RESULTING ETHNIC ANTAGONISM: 1848

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ABSTRACT

A SOCIAL HISTORY OF CHINESE IMMIGRATION AND THE RESULTING ETHNIC ANTAGONISM: 1848-1882

By

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This thesis explores the process whereby ethnic antagonisms are generated by the competitive forces of a capitalist economy. This process is explored through an investigation of the history of Chinese immigrants to the United States between 1848 and 1882. It has been generally assumed that the exclusion of Chinese from the U.S. in 1882 reflects that white labor had the stronger position in the balance of power between capital and labor. That assumption is called into question and each trade in which the Chinese participated significantly is analyzed in order that the strengths of the interests of the white laboring and capital owning classes on the immigration issue can be revealed. Although the historical findings are mixed, this thesis generally concludes that exclusion did not seriously impair the interests of the capital owners and that capital maintained the upper hand over labor despite the eventual passage of the Exclusion Act. During the examination of the historical record, certain weaknesses in the theory of the generation of ethnic antagonisms from a competitive labor market (as formulated by Edna Bonacich) are exposed. The original model is then amended to correct for these weaknesses.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

A LIST OF TABLES

INTRODUCTION

This thesis is a social history. By social history, I mean the process of posing sociological questions of the historical record. The process is something of a hybrid between the two academic disciplines of sociology and history. From sociology, social history draws a certain theoretical perspective, a concern about what is and is not important enough to take into consideration and a sense of what the salient questions to be asked are. From history, social history draws its "data", the recorded historical fragments from which the case for and against a certain thesis are to be drawn.

Any given piece of social history can hopefully advance the given store of knowledge in both sociology and history. As C. Wright Mills pointed out, sociology chronically suffers from being parochial with respect to both time and place.[1] Sociological theories tend towards a certain flatness whereby the social relations and dynamics found existent in 20th century American society often pass for "laws of human nature" valid for all times and places. As corrections of this flatness, historical and comparative studies, which extend across time and space what we already know to be true of our own society, are in order. Thus, sociological theories become refined as they are applied to specific historical situations. With regard to history, social history can help keep the record straight. The sociological

questions which are brought to bear on the historical record should be able to advance our knowledge of what really happened in the past and how it happened.

The above being a statement of what this thesis intends to do in the abstract, it is now time to get down to the specific business of introducing the problem at hand. In this thesis, I will be concerned with the generation of racial antagonisms, especially as they become expressed as efforts to exclude racially different groups from entering a society or from fully participating in it. I shall be adopting the perspective that racial antagonisms evolve, for the most part, from the economic relations of a society. Here, I shall be exploring a capitalist economy which is characterized by competition among people within a market system. The case can be made that this competition is the major cause of racial antagonisms. The market system creates three types of competition among the groups involved: 1) There is a struggle for resources between the capital owners and the laboring people. This struggle is the identifying characteristic of a capitalist economy, the one through which the capitalist owners seek to extract a surplus from those who work for them. Although this capital/labor tension is, perhaps, the primary process of the market system, I will have little to say about it in this thesis, but will focus on the other two types instead. 2) Next, there is competition between various capitalists for the greatest profit returns. This competition can become very fierce, and is, at the level of smaller business firms, a struggle for survival. 3) Also, there is competition between workers for jobs and wages.

Each worker is in a labor market where he/she competes with all of the other workers for the best paying jobs on the basis of the skills which he/she has to sell to prospective employers. Normally, when two prospective employees are similarly qualified for a job, the one who offers his or her services at a lower wage will be hired. In the history of the United States, there have been several waves of immigrant laborers who have been willing or forced to work for less than the wages of native workers. Thus, the ethnic worker can be a threat to the economic position of the native worker. Conceivably, this threat to the economic position of native labor could be the reason why native workers have developed prejudices aginst race and ethnic minority groups and have sought to exclude them from the country, or at least from the more desirable trades. It is this process, the generation of ethnic and racial antagonisms among workers through the competitive mechanisms of the market system, that I wish to analyze.

The historical experience of the early Chinese sojourners who came to this country in the last half of the nineteenth century springs to mind at once as a fertile ground for investigating the competition-antagonism process. The common-knowledge view of Chinese-American history tells us that when the Chinese came to the West Coast, they were willing to work for wages considerably below those acceptable to whites. The coming of the Chinese was seen by white workers as a threat to their economic position. In order for white labor to compete with the wages accepted by Chinese, it would be reduced to a level of bare subsistence if not lower. Thus, the white laboring

class undertook a long and violent campaign to bar the Chinese from the country. The workers were opposed by the employing class, who stood to make higher profits if cheaper Chinese labor could be employed. In the outcome, it was the working people who won the struggle, as signified by the Exclusion Act of 1882 which forbade the immigration of Chinese laborers, the first act in the history of the United States which excluded the free immigration of any group. Because exclusion was legislated in 1882, I have chosen that date as the terminal date of this study. The historical period I shall review, then, will extend from 1848, the date of the discovery of gold in California, to 1882.

As I said, a piece of social history should have two objectives: the refining of sociological theory and the documentation of the historical past. With regard to the second objective, I have come to question the above stated common-knowledge view of early Chinese-American history. What seems problematic about that view is the last part in which the exclusion of the Chinese is considered a victory for the interests of labor over the interests of capital. The student of labor history knows that, in general, the power of capital was very strong relative to that of labor throughout the late 1800's and that the few victories of labor are contained in the establishment of bourgeois unionism in the twentieth century.[2] Because of this general trend of capital dominance, it would be proper to be skeptical of the significance of any victory of labor with regard to the Chinese issue. Thus, the historical question which I hope to illuminate is "Can we say that the exclusion of the Chinese represented a favorable balance of the interests of labor over the interests of capital?"

The competition centered theory of race and ethnic antagonisms is quite different from another view which sees prejudice as a justification of exploitation. This justification-of-exploitation perspective was described in Baran and Sweezy's Monopoly Capital[3] and has appeared more recently in Robert Blauner's Racial Oppression in America.[4] In this theory, economic realities are again seen as the generators of race antipathy, but in a different way than as expressed in the competition model. The justification-of-exploitation theory claims that prejudice arises from the exploitation and robbery of various ethnically and racially different groups, an exploitation which occurs as a result of the expansion of the capitalist economic system. Exploitation creates an uncomfortable situation whereby it is necessary either to rationalize the robbery of the groups at the bottom of society or to call into question the basic justice of the political-economic system. For most people, the easiest way out of this dilemma is to invent various rationalizations such as: "The poor are poor because they're lazy." or "It's O.K. to enslave blacks because, after all, they're inferior people." According to this view, it is the degree of exploitation rather than the degree of competition which governs racial hostilities.

It seems that this view is most powerful when applied to situations in which the economic relations of ethnically or racially different groups to the dominant group are less favorable than those of the labor market relationship. For example, it was imperative that whites adopt a subhuman stereotype of the Native Americans as they robbed their lands and pursued them with genocidal warfare.

Similarly, we could only enslave a subhuman black group and steal the land of a subhuman Mexican population which we had conquered. The model loses some of its power when applied to situations in which the race or ethnic minority groups compete with native workers within the market system. Under those conditions, equally strong prejudices should be generated against both minority group members and poorer members of the dominant ethnic group. Still, the model retains some appeal since race and ethnic prejudice can come to be a justification for some of the groups exploited by the capitalist economy. Yet, it seems that this theory is very weak in explaining the timing of hostile outbreaks against minority groups. Chicanos, for example, have been concentrated in the poorer reaches of society and limited to the most menial occupations for a long time, yet outbreaks directed against them have risen and fallen sporadically. Perhaps a student of race relations should, at some time, set out to discover whether the severity of discrimination directed against a group coincides more closely with the degree of exploitation which that group experiences or with the degree of competitive threat which that group exerts on the position of the native laboring class. My overall evaluation of the justification-of-exploitation theory is that while it is a very plausible theory for explaining the abiding tendancy to create prejudices against groups at the bottom, it is weak in explaining the periodic shifts in the intensity of ethnic antagonisms and it fails to explain why the non-white poor are despised more than the white poor. Because there are these problems with the justification-of-exploitation theory, I shall concentrate instead on the competition-antagonism perspective.

A CONCEPTUAL MODEL AS SUPPLIED BY BONACICH

Before proceeding any futher, it will be necessary to create a more detailed description of the competition-antagonism process which was introduced in a rough form above. For this detailed exposition I shall turn to a theory posited by Edna Bonacich in an article entitled "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism: The Split Labor Market".[5] This theory is not referred to here because it expresses either a popular or a controversial position. Rather, I call the reader's attention to it because it attempts to articulate clearly the competition-antagonism theory which historians and sociologists have used implicitly or in a casually described way while discussing the early history of the Chinese in America.

The core of Bonacich's work is expressed as follows: "The central hypothesis is that ethnic antagonism first germinates in a labor market split along ethnic lines. To be split, a labor market must contain at least two groups of workers whose price of labor differs for the same work, or would differ if they did the same work."[6] In other words, ethnic antagonism will automatically result from those situations where ethnic groups exist as a supply of cheap labor. Antagonisms are specifically defined to include beliefs (such as racism and prejudice), behaviors (such as discrimination and riots), and institutions (such as discriminatory legislation).[7] Such split labor markets will eventually produce movements in favor of excluding the ethnic group from entering the economy or, failing that, of limiting the employment opportunities of the ethnic group through the erection of a caste system of labor.

The first half of Bonacich's exposition discusses how this "split labor market" can come about. This section begins with a discussion of the factors which affect the initial price of labor and follows with a discussion of the relations between this labor and ethnicity. The initial price of labor is seen as a function of two categories of factors; Resources and Motives. There are three types of Resources which determine the labor price: 1) The Level of Living (Economic Resources) of an ethnic group, before its immigration to the target country, may be low enough that the ethnics can be induced to immigrate by a higher wage, even if this wage is relatively low in the target country. 2) the Information which the ethnic group has about the target country can affect their labor price since these are opportunities for misrepresenting the labor market conditions in the target country. 3) Different types of Political Resources, owing to various group organizations, can be a factor in affecting the labor price. At the highest level of organization, the government of the ethnic group's home country might be strong enough to exert pressures on the target country toward protecting its immigrants. Currently, Canadian immigrants in this country could probably rely on more protection than could Vietnamese refugees, for example.

Proceeding on to the next category of factors which affect the initial price of labor, there are two Motives which are considered. Both revolve around the prospective immigrant's intention of becoming a permanent resident of the target country as opposed to a temporary sojourner: 1) The temporary worker may have a Fixed or

Supplementary Income Goal. That is, he/she may enter the labor market in order to supplement the family income at certain times or in order to earn enough to make a specific purchase and then return to his/her home country. 2) Some groups (especially the Chinese in 19th century America) enter the economy as Fortune Seekers. They may "migrate long distances to seek their fortune with the ultimate intention of improving their position in their homeland" where they intend to retire after their adventures abroad.[8]

Having discussed the factors affecting the initial price of labor, Bonacich proceeds to ask how it is that discrepancies in the price of labor should happen to fall along ethnic lines, for once the price split coincides with the ethnicity of the labor force, the "split labor market" which produces ethnic antagonisms has made its appearance. She decides that there are two forces which can create this situation: 1) The original wage agreement often takes place in the home country of the new laborers. Presumably, this opens the possibility that the wages agreed on would be lower than if the agreement had been made in the target country. 2) Nations have developed unevenly such that the levels of living and employment motivations of the peoples living in those countries have differed grossly. In the course of the uneven economic development of China and the United States, the customary standard of consumption for Americans was far higher than of the Chinese in the nineteenth century. This difference in level of living coincided, of course, with the racial differences between white Americans and Chinese.

This first half of Bonacich's exposition is permeated with an atmosphere of voluntarism. It conveys a picture of the prospective immigrant as a person calmly making a choice as to whether or not to emigrate. The record of history, especially the history of non-white groups in America, however, teaches us about groups which were conquered or enslaved. They had no choice about the matter. Thus, in criticism of Bonacich's work to this point, it must be pointed out that a disparity in political resources between groups can become so great that it becomes the dominant variable in the immigration equation. It overshadows the rest such that much of her analysis (motives, information, temporary vs. permanent intentions, etc.) becomes irrelevant. The difference in the situations is so great that Blauner has argued that we must define two separate processes of race relations, one for immigrant groups whose immigration is voluntary, and another for colonized peoples, whose immigration is forced upon them.[9] Since the Chinese were not forcibly injected into this country, we can sidestep this debate. Up to this point, then, my criticism of Bonacich's work is that in order for her theory to be used for all groups, it must be realized that the political resources variable can come to overshadow all of the others. This appears to be a question of "weighing" the factors rather than disputing them and is, therefore, only a minor criticism. In order that this analysis may proceed, we can agree that labor markets can become split along racial or ethnic lines. In the remainder of this thesis, little information will be encountered which reflects on this first half of Bonacich's work. I encourage the reader to

accept it for the time being and concentrate on the second half, where the important criticisms and modifications are to be made.

After having discussed the factors which create a labor market which is split along ethnic lines, Bonacich fills the second half of her exposition with an explanation of how this split labor market produces ethnic antagonisms. The production of these antagonisms is rooted in the interests of the three groups which interact within the market economy: 1) the business or employing class, which will also be labeled the capitalist class, or simply capital, in this thesis; 2) the class of higher paid labor, which will be referred to here as the native workforce (although it is conceivable that in some situations a native workforce could be cheaper than the incoming immigrant workforce); and 3) the cheaper labor force, usually the immigrant labor force, which will be referred to here as the ethnic workforce for simplicity (although realizing that this term is technically incorrect since the dominant workforce also has an ethnicity).[10] After discussing the interests of these three groups and pointing out how their differing interests come into conflict, the author discusses the ways in which that conflict can become resolved. When the position of capital is strong relative to the position of labor, the outcome of the situation involves continued immigration of cheaper workers. When the position of capital is weak relative to the position of labor, the conflict is resolved either by the exclusion of cheaper labor from the economy or by confining ethnic workers to the lowest paying jobs.

In order to follow the discussion in the order in which Bonacich presents it, I shall outline the interests of the capitalist class first. Capital is interested in obtaining the cheapest and most docile labor force possible. They they would desire a cheap labor force is obvious since the cheaper their labor cost is the higher their profits will be. Docility is sought because it ultimately reduces the labor costs. Usually, docility implies a condition where the corkers are not likely to agitate for higher wages or better working conditions. Ethnic labor might be used because it impedes the formation of unions. Also, the use of ethnic labor as strikebreakers represents the docility motive. In reading through the historical information, another aspect of docility appears. In the early stages of industrialization or in those stages when groups of people previously independent of the market economy are brought into employment, employers often find that their new workers, being unused to the regime of factory life, are undependable. They don't show up for work regularly or they leave the factory in the middle of the day. The employer's wish to obtain a more dependable workforce in such situations can be seen as a desire for a more docile labor force. In the case examined here, the Chinese were more dependable workers than were women and children, who were beginning to appear as factory hands in the West Coast during the late 1800's. But the immigrant workers are not always more dependable than native workers. Immigrant workers who came from a less industralized society (and most immigrants came from such societies) are usually less exposed to the factory way of life and can become, on that account, less desirable from capital's point of view.

The expensive class of labor is the class among whom ethnic antagonisms develop. This class fears that the importation of the cheaper ethnics will either displace them or force them to accept a reduction of wages until their level of living falls to the level accepted by the ethnic workers. This threat to the wage position of the native workers creates antagonism between the more expensive and the cheaper laboring groups. Since the labor market is split along ethnic lines this antagonism becomes an ethnic antagonism within the working class.

Although the native laboring group is the focus of consideration within the group labeled "Higher Paid Labor", Bonacich defines this higher paid group so as to also include small independent producers and entrepreneurs such as individual farmers and miners who do not hire any employees. These people react similarly to the native laborer when faced with the threat of immigration. Immigration of a cheaper ethnic labor force makes it possible for employers in the same trades as these independents to undermine the independents' position by producing at a lower cost with cheap labor. Thus, the independent, like the native worker, is threatened by immigration and both groups react against immigration in the same way.

The author points out that: "It does not take direct competition for members of a higher priced labor group to see the possible threat to their well being and to try to prevent its materializing."[11] The interests of native labor can be theoretically aroused whenever the possibility exists that ethnic workers could be found to replace them at lower wages. I would like to interrupt

my exposition of Bonacich's work here for a brief critique of this "possible threat" feature of the model. Although she states that antagonisms can be aroused whenever it is abstractly conceivable that ethnic workers could be found to replace natives, the article as a whole with its emphasis on competition for jobs and lowering the standard of living, implies strongly that direct competition among the groups in question is an essential element. Were it otherwise, the usefulness of the model would dissolve. To illustrate by example, consider the situation of pre-Civil War whites who were antagonistic toward black slaves (because they were a lower priced form of labor). If we based our model only on conceivable rather than actual labor market competition, we would also expect that whites would have been equally antagonistic toward South Americans, Eskimos, Koreans, etc. - all of whom would have done the same work for a lower price if their entrance into the American economy could have been arranged. This, of course, carries the argument to unrealistic proportions, beyond the scope of discussion intended by Bonacich. Therefore, in order to maintain the historical usefulness of the model, we must add a qualification to the Bonacich model to the effect that only ethnic groups which actually compete with native labor or which are imminently threatening to do so incur antagonisms. The definition of "imminent threat" is of course vague, but it is clear that competition must be more than just abstractly conceivable.

Returning to the exposition of the model, the cheaper labor group, in contrast to capital and the expensive labor group, plays a passive role. They respond to the employment opportunities

offered to them by capital and displace the native workforce accordingly. Subsequently, they become the targets of hostilities directed against them by the native workers. This group could conceivably ally with the higher priced native workers to form a broad coalition of laboring groups which would defend its interests against the employers. Such a move would reorient the poles of tension such that a labor/capital conflict would replace the antagonism between cheaper and more expensive labor. But the very "foreigness" of the ethnics tends to prevent such a coalition from developing. In the case of the early Chinese immigrants, such an alliance never seemed possible and was never imagined by anyone at the time.

As Bonacich sees it, the conflict situation generated by the split labor market can be resolved in terms either favorable to capital or favorable to labor (meaning only native labor). The side with the greater share of the political and economic resources generally gains the more favorable resolution.

The resolution favorable to capital is not stated, but lies implicitly in a clear enough way that it can be drawn out of the article. Where the relative position of capital is the strongest, its interests are protected. The result would be that the immigration of the cheaper ethnic group would continue. This continuance would eventually lower the wage level until the wages of ethnics and natives reach parity. In other words, immigration would continue until the labor market ceases to be split. Capital's interests are maintained in that the result implies a lower overall wage structure.

The other resolution, the one favorable to expensive labor, is, by contrast, explained in detail. A resolution in this direction would result either in the exclusion of further immigration or in the establishment of a caste system within the labor market. Which of these two forms the resolution will take depends on whether the cheaper group resides outside of the territory under consideration or resides inside as a conquered or colonized group. Exclusion should occur when the cheaper group resides outside and a caste arrangement should appear when the cheaper group resides inside. In the case of the Chinese, we would expect to see an exclusion movement rather than a caste system.

Exclusion is seen as the more desirable outcome from labor's standpoint. If exclusion is successful, the higher priced, non-split labor market is preserved. In this situation, the interests of native labor are maintained since its higher standard of living is maintained.

When the cheaper labor group is already present in the country and exclusion is not possible, higher paid labor will resort to a caste arrangement. The caste system restricts the ethnic laborers to the lowest paying jobs. Higher priced labor maintains this restriction in three ways: 1) It seeks to ensure its power over capital by monopolizing the aquisition of marketable skills and by "controlling such important resources as purchasing power."[12] (I doubt that this monopoly of purchasing power has much effect.) 2) It denies ethnic groups the access to general education, which makes it harder for employers to train the ethnics. 3) It tries to weaken the ethnic

group politically. In relying on these restrictions, the caste system tends to become increasingly rigid.

An effective caste system prevents the ethnic workers from ever occupying the positions reserved for higher paid labor. This means that the labor market is no longer split and the situation is thereby resolved. The interests of higher priced labor are preserved since ethnic workers are denied the resources which would allow them to undercut the high wage standard.

AN APPRAISAL OF BONACICH'S THEORY WHICH SUGGESTS A HISTORICAL QUESTION

Setting aside a concern with the development of caste, since the early Chinese immigration created a reaction of the exclusion form, we can say that Bonacich's model assumed that capital's interests are always anti-exclusionary while labor's interests are always pro-exclusionary. Are there times when this is not the case? Are there factors that might weaken the intensity of the interests of capital and native labor respectively with regard to an immigration issue? In my opinion such factors do exist and they could conceivably weaken the interests of either group to the point of neutrality.

The strength of the employers' interests should depend on three factors. The model itself suggests the first factor, the degree of disparity between the wages of native and ethnic workers. When this disparity is great, the interests of capital should be intense on the immigration issue, but as the wages of the two groups begin to approach parity (a phenomenon which, according to Bonacich,

should occur as immigration is continued), capital can afford to take an indifferent stance. Second, the model also suggests that docility should be a factor in the strength of capital's interest. The lower an ethnic group's docility or the lower its potential for assimilation into the industrial production system, the lower capital's interest in that group's immigration should be. Third, capital can be more indifferent on the issue if its monoploy position is strong enough that profits can be insured by passing increased wage costs on to the consumer. The more the situation comes to resemble any of these three cases, the more indifferent capital's position should be.

There are two cases in which the interests of native labor become weaker on the immigration issue: 1) When the economy is expanding rapidly enough that labor is scarce, an influx of cheap labor does not threaten the position of the native wage earner so long as employers continue to offer native labor high paying jobs. Conversely, a contraction in the economy marked by rising unemployment should intensify the formation of ethnic hostilities among this group. 2) Cheaper ethnic labor is also tolerated when it supplies services for native workers at rates which are low enough to bring those services within the range of affordable amenities. In other words, the cheaper labor force can come to provide previously non-existent services to the native labor aristocracy. (This process assumes that some degree of job segregation has already occurred.)

At a more general level, the Bonacich model presumes something of a pluralistic approach. Labor and capital are seen as powers

which struggle against each other on roughly equal terms. But as a general rule, capital was ascendant over labor in nineteenth century America.[13] How could exclusion, which favors the interests of labor over those of capital, have come about? The only way out of this dilemma would be to propose that capital was sufficiently disinterested in the issue and the issue was left to be settled by lesser interests (i.e., the interests of higher paid labor).

In light of these reflections, there seem to be grounds for questioning the assertion that the exclusion of a cheaper immigrant workforce represents a favorable balance of the interests of higher paid labor over the interests of the capital owning class. It may well be that the exclusion of the Chinese was promoted by labor in the face of indifferent (or even supportive) capital interests. Thus it is that I have come from these sociological concerns to pose the questions which are the primary historical focus of this thesis: What were the relative strengths of the interests of the white labor and capital owning classes on the issue of exclusing the Chinese, and what balance of interests between labor and capital does the eventual exclusion represent?

In the process of answering these questions, the sociological model given by Bonacich was put to the test. How adequately it helped me to order and understand the events of the past reflected on its usefulness as a conceptual construct. The process of applying the model revealed some of its inadequacies and suggested ways in which it must be elaborated. This appraisal and elaboration of the model is the second and the sociological contribution which this thesis seeks to make.

THE METHODOLOGICAL STRATEGY

In order to answer the historical questions which have been posed, a number of methodological strategies could be employed. All of them should be used to gain the fullest answer, yet employing them all would require an effort beyond the scope of the present project.

One approach would be to focus upon the various collective outbreaks or riots which were directed against the Chinese and to study the social makeup of the riot participants. Ira Cross gives a fair accounting of these things in chapters 6 and 7 of A History of the Labor Movement in California. This is a difficult strategy to pursue, however, because the movement's participants are unknown. We know generally that they were unemployed workers, but we don't know specifically where (or whether) these people competed with the Chinese in the labor market. Another approach would focus on the numerous discriminatory laws and ordinances directed against the Chinese, such as the capitation tax, the queue ordinance, the miner's tax and the laundry tax, and finally the Exclusion Act of 1882 itself as it evolved in the federal Congress. Elmer Clarence Sandmeyer follows such an approach in The Anti-Chinese Movement in California. The difficulty of following such an approach is soon revealed as one begins to make assumptions about which legislators represented which interests (labor or capital) as one traces the decision making process through the legislative records. Both of these possible approaches to the historical question are problematic and I have rejected them in my search for the most effective methodological strategy.

I have chosen, instead, to focus on what I perceive to be the vortex of the kind of pro-exclusion sentiment Bonacich describes, labor disputes and strikes. It is hoped that in this way I can come closest to grasping the competitive roots of racism and concentrate on antagonisms generated in the labor market. I intend to examine individually each of the industries or trades in which the Chinese figured significantly and to note all instances where labor protested Chinese employment either through collective action in strikes or through violence. If such instances occur with an industry, it will be assumed that labor has demonstrated its pro-exclusion interests and a further investigation to reveal the nature and intensity of capital's interests will be undertaken. At the end of the analysis of each incident, this strategy calls for some sort of judgement about which side won the strike, or if the settlement was a roughly equal compromise, as related to the degree of interest each side demonstrated on the issue. From this information, I should be able to determine which interests of either capital or labor were maintained in each case. For example, if a union wins a strike for higher wages and exclusion of the Chinese despite bitter opposition from the management I would conclude that exclusion in that case favored labor over capital. Or, if in a similar strike labor's wage demands are successfully and actively opposed by capital but demands for exclusion are readily accepted I would conclude that exclusion reflected the feelings of labor on an issue in which capital's interests are either weak or neutral. Thus, I hope to build piecemeal a picture of Chinese exclusion as a product of struggle between capital and labor.

This strategy has certain deficiencies. By analyzing industry by industry and piece by piece it may omit interactions and connections which form a more general pattern. Also, by not focusing on non-labor-market struggles (i.e., the above mentioned legislative issues or collective outbreaks) it may miss a part of the labor/capital struggle where that struggle becomes expressed in other arenas. Nonetheless, I feel that this heretofore unused strategy will both capture the essence of the anti-Chinese movement as a labor question and open up a new approach to the discussion of the anti-Chinese movement in general.

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

Because there are deficiencies in following the anti-Chinese movement within the labor market (as mentioned in the preceeding section), it seems necessary to give at least some attention to exclusion within both the legal and the collective behavior arenas. Here, I shall give a general outline of the legal arena, the pattern of the anti-Chinese legislation during the 1848-1882 period. For a more detailed exposition of the laws falling in this category, the reader is referred to Sandmeyer's The Anti-Chinese Movement in California and for a well researched discussion of the political forces behind those laws, the reader should consult Saxton's The Indispensable Enemy. A similar outline of the collective arena will be given later, just before my analysis of the manufacturing industries, where the interconnections between this more general social movement and ethnic antagonisms as expressed within the labor market can be more fruitfully explored.

If ethnic antagonisms were generated by the conditions of labor, one might expect (as I did at the outset of my research) that the exclusion struggle would begin at the workplace and gradually move from there into the political arena. History shows that such was not the case. Beginning in the 1850's, whites continuously harassed the Chinese through racist legislation. Aside from the mining camp exclusions, which will be discussed shortly, whites relied on the institutions of government to harass the Chinese through a variety of legislation. In 1852, for example, the state legislature re-enacted the foreign miner's tax (a tax which was originally established to exclude Mexican miners from the gold fields and had been repealed in 1851). Inasmuch as this tax affected a specific industrial pursuit, mining, it will be dealt with in more detail in the mining section of this thesis. Californians also passed restrictive laws of a more general nature such as the capitation tax of 1855, the exclusion law of 1858, and the "police tax" of 1862. These acts established a pattern which was to be followed over and over again until the final exclusion of 1882. Each law, after being established by the state legislature, was eventually declared unconstitutional by the courts (state or federal). Thus a pattern was established whereby the legislature continued to try to find constitutionally legal ways of harassing the Chinese while the courts appeared to be antagonistic to the popular sentiment by destroying the racist legislation. The position of the courts, however, was not always favorable to the Chinese. In one very important judgment, the federal Supreme Court declared in 1854, that a Chinese could not

testify against a white in any court of law. The decision was not overturned until 1872.

While the legal battles between the courts and the legislature continued, a new dimension of antagonism between the state government and the federal government appeared. The antagonism on this dimension was brought to a head by the signing of the Burlingame Treaty in 1868, which stipulated that Chinese subjects in America were to be afforded the same rights and privileges as extended to Americans in China. These rights included unrestricted immigration and the freedom to enter any occupation. In Californian eyes, the treaty rendered the West Coast helpless before an inundation by Mongolian labor. The case could well be made that after the signing of the treaty and during the continuing destruction of restrictive legislation in the courts, the anti-Chinese fight in the early '70's began to spill out into new arenas, resulting in an expression of the anti-Chinese movement in the labor market and also resulting in the collective violence of the Workingmen's movement. Whether one accepts that view or not, it is important to realize that much of the political energy expended by Californians was spent on gaining a nationwide sympathy for their cause and forcing an abrogation of the Burlingame Treaty. In the abrogation effort, Californians would not be successful until 1879 when the diplomatic machinery for reviewing the treaty, with an eye on its modification, was set in motion. Meanwhile, legislative harassment of the Chinese continued at the state and local level throughout the '70's, as reflected by such laws as the pole ordinance, the queue ordinance, the cubic air ordinance, and the laundry tax.

capital and labor on the issue. Hence, this study should take 1879 as its terminal date. Such a position is quite reasonable, yet even after that date there were a few confrontations between labor and capital on the Chinese issue. In order to include these, I shall continue to consider 1882, the date of the signing of the Exclusion Act, as the terminal data for this work.

MINING

Having posed the socio-historical questions and having filled in some of the political background, I turn now to the heart of this thesis, the separate analyses of the various industries which employed significant numbers of Chinese. It is appropriate to begin with mining, the industry which first attracted large numbers of Chinese and absorbed a great number of the immigrant population during the 1850's and 1960's. The mining discussion will be broken down into three areas: gold mining, silver mining, and coal mining.

Gold Mining

Although the Chinese were among the first to join the gold rush in 1848[19] they did not appear in significant numbers in the gold fields until 1851-1852, the dates of the first wave of Chinese immigration to the United States.[20] Before that time, whites concentrated their efforts on banning Mexican miners from the placer districts. In those early days of the gold rush, mining was usually a small operation with each claim being worked individually or by a small partnership group. The applicability of a labor-market

analysis to such conditions is rather tenuous, but the antagonisms generated among independent miners can still be seen as a function of competition, in this case a competition for natural resources.

Mining was unique insofar as the profitability of the enterprise had nothing to do with level of living expectations. A claim would pay what it would pay regardless of the race of its owners. It is true that once a claim deteriorated, profitability expectations governed whether its owners would stay or move one. That is why so many mines fell into Chinese hands during the waning years of the mining period. Nevertheless, when the claims were paying well, the racial antagonism that developed could not have resulted from a split labor market. Instead, I would suggest that during the greedy days of the gold rush, American miners seized on any plausible excuse to deny others the riches of the ground. They claimed, in the spirit of Manifest Destiny, that the gold was reserved for Americans. The argument was accepted as legitimate, and miners who were foreign enough (i.e. Mexicans, South Americans, and Chinese) were excluded.

Under these conditions a system arose whereby the Chinese took only those diggings abandoned by whites, removing themselves from the richer claims either voluntarily or in the face of threats. Although extensive records of the probably numerous instances of this individual removal do not survive, the system as a whole has been described by many.[21] J.D. Borthwick sums up the system as he witnessed it in 1851: "They [the Chinese] did not venture to assert equal rights so far as to take up any claim which other miners

would think it worth while to work; but in such places as yielded them a dollar or two a day they were allowed to scratch away unmolested. Had they happened to strike a rich lead, they would be driven off their claims immediately."[22] Inasmuch as there were no groups which stood to gain by protecting the rights of Chinese miners, this system of exclusion from the desirable claims continued in force throughout the mining period.

More significant (for my purposes) than these individualized explusions were mass expulsions of Chinese miners from whole areas. These expulsions were noticed more and better records of them survive. The first such incident which happened was an anti-Chinese riot at Chinese Camp in Tuolumne County in 1849. During the riot, white miners drove out some 60 Chinese miners who had been hired by a British company.[23] White miners objected to the presence of the Chinese since that presence gave the mining company a competitive edge over the independent, individual miners. Thus, the antagonism generated fits neatly into Bonacich's theory as an instance in which independents can be undercut by those employing native labor. The incident was, however, atypical of the general trend of anti-Chinese attacks during the early mining period. The appearance of the Chinese as hired miners at such an early date was unique. Such a practice did not become common until the late 1860's and not until that time would a similar incident occur. Instead, the targets of anti-Chinese antagonism during the 50's were, in all other cases, independent Chinese miners.

More typical of the dominant pattern is the expulsion from Foster and Atchinson's Bar, Yuba County in May of 1852.[24] In order to understand the events there, it must be realized that the character of gold mining was beginning to change. Although most miners were still independent prospectors, the influence of larger capital operations was beginning to be felt. Gold mining was still carried out by the placer process, which involved washing the combined dirt and gold mix with water so that the heavier gold could be separated. As the demand for water increased, thousands of miles of flumes, or long wooden troughs, which diverted the streams and brought water to previously dry diggings were constructed by companies which subsequently profited from their rents of water rights. These companies soaked up more and more of the profits, thereby threatening the independent status of individual miners. In Yuba County, the interests of white miners seeking to protect their independence came into conflict with the Chinese, whose claims were located, as a rule, alongside the streams. The whites were able to grab the stream rights after they expelled the Chinese from the area by passing a resolution at a miners' convention (which served as a town meeting in the frontier days). Thus, the antagonisms which resulted in the expulsion from Foster and Atchinson's Bar were an expression of native labor's wish to remain autonomous in the face of encroaching capital interests.

This pattern was more firmly established by the celebrated expulsion from Columbia camp (Tuolumne County) in the same month.[25] Again, the motivations were a fear of dependence on the water companies

and a hope that the trend toward company mining could be reversed. The Chinese were seen as pliable to the water company's high rent demands and it was hoped that by excluding the Chinese, white miners could increase their bargaining position against the water companies. Toward these ends the Columbia miners' convention met on May 8, 1852 and passed a resolution expelling the Chinese from the district. That the anti-Chinese movement was intertwined with anti-capital sentiment is clear in the wording of the resolution: "That the capitalists, ship-owners and merchants and others who are encouraging or engaged in the importation of these burlesques on humanity would crowd their ships with the long-tailed, horned and cloven-hoofed inhabitants of the infernal regions, and contend for their introduction into the mines on equality with American laborers if they could add one farthing to the rate of freight, or dispose one pound more pork or a few shillings work of rice by the operation."[26]

The ideological stance of the Columbia resolution caught the attention of miners elsewhere. A wave of expulsions of the Chinese from other mining camps followed it in short order. Riots drove the Chinese out of Marysville, Horseshoe Bar, the North Fork of the American River, and El Dorado.[27] At Sonora, the Chinese were again excluded through the convention process in response to similar conditions.[28] Shasta county, which didn't experience the gold rush until 1853, belatedly expelled the Chinese in 1855 after experiencing the same tensions.[29]

These exclusions all took a similar form and ended in the same way. Thus, they can be evaluated together as a group. The

explusions were victories for labor (remembering here that independent producers fall under Bonacich's definition of native labor), but rather hollow ones. They failed to favorably resolve basic issues, the water companies increased their grip over the independents, and the company style of mining overcame the independent prospector pattern.[30] Also, it should be pointed out that the interests of the companies were not as strong as they could have been. Neither the water companies nor the mining companies employed Chinese to any significant extent.[31] The position of the companies was probably weakened, since white miners would resist them more strongly than Chinese, but not paralyzed. Since neither type of business employed Chinese, exclusion did not immediately threaten their labor costs or operating procedure. That the companies failed to defend the Chinese at the conventions probably indicates that their interests were less than immediate.

Another phenomenon which falls under Bonacich's definition of ethnic antagonism is the imposition of the foregin miner's tax. Although the tax was first used to keep Mexicans out of the mines and was worded to apply to all foreigners, it was "considered a tax distinctly provided against and enforced against them [the Chinese]."[32] when it was reimposed. The following table summarizes the history of the tax:[33]

Table 1. A Summary of the Foreign Miner's Tax

Year	Amount of Tax Monthly
1850	$20
1851	repealed
1852	$3
1853	$4
1854	$4
1855	$6
1856	$8 then reduced to $4
1857-1869	$4
1870	declared unconstitutional

Although the tax served to keep the Chinese poorer than whites, it should not be construed as solely a caste or exclusionary phenomenon. Coolidge cogently argues that a chief purpose of the tax was to raise revenues for the frontier government, thereby removing the burden from the whites. Her figures indicate that the tax served as a major source of revenue.[34] Indeed, those who argued for the reduction of the tax in 1856 feared that the $8 rate was forcing the Chinese out of mining, thereby reducing government funds and depriving mining camp merchants of important customers.[35] Thus, both white miners and merchants stood to gain by the Chinese presence in most mining districts so long as the Chinese did not compete for the more desirable claims. The tax was subject to many abuses by its collectors (who were alloted a percentage of collections) and by those masquerading as collectors.[36] A similar miner's tax of $4 per quarter was passed in Oregon in 1864, but information about it is too sketchy for a detailed analysis.[37]

By 1854, the height of the gold rush had passed. California's surface mines began a slow decline in yield which lasted throughout the 1850's. As the richer claims became exhausted, the incomes of

independent miners and the wages of hired miners fell steadily.[38] At the same time, mining companies gained ascendancy over independent prospectors. The white mining population declined slowly, at first, but starting in 1859 a mass exodus of white miners to newer gold fields in southern Oregon and Canada and to Nevada's Comstock Lode of silver began. By the early 60's surface mining was dead in California and the more complex operations of hydraulic and quartz mining had taken over. Hydraulic mining involved washing away gravel hillsides with water from high pressure hoses. In some cases, the Chinese were hired in the less renumerative chores of the process. Quartz mining was hard rock mining. Quartz ore containing gold was dug from beneath the surface and pulverized at stamp mills so that the ore could be separated from the quartz. Both methods were large scale efforts geared to a company level of production. As whites abandoned their exhausted surface claims, those claims fell into Chinese hands. Thus, although in abolute numbers, the Chinese population declined during the '60's, their percentage representation in the mining figures increased. Chiu's figures are probably the most accurate: "In 1860, out of the total mining population of 82,573 only 24,282 were Chinese; by 1870 the corresponding figures were 30,330 and 17,363. In other words, when total mining population dropped 70 per cent in ten years, that of the Chinese declined less than 30 per cent."[39] Still, however, mining continued to be an important occupation among the Chinese. Collidge reports that 60% of all Chinese in 1870 resided in the mining districts.[40]

During most of the sixties, the Chinese presence in the unwanted diggings was tolerated. Riots against the Chinese, especially against Chinese independent miners, were rare if not nonexistent.[41] Even the few Chinese owned mining companies which had begun to appear after 1865 were left unmolested.[42] However, Chiu reports that in 1869 a new wave of anti-Chinese hostility broke out.[43] This new wave of antagonisms, directed against Chinese hired miners, was a byproduct of a labor/capital struggle between 1869 and 1871 over technological improvements which brought with them lowered employment schedules and lower wages.

Although Chiu reports a wave of anti-Chinese hostility within the larger capital/labor dispute, there is only one specific anti-Chinese incident of the period recorded in his work or elsewhere, the Sutter Creek strike of 1871. The main issues at Sutter Creek involved wages and the right to unionize, but the strikers also asked that the Chinese miners be fired. At the time, Chinese miners were earning $1.75 to $2.00 per day while white second class miners (whose jobs the Chinese performed) earned $2 per day. Evidently the savings to the company owing to hiring the Chinese were not significant because the strike was easily crushed by a show of force and the Chinese hiring question was the only one on which the company made concessions. Since Chinese were thereafter banned from the company's mines, the interests of labor were maintained, but the willingness to concede only this point in a strike which was easily defeated indicates that the company's interest in the Chinese issue was minor. Therefore, labor faced only minimal opposition on the race issue.[44]

The Chinese in the Comstock Lode Region and the State of Nevada

The Chinese were first introduced to Nevada (then Utah Territory) in 1858 by Elder Orson Hyde, who hired them to work on a ditch, but their presence in the state was never tolerated. Article 4 Section 11 of the Civil Regulations drawn up at Gold Hill in 1858 states that "No Chinaman shall be allowed to hold a claim in this district."[45] Bancroft reports that they were working in the mines of the Walker River and other localities in 1859, but they were never tolerated as miners in the richer Comstock country.[46] Yet as the region boomed following the silver discoveries, some Chinese drifted into Virginia City, taking menial positions as domestics, launderers, and wood-sellers.[47] Lord describes their presence as follows: "Yet the busy, useful Chinese were snubbed and scorned by everybody, Indians not excepted, and only tolerated in the town because it was practically impossible to fill their places with white servants."[48]

The first large group of Chinese to enter the state were hired by William Sharon (who was connected to the Central Pacific monopoly by way of the Bank of California) to build the Virginia and Truckee railroad between Virginia City and Carson City in 1869. Their presence evidently aroused the miners, who feared that the Asiatics might be used in the mines. In reaction to those fears, a crowd of 350 men from the Miner's Union descended on the Chinese railroad construction camp, temporarily frightening its inhabitants away with threats of violence. The miners pressed Sharon to sign an agreement barring the hiring of any Chinese in the mines within

the city limits of Gold Hill and Virginia City.[49] The agreement was honored with the exception of one Chinese who was reportedly employed by the mining companies as a cook in 1880.[50]

Despite these prohibitions, the Chinese community lingered on, working in the above mentioned service capacities. Bancroft states that by 1882 they "had begun to engage in quartz mining, [in districts outside of Comstock] and were applying to purchase state lands."[51]

The Nevada experience must be regarded as a victory for the Miner's Union over capital interests. Although the silver mines were showing good profits at the time and continually reducing the costs of ore production, it would have served employers interests to be able to hire Chinese labor during slump periods when poor ores and borrasco were encountered. Yet they never initiated any such moves. On the labor side of the question, it seems that the Miner's Union was a powerful union in Nevada. The union's chief concern was protecting a $4 per day wage rate for all miners. This they were able to do unchallenged through boom and slump periods up to at least 1881. Lord, who decries the $4 wage as "excessive"[52] and outlines a number of reasons for the union's strength, indicates that strength in the following description: "A careful comparison shows that there is no mining district in the world where the general condition of the laboring class has been better during the past twenty years than on the Comstock Lode."[53] From this information it is safe to conclude that the expulsion of the Chinese at the expense of the interests of capital paralleled the generally strong

position of labor's interests over those of capital in the Comstock region.

Coal Mining in Wyoming

In 1875 about 150 Chinese were introduced into coal mines in Rock Springs, Wyoming, which were owned by the Union Pacific, in order to break a strike by white miners. The strike was successfully broken, wages remained at $1 per ton rather than the demanded $1.25 per ton, and the strikers were fired. Work was resumed with 150 Chinese miners and some 50 white miners. Following this incident, increasing numbers of Asiatics were brought into the area. By 1885, 330 out of 481 miners were Chinese.

Over the years, wages fell to 74¢ per ton[54] and grievances against the U.P. and the Chinese rose in the oppressive one-company town. The Knights of Labor (who were gaining rapid national membership in the 1880's) attempted to organize the miners but found that the presence of the Chinese, who would not joint the union, was a stumbling block. The Knights began to call for their removal. Hostilities erupted on the morning of September 2, 1885 over work at the mines and two Chinese were severely beaten in one of the shafts. Later that afternoon, a mob descended on the Chinese quarter, firing into the midst of the fleeing inhabitants and burning some Chinese shacks. By the end of the day 28 Chinese had been killed, 15 wounded, and 600-700 had fled westward along the U.P.'s tracks toward Green River. The property damage by fire amounted to $147,000.[55]

The governor called for federal troops to restore order in a letter which termed the miners' actions: "Unlawful combinations and

conspiracies among coal miners and others... which prevents individuals and corporations from enjoyment and protection of their property, and obstruct execution of the laws."[56]

The company's immediate response was to order all engineers to pick up Chinese refugees travelling along the tracks and transport them to Evanston. About a week after the incident, the company returned the Chinese to Rock Springs under an escort of federal troops. These returning Chinese were lodged in company boxcars temporarily. The company also fired 45 miners whom it considered to have been participants in the riot. In the final resolution of the issue, the Union Pacific retained all its Chinese employees (331 out of the 481 miners) but agreed not to hire more for fear of arousing further revolt. The Chinese remained in the mines until their return to China or retirement, thus continuing to weaken union efforts.

The railroad's activities after the riot (transporting the Chinese to safety and housing them in boxcars on their return) indicate that the company perceived that important interests were at stake. While the Chinese were paid the same as whites, their presence insured the U.P. that union growth would be severely retarded, thereby keeping wages low. Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that the Rock Springs incident was resolved in terms favorable to capital on an issue in which the interests of both parties were strong, despite the fact that further importation of Chinese was ended.

The Rock Springs incident demonstrates that a wage split in the labor market is not the only factor which produces ethnic

antagonisms, since in this case antagonisms were produced between groups earning equal wages. Docility is also important. Where an ethnic group is more docile than the native laboring group such that ethnics are preferred as employees and the presence of ethnics in the workforce thereby impedes native labor's bargaining position, ethnic antagonisms can be expected to break out. This docility differential is stated in Bonacich's model, but it does not receive as much consideration as the wage split.

RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION

Railroad construction is an economic activity which must be taken into consideration in any discussion of the Chinese immigration, since the railroads employed a large Chinese labor force.[57] Yet, as we shall see presently, a discussion of railroad building does little to advance the ideas of this thesis.

Here, I shall consider only the role of the Chinese in the construction of the Central Pacific's transcontinential route. It should be realized, however, that the Chinese were involved in building many other railroads. They were used extensively in the construction of other California railroads such as the Southern Pacific line to Los Angeles, the route northward into Shasta County, and smaller feeder lines. Also, the Chinese appeared as railroad laborers in Oregon, Washington, British Columbia, Nevada, and Texas.[58] The role of the Chinese in building these other roads is not analyzed here because details on that subject are rather sketchy.

The introduction of Chinese into railroad construction, can be seen as the result of an expanding sector of the capitalist

economy's need for cheap labor. Yet it would be incorrect to say that the Chinese were hired because the C.P. was looking around to cut its construction costs. Actually, all of the C.P.'s "Big Four" (Leland Stanford, Collis Huntington, Mark Hopkins, and Charles Crocker) were originally opposed to hiring the Chinese. On becoming California's governor on January 10, 1862, Stanford called the Chinese the dregs of Asia and characterized them as a degraded people. He said that he would back any move to exclude them.[59]

Crocker had intimated once that he might hire Chinese in order to break up some dissidence among his white workers[60] but it seems like an acute labor shortage, rather than a need to discipline the workers was the motivation for hiring them. In January of 1865 the California Supreme Court decided to honor the legislature's pledge to the C.P. of a large amount of money, thus freeing the railroad from a tight financial situation and allowing it to advance full speed with the construction. Crocker (C.P.'s director in charge of construction) started advertising for 5,000 laborers, but was only able to collect a maximum of 800, a figure which dropped by 100 to 200 after each payday.[61] Attracting laborers for the arduous work in remote spots for what was low pay at the time proved difficult. The labor recruits were often interested only in the C.P.'s offer to transport them to the railhead, from whence they could depart to the Comstock mines. In the words of C.P.'s construction superintendent, James Strobridge: "A large number of men would go out to the work under those advertisements; they they were unsteady men, unreliable. Some of them would stay a few days, and

some would not go to work at all. Some would stay until pay-day, get a little money, get drunk and clear out. Finally, we resorted to Chinamen. I was very much prejudiced against Chinese labor. I did not believe we could make a success of it."[62] Charles Crocker yielded to his brother, E.B. Crocker, who suggested that the company experiment with a gang of 50 Chinese. The first group gave successful results and more gangs of 50 were recruited from San Francisco. By July, 1865, 2,000 out of the 4,000 construction workers were Chinese[63] and by the end of the year 3,000 Chinese were employed.[64]

The only recorded instance of hostilities occurred about the time when the number of Chinese came to equal the number of predominantly Irish white men. Competition was not the reason that whites objected to the Chinese; instead the racist reaction seems to have been based on a feeling that the Chinese were odious to the point of being a degrading or contaminating influence: "...when we first commenced employing them [the Chinese] on the road white men would not work in the same cut with them; they would not work within a hundred rods of them;..."[65] The Irish began to talk about driving the Chinese away, but Crocker laid down the law, saying that the C.P. was willing to release all of its white laborers and employ only the Chinese. At that point, the whites capitualted and did not resort either to a strike or to violence in order to push the issue further.[66] Clearly, the capitulation favored massive capital over unorganized labor, but it must be noted that the presence of the Chinese never threatened to lower white wages or push the more expensive white laborers out of employment. White labor was consistently paid

more than the Chinese and with regard to unemployment, the testimonies of Strobridge[67] and Crocker[68] indicate that white laborers were always in demand.

The following table, based mostly on Strobridge's testimony before the Pacific Railway Commission summarized the extent of Central Pacific's hiring of the Chinese:[69]

Table 2. The Employment of Chinese in the Construction of the Central Pacific Railroad

	Average Number Employed	
Year	Chinese	White
1864	-	1,200
1865	3,000[70]	2,500
1866	11,000	2,500-3,000
1867	11,000	2,500-3,000
1868	5,000-6,000	2,000-3,000
1869	9,000-10,000[71]	1,000-2,000[71]

With regard to wages, the Chinese were consistently paid less than whites. White common laborers were originally paid $30 per month and boarded at the company's expense. Later, in 1865, the pay was raised to $35 per month and board. The first Chinese employed by the Central Pacific were paid $26 per month but shortly afterward (in 1865) their wage was increased to $30. Still later, in 1866, their wage was raised to $35. At all of these wage levels, the Chinese were expected to board themselves, and thus their labor was consistently about one third cheaper than white labor.[72]

This examination of Chinese railroad workers points out an inadequacy in Bonacich's theory. Clearly, the historical situation was one of a split labor market, but the wage differential did not

create competition between Chinese and whites for employment and consequent racial antagonisms failed to occur.[73] The failure of the Bonacich model to adequately portray the situation is rooted in its neglect of the effects of economic expansion and contraction on the ethnic antagonism process. In the expanding railroad job market, employment was freely available to whites regardless of the scale of Chinese employment or any existing wage differentials. Thus, while the dynamics outlined by Bonacich remain operative in a stagnant or contracting economy, they are rendered inoperative under conditions of rapid expansion.

Furthermore, it seems that the presence of Chinese labor, albeit at a lower cost, actually enhanced the position of the white laborer. The Chinese were employed only as common laborers while whites were mostly employed in the more skilled and higher paid positions of the construction, such as teamsters, bosses over gangs of Chinese, carpenters, hostlers, blacksmiths, etc.[74] Indeed, the above mentioned wage figures are somewhat misleading since during the later years of construction, most whites were working in these skilled areas whereas the number of whites involved in common labor on the construction crews dwindled steadily to insignificance. Thus, the presence of the Chinese freed whites from the most menial positions. This meant that a white man who had been on the job for a few months could expect to be promoted to foreman over a gang of Chinese.[75]

This indicates that a caste system much like the one Bonacich conceptualized developed. Yet, this system seems to have sprung up without struggle between labor and capital and it is therefore

difficult to analyze within the methodological approach used here. On the one hand, labor did not agitate for the erection of this system, while on the other hand capital showed little inclination to challenge it.[76]

On the job, the Chinese proved to be easily managable. The Chinese were, as compared to whites, less quarrelsome among themselves and less prone to drunkenness, violence, abandoning the work, and striking.[77] The Chinese workers struck the Central Pacific only once, during the last week of June 1867. At that time, 2,000 Chinese who were working on digging tunnels in the Sierras struck for $40 per month (the wage of white tunnel workers) instead of $30 and an 8 hour day in the tunnels or a 10 hour day in the open work (they had been working sunup to sunset). Also, they denied "the right of the overseers of the company to either whip them or restrain them from leaving the road when they desire to seek other employment."[78] Even during the strike, the Chinese proved an orderly lot: "If there had been that number of white laborers on that work in a strike there would have been murder and drunkenness and disorder of all kinds; it would have been impossible to have controlled them; but this strike of the Chinese was just like Sunday all along the work... no violence was perpetuated along the whole line."[79] Crocker's response to the strike was to cut off provisions and to "make them a little war speech" to the effect that if the workers did not return by Monday, they would be fined the cost of keeping their foreman, teams, and carts idle for a week. On Monday the Chinese returned peacefully to work. It is not known whether pain

of starvation or the financial threat was more effective in smashing the strike.[80]

It has been inferred, especially by Gunther Barth in Bitter Strength, that the docility of the Chinese stemmed from an extensive system of control over the laborers by labor contracting agencies. This system of control supposedly arose out of the debt of Chinese laborers for the cost of passage to America, but the details of the system remain unclear despite Barth's outstanding exposition. The Central Pacific contracted for laborers locally at first and later, as their needs expanded, they contracted directly from China through Sisson, Wallace, and Co. and through Cornelius Koopmanschap. When contracting for labor in China, the railroad loaned each laborer a sum of $75 for the passage which was to be repaid over a period of 7 months from a $35 per month wage.[81] The impact of this hiring in China is, however, often overemphasized and it should be remembered that the major portion of the C.P.'s Chinese workforce consisted of ex-miners already residing in California.

As stated earlier, the details of the control system are unclear, and furthermore, it is not likely that the debate on this subject will ever be resolved since few primary records survive, owing to both the illiteracy of the Chinese laboring class and the illegality of the indenture system. Yet, to posit such a structure of control over the Chinese laborers certainly "makes more sense" out of their docility than to claim that that docility is somehow inherent in the Chinese race, psychological makeup, or cultural traditions.

At any rate, the docility of the Chinese workforce must have meant that it was strongly in the interest of capital to avoid any exclusionary measures. We can speculate that Chinese exclusion may not have been possible to achieve before the completion of the railroad in 1869 because of the strong interests of Central Pacific, which repeatedly had been able to manipulate government activity within the state of California as well as having its interests represented in the federal Congress. But speculation on this matter as well as speculation which has been advanced to the effect that the Chinese kept Central Pacific's wages low[82] cannot serve as the basis of sound scholarship. Neither issue was ever raised by labor so neither issue was ever expressed as a tangible struggle between labor and capital.[83] Therefore, we cannot gauge the relative strengths of labor and capital with respect to exclusion from the railroad labor force within the bounds of the methodological strategy employed here. All that can be said is that labor's failure to object to the railroad's hiring of the Chinese indicates that labor's interest was weak while the labor market was expanding. Thus, although railroad construction labor was an important feature of the Chinese historical experience, it contributes little toward the illumination of the historical questions which I have posed.

AGRICULTURE

The discussion of the role of the Chinese in agricultural pursuits can be conveniently broken down into three sub-topics: reclamation work, farming as an independent enterprise, and hired farm labor. I shall discuss each separately here.

Reclamation

When the United States acquired California from Mexico, great tracts of land in the state, especially along the Sacramento and San Joaquin Rivers, were vast swamps. Called tule lands, these areas required draining before they could be farmed. The first experiments in draining these lands occurred near Los Angeles in 1857 and along the San Joaquin River in 1859, but drainage projects did not really begin in earnest until around 1868 when: 1) investment profits from reclamation projects came to equal those in mining enterprises and 2) the exodus of Chinese from the exhausted gold mines provided a labor force which made such projects feasible. The peak year for drainage came around 1874-1875.[84]

Tule land drainage was an enterprise undertaken by large companies, such as the Tide Land Reclamation Company, which subsequently sold or rented their reclaimed land in large parcels. Like the railroads, these companies employed Chinese labor to build extensive construction works, in remote areas, for low wages, and under unhealthy circumstances (the tule land worker spent most of his day wading in swamp water). For white workers, such employment was unacceptable, and most of them were able to find employment elsewhere. As the president of the Tide Land Reclamation Company testified before the Joint Special Committee: "We have tried white labor in the country, and have found that it would not do at all. In the first place, irrespective of the wages, the white man would not do that class of work."[85] Thus, from the beginning, the reclamation effort depended on a workforce of Chinese laborers

obtained through the contract system while whites were employed only in supervisory or skilled positions.

As with the railroads, the hiring and presence of large numbers of Chinese construction laborers by the reclamation companies was never protested by white workers. Thus, this brief discussion further illustrates that ethnic antagonisms are not generated from a split labor market so long as an expanding economy continues to offer native workers ample employment opportunities in desirable jobs.

Independent Farmers

Although the Chinese entered agriculture early (in the late 1850's), they never became a significant part of the independent farming population.[86] The following figures of independent farmers who employed no laborers bear out this assertion:[87]

Table 3. Chinese Independent Farmers

Year	Chinese Farmers	Total Farmers
1860	8	20,826
1870	364	24,061
1880	1,434	43,489

Indeed, the only areas in which the impact of Chinese farmers seems to have been noticed are the small vegetable gardens which sprang up around the outskirts of all the major cities. Usually, the Chinese run truck garden was a small cooperative effort, undertaken on a land tenancy basis. The majority of them were valued at under $500.[88] From these gardens, the vegetables were taken into the cities,

where the sight of Chinese vegetable peddlers was common. As peddlers and gardners, the Chinese were quite visible to local whites, who often claimed that the Orientals had monopolized the business. According to Chiu's estimates, however, they could not have accounted for more than one fifth of the trade.[89] Despite this claim of monopolization, the independent Chinese gardner never aroused racial hostilities during the 1848-1882 period. Thus, an analysis of this sector of the agricultural industry adds little to an understanding of the ethnic antagonism process.

Farm Laborers

As farm laborers, the Chinese were present since the beginnings of West Coast commercial agriculture in the 1850's and continued to be a significant element of the farm labor force well into the 1880's. Chiu estimates the Chinese farm labor population as follows:[90]

Table 4. Chinese Farm Laborers

	1870	1880
Chinese Laborers	2,300	5,000
Total Farm Laborers	16,231	23,856

Other estimates, however, differ widely and because of this McWilliams concludes that although the exact figures can only be guessed at, the Chinese must have been widely employed.[91] The distribution of Chinese farm laborers was biased such that the Chinese figured in greater proportion as seasonal and migrant workers while accounting for a smaller percentage of those farm hands who were hired year

round.[92] The wage of $1 per day with no board is mentioned frequently as the standard wage for Chinese farm hands, slightly lower than the wages of whites, who were usually boarded by their employers, yet higher than Eastern rates.[93] Chinese fieldworkers were employed in harvesting the widest variety of crops imaginable including hops, peanuts, and asparagus as well as the more pedestrian wheat, grapes, potatoes, and orchard fruits. In their role as seasonal agricultural fieldhands, the Chinese set a precedent which continues today whereby successive waves of non-white immigrants have been imported to gather the harvest of the state's commerical farms.[94]

In order to understand the place of the Chinese field hands within California agriculture, we must step back and examine some of the features of that agricultural system in the 1800's. First of all, the land in California was previously held by the Mexicans in large parcels under the land grant system. Because of this, the land tended to remain in large chunks, as opposed to the small family farm system which was to be found elsewhere on the American frontier. This large farm legacy of the Mexicans was further reinforced by two circumstances of the Americanization of the region. The first, reclamation, has already been mentioned. Reclamation companies drained large areas at a time and tended to sell the reclaimed land in large pieces. Second, the railroads were given large land grants throughout the state, and tended to act as a land monopoly. All of these factors created an agricultural system characterized by large farms dependent on a large force of agricultural

workers; entry into the occupation for small farmers and homesteaders was limited.

The operators of California farms were handicapped by a number of factors. Inasmuch as mining was a far more profitable investment at the time, the farmer suffered from high interest rates and inadequate credit. These pressures were intensified by the exploitative freight rates which the railroads charged.[95] Since farm prices were often a function of an international market[96] (more of a factor in wheat and wines than in orchard fruits), the farmer operated on a fixed price basis so that high labor costs (and labor was a great expense relative to farm income[97]) cut into the profit margin. Hence, the farmer was bound, for his survival, to keep wages at a minimum. At the low wage rates he could afford, the farmer had a difficult time attracting laborers; he/she could not hope to compete with the mines or the urban job pool. Thus, agricultural laborers were continually scarce and of dubious quality.[98] In fact, growers had to limit their production to fit the size of their labor force.[99] Under such conditions, the Chinese fieldworker who worked cheaply, was kept on the job through the control system of his fellow countrymen, and could be hired for short term harvest work through the contract system was viewed as a necessity on the agricultural scene.

The small farmer, however, looked at the matter differently. In his eyes, it was the Chinese who allowed the large commercial farmer to operate and monopolize the land. In other words, the small farmer blamed the predominance of huge commercial farms over

the family farm system on the existence of the Chinese. Hence, the small farmer added his/her hostility to the Chinese to his/her hatred of the land and railroad monopolies. Thus, the small farmer fits into Bonacich's analysis as an independent whose position may be undercut by capitalists who employ cheap labor.

Agrarian hostility broke out into violence prematurely a few times in the latter 1870's, but did not reach a peak until the late 1880's, sometime after the passage of exclusion. The first incidents occurred in February of 1877 and were undoubtedly influenced by the anti-monopoly agitations building up steam at about that time in San Francisco. John Bidwell, a large employer of Chinese on his farm near Chico who was incorrectly thought of in the area as the first importer of Chinese in the country, had his soap factory burned down by unknown arsonists. Shortly thereafter there were two attempts to burn down the Chinese quarter in Chico.[100]

The next incident on the record was not explicitly exclusionary but the tensions which became manifest through it indicate the depth of anti-Chinese sentiment in the countryside. On March 15, 1877, a group of whites shot and robbed a party of Chinese who lived near Chico. Two of the Chinese, however, survived to report the case to the authorities. The police investigating the case received threats and finally found suspects linked to an anti-coolie organization called the Order of Caucasians. During the prosecution of the case, violence erupted up and down the Sacremento Valley in protest against the legal actions. The Chinese quarters in the Rocklin-Roseville area, Grass Valley, Colusa, and Lava Beds

were burned. In other areas, many farmers who employed Chinese had their buildings and equipment destroyed.[101]

Spurred on by the increasing tempo of the Workingmen's movement, violence continued through 1878 and 1879, the latter year marking the writing of California's Second Constitution. At the constitutional convention, Grange delegates allied with the urban Workingmen on anti-monopoly and anti-Chinese issues.[102] Meanwhile, back in the farm districts violence continued. McGowan reports that: "Hardly a day went by without some report of harassment of the celestials." but does not elaborate further such that any meaningful analysis can be made.[103]

As I said, these outbreaks of violence were somewhat premature since the bulk of anti-Chinese hostility in rural areas came in the latter half of the 1880's, which is beyond the scope of this thesis.[104] By that time large commerical farmers were still hiring Chinese despite the federal exclusion. Although I haven't researched these later developments enough to comment on them, it is clear that the contined hiring of Chinese farm laborers up until 1882 indicates that the small farmers were unsuccessful in promoting their exclusionist interests over the cheap labor interests of the big farmers. In other words, the analysis leads us to conclude that capital's interests were preserved despite sporadic protests from "labor".

AN OVERVIEW OF THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

The manufacturing industries in which the Chinese figured significantly will each be discussed separately. Yet because these trades reacted to a common economic background and experienced similar fluctuations during the same time period, it will be useful to provide an overview of the Chinese impact on manufacturing in general before analyzing each industry separately.

Manufacturing concerns in California became established during the 1860's. Their establishment was the product of a number of factors. California's population grew steadily during the '60's, requiring an increasing number of goods. In the early days, these goods were imported from the East at high transportation costs. Local manufacturers were established to produce at a cost cheaper than the Eastern imports, despite the higher West Coast wage rate. The Civil War added a great impetus to this process. Wartime demand absorbed the Eastern output, leaving less for export to the West Coast. California manufacturers rose to meet the situation.

In general, the 1860's were prosperous times on the West Coast. Business and industry had been expanding before the war, were accelerated by the war, and were further sustained by a post-war prosperity. As a rule, labor was in demand and unemployment was low.[105] These conditions were favorable to the growth of strong unions. It was during the '60's that unionization first took hold in California and by 1868 the union concept had clearly been established among San Francisco tradesman.[106] Most of the unionizing activity was concentrated in the ship building, construction, and

metal working industries (California's heaviest industries at the time) and labor's struggles revolved chiefly around the issue of the 8 hour day.

The Chinese entered various branches of manufacture quietly throughout the '60's. Because of the economic expansion during the period, their entrance was neither noted nor protested. Indeed the presence of the Chinese served more as an enhancement to white labor rather than a threat, similar to the enhancement it offered to white railroad workers, as has previously been discussed.[107]

The Chinese entrance into manufacturing can be traced through the demographic movements of the Chinese population. Beginning in 1860, two thirds of all of California's Chinese lived in the mining districts.[108] As the mines became exhausted (beginning in 1864)[109] the Chinese moved out in two directions: they moved into the rural agricultural areas to find work as field hands and they moved into San Francisco to become employed in the developing manufactures. Saxton's analysis of census data shows that in the years 1860, 1870, and 1880, the Chinese proportion of San Francisco's population steadily grew from 8% to 26% to 30% respectively.[110] Thus, the impact of the Chinese on the urban economy was rather large. In Saxton's words: "If our concern is primarily with wage workers, it would probably not be far wrong to estimate that one quarter of all available for hire in the early seventies must have been Chinese."[111] And so it was that whites began to become concerned what the Chinese were "monopolizing" various trades, such as cigar making, shoemaking, woolen manufacture, and the others discussed here.

It was not merely the numbers of Chinese which concerned white laborers, but also the fact that the Chinese workers appeared to be tightly controlled by some insidious "coolie system". Although applying the term coolie, which connotes a state of indentured servitude, is a mistake in this case, the system of control over Chinese labor (which is best described by Barth in Bitter Strength) was extensive.

Because of the language barrier, an employer did not hire individual Chinese, but rather contracted for a group of them from a Chinese comprador. Because the system of labor control within the Chinese community was effective, the employer was guaranteed a docile and dependable labor force. Clearly this docility worked to make the Chinese more attractive as employees at the expense of whites.

The Chinese labor control system revolved largely around the debt which an individual immigrant incurred for the payment of his passage to the United States. This debt and all other debts which he might later assume would have to be paid off before he was allowed to return to China. In addition, the Chinese community maintained its own legal system. This system was somewhat necessary since the American courts never honored the rights of Chinese immigrants and generally failed to render justice to the Chinese. Also, there were internal trade and merchant organizations, which acted in a co-operative spirit to further the community's economic resources.

Beginning in 1867 and increasing after the completion of the transcontinental railroad in 1869, some of California's manufacturing industries came into competition with more established Eastern firms.

The difference between those industries which were strained by this competition and those which were not is important because it shaped both the labor unionization patterns and the amount of anti-Chinese activity within each industry. Some industries, notably California's heaviest industries - ship building, construction, and metal working (which made machinery for the mines), supplied a local market. They were, by their nature, free of nationwide competition. If West Coast labor costs were high, these costs could be passed on to the consumer without fear of being undercut by Eastern firms. In other manufacturing areas, however, Eastern goods could invade the market, undercutting the price of local manufacturers. This was especially true for the trades which the Chinese would come to dominate: cigar making, shoemaking, woolens, etc. In these industries, Eastern firms were becoming mechanized, sweatshops were disappearing, craftsmen were being replaced by machine tenders (often women and children), and production costs were dropping. California firms engaged in producing these products were thus caught in a bind; they could not compete with the East without reducing wages. Their solution to the problem was to hire increasing numbers of Chinese workers at lower wages.

The difference in competitive pressures between these two types of industries produced different patterns of labor organization and agitation. In the locally competitive trades (shipbuilding et al.) labor's position was the strongest. Labor organizations formed on a traditional trade union basis and were fairly successful in pressing for an eight hour day and maintaining high

wage levels.[112] The employment of Chinese in these areas was a rarity, and the average union worker never felt competition from the Chinese. In the nationally competitive manufacturers (shoemaking, etc.) labor organizations originated to protect the individual craftsman and small sweatshop owner from the inexorable pressures of mechanization. Typically, these organizations were composed of journeymen and marginal entrepreneurs[113] who moved to limit the access of unskilled workers into the field and oppose the tide of Chinese workers through establishing union and white labor labels. Their chief weapon was the boycott rather than the strike.[114] During the 1860's these tactics were generally ineffective and the Chinese continued to dominate the field.

In contrast to the prosperous 1860's, the 1870's were a decade of deepening economic depression.[115] The decade opened with economic stagnation, and wages steadily dropped between 1870 and 1872.[116] The year 1873 brought with it a nationwide depression, one of the worst in American history, which was to last nearly a decade. California, by then tied by the railroads to the Eastern economy, suffered the depression along with the rest of the nation, although its early effects were somewhat mitigated by the fact that the Comstock mines were coming into their second boom period and by favorable agricultural productivity. Thus the economic picture in California in general, and in San Francisco in particular, steadily worsened. Between 1873 and 1875 an estimated 150,000 immigrants entered the state, thereby adding to the unemployment problem. A large part of these were unskilled factory workers who had been

thrown out of work in the East. In 1875 the Bank of California closed its doors for over a month.[117] The ultimate blow fell in 1877 (after a drought winter which had ruined agricultural production) when the Comstock boom fizzled out, as signified by the failure of one of the largest Nevada mining firms, the Consolidated Virginia, to pay dividends. Throughout the late '70's the streets of San Francisco filled up with the unemployed, especially during the winter months when agricultural work was unavailable. By Bancroft's estimates one fifth to one fourth of the work force was unemployed during 1877.[118] These dire economic conditions were to persist until the slow recovery of 1881 and 1882. It was within these circumstances that the anti-Chinese agitations reached a fever pitch and broke out into violence.

The contraction of the economy during the '70's weakened the labor movement and brought changes to the coalitions aligned against the Chinese. Those unions organized within the locally competitive industries which had made gains during the '60's lost those gains during the '70's. Between 1872 and 1875 most of these trades were reverting to the 10 hour day. In Saxton's opinion: "It seems from the evidence (or more accurately, lack of evidence) unmistakable that trade unionism in San Francisco - as in many other American cities - had almost ceased to exist during the depression years."[119] Within the nationally competitive industries, a change in the makeup of the anti-Chinese forces occurred. Previously, the small employer had benefited from hiring cheap Chinese labor and had worked through the trade organizations to protect his/her ability to do so. It was the worker who had opposed the Chinese. Around 1873 the entrepreneur's

position changed. Chinese who had acquired a knowledge of the trade by working in white owned shops began to set up shops of their own. As a general rule, these Chinese owned shops (which used Chinese labor exclusively) operated at lower costs, prices, and profit margins than their white counterparts. Feeling the pressure of competition from Chinese entrepreneurs, white owners allied with their workers in attempting to drive the Chinese from the trade. It was not until this coalition was formed that anti-Chinese agitation within the labor market arena began to be effective.[120] But in a sense, the exclusion came too late, the anti-Chinese forces could drive the Celestials from the white owned shops but had little power to prevent the Chinese from carrying on the trade under owners of their own race.

THE WORKINGMEN'S MOVEMENT: THE COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR ARENA

In 1877 during the deepest part of the depression, the Workingmen's movement was born. Its adherents were San Francisco's unemployed, who were unorganized and desperate. The movement began in outbreaks of violence (in what I here call the collective behavior arena) and shifted into a political organization, which was represented at California's second constitutional convention. Because the opening phases of the movement were violent and thereby colorful, many writers have fixed on the movement as the essence of the anti-Chinese sentiment of the times. Cross devotes the longer of his two chapters on the anti-Chinese issue to the Workingmen's movement, for example. But such an exclusive focus on the Workingmen's movement gives, in my opinion, a misleading impression of the more general body of anti-

Chinese sentiment which both preceeded and outlasted the briefer movement.

In this section I hope to give a brief overview of the Workingmen's movement, which has been adequately described elsewhere.[121] This overview is necessary inasmuch as the movement, occurring in the collective behavior arena, caused some reactions in the labor market arena. Yet, for the most part, I find that any longer discussion of the movement does not lend itself well to the analysis of the relative strengths of labor and capital, which is my chief concern. I shall also discuss this failure.

The movement was precipitated by the great railroad strike of 1877, which had caused violence to erupt across the country. In San Francisco, the Marxian oriented Workingmen's Party organization called meetings in support of the strike on July 23, 1877. The Marxian leaders confined their rhetoric to attacks on capital, to the dismay of some elements of the crowd who called for anti-Chinese statements from the speakers. In time, the anti-Chinese elements broke away from the meeting and headed toward Chinatown, bent on violence. Several Chinese were beaten, the Chinese Methodist Mission was stoned, and roughly 25 laundries were burned, totalling an estimated property damage of around $20,000.[122] Property owners quickly met the next day to form the Committee of Safety, which raised $58,000 for arming a body of 4,000 volunteers with pick handles in order to supplement the local police and state militia in curbing the rioters. That evening, mobs threatened to burn down the Mission Woolen Mills, but, being turned away by the presence of the militia,

contented themselves with burning some nearby laundries. On the third night (July 25th), the rioters were similarly frustrated by the presence of the "pick handle brigade" from attacking the docks of the Pacific Mail and Steamship Company. Instead they burned a nearby lumber yard causing an estimated $80,000 damage.[123] During the fourth night, it was apparent that the presence of control forces had succeeded in quelling the rioters, although some laundries were burned that night. By July 28, the danger was passed and the pick handle brigade was disbanded.

About a month after the riots, Dennis Kearney, a drayman who had served with the pick handle brigade, realized that political milage could be made by leading the desperate unemployed. He began to agitate against the Chinese on the street corners and had formed a Workingmen's Part of his own (as distinct from the older socialist group) by October. Kearney's agitations repeatedly threatened violence against the Chinese and the monopolists, but the thrust of his efforts went into organizing a political party. Thus, he transferred the movement from the collective behavior arena into the political arena. Within the latter arena, the movement was generally ineffective. I have already discussed its weakness during the redrafting of the state constitution. The candidate it elected to office fell so quickly into the hands of monopoly interests that some claimed that the party was merely a tool of the railroads.[124] Kearney and other top officials within the party were accused of taking bribes while party solidarity eroded in reaction against Kearney's dictatorial control. Overall, the party's impact on the political arena was confused and weak enough that its effects on the labor market struggle were negligible.

A detailed focus on the collective behavior arena fails to further the discussion of the anti-Chinese movement as a product of labor/capital struggles for a couple of reasons. For one thing, in trying to find the meaning of the riots, assuming that we go beyond dismissing them as ill-directed reactions to widespread economic frsutration, we must turn to an examination of the rhetoric of the movement's leaders. The rhetoric we would find would consist of damnations of the Chinese for lowering the standard of living and displacing white workers. Thus, in a search for the historical meaning of the riots we are led again into an examination of labor market conditions, the crux of the matter. Also, the episodic and generalized nature of the riots is difficult to assess. We know generally that the participants were unemployed workingmen, but the dynamics of their displacement and a sense of how they came into competition with the Chinese (if they did at all) will not be revealed by an analysis of the riot, especially when we know so little about the occupational backgrounds of the participants. Also, the riot's targets were somewhat diffuse. The rioters attacked all capitalists and all Chinese. Thus, any specific analysis of the impact of their protest on the exclusion of Chinese from certain trades or on the reactions of various capitalists is difficult except where the targets are more clearly delineated. Some of the riot's targets, such as the Mission Woolen Mills, were clearly delineated, and in those cases, the impact of the riots on the capital/labor struggle can be evaluated - and are evaluated here under the appropriate industry headings. In most cases, however, the researcher is at a loss for finding historical

specifics which might document the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the riot's generalized attack.

CIGAR MANUFACTURING

We know that the first Chinese employed in cigar manufacturing must have been employed before November, 1859 since on that date the Seegar (Cigar) Makers' Association expelled two of its members for employing Chinese.[125] Despite this, Chinese employment in the business was common by 1862.[126] Large numbers of Chinese did not enter the business until the business itself became more firmly established between 1864 and 1866 (owing largely to the impetus of the Civil War). From its beginning up until the early 1880's the industry employed a heavily Chinese work force as is evidenced in the following figures:

Table 5. Chinese Employment in the Cigar Making Industry (San Francisco only)

Year	Chinese Employed	Total Employed	Source
1867	450	500	Chinn 49
1870	1,657	1,811	Chinn 49
1876-77	5,500	6,500	Chinn 49
1878-79	4,000	6,000	Chinn 49
1880	2,757	3,217	Chiu 126
1881	8,500	8,679	Cigar Maker's Official Journal December 15, 1881

Not only were large numbers of the workers Chinese, but due to the small capital requirements of the industry, entry was easy and there were large numbers of Chinese firms producing cigars. Chiu states that half of all California cigar companies were owned by Chinese in 1866 and 70 to 90 of the 200 firms in the field in the mid '70's were owned by Chinese.[127] Thus, the movement to expel the

Chinese would have to concern itself with Chinese capitalists as well as Chinese workers.

Wages (generally computed on a piecework basis) for Chinese workers were lower than for whites[128] and Chinese owned factories tended to be smaller and less profitable than white owned ones.[129]

During the 1870's the profit returns for larger fims increased, but for smaller firms it deteriorated. Then in the early 1880's, the industry as a whole suffered a great decline. From Chiu's figures on stamp receipts, it appears that production in 1883 was only one fifth of production in 1881.[130] Doubtless, the smaller firms were eliminated.

There were no strikes against the use of Chinese labor nor riots at factories employing the Chinese (although a strike for higher wages only occurred in May of 1883[131]). The movement to expel Chinese from the trade operated through the use of a union label placed on cigars made by the white Cigar Maker's Association.

The actions of the Seegar Makers' Association, in the above mentioned disciplinary action of 1859 indicate that the anti-Chinese movement in the industry was always influenced by the interests of capital as well as labor. The resolution passed in that incident suspended two <u>employers</u> who were <u>members</u> of the association, with language which indicated (along with the usual fears that the Chinese would impoverish the white working man) a fear that the Chinese would learn the trade and set up their own shops.[132] As members of the Cigar Makers' Association, after its incorporation in 1874, factory owners pursued their interests in retaining Chinese labor for themselves, but attempted to exclude Chinese owned firms from competition.

In 1874 the C.M.A. devised a union label which was to serve notice to the consumer that the cigars bearing it were produced by white labor.[133] Later, in 1878, the Association convinced several cigar manufacturers to replace their Chinese work force with white laborers, for which the Association advertised in the East.[134] In both moves, however capital interests within the C.M.A. used the movement to their own ends, which included retaining their Chinese labor force.

The label was never effective, as can be easily seen on the previous table (Table 5) which shows that Chinese workers remained as a strong part of the labor force. It seems to have been used by the manufacturers to promote their products over those of Chinese competitors. The Association's vice president, Frank Muther, described the process as follows: "The advertising dodge is to call for twenty white men. If the white men go to the shop they will put them on. They will then advertise all through the country that they have been working white men, and are deserving of preference in the trade; but as soon as they get this thing established, by the next Saturday, Chinamen are there. Our society in that way has spent enough to make cigar makers rich by advertising."[135] For the most part it was the smaller firms who promoted their wares through using the union label. By 1878 of the 50 manufacturers using the label only 3 or 4 conducted large shops.[136]

On the issue of replacing the Chinese with workmen brought from the East, the cigar manufactureres again seem to have diverted the exclusionist aims of the Association toward their own ends. An

editorial in the Cigar Maker's Official Journal criticized the employers in these words: "But six months ago they gave the public to understand that they would gladly dispense with coolie labor provided others could be obtained as substitutes. Knowing at the time that no substitutes could be furnished within a short notice, they pretended to sympathize with the movement in order to retain their customers."[137]

In short, labor was never successful in excluding Chinese workers from the cigar trade before 1882 because of the interference of capital interests. Later, in December of 1885, the cigar workers withdrew from the Cigar Maker's Association, claiming that the organization had only served to protect the employers. The workers then formed Local 228 of the nationwide International Cigar Makers' Union, under whose label they continued the anti-Chinese fight.[138] The Chinese were finally driven from the trade in the mid 1880's after the industry itself had become crippled by the huge production declines of the early 1880's which were due to the competitive pressures of the cheaper labor force of women and children in the East and the even cheaper labor force of producers in Havanna and Manilla.[139]

BOOT AND SHOE MANUFACTURING

The boot and shoe manufacturing industry in California was first established during the late 1860's when the Civil War stimulated manufacturing throughout the country and California's growing agricultural economy provided an abundant supply of cheap leather. Apparently, the Chinese were brought into the trade in its early

stages. Cross reports that the white boot and shoemakers struck against a reduction in wages "caused chiefly by the competition of Chinese laborers. Violence and arrests followed in quick succession. The strike was lost and the Chinese continued to work, although it was necessary to give them police protection."[140] Thus, it appears that capital's interests were preserved in the hard fought first round of the exclusion struggle within the industry.

Shortly after its establishment in California, the shoe industry became subject to a number of pressures. Nationwide, the mechanization of the industry threw many skilled craftsmen out of work, replacing them with lower paid machine operators, most of whom were women in the East. Out of the chaos which ensured the Knights of St. Crispin, a shoemakers' union, was formed in defense of the earlier craft mode of production. These nationwide pressures of price competition from the newly mechanized Eastern firms were exacerbated in California when the railroad was completed in 1869. The Crispins, who had first organized a local in San Francisco in 1868, went out on strike in April of 1869 to demand both higher wages and the exclusion of the Chinese from the trade. At the time, 6 San Francisco firms employed about 600 shoemakers, nearly all of them white and most of them members of the Knights of St. Crispin. In response, the largest shoemaking firm, Buckingham and Hecht, hired Chinese workers as strikebreakers. Other firms quickly followed suit.[141] This constituted the first entry of large numbers of Chinese into the trade. By 1870 about 19% of the workers in the industry were Chinese[142] and by 1871-72 the ranks of the Chinese had swelled to include half of all those employed in the trade.[143]

Although labor had not been effective in preventing the entrance of the Chinese into the trade, their continuous pressure to exclude the Chinese was making some headway as early as 1872 and began to be really effective after 1876.[144] Several firms began to replace their Chinese employees with whites, especially women and children. (The listing of the numbers of various types of employees, "Whites, Chinese, Girls, and Boys" on page 2111 of the joint Special Committee Report indicates both that most firms tended to mix these types of labor and that the industry as a whole was a major employer of females and juveniles.) The dominant San Francisco firm Einstein and Company laid off some 300 Chinese.[145] It should be noted however that the firm probably did not suffer financially from the move since, by that time, the wages for white labor had fallen until they were equal to the wages paid to the Chinese.[146] Therefore, the exclusion occurred after the labor market ceased to be split and the exclusion failed to protect labor's interests by preserving a higher standard of living.

For the most part, the Chinese who were pushed out of employment by white-owned firms were absorbed by the growing number of Chinese owned boot and shoe sweatshops. Although the machinery necessary for shoemaking was expensive, it could be rented; thus allowing people with modest capital accumulations (i.e. Chinese entrepreneurs) to enter the field.[147] As in cigar making, as soon as Chinese workers learned the trade, Chinese firms began to appear and compete with white capitalists. The entry of Chinese firms began around 1875-76 when there were 8 such firms in the field and by 1880 there were 48 of them.[148] For California as a whole, Chinn estimates

that in 1877, 2,000-3,000 of the total 3,000-4,000 shoemakers were Chinese and in 1882 2,500 out of 4,000 were Chinese.[149] By 1883 only 300 Chinese were employed by whites, while some 2,000 were employed by Chinese.[150] These Chinese firms tended to operate with lower profit margins, specializing in the cheaper types of shoes and rougher types of workman's boots. Thus, Chinese workers were successfully excluded from white owned shops, but their numbers continued to account for a large proportion of the total of those employed in the trade. By 1882, there seemed to be no way to exclude the Chinese from entering the trade as manufacturers.

Inasmuch as the Chinese boot and shoemakers became concentrated in Chinese owned firms where the wages were slightly lower, it could be argued that a caste system became established in the industry. Usually, a caste system served to protect the interests of native labor, but in this case concluding that white labor was able to protect its interest through a caste system would be dubious. For one thing, the wage cost difference of employing white labor as opposed to Chinese became insiginficant in the later 1870's.[151] Meanwhile employers who had converted to all white labor were able to claim a preference in the trade by using white labor labels. At any rate, the caste system did little to protect the position of white workers since wages continued to drop throughout the 1870's due to mechanization and competition with Eastern firms - factors which had little to do with the presence of the Chinese.

THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY (WOOLENS AND JUTE)

The textile industry, which was founded in California in the early 1860's, differed sharply from all of the other industries which employed Chinese labor in that it represented a far greater concentration of capital. From the time of its establishment in the state, the industry was highly mechanized and could be characterized as a factory mode of production as opposed to the sweatshop and journeyman, craft modes of production found in other manufactures discussed here. As a result, the capital requirements tended to bar entry into the trade which meant that: 1) The number of firms in the field were few and large[152] and 2) Chinese entrepreneurs were prevented from entering the trade.

The Chinese were employed extensively within the trade from its founding.[153] As was the case with the railroads, the woolen industry found it difficult to attact white examiners into the regimen of factory employment for steady, but low wages. Thus Chinese workers, under the discipline of the contract system, were viewed as a necessity[154] and continued to dominate the trade. According to Chiu, white workers, except foremen, were a rarity in the early 1860's while the percentage of Chinese employees in the early '70's was between 73% and 80% of the workforce.[155] Cross estimates that 80% of the labor force was Chinese in 1865.[156] If the Joint Special Committee's data were assumed to be representative, one could estimate that 81% of the workforce was Chinese in 1876.[157] Because of the cheapness of this Chinese labor force the state's textile industry was able to survive when the competitive pressures from the Eastern firms became felt in the late 1870's.

Anti-Chinese attacks within the industry came to a head on three different occasions, each episode resulting in a maintenance of capital's interest. The first occasion occurred during 1867. Eastern factories had dumped their surpluses on the California market causing 50% production cuts in the Mission and Pioneer Mills.[158] The white workingmen began agitating against the Chinese whom they viewed as the source of the recession.[159] Following a rock throwing incident against some Chinese construction workers who were repairing a San Francisco street, a mob of 400 threatened to attack the Mission Woolen Mills in the winter of 1867. No action, however, was taken against the factory.[160] The recession was short lived, however, and the anti-Chinese sentiment subsided without the employers having made any concessions to the agitators.

Since the woolen mills were large employers, they became targets whenever the general level of anti-Chinese sentiment ran high. During the second night of the San Francisco riots of July 1877, the unemployed mob threatened to burn down the Mission Mills, but were turned back when they saw that the mills were heavily guarded by the merchant financed "pick handle brigade."

Although they were generally successful in maintaining their Chinese workforce, employers were not totally insensitive to the demands of the unemployed whites. Thus, in the spirit of public relations, employers attempted to replace some of their Chinese with whites around 1876.[161] It should be noted, however, that such substitutions were not made at the expense of profits. The Chinese were replaced with women and children machine tenders who were just as

cheap and as docile as their Chinese counterparts.[162] Also, despite the political mileage made from these substitutions before the congressional investigators, substitution was never widespread and the Chinese continued to serve as the bulk of the industry's work force.

The last anti-Chinese incident within the industry happened in 1880 after the new constitution had forbidden the employment of any Chinese by any corporation in the state. During February of 1880 the Pioneer and Mission Mills responded to the new law by shutting down and discharging some 500 Chinese employees. Oakland Jute followed suit by discharging 300 Chinese, and many of the smaller firms did likewise.[163] Had the firings been permanent, we might be reasonable in concluding that labor finally became more powerful than the woolen industrialists in those latter years when Chinese exclusion was demanded from all segments of society. However, in Saxton's opinion, the dischargings were merely a charade which bought time for the employers' legal staffs, who were working on getting the anti-Chinese parts of the new state constitution declared unconstitutional.[164] Once the new laws were so declared, the employers were again free to maintain a heavily Chinese workforce despite white protests.

The woolen industry is unique among all the industries covered in this thesis in that it was much more capital intensive. Hence, the Chinese never entered the field as entrepreneurs. Consequently, there was never any cause for the interests of capital to adopt a position of excluding the Chinese from the trade. Inasmuch as the industry continued to employ Chinese labor into the 1880's, their anti-exclusionist interests persisted throughout the

time being studied here. Coincident with the pro-Chinese interests of the employers is the fact that Chinese employment in the industry remained widespread. Thus, in conclusion, it seems that the issue of Chinese immigration was resolved in terms more favorable to capital than to labor throughout a series of confrontations.

THE SERVICE TRADES

From their earliest arrival, the Chinese worked within various service trades, supplying white Americans with a wide variety of services. In the East Coast, these service trades employed females for the most part. But in the frontier days on the West Coast working women were relatively scarce. Inasmuch as male workers considered servile positions beneath their dignity, some other source of labor would have to be found if these accustomed services were to be continued. The Chinese, of course, saved the day by offering their labors in these low paid positions traditionally held by women. In this section, I shall discuss the three service trades in which the Chinese immigrants had the greatest impact: domestic service, the restaurant trade, and laundring. These trades are included in order that this thesis might present a complete picture of the Chinese as workers within the California economy. However, a discussion of the service trades will do little to illuminate the overall development of this thesis, since the presence of the Chinese in these demeaning positions was never seriously challenged by white labor. Indeed it has always seemed appropriate to whites that servile positions be held by non-whites.

Domestic Service

Among the first Chinese to enter the United States were those brought here as servants. Since female servants were scarce in frontier California and few Eastern women could be persuaded to migrate, the Chinese were increasingly employed as housekeepers, cooks and so forth. Evidently, this scarcity of women was most deeply felt in the countryside, where households had experimented unsuccessfully with employing Native Americans as servants.[165] Unfortunately, since the hiring process was so individualized (with single households hiring one or at most a handful of servants under informal agreements) we have few reliable statistics as to the numbers of Chinese in service or their wages. One witness before the Joint Congressional Committee estimated that 4,000-5,000 Chinese were employed by private households within the state while another witness claimed that there were about 7,000 in San Francisco alone.[166] No one seems to have been concerned enough to have kept any longitudinal account which would tell us how the employment of Chinese as domestics varied over time, but it is safe to say that their employment remained widespread and common well into the 1890's.

With respect to wages, the domestic servant trade is unique among those reviewed here since the Chinese servants averaged a higher wage than their white counterparts. The testimony before the Joint Special Committee says that Chinese made between $60 and $40 per month while whites averaged $30 to $25[167] and adds that Chinese servants were often felt to be more faithful and reliable.[168] Probably, a position as a domestic was one of the better opportunities

open to a Chinese at the time. In addition to the good wages (which were high relative to those offered Chinese in other pursuits) domestic service was characterized by a degree of independence when contrasted with the contract employment system found in other trades.

Also, the Chinese were not harassed as domestics. While it is probable that anti-Chinese incidents did occur in this trade, such episodes have escaped notice and do not appear in the literature. At any rate, widespread protests against Chinese servants and movements directed towards their exclusion never materialized. Even after the exclusion of 1882, domestic service (like the other service trades) was an occupation which the Chinese felt free to enter.[169]

The Restaurant Trade

Although our everyday stereotypes strongly associate the Chinese with the restaurant trade, there is little solid information on the extent of their participation during the 1848-1882 period. We know that the first Chinese restaurant had been established in San Francisco by July of 1849 and that Chinese restaurants offered gold rush miners meals at cheap rates,[170] but beyond that we know little. Doubtless the Chinese restaurants remained in California throughout the period: they continued into the 1920's when a resurgence of interest in them came along with a more general interest in patronizing Chinatowns as quaint diversions during the flapper age. Thus, Chinese restaurants serving both an ethnic and a native clientele continued to be avenues of Chinese entrepreneurial activity.

Along with the absence of information about the extent of Chinese in the restaurant trade, there is an absence of restrictive legislation directed against the Chinese restaurant owner. Unlike other trades where taxes on ethnics were levied or boycotts were promoted by competing white businessmen, the restaurant trade was apparently free of overt harassment. In other words, ethnic antagonisms never germinated within this sphere of economic activity.

Laundries

The appearance of Chinese laundrymen was certainly welcomed in early California. During the gold rush days, the shortage or women willing to take in laundry was severe. Shirts were actually sent to Hawaii to be laundered, a process which took two months, at a cost greater than that of buying new shirts. Thus, the Chinese who took in wash individually as early as 1850 and who had, by 1851, established the first wash house in San Francisco afforded Californians the amenities of civilized life on the frontier.[171] Naturally, small Chinese wash houses (employing an average of about 5 people each) proliferated quickly throughout the West Coast. By the 1870's Chinese laundries had appeared in Chicago, St. Louis, Baltimore, and New York as well. The Chinese wash houses seemed to have served the middle classes since the laundry of the rich was usually washed by their servants. As one witness before the Joint Special Committee put it: "I think this very employment of the Chinese in laundry-work causes mechanics to change their clothing oftener than they did when they paid a high price for the washing."[172] In other words, the

presence of cheap Chinese labor brought an otherwise prohibitively expensive service to the white labor aristocracy.

This being the case, one would expect that the Chinese laundrymen would have been immune to ethnic antagonisms. Yet, the historical record shows the opposite. In San Francisco, a laundry tax discriminating against the Chinese was passed in 1873. Laundries using one horse were taxed $2 per quarter, laundries using two horses $4 per quarter, three horses or more $15 per quarter, but laundries employing no horses, namely Chinese laundries, were also taxed $15, the maximum rate.[173] Also, during the San Francisco riots of 1877, some 25 laundries were burned by the angry white mobs. Surely, then, there was antagonism, but it wasn't of the type Bonacich outlines. The Chinese did compete with women in the laundry trade,[174] but it was not those women who advocated the tax or sacked the laundries. As in other trades where the Chinese competed with women, the women remained quiet on the issue. We would have to stretch the historical truth pretty far to say that the unemployed who rioted in San Francisco sought to replace the Chinese as laundrymen. Instead, the antagonism against the Chinese laundrymen can best be explained by viewing the Chinese laundry as a symbol of the Chinese presence in the state. Thus, the laundries came under attack not because they undercut the standard of living of white workers (in fact the existence of the laundries enhanced that standard) but because they served as symbolic targets for those who wished the Chinese driven out. Therefore, it cannot be said that an analysis of the Chinese laundry business sheds much light on the ethnic antagonism process.

A RETURN TO THE HISTORICAL QUESTION

Having reviewed all of the relevant industries separately, we can now draw together the conclusions suggested by each analysis into a general concluding statement of the historical findings. It would be too simplistic to expect that each and every incident reviewed here would demonstrate the superiority of one side over the other, yet it can be said that in general the interests of capital were not seriously impaired by the exclusions which did occur within various trades by 1882. In other words, capital owners maintained the upper hand over the working class despite the eventual passage of the Exclusion Act.

Some of the industries reviewed here fail to illuminate this conclusion because the presence of Chinese workers was never contended by whites. In the cases of the railroad construction and reclamation industries, the expanding economy neutralized any threat which the presence of the Chinese might have made against the position of white labor within a split labor market. Consequently, white labor was never sufficiently aroused to raise the immigration issue. Also, the Chinese presence in the service trades was never protested. Why the mostly female native workers in these trades failed to protest against the Chinese is not entirely clear, but it is clear that since the issue was never raised, an analysis of the relative strengths of capital and labor within these trades cannot be made.

Some of the incidents reviewed here discredit the above general conclusion. The exclusion of Chinese hired miners from Chinese Camp, while atypical of the general trend of gold mining

exclusions, maintained the interests of independent miners over the encroachment of capitalists who hired cheaper ethnic labor. The exclusion of the Chinese from the silver mines of the Comstock Lode was rather clearly an example of a balance favoring labor's interests over capital's on an issue where the interests of both parties were at stake. Such incidents, however, are in the minority; in most cases the interests of capital prevailed.

In other cases, the Chinese were excluded, but that exclusion was a rather hollow victory for labor. In most of these cases, exclusion occurred after the wage levels of whites and Chinese had reached parity and therefore capital's interests were not overriden by labor. In the boot and shoe industry and to a more limited extent in the textile industry Chinese workers were replaced by white women and children at wages equal to those paid the Chinese. In the Sutter Creek strike, capital's actions reveal that the savings of employing Chinese must have been insignificant since the mine owners capitulated only on the Chinese issue in a strike which they clearly smashed. The general pattern of gold mining exclusions, as typified by the Columbia expulsions also represent a hollow victory for labor on issues where exclusion did not immediately threaten capitalists. In those cases, the exclusion of the Chinese failed to preserve the independence of the miners.

In other cases, labor was never successful in its drive to exclude the Chinese. The Chinese were never excluded from the cigar making and farm labor trades despite labor's protests. Although some Chinese were replaced by white women and children in the textile industry, the industry continued to depend on a large Chinese work-

force up until 1882. The settlement of the Rock Springs riot was something of a compromise, but capital maintained its existing Chinese workforce, thereby impeding labor's unionization activities. In these cases, the resolutions of the immigration issue are most clearly favorable to capital.

In summation, although it is not supported by every piece of evidence, the above concluding answer to the historical question, that capital's interests were generally favored over those of labor, is supported by the bulk of the history that has been reviewed.

EXTENDING THE MODEL

In a general sense, the Bonacich model of ethnic antagonism has been useful in understanding the Chinese exclusion movement. Its overall theme, that capitalist institutions acting to produce a competitive labor market situation are a primary factor in the production of exclusionist sentiment against immigrant ethnic groups has certainly been justified in my examination of this particular set of historical events. Of course, economic conflict is not the only variable at work in the exclusion process. As one reads through the California Senate Special Committee's Report and the federal Joint Special Committee's Report one is struck by how much of the testimony reflects an antipathy towards the Chinese based on the perceptions that the Chinese were filthy, given to the vices of opium, prostitution and gambling, were carriers of strange diseases, were prone to criminality, or would not accept the teachings of Christianity, remaining instead heathens and idol worshipers.

An opinion expressed by the Califonria State Senate illustrates this point: "But when all is said that can be said in his favor we still fall back upon the consideration that it is American and not Chinese civilization that we are trying to build up, and that since Chinese labor means American destitution we must rid ourselves of it. ... It is not a mere question of comparative wages, but of civilization and progress."[175] Some of these perceptions are based on the economic situation under which the two groups, white and Chinese came into contact. It is not surprising, for example, that the Chinese, forced to live as cheaply as they were, came to occupy filthy tenements (owned incidentally by whites) or sought a respite from the work world in opium and gambling. Still, however, there remain such objections as the repulsion toward the Chinese as heathens which have no economic basis at all. In The Unwelcome Immigrant, Stuart Miller underscores these non-economic antipathies by tracing the roots of the sterotypes and prejudices which formed long before the Chinese entered the United States or competed, as laborers, within its economy. Thus, no honest scholar can claim that all the roots of anti-Chinese hostility lie within the economic sphere, no matter how strongly he/she believes that economic relations condition social relations.

In fairness to Bonacich, it must be pointed out that she realizes that the forces of economic competition are not the sole determinants of hostility. She says: "Obviously, this type of three-way conflict is not the only factor in ethnic relations."[176] She does argue, however, that the conflict is basic to the antagonisms and that tracing the economic relations will be the most fruitful approach

toward understanding the antagonisms. Having reviewed the historical account, I must, in this case, agree with Bonacich that the economic forces of competition are the primary, though not the only, generators of exclusionist sentiment.

Having reached this kind of basic agreement with Bonacich, I find that my evaluation of her model calls more for its extension than its rejection. I say this because there were some important dynamics at work in the historical process which do not appear in the model. The model should be extended so that it can be of more use to later researchers who wish to pursue this kind of work. My work reveals that there are two such areas where the model needs to be extended: 1) The effects of expansions and contractions of the economy on the competition process is missing. 2) The role of the ethnic as an entrepreneur and an analysis of how he/she re-arranges the lines of conflict is also missing.

That expansions and contractions in the economy are important in the formation of hostilities toward the ethnic worker has been suggested at several points in this thesis. Expansion and contraction in the economy is indicated by rising and falling levels of unemployment. It seems that exclusionary sentiments have been rampant during times of high unemployment, while the Chinese encountered less hostility during times of labor scarcity. The Chinese were welcomed as railroad builders during the labor scarce 1860's when their presence did not threaten the position of white workers in any way; in fact the presence of the Chinese enhanced white labor by making employment of foremen over gangs of Chinese available to whites. Similarly, in the early gold rush days, the

presence of Chinese as launderers and domestics was welcomed inasmuch as there was a shortage of frontier women to serve in these trades. But during the depression of the '70's, hostility against the Chinese reached a fever pitch, especially among the unemployed, despite the fact that the removal of the Celestials would do nothing to impede the penetration of the local market by Eastern made goods, the chief cause of the problem.

Expansion and contraction in the economy is a dynamic which affects the strengths of the interests of both native labor and employers on an immigration issue. As the economy expands, unemployment drops and labor becomes more scarce. In a competitive labor market, in order to attract labor, employers must offer high wages. If labor is sufficiently scarce, the economy can absorb an influx of cheaper immigrant labor without threatening the native laboring group with either displacement or wage reduction. Hence, the native labor group becomes indifferent towards immigration to the degree that the economy is expanding. In other words, ethnic antagonisms by natives against immigrants will not appear even though the labor market remains split along ethnic lines. Contraction, on the other hand, usually implies, at some point, a downward pressure on profits. In this situation, the need for capital to reduce its wage costs becomes more acute. Hence, one would expect employers to work harder in their efforts to find and employ cheaper laboring groups. Thus competition between the native and ethnic workers increases as the living standrad of the former declines. (This decline in the standard of living also generates frustration among native

workers.) Predictably, this increase in competition during the contraction phase of the economy results in a heightening of ethnic antagonisms. Thus, in an overall sense, expansion tends to disarm the antagonism producing mechanisms of the Bonacich model while contraction tends to increase hostilities.

The second area where the Bonacich model needs to be extended is hinted at by the passive role assigned to the ethnic group by the model. The ethnic group is seen as being composed entirely of workers; yet my historical examination has revealed that the ethnic business entrepreneur can also have an impact on the conflict situation. To be fair, it must be pointed out that Bonacich did foresee, in one of her footnotes, that ethnics could enter the entrepreneurial realm, but a detailed focus on this group is missing from the analysis. "Sojourners often use their political resources and low price of labor to enter business for themselves (a process which will be fully analyzed in another paper). This does not remove the split in the labor market, though it makes the conflict more complex."[177] This other paper mentioned by Bonacich is titled "A Theory of Middleman Minorities" and appears in volume 38 of the American Sociological Review (October 1973). In this article, Bonacich is chiefly concerned with describing how the middleman status (her term for the ethnic entrepreneur) comes about, but she also comments on how this status can generate a hostile reaction by the host society. In her article, hostility is partly a reaction by the host society to the solidarity, the clannishness, of the ethnic group. This feature of the hostile reaction is non-economic

in origin. Also, the hostility reaction is partly created by economic features, namely the economic conflict between the ethnic group and: 1) its clientele; 2) native labor; and 3) native business interests.

Conflict between the ethnic entrepreneur and his/her native clientele is seen as the inevitable result of the inherent conflict of any merchant/consumer relationship. While this conflict can become severe wherever ethnic business dominates certain segments of commerce (as happens, for example, in Southeast Asia where the Chinese dominate the merchant trades), it never became an important enough force in the case of Chinese immigrants to America that my examination of that case would serve to elaborate this type of competition. Competition between native labor and ethnic capital is a product of ethnic capital's use of ethnic labor (especially each capitalist's preference for hiring members of his/her own family or kinship group). "The result is a cheap and loyal workforce, which threatens to disrupt the relationship between business and labor in the host society; for the latter, in trying to improve its position viz-a-viz management (with whom it has a recognized conflict), could price the business out of the market."[178] At its roots, then, this competition is essentially a competition between cheaper and more expensive labor. The process would be the same in the case where the relationship between business and labor is disrupted when native capitalists hire cheaper ethnic labor. Thus, an outline of the dynamics of this form of competition has already been given in her previous article. The third type of competition, that between native

entrepreneurs and ethnic entrepreneurs, was important in the historical experience of the Chinese immigrants and also constitutes an extension of the previously given model. Therefore, a detailed discussion of this feature is in order. Unfortunately, "A Theory of Middleman Minorities" gives only a brief statement that ethnic businesses threaten their competitors by operating at lower prices and then cites several comparative examples of such situations. A more detailed discussion of how ethnic firms operate at lower prices and of what forms the native businessman's reaction is likely to take (relative to the caste and exclusion resolutions of threatening situations mentioned in the earlier paper) is missing but can be constructed here as the second extension of the original model.

Presumedly, those factors which determine the lower price of ethnic labor relative to native labor would also produce a lower profit expectation for the ethnic capitalist relative to the native capitalist. In other words, a split in the market for commodities develops alongside the split in the labor market. This split in the commodity market only appears in the area of small businesses where firms are owned either individually or in small partnerships. It is only here that the lower acceptable profit rate becomes translated into any appreciable lowering of the product (or service) price. In addition, the propensity of ethnic entrepreneurs to hire only cheaper ethnic labor gives them an edge over native employers who mix the two types of labor. This edge is not restricted to small business, but it can be minimized if native employers hire only cheaper ethnic labor. As is the case with labor, the capitalist system generates

competitive tensions between employers. Thus, the appearance of the ethnic capitalists under conditions of a split commodity market, threatens to undercut the position of native capitalists. It would be expected that this threat would create antagonisms between the two capital owning groups and that native capitalists would move to drive out the ethnic entrepreneurs.[179]

Because the entrepreneurs who compete with ethnic capital find it profitable to employ the cheaper ethnic work force, they tend to favor a caste rather than an exclusion resolution of the conflict situation. They seek to maintain their advantage of being able to hire the cheaper ethnic workers while at the same time attempting to prohibit competition from the ethnic capitalist. Such a prohibition can be effected in two ways: 1) By capturing control of the legal apparatus, the native entrepreneur can seek to handicap the ethnic entrepreneur through the passage of discriminatory taxation laws. The foreign miner's tax enforced specifically against the Chinese reflects effort in this direction. In the extreme case, laws may be enacted which prohibit the ethnic group from engaging in entrepreneurial enterprises altogether. The prohibition against Chinese owning gold mining claims in Nevada is an example of such a measure. 2) Within the business world, discriminatory access to credit can handicap ethnic businesses. This restriction, however, was not effective in prohibiting the emergence of Chinese businesses since indigenous organizations within the Chinese community made access to small scale capital accumulations available.[180]

Despite these strategies, it becomes very difficult for native employers to destroy all ethnic enterprises and confine the ethnic group within the status of wage worker. For one thing, the presence of large numbers of ethnic laborers creates a demand for certain goods and services peculiar to that group's culture. The native entrepreneur, being unfamiliar with these goods and services leaves this field to the ethnics. In the case examined here, the grocer dealing in Chinese vegetables, the opium dealer, the labor contracter, and the Chinese herbalist represent occupations based on such particular ethnic demands. The businessmen serving such needs come to develop both a capital pool and the business skills necessary for branching out into other lines where they would compete with natives. Thus the cultural differences between the groups provides a potential incubator for an ethnic business class, which constantly threatens to break out into competition with native operators.

Once established, ethnic businesses become difficult to destroy. The native laborer who wishes to drive immigrants from the trade brings pressure to bear on a rather clearly defined target, the employer. The native businessman, in contrast to the worker, is dependent on a much more diffuse group for his survival in the trade, the consumers. Thus, in order to appeal for a preference in the trade, he/she must resort to consumer oriented strategies. Usually, these boycotts are rather ineffective. Despite boycotts against Chinese made boots and cigars, the Chinese entrepreneurs maintained a presence in these fields. Due to all of these factors, it becomes unlikely that native capital will be able to either root out or contain ethnic entrepreneurship.

In conclusion, my review of the history of the early Chinese immigrants to this country has indicated two features which need to be incorporated into the Bonacich model: the effects of expansion and contraction in the economy and the role of the ethnic capitalist. Both features can be integrated easily into the model, meshing closely with its emphases on splits in levels of living expectation and market competition as germinators of ethnic antagonism. It is hoped that this expansion of the basic model will be useful to later scholars who wish to pursue the economic underpinnings of race and ethnic hostilities.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. Mills chapter 8

2. In The Labor Wars, Sidney Lens discusses the major confrontations between labor and capital from the 1870's to the 1930's. In each of the nineteenth century confrontations reviewed (the early unionization of the Pennsylvania coal fields in the 1870's, the nationwide railway strike of 1877, the 8 hour movement in Chicago which led to the Haymarket bombing, the Homestead strike against Carnagie Steel, the Pullman strike of 1894 which was led by Debbs, and the mining wars against the Western Federation of Miners in Colorado and Idaho) emerging labor unions were smashed by a capital-government alliance. In the twentieth century, conservative unions were able to survive (with the depression era National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 recognizing the rights of unions to exist), but radical unions such as the I.W.W. continued to be destroyed by employers.

3. Baran and Sweezy chapter 9

4. Blauner chapter 2

A CONCEPTUAL MODEL AS SUPPLIED BY BONACICH

5. The article appears in volume 37 of the American Sociological Review (October 1972)

6. Bonacich ("A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism") 549

7. Bonacich ("A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism") 549

8. Bonacich ("A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism") 551

9. Blauner chapter 2

10. Throughout this thesis the term ethnicity will be used in such a way as to denote racial as well as ethnic differences between groups. The concept of race, thus being included within the more general concept of ethnicity, renders the arguments made in this thesis equally applicable to the situations of both ethnic and minorities and racial minorities. In short, the concepts of race and ethnicity can be used interchangeably here.

11. Bonacich ("A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism") 554 (my underline)

12. Bonacich ("A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism") 556

AN APPRAISAL OF BONACICH'S THEORY WHICH SUGGESTS A HISTORICAL QUESTION

13. See note 2 above

THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND

14. Sandmeyer 71-72

15. Saxton (The Indispensible Enemy) 129

16. This is Cross's view (117-118) yet Saxton disagrees, seeing the document as essentially conservative (The Indispensible Enemy 127-129).

17. Cross 118

18. Saxton (The Indispensible Enemy) 139

MINING

19. California State Senate Special Committee, p. 199 reveals that a Billy Holung had been mining in the state since 1848.

20. Chiu 13

21. Miner of '49 601; Joint Special Committee 914, 1103; Padden and Schlichtman 68; McLeod 42; Chiu 11

22. Borthwick 117

23. Chiu 12

24. Chiu 16-17

25. Chiu 14-16

26. As quoted in McLeod 67

27. McLeod 68; Nee and Nee 37

28. Chiu 16

29. Chiu 18-19

30. Chiu 16, 19

31. Chiu 15

32. Joint Special Committee 478; also see 603, 975, 1108

33. Chinn 24; Cross 17

34. Coolidge 37; also Speer 525

35. Chiu 8; Speer 528

36. Speer 575

37. Currier 26

38. Paul (California Gold) 349-350

39. Chiu 27; also see Coolidge 38

40. Coolidge 38; Note that this figure also includes merchants and other non-miners living in the mining districts.

41. Chiu 28

42. Chiu 31; Joint Special Committee 1114

43. Chiu 32

44. The best account of the strike can be found in Paul's California Gold 328-330

45. Lord 44

46. Bancroft (History of Nevada, Colorado, and Wyoming) 292

47. Lord 199, 204

48. Lord 199

49. Lord 355-356

50. Lord 385

51. Bancroft (History of Nevada, Colorado, and Wyoming) 292

52. Lord 365

53. Lord 368

54. Crane and Larson 54

55. Crane and Larson 47

56. Crane and Larson 49

RAILROAD CONSTRUCTION

57. At its peak in 1867, railroad construction employed about 21% of all Chinese immigrants. Chiu 64

58. Chinn 46-47; Currier 31; Joint Special Committee 599, 720

59. Griswold 110; also see Joint Special Committee 666, 723

60. Griswold 110; Saxton ("The Army of Canton in the High Sierra") 144

61. Joint Special Committee 667

62. Joint Special Commitee 723; also see Chiu 44

63. Griswold 117

64. Saxton ("The Army of Canton in the High Sierra") 144; Chiu 45

65. From the testimony of Charles Crocker before the Joint Special Committee 680

66. Griswold 111

67. Joint Special Committee 724

68. Joint Special Committee 672

69. Pacific Railway Commission 3139, but this information has been widely contradicted in spots and has been amended, see the following two notes.

70. Actually Strobridge gives the figure 7,000 but Saxton ("The Army of Canton in the High Sierra") 144, Griswold 117, and Coolidge 63 state that the figure should be around 3,000.

71. Here Strobridge's actual figures of 5,000 Chinese and 1,500 whites are contradicted by the more accurate figures given by Chiu 48 and Coolidge 63, which appear in the table.

72. Pacific Railway Commission 3139, 3659; Joint Special Committee 728; Saxton ("The Army of Canton in the High Sierra") 149; Chiu 46-47

73. Chiu 49

74. Joint Special Committee 604, 667

75. Joint Special Committee 601, 668, 682

76. The only time that the Central Pacific hired Chinese in skilled occupations was when the Chinese were used as strike-breakers in response to a strike by white stone masons.

(Pacific Railway Commission 3660). Otherwise, the management did not experiment with the Chinese in skilled positions.

77. Griswold 115; Joint Special Committee 89, 603, 669

78. Griswold 197 quoting the Sacremento "Union" of July 3, 1867

79. The testimony of Charles Crocker before the Joint Special Committee 669

80. Accounts of the strike are found in Griswold 196-197 and the Joint Special Committee 669-670

81. Coolidge 52; Barth 118

82. Griswold 111; Joint Special Committee 73

83. Here I am ignoring the sole protest which was discussed on page 41 of this thesis since wage competition was not at issue in that incident.

AGRICULTURE

84. Chiu 71, 72; Chinn 56

85. Joint Special Committee 439

86. Chiu 73, 75, 78

87. Chiu 78

88. Chiu 75

89. Chiu 79

90. Chiu 82-83

91. McWilliams 67

92. Chiu 82

93. Joint Special Committee 571, 572, 626; Chiu 82; Nordhoff 125, 133

94. It should be, in fairness, noted that Native Americans preceeded the Chinese as fieldhands during the pre-commercial days of Spanish mission agriculture.

95. Chiu 71

96. Chiu 69; Joint Special Committee 629

97. Chiu 70

98. Chiu 81; Joint Special Committee 439, 626, 628

99. Chiu 81

100. McGowan 325

101. McGowan 325, 326

102. Saxton (The Indispensible Enemy) 127-129

103. McGowan 326

104. McGowan 327; McWilliams 74

AN OVERVIEW OF THE MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES

105. Cross 74

106. Saxton (The Indispensible Enemy) 68

107. Saxton (The Indispensible Enemy) 70-71

108. Saxton (The Indispensible Enemy) 3; Chiu 64

109. Chiu 63-64

110. Saxton (The Indispensible Enemy) 4

111. Saxton (The Indispensible Enemy) 7

112. Saxton (The Indispensible Enemy) 68

113. Saxton (The Indispensible Enemy) 119

114. Speaking of the cigar making, boot and shoe making, and tailoring trades, Saxton (The Indispensible Enemy) says: "The white craftsmen employed in these shops were organized, but their organizations could scarcely be described as trade unions. They were associations of journeymen and proprieters dedicated to product differentiation, which they endeavored to achieve by means of white labor stamps and labels. Their aim was to preserve a refuge of small entrepreneurs against the march of capitalized manufacture." p. 168

115. Cross chapter 5

116. Cross 64, 67

117. Cross 69

118. Bancroft (Popular Tribunals vol. 2) 704; Saxton (The Indispensible Enemy) 106

119. Saxton (The Indispensible Enemy) 108

120. Cross 84

THE WORKINGMEN'S MOVEMENT: THE COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR ARENA

121. Cross chapter 7; Saxton (The Indispensible Enemy) chapters 6 and 7

122. Cross 90

123. Cross 92

124. Cross 113

CIGAR MANUFACTURING

125. Chiu 118; Cross 78; Chinn 49

126. Cross 79

127. Chiu 122, 123

128. Chiu 123-124; Coolidge 367

129. Chiu 124-125

130. Chiu 126

131. Cross 145

132. see the resolution as it is reprinted in part in Cross 316

133. Cross 136; Spedden 9-19

134. The Cigar Maker's Official Journal carries the invitation in its April 10, 1878 issue.

135. Joint Special Committee 319

136. Spedden 11

137. Cigar Maker's Official Journal January 10, 1879

138. Cross 170

139. Chiu 126; Coolidge 371

BOOT AND SHOE MANUFACTURING

140. Cross 56-57

141. Lescohier 36; Cross 57; Chinn 52

142. Coolidge 359

143. Cross 309

144. Chinn 52; Chiu 104

145. Joint Special Committee 332

146. Joint Special Committee 332; California State Senate Special Committee 116

147. Chiu 106

148. Chinn 52

149. Chinn 52

150. Coolidge 363

151. Joint Special Committee 332; California State Senate Special Committee 116

THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY (WOOLENS AND JUTE)

152. Chiu 89

153. Joint Special Committee 533, 801; Chiu 90

154. Joint Special Committee 559, 534, 608; California State Senate Special Committee 132-133

155. Chiu 90-91

156. Cross 315

157. Joint Special Committee 1207, 1211 The committee's figures only cover two firms, Heyneman and Company and Pacific Jute. Heyneman owned both of the two largest woolen concerns in the state, Pioneer Woolens and Mission Woolens (there were only six other firms operating in the state according to Chiu 89) and these firms were the largest employers of all the manufacturing enterprises in the state. Pacific Jute was the only San Francisco based jute producer.

158. Saxton (The Indispensible Enemy) 71; Chiu 91

159. Chiu 91

160. Saxton (The Indispensible Enemy) 72

161. Chiu 90; California State Senate Special Committee 117

162. Joint Special Committee 609, 1064

163. Cross 124

164. Saxton (The Indispensible Enemy) 147

THE SERVICE TRADES

165. Joint Special Committee 572, 595, 773

166. Joint Special Committee 811, 1014

167. Joint Special Committee 244, 621

168. Joint Special Committee 249, 798, 853

169. Nee and Nee 55

170. Chinn 61

LAUNDRIES

171. Chinn 63

172. Joint Special Committee 717

173. Sandmeyer 52; Chinn 24

174. California State Senate Special Committee 51

EXTENDING THE MODEL

175. California State Senate Special Committee 53

176. Bonacich ("A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism") 557-558

177. Bonacich ("A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism") 552

178. Bonacich ("A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism") 591

179. This process is, of course, conditioned by the above mentioned expansion/contraction dynamic.

180. In Ethnic Enterprise in America, Ivan Light discusses the institution of hui, or informal rotating credit unions, which were formed within existing family and clan groups. Each member of the hui would pay a specified fee into a pool. At meetings held monthly, the pool was bid for by having each member bid on the amount of interest he/she was willing to pay for borrowing the pool with the highest bidder winning. In this way, relatively low interest loans became available for business enterprise from pooled resources within the ethnic community.

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