# TWO RECENT RACE RIOTS: AN EXAMINATION OF THEIR DYNAMICS

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
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ABSTRACT

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AN EXAMINATION OF THEIR DYNAMICS

by Andrew H. Babyak

This paper explores the dynamics underlying two incidents of crowd behavior (racial riots that occurred respectively in Chicago and Cleveland during the summer of 1966). Crowd phenomena, an important subdivision of collective behavior, have been investigated infrequently by sociologists in the past. The theoretical constructs and hypotheses advanced by Neil Smelser, Ralph Turner and Lewis Killian guided the research and analysis.

Four field workers administered a 16 page open-ended interview questionnaire to 50 respondents who were familiar with the riot areas. The data gathered support 3 of the constructs involved in Smelser's value added schema, structural conduciveness, structural strain and precipitating factor. These constructs are concerned with the social structural factors that underly occurrences of collective behavior. However, the concept in regard to precipitating factors was found to be overly stressed as a causative agent of crowd outbursts, although important, it is only one instance in a much larger pattern of dynamic interaction.

Turner and Killian's theoretical framework, compared

with Smelser's is more specifically concerned with the actual dynamics of crowd behavior. For this reason, their concepts and hypotheses were utilized to describe and analyze the actual instances of crowd behavior that occurred. Hypotheses in regard to leadership, division of labor, symbol formation and other crowd dynamics were empirically verified by the collected data. Interaction, at the individual and group levels, was found to be of crucial importance in the development and patterning of crowd processes. Future research could fruitfully focus upon this interactional aspect and the role it plays in creating a natural life-history and sequence of crowd behavior.

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# AN EXAMINATION OF THEIR DYNAMICS

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

# APPENDIX

# INTRODUCTION

Sociological literature is characterized by a scarcity of systematic descriptions and theoretical explanations in regard to the dynamics and ramifications of crowd behavior. Blumer noted this impoverished condition a decade ago when he stated, "It is evident that little progress is being made in analyzing the generic nature of the crowd and the kinds of behavior related to it. The retarded state of our knowledge in this area seems to be caused in part by the paucity of study of actual instances of crowd behavior."[1] During the interim of the last ten years very little additional empirical research has been conducted. Hundley and Quarantelli, searching the literature, found "less than several dozen systematically described and analyzed instances of specific crowd formation and behavior."[2]

A review of the pertinent literature at this point will illustrate its scanty, somewhat fragmentary nature. In terms of basic causes, Lee and Humphrey have analyzed the Detroit race riot of 1943.[3] The Chicago Commission on Race Relations conducted a study of the 1919 Chicago race riot,[4] although dealing heavily with background factors and features, it also contains descriptions of

active crowd behavior. Hartung and Flock have concluded that a number of prison riots have resulted due to the heterogeneous inmate populations and the breakdown of informal inmate organization within the relevant prison communities.[5] Grimshaw has linked various social and demographic factors with various patterns of race rioting.[6] The effects of symbol formation and common definition of the situation on crowd behavior have been investigated by Turner and Surace.[7] Hypotheses concerned with the development of crowd behavior have been formulated by Turner and Killian.[8] Their emphasis is placed upon the breakdown of norms, values, communication and social control during a period of crowd behavior. Smelser posits certain structural factors in social life that render situations conducive for crowd behavior, or "hostile outbursts."[9] A recent study by Lieberson and Silverman investigates a number of situations that were crucial in initially sparking occurrences of riot behavior;[10] the study employs journal accounts of 73 race riots since 1900.

Studies of actual behavior within the crowd are almost non-existent. Elkin and Halpern and Cooper have discussed leadership during an alleged crowd outburst.[11] Smelser and Turner and Killian offer a number of theoretical notions and examples in regard to interaction and mobilization of action within the active crowd.

Similarly, the area of social control lacks systematic

exploration and discussion.[12] Grimshaw has discussed a number of social control techniques that have been employed in the past by certain police and military agencies.[13] Lohman discussed the methods whereby police officers can effectively disperse incipient crowds.[14] Smelser and Turner and Killian also discuss the factors necessary for the dissolution of crowd behavior. Only passing references are made in respect to the consequences and outcomes of crowd behavior.[15]

Such a situation has produced a consensus among sociologists that empirical research is sorely needed in this area of collective behavior. In order for knowledge to be generated concerning the causes, dynamics and consequences of crowd behavior, research and inquiry must be conducted. Smelser has recently formulated an explicit overall theoretical framework that encompasses crowd behavior, as well as the other forms of collective behavior.[16] This systematic set of propositions forms the only model of crowd behavior yet developed. This single work is also indicative of the few empirical studies and inadequate theoretical schemes that comprise the field. Utilizing this theoretical framework to derive hypotheses we have examined a number of the basic propositions that compose Smelser's model.

Smelser's framework postulates a set of determinants

that must be present in order to facilitate the occurrence of a hostile outburst. These five determinants - structural conduciveness, structural strain, generalized beliefs, precipitating factors, and mobilization for action, become organized into a sequence of increasing determinancy in the production of a hostile outburst. The accumulation of empirical events and situations, that correspond to the determinants, may occur in any temporal order; the curcial factor in the sequence from indeterminacy to determinacy involves the logical order and transition of the determinants, rather than their temporal nature, i.e. a single event may establish more than one necessary determinant. Thus, all five determinants must be present in order for a hostile outburst to occur; events and situations assume significance as determinants when they occur within the context of the other logically prior necessary conditions.

Three of these analytically distinct determinants - structural conduciveness, structural strain, and precipitating factor, will be discussed following an explanation of our methodological procedure. To supplement Smelser's notions, we have also examined some notions of Turner and Killian.

## METHOD AND DATA COLLECTION

During the summer of 1966, a number of racial outbursts and incidents occurred in the major metropolitan centers of our country. These instances of collective behavior, if investigated, should yield fruitful data on infrequently investigated phenomena. Utilizing the theoretical frameworks of Smelser and Turner and Killian, we derived a number of hypotheses that guided our empirical investigation. A lengthy questionnaire was developed; due to the paucity of empirical research done in the field of collective behavior, we were unaware of any previously developed questionnaire that had been utilized in studying riot incidents.[17]

We focused our research attentions on two cities; Cleveland, Ohio, and Chicago, Illinois. Each of these two cities had a racial outburst in the month of July; Chicago's outburst occurred on the 12th, 13th and 14th of the month, while Cleveland's occurred on the 18th, 19th and 20th. Four field workers conducted interviews in both cities within two weeks following the riots. Our interviews were with city officials, police, social workers, newspapermen, news commentators, civil rights leaders, members of the National Guard, firemen, university professors, religious

leaders and riot participants.

Exactly 50 interviews of 1 to 3 hours were conducted within these two communities.[18] In addition to this data, 30 informal interviews were taken at Michigan State University following two days of crowd outbursts and "panty raids" during June of 1966. The findings which follow are based on this interview data.

Our respondents were selected on the basis of two criteria; (1) if they witnessed crowd or riot activity and (2) if they were familiar with the riot areas. Some respondents were representative of both criteria. The actual amount of coverage given to riot participants was scanty, due to the difficulty involved in establishing contact with them. Limited time and resources were also responsible for this inadequate participant coverage, as well as for the small number of total interviews (50).

Such a limited number of interviews did not enable us to compile data on many important aspects of the communities under study. Information on local welfare agencies, schools and businesses would have greatly aided our analysis, as well as information on informal community relationships.

Another inadequacy in our methodology was the lack of systematic interviewing procedure. Respondents were

not always asked the same questions, due to their varying positions in and knowledge of the community. As a result, the various interviews conducted are not all equivalent, some are more or less complete than others. Thus, many areas of inquiry were not as fully explored as we desired.

Although we were unable to obtain first-hand observations of the crowd activity, our interviewing was conducted within two weeks following the riots. Such timeliness in reaching the two scenes of rioting enabled us to conduct interviewing while riot incidents were still "fresh" in respondents' memories. Another advantage of our procedure was the open-ended nature of our questionnaire, it allowed flexibility on the interviewer's part and enabled respondents to conceptualize information in their own words, with the attendant meanings it held for them. In addition, our analysis is based upon direct interview data, rather than mass media reports and printed documents, the source of information for most past riot research.

Our intention was to reconstruct the historical situations surrounding both riots and focus upon individual behavior patterns and definitions of the situation (actor meanings). It was not our intent to survey the attitudes and values of various individuals involved in the disturbances. Although we were guided in our research by a number of hypotheses, the resulting analysis is also exploratory

in nature and hopefully will serve to generate further hypotheses. This analysis and comparison of two riots and one college disturbance helps to move riot research beyond the single case study approach of most earlier endeavors.

## BACKGROUND FACTORS AND CONDITIONS

### Structural Conduciveness

Structural Cleavage: Smelser utilizes the terms, structural conduciveness and structural strain, to refer to the essential elements that produce an outburst of collective behavior.[19] We shall classify these concepts under the heading of background factors and conditions.

One of the important elements of structural conduciveness is "established cleavages" within a community. Smelser points out that racial antagonisms have a greater likelihood of occurring when economic, political and racial-ethnic memberships coincide to a large extent. Such coincidence between these various elements results in a social structural feature of widespread cleavage within a community. Cleavages resulting from such coincident factors were found to exist in both the metropolitan communities of Chicago and Cleveland.

The large majority of Negroes (approximately 300,000) who reside in Cleveland are located within the central city, while the majority of whites reside in the suburbs. (97 per cent of the Negroes are located in the central city, while 53 per cent of the whites live in the suburbs). In terms of actual separation, the two races are even more segregated

than the above figures would tend to indicate. Within the central city itself, the majority of Negroes live east of the Cuyahoga River, while most of the whites live west of the river. In other words, 96 per cent of the Negroes in Cuyahoga County live on Cleveland's east side, while 80 per cent of the city's whites live either in the suburbs or on the west side of the city.[20]

There are a number of indices which illustrate the extent and location of poverty within Cleveland's metropolitan area; a few of these indices will be cited here to document the economic position of the city's Negroes.

Dividing the central city and suburbs into census tracts, makes clear the extent of the Negro's poverty in comparison to the standard of living of whites. In 1960 there were nineteen census tracts in which over one-half of the families had an income of less than $4,000; all nineteen of these tracts were located within Cleveland. Twenty-five tracts existed in which one-third of the families had an income of less than $3,000; all twenty-five tracts were located in Cleveland. While the central city itself accounted for only 53.5 per cent of the population of Cuyahoga County, it accounted for 76 per cent of the families with an income of less than $3,000 per year.[21]

Conversely, in 1959, there were twenty-five census tracts in which the median family income was $9,000 or

more; twenty-four of these twenty-five tracts were located in the suburbs. In 1959, 46.5 per cent of the population of Cuyahoga County lived within its suburban communities, but 91 per cent of the families with an income of over $25,000 a year resided within these same suburbs. Of those families with an income of $15,000 to $25,000 per year, 78 per cent resided in the suburbs, as did 65 per cent of the families with a yearly income between $10,000 and $15,000.[22] Statistics such as these illustrate the nature and extent of cleavage, economically and residentially, between the two major racial populations within the county.

The extent of cleavage as represented by residential segregation and economic poverty is as pronounced in Chicago as it is in Cleveland. In 1964 the Negro population of Chicago was estimated to be approximately 930,000, or roughly 26 per cent of the total city population. The overwhelming number of these Negroes are residentially segregated within an "L" shaped strip of land which falls across the west and south sides of the city, with the larger number of Negroes being located on the west side of the city.[23]

Economically, these Negroes are in an inferior position compared with the whites residing within the city limits and outlying suburban areas. In 1964, the median family income of all Negroes within the city was $4,700

or only 65 per cent of the median income for all white families in the city. When we compare high and low income groups for the year 1960, we can also, again, note the inferior economic position of the city's Negroes; 29 per cent of the Negroes are in the low income group earning less than $3,000 per year, as compared to only 8 per cent of the whites, but only 9 per cent of the Negroes are in the high income group earning $10,000 or more per year, as compared with 28 per cent of the city's white population.[24]

In 1964, the unemployment rates for Negroes in both cities were at least twice as high as the white rates, with the ratio being four times as great in Chicago. Similarly, in both cities, the educational achievements of Negroes are below those of their white counterparts; e.g. the average Negro in Chicago has attended school 1.3 years less than the typical white.[25] In addition, the educational facilities and opportunities for the Negro are inadequate and inferior in comparison to the white educational facilities. Such employment and educational patterns help to maintain and increase the structural cleavage that exists between the two racial populations.

The vast majority of our respondents described the west side of Chicago and Cleveland's Hough area in terms

which were illustrative of structural cleavage. It was pointed out that the average age of Chicago's West Side tenement houses is sixty-five years, reflecting the economic poverty of the area. The new governmental-sponsored housing units were referred to as "concrete reservations". Many respondents testified that food prices on individual items were anywhere from 3 cents to 12 cents higher than in supermarkets in predominantly white areas of the city; a clear instance of cleavage when it is noted that the majority of businesses are owned by whites who reside outside of the ghetto areas. These, and many other statements, reflect their perceptions in regard to cleavage characteristics.

Grievance Channels: Smelser indicates that one of the elements embodied in structural conduciveness concerns the availability of channels for expressing grievances. It is stated that hostile outbursts will occur more readily if alternative channels of grievance expression or protest do not exist, or are gradually or suddenly closed. Such an absence of grievance channels characterized both of our research communities.

In both ghettos the dense population figures create an overload on the facilities of the various civil rights organizations dedicated to grievance and protest activities. Those few local neighborhood organizations or groups

located within the ghetto confines (West Side Organization in Chicago, J.F.K. House in Cleveland) lack economic support and trained personnel. For example, the West Side Organization in Chicago was unable to join the C.C.C.O. (Council for Coordinating Community Organizations) because it was unable to pay the yearly due of seventy-five dollars. Such conditions result in little tension dissipation through effective grievance channeling.

It was also generally indicated by our respondents that many members of the ghetto areas are so apathetic that they do not even know the names of their local councilmen.[26] This example is indicative of their disgust and disenchantment with political procedures and processes. Police are looked upon with suspicion and fear; they are, thus, viewed as enemies rather than protectors of the neighborhood. The Cleveland Police Department has virtually no organized component to handle grievances. The Chicago Police Department has established a Human Relations Division which has the responsibility of investigating grievances filed against the department. However, many of our respondents believed the division to be a public relations facade, offering very little real help in the solving of grievance problems. These situations can hardly be viewed as effective alternative channels of grievance expression; their inadequacy only serves to heighten the possibility

of riot behavior.

Communication and Ecology: The third factor of conduciveness deals with communication and ecology. Large numbers of individuals contained within a restricted area greatly enhances crowd formation by encouraging the processes of rapid communication, face-to-face interaction, and development of a common definition of the situation. The densely populated Negro ghettoes of both Chicago and Cleveland offered such an adequate medium of communication.

One respondent commented that news of the Chicago riot spread from 1600 West Ashland to 3500 West Ashland in the time it would have taken to make a telephone call. The dense concentration of people (300,000 crammed into 800 blocks on Chicago's West Side) rendered such rapid face-to-face interaction possible. In addition, the hot summer weather resulted in a large number of people thronging to the streets in search of relief, thus making effective and rapid communication feasible.

A number of other respondents noted that attempts by police to seal off various riot sections had little effect in terms of riot control or termination. Most sections contained such a dense populace that the people within them were able to interact and create rumors among themselves which resulted in a common definition of the situation. Thus, any attempt to isolate areas from

receiving rumors or other riot communications served little purpose.

Structural Strain

In addition to the concept of structural conduciveness, (which Smelser defines as being very general in nature) the term "structural strain" is employed in his analysis of hostile outbursts. This term refers to a buildup of tensions which often correspond with and follow the cleavages (structural conduciveness) that are existent in a community's social structure. One of the examples of such structural strain is the large influx of Negroes, into a city, which has preceded many of the racial outbursts which have arisen in our country. These large influxes create discomfort and tension between both races by increasing economic, political and residential competition. Such a condition of strain was found to have occurred in both of our research communities.

World War II resulted in the migration of a large number of Southern Negroes to the metropolitan community of Chicago; the Negro population increased from 289,000 in 1940 to 492,000 in 1950. This increase continued into the 60's, with the Negro population increasing by 65 per cent, from 492,000 to 813,000 during the ten year period between 1950 and 1960; it was to increase to 930,000 four years later in 1964. In 1960, 96 per cent of the Negroes

in Cook County, Illinois, were located in the "L" shaped black belt which was referred to earlier.[27] This tremendous population increase greatly strained the existing housing facilities available to Negroes in the city, as well as their chances of economic opportunity.

The strain created by Negro influxes often becomes focused upon a particular issue within the community. During the war years, in Detroit, the large number of incoming Negroes offered economic competition to the whites. It was this increase of tension that helped to produce the 1943 riot. It should be noted that the Sunday preceding the Tuesday riot (July 10), Martin Luther King led a freedom rally in one of the city's ball parks. This rally focused upon discrimination and residential patterns of segregation. Its demands and possible solutions were presented to Mayor Daley the following afternoon (July 11). The next day (July 12) the Chicago riot was underway. It seems that the primary focus of strain in Chicago was this matter of housing confinement and discrimination; it was, in effect, the basic problem that had been focused upon by Dr. King and his United Freedom Movement for over six months prior to the riot.

A very similar process of in-migration was found to exist within the central city of Cleveland, Ohio. Between 1930 and 1940 the Negro population of the city increased

by only 12,000, but between 1940 and 1950, it was to increase by 63,000. This increase was to almost double between 1950 and 1960, with 103,000 additional Negroes pouring into the city; 35,000 more would enter in the four year period between 1960 and 1964. During the 50's and 60's there was occurring, simultaneously, a rapid out-migration of whites from the central city. Over 142,000 were to leave between 1950 and 1960, more than offsetting the in-migration of Negroes. Today, Cleveland ranks eighth among the American cities having the largest number of Negro residents.[28] Such an influx of Negroes was to result in an increased shortage of housing and strained living conditions within the confined areas of the city's east end, as well as an increase in the poverty level due to the resulting increase of economic competition.

Cleveland's large Negro in-migration also created tensions within the political arena. In November, 1965, a Negro candidate for mayor lost the election by less than 3,000 votes. This occurrence was quite often referred to by our respondents and had been a major source of tension within the city during the preceding year. Similarly, such political tension was evident in Chicago before the 1919 race riots, due to the fact that local Negroes had played a conspicuous role in the mayoralty campaign.

Thus, two of the conditions formulated by Smelser as

being essential for the occurrence of a hostile outburst - structural conduciveness and structural strain - were found to be empirically verified by our data.

We should stress that such background features are necessary but not sufficient causes for a hostile outburst, according to Smelser. They must be present for an outburst to occur, but are only useful to a limited extent in specifying the actual dynamics that result in such an outburst. These background factors have been present in both of the above-mentioned communities for many decades, and yet these communities have not had racial outbursts that follow any consistent pattern over such an extended period of time. Similarly, many other cities in our country are characterized by these structural factors of conduciveness and strain, and yet these cities have not been associated, historically, with any consistent configuration of hostile outbursts.

This overemphasis on structural determinism has been discussed by Hundley and Quarantelli,[29] who state that it ignores individual interactions and hinders analysis in regard to hostile outbursts. Lieberson also criticizes such a purely structuralist argument when he points out that Negro influx occurs as rapidly within many "quiet" cities, as it does within "riot" cities.[30] Such influx,

which often results in structural strain, is inadequate as a sole explanatory variable in the incidence of riot occurrences. There are a number of other important elements that must be present in order for an outburst to occur; one of these, termed a "precipitating factor", will be discussed next.

## PRECIPITATING EVENT

Smelser also utilizes the term "precipitating factor" in his analysis of the factors producing hostile outbursts. In reference to this term, Smelser states,

> "(4) Precipitating factors. Conduciveness, strain and a generalized belief - even when combined - do not by themselves produce an episode of collective behavior in a specific time and place. In the case of panic, for instance, these general determinants establish a predisposition to flight, but it is usually a specific event which sets the flight in motion. Under conditions of racial tension, it is nearly always a dramatic event which precipitates the outburst of violence - a clash between two persons of different race, a Negro family moving into a white neighborhood, or a Negro being promoted to a traditionally white job. These events may confirm or justify the fears or hatreds in a generalized belief; they may initiate or exaggerate a condition of strain; or they may redefine sharply the conditions of conduciveness. In any case, these precipitating factors give the generalized beliefs concrete, immediate substance. In this way they provide a concrete setting, toward which collective action can be directed."[31]

This element is considered, by Smelser, to be one of the essential rudiments necessary, but not sufficient, for the occurrence of an episode of collective behavior. Dramatic precipitating events focus and crystallize complex tensions and antagonisms in a community which have resulted from structural conduciveness, structural

strain and generalized beliefs.

In both of our research communities such precipitating events were identified as helping to create the riot.

In Chicago, the event which escalated activity into open conflict between police and teenagers concerned the closing of a fire hydrant on the west side of town. Traditionally throughout the city, during the summer, hydrants are turned on by children and teenagers as a means of keeping cool during hot weather. The incident which sparked the three days of rioting in Chicago occurred on the hottest day of the year, the temperature being 98 degrees. White policemen attempted to turn off a hydrant at the intersection of Roosevelt Road and Throupe Street, located in Chicago's west side Negro ghetto. (Approximately 2 p.m. in the afternoon.) After the hydrant had been turned off, Negro teenagers turned it back on, and the police attempted to once more turn it off; this conflict resulted in the gathering of people and the beginning of what was to become three days of disorder.

A second possible precipitating incident was also mentioned by a few respondents. This event focused upon an ice cream truck operated by a white man within the West Side area. An episode of conflict occurred on Throupe Street between this ice cream vendor and a

number of Negro youths. The vendor was unwilling to give ice cream to the youths, who, in turn, proceeded to empty his truck of the ice cream supply. This conflict was quickly escalated into an open confrontation, as the truck became surrounded by local Negroes. Eventually, the truck was destroyed and looting spread to nearby stores.

However, it is our contention that the hydrant episode was the most important event. A number of Negro youths (10-15) who were participants in the active phases of the riot identified the water hydrant affair as the beginning. Nevertheless, the ice cream incident may have contributed to the initial development of crowd behavior. It is interesting to note that this reported conflict also involved a confrontation between Negroes and whites.

The precipitating event which occurred in Cleveland also involved a conflict between whites and Negroes in a Negro ghetto area. Two versions were widely circulated in Cleveland in regard to this incident. Both of the descriptions are centered around the white owner of a cafe and his Negro patrons. A local Negro newspaper states the following in reference to this precipitating incident:

> "It all apparently started because of a minor incident, a robbery of the Seventy-Niner's Cafe at 79 Hough Avenue. Reportedly, the angry owner had given his employees

> orders'not to serve those niggers a drink of water.' I heard several versions of this story. One was that an unidentified Negro man had gone to the cafe and asked for a drink of water and had been ordered out. He is reported to have gone back later and placed a sign outside the cafe which stated, "This place will not serve colored'.
> Another report is that a short time later a Negro woman went into the same cafe, soliciting for charity, and was bodily ejected. Word passed up and down the area like wildfire, and a mob, mostly adults and teenagers, began to gather. I saw what happened to this place, the mob tore it to pieces."[32]

An interview with the reporter who wrote the above excerpt, as well as others in the community, leads to the conclusion that the precipitating event occurred where reported, even though its actual details had become interspersed with various bits of rumor. In any event, a precipitating factor occurred which involved a conflict between whites and Negroes, in a bar, on the east side of town (Negro ghetto). It is interesting to note that the disturbance occurred only two blocks away from the intersection that was described in 1964 as the geographical center of Cleveland's poverty (East 79th Street and Euclid Avenue).[33] Smelser emphasizes the interdependent nature of the various component elements which combine to produce a hostile outburst. These above specific events illustrate well the interdependence existing among the component elements of structural

conduciveness, structural strain, and precipitating event. All three components were present in our two research communities and played an important role in bringing about the disturbances that occurred in each of these two cities.

Both of these precipitating factors occurred within a context of Negro-white interaction. This phenomena of provocation between members of both races has been documented by Lieberson and Silverman. Of 76 riots occurring between 1913 and 1963, only four have occurred without a precipitating event. Almost all of these instances have involved confrontations between Negroes and whites. As the authors stated, "In the same fashion, we suggest, the immediate precipitations of race riots almost always involve some confrontation between the groups in which members of one race are deeply 'wronged' in fact or rumor by members of the other."[34]

It is true that our research uncovered precipitating events which involved interpersonal clashes between Negroes and whites. This point, is, in effect, what Lieberson and Silverman documented in their study.[35] We suggest that such interpersonal clashes occur countless times in areas characterized by structural conduciveness and structural strain. For example, the clash between white police and Negro youth over the fire hydrant in Chicago was and is

enacted many times throughout that city during the course of a single summer. The overwhelming majority of these incidents never result in a race riot. In a number of personal interviews, respondents injected this point into our discussions and emphasized that such events were of little actual usefulness in the analysis of riot causes. The interactional dimension between ghetto members and outsiders, police and rioters, rioters and rioters, etc., is the most fruitful avenue to follow in the analysis of the causes and dynamics that surround a hostile outburst. Precipitating events are only a part of the larger flow of interaction. Seen from this perspective, an event can offer much in the way of useful data if it is used as a starting place in the analysis. But merely choosing some event and positing it as a riot cause affords little actual understanding of the elements and dynamics leading to an outburst of collective behavior. As we have said, such events occur nearly every day, in countless cities throughout the world, but very few of them ever eventuate in a hostile outburst. We must examine the complex interactions between various actors, if we wish to gain a better understanding of the dynamics that contribute to a racial outburst, as well as to expand Smelser's theoretical framework.

Such complex interactions sometimes result in a

breakdown of the informal control mechanisms which usually influence actor interrelationships. This cessation of informal controls, combined with the failure of social control agencies to properly play their roles, can often lead to unpunished individual deviations. These deviations can then result, through crowd convergence, milling and interaction, in the development of an emergent norm. Such emergent norms alter individual "definitions of the situation" and cause a basic change of meaning to occur among the various actors. It is this subtle process of normative alteration and emergence that must be investigated; precipitating events are necessary, but not sufficient causes of such complex occurrences.

## CROWD INTERACTION AND EMERGENT ORGANIZATION

### Control Agencies vs. Crowd Participants

At this point our theoretical frame of reference will no longer focus upon the determinants advanced by Smelser; the concepts and hypotheses employed by Turner and Killian will now guide our analysis. Their conceptual apparatus focuses upon interaction, behavior and organization within the crowd; emergent norms and subjective definitions of the situation develop as a result of various interactions and patterns of behavior. Such a theoretical framework is more applicable than Smelser's in dealing with the actual dynamics of crowd behavior.

We will describe some of the crucial interactions and emergent social norms which were to develop during the course of these racial outbursts. It is these elements which we feel are <u>most</u> central and important in explaining and analyzing why such outbursts occur <u>when</u>, <u>where</u> and at the <u>time</u> they do.

Turner and Killian emphasize this concept of interaction in their analysis of collective behavior and crowd outbursts.[36] We will attempt to merge a number of our observations and findings with their statements and formulations. In regard to interaction among members of

an emergent crowd, they state,

> "As will be seen in the descriptions of crowd behavior that follow, people may come to a crowd, even to the most violent mob, with quite different initial motives and interests. During the course of the crowd's activity different participants may behave in different ways. It appears that the unity of the crowd is often produced through the interaction of participants who are actually behaving in different fashions, and on the basis of different motivations.[37]

The precipitating event in Chicago, which centered around the fire hydrant episode described earlier, offers a good example of such crowd unity and formation through participant interaction. Two white policemen arrived at the corner of Roosevelt Road and Troupe Street, at approximately 2 p.m. in the afternoon. A number of Negro youths, approximately 20 to 30, were running through the water being emitted from an open fire hydrant. The police shut the hydrant off, whereupon the boys turned it back on again. This happened several times in succession, and a crowd of Negro youths and middle-aged Negroes began to gather on the corner. Verbal insults were exchanged between Negroes and police, with the police increasingly becoming a hostile symbol and focused target for the forming crowd of onlookers. After about fifteen minutes of such activity, a crowd of approximately 200 to 300 had formed on the corner; several bricks and stones had been

hurled at the police, and the number of verbal insults was increasing. At this point the police were getting ready to leave, and a few members of the crowd had dispersed and were also in the process of leaving the corner. It was at this time that three carloads of police arrived on the scene, leaped from their cars, and began attempting to clear the corner of Negroes by pushing them, swinging nightsticks at them, and shouting at them to go home. A number of participants indicated that at this time a Negro youth was knocked down and hit over the head with a police nightstick. It was at this point that the crowd began to surge forth against the police and to begin throwing rocks and bricks at several adjacent store fronts. Many informants indicated that this was the actual beginning of the three days of disorder that were to follow.

A number of social workers and ghetto residents who witnessed this incident stated that they believed the riot would not have occurred if the police had not arrived when they did and acted in the manner in which they did.[38] Their arrival was at a time when the crowd had reached a large size and had focused upon the two policemen already there. Their movements in attempting to disperse the crowd easily enabled the crowd to switch its attention to these new arrivals. This is a good example of the development of a hostile crowd symbol which is one of the elements

which Turner and Killian consider to be of importance in any process of crowd formation and development.

This example also illustrates the manner in which social contagion and milling occur through participant interaction. A crowd was formed through interaction which focused upon a common hostile symbol, and out of which an emergent norm developed. The arrival of the police and their subsequent interaction with the crowd only helped to solidify and better organize the crowd members, rather than disperse them. The crucial importance of the manner and type of interaction occurring between control agencies and crowd participants can be seen from this example. It is also useful in illustrating the manner in which the crowd became united through interaction and symbol formation.

Another illustration of the importance involved in the interaction between control agencies and crowd members can be cited from occurrances during the June, 1966, disturbances at a large midwestern university.[39] Rather than examine in detail all the events surrounding these incidents, the specific example that is useful in describing the interactional dimension is stated here. Due to one night of panty raids and student frollicking, the university administration believed that more widespread disturbances were about to occur the following evening. In

response to such a possibility, 247 police were dispatched to a dormitory complex on the campus the next night. They were assembled with riot helmets and billy clubs, and sealed off the complex from the rest of the university grounds. Following supper and throughout the evening, students began to gather in an area in front of the dormitory complex along which the police were loosely lined and assembled. By 11 p.m. there were approximately 900 students crammed into the area and facing the police. It was at this point that the ensuing interaction between police and students was to become of crucial importance in the events that followed. Approximately fifty students who resided in the dormitory complex were interviewed the following night. From these interviews we determined that the majority of students were assembled in the area largely because of their curiosity; they were in effect, spectators. Many of them were there due to the fact that they had been out on dates and were returning to their dormitories. Upon seeing the large number of students and police, many decided to stay outside and watch the fun. It was also a hot night, the dormitories were not air-conditioned, and many were outside to cool off. To these students, the police issued an ultimatum to disassemble or be arrested. They were told, over loudspeakers, that they were an unlawful assembly and that they constituted a riot crowd. The

majority of students were only there out of curiosity and considered themselves to be a good-natured group of harmless college students. In effect, they were told to leave their own "front yard" and were warned that they were considered by the police to be a dangerous riot mob. Such pronouncements by the police together with their riot helmets and nightsticks only served to anger and infuriate many of the students. Obscenities had been shouted at the police, and a few water balloons were thrown up to this point; but all of our student respondents told us that they felt that hardly any of the students were intent on attacking the police or the school. However, animosity was to rise following the police warning; and there was a large increase in the amount of shouting and swearing on the students' part.

It was at approximately 11:30 p.m. that the police issued their third warning; students were told to disband and then the police marched double-time into their midst, attempting to break up their numbers. In this forward march many of the students were shoved and pushed, as well as hit in the midsections and backs with police nightsticks. Twelve students were arrested by the police and many of the students dispersed into nearby dormitories. The police charge had caught the students by surprise. They were completely unaware that it was going to occur.

Following the charge, many of the students left the area and the group eventually dispersed later in the evening. The police took the twelve arrested students to jail and also left later in the night.

Following the above incident, many student attitudes altered greatly in regard to the police. In our interviews we noted a large amount of hostility and hatred in regard to them. Many students mentioned that they felt that the police had acted in an unfair and abrupt manner.

We wish to point out the effect of this charge on the students and its similarity with the incident we have described as occurring in Chicago. The large line-up of police offered the students a convenient symbol to focus upon and helped bring about crowd solidarity and unity. This is very similar to the situation fostering symbol formation that occurred around the fire hydrant in Chicago. Crowds of college students do not usually warrant a large amount of police attention; they usually expend energies by running and dispersing later, causing little actual property or personal damage. Most likely, many of the male students would have left after the females had gone in at 11:30, the women's closing hours. Many of the male students were performing for the women. But the police did not wait to see if this would happen. In this case, the actions and appearance of the police only helped to

produce a definition of the situation which was conducive to mob behavior. With any other group of individuals, the police line-up and charge could have resulted in a full-blown riot disturbance.

An example similar to the above is reported in Turner and Killian which involves a charge, by police, upon a group of civilians during the Paris riots.[40] This charge was to result in widespread disturbances and much bloodshed. Thus, although the incident at the university did not result in a hostile outburst, such interaction between police and crowd members greatly facilitates the creation of a definition of the situation which can lead to widespread violence and hostile behavior. In this instance it led to crowd dispersal, but resulted in a strained and tense situation which will have an effect upon student-police relationships in the future.

Crowd Organization

Turner and Killian refer to differential participation, leadership and division of labor within the crowd during an episode of collective behavior. We were able to identify such variations of behavior in the disturbances we investigated. Our respondents described a great amount of differential participation and differing individual behavior patterns among those individuals involved in the heaviest night of Chicago rioting. A number of

Negro youths were looting and vandalizing in shifts. A group of between 20 and 30 Negro youths were observed running up and down Roosevelt Road periodically looting and breaking store windows. This group of teenagers, estimated to be under 20 years of age, continued such behavior for about an hour and ten minutes; whereupon, quite exhausted, they walked to a nearby housing project and proceeded to rest under trees on its grassy lawn. At this time, a number of youths resting under the trees stood up, walked to Roosevelt Road, and commenced to run and loot throughout the area. After approximately one hour, the scene was once more repeated in much the same manner. Such a shifting of activity and rest is a very striking example of crowd division of labor and emergent organization.

Our interviews also indicated that various juvenile gangs had divided up the west side area of rioting, and were systematically remaining within their own areas. It illustrates the manner in which previously existing informal social groups maintain their unity and manifest themselves during such disorganized periods of time. Many of our respondents believed these gangs to be the most viable social groupings in the entire west side area. It is no wonder, then, that they would tend to be well organized social groupings during the riot period.

It should be noted that such a degree of social organization is at variance with the popular images of riots that envision crowd behavior as being characterized by "irrationality", "madness", and total "disorganization". Riot behavior may appear to be chaotic on the surface, but closer analysis reveals its underlying theme of social organization and differentiation of labor.

It was noticed that many of the active youths, running in groups, were characterized by the absence or presence of shirts. Usually, a band of youths would all be wearing T-shirts or no shirts whatsoever. Also, in several instances, all of the group members were wearing rags around their heads. This illustrates the manner in which emergent social groupings develop symbols to insure their unity and cohesion. Many of these groups were not composed of previously organized gang members; they had formed through interaction in an attempt to structure the situation. The youths stuck tenaciously to their own groups.

Cleveland's ghetto area is not characterized by a large extent of organized juvenile gang formation. Crime is widespread in the area, and there are a large number of juvenile cliques and informal groupings; but there are few gangs with stratification patterns or rigid codes of conduct. For this reason, there was no division of area

by gangs and no alternate shifting between riot activity and rest during the three days of rioting in the Hough area. Negro youths were organized into small groups of from 5 to 20, much as they were on Chicago's west side. These groups remained together during their riot activities, and were quite often composed of mutual friends and peer-group associates. Thus, once more, prior social organization can be seen manifesting itself during disorganized riot periods.

In both cities, a division of labor occurred between riot activists and passive spectators. Most of the individuals on the streets were spectators and curiosity seekers, while only a small number actively engaged in looting and burning. Of those activists, the overwhelming majority (most respondents said at least 90 per cent) were teenagers or men in their early twenties. However, a few respondents emphasized the point that a number of middle-aged men were seen actively looting and burning; such individuals were seen in both Chicago and Cleveland. The activists seemed exclusively males. No respondent could remember seeing any teenage females involved in the active violence.

Most spectators remained on the steps, or "stoops", or front lawns of their homes, or assembled in large groups on various street corners. These groups were

composed of both men and women, young as well as middle-aged. By and large, they took no active part in the rioting, but would often enter stores that had been broken into and looted earlier by youths. Such individuals would attempt to take any items of value that had been left behind by the previous looters. This seemed to be considered a safe way to loot by the spectators. (Those not actually part of the initial and most direct violence.) By looting in this manner they were also able to avoid being caught by the police. This is a clear example of the differential participation aspect outlined by Turner and Killian.

These spectators were observed making such comments as the following: "It's about time", "I knew it was coming", and "It serves the city right". When asked to leave the area and return to their homes, they were reticent and usually remained, leaving eventually of their own accord. Their sympathies, generally, were with the riot activists. Such attitudes of riot justification on the part of the spectator-audience, served an instrumental purpose in creating a permissive environment for the activist-performers. This spectator-activist relationship has been referred to by Turner and Killian as the process of commitment.[41] Through it, activists become publicly committed to a course of action and are, thereby,

encouraged to pursue that course of action. "Backing down" in such a situation becomes a very difficult choice to make.

The above authors also state that deliberate instigators often play a significant role in facilitating crowd action. In Chicago, such instigators had been apparent to a number of our respondents. They were described as standing on various corners and in areas where crowds were assembled. While there, they yelled inflammatory remarks and attempted to stir onlookers into action. Their shoutings dealt with such issues as "black power" and "police brutality". Whether these instigators spontaneously took advantage of the situation or whether their attempted exploitation was planned in advance, is a question to which we do not know the answer. At any rate, this is another clear verification of the hypothesis in regard to differential participation.[42]

Such a division of labor between spectators and activists occurred, similarly, in the 1943 Detroit race riot with the presence of youthful rioters and deliberate instigators also being documented.[43] Similar conditions and situations were also described in relation to the 1919 Chicago riot that resulted in the death of 38 persons.[44] These patterns of differential participation would seem, thus, to have prevailed in a number of other racial

outbursts throughout American history, thereby lending additional support to the aforementioned hypothesis.

In reference to the question of leadership, few of our respondents were able to identify key leaders during the riot episodes. Small bands of youths seemed to engage in the most bold instances of vandalism and violence, but they seemed to act in concerted harmony, rather than being led per se. The instigators, were in effect leading no one. Several respondents implied that most groups of youths were characterized by either one or a number of more aggressive juveniles. Quite commonly, these aggressive individuals served as models for the rest and were instrumental in bringing about certain acts of violence and vandalism. However, very few of these persons consistently and forcefully led a group of followers. It would seem that the members of such groups needed the mutual reinforcement and encouragement of each other when engaged in such deviant acts of violence and theft.

Emergent Norms and Crowd Symbols

The key concept in Turner and Killian's conceptual framework of interactional analysis is the concept of emergent behavior and emergent norms. These concepts are in contradistinction to traditional behavior and traditional norms. In regard to this hypothesis they

indicate:

> "As crowd behavior develops, there is communication of mood, imagery, and a conception of what kind of action is appropriate. These are emergent, not traditional. While they are related to the past experiences and previously-held norms and attitudes of the participants, they constitute new products of the interaction in the particular situation."[45]

Such emergent norms developed in both riot areas.

A number of respondents informed us that various members of youth groupings seemed to be trying to outdo each other in their acts of bravado and violence. One social worker in Cleveland said that a youth had to go along with, and even attempt to outdo, his group's deeds, or risk being ridiculed and branded as a "chicken". Acts of deviance and violence such as looting and breaking windows were to become common and expected in the riot areas. Such behavior has a normative history in ghetto areas characterized by poverty and crime; but these acts were definitely being committed at a greatly increased rate and by a much larger number of persons during the few days of acute rioting in both ghetto areas. In a similar manner, setting fire to business establishments and apartment houses was to become commonplace, especially in the Hough area in Cleveland, where over 110 fires raged at various times. Such acts were condoned and often

applauded by the large number of spectators who watched their occurrence, especially since many buildings were rundown and condemned.

In the safety of darkness the level of permissiveness increased substantially and many more deviant acts were committed during the rioting.[46] The roving groups of youths increased in numbers and many more spectators filled the street corners and open areas. Police, especially white police, and firemen were to become the hostile symbols which were focused upon by spectators and activists alike. Serving as symbols, they helped to unite and consolidate the various spectator and activist groupings in both riot areas. In many instances police and firemen were stoned and verbally insulted.

Respondents who were in the riot area during Chicago's disturbances said that the most unsafe place to be was where the police were. Thus, an appropriate conception of action developed, in both cities, that defined the police and firemen as enemies, and that encouraged and permitted deviant acts against them; e.g. verbal abuse and the widespread throwing of bricks at firemen that occurred in Cleveland's Hough area. The origins of such emergent normative behavior lie in the strained and tense relationships existing between police and residents in these two ghetto areas. Such strained relationships

exist in most slum areas across the United States, Negro or white.

## CONCLUSION

This paper has emphasized the important role of interaction in bringing about occurrences of collective behavior. We have stated that such crucial interaction occurs in a context of structural conduciveness and structural strain, and that the really important feature of a precipitating event is the complex network of interactions that occurs between its various participants. Two examples were given to illustrate some of the consequences that can occur as a result of the interaction occurring between control agencies and crowd members. It must be emphasized that similar patterns of interaction are constantly unfolding during the course of a riot episode. These chains and networks of relationship produce the various sequences of riot behavior that occur.

Structural conduciveness and structural strain set the stage for the occurrence of a hostile outbreak; i.e. they are necessary factors. A precipitating event, most often occurring between Negroes and whites, further enhances the possibility of open conflict ensuing. However, all three of these elements, though intimately interwoven, are not sufficient enough to cause a hostile outburst. Certain interactional patterns and relationships

are equally as necessary as these other factors, and help determine whether crowd formation and hostile outbursts occur.

Scientific prediction and explanation are dependent upon an understanding of these interactional processes. For this reason it is our contention that such interactional patterns should be focused upon in future research endeavors. One fruitful avenue of interactional analysis would be the sequence of events leading to a riot's termination. In both of our research communities disturbances tapered off after about three days of activity. Chicago's rioting was ended by a 45 minute rainstorm, in addition to the National Guard. This storm caused activists and spectators alike to seek shelter and resulted in a breakdown of communication and interaction. Following the storm, youth bands were unable to effectively organize themselves and continue their activities. No doubt, a level of exhaustion was reached by many participants that did not permit further roving and activity. Similarly, many spectators became bored after three days and nights of periodic watching; their lack of interest resulted in a declining audience for the activists, which had an effect on reducing riot behavior (decline in interaction and the suspension of an emergent, permissive norm). In Cleveland, the National Guard seemed to ease tensions,

with crowd activity becoming infrequent the third day after the initial incident.

It would be sociologically relevant in the determination of the natural life-history and sequence, to explore what function inter-group interaction plays in such a pattern. Future inquiry should shed more light upon the dynamics of such a process. It is imperative that such future research focus upon crowd participants and spectators, rather than upon secondary sources of information. Trained observers would aid greatly in the specification and analysis of crowd processes and dynamics.

## APPENDIX

### I. INTERVIEW SCHEDULE - IDENTIFICATION OF RESPONDENT

1. At what time and where were you when you first heard something was going on -- either in terms of the looting and window breaking, or in terms of a general crowd formation and development?

2. Who was with you at that time? (names and relationships if possible).

3. How did you get your first information?

4. What did this first source say?

5. What did you say -- if this involved any conversation -- to this first source?

6. What did you do then?

7. Did you tell anyone else?

   A. Who? (relationship more important than names)

   B. What did you tell them?

8. When did you go to the scene of the action? (or to another prescribed place because of crowd e.g., police station, TV station, or City Hall, etc.).

   A. Who with?

9. What did you see? (Describe in detail) If they were there this is the beginning of questions on division of labor in the crowd, mobilization of action, crowd symbolization, crowd communication, and creation of a generalized belief.

10. What did you do then?

11. Give a minute by minute (blow by blow) description of what you saw and did. (probe extensively on this).

12. To what extent did you get involved in the activities? (shout, mill around, run, just watch, give advice, try to control people, etc.).

13. Why did you go to the scene of the riot? (initial reason).

    A. If you got involved, why did you do what you did? (examples may be helpful in answering this question).

14. What were the reasons most persons gave for participating in the riot?

    A. What do you think were the real reasons that caused them to participate?

15. Who was standing around with you while you were there? (composition of the group structure if the respondent was in a group).

A. EMERGENT NORMS, RUMOR TRANSMISSION, CREATIONS OF A GENERALIZED BELIEF, AND COMMUNICATION IN THE CROWD.

16. What slogans and chants were the rioters yelling?

    A. What rumors were being circulated in the crowd or mob?

    B. What was the sequence of the slogans, chants, and rumors which the crowd repeated?

17. What was the feeling among participants in the crowd or riot? (his impression).

    A. What or who were they mad at?

18. What did you hear them say?

    A. Who or what kind of people were saying these things? (age, sex, type).

19. During the riot did your feelings and ideas change as you watched and talked to people?

20. Did you behave in a way, during the riot, (if the person took part in crowd or riot activity) in which you would not normally have behaved?

    A. What unusual ways of (acting or behaving) did you notice in the crowd?

    B. Did people act differently than they normally would have? How?

21. How many other people did you talk to during the disturbance?

22. Did you notice any shift or change in feeling, in the

crowd, as time went on? (crowd symbolization and change).

A. What do you feel happened to cause this change in feeling or mood?

23. Did you feel, initially, that some type of action must be taken by the crowd?

24. Did you have the impression that many members of the crowd, at first, felt that some type of action was necessary and needed?

A. Was it obvious that a number of people in the crowd wanted to do something?

B. Did an "urgent sense" that something must be done, pervade the crowd?

C. Did you, personally, feel an "urgent sense" that something must be done?

25. During the riot, did you feel that no one could stop your group from achieving its objective?

26. Did it seem to you that most of the participants were very confident that they would be successful in their actions?

27. Did you feel that you could really change certain conditions of the crowd through your actions?

A. Did many other people in the crowd feel this way?

28. Did many members of your crowd think that their actions were useless?

## B. CROWD SYMBOLIZATION AND CHANGE

29. What was the specific (symbol, object, objective) of the participants during the riot? (persons or physical objects).

A. Were there a number of separate objectives of action during the riot? (persons or physical objects).

B. Did the objectives (persons or physical objects) change as time went on?

C. When did the objectives (persons or physical objects) change for the riot participants?

D. What preceded or led to this change in objectives (persons or physical objects)? (a change in symbols).

30. What was the major activity you engaged in during the riot?

A. Did your activity change during the riot?

B. What happened to cause you to change your actions? (a change in symbols).

C. DIVISION OF LABOR, MOBILIZATION OF MOTIVATION

31. How many people did you see leading the crowd or riot?

A. At the start of the riot what did the leaders do?

32. What were the leaders doing? (describe the action of each leader which you can remember).

33. What were the activities that got the crowd going? (that increased spirit)?

34. What were the activities that went unpunished by police or official authorities?

A. How did by-standers and spectators react to these deviations?

B. How did the police react to these activities and deviations?

35. Why do you think most of the leaders were there?
A. For the same reasons as the rest of the crowd?

36. How many people there really had some gripes and complaints?

A. What were they? (give examples of people and complaints)-(be complete and exhaustive).

37. How many people just stood around and watched?

    A. What did they say?

    B. What did they do?

    C. How rapidly did these watchers leave and new ones come? (give examples).

38. Did you see any spectators become active members of the crowd?

    A. What happened to them (who talked to them, etc.) that caused this change in their behavior?

39. How many people were there because their friends were there also?

    A. Were groups or individuals recruited into the crowd? (explain)
    Did friendship groups sort of stay together during the crowd activity?

    B. As the crowd got involved in things, did people stay with their cluster or group? (with whom they came or with whom they were familiar).

40. How many people in the outburst were normally law-breakers and trouble-makers, and used the crowd situation as an excuse to do things?

    A. Who were they? (give class name such as rebels, nonconformists, political agitators, delinquents, psychopaths, insane, gang members, youth, guys from 1st. St., etc.).

    B. What did these deviant people do?

41. Draw me a diagram of the crowd. (start out when it first started and then how it changed over time).

42. What percentage of participants were really doing something?

    A. Where were they located with respect to the rest of the crowd?

B. Where were the watchers?

C. Within the active groupings, were there particular leaders?

D. What were they doing?

E. How did they do it?

F. Did leaders shift and change?

G. When did they change?

43. What activities in the crowd or riot caught on, and what things did not?

A. What did the (riot or crowd) allow?

B. What did the (riot or crowd) discourage?

C. What were the variety of things that participants proposed to do?

44. Did someone suggest doing something, and then did spectators and people around him wait for him to do it? (get committed to a course of action).

A. Or did they engage in activity themselves when the suggestion was voiced?

45. Did you have the feeling that the crowd couldn't be stopped in its course of action?

46. Did it seem to you that the crowd was perfectly right and justified in what it was doing?

A. Was it apparent to you that many other people in the crowd felt that they were right, justified, and very powerful in their chosen course of action?

B. How many would you say felt that way?

47. Prior to the riot, did anti-white hostility build up and increase? (explain).

A. Did it build up during the riot?

B. When?

C. Under what conditions?

D. When was hostility the greatest?

E. Among what kinds of crowd participants was it greatest?

48. During the riot, did people start defining whites and police as inhuman, and animals, and not deserving of fair play or fair treatment?

A. How hostile did people become towards the whites and police? (during the riot).

B. When this hostility occurred, what chants were cried out and elicited from the crowd members?

49. As time passed during the outbreak, did new people become involved?

A. What were these new participants like? (prior categories mentioned, such as delinquent, insane, etc.).

B. What did they do?

C. What was significantly noticeable about their behavior?

50. What kinds of rumors went through the crowd?

A. Please list them.

B. What specific rumors did you hear?

C. Was any rumor particularly outstanding or noticeable?

D. How did the rumors change?

## II. PRE-CONDITIONS OF THE RIOT

### A. STRUCTURAL CONDUCIVENESS

#### 1. RESPONSIBILITY:

51. Who do you think is responsible for the situation in this community, prior to this crowd outbreak?

52. Prior to the outburst, had there been specific complaints by Negroes against any particular agency or person? (is responsibility clearly institutionalized? failures blamed on agents?).

    A. Had someone sort of become the scapegoat? Who is the scapegoat now?

    B. Who had Negroes blamed? Who do they blame now?

53. Prior to the riot, had there been any specific complaints by <u>whites</u> against any particular agency or person?

    A. Has someone sort of become the scapegoat?

    B. Who have <u>whites</u> blamed?

54. Now I am going to ask you some questions about persons, agencies, and organizations in the community, with reference to a time prior to the riot. (Start out with government and ask questions A-E for each person or agency.)

    A. How have these persons or agencies made news?

    B. What have they been doing <u>for</u> or <u>to</u> the community?

    C. Before the riot, do you think these people or organizations failed to do something about the problems that existed?

    D. How effective have these persons and organizations been in doing their jobs?

    E. How could these persons or organizations improve?

        1. Government

            A. Mayor

            B. City Council

            C. City Departments (eg. Sanitation, Recreation, Streets, etc.)

D. Political Parties

2. Police: A. Local B. City C. State

3. Welfare Agencies

A. United Fund Organization

B. Community Chest

C. Social work centers

D. OEO Poverty Program

E. Other? _____

4. Local Organizations

5. Minority Group Organizations

A. CORE B. SNCC C. Black Muslims

D. NAACP E. SCLC F. Urban League

6. Church and its leaders (Both in and out of Ghetto area, all denominations).

7. Businessmen (inside and outside riot area).

8. Schools

9. Employment Agencies

10. Industry

55. Tell me about the long-standing conflicts between Negroes and the rest of the community here.

A. Have any organizations or movements enhanced these conflicts?

1. How?

B. Which ones have been most important here in this community?

1. CORE 2. SNCC 3. Muslims 4. NAACP

5. SCLC 6. Local Commissions, etc.

56. How well organized were civil rights organizations in this community?

    A. Have they recruited ghetto people? How many?

    B. Do they hold meetings?

    C. What have they done to bring about change?

    D. What do they do to communicate with the people?

    E. Have any new Negro organizations emerged? (RAM, Deacons for Defense, etc.)

    F. Have any new white organizations emerged?

57. In general, what have been the feelings of Negroes and whites toward each other?

58. Many times before crowd behavior there are many stereotypes and prejudices voiced by members of the community. To what extent was there stereotypes of Negroes and racial prejudice in the community?

    A. Did you notice an increase of stereotyping and prejudice before the riot occurred?

    B. On the part of whites or Negroes?

    C. In general?

2. <u>CHANNELS FOR EXPRESSING GRIEVANCES</u>:

59. How adequate and competent would you say the Police Department is here?

    A. Are they well trained?

    B. Are they paid well?

    C. Have there been any incidents of police being unfair to Negroes?

    D. Have there been any specific cases of clashes between the Negroes and police?

60. Prior to the crowd outburst, were there any laws or ordinances which tended to discriminate against the participants?

    A. Lack of a fair housing bill.

    B. Relocation under guise of urban renewal.

    C. Any other?

61. Have the courts been fair in handling Negroes?

    A. Have there been any complaints about the court and judicial system?

62. Now I am interested in your comments about how permissive certain groups have been in the community. How permissive or tolerant have the police been in allowing crime and other things to go on in the affected area?

    A. How permissive and tolerant have the political authorities been?

    B. Has any prestigeful public official recently urged sort of a "hands off" attitude toward minority group deviance?

    C. Have there been any charges of unfair and indiscriminate use of police power in the riot area?

63. How quickly did the police and political officials react to the first incidents of rioting?

    A. What did they do?

    B. Describe the activities of these officials as best you can for the days of the outbursts.

64. Before the outburst, what methods were available and used by Negroes to express their dissatisfactions?

    A. How could they complain to the Police Department?

        1. A review board?

        2. Community relations division?

        3. Were the channels used?

B. How many Negroes have been elected to political offices?

C. How is the Negro represented politically?

D. Do any of the mass media report controversies and complaints of the Negro community?

1. How well do they do this?

2. Are there Negro newspapers and radio stations?

E. To what extent did Negroes feel justice was being carried out by legal means?

65. Are there influential Negro businessmen or leaders in the community?

A. What have they done for the Negroes?

B. Do they have the confidence of the Negro population?

3. COMMUNICATION:

66. In the area where the crowd broke out, is there a high population density?

A. Are there crowded conditions?

B. Did the riot occur at places where people would normally congregate?

C. Did it occur at places where many people can hear or see something going on?

67. Had violence or similar outbursts occurred in the general area before?

A. Were there near riots previously?

68. Had radio and newspapers in the area printed news of injustices, rumors, charges, and controversies?

A. Have there been many articles and stories recently about violence in the area?

1. About ghetto life and problems?

2. About crime rates?

69. Was the weather particularly hot during the days of rioting?

70. Over how wide an area did the outbursts occur?

    A. What kind of area was it?

    B. Describe the physical layout of the riot scene?

B. STRUCTURAL STRAIN

71. Do you feel the rioters were well informed about the ways to better their lot?

    A. Did the participants know about ongoing efforts to help them?

72. Did the participants feel deprived?

    A. Lack of jobs?

    B. Low wages and income differences?

    C. High prices?

    D. Business exploitation?

73. Where do most of the Negroes in the area work?

    A. Any sudden unemployment?

    B. Do labor unions discriminate against Negroes?

    C. Any competition for jobs?

74. Did events or changes occur recently which threatened to put the Negro farther behind?

    A. What events occurred recently which threatened the status and pride of the Negro?

75. Has there been any competition between Negroes and whites for power?

    A. Housing?

    B. Do realtors discriminate?

C. Is housing hard to find for Negroes?

D. Are there inadequate recreational facilities for Negroes?

76. Has there been rapid in-migration of Negroes into this area?

A. To what extent?

77. To what extent did participants feel a gap between what they thought they deserved and what they actually received? (alienation - gap between aspirations, expectations, and actual achievements).

78. What about conflicts between various elements and factions of the Negro community?

A. Describe them.

79. Are there laws on the books allowing differential treatment of Negroes and whites?

80. Any prohibitions on shopping and borrowing money (credit)?

A. Do Negroes have trouble getting credit?

81. In general, what do you see as the basic differences between Negroes and whites? (particularly Negroes in riot area).

A. What are some differences about the way they think about the world?

B. What differences are there in the way they live?

C. What about family life?

D. Do you think they plan ahead?

E. What differences are there in spending patterns?

C. BREAKDOWN OF SOCIETAL FEATURES

82. To what extent did people in the area believe that it was possible to improve the conditions here?

A. Did many of them express hope of better things?

83. Would you say conditions in the ghetto were getting worse or actually getting somewhat better before the riot occurred?

    A. In what way?

84. Do you think many Negroes compared their conditions with conditions in white communities?

    A. Did they compare their area to other Negro areas, perhaps in other cities?

85. Did any people living in the area or other leaders point out how Negroes in other cities had improved their conditions by direct action?

86. Do you think the white community really understands the situation in the Negro area?

87. Would you say there are adequate channels of communication between the communities? (Negro and white, as well as between factions in the Negro community).

88. Has the riot area been a high crime rate area?

    A. Are there violent gangs in the area?

    B. Have you heard reports of groups plotting or organizing violence?

89. In general, before the riot, did the people in the riot area seem discontented, restless, and ready for change of some kind? (a crucial question).

## III. PRECIPITATING FACTOR OR EVENT

Now let's talk about the event or events which touched off the riots.

90. To your knowledge, what was this event?

91. How did the riot participants view this event?

    A. What did it mean to them?

92. Did this event further enhance the threat of the white community or police to the Negro?

93. Did this event point up the deprived nature of the Negro?

    A. Monetary or status ("second class citizen")?

94. Did this event affect the ability of Negroes to express grievances and bring about change?

95. Did the event indicate that some person or group had failed to carry out its or his prescribed duties?

96. Have similar events occurred before?

    A. How important were other riots in initiating this one? (a sequence of events).

## IV. SOCIAL CONTROL

### A. INTERNAL

97. To waht extent did the riot crowd achieve any of the objectives it had set for itself?

    A. What happened after it reached its objective?

    B. How did participants feel after the objective had been reached?

98. How were prospective crowd members cut off from the crowd?

99. Why did people finally stop crowd activities and/or leave the scene of the action?

### B. EXTERNAL

100. Was force used to control the crowd in its early stages?

    A. Did police or community leaders hesitate to control deviations in the crowd?

    B. Did they fail to act for a period of time?

101. How did the police attempt to break up the rioting crowd?

A. Use community leaders?

B. Did they use bull horns?

C. Did they use the mass media?

102. How did the agencies of control (police and other leaders) conduct themselves?

A. What did they do to quell the hostility that was occurring?

B. Were they effective in their actions?

C. What was the nature of the relationship between these agencies of control, and the participants in the hostile riot corwd?

103. What better action could the authorities have taken?

A. How firm were the authorities in their handling of the situation?

B. How quick and decisive were they?

104. Did the police try to remove the people involved in the precipitating event?

A. How quickly did they take such action?

105. Did these agents of social control appeal to abstract or religious ideals? (white appeal to societal mores) (higher level appeal to norms or values).

A. Or to ideals of Negro betterment? (appeal to Negro in-group mores).

106. Did police withdraw from the area?

107. Did the police indiscriminantly and randomly attack and arrest rioters?

A. Did rioters feel the police did this indiscriminantly?

108. How soon did local police call in State Police and National Guard troops?

A. Did Negro community members welcome these additional forces?

109. Did the police attempt to isolate and separate the crowd into smaller groups?

A. Was anything done to prevent communication among crowd members?

110. Did the police or others try to redirect the attention and focus of the crowd on other objectives and issues?

111. Was there any attempt to prevent leaders and followers from getting together?

112. Were the police well coordinated?

A. Did they seem to know what to do to stop the riot?

113. Did you see any other people besides police and community leaders trying to break up the riot?

A. What were they doing?

B. How did they try to break it up?

114. How did the riot finally end?

## V. CONSEQUENCES OF CROWD BEHAVIOR

115. How do most of the ghetto Negroes feel toward the police now?

A. How do they feel toward the rest of the community?

116. What has the riot accomplished?

117. What changes have occurred which can be attributed partially, at least, to the occurrence of a riot?

118. How have your activities changed?

A. How have the activities of your agency changed?

FOOTNOTES

1 Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior," in Joseph B. Gittler, Review of Sociology: Analysis of a Decade (New York, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1957), pp. 134-135.

2 James Hundley and E. L. Quarantelli, A Test of Some Propositions About Crowd Formation and Behavior. Department of Sociology, Ohio State University, a paper presented at the 1965 Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association in Chicago, Illinois, p.1.

3 Alfred McClung Lee and Norman D. Humphrey, Race Riot ( New York, New York: Dryden Press, 1943).

4 Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1922).

5 Frank Hartung and Maurice Flock, "A Social-Psychological Analysis of Prison Riots; An Hypothesis," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Political Science, XLVII (1956-57), pp. 51-57.

6 Allen Grimshaw, "Urban Racial Violence in the U.S.; Changing Ecological Considerations," American Journal of Sociology, LXVI (1960), pp. 109-119.

7 Ralph Turner and Samuel J. Surace, "Zoot-Suiters and Mexicans' Symbols in Crowd Behavior," American Journal of Sociology, LXII (July, 1956), pp. 14-20.

8 Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, Collective Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1957).

9 Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

10 Stanley Lieberson and Arnold R. Silverman, "The Precipitants and Underlying Conditions of Race Riots," American Sociological Review, XXX (December, 1965) pp. 887-898.

11 Frederick Elkin, Gerald Halpern, and Anthony Cooper, "Leadership in a Student Mob," Canadian Journal of Psychology, XVI (September, 1962) pp. 199-201. Also, Leo Lowenthal and N. Guterman, Prophets of Deceit: A Study of the Techniques of the American Agitator (New York, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949).

12 "Social control" in this instance refers to intervention in the dynamics involved in the development and dissolution of hostile outbursts and crowd activities.

13 Allen Grimshaw, "Actions of the Police and the Military in American Race Riots," Phylon XXIV, pp. 271-289.

14 Joseph D. Lohman, The Police and Minority Groups, (Chicago: Chicago Park District, 1947).

15 Turner and Killian, op. cit. / Also, George Rude, The Crowd In History (New York, New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964) and Dean Harpes, "Rochester Race Riots," Trans-Action, II, pp. 7-11.

16 Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

17 The questionnaire that was utilized in our interviewing procedure is included in the appendix section of the paper.

18 The interview categories are as follows: 8 city officials, 2 policemen, 5 social workers, 21 newspapermen, 3 news commentators, 4 civil rights leaders, 2 members of the National Guard, 1 fireman, 2 university professors, 1 religious leader, and 1 interview with 10 teenage riot participants.

19 Ibid.

20 The Regional Church Planning Office, and the Office of Religion and Race, Race and Poverty, 2230 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio, (May, 1964), pp. 10-13.

21 Ibid, pp. 13-20

22 Ibid.

23 Chicago Urban League, Commentary on Areas of Negro Residence Map: 1950, 1960 and 1964, (Research Department, May, 1965).

24 Chicago Urban League, Selected Characteristics of the Population of Chicago, (Research Department, November 10, 1964).

25 Chicago Urban League, Westside Fact Sheet, (Research Department, March 16, 1965), p.2.

26 Apathy, disinterest and lack of voluntary association are characteristic of the lower social strata's response to political and democratic processes. Riesman and Glazer (David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, "Criteria for Political Apathy," in Studies in Leadership, Alvin W. Gouldner, ed; 1950) state that members of the lower strata (most Negroes occupy this position on the social scale) have feelings of impotence in regard to the political world; they believe that policy decisions are determined largely by members of the higher social strata. Membership in voluntary associations is also inversely related to level of stratification.

The low voting rate of Negroes is discussed by Lipset, (Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, 1963, Anchor Books) who attributes the phenomena to the lack of middle-class social conformity norms within the Negro community. Kenneth Clark (Kenneth Clark, Dark Ghetto, 1965, Harper and Row) also mentions this low voting rate, both North and South, as well as the Negro communities' failure to develop political power.

27 Commentary on Areas of Negro Residence Map: 1950, 1960 and 1964, op. cit.

28 Race and Poverty, op. cit. pp. 10-12.

29 James R. Hundley, Jr. and E. L. Quarantelli, A Test of Some Propositions about Crowd Formationaand Behavior, a paper presented at the 1965 annual meeting of the American Sociological Association in Chicago, Illinois.

30 Stanley Lieberson, "The Meaning of Race Riots," Race VII (1966), p. 376.

31 Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior (New York, New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963) pp. 16-17.

32 Daisy Craggett, "I Ran Scared with Hough Area Looters," Cleveland Call and Post LIII (Saturday, July 23, 1966), p.1.

33 Race and Poverty, op. cit. p.15.

34 Stanley Lieberson and Arnold R. Silverman, "The Precipitants and Underlying Conditions of Race Riots," American Sociological Review XXX (December, 1965) p.888.

35 Words of caution and a criticism are appropriate at this point. Lieberson and Silverman have placed emphasis upon the role of such precipitants in bringing about racial outbursts. It is our contention that too much emphasis and importance have been placed upon this aspect as such, and that such events must be seen in their proper perspective amid the total configuration of phenomena surrounding a racial outburst.

These authors utilized the New York Times Index as their major source of data supply, and supplemented it with additional magazines and local newspapers. Such mass media periodicals are quite biased in their presentations of riot occurrences. Due to their concern with reporting "facts" they almost always focus their attention upon the most dramatic events surrounding a hostile outburst. For this reason, Negro-white clashes, as well as other sensational initial incidents are often described in extensive detail. Very seldom are background factors or other subtle phenomena discussed at any length. Could it be that these reporting biases have entered into their analysis and distorted the actual importance that such precipitating factors have in the occurrence of a hostile outbreak?

36 Ralph H. Turner and Lewis M. Killian, Collective Behavior, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1957).

37 Ibid, p.103.

38 Respondents were selected upon the basis of the two criteria listed in the methodology section of the paper.

39 This instance of crowd member and control agency interaction can be compared to the interaction process that occurs between referees and basketball players during a game. Such an analogy illustrates the manner in which control agencies (referees and police) can be either effective or ineffective in their handling of a situation. Certain interactional patterns lead to a minimum of conflict and a maximum of control between police and crowds

(referees and players), while other patterns develop into a maximum of conflict and a minimum of control. Consistency in the punishment of deviations (the looting of stores or the fouling of players) results in more conflict free control of the interactional situation, whereas, inconsistency and caprice result in more conflict and less control.

40 Ibid, pp. 106-110.

41 Ibid, p.118.

42 The manner of hypothesis employed here is of a descriptive rather than a relational nature. The term is meant to imply uniformity of observation, and as such is unrefined and gross in comparison to the more precise nature of relational hypotheses and propositions.

43 Alfred McClung Lee and Norman Daymond Humphrey, Race Riot (New York, New York: The Dryden Press, Inc., 1943).

44 Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Negro in Chicago: A Study of Race Relations and a Race Riot (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1922).

45 Collective Behavior, op. cit., p.83.

46 An atmosphere of permissiveness was quite apparent to one social worker who told me that homosexuality was much more openly displayed during the period of rioting in Chicago. In addition, he stated that prostitutes also became much bolder and more "open" in their behavior. He described them as very vocal spectators during the three day period of rioting.

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Turner, Ralph H. "Collective Behavior" in Faris, Robert L. (ed.) Handbook of Modern Sociology. Chicago, Illinois: Rand McNally and Company, 1964, 382-425.