THE SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS (SWAT) TEAM CONCEPT Thesis for the Degree of M. S. MICHIGAN STATE. UNIVERSITY MAX KENT HURLBUT 196.9 ' IIIQIIlilillflfljflI/llflle/Islllf/Ijlmmll ,L Riga THESIS, i University THE SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS (SWAT) TEAM CONCEPT BY Max Kent Hurlbut A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE Department of Police Administration and Public Safety 1969 Approved:1&béfljlrL(;.EE;1XI¢Qfikl/qd Chairman ABSTRACT THE SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS (SWAT) TEAM CONCEPT BY Max Kent Hurlbut The Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team concept is a response to three threats the conventionally trained and equipped policeman is unprepared to handle: the urban guerrilla, the sniper, and the political assassin. The SWAT team concept is explored as to size, function, and purpose. Policy and program administration are considered as are training, equipment, and tactics. The number of SWAT team programs in the United States is unknown. No literature has been published on the concept other than occasional articles containing limited data in gun magazines and other periodicals. A decision was made to survey SWAT programs in the 159 cities in the United States with populations over one hundred thousand. A nine-page questionnaire was con- structed from a methodology that explored thirty-five areas of program organization, structure, and function. A poor return was predicted because of the length of the questionnaire coupled with the sensitive nature of the subject. To offset these shortcomings and make the survey Max Kent Hurlbut of benefit to all agencies, an "information exchange pro— gram" was developed. All respondents were promised the survey data. A 43 per cent response was achieved. The survey results indicated a lack of staffing and coordination of the planning effort in most departments and a break-down in decision-making machinery for the commit- ment of SWAT teams. Political interference and an un- favorable operating climate through a lack of policy guidelines were detected in some responses. High morale and successful operations were reported on most departments. An investigation into the attitudes held by SWAT team members was attempted. SWAT membership in all agencies is voluntary. The fear of attracting "dangerous" or "violent" personalities contributed to secrecy and a reluctance to expand some programs. The Los Angeles Police Department agreed to make available its operational SWAT team membership and a fifty- subject police comparison group for the study. A four- measure instrument was designed to test differences in authoritarianism between the groups and to compare them with variables of age, education, and military and police experience. The tests, validated authoritarianism, dog- matism, and conservatism scales, were administered and appropriate statistical tests applied to the results. The Los Angeles Police Department's SWAT team membership and the police comparison group did not show statistically I Max Kent Hurlbut significant differences in authoritarianism from their peers. A summary, implications, and conclusions are pre- sented in the final chapter of the paper. THE SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS (SWAT) TEAM CONCEPT BY Max Kent Hurlbut A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE Department of Police Administration and Public Safety 1969 C,(-p/‘//Z- z/_ [/s 70 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to express my gratitude to the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance which provided this opportunity to continue my education. To the Los Angeles Police Department, which pro— vided the leave time and financial support which made the acceptance of this fellowship possible, I gratefully express my thanks. The author is also indebted to Professor Victor G. Strecher of the Police Administration faculty for his assistance and moral support throughout this past year. To Lieutenant Frank L. Brittell, Special Weapons and Tactics Team Coordinator for the Los Angeles Police Department, my thanks for the guidance over the past three years which is reflected in this study. To Professor William D. Crano of the Psychology Department, my sincere appreciation for the patience and assistance in programming and processing the attitude scales. To the Chiefs of Police and their staffs who responded to the lengthy questionnaires, my special thanks. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . The Problem. . . . . . . Statement of the problem. . Importance of the study . . Definitions of Terms Used . . Assembly area . . . . . Authoritarianism . . . . Clandestine operations . . Conservatism. . . . . . Cordon and search . . . . Counterguerrilla warfare. . Counterinsurgency . . . . Covert operations . . . . Dogmatism. . . . . . . Field commander. . . . . Field command post. . . . Field task force . . . . Insurgency . . . . . . Insurgency, levels of. . . Phase I. . . . . . . Phase II . . . . . . Phase III . . . . . . 10 10 10 11 11 11 12 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 14 14 14 14 iv CHAPTER PAGE Irregular forces . . . . . . . . . 15 Mobilization . . . . . . . . . . 15 Paramilitary forces . . . . . . . . 15 Special warfare . . . . . . . . . l6 Staging area . . . . . . . . . . l6 Staging-assembly complex . . . . . . 16 Subversion . . . . . . . . . . . l6 Tactical alert. . . . . . . . . . 16 Task force . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Unusual occurrence . . . . . . . . 17 Urban guerrilla warfare. . . . . . . 18 Command Strategy for Riot Control . . . . 18 Traditional methods of control . . . . 18 Mobilization . . . . . . . . '. . 19 Command decisions. . . . . . . . . 21 Planning and deployment. . . . . . . 22 Command and support elements . . . . . 23 Task force structure. . . . . . . . 24 Squads. . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Platoons and companies . . . . . . 24 Light striking forces. . . . . . . 24 Review of the Literature . . . . . . . 24 Old wine in new bottles. . . . . . . 25 Organization of the Remainder of the Thesis. 27 CHAPTER II. THE URBAN GUERRILLA, THE SNIPER, AND THE POLITICAL ASSASSIN . . . . . . . The Urban Guerrilla. . . . . . . Obstacles faced by urban guerrillas. The Sniper. . . . . . . . . . Types of snipers . . . . . . . 1. The amateur. . . . . . . 2. The intoxicated sniper . . . 3. The mentally deranged sniper . 4. The professional sniper. . . Types of sniping activity . . . . l. Diversionary fire. . . . . 2. Harassment . . . . . . . 3. Other police fire. . . . . The Political Assassin. . . . . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . III. THE SWAT TEAM CONCEPT. . . . . . . Team Size and Composition. . . . . Function and Purpose . . . . . . Intelligence . . . . . . . . Police considerations . . . . . Policy . . . . . . . . . . . PAGE 28 29 33 34 35 35 36 36 37 39 39 39 39 40 42 43 43 47 48 48 51 CHAPTER Program Administration . The program administrator Selection of personnel Equipment . . . . . Uniforms . . . . . Weapons . . . . . Other equipment. . . Training. . . . . . General . . . . . The classroom . . . Field training exercises. Tactics . . . . . . Sniper control . . . A tactical situation . Critique . . . . The "K" unit conspiracy IV. AN ANALYSIS OF AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT'S SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS TEAM PROGRAM The Problem. . . . . Instruments. . . . . Authoritarianism . . Dogmatism. . . . . Conservatism. . . . LOS vi PAGE 53 53 54 55 55 58 63 64 64 65 66 67 69 69 73 74 77 78 78 78 79 81 CHAPTER Information sheet . Hypotheses . . . . Hypothesis one . . Hypothesis two . . Methodology. . . . Subject selection . Administering and scoring scales . . . . Instructions . . Scoring. . . . Limitations of the Study Variations in measurement Situational factors. Mechanical factors administration. Analysis factors. Other factors. . Results . . . . . Analysis . . . . and variations attitude A comparison of raw score means. Correlations between attitude scales information variables Correlations among attitude scales. vii PAGE 83 83 83 84 85 85 87 87 88 89 90 90 91 91 92 92 92 92 94 94 viii CHAPTER PAGE Relationships between attitude scale coefficients in the SWAT and police comparison groups . . . . . . . 97 Differences between correlations. . . 98 Information sheet results. . . . . . 99 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . 99 Further observations . . . . . . . 104 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . 105 V. A SURVEY OF SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS TEAMS IN CITIES WITH POPULATIONS OVER ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 Survey Content . . . . . . . . . . 107 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Fixed-alternative questions . . . . . 109 Free-answer responses . . . . . . . 110 Establishing categories . . . . . . 110 Categorization of absent data . . . . 111 Uniformity of response. . . . . . . 112 Questionnaire Distribution . . . . . . 113 Questionnaire Response . . . . . . . 114 Questionnaire Results. . . . . . . . 115 1. General information . . . . . . 115 2. Number of riots. . . . . . . . 116 ix CHAPTER PAGE 3. Sniping incidents directed toward police personnel . . . . . . . . 118 4. Sniping incidents: daylight versus darkness. . . . . . . . . . . 118 1966 . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 1967 . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 1968 . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 1969 (first four months) . . . . . 120 5. Police injuries from sniper fire . . 121 6. Police deaths from sniper fire. . . 121 7. Types of firearms used against police in sniping incidents. . . . . . . 122 8. Does the department have a SWAT team program which is separate from riot control or unusual occurrence control efforts? . . . . . . . . . . 122 9.1 Comments on the development of SWAT teams by those departments without them . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 10. Information on the departments' SWAT team programs . . . . . . . 123 a. Team names. . . . . . . . . 124 b. Date started . . . . . . . . 124 c. Numbers of personnel by rank. . . 124 CHAPTER PAGE d 0 Age 0 O O O O O O O O O O 1 2 6 e. Years on the department . . . . 126 11. Number of teams and number of men per team. . . . . . . . . . . 126 12. The selection process . . . . . 127 13. Prerequisites for SWAT team membership . . . . . . . . . . 128 14. Rank of group commander. . . . . 129 15. How does the SWAT team program fit into the department's organizational structure? . . . . . . . . . . 129 16. Team composition . . . . . . . 130 17. Purposes for which the teams were formed . . . . . . . . . . . 133 18. Types of equipment used by SWAT teams . . . . . . . . . . . 134 Chemicals . . . . . . . . . . 134 Communications equipment . . . . . 137 Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . 137 Optical gear . . . . . . . . . 137 Protective gear . . . . . . . . 137 Uniforms. . . . . . . . . . . 137 Vehicles. . . . . . . . . . . 138 Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . 138 xi CHAPTER PAGE 19. Who supplies equipment for the SWAT teams? . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 20. What outside organizations, if any, participate in the SWAT team training program? . . . . . . . . . . . 139 21. Is there specialized training beyond that given to all officers? . . . . . 140 22. Describe the specialized training given SWAT teams as to type, subject, and approximate hours per year . . . . 140 23. Outside training materials in use . . 141 24. Have the SWAT teams been used in actual field situations for their intended purposes? . . . . . . . . 144 25. Situations in which the SWAT teams have been used . . . . . . . . . 144 26. What is the morale of the team members? . . . . . . . . . . . 145 27. Department members consider assign— ment to the SWAT team program as which of the following . . . . . . . . 146 28. The performance of the SWAT teams under actual field conditions may be described as the following . . . . . 146 xii CHAPTER PAGE 29. What do most supervisors and com- manders think of the program? . . . . 147 30. Is the program confidential? . . . 147 31. Has the program received any publicity? . . . . . . . . . . 147 32. Classification of the reported publicity. . . . . . . . . . . 147 33. Has there been any community opposition to the program? . . . . . 148 34. Has there been opposition from the city or local government? . . . . . 149 35. Has there been departmental opposition? . . . . . . . . . . 149 36. Do You wish your department to be listed as being interested in an infor- mation exchange program? . . . . . 150 Reliability of Questionnaire Returns . . . 150 Discrepancies . . . . . . . . . . 151 Sample size. . . . . . . . . . . 152 Comment on the Survey Results . . . . . 153 A critique of general procedures and pOIiCYo O O O O O O O O I O O 153 Logistical requirements. . . . . . . 154 xiii CHAPTER PAGE Political interference . . . . . . . 155 Training. . . . . . . . . . . . 156 VI . SUMMARY , IMPLICATIONS , AND CONCLUSIONS . . . 15 9 Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 Implications . . . . . . . . . . . 160 The SWAT image. . . . . . . . . . 160 SWAT and minority groups . . . . . . 163 SWAT and the city administration. . . . 165 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . 166 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 7 APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 9 A. Attitude Scales (Authoritarianism, Dogmatism, and Conservatism) and the "Information Sheet" . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180 B. Information Sheet and Attitude Scale Raw Data Special Weapons and Tactics Team Subjects . 186 C. Information Sheet and Attitude Scale Raw Data Police Officer Comparison Group. . . . . 189 D. Means, Standard Deviations, Correlation Matrices, and Programming Data . . . . . 192 E. United States Cities Over 100,000 Population . 205 F. Letter Introducing the Questionnaire. . . . 208 G. Questionnaire--Cities Over One Hundred Thou- sand Population . . . . . . . . . . 211 TABLE II. III. IV. VI. VII. VIII. IX. LIST OF TABLES A Comparison of Mean Scores, Standard Deviations, and Differences Between Uncorrelated Means . . . . . . . SWAT Group Correlations--Attitude Scales to Information Variables . . . . . Police Comparison Group Correlations—— Attitude Scales to Information Variables. The 3 Distribution of Attitude Scale Correlation Coefficients (£)° . . . SWAT and Police Comparison Group Data as .Recorded on the "Information Sheet" . SWAT Team Composition Reported by Question- naire Respondents . . . . . . . SWAT Team Position Titles Reported by Questionnaire Respondents. . . . . SWAT Team Equipment Reported by Question- naire Respondents . . . . . . . Total Annual Hours of Specialized SWAT Training, by Subject, All Departments. Total Annual Hours of Specialized SWAT Training by Department. . . . . . PAGE 93 95 96 98 100 125 131 135 142 143 LIST OF FIGURES FIGURE 1. SWAT Team Member in Fatigue Uniform Searching a Tunnel Running Beneath a Large City . . . 2. SWAT Team Boarding a 206 Bell Jet Ranger Helicopter During a Training Exercise . . . 3. Shotgun Man Carrying an Ithaca Model 37 D. S. "L.A.P.D. Special" Modified 12-gauge Shotgun. 4. Member of an Anti-sniper Detail Protecting a Presidential Candidate, State Capitol Build- ing, Lansing, Michigan . . . . . . . . 5. Assortment of Weapons Carried by One SWAT Team. (Top): U.S. Rifle, Caliber .30, M1 (Garand). (Left to Right): Colt AR-lS Semi- automatic Rifle (Caliber .223); Remington Model 11 12-gauge Autoloading Shotgun; Remington Model 760 .30-06 (Pump) Rifle With a 4X Telesc0pic Sight; Federal 201-Z, 1 1/2- inch (37 mm), Tear Gas Gun; Model Ten, Series A, "Police Shotgun," 18—inch Barrel; and, a U.S. Thompson .45 (1928) Submachine Gun . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. SWAT Team Members Rappelling from a 35-foot Training Tower. . . . . . . . . . . PAGE 30 45 46 57 59 68 FIGURE 7. 8. 9. Riots (Incidents Where There Has Been Arson, Sniping, Looting, or an Extra-Ordinary Police Response) Reported by Questionnaire Respondents Sniping Incidents Directed Toward Police Personnel as Reported by Questionnaire Respondents Sniping Incidents Directed Toward Police Personnel: Daylight Versus Darkness. xvi PAGE 117 119 120 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION During the next few years, organized urban insur- rection could explode to the extent that portions of large American cities could become scenes of destruc- tion approaching those of Stalingrad in World War 11.1 This prediction is part of a military appraisal of United States cities by Colonel Robert Rigg, a former United States intelligence officer who Specializes in long-range strategic forecasts. Colonel Rex Applegate, "Police Edi— tor" of Guns magazine, states, The appearance of the sniper . . . in recent civil disorders has so changed the character of civil disturbance control that on presidential order, special counter-sniper training has now been given to National Guard, Reserve, and regular Army units. Henry Fitzgibbon, Director of the St. Louis, Missouri, Police Academy, comments, "The emergence of sniper fire in connection with riots points up the changing character of the disturbances law enforcement officers are being called . .3 . upon to fight.' Terry Ann KnOpf, a research a85001ate at 1Robert B. Rigg, "Made In USA," Army, XVIII (January, 1968), 24. 2Rex Applegate, "Guns and the Law--Police Sniper Problems," Guns, XIV (December, 1968), 28. 3Henry A. Fitzgibbon, "Police Procedure Against Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence at Brandeis Uni- versity, notes, ". . . a few of the disorders chronicled in this report appeared to display the features of a different kind of violence."4 The writers, a research associate, a policeman, a civilian author of police-related articles and books, and a military strategist, are pointing to something the field policeman has "known"5 for several years--there has been an increase in and a change in the character of violence. This changing nature of violence is difficult to document because of a lack of standard reporting and investigative procedures over a substantial period of time. Press exaggeration and inaccurate reporting have added to the problem.6 To the policeman, whose experience is limited to this generation, the increase and change in violence is a topic of concern. the Sniper Menace," The Law Enforcement Executive, II (November, 1967), 1. 4Terry Ann Knopf, "Sniping Incidents. A New Pattern of Violence?" Law and Order, XVII (May, 1969), 31. 5Intuitive recognition of a changing condition as the basis of years of empirical observation. 6Knopf, op. cit., pp. 34, 36; Otto Kerner (chairman), Re ort of the National Advisornyommission on Civil Dis- or ers Twashington, D. C.: Government PrinEIng Office, Over the course of the research period, the author had the opportunity to talk with the sworn police heads of the Chicago, Detroit, and Los Angeles Police Departments. Other unstructured interviews were conducted with line and staff command personnel on the Cincinnati, Lansing, New York, and St. Louis Police Departments. They were almost unanimous in expressing the following subjective judgments: 1. Violence is on the increase, particularly that directed at the government, its representa— tives, and the social structure. 2. Policemen today are facing more armed violence. 3. The sniper is a serious problem. 4. The urban guerrilla (a member of an organized urban group conducting combat operations against the established authority on the basis of its unique capabilities and limi- tations as a small, disciplined, unit) is reported to exist, but in a "Phage I" stage (see "Levels of Insurgency," page 14). The potential exists, however, for the eruption of organized urban warfare.7 March 1, 1968), p. 180; and "Are We Heading Toward A Race War in Detroit This Summer?" Detroit Scope Magazine, (April 12, 1969), 10. 7Preparations by militant groups who openly advo- cate guerrilla warfare are described in: United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Un- American Activities, Guerrilla W3£_Advocates In the United States, Union Calendar No. 542, House Report No. 1351, 95th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 64. The four judgmental evaluations were also supported by letters received from respondents in a survey of cities with populations over one hundred thousand (Chapter V). Additional evidence of increased violence comes from the mass media. "Nearly every major city in the United States has experienced riots and civil disorder."8 Portions of cities have been destroyed in recent riots. Bombings have occurred.9 Policemen have been shot and killed by snipers10 and ambushed: The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence reported last week that the ambush 8Progress Report 9: the National Commission on the Causes andCPrevention 9£_Violence to President Lyndon B. Johnson (Washifigton, D. C.: Government Printing Office, January 9, 1969), p. A-ll. 9See, for example, The New York Times Company, "Bombs and Bomb Plots," The New York Times Index, Vol. LV (New York: New York Times Company, 1968). lo"Negro Revolt Echos to the Ugly Crack of Sniper Fire," Life, LXIII, July 28, 1967, pp. 18, 28; "Snipers Fight PoIic : 8 Die: 3 Cops Slain in Cleveland Negro Battle," Chica 0 Tribune, July 24, 1968; "Inkster Sniper Pleads Guilty in PoIice Attack," The Detroit News, March 21, 1969; "Chicago Bomber Slays Two OffIcers," The Detroit News, April 15, 1969; "Black is Guilty in Four KiIIIngs," DetroIt Free Press, May 13, 1969; "Four Wounded in New GreensBoro Incident,1r The State Journal [Lansing], May 23, 1969; "Shots Wound—I6 on Texas Campus: 9 Students Held," Detroit Free Press, May 28, 1969; "Police Under Sniper Fire in Two Cities," Detroit Free Press, June 29, 1969; "Snipers Kill Girl, Policeman in Camden Riots," The Detroit News, Septem— ber 3, 1969. triggering the Cleveland riot of July, 1968, was a deliberate intensification of racial conflict in America. The upheaval, which began with an ambush by blacks on police . . . [by] a small and well- equipped army of black extremists . . . [caused] the deaths of three policemen and a civilian.11 The New York Times Index lists the following number of references to bombing and sniping incidents in the United States: Bombings Snipings 1964 74 1 1965 73 4 1966 76 7 1967 84 6 1968 129 5 1969 (to July 15) 87 7 NOTE: The 1968 (and 1969) figures were taken from the "semi—monthly" issues as the annual publication was not available. Bombing incidents appear to be on the increase. No separate category exists for "sniping incidents" so they must be extracted from the "shootings" section of the Index. Although the New York Times was selected because it is indexed and is the largest daily newspaper in the country, the recording of sniping incidents appears to be 11Item in Time, XCIII, (June 6, 1969), 28. 6 inconsistent. Sniping incidents resulting in the deaths of policemen (footnote 10, page 4) were not entered as such in the Index. Extremists and militants have made clear their in— tentions. Stokely Carmichael, from Havana, Cuba, on August 1, 1967, urged American Negroes to take arms and seek vengeance. "The method of struggle for American Negros is guerrilla warfare. The struggle is in the streets of the United States."12 Two days later he re- peated his prediction of urban guerrilla warfare against the United States Government" Our only answer is to destroy that Government or to be destroyed while trying to destroy the Government. . . . We are going to start with guns to get our liberation.1 Robert Franklin Williams wrote, During the hours of day sporadic rioting takes place and massive sniping. Night brings all out warfare, organized fighting and unlimited terror against the oppressor and his forces.14 12"Looting, Burning--Now Guerrilla War," U.S. News and World Report, LXIII (August 7, 1967), 23. 13Rigg, op. cit., p. 27. 14A quotation from The Crusader, February, 1964, pp. 4, 5, cited in Committee on Un-American Activities, op. cit., p. 19. He also commented, "Ninety days of burning and guerrilla warfare will bring America to its knees."15 In Philadelphia, members of the Revolutionary Action Movement, carrying explosives and a large amount of potassium cyanide, were arrested for a plot to create a riot in order to lure the police and city officials to the scene. The poison was to have been placed in coffee and sandwiches in portable canteens stationed in the vicinity of the staged riot.l6 A partial list of extremist groups currently advo- cating and/or practicing violence against society would include the following: American Nazi Party Black Guards Black Liberation Front (Black Militia) Black Nationalists of New Lybia Black Panthers Blackstone Rangers Black Students' Union Black United Front Brothers United Deacons for Defense and Justice Five Percenters Forum 66 Freedom Fighters of Ohio Harlem Defense Council Harlem Mau-Mau Society Inner City Organizing Committee 15"Revolution Underway," (film), National Edu— cation Program, Searcy, Arkansas [1968]. 16Committee on Un-American Activities, op. cit., p. 23. JFK (Jamo Freedom Kenyata [sic]) House Ku Klux Klan Malcom X Society Medgar Evers Rifle Club Minute Men Nation of Islam (Black Muslims, Fruit of Islam) Northern Student Movement Progressive Labor Party Republic of New Africa (Black Legion) Revolutionary Action Movement (Uhuru, Afro-American Youth Association) Revolutionary Contingent Society of Man Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee Students for a Democratic Society (Weathermen) Third World Liberation Front US White Panthers Youth International Party NOTE: This list was casually compiled from recent news items. Any omissions are unintentional. I. THE PROBLEM Statement pf the Problem Violence in society today is probably a symptom of problems in several areas: political, social, psychological, economic, and perhaps others. A study of violence and its solutions is beyond the scope of this research and the competency of the investigator. To date, its solution (if indeed one exists) has eluded all disciplines. The police responsibility is to deal symptomatically with violence until a solution is found. Containment must be the focus. If the police cannot contain violence in the cities then the application of military force will be necessary. Considerable loss of life and property may then result. Even this extreme is not a permanent solu- tion. The National Guard or other military components cannot be maintained on permanent police duty because of political and cost factors. Importance pf the Study Two of the four subjective judgments (page 3) pre- sent special police problems. They are the sniper and the urban guerrilla (should he enter Phase II and conduct guerrilla or terrorist acts against the government or populace). Both are beyond the control of the conven- tionally trained and equipped policeman. The response to urban violence must be proportion- ate. Just as cannon cannot be used to destroy a city housing the urban guerrilla, a one hundred thousand dollar building containing a sniper cannot be burned down to accomplish the same results as would a fifteen cent bullet. The intensity of the means must be balanced against the magnitude of the problem. The Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team concept is just such a balance. It replaces indiscriminate firepower and massive, uncoordinated re- action with a professionally directed approach emphasizing small unit tactics and selective force directed with skill and restraint. It is a prOportionate response to the 10 assault on society by armed, violent men whose stated in- tent is its destruction. It is a selective measure which does not lose sight of the basic concepts of protection of society and protection of the rights of the individual. II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED The language of special warfare and other areas covered by the study employ terms invented, amplified, or interpreted to facilitate communication and understanding. These terms are fundamental to understanding the material presented. Assembly Area A location designated for congregation and deploy- ment of personnel used or held in reserve during an un- 17 usual occurrence. Authoritarianism The "psychological" definition rather than the political one (a blind submission to authority or concen- tration of power in a leader not responsible to the people) is used for purposes of this paper. Authoritarian- ism is: 17Los Angeles Police Department, Unusual Occurrence Procedures for Field Supervisors (August, I967), p. 39. ll . . . hostility towards people in general . . . a rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values . . . a tendency to condemn, reject, and punish those who vio— late conventional values . . . it includes a disposi- tion to think in rigid categories.13 The "F" or "predisposition to facism" scale is a measure of authoritarianism. Clandestine Operations Operations to accomplish intelligence, counter- intelligence, and other similar activities in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. Conservatism A measure of an individual's need to maintain traditionally constituted organizations and views. Con- servatism is a philosophy based on a tradition of social stability and a preference of gradual development to abrupt change. Cordon and Search A technique used in operations to isolate a small population group or designated area (cordon) to permit a detailed search for personnel or material. 18Albert Peckham, "Authoritarianism and Its Relationship to Group Structure" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, East Lansing, 1954), p. 5. 12 Counterguerrilla Warfare Operations conducted by the military or police agencies against guerrillas. Counterinsurgency Those military, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat sub- . . 19 ver31ve insurgency. Covert Operations Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of the spon- sor rather than on concealment of the operation. Dogmatism An intolerance toward those with opposing beliefs. Dogmatism is an unwillingness to accept the views of others. It is unwarranted or arrogant opinions based on insufficiently examined ideas. 19This definition and several others are adapted from a "Special Warfare Glossary" compiled by the United States Army Special Warfare School, Special Forces Exten- sion Course (Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 1967), p. 7. 13 Field Commander The police department officer, regardless of rank, having line command over a field task force. Field Command Post A temporary administrative facility staffed with officers appointed by the field commander to enable him to effectively direct the operations required to control the unusual occurrence, assemble and assign department re- sources, collect intelligence, communicate with concerned officers and units, and maintain appropriate records.20 Field Task Force The personnel who are assigned and actively engaged in performing the duties directed by the field commander at the scene of an unusual occurrence. Insurgency A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. 20Los Angeles Police Department, op. cit., pp. 32-33. 14 Insurgengy, Levels pf Phase I. The initial phase of insurgency in which subversive activities are a potential threat. It includes recruiting, developing, and organizing an insurgent appa- ratus for use in subsequent phases. No major outbreak of violence is involved. Phase II. This phase is reached when the subversive movement, having gained sufficient local or external sup— port, initiates organized urban guerrilla warfare or re- lated forms of violence against the established authority. Operations to hold terrain objectives and engage in con- ventional warfare are avoided. Phase III. This stage is reached when the insur- gency becomes primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority. This is sometimes called the "terrorism" stage.2l 21A "seige of terror" creates extreme fear through systematic violence with the purpose of overthrowing and destroying a system of authority. E. V. Walter, "Violence and the Process of Terror," American Sociological Review, XXIX (1964), 249. 15 Irregular Forces Armed individuals or groups who are not members of regular armed forces (despite their secessionist claims).22 Mobilization A mobilization usually follows a tactical alert which proves inadequate to handle the unusual occurrence. In addition to the usual implementation of a tactical alert it requires the following: (1) the extension of the work day to twelve-hour watches, (2) the temporary defer- ment of days off, and (3) the recalling of off—duty officers. A mobilization is activated when an unusual occur- rence is of sufficient magnitude to require major devi— ation from normal police operating procedures and neces- sitates a general modification of department organization and command. Paramilitary Forces Groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces but resemble them in organization, equipment, 22See, for example, Gary Blonston, "How Success Paved Path to Secessionist Movement," Detroit Free Press, January 4, 1969, p. lO-B. 16 training, or mission. Police departments and militant organizations are included in this definition. Special Warfare Special warfare embraces all of the military and paramilitary measures and activities related to uncon- ventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological Operations. Staging Area A location designated for the collection, storage, maintenance, disbursement, and accounting of vehicles, supplies, and equipment used or held in reserve during an unusual occurrence. Staging-assembly»Complex The staging and assembly areas. Subversion Action designed to undermine the military, police, economic, psychological, moral, or political strength of a government. Tactical Alert The field task force is initially assembled by means of a tactical alert. The tactical alert is a broad- casted decision by the field commander or Communications 17 Division to provide for the controlled redistribution of on—duty personnel during an unusual occurrence. Patrol divisions included in a tactical alert may be required to commit up to 50 per cent of their original field deploy- ment. A tactical alert may be followed by a mobilization if forces are insufficient to control the occurrence. Task Force Identifiable manpower committed to line and support responsibilities for combating the cause and effect of an 23 unusual occurrence. Unusual Occurrence An unscheduled physical event involving potential or actual personal injury or prOperty damage arising from fire, flood, storm, earthquake, tidal wave, landslide, wreck, enemy action, civil disturbance, or other natural 24 or man-caused incident requiring police action. Un- usual occurrences are classified into three types depending 23Los Angeles Police Department, Personnel Mobili- zation Plan for Unusual Occurrences (August, 1966), f. 24Los Angeles Police Department, Unusual Occur- rence Procedures for Field Supervisors (August, I967), 4. 18 upon the size of the response necessary for their contain- ment: minor, serious, and major. Urban Guerrilla Warfare Military or paramilitary operations conducted in cities by irregular predominantly indigenous forces or organizations. III. COMMAND STRATEGY FOR RIOT CONTROL An awareness of the command strategy for riot con- trol is necessary for an understanding of the SWAT concept. The SWAT team, to function prOperly during a riot situ- ation, must understand the field commander's strategy and the duties of other police elements. Traditional Methods pf Control Riots in recent years have taken different form and dimension from those described in current police literature. It is apparent that police strategies and tactics have failed to provide the field commander with the means to deal with the operational problems confront- ing him. Squad formations and other crowd control tech- niques are still effective in dealing with textbook mob situations. Many of these techniques have failed, how- ever, in the streets. The prime example of unsuccessful 19 control strategy was the establishment of perimeter control around the affected area and the withdrawal of the police from the interior.25 The rationale was sound. The tactic had been used before with good results. Its use in Los Angeles, Detroit, Boston, and Newark, under extremely violent conditions, however, resulted in chaos. This example illustrates the importance of building upon experience in the field rather than relying entirely on traditional methods. Mobilization Control of an unusual occurrence depends upon the immediate mobilization and redistribution of department manpower and resources. Time is critical. The rapid, organized mobilization of substantial manpower is essential for the protection of life and property and the prevention of escalation of the occurrence. Shifting from the routine of everyday police ser- vice to the demands of an unusual occurrence requires rapid organizational and mental readjustment. Non-urgent 25Los Angeles Police Department, Model Civil Dis— turbance Control Plan. Prepared for the President's Advisory CommIssion on Civil Disorders (March, 1968), p. 94; "Riot Control: Hold the Street and Seize 'The High Ground,'" Time, XC (August 4, 1967), 16. 20 police activities must be curtailed. The field commander must have sufficient manpower and equipment available in the shortest possible time. A large body of personnel must be rapidly assembled, broken into supervised units, equipped, directed, controlled, and accounted for through operations of the field command post and staging—assembly complex. This operation should be described in a depart- ment's personnel mobilization plan. This system for han- dling unusual occurrences, originated by the Los Angeles Police Department, has proven effective under simulated and actual disturbances. It contains minimal deviation from established operating procedures as the infrequent use of a complicated plan would require an extensive, continuous training program. It relies on effective control through the coordinated efforts of a well—trailed cadre.26 These procedures and policies are a major area of study in them- selves. 26Max K. Hurlbut, et a1., "Recommendations Based on an Analysis of Command POEE’EEercise 'Operation Tremor,'" (a report prepared in establishing unusual occurrence procedures, April, 1967), p. 26. 21 Command Decisions Certain pre-established command decisions are basic to a strategy for establishing control during a civil disturbance. These basic (but sometimes overlooked) tenets consist of the following: 1. React immediately with sufficient strength to overwhelm the rioters. Department capabiIIL ties, policy, and local laws enter into this decision. Failure to comply will result in the spread of rioting, increased casualties and damage, and loss of public confidence. 2. Establish control in all parts of the involved area. The streefg should be fifider police control. The rioters should have no sanctu- aries where they are immune from arrest. 3. Arrest all law violators utilizing reasonable force when necessary. 4. Prosecute with vigor all persons arrested. Although not necessarily a poIice decision, it should be part of the police policy.27 Without it, violators will be unconcerned about being arrested and police officers may become careless in their arrest and evidence procedures. This policy prevents the release of an arrested per- son as an act of compromise to the rioters. Such a release places the police in the untenable position of acceding to the extortionary demands of the mob. 5. Remain ip the affected areas with a show of force a sufficient period of time after—arder T—' — t r 1 — 1‘ pg restored. This is to conv1nce all 7Los Angeles Police Department, Model Civil Disturbance Control Plan, pp, cit., p. 95. 22 concerned that additional outbreaks will not be tolerated.28 Determined, resolute, and vigorous leadership is essential at all levels of command. Indecision by field supervisors is probably the major leadership problem but indecision at any level will lead to loss of confidence among the police ranks and be an encouragement to further disorder. The police have the initial advantage on the street. They must hold it. Planning and Deployment The field commander, through his operations officer, must implement a plan which will restore order. As the first units will be arriving at the assembly area within minutes after a tactical alert or mobilization broadcast, this almost simultaneous action of planning and deployment will not be possible without prior thought. Command and operations officers should discuss and critique possible courses of action and hold field training exercises routinely. Before a plan can be formulated, information must be available on the following: 28Daryl Gates, "Control of Civil Disorders," The Police Chief, XXXV (May, 1968), 32—34. 23 1. Area involved. 2. Estimated strength of the rioters. 3. Type of action occurring (looting, burning, etc.). 4. Possible mob objectives. 5. Composition of the crowd, including identity of the leaders. Degree of organization. Weapons. Sniper reports. Mobility and direction of the mob. \OGJxlON 29 Command and Support Elements The field commander and his staff operate from the field command post. The field commander appoints an executive officer to exercise line supervision over the command staff which consists of an intelligence, operations, personnel, and logistics officer. They each have their counterpart in the Emergency Control Center located in the central police facility. The Emergency Control Center coordinates auxiliary service and liaison requirements of the field commander and his Task Force.30 29A good discussion of the essential elements of information and other factors may be found in Chapter 11, "Intelligence," of Raymond M. Momboisse, Riots, Revolts and Insurrections (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1967), pp. 93-128. 30Los Angeles Police Department, Emergency Control Center Handbook (prepared by Planning and Research Divi- s1on, _JuIy, I965), p. 100. 24 Task Force Structure Squads. The basic unit for riot deployment is the ten-man squad (nine policemen and a sergeant).31 The squad is assigned two vehicles and a variety of equipment. Platoons and companies. Squads may be formed into platoons (three squads) or companies (two or more platoons). Deployment by company will usually be necessary only in initial strikes against a heavily concentrated group of rioters. Light striking forces. "Brushfire" units (named during the Watts Riots) consist of highly mobile platoons. Transportation may be by bus or personnel carrier. IV. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE Considerable literature is available on riot control techniques. Military publications frequently offer solu— tions in terms of massed manpower and heavy or sophisti- cated weaponry not available to most police departments. The Federal Bureau of Investigation--an investigative agency which by mission, training, and preference is not 31The number of men varies between departments. Squad size should combine control and effectiveness. 25 fitted to riot control--publishes a riot control manual in the "textbook mob situation" tradition.3-2 Few of these sources mention anything on sniper control or other areas related to urban warfare. There is a dearth of information on the SWAT con- cept. The "Center For Law Enforcement Research Infor- mation" of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., a section devoted to researching, publishing, and distributing current information on police subjects was contacted. The only data they were able to provide on the SWAT team concept was a two-page article containing the most general of information.33 Old Wine Ip New Bottles The possibilities of urban warfare have resulted in renewed interest and the reissue of old books on guerrilla warfare. Several publishers such as Panther Publications in Boulder, Colorado, Praeger, Incorporated, of New York, 32Federal Bureau of Investigation, Prevention and Control pthobs and Riots (April 3, 1967), p. 111. 33International Association of Chiefs of Police, "Appendix No. 1, Special Weapons and Tactics SWAT Team Concept," Guidelines for Civil Disorder and Mobilization Plannin , compiled by R. Dean Smith and Richard W. KoEetz (Washington, D. C.: Research, Development, and Planning Division, September, 1968), pp. 60-61. 26 and Burns and MacEachern, Limited, of Don Mills, Canada, print most of these books. Volumes of the Cumulative Book Ipdex indicate a total of seventy-five different books on guerrilla warfare have been published, world-wide, in the English language since 1938.34 Many of them appeared dur- ing World War II with none being published in some years during the fifties. The last few years, however, have resulted in a flurry of old books being reissued in re- vised form and the appearance of many new studies. Gun magazines and other periodicals provide some limited information on sniper techniques and guerrilla warfare. Several of the 159 police departments surveyed in Chapter V provided their SWAT training materials. This material was generally mimeographed and limited to lists of guerrilla warfare publications and patrol techniques extracted from Army Field Manuals and other sources. Nothing was available on policy or administration, possibly because of the classified nature of most programs, their recent development, and a fear of civil suits (see page 51). 34Cumulative Book Index, 1938-1969 (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1938-1969). 27 V. ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE THESIS Chapter II looks at the threat which made necessary the SWAT concept: the urban guerrilla, the sniper, and the political assassin. Chapter III presents the SWAT concept and delves into the organization, function, policy, training, and tactics of a model unit. Chapter IV investigates the authoritarian person- ality on the Los Angeles Police Department's SWAT team program. Chapter V surveys the existence and development of SWAT teams in cities in the United States with populations over one hundred thousand. Chapter VI concludes with a summation and impli- cations of the concepts gathered and revealed by the study. CHAPTER II THE URBAN GUERRILLA, THE SNIPER, AND THE POLITICAL ASSASSIN Three Cleveland policemen were shot to death in an 35 Charles J. Whit- ambush by militants on July 23, 1968. man, firing an assortment of weapons from the observation deck of the clock tower of the University of Texas in Austin, killed twelve and wounded thirty-one other people on August 1, 1966.36 President John F. Kennedy was as- sassinated by a sniper firing from the sixth floor of a building in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963.37 The killings illustrate three situations the average uniformed policeman is not prepared, trained, or equipped to handle: the urban guerrilla, the sniper, and the political assassin. The three examples are illustrations 35News item in Time, XCIII (June 6, 1969), 28; "3 Cops Slain in CleveIand Negro Battle," Chicago Tribune, July 24, 1968. 36Rex Applegate, "Guns and the Law—-Police Sniper Problems," Guns, XIV (December, 1968), 29. 37Henry A. Fitzgibbon, "Police Procedure Against the Sniper Menace," The Law Enforcement Executive, II (November, 1967), 1. 29 of the functional problems facing policemen. No consider— ation is given to the symptoms or causes of the violence such as mental state or social ills. The political assas- sin is labeled as such because of his victim and not the political factors which may have precipitated the killing. I. THE URBAN GUERRILLA The finest "jungle" for insurrection was created by man, not nature. Mao Tsé-tung's concept of prolonged war- fare could well be applied to the vertical acreage and horizontal mileage of steel-and-concrete high-rise build- ings. Knowledge of the "maze of buildings, stairwells, streets, alleyways, tunnels, and sewers in the large city may be the key to tactical success."38 Militants have promised urban guerrila warfare. Time will determine if they have the capabilities to carry out their threats. An unprepared police department confronted with an organized guerrilla force is likely to suffer high casu- alties in the initial contacts. To commit conventionally armed, organized, and trained policemen against a dispersed 38Robert B. Rigg, "Made in USA," Army, XVIII (January, 1968), 25. Figure l. SWAT team member in fatigue uniform searching-a tunnel running beneath a large city. 31 guerrilla force is a tactical blunder. Police and military tactics must merge as the guerrilla concept is largely a military one. The overall police objectives of control and containment remain the same, but flexibility of deployment and tactics must result. The police may, for example, find themselves in a firefight with no military backup elements available. Military firepower and assault techniques may have to be applied to insure mere survival of the police unit. Tactically, the guerrilla will not stand and fight in the open or restrict himself to a barricaded defense. Psychologically, he will not strive to create an image of invincibility. The guerrillas' primary means of success is to adhere closely to the principle of offensive action at the opportune moment. Surprise and rapid withdrawal are used to compensate for weaknesses in manpower and fire- power. A small guerrilla unit can destroy a favorable police manpower balance. The guerrilla is flexible and will withdraw or blend back into the community if threat— ened or encircled. The United States Army Special Warfare School notes, Guerrillas employ all the principles of war--objective, offensive action, simplicity, unity of command, mass, economy of force, maneuver, surprise, and security—- but they apply them in an irregular war primarily 32 against the enemy's morale, combat effectiveness, and industrial capacity.39 Translated into operations against a police department, the effects could be devastating. Police officers summoned on a "routine" call could be executed by one or two marksmen. Any other unit responding before the suspects could flee the area would be ambushed by a well-positioned covering party. Other units would find nothing of the suspects who would resume their civilian identities. This pattern could be repeated over a period of months without an apprehension of suspects. This action would not necessarily have to occur during a period of riots or other public disorders. Small, well-planned ambushes utilizing previously concealed weapons would be difficult to stop. A sympathetic popu- lace, an unlikely condition as discussed on page 33, would be a necessity for continued operations of this nature, however. The ambush could be quickly executed but, if the suspects had to depend upon flight rather than blending with the population, their chances of apprehension would increase substantially. Should these incidents occur during an extended period of disturbances, fear of the 39United States Army Special Warfare School, "Introduction to Guerrilla Warfare," Special Forces Exten- sion Course (Fort Bragg, North Carolina, January, 1965), p. II-go 33 suspects and the disruption of normal activities would make their identification difficult. Effective intelligence penetration of such groups (as discussed on page 48) is the obvious answer. The SWAT concept, however, is a reaction to violence and was not established to conduct the sophis- ticated intelligence functions required by such a problem. Obstacles Faced py Urban GuerriIlas Despite the initial destruction and terrorism, a sustained guerrilla effort could be effectively controlled. The following discussion is taken largely from Chapter X, "Conclusion," of the report of the Committee on Un-American Activities.40 The concept of guerrilla warfare is alien to both the American mentality and to the vast majority of Negroes in the ghettos. It could not hope to sway the majority of Negroes. The ghetto could be "isolated" and the guerrillas effectively bottled up, thereby cutting them off from supplies and support. The guerrilla could not depend on 40United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, Guerrilla War Advo- cates In the United States, Union Calendar No. 542, House Report-NoT—I35I, 9UtH Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 57-61. 34 outside countries as training bases or lines of support once the conflict began. Guerrilla warfare, as envisioned by its proponents at this stage, would have to be based in the ghetto. The ghetto could be cordoned and the following actions taken: 1. A curfew would be imposed in the enclosed iso- lated area. 2. The boundary lines would be patrolled. Foot patrols would penetrate the isolated area. Guerrillas attempting to break out or engage in open combat would be defeated. 3. If the guerrillas were able to hold out for a period of time then the population of the ghetto would be classified through an office for the "control and organization of the inhabitants." This office would distribute "census cards" which would hear a photograph of the individual, the letter of the district in which he lives, his house and street num- ber, and a letter designating his home city. This classification would proscribe movement of the guerrilla. II. THE SNIPER Definition: To snipe is "to shoot from a hidden position at separate individuals of an enemy force."41 The term "sniping" conjures up the thought of the expert marksman, equipped with a high velocity rifle with 41David B. Guralnik and Joseph H. Friend (eds.), Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language (CoIlege Edifion; New York: The—World Publishing Company, 1964), p. 1381. 35 teleSCOpic sight, who is capable of killing at long dis- tances with considerable accuracy.42 The term, as used by the news media, has been carelessly expanded to describe the use of any type of firearm in a disturbance. Over- zealous and exaggerated reporting of sniping incidents has I O O 43 drawn cr1t1c1sm from many sources. Types pf Snipers Four general classifications of snipers have con- fronted the police in recent incidents and riots: 1. The amateur. The amateur sniper is a relatively unskilled person who fires indiscriminately at targets of Opportunity using many types of weapons.44 Intent to kill selected police officials or civilians is generally absent. 42Gahan Wilson, "Overkill," (a cartoon), Playboy, XVI (March, 1969), 146. 43"Report Blasts Press Coverage of Sniping," Tpe American Rifleman, CXVII (June, 1969), 64; Terry Ann Knopf, "Sniping Incidents. A New Pattern of Violence?" Law and Order, XVII (May, 1969), 31; Otto Kerner (Chair— EEH)T—Re ort of the National Advisory Commission pp Civil Disorders (WaEKington, D."C.: Government Printing Office, March'I, 1968), p. 180. 44"Arsenal of Guns Confiscated in Riot Area," Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, August 17, 1965. 36 2. The intoxicated sniper. The intoxicated sniper is a sub-category of "the amateur" but, because of his frequent appearance, will be classified separately. During a disorder involving looting, many of the rioters have opportunity to acquire liquor and weapons-—a dangerous combination in any circumstance. Becoming a "sniper" is an easy step in the excitement and hysteria of the situation. His condition may make him more dangerous than the "professional" as the intoxicated sniper's actions may be less than predictable. 3. The mentally deranged sniper. This classifi- cation is necessarily general as standards of "derangement" are not established. For purposes of this paper, the de— ranged sniper is one who becomes a sniper because of ab- normal mental factors. The purpose of this classification is to distinguish the Charles Whitman with a brain tumor and a history of erratic behavior from the sane but strongly motivated individual who kills for other reasons. The deranged sniper is especially dangerous because of his unpredictability. He may be motivated to violence by reading of a similar event. He may not consider his 37 own safety or retreat when fire is returned. The problem is compounded when he has had sniper training.45 4. The professional sniper. The trained "pro- fessional" sniper is a reality in urban warfare. He usually has had military experience or has received train- ing through a militant organization. This individual will usually not fire unless sure of a kill. His choice of weapon depends on the situation and the target. The mission of the professional sniper varies. Aside from the killing of selected individuals, his traditional role is to harass in areas where enemy strength is nominal. His purpose may be to demonstrate to local inhabitants that his group can resist and disable a much larger force. Jones states he may even create a martyr by killing a member of his own organization.46 The sniper is extremely effective in a delaying action. He can halt a greatly superior force while his 45"40-Year-Old Marine Veteran Shoots and Kills Two Policemen, Injures Four Others with Gunfire and Grenades Tossed from His Apartment Window." News item in the New York Times, April 15, 1969, p. l. 46Adrian H. Jones and James M. Dodson, A Selected Bibliography of Crowd and Riot Behavior in CiV1l Dis- tufBances. Counterinsurgency Information _AnaIysis Center, SORO7CINFAC 85- -65, Special Operations Research Center (Washington, D. C.: American University, May 11, 1965), p. 32. 38 comrades withdraw. He may also be the bait for an ambush by withdrawing into a prepared trap.47 The inexperienced, greatly outnumbered, or poorly equipped sniper may engage his targets at ranges which will allow immediate retreat. The professional sniper will allow his quarry to approach his position for a sure kill. Concealment and/or cover, a field of fire, and an escape route are the basic requirements for a good sniping position. The sniper will fire from well back in a room. He will gain elevation to permit a line of fire through a slightly raised window to the street below by standing on a chair or box. His chances of going undetected are further increased by the use of a .22 caliber rimfire rifle. Muzzle flash is minimal and the report is easily concealed with riot-generated noise and confusion. The sniper's chances of being apprehended are substantially reduced in a metrOpolitan area if he fires but one or two rounds and abandons his position. Police counter-procedures are constantly improving but much time 47Patrick H. Graves, Jr., "Observations of a Platoon Leader," Operations Report--Lessons Learned 1-67 (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Department of tHe Army, Head- quarters, United States Continental Army Command, 20 April 1967), p. 9. 39 will be spent in investigating sniper incidents where the suspect is never seen or heard. Types pf Sniping Activity Police have been confronted with considerable "alleged" sniper fire that subsequent investigation re- vealed to be something different: 1. Diversionary fire. One or two shots fired will change the focus of police attention from looters and arsonists to the "sniper." Police respond in numbers only to conduct a futile search which ties up manpower urgently needed elsewhere. 2. Harassment. The police can never be sure of the sniper's intent. This makes harassment easily accom- plished. Several quick shots will cause the police to scatter and take cover. In this short lapse the sniper will flee or conceal his weapon. Firecrackers may also be used to accomplish this objective. 3. Other police fire. Ricochetting rounds and faulty target identification have been a problem from the Watts Riot to the present. The police, appearing to be 40 under sniper fire, have actually received indirect fire from the military or other police officers.48 III. THE POLITICAL ASSASSIN Assassination strikes at the heart of the democratic system. It enables one man to nullify the will of the peeple in a single act.49 The swiftness and complexity of national events makes hazardous even the slightest lapse in political leadership. The murders of several political figures in recent years has emphasized their vulnerability. The determination of an assassin coupled with the unwilling- ness of a politician to isolate himself from his public compounds the job of the policeman. Most assassinations fall into two broad categories: (1) those committed to accomplish a specific political goal (such as the World War II attempt on the life of 48"Guardsmen behind Jeep-mounted machine guns blazed away over the tops of cars and anything else that moved in the curfew area." Quotation from Art Berman, "Negro Riots Rage On; Death Toll 23; 21,000 Tr00ps, Police Wage Guerrilla War; 8 p.m. Curfew Invoked," Los Angeles Times, August 15, 1965. 49This quotation and much of the discussion are taken from Chapter IV of the Progress Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Vio- Ience To President L ndon B. Johnson (Washington, D. C: Government Printing Office, January 9,1969), p. A- 27. 4l Adolf Hitler), and (2) those committed by individuals to satisfy their psychotic drives (such as the attack on President Andrew Jackson by a man who believed himself to be Richard III of England). Political assassinations for money are not common enough to be classified separately. The poor chance of escape may discourage such assassi- nations for financial gain. Such classification dis- tinctions are relevant in a consideration of the motives of assassins and strategies to prevent or thwart them. Studies such as those being conducted by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Vio- lence are exploring ways to reduce the danger to prominent public figures. The Commission notes that Presidential assassins are not nearly so determined to carry out their attacks as has been commonly supposed.50 Zangara would not leave the warm climate of Florida to carry out his plan to assassinate President Hoover; Shrank chose not to attempt assassination in Chicago in order to protect the city's reputation; and, Guiteau postponed his attempt to kill President Garfield because the President's wife was present. Methods to increase the difficulty of attacking a President may come from such studies. A determined 501bid., p. A-29. 42 assassin willing to sacrifice himself, however, is likely to succeed. IV . CONCLUSIONS The classifications in this chapter are functional distinctions only. They are to make the policeman aware of the unpredictability of the sniper (the intoxicated and deranged suspect) or his ability to calculate the officer's next move (the professional sniper). They are to make the policeman aware that important tactical distinctions may govern the conduct of a gun battle with a militant as opposed to a shootout with a conventional gunman. The classifications overlap. The political assassin may be a professional or amateur sniper (or an intoxicated one). The lumping together of the urban guerrilla, the various types of snipers, and the political assassin can only be justified by the unique characteristic common to all: the inability of the conventionally prepared and equipped policeman to successfully counter them. The SWAT team concept (Chapter III) was established to fill this gap in the public defense. CHAPTER III THE SWAT TEAM CONCEPT The basic role of the police in a riot or other disorder does not change. It is to protect life and property. Strategy and tactics must change, however, to meet new challenges and threats to order and the public safety. The SWAT team concept, as discussed on pages 9 and 10, is a proportionate response directed against the urban guerrilla, the sniper, and the political assassin: threats that conventionally trained, directed, and equipped police cannot control. I. TEAM SIZE AND COMPOSITION SWAT teams must be flexible. They must be small enough to effectively infiltrate hostile areas but be large enough to defend themselves. They must be large enough to accomplish most missions and be able to combine with other teams when necessary. The departments surveyed in Chapter VI had a mean of 5.5 men per team but the mode (or most popular size) was the four—man team (page 126). A team with less than four men is ineffective; one with over five men is difficult to control. A four—man team 44 permits use of the "buddy system." It is also the proper size for transportation, intact, in the helicopter avail- able to many large departments (Figure 2). A four-man team will be the model for this study. Team position titles will be the following: Special weapons marksman, Observer, Scout, and Shotgun man. DWNH One member, preferably the observer, will be the team leader. The marksman will be armed with a high-velocity rifle with telescopic sights. Team weapons will provide balanced firepower for all ranges and situations. The marksman will provide long- and intermediate—range selective firepower. The observer will be the spotter for the marksman. He will also be the unit radioman. His weapon should be capable of considerable firepower for accurate close- and mid-range defense. The scout will be the primary point-man. He will be armed with a semi- automatic rifle of the same type and caliber as the spotter. The shotgun man will provide security and close- range defense for the team. His lZ-gauge shotgun will be capable of close-range assault or defensive firepower against a fortified position or in an alley or other close quarters (Figure 3). 45 mcficwmuu m mcflusp .mmfloumxm Hmumooflamn Hmmcmm umb Hamm mom m mcfipumon Emmy B<3m .m whamflm 46 Figure 3. Shotgun man carrying an Ithaca Model 37 D. S. "L.A.P.D. Special" modified lZ-gauge shotgun. 47 II. FUNCTION AND PURPOSE The Special Weapons and Tactics teams perform the following special missions and functions: 1. To neutralize groups or organizations directing guerrilla or terrorist operations against the established authority or populace. 2. To provide support and protection for emergency units when under attack of sniper or assault fire, or when such fire is anticipated. 3. To rescue officers or citizens captured, iso- lated, or endangered by gunfire. 4. To keep designated areas clear of snipers. 5. To provide controlled assault fire power in non-riot police situations, such as barri- caded suspects. 6. To provide anti-sniper and high ground security for dignitaries. The above missions conform closely to the purposes for which the SWAT programs were formed in the surveyed cities in Chapter VI (page 133) with the exception of the first function. The first function, neutralizing urban guerrillas (or terrorists), was only mentioned by one of the respondents. It is unknown if urban guerrillas are not considered a threat by most departments, if there has simply been no experience with them, or that they are a consideration in more cases but not mentioned for reasons known only to the respondents. To "neutralize" an urban guerrilla band is to destroy its effectiveness. The field commander provides the SWAT commander with a mission. The SWAT commander and 48 team leaders are responsible for formulating a plan and taking action to accomplish the mission. Neutralization may be the arrest of the band's leaders. It may be a raid on their headquarters or a counter-assault to repulse a guerrilla attack. It could also be a reconnaissance mission which results in conventional forces being called in to apprehend the band. Intelligence Inside intelligence is probably the answer to con- taining the urban guerrilla and other forms of organized violence. Deep political and intelligence penetration will enable the police to counter secret subversive plans, pinpoint leaders, and disrupt the hostile organization. This, of course, is not a SWAT function. The SWAT teams can be used, however, for reconnaissance patrols into hostile areas to obtain "combat intelligence." Policy Considerations The SWAT teams must function within the framework of existing laws and policies. Their "targets" must be persons who have committed specific crimes (rather than someone who is merely "the enemy" through membership in an extremist group). The apprehension of individuals for trial is always the objective. Local laws and department 49 policies remain in effect. If the suspect is a sniper about to shoot a citizen, another officer, or the appre- hending officer, his death is not only justified but a duty. If all reasonable means of apprehension fail, and a suspect will escape if not shot, other factors must be considered. The circumstances surrounding the incident and the nature of the crime for which the suspect is wanted govern the decision. If he is a murderer, an arsonist, or has seriously and feloniously assaulted others, then the officer has a duty to future, potential victims to stop the susPect by any means possible. "Borderline" circumstances must be handled by department policy and reason. Many state penal codes permit the killing of an escaping felon. Should the felony be one of the lesser of such crimes (such as burglary or kid- napping without injury) then reason dictates that the suspect's death, although legally justified, is not morally excusable. If the suspect escapes, he can be captured on another day. Functions two, three, and six (page 47) relate to counter-sniper missions. This was the most frequently mentioned purpose for forming SWAT programs (it was listed by twenty-eight of the thirty departments; see page 133). 50 The function of providing security for dignitaries was the second most popular reason for the existence of SWAT programs (mentioned by eleven departments). One department uses its teams for security pur- poses. Station and command post defense is one of the SWAT purposes recommended by the International Association 51 SWAT teams should not be used for of Chiefs of Police. such functions. These routine tasks can be performed adequately by uniformed officers. "Guard duty" defeats the purpose for which the teams were formed and the specialized training they have received. To provide support for units engaging rioters (function two) does not mean joining the action in the same capacity as other policemen. It means protecting the uniformed officer from sniper fire and high-ground as- saults. The field commander provides the SWAT mission but it should never be a task that can be effectively handled by conventional forces at his disposal. A field commander who deploys his SWAT people in a conventional manner when 51International Association of Chiefs of Police, "Appendix No. 1, Special Weapons and Tactics SWAT Team Concept," Guidelines for Civil Disorder and Mobilization Plannin , compiled by R. Dean Smith and Richard W. Kobetz (Washington, D. C.: International Association of Chiefs of Police, Research, Development, and Planning Division, September, 1968), p. 60. 51 short of manpower deprives himself (and the officers under fire) of their special capabilities. III . POLICY The question of policy (and compliance with it) is a difficult one. None of the departments responding to the questionnaire specifically referred to a SWAT policy. In several organizations there was apparent intent to avoid a written SWAT policy. The rationale behind this was to pre- vent its use, when violated, in civil litigation against the city or the department. Policy guides or places limits upon decisions or actions. Even if not written it is articulated through rules, regulations, procedures, training programs, and oral communications. The firearms-use policy of most depart— ments, as in the example of the fleeing felon, is more restrictive than the laws governing the use of deadly force in effecting an arrest. The decision as to whether or not to shoot must usually be made in an instant with no time for conscious deliberation. An error in judgment is therefore more likely under such conditions of stress than where deliberation is possible. The problem of litigation is a real one, especially where the policy is restrictive or narrowly defined. Where 52 policy is not clearly stated, however, there is often too wide a range for action. Officers must know, without speculation, just what is expected of them under basic conditions of arrest, self-defense, and other areas con- fronting them. A sound, written policy is therefore essential. It is not always possible or practical to place absolute limits on policy. Policies are guidelines and not concrete rules. This is an important consideration when dealing with infractions. Policy can be effected by training. It should be reinforced whenever possible with clear regulations. A simple but eloquent policy which states "don't shoot if in doubt" should be supported by more detailed regulations on warning shots, when to shoot, etc. It should be equally applicable in "routine" or emergency operations. Doubts of its application should be resolved through discussion in roll call and other training situations. Policy making is the responsibility of the depart- ment executive levels. A failure at the policy making level forces the development of guide lines upon the operational group that must function within them. The chief of police must insure that sound policies are formulated to govern SWAT activities. The policies 53 should be written and articulated throughout the entire department. Personnel should be certain of support for actions within such policy. IV. PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION The Program Administrator Selecting an administrator of superior competence is one of the most important considerations in establish- ing a SWAT program. Germann notes that most police organ- izations lack a systematic analytic method of discovering executive talent.52 The program administrator must be capable of dynamic, imaginative leadership. His quali- fications should be outlined by a determination of the duties and responsibilities of the job, the extent of his authority, the relationships he must maintain, and his accountability to higher authority. An incompetent official will falter in the most brilliantly conceived team blueprint. 52Albert Carl Germann, Jr., "The Executive Develop- ment of Police Administrators by Agency and College" (unpublished Master's thesis, The University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1955), p. 33. 54 Selection of Personnel Mature, experienced officers should be selected for team membership. They must be in sound physical and mental condition and have good judgment and even temperment. The team leader must have all of the basic qualifications plus those qualities of leadership, initiative, and imagination. The volunteer system of recruitment should be used in con- junction with other qualifications. The SWAT survey (page 127) indicated that most pro- grams are staffed with volunteers. The majority have no entrance requirements. Fourteen departments base their selection on marksmanship ability. Eight depend on mili— tary experience and the recommendations of superior officers. Several more consider maturity, demeanor, good judgment, hunting ability, leadership qualities, and assignment in specific areas of the department. Only one conducts testing of reactions under simulated field condi- tions. None administer personality or other examinations. All SWAT personnel should be volunteers because of the strenuous training and the unique duties. The killing of a suspect, regardless of how justified by the circum- stances, can be a much more personal and upsetting matter when accomplished by viewing the person through a tele— scopic sight. Minimum entrance requirements should consist 55 of a review of the applicant's personnel record including entrance psychological examinations. Staff recommendations should be obtained in interviews with his supervisors and commanders over the past several years. Military experi- ence should be considered. Attitude scales (such as the authoritarianism, dogmatism, and conservatism scales of Chapter IV) could be administered after standards are established. V . EQUIPMENT SWAT team deployment is usually a last resort. Conventional police methods have failed and the situation is serious. The lives of team members may depend upon their ability to move inconspicuously and be properly equipped to accomplish the mission and defend themselves. The unconventional mission of SWAT necessitates an unconventional appearance. All members of the department should therefore be familiar with the uniform and circum- stances under which it may be seen. The opposition may be similarly dressed. Target identification should be stressed, especially to the newer officers. Uniforms The uniform should be dark for night movement but not a solid black or blue. These two colors are 56 conspicuous during the day and easy to silhouette at night, especially against buildings. A green or dark gray camou- flage is ideal. A tailored light-weight, porous, one-piece jump-suit is recommended. A dark zipper, large pockets, and rubberized fabric at places requiring stretch are necessary. Tailoring keeps noise and loose ends to a minimum. The badge or embroidered insignia must be present in case of "capture" by a citizen or fellow officer. The badge, if worn, should be covered with a circle of dark cloth with an elastic sewn around the edges. This cloth can be pulled off exposing the badge. An embroidered emblem in a subdued color is preferred as the badge will snag objects and interfere with movement and equipment. A soft cap similar to the "patrol cap" should be worn. Helmets interfere with hearing and have a distinc- tive outline. Military footwear similar to the "jungle boot" is recommended. It provides ankle support and dries rapidly after being immersed in water. A fatigue uniform (Figures 1 and 3, pages 30 and 46) or informal civilian attire (Figure 2, page 45) may be preferred for certain training exercises. A conventional police uniform may be desirable from the public relations standpoint in the protection of dignitaries (Figure 4). 57 Figure 4. Member of an anti-sniper detail protecting a presidential candidate, State Capitol Building, Lansing, Michigan. 58 The SWAT team survey disclosed that most departments suit their teams in the standard police uniform (pages 137 and 138). Seven provide jump-suits. Three make use of a fatigue uniform. One department requires casual dress. Weapons All rifles should be of the same caliber. Inter- changeability of ammunition is a necessity in a firefight. Either of two weapons systems based on ammunition type are recommended. One is the 5.56 mm (.223 caliber) M16 rifle (or the Colt AR—lS, a semi-automatic rifle without the selector switch for fully automatic fire). The other is the 7.62 mm (.308 caliber) M14 rifle. The choice between the two systems depends upon the intended use, terrain, resupply, and other factors. The M16 rifle is lighter and has a lighter cartridge. Three hundred to 350 rounds, in magazines, can be carried per man. The light, high~velocity bullet tends to disinte— grate upon striking a solid object. This is an advantage in built-up areas as ricochets are reduced. The light bullet has a flat trajectory but is easily deflected by wind, twigs, etc. Its penetration power is considerably less than with the M14. The M14 rifle is heavier and shoots a larger, more stable projectile. Greater accuracy over longer distances 59 .csw mcflsomfinsm Ammm.v .¢ mmflumm .cma Howe: “:50 xv m aufl3 mama“ Assume Hove: coumcHEmm «Ammm. ms. commsoce .m.: m .ccm “amuumn confluma =.cnmuonm moflaom= Hmnflamo mmo name .Ass emv socflum\a H .Nuaom Hmumomm “ubmflm oflmoommamu own waoz coumcflfimm “cumuonm mcflpmoaousm mmsmmlma Ha "Augmflu on sumac .Aecmumov Hz .om. mouom. Hmnflamov OHMHH oaumfiouSmIHEmm manmm uaou "AQOBV .Emmu Edam one an pmwnnmo mcommms mo ucmEuHOmm¢ .m musmfim smHMHm omoD 60 with less interference from the wind is possible. It is capable of penetrating walls and ceilings--an advantage in combating barricaded suspects but a disadvantage in in- habited built-up areas. It is a harder rifle to acquire as efforts to convert it to solely semi-automatic fire have been unsucceszul. Many sporting rifles accept the bullet which is the standard NATO cartridge. A high-quality telescopic sight of the variable- power type is needed for at least one rifle on the team. One writer recommends scopes with post and crosshair reticules be mounted on all shoulder weapons, including shotguns.53 This suggestion has merit as the telesc0pic. sight does not improve the ability of the marksman. It enables him to see the target better while putting the target and the sight into focus at the same time. It also improves vision in poor light. Fifteen of the departments surveyed use rifles shooting the .30-06 cartridge. This is an excellent, plentiful cartridge similar in ballistic characteristics to the 7.62 mm round. The disadvantage is that the only rapid-fire military rifle capable of handling the cartridge 53Rex Applegate, "Guns and the Law--Police Counter- Sniper Team," Guns, XV (January, 1969), 71. 61 is the .30 caliber M1 (Garand). This weapon is clip-fed and limited to eight rounds. Seven departments use the .30 caliber Ml carbine. This is a popular semi-automatic weaponbut fires an under- powered cartridge for SWAT use. Six have automatic rifles. Five departments use submachine guns (and one somehow ac— quired a machine-pistol). Fully automatic weapons are not recommended (although some police writers desire them)54 because they rapidly expend ammunition and defeat the pur- pose of selective firepower in most cases. A military rifle with a selector switch is a good compromise. The demoralizing sound of such a weapon and its effectiveness in a close-quarter firefight would still be available if needed. The sc0ped rifle should either be owned or retained by the marksman. Frequent practice (including hunting) with city-purchased ammunition should be encouraged. Cross-training of all members with all weapons is neces- sary. All must be capable of qualifying with high scores as the mission or their lives may depend upon any member being able to continue despite casualties in the unit. 54Henry A. Fitzgibbon, "Police Procedures Against the Sniper Menace," The Law Enforcement Executive, II (November, 1967), 4, 5. 62 The shotgun should be the riot-type and be equipped with rifle sights and have a parkerized finish (as in Figure 3, page 46). The shotguns should have slings. The shotgun man should attach a minimum of four fabric magazine pouches to his webbed belt. Each pouch will hold one box of twenty-five,lZ-gauge,"double-aught" buck,shotgun shells. A minimum of one sidearm should be carried by all members. (The decision to carry a second sidearm is justi- fied only by the need for a readily available source of ammunition in a situation where reloading might cause a fatal delay--an unlikely but possible situation.) Discretion should be used by SWAT personnel in the handling and display of weapons around civilian and other police personnel. Careless handling of weapons should be cause for strict disciplinary action. The SWAT program will have a difficult uphill battle for acceptance, particularly during periods of inactivity. Portions of the public and elements within the department will seize upon every opportunity to discredit the program. As in the example of the Opposition based on racial grounds (page 148) the reasons for objections are not always apparent. It may be speculated that the secrecy associ— ated with some programs fosters a belief by some minori— ties that the teams were formed to attack them rather than 63 a specific crime or civil disturbance problem. There are also peOple in the community who believe the answer to the riot and crime problem is to disarm the police: Another kind of equipment would be possible. It would depend less on arms and more on moral power and better training. . . . The police could be trained in non- violence, and relieved of guns in connection with riot control. So far, guns have only started or escalated violence-~they have not suppressed it.55 Strong leadership is needed to insure the proper care and display of weapons and other SWAT equipment. Other Equipment High-quality binoculars of at least twenty power should be carried by the observer. All members should have miniature radio equipment (with ear plug receivers) where possible. Flashlights, a thirty-six and one-half meter nylon climbing rOpe, "pocket-size" tear gas and smoke grenades, a pry bar, and other equipment may be carried. .Each man should also have two snap—links, a small first aid kit, and a pocket or belt knife. Many departments issue protective gear. This should be kept available for such assignments as barricaded suspects. It is not generally appropriate for missions requiring 55Hallock Hoffman, "Policing the Police," reprinted from The Center Ma azine, I (Santa Barbara, California: May, I968), 5. (Mimeographed.) 64 heavy physical exertion. The group commander may authorize additional weapons and equipment as needed. VI . TRAINING Differences in conditions and departments make it impractical to establish a model training program that would be representative. A general approach to training will therefore be considered. General The SWAT survey in Chapter V indicated that train- ing is often neglected. Only two departments reported conducting actual field training exercises with the mili- tary. The mean period of training per year on each depart- ment (Table X, page 143) was forty-two hours. Six departments provide less than ten hours of training annually. One department has none. Only four agencies offer over 100 hours of training yearly. This says nothing of the quality of the instruction but it is clear that more time must be devoted to the training effort. A training program is established and implemented to modify the behavior of the subject. Learning is determined, in part, by the trainee's motivation and conditions under which he practices. The hazardous nature 65 of some of the SWAT training makes several basic obser- vations necessary: 1. If a trainee becomes tired, his performance will deteriorate. 2. If the skill no longer serves as a means to a goal, he will cease to perform in a skillful manner. 3. If he becomes bored he will perform in a perfunctory manner. The training director should take note of the ages and physical condition of personnel. Complete physical examinations should be given all members. An electro- cardiograph examination should be included. Table VI, page 125, indicates the mean age of team members is thirty years. One group has a mean age of thirty-seven years. The range is not available. The training should take into consideration not only differences in age but differences in age and motor abilities. These differences will effect the long-range training goal. Small differences in learn— ing rate between officers will become large as practice progresses. The Classroom Classroom training will serve to give officers a basic understanding of guerrilla warfare, sniper tech- niques, types of patrols, small unit tactics, and other subjects. A serious deficiency in the surveyed training 66 programs was the lack of small unit tactics--one of the most essential subjects in a SWAT training program. The department can be canvassed for qualified speakers in various areas. VVeterans' organizations are a source of potential instructors or guest speakers. One department was able to find two veterans with urban guer- rilla and demolitions training in foreign armies who passed on valuable techniques and information. Local active and reserve armed forces groups are probably the single best source of speakers and instructors. Care must be taken to select the subject area and speakers for maximum value in the time available. Field and classroom activities must be coordinated for the maximum benefit. Basic and Advanced SWAT Training Schools of at least one full week's duration should be established. Field Traininngxercises Field training possibilities are limited only by the imagination of the program director. Two departments have established close liaison with several active military units. The SWAT teams attend classes and participate in regular field exercises with the military. The military, in turn, sends men to the police department's training exercises to learn of tech- niques for urban operations. The military conducts various 67 schools on marksmanship, sniper training, patrol tech- niques, building clearance, and other areas which have been opened to SWAT personnel. They also have range, classroom, and other facilities not available to most police departments. Army Special Forces and Marine Reconnaissance reserve units are stationed in many large cities. These units are skilled in mountain and jungle techniques and are good sources of training in rappelling, patrol tech— niques, night movement, etc. Policemen in the department may even be members of these units. VII . TACTICS Small unit tactics can be found in many military publications including the field manuals and other sources listed in the bibliography. Methods for the suppression of snipers or guerrilla units require modification before they are appropriate for use by law enforcement. The military solution has frequently been developed in areas with antagonistic foreign populations. Action taken involves national authority which is sometimes far removed from local opinion and political considerations. The military method also pre-supposes available armament and logistical support beyond the capabilities of local authorities. 68 Figure 6. SWAT team members rappelling from a 35- foot training tower. 69 A lengthy discussion of tactics is beyond the scope of this paper. A tactical situation will be discussed, however, to stimulate thinking in adapting tactics appro- priate to SWAT needs. Sniper Control Sniping must be distinguished from heavy, continuous rifle fire from one area where a number of individuals are involved. This is a fire fight and should call for the deployment of back-up military units. Large scale combat in cities is a military function calling for the employ- ment of standard military weapons. In an organized, pre-planned conflict, sniper fire will probably be combined with arson and explosives to divide and disorganize police and fire fighting forces. Snipers will be used to prevent police counter-action and movement, and possibly to ambush reinforcements. A Tactical Situation A sniper, to minimize the possibility of detection, fires from a building at the second of two cars, each containing a SWAT team. The first vehicle must be notified immediately by radio, horn, or other prearranged signal. An attempt should be made to visually detect the sniper's location 70 while rapidly moving the vehicle to cover. The officers should not remain with the car long as it is not bullet- proof. If caught in the open, the cars should be stopped, side-by-side, leaving enough space between them to open the inside doors. The formation is not adequate to stop most rifle fire but will provide some protection to enable the teams to leave the vehicles. In a professional am- bush, the immediate stopping of the vehicle and the piling out of the officers to seek the nearest cover will have been anticipated. The nearest cover, if a gutter, may be booby trapped with an explosive such as detonating cord. More likely, another sniper, possibly with a shotgun, will be positioned to cover the spot. In any case, cover must be sought or a decision rapidly made to attempt to overrun the ambush position. Circumstances will dictate the action. No ambush exists. Assistance is requested to iso- late and contain the sniper. The containment and neutral- ization phases begin. Illumination of the building is desirable. Lights should not be shot out unless absolutely necessary. Fir— ing to extinguish lights may create confusion or unneces- sary tension among nearby officers who do not know the 71 source of the shooting. Ricochets or misses may cause casualties. The officer-in-charge uses a public address system to advise the people inside the building in the following manner: 1. The officer identifies himself and the reason for his presence. 2. He orders that all inside lights in the build- ing be turned on and the windows closed. 3. Instructions are given to the peOple inside to evacuate the building from a specific exit. Clear instructions must be given the people as to what to do when they emerge. 4. All occupants are searched and identified. They are questioned as to the identity and location of the sniper and the floor plan of the building. 5. The occupants are kept under control and are not immediately released. One of them may be the sniper. The SWAT teams are divided into a search and a cover team. Newly arriving officers should be redeployed or used to isolate the area. This keeps innocent people out and the sniper in. The officer-in-charge, usually the cover team leader, positions himself where he can best control his unit. A11 officers in the cover team around the building should be notified when the search team is about to enter. This prevents a policeman on the street from firing on an armed man inside the building who turns out to be part of the search team instead of the sniper. 72 Entry is made and the search team heads for the top of the building to begin the search. Starting at the bottom may work the sniper to the top of the building where, trapped, he may be forced to stand and fight. Starting from the top may flush the sniper out of the building into the covering team. The search team should have a predesignated system to conduct a methodical search.\ Voice contact should be kept to a minimum but not eliminated so as to assist the team leader in controlling the search. If the lights were not switched on previously, they should be turned on as the search progresses. one member of the search team kicks the door open, pauses an instant, and quickly enters and takes a posi- tion from which he can see or cover the entire room. The second man enters after a slight pause (to prevent catch- ing the shot fired at the first man) and goes to the opposite side of the door. A locked door is a danger signal. The room should be gassed, and entered only as a last resort. The door should be kicked and, after a moment's pause (in case the sniper fires at the opening door), the first man enters. He should be alert to the placement of furniture so as to channel movement. Booby traps are a possibility. 73 A wire running to the trigger of a shotgun or a loose fitting grenade pin is easily set up. While the search team is searching, the team leader covers the hallway and keeps the officer-in-charge informed of progress via radio. When the room is searched, the searcher should sound off "clear!" When entering or leaving a room which has been searched, "coming in" or "coming out" should be sounded. When using stairs leading to areas which have been cleared, "coming up" or "coming down" should be shouted. Critique. The procedure outlined is a tactic which includes the three basic steps of sniper control: (1) isolation, (2) containment, and (3) neutralization. It is just one of several approaches that could have been used. If the building is a large apartment house or hotel, the procedure may prove impractical. The SWAT peOple could then be stationed around the building in observation posts. If the sniper was spotted he could be eliminated. A search might be conducted with the occupants under orders to re- main inside their apartments. The search party should then be large enough to control the occupants as well as to search. If a weapon is found, fingerprints and the rules of evidence should not be overlooked. 74 The common ingredient in all small unit tactics is strong command leadership. Confusion must be kept to a minimum and performance to a maximum. Lack of strong leadership and control will cause policemen to revert to individual action--the status for which they were trained and the way they function under normal assignments. The "5f Unit Conspiracy One large department received reliable intelligence that a black militant organization was planning to assassi- nate an unknown policeman on a routine call at an unknown time. The threat was serious as this same group had re- cently attempted to dynamite a local bank. The explosion was prevented only through an intelligence source who revealed where the dynamite was hidden. An inert substance was substituted for the real dynamite and permitted to be planted in the bank. The militant group was apparently convinced the explosive was defective. A unique counterinsurgency device was (unofficially) devised to counter the plan to kill the policeman. One of the militants was arrested for a minor traffic offense. He was booked in one of the outlying precincts and left alone for several minutes in an office with papers scattered on a desk. One of these sheets had the words "CONFIDENTIAL" typed at the top and bottom. It was 75 numbered "page 3" (as though it had been separated from the original report). The paper is reproduced in its entirety as follows: CONFIDENTIAL "K" Unit Operations" Page 3 actions will utilize the "quick kill" concept. d. "K" Units will cover all patrol unit calls, regardless of how minor they may seem. e. "K" Unit coverage of the patrol unit on a call will follow the tactical plan in paragraph 2, above. It is essential that the presence of "K" Units not be notiEed in the neighborhood, and'that the operation of the patrol unit or units seem normal. f. Officers will not refer to "K" Units in reports or in radio transmissions. All personnel are expected to deny that such units exist if questioned by an outside person. g. "K" cars may contain one or more men, however, one man cars will always be equipped as provided in Annex 1, paragraph 2a, and will always have at least one "K" team within two blocks when covering patrol units. 4. Equipment a. Vehicles. "K" Unit personnel are encouraged to use their own cars to avoid being identified by the appearance of official cars. Gas and oil will be provided. (1) In exceptional cases, the use of rental cars is authorized. The "K" Unit Commander will determine the need for such equipment and is authorized to obtain it without further approval. b. Radios. (1) Car to car transmissions between "K" Units will be on the specially provided radios only. Equipment 76 to monitor this frequency is not readily available in the local area. (2) "K" Units will monitor the regular opera- tional frequency, and may receive routine messages from the dispatcher in this manner. - (3) See Annex 3 for radio call numbers and codes for "K" Units. (4) Patrol units will not communicate directly with "K" Units, but may transmit "Information for cars in the area," or "Information for car __," c. Ammunition. (1) Ammunition for weekly markmanship practice CONFIDENTIAL The document seems somewhat preposterous in retro- spect but the intelligence source later reported the plan to assassinate the policeman was temporarily dropped for unknown reasons. The officer who devised the ploy is con- vinced it was the result of a fear of ubiquitous "killer" cars who watch out for such things. Such imaginative thinking cannot always be condoned (or even admitted). But neither could every policeman be guarded twenty—four hours a day. CHAPTER IV AN ANALYSIS OF AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT'S SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS TEAM PROGRAM An investigation of attitudes held by individuals on SWAT teams has never been attempted. Accusations of "trained killers" and "hired assassins" have resulted in most departments attempting to keep the existence of their programs a secret. The police themselves are not sure of the validity of the charges. Are these the "violent men" 56 Are SWAT team members frustrated fascists of Hans Toch? who are out to assert their authority, or worse?: . . . There are those who volunteer for elite killer units that operate behind enemy lines and engage in assassinations or sabotage; there are others who prize assignments as snipers or scouts. . . .57 SWAT people are, after all, volunteers. Maybe some danger— ous personalities slip through the department's psycho- logical screening process. 56Hans Toch, Violent Men (Chicago: Aldine Publish- ing Company, 1969), pp. 135-36. 57J. Hersey, The War Lover (New York: Bantam Books, 1960), cited by Hans Toch, ibid., p. 213. 78 I. THE PROBLEM This study is an attempt to answer the following questions: 1. Are SWAT team members more authoritarian than their police peer group? 2. If the SWAT team personality is more authori- tarian, dogmatic, and conservative, what is the reason for this? 3. Are there parallels or statistically significant relationships between SWAT team membership and other aspects of member's lives such as mili- tary experience and education? II. INSTRUMENTS This chapter, based on a longitudinal research design, is a comparative study of two police groups. The subjects are fifty members of an operational SWAT program in the Los Angeles Police Department. A comparison group of fifty non-SWAT police officers from the same department was administered identical scales. A four-measure instru- ment (Appendix A, page 180) was used. Three of the mea- sures are validated attitude scales. The third, an "infor- mation sheet," was designed especially for this study. Authoritarianism The "F" or "predisposition to facism" scale was taken from a personality-attitude schedule published by 79 Shure and Meeker.58 It comprises the first twenty—one items on the examination. The F Scale, originally developed by Adorno, gt ai.,59 has been the subject of criticism. Shils demonstrated that it identifies "right— ist“ but not "leftist" authoritarians.6O Adorno, con- cerned about anti-Semitism, assumed it was better to be a liberal-leftist than a conservative-rightist. This reason- ing led to the inclusion of the Dogmatism Scale in this study. Dogmatism The second scale is a short form of Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale as developed and validated by Troldahl and 61 Powell. The dichotomy of "left" and "right" 58Gerald H. Shure and Robert J. Meeker, "A Person— ality/Attitude Schedule for Use in Experimental Bargaining Studies," The Journal gf Psychology, LXV (March, 1967), 233-52. 59T. W. Adorno, gt ai., The Authoritarian Person- ality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950). 60Edward A. Shils, "Authoritarianism: 'Right' and 'Left,'" Studies in the Sco e and Method of The Authori- tarian PersonaIit-T'EET Ric ard Christie 35d Marie Jahbda (Glencoe, IIIinois: Free Press, 1954), pp. 24—49. 61Verling C. Troldahl and Frederic A. Powell, "A Short-Form Dogmatism Scale for Use in Field Studies," Social Forces, XLIV (December, 1965), 211-14. 80 authoritarianism is undesirable because it closes the door in advance to the general properties held in common by all authoritarians, whether they be political, religious, academic, or whatever. The concern of dogmatism, an in- tolerance toward those with opposing beliefs, should be with the structure rather than the content of beliefs. "It is not so much what you believe that counts, but hgw_ you believe."62 The Dogmatism Scale, items twenty-two through forty- one, contains a varied collection of items that examine many different beliefs, which, on the surface, appear to be unrelated. The fact that subjects agree or disagree with these statements in a consistent manner is borne out by item analysis.63 Kerlinger and Rokeach questioned the discrimination of both the F and D Scales and found them to be "factorially discriminable, even though both are . . . 4 measures of authoritarianism."6 62Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960), p. 6. 63Ibid., p. 90. 64Fred Kerlinger and Milton Rokeach, "The Factorial Nature of the F and D Scales," Journal g£_Personality and Psychology, IV (1966), 398. 81 The purpose of the scale is to measure individual differences in openness or closedness of belief systems. This involves the extent to which a person can receive, evaluate, and act on relevant information on its own intrinsic merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors arising from within the person or from the outside. These are important considerations as determinants of the way information will be evaluated and acted upon by the indi- vidual. Conservatism The Conservatism Test, the fifty items on the fourth page of the survey, was developed by Wilson and Patterson and validated in Great Gritain.65 It is a measure of an individual's need to maintain traditionally constituted organizations and views. The Conservatism Test was administered because of the probable central processes that occur when persons respond to traditional statement—form items: 1. An immediate, emotional response to the central, controversial issue involved in the state— ment, and, 65Glen D. Wilson and John R. Patterson, "A New Measure of Conservatism," British Journal gf Social Clinical Psychology, (December, I968), 264-69. 82 2. Suspension of judgment while qualificatory and justificatory details of the statement are examined.66 During the second stage, the respondent begins to develop a sense of responsibility and commitment-~the feel- ing that a considered, rational, judgment is expected since the question is so 'carefully' worded. The motives of the tester in asking the question also become of concern. His initial reaction is adjusted in the direction of socially desirable responses. The possible solution is to abandon the proposi- tional form of item (as in the previous forty-one ques- tions) and list brief labels or catch-phrases representing various familiar and controversial issues. The scale, as developed by Wilson and Patterson, allows the respondent to indicate his 'position' immediately and reduces the in- fluence of grammatical confusion, social desirability, and cognitive processes. Four items were changed on the Conservatism Test to fit American terminology: Number twenty-nine was changed from "Royalty" to "states rights"; thirty—three was changed from "apartheid" to "strict segregation"; thirty- nine was changed from "birching" to "spanking"; and 661bid., p. 265. 83 forty-eight was changed from "coloured immigration" to "Open housing." Information Sheet The information sheet (Appendix A, page 180) con- tains data (police department assignments, military experience, home state, and education) that may help to explain differences, if observed, between the SWAT and comparison groups. "Home state" was included because of accusations that team members are predominantly recruited from the southern states. III. HYPOTHESES This study is geared toward determining whether a difference in authoritarianism can be observed between SWAT team members and the police group of which they are a part. Hypothesis One No statistically significant differences in authori- tarianism will be discovered between the SWAT team members and the officers in the Police Comparison group. SWAT team members will not have attitude and personality differences that set them apart from their peers. 84 Hypothesis Two Authoritarianism is correlated with education, age, and police experience. The group with less edu- cation, a higher mean age, and more police experi— ence will have higher authoritarianism scores. The above hypotheses are partially supported by other studies. Stewart and Hoult found those who are most authoritarian tend to be those who have less education.67 Older people also tend to be more authoritarian.68 Vacchiano found that "attitude shifts as a function of training were significantly related to authoritarianism but not to dogmatism."69 This could lend support to the theory that police training, coupled with police experi- ence, could lead to a shift toward increased authori- tarianism. McNamara found that the authoritarian scores 67Don Stewart and Thomas Hoult, "A Social Psycho- logical Theory of the Authoritarian Personality," American Journal 9; Sociology, LXV (November, 1959), 276. 68Morris Janowir and Dwaine Marvick, "Authori— tarianism and Political Behavior," Public Opinion Quarter- iy, XVII (Summer, 1953), 191. 69Ralph B. Vacchiano, David C. Schiffman, and Areta V. Crowell, "Attitude Change as a Function of Inten- sive Training, Dogmatism and Authoritarianism," Psycho- logical Reports, XIX (1966), 361. 85 of pre-tested New York police recruits rose significantly after two years of police work.70 Roe suggests there is a correlation between per— sonality and the choice of work. She states, Although the evidence is not extensive, there never- theless seems to be no doubt that some specialized occupations, at least, do attract persons who resemble each other in some personality characteristics.71 Stewart and Hoult indicate the possible existence of occupational authoritarians (physicians, policemen, army personnel, priests, and the like) who may exhibit authoritarian traits as an occupational necessity and who therefore may have high F scores even though they happen to be products of, say, a loving and democratic family, which, according to psychoanalytic theory, produces non-authoritarians. 2 IV. METHODOLOGY Subject Selection A metropolitan police department with a large SWAT team program was needed to obtain a sample that would be 70John A. McNamara, "Uncertainties in Police Work: The Relevance of Police Recruits' Backgrounds and Train- ing," The Police: Six Sociological Essays, ed. David J. Bordua_TNew York: JOhn Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 212. 71Anne Roe, Psychology of Occupations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1956Y, p. 80. 72Stewart and Hoult, gp. cit., p. 278. 86 statistically meaningful. A sample of fifty subjects was considered the acceptable minimum. A check of responding departments having SWAT team programs (pages 124, 126, and Table VI, page 125) revealed a mean of 19.3 members per department. Only four departments had SWAT teams of fifty members or more. The largest of these, which reported two-man teams totaling 754 members, was excluded because it was a marksmanship program which did not fit the SWAT team concept. Chief of Police Thomas Reddin of the Los Angeles Police Department agreed to the study. The Los Angeles Police Department SWAT program was formed in the Patrol Bureau in 1966. All members are volunteers. The SWAT team selection process includes per- sonnel interviews, a review of personnel files (including entrance psychiatric examinations), and staff and SWAT program recommendations. The unit attends a Basic and Advanced SWAT Training School and participates in monthly training exercises. All SWAT members not absent for some reason (vacation, sick leave, etc.) were tested at one of two sessions in the Parker Center Auditorium in downtown Los Angeles. The two sessions (one at 0930 hours and the other at 2130 hours on 21 March 1969) were necessary 87 because the subjects were assigned to various eight-hour watches. A total of fifty-three SWAT members were avail- able. Two of the finished examinations had to be dis- carded because of omissions. One subject devised his own coding system (the use of zeros on the "opinion survey" and comments instead of marks on the Conservatism Scale). This left an appropriate remainder of fifty completed questionnaires. A comparison group of fifty-four subjects was chosen for examination on the same day. These were all of the available police officers on three watches in Central and Hollywood Divisions in the same period during which the SWAT teams were tested. No attempt was made to match the groups by rank, assignment, or age. Three papers had to be discarded for incompleteness. One was randomly dis- carded to reduce the Police Comparison Group to fifty subjects. Administering and Scoring the Attitude ScaIes Instructions. The SWAT and Police Comparison Group subjects were told they were assembled to complete an "opinion survey" (the title of the questionnaire). This was an attitude scale which would be of possible value in the recruitment of future team members. It would not 88 affect current team structure or members. The "information sheet" attached to the questionnaire was also an important part of the survey. Accurate completion of the sheet was necessary to set up statistical relationships between the scales and military, police, and educational experience. Anonymity of the survey was stressed as well as the need for honest responses. The survey was passed out and the instructions read out loud. The subjects were then told, "It is important that you do not skip any questions. Decide quickly how you feel and put down your first impressions. There are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers. Work fast and be honest in your responses." Instructions were not altered or elabor- ated. If asked for advice, the tester emphasized an appropriate section of the instructions or offered a non- committal answer. Subjects were not permitted to consult with others. The questionnaire was completed by most in twenty minutes and by all in twenty-eight minutes. Scoring. The Authoritarianism and Dogmatism Scales comprised the first forty-one questions. The subjects indicated agreement or disagreement with each item on a scale ranging from minus three to plus three according to the following six-point scale: 89 Agreement +3 Strong Support +2 Moderate Support +1 Slight Support Disagreement -l Slight Opposition -2 Moderate Opposition -3 Strong Opposition The zero point was excluded to force responses to one side or the other. The authoritarianism score is the algebraic sum of the scores obtained on items one through twenty-one; the dogmatism score is the sum of items twenty-two through forty-one. The Conservatism Scale was graded with the aid of a "punch-card." Each odd-numbered 'yes' and each even- numbered 'no' was scored as "two." The question marks were scored as "one." The possible range of scores was, there- fore, zero to 100. V. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY The sample may or may not differ from other police groups in terms of education, maturity, experience, and other factors. All of the available SWAT population was tested. The randomness of the Police Comparison Group in relation to the remainder of the Department's 6,129 sworn personnel is unknown. The sample is not claimed to be more 90 than a comparison group. Any interpretations arising from this study must therefore be tempered with an awareness of its limitations. Variations In Measurement Attempts were made to keep potential sources of error to a minimum. The attitude scales were validated in other studies as previously mentioned. The examinations were administered as close together as possible to minimize the effects of history and maturation. A training exer- cise, riot, or other incident occurring close to the time of testing, for example, might have had a considerable effect on attitudes. Attempts were made to control or keep constant the variables or conditions between the groups. Situational factors. Anonymity was provided the subjects to encourage candid responses. Scores would otherwise be influenced not only by individuals' attitudes but by their willingness or unwillingness to admit holding opinions they know to be unpopular. Webb, however, notes that even the device of anonymity itself may lead to problems of validity.73 73Eugene J. Webb, 33 ai., Unobtrusive Measures (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), p. 15. 91 The same setting could not be provided all subjects taking the examinations because the policemen work differ— ent watches. The Comparison Group policemen were also selected from all watches over a twenty-four hour period. This was considered necessary because watch assignments, except for probationary policemen, are a matter of prefer- ence and seniority. Differences in age and (possibly) attitudes can be found on the day and night watches. The Comparison Group subjects were tested in the Parker Center "roll call" rooms and in the Hollywood Division roll call room and detective offices. The distractions and settings were therefore different for each group. Mechanical factors and variations in administration. Differences due to mechanical factors were kept to a mini- mum by checking individual questionnaires for poor print- ing and duplicate pages, providing extra pencils, etc. Uniform instructions and explanations were given both groups. Analysis factors. Questionnaires were scored twice (by different people) to ensure accuracy. Statistical computations not processed by computer were double checked with a calculator. 92 Other factors. The reliance on data supplied by the police to evaluate police attitudes or behavior is a common objection. This is a weak criticism that could be applied to any group. Adequate sample size and comparisons with similar groups help offset or identify such problems should they exist. Sincerity of the investigator is of primary importance. The groups tested were small enough to control with little interaction between subjects. Rapport was easily established as the investigator is a fellow police officer and SWAT team leader. VI. RESULTS Analysis The raw scores and data were programmed and pro- cessed through computers at Michigan State University. Raw scores, means, standard deviations, correlation matrices, and other data can be found in Appendices B, C, and D. Pearson product-moment correlations of the atti- tude scales to the information variables are in Tables II and III, pages 95 and 96. Table I lists a comparison of mean scores, standard deviations, and differences between uncorrelated means. A comparison of raw score means. A comparison of means and standard deviations between groups is illustrated 93 in Table I. A t test was used to determine the signifi- cance of the differences between the uncorrelated means. TABLE I A COMPARISON OF MEAN SCORES, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNCORRELATED MEANS Standard Mean Deviation E Authoritarianism SWAT 22.94 16.65 .204 Comparison 23.62 16.62 Dggmatism SWAT -l3.80 14.30 1.710 Comparison - 8.76 15.16 Conservatism SWAT 56.10 8.11 .440 Comparison 56.88 9.57 The authoritarianism mean scores for the SWAT and Comparison groups (22.94 and 23.62) and standard deviations (16.65 and 16.62) are quite similar. The .204 E test re— sult indicates there is no significant difference between means at the .05 level of probability. Dogmatism mean scores are not as close (-l3.80 and -8.76) but the standard deviations are similar (14.30 and 15.16). The E test result of 1.710 indicates there is 94 still no statistically significant difference between the scores of the SWAT and the Comparison Group. With an N of 100, a E value of 1.990 or better is needed for signifi- cance at the .05 level. The null hypothesis was therefore not rejected. The conservatism results are also similar (means of 56.10 and 56.88 and standard deviations of 8.11 and 9.57). The 3 test result of .440 again indicates there is no significant difference between group means at the .05 level. Correlations between attitude scales and information variables. Pearson product-moment correlations between the police department, military, and education variables and authoritarianism, dogmatism, and conservatism scores can be found in Tables II and III. A negative correlation merely indicates that the two variables are inversely re- lated. An inspection of both tables reveals that none of the scores approach a positive or negative value of one. The scores are scattered; practically no correlation is present. Correlations among attitude scales. The corre- lations (5) among the attitude scales are listed for both TABLE II SWAT GROUP CORRELATIONS--ATTITUDE SCALES TO INFORMATION VARIABLES Variables Auth Dog Cons Age -.299 -.267 -.O74 Rank, Police Dept. -.366 -.232 -.225 Months on Police Dept. -.259 -.204 -.012 Months in Patrol -.211 -.170 -.055 Branch of Military .042 .150 -.049 Months Active Duty .068 -.025 .065 Months Reserve —.l44 .011 .002 Rank, Military -.216 .054 -.332 Infantry Experience -.094 .035 -.112 Sniper Experience -.081 .147 .196 Guerrilla Warfare -.151 .081 .049 Airborne, Ranger, or Special Forces .061 .161 .321 Years of Education -.323 -.056 -.320 TABLE III POLICE COMPARISON GROUP CORRELATIONS--ATTITUDE SCALES TO INFORMATION VARIABLES 96 Variables Auth Dog Cons Age -.035 -.l45 .106 Rank, Police Dept. -.134 -.258 .142 Months on Police Dept. -.005 -.l47 .158 Months in Patrol -.058 -.082 .066 Branch of Military .056 -.112 .078 Months Active Duty -.208 -.120 -.l43 Months Reserve .046 -.041 -.021 Rank, Military -.091 .004 .054 Infantry Experience -.092 —.097 .053 Sniper Experience —.044 —.118 -.051 Guerrilla Warfare .061 -.087 .170 Airborne, Ranger, or Special Forces .200 .042 .188 Years of Education -.100 .047 .038 97 the SWAT and Comparison Groups in Table IV, page 98. In the SWAT group, the correlation of authoritarianism with dogmatism is .682. This interaction is statistically significant at the P < .01 level. The same correlation in the Comparison Group is .560, also a significant re- lationship. The SWAT correlation of dogmatism with conservatism is .396. The same correlation in the Comparison Group is .478. Both of these relationships are also significant at the P < .01 level. Conservatism correlated with authoritarianism in the SWAT group is .635. The Comparison Group correlation for these variables is .521. Both of these relationships are significant at the P < .01 level. Relationships between attitude scale coefficients in the SWAT and Police Comparison groups. Differences in correlation coefficients of the attitude score relation- ships between the SWAT and Comparison groups were tested by computing their E_distributions (Table IV). As a E level of 2.680 or better must be observed before the null hypothesis can be rejected, all of the intercorrelations in Table IV are statistically significant beyond the .01 level of probability. 98 TABLE IV THE E DISTRIBUTION OF ATTITUDE SCALE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (E) E E SWAT Group Authoritarianism/Dogmatism .682 6.461 Dogmatism/Conservatism .396 2.988 Conservatism/Authoritarianism .635 5.695 Comparison Group Authoritarianism/Dogmatism .560 4.683 Dogmatism/Conservatism .478 3.770 Conservatism/Authoritarianism .521 4.229 Differences between correlations. To determine the significance of the difference between the correlations in the SWAT and Comparison groups, the obtained correlations between groups must be transformed into 3 scores. The standard error of the difference between the z scores can be calculated and the significance of the ratio of the difference determined. These differences are as follows: Authoritarianism/Dogmatism .971 Dogmatism/Conservatism .398 Conservatism/Authoritarianism .553 The differences between the above correlations are not significant. No differences, however, were expected. 99 Score levels may differ between pOpulations but the relationships between scales in a given group remain fairly constant. Information Sheet Results A comparison of the data on police and military experience and educational differences between the SWAT and Comparison groups is presented in Table V. VII . DISCUSSION This study was based on hypotheses tied together by two propositions: (1) no statistically significant differ- ences in authoritarianism will be observed between the SWAT and Comparison groups, and (2) should either group have less education than the other, more police experience, or a higher mean age, that group will have higher authori— tarianism scores. Hypothesis one, that no statistically significant difference in authoritarianism would be observed between the SWAT team members and their police peers proved to be valid for this study. The Los Angeles Police Department Special Weapons and Tactics team members are no more authoritarian or conservative in their attitudes than are the sample of fellow police officers from the same TABLE V SWAT AND POLICE COMPARISON GROUP DATA AS RECORDED ON THE "INFORMATION SHEET" 100 Comparison SWAT Group 1. Age (mean years) 33.3 30.6 2. Rank (numbers) a. Policemen 25 43 b. Sergeants 24 5 c. Lieutenants 1 2 3. Police Department Experience a. Mean Months 119.4 82.8 b. Mean Years 10.0 6.9 4. Patrol Experience a. Mean Months 63.8 58.1 b. Mean Years 5.3 4.8 5. Home State (by region) a. Southwest 24 (48%) 24 (48%) b. Middlewest 11 (22%) 14 (28%) c. Northeast 7 (14%) 4 ( 8%) d. South* 5 (10%) 7 (14%) e. Northwest 3 ( 6%) l ( 2%) 6. Military Branch a. Army 17 16 b. Marine Corps 12 10 c. Navy 9 12 d. Air Force 6 5 e. Other 2 0 f. Unknown 4 7 7. Military Duty Assignments a. Infantry 14 8 b. Other Line (Armor, Art) 5 13 c. Military Police 10 1 d. Clerical 2 4 e. Other 15 12 f. Unknown 0 5 8. Active Duty a. Mean Months 35.8 32.6 b. Mean Years 3.0 2.7 9. Reserve Duty a. Mean Months 28.8 22.7 b. Mean Years 2.4 1.9 101 TABLE V (continued) Comparison SWAT Group 10. Military Rank a. Officer (numbers) 3 0 b. Officer (mean rank) CPT 0 c. Enlisted (numbers) 42 42 d. Enlisted (approx. mean rank) E4.5 (CPL) E4.2 (CPL) e. Unknown 1 l 11. Infantry Training or Experience (numbers) 27 17 12. Sniper Training or Experience (numbers) 11 6 13. Guerrilla Warfare Training or Experience (numbers) 19 11 14. Airborne, Ranger, or Special Forces Training (numbers) 11 3 15. Other a. SWAT (1) Jungle Warfare Training (2) (2) Weapons and Marksmanship (3) (3) Underwater Demolitions (1) (4) Hunter (1) b. Comparison Group (1) Air Evacuation (1) (2) Rifle or Pistol Team (2) 16. Mean Years of Education Completed 13.8 12.9 17. Degrees (number) a. Associate in Arts b. Bachelors c. Masters HON-b OOU1 *"South" includes those states categorized as "Deep South" as well as border states with a historical identification with Southern institutions —-Kentucky, Tennessee, Maryland, etc. NOTE: This table compiled from data in Appendices B and C, pages 186 and 189. 102 department. The SWAT members are slightly less dogmatic but the difference is not statistically significant. A partial explanation for this is suggested by the "infor— mation sheet" results, Table V, pages 100 and 101, and Appendices B and C. A dogmatic personality would have, by definition, difficulty accepting the views of others. A student, if he is receptive to the ideas of others, should therefore have a low level of dogmatism. More SWAT team members are students. They have a mean of approximately one more year of education than do Comparison Group mem- bers. They also have six bachelor's and one master's degree compared with none for the Comparison Group. Hypothesis two, that higher authoritarianism scores would be apparent in the group with the highest mean age, least education, or most police experience, could not be supported. The SWAT group had more police experience (3.1 years) and greater age (2.8 years) which should in- crease its authoritarianism level. Any increase may have been partially offset, however, by more education (1.0 years) in the SWAT group. A study by Smith and associates demonstrated that police officers who are attracted to college are significantly less authoritarian than those 103 who do not attend.74 The greater number of sergeants in the SWAT program (nineteen) might also decrease the level of authoritarianism. The better educated (and less authoritarian) policeman probably has a higher rate of success on promotional examinations and is therefore drawn away from the street. Niederhoffer notes that the police- man in the field is the most authoritarian of his peers for he is involved in most of the incidents that require a display of authority.75 Still another, but less obvious factor, may be present in a comparison of active duty mili— tary experience (a mean difference of 3.2 months) with age (a mean difference of 2.8 years). The Comparison Group police officers are younger but have almost the same active duty experience. This indicates there are probably more World War II and Korean War veterans in the SWAT group and more Vietnam veterans in the Comparison Group. This more recent military and combat experience may have increased the authoritarianism, dogmatism, and conservatism scores of the younger group. 74Alexander B. Smith, Bernard Locke, and William F. Walker, "Authoritarianism in College and Non—College Oriented Police," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, LVIII (March,wI967), 132. 7SArthur Niederhoffer, Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban Societ (New York: Doubleday and Company, I30. Inc., 1967), p. 104 Further Observations The SWAT group had 5.7 more months of police field (patrol) experience than the Comparison Group. They also had more infantry assignments (fourteen versus eight) and more infantry experience or training (twenty-seven versus seventeen). This may or may not have been by choice. The enlisted ranks attained by both groups were similar--both approximately the rank of corporal (E4). Military rank was disregarded, however, as a valid comparative measure. In many wartime settings, differing assignments among men of a common rank and specialty are made through chaotic pro- cesses with negligible regard to preferences or capabili— ties. Twice as many SWAT members, while in the military, volunteered for more hazardous assignments than the Com— parison Group. These included sniper, guerrilla warfare, jungle warfare, airborne, ranger, and special forces train— ing or experience. A more adventuresome nature and preference for rough, outdoor living seems to be indicated. Any future studies might attempt to ascertain the numbers of hunters and Sportsmen, in SWAT teams. The fellowship of an outdoors group may be a major attraction to team member— ship. The mean level of education of SWAT members (13.8 years) and Comparison Group police officers (12.9 years) is of passing interest. High school graduation (twelve) 105 years) or its equivalent is the required minimum for entrance into the Department. Most SWAT team and Comparison Group personnel have home-towns in the southwest (twenty-four members each or 48 per cent of each group). Twenty-two per cent of the SWAT people come from the middlewest, 14 per cent from the northeast, 10 per cent from the south, and 6 per cent from the northwest. A comparison of the police attitude scores with other occupational groups was beyond the scope of this research. VIII. CONCLUSIONS This study may be considered a pilot project in its attempt to establish some relationship between one facet of a policeman's personality and his membership in a group. The results indicate that members of the Los Angeles Police Department Special Weapons and Tactics Team do not differ significantly in authoritarian attitudes from their peers. The external validity of the results is, of course, open to question. The confidence with which the findings can be generalized to pOpulations beyond the samples immediately studied is unknown. The project tends to support the idea that these groups are composed of 106 individuals who are members of and therefore subject to the pressures and sanctions of a larger society. Authori- tarianism is but one facet of that complex organization known as a human being. This individual carries his com- plexities with him wherever he goes and into whatever organization he joins. Attitude scale examinations such as presented have possible application in the recruitment and selection of SWAT team personnel. A problem exists, however, in determining just what characteristics are desirable. Further study is indicated. CHAPTER V A SURVEY OF SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS TEAMS IN CITIES WITH POPULATIONS OVER ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND The number and locations of SWAT team programs in United States cities is unknown. A department faced with the need for a SWAT program must proceed on a trial—and— error basis. Knowledge and experience gained by other agencies with programs is simply not available because of a lack of communication between departments. A letter was mailed to the "Center For Law Enforce- ment Research Information" as previously mentioned (page 25). They had no information on the existence or state of development of SWAT programs. I. SURVEY CONTENT A decision was made to survey police departments having jurisdiction in all cities in the United States with populations over one hundred thousand. This survey would attempt to ascertain the following information: 1. General data on city population, square miles, and numbers of sworn and line personnel. This information would be useful when comparing SWAT teams on different departments. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 108 The number of riots occurring in that city dur- ing the last four years. This might reflect a pattern of increasing violence. It would also be an indication of how well (or how poorly) records are maintained--an important consideration when justifying or budgeting a SWAT program. Riots were defined as incidents which include "arson, sniping, looting, or an extra—ordinary police response." The number of sniping incidents directed toward police personnel. This would serve as an indicator of SWAT team need. The number of sniping incidents that occurred during darkness versus daylight. This is important when planning a training program. The numbers of policemen injured by sniper fire. The numbers of policemen killed by sniper fire. The types of firearms used against police in sniping incidents. Weapons and accoutrements are often indicators of sniper competency and mission. Does a SWAT program exist on the department? A concept definition should be included to distinguish it from riot control squads. If no SWAT program exists, does the department intend to develop one? All possible reasons for not having a team, including political pressures, should be covered. If a program exists, its name, date of origin, the numbers of personnel by rank, the average age of members, and their mean number of years with the department. The number of teams and men per team. The selection process for team membership. The prerequisites or entrance requirements. The group commander's rank. The program's position in the department's organizational structure. The team composition by position. The purpose for which the teams were formed. The types of equipment used. How equipment is supplied. Outside agencies, if any, that take part in the training. Specialized training beyond that given to all officers. A description of such training by type, subject, and approximate hours per year. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 109 Outside training materials and publications in use. Use of teams or members in actual SWAT field situations. Description of such uses. Team morale. The desirability of team assignment. A rating of the performance of the teams under field conditions. Supervisors' and commanders' opinions of the program. Confidentialness of the program. Publicity. Nature of the publicity. Community opposition to the program. Opposition from the city or local government. Department opposition. A questionnaire (Appendix G, page 211) was devised that inquired into each of the above areas. The preceding statements correspond to the same subjects and numbers on the questionnaire. II. METHODOLOGY A questionnaire combining the "fixed-alternative" (or multiple-choice) question and the "open-ended" (or "free-answer response") was considered the most desirable for this study. Fixed-alternative Questions A fixed-alternative question is one in which the responses of the subject are limited to stated alterna— tives. The advantages of this method are that the results 110 are easily tabulated, the number of respondents who claim to have 'no opinion' is reduced, and replies indicate the intensity of the respondents' feelings. The disadvantages include the difficulty of establishing clear-cut alter- natives and the danger of irritating the respondent. Free-answer Responses The open-ended question is designed to permit a free-response. It raises an issue but does not provide or suggest any structure for the reply. The disadvantages are that the method requires more time and effort by both the enumerator and respondent, and may result in many who refuse to answer or claim they have no opinion.76 Establishing Categories An attempt was made to provide exhaustive, mutually exclusive, categories for fixed-alternative questions. The responses to open-ended questions were organized into category sets. Oversights in coding were discouraged by requiring the respondent to check at least one category of the set. The total code is exhaustive in the sense that 76A good discussion of the advantages and dis- advantages of both types of questions is presented in Claire Selltiz, et al., Research Methods in Social Re- lations (New YorEF'Hdlt,_Rinehart and WinEEon, 196777 pp. 256963 and'552-74. ‘ 111 a place is provided for every possible response. It is not exhaustive, however, in terms of all possible classifica- tory principles that could be applied to the answers. Re— sponses irrelevant to the subject were thus not classified. Categorization o£_Absent Data The provision of a category for a response that is expected not to occur was also included. Selltiz con- siders the principle involved far from obvious and too often neglected.77 The application of this rule leads to the possible discovery of the significant absence of some response which might otherwise have gone unnoticed. Indirect questions, where the desired information is inferred from responses directed to other matters, were also devised in several instances. These include the questions on morale, field performance, political inter- ferrence, and "supervisor's" opinions of the program. In question 27 (page 146), for instance, the chief is asked how assignment to the program is considered (by the "men")? By answering, "One of the most popular assign- ments on the Department," or, "A way of escaping the drudgery of long hours of uniformed riot duty," he says much about his own opinion of the program's direction. 77Ibid., p. 396. 112 Uniformity of Response The impersonal nature of the questionnaire--its standardized wording, order, and instruction-- ensured some uniformity of response.78 There was considerable variation anticipated in the persons completing them and in the conditions under which they were filled out. The Chief or one of his staff might complete the questionnaire but it was probable it would be assigned to a member of the SWAT program. Once assigned, many factors enter into its completion. The respondent's competence and knowledge of the subject area are important. His enthusiasm, work load, attitude, and many other variables effect the outcome. The reSpondent may wish to state the facts of a situation but be reluctant to bring the matter to his chief's attention. Not all the questionnaires were returned under the Chief's signature. Several responses were quite frank and did not appear to be overly concerned with the department's image of competency in this field. 78Webb states that questionnaires "intrude as a foreign element into the social setting they would de- scribe, they create as well as measure attitudes, they elicit atypical roles and responses, they are limited to those who are accessible and will cooperate, and the re- sponses obtained are produced in part by dimensions of individual difference irrelevant to the topic at hand." Eugene J. Webb, et 3i., Unobtrusive Measures (Chicago: Rand McNally and—Company, 1966), p. l. 113 III. QUESTIONNAIRE DISTRIBUTION The 1969 edition of the Editor and Publisher Market GEidg was consulted to obtain the latest population esti— mates.79 Excluded were several "marketing areas" which are not true cities (examples: "San Fernando Valley, Cali- fornia" which includes parts of several cities, and "Hollywood" which is not an incorporated city but is part of Los Angeles). The final list (Appendix E, page 205) includes 159 cities ranging from Burbank, California (popu- lation: 100,162) to New York City (population: 8,203,916). The current names, addresses, and titles of the police department heads in the 159 cities were obtained from the "Directory of I.A.C.P. Members."8O A letter (Appendix F, page 208) on Michigan State University School of Police Administration and Public Safety letterhead, was 79"Editor & Publisher's Exclusive Market Rankings-- Population," Editor and Publisher Market Guide—-1969 Edition (New York: The Editor and Publisher Company, 1969), p. 4. 80International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., "Directory of I.A.C.P. Members: 1968-69," The Police Chief, XXXV (Washington, D. C.: International Association of Chiefs of Police, October, 1968). 114 mailed to each chief of police, along with the question- naire, introducing the author, explaining the project, and requesting the chief's assistance. The very onerousness of filling out a nine—page questionnaire would probably contribute to a poor return. A device was employed to offset this possibility. A pro- mise was made to furnish survey data to all respondents thus making completion of the questionnaire of benefit to the agency. The names of departments and other identify- ing data would be excluded to ensure anonymity. Those departments wishing to take part in an "information ex- change program," however, would be provided with the names and data from other organizations also wishing to partici- pate. This device of a positive return on the progress of other departments in the field, and anonymity if desired, would hopefully increase the responses. Organizations without programs or those attempting to start them would benefit by knowing of the efforts and experiences of others and could correspond with them. IV . QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE Seventy-two of the 159 departments (45.3 per cent) responded. Nine subjects (12.5 per cent of the seventy— two) returned the questionnaires unanswered. Explanations for their non-participation were as follows: 115 1. Five departments cited insufficient manpower available to complete this or any other survey. 2. Two departments stated any information of this nature was classified and could not be re- leased. 3. One department wrote that the completed questionnaire would follow shortly. It never arrived. 4. One department stated the population figures were inaccurate. The city had less than one hundred thousand residents and, therefore, should not be included in the survey. V. QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS The following numbered free-standing sideheads refer to corresponding questions in the questionnaire: 1. General Information The general information on city population, square miles, and numbers of sworn and line personnel, is not presented with the SWAT team data, Table VI, page 125, so as to preserve each department's anonymity, as promised. The purpose of the survey is to determine the current status of SWAT teams with emphasis on the development and sharing of techniques and programs. The information on specific organizational efforts was provided those who indicated a desire to share their programs (Appendix F, "introductory letter," and item 36 of the questionnaire). 116 No significant correlation exists between city population, square miles, the number of sworn personnel, the number of sniping incidents reported, or even the existence of a SWAT team program on a department. The larger cities tended to have more men detailed to anti- sniper teams but the largest cities did not have the largest teams. 2. Number pf Riots This chart, Figure 7, was compiled from information supplied by participating departments. It is incomplete and does not tally with other published surveys.81 Accurate records of riots and sniping incidents are not maintained by most departments. Reliable data was there- fore not available. The chart does, however, reflect a pattern of increasing national violence. One department made the observation that, although they were not without racial difficulties, their proximity to a city with considerably more problems was a source of 81Congressional Quarterly, Inc., "Urban Problems and Civil Disorder-~Civi1 Disorder Chronology," Congres- sional Quarterly Special Report, No. 36 (Washington, D. C.: September 8, 1967), pp. 1709-12; Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, "April Aftermath of the King Assassi- nation," Riot Data Review, No. 2 (Waltham, Massachusetts: Brandeis University, August, 1968). 117 1966 1967 1968 1969 Jan 1 Feb 4 Mar 5 Apr 24 May 7 4 Jun 7 6 Jul 5 25 10 Aug 2 9 6 Sep 3 5 8 Oct . 2 2 3 Nov 1 2 Dec 1 Totals 12 56 64 23 Figure 7. Riots (incidents where there has been arson, sniping, looting, or an extra-ordinary police response) reported by questionnaire respondents. 118 trouble. Black power organizations based in the other city constantly cause disturbances in the town's small Negro community. 3. Sni in Incidents Directed Toward Police Personnel This chart, Figure 8, is skewed by the statistics from two large cities which keep accurate records on snip- ing incidents. City "A" (Department 9 in Table VI, page 125) had 222 reported and 62 confirmed sniping incidents in July, 1967. They also had fifty—seven reported and eighteen confirmed incidents in April, 1968. City "B" (Department 27 in Table VI) had thirty reported sniping incidents in April, 1968, and twenty-five in March, 1969. These figures are also incomplete when compared with other published surveys.82 4. Sniping Incidents: Daylight Versus Dafkness NOTE: These figures were affected by the same two cities that distorted the sniping incidents in Figure 8. 1966. One daytime incident of sniping against policemen was reported. No incidents were reported during the hours of darkness. BZIbid. 119 1966 1967 1968 1969 Jan 2 Feb 2 Mar 26 Apr 86 May 2 Jun 2 Jul 225 5 Aug 3 8 Sep 1 1 4 Oct Nov 1 1 Dec Totals 1 232 106 32 Figure 8. Sniping incidents directed toward police personnel as reported by questionnaire respondents. 120 $261. One hundred and eighty-seven incidents of sniping against the police were reported during the hours of darkness. City "A" logged 177 of them. City "A" also reported the forty-five daylight incidents. i268. City "A" reported thirty-five of the eighty- five incidents during darkness; City "B" accounted for thirty of the remaining fifty. Twenty of the twenty-one daylight incidents were reported by City "A." 1969 (first four months). City "A" reported one of thirty-one incidents during darkness. City "B" ac- counted for twenty-six. One daylight sniping incident was reported. Year Darkness Daylight Year Darkness Daylight 1966 0 l 1968 85 21 1967 187 45 1969 31 l Figure 9. Sniping incidents directed toward police personnel: daylight versus darkness. 121 A total of 371 sniping incidents against policemen were reported. Three hundred and three (81.7 per cent) occurred during the hours of darkness and sixty-eight (18.3 per cent) during daylight hours. These figures mean little because of inconsistencies in the reporting and in- vestigation of incidents from city to city. Most sniping incidents, however, do occur during darkness which is an important consideration when planning a training program. 5. Police Injuries From Sniper Fire City "A" reported seventeen policemen injured by sniper gunfire during July, 1967. Other cities reported twenty-five similar injuries between July, 1967, and March, 1969. 6. Police Deaths From Sniper Fire Two cities each reported one police death from sniper fire (November, 1968, and March, 1969). Two other cities volunteered information of the similar deaths of a National Guardsman and two firemen.83 83The discrepancy between the large number of sniping incidents (371) and the small number of deaths (2) is not entirely accounted for by poor marksmanship. Definitional problems exist as previously mentioned. The large number of incidents reported by some cities 122 7. Types of Firearms Used Against PoIice i3 Sniping Incidents Few departments knew what weapons were used against them as the snipers and their firearms were not captured. Four departments thought .22 rifles were used; one reported a probable lZ-gauge shotgun; and, one mentioned a possible .38 caliber handgun. The following weapons were posi- tively identified by sight or recovery: Three 12-gauge shotguns (type unknown) Three .22 rifles (type unknown) One .303 Enfield rifle One .30 caliber Ml carbine One 9 mm pistol One .32 caliber revolver 8. Does the Department Have a SWAT Team Program Which is — Separate From Riot ContrSI or Unusual Occurrence Control Efforts? Thirty-three of the seventy-two agencies reporting (45.8 per cent) have no SWAT team program. Thirty (41.7 per cent) of the reporting departments have such programs (Table VI, page 125). The remaining nine departments re- turned the questionnaire unanswered for the reasons given on page 115. indicates inconsistencies in reporting or a lack of standards and investigational techniques. See pages 39 and 40 for a discussion of "alleged" sniper fire. 123 9. Comments pp the DeveloPment pf SWAT Teams §y_Those Departments WithOut Them The thirty-three departments without programs checked the following categories: a. Twelve believe their present methods are adequate. b. Five have no need for such a program. c. Nine have programs in the planning stages. Note: Two of these departments furnished written plans for such programs and were able to complete the questionnaire on this basis. These plans are not included in the survey results, however, as they are not Operational. d. Two departments stated they initiated programs recently but the plans are not complete. e. No respondent indicated the absence of a pro- gram was due to an inadequate budget or its lack of popularity within the community, city government, or department. f. Five departments checked "other" (item 91) and explained they had no specific SWAT team pro- gram because the concept was incorporated into their general civil disturbance and riot control plans. All men in these riot control programs are given anti-sniper train- ing and are expected to perform in both capacities. 10. Information gp_the Departments' SWAT Team Programs The information in this question, question 11 (the number of teams and members), and question 14 (the group commander's rank), have been combined and illustrated in Table VI, page 125. 124 a. Team names. The most popular title is "Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team" program whose name and acronym originated with the Los Angeles Police Depart- ment.84 This title is used by one-third (ten) of the departments. "Anti-sniper" squad or team is popular (five departments) as is "sniper" squad or team (four depart- ments). (Note: Numbers were substituted for department names in Table VI to encourage maximum response through anonymity as previously discussed. Question marks indi- cate the information was not included and could not be determined from other responses or attached training material.) b. Date started. The programs were arranged, as closely as possible, by starting date. Three programs were started in 1966, eight in 1967, fifteen in 1968, and three in 1969. Two teams have unknown starting dates. c. Numbers pf personnel by rank. SWAT team per- sonnel of all ranks reported by the 30 departments total 1,046 men (1,013 policemen, 105 sergeants, 21 lieutenants, and 7 captains). 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A. 205 APPENDIX E UNITED STATES CITIES OVER 100,000 POPULATION b ||lll I I 1| II A I ll \ A APPENDIX E UNITED STATES CITIES OVER 100,000 POPULATION* New York, NY Chicago, IL Los Angeles, CA Philadelphia, PA Detroit, MI Houston, TX Baltimore, MD Dallas, TX Washington, DC San Francisco, CA Cleveland, OH Milwaukee, WI San Antonio, TX San Diego, CA New Orleans, LA St. Louis, MO Memphis, TN Boston, MA Kansas City, MO Seattle, WA Indianapolis, IN Phoenix, AZ Columbus, OH Denver, CO Atlanta, GA Pittsburgh, PA Cincinnati, OH Buffalo, NY San Jose, CA Minneapolis, MN Oklahoma City, OK Oakland, CA Long Beach, CA Newark, NJ Toledo, OH Portland, OR Louisville, KY Honolulu, HI Ft. Worth, TX Omaha, NB 8,203,916 3,642,715 3,004,566 2,128,670 1,608,349 1,297,557 944,658 893,105 832,712 814,348 800,710 788,769 775,200 719,396 689,023 643,522 632,851 603,075 594,424 592,184 561,984 558,185 553,325 553,153 543,025 539,669 499,032 453,378 450,252 432,170 409,856 403,833 399,579 395,900 391,462 390,565 387,123 386,865 380,851 372,775 41. 42. 44. 45. 47. 48. 50. 51. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 60. 61. 62. 63. 65. 66. 67. 68. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 79. 80. Miami, FL Birmingham, AL Tulsa, OK El Paso, TX Norfolk, VA Tampa, FL St. Paul, MN Sacramento, CA Akron, OH Nashville, TN Rochester, NY Albuquerque, NM Wichita, KS Charlotte, NC Jersey City, NJ Dayton, OH Tucson, AZ Mobile, AL Austin, TX Flint, MI Grand Rapids, MI Richmond, VA St. Petersburg, FL Yonkers, NY Syracuse, NY Des Moines, IA Corpus Christi, TX Knoxville, TN Spokane, WA Arlington, VA Jacksonville, FL Salt Lake City, UT Gary, IN Lubbock, TX Anaheim, CA Madison, WI Fresno, CA Riverside, CA Jackson, MS Amarillo, TX 371,319 365,431 353,798 348,902 338,405 332,439 315,292 309,748 297,029 295,270 287,387 279,452 277,621 270,902 268,922 268,103 258,664 257,124 255,567 228,844 228,202 221,058 217,014 213,129 205,668 205,429 204,079 202,407 201,040 200,493 199,221 197,979 195,974 190,591 187,219 186,891 181,742 181,230 180,239 179,912 .206 APPENDIX E (continued) 207 118. 119. 120. Baton Rouge, LA Ft. Wayne, IN Providence, RI Worcester, MA Santa Ana, CA Youngstown, OH Hartford, CT Torrance, CA Shreveport, LA Tacoma, WA Springfield, MA Montgomery, AL Bridgeport, CT Lincoln, NB New Haven, CT Virginia Beach, VA Peoria, IL Glendale, CA Paterson, NJ Winston—Salem, NC Little Rock, AR Columbus, GA Macon, GA Evansville, IN Huntsville, AL Garden Grove, CA Erie, PA Greensboro, NC Newport News, VA Rockford, IL South Bend, IN Savannah, GA Chattonooga, TN Topeka, KS Beaumont, TX Berkeley, CA Hampton, VA Ft. Lauderdale, FL Kansas City, KS Lansing, MI 177,111 175,851 174,713 169,608 165,578 164,022 163,800 159,465 158,783 158,634 158,412 157,509 157,375 157,053 154,481 154,245 153,299 150,855 150,703 150,180 149,752 149,244 148,876 145,789 145,454 145,142 144,393 142,293 141,623 140,644 139,994 138,947 136,900 132,030 131,688 130,851 128,889 128,734 128,484 128,398 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. Pasadena, CA Albany, NY Waterbury, CT Elizabeth, NJ Portsmouth, VA Springfield, MO Alexandria, VA Fremont, CA Huntington Beach, CA Wichita Falls, TX Camden, NJ Independence, MO Hammond, IN Raleigh, NC Canton, OH Cedar Rapids, IA San Bernardino, CA Waco, TX Stamford, CT Trenton, NJ Allentown, PA Duluth, MN Sunnyvale, CA Pueblo, CO Inglewood, CA Columbia, SC Abilene, TX Las Vegas, NV Roanoke, VA Downey, CA Stockton, CA Saginaw, MI Scranton, PA Orlando, FL Pomona, CA Chesapeake, VA Royal Oak, MI Hayward, CA Burbank, CA 128,048 126,872 124,699 121,806 121,200 120,311 120,241 119,941 118,920 117,898 116,690 116,055 116,054 116,005 115,904 112,743 112,605 112,381 110,607 109,829 109,647 109,022 108,441 108,141 108,080 107,956 107,628 107,106 106,821 105,029 104,448 104,357 104,199 103,735 102,146 101,559 100,684 100,181 100,162 *Taken from the "Editor & Publisher's Exclusive Market Rankings: Population," Editor and Publisher Market Guide--l969 Edition (New York: The Editor and Publisher Company, 1969T, p. I. . t {i 1 ‘31 ll Ill ' I ‘l. [I1 In‘ 11" I till i El (I'll I 208 APPENDIX F LETTER INTRODUCING THE QUESTIONNAIRE MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY EAST LANSING - MICHIGAN 48823 COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE - SCHOOL OF POLICE ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC SAFETY ° OLDS HALL April 18, 1969 Thomas J. Cahill Chief of Police City and County of San Francisco 850 Bryant Street San Francisco, California 91h03 I am conducting a survey on.anti-sniper, counter-guerrilla, "Special leapons and Tactics (SWAT)" teams on all police departments in the United States in cities having popula- tions over one hundred thousand. Many departments have such programs but little information is available on their organization, structure, and function. This survey is an attempt to compare recruitment, training, deployment, and other sepects of these teams. I am a sergeant on the Los Angeles Police Department (Seventy-seventh Street Detective Division) attending Michigan State university on an Office of Law Enforcement Assistance graduate fellowship. This survey is being con- ducted through the School of Police Administration and Public Safety and is not connected with the Los Angeles Police Department. This study has more than theoretical value for all of us in law enforcement as evidenced by recent events in our cities. Although completion of the questionnaire is an imposition, it will not be without benefit to your organi- zation. All respondents will be furnished with data on the survey results except for the names of other partici- pating agencies or information which would tend to identify them. Departments wishing to exchange information with other participants should answer "yes” to question-thirtye six. A list of these departments and data furnished by them will be sent to all who respond with a "yes" on this question. A strict deadline requires the return of the questionnaire, Thomas J. Cahill, Chief of Police April 18, 1969 Page 2 through the School of Police Administration and Public Safety, no later than May 20, 1969. Please leave no questions (with the possible exception of number thirty- four) unanswered or any areas unchecked. This is important for statistical purposes. Your c00peration is appreciated. Thank you. Sincerely, %¢%fl/ Max K . Hurlbut . I 211 APPENDIX G QUESTIONNAIRE--CITIES OVER ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND POPULATION 11" i’ a! ‘Iii'l' .. oussnoumms Please answer all questions. If "none" or "unknown" is applicable, so state. If additional space is needed, use the back of the page of attach additional sheets. 1. GENERAL INFORMATION a. b. c. d. City papulation Square miles Number of sworn personnel on Department Number of line personnel (uniformed police personnel performing field duties) 2. List the number of riots (incidents where there has been arson, sniping, looting, or an extra-ordinary police response) occurring in your city: 1966 1967 1968 1969 Jan Peb a|~ ___ Apr 3 May Jun Jul 4.98 Sep Oct Nov Dec ~— . I... ..I 6 k ..J - Co 4 ‘ 1 ’ 4 A O .l q I a D . l -. ... . C 1 e i or! . . o. 0.. u . .O u . \ .... t a“ o. . . . .- I. . a .41 .I .-. .54 .. . .v . . 7|. . . a. ... v . : . ... ' ‘O ...-l“ .-~ ~ . “O“.- ...-I. -1. u‘ . via-5V ' - "...-“Qu- --CQ- .’ i-.. a n . ... -...-- ‘0... che .-.-......» .... -- . e O.- ‘- »---- ~e‘ ‘4‘ y . J O I 14 . . O .o o . o . r.....v'v. fun. ( . f _ _ . . . - ¢ » . a . o . .a I an- n . v . _ . 4 i . O _ . _ a . _ . . . M . . . m — _ . on ..Is It}: -~‘-«. ...- .— ‘. . 7 . u . W . . .. p _ O -‘ p O u . _ v . .I III... .-.IV. 2 3. List the number of sniping incidents directed toward police personnel. Include all those reported by police or other reliable sources: 1966 1967 1968 1969' Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 4. Number of sniping incidents that occurred during: Darkness Daylight 3 ... Darkness Daylight I 1966 1968 [I 1967 ’ g 1969 5. Number of policemen injured by sniper fire: (month-year) (month-year? 6. Number of policemen killed by sniper fire: (month-yearf’ Imonffi-yeime'" ... . 1 . . _. . 0 as. ..v . a . .I . . . . . . .: sci... . .. . . . . n . - .p . . . . y . . e .l .‘ A . l. . I u . a as I a I. . a . 1 I\ . . I . a I , . n 1 1 . a... I I . I l i! O. .I I. ‘ III-.rl If! .l..I. . . I ~ a . F . . l . 1 . 1 p I . . .- . . l w . . . v _ . . . l . (.6 1 I. , .‘II, I . . 2 a o l . 1 . a . a . . I I! I... .0: II I o J! I I... . , . . a r. I a . . . v . a _, . . 1 o . 4 . a ' I- ' I uflut _ O - . . .. . Oil 1 9 v a . . _ . I . .. . I . L I. I» .I III I L; I n . 1 1 I. . . .. . . II. . . I. o ,1 . ' I . w . ‘ a P, . . . . v u. . a 1 C o a u u 1 l c a H . .. , . . u \I.. . _ . I _ . I . £51- I . . ..I. I I .. r .. . . I. . . I: .....- .--- v . e o 1 a .. . . 1 ., c c .o . . , . a n _ . . H .-....I I v: 0 I new. 1 ‘0‘ 7. 8. 9. List the types of firearms used against police in sniping incidents, if known: WEAPON TOTALHNEAPONS OP NUMBER OF INCI- (CALIBER & TYPE) THIS TYPE USED DENTS WHERE USED Does your organization have an anti-sniper, "urban warfare," or counterguerrilla team or program? Do not include groups or individuals also used in riot control or other police duties during an "unusual occurrence." yes no If you have no anti-sniper program are you planning to develOp one? Please check one or more: a. ____ Present methods are adequate. b. __ We have no need for such a program. c. ____,0ne is in the planning stages. d. ____ We initiated a program recently. e. ‘____ Inadequate budget to support a program. f. ____ An unpopular idea within the community. 3. '____ An unpopular idea within the city government. h. ____ An unpOpular idea within the Department. i. ____'Other (please specify) ‘ ‘s a ' a a ‘ _ I I - o 1.. v 1 1 —.-'--g 0-.-. . '5‘..- m_ ‘-\ *0. Q... l o 1.... . - n:- .a- A .i. . ‘O I .- . I .' I v . \ L o.) . .1 ' D ’ _ O a . I .’ { ‘ s -' 'f , O ' ~- ' 1‘ -‘fl.---- 1 - f’ ‘ 1 . .-.... .... . '- .... . 1 , O r .1 . O O -...- 1' -..-. 7 ‘ | s . ‘ s , . . . i I I ‘— - a . -- . I . , . o . 1 ..s . .I—n- >.-—.. a-- ...~ .0 .- 4 o-1-vc. 54-- _-o.- ...a- . I”. , . b . I . . ,l v - . r . ‘I .. .. I O " . l . i - ,“ , ,. . U . . _- . . . I ,4 O . ...—... '- 0.0-... . -...-. ... I 0 ¢. - (w nun-O o . ---—-.A-~ 'wr‘h‘ -v. “.1 ... o I I run.- ‘-*----r.‘ ‘ . I - Q. “‘- a ,. - ..- - —- I . . . . r‘ “I 5 " - . . a ~ - ‘ I 0’ I ' a; I . I ”a ‘ I I ‘ I . . . . ah‘ ‘ ‘ . ~.I ..- , . . . I- a , ‘ l\ 4' I I" ' . . I J I . o f ' ‘ - . ‘ J ——.... -. a I ‘-' 1 . a _ L --o-.. . 1- ~ 0 ' s .. 94. 4. . .. a T l ‘ ‘ . .-.. .. . I -" - _ .. 1.. - J- I ' ' ' (I I .’ ‘ _ ... - .-- ‘45-. our ..- 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 4 If a specialized anti-sniper or anti-guerrilla program exists on your department: a. What is the program or team called? b. When was it started? (month-year); c. Numbers of personnel by rank: Policemen _____ Lieutenants Sergeants Other ( lease """" spec ifyg d. Average age of men. .———a e. Average number of years with the Department. Number of teams Number of men per team. How are the men selected (volunteer, recommendation of others, military experience, some form of testing, etc.)? Please describe the process. If vou have prerequisites or entrance requirements, please list them: What is the rank of the group Commander7 --r~_, ' n o. .- . n 'W‘H- 0 ' 'fl-v- ' a l . o-- . ...-~ 0. .. . ’ | - -7 o n ...-A 9 ad ‘ . ‘ _—_P 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 5 How does the group fit into the Department structure or under what section or portion of the organization does it fall? What is the team composition (example: Marksman, Leader): List the purpose for which the teams were formed (examples: to combat snipers, to protect VIP's, etc.): Briefly describe the types of equipment used by the teams and team-members (uniforms, weapons, vehicles, etc.): Is equipment supplied by (check one): a. Individual officers d. Combination of a. & b. b. City ‘ e. Other Are other agencies (police, civilian, military) utilized in the training program? Please specify: . .‘-- ‘ “*0.- , .Ih‘rw—~.. n" a. , --c- H~ -..; ‘0 sun. -- ,,.‘ 4‘. ,- 4 . . - el . - v...- 1 «.-.-a -- yr-.-'—\ -. .... o » -.¢ e _-4 u. n u ..-- a .--: e a s r ‘. . ...... — -—-A._,_~4 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. Is there specialized training beyond that given to all officers? V88 no Briefly describe the training as to type, subject, and approximate hours per year: (Examples: Classroom - Principles of Guerrilla Warfare - 7 hours Field - Marksmanship, rifle range . 12 hours) Briefly describe any outside training material in use (Army Field Manuals, etc.): Have the teams or individual members been used in actual field situations for their intended purpose? yes no Briefly describe any uses to which the teams have been put,(examp1es: Protected President of U.S. during tour; Anti-sniper duty during riots, August, 1967): n. .. .. . ... . ,., . 7 . .. .-. |‘ ’ I . .. , . . ‘ I”! . . I. . I | .. . , . l e “ - I . . M’lv—V-D‘v‘ - ‘¢- ..., ., . . . - .. . . . . . .... .... -........ , . -. ... -.. ...l .... . . V' ... . 0‘. Q . --' “..-—C. c- . o I ' f 1 II :.. ..~ .‘ . 1D “ I 4‘ n ‘ - . r _ v r 4.‘ . . I o ‘ , a . . -.i . A ‘ . _ . ‘v - ‘0 ‘ 9 '4 L‘ - .. 1. .. . , , _‘ n f- ., w . Q . r. f 2 .. -. I f . n ' - I a. - ‘ u . ' ' 'I ’ I ‘ . ‘ . . . J n ,.v -- . ....“ A . .r u—..-‘l.~—' - 0-0-. 4 ‘fl- -. ”.-.-.m— ...- . ...... - .1‘ . .- . . . v I ' v i .- -‘-. rn‘“ a—a.-—.- I n . ol ‘ L -. '. ( ’ ‘ ‘. ,. . . ‘ { . ... w ' - ’ . 3" i I. :n . . P o t‘ a I. ‘ . .. , J - I. l , - f . .. ‘ a o o ‘ m. a I.. .I -_u ark-m. ”.0 - ..- H ‘Vy-" ....» » - ... r.-...n._._. . . v .4 , -- _ ‘ v ‘ V I . a 4 . t - . Q “ I I ~. A 'g F . ‘ I (‘K . s n . l I - t * . r‘ , , e .L . a \ . . - , __ - 1..- . ’ s a a . u . - «. '- r - . T . A l - -. - . . I . uni; 'V. n“ ally—7‘ “ I’-- 'I’:‘ - s- eA-ur. . .....- , god‘s-- -.u-~...a— a . ...-.....- v .ux— ‘ ' a . Q . , . . ' . l . , n I . ' I J t , ‘ .. w. - - . .-w H‘——w.- 4 . u s o ‘ a , : . . r . v '. I o. l I .I . u n . . n. C. ‘ V 4 I- ” 'l l s, . s h l v . ‘ O I ‘ I .. ‘ ' _ ‘ \ 4 , Kl - A0..- .. -— -. ... ... - ‘o u u--¢----—.~.u .a‘oq , . .. ... -. v .. .. s- , H ...I an a . I K ' _ I. . s' a . ‘ x . g ‘ - ,' ' l . . v ' a ' ‘ f 5 4 . . . ' . V o r .. l ._. .3 .’ t . .I a . l _ . a... . t- . ' . s . ‘ I . n ‘ (' t ' \ .- u l . m- C .‘ 'r x a ‘ a . .’ ‘ q ‘ I '. , I " ‘ .u ...-I I, . , 1 . r , . v ..- - , I. .o ' ' ' J c a..- .9 -v-l—n “ -p,o-_t--—...”~ .... ¢.Iu'—..- - .-.. ~-- ._-.-- -n ~. . . . -—a—---.I'u‘ - ‘ - .. .. - _ -. . — 'I o. - - - m . ~ . I . .—‘ .. D . . i ’ ' ‘ ,- I: -. I ‘ , . . o 4 .' f O ‘ ‘_ > .. I ; 1~> av- . .- o .. v-'-.—-- a .-.-‘-I' '- 9‘ . . . ~ . . L ‘ A ' t. a A . I ' . - . ‘ 3 * . L. ' . r , , .a , u .L 9 .- 'hn —- I 5 , - a . . . . h' . ' . ' ..- I'..l A .. r‘ ' . - n . K o .- . g- . ‘ I , t. , .‘ . . - I - ..'. ~ 9 O . D . : . , «it -. “‘inZ' . . v .-.,- .. .,a.+-.-...‘. . . .., - . - ... .-.-1 ... -. .- - mm --- v o‘- 5‘ .. ~1*"'."*-~"‘ ' . .. ,.‘._ , V‘... .-v . V .-. w ...‘ov - u-- . , - _ . . s- _—“._—- 26. 27. 28. What is the morale of the men on the teams? a. b. c. d. e. Extremely high. Above average. Average. Low. Sufficient information not available to determine.' Is assignment to the program considered: a. e. f. One of the most popular assignments on the Department? Very much sought after? Accepted? A way of escaping the drudgery of long hours of uniformed riot duty? Avoided? Sufficient information not available to determine. The performance of the teams under actual field conditions may best be described as: a. b. C. d. Superior to and beyond the capabilities of non-specialized personnel. Performed well, but job could have been handled equally well by non-specialized uniformed personnel. Satisfactory. The men could best have been utilized in a uniform capacity. Unknown. Other (Specify)w_ -o.‘¢ ..-.-. .‘J—o . a __ J I .. v . ._ f s o. . . O t O . . . . It. . ‘ . . t. n .9 . .. f r . . C ...» r . 1. . . C .. J I v .... (I. ....-. o.‘ .ve‘._ v .o ...-'94 8 29. What do most supervisors and commanders on the Depart- ment think of the program? a. ____ Strongly in favor of. b. _____Think it is needed. c. _____Con§ider it a "necessary evil." 6. _____Are non-committal. e. __ Largely Opposed. f. ____ Unknown. g. Other (specify) 30. Is the program confidential? yes no 31. Has the program received any publicity in newspapers and magazines? yes no a. Please list these references by publication and date, if known: 32. Has this publicity generally been (check one or more): a. __ Accurate? b. _____Slanted? c. ____ Favorable? d. __ Hostile? e. ____ Unknown. f. ____ Other (specify) .H‘--. fi- 4: A . - '.‘ a u L _~ . n . . -' ‘1' .. . . J - t . . . | u—A .l 3 t, . t ' . l . -. . x J 1 _ . ,7 I A... . "', . \ -.» . p . ... . , . 7' A In., ‘I ‘ . . ‘. - - \ I - 1‘ ' . . -. on“ O o. ’ l -‘ '\ ' t J . a . . I l i‘ - ~ . I l . . ' ' . ' .7 ' v _. I’ ‘ ' ‘ .0. a - I I , ’ 9 ‘J i it‘- 6‘.“ O W-.." ' w ..l' ‘ I _ W ‘, . ‘ .' I‘ ~ ' . o ' l . ‘ ' . - .... I I 1 I 77 I ' l v-.- ’ I . 2' ' ....-- ...-..a— ......H P, ’--’ ..mw 33. 34. 35. 36. 9 Has there been any community apposition to the program? yes no a. Describe any Opposition, the groups involved, and their stated reasons: Has there been any Opposition from the city or local government? yes no A REPLY TO THIS QUESTION IS OPTIONAL. Has there been any Departmental Opposition? yes no a. Briefly describe the reasons for the opposition: Do you wish your Department to be listed as being interested in an information exchange program? yes no All respondents will be mailed the results of this survey except for Department names and information that would tend to identify other participants. All those answer- ing "yes" will also be furnished the names of other departments interested in an exchange program. ANY DEPARTMENT LITERATURE PERTAINING TO THE PROGRAM WILL BE APPRECIATED. . 1' \ . a k - . (-' .. 7 I - ' u'. D . ~ ' ' ' I ' \ '. H ' . ' ' V ‘ a\ t I ‘, . ‘ . 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