THE SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS (SWAT) TEAM CONCEPT

Thesis for the Degree of M. S.

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
MAX KENT HURLBUT

1969

THE SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS (SWAT) TEAM CONCEPT

By

Max Kent Hurlbut

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

Department of Police Administration
and Public Safety

1969

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ABSTRACT

THE SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS
(SWAT) TEAM CONCEPT

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Max Kent Hurlbut

The Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team concept is a response to three threats the conventionally trained and equipped policeman is unprepared to handle: the urban guerrilla, the sniper, and the political assassin.

The SWAT team concept is explored as to size, function, and purpose. Policy and program administration are considered as are training, equipment, and tactics.

The number of SWAT team programs in the United States is unknown. No literature has been published on the concept other than occasional articles containing limited data in gun magazines and other periodicals.

A decision was made to survey SWAT programs in the 159 cities in the United States with populations over one hundred thousand. A nine-page questionnaire was constructed from a methodology that explored thirty-five areas of program organization, structure, and function. A poor return was predicted because of the length of the questionnaire coupled with the sensitive nature of the subject. To offset these shortcomings and make the survey

of benefit to all agencies, an "information exchange program" was developed. All respondents were promised the survey data. A 43 per cent response was achieved.

The survey results indicated a lack of staffing and coordination of the planning effort in most departments and a break-down in decision-making machinery for the commitment of SWAT teams. Political interference and an unfavorable operating climate through a lack of policy guidelines were detected in some responses. High morale and successful operations were reported on most departments.

An investigation into the attitudes held by SWAT team members was attempted. SWAT membership in all agencies is voluntary. The fear of attracting "dangerous" or "violent" personalities contributed to secrecy and a reluctance to expand some programs.

The Los Angeles Police Department agreed to make available its operational SWAT team membership and a fifty-subject police comparison group for the study. A four-measure instrument was designed to test differences in authoritarianism between the groups and to compare them with variables of age, education, and military and police experience. The tests, validated authoritarianism, dogmatism, and conservatism scales, were administered and appropriate statistical tests applied to the results. The Los Angeles Police Department's SWAT team membership and the police comparison group did not show statistically

significant differences in authoritarianism from their peers.

A summary, implications, and conclusions are presented in the final chapter of the paper.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to the Office of Law Enforcement Assistance which provided this opportunity to continue my education.

To the Los Angeles Police Department, which provided the leave time and financial support which made the acceptance of this fellowship possible, I gratefully express my thanks.

The author is also indebted to Professor Victor G. Strecher of the Police Administration faculty for his assistance and moral support throughout this past year. To Lieutenant Frank L. Brittell, Special Weapons and Tactics Team Coordinator for the Los Angeles Police Department, my thanks for the guidance over the past three years which is reflected in this study.

To Professor William D. Crano of the Psychology Department, my sincere appreciation for the patience and assistance in programming and processing the attitude scales. To the Chiefs of Police and their staffs who responded to the lengthy questionnaires, my special thanks.

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INTRODUCTION

> During the next few years, organized urban insurrection could explode to the extent that portions of large American cities could become scenes of destruction approaching those of Stalingrad in World War II.[1]

This prediction is part of a military appraisal of United States cities by Colonel Robert Rigg, a former United States intelligence officer who specializes in long-range strategic forecasts. Colonel Rex Applegate, "Police Editor" of Guns magazine, states,

> The appearance of the sniper . . . in recent civil disorders has so changed the character of civil disturbance control that on presidential order, special counter-sniper training has now been given to National Guard, Reserve, and regular Army units.[2]

Henry Fitzgibbon, Director of the St. Louis, Missouri, Police Academy, comments, "The emergence of sniper fire in connection with riots points up the changing character of the disturbances law enforcement officers are being called upon to fight."[3] Terry Ann Knopf, a research associate at

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[1]Robert B. Rigg, "Made In USA," Army, XVIII (January, 1968), 24.

[2]Rex Applegate, "Guns and the Law--Police Sniper Problems," Guns, XIV (December, 1968), 28.

[3]Henry A. Fitzgibbon, "Police Procedure Against

Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence at Brandeis University, notes, ". . . a few of the disorders chronicled in this report appeared to display the features of a different kind of violence."[4]

The writers, a research associate, a policeman, a civilian author of police-related articles and books, and a military strategist, are pointing to something the field policeman has "known"[5] for several years--there has been an increase in and a change in the character of violence. This changing nature of violence is difficult to document because of a lack of standard reporting and investigative procedures over a substantial period of time. Press exaggeration and inaccurate reporting have added to the problem.[6] To the policeman, whose experience is limited to this generation, the increase and change in violence is a topic of concern.

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the Sniper Menace," The Law Enforcement Executive, II (November, 1967), 1.

[4]Terry Ann Knopf, "Sniping Incidents. A New Pattern of Violence?" Law and Order, XVII (May, 1969), 31.

[5]Intuitive recognition of a changing condition as the basis of years of empirical observation.

[6]Knopf, op. cit., pp. 34, 36; Otto Kerner (chairman), Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office,

Over the course of the research period, the author had the opportunity to talk with the sworn police heads of the Chicago, Detroit, and Los Angeles Police Departments. Other unstructured interviews were conducted with line and staff command personnel on the Cincinnati, Lansing, New York, and St. Louis Police Departments. They were almost unanimous in expressing the following subjective judgments:

1. Violence is on the increase, particularly that directed at the government, its representatives, and the social structure.
2. Policemen today are facing more armed violence.
3. The sniper is a serious problem.
4. The urban guerrilla (a member of an organized urban group conducting combat operations against the established authority on the basis of its unique capabilities and limitations as a small, disciplined, unit) is reported to exist, but in a "Phage I" stage (see "Levels of Insurgency," page 14). The potential exists, however, for the eruption of organized urban warfare.[7]

March 1, 1968), p. 180; and "Are We Heading Toward A Race War in Detroit This Summer?" Detroit Scope Magazine, (April 12, 1969), 10.

[7]Preparations by militant groups who openly advocate guerrilla warfare are described in: United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, Guerrilla War Advocates In the United States, Union Calendar No. 542, House Report No. 1351, 90th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 64.

The four judgmental evaluations were also supported by letters received from respondents in a survey of cities with populations over one hundred thousand (Chapter V).

Additional evidence of increased violence comes from the mass media. "Nearly every major city in the United States has experienced riots and civil disorder."[8] Portions of cities have been destroyed in recent riots. Bombings have occurred.[9] Policemen have been shot and killed by snipers[10] and ambushed:

> The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence reported last week that the ambush

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[8] Progress Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence to President Lyndon B. Johnson (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, January 9, 1969), p. A-11.

[9] See, for example, The New York Times Company, "Bombs and Bomb Plots," The New York Times Index, Vol. LV (New York: New York Times Company, 1968).

[10] "Negro Revolt Echos to the Ugly Crack of Sniper Fire," Life, LXIII, July 28, 1967, pp. 18, 28; "Snipers Fight Police: 8 Die: 3 Cops Slain in Cleveland Negro Battle," Chicago Tribune, July 24, 1968; "Inkster Sniper Pleads Guilty in Police Attack," The Detroit News, March 21, 1969; "Chicago Bomber Slays Two Officers," The Detroit News, April 15, 1969; "Black is Guilty in Four Killings," Detroit Free Press, May 13, 1969; "Four Wounded in New Greensboro Incident," The State Journal [Lansing], May 23, 1969; "Shots Wound 16 on Texas Campus: 9 Students Held," Detroit Free Press, May 28, 1969; "Police Under Sniper Fire in Two Cities," Detroit Free Press, June 29, 1969; "Snipers Kill Girl, Policeman in Camden Riots," The Detroit News, September 3, 1969.

> triggering the Cleveland riot of July, 1968, was a deliberate intensification of racial conflict in America. The upheaval, which began with an ambush by blacks on police . . . [by] a small and well-equipped army of black extremists . . . [caused] the deaths of three policemen and a civilian.[11]

The New York Times Index lists the following number of references to bombing and sniping incidents in the United States:

	Bombings	Snipings
1964	74	1
1965	73	4
1966	76	7
1967	84	6
1968	129	5
1969 (to July 15)	87	7

NOTE: The 1968 (and 1969) figures were taken from the "semi-monthly" issues as the annual publication was not available.

Bombing incidents appear to be on the increase. No separate category exists for "sniping incidents" so they must be extracted from the "shootings" section of the Index. Although the New York Times was selected because it is indexed and is the largest daily newspaper in the country, the recording of sniping incidents appears to be

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[11] Item in Time, XCIII, (June 6, 1969), 28.

inconsistent. Sniping incidents resulting in the deaths of policemen (footnote 10, page 4) were not entered as such in the Index.

Extremists and militants have made clear their intentions. Stokely Carmichael, from Havana, Cuba, on August 1, 1967, urged American Negroes to take arms and seek vengeance. "The method of struggle for American Negros is guerrilla warfare. The struggle is in the streets of the United States."[12] Two days later he repeated his prediction of urban guerrilla warfare against the United States Government"

> Our only answer is to destroy that Government or to be destroyed while trying to destroy the Government. . . . We are going to start with guns to get our liberation.[13]

Robert Franklin Williams wrote,

> During the hours of day sporadic rioting takes place and massive sniping. Night brings all out warfare, organized fighting and unlimited terror against the oppressor and his forces.[14]

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[12]"Looting, Burning--Now Guerrilla War," U.S. News and World Report, LXIII (August 7, 1967), 23.

[13]Rigg, op. cit., p. 27.

[14]A quotation from The Crusader, February, 1964, pp. 4, 5, cited in Committee on Un-American Activities, op. cit., p. 19.

He also commented, "Ninety days of burning and guerrilla warfare will bring America to its knees."[15]

In Philadelphia, members of the Revolutionary Action Movement, carrying explosives and a large amount of potassium cyanide, were arrested for a plot to create a riot in order to lure the police and city officials to the scene. The poison was to have been placed in coffee and sandwiches in portable canteens stationed in the vicinity of the staged riot.[16]

A partial list of extremist groups currently advocating and/or practicing violence against society would include the following:

American Nazi Party
Black Guards
Black Liberation Front (Black Militia)
Black Nationalists of New Lybia
Black Panthers
Blackstone Rangers
Black Students' Union
Black United Front
Brothers United
Deacons for Defense and Justice
Five Percenters
Forum 66
Freedom Fighters of Ohio
Harlem Defense Council
Harlem Mau-Mau Society
Inner City Organizing Committee

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[15]"Revolution Underway," (film), National Education Program, Searcy, Arkansas [1968].

[16]Committee on Un-American Activities, op. cit., p. 23.

JFK (Jamo Freedom Kenyata [sic]) House
Ku Klux Klan
Malcom X Society
Medgar Evers Rifle Club
Minute Men
Nation of Islam (Black Muslims, Fruit of Islam)
Northern Student Movement
Progressive Labor Party
Republic of New Africa (Black Legion)
Revolutionary Action Movement (Uhuru, Afro-American Youth Association)
Revolutionary Contingent
Society of Man
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee
Students for a Democratic Society (Weathermen)
Third World Liberation Front
US
White Panthers
Youth International Party

NOTE: This list was casually compiled from recent news items. Any omissions are unintentional.

I. THE PROBLEM

Statement of the Problem

Violence in society today is probably a symptom of problems in several areas: political, social, psychological, economic, and perhaps others. A study of violence and its solutions is beyond the scope of this research and the competency of the investigator. To date, its solution (if indeed one exists) has eluded all disciplines.

The police responsibility is to deal symptomatically with violence until a solution is found. Containment must be the focus. If the police cannot contain violence in the cities then the application of military force will be

necessary. Considerable loss of life and property may then result. Even this extreme is not a permanent solution. The National Guard or other military components cannot be maintained on permanent police duty because of political and cost factors.

Importance of the Study

Two of the four subjective judgments (page 3) present special police problems. They are the sniper and the urban guerrilla (should he enter Phase II and conduct guerrilla or terrorist acts against the government or populace). Both are beyond the control of the conventionally trained and equipped policeman.

The response to urban violence must be proportionate. Just as cannon cannot be used to destroy a city housing the urban guerrilla, a one hundred thousand dollar building containing a sniper cannot be burned down to accomplish the same results as would a fifteen cent bullet. The intensity of the means must be balanced against the magnitude of the problem. The Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team concept is just such a balance. It replaces indiscriminate firepower and massive, uncoordinated reaction with a professionally directed approach emphasizing small unit tactics and selective force directed with skill and restraint. It is a proportionate response to the

assault on society by armed, violent men whose stated intent is its destruction. It is a selective measure which does not lose sight of the basic concepts of protection of society and protection of the rights of the individual.

II. DEFINITIONS OF TERMS USED

The language of special warfare and other areas covered by the study employ terms invented, amplified, or interpreted to facilitate communication and understanding. These terms are fundamental to understanding the material presented.

Assembly Area

A location designated for congregation and deployment of personnel used or held in reserve during an unusual occurrence.[17]

Authoritarianism

The "psychological" definition rather than the political one (a blind submission to authority or concentration of power in a leader not responsible to the people) is used for purposes of this paper. Authoritarianism is:

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[17] Los Angeles Police Department, Unusual Occurrence Procedures for Field Supervisors (August, 1967), p. 39.

> . . . hostility towards people in general . . . a rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values . . . a tendency to condemn, reject, and punish those who violate conventional values . . . it includes a disposition to think in rigid categories.[18]

The "F" or "predisposition to facism" scale is a measure of authoritarianism.

Clandestine Operations

Operations to accomplish intelligence, counter-intelligence, and other similar activities in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.

Conservatism

A measure of an individual's need to maintain traditionally constituted organizations and views. Conservatism is a philosophy based on a tradition of social stability and a preference of gradual development to abrupt change.

Cordon and Search

A technique used in operations to isolate a small population group or designated area (cordon) to permit a detailed search for personnel or material.

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[18]Albert Peckham, "Authoritarianism and Its Relationship to Group Structure" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Michigan State University, East Lansing, 1954), p. 5.

Counterguerrilla Warfare

Operations conducted by the military or police agencies against guerrillas.

Counterinsurgency

Those military, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.[19]

Covert Operations

Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of the sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation.

Dogmatism

An intolerance toward those with opposing beliefs. Dogmatism is an unwillingness to accept the views of others. It is unwarranted or arrogant opinions based on insufficiently examined ideas.

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[19]This definition and several others are adapted from a "Special Warfare Glossary" compiled by the United States Army Special Warfare School, Special Forces Extension Course (Fort Bragg, North Carolina, 1967), p. 7.

Field Commander

The police department officer, regardless of rank, having line command over a field task force.

Field Command Post

A temporary administrative facility staffed with officers appointed by the field commander to enable him to effectively direct the operations required to control the unusual occurrence, assemble and assign department resources, collect intelligence, communicate with concerned officers and units, and maintain appropriate records.[20]

Field Task Force

The personnel who are assigned and actively engaged in performing the duties directed by the field commander at the scene of an unusual occurrence.

Insurgency

A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war.

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[20]Los Angeles Police Department, op. cit., pp. 32-33.

Insurgency, Levels of

Phase I. The initial phase of insurgency in which subversive activities are a potential threat. It includes recruiting, developing, and organizing an insurgent apparatus for use in subsequent phases. No major outbreak of violence is involved.

Phase II. This phase is reached when the subversive movement, having gained sufficient local or external support, initiates organized urban guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority. Operations to hold terrain objectives and engage in conventional warfare are avoided.

Phase III. This stage is reached when the insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority. This is sometimes called the "terrorism" stage.[21]

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[21] A "seige of terror" creates extreme fear through systematic violence with the purpose of overthrowing and destroying a system of authority. E. V. Walter, "Violence and the Process of Terror," American Sociological Review, XXIX (1964), 249.

Irregular Forces

Armed individuals or groups who are not members of regular armed forces (despite their secessionist claims).[22]

Mobilization

A mobilization usually follows a tactical alert which proves inadequate to handle the unusual occurrence. In addition to the usual implementation of a tactical alert it requires the following: (1) the extension of the work day to twelve-hour watches, (2) the temporary deferment of days off, and (3) the recalling of off-duty officers.

A mobilization is activated when an unusual occurrence is of sufficient magnitude to require major deviation from normal police operating procedures and necessitates a general modification of department organization and command.

Paramilitary Forces

Groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces but resemble them in organization, equipment,

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[22]See, for example, Gary Blonston, "How Success Paved Path to Secessionist Movement," Detroit Free Press, January 4, 1969, p. 10-B.

training, or mission. Police departments and militant organizations are included in this definition.

Special Warfare

Special warfare embraces all of the military and paramilitary measures and activities related to unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and psychological operations.

Staging Area

A location designated for the collection, storage, maintenance, disbursement, and accounting of vehicles, supplies, and equipment used or held in reserve during an unusual occurrence.

Staging-assembly Complex

The staging and assembly areas.

Subversion

Action designed to undermine the military, police, economic, psychological, moral, or political strength of a government.

Tactical Alert

The field task force is initially assembled by means of a tactical alert. The tactical alert is a broadcasted decision by the field commander or Communications

Division to provide for the controlled redistribution of on-duty personnel during an unusual occurrence. Patrol divisions included in a tactical alert may be required to commit up to 50 per cent of their original field deployment.

A tactical alert may be followed by a mobilization if forces are insufficient to control the occurrence.

Task Force

Identifiable manpower committed to line and support responsibilities for combating the cause and effect of an unusual occurrence.[23]

Unusual Occurrence

An unscheduled physical event involving potential or actual personal injury or property damage arising from fire, flood, storm, earthquake, tidal wave, landslide, wreck, enemy action, civil disturbance, or other natural or man-caused incident requiring police action.[24] Unusual occurrences are classified into three types depending

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[23]Los Angeles Police Department, Personnel Mobilization Plan for Unusual Occurrences (August, 1966), f.

[24]Los Angeles Police Department, Unusual Occurrence Procedures for Field Supervisors (August, 1967), 4.

upon the size of the response necessary for their containment: minor, serious, and major.

Urban Guerrilla Warfare

Military or paramilitary operations conducted in cities by irregular predominantly indigenous forces or organizations.

III. COMMAND STRATEGY FOR RIOT CONTROL

An awareness of the command strategy for riot control is necessary for an understanding of the SWAT concept. The SWAT team, to function properly during a riot situation, must understand the field commander's strategy and the duties of other police elements.

Traditional Methods of Control

Riots in recent years have taken different form and dimension from those described in current police literature. It is apparent that police strategies and tactics have failed to provide the field commander with the means to deal with the operational problems confronting him. Squad formations and other crowd control techniques are still effective in dealing with textbook mob situations. Many of these techniques have failed, however, in the streets. The prime example of unsuccessful

control strategy was the establishment of perimeter control around the affected area and the withdrawal of the police from the interior.[25] The rationale was sound. The tactic had been used before with good results. Its use in Los Angeles, Detroit, Boston, and Newark, under extremely violent conditions, however, resulted in chaos. This example illustrates the importance of building upon experience in the field rather than relying entirely on traditional methods.

Mobilization

Control of an unusual occurrence depends upon the immediate mobilization and redistribution of department manpower and resources. Time is critical. The rapid, organized mobilization of substantial manpower is essential for the protection of life and property and the prevention of escalation of the occurrence.

Shifting from the routine of everyday police service to the demands of an unusual occurrence requires rapid organizational and mental readjustment. Non-urgent

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[25]Los Angeles Police Department, Model Civil Disturbance Control Plan. Prepared for the President's Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (March, 1968), p. 94; "Riot Control: Hold the Street and Seize 'The High Ground,'" Time, XC (August 4, 1967), 16.

police activities must be curtailed. The field commander must have sufficient manpower and equipment available in the shortest possible time. A large body of personnel must be rapidly assembled, broken into supervised units, equipped, directed, controlled, and accounted for through operations of the field command post and staging-assembly complex. This operation should be described in a department's personnel mobilization plan. This system for handling unusual occurrences, originated by the Los Angeles Police Department, has proven effective under simulated and actual disturbances. It contains minimal deviation from established operating procedures as the infrequent use of a complicated plan would require an extensive, continuous training program. It relies on effective control through the coordinated efforts of a well-trailed cadre.[26] These procedures and policies are a major area of study in themselves.

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[26]Max K. Hurlbut, et al., "Recommendations Based on an Analysis of Command Post Exercise 'Operation Tremor,'" (a report prepared in establishing unusual occurrence procedures, April, 1967), p. 26.

Command Decisions

Certain pre-established command decisions are basic to a strategy for establishing control during a civil disturbance. These basic (but sometimes overlooked) tenets consist of the following:

1. React immediately with sufficient strength to overwhelm the rioters. Department capabilities, policy, and local laws enter into this decision. Failure to comply will result in the spread of rioting, increased casualties and damage, and loss of public confidence.
2. Establish control in all parts of the involved area. The streets should be under police control. The rioters should have no sanctuaries where they are immune from arrest.
3. Arrest all law violators utilizing reasonable force when necessary.
4. Prosecute with vigor all persons arrested. Although not necessarily a police decision, it should be part of the police policy.[27] Without it, violators will be unconcerned about being arrested and police officers may become careless in their arrest and evidence procedures.

This policy prevents the release of an arrested person as an act of compromise to the rioters. Such a release places the police in the untenable position of acceding to the extortionary demands of the mob.

5. Remain in the affected areas with a show of force a sufficient period of time after order is restored. This is to convince all

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[27] Los Angeles Police Department, Model Civil Disturbance Control Plan, op. cit., p. 95.

> concerned that additional outbreaks will not be tolerated.[28]

Determined, resolute, and vigorous leadership is essential at all levels of command. Indecision by field supervisors is probably the major leadership problem but indecision at any level will lead to loss of confidence among the police ranks and be an encouragement to further disorder. The police have the initial advantage on the street. They must hold it.

Planning and Deployment

The field commander, through his operations officer, must implement a plan which will restore order. As the first units will be arriving at the assembly area within minutes after a tactical alert or mobilization broadcast, this almost simultaneous action of planning and deployment will not be possible without prior thought. Command and operations officers should discuss and critique possible courses of action and hold field training exercises routinely.

Before a plan can be formulated, information must be available on the following:

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[28] Daryl Gates, "Control of Civil Disorders," The Police Chief, XXXV (May, 1968), 32-34.

1. Area involved.
2. Estimated strength of the rioters.
3. Type of action occurring (looting, burning, etc.).
4. Possible mob objectives.
5. Composition of the crowd, including identity of the leaders.
6. Degree of organization.
7. Weapons.
8. Sniper reports.
9. Mobility and direction of the mob.[29]

Command and Support Elements

The field commander and his staff operate from the field command post. The field commander appoints an executive officer to exercise line supervision over the command staff which consists of an intelligence, operations, personnel, and logistics officer. They each have their counterpart in the Emergency Control Center located in the central police facility. The Emergency Control Center coordinates auxiliary service and liaison requirements of the field commander and his Task Force.[30]

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[29]A good discussion of the essential elements of information and other factors may be found in Chapter 11, "Intelligence," of Raymond M. Momboisse, Riots, Revolts and Insurrections (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1967), pp. 93-128.

[30]Los Angeles Police Department, Emergency Control Center Handbook (prepared by Planning and Research Division, July, 1965), p. 100.

Task Force Structure

Squads. The basic unit for riot deployment is the ten-man squad (nine policemen and a sergeant).[31] The squad is assigned two vehicles and a variety of equipment.

Platoons and companies. Squads may be formed into platoons (three squads) or companies (two or more platoons). Deployment by company will usually be necessary only in initial strikes against a heavily concentrated group of rioters.

Light striking forces. "Brushfire" units (named during the Watts Riots) consist of highly mobile platoons. Transportation may be by bus or personnel carrier.

IV. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Considerable literature is available on riot control techniques. Military publications frequently offer solutions in terms of massed manpower and heavy or sophisticated weaponry not available to most police departments. The Federal Bureau of Investigation--an investigative agency which by mission, training, and preference is not

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[31]The number of men varies between departments. Squad size should combine control and effectiveness.

fitted to riot control--publishes a riot control manual in the "textbook mob situation" tradition.[32] Few of these sources mention anything on sniper control or other areas related to urban warfare.

There is a dearth of information on the SWAT concept. The "Center For Law Enforcement Research Information" of the International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., a section devoted to researching, publishing, and distributing current information on police subjects was contacted. The only data they were able to provide on the SWAT team concept was a two-page article containing the most general of information.[33]

Old Wine In New Bottles

The possibilities of urban warfare have resulted in renewed interest and the reissue of old books on guerrilla warfare. Several publishers such as Panther Publications in Boulder, Colorado, Praeger, Incorporated, of New York,

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[32]Federal Bureau of Investigation, Prevention and Control of Mobs and Riots (April 3, 1967), p. 111.

[33]International Association of Chiefs of Police, "Appendix No. 1, Special Weapons and Tactics SWAT Team Concept," Guidelines for Civil Disorder and Mobilization Planning, compiled by R. Dean Smith and Richard W. Kobetz (Washington, D. C.: Research, Development, and Planning Division, September, 1968), pp. 60-61.

and Burns and MacEachern, Limited, of Don Mills, Canada, print most of these books. Volumes of the Cumulative Book Index indicate a total of seventy-five different books on guerrilla warfare have been published, world-wide, in the English language since 1938.[34] Many of them appeared during World War II with none being published in some years during the fifties. The last few years, however, have resulted in a flurry of old books being reissued in revised form and the appearance of many new studies.

Gun magazines and other periodicals provide some limited information on sniper techniques and guerrilla warfare.

Several of the 159 police departments surveyed in Chapter V provided their SWAT training materials. This material was generally mimeographed and limited to lists of guerrilla warfare publications and patrol techniques extracted from Army Field Manuals and other sources. Nothing was available on policy or administration, possibly because of the classified nature of most programs, their recent development, and a fear of civil suits (see page 51).

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[34] Cumulative Book Index, 1938-1969 (New York: The H. W. Wilson Company, 1938-1969).

V. ORGANIZATION OF THE REMAINDER OF THE THESIS

Chapter II looks at the threat which made necessary the SWAT concept: the urban guerrilla, the sniper, and the political assassin.

Chapter III presents the SWAT concept and delves into the organization, function, policy, training, and tactics of a model unit.

Chapter IV investigates the authoritarian personality on the Los Angeles Police Department's SWAT team program.

Chapter V surveys the existence and development of SWAT teams in cities in the United States with populations over one hundred thousand.

Chapter VI concludes with a summation and implications of the concepts gathered and revealed by the study.

CHAPTER II

THE URBAN GUERRILLA, THE SNIPER, AND THE POLITICAL ASSASSIN

Three Cleveland policemen were shot to death in an ambush by militants on July 23, 1968.[35] Charles J. Whitman, firing an assortment of weapons from the observation deck of the clock tower of the University of Texas in Austin, killed twelve and wounded thirty-one other people on August 1, 1966.[36] President John F. Kennedy was assassinated by a sniper firing from the sixth floor of a building in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963.[37]

The killings illustrate three situations the average uniformed policeman is not prepared, trained, or equipped to handle: the urban guerrilla, the sniper, and the political assassin. The three examples are illustrations

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[35]News item in Time, XCIII (June 6, 1969), 28; "3 Cops Slain in Cleveland Negro Battle," Chicago Tribune, July 24, 1968.

[36]Rex Applegate, "Guns and the Law--Police Sniper Problems," Guns, XIV (December, 1968), 29.

[37]Henry A. Fitzgibbon, "Police Procedure Against the Sniper Menace," The Law Enforcement Executive, II (November, 1967), 1.

of the functional problems facing policemen. No consideration is given to the symptoms or causes of the violence such as mental state or social ills. The political assassin is labeled as such because of his victim and not the political factors which may have precipitated the killing.

I. THE URBAN GUERRILLA

The finest "jungle" for insurrection was created by man, not nature. Mao Tsê-tung's concept of prolonged warfare could well be applied to the vertical acreage and horizontal mileage of steel-and-concrete high-rise buildings. Knowledge of the "maze of buildings, stairwells, streets, alleyways, tunnels, and sewers in the large city may be the key to tactical success."[38]

Militants have promised urban guerrila warfare. Time will determine if they have the capabilities to carry out their threats.

An unprepared police department confronted with an organized guerrilla force is likely to suffer high casualties in the initial contacts. To commit conventionally armed, organized, and trained policemen against a dispersed

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[38]Robert B. Rigg, "Made in USA," Army, XVIII (January, 1968), 25.



Figure 1. SWAT team member in fatigue uniform searching a tunnel running beneath a large city.

guerrilla force is a tactical blunder. Police and military tactics must merge as the guerrilla concept is largely a military one. The overall police objectives of control and containment remain the same, but flexibility of deployment and tactics must result. The police may, for example, find themselves in a firefight with no military backup elements available. Military firepower and assault techniques may have to be applied to insure mere survival of the police unit.

Tactically, the guerrilla will not stand and fight in the open or restrict himself to a barricaded defense. Psychologically, he will not strive to create an image of invincibility. The guerrillas' primary means of success is to adhere closely to the principle of offensive action at the opportune moment. Surprise and rapid withdrawal are used to compensate for weaknesses in manpower and firepower.

A small guerrilla unit can destroy a favorable police manpower balance. The guerrilla is flexible and will withdraw or blend back into the community if threatened or encircled. The United States Army Special Warfare School notes,

> Guerrillas employ all the principles of war--objective, offensive action, simplicity, unity of command, mass, economy of force, maneuver, surprise, and security--but they apply them in an irregular war primarily

> against the enemy's morale, combat effectiveness, and industrial capacity.[39]

Translated into operations against a police department, the effects could be devastating. Police officers summoned on a "routine" call could be executed by one or two marksmen. Any other unit responding before the suspects could flee the area would be ambushed by a well-positioned covering party. Other units would find nothing of the suspects who would resume their civilian identities. This pattern could be repeated over a period of months without an apprehension of suspects. This action would not necessarily have to occur during a period of riots or other public disorders. Small, well-planned ambushes utilizing previously concealed weapons would be difficult to stop. A sympathetic populace, an unlikely condition as discussed on page 33, would be a necessity for continued operations of this nature, however. The ambush could be quickly executed but, if the suspects had to depend upon flight rather than blending with the population, their chances of apprehension would increase substantially. Should these incidents occur during an extended period of disturbances, fear of the

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[39]United States Army Special Warfare School, "Introduction to Guerrilla Warfare," Special Forces Extension Course (Fort Bragg, North Carolina, January, 1965), p. II-6.

suspects and the disruption of normal activities would make their identification difficult. Effective intelligence penetration of such groups (as discussed on page 48) is the obvious answer. The SWAT concept, however, is a reaction to violence and was not established to conduct the sophisticated intelligence functions required by such a problem.

Obstacles Faced by Urban Guerrillas

Despite the initial destruction and terrorism, a sustained guerrilla effort could be effectively controlled. The following discussion is taken largely from Chapter X, "Conclusion," of the report of the Committee on Un-American Activities.[40]

The concept of guerrilla warfare is alien to both the American mentality and to the vast majority of Negroes in the ghettos. It could not hope to sway the majority of Negroes. The ghetto could be "isolated" and the guerrillas effectively bottled up, thereby cutting them off from supplies and support. The guerrilla could not depend on

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[40]United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, Guerrilla War Advocates In the United States, Union Calendar No. 542, House Report No. 1351, 90th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 57-61.

outside countries as training bases or lines of support once the conflict began.

Guerrilla warfare, as envisioned by its proponents at this stage, would have to be based in the ghetto. The ghetto could be cordoned and the following actions taken:

1. A curfew would be imposed in the enclosed isolated area.
2. The boundary lines would be patrolled. Foot patrols would penetrate the isolated area. Guerrillas attempting to break out or engage in open combat would be defeated.
3. If the guerrillas were able to hold out for a period of time then the population of the ghetto would be classified through an office for the "control and organization of the inhabitants." This office would distribute "census cards" which would bear a photograph of the individual, the letter of the district in which he lives, his house and street number, and a letter designating his home city. This classification would proscribe movement of the guerrilla.

II. THE SNIPER

Definition: To snipe is "to shoot from a hidden position at separate individuals of an enemy force."[41]

The term "sniping" conjures up the thought of the expert marksman, equipped with a high velocity rifle with

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[41] David B. Guralnik and Joseph H. Friend (eds.), Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language (College Edition; New York: The World Publishing Company, 1964), p. 1381.

telescopic sight, who is capable of killing at long distances with considerable accuracy.[42] The term, as used by the news media, has been carelessly expanded to describe the use of any type of firearm in a disturbance. Overzealous and exaggerated reporting of sniping incidents has drawn criticism from many sources.[43]

Types of Snipers

Four general classifications of snipers have confronted the police in recent incidents and riots:

1. The amateur. The amateur sniper is a relatively unskilled person who fires indiscriminately at targets of opportunity using many types of weapons.[44] Intent to kill selected police officials or civilians is generally absent.

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[42]Gahan Wilson, "Overkill," (a cartoon), Playboy, XVI (March, 1969), 146.

[43]"Report Blasts Press Coverage of Sniping," The American Rifleman, CXVII (June, 1969), 64; Terry Ann Knopf, "Sniping Incidents. A New Pattern of Violence?" Law and Order, XVII (May, 1969), 31; Otto Kerner (Chairman), Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, March 1, 1968), p. 180.

[44]"Arsenal of Guns Confiscated in Riot Area," Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, August 17, 1965.

2. The intoxicated sniper. The intoxicated sniper is a sub-category of "the amateur" but, because of his frequent appearance, will be classified separately.

During a disorder involving looting, many of the rioters have opportunity to acquire liquor and weapons--a dangerous combination in any circumstance. Becoming a "sniper" is an easy step in the excitement and hysteria of the situation. His condition may make him more dangerous than the "professional" as the intoxicated sniper's actions may be less than predictable.

3. The mentally deranged sniper. This classification is necessarily general as standards of "derangement" are not established. For purposes of this paper, the deranged sniper is one who becomes a sniper because of abnormal mental factors. The purpose of this classification is to distinguish the Charles Whitman with a brain tumor and a history of erratic behavior from the sane but strongly motivated individual who kills for other reasons.

The deranged sniper is especially dangerous because of his unpredictability. He may be motivated to violence by reading of a similar event. He may not consider his

own safety or retreat when fire is returned. The problem is compounded when he has had sniper training.[45]

4. The professional sniper. The trained "professional" sniper is a reality in urban warfare. He usually has had military experience or has received training through a militant organization. This individual will usually not fire unless sure of a kill. His choice of weapon depends on the situation and the target.

The mission of the professional sniper varies. Aside from the killing of selected individuals, his traditional role is to harass in areas where enemy strength is nominal. His purpose may be to demonstrate to local inhabitants that his group can resist and disable a much larger force. Jones states he may even create a martyr by killing a member of his own organization.[46]

The sniper is extremely effective in a delaying action. He can halt a greatly superior force while his

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[45]"40-Year-Old Marine Veteran Shoots and Kills Two Policemen, Injures Four Others with Gunfire and Grenades Tossed from His Apartment Window." News item in the New York Times, April 15, 1969, p. 1.

[46]Adrian H. Jones and James M. Dodson, A Selected Bibliography of Crowd and Riot Behavior in Civil Disturbances. Counterinsurgency Information Analysis Center, SORO/CINFAC 85-65, Special Operations Research Center (Washington, D. C.: American University, May 11, 1965), p. 32.

comrades withdraw. He may also be the bait for an ambush by withdrawing into a prepared trap.[47]

The inexperienced, greatly outnumbered, or poorly equipped sniper may engage his targets at ranges which will allow immediate retreat. The professional sniper will allow his quarry to approach his position for a sure kill.

Concealment and/or cover, a field of fire, and an escape route are the basic requirements for a good sniping position. The sniper will fire from well back in a room. He will gain elevation to permit a line of fire through a slightly raised window to the street below by standing on a chair or box. His chances of going undetected are further increased by the use of a .22 caliber rimfire rifle. Muzzle flash is minimal and the report is easily concealed with riot-generated noise and confusion.

The sniper's chances of being apprehended are substantially reduced in a metropolitan area if he fires but one or two rounds and abandons his position. Police counter-procedures are constantly improving but much time

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[47]Patrick H. Graves, Jr., "Observations of a Platoon Leader," Operations Report--Lessons Learned 1-67 (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Department of the Army, Headquarters, United States Continental Army Command, 20 April 1967), p. 9.

will be spent in investigating sniper incidents where the suspect is never seen or heard.

Types of Sniping Activity

Police have been confronted with considerable "alleged" sniper fire that subsequent investigation revealed to be something different:

1. Diversionary fire. One or two shots fired will change the focus of police attention from looters and arsonists to the "sniper." Police respond in numbers only to conduct a futile search which ties up manpower urgently needed elsewhere.

2. Harassment. The police can never be sure of the sniper's intent. This makes harassment easily accomplished. Several quick shots will cause the police to scatter and take cover. In this short lapse the sniper will flee or conceal his weapon. Firecrackers may also be used to accomplish this objective.

3. Other police fire. Ricochetting rounds and faulty target identification have been a problem from the Watts Riot to the present. The police, appearing to be

under sniper fire, have actually received indirect fire from the military or other police officers.[48]

III. THE POLITICAL ASSASSIN

> Assassination strikes at the heart of the democratic system. It enables one man to nullify the will of the people in a single act.[49]

The swiftness and complexity of national events makes hazardous even the slightest lapse in political leadership. The murders of several political figures in recent years has emphasized their vulnerability. The determination of an assassin coupled with the unwillingness of a politician to isolate himself from his public compounds the job of the policeman.

Most assassinations fall into two broad categories: (1) those committed to accomplish a specific political goal (such as the World War II attempt on the life of

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[48]"Guardsmen behind Jeep-mounted machine guns blazed away over the tops of cars and anything else that moved in the curfew area." Quotation from Art Berman, "Negro Riots Rage On; Death Toll 23; 21,000 Troops, Police Wage Guerrilla War; 8 p.m. Curfew Invoked," Los Angeles Times, August 15, 1965.

[49]This quotation and much of the discussion are taken from Chapter IV of the Progress Report of the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence To President Lyndon B. Johnson (Washington, D. C: Government Printing Office, January 9, 1969), p. A-27.

Adolf Hitler), and (2) those committed by individuals to satisfy their psychotic drives (such as the attack on President Andrew Jackson by a man who believed himself to be Richard III of England). Political assassinations for money are not common enough to be classified separately. The poor chance of escape may discourage such assassinations for financial gain. Such classification distinctions are relevant in a consideration of the motives of assassins and strategies to prevent or thwart them.

Studies such as those being conducted by the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence are exploring ways to reduce the danger to prominent public figures. The Commission notes that Presidential assassins are not nearly so determined to carry out their attacks as has been commonly supposed.[50] Zangara would not leave the warm climate of Florida to carry out his plan to assassinate President Hoover; Shrank chose not to attempt assassination in Chicago in order to protect the city's reputation; and, Guiteau postponed his attempt to kill President Garfield because the President's wife was present. Methods to increase the difficulty of attacking a President may come from such studies. A determined

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[50] Ibid., p. A-29.

assassin willing to sacrifice himself, however, is likely to succeed.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The classifications in this chapter are functional distinctions only. They are to make the policeman aware of the unpredictability of the sniper (the intoxicated and deranged suspect) or his ability to calculate the officer's next move (the professional sniper). They are to make the policeman aware that important tactical distinctions may govern the conduct of a gun battle with a militant as opposed to a shootout with a conventional gunman.

The classifications overlap. The political assassin may be a professional or amateur sniper (or an intoxicated one). The lumping together of the urban guerrilla, the various types of snipers, and the political assassin can only be justified by the unique characteristic common to all: the inability of the conventionally prepared and equipped policeman to successfully counter them. The SWAT team concept (Chapter III) was established to fill this gap in the public defense.

CHAPTER III

THE SWAT TEAM CONCEPT

The basic role of the police in a riot or other disorder does not change. It is to protect life and property. Strategy and tactics must change, however, to meet new challenges and threats to order and the public safety.

The SWAT team concept, as discussed on pages 9 and 10, is a proportionate response directed against the urban guerrilla, the sniper, and the political assassin: threats that conventionally trained, directed, and equipped police cannot control.

I. TEAM SIZE AND COMPOSITION

SWAT teams must be flexible. They must be small enough to effectively infiltrate hostile areas but be large enough to defend themselves. They must be large enough to accomplish most missions and be able to combine with other teams when necessary. The departments surveyed in Chapter VI had a mean of 5.5 men per team but the mode (or most popular size) was the four-man team (page 126). A team with less than four men is ineffective; one with over five men is difficult to control. A four-man team

permits use of the "buddy system." It is also the proper size for transportation, intact, in the helicopter available to many large departments (Figure 2). A four-man team will be the model for this study.

Team position titles will be the following:

1. Special weapons marksman,
2. Observer,
3. Scout, and
4. Shotgun man.

One member, preferably the observer, will be the team leader. The marksman will be armed with a high-velocity rifle with telescopic sights. Team weapons will provide balanced firepower for all ranges and situations. The marksman will provide long- and intermediate-range selective firepower. The observer will be the spotter for the marksman. He will also be the unit radioman. His weapon should be capable of considerable firepower for accurate close- and mid-range defense. The scout will be the primary point-man. He will be armed with a semi-automatic rifle of the same type and caliber as the spotter. The shotgun man will provide security and close-range defense for the team. His 12-gauge shotgun will be capable of close-range assault or defensive firepower against a fortified position or in an alley or other close quarters (Figure 3).

Figure 2. SWAT team boarding a 206 Bell Jet Ranger helicopter during a training exercise.

Figure 3. Shotgun man carrying an Ithaca Model 37 D. S. "L.A.P.D. Special" modified 12-gauge shotgun.

II. FUNCTION AND PURPOSE

The Special Weapons and Tactics teams perform the following special missions and functions:

1. To neutralize groups or organizations directing guerrilla or terrorist operations against the established authority or populace.
2. To provide support and protection for emergency units when under attack of sniper or assault fire, or when such fire is anticipated.
3. To rescue officers or citizens captured, isolated, or endangered by gunfire.
4. To keep designated areas clear of snipers.
5. To provide controlled assault fire power in non-riot police situations, such as barricaded suspects.
6. To provide anti-sniper and high ground security for dignitaries.

The above missions conform closely to the purposes for which the SWAT programs were formed in the surveyed cities in Chapter VI (page 133) with the exception of the first function. The first function, neutralizing urban guerrillas (or terrorists), was only mentioned by one of the respondents. It is unknown if urban guerrillas are not considered a threat by most departments, if there has simply been no experience with them, or that they are a consideration in more cases but not mentioned for reasons known only to the respondents.

To "neutralize" an urban guerrilla band is to destroy its effectiveness. The field commander provides the SWAT commander with a mission. The SWAT commander and

team leaders are responsible for formulating a plan and taking action to accomplish the mission. Neutralization may be the arrest of the band's leaders. It may be a raid on their headquarters or a counter-assault to repulse a guerrilla attack. It could also be a reconnaissance mission which results in conventional forces being called in to apprehend the band.

Intelligence

Inside intelligence is probably the answer to containing the urban guerrilla and other forms of organized violence. Deep political and intelligence penetration will enable the police to counter secret subversive plans, pinpoint leaders, and disrupt the hostile organization. This, of course, is not a SWAT function. The SWAT teams can be used, however, for reconnaissance patrols into hostile areas to obtain "combat intelligence."

Policy Considerations

The SWAT teams must function within the framework of existing laws and policies. Their "targets" must be persons who have committed specific crimes (rather than someone who is merely "the enemy" through membership in an extremist group). The apprehension of individuals for trial is always the objective. Local laws and department

policies remain in effect. If the suspect is a sniper about to shoot a citizen, another officer, or the apprehending officer, his death is not only justified but a duty. If all reasonable means of apprehension fail, and a suspect will escape if not shot, other factors must be considered. The circumstances surrounding the incident and the nature of the crime for which the suspect is wanted govern the decision. If he is a murderer, an arsonist, or has seriously and feloniously assaulted others, then the officer has a duty to future, potential victims to stop the suspect by any means possible. "Borderline" circumstances must be handled by department policy and reason. Many state penal codes permit the killing of an escaping felon. Should the felony be one of the lesser of such crimes (such as burglary or kidnapping without injury) then reason dictates that the suspect's death, although legally justified, is not morally excusable. If the suspect escapes, he can be captured on another day.

Functions two, three, and six (page 47) relate to counter-sniper missions. This was the most frequently mentioned purpose for forming SWAT programs (it was listed by twenty-eight of the thirty departments; see page 133).

The function of providing security for dignitaries was the second most popular reason for the existence of SWAT programs (mentioned by eleven departments).

One department uses its teams for security purposes. Station and command post defense is one of the SWAT purposes recommended by the International Association of Chiefs of Police.[51] SWAT teams should not be used for such functions. These routine tasks can be performed adequately by uniformed officers. "Guard duty" defeats the purpose for which the teams were formed and the specialized training they have received.

To provide support for units engaging rioters (function two) does not mean joining the action in the same capacity as other policemen. It means protecting the uniformed officer from sniper fire and high-ground assaults. The field commander provides the SWAT mission but it should never be a task that can be effectively handled by conventional forces at his disposal. A field commander who deploys his SWAT people in a conventional manner when

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[51] International Association of Chiefs of Police, "Appendix No. 1, Special Weapons and Tactics SWAT Team Concept," Guidelines for Civil Disorder and Mobilization Planning, compiled by R. Dean Smith and Richard W. Kobetz (Washington, D. C.: International Association of Chiefs of Police, Research, Development, and Planning Division, September, 1968), p. 60.

short of manpower deprives himself (and the officers under fire) of their special capabilities.

III. POLICY

The question of policy (and compliance with it) is a difficult one. None of the departments responding to the questionnaire specifically referred to a SWAT policy. In several organizations there was apparent intent to avoid a written SWAT policy. The rationale behind this was to prevent its use, when violated, in civil litigation against the city or the department.

Policy guides or places limits upon decisions or actions. Even if not written it is articulated through rules, regulations, procedures, training programs, and oral communications. The firearms-use policy of most departments, as in the example of the fleeing felon, is more restrictive than the laws governing the use of deadly force in effecting an arrest. The decision as to whether or not to shoot must usually be made in an instant with no time for conscious deliberation. An error in judgment is therefore more likely under such conditions of stress than where deliberation is possible.

The problem of litigation is a real one, especially where the policy is restrictive or narrowly defined. Where

policy is not clearly stated, however, there is often too wide a range for action. Officers must know, without speculation, just what is expected of them under basic conditions of arrest, self-defense, and other areas confronting them. A sound, written policy is therefore essential.

It is not always possible or practical to place absolute limits on policy. Policies are guidelines and not concrete rules. This is an important consideration when dealing with infractions.

Policy can be effected by training. It should be reinforced whenever possible with clear regulations. A simple but eloquent policy which states "don't shoot if in doubt" should be supported by more detailed regulations on warning shots, when to shoot, etc. It should be equally applicable in "routine" or emergency operations. Doubts of its application should be resolved through discussion in roll call and other training situations.

Policy making is the responsibility of the department executive levels. A failure at the policy making level forces the development of guide lines upon the operational group that must function within them.

The chief of police must insure that sound policies are formulated to govern SWAT activities. The policies

should be written and articulated throughout the entire department. Personnel should be certain of support for actions within such policy.

IV. PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

The Program Administrator

Selecting an administrator of superior competence is one of the most important considerations in establishing a SWAT program. Germann notes that most police organizations lack a systematic analytic method of discovering executive talent.[52] The program administrator must be capable of dynamic, imaginative leadership. His qualifications should be outlined by a determination of the duties and responsibilities of the job, the extent of his authority, the relationships he must maintain, and his accountability to higher authority. An incompetent official will falter in the most brilliantly conceived team blueprint.

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[52]Albert Carl Germann, Jr., "The Executive Development of Police Administrators by Agency and College" (unpublished Master's thesis, The University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1955), p. 33.

Selection of Personnel

Mature, experienced officers should be selected for team membership. They must be in sound physical and mental condition and have good judgment and even temperment. The team leader must have all of the basic qualifications plus those qualities of leadership, initiative, and imagination. The volunteer system of recruitment should be used in conjunction with other qualifications.

The SWAT survey (page 127) indicated that most programs are staffed with volunteers. The majority have no entrance requirements. Fourteen departments base their selection on marksmanship ability. Eight depend on military experience and the recommendations of superior officers. Several more consider maturity, demeanor, good judgment, hunting ability, leadership qualities, and assignment in specific areas of the department. Only one conducts testing of reactions under simulated field conditions. None administer personality or other examinations.

All SWAT personnel should be volunteers because of the strenuous training and the unique duties. The killing of a suspect, regardless of how justified by the circumstances, can be a much more personal and upsetting matter when accomplished by viewing the person through a telescopic sight. Minimum entrance requirements should consist

of a review of the applicant's personnel record including entrance psychological examinations. Staff recommendations should be obtained in interviews with his supervisors and commanders over the past several years. Military experience should be considered. Attitude scales (such as the authoritarianism, dogmatism, and conservatism scales of Chapter IV) could be administered after standards are established.

V. EQUIPMENT

SWAT team deployment is usually a last resort. Conventional police methods have failed and the situation is serious. The lives of team members may depend upon their ability to move inconspicuously and be properly equipped to accomplish the mission and defend themselves.

The unconventional mission of SWAT necessitates an unconventional appearance. All members of the department should therefore be familiar with the uniform and circumstances under which it may be seen. The opposition may be similarly dressed. Target identification should be stressed, especially to the newer officers.

Uniforms

The uniform should be dark for night movement but not a solid black or blue. These two colors are

conspicuous during the day and easy to silhouette at night, especially against buildings. A green or dark gray camouflage is ideal. A tailored light-weight, porous, one-piece jump-suit is recommended. A dark zipper, large pockets, and rubberized fabric at places requiring stretch are necessary. Tailoring keeps noise and loose ends to a minimum.

The badge or embroidered insignia must be present in case of "capture" by a citizen or fellow officer. The badge, if worn, should be covered with a circle of dark cloth with an elastic sewn around the edges. This cloth can be pulled off exposing the badge. An embroidered emblem in a subdued color is preferred as the badge will snag objects and interfere with movement and equipment.

A soft cap similar to the "patrol cap" should be worn. Helmets interfere with hearing and have a distinctive outline. Military footwear similar to the "jungle boot" is recommended. It provides ankle support and dries rapidly after being immersed in water.

A fatigue uniform (Figures 1 and 3, pages 30 and 46) or informal civilian attire (Figure 2, page 45) may be preferred for certain training exercises. A conventional police uniform may be desirable from the public relations standpoint in the protection of dignitaries (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Member of an anti-sniper detail protecting a presidential candidate, State Capitol Building, Lansing, Michigan.

The SWAT team survey disclosed that most departments suit their teams in the standard police uniform (pages 137 and 138). Seven provide jump-suits. Three make use of a fatigue uniform. One department requires casual dress.

Weapons

All rifles should be of the same caliber. Interchangeability of ammunition is a necessity in a firefight. Either of two weapons systems based on ammunition type are recommended. One is the 5.56 mm (.223 caliber) M16 rifle (or the Colt AR-15, a semi-automatic rifle without the selector switch for fully automatic fire). The other is the 7.62 mm (.308 caliber) M14 rifle.

The choice between the two systems depends upon the intended use, terrain, resupply, and other factors. The M16 rifle is lighter and has a lighter cartridge. Three hundred to 350 rounds, in magazines, can be carried per man. The light, high-velocity bullet tends to disintegrate upon striking a solid object. This is an advantage in built-up areas as ricochets are reduced. The light bullet has a flat trajectory but is easily deflected by wind, twigs, etc. Its penetration power is considerably less than with the M14.

The M14 rifle is heavier and shoots a larger, more stable projectile. Greater accuracy over longer distances

Figure 5. Assortment of weapons carried by one SWAT team. (Top): U.S. Rifle, caliber .30, M1 (Garand). (Left to right): Colt AR-15 semi-automatic rifle (caliber .223); Remington Model 11 12-gauge autoloading shotgun; Remington Model 760 .30-06 (pump) rifle with a 4X telescopic sight; Federal 201-Z, 1 1/2-inch (37 mm), Tear Gas Gun; Model Ten, Series A, "Police Shotgun," 18-inch barrel; and, a U.S. Thompson .45 (.928) Submachine Gun.

with less interference from the wind is possible. It is capable of penetrating walls and ceilings--an advantage in combating barricaded suspects but a disadvantage in inhabited built-up areas. It is a harder rifle to acquire as efforts to convert it to solely semi-automatic fire have been unsuccessful. Many sporting rifles accept the bullet which is the standard NATO cartridge.

A high-quality telescopic sight of the variable-power type is needed for at least one rifle on the team. One writer recommends scopes with post and crosshair reticules be mounted on all shoulder weapons, including shotguns.[53] This suggestion has merit as the telescopic sight does not improve the ability of the marksman. It enables him to see the target better while putting the target and the sight into focus at the same time. It also improves vision in poor light.

Fifteen of the departments surveyed use rifles shooting the .30-06 cartridge. This is an excellent, plentiful cartridge similar in ballistic characteristics to the 7.62 mm round. The disadvantage is that the only rapid-fire military rifle capable of handling the cartridge

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[53]Rex Applegate, "Guns and the Law--Police Counter-Sniper Team," Guns, XV (January, 1969), 71.

is the .30 caliber M1 (Garand). This weapon is clip-fed and limited to eight rounds.

Seven departments use the .30 caliber M1 carbine. This is a popular semi-automatic weapon but fires an underpowered cartridge for SWAT use. Six have automatic rifles. Five departments use submachine guns (and one somehow acquired a machine-pistol). Fully automatic weapons are not recommended (although some police writers desire them)[54] because they rapidly expend ammunition and defeat the purpose of selective firepower in most cases. A military rifle with a selector switch is a good compromise. The demoralizing sound of such a weapon and its effectiveness in a close-quarter firefight would still be available if needed.

The scoped rifle should either be owned or retained by the marksman. Frequent practice (including hunting) with city-purchased ammunition should be encouraged. Cross-training of all members with all weapons is necessary. All must be capable of qualifying with high scores as the mission or their lives may depend upon any member being able to continue despite casualties in the unit.

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[54]Henry A. Fitzgibbon, "Police Procedures Against the Sniper Menace," The Law Enforcement Executive, II (November, 1967), 4, 5.

The shotgun should be the riot-type and be equipped with rifle sights and have a parkerized finish (as in Figure 3, page 46). The shotguns should have slings. The shotgun man should attach a minimum of four fabric magazine pouches to his webbed belt. Each pouch will hold one box of twenty-five, 12-gauge, "double-aught" buck, shotgun shells.

A minimum of one sidearm should be carried by all members. (The decision to carry a second sidearm is justified only by the need for a readily available source of ammunition in a situation where reloading might cause a fatal delay--an unlikely but possible situation.)

Discretion should be used by SWAT personnel in the handling and display of weapons around civilian and other police personnel. Careless handling of weapons should be cause for strict disciplinary action. The SWAT program will have a difficult uphill battle for acceptance, particularly during periods of inactivity. Portions of the public and elements within the department will seize upon every opportunity to discredit the program. As in the example of the opposition based on racial grounds (page 148) the reasons for objections are not always apparent. It may be speculated that the secrecy associated with some programs fosters a belief by some minorities that the teams were formed to attack them rather than

a specific crime or civil disturbance problem. There are also people in the community who believe the answer to the riot and crime problem is to disarm the police:

> Another kind of equipment would be possible. It would depend less on arms and more on moral power and better training. . . . The police could be trained in non-violence, and relieved of guns in connection with riot control. So far, guns have only started or escalated violence--they have not suppressed it.[55]

Strong leadership is needed to insure the proper care and display of weapons and other SWAT equipment.

Other Equipment

High-quality binoculars of at least twenty power should be carried by the observer. All members should have miniature radio equipment (with ear plug receivers) where possible. Flashlights, a thirty-six and one-half meter nylon climbing rope, "pocket-size" tear gas and smoke grenades, a pry bar, and other equipment may be carried. Each man should also have two snap-links, a small first aid kit, and a pocket or belt knife. Many departments issue protective gear. This should be kept available for such assignments as barricaded suspects. It is not generally appropriate for missions requiring

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[55]Hallock Hoffman, "Policing the Police," reprinted from The Center Magazine, I (Santa Barbara, California: May, 1968), 5. (Mimeographed.)

heavy physical exertion. The group commander may authorize additional weapons and equipment as needed.

VI. TRAINING

Differences in conditions and departments make it impractical to establish a model training program that would be representative. A general approach to training will therefore be considered.

General

The SWAT survey in Chapter V indicated that training is often neglected. Only two departments reported conducting actual field training exercises with the military. The mean period of training per year on each department (Table X, page 143) was forty-two hours. Six departments provide less than ten hours of training annually. One department has none. Only four agencies offer over 100 hours of training yearly. This says nothing of the quality of the instruction but it is clear that more time must be devoted to the training effort.

A training program is established and implemented to modify the behavior of the subject. Learning is determined, in part, by the trainee's motivation and conditions under which he practices. The hazardous nature

of some of the SWAT training makes several basic observations necessary:

1. If a trainee becomes tired, his performance will deteriorate.
2. If the skill no longer serves as a means to a goal, he will cease to perform in a skillful manner.
3. If he becomes bored he will perform in a perfunctory manner.

The training director should take note of the ages and physical condition of personnel. Complete physical examinations should be given all members. An electrocardiograph examination should be included. Table VI, page 125, indicates the mean age of team members is thirty years. One group has a mean age of thirty-seven years. The range is not available. The training should take into consideration not only differences in age but differences in age and motor abilities. These differences will effect the long-range training goal. Small differences in learning rate between officers will become large as practice progresses.

The Classroom

Classroom training will serve to give officers a basic understanding of guerrilla warfare, sniper techniques, types of patrols, small unit tactics, and other subjects. A serious deficiency in the surveyed training

programs was the lack of small unit tactics--one of the most essential subjects in a SWAT training program.

The department can be canvassed for qualified speakers in various areas. Veterans' organizations are a source of potential instructors or guest speakers. One department was able to find two veterans with urban guerrilla and demolitions training in foreign armies who passed on valuable techniques and information. Local active and reserve armed forces groups are probably the single best source of speakers and instructors. Care must be taken to select the subject area and speakers for maximum value in the time available. Field and classroom activities must be coordinated for the maximum benefit. Basic and Advanced SWAT Training Schools of at least one full week's duration should be established.

Field Training Exercises

Field training possibilities are limited only by the imagination of the program director.

Two departments have established close liaison with several active military units. The SWAT teams attend classes and participate in regular field exercises with the military. The military, in turn, sends men to the police department's training exercises to learn of techniques for urban operations. The military conducts various

schools on marksmanship, sniper training, patrol techniques, building clearance, and other areas which have been opened to SWAT personnel. They also have range, classroom, and other facilities not available to most police departments.

Army Special Forces and Marine Reconnaissance reserve units are stationed in many large cities. These units are skilled in mountain and jungle techniques and are good sources of training in rappelling, patrol techniques, night movement, etc. Policemen in the department may even be members of these units.

VII. TACTICS

Small unit tactics can be found in many military publications including the field manuals and other sources listed in the bibliography. Methods for the suppression of snipers or guerrilla units require modification before they are appropriate for use by law enforcement. The military solution has frequently been developed in areas with antagonistic foreign populations. Action taken involves national authority which is sometimes far removed from local opinion and political considerations. The military method also pre-supposes available armament and logistical support beyond the capabilities of local authorities.

Figure 6. SWAT team members rappelling from a 35-foot training tower.

A lengthy discussion of tactics is beyond the scope of this paper. A tactical situation will be discussed, however, to stimulate thinking in adapting tactics appropriate to SWAT needs.

Sniper Control

Sniping must be distinguished from heavy, continuous rifle fire from one area where a number of individuals are involved. This is a fire fight and should call for the deployment of back-up military units. Large scale combat in cities is a military function calling for the employment of standard military weapons.

In an organized, pre-planned conflict, sniper fire will probably be combined with arson and explosives to divide and disorganize police and fire fighting forces. Snipers will be used to prevent police counter-action and movement, and possibly to ambush reinforcements.

A Tactical Situation

> A sniper, to minimize the possibility of detection, fires from a building at the second of two cars, each containing a SWAT team.

The first vehicle must be notified immediately by radio, horn, or other prearranged signal. An attempt should be made to visually detect the sniper's location

while rapidly moving the vehicle to cover. The officers should not remain with the car long as it is not bullet-proof.

If caught in the open, the cars should be stopped, side-by-side, leaving enough space between them to open the inside doors. The formation is not adequate to stop most rifle fire but will provide some protection to enable the teams to leave the vehicles. In a professional ambush, the immediate stopping of the vehicle and the piling out of the officers to seek the nearest cover will have been anticipated. The nearest cover, if a gutter, may be booby trapped with an explosive such as detonating cord. More likely, another sniper, possibly with a shotgun, will be positioned to cover the spot. In any case, cover must be sought or a decision rapidly made to attempt to overrun the ambush position. Circumstances will dictate the action.

No ambush exists. Assistance is requested to isolate and contain the sniper. The containment and neutralization phases begin.

Illumination of the building is desirable. Lights should not be shot out unless absolutely necessary. Firing to extinguish lights may create confusion or unnecessary tension among nearby officers who do not know the

source of the shooting. Ricochets or misses may cause casualties.

The officer-in-charge uses a public address system to advise the people inside the building in the following manner:

1. The officer identifies himself and the reason for his presence.
2. He orders that all inside lights in the building be turned on and the windows closed.
3. Instructions are given to the people inside to evacuate the building from a specific exit. Clear instructions must be given the people as to what to do when they emerge.
4. All occupants are searched and identified. They are questioned as to the identity and location of the sniper and the floor plan of the building.
5. The occupants are kept under control and are not immediately released. One of them may be the sniper.

The SWAT teams are divided into a search and a cover team. Newly arriving officers should be redeployed or used to isolate the area. This keeps innocent people out and the sniper in. The officer-in-charge, usually the cover team leader, positions himself where he can best control his unit. All officers in the cover team around the building should be notified when the search team is about to enter. This prevents a policeman on the street from firing on an armed man inside the building who turns out to be part of the search team instead of the sniper.

Entry is made and the search team heads for the top of the building to begin the search. Starting at the bottom may work the sniper to the top of the building where, trapped, he may be forced to stand and fight. Starting from the top may flush the sniper out of the building into the covering team.

The search team should have a predesignated system to conduct a methodical search. Voice contact should be kept to a minimum but not eliminated so as to assist the team leader in controlling the search.

If the lights were not switched on previously, they should be turned on as the search progresses.

One member of the search team kicks the door open, pauses an instant, and quickly enters and takes a position from which he can see or cover the entire room. The second man enters after a slight pause (to prevent catching the shot fired at the first man) and goes to the opposite side of the door.

A locked door is a danger signal. The room should be gassed, and entered only as a last resort. The door should be kicked and, after a moment's pause (in case the sniper fires at the opening door), the first man enters. He should be alert to the placement of furniture so as to channel movement. Booby traps are a possibility.

A wire running to the trigger of a shotgun or a loose fitting grenade pin is easily set up. While the search team is searching, the team leader covers the hallway and keeps the officer-in-charge informed of progress via radio.

When the room is searched, the searcher should sound off "clear!" When entering or leaving a room which has been searched, "coming in" or "coming out" should be sounded. When using stairs leading to areas which have been cleared, "coming up" or "coming down" should be shouted.

Critique. The procedure outlined is a tactic which includes the three basic steps of sniper control: (1) isolation, (2) containment, and (3) neutralization. It is just one of several approaches that could have been used. If the building is a large apartment house or hotel, the procedure may prove impractical. The SWAT people could then be stationed around the building in observation posts. If the sniper was spotted he could be eliminated. A search might be conducted with the occupants under orders to remain inside their apartments. The search party should then be large enough to control the occupants as well as to search. If a weapon is found, fingerprints and the rules of evidence should not be overlooked.

The common ingredient in all small unit tactics is strong command leadership. Confusion must be kept to a minimum and performance to a maximum. Lack of strong leadership and control will cause policemen to revert to individual action--the status for which they were trained and the way they function under normal assignments.

The "K" Unit Conspiracy

One large department received reliable intelligence that a black militant organization was planning to assassinate an unknown policeman on a routine call at an unknown time. The threat was serious as this same group had recently attempted to dynamite a local bank. The explosion was prevented only through an intelligence source who revealed where the dynamite was hidden. An inert substance was substituted for the real dynamite and permitted to be planted in the bank. The militant group was apparently convinced the explosive was defective.

A unique counterinsurgency device was (unofficially) devised to counter the plan to kill the policeman. One of the militants was arrested for a minor traffic offense. He was booked in one of the outlying precincts and left alone for several minutes in an office with papers scattered on a desk. One of these sheets had the words "CONFIDENTIAL" typed at the top and bottom. It was

numbered "page 3" (as though it had been separated from the original report). The paper is reproduced in its entirety as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL

"K" Unit Operations" Page 3

actions will utilize the "quick kill" concept.

d. "K" Units will cover all patrol unit calls, regardless of how minor they may seem.

e. "K" Unit coverage of the patrol unit on a call will follow the tactical plan in paragraph 2, above. It is essential that the presence of "K" Units not be noticed in the neighborhood, and that the operation of the patrol unit or units seem normal.

f. Officers will not refer to "K" Units in reports or in radio transmissions. All personnel are expected to deny that such units exist if questioned by an outside person.

g. "K" cars may contain one or more men, however, one man cars will always be equipped as provided in Annex 1, paragraph 2a, and will always have at least one "K" team within two blocks when covering patrol units.

4. Equipment

a. Vehicles. "K" Unit personnel are encouraged to use their own cars to avoid being identified by the appearance of official cars. Gas and oil will be provided.

(1) In exceptional cases, the use of rental cars is authorized. The "K" Unit Commander will determine the need for such equipment and is authorized to obtain it without further approval.

b. Radios.

(1) Car to car transmissions between "K" Units will be on the specially provided radios only. Equipment

to monitor this frequency is not readily available in the local area.

(2) "K" Units will monitor the regular operational frequency, and may receive routine messages from the dispatcher in this manner.

(3) See Annex 3 for radio call numbers and codes for "K" Units.

(4) Patrol units will not communicate directly with "K" Units, but may transmit "Information for cars in the area," or "Information for car __."

c. Ammunition.

(1) Ammunition for weekly markmanship practice

CONFIDENTIAL

The document seems somewhat preposterous in retrospect but the intelligence source later reported the plan to assassinate the policeman was temporarily dropped for unknown reasons. The officer who devised the ploy is convinced it was the result of a fear of ubiquitous "killer" cars who watch out for such things. Such imaginative thinking cannot always be condoned (or even admitted). But neither could every policeman be guarded twenty-four hours a day.

CHAPTER IV

AN ANALYSIS OF AUTHORITARIANISM IN THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT'S SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS TEAM PROGRAM

An investigation of attitudes held by individuals on SWAT teams has never been attempted. Accusations of "trained killers" and "hired assassins" have resulted in most departments attempting to keep the existence of their programs a secret. The police themselves are not sure of the validity of the charges. Are these the "violent men" of Hans Toch?[56] Are SWAT team members frustrated fascists who are out to assert their authority, or worse?:

> . . . There are those who volunteer for elite killer units that operate behind enemy lines and engage in assassinations or sabotage; there are others who prize assignments as snipers or scouts. . . .[57]

SWAT people are, after all, volunteers. Maybe some dangerous personalities slip through the department's psychological screening process.

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[56]Hans Toch, Violent Men (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 135-36.

[57]J. Hersey, The War Lover (New York: Bantam Books, 1960), cited by Hans Toch, ibid., p. 213.

I. THE PROBLEM

This study is an attempt to answer the following questions:

1. Are SWAT team members more authoritarian than their police peer group?
2. If the SWAT team personality is more authoritarian, dogmatic, and conservative, what is the reason for this?
3. Are there parallels or statistically significant relationships between SWAT team membership and other aspects of member's lives such as military experience and education?

II. INSTRUMENTS

This chapter, based on a longitudinal research design, is a comparative study of two police groups. The subjects are fifty members of an operational SWAT program in the Los Angeles Police Department. A comparison group of fifty non-SWAT police officers from the same department was administered identical scales. A four-measure instrument (Appendix A, page 180) was used. Three of the measures are validated attitude scales. The third, an "information sheet," was designed especially for this study.

Authoritarianism

The "F" or "predisposition to facism" scale was taken from a personality-attitude schedule published by

Shure and Meeker.[58] It comprises the first twenty-one items on the examination. The F Scale, originally developed by Adorno, et al.,[59] has been the subject of criticism. Shils demonstrated that it identifies "rightist" but not "leftist" authoritarians.[60] Adorno, concerned about anti-Semitism, assumed it was better to be a liberal-leftist than a conservative-rightist. This reasoning led to the inclusion of the Dogmatism Scale in this study.

Dogmatism

The second scale is a short form of Rokeach's Dogmatism Scale as developed and validated by Troldahl and Powell.[61] The dichotomy of "left" and "right"

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[58]Gerald H. Shure and Robert J. Meeker, "A Personality/Attitude Schedule for Use in Experimental Bargaining Studies," The Journal of Psychology, LXV (March, 1967), 233-52.

[59]T. W. Adorno, et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950).

[60]Edward A. Shils, "Authoritarianism: 'Right' and 'Left,'" Studies in the Scope and Method of The Authoritarian Personality, ed. Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1954), pp. 24-49.

[61]Verling C. Troldahl and Frederic A. Powell, "A Short-Form Dogmatism Scale for Use in Field Studies," Social Forces, XLIV (December, 1965), 211-14.

authoritarianism is undesirable because it closes the door in advance to the general properties held in common by all authoritarians, whether they be political, religious, academic, or whatever. The concern of dogmatism, an intolerance toward those with opposing beliefs, should be with the structure rather than the content of beliefs. "It is not so much what you believe that counts, but how you believe."[62]

The Dogmatism Scale, items twenty-two through forty-one, contains a varied collection of items that examine many different beliefs, which, on the surface, appear to be unrelated. The fact that subjects agree or disagree with these statements in a consistent manner is borne out by item analysis.[63] Kerlinger and Rokeach questioned the discrimination of both the F and D Scales and found them to be "factorially discriminable, even though both are measures of authoritarianism."[64]

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[62]Milton Rokeach, The Open and Closed Mind (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1960), p. 6.

[63]Ibid., p. 90.

[64]Fred Kerlinger and Milton Rokeach, "The Factorial Nature of the F and D Scales," Journal of Personality and Psychology, IV (1966), 398.

The purpose of the scale is to measure individual differences in openness or closedness of belief systems. This involves the extent to which a person can receive, evaluate, and act on relevant information on its own intrinsic merits, unencumbered by irrelevant factors arising from within the person or from the outside. These are important considerations as determinants of the way information will be evaluated and acted upon by the individual.

Conservatism

The Conservatism Test, the fifty items on the fourth page of the survey, was developed by Wilson and Patterson and validated in Great Gritain.[65] It is a measure of an individual's need to maintain traditionally constituted organizations and views.

The Conservatism Test was administered because of the probable central processes that occur when persons respond to traditional statement-form items:

1. An immediate, emotional response to the central, controversial issue involved in the statement, and,

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[65]Glen D. Wilson and John R. Patterson, "A New Measure of Conservatism," British Journal of Social Clinical Psychology, (December, 1968), 264-69.

2. Suspension of judgment while qualificatory and justificatory details of the statement are examined.[66]

During the second stage, the respondent begins to develop a sense of responsibility and commitment--the feeling that a considered, rational, judgment is expected since the question is so 'carefully' worded. The motives of the tester in asking the question also become of concern. His initial reaction is adjusted in the direction of socially desirable responses.

The possible solution is to abandon the propositional form of item (as in the previous forty-one questions) and list brief labels or catch-phrases representing various familiar and controversial issues. The scale, as developed by Wilson and Patterson, allows the respondent to indicate his 'position' immediately and reduces the influence of grammatical confusion, social desirability, and cognitive processes.

Four items were changed on the Conservatism Test to fit American terminology: Number twenty-nine was changed from "Royalty" to "states rights"; thirty-three was changed from "apartheid" to "strict segregation"; thirty-nine was changed from "birching" to "spanking"; and

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[66] Ibid., p. 265.

forty-eight was changed from "coloured immigration" to "open housing."

Information Sheet

The information sheet (Appendix A, page 180) contains data (police department assignments, military experience, home state, and education) that may help to explain differences, if observed, between the SWAT and comparison groups. "Home state" was included because of accusations that team members are predominantly recruited from the southern states.

III. HYPOTHESES

This study is geared toward determining whether a difference in authoritarianism can be observed between SWAT team members and the police group of which they are a part.

Hypothesis One

> No statistically significant differences in authoritarianism will be discovered between the SWAT team members and the officers in the Police Comparison group. SWAT team members will not have attitude and personality differences that set them apart from their peers.

Hypothesis Two

> Authoritarianism is correlated with education, age, and police experience. The group with less education, a higher mean age, and more police experience will have higher authoritarianism scores.

The above hypotheses are partially supported by other studies. Stewart and Hoult found those who are most authoritarian tend to be those who have less education.[67] Older people also tend to be more authoritarian.[68] Vacchiano found that "attitude shifts as a function of training were significantly related to authoritarianism but not to dogmatism."[69] This could lend support to the theory that police training, coupled with police experience, could lead to a shift toward increased authoritarianism. McNamara found that the authoritarian scores

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[67]Don Stewart and Thomas Hoult, "A Social Psychological Theory of the Authoritarian Personality," American Journal of Sociology, LXV (November, 1959), 276.

[68]Morris Janowir and Dwaine Marvick, "Authoritarianism and Political Behavior," Public Opinion Quarterly, XVII (Summer, 1953), 191.

[69]Ralph B. Vacchiano, David C. Schiffman, and Areta V. Crowell, "Attitude Change as a Function of Intensive Training, Dogmatism and Authoritarianism," Psychological Reports, XIX (1966), 361.

of pre-tested New York police recruits rose significantly after two years of police work.[70]

Roe suggests there is a correlation between personality and the choice of work. She states,

> Although the evidence is not extensive, there nevertheless seems to be no doubt that some specialized occupations, at least, do attract persons who resemble each other in some personality characteristics.[71]

Stewart and Hoult indicate the possible existence of

> occupational authoritarians (physicians, policemen, army personnel, priests, and the like) who may exhibit authoritarian traits as an occupational necessity and who therefore may have high F scores even though they happen to be products of, say, a loving and democratic family, which, according to psychoanalytic theory, produces non-authoritarians.[72]

IV. METHODOLOGY

Subject Selection

A metropolitan police department with a large SWAT team program was needed to obtain a sample that would be

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[70] John A. McNamara, "Uncertainties in Police Work: The Relevance of Police Recruits' Backgrounds and Training," The Police: Six Sociological Essays, ed. David J. Bordua (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967), p. 212.

[71] Anne Roe, Psychology of Occupations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1956), p. 80.

[72] Stewart and Hoult, op. cit., p. 278.

statistically meaningful. A sample of fifty subjects was considered the acceptable minimum. A check of responding departments having SWAT team programs (pages 124, 126, and Table VI, page 125) revealed a mean of 19.3 members per department. Only four departments had SWAT teams of fifty members or more. The largest of these, which reported two-man teams totaling 754 members, was excluded because it was a marksmanship program which did not fit the SWAT team concept.

Chief of Police Thomas Reddin of the Los Angeles Police Department agreed to the study.

The Los Angeles Police Department SWAT program was formed in the Patrol Bureau in 1966. All members are volunteers. The SWAT team selection process includes personnel interviews, a review of personnel files (including entrance psychiatric examinations), and staff and SWAT program recommendations. The unit attends a Basic and Advanced SWAT Training School and participates in monthly training exercises.

All SWAT members not absent for some reason (vacation, sick leave, etc.) were tested at one of two sessions in the Parker Center Auditorium in downtown Los Angeles. The two sessions (one at 0930 hours and the other at 2130 hours on 21 March 1969) were necessary

because the subjects were assigned to various eight-hour watches. A total of fifty-three SWAT members were available. Two of the finished examinations had to be discarded because of omissions. One subject devised his own coding system (the use of zeros on the "opinion survey" and comments instead of marks on the Conservatism Scale). This left an appropriate remainder of fifty completed questionnaires.

A comparison group of fifty-four subjects was chosen for examination on the same day. These were all of the available police officers on three watches in Central and Hollywood Divisions in the same period during which the SWAT teams were tested. No attempt was made to match the groups by rank, assignment, or age. Three papers had to be discarded for incompleteness. One was randomly discarded to reduce the Police Comparison Group to fifty subjects.

Administering and Scoring the Attitude Scales

Instructions. The SWAT and Police Comparison Group subjects were told they were assembled to complete an "opinion survey" (the title of the questionnaire). This was an attitude scale which would be of possible value in the recruitment of future team members. It would not

affect current team structure or members. The "information sheet" attached to the questionnaire was also an important part of the survey. Accurate completion of the sheet was necessary to set up statistical relationships between the scales and military, police, and educational experience. Anonymity of the survey was stressed as well as the need for honest responses.

The survey was passed out and the instructions read out loud. The subjects were then told, "It is important that you do not skip any questions. Decide quickly how you feel and put down your first impressions. There are no 'right' or 'wrong' answers. Work fast and be honest in your responses." Instructions were not altered or elaborated. If asked for advice, the tester emphasized an appropriate section of the instructions or offered a non-committal answer. Subjects were not permitted to consult with others.

The questionnaire was completed by most in twenty minutes and by all in twenty-eight minutes.

Scoring. The Authoritarianism and Dogmatism Scales comprised the first forty-one questions. The subjects indicated agreement or disagreement with each item on a scale ranging from minus three to plus three according to the following six-point scale:

Agreement

+3 Strong Support
+2 Moderate Support
+1 Slight Support

Disagreement

-1 Slight Opposition
-2 Moderate Opposition
-3 Strong Opposition

The zero point was excluded to force responses to one side or the other. The authoritarianism score is the algebraic sum of the scores obtained on items one through twenty-one; the dogmatism score is the sum of items twenty-two through forty-one.

The Conservatism Scale was graded with the aid of a "punch-card." Each odd-numbered 'yes' and each even-numbered 'no' was scored as "two." The question marks were scored as "one." The possible range of scores was, therefore, zero to 100.

V. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

The sample may or may not differ from other police groups in terms of education, maturity, experience, and other factors. All of the available SWAT population was tested. The randomness of the Police Comparison Group in relation to the remainder of the Department's 6,129 sworn personnel is unknown. The sample is not claimed to be more

than a comparison group. Any interpretations arising from this study must therefore be tempered with an awareness of its limitations.

Variations In Measurement

Attempts were made to keep potential sources of error to a minimum. The attitude scales were validated in other studies as previously mentioned. The examinations were administered as close together as possible to minimize the effects of history and maturation. A training exercise, riot, or other incident occurring close to the time of testing, for example, might have had a considerable effect on attitudes. Attempts were made to control or keep constant the variables or conditions between the groups.

Situational factors. Anonymity was provided the subjects to encourage candid responses. Scores would otherwise be influenced not only by individuals' attitudes but by their willingness or unwillingness to admit holding opinions they know to be unpopular. Webb, however, notes that even the device of anonymity itself may lead to problems of validity.[73]

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[73]Eugene J. Webb, et al., Unobtrusive Measures (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), p. 15.

The same setting could not be provided all subjects taking the examinations because the policemen work different watches. The Comparison Group policemen were also selected from all watches over a twenty-four hour period. This was considered necessary because watch assignments, except for probationary policemen, are a matter of preference and seniority. Differences in age and (possibly) attitudes can be found on the day and night watches. The Comparison Group subjects were tested in the Parker Center "roll call" rooms and in the Hollywood Division roll call room and detective offices. The distractions and settings were therefore different for each group.

Mechanical factors and variations in administration. Differences due to mechanical factors were kept to a minimum by checking individual questionnaires for poor printing and duplicate pages, providing extra pencils, etc. Uniform instructions and explanations were given both groups.

Analysis factors. Questionnaires were scored twice (by different people) to ensure accuracy. Statistical computations not processed by computer were double checked with a calculator.

Other factors. The reliance on data supplied by the police to evaluate police attitudes or behavior is a common objection. This is a weak criticism that could be applied to any group. Adequate sample size and comparisons with similar groups help offset or identify such problems should they exist. Sincerity of the investigator is of primary importance. The groups tested were small enough to control with little interaction between subjects. Rapport was easily established as the investigator is a fellow police officer and SWAT team leader.

VI. RESULTS

Analysis

The raw scores and data were programmed and processed through computers at Michigan State University. Raw scores, means, standard deviations, correlation matrices, and other data can be found in Appendices B, C, and D. Pearson product-moment correlations of the attitude scales to the information variables are in Tables II and III, pages 95 and 96. Table I lists a comparison of mean scores, standard deviations, and differences between uncorrelated means.

A comparison of raw score means. A comparison of means and standard deviations between groups is illustrated

in Table I. A *t* test was used to determine the significance of the differences between the uncorrelated means.

TABLE I

A COMPARISON OF MEAN SCORES, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN UNCORRELATED MEANS

	Mean	Standard Deviation	*t*
Authoritarianism			
SWAT	22.94	16.65	.204
Comparison	23.62	16.62	
Dogmatism			
SWAT	-13.80	14.30	1.710
Comparison	- 8.76	15.16	
Conservatism			
SWAT	56.10	8.11	.440
Comparison	56.88	9.57	

The authoritarianism mean scores for the SWAT and Comparison groups (22.94 and 23.62) and standard deviations (16.65 and 16.62) are quite similar. The .204 *t* test result indicates there is no significant difference between means at the .05 level of probability.

Dogmatism mean scores are not as close (-13.80 and -8.76) but the standard deviations are similar (14.30 and 15.16). The *t* test result of 1.710 indicates there is

still no statistically significant difference between the scores of the SWAT and the Comparison Group. With an N of 100, a *t* value of 1.990 or better is needed for significance at the .05 level. The null hypothesis was therefore not rejected.

The conservatism results are also similar (means of 56.10 and 56.88 and standard deviations of 8.11 and 9.57). The *t* test result of .440 again indicates there is no significant difference between group means at the .05 level.

Correlations between attitude scales and information variables. Pearson product-moment correlations between the police department, military, and education variables and authoritarianism, dogmatism, and conservatism scores can be found in Tables II and III. A negative correlation merely indicates that the two variables are inversely related.

An inspection of both tables reveals that none of the scores approach a positive or negative value of one. The scores are scattered; practically no correlation is present.

Correlations among attitude scales. The correlations (*r*) among the attitude scales are listed for both

TABLE II

SWAT GROUP CORRELATIONS--ATTITUDE SCALES TO INFORMATION VARIABLES

Variables	Auth	Dog	Cons
Age	-.299	-.267	-.074
Rank, Police Dept.	-.366	-.232	-.225
Months on Police Dept.	-.259	-.204	-.012
Months in Patrol	-.211	-.170	-.055
Branch of Military	.042	.150	-.049
Months Active Duty	.068	-.025	.065
Months Reserve	-.144	.011	.002
Rank, Military	-.216	.054	-.332
Infantry Experience	-.094	.035	-.112
Sniper Experience	-.081	.147	.196
Guerrilla Warfare	-.151	.081	.049
Airborne, Ranger, or Special Forces	.061	.161	.321
Years of Education	-.323	-.056	-.320

TABLE III

POLICE COMPARISON GROUP CORRELATIONS--ATTITUDE SCALES TO INFORMATION VARIABLES

Variables	Auth	Dog	Cons
Age	-.035	-.145	.106
Rank, Police Dept.	-.134	-.258	.142
Months on Police Dept.	-.005	-.147	.158
Months in Patrol	-.058	-.082	.066
Branch of Military	.056	-.112	.078
Months Active Duty	-.208	-.120	-.143
Months Reserve	.046	-.041	-.021
Rank, Military	-.091	.004	.054
Infantry Experience	-.092	-.097	.053
Sniper Experience	-.044	-.118	-.051
Guerrilla Warfare	.061	-.087	.170
Airborne, Ranger, or Special Forces	.200	.042	.188
Years of Education	-.100	.047	.038

the SWAT and Comparison Groups in Table IV, page 98. In the SWAT group, the correlation of authoritarianism with dogmatism is .682. This interaction is statistically significant at the $P < .01$ level. The same correlation in the Comparison Group is .560, also a significant relationship.

The SWAT correlation of dogmatism with conservatism is .396. The same correlation in the Comparison Group is .478. Both of these relationships are also significant at the $P < .01$ level.

Conservatism correlated with authoritarianism in the SWAT group is .635. The Comparison Group correlation for these variables is .521. Both of these relationships are significant at the $P < .01$ level.

Relationships between attitude scale coefficients in the SWAT and Police Comparison groups. Differences in correlation coefficients of the attitude score relationships between the SWAT and Comparison groups were tested by computing their *t* distributions (Table IV). As a *t* level of 2.680 or better must be observed before the null hypothesis can be rejected, all of the intercorrelations in Table IV are statistically significant beyond the .01 level of probability.

TABLE IV

THE *t* DISTRIBUTION OF ATTITUDE SCALE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS (*r*)

	r	*t*
SWAT Group		
Authoritarianism/Dogmatism	.682	6.461
Dogmatism/Conservatism	.396	2.988
Conservatism/Authoritarianism	.635	5.695
Comparison Group		
Authoritarianism/Dogmatism	.560	4.683
Dogmatism/Conservatism	.478	3.770
Conservatism/Authoritarianism	.521	4.229

Differences between correlations. To determine the significance of the difference between the correlations in the SWAT and Comparison groups, the obtained correlations between groups must be transformed into *z* scores. The standard error of the difference between the *z* scores can be calculated and the significance of the ratio of the difference determined. These differences are as follows:

Authoritarianism/Dogmatism	.971
Dogmatism/Conservatism	.398
Conservatism/Authoritarianism	.553

The differences between the above correlations are not significant. No differences, however, were expected.

Score levels may differ between populations but the relationships between scales in a given group remain fairly constant.

Information Sheet Results

A comparison of the data on police and military experience and educational differences between the SWAT and Comparison groups is presented in Table V.

VII. DISCUSSION

This study was based on hypotheses tied together by two propositions: (1) no statistically significant differences in authoritarianism will be observed between the SWAT and Comparison groups, and (2) should either group have less education than the other, more police experience, or a higher mean age, that group will have higher authoritarianism scores.

Hypothesis one, that no statistically significant difference in authoritarianism would be observed between the SWAT team members and their police peers proved to be valid for this study. The Los Angeles Police Department Special Weapons and Tactics team members are no more authoritarian or conservative in their attitudes than are the sample of fellow police officers from the same

TABLE V

SWAT AND POLICE COMPARISON GROUP DATA AS RECORDED ON THE "INFORMATION SHEET"

	SWAT	Comparison Group
1. Age (mean years)	33.3	30.6
2. Rank (numbers)		
a. Policemen	25	43
b. Sergeants	24	5
c. Lieutenants	1	2
3. Police Department Experience		
a. Mean Months	119.4	82.8
b. Mean Years	10.0	6.9
4. Patrol Experience		
a. Mean Months	63.8	58.1
b. Mean Years	5.3	4.8
5. Home State (by region)		
a. Southwest	24 (48%)	24 (48%)
b. Middlewest	11 (22%)	14 (28%)
c. Northeast	7 (14%)	4 (8%)
d. South*	5 (10%)	7 (14%)
e. Northwest	3 (6%)	1 (2%)
6. Military Branch		
a. Army	17	16
b. Marine Corps	12	10
c. Navy	9	12
d. Air Force	6	5
e. Other	2	0
f. Unknown	4	7
7. Military Duty Assignments		
a. Infantry	14	8
b. Other Line (Armor, Art)	5	13
c. Military Police	10	1
d. Clerical	2	4
e. Other	15	12
f. Unknown	0	5
8. Active Duty		
a. Mean Months	35.8	32.6
b. Mean Years	3.0	2.7
9. Reserve Duty		
a. Mean Months	28.8	22.7
b. Mean Years	2.4	1.9

TABLE V (continued)

	SWAT	Comparison Group
10. Military Rank		
a. Officer (numbers)	3	0
b. Officer (mean rank)	CPT	0
c. Enlisted (numbers)	42	42
d. Enlisted (approx. mean rank)	E4.5 (CPL)	E4.2 (CPL)
e. Unknown	1	1
11. Infantry Training or Experience (numbers)	27	17
12. Sniper Training or Experience (numbers)	11	6
13. Guerrilla Warfare Training or Experience (numbers)	19	11
14. Airborne, Ranger, or Special Forces Training (numbers)	11	3
15. Other		
a. SWAT		
(1) Jungle Warfare Training (2)		
(2) Weapons and Marksmanship (3)		
(3) Underwater Demolitions (1)		
(4) Hunter (1)		
b. Comparison Group		
(1) Air Evacuation (1)		
(2) Rifle or Pistol Team (2)		
16. Mean Years of Education Completed	13.8	12.9
17. Degrees (number)		
a. Associate in Arts	4	5
b. Bachelors	6	0
c. Masters	1	0

*"South" includes those states categorized as "Deep South" as well as border states with a historical identification with Southern institutions --Kentucky, Tennessee, Maryland, etc.

NOTE: This table compiled from data in Appendices B and C, pages 186 and 189.

department. The SWAT members are slightly less dogmatic but the difference is not statistically significant. A partial explanation for this is suggested by the "information sheet" results, Table V, pages 100 and 101, and Appendices B and C. A dogmatic personality would have, by definition, difficulty accepting the views of others. A student, if he is receptive to the ideas of others, should therefore have a low level of dogmatism. More SWAT team members are students. They have a mean of approximately one more year of education than do Comparison Group members. They also have six bachelor's and one master's degree compared with none for the Comparison Group.

Hypothesis two, that higher authoritarianism scores would be apparent in the group with the highest mean age, least education, or most police experience, could not be supported. The SWAT group had more police experience (3.1 years) and greater age (2.8 years) which should increase its authoritarianism level. Any increase may have been partially offset, however, by more education (1.0 years) in the SWAT group. A study by Smith and associates demonstrated that police officers who are attracted to college are significantly less authoritarian than those

who do not attend.[74] The greater number of sergeants in the SWAT program (nineteen) might also decrease the level of authoritarianism. The better educated (and less authoritarian) policeman probably has a higher rate of success on promotional examinations and is therefore drawn away from the street. Niederhoffer notes that the policeman in the field is the most authoritarian of his peers for he is involved in most of the incidents that require a display of authority.[75] Still another, but less obvious factor, may be present in a comparison of active duty military experience (a mean difference of 3.2 months) with age (a mean difference of 2.8 years). The Comparison Group police officers are younger but have almost the same active duty experience. This indicates there are probably more World War II and Korean War veterans in the SWAT group and more Vietnam veterans in the Comparison Group. This more recent military and combat experience may have increased the authoritarianism, dogmatism, and conservatism scores of the younger group.

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[74]Alexander B. Smith, Bernard Locke, and William F. Walker, "Authoritarianism in College and Non-College Oriented Police," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology, and Police Science, LVIII (March, 1967), 132.

[75]Arthur Niederhoffer, Behind the Shield: The Police in Urban Society (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1967), p. 130.

Further Observations

The SWAT group had 5.7 more months of police field (patrol) experience than the Comparison Group. They also had more infantry assignments (fourteen versus eight) and more infantry experience or training (twenty-seven versus seventeen). This may or may not have been by choice. The enlisted ranks attained by both groups were similar--both approximately the rank of corporal (E4). Military rank was disregarded, however, as a valid comparative measure. In many wartime settings, differing assignments among men of a common rank and specialty are made through chaotic processes with negligible regard to preferences or capabilities. Twice as many SWAT members, while in the military, volunteered for more hazardous assignments than the Comparison Group. These included sniper, guerrilla warfare, jungle warfare, airborne, ranger, and special forces training or experience. A more adventuresome nature and preference for rough, outdoor living seems to be indicated. Any future studies might attempt to ascertain the numbers of hunters and sportsmen, in SWAT teams. The fellowship of an outdoors group may be a major attraction to team membership.

The mean level of education of SWAT members (13.8 years) and Comparison Group police officers (12.9 years) is of passing interest. High school graduation (twelve)

years) or its equivalent is the required minimum for entrance into the Department.

Most SWAT team and Comparison Group personnel have home-towns in the southwest (twenty-four members each or 48 per cent of each group). Twenty-two per cent of the SWAT people come from the middlewest, 14 per cent from the northeast, 10 per cent from the south, and 6 per cent from the northwest.

A comparison of the police attitude scores with other occupational groups was beyond the scope of this research.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

This study may be considered a pilot project in its attempt to establish some relationship between one facet of a policeman's personality and his membership in a group. The results indicate that members of the Los Angeles Police Department Special Weapons and Tactics Team do not differ significantly in authoritarian attitudes from their peers.

The external validity of the results is, of course, open to question. The confidence with which the findings can be generalized to populations beyond the samples immediately studied is unknown. The project tends to support the idea that these groups are composed of

individuals who are members of and therefore subject to the pressures and sanctions of a larger society. Authoritarianism is but one facet of that complex organization known as a human being. This individual carries his complexities with him wherever he goes and into whatever organization he joins.

Attitude scale examinations such as presented have possible application in the recruitment and selection of SWAT team personnel. A problem exists, however, in determining just what characteristics are desirable. Further study is indicated.

CHAPTER V

A SURVEY OF SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS TEAMS IN CITIES WITH POPULATIONS OVER ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND

The number and locations of SWAT team programs in United States cities is unknown. A department faced with the need for a SWAT program must proceed on a trial-and-error basis. Knowledge and experience gained by other agencies with programs is simply not available because of a lack of communication between departments.

A letter was mailed to the "Center For Law Enforcement Research Information" as previously mentioned (page 25). They had no information on the existence or state of development of SWAT programs.

I. SURVEY CONTENT

A decision was made to survey police departments having jurisdiction in all cities in the United States with populations over one hundred thousand. This survey would attempt to ascertain the following information:

1. General data on city population, square miles, and numbers of sworn and line personnel. This information would be useful when comparing SWAT teams on different departments.

2. The number of riots occurring in that city during the last four years. This might reflect a pattern of increasing violence. It would also be an indication of how well (or how poorly) records are maintained--an important consideration when justifying or budgeting a SWAT program. Riots were defined as incidents which include "arson, sniping, looting, or an extra-ordinary police response."
3. The number of sniping incidents directed toward police personnel. This would serve as an indicator of SWAT team need.
4. The number of sniping incidents that occurred during darkness versus daylight. This is important when planning a training program.
5. The numbers of policemen injured by sniper fire.
6. The numbers of policemen killed by sniper fire.
7. The types of firearms used against police in sniping incidents. Weapons and accoutrements are often indicators of sniper competency and mission.
8. Does a SWAT program exist on the department? A concept definition should be included to distinguish it from riot control squads.
9. If no SWAT program exists, does the department intend to develop one? All possible reasons for not having a team, including political pressures, should be covered.
10. If a program exists, its name, date of origin, the numbers of personnel by rank, the average age of members, and their mean number of years with the department.
11. The number of teams and men per team.
12. The selection process for team membership.
13. The prerequisites or entrance requirements.
14. The group commander's rank.
15. The program's position in the department's organizational structure.
16. The team composition by position.
17. The purpose for which the teams were formed.
18. The types of equipment used.
19. How equipment is supplied.
20. Outside agencies, if any, that take part in the training.
21. Specialized training beyond that given to all officers.
22. A description of such training by type, subject, and approximate hours per year.

23. Outside training materials and publications in use.
24. Use of teams or members in actual SWAT field situations.
25. Description of such uses.
26. Team morale.
27. The desirability of team assignment.
28. A rating of the performance of the teams under field conditions.
29. Supervisors' and commanders' opinions of the program.
30. Confidentialness of the program.
31. Publicity.
32. Nature of the publicity.
33. Community opposition to the program.
34. Opposition from the city or local government.
35. Department opposition.

A questionnaire (Appendix G, page 211) was devised that inquired into each of the above areas. The preceding statements correspond to the same subjects and numbers on the questionnaire.

II. METHODOLOGY

A questionnaire combining the "fixed-alternative" (or multiple-choice) question and the "open-ended" (or "free-answer response") was considered the most desirable for this study.

Fixed-alternative Questions

A fixed-alternative question is one in which the responses of the subject are limited to stated alternatives. The advantages of this method are that the results

are easily tabulated, the number of respondents who claim to have 'no opinion' is reduced, and replies indicate the intensity of the respondents' feelings. The disadvantages include the difficulty of establishing clear-cut alternatives and the danger of irritating the respondent.

Free-answer Responses

The open-ended question is designed to permit a free-response. It raises an issue but does not provide or suggest any structure for the reply. The disadvantages are that the method requires more time and effort by both the enumerator and respondent, and may result in many who refuse to answer or claim they have no opinion.[76]

Establishing Categories

An attempt was made to provide exhaustive, mutually exclusive, categories for fixed-alternative questions. The responses to open-ended questions were organized into category sets. Oversights in coding were discouraged by requiring the respondent to check at least one category of the set. The total code is exhaustive in the sense that

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[76]A good discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of both types of questions is presented in Claire Selltiz, et al., Research Methods in Social Relations (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), pp. 256-63 and 552-74.

a place is provided for every possible response. It is not exhaustive, however, in terms of all possible classificatory principles that could be applied to the answers. Responses irrelevant to the subject were thus not classified.

Categorization of Absent Data

The provision of a category for a response that is expected not to occur was also included. Selltiz considers the principle involved far from obvious and too often neglected.[77] The application of this rule leads to the possible discovery of the significant absence of some response which might otherwise have gone unnoticed.

Indirect questions, where the desired information is inferred from responses directed to other matters, were also devised in several instances. These include the questions on morale, field performance, political interferrence, and "supervisor's" opinions of the program. In question 27 (page 146), for instance, the chief is asked how assignment to the program is considered (by the "men")? By answering, "One of the most popular assignments on the Department," or, "A way of escaping the drudgery of long hours of uniformed riot duty," he says much about his own opinion of the program's direction.

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[77] Ibid., p. 396.

Uniformity of Response

The impersonal nature of the questionnaire--its standardized wording, order, and instruction-- ensured some uniformity of response.[78] There was considerable variation anticipated in the persons completing them and in the conditions under which they were filled out. The Chief or one of his staff might complete the questionnaire but it was probable it would be assigned to a member of the SWAT program. Once assigned, many factors enter into its completion. The respondent's competence and knowledge of the subject area are important. His enthusiasm, work load, attitude, and many other variables effect the outcome. The respondent may wish to state the facts of a situation but be reluctant to bring the matter to his chief's attention. Not all the questionnaires were returned under the Chief's signature. Several responses were quite frank and did not appear to be overly concerned with the department's image of competency in this field.

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[78]Webb states that questionnaires "intrude as a foreign element into the social setting they would describe, they create as well as measure attitudes, they elicit atypical roles and responses, they are limited to those who are accessible and will cooperate, and the responses obtained are produced in part by dimensions of individual difference irrelevant to the topic at hand." Eugene J. Webb, et al., Unobtrusive Measures (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), p. 1.

III. QUESTIONNAIRE DISTRIBUTION

The 1969 edition of the Editor and Publisher Market Guide was consulted to obtain the latest population estimates.[79]

Excluded were several "marketing areas" which are not true cities (examples: "San Fernando Valley, California" which includes parts of several cities, and "Hollywood" which is not an incorporated city but is part of Los Angeles). The final list (Appendix E, page 205) includes 159 cities ranging from Burbank, California (population: 100,162) to New York City (population: 8,203,916).

The current names, addresses, and titles of the police department heads in the 159 cities were obtained from the "Directory of I.A.C.P. Members."[80] A letter (Appendix F, page 208) on Michigan State University School of Police Administration and Public Safety letterhead, was

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[79]"Editor & Publisher's Exclusive Market Rankings--Population," Editor and Publisher Market Guide--1969 Edition (New York: The Editor and Publisher Company, 1969), p. 4.

[80]International Association of Chiefs of Police, Inc., "Directory of I.A.C.P. Members: 1968-69," The Police Chief, XXXV (Washington, D. C.: International Association of Chiefs of Police, October, 1968).

mailed to each chief of police, along with the questionnaire, introducing the author, explaining the project, and requesting the chief's assistance.

The very onerousness of filling out a nine-page questionnaire would probably contribute to a poor return. A device was employed to offset this possibility. A promise was made to furnish survey data to all respondents thus making completion of the questionnaire of benefit to the agency. The names of departments and other identifying data would be excluded to ensure anonymity. Those departments wishing to take part in an "information exchange program," however, would be provided with the names and data from other organizations also wishing to participate. This device of a positive return on the progress of other departments in the field, and anonymity if desired, would hopefully increase the responses. Organizations without programs or those attempting to start them would benefit by knowing of the efforts and experiences of others and could correspond with them.

IV. QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONSE

Seventy-two of the 159 departments (45.3 per cent) responded. Nine subjects (12.5 per cent of the seventy-two) returned the questionnaires unanswered. Explanations for their non-participation were as follows:

1. Five departments cited insufficient manpower available to complete this or any other survey.
2. Two departments stated any information of this nature was classified and could not be released.
3. One department wrote that the completed questionnaire would follow shortly. It never arrived.
4. One department stated the population figures were inaccurate. The city had less than one hundred thousand residents and, therefore, should not be included in the survey.

V. QUESTIONNAIRE RESULTS

The following numbered free-standing sideheads refer to corresponding questions in the questionnaire:

1. General Information

The general information on city population, square miles, and numbers of sworn and line personnel, is not presented with the SWAT team data, Table VI, page 125, so as to preserve each department's anonymity, as promised. The purpose of the survey is to determine the current status of SWAT teams with emphasis on the development and sharing of techniques and programs. The information on specific organizational efforts was provided those who indicated a desire to share their programs (Appendix F, "introductory letter," and item 36 of the questionnaire).

No significant correlation exists between city population, square miles, the number of sworn personnel, the number of sniping incidents reported, or even the existence of a SWAT team program on a department. The larger cities tended to have more men detailed to anti-sniper teams but the largest cities did not have the largest teams.

2. Number of Riots

This chart, Figure 7, was compiled from information supplied by participating departments. It is incomplete and does not tally with other published surveys.[81] Accurate records of riots and sniping incidents are not maintained by most departments. Reliable data was therefore not available. The chart does, however, reflect a pattern of increasing national violence.

One department made the observation that, although they were not without racial difficulties, their proximity to a city with considerably more problems was a source of

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[81]Congressional Quarterly, Inc., "Urban Problems and Civil Disorder--Civil Disorder Chronology," Congressional Quarterly Special Report, No. 36 (Washington, D. C.: September 8, 1967), pp. 1709-12; Lemberg Center for the Study of Violence, "April Aftermath of the King Assassination," Riot Data Review, No. 2 (Waltham, Massachusetts: Brandeis University, August, 1968).

	1966	1967	1968	1969
Jan				1
Feb				4
Mar				5
Apr			24	
May		7	4	
Jun		7	6	
Jul	5	25	10	
Aug	2	9	6	
Sep	3	5	8	
Oct	2	2	3	
Nov		1	2	
Dec			1	
Totals	12	56	64	23

Figure 7. Riots (incidents where there has been arson, sniping, looting, or an extra-ordinary police response) reported by questionnaire respondents.

trouble. Black power organizations based in the other city constantly cause disturbances in the town's small Negro community.

3. Sniping Incidents Directed Toward Police Personnel

This chart, Figure 8, is skewed by the statistics from two large cities which keep accurate records on sniping incidents. City "A" (Department 9 in Table VI, page 125) had 222 reported and 62 confirmed sniping incidents in July, 1967. They also had fifty-seven reported and eighteen confirmed incidents in April, 1968. City "B" (Department 27 in Table VI) had thirty reported sniping incidents in April, 1968, and twenty-five in March, 1969. These figures are also incomplete when compared with other published surveys.[82]

4. Sniping Incidents: Daylight Versus Darkness

NOTE: These figures were affected by the same two cities that distorted the sniping incidents in Figure 8.

1966. One daytime incident of sniping against policemen was reported.

No incidents were reported during the hours of darkness.

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[82] Ibid.

	1966	1967	1968	1969
Jan				2
Feb				2
Mar				26
Apr			86	
May			2	
Jun		2		
Jul		225	5	
Aug		3	8	
Sep	1	1	4	
Oct				
Nov		1	1	
Dec				
Totals	1	232	106	32

Figure 8. Sniping incidents directed toward police personnel as reported by questionnaire respondents.

1967. One hundred and eighty-seven incidents of sniping against the police were reported during the hours of darkness. City "A" logged 177 of them.

City "A" also reported the forty-five daylight incidents.

1968. City "A" reported thirty-five of the eighty-five incidents during darkness; City "B" accounted for thirty of the remaining fifty.

Twenty of the twenty-one daylight incidents were reported by City "A."

1969 (first four months). City "A" reported one of thirty-one incidents during darkness. City "B" accounted for twenty-six.

One daylight sniping incident was reported.

Year	Darkness	Daylight	Year	Darkness	Daylight
1966	0	1	1968	85	21
1967	187	45	1969	31	1

Figure 9. Sniping incidents directed toward police personnel: daylight versus darkness.

A total of 371 sniping incidents against policemen were reported. Three hundred and three (81.7 per cent) occurred during the hours of darkness and sixty-eight (18.3 per cent) during daylight hours. These figures mean little because of inconsistencies in the reporting and investigation of incidents from city to city. Most sniping incidents, however, do occur during darkness which is an important consideration when planning a training program.

5. Police Injuries From Sniper Fire

City "A" reported seventeen policemen injured by sniper gunfire during July, 1967. Other cities reported twenty-five similar injuries between July, 1967, and March, 1969.

6. Police Deaths From Sniper Fire

Two cities each reported one police death from sniper fire (November, 1968, and March, 1969). Two other cities volunteered information of the similar deaths of a National Guardsman and two firemen.[83]

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[83]The discrepancy between the large number of sniping incidents (371) and the small number of deaths (2) is not entirely accounted for by poor marksmanship. Definitional problems exist as previously mentioned. The large number of incidents reported by some cities

7. Types of Firearms Used Against Police in Sniping Incidents

Few departments knew what weapons were used against them as the snipers and their firearms were not captured. Four departments thought .22 rifles were used; one reported a probable 12-gauge shotgun; and, one mentioned a possible .38 caliber handgun. The following weapons were positively identified by sight or recovery:

Three 12-gauge shotguns (type unknown)
Three .22 rifles (type unknown)
One .303 Enfield rifle
One .30 caliber M1 carbine
One 9 mm pistol
One .32 caliber revolver

8. Does the Department Have a SWAT Team Program Which is Separate From Riot Control or Unusual Occurrence Control Efforts?

Thirty-three of the seventy-two agencies reporting (45.8 per cent) have no SWAT team program. Thirty (41.7 per cent) of the reporting departments have such programs (Table VI, page 125). The remaining nine departments returned the questionnaire unanswered for the reasons given on page 115.

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indicates inconsistencies in reporting or a lack of standards and investigational techniques. See pages 39 and 40 for a discussion of "alleged" sniper fire.

9. Comments on the Development of SWAT Teams by Those Departments Without Them

The thirty-three departments without programs checked the following categories:

a. Twelve believe their present methods are adequate.
b. Five have no need for such a program.
c. Nine have programs in the planning stages. Note: Two of these departments furnished written plans for such programs and were able to complete the questionnaire on this basis. These plans are not included in the survey results, however, as they are not operational.
d. Two departments stated they initiated programs recently but the plans are not complete.
e. No respondent indicated the absence of a program was due to an inadequate budget or its lack of popularity within the community, city government, or department.
f. Five departments checked "other" (item 91) and explained they had no specific SWAT team program because the concept was incorporated into their general civil disturbance and riot control plans. All men in these riot control programs are given anti-sniper training and are expected to perform in both capacities.

10. Information on the Departments' SWAT Team Programs

The information in this question, question 11 (the number of teams and members), and question 14 (the group commander's rank), have been combined and illustrated in Table VI, page 125.

a. Team names. The most popular title is "Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team" program whose name and acronym originated with the Los Angeles Police Department.[84] This title is used by one-third (ten) of the departments. "Anti-sniper" squad or team is popular (five departments) as is "sniper" squad or team (four departments). (Note: Numbers were substituted for department names in Table VI to encourage maximum response through anonymity as previously discussed. Question marks indicate the information was not included and could not be determined from other responses or attached training material.)

b. Date started. The programs were arranged, as closely as possible, by starting date. Three programs were started in 1966, eight in 1967, fifteen in 1968, and three in 1969. Two teams have unknown starting dates.

c. Numbers of personnel by rank. SWAT team personnel of all ranks reported by the 30 departments total 1,046 men (1,013 policemen, 105 sergeants, 21 lieutenants, and 7 captains). The mean of 43.8 policemen per team is misleading because of the 754 men reported by Department

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[84] International Association of Chiefs of Police, op. cit., p. 60.

TABLE VI

SWAT TEAM COMPOSITION REPORTED BY QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS

	Program Name	Start Date	Personnel				Mean Age	Yrs on Dept	No. of Teams	Men on Team	Group Cmdr's Rank
			Pol	Sgt	Lt	Cpt					
1.	Anti-Sniper Squad	Feb 66	55	7	4	2	25	4	5	13	Cpt
2.	Special Weapons & Tactics	Mar 66	43	25	1		33	9	16	4	Lt
3.	Sniper Search Teams	? 66	35	12	1		30	7	6	8	Dep Chief
4.	Anti-Sniper Squad	Jun 67	6	2		1	37	10	2	4	Cpt
5.	Special Weapons & Tactics	Jun 67	16				32	9	4	4	Pol
6.	Sniper Squad	Jul 67	8				32	5	1	8	Pol
7.	Tactical Weapons Squad	Aug 67	11	1			33	10	4	3	Sgt
8.	Sniper Squad	Aug 67	14	1			32	10	2	7	Sgt
9.	Anti-Sniper Team	Oct 67	754				28	5	377	2	Fld Cmdr
10.	Special Weapons & Tactics	Nov 67	15	2		1	27	5	3	6	Cpt
11.	Tactical Unit	Nov 67	30	5	1		30	9	4	8	Lt
	Fire Squad	Nov 68	6						3	2	
12.	Counter-Sniper Team	Feb 68	3	1			26	4	5	4	Lt Col
13.	Special Weapons & Tactics	Mar 68	26	5	3	1	30	13	5	5	Lt
14.	Special Weapons & Tactics	Apr 68	12	4			28	4	4	4	Sgt
15.	Disorder Platoon	Apr 68	48	4	1	1	31	9	4	12	Lt
16.	Anti-Sniper Team	Apr 68	30	6	4		30	8	15	2	Lt
17.	Special Weapons & Tactics	May 68	26	6			30	8	6	4	Sgt
18.	Anti-Sniper Squad	May 68	36	9	3		33	10	9	5	Lt
19.	Special Weapons & Tactics	Jun 68	5	1			35	10	1	4	Sgt
20.	Special Unit	Jun 68	5	1			30	5	2	3	Sgt
21.	The Snipers	Jun 68	28	2			30	7	5	5	Sgt
22.	Special Weapons & Tactics	Jul 68	35	2			27	5	7	5	Sgt
23.	Special Weapons Team	Aug 68	6		1	1	36	13	1	8	Cpt
24.	Special Squad	Sep 68	4	1			30	6	1	5	Sgt
25.	Special Task Force	Sep 68	20	5			33	8	2	10	Sgt
26.	Special Weapons & Tactics	Apr 69	7	2			?	?	2	4	Sgt
27.	Sniper Team	Apr 69	8				27	6	4	2	Sgt
28.	Sniper Squad	Apr 69	11	1	1		33	10	1	12	Lt
29.	Special Weapons & Tactics	?	?	1	1		?	?	3	4	Lt
30.	?	?	10				?	?	2	5	Fld Cmdr
		Total	1313	105	21	7	828	209	506	172	
		$\bar{x}$	43.8	3.5	.7	.2	29.6	7.5	16.3	5.5	
	Total Minus Department 9		559						129		
	x Minus Department 9		19.3						4.3		

9. Excluding Department 9, the mean drops to 19.3 policemen per team. The mean number of sergeants per team is 3.5. The mean number of lieutenants per team is .7 and of captains is .2.

d. Age. The mean age of team members is 29.6 years.

e. Years on the department. The mean number of years SWAT team personnel have been department members is 7.5.

11. Number of Teams and Number of Men Per Team

The mean number of teams per department is 16.3. Excluding the 377 teams of Department 9, the figure drops to 4.3 teams per department. (Note: Department 11 has two separate SWAT programs. The "Tactical Unit" (four teams of eight men each) is deployed for police department needs. The "Fire Squad" (three teams of two men each) is assigned to the fire department to protect firemen from sniper fire.)

The mean number of men per team is 5.5. The number of departments by team size is as follows:

Two-man Teams	4	Seven-man Teams	1
Three-man Teams	2	Eight-man Teams	4
Four-man Teams	9	Ten-man Teams	1
Five-man Teams	6	Twelve-man Teams	2
Six-man Teams	1	Thirteen-man Teams	1

12. The Selection Process

The following areas were reported by respondents as being factors in the consideration of applicants for SWAT team membership:

		Number of Departments Mentioning
a.	Must be volunteers	16
b.	Marksmanship ability	14
c.	Military experience (included is one department requiring actual sniper experience)	8
d.	Recommendation of supervisor or commanding officer	8
e.	Demeanor, maturity, good judgment	4
f.	Hunter or shooter	2
g.	Leadership qualities	2
h.	Superior performance ratings	2
i.	Age requirements	1
j.	Detective bureau membership	1
k.	Patrol bureau membership	1

	Number of Departments Mentioning
l. Personality (unknown if tested)	1
m. Recommendation of police academy	1
n. Testing of reactions under simulated field situations	1

13. Prerequisites for SWAT Team Membership

The following entrance requirements were reported by respondents:

	Number of Departments Where Required
a. No prerequisites other than department membership	17
b. Staff recommendation	4
c. Military experience	2
d. Minimum age	2
e. Minimum physical qualifications	2
f. Minimum years on department	2
g. Marksmanship qualification score	1
h. Superior performance ratings	1

(Note: The excessive number of "no prerequisites"

indicates possible confusion between this and the previous question. Question 12 was intended to convey, "What do you look for in a candidate?" as opposed to question 13, "What minimum requirements must he meet to be admitted to the program?"

14. Rank of Group Commander

The SWAT team group commander is a sergeant in most cases (twelve), followed by the ranks of lieutenant (eight), captain (four), policeman (two), deputy chief (one), and lieutenant colonel (one). Two departments have no group commander but place their SWAT teams under the field commander at an unusual occurrence.

15. How Does the SWAT Team Program Fit Into the Department's Organizational Structure?

	Number of Departments
a. Dormant until activated during an emergency	14
b. Under the patrol bureau	9
c. Under a division created to handle unusual occurrences	2
d. Under the vice control bureau	1
e. Unanswered or unknown	4

Members of the SWAT team program are distributed throughout the organization in almost all departments. The team structure does not appear on the organizational charts of these departments. The program becomes operational only for training purposes or upon call-up by the department or field commander during an unusual occurrence.

16. Team Composition

Position titles are listed, by team size and department, in Table VII, pages 131 and 132. One-third of the departments (ten) did not answer this question. This failure to respond is indicated by "unknown" followed by the Department identification number. These "department numbers" correspond to the numbers listed in Table VI, page 125.

Thirty-one teams are listed for thirty departments because the "Fire Squad" of Department 11 (Table VI) was counted as a separate SWAT team.

The teams vary in composition from two to thirteen men each, with four men being the most popular size (nine departments). The positions of marksman and observer are common to almost all teams. The leader is usually the observer or "spotter." As the team size increases, generally only two additional positions appear: shotgun

TABLE VII

SWAT TEAM POSITION TITLES REPORTED
BY QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS

Two-man Teams

1. Rifleman; spotter (Department 9)*
2. Unknown** (Department 11--Fire Squad)
3. Marksman; spotter (Department 16)
4. Marksman; observer (Department 27)

Three-man Teams

1. Marksman; spotter; security man (Department 7)
2. Unknown (Department 20)

Four-man Teams

1. Leader (and observer); marksman; scout; rear guard (Department 2)
2. Unknown (Department 4)
3. Sniper; spotter; two defense men (Department 5)
4. Unknown (Department 12)
5. Leader; rifleman; observer; coverman (Department 14)
6. Leader; rifleman; shotgun man; automatic weapons man (Department 17)
7. Leader; marksman; alternate marksman; shotgun man (Department 19)
8. Leader; marksman; two shotgun men (Department 26)
9. Leader; rifleman; automatic rifleman; shotgun man (Department 29)

Five-man Teams

1. Leader; two riflemen; two shotgun men (Department 13)
2. Fire team leader; rifleman; cover-patrolman; shotgun man; smokeman (provides a smokescreen, with smoke grenades, to cover the team's maneuvers). (Department 18)
3. Unknown (Department 21)
4. Leader; marksman; observer; gas man; radio man (Department 22)
5. Unknown (Department 24)
6. Unknown (Department 30)

TABLE VII (continued)

Six-man Team

1. Supervisor; observer; marksman; three shotgun men (Department 10)

Seven-man Team

1. Leader; two riflemen; two shotgun men; rapid-fire weapons man; gas man (Department 8)

Eight-man Teams

1. Team leader; assistant team leader; two marksmen (rifles with telescopic sights); two riflemen (rifles with open sights); two shotgun men (Department 3)
2. Squad leader; remainder not listed (Department 6)
3. Unknown (Department 11)
4. Unknown (Department 23)

Ten-man Team

1. Unknown (Department 25)

Twelve-man Teams

1. Leader; rifleman (rifle with telescopic sight); spotter; the remainder are riflemen (rifles with open sights) and shotgun men (Department 15)
2. Leader; marksman; remainder not listed (Department 28)

Thirteen-man Team

1. Leader; assistant leader; sharpshooter; spotter; radio man; the remainder are covermen and runners (Department 1)

NOTE: Thirty-one teams are listed for thirty departments because the "Fire Squad" of Department 11 (Table VI, page 125) was counted as a separate SWAT team.

*Department numbers correspond to the numbers listed in Table VI, "SWAT Team Composition Reported by Questionnaire Respondents," page 125.

**"Unknown" indicates the information requested in question 16, "What is the team composition?" was omitted from the questionnaire.

man and rifleman. These are security positions to protect the remainder of the team. The shotgun man provides close-range firepower and the rifleman provides mid-range, rapid-fire capabilities. One five-man team (Department 18) employs a "smokeman" who, with smoke grenades, provides a smoke screen to cover the team's maneuvers.

17. Purposes for Which the Teams Were Formed

The thirty departments with SWAT teams listed the following reasons for the formation of their programs:

	Number of Departments
To Combat:	
a. Snipers	28
b. Barricaded suspects	5
c. Beserk people with guns	1
d. Urban guerrillas	1
To Perform:	
a. Raids	2
b. Special assignments or other undefined duties	2
To Protect:	
a. Dignitaries	11
b. Firemen	2
c. Policemen	2

	Number of Departments
To Provide:	
a. Jail or command post security	1
b. Surveillance of extremist groups	1

18. Types of Equipment Used by SWAT Teams

The equipment reported by the thirty departments with programs is listed in Table VIII. An item possessed by a department, regardless of the quantity, was tallied only once. Under "Optical Gear," for example, thirteen departments use binoculars. The number of binoculars available, however, is unknown.

The table of equipment is necessarily sketchy. Almost all departments (twenty-eight) reported they utilize telescopic sights on at least one rifle per team. Only four departments mentioned the revolver, however. Most officers probably carry their on-duty revolver but this is not reflected in the questionnaire returns.

Chemicals. Ten departments report their SWAT teams use smoke and tear gas. Six of the eight departments using tear gas issue the gas gun in addition to grenades.

TABLE VIII

SWAT TEAM EQUIPMENT REPORTED BY QUESTIONNAIRE RESPONDENTS

	Number of Departments
Chemicals	
1. Smoke	2
2. Tear gas	8
Communications Equipment	
1. Radios, hand-carried	8
Miscellaneous	
1. Barbed wire	1
2. Batons	1
Optical Gear	
1. Binoculars	13
2. Infra-red scopes	3
3. Starlight scope	1
4. Telescopic rifle sights	28
Protective Gear	
1. Bullet-proof vests	6
2. Gas masks	6
3. Helmets	7
4. Self-contained breathing apparatus	1
Uniforms	
1. Casual wear (street clothes)	1
2. Coveralls	7
3. Fatigues	3
4. Field caps	3
5. Standard police	10

TABLE VIII (continued)

	Number of Departments
Vehicles	
1. Armored or tracked	3
2. Bus	1
3. Helicopter	1
4. Standard sedan	8
5. Station wagon	1
6. Truck, panel	1
Weapons	
1. Carbine, .30 caliber, M1	7
2. Gas gun	6
3. Grenade launcher	2
4. Pistol	2
5. Pistol, machine	1
6. Revolver	4
7. Rifle, automatic	6
8. Rifle, caliber .308 or .30-06	17
9. Rifle, small caliber, high-velocity	9
10. Shotgun, 12-gauge	17
11. Submachine gun	5

NOTE: An item possessed by a department, regardless of the quantity, was recorded only once on this table. Six departments of the thirty reporting, for example, issue automatic rifles to their SWAT teams. The exact number of automatic rifles possessed by any team or any department is unknown.

Communications Equipment. Eight departments issue the hand-carried radio. Three make use of miniature pocket-size equipment, while the remainder use the older and larger models.

Miscellaneous. One department SWAT team carries concertina wire (for hasty barricades) in its supply vehicle. Another requires that batons be carried.

Optical Gear. Twenty-eight of the thirty departments make use of telescopic sights on one or more of the weapons in each team. Thirteen report they issue binoculars to the team leader or observer. Three departments have infra-red equipment and one has a late-model starlight scope on loan from the military.

Protective Gear. Seven departments require their SWAT team members to wear helmets. Six issue armored vests. Gas masks are distributed by six more departments and one reports having self-contained breathing apparatus.

Uniforms. Ten departments suit their SWAT team members in the standard police uniform. Seven provide black or dark blue coveralls or "jump-suits." Three programs make use of a fatigue uniform. One organization requires casual dress (street clothes) for its teams.

This department did not indicate if badges or other identifying insignia or clothing are worn. Field caps are part of the uniform of three units.

Vehicles. Standard police sedans are used by eight departments. How many are marked or unmarked vehicles is unknown. Only one of these teams indicated the vehicle was equipped or retained solely for their use. Two armored and one tracked vehicle (an armored personnel carrier) are used. It is unknown if they are part of the departments' riot-control equipment or are for the exclusive use of the SWAT teams. One bus, one helicopter, one station wagon, and one panel truck were also reported.

Weapons. Fifteen departments reported they equipped their SWAT teams with .30-06 rifles. These were combined, with two other large caliber, high-velocity weapons (.308 caliber), into one category. Nine departments are equipped with small caliber, high-velocity rifles. Six automatic rifles of unknown caliber or type are also employed. Seven departments use .30 caliber M1 carbines, seventeen have 12-gauge shotguns, five use submachine guns, six employ gas guns, and two have grenade launchers (unknown type). Only four departments mentioned revolvers and two reported

the carrying of pistols. One department has a machine pistol.

19. Who Supplies Equipment for the SWAT Teams?

a. One department requires the individual SWAT team member to provide his own equipment.

b. In nineteen of the thirty departments, the city supplies all equipment.

c. Eight departments stated part of the equipment is supplied by the city and part by the individual. It is unknown what portion of the burden is handled by each.

d. One department reported that state aid provides all equipment.

e. One department did not answer the question.

20. What Outside Organizations, If Any, Participate in the SWAT Team Training Program?

Twenty of the participating departments reported no other agencies assisted in training. Three departments stated they assist other SWAT teams in neighboring cities.

The remaining ten departments reported receiving assistance from the following organizations:

Military

Air National Guard	1
Army	4
Army National Guard	1
Marine Corps	2
Military (without specifying branch)	1

Police

Federal Bureau of Investigation	1
Highway Patrol	1
Police (without specifying department)	1
Sheriff	3

Assistance is primarily the use of range facilities at nearby military installations. Some departments receive an occasional military instructor to teach principles of guerrilla warfare, demolitions, etc. Only two departments reported conducting actual field training exercises with the military. These exercises include attendance at a "Recon" (reconnaissance) and a sniper school, assaulting a town (especially built for the purpose) with booby trapped buildings and concealed snipers, range training, weapons and demolitions familiarization, rappelling, and others.

21. Is There Specialized Training Beyond That Given to All Officers?

Twenty-eight departments report "yes" and two state "no."

22. Describe the Specialized Training Given SWAT Teams As to Type, Subject, and Approximate Hours Per Year

Few of the twenty-eight departments with specialized training followed the suggested format given on the sixth

page of the questionnaire (Appendix G, page 211). The total hours of training, if included, were often not broken down by subject. The two departments (12 and 29) that reported no specialized training in the previous question listed specialized training by subject and number of hours in response to this question. One of the departments that reported they had specialized training in question 21 failed to list that training. The number of hours of training or the subject matter could not be determined from the answers given by Departments 3, 6, and 26.

The total hours of specialized training by subject per year and the total hours of specialized training by department per year are illustrated in Tables IX and X.

23. Outside Training Materials in Use

Fourteen departments do not use outside training materials. One department writes its own manuals and lesson plans.

The remaining sixteen departments report making use of training materials from the following sources:

	Number of Departments
a. Army Field Manuals and Training Films	11
b. Federal Bureau of Investigation	3

TABLE IX

TOTAL ANNUAL HOURS OF SPECIALIZED SWAT TRAINING, BY SUBJECT, ALL DEPARTMENTS

	Hours
Classroom	
Classroom (unknown subjects)	242
Counter-sniper training	6
Guerrilla warfare	20
Riot control	34
Small unit tactics	20
Weapons and gas	44
	366
Field	
Field (unknown subjects)	210
Range firing and weapons familiarization	292
Small unit tactics	96
	598
Other	
Unknown type and subject	176
Total Hours, All Categories	1,140

TABLE X

TOTAL ANNUAL HOURS OF SPECIALIZED SWAT TRAINING BY DEPARTMENT

Department	Hours	Department	Hours	Department	Hours
1	24	11	36	21	16
2	124	12	28	22	16
3	Unk	13	24	23	96
4	8	14	76	24	0
5	54	15	52	25	112
6	Unk	16	24	26	Unk
7	60	17	8	27	12
8	4	18	104	28	116
9	8	19	20	29	36
10	6	20	64	30	12

Total Hours, All Departments: 1140

$\bar{x}$, Twenty-seven Departments: 42.2 Hours

NOTE: Department numbers correspond to the numbers listed in Table VI, page 125.

	Number of Departments
c. International Association of Chiefs of Police	3
d. Marine Corps	2
e. National Rifle Association	1
f. Other police departments	4

24. Have the SWAT Teams Been Used in Actual Field Situations for Their Intended Purposes?

Fifteen departments report "yes" and fifteen state "no."

25. Situations in Which the SWAT Teams Have Been Used

The fifteen departments responding "yes" to question 24 listed the following uses to which their SWAT teams were put:

	Number of Departments
a. Anti-sniper duty at potential or actual riot scenes	7
b. Barricaded suspects	2
c. Manning guard towers during prison riot	1
d. Manning rooftops at trial of militants	1
e. Protection of firemen	2

		Number of Departments
f.	Protection of policemen on raid	1
g.	Protection of VIP's (Note: Nine of these departments reported they protected the President of the United States one or more times.)	10
h.	Special assignment not described	1
i.	Surveillance of extremist groups	1

26. What is the Morale of the Team Members?

		Number of Departments
a.	Extremely high	20
b.	Above average	9
c.	Average (Note: One department checked "extremely high" but added the comment, "Prior to the indictment of eight men by (a) Federal Grand Jury." No explanation was offered.	1

27. Department Members Consider Assignment to the SWAT Team Program as Which of the Following:

		Number of Departments
a.	One of the most popular assignments on the Department	1
b.	Very much sought after	18
c.	Accepted	7
d.	Sufficient information not available to determine	4

28. The Performance of the SWAT Teams Under Actual Field Conditions May be Described as the Following:

		Number of Departments
a.	Superior to and beyond the capabilities of non-specialized personnel	13
b.	Satisfactory	2
c.	Unknown	12
d.	Other (Note: The three departments checking "Other" indicated the teams were not used in field situations. As fifteen departments reported not using the teams (question 24, page 144), "unknown" actually means "not used.")	3

29. What Do Most Supervisors and Commanders Think of the Program?

	Number of Departments
a. Strongly in favor of	15
b. Think it is needed	14
c. Consider it a "necessary evil"	1

30. Is the Program Confidential?

Eighteen departments reported their program was considered confidential. The remaining twelve departments checked "no."

31. Has the Program Received Any Publicity?

Four departments checked "yes."

32. Classification of the Reported Publicity

	Number of Departments
a. Accurate	1
b. Favorable	2
c. Other (The one department commended: "varies from favorable to untruthful")	1

33. Has There Been Any Community Opposition to the Program?

Three departments answered this affirmatively.

One department reported that a Negro member of their SWAT team was assigned to guard a black militant whose life was threatened. The militant, in his speeches, attempted to embarrass the policeman for his membership in the department and on the team. The respondent indicated this policeman is "a model of good sound composure" and did not react unfavorably to the baiting. Whenever the militant comes into town he now requests the services of this particular officer as a bodyguard.

Another department wrote that it has received opposition from "a most interesting assortment of bedfellows." The local branches of the Black Panthers, Black Students' Union, Communist Party, Congress of Racial Equality, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and Students for a Democratic Society are all claiming "enforcement of this type (the SWAT team concept) is strictly a racial attack on Negroes."

The third department made no comment.

One department did not respond to the question. Two of the twenty-five answering "no" stated they felt there was no opposition only because the program was classified and not, therefore, widely known.

34. Has There Been Opposition From the City or Local Government?

(Note: This question was modified by the statement, "A REPLY TO THIS QUESTION IS OPTIONAL.")

Two departments did not answer the question. Twenty-six indicated there was no opposition. The two remaining organizations answered "yes."

One respondent wrote, "Yes. Some local and State Politicians." The other stated, "Originally the department ordered (Colt) AR-15 rifles for the unit; after much controversy they were ordered to be returned by our mayor. The .30-06 rifles presently in use are not publicized, nor is the program." A third commended, "The mayor and council did not interfere in the operation, but they could have."

35. Has There Been Departmental Opposition?

Twenty-seven departments answered "no." One did not respond. Two stated there was opposition. One of the two replied that the opposition originated when the team concept was new and the "mission was uncertain in (the) minds of other officers." Most of this opposition disappeared after the team became operational. The other department stated some of its supervisors believe the program is unnecessary.

36. Do You Wish Your Department to be Listed as Being Interested in an Information Exchange Program?

(Note: Also included was the statement, "All respondents will be mailed the results of this survey except for Department names and information that would tend to identify other participants. All those answering 'yes' will also be furnished the names of other departments interested in an exchange program.")

Forty-four of the seventy-two respondents (61.1 per cent) replied they wished to participate in an information exchange program. Twenty-five of the thirty departments (83.3 per cent) with SWAT team programs answered "yes." Nineteen departments without programs also became part of the exchange program.

VI. RELIABILITY OF QUESTIONNAIRE RETURNS

Information received from the various departments was recorded as reported on the questionnaire returns. The reliability and validity of the survey was dependent upon the honesty, accuracy, and thoroughness of the respondent's reply.

Discrepancies

Several discrepancies or omissions were apparent in questionnaire returns. One chief of police wrote that his department had no such program. The same day his letter was received an issue of a gun magazine with nation-wide circulation appeared on the news stands. A six-page article described, in part, that department's anti-sniper program:

> Forward-looking departmental executives asked themselves what they could do to cope with a similar (sniper) incident should it occur in their own jurisdictions. . . . Suddenly it became mandatory and imperative to establish some sort of anti-sniper squad . . . there are ninety officers who have been hand-selected for special training in sniper control. Each of these men is issued a kit made up of one of the New Browning auto-loading rifles in caliber .30-06 scoped with a 2-7X Redfield variable. . . . The ninety anti-sniper specialists are apportioned carefully throughout the metropolitan area, both by district and by watch. . . .[85]

Another department, the recipient of a Department of Justice Law Enforcement Assistance Grant which was utilized to prepare a manual on sniper suppression,[86] did not respond.

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[85]Art Wesley, "St. Louis Blues," Gun World, IX (June, 1969), 36-41.

[86]Board on Police Standards and Training, Sniper Suppression and Building Clearance, outline prepared by the Portland Police Bureau Training Division. U.S.

Reluctance to release information about a sensitive and controversial area is understandable. Several departments "solved" the problem by stating the information was classified and could not be released. Others simply did not return the questionnaire. Several respondents, however, indicated that a lack of communications between departments made it necessary for each agency to "start from scratch," that recent events made a SWAT program mandatory but they were unable to draw on the experience of others for its establishment. This may account for the favorable response to the "information sharing" portion of the questionnaire by those without programs.

Sample Size

The survey sample is small and the conditions in the different cities and organizations sufficiently varied to make many findings unique to the department under discussion. Criteria for confirming or recording sniping incidents, for example, varies so much from city to city that the figures are statistically unsound. Their value comes in the realization that such incidents do occur and new techniques are needed to minimize their occurrence and

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Department of Justice Law Enforcement Assistance Grant No. 216. Salem, Oregon, November, 1968, p. 35.

apprehend those responsible. Such problems and solutions often cease being unique and can find application in other departments.

VII. COMMENT ON THE SURVEY RESULTS

A Critique of General Procedures and Policy

Written mobilization plans, including SWAT team call-up, are found in some form in most of the agencies surveyed. The quality of the plans, however, covers a wide spectrum of completeness and attention to detail. Plans are generally sketchy and incomplete.

The agencies have considered many of the points covered in the questionnaire but have given little or no thought to their actual implementation. This study indicates a complete lack of staffing and coordination of the planning effort within most departments.

In the larger cities there appears to be a trend to establish SWAT teams to be immediately constituted from designated on- and off-duty personnel. Assuming the team members are properly selected, trained, equipped, and directed, such a force should be effective in dealing with the urban guerrilla and sniper. The major snag in these departments is a breakdown in decision-making machinery for the commitment of such units.

Few departments keep other than command personnel informed as to SWAT team plans. Field personnel are therefore not aware of SWAT team capabilities or the procedures for summoning them when needed. Departments tend to rely mainly on briefings of personnel immediately prior to commitment. It is too little, too late, at this stage.[87]

There is a definite lack of procedures or methods to evaluate or improve SWAT operational plans. Few communities have afforded their enforcement personnel the opportunity to observe disorders, training, and team operations in other cities.

Logistical Requirements

General logistical readiness in terms of re-supply of manpower and items of equipment is in need of considerable review. There is a lack of hand-portable communications equipment for the teams. Vehicles to transport SWAT team members and their specialized equipment are

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[87] A communications device used by one agency to disseminate SWAT information is the "special order," a directive to all Department members from the Chief of Police on policy, procedures, and other matters. After being read and discussed at daily roll call sessions it is published in the Department Manual which is available to all officers. Los Angeles Police Department, Special Order Number 47, "Special Weapons and Tactics Teams," July 28, 1969.

alloted to other functions in time of need. Few departments have access to rotary wing aircraft, absolutely essential to some SWAT team missions. When helicopters are available they usually lack the equipment and pilots trained for use in built-up areas during the hours of darkness. The use of other SWAT equipment (particularly controversial items such as automatic weapons, types of ammunition, etc.) is a decision that must be made within the framework of the individual department's policy-making machinery.

Political Interference

Two reports frankly mentioned political interference in SWAT team programs. Political undertones were reflected in the replies and lack of response of several others. Police administrators generally reported complete authority but the lack of policy guidelines indicated an unfavorable operating climate. Such statements as, ". . . after much controversy they (an order of rifles) were ordered to be returned by our mayor," and "The Mayor and Council did not interfere in the operation but they could have," need no elaboration.

Political interference in police policy and other areas can be a serious problem to the proper functioning of a department. The mayor, as the chief elected official,

must take ultimate responsibility for all governmental action. Police chiefs should understand this responsibility and involve the mayor in their planning and operations. The chief, and not the politician, however, is responsible to insure that sound policies are formulated to serve as guidelines for members of the department. Interference with SWAT or other department operations and policy may result in loss of control and the ability of the department to function properly.

Training

An evaluation of SWAT team training based upon the data of this survey needs to be prefaced by a mention of the limitations of such a study. First, there must be a recognition of the inherent inequity of a statistical approach that compares, for example, hours of instruction in a particular subject area without a basis for determining the quality of content. Two hours of small unit tactics by a highly qualified instructor may be superior to ten hours of the same topic taught in another department by a disinterested or poorly prepared instructor.

Secondly, the ultimate criterion of training excellence is performance in the field, not the collection of statistics or the paper output of the training effort. The most realistic place to evaluate a training program is

on the street and not in the classroom. This is not to say, however, that conditions conducive to successful learning situations cannot be used to gauge at least the success potential of the training program. In any event, this survey was necessarily directed toward quantity rather than the quality of specific areas of SWAT team training.

Most departments felt capable of devising their own training. The fallacy of this reasoning is apparent upon examination of Tables IX and X, pages 142 and 143. If the departments reported accurately, the thirty agencies with SWAT programs devote a total of twenty hours (forty minutes per team) each year to small unit tactics, one of the most essential areas of SWAT performance. Defective (lazy) reporting is suspected, however, as "unknown subjects" take up 242 hours. Few departments conduct monthly training.

Training in many departments would correlate significantly with the approach of the equinoxes or the migration of ducks. The change to warm summer weather brings a flurry of training demands from the department command. Cold weather signals inactivity, indifference, and practical dissolution of many of the programs.

Most SWAT programs suffer from budgetary deficiencies. Others are subtly stifled by commanders who resent

the training time away from the division deployment or the non-availability of officers for sentry, patrol, and other routine assignments during emergencies. All have various needs for assistance. The most frequently stressed areas of assistance needs are as follows: (1) information from other cities, (2) funds to permit travel to other cities, (3) funds to permit off-duty training to prevent the weakening of field forces, (4) specialized military training and equipment, and (5) qualified SWAT consultants.

CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

I. SUMMARY

The sniper and the political assassin are realities of our times. The urban guerrilla is reported to be in training but has not yet emerged. The Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) team concept, a professionally directed, proportionate response, was formed to counter these threats.

The SWAT teams are assigned tasks and missions that are beyond the capabilities of the conventionally trained and equipped policeman. The "ideal" team is composed of four members: a special weapons marksman, an observer, a scout, and a shotgun man. The team leader may be any member but is preferably the observer. SWAT members are armed with weapons which provide balanced firepower for different ranges and situations.

The attitude scales reflect that members of the Los Angeles Police Department Special Weapons and Tactics team program and the Police Comparison Group do not differ significantly in authoritarian attitudes. Such examinations may eventually find use in the recruiting of applicants to police departments as well as to SWAT teams.

The survey of cities with populations over one hundred thousand revealed that SWAT programs are largely classified. Problems exist in the areas of policy formulation, political interference, and training. The information exchange program established through this study will hopefully permit the transfer of more information between departments. The communications block appears to be the largest single obstacle to SWAT program development. Few departments have benefited from the experience of others. Thirty SWAT programs were thirty individual efforts. A sharing of experiences, problems, and solutions will benefit the departments and the publics they serve.

II. IMPLICATIONS

The SWAT Image

Many police departments are trying to return the policeman to the foot beat to better his relations with the public. There is talk of turning some punitive "non-police" functions such as traffic enforcement over to civilian specialists. The trend is to bring the policeman closer to the community he serves.

The SWAT image conflicts with that of the conventional policeman. SWAT is a paramilitary group separate in appearance, purpose, and function from other units in

the department. It is frequently cloaked in secrecy, even from other policemen. Removal of team members has resulted when they discussed SWAT activities with fellow police officers and friends.

Word of SWAT's existence eventually reaches the public, usually through a newspaper "exposé." Minority groups often react with indignation and accusations that the unit was formed to harass and attack them.[88] Pressure is applied to discredit and scrap the program. Training must take place; mistakes will occur. Exposure is therefore inevitable.

The SWAT image must be brought in line with the conventional police responsibility "to protect and to serve." The police have a legitimate reason for forming SWAT programs. They are essential to combating snipers and barricaded suspects. They could conceivably become a city's only means to effectively combat an organized insurrection. Most citizens would understand this need if it were presented to them in a positive manner. A planned and coordinated news release program could be established. The public safety and protection aspect should be emphasized. The public is aware of the sniper problem, for instance. The

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[88]See page 148.

dangers of massive response and indiscriminate firepower could be presented through a good public information program. The proportionate response of SWAT as an alternative would be understood. Friction can still be expected from dissident groups. The impact will be lessened, however, if the initiative in reporting is taken by the police.

Other means of furthering the SWAT image through community service should be considered. These can be tailored to the needs of the particular city. Those municipalities which own helicopters, for instance, could consider their use in rescue operations. A SWAT team could land on the roof of a burning building and rescue trapped occupants. The team rappelling skills could be used in rescue operations (cars over cliffs, injured hikers, etc.). Demonstractions of rappelling from buildings could be staged for school children. Numerous positive ways of presenting the SWAT program and encouraging public support exist. The alternative to honest presentation (as some cities have discovered) is the overreaction of an uninformed public when the program is finally exposed. Any positive gestures are then seen as weak excuses to offset unfavorable publicity.

SWAT and Minority Groups

The majority of all citizens are law-abiding and involved in the daily problems of earning a living, raising families, and other activities. Yet extremist groups often spring up from minority and middle-class communities. Here they have the support of not only political and social radicals but many of those who may have legitimate grievances against society.

Support is essential to the guerrilla. Without it he has no means of escape or blending back into the community when pressure to capture him is applied. The law-abiding will not voluntarily support the urban guerrilla and his activities. Support will be provided, but largely through intimidation and terror. Such activities exist today if the large number of bombings for the past several years in the New York Times Index listed as being "Negro" are any indication. Fear of black militants and fear of white night riders constitute equal threats. SWAT, through developed intelligence, could conduct operations against these organizations. The minority and majority communities would each welcome the disruption of extremist black nationalist and white supremacist organizations.

Additional minority group support of SWAT activities could result from other means of protecting the community.

This would include the protection of community leaders in riot and other situations. An example of "other situations" was the plan of the Revolutionary Action Movement to assassinate Roy Wilkins, the executive director of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.[89]

Many militant groups are not prejudiced in one sense--they intend the assassination of anyone, regardless of race or creed, who does not support their programs:

> As the struggle becomes more intense, a Mau-Mau of a political form will probably have political ambitions which the house niggers, (uncle toms) and the public racists will be unable to fulfill. It will probably assassinate racist leaders and house niggers who don't follow its line. The cry in the black community will be "Liberation or Death!"[90]

Support of the entire community is necessary for proper SWAT functioning. The chief administrator of the police department has a sworn duty to provide the maximum protection for all members of the community.

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[89] United States Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Un-American Activities, Guerrilla War Advocates in the United States, Union Calendar No. 542, House Report No. 1351, 90th Congress, 2d Session (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 23.

[90] An unsigned article in Black America, Summer-Fall, 1965, 12, quoted in ibid., pp. 22-23.

SWAT and the City Administration

Selling the SWAT concept must start at the top and work down through an organization to be successful. No program can succeed if its administrator or controller of the purse strings is not convinced of its soundness and value. No attempt was made to gather further information on political difficulties such as in the one city whose mayor intercepted a shipment of SWAT rifles and returned them (page 149). The police responded, in this instance, by buying their own weapons and proceeding without official sanction. This has implications of unauthorized police power--a foreign (and feared) situation in the American political scheme.

Support of the city administration is essential to proper SWAT function. The SWAT administrator must carry the program banner. He has a good program and he must be able to obtain support for it. Conflicts in the perception of SWAT by others should be promptly and honestly discussed and resolved. Deficiencies in the SWAT program should be corrected. Unfit personnel should be weeded from the unit. The concept demands nothing less.

III. CONCLUSIONS

The State, to protect itself, has delegated the legitimate use of violence to the policeman. The policeman, unfortunately, must now concern himself with practical solutions to contain the problem of urban violence that no one else has been successful in providing. The SWAT concept is part of the containment solution.

The implications (and consequences) of having one's occupation at the center of a nation's violent behavior are many. The discomfort upon being presented with incompatible tasks is small when compared to confronting the sniper and the urban guerrilla on his own ground. The policeman alone stands between these elements and the public he is sworn to protect.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

ATTITUDE SCALES (AUTHORITARIANISM, DOGMATISM, AND CONSERVATISM) AND THE "INFORMATION SHEET"

OPINION SURVEY

Below are some statements reflecting attitudes toward various matters. Indicate the amount of your agreement or disagreement with each statement by putting a number in the blank at the left according to the following scale:

+1 Slight support, agreement	-1 Slight opposition, disagreement
+2 Moderate support, agreement	-2 Moderate opposition, disagreement
+3 Strong support, agreement	-3 Strong opposition, disagreement

Read each line and decide quickly how you feel about it; then fill in the number corresponding to the extent of your agreement or disagreement. Put down your first impressions.

1.____If the United Nations doesn't show more signs of getting tough with Russia soon, America must be prepared to carry on the fight by itself.

2.____While we should give military aid to countries which are prepared to fight our enemies, we ought to cut down on foreign economic help, or else the other countries will just play us for a sucker.

3.____If it weren't for Russia and her satellites, the world would be headed toward peace and prosperity by now.

4.____In these troubled times, if we are to be strong and united against our common enemy, we must have more laws and safeguards against the spreading of dangerous ideas.

5.____Pacifist demonstrations--picketing missile bases, peace walks, etc.--are harmful to the best interests of the American people.

6.____Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.

7.____Every person should have complete faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question.

8.____We need more leaders like J. Edgar Hoover, who have the morals and the strength to put our national honor above appeasement.

9.____Our government has shown too much patience in negotiating with nations which disagree with us.

10.____The greater the danger of war, the less use there is in working for world disarmament.

11.____Our diplomats have been too patient in conducting negotiations with other governments.

12.____The first principle of our foreign policy should be to join forces with any country, even if it is not very democratic, just as long as it is strongly anti-Communist.

13.____We should not trade with nations whose policies we don't approve.

14.____No sane, normal, decent person could ever think of hurting a close friend or relative.

15.____Young people sometimes get rebellious ideas, but as they grow up they ought to get over them and settle down.

16.____If people would talk less and work more, everybody would be better off.

17.____Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse.

18.____Some leisure is necessary but it is good hard work that makes life interesting and worthwhile.

19.____What youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to work and fight for family and country.

20.____There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.

21.____Books and movies ought not to deal so much with the unpleasant and seamy side of life. They ought to concentrate on themes that are entertaining and uplifting.

22.____In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know what's going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can be trusted.

23.____My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to admit he's wrong.

24.____There are two kinds of people in this world: those who are for the truth and those who are against the truth.

25.____Most people just don't know what's good for them.

26.____Of all the different philosophies which exist in this world there is probably only one which is correct.

27.____The highest form of government is a democracy and the highest form of democracy is a government run by those who are most intelligent.

28.____The main thing in life is for a person to want to do something important.

29.____I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how to solve my personal problems.

30.____Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth the paper they are printed on.

31.____Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.

32.____It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or cause that life becomes meaningful.

33.____Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.

34.____To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous because it usually leads to the betrayal of our own side.

35.____It is often desirable to reserve judgment about what's going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions of those one respects.

36.____The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is only the future that counts.

37.____The United States and Russia have just about nothing in common.

38.____In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself several times to make sure I am being understood.

39.____While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or Beethoven, or Shakespeare.

40.____Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worthwhile goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict the freedom of certain political groups.

41.____It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING DO YOU FAVOR OR BELIEVE IN?

Mark an "X" through "Yes" or "No."
If absolutely uncertain, mark an "X" through "?"
There are no right or wrong answers; do not discuss; just give your first reaction. Answer all items.

1.	death penalty	Yes	?	No	26.	computer music	Yes	?	No
2.	evolution theory	Yes	?	No	27.	chastity	Yes	?	No
3.	school uniforms	Yes	?	No	28.	fluoridation	Yes	?	No
4.	striptease shows	Yes	?	No	29.	state's rights	Yes	?	No
5.	Sabbath observance	Yes	?	No	30.	women judges	Yes	?	No
6.	beatniks	Yes	?	No	31.	conventional clothing	Yes	?	No
7.	patriotism	Yes	?	No	32.	teenage drivers	Yes	?	No
8.	modern art	Yes	?	No	33.	strict segregation	Yes	?	No
9.	self-denial	Yes	?	No	34.	nudist camps	Yes	?	No
10.	working mothers	Yes	?	No	35.	church authority	Yes	?	No
11.	horoscopes	Yes	?	No	36.	disarmament	Yes	?	No
12.	birth control	Yes	?	No	37.	censorship	Yes	?	No
13.	military drill	Yes	?	No	38.	white lies	Yes	?	No
14.	co-education	Yes	?	No	39.	spanking	Yes	?	No
15.	Divine law	Yes	?	No	40.	mixed marriage	Yes	?	No
16.	socialism	Yes	?	No	41.	strict rules	Yes	?	No
17.	white superiority	Yes	?	No	42.	jazz	Yes	?	No
18.	cousin marriage	Yes	?	No	43.	straitjackets	Yes	?	No
19.	moral training	Yes	?	No	44.	casual living	Yes	?	No
20.	suicide	Yes	?	No	45.	required Latin in school	Yes	?	No
21.	chaperones	Yes	?	No	46.	divorce	Yes	?	No
22.	legalized abortion	Yes	?	No	47.	inborn conscience	Yes	?	No
23.	empire-building	Yes	?	No	48.	open housing	Yes	?	No
24.	student pranks	Yes	?	No	49.	Bible truth	Yes	?	No
25.	licensing laws	Yes	?	No	50.	pajama parties	Yes	?	No

INFORMATION SHEET

(It Is Important To Answer All Questions)

1. Age _____

2. Rank On Police Department _____

3. Months On Police Department _____

4. Months In Patrol Assignment _____

5. Home State _____

6. Military Experience: (If None, check /__/)

   a. Branch (Army, Navy, etc.) _____

   b. Duty Specialty (Infantry, M.P.'s, Airman, etc.) _____

   c. Number Of Months Active Duty _____

   d. Number of Months Reserve Duty _____

   e. Highest Military Rank Held _____

   f. Check if applicable:

      (1) Infantry Experience /__/

      (2) Sniper Experience /__/

      (3) Guerilla Warfare Training /__/

      (4) Airborne, Ranger, or Special Forces /__/

      (5) Other Experience Applicable to SWAT Program _____ (Specify)

7. Education: (Circle Highest Year Completed)

   (a) High School: 9 10 11 12

   (b) College: 13 14 15 16

   (c) Graduate: 17 18

   (d) Degree(s) _____

APPENDIX B

INFORMATION SHEET AND ATTITUDE SCALE RAW DATA

SPECIAL WEAPONS AND TACTICS TEAM SUBJECTS

APPENDIX B

	Age (1)	Rank (2)	*Mo/Pd (3)	*Mo/Pat (4)	*St (5)	Branch (a)	Duty (b)	*Acduty (c)	*Res (d)	Rank (e) (6)	*Inf (f)	Sniper (g)	*Gwar (h)	*AR/SF (i)	Other (j)	Years (a) (7)	Deg (b)	Auth (8)	Dog (9)	Cons (10)
1.	30	Sgt	72	48	MN	ARMY	INF	6	36	E5	X	X		X		14		-2	-49	42
2.	30	Sgt	103	32	CA	NONE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15		16	-22	52
3.	25	Pol	42	33	CA	ARMY	MP	6	44	E4	X					16	BS	26	8	61
4.	30	Sgt	83	83	PA	NONE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14		21	-15	48
5.	31	Pol	78	48	MI	NAVY	ELEC	48	0	E5						13		-5	-37	44
6.	29	Sgt	83	7	CA	USAF	AP	48	24	E4						13		22	-20	61
7.	25	Pol	48	36	AR	ARMY	INF	36	36	E5	X	X	X	X	Jng. Wrf. Tng.	12		42	6	65
8.	31	Pol	109	72	CA	ARMY	INF	24	48	E5	X				Mrkmanshp Instr.	13		9	-25	60
9.	34	Sgt	120	120	OH	NAVY	ELEC	42	0	E6						13		19	-29	54
10.	38	Sgt	156	132	ME	ARMY	CLK	21	96	E4						17	BA	2	-16	47
11.	38	Sgt	168	120	CA	USMC	INF	48	0	E6	X				Weapons Instr.	12		21	-18	65
12.	39	Sgt	194	91	IL	USMC	INF	48	0	E6	X					15	AA	34	-8	56
13.	37	Sgt	180	144	CA	USMC	INF	39	0	E5	X					16		32	-16	66
14.	41	Sgt	230	184	CA	CG	MACH	18	0	E4						14		29	-8	59
15.	26	Pol	31	28	CA	NAVY	ENG	22	12	E3						12		40	1	57
16.	40	Sgt	156	120	CA	USAF	MACH	96	0	E7						14		2	-22	50
17.	26	Pol	45	24	CA	NAVY	DECK	56	0	?			X	X		17	MA	4	-4	40
18.	41	Sgt	180	72	ID	ARMY	INF	48	20	E3			X			16	BS	30	-5	68
19.	36	Sgt	156	156	CA	ARMY	INF	36	0	E5	X	X	X	X		12		34	-22	60
20.	29	Sgt	103	40	MA	ARMY	INF	9	92	E6	X	X	X	X		17	BS	7	-17	43
21.	42	Sgt	210	148	CA	NAVY	LC	36	0	E4	X					14		15	2	45
22.	42	Sgt	257	120	IA	ARMY	AIR	15	80	E8	X					13		0	-12	59
23.	48	Pol	232	168	CA	USMC	AIR	72	84	MAJ	X	X	X	X		15		-3	-38	52
24.	33	Pol	43	43	OK	ARMY	INF	36	36	E5	X	X	X	X		14		34	-13	46
25.	37	Sgt	140	20	OK	USMC	INF	36	48	E5	X	X	X	X		14		22	-18	55
26.	37	Pol	159	72	WA	USAF	AP	15	0	E5						13		19	-36	60
27.	27	Pol	65	45	SC	NAVY	ELEC	24	24	E3						13		21	-16	58
28.	26	Pol	53	50	IA	NONE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	13		42	3	52
29.	25	Pol	44	41	NJ	USMC	MP	36	36	E4	X		X			13		49	-12	72
30.	28	Pol	54	48	NY	ARMY	ART	24	48	E4	X				Hunter	13		26	9	66
31.	33	Pol	84	42	CA	NAVY	HOSP	3	93	E4					Weapons-Hunter	14		51	9	69

APPENDIX B (continued)

	Age (1)	Rank (2)	*Mo/Pd (3)	*Mo/Pat (4)	*St (5)	Branch (a)	Duty (b)	*Acduty (c)	*Res (d)	Rank (e) (6)	*Inf (f)	Sniper (g)	*Gwar (h)	*AR/SF (i)	Other (j)	Years (a) (7)	Deg (b)	Auth (8)	Dog (9)	Cons (10)
32.	29	Sgt	84	14	CA	ARMY	MP	24	0	E4						14	AA	-2	-25	47
33.	28	Pol	49	45	KY	NAVY	SP	96	0	E6	X	X	X	X	UDT	11		40	3	60
34.	29	Pol	65	65	CO	NAVY	SPNS	48	0	E5			X			12		34	-5	64
35.	27	Pol	36	34	NY	USMC	INF	54	0	E5	X	X	X	X		13		44	-14	54
36.	30	Pol	59	20	OH	USMC	ART	36	36	E4	X		X			14	AA	-10	-44	51
37.	26	Pol	44	16	CA	CG	BTSW	48	36	E3						14		48	8	75
38.	39	Sgt	198	54	CA	USMC	TRNS	23	0	E4	X					12		39	4	56
39.	44	Pol	226	0	MN	ARMY	INF	24	0	E3	X		X		Jng. Wrf. Tng.	14		24	-10	52
40.	27	Pol	62	41	CA	USAF	ELEC	48	24	E4						13		39	2	52
41.	26	Pol	50	28	CA	USAF	MED	48	24	E3						12		24	-10	52
42.	32	Pol	91	91	CA	USMC	ART	72	0	E5	X		X			12		50	-19	65
43.	36	Sgt	169	18	IL	USMC	TRNS	48	0	E5	X					13		23	-15	67
44.	43	Sgt	252	24	ND	ARMY	MP	24	18	E7	X	X	X	X		14		11	-34	54
45.	35	Pol	168	0	RI	USMC	MP	24	24	E5	X	X	X			14		51	0	60
46.	36	Pol	168	0	IL	ARMY	MP	24	96	E4	X		X			16	BS	23	-20	58
47.	35	Sgt	139	36	CA	ARMY	MP	6	124	CPT					Pistol Tng.	17	BS	27	-5	56
48.	40	Sgt	144	96	CA	USAF	ADM	48	0	E6						12		5	-28	53
49.	40	Lt	180	120	NB	NONE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15		9	-11	50
50.	31	Sgt	108	100	CA	ARMY	INF	6	84	1LT	X		X			16	AA	9	-27	47
Totals	1667		5970	3189				1648	1323		27	11	19	11		692		1147	-690	2805
$\bar{X}$	33.34		119.40	63.78				35.85	28.76							13.84		22.94	-13.80	56.10
SD	6.05		65.61	47.96				21.35	34.05							1.54		16.65	14.30	8.11

*Mo/Pd = Months on Police Department; Mo/Pat = Months in a Patrol Assignment; St = State; Acduty = Months on Active Duty; Res = Months in a Reserve Assignment; Inf = Infantry; Gwar = Guerrilla Warfare Experience or Training; AR/SF = Airborn, Ranger, or Special Forces Assignment; Deg = Degree(s); Auth = Authoritarianism; Dog = Dogmatism; Cons = Conservation.

APPENDIX C

INFORMATION SHEET AND ATTITUDE SCALE RAW DATA

POLICE OFFICER COMPARISON GROUP

APPENDIX C

	Age (1)	Rank (2)	*Mo/Pd (3)	*Mo/Pat (4)	*St (5)	Branch (a)	Duty (b)	*Acduty (c)	*Res (d)	Rank (e) (6)	*Inf (f)	Sniper (g)	*Gwar (h)	*AR/SF (i)	Other (j)	Years (a) (7)	Deg (b)	Auth (8)	Dog (9)	Cons (10)
1.	32	Pol	126	72	OK	USMC	SPSR	24	0	E2	X					12		35	-14	56
2.	27	Pol	64	36	CA	ARMY	INF	9	11	E7		X			Air Evac	14		48	11	54
3.	43	Lt	258	168	KS	NAVY	SUB	28	0	E3						12		45	-21	74
4.	32	Sgt	120	18	MI	NAVY	?	48	48	E4						12		28	-22	58
5.	28	Pol	72	72	NY	NAVY	ELEC	48	78	E5						14	AA	12	-22	49
6.	28	Pol	80	80	CA	NAVY	BOIL	40	0	E4						12		19	-28	65
7.	25	Pol	38	38	CA	ARMY	INF	24	16	E3			X			12		36	12	62
8.	26	Pol	46	28	CA	NAVY	FIN	21	10	E4						14		48	14	66
9.	23	Pol	20	17	CA	USMC	INF	48	24	E4	X		X	X	Rifle & Pistol Tm	12		22	-23	47
10.	22	Pol	14	11	AR	NAVY	PERS	24	36	E4						13		27	-9	50
11.	23	Pol	15	10	CA	ARMY	ART	24	0	E5	X	X				13		17	-20	70
12.	28	Pol	54	54	CA	ARMY	ART	24	24	E5	X					15		41	2	56
13.	25	Pol	9	4	CA	ARMY	ART	24	0	E4						13		27	-18	51
14.	31	Pol	26	23	IN	USMC	INF	21	48	E2	X	X	X			12		29	3	42
15.	25	Pol	14	9	MI	ARMY	AG	21	18	E5						14		-5	-27	50
16.	31	Pol	97	29	IL	NONE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		13		34	-12	53
17.	25	Pol	35	32	CA	USAF	TECH	48	24	E3						12		30	-25	53
18.	24	Pol	44	30	MI	NONE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		12		42	18	64
19.	25	Pol	23	19	TN	USAF	PERS	57	0	E4						12		34	1	56
20.	30	Pol	60	60	CA	ARMY	ORD	36	0	E3						12		28	17	67
21.	27	Pol	66	36	CA	NONE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		14		29	11	74
22.	31	Pol	132	90	ND	ARMY	ARM	6	66	E6	X		X			14		48	-5	56
23.	28	Pol	62	48	AR	USMC	AIR	11	61	E6	X		X			14		24	0	68
24.	51	Pol	252	12	TN	ARMY	ART	48	0	E5						13		24	-16	67
25.	26	Pol	23	20	IL	ARMY	MP	70	12	E4						12		15	-23	46
26.	27	Sgt	62	42	CA	USMC	INF	6	68	E4	X	X	X		Rifle Inst	14	AA	7	-20	58
27.	37	Sgt	168	144	MI	NAVY	?	48	0	E3						15	AA	12	-10	50
28.	42	Pol	247	216	CA	NAVY	COXS	28	0	E4						12		38	2	56
29.	34	Pol	96	96	MO	NONE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		13		35	-25	52
30.	39	Pol	120	100	IL	ARMY	MI	25	48	E4	X			X		16	AA	5	-3	49
31.	30	Pol	84	60	CA	USMC	ARM	24	48	E3	X					13		52	8	80

APPENDIX C (continued)

	Age (1)	Rank (2)	*Mo/Pd (3)	*Mo/Pat (4)	*St (5)	Branch (a)	Duty (b)	*Acduty (c)	*Res (d)	Rank (e) (6)	*Inf (f)	Sniper (g)	*Gwar (h)	*AR/SF (i)	Other (j)	Years (a) (7)	Deg (b)	Auth (8)	Dog (9)	Cons (10)
32.	46	Pol	252	209	CA	NAVY	?	48	0	E4						12		1	-11	47
33.	22	Pol	16	9	CA	NONE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		13		20	-18	48
34.	28	Pol	30	27	NJ	USMC	ELEC	50	13	E5						13		19	-5	53
35.	22	Pol	12	8	CA	NONE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		14		20	-4	55
36.	25	Pol	12	7	OH	NAVY	SUB	24	48	E3						12		17	-2	54
37.	32	Sgt	116	116	CA	USAF	ELEC	43	53	E4						15	AA	9	-5	70
38.	49	Lt	238	108	CA	NAVY	?	24	0	E5	X					14		0	-23	53
39.	28	Pol	30	30	OK	NONE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		12		28	-19	64
40.	28	Pol	48	48	CA	ARMY	INF	6	66	E6	X					12		17	-26	52
41.	25	Pol	14	9	CA	ARMY	ELEC	24	0	E4						12		-12	-41	38
42.	30	Pol	86	76	NY	USAF	AIR	48	0	E3						12		37	15	62
43.	38	Pol	156	60	MT	USAF	AIR	48	96	E6	X	X	X			12		34	-17	61
44.	49	Pol	252	216	NC	ARMY	AIR	36	0	FO						12		13	-8	60
45.	23	Pol	15	11	IL	USMC	INF	48	22	E5	X	X	X			12		12	15	62
46.	24	Pol	10	6	CA	USMC	INF	36	36	E4	X		X			12		39	-2	46
47.	31	Pol	9	4	NY	ARMY	ENG	24	0	E4						12		49	21	76
48.	49	Sgt	264	240	IL	NAVY	ORD	24	0	E4						14		14	-26	54
49.	26	Pol	22	20	CA	ARMY	?	36	0	E5			X	X		12		3	-8	54
50.	28	Pol	31	28	CA	USMC	ORD	48	0	E4	X		X			12		-25	-30	36
Totals	1528		4140	2906				1402	974		17	6	11	3		644		1181	-438	2844
$\bar{X}$	30.56		82.80	58.12				32.61	22.65							12.88		23.62	-8.76	56.88
SD	7.82		79.96	61.10				15.16	26.20							1.08		16.62	15.16	9.57

*Mo/Pd = Months on Police Department; Mo/Pat = Months in a Patrol Assignment; St = State; Acduty = Months on Active Duty; Res = Months in a Reserve Assignment; Inf = Infantry; Gwar = Guerrilla Warfare Experience or Training; AR/SF = Airborn, Ranger, or Special Forces Assignment; Deg = Degree(s); Auth = Authoritarianism; Dog = Dogmatism; Cons = Conservation.

APPENDIX D

MEANS, STANDARD DEVIATIONS, CORRELATION MATRICES, AND PROGRAMMING DATA

```
NUMBER OF VARIABLES =     16
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS =        50
NUMBER OF FORMAT CARDS =      2
DATA READ IN FROM LOGICAL UNIT NUMBER 60
NO PARAMETER FOR NUMBER OF CHARACTERS PER PHYSICAL TAPE RECORD
IF PARITY ERROR -- RECORD DROPPED AND PROGRAM CONTINUES
RESULTS PRINTED AND PUNCHED
DATA READ IN BY PROGRAM
VALUE OF FREE PARAMETER IS    -0
THIS IS YOUR DATA INPUT FORMAT =  (F2.0,X,F1.0,X,F3.0,X,F3.0,X,F1.0,X,F2.0,X,F3.0,X,F2.0,X,4(F1.0,X),
F2.0,X,F3.0,X,F3.0,X,F2.0)
LABELS AND MISSING DATA CODES ARE --
```

VARIABLE NUMBER	VARIABLE NAME	CODE
1	AGE	99.0000
2	RANK	0.0000
3	MO PD	999.0000
4	MO PAT	999.0000
5	BRANCH	0.0000
6	AC DUTY	0.0000
7	RES	999.0000
8	RANK	0.0000
9	INF	0.0000
10	SNIPER	0.0000
11	GWAR	0.0000
12	AR SF	0.0000
13	YEARS	99.0000
14	AUTH	999.0000
15	DOG	999.0000
16	CONS	99.0000

FIRST TRANSFORMED OBSERVATION (FROM RAW OBS. NO. 1)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
30.0000	2.0000	72.0000	48.0000	1.0000	6.0000	36.0000

8	9	10	11	12	13	14
5.0000	1.0000	1.0000	2.0000	1.0000	14.0000	-2.0000

15	16
-49.0000	42.0000

OTE - CALCULATIONS MADE WITH ADJUSTMENTS FOR ANY MISSING DATA.

VARIABLE	N	MEAN	STD DEV	VARIABLE	N	MEAN	STD DEV	VARIABLE	N	MEAN	STD DEV	VARIABLE	N	MEAN	STD DE
AGE	50	33.340	6.046	RANK	50	1.520	0.544	MO PD	50	119.400	65.610	MC PAT	50	63.780	47.95
BRANC	46	1.370	0.488	AC DUTY	46	35.848	21.349	RES	50	26.460	34.046	RANK	46	7.239	13.99
INF	46	1.391	0.493	SNIPER	46	1.761	0.431	GWAR	46	1.587	0.498	AR SF	46	1.761	0.43
YEARS	50	13.840	1.543	AUTH	50	22.940	16.647	DOG	50	-13.800	14.296	CONS	50	56.100	8.11

CORRELATION MATRIX

E --UPPER-RIGHT TRIANGLE CONTAINS CORRELATIONS.
LOWER-LEFT TRIANGLE CONTAINS ADJUSTED N.

VARIABLE	AGE	RANK	MO PD	MO PAT	BRANCH	AC DUTY	RES	RANK	INF	SNIPER	GWAR	AR SF
AGE	**********	0.492	0.942	0.535	-0.206	0.042	0.022	-0.129	-0.214	-0.021	0.011	0.055
RANK	50.000	**********	0.538	0.439	-0.192	-0.131	-0.073	-0.101	-0.054	0.027	0.273	0.027
MO PD	50.000	50.000	**********	0.491	-0.256	-0.039	0.028	-0.119	-0.254	0.022	0.053	0.117
MO PAT	50.000	50.000	50.000	**********	0.052	0.135	-0.086	-0.066	-0.017	0.085	0.201	0.059
BRANCH	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	**********	0.287	-0.332	0.156	0.770	0.324	0.368	0.218
AC DUTY	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	**********	-0.476	0.151	0.037	-0.084	-0.192	-0.161
RES	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	46.000	46.000	**********	-0.059	-0.079	-0.086	-0.082	-0.050
RANK	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	**********	0.163	0.047	-0.199	-0.300
INF	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	**********	0.449	0.492	0.345
SNIPER	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	**********	0.565	0.881
GWAR	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	**********	0.565
AR SF	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	**********
YEARS	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	46.000	46.000	50.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000
AUTH	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	46.000	46.000	50.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000
DOB	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	46.000	46.000	50.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000
DOMS	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	46.000	46.000	50.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000	46.000

VARIABLE	YEARS	AUTH	DOG	CONS
AGE	0.179	-0.299	-0.267	-0.074
RANK	0.271	-0.366	-0.232	-0.225
MO PD	0.204	-0.259	-0.204	-0.012
MO PAT	0.032	-0.211	-0.170	-0.055
BRANCH	-0.306	0.042	0.150	-0.049
AC DUTY	-0.336	0.068	-0.025	0.065
RES	0.502	-0.144	0.011	0.002
RANK	0.341	-0.216	0.054	-0.332
INF	-0.042	-0.094	0.035	-0.112
SNIPER	0.066	-0.081	0.147	0.196
GUAR	-0.105	-0.151	0.081	0.049
AR SF	-0.037	0.061	0.161	0.321
YEARS	**********	-0.323	-0.056	-0.320
AUTH	50.000	**********	0.682	0.635
DOG	50.000	50.000	**********	0.396
CONS	50.000	50.000	50.000	**********

```
NUMBER OF VARIABLES =     16
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS =        50
NUMBER OF FORMAT CARDS =      2
DATA READ IN FROM LOGICAL UNIT NUMBER 60
NO PARAMETER FOR NUMBER OF CHARACTERS PER PHYSICAL TAPE RECORD
IF PARITY ERROR -- RECORD DROPPED AND PROGRAM CONTINUES
RESULTS PRINTED AND PUNCHED
DATA READ IN BY PROGRAM
VALUE OF FREE PARAMETER IS    -0
THIS IS YOUR DATA INPUT FORMAT =  (F2.0,X,F1.0,X,F3.0,X,F3.0,X,F1.0,X,F2.0,X,F3.0,X,F2.0,X,4(F1.0,X),
F2.0,X,F3.0,X,F3.0,X,F2.0)
LABELS AND MISSING DATA CODES ARE --
```

VARIABLE NUMBER	VARIABLE NAME	CODE
1	AGE	99.0000
2	RANK	0.0000
3	MO PD	999.0000
4	MO PAT	999.0000
5	BRANCH	0.0000
6	AC DUTY	0.0000
7	RES	999.0000
8	RANK	0.0000
9	INF	0.0000
10	SNIPER	0.0000
11	GWAR	0.0000
12	AR SF	0.0000
13	YEARS	99.0000
14	AUTH	999.0000
15	DOG	999.0000
16	CONS	99.0000

FIRST TRANSFORMED OBSERVATION (FROM RAW OBS. NO. 1)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
32.0000	1.0000	126.0000	72.0000	1.0000	24.0000	0.0000

8	9	10	11	12	13	14
2.0000	1.0000	2.0000	2.0000	2.0000	12.0000	35.0000

15	16
-14.0000	56.0000

N, MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS

NOTE -- CALCULATIONS MADE WITH ADJUSTMENTS FOR ANY MISSING DATA.

VARIABLE	N	MEAN	STD DEV	VARIABLE	N	MEAN	STD DEV	VARIABLE	N	MEAN	STD DEV	VARIABLE	N	MEAN	STD DEV
AGE	50	30.560	7.820	RANK	50	1.180	0.482	MO PD	50	82.800	79.964	MC PAT	50	58.120	61.10
BRANC	43	1.395	0.495	AC DUTY	43	32.605	15.160	RES	50	19.480	26.198	RANK	43	6.395	14.49
INF	43	1.581	0.499	SNIPER	43	1.860	0.351	GWAR	43	1.744	0.441	AR SF	43	1.930	0.25
YEARS	50	12.880	1.081	AUTH	50	23.620	16.622	DOG	50	-8.760	15.156	CONS	50	56.880	9.57

CORRELATION MATRIX

E --UPPER-RIGHT TRIANGLE CONTAINS CORRELATIONS.
LOWER-LEFT TRIANGLE CONTAINS ADJUSTED N.

VARIABLE	AGE	RANK	MO PD	MO PAT	BRANCH	AC DUTY	RES	RANK	INF	SNIPER	GWAR	AR SF
AGE	**********	0.466	0.948	0.773	0.280	0.059	-0.119	0.342	0.158	0.151	0.258	0.063
RANK	50.000	**********	0.517	0.408	0.416	-0.052	-0.010	-0.072	0.071	0.034	0.137	0.113
MO PD	50.000	50.000	**********	0.847	0.396	0.045	-0.099	0.303	0.159	0.153	0.252	0.112
MO PAT	50.000	50.000	50.000	**********	0.412	-0.006	-0.113	0.365	0.198	0.201	0.252	0.071
BRANCH	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	**********	0.301	0.014	-0.138	0.493	0.188	0.365	0.221
AC DUTY	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	**********	-0.220	0.020	0.412	0.178	0.095	-0.068
RES	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	43.000	43.000	**********	-0.110	-0.400	-0.275	-0.376	-0.014
RANK	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	**********	0.112	0.044	0.079	0.039
INF	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	**********	0.475	0.583	0.138
SNIPER	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	**********	0.379	-0.110
GWAR	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	**********	0.258
AR SF	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	**********
YEARS	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	43.000	43.000	50.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000
AUTH	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	43.000	43.000	50.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000
DOG	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	43.000	43.000	50.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000
CONS	50.000	50.000	50.000	50.000	43.000	43.000	50.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000	43.000

VARIABLE	YEARS	AUTH	DOG	CONS
AGE	0.112	-0.085	-0.145	0.106
RANK	0.238	-0.134	-0.259	0.142
MO PD	0.125	-0.005	-0.147	0.158
MO PAT	0.147	-0.059	-0.082	0.066
BRANCH	0.016	0.056	-0.112	0.078
AD DUTY	-0.317	-0.208	-0.120	-0.143
RES	0.207	0.046	-0.041	-0.021
RANK	-0.097	-0.091	0.004	0.054
INF	-0.149	-0.092	-0.097	0.053
SNIPER	0.010	-0.044	-0.118	-0.051
GWAR	0.166	0.061	-0.087	0.170
AD SE	-0.116	0.209	0.042	0.188
YEARS	**********	-0.100	0.047	0.038
AUTH	50.000	**********	0.560	0.521
DOG	50.000	50.000	**********	0.478
CON	50.000	50.000	50.000	**********

```
TACTICAL TEAM COMPARISON GROUP **** GROUP A
THE FOLLOWING  3 CARDS CONTAIN THE FREQUENCY(N). THERE IS SPACE FOR 7  N PER
CARD. EACH  N OCCUPIES 11 CONSECUTIVE COLUMNS BEGINNING IN COLUMN 3 OF EACH
CARD. THE FIRST 3 COLUMNS OF EACH CARD CONTAIN A UNIQUE SEQUENTIAL CODE.
CARD 1 CONTAINS THE  N FOR VARIABLES 1-7.
N 1          50          50          50          50          46          46          50
N 2          46          46          46          46          46          50          50
N 3          50          50
THE FOLLOWING  3 CARDS CONTAIN THE   MEANS(M).   THERE IS SPACE FOR 7  M PER
CARD. EACH  M OCCUPIES 11 CONSECUTIVE COLUMNS BEGINNING IN COLUMN 3 OF EACH
CARD. THE FIRST 3 COLUMNS OF EACH CARD CONTAIN A UNIQUE SEQUENTIAL CODE.
CARD 1 CONTAINS THE  M FOR VARIABLES 1-7.
M 1     33.3400      1.5200    119.4000     63.7800      1.3696     35.8478     26.4600
M 2      7.2391      1.3913      1.7609      1.5870      1.7609     13.8400     22.9400
M 3    -13.8000     56.1000
THE FOLLOWING  3 CARDS CONTAIN THE STD.DEV.(SD). THERE IS SPACE FOR 7 SD PER
CARD. EACH SD OCCUPIES 11 CONSECUTIVE COLUMNS BEGINNING IN COLUMN 3 OF EACH
CARD. THE FIRST 3 COLUMNS OF EACH CARD CONTAIN A UNIQUE SEQUENTIAL CODE.
CARD 1 CONTAINS THE SD FOR VARIABLES 1-7.
S 1      6.0461      0.5436     65.6099     47.9559      0.4880     21.3469     34.0403
S 2     13.9955      0.4934      0.4313      0.4978      0.4313      1.5434     16.6469
S 3     14.2957      8.1096
THE FOLLOWING   48 CARDS CONTAIN THE CORRELATIONS. THERE IS SPACE FOR 7
CORRELATIONS PER CARD. EACH CORRELATION OCCUPIES 10 CONSECUTIVE COLUMNS
BEGINNING IN COLUMN 11 OF EACH CARD. THE FIRST 10 COLUMNS OF EACH CARD CONTAIN
A UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION CODE. COLUMN 1 CONTAINS THE LETTER R. COLUMNS 2-4
SIGNIFY THE ROW OF THE CORRELATION MATRIX. COLUMNS 5-7 SIGNIFY THE R-MATRIX
COLUMN NUMBER OF THE FIRST CORRELATION ON A CARD. COLUMNS 8-10 SIGNIFY THE
R-MATRIX COLUMN NUMBER OF THE LAST CORRELATION ON A CARD.
R  1  1  7 1.0000000 0.4915266 0.9415897 0.5352664-0.2055867 0.0416125 0.0220274
R  1  8 14-0.1286466-0.2144216-0.0211493 0.0109931 0.0549881 0.1787233-0.2986698
R  1 15 16-0.2666672-0.0739633
R  2  1  7 0.4915266 1.0000000 0.5382122 0.4389568-0.1920816-0.1311877-0.0727325
R  2  8 14-0.1014244-0.0542782 0.0266155 0.2728429 0.0266155 0.2714609-0.3663344
R  2 15 16-0.2316224-0.2249860
R  3  1  7 0.9415897 0.5382122 1.0000000 0.4912055-0.2563775-0.0866475 0.0264482
R  3  8 14-0.1192924-0.2540182 0.0218966 0.0532790 0.1166867 0.2057968-0.2587327
R  3 15 16-0.2038990-0.0121973
R  4  1  7 0.5352664 0.4389568 0.4912055 1.0000000 0.0518638 0.1352329-0.0834831
R  4  8 14-0.0658918-0.0168717 0.0846258 0.2009539 0.0593753 0.0320511-0.2106944
R  4 15 16-0.1609421-0.0548850
R  5  1  7-0.2055867-0.1920816-0.2563775 0.0518638 1.0000000 0.2870624-0.3319225
R  5  8 14 0.1569591 0.7723578 0.5236423 0.3873839 0.2160569-0.3663344 0.0419251
R  5 15 16 0.15[illegible]
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R  6  1  7 0.0416125-0.1311877-0.0886475 0.1552329 0.2870624 1.0000000-0.4763198
R  6  8 14 0.1507322 0.0374209-0.0836892-0.1921377-0.1609246-0.3355479 0.0680074
R  6 15 16-0.0246011 0.0649869
R  7  1  7 0.0220274-0.0727325 0.0284482-0.0664631-0.3519225-0.4763198 1.0000000
R  7  8 14-0.0587751-0.0790887-0.0859199-0.0820700-0.0501388 0.5016654-0.1436228
R  7 15 16 0.0106671 0.0021214
R  8  1  7-0.1286466-0.1014244-0.1192924-0.0658918 0.1559591 0.1507322-0.0587751
R  8  8 14 1.0000000 0.1631318 0.0465020-0.1992060-0.2995815 0.3414713-0.2157964
R  8 15 16 0.0539062-0.3323776
R  9  1  7-0.2144216-0.0542782-0.2540182-0.0168717 0.7703578 0.0374209-0.0790887
R  9  8 14 0.1631318 1.0000000 0.4494895 0.4916613 0.3450627-0.0419678-0.0938874
R  9 15 16 0.0350273-0.1120376
R 10  1  7-0.0211493 0.0266155 0.0218966 0.0846258 0.3236423-0.0836892-0.0859199
R 10  8 14 0.0465020 0.4494895 1.0000000 0.5647870 0.8805195 0.0600221-0.0812262
R 10 15 16 0.1469222 0.1960767
R 11  1  7 0.0109951 0.2728429 0.0332790 0.2009339 0.3678659-0.1921377-0.0820700
R 11  8 14-0.1992060 0.4916613 0.5647870 1.0000000 0.5647870-0.1046069-0.1514229
R 11 15 16 0.0810323 0.0494210
R 12  1  7 0.0549881 0.0266155 0.1166867 0.0593753 0.2180569-0.1609246-0.0501388
R 12  8 14-0.2995815 0.3450627 0.8805195 0.5647870 1.0000000-0.0374256 0.0614310
R 12 15 16 0.1609949 0.3207419
R 13  1  7 0.1787233 0.2714659 0.2037968 0.0320511-0.3063944-0.3355479 0.5016654
R 13  8 14 0.3414713-0.0419678 0.0600221-0.1046069-0.0374256 1.0000000-0.3228758
R 13 15 16-0.0558677-0.3199115
R 14  1  7-0.2986698-0.3663344-0.2587327-0.2108944 0.0419251 0.0680074-0.1436228
R 14  8 14-0.2157964-0.0938874-0.0812262-0.1514229 0.0614310-0.3228758 1.0000000
R 14 15 16 0.6824988 0.6354230
R 15  1  7-0.2666672-0.2316224-0.2038990-0.1699421 0.1503824-0.0246011 0.0106671
R 15  8 14 0.0539062 0.0350273 0.1469222 0.0810323 0.1609949-0.0558677 0.6824988
R 15 15 16 1.0000000 0.3960794
R 16  1  7-0.0739633-0.2249860-0.0121973-0.0548850-0.0494555 0.0649869 0.0021214
R 16  8 14-0.3323776-0.1120376 0.1960767 0.0494210 0.3207419-0.3199115 0.6354230
R 16 15 16 0.3960794 1.0000000
TACTICAL TEAM COMPARISON GROUP **** GROUP B
THE FOLLOWING  3 CARDS CONTAIN THE FREQUENCY(N). THERE IS SPACE FOR 7  N PER
CARD. EACH  N OCCUPIES 11 CONSECUTIVE COLUMNS BEGINNING IN COLUMN 3 OF EACH
CARD. THE FIRST 3 COLUMNS OF EACH CARD CONTAIN A UNIQUE SEQUENTIAL CODE.
CARD 1 CONTAINS THE  N FOR VARIABLES 1-7.
N 1          50          50          50          50          43          43          50
N 2          43          43          43          43          43          50          50
N 3          50          50
THE FOLLOWING  3 CARDS CONTAIN THE  MEANS(M).  THERE IS SPACE FOR 7  M PER
CARD. EACH  M OCCUPIES 11 CONSECUTIVE COLUMNS BEGINNING IN COLUMN 3 OF EACH
CARD. THE FIRST 3 COLUMNS OF EACH CARD CONTAIN A UNIQUE SEQUENTIAL CODE.
CARD 1 CONTAINS THE  M FOR VARIABLES 1-7.
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M 1      [illegible]
M 2      6.3953      1.5814      1.8605      1.7442      1.9302     12.8800     23.6200
M 3     -8.7620     56.8800
THE FOLLOWING  3 CARDS CONTAIN THE STD.DEV.(SD). THERE IS SPACE FOR 7 SD PER
CARD. EACH SD OCCUPIES 11 CONSECUTIVE COLUMNS BEGINNING IN COLUMN 3 OF EACH
CARD. THE FIRST 3 COLUMNS OF EACH CARD CONTAIN A UNIQUE SEQUENTIAL CODE.
CARD 1 CONTAINS THE SD FOR VARIABLES 1-7.
S 1      7.8198      0.4819     79.9635     61.1013      0.4947     15.1597     28.1980
S 2     14.4982      0.4992      0.3506      0.4415      0.2578      1.0812     16.6217
S 3     15.1557      9.5739
THE FOLLOWING  48 CARDS CONTAIN THE CORRELATIONS. THERE IS SPACE FOR 7
CORRELATIONS PER CARD. EACH CORRELATION OCCUPIES 10 CONSECUTIVE COLUMNS
BEGINNING IN COLUMN 11 OF EACH CARD. THE FIRST 10 COLUMNS OF EACH CARD CONTAIN
A UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION CODE. COLUMN 1 CONTAINS THE LETTER R. COLUMNS 2-4
SIGNIFY THE ROW OF THE CORRELATION MATRIX. COLUMNS 5-7 SIGNIFY THE R-MATRIX
COLUMN NUMBER OF THE FIRST CORRELATION ON A CARD. COLUMNS 8-10 SIGNIFY THE
R-MATRIX COLUMN NUMBER OF THE LAST CORRELATION ON A CARD.
R  1  1  7 1.0000000 0.4855123 0.9476801 0.7733837 0.2804278 0.0586612-0.1189881
R  1  8 14 0.3416142 0.1584618 0.1506001 0.2580756 0.0625379 0.1119046-0.0851569
R  1 15 16-0.1447712 0.1064109
R  2  1  7 0.4855123 1.0000000 0.5173026 0.4081656 0.4155356-0.0624059-0.0102160
R  2  8 14-0.0720088 0.0711531 0.0537678 0.1365220 0.1127351 0.2381392-0.1339662
R  2 15 16-0.2575113 0.1418986
R  3  1  7 0.9476801 0.5173026 1.0000000 0.8473326 0.3960925 0.0451398-0.0989114
R  3  8 14 0.3031454 0.1591275 0.1526742 0.2515370 0.1115092 0.1245885-0.0050639
R  3 15 16-0.1466841 0.1581823
R  4  1  7 0.7733837 0.4081656 0.8473326 1.0000000 0.4118562-0.0061721-0.1127784
R  4  8 14 0.3653338 0.1975733 0.2613415 0.2516872 0.0707228 0.1472696-0.0579871
R  4 15 16-0.0822122 0.0657526
R  5  1  7 0.2804278 0.4155356 0.3960925 0.4118562 1.0000000 0.3007143 0.0141534
R  5  8 14-0.1384966 0.4932934 0.1883495 0.3650733 0.2214463 0.0159173 0.0559347
R  5 15 16-0.1117478 0.0778003
R  6  1  7 0.0586612-0.0624059 0.0451398-0.0061721 0.3007143 1.0000000-0.2202680
R  6  8 14 0.0199024 0.4118117 0.1775186 0.0948122-0.0681562-0.3174083-0.2078379
R  6 15 16-0.1204329-0.1432030
R  7  1  7-0.1189881-0.0102160-0.0989114-0.1127784 0.0141534-0.2202680 1.0000000
R  7  8 14-0.1095627-0.4002444-0.2747310-0.3756622-0.0138604 0.2066961 0.0460292
R  7 15 16-0.[illegible]410558-0.0210025
R  8  1  7 0.3416142-0.0720088 0.3031454 0.3653338-0.1384966 0.0199024-0.1095627
R  8  8 14 1.0000000 0.1122410 0.0438792 0.0794144 0.0394111-0.0972555-0.0908671
R  8 15 16 0.0035512 0.0543277
R  9  1  7 0.1584618 0.0711531 0.1591275 0.1975733 0.4932934 0.4118117-0.4002444
R  9  8 14 0.1122410 1.0000000 0.4743720 0.5829219 0.1377061-0.1486767-0.0919058
R  9 15 16-0.[illegible]
R 10  1  7 0.1506001 [illegible] 0.1526742 [illegible] 0.1883495 0.1775186-0.2747310
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R 10  6 14 0.[illegible]
R 10 15 16-0.1176804-0.[illegible]
R 11  1  7 0.[illegible] 0.1[illegible] 0.[illegible] 0.2[illegible] 1.0[illegible]733 0.[illegible]-0.[illegible]
R 11  6 14 0.[illegible]744144 0.[illegible] 0.[illegible] 1.[illegible] 0.2575776 0.1081[illegible] 0.0515[illegible]
R 11 15 16-0.[illegible]871[illegible] 0.16[illegible]
R 12  1  7 0.[illegible] 0.112[illegible] 0.111[illegible] 0.[illegible] 0.2214403-0.7861362-0.0[illegible]
R 12  6 14 0.[illegible]111 0.1377701-0.11[illegible] 0.2516778 1.[illegible]-0.1164003 0.[illegible]
R 12 15 16 0.[illegible]417[illegible] 0.1[illegible]
R 13  1  7 0.111[illegible] 0.2501[illegible] 0.1[illegible] 0.1472[illegible] 0.[illegible]-0.[illegible] 0.2[illegible]
R 13  6 14-0.[illegible]-0.1[illegible] 0.[illegible] 1.[illegible]-0.110[illegible] 1.[illegible]-0.1[illegible]
R 13 15 16 0.[illegible] 0.[illegible]
R 14  1  7-0.[illegible]-0.1[illegible]-0.[illegible]-0.[illegible] 0.[illegible] 0.2[illegible] 0.0[illegible]
R 14  6 14-0.[illegible]-0.[illegible]-0.[illegible] 0.[illegible] 0.2[illegible]-0.1[illegible] 1.[illegible]
R 14 15 16 0.[illegible] 0.[illegible]
R 15  1  7-0.1447[illegible]-0.[illegible]-0.1[illegible]-0.[illegible]-0.1117[illegible]-0.1[illegible]-0.[illegible]
R 15  6 14 0.[illegible]-0.[illegible]-0.117[illegible] 0.[illegible] 0.[illegible] 0.[illegible] 0.[illegible]
R 15 15 16 1.[illegible] 0.4[illegible]1514
R 16  1  7 0.1[illegible] 0.1[illegible] 0.1[illegible] 0.[illegible] 0.[illegible]-0.1[illegible]-0.[illegible]
R 16  6 14 0.0[illegible] 0.0[illegible]-0.0[illegible] 0.1[illegible] 0.1[illegible] 0.[illegible] 0.[illegible]
R 16 15 16 0.4781514 1.0000000
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APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES CITIES OVER 100,000 POPULATION

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES CITIES OVER 100,000 POPULATION*

1.	New York, NY	8,203,916	41.	Miami, FL	371,319
2.	Chicago, IL	3,642,715	42.	Birmingham, AL	365,431
3.	Los Angeles, CA	3,004,566	43.	Tulsa, OK	353,798
4.	Philadelphia, PA	2,128,670	44.	El Paso, TX	348,902
5.	Detroit, MI	1,608,349	45.	Norfolk, VA	338,405
6.	Houston, TX	1,297,557	46.	Tampa, FL	332,439
7.	Baltimore, MD	944,658	47.	St. Paul, MN	315,292
8.	Dallas, TX	893,105	48.	Sacramento, CA	309,748
9.	Washington, DC	832,712	49.	Akron, OH	297,029
10.	San Francisco, CA	814,348	50.	Nashville, TN	295,270
11.	Cleveland, OH	800,710	51.	Rochester, NY	287,387
12.	Milwaukee, WI	788,769	52.	Albuquerque, NM	279,452
13.	San Antonio, TX	775,200	53.	Wichita, KS	277,621
14.	San Diego, CA	719,396	54.	Charlotte, NC	270,902
15.	New Orleans, LA	689,023	55.	Jersey City, NJ	268,922
16.	St. Louis, MO	643,522	56.	Dayton, OH	268,103
17.	Memphis, TN	632,851	57.	Tucson, AZ	258,664
18.	Boston, MA	603,075	58.	Mobile, AL	257,124
19.	Kansas City, MO	594,424	59.	Austin, TX	255,567
20.	Seattle, WA	592,184	60.	Flint, MI	228,844
21.	Indianapolis, IN	561,984	61.	Grand Rapids, MI	228,202
22.	Phoenix, AZ	558,185	62.	Richmond, VA	221,058
23.	Columbus, OH	553,325	63.	St. Petersburg, FL	217,014
24.	Denver, CO	553,153	64.	Yonkers, NY	213,129
25.	Atlanta, GA	543,025	65.	Syracuse, NY	205,668
26.	Pittsburgh, PA	539,669	66.	Des Moines, IA	205,429
27.	Cincinnati, OH	499,032	67.	Corpus Christi, TX	204,079
28.	Buffalo, NY	453,378	68.	Knoxville, TN	202,407
29.	San Jose, CA	450,252	69.	Spokane, WA	201,040
30.	Minneapolis, MN	432,170	70.	Arlington, VA	200,493
31.	Oklahoma City, OK	409,856	71.	Jacksonville, FL	199,221
32.	Oakland, CA	403,833	72.	Salt Lake City, UT	197,979
33.	Long Beach, CA	399,579	73.	Gary, IN	195,974
34.	Newark, NJ	395,900	74.	Lubbock, TX	190,591
35.	Toledo, OH	391,462	75.	Anaheim, CA	187,219
36.	Portland, OR	390,565	76.	Madison, WI	186,891
37.	Louisville, KY	387,123	77.	Fresno, CA	181,742
38.	Honolulu, HI	386,865	78.	Riverside, CA	181,230
39.	Ft. Worth, TX	380,851	79.	Jackson, MS	180,239
40.	Omaha, NB	372,775	80.	Amarillo, TX	179,912

APPENDIX E (continued)

81.	Baton Rouge, LA	177,111	121.	Pasadena, CA	128,048
82.	Ft. Wayne, IN	175,851	122.	Albany, NY	126,872
83.	Providence, RI	174,713	123.	Waterbury, CT	124,699
84.	Worcester, MA	169,608	124.	Elizabeth, NJ	121,806
85.	Santa Ana, CA	165,578	125.	Portsmouth, VA	121,200
86.	Youngstown, OH	164,022	126.	Springfield, MO	120,311
87.	Hartford, CT	163,800	127.	Alexandria, VA	120,241
88.	Torrance, CA	159,465	128.	Fremont, CA	119,941
89.	Shreveport, LA	158,783	129.	Huntington Beach, CA	118,920
90.	Tacoma, WA	158,634	130.	Wichita Falls, TX	117,898
91.	Springfield, MA	158,412	131.	Camden, NJ	116,690
92.	Montgomery, AL	157,509	132.	Independence, MO	116,055
93.	Bridgeport, CT	157,375	133.	Hammond, IN	116,054
94.	Lincoln, NB	157,053	134.	Raleigh, NC	116,005
95.	New Haven, CT	154,481	135.	Canton, OH	115,904
96.	Virginia Beach, VA	154,245	136.	Cedar Rapids, IA	112,743
97.	Peoria, IL	153,299	137.	San Bernardino, CA	112,605
98.	Glendale, CA	150,855	138.	Waco, TX	112,381
99.	Paterson, NJ	150,703	139.	Stamford, CT	110,607
100.	Winston-Salem, NC	150,180	140.	Trenton, NJ	109,829
101.	Little Rock, AR	149,752	141.	Allentown, PA	109,647
102.	Columbus, GA	149,244	142.	Duluth, MN	109,022
103.	Macon, GA	148,876	143.	Sunnyvale, CA	108,441
104.	Evansville, IN	145,789	144.	Pueblo, CO	108,141
105.	Huntsville, AL	145,454	145.	Inglewood, CA	108,080
106.	Garden Grove, CA	145,142	146.	Columbia, SC	107,956
107.	Erie, PA	144,393	147.	Abilene, TX	107,628
108.	Greensboro, NC	142,293	148.	Las Vegas, NV	107,106
109.	Newport News, VA	141,623	149.	Roanoke, VA	106,821
110.	Rockford, IL	140,644	150.	Downey, CA	105,029
111.	South Bend, IN	139,994	151.	Stockton, CA	104,448
112.	Savannah, GA	138,947	152.	Saginaw, MI	104,357
113.	Chattonooga, TN	136,900	153.	Scranton, PA	104,199
114.	Topeka, KS	132,030	154.	Orlando, FL	103,735
115.	Beaumont, TX	131,688	155.	Pomona, CA	102,146
116.	Berkeley, CA	130,851	156.	Chesapeake, VA	101,559
117.	Hampton, VA	128,889	157.	Royal Oak, MI	100,684
118.	Ft. Lauderdale, FL	128,734	158.	Hayward, CA	100,181
119.	Kansas City, KS	128,484	159.	Burbank, CA	100,162
120.	Lansing, MI	128,398			

*Taken from the "Editor & Publisher's Exclusive Market Rankings: Population," Editor and Publisher Market Guide--1969 Edition (New York: The Editor and Publisher Company, 1969), p. 4.

APPENDIX F

LETTER INTRODUCING THE QUESTIONNAIRE

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY EAST LANSING · MICHIGAN 48823

COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE · SCHOOL OF POLICE ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC SAFETY · OLDS HALL

April 18, 1969

Thomas J. Cahill
Chief of Police
City and County of San Francisco
850 Bryant Street
San Francisco, California 91403

I am conducting a survey on anti-sniper, counter-guerrilla, "Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT)" teams on all police departments in the United States in cities having populations over one hundred thousand. Many departments have such programs but little information is available on their organization, structure, and function. This survey is an attempt to compare recruitment, training, deployment, and other aspects of these teams.

I am a sergeant on the Los Angeles Police Department (Seventy-seventh Street Detective Division) attending Michigan State University on an Office of Law Enforcement Assistance graduate fellowship. This survey is being conducted through the School of Police Administration and Public Safety and is not connected with the Los Angeles Police Department.

This study has more than theoretical value for all of us in law enforcement as evidenced by recent events in our cities. Although completion of the questionnaire is an imposition, it will not be without benefit to your organization. All respondents will be furnished with data on the survey results except for the names of other participating agencies or information which would tend to identify them. Departments wishing to exchange information with other participants should answer "yes" to question thirty-six. A list of these departments and data furnished by them will be sent to all who respond with a "yes" on this question.

A strict deadline requires the return of the questionnaire,

through the School of Police Administration and Public Safety, no later than May 20, 1969. Please leave no questions (with the possible exception of number thirty-four) unanswered or any areas unchecked. This is important for statistical purposes. Your cooperation is appreciated.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Max K. Hurlbut

Max K. Hurlbut

APPENDIX G

QUESTIONNAIRE--CITIES OVER ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND POPULATION

QUESTIONNAIRE

Please answer all questions. If "none" or "unknown" is applicable, so state. If additional space is needed, use the back of the page of attach additional sheets.

1. GENERAL INFORMATION

   a. City population _____

   b. Square miles _____

   c. Number of sworn personnel on Department _____

   d. Number of line personnel (uniformed police personnel performing field duties) _____

2. List the number of riots (incidents where there has been arson, sniping, looting, or an extra-ordinary police response) occurring in your city:

	1966	1967	1968	1969
Jan				
Feb				
Mar				
Apr				
May				
Jun				
Jul				
Aug				
Sep				
Oct				
Nov				
Dec				

3. List the number of sniping incidents directed toward police personnel. Include all those reported by police or other reliable sources:

	1966	1967	1968	1969
Jan				
Feb				
Mar				
Apr				
May				
Jun				
Jul				
Aug				
Sep				
Oct				
Nov				
Dec				

4. Number of sniping incidents that occurred during:

	Darkness	Daylight		Darkness	Daylight
1966			1968		
1967			1969		

5. Number of policemen injured by sniper fire:

____ _____ (month-year) ____ _____ (month-year)

6. Number of policemen killed by sniper fire:

____ _____ (month-year) ____ _____ (month-year)

7. List the types of firearms used against police in sniping incidents, if known:

WEAPON (CALIBER & TYPE)	TOTAL WEAPONS OF THIS TYPE USED	NUMBER OF INCIDENTS WHERE USED

8. Does your organization have an anti-sniper, "urban warfare," or counterguerrilla team or program? Do not include groups or individuals also used in riot control or other police duties during an "unusual occurrence."

yes no

9. If you have no anti-sniper program are you planning to develop one? Please check one or more:

a. ____ Present methods are adequate.

b. ____ We have no need for such a program.

c. ____ One is in the planning stages.

d. ____ We initiated a program recently.

e. ____ Inadequate budget to support a program.

f. ____ An unpopular idea within the community.

g. ____ An unpopular idea within the city government.

h. ____ An unpopular idea within the Department.

i. ____ Other (please specify)_____

_____

10. If a specialized anti-sniper or anti-guerrilla program exists on your department:

    a. What is the program or team called? _____

    b. When was it started? _____ (month-year)

    c. Numbers of personnel by rank:

    ____ Policemen ____ Lieutenants

    ____ Sergeants ____ Other (please specify) _____

    d. Average age of men. ____

    e. Average number of years with the Department. ____

11. Number of teams _____ Number of men per team. ____

12. How are the men selected (volunteer, recommendation of others, military experience, some form of testing, etc.)? Please describe the process.

_____

_____

_____

_____

_____

13. If you have prerequisites or entrance requirements, please list them:

_____ _____ _____

_____ _____ _____

14. What is the rank of the group Commander? _____

15. How does the group fit into the Department structure or under what section or portion of the organization does it fall?

_____

_____

_____ _____

16. What is the team composition (example: Marksman, Leader):

_____

17. List the purpose for which the teams were formed (examples: To combat snipers, to protect VIP's, etc.):

_____ _____ _____

_____ _____ _____

18. Briefly describe the types of equipment used by the teams and team-members (uniforms, weapons, vehicles, etc.):

_____

_____

_____

19. Is equipment supplied by (check one):

____ a. Individual officers

____ b. City

____ d. Combination of a. & b.

____ e. Other_____

20. Are other agencies (police, civilian, military) utilized in the training program? Please specify:

_____

_____

21. Is there specialized training beyond that given to all officers?

yes no

22. Briefly describe the training as to type, subject, and approximate hours per year:

(Examples:
Classroom - Principles of Guerrilla Warfare - 7 hours
Field - Marksmanship, rifle range - 12 hours)

_____

_____

_____

_____

23. Briefly describe any outside training material in use (Army Field Manuals, etc.):

_____ _____ _____

24. Have the teams or individual members been used in actual field situations for their intended purpose?

yes no

25. Briefly describe any uses to which the teams have been put. (examples: Protected President of U.S. during tour; Anti-sniper duty during riots, August, 1967):

_____

_____

_____

_____

26. What is the morale of the men on the teams?

a. ____ Extremely high.

b. ____ Above average.

c. ____ Average.

d. ____ Low.

e. ____ Sufficient information not available to determine.

27. Is assignment to the program considered:

a. ____ One of the most popular assignments on the Department?

b. ____ Very much sought after?

c. ____ Accepted?

d. ____ A way of escaping the drudgery of long hours of uniformed riot duty?

e. ____ Avoided?

f. ____ Sufficient information not available to determine.

28. The performance of the teams under actual field conditions may best be described as:

a. ____ Superior to and beyond the capabilities of non-specialized personnel.

b. ____ Performed well, but job could have been handled equally well by non-specialized uniformed personnel.

c. ____ Satisfactory.

d. ____ The men could best have been utilized in a uniform capacity.

e. ____ Unknown.

f. ____ Other (specify)_____

29. What do most supervisors and commanders on the Department think of the program?

a. ____ Strongly in favor of.

b. ____ Think it is needed.

c. ____ Consider it a "necessary evil."

d. ____ Are non-committal.

e. ____ Largely opposed.

f. ____ Unknown.

g. ____ Other (specify)_____

30. Is the program confidential? yes no

31. Has the program received any publicity in newspapers and magazines?

yes no

a. Please list these references by publication and date, if known:

_____

_____

32. Has this publicity generally been (check one or more):

a. ____ Accurate?

b. ____ Slanted?

c. ____ Favorable?

d. ____ Hostile?

e. ____ Unknown.

f. ____ Other (specify)_____

33. Has there been any community opposition to the program?

yes no

a. Describe any opposition, the groups involved, and their stated reasons:

_____

_____

_____

_____

34. Has there been any opposition from the city or local government?

yes no

A REPLY TO THIS QUESTION IS OPTIONAL.

35. Has there been any Departmental opposition? yes no

a. Briefly describe the reasons for the opposition:

_____

_____

_____

36. Do you wish your Department to be listed as being interested in an information exchange program?

yes no

All respondents will be mailed the results of this survey except for Department names and information that would tend to identify other participants. All those answering "yes" will also be furnished the names of other departments interested in an exchange program.

ANY DEPARTMENT LITERATURE PERTAINING TO THE PROGRAM WILL BE APPRECIATED.