

MSIS



THE EVOLUTION OF THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE AND AID TO GREECE

by

Richard J. Danilowicz

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Michigan
State University

East Lansing, Michigan
1960

Approved Paul G. Lang
Department of History

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Introduction.	1
Chapter I Political Situation in Greece, 1946-47	6
Chapter II Economic Situation 1946-47	14
Chapter III The United Nations and Greece 1946-49.	28
Chapter IV Evolution of Aid to Greece	46
Chapter V The Public, Congress, and the Truman Doctrine.	59
Chapter VI Plans for Greek Rehabilitation	79
Chapter VII Shoring of Outer Defenses.	86
Chapter VIII Conclusions.	106
Bibliographical Note.	110

INTRODUCTION

No short period in the history of the world ushered in more earth-shattering events than the fourth decade of the twentieth century. A world war of such magnitude that millions were led to their death laid the foundation for those changes. New tanks, airplanes, rockets and finally the atomic bomb made available to man methods of extinction, almost beyond the wildest figments of imagination.

World War II seriously impaired the economic system of Europe. It also led to a change in the strength, influence and policies of the Western world. France, a world leader in 1938, came to be recognized as a second class power. England faced the postwar world severely weakened by the economic strains of war. Her influence in world politics remained, but she could no longer maintain an empire. Germany, the economic key to Europe, was partitioned among the Allies. This made her economic plight even more pronounced. Russia, the silent threat to Europe and the world, emerged from the war a tremendous power. Her political ideology, huge military forces, and powers of resistance, so evident during the war, caused her to be regarded as the major stumbling block to world peace. The United States moved into the postwar period bearing the distinction of the most powerful country in the world. Its military might, productive powers, and demands for world peace, made it the bulwark of all democratic nations. Under the guidance of President Roosevelt, the United States became the standard bearer for a new international organization,

the United Nations. The preservation of peace was to guide all of its actions. The changes brought by the war only emphasized the need for a lasting world peace. Most nations concurred in this principle.

A plan for peace had no sooner been decided upon, when friction developed between the two major powers. The ancient conflict between the Soviet Union and the West smoldered through the war years. It was aggravated by Soviet requests for a second front and the Allied delay in acknowledging that request. Russian demands for recognition of her conquests in the Baltic Area and the Polish question further separated the wartime allies.

The world looked to the United States for leadership. President Roosevelt accepted that responsibility. His plans for peace were founded upon cooperation with the Soviet Union, a repudiation of the concept of spheres of influence, and a European settlement based on The Atlantic Charter. Before final peace issues came to be discussed, Roosevelt died. A negative policy resulted from his program. Cooperation with Russia had been most important for successful completion of the war. Both the United States and Russia felt they had contributed more than their share: the Soviets in blood, manpower, and a ravaged country; and the United States in materials and manpower. The Soviets decided to carry the spirit of cooperation into the postwar world. It was to have a new definition. They were to make demands and policy and we were to acquiesce and follow. Our assumptions that fair play would come to be a part of the Russian program clouded our actions. Soon, the

United States began to seek a new approach to world problems. Whether Roosevelt and his dynamic personality could have carried to a conclusion his plans for peace, no one shall ever know.

A successful war and international efforts for a lasting peace did not quell Soviet desires for security. They feared the future, if the nations to their west were allowed to choose their own form of government. Communism surely would not be the expression of the majority. To satisfy their desires for security, and to fulfill goals established by the Czars for a window on the Baltic and expansion to the west, they exploited the weak to their own advantage. Misery became their calling card. The frontiers of freedom were pushed back, and efforts of war-torn nations to regain political and economic stability were strangled. This cynical and calculated disregard for human freedom became the established pattern of Soviet activity. It bred a new fear and insecurity throughout the world. Poland, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia fell into the Soviet orbit. Pressure was exerted upon Turkey and Greece in 1946. The Russians had fought their own war, and in areas it considered of vital concern it intended to write its own peace. The breach was widened by re-emphasis of Marxist Leninist orthodoxy on the part of the Soviet leaders who did not find it embarrassing to pursue at the same time the old expansionist policies of the Czars. The wartime mellowing of Communist Doctrines did not continue. They were sure the democratic nations were riding for an economic fall, and would in time drop into the Soviet lap. To hasten that conclusion, they followed a program of coercive pressure and resistance.

Between the two wars, the United States pursued a policy of neutrality and non-interference. In 1945, that no longer seemed adequate. Science's conquests of time and space had brought the whole world together. The concept of peace for the United States seemed indistinguishable from the concept of peace in the world as a whole. A threat to peace in any section of the world now became a threat to her shores. Two world wars had made it evident the United States could not remain in a shell.

Our willingness to permit the Soviets to expand soon came to an end. By 1945 at Potsdam, President Truman decided to begin a policy of resistance to Soviet pressures.¹ This was strengthened by Soviet threats to peace in Iran, Turkey, and by her actions in the United Nations during 1946. The British had been the pillar of strength in the Near and Middle East, but their withdrawal from Greece planned for April 1, 1947, and Soviet threats to the Near East, forced President Truman to prepare an active policy against the spread of Communism. This change in American foreign policy may well rank in importance with the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine.

The new program was the first of several adopted by the United States, after 1947, for the strengthening of democratic peoples throughout the world. The original program applied to Greece and Turkey, but its results morally strengthened all freedom loving nations. It will be the task of this paper to examine the aid program to Greece, up to June 1949, at which time aid under U.S. Public Law 75 came to an end. Four groups of questions will act as guide posts.

¹Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Year of Decisions (New York, 1955), II, 77-83.

- (1) What was the political and economic situation in Greece during 1946? Did Greece warrant direct American aid in 1947?
- (2) Why was the United Nations not made the vehicle of Greek requests for aid? What part did the United Nations play in the postwar Greek world?
- (3) What history lay behind The Truman Doctrine? Did it encounter difficulties in its passage through Congress? What were the arguments for and against the program?
- (4) The program in action: What were its objectives? How did it work? What were its successes and failures? Did we impair Greek sovereignty?

Chapter I

Political Situation in Greece, 1946-47

The blue sky over Greece and clear waters of the Mediterranean have not changed through the centuries. They surround a land that has fluctuated between success and failure, wealth and poverty, and independence and subjugation. The physical make-up of Greece discouraged progress. Mountain ranges split the country from north to south and east to west. This hampered the development of transportation facilities. Turkish demands for tribute and the subjugation of centuries stifled progress and led to a destruction of soil fertility. A Mediterranean climate is ideal for vacationers, but the scarcity of rainfall blocked efficient exploitation of the soil. Industry never found a place for itself due to the lack of skilled labor and limited supplies of fuel.

Another factor detracted from the country's success. This was the concept of the family. It overruled allegiance to the state and stifled unity. Ancient Greece had developed this concept. In general, even before World War II, the Greek standard of living was low.

General John Metaxas became dictator of Greece in 1936. His apologists stress the imposition of his dictatorship as the only way to block a communist seizure of the government. Communist literature refuted this idea. Instead of an active movement toward government control, the communists planned to infiltrate the governmental offices and take over peacefully.²

²Floyd A. Spencer, War and Postwar Greece An Analysis On Greek Writings (Washington, 1952), pp. 1-5.

With the seizure of power, Metaxas instituted a program aimed at abolishing all political parties. Particular emphasis was given to the extermination of communists. Liberal dissatisfaction with the Metaxas regime piled up after 1937. Literature and communications were censored. Teachers were outraged because censorship erased mention of democracy from the text books. Metaxas methods of control were considered to be a carbon copy of Mussolini's facism. By 1938, the government moved into the German sphere of influence. Governmental machinations permitted only token resistance to the German invasion.³

The Albanian Campaign was viewed as a miracle. The Greeks felt they had written an epic that brought eternal glory to Greece. The consciousness of that epic, sustained the Greek people throughout the German occupation, and also during the war against the Communists who engaged Greece for a matter of five years after her stormy liberation. It became customary to identify the war against the Axis and the war against the Communists, with the Greek fight against the Turks in the 1820's as one continuous struggle for humanity and liberty.⁴ The Greeks felt they were the guardians of civilization and the champions of liberty. They had proved Greece was immortal and were sure it had a special right to survival that all free nations must guarantee. A conviction of the special position of Greece, grounded on her long and costly fight for liberty, formed the basis for Greek national claims and demands for rehabilitation and defense funds in the postwar years.

³Ibid., pp. 1-5.

⁴Ibid., p. 12.

During the Metaxas regime, the Communist Party was forced underground. From 1936 to 1941, they operated as a secret organization. Their actions during this period provided experience in carrying out underground activities. German occupation found them in an excellent position to assume leadership of the Greek resistance. This was the opportunity they had been waiting for. In 1941, with "the spirit of Albania" as their standard, they began to group their forces. Greek patriots did not dispute whether a resistance movement was legal or illegal. They only demanded some active show of resistance. The old political leaders, on the other hand, debated the legality of resistance, and in the process lost contact with the populace. The door was left wide open for the Communists.⁵

From 1941 to 1944 the Communist groups ELAS and EAM, gained in stature and power.⁶ In March, 1944, they set up their own government, the Political Committee of National Liberation, PEGA. With an increase in power, they began the elimination of other guerilla forces. As liberation drew near, they made plans to assume control of the whole country. Their brutal elimination

⁵Ibid., pp. 42-64.

⁶Williams Hardy McNeill, The Greek Dilemma War and Aftermath (New York, 1947), pp. 92-100.

EAM grew for its program appealed to the people. In 1942 they published a pamphlet which made known their objectives: (1) there was to be protection for the people against illness and hunger; (2) the morale of the people was to be raised by passive and active resistance to the occupying forces; (3) there was to be daily paralyzing of the occupying forces to ensure their war aims were not served by Greek labor or materials; (4) force was to be answered by force; (5) when the occupying forces were expelled there was to be a government formed from the leaders of the National Liberation Group; and (6) popular liberties were to be re-established following liberation.

of guerilla groups, and their efforts to seize the loyal Greek Government in Egypt (1944) warned the British what to expect after liberation. They were not disappointed. The guerillas, led by hard-core communists, followed the tactics taught to them by their Soviet friends. Slow-down methods, terror and resistance became their plan of action.⁷

By November 1944, a civil conflict between the guerilla forces and loyal government troops was inevitable. The government charged the Communists with interference in its policies. They pointed to the brutal methods of the guerillas as evidence that they planned to destroy the country. The Communists, in turn, charged the government with being fascist. Premier Papondreau was viewed as the King's strawman. The King was hated because in 1936 he had willingly given way to a dictator. Both groups propagandized their charges. It was not a question as to whether civil war would break out in Greece; it was a question of when, how, and of who would take the first step. Civil war began on December 6, 1944. The EAM committed many atrocities. This disgusted a large portion of their supporters, and was directly related to their withdrawal from the guerilla cause. By January 1945 the war was over. English military forces turned a sure defeat for the government forces into victory. The Varkiza Armistice, signed on February 11, 1945 ended the second phase of the Greek Civil War, or if one prefers, the inner communist aggression against Greece. The first phase clearly was marked by the Elas-Edes guerilla struggle in 1943-44. Both phases were terminated

⁷Spencer, op. cit., pp. 64-82.

by British support of troops officially loyal to King George II. The third grand stage of the communist aggression against Greece did not begin until one and a half years after Varkiza, or in autumn of 1946. This third war, lasting until August 1949, ended only after the United States moved in and gave its support to the anti-communist government.⁸

Greek Governmental System

A country ruled by a dictator, subjected to invasion and occupation, and racked with civil war could not have a stable governmental system. The American and British government activities are part tradition, practice, and common sense. In Greece, acts were carried out, then laws were made to fit the case. That led to a tremendous overlap in laws, a great deal of inefficiency, and the stretching of legal points. In 1946 legality according to form was stressed, but frauds in the shadow of legal form went untouched.⁹

On March 31, 1946 and again on September 1, 1946, the communist forces were decisively rejected by the Greek electorate. The March election returned a conservative parliament under Mr. Tsaldais, the Prime Minister in 1946 and leader of the Populist Party. In September of that year a Populist-Liberal Coalition Government was formed, headed by its new Prime Minister, the Liberal Party Head, Sophoulis. The September 1946 plebiscite returned the king to the throne. Seventy per cent of the electorate favored his return. This

⁸Spencer, op. cit., pp. 82-89.

⁹C. A. Munkman, American Aid to Greece A Report on the First Ten Years (New York, 1958), pp. 254-61.

victory for the Right, led to a resumption of the guerilla warfare.¹⁰

Traditions of arbitrary and corrupt governmental administration were firmly established among the Greeks during Turkish and Byzantine times. The new Greek State could not escape them. To all peasants, the government appeared as a hostile force, something strange and alien which came and took taxes, often by force, and gave no perceptible benefit in return. Despite the passing years and ever closer contact with the West, those attitudes and traditions characterized the day-to-day functioning of the Greek government.¹¹

The Greek people possess a community loyalty stronger than national patriotism. Greek national ties, as far back as the tenth century B.C. have taken second place to the local band. Athens, Sparta, Corinth, and Thebes were not kingdoms or nationalities, but free cities enjoying only a filial relationship with the parent. The Greeks credit their survival under the Turks to these strong local loyalties. Despite this, since 1833 the Greek state followed a policy that destroyed communal rights. In its place they substituted a highly centralized state.¹² In 1946 Greece was divided into fifty nomarchies (counties). Each ministry had its own office at the county seat. Every action was dependent on national

¹⁰Greek Country Study European Recovery Program, Economic Cooperation Administration (Washington, 1949), pp. 9-10.

¹¹Frank Smothers, William McNeill, and Elizabeth McNeill, Report on the Greek Findings of a Twentieth Century Fund Team Which Surveyed Conditions in 1947 (Vermont, 1948), p. 13.

¹²Munkman, op. cit., pp. 251-55.

direction. Each nomas was headed by a monarch, an official of the Ministry of Interior, who was responsible for general supervision and coordination. His county council consisted of the representatives of the other ministries. There were no democratically elected county councils, and no elected officials. Community action of any kind was so stifled as to be non-existent. Only to unimportant posts such as mayors of towns and presidents of communities were men elected. Until 1948 the nomarchs were political appointees. Their prime function was to preserve the interests of the party members.¹³

In Greece a two-party system was not traditional. There were usually several separate small parties grouped about individual leaders. Few politicians were ever able to rally a majority of the voters to the strong support of a single party. Governments were formed by the coalitions of two or more groups. Seldom did they manage to work together. In 1945-1946, after ten years of dictatorship, war, German occupation and civil strife, the situation was highly complicated. More than forty separate political parties, coalitions, associations and movements stretching from the extreme Left to the extreme Right, were in evidence.¹⁴

The war contributed to the inefficiency of the Greek Civil Service. Patronage overloaded the service with non-qualified personnel. Other faults contributed to its lack of efficiency. The pay was inadequate. In those years of

¹³Ibid., pp. 251-60.

¹⁴Department of State Publication No. 2522 (Washington, 1946), p. 7.

growing inflation, the stipend was too small to maintain a family. To boost their incomes, civil servants took a second position. The hours actually worked by the Civil Service staff were ridiculously low. Twenty hours a week was average. Numerous functions were duplicated in the allocation of administrative responsibility. Two reasons are given: first, it used up manpower; and second, it guarded the jealous system of centralization. Bribery also entered into the governmental processes. To alleviate red tape, the greased palm opened many doors. This practice grew as the demands for money became more acute with the growing inflation. The insecurity of government positions added to the inefficiency. The right to discharge at will overloaded the system with "yes men," thus curbing the development of new ideas and healthy criticism within the government.¹⁵

¹⁵Report of the FAO Mission For Greece, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (Washington, 1947), p. 56--hereafter cited as FAO Report.

Chapter II

Economic Situation 1946-47

The economic problem was at least as serious as the political. Destruction of material goods, sickness, starvation, inflation, and a numbness from repeated shocks emphasized an acute economic problem. Limited financial and natural resources made any effective attack by the Greeks themselves almost impossible.

Financial Prospects

The support of a 150,000-man army was the primary reason for the budget deficit. The prewar army had been only 40,000 strong. During the early period the economy had been stable, but not a drachma to spare was left once the army budget was met. In 1946, a period when agriculture and industry were operating on only a small percentage of their prewar efficiency, the government was compelled to maintain a force three times the size of the prewar army. To make the situation more difficult, a large army contributed to the political tensions. Yet without a sizable army the government could not establish the unity necessary for economic and financial stability.¹⁶ A quick examination of the 1946-47 budget illustrates the financial difficulties. The tentative estimates of the Minister of Finance indicated a deficit, including the military, of about 1,682 billion drachmas, or

¹⁶Department of State Publication No. 2802 (Washington, 1947), pp. 898-99.

\$287,000,000, over three times the amount of currency in circulation.¹⁷

The shortage of industrial goods, and the general inflationary situation affected the buying power of the farmers. (See Table I) On the average, the price farmers paid for industrial products was three times what he was paid for his agricultural produce. The need for industrial products was evident. The end of UNRRA aid, and British support made the situation even more acute. The farmers, unable to purchase industrial products, blocked agricultural production in an attempt to boost agricultural prices. That aggravated an already critical shortage of food and export products. Nothing was solved. An increase in agricultural prices resulted in a boost in the price of industrial products.¹⁸

Table I

Item	Drachmas per OKE		Multiple of Prewar
	Prewar	May-July 1946	
Wool (unwashed), Crete	37	4,500	122
Oranges (Peloponnesus)	4.5	475	106
Early Potatoes, Crete	5	450	90
Wheat, Peloponnesus	10	1,300	130
Cheese, Peloponnesus	60	1,100	183
Cotton, Peloponnesus	24	1,500	110
Average			110
EXPORT FARM PRODUCTS			
Tobacco, Macedonia	95	7,500	79
Currants, Peloponnesus	8.5	1,200	141
Olive Oil, Peloponnesus	38	5,800	153
Olive Oil, Crete	30	4,430	148
Sultania raisins, Crete	16.5	1,050	64
Average			110

¹⁷Hearings, Assistance to Greece and Turkey Report No. 2616, U. S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Relations, 80th Congress, 1st Session, 1947, pp. 123-24.--hereafter cited as House Hearings Report No. 2616.

Table I (continued)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Drachmas per unit</u> <u>Prevar May-July 1946</u>		<u>Multiple</u> <u>of Prevar</u>
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS BOUGHT BY FARMERS			
Men's undershirts, Peloponnesus	10	300	300
Cabot cloth, Crete	10.7	3,750	351
Cabot cloth, Peloponnesus	17	4,517	266
Cotton dull, Peloponnesus	53	12,300	232
Cotton thread, Crete, per oke	120	30,088	251
Nails, Crete, per oke	14.5	6,000	414
Chicken wire, Crete, per meter	22.5	4,000	178
Farmer's boots, Peloponnesus	203	72,000	355
Rope, Peloponnesus	36	16,000	444
Cart wheel, Peloponnesus	1,400	450,000	322
Form cart, 4 wheel	7,000	2,800,000	400
Average			309 19

The delay in distributing available relief supplies added to the difficulty. Many times considerable quantities of UNRRA products, clothing, shoes and lumber were held in warehouses for months. Other materials such as tractors and trucks were left in open lots, and rust destroyed them before they could be used. This delay kept needed consumer supplies off the market and helped raise the price of articles displayed for sale.²⁰

With respect to the drachma exchange rate, a heavy over-evaluation of the drachma at the official rate of 5,020 drachmas to the dollar seriously hampered export recovery throughout 1946 and the first nine months of 1947. In October 1947, the Greek government, with the assistance of the American Mission For Aid To Greece, introduced the so-called exchange

¹⁹Ibid., p. 12.

²⁰Ibid., p. 152.

certificate system which subsequently succeeded in establishing a reasonably realistic rate of exchange.²¹

Inflation, great shifts of income, and political considerations forced the government to rely upon indirect taxes. The burden fell heavily upon the poor man, and far less heavily, in proportion to their income, on the well-to-do. The system of taxation was most complex. "There were taxes on production and consumption at all levels, including export taxes on the farmer's sale of tobacco, wine, and oil; local taxes on movements of farm or manufactured products out of, or into, industrial towns, cities, and ports; taxes on retail sales of cigarettes, wine and spirits, and gasoline and kerosene; import duties; and large monopoly profits on salt and matches."²² Taxes were also levied on profits, rents, and real property. Those direct taxes yielded only fifteen per cent of the national ordinary revenue, while excise, commodity, customs, and other indirect taxes made up the balance. Over four-fifths of the total tax revenue thus came from taxes which reduced income to producers, or raised costs to consumers.

Export Market and Products

Greece normally sold the bulk of her exports to Central and Eastern Europe. Germany purchased over thirty-seven per cent of those exports. The task of reviving a postwar market posed a major problem. Many of the Greek exports were regarded

²¹Greek Country Study European Recovery Program, Economic Cooperation Administration (Washington, 1949), pp. 21-22.

²²FAO Report, p. 57.

as deferrable luxuries, and were not wanted by countries ravaged by war and with limited foreign credits. Many of Greece's prior customers, denied Greek products during the war, now took emergency measures to meet their needs. Several began to grow new products or looked to different markets. That brought about a shift in industry and tastes of consumers. Many industries were happy and refused to consider the return to prewar markets.²³

Before the war, tobacco provided fifty-two per cent of all foreign exchange. In farm production and warehouse manipulation, it supplied employment for a large proportion of Greek farmers and industrial workers. The war reduced the production of tobacco. Small crops during the war were confiscated by the Bulgarians. The 1945 crop was very small and of very poor quality, owing to the extended dry weather. In 1946 the bulk of the 1945 crop was still in the hands of the producers. This resulted from unsatisfactory export prices and shortages of drachmas for purchases. It was estimated the 1946 crop would be between 35,000 - 40,000 metric tons. That would be about seventy per cent of prewar production. The American market and a few continental markets still preferred the Greek leaf, but bought little because the price asked by the Greek farmer was well above the world price. Before the war many American tobacco companies operated manipulation plants in Greece. Before resuming operations, they asked for a clarification of the inflationary situation, assured

²³Ibid., p. 12.

financial arrangements for moving the tobacco, and stability in tax and contractual relations. None of those conditions were met.²⁴

The exportation of currants was a lucrative prewar occupation. During the war, one-fifth of the total number of currant vines were pulled up, and the remainder were neglected. Production fell to less than one-third of prewar tonnages. In 1946 the production of currants was expected to total 75,000 metric tons, as contrasted with an average of 125,000 metric tons between 1935-39. Greek exports during those years averaged 74,000 metric tons of which 10,900 went to Germany and 48,000 to the United Kingdom. With an increased production in South Africa and the United States, and with prices in Greece well above the international market levels plus reduced ability of the United Kingdom and other countries to import currants, that industry faced a dim future in 1946.

The production of olive oil was a booming industry in 1938. Lack of attention to the olive trees during the war, and a blight which hit the trees in the regular three-year cycle, placed the 1946 crop well below average. Olive oil was used extensively by the Greek for cooking, and as a spread on heavy black bread. He refused to sell his product. Furthermore, the price he asked was well above the world level, and importers refused to consider the product. It was hoarded by the producer while he waited for a better price, or he

²⁴Ibid., pp. 167-68.

sold at outrageous prices on the domestic market. A lucrative source of foreign exchange was lost.²⁵

Industry

Greece was never an industrial nation. Lack of fuel deposits stifled its development. In the period under consideration, several factors limited the return to prewar standards. Industry was operating at sixty per cent of the 1939 production level. The absence of skilled labor was obvious before World War II, but in 1946 it posed a serious threat. The German occupation, and the civil conflict depleted the ranks of industrial laborers. Good help was at a premium. To further complicate matters, new materials were almost non-existent. Machinery had been purchased from Germany during the Metaxas era. It was now obsolete or in need of repair with few or no spare parts in evidence. When production was established, the costs of that effort, priced articles well above the reach of the average domestic consumer. If placed on the export bloc, it could not compete with world prices. Only two industries made a comeback in 1946, generating plants and cigarette production.²⁶ (See Table II)

²⁵Ibid., p. 170.

²⁶Greek Country Study European Recovery Program, Economic Cooperation Administration (Washington, 1949), p. 14.

Table II

Ministry of Co-Ordination Reports

Industry	1947 % of Pre-war Production
Steel	65
Shipbuilding	8
Cement	64
Brick and tiles	40
Cotton spinning	75
Knitting	30
Carpet making	5
Flour production	66

This table was taken from: International Labour Office, Labor Problems in Greece (Greece, 1949), p. 34

Population - Education Health

In spite of the limited farm land over sixty per cent of Greek nationals were farmers. The serious overcrowding of the farm land can be explained in part by strong family ties (genos). The situation had been made worse after World War I, when thousands of Greeks in Asia Minor returned.

All Greeks looked to a large family as the most treasured of possessions. The concept was pursued even if the peasant was unable to support a large family. The Greek people presented an appearance of friendliness, but that was external. Only family members were true friends and could be relied upon for help in time of need. It was not unusual for an elderly person to be supported by his family. That was an accepted obligation. To the male, a large family attested to his virility. In the mountain areas this was a badge denoting social level. Lastly, a large family indicated the person was in the grace of God. Forgotten was that each addition to a family received a portion of the family land, and it grew smaller as the years advanced. Many plots were too small for subsistence. The excess rural population moved into the cities. They found little work and existed only by relief

subsidies. In 1947 almost one-half the urban labor force was unemployed and salaries were so low as to barely sustain life. The major portion of the urban population was underfed. Sick-ness ran rampant. Sanitary conditions were poor or non-existent. Tuberculosis figured in one-fifth of all deaths. Malaria also touched the population and two to four million cases were reported as an annual average. In 1946 UNRRA aid and spraying with DDT cut that figure immeasurably.²⁷

The education system was antiquated. The first and most serious problem was the lack of qualified teachers and teacher training institutions. That was closely followed by hide-bound curriculums, poor equipment and schools, the tight political control over the schools, and the use of three languages throughout the country. They were the spoken tongue, high Greek, and ecclesiastical Greek. Education was a path to escape the farm and enter government service. As a consequence, the schools were crowded and the hide-bound curriculum prepared the boys for government duties of a minor clerical nature instead of education based on practical needs. This overcrowded the ranks waiting to enter governmental service, and added to the deterioration of the civil service by establishing a long list of "yes men" in need of work, at any cost.²⁸

Agriculture

In 1946, agriculture incorporated sixty per cent of the population. With this we compare the agrarian minority of

²⁷Smothers, McNeill, McNeill, op. cit., pp. 82-96.

²⁸Ibid., pp. 117-41.

nineteen per cent in the United States and thirty-five per cent in France.²⁹ The system of agriculture was inherited from forefathers. It was traditional and allowed little opportunity for experimentation. The people refused to change when advice was offered. They would not accept scientific principles. Their traditional distrust of government closed their minds to all government programs. That was enough to discourage the most enthusiastic reformer. Lack of rain, poor climate and poor soil only compounded the problem.³⁰

From pre-historic time to 1946 the soils of Greece were cropped to the mountain tops, with little thought given to maintaining their fertility. It seems strange for many of our doctrines of good agriculture, good seed, crop rotation, cover cropping, fallowing, and legume growing were known to and prescribed by ancient Greeks. Aristotle, Xenophon, and others strongly advocated crop rotation and legume culture. The latter are raised but are used for food. The roots are pulled up and used to feed the stock. Manure is a source of phosphorus. In some instances, farmers used it in agriculture, but with the scarcity of wood, much more was dried and used as fuel. Ancient processes, advocated by the most famous of Greeks were discussed and praised, but not put to use.³¹

Strip cultivation was prevalent in many areas. This found the lands of individual operators scattered in small strips far from each other, and often far from the village.

²⁹Ibid., pp. 56-65.

³⁰FAO Report, pp. 24-47.

³¹Ibid., pp. 134-36.

In many areas there was a reason for this. It represented an attempt to give each person a fair share of the grainland, tobacco land, dryland and irrigated land. This wasted human and animal labor in traveling between plots. Machines were of little benefit, for the plots were too small for their efficient use.³² The average cropland per person on farms was 1.31 acres in Greece. That represented the same acreage as in India. This compared unfavorably with other nations. For example, in Rumania it was 2.45 acres, over 3 acres in France and Germany, and 4.6 to 6 acres in the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark. At the same time the average yield in Greece of graincrops was 13.5 bushels per acre. That was only one-half to one-third the average yield of other countries in Europe, and only a little higher than the average yeild in India.³³

The low productivity of Greek agriculture was directly responsible for the chronic low nutrition of the Greek population. The people were constantly underfed. Their diet sorely missed energy and protein factors, and was inferior in other respects. Most of the nutrients came from vegetable sources. Their consumption was the highest in Europe. Meats, dairy products, and other foods high in protein and vitamins were noticeably lacking in the Greek diet.³⁴

The best livestock in Greece was lost during the war, either through destruction or seizure by the occupying forces, or by premature slaughter in an attempt to supplement

³²Ibid., p. 51.

³³Ibid., pp. 20-23.

the meager Greek diet. Stock that survived the war was underfed. Herds were so depleted that natural growth could not replenish the losses. Outside aid was granted through UNRRA. Male animals were imported for breeding purposes and to improve the strain of the remaining animals. Artificial-insemination was introduced in 1946. Its objectives were two-fold: to provide the best of the breed; and to quicken the breeding processes. The Greeks refrained from using it for it offended their moral convictions.³⁵

Before the war, fish were an important protein source in the Greek diet. Annual production averaged 17,500 tons. The war reduced the number of fishing vessels and workers to about one-third their prewar number. Reports for 1946 show 8,000 tons of fish were caught with only one-third the facilities. That was a remarkable achievement, but it left the protein diet minus a necessary source.³⁶

Transportation

The restoration of the Greek transportation system was necessary for economic rejuvenation. Her ports were partially clogged and destroyed. Coastal shipping was reduced to one-half of prewar tonnages. Many small vessels were scuttled by the Germans or joined Davy Jones after hitting one of the thousands of mines planted off the Greek coast. Several important railroads were unable to carry out uninterrupted service. Railway efficiency was only one-third of the 1939 level.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 101-20.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 147-48.

The sections that remained open had been so over-used and battered during the occupation that traffic moved at speeds one-third to one-half of normal. Damage to cars and trucks had been severe and extensive. No attempts were made to keep them in working order. Automotive vehicles were subjected to a grueling treatment over roads full of pot holes. Such treatment reduced the life of tires twenty-five per cent of what could be expected for cars, and to fifty per cent of what could be expected for trucks.

In 1946 the government planned road repairs, utilizing civilian work groups. Only a few sections of road were repaired. Lack of government supervision, political instability and threats to the well-being of the workers by guerilla groups led to the failure of the project.³⁷

Was the United Nations in a position to assume responsibility for alleviating the Greek crisis? Did Greece warrant direct American aid? UNRRA was organized as a stop-gap measure to prevent starvation in war-torn nations and to provide materials for reconstruction. Only in part was it successful. Goods were dumped into the laps of ravaged nations and their dispersal left to the governments of the aided countries. They were in no position to assume this burden. How could Greece distribute goods with her disrupted transportation facilities and absence of governmental controls? It resulted in the backlog of goods, stealing, black marketing and general inefficiency. That type of aid added to a country's problems. A strictly supervised program was the

³⁷Ibid., pp. 6-8.

solution. It would have to be responsible for the disposal of materials and for alleviating the inefficiency within the governmental structure by pertinent suggestions.

Postwar literature emphasized that the United Nations was the logical place to seek aid, but was it qualified and in a position to assume responsibility? Its plan of action would be similar to the UNRRA program. Could another objective, impassionate, disinterested committee handle the situation, or was the firm hand of an interested nation, granting aid in a unilateral manner the solution?

Chapter III

The United Nations and Greece 1946-49

Any discussion of the Truman Doctrine would be incomplete without reference to the United Nations. Before Public Law 72, "Assistance To Greece and Turkey" was passed in May 1947, the question was raised in Congress and among the general public as to why the United Nations did not assume the burden of aid to Greece. They feared unilateral action would undermine the United Nations.

The President and State Department contended that the United Nations was not prepared to handle the situation. In the Open Hearings of the Senate and House Foreign Affairs Committees, the explosive nature of that conclusion was made known. Witness after witness chastised the State Department for its disregard of United States obligations to the United Nations and world peace.

A consideration of the United Nations program in Greece will make it clear why action by the United States became necessary. One must constantly bear in mind immediate and effective aid was imperative.

From the beginning, United Nations action on the Greek problem encountered difficulties. The Soviet Union initiated delaying tactics grounded on accusations and obstructive parliamentary techniques. This created an unrealistic atmosphere. Tensions developed between the Soviets and other members of the Security Council. Those factors, plus lack of experience in handling a major crisis, paralyzed the group.

A positive solution was denied the Security Council, but their efforts did not go unrewarded. Modern communications informed the free world of United Nations progress. Failure to provide a solution to the Greek problem irked the free world. Public opinion became aroused and it denounced potential aggressors. This public interest became the United Nations' strongest weapon.

World attention was first focused on Greece in 1945. At a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Greece presented a claim to southern Bulgaria. It was based purely on strategic considerations, for the area was inhabited by Turks and Bulgarians, not Greeks. In the American view, the claim had little to recommend it. They advised Greece to rely upon the United Nations for security, not the acquisition of territory.³⁸

The Soviet Union in January 1946 officially brought the matter of Greece to the attention of the United Nations. Their motive was to aid the insurgents in northern Greece by moves in the Security Council. They contended the British had forced a Monarchist-Fascist Organization upon the Greek people. The Soviet Union charged that this interference in internal affairs by the British caused tension fraught with grave consequences for the Greek people and for the maintenance of peace and security. The Soviet delegate stated emphatically British occupation troops were not necessary in a friendly nation. Their presence in Greece hindered

³⁸John C. Campbell, The United States In World Affairs 1945-47 (New York, 1947), p. 144.

the movement of truly democratic processes. The British denied the charge, and were supported by the Greek delegate who stressed that his government had requested military aid. Members of the Security Council accepted the British explanation and the matter was deemed closed.³⁹

In August 1946 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic again brought the problem of Greece and her neighbors to the attention of the Security Council. He indicated that the situation in Greece endangered the peace and security of the Balkans. Greek Army units were accused of provoking border incidents with the connivance and encouragement of their government. Conflicts with Albania in particular had been deliberately provoked because the Greeks hoped to incite warfare and thus satisfy their imperialistic desire for southern Albania. In his concluding remarks, the Ukrainian delegate inferred that the whole situation was inflamed by British troops and their support of Greek Governmental Policies. The problem was dropped after considerable discussion. This debate showed a sharp clash of Soviet and Western aims.⁴⁰

On December 3, 1946 the Greek delegate charged that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were lending aid to the guerillas in Greece. He indicated it endangered the public order and territorial integrity of Greece. If not rectified, it would become a threat to international peace and security.

³⁹Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-47 (Lake Success, 1947), p. 336.

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 351-60.

Again on December 10, 1946 Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were accused of permitting the guerillas to pass freely over their borders and set up military supply dumps.

At the eighty-fifth meeting of the Security Council, December 20, 1946, the United States Representative proposed the establishment of a Commission to determine the facts relating to the border violations. Its primary function would be to conduct on-the-spot investigations. Their findings were to be forwarded to the Security Council. The proposal was immediately passed, without a dissenting vote.⁴¹

The Commission was composed of a representative from each member of the Security Council as constituted in 1947. It was to begin its work before January 15, 1947, and report to the Security Council at the earliest possible moment.⁴²

Before the Commission could submit a report, the United States took direct steps to aid Greece. The United States delegate informed the Security Council March 24, 1947, of the proposed American plan stressing that economic aid was being granted upon the direct request of the Greek Government. He indicated United States assistance was directly related to the United Nations Commission. The two, taken together, provided a double-barrelled approach to the solution of the problem. They were complimentary, not conflicting proposals. Immediately, the Soviet delegate charged the United States

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 360-65.

⁴²Department of State Publication No. 2909 (Washington, 1947), pp. 2-3.

with ulterior motives and begged them to reconsider their plans and permit the United Nations to carry through the aid to Greece.⁴³

The Commission left Greece in March 1947. Before leaving it asked permission of the Security Council to leave a Subsidiary Group composed of a representative of each of the members of the Commission. Its purpose would be to fulfill such functions as the Commission desired, within the limits of the original orders. Permission was granted on April 18, 1947 over vehement Soviet protests.⁴⁴

On June 27, 1947 The Report of the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents was laid before the Security Council by Francisco Urutia, the delegate of Columbia on the Commission and its Raporteur to the Security Council. The problem remained there for the rest of the summer. During this period the Soviet Union made its greatest efforts to prevent aid to Greece. They utilized their veto power, made accusations and condemnations, refused to participate with the other members of the council, and changed sides on questions and topics for no other reason than to obstruct progress. The inadequacy of the United Nations to cope with a major problem was evident. Discussion and public condemnation were not enough to force a solution.

⁴³Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-47 (Lake Success, 1947), pp. 365-75.

⁴⁴Department of State Publication No. 2909 (Washington, 1947), pp. 9-11.

The Greek government's charge that its northern neighbors were supporting the guerilla warfare in Greece was directed against Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. Evidence submitted related primarily to Yugoslav intervention, and only to a lesser degree to that of Albania and Bulgaria. Those countries continually denied the charges and credibility of the witnesses. They could not support their denials by proof. On the basis of facts ascertained by the Commission, Yugoslavia and to a lesser extent Bulgaria and Albania were guilty as charged.

The Commission's Report was based on material gathered through the direct questioning of witnesses and from special written evidence compiled by the Greek government.⁴⁵ The Commission found that Yugoslavia's aid to the guerillas took the form of training refugees within her borders, recruiting and dispatching them to Greece for action with the guerillas, and supplying them for this purpose with arms, supplies, transport, guides, hospitalization and avenues of escapes when fleeing from Greek government forces. Several witnesses mentioned that a special course for guerilla leaders, designed to give practical and theoretical training in guerilla warfare, had been conducted in the refugee camp at Bulkes.⁴⁶

The Yugoslav government was charged with encouraging the N.O.F., the Slavic equivalent of EAM (Greek Communist Party), to agitate for the detachment of Aegean Macedonia from Greece.

⁴⁵Report to the Security Council by the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents, United Nations Security Council, S/360 (Late Success, 1950), pp. 167-70.

⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 170-75.

High Yugoslav Government officials, including Marshal Tito, were accused by the Greek liaison representative of pressing for that by radio broadcasts and newspaper articles.⁴⁷

Evidence against Albania indicated that at Rubig, a village fifty miles north of Pirand, a camp for Greek refugees had been in existence from the Spring of 1945 to October 1945. Witnesses testified after the Varkiza Agreement, former members of ELAS were advised by KKE to cross into Albania to avoid persecution.

The Bulgarian Government also provided aid to the guerillas. Assistance in entering and leaving her territory, provision of transportation for guerillas crossing Bulgaria to Yugoslavia, and hospitalization were in evidence but there was little to indicate that the Bulgarians armed the guerillas.⁴⁸

The Commission proposed that Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Greece strive for good neighbor relations, end actions that increased tensions, and bear in mind that peace could only be obtained through cooperation. They also recommended a Commission be assigned to continue investigation of frontier violations, establish hearings and report periodically to the Security Council. This function was temporarily being fulfilled by the Subsidiary Group.⁴⁹

⁴⁷Department of State Publication No. 2909 (Washington, 1947), p. 17.

⁴⁸United Nations, Security Council, S/360, op. cit., pp. 174-82.

⁴⁹Department of State Publication No. 2909 (Washington, 1947), p. 18.

Following the official presentation of the report, Mr. Austin, United States Representative at the seat of the United Nations, addressed the Council. He emphasized that the problem was a threat to world peace. Furthermore, the power and prestige of the United Nations were at stake, for ineffective action would weaken its influence in future crises. He pointed out that the United Nations could use force if conditions became too aggravated. This weapon was not used until three years later and it was possible then only because the Soviet delegate was absent. Mr. Austin ended his speech with a draft resolution. It called for establishment of normal relations between the involved nations, the development of new frontier conventions along the lines of the Greek-Bulgarian Convention of 1931, and the establishment of a Commission composed of each of the members of the Security Council. The Commission was to use its good offices for settlements in accordance with Article 33 of the Charter, to assist in the conclusion of new frontier conventions, to make plans for solving the refugee problem, and to do all within its power to end the irritation.⁵⁰

The Soviet and Polish members of the Commission refused to endorse the Commission's proposals. Instead, they submitted their version of the investigation. It charged the Greek Government as solely responsible for conditions in Greece. Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria were held in no way responsible. Three reasons were given for rejection of

⁵⁰Ibid., pp. 27-28.

the Commission's proposals: they were not based on documents and facts but on unfounded assertions by the Greek Government; the proposals involved four countries, but only in Greece was there a tense situation; and the proposed Special Commission would infringe on the sovereign rights of the States.⁵¹

Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Representative to the United Nations, commented upon the United States' proposals. This initiated a pattern of argument the Soviets were to use throughout the summer. It also laid the basis for counter charges by Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The Soviet delegate charged the trouble in the Balkans to the Monarcho-Facist Greek Government. British military forces contributed to the tensions. With their removal, the United States had taken over, and their aid constituted the crudest interference in the internal affairs of Greece. He insinuated that the American proposals were not associated with any attempt to solve the problem, but were aimed at the creation of a Commission meant to undertake tasks which could neither be justified by the situation to the North of Greece nor by the United Nations Charter. He was confident it would impair the sovereignty of those states. Mr. Gromyko added to the standard arguments against the Commission that its preconceived ideas had prevented an objective evaluation of the evidence. His concluding statements charged the Commission

⁵¹Ibid., pp. 24-26.

with refusal to investigate cases in which the Greeks were definitely implicated.⁵² By that admission Gromyko recognized the guilt of the three northern countries.⁵³

~ Six weeks after the Commission's report and the announcement of the United States proposals, the latter was put to a vote (July 29, 1947). The proposals were vetoed by Russia and Poland. The Soviets had scored a victory by delaying action in the Security Council. Their resistance tactics were supported and mimicked by Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria.⁵⁴

By August 12, 1947 the members of the Security Council began to view the Greek situation as a nearly insoluble problem. The United States had defended its aid plan to Greece before the Security Council, and to this date only slight reference had been made to it during the general discussion of the Greek problem. Soviet accusations and insinuations finally led Mr. Herschel V. Johnson, United States Representative to the Security Council, to state the position of his government:

My Government will not sit idly by while the territorial integrity and political independence of a Member of the United Nations are challenged. We

⁵²There is no proof that the Commission refused to investigate cases. What Mr. Gromyko alludes to is an investigation into Yugoslav territory. The Commission was to interview a high guerilla leader. After waiting six days all but the Soviet and Polish delegates returned to Greece. Upon the return of the two delegates, they presented startling evidence as to the Greek guilt. It was not submitted to the record, for by the Commission rules, the whole group had to be present at the time evidence was being given.

⁵³Department of State Publication No. 2909 (Washington, 1947), p. 40.

⁵⁴Ibid., pp. 34-35.

do not consider that our obligations or the obligations of the United Nations in this regard are ended merely because we have seen our obligations frustrated by the veto of another Member of the Council. It becomes all too clear that this veto has been used in defense of the aggressions of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria. Greece's right to exist is involved in this case.

We wish to make it very clear that we shall not hesitate to exhaust every available means within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations to maintain international peace and to provide Greece with whatever protection she may need in the future.

The continual failure, so far, of the Security Council to take effective action in this case because of the Soviet Union veto cannot, in the opinion of the United States Government, preclude individual or collective action by states willing to act, so long as they act in accordance with the general principles and purposes of the United Nations."⁵⁵

The United States explained her position concerning the Greek Aid Program. Mr. Johnson stressed it would remain within the framework of the Charter, and would terminate when the United Nations was in a position to assume responsibility. That would not happen until the Soviets promised to work in unity with the other members of the Security Council. This can also be taken as an admission that the United States by-passed the United Nations realizing its inability to work with Russia and her veto. Delay had been accomplished. It was a negative result.

After the Security Council had discussed the Greek problem for three months, it was taken off the agenda on September 15, 1947, upon the motion of the United States Representative. On September 23, 1947 the General Assembly

⁵⁵ Department of State Report No. 2902 (Washington, 1947), p. 93.

placed the question of "Threats To The Political Independence and Territorial Integrity of Greece" on its agenda. The General Assembly on October 21, 1947, by a vote of 40 to 6 with 11 absentions approved a resolution establishing the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, UNSCOB. Eleven nations were represented on the Committee. The Soviet Union and Poland were elected to serve, but refused to meet with the Committee. Seats were held for them until 1949, at which time the Committee was dissolved. It was granted powers of observation and conciliation in accord with the proposals of the original commission of investigation. Recommendations were made asking Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia to cooperate in the settlement of their disputes by peaceful methods.⁵⁶

The UNSCOB was informed between September - December 1947 that the Bulgarian, Albanian, and Yugoslav governments would close their frontiers to investigating teams. Yugoslavia was certain it could handle its own problems, and expressed the belief that Committee action would only develop more friction. On the other hand, Albania and Bulgaria deemed the Committee illegal, for it violated national sovereignty. The three governments hinted the UNSCOB was biased in favor of Greece, and any investigation of charges would be distorted to serve the Greek government.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Department of State Publication No. 3645 (Washington, 1949), p. 2.

⁵⁷ Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, United Nations, General Assembly (U.N. Doc. Supp., No. 8, A/574, 1948) (Lake Success, 1948), pp. 4-5.

UNSCOB carried out its investigations in much the same manner as its predecessor. A hostile attitude, by the three northern governments, made the task more difficult. Findings of the second committee were identical to earlier reports submitted to the Security Council. The Greek charges against Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were valid. In December 1947 a Provisional Democratic Greek Government was organized by the guerilla, Markos. The Greek government viewed this as a direct threat formulated by her three northern neighbors. On December 22, 1947 a National Committee for Assistance to the Greek Democratic People was organized in Bulgaria. It carried the support and authorization of the Bulgarian Government. Forced donations were collected to finance the guerilla efforts. Mme. Rosa Dimitrova, wife of the Bulgarian Premier, campaigned vigorously for that organization.⁵⁸

On January 2, 1948 the UNSCOB definitely reported the guerillas were supplied with ammunition from Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. As further gestures of aid, the guerillas were permitted to escape into Albanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav territory. The Committee felt this constituted a grave threat to international peace and security.⁵⁹

The Committee continued its work throughout 1948, 1949. Quarterly reports informed the General Assembly of conditions in Greece, and the progress of the Committee. Those reports

⁵⁸Ibid., pp. 14-16.

⁵⁹Aid To Greece and Turkey Report No. 1017, U. S., Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1948, p. 6.

were released to the press. The first report, elaborated upon earlier, set the pattern for those that followed. The Commission continually attempted to resolve the issues, but were rebuffed at every turn. Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia refused to cooperate, and cooperation was the key to a solution.

In November 1948 the Soviet Union was linked to the guerilla effort. M. Porphyrogennis, Minister of Justice in the Provisional Democratic Government of Greece, wrote in the Cominform Journal that Greek guerillas were supported by the freedom-loving peoples of the world headed by our friend and defender, by the land of socialism, the Soviet Union.⁶⁰

The First Committee, Political and Security, of the General Assembly on November 10, 1948 established a Conciliation Committee under the Chairmanship of Dr. H. V. Evatt, President of the General Assembly, to explore methods and procedure with the representatives of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia looking toward a settlement of their difficulties. Draft agreements were prepared by mid-December and Dr. Evatt reported progress toward establishment of mixed frontier commissions and the drafting of frontier conventions. The Albanian government refused to sign unless Greece renounced her claim to northern Epirus. Signatures of the Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments hinged on the Albanian signature. On May 11, 1949 the Greeks accepted Dr. Evatt's

⁶⁰ Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, General Assembly (U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 8, A/935, 1949) (Lake Success, 1949), p. 8.

proposals, but no reply was ever received from the other governments. UNSCOB suspended its conciliation role while Dr. Evatt's commission was in session (November 10, 1948 - May 11, 1949). ⁶¹

There was a change in Yugoslav-Greco relations in 1949. Differences arose between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. This brought the latter closer to the West. As part of a new program Yugoslavia attempted to resolve its differences with Greece. The borders were closed to the guerillas and material aid ceased. This weakened the guerilla forces, and made it easier for the Greek Army to carry out mop-up operations. The greatest concentrations of guerillas were now focused along the Albanian border.

In a final report published in 1950, the UNSCOB stated that the guerilla activity had decreased sufficiently by August 1949 so the threat to the political independence and territorial integrity of Greece had ended. The guerilla movement consisted of scattered bands, poorly organized, poorly equipped and now hunted by the Greek Army. Several thousands managed to escape into Albania where they were dispersed throughout the country and accepted as residents. ⁶²

From the beginning, United Nations action in Greece was halting and uncertain. The investigating teams encountered several difficulties, which remained until the

⁶¹Department of State Publication No. 3645 (Washington, 1947), pp. 3-4.

⁶²Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, United Nations, General Assembly, (U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 11, A/1307, 1950) (Lake Success, 1950), p. 26.

United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans was terminated. Soviet and Polish vetoes hindered action in the Security Council. That alone was enough to try the patience of its members, however, there was further evidence of discord. Charges, constant petty bickering, and slanderous accusations halted the deliberative processes. Valuable time was wasted. No solution presented itself. When the problem was transferred to the General Assembly, a definite program was devised for the new investigating Committee. Resistance within the General Assembly was at a minimum, but Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria refused to cooperate. Plans for conciliation were disregarded, and the success of the Committee indeed appeared bleak.

United Nations action was based on the principle that mankind wished to resolve their difficulties by peaceful arbitration, but the Greek problem indicated some nations were quite willing to resort to force. The only weapon possessed by the United Nations, between 1946-1949, was public opinion. In the Security Council and General Assembly the aggressors were exposed. Public opinion led to disavowal of Soviet, Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslav actions. The careless, let live, they can't bother us because we are too strong attitude prevalent after the war came to a halt. Distaste for aggression again became a popular topic. Western democratic peoples were alerted to the fact that new dangers confronted the world.

What did the United Nations have to assist Greece in the bleak days of 1947? Their approach to assistance was grounded

on committee reports, words, hopes, and prayers. A dire economic and political situation called for immediate action. The United Nations had quickly dispatched a Commission, however its efforts were appreciated by only a few government officials. Death, starvation, and the ravaging of the land by an enemy force emphasized the need for constructive aid and overshadowed the words of a well-meaning Commission. Definite material aid, aid readily visible to the Greek peoples was needed. A moral approach to the problem by the infant organization was not enough. The United Nations was limited in its approach to the problem. Success was to be attained only if the nations directly concerned wished to have their differences resolved by the peaceful methods. That would only settle the foreign political aspects of the problem.

Actually two problems faced Greece: one of a political nature, and the other economic. Guerilla action had to stop before the economy could be stabilized, yet a stable economy was needed to end the war. United Nations efforts in the political field were halting and uncertain, with no consideration given to the economic aspects. Direct and immediate aid was needed to solve the problem.

The Greeks had requested United Nations aid in February 1946. Two months later no solution was in sight. Withdrawal of British aid in February 1947 created economic panic in Greece. Government financial reserves would last only sixty days. The military situation became worse, and it was apparent from the United Nations investigations of the

border incidents they could not provide immediate economic aid. Thus a deteriorating economy, fears of subjugation, and an apparent absence of strength in the United Nations, forced Greece to seek unilateral aid. The logical benefactor was the United States, for it was the bulwark of democratic principles, as well as the wealthiest nation in the world.

Chapter IV

Evolution of Aid to Greece

While the United States pursued a foreign policy interested in the welfare, peace and security of the peoples of the Near East, the Soviet Union, not unlike Imperial Russia, pursued a different policy with the new dynamic of totalitarian Soviet Communism surpassing the imperialistic ambitions of the Red Tzar. The outlines of postwar Soviet policy were clear in November 1940. Molotov told Hitler and Ribbentrop Soviet allegiance was for sale, provided the security of the Soviet Union in the Straits was assured by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact with Bulgaria, and by establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the U.S.S.R. within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a long term lease. He also requested that the area south of Baturn and Baku, in the direction of the Persian Gulf, be recognized at the center of Soviet aspirations.⁶³

The break with Hitler, and the war that followed glossed over Soviet expansionist tendencies. Only when success for the Allies loomed into sight did it become evident the Soviets had been following a plan to encompass as much of Europe, Asia and North Africa as possible short of war with the West. As the Soviets marched on Berlin, they subordinated military objectives to long range political

⁶³ Department of State Publication No. 4446 (Washington, 1952), p. 810.

goals, whereas the Allies did the opposite. In consequence, the Red Armies liberated or occupied all of Central Europe westward to the Elbe, and all the Balkans except Greece. Next, they installed Communist puppet dictatorships in which human beings lost their dignity and nations their capacity for independence. In 1946, the Soviets launched a propaganda campaign (cold war), against the West.

The barrier to the extension of Soviet power and influence into the Mediterranean, North Africa and Southern Asia was the landmass extending from the borders of Afghanistan westward to the Adriatic, comprising Iran, Turkey and Greece. Against those three countries beginning in 1945 and extending through 1948, the Soviet Union persistently deployed the powerful measures of diplomacy, propaganda and its apparatus for subversion. They were reinforced in Iran by direct armed intervention and in Greece by armed intervention of an indirect variety. Once Russia gained control of Iran it would command the oil of the Russian Gulf and would be able to play a direct and powerful role in the political evolution of the weak, and newly independent countries of the Middle East and South and South-East Asia.

From 1941, the United States attempted to cooperate with the Soviets. President Roosevelt made use of his dynamic personality and tremendous war machine to keep Stalin from openly infuriating the West. Certain of his intimates however refused to believe the Soviet Union would be satisfied with the subjugation of Germany. Secretary

of the Navy Forrestal, was critical of the President's dealings with Stalin. In September 1944 he wrote Palmer Hoyt, a newspaper editor:

I find that whenever an American suggests that we act in accordance with the needs of our own security he is apt to be called a God-Damned facist or imperialist, while if Uncle Joe suggest that he needs the Baltic Provinces, half of Poland, all of Bessarabia and access to the Mediterranean, all hands agree that he is a fine, frank, candid and generally delightful fellow.⁶⁴

He continued to regard the Soviets with suspicion. It became his policy to sound out informed individuals as to a possible Russian threat to world peace. In April 1945 Forrestal received a letter from Averill Harriman, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, which emphasized the need for a firm policy against the Russians. It was his contention the Russians were selfish liars who would fulfill no promises except for their own gain.⁶⁵ On April 20, 1945 Forrestal met Harriman in Washington and was told the "outward thrust of Communism was not dead and that we might well have to face an ideological warfare just as vigorous and dangerous as Facism and Nazism."⁶⁶ Several times Secretary Forrestal, at Cabinet meetings, broached the question of a possible Russian threat to world peace, but each time his fears were temporarily quelled by the President.

⁶⁴The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis (New York, 1951), p. 14.

⁶⁵Ibid., pp. 38-39.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 47.

Before Germany could be brought to her knees, President Roosevelt died. His successor Harry S. Truman appeared poorly equipped to face the Herculean postwar problems. He lacked international experience, and it was feared beside Prime Minister Churchill and Marshall Stalin he would appear as a "babe in the woods." This was over-emphasized by his lack of color and the absence of the Roosevelt speaking voice. His major problem stemmed from President Roosevelt's refusal to delegate authority in foreign affairs. It had been a personal job and his death made it difficult for his successor to determine what had been planned for the postwar years. Outwardly it appears President Roosevelt gained Soviet cooperation by appeasement. Was that to be his postwar policy? What role was the United States to follow with the defeat of her enemies? What had been settled at the conferences between Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill? Such were the questions that confronted President Truman. In the hope of gaining answers to those and many other questions, President Truman discussed at length American foreign policy with Harry Hopkins and Forrestal. He indicated to the press that President Roosevelt's policies would be fulfilled, but what were his policies? The seriousness of world affairs gave him no time for reflection.

The question of a Polish delegation to the United Nations confronted the President shortly after his ascendency to office. At a Cabinet Meeting on April 23, 1945 he was told by the Secretaries of State and War to tread lightly in handling the problem. His retort was that, "...our agreements with

the Soviet Union so far had been a one-way street and that we could not continue; it was now or never. I intend to go on with plans for San Francisco and if the Russians do not wish to join us they can go to hell."⁶⁷

President Truman was anxious to meet Churchill and Stalin. He was sure a meeting of the Big Three would clarify many doubts he held as to policy. In July-August 1949, the three leaders met at Potsdam. President Truman elaborates upon the meeting in his Memoirs. Summarized, we can say he disliked Stalin and was firmly resolved to block Soviet attempts at expansion.⁶⁸

Secretary of State Byrnes attended a meeting in Moscow, December 1945. The Soviets utilized their techniques of words and delay. Byrnes did not keep President Truman advised as to his progress, much to the indignation of the Executive. The conference brought no visible advantage to the United States, but Russia continued to coerce Iran. Upon his return Secretary Byrnes received this letter from the President.

There isn't a doubt in my mind that Russia intends an invasion of Turkey and the seizure of the Black Sea Straits to the Mediterranean. Unless Russia is faced with an iron fist and strong language another war is in the making.

I do not think we should compromise any longer. We should refuse to recognize Rumania and Bulgaria until they comply with our requirements; ...we should continue to insist on the internationalization of the Kiel Canal, the Rhine-Danube waterway and the Black Sea Straits and we should maintain complete control of Japan and the Pacific....

⁶⁷Ibid., pp. 49-50.

⁶⁸Harry S. Truman, Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Year of Decisions, I (New York, 1955), 262-412. Hereafter cited as Truman Memoirs.

1

10/10/10

Then we should insist on the return of our ships from Russia and force a settlement of the Lend-lease debt of Russia. I'm tired of babying the Soviets.⁶⁹

In February 1946, M. George F. Kennan, American Charge d' Affairs at Moscow, published an article entitled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," in Foreign Affairs, with complete support from the State Department, which summarized the Russian position and attitudes. It was his opinion that: Russian views toward world affairs were distorted by insecurity from the Czarist regimes, when Russia was a poor defenseless agricultural plain; they feared contact with the successful west for their political system was cruel and unfair and could not stand comparisons with better developed systems; the military was used to keep the minds of the people from internal affairs; the Soviets would continue to seize territories as the opportunities presented themselves; they would use the United Nations for their own purposes abandoning it at their convenience; and he was sure the U.S.S.R. would feel secure only when the United States and all it represented were destroyed.⁷⁰ Mr. Kennan's article indicated the United States was aware of Soviet policy, and resulted in American policy being moved from the defensive to the offensive. The United States, to this point, had attempted to work with Stalin, but it failed to produce positive results. A firm hand, and a selfish hand was now to guide relations with Russia.

⁶⁹Ibid., pp. 551-553.

⁷⁰Walter Millis, op. cit., pp. 135-40.

Opinions regarding Russia were formed during 1945 and 1946. President Truman, his Cabinet and the State Department were firmly resolved to end Soviet aggression. The presence of Soviet troops in Iraq after the war concerned the West. Overtures to the United Nations failed to bring their withdrawal. Early in 1946 Soviet intentions in Iraq were boldly flaunted. Notes passed between the Soviets and the United States, but until the note of March 24, 1946, all were disregarded by Russia. It strongly criticized Soviet actions and threatened United States intervention if Soviet troops were not removed.⁷¹ The troops were withdrawn.

A glimpse at Russian history will indicate the great value the Soviets placed on acquisition of the Straits. They continually exerted pressure for success of such a scheme, but it was not until 1945 that an active policy was put into operation. The Soviet-Turkish Agreement of Neutrality and Friendship signed on December 17, 1925 was renounced on March 19, 1945. The price of Soviet friendship came to depend on Turkish willingness to part with a portion of her territory and a provision establishing Soviet control over the Straits. Both were refused. Pressure was exerted upon Turkey by the massing of Soviet troops along the Turkish borders, and through propaganda. In August 1946 the Soviets again demanded a new administration for the Straits. Previously, the United States had attempted to

⁷¹Truman Memoirs, II, pp. 80-95.

mediate the dispute, but this time President Truman announced a firm policy was to be followed prohibiting Soviet control of the Straits.⁷²

August 1946 was a month to remember. The Peace Conference in Paris, where Secretary of State Byrnes was heading the American delegation, had degenerated into a bitter wrangle. Molotov, joined by Communist puppets from the satellite states daily cast aspersions upon the American role in the war, impugning our aims and methods and railing against capitalism and British-American imperialism. Demands for the return of Trieste to the Yugoslavs were accompanied by Tito's provocations along the Morgan Line and threats to take the territory by force. British troops had been hurried to Bosra, and the fate of Iran hung in the balance. Violence was daily succeeded by violence in Palestine. General Marshall's mission to China had failed, and the Reds were on the verge of launching an all-out attack upon the Nanking government. During this month Tito's Air Force chose to shoot down two United States transport planes on regular flights from Austria to Italy. The passengers of the first plane were not killed, but were held incommunicado. The passengers of the second were killed. On August 22, 1946 the New York Times carried this headline: "U.S. Gives Belgrade 48 Hours To Free Fliers or Face Action Before U.N. Security Council; Rejects Russian Share In Straits Defense." Tito backed down immediately and the Yugoslav duck shoot

⁷²Department of State Publication No. 4446 (Washington, 1952), pp. 810-15.

was settled. The Straits problem lingered on, but it was toned down. Soviet and Yugoslav tactics united the American people behind the new Presidential program of firmness toward Communism.

Soviet coercive pressures mounted during 1946, however, United States resistance was strengthened during the same period. The creation of the United Nations at first provided the United States with a way to ^{get away from} shunt its newly acquired world responsibilities. The ineffectiveness of that organization plus growing Soviet intolerance changed the American approach to world problems. President Truman was firmly resolved to bolster countries (weakspots), when and if the need arose, however, it does not appear that he expected requests for aid in the early months of 1947.

In January 1946, the United States informed the Greek government that aid to Greece would be considered but not before that government made an attempt to ^{relieve} alleviate her economic problems. Throughout 1946 the Greek Government informally requested United States aid, but nothing was done until December 1946 when Paul Porter was sent as the head of an American mission to investigate and make recommendations concerning the Greek economic situation. Before he could report, two incidents forced the United States government to take immediate action.⁷³

(1) That Great Britain was running into trouble of an alarming character began to be reported to the State

⁷³Truman Memoirs, II, pp. 1-200.

11

Department in January 1947 and was publicly confirmed by the British government on January 20, in a White Paper on the problems of economic recovery. During the war Britain sold over one-half her external assets and piled up huge debts. Imports exceeded exports and the American and Canadian postwar loans were almost gone. Production and exports were hampered by a shortage of manpower and low productivity. One solution to the problem was to cut military commitments at home and abroad and to reduce the standard of living. Coal was necessary for industry, but it could not be mined quickly enough to answer the demands. The winter of 1946-1947 was the most bitter in decades. Civilians clamored for coal and fuel, roads and railways were blocked, rivers were frozen solid and ships held in ports, coal pits were closed, and winter wheat was killed. Production targets for 1947 were disrupted even before the programs could gain momentum. United States and Canadian loans to Britain were depleted, and the economic set back caused by winter blocked British efforts to become self-supporting in 1947. This was only part of a postwar revelation.⁽²⁾ The other half found Britain finished as a world power. Suddenly the news reports of a year and a half formed a pattern: the strongest bastions of the imperial system had collapsed, India, Burma, Egypt, and Palestine; elsewhere Britains' authority was reduced by troop withdrawals and reductions in financial and political aid; and finally, Great Britain heavily in debt and unable to sustain itself even with generous foreign aid faced collapse. (On February 24, 1947 the United States

government was officially notified that British economic and military aid to Greece would cease on April 1, 1947. The first weakness in America's outer defense chain had to be met.⁷⁴

On March 3, 1947 the Greeks officially requested United States economic aid. The withdrawal of British support, and the futility of action by the United Nations Committee in Greece, forced Greece to take this step. They presented a summary of aid that would be most beneficial. Four points were emphasized: ⁽¹⁾ financial aid was needed to purchase subsistence articles, food and clothing, to keep the populace from dying of starvation and exposure; ⁽²⁾ economic rehabilitation and the end to guerilla warfare could only be effected if funds were allotted for the purchase of military materials; ⁽³⁾ funds were requested so a reconstruction program could be started; finally, ⁽⁴⁾ the Greeks asked that American specialists be made available to supervise the expenditure of funds. This program was closely followed by the American Mission For Aid To Greece.⁷⁵

Immediately following the British announcement of withdrawal from Greece, President Truman set the State Department to work on a trial aid program to Greece. He wanted the objectives and specifics of the new program drafted into a speech so he could inform the American public of his

⁷⁴ Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 5, 1947), (New York, 1955), pp. 1-89.

⁷⁵ Department of State Publication No. 2802 (Washington, 1947), pp. 827-30.

11

plans. This was a superb bit of politicking. The public was aroused over Russian and Yugoslav abuses of freedom. President Truman knew that, and by stating his aid program for Greece, he was sure the sympathies of the American people would pressure Congress into passage of a large money grant. He delivered the speech on March 12, 1947, and emphasized eight reasons why aid should be granted to Greece: (1) the foreign policy and the national security of the country were involved; (2) the Greek nation requested aid; (3) no other nation was willing or able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government; (4) ... "We have considered how the United Nations might assist in this crisis, but the situation is an urgent one requiring immediate action and the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required...."; (5) the United States was dedicated to the creation of conditions in which all nations could work out a way of life free from coercion; (6) the indirect or direct aggressions of a totalitarian government undermined the foundation of international peace and hence the security of the United States. They had to be stopped; (7) the free peoples of the world looked to the United States for support in maintaining their freedom; and (8) the British government left Greece in the lurch by withdrawing aid. The gap had to be filled.

He requested,

....Congress to provide authority for assistance to Greece and Turkey in the amount of \$400,000,000 for the period ending June 30, 1948....

In addition to funds, I ask the Congress to authorize the detail of American Civilian and Military personnel to Greece...to assist in the tasks of reconstruction, and for the purpose of supervisory financial and military assistance....

I recommend that authority also be provided for the instruction and training of selected Greek and Turkish personnel for military and civil duties....

Finally, I ask that the Congress provide authority which will permit the speediest and most effective use, in terms of needed commodities, supplies, and equipment, of such funds as may be authorized....⁷⁶

⁷⁶Department of State Publication No. 2875 (Washington, 1947), pp. 1-10.

Chapter V

The Public, Congress, and the Truman Doctrine

The President's message posed the problem in such a way that American responsibility in the world had to be accepted or rejected. It is significant that the early reactions to the Truman Doctrine cut across party lines, class and group lines, and regional lines. A few recognized "isolationists" supported it; many recognized "internationalists" opposed it. Established groups lost power through defections. There was little elation among supporters of the policy; in fact, to most the project was grim but there seemed to be no acceptable alternative.

It is not surprising the President's program met opposition from both isolationists and internationalists. In 1943 the American State Department had to choose between a policy of isolationism or collective action. Public discussion became focused upon the merits and disadvantages of both. Technical advances made it obvious, except to a few die-hards, isolationism was not the program to follow. The United Nations was organized, the error of 1920 was rectified, and people believed peace would permanently envelope the world. Secretary of State Byrnes pursued a policy toward the Soviets grounded on compromise and concession, hoping to find the correct medium necessary for collective action.

Suddenly, people were exposed to a third policy that fell between the two. It accepted the balance of power approach, rejected isolationism, and, in part at least,

1

collective security through world organization. Groups and individuals became concerned with such matters as: by-passing the United Nations; aid to reactionary governments; cost of the aid program; and its implications for the future. Supporters believed the policy involved the calculated risk of war and feared the projection of the United States as the direct opponent of Soviet expansion. Yet, most affirmed their support on the ground that failure to take action would be appeasement and isolation, which could court even greater dangers.

Most opposition came from the extreme Left or extreme Right, from a school of liberals (Wallace) who had long been critical of the administration's stiffening policy toward the Soviet Union, and from isolationists who opposed all projected movements of United States foreign policy into world affairs. As a result, the following were grouped together: Henry Wallace, Fiorello La Guardia, Senators Claude Pepper and Glenn H. Taylor, Colonel Robert McCormick, John O'Donnell, Representatives Harold Knutson and Everette Dirksen, the Marshall Field Papers (P.M. and the Chicago Sun), the Chicago Daily News, and the Nation and New Republic.

The opposition of the Left emphasized that American aid to Greece and Turkey would be used to protect anti-democratic and reactionary regimes instead of freedom, and that the proposed action by-passed the United Nations and endangered the future. The Rightist opposition said the policy would lead to war, and the American economy



could not stand the strain of buying off Communism by dollars. Furthermore, it was not fair to overburden the American tax payer.⁷⁷

Isolationist Arguments

Three professed isolationists argued against aid to Greece during the Open Hearings of the Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees. Edward Stokes, former member of the House of Representatives from Pennsylvania, opposed the program for it launched the United States on a policy of commercialism. He felt the Truman program gambled with the money of citizens because it supported a Rightist, Fascist and unstable government. Furthermore, Americans found commercialism made the Soviets objectionable so why should the United States initiate a policy that would purchase enemies in the world? In no uncertain terms, he emphasized that the fruits of this program would be war. As a final argument, the committee members were instructed to review American history, for they would find the Truman program violated the Monroe Doctrine.⁷⁸

Lawrence Mallery, an interested citizen from Philadelphia, viewed the Truman Doctrine as the first step in a master plan to begin World War III. The Second World War had enabled military men to permeate the governmental system. When peace arrived, it became their policy to advise the Executive war was imminent, and that force had to be met

⁷⁷ Joseph M. Jones, op. cit., pp. 1-150.

⁷⁸ House Hearings, Report No. 2616, pp. 271-73.

by force. President Truman assumed office and readily fell in with their plans.⁷⁹ Mallery's contribution was unorthodox. In reading his speech one receives the impression he disliked General Marshall and from that, built his radical thesis.

The most colorful argument was presented by Hamilton Fish, former Representative to Congress from New York. It was his opinion that when President Truman assumed office he embarked upon a program of intervention and imperialism, and that his proclamation of May 12, 1947 was nothing more than a call for bigger and better internationalism and imperialism. If followed to its logical fulfillment, it would mean intervention in France, Italy, China plus the Near East. The result would be war. In a sarcastic vein, he said the United States should not wait for war to ensue from its pressure program, instead it should declare war while the military advantage lay with the West. The British were the major influence upon American policy. Twice the United States had gone to war to preserve their lines of communication and oil interests in the Near East; it should not pull their chestnuts out of the fire a third time.⁸⁰

Three different arguments were presented, yet there was an underlying theme, in that war would begin if the United States persisted in taking an active role in world

⁷⁹Hearings, Assistance to Greece and Turkey Report No. 938, U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 1947, pp. 93-96. Hereafter cited as Senate Hearings, Report No. 938.

⁸⁰House Hearings Report No. 2616, pp. 195-99.

affairs. They clung to the traditional concept that war could be averted by United States refusal to attend to European ills. Noteworthy is the fact that at no time in their presentations was the United Nations mentioned.

United Nations Advocates - Internationalists

Henry Wallace, Vice President under Roosevelt and formerly Secretary of Agriculture, in a speech on March 14, 1947 accused President Truman of, "...betraying the great tradition of America, of acting as the best salesman Communism ever had, and of plunging into a reckless adventure...." He described the new policy as, "...utterly futile and amounting to a military lend-lease program...."⁸¹ His attacks were stronger than expected. For years his group were exponents of using the power and public funds of the United States to aid under-privileged groups at home and abroad. They were ardent internationalists, committed to the ideas and institutions of freedom. When it came to recognizing that the Soviet Union was the enemy of freedom, and to extending economic and military aid to the intended victims they balked. They approved economic aid to Greece through the United Nations, but opposed military aid even though it was clear Greece could not recover economically, or even survive, unless the Communist military threat was contained. The Wallace faction clung to the belief that accommodation could be reached with Russia.⁸²

⁸¹New York Times, March 14, 1947.

⁸²Joseph M. Jones, op. cit., pp. 1-150.

The reaction to President Truman's program indicated that many Americans refused to accept world responsibility. Instead, they found it convenient to shunt problems to an infant organization. At the Open Hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Fioriello H. La Guardia admitted the Greek problem warranted immediate attention. He was convinced a solution to the Greek crisis could only be found in the United Nations, and so strong were his convictions, that he supported a Soviet program with that goal. The ex-Congressman and UNRRA executive, forgot a committee under supervision of the Security Council, was investigating the situation, and after four months was no nearer a solution than the day it was organized.

In his second point, La Guardia found the United States guilty of shirking moral obligations. It had proposed, developed and seated the international organization, but in a period of trial it was abandoned for unilateral action. He was sure this would mock the principles of the Charter and forever render the United Nations useless. Mr. La Guardia professed to be a humanitarian. He admitted UNRRA was ineffective and corrupt for lack of interested controls. How could he calmly insist the United Nations be utilized while thousands or millions starved or were killed by guerillas and disease, waiting for petty arguments in the Security Council to cease and a plan of action be developed? He felt the President's program would not

alleviate the critical conditions in Greece, but it would waste 350 million dollars.⁸³

Martin Popper, Executive Secretary of the National Lawyers Guild, presented a very interesting argument to the House Foreign Relations Committee. He asked a series of questions. What were the United States obligations to the United Nations? Was the Greek problem within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United Nations, or could the United States act unilaterally? Would the United Nations be able to deal effectively with the problem? He felt the United Nations Charter legally bound its member nations to refrain from unilateral action. The United States government had accepted this obligation when permission to sign the Charter was granted by a vote of Congress. President Truman's plan was illegal; if passed by Congress, it would nullify United States membership in the United Nations, and at the same time set an evil precedent. Such individual action would undermine the international body. It was his contention that the United States should act within the framework of the Charter. A body of the United Nations was constantly in session to deal with critical situations. Vetoes may temporarily block proceedings, but a solution could always be searched for in another direction. His argument was very convincing, but it was a legal approach that failed to consider world conditions.⁸⁴

⁸³Senate Hearings, Report No. 938, pp. 120-43.

⁸⁴Ibid., pp. 259-66.

1

Alfred

The Washington Representative of the Socialist Party, William C. Gausmann, expressed the views of his organization. They felt the President's program emphasized the growing imperialistic tendencies of the United States. The British had found that imperialism was no basis for a democratic world, and their exodus from Greece was the first step in a program of withdrawal from global intervention. He failed to examine the British economic plight which necessitated withdrawal. The Socialist Party was sure aid could best be fulfilled by a United Nations program. If the United States, a well respected country, insisted upon unilateral action it would make enemies who would soon clamor for its destruction. However, if aid programs were conducted under United Nations auspices, a friendly atmosphere would pervade the world and true democracy, evidenced by British governmental changes, would become standard practice.⁸⁵

The American Veterans Committee submitted a letter to the House Foreign Relations Committee, in which they looked to the United Nations as the basis for world peace. They suggested the United States render full support to the United Nations, contribute to its aid programs, and do everything possible to strengthen the organization. According to their letter, President Truman's approach to the Greek problem was wrong. Arms would not buy peace. The best way to defeat Communism was to bring the problem of Democracy v. Communism into the open, educate the world about the conflict and each system, and permit the

⁸⁵Ibid., pp. 276-82.

11

the two ideologies to vie for power peacefully, with the best system the victor. The Committee failed to indicate how the program was to be initiated or carried out.⁸⁶

Professor Broadus Mitchell of Rutgers University and a well known economist, felt the Presidential policy would lead to war, because it gave the Russian leaders cause to propagandize their encirclement theory, time to marshall support for their war plans, and in the end would provide an excuse for war. There was another danger. History proved no nation that ever embarked upon a program of intervention ever escaped the development of imperialism and militarism at home. He saw no reason to believe the United States would be different. The only possible way to avoid the evils of the Truman Doctrine was to make the United Nations responsible for aid and support to critical areas. Its member nations should limit their participation to financial contributions and moral support.⁸⁷

The Methodist Federation For Social Action was represented at the Open Hearings of the House Foreign Relations Committee by Reverend Olson J. Smith. This church group opposed aid to Greece for it found the structure and nature of the Greek government objectionable. It was their contention that the Greek government grabbed power through a rigged election. Furthermore, it made no attempt to operate as a Democracy. Instead, the Greeks pursued a program that smacked of

⁸⁶House Hearings, Report No. 2616, pp. 334-35.

⁸⁷Senate Hearings, Report No. 938, pp. 96-98.

Fascism. The Methodists were inclined to believe all aid to disrupted areas should come through the United Nations. If for various reasons aid was not forthcoming, events should be allowed to take a natural course.⁸⁸

Arguments of Administration Representatives

The changing world situation required a bold step in American foreign policy. Members of the State Department and the Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees were aware of the need for change. The public had to be convinced. This required satisfactory answers to two questions. Did the United States by-pass the United Nations? Why? What did the program imply for the future? Senator Vandenberg, Acting Secretary of State Acheson, and United States Representative to the United Nations, Warren Austin, became official government spokesmen.

Mr. Acheson defended the Executive policy on three separate occasions. At the first session of the Senate Open Hearings, he mentioned that Greece was burdened by two problems. The first was caused by armed bands operating in Greece that were trained, supplied, and given refuge in neighboring countries. "This is peculiarly a United Nations problem and one with which the United

⁸⁸House Hearings, Report No. 2616, pp. 227-34.

Several other groups and individuals supported the arguments of the Internationalists: Miss Anna Strauss, President League of Women Voters of the United States; Charles F. Boss, Jr., Executive Secretary of the Commission on World Peace of the Methodist Church; Henry J. Codbury, Chairman of the American Friends Service Committee; and Samuel Guy Inman, Guest Professor of International Relations, Ohio Wesleyan University.

Nations is dealing expeditiously and effectively. In this matter the United States is supporting the Security Council action energetically."⁸⁹

The second problem confronting the Greek government was the need for supplies and funds to meet international difficulties, namely, the restoration of order in the country and the averting of economic collapse. UNRRA and Great Britain assisted with those problems, but their aid was withdrawn. He was sure Greece could not apply to the United Nations for time would be lost in the allocation of funds. The program offered by the administration was the only alternative.⁹⁰

In his speech of March 12, 1947, President Truman stressed that the United Nations was not equipped to provide aid to Greece. On March 24, 1947 Mr. Acheson expanded upon that point. He emphasized that the United Nations possessed no funds. Furthermore, the Economic and Social Council was an advisory body that only recommended economic, financial and social action to states. The International Bank was unable to help for it was not completely organized and it was set up primarily to make self-liquidating loans for long-term reconstruction purposes. Even if some United Nations organ recommended assistance, the bulk of the funds, supplies and technical assistance would come from the United States. Why should time be lost through red tape? Wasn't

⁸⁹Department of State Bulletin No. 2802 (Washington, March 20, 1947), pp. 835-36.

⁹⁰Ibid., pp. 836-38.

1

it better for the United States to have complete control over expenditures?⁹¹

Mr. Acheson spoke at Wesleyan University on June 15, 1947, and he said President Truman's message was "typically and traditionally American," for it responded to people struggling to attain or maintain their freedom. He continued,

We have done so because it is important to us they shall succeed. Sometimes we can do much, sometimes little, but the response is always there. It was there in the case of Greece over a century ago....It was there throughout the nineteenth century in the struggle of the Latin American states to obtain and keep their freedom from the encroachments of European powers. It underlay our efforts for decades to help China in her struggle against foreign subjugation.⁹²

Mr. Acheson extended the Monroe Doctrine to world proportions and appealed for Americans to revitalize the program developed by their ancestors in 1823.

Representative Richards, South Carolina, spoke at the Open Hearings of the House Foreign Relations Committee. He charged the United States with flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter in its unilateral aid program to Greece. Mr. Austin replied that the United Nations was not created to supersede the ordinary relations between states. If the United Nations was able to help in any situation, it most certainly should do so. All threats to peace were situations which should be and must be brought before the United Nations. "...but it was not the intention,

⁹¹Department of State Publication No. 2915 (Washington, 1947), p. 6.

⁹²Ibid., p. 11.

11

so far as I know, that any state was precluded from asking the assistance of any other friendly state when an economic or other internal matter arose which caused difficulty in that state."⁹³

On April 10, 1947 the Soviet delegate to the United Nations Security Council, charged the United States with unwarranted interference in the domestic affairs of Greece, and with action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. In reply, Mr. Austin made reference to the Greek letter of March 3, 1947 requesting United States economic and military aid. He emphasized several times that aid had been requested.⁹⁴ Furthermore, the charge that the United States was acting without authority was not true. The Food and Agricultural Organization, a part of the United Nations, recommended that the Greek government request funds from the Economic and Social Council or the United States government, for the continuation of essential food and other imports to cover the period after UNRR's withdrawal, until expanding exports, international development loans and expanding production enabled Greece to balance her international accounts without special aid. This implied the United Nations could not take immediate action, another source of aid had to be found, but a long range plan could fall under the cognizance

⁹³House Hearings, Report No. 2616, p. 20.

⁹⁴Department of State Bulletin, No. 2802 (Washington, 1947), pp. 861-65.

of United Nations powers.⁹⁵ As to interference in Greek domestic affairs, it was explained American actions would be open to world scrutiny, and if found guilty of offensive acts, they would be immediately remedied.

Mr. Vandenberg, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, felt the Truman program had two functions. The first was to provide aid to a needy people. The second was to throw up a barrier against Communist imperialism. Russia had a heritage grounded on expansion, and only a show of force would curb its appetite. He was positive the United Nations was insufficiently developed to handle the problem.⁹⁶ In a letter to Representative John B. Bennett, Michigan, he said, "I am frank to say that I think Greece could collapse fifty times before the U.N. itself could ever hope to handle a situation of this nature. It is not supposed to handle such situations. But if there is any way to tie it collaterally, I shall be very glad to see this done."⁹⁷

Most of the organizations that opposed the Truman Doctrine were national in scope but commanded a comparatively small following. They did represent all levels of American society. The largest organization to voice an opinion, the American Legion, supported the government program. Paul H. Griffith, National Commander, said the United States would be gambling with peace if it did not admit the United Nations

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 5.

⁹⁶Senate Hearings, Report. No. 938, p. 75.

⁹⁷Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg (Boston, 1952), pp. 340-41.

1

as presently constituted was incapable of preventing the spread of Communism throughout Europe. An active policy by the United States was the only way to rally the nations of the world to oppose Communism. He closed by stating his organization supported the principles of the United Nations Charter, but words without force were of small value in an unsettled world.⁹⁸

Members of the Senate and House Foreign Relations Committees entered the public hearings with a closed mind. Questioning of government witnesses was done carefully so that the Executive program was in no way degraded. At times discussions became heated. Before governmental policy was bared to the public, the inquisitor gave way to the next interested party. The public witnesses were permitted to express their views, but few questions were asked of them. Refreshing approaches were passed over without comment. The Open Hearings reeked of a type atmosphere that surrounds a kangaroo court. The ballots of both committees in secret session were unanimously in favor of the Truman Doctrine.

Senator Vandenberg guided the progress of the bill. He had been in conference with President Truman on several occasions before the Presidential message, and it may be assumed he contributed to the development of the program. Vandenberg was the Republican member of Congress who promoted the bi-partisan approach to foreign policy. With that in mind he soothed the storm that developed over United

⁹⁸Senate Hearings, Report No. 938, p. 3.

1

States disregard of the United Nations by providing an amendment to the bill. Several ways for United States aid to be withdrawn from Greece were mentioned, but article two was the most important: "If the President is officially notified by the United Nations that the Security Council finds (with respect to which finding the United States waives the exercise of any veto) or that the General Assembly finds that action taken or assistance furnished by the United Nations makes the continuance of such assistance unnecessary or undesirable it shall be withdrawn;"⁹⁹ This calmed ardent United Nations advocates.

The Senate bill was passed on April 22, 1947 by a vote of 67 to 23 after an amendment proposed by Senator Edwin C. Johnson, Colorado, to delete all provisions granting military aid to Greece and Turkey was defeated, and a further proposal by Senator Edward V. Robertson, Wyoming, to table the bill was rejected.¹⁰⁰

House Report 2616 was passed by the House of Representatives on May 9, 1947 by a vote of 287 to 107.¹⁰¹ Along floor amendments rejected by the House of Representatives were the following: (1) introduced by Representative Lawrence H. Smith, Wisconsin, to refer the matter to the United Nations and to permit action by the United States

⁹⁹Assistance to Greece and Turkey, Report No. 314, House of Representatives, (80th Cong. 1 Sess., Washington, 1947), p. 15.

¹⁰⁰U. S., Congressional Record, 80th Cong. 1st Sess., April 23, 1947, XCIII, pp. 3907-08.

¹⁰¹Ibid., XCIII, p. 5031.

only if that organization failed to act in sixty days, defeated by a vote of 137 to 65;¹⁰² (2) introduced by Representative Smith to reduce the 400 million dollar appropriation by one-half, defeated 121 to 49;¹⁰³ (3) and introduced by Representative George Bender, Ohio, to limit aid to economic assistance only, defeated by a voice vote.¹⁰⁴

Following the approval by the House of Representatives of S. 938 with amendments, a conference of both Houses of Congress was held. On May 15, 1947 both the Senate and House approved the report of the conference. S. 938 approved by the President on May 22, 1947.¹⁰⁵

The United States refused to accept a leader's role after World War I; instead the American people, cowed by the depression, adopted a policy of "isolation." In keeping with that principle, they enacted a series of neutrality laws, hoping to remain outside Europe's brewing caldron. They accepted the rewards of business resulting from overseas sales, but refused to assume any responsibility. The people exerted great influence upon foreign policy during the 1930's. President Roosevelt, and his staff, were aware that a changing world scene demanded a new approach to world affairs, but the apathy of the American people fostered an isolationist policy that prevented change.

¹⁰²Ibid., XCIII, p. 5008.

¹⁰³Ibid., XCIII, p. 4989.

¹⁰⁴Ibid., XCIII, p. 4986.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., XCIII, p. 5460.

Hitler's aggressive actions, and the deteriorating Far Eastern situation enabled Roosevelt to launch a more active program. After December 1941, the United States became a full partner in the war against aggression. By 1943, a new concept had germinated. Collective action seemed the key to a peaceful future. The United Nations was organized and the war weary, but prosperous, American people adopted its principles.

Prewar European policies based on secret treaties, spheres of influence and the balance of power were viewed with disgust. Open collective action, through the United Nations became the only acceptable policy. President Roosevelt died before the war ended. His successor, Harry S. Truman, lacked the dynamic personal touch of Roosevelt, but he did realize Americans placed great reliance upon the principles of the United Nations Charter, and the potential powers of that organization. This was their way of again forming a program to shunt responsibility. He was determined to pursue a policy along those lines. The path was difficult. Russia began a policy of opposition to the West. At the same time, her imperialistic program was exposed. President Truman advised Secretary of State Byrnes to handle the Soviet problem carefully, for compromise might end Soviet imperialistic demands.

The essence of that policy continued for the better part of two years, but another program was in the process of development. The friction at Potsdam, Soviet ventures into the Balkans and Far East, and the Polish problem made

it evident sometime, somewhere this outward push would have to cease. In 1946, George Kennan informed the State Department that Soviet expansion could only be halted by a strong show of force. The opponents of Communism now had a bible to quote.

Despite publication to the contrary, the world in 1945 was divided into power groups and spheres of influence. The British were responsible for the Mediterranean area. Growing economic deterioration forced their withdrawal from Greece. This opened the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, Suez and Africa to Soviet expansion. The break in America's outer defenses had to be shored. President Truman's speech of March 12, 1947 officially laid the basis for a new program.

The Truman Doctrine was a new approach to foreign affairs. It was designed in the beginning only to prevent Communist-Soviet subversion of Greece and Turkey, but soon afterward was enlarged to include the defense of western Europe against a Communist attack from within and without.

It completely rejected isolation, in part rejected collective action through the United Nations, and adopted a policy based on spheres of influence and the balance of power. This discarded the prewar principle of isolation, and the Roosevelt program of collective action, led from the top by the United States, Russia, Britain, and China, and announced to the world that the United States assumed leadership of the free world; that an active instead of passive policy was to be followed in the future; it accepted

1850

the financial burden of restoring world trade and world reconstruction; made plans for filling the void left by British withdrawal from their sphere of influence in the Mediterranean; that American outer defenses were the furthest outposts of the world; and that the United States had assumed the burden of military resistance to Communism.²⁴

Chapter VI

Plans for Greek Rehabilitation

In January 1947, the United States anticipated a formal Greek request for aid. To properly act upon the matter, an American Economic Mission, under Paul Porter, was dispatched to Greece for the purpose of investigating economic conditions, and to report said conditions and possible solutions to the United States government. The Mission reported that Greece required outside financial assistance for at least five years due to the destruction of war and the current circumstances. They recommended the United States extend immediate financial aid sufficient to meet requirements for relief, reconstruction and military purposes until June 30, 1948. A five-year plan for outside support depended upon how long the burden of a large military force was to be imposed upon Greece.¹⁰⁶

A plan was proposed for revamping the Greek Economic system. A series of indirect taxes burdened the populace, but permitted the rich to escape lightly. It was suggested a new income tax and a new commercial enterprises tax be levied so as to reduce the tremendous profits of rich Greeks and bolster the government treasury. At the same time, indirect taxes were to be reduced.

An increase of income was no more important than a reduction of expenditures. The most serious burden was

¹⁰⁶Department of State Publication, No. 2802 (Washington, 1947), pp. 901-03.

1

maintenance of a large military force. It had to be reduced. Parasitic Greeks disrupted the Greek budget. The Civil Service was overrun with incompetents and a surplus of manpower. A reduction was necessary. Finances were also hampered by an excessive pension list and relief rolls. Both had to be revamped.

The Mission advised that import and export business be placed under central supervision, with the idea of blocking unnecessary imports and of building up exportable items. This was to be coordinated with another program whose job it would be to seek out new markets for Greek products.

A postwar reconstruction program was outlined... Industry was to have precedence over agricultural rehabilitation in the hope of draining off the excess agricultural population. As it happened, the demands of a starving nation were met by subjugating industry to agriculture and the military. The plan contained provisions for rebuilding roads, bridges, water systems, power stations, tunnels, railroad lines, and the ports of Piraeus, Solonika and Volos.¹⁰⁷

On March 3, 1947 the Greek government requested aid in harmony with the Porter Mission recommendations. On June 15, 1947 they promised to fulfill the prerequisites and demands of an American plan.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁷Ibid., pp. 903-09.

¹⁰⁸Documents on American Foreign Relations, eds. Raymond D. D. C. Dennett, Robert Turner, IX (Princeton, 1949), pp. 678, 680, 681, 685.

When Senate Bill 938 was signed by President Truman, a new era began in American foreign policy. The Truman Doctrine was weaned on two years of growing tensions with the Soviets. Since its proclamation, it has come to represent the entire change in United States policy. This essay deals with the initial step of this new concept, Public Law 75.

What were the immediate objectives of Public Law 75? The program developed by the State Department incorporated the suggestions offered by the American Economic Mission. There were differences in the program, but the fundamental structure was the same.

The Truman Doctrine requested \$400 million to assist Greece and Turkey, with the major portion, \$300 million, being set aside for Greece. She was also to receive \$50 million from the \$350 million appropriated by Congress for post-UNRRA relief abroad. Thus, \$350 million was available to assist Greece through June 1948. The sum was divided in two: \$150 million was to be spent for import needs of the Greek Armed Forces; and \$200 million was to provide goods for the civil population, to meet costs in foreign exchange and for rebuilding the civil economy.¹⁰⁹ Funds for the civil program were broken down into: (1) \$50 million for outright relief from the post-UNRRA relief fund; (2) \$50 million for imported materials needed in reconstruction; (3) \$80 million

¹⁰⁹ Department of State Publication No. 2939 (Washington, 1947), p. 4.

for internal expenditures; (4) and \$20 million for agricultural rehabilitation.¹¹⁰

The United States was to control the expenditure of their funds. Americans were to be placed in strategic positions within the governmental framework. They were to control the revamping of the tax structure and civil service. All imports and exports were to be shunted through a control agency headed by an American.¹¹¹

About 60-65 per cent of Greece's 7,500,000 population depended upon agriculture for a livelihood, and only about twenty per cent of the country's 50,000 square miles was arable. Twenty million dollars was labeled for agricultural rehabilitation and a comprehensive plan was developed. Funds were to be set aside for: (1) the repair and purchase of equipment needed for production and research; (2) local processing facilities for sterilizing dried fruits, for pressing olives, and for ginning cotton; (3) pumping and irrigation equipment, spraying equipment, pruning tools and tractors for developing new lands; (4) emergency storage facilities to store bumper crops while waiting for markets to open; (5) veterinary supplies to improve the stock; and technical advisory assistance to coordinate new programs.¹¹²

¹¹⁰Department of State Publication No. 2802 (Washington, 1947), pp. 838-42.

¹¹¹Ibid., pp. 839-41.

¹¹²Department of State Publication No. 2939 (Washington, 1947), pp. 6-7.

1

The Greek military force was to receive \$150 million worth of supplies. It covered most of the \$250 million the Greeks were to spend on their army and navy during 1947. What made their plight so difficult was their inability to produce the needed supplies. Almost all weapons of war had to be imported and this wrecked what little Greek foreign exchange that was available. The Air Force was to receive clothes, gasoline, spare parts, medical supplies and a few old airplanes. The Navy was to be given several small ships, mine sweepers and a few destroyers. No capital ships were involved in the aid program. Those small vessels were needed to sweep the Greek waters of mines and open up the sea lanes. Spare parts, gasoline, and clothing were to be included in the aid program. As expected, the Greek Army received the lion's share of the aid funds. Every conceivable type of military equipment, except the atomic bomb, were to be sent to Greece. The service programs were to be coordinated by American Service Personnel who were to train the Greeks in tactical guerilla warfare and in the use of modern weapons. No Americans were to take part in any form of combat.¹¹³

The Greek reconstruction program was to receive \$50 million for imports and \$80 million for internal consumption. Highway repair had priority over all other projects. The roads were needed to facilitate movement of civil supplies to market, and were important to the military for rapid movement of personnel and supplies. Bridges, culverts

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 4.

1

and railroad repair came under the priority program. The ports of Piraeus, Solonika and Volos were to be repaired. Warehouses, port facilities, and unloading cranes had to be replaced, quay walls and breakwaters rebuilt, and sunken ships removed from the harbors. The Corinth Canal was to be cleared, for it would shorten East-West traffic by some two hundred miles. Plans were developed to repair 200,000 homes, and the telecommunications system.¹¹⁴ This was indeed a very ambitious one-year program.

The award of \$82 million in contracts to American engineer-construction companies for the building and rehabilitation of Greek highways, railroads, bridges, and ports was made on August 5, 1947. They were negotiated for the Mission by the Army Corps of Engineers on a cost-plus, fixed-fee basis and/or an inclusive architect-engineer-management type. The award of contracts was based on the experience of the companies with overseas projects, personnel, equipment available for immediate use, and past performance on government projects. Because of the unusual nature of work contemplated, it was not possible to let the contracts out on a bid basis.

The contract for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of railroads, highways, and bridges totaling \$64 million was awarded to Johnson, Drake and Piper, Inc., of New York; Guy F. Atkinson, Inc., of San Francisco; and Starr, Park and Freeman, Inc., of New York. The contract for the

¹¹⁴Ibid., pp. 4-6.

reconstruction of the three Greek ports and clearance of the Corinth Canal totaling \$17 million went to Grove, Shepherd, Wilson and Kruge, Inc., of New York, and J. Rich Steers, Inc., of New York. The United States Steel Corporation was scheduled to fabricate steel for fourteen bridges.¹¹⁵

Public Law 75 was to last one year. It was not designed to completely remake the Greek economy, but to restore some semblance of order and stability so that international loans could be contracted directly by the Greek government. However, if progress was delayed and the President deemed it advisable, aid could be extended for one year. In June 1948 the economic aspects of the Truman Doctrine were transferred to the Marshall Plan. The military program remained under Public Law 75.


¹¹⁵Department of State Bulletin No. 424, XVII (Washington, 1947), pp. 335-336.

Chapter VII

Shoring of Outer Defenses

On June 10, 1947, Dwight P. Griswold, former Governor of Nebraska and later a member of General Lucius D. Clay's staff in Germany, was appointed Chief of the American Mission to Greece by President Truman. The Senate immediately confirmed the appointment. On June 14, 1947 Mr. Griswold assumed his duties, and spent the first thirty days in office reviewing the Greek problem. He and his staff, some 206 members, left for Athens on July 15, 1947.¹¹⁶

The Mission was composed of twenty separate groups, each under the supervision of an expert in the field. For clarity, the organization of the Mission can best be explained by a diagram.¹¹⁷



¹¹⁶Department of State Publication No. 2957 (Washington, 1947), p. 2.

¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 24.

The last chapter was devoted to the objectives of the Truman Program. Now, the success of the program, in the light of its objectives, will be examined.

Before entering into a discussion of the Truman Doctrine's (Public Law 75) success and failures, one point must be made. The economic aspects of Public Law 75 only lasted until June 30, 1948. Successful economic rehabilitation placed Greece in a position where direct American aid was no longer needed. After one year, the economic phase was transferred to the European Recovery Program, more popularly known as the Marshall Plan. Guerilla warfare continued, so Public Law 75 extended military aid to Greece under the authority of Title III of Public Law 472. This second appropriation for military aid to Greece, scheduled for the period June 30, 1948 to June 30, 1949, amounted to \$275 million. In June 1949 military assistance was shifted to the Mutual Defense Program, but actual aid lasted only three months, for the guerilla war ended in September 1949.¹¹⁸

The Military Aspects

The object of American aid was to strengthen the Greek economic system, bring to an end the guerilla war, and make Greece powerful enough to repel Communist aggression. One

¹¹⁸Department of State Publication No. 3149 (Washington, 1947), p. 1; Department of State Publication No. 3291 (Washington, 1947), pp. 4, 56; House Report No. 1505 (80th Cong. 1st Sess., 1948), p. 3; Senate Report No. 1017 (80th Cong. 1st Sess., 1948), pp. 11-16.

factor depended upon the other. Financial disruption could be ended if the burden of military operations was removed. On the other hand, the military program required the support of a strong and solvent economic system. The guerillas did not direct their attacks against the Greek Army, but against the people of Greece. There was a deliberate and wanton destruction of Greek villages. This destruction was intended to render people homeless and drive them from the soil; to force them into overcrowded urban centers where they would become charges of an already overburdened state; and to create for them conditions of misery and hardship in the hope that this would make them susceptible to political agitation. Economic recovery demanded internal security.¹¹⁹

In July 1947 a small group of American Army and Navy personnel arrived in Greece. They established working relations with the Greek government and surveyed their requests for aid. Besides the initial task of determining the types and quantity of supplies, they were: to control the receipt and distribution of materials in Greece; to ensure proper and effective use of the materials; to instruct Greeks in the use of American equipment; and to provide tactical training. In 1948 the Americans were permitted to supervise front line action. To fill the gap between the arrival of American military supplies and the abrupt end of British support, the United States signed a treaty with Great Britain and Ireland (July 1947) for the

¹¹⁹Department of State Publication No. 3035 (Washington, 1948), p. 1.

continuance of military supplies until such time as American equipment would arrive in sufficient quantities to meet demands.¹²⁰

The United States had assumed that the guerilla problem would be solved within a very short period. That assumption was a major blunder. Greek Armed Forces were weak, poorly equipped, lacked a coordinated plan of action, possessed poor transportation facilities for supplying front line troops, and were faced with a growing refugee problem. The guerillas were supplied with military weapons by Albania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, had the advantage of striking at a selected position, refused to meet government troops in open battle, and could flee into the northern states if pressure became too great.

The first year of military aid ended in June 1948, but the guerilla problem remained. That year was spent preparing the Greek Army for an offensive operation and included training in guerilla warfare, increase of the Greek Army to 168,000 men, establishment of a national guard to occupy liberated areas and thus free regular troops for combat, and the build-up of supplies needed for a major offensive trucks, tanks, ammunition, clothing, food, weapons, airplanes, and winterized air bases. The delay enabled American contractors to restore transportation facilities so front line forces could be easily and effectively provisioned. The material program was bolstered by a change in the attitude

¹²⁰ Department of State Publication No. 3957 (Washington, 1947), pp. 12-14.

of the Greek people, who now felt they were not forgotten and that someone had an interest in their well-being. A desire to free Greece of strife and to prosper economically dominated the people. They were willing to sacrifice to obtain those ends.¹²¹

In July 1948, for the first time, Greek forces mounted an offensive. It was not halted until the guerillas were defeated in September 1949. By late 1948 it became evident that the balance was turning against the guerillas as a result of the training, regrouping and tenacious holding operations of the Greek Armed Forces. There was growing evidence of discouragement and dissension among the guerilla leaders. Moscow-trained Communists were forced into the open in their efforts to continue the guerilla movement. They openly admitted connection with Russia in an attempt to boost morale among the guerillas. Evidence that the guerilla forces became disheartened by the failure of the Greek people to collapse under guerilla terror was submitted by the Greek Communist Party when they found it necessary to purge their ranks of certain leaders who despaired of military victory. The difficulties in perpetuating the guerilla movement were further reflected by a declaration of the

¹²¹For a complete and detailed coverage of the military campaigns and military aid programs see: Department of State Publication No. 2957 (Washington, 1947), pp. 12-14; Department of State Publication No. 3035 (Washington, 1948), pp. 1-15; Department of State Publication No. 3149 (Washington, 1949), pp. 3-7; Department of State Publication No. 3278 (Washington, 1948), pp. 1-15; Department of State Publication No. 3371 (Washington, 1948), pp. 1-10.

Greek Communist Party promising to establish an independent Macedonia. The plan looked for a separate Macedonian state, within a federation of Communist Balkan States under Cominform leadership. It was to be created from territories belonging to Greece, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. The proposed association injured the guerilla cause. This threat to Greek lands brought Greeks of both sides into acknowledgment of the peril of International Communism. The guerillas became divided in their objectives, with the resulting loss of efficiency. ~~KKE~~ realized it overplayed its hand and attempted to make amends. It was too late. Yugoslavian aid had been the bulwark of the guerilla campaigns. In 1948 and 1949 they renounced Soviet ties and turned toward the West. The Yugoslav border, military aid, and recruiting facilities were denied the guerillas.¹²²

This dissension among the guerilla forces gained ground when the hero of the Albania War, General Papagos, returned to lead the Government forces. The Greek people accepted him as a symbol of national unity.

In January 1949, the 600,000 Greeks who had been routed from their homes could return to their old locations. Each male was given a weapon plus ammunition and told to defend his home and lands if attacked by guerillas. They were also given seed and food to last until harvest time. The guerilla menace was now largely a matter of history.¹²³

¹²²Department of State Publication No. 3467 (Washington, 1949), pp. 1-4; Department of State Publication No. 3599 (Washington, 1949), pp. 4-7.

¹²³Department of State Publication No. 3594 (Washington, 1949), pp. 7-12.

By August 1949, Government troops had pushed the guerillas across the border into Albania and Yugoslavia. Except for small mop-up operations, the war was over. Superior manpower, materials, the military genius and coordinating ability of General Van Fleet, and a series of conflicts within the guerilla high command led to a guerilla defeat. Many stumbling blocks had been overcome, and the break in America's outer defense ring had been mended, at a cost of over \$350 million.

A great victory had been won by the use of force. Faced by the danger of Soviet expansion, the United States found the system of collective security a weak reed to lean upon. The United Nations was organized for the purpose of maintaining world peace through discussion and mediation. As an ultimate goal, all nations were to disarm. Those were ideals for humanity to cherish and work toward, but in reality were impractical. United Nations attempts to solve the Greek border problems indicate beyond any doubt the unsuccessful nature of its program to bring peace and friendship to the Balkans. Two years were devoted to committee investigations and recommendations, but little of a constructive nature was accomplished. We must, however, give credit to the United Nations for publicizing the Greek problem, and thus stirring up public opinion against Communism. It had no power to enforce or even strengthen its propositions. Only under the most ideal of conditions could the United Nations programs have been successful. In Greece it was confronted with an aggressive

power prepared to exploit any weakness. The Soviet Union refused to acknowledge Western proposals after 1945, continued to absorb small eastern European countries, and professed its plans for future acquisitions. How could anyone expect words, without any force other than of a moral nature, to have a positive effect upon the Communists?

The United Nations could muster force only when the member states agreed. In this case, they did not agree. Thereby the United Nations was reduced to an agency of inquiry.

An aid program under the auspices of the United States was the only way to end the guerilla war, and through its show of force, block Soviet expansion.

The United States could have been more diplomatic in the by-passing of the United Nations, but the Presidential message (March 12, 1947) was meant to stir up the nation, and a forewarning, by a letter to the United Nations, would have defeated that purpose. After World War II, Americans became complacent and refused to recognize the dangers of Communism. The President's message made them aware that world peace was threatened. The program as passed by Congress made a concession to the possible growth of United Nations power through the Vandenberg Resolution. Yet, two years passed and no attempt was made by the International Organization to assume the full burden of ending the guerilla problem in Greece. By this silence, the learned men of the United Nations admitted their inability to cope with such a problem. Their hopes lay in the future.

Finances

Greece was never rich in material things. Three factors kept it in a precarious state: (1) adverse world economic policies; (2) lack of competent political leadership; (3) and the intense preoccupation of her people with their own concerns to the exclusion of the national interest. These weaknesses carried over into the postwar world. War damage, the disruption of international trade, and civil war completed the paralysis.

Before the guerilla conflict could be ended, the Greek financial machine had to be revamped. The American Mission began this task by remaking the budget. Greek expenditures for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1948 involved nearly 3,800 billion drachmas, with an estimated 1,900 billion drachmas in receipts. A deficit of such proportions could have been covered only by the printing press, which would inevitably have created hyperinflation and made economic planning useless. The Mission launched a series of studies attempting to remake the budget by planning a cut-back in expenditures and an increase in revenues. As part of their program, each ministry and its expenditures were examined. This resulted in the reshaping of the civil service. Fifteen thousand civil employees were dismissed. Other savings helped pare expenditures twenty-three per cent. The tax experts went to work and increased revenues forty-two per cent. This resulted in the budget deficit being cut from 1,900 billion drachmas to 207 billion drachmas.¹²⁴

¹²⁴Department of State Publication No. 3035 (Washington, 1947), pp. 15-17.

To counter a fear that future Greek budgets would not balance, the Mission established a Currency Committee composed of three Greek, one Britisher, and one American. Its task was to pass on budget plans, expenditures, and the issuance of currency. The American was hired by the Greek government, and he retained his post after June 1948. His program and decisions were formulated by the Mission. He wielded great power, for a unanimous vote was necessary to reach a decision in the Currency Committee. That this power infringed upon the sovereign rights of the Greek nation cannot be questioned. The Greeks gave their assent because only by this temporary compromise of their sovereignty could they assure themselves that they would have any sovereignty to protect in the future.¹²⁵

In the field of taxation, emphasis shifted from consumption and import taxes to income taxes in order that those best able to pay should carry the burden. Previously, Greek business had kept no accounting books. As a result, they had escaped almost all taxes. American tax experts insisted a law be passed forcing all business ventures to keep books. This law was enacted.

Personnel in the Ministry of Finance were ignorant of western methods of taxation, bookkeeping, and economic theories. To remedy this, an intensive educational program was begun

¹²⁵Department of State Publication No. 2939 (Washington, 1947), pp. 9-12.

by the tax experts. At the same time, the whole Ministry of Finance and tax structure was remodeled along American lines.¹²⁶

In an attempt to curb inflation, the Americans tightened credit. Bank lending policies were tightened and plans were made for recalling a portion of all outstanding loans, with the object of compelling industrialists and merchants to use some of their reserves, particularly gold, for making repayment,¹²⁷

With respect to the drachma exchange rate, a heavy overvaluation of the drachma at the official rate of 5,020 to the dollar seriously hampered export recovery throughout 1946 and the first 9 months of 1947. However, in October 1947 the Greek government, with the assistance of the Mission, introduced the exchange certificate system which succeeded in establishing a realistic rate of exchange. Under this system, the official buying and selling rates of foreign exchange remained at their official levels of 5,020 drachmas to the dollar and 20,000 drachmas to the pound sterling. Sellers of foreign exchange to the Bank of Greece and other authorized dealers, received, in addition to the drachma value of such exchange computed at the official rate, exchange certificates which carried no fixed value in drachma terms but were denominated in terms of dollars or sterling.

Demand for such certificates was created by the requirement

¹²⁶House of Representatives Report No. 1505 (80th Cong. 2nd Sess., Washington, 1948), pp. 7-10.

¹²⁷Department of State Publication No. 3035 (Washington, 1947), pp. 17-21.

that all purchasers of foreign exchange present certificates having a face value equivalent to the foreign exchange demanded. Those certificates automatically made up the difference between internal and foreign prices.¹²⁸

The success of the Mission in the financial sphere was hidden until the reconstruction program was well advanced. By June 1948 serious inflation had been averted, and buying power was in part restored. If the United States felt Greece was still in need of direct aid, it would have been continued under Public Law 75, for a threat to Greece was also a threat to American shores. Greece was far from being completely stable, financial help was still needed, but it no longer had to resemble a dole. A program and machinery were installed that permitted Greece to help herself through the European Recovery Program.

Commerce

In 1946, much of the Greek foreign exchange was used to purchase luxury items. It was a lucrative business, and appealed to the few rich Greek families, but it did little to improve the Greek economic conditions. The American Mission decided on a two-fold plan to eliminate that practice. First, an organization had to be created that would control all imports and exports. Second, trade relations between Greece and other countries had to be improved.

¹²⁸Greece Country Study European Recovery Program, Economic Cooperation Administration, (Washington, 1949), pp. 21-22.



9/2

1/2

Germany was the largest importer of Greek semi-luxury items before the war. With that in mind, the Mission signed an agreement with United States Occupation authorities in Germany that provided for the sale of Greek tobacco, olive oil and minerals against purchases of German industrial and chemical items. Similar agreements were signed with France, the United States, Ireland and Great Britain.¹²⁹

A Foreign Trade Administration, under the direction of an American citizen, was created. It was responsible for the planning and implementation of the program of exports, including licensing, and for matters relating to the stimulation and control of exports as well as the distribution of government supplies. Here again was a flagrant violation of Greek sovereign rights.¹³⁰

The logic behind the program was excellent, but the economic condition of the country, the internal disruption, and the lack of purchasing power throughout the world blocked a potentially successful program. It did, however, control imports so that only the most essential items were purchased.

Reconstruction

The Truman Doctrine earmarked 50 million dollars for Greek reconstruction. Principally because of heavy military

¹²⁹Department of State Publication No. 3149 (Washington, 1948), pp. 13-16.

¹³⁰Department of State Publication No. 2939 (Washington, 1947), pp. 9-12; Department of State Publication No. 3025 (Washington, 1947), pp. 15-16; Department of State Publication No. 2957 (Washington, 1947), pp. 6-8.

expenditures, this amount was reduced to \$23,250,000, and a modified program. Plans called for the eliminated projects to be completed sometime after 1948 under supervision of the Economic Cooperation Administration.¹³¹ Six projects concerned the American Mission For Aid To Greece (AMFAG) during 1947-48.

(1) Improved highways and railroads were important to the Greek Armed Forces and to business. Their rehabilitation would provide substantial benefits including: ease in collection and distribution of goods and produce; the lowering of internal costs to Greek consumers; and promotion of an interregional exchange of goods. This phase of reconstruction was given top priority. Unfortunately, the guerilla conflict and subsequent raids into the central and southern portions of Greece, disrupted work. Partially reconstructed bridges, roads, tunnels, and railroads were destroyed. By June 1948, only thirty-three per cent of highway, three per cent of bridge, and sixteen per cent of railroad construction was completed.¹³²

The program was not an entire failure. Granted, it fell short of expectations, however, the basic plan remained and only internal security was necessary for its success. With the slackening of guerilla efforts in 1948, the Greek government on the strength of the American plan and the

¹³¹Department of State Publication No. 3278 (Washington, 1947), pp. 13-14.

¹³²Ibid., pp. 14, 18.

14-00000

14-00000

14-00000

partially constructed transportation facilities, was able to float loans with comparative ease.

(2) The Corinth Canal was officially opened on July 4, 1948. Small vessels were permitted its use, but more work was needed before it could accommodate deep-draft vessels. The work involved removal of earth-fill and wreckage blasted into the canal by retreating Germans. By July 1948, eighty-four per cent of the restoration was accomplished, and may be summarized as follows:¹³³

	<u>Cubic Yards</u>
Evacuation of earth fill	728,000
Dredging silt	19,000
Concrete for breakwater	720
Ripragging	149
Removal of debris	Tons
Railroad rails	21
Bridge steel	1,200
Railroad cars	Number 105
Railroad locomotives	4

(3) Among the principal parts of Greece and Piraeus, Solonika, and Volos, the total work planned for those parts amounted to the reconstruction of 2,640 linear yards of quay walls, reconstruction of 985 linear yards of breakwater, dredging, removal of numerous wrecked vessels, reconstruction of two dry docks, and the replacement of dock operating equipment. By June 30, 1948 fifty per cent of the work was accomplished, and the ports were opened for reception of needed materials.¹³⁴

¹³³Ibid., p. 14.

¹³⁴Ibid., p. 17.

4

(4) The airfield program undertaken with aid funds was limited essentially to the construction of runways at eight airfields, involving a total of 350,000 square yards of surface, and some improvements to control towers, lighting systems and operational buildings. Their improvement enabled the Greek airforce to operate under all weather conditions against the gucrillas. The program was seventy-one per cent completed by June 1948.¹³⁵

(5) The Mission granted \$1,800,000 for housing development. It was tied up importing lumber to supplement the inadequate production of one million board feet per month. In addition, a sum of eight billion drachmas derived from the sale of goods imported with aid funds, was allotted for housing, labor, and materials. Over ten thousand families were provided with new shelter or with materials to do so. In refugee centers basic shelter was provided for 7,600 families. The program was successful, and in most instances would have been adequate, but the problem of coping with 600,000 refugees innundated the Mission's valiant efforts.¹³⁶

(6) From 1946-48 Greek industry operated at sixty-five per cent of its prewar level. Scarcity of fuel and raw materials, a destroyed transportation system, a poorly trained labor force, worn-out machinery and internal disruption stymied their efforts to expand. It was also a Greek belief that the United States and Great Britain were

¹³⁵Ibid., p. 18.

¹³⁶Ibid., p. 20.

withholding the development of Greek industry for their own benefit. They could not understand that industry did not grow over night, but was an evolutionary process, that saw one step leading to another.¹³⁷ Only the power and cigarette industries operated above prewar levels, and did so without aid from the Mission.

The limiting factors to industrial development had to be removed before industry could develop, and it was to that direction that the Mission applied its efforts. It met with some success. New attitudes and skills were developed through educational programs, machines were imported for the textile industry, the transportation system was improved, and new power stations were established with water and new lignite deposits providing the energy. By June 1948 the Greek government was able to initiate a long-range plan for industrial development under the European Recovery Program (E.R.P.).¹³⁸

Government

The occupation of Greece during the war took a heavy toll on the efficiency of the country's civil administration, and to a considerable extent undermined the confidence of the people in the administrative efficiency of their government. Civil administration was disorganized and overly centralized, the number of civil servants were greatly in excess of requirements, and their morale was

¹³⁷C. A. Munkman, op. cit., pp. 131-34.

¹³⁸Department of State Publication No. 3278 (Washington, 1947), pp. 22-23.

148

low because of poor salaries. The existing government machinery was not capable of fulfilling its proper role. With those conditions in mind, the Mission began to reorganize the government so it could best benefit from American aid.

The Mission addressed its efforts to reorganizing, simplifying, and decentralizing the government; to improving the civil service; and to revising educational training methods. To assist in achieving their objectives, the Greek government, upon Mission advice, established by law the Greek-American Committee on Government Organization, composed of top administrative officials, to work with members of the Mission on administrative methods and techniques. During the year, the Mission made surveys, expanded and strengthened the number of ministries, cut the number of civil servants and the pension rolls, and recommended that local officials have power to run local affairs. The need for centralization in times of stress hampered the decentralization process.¹³⁹

Agriculture

Greek requirements for bread grains, mainly wheat, approximated 1,100,000 tons per year. A partial failure of the 1947 crop left a deficit approaching 600,000 tons, to be met by imports. The bread grains were imported by the Mission under careful control and supervision, making possible the maintenance of adequate, although austere,

¹³⁹Ibid., p. 31.

living standards throughout Greece. Steps were immediately taken to improve the 1948 crop, including seed distribution, provision for fertilizer and pesticides, application of modern techniques involving seed preparation and weed killing. The crop was estimated to total 775,000 tons, or ninety per cent of the prewar average normally planted to wheat. (See Figure 3)¹⁴⁰

Figure 3

Greek Agricultural Production, Prewar, 1947, 1948

Measure - thousands of tons

	1935-38 Average	1947 Final	1948 Prelim.	1948 as a Percentage of 1935-38	
<u>Cereals</u>					
Wheat	767.0	538.2	770.0	100)	Had to im- port be- fore war
Rye	55.0	40.5	40.0	72)	
Neslin	40.0	25.9	30.0	75)	
Total	867.0	644.0	840.0	96)	
Rice	4.1	6.4	5.0	121	
Pulses	77.8	65.3	71.3	91	
Potatoes	196.2	301.0	300.6	153	
Other vegetables	233.0	346.0	420.6	180	
Tables grapes	79.5	80.0	82.0	103	
Melons	202.6	306.0	195.0	96	
Citrus fruit	54.5	77.6	101.0	185	
Other fresh fruit	75.6	160.0	167.0	220	
Currants dried	158.2	76.8	101.0	63	
Sultanos dried	28.6	23.0	22.0	77	
Rozaki dried	5.0	1.6	1.0	20	
Figs dried	28.6	25.3	26.0	91	
Nuts	22.7	45.0	48.0	211	
Olive oil	112.7	145.0	60.0	53)	Major Prewar Exports
Vegetable oil seeds	12.1	12.0	13.4	110)	
Wine	372.0	355.0	370.0	99)	
Tobacco	60.0	46.8	39.5	66)	
Cotton	44.3	34.8	NA	NA	

Greek Country Study, Economic Cooperation Administration
(Washington, 1949), p. 13.

A well drilling program was sponsored by the Mission. Its purpose was to increase ground water supplies available for agricultural use. Ten American well drillers set up a

¹⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 23-24.

200

training program for the Greeks in modern drilling techniques. By June 1948, thirty wells had been completed, twenty-five rigs were in operation, and additional equipment including pumps, diesels, and well casting was on the way.

Some months ago the writer asked the Greek Embassy in Washington, D. C. for their government's opinion of the American Aid program. This is the essence of their reply.

...the outcome of the struggle would have been doubtful had not the United States come to the assistance of Greece. With the logistic support from the United States, the Greek Army was reorganized and managed, after three years of active warfare, to crush the Communist rebellion....

The effect of economic and technological assistance from the United States upon the Greek economy can best be judged if we say that, without this aid, Greece might not even be a free nation today....

Chapter VIII

Conclusions

United States interest in Greece was strategic. Modern weapons and unsettled world conditions forced the President and State Department to consider an outer ring of defenses. Greece was part of that ring, and could not be sacrificed to Communist expansion without impairing the safety of the United States. American strength evolved from Western nations looking to her for leadership and also from her great military machine. The sacrifice of Greece to the Communists would end Western respect for the United States. Thus, the Truman Doctrine aimed not only at saving Greece but at building up a bloc to resist Soviet pressure.

President Roosevelt promoted collective security. He visualized a United Nations in which the dominant powers would be Russia, the United States, Great Britain, and China. The cooperative efforts of the Allies during the war helped foster the concept, but Americans were leary of its effectiveness, for many remembered the failures and insults suffered by the League of Nations. The idea was finally accepted, except for a few die-hards. Between 1944-46, it became obvious that the United Nations could not cope with major international problems. The American people were not prepared to make a shift from their so recently adopted policy of collective security. The United

Nations was more in accord with their idealism in the field of foreign affairs than was the bolder, more costly, and less Utopian policy of containment outlined by George Kennan. World War II made the United States leader of the western world, but the people were not ready to accept the position. President Roosevelt's concept called for lesser sacrifices. A disinclination to shoulder international problems was the reason why the Truman Doctrine appeared so frightening. Truman emphasized that the United States must assume the leader's responsibilities if it wished to survive, and that included an active part in world affairs aimed toward blocking Communist expansion. This doctrine reduced dependence upon the United Nations, and leaned toward the concept of a balance of power that revolved around the United States.

The message also indicated that for the first time, the United States was to interfere in European problems during peacetime. Americans were told this was necessary, for geography no longer isolated the United States from European problems and the threats of attack. Interference in Europe clashed with the American tradition of self-determination. Yet, the United States now faced a very real possibility that the world was to be reorganized in a fashion that was inimicable to American economic and security interests.

In the past, American security was based on geography, not international experiences, and as a result, American foreign policy never matured. During the 1930's and early 1940's, the government frantically searched for an approach

to world affairs. The United Nations was its scapegoat. It proved ineffective and was by-passed. The Truman Doctrine grew from that atmosphere. Oscillations in policy emphasized that the State Department was groping for a policy.

America's new program was similar to those offered by the Soviets. The United States entered Greece peacefully, by request, and then tied Greece to her economic system by making her dependent upon American resources. The Soviets entered a country by the threat of her military, or by opening the door by means of winning eternal support through the appeal of her Utopian plans to people who were underfed and who sought quick and easy solutions. However, her plan was also to make satellites economically dependent. Thus, economic ties were the key to modern strategic defenses.

Throughout history, the United States has promulgated a policy of non-interference on the sovereign rights of nations. However, there are numerous occasions where the United States did violate those sacred rights. An excellent contemporary example is Greece. America controlled the Greek financial, commercial, reconstruction, and civil programs. An attempt was made to hide American intervention under a cloak of propaganda, emphasizing that the American program was based on lines established by the Greek government. Despite the excuses, the United States did violate the sovereign rights of Greece by dictating policy for its own benefit. In spite of being guilty to the charge of intervention, the Truman Doctrine, as represented by Public

Law 75, was successful, for it laid an economic foundation for long-range reconstruction programs, and kept Greece from falling into the Soviet orbit.

The new concept of world leadership and intervention so far appears successful. It can only be judged by its immediate economic successes. The stress and strain of time must be met before truly objective conclusions can be drawn.

1551

Bibliographical Note

Primary Materials

A study of the Truman Doctrine was accomplished through the use of innumerable government and United Nations documents. The Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Report of the FAO Mission For Greece (Washington, 1947), provides an excellent picture of the agricultural and political situation in Greece during 1946. No less important is the Economic Cooperation Administration, Greece Country Study European Recovery Program (Washington, 1949). It provides a graphical summary of the Greek economy from 1938-50. A supplement, Economic Cooperation Administration, Country Data Book: Greece (Washington, 1952), continues verbally and graphically the history of the Greek economy to 1952. International Labour Office, Labour Problems in Greece (October 1946 - November 1949) (Geneva, 1949), is a classic depicting the severe unemployment problem that confronted the Greek government during the Truman aid program.

A large portion of the paper was devoted to United Nations efforts to quell the Greek guerilla problem. An overall coverage is provided by the Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-47 (Lake Success, 1947), and the Yearbook of the United Nations 1947-48 (Lake Success, 1948). A Commission was dispatched by the United Nations Security Council to investigate the problem in 1946. Its conclusions are titled Report to the Security Council by the Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents,

Vols. I - II - III (Lake Success, 1950). The United Nations General Assembly dispatched a second Commission to investigate the guerilla problem in 1947. Its progress can be followed by using: Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (A/574) (Lake Success, 1947); Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (General Assembly, 3rd Sess., Supplement No. 8, A/574) (Lake Success, 1948); Supplementary Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (General Assembly, 3rd Sess., Supplement No. 8A, A/644) (Paris, 1948); Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (General Assembly, 4th Sess., Supplement No. 8, A/935) (Lake Success, 1949); and Report of the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (General Assembly, 5th Sess., Supplement No. 11, A/1307) (Lake Success, 1950). The United Nations and the Problem of Greece, Department of State Publication No. 2909 (Washington, 1947) is the best summary account of early United Nations efforts in Greece. An excellent chronology of United Nations participation in Greece can be found in Greece and the United Nations 1946-49, Department of State Publication No. 3645 (Washington, 1949). Several documents warrant recognition for their usefulness in completing the story of United Nations efforts in Greece. They are: Report of the Allied Mission to Observe Greek Elections, Department of State Publication No. 2522 (Washington, 1946); Problems of Greece, Korea and Palestine, Department of State Publication No. 3417 (Washington, 1949); The General Assembly and the Problem of Greece, Department of State Bulletin, Supplement Vol. XVII,

No. 440A (Washington, December 7, 1947); The United Nations and the Problem of Greece, Part I, The United Nations Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XVII, No. 423 (Washington, August 10, 1947); The United Nations and the Problem of Greece, Part II, The United Nations Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents: The Evidence, Conclusions, and Proposals of the Commission, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XVII, No. 423 (Washington, August 24, 1947); and The United Nations and the Problem of Greece, Part III, The Security Council and the Report of the Commission, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XVII, No. 427 (Washington, September 7, 1947).

The furor evoked by the Presidential speech of March 12, 1947 (Truman Doctrine) raised numerous questions regarding American Foreign Policy. Arguments for and against this new concept are found in House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Open Hearings on House Report 2616, A Bill to Provide for Assistance to Greece and Turkey, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 1947). The arguments in the secret sessions of the Foreign Relations Committees are found in Senate Report No. 90, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 1947), Senate Report No. 1017, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, 1948), House Report No. 1505, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, 1948), and House Report No. 314, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, 1947).

The principle sources that critically examine every aspect of the Truman Aid Program are the Presidential Reports to Congress on Assistance to Greece and Turkey:

Department of State Publication No. 2957 (Washington, 1947);
Department of State Publication No. 3035 (Washington, 1948);
Department of State Publication No. 3149 (Washington, 1949);
Department of State Publication No. 3278 (Washington, 1949);
Department of State Publication No. 3371 (Washington, 1949);
Department of State Publication No. 3467 (Washington, 1949);
Department of State Publication No. 3594 (Washington, 1949); and
Department of State Publication No. 3674 (Washington, 1949).

Aid to Greece and Turkey A Collection of State Papers, Department of State Publication 2802 (Washington, 1947) is an excellent summary of the development of the Truman Doctrine, its goals, successes, the American position toward aid to Greece, and the Soviet view of this new program. Our Foreign Policy, Department of State Publication No. 3972 (Washington, 1950) is a critical evaluation of United States Foreign Policy before World War II and attempts to evaluate American policy in the postwar world, emphasizing the need for aid to under-developed and threatened areas. Following is a group of documents that present a more rounded picture of the Truman Aid Program to Greece. To comment on every document would cause repetition of what has already been said, however, each provided a little to the total product and cannot be omitted. Problems of United States Foreign Economic Policy, Department of State Publication No. 2750 (Washington, 1947), Recommendations on Greece and Turkey The President's Message to Congress, Department of State Publication No. 2785 (Washington, 1947), The Development of the Foreign Reconstruction Policy of the United States, Department of State Publication No. 2912

(Washington, 1947), Aid to Greece Procurement of Military Equipment and Supplies, Department of State Publication No. 3105 (Washington, 1947), Relief Assistance Agreement Between the United States of America and Greece, Department of State Publication No. 2923 (Washington, 1947), Peace, Freedom, and World Trade, Department of State Publication No. 2789 (Washington, 1947), The Greek Aid Program Department of State Publication No. 2939 (Washington, 1947), Economic Cooperation Agreement Between the United States of America and Greece Under Public Law 472, Department of State Publication No. 3291 (Washington, 1948), Receiving American Foreign Policy Since 1945, Department of State Publication No. 3984 (Washington, 1950), The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 1945-51, Department of State Publication No. 4446 (Washington, 1952).

Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Year of Decisions, I (New York, 1955) and Memoirs by Harry S. Truman Years of Trial and Hope, II (New York, 1956) provide the personal contact necessary for tracing the evolution of the Truman Doctrine. The germ of resistance to Soviet expansion was sowed by the Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal, The Forrestal Diaries, ed. Walter Millis (New York, 1951) and nurtured by Arthur Vandenberg, The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg, ed. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (Boston, 1952). The memoirs, diaries and papers indicate clearly the position of the Truman administration. Also in evidence is the apathy of the American people toward foreign policy.

Secondary Materials

For an excellent general survey of world affairs, the Council on Foreign Relations, The United States in World Affairs 1946-47 (New York, 1947), and Council on Foreign Relations, The United States in World Affairs 1947-48 (New York, 1948) were used. Their documentation and bibliographies were a convenient guide to literature of the period. To counter the language barrier between English and Greek, Floyd A. Spencer, Near Eastern Consultant to the Library of Congress, wrote a short history of Greece from 1938-50, War and Postwar Greece An Analysis Based on Greek Writings (Washington, 1952). It was compiled solely from Greek sources, and proved invaluable for understanding the problems and attitudes of the Greek people. It is the author's opinion, and that of the Greek government, that the best secondary account of American Aid to Greece is C. A. Munkman, American Aid to Greece A Report on the First Ten Years (New York, 1958). Its one fault is the absence of documentation, however, Mr. Munkman was an accountant on the staff of the American Mission for Aid to Greece, and his personal knowledge of the program has enabled him to relate the story behind the scene. An English author Bickham Sweet-Escott, Greece A Political and Economic Survey 1939-53 (Suffolk, England, 1954) attempts a study similar to Mr. Munkman's. The book is well documented and contains an excellent bibliography. It must receive special commendation for its coverage of the Greek political scene. Greek history is set in tradition. One is made aware of this and the problems it presents by reading

William Hardy McNeill, The Greek Dilemma War and Aftermath (New York, 1947), Frank Smothers, William McNeill, and Elizabeth McNeill, Report on the Greeks Findings of a Twentieth Century Fund Team which Surveyed Conditions in Greece in 1947 (Vermont, 1948), and William Hardy McNeill, Greece: American Aid in Action 1947-56 (New York, 1957). The three books should be read to obtain the temper of the period, but lack of documentation emphasizes the reading should be done critically. L. S. Starvianos, Greece: American Dilemma and Opportunity (Chicago, 1952), forwards a Leftist interpretation. He criticizes the British and American governments for their inability to better the position of the Greek people. His interpretation discounts the absence of cooperation on the part of the Greeks. The machinations of the State Department always leave the layman in a state of confusion. James M. Jones, in Fifteen Weeks (February 21 - June 5, 1947) (New York, 1955), has done much to dispel the confusion. He traces the development of the Truman speech (March 12, 1947), and in doing so bares the inefficiency of the U. S. State Department. Bipartisan policy was important to President Truman. For an understanding of that concept one should read Cecil V. Crabb, Bipartisan Foreign Policy Myth or Reality (Illinois, 1957), and Lewis W. Koenig, The Truman Administration: Its Principles and Practice (New York, 1956). The Truman Doctrine was a radical change in American Foreign Policy. An analysis of such general studies on American Foreign Policy as: Hollis W. Barber, Foreign Policies of the United States (New York, 1953);

Ruhl J. Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy (New York, 1947); and Hans J. Morgenthau, and Kenneth Thompson, Principles and Problems of International Politics (New York, 1952), make this evident.

ROOM USE ONLY

~~MAR 2 1961~~

APR 18 1961

~~MAY 25 1961~~

~~MAY 12 1961~~

~~OCT 2 1961~~

~~MAY 21 1961~~

NOV 5 1961

~~DEC 1 1961~~

~~NOV 21 1961~~

~~MAY 1 1962~~

MAY 26 1961

~~MAY 29 1961~~

~~OCT 12 1961~~

~~NOV 13 1962~~

~~MAY 1 1962~~

~~MAY 1 1962~~

~~MAY 18 1962~~

JAN 6 1965

ROOM USE ONLY

MICHIGAN STATE UNIV. LIBRARIES



31293105851186