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".‘°"""'9‘fl'm .1 a . CI. p - ., . . , I .. .» -'- ' ‘ o - ~- . - . . rad .- O 9 I- _ "'f:.";" 2, O’O’M uwxrlnflnjrmijmnwgmingumuu THESIS \ s 1.? 6;: 2;“ M ‘V new i J «:1 .4... ‘ “r .1 .1. 1 '. -“ _ . a} '1‘ cf. . n - ' ‘ ‘ a .‘bv’L a“ J 4 ‘ u” LIA:,«"‘IQI - « . m -e a g” a j; - ~ .- . a; ‘I .P I ' -§:_' ‘3: ' h *i ‘0 «CL (.11-- ,__. swims av “ HUM; & SUNS' 800K BlNDERY IN .. .Iamw BINDERS -- - -...:7 MICHIGAN MSU LIBRARIES RETURNING MATERIALS: Place in book drop to remove this checkout from your record. FINES will be charged if book is returned after the date stamped be10w. ."l 4"" v? .fl-u.“ L ' Li [A I \ \D ABSTRACT PROMOTIONAL BUDGETS AND THE U. S. ARMY A STUDY OF DECISION MAKING BY John Charles Burke This study examined the U. S. Army as one of the nation's largest advertisers. The Army's promotion budget increased from $3 million to $35 million in three years. This rapid expansion, coupled with the attendant challenges of selling the all-volunteer Army provides a unique basis for analysis. The Army's promotional environment is composed of several atypical elements. Most prominent among these atypical elements are the prohibition against buying time in the broadcast media and the absence of profit incentives. Without pressure from the draft, enlistments have fallen off in recent months. The Army has launched a major promotional offensive to counter the trend of declining accessions. The promotion budget for fiscal year 1974 is $34.9 million. All of the Army's promotional activities are aimed at creating adequate leads for the 6,700—man sales force. The Pentagon determines the number of new recruits needed to meet force level requirements. The recruiters in the field must then meet their monthly objectives. Accessions currently are below expectations. The Army's media mix relies heavily on print, outdoor John Charles Burke and direct mail because of the moratorium against the broad- cast media. Magazine coupon responses are the main source of leads. Responses from this medium alone exceed 25,000 per month. The primary target audience of 17-21 year old high school graduates is reached through the media described above. Their influencers are reached through the same media, as well as a massive public relations program. Major emphasis is placed on the high school graduate who does not plan to attend college. The Army uses research findings and the experience of its agency, N. W. Ayer, to guide promotion decisions. The objective-task method is employed for determining the level of promotional appropriations. The over-all Army promotion program has greatly matured. Each element reflects SOphisticated planning based on research findings of the recruiting environment. Arbitrary promotional decisions are avoided and both the agency and the Army advertising management fully coordinate each element of the program. Still, recruiting objectives are not being met and the quality of enlistees is below expectations. These shortcomings have forced Army promotional planners to push for bold innovations in the Army's marketing program. Three recommendations are discussed in Chapter V. First, it is recommended that a test he conducted to determine the feasibility of selling the Army to college-bound seniors. It is felt that a small, but significant, percentage of this John Charles Burke segment of the target audience could be persuaded to try two or three years in the Army first. Secondly, the Army should standardize the direct sales techniques which have proven successful in the field. Finally, a major campaign should be waged against the paid broadcast moratorium. Accepted by the faculty of the Department of Advertising, College of Communication Arts, Michigan State University, in partial fulfillment of the require- ment for the Master of Arts degree. \éwm Q one . Diffictor of Thesis PROMOTIONAL BUDGETS AND THE U.S. ARMY A STUDY OF DECISION MAKING BY John Charles Burke A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Department of Advertising College of Communication Arts 1973 AC KNOWLEDGMENT S I would like to thank Colonel Gerald Childress and his entire staff at the Army's Advertising and Infor— mation Directorate for the assistance provided in pre- paring this paper. Captain Don Carfagna, Lieutenant Lin Lucchetti and Major Robert Coombs were particularly helpful. They consistently took time away from hectic schedules to grant interviews and find documents. Without their help this paper would not be possible. Finally, I thank my advisor, Dr. Kenward Atkin, for his guidance in preparing this paper and the general encouragement he has given over the past few years. ii LIST OF Chapter I. II. III. IV. TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . THE ARMY AS AN ADVERTISER . . . . . . . . Fiscal Year 1970 . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fiscal Year 1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fiscal Year 1972 . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fiscal Year 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . DEVELOPMENT OF THE FY 74 BUDGET . . . . . Fact Finding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Army Recruiting Objectives . . . . . . . . Marketing Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . Promotional Objectives and Strategy . . . Message Objectives and Strategy . . . . . Media Objectives and Strategy . . . . . . Media Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Public Relations Program . . . . . . . . . Sales Promotion Plan . . . . . . . . . . . Defining Advertising and Promotional Expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Promotional Chart of Accounts . . . . . . Budgetary Responsibilities . . . . . . . . Costing Out the Advertising and Promotion Budget Implementation . . . . . . . . . . DEVELOPMENT OF THE ADVERTISING BUDGET . . Percentage of Sales . . . . . . . . . . . Arbitrary Allocation . . . . . . . . . . . Competitive Parity . . . . . . . . . . . . All- -you-can—afford . . . . . . . . . . . . Objective and Task . . . . . . . . . . Establishing the Objective . . . . . . . . iii Page 14 19 24 24 28 28 31 34 37 40 44 45 45 46 49 50 53 56 57 57 57 58 59 62 Chapter Page V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . 64 FOOTNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Books . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 Articles in Journals, Magazines and Newspapers 77 Conferences and Speeches . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Research Reports and Surveys . . . . . . . . . 81 Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 APPENDIX A. Comparison of Army Advertising Budgets 83 B. Synopsis of Army Advertising Research Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 C. Direct Mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88 D. Paid Broadcast Contingency Plan . . . 91 E. Quarterly Production Schedule . . . . 94 iv Table 10. ll. 12. LIST OF TABLES Comparison of Media Expenditures in 1972 . . Results of $10.6 Million Radio and TV Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Attitudes about Army Slogan . . . . . . . . FY 72 Advertising Budget Requests . . . . . Army Coupon Inquiries . . . . . . . . . . . Comparison of Promotion Costs per Recruit . Comparison of Army Non-prior Service PrOduction O O O O O O O O O I O O O 0 O O O Non-prior Service Male and Influencer Reach and Frequency Tabulations . . . . . . . . . Non—prior Service Female Reach and Frequency Tabulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comparison of Current Media Plan and Media Plan for Paid Broadcast Contingency . . . . FY 74 Public Relations Expenses . . . . . . Cumulative Quarterly Budget Allocation . . . Page 12 15 16 20 27 29 38 39 43 44 54 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The U. S. government spent $16,508,800 on adver- tising in major media during 1972. This feat places it 79th on the 1972 list of the top 100 national advertisers.l The purpose of the expenditures was to gain more recruits for all the armed services. Enlistments fell sharply after the draft ended in 1973. Major expenditures in advertising and promotion are viewed as a necessity for filling the enlistment void created by a zero draft environment. The U. S. Army is the largest of the services in both manpower and dollars spent on promotion. The Army's advertising and publicity budget for fiscal year 1974 is $34,900,000.2 This large promotional appropriation will, in all likelihood, propel the Army past such big advertising spenders as Gulf Oil Corporation, Revlon, Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, Pillsbury Company, DuPont Company, and Joseph Schlitz Brewing Company. Perhaps even more eye—opening than the size of the Army's current advertising budget, is the rapid increase in the budget over time. In 1970 Army advertising expenditures were at the $3 million level. Today they are ten times that. The Army's emergence as a major advertiser occurred virtually overnight. This rapid growth and the attendant lack of advertising experience caused many management challenges. The Army is unique among major advertisers for several reasons. First, a product or service is not being sold to the consumer in the conventional sense. Thus, profit incentives do not exist. The absence of a profit- loss environment necessitates major modifications in the framework for advertising budget decisions. For instance, producers of such consumer products as alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, drugs, soaps, cosmetics and toiletries, ". . . find that their advertising expenditures are equal to or even exceed their after-tax profits."3 This implies that minimum profit objectives will retard the upward spiral of advertising appropriations in these, and many other, industries. The Army, on the other hand, appears headed into an era wherein promotional monies will continue to increase at a relatively unimpeded rate. Secondly, the Army is not faced with the problem of long and complicated channels of distribution. Marketing intermediaries, such as wholesalers and retailers, do not exist in recruiting channels as they do in most industrial channels. The absence of the middleman or the reseller eliminates the challenge of stimulating reseller support which faces most manufacturers. This, in turn, releases promotional appropriations which would otherwise be tied up in activities aimed at gaining reseller support. A third promotional activity which is peculiar in the military realm is personal selling. On the surface it appears that the Army is not unlike most multi-million dollar advertisers in this area. That is, the Army employs a direct selling force of thousands. They are located in every city in this country with a pOpulation of 100,000 or more. Many are found in smaller communities. Their job is to enlist qualified young men and women into the Army. This promotional function, direct selling, is the most important aspect of all military recruiting programs. To expect a young person to make the enlistment decision solely as a result of mass media communication is foolhardy. The personal impact of such a decision is simply too great. Thus, the Army has doubled the size of its recruiting force over what it was two years ago. The advantages of such a move are obvious; however in industry its wisdom would be seriously questioned. In discussing sales forces, Kotler states that expansion should occur, ". . . up to the point where an additional salesman would impose more cost on the company than he generates in the way of gross margin on sales."4 Cost effectiveness, then, is not a factor in the decision of the Army to expand its sales force. A fourth unique factor is the source of the funds for the Army's advertising appropriation. The source is the American taxpayer; however, it is Congress who makes the funding decision. While the budget approval will be discussed in a later chapter, some general discussion is apprOpriate at this point. Military decision makers are generally reluctant to comment officially on the moods and trends of Congress, but one can, nevertheless, derive what they are by simple observation. As the post-Vietnam demobilization continues, apprOpriations for military spending are rapidly shrinking. Additionally, Congress has set the statutory strength of the Army at about 800,000, down from a peak of 2,500,000 in 1970. Similar trends occurred after each major war this country has fought. The end of the draft and subsequent all-volunteer Army are major variables in this demobilization. Public demand and congressional sentiment forced the ending of the draft, and Congress appears to be willing to accept a portion of the respon- sibility for the success or failure of the all-volunteer Army. These factors have created a spirit of benevolence in Congress with regard to military recruiting activities. Pentagon department heads have adopted similar attitudes. For instance, the United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) is the only organization in the Department of the Army that is authorized to conduct funded public relations campaigns. This aura of financial permissiveness in Congress and the Pentagon places the Army advertising manager in an enviable position. Such is seldom the case in commerce and industry. Another unusual aspect of the Army advertising setting is the prohibition against buying time in the broad- cast media. Except for a thirteen week blitz in early 1971, the Army has not bought time on radio or television. This gaping hole in media strategy is forced upon the Army by lack of Congressional authority to spend advertising dollars in the broadcast media. The Army did receive a one-time $10.6 million appropriation beginning in March, 1971. This classical saturation campaign was designed to establish a high awareness level of the new theme: Today's Army Wants to Join You. Several reasons are given for the denial of funds for radio and television advertising. Don Reath, Army Account Executive at N. W. Ayer, summed up the reasons before the Louisiana Broadcasters Convention in September, 1973. The argument, voiced by responsible critics both outside and inside of the government, goes like this: the government shouldn't have to pay for the use of broadcast media since airwaves belong to all and broad- casters are merely licensed to use them. Critics also allude to the danger of government using TV and radio on a paid basis to propagandize the public. And they go on to cite the possibility of implicit government censorship through the allocation of large budgets to media with sympathetic edigorial policies, while with- holding funds from others. Regardless of the reasons cited, the absence of the broadcast media in the Army's media plan is astonishing. Table l is a comparison of leading advertisers. It dramatizes the issue. Data were derived from Advertising Age figures.7 o.ms -n- H.m o.mm m.sH ooo.mao.m~ .00 mayo xooam as H.H~ H.o m.H m.sa o.v oos.~mo.m~ .ucH museum amusemea ms m.sm m.~ s.sa s.~ m.ss oos.mmm.m~ .06 .on smashes .22 be H.om m.H o.~ m.mH ~.s~ oom.m¢a.mm .mooo «om we s.mm m.o s.H m.mm a.» oom.msm.mm .oaH mom»: a oommmflq ms m.am m.H ~.~s m.a~ H.0N oo~.m~m.m~ .ocH nomsmuuomsmsaa as m.mm m.o m.o o.¢s m.~¢ oom.asm.mm .oo mono umxmso me u--- -n- n--- n--- .n.. oom.~so.s~ sane .m .6 «.mm m.~ ~.m m.vm m.~s oom.a¢s.s~ .oo Hao Hamsm ms 5.4m ¢.H s.v H.ms m.mH oom.omm.s~ .ocH momaamznumuumo as m.mo ~.o ~.H m.~m m.m~ ooo.~oa.m~ moaume< mo cmmmsmxao> ow m.ms m.¢ m.m m.m¢ o.m~ ooo.omm.m~ .oo meow Hamnmewo mm p.04 uuu m.c v.s~ m.ma oom.a~s.m~ .oo ofiuoomam Hmumcmo mm m.~m --- m.o m.sm m.s oom.omm.m~ .muoo moaumeaunammm em m.ns m.H ¢.m ~.om ¢.sa ooa.mo~.om acmcnon a comcnoe om Hmuoa oaomm oaemm >9 >9 m Hmooe mammsoo xcmm bum uoz poem ooz boom we mHmHHoo amuoa mo w mhma CH monsufiocomxm capo: mo somfluwmeou H manna m The facts outlined above clearly illustrate the unique aspects of the advertising environment in which the Army must function. These conditions multiply the diffi- culty of the advertising budget decision which, under ideal conditions, is complex and diverse. CHAPTER II THE ARMY AS AN ADVERTISER Although the focus of this study is on the FY 1974 Army advertising budget, a summary of the spectacular growth of promotional activities in the Army is appropriate for it sets the foundation upon which the budget is built. Fiscal Year 1970. A Presidential Commission headed by former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates was appointed on January 29, 1969. The Commission's task was to study the feasibility of an all-volunteer armed force. During the same week, on February 3, 1969, the Army undertook its own study, entitled PROVIDE (Project Volunteer in Defense of the Nation). The PROVIDE study was to examine all possible methods to enhance the attractiveness of military life without sacrificing professionalism. The Gates study went to President Nixon on Feb- ruary 20, 1970 with a recommendation of ending the draft. Meanwhile, the PROVIDE study was completed. It outlined what would be necessary to implement an all—volunteer armed force and maintain required force levels without the draft. The study envisioned a three—phase transition over a period of several years. The first phase would be in the general area of enhancing service attractiveness to permit a lower level of reliance upon the draft through methods not requiring legislative action. The second phase would include development and implementation of programs and policies considered essential to the early attainment of a zero-draft goal; these actions would require legislative authorization and the allocation by Congress of sufficient funds. Phase three concerned those additional actions that might be necessary in the event that the previous phases, after implementation and close evaluation, proved inadequate. Fiscal Year 1971. The first, and most significant, Phase II recommendation was to, ". . . increase the adver- tising budget of the United States Army Recruiting Command from $3,000,000 to $36,000,000 annually to support an extensive advertising campaign."9 In the early fall of 1970, at the annual meeting of the Association of the U. S. Army held in Washington, D. C., the Chief of Staff, General William C. Westmoreland, addressed the convention and announced that the Army intended to make an all-out effort to reduce reliance upon the draft and to create a Modern Volunteer Army. Shortly thereafter, General Westmoreland appointed Lieutenant General George Forsythe as Special Assistant (to the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff) for the Modern Volunteer Army (SAMVA). General Forsythe set about 10 manning a small staff of outstanding officers and enlisted personnel to develop, and to assist in the implementation of new programs directed toward the MVA goal. The SAMVA staff was selected to reflect a cross section of rank and age, education and experience. At this point in time the Army was spending approxi- mately $3,000,000 annually on advertising and publicity. The PROVIDE study forced Army planners to consider increasing this amount. The decision to significantly increase the recruitment advertising budget occurred on October 12, 1970. On that date Defense Secretary Laird sent a communique to each of the Service Secretaries affirm- ing a zero—draft policy by FY 1973. This erased any doubts which may have existed about the all-volunteer decision. Secretary Laird's memo also created mild panic among the various recruiting commands. To help abate some of this panic a Joint Recruiting Conference was held in November, 1970, at Ft. Monroe, Virginia. The aim of this conference was to have all of the armed services assemble and discuss how they proposed to organize for the eventual end of the draft. Each of the services made a presentation announcing the manpower and resources required to meet recruiting objectives without the draft. One of the Army's proposals was a Spring 1971 test campaign in the broadcast media. This $1.2 million preposal initially was met with general negative response. However, a classified Pentagon study was released in November, 1971. This study indicated that 11 to meet proposed manpower levels, the Army would have to double its true volunteer enlistments. A true volunteer is an enlistee who was motivated to join for reasons other than draft pressure. The study revealed that slightly more than fifty per cent of all enlistments were entirely draft motivated. These factors made Army planners realize that timidity was inappropriate and that a major promotional campaign was in order. The Army was making bold changes from within to make the prOposition of military service more palatable. Something had to be done fast to bring this to the attention of the target audience and the general American public. Colonel Gerald Childress, the Army's advertising manager, sums up how the Army became a big advertising spender. At Department of Defense level there was quite a bit of foot-dragging during the Fall of 1970. They were reluctant to authorize any major expenditure for advertising because no one knew what would result. Our attitude was that if we are going to impact our message quickly all across the country, then we had to use the broadcast media in a big way. So, John Kester, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower, sent a memo to Roger T. Kelley, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs. The memo stated that we were planning to conduct a modest $10.6 million advertising test on the broad- cast media. Well, in fact that was a damned satura- tion campaign. The memo went on to say that we were planning to do this beginning March 1, 1971, unless we heard otherwise. Well, we never heard otherwise and the campaign is history. 0 By the end of FY 71 the Army's advertising budget bulged to $18,000,000 because the high impact radio and 12 television campaign was later reinforced with magazine ads and outdoor displays. One would assume that many of the major decisions made during this turbulent period were arbi- trary in nature. Don Reath corrects this mistaken notion. The radio and TV test campaign was undoubtedly one of the most intensively researched advertising efforts in history. For our client we conducted two major national surveys on a pre and post basis to assess its effects. In addition, studies were commissioned by the Department of Army, the other armed forces and the Department of Defense. In all, over one-half million dollars worth of research was done on this campaign. Table 2 is a summary of some of the startling results of the ninety day, $10.6 million broadcast satura- tion campaign conducted in the Spring of 1971. Table 212 Results of $10.6 Million Radio and TV Campaign April-June April-June 1970 1971 Recall of Army Ads 17—21 year old males 38% 84% Recall of Army Ads Fathers of 17-21 year old males 14% 70% Traffic through U.S. Army Recruiting Stations 87,000 129,000 Non-prior Service Enlistments 66,000 75,000 Increase in Combat Arm Enlistments -- 728% 13 These results are further dramatized by the fact that by April, 1971 monthly draft quotas were down con- siderably from the previous year. This, of course, reduced the number of draft-induced enlistments, which increased the proportion of true volunteers in the 75,000 figure cited in Table 2- Additionally, the Army was getting extremely bad press during the ninety days the campaign was running. Drug problems, racial squabbles, PX scandals, the My Lai prosecution--these were among the stories which broke in the Spring of 1971. The CBS documentary, "The Selling of the Pentagon," appeared during prime time on network television immediately prior to the massive broad- cast campaign. Colonel Childress outlines the devastating effect this program had on the future of paid Army adver- tising on the broadcast media. Just about the time that we had signed all our contracts and bought the air space, "The Selling of the Pentagon" broke on CBS. If you think that wasn't a mastication, you're mistaken. Representative F. Edward Hebert, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, was infuriated. He immediately became very hostile towards CBS and announced that, "CBS taking money from the Army after denouncing it on TV is like Mary Magdalene pleading she is a virgin." His hostility towards CBS spread to television in general. If he would have had his way at that time we would have been forced to cancel all our contracts and the campaign would have died right there. Even today he maintains that since the air waves belong to the public, the armed services should be satisfied with what little public service time they can get. Mr. Hebert is the roadblock which prevents us from buying time. But we're not going to let him stop us. We are currently preparing a position paper for presentation to appropriate Department of Defense officials. We are stating that we are being denied access to one of the principal media which reaches and impacts on our primary target audience. 14 We will show that if you use a total media approach, you can do the job better, and in fact, you can do it cheaper. From the turbulent Spring of 1971 the Army adver- tising program has increased in size and grown in sophisti- cation. Appendix A is a summary of advertising expenditures for the three most recent fiscal years. Figures shown for FY 74 represent proposed expenditures as opposed to recorded expenditures for FY 72 and 73. The slogan, "Today's Army Wants to Join You," has been the central advertising theme of Army copy since the Spring of 1971. Since its adoption, it has been the point of departure for all messages and appeals aimed at the primary target audience. Although the slogan has been the target of some criticism, research indicates that it communicates effectively. Table 3 illustrates a relative high level of acceptance and favorability among all groups surveyed. Additionally, the majority of respondents regard the theme as suitable for Army use. Fiscal Year 1972. Optimism over the apparent success of the $10.6 million saturation campaign caused Army planners to schedule another big radio and television buy for August-September 1971. In early July, 1971, the Secretary of Defense approved the interim six-week campaign and $3 million was budgeted for that purpose. The media schedule closely resembled the earlier, more costly campaign except for a reduction in the frequency of 15 14 Table 3 Attitudes About Army Slogan % % Young Young % % Men WOmen Fathers Mothers Theme Awareness: 1973 92.0 90.0 74.0 68.0 1972 83.3 82.7 64.2 59.5 1971 85.6 82.6 68.6 59.3 Ad Awareness: 1973 77.0 69.3 68.7 52.7 1972 71.0 60.0 49.3 47.3 1971 73.3 64.0 52.6 50.0 Favora- bility: 1973 72.2 75.3 71.2 72.8 1972 60.7 67.3 70.3 67.6 1971 61.3 66.7 69.4 64.1 Suita- bility: 1973 77.3 77.0 77.8 81.4 1972 64.7 66.0 68.9 77.7 1971 65.0 59.3 68.0 64.6 16 l5 . . announcements. However, Congressman Hebert's disillu- sionment with the broadcast media had spread to other members of his committee and they disapproved the proposal. The Army refused to let this setback dampen their enthusiasm for the broadcast media. The FY 72 Army adver- tising budget request was $27.7 million. This request included $9 million for magazines and another $9 million for paid radio and television. On November 17, 1971 the House passed the armed forces appropriation bill which included the Army's request for $27.7 million. Later that week the Senate Appropriations Committee deleted the $9 million paid broadcast proposal from the bill before it went to the floor. It appeared that the Army's advertising budget would be cut by one-third.16 The FY 72 advertising budget request for all of the armed services totaled $48.1 million. The Army was clearly the leader as Table 4 illustrates. Table 4 FY 72 Advertising Budget Requests Army $27,700,000 Marine Corps 7,600,000 Air Force 7,100,000 Navy 5,700,000 17 The Army's relatively large request, coupled with the paid broadcast proposal, created considerable resent- ment among the other services. It is clear that at this point only the Army felt the need to advertise in a big way to meet the challenge of a zero-draft environment. The other services resented the Army's initiative and their objections influenced the Senate to put the ax to the $9 million requested for radio and television. However, the presence of the Yuletide season may have created an aura of benevolence in the Congress. A week before Christ— mas the House and Senate jointly voted to give half the $9 million back with the caveat that it be used for buying other than broadcast time. Thus, the Army's FY 72 adver— tising appropriation was $23.2 million. As the fiscal year progressed, several changes were made in the overall promotional mix. A number of public relations consultants were hired through N. W. Ayer. They were initially employed in the largest cities. Later this concept was expanded and an agency field representative was placed at all sixty-nine main recruiting stations. This "field force" is the backbone of Army public relations activities. Responsibilities of the field representatives include: generating c00peration among educators and guidance counselors, improving rapport with the local media, arranging and promoting Army exhibits and other special performances, formulating marketing plans, and a host of other important projects in support of recruiting 18 and recruiters. The quantity and quality of production of public service announcements was increased during this period. Automatic, national distribution of Army messages also was upgraded. The Army and N. W. Ayer conducted a major campaign, by letter and personal visit, aimed at encouraging the broadcast media to air Army messages free. Promotional aid kits were developed and mailed monthly to every field recruiter. The kits contained printed materials and tapes as well as instructions about how to use them. In one handy kit, the recruiter would receive a supply of a weekly column written for him to be placed in weeklies or dailies'under his byline. The kit also contained radio news "beeper" reports and special tips on how to enlist prospects. Media expenditures were confined to magazines and direct mail. Of the $12,445,566 Spent for media placement, only $400,000 was used for direct mail. The remaining $12 million plus went to magazines. This lack of diversifica— tion indicates that the Army media strategy for FY 72 was extremely unSOphisticated. However, the current staff of Army advertising managers indicate that during this period extensive research was under way to determine the most cost-effective method of reaching the primary target audience. In the interim magazines were selected, to the exclusion of other media, as the safest bet. 19 Fiscal Year 1973. An analysis of events occurring between July 1, 1972 and June 30, 1973 reveals that the Army advertising plan was rapidly becoming more refined and sophisticated. Not only was the media mix more sen— sible, but the message content was totally research-based. Throughout FY 1973, attempts to evaluate the effects of the overall advertising and publicity program continued. Research results were incorporated into the development of specific advertising material as they became available. Additionally, new advertising techniques were utilized to reach the target audience such as outdoor billboards, transit advertising, and yellow pages. Research provided further identification of the needs perceived by the target audience which would be satisfied by Army enlistment. These needs are: 1. To obtain a fair rate of pay for the work I do. 2. To gain respect as a person. 3. To have work that is really interesting. 4. To have good living conditions. 5. To become a better person. These findings enabled the Army to orient overall appeals and specific messages directly to these needs. Examples of copy themes employed during FY 1973 are as follows: 1. Learn useful trade or skill in the Army. 2. Can choose the job or training you want. 3. Have chance at a good career in Army. 20 4. Can pick unit you want to join. 5. Get chance to travel and meet people. 6. Can continue education after school. 7. Will make you more mature. 8. Be proud to serve your country. Another major innovation of FY 1973 was the develop- ment of a magazine coupon response fulfillment system. Coupon inquiries are the main source of leads for the recruiter. The upward spiral of inquiries, shown in Table 5, caused the Army to seek a more efficient method of handling the coupon and evaluating the effectiveness of the particular medium in which it was placed. 17 Table 5 Army Coupon Inquiries Fiscal Year Inquiries Received 1970 71,051 1971 98,685 1972 251,509 1973 312,469 On January 1, 1973 the Rapid Elective Ad Coupon Transmission System was implemented. REACT employs the 21 services of World Wide Mailing Services in Philadelphia and all coupons are pre-addressed to them. The system is designed to process all inquiries within twenty-four hours. The mechanics of the system are explained below. The inquirer is mailed a packet of information thanking him for his inquiry and telling him exactly how to get in touch with his nearest Army represen- tative. This is done in the form of an individually addressed, computer letter which is keyed to the specific type ad from which the coupon resulted, such as an offer of jobs, benefits, travel, education, etc. The computer also prints the data received about the prospect onto a card that can be divided into two parts. One is the prospect card. It contains all the information the recruiter would have gotton on the coupon, but it is ready to be used and then placed in his prospect file. The second part is called the "Lead Evaluation Report" and is to be "ripped off," filled in, and returned to the Area Commander by the recruiter. This gives the Area Commander a method for evaluating the recruiter's ability to convert a lead into an enlistment, will insure that all prospects are in fact being called upon, and will provide information on the effectiveness of different ads in producing enlistments. The Area Commander then mails the evaluation to the REACT Center. At the center the information serves several purposes. First it is tabulated to determine the number of leads which result in enlistments. It is also used to inform districts and RMS of recruiter success in turning leads into enlistments. This information helps determine the effectiveness of the "quick-response" system. The reports also show which ads in which magazines at what time of the year pro- vide the best prospects. In short, the evaluation reports help in analyzing advertising effectiveness in terms of enlistments produced. It is also a check to make sure recruiters are effectively using the leads they are provided. At random, prospects will be con- tacted by telephone to determine the effectiveness of the recruiter sales effort. A duplicate copy of the letter to the prospect is mailed to the recruiting main station for information and on a monthly basis a report is prepared for each district providing information on the number of coupons received by District, RMS and indidivual recruiting 22 stations. Although this system is very complex, it provides timely leads to the recruiters, speedy res- ponse to the prospect, and management information to better enable the supervisors of the recruiter force to accomplish their jobs.18 Recognizing the desire of the young prospective enlistees to want: guaranteed special training for the development of future careers, to pick the location they want, along with higher pay, the advertising program con- tinued to promote enlistment Options and Army opportunities so that a higher level of awareness of these offers were maintained. Included were not only public service advertisements for radio, TV and magazines, but also locally procured ads in individual newspaper columns. During FY 1973, a total of $1,001,889.47 was spent to place 13,383 classi- fied ads in 27,290 newspapers 77,063 times. These ads generated 74,485 inquiries and resulted in a total of 15,195 enlistments. The average cost per inquiry during the period was $13.59.19 Finally, while a campaign directed against the prime target audience is of paramount importance, USAREC recognized the continued need for appealing to those individuals who exert a significant degree of influence on the young. These include but are not necessarily limited to parents, teachers, coaches and guidance counselors. To reach this element, advertisements stressing the more tra- ditional values obtained from Army service were employed. These included appeals to patriotism, and Army service as 23 a road to maturity, as well as those previously mentioned appeals dealing with the guaranteed job training, Army benefits, continued schooling, etc. In summary, the Army has grown from a small-time advertiser to one of the nation's largest in only a few years. This growth has been accompanied by constant refinement and bold innovation. A hunger for audience and media research characterizes current marketing planning and the turmoil of the rapid expansion has served to create a new breed of executive--the Army advertising manager. CHAPTER III DEVELOPMENT OF THE FY 74 BUDGET The Army's advertising budget is a combination of the over-all promotion plan and the funds necessary to implement it. The promotion plan embodies all activities considered necessary to achieve adequate enlistments and is based on Department of the Army manpower requirements. The annual advertising budget is prepared by the Adver- tising and Information Directorate of USAREC. Prior to its approval, the Army budget runs a gauntlet of assess- ments which terminates on the floor of the Congress of the United States. This chapter describes the development and management of the Army's FY 1974 advertising budget. Fact Finding. Promotional decisions are seldom made in a vacuum and the magnitude of the Army promotional budget necessitates that all decisions must be founded on a thorough knowledge of the marketplace. Army planners are constantly measuring the pulse of the enlistment market, specifically the primary target audience of 17-21 year olds and their influencers. Additionally, the general state of the economy, the job market, and the promotional activities of the other armed services are items of 24 25 interest to Army advertising managers. The Army, like many large companies, makes research and marketing planning year-round propositions which culminate in the annual advertising budget. CPT Don Carfagna outlines the Army's point of View regarding fact finding in a memorandum which synopsizes advertising related research. . . The mission of Army advertising research is to supply the necessary audience feedback on a mass scale, and in such a way as to represent the attitudes and behavior of virtually millions of identified target audience members. The following diagram shows the attitude and behavior continuum that leads to enlistment. AWARENESS ____) KNOWLEDGE—H FAVORABILITY______) SERVICE PREFERENCE—.9 CONVICTION—9 ENLISTMENT The mission of advertising is to provide adequate information and a favorable Army image at each of the first four points and to provide reinforcement for the fifth point, "conviction." By the time the pros- pect reaches the point of "conviction" he will most probably have contacted a recruiter; and, the recruiter must "make the final sale." Therefore, the mission of Army advertising research is to: (1) measure the progress of Army advertising at each point on the continuum, and (2) supply feedback to the Army and its advertising agency which will enable the Army to communicate more effectively at each point on the continuum. Finally, there are two additional points to con- sider. First, the above attitudinal continuum also applies to the "Influencers." Second, there is no ultimately effective method of communication and therefore, Army advertising can always be improved and Army advertising research will always be necessary to initiate these improvements.2 Appendix B is an illustrative summary of some of the research projects, past and present, conducted for the Advertising and Information Directorate. In addition to 26 these projects, USAREC has officially requested that funds be made available to develop a marketing information system. A study is under way to determine the feasibility of the proposal. USAREC wants the system to be capable of providing continuous feedback on the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of its advertising. The competition for recruits is at an all-time high and the Army is more interested than ever before in the recruiting activities of the other services. Most of the facts gathered in this regard are not available for release. However, Table 6 is an example of this type of fact finding activity. The table is a comparison of pro- motion costs per recruit. This category of data is invaluable when used to defend budget requests. Captain Carfagna outlines the current emphasis on feedback systems in USAREC: Our research effort is undergoing a transition. A few years ago most of our effort was attitudinal in nature. We needed this type of research because we had to have something to back up and justify our copy strategy. Now we have reached a point where we know that our advertising program will continue for many years to come. As our advertising program grows, so must our research effort. We realize that our research must be more sophisticated than merely iden- tifying certain susceptible attitudes in our target audience and then aiming our advertising at those sus- ceptibilities. Now we are conducting research which will identify the most effective, as well as cost effective, advertising strategies. We are building a data bank which will help us better segment our target audience. We are finding that certain segments are susceptible to a given appeal, while others are not. We want to establish a good professional rela- tionship with the research field in this country. We are seeking to become affiliated with the commercial research organizations as well as institutes of higher 27 .oofl>umm HoHumlcoz«¥ .mconaaae :H. .mmam .Hamm .mmaw .smmm .mnam .com Hmsow>flmcH Mom m «mmum>¢ oo¢.mme oom.om ooo.mm oom.mm ooo.oom Hobos ooe.vm oom.n ooo.m oom.m ooo.n mow>u0m uoflnm oo~.mm ooo.m oom.H ooo.m ooo.ma «4mmz onEmm oom.~em oov.mo oom.am oom.v> ooo.HmH «4mmz mam: mo>aoommoo ~.vmm H.~Hm s.sm m.¢mm m.smw .0omcsm we «Mlmm .emam .mmam .Haam .mmaw .nmam .wom Hmsofl>floaH mom w ommuo>< oow.m>¢ oom.moa oom.hm oom.>oa oom.oam Hmuoa oov.om ooa.e ooo.v oom.m oom.ma 00H>uom uofium oom.m~ oo~.m oom.a ooo.m oom.oa «4mmz mamEom ooo.m~¢ ooe.om oom.mm ooa.mm oom.nma 44mmz owns mo>wuommno m.mmm s.mam v.0m o.o~m s.omm «homosm ca me we dance mmz sane uflsuoom mom mumoo GOHDOEoum an o OHQMB mo cOmHummEou 28 learning. The idea is to keep abreast of any finding which may have a bearing on the recruitment of volun- teers in a zero-draft environment. Army Recruiting Objectives. Congress sets the force levels for each of the armed services each year. Each of the services must then establish the number of accessions needed to achieve its authorized strength. In the Army the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel is responsible for determining annual recruiting objectives. These objectives are determined by applying a number of complex formulae and forecasts to the force levels set by Congress. Retirements, promotions, separations, troop reductions, shortages in critical skills and organizational changes are but a few of the factors considered. The recruiting objectives are broken down by month and passed on to USAREC for fulfill- ment. Table 7 is a comparison of recruiting objectives and the number of accessions accomplished for non—prior service males for the past two fiscal years. The table illustrates the seasonal fluctuation in enlistments. These recruiting objectives for each month are the total marketing objectives for USAREC. They are comparable to the marketing objectives set by any large advertiser. Marketing Strategy. Selling the Army to potential enlistees is a unique marketing challenge, as discussed in Chapter I. Nevertheless, each element of the marketing mix is considered by the Army's marketing managers. The Army must be a product which satisfies the needs, desires, 29 .Hmmw Hmomflm MOM ommucmoumm ommnm>¢e «o.mm Hem.mma mao.H>H «v.5w Hmm.mea oov.>ma Hmuoa H.mm mmm.va oom.ma m.om mna.ma ooo.o~ mean >.mm bao.m ooo.m m.mm hem.m ooo.oa an: ~.mv emm.¢ ooo.m m.vh oam.m ooo.~H Hanna m.v> mmm.m oom.m H.m> mam.oa ooo.ma .Hmz «.mm mv¢.m oom.aa n.mh mmv.aa ooo.mH .Qmm m.>m hmm.na oom.ha o.mm Hon.va ooo.ma .cmo m.mm hmn.ma ooo.va m.mm mmm.aa ooo.ma .000 «.mm ¢H¢.wa oom.¢H w.mm omo.m oom.oa .>oz m.moa omm.ha omm.ma m.hm Hmm.m oom.oa .uoo b.voa vwm.am mom.o~ m.mm www.ma oom.ha .ummm H.NHH mmo.ma mmm.>a «.mm Hmm.¢a oom.ma undone m.moa mes.sa mHH.GH e.ooa msm.ma oom.ma mass m» wm mp Mm w mcoflmmoood o>fluommno w mcoflmmoood o>Hpoohno t coflhosooum ooa>uom Hoflumlcoz >EH< mo GOmHHmmEou o m mmh an 9 3O attitudes and other influences which motivate young men and women to join. This fact has been recognized from the outset and a number of policy changes have been implemented to present the Army in better light. Many of the irritants in Army life such as, early morning formations, make-work projects and lack of privacy were removed. Colonel Childress outlines the Army's emphasis on product improve- ment. Early in the game we asked outselves, "What will it take to make the Army more attractive?". After all, in any sales environment the product is the most important element. If your product isn't any good, you can create all the awareness you want to and people still won't buy it. They will know it's a lousy product. So we went about the controversial task of improving our product from within. We elim- inated many of the unnecessary irritants, raised the pay, added numerous special enlistment options and24 then started telling our target audience about it. But, the product must be offered at a price which will produce an acceptable return on investment. Travel opportunities, education, training and excitement are stressed in Army messages. Research has identified these as important aspects in the enlistment decision. Channel decisions are also a part of the Army's general marketing strategy. The number of field recruiters has more than doubled over the past three years. Likewise, the number of recruiting offices increased. The offices have also been moved out of post office buildings and into shopping malls and other high visibility locations. Most important of all, has been the predominance of promotion in the marketing mix. The size of the advertising and publicity 31 budget alone, illustrates the emphasis on this element of the marketing mix. Studies are under way to determine the relative importance of advertising versus personal selling in the enlistment decision. Some facts which are known could serve as guidelines for setting the general promotional objectives. For instance, the Army's most successful recruiters will eventually enlist one out of every three persons who walks in to the recruiting office with inquiries. The least successful recruiters may not even tally a single enlistment for a given month despite conducting up to twenty interviews. During August, 1973, 400 of the Army's 4,300 recruiters failed to produce a single enlistment. Another interesting fact is that between two and five per cent of all coupon inquiries culminate in an enlistment. Promotional Objectives and Strategy. The objective of the Army's advertising and publicity program is, . to present an advertising and publicity program which will provide adequate support for the achievement of the man- power requirements of the Army in a zero-draft environ- ment."25 The following priorities have been established: 1. Influencing l7-21 year old high school graduates or high school students about to graduate to seek enlistment in the United States Army, and reten- tion of qualified individuals who are completing their first term of service. 2. Obtaining sufficient enlistments in the combat arms (infantry, armor and artillery). 32 3. Obtaining sufficient enlistments in specific Military Occupational Specialties, as may from time to time be designated by the Department of the Army. 4. Securing an equitable proportion of enlistments in all programs from minority groups. 5. Attracting sufficient volunteers for special programs such as Judge Advocate General's Corps, Officer Candidate School, WOmen's Army Corp and Army Nurse Corps. 6. Enhancing the general public knowledge of the U. S. Army. Emphasis is placed on continuity of advertising appeals and messages to the target audiences and their influencers with sustained momentum reflecting a response to the traditional seasonal peaks and valleys of the recruiting cycle. The plan, while annual in scope is implemented on a quarterly basis thereby retaining flex- ibility of response to the results of continuing research development and to the modifications of recruitment and reenlistment objectives and procedures as may from time to time be required by the needs of the Army. The Army's general promotional strategy for FY 1974 is stated below: The strategy for implementing this plan will con- centrate on the following: (1) NPS Male and Female (a) Prospects: to sell enlistment in the United States Army to high school graduates, age 17-21. Other key target audiences include college drop-outs, junior college students, and vocational students. Primary emphasis will be placed on the higher mental categories among seniors about to graduate. Adver- tising will concentrate on jobs and training, choice of jobs, and job security, with strong emphasis on civilian-negotiable skill training. Critical career 33 group needs of the Army, as communicated to USAREC from time to time, will be featured in both national and local programs, as will pay and benefits, physical and psychological self-development and maturity, overseas Options (with special emphasis on Europe), and the delayed entry option. Special weight will be assigned to combat arms enlistment Options, with more use of teamwork in training and hands-on learning experiences in a more rugged environment, in keeping with a more conducive pOpular attitude toward service in a peacetime military force. This advertising will all be positioned within the framework of a changing Army and its attractiveness to young people--more confident and more candid in its posture than ever before. (b) Influencers: to enhance the general public knowledge of the United States Army, with specific emphasis on key influencer groups: parents, guidance counselors and other educational influencers, peer groups, etc. This emphasis will extend beyond adver- tising into the areas of public affairs and sales pro- motion, with the development of support materials to implement recruiter activity with influencer groups. It will also be augmented by advertising weight placed on appeals to minority prospects and influencers, especially Black and other minority high school graduates in the higher mental categories. Service in the Army will be presented throughout as a bene— ficial step between high school and adult career decisions. (2) Reenlistment (a) Prospects: to retain qualified individuals who are completing their first term of service. This program will utilize on-post media (including, but not limited to, post newspapers, general service pub- lications, AFRTS broadcast services, and collateral and outdoor material) to remind the first-term soldier of the advantages of remaining on active duty. Over- seas editions of mass publications will also be used where appropriate and efficient. (b) Influencers: to inform the wives and other influencers of first-term soldiers of the advantages-- both to them and to the soldier--Of remaining on active duty. Special publications for service dependents will be employed to elicit their favorable attitude toward reenlistment and career service. 34 (3) Professional Services: to seek out and eXpose quality students and practitioners to service in the Army professional corps as a viable alternative. This program will utilize professional journals to acquaint their readerships (especially medical, dental, veterinary, nursing, and legal) about the specific options and benefits of Army service, including and emphasizing scholarship assistance and continuing education where applicable. Message Objectives and Strategy. The Army's mes- sage objectives and strategy are outlined below: OBJECTIVES. a. To maintain the consistent dialogue with prospects, influencers and the American public gained during previous advertising campaigns. b. To increase appeal to the quality NPS market of high school graduates and their influencers. c. To increase the credibility of Army advertising prospects, influencers and the public. d. To target specific MOS areas and other recruiting requirements within the creative program. EXECUTION. a. General Strategy. (1) Adherence to fundamental advertising disciplines. (2) Maintain the successful recruiting signature "Today's Army Wants to Join You." (3) Continue the central theme. (4) Maintain the consistent graphic format. (5) Produce consistent copy tone of voice. (6) Maintain high production values. b. Copy Stance. (l) The country is wondering if the Army will succeed in achieving necessary manpower for a volunteer force. And, most personally, the prospects and their influencers are wondering: "What kind, 35 what quality volunteer is the Army after?" To meet the quality goals, FY 74 copy will address more directly the quality prospect and his key influencers; parents, uncles and aunts, teachers, guidance counselors, and his peers. (2) The Army's involvement in Vietnam is ended. It does not have to be announced, or even mentioned in advertising, but FY 74 COpy will capitalize on it. In addressing the traditional benefits of Army service: getting out on your own, gaining maturity, meeting people, travel, job- training, challenge and adventure, the quick mental reply won't be, "Yeah, but I might have to die for it." This more confident attitude will be reflected not only in headlines and copy, but in visuals as well. Now that soldiers in battle are off the front pages and the TV screens, FY 74 advertising will be more soldier/uniform oriented and directly relate to the prospect who might want to try soldier- ing for a while. (3) FY 74 advertising will begin to position, more explicitly service in the Army as a natural, beneficial step between high school and adult- hood for many young Americans; not just some- thing you do in wartime, but something you do as a part of life--to test yourself--to grow mentally, physically, and socially--a way to serve your country as you serve yourself.27 To insure consistency in its theme presentation, the Army has developed six standards or disciplines which are applied to all messages. These standards are: l. 2. Present Army offers and information in a way that is credible. Use quality language and graphics to attract the quality individual. Emphasize the Army's awareness of the importance of the individual's enlistment decision. The message must have personality, wit, a sense of humor, and a style consistent with the prospect's own. Make the prospect feel needed, not just informed. 36 6. Each advertising message must contain an idea, not just a headline and graphics. Colonel Childress discusses his concept of the objectives which Army advertising seeks to achieve. I am asked on a daily basis questions like, "How do you know if your ads are effective?" "Why is your budget so big?" The tendency is for people to want us to directly correlate advertising expenditures to a specific number of enlistments. That is very diffi- cult. The enlistment decision is simply too complex. It involves the prospect's personality, the job market, the fluctuating state of the economy and many other factors. But, we can measure our advertising in terms of the communication goals that we have established for it. After all, advertising is communi- cation, and if you want to measure it then you have to go about that measurement from a communication stand- point. We have three goals for our advertising. They are: 1. To create awareness in our target audience of Army Opportunities. We do that through mes- sages delivered in magazines, billboards, direct mail and newspapers. Of course, we would also use radio and TV, if we could. 2. To gain public acceptance of the Army among the many influencers of our target audience. I'm speaking of parents, guidance counselors, coaches and the general public. The country wants a volunteer Army and that is what we're trying to give it. But, we need to improve the Army's image. 3. The most important goal is to convince the prOSpect to go down and talk to the recruiter,‘ eye-ball to eye-ball. Now, these goals we can measure. We use awareness and motivational surveys on a quarterly basis. We are constantly evaluating magazine advertising by the number of coupon responses received, and how many of those responses lead to enlistments. The same applies to our direct mail campaigns. For instance, right now Our cost per lead from magazine advertising is about $39 for males and about $24 for females, averaged out over the year. 37 Media Objectives and Strategy. The congressional prohibition of paid broadcast advertising predetermines much of the Army's media strategy. In order to reach its target audience with the desired reach and frequency; magazines, outdoor, newspapers and direct mail are the only reason- able media. In general, the Army plans to reach ninety- five per cent of each of its male target audiences, at a frequency of three times each quarter. The female prospect will be reached to a lesser extent (See Tables 8 and 9). Media selection is an item of major concern within the Army's advertising management. Each media decision is weighed against alternatives, both within and without the medium under consideration. Projected purchases are developed using the best available evaluations of adver- tiSing markets to reach the various recruiting target audiences, and are based on: 1. Market and audience research 2. Response to previous advertising 3. Seasonal variations in target audience consumption behavior 4. Dollar cost 5. Professional market experience. Media effectiveness is under continuous review. Proposed purchases are refined and updated prior to actual placement. Those media producing exceptional results are exploited. Non-productive media are excluded from the buy. 38 Table 829 Non-prior Service Male and Influencer Reach and Frequency Tabulations lst Quarter FY 74 Men 18-24 # H.S.G. Total Inser- Some College Adults tions (000) (000) Senior Scholastic l 1867 (15-17) N.A. (H.S.B.) Hot Rod 2 1250 4112 Motor Trend 2 1313 3988 Car Craft 2 455 1579 Popular Hot Rodding 2 250 (est) 1000 (est) Mechanix Illustrated 2 657 4970 Popular Science 2 744 5171 Field and Stream 2 762 7507 Outdoor Life 2 711 6469 Sports Afield 2 494 5022 Sport 2 1143 5541 Sports Illustrated 2 2196 11417 Pro Quarterback l 150 (est) 300 (est) Letterman l 200 (15-17) 400 (est) Exploring 1 375 (16-18) 500 (est) National Future Farmer 1 400 (16-20) 500 (est) Reader's Digest 1 2222 42107 Playboy l 3316 17927 Esquire 1 1337 7096 True 1 451 2929 Time 1 2003 20832 Newsweek l 1620 13894 U. S. News l 588 9025 Personnel & Guidance Guidance Journal 1 N.A. 36 School Counselor 1 N.A. l6 Guidepost l N.A. 29 First Quarter Reach and Frequency Men 18-24 Total H.S.G.-Some College Adults Reach: 7,511,000 77,659,000 (92.3%) (58.2%) Average Frequency: 4.8 3.0 39 Table 930 Non-prior Service Female Reach and Frequency Tabulations lst Quarter FY 74 Publication # Insertions WOmen 18-24 Seventeen 2 1,521,000 Glamour 2 1,943,000 Mademoiselle 2 1,290,000 Cosmopolitan 1 1,650,000 Teen 1 445,000 Ingenue 1 445,000 Total Population Average Women 18—24 Net Reach % Coverage .Frequency 12,432,000 6,205,000 49.91 1.94 40 Media Plan. In addition to the magazine schedule cited at Tables 8 and 9, the Army will advertise in a number of medical and law journals to reach the professions. This year 1,260 yellow page renewals will be purchased and 225 directories will carry Army listings for the first time. The Army will place full-page ads eight times during FY 74 in each of the following newspapers: 1. New York Times 2. Washington Post 3. Chicago Tribune 4. Pittsburgh Press, Post-Gazette 5. Los Angeles Times 6. St. Louis Globe-Democrat 7. Philadelphia Inquirer 8. Atlanta Journal, Constitution 9. Detroit Free Press 10. Cleveland Plain Dealer 11. Boston Globe 12. Minneapolis Star, Tribune 13. San Francisco Chronicle, Examiner 14. Milwaukee Journal, Sentinel 15. Miami Herald, News. Additionally, during FY 74 a test of free—standing inserts in Sunday neWSpapers will be made. These inserts are separate units, "stuffed" into the papers along with the TV booklets, magazine sections, etc. Such inserts are used as a direct response type of medium and are becoming 41 more and more productive for direct response advertisers. It is planned to conduct this test in the first quarter of FY 74 and "roll out" to additional markets during the balance of the year if the test proves productive. Essentially, two things are being tested, the medium and creative approach. From a media standpoint, a test will run in seven papers in the following seven major cities throughout the U. S. (covering all five recruiting districts), and providing approximately 3,700,000 total circulation. Newark Star Ledger Minneapolis Tribune Atlanta Journal Constitution Los Angeles Herald Examiner Kansas City Star Seattle Post Intelligencer Cleveland Plain Dealer Four creative/format alternatives have been developed and will be tested. All four center or critical skills requirements. 1. A single sheet, 10-7/8" x 12", four-color, two sides with a reply card perforated for each tear out. 2. More of an "involvement" piece, it utilizes the stamp approach wherein the prospect would punch out his area of interest and attach it to the reply card. 3. An alternative of number two utilizes a numbering system (instead of the tear-me-out-stick-me-on- the-reply-card approach). In this case, the cri- tical skills would be listed and the prospect picks the one he wants by number. 4. Number four is a "his and hers" approach, again utilizing the critical skills and the numbering approach. The REACT system will process and respond to coupon returns. Once the test results have been analyzed, future 42 "roll-outs" of the most successful approach will be announced in subsequent quarterly plans. The following outdoor purchases are envisioned during FY 74. a. A number 50 showing in the top 200 metropolitan markets during August-September and May-June. A showing of this size will include over 7,200 bill- boards and on any given day should deliver the number of advertising impressions equal to 50% of the population of each market. b. A supplemental number 25 showing in 81 markets of special opportunity during September and June. These markets have been found to be areas where the Army's share of enlistees is considerably below the other services. The direct mail plan is shown at Appendix D. Two public service announcement spots will be produced each quarter for both radio and television usage. The spots will be delivered to all commercial stations accompanied by appropriate correspondence encouraging station managers to air the messages as a public service. In the meantime, the Army continues its fight for authorization to purchase time in the broadcast media. A contingency plan has been prepared for this eventuality. This plan calls for the same $34.9 million allocation as the current budget. Major differences between the two plans occur in the media plan. A comparison of the media plans is shown at Table 10. 43 31 Table 10 Comparison of Current Media Plan and Media Plan for Paid Broadcast Contingency Millions of Dollars Paid No Paid Media Broadcast Broadcast Magazines 2.552 5.044 Outdoor .130 3.834 Newspapers .392 1.852 Yellow Pages .190 .185 Direct Mail 1.584 1.585 Minority Media .500 .500 Radio 2.892 ---- TV 4.060 ---- Total 12.300 13.000 Details of the paid broadcast contingency plan are at Appendix D. The Army will reach its minority group audience primarily through print advertising in magazines having a predominantly black or Spanish-speaking audience. One-half million dollars is allocated for buying space in magazines such as: Black Sports, Ebony, Jet, Reader's Digest--U. S. Spanish Edition, Essence and Vanidades. Periodic buys are also slated in monthly newspaper supplements directed to blacks and the Spanish-speaking population in the West, Southwest and Midwest. Examples are Tuesday and Vida Nueva. 44 Public Relations Prggram. The Army will expend $6.8 million during FY 74 on a public relations campaign designed to reinforce the paid advertising. Table 11 is a break-down of public relations expenses. 32 Table 11 FY 74 Public Relations Expenses Program Cost N. W. Ayer Field Force $2,500,000 National Varsity Club 1,100,000 Syndicated TV Series 600,000 Exhibits and Displays 350,000 Educator Support Program 1,750,000 Miscellaneous Programs 500,000 Total $6,800,000 program 1. The objectives of the Army's public relations are as follows: To increase the number of high school graduates seeking enlistment in the Army in the critical skills. To increase public awareness of the Army as a viable alternative to civilian employment for high school graduates. To increase public awareness of the Army as a worthwhile organization making significant con— tributions to the quality of American life. 45 4. To increase public appreciation of Army men and women as dedicated members of an honorable profes- sion, worthy of respect. Sales Promotion Plan. This year the Army has recognized that a major flaw in the promotion plan, to date, has been a lack of emphasis on sales promotion. A number of Army field studies indicate that recruiters often lack certain basic direct sales disciplines. Further, sales incentives have tended to be negative in nature (harsh letters from higher up when monthly quotas are not met). TO professionalize the recruiter force, $3.9 million has been allocated for FY 74. These funds will be used for a number of sales promotion activities. Special recruiter kits will be fur- nished twice a year. The kits will contain numerous mer- chandising and sales promotion devices. Contents will include posters, advertising schedules and reprints, tele- phohe technique cards, tie-in suggestions, etc. A series of films is in production to assist the recruiter in sales presentations. A special guidance counselor package is also being prepared. The Objective of this package is to re-educate this important audience about the total Army Offer. Contents will include: a manual entitled The_ Guidance Counselor Career and Education Guide, supporting film strips and record scripts, pamphlets and posters. Defining Advertising and Promotional Expenses. The decision of exactly what should be charged to the advertising 46 and promotional budget is entirely up to the top manage- ment of the individual firm. Outside influences are irrelevant because the environment of the firm is individ- ually unique. The important issue is that company policy be clear cut. Otherwise, those charged with developing the budget may begin their labors under a cloud of doubt. When top management is preoccupied with advertising cost per unit sold, the tendency is to trim the advertising budget of the "gray" areas. Printer's Ink provides two articles on the topic (December 16, 1960 and September 24, 1964). These articles do not attempt to recommend which items are legitimate promotional expenses and which are not. Rather, the articles are a listing of how a number of national advertisers handle their promotional budgets. The Army divides its $34.9 million promotional budget into two broad categories. The largest subdivision contains all advertising agency fee categories. They are: media costs, ad production costs, research contracts, public relations and sales promotion. The other category groups all promotional expenses for which N. W. Ayer is not commissioned. Examples are government printing, locally controlled promotion campaigns, and miscellaneous military expenses. Promotional Chart of Accounts. To facilitate orderly expenditure control, the Army pays its promotional bills by recruiting programs. These programs include: 47 Non-prior Service, Women's Army Corps, Surgeon General's Office, Judge Advocate General, and reenlistment. These programs are further subdivided by media and by fiscal quarter. The system is quite complicated and can be best illustrated by example. In July, N. W. Ayer submitted a media prOposal for the second quarter of FY 74 in support of the Women's Army Crops (WAC) program. The Advertising and Information Directorate (A & I) reviewed the proposal and returned it to the agency for implementation. The agency then formalized the proposal and requested A & I to initiate a delivery order in the amount of the proposal. A & I reviewed the formalized proposal and initiated the delivery order. The Army comptroller prepared the pur- chase Or delivery order and forwarded it to the agency. N. W. Ayer then placed the insertion order and invoiced the Army for eighty—five per cent of the delivery order. A & I certified the invoice and instructed the Finance and Accounting Office to make payment. The agency then for- warded tear sheets to A & I together with an invoice for the outstanding fifteen per cent of the delivery order. Final payment is made as outlined above. Figure l is a flow chart of the procedures des— cribed above. 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