²⁰⁸

The United States, in effect, recognized Britain's strategic interest throughout the eastern Atlantic and European narrow seas. Britain, in turn, tacitly acknowledged American control of the American Seas. Great Britain centralized her fleet then in European waters and the United States gradually shifted her units to the Pacific waters. The British ideal was still avoidance of military guarantees, a balance of power on the Continent, and a two power naval standard for

European waters. No power was disposed in 1922 to contest Britain's two power standard in the capital ship class. But capital ships had ceased to be the index of naval power. The late war and more so the conflict of 1939-45 has hastened the development of two new weapons which played an increasing role in the control of the narrow seas. One of these was the submarine which has now twice forced Britain to the brink of disaster despite the Royal Navy's control of the ocean's surface. The other new weapon, the aeroplane has developed into even a greater threat not only to shipping, but to port installations and industrial centers of Britain and its empire.²⁰⁹ We today remember only too vividly the bombing of Manchester, London, Singapore, Hong-Kong and the sinking of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse. Today one must control not only the sea but under the sea and the very air itself. Britain has the necessary bastions well placed to hold this new air superiority. Does she have the initiative to assure the predominant control?

Great Britain with the aid of the United States and her own dominions was able to wrest the victory from Germany and Japan. Together Britain and America possess in a large degree the fundamental requisities for continued command of the Atlantic and the narrow seas. Today the problem of the control of the

The fact that Egypt commands in the Suez Canal the main artery of communication between England on the one hand and India and Australia on the other is what took England into Egypt and what keeps her there. Britain cannot afford to see Egypt and the Canal dominated by another country any more than the United States could tolerate the domination of the Panama Canal.²¹¹

In the Near East Britain's interest lies in the maintenance of peace and the 'status quo' Stable governments, able to defend their independence and to preserve their territory from attack best serve the British interests alike in Iraq, Persia, and Afghanistan.²¹²

In China the interests of Britain are purely commercial. There more than anywhere else, her policy is the policy of a 'nation of shopkeepers.' At no time has she cherished territorial ambitions, and here as elsewhere British interests will best be served by the establishment of a strong national government able both to preserve internal order and to protect Chinese territory from external aggression.²¹³

Concerning America it has been an axiom of British policy that British ministers should always seek to preserve the most friendly relations with America. Sentiment and interest combine to impose this attitude upon England. It can safely be said that no British government will ever command or retain the support of the British people which is thought for a moment needlessly to jeopardize the good relations of the two peoples.²¹⁴

211. Ibid., p 542
212. Ibid., p 543

213. Ibid., p 544
214. Ibid., p 546

seas has merged into the larger problem of future air power and Sea power relationships within Europe and between Europe and other continents facing the Atlantic. On the trend of Anglo-American relations, the English-speaking countries facing the Atlantic might come to a coalition of sea and air power as formidable, as stable and as useful in the future as has been British sea power in the past. Sir Austen Chamberlain writing on this problem said, "the development of aeronautics has further impaired our insular security and has given fresh impetus to the secular principle of British policy that the independence of the Low Countries is a British interest, that their frontiers are in fact our frontiers, their independence the condition of our independence, their safety inseparable from our own. It was to secure the independence of the Low Countries that we fought Spain in the sixteenth century, that we fought Napoleon in the nineteenth and that we fought Germany in the twentieth. Here, at any rate, we find a permanent basis of British policy."²¹⁰

Outside Europe the maintenance of her imperial communications and the interests of the Dominions, colonies and dependencies become dominant. But for India, the Dominions of Australia, New Zealand, there would be no occupation of Egypt, no reconquest of the Sudan for civilization and the great work accomplished by Lord Cromer and his assistants would have remained unattempted.

210. Foreign Affairs July 1931, Vol. 9 p. 538

BRITAIN'S ROLE IN THE POST WAR WORLD

The world politics of the post war years will be shaped primarily in terms of the relations between three or four great world powers; and this is the fact which must determine the outlines of the new international system which we aim to create.

To qualify for the role of a world power a nation must possess a formidable combination of resources. It must possess an extensive and highly developed industrial potential; the ability to control or ensure the supply of vast quantities of raw materials, often from sources scattered throughout the world; a high order of technical and administrative skill; and last but not least, the ability of its leaders to command the continued and active support of the increasingly powerful
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and politically conscious masses.

But first we must analyze in greater detail both the weaknesses and the strength of Britain's world position in the light of these new conditions. Of her weaknesses, the first and foremost is that her material power has declined and is declining relatively to that of other world powers. The material preeminence which was Britain's in the nineteenth century has passed once for all. England's now almost stationary and aging population of less than fifty millions is less than half of the United States and barely a quarter that of the U.S.S.R. The days of the two-power naval standard based on a navy which

was the mistress of the seas are gone for good, and unlike the U.S.S.R. Britain only contains within her own island territory a small proportion of the vital raw materials upon which industrial power is built.²¹⁶ The rest, together with the greater part of her foodstuffs, Britain must draw from the four corners of the world over long and vulnerable lines of communication from sources^{216a} often not in her own control.

Even more important is the passing of England's preeminence as the workshop of the world, the mainspring of the world's commerce and capital investment, and the master mechanic of the world's financial machinery. The centers of gravity of the world's heavy industry have shifted eastward to Russia and westward to the United States. Today the medium of financial exchange is no longer the 'pound sterling' but the 'almighty dollar'. A basic weakness in another field is that though second to none in inventiveness, England has been shy in the application of new methods and techniques, whether in the sphere of warfare, industry, or social organization. In the field of diplomacy she has only²¹⁷ offered negative appeasement and the stale appeal of past ideals.

Against these weaknesses Britain can balance these elements of strength; first, there is her geographical position between Europe and America, a position reinforced by the historical role as the bridge between the old world and the new. There is also the British position as the nucleus of a world-wide commonwealth

216. Ibid., p. 209

216.a Foreign Affairs, April 1946 p. 411

217. Ibid., p. 427

of free peoples and association of peoples whose cohesiveness in the Boer,^{WAR} and last two conflicts has been strikingly demonstrated. This combination of peoples has a great potential also in times of peace. In the line of industry Britain has a high degree of technical skill coupled with the experience and knowledge gained during the war will qualify her to play a leading role in a world economy directed toward rising living standards.
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It is in the social and political field that Britain's greatest strength lies. Here geography and history has endowed her with an exceptional wealth of experience, expressing itself in her capacity for tolerance and compromise and for combining change with continuity; and the development of free institutions and associations that give vigor and variety to a modern community. She has learned through the years the art of handling peoples from the most advanced to the most backward; but greater than all these the British people have begun to learn, as so many other nations of the world have failed to learn,-- the necessity of harmonizing their own national aims and aspirations with the basic needs, aims and aspirations with the basic needs, aims and values of civilization.
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218. Sprout, p. 210

219. The Nation Dec. 22, 1945 "Future Role of Great Britain" p. 679

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

NOTE #1.

Extract from Salisbury-Shuvalov Memorandum of May 30,
1878

e. Le Gouvernement Anglais se réserve de discuter au Congrès toute question Touchant aux Détroits.

(The English Government reserves for discussion in the Congress all the questions concerning the Straits.)

f. The existing arrangements made under European sanction, which regulate the navigation of the Bosphorus, and the Dardenelles, appear to them (the British Government) wise and salutary, and there would be in their judgment, serious objections to their alteration in any material particular.

Et le Plénipotentiaire Russe insistera au Congrès sur le 'status quo' (And the Russian representative will insist in the Congress on the retention of the 'status quo').

NOTE #3 May 31, 1878

Sa Majestie L'Empereur de Russie, ayant consenti à restituer a sa Majestie le Sultan la vallée d'Alaschkert et la ville de Bagzid, et n'ayant pas l'intention de l'entendre ses conquêtes en Asie au delà de Kars, Batoum, et des limites posées par le Traité Préliminaire de San Stefano, et rectifiées par la retrocession

1. Lee, Dwight, "Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878, p. 195

susmentionnée, le Gouvernement Impérial ne se refuse pas à conclure avec le Gouvernement Britannique un engagement secret à l'effet de la rassurer à cet égard.

(His Majesty the Emperor of Russia having consented to restore to the Sultan the valley of Alaschkert and the city of Bayazid and does not have the intention of extending his conquests in Asia beyond Kars, Batoum and the limits as stated by the preliminary treaty of San Stefano, and rectified by the following conditions, the Imperial government has not refused to conclude with the British Government a secret agreement to this effect.

NOTE #2

Anglo-French Declarations of 1890

On August 5, by an exchange of declarations France recognized the British Protectorate over Zanzibar and Pemba, in return for concessions of far greater importance by Great Britain who accepted the French Protectorate in Madagascar and acknowledge extensive claims by France in Central Africa.

NOTE #3

CONGO CONVENTION OF FEBRUARY 26, 1885

This Convention affirmed the principle of freedom of navigation and trade for all nations in the regions forming the basins of the Congo and the Niger, provided for the adop-

tion of joint measures for the suppression of slavery and the salvetrade, and laid down rules relating to the future appropriation of territory on the African coast.

NOTE# 4

Anglo-German Agreement of 1890

Germany renounced in favour of Great Britain all claims to the Somiland coast, Witu, and Uganda; her western boundary was stablized with Lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa, with the Congo State and British Central Africa, respectively on the other side of her boundaries. Germany, also, acknowledged a British Protectorate over Zanzibar and Pemba.

In 1893, November 15th, a Western African Agreement with Germany stipulated that her sphere of influence should not extend eastward beyond the basin of the Shari; Darfur, Kordofan, and Bahr-el-Ghazal being excluded from it. In Germany's favor a rectification of the Boundaries in West and South-west Africa was agreed upon involving in this latter case the cession to her of a st^yip of territory (the Caprivizipfel) giving access from her territories to the Zambesi. Germany was also ceded the Island of Heligoland, lying in the estuary of the Elbe.

NOTE #5

Anglo-German Agreement - 1898

On August 30, 1898, Mr. Balfour and Count Hatzfeldt signed two conventions. The first of these Conventions provided;

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3. Ward & Gooch, Vol. III, p 209
 4. Ward & Gooch, Vol. III, p 217

that whenever either Government thought it expedient to accede to a request by Portugal for an advance on the security of the revenues of Angola, Mozambique, or Timor, they should inform the other Government which should have the right of participation; that the revenues of Mozambique south of the Zambezi, and of that part of the province lying on the left bank of the Zambezi above its confluence with the Shire, and those of the province of Angola, between latitude 8 and a point 5 miles north of Egito should be assigned to the English loan, and the remainder to the German loan; in case of default the customs-houses of the districts thus defined to be handed over to the two Powers respectively; neither Power to endeavour to obtain concessions except in its own sphere.

The second convention, which was secret was not made known to the Portuguese Government, provided for the contingency of "its" unfortunately not being found possible to maintain the integrity of the African possessions of Portugal south of the Equator, as well as those in Timor."

The Powers agreed jointly to oppose intervention of any kind by a third Power in the Portuguese possessions, that neither would advance any claim to the possession of or the exercise of political influence in the district of which the customs had been assigned to the other.

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