‘fi‘HE mum G‘F THOMAS EFFGRSON M9 ALEXW WTW ‘fGWARE THE WM REVGL‘U'TSW Thesis. far fine Degree 9% M. A. NW ”A?! WWW”? Jack Chrésfia ‘Brmuh @959 N W \\ \\ W“W\\\\\\\\|\\\\\|\\\\\\\\l\\\l 3 1293 10452 4461 I LIBRARY Michigan State- University MSU LIBRARIES ”- BEIURNING MATERIAL§3 Place in book drop to remove this checkout from your record. FINES wiII be charged if book is returned after the date stamped below. THE ATTITUDE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON AND ALmXANDER HAMILTON TOWARD THE FRENCH REVOLUTION By JACK CHRISTIE BRAUN AN ABSTRACT Submitted to the College of Science and Arts Michigan State University of Agriculture and Applied Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of History ’ 1959 APproved - ' 1“‘3&. ‘Major Professor 5| ABSTRACT Perhaps no more exciting and turbulent period of Euro- pean history can be found then the decade of the 1790's. The French Revolution raging at that time had a profound effect upon every facet of European life. Its effects were not con- fined to that area of the world alone, however, but played a significant part in the growth and development of the United States. American foreign policy to a great degree was shaped by the events in France and their influence upon the rest of the world. Foreign policy, in fact, became the outstanding issue between the two national parties. The Federalist Administrations of Washington and Adams, rePelled by the licentious events in France, spurned our trea- ties 0f 1778 with that country. They sought instead closer ties with Great Britain, a nation with stable, conservative Principles similar to their own. The Republicans, forming the opposition party, advo- cated a different course. Embracing the French Revolution and its republican principles they favored a close friend- ShiP with France, voicing hatred toward our former enemy, Great Britain, and her monarchial form of government. Alexander Hamilton and Thomas Jefferson, as the leading spokesmen for the Federalist and Republican parties respec- tively, were the two Americans undoubtedly most responsible for molding the policy of the United States. g_ This monograph attempts to show through the thinking and actions of these two men the influence of France and her revolution upon America's foreign policy, from the convoca- tion of the Assembly of Notables in 1787 through the Louisiana Purchase of 1803. It also attempts to point out that a diversity of opinion on the best policy to pursue with France was one of the chief sources of cleavage be- tween Jefferson and Hamilton. It is not the purpose of this paper, however, to give a detailed analysis of Franco-American relations during these years except as they concern Jefferson and Hamilton. The opinions of Hamilton and Jefferson on the French Revolution afford a remarkable contrast. Their opposite viewpoints led to many quarrels. As Minister to France, Jefferson witnessed the be- ginning of the revolution in which, because of his sympathy, he PlaYed an active part. Although national self-interest and immediate circumstances modified his views in the years that followed, he still retained his enthusiasm for France and her revolution. This preference for France affected his thinking on foreign policy and influenced his views on the domestic development of the United States. He believed we were bound together with the French nation not only be- cause of our alliance, but because of mutual doctrines and POints of view. Jefferson thought it best to seek the friendship of France, a proved ally in our fight for indepenoenceo He relegated our late enemy, Great Britain, and her monarchial system which he feared might spread to the United States, to a secondary role. Hamilton, from the first, viewed with skepticism the events taking place in France. His suspicions turned to disgust with each violent upheaval that shook the nation. He heaped scorn on her pretensions with regard to liberty and the rights of man. Hamilton believed the future of the United States could best be protected by close ties with Great Britain. He placed the French nation, permeated with radical republican ideas dangerous to the propertied inter- ests and stability of any government, in the lesser posi- tion. This dislike of France influenced his decisions on foreign and domestic affairs. Hamilton as Secretary of the Treasury and Jefferson as Secretary of State felt that the adoption of a neutral poli- cy, Staying clear of European conflicts and avoidance of war, to be the best policy for the United States. However, they disagreed on how best to pursue this doctrine in the face of repeated violations upon our commercial rights by both France and Great Britain, at the time engaged in a bitter war. The attempt of the United States to maintain a neutral Position was made difficult by her treaties with France. If the United States had accepted the French interpretation 0f the treaties, as outlined by her ministers, it would probably have involved us in a war with Great Britain. Such a war might have proved disastrous in the formative years of our nation. Although we were able to solve our differences with Great Britain through the Jay Treaty, it was impossible to avoid a cold war with France. Though no longer in the Cabinet, Jefferson and Hamilton played an important part ‘ in the negotiations which resulted in the Franco-American convention of 1800. With this agreement amiable relations were restored. Jefferson's pro-French and Hamilton's anti-French attitude during the revolutionary period remained basically unchanged. The assumption of power by Bonaparte and the acquisition of Louisiana by France, however, resulted in a noticeable change in the attitude of Jefferson toward our former ally - an attitude more in accord with that of immilton's. On the other hand, Hamilton supported Jeffer- son when he was attacked by the Federalists for purchas- ing Louisiana. On the eve of Hamilton's death, there- fore, the two great antagonists were drawing closer to- gether. THE ATTITUDE OF THOMAS JEFFERSON AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON' TOWARD THE FRENCH REVOLUTION By JACK CHRISTIE BRAUN A THESIS Submitted to the College of Science and Arts Michigan State University of Agriculture and Applied Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of History 1959 l Approved . W ajor Professor CHAPTER CHAPTER CHAPTER CHAPTER CHAPTER CHAPTER II III VI TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE JEFFERSON MINISTER To FRANCE 1 SECRETARY OF STATE VERSUS SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 1790-1793 53 A JEFFERSON, HAMILTON AND CITIZEN GENET 94 THE INTERLUDE: l79h-l796 182 COLD WAR WITH FRANCE: 1797—1800 232 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 388 BIBLIOGRAPHY 413 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Professor John B. Harrison for his assistance, encouragement, and constructive criticism in the study and writing of this thesis. CHAPTER I JEFFERSON MINISTER TO FRANCE On may 7, l78h, Thomas Jefferson, author of the American Declaration of Independence and former Governor of Virginia, 'was chosen by the Congress of the United States to go to France to join Benjamin Franklin and John Adams as Ministers Plenipotentiary in the negotiation of proper commercial trea- ties with various European countries. It was Jefferson's abi- lity, plus the fact that Franklin and Adams were northern men, that motivated the choice of Congress. A man of the South would know southern problems and southern needs for markets.1 Little did Jefferson realize, arriving at Paris on the 6th of August, that this was to be his home for the next five years. Although Franklin and Adams would go their separate 2 would remain here ways, Jefferson, as Minister to France, to witness the beginnings of a revolution that would change 'um face of Europe, and affect the lives of millions of un- born generations. It was not long after his arrival in France, that Jeffer- lNathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson A Biography (New York, 1951), I, 256. HereETter reTerred to as Echachner, liomas Jefferson . 2Ibid., I, 256. Jefferson was appointed sole Minister to France on March 10, 1785. Franklin, at his request, re- turned to the United States. John Adams was appointed Minister to Great Britain. son expressed his feelings concerning that nation and her peeple. Although he showed an admiration for Parisian so- ciety,3 a liking for the French arts,h and an appreciation of the temperate and courteous manner of the people,5 Jefferson had no liking for the French political System. He felt that "notwithstanding the finest soil upon earth, the finest climate under heaven, and a peOple of the most bene- volent, the most gay and.amiab1e character of which the human form is susceptible," France was "loaded with misery by kings, nobles and priests and by them alone."6 Jefferson's travels through the countryside and visits to various French cities brought to his mind that "in spite of the mildness of their governors, the people are ground to powder by their form of government. Of twenty million people 3Claude Gernade Bowers, Jefferson and Hamilton The New YorE, fine. 1e for Democrac in Amefica (Boston and I925i, pp. 93-99. Hereafter referred to as Bowers, Jefferson and Hamilton . “Letter to Carlo Bellini, September 30, 1785, The Writin s of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Andrew A. LipscomE-End AIBert EIIery BergH lWasEington, D. C., l903-l90h), V, 153-15A. Hereafter referred to as The Writings of Thomas Mferson, Lipscomb and Bergh. 5Edward Dumbauld, Thomas Jefferson American Tourist Ewing an Account of His JOurneys in the'United States 6? Amefica England, France, ItaIy,_the Low Countries and Emanz (Norman, Oklahoma, IgliéT, p. 199. 6Letter to George wythe, August 13, 1786, in The writings of Thomas Jefferson being his Autobiography, Reports,IMessages, Addresses,_and other Writin 3 Official and Private, ed. H. A. WaShington (New YorE, IEEB-IESE), II, 7-3. Hereafter referred to as Writings of Jefferson, Washing- ton. y. .01" supposed to be in France, I am of opinion there are nineteen million more wretched, more cursed in every circumstance of human existence than the most conspicuously wretched indivi- dual in the whole United States."7 To another he expressed virtually the same sentiments. "I find the general fate of humanity here most deplorable. The truth of Voltaire's ob- servation offers itself perpetually, that every man is either the hammer or the anvil."8 There is no doubt that Jefferson definitely felt that America was superior to Europe. He urged that James Monroe visit the continent and See this for himself. "It will make you adore your own country, its soil, its climate, its equa- lity, liberty, laws, people and manners. My God! how little do my countrymen know what precious blessings they are in Imssession of, and which no other people on earth enjoy. I (mnfess I had no idea of it myself. While we shall see mul- tiplied instances of Europeans going to live in America, I 1d 1 venture to say no man now living will ever see an in- flence of an American removing to settle in Europe and con- tinuing the re ."9 7Letter to Elizabeth Trist, August 18, 1785, The Writ- ings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, V, 8 - . 8Letter to Carlo Bellini, September 30, 1785, Ibid., V, 151-15h. 9Letter to James Monroe, June 17, 1785, The writin s of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Paul Leicester Ford (New YorE and Ionaon, I8§2-I3§§), IV, 59. Hereafter referred to as The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford. 1.. Above all, Jefferson was extremely afraid that the in- stitution of monarchy might take hold in the United States. I was much an enemy to monarchy before I came to EurOpe. I am ten thousand times more so since I have seen what they are. There is scarcely an evil known in these countries which may not be traced to their King as its source, nor a good which is not derived from the small fibres of republicanism existing among them. I can further say with safety there is not a crowned head in Europe whose talents or merit would entitle him to be elected a vestrymag by the people of any parish in America. 0 Although Jefferson had quickly assayed the misery of the people in France, he did not see the glowing sparks that mmfld.soon burst into the flame of revolution.11 It was not tmtil February, 1786, that Jefferson had some indication that 12 Imrhaps something was in the wind. Yet a serious revolt of mw'kind in France, at that time, was something that was farthest from his mind. Jefferson continued to speak of the Inseries of the Old WOrld.and of little hope for its salva- 'uon. A small number of men were crushing the mass of people. 10Letter to George washington, May 2, 1788, Ibid., V, 8. Similar sentiments are expressed.in Letter to Washing- ton, November la, 1786, Ibid., IV, 328-329. 11He was more interested in settling the debts of Ameri- cm.with her foreign creditors. Jefferson was also seeking more advantageous commercial relations with France. Schachner, II'khomas Jefferson, I, 31.7. 12Gilbert Chinard, The Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson with an introduction and notes, Tie John Hopkins Studies in InternationaI Thougfit (BEItimore, Maryland and Paris, 1929), p. 218. Hereafter referred to as Chinard, The Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson. tuCl .nn .~ H .\ 3N5.) NH. ~\.I..\ ..1\.1..\.l..\... 1‘. I The sheep could do little but submit to the wolves and this would never change the established order.13 Jefferson first sensed a possible change in fine order of things when he heard of the convocation of the Assembly of the Notables for the first time in one hundred seventy three years.1h The reasons for the calling of the Notables were not given and Jefferson showed only a mild interest.15 He remarked in a letter to Edward Carrington that "this event, which will hardly excite any attention in America, is deemed here the most important one which has taken place in their civil line during the present century."l6 His 8018 interest at this time was that his friend Lafayette had his name on 13Letter to George Wythe, August 13, 1786, The Writings iThomas Jefferson, Ford, IV, 269. 1“Letter to Edward Carrington, January 16, 1787, Ibid., IV, 360. Also Letter to John Jay, January 9, 1787, The 'mutiggs of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VIT_ZS. lsLetter to John Jay, January 9, 1787, The Diplomatic (brres ondence of the United States of America from the ii In of the Definitive Treaty ofp’eaceJ 10th September, Ezgg; go the Adoption of the ConstitutionLMarch A, 1789. e n e Letters of the Presidents of Congress, The secre- ta For Foreign Affairs - American‘NinISters at’FOreign Courts Forei NiniEters near Congress - Reports of Committees 0? Congress and Reports of the Secretarygfor £3363. Affairs on Various Letters andCommunications; to- ga; er with Letters from Individuals on Public AffaiYS [ty ofIwashington, 1837), II, ZOAZI. *Hereafter referred to as The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States. 16Letter to Edward Carrington, January 16, 1787, The writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, IV, 358. the list.17 The Assembly of Notables met on February 22, 1787, to try and solve the problem of a shrinking royal treasury. Describing the meeting to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, John Jay, Jefferson said, that its immediate objectives were "in no way connected with our interests."18 Jefferson again expressed the belief that the peOple of France were not about to use violence to remedy their ills. The most remarkable effect of this convention as yet is the number of puns and bon mots it has generated. I think were they all collected it would make a more voluminous work than the Encylo- pedie. This occasion, more than anything I have seen, convinces me that this nation is incapable of any serious effort but under the word of com- mand. The people at large view every object only as it may furnish puns and good mots; and I pro- nounce that a good punster would disarm the whole nation were they ever so seriously disposed to revolt. Indeed... they are gone, when a measure so capable of doing good as the calling of the Notables is treated with so much ridicule; we may conclude the nation desperate, and in harity pray that heaven may send them good kings. Jefferson, in an interesting letter to Nadison, describ- hm what he thought were the three forms of society, told his l7Ibid., IV, 358-359. "His education in our school has drawn on Him.a very jealous eye from a court whose principles are the most absolute despotism. But I hope he has nearly passed his crisis. The King, who is a good man, is favorably disposed towards him, and he is supported by powerful family connections and the public good will. He is the youngest man If the Notables, except one whose office placed him on the 1815." 18Letter to John Jay, February 23, 1787, The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, II, h2-h3. 19Letter to Abigail Adams, February 22, 1787, The writ- ings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, IV, 370-371. 7 friend that "a little rebellion now and then is a good thing, and as necessary to the political world as storms in the phy- sical.... It is a medicine necessary for the sound health of government ."20 In spite of this somewhat violent remark, Jefferson was quick to imbue Lafayette with thoughts to the contrary. He did not believe that France was ready to adopt a form of government similar to what existed in his own country.21 That Lafayette with his enthusiasm for American ideas might well propose radical changes for France, was a fear that taunted Jefferson. Caution was the watchword he urged. Although Jefferson had no love for Great Britain, or a liking for her constitution, he advised Lafayette that France proceed "step by step towards a good constitution. Though that model may not be perfect, yet as it would unite mne suffrages than any new one which could be proposed, it is better to make that the object."22 Concessions, he felt, should be made to the King. "If every advance is to be smrchased by filling the royal coffers with gold, it will be gold well employed. The King, who means so well, should 20Letter to James Madison, January 30, 1787, Ibid., IV, 362'363 o 2lciibert Chinard, The Letters of Lafayette and Jeffer- son, p. 70. 22Letter to Lafayette, February 28, 1787, Ibid., p. 109. ._t.u "l a. ,4 O 9. ‘9 all. be encouraged to repeat these Assemblies."23 As a diplomatic representative from the United States to France, Jefferson used poor judgment in giving this advice to Lafayette. But as to any charge that Jefferson plotted against the government of France, this is utterly without foundation.2h In fact, if anything, he was out to maintain the existence of that government.25 Soon after attending the opening session of the Assembly, Jefferson left on a tour of southern France and Italy. Al- though away from the center of activity in Paris the pen of ibfferson was not still in proposing a series of administra— tdve reforms. These he presented to Lafayette's aunt, Madame «iTessé, knowing full well they would reach the right hands.26 Their first step should be to get themselves di- vided into two chambers instead of seven, the Ndblesse and the Commons, separately. The se- cond, to persuade the King, instead of chosing the deputies of the Commons himself, to summon those chosen by the peOple for provincial ad- ministrations. The third, as the Noblesse is too numerous to be all of the Assembly, to ob- tain permission for that body to chose its own deputies. Two Houses, so elected, would con- tain a mass of wisdom which would make the people happy, and the King great, would place 231bid., p. 109. 2“Ibid., pp. 70-71. 25Gilbert Chinard, Thomas Jefferson The A ostle of Americanism (Boston, 1929), p. 22I. HereEfter referrea to as nar , omas Jefferson. 26Marie Kimball Jefferson The Scene of Europe, 178A to l 8 (New York, 1950 , p. I7I. Hereafter referred to as all, Jefferson.’ him in history where no other act can possibly place him.... Should they attempt more than the established habits of the people are ripe for, they may lose all, and retard iggefinite- ly the ultimate object of their aim. Here we can see that Jefferson is advocating a form of government similar to that of Great Britain, not as a perma- nent institution, but only as a temporary one.28 Returning;to Paris in June, 1787, Jefferson found some changes in the King's Council, but was well pleased with them.29 With Loménie de Brianne, the new Chief Consul of Finance, he found some fault,30 but still thought of him as "a virtuous, able and patriotic character."31 Jefferson cud not present the King and Queen in a very favorable light. The King loves business, economy, order and jus- tice, and wishes sincerely the good of his people; but he is irascible and rude, very limi- ted in his understanding, and religious, border- ing on bigotry. He has no mistress, loves his Queen, and is too much governed by her. She is capricious like her brother [the Emporer Joseph 11;] and governed by him; devoted to pleasure and expense; and not remarkable for any other vices or virtues. Unhappily the King shows a propensity for the pleasures of the table. That for drink has increased lately or at least, 27Letter to Madame de Tessa: March 20, 1787, The ‘mfitings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VI, 105. 28Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, p. 222. 29Letter to James Madison, June 20, 1787, The writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VI, 13h. 30Letter to John Jay, November 3, 1787, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, IV, h63-h6h. 31Letter to John Adams, August 30, 1787, The Writings 0f Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VI, 287. .... .,. p . .. a. . L‘ -4 - .\. ".1 10 32 it has become more known. In the Assembly of Notables, Jefferson was of the Opinion that the partitioning of the country into a number of subordi- nate governments, under the administration of Provincial Assem- blies, would be advantageous for France. He believed there were several reasons for this. First, the people would choose the representatives, with one-third of the seats to be elected each year. Second, mercy would be accorded before sentencing violators of harsh laws, and third, with the right of repre- sentation to king they would suggest that good laws be enacted emu bad laws eliminated. When united together they would com- nend the respect of the king. One of the best advantages of all he thought to be the right of calling into convocation 'um Assembly of Notables, which he hoped would be a regular Inttern for the future.33 Although great improvements had been made in the French (kmstitution by the Assembly of Notables,3h Jefferson thought um joy expressed by many was unwarranted. He believed the mndness of the enemies of the present regime, in advocating mmm changes in the order of things, to be the playful antics 32Letter to James Madison, June 20,1787, The Works of Thomas Jefferson, Paul Leicester Ford (New York andeondon Hereafter referred to as The Works of Thomas .kfferson, Ford. 33Letter to John Jay, June 21, 1787, The Diplomatic Corres ondence of the United States, II, 56. Letter to James Honroe, Iugust 5, I787,'1'He Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VI, 235. 3“Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, p. 222. v4 gr. ll of a nation in its old age.35 The next day, however, writing in a more serious vein, he declared that "the spirit of this country is advancing toward a revolution in their constitution. There are not wanting persons at the helm, friends to the progress of this spirit."36 A few days earlier he had told Madison of the deficient reve- nues of the country, the refusal of Parliament to register any new taxes, demanding instead the calling of a States- (kmeral. The King, he said, had taken to drink, the Queen was detested, "and an explosion of some sort is not impossible."37 The same sentiments were expressed to George Washington a few days later.38 All the tongues of Paris spoke against the Government emd he knew not of any "well attested instance of a single punishment."39 Mobs of‘ ten, twenty and thirty thousand daily mnrounded the Parliament house. The King was "drowning his cares in wine.... The Queen cries, but sins on. The Count (PArtois is detested."l'o In the same tone over a month later, 35Letter to James Monroe, August 5, 1787, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VI, 235. 36Letter to John Jay, August 6, 1787, The Diplomatic Qgrespondence of the United States, II, 71. 37Letterto James Madison, August 2, 1787, The Works of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 317. 38Letter to George Washington, August 1A, 1787, The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, II, 79.- 39Letter to John Adams, August 30, 1787, Ibid., II, 81.. h01bid., II, 85. ”I 1 - u'l u n >1. ! 0.. 'o I . ‘ .1 "up... 0... r -. -c~;l o,,‘ a“..- ‘u . b. 1" v I 'u‘, I N.“ 12 Jefferson said, "The King goes for nothing. He hunts one half the day, is drunk the other and signs whatever he is bid."l*l Jefferson sums up his views as to the situation in France at this time in a letter to John Adams. "I think that in the course of three months, the royal authority has lost, and the rights of the nation gained, as much ground by a revolution of public opinion only as England gained in all her civil were under the Stuarts. I rather believe, too, they will re- tain the ground gained, because it is defended by the young and middle aged in opposition to the old only. The first party increases and the latter diminishes daily, from the course of nature."h2 As an example of the diminishing royal authority Jefferson pointed to the King being forced to re- tract two edicts by "public voice."h3 Even though financial difficulties had given France a bad reputation, the Minister felt that it vould "gain uninitely in happiness under the present administration."hh The spirit of the revolutionist was still in Jefferson, however. Shay's rebellion in Massachusetts during the years 1786-1787, and the recent events in France, brought forth 'uus declaration. hlLetter to John Jay, October 8, 1787, Ibid., II, 98. “zLetter-to John Adams, August 30, 1787, Ibid., II, 85. 90 91‘3Letter to John Jay, September 22, 1787, Ibid., II, “ALetter to John Adams, September 13, 1787, Ibid., II, 11h. 13 God forbid we should ever be 20 years without such a rebellion. The people cannot be all and always, well informed. The part which is wrong will be discontented in proportion to the importance of the facts they misconceive. If theeremain quiet under such misconceptions it is a lethargy, the forerunner of death to the public liberty. we have had 13 states indepen- dent 11 years. There has been one rebellion. That comes to one rebellion in a century and a half for each state. What country before ever existed a century and half without a rebellion? and what country can preserve its liberties if their rulers are not warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit of resistance? Let them take arms. The reme- dy is to set them right as to facts, pardon and pacify them. What signify a few lives lost in a century or two? The tree of liberty must be refreshed.from time to time with the blood of patriot; and tyrants. It is its natural manure. When the edict on the Protestants appeared in early 1788 Jefferson spoke out harshly against this reform, for although the Protestants could "beget children... die, and be offen- sive unless buried," it did "not give them permission to think, to speak, or to worship...."l+6 Despite this momentary outburst to Colonel Smith that a revolution from "time to time" with the shedding of blood was good for a country, Jefferson, as mentioned before, did not think it applicable to France at this time. He was not in favor of the Third Estate obtaining their rights by ferce, ”Letter to Colonel William Stephens Smith, November 13, 1787, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, IV, A67. A6Letter to William Rutledge, February 21, 1788, Ibid., v, h’SO 14 lest they lose everything they were seeking. Instead he urged a policy of moderation, whereby the King gradually would be obliged to concede to their wishes. However, he saw that the nobility would try and seek an alliance with the Third Estate in order to obtain money from them.47 He felt that, "Courtiers had rather give up power than plea- sures: they will barter therefbre the usurped prerogatives of the King for the money of the people. This is the agent by which modern nations will receive their rights."l'8 Jefferson still refused to admit that he was seeing the beginnings of a revolution. In the past few months little progress had been made by the King and the Assembly of Notables in solving the financial difficulties of the count— ry. "The struggle in this country is as yet of doubtful issue. It is in:fact between the monarchy and the parlia- ments. The nation is no otherwise concerned but as both parties may be induced to let go some of its abuses to court the public favor. The danger is that the people, deceived by a false cry of liberty may be led to take side with one party, and thus give the other a pretext for crushing them still more."l‘9 A more optimistic view of “7Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, p. 225. 48Letter to Comte De Moustier, May 17, 1788, The WOrks of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 12. “9Letter to Edward Rutledge, July 18, 1788, Ibid., v, 42. Jefferson's worries seemed to be unwarranted. Ilthough public sentiment favored the parliaments, because of their 15 the situation was reached a few days later when he was sure that there would be a meeting of the States-General. At first he believed the States-General would possess only "a negative on the laws," but later this would "grow into the right of original legislation."50 A change of attitude to- ward the King was noticeable. Nothing, he felt, would "en- list him against the good of his peOple."5l Jefferson's hopes were that progress toward the attain- ment of certain fundamental rights could be achieved by all in France without the shedding of blood or the loss of any human life. "I am in hopes her internal affairs will be arranged Without blood. None has been shed yet. The nation presses on sufficiently upon the government to force refor- nations, without forcing them to draw the sword. If they can keep the opposition always exactly at this point, all demand that the King convoke the States-General, these judi- cial bodies were not interested in the welfare of the peOple and probably would never have consented to give up any of their privileges at this time. A Documenta Surve of the FTench Revolution, ed. John Hall Stewart (New YorE, I95I), pp.I8- I9. IItHough Jefferson did not seem to favor the people allying with either’party, at this time, only a few months later he favored closer relations between the King and the Third Estate. He believed the King had no recourse but to tax the privileged class to obtain the money he desired and, to take this step, he would need the support of the people. Letter to John Jay, January 11,1789 The Diplomatic Corres- pondence of the United States, II, 263-26h. 50Letter to John Brown Cutting, July 24, 1788, The Writ- ings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VII, 8 . 5112i23. August 23, 1788, VII, 131. l~l n.‘ I v.“ v . o l \7 Q 16 will end well."52 To Mbnroe he expressed virtually the same conclusions. "I think it probable this country will, within two or three years, be in the enjoyment of a tolerably free constitution... and that without its having cost them a drop of blood; for none has yet been spilt, though the English papers have set the whole nation cutting throats."53 But unfortunately this was not to be. France was a nation on the verge of bankruptcy. The starving peasants, while crying for'more land to till, had been taxed to the limit. The nobility and.clergy, who were able to pay taxes, were unwilling to contribute their fair share to the treasury of the nation. It should have been apparent that the only solution to the problem.was a fair me- thod of taxation whereby the unproductive aristocracy would be taxed properly, and the peasants given more land to work. Enwver, this was not understood by the Court and the nobili- ty before 1789, nor was it ever understood, as the only thing that mattered, after 1789.51+ It was the opinion of the masses that if a man who under- 52Letter to John Adams, August 2, 1788, Ibid., VII, 103. 53Letter to James Mbnroe, August 9, 1788, Ibid., VII, 113. Also Letter to William Carmichael, August I2, 1788, Eng Lflplomatic Correspondence of the United States, II, 186. SSA. Aulard, The French Revolution: A Political Histo , l789-l804, trans. Bernard MIaII (London, I9IU), I (THe Hevqu- tion under the Monarchy 1789-1792), 21. Hereafter referred to as.Au1ard, :53 French Revolution. 1? stood finances could be found, that the tax problem would be solved. The nobility also hoped for such a savior, who would secure for them commissions and offices with pay ample enough to assure the luxurious life they desired. Louis XVI recognized his inability to solve the financial plight of France, but hoped others might work out a solution. Turgot, Controller-General of Finance, pr0posed to tax the clergy, nobles and parliament. For this he was dismissed from office in 1776. There is a strong possibility that the revo- ltmion could have been avoided if his plan had been adopted.55 Necker, one of Turgot's successors, in his first term of office, attempted to fill the royal purse by negotiating a series of foreign loans. This only called attention to the financial problems of France and increased the country's debt. Calonne, who followed Necker, some two years later, in 1783, spent money recklessly. Eventually he resorted to in- tneased taxation. The people and nobles both refused to pay. hidesperation Calonne called together the Assembly of Notables thebruary, 1787. He recommended that there be a tax on land ‘Mmre all would pay. His reward was dismissal from office in 1787. Parliament also proved most uncooperative in its rela- tions with the court during this time. The main function of this body was to register decrees before they could become law. It refused to sanction new loans requested by the king. 55Aulard, The French Revolution, I, 23. l8 Banishment of parliament members followed, but this only led that body to demand the convocation of the States-General. Brienne, Archbishop of Sens, and opponent of Calonne, exiled the entire magistracy of France and took steps to establish a new court to take its place. However, all social classes in France protested this move. The clergy assembled and also demanded that the States-General be called. Finally, bowing to public pressure, the king announced on August 8, 1788, that the convocation of the States-General would take place on May 1, 1789. The revolution was on its way: Necker was recalled to office, parliament sat again and France prepared itself for the coming elections. I By September, 1788, Jefferson informed Jay that the Paris populace and the city guard had clashed over the farmer's cele- bration of the dismissal of Calonne, with the result that several people had been killed and martial law declared for a time in the city,.56 With the convocation of the States-General decided upon, ‘ue main problem in the Fall of 1788, centered on whether the three orders should meet separately or whether they should meet together.57 Jefferson felt that the king would have to decide 56Letter to John Jay, September 3, 1788, The Di lomatic Correspondence of the United States, II, 188-189. 57According to Jefferson there was a third procedure, namely; the meeting of the Nbbility and Clergy together'and the Commons by themselves. Letter to William Short, November 2 1788 The writin s of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VII, 160-IEI. CHInard, Thomas Jefferson, p. 226, is the only In y... in | A— ‘4&_ ‘__-_AI_ 19 this, and that, if he were wise, he would prefer to have twenty-three and a half million people on his side rather than a half a million.58 A letter to James Madison shows more fully Jefferson's real views of the proper and attainable aims of the French Revolution at this time. Once more he alerts us to the fact that France is not ready for a democratic government like that of the United States.59 I Here, things internally are going on well. The Notables, now in session have, indeed, passed one vote which augurs ill to the rights of the people; but if they do not obtain now so much as they have a right to, they will in the long run. The misfortune is, that they are not yet ripe for re- ceiving the blessings to which they are entitled. I doubt, fer instance, whether the body of the na- tion, if they could be consulted, would accept a habeas corpus law, if offered them by the King. If the Etats Gene'raux, when they assemble, do not aim at too much,they may begin a good con- stitution. There are three articles which they may easily obtain: I. Their own meeting periodi- cally; II. The exclusive right of taxation; III. The right of registering laws and proposing amend- ments to them, as exercised now by the parliaments. This last would be readily approved by the court, on account of their hostility against the parlia- ments, and would lead immediately to the origina- ____ tfiographer who refers to this third possibility. I found no evidence to support Jefferson's belief in my examination of French sources. . 58Letter to William Short, November 2, 1788, The Writings QfJThomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and.Bergh, VII, 160-161. 59This is why Jefferson does not give, at this time, first place to the guarantees of individual freedom. Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time (Boston, 1951), II (Jefferson and the HI Hts of NEE], I95. Hereafter referred to as Manne, Jefferson and the Rights of Man. h; «.l \ 20 tion of laws; the second has been already solemnly avowed by the King; and it is well understood there would be no opposition to the garst. If they push at much more all may fall. The cautious tone of this letter is accentuated in a letter to Jay the fellowing day. "If the States stop here, for the present moment, all will probably end well, and they may, in future sessions, obtain a suppression of lettres de geghgt, a free press, a civil list, and other valuable molli- fications of their government. But it is to be feared,that an impatience to rectify everything at once, which prevails in some minds, will terrify the court and lead them to appeal to force, and to depend on that alone."61 Here Jefferson appears not as a revolutionist, but as a moderate reformer and political opportunist, "ready to employ in the public innerest such instruments as were at hand - even a King."62 The great moment of crisis would come, said Jefferson, when the meeting of the States-General would decide whether they should vote by persons or orders.63 The Court began to 60Letterto James Madison, November 18, 1788, The Writ- ,ygg of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 53-5h. 61Letter to John Jay, November 18, 1788, The Di lomatic .Qnuespondence of the United States, II, 232-233. VIrtuaIIy the same views are expressed in a Letter to washington, Decem- ler h, 1788, The Writingg of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V,_56-60 émd Letter to Dr. James Currie, December2U:_l788, The writings cm Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VII, 259. ‘ 62Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, pp. 195-196. 63Letter to John Jay, January 11, 1789, The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, II, 263-26h. 21 side with the Third Estate's demand for half the representa- tion at the States-General, not because of any love for it, but because they needed help to get money from the Nobility. The people could be squeezed no more, but this did not apply to the aristocrats of the country. "Courts love the people always," he said, "as the wolves do the sheep."6l’ While balloting for the States-General was in progress, Jefferson felt that the revolution was advancing smoothly. His main fear at this time was that twelve hundred people in the same assembly might form "a mob," causing great diffi- culty in carrying out a proper job of legislating. He was of the opinion that they "have indeed a miserable old canvas to work on, covered with daubings which will be difficult to efface," but he believed that "some they will efface, and some soften, so as to make a tolerable thing of it, perhaps a good one."65 Writing his good friend Madame de Bre/han, he declared that "a great political revolution will take place in your country, and that without bloodshed. A King, with two hm; dred thousand men at his orders, is disarmed by the fore Q a; Public opinion and tie want of money."66 “ing. , II, 261.. “Tit 651etter to William Carmichael, March A, 1789, The M Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 73-71,. _" (”flatter to Madame de Bréhan, March 11., 1789, Ibid ‘ 22 Jefferson at this time began to be influenced by some of 67 the French political writers, not because of their theoreti- cal views, but because of their logical presentations that might help his own government overcome some of the last ves- tiges of monarchism.that were threatening the republican 68 government. The possibility of radical French reforms were 69 not indicated by Jefferson at this time. A letter to David Humphreys best sums up his thoughts. The writings published on this occasion are, some of them, very valuable; because, unfettered by the prejudice under which Englishmen labor, they five a full scope to reason and strike out truths, as yet unperceived and unacknowledged on the other side of the channel.... In fine, I believe this nation will, in the course of the present year, have as full a portion of liberality dealt out to them, as the nation can bear at present, considering how uninformed the mass of their people 13.70 The optimism of Jefferson began to fade after the open- ing of the States-General on the 5th of May, 1789. The question of voting by order, or by delegate, had not been Specified when the States-General was convoked. The Third Estate Opposed voting by order knowing they would lose every issue by a two to one margin. However, if the vote should be 67Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, p. 228. 68Letter to Thomas Payne, March 17, 1789, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VII, 317. 69Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, p. 228. 70Letter to David Humphreys, March 18, 1789, The Writings of Thomgg Jefferson, Ford, V, 88. 23 by delegate, with as many representatives as the first two estates combined (600), they hoped to persuade a few of the clergy and nobility to vote with them and thus insure victory on practically every issue. It soon became apparent to Jefferson that the Nobles were not about to yield to the wishes of the Third Estate. He was well aware that violence might come.in the near future. It was because of this that he urged his great friend Lafayette to go over to the Third Estate because, "it will be impossible for you to live in a constant sacrifice of your own sentiments to the constant prejudices of the Noblesse."71 Still, Jeffer- son felt that if the King would do business with the Third Estate, violence might well be averted.72 The Minister had a good word for the King and his Di- rector General of Finance, Necker. "Happy that he is and honest, unambitious man who desires neither money nor power for himself; and that his most Operative minister, though 71Letter to the Marquis de Lafayette, May 6, 1789, Ibid., V, 92. ,Mention of this proposal is also found in a.L3tter to Washington, May 10, 17 9. Ibid., V, 96. This suggestion is attributed as extraordinary for Jeffer- son because he was "ordinarily so sensitive to the obligations of the representative to his constituency...." Ihnr S. Randall, The Life of Thomas Jefferson (New York, 1858 , I, 521. This author believes that Jefferson was cmt of place in making this suggestion to Lafayette. Ehentually Lafayette did join the Third Estate and was 'mumdy welcomed by it. 72Letter to William Carmichael, May 8, 1789, The Writ- £938 of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VII, 337-558. l.-' 2h he has appeared to trim a little, is still, in the main, a friend to public liberty."73 There was hope on his part that the lower clergy, meny'of whom were sons of peasants, and who filled five sixths of the Clerical Order in the States-Gener- al, might swing over to the side of the Third Estate, although the Bishops were trying to prevent this.7h Jefferson thought that a bicameral, rather than a unicameral, legislature would be better for France. One body would contain the privi- leged order and the other the unprivileged.75 Because of tie deadlock on whether to vote by orders or persons, and the distinct possibility of civil war or the threat of despotism,76 Jefferson proposed the following solution. This third hypothesis which I shall develop, be- cause I like it, and wish it, and hope it, is that as soon as it shall be manifest that the committees of conciliation, now appointed by the three chambers,_shall be abls to agree in nothing, the Tiers LThird EstateJ will invite the other two orders to come and take their seats in the common chamber. A majority of the Clergy will come, and a minority of the Noblesse. The chamber thus composed would de- clare that the States-General are now consti- tuted, will notify it to the King, and propose 73Letter to John Jay, May 9, 1789, The Di lomatic Correspondence of the United States, 11, 288. 7"Ibid., II, 287. ”Letter to Lafayette, May 6, 1789, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 92-93. 76Letter'to John Jay, May 9, 1789, The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, II, 287. [*1 3L!- 25 to do business.77 He was confident that the revolution would not be stopped. "I‘think that in the end.the Nobles will be obliged to yield to the vote by persons, because the Tiers are more unanimous, more inflexible, and more formidable."78 Jefferson did not play a neutral part in the proceedings to follow. He believed he could offer sound advice to a new revolution since he had played a successful part in an old one. While attending a meeting of the States-General on June 2, with William.Short and a prominent French liberal, Rabaud de St. Etienne, the idea was started, probably by Jeffer- son,79 that the King should propose a séance royals and offer a Charter of Rights to the three Orders. The Charter would contain all that the parties believed to be good and was to be signed by all the members of the orders.80 Forgetting his diplomatic role, Jefferson drew up a "Charter of Rights" and sent copies to Lafayette and St. Etienne.81 The main provisions of the Charter were that the 77Letter to Hector St. John Crevecoeur, May 20, 1789, The‘Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VII, 368. 78Letterto Comte De Moustier May 20, 1789, The Writingg of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 97-98. 79Kimball, Jefferson, p. 281. 80Letterto Lafayette, June 3, 1789, The writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 99, and Letter to St. Etienne, June , ’ ~., , - O . 311bid. , v, 99-100. 'I I 26 States-General was to meet annually, and the law making powers were to be vested in the States-General; it would have the right also to levy taxes and appropriate them. Freedom of the press and abolition of all privileges were two other main pro- visions. The King in return for giving up practically every power he had, was to receive eighty million livres, and the nation was to assume his-debts.82 The Charter did not satisfy all the wishes of the, Orders or the King, and consequently was never accepted by them..83 The Nobility had no desire to give up its privi- leges-and exemptions. The King objected to losing his money making powers and the Third Estate did not think that the reforms would solve any of the economic problems confronting the nation .81’ Jefferson, in the Charter of Rights, advocated a con- emitutional monarchy, and had no desire, as mentioned before, to transfer the democratic experiment of America to French soil.85 Any idea that Jefferson was filled with the theories 82Proposed Charter For France, June 3, 1789, Ibid., V, 101-102 . 83Later, however, some of the provisions of the Charter plus others from the American Bill of Rights, were incorpora- ted into Lafayette's Declaration of the Rights of Man. Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, I, 371;. 8“Ibid., I, 37h. In my research I did not find a record of the Chifter having officially been presented to the Court. There is a strong possibility however, that since Lafayette received a copy that its contents became known to the King. 85Letter to St. Etienne, June 3, 1789, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 100. ’ .r'q - ‘0: 'II "'vv u~ 27 of Jacobinism, and brought them back to the United States on his return, is absurd.86 These were the same ideas that were expressed by him prior to his sailing to Europe.87 .Many years later Jefferson told of his disappointment that France had not accepted the Charter, for after thirty years of foreign and domestic wars, the loss of millions of lives, and the temporary foreign occupation of the country, her people had gained no more than what was contained in the Charter.38 Jefferson continued to watch carefully the delibera- tions of the States-General during the remainder of June. In a letter to Madison on June 18th, Jefferson said that, in a.few days all should know whether the government would choose bankruptcy and civil war, or do away with the dis- tflnctions of order.89 A clear picture of the character of the National Assembly was given at the same time. The lfinister definitely sided with the Commons where he felt fie talents of the nation lay. ...they are firm and bold, yet moderate. There 86Bowers, Jefferson and Hamilton, p. 101. 87Ibid., p. 101. F d 8:Autobio ra h , 1789, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, or , , I38. A 89Letter to John Jay, June 17, 1789, The Di lomatic Chrres ondence of the United States, II, 292 -293, and Latter to James MEdIson, June I8, I789, The writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and.Bergh, VII, 388- 390. t a a \ lux 28 is, indeed, among them a number of very hot- headed members; but those of most influence are cool, temperate and.sagacious.... Every step of this House has been marked with caution and wis- dom. The Noblesse, on the contrary, are abso- lutely out of their senses. They are so furious, they can seldom debate at all. They have few men of moderate talents, and not one of great, in the majority. Their proceedings have been very inju- dicious. The Clergy are waiting to profit by every incident to securS themselves, and have no other object in view 0.... I give you these miscellaneous observations, that knowing some- what the dispositions of the parties, you may be able to judge of the future for yourself, as I shall ngi be here to continue its communication to you. Movements proceeded at a much faster pace than Jefferson ted anticipated in the following week. The Salle des Menus Thaisirs was closed to the meetings of the Assembly until the King declared his "sentiments at a se’ance royale on the 22nd."92 The Commons, finding the hall closed, adjourned to the Tennis Court, where on June 20th, they took the famous oath to "bound themselves to each other by an oath never to separate of their own accord till they had settled a con- stitution for the nation on a solid basis, and that if 90It should be noted, however, that Jefferson did pay ‘hdbgte to the curés who he felt did a great deal to help the PGOp e. 91Letter to James Madison, June 18, 1789 The Writin s of fixmas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VII, 388-398. Jefferson Th3 requested a leave to return to the United States for a dust time. Letter to John Jay, November 18, 1788, The Di lo- yfldc Correspondence of the United States, II, 23A-235 and letter to WaShington, May 20, I789, The Writings of Thomas «hfferson, Ford, V, 95-96. 92Letter to John Jay, June 2A, 1789, The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, 11, 297. 29 separated by force, they would reassemble in some other place."93 The next day they met in'a church where a majori- ty of the clergy joined them. The King was assailed by all sorts of lies about what the Commons were about to do. The Queen was full of "rage and despair."9h As time progressed Jefferson developed a dislike for Necker. In Jefferson's opinion, "a tremendous cloud" hung over France, and Necker at the helm had "neither the courage nor the skill to weather it."95 Eloquence in a high degree, knowledge in matters of account, and order, are distinguishing traits in his character. Ambition is his first passion, virtue his second. He has not discovered that sublime truth, that a bold, unequivocal virtue is the best handmaid even to ambition, and would carry him further, in the end, than the tempo- rizing, wavering policy he pursues. His judgment is not of the first order scarcely even of the second; his resolution frail; and upon the whole, it is rare to meet an instance of a per- son so gch below the reputation he has ob- tained. When both Montmorin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Necker offered their resignations, the Count d'Artois de- clared, "No, Sir, you must be kept as a hostage. We hold yetlresponsible for all the ill which may happen."97 93Ibid., II, 297. 9’+Ibid., II, 297-298. 951bid., June 17, 1779, II, 293. 96Ibid., II, 293. See also pages 29A-296 fOr further information on Jefferson's Opinion of Necker's character. 97Ibid., June 21., 1789, II, 298. 30 The people became aware of this change of plan and the next day the King, while proceeding to the Royal Session, was cold- 1y received by them. The Duke D'Orleans on the contrary re- ceived much applause.98 After the King's speech, he ordered the Assembly to follow him and resume deliberations by order the next day. However, thirty of the Clergy and the Third Estate chose to remain. Although twice ordered out of the room by an officer in the King's name, they refused to obey.99 In the afternoon, so many people had gathered about the palace that the Queen sent for Necker. He was received with much ac- claim by the people. After a few minutes with the Queen and about forty-five minutes with the King, the Minister was es- corted back to his house amid the same joyous acclamations as greeted himbef’ore.100 In a postscript the following day, Jefferson added that the Archbishop of Paris, "one of the instigators of the Court to the proceedings Of the séance royale," while riding in his carriage was bombarded by mud and stones.101 On the 25th of June, forty-eight Nobles, including the Duke D'Orleans, joined the Third Estate.102 931bid., II, 298. 99Ibid., II, 298. l°°Ibid., II, 298-299. 101Ibid., II, 299. lozIbid. , II, 299. u ‘1 I. :' '1‘] [.4 I'! ('3 31 Through all these events, Jefferson had reason to believe that the Third Estate was moving too rapidly and was opening itself up to a great deal of danger.103 On June 29th, Jefferson informed Jay that the soldiers of the country were squarely behind the nation. They would defend the life of the King, but at the same time, would not cut the throats of the people. The King, in great alarm, recommended that the Noblesse and Clergy join the Third Es- tate in one Assembly. After this was accomplished great joy followed in both Verseilles and Paris. The King and Queen were greeted with cries of "Vive 1e Roi!" "Vive 1a Reine!"lOl+ Jefferson believed that the Revolution was complete with the triumph of the Third Estate. He informed Jay that "This great crisis being now over, I shall not have matter interest- ing enough to trouble you with as often as I have done late- ly."105 But the great crisis was not over yet, in fact, it had hardly begun. In the first days of July, a scarcity of bread hit France and there had "not been three days' provision be- forehand in Paris fOr two or three weeks past."106 Mirabeau, who did not like Necker, and was looking for a way to censure 103Ibid., II, 300. 10AIbid., June 29, 1789, II, 301. 1°5Ibid., II, 302. 1061bid., July 19, 1789, II, 303. 32 him, accused the Minister of turning down a proposal from Jefferson of a great quantity of flour to be furnished by the United States.107 Ample time was asked by Mirabeau to furnish proof to the States-General of these charges. Lafayette in- formed Jefferson of Mirabeau's charges,vvhich the American Minister immediately disavowed.108 Both Mirabeau and Necker received copies of Jefferson's reply to Lafayette. Mirabeau, seeing the inaccuracy of his information, immediately read the letter of Jefferson to the States-General.109 In order that.Mirabeau should not be hurt by his enemies with "scandal- ous versions of my letter," Jefferson thought it best that it be published.110 The letter appeared in the Journal de Paris on July 11, and the matter came to a close.111 Both Count Mirabeau and the Duke D'Orleans were attacked by Jefferson in his writings. The Duke, who had ambitions of becoming king, was described as "a man of moderate understand- ing, of no principle, absorbed in low vice and incapable of abstracting himself from the filth of that to direct anything 107Ibid., II, 303. On June 12, Jefferson had proposed that the States-General vote a distribution of bread to the pogr. Chinard, The Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson, pp. 2 -129 0 103Letter to John Jay, July 19, 1789, The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, II, 30K} 109Ibid., II, 30A. 110Letter to Lafayette, July 10, 1789, Chinard, Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson, p. 135. 111Kimball, Jefferson, p. 337- I-w 33 else."112 The American Minister was sure that this prince of the royal blood was being used by the unscrupulous Mirabeau in order that the Count could gain power for himself.113 Jeffer- son did not believe that either man would be successful in attaining his ambitions.llh There seems to be ample evidence that Jefferson had par- ticipated with.Lafayette in forming a Bill of Rights fOr France. The American Minister had sent a copy of these rights kw Lafayette to Madison at the beginning of 1789.115 On July lwh.Lafayette asked Jefferson to send him his "Bill of Rights 116 vdth your notes." The request was repeated a few days later.117 On examination of Lafayette's Déclaration des Dpoites de l'Homme et du Citoyen, it seems probable that the author drew a great deal of material from Jefferson's Decla- 112Letter to James Madison, August 28, 1789: The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 109. 113Ibid., v, 109. 11thid., v, 109-110. _115Ibid., January 12, 1789, V, 64. 116Letter to Jefferson, July A, 1739. Chinard, £2222£§ pf Lafayette and Jefferson, p. 130. 117Ibid., undated, p. 13h. Two c0pies of Lafayette's Bill of Rights, one annotated by Jefferson in pencil, are said to be in the Jefferson papers. Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, p. 232 or Kimball, Jefferson, p. 287. These copies must'be in the Library of Congress or the papers of the Massachusetts Historical Society as I did not find them in my examination of the Writings of Jefferson. 3h ration of Independence and his proposed Constitution for Virginia.118 The Bill of Rights was presented to the Assem- bly by Lafayette on July 11, 1789.119 Much enthusiasm was shown by Jefferson while writing Tom Paine of the change in the form of life and government in France. The National Assembly came in for a large share of the credit, he thought, by refusing to compromise in their desired goals. "The executive and aristocracy are at their feet; the mass of the nation, the mass of the clergy, and the army are with them. They have prostrated the old government, and are now beginning to build one from the foundation."120 Mention is made of Lafayette's Declaration 118Proposed Constitution for Virginia, The Writings of flipmas Jefferson, Ford, II, 7 n. 119Gazette Nationale,,ou Le Moniteur Universel, July 11, 1789, pp.7A-75. Hereafter referred to as MOniteur. These rights were discussed, but then turned over to a committee. Ibid., p. 75. They came back from the committee on July 27 an discussions and amendments took place until August 26. Ibid., pp. 108-193. The Declaration was finally adopted by theTNational Assembly on August 27. Ibid., p. 193 and A.Documentary Survey of the French Revqution, Stewart, p. . or the complete text of Eafayette's fieclaration of the Rights of Man (with the preamble), see Eugene Blum, Ia declaration des Droites de 1'Homme et du Citoyen (Paris, , pp. 3-8. ‘In'his annotated text of;Lafayette's De- claration, Jefferson proclaimed that "a generation had no light to bind the following generations by legislative action...." Chinard, Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson, p. 81. Curiously enough pefhaps because the Aesembly never adopted this point, Jefferson denied that this idea had ever been proposed befOre. Letter to James Madison, Septem- ber 6, 1789, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 115. Lafayette, anticipating trouble—from the COurt party in the Assembly, asked that if anything should happen, he be de- clared by Jefferson an American citizen. 120Letter to Tom Paine, July 11, 1789, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VII, A05. 35 of the Rights of Man. Rights, he said, were provided for nation, king and citizen alike. Duties and functions of the military and judicial powers were defined, as well as the organizations and functions of the Provincial and 121 "These are the materials of a municipal Assemblies. superb edifice, and the hands which have prepared them, are perfectly capable of putting them.t0gether, and of filling up the work of which these are only the outlines. While there are some men among them of very superior abilities, the mass possess such a degree of good sense as enables them to decide well."122 Meanwhile, Jefferson took an avid interest in the daily Imoceedings outside of the National Assembly. Details of the events taking place in Paris during the early days of July tmre forwarded to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, John Jay. Thward the end of June, the King dispatched troops, many of them foreign, to Paris, supposedly to keep the peace. Jeffer- son believed that the King's advisers were after more than just this; perhaps "to take advantage of some favorable moments, and surprise him into an act of authority for establishing the Inclaration of the 23rd of June," or "dispersing the States- General . . . ."123 121Ib1d., VII, a07. 1221b1d., VII, #07-A08. 123Letter to John Jay, July 19, 1789, The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, II, 30E: 36 The pe0ple, after freeing some French guards who were arrested, asked in a delegation to the States-General that they be pardoned. The States-General recommended the pri- soners to the King, and peace was asked of the pe0ple of Paris.12h This the King refused to do, saying that they udght remove themselves, if they so wished, to Noyons 0r Soissons.l25 By July 11, twenty-five to thirty thousand 126 Necker tnoops had gathered between Paris and Verseilles. was informed of his dismissal that afternoon. The next day, practically the whole Ministry of France was removed and re- placed by men, "the principal among whom had been noted flueugh their lives for the Turkish despotism of their <flmracter...."127 In the afternoon a clash occured between atroop of German cavalry and a mob of people. "This," said Jefferson, "was the signal for universal insurrec- tion."128 The people began to arm themselves with anything 12“Ib1d., II, 304. 125Ibid., II, 205. It is strange that in Jefferson's narrative of the early days of July in Paris, and its vi- cinity, that he makes no mention of the October 5th and 6th march of the women on Verseilles. 126Ibid., II, 305. 127Ibid., II, 305. 3‘281mm,, II, 306. In the midst of these events Jefferson's home was ffiree times broken into and robbed. Letter to Count de lvdonzbngrhn, July 8, 1789, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, 9 " 30 ‘ l .1- 37 they could get their hands on. The next day the States- General again asked the King to remove the troops, but were refused. On July It, the pe0ple, unable to obtain arms at the Hotel degZInvalides, arrived at the Bastille and asked f0r them. After being fired upon, they stormed the fort- ress, and not only seized the arms and freed the prisoners, but murdered the Governor, Monsieur de Launai.129 These events made a deep impression upon the King to the extent that he surrendered to the States-General the following day. Two hundred workmen were ordered to complete the demolition of the Bastille, the troops were removed from the Capitol, and all the Ministry resigned.130 At the same time Necker was recalled. The Nobles and Clergy at Verseilles, fearing for their lives, vied with each other in declaring how they were sincerely converted to the justice of voting by Orders and how determined they were in going along with the nation at all lengths.131 Prominent royalty, such as the Count d'Artois and the IMke de Bourbon, had fled. Jefferson did not know their 129Moniteur, pp. 79-80 and Letter to John Jay, July 19, §329";h8 Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, II, -30 . 130Duke of Dorset t0 the Duke of Leeds, July 16, 1789, Despgtches from Paris, lgB8-lggo ed. Oscar Browning, Camden, r r., on on, - 5, II, 2h3. 131Letter to John Jay, July 19, 1789, The Diplomatic Correspondence 0f the United States, II, 308. 38 whereabouts.132 0n the 17th of July, with sixty thousand people lining the way, many of them armed, the King returned to Paris from Verseilles, where M. Bailly, Prevost des Marchands, "put into his hat the popular cockade,"and peace was restored.133 This marked the real surrender ofthe royal power. There is little doubt that Jefferson was shocked by these events. He had urged a compromise with the King, but the Assembly was now unwilling to do this. They had tasted success and were ready to proceed with the Revolution until their extreme demands were met.13h The King, had he been left to himself, "would have willingly acquiesed in whatever they should devise as best for’the nation."135 He believed that a wise constitution would have been formed, hereditary in his line, with him as the titular head. The King, too, would have governed wisely, for Jefferson felt that this 136 was all he ever wished. Unfortunately, however, he had a.Queen who had "absolute sway over his weak mind, and 132Ibid., II, 308. In a postscript dated the let of July, Jefferson reported that the Count d'Artois was at Vhlenciennes, and that the Duke de Bourbon with the Prince cm Condé had passed that place. Ibid., II, 310. 1331b1d., II, 308-309. 13“Autobiography, 1789, The W0rks of Thomas Jefferson, Fbrd, I, 139: 135Ibid., I, 139-1t0. 1361hid., I, 139-140. .1. \. 39 timid virtue; and a character the reverse of his in all points." Jefferson sincerely believed that "had there been no queen, there would have been no revolution."137 Because Jefferson was the author of the Declaration of Independence and had helped lead the American Colonies to freedom, his advice was sought by various French political leaders. He said in his autobiography that "I was much ac- quainted with the leading patriots of the Assembly. Being from a country Which had successfully passed through a simi- lar reformation, they were disposed to my acquaintance, and Ind some confidence in me."138 On July 20, 1789, the Archbishop of Bordeaux, one of the cmmmittee picked by the Assembly to draft a Constitution, re- quested that Jefferson attend one of their first meetings "to nmke use to the profit of France of the lights of your reason amd experience."139 Jefferson begged off, saying that he was tmsy, and hinted also that this would not be correct for a 1&0 rmn in his position. He felt that his "mission was to the 137Ihid., I, 139-140. 1381bid., I, 138. 139Letter from the Archbishop of Bordeaux to Jefferson, hayii$,1l789, Chinard, Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson, PP. " [+20 lhoLetter from Jefferson to the Archbishop of Bordeaux, Jhly 22, 1789, Ibid., pp. lAA-th. This letter is in French. Kimball, Jefferson, p. 3A1, is of the opinion that Jefferson had aid in writing this letter. For a translation in English of this letter see pp. 289-290. 1+0 King as chief magistrate of the nation," and that his "du- ties were limited to the concerns of my own country and for- bade me to intermeddle with the internal transactions of that, in which I had been received under a specific character 0nly."lh1 However, this was not the end of the matter, for on August 25,142 Jefferson received a letter from Lafayette ask- ing him to receive at dinner the following evening, eight mem- bers of the National Assembly to discuss the proposed consti- tuliionoll+3 Brushing aside his previous resolution not to meddle in the purely domestic affairs of another nation, Jeffer- son agreed to Lafayette's wishes. Perhaps this acquiescence on his part was due to the friendship between himself and Lafayette, or just that the revolutionist in Jefferson emerged at this particular moment.th Present at the dinner were a group of moderate royalists and moderate republicans. They were Lafayette, Duport, Bar- lhlAutobiOgraehfa 1&82, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson: Lipscomb an erg s 2 ° lthchachner, Thomas Jefferson, I, 378. lhBLetter from Lafayette to Jefferson, undated, Chinard, Letters of Lafayette and Jefferson, p. 11.5. "The difficulty Between us is the Kfngrs veto-some want it absolute, others will have no veto-and the only way to unite them is to find some means for a suspensive veto so strong and so complicated as to give the King a due influence.- If they don't agree in a few days we shall have no great majority in a favor of any plan, and it must end in a war. Because the discontented party will unite either with aristocratic or factious people." lM'Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, I: 379. [a J‘ 1+1 nave, a young lawyer from the Dauphine’, Alexander Lameth, from Pe’ronne, Blacon, Mounier, the man who proposed the Oath of the Tennis Court, Maubourd and Dagout.u’5 In his Autobiography Jefferson claimed that he took no part in the discussions, thereby remaining a neutral)“6 This seems most improbable. In a confidential letter to John Jay, he said that he was very interested in the meeting.lh7 As a result of the meeting, it was agreed to permit the King to have "a suspensive veto on the laws, that the legisla- ture should be composed of a single body only, and that to be chosen by the people," thus making France a limited monarchy with the chief power vested in a popularly elected Assem- bly.ll*8 Plagued with a guilty conscience, Jefferson paid a call the next morning on the Comte de Montmorin and explained to him the nature of the meeting.“'9 Jefferson rightly suspected that the Foreign Minister had known of the meeting and what had taken place. The Comte, far from being angry, urged that Jefferson continue to "assist at such conferences" to keep the ~ lt'sAutobiography, 1289, The Works of Thomas Jefferson: Ford, I , . 1h61bid., I, 154. 1wLetter to John Jay, September 19. 1739: W119 Writin 3 Of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VII, A7 - . 1431bid., VII, A7A-h75. ' l’+9Ihic1., VII, A7A-A75. 42 hotheads in line.150 The American Minister told Montmorin that he knew only too well the duties that he owed to the King, France, and his own nation, and that he would "perse- vere with care, in the character of a neutral and passive spectator...."151 Jefferson continued to keep his American colleagues in- formed of the events taking place in the National Assembly dur- ing the month of August and early September. His early fear was justified, in that this body of twelve hundred men was finding it increasingly difficult to accomplish their task in legislation, because of the large number taking part in the debates .152 ~ The government, he felt, would be divided into three Iarts under the new constitution; legislative, judiciary, and executive. There would probably be a single house in the le- gislature with no hereditary branch. He was afraid, however, that "not a member of it will be chosen by the people direct- 3hh"153 The executive, he thought, would have a veto, although hechd.not know whether it would be absolute or qualified. KU.the executive power, nevertheless, would remain in the 15°_I._b__id - . VII. A7A-A75 . 1511bid., VII, A7A—A75. 152Letter to John Jay, August 5, 1789, The Diplomatic Cmnespondence of the United States, II, 3lh- II 3i23Letter to William Carmichael, August 9, 1789, Ibid., ’ —————- O ‘ I A . f . . o - C . \ . A\ I v r O , . . . . ’ . e \ ‘ . I . .. _ , \. \ . . #3 hands of the King.l5h In the judiciary, the parliament would be suppressed.and replaced by less numerous judiciary bodies, with trial by jury instituted in criminal, if not civil cases.155 In short, he felt that their constitution would be modeled after that of the United States with a few necessary changes to meet their circumstances.”6 There seems no doubt that Jefferson favored restrictions on the unlimited participation of the French people in their government. In America, he felt, they thought it necessary to "introduce the people into every department of government as far as they are capable of exercising it; and that this is the only way to ensure a long continued and honest admin- istration of its powers."157 Jefferson then proceeded to list point by point the safety with which people could participate in the three branches of government. 1. They are not qualified to exercise them- selves the Executive department; but they are qualified to name the person who shall exer- cise it. With us therefore, they chuse this officer every four years. 2. They are not qualified to Legislate. With us therefore they only chuse the Legislators. 3. They are 1541bid., II, 316. 155Ibid., II, 316. 156Letter to James Madison, August 28, 1739, The Writings 2f Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 109. 103 157Letter’to L'Abbe Arnoud, July 19, 1789, Ibid., V, ‘n‘i -' I 4h not qualified to 'ud e questions of law; but they are very capable of judging questions of fact. In.the form of juries therefore they de- termine all matters of fact, leaving to the per- manent judges go decide the law resulting from those facts. 5 If Jefferson imposed these limitations on the American people in the participation in their government, it only seems logical that the French, based on Jefferson's past statements, should have the same or more strict limitations placed on their governmental activities. Jefferson reported to Jay on the 27th of August that the Fiench government was in extreme need of money, taxes were rmt being paid, and that many people had been without bread fbr several days.159 He did feel, however, that the latter situation would ease in a few days.160 Jefferson showed much concern over the aristocratic Imrty trying to make a comeback because of friction among the Iatriots, but he was more worried about a group with "des- lkrate views... led by'Mirabeau,"161 who were supporting the Duke D ' Orleans . E 1531bid., V, 103. 159Letter to John Jay, August 27, 1789, The Di lomatic Eprrespondence of the United States, II, 321. The inability of the city administration ofFParis to furnish bread to the city led Jefferson to make the1remark that "Never was there a count- ry'where the practising of governing too much had taken deeper root and done more mischief." Letter to Madison, August 28, 1789, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 107. 160Letter to John Jay, AugUSt 27, 1789, The Diplomatic Qprrespondence of the United States, II, 322. 161Letter to Madison, August 28, 1789, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 109. AS The members of this faction are mostly persons of wicked and desperate fortunes, who have noth- ing at heart but to pillage from the wreck of their country. The Duke himself is as unprin- cipled as his followers; sunk into debaucheries of the lowest kind and incapable of quitting them for business; not a fool, yet not head enough to conduct anything. In fact, I suppose him used merely as a tool, because of his immense wealth, and that he ac uired a certain degree of popu- larity by his first opposition to the Governmeng then credited to him as upon virtuous motives.l é .Jefferson, being on good relations with the Ministry in Ihndon, had no doubt that they would furnish money to the Duke hlorder to promulgate a civil war in France.163 Up to his very departure from.France, 164 Jefferson failed to foresee the coming of‘a real revolution and the establish- nmnt of a republican form of government. It was his opinion that the King, "the substantial pe0ple of the whole country, the army, and the influential part of the clergy, formed a firm phalanx which must prevail."165 His description, at 162Letter to John Jay, August 27, 1789, ghe Diplomatic Cprrespondence of the United States, II, 322-323. 163Ibid., II, 323. Jefferson was of the opinion that the fhction of Orleans would be in favor of giving up the French Vbst Indies possessions to England, in return fer a large sum of money to alleviate France's financial problems. He went so far as to inform Montmorin that it would not be in the best interests of the United States to have one power mono- polizing the whole West Indies. 16“Jefferson's request for permission to return home for a short visit was granted in a letter from John Jay dated June 19th. Ibid., II, 319. He left Paris on the 26th of Sep- tember, but did—not sail for England until October 8th, because of very stormy weather. Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, I, 383. 165Letter to Madison, August 28, 1789, The writings 0f Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 110. ‘0- "I #6 this time, of the parties in the Assembly would lead one to believe there was little chance of a true republican govern- ment coming into being in t he near future. They were dis- tinguished as: l. The Aristocrats, comprehending the higher members of the clergy, military, nobility, and the Parliaments of the whole kingdom. This forms a head without a body. 2. The moderate Royalists, who wish for a Constitution nearly similar to that of England. 3. The Republicans, who are willing to let their first magistracy be hereditary, but to make it very subordinate to the Legislature, and to have that Legisla- ture consist of l gingle chamber. A. The fac- tion of Orleans. 6 , The second and third parties, of which he spoke with great favor, he. did not think would split, because of gener- al agreement in their views plus the powerful bond of La- fayette between them.167 We can come to the conclusion that Jefferson did not tmlieve the establishment of a republican form of government vms practical or possible in France at this time, but that the best possible hope at present was to establish a system similar to that of England's with a constitutional monarchy. (her a gradual period of years the people could then entirely emancipate themselves. With the talk of civil war in the air at Paris, Jeffer- son outlined to Jay what could possibly bring this catastrOphe 166Letter to John Jay, September 19, 1789, The Diplomatic Cprrespondence of the United States, II, 328. 167Ibid., 11, 328-329- #7 about. The first, was the shortage of bread, the second, a public bankruptcy and the third, the possible flight of the King from Verseilles.168 Although King Louis XVI's famous flight took place almost two years later, Jefferson, correct- ly foresaw the disastrous effect it had upon the nation. It is necessary that Jefferson's attitude toward Bri- tain and France be expressed clearly at this point, in order to understand his thinking on foreign affairs in the years that followed. Jefferson was deeply disturbed by a strong party in the United States who wished to make no distinction fllcommercial and international legislation between France and Great Britain. He felt that it was a great mistake to rmt Great Britain, a nation which "had moved heaven, earth, and hell, to exterminate us, in war, had insulted us in all lmr councils in peace," on an equal level with France which 'de spent her blood and money to save us" and "Opened her tmsom to us in peace, and received us almost on the footing (fl’her own citizens."169 It was folly he thought, for one 'u1believe that gratitude should never enter motives of rmtional conduct. Hamilton, in the future, would.take issue 168Ibid., II, 329. 169Letter to Madison, August 28, 1789, The Writin s gEAThomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 111. Jefferson in his Bitter- ness toward England added also that that nation had "shut her doors to us in every part where her interests would admit it, libelled us in foreign nations, and endeavored to poison them against the reception of our most precious commodities." ‘0. A8 with him on this point. There is no doubt that Jefferson had a great love for France and her people. "A more benevolent people I have never known, nor greater warmth and devotedness in their se- lect friendships. Their kindness and accommodations to strangers is unparalled...."170 If asked by anyone in which country in the world he would rather live, his reply would be, "...my own, where are all my friends, my relatives, and 'um earliest and sweetest affections and recollections of am life. Which would be your second choice? France."171 When Jefferson departed for home in the fall of 1789 km did not foresee the coming violence that would take place tithe French revolution. True, there were local disturb- ances,172 but he did not feel that this had anything to do ldth the national scene.173 170Autobio ra h l 8 , The Works of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, 1,137—5—2. ; ” ' 1711bid., I, 157. Jefferson in a letter to Mrs. John Adams, four years earlier, expressed his love of the French Imople but not of the despotic crown. Letter to Mrs. John (Abigail) Adams June 21, 1785, The Writings of Thomeg Jeffer- smn, Ford, IV, 61. His devotion to‘France was also expressed a Letter to M. De St.Etienne, June 3, 1789, Ibid., V, 99. 172Letter to John Jay, May 9, 1789"fl§$EiE§§I2£_%2£§%§- son, washington III, 26. Letter to John ay, u y 2 , 9, Ed. , III, 86-87. 173Charles Downer Hazen, Contem ora American 0 inion cm the French Revolution, John Hopkins University Stugies in Historical and PoIl'ticEI Science, ed. Herbert B. Adams, XVI (Baltimore, 1897), 52-53. This author has very little to say about Hamilton's and Jefferson's attitudes and opinions on the French Revolution. #9 He left for homel7h with the plan of returning to Paris and seeing the conclusion of the revolution, which he thought would be "happily closed in less than a year."175 As the Minister to France from a newly founded democra- tic republic Jefferson had an opportunity to study the develop- umnt 0f the French revolution from a position not accessible ibr any other foreigner. As he himself remarked in his £339- lfiography, "I was in circumstances peculiarly favorable for a knowledge of the truth. Possessing the confidence and in- thmoy of the leading patriots, and more than all, of the Marquis Fayette, their head and Atlas, who had no secrets from me, I learned with correctness the views and proceed- ings of that party; while my intercourse with the diploma- tic missionaries of Europe at Paris all of them with the court, and eager in prying into its councils and proceed- ings, gave me a knowledge of these also."176 It has been said by his biographers that Jefferson per- formed his duties well as American Minister to France. This is undoubtedly true. He was first of all a fine good-will ambassador, second only to Franklin, in the hearts of the .4.— 17"There were two important reasons why Jefferson wished to return to America. First, he wanted his daughters there and second, he wished to examine his private affairs and settle some debts. Autobiography, 1289, The W0rks of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, I, . 175Ibid., I, 149. 176Autohiograph¥, 1789, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb an erg , , 158-159: 50 177 178 French, as well as many other Europeans. Secondly, he concluded an important commercial agreement with France that "cracked the solid wall of French mercantilism" and.helped substantially the commerce of the United States.179 Thirdly, with the aid of John Adams, he obtained a new loan from Dutch bankers which.helped ease the public debt of the United 180 States for a period.of two years. Meanwhile, across the sea, in America, Alexander Hamilton 177King Louis XVI, in an official paper to the Department cfl‘State, spoke of Jefferson in glowing terms. "The manner in which he conducted [himself] during his residence with us had nmrited our esteem and entire approbation, and it is with great Ifleasure that we now give him the testimony of it." September 11, 1790, American State PapersiAForeign Relations. Documents Legislative and Executive ofithe Congress of the United States, From the First Session of the First to the Third Session of the Nurteenth 00n;ress~ Inclusive° Commencin;‘March 178' and . n; 'arc 3 , ed. under aut orlty 0 Congress oy a.ter owrle and -.tthew St. Clair Clarke (Washington, 1832-1861), I, 109. Hereafter referred to as A. S. P.; F. R. 178An article in the Edinburgh Review reflected the general sentiment of Europeans toward Jefferson's diplomatic career in France. "His watchfulness on every subject which nught bear on the most favorable arrangement of their new (mmmercial treaties, his perseverance in seeking to negotiate a general alliance against Algiers, the skill and knowledge lath which he argued the different questions of national in- terest that arose during his residence, will not suffer even in comparison with Franklin's diplomatic talents. Everything he sees seems to suggest to him the question, whether it can km made useful in America." Quoted in Henry S. Randall, The Lgfe of Thomas Jefferson, I, 551. 179Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, I, 3A9. For further de- tails see A. Se PeiFe Re, I, IIg-Ilhe 180Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, I, 356-357. For a complete discussion-3f AmeriCa's war debts see Kimball, Jefferson, pp. 202-217. I A I r J L 51 viewed the proceedings of the French revolution with a great deal of skepticism and with more awareness of the dangers that were eminent than Jefferson. Prior to the news of the events of July, 1789, reaching America, Hamilton had written the following to his good friend Lafayette: If your affairs still go well when this reaches you, you will ask why this foreboding of 111, when all the appearances have been so much in your favor. I will tell you. I dread disagree- ments among those who are now united (which will be likely to be improved by the adverse party) about the nature of your constitution; I dread the vehement character of your people, whom I fear you may find it more easy to bring on, than to keep within proper bounds after you have put them in motion; I dread the interested refrectoriness of your n0bles, who cannot be gratified, and who may be unwilling to submit to the requisite sacrifices. And I dread the reveries of your ph11030phic politicians, who appear in the moment to have great influence, and who, being mere speculatists, may aim at more refinement than suits either with humgg nature or the composition of your nation. Hamilton, in the early months of 1789, had both love and affection for France. She had.proved a faithful ally in a 'war'fbr his country's independence. Also many of his com- rades in arms resided there. Nevertheless, Hamilton felt that the new nation should lay aside all sentiments and Prejudice in regard to its relations with other countries, and start anew with a fresh slate. There were to be no al-L‘l'-a.l::1<.~.es, no friendships, and no ill feelings between the United States and other nations. To discriminate between Ale lleetter to Lafayette, October 6, 1789, The Works of nItalicl er Hamilton, ed. Henry Cabot Lodge (New-York and 5 3°11 , m. , VIII, 206-207. 52 France and Great Britain, because we owed our gratitude to one and our hatred to the other, Hamilton thought entirely out of place. He felt that we should treat all nations as they treat us and bury the past.182 In this, he took a stand that was directly opposite to that of Jefferson. A —--—'—-——r-—-—— t ‘Engen y Cabot Lodge, Alexander Hamilton, American 1382338111611, ed. John T. Morse Jr. (Boston andWew York, ’ pp. 153-1550 53 CHAPTER II SECRETARY OF STATE VERSUS SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY 1790 - 1793 Upon his arrival in the United States on November 23, 1789, Jefferson immediately was pressed to accept the new office of Secretary of State. Previously, in May, 1789, Abdison, who was consulted on matters of legislation and appointments by President Washington, had asked Jefferson if he was available for an important post in the new govern- nwnt. Jefferson had replied in the negative, stating he wished to return to France.1 Upon his return, Jefferson found two letters from President Washington, dated October 13 and November 30, urging that he reconsider returning to France, and instead 1Letter to Madison, August 28, 1789, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, llA-llS. Adrienne Koch, in‘his oo , e arson and Madison, gives several reasons why he thirucs Jefferson wanted to return to France. One was that his Irrench friends looked to him for political guidance. Another was that Mrs. Maria Cosway, a lovely British lady, had Cgptured his heart. A third reason, and perhaps the 5°33 important, was that he honestly thought, being in ”is? he could best foster good relations between France :fd IIJLES country. In addition, he had negotiated good limercial treaties between the two countries and estab- tosged himself as the best liked American in Europe, next Pro Panklin. Last, but not least, he wished to watch the g1" ess of the French revolution. Adrienne Koch, Jefferson Wang Ma dison, the Great Collaboration (New York, 19507, pp. 0 erea ter re erred to as Koch, Jefferson and Madison. 54 2 to undertake the new responsibility. Jefferson, in his reply, again expressed his desire to return to France and see the culmination of the revolution. After this he wished 3 to retire from politics. Because of "the criticisms and censures of a public, just indeed in their intentions, but sometimes misinformed and misled," Jefferson thought that the office "may end disagreeably for me."l’ However, Jefferson left the final decision up to Wash- ington himself. If the President still insisted that he accept the office, Jefferson would comply. Washington did insist and Jefferson gave his consent to accept the post on February 11., 1790. Five months earlier, with considerably less reluctance, Alexander Hamilton began his duties as Secretary of the Treasury. - George Washington had, at first, asked Robert Morris, chief financier of the American Revolution, to take over the duties of this important cabinet position. Morris, 2Letter‘ to Thomas Jefferson, October 13, 1789, The Writins of Geor_e Washin_ton from the Oriinal Manuscriot ources 15:91? Was Ington, p 3 - 'N , e-. 0 . thatric , XXX, AA6-AA7. Hereafter referred to as {he Writings of George Washinggon, Fitzpatrick. Mn 0V8 er , ’ ’ . of 31'6“” to Washington. December 15, 1789, The Writings Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, IAO-lhl. 1‘. Ibid., V, lhO-lh‘l. A - vii “Mon - 1946), p. 236. 55 however, declined and asked that.Hamilton be appointed.5 There is reason to believe that Washington, looking for a man with "bold and radical measures" to solve the country's financial problems, was happy that Morris refused and re- commended Hamilton instead.6 Although the salary of $3,000 a.year was considerably less than he earned in his law prac- tice, Hamilton took the post.7 Jefferson was deeply shocked by the change in the poli- tical atmosphere of his society. The republican principles cfi‘the American Revolution, the enthusiasm for liberty, equality, and fraternity, recently agitated in Paris, were notably absent. Instead there was a fear that the Revolution would be carried to extremes. When I arrived at New York in 1790 to take part in the administration, being fresh from the French revolution, while in its first and pure stage, and consequently somewhat whetted up in any own republican principles, I found a state of things, in the general society of the place, which I could not have supposed possible. Be- . ing a stranger there, I was feasted from table to table, at large set dinners, the parties generally from twenty to thirty. The revolu- tion I had left, end.that we had just gone through in the recent change of our own govern- nent, being the common topics of conversation. I was astonished to find the general prevalence of monarchical sentiments insomuch that in Innintaining those of republicanism, I had al- inays the whole company on my hands, never sNathan Schachner, Alexander Hamilton (New York and ES Q51” p. 236. 7%., p. 237. 56 scarcely finding among them a single co-advocate in that argument, unless someaold member of con- gress happened to be present. Although republican principles were still abundant in the p0pulace of the United States, their absence from the law- makers of the society caused Jefferson much concern. - To find that Great Britain, his great andldespised enemy, was ad- mired by this ruling caste, while France, the great ally and friend, was feared and hated, was something that Jefferson could not, at first, understand. In the beginning the Federalists, like the Republicans, looked with favor upon the French Revolution. Here was a nation struggling for her liberty as their own country had, a decade earlier. However, with the increasing excesses, especially the bloodshed and attacks on private property, they soon changedtheir minds. The only way to preserve the liberties of the United States was to fight the French prin- ciples which advocated the overthrow of the government. The standard question after 1793 was, where is there any sign of true liberty in France? The king and queen have been killed; H the Constitution of 178.9 overthrown; Christianity abolished " and Reason established; and the Netherlands annexed.9 The Federalists felt the United States should look to Great Britain for a friend, instead of France. The reason 8Ioetter to William Short, January 8, 1825, The Writing \‘01' ThOmas Jefferson, Ford, K, 332-333. Rem).1 9H§zen, Contemporary American Opinion of the French m l 23, PP0 $3-296}. A -—-- v 57 for this was the tremendous commercial trade with Great Britain,10 the great merchants Operating on English credit and the moderation of the British Constitution.11 The Republicans, on the other hand, looked with great fondness on France and her pe0p1e. If French liberty was crushed by the European "monocrats," the United States would be next. France had been our great ally in our fight for in- dependence. Because of this we owed her a great debt of gratitude. The French, it was felt, were making the first practical attempt to introduce democratic principles into Europe. Were not her interests identical with our loIn 1790, 75% of all the commercial trade of the United States was with Great Britain. British vessels carried over half of this commerce. 90% of American imports came from Great Britain. There were several reasons for this. Great Britain was the only country that would give long-term credits to our merchants; Americans preferred English goods; and the merchants were familiar with English business methods. John Holladay Latane’ and David W. Wain- house, A Histo of American Forei Polic (New York, 1.91.0), p. 50. ere was a strong poss 1 ty, n 790, that an Anglo-American treaty might come into being. William Kirk Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Forei PoIIc I'783-I’7xg9 , John Hopkins Studies in History 8113 PoIItIcaI Science, V (Baltimore, 1927), 88. Here- after cited as Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson ( ito American Foreign PolicyP WSE-IEQQ. America was not i 111g to pay t 13 pr ea or t e oss of her friendship with France. A. S. P.°LF. R., I, 121. The United States £3 hurt in her trade with Great Britain in that certain 91"1 can goods were restricted in Great Britain. Ibid., 1’ 121 - Also the British West Indies, as well as the ) Spanish and Portugese colonial ports, were closed to Ameri- Va 88918. Ibid., I, 302. Rayolllliazen, Contem orar American 0 inion of the French R7 “tion, pp. 293-291: and Etane’anh Wainhouse, A HIstory W \ can Forei Polic , p. 50. 58 own 7’12 The liking for France, on the part of the Republicans, was further enhanced by the tremendous resentment against Great Britain. She was devoted to stamping out free govern- ment in the world. George III was as much a tyrant to them now as he had been before, and during, the War for Inde- pendence.]'3 The Republicans, concentrated in the South and West, were not as closely tied up with Great Britain as the Federa- lists whose stronghold was in the New England area, center of commerce, shipping and banking. The aristocrats, comprising the merchants, shipbuilders, bankers and importers preferred doing business with Great Britain because of liberal credits and a similarity in business methods. The Republicans were for the most part farmers and artisans. Because they were not as closely allied with commerce and the various business activities in which the Federalists were engaged they were not quite as concerned with the importance of a strong ( commercial alliance with Great Britain. Republican animosity H toward Great Britain was heightened by the fact that the British flag was still flying over Northwestern posts in A. ( Violation of the treaty of 1783 and by British incited Re leazen, Contemporary American Opinion of the French W. pp. 591-291;. 1‘3 Ibid. , pp. 291-292. 59 ll» Indian attacks on our frontiersmen. No sooner had Jefferson taken office, when he was faced with the menace of war between Great Britain and Spain over the Nootka Sound affair. There was the fear that Lord Dor- chester might ask permission of the United States to travel across her territories with an expedition from Canada to Louisiana to capture New Orleans.15 Washington sounded out his advisers on what course they would pursue. John Adams, the Vice-President, did not favor the passage of British troops. Jefferson said he would be in favor of no direct answer to the British.16 Hamilton, seeing that the United States would be in no position for a war with Great Britain reluctantly replied that if the request be made, consent be granted .17 Fortunately for the United States, Washington was not formally pressed for a decision on this point, for war be- twmen Great Britain and Spain did not materialize. Jefferson was aware that if Spain and Great Britain went to war, and the latter seized Spanish territory along lhThomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American EEQIlléi: Fifth Edition (New York, 1955). PP. 59;60. T 15Letter to James Monroe July 11, 1790, The Writings 0f .QPHIEIss Jefferson, Ford, V, 19é-l99. 3 :1‘6"Cabinet opinion on war between Great Britain and Pain - ., July 12, 1790. Ibid., v, 199-203. 1790 17Letter to Washington (Cabinet Paper), September 15, a The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Lodge, IV, 30-31. 60 our border, the United States might have to go to war. He thought our chances fer winning such a war were slight un- less France should enter on our side. However, we could bide our time. If Great Britain did seize Spanish territory in Louisiana and Florida, we would have to retake it.18 How, he did not say. Jefferson was confident that France would support Spain in a war against Great Britain.19 He therefore, wrote William Short, the Charge d' Affaires, in France, to urge Lafayette to approacthontmorin, French Foreign Minister, to bring pressure on Spain to allow the United States to use the port of New Orleans or, at least, 20 one nearby. At the same time he believed France should help the United States gain unrestricted navigation of the Mississippi .21 18"Cabinet Opinion on War between Great Britain and Spain," July 12, 1790, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Fbrd, V, 199-203. 19Jefferson also saw the possibility of war between Spain and the United States over disputes in the Mississippi Valley region. He believed this might bring the United States and Great Britain together as allies, with the possibility that the United States might be involved in a war against her ally France. This, he believed, should be avoided because he felt only French intervention prevented Great Britain from resuming her struggle against the United States. Randall, Eye Life of Thomas Jefferson, I, 6lh-615. 20Letter to William Short, August 10, 1790, The Writings Qg'Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 218-221. le. Edwin Hemphill, "The Jeffersonian Background of the Louisiana Purchase," Mississippi Valley_HistoriCal Review, XXII (1935-1936), 183. 0-- L! ..‘ 0., A “II n ‘1 A! 61 As we have seen, Jefferson was gravely concerned over the change in the political trend upon his return to the United States. It was difficult fer him to comprehend how a nation could divide its allegiance so drastically, es- pecially since France had played such an important part in our struggle for'independence. The Federalists, who at first looked with favor on France and her revolution, had nowuadopted a contrary attitude favoring close ties with 'Great Britain because of our commercial relations with that country. They looked with disfavor upon French excesses and questioned her liberty as being a true.liberty. Their belief was that the future growth of our country and the pro- tection of our liberty would best be insured through an alliance with Great Britain. The Republicans, on the other land, were firm in their loyalty to France. They acknow- ledged that we owed her a debt of gratitude for aid given rm during the American Revolutionary War and sincerely be- lieved her republican principles were similar to those of our own. Fear that Great Britain desired to crush all democratic governments aroused their intense hatred. To fully unnderstand the attitude and relations of both Hamilton and Jefferson toward France, and her Revolu- tion, we must first examine briefly their attitude toward Great Britain. Hamilton believed that any interruption of Anglo- lhmerican trade would bring financial and political ruin to 62 the United States.22 Therefore, above everything else, peace must be maintained between the United States and Great Britain. Hamilton was on very intimate terms with George Hammond, the British Minister to the United States, and his secret con- ferences with him continually undermined Jefferson's nego- tiations with Hammond on British infractions of the Paris . Peace Treaty of 1783, ending the Revolutionary War. Hammond remarked that, "of this gentleman's [Hamilton\ sincerity I have the surest pledge in the knowledge that any event which might endanger the external tranquillity of the country would be as fatal to the systems he has formed for the benefit of his country as to his present personal reputation and to his 23 future projects of ambition." Jefferson, unaware at first, that Hamilton was under- nuning his whole relations with Hammond,2h sent an advance 22WhenMadison proposed a tariff that would be bene- ficial to both France and Holland, but harmful to Great Britain, Hamilton used his influence to defeat the proposals in the Senate. Frederick Scott Oliver, Alexander Hamilton° An Essa on American Union (New York, 1927}, p. 311. Hami - ton like Jefferson, favored reciprocal trade agreements with other countries, but unlike Jefferson, did not favor a course Which might result in commercial warfare if these countries did not agree to meet us on these terms. Letter to Jefferson (Cabinet Paper), January 31, 1791, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Lodge, IV, 5h-55. ‘ 23Samuel F. Bemis, Ja '8 Treat , A Study in Commerce and Di.lomac (New York, 19235, p. ICE. Hereafter referred’to as em s, ay's Treaty. 2“Jefferson became aware of Hamilton's secret negotia- tions with Hammond early in 1792. (Hammond arrived in the United States in the fall of 1791.) "It was observable that 63 cOpy of his reply to Hammond, to the Secretary of the Trea- sury, at the same time seeking his advice. He then for- warded Hamilton's notes, together with his own to Washing- ton. When Hammond received Jefferson's reply, he quickly whenever at any of our consultations anything was proposed as to Great Britain, Hamilton had constantly ready something which Mr. Hammond had communicated to him, which suited the subject, and proved the intimacy of their communications, insomuch that I believe he communicated to Hammond all our views and knew from him in return the views of the British court." ‘March 11, 1792, Jefferson Manuscripts, Library of Congress. Quoted in Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jeffer- son to American Foreign Polic - 3, X ,. 3- h. UEffersonbelievéd proo o t s can d e found in that Hamilton wished the government to enter into negotiations with Ternant, the French Minister, for a new treaty with France, although Ternant had no power to do this. When negotiations with France were unsuccessful Hamilton proposed that the government negdtiate with Hammond. .Jefferson be- lieved that the old treaty with Great Britain had been clear enough, yet they had not lived up to their end of the agree- nents. These violations occupied his talks with Hammond. Should Hammond obtain full rights in the future to negotiate a new commercial treaty Jefferson said he then would be willing go discuss the matter. Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, . 2-h 3. Jefferson saw that Hanilton was also against the report to Congress favoring retaliation against British shipping, on the grounds that our Western posts might not be returned to us. Anas, 1791, The writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, I, 185-187. The so-called Anas composed of7miscellaneous "scraps" of paper, rough drafts and memorandums, was written between 1791 and 1806. A preface or "Explanation" was added in 1818. It is practically a continuation of Jefferson's Autobiography. Ibid.,‘I, lShn. He thought the real reason was t t preparations were being made for a new Western boundary. Bemis, Jay's Treaty, p. 129; Hammond to Grenville, January 9, 1792, Hammond Cbrres ondence (Henry Adams Trans- cripts); and Extracts from 1r an s etters to Washington, 3February 25, 1792, in Jeffersoananuscripts, Library of (3ongress. The last two sources are cited in Woolery, Th3 ‘Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, Wen. 6h ran to Hamilton who comforted him with the knowledge that Jefferson's note did not represent the true sentiments of the country and that President washington had not seen it, but took the Secretary of State's word that it was in con- formity with the views of the rest of the Cabinet.25 Jefferson reported, on one occasion, that Hamilton was dissatisfied with the structure of the American government, thinking it better to go into the British form.26 On another occasion the Secretary of the Treasury said, however, that the success, so far, had been greater than his expectations, and that he was willing to give the experiment a fair chance.27 I According to Jefferson, Hamilton proposed a defensive alliance with Great Britain in 1792. VTo secure such an alliance, Hamilton proposed giving Great Britain a foothold .on the upper Mississippi with the right of common navigation 25Bemis, Jay's Treaty, p. 106. 26Anas, August 13, 1791, The writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, I, 1690 27Ibid., I, 169. Later, however, the Secretary of State reported Hamilton as saying the Constitution was a "shilly Shelly thing of mere milk and water which could not last, and "as only good as a step to something better." Ibid., I, 236. Hamilton and another Federalist leader, either Adams, Knox.or Jay, were classified by Jefferson as dangerous. "They pant fitter union with England as the power which is to support their projects, and are most determined Anti-gallicans. It 18 prognosticated that our republic is to end with the Presi- ment's life. But I believe they will find themselves all head and no body." Letter to William Short, July 26, 1791, Ibid., V, 361-362. 65 on the river. This proposal, however, was defeated by the vote of the President.28 In contrast to Hanilton's views toward Great Britain, Jefferson held a deep hatred of that country. This animosity seemed to reach back to the Revolutionary War when Jefferson was Governor of Virginia.29 His hatred of the aristocracy, brought about by his 5 years in Europe, was now identified with t he British. As mentioned in the first chapter, Jefferson felt that a distinction should be drawn between our ally France and.a hostile Great Britain, which had inflicted much grief on his country.30 There was no better place to draw a line between the two countries than in the field of commerce. A bill for the regulation of trade, although not acted upon because of the lack of time, was introduced in Congress in early 1791. It was composed mostly of Jefferson's ideas on trade,31 and 28Anas, October 31, 1792, Ibid., I, 206-207. (I found no reference to this proposal by Hamilton in any of his papers or A. S. P.; F. R.) In addition, Hamilton noted that we would have to dissolve our "fermer connections," meaning France, and continue the status quo in commerce with Great Britain for the next ten years. Ibid., I, 207. 29Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, I783-I793, XIV, 85. 30See page #7. 311a the United States' relations with all foreign coun- tries, Jefferson favored the principle of complete recipro- city. This should be supported by commercial treaties with these countries. If this utopian ideal should prove impossible between his country and another, he favored equal restrictions 66 contained many restrictions against Great Britain.32 As long as British regulations slowed down the volume of American trade, Jefferson felt this country would never truly be independent. He remarked to William T. Franklin, that "they think their commerce indispensable to us. I think that if we are excluded from their West Indies we shall be better without the commerce to Great Britain than with it. The luxuries of that country are familiar to us and will al- ways tempt us to be in debt. They think we cannot unite to retaliate upon them. I hope we can, and that we shall ex- clude them from carrying our produce, if not suppress their commerce altogether. They think our whole people would be glad to return to their former dependence on them."33 The failure of the Federalist dominated Congress to dis- criminate between the regulations imposed on British and French commerce,3h caused Jefferson to place before washing- cn both countries. Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, I, #25. In retaliating against a country who put afhigh tariff on cer- tain American products, Jefferson would, however, impose high tariffs only on articles which we cauld obtain elsewhere, or, by employing foreigners, manufacture at home. 32Letter to David Humphries (United States Minister to Portugal), March 15, 1791, The Writin s of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 302 and Letter to WIIIIam CaéfiichaeI (United States Charge’ d' Affaires in Spain), March 17, 1791, Ibid., v, 303. 33Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, 1783-1793, XIV, 90. 3("Letter to Edward Rutledge, August 29, 1791, The Writ- ings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 375. 67 ton, on December 23, 1791, the conditions of American commer- ce with the British and French. British duties on American products were higher, in practically every case, than those of the French.35 Although Jefferson showed an intense dislike of Great Britain in his personal correspondence, such was not the case in his official correspondence with representatives of that country. His letters to Hammond were completely fair and impartial and contained no evidence of personal animo- sity toward Great Britain.36 With this brief sketch of Jefferson's and Hamilton's attitude toward Great Britain let us now return to their position relative to France. Hamilton, from the very beginning, felt that the French Revolution was incianger of falling into complete anarchy. He told Washington there was little hope for order in that country fOr a.considerable period to come. It is possible, indeed, that the enthusiasm which the transition from slavery to liberty may 35Letter to the President of the United States, De- cember 23, 1791, Ibid., V, All-413. Only indigo was sub- jected to a higher duty in France than Great Britain, except in the West Indies, where there was a difference of 1% on some products favoring the English. Naturalization of Ameri- can ships, which was prohibited in Great Britain, was per- mitted in France. Also the English port charges were higher than in France. 36Jefferson was not afraid of President Washington's dis- approval of unfairness or partiality in his letters. Most of the dispatches were seen only by Jefferson and when a few came before the Cabinet, seldom were there any alterations. Ran- dall, The Life of Thomas Jefferson, II, 60-61. 68 inspire, may be the substitute for the energy of a good administration, and the spring of great exertions. But the ebullitions of enthu- siasm must ever be a precarious reliance. And it is quitevas possible that the greatness and perhaps immaturity, of that transition, may pro- long licentiousness and disorder. Calculations of what may happen in France must be unusually fallible, not merely from the yet unsettled state of things in that kingdom, but from the extreme violence of the change which has been wrought in the situation of the people.37 Although, at first, favorably disposed toward the French Revolution, later, when Hanilton saw that it was not only a political revolution, but a social and economic revolution, he performed a quick about-face. Throughout his life he had a profound respect for order and stability. The attacks of the French mobs on the person and property of the vested interests of society were of such a violent nature that his conservative instincts rebelled against them. Many people, at this time, were speaking of the grati- tude we owed France for the aid given us in our struggle for independence. Hamilton was of the opinion that France helped the United States, not because of her attachment to our in- dependence or'liberty, but because she desired to weaken the British Empire. By uniting together against Great Britain, both nations secured mutual advantages. Therefore, he felt, the account was balanced and that the United States owed 37Letter to Washington (Cabinet Paper), September 15, 1790, The WOrk§_of Alexander Hamilton, Lodge, IV, hO-hl. 69 France no debt of gratitude.38 Jefferson wrote in his _A_n_§_§ that Hamilton thought France could not be counted upon as an ally in a war with Spain, which the latter felt was inevitable. "France was too intimately connected with Spain in other points, and of too great mutual value, ever to separate for us. Her affairs, too, were such, that whatever issue they had, she could not be in a situation to make a respectable mediation 39 for us." Both during and after the Revolutionary War, France had lent the United States a substantial amount of money. Further loans had been granted by the Dutch. With the com- plete bankruptcy of the United States, during the period of the Articles of Confederation, no payments, either of inter- est or principal, had been made on any foreign loans between 1786 and 1790.“) \ 38I_b___id., IV, 30. In commenting on a report by Jeffer- son, a year and a half later, Hamilton asked if it was "accurate to say that France aided us in capturing the wh__q____le arm of the enemy." He wanted to know if this meant that tEere was no other army in the country; although there were two others, one in New York and one in South Carolina. Hamil- ton pointed out he was only criticizing Jefferson's "accuracy of expression." The sense was clear encugh. Letter to Jefferson, March, 1792, Ibid., IV, 65. 39Anna, October 31, 1792, The Writings of Thomas Jeffer- son, Ford, 1, 206 -2 07. 1+0Samuel F. Bemis, "Payment of the French Loans to the United States, 1777-1795," Current History, XXIII (March, 1926), 828. 70 One of the initial acts of Hamilton, upon his appoint- ment as the first Secretary of the Treasury, under the Con- stitution of 1789, was to find the means to pay the long overdue obligations to these two countries. That the debt should be paid, Hamilton had no doubts. "The money we ought to exert ourselves to pay with interest, and as well for the loan of it, as for the forbearance to urge the repayment of the sums which have become due,“ we ought always to be ready to make proportionate acknowledgments, and when. opportunities shall offer, returns answerable to the nature of the ser- vice."l’2 The fact that France did not force any humiliating concessions upon the United States with her loans left the mark of a. "liberal policy." However, Hamilton felt that per- haps this was because she was "influenced by an enlightened view of her own interest.”3 There was no doubt that we. owed France our "goodwill," but this was a far cry from thrance had had little hope of the United States ever paying her debts, in fact, she felt this might be the best thing. A weak America under the Articles of Confederation was a policy more preferable to France than a strong central- ized government, which would be able to collect the taxes to pay Revolutionary War debts. Of course, this attitude changed after 1792 when the French needed money desperately to finance their foreign wars. Ibid., XXIII, 828. thetter to Washington (Cabinet Paper), September 15, 1790, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Lodge, IV, 30. “31b1d., Iv, 30-31. "" 71 "a spirit of romantic gratitude...."u* New loans from Dutch bankers enabled Hamilton to make a payment of 2,171,637'livres (approximately $400,000) to France 111 November, 1790, toward the total debt of $2,h61,513. In IMecember, of the same year, 310ther payment of 1,AAO,362 ilivres (approximately $285,000) was made.h5 With the need for money created by the foreign wars, ‘which began in 1792, France sought to secure advance payment on the debt owed her by the United States. Although the crux of this problem is not taken up until after the arri- val of Citizen Genet to the United States, a word or two about Hamilton's attitude on the matter should be dis- cussed here. I As early as September, 1790, Hamilton was against ad- vance payments to France, on the debt we owed her, unless the United States could secure some advantageous terms. "However cordial our disposition to come to the pecuniary aid of France, in her present affecting and embarrassed con- chtion, in this early stage of our finances we could not in prudence volunteer payments, not due by the terms of the cmntract, especially too, by the expedient of new foreign loans, unless it should be attended with some circumstance <fi’advantage in the operation to ourselves. By this I "hibid., IV, 31. ASBemis, "Pa ent of the French Loans to the United States, 1777-17 ," current History,’XXIII (March, 19261828. 72 understand a lower rate of interest."h6 However, against Hamilton's advice, in 1792, a sum of u,000,000 livres ($760,000) was granted to Ternant, the French Minister at Philadelphia, for relief work for the French refugees from the Colony of San Domingo, and for re- lief work on that island.)+7 A negro insurrection had caused havoc on the island, practically wiping out the whole Euro- pean population. With the dethronement of the King of France and the suspension of the Constitution in August-September, 1792, both Hamilton and Jefferson agreed there should be no pay-I ments on the debt of France until a "legitimate body" had come into being."8 The National Assembly was not recog- nized as an "integral legislature." Jefferson felt that when the National Convention met, the United States should resume its payments to France. Hamilton thought otherwise. He doubted whether'the Convention would be a "legitimate body" and pointed out that if the King should be restored to power, he might well disavow any payments made to that 'héLetter to William Short (Cabinet Paper), September 1, 1790, The W0rks of Alexander Hamilton, Lodge, IV, 17-18. A7Samuel F. Bemis, "Payment of the French Loans to the United States, 1777-1795." Current History, XXIII (March, 1926, 829. 43Anas, November, 1792, The Writings of Thomas Jeffer- fl, Fora, 1, 208-2091]. 73 body.’+9 The matter ended with Jefferson asking Gouverneur Morris, the Minister to France, to inform that country of the temporary suspension of the payments. The Secretary of State recommended that the message be accompanied with the most "friendly declarations," pointing out that we did not wish to embarrass France, but only to see that our debt was paid "justly and honorably" and to the legitimate authori- ties.5O It was over two months later before washington agreed, at Jefferson's suggestion, to resume payment of our debts to France.51 I The attachment of Jefferson to France and her Revolu- tion upon his return to the United States, was no less en- thusiastic than it had been while he was on her soil. In addition to his gratitude for the help France gave the United States in the Revolutionary War, Jefferson had another important reason for supporting the Revolution. Not only did he believe a successful reformation of the govennment of France would insure a general reformation throughout the whole of Europe,52 but that the outcome of “9Ibid., I, 208-209n. 50Letter to the United States Minister to France (Gouver- neur.Morris), October 15, 1792, Ibid., VI, 121. Jefferson said it was the "sincere prayer" of America that France "speedily obtain liberty, peace and tranquillity...." SlAnas, December 27, 1792, Ibid., I. 213. 52Autobio ra h , The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergfi, I, 1§9- 7A the Revolution in that country would determine the success or failure of our own Merican experiment. "I consider the establishment and success of their government as necessary to stay up our own and to prevent it from falling back to that kind of "Half-Way house, the English constitution."53 The danger of a small, centralized and privileged group, the Hamiltonians, running the economy and government of the nation struck fear in the heart of Jefferson. He looked to the great mass of the people for strength to counteract this group.5‘* 53Letter to George Mason, February a, 1791, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 27h-276. Similar sentiments are expressed in Letter to Edward Rutledge, August 25, 1791, The writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VIII, 2317 ShLetter to George Mason, February A, 1791, The Writingg of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 27h—276. In 1790 John Adams published a series of papers called Discourses on Davila which appeared in John Fenno's Gazette of theIUnited States at Philadelphia. These papers were not favorable to the princip- les of republicanism or the French Revolution. Jefferson imme- diately believed that Adams was advocating monarchy as the best form of government for mankind. Ibid. V, 27h-276. In answer to Adams' pamphlet, he was instruments in seeing that Paine's pamphlet, The Rights of Man, was republished. Unfortunately, Jefferson's notes regarding The Rights of Man, were inserted in the republication. In these he made it_known that certain "political heresies" were springing up in the United States. Letter to Jonathan B. Smith, April 26, 1791, Hanley-Smith Pa ers, Library of Congress, cited in Schachner, Thomas flgfferson, I. #33. John Q. Adams attacked Jefferson for these remarks in Pu licola, which also appeared in Gazette 9f_the United States. Republicans all over the country went to Jefferson's aid, but the Secretary of State was "mortified" that he was brought forth into such a violent public discussion. Letter to washington, May 8, 1791, Th9 Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 329. Nevertheless, he thanked God that the people of his country "appear firm in their republicanism, notwithstanding the contrary hopes 75 Jefferson was convinced that the republican form of government in the United States was the only form of govern- ment in the world that was not opposed to the rights of man- kind.55 Under this form of government, the people every- where could create or change the government. Their will, and not that of one individual, or a group of individuals, was the only thing essential.56 As Gilbert Chinard points out, in the introduction to his biography of Jefferson, it was not out of sympathy for the Jacobins that Jefferson looked with favor on the French Revolution, but because of the struggle between two ideals, republicanism and the privileged classes.57 Although violence and excesses had taken place in the Revolution, since Jefferson's departure from France, he was and assertions of a sect here high in names but small in numbers." Letter to Paine, July 29, 1791, Ibid., V, 367. Adams, Jay, Hamilton and Knox were specified as four of this ngmger. Letter to William Short, July 28, 1791, Ibid., V, 3 . 55Letter to William Hunter (Mayor of Alexandria), March 11, 1790, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VIII, 6-7. 56Ibid., VIII, 6-7. 57Chhnard, Thomas Jefferson, p. X. According to Hazen party strife in the United States was "strangely foreign in character." The reason was "the French Revolution really drew a red-hot ploughshire through the history of America, as well as through that of France. It not merely divided parties, but moulded them; gave them their demarkations, their watch- words and their bitterness. The Whole issues were for a time subordinate collateral; the real party lines were established on the other side of the Atlantic." Hazen, Contemporary Amer- ican Opinion of the French Revolution, Introduction. (No page number given.) 76 no less enthusiastic that the people would gain their free- dom. After all, "we are not to expect to be translated from despotism to liberty in a feather bed."58 The spirit of the Revolution was spreading all over Europe and nothing could st0p it. The Opposition "will only multiply its millions of human victims; their own satellites will catch it, and the condition of mankind through the civilized world will be finally and greatly ameliorated.59 In early April, 1790, Jefferson mentioned to the Duke de la Rochefoucauld, that a conservative check would be necessary in the French Constitution. In order to prevent. tyranny by a single house legislature, it would be necessary, hereafter, to have a two house legislature. This could be~ done simply by amending the Constitution.60 This advice was not heeded and the Legislative AsSembly, the successor of the National Convention, was a unicameral legislature. It was over a year later before Jefferson made any note- worthy remarks concerning the French Revolution. After hear- ing of the flight and recapture of King Louis XVI, Jefferson thought it unfortunate if one man could spoil the success of so "beautiful a revolution." Hope was expressed that this 58Letter to Lafayette, April 2, 1790, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 152. 59Autobio ra h , The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lips- comb an erg , , 58. 60Letter to the Duke de la Rochefoucauld, April 3, 1790, Ibid., VIII, 18-19. 77 catastrophe would not come about, and that the revolution 61 would be "spread through the whole world." The general condition of Europe rested on the success or failure of this enterprise.62 In January, 1792, Jefferson said to the American Minis- ter in Paris that the people of the United States would be happy if the French, like themselves, established a govern- ment bound by the will of the pe0p1e.63 A few months later he remarked to Thomas Pinckney, the American Minister to London, that we could not deny to nations the principle upon which our own government was formed, the right of the people to govern or change their internal affairs as they see fit.6h The rise of the Jacobins in the fall of 1792 posed no problem for Jefferson in his wishes for the success of the French Revolution. Although many Americans, of the upper classes, were alarmed over the radical group's climb to po- litical power in France, Jefferson accepted them whole- heartedly. "I begin to consider them as representing the true revolution - spirit of the whole nation, and as carrying the nation with them. The only thing wanting with them is 61Letter to Sir John Sinclair, August 24, 1791, The writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VIII, 231. 62Letter to the Marquis De Condorcet, August 30, 1791, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 379. , 63Letter to Gouverneur Morris, January 23, 1792, The Writ- ings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, VIII, 29 . IX 76gLetter to Thomas Pinckney, December 30, 1792, Ibid., :‘o , ‘— more 78 experience in business, and a little more confbrmity to the established style of communication with foreign powers." more 65 Even later, when the excesses of the Jacobins became pronounced, Jefferson continued to defend them. I considered that sect as the same with the Re- publican patriots, and the Feuillants as the monarchical patriots, well known in the early part of the revolution, and but little distant in their views, both having in object the es- tablishment of a free constitution and differ- ing only on the question whether their chief executive should be hereditary or not. The Jacobins (as since called) yielded to the Feuillants and tried the experiment of retain- ing their hereditary executive. The experiment failed completely, and would have brought on the reestablishment of despotism had it been pursued. The Jacobins saw this, and that the ex- punging of that officer was of absolute necessi- ty. And the Nation was with them in Opinion, for however, they might have been formerly for the constitution framed by the first Assembly, they were come over from their hope in it, and were now generally Jacobins. In the struggle which was necessary many guilty persons fell without the forms of trial, and with them some innocent. These I deplore as much as anybody, and shall deplore some of them to the day of my death. But I deplore them as I should have done had they fallen in battle.... The liberty of the whole earth was depending on the issue of the contest, and was ever such a prize won with so little innocent blood? My own affections have been deeply wounded by some of the martyrs to this cause, but rather than it should have failed, I would have seen half of the earth de- solated. Were there but an Adam and an Eve left in every country, and left free, it would be 65Letter to William Short, January 3, 1793, The Writ- ings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 153-154. 79 better than as it is now.66 This abandonment of Jefferson's early conservatism was due to one or the other of two reasons; either to the success of French arms or because, with the Constitution of 1791 - the union of a democracy with monarchy - he felt that France was ready to run the full length of a democratic experi- ment 067 The attitude of the Federalist opposition that France was some monster out to wreck the civilization of the world, was probably responsible, as much as anything else, for Jefferson swinging so far to the left.68 To Joel Barlow, American poet and pamphleteer, he remarked hopefully, "God send that all nations who join in attacking the liberties of France may end in the attainment of their own."69 He told Tom Paine that there were important people in the United States who needed his lessons in republicanism and were not paying any attention to them.70 And to Lafayette he said; "While you are exterminating the monster aristocracy, and pulling out the teeth and fangs 66Ibid., VI, 153-151. 67Randall, The Life of Thomas Jefferson, II, 109. This author is of the opinion that it was theflatter reason that prompted Jefferson to defend the Jacobins. 68Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, I, L60. 69Letter to Joel Barlow June 20, 1792, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 88-89. 70Letter to Thomas Paine, June 19, 1792, Ibid., VI, 87. 80 of its associate monarchy, a contrary tendency is discovered in some here. A new sect has shown itself among us, who de- clare they expound our new constitution, not as a good and sufficient thing itself, but only as a step to an English constitution, the only thing good and sufficient in itself, in their eye."71 The Secretary of State expressed his happiness that the Prussian army was forced to retreat from the French army in the autumn of 1792. Not satisfied with the news, he hoped 2 that "some proper catastrophe" would follow.7 In a meeting with Washington in December, 1792, the President surprisingly expressed to Jefferson his dissatis- faction with both Great Britain and Spain and called for closer ties with France. Jefferson remarked that he was pleased with this tone of conversation, but that he did not "need the successes of the Republic arms in France... to bring me to these sentiments."73 Although the debt payments to France were resumed at Jefferson's suggestion, this de— parture on Washington's part from Federalist thinking was only temporary. Upon hearing of the death of King Louis XVI, January 21, 1793, most of the aristocratic society of Philadelphia 71Letter to Lafayette, June 16, 1792, Ibid., VI, 78. VI lZZLetter to Dr. George Gilmer, December 15, 1792, Ibid., , e 73Anas, December 29, 1792, Ibid., I, 212-213. 81 were shocked and many, especially the ladies, expressed their 7h indignation toward the Revolution. Jefferson was a notable exception. He believed that if this did not cause republics to spring up all over EurOpe, at least it caused a loss of prestige for the monarchical government in that kings were liable to punishment for their acts like any other crimi- nals.75 His chief concern, at this time, was that Ternant, who had gone into mourning for the King, seemed to be form- ing a connection with Hamilton.76 A few words should be said here concerning Jefferson's and Hamilton's attitude on Franco-American commercial rela- tions. L. W. Otto, French Charge d' Affaires, complained to Jefferson that the Acts of Congress in 1789 and 1790, re- lating to import and tonnage duties between the United States and foreign vessels, were much to the advantage of the United States. He complained that this was a violation of the fifth article of the 1778 treaty of commerce between his 77 country and America. 7“Letter to Madison, March 1793, Ibid., VI, 192-193. 75Jefferson to unknown addressee, March 18, 1793, The lfifitings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, IX, 43. 76LettertoMadison, March, 1793, The Writings of 'Lhomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 193. 77Letter from L. W. Otto to Jefferson, December 13, 1790, Jefferson Manuscri ts, Library of Congress. Cited in Woolery, TheIRelation of' omas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, 82 . Jefferson sent this protest to Hamilton, remarking this was not a violation of the treaty, but that for "a nation which takes one-third of our tobacco, more than half our fish oil, and two-thirds of our fish.... and a great deal of rice; and from whom we take nothing in return but hard money to carry directly over and pour into the coffers of their ene- mies," France did deserve some special favors in order to in- sure their good will toward us.78 Because those nations not favored would resent special concessions to France, Hamilton was not in agreement with Jefferson. Instead he called for a new treaty with France.79 The Secretary of State answered that the intention of the 1778 treaty was to "grant fully reciprocal and most favored nation rights."80 Jefferson then proposed a new plan with trade advantages for both nations. Why not exemption from tonnage duties in the United States for reduced duties on whale and fish oils in France? Hamilton was not satisfied with this plan either. He 78Letter to Hamilton, January 1, 1791, American Letters, State Department, National Archives. Cited in Sohachner, fllpmas Jefferson, I, A26. 79Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Ebreigp Policy, 178341793, XIV, 1001 801b1d., XIV, 100. 811bid., XIV, 100-101. 1 A 111‘! ‘1 l‘l‘ m I! 83 saw a loss of revenue which could not be adequately re- placed, plus an unequal result which would greatly benefit France rather than the United States.82 Jefferson could only reply, as before, that he did not admit to France's inter- pretation of the treaty, but thought it beneficial to the United States to maintain her good-will by granting some special concessions.83 With Hamilton's reluctance to grant special favors to France, Jefferson told Congress, and later Otto himself, that the article of the treaty which the French Charge d' Affaires referred to, did not apply in the case.84 To Otto, however, he hinted that Congress might pass legislation, at the next 82Letter to Jefferson, January 11, 1791, Hamilton Manu- scri ts, Library of Congress. Cited in Woolery, The Relation of Tgomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, 1783-1793, XIV,*lOl. 83Letter to Hamilton, February 13, 1791, Jefferson Manu- scri ts, Library of Congress. Cited in Woolery, The’ReIation of Tfiomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy, 1733-I7§3, XIV,*IOl. 81“"Report on Tonnage Law," January 18, 1791, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V 266-273 and Letter to L. W. Otto, March 297‘1791, Ibid., v, 306-313. Some radical Republicans were shocked at Jefferson's public stand on this point little knowing that, privately, he sought private favors for France and a navigation act directed against Great Britain. Schach- ner, Thomas Jefferson, I, 427. Already this act had been drafted andfa copy sent to Carmichael. Short and Humphries were asked to feel out France and Portugal to see if they would pass similar'acts in order to secure the freedom of the seas. Letter to the United States Charge d' Affaires in Spain (William Carmichael), March 17, 1791, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, 303 and Letter to the United States MiniSter to Portugal (David Humphries), March 15, 1791, Ibid., V, 302. 84 session, that would bring mutual advantage to both count- 85 ries. Both political parties hadflattached themselves to their favorite nation overseas; the Republicans to France; the Federalists to Great Britain. Neither could see why the other supported the policies and institutions of their fa- vorite country and, at every opportunity, bitterly denounced the enemy European country. . When Great Britain made the first chief provocation upon American commerce by not recognizing a ship as American, un- less built in an American shipyard,86 Jefferson was for imme- diate retaliatory measures against that country. At approxi- mately the same time France added an extra duty on American tobacco imported in American vessels, as against French vessels. Jefferson declared he did not expect such an act against our navigation from a country whose friendship we held in such high esteem. The British Navigation Act, it- self, he said, at least left "all nations the carriage of their own commodities free.'_'87 However, in this case, he did not call for any retaliation against France, as he had 85Letterto L. w. Otto, March 29, 1791, Ibid., V, 312-313. 86Letter to the President of the United States, April 17, 1791, Ibid., V, 322. 87Letter to William Short (United States Chargé d'. Affaires in France), July 28, 1791, Ibid., V, 362-363.- Jefferson called on Short to seek Lafayette's assistance on this PrOblemo Ibid., V, 36140 85 against Great Britain. He believed the National Assembly had enacted the discriminatory duty hurriedly and hdthout having had the time to consider the consequences. Shortly after these incidents, in August, 1791, the appointed French Minister to the United States, Jean Bap- tiste Ternant, arrived in this country. Much to the dis- appointment of Jefferson, Ternant had brought no instruc- tions to propose the negotiation of a new commercial treaty, nor was there much chance that he would receive such in- structions in the near future.89 Because of this, any such discussions would have to take place in Paris and Jefferson did not favor such procedure.90 Hamilton thought he had the perfect solution to this dilemma. He suggested privately to Ternant that terms for a treaty be discussed on a "volunteer" basis. Upon reach- ing an agreement it could then be forwarded to Paris for confirmation or rejection. This idea was made known to washington, who passed it on to Jefferson. The Secretary of State, however, would have no part in such a plan. He said that the United States would be bound by any agree- nents reached with Ternant, while France could reject them 88Letter to the United States Consul at Bordeaux (Joseph Fenwick), August 30, 1791, Ibid., V, 380. 89Letter to the Charge d' Affaires in France (William Short), November 2A, 1791, Ibid., V. 39h. 903chachner, Thomas Jefferson, I, 452. 86 if she so wished. Meanwhile, France would know exactly 1 how far we would be willing to go to achieve our objective.9 Because of Hamilton's constant pressure, the President, however, insisted that Jefferson follow through with the Secretary of the Treasury's proposal. Jefferson, therefore, drafted a set of proposed clauses for a treaty of commerce which contained the following main provisions - "... a mutual agreement that the citizens of each country, their ships, produce and manufactures, receive the same treatment from the other as their own citizens and effects; and that the import duties laid by both remain at current maximums, with the proviso that if either'oountry lowered its duties, then the other must reduce its own by an equivalent amount."92 Hamilton, meanwhile, had prepared his own set of propo- sals which placed higher duties on commodities, regardless of what action France might take93 in the drafting of a new commercial treaty. Not only did Hamilton refuse to cooperate with Jefferson, but Ternant, too, did not see eye to eye on the proposal of the Secretary of State. Instead of freezing the import duties at the current maximums, the French Minis- ter wished to reserve the right to increase French duties as 18 :EAnas, 1791, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, I, 5"]. o 92"Clauses for Treaty of Commerce with France," November, 1791, Ibid., V, 397-399- 93Ibid., v, 398n. 87 much as 50% on American commodities.9h With discuSSions at an end, Hamilton came up with a proposition that as long as Ternant would not cooperate with the United States, why not open negotiations with Hammond, the British Minister, to attain similar ends? Jefferson at last saw the light. He believed Hamilton proposed opening negotiations with Ternant for a new commercial treaty, planning all along to sabotage the effort, as he did with his insistence on higher duties. Then, with negotiations at an end, between France and the United States, plans could be made for a treaty of commerce vdth Great Britain, on such favorable terms to the latter, that we would forever be imprisoned in her commercial 95 sphere. Seeking to avoid this trap, Jefferson was determined not to speak of any new commercial treaty with Hammond. He be- lieved there was some chance of success with Ternant,'but With Hammond he felt there was none. The old treaty with (3reat Britain had been clear'enough, yet that country had ‘riolated it in many instances. It was these violations 9[*Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, I, 452. 95Anas, 1791, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, I, 185-186. Great Britain had refused to embody any commercial Clauses in the Treaty of 1783. Following the mercantilistic theory of colonial monopoly, she had hurt American commerce, to a great degree, by not allowing our ships to enter the British West Indies. Spain and Portugal had applied similar restrictions on American ships. Therefore, there was not a Imrt in the Western Hemisphere, outside of a few open Dutch and French ports, where an American ship could enter. Latane and Weinhouse, A History of American Foreign Poligy, p. #9. 88 Jefferson would discuss with Hammond, and nothing else. However, he always reserved the right of agreeing to nego- tiations for a new treaty if Hammond should ever obtain full powers to discuss such a matter.96 Still hoping for closer commercial relations with France, Jefferson instructed Morris, in March, 1792, to hurry up ne- gotiations for a new commercial treaty with France.97 In April of that year, again writing to Morris, he expressed the hope that the Legislative Assembly would "repeal the very obnoxious laws respecting our commerce." He believed that the present session of Congress would pass over these laws Without any retaliation, but that, if the Legislative Assembly did not produce a "retaliation of good on their part," at the next session of Congress there would pass "some counter-regulations for the protection of our navi- gation and commerce."98 He again expressed the desire to enter into "an equal and cordial treaty" with France.99 The summer passed with France showing no desire to enter into such an agreement. The Administration saw clearly that the autumn of 1792 with its clashes that brought the emergence of the French 96Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, I, 453. 97Letter to United States Minister to France (Gouverneur Morris), March 10, 1782, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, V, #50. 98Letter to United States Minister to France (Gouverneur Morris), April 28, 1792, Ibid., V, 513. 99Ibid., v, 513. 89 Republic, was not the time to conclude a commercial treaty.100 Thus the matter stood, with Jefferson urging Morris to inform the French that, if they did not revoke the "late innovations," the United States would be forced to "lay additional and equivalent burthens on French ships...."lOl At about the same time, Ternant proposed that the United States and France conclude an agreement abandoning the prac- 'tice of privateering in time of war.102 Jefferson was re- ported to be in full agreement with this proposal, stating the United States had made such a stipulation in its trea- ties of commerce with Prussia and Portugal.103 The French, by February, 1793, had made some reductions in their tobacco duties, but this was not enough to satisfy Jefferson. While wishing the "happiness and prosperity" of that nation, he expressed the hope that they would revise their duties further to bring them on a more equal basis with those of the United States.10’+ 100Letter from Gouverneur Morris to Jefferson, February 13, 1793, A. S. P.; F. R., I, 350 and Letter to Gouverneur Morris, The Writings of George Washington, Fitzpatrick, XXXII, 189. A 101Letter to Gouverneur Morris, November 7, 1792, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 131. 102Letter to the French Minister (Jean Baptiste Ternant), October 16, 1792, Ibid., VI, 122. 103Ibid., VI, 122. 10“Letter to the French Minister (Jean Baptiste Ternant), February 17, 1793, Ibid., VI, 189. 90 As early as the beginning of 1792, Jefferson had in- formed washington of his desire to retire from office at the end of the President's term.105 The Chief Executive urged Jefferson to stay on, but the Secretary of State would not consent. When Jefferson accepted the office he had been very reluctant to do so. Now he was convinced the political clashes he would have to face in the coming year would make it the longest of his life.106 The main reason for Jefferson's decision was the con- tinual controversy with Hamilton over the domestic and for- eign affairs of the country. There was very little these two men agreed upon. Hamilton believed in a strong central government and an industrial society, with favoritism to the bankers and merchants. Jefferson believed the states should have more say in the affairs of the nation than at present. Faworing the middle class farmer, he believed an agriculture society best for the interests of the United States. Although Hamilton's financial policies were the exact and direct reasons given to washington for Jefferson's desire to retire from office,107 he was also tired of Hamilton's loSAnas, March 1, 1792, Ibid., I, 175-176. 3:06Letter to Martha J. Randolph. March 22: 1792: IQEQ': v,z.. 107Jefferson cited three of Hamilton's policies; the me- thods for refunding the public debt, the Bank of the United States, and the "Report on Manufactures." Jefferson accused 91 continual interference in the department of foreign affairs. The Secretary of the Treasury's backstage diplomacy, with Hammond and Ternant, was sabotaging all of Jefferson's efforts to seek some solution to the problems that con- fronted the government with France and Great Britain.108 Jefferson said that his system was to give "some satis- factory distinctions" to France, at little cost to the United States, in return for "the solid advantages" she would yield us. As for Great Britain, he planned to impose "some restrictions" which might induce her to refrain from attacking our commerce.109 Hamilton, in return, was sick of Jefferson's "woman- ish attachment to France and a womanish resentment against Great Britain."110 He felt that both James Madison and Jefferson wished to involve the United States, as closely as possible, in the internal affairs of France. He also be- Hamilton of poisoning the government of the country. It was histlelief that congressmen were making substantial profits by supporting Hamilton's policies. Congress, he felt, would be endowed with too much power to appropriate money if the "report" prevailed. Anas, March 1, 1792, Ibid., I, 177. Also, Letter to the PreSIdent of the United States, September 9, 1792, Ibid., VI, 102-103. 108Anas, March ll, 1792, Ibid., I, 185- 187 and Letter to the Pre31dent of the United States, September 9, 1792, Ibid., VI, lOB-IOA. 109Ibid., VI, 103. 110Letter to Edward Carrington, May 26, 1792, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Lodge, VIII, 258-259. 92 lieved they threatened the peace of the United States be- cause of their desire to bring about as complete a break as possible in the relations between the United States and Great Britain.111 As for Hanilton's attitude toward France, he was of the opinion that a neutral policy would be the best course of action for the country. "I have a due sense of the con- duct of France towards this country in the late revolution; and that I shall always be among the foremost in making her every suitable return; but there is a wide difference be- tween this and implicating ourselves in all her politics; between bearing good-will to her and hating and wrangling with all those whom she hates. The neutral and pacific policy appears to me to mark the true path to the United States."112 Throughout 1792, both the Federalist press and Hamilton under the guise of An American, attacked Jefferson so violently for his policies that there was talk of an in- vestigation of his conduct in office. More than anything else, this threat of being fired from office, caused Jeffer- son to reconsider his retirement.113 On February 7, 1793, 111Ibid., VIII, 259. llZIbid., VIII, 259. 113Letter to Martha J. Randolph, January 26, 1793, The writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 163-16h. Of course, Jefferson did not state this to the President as his reason 93 he informed washington he would remain at his post until summer or autumn of the year.llh Had Jefferson foreseen the troubles that would develop, when news of war between France and Great Britain reached America, he might very well have regretted his decision to continue in office. for staying in office. Another important reason for Jeffer- son's remaining in the Cabinet was that he anticipated the arrival of Genet in Philadelphia and the significant develop- ments that might follow. Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American Foreign Policy,_I783-1793, XIV, IOS. lll"’Anas, February 7, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, I, 21h. Washington urged‘Jefferson to accept the post as Minister to France, but the Secretary of State deglined the office. February 20, 1793. Ibid., I, 217- 21 . w h I‘H 9h CHAPTER III JEFFERSON, HAMILTON AND CITIZEN GENET Upon hearing of the outbreak of war between France and Great Britain, which occured February 1, 1793, President washington immediately submitted thirteen questions to the Cabinet as to the conduct of the Executive towards the war.1 The first question was whether or not the United States should issue a proclamation advocating strict neutrality be- tween itself and the warringpowers.2 The second and third questions asked whether or not we should allow the French to send a minister to the United States, and, if so, with or lHamilton had prepared these questions and sent them to Washington. Lodge, Alexander Hanilton, p. 160. Through his intimacy with Hammond, the BritiSh Minister, Hamilton was the first to apprise Washington of the existing war. Letter to Washington, April 5, 1793, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, ed. John C. Hamilton (New Yor , - -3 Hereafter referred to as The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Hamilton. Jefferson told washington twour ports to cruise on her enemies? The Cabinet unanimously agreed that she could. What should be done with vessels armed in our ports before the Presi- dent's Proclamation; and what of the prizes brought into American harbors? Hamilton and Knox believed the prizes should be given up and the privateers suppressed. Jefferson was of the opinion that the prohibition was not retroactive and that the French should be allowed to keep their prizes or legally dispose of them. Randolph compro- mised by favoring the disposition of the prize, but felt the privateers should be ordered away from our ports. To the question, should Americans who participate in war against nations at peace with the United States be prosecuted; the answer was unanimously, yes.115 None of these decisions however, would apply to the La Petite Democrate. During the debate on the law, she had slipped down the river and put out to sea. Hamilton was 113Letter to Genet, July 12, 1793, Ibis}. VI: 3&5; lthuestions as to Belligerents, July 29, 1793, Ibid., VI, 358-360.. The ultimate form consiSted of eight questions. Ibid., VI, 358-359n. ' 115Anas, July 10, 1793, Ibid., I, 2h2. 131 furious and immediately demanded that the French be told to recall Genet. Meanwhile, he felt that his duties as Minis- ter to the United States should be suspended.116 Shortly after the trouble concerning La Petite Democrate had begun Jefferson had again voiced criticism concerning Gengt's conduct. He told Madison that he must see him be- fore Congress met because the French Minister "is so evident- ly in the wrong that those are pressing for an appeal to the people who never looked towards that tribunal before.117 To Monroe he expressed fear that Genet might destroy the friendly relations between France and the United States. I fear the disgust of France is inevitable. We shall be to blame in part. But the new minister much more so. His conduct is indefensible by the most furious Jacobin. I only wish our country- men may distinguish between him and his nation, and if the case should ever be laid before them, may not suffer their affection to the nation to be diminished. H [Hamilton] sensible of the advan- tage they have got, is urging a full appeal by the government to the pe0p1e. Such an explosion would manifestly endanger a dissolution of the friendship between the two nations, and ought therefore to Ra deprecated by every friend to our liberty.l As is evident in the preceding quotation, Jefferson's disgust of Genet's actions had in no way changed his opinion 116Anas, July 13, 1793, Ibid,, I, 2A3 and 2A3n. 117Letter to Madison, July 14, 1793, Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress, XC, 15508. Quoted in Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, 1, 500. 118Letter to Monroe, July 1A, 1793, The Writings 0f Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 3h8-3A9. 132 about France and the principles for which she stood. Throughout his debate with the French Minister over the in- terpretation of the treaties of 1778, the Secretary of State continued his well wishes to France and her Revolution. Jefferson could hardly contain his enthusiasm when the French frigate l'Embuscade brought its British prizes into the port of Philadelphia. He was especially pleased that so many thousands of the yeomanry of the city had turned out to witness the event and that they cheered when they saw the French colors flying over the reversed British colors.119 On the other hand, disgust was evident when that #00 aristocrat refugees from the insurrection on the island of St. Domingo were seeking a home in Philadelphia. His wish was that the 400 would be distributed among the Indians, "who would teach them lessons of liberty and equality."120 119Letter to Monroe, May 5, 1793, Ibid., VI, 238. Letter to Thomas Mann Randolph, May 6, I793, Ibid., VI, 2A1. Letter to John Wayles Eppes, May 23, 1793, Ibid., VI, 26h. 120Letter to Martha Jefferson Randolph, May 26, 1793, Ibid., VI, 268. Later, however, Jefferson was in favor of United States' aid to these "aristocrats." He hoped that with the Administration's aid it would do away with "the impression of their disobligations toward France." Letter to Menroe, July 1h, 1793, Ibid., VI, 3A9. Genet feared that these re- fugees would be a threat to the French consuls. Jefferson said that every effort possible would be taken by the govern- ment to protect the consuls. Jefferson also sought to calm Genet over the latter's apprehensions that the refugees were fittigg out an.expedition to go against St. Domingo. Ihid., , h 9. . . 133 Concern for the success of the French arms on the battlefields of Europe was evident in a letter to his son-in- law, T. M. Randolph. If the French should suffer reverses, Jefferson believed that it would aid the monocrats, "un- questionably affect the tone of administrating government," and hurt the cause of republicanism in the newCongress.121 The recent (April 3, 1793) desertion of General Dumouriez, the head of the French armies, from the French cause, Jefferson believed would temporarily upset the ar- mies, but not affect its republicanism or that of the people. The insurrections in France he felt were somewhat exaggerated. He thought the only thing that could possibly interfere with the success of the revolution was a large scale famine. Should that take place, it would prove dis- astrous. However, this threat he felt to be practically over because of the approaching harvest.122 Jefferson admitted that the French had been guilty of "great errors in their conduct" toward other countries, not only insulting the crowned heads of Europe, but in trying to force their kind of liberty on their neighbors. However, he believed they were taking steps to correct themselves on the 121Letter to T. M. Randolph, June 2, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, IX, 107-109. The address is incorrectly given as Edmund Randolph. Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, I, 557. 122Letter to Thomas Mann Randolph, June 2A, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 317-318. Letter to Dr. George Gilmer, June 28, 1793, Ibid., VI, 32A-325. 13h latter point.123 France was planning on liberating the territories of Louisiana and the Floridas from Spain. He believed France would have no objection to the United States annexing the area on the east side of the Mississippi River and thus giving his country free navigation on the great river.l2h Several months later he wrote, after an interview with Genet, that he expected an expedition to be organized outside the United States for such an attack. Nevertheless, he wrote at the same time to Governor Shelby of Kentucky, introducing Andre Michaux as a French botanist and confidant of Genet.125 The recruiting activities of this French agent, within the boundaries of the United States, led to a proclamation for- bidding American citizens from serving with French forces. There is no clear evidence that Jefferson saw in the French revolution an aid to his dream to expel Spain from the New World. He did not discourage Genet from making the 123Letter to Thomas Mann Randolph: June 24: 1793' Ibid., VI, 318. 12“Hemphill, "The Jeffersonian Background of the Louisiana Purchase," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXII, 186-187. Letter to Wayne Carmichaél and William Short, March 23, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 206. News of the GirondiSt‘MinistryTs plan to attack the Spanish territories was given to Jefferson by Colonel Smith in February. Anas, February 20, 1793, Ibid., I, 216-218. 125Anas, July 5, 1793, Ibid., I, 235-237. Hemphill, 'The Jeffersonian Background of the Louisiana Purchase," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXII, 187. 135 attempt, although he cautioned him against recruiting troops from Kentucky for his expedition.126 Jefferson was an arch-imperialist when it came to the Spanish territory bordering the United States, but his hos- tility toward France also became very evident when he learned that the French intended to control rather than liberate Louisiana.127 On the complaints of Viar and Jaudenes, Spanish commissioners at Philadelphia, on August 27, over French de- signs in Louisiana, Jefferson told Governor Shelby of Ken- tucky to restrain the expedition.128 Later on Jefferson and Washington agreed to instruct Shelby to use force, if necessary, to stop the expedition.129 Although army commanders in the West were instructed in the same way, Genét continued with his plans for an attack on Louisiana up to the time of the arrival of his successor, 126Ana8, July 5, 1793, The writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, I, 236. 127Ibid., I, 236. Frederick J. Turner, "The Origin of Genét's Projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas," The Significance of Sections in American History (New York, 1932), PP. 80‘830 128Letter to Governor Isaac Shelby, August 29, 1793, A. S. P.; F. R., I, #55. Letter from Jefferson to Viar and Jaudens, August 29, 1793, "Selections from the Draper Collec- tion in the Possession of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin to Elucidate the Proposed French Expedition under George Rogers Clark Against Louisiana, In The Years l793-9h," Annual Re ort of the American Historical Association for the gear IEEE (Washington, I897), II, 1005. Jefferson informed ar and Jaudens that the President would see to it that no such expedition would leave the United States. 129WOodfin, Citizen Genét and His Mission, p. A51. 136 l 0 Joseph Fauchet, on February 21, 1794. 3 The latter issued a proclamation on March 6, withdrawing all French support from the proposed enterprise.131 As has been indicated, Jefferson's sympathies toward France had not changed despite Genet's actions. Hamilton, on the other hand, was deeply disturbed not only over the conduct of Genet, but the conduct of the French nation as well, primarily because of its impact on our citizenry and the effect it might have on the future of our country. Although he expressed the hope that the end of the re- volution would bring happiness to her people,132 Hamilton, advocating a strict neutrality for the United States, did not want any entangling alliances with the French Repub- lic.133 or her behavior he did not approve in the least. To see American citizens participating in hostilities on the side of France was disgusting to him. The same could be said of the public demonstrations of attachment to her cause .13," 1301bid., p. #51. 11 A 3 Turner, "The Origin of Genet's Projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas," The Significance of Sections in American History, p. 8h. 132Letter to William Short (Private), February 5, 1793, The Works of Alexander Hanilton, Lodge, VIII, 293. 133Ibid., VIII, 293- 13“Hamilton to unknown addressee, May 1793, Ibid., VIII, 302. This letter appears to have been written about the time of Genét's arrival in Philadelphia on May 16, 1793. Ibid., VIII, 300n. 137 Any comparison between the American Revolution and the French Revolution was no less revolting to the Secretary of the Treasury. When I contemplate the horrid and systematic massacres of the 2d and 3d of September; when I observe that a Marat and a Robespierre, the notorious prompters of those bloody scenes, sit triumphantly in the convention and take a con- spicuous part in its measures - that annattempt to bring the assassins to justice has been obliged to be abandoned; when I see an unfortu- nate prince, whose reign was a continued demon- stration of the goodness and benevolence of his heart, of his attachment to the people of whom he was monarch, who, though educated in the lap of despotism, had given repeated proof that he was not the enemy of liberty, brought precipi- tately and ignominiously to the block without any substantial proof of guilt, as yet dis- closed - without even an authentic exhibition of motives, in decent regard to the opinions of mankind; when I find the doctrines of atheism Openly advanced in the convention, and heard with loud applause; when I see the sword of fanaticism extended to force a political creed upon citizens who were invited to submit to the arms of France as the harbingers of li- berty; when I behold the hand or rapacity out- stretched to prostrate and ravish the monuments of religious worship, erected by those citi- zens and their ancestors; when I perceive passion, tumult, and violence usurping those seats, where reason and cool deliberation ought to preside, I acknowledge that I am glad to be- lieve there is no real resemblance between what was the cause of America and what is the cause of France - that the difference is no less greatlthan that between liberty and.licentious- ness. The preceding quotation seems to sum up very well Hamil- ton’s views concerning the French Revolution after the abolishment of the monarchy. l351bid., VIII, 302-303. 138 Through a series of seven papers called Pacificus, which defended the Neutrality Proclamation of the Adminis- tration, and of Washington's right to issue it, Hamilton found another opportunity to attack the French Republic.136 Repeating some of his statements to Washington in a Cabinet Paper of April, 1793, Hamilton said, (1) that the service of France to the United States in the Revolutionary War was exaggerated;137 (2) that the claims of some Ameri- cans that we should aid France because of our gratitude to 138 (3) that because France was waging an her was absurd; offensive and not a defensive war we were not bound to aid her;139 (A) that the United States was not powerful enough to enter the war as an ally of France;ll*O and that the French people had made a horrible mistake in executing their King.“Fl 136These papers first appeared in John Fenno's Arch Federalist newspaper, A Gazette of the United States from June 29 to July 20. The full text can be found in The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Lodge, IV, 135-191; The force of these articles was so damaging to the Republican position, that Jefferson persuaded Madison to answer Hamilton in a paper signed Helvidius. Letter to Madison, July 7, 1793, The Writ- ings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 338. It is generally be- lieved that Hamilton emerged the victor in these discourses. 137Pacificus No. 5, July 13, 1793, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, 'Lodge, IV, 167-175. 138Pacificus No. 4, July 10,1793, Ibid., IV, 162-167 and Paciflcus No. 6, July 17, 1793, Ibid., IV, 177-182. 139Pacificus No. 2, July 3, 1793, lEiQ-s IV: 1H7’157° 140Pacificus No. 3, July 6, 1793, 19120: IV: 157'161° lhlPacificus No. 6, July 17, 1793, Ibid.. IV. 175-178- 139 This was not the only time that Hamilton used an anony- mous pen name to attack the policies of the French nation. He did this several times in the years that followed. Although Hamilton believed in April, 1793, that the treaties between the United States and France should be sus- pended, he did not believe this should be applied to the debt we owed that country.ll“2 In the previous years, upon the dethronement of the king, he had favored a temporary suspension of the debt until a "legitimate body" had been established as the governing body of France. The National Convention did not, at the time, represent such a body to Hamilton,173but, over-ruled by Jefferson and Washington, he had apparently since changed his mind. He now said that "possession alone can guide as to the party to whom they are to be paid."lhh Genet's instnictions had ordered him to press for the advancement of the remaining French debts which then amounted , 1 A to $2,h6l,513. #5 With the money Genet hoped to purchase lthetter to Washington (Cabinet Paper), April, 1793, Ibid., IV, 99. The Secretary of the Treasury also had re- fused to take advantage in 1790-1791 of inflated French currency to pay off the debt in depreciated assignats. Bemis, "Payment of the French Loans to the United States, 1777-1795," Current History, XXIII, 830. 143See pages 72 and 73. 1""Letter to Washington (Cabinet Paper), April, 1793, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Lodge, IV, 100. lMBemis, "Payment of the French Loans to the United States, 1777-1795," Current Hisunry, XXIII, 829. lhO munitions, military supplies and foodstuffs for the hard- pressed French armies in Europe. Another reason for wanting the money was to outfit a Western expedition led by George Rogers Clark, of Revolutionary War fame, to<:apture Louisiana and the port of New Orleans from Britain's ally, Spain.ll+6 Again, as in 1790, Hamilton opposed the granting of any advance sums on the debt owed France.lh7 No eXplanatioanas given except for a reference to the failure of government sanction to a similar proposal by Colonel William S. Smith.148 Jefferson was in favor of maintaining friendly relations with France by advancing the remainder of the sum due her for the year 1793. He, at least, felt it important to give lh9 some good reasons as to why we could not advance any sums. 1461bid., XXIII, 839. l‘*7See page 72. Letter to Madison, May 27, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 268-269. 1L8Letter to Washington (Cabinet Paper), June 5, 1793, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Lodge, IV, 122-123. Bemis, "Payment of the—French Loans to the United States, 1777-1795," Current History, XXIII, 830. Smith had been acting as a French purchasing agent during the war between Frande and her enemies. l1’9Letter to the President of the United States, June 6, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 287-288. Letter to washington (cabinet Paper), June 5, 1793, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Lodge, IV, 12h-126. Bemis, "Payment Offithe'French Loans to the United States, 1777-1795," Current Histor , XXIII, 830-831. A month earlier, Jefferson denied to HamiIton that he gave Ternant any indication he would receive any advancement of the loans. Letter to Secretary of the Treasury, May 1, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 235-236. lhl Hamilton modified his report and inserted two reasons why the United States could not advance any payment on the debt owed France. First, he said, the resources of the Treasury 'were too depleted to allow an advance to the French either in the form of specie or bankbills. Second, the advancement of money by government bonds payable at certain specified ,periods he declared not to be practical because it would up- set the general operation of finance and might tend to im- pair the financial credit of the United States.150 Jeffer- son sent a denial of the advanced sums to Genet, couched in as friendly a tone as was possible.151 A disappointed Genét then made a request for the in- stallments of principal and interest due on June 14. Jefferson informed the French Minister, on June 19, that President Washington would give the instructions for’such ' a settlement.”2 On June 23, the Secretary of State wrote Gengt that advances already made were understood to be for the payments of bills drawn by the Administration of St. Domingo and held by citizens of the United States.153 150Letter to Washington (Cabinet Paper), June 8, 1793. The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Lodge, IV, 130-131. A. S. P.; F. R., I,‘I56. 151Letter to Gengt, June 11, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 294-295. 152Letter to Genet, June 19, 1793, Ibid., VI, 312. 1”Letter to Genet, June 23, 1793. Ibid., VI: 315- \ lh2 The remainder of the advance money, which was appropriated for St. Domingo's relief work, was used, instead, by Genet for his current expenses. As a.result, the United States Treasury Department had to meet the drafts drawn by the Administration of St. Domingo or see the citizens lose their payments.15h Genét again made two requests to Jefferson, later in the year (November 11), for an advancement on funds owed France in 1791,-1705.155 Jefferson turned both letters over to the President who referred them to the Secretary of the Treasury. Hamilton reiterated that the United States was in no position, at that time, to advance any sums on the debt owed France.156 Despite the fact that payment in anticipation of the balance of the debt to France was refused in 1793 our 1 5“Bemis, "Payment of the French Loans to the United States, 1777-1795," Current History, XXIII, 831. .Hamilton gave the details of this matter in a report to Washington on January 5, 179b, because of an error by a treasury department clerk. This man denied that a balance was due France and refused payment of bills that were presented when actually there was a balance to the credit of that nation. Letter to WaShington (Cabinet Paper), January A, 179A, The Writings of Alexander Hamilton, Lodge, IV, 251-260. 155Letter from Genet to Jefferson, November 11, 1793. A. S. P.; F. R., I, 185 and Letter from Genet to Jefferson, NOvember IL,II793, Ibid., I, 185-186. 156Reports to President of the United States, November 23, 1793, Ibid., 1, 186. EVentually our debts to both French and Dutch creditors were wiped out in 1795 when they were converted into United States domestic bonds. Thus the French debt became part of the United States domestic debt. Bemis, "Payment of the French Loans to the United States, 1777-1795," Current History, XXIII, 831. 1A3 account to that nation and our debts to Dutch creditors were eventually wiped out by what amounted to the same me- thod in 1795, under authority of an act of Congress. The treasury in that year, and in 1796, made arrangements with one James Swan, an American citizen, who acted as the pur- chasing agent of the French government in the United States, whereby the debt to France was converted into United States domestic bonds bearing 5% percent interest (none of the French loans had borne more than 5 percent interest), which had been created for that purpose by an act of Congress in that year. The French debt was thus merged into the domes- tic debt, and the bonds finally retired in 1815. Our other foreign debts in the Netherlands were also refunded in 1795 into domestic bonds. By the end of July, 1793, Washington and his advisors saw that some drastic steps must be taken in regard to Genet. They agreed that his actions had gotten entirely'out‘of hand. As has been mentioned previously, in a Cabinet meeting at the time of the La Petite Democrate (Little Sarah) incident Hamilton made a.pmoposal that France he asked to recall her Minister. Knox suggested, in the meantime, that Genet's functionsias Minister be suspended. Jefferson, in a milder tone, suggested that GenGt's correspondence be forwarded to the French government with some friendly sentiments. Wash- ington remained silent during this debate.157 157Anas, July 13, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, I, 253 O lhh A week later Washington said it was his opinion that France should be given a request for Genet's recall. He, at the same time, favored Jefferson's proposal that Genét's correspondence be forwarded and a clear line of distinction be made between the French Minister and the United States' expression of friendship for France. He agreed with Hamilton that Genét's duties as Minister should be suspended.158 At the Cabinet meetings of August 1 and 2, a unanimous vote was passed asking for the recall of Genet.”9 Knox wanted Genét removed from the country immediately, but the rest were against this. A resolution was passed to tell Genet of his recall, although Jefferson did not favor this action. Hamilton wanted to inform the people of Genét's actions, but Jefferson said the Administration would only be playing into the Minister's hands by giving him an oppor- tunity to appeal to the people on his own.160 Washington favored Randolph's proposal of putting off the appeal and the motion was postponed.161 The Secretary of State informed his friends, shortly after the tempestuous Cabinet meeting, of 158Anas, July 23, 1793, Ibid., 1,247. 159Anas, A ust 1, 1793, Ibid., I, 252. Cabinet Opinion on Recall of Gen t, August 23, I793, Ibid., VI, 397. 160It is probable that Jefferson saw the danger to the Republican cause if Genet's outrages became generally known and if he attacked the revered Washington. 161Anas, August 1 and 2, 1793. The Writings of Thomas th the reason for his utter abandonment of the French Minister. It seems that Jefferson's chief fear was that the Republican following for France, in this country, might become involved in the fate of Genet.162 He wrote James Madison that Genet would "sink the republican interest if they do not abandon him."163 In another letter to Madison, a week later, Jeffer- son told of his efforts to try and set Genét straight be- cause of the importance of keeping the American people on the side of the French nation and her cause, but this he found to be impossible because the man was "absolutely incorrigible. I saw the necessity of quitting a wreck which could not but sink all who should cling to it."16h He believed that Genet's conduct "had given room for the enemies of liberty and of France, to come forward in a stile of acrimony against that nation which they never would have 1,65 dared to have done. 162Woodfin reports that Jefferson's personal ambitions might have entered the picture here. Jefferson believed that the Republican cause was the hope for the people of the United States and he was not willing that this should become in- volved with the success or failure of Gen€t's mission. Wood- fin, Citizen Genét and His Mission, p. 3h0. 163Letter to Madison, August 3, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 3 1. 16“Letter to Madison, August 11, 1793, Madison Papers, Lib- rary of Congress, XVI, 55 or Jefferson Papers,'Library of Con- gress, XIC, 15692-15695. Quoted in Sdhachner, Thomas Jefferson, 5 5. ’ 165Letter to James Madison, September 1, 1793, The Writ- ings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, hOl-h02. 1&6 He was alarmed that the towns of the central and north- ern states might sway from the Republican cause, for, as he reported to Madison, they were making known their disapproval of Gengt's conduct and their support of President Washington and the Proclamation of Neutrality.166 Jefferson wrote Governor Lee of Maryland, as he had pre- viously his other acquaintances, that a distinguishing line should be drawn between the conduct of France on the one hand and the conduct of her agents on the other. "...it is really unfortunate that theVagents of the French republic should be conducting themselves as if their object was to disgust and alienate all friends of their nation. It is but an act of justice, however, to distinguish between the conduct of their nation, which is replete with affection to us, and that of those gentlemen themselves, to which it is difficult to give a proper and yet temperate appellation."167 Jefferson's respect for Genét's professional ability had been waning of late also. He informed Madison that be- 166Letter to Madison, August 11, 1793, Madison Papers, Library of Congress, XVI, 55 or Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress, XIC, 15692-15695. Cited in Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, I, 505. Jefferson reported that resolutions on the approval of the Proclamation of Neutrality which were a vote in support of the President, were becoming universal. Letter to Madison, August 18, 1793. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 39h. 167Letter to Governor Thomas Sim Lee, September 13, 1793, Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress, XIIIC, 15972. Quoted—in WOodfin, Citizen Genet and His Mission, pp. 3h2'3h3n o 1&7 cause of Genet's exaggerated claims regarding the treaties between the United States and France, it was his opinion that the French Minister knew nothing about the subject or had ever read any book pertaining to that branch of science.168 The harm Genét had inflicted upon the Republican party caused Jefferson to wonder if, like Dumouriez, the French Minister was not a traitor to France.169 In an official letter to be presented to the French government, dated August 16, 1793, Jefferson gave instruc- tions to Gouverneur Morris to request the French government to recall her Minister from America.170 The points of friction between Genet and the Adminis- tration were given in detail, but were tempered with best wishes for continued friendship and goodwill between the governments of the United States and France. Jefferson began the letter by reciting the general be- havior of Genet since his arrival in this country. "Mr. Genet had been then [guns 13, the date of his last corres- 168Letter to Madison, August 3, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 3 . 169Letter to Madison, September 8,1793. Ibid.: VI #19- #20. 170This letter was submitted in a rough draft to the Cabinet on August 15. It was read and corrected by paragraphs at a meeting of August 20, and signed on August 23, when the Cabinet had officially decided on asking the recall of Genet. .ggbingg Opinion on Recall of Genet, August 23, 1793, ILid., 3 . 148 pondence witthorris] but a little time with us; and but a little more was necessary to develop in him a character and conduct so unexpected and so extraordinary as to place us in the most distressing dilemma, between our regard for his nation, which is constant and sincere and a regard for our laws, the authority of which must be maintained; for the peace of our country, which the Executive magistrate is charged to preserve; for its character grossly traduced in the conversations and letters of this gentleman."171 Jefferson excused the French nation from any knowledge or involvement in the extraordinary activities of her Minister. "In the course of these transactions, it has been a great comfort to us to believe, that none of them were within the intentions or expectations of his employers. These had been too recently expressed in acts which nothing could discolor, in the letter of the Executive Council, in the letter and decrees of the National Assembly, and in the general de- meanor of the nation towards us, to ascribe to them things of so contrary a character.l72 Jefferson said that Genet had created points of difference between himself and the United States government by his assertions that French ships could arm in American 171Letter to Morris, August 16, 1793, Ibid., VI, 372-375 or A. S. P.; F. R., I, 167. 172Ibid., VI, 378-388 and I, 167-170. '2 LJ‘ 'e. h‘ ‘n — n 1 ll- 1A9 ports and enlist American citizens to serve on those ships; by claim of admiralty jurisdiction for French consuls, claiming The Jane a British privateer which had outfitted in American ports when the President had declared the ship a merchant vessel; by insisting that the French had a right to sell their prizes in the ports of the United States; and by advocating that English seizure of French goods on Ameri- can ships was a violation of the laws of nations and should be forbidden by the United States.173 The Secretary of State brought to the attention of France two special violations the French Minister had committed during his residence in the United States. First, whenever there had been a difference of Opinion between President washington and Genet, the latter had refused to abide by the American Executive's decision until the dispute could be settled by the two governments. Examples of this were the failure of the privateers Le Citoyen Genet and Sans Culottes to depart from our ports when ordered to do so, the continued issuance of commissions to privateers, the upholding of consular jurisdiction in admiralty cases, and.the departure of the La Petite Democrate (Little Sarah) equipped and manned in the port of Philadelphia, under the very eyes of the government after Jefferson had requested tfluit she detain her journey until an inquiry could be made 1731bido, VI, 378-388 and I, 167-170. 150 174 into the case. The second offense that Jefferson found in Genét's gener- al policy was the continued effort of the French MiniSter to direct the civil government. This particularly applied to the Executive and Legislative bodies where Genet sought "to pro- nounce what powers may or may not be exercised by the one or the other." Evidence of this is revealed, said Jefferson, in Gengt's letter of June 8, in which he promises to "respect the political opinions of the President, till the Representa- tives shall have confirmed or rejected them; as if the Pre- sident had undertaken to decide what belonged to the deci- 175 In his letter of June 14, Genet said sion of Congress." more openly that "the President ought not to have taken on himself to decide on the subject 0f the letter, but that it was of importance enough to have consulted Congress there- "176 on.... Jefferson declared that in a letter of June 22, Geth told the President in direct terms that "Congress ought already to have been occupied on certain questions which he had been too hasty in deciding; thus making himself and not the President, the judge of the powers ascribed by the constitution to the Executive, and dictating to him the occasion when he shall exercise the power of convening Con- 17"Ib1d., VI, 388-389 and I, 170. 175Ibid., VI, 390 and I, 171. 176Ibid., VI, 390 and I, 171. 151 gress at an earlier day than their own act had prescribed." 177 These, and other derogatory remarks of Genét's concern- ing the government of the United States, Jefferson declared to be serious. He was sure they would not escape the per- ception of a "friendly and magnanimous" French nation, who would be just toward us. we see in them neither the portrait of ourselves, nor the pencil of our friends; but an attempt to embroil both; to add still another nation to the enemies of his country, and to draw on both a reproach, which it is hoped will never stain the history of either. The written proofs of which Mr. Genet himself was the bearer, were too un- equivocal to leave a doubt that the French nation are constant in their friendship to us. The re- solves of their National convention, the letters of their executive council, attest this truth, in terms which render it necessary to seek in some other hypothesis the solution of Mr. Genet7 g machinations against our peace and friendship.7 With his statement that if France had seen a different interpretation of the treaties of 1778 the United States would be most willing "to enter into candid explanations and to do whatever we can be convinced is right," Jefferson asked that Merris lay the facts before the French government that if Genet continued in these activities "we may be forced even to suspend his functions before a successor can arrive 179 to continue them." l77Ibid., VI, 390 and I, 171. 1781b1d., VI, 391 and I, 171. 179Ibid., VI, 393 and I, 172. An outline of this letter by Hamilton is contained in his Works, Lodge, IV, 243- -245, and in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 37l-372n. 152 Hamilton differed in many details from the plan that Jefferson followed. He would have added the following to Jefferson's letter to Morris. "Improprieties of conduct in other respects: I. His being President of a political society - Society of Friends of Liberty & Equality. II. His declaration to Mr. Dallas that he would appeal from the Pre- sident to the People. General observations on the inference to be drawn from such circumstances - an inference fortified by the conduct of his Secretary, Mr. Pascal, stating it with proper remarks on the Impropriety of a privileged person pursuing such a course."180 Eben Randolph, on the contrary, wrote Jefferson that the impeachment of Genet should be drawn from no other sources than "his writtenand verbal communications with you."181 In examination of Jefferson's August 16 letter to Morris by paragraphs in the Cabinet meeting of August 20, 1793, there was no difference of opinion except in regard to one particular expression, "An attempt to embroil both, to add still another nation to the enemies of his country, and to draw on both a reproach, which it is hoped will never stain the history of either, that of liberty warring 180"Hamilton's plan of remonstrance against Genet, when it was concluded to write Gouverneur Morris as was afterwards done, Aug. 16, 93," The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 372-373n. 181August a, 1793, Ibid., VI, 373n. There is also an outline of this letter by Jefferson in Ibid., VI, 37th. 153 on herself." Hamilton made a motion to strike out the words, "that of liberty warring on herself." Jefferson reported that Hamilton's reasons for favoring such action were that "it would give offense to the combined powers, that it amounted to a declaration that they were warring on liber- ty, that we were not called on to declare that the cause of France was that of liberty, that he had at first been with them with all his heart, but that he had long since left them, and was not for encouraging the idea here that the cause of France was the cause of liberty in general, or could have either connection or influence in our affairs." Jefferson attempted.to defend the insertion of this passage, declaring that some expressions of friendship to France should be contained in the letter. He thought it essential to "satisfy the French and our own citizens of the light in which we viewed their cause, and of our fellow feeling for the general cause of liberty...." The President declared a strong attachment to the expres- sion, but left it to the Cabinet members to decide whether or not to retain the passage. With Knox and Randolph adhering to Hamilton's point of view, this passage, to Jefferson's dismay, was struck out of the letter.182 Because of the danger of French cruisers intercepting 1821bid., I, 259-261. 154 the vessel carrying this letter to Morris, it was not until September 15 that Jefferson informed Genet of the request for his recall.183 Genet replied to Jefferson on September 18, defending himself at great length and with emotion.18h Any fear on the part of the Cabinet that France would view with disfavor the request for the recall of Genet was unwarranted. The Girondists, of which Genet was a.member, had fallen from power on June 2, and Robespierre and the Committee of Public Safety were then assuming the heights of leadership in the Revolution. The Reign of Terror followed, continuing until the summer of 179A. In these months many Royalists and Royalist sympathizers were arrested, the majority meeting their death on the guillo- tine. With the arrest of the Girondist leaders confusion was the order of the day as revolts spread throughout France during the summer of 1793.185 Although Hamilton, Knox, Randolph and washington seemed to have no inkling of the upheaval in the French government, there is reason to suspect that Jefferson did. Claviere, one of the Girondist jMinistry, wrote Jefferson on June 19, that he was no longer 183Letter to Genet, September 15. 1793: The Writings or Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, h29-h30. Enclosed was a copy of the latter toberris. 18“Letter from Gengt to Jefferson, A. S. P.; F. R., I , 172 “1714' o 185By September these revolts were over except in the Lyons, Toulon and Vendée districts. The last revolt, in the Vendée district, was over by the end of the year. 155 minister.186 The Secretary of State had also been sent French news- papers for the past six months, which were mailed from Havre on July 6.187 If Jefferson did know of the fall of the Girondist Ministry, it is certain that he did not inform his fellow Cabinet members of this event. Public acceptance of therequest for Gengt's recall was largely brought about by Hamilton in a series of five ar- ticles entitled No Jacobin, which appeared in the New York Daily Advertiser and John Fenno's Gazette of the United States.188 These papers were written in reply to articles signed A Jacobin which had been appearing in the General Advertiser.189 The first four articles are clearly a defense of the policies of washington and the fifth a personal attack on Genét. In the first article, in answer to the charge of 186Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress, LXXXVIII, 15255. Cited'in Wbodfin, Citizen Genét and His Mission, p. 388n. Schachner, ThomasJefferson, I, 506,does not hold with this belief, stating that Jefferson was unaware of the fall of the ministry. 187Letter from J. Wheatcroftson to Jefferson, Jefferson Pa ers, Library of Congress, LXXXIX, 15437. Cited in Woodfin, Citizen Genet and His Mission, p. 388n. 188No Jacobin appeared in the Daily Advertiser from July 31 to August 15, 1793. Woodfin, Citizen GenEt and His Mission, p. 372n.. The first number appeared inIFenno's paper on August 31, 1793. The rest of the articles appeared short- ly after this date. The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Lodge, IV, 198-229. No Jacobin came to a sudden ending because of Hamilton's illness with yellow fever, Ibid., IV, 229n. 189The WOrks of Alexander Hamilton, Lodge, IV: 199‘ 156 A Jacobin that the United States had violated Article 22 of the treaty with France, he defended the right of the United States to prevent French vessels, armed in the ports of the United States, from leaving the country.190 In answer to a charge made by A Jacobin that the United States had violated Article 17 of the Treaty of Commerce, by seizing prizes of the French at the time they were put up for sale in our ports, Hamilton, in his second article, replied that these captures were made within the limits of the pro— tection of the United States and were illegal on the prin- ciple of its being "a violation of the jurisdiction and pro- 191 In this same article tection of the neutral country." Hamilton also took a stab at the agents of France, who he accused of having acted, from the very beginning of the ex- istence of the United States, "more like a dependent colony than an independent nation - a state of degradation to which I trust that the freedom of the American mind will 192 never deign to submit." . Hamilton, in his third article, sought to answer the charge of A Jacobin that while the goods of the enemies of France on board our ships were exempt from capture, the goods of France on board our ships were subject to confis- 190No Jacobin No. 1, August, 1793: léléo: IV: 200'201° 191No Jacobin No. 2, Ibid., Iv, 207-209. 1921bid., IV, 216. 157 cation by her enemies and that the United States had done nothing to cause French property to be returned or to pre- vent similar hardships from occuring in the future. The Secretary answered that although the provision "free ships make free goods" was contained in our treaties with France, Great Britain, under the "law of nations" did not recog- nize such a rule. He alsoaasserted that unless we were prepared to defend this principle by support of arms we could not insist upon adherence to it.193 In his fourthairticle Hamilton said the United States had given France the "doubtful privilege" not contained in the treaty between the two countries of selling her prizes within the ports of the country. No other country had been given such consideration. To go any further and allow France the full right to arm her vessels and give her asy- lum in our-ports would surely make us one of the most feared nations of the enemies of France and lead the United States into an inevitable war. This, he believed, was un- questionably the goal of France.19h Genet was the subject of a scathing attack by Hamilton in his fifth and last article of the No Jacobin papers. He first accused the French Minister of not coming imme- diately to the capitol upon his entrance into the country 193No Jacobin No. 3. Ibid., IV, 216 and 220° 19ANO Jacobin No, A, Ibid., IV, 220 and 225. 158 because of his interest in "electrifying the people" and bringing about "popular intrigue." Secondly, he said, that Genét was responsible for fitting out two privateers in the service of France, without first checking with the United States government on the legality of such a course. These privateers, with Genét's permission, said Hamilton, engaged American personnel in their service. This was contrary to our neutral duties. One of these privateers captured an English vessel, brought her into the harbor of Charleston, condemned and sold her. This, said the Secretary, was un- warranted "by usage, by treaty, by precedent, by per- mission...."195 Hamilton said the United States government let Genet know of their disapproval of this act, yet the Consuls of France, with.Gen§t's endorsement, had persisted with the condemnation and selling of prizes. One of the Consuls, he said, not only had the audacity to deny the jurisdiction of the District Court, in one of the cases, but to set him- self up as the sole authority in the matter.196 He said A. Genet had also continued his active participation in en- couraging American citizens to enter the service of France. This was not only without the consent of the government, 195 6 No Jacobin No. 5, August 16, 1793, Ibid., IV, 22 . 1961bid., IV, 227-228. 159 1 but.against the will of the government. 97 One of the most serious charges against Genet, hasten- ing the demand for the recall of that Minister, was the rumor, throughout the city of Philadelphia, that Genet had threatened to appeal from the President of the United States to the people.198 Hamilton's article gave emphasis to this rumor. Further emphasis was given by Hamilton and Knox in discussing it with their Federalist friends.199 Jefferson assured Madison that he knew it to be a fact that Genet had threatened to appeal to the pe0p1e.200 But to no one else did he acknowledge this because of the harm it might have caused both the Republican party and Genet.201 197Ibid., IV, 228—229. 198Anas, July 10 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, I’m-21+]- o 199Woodfin, Citizen Genet and His Mission, P0 372° 200Letter to Madison, September 1, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, AOZ. This information the Secretary ofIState received.from Dallas, an emissary of Governor Thomas Mifflih of Pennsylvania in the Lar Petite Democrate incident. Anas, July 10,1793, Ibid.,T ZED-241. At that time Jefferson said that he had not recalled Genet in his presence using disrespectful expressions of the President. Ibid., I, 241. 201Jefferson prepared a statement for the press, but it was not issued. A Statement, October, 1793, Ibid., VI, h32-h33. (WOodfin claims there was no date on the ori inal manuscript, but Ford gives the date as October, 1793. In this statement Jefferson declined to trust his memory in giving testimony in so controversial an issue and so he 160 Genet's denial of the charges against him, first pri- 202 vately to Washington, and then publicly to the press, did referred the supposed reader to his statement of the inter- view of July 7, 8 and 9, with Dallas and Mifflin, prepared at the time for Washington while the conversation was still clearly in mind. This was the interview in which Dallas re- marked that Genet said he would appeal from the President to the people. Anas, July 10, 1793, Ibid., I, 2h0-2h1. The Federalists waited eagerly to see what Jefferson‘would say concerning the widespread rumor, but heaidded nothing further publicly to the notes he had made in July. The aftermath of this episode came on December 16, 1793, when Genet asked Randolph, the Attorney-General, to bring suit against John Jay and Rufus King, for libellous publications made by them against him. Gen t sent Jefferson a copy of the letter and asked him to present it to the President. This was done. Washington said that Randolph could proceed with the suit according to law, but that if he thought this would veX‘ American citizens with groundless prosecutions, he should drop the matter. (See page 161m for final disposition of suit.) Letter to Randolph, December 18, 1793, Ibid., VI, 484-485. This action of Genet followed publication by Jay and King, on November 26, 1793, of the details of the cir- cumstances concerning the French Minister's alleged threat. A statement signed by Hamilton and Knox on November 29, that they had given Jay and King the information published and where they had gotten it, strenghtened the case against Genet. Woodfin, Citizen Gen’et and His Mission, p. 381n. Genét claimed that Jay and King had sold out to Hamilton and had published the charge at his instigation. Letter from Genet to Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 10, 1793, "Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791-1797," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the year 1903, II, 278:279. 202When Washington first heard that Genet would pass over his head and appeal to the people he exclaimed angrily "Is the Minister of the French Republic to set the acts of the government at defiance with impunity? And then threaten the executive with an appeal to the people? What must the world think of such conduct, and of the government of the United States in submitting to it?" Letter to the Secre— tary of State, July 11, 1793, The Writings of George Washing- ton, Fitzpatrick, XXXIII, h. 161 him "little avail."203 His days were now numbered as the French Minister to this country. There seems little doubt that the spreading of the ru- mor was calculated to use the pOpular weight of the Presi- dent to discredit Genet and turn the sympathy of a majority of the people of the d>untry against France. As a political move the publicity given Genet's alleged threat was a success for Hamilton and his group. Not only did it bring washington to the pointFOf agreeing to the recall of the French Minister, but gave popular support to the Adminis- tration which had been lacking, to a serious degree, be- tween the issuance of the Neutrality'Pkoclamation in April , and the La Petite Democrate incident.20h 203Receiving no satisfaction from Washington, Genet made his denial of the charges against him public to the press. Correspondents of the press called for evidence upon which Jay and King based their accusations. This left the responsi- bility with Dallas for the original statement that Genet in his presence had said he would appeal from the President to the people. Dallas issued a statement to the press, De- cember 7, that he had understood Genét to have meant that he would appeal fromtshe President to the people in Congress. Before this statement was issued Dallas wrote Jefferson ask- ing if the version of his conversation with Hamilton and Knox was authorized by him? Apparently Dallas wanted Jefferson' 3 support in a version of the conversation that differed from that given by Hamilton and Knox. woodfin, Citizen Genet and His Mission, p. 382n. According to Woodfin, Genet was threatened‘by Fauchet, his successor as Minister to the United States, that if he did not withdraw his suit against Jay and King, this action would be reported to France. Genét's mother, sisters and other members of his family would be imprisoned and would pay with their lives for his rash actions. Genet yielded to these threats and withdrew his suit. Ibid., p. 383n. 2“Ibid., p. 381. 162 sedan definitely believed that Jefferson had betrayed him by reporting the alleged threat to Washington, although he did not reveal his true feelings to Jefferson at this time.205 This closed the door for good on any possibility 20580me four years later, in 1797, Genet said to Jeffer- son, "...fear seized you and paralyzed your soul, like those Indians who are terrified at images formed by their own hands you trembled with all the tremblers of the Union and of the Cabinet of St. James and from that time you only sought means to render me unpopular and to smother the Re- publican fires which had been kindled on all sides. It was at that time upon a report misunderstood by the Governor of Pennsylvania, that you tried to increase the panic terror which had assailed the breast of the President and his council by informing him in a report of my pretended appeal to the people with a view probably to make him comprehend the danger impending to theggreat and lucrative employments of the Federal Government those dear objects of your heart's desire to peace and all those fine speculations in land & merchandise which accompany it unless a speedy end was put to my political existence. You took the pen you Mr. Jeffer- son to write that long letter to Morris filled with assertions without proof upon which Robespierre sensible to his dic- tatorial tone flattering himself that he would soon be sitting in France under the shadow of the law on a seat not less elevated than that on which washington was then sitting in America did not hesitate to sacrifice me in an exemplary manner so as to accustom the French people to venerate the name of President under a popular crown. But it did not suffice to calm their alarms that I should lose my place - it was necessary to consumate my ruin that the most arbi- trary orders solicited for my successor should suspend all the proceedings I had been able to commence in your tribu- nals on that appeal to the people in which you find yourself implicated...." Letter from Genet to Jefferson, July A, 1797, Genet Papers, Library of Congress. Quoted in Woodfin, Citizen Genét andMHis Mission, p. 567. Minnigerode, who had no liking fOr Jefferson, claims that the real reason for Jefferson's treatment of Genet was fear. The French cause had become suddenly too successful. There were too many democratic societies in the country, too much noise in the streets, and too many men enlisting in the cause of France. The Federalists were becoming alarmed. Jefferson felt the people would soon be calling for war against Great Britain to more directly aid France, or perhaps, a huge Federalist reaction would sweep him and his followers 163 of an understanding between the two men for a betterment of relations between their two countries. Regardless of what Jefferson thought of Genet personally, he certainly separated the acts of that minister and other French agents from the French nation and its cause.206 The embarrassment which this matter caused for Jeffer- son did not end with the recall of GenEt. He was still sensitive some years later to the possible political in- fluences of popular disapproval of Genet's alleged threat from office. Minnigerode, JeffersonJ Friend of France; The Career of Edmund Charles Genet as Revealed in HisfPrivate Papers (176341834), pp. 2659266. I think that Minnigerode is too quick to picture Jefferson as a desperate man look- ing for a way out of a bad predicament brought about by him- self as leader of the Republican Party. I believe that Schachner's appraisal of the situation is closer to the truth of the matter. This author also believes that Jefferson abandoned Ganét'because of the harm he might cause the Re- publican Party, but unlike Minnigerode, he feels that Jeffer- son only did so after a "cool appraisal of the consequen- ces...." Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, I, 506. A letter from Jefferson to MadiSon dated August 11, 1793, seems to substantiate Schachner's belief. Jefferson thought it best that the Republican Party "abandon G [enet]entire1y, with expressions of strong friendship & adherence to his nation and confidence that he has acted against their sense. In this way we shall keep the people on our side by keeping ourselves in the right.- I have been myself under a cruel dilemma with him. I adhered to him as long‘as I could have a hope of getting him right, because I knew what weight we should derive to our scale by keeping in it the love of the people for the French cause and nation, and how important it was to ward off from that cause and nation any just grounds of alienation. Finding at length that the man was absolutely incorrigible, I saw the necessity of quitting a wreck which could.not but sink all who should cling to it.-" Letter from Jefferson to Madison, August 11, 1793, Madison Papers, Library of Congress, XVI, 55, and Jefferson Pa ers,*Library of Congress, XIC, 15692-15695. Quoted in Scfiacfiner, Thomas Jefferson, I, 505. See also page 1h5. 206See page 1&6. 16h to appeal to the people.207 Would Genet have met a better fate if he has listened to Jefferson more carefully and followed a more conservative policy in his pursuits? Monroe thought it "astonishing" that he had not.208 In a letter to Deforgues, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Genet had an explanation for this. He LJefferson] appeared to me to be the most dis- posed to second our views. He gave me some use- ful notions concerning the men in place, and did not conceal from me, that Senator Morris and Hamil- ton, Secretary of the Treasury attached to the in- terests of Great Britain, had the greatest influ- ence over the mind of the President; and it was with difficulty that he counterbalanced their ‘efforts. He did more, he published in the papers over the signature of Veritas, three letters against the system of these gentlemen.209 Still I have remarked in his official declara- tions a sort of restraint, that has convinced me that this man wished to keep himself in a posi- tion to retain his place, whatever might be the issue of events. In fact, scarcely had the news 207When Monroe was asking Jefferson about a title for his pamphlet defending his conduct in France (Menroe had been recalled as Minister to France because of his too friendly relations with the French government), Jefferson wrote him..."The following title would be better for but one reason: 'An account of the foreign affairs of the U. 8., during the years l79h-5-6 rendered to his fellow citizens by J. Monroe late M. P. to the Republic of France.', but that it would raise the old hue and cry against any attempt to separate the people from their government. For this reason it might be questionable whether the words 'laid before his fellow citizens' in the first title I propose, had not better be omitted. Letter to Mon- roe, October 5, 1797, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 178. 2(”Woodfin, Citizen Genet and His Mission, p. AOOn. 2091 could find no such work in the Jefferson papers to which I had access. of the infamous defection of Dumouriez and of the reverses which resulted from it, reached here, scarcely had the revolution of St. Domingo spread terror, among all the owners of slaves, then I saw him weaken from day to day and render himself the passive instrument of a party that detests him. Then, seeing myself deserted by the Minis- ter on whom we had most reason to rely - seeing that the Minister of England was drawing closer to the President - that Talon, that Noailles, the agent of the pretended Regent of France was received at the house of Morris and Hamilton, and was even received at the house of the Pre- sident, seeing that all of the decisions of the Federal Government were against us, that every- thing tended to annul the effect of our treaties, I took the only course that could be taken, I surrounded my§i6f with the most pronounced Re- publicans.... 210Letter from Genet to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 5, 1793, George Clinton Genet, Washington, Jefferson and "Citizen" Genfit, 1793 (Chicago, March 30,‘l903), p. I7.‘IMOustier and Otto, the Ministers to the United States, who had preceded Ternant, painted a very favorable picture of Jefferson to Genet. This was the individual that France desired more than any other to be Secretary of State. He had always taken a great interest in the success of the French Revolution. Minnigerode, Jefferson, Friend of France; The Career of Edmund Charles Genet as Revealed in His Private Papers (17534I8341, PP.“I53-15h. This author believes that Genet gambled too heavily by putting all his trust in Jeffer- son. According to Minnigerode, Ralph Izard, an old friend of Genet's father, told the French Minister that Jefferson and Madison "pretend to be great Republicans....They will do everything in their power to secure you on their side and will be friendly to you as long as your country or yourself may be serviceable to their ambitious views. Place no con- fidence in them, but be well assured that if youzadhere to General Washington and to his tried friend Colonel Hamilton you will follow the safest and wisest course." Ibid., pp. 188-189. Genet said he would listen only to the frlends of France. Izard warned him that Jefferson would betray him. The author reports that later Genet saw the wisdom in Izard's warning. He was forced tQ_"confess there was something prophetic in those words Lof Izard's] which I have frequent- ly recollected since I was so basely abandoned by that same Thomas Jefferson...after I had followed his impulse on the advice of his most confidential friends in everything." 166 Although the American government did not know it, the French government was ready to abandon Genet even before Jefferson's demand for the recall of the French Minister had been forwarded to Morris. The Jacobin party, now in power, had no use for the Girondist minister. Deforgues bitterly attacked Genet for his arming of privateers and enlistment of volunteers before he had been recognized by the American government. Genet was even accused of violating his original instructions by leaving them open to a "strange interpretation" and was rebuked severely for his conduct. You are ordered to treat with the government and not with a portion of the people, to be the mouthpiece of the French Republic before Con- gress, and not the leader of an American par- ty....We must not, we cannot recognize in America any legitimate authority other than that of the President and of the Congress... it seems, Citizen, that since your arrival at Charleston, you have been surrounded by ignorant or very ill intentioned pe0p1e....Dazzled by a false,popu1arit , you have alienated the one man LWashington who must be fil us the mouth- piece of the American people.2 Although Genet had been severely critized by the French government he did not cease in his efforts to try to push the interests of France upon the American government in an illegal and aggressive manner. On September 9, Jefferson chided Genét for first, his forbidding a United States marshall to detain a vessel captured illegally off the American coast and second, for giving orders to the 211Letter from Deforgues to Genet, July 30, 1793, "Corres- pondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791- 1797," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the year 1903, II, 228e231. 167 French squadron to protect her by force.212 He warned the French Minister that he must not again interfere with the duties of an American government official.213 In relating this particular incident to Madison he asked, "Was there ever an instance before of a diplomatic man overawing and obstructing the course of the law in a country by an armed force?"21h When Genet received the news from Jefferson on Septem- ber 15, that the American government had asked France for his recall,215 he flew into an uncontrollable rage. The acts and conduct of the United States government, as well as many of its representatives, were targets of his attack. Washington, Hamilton, Morris and Jefferson were singled out for special condemnation.216 212The British brig William Tell has been captured with- in a mile of the American coast. Letter to the French Minis- ter (Genet), September 9, 1793, The writings of Thomas ' Jefferson, Ford, VI, A20-A22 or A.‘S. P.3F. R., I, 175. 213Letter to the French Minister (Genet), September 9, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, A22. Zthetter to James Madison, September 8, 1793, Ibid., v1, 418. 215Letter to Genet, September 15, 1793: 2212'! VI! #29-h30- 216Letter from Genet to Jefferson, September 18, 1793, A. S. P.; F. R., I, l72-l7h. The French Minister said he was disappointed with Hanilton, "with whom I had a conversation on the proposition which I had made to convert almost the whole American debt, by means of an operation of finance authorized by the law, into flour, rice, grain, salted pro- visions, and other objects of which France had the most 168 A Genet defended his acts and those of the consuls of France on the grounds that they had only "obeyed superior orders which it was neither in their power nor in their mind to revoke." The perplexed minister ended this letter pressing need, added to the refusal which he had already made officially of favoring this arrangement, the positive declaration, that, even if it were practicable, the United States would not consent to it, because Great Britain would not fail to consider this extraordinary reimbursement fur- nished to a nation with which she is at war, as an act of hostility. Ibid., I, 173-l7h. Genét accused Jefferson of having used to him "an official language,and a language confidential." Ibid., 1, 17A. Genet was angry because the Secretary of State had pretended to be his "friend." It was Jefferson who had "initiated" him into "mysteries which have inflamed my hatred against all those who aspire to an absolute power." He said he would see to it that all correspondence between himself and Jefferson was pub- liShedo Ibid., I, 1730 217Ibid., I, 173. AJefferson complained in his letter of September 15, to Genet, and had also complained numerous times before, of the interference with and disobedience of the laws of this country by various French consuls in the United States. Some of these consulates were used as re- cruiting agencies for Genet's various expeditionary plans. They were so active that Jefferson sent a warning to all French consuls on September 7, that if any of them "assumed any jurisdiction not expressly given them by the convention between France and the United States" that they should have their exequatur revoked and would be subject to prosecution and punishment according to the law. Circular to the French Consuls, September 7, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 417. On October 3, Jefferson informedfiMorris and also Genet that the exequatur of M. Duplaine, the French Vice-Consul in Boston would be revoked. The reason for re- voking the exequatur which allowed him to exercise his func- tions there was because of his interference with the laws of the United States. October 3, 1793, A. S. P.;,F. R., I, 182. Duplaine, under the protection of the French frigate Lg Concorde, had prevented the United States District-Attorney Gore from.seizing the Greyhound, a British vessel captured illegally by the French privateer Roland. A. S. P.; F. R., I, 178-181, and Letter to Madison, September I, 1793, Th2 Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, A01. Jefferson said that consuls Tiare not diplomatic characters and have no 169 by demanding from Jefferson the right to appeal to Con- gress.218 News of the United States' request for his recall did nothing to stop Genet's complaints to the American govern- ment of unfair treatment of his country and preferred treat- ment of the enemies of France. During the next three months the Minister flooded Jefferson's office with various com- plaints. Jefferson patiently responded to these charges, as best he could, without antagonizing the French Minister further .219 immunity whatever against the laws of the land." Duplaine was liable to "arrest, imprisonment and other punishments, even<:apital...." Jefferson ordered him arrested. Letter to Christopher Gore, September 2, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 404-406. Duplaine was sent to priSon immediately after his arrest, but three times the government could find no "true bill" a ainst him and he was later dismissed. Woodfin, Citizen Gen and His Mission, p. 464n. Jefferson took some sting from this action, how- ever, by offering to remove any of our consuls in France for similar offenses. October 3, 1793, A. S. P.; F. R., I, 182. Jefferson rebuked Genet a month and a halfflater for not addressing commissions of consul to the President. He ordered Genet to return them. Letter from Jefferson to Genet, November 22, 1793, Ibid., I, 184. Jefferson politely refused to take advantage of an offer made to him by the consul of France in Baltimore, Mr. Moissonier. The consul informed Jefferson that the British were ready to commit hostilities against the United States, but that France would offer to put its naval forces in Chesepeake Bay - to defend this country. November 5, 1793, Ibid., I, 182. 218Letter from Genet to Jefferson, September 18, 1793, Ibid., I, 172-174. Fortunately for Genet this letter, with several others, was received in Jefferson's office in Phila- delphia, then formed into a packet on September 20, and for- warded to Virginia. Because of some accident by the post office the packet did not reach him in Virginia. It was re- turned to Philadelphia and was not received by him until December 2. Ibid., I, 174n. 219For example, in answer to Genet's complaint that arms 170 \ GenEt did mellow in these torrid months, however, in regard to one matter and that was to renew his efforts for a new treaty of commerce between his country and the United States. This was suggested in a letter to Jefferson on 220 September 30. He had previously suggested such a treaty in a letter of May 23.221 The Cabinet did not take up the 222 matter until August 23. It was agreed that Jefferson were being smuggled from the United States to "rebels" in St. Domingo by immigrants of that island, Jefferson could only say there was no indication of this, but that if arms were found they would be confiscated. To stop all vessels bound for the French West Indies if they did not have a passport issued by Genet, as suggested by the French Minis- ter, Jefferson thought far beyond the powers of the Pre- sident. Letter to Genet, November 30,1793, Ibid., 1,188. 220Letter from Genet to Jefferson, September 30,1793, Ibid., I, 244-245. Genet also sent a decree of the Conven- tion of March 26, instructive of that of February 19 (Ibid., I, 147), opening the ports of France and her colonies to the United States. Ibid., I, 245- 246. The French Minis- ter sent to Jefferson, as soon as he received them, the quickly warying commercial decrees of the shifting French government. Woodfin, Citizen Genet and His Mission, p. 412m. 221Letter from Genet to Jefferson, May 23, 1793, A. S. P.; F. R., I, 147. Jefferson had put Genet off by telling nlm that the treaty making powers of the government were vested in the Senate and since that body did not meet until December, any decisive agreement would have to wait until that time. 222This delay was due to the problems of privateering, changing regulations of commerce in Paris, and our declared state of neutrality. WOodfin, Citizen Genet and His Mission, p. 410. Washington explained, at thls time, that the delay was due to the instability of the French nation as the result of political changes in their government. Anas, August 23, 1793, The writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, I, 261. Jefferson had prompted Washington to take up the matter after the re- call of Genet had been agreed upon. 171 should write to Morris,223 andeaxplain that the matter of the treaty had not been taken up before because its import- ance warranted first, the meeting of the Senate. He was instructed to suggest to the French government that the powers of Genet to negotiate such a treaty be transferred to his successor. The letter to Morris was written the same day.224 Perhaps Gengt's turning again to the proposed treaty in late September was for the purpose of smoothing relations between himself and the President.225 The tone 0f Genet's letter was friendly. He endeavored to show by statistics that France had not benefited from her trade with the United States and that American imports to France had furnished our country with specie to purchase manufactured articles from Great Britain. The mutual benefits of the treaty, he said, would strengthen the ties of friendship between the two nations. He concluded, however, with the warning that re- fusal of the United States to negotiate a treaty would cause the repeal of French navigation acts favoring Ameri- can commerce.226 A 223Washington felt it was a little awkward to reply to Genet's letter of May 23. Ibid., I, 263. 22“Letter to Morris, August 23, 1793, Ibid., VI: 296- 225Woodfin, Citizen Gene‘s and His Mission, p. 1.11. 226Letter frOm Genet to Jefferson, September 30, 1793, A. S. P.; F. R., I, 2h4-2A5. 172 The second effort of Genet to negotiate a treaty of commerce was a failure like the first. There were two rea- sons for this. In the first place, this letter of September 30 was not received by Jefferson until November 5, because he had left Philadelphia with other government officials be- 227 Secondly, the Ameri- cause of the yellow fever epidemic. can government had learned by this time of the fall of the Girondist Ministry and.was not willing to negotiate with a minister they soon expected to be recalled.228 Although countless discussions over such a treaty followed in the next few years, between the two countries, it was not until 1800, under Napoleon's auspices, that a commercial treaty was promulgated. Genet was busy also answering charges from his own government that he was not conducting his affairs in this country in the proper manner.229 On October 8, Morris 227Letter from Randolph to Monroe, June 1,1795, Ibid., I, 709 or Letter from Jefferson to Genet, November 5, I793, Ibid., I, 2A6. - 228Woodfin, Citizen Genet and His Mission, p. 413. 229Deforgues questioned Genet as to how he could form an expedition against New Orleans, as reported to him, with- out openly violating the neutrality of the United States wd incurring further the wrath of its government OffiCLalS. Genet sent his secretary, Pascal, to Paris with a long reply to the letter. Letter from Genét to Minister of Foreign Affairs, October 7, 1793, "Correspondence of the French Minis- ters to the United States, 1791-1797," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the year'l903, II, 273. In this reply Genet pictured Washington as an enemy of France and the rights of man. Jefferson was said to be a man not as 173 turned over to Deforgues the dispatches of the United States government asking for the recall of Genet. The Foreign Minis- ter informed Morris on the 10th that he readily agreed to the request of the American government.230 He also said that Genet should be "punished" and that a commission would be sent to the United States to take him home as a "prison- "231 ’ er. There was danger for a while that Genet would be ex- well disposed to France as at first presumed. Woodfin is of the opinion that since Genet is clearly on the defensive in his dispatches to Deforgues that he knew by this time of Morris' request for his recall. Woodfin, Citizen Genet and His Mission, p. #66. 230"I shall give the Consul an account of the punishable conduct of their agent in the U. S., & I can assure you, beforehand, that they will regard the strange abuse of their confidence by this agent, as I do, with the liveliest indig- nation. The President of the U. S., has done justice to our sentiments, in attributing the deviations of the citizen Genét to causes entirely foreign from his instructions and we hope that the measures, which are to be taken, will more convince the head and the members of your government, that so far from having authorized the proceedings and criminal maneuvers of citizen Genet, our only aim has been to main-1 tain between the two nations the most perfect harmony." Randall, The Life of Thomas Jefferson, II, 203-204n. 231Ibid., II, 20hn. On November 12, Gouverneur Morris announced to the President that this commission was composed of Fauchet, the new Minister to the United States, and two others. Ibid., II, ZOAn. Due to new complications in the internal affairs of France, Fauchet and his two cohorts did not arrive in the United States until February, l79h. Their request for the arrest of Genet, in order to take him back to France as a prisoner, was denied by President Washington. Genet remained in the United States and married a daughter of Governor George Clinton of New York, emerging from poli- tical obscurity only once to denounce Jefferson in a vehe- ment letter of 1797. He died in 183A. Ibid., II, 20th. 17h pelled from the country without waiting for his recall. Wash- ington asked in a Cabinet meeting if this should not be done. The President was very angry over Genét's clumsy efforts to sway Congress against him. Hamilton, as well as Knox, was in favor of such action. Jefferson, of course, was not, but he let Randolph carry the argument against such a propo- 232 Because the group could not agree on a united sal. course of action, the matter was dropped until the next Ca- binet meeting. At that meeting, on November 18, Jefferson said that at any moment now we might expect an answer from France on the fate of Genet. Would it not be better to wait a little longer for an answer rather than offend France, "the only nation on earth sincerely our friend," and open ourselves to a possibility of war.233 Hamilton still insisted that Genet should be made to leave the country now, without waiting for a reply from France. It was a matter of honor to preserve the dignity of the nation and its officers. Our conduct in the matter, he said, would set a precedent as to how other foreign ministers would treat us in the future.’ He did not believe that France would make war over the matter, and if she did, we should do accordingly what we thought was right.23’+ Again, since there was not unanimity among the Cabinet, the matter was dropped. 232Anas, November 8, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jeffer- sgn, Ford, I, 265-266. 233Ibid., I, 267. 2341bid., I, 267-268. 175 Genet was not through yet in causing embarrassment to the United States government. He sent a translation of his original instructions from the French government to Jeffer- son on December 20, and demanded that the President offi- 235 cially lay them before Congress. The President refused to do so on the basis of official etiquette.236 In his re- ply to Geth, Jefferson said, "Your functions as the mission- ary of a foreign nation here, are confined to the transac- tions of the affairs of your nation with the executive of the United States, that the communications which are to pass between the Executive and Legislative branches, cannot be subject for your interference, and that the President must be left to judge for himself what matters his duty or the public good may require him to propose to the de- liberations of Congress."237 It can be said, I think, with complete assurance, that Hamilton opposed most stubbornly all of the objectives of Genet. With his sympathies lying with Great Britain, Hamil- ton, naturally, from the beginning, opposed the machinations 235Woodfin, Citizen Genet and His Mission, p. 470n and Letter to Genét, December 31, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 495-h96. washington had sent to Con- gress on December 5, most of the correspondence that had passed between Genet and the Federal Government. A. S. P.; F. R., I, lbl‘tho 236Letter to Gefiét, December 31, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, A95-A96. 237Ibid., VI, 495-496. 176 of a Minister sent from that country's greatest foe. The Genet privateers,'being a great threat to British commerce, were not only unpopular with American merchants, but with Hamilton as well.238 Jefferson, on the other hand, was a sincere friend of France and was thus naturally inclined to look with favor upon the chosen representative between the two countries. Though not in full sympathy with all of Gengt's contentions, Jefferson continued to tolerate his conduct for some time, hoping to make him see the error of his ways. Only when he saw that the conduct of the Foreign Minister was harmful to the Republican interests in his country, did he abandon him, and then‘with considerable reluctance. The key to Jefferson's policy, asvvell as that of leaders like Madison and Monroe, in the last six months of 1793, was to prevent any of the evil of Geth's indiscretions, or those of the other French representatives, from harming the Republican party, while, at the same time, maintaining the Republican sympathy’for France.239 Jefferson in preparing a speech on foreign affairs to 238 WOodfin, Citizen Genet and His Mission, p. A72. 239Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, I, 508. John Adams remarked to his wife, Abigail, at'the time of President Washington's message to the Third Congress concerning Genet's conduct, that Jefferson seemed as little satisfied with Genét's actions as anyone. December 5, 1793, The Works of John Adams,,Second President of the United States,_withfiA Life of the Author, Notes and Illustrations, ed. Charles Francis Adams (Boston, 1850-1356I, I,L58. Hereafter cited as The Works of John Adams, Adams. 177 be presented before the new session<>f Congress in Decem- ber, was strong in his denunciation of Genet, but spoke 2&0 of France in friendly terms. Great Britain, however, came under attack for her restraints on American trade and molesting of American ships and commerceju’l Hamilton objected to practically everything in the message. He believed the contrast drawn between the conduct of France and Great Britain amounted to a declaration of war 21+0"The several Representatives & Executive bodies in France have uniformly manifested the most friendly attach- ment to this country, have shewn particular favor to our commerce & navigation and as faraas yet appears, have given just and ready redress of the wrongs to our citizens & their property irregularly taken on the high seas, & carried into their ports." Draft of President's message, November, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, h57n. "It is with extreme concern I have to inform you that the proceedings of the person whom they have unfortunately appointed their Minis- ter Plenipf here have breathed nothing of the friendly spirit of the nation which sent him. Their tendency on the contrary has been to involve us in a war abroad, & discord & anarchy at home. So far as his acts, or those of his agents, have threatened our immediate commitment in the war, or flagrant insult to the authority of the laws, their effect has been counteracted by the ordinary cognizance of the law, & by an exertion of the powers confided to me. When their danger was not imminent, they have been borne with, from sentiments of regard to his nation,.from a sense of their friendship toward us, from a conviction they would not suffer us to remain long exposed to the action of a person who has so little respected our mutual disposition, and, I will add, from a firm reliance on the firmness of my fellow-citizens in their principles of peace and order." Ibid., VI, #57. 241Ibid., VI, #58. Great Britain was also pictured in a very unfavorable light in the Secretary of State's Commercial Report to Congress. France, however, was put in a favorable position and note made of that nation's willingness to enter into a new treaty of commerce with the United States. "Re- port on the Privileges and Restrictions on the Commerce of the United States in Foreign Countries," December, 1793, Ibid., VI, h70‘48h- 178 on the latter. He denied, as before, that France had ever done us any favors. The attitude of the people of this count- ry toward France he considered a "serious calamity." As to the late offers on commerce made by France, he felt them to be a temporary thing and not to be considered permanent. He could show that Great Britain had accorded us more favars in this field than France. In compliance to Hamilton, Jefferson struck out some of the more favorable expressions in the draft, concerning France, and omitted some of his sentiments concerning Great Britain.2h3 Although still dissatisfied with the document, Hamilton did not press for further changes. He did, however, insist that the message be a secret communication because certain 2L’BAnas, November 28, 1793, Ibid., I, 271. 2‘*3Ibid., I, 271. In the draft contained in Ibid., VI, h56-A59 the editor has seen fit to leave Jefferson's original remarks (crossed out with pencil or pen) in the body of the paper with the exception of the paragraph concerning our friendly attachment to France which is contained in a footnote (Ibid., h57n). This paragraph was altered to read; "The Representative & Executive bodies of France have manifested generally a friendly attachment to this country, have given advantages to our commerce & navigation and have made over- tures for placing these advantages on permanent ground. A decree, however, of the national assembly, subjecting vessels laden with provisions to be carried into their ports, & making enemy goods lawful prize in the vessel of a friend, contrary to our treaty tho' revoked at one time as to the U. S. has been since extended to their vessels also, has been recently stated to us. Representations on this subject will be immediately given in charge to our minister there, & the result shall be communicated to the legislature." 179 matters were still open to negotiation, including the newly proposed dammercial treaty with France. Washington, for once, sided with Jefferson, and insisted that all the papers be made public?“P This was one of the last times that Jefferson and Hamilton clashed openly in a Cabinet meeting for Jefferson resigned from his post at the end of the year, December 31, 1793. He had expressed his desire on July 31, to retire at the end of September, but Washington had persuaded him to stay on a while longer.2h5 Although Hamilton had expressed to Washington a simi- 2A6 lar desire to retire from public life, he was to remain in the Cabinet until January 31, 1795.247 At the time of his resignation and retirement from pub- lic life, which he thought permanent, Jefferson was willing to do everything in his power to benefit the cause of the 2M*Ibid., I, 271-272. 21*5Letter to the President of the United States, July 31, 1793, Ibid., VI, 360-361. Anas, August 6, 1793, Ibid., I, 256-259. Letter from Washington to the Secretary of State, August 12, 1793, The Writings of George Washington, Fitz- patrick, XXXIII, 55. There were several reasons why Jeffer- son wished to retire from office. Among these are his re- peated battles with other members of the Administration, the yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia, lack of finances, no time for his family and his interest in his farm.and its improvements. Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, I, 509-510. 2A6Anas, August 6, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jeffer- son, Ford, I, 256. 21+?Schachner, Alexander HEIHiltOn, p. 3390 180 French nation and the revolution. His willingness to aban- don Genet is proof of this. He believed, however, that having the people alienated from the Republican Party was more serious than a temporary breach with France.2L8 AS things turned out, the desertion of GenEt was not harm- ful in the least to Franco-American relations. As indicated in his opposition to Jefferson's draft on the state of foreign affairs in the United States, Hamil- ton had no liking for France. During the course of Genet's mission the Secretary of the Treasury never missed an oppor- tunity to take verbal or written stabs, either publicly or privately, at_that minister or the nation he represented. His attitude had not changed even with the recall of Genet. There is no doubt that the respect Hamilton had for Great Britain and her institutions, plus the fact that he be- lieved the future growth of the United States depended on good commercial relations with that country, rather than her hated enemy, France, had a great deal to do with his feeling toward France. Then too, Hamilton was by nature a conservative individual, who would naturally appreciate stable institutions and ways, of which Great Britain was an example, and of which France was not. The radical changes in the French government in the year 1793, with the beheading of King Louis XVI, the rise and fall of the Gi- 21"8Koch, Jefferson and Madison, P0 143' 181 rondist Ministry, the coming of the Mountain to power, the excesses accompanied by the work of Madame Guillotine climaxed as a high point with the beheading of Queen Marie Antoinette in October, all must have sickened Hamilton and further enhanced his dislike for the French Republic. His attitude toward the French Revolution, near the conclusion of the year, is best illustrated by a remark attributed to him by Randolph and forwarded to Jefferson. "E. R. tells me, that Ham. in conversn. with him yesterday said 'Sir, if all the people in America were now assembled, to call on me to say whether I am a friend to the French Revolution, 2A9 I would declare that I have it in abhorrence.'" 259Anas, November 15, 1703, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, I, 268. 182 CHAPTER IV THE INTERLUDE: l79h-l796 With the recall of Genet, attention in the foreign affairs of the United States was diverted from France and centered upon our first cousins across the Atlantic, Great Britain. A brief examination of the contrasting views of Jefferson and Hamilton concerning our relations with Great Britain, 1794-95, isnecessary in order to show the com- plete reversal of their attitude, some three years later, when similar difficulties with France confronted our nation. Our relations with Great Britain, since June of l793,”had gone from bad to worse. Anxious to bring France to her knees as soon as possible, Great Britain had issued two orders in Council in November, 1793 and January, 179A, forbidding all trade with the French West Indies.1 In the next few months hundreds of American vessels and goods were seized by the British for violation of these orders. Jeffer- son, as Secretary of State, naturally protested against 1November 6, 1793, A. s. P.; F. R., I, 430. January 8, 179A, Ibid., I, #31. An earlier order, dated June 8, 1793, listed corn, meal, and flour as contraband and subjected to capture and condemnation American vessels proceeding for the firstotime to a blockaded French port. June 8, 1793, Ibid., , 2h . 183 earlier infringements upon our neutrality, but to little avail.2 Hamilton, however, sang a different tune. It would seem only natural that the guardian against violation of American neutrality rights by the French would assume the same sort of protectorship in behalf of American commerce against the British. Such was not the case. The Secretary of the Treasury had been very intimate with British represen- tatives to this country; first with Beckwith and then with Hammond. While Jefferson was busy protesting to the British of their violations upon our commerce, Hamilton had even gone so far as to agree with Great Britain's attitude on inter- national law, although he could not be responsible for Jefferson's views in the matter.3 So close was the relationship between Hamilton and Hammond that the latter had little to discuss with Jefferson during his residence in this country, preferring instead, upon receiving his instructions from the British Foreign Office, to consult Hamilton, whom he designated as No. 7 h in his code. 2Letter from Jefferson to Thomas Pinckney (United States Minister to Great Britain), September 7, 1793, Ibid., I, 239. Letter from Jefferson to George Hammond, September 22, 1793, Ibid., I, 2A0-2Al. 3Letter from Hammond to Grenville, July 7, 1793, Hammond Transcripts, New York Public Library, cited in Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 327. ilbid., p. 327. (Primary source same as above, except November 7, 1793.) Hammond to Grenville, November 7, 1793, New York Public Library. 184 Schachner calls this "an amazing situation" for, at about the same time, Jefferson was channeling information to 5 Gen$t on the affairs of the American government. As mentioned briefly in the last chapter, two weeks be- fore he left office Jefferson submitted a report to Congress on the commercial affairs of the United States. In this re- port he did not miss the opportunity to denounce Great Bri- tain for her attacks upon American commerce.6 Shortly there- after Madison reintroduced in the House of Representatives his famous Resolutions of 1791 calling for retaliation on Great Britain. These resolutions called for additional du- ties on all shipping and imports from countries with which we had no commercial treaty, aimed specifically at Great Britain. Heavy tonnage duties would also be placed on Bri- tish vessels trading between the West Indies and the United States.7 This was to be in retaliation for the exclusion of American vessels from the lucrative trade with those colonies by the British Navigation Acts.8 As the resolutions were laid before the House news was received (March 7, l79h)of the November 6, 1793 Order in Council, a mandate more 5Ibid., p. 327. 6See page 177. 7Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 327. 8Ibid., p. 327. 185 severe than any previous one.9 This was too mucht The whole country exploded. Many people, even Federalists, called for war. Hamilton himself was very angry with Great Britain, and, for a time, turned his back on Hammond,lo but he wanted, at all costs, to avoid war with Great Britain. Hamilton believed British exports to be the chief source of tariff revenue, the backbone for his fiscal system. To upset commercial relations with that country would be to cut our credit to the bone.11 He be- lieved that such a war would wreck the financial structure of the country.12 If the Madison Resolutions were allowed 91bid., pp. 327-328. November 6, 1793, A. s. P.; F. R., I, L30. News had also been received of the capture of’a number of American vessels by British cruisers. John T. Morse Jr., The Life of Alexander Hamilton (Boston, 1876), II, 175. 10Hamilton termed the new order atrocious and said Washington should raise an army of twenty thousand men and fortify the ports. Letter to Washington, March 8, 179A, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Hamilton, IV, 506-507. 11Alexander Hamilton and the Founding of the Nation, ed. Richard B. Morris (New York, I957), pp. 381-382. 12Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 328. There was the danger that if the United States did not remain neutral but instead took up the cause of France, British financial invest- ments in this country would collapse and perhaps bring about radical changes in the government. Link, Democratic-Republi- can SocietiesJ 1790-1800, Columbia Studies in American Cul- ture, No. 9, p. I77. It was rumored that Hamilton, as well as other leading Federalists, held investments in British securities. Letter from John Berkley to James Madison, May 25, 1795, Madison Papers, New York Public Library. Cited in Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800, Columbia Studies in American Culture,No. 9, p. 177. Berkley told Madison that Commodore Nicholson, President of the New York 186 to prevail he thought a war would be inevitable. Therefore, he, and his followers in Congress, played for time hoping the ardor of the country would cool for such an enterprise. He was accused by Jefferson of writing the speech of William Smith in the House opposing the adoption of the Resolu- tions.l3 Jefferson declared himself to be against war with Great Britain, but, of course, was in favor of cutting off trade relations with that country. He believed war to be as "much a punishment to the punisher as to the sufferer." If cutting off all relations with Great Britain brought on war, let it come, "we will meet it like men; but it may not bring on war, and then the experiment will have been a happy one."lh Believing the Resolutions of Madison were designed to Democratic Society, had proof that Hamilton had considerable investments in British funds. Nicholson was said to have warned Hamilton that if he should ever consider running for public office these factsvvould be published immediately. Other leading Federalists like William Smith, Fisher Ames, Rufus King, and Ralph Izard were out to stop any movements that would interfere with the status quo. Walter R. Fee, "The Effect of Hamilton's Financial Policy upon Public Opinion in New Jersey," Proceedings of the New Jersey His- torical Society, I (1932), 33-3h. Cited in Link, Democratic- Republican Societies, 1790-1800, Columbia Studies in American Culture, No. 9, p. 177. 13Letter to Madison, April 3, 179A, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 501-502. thetter to Tench Coxe, May 1, 1794, Ibid., VI, 508. A similar attitude is expressed in Letter to Madison, April 3, 1794, Ibid., VI, 502. 187 bring the United States into a war with Great Britain on the side of France, Hamilton in the tradition of No Jacobin and Pacificus wasted no time in attacking France and her cause under the pen name of Americanus.l5ln the first of his two articles Hamilton asked the American people to consider two things in contemplating entering the war on the side of France. First, whether the cause of France was truly the cause of liberty, "pursued with justice and humanity and in a manner likely to crown it with honorable success." Second, whether or not, by participating in the conflict, our ser- vices rendered to her cause, would outweigh the evils which would probably vex this country. If either of these questions could be answered in the negative, and Hamilton was sure that both questions could be, then the United States ought to stay clear of the war.16 Hamilton said he would not discuss the first question be- cause of the length needed for an adequate examination and because the subject matter itself was open to too much "opinion, imagination...feeling" for argument. Nevertheless he proceeded to paint France and her Revolution in a very bad.light, leaving the reader in no doubt as to what he 15These papers originally appeared in the New York Dail Advertiser. They were later reprinted in Fenno's Gazette of the"United States, February, 179A. The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Federal Edition, Hanry Cabot‘Lodge (New YOrk and London, l90h), V, 7hn. 16Americanus No. 1, February 1, 1794, Ibid., V, 75. 188 thought of the "cause of liberty" and its future outcome in that country. Because of Hamilton's strong and lengthy opposition to France this particular passage warrants quot- ing his statement in full. There was a time when all men in this countryLUni- ted States] entertained the same favorable view of the French Revolution. At the present time, they still unite in the wish that the troubles of France may terminate in the establishment of a free and good government; and dispassionate, well- informed men must equally unite in the doubt whether this be likely to take place under the auspices of those who now govern the affairs of that country. But, agreeing in these two points, there is a great and serious diversity of opinion as to the real merits and probable issue of the French Revoluti on . None can deny that the cause of France has been stained by excesses and extravagances, for which it is not easy, if possible, to find a parallel in the history of human affairs and from which reason and humanity recoil. Yet many find apo- logies and extenuations with which they satisfy themselves; they still see in the cause of France the cause of liberty; they are still sanguine in the hope that it will be crowned with success; that the French nation will establish for them- selves not only a free but a republican govern- ment, capable of promoting solidly their happi- ness. Others, on the contrary, discern no ade- quate apology for the horrid.and disgusting scenes which have been, and continue to be, acted. They conceive that the excesses which have been com- mitted, transcend greatly the measure of those which, with every due allowance for circumstances, were reasonably to have been expected. They per- ceive in them proof of atrocious depravity in the most influential leaders of the revolution. They observe that among these a MARAT and a ROBESPIERRE, assasins still reeking with the blood of their fellow-citizens, monsters yho outdo the fabled enormities of a BUSIRISl 17In a Greek legend Busiris was an Egyptian king who yearly sacrificed a foreigner to Zeus or Jupiter in order to bring about an end to a famine in his country. This idea was given to him by a foreign seer who was promptly made the first sacrifice to the gods. Encyclopedia Britannica: A New Survey of Universal Knowledge (Chicago, London, Toronto, 1956). 189 and a PROCRUSTES,l8 are predominant in influence as well as iniquity. They findeaverywhere marks of an unexampled dissolution of all the social and moral ties. They see nowhere anything but principles and opinions so wild, so extreme, passions so turbulent, so tempestuous, as almost to forbid the hope of agreement in any rational or well-organized system of government. They conclude that a state of things like this is calculated to extend disgust and disaffection throughout the nation, to nourish more and more a spirit of in- surrection and mutiny, facilitating the progress of the invading armies, and exciting in the bowels of France commotions, of which it is im- possible to compute the mischief, the duration or the end; that if by the energy of the national character, and the intrinsic difficulty of the enterprise, the enemies of France shall be com- pelled to leave her to herself, this era may only prove the commencement of greater misfortunes; that after wading through seas of blood, in a furious and sanguinary civil war, France may find herself at length the slave of some victorious Sylla [Bulls] or Marius, or Caesar: and they draw this afflicting inference from the whole view of the subject, but there is more reason to fear that the Cause Of True Liberty has received a deep wound in the mismanagements of it, by those who, unfortunately for the French nation, have forza considerable time past maintained an ascendant in its affairs, than to regard the re- volution of France in the form it has lately worn, as entitled to the honors due to that sacred and all-important cause, or as a safe bark on which to freight the fortunes, the liberties, and the reputation of this now re- spectable and happy land. Without undertaking to determine which of these opposite opinions rests most firmly on the basis of facts, I shall content myself with observing that if the latter is conceived to have but a tolerable foundation, it is conclusive against the propriety of our engaging in the war, merely through regard for the cause of Liberty. For 18According to a Greek legend Procrustes was a robber dwelling in the neighborhood of Eleusis, wlo was slain by Theseus, the great hero of Attic legends. Ibid. 190 when we resolve to put so vast a stake upon the chance of the die, we ought at least to be cer- tain that the object for which welgazard is genUine, is substantial, is real. As to the second question, Hamilton concluded that the degree of aid the United States would furnish France would make little difference in her present struggle. Because of various circumstances this country, he said, was totally un- able to raise money through any of its methods employed dur- ing her own revolution for liberty, mainly, paper money, do- mestic loans, foreign loans, pecuniary taxes, taxes on spe- cific articles and military impress. The first three me- thods were impractical. The last three could be used, but he believed the people, as a whole, would be unwilling to finance an external war. As for military aid, we could not at this time or in the near future, furnish a navy. An army, he said, was not what France wanted, she had enough soldiers. The true wants of France he declared to be "system, order, money, provisions, arms, military stores." This would be impossible by our entering the war. If we could not aid France in Europe, how about aid to the French West Indies? This too he thought impractical. We would only encounter internal disorders, to.aid.Frenchmen against Frenchmen, whites against blacks, or blacks against whites. He believed the islands not to be of great military 19Americanus No. 1, February 1, 179A, The Works of Alex- ander Hamilton,iFed. Ed., Lodge, V, 75-78. 191 importance to the powers at war with France and, even if theywwere, what would our defense of them have to do with the preservation of French liberty? An attack on the islands of the powers opposed to France (British, Spanish and Dutch West Indies) he thought was out of the question. How could this be done without a competent fleet to carry on such operations? If a fleet could be found how could we maintain our conquests after they were made? What influence would the capture of an island or two have on the total effect of the war? Neither would an attack on Canada or Florida be likely to succeed for we would most likely encounter superior enemy forces brought from the West Indies. Hamilton pointed out that armies would have to be raised and equipped for these operations. This would cost a great deal of money. The militia would be fine for internal defense, but, he said, would be impractical for a conquest of Canada. The preparations for such a war would consume a year, and the fate of France, he felt, would be decided by that time. Our effort would be too late to benefit her. The only way any of these enterprises could help France would be a diversion of enemy forces to contain our attack and he did not think this likely to happen. Hamil- ton believed the United States could inflict far more dam- age than any military expeditions on Great Britain, first, by the use of privateers against her shipping and second, by the interruption of the flow of commerce between the 192 two countries. He was of the opinion however, that be- cause her public credit was sound enough and because the rapidly increasing navy would adequately protect her commer- ce Great Britain would be able to cope with these problems. Then too, because of her allies, Great Britain probably would be able to carry on a long war in which she would not have to exert herself as much as we, even withdrawing honorably from such a war should she choose to do so. He summed up the situation with the remark that "if France is not in some way or other wanting_to herself, she will not stand in need of our assistance; and if she is, our assistance cannot save her."20 In the second article of Americanus Hamilton stated that this country at present enjoyed an "unexampled state of prosperity" and to enter-a war would certainly disrupt this situation. If we could keep the peace while Europe was bent on destroying itself, he believed, that a whole new field of advantages would be open to us. However, a check in the progress of our prosperity he believed not to be our greatest danger. It was instead that the naval superiority of Great Britain would destroy our commerce. Agriculture and manufacturing would also suffer. He pointed out, too, that nine-tenth of the present revenue was derived from commercial duties. There could be no 201bid., v, 78-86. 193 substitute for this means of obtaining revenue without im- posing heavy burdens upon the people. Hamilton did not forget to add that a war against Great Britain and Spain could easily lead us into a general Indian war incited by the influence of the two European nations. Because our interference would be regarded as "offi- cious and wanton," Hamilton pointed out that it was probable also that the United States might be treated by Great Bri- tain and her allies with "unusual animosity and rancor." Hamilton gave several reasons to refute the argument of those who said that if France fell the United States would be the next victim because our principles of liberty were the guns of the French Revolution. Above all he did not think that our interference would alter the case. It would only exhaust our strength that much sooner. There were, however, more conclusive answers. No matter how the war against France should end, her enemies would pay a large price for their part in the undertaking. If they should attempt the conquest of this country they would also pay a large price for their objective. Hamilton did not believe that the enemies of the French Revolution would be so foolish as to embark on such a course. Should France be beaten and a restoration of the monarchy be effected troops of the conqueors would be needed for the support of the new authority. If there should be a partition of France, troops would be needed to keep order. The new partition of Poland, too, he believed would.deter the allies from detaching troops 191» from Europe to attack this country. Of the powers allied against France, Hamilton said there were only three, Holland, Spain, and Great Britain "whose interests have any material reference to this country." Holland definitely did not have any interest or desire to embark on such a project. As far as Great Britain and Spain were concerned, the only interest thouse countries would have in our own would be to establish a monarchial form of government, occupy the country for it- self or divide it amongst themselves. The first of the three possibilities he thought im- probable because such a form of government might be of a more enduring nature than the present form and consequently of a more formidable power. The only possibility would be a sovereign chosen from one of their ruling families. This he thought most unlikely because there would arise a "collision of interests between them" as to which family would reign over the country. The second possibility was also as unlike- ly as the first. He did not think either Spain or Great Bri- tain would give consent to the other to occupy the country. Besides it would cost more to occupy the country than it would be worth to the two countries. The third possibility was the more probable of the three, but this too, Hamilton rejected. Neither occupation would last and the cost would be too great. When the first.clash occured between Spain and Great Britain one of two things would happen. Either Great Britain would triumph and occupy the whole country, or the American people would throw off the yoke of both 195 nations. The latter would most probably happen and wauld show to both the foolishness of such a project. Great Britain, too, would run the greater risk of bankruptcy and revolution than we of subjugation. Hamilton believed she would, in effect, be making war on her own commerce and credit. This the English people would certain- ly reject, mindful of the disasters of the Revolutionary War. Many would see an attack on the United States as an attack on liberty, with themselves perhaps the next victim. They would distinguish this case from the American Revalu- tionary War or the war with France. Hamilton believed also that Britain, Spain, Austria, Prussia, and perhaps even Russia would be too busy with their own internal problems to contemplate an attack ontshe United States. If there was to be any danger to this country it would come from thrusting ourselves into the war. Once embarked in a war with this country these nations would be much more apt to conclude such a war because of what they would call "wanton and presumptious intermeddling on our part" than they otherwise would have dreamt. Hamilton reasoned there were two errors in our thinking upon this subject (that our own liberty would be at stake upon the event of the war against France for, if she should fall, we would be the next victim). One, that the combined powers would attribute to us the same principles that they deplore in France and two, that they in fact are the same. These nations would see that the American people re- 196 sorted to a revolution to obtain rights and privileges they previously had enjoyed and not because they wished to bring about a radically different change in the established govern- ment. They would observe that this nation had a respect for property and who in the Revolution established with modera- tion a government giving adequate protection to its citizens and their property. They would.see, too, that America had established a general form of republican government without bloodshed, "enemies to licentiousness and anarchy" and de— dicated to the "order of tranquillity of all mankind." With France clearly in mind, Hamilton declared the above mentioned powers "will not see in us a people those best passions have been misled, and whose best qualities have been perverted from their true direction by headlong, fanatical or designing leaders, to the perpetration of'acts from which humanity shrinks, to the commission of outrages over which the eye of reason weeps, to the profession and practice of principles which tend to shake the foundations of morality, to dissolve the social bands, to disturb the peace of mankind, to substitute confusion to order, anarchy to government." He tendered this statement with the remark that this is at least what the confederation against France believed, but he made it clear he was of the same opinion. He expressed the hope that God would "bring them back from the ways of their errors to a more sober and a more just ‘ way of thinking and acting and will over-rule the compli- cated calamities which surround them, to the establishment 197 of a government under which they may be free, secure and happy. But let us not corrupt ourselves by false comparisons or glosses, nor shut our eyes to thet;rue nature of trans- actions which ought to grieve and warn us, nor rashly mingle our destiny in the consequences of the errors and extrava- ' 21 gances of another nation." In spite of the efforts of Americanus and the speech of Representative William Smith in the House, Hamilton was un- able to prevent an enactment of a temporary Embargo Act against Great Britain to last for a duration of one month. Washington did not waste a moment in declaring the act to take effect immediately. Meanwhile, a meeting of Federalist Party leaders suggested that a special envoy be sent to Great Britain to prevent a rupture of diplomatic relations between that country and the United States. They were in agreement that Hamilton should be the choice.22 John Jay was another possi- bility. When the news leaked out that Hamilton was being con- sidered for the post, the Republicans, to a man, protested most violently.23 Monroe and Randolph were the chief 21Americanus No. 2, February 8, 1794, Ibid., V, 86-96. 22Jefferson declared "a more degrading measure could not have been proposed." Letter to Monroe, April 2h, 179A, Thg Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 504. Jefferson had learned the details from Nadison. Madison Papers, Library of Congress, XVII, 51. Cited in Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 1011. 23Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 330. l98 leaders in the effort to defeat Hamilton's appointment. Be- cause the controversy over his proposed appointment was so widespread, Hamilton wrote to Washington asking that his name be withdrawn from consideration and recommending John Jay as the man for the mission.2h Washington followed Hamilton's advice to the letter and offered Jay the post. The Republi- cans, believing Jay to be pro-British, favored Madison or Jefferson. A bitter struggle resulted in the Senate, but approval of Jay's appointment was secured on April 18, by a vote of 18 to 8.25 At a meeting ontzhe let, leading Federalists, including Hamilton, laid down a series of in- structions for Jay to follow on his mission.26 Hamilton drafted a memorandum of these instructions with the con- 27 sent of Washington on April 23rd. 2“Letter to Washington, April 14, 179A, The Works of Alexander Hamilton,Fed. Ed., Lodge, V, 97-115. 25 Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 330. 26Ibid., p. 330. 27Jay was to demand "(1) indemnification for depreda- tions on our commerce; (2) arrangements for the future guaranteeing freedom from seizure of all articles except those which were specifically contraband of war; (3) prompt compliance by the British with the Peace Treaty of 1783 with respect to indemnity for the slaves which had been carried away and the surrender of the ports still held by them, in return for which the United States would pay damages for the state obstructions in the way of the recovery of debts specified in the treaty; (4) the United States to receive certain trading privileges with the West Indies, England and Ireland, and to offer in return a most-favored- nation clause on imports from England. " Ibid., p. 331. Letter to washington, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. 199 John Jay's mission, however, was not a happy one. Ill equipped for the job at hand, he was no match for Lord Gren- ville, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. As Schachner points out, Jay had Great Britain in the palm of his hand, but did not know enough to take advantage of the situation. The United States was ready to back him up all the way. Even the "most moderate of the American Ministers" Hamilton, was urging him to be firm in his de- mands to Great Britain.28 In addition to all this, Gren- ville received the news that Sweden and Denmark had in- vited the United States to join a general alliance of all neutral countries to oppose Great Britain's violations of their neutrality. This would cut Great Britain off from needed naval stores, not to mention much needed customers 29 in the world market. Ed., Lodge, V, 115-119. While Hamilton allowed room for modifications on these demands he laid down two inflexible rules: "(1) no treaty was to be entered into which would affect unfavorably the existing treaty with France, and (2) American ships must be granted unrestricted entry in the west Indies." Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 331. Bemis, Jay's Treaty, p. 212. (According to Schachner, these two demands can be found in The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, V, 115-119. This must be in error as I found no reference to such demands. See instead Instructions to Mr. Jay (from Eben Randolph), May 6, 179A, A. S. P.; F. R., I, h73-h7h. Part of Instructions to John Jay (Draft by Hamilton), 179A The Works of Alexander Hamil- 233, Fed. Ed., Lodge, v, 122.) 28April 17, 179A, Hammond Transcripts, New York Public Library, cited in Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 332. 291bid., p. 332. 200 Unfortunately, Jay did not know of this development. He was received very warmly in Great Britain, but was unable to get Grenville to accept his proposed treaty. Meanwhile, Hamilton was unwittingly doing his share to sabotage Jay's mission. In a private discussion with Hammond, he let it be known that it was the policy of the United States, even should there be an "open contest with Great Britain" to avoid entangling alliances with European countries.30 This news, of course, was rushed by fast packet to Lord Gren- ville. Great Britain should have been the last country to hear such news. Jay suddenly found, much to his amazement, that the warm atmosphere of the previous meetings with the Foreign Secretary no longer prevailed. Completely on the defensive, and at the mercy of Grenville, he was forced to back down on every point, finally accepting a treaty on November 14, which contained practically nothing of his 31 original instructions. 30 , Ibid., pp. 332-333. (Primary source same as above, except August 3, 179A.) 31Ibid., p. 333. Great Britain promised to evacuate the forts of the Northwest, but the time for this was not definite. All that she yielded in the matter of unrestricted trade with the west Indies was to let vessels seventy tons or less to enter under almost prohibitive conditions. This was counter- acted by forbidding American vessels to trade anywhere on the globe in molasses, sugar, coffee, cocoa and cotton. However, British vessels would be allowed unrestricted trade between the West Indies and the United States. This particular ar- ticle of the treaty, Number XII, was the only one that Hamil- ton found.completely distasteful. Letter to Washington (Cabinet Paper), "Remarks on the treaty of amity, commerce 201 Thdre are some biographers of Hamilton who are sure he was keenly disappointed upon reading the confidential 3 text of the treaty. If this was so Hamilton was very care- ful to refrain from expressing his true sentiments concern- 33 ing the document. After discussing each article separately, Hamilton summed up his remarks to Washington with the following gener- al view of the treaty: The truly important side of this treaty is, that it closes, & upon the whole as reasonably as could have been expected, the controverted points be- tween the two countries; and thereby gives us the prospect of repossessing our Western posts, an ob- ject of primary consequence in our affairs, of es- caping finally from being implicated in the dread- ful war which is ruining Europe and of preserving ourselves in a state of peace for a considerable time to come. Well considered the greatest interest of this country in its external relations, is that of peace. The more or less of commercial advantages which we acquire by particular treaties, are of far, less moment. With peace, the force of circumstances will enable us to make our own way sufficiently fast in trade. War, at this time, would give a serious wound to our growth and prosperity. Can we escape it for ten or twelve years more, we may then meet it without much inquietude and may advance and support with energy and effect any just pretensions and navigation, made between the United States and Great Bri- tain," July 9, 1795, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, V, 162-163. No provision was made for the return of slaves removed by the British, impressment of seamen, or the claims of Loyalists in the Revolutionary War. Alexander Hamil- ton and the Founding of the Nation, Morris, p. 384. A copy of thi complete treaty can be found in Bemis, Jay's Treaty, pp. 32 -3LI‘5 0 32Alexander Hamilton and the Founding of the Nation, Morris, p. 384. David Loth, Alexander Hamilton: Portrait of a Prodigy (New York, 1939), p. 233. Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 349. Lodge, Alexander Hamilton, p. 186. John T. Morse, Jr., Life of Alexander Hamilton, II, 206. 33Alexander Hamilton and the Founding of the Nation, Morris, p. 381. 202 to greater commercial advantages than we may en- joy. It follows that the objects contained in the per- manent articles are of real and great value to us. The price they will cost us in the article of compensation for the debts, is not likely to bear any proportion to the expenses of a single cam- paign to enforce our rights. The calculation is therefore a simple and a plain one. The tergi are no way inconsistent with national honor. As to the commerc1al arrangements in the tempo- rary articles, they can be of no great importance either way; if it were only for the circumstances that it is in the power of either party to ter- minate them within two years after the war. So short a duration renders them unimportant, how- ever considered as to intrinsic merit. Intrin- sically considered, they have no very positive character of advantage or disadvantage. They will in all probability leave the trade between the two countries where it at present is. Was there not a possibility that France would be angry with the United States for negotiating such a treaty with Great Britain? According to Hamilton she should not be be- cause our agreements with her would remain unimpaired, and 36 she would still be on as good a footing as Great Britain. 31+Yet in a letter to Washington, dated September 4, 1795, Hamilton urged the President to press Great Britain for a stipulation ending the impressment of American seamen by that country. The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 205. 35Letter to Washington, July 9, 1795, Ibid., V, 176-177. Hamilton declared Article XV to be an exception. This ar- ticle, he said, would permit the United States to carry to the British dominions any article, the growth or manufacture of another country, which may be carried from such country to those dominions. Ibid., V, 177-178. 361bid., v, 179. Hamilton added, "We are in a deplor- able situation if we cannot secure our peace, and promote our own interests, by means which not only do not derogate from our faith, but which leave the same advantages to France 203 As to the possibility that it might hinder the United States from making a more beneficial treaty with France, Hamilton showed little concern. Although the Jay Treaty might prevent this country, in many cases, from giving preference to France, there were still important points which were open to arrange- ments beneficial to France and which might serve as equiva- lents.37 Besides, what evidence had France given that she was interested in giving the United States a more beneficial treaty than had Great Britain? All she had offered so far, under the present government, was dependent uponcaur becoming a partner in the war. We ought to dismiss the possibility of peculiar favors. Favors, indeed, in trade he thought very absurd.38 When the treaty was made public in March, 1795, the American people did not view the document in the same manner as did Hamilton. To say they were upset would be putting it mildly. The Republicans shouted treason. Even the Federa- lists were hesitant in their support of the document, finally rallying after considerable delay and pressing its ratifica- tion in the Senate. Those friendly to France were very angry because it gave as to other powers with whom we form treaties. Equality is all that can be claimed from us. It is improbable that France will take umbrage, because there is no disposition on her part to break with us, and because her situation forbids a breach." 37Hamilton gave as an exanple the lowering or abolishing altogether of the duties on French wine. Ibid., V,180. 38Ibid., v, 180. 204 to Great Britain the same privileges granted to the French privateers and ships-of—war under the treaty of 1778. Jefferson saw the possibility of the treaty destroying the Federalist Party.39 Although Hamilton had retired to private life with his resignation from the Treasury at the end of January, at Washington's request he entered the fight for ratification 40 of the Jay Treaty, on July 22, with a series of brilliant articles entitled Camillus which continued throughout the 41 year. In them Hamilton tried to show the American people that 39Letter to Mdnroe, September 6, 1795, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 27. Jefferson traced through his notes the entire history of Anglo-American relations from the Revolutionary War to the mission of Jay. "Notes on Jay's Treaty," Jefferson Papers, Library of Congress, XVIIIC, 16750-16759. Cited in Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 572. It is not known what Jefferson planned to do with this data. It has been suggested by Schachner that perhaps Jefferson planned to turn it over to Madison to be used as a basis of a speech in Congress. Ibid., II, 572-573. hoThe treaty was laid before the Senate on June 8, rati— fied by that body on June 24, 1795, and then sent to the Pre- sident for his signature. Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, p. 307. thhe first twenty-five articles appeared in the New York Argus. The remainder appeared in the New York Minerva. All were reprinted by Fenno in the Gazette of the United States. The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 32m. The Camillus articIes can be found in Ibid., V, 189—491 and VI, 3-197. There were thirty-eight of these—articles, eight in collaboration with Rufus King. Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 350. Lodge considers these essays to be first among the writings of Hamilton. Ibid., V, l89n. Previously Hamilton had attempted to speak in New York in behalf of the treaty before a large assembly, but was stoned for his efforts and had to retire from the scene. Letter to Madison, August 3, 1795, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 23. 205 the important thing about the Jay Treaty was that it had averted war with Great Britain, a calamity if brought about he was sure would have been disastrous to the United States. He pointed out that the main objectives of the mission had been substantially obtained. These were the restitution of our Western posts and reparations for capture and damage to our property in the existing war.)+2 If failure on the part of Great Britain to evacuate our Western posts prior to rati- fication of the treaty had been a breach of the treaty, the failure on our part to carry out the points stipulated by us until after ratification, was equally a breach of the treaty.l+3 He thought it important to note that in the provisions on the settlement of the Revolutionary War this country had nothing to perform prior to the evacuation of Great Britain from the Western posts. If she failed by the agreed time to evacuate, then the United States could consider scrapping the whole treaty. As to why we did not insist on indemnification for the expenses of the Revolutionary War, this was not be- cause it was unreasonable, but because it would not have been obtained and peace was the desirable thing, not only for us, 44 but for our enemy. AZCamillus No. 2, 1795, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed., Ed., Lodge, V, 208. “39231111115. NO- 3. 1795. Ibid., V, 222. uucamilius No. a, 1795, Ibid., V. 276- 206 Hamilton.admitted that the omission of a provision against the impreSsment of our seamen was unfortunate, but be- cause there was no adequate way to distinguish between the seamen of the two countries it was not likely that anything else could have been done at the time.‘ Hamilton did not fail to point out the economic advanta- ges to the United States of the Jay Treaty. For one thing, there would be increased trade with Canada in spite of "love- sick" French partisans who seemed to believe that free trade with France and her dominions should be the policy of this country to the exclusion of the rest of the world.A6 A greater share of the fur trade would be ours, along with a common in- terest between ourselves and Great Britain for the preserva- tion of peace with the Indians.l+7 We also would acquire the right of dampetition upon equal terms of privilege in the European and East India trade, with real and considerable ad- vantages to ourselves}P8 He believed also that Great Britain might take an interest in seeing that we obtained our navi- hsCamillus No. 6, 1795, Ibid., V, 244-247. This indicates a change of attitude from HamiIton's views as expressed to Washington on September 4, 1795. See page 202n. Earlier Hamilton defended the treaty as in "no way inconsistent with national honor." See page 202. h6Camillus No. 10, 1795, Ibid., V, 291-293. Hamilton did not conceaI the fact that he Believed the Republican Party to be an advocate of such a policy. He believed they had adOp- ted the motto, "All for love, and the world well lost." Ibid., v, 293. 47Cam111us No. 11, 1795, Ibid., v, 311-318. 48M. ) V: 311‘312 . 207 49 gable rights to the Mississippi River. In a later article Hamilton pointed out another economic advantage of the treaty; the settlement of private debts on both sides by means of commissioners.50 In reply to a great deal of opposition that the treaty did not contain the principle "that free ships make free goods," Hamilton said that any change in the pre-established use of the laws of nations must be expressed by either "trea- ties, declarations...adopting and promising the observance of a different rule...implied by a course of practice or usage." In any case, common consent of a majority of nations of the world was necessary. No such consent, he observed, had been forthcoming.51 He doubted that there would be any speedy general establishment of such a rule in the near fu- ture because of the hindrance it would bring to the prepon- derant maritime power (Great Britain) in her efforts to sub- due her enemies (chiefly France).52 hgfiémillae NO- 12, 1795, Ibid., v, 328. 5ogapiiiga No. 14. 1795, Ibid.. V. 347-349 and 357-359. 5lcam111us No. 31, 1795, Ibid., v1, 100. This same view was also expressed in Camillus No. 32, 1795, Ibid., VI, 121. Bemis declares that the aEandonment of the principle "free ships, free goods" along with the greatly extended list of contraband articles were measures "in some sense incompatible with the Franco-American treaty of 1778, but not a violation of it." Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York, February,Il947), p. I03. 52Camillus No. 32, 1795, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 109. Hamilton quoted from Jefferson's 208 By playing down the weak points and hammering incessant- ly on the strong, Camillus made a tremendous impression on the country and did much to swing public opinion into accepting the treaty. This was made all too evident with Jefferson's plea for Madison to take up his pen and give a reply to Camillus. "Hamilton is really a colossus to the anti- republican party. Without numbers, he is an host within himself. They have got themselves into a defile, where they might be finished; but too much security on the republican part will give time to his talents, & indefatigableness to extricate them. We have had only middling performances to oppose him. In truth, when he comes forward, there is no- body but yourself who can meet him....For god's sake take up your pen, and give a fundamental reply to Curtius and Camillus."53 Jefferson sang a different tune a short time before this. He said that Camillus could write "an encyclopedia" on the Jay Treaty, "but it is too obstinate to be twisted by official letters to Genet and Gouverneur Morris to indicate that the United States government did not regognize such a rule or its reversal "enemy ships make enemy goods." Letter to Genet, July 24, 1793, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 356 and Letter to GOuverneur‘Morris, August‘lo, 1793, Ibid., VI, 387. Hamilton erroneously gives the date as August 26. Camillus No. 31, 1795, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 103. 53Letter to Madison, September 21, 1795, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 32-33. ,The letters of Curtius were writtenfby Noah Webster, except Nos. 6 and 7, which were from tge pen of James Kent, a famous New York jurist. Ibidi, VII, 3 n. 209 5A all his sophisms into a tolerable shape." Only a week and a half before this Jefferson showed much less concern with the controversies surrounding the treaties. He remarked there was much dissatisfaction with the trea- ty, but that for his part, he considered himself to be "a passenger, leaving the world, and its government, to those who are likely to live longer in it."55 With Henry Tazewell Jefferson was more outspoken. A look at the document convinced him that the United States would be better off without a treaty of that sort. He said, "acquies- cence under insult is not the way to escape war." He hoped the President would take action to see that the treaty would not become law.56 A letter to Monroe, a week later, expressing the belief that the Jay Treaty had wrecked the "monarchist party" in this country, that the articles had been condemned by practi- cally everyone, and by many because it was hostile to France, showed that Jefferson, whether he wanted to or not, could not entirely remove himself from the political controversies of the day, particularly the Jay Treaty.57 54Letter to Tench Coxe, September 10, 1795, Ibid., VII, 29-30. 55Letter to Mann Page, August 30, 1795, Ibid., VII, 25. 56Letter to H. Tazewell, August 30, 1795, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, IX, 307. 57Letter to Monroe, September 6, 1795, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 27. 210 A few days later Jefferson stated he was not sure the United States should be without treaties with any nation, but he was sure we would be better off without the Jay Treaty. The hope was implied that Washington would find dissatisfac- tion with the treaty and send it back to the Senate}8 A month and a half later in a letter to Edward Rutledge he wrote: "I join with you in thinking the treaty an execrable thing...I trust the popular branch of our Legislature will disapprove of it, and thus rid us of this infamous act, which is really nothing more than a treaty of alliance between Eng- land and the Anglomen of this country, against the Legislature and the people of the United States."59 In a letter to James Monroe, some four months later, Jefferson remarked that the only man having affrontery to affirm that the treaty was not a bad one was Hamilton under 58Letter to Henry Tazewell, September 13, 1795, Ibid., VII, 30-31 0 59Letter to Edward Rutledge, November 30, 1795, Ibid., VII, 40. The House of Representatives requested Washington to send copies of the instructions on which the treaty had been negotiated, but this the President refused to do on grounds that under the Constitution, the House had no jurisdiction in the making of treaties. Because the House was a stronghold of opponents of the treaty, debate lasted a month. At first oppo- nents of the treaty were in a majority and the House refused to grant funds to carry out the stipulations of the treaty. However, on a test vote in the Committee of the Whole the parties were evenly divided until the chairman passed his vote with supporters of the treaty. The treaty party won by three votes on the same question a few days later. After this there were more desertions of Republican Party members. Bemis, Jay's Treaty, pp. XII-XIII. Alexander Hamilton and the Found- ing oTIthe Nation, Morris, p. 396. 211 the guise of Camillus. He said even its most zealous de- fenders only pretended it was better than war. It was his opinion that war was invited rather than avoided by the un- founded demands of the treaty.6 Although Jay's mission, and the treaty with Great Bri- tain that followed, occupied most of the pen of Hamilton and Jefferson in foreign relations throughout 1794-1795, neither completely lost sight of the importance of France in our affairs. This was because of two things. First, whether or not the Jay Treaty violated our 1778 treaty with France and secondly, the effects of internal developments in France upon domestic affairs in this country. Hamilton's attack in the Americanus papers (February, 1794), on those who would advocate entering the war on the side of France against Great Britain, had been previously mentioned.01 They clearly indicate the author's dislike of the French government and the Republican Party in this country. Two months after the publication of Americanus, Hamilton made known to Washington what he believed to be the objectives of the political parties of the country in 60Letter to Monroe, March 2, 1796, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 58. Although Bemis agrees with Jefferson and the Republicans that the treaty was a bad one, because the United States needed peace and commercial expansion more than anything else, it was a necessary evil. A war with Great Bri- tain, at this time, would have destroyed the national credit of the United States. This Alexander Hamilton realized. Be- cause the terms of the treaty were much the result of the in- fluence of Hamilton, Bemis remarks that the treaty might more Sggly7ge called "Hamilton's Treaty." Bemis, Jay's Treaty, pp. 61 See pages 186 to 197. 212 regard to the position of the United States in her foreign relations.62 This letter contained a bitter denounciation of the Republican Party which he claimed was united by its ”implacable hatred to Great Britain and a warm attachment to 63 France." 62Letter to Washington (Cabinet Paper), April 14, 1794, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed.Ed., Lodge, V, 98-99. Perhaps no better statement of Federalist policy can be found than is contained in the following paragraph of this letter. "The views of the first party LFederalist] in respect to the questions between Great Britain and us, favor the following course of conduct: to take effectual measures of military pre- paration, creating, in earnest, force and revenue; to vest the President with important powers respecting navigation and commerce for ulterior contingencies - to endeavor by another effort of negotiation, confided to hands able to manage it, and friendly to the object, to obtain reparation for the wrongs we suffer, and a demarkation of a line of conduct to govern'in”future; to avoid till the issue of that experiment all measures of a nature to occasion a conflict between the motives which might dispose the British Government to do us the justice to which we are entitled and the sense of its own dignity. If that experiment fails, then a not till then to resort to reprisals and war." Ibid., V, 98. 63Ibid., V, 100. According to Hamilton, "Their [Repub- lican] animosity against the former LGreat Britain] is inflamed by the most violent resentment for recent and unprovoked in- juries - in many instances by personal loss and suffering of intimate friends and connections. Their sympathy with the latter [France] is increased by the idea of her being engaged in defending the cause of liberty against a combination of despots,who meditate nothing less than the destruction of it throughout the world. In hostility with Britain, they seek the gratification of revenge upon a detested enemy with that of servhng a favorite friend and in this the cause of liber- ty. They anticipate, also, what is, in their eStimation, a great political good, a more complete and permanent aliena- tion from Great Britain, and a more close approximation to France. Those even of them who do not wish the extremity of war consider it as a less evil than a thorough and sincere accomodation with Great Britain, and are willing to risk the former rather than lose an opportunity so favorable as the present to extend and rivet the springs of ill-will against that nation." Ibid., V, 100-101. 213 The French nation itself was severely criticized by Hamil— ton: ...it is certainly not an idle apprehension that the example of France (whose excesses are with too many an object of apology, if not of justification) may be found to have unhinged the orderly principles of the people of this country; and that by war, by putting inrnotion all the turbulent passions, and promoting a further assimilation of our principles with those of France, may prove to be the threshold of disorga- nization and anarchy. The late successes of France have produced in this country conclusions much too sanguine with regard to the event of the contest. They no doubt afford a high probability of her being able, eventually, to defend herself, especially under a form of adminis- tration of such unexampled vigor as that by Wiich she has of late managed her affairs. But there would be nothing wonderful in a total re- verse of fortune during the ensuing campaign. Human nature must be an absolutely different thing in France from what it has hitherto shown itself to be through- out the globe, and in all ages, if there do not exist in a large proportion of the French nation, germs of the profoundest discontent, ready to burst into vege- tation the moment there should appear an effiCacious prospect of protection and shade from the process of the invading armies. And if having possessed them- selves of some of the keys of France, the principle of the commencing campaign should be different fnam that of the past, active field operations succeeding to the wasteful and dilatory process of sieges, who can:3ay that victory may not so far drown the enter- prises of the coalesced powers as to open the way to an internal explosion which may prove fatal to the republic? 'T is now evident that another vigor- ous campaign will be essayed by the a%lies. The result is, and must be, incalculable. 4 6“Ibid., V, lOB-th. One biographer of Hamilton has said, that in His writings of the years l793-l79h, it is plainly evi- dent that he was more conscious now of the fact that the real issue between himself and the radical Republicans was that "he was an enthusiastic believer in constitutional liberty, or liberty under law, but that he detested the declamatory phrases and empty generalities of the French revolutionary school, while he thought their working principles anarchistic." William Graham Sumner, Alexander Hamilton, Makers of America Series (New York, 1890), p. 213. 21h There is little mention of France or foreign affairs by Hamilton in his writings between April 1h, 179A and May of 1795. This is chiefly because of his occupation in heading an expedition to bring an end to the Whiskey Rebellion and later, his retirement from the post of Secretary of the Treasury, on January 31, 1795. However, hostile feeling in the country in regard to the Jay Treaty brought Hamilton to the fore again, under the title of Horatius, in a desperate effort to check the current and divert it at the beginning. The result was another attack on the Republican Party for its desire for close ties with France. "...that they should stoop to nourish and foster this exotic plant, and should exchange the pure and holy love of their own country for a meretricious foreign amour; that they should be willing to sacrifice your interests to their animosity against one foreign nation and flaeir devotion for another, is justly matter of surprise and indignation. No terms of reprobation are too severe for so faithless and so unworthy a conduct."65 Because of our extensive a>mmercial relations with Great Britain and her capabilities of destruction upon us With her mighty navy, Hamilton believed this attitude of the 66 Republicans was born of "treachery or extreme folly." He declared that our true motto should be "Peace and Trade 65Horatius, May, 1795, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Eodge, V, 184. 661bid., v, 184. 215 with All Nations; beyond our present engagements, Political Connection with None." All countrymen should forget, he said, "the fatal heresy of a close alliance, or in the language of Genet, a true familygcompact, with France." This would make us, he said, "a mere satellite of France," evolving us in the "contests, broils, and wars of Europe." What picture of French government did Hamilton present to his countrymen at this time? Had it changed to any degree over the past year? No indeed! The present rulers of France proclaimed to the world the insidious and unfriendly policy of the former government toward this country. Their successors may hereafter unmask equally insidious and unfriendly views in their present rulers. But if you are discerning as I believe you to be, yeu will not wait for this evidence to form your opinion. You will see in the conduct of the agents of that government, wherever they are, that they are machinating against your indepen- dence, peace and happiness; that not content with a fair competition in your trade, on terms of enual privilege, they are laboring to continue you at variance with Great Britggn, in order that you may be dependent on France. Hamilton's displeasure of the French Republic, and the Republicans, was made more acute with the discovery that Randolph, Jefferson's successor, as Secretary of State, had indiscreetly revealed confidential information to the French 67Ibid., V, 184. 68Ibid., V, 184. 691bid., v, 183. 216 Minister, Joseph Fauchet, about the course of Jay's negotia- tions with Great Britain. Forgetting his own personal rela- tionship with Hammond in 1793, which hampered Jefferson's negotiations with Great Britain, Hamilton condemned Ran- dolph‘s actions to the Attorney-General, William Bradford: "If Mr. Randolph showed Fauchet any part of the instructions to Mr. Jay, I do not much regret that he manifests dis- pleasure at the withholding of a part. When shall we cease 70 to consider ourselves as a colony of France?" 70 Letter to William Bradford, May, 1795, Ibid., X, 99. Under suspicion of bribery and treason Randolph resigned from office vigorously protesting his innocence. Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 571. Randolph had become the devoted friend with whom Fauchet consulted over his official communications. Through these conferences the French Minister learned what was taking place in the councils of the American government. He therefore, did not miss an opportunity to try and exercise an indirect influence upon them. James Alton James, "French Diplomacy and American Politics, 1794-1795," Annual Report of American Historical Association for the year 1911(Washing- ton, I913), I,IS8. Fauchet described Randolph as "without a doubt a very excellent man, very partisan to our revolu- tion, but I believe of a weak character. It is very easy to penetrate his secrets when one excites him. So I give him mine only when I desire it shall be known. He is of great aid to me to prevent the perfect machinations of Hamilton, whom you know by his association with emigrés who are his intimates." Ibid., I, 159-160. Fauchet acknowledged Hamil- ton to be the "real leader of the opposition" to France in the United States. Ibid., I, 158. Letter from Fauchet to Minister of Foreign Affa airs, May 5, 1794, "Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791- -l797," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the year 190%, II, 331. (It is interesting to note Fauchetrs p0 1t1ca description of other prominent American statesmen. He describes Knox as"without firmness and without character and subject to the bidding of Hamilton and Noailles. John Adams favored the English form of constitution and saw in the French Republic a "movement of circumstance" destined to be soon destroyed. Monroe, who had just been appointed Minister to France, "was a man whose talents, principles and purest 217 The following year, 1796, Hamilton produced an essay entitled France?l Because of the approaching presidential election and the support of the French government for the Re- publicans, Hamilton felt compelled to expose to the country what he believed to be the real attitude and conduct of the French Republic. By this he hoped to destroy as much as possible, the sentiment of affection and gratitude toward 72 our former ally. patriotism will be dear to the true friends of liberty." Madison was also described as a true friend to liberty. Nothing was said of Jefferson. Ibid., I, 158 and II, 332-33h.) Despite the close relationship between Fauchet and Randolph, the latter had occasion to be firm with the French Minister. Before the Jay Treaty reached this country Fauchet had been led to believe that it interfered with the existing relations be- tween France and the United States. Ibid., I, 159-160 and II, 372. When the treaty appeared before the Senate, other means failing, Fauchet thought to make public his appeals in be- half of the partisans of France. He believed this would cause a crisis between the two major parties. The French Minister was put in his place by Randolph who said that he had no right to appeal to the people to defeat a measure. A foreigner could only appeal to the Executive. Letter from Randolph to Fauchet, June 13, 1795, A. S. P.; F. R., I, 620. This task was later given to Adet, the new French Minister to the United States. James, "French Diplomacy and American Politics, 179A- 1795," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the year—1911, I,‘159—160. Fauchet, thirty years of age at the timeghe was Minister to the Uhited States, was a lawyer who had been an ardent supporter of the revolution. In 1791 he was the chief of the Bureau of Administration of War. The following year he became secretary to the Mayor of Paris, and later secretary of the exedutive power. This was his first effort in the field of diplomacy. After he returned to France he became an adherent of Napoleon and was made a Baron. Ibid., I, l5h-154n. 71Morris refers to France as "essays" in Alexander Hamil— ton and the Founding_of the Nation, p. 416, but I found only a single essay entitled France in The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 206-21h. 72The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 206n. 218 In this essay Hamilton presented a general review of Franco-American relations from the Revolutidnary War to 1796. Although questioning the motives of France in helping us 73 against Great Britain in the Revolutionary War, Hamilton admitted she was "extremely useful to our cause, and, no doubt, contributed materially to its success."7# He stated, however, that at the close of the war the views of France in several important particulars did not accord with the interests of the United States.75 73"The primary motive of France for assistance she gave us, was obviously to enfeeble a hated and powerful rival, by breaking in pieces the British Empire. A secondary motive was to extend her relations of commerce in the New World, and to acquire additional security for her possessions there, by forming a connection with this country when detached from Great Britain. To ascribe to her any other motives -- to suppose that she was actuated by her friendship towards us, or by a regard for our particular advantage, is to be ignorant of the springs of action which invariably regulate the cabi- nets of princes. He must be a fool, who can be credulous enough to believe, that a despotic court aided a popular revolution, from regard to liberty or friendship to the princi les of such a revolution." France, 1796, Ibid., VI, 207. his is somewhat of a repetition of the argument put forth by Hamilton in Pacificus No. 5, July 13, 1793, The Wgrki7of Alexander Hamilton.(not Fed. Ed.,), Lodge, IV:— 7- 5. 7"France, 1796, The WOrks of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 207. 75"She manifestly favored and intrigued to effect the sacrifice of our pretentions on the Mississippi to Spain; she looked coldly uponcaur claims to the privileges we en- joy in the God Fisheries; and she patronized our negotia- tion with Great Britain without the previous acknowledgement of our independence; -- a conduct which, whatever color of moderation may be attempted to be given to it, can only be rationally explained into the desire of leaving us such a state of halfjpeaceJ half hostility with Great BritainJ as gguld gecessarily render us dependent upon France." Ibid., , 20 . ~ 219 Hamilton particularly condemned the three revolution— . . . A ary French ministers to this dauntry, Genet, Fauchet and Adet, for their intervention in American domestic politics. Of Genet: "...he was the first ministet sent by the new government to this country. Are there no marks of a crooked policy in his behavior, or in his instructions? Did he say to us, or was he instructed to say to us, with frankness and fair dealing: 'Americans, France wishes your cooperation; she thinks you bound by your treaty - or by gratitude or by affinity of principles, to afford it?‘ Not a word of all this. The language was: 'France does not require your assistance; she wishes you to pursue what you think your interest.”76 A What conduct did Genet pursue? ... He came out with his pocket full of com- missions to arm privateers. Arrived at Charles- ton, before he had an opportunity of sounding our government, he begins to issue them, and to fit privateers from our ports....sets on foot in- trigues with our southern and western extremes, and attempts to organize our territory, and to carry on from it military expeditions against the territories of Spain in our neighborhood - a na- tion with which we were at peace. It is impossible to doubt that the end of all this was to drag us into the war, with the humiliation of being plunged into it without ever being con- sulted and without any volition of our own. /\ . Why did Genet's government accept our request for his recall? "The French government could not refuse our request without a rupture with us, which, at that time, would have been extremely inconvenient for many plain reasons.... 761bid., VI, 210. 77Ibid., VI, 211. 220 it arrived shortly after the overthrow of the Girondist party (to which Genet belonged) and thus afforded another opportunity of exercising vengeance on that devoted par- tyul'78 To what degree was the French government itself respon- sible for the actions of its ministers? But it were to be very credulous to be persuaded that Genet acted in this extraordinary manner, from the very beginning,vvithout the authority of the government by which he was sent; and did not the nature of his conduct contain an internal evidence of the source, it could be easily traced in the instructions which he published. These in- structions demonstrate three things, though the last is couched in very covert terms: 1. That France did not consider us as bound to aid her in the war. 2. That she desired to engage us in it, and the principal bribe was to be large privileges in her Vest India trade. 3. That if direct nego- tiations did not succeed, indirect means were to be taken to entangle us in it whether so disposed or not. It is not matter of cmmplaint that France should endeavor to engage by fair means our assis- tance in the war, if she thought it would be use- ful to her, but it is just matter of bitter com- plaint that she should attempt ggainst our will to ensnare or drive us into it. 9 What of the French Republic's second minister? Fauchet. No very marked phenomena distinguish his course. But the little twinkling appearances which are here and there discernible, indicate the same general spirit in him which governed his prede- cessor. The Executive of our «Juntry, in conse- quence of an insurrection, to which one of them had materially cgatributed, had publicly arraigned political clubs. Fauchet, in opposition, openly 78Ibid., VI, 211-212. 79Ibid., VI, 212. 80The best source of a discussion of these clubs is Link, Democratic-Republican Societiesi_l790-1800. 221 patronizes them. At the festivals of these clubs he is always a guest, swallowing toasts full of sedition and hostility to the govern- ment. Without examining what is the real ten- dency of these clubs, without examining even the policy of what is called the President's denoun- ciation of them, it was enough for a foreign minister that the Chief Magistrate of our caint- ry had declared them to be occasions of calami- ty to it. It was neither friendly nor decent in a foreign minister after this to counte- nance these institutions. This conduct dis- covereg toward us not only unkindness but con- tempt . 1 How did the conduct of the present French minister (Adet) compare with that of Genht or Fauchet? "Mr. Adet has been more circumspect than either of his predecessors; and perhaps we ought scarcely to impute it to him as matter of reproach that he openly seconded the opposition in Congress to the treaty concluded with Grqat Britain."82 Hamilton declared he knew Adet's reason for doing this. 81France, 1796. The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, V1, 212-213. Recognizing that Genét had failed in his ) mission because of too friendly a relationship with the De- mocratic-Republican Societies and because of his general in- terference with American domestic affairs, Fauchet, for a time, profited by his example. He said it was his desire to maintain a balance between Republican and Federalist parties. Leading men, inclrding Washington, were impressed with his sin- cerity and extended to him marks of social favor. James, "French Diplomacy and American Politics, 1794-1795," Annual Report of American Historical Association for the year 1911, I, 158. During the process of debates in Congress, however, Fauchet soon became aware that Monroe had been right when he said that the Republican Party was the only friend of the French cause. Ibid., I, 158. Fauchet then proceeded to follow a course of action that he thought would be most beneficial to the interests of his country. Ibid., I, 158. “2 , , France, 1790. The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., LOdge, VI, 2130 222 Can it be anything else than a part of that policy which deems it useful to France, that there should perpetually exist between us and Great Britain germs of discord and quarrel? Is it not manifedt that in the eyes of France the unpardonable sin of that treaty is, that it roots up for the present those germs of discord? To pretend that the treaty interferes with our engagements with France, is a ridiculous absurdity - for it expressly excepts them. To say that it establishes a course of things hurtful to France in her present struggle, is belied by the very course of things since tag treaty - all goes on exactly as it did before. Of peOple in this country who tried to justify displea- sure in France on this account, Hamilton declared them to be "not Americans, but Frenchmen. They are not fit for being members of an independent nation, but are prepared for the dependent state of colonists. If our government could not without the permission of France terminate its controversies with another foreign power, and settle with it a treaty of commerce, to endure three or four years, our boasted indepen- dence is a name. We have only transferred our allegiance! we are slaves!" Because of his retirement from the post of Secretary of State, Jefferson's references to France in his].etters from 179h—l796 are rather limited. Nevertheless, his interest in France and the objectives of her Revolution did not change during these years. "Over the foreign powers I am con- vinced they will triumph completely & I cannot but hope that 83Ibid., VI, 214 8“Ibid., VI, 214. 223 the triumph & the consequent disgrace of the invading ty- rants, is destined, in the order of events, to kindle the wrath of the people of Europe against those who have dared to embroil them in such wickedness, & to bring at length, .kings, nobles, & prieSts to the scaffolds which they have been so long deluging with human blood. I am still warm whenever I think of these scoundrels...."85 After a few months of seclusion at Monticello, Jefferson remarked that the only thing that still mattered was the success of the French Revolution. An indication that ex- cesses had been prevalent in the Revolution was evident in a letter to Henry Remsen.86 The Reign of Terror had continued unabated in France after the execution of the Queen in October, 1793. Danton and Robes- pierre, the two Jacobin leaders, met their death at the hands of their own creation in April and July of 179A. Jacobin power . in France came to an end. Perhaps the peak of the revolutionary crisis in France had been experienced during the Reign of Terror. By the summer of 179A the crisis seemed to have passed, at least in foreign affairs.87 This was primarily because of the 85Letter to Tench Coxe, May 1, 1794: The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VI, 507. 86Letter to Henry Remsen, October 30, 179A, Franklin Pa ers, Yale University (Copy). Cited in Schachner, Thomas Jegferson, II, 567. 87Stewart, A Documentary Survey of the French Revolu- tion, p. A53. 224 reorganization of the armies by the brilliant French General Lazare Carnot and the expulsion of the allied armies from France by the end of December, 1793.88 However, the domestic sphere was still in an unsettled state. Robespierre's successors were not above the continued use of the Terror if need be to maintain themselves in office and avoid the resto- ration of monarchy.89 However, forces were at work which would make it necessary to adOpt a policy against a resumption of the Terror and its adherents. The period after July 27, 179A un- til October 17, 1795 became known as the "Thermidorian Re- action," a name which has come to be applied to the final phase of the Convention. One of the basis reasons for the Terror, the war crisis, no longer existed. Robespierre, whose very name symbolized the word Terror, was dead. Many of his successors were of the well-to-do element and favored a return to "normalcy." They were hailed as national heroes. These men were shrewd enough to face the situation and make the most of it. They were able to emerge as the controlling element in the new government of the Directory, established in October, 1795.90 Jefferson expressed the hope "that the execution of 88James, "French Diplomacy and American Politics, 179A- 1795," Annual Report of American Historical Association for thegyearngII, I, 154. 89 Po 537- Stewart, A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution, 901bid., p. 537. 225 Robespierre & his bloodthirsty satellites is a proof of their return to that moderation which their best friends had feared had not always been observed."91 To a friend, whom he had last seen in France, Jefferson wrote that he could be seen at Monticello "in my farmer's coat, immersed soul & body in the culture of my fields, & alive to nothing abroad except the successes of the French revolution a the welfare of my friends."92 To William B. Giles he repeated that his days "were busy with now and then a pious ejaculation for the French and Dutch, returning with due dispatch to my clover, potatoes, wheat, etc."93 After Adet failed to prevent the ratification of the Jay Treaty, the French Minister worked for the elevation of the 9A presumably pro-French Jefferson to the presidency against the presumably pro-British John Adams, the Federalist candi- 91Letter to Henry Remsen October 30, 1794, Franklin Pa ers, Yale University (Copy . Cited in Schachner, Thomas Jegferson, II, 567. . 92Letter to Colonel Blockden, December 11, 1794, Jefferson Pa ers, Library of Congress, Quoted in Koch, Jefferson and Magison, p. 161. 93Letter to tiiiiam B. Giles, April 27, 1795, The Writ- ings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, IX, 3 5. 95French agents had described Jefferson, together with such Republicans as Madison, Monroe, Robert R. Livingston, Senator Tazewell of Virginia, Governor Clinton of New York and Governor Mifflin of Pennsylvania as patriots. Washington, Hamilton, Jay, Rufus King and John Adams were aristocrats un- friendly to liberty. Memoir on the United States Florida and Louisiana, 12 Frimaire, an IV. (December 3, 1795) Azghiyes flu Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres, Correspondence Politique, 226 date, in the election of 1796.95 His efforts were in vain as the presidential electors chose Adams by a majority of three votes over Jefierson, who became Vice-President. Adet worked at first for the defeat of Washington for re-election until he found the President was not a candidate 97 for a third term. ,The plan to concentrate on the defeat of Washington was the brainchild of Fauchet. It was pre- sented to the Directory on December 15, 1795. At that time, too, he suggested, as mentioned previously, that France avoid the pitfall of appealing to any faction in the United States, as had Genet, but instead to cooperate with her friends in a more dignified manner. He expressed the belief too, that France could induce the House of Representatives not to appro- priate enough money to put the Jay Treaty into force.9 If France should be unable to block the Jay Treaty, or if / . / Etats-Unis, XIVL, 407-Al7, hereafter cited as Arch. Aff.J Etr., EtatsJUnis. Cited in Samuel F. Bemis, "Washington‘s Farewell Address: A Foreign Policy of Independence," The American His- torical Review (193A), XXXIX, 238. 951bid., XXXIX, 258. (Primary source same as above.) "Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791-1797," Annual Report of the American Historical Associa- tion for the year 1903, II, 972. Thomas A. Bailey, A Dillo- matlc History of the American People, Fifth Edition (New York, 19557, Pp. 80-8l. 96Bemis, "Washington's Farewell Address: A Foreign Policy of Independence," The American Historical Review, KXAIX, 266. 97Ibid., XXXIX, 257. 98Eugene Wilson Lyon, "The Directory and the United States," The American Historical Review, XLIII, 51A-515. 227 Jefferson was not elected, then Fauchet said, France should be resigned to the:fact. American war time trading privileges in French colonies was a necessity to France. Only the acqui- tion of Louisiema he believed would free France from depend— ence on the United States. Fauchet's suggestions were the policies of the Directory toward the United States in the succeeding months.99 In the beginning the Directory decided on a more posi- tive step to offset Jay's Treaty: to send a special envoy extraordinary to Philadelphia to recall Adet and to announce the end of the Franco-American treaties and then himself withdraw.lOO Monroe was able to deter Delacroix, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, from such actions by convincing him that it would please the enemies of both countries. By waiting until the end of the year the Directory was assured by the American Minister that President Washington would be 101 removed from office by the American people. Later, as a warning to the American people of worse 99Ibid., iLIII, 514-515. 100Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Executive Directory, 27, nivase, an IV. (January 17, 1796), Arch. Aff.,gEtr,, Etats-Unis, XVL, 41-43. Cited in Bemis, "Washington's Farewell Address: A Foreign Policy of Indepen- dence," The American Historical Review, XXXIX, 258. 101Letter from Monroe to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, February 17, 1796 (28 pluvi6s, an IV.) Ibid., XXXIX, 258. Primary source same as above. 228 things to come if Washington should be continued in office, the Directory decided to suspend Adet's functions and with them formal diplomatic relations with the United States. Believing the Jay Treaty to be an alliance between the United States and Great Britain it proceeded to invoke against Ameri- can shipping the maritime principles of the document itself.102 It had been Adet's suggestion that France pursue such a poli- cy.103 This is what had been done up to January 3, 1795, when Monroe secured from the Convention full and entire recogni- tion of the Treaty of 1778, but not since the nature of the Jay Treaty had become suspected in France.th If Jefferson was elected the plan was to restore relations on the old basis with the hope that a new treaty with France might off- set the Jay Treaty.105 On October 27, 1796, Adet presented to the United States a decree of the Directory announcing that "All neutral or allied Powers shall, without delay,be notified that the flag of the French republic will treat neutral vessels, either as to confiscation, as to searches, or capture, in the same 102Ibid., XXXIX, 26A. (Primary source same as above except Letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Adet, August 24, 1796 (7 fructitor, an IV.), XVIL, 1h4-1h5. See also drafts and reports associated with these instructions contained in the same primary source XVIL, 135-140.) 103Ibid., XXXIX, 264. lO“Ibid., XXXIX, 264. 105Ibid., XXXIX, 26A. (Primary source same as above, ex- cept November 2, 1796 (12 brumaire, an V.), AVIL, 355-358. 229 manner as they shall suffer the English to treat them."106 At the end of October, Adet began writing a series of articles in one of which he asserted that the election of Jefferson would eliminate chances of a war with France.107 Adet announced suspension of his functions on November 15. He said this was not to indicate a formal rupture be- tween the two republics, "but as a mark of great discontent which is to last until the government of the United States returns to sentiments, and to measures, more conformable to the interests of the alliance, and the sworn friendship of the two nations."108 Accompanying the announcement was a long review of the quarrel between the two nations over American neutrality, including a bitter denouncement of the Jay Treaty. These topics were reviewed, too, in an appeal to the American people (published in a newspaper), to "let your government return to itself and you will still find in Frenchmen faithful friends and generous allies."109 Adet questioned whether Jefferson could be counted upon to favor France. "Mr. Jefferson likes us because he detests England; he seeks to draw near to us because he fears us less. 109A. s. P.; F. R., I, 577. 107Alexander DeConde, "Washington's Farewell, the French Alliance, and the Election of 1796," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, June l956eharch 1957), XIIIL, 653. 108A. s. P.; F. R., I, 583. lO9Ihid., I, 583. 230 than England; but tomorrow he might change his opinion about us if England should cease to inspire his fear. Althoug Jefferson is the friend of liberty and of science, although he is an admirer of the efforts we have made to cast off our shackles and to clear away the cloud of ignorance which weighs down the human race, Jefferson, I say is an American, and as such, he cannot sincerely be our friend. An American is the 110 born enemy of all the pe0p1es of Europe." Jefferson's dislike of Great Britain is best illustrated in a letter to a friend condemning the Federalist Party who would prefer close ties with what he believed to be a despotic government instead of remaining true to Republican principles and government. The aspect of our politics has wonderfully changed changed since you left us. In place of that noble love of liberty, & Republican government which carried us triumphantly thro the war, an Anglican, monarchical, & aristocratical party has sprung up, whose avowed object is to draw over us the substance as they have already done the forms, of the British government. The main body of our citizens, however, remain true to their republican principles; the whole landed interest is republican, and so is a great mass of talents. Against us are the Execu- tives, the Judiciary, two out of three branches of the legislature, all the officers of the govern- ment, all who want to be officers, all timid men who prefer the calm of despotism to the boisterous sea of liberty, British merchants & and American trading on British capitals, speculators & holders in the banks and public funds, a contrivance in- vented for the purposes of corruption, & for assimilating us in all things to the rotten as well as the sound parts of the British model. It would give you a fever were I to name to you the 110Letter from Adet to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 31, 1796, "Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791-1797," Annual Report of the American His— torical Association for the year 1903, II, 983. 231 apostates who have gaze over to these heresies, men who are Samsons in the field & Solomons in the council, but who havelhid their heads shorn by the harlot of England. In short, we are likely to preserve the liberty we have obtained only by unremitting labors & perils. But we shall preserve them; and our mass of weight & wealth on the good side is so great, as to leave no danger that force will ever be attempted against us. We have only to awake and snap the Lilliputian cords with which they have been en- tangling us during thi first sleep which succeeded our labors. 12 In this letter Jefferson referred mainly to hashington. Unfortunately this letter was made public in three news- papers, causing considerable embarrassment to Jefferson.113 111 The writings of Thoras Jefferson, Ford, VII, 77n. 112Letter to Philip Mazzei, April A, 1796, Ibid., VII: 75-77. 113Florence, Italy (January 1, 1797), Paris Moniteur (January 25, 1797, where a few changes were made in the'text), and the Philadelphia Minerva (May lh, 1797). Ibid., VII, 74n and Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 578. \ 232 CHAPTER V COLD WAR WITH FRANCE: 1797-1800 The waning days of Washington's tenure in office brought about a shift in the balance of power in Europe from British supremacy to that of revolutionary France. The tender spot in our foreign relations suddenly became not Great Britain, but France. French disregard for our neutral rights at sea brought about a crisis similar to that which faced the United States prior to the Jay mission to Great Britain. But this was not all. As mentioned in the previous chapter, France had been guilty of interference in American domestic politics.1 It was now the Federalists, instead of the Republicans, who de- manded war against the transgressors of American rights. Hamilton was particularly angry with the conduct of Adet in publically appealing to the American people to support the Republicans against the Administration in the election of 1796. He believed this disrespect toward the government ought not to go unnoticed and urged the President to maintain a "dignified reServe" in his relations with the French minister. The admin- nistration's reply to Adet's denouncement of the Jay Treaty, with a general review of Franco-American affairs, must, how- ever, he said, "be one of the most delicate papers that has lSee pages 225-229. 233 proceeded from our government, in which it will require much care and nicety to steer between sufficient and too much jus- tification, between self-respect and provocation of further insult or injury; and that at the same time save a great poli- tical interest which this step of the French government opens to us."2 If possible the United States must "avoid a rupture with France, who, if not effectually checked, will, in the in- solence of power, become no less troublesome to us than to the rest of the world."3 It was left to Thomas Pickering, successor to Randolph, as Secretary of State, to defend American neutrality, the Jay Treaty with Great Britain, and, in general, the foreign .policy of Washington. There is no doubt that he was greatly inspired by Alexander Hamilton.“ Pickering's defense took the fOrm of instructions to Charles C. Pinckney (January 16, 1797), who had already 2Letter to Washington, November A, 1796, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 198-199. The "great political interest" mentioned is the release of the United States from the French Alliance. Bemis, "Washington's Fare- well Address: A Foreign Policy of Independence," The American Historical Review, XXXIX, 267. 3Letter to Washington, November A, 1796, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 200. Hamilton re- gretted that the government had failed to answer the pre- vious communications of Adet. If this was because we were fearful of not maintaining harmony with the French govern- ment then he believed we should, in our reply, to distinguish between the minister and the government. Letter to Washington, November ll, 1796, Ibid., X, 206. hLetter to Oliver Wolcott, November 22, 1796, Ibid., X 209‘2130 . 234 sailed to France to replace Monroe as United States minister. Its real purpose as a counter-measure to Adet's attacks on the Administration and efforts to secure the election of Jefferson over Adams was evident in its immediate release to the press on January 19, 1797.5 The instructions were transmitted to Congress on January 19, 1797, and immediately ordered to be printed. They appeared in the Aurora in installments be- tween January 24 and February 3, 1797.6 The document was a denial of American ingratitude towards France and a pronounce- ment that France owed fully as much to the United States as the United States owed France.7 Pickering believed the day for finesse had passed. He said the American people should know the truth of the efforts of foreign diplomats to draw us into the politics of Europe.8 While the French were accusing the United States of ingratitude and treachery in 1795-1796, they, themselves were plotting to seize control over the United States by regaining Louisiana and West Florida from Spain, allying France with the south-western Indians, and tempting the allegiance to the Union of the new western states 5Bemis,"washington's Farewell Address: A Foreign Policy of Independence," The American Historical Review, XKXIX, 266. 61bid., XXXIX, 266n. 7January 16, 1797, A. S. P.; F. R., I, 559-576. 81mm, 1,. 559-576. 235 to build up thereby a new colonial empire that would be the 9 preponderant power in the new world. France had been worried that Pinckney might obtain Louisiana from Spain for the United States in 1795. With the purchase of this large area of land the United States might become too strong and have no 10 need of France. Throughout 1796 France tried to persuade Godoy, who was in charge of Spanish foreign affairs,to cede Louisiana, but to no avail.11 It was said by A. Sachouse, French special agent in the United States on behalf of Santo Domingo, that if war should become necessary, Kentucky and Tennessee, both devoted to Thomas Jefferson, could be counted upon to observe a strict neutrality.12 Because the votes of the electors had already been announced before the publication of Pickering's instructions to Pinckney, we cannot conclude that they decided the elec- tion of 1796. The document was rather an appeal to the people to support the foreign policy of Washington and Hamilton and I I ‘\ ‘7' T" ° ‘ \ ‘ 9Arch. Aff., Etr., Etats-Unis, XAAIA-XIIL. Cited in Bemis, "Jashingtonrs Farewell Address: A Foreign Policy of Indepen- dence," The American Historical Review, iXkIX, 266. James Alton James, "French Opinion as a Factor in Pre- venting War between France and the United States, 1795-1800," The American Historical Review (New York, October l92h - July 1925), XXX, #7. llFredrick Jackson Turner, "The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley in the period of Washington and Adams," The American Historical Review (New York, October l9OA-July 1905), K, 268-269. 12Letter to Delacroix, Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 236 also an argument to pave the way for release of the United States from the French alliance, by proving, as Hamilton had suggested, that the United States had kept good faith in its engagements.13 Seeking to remove foreign interference in our domestic affairs and to protect the American peOple from involvement in European affairs, Washington sought the aid of Hamilton in the writing of a final address to the nation. Hamilton played an important part in the phrasing of the document and in the previous expression of some of the ideas. He 1 might well be called the co-author of the "Farewell Address." h 9, 1797, Arch. Aff., Etr., Etats-Unis, XVIIL, f. 151. Cited in James, "French Opinion as a Factor in Preventing War between France and the United States, 1795-1800," The American Historical Review, XXX, h8—h8n. 13Letter to Wolcott, November 22, 1796, The works of glexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, K, 209-213. Bemis, "Washington's Farewell Address: A Foreign Policy of Indepen- dence," The American Historical Review, XXXIX, 267. ll’The works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VIII, 187-188n. Horace Binney, An Ifiguiry into the Formation of Washington's Farewell Address (Philadelphia, 18597. ‘ViCtor HUgo Paltsits, hashington's Farewell Address (New York, 1935). DeGonde states that Hamilton had a prominent hand in the do- cument, but the main ideas and foreign policy principles were not unique with either Hamilton or Washington, but were pre- valent Federalist ideas on current foreign policy and politics. Alexander DeConde, "Washington's Farewell, the French Alliance, and the Election of 1796," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XIIIL, 6h8wand 650. An abstract and a copy of the original draft by Hamilton of the Address can be found in The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VIII, 181-187—— and 187-214. A complete text of the Farewell Address can be found in A. S. P.; F. R., I, 3A-38. 237 Both Hamilton and Washington, in drawing up the document, had in mind the involvement of the French alliance in American diplomacy and domestic politics. They urged American citizens to stay clear of European alliances and wars until the nation 15 could be strong enough to command its own course. The imme- diate purpose of the document was to strike a blow against the French for meddling in American affairs, and, at the same time, use it as a campaign doctrine in the election of 1796.16 Hamilton was not content to rely solely on Pickering to answer Adet's indictment of the Jay Treaty and American in- fractions of the Treaty of 1778 with France. Under his old signature Americanus, he denied the French minister's charges 15Bemis, "Washington's Farewell Address: A Foreign Po- licy of Independence," The American Historical Review, XJCAIX , 262-263 0 16Ibid., XXXIX, 263. DeConde, "Washington's Farewell, The French Alliance, and the Election of 1796," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XIIIL, 6A8. The Farewell Address played an important part in the Federalist victory and doomed the French alliance. Ibid., XIIIL, 658. In forwarding the document to his government Aded stated: "It would be useless to speak to you about it. You will have noticed the lies it contains, the insolent tone that governs it, the immorality which characterizes it. You will have had no difficulty in recognizing the author of a piece extolling ingratitude, show- it as a virtue necessary to the happiness of States, pre- senting interest as the only counsel WliCh governts ought to follow in the course of their negotiations, putting aside honor and glory. You will have recognized immediately die doctrine of the former Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton, and the principles of loyalty that have always directed the Philadelphia government." Letter from Adet to the Einister of Foreign Affairs, October 12, 1796, "Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791-1797:" Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the year l903, II, 954. ' 238 that the United States had violated the 17th article of the 1778 treaty,l7or that the 18th article of the Jay Treaty sus- pended all commercial relations between the United States and France by preventing the supplies sought by France from this country .1 In answer to the French charge that these injuries had been received while we put up with British tyranny and seemed to have forgotten the generous assistance of France during the American revolution, Hamilton again pointed out that the French motives in aiding our cause for freedom were not un- selfish ones. The generosity of France and the gratitude of the United States have been often suggested by some of our own citizens, and we are now reproached with it by France herself. Gratitude is due7for favors received; and this virtue may exist among' nations as well as among individuals; but the motive of the benefit must be solely the advan- tage of the party on whom it was conferred, else it ceases to be a favor. There is positive proof that France did not enter into the alliance with us in 1778 for our advantage, but for her own. The whole course of the investigation, as well as a positive knowledge of the fact, proves this. She resisted all of our solicitations for effect- ual assistance for war three years, and rose in her demand during the campaign of 1777, when our affairs presented the most threatening aspect. l7One charge was that the American government had re- stored to their owners prizes captured by French vessels and taken to the ports of the United States. Another was that the United States had not allowed France to sell her prizes in her ports. The Answer, December 6, 1796, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 217-225. 18Ibid., VI, 225-226. 239 Memorials were presented in August and September of that year, while General Burgoyne's army arrived in December; fearing we might be able to do the business without them, the French court began to change its tune....In the interval be- tween the declaration of independence and the alliance with France, that court sometimes ordered away our privateers, and sometimes re- stored their prizes. They refused to receive an ambassador or acknowledge our independence; all of which was for fear of bringing France prematurely into the war. The fact is, that the French spoke of very different terms, as the condition of dieir assistance, before the capture of Burgoyne, from those actually agreed on afterwards. It was certainly the interest of the French to unite with America in the war against Great Britain. They therefore acted right in doing this at last, though with too much refinement in putting it off so long, but it is not the interest of the United States to be engaged in any war whatsoever - much less do they desire to imbrue their hands in the blood of one nation to gratify the hatred or serve the interest of another. In another series of public essays entitled The Warnigg Hamilton assailed the French for violations of neutral rights by the seizure of American vessels bound for lritish ports and confiscation of their cargoes.2 The July 2, 1796 decree of France, issued to the United States on October 27, announced that in the future the treat- ment of neutrals would be as they allowed the enemies of 19Ibid., VI, 226-228. 20The Warning No. 1, January 27, 1797, Ibid., VI, 229-231. These essays were a contination of the line of argument pre- sented in the essay entitled France. The purpose was three- fold: 1. To arouse the people against French influence in American affairs. 2. To show that we ought to remain indepen- dent of all foreign nations. 3. Not to allow<3urselves to be dragged into a war on the side of France against Great Bri- tain, but to wdthstand the greater danger of encroachment upon our rights by the French natidn. Ibid., VI, 229m. 240 France to treat them-21 hamilton thought this unrealistic. This was because the enemies of France, even at their height of power, never pretended to cut off totally the trade of neutrals with her ports.22 To the charge that the United States had stood as much from Great Britain as she was now standing from France, Hamilton stated that if this were true it would not excuse the actions of the French.23 Moreover, he said, the French aggressions had been far more numerous than those of Great Britain.24 He told Rufus King that every'exertion, not degrading to us, would be made to preserve peace with 25 France. If, after being properly called upon, France did 21A. s. P.; F. R., I, 577. See pages 228-229. 22The Warning,No. 1, January 27, 1797, The Works of Alexander—Hanilton,'Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 232. Hamilton added that Great Britain, too, had violated neutral rights, but France Was the first to do so with the decree of May 9, 1793. The Warning No. 5, March 13, I797, Ibid., VI, 251-252. A. S. P.; F. R., I, 377-378. France,however, did not include the United States in this particular decree. Ibid., I, 2AA. Great Britain did not announce a similar policy until June 6, 1793. The Warning, No. 5, March 13, 1797, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 252. A. S. P.; F. R., I, 2A0. Then too, the French decree pertaining to confisca- tion of goods extended to all provisions. Great Britain's decree extended only to corn, flour, and meal. The Warning, No. 6, March 27, I797, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 25h. 23The warning No. a, February 27, 1797, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 2A5. He claimed also that we had never tolerated the aggressions of Great Britain, but had always taken steps to resist them. Ibid., VI, 246-2A7. 21"The Warning, No. 6, March 27, 1797, Ibid., VI, 25h-259. 25Letter to King, December 16, 179a, Ibid., X, 216. 2A1 not renounce her treacherous policy toward neutral shipping, 26 Hamilton said "open war will be preferable to such a state." What had been the treatment by France by other neutral nations? Hamilton asked the American people to behold the fate of Genoa; a small country which maintained its neutrali- ty, but at a price of nearly a million dollars. This, he said, was an indication of the "domineering and predatory spirit" of the French nation.27 At the same time it should serve a fruitful lesson to us. "The most infatuated parti- sans of France cannot but see in it an unequivocal proof of the rapacious and vindictive policy which dictates her measures. All men must see in it, that the flagrant injuries which we are now suffering from her, proceed from a general plan of domination and plunder; from a disposition to pros- trate nations at her feet; to trample upon their necks; to ravish from them whatever her avidity or convenience may 26The Warning, No. 3, February 21,1797, Ibid., VI, 2A3. Hamilton hoped the United States would not be driven to such a "disagreeable extremity." Ibid., VI, 239. His private corres- pondence showed that he favored a more discreet policy toward France. He urged first that a special mission be sent to try to come to satisfactory terms. Letter to Washington, January 19, 1797, Ibid.,X, 230. Letter to Theodore Sedgwick, January 20, 1797, Ib1d., X, 232. Meanwhile Hamilton favored an embargo oncur own vessels with the hope that France would change her conduct. If not, he favored the following program: "...to grant special letters of mark, with authority to repel aggressors and capture assailants; to equip our frigates; to arm a number of sloops-of-war of existing vessels to convoy our merchant— men."rIb1d., X, 232. This program was advocated also in Letter to James McHenry, March 22,1797, Ibid., X, 2Al-2A2 and Letter to William Smith, January 19, 179 7, Ibid., X, 231. 27The Warning, No. 3, Ibid., VI, 2io. 2h2 think fit to dedicate to her own use."28 What objective of the French was responsible for her un- reasonable conduct toward neutral nations? In every case, said Hamilton, her aim had been to "seduce the people from their government, and, by dividing, to conquor and oppress.... to be the legislatrix of nations; that they are all bound to submit to her mandates, to take from her their moral, poli- tical, and religious creeds; that her plastic and regenerating hand is to mould them into whatever shape she thinks fit; and that her interest is to be the sole measure of the rights of the rest of the world. The specious pretense of enlightening mankind and reforming their civil institutions, is the var- nish to the real design of subjugating them."29 Men designated by Hamilton as "well informed and unpre- judiced," from the beginning of the Revolution had seen the evil symptoms of this spirit. "Reasoning from numan nature, they foresaw its growth with success; that from the love of dominion, inherent in the heart of man, the rulers of the most powerful nation in the world, whether a Committee of Safety or a Directory, will forever aim at an undue empire over other nations; and that this disposition, inflamed as it was by enthusiasm, if encouraged by a continuation of 28 Ibid., VI, 242. 29The Warning, No. 1, Ibid., VI, 232-234. 243 success, would be apt to exhibit itself, during the course of the French Revolution, in excesses of which there has been no example since the days of Roman greatness."3 What possible effects could the present actions of the French have upon the future of their country? Hamilton had the answer: If France can finally realize her present plan of aggrandizement, she will attain to a degree of greatness and power which, if not counteracted by internal disorder, will tend to make her the'terror and the scourge of nations. The spirit of modera- tion in a state of overbearing power is a phenome- “ non which has not yet appeared, and which no wise man will expect ever to see. It is certain that a very different spirit has hitherto marked the ca- reer of the new republic; and it is due to truth toeadd, that theeardent, impetuous, and military genius of the French affords perhaps less prospect of such a spirit in them than in any other pe0p1e. 1 Hamilton was at least comforted by the thought that with every passing day more and more Americans were becoming aware of the politics of France in all its "intrinsic deformity."32 With the mass of evidence showing the outrageous conduct of France toward not only the United States, but other neutral nations, apparent for all to see, Hamilton declared that any man in this country "the apologist of France, and the calumina- tor of his Own government, is not an American. The choice for him lies between being deemed a fool, madman, or a traitor."33 30Ibid., VI, 234. 31The Warning, No. 2, February 7, 1797, Ibid., VI, 236. 32The warning, No. 1, Ibid., VI, 233. 33The Warning, No. 6, Ibid., VI, 259- 244 The French Revolution had brought about a new growth of religious and political ideas which alarmed Hamilton enough at this time to cause him to write another essay. In this essay he elected to discuss and criticise these ideas. Facts, numerous and unequivocal, demonstrate that the present Aera [era] among the most extraordinary which have occured in the history of human affairs} Opinions, for a long time, have been gradually gaining ground, which threaten the foundations of religion, morality and society. An attack was first made upon the Christian revelation for ‘ l which natural religion was offered as the substi- ~ ‘ tute. The Gospel was to be discarded as a gross imposture, but the being and attributes of God, the obligations of piety, even the doctrine-5f a future state of rewards and punishments, were to beretained and cherished. In proportion as success has appeared to attend the plan, a bolder project has been unfolded. The very existence of Deity has been questioned and in some instances denied. The duty of piety has been ridi- culed, the perishable nature of man asserted, and his hopes bounded to the short span of his earthly state. Death has been proclaimed an Eternal Sleep; 'the dogma of the immortality of the soul a cheat, invented to torment the living for the benefit of the dead.’ Irreligion, no longer confined to the closets of conceited sophists, nor to the haunts of wealthy riot, has more or less displayed its hideous front among all classes.... A league has at length been cemented between the apostles and disciples of irreligion and of anarchy. Religion and government have both been stigmatized as abuses; as unwarrantable restraints upon the free- dom of man; as causes of the corruption of his nature, intrinsically good; as sources of an artificial and false morality which tyrannically robs him of the enjoyments for which his passions fit him, and as clogs upon his progress to the perfection for which he was destined. As a corollary from these premises, it is a favorite tenet of the sect that religious Opinion of any sort is unnecessary to society; that the maxims of a genuine morality and the authority of the magistracy and the laws are a sufficient and ought to be the only security for civil rights and private happi- ness. .5 3hFragment on the French Revolution, Ibid., VIII, 425-427. V 2A5 Hamilton also believed these ideas detrimental to the French nation. It has served as antengine to subvert all her an- cient institutions, civil and religious, with all the checks that served to mitigate the rigor of authority; it had hurried her headlong through a rapid succession of dreadful revolutions, which have laid waste property, made havoc among the arts, overthrown cities, desolated provinces, un- peOpled regions,<:rimsoned her soil with blood, and deluged it in<:rime, poverty, and wretchedness; and all this as yet for no better purpose than to erect on the ruin of former things a despotism unlimited and uncontrolled; leaving to a deluded, an abused, a plundered, a scouraged, and an oppressed , people, not even the shadow of liberty to console v them for a long trgin of substantial misfortunes, of bitter suffering.3 Although increasing French victories in Europe and con- sequent reversal of British fortunes made many men abhor a war with the French hepublic, a number of Federalists were not un- willing to take this drastic step to check French depreda- tions against our shipping. Undoubtedly they were delighted with Hamilton's anonymous essays condemning French policies toward the American government. They began to increase their call for immediate and outright war with France.3 As previously indicated, Hamilton, in his private corres— (The Lodge edition gives no date for this essay, but Morris in Alexander Hamilton and the Founding of the Nation (p.422) lists the date as about 1796.} This essay is of interest not only because it shows the effect of the French Revolution upon the thinking of Hamilton, but because it indicates why the Revolution so affected and colored the views of the Federalists, as well as other conservative classes throughout the world. Ibid., VIII, h25n. 35Ib1d., VIII, 428. 368chachner, Alexander~Hamilton, p. 361. 246 pondence, adopted a more cautious attitude.37 Believing an outrightvvar at this time to be disastrous to the prosperity of the country, he urged that a special mission, like that of the Jay Mission to Great Britain, be sent to France.38 That most of the leading Federalist statesmen opposed this move is indicated in the constant mentioning of this point in his correspondence to these men, over a period of some five months.39 Hamilton also had definite ideas on who should compose this mission. It should consist of either Jefferson or Ma- dison, Pinckney, and a "third very safe man, say Cabot (or Jay)."L’O 37See page 241. 38Letter to Washington, January 19, 1797, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 230. John Adams succeeded Washington before the latter could act upon Hamil- ton's suggestion. 39January 19, and May 11, 1797, Ibid., X, 229-265. See especially letter to James McHenry, March 22, 1797, Ibid., X, 242; Letter to Timothy Pickering, March 29, 1797, Ibid., X, 246; Letters to William Smith, April 5, 1797 and April 10, 1797, Ibid., X, 253 and 256. For the most part these men be- lieved the sooner the United States engaged in open hostili- ties with France, the better. Lodge, Alexander Hamilton, p. 199. John Adams had submitted to his Cabinet a series of fourteen questions as to what policy the United States should pursue with France. "To the Heads of Departments," April 14, 1797, The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States with a Life of the Author, ed. Charles Francis Adams (Boston, 1853f, VIII, 540-541. The members of his Cabinet carried over from the days of Washington, turned them over to Hamilton for his opinion. This happened time and time again throughout Adams' administration. It was not until the closing days of his term of office that the President was aware of this "backstairs diplomacy." Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, pp. 362-363. 40 Letter to James McHenry, March 22, 1797, The Works of 247 Hamilton's preference for Jefferson or Madison as one of the commissioners was not, of course, because he saw eye to eye with either of the Republican statesmen on the political issues of the day. He believed the mission should contain a leading Republican who would have the reSpect of France, as 41 well as the Republican Party in the United States. This, Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 241. Refer also to Letter to washington, January 22, 1797, Ibid., X, 234, and Letter to Theodore Sedgwick, February 26, I797, Ibid., X, 239-240. Jefferson is not mentioned for the mission in the letters to Washington and Sedgwick. Hamilton believed Jeffer- son or Madison could not be trusted alone. Therefore, he con— ceived the idea of a commission. Letter to Timothy bickering, May 11, 1797, Ibid., X, 262. Refer also to Letter to Sedgwick, February 26, 1797, Ibid., X, 239-240. Hamilton favored naming three commissioners for two reasons. The first was that just two commissioners might disagree. The second, because rinck- ney was considered to have too much "French leaning” to make him perfectly safe. He was considered a "middle character." Letter to Timothy Pickering, May 11, 1797, Ibid., X, 262. Refer also to Letter to Pickering, March 29, I797, Ibid., X, 247. He even believed Jefferson, Pinckney and Rufus hing might agree together in a crisis. Letter to Pickering, May 11, 1797, Ibid., X, 263. Hamilton was sure Jefferson was for peace. His only fear was "he would give too much for it." Ibid., X, 263. Nevertheless, Hamilton was thinking too, along the lines of a joint commission with Jefferson as "am— bassador extraordinary for representation" as a good idea. If there were too many objections perhaps this title could go to Pinckney. Regardless, there should be a commission of some sort. Ibid., X, 263. He believed George Cabot would be a check on too much "Gallicism." Other assets were his knowledge of commercial affairs and that he enjoyed the "confidence of all the friends of the Administration." Letter to Washington, January 22, 1797, Ibid., X, 234. If Cabot would not go, then the other two could act without him, although Hamilton pre- ferred that there be three commissioners. Ibid., X, 234. hlLetters to Pickering, March 29, 1797 and May 11, 1797, Ibid., X, 247 and 262. Hamilton did not see how either, if asked, could refuse to go on such a mission without a good reason. If there was to be a commission he believed it would not be a good reason for refusal. Politics were involved too. Hamilton said if there should be a refusal it would furnish a “m \gl“ 248 . . . . . , 2 too, was a sore spot Wlth most of his political friends.h After the refusal of the French government to receive C. C. Pinckney, as the new United States minister,LP3 Hamilton was more than ever convinced that an extraordinary mission was a necessary extremity to iron out our differences with that 44 country. In spite of the Directory's announced decision not reply to "Jacobin clamor." The Administration could say "It was offered your leaders, and they would not act." Ibid., X, 262. 42 Hamilton tried to win over Uolcott from his opposition to Madison as one of the commissioners. He told him that if Madison advocated "dishonorable concessions" to France, pub- lic opinion would not support him. Besides his colleagues could prevent him from adopting such an attitude before he could upset public confidence in himself. Letter to Folcott, April 5, 1797, Ibid., X, 252-253. ABPinckney was even ordered to leave the country by the French government. A. S. P.; F. R., I, 40. thetter to Wolcott, April 5, 1797, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 251. Letter to Pickering, May ll, I797, IBid., X, 261. The French had scored new victories in Europe. Hamilton mentioned again his opposition to a rupture with France or an alliance with Great Britain. Letter to Wol- cott, April 5, 1797, Ibid., X, 251-252. Adams, upon hearing the news of Pinckney's rejection, proclaimed at once a day of fasting and prayer, in addition to calling the Congress into an extra session. Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, p. 331. It is evident that Pickering received this idea from Hamilton and passed it on to Adams. Hamilton suggested the following steps to the Secretary of State. "First. - I would appoint a day of humiliation and prayer. In such a crisis this appears to me proper in itself, and it will be politically useful to impress our nation that there is a serious state of things - to strengthen religious ideas in a contest, which in its progress may require that our people may consider themselves as the defenders of their country against atheism, conquest, and anarchy....Second. - I would call Congress together at as short a da as a majority of both houses can assemble." Letter to Pickering, March 22, 1797, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 244. In addition Hamilton proposed a special mission and certain defensive measures, including an embargo. Ibid., X, 244-245. 249 to receive a minister until their grievances had been re- dressed, Hamilton believed this to mean only that they would not receive a resident minister.h5 Even if the Directory would not hear the Commission, Hamilton was still for the mission}+6 He felt the advantages were threefold. First, it would show to all Americans the unreasonableness of the French. Secondly it would answer the Republican Party's statement that not all had been done that could be done to settle our grievances with France. Thirdly, it would refute the charge that the Federalist Administration wanted war with France}+7 The only alternative to a special mission was war, and this Hamilton wished toaavoid if at all possible, such a step to be taken only as a last resort. Meanwhile he 8 urged the country to take measures for its self-defense}+ In spite of extreme Federalists like William Smith A5Letter to ucHenry, March 22,1797, Ibid., X, 242— 243. Letter to Wolcott, March 30,1797, Ibid., X, 248- 249. uéLetter to Pickering, March 29, 1797, Ibid., X, 246. A7Letter to McHenry, March 22, 1797, Ibid., X, 243. “8Letter to rickering, March 22,1797, Ibid., X, 245. Letter to Wolcott, April 5, 1797, Ibid., X, 252. Letter to Pickering, May 11,1797, Ibid.,X 263 -265. In addition to the embargo mentioned previously (see3 page 248 of text) particulars were: 1. hdditional revenue for additional ex- penses. 2. Creation of a naval force. 3. Commissions granted to merdhant vessels to arm themselves and granting authoriza- tion to capture vessels when attacked. 4. Organization of a provisional army of twenty- -five thousand men, ready to serve in case of war. Letter to Pickering, March 22,1797, Ibid., 245 o 7' 250 49 and Uriah Tracy being opposed to an extraordinary mission, eventually most of the Federalists came around to Hamilton's way of thinking. John Adams, like Hamilton, had no desire for war with France and was willing to do what he could to avoid such a catastrOphe.50 Unknowingly adopting a broad outline of Hamilton's ideas, the President appinted a commission consist- ing of three men; Elbridge Gerry, a moderate Federalist with Republican principles, the previously rejected C. C. Pinck- ney, and John Marshall, a Virginia lawyer and, later, Chief 51 Justice of the United States Supreme Court. The latter hglf by pressure of Southern representatives Congress should decide that the government had injured France, Tracy said he would favor a separation of North and South. He feared that importation of foreigners and home manufactures might cause the South to swallow up the North. If there should ever come a choice between being a colony of France or a colony of Great Britain, he would prefer the latter. April 6, 1797, Hamilton Manuscripts, Library of Congress. Cited in Schachner, Alexander’Hamilton, pp. 362-363. Hamilton was acutely aware of’the difference in views between himself and Smith. This is evident in the following statement in a letter to Smith. "It is unpleasant to me to know that I have for some time differed materially from many of my friends on public sub- jects....We seem now to feel and reason as the Jacobins did when Great Britain insulted and injured us, though certainly we have at least as much need of a temperate conduct now as we had then. I only say, God grant that the public in- terest may not be sacrificed at the shrine of irritation and mistaken pride." Letter to hilliam Smith, April ID, 1797, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 256. Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 364. Hamilton told Wolcott: "I like very well the course of Executive conduct in regard to the controversy with France." Letter to Wolcott, June66, 1797, The Works of filexandor Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 2 8. ' 51 Jefferson and Madison were asked, but both refused. 251 two appointees were staunch Federalists. Even the instructions given the envoys were very similar to those suggested by Hamilton to Washington and Sedgwick.52 Sedgwick must surely have passed them on to fickering, thence to Adams. At first Hamilton favored stiff instructions to the en- voys, as had been the case originally in the proposed mission to Great Britain: The commission shall be charged to make explana- tions, to remonstrate, to ask indemnification, and they should be empowered to make a new treaty of commerce, not inconsistent with our other trea- ties; and perhaps to abrogate or remodify the treaty of alliance. That treaty can only be in- convenient to us in the future. The guarantee of our sovereignty and independence henceforce is nominal. The guaranty of the West India Islands of France, as we advance in strength, will be more and more real. In future, and in a truly defensive war, I think we shall be bound to com- ply efficaciously with our guaranty. Nor have I beeneable to see that it means less than obliga- Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 595. The wisdom of the appointment of two Federalists from the South where the party was weak, and a ”Nothern Democrat (Republican3," especially a man of "slender abilities” like Gerry, instead of Madison, has been questioned by a prominent biographer. Lodge, Alexander Hamilton, p. 200. (Schachner does not consider Gerry a Repub- lican. Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 621.) Lodge claims Adams was carried away by the suspicion that the Hamiltonian faction in New England was trying to force the appointments from that area. Lodge, Alexander Hamilton, p. 200. Schachner gives a different reason for these particular appointments. He said Adams wanted no partisan uproar such as had greeted the Jay Mission to Great Britain. Therefore, he sought to balance his appointments. Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 595. 52A. S. P.; F. R., I, 153-157. Letter to bashington, January 22,Il797, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 235. Letter to Sedgwick, February 26, 1797, Ibid., X, ZAO. 252 tion tO'take part in such a war with our whole force. I have no idea of treaties which are not executed. Hence, I want to get rid of that treaty by mu- tual consent, or liquidate its meaning to a treaty of definite succor, in a clearly defen- sive war; so many men, so many ships, so much money,-and to be furnished by one ally to the other. This of course, must be so managed as to exclude unequivocably the present war in all its possible mutations. The ideg of a definite du- ration would also be useful. 3 Later, however, as in the previous mission, he believed the instructions should be of such a nature as not to dis- grace our country, but at the same time more amiable to France. "...we ought to risk everything before we submit to any dis- honorable terms. But we may remould our treaties. he may agree to put France on the same footing as Great Britain by our treaty with them. We may also liquidate, with a view to future wars, the import of the mutual guaranty in the treaty of alliance, substituting specific succors, and de- fining the casus foederis [pass of alliancei] But this last may not be done, though with me it is a favorite ob- jeCt 0" With controversy ringing in their ears over the proposed mission, the envoys set forth on a journey that was to bring 53Letter to Sedgwick, February 26, 1797, The WOrks of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 2h0. The same ideas were suggested to Washington earlier. Letter to Washington, January 22, 1797, Ibid., X, 235. Hamilton expressed at an even earlier date that the treaty of 1778 be modified or abolished, if possible. Letter to Wolcott, November 22, 1796, Ibid., X, 212-213. 54Letter to Wolcott, April 5, 1797, Ibid., x, 252. 253 Franco-American relations eventually to a breaking point, with an undeclared naval war lasting nearly three years. While Hamilton was using his powerful pen to attack France in his public essays, Thomas Jefferson expressed great concern over the present state of Franco-American relations. To Madi- son he expressed the belief that war with France, and a con- sequent alliance with Great Britain, had been the object of the Administration for some time. He hoped war could still “be avoided. "I do not believe mr. A. wishes war with France; nor do I believe he will truckle to England as servilely as has been done. If he assumes the front at once and shews that he means to attend to:self-respect & national dignity with both nations, perhaps the depredations of both on<>ur commerce may be amicably arrested. I think we should begin first with those who first begin with us, and by an example on them, acquire a right to re-demand the respect from which the other party has departed."56 Jefferson expressed doubts, a short time later, as to 55Letter to Madison, January 22, 1797, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 108-109. 561hid., VII, 109. Adams wrote of Jefferson, after his election to the Vice- ~Fresidency in 1796, "I may say to you that his Fatronage of Iaine & Freneau, & his entanglements with Characters & Politicks which have been pernicious, are & long have been a Source of Inquietude & anxiety to me, as they have been to you. But I hope & believe that his advancement & his Situation in the Senate, an excellent school will correct him. He will have too many French friends about him: but I hope we can keep him steady...." Letter to Tristam Dalton, January 19, 1797, Ibid., VII, lO8n. 254 Adams' position with regard to France. The President's opening message to Congress he believed to be of a warlike nature, per- haps enough so to cause a drift in the direction of war among its members.57 The thing that Jefferson feared most, an embargo on France, did not appear in the message. Virginia tobacco exporters, of which Jefferson was one, would have been hard hit by such an act.58 A week later, however, there was talk of such an em- bargo. Jefferson became deeply concerned over this state of affairs}:9 He was greatly relieved when the news of the failure of 57Letter to French Strother, June 8,1797, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 138-139. Letter to Pereguine Fitz- hugh, June h,‘I797, Ibid.,VII, 136. Letter to Edward Rutledge, June 24, 1797, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, IX, #08. ILetter to R. H. Randolph, nayIl9, I797, Jeffer- son Papers, Library of Congress, CI, 17384. Cited in Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 593. Actually Adams' message was not What Jefferson thought it to be. His message was delivered to a special session of Congress called after the rejection of Pinckney by France. He merely pointed out the seriousness of our relations with that country; that the French government had refused to accept Pinckney as the new American Minister; that fresh decrees were reponsible for new attacks upon our com- merce; and that we should adopt a permanent system of naval defense. May 16,1797, A Com ilation of the Messa es and Papers of the Presidents, ITBS-I897, ed. James BanieI Richard- son (Washington, 1896- 1899), II, 233- 239. Hereafter referred to as The Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Richardson. A. So P.; F. R., I, [kg-RI. 58Letter to R. M. Randolph, May 19, 1797, Jefferson Pa ers, Library of Congress, CI, l738h. Cited in Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 593. 59He had withheld his tobacco from the market in anticipa- tion of a rise in price. An embargo would stop foreign sale of the product and the price would drop greatly. Ibid., II, 593-59h0 255 the bank of England calmed down considerably the talk of war. Speeches advocating the arming of American ships for defense against French aggression were heard less frequently. 0 The threat of bankruptcy was enough to make any Federalist think twide before embarking upon a major war. Nevertheless, in a pessimistic vein, Jefferson stated his belief that the bank situation was the only thing that prevented the Federalists from drawing the United States into a war with Great Britain against France. vJefferson was particularly worried over the cessicn of Louisiana to France by Spain. He felt this could be danger- 60Letter to Madison, May 18, 1797, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 124-127. The news of the fail- ure of the Bank of England however, was erroneous. 61Letter to Gerry, May 13, 1797, Ibid., VII, 122. Jefferson was greatly concerned over the dominant intrench- , ment of the British in American life through their commerce. He claimed British merchants occupied strategic positions in this country. The British dominated American banks. Goods were hauled in British ships. Because of the lack of domes- tic industries we had to go to Great Britain for many of our manufactured products. The British were advocating through their paid press in this country a cessation between North and South. To avoid this, Jefferson was willing to go to war, but he hoped there could be some may to keep out of the European quarrels. Ibid., VII, 122-123. This is not un- like the policy advocated by Washington and Hamilton in the Farewell Address. See pages 236-237. Hamilton and Jeffer- son took the same view of the situation. However, it was on the remedy that they differed. Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, pp. 326-327. Jefferson wrote, at the end of the short session of Congress, that the United States ought to divorce itself from Europe in everything but commerce. He did’ acknowledge this would take "time, wisdom and occasional sacrifice of interest." Letter to Rutledge, June 2A, 1797, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, IX, A08. 256 62 ous to the United States in case of war. On the merit of the United States going to war he had the fbllowing to say: "War is not the best engine for us to resort to, nature has given us one in our commerce, which, if properly managed, will be a better instrument for obliging the interested na- tions of Europe to treat us ydth justice. If the commercial regulations had been adopted which our legislature were at one time proposing 6 iagainst Great Britain) we should at this time have been standing on such an emience of safety 6b and respect as ages can never recover." It is apparent that in looking back to his old idea of an embargo against Great Britain, Jefferson forgot his aversion to an embargo against France, the present chief despoiler of American commerce.65 News from France was slight in the spring of 1797. Therefore, Jefferson waited anxiously for the return from abroad of Thomas Paine and James Monroe for a true account of affairs in Paris.66 62Letter to Thomas Pinckney, May 29, 1797, The Writings of Thomas Jefferggg, Ford, VII, 129. Letter to Aaron Burr, June I7, I797, Ibi ., VII, 1A7. Actually Louisiana was not ceded until 180 . See page 29h. 63See pages 18A-l85. 61‘'Letter to Thomas Pinckney, May 29, 1797, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 129. 65Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 59h-595. 66Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, p. 331. 257 It was no secret, however, that the British and French were still violating American neutral rights on the high seas. Because of low British fortunes Jefferson thought there might be a chance their attacks would cease. However, with the French he saw no chance except the realization on their part that they would starve themselves by causing us to lay an embargo on all goods destined for their country.67 During the middle of June news of Napoleon's victories and the signing of peace between Austria and France reached the United States. Jefferson said this was the only thing that could have abated the wrath of the British faction. He believed the French victories on the Rhine and in Italy, peace with Austria, the bankruptcy of Great Britain, the mutiny of the British fleet and the letters of King George recommending peace, nothing short of a miracle.69 With these events in mind, Jefferson declared the idea of war with France preposterous. He was sure the Adminis- tration had been for war when Congress had been called to- gether. He believed the purpose of such an act was to see if the nation was of the same spirit. Adams had promised efforts at negotiation, but if this 67Letter to John MOody, June 13, 1797, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, lAl-IAZ. 68Letter to Madison, June 15, 1797, Ibid., VII, 112-144. 691bid., VII, 113. 70Letter to Aaron Burr, June 17, 1797, Ibid., VII, lh6. 258 alone had been meant Jefferson believed he could have sent the mission sooner and without calling Congress into session.71 If strong negotiations had been the intent, he believed Adams could have also selected as the third envoy someone who would have been sincerely and firmly attached to the alliance of 1778 with France.72 As it was, war had narrowly been averted. The French Di— rectory had proposed a declaration of war, but the Council of 73 Ancients had rejected it. Disgust was evident upon receiv- ing this news. "Thus we see two nations who love one another affectionately, brought by the ill temper of their executive administrations, to the very brink of a necessity to imbue their hand in the blood of each other."7h Jefferson's disgust turned to infinite joy four days later when he heard of the appointment of Gerry as an envoy to France.75 He immediately sat down and wrote the New Eng- 71Ibid., VII, 1A6. At first Jefferson was suspicious of the mission as a project for peace. Schachner, Thomas Jeffer- son, II, 595. After hearing of Finckney's rejection he was Thalined to believe a war would follow. Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, p. 325. 72Letter to Burr, June 17, 1797, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 1&6. Jefferson had heard that Francis Dana, aIFederalist, had been picked for the mission, in addi- tion to Marshall and Pinckney. Letter to Madison, June 1,1797, Ibid., VII, 132. Jefferson had no objection to the appointment of Pinckney and hoped this time he would be well received. Letter to Thomas Pinckney, May 29, 1797, Ibid., VII, 129-130. 73Letter to Burr, June 17, 1797, Ibid., VII, 1A8-1h9. 7“Ibid., VII, 149. 75Dana had refused the appointment because of reasons of health. The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United §pates with a Life of the Author, C. F. Adams,‘I, 511. 259 lander a long and serious letter asking that he accept the appointment for the sake of his country. In addition to this appeal to Gerry, the main theme of the letter was that the first objective of the mission should be the preservation of peace between the United States and France. In spite of his previous declarations to the contrary, Jefferson was willing to see the United States sacrifice its national honor by accepting a few more months of violations upon our neutral rights, as it had been doing since 1793, in order to achieve this objective. Peace is undoubtedly at present the first object of our nation. Interest & honor are also national considerations. But interest, duly weighed, is in favor of peace even at the expense of spoilations past & future; & honor cannot now be an object. The insults & injuries committed on us by both the belligerent parties, from the beginning of 1793 to this day, & still continuing cannot now be wiped off by engaging in war with one of them. As there is no great reason to expect this is the last cam- paign in Europe, it would certainly be better for us to rub thro this year, as we have done through the four preceding ones, and hope that on the res- toration of peace, we may be able to establish some plan for our foreign conneCtions more likely to secure our peace, interest & honor, in future. Our countrymen have divided themselves by such strong affections, to the French & the English, that nothing will secure us internally but a di- vorce from both nations; and this must be the ob- ject of every real American, and its attainment is practicable without much self-denial. But for this, peace is necessary. Be assured of this, my dear Sir, that if we engage in a war during our present passions, & our present weakness in some quarters, that our Union runs the greatest risk of not coming out of that war in the shape in which it enters it. My reliance for our preser- vation is in your acceptance of this mission. I know the tender circumstances which will oppose themselves to it. But its duration will be short, 260 and its reward long. You have it in your power, by accepting and determining the character of the mission, to secure the present peace & eter- nal union of your country. If you decline, on motives of private pain, a substitute may be named who has enlisted his passions in the pre- sent contest, & by the preponderance of his vote in the mission may entail on us calamities, your share in Which, & your feelings, will outweigh whatever pain a temporary absence from your fami- ly could give you. The sacrifice will be short, the remorse would be never ending. Let me then, my dear Sir, conjure your acceptance, & that you will by this act seal the mission with the con- fidence of all parties. Your nomination has 76 given a spring to hope, which was dead befbre. When one considers the weakness of the United States at this time in comparison with France, Jeffersonfs words have a sound of sensibility, rather than cowardice. Jefferson was not happy with the way bills were pushed rapidly through both Houses of Congress. All of them, in- cluding pending bills for fortifications along the coast and for manning three frigates he thought warlike measures.77 It must have been a great relief to Jefferson when Congress adjourned that instead of declaring war with France that a mission had been chosen to try and settle differences with 76Letter to Gerry, June 21, 1797, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 1h9-150. Jefferson was afraid, even after this letter was sent, that Gerry would not accept the appointment. Letter to Edmund Randolph, June 27, 1797, Ibid., VII, 156. The question might be asked, why did Jefferson not accept the appointment himself if he was certain the fortunes of the United States were in such jeopardy? Perhaps he thought his position as leader of the Republican Party (in his mi’d probably more important than the office of Vice-President de- manded his attention at home. Channing suggests that maybe his duties as Vice-President were a factor in his decision. Edward Channing, A History of the United States (New York, 1917), IV, 181. 77Letter to Madison, June 15, 1797, The sflritings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 143. 261 our ally. The next few months were quiet ones as far as Franco- American relations were concerned. Both Congress and the Ad- ministration bided their time in waiting for news from the envoys before taking further steps that might bringeabout war. After the mission was set Hamilton made no mentionable refer- ence to France the remainder of the year, and Jefferson but brief remarks. Jefferson had come to the conclusion that the only safe course for this country in foreign affairs was to sever its last bonds with Europe and to handle our foreign connections in a new and different manner.78 In the future an independent course should be pursued, for "we owe gratitude to France, justice to England, subservience to none."79 He believed all of our troubles with France stemmed from her death struggle with Great Britain. Once France won the war, disregard for American neutral rights would cease.80 As the weeks passed Jefferson became more hopeful that things would turn out for the best. "This long silence (if they have been silent) proves things are not going on very 78Letter to Edward Rutledge, June 2A, 1797, Ibid., VII, 15h. ’ 79Letter to Edward Rutledge, January 3, 1798, The Writ- ings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, IX, 43 . 80Letter to T. M. Randolph, January 11, 1798, Jefferson Pa ers, Library of Congress, CII, 1755A. Cited in Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 599. 262 roughly. If they have not been silent, it proves their in- formation, if made public,would check the disposition to arm.81 This comment seems to show that Jefferson, although holding a high position in the Administration, was not in- formed of what was going on. It shows too, the belief of the Republicans that Adams was for war; and that the news of a settlement would be withheld deliberately from the American people.82 Jefferson had eXpected there would be some news from the envoys by the end of January, 1798.83 However, that month passed, and February too, without the packet boats bringing any information regarding their negotiations with French 84 officials. What Jefferson feared most during these months 81Letter to Madison, February 15, 1798, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 201. 82Letter to Madison, January 25, 1798, Ibid., VII, 191. Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 599. Jefferson's opinion re- garding Adams' position toward France had changed considerably from the previous year. At the close of the year 1797, Fan- chet, the departing former French minster to the United States, wrote a pamphlet accusing Adams of being an enemy of France. Jefferson privately agreed with him. Letter to John Taylor, December 23, 1797, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 181-182. Letter to James Monroe, December 27, 1797, Ibid., VII, 183. The Republican press exclaimed, "People begin to see their madness in preferring John Adams and a French war to Thomas Jefferson with a French peace." Phila- deIpEia Aurora, March 12, 1798:' Quoted in Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 600. 83Letter to John Taylor, December 23, 1797, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 181. 8"Letter to Madison, February 8, 1798, Ibid., VII, 196. Letter to Monroe, February 8, 1798, Ibid., VIIj-l99. Letter 263 was not so much a war with France, but a refusal on her part to come to terms and continued depredations on our commerce, like those of the British. The perfect solution, he thought, was for France to invade and republicanize Great Britain; then "all will be safe with us, whatever mortifying things we may suffer in the meantime."85 Jefferson believed all along through the month of Feb- ruary and into March that no news from the envoys was good news; either they had not written pending final settlement of negotiations or they had written and Adams was with- holding the news lest he would have to call a halt to his to Madison, February 15, 1798, Ibid., VII, 201. Letter to Horatio Gates, February 21, 1798, Ibid., VII 20A. Letter to Madison,February 22, 1798, Ibid—‘., VII, 20%). Letter to Peregrine Fitzhugh, February 23, I798, Ibid., VII, 209-210. Letter to Madison, March 2, 1798, Ibid., VII, 213. Jeffer- son said that Talleyrand had informed LeTombe, the French Consul, that the envoys would be well received. Letter to John Taylor, December 23, 1797, Ibid., VII, 181. Letter to John Page, January 1, 1798, Ibid., VII, 186. Jefferson in- formed Madison on January 3, that the envoys had arrived in France. Letter to Madison, January 3, 1798, Ibid., VII, 191. Through an unnamed individual in the United States who had received a letter from Talleyrand, Jefferson learned that it was Talleyrand's opinion that although an agreement might not take place, France would not declare war. Letter to Madison, January 25, 1798, Ibid., VII, 192. 8:5Letter to T. M. Randolph, January 11, 1798, Jeffer- son Papers, Library of Congress, CII, l755h. Quoted in Schachfier, Thomas Jefferson, II, 599. Refer alto to Letter to Fitzhugh, February 23, I798, The Writings of Thomas Jeffer- son Ford, VII, 210-211. Jefferson thought that if Great Britain were only republicanized by France it would be a good thing, but the complete "subjugation" of that country would be a "general calamity." Ibid., VII, 211. 264 preparations for war. His optimism came to an abrupt halt upon receiving the news that the French had issued a new decree (January 8, 1798), announcing that neutral ships carrying enemy goods would be subject to confiscation. 7 This was certainly as bad as any of the previous British Oruers in Council. Ameri- can merchants were thunderstruck by the decree.88 Even Jefferson was greatly distressed. He believed the decree would probably drive American vessels out of the British trade in favor of British ships.89 If the merchants were up in arms over the decree, Con- O gress was furious.9 Adams sent what Jefferson termed an 86Letter to Madison, February 15, 1798, Ibid., VII, 201. Letter to Gates, February 21, 17T8, Ibid., VII, 20h. Letter to Madison, Febrary 22, 1798, Ibid., VII, 206. Letter to Fitzhugh, February 23, 1798, Ibid., VII,209. Letter to Madi- son, March 2, 1798, Ibid., VII, 213. 87Letter to Monroe, March 8, 1798, Ibid., VII, 21A. The date of the decree in the A. S. P.; F. R, is given as January 8, 1798. A. S. P.; F. R., II,*151. However, Schachner, gives the date of issuance as January 18, 1798. Nathan Schachner, The Founding Fathers (New York, 1954), p. #37. 88Letter to Monroe, March 8, 1798, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 21h. Letter to Madison, March 13, 1798, Ibid., VII, 216-217. 89Letter to Monroe, March 8, 1798, Ibid., VII, 21A. Jefferson had expressed a fear only two weeEs earlier that in the future neither Great Lritain nor France would desire that the United States become a comrercial power, and would do all they could to drive us from the oceans. Letter to Gates, February 21, 1798, Ibid., VII, 205. 90Letter to Madison, March 15, 1798, and March 21, 1798, Ibid., VII, 217 and 219. Letter to Monroe, March 21, 1798, Ibid., VII, 221. 265 insane communication to Congress labeling the consequences of the decree and withdrawing his previous opposition to the 01 arming of private vessels./ The Federalists in both Houses of Congress sought to pass measures for theaarming of ships and for troops and munitions.92 Hoping the Republican majority in the House would halt a drive towards war, although he believed Adams' meSsage had brought the possibility to the danger point, Jefferson pro- posed a method of procedure; first,call for all the documents in the case, second, pass a Congressional prohibition to arm vessels, third, adjourn and consult the American people on the current crisis.93 Although the Republicans were unable to muster enough strength for adjournment, they were able to bring forth a resolution in a committee on the State of the Union stating 9h it unwise to declare war against the French Republic. 91Letter to Madison, March 21, 1793, Ibid., VII, 219. Letter to Monroe, March 21, 1798, Ibid., VII, 221. Adams told Congress on march 19, that while the envoys had made every possible effort he could "perceive no ground of expectation that the objects of their mission can be accomplished on terms compatible with the safety, the honour, or the essential in- terests of the nation." A. S. P.; F. R., II, 152. 92 Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 601. 93Letter to James Madison, March 21, l 98, The writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 219-220. Letter to Monroe, March 21, 1798, Ibid., VII, 221-222. Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 601. Letter to T. M. Randolph, March 22, 1798 Milliam and Mary College Quarterly, Ser. 2 (Williamsburg, 1926; VI, 335-336. 9"*Letter to Madison, March 29, 1798, The lritings of 266 This resolution was bitterly attacked by the Federalists and Jefferson was worried about the outcome. "...The ques- tion of war & peace depends now on a toss of crOss & pile. If we could but gain this season, we should be saved. The affairs of Europe would of themselves relieve us."95 (Mean- ing by this time France would have won the war.)96 A delay, too, would give time for popular remonstrances against war which were already occuring in some Massachusetts town 97 meetings. As if relations were not already strained enough between France and the United States they suddenly became much worse when Adams, yielding to the demands of Congress, revealed the 6 contents of due envoys' dispatches to that body on April 3.”8 Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 22h. This was known as the Sprigg resolution. Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, p. 337. Two other re- solutions were introducedby Richard T. Sprigg of Maryland. They declared that a restriction ought to be placed on the arming of merchant vessels and urged that the coast be put in a state of defense. John Bach McMaster, A History of the People of the United States:From the Revolution to the Civil .EEE (New York, 1853}, II, 375. 95Letter to Madison, March 29, 1798, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 22h-225. 96 Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 601. 97Letter to Edmund Pendleton, April 2, 1798, The Writings of Thomas-Jefferson, Ford, VII, 228-229. 98A. S. P.; F. R., II, 153. Hamilton, seeing advantages for the FederaIISt Party, if the contents of the dispatches were revealed to the public eye, was instrumental in master- minding this move. The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States with a Life of the Author, C. F. Adams, I, 518. See also Letter to Pickering, March 23, 1798, Th2 Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 279. 267 Hitherto Adams had pronounced to Congress that the mission was a failure, but did not elaborate on the details.99 The dispatches reveal the following sordid story. When the envoys reached France on October 5, 1797, they had found an impossible situation. The men who held power changed often and the attitude they held toward nations was governed less by a sense of equity and justice than by the latest tidings of the armies of the Republic. France was, at the moment, filled with an air of extraordinary national intoxication. Napoleon Bonaparte was about to astonish EurOpe with his deeds and already was beginning to impress the leaders of the Republic. He had played an important part in a coup d' etat in September, 1797, whereby the anti- revolutionary members of the legislature and executive de- 101 partments had been exiled. His successful Italian cam- 99A. S. P.; F. R., II, 153. The Messages and the Papers of the Presidents, Richardson, I, 26A-265. Adams received the packet on March A and informed Congress on_March 5. Schachner, The Foundinngathers, p. ##7. The Messages and the Papers of the Presidents, Richardson, I, 263-2o4. A. S. P.; F. R., II, 150. He announced only that the dis- patch ofJanuary 8 gave no hope that the envoys would be received. At the same time it was made known that a new French decree ordered the capture of all neutral ships bound with goods for Great Britain or her colonies. A. S. P.; F. R., II, 150-151. Schachner, The Founding Fathers, pp. hh7-AA8. This decree was not approvedlby the renc government until January 8, 1798. A. S. P.; F. R., II, 182. See page 26h. looChanning, A History of the United States, IV, 185. McMaster, A History of'the People of the United States: from the Revolution to the Civil Mar II, 368 gives the date as October A, 1798. 101See page 296n. 268 paign had more firly convinced the new leaders of his value to themselves and the French Republic. His successes opened the opportunity for men to enrich themselves through army contracts, besides placing the Directory in a position to dictate their own terms to weaker nations, of which the United States was one. Protection from the ravages of the 102 French navy could rot be had without paying a price. C. R. Fish in American Diplomacy has described this situa- tion as "unparalled since the last century of the Roman republic. Triumphant France was surrounded by nations buy- ing peace; the dazzling private expenditure which betokened the coming empire tempted officials to demand private dou- ceurs [bribes] for the favor of their nod. The world seemed melting into new shapes at the whim of those who from moment to moment dominated Paris. _America was a minor consideration; she was treated as were other powers. Even the asture Talley- rand, master of finesse, could see the need of no more subs tile weapon than the threat, to be parried by the bribe."103 102The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States with a Life of the Author, C. F. Adams, I, 512. Al- though the French navy had suffered reverses in October, 1797, the Treaty of Campo Formio (October 17, 1797), placed the Re- public in a better international position. Channing, A His- tory of the United States, IV, 183 and l83n. This treaty lS confildered Napoleon Bonaparte's first major diplomatic triumph. It secured for France a dream of long standing, possession of the left bank of the Rhine. A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution, Stewart, pp. 702-703. A complete text of the Treaty is contained in Ibid., pp. 793-709. 103Carl Russell Fish, American Diplomagy, American His- torical Series, Ath Edition (New York,l923), p. 132. 269 There was also with America the resentment of the French over the Jay Treaty with Great Britain. This was heightened by the seeming acquiescence of the United States to the most recent Orders in Council which di- rected the seizing of all American ships and their cargo bound for the continent of Europe. The British were especially harsh in their enforcement of the Jay Treaty in the West Indies. On the other hand, the British were paying for the confiscation of American ships and their provisions while Lord Grenville was doing his best to restrain the activities of the British West Indies Admiralty Courts.101+ As has been mentioned before, the French in return put pressure on the United States by issuing a decree authorizing the seizure of all American vessels and their cargo bound to or from British ports. The result was the wholesale seizure by the French of American ships sailing from the West Indies to the Mediterranean. Instead of convincing the United States of itshelplessness this harsh French policy only manifested a.desire on the part of the United States to try to reach a settlement with France like that of the Jay Treaty with Great Britain.105 Up to this time most Frenchmen, either in or out of office, did not truly believe the American people approved of the Neu- trality Proclamation issued by their government in 1793. The 2L0L’Channing, A History of the United States, IV, 183- 105Ibid., IV, 184. 270 The feeling was, why should America not be freed from the tyranny of its rulers as had some European states?106 Talleyrand refused to receive the American envoys until certain passages of Adams' May 16, 1797 speech to Congress were recalled.107 Nevertheless, the Foreign Minister did not hesitate to introduce to the envoys three individuals whose names were concealed under the letters I l and 2.108 These men explained that prior to any preliminary negotia- tions the United States must buy from France at par, certain Dutch bond worth about fifty cents on the dollar.109 The United States and Holland thus would ally to enrich the treasury vaults of France. It was hinted that a bribe of a million francs might satisfy the right parties. This was a well known expedient of exacting tribute and should have 06Examples were Holland and Hamburg. Ibid., IV, 18h. 107A. s. P.; F. R., II, 158. Adams, in critizing the con- duct of France, stated in part that while Pinckney, our Minis- ter resided in Paris, "cards of hospitality were refused him, and he was threatened with being subjected to the jurisdiction of the Minister of Police." The rejection of Pinckney he said, was "the denial of a right," but the "refusal to receive him until we have acceded to their demands without discussion and without investigation is to treat us neither as allies, nor as friends, nor as a sovereign state." Special Session Message of Adams to the Congress of the United States, May 16, 1797, The Messages and the Papers of the Presidents, Richardson, I, 235. 108; was a Mr. Hottinguer; Y a Mr. Bellamy; g a Mr. nauteval. McMaster, A History of the People of the United States: From the Revolution to the Civil War, II, E05n. 109Beckles Willson, America's Ambassodors to France (1777- 1927): A Narrative of Franco-AmefiCan Diplomatic Relations (New York, 1928), p. 8l. A. S. P.; F. R., II, 159. ern. r: '~ .. '. 1;? ;—:.,‘. 17".; .3 g ‘ 5'3 ‘1 ,1: ,abn . - - .— °. . 3- "- "o .' C . _'---! ‘4 . Hz" J _.- - a . ' ' '7( , $11."? 7‘: L‘lfifibr‘. I . .. . "1’ .w " :7.“ i. . 1"TOH ."II‘. am sits; at: q" ...t. . a".‘ w? :‘ as! Gill, o ' . O _0 I . d O i 0 'U u ’ d . ‘ I o o . p ' O o C ,0 O . C t . O ( O . a f - . .I .. A ‘ . C 0 I . . ‘ - ’ ‘. ‘ ‘ . V U A r- . D '. . . I . ... f 0| I . , J .' o o o . o '_ : 9P . ' ‘ . f f 3 - o n l o .J ‘ 1 o .' . ' o- n . 0 v . , ' J. ~ I . - ' n J ‘9 4 L — bf ' 1 ) ta.Li 1‘. - ;'° 4 £9 v' ’ 3 ' ' ‘ '. t" _ ‘l. 9". 8‘:351:§®bl PdTA-‘x‘ I .39? : L 3‘ ‘ 09th“ :- g 4 ‘- j???- I- :‘l - if; 0.1;!!31 JL'LOV 3.3,. - '7 ' .fiz": 5%,: A[1r\" [l‘u an. I at lng-wr ‘1": '10 9ths 22,-J 9 0% " _ t- J" .. .4;0:..‘=‘~_?m . 271 110 shocked no one, but it did the American envoys. Pinckney is said to have replied, "No, no, no! Not a Sixpence!" His earlier rejection, excessive delays, unwarranted demands for money and the unfriendly manner in which he and the other envoys wereireceived undoubtedly caused the violent outburst on Pinckney's part. He and Marshalllaroke off negotiations and left almost immediately for home. Gerry, at Talleyrand's request, remained for three months longer, leaving France in August, 1798.112 With the details of the special commission to France re- vealed both to Congress and the nation the alarming cry 110Ibid., p. 81. "This proposal was not likely to surprise a trained diplomat at that time, as now, if indeed anything in the Paris of 1798 could have surprised a trained diplomat. It was, in effect, a renewal in a different form of the loan pro— position of 1794 so warmly endorsed by Munroe. We had not hesi- tated to buy peace from the Barbary pirates, and there was really no need of being more scrupulous about corrupting Talleyrand's morals than theirs. Pitt (the Younger, Prime Minister of Great Britain), himself was this very time considering the purchase of peace on similar, but dearer terms." Fish, American Diplomacy, pp. 132-133. For details on Pitt's negotiations see Channing, A History of the United States, IV, 185-187. 111Fish, American Diplomacy, p. 133. A. S. P.; F. R., II, 161. 112Hillson, America's Ambassadors to France (1777-1927): A Narrative of Franco-American Diplomatic Relations, p. 81. Talleyrand told Gerry that ifihe did not remain,France would declare war at once. Channing, A History of the United States, IV, 188. Gerry refused to be "trapped into any concessions," with Talleyrand and left without coming to any agreement with the French government. Willson, America's Ambassadors to France (l777-1927): A Narrative of Franco-American Diplomatic Relations, p. 81. For a more detailed account of the X Y Z affair see McMaster, A History of the People of the United States: From the Revolution to the Civil War, II, 368937A and A03-AO8; also LS. P.; F. R., II, I53-1680 272 ."millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute" became 113 the prevailing sentiment. All commercial intercourse with 11h France was suspended. Mass meetings were organized to protest the actions of the French government. The navy was strengthened and outfitted for war. Merchantmen were armed and ordered to capture all French vessels on sight. Plans were made to create a large army.ll5 Sprigg's first resolu- tion against the expediency of war was discarded as not appropriate at this time.116 The Jeffersonian majority in Congress dwindled rapidly either by the Republicans leaving the capitol for home or by voting with the Federalists.117 Three billsvvere passed by Congress designed to curb dras- tically or destroy the activities of the French party in this country. (1) An Alien Act "giving the government power to deport or arrest all aliens in the United States," (2) a Sedition B111 "making attacks on the government, its officers and policies, criminal libels under Federal jurisdiction, sub- ject to prosecution in the Federal Courts," (3) a Naturalization Bill "increasing the term of residence required for citizenship 113Charming, A History of the United States, IV, 139- llI‘V-Jillson, America's Ambassadors to France (1777-1927): A Narrative of Franco-American Diplomaticlfielations, p. 82. llSSchachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 602. 116Letter to Madison, April 12, 1798, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 237. 117Channing, A History of the United States, IV, 189. 273 to fourteen years,"118 There was a riot in Philadelphia between young men of the French and British factions which became serious enough to call out the troops. President Adams was certain it was a plot to burn the city}19 Jefferson was more certain than ever that Adams was trying to draw the country into a war with France. Although he was stunned by the reports of the envoys, he did not put it beyond the Federalists and Adams to manufacture the whole X Y Z affair. Even if the story were true, he did not believe it justified a war, though he knew many Republicans would favor the War measures so vehemently pushed by the other party.120 The last resort left to the remaining Republicans was to avoid Open hostilities with the French Republic and to support all reasonable preparations of internal defense, but resist 118Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 602-603. Jefferson saw the Alien Bill aimed at such men as Albert Gallatin, the leader of the Republicans in Congress and Volney, the French Philosophe living in Philadelphia. The Sedition Bill he saw as an instrument to destroy the Republican press, especially Benjamin F. Bache's Aurora. Letter to Madison, April 12, 1798, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 2h5. . 119Letters to Madison, May 10 and May 17, 1798, The Writ- lflgs of lhomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 251—252 and 253. 120Letter to Madison, April 6, 1798, Ibid., VII 234-236. ’Letter to Peter Carr, April 12, 1798, Ibid., VII, 23o. Jeffer- son heard the news of the envoys' reports on April 3 but, be- cause he was undecided as to whether they could be brought before the general public, he refrained from discussing the matter with Madison until April 6. Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, P. 338. 27A 121 . all external measures. Jefferson did not believe the door to negotiations with France was absolutely closed.122 The Vice-President could not understand that Adams was being pro- voked into these war-like measures much against his own wishes, first by the logic of‘events taking place, and second, by the manipulations of his own Cabinet, which was taking its orders from Hamilton.123 Even before the news of the X Y Z Affair was known to either the Administratitn or the nation, Adams consulted his Cabinet on the policy to be pursued in the event of the fail- ure of the special mission to France. "Should a declaration ofxwar be recommended? Or an Embargo? Should any change be attempted, contingent upon that event, in the nature of the relations held with other European powers in general, and 12h most particularly with Great Britain?" 121Letter to Madison, April 12, 1798: The Eritings Of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 237. Letter to Peter Carr, April 12:“l798, Ibid., VII, 239. 122Letter to Carr, Ibid., VII, 238-239. Jefferson believed Adams' speech to Congress (March 19, 1798), to be the only obstacle. He suspected that the Directory was unaware of Talley— rand's demands for money. Ibid., VII, 238-239. This view is substantiated by Eugene Wilson Lyon, "The Directory and the United States," The American Historical Review, XLIII, 525. See also Letter from—Pidkering to‘Hamilton, April 9, 1798, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, VI, 280. 123Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 602. 12l'iJanuary 2A, 1798. The werks of John Adams, Second President of the United States with a Life oflthe Author, C. F. Adams, I, 51A. The complete message is contained in Ibid., VIII, 561-562. 275 After a conference among Pickering, Holcott, and McHenry the latter was instructed to write to Hamilton seeking his ad- vice on the questions.125 The Federalist statesman was most happy to oblige the Secretary of Jar. He thought it prudent not to go to war with France because of the widespread aversion to war on the part of the people of this country. It would be better to be in a state of mitigated hostility leaving open the possibility of resuming negotiations which he believed would place the United States in a strong defensive position. Meanwhile he would suspend our treaties with France, raise a standing army, arm our merchant vessels, create a strong navy, enlarge our revenues and float a loan. He advised, however, against an embargo or alliance with Great Britain. Reciprocal interests he felt would gain as much from her as a treaty. 12sBowers, Jefferson and Hamilton, p. 362. "I am sure I cannot do justice to the subject as you<3an. Let me, therefore, entreat you to favour me, as soon as possible with your ideas." January 26, 1798, Bernard 0. Steiner, The Life and Correspon- dence of James McHenry - Secretagy of har Under hashington and Adams‘TGleveland, 1907), p. 291. 126Letter from Hamilton to McHenry (no date given), Steiner, The Life and Correspondence of James McHenry — Secretary of War Under hashington and Adams, pp. 29l-295. This letter is not to be found in either the Looge or the J. C. Hamilton versions of The Works of Alexander Hamilton. Although there is no date on the—letter, it must‘have been written sometime between January 26, 1798, when McHenry wrote Hamilton, and February 15, 1798, when the Secretary of War gave his reply to the President. The Works of John Adams,_Second President of the United States flith a Life of the Author, C. F. Adams, VIII, 562n. Steiner, The Life and Correspondence of James Mchenry - Secretary of Tgr Under Mashington and Adams, p. 295. (A Letter from hamilton to McHenry dated February 13, 1798, speaks only of a reference to Hamilton's private debts. Ibid., p. 295.) 276 He said though that Rufus King, the American Minister in Lon- don, should work nut a plan of cooperation with Great Britain . . 1 , h 127 just in case there was a formal break with rrance. Over a month later Hamilton, on his own volition, wrote to Pickering with similar instructions as to the policy to be pursued with France. He informed the Secretary of State of his desire to see "a temperate, but grave, solemn, and firm communication" from the President to both Houses of Congress on the result of the advices from our envoys. He said this communication should include the following; To review summarily the course of our affairs with France from the beginning to the present moment; to advert to her conduct towards the neutral powers generally, dwelling emphatically on the last decree respecting vessels carrying British manufactures as an unequivocal act of hostility against all of them; to allude to the dangerous and vast projects of the French government; to consider her refusal to re- ceive our ministers as a virtual denial of our inde- pendence, and as evidence that, if circumstances favor the plan, we shall be called to defend that independence, our political institutions, and our liberty, against her enterprises; to conclude, that leaning still the door to accommodation open, and not proceeding to final rupture, our duty, our honor, and safety, require that we shall take vigorous and ccmprehensive measures of defense, adequate to the immediate protection of our com- merce, to the security of our ports, and to our eventual defense in case of invasion and with a view to these great objects, calling forth agd or- ganizing all the resources of the country.1 n; McHenry's suggestions to Adams were practically a Of Hamilton's instructions to the Secretary of Va Po 295. Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 374. direct copy r Ibid., m 127The Works of John Adamsj Second President of the United Otates with a Life of the Author, C. F. Adams, I, 516L517 and 5I7n. 128Letter to Picker-ing, IJIarCh 17, 1798, The ‘L'TOI'kS Of 277 Hamilton made the suggestion, as he had previously, after the dismissal of Pinckney from Paris, that the President de- .clare a "day of fasting, humiliation, and prayer." 129 He specified, as in his letter to McHenry, that the follow- ing measures be advocated by the Federalists in Congress: I. II. III. IV. VI. VII. Permission to our merchant vessels to arm and toczapture those which may attack them. The completion of our frigates, and the provi- sion of a considerable number of sloops-of-war not exceeding twenty guns. 'Authority to cap- ture all attacking, and privateers found with- in twenty leagues of our coast. Power to the President, in general terms, to provide and equip ten ships of the line in case of open rupture with any foreign power. The increase of our military establishment to twenty-thousand, and a provisional army of thirty-thousand besides the militia. The efficacious fortifications of our prin- cipal ports, say Portsmouth, Boston, Newport, New London, New York, Philadelphia, Norfolk, Baltimore, Wilmington, N. 0., Charleston, Savannah. It is waste of money to be more diffusive. The extension of our revenue to all the prin- cipal objects of taxation and a loan commen- surate with the contemplated expenditures. The suspension.of our treaties with France till a basis of connection shall be re- established by treaty.l30 Hamilton was of the opinion that "bold language and bold measures" were necessary. He thought the choice lay between "a tame surrender of our rights" or, as mentioned in the ‘ filexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 276. See also Letter t0 Sedgwick, March, 1798, IbidJ, X, 278-279. 129Letter to Pickering, March 17: 1798: 2239', X’ 276‘ l3OIbid., x, 277. 278 131 McHenry letter, "a state of mitigated hostility." When the Administration received news of the failure of l3lIbid., X, 277. See page 275. Because there is no offi- cial record of Pickering seeking the advice of Hamilton on Adams' questions to the Cabinet it is most probable that Hamil- ton took it upon himself to address the Secretary of State be- cause of his concern over news of the new French decree, issued January 8, 1798. See page 26A and 267n. The Historical Index to Pickering Papers (Boston, 1896), contained in CoIIec- tions of the Massachusetts Historical Society, 6th Ser., V 178, does not indicate a letter between January 3, 1798 and March 25, 1798, from Pickering to Hamilton. His opening re- mark was, "I make no apology for offering you my opinion on the present state ofaaffairs," which would seem to indicate that there was no request on Pickering's part that Hamilton give him advice. Letter to Pickering, March 17, 1798, The works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 275. PIEker- ing replied that he would welcome Hamilton's advice at any time. Letter from Pickering to Hamilton, March 25, 1798 (there are two letters to Hamilton on this date), The Works of Alex- ander Hamilton, Hamilton, VI, 273. Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 37h indicates there is such a letter. There is no official record that he had heard of the official announce- ment of the failure of the special mission when this letter of March 17 was written. Schachner, The Founding Fathers, p. #48. Although Adams had received the packet on‘MarCh a, he had only revealed the contents of the envoy's January 8 dis- patch, indicating no hope that the envoys would be received. A. S. P.; F. R., II, 150-151. See page 267n. Hamilton surely was aware that the mission had failed after Adams' speech to Congress on March 19, but he did not know of the details of the mission until so informed by Pickering on March 25, 1798. The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Hamilton VI, 273-277. Hamil- ton had written Pickering on'Narch 23, but only said he be- lieved the request of the Senate for the dispatches was prOper, not indicating that he knew of any of thef men hostile to their views on the futile pretense of a counter-revolutionary plot, 18A to be effected by royalizing the elections." 183The Stand, No. A, April 12, 1798, The Works of Alexan- der Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 285-286. 18thidJ, VI, 286. In the spring of 1795 a commission was appointed By the Convention to modify the Constitution of 1793. On June 23, the commission reported in favor of an entirely new constitution. The Constitution of the Year III was presented to the Convention on August 22. It called for a Legislative Body composed of two houses - the Council of Elders and a Council of Five Hundred. The real power of the government rested in the executive - a Directory composed of five members appointed by the legislative body. Thanks to the efforts of Napoleon in checking the Paris mOb on October 5 (13 Vendémiare), thus saving the Convention, elections for the new government took place the last two weeks in October and the Directory assumed office on October 27, 1795. A Dpcumentary Survey of the French Revolution, Stewart, pp. 571-372, 580, 588. “FOr a complete text of the Constitution of the Year III see Ibid., pp. 572-612. Madelin concludes that the majority of the -/ 296 Hamilton declared that no man could doubt that the plot charged upon the exiled members of the Directory, Barthelemy 185 and Eichegru, was a falsification. Councillors were not in favor of restoring the throne, but were for a "loyal trial" of a liberal republic. Louis Madelin, Th2 French Revolution, ed. Fr. Funck-Brentano (London, 1933), p. 5A3. The first Directors were Barras, Rewbell, and Le Tour- neur, La Revelliere-Lepeaux, and Carnot. A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution, Stewart, p. 653n. Weaknesses in the administrative structure of the government became apparent quite early. The work of the government was obtained through force, intrigue or both. In the Spring of 1796 a revolution- ary plot led by radicals was discovered and its leaders exe— cuted or exiled. Ibid., pp. 653-65A. Dissatisfaction with the existing government was apparent in the first elections held under the new constitution in the late summer of 1797 which returned, if not the Royalists, at least the anti- revolutionists to power. The new Councillors were planning to arrest the "old guard" or continuing members of the Coun- cils and the Directory. However, the old ones acted first. With'the support of the army they carried out a purge of the Royalist councillors on September A, 1797 (18 Fructidor, Year V), following which, the remainder nullified some two hundred of the recent elections. Hany of the recently elected coun- cillors were deported. This ended for some time toczome any serious opposition from the Royalist faction. Ibid., pp. 69A-o95 and 695n. Shortly after Hamilton's observations on the Directory a new coup d' etat on May 11, 1798 (22 Floréal, Year VI} was undertaken by the government to elimi- nate extreme revolutionists (Jacobins) who had been elected by the voters. They were just as distasteful to the Di- rectory as had been the Royalists of the previous year. Ibid., p. 728. 185The Stand, No. A, April 12, 1798, The Works of Alexan- der Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 287. Barthelemy, who had taken‘Le Tourneur's place in the Directory (May 21, 1797), and Pichegru, a French.general who became President of the Council of Five Hundred, were both victims of the coup d' etat of 18 Fructidor Year V (September A, 1797). They were accused of being part of the Royalist plot to make Louis XVIII King of France. Madelin, The French Revolution, pp. 52A-525, 533-53A, 537-538, 5A0, 5A2 and 56*} richegru had earlier cooperated with the Royalist faction. Ibid., p. A95. 297 Neither of them was prisoner of his ambitions like Dumouriez.186 They were instead virtuous men.187 He claimed that no proof of their guilt had come to light. Horst of all they had not received a fair legal accu- sation or trial. Their real crime had been to desire to check the erratic career of the Directory and to restore peace to France.188 The rajority of the Directory had been against peace be- cause they believed it better to continue the revolution un- til”matters were better prepared for creating a new Dynasty 189 and a new aristocracy to regenerate the exploded monarchy \ 6French general and hero of the Battle of Valmy and Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, disgusted and defeated at Neerwinden and Kaestricht on March 18 and 21, 1793, at the hands of the Austrians, deserted his command. A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution, Stewart, pp. 280, 320 and 397-398. Also refer to page 133. 167The Stand, No. A, April 12, 1798, The Works of Alexan- der Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 287. 188Ibid., VI, 287-288. For further details on the fate of the Royalist "conspirators" see Madelin, The French Levo- lution, pp. 539-5A2. 189Hamilton believed this to be the plan of Abbe Siéyes, with some of the most influential members of the executive department his stooges. The Stand, No. A, April 12, 1798, The_porks of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 288. Siéyés, publicist and political scientist, who was active throughout the revolution , later became a member of the Directory in the coup of 30 Prairial, Year VII (June 18, 1799). He actually had been a member of the Directory in November, 1795, but resigned a few days later. He was one of the leaders of the coup of 18 and 19 Brumaire (November 9-lO, 1799), which brought the downfall of the Directory, 190 of France with due regard to their own interest." Hamilton claimed this conduct should prove to all that there was nothing too wicked or too monstrous for them to con- template or attempt.191 In the fifth article of The Stand Hmnilton presented a re- view of Franco-American relations from the beginning of the French Revolution through the X Y Z Affair. The purpose was to show that France and not the United States had been responsible for the past and present friction between the two nations. Hamilton began by remarking that Americans had looked with favor upon the French Revolution in its early states,192 When the French government changed from a monarchy to a republic, the United States had been the first government to recognize the 193 new order of things. and a member of the frovisional Republican Consulate with Bona- parte and Roger Ducos which followed. He also played an impor- tant part in the writing of the Constitution of the Year VIII, the feurth and last of the constitutions of the French Revolu- tion. A DocumentaryISurvey of the French Revolution, Stewart, PP- 7A0. 753-759, 767 and 815. 19OThe Stand, No. A, April 12, 1798, The werks of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 288. The government was still in the hands of revolutionaries, no matter how conservative their ideas of what constituted a revolution. A Dgcumentarv Survey of the French Revolution, Stewart, p. 69A. 191The Stand, No. A, April 12, 1798, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 288. 192The Stand,No. 5, April 16, 1798, The Workgof Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 289. 1931bid., v1, 289-290. 299 He said we had recognized that the treaties, existing between this country and the French monarchy, were still bind- ing with the French Republic although the conduct of the latter, and some stipulations in the treaties themselves, might have 19h warranted a contrary policy. The United States at the outbreak of war in Europe had de- clared its intent to maintain a sincere neutrality cansistent with the conditions of the treaty.195 we had run a great risk at this time for this policy nearly involved us in the war on the side of France when she could have offered us no protec- 196 tion or assistance. How had France thanked us in return? Genet came with neutrality on his lips, but war in his heart. The instructions published by himself, and his practice upon them, demonstrate that it was the premeditated plan to involve us in the contest; not by a candid appeal to the judgment, friendhip, or interest of our country but by alluring the ava- rice of bad citizens into acts of predatory hostili- ty, by instituting within our territory military expeditions against nations with whom we were at peace. And when it was found that our Exexutive - would not connive at this insidious plan, bold attempts were made to create a schism between the people and the government, and, consequently, to sow 1 seeds of civil discord, insurrection, and revolution. 97 With the overthrow of the Girondists by the Jacobins our request for the recall of Genet met with success. But Robes- l9hlbig., VI, 290. 195Ibid., VI, 290. lgéIbid., v1, 290-291. See pages 96-97. 197Ibid., VI, 291. See pages 219-220. 300 pierre, in a public speech, did not fail to "give a gentle hint of delinquency in the United States, sufficiently indi- cating that the authors and the manner were more at fault, in his Opinion, than the thing."198 However, it was not expedient for France to quarrel with us. There was still hope that she would be able to secure 199 us as an ally in the war. How had the United States fulfilled its obligations in the treaties in comparison with those of France? We saw without murmur our prOperty seized in belli- gerent vessels; we allowed to French ships of war and privateers, all the peculiar exclusive privi- leges in our ports to which they were entitled by our“treaties upon fair construction - uponggfcon- struction fully concurred in by the Balitical eader of the adherents of rance; we went further, and gratuitously suffered her to sell her prizes in<>ur country, in contravention, perhaps, of the true principles of neutrality; we paid to her new government the debt contracted by us with the old, not only as fast as it became due, but by an anticipation, which did not give pleasure to her enemies. While our government was faithful our citizens were zealous. Not content with good wishes, they‘adventured their property in the fur- nishing of supplies to an extent that showed, in many cases, the cooperation of zeal with inter- est....Reverse the medal. France from the be- ginning has vio1ated essential points in the treaties between the two countries. The first formal unequivocal act by either of the belliger- ent parties, interfering with the rule that "free. 198The Stand, No. 5, April 16, 1798, The Works of Alex- ander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 291. 199Ibid., VI, 291-292. 2 00Jefferson. 301 shipg make free goods," was a decree of the French convention.ZUI This violation has been persisted in, and successive violations added, tiléofihey amount to a general war on our commerce. What excuses did France give for these violations upon Am- erican commerce? First, the plea of necessity, next, the plea of delinquencies on our part. The latter included "our refu- sal to accord privileges not granted by our treaties, but claimed by misconstructions destitute even of plausibility - privileges which would have put us at once in a state of war with the enemies of France; the reciprocal application to them of principles originally established against their remonstrances in favor of France; occasional embarrassments to her privateers, arising from the established forms ofcaur courts, and the ne- cessity of vigilance to frustrate her efforts to entangle us against our will in the war; delays in giving relief in a few instances, rendered unavoidable by the nature of our 'government, and the great extent of our territory...."203 Hamilton said that Americans judging whether these accu- sations be true or false, ought to keep in mind that most of the transactions took place while Jefferson and Randolph were zolmay 9,1793, A. s. P.; F. R., I, 24a. Vessels of the United States were exempted from this decree by a May 23, 1793 decree. Ibid., I, 365 and 371. See also The Warning, No. 5 March 13 797, The Works of Alexander HamiIton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 251. ee pages 223n and 2AOn. 202The S and, No. 5, April 16 1798, The Works of Alex- ander HamiIESHIMFed. Ed., Lodge, vi, 292-2§§T""'"'“m'“"" 203Ibid., VI, 293. 302 Secretaries of State, and had their complete agreement and cooperation. He was sure that Americans would not believe these astute men were the dupes of colleagues influenced by ill-will towards France, but instead would entertain a strong feeling that our government had proceeded with utmost propri- I ety, and that the disapproval of France, if more than a color, was unjustified.20h Advocants of France, after the conclusion of our treaty with Great Britain, were inclined to dismiss French complaints against the United States as frivolous, but saw in our new treaty a cause for dissatisfaction on the part of France and a policy which had brought our country to the brink of war with our first ally and best friend. Hamilton declared these suggestions to be without foundation.205 To the charge that we had abandoned the rule that "free ships make free goods" incaur treaty with Great Britain, Hamil- ton said no known or reasonable principle of interpretation could be construed to mean that France and the United States in their treaty insisted upon that rule with all nations and would not make a treaty with a nation that would not abide 206 by this rule. It might be said, too, since France violated 20“Ibid., VI, 293-291. 2051bid., VI, 29h-295. Hamilton's remarks on the Jay Treaty mentioned here and in the following paragraphs are discussed in detail on pages 201-209. 206Ibid., VI, 295-296. See Pages 206'208- I 303 the rule before the treaty with Great Britain that the United 20 States was absolved from all obligations to observe it. 7 Another complaint was that the British treaty "extended unduly the list of contraband articles, and gave color to O the claim of a right to subject provisions to seizure."2 8 Hamilton pointed out that the itemized list of contraband was agreeable to the "general law of nations", but this, he ' said, by its very nature was liable to change according to "relative situation, and to be variously modified not only between different nations, but between one nation and differ- ent nations."209 As regards the seizure of provisions, Hamil- ton said the treaty only stipulated that according to the law of nations they were to be paid for.210As to the possibility of giving color to abuse arising from a doubtful construction of the1:reaty, he declared this to be no subject of offense to France. "It is the fact which must govern" and since the ra- tification of the treaty had taken place there had been no known instances of the seizure of provisions by Great Bri— tain.211 _lr' g 208Ibid., VI, 295. Bemis, Ja '3 Treat . Po 336- See page 201m. 209The Stand No. 5 April 16 1708 The Works of Alex- ander Ham"i"It"o"n","Féd. Ed.: Lodge, VI’, 29512W97. 2101bid.’ VI, 297. Bemis, Ja '8 Treat . PP- 336-337- See page 259- ‘ 211 ' The S and No. 5 April 16 1798 The WOrks of Alex- ander Ham"1'1"t"o"tn', 'F'éd. Ed.: Lodge, VI, 297: 30h Furthermore, the treaty had made no change whatever in the actual state of affairs to the disadvantage of France. "Great Britain, had before the treaty, with the sanction of our government, acted upon the principles as to free ships making free goods, and generally, as to the affair of contra- band which the treaty recognizes."212 If there was anything wrong in the matter, Hamilton charged it not the fault of the treaty itself, but to earlier measures of the government which had left these points mere points of form in the agreement.213 Another favorite charge of the advocates of France in the country was that the making of a treaty by our government with an enemy of France was a mark of preference to that enemy and a mark of ill-will toward our republican ally.21h Hamil- ton said that no school of political writers or the history of nations would bear out the position that "a treaty of amity between a neutral state and one belligerent party, not granting either succors or new privileges relative to war, nor derogatory from any obligation of the neutral state to the other belligerent party, is a cause of umbrage to the later." All this argument he declared to be a question of courtesy not of quarrel and, in this case, even the former 2121bid., VI, 297-298. 2131hfld., VI, 298. 21“Ibid., VI, 295. 305 did not apply. The United States, he said, was led into treaty negotiations with Great Britain by pre-existing differences which had nearly ruptured into war. It was im- portant to the peace of the United States that she took the step she did.215 Hamilton was convinced that Jay's treaty was a mere subterfuge on the part of France for ill treatment toward the United States. Even if this were not so and the treaty had actually caused France displeasure, he felt it was not of a sufficient degree to warrant the humiliation of our country. If this was so, the United States had done all that was possible towards reconciliation, certainly enough to have satisfied any sensible and just government.216 Hamilton reported that since the Jay Treaty France had increased her attacks on our commerce with "unparalled cir- cumstances of rapacity and violence." In addition to this, attention was drawn to the manifes- to of Adet to the United States government, which Hamilton termed "insulting," and the withdrawal of that minister from the country. In spite of this treatment of the American government, said Hamilton, a new minister (Pinckney) was sent to France to clear up misunderstanding and restore 2151b1d., VI, 298-299. 216Ibid., VI, 299. 306 217 goodwill, but he was refused an audience. namilton said although the honor of the United States was involved, a new mission was sent to preserve the peace. It was composed of three envoys, "in every degree men well affected to France and her revolution." These men also were not received. Even if it were admitted that the French charges against the American government were valid, Hamilton believed the ministers "ought on every principle to have been accredited and conferred with, till it was ascertained that they were not ready to do as much as was expected." Instead the envoys were forced to treat with "panders and mis- tresses." These informal agents were not satisfied with a disavowal of President Adams' speech of last May (1797) but wanted, too, a bribe of 50,0GO pounds sterling for the Di- rectory. But Hamilton asked if this was all? No! Instead of paying reparations for damage to our commerce which he claimed exceeded twenty million dollars, a loan equal to this amount was to be made to the Erench government.219 With this done the French might consent, at some future 217Ibid., VI, 299-300. See pages 226n, 232, 247 EHd 2A8- 2181bid., VI, 300. See page 250. 2191bid., VI, 300-301. The x Y z Affair referred to here, and in the next few paragraphs is discussed on pages 269-272 of the text. For further details see A. S. P.; F. R., I, 40-A2 and II, 158-160, 162 and 167; McMaster, A Histogy 2f the Pe0ple of the United Statestrom the Revolution to the Civil War, II, 368-37h and #03-408? Schachner, The Foundin Fathers, pp. h35-h36. 307 date, to consider the claims of our merchants. Nevertheless, ravages upon our commerce would continue until a treaty should be concluded between the two countries. In addition to all this the United States was asked to purchase Dutch bonds to the amount of "thirty millions of florins," although their nominal value had dropped in half. Without meeting these commitments our ministers were told they could reside in Paris for simeonths without advancing a step toward the solution of Franco-American difficulties.220 Hamilton concluded, "at so hideous a compound of corrup- tion and extortion, at demands so exorbitant and degrading, there is not a spark of virtuous indignation in an American breast, which will not kindle into a flame. And yet there are men, could it be believed, vile and degenerate enough to run about the streets to contradict, to palliate, to justify, to preach the expediency of compliance. Such men merit all the detestation of all their fellow-citizens: and there is no doubt that with time and opportunity, they will merit much more from the offended justice of the laws."221 With the foregoing in mind, Hamilton opened the sixth ar- ticle of The Stand with the remark that revolutionary France had been, and was at present, "governed by a spirit of prose- 220The Stand No 5 A ’ . pril 16 1798 The Works of Alexan- der Hamilton, Fed: Ed., fiodge, VI,,30l-362. A. 3. P.; Ferfi., II, I39, I63 and 167. 221The Stand, No. 5, April 16, 1798, The Works of Alexan- der Hamilton, Fe . Ed., Lodge, VI, 302. 308 222 1ytism, conquest, domination, and rapine." Anticipating that Great Britain might be forced to con- clude peace with France, he cited four courses open to the United States; "surrender of their sovereignty, the new- modelling of their government according to the fancy of the Directory, the emptying of their wealth by contributions into the coffers of the greedy and insatiable monster, and resis- tence to invasion in order to compel submission to those ruinous conditions."223 He said there were those who would say that it was not expedient for France to pursue such a policy toward the United States. They would ask, "what incentives sufficiently potent can stimulate to so unpromising an attempt?"22" Hamilton de- clared the answer to be: I ...the strongest passion of bad hearts - inordinate ambition - the love of domination, that prime characteristic of the despots ofFrance, - the spirit of vengeance for the presumption of having thought and acted for ourselves, a spirit which has marked every step of the revolutionary leaders, - the fana- tical egotism of obliging the rest of the world to adapt their political system to the French standard ' of perfection - the desire of securing the future control of our affairs by humbling and ruining the independent supporters of their country, and of elevating the partisans and tools of France, - the desire of entangling our commerce with preferences and restrictions which would give to her the monopo- ly; these passions, the most imperious, - these mo- tives, the most enticing to a crooked policy, are 222The Stand, No. 6, April 19, 1798. Ibid.. VI. 302. 223Ibid., VI, 303. 2241b1d., VI, 303. 309 sufficient persuasives to undertake the subjugation of this country. Added to these primary inducements, the desire of finding an<>utlet for a part of the vast armies which, on the termination of the European war, are likely to perplex and endanger the men in 225 power, would be an auxiliary motive of great force. Hamilton was concerned that most Americans regarded the idea of invasion by French troops as incredible. Who would have thought eighteen months ago that Great Britain would now be in danger of invasion? Even if we admitted the whole idea as im- probable, we should still act as if it were likely to happen.226 What should we do? Perhaps give in on any terms to France rather than face such a threat? Hamilton said to do so would be dishonorable and ruinous to the country. Because France would only ask for new sacrifices on our part at a later date "resistance is to be preferred to submission."227 But could we oppose France with success? He thought so. "...It is in our power to maintain.our independence and baffle every enemy. The people of the United States from their number, situation, and resources, are invincible, if they are provident and faithful to themselves.228 Then, should the United States declare war? No, he said, because there was still a chance that an open rupture with France might be avoided. "Want of success must bring 225Ibid., VI, 303-30A. 226Ibid., VI, 305. 227Ibid., VI, 305-306. 228222g.’ VI: 306. See page 282. 310 the present despots to reason. Everyciay may produce a revolution which may substitute better men in their place, and lead to honorable accommodation."229 What should be the policy of the United States? Hamilton said it should be an attitude of "calm defiance, to meet the aggressions upon us by proportionate resistance, and to pre- pare vigorously for further reSistance."23%hat measures were needed to meet this end? ...to invigorate our treasury by calling into ac- tivity the principal untouched resources of reve- nue - to fortify in earnest our chief seaports - to establish foundries and increase our arsenals - to create a respectable naval force, and to raise with the utmost diligence a considerable army. Our merchant vessels ought to be permitted not only to arm themselves, but to sink or capture their assailants. Our vessels of war ought to cruise on our coast and serve as convoys to our trade. In doing this,t:hey ought also to be authorized not only to sink or capture assail- ants, but likewise to capture and bring in priva— teers found hovering within twenty leagues of our coast. For this last measure, precedent, if re- quisite, is to be found in EBI conduct of neutral powers on other occasions. Some would object to this policy because it implies a state of war. "Let it be so," declared Hamilton. It would be a limited war to grow into a general war only if France wished it. If France continued successfully with her policies in Europe there would surely be a general war. If not, there 229Ibfd., VI, 306-307. 2301bid., VI, 307. 2311bid., VI, 307. 311 was a chance for general peace between the two nations. There have been instances in history where two nations for some time continued in a state of partial hostility without recourse to general warfareoZBZ The conduct of the United States for the duration of this period would be reatricted to resisting the last two decrees of France; that of forbidding neutrals to trade with the ports of her enemies; and that authorizing seizure of vessels and their cargoes if such cargo be wholly or partly of British fabrics.233 Hamilton claimed it would be necessary to declare the suspension of’our treaties with France. ~It would be prepos- terous to abide by them when they were wholly disregarded by France.23h It was essentially our interest also to get rid of the treaty of alliance which on the part of France would prove worthless; on our part a dangerous stipulation to de- fend the French West Indies should they be attacked.235 The consular convention of 1788 he thought likewise "a 2321bid., VI, 307-308. 233Ibid., VI, 308. The first French decree mentioned (@arch 2, I797), abandoned the principle that "free ships make free goods." A. S. P.; F, R., II, 12-13. The second decree mentioned (January 8) was a direct violation of the 1778 trea- ties. A. S. P.; F. R., II, 151. Lyon, "The Directory and the United States," The American Historical Review, XLIII, 517. See also pages 265, 266m and 267n. ' '23“The Stand, No. 6, April 19, 1798, The Works of Alex- H - ’ ed. Ed., Lodge,VI, 308. 2351bid., VI, 308. 312 235 mischievous instrument." Hamilton believed the opportunity to break through these shackles with good faith might be the best thing for the United States. When this country and France settled their differen- ces more convenient and.more satisfactory negotiations perhaps would take place.237 The resolution to raise an army Hamilton thought would meet the greatest obstacle. He declared this should not be. The army would not be used to provoke war, but only as an instrument of internal security. We had nearly lost the Re- volutionary War because of the delay in creating one. If we depended upon militia alone in an invasion of our shores he doubted whether we could successfully repel the invaders.238s Hamilton Concluded the article in a patriotic fervor by calling on all Americans to rise and "be unanimous, be vir- 236Ibid., VI, 308. For a complete test of this document see The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, II, l99-23I. Perhaps Hamilton's disgust stemmed from the fact that he considered the Councillors' jurisdiction too exten- sive. Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York, 1936), p. 83 points out that the convention provided that in civil cases between nationals residing in the territory of the other party, the consul should exercise jurisdiction. Talleyrand believed the consular convention gave the consuls more extensive powers than either the sovereignty of the United States or the efficiency of the French Administration could afford. Lyon, "The Franco- émiricgg Convention of 1800," The Journals of Modern History, . 3 . 237The Stand, W6. 6, April 19, 1798, The Works of Alex- ggder HamIIton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 308. 2381big., VI, 309. 313 tuous, be firm, exert your courage, trust in Heaven, and 2 nobly defy the enemies both of God and man!" 39 Hamilton devoted the seventh and last article of The §t§§§ to anaittack on Jefferson and the Republican Party for their pro-French views and their attempts to excuse the Directory from participation in the X Y Z Affair. There are strong symptons that men in power in France understand better than ourselves the true character of their faction in this country, at least of its leaders; and that as to these, the agents who conferred with our envoys were not mistaken in predicting that the unreasonableness of the demands upon us would not serve to detach the party from France, or to reunite them to their own country. The high-priest of this sect, [Jeffer- ~ son] with a tender regard for the honor of the imma- culate Directory, has already imagined several in- genious distinctions to rescue them from the odium and corruption unfolded by the dispatches. Among these is the suggestion that there is no proof of the privity of the Directory - all may have been the mere contr'vance of the Minister for Foreign Relations TalleyrandZ] The presumption from so miserable a subterfuge is, that had the propositions proceeded immediately from the Di- rectory, the cry would the same quarter would have been - there is no evidence the council or nation approved of them; they, at least, are not implicated; the friendship of the two republics ought not to be disturbed on account of the villany of the transitory and fugitive organs of one of them. The inventor of the subterfuge, however, well knew that the executive organ of a nation never comes forward in person to nego- tiate with foreign ministers; and that unless it be presumed to direct and adopt what is done by its agents, it may always be sheltered from re- sponsibility or blame. The recourse to so pitiful an evasion betrays in its author a syste- matic design to excuse France at all events — to soften a spirit of submission to every violence she may commit - and to prepare the way for im- plicit subjection to her will. To be the pro- consul of a despotic Directory over the United States, degraded to the condition of a province, can alone be the criminal, the ignoble aim of 239Ibid., VI, 310. 31h . . . 240 so seditious, so prostitute a character. Some pamphleteers of the pro-French party had declared the United States to be the aggressors and believed they should make atonement. They would.say, "France assisted them in their revolution with loans, and they ought to reciprocate the benefit; peace is a boon worth the price required for it, and it ought to be paid."2"l Hamilton labeled the charge of aggression upon the United States as false. He drew a distinction between the loans made by France to the United States during our war for independence and the loans asked of us at present by France. The first"were asked as a favor, on condition of reimbursement by the United States; and were freely granted for a purpose of mutual advantage."2h2 The second were "exacted as the price of peace." They were in reality "contributions by the coersion of a power which has already wrested from our citizens an immense property, for which it owes to them compensation."2A3 Hamilton was of the opinion that to pay such a price for peace was to prefer "peace to independence, and the 1 ZhoThe 81331191! NO. 7, April 21, 1798’ Ibid., VI, 311- 3 2. __, 21+11bid., VI, 312. 2h2161d., VI, 312-313. 2“Ibid., VI, 313. 315 nation which becomes tributary takes a master."2hh He said also that it was alleged by the same Republican pamphleteers that the United States was asked only to pur- chase sizteen million ($6,A00,000) inscriptions worth of Dutch bonds and, by doing so, the government would have "secured compensation to their citizens for depredations on their trade to four times the amount, with an intermission of the depre- dations; that no hazard of loss could have attended the opera- tion, because the United States owed.the Dutch a much larger sum, which would be a pledge for payment or discount."2h5 Hamilton declared this an attempt to deceive the American pe0p1e. Actually the United States was to pay twelve hundred thousand livres (at first it was considered more) to the Frenchzagents, a sum equal to the amount of the spoliations upon our trade,alnd to purchase from France thirty-two mil- lions ($12,800,000) worth of bonds/21*6 This would be a total 244lbid., VI, 313. Hamilton, in a rather weak argument, tried to excuse American past and present payments to the In- dians and the Barbary pirates for peace. "The arguments of what has been done in the cases of Algerines and Indians has nothing pertinent but in the comparison of relative ferocity. In this view the claim of the Directory is indisputable; but in every other it is preposterous. It is the general practice of civilized nations to pay barbarians; there is no point of honor to the contrary. But between civilized nations, the payment of tribute by one to another, is by the common Opinion of mankind, a badge of servitude." Ibid., VI, 313n. 2"5mm” VI, 313-314. zhélbid.’ VI, 311+. A. so POLF° R., II, 159. see also page 307 of text or The Stand, No. 5, April 16, 1798, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 301-302. 316 of twenty million dollars more than the estimated amount of damages to our commerce.2h7 Hamilton asked for what we were paying this extra money? The answer should be apparent to all. "Barely for the acknowledgement of a debt due to our citizens,VVhich, without it, is not the less due, and for the suspension of hostilities for six months."2l+8 Later in a conversation between Talleyrand and one of the envoys Hamilton said a different proposition was made. The United States was to purchase at par, "sixteen millions of inscriptions, and to promise further aid when in their power." Only when this arrangement was made would France consider taking measures to reimburse our merchants for damages to their commerce.249 Hamilton declared this proposition to be worse than the one previous. To promise aid in the future, he said, "would have carried with it the privilege to repeat at pleasure the demand of money, and to dispute with us about our ability to supply; and it would have embarked us as an associate with France in the war." 2[*7The Stand, No. 7, April 21, 1798, The Works of Alexan- der Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 31h. 2"Blbidu VI, 31A. Hamilton said the French referred to the depredations upon our commerce as "hostilitie igepublicans] bid., VI 3lkn. jokingly reminded his readers that "our Jacobins would have us consider them as gentle caresses." 249Ibid.’ VI, 311+..315. A. S. P.; F. R., II, 168. The envoy referred to is Gerry. 317 That France would agree to keep this negotiation se- cret, Hamilton declared to be another trick. It was too much the interest of France to involve us in a war with Great Bri- tain as a means of damaging her commerce, to have kept the secret. In addition, ratification of any such agreement by the Senate certainly would disclose the negotiation to too many ears. France also could have used the fear of discovery as a means of unlimited extortion. A greater objection to this agreement would have been the relinquishing of United States neutrality and, equally as bad, pretending to the world that such was not the case.250 Hamilton could not understand how it was possible for the French to secure our money by means of the debt which we owed to the Dutch, for the creditors of the United States he de- clared to be the private citizens of the Batavian Republic (Netherlands).251 According to Hamilton there was also a charge circu- lating that the payment of twelve hundred thousand livres to the French agents would have brought a suspension of attacks uponcaur commerce for six months. He said there was no place in the dispatches to support such a conclusion. An addition- al advance of a large sum of money by the purchasing of bonds 250The Stand, No. 7 April 21, 1793, The works of Alexan- der HamiIEEfiT‘FE". Ed., Lodge, VI, 315. "“"“"" 2511bid., VI, 316. 318 or in the form of a loan was the actual prerequisite for such a stipulation.252 He was against giving any money to France. It was the principle which was important. Every American should resist with the last drop of blood the attempt of a foreign power to make us tributary.253 Hamilton said he was aware that some men believed the cause of the resentment of France toward this country to be the product of our treaty with Great Britain. If this was so, he wondered why this treaty was never mentioned by France in negotiations withcaur envoys. Particular passages of the May 16, 1797 speech of President Adams were also specified as grounds for dissatisfaction.254 Hamilton concluded the last article of The Stand by pointing out that although the dispatches of the envoys did not support the charge by the French party here against the treaty, they confirmed a serious charge of the Federalists against that faction. "They prove by the unreserved con- fession of her agents, that France places absolute dependence on this party in every event, and counts upon their devotion to her as an encouragement to the conditions which they 2521bid., VI, 316. 253Ibid., VI, 317. 254min” VI, 317. g. S. P.; F. R., I, hO-AZ and II, 159 and 162. See also page 270. 319 attempt to impose. The people of this country must be in- fatuated indeed, if after this plain confession they are at loss for the true source of the evils they suffered, or may hereafter suffer fromtzhe despots of France. 'T is the un- natural league of a portion of our citizens with the oppres- sors of their country."255 Shortly after the publication of the seventh and last article of The Stand, Hamilton again addressed the American people as Detector.256 This article, composed of a single paper, was again an attack upon the Republican Party for their pro-French views. In the process Hamilton took a closer look at the X Y Z Affair. He believed that this party were in their hearts "more Frenchmen than Americans." 257 Many of them, he said, would flock to the standard of France if she should choose to in- vade the country. He exclaimed they were openly claimed by France as their tools, but took no steps to deny it. It only proved they had "embarked beyond the power of retreat."258 255The Stand, No. 7, April 21, 1798, The Works of Alex- ander HamiIton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 317-3 . See a so I?‘ST'FT?'FT‘§., II, 165 and 167. 256Only the date 1798 is given, but the article is simi- lar to those of The Stand and must have followed close in point of time. The Works of AIexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 318n. Alexander Hamilton and the Founding of the Nation, 13. [+270 257Detector, 1798, The Worksof Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ede LOdge, DI, 3190 258Ibid., VI, 318-319. 320 The men of this French faction, he said, would have us believe the envoys "have been the dupes of unauthorized and swindling imposters, and that our government, in publishing these dispatches, has been actuated by a desire to make the circumstances subservient to a long premeditated design of rupture with France}?59 Hamilton claimed that it was popu- lar for them to cite the case of Portugal which supposedly had been duped into advancing a large sum of money through their ambassador to pretended agents of the French govern- ment.260 These agents had been disavowed by the Directory but Hamilton believed they had actually been in league with that executive body.261 ; Hamilton implicated Beaumarchais, the famous French financier of the American Revolution, in the Portugese affair. He believed the Frenchman, one of the most cunning and intriguing men of Europe, to be the link also between 259Ibid., VI, 320. Congress published the x Y z Affair correspondence after receiving the dispatches from the Pre- sident on April 3, 1798. The Works of John Adams,Second President of the United States with aILife of the Author, C. F. Adams, I, 519. Jefferson gives the date of publica- tion as April 5. Letter to Madison, April 6, 1798, 222 Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 236. 260Detector, 1798, The Works of Alexande§_Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 320. See also Letter to Peter Carr, April 12, 1798, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 238. _ 261DeteCtOr, 1798, The Work§:of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 320-321. 321 262 Talleyrand and the French agents in the X Y Z Affair. Hamilton found it difficult to believe the story that the propositions of the secret agents to our envoys did not neces- sarily originate from Talleyrand. He proceded to compare ex- amples of the declarations and proposals of the agents with those of the Foreign Minister to counteract such a belief.263 If Talleyrand.was mixed up in this odious affair, Hamil- ton could not see how the Directory itself could be excused from participation also. He believed it utterly incredible that Talleyrand would expose himself to such hazards unless he had the full support of the executive body.26" Contrary to our envoys being the dupes of unauthorized agents, Hamilton said they had the sense to realize that their orders came from the Foreign Minister himself. Although 262Ibid., VI, 321-323. One of the French agents, I, knew that John Marshall was counsel for Beaumarchais in his successful suit against the State of’Virginia for one hundred forty-five thousand pounds sterling alleged to be due for military supplies furnished to that State during the Revolu- tionary war, and that there was an appeal to the judgment. The agent told Marshall that if the claim should be made good, fifty thousand pounds would go to the Directory representing payments of the United States to that body. This same agent told Gerry a less sum, forty—five thousand, would be credited to the United States. A. S. P.; F. R., II, 168. McMaster, A Histor of the Peo le-Ef‘the United States: From the R volu- tion to the CiviI War, II, 373. AIIan B. MEgruder, JOKE rsha , merican tatesmen, ed. John T. Morse, Jr. {Boston and New York, 1885), pp. ll7e118. Undoubtedly this proposed transaction, in Hamilton's mind, was only another means of exacting tribute from the United States. 263Detector, 1798, The Works of Alexander Hamilton: F9d0 Ed., Lodge, VI, 32h-327. 26thid., VI, 327. 322 the partisans of France had made everyeaffort to extinguish the truth, there was no doubt in the minds and hearts of true Americans that corruption had existed.265 This article was not the end of Hamilton's public attacks upon the Republican Party. Later in the year, another essay, entitled A French Faction, accused them of being "Frenchmen in all their feelings and wishes."266 The Republi- cans, he said, believed every independent thinking man in America to be an Englishman, but the truth was only a French faction existed.267 He accused the leaders of this faction as being depen- dent on France during our own Revolutionary War to the ex- tent that they had threatened our early efforts for a treaty of peace with Great Britain. Furthermore, they had been re- Sponsible for the defeat of efforts to negotiate a commercial treaty with Great Britain with the closing of the war.268 He said these same men had worked also, from the es- tablishment of the Constitution to the present time (1798), to make the government subservient not to the advancement 265Ibid., VI, 328. 266A French Faction, 1798, Ibid., VI: 328° (N0 month is given for this article.) - 267Ibid., VI, 328. 268Ibid., VI, 329. According to Bemis, Pitt was sympathe- tic to a restoration of trade with the United States on equal terms, but opposition came from the ship-owning interests and from American loyalists in Canada who wanted a monolOpy of supplying the West Indies with continental products. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, p. 69. See also page 57n. 323 of its own manufactures, but to the manufactures and navi- gation of France.269 Henry Cabot Lodge, in his biography of Hamilton, has suggested that the Federalist leader had too acute a mind to believe like many of his cohorts that Jefferson and Madi- son were Marats and Robespierres, or, if they should take office, they would be ready to tear down society and re- ligion and set up a guillotine to take care of all aristo- crate.270 He did believe, however, there was a party ready to remodel the Constitution after the French principles and to form with that country an offensive and defensive alliance giving her, in addition, a monopoly on our trade by certain privileges. This would in substance make the United States a province of France.271 It was a remarkable situation which divided the United States into two separate factions during these trying times. There was no room for neutralism in political affairs. If one was an admirer of France he was called a "Jacobin, an atheist, a blood-thirsty monster who wished to murder all respectable citizens in their beds." If one denounced France he was called "a monarchist, a monocrat, a man who bitterly 269A French Faction, 1798, The Works of Alexander Hamilton: Fed. Ed.,Lodge, VI, 330. 270Lodge, Alexander Hamilton, p. 220. 271Letter to Washington, May 19, 1798. The Works or Alex- ander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, K, 284-285. 32h regretted having left the British fold, a hater of equali- tarian principles and tainted with financial corruption."272 Alarmed by the effect of Hamilton's public essays upon the temperament of the country, Jefferson urged that Madison take up his pen, "for heaven's sake and not desert the public cause altogether."273 Madison, however, remained silent. In all this exitement Jefferson fought to remain calm and avoid the seemingly inevitable war. He was worried that Adams' May 16, 1797 speech to Congress might cause the French to commence hostilities.27h Hamilton's doubt of the Republican leader's patriotism, should war come, seems unwarranted, for Jefferson declared that should such a calamity ever strike the country again, "we shall defend ourselves as one man. When our house is on fire, it matters little whether fired from without or within, or both. The first object is to extinguish it."275 It is a great credit to Jefferson that he was able to keep a cool head about him while insults came his way every day from the press and public meetings. He was in a strange political situation; the leader of the opposition party, 272Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, pp. 375—376. 273Letter to Madison, April 5, 1798, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 231. 27"Letter to Madison, April 6, 1798, IbiQ-r VII: 234'236° 250 275Letter to James Lewis, Jr., May 9, 1798, Ibid., VII, 325 unable to protest publically the policies of the government or defend himself because of his position as Vice—President.276 Jefferson was concerned too, during this period, over the effect of the war fever upon his own personal finances. He had intended to withhold his tobacco from the market in anticipa- tion of a rise ingarice, but nOW'ordered it sold, "contrary to what I had determined on if the madness of our government was not hastening as it is to ruin our private fortunes as well as the public interest."277 In spite of despair caused by these public and personal misfortunes he thought it possible, by mid-April, that France "instead of declaring*war,*will worry us with decrees." He reported a new one being proposed - "making neutral armed ships good prize."278 This, together with the expenses for preparation of a serious war, would make the United States think twice before embarking on such.a course. "Bankruptcy," he said, "is a terrible foundation to begin a war on, against the con- 279 querors of the universe." By the end of May, however, Jefferson was thoroughly dis- 276Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, pp. 339-3A0. 277Letter to T. M. Randolph, May 3, 1798, Jefferson Pa ers, Library of Congress, 0111, l77h8. Quoted in Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 603. 278Letter to Monroe, April 19, 1798, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 241. 279Ibid., VII, 211. 326 heartened by the introduction of a bill authorizing the capture of'armed French vessels off our coast. He declared this to be war without declaration.280 If only an actual declaration of war itself could be avoided during the summer he believed the coming election, in the fall would strengthen the Republican party.281 Writing to General Koscuisko, on June 1, however, he de- clared war to be almost inevitable.282 He said a few days later that nobody could deny that France had given us just cause for war, but so had Great Britain. She was capturing our vessels as much as France.283 As long as both countries did everything possible to injure one another, which included ravaging neutral commerce, equally Denmark and Sweden, as well as our own, he asked if it would not be more prudent for us to "bear with it as the Danes and Swedes do, curtailing our commerce, and waiting for the moment of peace when it is probable both nations would for their own interest & honor retribute for their wrongs."28h However, the public 28OLetter to Martha J. Randolph, May 31, 1798, Jefferson Manuscri ts, Morgan Library. Cited in Schachner, Thomas JeFferson, II, 605. (Primary source same as above. 281Letter to Madison, May 31, 1798, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, X, #3. 282Letter to General Thaddeus KoscuiskO. June 1: 1798: Ibid. 0 , X, [+7-h’9. 283Letter to Archibald Stuart, June 8, 1798, The Writ- ings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 270. 28“Ibid., VII, 270. 327 mind had been "inflamed by publications wellcalculated to de- ceive them," and he believed war was now inevitable.285 He was of the Opinion that events in Europe would occupy France for the moment. "I imagine that France will do little with us till she has made her peace with England, which whether her invasion succeeds or fails, must be made this summer and autumn. The game on both sides is too heavy to be contin- ued."286 When France was ready to turn her arms on us, Jeffer- son believed it would be mainly against commerce and fisher- ies. If anything were attempted by land it would probably be to the westward.287 He again expressed the fear that the United States would bankrupt itself in such a war. "Our great expense will be in equipping a navy to be lost as fast as equipped, or be maintained at an expense which will sink us with itself, as the like course is sinking Great Britain. 0f the two million of dollars now to be raised by a tax on lands, houses & slaves, Virginia is to furnish between 3 &, A00,000 but this is not more than half of the actual expense if the provisional army be raised, nor one tenth of what must "288 be the annual expenses. The best time to negotiate with France to avoid these 2851bid., VII, 270. 286Ibid., VII, 270. 2871bid., VII, 270-271 288Ibid., VII, 271 328 catastrophes, he believed, to be at once, but he was fully aware that the irate citizens of the country would not sanc- tion such a policy.289 For the present nothing could be done. He believed it of the utmost importance tokavoid, at all costs, any cession on the part of the southern states from the Union. It would be better to endure temporarily any detesible measures rather than to take this step.290 Because Jefferson sought to putlaside all interests of party and self and to think nationally, biographer Chinard believed him, at the time, to be "the only great American in the country."291 After Marshall returned home from France, a national hero, most Republicans took a less pessimistic view of the troubles besetting the country.292 After all, Gerry had re- mained in Paris and negotiations could, at any time, be re- opened, and the conduct of the envoys in resisting the corrupt offers of the Directory gave the public a feeling that our 289Ibid., VII, 271. 290Letter to John Taylor, June 1, 1789. lEiQ-r VII: 263 “266 o 291Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, p. 3A1. This was before Jefferson had any ideas of the concepts which appeared a few months later in the Kentucky Resolution. Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 605. 292Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, p. 3A1. In seeking first hand knowledge of the results of the mission, Jefferson called at Marshall's lodgings on June 23, but did not find him at home. Jefferson Pa ers, Library of Congress. Cited in Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 605-606. 329 293 national honor had been upheld. However, with the return of Marshall a new campaign against Jefferson was begun on the part of the Federalists. This was due to the visit of one Doctor George Logan with the French government. The good doctor had conceived the idea of singularly voyaging to France and persuading its govern- ment "to alter the tone of their conduct against the United States." He had sought recommendations not from official channels, but from Jefferson and Thomas McKean, the latter, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Both men obligingly furnished him with papers asserting his good citizenship, although Jefferson later denied he knew the purpose of the mission.29h Dr. Logan secretly set sail on June 12, 1798, but his disappearance soon attracted the no- tive of the Federalist press. The Philadelphia Gazette declared that Logan was revealing important information to the French and would return with a French army to destroy American "lives, property, liberty and holy religion."295 The secret mission was reported as financed by the Jaco— 293Chinard, Thomas Jefferson, p. 3hl. 29("Letter to Edmund Pendleton, January 29, 1799, The Writin s of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 338-339. Deborah Norris Iogan, MemoIr 0? Dr. George Logan of Stanton, ed., Frances A. Logan (Philadelphia, 1899f, pp. 5A-56. Hereafter referred to as Logan, Memoir of Dr. George Logan of Stenton. Jefferson's certificate is dated June A, 1798. Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 60A. 5 6 295Logan, Memoir of Dr. George Logan of Stenton. pp- 9- 0n. 330 296 bins in this country. Much to his surprise, Logan found the French as suspi- cious of the purpose of his mission as the Federalists at home. It was only through Lafayette that Logan was able to ob- tain an interview with Talleyrand. The results were neverthe- less amazing. Logan was able to win two important concessions from the French government; the lifting of an embargo on Amer- can ships in French ports; and liberating American sailors in French prisons.297 This order was immediately communicated to the United States government and Logan soon sailed for home.298 His reception in the United States is best measured by the conduct accorded him by the President and the Secretary of State. When informed by Logan that Talleyrand was ready to receive an accredited minister from the United States, Adams replied, "Yes, I suppose if I were to send Mr. Madison or Mr. Giles [Republican Representative from Virginia] or Dr. Logan they would receive either of them."299 Pickering was more blunt. "Sir, it is my duty to inform you that the government 296Letter to Madison, June 21. 1798: The Writings or Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 273. 297Letter to Deborah Logan, September A, 1798, Logan, IMemoir of Dr. George Logan of Stenton, pp. 79-80. Cited in Schachner, Thomas Jefferson,'II, 60A. 2981b1d., II, 60A. (Primary source same as above.) 331 does not thank you for what you have done."300 The anger of the Federalists culminated in the famous Logan Act, passed January 30, 1799, forbidding any citizen of the United States to negotiate with a foreign government with- 301 out the authorization of the United States government. In the process of debate on this bill, Robert Harper of South Carolina accused Logan of having gone to France as an emissary of Jefferson.302 Jefferson denied any prior knowledge of Logan's mission stating the doctor had asked only for letters of introduction and a certification of his citizenship. He had done this for hundreds before. He declared no instructions or communications ‘were given him and that there had been no conspiracy.303 Even before the Logan mission had taken place Jefferson had received threatening letters and was well aware that spies were 300Ibid., II, 60h. (Primary source same as above except pp. 85-86n.) Logan's wife, Deborah, insisted that Jefferson used to visit her secretly to console her for the abuse heaped upon her by the Federalists. (Same primary source except p.75). 301Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 60h-605- 302Randall, The Life of Thomas Jefferson, II, A66n. 303Letter to Gerry, January 26, 1799, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 326-327. Letter to Edmund Pendleton, ‘January 29, 1799, Ibid., VII, 338-339. Logan, in a signed state- ment, said Jefferson did not know of his plans to negotiate with the French government. Letter to Gerry, January 26, 1799, Ibid., VII, 326. Jefferson accused the Federalists of deliberately drawing up a paper and pretending that it had been presented by Logan to the French government. The purpose, said Jefferson, was to bring his name before the public eye as connected with this transaction. Ibid., VII, 326-327. In a letter to the American Dail Advertiser, January 1A, 1799. Logan denied ever presenting any kind of paper to Talleyrand. Randall, The Life of Thomas Jefferson, II, L66. 332 all about him eager to pick up pieces of casual conversation that could be twisted into ways which would be harmful to his reputation and career.30h When in the company of all but his most intimate friends he kept as silent as possible, ignoring all personal affronts.305 He was convinced that even his mail was tampered with.306 After he had made the mistake of entertaining some guests on Sunday during a visit to Virginia his enemies said this showed absolute proof of his contempt for the Christian reli- gion and his devotion to the new religion of France.307 It was no wonder that Jefferson left his post as presiding officer of the Senate and departed for Monticello on June 27.308 30hLetter to James Lewis, Jr., May 9, 1798, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, X, 36-37. See also Letter to Samuel Smith, August 22, 1798, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 275-276. 305Letter to James Lewis, Jr. May 9, 1798, The Writings of Thoma§;Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, X, 36-37. 306Letter to Madison, April 5, 1798, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 230. Letter to John Taylor, November 26, I798, Ibid., VII, 309. . 307Letter from Robert Troup to King, October 2, 1798, The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King Comprising His Letters, Private and Official His Public Documents and His Seeches, ed., CharIes R. King (New York, I89h-I900), II, h3I-A32. 308Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 606. Other reasons for leaving probably were (1) that he had no vote in the Senate except to break a tie, and measures there could be expected to be passed by large Federalist majorities; (2) that ideas of the Kentucky and Virginia resolution to oppose Federalist measures were already in his mind and he could think them out 333 In August he declared in a rather pessimistic vein, "there is no event however atrocious which may not be ex- pected."309 He was, however, ready to meet "the Maratists of the day" in such a matter "as shall not be derogatory either to the public liberty or my own personal honor."310 As to his own position in foreign affairs he was ready to declare again that he was ready for peace with both Great Britain and France. He was aware that both countries had given us sufficient cause ferns declaration of war, but if we could only wait out the winter he was sure there would be peace between the two European countries and at that time we would receive indemnification from both.311 He believed it to be true that we had a choice with Great Britain and France for peace or war; with Great Britain we had chosen peace, with France, war.312 The policy pursued with France better at home; (3) and then there were friends and political allies in Virginia. Ibid., II, 606-607. Before he arrived home on July 9, the Alien Bill was passed and the treaties with France were declared void. Bowers, Jefferson and Hamil- ton, p. 379. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American PESple, pp. 85-86. Earlier, on June I3, commercial inter- course with France had been suspended. 309Letter to Samuel Smith, August 22, 1798, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 277. 31°Ibid., VII, 277. Schachner is of the opinion that Jefferson, although Vice-President, was perhaps expecting him- self to be charged with sedition. Schachner, Thomas Jeffer- ggg, II, 607. 311Letter to Smith, August 22, 1798, The Writin s of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 277-278. 3121bid., VII, 278. 33A he believed to be a mistake. The written and verbal informa- 313 tion of the envoys plus a letter received from Talleyrand indicated that France had no intention of making war on us and desired fervently to negotiate with Gerry.31h Jefferson was not only thinking of the war measures adop- ted by Congress in recent months in his reference to the Ad- ministration's policy toward France, but of Adams' June 21 message to Congress in which the President stated that he considered negotiations with France at an end and would "never send another minister to France without assurances that he will be received, respected and honored as the representative of a great, powerful, free & independent nation."315 After fully arousing most of the populace in his public essays to the injustices by this country at the hands of France, Hamilton turned next to the job of trying to form a 313A, 3, p,, F, 3., II, 188-191. 31"Letter to Smith, August 22, 1798, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 278. See also Letter to Madison, June 7, I793, Ibig., VII, 268 and Letter to Archibald Stuart, June 8, 1798, Ibid., VII, 269. 315Letter to James Madison, June 21, 1798, Ibid., VII, 27h-275. A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presi- dents, Richardson, I, 266. Adams specifically told Congress that he considered negotiations with France at an end because the original instructions to the envoys were for them not to consent to a loan. Ibid., I, 266. In his letter to Stuart on June 8, Jefferson stated the belief that Gerry would conclude a successful treaty with the French. He said the French in- sisted on a loan but also had offered to eventually pay for un- justifiable attacks on our commerce. Letter to Stuart, June 8, 1798, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VII, 269-270. 335 strong regular army.316 Although he saw nothing to gain in open warfare with France, he saw an advantage in preparation 317 for war. Someday it might be necessary to crush a Jacobin revolution in the United States. In addition to his chief aim in raising an army Hamilton urged further measures to be taken widioutcielay. Among them cutting up all the small privateers and gunboats in the West Indies so as at the same time to distress the French islands and protect our own commerce.319 He wondered also if it would not be wise for the United States to open negotiations with the French West Indies Colo- 316Letter to Wolcott, June 5, 1798, The Worke of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 288. The Commalder-in-Chief of this army naturally would be washington, but Hamilton hoped to be second in command with the post of Inspector-General. Letter to hashington, June 2, 1798, Ibid., X, 287. Letter to Pickering, July 17, 1798, Ibid., X, 297-298. Adams objecped most strongly to Hamilton's appointment, believing Knox and Pinckney entitled to rank next to Washington. Letter to McHenry, August It, 1798, The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States with a Life of the Author, C. F. Adams, VIII, 580. However, with Pickering,‘McHenry and washington Openly supporting Hamilton for the appointment, Adams reluctantly yielded. Letter to Washington, October 3, 1798, Ibid., VIII, 600-601. It was during this incident that Adams became aware, for the first time, of his Cabinet's subservience to Hamilton. Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 378. 317Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 376. Lodge indicates that Hamilton's policy toward France at this particular stage was to maintain a firm and dignified attitude, backed by ships and armed men, followed by a period of quiet waiting until France should wake up and send a minister to this country. Lodge, Alexander_“amilton, pp. 215-216. 318Schachner, Alexander Hamilton: P- 376° 319Letter to Wolcott, June 5, 1798, The Works of Alexan- der Hamilton, Fed., Ed., Lodge, X, 289. 336 nice for the purpose of recognizing their independence under guaranty of this country.320 Hamilton was not content with showing this hostility to France, but told Pickering he was ready to tangle with Great Britain too, if necessary, because of recent violations by that country upon American commerce.321 In his attempt to raise a standing army Hamilton searched about for adequate officers to lead such a group. He was par- ticularly interested in securing the services of one General Louis Duportail, a former Officer of French engineers who had fled to this country int3he early stages of the revolution.322 Hamilton encountered many difficulties throughout the remainder of the year in his attempt to build a standing army from scratch. The Republicans, Adams, and most of the people, were against such a project.323 Although Washington admitted to McHenry, in a draft pre- pared by Hamilton, that the danger of an invasion by France was now remote (December, 1798), because of the extraordinary ever changing military and political events, he saw the BZOIbid., X, 289' 321Letter to Pickering, June 8, 1798, lhiQ-r X: 294- 322Letter to General Duportail, July 23, 1798, Ibid., 1, 298-299 and 298n. I found no reply to this letter in Hamil- ton's correspondence. I 323Schachner, Alexan'er Hamilton, p. 379. The peOple be- gan not only to fear the cost of raising such an army, but the exngge of a war with France. Bowers, efferson and Hamilton, p. . 337 necessity of being prepared for the inevitable. He believed it wise to "cultivate a spirit of self-dependence," while standing aloof from European affairs?”+ A strong army would be extremely helpful in pursuit of such a policy. By this time, however, Hamilton was thinking that the army might better be uSed to seize Spanish possessions in South America.325 If so, France was not to be treated any different than her ally Spain.326 "If universal empire is still to be the pursuit of France, what can tend to defeat that purpose better than to detach South America from Spain?"327 Hamilton had already corresponded with one Francisco Miranda, a Venezuelan revolutionist, whose dream was the liberation of South America with the aid and cooperation Of 328 Great Britain and the United States. It seems that in 32llLetter from Washington to Secretary of War McHenry (draft by Hamilton), December 13, 1798, Morris, Alexander Hamilton and the Foundinggof the Nation, p. A32. This was somefiiat of a repetItion of the FareweIl Address. See pages 236-237 0 325Letter to Francisco Miranda, August 22, 1798, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 316. 326Letter from Hamilton to General Gunn, December 22, 1798, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Hamilton, V, 184. Spain for- sook Great Britain and became an ally of France in 1796. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, p. 86. 327Letter to Harrison Gray Otis, January 26, 1799, 222 WOrks of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 339. 328Letter to Rufus King, August 22, 1798, Ibid., X, 314. Letter to Francisco Miranda, August 22, 1798, Ibid., X, 315-316. 338 his support of such a project Hamilton was letting his dreams of military glory run away with his common sense, although the aid of Great Britain might have made the adventure fea- sible. Probably more important to Hamilton than the liberation of South America was the seizure of the Floridas and Louisiana from Spain lest they should fall into the possession Of France.329 Hamilton's dream, however, did not materialize because Adams failed to endorse the expedition.330 Although he did not desire that the United States shouki go to war with France Hamilton realized, in January, 1799, that a state of war existed between the two countries in the last few months. He suggested to Harrison Gray Otis, a Federalist congressman, that if this onuntry and France had not opened negotiations by August to settle their differences or, if doing so, failed to come to an agreement, he would like to see enacted a law giving the President the power, at his discretion, to declare that a state of war exists between 329Letters to Otis, January 26 and June 27, 1799, Ibid., X, 339. Morris, Alexander Hamilton and the Founding of the Nation, p. 436. Pericles, I803, The Workeof Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 333-334. This anonymous essay by Hamil- ton appeared in the New York Evening Post. It shows how com- pletely Hamilton split with his party on the Louisiana ques- tion. 330Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. 384. In addition Great Britain delayed giving aid tO‘Miranda and the adventurer finally abandoned his scheme. 339 the United States and France. At the same time the Chief Executive should be given the power to use the military forces of the country in a manner of his choosing "for annoying the enemy, and for preventing and frustrating hostile designs of France either directly or indirectly through any of her allies."331 If France was really desirous of peace he be- lieved this plan would see her take steps to bring it about. If she was not, then it was now time to "throw whatever 332 weight we have into the scale opposed to her." Hamilton found time in 1799 to write two more pamphlets 331Letter to Otis, January 26, 1799, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 338. By allies Hamilton meant Spain. Randall says a war against France was the only pretext that Hamilton had for justifying an American attack on Spanish colonies. We were at peace with Spain and there were no di- plomatic controversies. It would be easy to argue that Spain was subservient or dependent on France and that, if her colo- nies were not taken from her, their material resources would be at the disposal Of the European power. The pretext would not cost the United States anything in addition for if this country attacked the Spanish possessions without it France would surely aid Spain and oppose any coalition of which Great Britain was a part. F. S. Oliver states that although Hamilton wanted peace for his country he saw the advantage of a war with France, not because of a hatred of France or because he de- sired a Napoleonic career, but mainly because of the advantages to the United States in obtaining Spanish possessions, thus ending territorial controversies forever. Oliver, Alexander Hamilton;_An Essay on American Union, pp. 394-395. 332Letter to Otis, January 26, 1799, The Works of Alexan- der Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, 338. Some two weeks later Hamilton advised Pickering to verbally assure Toussaint 1' Ouverture on the French island of Santo Domingo that we would, on his declaration of independence, agree to open commercial relations with him, providing due protection be given to our ships and property. However, he was against a formal treaty or written guarantee that could later embarrass the United gzgtes. Letter to Pickering, February 9, 1799, Ibid., X, 3h0 attacking the French Republic. In analyzing the conflict abroad between France and her enemies, he expressed wonder and regret that the French could profess themselves to be the champions of the rights of man when they had inflicted untold horrors upon the peoples of Europe.333 He particularly con- demned France for Offering "liberty to the Germans of Europe at the point of a bayonet." This he declared to be against all the ideas of morality and humanity.‘ The practice of war- fare according tO the law of nations had been to leave the populace alone if they remained peaceably at home and contri- buted to the necessities of their armies; or if they joined the armies of their country to treat them as other soldiers. The present practice of the French, he declared, was to treat the populace as "rebels & criminals."33h He compared the French to the ancient Romans who believed they had the right to be masters of the world with mankind paying homage at their feet.335 The renouncement of Christianity he believed chiefly responsible for the French relapse into barbarianism.336 He did not think that the great Colossus, alluding to the French Directory, would contemplate sparing the United States 333The War in Europe, 1799. Hamilton's writings do not indicate whether or not this essay was published. Ibid., VI, 330-3310 3341bid., VI, 331. 335Ioid., VI, 331-332. 336Ihid., VI, 332. .JQvH 2' 5305.H n9' 'I.fl‘ _ «PI r ‘lI'.’"T an A .VIY' O 0 13 )I.’ ufJ. ,oqei I ' '1 . ' _ D. . . r .‘I .git-L '.x ' -: .: I‘IE iaii J! '.' Hooded e-~ 1'13 and .L'i’: ifj? '1‘) .. . O ‘=~ «of - a noqn ., ,7 ‘36 no} sens! “ .ol ;n+ e do malady" .v r is each: ,F o: sukb1~-_’ ll 9”0£.r' .eI" as 09 diaries ed: fil’ I' 1 -mli lo 8191 ; I . ‘ ... «r.,, '-d . ., ” ,u ; efdfanoqu .';, ;r" 1' unth :03 g uQW ,vmoJ oggnt 12!. n 10 16K:- :.Ir {a ‘ Iv .fi'b‘ ' it ,1? (.1 ‘3hl in its quest for world domination. However, in a patriotic fervor, he declared that a peace-loving America, guided by wisdom and justice and successfully exerting her valor, would be able to break the sword of the tyrant.337 While Hamilton had been occupied with the raising of a standing army in the last six months of 1798, Jefferson was absent from his duties as Vice-President with his return to Monticello, and fully engrossed in his work on the Kentucky 338 Resolutions. Adams' opening address to Congress on December 8, 1798, in which he stated that it would be a humiliation for the United States at this time tosend another mission to France, but that it would be up to France "to take the requisite steps," brought Jefferson back into the whirl of the contro- versial Franco-American relations.339 He was of the Opinion that Adams' speech was of a war-like nature and had probably been written "by the military conclave, and particularly 337Allegerical Device, 1799, Tpid., VI, 333. (Hamilton's writings do not reveal that this essay was published.) 338These and the Virginia Resolutions, written by Madi- son, proclaiming the right and duty of the States tote could give the presidency to Jefferson. Letter from Bayard to Hamilton, January 7, 1801, The Works of Alexander hamilton, Hamilton, VI, 505-507. Morse, The Life of Alexander Hamilton, II, 305. 465Letters to Bayard, December 27, 1800 and January 16, 1801, The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, X, AOA-AOS and Al3-A1A. "66Letter to Bayard, January 16, 1801, Ibid., X, AlA. According to Adams there was no question about Jefferson's loyalty toward his country. In 1809 John Adams submitted to the Boston Patriot a series of letters, the facts of which were drawn from fragments prepared in 1801, but not hereto- fore published. The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States with a Life of the Author, C. F. Adams, IX, 2A0. *In one of these letters he remarked of Jefferson _ "that the accusations against him of blind devotion to France, of hostility to England, of hatred to commerce, of partiality and duplicity in his late negotiations with the belligerent powers, are without foundation." Letter No. 13 to the Printers of the Boston Patriot, 1809, Ibid., IX, 285. "67The final vote was 10 to A, with two states ab- staining. Schachner, Alexander Hamilton, p. A02. 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However, without the open support of the Federa- list leader, Burr could not command the necessary votes for a 68 victory.h According to Chinard, after the victory of the Republi- cans in this election, America no longer found it necessary to be concerned about the politics which seemed to be wreck- ing the old world. The American experiment ceased to be de- pendent upon the issue of the French Revolution.#69 Jefferson was against any future political alliances with European countries. "We have a perfect horror at everything connecting ourselves with the politics of Europe."470 The best course would be to "let every treaty we have drop off without renewal. We call in our diplomatic missions, bare- ly keeping up those to the most important nations. There is a strong disposition in our countrymen to discontinue even A71 these; and very possibly it may be done." Our neutral rights might suffer somewhat at first, but he believed this would only be temporary, for the country'was daily becoming stronger."72 468Morse, The Life of Alexander Hamilton, II, 311-312° hégChinard, Thomas Jefferson, p. 396. 470Letter to William Short, October 3, 1801, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VIII, 98. 4711bid., VIII, 288. A721hid., VIII, 288. 382 Soon after his election Jefferson had an opportunity to show where his true allegiance was centered - in France or the United States. The government of the United States was greatly disturbed, in the spring of 1801, upon hearing of the treaty of San Ildefonso whereby Spain ceded Louisiana to France. It was bad enough that a weak Spain should hold the port of New Orleans, thus blocking American commerce on the Mississippi River to the Gulf of Mexico, but in the hands of a powerful France it was unthinkable}+73 Jefferson's successful negotiations to obtaianouisiana are a story within itself and does not fall within the scope of this paper, but it is noteworthy to point out that his attitude on the San Ildefonso treaty indicates that he would not sacrifice the interests of the United States for those of France. To the Minister in London,Rufus King, he declared this treaty to be "an inauspicious circumstance for us."h7h A few days later in a letter to Monroe, he*wrote: ”There is considerable reason to apprehend that Spain cedes Louisiana and the Floridas to France. It is a policy very unwise, in both, and very ominous to us."z‘L75 h73Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 71A-715. h7hLetter to Rufus King, May 1A, 1801. Cited in David Saville Muzzey, Thomas Jefferson, Figures from American History Series (New York, 1918l, p. 22A. Hereafter referred to as Muzzey, Thomas Jefferson. A75Letter to Monroe, May 26, 1801, The Writings of Thomas Jgfifgxsgn, Ford, VIII, 58. The treaty omitted the mention of 383 When Jefferson heard of Napoleon's dispatch of an army to squelch a rebellion on the Island of Santo Domingo as a preliminary move to the occupation of New Orleans, he informed Livingston, our Minister to France, that the cession of Louisiana completely reversed the political relations of France and the United States}.76 Jefferson believed that in all our foreign relations we had had the fewest points of friction and the most interests in common with France and for this reason esteemed her as our "natural friend." However, one thing might disturb this amiable relationship: There is on the globe one single spot, the possess- or of which is our natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans, to which the produce of three- eighths of our territory must pass to market, and from its fertility it will ere long yield more than half of our fliole produce and contain more than half of our inhabitants. France placing her- self in that door assumes to us the attitude of defiance. Spain might have retained it quietly for years. Her pacific disposition, her feeble state, would induce her to increase our facili- ties there, so that her possession of the place would be hardly felt by us and.it would not per- haps be very long before some circumstance might the Floridas, but it was agreed that certain sections of West Florida would be ceded to Napoleon upon his call after dim- pletion of a general peace. Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, II, 71A. It was not until the spring of 1802 that the treaty of San Ildefonso was an assured fact instead of rumor. John T. Morse, Jr., Thomas Jefferson, American Statesmen, ed., John T. Morse, Jr. (Boston and New York, 1911), p. 210. “76Letter to Robert R. Livingston, April 18, 1802, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,Ford, VIII, 1AA. Toussaint—IT" Ouverture waslleading a Negro revolt which hoped to drive the French from Santo Domingo. Eventually he was defeated but at the cost of twenty-four thousand Frenchmen. Muzzey, Thomas Jefferson, pp. 22A-225 and 230. 38A arise which might make the cession of it to us the price of something of more worth to her. Not so can it ever be in the hands of France. The impetuosity of her temper, the energy and restlessness of her character...render it im- possible that France and the U. S. can continue ong friends when they meet in so irritable a position. They as well as we must be blind if they do not see this; and we must be very im- provident if we do not begin to make arrange- ments on that apothesis. The day that France takes possession of N. Orleans fixes the sen- tence which is to restrain her forever within her low water mark. It seals the union of two nations who in conjunction can maintain ex- clusive possession of the ocean. From that moment we must ma£§¥ ourselves to the British fleet and nation. This was the same Thomas Jefferson speaking who for years was regarded as a friend of France and hater of Great Bri- tain and the Jay Treaty. However, evidence of friendship to France was still apparent when he asked Du Pont de Nemours, the bearer of the above letter, to familiarize himself with its contents soaas to impress upon the French government the consequences Of their taking possession of Louisiana, namely; a war which would place both nations under despotism. Jefferson did not fear the military power of France, should a war occur, but knew that it would necessitate an alliance with Great Bri- tain which might involve us in future European conflicts. He wished a state of friendship could continue between France and the United States. "You know too well how sincere I 477Letter to Livingston, April 18, 1802, The Writingg of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VIII, lAA-1A5. 385 m." #78 have ever been in these dispositions to doubt the News that Spain had been induced by France in July, 1802, to close the port of New Orleans to American shipping was the final breaking point. In a burst of temper Jefferson de- clared, "we stand completely corrected of the error, that either the government or the nation of France has any remains of friendship for us. On the contrary, it appears evident, that an unfriendly spirit prevails in the most important in- dividuals of the government towards us."h7 In a letter to Sir John Sinclair he said, "the events which have taken place in France have lessened in the American mind the mo- tives of interest which it felt in that revolution, and its amity towards that country now rests on its love of peace and commerce.""80 The long honeymoon was over! In the future Jefferson said the United States would no longer tend to favor France in any tussle with Great Britain, but would observe the principles of strict neutrality and take sides only when the actions of other countries required us to do so."81 578Letter from Jefferson to Du Pont, April 25, 1802, Jefferson and Du Pont de Nemours, ed., Dumas Malone, pp. A6-A9. Cited in Randall, The‘Life of Thomas Jefferson, III, 8 and Schachner, Thomas Jefferson, l1, 102A. 479Letter to Livingston, October 10, 1802, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VIII, 173. _ "80Letter to Sir John Sinclair, June 30, 1803, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Lipscomb and Bergh, X, 397. 481Letter to Livingston, October 10, 1802, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Ford, VIII, 173. 386 Hamilton concurred with Jefferson's views that French possession of Louisiana presented a danger to the United States and that the country should take steps to acquire A82 the area. "I have always held that the unity of our empire and the best interests of our nation require that we shall annex to the United States all of the territory east of the Mississippi, New Orleans included."483 Hamilton differed from Jefferson in only one particu- lar. He believed it wiser to seize New Orleans and the Floridas at once rather than waste time negotiating for an area with which Bonaparte would not be willing to part.h8" He did not fear a war with France. The shortcomings of that nation were listed as a crippled and powerless navy, an empty treasury, and a lack of resources. Aid could be counted on from Great Britain with her powerful navy.l"85 Hamilton believed this plan would deter France from enter- ing into a long war whichiuould be harmful to her economy. He would increase the United States army to ten thousand men with militia in order to insure the preservation of the conquest, with provisions taken to call an emergency force “82The Works of Alexander Hamilton, Fed. Ed., Lodge, VI, 333n. "83Letter to General Cotesworth Pinckney, December 29, 1802, Ibid., X, [4.45-1414'60 hghPeriCleS, 1803, Ibid., VI, 33A. This article was printed in the New York EveninggPost, Ibid., VI, 333. A85Ibid., VI, 335. 387 A86 of forty thousand men, if necessary. He recommended also that we enter into negotiations with Great Britain to help us on a moment's notice should we need her. Hamilton had little hope, however, that Jefferson would embark on such a course.487 When Jefferson went beyond this pessimistic prediction and obtained the whole of Louisiana, without a war, Hamil- ton was practically the only Federalist who supported Jeffer- son's action."88 After more than a decade of controversy and difference of opinion as to the position the United States should assume in her policies with France, JefferSOn and Hamilton finally reached a point in their relationship where their views coincided to a greater extent. Although differing in the method of acquiring Louisiana from France, both saw the necessity and importance of the acquisition to insure the future growth and greatness of the United States. 4861bid., VI, 335. 487Ibid., VI, 335-336. 388 CHAPTER VI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS On May 7, 178A Jefferson sailed to France to assist Benja- min Franklin and John Adams in the negotiation of commercial treaties for the new United States., In the following year Congress appointed him Franklin's successor as minister to France, a post he held until October, 1789. From the be- ginning the French received him kindly, and he found the government friendly toward the United States. Jefferson was convinced that America's welfare depended on continued close relationship with France. While placing his country's wel- fare above the French alliance, he nevertheless believed we owed France a debt of gratitude, and thought that France would serve as.a valuable counterpoise against Great Britain. Considering Great Britain as greedy, overbearing and hostile to the United States he regarded her as a country not to be trusted. Friendship with France, according to Jefferson, benefited America because the two countries were complemen- tary to one another. Jefferson expressed admiration for French culture, but not for France's monarchial form of government believing the American republican form to be superior. His aversion to the French type of government was enhanced when he observed it in action. 389 Although sensing the oppression to which the French people were being subjected he deemed the country unready for a revolution; The convocation Of the Assembly of Notab- les in 1787 aroused only mild interest on his part. When it became apparent that political reforms were being con- sidered he urged Lafayette to proceed with caution. Be- lieving France unready for a republican form of government he advocated a constitutional monarchy, like that of Great Britain. Seemingly unaware, at first, that a revolution was occuring before his very eyes Jefferson felt that lack of finances and open criticism of the king and queen would sure- ly lead to an explosion of some sort. He still believed a revolution was not the answer to the problems confronting France and hoped a free constitution without bloodshed would result from the convocation of the States-General. Jeffer- son favOred the demands of the Third Estate over those of the nobility and clergy, the three orders meeting together and voting by persons rather than orders.. He correctly saw this as the determining factor in the success or failure of the work of the States-General and predicted a victory for the Third Estate. Because of his part in his own country's fight for in- dependence Jefferson's advice was sought by the more liberal element of the National Assembly. At first he rejected their advances because of his diplomatic position. However, later, perhaps because of his friendship with Lafayette, or the re- 390 volutionary spirit within him, he agreed to meet with some of the liberal leaders. He proposed a Charter of Rights to Lafayette and his followers providing for a constitutional monarchy which would more equitably divide privileges amongst the classes. This proposal failed to gain the approval of the three orders primarily because it was deemed too much of a sacrifice of privileges on the part of the first two orders and because the Third Estate believed it did not solve the economic problems confronting the nation. With the victory of the Third Estate, Jefferson felt that the revolution, such as it was, had come to an end. In the light of these events it is no wonder then that he was deeply shocked over the attack on the Bastille in July, 1789, and the repercussions that followed. Nevertheless, his sympa- thies were with the revolutionists. Through the years, al- though national self interest and immediate circumstances modified his views, Jefferson retained his enthusiasm for the French and their revolution. This partiality, in the years to come, affected his view of American foreign policy and influenced the domestic development of the United States. Returning to the United States in 1789, Jefferson was appointed Secretary of State. While in that office he clashed.many times with his political foe, Alexander Hamilton, Secretary of the Treasury. One of the chief sources of cleavage was on the policy to be pursued with France. Hamilton, like most Federalists, favored close ties with Great Britain because of our vast commercial trade and cre- 391 dit with that country. He relegated France, our ally in our revolution, to a secondary role. Although grateful to France he believed gratitude should play no part in our diplomatic re- lations with any country. From the very beginning Hamilton was not optimistic about the outcome of the French Revolution. When he saw that the revolution was not only a political revolution, but a social and economic one as well, reflected in attacks on person and property, his conservative instincts rebelled. He saw in the overthrow of the monarchy, the September massacres, and the beheading of the king a threat to stable institutions and property in the United States. Jefferson's attachment to France and her revolution did not abate with his return to the United States. He felt the outcome of that revolution would determine the success or failure of our own government. Failure might bring forth a monarchial form of government abhorrent to his republican principles. He was convinced the revolution would be a success and eventually encompass the Whole world. The rise of the Jacobins and their excesses did not change his con- viction. This shows a definite change in Jefferson's earlier conservative attitude, due to his belief that after a period of trial she was now ready for a republican form of govern- ment. The Federalist contaltion that France was out to wreck the civilization of the world was undoubtedly a contributing factor. One of the first problems confronting the Washington 392 Administration was payment of French loans advanced by that nation during our revolution. Both Jefferson and Hamilton agreed that payment should be made. With the dethronement of the king, however, they felt that there should be a suspen- sion of payment until a legitimate body had come into being. Jefferson believed the National Convention to be the proper recipient and suggested resumption of payment upon the con- vocation Of that body. Hamilton did not favor such payment. He questioned the legitimacy of the Convention and pointed out that if the king were restored to power he might disavow such payments. As a result the payments were suspended and not resumed until Washington agreed, some two months later, at Jefferson's suggestion, to make further payments. Hamilton was not in favor of requested advance payment unless advantageous to us. A controversial point also was the matter of special favors in commercial relations which Jefferson felt were due France because of her purchases from us. Hamilton felt other nations might resent such action on our part. Instead he advocated a new treaty with France. Jefferson believed Hamilton deliberately made this proposal, anticipating its failure, to clear the way for a similar arrangement with Great Britain. Treaty negotiations with France were, indeed, unsuccessful. Because of internal strife in that country a new treaty was vetoed by the Admin- istration. Disagreement as to the Administration's policy toward France, dictated by Hamilton, was a major factor in Jeffer- 393 son's desire to retire at the conclusion Of President Washing- ton's first term Of office. Charges of favoritism toward France and threat Of possible eviction from office, however, caused him to reconsider his retirement. With the outbreak Of war between Great Britain and France in February, 1793, Washington sought the advice of his Cabinet as to what our policy should be. Both Jefferson and Hamilton were for neutrality. Hamilton favored the issuance of a Neu- trality Proclamation, and, with the support of the Cabinet, such a proclamation was issued on April 22, 1793. Jefferson thought it more advantageous to refrain from announcing our intentions and to await offers from other nations for our neu- trality. On the question of whether a new minister should be re- ceived from the French Republic both Jefferson and Hamilton answered in the affirmative. Hamilton reluctantly agreed be- cause he could find no precedent for not doing so, but advo- cated that he be received only with qualifications. These qualifications pertained to our 1778 treaties with France. Jefferson was sure the minister should be received without qualifications. Hamilton urged a suspension Of our treaties with France which he claimed were made with King Louis XVI and not the French Republic. He saw no reason why they could not be de- clared null and void if detrimental to the best interests Of the United States. Jefferson did not share this view, declar- ing the treaties to be between the United States and France 39A and still binding upon us. He declared a treaty could not be dropped or nullified just because it was inconvenient. The only possible exception, according to Jefferson, would be if it should become self-destructive to a nation or impossible to fulfill. In this particular instance Jefferson's views prevailed. Edmund Charles Gengt, the French Minister, was received without qualifications and the validity of the trea- ties was left undefined. Immediately upon his arrival in the United States Gengt's activities in violation of the treaties Of 1778 brought him into conflict with the American government. Sent to the United States with definite instructions to bring us into the war his actions almost caused our involvement. Jefferson cautioned Genet to curb his violations, but to no avail. Perhaps Jefferson was more personal and indiscreet in his relations with Genet than he should have been, but Hamilton was equally as guilty, probably more so, in his private meet- ings with George Hammond, the British Minister. Confidential information imparted to Hammond by Hamilton hampered Jeffer- _ son in his negotiations with Great Britain. The La Petite Democrate incident and Genet's alleged threat to appeal to the American people over Washington's head, fostered and blown out Of proportion by Hamilton, led Jeffer- son to support Hamilton's demand that Gengt be recalled. The Secretary of State deemed ittaetter to incur the wrath of France than to sacrifice the interests of the Republican par- A ty by allowing Genet to remain as minister. However, in the 395 recall letter Jefferson expressed friendly sentiments to France, distinguishing between the conduct of Genet and that of the French nation. Public acceptance of the recall of Genet was stimulated by Hamilton's Pacificus and No Jacobin articles which de- fended Washington's policies of neutrality andaittacked Gengt for his violations of the treaties of 1778., Upon hearing the news Of his recall, Genet condemned officials of the government, particularly Jefferson and Hamil- ton. He demanded of Jefferson the right to appeal to the American people. Because of Genet's actions Hamilton favored his immediate deportation. Jefferson, on the other hand, thought it best to wait for a decision from France, and his suggestion was followed. The new Jacobin government had little use forea Girondist minister and readily agreed to the recall. In a commercial report to Congress in December, 1793. Jefferson commended France for her friendly treatment of<3ur commerce and navigation and mentioned her willingness to enter into a new treaty Of commerce. At the same time he attacked Great Britain for her discriminatory policies. Hamilton again condemned the granting of special favors to France pointing out that such action might involve us in a war with Great Britain. It was his opinion that the future growth of the United States depended a great deal more on favorable commercial relations with Great Britain than the maintenance of friendly relations with France. 396 Jefferson retired from Office on December 31, 1793. An evaluation Of his conduct while Secretary of State re- flects a policy of fairness and impartiality. Although sym- pathetic to France he pursued an objective attitude in his official correspondence with Great Britain, not allowing per- sonal feelings to prejudice or influence his decisions. With Genet's recall attention in foreign affairs was focused on Great Britain. Troublesome relations with Great Britain resulted because, in her desire to subdue France, she committed infringements upon our neutrality. While Jefferson protested these violations against our commerce, Hamilton was inclined to agree with Great Britain's interpretation of international law. New British decrees of November, 1793, and January, 179A, forbidding all trade with the French west Indies, brought the United States perilously close to war. Hamilton, while angry at this turn of events, wished at all costs to avoid such a cOnflict. He was convinced that such a war would up- set our commercial relations, impair our credit, and ruin the financial structure of our nation. Jefferson was also against war, but favored the placing Of an embargo against Great Bri- tain as a retaliatory measure. Anticipating that a war with Great Britain would involve us on the side of France Hamilton wrote a pamphlet entitled Americanus. In it he questioned whether or not the cause of France was truly the cause of liberty and whether our gains would outweigh the evils which might be our lot through such an embroilment. In spite of 397 Hamilton's arguments he was unable to prevent the enactment of a temporary embargo against Great Britain. To effect a settlement of our differences with Great Bri- tain it was thought advisable to send a special envoy to that country. Hamilton was the lOgical choice, but because of ex- treme Republican opposition John Jay was appointed to the post. A draft of Jay's instructions was prepared by Hamilton. The United States was in a position to win favorable concessions from Great Britain. Instead, because of Jay's limited know- ledge of diplomatic intercourse and Hamilton's lack of dis- cretiOn in supplying Hammond with secret information, Great Britain received the maximum benefits from the treaty that was concluded. If Hamilton was disappointed with the treaty he was careful to refrain from expressing his true sentiments. He believed France had no<3ause to find fault with the treaty since it did not change or interfere with our Obligations to her. The treaty was considered a stain on our national honor. Those friendly to France resented concessions to Great Bri- tain similar to those accorded our ally under the treaties of 1778. Jefferson hoped the treaty would not become law be- cause of its unwarranted demands. In spite of considerable Opposition it was ratified by the Senate in June of 1795. Although Hamilton was not entirely satisfied with the treaty, in a series of papers entitled Camillus he urged its acceptance believing it best to avoid open hostilities with Great Britain at a time when it might check or wreck the fu- ture growth of the United States. In defending the Jay Treaty 398 he declared it had averted war with Great Britain and that the main Objective had thus been attained. These articles played an important part in swaying public opinion to favorable acceptance of the treaty. While our foreign relations in l79A-95 were chiefly con- cerned with Great Britain neither Jefferson nor Hamilton lost sight Of the importance of France in our affairs. This was because Of two important factors; namely, whether or not the Jay Treaty violated our 1778 treaties with France, and the effects of internal developments in that country upon our own domestic affairs. In Horatius, written after Hamilton's re- tirement at the end of January, 1795, because of continued hostility against the Jay Treaty, he attacked the Republican party for what he termed their faithless and unworthy conduct. He advocated peace and trade with all nations and political connections with none. His views here clearly indicate no change in his attitude toward France. With the coming presidential election Hamilton endeavored to expose the true character of the French nation in an essay entitled France. He reviewed Franco-American relations from the American Revolutionary War to 1796. While acknowledging the aid that France had given us during our struggle for in- dependence he pointed out that after the war interests of the two nations were no longer in accord. He condemned the three ministers, Genet, Fauchet, and Adet for their interference in our internal affairs. Jefferson, in retirement at Monticello during the years 399 179A to 1796, made few references to France. It is clearly indicated, however, that his interest in that country and in her objectives had not changed. France, angry over the signing of the Jay Treaty and our affront in removing the pro-French Monroe, as Minister to France, ordered Adet to work for the election of Jefferson to the presidency Of the United States. Such an election they hoped would restore relations between the two countries to the level on which they were prior to the Jay Treaty. They de- sired also tO conclude a new Franco-American treaty to offset the controversial Jay Treaty. Adet worked faithfully for the election Of Jefferson al- though he felt he could not be counted upon to favor France. He believed Jefferson's admiration for France stemmed from his hatred of Great Britain rather than sincere friendship for France. The subsequent failure of Jefferson to win the presi- dential election caused a further widening of the breach be- tween France and the United States. In retaliation against the Jay Treaty the French govern- ment announced a new commercial decree (July 2, 1796) treating neutral vessels as the British would treat them. This action resulted in the loss of privileges accorded us under our trea- ties with France. At the same time the French government announced the suspension of Adet's functions until the United States assumed a more favorable policy toward France. The end of Washington's second term of Office saw a shift in world power from Great Britain to France. Aware of the AOO threat to our country because of this, Washington and Hamilton, as co-authors Of Washington's Farewell Address, urged strict American neutrality in European alliances and wars. The imme- diate purpose of the document was to check French interference in American domestic affairs and to aid the Federalists in the election of 1796. Hamilton's animosity toward France was reflected again at this time in a series of essays. He pointed out that France had ulterior motives in offering us her aid during our revolu- tion. He condemned France for her violations of neutral rights at sea and advocated open warfare unless she changed her policy. Attacks on the Christian religion stemming from the French Re- volution were severely criticised in Hamilton's Fragment of the French Revolution. Instead of fostering the ideals of liberty Hamilton saw the revolution as the breeding place Of despotism and Oppression. Because of French disregard of neutrality rights, many Americans called for war. Hamilton, however, urged the adop- tion of a more cautious attitude and suggested the sending of a mission like that sent to Great Britain some two years earlier. Although there was opposition to this plan, Hamil- ton was able to convince most Federalist leaders of its fea- sibility. His sincerity to try to come to some agreement with France is indicated in his advocacy of a bi-partisan commission. The rejection of C. C. Pinckney, Monroe's successor as minister to France, helped to make Hamilton's plan more acceptable. Meanwhile he favored a program of A01 national defense. John Adams appointed a mission early in 1797 consisting of Elbridge Gerry, C. C. Pinckney and John Marshall. Al- though favoring rigid instructions to the envoys at first, Hamilton felt later they should be of a nature more amiable to France. Jefferson was not too happy over the prospect that the mission would be composed of Federalists. However, he ex- pressed joy that Gerry, sympathetic to Republican principles, was one of the appointees and urged that he accept the post. Believing the primary purpose of the mission to be that of preserving peace Jefferson felt it to be in our best inter- ests to endure the violations upon our neutral rights a few months longer in order to attain this Objective. He be- lieved a war could be avoided if we could remain neutral the rest of the year. He was confident France would emerge the winner in the existing war. He advocated a Republican program to counteract Federalist warlike measures, citing .specifically the arming Of private vessels, which he thought brought the threat of war to the danger point. A crisis was reached when the three envoys were sent to France to discuss new treaties with the Directory, then in control of affairs. Secret agents, later designated as X, Y and Z, insisted that certain provisions be fulfilled be- fore an audience would be granted them with Talleyrand, the Foreign Minister. These provisions were the payment of a large sum Of money to the Directory and the recall of cer- tain defamatory remarks against France contained in.a speech A02 made by President Adams on May 16, 1797, to the United States Congress. This expedient of’exacting tribute shocked the American envoys. Negotiations were severed and Pinck- ney and Marshall returned to the United States almost imme- diately. Gerry, the third envoy, remained at Talleyrand's request, leaving France in August of 1798. The January 8, 1798 French decree, so unfavorable to our commerce, together with the dispatches announcing the failure Of the mission, aroused the ire of the country and filled the American people with a spirit Of war. Commer- cial intercourse with France was suspended, steps were taken tolstrengthen our armed forces and the Alien and Sedition Bills were passed. In a speech to Congress on June 21, Adams declared he would never again send a minister to France unless assured that he would be received without qualifications. Jefferson was extremely disappointed at this turn of events. He found solace in the belief, however, that the whole X Y Z Affair had been manufactured by the Federalists. But even if the story was true, he did not believe it justi- fied a war. After the truth of the X Y Z Affair was sub- stantiated by Gerry, Jefferson was still of the firm belief that Talleyrand and the Directory had no prior knowledge of it. The fact that many Republicans were supporting Federa- list war measures caused Jefferson great concern. He urged instead the active support of a defense program and resistance A03 against external measures. He was alarmed, too, over the ac- tions of the Congress fearing an actual declaration Of war might ensue. In spite of all these adverse circumstances he was still of the Opinion that we should endure a little long- er and avoid any action that might have such a result. How- ever, should such a war take place he made it known very em- phatically that he would stand firmly with the United States. What were Hamilton's reactions to the events taking place during this period? After the mission had departed President Adams consulted his Cabinet as to the course to follow should the mission fail. Should war be declared or would they re- commend an embargo? What steps should be pursued with refer- ence to other European powers, particularly Great Britain? hamilton's advice was sought by the Cabinet on these ques- tions, revealing that he, although not a member of that body, was dictating the policies of the Administration instead of Adams. He declared himself to be against a war with France, but advocated strong defense measures and a suspension of our treaties with France. He was against an embargo or an alliance with Great Britain, but favored cooperative measures to safe- guard our position. With the failure of the mission he ex- pressed the wish that a letter be sent to both Houses of Congress with a summation Of French violations and infrac- tions, also to call to mind again her failure to receive our envoys. Hamilton feared the American people would not accept the policy of the government because of their attachment to the AOA French nation. Although he was able to mold what he thought the correct policy of the government toward France through the medium of his followers in the Cabinet, the Federalist leader was afraid the American people needed a great deal of awakening before they would accept willingly or understand fully such a policy. In his estimation they had become so attached to the revolutionary principles of their old ally that they were unable to see the despotic nature of that government and the dangers it offered to the United States. He alerted the American peOple to this grave situation in a series of articles entitled The Stand. This undoubtedly was Hamilton's most passionate outburst against France and her revolution. In a summary of Franco-American relations from the be- ginning of the French Revolution through the X Y Z Affair he attempted to Show that France and not the United States was responsible for past and present friction between the two republics. Anticipating an end of the war in Europe, Hamilton cited four courses open to the United States in her future conduct with France. 1. Surrender; 2. the remodeling of the American government to the dictates of France; 3. the paying of tri- bute and A. resistance on our part, thus inviting a possible invasion. Hamilton blamed the Republican party's sympathy for France as the responsibility for our troubles with her. A scathing denouncement of Jefferson and the Republican party was also contained in writings entitled Detector and A French A05 Faction wherein he accused the Republicans Of working for the interests of France and against those of Great Britain. hamilton's pet project throughout 1798-99 was the rais- ing of a large standing army to resist an invasion by France or perhaps to be used in attacking Louisiana and the Flori- das owned by Spain, then an ally of France. Although an in- vasion did not take place, the United States became involved in an undeclared naval war with France which was to last for nearly three years. In an effort to bringeabout more amiable relations be- tween France and the United States one Dr. George Logan took it upon himself to voyage to France in the summer of 1798. He took this step as a private citizen and without diplomatic sanction. His actions created a furore in the United States and heaped censure upon Jefferson for his alleged encouragement and aid. Jefferson denied knowledge of the purpose of the mission and contended he had merely supplied letters of introduction and references as to Logan's character. Although Logan's mission fell short of its goal he was able to effect the release of American sailors in French prisons and to lift an embargo on American ships in French ports. This mission was climaxed by the enactment of a law forbidding private citizens to negotiate with foreign governments without express authorization of the United States government. In an address to Congress on December 8, 1798, Adams bitterly condemned the sending of another mission to France A06 stating such a step would place us in a most humiliating po- sition. He said it was now up to France to make the first overtures and voiced again, as he had in his June 21 speech, that approval of the mission would be absolutely contingent upon assurances that our minister would be received without qualifications. Adams' speech was distasteful to Jefferson, who termed it Of a warlike nature. Jefferson believed France again ready to negotiate with us; in fact, he felt we might even be able to gain a liberal treaty without sacrificing the Jay Treaty. Realizing her error in the X Y Z Affair France was anxious to restore herself in our good graces. She knew she had everything to lose and nothing to gain in a war with the United States. Jefferson, though well aware that France was guilty of violations against our neutral rights and deserving of just and rational censure, was not in favor of the condemna- tion heaped upon her. Although not blinded to France's attacks against us he still hoped for the success of the French Revolution. He expressed the belief that the mission would have succeeded had Marshall and Pinckney been of the same opinion as Gerry. He still believed a proper mission the best way to settle our differences. Steps taken by France to correct her mistakes on Ameri- can policy may be traced indirectly to Jefferson's influence. Believing a restoration of friendly relations necessary to save the Republican party Jefferson suggested to Victor Du Pont that France approach the United States with conciliatory A07 gestures. Du Pont, in turn, passed these suggestions on to Talleyrand. In an effort to reopen negotiations between the two countries Talleyrand sent a special agent, Pichon, to the Hague to win the friendship of William Vans Murray, the United States Minister. He let it be known that France would be willing to receive a minister from the United States under the terms stipulated by President Adams. With Talleyrand's willingness to receive a new minister the course was open for Adams, who sincerely desired peace, to end our hostilities with France. On February 18, 1799, he appointed Murray as United States Minister to France. This unexpected action aroused the anger of the Federalists, but naturally pleased the Republicans. Later, because of Hamil- ton's manipulations, Adams was forced to name a commission consisting of William R. Davie, Oliver Ellsworth, and Murray. The idea of a commission was Hamilton's who did not believe Murray strong enough for such a mission, but did not go along with extremists who would have entirely blocked the mission. Although enthusiastic over Adams' decision to reopen ne- gotiations with France, Jefferson saw ulterior motives in the actions of the President. He believed Adams had known for some time of Talleyrand's willingness toeaccept a new minister, but had withheld the information. Only the threat of exposure prompted his making it public at this time. He charged the President with attaching conditions to the mission to embarrass France and hoped secretly that the Senate would reject them. Jefferson was greatly mistaken. The last thing A08 Adams wanted was a war. Because of internal disturbances in France there was a delay of several months in the sending of the mission. The commission finally set sail on November 3, 1799, although Hamilton had urged a still further delay. When theyaarrived in Paris on March 2, 1800, a new government, The Consulate with Napoleon Bonaparte as First Consul, confronted them. After six months of negotiation a compromise treaty was effected on September 30, 1800. If the misSion could have arrived during the summer of 1799, when France was suffering serious military defeats, undoubtedly a much more favorable agreement might have been Obtained than the one ultimately concluded. The chief benefits to the United States from the Conven- tion of 1800 were that the treaties of 1778 were suspended and protection of American commerce was guaranteed. Payment of indemnities for damages inflicted upon American shipping were left for discussion at a later date. At first the United States Senate rejected the Convention. Although not altogether satisfied with the Conventicncaf 1800, Hamilton expressed his approval and urged its ratification. His attitude was probably influenced by the might of France. He believed, too, that it would end our difficulties with France and reflect credit on the Federalist party. Jefferson had little to say about the treaty other than that it contained some disagreeable features which might prove troublesome. It was his Opinion that the Convention A09 had been handled in an unskillful manner. Adams again submitted the Convention to the Senate, and with a few slight changes, it was ratified by that body on February 3, 1801. With the changes agreed to by France final ratification was effected on December 27, 1801. The unde- clared war with France was officially concluded. Probably the most reassuring factor in Franco-American re- lations, along with the ratification of the Convention, was the election of Jefferson to the presidency in 1800. Jefferson was attacked unmercifully in the campaign by the Federalists for his pro-French views. His patriotism was questioned, and supposed intrigues with Genet, Fauchet, and Adet were again brought to the forefront. It was prophe- sied that if elected he would turn the country into an image of France. He was labeled the American Bonaparte, and it was predicted he would aid the French in an invasion of the United States. Placing Jefferson in the same category as Bonaparte was an injustice. In reality Bonaparte's actions were causing Jefferson grave concern. He wondered if the freedom of the French nation was not being placed in jeopardy. In a wishful vein, however, he held out the hope that Bona- parte might give more freedom to the French nation. Jefferson had the opportunity to show the country, when he became President, where his true alliegance was centered - with France or the United States. The threat to the United States by France's purchase of Louisiana from Spain in 1802 provided the opportunity. AlO Jefferson believed that as long as France possessed the New Orleans area she could no longer be considered a friend of the United States. He claimed this completely reversed the poli- tical relations of France and the United States. He was afraid, too, that failure of the United States to acquire the port of New Orleans would make it necessary to ally ourselves with Great Britain as a matter of expediency. He hoped that somehow friendly relations with France might still prevail. However, the closing Of the port of New Orleans shattered this dream and brought his patience dangerously close to the break- ing point. He proclaimed angrily that we could no longer favor France in any struggle with Great Britain, but would instead maintain a strict neutrality, taking sides only when forced to do so. This reflects a marked change in Jeffer- son's previous attitude toward France. Ultimately Jefferson was able through negotiations to solve our difficulties with France. Although he originally sought only the port of New Orleans, our representatives were able to purchase the whole of Louisiana. Jefferson thought perhaps the French were now ready to decide in favor of the American form of government - a single executive rather than a plural executive as now existent in that country. He feared, however, that France would suffer internal disorders fOr a number of years to come. According to Jefferson the government of France was controlled by mili- tary rather than civilian authority. From this it can be seen that with Bonaparte's assumption of power, Jefferson All was torn between the hope that things might turn out well and the fear, only too justified, that they would not. In spite of the accusations against Jefferson he Ob- tained enough votes to tie Burr for the presidency. Hamil- ton was instrumental in overcoming Federalist opposition to Jefferson's election. Most Federalists favored Burr. The outstanding exception was Hamilton. If ever the Federalist leader had an opportunity to thrust revenge upon his chief political adversary - this was the time. However, Hamilton felt the public good could best be served by the election of Jefferson to the presidency. He believed there was no fair reason to think Jefferson could be corrupted, which was more than could be said for Burr. Amongst grievances cited by Hamilton against Burr were his pro-French views. On the other hand, he was of the Opinion that Jefferson's sympa- thies toward France had abated considerably. Hamilton like Jefferson believed the United States should acquire Louisiana, differing only in one particular. Rather than waste time in negotiating with France he favored outright seizure of the area. Because of her weakened con- dition he thought a war with France unlikely. If such a . conflict should develop he felt we could rely upon Great Britain for aid. This attitude attests to the fact that Hamilton's dislike of France and his preference for Great Britain remained unchanged. While most Federalists opposed Jefferson in his acqui- sition of Louisiana, Hamilton supported Jefferson's policy, A12 once again putting the interest of his country over that of; party. After years of controversy and strife Jefferson and Hamil- ton, shortly before Hamilton's death, had apparently reached a point in their relationship where they were in closer har- mony, even on the delicate question of our relations with France. A13 BIBLIOGRAPHY BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AIDS A number of bibliographical aids were consulted in this study. Extremely valuable in the field of American diplomacy and superior to any work of its kind was Samuel Flagg Bemis and Grace Gardner Griffin, Guide to the Diplogatic Histogy of the United States, 1795-1921 (washington, 1935). Also help- ful were the bibliographical notes at the end of Chapter IV in Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American ngplg (New York, fifth edition, 1955), and the notes in re- lated chapters of Volume IV in Edward Channing, A History of the United States, 6 Vols. (New York, 1917). Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, ed., Dictionagy of Amer- ican Bio ra h , 22 Vols. (New York, l928-AA), constitutes a ready and available source for both primary and secondary ma- terial pertaining to Jefferson and Hamilton. Additional bio- graphical aids were found in the "Appendix to Sketch" of Jefferson, Volume II, Samuel F. Bemis, The American Secreta- ries of State And Their Di lomac , lO Vols. (New York, 1927-29), and in the biography contained in Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time, 2 Vols., Jefferson The Virginian and Jefferson ang the Rights of Man (Boston, 19A8-51). Primary Material In a study of this nature the student is often handi- AlA capped by the inadequate facilities of just one library. This study is no exception. The author found it necessary in addi- tion to the use of the Michigan State University Library, and its Inter-Library Loan service, to avail himself of the faci- lities of the University of Michigan Graduate Library, Ann Arbor, and the Michigan State Government Library in Lansing. When the papers now being edited at Princeton, Julian P. Boyd, ed., Lyman H. Butterfield and Mina R. Bryan, assoc. eds., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton, 1950 - ), are completed they will supersede all previous editions. To date only fifteen of the fifty-two proposed volumes have appeared. Although the published volumes touch briefly on the period encompassed in my study, they were of no value to me since my research was completed before their appearance. The best of the present editions, especially pertaining to Jefferson's political writings, is Paul Leicester Ford, ed., The Writingg of Thomgngefferson, lO Vols. (New York and London, 1892-99). This edition proved of immeasurable value. Because of the absence of one volume in the collection at the Michigan State University Library, the author found it necessary to use also Paul Leicester Ford, ed., The Work§_gf Thomas Jeffersqg, Federal Edition, 12 Vols. (New York and London, l9OA-05), at the University of Michigan. This is a duplicate of the earlier Ford edition. Larger, but much less reliable, than Ford, because of errors in transcription, is Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, eds., The Writingg of Thomas Jefferson, 20 A15 Vols. (Washington, D. C., l903-OA). The facilities of the University of Michigan Library were used because this set was not available in local libraries. Reference was made, although to a much lesser degree, to H. A. Washington, ed., The Writings of Thomas Jefferson beingghis Autobiogpgpgy, Reports, Messages, Addresses, and other Writings,_0fficial and Private, 9 Vols. (New York, 1853-5A), also only available at the University of Michigan. With the forthcoming publication of the multi-volume Syrett edition of The Papers of Alexander Hamilton a vacuum will be filled for Hamiltonian scholars, as is now being. done for Jeffersonian scholars through the Boyd edition. For my purpose the source most frequently referred to was Henry Cabot Lodge, ed., The Works of Alexander Hamilton, 9 Vols. (New York and London, 1885-86), and Henry Cabot Lodge, ed. The Works Of Alexander Hamilton, Federal Edition, 12 Vols. (New York and London, l9OA). Use of the Federal Edition at the.Michigan State Government Library was necessary because of missing volumes in the older Lodge edition at Michigan State University. The University has recently acquired a set Of the Federal Edition, a replica of the earlier works. Although the editorial comments of both editions are some- what prejudiced, no less so are those of John C. Hamilton, ed., The WOrksénglexander Hamilton; comprising His Correspondence, and His Pglitical and Official'Writingg, Exclusive o§_§gg Federalist Civil and Milita , 7 Vols. (New York, 1850-51). The chronological arrangement is better than in the Lodge A16 editions, but again, because it was not available at Michigan State University Library, the Lodgs works were used to a greater extent. The most recent and only one volume edition of Hamilton's writings is contained in Richard B. Morris, ed., Alexander ngilton and the Foundingyof the Nation (New York, 1957). This is valuable because it contains sources not found in earlier writings, the editor having access to the material being compiled by Syrett and his associates. Some standard editions of contemporary statesmen were useful in supplementing the writings of Jefferson and Hamil- ton. John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manugcript Sources 1255-1229, 39 Vols. (Washington, l93l-AA), superior to other works of its kind, reflects the President's efforts to maintain a middle position between Jefferson and Hamilton. Charles Francis Adams, ed., The WOrks of John Adams,_Second Presigent of thg United States, with A Life of the Author, Notes and Illustra- pgggg, lO Vols. (Boston, 1850-56), pictures a determined President in pursuit of what he believed to be the correct policy toward France, in spite of opposition within his own party. One Of the best sources reflecting the opinions of Hamilton's partisans is Charles R. King, ed., The Life and Correspondence of Rufus KingCogprisingHis Letterg, Private and Official, His Public Documents and his Speecheg, 6 Vols. (New York, 189A-1900). A primary source valuable for its running commentary on the French Revolution, as well as for the documents it con- A17 tains, is John Hall Stewart, ed., A Documentary Survey of the French Revolution (New York, 1951). Gilbert Chinard, The Letters of Lafayette ang;Jefferson with an introduction and notes, The John Hopkins Studies in International Thought (Baltimore, Maryland and Paris, 1929), contains letters reflecting Jefferson's attitude on French affairs, not found in the standard editions of Jefferson's writings. Frederick J. Turner, ed., "Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791-1797," in Annual Report of the American Historical Aggociation fog_§hg year 1903, Seventh Report of the Historical Manuscripts Commission, 2 Vols. (Washington, 190A), gives a report on American political affairs by outsiders,,and.the effect upon their country. . Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., "Letters of William Vans Murray to John Quincy Adams, 1797-1803," Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the year 1912 (washington, 191A), shows Murray's efforts to bring about the restoration of amicable relations between the United States and France following the X Y Z Affair. Jefferson is depicted as an innocent by-stander in the controversial mission which resulted in theLogan Act in Deborah Norris Logan, Memoir of Dr. George Loggn of Stentqg, ed., Frances A, Logan (Philadelphia, 1899). Qggette Nationale,gou Le Moniteur Universal substantiates that some of Jefferson's ideas were contained in Lafayette's Declaration of the Rights of Man. A18 A brief reference was made to Oscar Browning, ed., Despatches from Pari§,1788-1790, Camden, 3rd Ser., XIX, 2 Vols. (London, 1909-10). The Historical Index to Pickering Pa ers, VIII, contained in Collections of the Massachusetyg Historical Society 6th Series (Boston, 1896) was consulted for Hamilton's knowledge of the X Y Z Affair, prior to its dis- closure to the public. Invaluable for Franco-American relations in the 1780's, especially for the correspondence between Jefferson and John Jay is The Diplomatic Correspondence of the United Statg§_g§ America from the signing of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, lOth September,gl783, To the Adoption of the Constitution, March A, 1289. Being The Letters of the Presidentg of Con ress, The Secretary for Foreign Affairs - American.Minister§_g§ Foreign Courts, Foreign Ministers near Congress - Reports Of Qgggittee§_of Conggggg and_Report§ of the Secretaryfor Foreign Agfairs on Various Lettegggand Communicationgz together with Letters from Individuals on Public Affairg, 3 Vols. (City of Washington, 1837). A must for any diplomatic study of this period are Walter Lowrie and Matthew St. Clair, eds., American State Pa ers;,Foreign Relationg. Documents Legislative and Execgpgyg of the Congress of the United Stgpgg, From the First Session of the First to the Third Session of the Thirteenth Congress, Inclusive; Commencing March 3, 1289 and Ending March 3, 1815, 38 Vols., edited under authority Of Congress (Washington, 1832-61). Important to me were references in these papers A19 to correspondence between Jefferson and Genét, not found else- where in the writings of the Secretary of State, references to British and French decrees affecting American commerce, and a complete text of the X Y Z Affair. Also useful as a guide to any diplomatic study, but limited because of the lack, in many cases, of accompanying documents, is James Daniel Richardson, ed., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, 10 Vols. (Washington, 1896-99). Helpful in my study were the messages of Adams to Congress during the undeclared war with France. WOrthington Chauncey Ford, ed., The Journals of the Continental Congress, l77A-1789, Library of Congress, 3A Vols. (Washington, l9OA-37), is indispensable to the historian in the diplomacy Of the American Revolution. For my purpose it was an excellent source of information on the Franco-American treaties of 1778. A source useful for background material was Frederick J. “Turner, ed., "Selections from the Draper Collection in the Possession of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin to Elucidate the Proposed French Expedition Under George Rogers Clark Against Louisiana, In The Years 1793-9A," Annugl Repggp of the‘Aggrican Hjstorical Association for the Year 1896, 2 Vols. (Washington, 1897). Secondary Material - Books General: Although no single secondary source was satisfactory in the coverage of Franco-American relations during the French A20 Revolution there were several sources which, together, contri- buted to a satisfactory background and worth-while understand- ing of the period. Two sources which added to the author's general knowledge of the French Revolution were A. Aulard, The French Revolution: A Political Histwory, 1283-1801,, trans. Bernard Miall (_ng Revolution under the Monarchy, 1289-1792), A Vols. (London, 1910), perhaps the best political history on the subject, and Louis Madelin, The French Revolution, ed., Fr. Funck-Bretano (London, 1933), the best one volume work. Four standard texts on American diplomacy valuable to the author were Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the Agerican PeOple (New York, Fifth Edition, 1955), Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York, 19A7), John H. Latane and David M. Wainhouse, A History Of Agggican Foreigg Policy (Garden City, New York, 193A), and Carl Russell Fish, American Diplomacy, American Historical Series, Ath Edition (New York, 1923). Perhaps the best account of Franco-American relations from 1795 to 1800 is given in Volume IV of Edward Channing, A History of the United States, 6 Vols. (New York, 1917). The most recent and probably the best work on Franco- American affairs is Alexander DeConde, Entangling Alliance: Politics & Diplomacy unger George Washingtgg (Durham, N. C., 1958). This book is the first to deal with the interaction of politics and diplomacy centering on the French alliance of 1778, in the Washington years, and the second book to A21 treat the alliance as a central theme. A recent treatment of the Federalist period which has a good account of the Jefferson-Hamilton controversy is Nathan Schachner, The Founding Faphers (New-York, 195A). Valuable in my research was the material on the Adams Administration. Charles Downer Hazen, Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution, John HOpkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, ed., Herbert B. Adams, XVI (Baltimore, 1897) contains a valuable chapter on Jeffer- son's residence in France as United States Minister. . A complete text of Lafayette's Declaration of the Rights Of Man is found in Eugene Blum, La declaration des DrOites de l'Home et du Citoyen (Paris, 1902). Two specific works which excellently reflect Jefferson's foreign policy as Secretary of State are Volume II, Samuel Flagg Bemis, The American Secretaries of State And Their Diplomacy, lO Vols. (New York 1927-29), and William Kirk Woolery, The Relation of Thomas Jefferson to American nggigg Policy. 1783-1793 (Baltimore, 1927). ’ Maude Howlett WOOdfin, gigggen Gengt and His Mission (Chicago, 1928), is by far the best work on the French Minis- ter and extremely helpful because of its references to Jeffer- son and Hamilton. Another source protraying the relationship between Jefferson and Genét, but used to a lesser extent in my study, is George Clinton Gengt, Waghington, Jegferson and "Citizen" Gengt,l793 (Chicago, 1903). The importance of Great Britain's part in Franco-American A22 relations is revealed in Samuel F. Bemis, Jay's Treaty,,A Study in Commerce and Diplomaey (New York, 1923). This is the finest work of its kind and eSpecially helpful in the study of Anglo-American relations during the Federalist period. Victor Hugo Paltsits, Washington's Farewell Addreeg (New York, 1935), and Horace Binney, An Inquiry into the Forma- tion of Washington's Farewell Address (Philadelphia, 1859), paint Hamilton as the co-author of Washington's Farewell Address. Beckles Willson, America's Ambassadors to France (1777- 1927): A Narrative of Franco-American Diplomatic Relationg (New York, 1928) has a good account of the X Y Z Affair controversy, but a more detailed description can be found in Volume II, John Bach McMaster, A History of the People of the United StategyFrom the Revolution to the Civil War, 8 Vols. (New York, l88A-l9l3). An extensive account of Hamilton's life is given by his grandson in John C. Hamilton, Hipppry of the Republic o§_ppp United States as traced in the Writings of Alexander Hamilton gpg_of His Contemporaries (Philadelphia, 1857-6A). Although biased, and not too well documented, it is of value because of the Hamilton letters it contains. Bernard C. Steiner, The Life and Correspondence of Jamgp McHenry - Secretary of ngfiUnder waphington and Agggg (Cleve- land, 1907), shows the influence of Hamilton's ideas on a member of the Cabinet. 7 The development of liberal organizations in the United A23 States, during the decade of the 1790's is presented in Eugene Perry Link, Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790-1800, Columbia Studies in American Culture, No. 9 (New York, 19A2). . Two sources, not pertaining directly to this study, but of some value were Eloise Ellery, Brissot de Warville; A Study in the History of the French Revolution (Boston and New York, 1915), and Allan B. Magruder, John Marshall, American Statesmen, ed., John T. Morse, Jr. (Boston and New York, 1885). Biography: The available secondary literature on Jefferson's life is enormous. The student will find information relating to practically every phase of his career. Perhaps the best and most reliable biography is Nathan Schachner, Thomas Jefferson A Biography, 2 Vols. (New York, 1951), a scholarly, well documented book of considerable overall value in my study. Of the older biographies, although extremely pro-Jefferson, the best if Henry S. Randall, The Life of Thomas Jefferson, 3 Vols. (New York, 1858), an excellent Source because of the letters and documents it contains. Three important books for chapters dealing with Jefferson as Minister to France are Marie Kimball, gggferson The Scene of Europe, 178A to 1789 (New York, 1950), in which the author has drawn extensively from the available sources of the period, Gilbert Chinard, Thomas Jefferson The Apostle of Americanisg (Boston, 1929), a reliable, short biography which emphasizes the intellectual aspect of Jefferson's career, and Volume II, Jefferson and the Rights of Man in Dumas Malone, Jefferson A2A and His Time, 2 Vols. (Boston, 19A8-51). The last mentioned book is an excellent multi-volume biography of Jefferson (four volumes are contemplated), but limited in my work in that it ends with the year 1792. An interesting account of Jefferson's EurOpean travels, while minister, but of little pOlitical worth, is recorded in Edward Dumbauld, Thomas Jefferson American Tourist Being an Account of His Journeys in the United States of America, England, France,,Italy, the Low Countries ang Germany (Oklahoma, 19A6). V A book frankly hostile toward Jefferson is Meade Minnigerode, Jefferson, Friend of France; The Career of Edmund Charles Gengt as Revealed in His Private Paper§ (1763- 2§951 (New York, 1928). The title is misleading. It is really a biography of Genet. Although valuable for its source materials, caution should be employed in its interpre- tation. Several additional biographies, somewhat limited, but nevertheless of value in this study were John T. Morse, Jr., Thomas Jefferson, American Statesmen (Boston and New York, 1911), David Saville Muzzey, Thomas Jefferson, Figures from American History Series (New York, 1918), older biographies which give a brief general treatment Of Jefferson, James Truslow Adams, Tpe LivinggJefferson (New York and London, 1936), anaattempt to explain the origin and nature of Jefferson's political ideas and his application of them to public life, to be used with prudence because of the author's A25 prejudice against the new deal, Saul K. Padover, Jefferson (New York, l9A2), a well documented account, and Adrienne Koch, Jefferson and Madison, the Great Collaboration (New York, 1950), which shows the interplay of ideas between the two statesmen. A check of biographies of Hamilton will find the printed literature on this American statesman limited in comparison with that of Jefferson. There is, at present, no completely satisfactory work on Alexander Hamilton's life. A dire need exists for the undertaking of such a prOject. The bi- centennial celebration of his birth (1957) resulted in some effort along this line, but nothing of intrinsic value has appeared so far. 'The best of the recent biographies is Nathan Schachner, Alexander Hamilton (New York and London, 19A6). This is a readable and well documented work, but written in a detached manner and lacking in opinion. A lack of objectivity marks the Older biographies of Hamilton.- Of most value perhaps, although extremely biased in Hamilton's favor, is Henry Cabot Lodge, Alexander Hamilton, American Statesmen (Boston and New York, 1882). Its use is essential in a study of this na- ture. It gives a well written account of Hamilton's life. John T. Morse, Jr., The Life of Alexangg;_Hamilton, 2 Vols. (Boston, 1876), and William Graham Sumner, Alexander Hamilton, Makers of America Series (New York, 1890) are two other pro-Hamilton accounts that are noteworthy. Frederick Scott Oliver, Alexander Hamilton; An Essay on American Union (New York, A26 1906), is extremely partisan and lacks continuity in the arrangement Of events. A popular, unprejudiced, but none too scholarly account of Hamilton is David Loth, Alexander Hamilton: Portrait of a Prodigy (New York, 1939). Valuable for an overall view of the clash between Hamil- ton and Jefferson, but limited within the scope of my work, is Claude Gernade Bowers, Jefferson and Hamilton, The Struggle for Democracy in America (Boston and New York, 1925). This author makes use of many newspaper accounts of the day, is frankly favorable to Jefferson and distinctly hostile to Hamilton. #27 Secondary Material - Articles An article reflecting the French Directory's attachment to Jefferson and the importance of his friendship with the French nation is contained in Eugene Wilson Lyon, "The Directory and the United States," The American Historical Review, XLIII (October 1937-July 1938), 51h-532. Thisaar- ticle ranks among the best on Franco-American relations in this era and was extremely useful in my study. Eugene Wilson Lyon, "The Franco-American Convention of 1800," The Journal gigModern History XII (Chicago, March-December, 1940), 305-333, is an excellent short study on this topic, and was of con- siderable value. Samuel F. Bemis, "Payment of the French Loans to the United States, l777-l795," Current History, XXIII (March, 1926), 82h-831, gives Jefferson's and Hamilton's views on the repayment of the loans, and who the recipient should be. The Farewell Address is pictured as a political document to check French influence in American domestic politics in Samuel F. Bemis, "Washington's Farewell Address: A Foreign Policy of Independence," The American Historical Review, xxxxx (1934). 250-268. Three sources showing the attitude of France toward the United States between the recall of Genet and the Convention of 1899 are James Alton James, "French Diplomacy and American Politics, l79h-l795," Annual Report of American Historical Association for the year 1911, 2 Vols. (Washington, 1913), 151-163, James Alton James, "French Opinisn as a Factor in #28 Preventing War between France and the United States, 1795- lSOO," The American Historical Review, XXX (New York, October l92h-July 1925), hh-SS, and Alexander DeConde, "Washington's Farewell, the French Alliance, and the Election of 1796," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XIIIL (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, June 1956-March 1957), 661-658. ' Charles 0. Lerche, Jr., "Jefferson and the Election of 1800: A Case Study in the Political Smear," The William and Mary Quarterly, Ser. 3, V (Williamsburg, October, 1948), h67-A9l, portrays how extensively Jefferson was attacked for his alleged pro-French views. An aid in the use of Ford for Jefferson primary materials is Charles M. Thomas, "Date Inaccuracies in Thomas Jefferson's Writings," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XIX (June, l932-March, 1933), 87-90. Jefferson's participation in the Louisiana affair is discussed in W. Edwin Hemphill, "The Jeffersonian Background of the Louisiana Purchase," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXII (1935-1936), 177-190. Albert H. Bowman,"Jefferson, Hamilton and American For- eign Policy," Political Science Quarterly, LXXI, No. 1 (March, 1956), 18-41, presents Jefferson's views on American foreign policy in a favorable light. Two articles which contained helpful background material were Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Policy of France toward the Mississippi Valley in the period of Washington and Adams," The American Higtorical Review, X (New York, October l90h-July 429 1905), 2h9-279, and Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Origin of Genet's Projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas," The Significance of Sections in American History (New York, 1932) , 52-85 0 MW)WWW”!(WNW)WW) 31293104524461