. -. .5 ,5 .5 ..._,........-.~5cum-555150001thnuflwm 0 AGRICULTURAL BARRIERS T ' CULTURE AND CUSTOM MODERNIZATION IN JAVA VEHICLE FORSOCIAL MOBILIZATION PUBLIC HOUSING IN SINGAPORE Research Paper for the Degree of M. A. MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSI‘IY 'JUUE G-RIFFING 1975 .5. .5:.....lo... ’a.r...oa...5.5- %..5..1555.o- ’59... _ 4 UN . : ._ _. .........._.:..........2523.6 . _ . . . .o 5 5* . . . . .5. .. . :55. r555 .9 I ._ . . 5.5.1.». an...» 5.. 5 5 .55 5 .5. 1.‘ .- . .. .. . :45... .._ “5 .51p’3. . . .. . .....5.5. . 5ww555u11.7.5. 7?. . . . . . :5, . .51 . W5.J5.u. flux... . . .. . . 555‘ . 5 ... _ . . . . 5 .. 5 . .5451...“ o .45! .mwic5n55 5 v.1 . . 5 5o. Iéor‘ J.“ .5 ”a. o 5 . 5 . 5. . 5 . ,5. ~...o.o. .65.... ”I. #5515 I . . . . . 5. .5. .. . ....J.... .31.. bit. (tour ..5l..5é.3vu u . . 5. .5. 5.2.“) .51! _ . . r. .5 . 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I5 I I 5 l I IA 55 _ 5 5 . o I :5... ._.5.—'..._n...5.-. 55.7.5551 5P5 .. :I . . 5... .0. .2... £0 55.....53' 53.5 5—.555555'Ol5b155. .‘Rv .‘.l.. ‘ciwol .2... $3.... a“. .2... fig??? .35... 131 E5} u:1117311111111171117m:m: , 3 3 10616 3144 ' CULTURE AND CUSTOM: BARRIERS TO AGRICULTURAL MODERNIZATION IN JAVA By Julie Griffing A RESEARCH PAPER Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS College of Social Science 1975 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF MAPS AND DIAGRAMS ..................... 1 LIST OF TABLES ........................... ii PREFACE CHAPTER I. II. III. IV. oooooooooooooooooooooooooooooo iii INTRODUCTION ....................... 1 Theme of the Study Focus and Objectives Data Limitations Organization of the Study THE SETTING ........................ 7 INVOLUTION: THE COLONIAL LEGACY ............. 9 Dual Economic Structure Sugar, Rice, and Society in Central Java RURAL MODERNIZATION IN THE JOGJAKARTA REGION ....... 22 The Situation REPELITA I and INPRES TheK Kabugaten Program The Desa Program BIMAS Revised Summary of New Programs Modernization and Small Farm Size Land Use and Tenancy Yields Tenancy Tebasan and Bawon amon foesa Imp ations for Change CONCLUSIONS ........................ 51 Map l Map 2 Map 3 Map 4 Map 5 Diagram l LIST OF MAPS AND DIAGRAMS Page_ Main Estate Coffee Divisions .............. 18 Main Estate Tea Divisions ............... 18 Main Estate Rubber Divisions .............. 19 Main Estate Sugar Divisions .............. 19 Population Density Java 1970 .............. 19a The Petukan System ................... 41 Table Table Tebie Table Table Table Table Table Table Table Table LIST OF TABLES Area Harvested and Milled Rice Production in Indonesia 1958 - 1967 .................. Culture System Sugar and Rice Rotation .......... Total Population and Land Use, Three Sample Vi1lages in Klaten .................... Land Ownership by Type of Owner or Cultivator ...... Ricefields by Type of Ownership and Size of Farm, Three Sample Villages, Klaten .............. Farm Size and Yield ................... Returns to Tenants Under Various Tenancy Agreements . . . Labor Used (Male and Female and Total) Per Hectare of Rice per 4 - 5 Month Crop, Yields in Stalk Paddy, Jogjakarta. Java, 1971 .............. ii Page 36 36 38 39 43 49a kn tw be my an: PREFACE This study is, in part, a result of study and field work carried out in the Jogjakarta region for the period of March 21 to April 7, 1973, under the direction of the American Universities Fieldstaff— University of Hawaii. Enrolled as a student at Gadjah Mada University during this period of study, I was exposed to a wide range of study of the problems of the region and was given access to the various government.agencies, both regional and national, concerned with moderni- zation of the agricultural sector. I was also a participant in several trips into the villages for direct field experience and interviews with the farmers and extension workers. Since returning to East Lansing, I have maintained my interests in the "green revolution" in Java. The knowledge and interests of Java's problems have grown over the past two years. Much has not been recorded in this study, but primarily because of length limitations. In the future, it is my hope to expand my research and writings on what is considered to be a very important topic of agricultural modernization in Indonesia--the barriers of custom and culture. of We till the PM Inc 01’ as 01" 5111' for the and CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Indonesia is one of the world's poorest countries. Per capita income is around US$100 per year and the country has the lowest caloric intake per capita of any country in the world.1 Indonesia posseses all the indicators of underdevelopment: three-fourths of its labor force is in the agricultural sector, there are high levels of unem- ployment and under-employment, high birth rates and high infant mortal- ity rates, low ratios of doctors and dentists and few visible artifacts of the industrial world such as electric lamps and automobiles. The western traveller in Java, Indonesia's "heartland", quickly notices the ubiquitous presence of extreme poverty and can readily visualize the pOpulation density statistics as a part of Javanese reality. The growing of rice consumes most of the rural labor force and its production constitutes the foundation of the national economy. This is especially true for the island of Java where two-thirds of the Indonesian population live on only 9 percent of the total land area of Indonesia. Java is of the utmost significance in growing of rice as indicated by Table 1. Java cannot be studied in the usual terms of "development" that are applied to the Third World countries. In spite of its fertile volcanic soils, human resources, 150 years of foreign investment. and its rich cultural history, Java is far from the "take-off" stage and is faced with an accumulation of problems and set-backs. The rural infrastructure built up by the Dutch colonial .nnop 53ch so: 3323 azure m~._ NN.P m~._ mm.m om.¢ N_.m mm.“ m¢.m m_.¢ Kemp o_._ o_.F m_.F em.m Km.m Aw.¢ _o.u ~¢.m mF.¢ mom_ mF._ m_._ NN._ mm.“ m¢.m ¢¢.¢ me.o mo.m mo.m mom_ _N._ _N.F ON._ EN.m N¢.m om.¢ ow.o cm.~ mm.m _mm_ o_._ m_._ N_._ mm.m «N.m mo.m m_.N mm.N mm.¢ omm_ N_._ ©_.F OF._ mo.“ mm.~ e“.e om.o me.~ Fm.¢ “mm, ¢_._ mm._ mo._ _m.u N¢.N mm.e Km.m mm.N mp.¢ mmm_ m_._ mP._ op._ _m.u mm.~ me.e N¢.© m¢.N No.¢ mmmp A.m;\mcopv - i A.m; mcoe__wsv A.m; meow__wev mwmm: m>mn o_mmc m>mn mwmm: m>ma noncH muwmgso m>mn noucH muwmpao m>ma aoucH muwmuao m>mn Lam» nFmv> - .eowuusvogm umpmm>gmz mmg< onpuzooma muHm QMJAHZ oz< omhmm>moz "cacao... .OVONO— is. a.o 0 $2 36ch fl 9 533m .afi... 5:223; 222 Mcmxflm a; 2236 g NW ......s 32%.“? on? .. . .m .. “Q. m coo-cocooofloo on a” o o o o o. o .0“ . / o ’ t o o - coco-o- . .ouuooo%ouuooo no u... - n... ”0...... no... 0 o no a o o c o .0. . oooooo 0 "hence no Von. on“ no... a o o o o o o o a”... \ . . .0. o "may“..muuo o o o... . . \ . 05w... . o . s . 523.1 3:6 d) V-v- 1 ‘OJL' Enema con 226m coo comm Shops and Resndential Singapore City Center 1953 21 13:0 l .9100 yordg fi J Griffing adapted from SlT Records - shop- houses -j residential fl . i'lllll‘l'l‘» shops 19 20 were built on street frontages of 16' and depths of up to 200' and extended vertically from two to four stories: rooms were added and rooms were subdivided again and again into tiny airless cubicles. Female immigration started in the 1930's and when families began to form and settle in the city, the conditions in the slums worsened. The buildings were old and dilapidated, the first floor used for shops or other commercial uses, and the upper floors used as living quarters. The original living quarters were intended as dormitories for the male population and not as family living quarters. Entrance was gained by stairs and doors to the room opened from a dark hallway. Windows were on the front of the building and not usually placed in back, resulting in poor ventilation. “As more and more families settled in the city, living conditions deteriorated further: families literally lived under the beds of other families, and densities of five families to a room were common."22 Need- less to say, living conditions were appalling. Soo Chin Bee, a relocated seamtress said that she, her husband, mother-in-law, sister-in-law and five children lived in a room above a dish shop on Cross Street and shared a communal kitchen and one toilet with 17 other persons.23 People spilled out into the narrow streets where they conducted their economic and social activities, using the living quarters only as places to sleep. Sanitation was poor and in some cases nonexistant. "Old Chinatown", south of the Singapore River and adjacent to the city's central business district occupied about one square mile land and 130,000 persons lived in the shop-houses where densities ranged up to 21 1,000 persons per acre.24 From this core, Chinese shop-houses, built in typically Southern Chinese style with narrow fronts and covered walk- ways, gradually extended along all major roads and formed urban links to former rural villages. The peripheral land was once used for market gardening but after the 1930‘s squatter colonies rapidly spread in the peripheral areas behind the permanent shop-house buildings and by 1955 more than 400,000 people were living in 3333p4huts, built of wood, and scrap materials, within the city limits.25 By 1960, the city was literally enclosed by a ring of squatter settlements, wedging into every available nook and cranny, stretching across vast expanses of underdeveloped land, straddling swamps and overflowing into cemeteries, railway land, derelect mansions, and factory 'backyards'.26 The masses of the Chinese and Indian populations in Singapore were compressed into the Central City shop-houses and g33gp_huts of the squatter slums. They were already a sophisticated, highly urbanized group who mere readily accepted the crowded conditions than the relatively unurban- ized Malay groups. The Malays settled in kampongs, or neighborhoods located on the perimeters of the Central City, or in open spaces within the city. The kampongs were laid out in rows of wood and thatched or zinc-roofed houses on raised platforms. One nuclear family per house was typical with relatives residing on the same “street" within the kampong. Narrow ditches running behind the houses received waste and each kampong house usually had a small garden plot for vegetables and a few coconut trees which were owned by individuals. Employment activities were carried on outside the kampong and it was unusual for a Malay to conduct business within the home. A central well provided the 22 fresh water needs of the community and this area of the well also functioned as a social gathering place for women and children and as a marketplace for hawkers selling food and Small sundry items. The kampongs usually had a mosque where the men congregated to carry on social activities. In this spatial and morphological composition, the Malay kampong represented a distinct racial and ethnic grouping. RENT CONTROL AND THE TAX STRUCTURE Rent control and the tax structure were two serious barriers to the maintenance of existing properties or to the expansion of rental properties in the Central City area in the post-war period. The Rent Control Ordinance of 1947 declared it unlawful for any landlord to charge any tenant, whether business or residential, "in excess of the standard rent which has been fixed by the Rent Conciliation Board or the 27 The law also gave tenants rent of the premises as of August 1, 1939." the status of "statutory tenants," meaning in effect that landlords could not evict tenants in order to convert the use of the property, to make improvements or to bring in new tenants who would pay a higher rent. Rents did not keep up with the actual increases in the market value of the property under the Rent Control Ordinance and landlords showed no willingness to increase the value of their pr0perties through improve- ments under the restrictive law. The other problem of tax structure also mitigated against property improvement or maintenance. A general rate of 36 percent per annum tax was charged on rental properties, calculated on the gross rent receipts. 23 Koh says that this rate, although generating 13 percent of government revenue (1967 figures) that could be reinvested in public housing development discouraged the maintenance and development of properties by private owners and developing firms.28 A United Nations Mission reported that strict conformity to the tax requirement frustrated any new rental transaction for few ventures paying 36 percent of annual value would leave enough for operating expenses and mortgage interest and still justify investment of fresh cash.29 Summary The extreme crisis in housing in Singapore was a result of the colonial zoning laws and economic systems, and led to the creation of some of the world's worst slums. The Rent Control Ordinance and the tax structures were originally designed to protect the tenant and to pump money into housing which would improve the conditions of the masses of people. Until 1965 the effects of the rent and tax laws actually worked against the poor, working class, and lower middle classes of Singaporeans. The pre-independence housing situation has been discussed in its spatial terms, but the consequences of the housing distribution in socio-economic terms were to prove to be a major stumbling block in the processes of social mobilization and the development of a national identity. 24 SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PRE-DEVELOPMENT HOUSING DISTRIBUTION It is a matter of historical record that Spatially reinforced ethnic exclusiveness was a deliberate product of colonial times in Singapore. Even had colonialism not deliberately fostered the separation of ethnic groups,the prevailing economic conditions would have been a powerful force of separatism. Iain Buchanan summarizes the effects of economic instability: "Assimilation, and the willingness to assimilate, presuppose a sense of national belonging and a sense of economic security. When both are lacking, one reaches for the familiar--and in a society such as Singapore's, the familiar is the communal group, the people who speak the same language, come from the same home province, or belong to the same clan. Economic insecurity does not encourage assimilation-- and in this respect Singapore merely dramatizes tendencies among immigrants in many of the wgsld's large cities, both Western and non-Western." OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALIZATION Occupational specialization according to ethnic group membership in Singapore is usually associated with residential localization, and is a consequence of colonial policies. The tendency to specialize can also be ascribed to some other general factors: patterns of economic activities, social and cultural prejudices, and influence of the ethnic community in obtaining jobs. The Chinese brought with them a great skill for enterprise in Singapore. Once the pioneer immigrants from China acquired some form 25 of skills and livelihood, later arrivals of the same clan or dialect tended to concentrate around the established nuclei. The Chinese sense of kinship consolidated clan and dialect associations and entrenched the lines of occupational specialization. Skills were learned within the kin group and employment was within the group. Many kin groups became very wealthy, particularly when membership was drawn from the established merchant class. Poorer Chinese tended to dominate lower grade occupations, such as the women construction laborers of the Saam Shui dialect group,31 and Heng Hua trishaw-pedalers mutual aid association. These groups are small minority dialect groups, whose members concentrated within the same spatial territory in the city and whose smallness combined with the relative poverty of its members to enhance the sense of group identity. The Malays were less assertive than the Chinese and were largely satisfied with filling menial and subordinate servicing roles within the economy and particularly within the colonial government administra- tion. It has already been mentioned that the Malays prefer not to conduct business within the kampong and culturally preferred to work outside of the residential neighborhood. The Malays did not tradition- ally settle near the city center and today they still occupy some noticeably Malay areas. Early Malay settlement was almost entirely rural around the eastern coast and the interior of the island, even though they worked in the city. 0 The Indian and Pakistani influence within the Singapore economy and professions is out of proportion to its numbers. 26 What others could or would not do, the Indians did: railway, road, and port construction: the initial complementing of British police and military forces, and the later maintenance of military bases; lower and middle echelon civil service; and a variety of residual trading activities--or trading activities particularly well developed by Indian merchants such as the import and export of textiles}2 It would seem that the British view of the Indian as a neutral adminis- trator between the rulers and the laboring masses, and the British preference for and trust of Indians due to their long experience in India, combined to give the Indians a superiority in educational oppor- tunities. They were trained for the legal, medical and educational professions, English language for administration jobs, and they also took the lead in trade union leadership.33 Indian settlement orginally concentrated adjacent to the COD-- mostly the financiers, money-lenders, petty traders, and quayside workers, who have been displaced since 1965 to the Anson Road area. The High Street area is still predominantly Indian textile retailers, and the Serangoon area is composed of Tamil merchants and the residences of Indian professionals and bureaucrats. Indians are also located in small concentrations around the old British military complexes in Sembawang.34 Residential localization and economic specialization were two distinctly interrelated factors that served to reinforce specific employ- ment attitudes. In all three major ethnic categories another economic activity, hawking and petty trading, were related to other factors and the overall problem of poverty will be discussed in that context. More importantly, localization and specialization led to the entrenchment 27 of social and political attitudes which were not conducive to national development goals of the independence period. POVERTY AND CULTURE The meaning of "poverty" can be statistically measured and defined as a state of existence. It can also be analyzed as a kind of sub- culture within a broader society. The only statistical definition of poverty ever carried out in Singapore was done in 1953-1954 by Goh Keng Swee, an economist who is now Singapore's Minister of Defense.35 During the same time span a sociologist, Barrington Kaye, conducted a study of the sociological aspects of poverty in Singapore's Old Chinatown.36 Oscar Lewis defined the "culture of poverty"37 and many of his generaliza- tions describe the processes that, in Singapore, worked against the government's national goals, and in fact, impeded attainment of these goals. Official figures for measurement of poverty level have never been , calculated in Singapore. Goh's estimates of under $5175 for a family 38 of five will be accepted for the predevelOpment era. His estimates were based on the costs of maintaining minimum standards of nutrition, clothing, housekeeping, transportation, and rent expenditures. Goh concluded in 1954 that 19 percent of households in Singapore, or 25 39 percent of the population were in poverty. When school expenses were deducted, 24 percent of households were in poverty, or 30 percent of the population.40 The report also estimated that 90 percent of all urban households, or 82 percent of the total population of Singapore, did not earn household incomes exceeding $3400 per month. 28 What were the socio-economic effects of this poverty and near poverty in Singapore? Before development Singapore's economy was heavily tertiary (see page 12), and under-employment was endemic in the Central City.41 The type of under-employment that dominated Singapore was the under-employment of expansion which occurs during periods of economic growth. According to Navarette this kind of under- employment grows out of "the failure of capital and of most complementary means of production to increase at the same rate as the supply of labor in secondary and tertiary activities".42 It is typified by the absorp- tion of immigrants into economic activities having a very low productive value: peddlers of all kinds of goods and services requiring little or no capital outlay, such as vendors of fruit. . .cigars, lottery tickets, newspapers, or else car-washers, bootblacks, porters, waiters, and shop-assistants.43 This kind of under-employment was a reflection of unbalanced growth and capital concentration in the tertiary sector in a population which was predominantly urban. Singapore was never subjected to the pressures of heavy rural migration, or intra-national migration, but rather it was subject to international migration and excess population could not be reabsorbed into a rural hinterland. Although the economy expanded in Singapore, the low labor requirements of the tertiary sector could not absorb excess immigrants. The excess labor was absorbed in the marginal occupations of "hawking" (petty trading), domestic service, shop-assist- ing, short-run transport services, and small-scale industries. All of these activities are marginally productive and marginally profitable. 29 In Singapore hawking was the prime expression of under-employment. It was also an integral part of slum life. In 1954 Kaye estimated that 17 percent of males and 7 percent of females in the slums earned their living solely by hawking.44 Very few hawkers had "beats" outside the slum area and most hawked within their own ethnic community. Goh's survey revealed that of 140 workers, 32 were engaged in hawking as the only means to support a family, and 6 as part-time hawkers.45 In other words, nearly 25 percent of households derived income from hawking. The range of income derived from full-time hawking was S$60 to $5250 per month, but only one (the $250 monthly it is assumed) made over the poverty level of income as determined by Goh. Table IV shows the growth of hawkers in Singapore's total population but does not account for part-time hawking or family members who work labor free in the hawking enterprise.46 Statistics on hawkers tell little in terms of assessing the quality of life or the extent of deprivation. They do not speak of the involu- tionary aspects of hawking or of the protection rackets associated with hawking. What the statistics reveal is one aspect of the extensive under- employment that pervaded Singapore's predevelopment economy. Field observations and interviews in a squatter slum or a Chinatown street will disclose more information about the hawker or stall-keeper then statistics which tend to sterilize reality.47 Hawking was a direct attempt to cope with poverty, a marginal enterprise,in response to marginal living condi- tions. It is a response common to most underdeveloped countries, and is a distortion of the tertiary economy. The success of Singapore's develop- ment schemes, of social mobilization and the reordering of identity was to be measured in terms of the decline of the hawker population. TABLE IV 30 ESTIMATES OF SINGAPORE'S HAWKER POPULATION Year 1931 1950 1957 1962 1967 BETWEEN 1931 AND 1967 Population 557,747 1,048,673 1,445,929 1,732,800 1,955,600 Hawkers 11,000 26,580 37,180 50,000-a 60,000 40,000-b 60,000 Lower figure estimates of Department of Social Studies, University of Singapore, higher figure by Superintendent of the Hawkers and Market Department. b: Lower figure estimated by Minister of Health, higher figure by Teo Eng Siong, M.P., reported in S.T.,8-8-67. Source: Superintendent of the Hawkers and Market Department, Singapore. 31 In analyzing the rationale for Singapore's choices of development options and the perceived need for a spatial reorientation of their population it must always be borne in mind that two different social systems had to be dealt with. The first system was a national framework of institutions and relationships--the social, economic and political structure of an emerging nation, its rationale for its sovereignty, its functional relationships to the geographic region, its external and internal problems and its barriers to development. The second system was represented by its slum life and its people--their economic activities, family and community life, their attitudes, their problems. Both of these systems were symbolically related but each had an identifiable structure into which social, economic, cultural, and political realities were woven into the fabric of a working system. For a long time Singapore's social and economic structure was imbalanced, or in a state of what Buchanan terms "regressive disequili- brium,"48 that prevented sustained and balanced economic growth. The economy was dependent on foreign capital and its needs and heavily tertiary in function, was for long incapable of providing adequate employ- ment opportunities or utilizing skilled labor, and conspicuously displayed a wide diSparity in the distribution of income. The most apparent expression of these features were the slums of Singapore. Within the slums dwelled the "marginal" people of Singapore's economy and privileged society. What was marginal within the broader national framework was institutionalized in the slum,--a complete system geared towards finding security in an insecure economy. 32 If the wider economy and society function within a state of 'regressive disequilibrium', the same cannot so easily be said of slum life. An essential feature of life in the slum is that some form of equilibrium has evolved: some of the most glafing contra- dictions evident in the wider socio-economic structure have been resolved, or at least submerged, within the fabric of slum life. Those who are marginal gravitate together and create the slum, and the slum--in its turn-- helps justify or encourage a host of marginal means of employment to keep such people going. Equilibrium was achieved through the formation of institutions. They established occupational specializations and patterns of spending. They saved and loaned money through their own formal or informal groups, family and clan relationships, which in China had been weakened by poverty but grew stronger in Singapore. Secret societies flourished, as well as political and religious organizations. Most of these groupings were strongly tied to the search for economic security. The definition of security and the means to achieve it differed, however, between the three main ethnic groups. To the Chinese, the search for security meant the differentiation in the division of labor with wives and children often being employed. 50 Associations extended beyond the kin groups: informal tontine groups; people of the same clan or dialect groups or occupations formed asso- ciations and guilds for the purposes of mutual assistance; men formed secret societies in order to establish a group identity, pride, source of income or influence in the business life of the outside community. Also of particular importance to the Chinese slum system was a marked political unity in the predevelopment era. 33 The Malays were the least "urbanized" and "individualistic" in temperament, social life, and economic activities. Even in poverty the Malays maintained a distinct division of labor in the family, with the woman at home and the man providing income. Worship at mosque did not carry the economic implications that Chinese temple worship carried. Kampong solidarity was an ideal, but in terms of Malay poverty, the patterns were rarely achieved.51 The Indian population banded together to protect their traditional lines of occupations and within the temples rationalized their poverty through the spiritual fatalism of Hinduism. One of the results of poverty is the alienation of the poor from the wider society not only by their own attitudes but by the attitudes of the more well-off members of the broader society. Alienation of the poor from broader society has specific features which tend to operate against integration of the poor into the national framework. First, poverty enhances the feelings of economic, social and political unity among the poor. Secondly, the slum institutions operate beyond the realm of the laws of the establishment because poverty encourages and makes economically necessary the avoidance of regulations such as licensing fees and its evasive nature makes surveillance and enforcement of laws nearly impossible. In Singapore, unlicensed hawkers, "pirate" taxi drivers, illegal rice-wine distilleries, opium dens, prostitution, protection rackets, and secret society groups tended to enhance the "outlaw" character of slum life. Third, from this "outlaw" character grows an antagonism towards law enforcement personnel, a suspicious attitude towards the administrative instituions of the establishment 34 and mistrust of government in general. Finally, the alienation of the poor becomes institutionalized in political movements which tend to sharpen the awareness of class differences.52 In Singapore, during the 1950's the Barisan Socialis Party and radical left-wing organizations had strong appeal and a solid base of support among the poor. Even today, while the government has banned the publication of the Barisan Socialis papers and other socialist publications one can obtain mimeograph and outlaw newspapers if known in the community by asking a question, "ada kapar?" (any things), the password for obtaining the newsheets which are written in Chinese. Political repression served to "force" the issues and heighten solidarity in the slum districts of Singapore. The two characteristics of Singapore's slum system which were viewed by the establishment as barriers to social mobilization were its internal coherence and lack of integration with the national society. Oscar Lewis says that the evolution of the "sub-systems“ of security within the poor culture allows them to deal with broader problems that affect their economic security at a local level.53 Those in poverty achieve through their institutions a measure of social security, and a group identity which they would not otherwise have developed. But the processes serve to accentuate the contradictions of the national sys- tems, between the rich and poor. Those who, in the past, became marginally productive through no choice of their own, will, over time, remain mar- ginally productive through their own choice. CHAPTER IV CHOICE OF DEVELOPMENT OPTIONS CONSIDERATIONS Singapore's future expansion as an entrepot was limited by the development in the other Southeast Asian countries of adequate port facilities to provide direct shipping services and thus bypass Singapore. The urgent need for Singapore to diversify its economy was reflected in a rising rate of unemployment--12.5 percent in 1964, combined with entrenched attitudes about the right to remain underemployed., The need for social welfare programs and housing programs were directly related to the question of urban renewal and slum clearance. Thesjpt operational factors were generated by the need to effect a massive social mobilization and build a national identity in Singapore in order to diversify and modernize not only the economy but the society. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew stated Singapore's most urgent need in 1968 as "the need to transform Singapore from a non-cohesive migrant society to an increasingly stable, orderly, and socially cohesive nation-state, willing to work and be aware of its problems."54 Besides the social and economic problems of the slums, the wealthy elite and intellengentsia had established ties in China, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In reality, most of the wealthy Chinese ties were actually in Malaysia with other Chinese kin and much profit outflow went directly into Malaysian Chinese hands to be reinvested in European enterprises.55 Another problem with the intellegentsia was identified as "Chinese 36 chauvinism“ and communism. The Chinese of the upper and middle classes tended to identify with communism because it was seen as being Chinese and because of this tended to promote Singapore as a "Third China".56 By utilizing the talents of the intelligentsia in national development schemes it was thought that the focus of identity would be turned to Singapore as a nation-state, rather than Singapore as an overseas post of China. In his early political career Lee Kuan Yew was pegged as a communist, particularly by American journalists.57 This gross distortion was due to the fact that American educational institutions usually ignores the study of political systems outside the capitalist systems, and that Smericans are indoctrinated to think of terms such as "democratic socialism", "socialism", and "communism" as being synonymous terms. The fallacy of thinking that Lee Kuan Yew was a communist could have easily been corrected by knowledge of the facts. He was a leader, since 1955, of a party that could not have allowed the rise of communism in Singapore because Malaysia, Britain, and Indonesia would have reacted swiftly to this threat and it would have meant the loss of the tertiary sector of the economy, leaving Singapore virtually without any type of major employment sector. At the time of independence U. S. influence in the Southeast Asian region was dominant but Singapore was not much affected until involvement in Indo- china by the U. S. Instead, Singapore's position vis-a-vis international politics was, according to Buchanan, mostly within Britain's sphere of influence: Whilst most of the surrounding region has been drawn decisvely into the domain of the 37 United States' interest, both Malaysia and Singapore have remained largely within Britain's sphere of interest. This naturally meant a strong concern with maintaining non- socialist systems of government and supress- ing left-wing opposition. From independence onwards, both territories have been administered by pro-Western and right-wing regimes. In Singapore, however, the People's Action Party Government has retained the veneer of a peculiar form of 'democratic socialism' -- a unique blend of one-party authoritarianism, bourgeois liberalism, devout anti-Communism, state welfareism, unbrig§ed free enterprise, and Chinese chauvinism. The possibility of the rise of communism in Singapore was viable. The internal problems, particularly the socio-economic conditions in the Central City Area have already been discussed. The choice of development options, the urgency of mobilizing the human resources of Singapore and the development of a national identity was also tied to the external political realities. By early 1966 the official ideology of the government was survival as a nation-state under democratic socialism and capitalism. In the words of the Prime Minister it was stated as possible: It is possible, through trade and the borrowing of technological and capital resources, for democratic socialism with less ruthless methods of human organization to match and even outpace the rate of economic change which communist systems can bring about in under-developed countries. A new society had to be created (see quote page 3) and to do this the Prime Minister said of his government: We shall inject massive amounts of additional expenditure into the public sector. It will be more through voluntary and induced savings, rather than increased taxes. In addition, we shall have 38 loans and grants from abroad. Several projects, originally planned for the middle and late 1970's will be brought forward. Express highways, a second industrial complex like Jurong, land reclamation, earth moving and site preparation with roads, water, power, sewerage for luxury hotels and apartments, accelerating urban renewal with maximum private participation, and a heightened tempo of HousingyBoard builaing of new townsh3p5.5U Rather than wait for a new society to emerge and gradually determine the impact of its social and political institutions on the landscape, the thrust was towards changing the landscape, and hopefully, the society would adjust itself to its environment. PUBLIC HOUSING POLICIES AND THEIR ROLE IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT Singapore Improvement Trust The first statutory planning body in Singapore was created in 1927 with the enactment of the Singapore Improvement Ordinance. The Singapore Improvement Trust was established to implement the provisions of the Improvement Ordinance, and to devise an "improvement plan" for the island, especially the city. This "plan" consisted of a series of cadastral maps which recorded all decisions of the "plan" regarding disposal and use of land, of planning schemes and designs approved by both the Governor-in- Council and the Trust. Written permission had to be obtained from the Trust to lay out any road, street, or backlane or to erect any building which was "contrary to the General Improvement Plan".51 The SIT was also to prepare improve— ment schemes for slum clearance and road improvements. In actuality, 39 the SIT did not succeed either in planning or improving the city because: . the Trust is little more than an authority for devising road improvements. It has certain powers for approving or disapproving what are termed '1ay-outs', a phrase unknown to planning law elsewhere. But these powers are essentially futile. As long as certain elementary require- ments for access (such as prescribing a 36 foot road, which is expensively wide considered as access, but too narrow for a traffic route) are complied with, the Trust has no power to control development. What is required is a plan for the whole island, showing not only roads, as at present, but what land is to be developed, and how it is to be developed, and what land is not to be developed.62 In 1949 the Singapore Improvement Ordinance was amended to allow the SIT to conduct a diagnostic survey of Singapore and submit to the Governor-in-Council a report of the survey and a Master Plan for the entire island. The result of this survey was the Master Plan of 1955. MASTER PLAN OF 1955 The Master Plan was a statutory rather than advisory planning document. Island-wide development was to follow a predetermined plan which was similar to British town-planning traditions and methods. The principal proposals of the Master Plan were: 1) a green belt arcing about the city in order to prevent urban sprawl: 2) the relocation of about 1/6 of the population in the slums; 3) the construction of three New Towns at Jurong, Woodlands, and the Yio Chu Kang Road area; 4) pre- scription for average and maximum net residential densities in each planning area and maximum plot ratio for each block in the Central Area.63 The Plan was to be effective for the years 1958-1972 but was not officially adopted until 1958. The creators of the Master Plan were unable to predict the political and social developments of the 4O post-l959 period and the fact that by l972 the population would exceed their projected 2 million by 240,000 people.64 They envisioned, also, that Singapore's economy would remain primarily dependent on entrepot trade.65 The Master Plan required by law review every five years and this did not occur until late 1965. THE PAP AND NEW DEVELOPMENT POLICIES When the PAP rose to power in the early l960's the unemployment problem in Singapore was serious, 12.5 percent in l963. The rapid rate of natural population increase indicated a future downward trend when young persons entered the labor market. Despite warnings from technol- ogists and development experts, the government pushed the development of the Jurong Industrial Estate at the site of a swamp in West Singapore. An initial emphasis on import substitution was replaced after l965 by a policy of production of goods for foreign export. The role that public housing plays in development was recognized early by the PAP, and especially the role that public housing could play in integrating the various ethnic groups into a cohesive national unit. In Singapore, the historical antecedents and basic legislation already existed when the PAP sought to accelerate the housing program. In the first Development Plan (l96l-l964) housing was allocated 43 percent (S$l53.6 million) of the total social development budget, in the third Development Plan (l968-l972) S$600 million was allocated for an accelerated plan. 4l The problems of the Central City slums have already been discussed. The objective of the urban renewal program, under the direction of the Urban Renewal Department and sub-department of the Housing Development Board, was to generate private investment and employment opportunities in the Central Area.67 In so doing, particular emphasis was given to the human problems caused by dislocation, and in l963 the urban renewal program was temporarily scaled down to allow public housing construction to catch up with the numbers of persons who might be dislocated. PLANNING ORDINANCE OF 1959 Anyone wishing to develop or subdivide land in the Republic of Singapore must abide by the Development Rules.68 Under these rules applications must be made to the Competent Authority. Since l966 the Chief Building Surveyor has been designated as the Competent Authority. Two divisions are under the Chief Building Surveyor, the Development Control Division and the Building Survey Division. All applications for planning and development are processed by the Development Control Division.69 The Prime Minister has appointed a Development Control Committee to assist the Competent Authority in processing the applica- tions from the private sector of development. Both the Competent Authority and the Development Control Committee are required to act "in conformity with the provisions of the Master Plan and any Certified Interpretation Plan".70 The Committee can decide on applications in terms of reference to the Master Plan of 1959 and its amendments and if it sees necessity to change any part of the Master Plan it can only 42 make its recommendations to the Office of the Prime Minister.71 The Prime Minister has his own policy regarding urban modernization in Singapore. Singapore does not have the land resources to accommodate a low profile city. Therefore, the official policy of the Office of the Prime Minister is that all buildings to be used for apartments, hotels, commercial centers, and any other multiple-purpose development shall be no less than 10 stories in height. This has been the policy since l967.71 HOUSING AND DEVELOPMENT BOARD ORDINANCE OF l959 The Housing and Development Board succeeded the Singapore Improvement Trust. The HOB was entrusted with six departments that are responsible for planning, construction, research, resettlement, urban renewal and building maintenance. Empowered with legal and financial clout to carry out the primary functions of the HDB--improvement of living conditions through public housing--the HOB has also engaged in resettlement of farmers, land reclamation on the east coast, and the establishment of 73 a building materials industry. By law, the HDB has the power to plan, and the power to operationalize all aspects of planning. MODIFICATION OF THE 1947 RENT CONTROL LAW The HDB has the power to request the President to direct necessary 74 land acquisitions for development purposes. Landlords may apply to the Tenant's Compensation Board to recover premises from tenants if the premises are: l) situated within a designated development area, and f.75 2) if the landlord intends to develop the premises himsel Once premises are decontrolled the HDB has the power to evict tenants if they 43 fail to comply within 90 days and the power to directly acquire the property if a landlord fails to start development within six months of recovery of possession of the property.76 ‘The landlord must pay the tenants from eight to twelve years rent in compensation once he has applied for recovery of the premises. Business compensation is based on factors such as loss of established clientele, costs of relocating, annual rent paid, and commercial value, if developed, of the property.77 It was expected that the decontrol of premises would take up to seven years for business and twelve for residential, providing Singapore's economic boom remained stable.78 The first rent decontrol area of 80 acres was delimited right in the heart of the city (Shenton Way, Anson Road, Robinson Road area) in February of l970. The implications of the Act were controversial but the HDB proceeded with resettlement. Previous to rent decontrol little headway was made in resettlement of squatters and slum dwellers into HDB flats and this congested core near the port was the area de- signated for development into the "Wall Street of Southeast Asia". Underutilization of this prime land was a direct impediment to economic expansion. The net result of decontrol was inflation of land values in the area.79 LAND ACQUISITION ACT OF l966 According to the Master Plan, by l975 the government would need to own 60 percent of the land on Singapore Island.80 The most obvious question posed was how to legally acquire the land and still uphold 44 the capitalist ideals of private ownership. The Land Acquisition Act of l966 empowered the State to acquire land "for any residential, com- mercial, or industrial purposes".81 This law has been unpopular in Singapore primarily because citizens feel it undercompensates the former land owners, particularly when land is subsequently sold to private developers on a "highest bid" basis. Besides the fact that very little land is sold to private developers, Yeung defends the law because: It is forgotten, however, that the government has put additional investments in its infra- structure. . .Additionally, much of the criticism with regard to compensation has lost its pointed- ness in the light of a recent move adopted by the government to apply very generous compegéation formulae for different types of relocatees. SUMMARY Planning legislation existed when the PAP gained power and provided structure for implementation of bold new programs of development. To overcome barriers to effective operationalization of the laws the PAP implemented corrective legislation, so that planning laws in Singapore provided a structure and legal means for implementing national develop- ment policies. OMWERIV ROLE OF PUBLIC HOUSING IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT To meet the needs Of capital the infrastructure had to be changed as well as the society. The congested Central City was blamed for the 83 for two different reasons. loss of four major investors in 1963, The potential manufacturer decided that the location of the potential labor force in the city was too far away from the industrial site and the finance investors cited lack of building sites near the 080 as reasons for not locating in Singapore. Therefore, decentralization of population was viewed as a single solution to mulitple problems and as crucial to revitalization of the city core. Low cost housing would not only disperse the population to industrial sites but soften the PAP wage controls designed to stimulate investment in the manufacturing sector.84 «V In terms of social mobilization the public housing program was designed to involve a population usually suspicious and cynical about government interests in social and economic welfare in direct participa- tion and receipt of government benefits. This was to be accomplished in two ways: 1) the employment stimulus in the construction sector would immediately lower the unemployment rate and distribute income, and 2) settlement in public housing would materially and esthetically raise the standard of living for thousands of families. Then, hopefully, the public's level of confidence in government would rise.85 46 I The ruling ideology of promoting a strong national identity and reshaping society to fit the needs of industry could also be realized through rapid urban landscape changes and bring about the political stability foreign investors seem to require. Political stability was to be achieved, using public housing as the vehicle, through integration of the various ethnic groups, the breakdown of the slum institutions, and the breakdown of the family system from branch extended to stem extended or simple nuclear units.86 SPATIAL CHANGES AND THE SOCIAL MEANING A comparison of Maps l and 3 shows the 1970 dispersal of population on the island and proposed dispersals. This was of course, contingent on the expansion of the mass transit system, which has been accomplished. The change in the urban profile is most noticeable, from that of a low profile, congested city with narrow streets and back lanes to one of a dispersed, high profile urban landscape with wide Streets and avenues. Density of persons per acre do not seem to be changed in new residential areas from a glance at statistics. Densities in the Central City Area ranged up to 1,000 persons per acre with average densities of 500 persons per acre; in the satellite estates, average densities are still 500 persons per acre.87 It must be remembered that the average housing estate building is 16 stories compared to two to four stories of the shophouses and densities per acre are measured from the ground. Further, land use in the housing estate allows for recreational and park areas, whereas in the Central City areas recreational land use and parks were virtually unknown. Table V shows average land uses in housing estates.88 47 TABLE V AVERAGE LAND USE PERCENTAGES IN HOUSING ESTATES Land Use Percent Residential l8 Recreational Facilities 10 Parks and Open Spaces 22 Roads and Carparks 12 Schools (Including Playgrounds 20 and Sports Arenas) Shopping Centers - 5 Community Centers, Health 5 Clinics, Religious Buildings TOTAL 100 Source: Teh Chang Wan, “Public Housing". In Modern Singapore, Ooi Jin-Bee and Chiang Mai Ding (eds.), (Singapore: University of Singapore, Department of Geography, 1969), p. 178. Table modified from field notes and HDB corrections. 48 3(2 50 (u¢( .w..E 2(083 .mO (u¢( .. .\ \ .“fi'foo I’erhafl S \no\ .\.. it! :3»; / .\. < 35:3!!3.H £30 0 a.“ O 00 2.6:. o o o coo-ocuo-fiOo a. I ...uu............ . 94......Uun ~00 noo~o o f£¢f 0:: 22:20 oooH m_m:cm .TMV\.L§E\\V.. 353-3.. :5 3 w .\ Tait...» meoamm woo comm Ill m¢0m48v2.w Efiyu 38:33. .IEy : I (iflgm ’0. In. on .4232: ) Ugandan” \. ._. noose-0.... .2. 3192.330 zo_._.<._:n_on_ :_m .mo: «0:... -|l| u a o ”muesom 2 3‘23. 38 Slop-Ii 49 , The flats are standardized in floor plan and include self-contained electric and water sewage facilities. Flats are from one to five rooms, excluding kitchen and bathroom/water closet, and are offered as unfurnished. During the first four-year plan flats were let out as rental units, but now are almost exclusively for sale. The government feels that ownership of flats will accomplish three objectives: 1) give the owner a feeling of having roots in Singapore, 2) promote the ideals of private ownership, and 3) stimulate interest in building maintenance.89 Table VI shows area and cost of the seven types of flats.90 The radical improvement in living conditions when compared to the shophouses and attgp_huts should not require documentation. XCity average living space per person was estimated at 3l.2 square feet per person based on all classes of housing, in the HDB flats average space per person is calculated at 66.4 square feet per person, plus the provision of individual kitchens, toilets, running water, and electricity. Diagrams l, 2, and 3 show flat layouts.91 2* Each satellite town is designed to be a self-contained area to meet all human needs, except employment. The estates provide schools, PAP community centers, markets and recreational facilities. Average cost of a round trip to the city for any purpose is approximately S$.80,92 which amounts to $9.60 per week to commute to the Central City for work.93 For the wage earner who nets under S$250 per month this amount is costly. Other trips by family members also add to transportation costs. TABLE VI AREA AND COST OF FLATS Type of Internal Rental _flat__ Floor Area* Per Month 1 Room 230 f.s./21 m.s. S$20 1 Room Improved 353 f.s./33 m.s. S$3O 2 Room 425 f.s./39 m.s. S$4O 3 Room 550 f.s./51 m.s. S$60 3 Room Improved 667 f.s./62 m.s. - 4 Room 900 f.s./82 m.s. - 5 Room Luxury 1300 f.s./121 m.s. - * f.s. = square feet, m.s. = square meters 50 Selling Price Per Unit ** S$3,3OO $54,900 s$6,200 $37,800 s$12,500 S$22,000 **Residents spend an average of 15 percent of their monthly income income for rentals, selling prices of flats are intended at slightly below two years average earnings of purchasers. Source: Data from HOusing Development Board, Singapore, compiled by author. 51 ._.<.: 200m m ,m SSQDDV UOOIUIOD 2<._ invOB F