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ABSTRACT

THO RECENT RACE RICTS:
AN EXAMINATION OF THEIR DYNAMICS

by Andrew H. Babyak

This paper explores the dynamics underlying two inci-
dents of crowd behavior (racial riots that occurred respect-
ively in Chicago and Cleveland during the summer of 1966).
Crowd phenomena, an important subdivision of collective
behavior, have been investigated infrequently by sociolo-
gists in the past. The theoretical constructs and hypo-
theses advanced by Neil Smelser, Ralph Turner and Lewis
Killian guided the research and analysis.

Four field workers administered a 16 page Open-ended
interview questionnaire to 50 respondents who were familiar
with the riot areas. The data gathered support 3 of the
constructs involved in Smelser's value added schema, struc-
tural conduciveness, structural strain and precipitating
factor. These constructs are concerned with the social
structural factors that underly occurrences of collective
behavior. However, the concept in regard to precipitating
factors was found to be overly stressed as a causative
agent of crowd outbursts, although important, it is only
one instance in a much larger pattern of dynamic inter-
action.

Turner and Killian's theoretical framework, compared

Andrew H. Babyak

with Smelser's is more specifically concerned with the
actual dynamics of crowd behavior. For this reason, their
concepts and hypotheses were utilized to describe and
analyze the actual instances of crowd behavior that
occurred. Hypotheses in regard to leadership, division of
labor, symbol formation and other crowd dynamics were
empirically verified by the collected data. Interaction,
at the individual and group levels, was found to be of
crucial importance in the develOpment and patterning of
crowd processes. Future research could fruitfully focus
upon this interactional aspect and the role it plays in
creating a natural life-history and sequence of crowd

behavior.

TWO RECENT RACE RICTS:

AN EJQnViINATIC‘N CF THEIR DYNAMICS
By

Andrew H. Babyak

A THESIS

Submitted to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS
College of Social Science

1967

ACKNOWLE'GEIENTS

This research project would not have been initiated
or completed without the aid and assistance of Dr. James
R. Hundley. It is to him that I owe my largest debt and
greatest gratitude.

I wish also to formally thank John Ellis and Bill
Given for their help in gathering the data upon which
this paper is based. The many hours they contributed
toward this end are gratefully acknowledged.

To my wife who has given graciously of her time
and effort in the typing and editing of this manuscript,
I extend my thanks. Needless to say, all errors of
omission and commission are my sole responsibility;
the above-mentioned persons are in no way accountable

for any such errors.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

quTROD UCTI ON C C O O O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O .
:ETHOD AlgD DATA COLLECTI ON 0 O O O O O O O O 0 O O 0
BACKGROUND FACTORS AND CONDITIONS. . . . . . . . .

Structural Conduciveness. . .
Structural Cleavage. . . .
Grievance Channels . . . .
Communication and Ecology.

Structural Strain . .9. . . .

PRECIPITATING EVENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
CROWD INTERACTION AND EMERGENT ORGANIZATION. . . . 28

O
M
(1)

Control Agencies vs. Crowd Participants
Crowd Organization. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Emergent Norms and Crowd Symbols. . . . . . . . 41
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
FOOTNOTES 0 O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 66

BIBLIOGMPHI O O O O O O O O O O O O 0 O O O O O O 71

111

 

AEPENDIX

Page
INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 48

iv

INTRODUCTION

Sociological literature is characterized by a scar-
city of systematic descriptions and theoretical explana-
tions in regard to the dynamics and ramifications of
crowd behavior. Blumer noted this impoverished condition
a decade ago when he stated, "It is evident that little
progress is being made in analyzing the generic nature
of the crowd and the kinds of behavior related to it.

The retarded state of our knowledge in this area seems

to be caused in part by the paucity of study of actual
instances of crowd behavior."l During the interim of

the last ten years very little additional empirical
research has been conducted. Hundley and Quarantelli,
searching the literature, found "less than several dozen
systematically described and analyzed instances of specific
crowd formation and behavior."2

A review of the pertinent literature at this point
will illustrate its scanty, somewhat fragmentary nature.
In terms of basic causes, Lee and Humphrey have analyzed
the Detroit race riot of 1943.3 The Chicago Commission
on Race Relations conducted a study of the 1919 Chicago
race riot,4 although dealing heavily with background L.

factors and features, it also contains descriptions of

active crowd behavior. Hartung and Flock have concluded
that a number of prison riots have resulted due to the
heterOgeneous inmate pOpulations and the breakdown of in-
formal inmate organization within the relevant prison com-
munities.5 Grimshaw has linked various social and demo-
graphic factors with various patterns of race rioting.6
The effects of symbol formation and common definition of
the situation on crowd behavior have been investigated
by Turner and Surace.7 Hypotheses concerned with the
develOpment of crowd behavior have been formulated by
Turner and Killian.8 Their emphasis is placed upon the
breakdown of norms, values, communication and social
control during a period of crowd behavior. Smelser pos-
its certain structural factors in social life that render
situations conducive for crowd behavior, or "hostile out-
bursts."9 A recent study by Lieberson and Silverman
investigates a number of situations that were crucial in
initially sparking occurrences of riot behavior;10 the
study employs journal accounts of 73 race riots since 1900.
Studies of actual behavior within the crowd are almost
non-existent. Elkin and Halpern and COOper have discussed
leadership during an alleged crowd outburst.ll Smelser
and Turner and Killian offer a number of theoretical
notions and examples in regard to interaction and mobili-
zation of action within the active crowd.

Similarly, the area of social control lacks systematic

exploration and discussion.12 Grimshaw has discussed a
number of social control techniques that have been employed
in the past by certain police and military agencies.13
Lohman discussed the methods whereby police officers can
effectively disperse incipient crowds.14 Smelser and
Turner and Killian also discuss the factors necessary for
the dissolution of crowd behavior. Only passing refer-
ences are made in respect to the consequences and out-
comes of crowd behavior.15

Such a situation has produced a consensus among
sociologists that empirical research is sorely needed in
this area of collective behavior. In order for knowledge
to be generated concerning the causes, dynamics and con-
sequences of crowd behavior, research and inquiry must
be conducted. Smelser has recently formulated an explicit
overall theoretical framework that encompasses crowd be-
havior, as well as the other forms of collective behavior.16
This systematic set of prOpositions forms the only model
of crowd behavior yet deveIOped. This single work is also
indicative of the few empirical studies and inadequate
theoretical schemes that comprise the field. Utilizing
this theoretical framework to derive hypotheses we have
examined a number of the basic prepositions that compose
Smelser's model.

Smelser's framework postdates a set of determinants

that must be present in order to facilitate the occurrence
of a hostile outburst. These five determinants - struc-
tural conduciveness, structural strain, generalized beliefs,
precipitating factors, and mobilization for action, become
organized into a sequence of increasing determinancy in
the production of a hostile outburst. The accumulation of
empirical events and situations, that correspond to the
determinants, may occur in any temporal order; the curcial
factor in the sequence from indeterminacy to determinacy
involves the logical order and transition of the deter-
minants, rather than their temporal nature, i.e. a single
event may establish more than one necessary determinant.
Thus, all five determinants must be present in order for
a hostile outburst to occur; events and situations assume
significance as determinants when they occur within the
context of the other logically prior necessary conditions.
Three of these analytically distinct determinants -
structural conduciveness, structural strain, and precip-
itating factor, will be discussed following an explanation
of our methodological procedure. To supplement Smelser's
notions, we have also examined some notions of Turner and

Killian.

METHOD AND DATA COLLECTION

During the summer of 1966, a number of racial out-
bursts and incidents occurred in the major metrOpolitan
centers of our country. These instances of collective
behavior, if investigated, should yield fruitful data on
infrequently investigated phenomena. Utilizing the theo-
retical frameworks of Smelser and Turner and Killian, we
derived a number of hypotheses that guided our empirical
investigation. A lengthy questionnaire was develoged;
due to the paucity of empirical research done in the field
of collective behavior, we were unaware of any previously
deveIOped questionnaire that had been utilized in studying
riot incidents.17

We focused our research attentions on two cities;
Cleveland, Ohio, and Chicago, Illinois. Each of these two
cities had a racial outburst in the month of July; Chicago's
outburst occurred on the 12th, 13th and 14th of the month,
while Cleveland's occurred on the 18th, 19th and 20th.
Four field workers conducted interviews in both cities
within two weeks following the riots. Our interviews were
with city officials, police, social workers, newspapermen,
news commentators, civil rights leaders, members of the

National Guard, firemen, university professors,religious

leaders and riot participants.

Exactly 50 interviews of l to 3 hours were conducted
within these two communities.18 In addition to this data,
30 informal interviews were taken at Michigan State Uni-
versity following two days of crowd outbursts and "panty
raids" during June of 1966. The findings which follow
are based on this interview data.

Our reapondents were selected on the basis of two
criteria; (I) if they witnessed crowd or riot activity
and (2) if they were familiar with the riot areas. Some
respondents were representative of both criteria. The
actual amount of coverage given to riot participants was
scanty, due to the difficulty involved in establishing
contact with them. Limited time and resources were also
responsible for this inadequate participant coverage, as
well as for the small number of total interviews (50).

Such a limited number of interviews did not enable
us to compile data on many important aspects of the com—
munities under study. Information on local welfare agen-
cies, schools and businesses would have greatly aided our
analysis, as well as information on informal community re-
lationships.

Another inadequacy in our methodology was the lack

of systematic interviewing procedure. Respondents were

not always asked the same questions, due to their varying
positions in and knowledge of the community. As a result,
the various interviews conducted are not all equivalent,
some are more or less complete than others. Thus, many
areas of inquiry were not as fully explored as we desired.

Although we were unable to obtain first-hand observa-
tions of the crowd activity, our interviewing was conducted
within two weeks following the riots. Such timeliness in
reaching the two scenes of rioting enabled us to conduct
interviewing while riot incidents were still "fresh" in
respondents' memories. Another advantage of our proce-
dure was the open-ended nature of our questionnaire, it
allowed flexibility on the interviewer's part and enabled
respondents to conceptualize information in their own words,
with the attendant meaniggs it held for them. In addition,
our analysis is based upon direct interview data, rather
than mass media reports and printed documents, the source
of information for most past riot research.

Our intention was to reconstruct the historical Bit-

uations surrounding both riots and focus upon individual
behavior patterns and definitions of the situation (actor
meanings). It was not our intent to survey the attitudes
and values of various individuals involved in the disturb-
ances. Although we were guided in our research by a number

of hypotheses, the resulting analysis is also exploratory

in nature and hOpefully will serve to generate further
hypotheses. This analysis and comparison of two riots
and one college disturbance helps to move riot research
beyond the single case study approach of most earlier

endeavors.

BACKGROUND FACTORS AND CONDITIONS

Structural Conduciveness

 

Structural Cleavage: Smelser utilizes the terms,
structural conduciveness and structural strain, to refer
to the essential elements that produce an outburst of
collective behavior.19 We shall classify these concepts
under the heading of background factors and conditions.

One of the important elements of structural conducive-
ness is "established cleavages" within a community. Smelser
points out that racial antagonisms have a greater likeli-
hood of occurring when economic, political and racial-
ethnic memberships coincide to a large extent. Such coin-
cidence between these various elements results in a social
structural feature of widespread cleavage within a com-
munity. Cleavages resulting from such coincident factors
were found to exist in both the metrOpolitan communities
of Chicago and Cleveland.

The large majority of Negroes (approximately 300,000)
who reside in Cleveland are located within the central city,
while the majority of whites reside in the suburbs. (97 per
cent of the Negroes are located in the central city, while
53 per cent of the whites live in the suburbs). In terms

of actual separation, the two races are even more segregated
i

9

10

than the above figures would tend to indicate. within the
central city itself, the majority of Negroes live east of
the Cuyahoga River, while most of the whites live west of
the river. In other words, 96 per cent of the Negroes in
Cuyahoga County live on Cleveland's east side, while 80
per cent of the city's whites live either in the suburbs
or on the west side of the city.20
There are a number of indices which illustrate the
extent and location of poverty within Cleveland's metro-
politan area; a few of these indices will be cited here
to document the economic position of the city's Negroes.
Dividing the central city and suburbs into census
tracts, makes clear the extent of the Negro's poverty in
comparison to the standard of living of whites. In 1960
there were nineteen census tracts in which over one-half
of the families had an income of less than $4,000; all
nineteen of these tracts were located within Cleveland.
Twenty-five tracts existed in which one-third of the
families had an income of less than $3,000; all twenty-five
tracts were located in Cleveland. While the central city
itself accounted for only 53.5 per cent of the pOpulation
of Cuyahoga County, it accounted for 76 per cent of the
families with an income of less than $3,000 per year.21

Conversely, in 1959, there were twenty-five census

tracts in which the median family income was $9,000 or

_ .1"

11

more; twenty-four of these twenty-five tracts were located
in the suburbs. In 1959, 46.5 per cent of the population
of Cuyahoga County lived within its suburban communities,
but 91 per cent of the families with an income of over
$25,000 a year resided within these same suburbs. Of those
families with an income of $15,000 to $25,000 per year, 78
per cent resided in the suburbs, as did 65 per cent of the
families with a yearly income between $10,000 and 1435,00092
Statistics such as these illustrate the nature and extent
of cleavage, economically and residentially, between the
two major racial p0pu1ations within the county.

The extent of cleavage as represented by residential
segregation and economic poverty is as pronounced in
Chicago as it is in Cleveland. In 1964 the Negro pOpula-
tion of Chicago was estimated to be approximately 930,000,
or roughly 26 per cent of the total city pepulation. The
overwhelming number of these Negroes are residentially
segregated within an "L" shaped strip of land which falls
across the west and south sides of the city, with the
larger number of Negroes being located on the west side of
the city.23

Economically, these Negroes are in an inferior
position compared with the whites residing within the city
limits and outlying suburban areas. In 1964, the median

family income of all Negroes within the city was $4,700

12

or only 65 per cent of the median income for all white
families in the city. When we compare high and low in-
come groups for the year 1960, we can also, again, note
the inferior economic position of the city's Negroes; 29
per cent of the Negroes are in the low income group earn—
ing less than $3,000 per year, as compared to only 8 per
cent of the whites, but only 9 per cent of the Negroes
are in the high income group earning $10,000 or more per
year, as compared with 28 per cent of the city's white
population.24

In 1964, the unemployment rates for Negroes in both
cities were at least twice as high as the white rates,
with the ratio being four times as great in Chicago.
Similarly, in both cities, the educational achievements
of Negroes are below those of their white counterparts;
e.g. the average Negro in Chicago has attended school
1.3 years less than the typical white.25 In addition,
the educational facilities and Opportunities for the
Negro are inadequate and inferior in comparison to the
white educational facilities. Such employment and educa-
tional patterns help to maintain and increase the struc-
tural cleavage that exists between the two racial pOpula-
tions.

The vast majority of our respondents described the

west side of Chicago and Cleveland's Hough area in terms

13

which were illustrative of structural cleavage. It was
pointed out that the average age of Chicago's West Side
tenement houses is sixty-five years, reflecting the eco-
nomic poverty of the area. The new governmental-sponsored
housing units were referred to as "concrete reservations".
Many respondents testified that food prices on individual
items were anywhere from 3 cents to 12 cents higher than
in supermarkets in predominantly white areas of the city;
a clear instance of cleavage when it is noted that the
majority of businesses are owned by whites who reside out-
side of the ghetto areas. These, and many other state-
ments, reflect their perceptions in regard to cleavage
characteristics.

Grievance Channels: Smelser indicates that one of
the elements embodied in structural conduciveness concerns
the availability of channels for expressing grievances.

It is stated that hostile outbursts will occur more read»
ily if alternative channels of grievance eXpression or
protest do not exist, or are gradually or suddenly closed.
Such an absence of grievance channels characterized both
of our research communities.

In both ghettos the dense pepulation figures create

an overload on the facilities of the various civil rights

organizations dedicated to grievance and protest activities.

Those few local neighborhood organizations or groups

I

located within the ghetto confines (West Side Organization
in Chicago, J.F.K. House in Cleveland) lack economic sup-
port and trained personnel. For example, the West Side
Organization in Chicago was unable to join the 0.0.0.0.
(Council for Coordinating Community Organizations) because
it was unable to pay the yearly due of seventy-five dollars.
Such conditions result in little tension dissipation through
effective grievance channeling.

It was also generally indicated by our respondents
that many members of the ghetto areas are so apathetic
that they do not even know the names of their local council-
men.26 This example is indicative of their disgust and dis-
enchantment with political procedures and processes. Police
are looked upon with suspicion and fear; they are, thus,
viewed as enemies rather than protectors of the neighbor-
hood. The Cleveland Police Department has virtually no
organized component to handle grievances. The Chicago
Police Department has established a Human Relations Division
which has the responsibility of investigating grievances
filed against the department. However, many of our res-
pondents believed the division to be a public relations
facade, offering very little real help in the solving of
grievance problems. These situations can hardly be viewed
as effective alternative channels of grievance expression;

their inadequacy only serves to heighten the possibility

15

of riot behavior.

Communication and Ecology: The third factor of con-
duciveness deals with communication and ecology. Large
numbers of individuals contained within a restricted area
greatly enhances crowd formation by encouraging the pro—
cesses of rapid communication, face-to-face interaction,
and develOpment of a common definition of the situation.
The densely pepulated Negro ghettoes of both Chicago and
Cleveland offered such an adequate medium of communication.

One respondent commented that news of the Chicago
riot spread from 1600 West Ashland to 3500 West Ashland
in the time it would have taken to make a telephone call.
The dense concentration of peOple (300,000 crammed into
800 blocks on Chicago's West Side) rendered such rapid
face-to-face interaction possible. In addition, the hot
summer weather resulted in a large number of peOple
0thronging to the streets in search of relief, thus making
effective and rapid communication feasible.

A number of other reapondents noted that attempts
by police to seal off various riot sections had little
effect in terms of riot control or termination. Most
sections contained such a dense populace that the peOple
within them were able to interact and create rumors among
themselves which resulted in a common definition of the

situation. Thus, any attempt to isolate areas from

16

receiving rumors or other riot communications served
little purpose.
Structural Strain

In addition to the concept of structural conducive-
ness, (which Smelser defines as being very general in
nature) the term "structural strain" is employed in his
analysis of hostile outbursts. This term refers to a
buildup of tensions which often correspond with and fol-
low the cleavages (structural conduciveness) that are
existent in a community's social structure. One of the
examples of such structural strain is the large influx
of Negroes, into a city, which has preceded many of the
racial outbursts which have arisen in our country. These
large influxes create discomfort and tension between both
races by increasing economic, political and residential
competition. Such a condition of strain was found to have
occurred in both of our research communities.

World War II resulted in the migration of a large
number of Southern Negroes to the metropolitan community
of Chicago; the Negro pOpulation increased from 289,000
in 1940 to 492,000 in 1950. This increase continued into
the 60's, with the Negro pOpulation increasing by 65 per
cent, from 492,000 to 813,000 during the ten year period
between 1950 and 1960; it was to increase to 930,000 four

years later in 1964. In 1960, 96 per cent of the Negroes

17

in Cook County, Illinois, were located in the "L" shaped
black belt which was referred to earlier.27 This tremen-
dous population increase greatly strained the existing
housing facilities available to Negroes in the city, as
well as their chances of economic Opportunity.

The strain created by Negro influxes often becomes
focused upon a particular issue within the community.
During the war years, in Detroit, the large number of in-
coming Negroes offered economic competition to the whites.
It was this increase of tension that helped to produce the
1943 riot. It should be noted that the Sunday preceding
the Tuesday riot (July 10), Martin Luther King led a free-
dom rally in one of the city's ball parks. This rally
focused upon discrimination and residential patterns of
segregation. Its demands and possible solutions were pre-
sented to Mayor Daley the following afternoon (July 11).
The next day (July 12) the Chicago riot was underway. git
seems that the primary focus of strain in Chicago was this
matter of housing confinement and discrimination; it was,
in effect, the basic problem that had been focused upon
by Dr. King and his United Freedom hovement for over six
months prior to the riot.

A very similar process of in-migration was found to
exist within the central city of Cleveland, Ohio. Between

1930 and 1940 the Negro pOpulation of the city increased

18

by only 12,000, but between 1940 and 1950, it was to
increase by 63,000. This increase was to almost double
between 1950 and 1960, with 103,000 additional Negroes
pouring into the city; 35,000 more would enter in the
four year period between 1960 and 1964. During the 50's
and 60's there was occurring, simultaneously, a rapid out-
migration of whites from the central city. Over 142,000
were to leave between 1950 and 1960, more than offsetting
the inemigration of Negroes. Today, Cleveland ranks
eighth among the American cities having the largest number
of Negro residents.28 Such an influx of Negroes was to
result in an increased shortage of housing and strained
living conditions within the confined areas of the city's
east end, as well as an increase in the poverty level due
to the resulting increase of economic competition.
Cleveland's large Negro in-migration also created
tensions within the political arena. In November, 1965,
a Negro candidate for mayor lost the election by less than
3,000 votes. This occurrence was quite often referred to
by our respondents and had been a major source of tension
within the city during the preceding year. Similarly,
such political tension was evident in Chicago before the
1919 race riots, due to the fact that local Negroes had
played a conspicuous role in the mayoralty campaign.

Thus, two of the conditions formulated by Smelser as

19

being essential for the occurrence of a hostile outburst -
structural conduciveness and structural strain - were
found to be empirically verified by our data.

We should stress that such background features are
necessary but not sufficient causes for a hostile out-
burst, according to Smelser. They must be present for
an outburst to occur, but are only useful to a limited
extent in specifying the actual dynamics that result in
such an outburst. These background factors have been
present in both of the above-mentioned communities for
many decades, and yet these communities have not had
racial outbursts that follow any consistent pattern over
such an extended period of time. Similarly, many other
cities in our country are characterized by these struc-
tural factors of conduciveness and strain, and yet these
cities have not been associated, historically, with any
consistent configuration of hostile outbursts.

This overemphasis on structural determinism has been
discussed by Hundley and C7,,uarantelli,29 who state that it

ignores individual interactions and hinders analysis in

regard to hostile outbursts. Lieberson also criticizes
such a purely structuralist argument when he points out
that Negro influx occurs as rapidly within many "quiet"

cities, as it does within "riot" cities.30 Such influx,

20

which often results in structural strain, is inadequate
as a sole explanatory variable in the incidence of riot
occurrences. There are a number of other important ele-
ments that must be present in order for an outburst to
occur; one of these, termed a "precipitating factor",

will be discussed next.

PRECIBITATING EVENT

Smelser also utilizes the term "precipitating factor"
in his analysis of the factors producing hostile out-
bursts. In reference to this term, Smelser states,

"(4) Precipitating factors. Conducive-
ness, strain and a generalized belief -
even when combined - do not by them-
selves produce an episode of collective
behavior in a specific time and place.

In the case of panic, for instance,

these general determinants establish a
predisposition to flight, but it is
usually a specific event which sets the
flight in motion. Under conditions of
racial tension, it is nearly always a dra-
matic event which precipitates the out-
burst of violence - a clash between two
persons of different race, a Negro family

moving into a white neighborhood, or a
Negro being promoted to a traditionally
white job. These events may confirm or
Justify the fears or hatreds in a gen-
eralized belief; they may initiate‘or
exaggerate a condition of strain; or
they may redefine sharply the conditions
of conduciveness. In any case, these
precipitating factors give the general-
ized beliefs concrete, immediate sub-
stance. In this way they provide a
concrete setting, toward {hich collective
action can be directed."3

This element is considered, by Smelser, to be one of the
essential rudiments necessary, but not sufficient, for
the occurrence of an episode of collective behavior.
Dramatic precipitating events focus and crystallize
complex tensions and antagonisms in a community which

have resulted from structural conduciveness, structural

21

22

strain and generalized beliefs.

In both of our research communities such precipi-
tating events were identified as helping to create the
riot.

In Chicago, the event which escalated activity into
Open conflict between police and teenagers concerned the
closing of a fire hydrant on the west side of town. Tra-
ditionally throughout the city, during the summer, hydrants
are turned on by children and teenagers as a means of
keeping cool during hot weather. The incident which
sparked the three days of rioting in Chicago occurred on
the hottest day of the year, the temperature being 98
degrees. White policemen attempted to turn off a hydrant
at the intersection of Roosevelt Road and Throupe Street,
located in Chicago's west side Negro ghetto. (Approxi—
mately 2 p.m. in the afternoon.) After the hydrant had
been turned off, Negro teenagers turned it back on, and
the pelice attempted to once more turn it off; this con-
flict resulted in the gathering of peOple and the begin-
ning of what was to become three days of disorder.

‘ A second possible precipitating incident was also
mentioned by a few respondents. This event focused upon
an ice cream truck operated by a white man within the
West Side area. An episode of conflict occurred on

Throupe Street between this ice cream vendor and a

23

number of Negro youths. The vendor was unwilling to give
ice cream to the youths, who, in turn, proceeded to empty
his truck of the ice cream supply. This conflict was
quickly escalated into an Open confrontation, as the truck
became surrounded by local Negroes. Eventually, the truck
was destroyed and looting Spread to nearby stores.~

However, it is our contention that the hydrant epi-
sode was the most important event. A number of Negro
youths (10-15) who were participants in the active phases
of the riot identified the water hydrant affair as the
beginning. iNevertheless, the ice cream incident may have
contributed to the initial develOpment of crowd behavior.
It is interesting to note that this reported conflict
also involved a confrontation between Negroes and whites.

The precipitating event which occurred in Cleveland
also involved a conflict between whites and Negroes in
a Negro ghetto area. Two versions were widely circulated
in Cleveland in regard to this incident. Both of the
descriptions are centered around the white owner of a
cafe and his Negro patrons. A local Negro newspaper
states the following in reference to this precipitating
incident:

"It all apparently started because of a
minor incident, a robbery of the Seventy-

Niner's Cafe at 79 Hough Avenue. Reportedly,
the angry owner had given his employees

24

orders'not to serve those niggers a drink

of water.‘ I heard several versions of

this story. One was that an unidentified
Negro man had gone to the cafe and asked

for a drink of water and had been ordered
out. He is reported to have gone back

later and placed a sign outside the cafe
which stated, "This place will not serve
colored'.

Another report is that a short time later

a Negro woman went into the same cafe,
soliciting for charity, and was bodily
ejected. Word passed up and down the

area like wildfire, and a mob, mostly

adults and teenagers, began to gather.

I saw what happened to 2313 place, the

mob tore it to pieces."

‘An interview with the reporter who wrote the above
excerpt, as well as others in the community, leads to
the conclusion that the precipitating event Occurred
where reported, even though its actual details had be-
come interspersed with various bits of rumor. In any
event, a precipitating factor occurred which involved a
conflict between whites and Negroes, in a bar, on the east
side of town (Negro ghetto). It is interesting to note
that the disturbance occurred only two blocks away from
the intersection that was described in 1964 as the geo-
graphical center of Cleveland's poverty (East 79th Street
and Euclid Avenue).35 Smelser emphasizes the interde-
pendent nature of the various component elements which
combine to produce a hostile outburst. These above
specific events illustrate well the interdependence

existing among the component elements of structural

25

conduciveness, structural strain, and precipitating event.
All three components were present in our two research
communities and played an important role in bringing
about the disturbances that occurred in each of these two
cities.

Both of these precipitating factors occurred within
a context Of Negro-white interaction. This phenomena of
provocation between members of both races has been docu-
mented by Lieberson and Silverman. Of 76 riots occurring
between 1913 and 1963, only four have occurred without a
precipitating event. Almost all of these instances have
involved confrontations between Negroes and whites. As
the authors stated, "In the same fashion, we suggest, the
immediate precipitations of race riots almost always in-
volve some confrontation between the groups in which
members of one race are deeply 'wronged' in fact or rumor
by members of the other."34

It is true that our research uncovered precipitating
events which involved interpersonal clashes between Negroes
and whites. This point, is, in effect, what Lieberson and
Silverman documented in their study.35 We suggest that
such interpersonal clashes occur countless times in areas
characterized by structural conduciveness and structural
strain. For example, the clash between white police and

Negro youth over the fire hydrant in Chicago was and is

26

enacted many times throughout that city during the course
of a single summer. The overwhelming majority of these
incidents never result in a race riot. In a number of
personal interviews, respondents injected this point into
our discussions and emphasized that such events were of
little actual usefulness in the analysis of riot causes.

_ The interactional dimension between ghetto members and-
outsiders, police and rioters, rioters and rioters, etc.,
is the most fruitful avenue to follow in the analysis of
the causes and dynamics that surround a hostile outburst.
Precipitating events are only a part of the larger flow of
interaction. Seen from this perspective, an event can
offer much in the way of useful data if it is used as a
starting place in the analysis. But merely choosing some
event and positing it as a riot cause affords little
actual understanding of the elements and dynamics leading
to an outburst of collective behavior.f As we have said,
such events occur nearly every day, in countless cities
throughout the world, but very few of them ever eventuate
in a hostile outburst. 3we must examine the complex inter-
actions between various actors, if we wish to gain a better
understanding of the dynamics that contribute to a racial
outburst, as well as to expand Smelser's theoretical frame-
work.

Such complex interactions sometimes result in a

27

breakdown of the informal control mechanisms which usually
influence actor interrelationships. This cessation of
informal controls, combined with the failure of social
control agencies to prOperly play their roles, can often
lead to unpunished individual deviations. These deviations
can then result, through crowd convergence, milling and
interaction, in the develOpment of an emergent norm. Such
emergent norms alter individual "definitions of the situa-
tion" and cause a basic change of meaning to occur among
the various actors. It is this subtle process of norma-
tive alteration and emergence that must be investigated;
precipitating events are necessary, but not sufficient

causes of such complex occurrences.

CROJD 1NTERACTICN AND EAERGENT CRGANIZATION

Control Agencies vs. Crowd Participants

At this point our theoretical frame of reference will
no longer focus upon the determinants advanced by Smelser;
the concepts and hypotheses employed by Turner and Killian
will now guide our analysis. Their conceptual apparatus
focuses upon interaction, behavior and organization with-
in the crowd; emergent norms and subjective definitions
of the situation develop as a result of various inter-
actions and patterns of behavior. Such a theoretical
framework is more applicable than Smelser's in dealing
with the actual dynamics of crowd behavior.

We will describe some of the crucial interactions
and emergent social norms which were to develOp during
the course of these racial outbursts. It is these ele-
ments which we feel are mpgt_centra1 and important in
explaining and analyzing why such outbursts occur ghen,
where and at the p;me_they do.

Turner and Killian emphasize this concept of inter-
action in their analysis of collective behavior and crowd
outbursts.36 We will attempt to merge a number of our
observations and findings with their statements and

formulations. In regard to interaction among members of

28

29

an emergent crowd, they state,

"As will be seen in the descriptions of
crowd behavior that follow, peOple may
come to a crowd, even to the most violent
mob, with quite different initial motives
and interests. During the course of the
crowd's activity different participants may
behave in different ways. It appears that
the unity of the crowd is often produced
through the interaction of participants
who are actually behaving in different
fashions, an on the basis of different
motivations.

The precipitating event in Chicago, which centered
around the fire hydrant episode described earlier, offers
a good example of such crowd unity and formation through
participant interaction. Two white policemen arrived at
the corner of Roosevelt Road and Troupe Street, at approx-
imately 2 p.m. in the afternoon. A number of Negro youths,
approximately 20 to 30, were running through the water
being emitted from an Open fire hydrant. The police shut
the hydrant off, whereupon the boys turned it back on
again. This happened several times in succession, and a
crowd of Negro youths and middle-aged Negroes began to
gather on the corner. Verbal insults were exchanged
between Negroes and police, with the police increasingly
becoming a hostile symbol and focused target for the form-
ing crowd of onlookers. After about fifteen minutes of

such activity, a crowd of approximately 200 to 300 had

formed on the corner; several bricks and stones had been

30

hurled at the police, and the number of verbal insults

was increasing. At this point the police were getting
ready to leave, and a few members of the crowd had dis-
persed and were also in the process of leaving the corner.
It was at this time that three carloads of police arrived
on the scene, leaped from their cars, and began attempt-
ing to clear the corner of Negroes by pushing them, swing-
ing nightstioks at them, and shouting at them to go home.
A number of participants indicated that at this time a
Negro youth was knocked down and hit over the head with a
police nightstick. It was at this point that the crowd
began to surge forth against the police and to begin
throwing rocks and bricks at several adjacent store fronts.
Many informants indicated that this was the actual begin-
ning of the three days of disorder that were to follow.

A number of social workers and ghetto residents who
witnessed this incident stated that they believed the riot
would not have occurred if the police had not arrived when
they did and acted in the manner in which they did.:58
Their arrival was at a time when the crowd had reached a
large size and had focused upon the two policemen already
there. Their movements in attempting to disperse the
crowd easily enabled the crowd to switch its attention to
these new arrivals. This is a good example of the develOp-

ment of a hostile crowd symbol which is one of the elements

31

'which Turner and Killian consider to be of importance in
any process of crowd formation and develOpment.

This example also illustrates the manner in which
social contagion and milling occur through participant
interaction. A crowd was formed through interaction which
focused upon a common hostile symbol, and out of which an
emergent norm develOped. The arrival of the police and
their subsequent interaction with the crowd only helped to
solidify and better organize the crowd members, rather
than disperse them. The crucial importance of the manner
and type of interaction occurring between control agencies
and crowd participants can be seen from this example. It
is also useful in illustrating the manner in which the
crowd became united through interaction and symbol forma-
tion.

"Another illustration of the importance involved in
the interaction between control agencies and crowd members
can be cited from occurrances during the June, 1966, dis-
turbances at a large midwestern university.39 Rather than
examine in detail all the events surrounding these inci-
dents, the specific example that is useful in describing
the interactional dimension is stated here. Due to one
night of panty raids and student frollicking, the univer-
sity administration believed that more widespread disturb-

ances were about to occur the following evening. In

32

response to such a possibility, 247 police were dispatched
to a dormitory complex on the campus the next night. They
were assembled with riot helmets and billy clubs, and sealed
off the complex from the rest of the university grounds.
Following supper and throughout the evening, students

began to gather in an area in front of the dormitory com-
plex along which the police were loosely lined and assem-
bled. By 11 p.m. there were approximately 900 students
crammed into the area and facing the police. It was at
this point that the ensuing interaction between police

and students was to become of crucial importance in the
events that followed. Approximately fifty students who
resided in the dormitory complex were interviewed the fol-
lowing night. From these interviews we determined that

the majority of students were assembled in the area largely
because of their curiosity; they were in effect, specta-
tors. Many of them were there due to the fact that they
had been out on dates and were returning to their dormi-
tories. Upon seeing the large number of students and police,
many decided to stay outside and watch the fun. It was
also a hot night, the dormitories were not air-conditioned,
and many were outside to cool off. To these students, the
police issued an ultimatum to disassemble or be arrested.
They were told, over loudspeakers, that they were an unlaw-

ful assembly and that they constituted a riot crowd. The

33

majority of students were only there out of curiosity and
considered themselves to be a good-natured group of harm-
less college students. In effect, they were told to leave
their own "front yard" and were warned that they were con-
sidered by the police to be a dangerous riot mob. Such
pronouncements by the police together with their riot hel-
mets and nightstioks only served to anger and infuriate
many of the students. Obscenities had been shouted at the
police, and a few water balloons were thrown up to this
point; but all of our student respondents told us that

they felt that hardly any of the students were intent on
attacking the police or the school. However, animosity was
to rise following the police warning; and there was a large
increase in the amount of shouting and swearing on the
students' part.

It was at approximately 11:30 p.m. that the police
issued their third warning; students were told to disband
and then the police marched double—time into their midst,
attempting to break up their numbers. In this forward
march many of the students were shoved and pushed, as
well as hit in the midsections and backs with police night-
stioks. Twelve students were arrested by the police and
many of the students dispersed into nearby dormitories.

The police charge had caught the students by surprise.

They were completely unaware that it was going to occur.

34

Following the charge, many of the students left the area
and the group eventually dispersed later in the evening.
The police took the twelve arrested students to jail and
also left later in the night.

Following the above incident, many student attitudes
altered greatly in regard to the police. In our inter-
views we noted a large amount of hostility and hatred in
regard to them. Many students mentioned that they felt
that the police had acted in an unfair and abrupt manner.

We wish to point out the effect of this charge on
the students and its similarity with the incident we have
described as occurring in Chicago. The large line-up of
police offered the students a convenient symbol to focus
upon and helped bring about crowd solidarity and unity.
This is very similar to the situation fostering symbol
formation that occurred around the fire hydrant in Chicago.
Crowds of college students do not usually warrant a large
amount of police attention; they usually expend energies
by running and dispersing later, causing little actual
prOperty or personal damage. Most likely, many of the
male students would have left after the females had gone
in at 11:30, the women's closing hours. Many of the male
students were performing for the women. But the police
did not wait to see if this would happen. In this case,

the actions and appearance of the police only helped to

35

produce a definition of the situation which was conducive
to mob behavior. With any other group of individuals, the
police line-up and charge could have resulted in a full-
blown riot disturbance.

An example similar to the above is reported in Turner
and Killian which involves a charge, by police, upon a
group of civilians during the Paris riots.4O This charge
was to result in widespread disturbances and much blood-
shed. Thus, although the incident at the university did
not result in a hostile outburst, such interaction between
police and crowd members greatly facilitates the creation
of a definition of the situation which can lead to wide-
spread violence and hostile behavior. In this instance
it led to crowd dispersal, but resulted in a strained and
tense situation which will have an effect upon student-

police relationships in the future.

. Crowd Organization

Turner and Killian refer to differential participa-
tion, leadership and division of labor within the crowd
during an episode of collective behavior. We were able
to identify such variations of behavior in the disturb-
ances we investigated. Our respondents described a great
amount of differential participation and differing indi-
vidual behavior patterns among those individuals involved

in the heaviest night of Chicago rioting. A number of

36

Negro youths were lomting and vandalizing in shifts. A
group of between 20 and 30 Negro youths were observed
running up and down Roosevelt Road periodically looting
and breaking store windows. This group of teenagers,
estimated to be under 20 years of age, continued such
behavior for about an hour and ten minutes; whereupon,
quite exhausted, they walked to a nearby housing project
and proceeded to rest under trees on its grassy lawn.

At this time, a number of youths resting under the trees
stood up, walked to Roosevelt Road, and commenced to run
and loot throughout the_area. After approximately one
hour, the scene was once more repeated in much the same
manner. Such a shifting of activity and rest is a very
striking example of crowd division of labor and emergent
organization.

Our interviews also indicated that various juvenile
gangs had divided up the west side area of rioting, and
were systematically remaining within their own areas.

It illustrates the manner in which previously existing
informal social groups maintain their unity and manifest
themselves during such disorganized periods of time.

Many of our respondents believed these gangs to be the
most viable social groupings in the entire west side area.
It is no wonder, then, that they would tend to be well

organized social groupings during the riot period.

37

It should be noted that such a degree of social
organization is at variance with the popular images of
riots that envision crowd behavior as being characterized
by "irrationality", "madness", and total "disorganization".
Riot behavior may appear to be chaotic on the surface, but
closer analysis reveals its underlying theme of social
'organization and differentiation of labor.

It was noticed that many of the active youths, running
in groups, were characterized by the absence or presence
of shirts. Usually, a band of youths would all be wearing
T-shirts or no shirts whatsoever. Also, in several in-
stances, all of the group members were wearing rags around
their heads. This illustrates the manner in which emergent
social groupings develOp symbols to insure their unity and
cohesion. Many of these groups were not composed of pre-
viously organized gang members; they had formed through
interaction in an attempt to structure the situation. The
youths stuck tenaciously to their own groups.

Cleveland's ghetto area is not characterized by a
large extent of organized juvenile gang formation. Crime
is widespread in the area, and there are a large number
of juvenile cliques and informal groupings; but there are
few gangs with stratification patterns or rigid codes of

conduct. For this reason, there was no division of area

38

by gangs and no alternate shifting between riot activity
and rest during the three days of rioting in the Hough
area. Negro youths were organized into small groups of
from 5 to 20, much as they were on Chicago's west side.
These groups remained tOgether during their riot activities,
and were quite often composed of mutual friends and peer-
group associates. Thus, once more, prior social organiza-
tion can be seen manifesting itself during disorganized
riot periods.

In both cities, a division of labor occurred between
riot activists and passive spectators. Most of the indi—
viduals on the streets were spectators and curiosity seek-
ers, while only a small number actively engaged in looting
and burning. .Of those activists, the overwhelming majority
(most respondents said at least 90 per cent) were teen-
agers or men in their early twenties. However, a few
respondents emphasized the point that a number of middle-
aged men were seen actively looting and burning; such
individuals were seen in both Chicago and Cleveland. The
activists seemed exclusively males. No respondent could
remember seeing any teenage females involved in the active
violence.

Most spectators remained on the steps, or "stOOps",
or front lawns of their homes, or assembled in large

groups on various street corners. These groups were

39

composed of both men and women, young as well as middle-
aged. By and large, they took no active part in the riot-
ing, but would often enter stores that had been broken into
and looted earlier by youths. Such individuals would
attempt to take any items of value that had been left be-
hind by the previous looters. This seemed to be considered
a safe way to loot by the spectators. (Those not actually
part of the initial and most direct violence.) By loot-
ing in this manner they were also able to avoid being
caught by the police. This is a clear example of the dif-
ferential participation aspect outlined by Turner and
Killian.

These spectators were observed making such comments

as the following: "It's about time", "I knew it was
coming", and "It serves the city right". When asked to
leave the area and return to their homes, they were reti-
cent and usually remained, leaving eventually of their
own accord. Their sympathies, generally, were with the
riot activists. Such attitudes of riot justification on
the part of the spectator-audience, served an instru-
mental purpose in creating a permissive environment for
the activist-performers. This spectator-activist relation-
ship has been referred to by Turner and Killian as the pro-
cess of commitment.4l\)Through it, activists become

publicly committed to a course of action and are, thereby,

4O

encouraged to pursue that course of action. "Backing
down" in such a situation becomes a very difficult choice
to make.

The above authors also state that deliberate insti-
gators often play a significant role in facilitating crowd
action. -In Chicago, such instigators had been apparent to
a number of our respondents. They were described as stand-
ing on various corners and in areas where crowds were
assembled. While there, they yelled inflammatory remarks
and attempted to stir onlookers into action. Their shout-
ings dealt with such issues as "black power“ and "police
brutality". Whether these instigators spontaneously took
advantage of the situation or whether their attempted
exploitation was planned in advance, is a question to
which we do not know the answer. At any rate, this is
another clear verification of the hypothesis in regard
to differential participation.42

Such a division of labor between spectators and
activists occurred, similarly, in the 1943 Detroit race
riot with the presence of youthful rioters and deliberate
instigators also being documented.43 Similar conditions
and situations were also described in relation to the
1919 Chicago riot that resulted in the death of 38 persons.44
These patterns of differential participation would seem,

thus, to have prevailed in a number of other racial

41

outbursts throughout American history, thereby lending
additional support to the aforementioned hypothesis.

A In reference to the question of leadership, few of
our respondents were able to identify key leaders during
the riot episodes. Small bands of youths seemed to engage
in the most bold instances of vandalism and violence, but
they seemed to act in concerted harmony, rather than being
led per se. The instigators, were in effect leading no
one. Several respondents implied that most groups of
youths were characterized by either one or a number of
more aggressive juveniles. Quite commonly, these aggres-
sive individuals served as models for the rest and were
instrumental in bringing about certain acts of violence
and vandalism. However, very few of these persons consis-
tently and forcefully led a group of followers. It would
seem that the members of such groups needed the mutual
reinforcement and encouragement of each other when engaged

in such deviant acts of violence and theft.

Emergent Norms and Crowd Symbols

The key concept in Turner and Killian's conceptual
framework of interactional analysis is the concept of
emergent behavior and emergent norms. These concepts
are in contradistinction to traditional behavior and

traditional norms. In regard to this hypothesis they

42

indicate:

"As crowd behavior develOps, there is
communication of mood, imagery, and a
conception of what kind of action is
apprOpriate. These are emergent, not
traditional. While they are related
to the past experiences and previously-
held norms and attitudes of the parti-
cipants, they constitute new products
of the intefiaction in the particular
situation." 9

Such emergent norms develOped in both riot areas.

A number of respondents informed us that various
members of youth groupings seemed to be trying to outdo
each other in their acts of bravado and violence. One
social worker in Cleveland said that a youth had to go
along with, and even attempt to outdo, his group's deeds,
or risk being ridiculed and branded as a "chicken". Acts
of deviance and violence such as looting and breaking
windows were to become common and expected in the riot
areas. Such behavior has a normative history in ghetto
areas characterized by poverty and crime; but these acts
were definitely being committed at a greatly increased
rate and by a much larger number of persons during the
few days of acute rioting in both ghetto areas. In a
similar manner, setting fire to business establishments
and apartment houses was to become commonplace, especially

in the Hough area in Cleveland, where over 110 fires raged

at various times. Such acts were condoned and often

43

applauded by the large number of spectators who watched
their occurrence, especially since many buildings were
rundown and condemned.

In the safety of darkness the level of permissive-
ness increased substantially and many more deviant acts
were committed during the rioting.46 The roving groups
of youths increased in numbers and many more spectators
filled the street corners and Open areas. Police, espe-
cially white police, and firemen were to become the hos-
tile symbols which were focused upon by spectators and
activists alike. Serving as symbols, they helped to ,
unite and consolidate the various spectator and activist
groupings in both riot areas. In many instances police
and firemen were stoned and verbally insulted.

Respondents who were in the riot area during Chicago's
disturbances said that the most unsafe place to be was
where the police were. Thus, an apprOpriate conception
of action develOped, in both cities, that defined the
police and firemen as enemies, and that encouraged and
permitted deviant acts against them; e.g. verbal abuse
and the widespread throwing of bricks at firemen that
occurred in Cleveland's Hough area. The origins of such
emergent normative behavior lie in the strained and tense
relationships existing between police and residents in

these two ghetto areas. Such strained relationships

44

exist in most slum areas across the United States, Negro

or white.

COKCLUSION

This paper has emphasized the important role of
interaction in bringing about occurrences of collective
behavior. We have stated that such crucial interaction
occurs in a context of structural conduciveness and
structural strain, and that the really important feature
of a precipitating event is the complex network of inter-
actions that occurs between its various participants.

Two examples were given to illustrate some of the conse-
quences that can occur as a result of the interaction
occurring between control agencies and crowd members.

It must be emphasized that similar patterns of interaction
are constantly unfolding during the course of a riot epi-
sode. These chains and networks of relationship produce
the various sequences of riot behavior that occur.

Structural conduciveness and structural strain set
the stage for the occurrence of a hostile outbreak; i.e.
they are necessary factors. A precipitating event, most
often occurring between Negroes and whites, further en-
hances the possibility of open conflict ensuing. How-
ever, all three of these elements, though intimately inter-
woven, are not sufficient enough to cause a hostile out-

burst. Certain interactional patterns and relationships

45

46

are equally as necessary as these other factors, and
help determine whether crowd formation and hostile out-
bursts occur.

Scientific prediction and explanation are dependent
upon an understanding of these interactional processes.
For this reason it is our contention that such interaction-
al patterns should be focused upon in future research
endeavors. One fruitful avenue of interactional analysis
would be the sequence of events leading to a riot's ter -
mination. In both of our research communities disturb-
ances tapered off after about three days of activity.
Chicago's rioting was ended by a 45 minute rainstorm, in
addition to the National Guard. This storm caused acti-
vists and spectators alike to seek shelter and resulted
in a breakdown of communication and interaction. Follow-
ing the storm, youth bands were unable to effectively
organize themselves and continue their activitiesy/ No
doubt, a level of exhaustion was reached by many partici-
pants that did not permit further roving and activity./
Similarly, many spectators became bored after three days
and nights of periodic watching; their lack of interest
resulted in a declining audience for the activists, which
had an effect on reducing riot behavior (decline in inter-
action and the suspension of an emergent, permissive norm),

In Cleveland, the National Guard seemed to ease tensions,

47

with crowd activity becoming infrequent the third day
after the initial incident.

It would be sociologically relevant in the deter-
mination of the natural lifeuhistory and sequence, to
explore what function inter-group interaction plays in
such a pattern. Future inquiry should shed more light
upon the dynamics of such a process. It is imperative
that such future research focus upon crowd participants
and spectators, rather than upon secondary sources of
information. Trained observers would aid greatly in the

specification and analysis of crowd processes and dynamics.

10.

ll.

12.

APPENDIX

I. IKTERVIE; SCHEDULE - IDEfiTIFICATION OF RESP‘NEEK

 

At what time and where were you when you first heard
something was going on -— either in terms of the
looting and window breaking, or in terms of a general
crowd formation and develOpment?

Who was with you at that time? (names and relation-
ships if possible).

How did you get your first information?
What did this first source say?

What did you say -- if this involved any conversation --
to this first source?

what did you do then?
Did you tell anyone else?
A. Who? (relationship more important than names)
B. What did you tell them?
When did you go to the scene of the action? (or to
another prescribed place because of crowd e.g., police
station, TV station, or City Hall, etc.).
A. Who with?
What did you see? (Describe in detail) If they were
there this is the beginninggof questions on division
of labor in the crowd, mobilization of action, crowd

symbolizationi crowd communication, and creation of a
generalized belief.

 

 

What did you do then?

Give a minute by minute (blow by blow) description of
what you saw and did. (probe extensively on this).

To what extent did you get involved in the activities?

(shout, mill around, run, just watch, give advice, try
to control peOple, etc.).

48

13.

14.

15.

l6.

I7.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

49

Why did you go to the scene of the riot? (initial
reason).

A. If you got involved, why did you do what
you did? (examples may be helpful in
answering this question).

What were the reasons most persons gave for par-
ticipating in the riot?

A. What do ypu think were the real reasons
that caused them to participate?

 

Who was standing around with you while you were there?
(composition of the group structure if the respondent'
was in a group).

EMERGENT NORMS, RUMOR TRANSMISSION, CREATIONS OF A
GENERALIZED BELIEF, AND COMMUNICATION IN THE CROWD.

 

What slogans and chants were the rioters yelling?

A. What rumors were being circulated in the
crowd or mob?

B. What was the sequence of the slogans, chants,
and rumors which the crowd repeated?

What was the feeling among participants in the crowd
or riot? (his impression).

A. What or who were they mad at?
What did you hear them say?

A. Who or what kind of peeple were saying these
things? (age, sex, type).

During the riot did your feelings and ideas change as
you watched and talked to peOple?

Did you behave in a way, during the riot, (if the
person took part in crowd or riot activity) in which
you would not normally have behaved?

A. What unusual ways of (acting or behaving)
did you notice in the crowd?

B. Did peOple act differently than they normally
would have? How?

How many other peOple did you talk to during the
disturbance?

Did you notice any shift or change in feeling, in the

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

50

crowd, as time went on? (crowd symbolization and
change).

A. What do you feel happened to cause this
change in feeling or mood?

Did you feel, initially, that some type of action
must be taken by the crowd?

Did you have the impression that many members of
the crowd, at first, felt that some type of action
was necessary and needed?

A. Was it obvious that a number of people in
the crowd wanted to do something?

B. Did an "urgent sense" that something must
be done, pervade the crowd?

C. Did you, personally, feel an "urgent sense"
that something must be done?

During the riot, did you feel that no one could
stOp your group from achieving its objective?

Did it seem to you that most of the participants
were very confident that they would be successful
in their actions?

Did you feel that you could really change certain
conditions of the crowd through your actions?

A. Did many other people in the crowd feel
this way?

Did many members of your crowd think that their
actions were useless?

B. CROWD SIMBOLIZATION AND CHANGE

What was the specific (symbol, object, objective)
of the participants during the riot? (persons or
physical objects).

A. Were there a number of separate objectives
of action during the riot? (persons or
physical objects).

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35-

36.

51

B. Did the objectives (persons or physical
objects) change as time went on?

C. When did the objectives (persons or physical
objects) change for the riot participants?

D. What preceded or led to this change in
objectives (persons or physical objects)?
(a change in symbols).

What was the major activity you engaged in during
the riot?

A. Did your activity change during the riot?
B. What happened to cause you to change your
actions? (a change in symbols).
C. DIVISION OF LABOR, MOBILIZATION OF MOTIVATION
How many peOple did you see leading the crowd or riot?

A. At the start of the riot what did the leaders
do?

What were the leaders doing? (describe the action of
each leader which you can remember).

What were the activities that got the crowd going?
(that increased spirit)?

What were the activities that went unpunished by
police or official authorities?

A. How did by-standers and spectators react to
these deviations?

B. How did the police react to these activities
and deviations?

Why do you think most of the leaders were there?
A. For the same reasons as the rest of the crowd?

How many peOple there really had some gripes and
complaints?

A. What were they? (give examples of peeple
and complaints)-(be complete and exhaustive).

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

52

How many peOple just stood around and watched?
A. What did they say?
B. What did they do?

G. How rapidly did these watchers leave and
new ones come? (give examples).

Did you see any spectators become active members of
the crowd?

A. What happened to them (who talked to them,
etc.) that caused this change in their
behavior?

How many peOple were there because their friends were
there also?

A. Were groups or individuals recruited into
the crowd? (explain)
Did friendship groups sort of stay together
during the crowd activity?

B. As the crowd got involved in things, did
peOple stay with their cluster or group?
(with whom they came or with whom they were
familiar).

How many people in the outburst were normally law-
breakers and trouble-makers, and used the crowd
situation as an excuse to do things?

A. Who were they? (give class name such as
rebels, nonconformists, political agitators,
delinquents, psychOpaths, insane, gang
members, youth, guys from lst. St., etc.).

B. What did these deviant people do?

Draw me a diagram of the crowd. (start out when it
first started and then how it changed over time).

What percentage of participants were really doing
something?

A. Where were they located with respect to the
rest of the crowd?

43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

53

B. Where were the watchers?

C. Within the active groupings, were there
particular leaders?

D. What were they doing?

E. How did they do it?

F. Did leaders shift and change?
G. When did they change? i

What activities in the crowd or riot caught on, and
what things did not?

A. What did the (riot or crowd) allow?
B. What did the (riot or crowd) discourage?

C. What were the variety of things that parti-
cipants pr0posed to do?

Did someone suggest doing something, and then did
spectators and people around him wait for him to
do it? (get committed to a course of action).

A. Or did they engage in activity themselves
when the suggestion was voiced?

Did you have the feeling that the crowd couldn't be
stOpped in its course of action?

Did it seem to you that the crowd was perfectly right
and justified in what it was doing?

A. Was it apparent to you that many other peOple
in the crowd felt that they were right,
justified, and very powerful in their chosen
course of action?

B. How many would you say felt that way?

Prior to the riot, did anti-white hostility build
up and increase? (eXplain).

A. Did it build up during the riot?

B. When?

54

C. Under what conditions?
D. When was hostility the greatest?

E. Among what kinds of crowd participants
was it greatest?

48. During the riot, did peOple start defining whites
and police as inhuman, and animals, and not deserving
of fair play or fair treatment?

A. How hostile did peOple become towards the
whites and police? (during the riot).

B. When this hostility occurred, what chants
were cried out and elicited from the crowd
members?

49. As time passed during the outbreak, did new peOple
become involved?

A. What were these new participants like?
(prior categories mentioned, such as
delinquent, insane, etc.).

B. What did they do?

C. What was significantly noticeable about
their behavior?

SO. What kinds of rumors went through the crowd?
A. Please list them.
B. What specific rumors did you hear?

C. Was any rumor particularly outstanding or
noticeable?

D. How did the rumors change?

11.! FEE-CONDITIONS OF was RIOT
A. sgsucmusst CONDUCIVENESS
l. RsssowglleIgg:

51. Who do you think is responsible for the situation in
this community, prior to this crowd outbreak?

52.

53.

54.

55

Prior to the outburst, had there been specific com-
plaints by Negroes against any particular agency or
person? (is responsibility clearly institutionalized?
failures blamed on agents?).

A. Had someone sort of become the scapegoat?
Who is the scapegoat now?

B. Who had Negroes blamed? Who do they blame
now? v

Prior to the riot, had there been any specific com-
plaints by whites against any particular agency or
person?

A. Has someone sort of become the scapegoat?

B. Who have whites blamed?
Now I am going to ask you some questions about
persons, agencies, and organizations in the community,
with reference to a time prior to the riot.
(Start out with government and ask questions AeE for
each person or agency.)

A. How have these persons or agencies made news?

B. What have they been doing for or 13 the com-
munity?

C. Before the riot, do you think these peOple
or organizations failed to do something about
the problems that existed?

D. How effective have these persons and organiza-
tions been in doing their jobs?

E. How could these persons or organizations
improve?

1. Government
A. mayor
B. City Council

C. City Departments (eg. Sanitation,
Recreation, Streets, etc.)

56

D. Political Parties
2. Police: A. Local B. City C. State
3. Welfare Agencies

A. United Fund Organization

B. Community Chest

C. Social work centers

D. 0E0 Poverty Program

E. Other?

 

4. Local Organizations

5. Minority Group Organizations
A. CORE E. SNCC C. Black Muslims
D. NAACP E. 8010 F. Urban League

6. Church and its leaders (Both in and
out of Ghetto area, all denominations).

7. Businessmen (inside and outside riot
area).

8. Schools
9. Employment Agencies
10. Industry

55. Tell me about the long-standing conflicts between
Negroes and the rest of the community here.

A. Have any organizations or movements enhanced
these conflicts?

1. How?

B. Which ones have been most important here in
this community?

1. CORE 2. SNCC 3. Muslims 4. NAACP

5. SCLC 6. Local Commissions, etc.

56.

57.

58.

2.
59.

57

How well organized were civil rights organizations
in this community?

A. Have they recruited ghetto peOple? How
many?

B. Do they hold meetings?
C. What have they done to bring about change?

D. What do they do to communicate with the
people?

E. Have any new Negro organizations emerged?
(RAM, Deacons for Defense, etc.)

F. Have any new white organizations emerged?

In general, what have been the feelings of Negroes
and whites toward each other?‘

Many times before crowd behavior there are many
stereotypes and prejudices voiced by members of the
community. To what extent was there stereotypes of
Negroes and racial prejudice in the community?

A. Did you notice an increase of stereotyping
and prejudice before the riot occurred?

B. On the part of whites or Negroes?

C. In general?

CHANNELS FOR EXPRESSIKG GRIEVANCES:

How adequate and competent would you say the Police
Department is here?

A. Are they well trained?
B. Are they paid well?

C. Have there been any incidents of police
being unfair to Negroes?

D. Have there been any specific cases of
clashes between the Negroes and police?

60.

61.

62.

63.

58

Prior to the crowd outburst, were there any laws or
ordinances which tended to discriminate against the
participants?

A. Lack of a fair housing bill.
B. Relocation under guise of urban renewal.
C. Any other?

Have the courts been fair in handling Negroes?

A. Have there been any complaints about the
court and judicial system?

Now I am interested in your comments about how per-
missive certain groups have been in the community.
How permissive or tolerant have the police been in
allowing crime and other things to go on in the
affected area?

A. How permissive and tolerant have the political
authorities been?

B. Has any prestigeful public official recently
urged sort of a "hands off" attitude toward
minority group deviance?

C. Have there been any charges of unfair and
indiscriminate use of police power in the
riot area?

How quickly did the police and political officials
react to the first incidents of rioting?

A. What did they do?

B. Describe the activities of these officials
as best you can for the days of the outbursts.

Before the outburst, what methods were available and
used by Negroes to express their dissatisfactions?

A. How could they complain to the Police Depart-
ment?

1. A review board?
2. Community relations division?

3. Were the channels used?

65.

3.
66.

67.

68.

59

B. How many Iegroes have been elected to
political offices?

C. How is the Negro represented politically?

D. Do any of the mass media report controversies
and complaints of the Negro community?

I. HOw well do they do this?

2. Are there Negro newspapers and radio
stations?

E. To what extent did Negroes feel justice was
being carried out by legal means?

Are there influential Negro businessmen or leaders
in the community?

A. What have they done for the Negroes?
B. Do they have the confidence of the Negro
pOpulation?
COMMUNICATION:

In the area where the crowd broke out, is there a
high population density?

A. Are there crowded conditions?

B. Did the riot occur at places where peOple
would normally congregate?

C. Did it occur at places where many peOple
can hear or see something going on?

Had violence or similar outbursts occurred in the
general area before?

A. Were there near riots previously?

Had radio and newspapers in the area printed news
of injustices, rumors, charges, and controversies?

A. Have there been many articles and stories
recently about violence in the area?

1. About ghetto life and problems?

2. About crime rates?

69.

70.

B.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

Was the weather particularly hot during the days of
rioting?

Over how wide an area did the outbursts occur?
A. What kind of area was it?
B. Describe the physical layout of the riot
scene?
STRUCTURAL STRAIN

Do you feel the rioters were well informed about the
ways to better their lot?

A. Did the participants know about ongoing
efforts to help them?

Did the participants feel deprived?
A. Lack of jobs? I
B. Low wages and income differences?
C. High prices? A
D. Business exploitation?
Where do most of the Negroes in the area work?
A. Any sudden unemployment? ‘
B. Do labor unions discriminate against Negroes?

C. Any competition for jobs?

Did events or changes occur recently which threatened
to put the Negro farther behind?

A. What events occurred recently which threatened
the status and pride of the Negro?

Has there been any competition between Negroes and
whites for power?

A. Housing?

B. Do realtors discriminate?

76.

77.

79-

80.

81.

C.

82.

61

C. Is housing hard to find for Neg roes?

D. Are there inadequate recreational facilities
for Negroes?

Has there been rapid in-migration of Negroes into
this area?

A. To what extent?
To what extent did participants feel a gap between
what they thought they deserved and what they actually
received? (alienation - gap between aspirations,
expectations, and actual achievements).

What about conflicts between various elements and
factions of the Negro community?

A. Describe them.

Are there laws on the books allowing differential
treatment of Negroes and whites?

Any prohibitions on shOpping and borrowing money
(credit)?

A. Do Negroes have trouble getting credit?
In general, what do you see as the basic differences
between Negroes and whites? (particularly Negroes in
riot area).

A. What are some differences about the way
they think about the world?

B. What differences are there in the way they
live?

C. What about family life?
D. Do you think they plan ahead?
E. What differences are there in spending
patterns?
BREAKDOWN OF SOCIETAL FEATURES

To what extent did peOple in the area believe that it
was possible to improve the conditions here?

A. Did many of them express hOpe of better things?

83.

84.

85.

86.

87.

88.

89.

Now
off

90.
910

92.

62

Would you say conditions in the ghetto were getting
worse or actually getting somewhat better before the
riot occurred?

A. In what way?

Do you think many Negroes compared their conditions
with conditions in white communities?

A. Did they compare their area to other Negro
areas, perhaps in other cities?

Did any peOple living in the area or other leaders
point out how Negroes in other cities had improved
their conditions by direct action?

Do you think the white community really understands
the situation in the Negro area?

Would you say there are adequate channels of com-
munication between the communities? (Negro and white,
as well as between factions in the Negro community).
Has the riot area been a high crime rate area?

A. Are there violent gangs in the area?

B. Have you heard reports of groups plotting
or organizing violence?

In general, before the riot, did the peOple in the
riot area seem discontented, restless, and ready for
change of some kind? (a crucial question).

III. PRECIPITATING FACEOR OR EVENT

let's talk about the event or events which touched
the riots.

To your knowledge, what was this event?
How did the riot participants view this event?
A. What did it mean to them?

Did this event further enhance the threat of the white
community or police to the Negro?

93.

98.

99-

B.
100.

101.

63

 

Did this event point up the deprived nature of the
Negro?
A. Monetary or status ("second class citizen")?
Did this event affect the ability of Negroes to express
grievances and bring about change?
Did the event indicate that some person or group had
failed to carry out its or his prescribed duties?
Have similar events occurred before?
A. How important were other riots in initiating
this one? (a sequence of events).
IV. SOCIAL CONTROL
INTERNAL
To waht extent did the riot crowd achieve any of the
objectives it had set for itself?
A. What happened after it reached its objective?
B. How did participants feel after the objective
had been reached?
How were prospective crowd members out off from the
crowd?
Why did peOple finally stop crowd activities and/or
leave the scene of the action?
EXTERNAL
Was force used to control the crowd in its early
stages?
A. Did police or community leaders hesitate
to control deviations in the crowd?
B. Did they fail to act for a period of time?
How did the police attempt to break up the rioting

crowd?

102.

103.

104.

105.

106.
107.

108.

A. Use community leaders?
B. Did they use bull horns?
C. Did they use the mass media?

How did the agencies of control (police and other
leaders) conduct themselves?

A. what did they do to quell the hostility
that was occurring?

B. Were they effective in their actions?

C. What was the nature of the relationship
between these agencies of control, and the
participants in the hostile riot corwd?

What better action could the authorities have taken?

A. How firm were the authorities in their handling
of the situation?

B. How quick and decisive were they?

Did the police try to remove the people involved in
the precipitating event?

A. How quickly did they take such action?

Did these agents of social control appeal to abstract
or religious ideals? (white appeal to societal mores)
(higher level appeal to norms or values).

A. Or to ideals of Negro betterment? (appeal
to Negro in—group mores).

Did police withdraw from the area?

Did the police indiscriminantly and randomly attack
and arrest rioters?

A. Did rioters feel the police did this indis-
criminantly?

How soon did local police call in State Police and
National Guard tr00ps?

A. Did Negro community members welcome these
additional forces?

109.

110.

111.

112.

113.

114.

115.

116.
117.

118.

65

Did the police attempt to isolate and separate the
crowd into smaller groups?

A. Was anything done to prevent communication
among crowd members?

Did the police or others try to redirect the attention
and focus of the crowd on other objectives and issues?

Was there any attempt to prevent leaders and followers
from getting together?

Were the police well coordinated?

A. Did they seem to know what to do to stOp
the riot?

Did you see any other people besides police and
community leaders trying to break up the riot?

A. What were they doing?
B. How did they try to break it up?

How did the riot finally end?

V. CONSEQUENCES OF CRCND BEHAVIOR

How do most of the ghetto Negroes feel toward the
police now?

A. How do they feel toward the rest of the
community?

What has the riot accomplished?

What changes have occurred which can be attributed
partially, at least, to the occurrence of a riot?

How have your activities changed?

A. How have the activities of your agency
changed?

 

FOOTNOTES

1 Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior," in Joseph
B. Gittler, Review of Sociology: Analysis of a Decade
(New York, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), pp. 134-
135.

 

2 James Hundley and E. L. Quarantelli, A Test of
Some PrOpositions About Crowd Formation and Behavior.
Department of Sociology, Ohio State University, a paper
presented at the 1965 Annual Meeting of the American
Sociological Association in Chicago, Illinois, p.l.

 

 

3 Alfred McClung Lee and Norman D. Humphrey, Race
Riot ( New York, New York: Dryden Press, 1943).

4 Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro
in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot
(Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1922).

5 Frank Hartung and Maurice Flock, "A Social-
Psychological Analysis of Prison Riots; An Hypothesis,"
Journal of Criminal LawL Criminologygand Political
Science, XLVII (1956-57), pp. 51- 57.

6 Allen Grimshaw, "Urban Racial Violence in the U.S.;
Changing Ecological Considerations," American Journal of
Sociology, LXVI (1960), pp. lO9~ll9.

7 Ralph Turner and Samuel J. Surace, "Zoot-Suiters
and Mexicans' Symbols in Crowd Behavior," American Journal
of Sociology, LXII (July, 1956), pp. 14-20.

8 Ralph R. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, Collective
Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall
Inc., 1957).

9 Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior
(New York, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

10 Stanley Lieberson and Arnold R. Silverman,"The
Precipitants and Underlying Conditions of Race Riots,"
American Sociological Review, XXX (December, 1965)
pp. 887-898.

66

67

11 Frederick Elkin, Gerald Halpern, and Anthony
COOper, "Leadership in a Student Mob," Canadian Journal
of Psychology, XVI (September, 1962) pp. 199-201.
~Also, Leo Lowenthal and N. Guterman, PrOphets of Deceit:
A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator (New
York, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949).

12 "Social control" in this instance refers to inter-
vention in the dynamics involved in the development and
dissolution of hostile outbursts and crowd activities.

13 Allen Grimshaw, "Actions of the Police and the
Military in American Race Riots," thlon XXIV, pp. 271-289.

14 Joseph D. Lohman, The Police and Minority Groups, ,
(Chicago: Chicago Park District, 1947).

15 Turner and Killian, Op. cit.!Also, George Rude,
The Crowd In History (New York, New ork: John Wiley and
Sons, 1964) and Dean Harpes, "Rochester Race Riots,“
Trans-Action, II, pp. 7-11.
16 Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior \
(New York, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

17 The questionnaire that was utilized in our inter-
viewing procedure is included in the appendix section of
the paper.

18 The interview categories are as follows: 8 city
officials, 2 policemen, 5 social workers, 21 newspapermen,
3 news commentators, 4 civil rights leaders, 2 members of
the National Guard, 1 fireman, 2 university professors,

1 religious leader, and 1 interview with 10 teenage riot
participants.

19 Ibid.

20 The Regional Church Planning Office, and the Office
of Religion and Race, Race ananoverty, 2230 Euclid Avenue,
Cleveland, Ohio, (May, 1964), pp. lO~13.

21 Ibid, pp. 13-20
22 Ibid.
23 Chicago Urban League, Commentary on Areas of

Negro Residence map: 1950, 1960 and 1964, (Research
Department, May, 1965).

24 Chicago Urban League, Selected Characteristics
of the ngulation of Chicago, (Research Department,
November 10, 1964).

25 Chicago Urban League, Westside Fact Sheet,
(Research Department, March 16, 1965). 9.2.

26 Apathy, disinterest and lack of voluntary asso-
ciation are characteristic of the lower social strata's
response to political and democratic processes. Riesman
and Glazer (David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, "Criteria
for Political Apathy," in Studies in Leadership, Alvin W.
Gouldner, ed; 1950) state that members of the lower
strata (most Negroes occupy this position on the social
scale) have feelings of impotence in regard to the polit-
ical world; they believe that policy decisions are deter-
mined largely by members of the higher social strata.
Membership in voluntary associations is also inversely
related to level of stratification.

The low voting rate of Negroes is discussed by
Lipset, (Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, 1963,
Anchor Books) who attributes the phenomena to the lack of
middle-class social conformity norms within the Negro
community. Kenneth Clark (Kenneth Clark, Dark Ghetto,
1965, Harper and Row) also mentions this low voting rate,
both.North and South, as well as the Negro communities'
failure to develOp political power.

27 Commentary on Areas of Negro Residence Mgp:
1950, 1960 and 1964, 0p. cit.

28 Race and Poverty, 0p. cit. pp. 10-12.

/ 29 James R. Hundley, Jr. and E. L. Quarantelli, A
Test of Some Prepositions about Crowd Formationaand
Behavior, a paper presented at the 1965 annual meeting
of the American Sociological Association in Chicago,
Illinois.

30 Stanle Lieberson, "The Meaning of Race Riots,”
Race VII (1966 , p. 376.

31 Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior
(New York, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963)
pp. 16-17.

32 Daisy Craggett, "I Ran Scared with Hough Area
Looters," Cleveland Call and Post LIII (Saturday, July
23. 1966), p.1.

69

33 Race and Poverty, 0p. cit. p.15.

34 Stanley Lieberson and Arnold R. Silverman, "The
Precipitants and Underlying Conditions of Race Riots,"
American Sociological Review XXX (December, 1965) p.888.

35 Words of caution and a criticism are appropriate
at this point. Lieberson and Silverman have placed emphasis
upon the role of such precipitants in bringing about racial
outbursts. It is our contention that too much emphasis
and importance have been placed upon this aspect as such,
and that such events must be seen in their preper per-
spective amid the total configuration of phenomena sur—
rounding a racial outburst.

These authors utilized the New York Times Index
as their major source of data supply, and supplemented it
with additional magazines and local newspapers. Such mass
media periodicals are quite biased in their presentations
of riot occurrences. Due to their concern with reporting
"facts" they almost always focus their attention upon the
most dramatic events surrounding a hostile outburst. For
this reason, Negro-white clashes, as well as other sensa-
tional initial incidents are often described in extensive
detail. Very seldom are background factors or other
subtle phenomena discussed at any length. Could it be
that these reporting biases have entered into their
analysis and distorted the actual importance that such
precipitating factors have in the occurrence of a hostile
outbreak?

36 Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, Collective
Behavior, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall
Inc., 1957).

37 gpgg, p.103.

38 Respondents were selected upon the basis of the
two criteria listed in the methodology section of the
paper.

39 This instance of crowd member and control agency
interaction can be compared to the interaction process
that occurs between referees and basketball players
during a game. Such an analogy illustrates the manner in
which control agencies (referees and police) can be either
effective or ineffective in their handling of a situation.
Certain interactional patterns lead to a minimum of con-
flict and a maximum of control between police and crowds

 

7C

(referees and players), while other patterns develOp into
a maximum of conflict and a minimum of control. Consis-
tency in the punishment of deviations (the looting of
stores or the fouling of players) results in more con-
flict free control of the interactional situation, where-
as, inconsistency and caprice result in more conflict and
less control.

41 Ibid, p.118.

42 The manner of hypothesis employed here is of a
descriptive rather than a relational nature. The term is
meant to imply uniformity of observation, and as such is
unrefined and gross in comparison to the more precise
nature of relational hypotheses and prOpositions.

43 Alfred McClung Lee and Norman Daymond Humphrey,
Race Riot (New York, New York: The Dryden Press, Inc.,
1943).

44 Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro
in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot
(Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1922).

45 Collective Behavior, 0p. cit., p.83.

46 An atmosphere of permissiveness was quite apparent
to one soCial worker who told me that homosexuality was
much more openly displayed during the period of rioting
in Chicago. In addition, he stated that prostitutes
also became much bolder and more "open" in their behavior.
He described them as very vocal spectators during the
three day period of rioting.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Chicago Commission on Race Relations. The Neggo In
Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race'
Riot. Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago
Press, 1922.

Chicago Urban League, Research Department. Analysis
of Urban League Report on Public School Segregation. ‘ F“
October, 1964.

Chicago Urban League, Research Department. Facts About
the Negro in Chicagy. October, 19641

Chicago Urban League, Research Department. Selected
Characteristics of the Population of Chicago. {
November 10, 1964. ~ p;

 

Chicago Urban League, Research Department. Commentary
on Areas of Negro Residence Map: 1950; 1960 and
1964. May, 1965.

Chicago Urban League, Research Department. Notes on
Negro Poverty. November 29, 1965.

Chicago Urban League, Research Department. Race Relations
Problems - Magnitude and Nature. 1965. .

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