THE ENACI'MENT OF LEND-LEASE

Thesis For {230 Degree of M. A.
MICHEGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Richard Laughiin MéBane
1958

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THE ENAcmfiENT OF LEND-LEASE

BY

Richard Laughlin McBane

A THESIS
Submitted to the College of Arts and Sciences
Michigan State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1958

Dr.

ACKN O'J'LEDGEI‘J‘V‘IT

I Wish to express my sincere appreciation to

Madison Kuhn for his assistance and criticism in

the writing of this thesis.

TABLE OF CONTZH-ITS

Chapter . Page
I O m E Ii AIID O F "I; A R O O O O O O O O O O O O 1

II. A WORLD SAFE FOR AGRESSION. . . . . . 10
III. THE ARSENAL OE‘DEKOCRACY. . . . . . . 22
A Length of Garden Hose
The Forces Take The Field
The Four Freedoms
H. R. 1776
IV. THE GMLE'S AFOOTQ o o o o o o o o o 0 50
The Best and Simplest Plan
Away From Democracy
The Early Returns
v. IN FREEDOM AND LIBERTY. . . . . . . . 88
With.Humility
The Price of Unity
The First Big Test
VI. THE SECOND ROUND. . . . . . . . . . . 117
Last Call For Lunch
The Gates of Hell
The Barefoot Boy
VII. THE TOGA OF DIGNITY . . . . . . . . . 150

Time Is The Point
Not Quite A Filibuster

VIII. TOWARD RESPONSIBILITY . . . . . . . . 177
APPENDIE‘IX. O O 0 O 0 O O O O 0 0 0 0 O 0 O O O 188

BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195

 

 

I'l‘J. ..

 

 

 

Au.

 

 

CHAPTER I
THE HAND OF WAR

When France collapsed suddenly in the late spring
of who the full weight of German might rested against
Great Britain. With their back against the sea and facing
a hostile continent the English felt the force of what was
to come When the first air raids over eastern and
southeastern England were staged on June 18. Throughout
the summer BritiSh industrial centers and ports were
subjected to attack, and early in September London'became
the chief Nazi target. The London "blitz" continued into
the long winter nights and reached a height on December 29
when the square mile of the City of London proper was bombed,
destroying the Guildhall and eight Wren churches, along with
other historic buildings.

The prospects for the approaching spring held but
little hope for the British as the end of winter storms
would allow German submarines to operate more effectively
and would increase the rate of shipping losses which had
been temporarily reduced. It was also expected that Hitler
would launch his all out invasion attempt on England as soon
as the weather permitted in the spring of 191g. With this
in mind, not only the British but also the American public

officials and private citizens came to view the first six

 

 

 

Luv

 
 
 

. v

months of lth as a crucial period in the war.

The British, however, were not idle during these
winter months. In December they opened a drive against the
Italians in Libya, and in January they launched another in
Ethiopia. British warships were also engaged off the
Italian coasts in an effort to put Italy out of the war
before the spring. Greece, the only other nation fighting
the Axis in Europe, continued to make gains in Albania.1

Both the British and the Greeks went into this phase
of the war with high morale, and the British, on the fighting
fronts as well as at home seemed to prove that this was
indeed their finest hour. In Libya the Australians were
soon to swing in to capture Bardia singing ”We're off to
see the Wizard, the wonderful Wizard of Oz," while in London
revellers gathered in the darkened city to greet the new
year with shouts of "to hell with Hitler." In fact three
associated press correspondents returning from England at
the end of December, lQhO, were able to say that the British
didn't think it possible for them to lose the war. They
were encouraged by gains against the Italians. Still, the
warning that they thought it would be difficult to win
vithout aid was carefully present.

This was just another way of saying that it was
necessary to have more than fire—bomb wardens standing in

the streets and chanting "we want more" at the retreating

 

lFrancis Trevelyan Miller, History of World War_ll
(Philadelphia, IQhS), pp. 224, 226, 229; New York Times,
January 5, lghl; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 3, l9hl.

 

 

 

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German planes, or boys in a bombed hospital ward singing
"There'll always be an England." It would take both money
and material, and the officials became increasingly aware
that both were running short.2 '
A Royal Air Force officer in reviewing the war in
lghfl made plain.the need for material aid in a statement
on December 31, When he pointed out that American production
of airplanes would be an important factor in the war during
the coming year. This was a view twice given strong support
frem the Greek front within the following ten days. From
southern Albania General Papagos, commander-in-chief of the
Greek forces, called for speed in American aid, claiming
that 300 good airplanes in Greek hands could have won the
war. Only a few days later it became known that the Greeks
had been reduced to dropping stones on the Italians in lieu
of bombs.3
The bare outlines of the British financial picture
also began to become evident as the report on the first
nine months of the fiscal year in Britain showed government
revenues up 5 207,9hh,033, but still far short of expenditures.
Even.more revealing was a united States State Department
report which showed a decrease in export licenses on war

exports to Britain of $16h.million in the month of November

 

2Cleveland glain Dealer, January 1, lth; New Yerk
Times, January 5, lgfll; Washington Post, January 1, 19hl.

 

3New York Times, January 1, lth; Washington Post,
January 5, ll, IQHI.

19h0. This represented a reduction of 96 per cent from the
October figure. Private relief from the United States to
Britain, including that of the British War Relief Society
which collected $h,200,000 in cash contributions in the first
week of lth, could not hope to make up what was needed.it

The American government as well as the public had
had clear warning of these trends for some time, and the
pressures for American governmental action had long been
building up. Indeed, the United States government had been
far from.inactive in assisting the British in every way
possible within the limits open to them under the neutrality
legislation. By early June of lQhO, after the British had
succeeded in withdrawing their troops from Dunkirk, actions
were taken on several fronts. Cordell Hull, the Secretary
of State, interpreted the regulations of the Neutrality Act
to allow American pilots to transport planes to the Canadian
maritime provinces. An old law, dating from 1917, was
uncovered which would allow Army and Navy aircraft to be
traded back to the manufacturer for resale to the Allies.
The most important action was the supply of Britain with
surplus World War I equipment in order to make good the
Dunkirk losses. 4

Early in September another agreement was concluded
which was essential to survival of the British, and which
clearly indicated America's intention to give them aid

against Hitler. By this agreement, closed after difficult

 

uNew York Times, January 5, 8, 19hl.

negotiations, the United States exchanged fifty over-age
destroyers with Britain for leases on.bases in the Western

Hemisphere. Roosevelt announced the trade on September 3,

191m after having informal assurances that Wendell Willkie,
his opponent for the presidency, would not make it an issue
in the campaign. The President further demonstrated
publicly the fact that assistance would be an integral part
of the national defense under his continued administration
in the speech he delivered at Boston on October 30.5

But these actions, While assisting the British, were
not designed to solve their problems of money and transportation,
and immediately after the e1ection.had returned Franklin
Roosevelt as the first third term president the administration
began to consider other methods. On November 7 Secretary of
the Treasury Morgenthau arranged a White House luncheoniwith
the President and Arthur Purvis of the BritiSh Purchasing
Commission. Purvis outlined the needs of the British,
particularly in regard to airplanes and shipping. As these
talks were closing Roosevelt voiced the idea of building
cargo ships and leasing them to Britain. Nothing immediate

seemed to come from.the lease idea, but immediate action did

 

sForrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley, HOW'War Came, An
American White Pa er; From.the Fall of France to Pearl Harbor
TNeijdrk, 19%25,p pp IOE-IOE; Cordell Hull, The memoirs of
Cordell Hull New Yerk, l9h8), I, 775; William L. Langer and
S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War Iago-13g; (New Yerk,
1953)i p. 189; Edgarm gene Robinson, The Roosevelt Leadership
19

(New Ybrk, 5), p. 26 7; Dexter Perkins, The New
_ge ol anklin Roosevelt 1232 -g§ (Chicago, 1957), p. Ifli.

 

 

 

follow, as the President announced that henceforth production
of airplanes and other weapons would be divided with the
British on a fifty-fiftybasis.6

On November 9, however, it was still clear that the
administration did not realize the plight of Britain
financially When Roosevelt said at a cabinet meeting that
she still had $2.5 billion in credits and property which
could be used. Not all of this could be actually realized,
though, and large parts of it were already committed, so
that the real sum was a great deal smaller. The President
did look toward the future, however, and suggested leasing
ships again, along with other properties.

It was only a few days until the imminence of a
complete British financial breakdown was made clear.
Lord Lothian, the British Ambassador, had returned to England
during the Presidential campaign, and he arrived again in
the United States on November 23. Without consulting
American officials he announced on leaving his plane that
Britain would need financial help in the near future and
that Sir Frederick Phillips of the British Treasury would
soon arrive to confer with American officials. Lothian
himself conferred with Hull on November 25 over credits and

7

the long range need for ships.

 

6Davis and Lindley, p. 11h; Hull, I, 870; Langer and
Gleason, Undeclared War, pp. Zlh-EIS, 217.
7Hull, I, 871-872; Harold L. Iokes,_ghe Secret Diary

of Harold L. Icke§_(New York, 195h), III, 367; Langer and
Gleason, Undeclared War, pp. 225-227.

r L...

‘I

"a

E. .

The United States government was now squarely faced
with new problems in aiding Great Britain, as British orders
had almost ceased, and their need for war materials was
becoming more and more acute. An official silence settled
over the administration, as Roosevelt, having mentioned the
possibility of leasing once more to Morgenthau on December 1,
went to sea on December 3 to take a look at the new
Caribbean bases. Sailing with Harry Hopkins on the cruiser

Tuscaloosa, his rumination over means of British aid was

 

given a boost when.he received a December 8 letter from
Winston Churchill. This nineteen paragraph letter included
two alternatives on the aid question. The first of the
Churchill proposals was a repeal of the Neutrality Act so

that American ships could carry cargoes to Britain. The
second proposal, and the one which.must have struck a familiar
cord, was the "gift, loan, or supply" of American warships,
along with the extension.of other United States sea
commitments.8

While Roosevelt was considering means of aid on the

Tuscaloosa, the cabinet was conferring in washington and

 

keeping in touch with the President by cable. The lease

idea seemed to take hold in Roosevelt's mind and appeared

to be the best method, while in the United States the cabinet
encouraged the giving of speeches to prepare the public for

a new departure in British aid.

 

8Langer and Gleason, undeclared War, pp. 227-228;
Basil Rauch, Roosevelt, From Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York,
1950) , pp- 290-292-

The leasing solution was by no means a new one, as the
several remarks by Roosevelt illustrated, and there are even
some grounds for believing that the idea had roots farther
back than the summer and fall of 1940. When Roosevelt was
Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the first world war
he proposed trading destroyers for battleships. At about
the same time he discovered an old law which would have
permitted him to lease guns to arm private merchant ships.

In l9h0 several sources contributed to the idea, as
Secretary of Ear Henry Stimson found an old 1892 statute
that permitted the leasing of army property, and treasury
department lawyers uncovered the same law.9

Whether it was to be leasing, a new idea to the public,
or some other means, there was little question of public
support for aid to Britain. William Allen.White, then
chairman of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the
Allies, editorialized in the Emporia Weekly Gazette in the
middle of December that, "it is our cause and by our industrial
organization we can help it . . . ." At the beginning of
that month he had republished an editorial from the Providence

Evening Bulletin, that pointed out how British opposition to

 

9James M. Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox
(New York, 1956), p. 63; Richard N. Current, Secretar Stimson,
AgStudy In Statecraft (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 195 ), p. 1&9;
Jenathan Daniels, The End of Innocence (New York, l95h), pp.
267-268; Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Lend-Lease, Weapon for
Victory (New York, l9hh), pp. 62-63; Langer and Gleason,
Undeclared War,_pp. 23h-235.

 

totalitarianism was tied to the vital national interests of
the United States. A Gallup poll at the end of the year
showed 85 per cent of those questioned thought American aid
was essential to British victory, and 68 per cent felt that
the continued safety of the United States depended upon
English victory. As far back as the time of Munich, 55 per
cent in such a poll had favored aiding England in case of

a war. Now, with.the hand of war resting far from lightly

on the British, the United States both publicly and privately

seemed set on relieving the pressure.10

loEmporia fleekly Gazette, December 5, 19, 1940; New
York Times, January 3, l9hl; George Gallup, "Public Opinion,
l9hl," Current History and Forum, January 23, l9hl, p. 13.

 

 

CHAPTER II
A WORLD SAFE FOR AGGRESSION

Winston Churchill had ample cause for suggesting
repeal of the Neutrality Act in his December 8, 19h0,
letter to President Roosevelt, for that Act, and its
predecessors dating back to 1935, had circumscribed.the
actions of the administration, and were still the major
obstacle in.the way of direct aid to Great Britain. This
law as amended in 1939, permitted.the purchase of war
materials by'belligerents only on a cash and carry basis,
while carefully keeping the United States government and
American individuals out of "danger" by setting up war
zones, and limiting the activities of the American merchant
marine. Another separate law forbade the extension of
credit to countries which had defaulted on World War I
debts. This, with the neutrality law, was a stronghold and
a rallying point for isolationists and the administration
had found that out-right attack was both.futile and unwise.
It was partly for this reason that Roosevelt and the cabinet
were searching for new methods of aid in the closing weeks
of 1940.

American neutrality legislation.had its beginning in

1935, and was the child of the Senate's Nye Committee, a

10

11

special body originally charged with the investigation of
the manufacture and sale of arms and munitions in World Uar
I. Once underway this committee was ruthless in condemning
bankers and munitions makers as responsible for American
entrance into the first world war. As the committee seemed
to be getting somewhat out of hand, Secretary of State Hull
suggested to Roosevelt that he call it in and try to limit
its investigation so that it would not adversely affect
foreign affairs. Roosevelt did call in the committee, but
unfortunately Hull was not present, and the committee seems
to have understood the President's discussion of the causes
of war to be an invitation to devise neutrality legislation.1
The clearly approaching conflict between Italy and
Ethiopia served as an added incentive toward neutrality and
the committee quickly jumped into the breach. While Roosevelt
and Hull would have been pleased with a law permitting them
to embargo the agressor, the trend was not in that direction.
As a result Hull tried to suppress the neutrality sentiment,
particularly that of Senators Gerald P. Nye and Bennett Clark,
but he was eventually faced with the very policy which he
vanted most to avoid. Together with the President he
attempted to persuade Senator Key Pittman, then Chairman of

the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, to report the

1Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New Yerk,
l9h8), I, 398, hos; John T. Flynn, The Roosevelt Myth (New
York, 1956), p. 169.

12

bill unfavorably, but they were unsuccessful. This failure
was also partly due to an increasing public opinion in the
support of neutrality. This trend was such that William
Allen White thought a Congressional enactment would help to
keep the United States out of war. As a result some fifteen
bills were introduced in Congress in the summer of 1935,
including a State Department version produced at the last
minute in an attempt to save something of the President's
maneuverability in foreign affairs. It was, however, too
late, and by August 31, the United States had its first
neutrality act.2
This bill had not passed without some of the strong
divisions of opinion which Characterized the entire course
of the legislation. Senator Tom Connally, not one to view
anything complacently, lashed out at the isolationists,
labelling Bennett Clark of Missouri and Burton Wheeler of
Montana as biased, and Nye of North Dakota and Arthur
Vandenberg of Michigan, as acting on evidence which would
fail to convince a justice of the peace from their respective
states. He insisted that the bill was not neutrality, but
one whiCh proclaimed the United States would not fight under
any condition. He might not have been far wrong as one of

the isolationist views was that the purpose of the law was

 

ZSelected Letters of William Allen White 1899-1919, ed.
Walter JShnson (New York, 19h77, p. 355; Donald F. Drummond,
The Passing of American Neutrality 1937-1940 (Ann Arbor, 1955),
p. ; Allan Nevins, America In World Affairs (New York, 19h2),
pp. 7-88; Charles Callan Tansill, Back Door To War: The
Roosevelt Foreign Policy 1933-191; (Chicago, 1952), p720.

h. 3:».

afifi.

13

to insulate the country against all foreign wars.

The 1935 Act was characterized.mainly by a mandatory
embargo on arms, ammunition, and other war materials which
amounted to little in addition to lethal weapons. The bill
also established a munitions control board to regulate the
export of these materials. Among the blessings of the bill
was the fact that it was designed to last only six months.
This bill was a significant departure from historic policy,
and waived some of the neutral rights Which the United States
had previously defended. Under these conditions the act
was signed by Roosevelt, although he criticized the inflexible
nature of the embargo, and thought that these provisions could

even drag the United States into war rather than keep it out.3
With its six month time limit the 1935 Act was due

to lapse early in 1936. Although the administration had

hoped to obtain revision of the act in the direction of

larger Executive discretion, the tide was running in the

opposite direction. The failure of sanctions imposed by

the League of Nations against Italy apparently encouraged

the isolationist vieWpoint. Pressure was also applied by

an Italian-American group to defeat any serious changes in

3Edwin Borchard and william Potter Lage, Neutralit
Egr the United States (New Haven, 19h0), pp. 315-315; Tom
Connally, My Name Is Tom Connally(New Yerk, l95h), pp. 21h,
220; Nevins, p. 91; Harold Bartlett Whiteman, Jr.,
Ngutrality,_l9hl (New Haven, l9hl), p. 23; The Public Papers
gpd Addresses of Eganklin D. Roosevelt: With a Special
Introduction and Explanatory Notes by President Roosevelt,
ed. Samuel I. Roseman (New York, 19h17, VIII, xxxii; ‘—
William T. Stone, "Will Neutrality Keep U. S. Out of War?”,
Foreign Policy Reports, October 1, 1939, pp. 166-167.

 

 

 

 

 

H

 

 

 

 

in

‘u

 

 

 

11L

the law, and coupled with a fear of rash action by Roosevelt
in foreign affairs, this was enough to produce an even.more
restrictive law.

The arms embargo was made tighter by substituting
shall for may in its wording, and in addition it prehibited
loans and credits to belligerent countries, and even
provided against the purchase or sale of bonds, securities
and other obligations of such countries in the United States.
American vessels were also prohibited from carrying embargoed
items. Again, however, this was a temporary act and would
be in effect for only 15 months.4

This 15 month period ended on May 1, 1937, but new
legislation was introduced in.both houses long before that
date. As usual the administration wanted more discretionary
power, and the fight over the bill was one of sharp division.
The'bill which finally passed, under Senator Pittman's name,
had two new provisions. It extended the scope of materials
listed as contraband and placed the list under Presidential
discretion. It also provided that belligerents purchasing
raw materials must pay in cash and must transport the
nmterials in their own ships. The act was approved on
March 3, 1937, as permanent legislation, to take effect on
May 1, and the clause regarding purchase of materials by
belligerents, known as "cash and carry" was to have a life

of two years.

‘uDexter Perkins, The New Agg of Franklin Roosevelt
l 32-h (Chicago, 1957), p. 100; Hull, 1, M61; Drummond,
p. ; Tansill, p. 2h7; Whiteman, p. 23; Borchard and Lage,
p. 327.

15

While the President did have discretion under this
act as to the use of "cash and carry" and also as to the
existence of "a state of war”, the legislation.marked a
high point of isolationist strength for this was the most
complete program enacted, and also was to be permanent
unless changed by Congress itself.5

The world situation continued to deteriorate throughout
the following two years, and the Neutrality Act had imposed
narrow limits on the conduct of affairs by Roosevelt and
Hull. Thus, as the date for the expiration of the "cash and
carry" provisions approached in 1939, the administration
wished an extension of cash and carry and an arms embargo
repeal. The stage was set for the biggest fight yet on the
neutrality and isolation of the United States.

In addressing the Congress on January a, 1939,
Roosevelt hinted at the desirability of repealing the arms
embargo, if nothing else, as he warned that the neutrality
laws "may operate unevenly and unfairly - may actually give
aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim.” He continued
to make statements through out the spring even remarking at
a press conference that such legislation had not contributed
to the cause of peace. Together with Secretary Hull he
again worked actively toward revision, and Pittman in.the

Senate, and Sol Bloom, chairman of the Foreign Affairs

SSol Bloom, The Autobiography of Sol Bloam (New York,
l9h8), p. 231; Borchard and Lage, pp. 337-338; Connally,
p. 223; Drummond, p. A6; Whiteman, p. 25.

16

Committee in the House, both introduced bills.6

Pittman's bill did not go as far as Hull would have
liked, but did include a renewal of cash and carry Which
included arms, ammunition, and implements of war. The
Bloom resolution, also included the same type of provision.
During the period of May, June and July the President and
Secretary Hull based their activities in foreign affairs on
the assumption that an arms embargo repeal would go through
and that cash and carry including munitions, would be
reinstated. They had hoped to use these provisions as
influences toward peace in Europe. They were disappointed,
however, as a 159 to 15? vote in the House on June 30
amended Bloomls bill in what he himself termed "a bitter
defeat", and what Hull called "a real tragedy." The
amendment, offered by John M. Vorys of Ohio, removed cash
and carry from the bill.

Pittman fared no better in the Senate, for after
assuring the administration that the desired bill would be
favorably reported from his committee, it voted by 12 to 11
to defer any action on peace and neutrality legislation
until the next session of Congress in January 19h0.7

The administration felt these defeats profoundly.

The day after the Vorys amendment passed in the House the

 

6Public Papers, VIII, 3-h, 155; Hull, pp. 613; Charles
A. Beard, American Foreiganolicy in the Making_l932-l9a_:
A Study in Responsibilities (New Haven, l9h6), p. 226

7Beard, p. 226; William L. Langer and s. Everett
Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation l937-l9ho New York,
1952), pp. 136-137; Bloom, p. 235; Hull, I, 6h ; Perkins,
pp. 106-107. ‘

17

President wrote a brief note to the Attorney General inquiring
how far he might go in ignoring neutrality legislation even
though.he had signed it. He followed this by a personal appeal
to Senator Pat Harrison on July 6, and after the vote of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee he sent a formal message
to Congress stating that he felt action was "highly advisable."
This July lh.message included a statement by Hull urging
action.without "unnecessary or undue delay.”

As a final attempt a conference was held on July 18
at the White House with Roosevelt, Hull, and the Congressional
leaders. Both Roosevelt and Hull painted the gloomy hues
of the deepening crisis in Europe, and outlined the possibilities
of war before the end of the summer. Senator Borah, the
outstanding isolationist, spoke for the opposition, and
clearly implied that from his private sources in Europe he
had'better information than the Department of State. Vice—
President Garner finally announced that the administration
did not have the votes, and the Republicans agreed to assume
the responsibility. The President and Hull issued the
statement that failure to take action "would weaken the
leadership of the United States in exercising its potent
influence in.the cuase of preserving peace among other nations
in.the event of a new crisis in Europe between now and next

January." The subject was closed - temporarily.8

‘

8U. s. Department of State, Peace and War: United
§tates Foreign Policy 1 31-1 hl (Washington, 1943), p. 67;
Public Papers, VIII, 301, 3 7; F.D.R. His Personal Letters
, ed. Elliott Roosevelt (New Yerk, 1950), II, 899,
902; Perkins, p. 107.

18

This temporary period ended abruptly wiflh the German
invasion of Poland and.the beginning of European Bar in September
1939. Roosevelt issued a call for a special session of
Congress, and addressed that session on September 21. At that
time he stated that he regretted'both the passage of and his
signature of the Neutrality Act, and he requested a.change of
the embargo provisions because they were dangerous to "American
neutrality, American security and, above all, Amerixu1peace."9

The administration had been preparing Congress for
such a message. Two weeks before Stephen Early had reported
to the President that 60 Senators would favor cash and carry
with 25 opposed. (Senator Arthur Vandenberg, writing on the
arms embargo, recorded on September 15 that "The story of
1917—18 is already repeating itself. ressure and propaganda
are at work to drive us into the new World War." On the
following day Harold L. Ickes, recorded in his diary that
Senator Borah of Idaho was to speak on the radio against
Neutrality repeal and the administration was seeking a non-
administration voice to reply. Frank Knox, later Roosevelt's
Secretary of the Navy, filled this job. Borah, with arguments
furnished by professors Edwin.Borchard of Yale and Thomas
iHealy of Georgetown, led the isolationist fight. He was ably
assisted by Senators Vandenberg, Bennett Clark of Missouri,

tHiram.Jehnson of California, and Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota.10

.—

9Public Papers, VIII, 516.

10F. D. R. Letters, II, 918; The Private Papers of
§9nator Vandenberg, ed. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. (Boston,
1932), pp. 2-3; Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold
L. Ickes (New Yerk, 195k), III, 7:8, 10; Connally, p. 229;

Tansill, pp. 563-56h.

 

 

19

Senators Alben Barkley, the majority leader, Minton
of Indiana, and James Byrnes of South Carolina were strongest
in the cause of the administration, and as the fight
“”progressed in the Senate, outside influences also were felt
on the side of amendment or repeal. Al Smith, temporarily
forgetting old animosities, spoke for neutrality amendment over
the radio, as an antidote to Father Coughlin. Henry Stimson,
former Secretary of State, and later to be Secretary of War
for Roosevelt, testified at hearings in favor of the bill.
William Allen White, who had favored neutrality in 1935
changed to administration support, and was a moving spirit
in a non-partisan committee fighting for repeal of the arms
embargo. He devoted three or four weeks to the cash and
carry bill, as it was called, and received letters of thanks
from both Roosevelt and Hull. .

The fight closed in the Senate on October 27 When the
administration bill passed by 83 to 30. Meanwhile, the House
had also been considering the same legislation. A revolt
against the bill flared in the House about the middle of
October, but Garner was able to report at a cabinet meeting
on October 27, that he eXpeeted the House to approve it
eventually by a margin of 20 to k0 votes. Finally the House,
too, passed the bill allowing cash and carry sale of arms early
in November by a vote of 2H3 to 172. Roosevelt made it law

,-by'his signature on November 9°11

 

11Connally, p. 229; F.D.R. Letters, II,_92L; Ickes,
pp. 28, k3, 51, 57; Richard N. Current, Secretary Stimson, A
Study in Statecraft (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 193h), . 152;
white Letters, pp7'399-2goo; Draimmond, p. 109; Hull, I, 96-697;
Beard, p. 261.

 

 

 

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20

The administration was happy to receive the freedom
of the "cash and carry" provision, and cash payment was not then
considered to present a particular difficulty for aid to the
democracies, especially since the Johnson Act, the law
designed to prevent extension of credits to countries which
had defaulted on.World War I debts, could be interpreted
not to apply to government loans. The fact remains, however,
that the isolationist strength and sentiment were such that
they hamstrung administration foreign policy to a large extent
from.l935 until after the European War began. Although this
might be ascribed to several reasons, it was probably at
least partly due to a conservative attitude on the part of
the administration on foreign affairs which allowed the
Congress, especially the Senate, to seize the initiative.

The continued efforts of the administration to win back the
initiative were not successful until the situation.had
seriously deteriorated.

The later administration attitude was represented by
Roosevelt who felt that repeal of the neutrality laws would
strengthen.the weaker nations in Europe and help deter war.
Disregarding the earlier administration failure to lead there
is, therefore, justification for the opinion that the initial
Congressional refusal of amendment in 1939 was tantamount to
destroying a weapon for peace. In effect, the neutrality
laws were designed to prevent the type of involvement which
faced the United States in 1917-1918, and the reflections
of Senator Vandenberg show clearly that the isolationists

had not grasped the changes which.had affected the world

since then. The country, under this leadership, was buying
peace by refusing responsibility.

This recent history of isolation and administration
defeat on foreign affairs in Congress faced Roosevelt in
his late 1940 search for methods of aid to Great Britain.
The isolationist element was still strong and exceptionally
vocal. According to some authorities, apparently by virtue
of the events of 1935-1939, hey had already made the world
safe for aggression. They had in l9hO brought democracy to

its most severe trial.12

_ -.

12Public Paperg, VIII, xxxiv-xxxv; Langer and Gleason,
Challengg, pp. lk7, 232; Whiteman, p. 23; Harold B. Hinto,
gprdell Hull: A Biography_(New York, l9k2), p. 292.

 

 

CHAPTER III

THE ARSENAL OF DEKOCRACY

I. A Length of Garden Hose

President Roosevelt returned from the Tuscaloosa

 

cruise on December 1h, l9h0. He was determined upon the
lease-lend idea, although the exact methods and form were
still unsettled. He seemed to be convinced that by this
general method the aid he wished to extend to Great Britain
could be effective, and the isolationist element could be
circumvented.

As Roosevelt's trip was drawing to a close the
British need was underlined once more to the American public
on December 11 in a speech read at Baltimore for Lord Lothian,
the British Ambassador. He graphically pointed out that
United States security depended upon British control of the
Atlantic, and that responsibility for the action to be taken
was now brought clearly down "to every citizen and every
nation." On the following day Lothiandied.l

Meanwhile Roosevelt kept silent on the lease idea
and maintained that silence until after his return to

Washington. Apparently he was perfecting the idea in his

1Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An
Intimate History, Bantam Enlarged Edition (New York, 1950), I,
275; Marquess of Lothian, "Britain and America,” Vital Speeches,.
January I, 19k1, pp. 105- -lo7.
22

 

J’.‘ ’17 ”0.1.3.. “H

 

23

mind. On December 17, he was ready for the unveiling. At
a White House luncheon that day Secretary Morgenthau and
several British guests were present. Toward the end of the
meal Roosevelt turned to them and explained that he had been
thinking very hard about what to do for England. He
stressed the idea that he felt the thing to do was to get
away from the dollar sign and the loan idea. He finished
the observation with, "We will give you the guns and ships
you need, provided that when the war is over you will return
to us in kind the guns and ships we have loaned to you."2
Shortly after the luncheon the President held a press
conference and fulfilled the expectations which had been
~generated by his return to the capital. Seizing on the most
graphic of terms he presented the lend-lease idea for the
first time publicly in a manner calculated to capture the
imagination of the thousands of people who would not have
been interested in the technicalities of British aid.
He first explained that they planned either to lease
or sell materials to Great Britain, and came back to the
dollar sign he had mentioned at luncheon. "Now," he said,
"what I am trying to do is to eliminate the dollar Sign.
That is something brand new in the thoughts of practically
everybody in this room, I think - get rid of the silly,
foolish old dollar sign." Then he went on to give the analogy

which served to illustrate his idea in the simplest terms.

 

ZWilliam L. Lan er and s. Everett Gleason, The
Undeclared War 19 0-19. (New York, 1953), p. 238; Henry
Morgenthau, Jr., 'The Morgenthau Diaries", Part IV, Colliers,

October 18, 19k7, pp. 72, 7h.

“est (may. I
" his r1301:
efet words,
tie iiea of 1‘
in newspaper
eventual saw

"31",.) n I

"$--—V
#1:"pr f. w -
:hikku‘aL‘e & \A
:lPossi‘sle f0:

scze reason t;

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W‘s-JO? ' S {101.

:18 flames toT

 

24

"Suppose my neighbor's home catches fire," he explained,
"and I have a length of garden hose four or five hundred
feet away. If he can take my garden.hose and connect it up
with.his hydrant, I may help him to put out his fire." In
a few words, using the garden hose as the example, he explained
the idea of lend-lease. While other factors gained prominence
in.newspaper reports the garden.hose may have assured the
eventual success of the bill.3

While Roosevelt used the analogy to the best possible
advantage and gained with it publicity which would have been
impossible for any one less than.the President, there is
some reason to believe that the idea was not his. In June
of 1911.0 a volumn edited by William Allen White included an
article by Rupert Hughes in which he wrote; "If your
neighbor's house were on fire and a strong wind carrying
the flames toward your own home, would you think it wise
to join the bucket line and help pass water forward to the
firemen desperately attacking the blaze? Would you perhaps
go so far as to pass a ladder to those who were willing to
climb? Would you hand an ax to a sorched hero?" The
similarity is unmistakable.”
\\\~ But while the garden hose analogy struck the first

 

3Langer and Gleason, Egdeclared War, p. 2RD; The Public
ngers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt: With a Special
Introduction and Explanatory Notes by Pregident Roosevelt, ed;
Samuel 1. Rosenman (New York, 1941), IX, 607; New York Times,
December 18, 19h0.

hRupert Hughes, "The Allies are Ourselves," Defense For
America, ed. William.A11en White (New Yerk, 1940), p.2b3}

25

blow, the bill itself was still undrafted, the ideas were
still hazy, and the British need was as acute as ever.
Although Roosevelt was again to underline the British
need by quoting figures on shipping losses at a cabinet
meeting on December 21, the next public move toward eventual
British aid did not occur until Sunday, December 29. The
President then took to the public, in a radio fireside chat,
an explanation of the seriousness of the world situation,
and a strong statement which.clearly indicated that British
aid would be integrated with the American defense program.

‘Warning the American people that the nation had never
before faced such danger, the President went on to explain
that the British were conducting a war against the unholy
alliance of the Axis powers. "Our own future security,"
he said, "is greatly dependent on the outcome of that fight.
Our ability to 'keep out of war' is going to be affected by
that outcome." He was careful, however, to point out that
British aid offered only the least risk of American
involvement in the war, but he was firm on.the idea of aid,
stating finally that; "We must be the great arsenal of
democracy. For us this is an emergency as serious as war
itself."5

The response to the speech was immediate and heartening.
In so far as it was a move to unify public opinion behind an

aggressive aid to England policy it was highly successful.

-‘

5Harold L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Icke§_
(wow York, 195i), III, 39k; Time, January 6, l9kl, pp. 9-10;
New York Times, December 30, 19E0.

26

Stephen Early, the White House secretary, announced that
messages were running 100 to 1 in favor of the speech, and
the response was far heavier than.had been anticipated.
New Deal critic Frank Kent of the Baltimore §EE wrote that
the message voiced what the people had in their hearts,
while in the South, where sentiment for aid was strongest,

the Atlanta Constitution said editorially that it had

 

reawakened the spirit of America. The German American

Congress for Democracy, an organization to mobilize the

loyalty of Americans of German birth, endorsed the message

on January 1, 1941.6
By the following week the New York Téggg had completed

a survey of the opinion in centers around the country. The

reports of its correspondents were far from uniform, but

were generally favorable. Reports from.Birmingham and Dallas

in the South reflected strong agreement, as did those from

Philadelphia and Cleveland. In Ohio only one leading

newspaper withheld at least qualified approval. Elsewhere,in

Boston, Chicago, and Omaha, the reaction seemed to be carefully

conservative. San Francisco was reported to have a spirit of

fatalism, and the same effect seemed to be evident in the

Los Angeles Egggg. The report from St. Paul, however, was

that the speech had regained for Roosevelt a moral leadership

over the isolationists. 0n the Whole he had cause to feel,

in the concluding words of the Fireside Chat, that "our common

 

6Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, p. 249; Time,
January 13, 1941, p. 9; Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 3,
1941; Atlanta Constitution, January 1, 1941; New York Times,
January 2, February 27, 1941.

 

 

27

cause will greatly succeed."7
II. The Forces Take The Field

In the days while the American people were adjusting
to the wide impact of becoming the "arsenal of democracy"
the Congressional forces, and also the public pressure groups,
were aligning themselves for the battle to decide whether
or not the United States would really assume the role marked
out for it by President Roosevelt.

Senator Burton K. Wheeler, a Democrat from Montana
Who had disagreed with the President on other occasions, and
who was a strong isolationist, took the lead in opposing the
President's policy. Wheeler has been described as a very
suspicious man, whose entire career was marked by a high
degree of incredulity. Certainly no one surpassed him in
incredulity on the proposition of lend-lease.8

He immediately counter-attacked on the aid issue by
replying to Roosevelt's fireside speech with a radio talk
on December 31. Warning in part that, "if we lend or lease
war materials today, we will lend or lease American boys
tomorrow," he presented an eight point program for peace
in Europe.9

his New Year's Eve speech, which was carried by about
only one tenth as many radio stations as Roosevelt's speech,
also produced an immediate response for Wheeler. On January 1,

1941, he was able to report that he had received over 1,000

 

7New York Times, December 30, 1940, January 5, 1941.
8New York Times, February 9, 1941.

9Burton K. Wheeler; "America's Present Emergency,"
Vital S eeches, January 15, 1941, p. 204

28

telegrams and 99 per cent of them were in favor of the speech.
Three days later he reported he had received twice as many
telegrams and letters than he had in response to any previous
speech. Although he now said the percentage of telegrams
favorable to his position was down to 93 per cent, he

expected the letters to be far more favorable.10

The favorable responses to Wheeler's proposal were
far from including influential elements of the press and
opinion forming media. He was immediately more thoroughly
and directly attacked than was anyone else in the following
two months. [Timg magazine that week characterized Wheeler
as being "most exquisitely befuddled," and it was extremely
kind in comparison to other commentators.

Editorially, the Los Angeles Timgg attacked him for
failing to realize the significance of the British navy to
American defense. The Washington Eggt, admitting that his
eight point program had much to recommend it, attacked him
on the issue of historical geography and dismissed the idea
that Hitler would accept the plan as "wishful thinking of
the most extreme sort." The Atlanta Constitution, notably
more partisan, said simply that he "seems to have lost all
sense of reason . . . ." The Cleveland Plain Dealer,
however, surpassed them all by calling his eight point program
more childish than.Henry Ford's peace ship of the first
World War. The coup de grace was administered editorially

by William Allen White in the Emporia Gazette. "Here is

L

10Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 1, S, 19hl.

just another appeasement," he wrote. "Sen. Bert Wheeler
is only Chamberlain in a 10-gallon hat and chaps."ll
The Opposition to Wheeler's speech was equally as
vocal among some of the popular newspaper columnists.
Ernest K. Lindley analysed Wheeler's problem as being mired
in the past, and decided that while Bob La Follette might
have been correct at the time of the first World War,
Senator Wheeler certainly was not correct in 19h1.
Walter Lippman evaluating Wheeler's peace plan, found it
curious that an isolationist would propose a program that
would fix European boundaries.12
But the unfavorable publicity on his reply to the
Fireside Chat did not affect Wheeler and he quickly moved
into the position of opposition leader in the Senate and in
the Congress as a whole. He met groups that espoused his
point of view and generally missed no opportunity to express
his views. However, he was fighting a tide that was bringing
more and more of the members of Congress into the aid camp.
Representative Cox of Georgia insisted in the House that
Roosevelt's policy "expressed the will, the wish, and the
determination of the American people." More influential
members also raised their voices on the aid issue.
Senator Styles Bridges of New Hampshire wanted more ships

sold to England. Senator Lee of Oklahoma claimed that England

 

11Time January 6, 19u1, p. 12; Los Angeles Times,
January 6:_l9fll; Washington Post, January 1, lfihl; Cleveland
glain Dealer, January 1, 19kl; Atlanta Constitution, January
4, 1941; Emporia Gazette, January 9, 19El.

 

12Washington Post, January 1, 2, 19h1.

30

was the only hope of the United States to escape war.

Senator George of Georgia, the chairman of the Senate Foreign

Relations Committee, asserted that there was less danger in

aiding England than in following a negative course. But

the venerable Senator Carter Glass, Democrat of Virginia,

and shortly to become a member of the Foreign Relations

Committee, celebrated his eighty-third birthday with the

strongest statement of all. The navy, he said, should be

sent "over to blast hell out of Germany."13
These friendly voices were matched by others from

outside the government. Not only did editorials and newspaper

columns reflect support for the yet undisclosed Roosevelt

program, but individuals spoke for the principle of aid.

Wendell Willkie, the 19h0 Republican presidential candidate

was among those who gave their support. He was promptly

applauded by William Allen White in the Emporia Gazette who

took an added slap at the Republican National Committee.

Among his other admirers was the Cleveland Plain Dealer

which characterized those Who opposed the "arsenal of

democracy" view as among other things, misguided pacifists,

stupid isolationists, and henchmen of Hitler, Mussolini and

Stalin. Willkie was jointed in his support by such influential

figures as Bishop William T. Manning of New York, and

Dr. Iicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University.

In the New Ybrk Tiggg an advertisement appeared urging

letters supporting aid to be sent to Congressmen. It was

signed by a long list of influential Americans, including

 

13New Yerk Times, January 1, 3, S, 19h1; Washington
Post, January 1, 1951:—

31

Dean Acheson, Herbert Agar, James B. Conant, and Robert
Sherwood.1hr

”’fi But during this period, and for a long period preceding
the administration.move toward an effective aid to England
policy, the most influential of the forces working in the
American public were the groups formed in favor of and

against American aid to the democracies. These groups seemed
to proliferate particularly among those who opposed aid,

but two organizations, one on each side, stood out. They

were The Committee to Defend America'by Aiding the Allies,

and the America First Committee.

The Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies
was definitely at the head of the field of aid proponents.
Headed.by William Allen White, and commonly referred to as
the White Committee, it was able to form chapters all over
the country and to conduct meetings of the type held in
Cleveland soon after Roosevelt's speech. On that occasion
1,800 women unanimously pledged support to the program~15

The pregram.supported by the White Committee could
be roughly broken down into five parts. All of them.had to
do either with aid directly or with the expansion.of United
States efforts, or changing restrictions in a manner Which wouki
benefit the allies. Specifically they were; first, to give
the allies anything Which would not weaken United States

defenses; second, to increase American production so more

could be given; third, to amend interfering legislation;

 

1LPNew Yerk Times, January 1, S, 6, l9h1; Emporia Gazette,
January 9, l9h1; Cleveland Plain Dealer, January u, 19u1.

15Cleveland Plain Dealer, January h, l9hl.

32

fourth, to make it easier for Americans to volunteer in allied
forces; and fifth, to make sure materiel did not reach the
Axis.16

However, just at the critical moment When the lines
were being drawn for a fight over aid the White Committee
ran into difficulties. Challenged to present his views on
aid, William Allen White defined his position as being in
favor of aid, but not to an extent that would involve war,
troops, or convoys. When White's views were made public
cries went up from.both sides. Some members of the committee
voiced strong disapproval, and a few, like General John F.
O'Ryan, strongly pro-war, resigned. General Robert E. Wood
and Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, of the America First
Committee endorsed White's statement. Complaints promptly
flowed from.the rank and file of that organization, too.

On January 2, White defended and.explained his views
in.the Emporia Gazette, and then, the same day announced his
resignation as chairman of the Committee. He issued a strong
statement with.his resignation, warning that the "menace of
appeasement is heavily financed," and urging that public
sentiment be kept alert. He agreed to serve as an honorary
chairman of the Committee.17

The resignation was a surprise to the country, but

after the interchange Which had preceded it, the newspapers

 

6 a
l washington Post, January 5, 19hl.

172293; January 6, 19h1, p. 11; Emporia Gazette, January
2, 19141; Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 3, 1941”; New York
Times, January'3, 19H1.

33

which.were predisposed to oppose the aid position were quick
to assume the point of view voiced by General Wood. The

St. Louis_§gst-Dispatch noted that if the committee was too

 

radical for White it was "too radical for the American
people." The Akron.Beacon Journal, more strongly
isolationist, editorialized, "White's definition of his own
views served the useful purpose of revealing the true aims
of the 'America Second' pressure group that had been.using
the Kansan's name and unquestioned patriotism to allay
suspicion of its motives." The Chicago Dgily Tribune hailed
the resignation and noted in regard to the rest of the
committee that White "didn't want to throw them.red.meat."
But a few more astute heads prevailed, and.the Republican
Los Angeles Témgg, noting his position as honorary chairman,
pointed out that White was "too forthright a man to keep on
with.a committee with Which he was fundamentally at odds.
If there were disagreements, they evidently were on relatively
minor questions."18
General WOod fired a parting shot a few days later
when he invited White to become a member of the America
First Committee, but the furor quickly died down as the
committee began to map reorganization plans the day after
White's resignation.19
The apposition to the Roosevelt aid policy, and to

 

18St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 3. 1941; Akron
Beacon Journal, January 3, 19Hl; Los Angeles Times, January h,
T9El} Chicago Daily Tribune, January u, lgul.“""

19Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 8, l9h1; New York
Times, January Ll, 1911.1.

3h

What was generally called "all aid short of war" did not
consist merely of Senator Wheeler. Equally influential
Senators joined.him in.his attack, and they had several
vocal colleagues in the House. Senator Vandenberg of
Michigan, a leading isolationist, and a respected member of
the upper chamber, released a peace plan of his own soon
after Wheeler's radio address. The following day he
explained his proposed tight restrictions on any aid to
\\Britain. The same day Representative Woodruff, also of
Michigan, attacked the "arsenal of democracy" program as a.means
of involving the country in war. On the closing day of the
seventy-sixth Congress, Senator Rush Holt of West Virginia,
a lame-duck member, echoed.Woodruff's charges of war,
accusing President Roosevelt of concealing his true war-like
intentions.20
The Congressional leaders in opposition were also able
to point to public support as easily as were those in favor
of aid. Editorially, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch was clearly
reluctant to accept "another great crusade for democracy,"
and a few days later they were ready to question whether or
not agreements had been.made secretly with the allies. On
January 1 the Chicago Daily Tribune_had accused Roosevelt
of aiming at an economic dictatorship. At the same time the
Akron Beacon Journal was criticising the President for

intolerance of apposition to his views, and later for his

deprecating remarks about money. General Hugh.JOhnson, in

 

2ONew‘York Times, January 2, 3, 19h1.

35

his newspaper column, was more straightforward. He was
willing to label the proposed policy as "the most futile
and pusillanimous ever followed by an.honorable nation."
Individually, Phillip La Follette, former Governor of
Wisconsin, lashed at the President in a speech in Chicago
on January 5, while two days before twenty-eight pickets
had paraded in the rain and fog in front of a Philadelphia
hotel. They were picketing a ball for Britain and her allies
which was attended by 3,000.21

But Just as the Committee to Defend.America by Aiding
the Allies was at the head of the proponents forces, so the
America First Committee, was in the first rank of opposition
to aid. It was for a strong American defense in the belief
that no country could attack a prepared America successfully.
They were opposed to any extension of American aid beyond the
cash and carry neutrality provisions finally passed in 1939,
and they felt it was necessary to stay out of the European
war in order to preserve democracy in America. They were
strongly attacked from several quarters, and accused, as by
the Atlanta Constitution of "doing exactly the thing Which
Hitler and all his Nazis would have them.do.8 The Committee,

as did the White Committee, lost a few prominent members as

the l9u1 aid battle opened.22

21$t. Louis Post-Dis atch, January 2, 3, 6, 19u1;
Akron Beacon Journal, January I, 6, lghl; New Yerk Times,
January K,5, 19Ei; Chicago Daily Tribune, January 1:_I§El.

22Washington Post, January 5, 19i1; Atlanta
Constitution, January 1, l9hl; Time, January 6, 19u1, p. 11.

36

The immediate attack on the America First Committee
was nothing, however, compared to what opened up shortly on
another of the many anti-aid groups. Organized late in lQhO,
the No Foreign War Committee emerged suddenly into the lime-
light Just before the New Year. Under the direction of
Verne Marshall, the editor of the Cedar Rapids, Iowa, Gazette,
the Committee claimed that the White House had refused to
consider peace proposals earlier brought from.Germany. Almost
immediately Senator Lee of Oklahoma asserted that the financial
backer of the Committee, and the bearer of the supposed peace
plan, was an oil merchant with a financial stake in Nazi
victory. On January 2 Marshall announced that William Rhodes
Davis, the committee backer, would explain.his Mexican oil‘
deals which had involved the Nazis. The situation was not
clarified, however, for on January 5 Davis denied that he
was a backer of either Marshall or the Committee.23

Meanwhile, Marshall had indicated that the committee
had respectable support, and that he expected Senator Holt
of West Virginia to become a director. Senators Wheeler
and Bennett Clark of Missouri were eXpected to stump for the
committee.

After a temporary respite Marshall was back in.the
news, when on January 9, in a radio debate, he again accused
the Roosevelt administration of turning down a peace plan.

The next day L. M. Birkhead, director of the Friends of

 

232$E2; January 6, l9hl, p. 11; Cleveland Plain Dealer
January 1, 3, 1911.1; New York Times, January 3, ,W

37

Ibmocracy, took Marshall up on an invitation that the Committee's
financial records would be open to anyone. He was refused a
chance to view them. On January 11 it was reported that

O. K. Armstrong, an originator of the committee was planning

to resign, and two days later Armstrong confirmed his
resignation. The next day, January 1k, Marshall discharged
one-third.of the office staff maintained by the Committee,

and announced the election of ten directors.2u

III. The Four Freedoms

But While the story of the difficulties of the pressure
groups that were to battle over Roosevelt's policy was
unfolding, the administration itself was working toward a
double goal - the State of the Union Message and the introduction
of the aid-to-England bill in Congress.

After the fireside address of December 29, speculation
was continual and intense over the exact form the lending
idea of aid to Britain.would assume. In his press conference
on January 1 Roosevelt indicated that plans were proceeding
along the lines he had outlined. He also indicated that he
was not concerned over the British financial condition.25

This but added fuel to the fire of speculation and
gradually attention was focused toward the President's
address on.the State of the Union to be delivered to the new
congress on January 6. Those Who were looking for a specific

discussion of the proposed aid policy were disappointed, but

 

2LPNew York Times January 1, 10, ll, 12, 15; Cleveland
Plain Dealer, January lfi.’ 1914—10

25NewYork Times, January 1, 19hl.

38

Roosevelt could scarcely have given a more ringing declaration
of American intentions than.he delivered to the Congress
and the nation.

The solemnity on the occasion of the speech was apparent
throughout. A.heavy guard surrounded the President on his
way to the Capitol, and the precautions were not relaxed
inside the building. In the House Chamber, where bare steel
structuring was supporting the roof, a relatively small crowd
gathered in the galleries. Crown Princess Martha of Norway
entered with.Mrs. Roosevelt, and in the adjoining diplomatic
gallery'Wilhelm de Morgenstierne, the Norwegian Minister, sat
on.the carpeted stairway with Mohammed Schayesteh, the

26

Minister of Iran.

Before an audience which.showed little enthusiasm and
which Mrs. Roosevelt later attacked for an apparent failure
of Republicans to applaud, the President outlined strongly
the sharp division between the Axis nations and Britain and
her allies. Placing the United States firmly in the democratic
camp, and pledging support to the nations keeping war away
from the western hemisphere, he reminded his listeners that:
"In times like these it is immature - and incidentally untrue -
for anybody to brag that an unprepared America, single-handed,
and with one hand tied behind its back, can hold off the

entire world."27

 

26Ibid., January 7, 1941.

27Time, January 13, 1914.1, pp. 9-10; New York Times,
January 7, 3, 19hl.

.1..‘~. h .

39

He asked the Congress, in.this speech, for the authority
and funds for the contemplated aid policy, and he reminded
them.that under his proposal the United States would be repaid
in kind, "or, at our Option, in other goods of many kinds
which they can produce and Which we need." With these
statements in the record he concluded his address with the
delineation of the four freedoms - speech and expression,
worship, want, and fear, everywhere in the world - the most
impressive statement of aims which could have been produced
at that time.28

‘5‘ The reception of the address was as varied as the
opposition to aid in general. Senator Vandenberg, one of the
most responsible among the isolationists, assessed Roosevelt's
appearance and speech as a flop, and publically described
it as a "Peace Through War By Proxy" speech. Taft of Ohio
objected to the unlimited nature of the contemplated loan,
and Senator Wheeler of Montana commented that: "It is too
bad this speech was not made before the election. It was
intended to frighten the American people to a point that they
would surrender their liberties and establish a war-time
dictatorship in this country. "29

Ample Opposition was also evident in.the House of
Representatives where comment ranged from the weak ineptness

of Mrs. Frances Bolton of Ohio Who complained, "I can't

 

28Time January 13, 19in, pp. 9-10; New York Times,
n.

January 7I—I9f

29New‘York Times January 7, l9hl; The Private Papers of
Senator Vandenberg, ed. Arthur’H. Vandenberg, Jr. (Boston, 1932),

p.8.

to

follow his reasoning," to the strong condemnation of R. F.
Rich of Pennsylvania, W. D. Barry of New Yerk, and Hamilton
Fish.of New Ybrk. While Barry called the ideas extravagant
and absurd, and Rich.asserted that the will of the President
would mean dictatorship, Fish, ranking minority member of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, offered a reasoned
statement on the condition of British finances, intimating
30

that aid was not necessary in the scOpe proposed.
/ Other Senators and Representatives rushed to the support
of the President's freshly outlined program, and the majority
opinion seemed to be with.them. Senator Barkley said that
it expressed the "overWhelming determination of the American
people" while Senator George of Georgia, the chairman of the
‘Senate Foreign Relations Committee, called it a strong statement.
Senator Austin, an outstanding Republican favoring aid, hailed
it as enlisting the United States on the side of freedom. In
the House the statements of Speaker Sam.Rayburn and Sol Bloom,
chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, both.key men
in the administration plans, closely resembled those of their
senatorial counter-parts.31

The reactions to the speech outside Congress were more
uniform. In a break-down published by the Cleveland Plgig
Dealer only the New York Daily News_and the Chicago Qgggx
Tribune had strongly worded critical editorial comments.

But while the Tribune was crying hysteria and saying the

 

3°New York Time_____§_, January 7, 19171.

31New‘York Times, January 7, l9hl, Cleveland Plain
Dealer, January 7, 19E1.

hi

President was "in an excited frame of mind," the New York

" and papers

EEEEE hailed it as a "sound and necessary policy,
like the Los Angeles 21mg§_and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
normally only luke-warm on aid, also praised it.32

While Alfred M. Landon, the 1936 opponent of Roosevelt,
and former Governor Philip La Follette of Wisconsin, both
had critical statements to make, especially La Follette who
“spoke for the America First Committee, the President still
had the pleasure of knowing his message was strongly supported

in the United States as well as being considered an inspiration

\'and source of strength in the allied countries.33

IV. H. a. 1776

Meanwhile Roosevelt had put into operation the machinery
that was drafting the bill to carry out his program. After
the initial idea had been talked over to the President's
satisfaction, he called Henry Morgenthau at the Treasury on
January 2. Previously he had decided to have the bill drafted
through the Treasury, and now Mbrgenthau put his general
counsel Ed Foley to work on the proposal. Together with
Oscar Cox, a Foley assistant, and a representative of the
British Purchasing Commission, they talked over the requirements.

By midnight that night Foley and Cox had produced a draft of

 

32New'York Times, January 7, 8, lohl; Cleveland Plain
Dealer, January 7, l9hl; Los Angeles Times, January 7, l9hl;
Washington Post, January 7, l9hl; St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
January 7, l9hl; Atlanta Constitution, January 7, 19% ;
Chicago Daily Tribune, January77,'l9hl.

33New York Times, January 7, 8, l9hl; Cleveland Plain
Dealer, January 7, l9hl.

172

the bill. Consultations with the other government departments
produced some changes, and on Monday, January 6, Foley and
Morgenthau took the bill to the White House. Then on the
advice of Congressional leaders the draft was submitted to

the Legislative Counsel of Congress and with the experts from
the Treasury and State Departments still another draft was
worked out. 34

While the drafting was in progress a few hints leaked
out as to its form. A January 1 press conference by
Morgenthau, before the go ahead on.the bill from Roosevelt,
indicated that the provisions might apply to Greece and China
as well as Britain. This was, as it turned out, the most
accurate of all the speculation. On January h Senator Barkley
said that a government corporation was being proposed as a
possible financing scheme, and the New York Time; repeated
this on January 7.

On.the following day more accurate information was
available as Secretaries Morgenthau and.Hull held separate
meetings with Speaker Rayburn and Majority Leader McCormack
of the House and Senator Barkley, Majority Leader, and
Senator Harrison, Finance Committee chairman, of the Senate.
A final conference was held at the White House with the
administration leaders, Morgenthau and Foley, Hull,

Henry Stimson, Secretary of War, Frank Knox, Secretary of

the Navy, Jesse Jones, Secretary of Commerce, William.S.

 

3"PI-anger and Gleason, Undeclared War, p. 25h;
"Morgenthau Diaries", Colliers, p. 75; New York Times,
January 7, 1941.

1+3

Knudsen, Office of Production Management, and the legislative
leaders, Senators Barkley, Harrison, Connally, and George,
and representatives Rayburn, Bloom, Luther Johnson, and
McCormack. Roosevelt stressed the necessity of speed in
enacting the bill, and on leaving the White House Barkley
announced that the next day he would introduce the bill in
the Senate and McCormack would do so in the House.35
While these events were transpiring another thread of
the complex pattern of Roosevelt's policy also came into.
evidence. On January 3, while the Treasury was drafting the
aid bill, Roosevelt appointed Harry Hopkins as his personal
represenative to London. Hopkins, described as studiously
unsuave and a reformer who was sometimes intolerant and
tactless, had been Secretary of Commerce and earlier the
Administrator of Federal Work Relief. He was in too poor
health to serve in any official capacity,‘but was prdbably
closer to Roosevelt than any other individual. After a
conference at the State Department Hopkins was ready to leave
on the Pan American Clipper from.New York on the sixth. He
steadfastly refused to make any comment, and the nature of
his mission was reliably supposed to be to keep Churchill
informed on Roosevelt's plans, as well as to observe English
conditions. On January 9‘he arrived in London in the midst

of an air-raid, and on the tenth.he lunched with Churdhill
after conferences with Anthony Eden.and Viscount Halifax,

 

3SLangerand Gleason, undeclared War, fip. 257-258;
New York Times, January 2, 3, E, 7, 9, 10, 19 ; Cleveland
Plain Dealer, January 10, l9hl.

the Ambassador-Designate to the United States.36

But with the advent of January 10 the attention that
might have'been focused on.Hopkins mission was brought
suddenly back to the United States Congress. In the Senate,
soon after its twelve o'clock meeting time, Senator Barkley
introduced What was promptly called the lend-lease bill.
He offered a brief explanation of the bill, and although a
short-time later Senator McKellar spoke in favor of aid no
real comments were made on the floor in regard to the bill.
In.the House, Majority Leader McCormack had more difficulty.
After introducing the bill he requested unanimous consent to
have it inserted in the ggngressional Record. Joseph Martin,
the Minority Leader, immediately took the opportunity to
inquire over the partisan nature of the bill. After Martin
had yielded, Congresswoman Rogers of massachusetts Objected
to having the bill printed, but later McCormack renewed'his
request successfully.37

The bill, entitled "A Bill To FUrther Promote the
Defense of the United States, and For Other Purposes," was
given.the historic number H. R. 1776. Immediate evaluations
were that the bill was broad and the powers granted to the
President very great. Brief in itself, the bill was comprised

of only nine sections. After the enabling section of the

 

36New York Times, January h, S 6, 7, 10, ll, lth;
Cleveland Plain Dir—“g or, January a, 19 ; Sherwood, Roosevelt

37Congressional Record, 77th Congress, lst Session,
87, 101-165 (January W) .

bill "defense articles" and "defense information" were
defined. Then "notwithstanding the provisions of any other
law" the President was permitted to aid the countries Whose
defense was deemed vital to the defense of the United States.
This'article, one of the broadest in the bill, included the
phrasing Which.gave the bill its name: "To sell, transfer,
exchange, lease, lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such
government, any defense article." The other sections of the
bill were essentially limitations on.the broad nature of the
first three sections.38

Roosevelt made a public bid for Congressional support
of the bill in.his January 10 press conference, When.he called
“for swift action. The support for the bill was, in fact,
impressive, but it came in Congress mostly from the eXpected
administration spokesmen. Speaker Rayburn endorsed the bill,
and in.the Senate Hill of Alabama and Thomas of Utah.were
particularly strong in support of the bill with Thomas
claiming that it did not go far enough. Senator George,'
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to which
the bill was referred, did not flatly endorse it until the
following day, while Senator Austin, a Republican expected to
support the bill, suggested a time limit amendment.

Outside Congress the Committee to Defend America by

 

38Time, January 20, 19kl, p. 15; United States Congress
House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings
on.H. R. 1776: A Bill Further To Promote The Defense of The
United States And For Other Purposes, 77th Cong. lst sess.,

prof-2.

 

lo

Aiding the Allies issued a strong call for action on the bill.
Al Smith, Winthrop W. Aldrich, chairman of the Chase National

Bank, and various British sources also endorsed the bill.

’fiProbably fihe strongest unexpected endorsement of the bill

—~_

itself came from wondell L. iillkie. Roosevelt's Republican
challenger in the l9hO election on January 12 issued a
statement giving his approval to the bill with.modifications.
At the same time he announced his intention to fly to Britain
to survey the situation. He expressed.hope that the bill
would be debated on its merits rather than on attempts to
sabotage any aid program, By the following day'he had
received about 800 messages commending him for his stand. The
total in opposition was around llO.39

Several newspapers and columnists also sprang to the
support of the bill. The Cleveland Plain Dealer said that:
"We are willing to trust President Roosevelt with this
tremendous amount of power." A few days later the same paper
criticized Landon for opposition to the bill, but also
recommended some amendments. The Atlanta Constitution was
even stronger in its support claiming that: "The Congress
will stand higher in public approval the quicker it enacts
the measure into law." A fair proportion of newspapers
across the country, as indicated in a survey published by the
New'York.ggm£§_had favorable editorial comments. Among the
columnists Robert C. Allbright writing in the Washington

 

39Langer and Gleason, Undeclared War, p. 259; New York

Times, January 11, 12,13,1u, IS, IQEI; Cleveland Plain
‘fizfi'e'r, January ll, 13, 191.1; Time, January 20, 191?, p. la.

in

3953 pointed out that the power conferred on the President
had not been directly proposed by Roosevelt at all, while
Ernest K. Lindley, speaking in Cleveland, claimed that the
power granted to the President was not as great as supposed.
Robert Quillen of the Atlanta Constitution and Arthur Krock
of the New'York'Timgg in essense agreed that while parts of
the bill might be objectionable there was no use quarrelling
with facts.u0

Initial opposition to the bill, however, was much
stronger than support. In Congress Senator Wheeler, as
expected, led off the opposition, and took a slap at Willkie's
endorsement on a radio broadcast on January 12. Many Democrats
who usually supported the administration were also skeptical
about the broad powers of the bill. Senator Hiram Johnson,
the last survivor of the League of Nations fight called the
bill monstrous and leading toward dictatorship. His view
was also backed by Senator Clark of Missouri. Senator Bob
LaFollette, Jr., of Wisconsin called it "a bill for Congress
to abdicate." Senator Taft of Ohio, Who was opposed to the
crusading spirit of the four freedoms, advanced the idea of a
$1 billion loan. Senators Nye of North Dakota, McCarren of
Nevada, Ellison.D. Smith of South Carolina, Capper of Kansas,
and Burton of Ohio also spoke out in opposition.

In the House Representative Mass of Minnesota announced

 

uOCleveland Plain Dealer, January 11, 1h, l9h1; Atlanta
Constitution, January 12, 13,—I941; New York Times, January 11,
lBj'lgul; Washington Post, January 12, 1941.

 

r

liB

he would offer an amendment to take over the British West
Indies and the Falkland Islands. Frances Bolton of Ohio
implied dictatorship, While Dewey Short of Missouri, called
it the "most dangerous proposal ever made by the New Deal."
thn M. Vorys, another Ohio Representative and a member of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said the bill seemed a

"stream-lined declaration of war." Representative Shanley

"of Connecticut, another committee member, criticized the

bill on the grounds of international law.1+1

At the same time widespread opposition was also voiced
outside the government. General Robert E. Wood wasted little
time in requesting a hearing before the House committee for
the America First Committee. He also announced his group
would fight the bill "with all the energy it can exert." A
Republican trinity of Alfred M. Landon, Herbert Hoover, and
Thomas E. Dewey all warned against the great powers and the
dangers of war“which were implicit in.the bill. Later even
Henry Morgenthau.had to admit that the mail he received on
the bill was antagonistic.u2

The newspaper opposition was even.more widely spread.
The New‘York'Tgmgg'survey Which had indicated approval showed

an equal amount of disapprobation across the country. Papers

 

, L'lNew York Times January 11 12, 13, 15, 19171; Cleveland
Plain Dealeg, January 11, 12, 15, 16, l9hl; Vernon Van Dyke
andedward Lane Davis, "Senator Taft and American Security,"

The Journal of Politics, May, 1952, p. 181.

Miter York Times, January 11, 12, 15, 19m; Cleveland
Plain Dealer, January ll, 12, 19h1; Langer and Gleason,
Undeclared Egg, p. 271.

 

 

#9

like the Akron Beacon Journal and the Chicago Tribune were
no surprise in the camp of the opponents, and the ggibune's
dictatorship charges, including the observation that "American
liberties are in greater danger from.forces here than anyWhere
else," could almost have been.predicted. But the broad powers
included in the bill, along with frequent references to the
dangers of war, were criticized by papers normally agreeable
to the idea of aid, and this opposition was found in New York,
washington, St. Louis, and Los Angeles."3

In a country Which still had a very strong anti-war
sentiment, despite a determination to aid Britain, and Which
was in many quarters sensitive to threats of a dictatorship
because the no third term tradition had been.broken for the
first time, the broad terms of the bill came as a surprise
and a threat. This produced a more wide-spread initial
opposition than.might otherwise would have been evident. Even
so, the scope of the opposition could.well have given the
administration pause. The strongly favorable atmosphere
which.had surrounded the "Four Freedoms" only a few days

before seemed to have largely disappeared.

 

"BNew'York Times, January 11, 1h, l9ul; Los Angeles
Times, January 11,-19El} St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 11,
I}, I9hl; Akron Beacon Journgl, January 11, 13, l9u1;

washington.Post, January 11, 12, l9hl; Chicago Daily Tribune,
January 11, 1951.

CHAPTER IV
THE GAME'S AFOOT

I. The Best and Simplest Plan

As soon as the lend-lease bill was introduced in the
House, Speaker Sam Rayburn referred it to the Foreign Affairs
Committee. Sol Bloom, prognathous, and gnomish, with a
black ribboned pince nez somewhat in the style of Disraeli,
was the chairman of that committee, and by the evening of
January 10 he had announced that his committee would
approve the bill by the following week and that it would pass
the House the week after. On the following day, after a
meeting of the committee, he said.that Secretary Hull would
be the first witness and would be followed by Morgenthau,
Stimson, and Knox.l

But Bloom and the administration faced one immediate
problem before the hearings could begin. Representative May
of Kentucky, a man Who replied.when asked.that he was
emphatically in favor of the bill, insisted that it should
be referred not to Bloom's Committee, but to his own, The
Military Affairs Committee. On January 11 May's Committee

 

1
Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 11, 12, l9hl; Time,
January 20, l9hl, pp. 15-15; I. F. Stone, "A Time For Candor,"
The Nation, January 25, 19hl, p. 91.

SO

 

Sl

voted 15 to unto demand control of the measure. Bloom
was confident that Rayburn would be upheld when.the issue
was brought to the House floor, and scheduled his
hearings to begin on January 15.

On January 13 May took the floor of the House to make
his motion‘for reassignment of the bill. He was opposed
by Cox of Georgia, Majority Leader McCormack, and Luther
Johnson of Texas. After Rayburn himself offered to explain
his assignment of the bill the motion.was defeated by a
voice vote.2

MeanWhile, one of the first serious attempts was
started for a responsible revision of the bill. Kenneth F.
Simpson, a newly elected representative from.New Ybrk, and
former chairman of the Republican Committee of New York
county, introduced an.amended bill that was designed to
restrict lend-lease to Britain and Ireland, and to allow
Congress to name any other nations to be aided. Simpson,
although he made no claim.that his bill represented Willkie's
point of view, had read it to Willkie over the telephone
and apparently had his tacit support.3

That same day also saw the first real attacks on the
bill from the floor of the Congress. Senator Capper, who
had previously'been described as middle of the road on the

aid issue came out in ringing opposition in a Senate speech.

 

2New York Times, January 11, 12, 13, 19m; Cleveland
Plain Dealer, January 12, 1h, l9hl; Co ressional Record,
77"‘—"_‘th Congress, lst Session, 126-128, January 13, 1914.1)T

3New York Times, January 1h, 19hl; Time, January 20,
1941, p. 16. “""' """"

 

52

In the House Hoffinan of Michigan and Jenkins and Vorys of
Ohio all made speeches against the bill. Hamilton Fish
also made his first attack, partly in reply to a Bloom
pronouncement that hearings could be concluded in three days.
Fish suggested a list of witnesses to be called before the
committee and concluded: "I believe the House Democrats

and the House Republicans will work their will upon this
bill “and that they will rewrite the measure, and they will
put it in such shape as to expedite aid - all possible aid -
to Great Britain, but they will insist on maintaining
representative and constitutional government and preserving
free institutions and government in America.""‘

Subsequently Bloom revised his rather rash statement
on three days of hearings, and adopted the point of view
that his committee would never have to meet an accusation
that full hearings had not been permitted. Although this
may have caused some lengthening of the hearings, in the
end it was a beneficial point of view which may have speeded
the ultimate passage of the bill.5

But before even the hearings opened, one exchange
transpired which set the tone for much of what was to come
after, and unfortunately to doom Willkie's statesmanlike
hape for a debate largely on the merits of the bill. In a

Sunday night radio debate Senator Wheeler, in a brillant

—‘

hoogiecord, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 129-131, 135-136,
111.3 (January 13, 191B); New York Times, January 12, 19141.

SSol Bloom, The Autobiography of Sol Bloom (New York,
191:3). pp. Mil-2&2-

53

flash.of calumny, branded the lend-lease bill as the "New
Deal triple A foreign policy - plow under every fourth
American boy."

The next afternoon President Roosevelt had a chance
to reply, and he did so with a verbal explosion. Asked to
comment on.the expression "blank check powers" at his press
conference, he did so and then authorizing direct quotation,
he continued: "That is not an answer to those, at all, who
talk about plowing under every fourth.American child, which
I regard as the most untruthful, as the most dastardly,
unpatriotic thing that has ever been said. Quote me on that.

"That really is the rottenest thing that has been
said in public life in my generation."6

Wheeler made a more calm and measured reply, but one
which nonetheless also accused Roosevelt, in.his turn, of
being all but a traitor, saying: ". . . nothing could be
more unpatriotic than to try to fan the passions of the
American people to the point where they will accept a program
that will eventually send American.boys to be killed upon
foreign battlefields." The newspapers immediately jumped
into the fray. The Chicago Tribune, in a rather calm editoral,
defended Wheeler, while the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.took
the exchange as a guide to Roosevelt's foreign policy thinking.
The WaShington‘ngt Observed that the remarks would bring
more support to the bill than they would take away. The

Los Angeles Times, however, made probably the most profound

__

6New Ybrk Times January 15, l9hl; Cleveland Plain
Dealer, January lg, 19hl.

and accurate appraisal. They wrote: "The interchange
between the President and Senator Wheeler is unfortunate
because it tends to distract attention from the main‘business
at hand - which is to provide, swiftly and efficiently, for
the national defense."7

\~ So, on January 15, in the ornate room of the House
Ways and Means Committee, the hearings on the lend-lease
bill opened. Before 10 a.m. the room was crowded and 23 of
the 25 committee members were seated behind the horseshoe
desk. Sol Bloom, described by Tim3_as a Neanderthal man
dressed up in clothes, descended to be photographed with
Secretary Hull when he appeared as the first witness.

‘“\- The Secretary led off the hearings with a carefully

prepared, powerful, and strongly argued statement. He early

set the tone for the administration witnesses, and established

the principle of self-defense as that which should motivate

the United States. "In the face of the forces of conquest

now on the march across the earth," he said, "self-defense

is and.must be the compelling consideration.in.the determination

of wise and prudent national policy." Very quickly he closed

the issue of the bill itself, saying: "The present bill

sets up machinery which.will enable us to make the most

effective use of our resources for our own needs and for the

needs of those whom, in our own self-defense, we are determined

 

7New York Times Januar ~
y 15, l9h1, Washington Post,
January 15, 19h hl; Chicago Daily Tribune, January 16, I9hI;

St. Louis Post- Dis atch, January 16, 1941; Los Angeles Times,
January 16, 1951

55

thus to aid." Effectively pointing out that speed was the
greatest need, Hull also dealt with the statutes and
h\‘agreements which might be affected under the new law.
Monetarily, he pointed out that the Johnson Act and Section 7
of the Neutrality Act of 1939 would not seem.to be directly
affected, although the neutrality provision would.be

superseded as far as the government was concerned. On.the
provision.in.the bill that would apparently permit the repair
of British warships in American ports, he said it \rioulc‘:

suspend sections 23, 2h, and 33 of United States Code, title
18, Which.made such actions illegal in accord with international
law. He also observed that While parts of the Hague Convention
XIII of 1907 were in opposition to provisions of the bill,

that the Convention was not applicable in the present war

because all of the belligerents were not signatories of the

Convention.8

Then the committee took over questioning Hull, and
Luther Johnson carefully posed a situation that enabled Hull
to again point out the importance of self-defense. However,
When.Hamilton Fish began his questioning the tone of the
‘3ihearings changed, and one of the questions Which.was to
plague the hearings through-out, the authorship of the bill,

was first raised. Hull, in reply to FiSh, pointed out that

 

8United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Hearings on H. R. 1776; A 13111
Further To Promote The Defense Of The United States And For

Ctfier P oses, 7?tfi Cong., lst Sess., 5-9; Time, January 27,
I915"; CJlEevae-l—an'd Plain Dealer, January 16, 1953. '

.Jrntl...rfr .u

 

 

56

he did not wish to discuss mechanics of the bill, and that
Morgenthau could do so because the bill had been drawn by
the Treasury Department.

A few minutes later he repeated the same thing to
Tinkham of Massachusetts. But burly bearded big-game hunter
George H. Tinkham had other roaring to do, and he and Hull
were soon entangled despite the efforts of Sol Bloom, the
chairman.

One of the first shots from Tinkham's gun was on whether
the United States would aid Russia 11' she were attacked.
Hull replied, "That is so theoretical I think it would not
help to discuss it." "I do not think it is theoretical at
all," Tinkham rejoined.

Bloom interrupted then to end the interchange, but in
a few minutes they were again at odds over the question of

whether the bill might include manpower. Hull told him, "I

have not heard that dis cussed by anybody. "

Mr. Tinkham. You do not want to answer in any

other way?
Secretary Hull. No; I have not heard anybody

discuss that.
The Chairman. The Secretary has answered the

question.
Mr. Tinkham. I gave him an opportunity 06
answering in any other way that he wants to.

Then under Tinkham's guiding they moved on to the issue
of the power of the President under the bill, and then to the
question of giving away the United States Navy. Hull was

9House Hearings, pp. 11 , 18, 20- ~21; Alben W. Barkley,
ghat Reminds Me (New York, l95fp),p p. 128.

57

careful to point out that the President did not need any
additional power to commit acts of war, and.therefore that

could.not be an.objection.to the bill. Then finally Tinkham

asked:

Now, I want to know, Mr. Secretary, whether under
the terms of this bill, and you have read it, of
course, the President can give away any part of the
united States Navy?

Secretary Hull. Oh, that is such.a violent
assumption I am surprised that even you would want
to take up time to discuss it.

Mr. Tinkham. It seems to me it is implicit. I
do not want to read the bill, but it seems to me it
is quite implicit in the language as drawn. I could
read the bill. Is the bill here?

Secretary Hull. I say, it is such a violent
assumption that anybody would try to give away a
dreadnought.

Mr. Tinkham. mr. Secretary, we are in days When
the most violent assuaptions are liable to be the
correct assumptions.

Finally, light was thrown on one of the earliest and
most consistently mentioned of possible amendments. Under
questioning by Foster Stearns of New Hampshire, Hull intimated
that no objection would be made to putting a time limit on.the
provisions of the bill.11

This time limit modification, which was first mntioned
by Willkie, and was also included in the amended bill introduced
by Kenneth.Simpson, brought wide praise, and the same day Hull
voiced tacit approval the Cleveland Plain Dealer had
editorialized that: "It is in thisspirit of co-operation
that American.will make her aid to the embattled Allies count

toward victory." On the day following his appearance Hull

L

10House Hearings, pp. 2h, 28.
111bid., p. 41.

58

received outright praise for his "cogent arguments" in.the
Washington.§2§t,12
After a luncheon recess the committee reconvened to
hear Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. Hull
had appeared alone, but Morgenthau came with seven aides: In
a long and technical statement Morgenthau, with British
approval, revealed the financial condition of the BritiSh.
The complete figures showed that the British had exhausted
all their assets which were quickly convertible into dollars,
and had either spent or obligated them.before January 1, 19hl.
The other assets could not be converted quickly enough to
help, and their gold was virtually exhausted. The figures
which showed the British would need at least $3 billion from
the United States in l9hl were quickly challenged by Hamilton
Fish.flho produced a Federal Reserve Board statement. Mbrgenthau,
however, noted that the statement in question was dated
August 1939, before the war began, and that the war had
depleted the resources very drastically. He underlined all
that had gone before in a reply to a question put to him.by
Herman P. Eberharter of Pennsylvania. "But when it comes to
finding the dollars," he said, "to pay for anything like
what they need in the future, they just have not got it."13
The questioning of Morgenthau also strayed from.the

strictly monetary aspects of’the bill, and came'back once~

 

12Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 15, l9hl; Washington
Post, January 16, 19114.

Bilge. January 2?. 19in, pp. 13-1Lp; Cleveland Plain
Dealer, January 16, 19hl; House Hearings, p. 55.

59

more to the powers of the President. Fish questioned him.as
to whether the President would.have power to convoy
belligerent ships, and received the reply that the bill gave
him no additional power. Morgenthau.was also examined over
the possible cost of the bill. He refused to be committed
to any figure, but did leave the impression that all repayment
for leased materials might not be either in goods or in money,
but in.the service of keeping the United States free from
attack.lu

The same day filat the committee heard Hull and Morgenthau,
the divisions on the bill were becoming more clearly cut.
Herbert Hoover wrote a letter to Sol Bloom, warning the
committee that the bill could cancel parts of the very laws
and agreements which Hull had mentioned in.his testimony, and
adding the labor laws for good measure. The Cleveland Plain
Dealer was able to report, without approval, that both Ohio
senators, Taft and Burton, opposed the bill along with 10
Republican representatives from Ohio. But a Gallup Poll
released.the same day showed 60 per cent of Willkie's
supporters and 62 per cent of Roosevelt's would help England
even at the risk of war. Clearly the issue between those
who favored lend-lease and those who opposed it was not to
turn on.the question of aid alone. The powers, intentions,
and judgement of the President were to assume a larger and

larger position in the following days.15

 

1"§2939 Hearings, pp. 58-59, 68, 77.

lSCleveland.§lain Dealer, January l5, l6, l9hl; New
York Times, January 17, 1 MI; Herbert Hoover, Addresses Upon
the American Road l9hO-19, (New York, l9hl), p. 6h.

60

This was largely true because of the vague charges
of dictatorship time and time again leveled against the
bill by its opponents. These charges always seemed to
escape exact definition but centered around the clauses
"notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, " and "or
otherwise procure" as they appeared in the original bill.
Generally they were based on the idea that these clauses
would allow the President to seize private property,
conscript labor, and more commonly to give away virtually
anything that belonged to the United States without recompense
or without control. Economic considerations, hidden under
the guise of patriotism, were a main factor in the thought
of the opponents. I
On the second day of the hearings Henry Stimson, the
Secretary of War, came before the committee to take up where
Hull and Morgenthau had left the defense of the bill and to
warn the Congressmen and listeners in the committee room of
the danger that would face the nation should the bill fail
to pass. In his prepared statement Stimson pointed out that
the bill was similar to the Pittman Act passed the year before,
and summarized his thoughts, and those of the administration.
"I feel," he said, "that the proposed bill is a forthright
and clear grant of power which will enable the President to
place in operation the best and simplest plan to carry out a
national policy many times stated and eniorsed."16
In the subsequent questioning Stimson and Hamilton Fish

1621—322. January 27. 19241, p. 11;; House Hearings, pp. 89-90.

61

occupied the spot-light. As Stimson put strongly the
proposition.that the defense of the United States depended
upon a successful defense of Great Britain several clashes
occurred. After Stimson.had discouraged the idea of taking
the British.West Indies as collateral for loans Fish jumped
on the defense idea.

"Is it not rather cowardly of us," he asked, "if
England is fighting our battle, not to go into the war?"

Stimson.side-steppedlwifll, "I am.not going to pursue
this line of argument. We are not concerned with it in this
bill."

But Fish's insistance on the issue of the danger to
the United States brought Stimson to his feet. After a
question on the danger of invasion Stimson rose to point his
finger at Fish.before he gave a slow, measured, and emphatic
answer. "I think we are in very great danger of invasion
by air in the contingency the British navy is destroyed or
surrendered."17

The questioning of Stimson could not be concluded in
one session and the Secretary agreed to return the following
morning to allow the other Congressmen a chance to question
him. Neither could the fire-works be confined to the open
session of the committee. Despite Stimson's warnings on the
need for speed on the bill the administration forces were
not able to block invitations to witnesses by minority members

of the committee. After the committee adjournment Bloom

 

l"House Hearings, pp. 98, 101-102; New York Times,
January 17, 19hl.

 

62

accused Fish of inviting witnesses, including Wendell L.
Willkie, and Joseph P. Kennedy, the retiring Ambassador to
Great Britain, without the consent of the full committee.
Fish contended that Bloom had authorized him to do so.
Before a group of spectators who had been attracted by the
interchange the two New York congressmen found themselves
shouting at each other toe to toe over Fish's calling the
bill "the President's dictator bill." The committee, in
executive session, agreed to meet later to consider the
question.18

The immediate comments on Stimson's testimony were,
as usual, varied. Senator Wheeler, with his biting attitude,
told reporters: "Every informed person in WaShington knows
that Mr. Stimson was placed in the War Department because
of his known prowar attitude." But the Washington.§g§t in
its editorial the following day praised Stimson's testimony,
and observed that congress could modify the bill and still
accomplish the administration purposes.19

In.the meantime action was taken on.other fronts in
addition to that of the committee room. Some of it was
publicly known, and some of it was not. As a quiet reminder
that harmony was not the key-note among the opponents of the
bill Colonel Charles A. Lindberg denied any connection.with

the No Foreign War Committee, although he had been listed

18New'York Times, January 17, l9h1; Cleveland Plain
Dealer, January 17, 19Kl.

19Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 17, l9hl; WaShington
Post, January 17, 19Hl.

 

63

among its backers by Verne Marshall. More important activities

turned on the pivot of the White House. Roosevelt, in a

note to Churchill, guessed that the bill might pass by

February 15, but observed that a Senate filibuster might.

delay it. He also received Joseph Kennedy for a conference.

Whon.he left the White House Kennedy commented on the radio

speech he had scheduled for that Saturday, saying: "For

once, I am going to say for myself what I have in my mind."

After the Roosevelt conference Kennedy also talked with

Wheeler, and the Senator soon afterward demanded that the

President make public Kennedy's report on European conditions,

although he denied any connection.between the two events.20
Action was also taking place on the floor of the House

as John M. Costello of California introduced another substitute

bill, and explained that he felt the administration should

have introduced separate legislation to repeal the Johnson

Act and the Neutrality Act, if they intended to do so with

the lend-lease bill. Shortly after this appearance George

Tinkham, fresh from the committee hearings of Stimson,

appeared on the floor to unlimber his big-game guns. He took

the floor at the close of general orders for that day in the

House and after yielding briefly to Marcantonio and to Hoffman

of Michigan, he proceeded to briskly accuse Roosevelt and

Hull, not of unpatriotic conduct in the style of Senator

Wheeler, but of outright treason. "Mr. Speaker," he began,

 

20New York Times, January 17, 19141; F.D.R. His Personal
Letters l928-19h5, ed. Elliott Roosevelt (New York, 19557, II,

1107.

 

a: C 1: car“. rt. 1 H. MRI- .Hm. a 0 c and uh .- G o - HM: -1~‘Iio.

.. ’l'iui

 

 

61+

"President Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull have plotted
against the peace and safety of the United States. They
have purposely created a war hysteria and they are now
projecting the United States into war. Their conduct is
disloyal and traitorous."21

The press comments that same day ranged over all the
fronts of the aid-to-Britain battle. Since Wendell Willkie
had made an unscheduled appearance in the audience of the
Town.Hall of the Air Meeting the preceding night, his stand
was praised in William Allen White's Emporia Gazette, and the
independence of his action was recognized in Paul Mallon's
Column in the Cleveland Plain Dealer. The preceding day

Plain Dealer had praised the endorsement of the bill by

 

Winthrop W. Aldrich of the Chase National Bank, and on

January 17 attacked the bill opponents. Morgenthau related
again the great British financial need at a press-conference
on.January 16, and the following day the New York EEEEE
carried an editorial supporting his position. The national
board of the League of WOmen Voters also endorsed the bill.
The Akron Beacon Journal, taking an Opposite tack accused Hull

of one-sided testimony and condemned Roosevelt for his attack

on Wheeler.22

When Stimson.resumed the witness chair for the third

21New York Times, January 17 19141; Cong. Record, 77
Cong., l Sess., 165, 178 (January 16, l9hl).

22
Emporia Gazette, January 16, 19hl; Cleveland Plain
Dealer, January 15, 17, l9hl; New York Times, January 17, l9h1;
Akron.Beacon Journal, January 16, 19hl.

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65

day of the House hearings George Tinkham was again in the
forefront with a barrage of questions. But no matter how
strongly he tried to beat the Secretary out of his stand on
a wide range of issues, he was uniformly unsuccessful.
Ranging from the possibility of buying French warships lying
at Martinique, through aid to China, to the question of ships
in belligerent waters and the use of manpower, Tinkham was .
foiled. In reply to a question from Bartel J. Jonkman of
Michigan, however, Stimson was again able to assert the
necessity of the bill to Britain's survival, and finally under
friendly questioning from Luther Johnson, he was able to
emphasize the need for speed.

"Mr. Johnson," he replied, "I cannot state too
emphatically the apprehension that I feel as to the possibility
of a crisis, which I think even my friends on the right would

recognize as a crisis, within the next 60, or at most, 90
days."23

Colonel Frank Knox, the ruddy and tough Secretary of
the Navy, followed Stimson on the stand. He had listened to
the final quarter hour of questioning directed at Stimson and
had received the chair from Stimson with his comment, "I resign
this rather warm chair to you." Stimson left the room amid
applause from the committee members and the standing-room-only
crowd that included many other congressional members since the
House was not in session.

Knox launched into his testimony combatively and strongly

defended the importance of Britain and the British navy to

 

23House Hearinas. pp. 107-110, 112-133, 115, lh6, 150-151-

66

American defense. He emphasized the fact that the British
navy really made the Monroe Doctrine possible, and that it
would be six years until the United States had an.affective
two ocean navy. He made the danger of a British defeat
clear once more, and reiterated Stimson's 60 to 90 day
crisis prediction. Then.he defended his views stoutly from
the questioners.2hr

And again, the events outside of the Ways and Means
Committee room were almost as important as those within. In
Great Britain Winston Churchill made an unexpected appearance
before a large audience in Glasgow. Seated with.him.on.the
platform.was Harry Hopkins. Churchill made a point of
introducing Hopkins to the audience and then.made a widely
hailed speech, denying the need for American troops in lth,
but calling for weapons, ships, and planes beyond Britain's
capacity to pay.

Almost automatically Senator Wheeler had a statement
that-he had learned from."reliable sources" that Churchill
had been pressing for an.American declaration of war and that
Hopkins was in.Britain to see what steps short of a declaration
could be taken. In.his haste to condemn.he apparently
overlooked the fact that this might be exactly the "short-
of-war" formula which practically everyone supported verbally.

Sol Bloom was quick to point out the similarity between who

 

2“New York Times, January 18, 19h1; Cleveland Plain

Dealer, January 18, 1§El; Time, January 27, l9hl, p. IE,
House Hearings, pp. 155-187-

67‘

the views of most Americans and those of Churchill's speech.25
This same day the Los Angeles 2222§.h3d another reminder
that neutrality was meaningless anyway, and labeled the lend-
lease bill, interestingly, "The Arms Pool Plan." On.January 18
the Chicago Tribune also jumped.back into the publicity battle
over aid, and for it dictatorship, with an attack reading
Wendell Willkie out of the Republican party for his support
of the Roosevelt bill. "Mr. Willkie entered the Republican
party as a mysterious stranger, suddenly and to the astonishment
of thousands of the party'members who didnfit recall the face
or the name," it wrote. "He may now take his leave, quite as
suddenly, still a stranger to the party's principles, altho
no longer mysterious." Neither dti it miss a chance to attack
the bill, and warned that passage would make congress "only

another reichstag." On the nineteenth it made another attack

on Willkie.26

Concluding the initial testimony for the administration
and for the best and simplest plan, William S. Knudsen,
Danish-American and newly appointed head of the Office of
Production.Management, had the briefest time on.the stand,
and in essense made two important points. The first was
that it was essential to arm rapidly, and the second was that
it was essential to aid Britain whether or not the United States
was ever paid. He defended the bill on the grounds that the

 

25New Yerk Times, January 18, l9hl; Cleveland Plain
Dealer, January 18, I§El.

26Chicago Daily Tribune, January 18, 19, 19h1;
Los Angeles Times, January 17, 19hl.

68

combination of purchases and procurement would make his job
simpler.27

The Washington.§g§t took the Opportunity to point out
that Knudsen's testimony was evidence of "yet another
intelligent man Who has the wit to see the ugly shape of
things to come under the heels of Axis victory." They took
the view that his testimony made clear the need to furnish
British needs out of existing stocks of weapons. But their
analysis could.be easily lost in the sea of surrounding events.
The Los Angeles Timgg'was praising Hoover's letter to Bloom,
and the preceeding testimony of Knox was eliciting critical
comment from the Akron Beacon Journal, which claiming that
"The Truth Becomes Plainer," wrote: "His statement should be
rejected by every self-respecting American." It concluded,
in capitals, "THE ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT TRUST CONGRESS TO
DECLARE WAR SOON ENOUGH." Demonstrating clearly at least
part of the sectional differences in point of view the Atlanta

Constitution editorialized on the numerical designation of the

 

bill, and hoped "that it will bring to the congress something
of the spirit that animated the men of the year designated

by the same numerals - 1776." Wendell Willkie, in an apt reply
to the Chicago Tribune's attack upon.him warned Republicans

they would never regain control of fine government if they made

 

27House Hearin 3, pp. lei-195, 197, 211w Cleveland
Plain Dealer, January , 19hl° Time, January 27, 19hl, p. 1h;
New York Times, January 19, l9hl

O

blind opposition to the lend-lease bill.28

But the real attention was focused away from.Knudsen
and toward Joseph P. Kennedy,.for his radio address the
evening of Knudsen's testimony. In the face of statements
made the same day by such varied sources as Ernest Gibson,
the newly elected head of the Committee to Defend America
by Aiding the Allies, Sir Arthur Salter of the British
Ministry of Shipping, and by salty old Senator Carter Glass,
Kennedy made a clear but ambivalent speech which left him
approximately where he began - in favor of the "utmost aid
to England" but Opposed to the lend-lease bill. Among
those who had fear of the extensive powers Which were
supposedly claimed by the President under this legislation,
this was not an unusual position.

It was, however, a position.which left him open to
attack. Dorothy Thompson, concluded in her column that "he
had out-Hamleted.Hamlet, for instead of posing the question,
'to be or not to be,’ he managed to make it 'To be and not
to be.'" The‘Wamaington‘gggg wrote that "The negativeness
in Hr. Kennedy's speech, in.ehort, doesn't comport with his
constructive approach," While the Cleveland Plain Dealer
decided that the people were with Willkie and Roosevelt rather
than Kennedy. Of course, he had his supporters too. The
St. Louis Post-Dispatch evaluated.his address as "Sensible,

temperate, realistic, patriotic . . ." and the Akron.Beacon

 

28Washington Post, January 19, l9hl; Akron Beacon
Journal, January 18, 1951; Atlanta Constitution, January 18,
IQEl; Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 19, l§h13 Los Angeles
Times, January 187 1911; New York Times, January 19, 19111.

70

Journal wrote, "Naturally we consider his speech an excellent
work."29

For those in doubt, Kennedy would soon have a chance
to either’redeem.or prove himself when the hearings reopened
after Roosevelt's inauguration, for he was scheduled as the

witness to appear on January 21.

II. Away From.Democracy

On Sunday, January 19, another in a lengthening series
of unprecented acts was taken When President Roosevelt
received Wendell Willkie at the White House. He personally
wished Willkie a good trip to England, and gave his defeated
rival a note of introduction to Churchill. Written with his

own hand, it said:

To a Certain Naval Person:
Dear Churchill:
Wendell Willkie is taking this to you. He is
being a true help in keeping politics out of things.
I think this verse applies to you people as well
as to us:
"Sail on, 0 Ship of State!
Sail on, 0 Union, strong ani great:
Humanity with all its fears,
With all the hopes of future years

Is hanging breathless on thy fate!" , 30
Franklin D. Roosevelt

The third inauguration of Roosevelt as President of
the United States took place on the following anday. The

same day John G. Winant was announced as the new United States

29New Yerk Times, January 19, 19k1; Cleveland Plain
Dealer, January 19, 20, l9hl; Washington Post, January 50, 22,
19K1: St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 20, l9hl; Akron Beacon
Journal, January 20, 1941; House Hearings, pp. 264-265.

 

30F.D.R. Letters, II, 1109; Cleveland Plain Dealer,
January 20, l9hl; New York Times, January 20, l9hl.

71

Ambassador to the Court of St. James. He was to succeed
Joseph Kennedy whose appearance before the House Committee
was eagerly awaited. The first of the proposed opposition
witnesses, he was expected to indicate something of the drift
away from democracy in.his testimony.

In.this appearance on January 21, Kennedy frequently
brought applause from the crowd and Chairman Bloom
occasionally had to warn them.against displays of approval
or disapproval. But Kennedy completely failed to make clear
his own position on the proposed legislation. Having no
qualms at all about stating, "I am against the bill in its
present.form," in.reply to a question by Robert B. Chiperfield,
he nonetheless had no amendments or suggestions to offer,
and the questioning on the whole tended to confirm.him.in
the camp of those who would give greater powers to the
executive.31

Kennedy was questioned extensively and Sharply, and in
reply to a query from.Hamilton Fish.on the very issue of the
possible power of the President to give away the United States
Navy, the farmer ambassador was able to affirm his belief in
the administration. He replied to Fish, "Very frankly, as
I said in a speech I made on Saturday night, I am.a great
believer in authority going with responsibility, and I cannot
for the life of me believe that there is anybody in these
United States that would give away the American Navy."32

 

31House Hearings, pp. 282-283; New York Times, January
21, 22, l9hl.

32House Hearings, p. 226

72

The real failure of Kennedy before the committee was
his inability to hold any single position.against the
Congressmen. More than.once he seemed to be moved from one
camp to the other. Fish, just a few minutes after the
statement on giving away the navy, was able to accomplish
just such.a move in regard to conveying ships.

He asked: "Would you object to an amendment going
into this bill stating that our ships should not be conveyed
without the consent of Congress?"

Kennedy replied, "I would."

This apparently placed him.in opposition to the proposed
amendment, but Fish went on, undaunted, to ask, "That is, you
would not object?"

Completely reversing himself, Kennedy agreed, "I would
not object."33

While Kennedy was eventually found in opposition to
most of the arguments presented by Stimson.and Knox the
preceding week, When specific questions came up Kennedy was
not willing really to commit himself to the opposition point
of view. He was unable to place himself on record against
repairing British ships in American yards, nor could he really
see that giving material to Britain would lead directly to war.
He certainly adopted the administration point of view on the
reasons why aid should.be extended When he put it on the basis

of gaining time for the United States itself to arm.34

 

33Ibid., pp. 226-227.
3LtHouse Hearings, pp. 227, 230; Cleveland Plain.Dgaler,

January 22, 1951.

73

But when it cane down to the question of money to
finance the bill, and limiting the amount to be expended, he
again ran into difficulty. Charles Eaton, a Republican
member of the committee from.New Jersey, carefully led
Kennedy through a series of questions which ended with Eaton
asking: "That we ought to have a definite anount named in
the bill?" Kennedy to this replied, "It would seem so . . . ."

No sooner had Eaton left this line of questioning
than John Kee of West Virginia took it up and led the
ambassador back to his starting point. Kee's questioning on
this issue concluded with: "Therefore, there would be no

necessity of saying in this bill the amount of the appropriation,

or limiting its is that right?"

"That is right, sir," was Kennedy's answer.35

Despite what appeared to be such obvious contradictions
in Kennedy's testimony, and his general unwillingness to be
specific through-out his testimony, when he concluded he was
cheered by the crowd which consisted largely of women, and
police were forced to clear a path through eager autograph
seekers so that he could leave the hearing room.36

Although he could not have known.Hamilton Fish's question
on convoys, Roosevelt, probably in a definite attempt to

reassure anxious Congressional members, announced at his press

conference that day that he never considered conveying supplies

 

35House Hearings, pp. 231, 2349235.

36House Hearings, pp. 221-317; Cleveland Plain Dealer,
January 22, l9hl.

71!-

to Great Britain. And, a Gallup poll, released the same day,
seemed to lend strength to the administration pressure for the
bill, as the figures showed 62 per cent of the Republicans and
7h per cent of the Democrats willing to endorse in principle
the plan embodied in H. R. 1776.

Agreement in principle, however, did not step many
people really in favor of aid from frowning upon the powers of
the bill. Indeed, those who might normally discount venomous
attacks from the Chicago Tribune, found other responsible and
probably less interested organs of opinion voicing essentially
the same things. The Christian Century, consistently in favor
of neutrality and of peace, called for "No Compromise" in its
issue of January 22. "The President's bill 'to promote the
defense of the United States'," it decided, "is in its effect
a bill to put the United States into the war and to shift the
government of this country from its democratic basis to a
dictatorship. It is the most un-American proposal which the
American people have ever had seriously to consider." A few
days later this View was supported by the equally responsible

Commonweal which observed: "We find it more difficult than the

 

all-out supporters of this Bill 1776 to make the shift to
authoritarianism"37

On the day following Kennedy's testimony at the hearings
Norman Thomas and Hanferd MacNider appeared. Thomas, speaking
before the smallest crowd that had been attracted, politely

thanked the committee for a chance to appear, and in a concise

 

37New York Times, January 22, l9hl; The Christian
Century, January 22, 19hl, p. 113; Commonwegl, January 2 ,

19b1, p0 3390

75

and clear, if not eloquent statement presented.his arguments.
He quickly made clear that he felt the ultimate intention of
the bill was to take the United States into the war. MacNider,
who followed the perennial Socialist candidate for President,
adopted in his brief testimony on behalf of the America First
Committee, a position of complete isolation.38

The morning of this activity, Wendell Willkie, carrying
the letter given him.by Roosevelt, began the trip he had
planned to survey conditions in mgland. Boarding the plane
for Lisbon.he stressed that he was going purely as a private'
citizen.39

The hearings themselves reached another climax on
Thursday, January 23, as the bill opponents brought forward
.their big guns. To lead off that day's hearings was
Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, and he was to be followed by
General Hugh S. Johnson.

Lindbergh's appearance attracted a large crowd, and
one Which proved to be the most demonstrative of the hearings.
Long lines of prospective spectators formed outside of the
Ways and Means Committee room, and once inside Sol Bloom
had to make frequent warning against applause and other signs
of approval or disapproval. On one occasion Representative

Wirt Courtney of Tennessee, a Democrat, was booed for asking

 

38Heuse Hearings, pp. 317-370; Time, February 3, 19h1,
p. 13; Cleveland Plain.Dealer, January 23, l9hl; Wayne S. Cole,
America,First: The Battle Against Intervention l9hO-l9hl

(Madison.i§§3). pp-ABIhr-
39New York Times, January 23, 19m.

 

76

Lindbergh which side he wanted to win the war, and the uproar
drowned out Lindbergh's answer of neither side.

In a striking contrast to Kennedy, the Colonel was
straightforward and definite, and he adopted a strong and
consistent position.which he defended well from.the administration
questioners. He Opposed the bill chiefly on three counts.
First, he felt it reduced the powers of Congress in relation
to those of the President, and when.he was asked he side-stepped
the issue of whether or not a President would act against
reliable advice. Second, he felt it weakened the potential
United States defense by giving material to Britain, and'
thirdly, he felt the bill would lead.to war. In general he
voiced himself in favor of strict, complete neutrality, a
negotiated peace in Europe in Which neither side would be
the victor, and in favor of an American defense force of
10,000 modern planes. He believed that the United States
would.be safe from.any attack with such a force, and he seemed
to imply that even the combination of Britain and America

to

After his appearance Lindbergh wrote to Sol Bloom

could not defeat Germany on.the European continent.

expressing his thanks for a fair hearing, and praising the
tact and consideration with Which the proceedings were
conducted. But from large segments of the press Lindbergh
received slight consideration. A few papers praised his

position, but elements which had been initially shocked by

 

hflfiguse Hearingg, pp. 371-436; New York Times, January
2h, l9hl; Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 2h, l9EI; Time,
February 3, 19111, p. 13.

77

the broad powers of the bill had now returned to administration
support. They believed that the bill would be amended in a
manner to remove any doubt of potential threats to American
liberty. The Washington‘ggst was one of these which attacked
Lindbergh all out. In an editorial headed "Will-To-Lose" he
was chastised for his attitude that Germany could not be
beaten. The §2§£,contended, "At a time When the President, on
a mandate from the people, is seeking to evoke the spirit of
America in this great national enterprise, the Colonel serves
an ill purpose by making out that the British cause is hopeless
Unconsciously, indeed, he serves a Nazi end." The New‘York
T§m£§_was another paper Which censored Lindbergh, as they ran
an editorial proclaiming "Peace When There Is No Peace."h'l
Following Lindbergh on the stand, and benefiting to a
large extent from the audience which he had attracted,
General Hugh S. Johnson forthrightly expounded his views,
pounded the table, and evoked laughter at several points in
his exchanges with the committee members. Unlike Lindbergh,
Johnson was in favor of aid, but'by no means was he in favor
of the bill, or of what he called "humanitarian lollipopping
all over the world." He was Opposed to an amendment that
would limit the conveying power of the President, but he was
adamant on the amount of aid to be given.

"I have stated over and ever again, that I am.for such

 

hlBloom Autobiggraphy, p. 2h2; Chicago Daily Tribune,
January 25, 19 ; Akron Beacon Journal, January—2h, l9hl;
Washington Post, January‘Zh, 19El; New Yerk Times, January 2h,

191,1.

78

aid as will insure the defense of the United States, and not
for one inch more," he told James A. Shanley, a committee
member from.Connecticut.

But when it came to considering danger to the United
States General Johnson and Lindbergh were in.eomplete
agreement. "I do not know Why," Johnson opined, "people
should begin turning up their nose at 3,000 miles Of the
Atlantic Ocean and up to 6,000 miles of the Pacific Ocean,
after seeing the difficulty that Mr. Hitler is having with
22 miles of the English Channel.“1L2

As a final witness that day Dr. Brooks Emeny, director
of the Cleveland Foreign Affairs Council, was called before
the committee by Congresswoman Bolton of Ohio, but did not
represent a majority of the Council. Appearing as an expert
in raw materials, he claimed that the United States could
maintain itself even if the rest of the world were totalitarian.
In essence confirming the testimony of Lindbergh and Johnson,
Emeny rounded out a concerted attack which was aimed at making
the bill unnecessary on practical considerations of the national
self-defense. Although vocally stated, the charges of
dictatorial powers slipped temporarily into the background]+3

The night after the appearance of these witnesses
before the committee, Dr. Robert M. Hutchins, president of the
University of Chicago, made a radio address warning against

the drift toward war, and in effect charging that the American

 

“ZHOuse Hearings, pp. h36-h6h; Time, February 3. l9hl, p. 13

h3H0use Hearings, pp. h6S-h77; Cleveland Plain Dealer,
January ZHI'19H1.

79

people were "morally and intellectually unprepared" for the
policies mapped out by the President. Almost simultaneously
a statement was issued by 125 faculty:members of the
University urging the enactment of the lend-lease bill.ML

In the meantime, two substitute bills were introduced
in the Senate. The bills, introduced by Taft of Ohio and
Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado, both proposed large loans to
the British and their allies. At the same time a subcommittee
of the Foreign Relations Committee in the Senate was meeting
with Hull, Morgenthau, Stimson, and Knox to plan hearings
on the Senate version of the bill. Hull was again to be the
first witness at hearings planned to open on the following
Monday.LLS

And also on the same day the prospects for definite
amendment of the bill, at least in respect to a time limit,
markedly improved. James Wadsworth, a Republican Representative
from.New York conferred with Roosevelt at the White House,
and was supposed to have received agreement on several
amendments. Luther Johnson announced that he would sponsor
the time limitation in committee. This agreement coincided
almost exactly with a lengthy and reasoned editorial in the
St. Louis Epst-Dispatch, a paper which was never able to work
up much enthusiasm for the bill. In one of the best analyses

published, it called for a definite time limit of two years,

 

New Yerk Times, January 2h, l9hl.

uSNew‘Yerk Times, January 2h, l9hl; Cleveland Plain
Dealer, January 2h, l9hl.

80

a monetary ceiling of $2 billion, a definite limit on conveys,
a ban on the transfer of American Ships, either commercial

or naval, and.a requirement for the President to get a quid
.pgg'qgg for each transaction rather than leaving repayment

to his discretion.u6

On the eighth day of the hearings, January 211-, the
attention was largely drawn away from the lengthy list of
opposition witnesses by two other events. One of these was
another dispute between committee members. This was over
whether or not to publicly hear testimony from the heads of
the Army and Navy. The other event was the arrival of the
new British.Ambassador.

Taking still another unprecedented step, President
Roosevelt, accompanied by Secretary Knox, and a few other
officials drove to Annapolis, Maryland, where they took the
Presidential yacht Potomac and sailed down the bay to meet
the battleship Kinngeorge V which was bringing Lord Halifax
to the United States. Viscount Halifax had left the British
Foreign Office and the inner war cabinet to become Ambassador.
Roosevelt extended to him.an act of friendship usually
reserved for the head of a state. It was another underlining
of the essential unity which the administration was attempting
to promote with Britain in.her struggle against the Nazis. As
the Washington 22§2.n°ted: "It was a gesture which charged

with electric current every word he (Roosevelt) has uttered

 

hécleveland Plain Dealer, January 25, l9hl; St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, January 2E, l9hl.

81

in the last three weeks."u7

MeanWhile the committee dispute was taking place.
Republican.members wished to obtain public testimony from
ranking Army and Navy officers on the conditions of United
States defense. The committee divided on the issue, and
Hamilton Fish charged after a luncheon recess that the
Democrats were afraid the testimony would show the bill to
be unwise and unnecessary. The Democrats contended it
would not be in the national interest to make public,
defense plans and conditions.h'8

But in fine time when the committee members were not
arguing with each other they were hearing testimony from the
largest number of witnesses to appear before the committee
in a single day. These people were: William R. Castle, an
under-secretary of State in the Hoover administration,
Gerald L. K. Smith, the National Chairman of the Committee
of One Million, John Burke, a representative of the American
Defense Society who read a statement submitted by Amos Pinohot
as well as giving his own testimony, Benjamin marsh, the
Executive Secretary of the Peoples Lobby located in Washington,
William.J. Grace, the Chairman of die Citizens Keep America
Out of War Committee from.Chicago, George H. Gless, of Glen
Falls, New Yerk, and William.C. Dennis, the president of

Earlham.College in Richmond, Indiana.

 

#73322, February 3, 1941, p. 12; New York Times, January
25, 1941; Washington Post, January 25, lth.

uaNew'York Times, January 25, 19hl.

82

Of these witnesses the testimony offered by Castle,
and by Gerald L. K. Smith garnered.the most attention. Castle,
Who had served a total of sixteen years in the State Department
and Who appeared for the America First Committee, reopened
the dictatorship charges, and contended that Roosevelt,
under the provisions of the bill could dominate Britain as
well as the Uhited States. This would be through his ability
to send whatever supplies he saw fit When and where he wanted to.

Smith on the other hand, after explaining the size
and importance of his committee, presented a list of five
reasons Why it opposed the bill. First,it saw the President
gaining dictatorial powers; second, it thought the bill
abandoned the Monroe Doctrine by entering in European quarrels;
thirdly, the bill would imperil America's own defense program;
fourthly, he said, his committee did not trust English or any
other foreign politicians; and finally the bill was considered
the first step toward sending American troops abroad.u9

The major efforts of the opponents had.been concluded
and on Saturday, January 25, When another long list of witnesses
paraded to the stand, they were speaking in favor of the bill.
They were led off by William.C. Bullitt, the former Ambassador
to France, who presented a logical step by step case building
to the conclusion that the United States should buy time by
aiding England. He was followed on the stand by General John

F. O'Ryan whose well-known and frankly stated pro-war views

 

hgflouse Hearings, pp. @79-580; Time, February 3: lth,
p. 13; Cleveland Plain Degler, January 25, lth; New York
Times, January 25, 1941; Cole, America First, pp. h3-hh.

83

probably did.more harm than good. Dorothy Thompson was next

before the committee, and together with Mrs. J. Borden.Harriman,

the Ambassador to Norway, elaborated still further the idea of

national "self-interest" as agguide to reasons why the bill

should be approVed. William Green, President of the AFL,

and Louis Waldman, a labor attorney and National Chairman

of the Council of Social Democracy, both supported the bill

before Ernest W. Gibson came to the stand.50
Gibson was a former Senator from.Vermont, and was now

the Chairman.of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding

the Allies. Although the limitation of time meant that he

was not questioned by the committee, the statement he presented

effectively faced and indicated as false the dictator charges

against the bill. "And to those who claim.this 'stop Hitler'

bill sets up a dictatorship in America," he said, "I want to

suggest this bill does not impose a censorship. It does not

restrict freedom of speech. It does not restrict freedom of

assembly. It does not suspend the right of habeas corpus.

It does not give him the right to seize property. It does

not give him the right to conscript labor."Sl

III. The Early Returns

When the committee recessed after hearing Gibson they
were not to meet in public session again until January 29

when they held a brief meeting to hear Representatives William

 

SOHouse Hearings, pp. 581-677; New York Times,
January 26, lgfll.

51House Hearings, pp. 677-680.

81+

B. Barry of New York, and Frederick C. Smith of Ohio. Previously
they had gone into executive session to take testimony from
Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, General
George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, and Major
General George H. Brett, Acting Chief of the Army Air Corps.
Although the exact nature of this testimony was never revealed,
a press conference held by General Marshall on January 29,
indicated that he, at least, favored the bill},2

Over the period when the House committee was not
meeting publicly other developments were taking place. On
Saturday, the same day as the last witnesses in favor of the
bill, Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, speaking before the New York
State Bar Association, attacked the bill as a measure that
would make "Uncle Sam the best and biggest Santa Claus the
world has ever seen." On Sunday, the day before the Senate
hearings were to open Senators Wheeler and Nye announced that
they planned to introduce a Senate resolution that would
request Roosevelt to find out the war aims of all belligerents,
their peace conditions, and "any and all secret treaties for
disposition of territorial spoils."S3

After this resolution was introduced, the New York
T§g§§_attacked it in a finely written sarcastic editorial
entitled, "Territorial Spoils" whidh voiced the hope that,

"Messrs. Nye and Wheeler will now introduce another resolution

 

52House Hearingg, pp. 681-692; New Yerk Times, January
28, 29, 19m. “‘-

53New York Times, January 25, 27, 1941.

 

85

asking the President to ascertain.Whether there is any truth
in these repeated rumors that German troops are occupying
Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Belgium, France, andHolland."Sit

On Monday, January 27, the committee also began executive
consideration of the bill with a view toward reporting it to
the House. Fish announced previously that he had a group of
amendments to offer, and the prospects for definite amendment
of the bill appeared certain after a White House conference
held that same day. Nevertheless, by Wednesday, the Committee
had rejected a substitute Aid-to-Britain bill which Fish had
offered. Four definite amendments were written into the bill
by the committee, however, before it was finally approved.

These amendments, all adopted on Wednesday, provided:
first, that nothing should be diaposed of without "consultation
vith the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval
Operations of the Navy, or both"; second, that the powers of
the bill would terminate on June 30, 1943; third, that nothing
in the act was to be "construed to authorize or to permit the
authorization of conveying of vessels by naval vessels of the
United States"; fourth, that the President would be required
to transmit reports on the operations under the act to Congress
at least every 90 days.55

On the following day the bill was favorably reported
from the Committee to the House by a vote of 17 to 8. Fou~teen

Democrats and three Republicans made up the majority, while

 

SLtlbidu January 28, l9hl.

55Time, Februar lO, l9hl, p. 17; New York Times,
January 27, 28, 30, 1941.

00
one Democrat and seven Republicans were in the minority.56

The majority for the bill apparently correctly
reflected the public sentiment as a Gallup poll, although
with results from only large urban centers, just before the
committee vote showed that 5k per cent of the public was in
favor of the bill with 3h per cent opposed and 12 per cent
still undecided.57

The evaluation of the bill by the majority as voiced
in the report to the House was that the amended bill met the
requirements of safely providing aid to the countries
resisting aggression and thus aiding in the defense of the
United States. They felt that the probable effect of the
bill would be to kezp the United States out of war, and that
the bill was consistent with the Constitution and with
international law. The evaluation of the Congressmen.had
previously been and was then agreed to by diverse elements
of the public and of the channels of public information,
particularly after the amendments.

However, the evaluation of the committee minority was
also extensively hailed, and was particularly noted in some
sections of the press. In their report they claimed that
they were strongly in favor of aid but against a large grant
of power to the executive. It was exactly such power,
according to them, that threatened democracy. However, seeking

to get out from under any charges of obstructing aid, they

 

56New Yerk Times, January 31, l9hl.
S7Ibid., January 29, l9hl.

noted: "If there is any delay in reaching this objective
(aid) it would.be caused by this unprecedented bid for
Presidential power."

Speaker Sam.Rayburn, having received the committee
report of the bill to the floor of the House, announced
that the debate on the bill would begin the next Monday.
The game was afoot - the chase was on. He expected passage

by the end of the week.58

S?I2ig-. January 31, February 1, l9hl.

CHAPTER V

IN FREEDOM AND LIBERTY

I. With.Humility
On the day that the bill was finally ready for the
consideration of the House, Britain's continuing crisis was
underscored by a report from.the British treasury that they
were then preparing to use the securities of British controlled
industry in the United States to finance the war. According
to the report they were selling securities "steadily," and
two weeks before the announcement arrangements with a group
of investment trust representatives from New York had
already started. The last source was about to be exhausted.1
The fact that Britain was vital to the United States,
and was in increasing danger was not apparently lost on the
bulk of the American people. A Gallup poll of January 31
showed only 15 per cent of the people in the extreme anti-aid
camp occupied by Colonel Lindbergh. The New Yerk Timgg,
just before the debate was to open in the House, went on
record for the bill with a call for "heroic action." Iany
of the other papers also supported it, and .the Democratic

whip, Representative Patrick Boland of Pennsylvania, predicted

 

lNew York Times, January 1h, 30, lgul; F.D.R. His
Personal Letters I9‘E‘8-‘19h5, ed. Elliott Roosevelt Wow York,

“3'19 oT,‘ II, 1101.

88

89

a victory margin of at least 50 votes.2

The Opposition, however, had by no means folded its
tents. The Akron.Beacon Journal found it could praise
students at Akron University and the nearby Kent State
University for splitting 50-50 on "all-out" aid to Britain,
and also was vocal on the danger of a war bill. The Chicago
Tribune, noting the beginning of the Senate hearings on the
bill, started a series of almost daily attacks Which included
denying the importance of the British.Navy, and again praising
the stand taken by Colonel Lindbergh. At the Mecca Temple
in New York a protest meeting arranged by the American Youth
Congress was attended by 3,000 on January 31. The following
day a demonstration against the bill was attempted in
Washington by the American Peace Mobilization, and as debate
was about to open John T. Flynn of the New York Chapter of
the America First Committee launched an attack on.the "war-
dictatorship" bill.3

Flynn's attack was just one phase of a large drive on
public opinion.which brought into play both the America
First Committee and the Committee to Defend America by Aiding
the Allies. The America First Committee, during the entire
period of the consideration of the bill, provided speakers
for meetings, radio programs, forums, and debates, and sent

transcriptions of speeches by Hanford MacNider, Alfred Landon,

 

2New York Times, January 31, February 2, 3, l9hl;
Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 30, February 2, 1941.

 

3Chicago Daily Tribune, February 3, 6, 7, 8, l9hl;
Akron Beacon JournalL_January 26 February 3, l9hl; New
Yerk Times, February 1, 2, 3, 19fll.

90

and Senators Taft, Wheeler, Shipstead, and Walsh to radio
stations all over the country. Many newspapers were a
definite help to their efforts and the Chicago Tribune
played a particularly key role. The Chicago Chapter of the
committee, with the Tribune's help, managed to gain an
estimated 628,000 signatures on petitions against the bill.
America First also aided the efforts of the Church League
of America, and the Ministers No War Committee, which
reached 93,000 protestant ministers. After the Committee
to Defend America by Aiding the Allies discovered the scope
of their rivals activities they launched a wide letter
writing campaign, and their leaders, Eichelberger and Gibson,
spoke at mass meetings throughpout the heart of the area
most strongly opposed to the bill, stepping at Minneapolis,
St. Paul, Kansas City, and Chicago."

The administration leaders pushed on with.the bill
and on January 31 secured a unanimous vote of the Rules
Committee which set the time for the debate, and.made the
prospects of passage by the following week-end look extremely
good. On Monday, February 3, the debate began with what later
proved to be a needed warning from Speaker Rayburn to the
House galleries against any demonstrations. When.he had
concluded, Representative Adolph sabath called up the
resolution Which would establish the rule for the debate -

three days of general debate equally divided, after which

Wayne 5. Cole, America First: The Battle Against '
Intervention lQEO-lggl (Madison, 1953), pp.fiu54h8; Walter
JEhnson, The Battle Against Isolation (Chicago, l9hh), p. 208.

 

91

the five minute rule would apply as the bill was read for
amendment.

sabath spoke briefly in support of the rule, and
Hamilton Fish, ostensibly to save time later in debate, spoke
against the bill, saying: "It is with humility and a prayer
in my heart that I open the debate against what I term to be
in its present form the dictator-war-bankruptcy bill."5

In short order the debate on the rules was completed
and they were approved. Sol Bloom moved.that the House
resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole, and then
began one of the great debates in American history. In a
long and able speech Bloom analysed and defended the various
sections of the bill. But no sooner had he concluded than
he found himself entangled with Representative Everett Dirksen
of Illinois. This interchange, the only real fire-works of
the first days debate, was over a visit of Lord Halifax
to Bloom.and to Senator George. Halifax, the new British
aubassador, had paid courtesy calls on both, and had inquired
over how long it would probably take to pass the bill. Dirksen
labeled the visit "extraordinary procedure" claiming that the
bill was still pending in committee at the time of the visit.
Bloom denied that the bill had been pending, pointing out that
it had been reported at the time of the visit.

"Mr. Chairman," he exploded, "I think the only thing
that is unusual about any procedure is for the gentleman from

Illinois to ask suoh a question. I think it is very improper."

 

5New York Times, February 1, l9hl; Congressional Record,
77th Congress, lst Session, h8h-h89 (February 3, l9hl).

92

John Taber, a New York Representative, interjected,
"Why not?"

"I am answering this, and that is 'why net', and please
obey the rules of the House," Bloom.retorted. Then the chair
ended the interchange temporarily, and finally it was lost
in the other debate of the day.6

Charles Eaton, a New Jersey Representative, and a
committee member made the first real opposition speech. It
was a well-reasoned appeal in which he complained of being
placed in the position of opposing something he really wanted
because it was tied in with what he called a "dangerous and
unnecessary political innovation." But Eaton's presentation
was immediately over-shadowed by that of Luther Johnson of
Texas, also a committee member, who concisely examined each
of the issues and concluded in favor of the bill.7

Through-out the remainder of the day, as the House
chamber and the galleries bed: gradually emptied of listeners,
only three other really note-worthy speeches were made.
Representative Rey Woedruff of Michigan, speaking in opposition
to the bill, made the first of these. Equating the issue
with basic American rights, he said: "The issue today is
whether we shall cling to freedom and liberty or whether it
shall be wrested from us by powers without, or whether we

shall lose it by lack of wisdom from within. That, in blunt

 

6New York Times, February h, l9hl; Cong. Record, 77th
Cong., l Sess., h89-h9h (February 3, l9h1).

7Cong. Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., h9h-h99 (February
3, 19h1). _~

 

 

$331.11]... It. ., -..

m.
fits-“u...”

 

93

words, is the issue we face today."8

In his long attack, however, he never quite came to
grips with the bill, but devoted considerable time to the
dangers of dictatorship, and belabored the eventual cost of
such a program, noting that it would probably be necessary
to continue it after the conclusion of the war.

Representative Charles Faddis of Pennsylvania
immediately followed Weedruff in another able speech and was
not worried about such prospects. He dealt primarily with
the military threat and reasoned that it was a duty to keep
war away from America. The way to do it, he thought, was to
aid Great Britain.9

But probably the best speech of the day was delivered
near the end of the debate when Bloem.yielded an initial
30 minutes to Representative Butler B. Hare of South Carolina,
and than.twice extended his time so that he could complete a
fine, well-reasoned, and documented speech. Hare included
several Supreme Court rulings on the scope of Presidential
powers in his argument, and effectively answered what appeared
to be one of the major opposition worries - the ability of the
President to give away almost anything without guarantee of
return.

In one key paragraph he explained and dismissed.this
issue, saying:

Practically all of the objectors to the bill

8Cong. Recerg, 77 Cong., l Sess., 500-519 (February
3, 19141); New York Times, February Li, l9Lil.

9Cong. Record, 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 502-508 (February 3, l9hl)

9h

emphasize the words 'or otherwise dispose of'
found in subsection 2, where provision is made
for the sale, transfer, exchange, lease, or

lend such military equipment as may be utilized
'in the interest of national defense,' saying
that these words give the President the right

to actually give away such military equipment

as he may desire. That is, they seem to be

very mmoh exercised over the idea that Congress
may provide equipment to be used in the defense
of our country and the President will then give
it away without a consideration. The implication
is unwarranted and unjustified because subsection
b shows some consideration, and it is absurd to
think that any President of the United Staigs
would violate such a trust reposed in him.

The debate on the second day of consideration was
more lively in some respects than on.the first day, and it
definitely ranged over a wider range of territory, as many
of these opposed to the bill spoke. By the end of the day
the tone was notably more partisan than it had been when
Bloom.began the consideration the day before. However,
when Representative James Richards of South Carolina led
off the second day's debate it was on.a high and reasoned
level. Richards, who had given some support to the
neutrality legislation of the years before the war appealed
to the members to consider the legislation on the basis of
its ability to promote the defense of the United States. He
concluded that the bill promoted suoh defense through aiding
Great Britain, and in one short passage he revealed What
seemed to be one of the attitudes assumed by the opponents

toward the bill. It was, perhaps, the key one, for it left

their true motives open to question. "The gentleman from

__;

10Ibid., pp. 513-515 (February 3. 191m.

95

New York (Mr. Fish)," he said, "says in effect that we should
help Great Britain and the other democracies in any way we
can, but we (the Opponents) refuse to provide proper machinery
to do it."11
Shqrtly after this speech Bloom yielded timetn
Representative Charles Gifford of Massachusetts. He in turn
yielded often to other members on the floor, and very quickly
found himself entangled with the opposition. After an
exchange of remarks over the nature of imperialism, he
asserted the importance of the British Navy to the support
of the Monroe Doctrine. The opponents of the bill, through-
out the hearings as well as the debate, tended to regard the
Monroe Doctrine, along with Washington's and Jefferson's
views on international affairs, to be endangered by the bill.
Gifford, therefore, promptly found himself challenged on this
issue. In as much as the relevant parts of the Doctrine had
a beginning in a British proposition to the United States,
and were to a large extent operative only because of the
co-operation of the British, and the known British agreement
in Europe, the bill proponents were on.sound historical
grounds.12
But soon after Gifford had concluded almost an.hour
on the floor, Hamilton Fish yielded‘What finally amounted to

20 minutes to Representative Burdick of North Dakota Who

 

llIbid., pp. 522-567 (February u. 19hl)-

lZJulius w. rratt, A History ofLUnited States Foreign
Policy (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1 55), pp. 167-181°
Cong, Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., 532-53 (February h, 1931).

96

promptly reopened the same almost irrelevant issue with the
deduction that the Monroe Doctrine had been a warning to
Great Britain, with its origins in the War of 1812. But,
more importantly, Burdick spelled out, in the latter part
of his speedh, another of the mental road-blocks in the
path of the opponents. Completely ignoring all the warnings
of potential dangers inherent in the fall of Britain, and
in the inability of the United States to put up an adequate
defense at that time, he voiced the same philosophy which
other opponents Who rejected the idea of buying time in.the
national self-interest voiced throughout.

"We do not," he concluded, "ask any nation to fight
our battles for us, and it is unfair to say that any nation
is doing or ever has done that. We are able to defend
ourselves, but we cannot police the world."13

Then, in.the most important speech of the day,

James Wadsworth, the New York Representative Who had conferred
at the White House, took the floor. Although he spoke

largely against the bill as it currently stood, Bloom granted
him time from.that allotted for the proponents. In an
excellent speech Wadsworth proposed two major amendments.

The first of these was the tentatively accepted limitation

on the duration of the act. The second was new. He proposed
a limitation on the amount to be authorized under the bill.
This was a limitation which would effectively set a level

on.the amount that could be transferred, by, in effect

 

13Cong. Record, 77 Cong., 1 Sess., S38-5h0 (February

u, 191a).

 

97

prohibiting any future appropriations committee from
appropriating over a set figure to implement the bill. It
could be even.more effective than.an actual time limitation
in ending operations under the act.

Wadsworth's proposal was warmly received by large
numbers of both Democrats and Republicans, and the
administration leaders were facedxnifii a problem. They
decided to seek a liberalization of the amounts Wadsworth
initially mentioned if pressure seemed to point toward an
acceptance of his amendment.lu

Throughout the following hours of debate the opposition
began to use more and more of the time, but only two of the
other speakers were truly effective in putting cogently
major arguments against the bill. The first of these was
Robert Chiperfield of Illinois, one of the committee members.
Using extensive materials furnished by the Legislative
Reference Service of the Library of Congress, he pointed
out a major loOp-hole in the time limitation amendment
reported by the committee. Under the wording of that
amendment contracts signed before the terminal date in 1943
might extend the operations of the act indefinitely. He
appealed for an effective limitation.15

The other speaker was the last for the day, and he

was considerably less cogent. Representative Richard Gale

 

lliNew‘York Times, February 5, lgul; Cong, Record, 77
Cong., 1 Sess., SAD-5H2 (February h, l9hl).

l5Cong. Record, 77 Cong., 1 Sess., ShB-SSO (February
LL. 1914—1).

98

of Minnesota, however, expanded on the recurrent theme of
dictatorial powers by pointing out the belief entertained
by the opponents that under the phrase "notwithstanding the
provisions of any other law" the President would be able to
virtually conscript labor. The key word, however, in Gale's
attack was the word "virtually", for the context of the
bill seemed to indicate rather clearly that the President
would not have such power since the commonly used terminology
of "notwithstanding" could not apply to any of the United
States labor legislation.16
On Wednesday, the final day allotted for general

debate, 68 individual members took the floor either to attack
or defend the bill. After Majority Leader Jehn M. McCormack
arranged for the House to meet an.hour earlier on Thursday
and Friday, the fireworks began. Stephen M. Ybung of Ohio
was the third speaker of the day, and presented a reasoned
and.historically correct speech, but the most spectacular
interruption of the debate occurred just as he was telling
the members: "There is nothing in this bill that makes for
war or dictatorShip." As he uttered those words a black-
robed woman in a skull-mask arose in the gallery and raised
her right arm, crying: "My Novena! My Novena!"

_ Attendants quickly seized the shrouded woman and took
her to the office of the House Sergeant-at-Arms. She explained
her strange cry as meaning "death is the victory .512 , not

Germany, not England," and identified herself as Margaret Russell,

 

légpgg,, pp. 567-568 (February h, 19hl).

99

of New York. Officials were unable to determine how she got
into the galleries, and While there was some speculation
that she was aided by someone from Representative Jeannette
Rankin of Montana's office, that office denied any knowledge
of the event.17

The debate, however, continued, and very shortly the
members were treated to two able speeches back to back in
the long list of those Who addressed the chamber. John Kee
of West Virginia in an address of almost half an hour
carefully explained that the bill did not yield Congressional
powers to the Executive, and that the "notwithstanding"
clause did not repeal any laws. He was immediately followed
by James Van Zandt of Pennsylvania, in a somewhat shorter
but equally able speech. He, more astutely than.his
companions, charged dictatorship, and compared the lend-lease
bill to the enabling act passed by the German Reichstag in
1933.18

Then some of the big guns of the debate began to come
into play. Bloom, controlling the time for the administration,
yielded to minutes to John M. McCormack, who went down the
line for the bill, describing it as "a peace measure for our
people." He was very quickly followed by Dewey Short of
Missouri, who, in a speech which stayed on a quite general
level, tangled with Bloom over the intention of Washington

in the "Farewell Address." Finally, in direct opposition to

 

l7New Yerk Times February 6, 19hl; Cong. Record, 77
Cong., 1 Sess., S71, 57é-S77 (February 5, lghl).

laggps: Record, 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 583-589 (February
5, 191L1)0

100

McCormack, he charged, "This is a war bill." But Herman
Eberharter, a committee member from Pennsylvania, was next
on the floor with a defense of the bill which was even better
than.that put forth by McCormack. Beginning with charges
that Nazi propaganda was working actively against the bill,
he finally concluded by listing, for the benefit of the
members, each of the laws from the Neutrality Act to Statutes
on army purchasing, which would be affected by the "notwithstanding
clause in the bill.19

Karl Mundt, a committee member from South Dakota, raised
the next issue of the debate some minutes later When.he rose
in opposition to challenge the authorship of the bill. In
the hearings, after Hull's initial statement that the bill
was a treasury bill, none of the other witnesses had been
willing to assign a specific parentage to the bill. EVen
Morgenthau was unwilling to c1aim.complete responsibility.
This left an argument epen for the opponents of the legislation,
and they used it to charge that the author of the bill was
concealed because of the evil intention behind its provisions.20

The administration forces by this time virtually
surrendered the floor to the opponents who proceeded to ring
all the changes on America First, war danger, dictatorship,
and.the deceptive nature of President Roosevelt. Only once,
when John.Dinge11 of Michigan took die floor was an

exceptionally strong counter-attack forthcoming. Dingell

 

191mg... pp. 591-595. 599-607 (February 5. 19h).
20;2i§., pp. 610-613 (February 5, l9hl).

lOl

took issue with the committee testimony of Lindbergh, and
decided that: "The sum total of Lindbergh's advice could
be totaled at zero." But his speech was at least overcome
by John Robsion of Kentucky, James Mott of Oregon, and
Vito Marcantonio of New York on.the other side.

Robsion was the first of these to speak, and in a
curious manner he divined the immediate nature of the bill
without understanding the importance of the legislation.
He claimed that the real idea of the bill was to give away

war materials which the United States then had on.hand, and

he attacked that action as dangerous to the American defense.

He also concluded that the bill would delegate dangerous
powers likely to take the United States into war, and that
therefore amendments could not improve it.21
Mott of Oregon who was second of the three Speakers
had the Shortest of the speeches, but charged effectively,
and in a manner calculated to lend additional credence to
Robsion's charges, that the bill would permit acts which
would result in war. Then Marcantonio took the floor. He
was initially given time by Bloom and.1ater had additional
time extended to him by HMndt and Fish Who were controlling
the time of the opponents. He yielded many times for
questions and discussions, and after a ringing attack on

Willkie, he also settled down to the question of the war

dangers inherent in the bill.22

 

21Ibid., pp. 631-633, 639-6h3 (February 5, 19h1).
22Ibid., pp. 652-654, 656-660 (February 5, lghl).

 

 

'102

II. The Price of Unity

With the conclusion of the three days of general debate,
it seemed clear that nothing new had been said, nor had any
minds been actually changed, but the proposals by
James Wadsworth on the second day of the debate had
introduced a new element into the consideration. By the
close of the debate'his proposal for a limitation on the
amount to be appropriated appeared as the high spot. The
general membership of the House was thought to favor this
approach, and although the administration leaders had
'apparently reached no conclusion on the proposal they too
seemed to lean in the direction of compromise. Wadsworfil's
prOposal, indeed, had gained the support of some of the
factions most strongly in favor of the bill, and the

Cleveland Plain.Dealer lauded him for displaying "qualities

 

of statesmanship that have been conspicuous only by their
absence in most previous discussions of the proposal by
his party fellows."23

Therefore, when the consideration of the bill reached
the point of being read under the five minute rule for
amendments, the administration seemed willing to carefully
amend whenever it seemed likely that unity would be improved
by a concession. It was judged that many of the Republicans
who were most interested in compromise would finally vote

against the bill no matter what was done with it, but that

 

23New York Times, February'é, 19hl; Cleveland Plain
Dealer, February 6, lth.

103

there was hope of winning the support of men like Wadsworth.
Sol Bloom began the consideration of amendments by announcing
that he would propose two additional changes in the bill at
the proper time in the reading. The administration itself,
however, was chiefly concerned with voting down opposition
attempts to amend the heart out of the bill, and it mustered
an almost consistent majority to prevent this. The first

of the op osition attempts was one by Karl Mundt in which

he put forward a substitute bill designed to extend $2 billion
to Great Britain in the form of a loan. After a somewhat
lengthy debate Which rehashed the same issues the substitute
was brought to a vote, and on a teller count demanded by
Mundt, was defeated 145 to 206.2“

The next amendment attempted was by Melvin Maas of
Minnesota. He proposed that the President be authorized to
purchase all of the British possessions in the Western
Hemisphere. After some discussion his proposal was ruled
not germane to the bill, and John Vorys of Ohio was able to
bring up an amendment which would require the President to
obtain the specific approval of the Chief of Naval Operations,
and of the Chief of Staff of the Army before he could transfer
anything under the provisions of the bill. His proposal was
more thoroughly and intelligently debated and then defeated
on a division of 78 to 109. Then the first of the committee
amendments, one merely requiring the President to consult

with the Army and Navy chiefs was written into the bill by a

 

 

2400ng, Record, 77 Cong. 1 Sess,, 710-725 (February
6, 19h1):—Time, February 17, l9nl, p. 10.

104

voice vote.25

Moving quickly the administration wrote in the recommended
time-limit amendment, and tightened the limitation under a
recommendation by Luther Johnson, that was exactly in line
with the loop-hole pointed out by Robert Chiperfield in the
debate on February h. The original amendment, which limited
the life of the act set June 30, 1943 as the terminal date.
The additional amendment limited any contract concluded before
that date to a life extending only to July 1, 193:626

But having demonstrated its ability to control action
on the bill, the administration suffered a surprising set-back
at the hands of Everett Dirksen of Illinois. Striking quickly
while 65 Democrats were out to lunch, Dirksen offered an
amendment which.wou1d allow Congress to terminate the powers
of the bill at any time by concurrent resolution. Bloom
attacked the amendment heatedly, and it was quickly brought to
a vote. When the House divided Dirksen faced defeat 83 to
107, but he demanded a teller vote, and with the 65 administration
supporters missing, he managed to get his amendment approved
1&8 to 1&1. Actually, the meaning of the amendment was not
too great since Presidential signature is required on concurrent

resolutions before they become effective.27

 

 

‘ esggpg, Record, 77 Cong. 1 Sess., 729-733 (February
6, 1941); Time, February 17, 1961, p. 16.

Zéggng. Record, 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 73h-735 (February
6, 1941); Time, February 17, 19h1, p. 16.

27Cong. Record, 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 735 (February 6, l9hl);
Time February 17, l9hl, p. 17; New'York Times, February 7,

ram.

105

The administration forces, however, promptly resumed
control, and an amendment offered by Jerry Voorhis of
California to reduce the time limits to 19h2, although long
and bitterly discussed, was defeated by a division of 93 to
136. Likewise, another amendment by Karl Mundt, this one
to specifically rule out any possible conveying, was halted
after a debate in which even Smn Rayburn joined. Mundt was
defeated on a division vote of A9 to 111, and the amendment
first offered by the committee which.stated that nothing
was to be "construed to authorize or permit the authorization
of convoying" was approved before the House ended its first
session on amending the bill.28

Although the time limitations on the bill were much
the more important amendments, the convoy issue seemed to

raise more heat, publicly as well as in the House chamber.

The St. Louis 39st-Dispatch, noting only that a shorter time

 

limitation would be preferable from its point of view,

devoted much time to a discussion of the convoy issue. It
shared, almost exactly, the sentiment expressed by many of the
Congressmen. Their argument was that the bill as proposed
would enable the President to send convoys into war zones.

The administration amendment in actuality could not stop the
President from sending ships into war zones, or from conveying,
simply because as Commander-ianhief the President already

had such power under the Constitution. The opponents, however,

could never seem to grasp this, and their continuing refrain

ZBCong. Record, 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 735-7h9 (February
6, 191a); Time, February 17, 191m, p. 16.

 

106

was that the bill would enhance the President's power, and
as the Post-Dispatch said: ’"There is no sound.reason to
enlarge the area of his power to make war at a time when so
much of the world is already aflame with war."29

After McCormack and FiSh had set the order of business,
the second day of amendment in the House opened with Sol
Bloom.proposing an additional amendment stating that nothing
in the act would permit Shipping in violation of section 3
of the Neutrality Act of 1939. This was an amendment of
rather wide latitude and was principly designed to further
reassure those who had war fears about the bill, without
hindering in any way its operation. James Mott of Oregon,
however, offered a substitute for Bloomfls amendment which
would.have'been more stringent, and which was eventually
over-ruled as changing the nature of the Neutrality Act itself.
After the substitute had been over-ruled Bloom's amendment
was agreed to.30

George H. Tinkham then rose to offer an.amendment
which would specifically exclude Russia from being judged
vital to the defense of the United States. On a teller vote
he was defeated 9h to 185. Immediately Mott was ready to
try again with anamendment which would expand the Neutrality
Act, and this time he was defeated by a division of 57 to 91.
Moving quickly, an amendment by John M. Costello of
California was offered which would have made mandatory a

material quid pro quo for anything transferred under the bill.

 

 

29St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 7, 1941.
30Cong. Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., 753-761 (February 7, 19h1:

107

His move was also defeated on a teller vote of 125 to 150.31

Hamilton Fish next preposed an.amendment which would
prevent the President from giving away any naval vessels
under the bill. A bitter debate developed between McCormack
and Vorys of Ohio on this issue, but the administration
maintained firm control over the situation and the amendment
went down on a teller vote by 123 to 183. They likewise
ouickly disposed of three more amendments, all by comfortable
margins. The first was proposed by Clifford Hope of Kansas
to assure a market for agricultural products. It was defeated
106 to 158. The second was offered by Jesse Wolcott of
Michigan. A move to strike out the "notwithstanding" clause,
it was stopped by the administration 71 to 11h. The third
was another offered by Fish, which specified that labor
legislation was not to fall under the "notwithstanding"
provision. The administration claimed that such legislation
would not be affected anyway and defeated Fish again 98 to
153.32

The next amendment was then written into the bill.
Charles I. Taber of New Yerk proposed an amendment to limit
the amount that could be transferred out of current United
States stocks of weapons and materials to a value of $500
million. This, in effect, recognized the give-away thesis
that had been voiced by Robsion in debate, and sought to
limit its scope. Sol Bloom immediately offered a substitute

amendment which would set the limit at 10 per cent of the

 

311b1d., pp. 761-769 (February 7, 19a1).
32Ibid., pp. 769-779 (February 7, l9h1).

108

military appropriation for that year. Taber estimated that
Bloom's provision would raise the limit to $1.3 billion,
but was willing to accept it. It was, accordingly, written
into the bill as the last amendment to be considered on
Friday, February 7. The administration apparently felt that
such an amendment would help to increase unity on the bill,
and after its approval hoped to go through to a final vote
on Saturday with a minimum of difficulty.33

American unity, indeed, had become one of the important
factors dealt with in the editorial columns of the press, and
the New York Tim§§_built its entire treatment of the bill
around the theme of national unity. The Washington ngt,
commenting after the preceding amendments had been written
into the law, came to the defense of the measure, and of
unity, in a strong editorial. After standing firmly against
any abridgement of the powers of the President, it reasoned:
"It is axiomatic that if the price of national unity is a
trimming of the lend-lease bill, such trimming should be made.
Unity is even more of a shield and buckler than a two-ocean
navy. And it is even more potent as a weapon against
Hitlerism than arms. All that proponents of the measure
wish to insure is that the purposes of the bill shall not
be emasculated."3"

When the final day of consideration opened on the bill,

Bloom asked unanimous consent to change the limitation

 

33New Yerk Times, February 8, l9hl; Cong. Record, 77
Cong., l Sess., 780-781 (February 7, l9hl). ,

Navasmngten Post, February 8. 1911-1.

109

amendment from 10 per cent to the previously estimited $1.3
billion. The move was promptly objected to by Frederick Smith
of Ohio, thus halting it temporarily. But as soon as a
proposal by Charles Dewey of Illinois to take custody of
all allied securites in the Western Hemfisphere had been ruled
not germane, McCormack offered the same $1.3 billion amendment
which Bloom had attempted. Sam Rayburn offered a perfecting
amendment to the language of the one offered by McCormack,
and they were both approved, writing in a limit of $1.3 billion
rather than 10 per cent of the military appropriations.35
Still working on the same section of the bill Karl
Mundt proposed to define the $1.3 billion to consist of the
total original cost of the products to be transferred, but
was defeated 68 to 97, While John Costello offered an amendment
to keep more than one-third of the United States war planes
from.being given away, and was defeated 73 to 103.36
Then Jeannette Rankin, the Montana pacificist, proposed
an amendment to specifically limit the ability to send service
men outside the Western Hemisphere. It was immediately
pointed out that this would impair the operation of the Uhited
States Pacific Fleet, and finally after Sol Bloom Objected
to the amendment she withdrew it. But immediately James Van
Zandt offered a similar amendment designed to apply only to

the army. After some discussion as to its applicability to

3SCong. Record, 77 Cong. l Sess., 785-788 (February
8,19u1); Time, February 17, 19L1, p. 6.

36Cong. Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., 788- 791 (February
8,19k1)

110

the troops in.the Philippine Islands, it was also defeated.37

Hamilton Fish next moved to report the bill back to
the House with the enacting clause stricken, and was soundly
defeated. Immediately he offered an amendment to alter the
"notwithstanding" clause, and had it rejected. In a third
consecutive unsuccessful attempt he tried to limit the
provisions for repair of belligerent ships to the time set
for such repairs by international law. On a division vote
he was again defeated 70 to lh?.38

Then a relatively quick series of substitute moves and
two amendments designed to provide markets for United States
commodities abroad were defeated. The substitute amendments
were offered by Eaton of New Jersey and Taber of New York,
While the others came from Edith Rogers of Massachusetts and
Vincent Harrington of Iowa. But with these finally out of
the way, the reading of the bill was able to move rapidly
past the third section, and.the two remaining committee
amendments were proposed. The first of these, requiring
Congressional approval of future appropriations and
authorizations was quickly adopted. The second, requiring
the President to report to Congress at least every 90 days
attracted another amendment from Hamilton Fish. His proposal,

again rejected, would have required similar reports from.the

 

37Ibid., pp. 791-795 (February 8, 19kl).

38Ibid.. pp. 795-798 (February 8. l9hl)-

111

other agencies involved in operations under the act.39
With the final administration-sponsored amendment
written into the bill the leaders pressed rapidly for final
consideration. Seven additional amendments were quickly
disposed of, eliciting a "gag-rule" charge from Congresswoman
Edith Rogers of Massachusetts. Among the seven.rejected
amendments were another by Jeannette Rankin to keep men from
being sent outside the country, another by James Wadsworth
to limit the entire expenditure under the bill to $7 billion,
and one by Vito mercantonio to assure that the thirteen
original colonies would not be declared surplus and deeded
back to King George}LO
When the last amendments had been considered and the
reading of the bill completed, the Committee of the Whole
House rose and reported the bill back to the House itself.
As allowed under the rules adopted for the consideration of
the bill, Fish moved to recommit it to the Foreign Affairs
Committee, and a roll call vote was taken. With eight or
the A31 members then sitting in the House not voting Fish's
motion failed by l60 to 263. The stage was set for the final

VOteolLl

III. The First Big Test

In a sense the administration now faced its first big

 

39Cong. Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., 798-80h (February 8,
l9hl); Time, February 17, lgui, pp. 16-17.

 

u uOCong, Record, 77 Cong., l 5885-: 808'814 (February 8’
19 l).

hlIbid., p. 81h (February 8, 19h1).

112

test. Having yielded to:many modifications, and some apparent

improvements on the original bill, as the price of unity,

it was hoping for a big margin of victory as an encouragement

to the British and the Greeks, and as a sign of strength

to the other nations in Europe and Asia. Since the beginning

there had been little doubt about the ultimate passage of

the bill, and there was none on February 8 when Sol Bloom

at last asked that the final roll be called. The vote showed

a total of 280 in favor of the legislation, 165 opposed,

and six still not voting. All six of these were paired on

the le,.r;:islation.ll'2
The final vote, when tabulated by state delegations,

produced some interesting results. Ralph Smuckler, in a

study of isolationism.made in 1953 found "that a broad band

of isolationist strength existed across the northern portion

of the United States as compared to a relative lack df

isolationism.in the southern and southwestern states." For

the House of Representatives the twelve most isolationist

states, over a period from 1933 to 1950, were, in order,

North Dakota, Idaho, Kansas, Nebraska, Wisconsin, Minnesota,

Wyoming, South Dakota, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio, and Vermont.

The vote on the lend-lease bill bore out completely this

breakdown. Only 15 states had delegations which were

unanimously against the bill, or split with a majority against

it. Out of this total, North Dakota, South Dakota, Idaho,

and mentana were the only states to cast unanimous votes

 

£4'21\Iew Ybrk Times, February 9, l9hl; Cogg. Record, 77
Cong., l Sess., 815 (February 8, 1941).

ammonia .Emoozmo a . moi“. z. soc B 2m>m thaw _U
meOanwO wDOZ_Z<ZD. a IO><L Z. >.Cm0fl<z a
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35.5 omtz: MM>F<P2mwmmmmm no muse: Z. mFo> 5.22: .83.: sausages: 3:83: 2:. 3 .fieseoo EN .02 me:

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113

against it. All but one of the states named by Smuckler
cast a majority against the bill. The single exception was
Vermont. The states which joined those named by Smuckler
were Illinois, Indiana, Oregon, and I-é'ainefi’3

Perhaps one of the most interesting areas in the
nation in regards to voting on the bill was the Pacific
Coast. Althodgh the Los Angeles 22E g exhibited a high degree
of fatalism in regard to American neutrality in the war,
there was no doubt that the area was aware of certain dangers
from Europe, and especially from Asia. Yet, in the final
vote, the Congressmen from the three Pacific states split
1h to 15 against the bill. California split its delegation
10 to 10 and Washington split 3 to 3. Oregon voted 2 to 1
against the measure.

Otherwise the bulk of the vote went about as it might
have been expected to go with most of the nineteen states
which went unanimously for the bill scattered through the
South and Southwest.uu

Neither was there much question but that the final
vote represented the wishes of the nation's people. A
Gallup poll released the day following the House vote found
5h per cent of the nation in favor of the bill with 22 per

cent opposed, and another 15 per cent giving qualified

L

uBRalph H. Smuckler,"The Region of Isolationism ," The
,American Political Science Review, June, 1953, p. 391, Cong.
.Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., 815 (February 8,19h1).

uhCong. Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., 815 (February 8,

 

lahl).

114

answers. This showed a drop of 12 per cent in the numaer of
those opposed to the bill in the week of House debate. Those
in favor remained constant. Of course, the party support

was much more marked with 69 per cent of the Democrats being
registered in favor of the legislation. Republican sentiment
was much more divided but the largest single segment of those
polled, 38 per cent, was in favor cf the bill. This was
particularly interesting in the light of the actual vote in
the House where the Republicans split 135 to 2h against the

bill - a percentage break of almost 85 to 15 in opposition};5

 

 

For Against Qualified-#8 No

Bill Bill Opinion Opinion
Gallup GOP 38 3O 23 9
House GOP 15 85 ‘ '
Gallup Democrats 69 13 1o 8
House Democrats 9O 10 - -
Gallup National 5k 22 15 9
House National 61 39 - -

 

Possibly this was mostly due to the strong and vocal
opposition to the bill raised in many areas. Among the most
vocal leaders of this sentiment was the Chicago Tribune which
could see no good at all on the side of the proponents. The
Tribune, in analysing the passage of the bill in the House

wrote: "The house of representatives passed its war bill,

 

hrSCong. Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., 815 (February 8,
19u1); Time, February 17, 19i1, p. 16; New York Times,
February 9, l9hl.

115

the ironic No. 1776, as was expected. All the arguments
, advanced against it in Congressman Bloom's committee
hearings were sound, and most of them were unanswerable, but
reason had no effect on the minds of the majority."46

More moderate, and more reasonable voices from the
press in St. Louis and Los Angeles accepted the bill and
called for further fair consideration, and tightening
amendment. Together with responsible organs like Commonweal
which still wanted an exact definition of all the powers, and

like The Christian Century'Which called for outright defeat

 

of the bill, these probably carried more weight among the

bills opponents.h7
But with the bill half-way through Congress and largely

unimpaired by amendments, the administration.had reason to be

more confident. The strict party division of the vote in

the House could be interpreted as a failure of the attempt

to gain unity, and the bitter fight that was shaping up in

the Senate was ample indication that the worst was yet to

come. Still, the House conduct of both the hearings and the

debate could not be legitimately attacked as partisan er

unfair to the opponents of the bill. Combined with the passage

of the bill in the House, and itaapparently safe margin in

the Senate, the administration could feel that the United

 

1+6Chicago Daily Tribune, February 12, l9hl.

h7St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 9, l9h1; Los Angeles
Times, February 10, l9hl; "Policy and Action," Commonweal, "
Pbbruary 21, 19h1, p. #36; "The Debate on the Lend-Lease Bill,
The Christian Centug, February 12, 191:,1, p. 213.

116

States was making progress toward responsibility in freedom
and liberty. The arsenal of democracy was now half-assured

to the allies. The question was one of speed.

CHAPTER VI

THE SECOND ROUND

1. Last Call For Lunch
Speed was the key-note from the day the hearings on
the lend-lease bill opened in the Senate, until the day the
committee took its final vote on the measure. Frem the
beginning it was fairly certain that the bill would clear
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee since a poll taken a
few days after the introduction of the bill showed an 8 to
h split of committee members in favor of the bill. Many of
the other membe 3 did not express their opinions, but with
the assurances of Senator Walter George of Georgia, the
chairman, that some amendments would.be written into the
bill, and with the addition of James Byrnes of South Carolina
and belligerent old Carter Glass of Virginia to the committee
the margin of passage was considered to be safe.1
The hearings, which opened on January 27, a few days
before the House hearings finally closed, were tense, and
at times, bitter, attracting consistently large crowds into

the Senate Caucus Room where they were held. As had been

the case in the House hearings, Secretary of State Cordell Hull

___ __‘

1Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 12, l9hl; Tom Connally,
E3;Name Is Tom Connally (New York, l95h), p. 2&2; Time,
February 10, 1921, p. 17.

 

 

117

118

was the first witness, but those who had gathered to hear
him were disappointed for, as soon as it became clear that the
Senators wished to ask him questions he did not feel he could
publicly answer, the committee adjourned and went into
executive session. There Hull was blunt, according to some
of the members, in stating the danger to the United States,
and the need for prompt action.2

But when the committee met again publicly on the
morning of January 28 to hear Secretary Morgenthau, the public
was not disappointed, for not only the Secretary, but also
two of his assistants appeared on the stand. They gave
some phases of the bill the most thorough treatment it was
to receive. Morgenthau, repeating to a large extent the
statement he had given before the House committee, brought
the Senators newer up-to-date figures on the dire condition
of British finances, reminding them that Britain didn't have
the money to buy what it needed and that American airplane
manufacturers would run out of British orders by April unless
new ones could be placed. Once more Morgenthau attempted to
stay with the monetary aspects of the bill, but was quickly
forced into a discussion of its effects on Neutrality
legislation.3

Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan had been

selected to cross-question Morgenthau on.these topics for the

 

2United States Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, Hearings on S. 275; A Bill Further To Promote the
Defense of the United States, And for Other Purposes, 77 Cong.,
l Sess., Part I, 248} Connally, p._2h2; New York Times,
January 28, l9hl.

3Time, February 10, l9hl, p. 17; Senate Hearingg, I, 9-76.

 

119

' opposition, and was polite and mannered in his questioning.
Later the Secretary had complaints against Senator Gerald
P. Nye of North.Dakota, and Robert Taft of Ohio, who was
not a committee member, but who sat with Nye at the hearings
and handed him written questions.LL
Vandenberg began by inquiring what the President would
be able to do under lend-lease that he couldn't do under
existing law. Morgenthau replied that it would make it
"possible for him to make available to any country that he
so desires the munitions of war that they need and that they
do not have the dollars to pay for." Although this left a
wide avenue of attack Vandenberg went on to ask if amendment
of the Johnson Act or the Neutrality Act couldn't accomplish
the same things, and Morgenthau.had to agree that this would
be true in so far as credits were concerned.
With this admission in the record Vandenberg asked:
"So the net result is fiaat this is an indirect repeal of
those provisions in.the Neutrality Act and in the Johnson
Act?"
Secretary Morgenthau. Not in the Johnson
Act, as I understand it.
Senator Vandenberg. Perhaps not literally,
but the spirit of the Neutrality Act as you
have acknowledged it.
Secretary morgenthau. No. This is government
to government. I don't think anybody who has

studied the bill feels Ehat this in any way cuts
across the Johnson Act. .

 

#Henry Morgenthau Jr., "The Morgenthau Diaries,"
Colliers, October 18, 19 7, p. 75.

 

SSenate Hearings, I, 25.

 

120

The Senator continued to pursue the topic by asking
why the Treasury Department did not fieink an amendment of the
Neutrality Act would accomplish the same result. florgenthau
requested that his counsel, Ed Foley, who had been a key
figure in drafting the bill, be allowed to explain this
reason. When Foley took the stand he presented one of the
most logical of all the explanations of the bill produced
in its entire consideration. He compared the lend-lease
method with the method of extending credits, and summed up
the difference in cogent terms. He explained:

You simply provide another country with dollars
with which to pay for material that it would order
here, it would mean.that it would be months and
months before those materials came off the assembly
lines and could be made available. Under the
provisions of this bill it would permit the President
to make available to a country, Whose defense is
vital to our defense, materials that we have on
hand now which they might need at any time, and
it would permit them to marshall those materials
and those supplies and put them in the places
where they have to have them.when they have to
have them. That is the principal difference. I
think it is not correct to say that it is simply
a difference of credit. It is g difference of
speed, expedition, and purpose.

Under questioning by Senators Tom Connally of Texas,

James E. Hurray of Montana, and Claude Pepper of Florida,
Morgenthau was able to do a neat job of defending the bill.
He pointed out that inasmuch as Britain had paid for
everything it had received in the way of supplies it could

not be said that the United States was aiding Britain at all,

and indeed, he asserted to Murray'that it had at times been

 

6Ibido, I, 25-260

121

difficult for the British to buy at all. Finally he made
it clear, in a statement that was directly opposed to the
isolationist position, that he thought the aid policy would
be a good buy. "I can answer that in this way," he told
Pepper, "I think we would save money by making available to
England or any other country that is attacked the implements
of war to fight on their own ground rather than be left in
this hemisphere alone against the world."7
But between the first of these questions and Morgenthau's
later statement Senators Hiram Johnson of California and
Bob La Follette, Jr., of Wisconsin raised again the question
of the authorship of the bill. Morgenthau was unwilling to
make a flat statement to La Follette, but indicated that the
bill had been drafted through a series of many conferences.
Vhen Johnson asked if the bill had been written by Foley,
morgenthau denied it, and indicated that Foley had
collaborated with Beaman, and with Hackworth of the State
Department, and that conferences had been held which included
all of the Congressional leaders. Although this was
apparently specific the opponents were never satisfied and
contended to the end that the authorship of the bill had
been kept secret by the administration.
Finally as Morgenthau's day before the committee drew
to a close Senator Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri, by a

series of questions on the war debts from the First World War,

attempted to indicate that the amount the lend-lease bill would

 

7Ibid., 1, 23, 37. 39.

 

a)

Ibid-9 1: 3h-36.

 

122

cost the American public could not be estimated. In this
effort D. W. Bell, under-secretary of the Treasury, was
called to the stand to explain the status of the debts.9

But while Morgenthau and his aides had been pointing
out the advantages of lend-lease over a simple grant of
credits or a loan which would reOpen the war debts wounds,
the sentiment for just such a loan was having a slight up-
surge. A few days before the hearings opened Raymond L. Buell,
round-table editor of Fortune and a former director of the
Foreign Policy Association, had called for a grant of $5
billion without a demand for repayment. On the day Morgenthau
appeared, Mark Sullivan in his column wrote that any war
responsibility could be avoided by just loaning money to
Britain. Those who were essentially isolationist were still
attempting to avoid the responsibility of world power. The

Akron Beacon Journal was certainly in this position when it

 

observed after Morgenthau's testimony that the United States
had not asked Britain, Greece, or China to fight. It did,
however, see a bit into the future when it observed further
that "one or both of the belligerents in every future war .
will have a right to expect the same consideration from
soft-hearted, soft-headed Uncle Sam."10

The third witness called before the Foreign Relations

Committee was Secretary of War Henry Stimson. Stimson, in

 

91bid., I, 76-80.

10Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 26, 19hl; Washington
Post, January 28, léfil; Akron Beacon Journal, January 29, lth.

 

123

another fine statement, attempted to outline the purpose and
the expediency of the bill. Initially he pointed out that
it would centralize the purchase of munitions and make their
production thereby both cheaper and speedier. Then he
emphasized the idea that the United States was not eithhr
actually giving or lending anything to Great Britain, but.
that it was uying "our own security while we prepare."
Continuing to slap at the bill opponents in his statement,
Stimson pointed out that under these conditions an ordinary
loan was short-sighted, and that furthermore a grant of
flexible and effective authority to the executive would
enable a day to day dealing with extraordinary situations
which the legislative branch of government could not handle.11
When the questioning began LaFollette opened the topic
of Presidential powers and of convoying. But Stimson was
not to be pushed on any topic and h quickly told the Senator
that no new powers in regards to the way in which the President
could handle the fleet were given in the bill, and that the
bill itself did not authorize convoying. After Stimson had
entered a series of documents in the record showing which laws
authorized the sale of military equipment, established reusable
funds, and which ones would be affected under the "notwithstanding'
clause, La Follette came back to convoying with a suggestion
for an anendment to prohibit convoying. Stimson dismissed

it as being not germane to the bill. He did not, however,

object to a time limitamendment.12

 

llSenate Hearings, I, 85-87, 90.
12Ibid., I, 95-96, lOO-llh,.116.

121;

But probably Stimson's clearest warning, and really
a call for speed, was in reply to a question by Senator Pepper.
"So that this is a method toward the peace of this country,"
Pepper asked, "and not a step toward getting this country
into war?"

Stimson replied: "As I surveyed it in times past,
it is about the last call for lunch on that kind of a
procedure. This is an effort to do just as you say - to
carry out, by nonviolent methods, the protection of our own
country through aid to Great Brfiain. It may be the last."13

Stimson's stand was immediately strongly endorsed by
the washington Post, which also put its weight behind the
move for speed in the bills consideration. "There is a
Latin proverb," it editorialized, "which runs something like
this: He who gives now, gives many fold. It should shine
out with words of fire from the walls inclosing the
legislators who have the lend-lease bill under discussion."
Although Stimson's stand on convoys was attacked in the

St. Louis Post-Dispatch, the same day produced a column.by

 

Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner which pointed out that the
powers granted the President were less than those in the
Constitution. In addition, they argued, "The method of
preparing the bill was far less dictatorial than methods often
employed in.the past. And the spirit shown by the White House

' 3
is conciliatory rather than hectoring."l¢

 

l3;§i§., I, 125; Time, February 10, 1941, p. 17.

lLPSt. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 30, lth;
‘Washington Post, January 30, lghl.

 

125

If the White House was not hectoring, however, the
opposition Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee were,
and in a brief respite from administration witnesses, their
sharp and belligerent attitude became increasingly evident
when Jmnes W. Gerard, the former ambassador to Germany, and
Reinhold Niebuhr were called to appear on January 30. Gerard
got off fairly easily with a strong endorsement of the bill
on the basis of his experiences in Europe. Niebuhr, however,
seemed to particularly raise the ire of Senators Johnson and
Nye. He was a professor of theology at the Union Theological
Seminary, and also the editor of Christianity and Crisis, a
newly founded magazine, as well as being a member of the
executive committee of the Inter-Faith Committee for Aid to
the Democracies. Niebuhr came to the strong support of the
bill not only because of the national interest, but also
because of "the obligations whiCh we owe to the community of
nations as one of the nations which may be regarded as an
inheritor and custodian of die standards of justice of western
civilization."l§

After making a strong reply to Senator Johnson, Niebuhr
met the belligerent questions of Nye with equal force. "May
I ask the witness," questioned Nye, "for whom do you pretend
to speak?"

"I am not pretending to speak for anybody, Senator,

except myself," Niebuhr replied.16

 

lsSenate Hearingg, I, 163-176.
161bid., I, 172-173.

126

But this testimony was only an interlude before Frank
Knox, the Secretary of the Navy, came before the committee
for two full days to do battle with the opposition in as
strong or stronger terms than those employed by Stimson.
After entering his House committee statement and testimony
in the record, he proceeded to make mince-meat out of the
opposition's star witness, Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh.

He strongly stated that any talk of a negotiated peace was
"wild fancy."

Then in the questioning he quickly pointed out to
Senator Pepper that the cost of the bill would be small
compared to the cost should Britain fall. Senator Nye,
however, soon was questioning the Secretary about the purposes
of the bill. As clearly as possible Knox explained the
necessity for British dollar exchange, and that all the powers
in the bill were necessary for its operation. The real point
of Nye's questioning, however, soon again resolved itself
around the issue of convoying. He asked:

Mr. Secretary, will this so-called lend-lease

bill, to your way of thinking, permit the convoying
of British merchantmen by the American Navy?

Secretary Knox. No more than if we do not pass

the bill.

Senator Nye. No more than if we do not pass the

bill?

Secretary Knox. Yes.

Senator Nye. In other words, you think the

President has that power now? 17
Secretary Knox. Any time he wants it.

Nye continued questioning Knox until the end of that

days hearings and continued briefly again on the following

‘

17Ibid., I, 177-182, 185, 200-2ok; Time, February 10,
l9hl. p. 17.

127

day. In the course of this testimony Knox assured Nye that
the Navy would not be given away, and that his entire purpose
was to buy time, finally concluding that he would not care
if the United States never got anything back because he
thought it "the most economical way of defense." Shortly
after that statement Tom Connally pointed out, "If we can
get our safety and security, that is pretty good repayment,
isn't it?" "I think so, Senator," Knox replied.18

But Knox and the administration, too, were subjects
of attack in the following days. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch
seizing on Knox's statement about a negotiated peace, opposed
going beyond any discussion of British requirements, and
decided that the hearings "should not become the forum of
American Cabinet officers for personal judgments on an issue
not before them or the country for decision." In the light
of some of the questions asked by opposition Senators this
was a strange view to take. At the same time that Knox was
appearing before the Senate Committee a thousand men and
women carrying placards denouncing the "war bill" were also
parading in front of the White House. This demonstration
was organized by the partly Communist-sponsored American
Peace Mobilization.

However, the administration also had its supporters
and while the House leaders were preparing for the opening
of debate in that body, over the week-end following Knox's

testimony, the bill's supporters could draw encouragement

18Senate Hearings, I, 205-206, 216, 236, 2h2.

128

from.such columnists as Walter Lippmann, who reasoned: "We
may conclude, therefore, that the structure of opposition,-
reared on the assumption that this bill gives the President
new power for war and dictatorship, - is contrary to fact

and irrelevant and a waste of good energy and precious time."
This view was similarly supported in the editorials of the
Washington 23st, while the Atlanta Constitution, in commenting

on Willkie's stay in Great Britain, was again able to urge

speed.19

II. The Gates of Hell

If speed were the key-note for the administration
witnesses, then eloquence and delay in about equal parts
made up the contribution of the opposition witnesses the
following week. The crowds were somewhat smaller than usual
at the Senate hearings, but they made up in interest what
they lacked in size. Senator Connally complained that they
were made up of America Firstors who came only to cheer their
leaders and heckle adrinistration Senators. Indeed, on
February 2, the day before debate opened in the House, and
the day before the first Opposition witnesses appeared
before the Foreign Relations Committee in.the Senate, the
America First Committee held its first mass meeting in
Washington, D. C. Still, the admdnistration.was not totally

silent, and Senator Josh Lee of Oklahoma asserted that same

day, that the Congress was being assaulted by Nazi prOpaganda

 

198t. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 1, l9hl; Washington
Post, February 1, 2, lghl; Atlanta Constitution, February 1,
Ith.

 

129

in an effort to stop the lend-lease bill, weaken it, or at
least delay it until it was too late.20

It was in this atmosphere that Philip LaFollette,
former governor of Wisconsin and brother of the Senator on
the committee, led off the parade of 30 opposition witnesses
who appeared that week. He was, initially, in that group
whiCh failed to see the necessity of buying time, and
considered the policy proposed as an attempt to fool the
British.into fighting for the United States. He apparently

was unable to realize that the British were in the war anyway

 

and had nothing to lose and everything to gain through a E

lend-lease policy. The chances of their being fooled were

extremely thin. But this was not the total extent of

LaFollette's testimony. He was also firmly convinced that

the President was determined on, and that the bill was, a

"mandate for a war policy." This was completely unnecessary

in his View, because as he told Senator "Roarin' Bob" Reynolds

in answering a question: "They will never come over here,

Senator. I am convinced of that."21
LaFollette was followed on the stand by Norman Thomas

who made his second appearance against the bill. Thomas

felt that it had become a waste of time to belabor the point

that the powers extended to the President might put the United

States into war, but he thought so not on the grounds that

 

2Coonnally, p. 242; Time, February 17, 1941, p. 17;

New York Times, February 2, 1941; Washington Post, February

3, lgkl.
21Senate Hearings, I, 263, 27k, 287.

130

the charges were vague, but that the contention had virtually
been admitted to by the administration. He strongly
supported the contention that the real duty of the United
States was to perfect its own democracy, and not to enter
into foreign quarrels.

When, however, he was finally brought around to
answering questions about the new grants of power he was 9‘

not able to pinpoint exactly what additional power would

“‘- ‘11' a! l.»".' ”a.“

be granted to the President. Senator Pepper, attempting to

get a flat answer on convoying finally forced Thomas into a

 

position where he all but admitted the President had such

57'

power under the Consitution. Senator Pepper asked:
Let's separate them for a moment or two and
discuss what new power is conferred on the President
by this bill. Take the whole aspect and not the
constitutional aspect; what is the source of the
greatest danger with respect to getting us into war?
Mr. Thomas. There isn't any one. This bill
eithcr gives or confirms other laws in the Constitution
which gguld give the President power to convoy
ships.

A third of the opponents' star witnesses led off the
hearings on the following day, February h. This was the
historian Charles A. Beard. Beard presented an eloquent
brief, pointing out that neither Lincolnrnr Wilson, in great
national emergencies, had requested power to use anything
they wanted, in any way they wanted, and even to give away
the materials of the United States. He felt that such a

grant of power to the executive was dangerous, and was indeed

tantamount to waging an undeclared war. Therefore, he

‘——-—

22%.. I. 287, 2924-, 301.

131

proceeded to ask if Congress was prepared to guarantee the
extent of the British Empire, restore the French Republic,
return to their rightful owners the territories of Finland
and Poland, re-establish democracy in Greece and independence
in Albania, and aid China until both the Japanese and the
Communists were suppressed, for such a policy, he felt,

must lead necessarily to these things. This was, indeed,

a fine discussion of the true and eventual extent of world
responsibility, but Beard, like the rest of the isolationists,
was unwilling to accept this responsibility.

For himself, he saw the problem clearly:

The present business of Congress is to decide

now, in voting on this bill, whether it is prepared
on a show-down to carry our country into war in
Europe and Asia, and thus set the whole world on
fire, or whether it is resolved, on a show-down,
to stay out to the last ditch and preserve one
stronghold of order and sanity even against the
gates of hell. Here, on this continent, I believe
we may be secure and should make ourselves secure
from the kind of conflict and terrorism.in which
the old worlds have indulged for such long ages of
time.

Beard's strongly isolationist position was followed
immediately by a short interlude of more soundly reasoned
thought by Major George Fielding Eliot. Eliot, who made no
bones about his position, was certainly not included in the
isolationist camp, and while he said he held "no brief for

his particular measure," he was not opposed to grants of

executive power either. As he replied to Senator LaFollette:
"Therefore, I believe that the powers that the Executive

asks for in this bill should be granted him, with proper

231bid., II, 309-312.

132

limitations upon their exercise."

These limitations, according to Eliot, should not
include one on conveying, but should incorporate limitations
as to time, and provisions for legislative review.21L

But the hearings returned to the normal "war bill"
and "dictatorship" level as soon as Eliot left the stand,
and with the single exception of Quentin Reynolds, an
administration witness at the Saturday session, remained on
that level for the rest of the wedz. The immediate switch
was engineered by General Robert E. Wood of the America
First Committee who followed Eliot to the Chair. In
beginning his statement he said: ". . . it is really a war
bill, transferring the war-making powers of Congress to the
President. As such, I oppose it." On the whole Wood
emphasized the broad nature of the bill, but Senator Pepper
soon get him into difficulty when he attempted to take the
stand that the America First group was not really opposed
to aid. In essence Wood supported the administration view-
point on aid, and Pepper sawed the limb off behind him. The
Senator asked:

Now, if you do not think that Englandfis holding

out has anything to do with the defense of America,
Why are you willing to give England supplies?
General Wood. We do, we do.

Senator Pepper. Oh, you do?
General WOOd. We believe it is only common

sense.
Senator Pepper. Why? Why is it common sense

to help England?

General Wood. Because if you have got a
potential adversary, it is good policy to weaken
him.

242132.. II, 318, 322, 325-326, 330-331.

133

Senator Pepper. Who is our potential

adversary?

General Wood. Germany is the potential

adversary.

Senator Pepper. Why is she our potential

advéiiiiii *fd 323310123301. “‘3?

On the following day the opponents of the legislation
brought to the stand Dr. Allen Valentine, the president of
the University of Rochester, James S. Kemper, the president
of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, Dr. Herbert
Wright, professor of International Law at Catholic University
in Washington, D. C., and Gerald L. K. Smith of Detroit,
for his second appearance on the legislation.

In his testimony Smith presented a fairly loosely
reasoned and largely emotional discussion of the objections
to the bill based on a 15 point program composed from.the
letters received by his Committee of One Million. Wright,
who confined himself largely to the arguments of international
law, ignored the realities of international relations, and
the inherent right of self-defense so ably presented by
Cordell Hull in opening the House hearings. The testimony
of Valentine and Kemper, however, was of somewhat wiéer
importance, for in their separate ways they enlarged on the
popular theme of dictatorship.26

Valentine's statement was as concise and detailed

as any on the topic. He said:

My objections to the bill are simple. The

 

25%" II! 3&2! 319-19 362'363: 385: 390.
2%.me n, tel-11-02, nos, m, was, 12.68-14-70.

bill delegates to one man full power to control
completely the industrial life of America down

to the smallest factor, for it authorizes full
control of the manufacture of all defense
materials, and defines defense materials so
broadly that they include anything that floats

or flies or could be used to injure an enemy,

and anything that could contribute to the
manufacture of any of these. This amounts to

the abnegative of Congress, the nullification

of property rights, the centering of complete
economic power in one man. Is the emergency so
great that the President needs all this power?

If he intends to use it, he kills the fundamentals
of democratic procedure. If hi does not intend to
use it, why should he have it? 7

Kemper also dealt largely with the powers of the
President, and after having some difficulty over just how
he was authorized to speak for the Chamber of Commerce,
his presentation, while it included the time limitation

uggestion, centered on the possibilities of the seizure

U]

of private property. On this topic Senator Connally of
Texas soon re7uced him to worse straits than Senator Pepper
had General Wood. Connally began a particularly revealing
dialogue by saying:

I would like to have you take the bill and
point out where there is anything that authorizes
the President to seize the property of any citizen
and confiscate it.

Mr. Kemper. You have some pretty loose language
here, Senator. For instance, will you turn to page
2, section 3 (a) and tell me what you mean in line
20 by "or otherwise procure"?

Senator Connally. It means just what it says -
otherwise procure.

Hr. Kemper. How might that be done?

Senator Connally. He could buy it. The Constitution
prohibits the Government from taking any private
property without just compensation. You know that,
don't you?

Mr. Kemper. Yes, I do.

 

27Ibid., II, hOl.

13S

Senator Connally. If he gets it he could
buy it, or if he commandeers it, under existing
laws he would have to pay for it. A jury would
pass upon the value under condemnation proceedings
in the Federal Court.

Mr. Kemper. I should be very hapey if the
lawyers on the board who are respogsible for this
were here to answer your question. 0

The stand on dictatorship in regard to the seizure
of private property could not even garner the support of
the strongest anti-administration newspapers. The Akron

Beacon Journal while subscribing to the idea that property

 

could be seized under the terms of the lend-lease bill,
decided that the Chamber of Commerce had used "lamentable
judgement in emphasizing the peril to private property as

an objection to H. R. 1776." It even went so far as to

state that "it is inconceivable that the possessions of
individuals or corporations would be taken without compensation.”
Keanwhile, the newspapers and columnists were to a large
extent coming either to the supdort of the administration,

or attacking some of tie leading figures of the opposition
camp. Philip LaFollette, Charles Beard, and Senator Wheeler
all were targets for barbs at their respective knowledge,

and Wheeler himself became the target for another attack by
President Roosevelt himself. On February 3 Wheeler issued

a statement to th‘ effect that five out of every six airplanes
produced were going to Britain. On the following day

Roosevelt, at his press conference, replied that all kinds

of things could be worked out with figures and that Wheeler's

 

28Senate Hearings, II, h27; Los Angeles Times, February

 

6, ioki.

136

computation was probably satisfactory to Hitler.29

Colonel Lindberg did not escape the general onslaught
either as Dorothy Thompson took him to task early in the
week for a "complete lack of knowledge of history and of
naval, economic and cultural factors." In an analysis that
could apply to the isolationist position as a whole, she
wrote: "His program would mean the end of the freedom and
equality of the United States as a great nation." These
attacks were aided by Walter Lippmann in a column later in
the week, and by an editorial in the Emporia Gazette on
February 6.30

This was particularly appropriate, for Lindbergh, the
biggest single attraction that could be mustered by the
Opposition, appeared before the Senate Committee that same
day. To a large extent Lindbergh repeated what he had told
the House Committee. He was, if anything, more positive in
his opposition to the bill on dictatorship grounds. In his
prepared statement he told the committee: "I do not believe
that the danger to America lies in an invasion from abroad.
I believe it lies here at home in our own midst, and that it
is exemplified by the terms of this bill - the placing of
our security in the success of foreign armies, and the removal

of power from the Representatives of the people in our own

 

29Akron Beacon Journal, February 6, lth; Washington
Post, February EI'S, lQhI} New York Times, February 5, lghl;
Los Angeles Times, February 6, 8, 1953.

 

30Washington Post, February 3, 5, 19M13 Emporia.figgglz
Gazette, February 6, lth.

137

land." Later he told Senator Connally, "My general objection
to it and my primary objection to it would be that I believe
it is a step away from our system.of government in this
country."31

In response to a question from Senator Pepper,
Lindbergh was also able to present once more his opposition
to aid as a weakening factor in the United States defense.
"I oppose aid to England which will carry us into the war,"
he told the Senator, "or will weaken our own forces in
America; yes, sir."

"Weaken us to what point?" Pepper inquired.

"For instance, by sending our new aircraft to Europe
when our own forces are in deplorable condition."32

Pepper and Lindbergh also provided the hearings with.
one of their unintentional lighter moments when Pepper in
beginning his questions asked him, "Wlen did you first go
to Europe?"

His response of "In 1929, sir," brought several
minutes of laughter and applause which embarrased both the
Senator and Colonel Lindbergh. Senator George established
order by rapping with a glass ash-tray, and later when
Lindbergh left, warned the audience after their prolonged
applause, that the committee would go into executive session

if the audience did not remain quiet. Later, after the

audience had applauded the testimony of Hanford MacNider,

 

3lSenate Hearings, II, hes-k93.

 

32Ibid., II, 526.

138

George ordered the room cleared, and the committee proceeded
in executive session.33
But the testimony after Lindbergh was a distinct

letdown. MacNider defended the isolationist position
stoutly, and the opponents of the bill managed to marshall

19 witnesses to follow him, but none oftimm, with the
exception of Alfred M. Landon, were well known across the
country. Probably the most influential of the remainder

was Dr. Charles Clayton Morrison, the editor of The Christian
Century, who was unalterably opposed to the bill as a war
measure. His testimony, looking forward to that of Wendell
Willkie, scheduled for the following Tuesday, appealed to

the Senators to reject emotional testimony. "You will
receive," he told them in an allusion to Willkie, "a fresh
injection of this brainstorm stimulant when one or two week
end visitors return from England with their eyes and ears
full of what they have been shown and told. Does anyone
suppose that an American barefoot boy could spend a week end
with Hitler at Berchtesgaden and come home with an.unbiased
mind?" But he pleaded against excitement, requesting, "that
Congress shall detach its deliberations from.the hysteria,
the sentimentalism, the melodramatics and the fantastics in
which the President and his supporters have stated the issue,
and recast the issue in the more realistic framework in which

n3u

our national decision must be made.

 

33New York Times, February 7, lth; Senate Hearings, II

512. 560. 567.

3l-LSenate Hearings, II, 621, 623-62h3‘2322, February

17: 19'4—1: p0 1?-

 

139

If anyone had been unrealistic, sentimental, or
hysterical, it had certainly not been the administration.
On February 7 when Morrison made his statement the House
had been calmly, if bitterly, debating the measure for five
days. It had been almost a month exactly since the bill,
on which speed was considered essential, had been introduced
in the Congress, and three weeks longer since the idea of
lend-lease had been publicly formulated. This, as well as
the reasoned and logical testimony of the departmental
secretaries, appearing on behalf of the bill, would be
enough to demolish the charges of hysteria. On the other
hand, the opponents, led by Wheeler, had immediately jumped
into the fray with vague charges of dictatorship, and
attracted all the fringes of anti-war sentiment into their
camp, espousing individually, some truly "fantastic" schemes
as substitutes for lend-lease. This was at no time so clear
as in the closing days of the Senate hearings. If emotional
testimony was to be rejected, the opponents' attempt to
over-whelm.the administration with weight of numbers was
definitely doomed.

Even Alfred Landon was not particularly reasoned in
his approach to the bill, and opposed it because it was a
concept of unlimited aid while only limited aid had been
discussed in the lQhO presidential campaign. He wanted to
prepare the United States first, and then "long and seriously

at 35

consider the wisdom of a 'guess and be damned policy'.

 

3SSenate hearings, II, 661, 667-

 

lliO

The quality declined even more rapidly after Landon's
appearance and reached the point of unreality when later on
February 8, Mrs. Cecil Norton Broy, representing Americans
United, Inc., presented, in an appeal that seemed almost
pro-German, a plan for a negotiated peace, and an offer of
three women to go to Berlin to confer with Hitler. She was
almost equaled on February 10, by Rosa M. Farber, Who was
the Acting National Chairman of the Mothers of the United
States of America. Reaching a new pitch of emotionality,
she told the Senators: ”We repeat, gentlemen, this bill is
part and parcel of an alien program to destroy the security
of our homes, the respect for our women, and nullify the
God-given right of parenthood over children." Concluding,
she pointed out: "We suggest for your consideration that
history proves the wisdom of heeding the voice of motherhood."36

But other action.had been taking place as well,
'including an unscheduled appearance by Jack McMichael of the
American Youth Congress before the Senate Committee on
February 8. He was ejected from the hearing room for his
pains, but the brief of the Congress, in opposition to the
bill, was made part of the record on February 10 when the
committee met again. The Youth Congress, the afternoon of
McMichael's appearance, presented the same protest to
President Roosevelt, and a rally 6,000 strong at the Washington

Monument was addressed by Representative Vito Marcantonio.

On Sunday, February 9, wendell Willkie arrived back

361bid.. II. 713-717. 773.

1&1

from his trip to England, convinced that to withhold aid
from the British would eventually involve the United States
in war with the Axis, and even John S. Knight's Akron Beacon
Journal was reduced to admitting that his return would mean
approval of the bill by the Senate. It did, however, condemn
in advance, his testimony as irrelevant.37
That same week end Senator Taft of Ohio proposed seven
amendments to the bill, supposedly after long consultation
with Herbert Hoover, Senator McNary, and Representative Joseph
Martin. His program would have eliminated the repair of
British ships in American ports, and specifically have
prohibited conveying, among other restrictions.
And along with these deveIOpments Winston Churchill
had delivered an address which denied the need for American
troops and which was hailed by the proponents of the bill
as "reassuring" and "magnificent”. Senator Wheeler attacked
it as a ruse to get the United States into the war as it

had entered in 1917, and he was promptly taken to task by

the Atlanta Constitution for an exceedingly short memory

 

or a deliberate attempt to mislead the younger generation.

On February 10, the last day for the Opponents
witnesses before the camaittee, Harry Hepkins boarded a plane
in Lisbon, Portugal, for his return from England, and it
was revealed in "official quarters" that the Treasury was

preparing a list of materials with a value of around $500

 

37Akron Beacon Journal, February 9, l9hl; New York
Times, February 9, 10, l9Ll.

 

11.2

million to go to Britain as soon as the bill passed.3

The program toward r;sponsibility in world affairs was
moving slowly forward. The responsibility which the
isolationists so completely rejected was on the verge of
reality. With the testimony of Wendell L. Willkie about
to break over them, and the prospect of the Senate debate
before them, they prepared to stop the United States from

passing through what they considered the gates of hell.

III. The Barefoot Boy

The suspense preceding Willkie's appearance was great,
and it was prolonged and heightened when the Committee
met on the morning of February ll. The Senate Caucus Room
where the hearings were held was built to accommodate 500
persons. Time Lagazine estimated 1,200 were crowded into
the room and committee employees estimated 1,800. The
crowds outside were even larger and finally get beyond the
control of the Capitol police. Thirty additional men were
rushed to the scene.39

Before this crowd the committee members carefully
played out their preliminaries. A statement filed by
William Green for the AFL was read into the record. Then

James B. Conant took the stand to defend the bill. In clear

 

38New York Times, February 10, ll, l9hl; Atlanta
Constitution, February 11, l9hl; Washington Post, February
12, 1914.1.

 

392123: February 2h, l9hl, p. 16; New York Times,
February 12, l9hl.

143

terms he summed up two of the many arguments and objections
to the bill. Speaking first on the charge of dictatorship
he concluded: ”Whether we lose civil liberties does not
depend on the grant of necessary powe s in an emergency to
the President. It depends upon the general spirit and sense
of values of the people and their Representatives in
Congress." Secondly, he dealt with the question of speed,
and what the bill could accomplish. He pointed out that
steps not otherwise possible might be taken and that those
steps might be critical in the final outcome of the war}LO
Conant was followed on the stand by Mayor Fiorello
LaGuardia of New York. LaGuardia, in his preliminary to
the main attraction, again summed up the need for the bill
to strengthen the defense of the United States, and emphasized
the fact that it would be cheap defense, if we thereby helped
Britain defeat the Axis};1
Finally the climax of the hearings was reached.
Wendell Willkie, the l9h0 Republican nominee for the presidency,
just returned from England, and sarcastically dubbed the
"barefoot boy" after the testimony of Dr. Morrison, took the
stand. But he, unintentionally prolonged the suspense for
yet another half-hour, as he had forgotten his statement and
it took a half-hour to procure it and furnish mimeographed
copies to the Senators. With his freshly trimmed hair drooping

over one eye, and his voice as throaty and hoarse as ever,

 

QOSenate hearings, III, 831-833: 835‘837°

 

AlIbid., III, 859.

1M.L

he hunched over the witness table and read his statement.
With calm defiance he quickly laid the idea of isolation.
”The trouble with the idea that we can withdraw within
ourselves is that it is too simple," he told them. "It has
no regard for the way the world is actually built." He
pointed out that aid to England must be effective aid, and
that ineffective aid would be just as likely to cause war
as an effective policy. Then he went on to point out the
hazard that England faced. The greatest of her hazards,
he felt, was shipping losses. Ier losses, according to
Willkie, were amounting to about three times her rate of
construction.

When he reached the bill itself he urged compromise
in the interests of national unity, reminding the majority
that they had the votes to pass the bill, but telling them that
unity was more important. He proposed his own limitations
on the legislation - limitations as to the time the bill
would run, the ability of the Congress to terminate it by
concurrent resolution, and as to the countries to which it
was to be extended. But Willkie had other proposals as well.
He proposed, with electrifying clarity, that the United
States should provide five to ten destroyers a month to the
British in addition to patrol bombers, and merchant ships,
without any legal ruses.u2

His proposals agparently put some of the Senators

temporarily off their feet, for when Chairman George asked

 

u2Time, February 2h, 19hl, p. 16; New York Times,
February 12, 19:1; Senate Hearings, III, 874-875.

1&5

for questions Hiram Johnson was reduced to shaking his head
sadly and saying, "No questions." Senator Vandenberg,
however, asked Willkie if he thought the bill was designed
to take the country into war to save Great Britain. Willkie
reminded him.that there was only one body that could declare
war, and that was the United States Congress. Senator Clark
of Missouri, described as a man with a genius for public
rudeness, took over the questioning. He raised the issue

of convoys and Willkie replied to him that convoys hadn't
been regarded as a British desire on his recent tour.

But then Clark trapped himself, as he forgot
temporarily that he wasn't on the floor of the Senate, and
reared at Willkie, "Mr. President."

Willkie laughed, Clark flushed, and the crowd applauded
as Willkie replied to him, "Senator, you merely speak of
what should have been."

Clark immediately recovered and turned to the topic
of Willkie's endorsement of Roosevelt's policies, and attempted
to compare it to a Willkie campaign statement.

"As to the statement about the President," Willkie
reminded him, "in the course of the campaign I made a great
many statements about him. He was my opponent you know."

Clark retorted, "You would not have said anything
about your opponent you did not think was true, would you?"

"Oh, no," Willkie replied, "but occasionally in

l
moments of oratory in campaigns we all eXpand a little bit."4'3

 

M3Time, February 2h, lghl, pp. 16-17; Senate Hearings,
III, 878,”892-893.

146

When he finally finished his testimony the crowd
surged around him, making it almost impossible for him to
leave. He was widely congratulated, and hailed by most of
the newspapers across the country. The New Yerk Timgg
saluted his stand on unity, while the Washington Egg:
called him "Uhanswerable Willkie" and supported his idea
of giving five to ten destroyers a month to Britain. The

Atlanta anstitution said that he "revealed himself as a

 

greater American, even, than at any time in the past. He
presented a remarkable example to those of his own party
who have allowed partisanship and jealousy of the President
to obscure the greater principles of loyalty to their
country in an.hour of dire peril." The Los Angeles Tgmgg,
also supporting the ten destroyers a month stand, joined
in praise of Willkie. The Opposition, to a large degree
was somewhat half-hearted. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch
criticised him for emitting a no—convoy limitation from his
suggestions, and the Akron Beacon Journal was more sad than
belligerent in its treatment. Only a few, like the Chicago
Tribune, were willing to attack him in terms of "The Barefoot
Boy As A Barefaced Fraud."uu

His statement was considered to be a substantial help
to the bill, and it was thought Uiat when the bill finally

reached the amendment stage in the Senate many of his

 

uuMary Earhart Dillon, Wendell Willkie 1892-19fig (New
York, 1952), p. 2H3; New York Times, Februar 12, 1941;
Washington Post, February 12, I3;'Ik, 15, 19 1; Atlanta
Constitution, February 13, lgkl; Los Angeles Times, February
12, lghl; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 12, l9hl, Akron
Beacon Journal, February 12, lghl; Chicago Daily Tribune,
February 13, lth.

 

 

 

 

suggestions would be incorporated. In the meantime his

stand had apparently encouraged some other Republicans to

take a more statesmanlike view, and Thomas E. Dewey,

speaking at a Lincoln Day dinner on the day following the

hearings switched to advocating the passage of the bill

with unity reservations. The same day Willkie issued

another unity appeal to the Republicans. The only real

dissonant note came from Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox

who put a stop to Willkie's destroyer suggestion by

opposing "any further depletion of the United States Fleet."1L5
The committee went immediately into executive

consideration of the bill, and on February 12, had defeated

the first attempt at amendment by a vote of 13 to 10. This

was considered the best that the opposition could muster,

and the observers were right as the committee reported the

bill to the Senate on February 1k by a favorable vote of 15

to 8. The vote, despite Willkie's plea, was strictly partisan

with 1h Democrats and one Republican voting in favor of the

bill, while the opposition consisted of five Republicans,

two Democrats, and LaFollette of Wisconsin who was offically

a Progressive. Senator Barkley, the majority leader,

ptimistically predicted passage within ten days with no more

than 25 votes against the bill in the Senatefl‘6

The administration seemed to be moving rapidly in that

 

uSDavid Lawrence, Diary of A Hashington Correspondent
(New York, 19h2), p. lOS;—New‘York Times, February 13, lgkl.

héNew York Times, February 13, la, lth.

llIB

direction, as a vote on the same day made the bill the pending
business of the Senate and insured the beginning of debate
on the next Monday. They also seemed to have the increasing
support of the country behind them as the Gallup poll
released on February 1h showed the percentage support for
the bill up to 58 per cent, an increase of a per cent over
the figures released for February 9, and at the same time
the percentage of those definitely opposed to the bill
decreased from 22 to 21 per cent. On a sectional basis
only the East Central States failed to give an absolute
majority in favor of the bill, and they still provided a
margin of 39 per cent in favor of the bill to 35 per cent
opposed.1L7

But future danger was still clearly evident as the
Chicago Tribune blasted Dewey for supporting the bill, and
Capitol police broke up a demonstration of women outside
the Senate chamber. Led by Mrs. Mynnie Fischer of Milwaukee,
they were there to find out "why this man Sol Bloom and his
henchmen are being permitted to run the country." At the
same time the British Embassy was the scene of activity by
the WOmen's Neutrality League and Paul Revere's Sentinels.
A two faced effigy representing President Roosevelt and
Wendel Willkie was hanged from the embassy wall. Among the
placards carried by these women was one reading:

We lease-lend and give to you,
F.D.R. and Willkie too;

You can.have them.but not us
For in God we place our trust.

LL7Ibid., February 12, 12.3-, 13, 1914-1-

We'll fight, defend, and die if need, DB
To save our Republic from.bankers' greed."

 

u8New York Times, February 1h, lQHl; Chicago Daily
Tribune, February 1;, 19kl.

CHAPTER VII
THE TOGA OF DIGNITY

I. Time Is The Point

On February 13 the Majority Report of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee became available. Released
after the favorable vote on the measure it emphasized the
idea that the bill was designed as a "practical safeguard
aimed at keeping us out of war". As well as giving an
analysis of the provisions of the law, the majority
reported that it had considered amending the bill to name
the countries to be aided, but decided that such a course
would be "unwise." The growing tension and Nazi pressure
in the Balkans was thought to be the reason for the
decision not to name nations. It was hOped they would
resist the Nazi moves.1

The Minority Report was not ready until five days
later, but in the interim the opponents of the bill managed
to keep busy. On the day the committee reported the bill
Senator Wheeler charged that radio commentators had been
one-sided in discussing the bill. The next day seventeen

.3

Senators opposed to the bill met in Hiram Johnson's office

lNew York Times, February 1h, 16, lghl.

150

151

and agreed to try to amend the bill to prohibit transfer of
‘any part of the navy to Britain, and to bar convoying by
American warships. MeanWhile, a two day conference, to be
addressed by Norman Thomas and Senator Wheeler was being
organized to include the National Council for Prevention

of War, the Women's International League for Peace and
Freedom, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Keep America
Out of War Congress, the War Resistors League, and the
Youth Committee Against War. John T. Flynn, speaking for
the America First Committee, charged President Roosevelt
with stirring up fear and hatred, and he was supported by
the newsletter of the German-American National Alliance.
Paul A. F. Warnholtz, the editor of the newsletter, attacked

9: "They are

L)

those Who ”shout loudest for war" by sayin
usually old men, sterile biologically, and sterile even of
all dreams and memories of life, love and youth, and would
deny the right of youth to live. Their senile bodies,

their cold, calculating brains, frequently find compensation
for their lost youth in hatred and false ambitions for glory
and gold . . ."2

Meanwhile, at a February 15 luncheon, proponents of

the bill made plans for the debate and decided that only
proponents of the bill would be recognized on Monday, February
17, when debate opened, and that opponents of the measure

would be recognized the following day. On Sunday Harry Hopkins

arrived back from England, and issued a warning that was

 

2New York Times, February 11.1., 15, 16, 19131; Time,
February 2h, lghl, p. 18.

152

clearly designed to speed passage of the bill. Immediately
after Hopkins' return President Roosevelt looking forward
to passage of the bill, began to set up administrative
machinery.3
Senator Walter George of Georgia, chairman of the
Foreign Relations Committee, had been picked to lead off
the debate. He was ill on Menday, February 17, and when
Majority Leader Alben W. Barkley rose to take his place he
was accorded the attention of a crowd surpassed only a few
times in Senate history. Most of the Senators were in their
places, and while the galleries were only partly filled the
doorieepers were holding the crowds back at some of the doors.
In opening Barkley appealed for calm consideration of
the bill, and then proceeded to paint a picture of what
German victory could mean. He reviewed the neutrality
legislation and the reasons for its passage, and then
undertook an analysis of the bill in terms of what laws would
be affected under the notwithstanding clause of lend-lease.
The Johnson Act, he told them, would not be affected, and
neither would the carry provisions of the Neutrality Act.
The cash provisions of the same act, however, would be
suspended. Likewise, port restrictions under the Neutrality
Act would be lifted, the financial transactions provisions
suspended, and the limitations on servicing warships lifted.

Also, affected under the provision would be a 1917 law

 

3NewYork Times, February 16, 17, 13, lel.

153

prohibiting the building of warships for belligerents, the
2h hour provisions for warship repair in the Hague
Convention, the military secrets statute, and some other

statutes rewarding the purchase of military supplies from

,0
other countries.

Then he went on to point out what the law did not
do, with the purpose of showing the dictatorship charges
to be groundless. He said:

This measure does not surrender the right of
Congress to declare war. It not only preserves
that constitutional right, which cannot be
abrogated, but it requires the President to come
to Congress for the appropriations necessary to
administer it, and also the authority to make
contracts for future execution.

This measure does not confer upon.him the right
to convey ships across the ocean.

It does not confer upon him the right to send
American troops to Europe.

It does not confer upon him the power to seize
foreign ships in the ports of the United States.

It does not confer upon him the power to impose
a censorship, or to restrict the freedom of speech
or of the press or of worship or of assembly.

These rights have been abolished in the dictator
nations, but they have not been restricted in any
respect in the United States, and will not be under
the terms of this measure.

This measure confers upon the President no power
to seize property or to conscript labor, or to nullify
the laws enacted for the protection of labor in the
United States.

It gives him power to do the things set out in the
measure. He may possess other powers given him in the
Constitution or in other laws in conflict with this; u
but this measure does no more nor less than what it says.

After Barkley had concluded his speech, he and Senator

Robert A. Taft of Ohio reached an impasse in an exchange

 

hNew York Times, February 18, 1941; Congressional
Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., 1033-1039 (February 17, lghl7f

15h

over whether Barkley was in favor of war. But it was only a
short time until Warren Austin, Republican of Vermont, took
the floor to give a more detailed speech in favor of the
bill than had Barkley. "Time is the point," he told the
listening Senators. "The time is brief for us. We must
get to work as quickly as we can." 1e was extensively
cuestioned by Senators Bennett Clark of Missouri and Wheeler
of Montana, as well as other opponents of the measure, and
the high point of his presentation came in an exchange with
little Senator Homer Bone of Washington. When Austin asserted
in the heat of the interchange that "There are much worse
things than grim, bloody war," Bone challenged him. Said he:
"If the Senator thinks there are worse things than grim,
bloody war, I have nothing to say. I do not know of any
worse hell than war. If the Senator knows of anything worse
than war, I should like to have him expose it to me now."
Mr. Austin. I will. I say that a world enslaved
to Hitler is worse than war, and worse than death.
A country whose boys will not go out to fight to
save Christianity in the world, and to save the
principle of freedom from ruthless destruction by a
fiend - well, we do not find such boys in America.
When it becomes necessary for us to fight, if it 5
ever becomes necessary for us to fight, we will fight.
The galleries immediately broke into an uproar with an
undertone of bees being overcome by applause, and the galleries
were warned for the first of many times in that long debate

/
to refrain from signs of approval or disapproval.

 

SCong. Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., 1039-1051 (February
17, lgzl77Time, March 3, 1931, p. lo; New York Times, February
18,19 .1.

 

0New York Times, February 18, l9hl.

’_,
\‘1
U1

After a brief address by Senator Thomas of Utah,
Claude Pepper of Florida took the floor as the proponents
third major speaker. The galleries fell into a hush as
Pepper neared the end of his speech and declared:

Mr. President, I venture to lay down the
statement that not the American Congress, but
the American people will not let England fall,
and whether we like it or not, let England
totter and they will drive us into action under
the lash of their demands. Call it war or do not
call it war - lay it down as a premise, America
will not let England fall to Hitler. If the
action now proposed will not save England, we
will save it anyway. Watch Amgrican opinion, and
see if what I say is not true.

The newspaper advocates of the bill were during this
period entering an even more active campaign to support the
bill and speed its passage. In the week before the debate
began the Emporia Gazette attacked the idea of isolation,

while the Atlanta Constitution opined that conveys would

 

eventually be necessary so the people might just as well
prepare for them now. In later days they also attacked
Wheeler and pointed out the wisdom of stopping Hitler in

Europe. The Cleveland Plain_§ealer, meanwhile, was centering

 

its attack on the two Republican Senators from Ohio, and
chiefly berating Senator Taft for his loan idea, saying:
"With stubborn determination Taft continues to argue that

all England needs from this country is a loan. For reasons
of his own he ignores the fact that it is not money England
needs now but guns, ships, and planes." On the day after the

debate opened both the Cleveland and Atlanta papers warned

7New York Times, February 18, 19al; Cong. Record, 77
Cong., l Sess., 1032-1058 (February 17, lghli.

-_)

156

that opponents who delayed would be aiding Hitler. The
New Yerk 21333 continued its campaign for unity, and on
the morning of the opening of debate optimistically
declared that the "swift march of events abroad has helped
to make clear why such a measure as this must be enacted"
-and they anticipated speedy action and wide agreement.
There was a substantial body of newspaper sentiment
which did not agree with these views. The Chicago Tribune,
on the day debate opened declared that the British did not
need financial aid, and the following day warned that the
United States was "entering the twilight of free government."

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch continued to campaign for a no-

 

convoy limitation and the Los Angeles 21225 complained about
the Roosevelt habit of "keeping the public in the dark" and
named that trait as one of the objections to giving him
increased powers. In the world of the columnists Mark Sullivan
managed to produce still another new argument against the

bill - socialism. Before the debate opened he eXplained it
in this way:

That in Britain a small number of leaders of
the British Labor Party entertain the expectation
that Britain is to be made a country with a socialist
economy. In some cases the eXpectation may be more
than an expectation; it may be a planned intention.

That in the United States, a small number of
persons associated with the leadership of the New
Deal have a corresponding expectation or intention
about this country.

That between the two groups there is understanding.

 

8Emporia Weekly Gazette, February 13, l9hl; Atlanta
Constitution, February 1h, 1;: 17, 18, lghl; Cleveland
Plain Dealer, February 1h, 16, 17, 18, lghl; New York Times,
February 1a, 17, igil.

 

 

 

157

That the idea is to bring about a program of
socialist economy, similar in form, in the two
countries. That the lend-lease bill, if
enacted, as well as the relations generally
between the two countri 3 would be used to
facilitate the process.

With the advent of the opponents' first chance at
official debate on the measure, the Minority Report of the
Foreign Relations Committee was released. This report
attacked the hearings themselves, labeling Reinhold Niebuhr
as "one immaterial witness," and Wendell Willkie as "a one-
man circus intended to influence our citizens." The bill
itself was characterized as "a pure grant of power to the
President . . .” But Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri saved
many Senators the trouble of reading the report When he
discussed the bill in detail in his opening speech for the
opposition. In brief he denounced and opposed the bill for
seven reasons. The number 1776 he explained was a desecration.
Secondly, the title was misleading because the bill was really
designed to denude the defense of the United States. In
rapid order he also mentioned that the bill allowed the
President to procure goods as he saw fit, gave him autocratic
powers over defense, and was an abdication by Congress. He
also claimed the bill was a violation of obligations with

other American states, and he denounced it as staking the

safety of the country on an English victory and so bringing

 

9Chicago Daily Tribune, February 17, 18, 1941; Los
Angeles Times, February 16:19h1; St. Louis Post-Dispatch,

February 1K, 19hl; Washington Post, February 15, 1§hl.

 

158
it to the "very brink of war."10
Before a crowd that was so large that Capitol police
took special precautions, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of
Michigan, the most statesmanlike of all the isolationists,
followed him on the floor. Outside the chamber the visitors
were marshalled on the second floor of the capitol in a line
extending from.the Senate to the old Supreme Court room.
Only a single staircase was used to permit them up to the
gallery level and that was open only when seats were assured.
Inside, Vandenberg was calling the bill "a potential and
needless threat to the peace and security of the United States,"
and asserting that through it the President would control
the world's war strategy. But Vandenberg, recalling changes
in neutrality, also said:
I repeat that I moved forward in step with the
new program - as I shall move with this When the
issue is decided by democratic process. I do not 11
believe in domestic divisions when we face the world.
Never again were the opponents of the bill to reach
such a level, as Vandenberg was immediately followed by
Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, for the first of his four
speeches against the bill. Nye, compared to the seven
objections voiced by Clark, managed to marshall a full
seventeen counts against the bill. First, he charged the

bill gave the President power to make indiscriminate military

alliances. Then he launched into the list of give aways,

 

loCong. Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., 1097—1101 (February
18, 191.11); New York Times, February 19, 1941.

 

11Cong. Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., 1101-1108 (February
18, 19hl); New York Times, February 19, 19ml.

 

159

naming the navy, the army's equipment, the air force, and
military secrets as well as strategic plans. He further
objected to the bill because it would open the harbors of the
United States to belligerent warships, give the President
power to seize foreign vessels and also to order convoys.

It would, he charged, deprive labor of protection, allow the
President to fix the terms for all give aways, take whatever
he desired in return, and to assume the costs of a foreign
government's war. He further pointed out that under the bill
the United States might be saddled with the total Cost of the
war, or that the President might buy the British navy.
Finally he characterized the notwithstanding clause as "anti-
democratic" and "anti-American" and warned that the bill would
allow the President to govern by proclamation.

When Nye concluded the opponents' first day on the
floor even some of the less enthusiastic newspapers were
found in the proponents camp. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch
dissented from Senator Clark's idea that the bill had to be
defeated in toto rather than amended. The Los Angeles Timgg
immediately discovered that "Delay is probably the most
dangerous of all policies, and it is only delay that is being
accomplished by this debate." Meanwhile the New York EEELE:
a paper not to be included in the unenthusiastic category,
decided there was only one choice. "There are no shadings in
this issue," it wrote. "One is either for Hitler with his

whole heart or against him with his whole heart. Can any

 

12Cong. Record, 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 1109-1121 (February
18 , 193%]. ) o

 

160

true American hesitate in the decision?" For the administration
there was no hesitation, and in fact Jesse Jones almost made
it appear too eager. While President Roosevelt was appointing
W. Averell Harriman to a post as special defense liaison
officer in London, Jones was appearing before the House
Currency and Baking Committee and telling it that the United
States was "in the war, or at least nearly in the war” and
is "preparing for it." The remarks were stricken from the
record, but the damage was done.13

Then, on the third day of the debate one of its most
dramatic moments occurred. After Tom Connally of Texas had
led off for the proponents, Josiah Bailey of North Carolina
took the floor. Josiah Bailey had opposed the administration
and the New Deal. He had been a strong opponent of
Congressional delegations of power. He had opposed American
involvement and supported strong neutrality laws. Now he
favored lend-lease. The other Senators drew their chairs
into a close circle around him as he stated that he was
unwilling to take a chance on the fall of Britain. "I am
unwilling to refuse credit to Great Britain. I am unwilling
to refuse to put weapons in her hands."

But he was reminded by the relentless Senator Wheeler
of a speech he had.made on October 10, 1939, when he said,
in part, if the United States should get into the war "I

should think we were the greatest pack of fools history has

 

13New York Times, February 19, lghl; Los Angeles Times,
February 19, lghl; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 19, 19K1.

161

ever recorded." Now he replied to Wheeler in measured reason:

I am glad my friend asked me that question.

My mind has changed about this situation and against
all the wishful thinking of which I was capable. It
has utterly changed, and the gravest facts have
wrought that change. When the war first broke out I
hoped and prayed to God that it would not be our war.
When.the war first broke out I was devoted to the
Neutrality Act. I know now that I am advocating its
repeal in part. I am now advocating intervention now;
and I wish to say to the distinguished Senator, as
Paul said in his famous trial:

'I would to God that not only thou, but also all
that hear me this day, were both almost and altogether
such as I am, except these bonds.‘

mr. Wheeler. Mr. President, if I understand the
Senator correctly, he actually is advocating that we
go to war?

Mr. Bailey. I am not advocating that we go to
war; I am advocating intervention. But do not
misunderstand me, I am advocating intervention with
all its implications. I am not hedging. All my
life I hayfi looked a thing in the face and argued it
as it is.

Later that day the administration made an unsuccessful
attempt to begin amending the bill, but after the Opponents
objected all amendment attempts were abandoned until the
close of regular debate. On the following day "Roarin' Bob”
Reynolds, Bailey's colleague from North Carolina, led off
the debate with a speech against the bill, claiming that it
signified the dependence of the United States on the British
Empire, and saying, "I believe that we should look after
America first." His two and a half hour effort was followed
by a speech by Homer Bone. When it was clear that Bone's
speech was the last to be made that day, Senator Barkley let

it be known that he was not pleased with the dilatory procedure

 

- luCong. Record, 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 1152-116k (February
19, l9kl); Time, March 3, l9kl, p. 16; New York Times,
February 20, lgki.

 

162

of the opponents. After some discussion Senator Taft
announced a tentative schedule of speakers against the bill.15
On Friday, February 21, the opposition was able to
attract almost as much attention to one of its speakers as
Josiah Bailey had attracted for the administration two days
before. William Bulow of South Dakota, a plain-spoken man
who seldom addressed the Senate took the floor. He spoke
in a soft, conversational tone and again the Senators drew
their chairs around him so as not to miss any of his words.
He began:
Let me preface my remarks with the statement
that I have no illusions that anything which I
might say would in any way affect the final action
on the pending bill. The only reason I beg the
indulgence of Senators at all is that I want the
permanent record of our labors here to show to
future generations the battle that some of us
made to keep the United States out of another
Eurdpean War. 0
As he developed his thesis he asked for England's
war aims, and compared the trading of ships to trading mules

"in

in South Dakota, and concluded therefrom.that he was not
favor, and I believe that most of my people are not in favor,
of giving a blank check to the President not only to finance
a war in and for this country, but also to finance wars in

and for other countries."17

15Con . Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., 1167-1220
(February I9, 25, I9HI); Time, March 3, l9hl, p. 16.

16New York Times, February 22, l9h1; Cong. Record,
77 Cong., 1 Sess., 1251-1252 (February 21, 19k1).

 

l7Cong. Record, 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 1252-1259
(February 21, 19h17.

163

While these debates were taking place on the floor of
the Senate, Senators Wheeler and Nye traveled to New York to
address a rally of 3,500 persons on February 20. The rally,
held at the Mecca Temple, was called by the America First
Committee and the Keep America Out of War Congress. The
Senators asserted that the bill could still be defeated. On
the same day General George C. Marshall, the Army Chief of P
Staff, told the Senate Military Affairs Committee that the bill
would speed up aid to England by coordinating production for

Britain and the United States.18

 

Washington's birthday witnessed the conclusion of the
first week of debate in the Senate without any end clearly
in sight. No amendment to the bill had even been acted upon.
That day also witnessed three major opposition speeches. The
first was by Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada, who was known
to the press as ”Old Bleeding Heart” and who made one of the
most emotionally inspired addresses of the debate, saying his
country was about to reach the end of its rosary. He was
followed on the floor by Senator Arthur Caeper of Kansas,
and finally by Robert A. Taft of Ohio who entered a loan
substitute for lend-lease and treated the topic in generally
matter-of-fact economic terms. He did, however, come up with
the only analogy which even came close to equaling that of
Roosevelt's "length of garden hose." Said Taft:

There is some merit in taking a promise to repay

in kind instead of in money, and I have provided for
such considerations in my substitute; but lending

 

18New York Times, February 21, l9hl.

l 61;.

war.equipment is much like lending chewing ggm.
We certainly do not want the same gum back. /

Then with the close of the debate Senator Barkley
announced his intention to have the Senate meet an hour early
when debate was resumed the next week. Senator Wheeler and
then Senator Clark attacked this move, calling it "pressure
tactics" and in veiled and not—so-veiled terms threatened to
filibuster. Wheeler, who expressed his attitude first, told
Barkley:

But if Members of the Senate are to be forced

and driven into making speeches at times when they
cannot be entirely prepared, I say to the Senator

in all sincerity that we shall be forced to resort
to making speeches which peghaps may not be entirely
to the merits of the bill.2

When Barkley showed signs of persisting Bennett Clark
was even more insistant than Wheeler. He said:

I think I may say, in all fairness, that, while

no opponent of the pending bill, so far as I know,

has ever suggested or desired to be put in the

attitude of a filibuster before the American people,
nothing will be gained by meeting at 11 o'clock,
because, if necessary, the reading of the Journal

in full will occupy the time between 11 and 12 o'clock.

Meanwhile Wheeler was also replying to a charge
leveled by Dr. Frank Kingdon and Herbert Bayard Swope that
the New York rally addressed by he and Senator Nye two days

before was "un-American." Wheeler called it "a deliberate lie."

But lie or not Wheeler and his colleagues seemed to be facing

 

lgCong. Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., 1267-1285 (February
22, 19k1); Time, March 3, 19hl, p. 16.

 

20New York Times, February 23, l9hl;_Cong. Record, 77
Cong., l Sess., 128§-1287 (February 22, l9kl).

21Cong. Record, 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 1286 (February 22, l9hl)

 

F‘m

 

rm ‘-0. u

165

sure defeat for their cause as a poll of the Senate indicated

52 votes certain for the administration.22

II. Not @uite A Filibuster

When the Senate met again on Monday, February 2a, it
was at the regular time, and when Senators Clark of Idaho,
La Follette of Wisconsin, and John Danaher of Connecticut
had provided the day's oratory, Barkley announced that there
would be no early meetings of the body. On Tuesday, February
25, Senators Shipstead, Murray, Barbour, and Aiken held the

floor until Gerald P. Nye took over, and in one of the nearest

 

!T”"'

approaches to a filibuster kept the floor until adjournment
while reading long passages from a British book, Propaganda

In The Next War, ostensibly to indicate that the United States

 

was being taken in by Britain. Meanwhile the administration
indicated an expectation to begin amendment of the bill by
Wednesday, and Senator Wheeler announced that if the bill
passed he would lead opposition Senators in stumping the
country to prevent an American entry into the war. All during
this period Colonel McCormack's Chicago Tribune had continued
a series of blistering daily attacks, while other papers
joined in from time to time. The Akron Beacon Journal praised
Senator Bulow's speech against the bill, and continued to
campaign against anything tending toward war. On the opposite

side the Cleveland Plain Dealer praised Senator Bailey of

 

Iorth Carolina, and attacked Senator Taft, while the Atlanta

 

22New York Times, February 23, l9k1.

Constitution centered its comments on the dictatorship

 

arguments.23

But despite administration intentions to begin
amendment and the New York Tiggg opinion that the Senate was
nearing a vote there was little real indication that this

was the case. Nevertheless, there was no particular resentment

against the slow movement of the bill, largely because as the fin
Times eXplained: "If the debate in the Senate on the lease- L

lend bill has seemed at times to move slowly, let us remember

how important it is, from the standpoint of national unity,

 

imit'. . _ -....'. J.‘
!.
‘

for the whole countrv to feel certain that the opponents of
this measure have had their full day in court, that every
argument which can possibly be made against the bill has
received a fair hearing, and that no attempt has been made
to shut off debate upon a vital issue."ELL
It had become known, in addition, that Allen Ellender
of Louisiana expected to introduce an amendment to prohibit
the sending of troops beyond the limits of the Western
Hemisphere. After a meeting between Roosevelt and the
administration leaders in the Senate, it was decided that the
administration would stand firm against any amendments of

that nature. On the following day the isolationists held a

meeting at which they agreed not to filibuster, and to be

 

23New York Times, February 2h, 27, l9hl; Cong. Record,
77 Cong., 1 Sess., l29H-l370 (February 2E, 25, l9hl); Chicago
Daily Tribune, February 20, 21, 22, 23, 2h, 25, l9hl; Akron
Beacon Journal, February 2h, 25, l9hl; Cleveland Plain Dealer,
February 2h, 26, l9k1; Atlanta Constitution, February 26, 19Hl.

 

 

21(‘New York Times, February 27, l9hl.

167

ready to begin amending the bill by the next Monday. But
during this time the debate was proceeding on its leisurely
way with the opponents holding the floor for the bulk of the
time.

Then, on the last day of February, as Bulgaria was
about to become the seventh signatory of the Three-Power Pact
and the way was cleared for the movement of German troops to
the Greek border, Senator Wheeler rose in the Senate to make
his address against the bill. He compared it to the German

enabling act of 1933 and raised again the question of who

.31“ -I.IZ ‘A'IF

 

 

authored the bill, while also attacking the Committee to

if"

Defend America by Aiding the Allies. Unable to complete his
speech in one day, he continued on the floor on Saturday,
March 1, and as he spoke the German Army and Air Force was
beginning an occupation of Bulgaria's strategic bases.25
On this same Saturday Mrs. Elizabeth Jane Dilling,

already on trial for disorderly conduct for a demonstration
against the bill, led her ”Mothers' Crusade Against Bill 1776"
to the office of Senator Carter Glass of Virginia where they

staged a noisy sit-down strike in the corridor. Hrs. Dilling,

author of The Red Network, called Glass "an overaged destroyer

 

of American youth." After mie was arrested again for this
demonstration Glass issued a statement calling the affair a
"noisy disorder of which any self-respecting fishwife would

be ashamed." He invited the F. B. I. to investigate the group

 

2SCong. Record, 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 1h68-lh9h, 1508-1535,
1583-1609 (February 27, 28, March 1, l9h1); New York Times,
February 26, 27, 28, March 1, 2, l9hl.

 

168

with the tart suggestion that it would be "pertinent to

inquire into whether they are mothers 7 for the sake of the

race I devoutly hope not."20

It was only a short time until the incident reached

the Senate floor, as Scott Lucas of Illinois followed

um

uneeler's'concluding remarks on Saturday with a defense of
the bill. In speaking of what the bill would and would not

do Lucas happened to touch on the right of petition as

guaranteed under the Constitution. Bennett Clark of Missouri
interrupted him to observe:

The right of petition will not continue if the
Senator from Virginia (Mr. Glass) has his way and
has the F. B. I. investigate everyone Who comes to

1

his office and tries to petition him.
Lucas reminded Clark that what Glass did would be
unlikely to affect the Constitution in any manner, and Clark
replied: -

Let me say to the Senator that I have received
many persons in my office who did not like the
course I was pursuing in the Senate. I have
received them all with respect though I have not
been influenced by their exercise of the right of
petition.

Mr. Lucas. But the Senator did not get hold
of Mrs. Dilling. (Laughter)

Mr. Clark of Missouri. The Senator seems to
speak from.bitter experience. (Laughter)

Mr. Lucas. I speak from experience, Mr. President.
I can appreciate what the Senator from Virginia had
to experience when that lady - shall I say - came
along and presented her views.

Clark then r lated the story of John Quincy Adams

receiving a petition calling for his own removal from the

 

26New York Times, ihrch 2, lghl; Time, March 10, l9hl:

p. 1h.

-

 

House of Representatives on the grounds of insanity, but Lucas
closed the exchange by remarking to him:
If the Senator wishes to deal with insanity
petitions, I suggest that he t he the matter up
with Mrs. Dilling. (Laughter)
In some quarters, however, the affair was not a
laughing matter, as the Chicago Tribune, which had previously

defended Mrs. Dilling's activities, attacked Glass for his

quip about the motherhood of her group. But outside of

.Lgl 5. .m-m'i. "
4";

Chicago, Where Mrs. Dilling made her home, other factors were

\‘JH'I‘EL

attracting the attention of the press. More than ever before,

‘\ .i’ ‘

the passage of Bulgaria into the Axis camp underlined the

 

danger to Britain and especially to Greece, and by indirection
to the United States as well. It did so strongly enough that

the Cleveland Plain Dealer reminded its readers that ”Every

 

senator whose actions retard the passage of this bill beyond
a reasonable time, which we believe has now elapsed, becomes
whether he realizes it or not, one of Hitler's helpers."28
With the second week of Senate debate concluded the
administration had consumed 13 hours and 58 minutes. The
opponents, led by Gerald P. Nye who had in two Speeches talked
9 hours and k0 minutes by himself, had consumed 39 hours and
h2 minutes, and the end was not yet. Impatience, however,
was growing, and Senator Barkley finally got the Senate to
begin meeting an hour earlier.

The earlier meeting hour, however, did little to

 

27Cong. Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., 1609-1613 (March 1,

 

1912—1) .

28Chicago Daily Tribune, March 3, lghl; Cleveland
Plain Dealer, March 1, lth.

170

improve debate on the bill and the Senators ground through
the same arguments on Menday and Tuesday, including a thi'd
speech by Senator Nye. Finally, on Wednesday, March 5, the
amendments were taken up.2

The first amendment to be acted upon was one to
strengthen the amendment put into the House version of the
bill by Everett Dirksen. It was quickly agreed to, and so
was another improvement of the time limitation. Senator George
procured the inclusion of a separability clause meaning that

the invalidity of one section of the bill would not affect

 

 

any of the other sections. Another George amendment to set
the value of articles to be transfered was approved as was
the Byrnes amendment, originally offered first, which was a
limitation on the amount which Could be transferred. After
a final committee amendment was approved, Allen Ellender
offered his amendment to prohibit the use of United States
land or naval forces beyond the limits of the Western
Hemisphere. A rather lengthy debate got under way on his
amendment and continued into the session of March 6. Finally,
Senator Joseph O'Mahoney of Wyoming, offered a substitute for
the Ellender amendment.

But in the meantime the administration had.been working '
with Ellender, and got him to accept an administration substitute

that nothing in the bill could be construed to change existing

 

2C)New York Times, March 2, h, lth; Cong. Record,
77 Cong., l Sess., 1613-1655, 1708-1735, 1790-1797 (March 3,
14-! 5’ 1912-1).

111

law about the use of the Army and Navy. Ellender modified
his original amendment by introducing this version on the
floor. O'Mahoney and Bennett Clark both attacked the
administration version as meaningless, and with a Clark
perfecting amendment being offered to the O'Mahoney substitute
the Senate adjourned in somewhat of a parliamentary tangle.3O
The tangle quickly resolved itself on March 7, and
the O'Mahoney substitute was defeated on a roll call vote of

28 to 63. Then a long series of other substitutes to the

Ellender amendment were dealt with in fairly short order. The

 

first of these, offered by Hiram Johnson of California,
received more consideration than many of the others, but was
defeated on another roll call by 35 to 56. In rapid
succession a Taft substitute was defeated 38 to 51, a George
Norris substitute by 39 to 52, and a Francis Maloney effort
by 30 to 60. Then the Ellender amendment itself was brought
to a vote and approved 65 to 2k.

Senator Reynolds of North Carolina then offered an
amendment to specifically prohibit any aid to Russia. This
was defeated 35 to 56. A short time later he offered another
amendment to make certain that no Communists, Nazis, or
Fascists were employed under the terms of the bill. This was
also defeated by 29 to 53. Finally, Reynolds preposed a section
31

to deport Harry Bridges, and had it defeated on a voice vote.

 

30C0ng. Record, 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 1797-1825, 1866-1901
(March 5, 6, l9hl): Time, March 17, l9hl, p. 20; New York
Times, March 5, 6, 7, l9h1.

31

 

Cong. Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., l9h8-l991 (March 7,

 

1941).

“I !'l' ' .~'.- " "

172

The opponents moved to within nine votes of the
administration when Arthur Vandenberg proposed the amendment
to require a specific statement from the Army or Navy that
the material transferred was not vital to American defense,
which had been voted down 13 to 10 in the committee
consideration of the bill. Their 36 to a; defeat, however,
was due largely to a decrease in administration voters rather r!
than to any gain in their own cause, and the administration
had little difficulty in defeating the rest of the amendments

proposed that day.

 

When the Senate opened the third Saturday of its :3
consideration on March 8, the final vote was in sight. An
amendment offered by David Walsh of Massachusetts was pending
and after it had been defeated Senator Barkley offered and
had approved a face-saving amendment making sure that
agricultural products were included under the terms of the
act. Another amendment offered by James D vis of Pennsylvania
and modified at the suggestion of Senator George was approved.
It would assure that private companies would be permitted to
test, inspect, and repair as provided by the bill.

Then another series of amendments, culminating in
Senator Taft's $2 billion loan substitute were offered and
rejected. After Taft's attempt had been defeated 29 to 62,
Gerald P. Nye took ‘he floor for the fourth time. In the
face of cries of "Vote! Votei" from his Senatorial colleagues,
his remarks were rather brief and he contended himself with

inserting lengthy printed materials into the record.

173

As soon as Nye yielded the floor Senator George
called for the yeas and nays on the measure itself. Charles
McHary of Oregon, the minority leader, requested a quorum
call and after the Senators were in the chamber Bennett Clark
offered still another amendment touching on the laws to be
affected by the notwithstanding clause. In an effort to save
trouble George asked unanimous consent for the consideration
of Clark's amendment. The Senate defeated Clark's attempt
and then the roll was taken. Lend-lease passed 60 to 31.32

The vote itself was along the same type of partisan
division which had marked the House vote. The Democrats
provided enough votes to pass the measure as h9 voted in favor
of it. They were joined by 10 Republicans and George Norris
of Nebraska who was officially an Independent. In opposition
there were 13 Democrats, 17 Republicans, and Robert LaFollette,
Jr. of Wisconsin who was officially a Progressive. A total
of 21 states cast unanimous ballots in favor of the bill. The
Senators from another 21 states split, and only six states
were unanimously opposed to the bill. The St. Louis 22st-
Disoatch, leaving Indiana out of its calculations, observed
that this division meant 26 states reflected doubt about the
bill or openly opposed it. It could as easily have meant
that Q2 states reflected a fair degree of approval for the
bill.

The findings of Ralph Smuckler in his study on

isolation do not apply nearly so well to the Senate vote as

 

321bid., 77 Cong., l Sess., 1991-2003, 203t-2097
(March 7, 3; lghl).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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they did to the House. The six most isolationist states in
his study of the Senate were North Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas,
Ohio, Idaho, and Nevada. Only North Dakota, Idaho, and Kansas
were to be found among the six states voting unanimously
against the bill. Wisconsin, Indiana, and Colorado were the
other three states which did so. Of these, two are listed
among the first twelve isolationist states by Smuckler. Only
Wisconsin is missing. Maine, however, which was eleventh in
the Smuckler study cast both of its Senate votes in favor of
the bill.33

From some of the bill's opponents a measure of
agreement was later forthcoming. When the Senate met once
more on Monday, March 10, Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin
called for unity, saying of lend-lease that ”we must all
accept it as the law of the land." And despite the Observations
which he had recorded in his diary on the night of March 8
when.the bill passed, Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan also
had some words for unity. Vandenberg doubted that lend-lease
was simply to aid England and privately recorded that if
America cracked up the time of the lend-lease vote could be
pointed to as the time When it began. "I had the feeling,"
he wrote, "as the result of the ballot was announced that I

was witnessing the suicide of the Republic." On that Monday

following passage of the bill, he declared that the debate

 

33Cong. Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., 2097 (March 8, l9hl);
New York Times, March 9, l9hl; St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
March 11, 'l'9lgl' '; Ralph H. Smuckler, "The Region of Isolationism",

The American Political Science Review, June, 1953, p. 392.

175

had been, not on aid to England, but on the means of aid,
and that 90 out of 95 Senate members had been.united in
really voting for aid.32L
The newspapers, during the final week of the debate,
by and large followed the courses they had long since mapped
for themselves. Early in the week there was wide spread
complaint about a filibuster, but when the bill finally

passed most of the papers managed to give it at least

grudging approval, and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch was able

 

to state: "From beginning to end, democratic usages were
strictly observed." A few papers had continued their out-

right opposition with the Akron Beacon Journal praising the

 

delay early in the week, and the Chicago Tribune, on the day
of passage, accusing the authors of the bill of a "malignant
genius for slippery language." Other factors than papers
noted a slightly different trend, as the Gallup poll for

Nhrch 8 showed a 7 to l perc ntage margin gain for the
opponents of the bill. Nevertheless, the proponents still
polled 56 per cent and the opponents only 27 per cent. This
gave a slight character of unreality to The Christian Century
editorial prepared during the last week of debate, and which
appeared the day following final action on the bill. Said the

Century:

If the popular reaction which began to register
in Washington last week continues much longer, and
particularly if it shows signs of increasing in

 

31+New York Times, March 11, l9hl; The Private Papers
of Senator Vandenberg, ed. Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. TBoston,

1952), PP. 9-10-

 

 

176

strength, it may produce an outcome far different
than could have been prophesied a week ago.3

 

35Washington Post, Earth 3, h, S, 8, l9hl; Cleveland
Plain Dealer, March 3, E, 9, l9hl; Atlanta Constitution,
March 5, 19El; St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 10, lghl; Akron
Beacon Journal, March a, lghl; Chicago Daily Tribune, March 8,
19h1; New Ybrk Times, march S, 9, 15, l9hl; Los An,eles The 3,
March 9, l9hl; The Christian Century, march 12, 1941, p. 3h7.

 

 

 

 

 

 

CHArTER VIII
TOWARD RTSPONSIBILITY

Senate passage of lend-lease, however, did not
completely end consideration of the message. Due to the
amendments made there was considerable difference between
the House and Senate versions of the bill. The course of
action to be followed by the administration was tentatively
settled on Sunday, the day after Senate approval, when
Sol Bloom and Sam Rayburn conferred, and decided to seek
approval of the Senate version rather than appoint a
compromise committee. This course of action was strengthened
on Monday, March 10, when Roosevelt indicated to the
Congressional leaders that he had no objections to the Senate
version. By unanimous consent the House voted to limit debate
on the Senate amendments to two hours.

The actual debate did not even take that long when
Bloom presented a resolution to adopt the Senate amendments.
Bloom and McCormack spoke briefly for the resolution, and
then Hamilton Fish explained that the vote to be taken was
not actually on.the lend-lease bill, but only on the Senate
amendments, indicating that a vote in favor of Bloom's
resolution could not be interpreted as a vote in favor of

the bill. The other remarks were quickly concluded and the

177

178

House approved the resolution by 317 to 71. Now only the
President's signature was required to make lend-lease law.
That signature was not long delayed as President
Roosevelt signed the bill at 3:50 p.m. on.Harch 11. A few
minutes later he approved a list of war materials to be
immediately transferred to Great Britain and Greece.
Significantly enough the British Admirality announced the
same day that its shipping losses for the week ended March 2
were the third highest for any week of the war. And, at the
same time, a group of 15 Senators met in the office of
Senator Hiram Johnson of California and agreed to undertake
a Speak king campaign to "keep the country out of a foreign war."2
Their attitude, however, got scant support from the
public in the final analysis. Only the Chicago Tribune
which adopted the platform "Save Our Republic" on March 12,

remained in strong opposition. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch

 

noted that attention.should be paid to the Senators Who were
going to speak, but the common opinion was at least somewhat
similar to that expressed by the New YOPK.EEEEE which
editorialized:

March 11, l9hl, ought to be remembered in our
history as the day when the United States ended
the great retreat which began with the Senate
rejection of the Treaty of Versailles and the
League of Nations. Our effort to find security
in isolation has failed. By the final passage
of the lease-lend bill we confess its failure.3

 

1New York Times, March 9, 10, ll, l9hl; Congressional
Record, 77 Cong., l Sess” 2100- 2178 (Pfiarch 11,191).

 

2New York Times, March 12, 19hl.

BCqLcan‘o Daily Tribune, March 12, 191:,1 St. Louis Post-
Dispatgh', Zarch 12, 19M ; New York Timas, ilarch 12,19L1.

 

 

179

The Los Angeles 22222 in substantial agreement with
this sentiment hailed the bill in the terms used by
Winston Churchill in Britain, while the Washington 33st,
saluting Willkie's endorsement of the bill, used his words
that: "We must lay the moral, intellectual and spiritual
foundations for the kind of world we want our children to
inherit."LL

The New York Zigg§_attitude was even more closely
reflected in some of the neWSpaper columns. Ernest Lindley,
particularly, struck the note of the Versailles Treaty, but
did observe that the lend-lease passage did not mean a return
to the path outlined by Wilson. "It may mean, instead," he
wrote, "an era in which the United States determines the main
pattern of the world by holding the high cards of naval and
air power." Walter Lippmann also reflected that the end of
isolation had finally arrived, and later, that any longer
delay on the decision of the United States would have made the
risks "immensely greater." William Allen White, writing to
the Emporia Gazette from Tuscon, Arizona, could not help
making a parting observation on the Republicans. "The
Republican record in Congress is about the record," he wrote,
"that Hitler would.have made if he had been a Republican leader."5

On the whole the consiieration of the bill presented

almost the kind of division reflected in the final opinions

 

b

rLos Angeles Times, March 13, 19hl; Hashington Post,
March 12, igui.

5Washinrtton Post, February 27, March 12, 13, lth;
Emporia Weekly Gazette, March 20, lghl.

180

from the public media. The opponents of the bill, as
revealed in the hearings and debates, and giving all of

them credit for sincerity, fell generally into two groups.
These could be roughly broken down into those who were

afraid that the bill would lead to war, and.those who were
afraid of a potential dictatorship in.the United States.
These views, however, were also liberally reinforced by the
idea that the United States itself should remain aloof from
the world. These attitudes meant that the opponents did not
by any means confine their discussions of the bill to the
bill itself, or to What it was designed to do, but attributed
to the administration all sorts of terror stories and false
crises supposedly designed to help pass the bill. Seemingly,
they never realized that very real crises were facing Britain
and Greece.

Instead, the opponents launched their attack on
dictatorship on the strength of charges which they were never
able to closely define in any terms except those of helping
foreign nations. Such help, of course, was diametrically
opposed to an isolationist view-point, even When in itself it
would not endanger the United States. The real defect of the
debates, and of the hearings as well, was that the opponents
were never able to bring themselves to believe the
administration. Roosevelt, of course, had made a reputation
for hiding his designs, but in this case they were completely
clear. The opponents, while perhaps they can not be

completely at fault for looking deeper than.the administration

18].

statements, however cannot be praised either for over-looking
and disregarding clear statements on the authorship of the
bill, or of being victims of their own wishful thinking in
regard to conveying power or the nature of the bill.

But despite the fact that their isolationist attitude
toward world affairs, and particularly toward American history
in such details as the Monroe Doctrine, gave the opponents

~

an appearance of being generally more poorly informed and
educated, they did make some observations which later turned
out to be amazing y correct. Charles Board, in his testimony
before the Senate committee, provided one of the clearest
examples of this when he stated that the bill would mean the
extension of United States responsibility all over the world.
Others dealt with the same idea in varying details, and on the
other side of the coin men like Reinhold Niebuhr, also in

the Senate hearings, felt that the United States had an
obligation and a duty to the world, both in terms of its
heritage and its power. If anything does so, this in itself,
indicates the essentially moral division that took place on
the bill. Lend-lease recognized the responsibility of the
United States and placed the country actively in world affairs.
The opponents still longed for the time before the United
States had become, by virtue of its population and resources,
a world power. They still advocated a passive policy toward
the world, failing to realize that power itself carried
responsibility.

This failure, in the end, had a deleterious effect on

the debate, because the opponents were not willing to directly
oppose aid to Britain, and so unintentionally beclouded the
issue. Their reluctance also notably delayed the passage of
the bill. Men like Senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota,
who alone spent twelve hours discussing the bill, and the
other opposition Senators in general, who consumed an
additional 32 hours, should share a degree of responsibility
for the conditions which their delay may have produced. It
is, of course, impossible to determine whether or not an
earlier r.cognition of the responsibilities of the United States,
and an earlier passage of the bill would have changed some
aspects of the war. It is, however, clear that when the bill
was introduced the British and Greeks were making strong
progress toward the elimination of Italy from the war. While
the debate was going on the Balkans fell to Hitler and through
them he was able to place increasing pressure upon the Greeks
and upon the British in Africa. On April 6, less than a month
after lend-lease became law, German units crossed the Bulgarian
border and invaded Greece. In less than a month Greece was
eliminated despite a valiant defense. It can never be clear
whether a better supply of equipment, planes, and motorized
units would have made a successful defense possible. We do,
however, have the testimony of Cordell Hull that lend-lease
was too late to help Greece. Wrote Hull in his Memoirs:
We made war supplies and medicines available
for shipment to Greece and declared Greece

eligible for Lend-Lease aid as soon as enabling
legislation should be passed. The Germans,

183

however, coming to the help of the humiliated
Italians, overran Greece before our Lend-Lease
help could get there.0
Assuming that Greece could have been saved, it is
not out of line to point out that a continuous Greek front
would have given the allies a second front in Eastern.Europe,
and so might have kept Hitler from attacking Russia. Although
such a course of action would have placed a larger burden
upon Great Britain and the United States, it might possibly
also have stopped the spread of Communism into Albania,
Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, if not all of Eastern Europe.
But in the press of momentous world events the vision
of men into the future is necessarily limited, and the men
in Congress responsible in part for the safety of the United
States in lghl had a responsibility to look carefully at the
bill which they were asked to approve. Those who favored an
active role for the United States found the bill acceptable
as a means by which.the country could move toward its proper
world position, aid the allies, and at the same time strengthen
itself against the possibility of a future attack. Those who
favored a passive role did not see this, and looked at the
bill more closely.
One of the first things they looked at was the all
important Section 3 (a), part 2, which stated that the
President may "sell, transfer, exchange, lease, lend, or

otherwise dispose of, to any such government any defense

 

6Tom Connally, Ly'Name Is Tom Connally (New York, lQSh),
p. 2%; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York,
1914.8), I, 8860

lab,

article." Legally there was little difference between the
terms, ”sell, transfer, exchange, lease", and ”lend,” and

"or

the initial attack of the opposition centered upon
otherwise dispose of." It was ’transfer", however, which
held the most danger for the opponents of the bill, for in the
entire bill it was the only word which could be interpreted
to include conveying. Technically "transfer" included
"convey" and "convey" could mean both sending American
shipping into war zones and conveying foreign shipping in
such zones with American warships. Strangely enough no
question was raised about this term until February 10 when
Senator Vandenberg questioned Merwin K. Hart, a New York
businessman, on its meaning at the Senate hearings.
Subsequently it was raised in the Senate when the bill was
being amended, and later the bill was amended to remove this
danger.7

The question as to whether the bill itself allowed
or authorized convoys was a very live one, and more true
debate, and more strong attempts at amendment centered on
that than on anything else. In retrospect it would seem plain
that the President, as Commander-in-Chief had it clearly within
his power to order conveying by American naval vessels at any
time. This was not clear, however, to the opponents who were

at least partly guilty of wishful thinking in believing they

 

7United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign
Relations, Hearings on S. 215, A Bill Further To Promote The
Defense of The United States, And For Other Euiposes, 77 Cong.
l Sess., II, 768; Cong, Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., 1891
(March 6, 1914.1) .

 

185

could prohibit such action by keeping an endorsement of it out
of the lend-lease bill. Charles A. Beard was still guilty of
a degree of the same kind of thinking when he wrote
President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War seven years
later. Beard considered the Ellender amendment along with
the other limitations a specific declaration that "conferred
on the President no power whatever to use the armed forces
for combatant purposes, that in executing the law he could
not order the armed forces to commit acts of war." He
concluded, "Indeed, it is doubtful whether Congress would
have passed the bill if provisions against conveying and
committing 'combatant', or fighting, acts had not been
written clearly in the bill." In actuality no such provisions
were written into the bill for the Ellender amendment was
specious, declaring in fact that all the laws concerning the
use of the Army and Navy were the same as they were before
except for the new provisions written into lend-lease.8
It would be grossly unfair to leave the impression,
however, that the Ellender amendment was accepted as genuine
by the Senators on the floor when it was approved. After
Ellender had introduced the administration modification on
March 6, it was attacked as meaningless by both Senator Joseph

O'Mahoney and Senator Bennett Champ Clark. They were not

deceived.9

8Charles A. Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming
of the war l9hl: A Study in Appearances and Realities (New
Haven, 19h8), pp. 32-33.

9Cong. Record, 77 Cong., l Sess., 188h-1885 (MacCh 6,

 

191a) .

186

The effect of the lend-lease bill on the American
Neutrality Act and on international law in general was also
raised by the opponents. It was generally admitted that some
sections of the Neutrality Act would be suspended, and this
was accepted by those who voted for the bill. The
international law issue was never so clear. Charles Beard,
this time more accurately reflecting the sentiment of the
opponents, wrote that munitions and materials could not be
supplied to a belligerent without committing an act of war,
and that lend-lease, therefore, authorized an act of war. The
opinion of Quincy Wright, writing in The American Journal of

International Law in 19h1, is probably more sound. According

 

to Wright the bill did not add to or subtract from.the powers
of the President, and while it drew away from neutrality,
it was just an authorization of "abandonment of impartiality
in the interest of American defense," and was a move "toward
responsibility for world order." The proponents, of course,
would have been willing to accept Wright's analysis of the
bill.10

While isolationist sentiment did show some increase
during the summer of 1941, no big out-cry or sentiment against
lend-lease developed, and the proponents seemed to be on sound
ground. Initially $7 billion was appropriated under the act,

and almost all of that amount had been expended by the time

President Roosevelt made his second report to Congress in

 

lOBeard, President Roosevelt, pp. 15-16; Quincy Wright,
"The Lend-Lease Bill and International Law," The American
Journal of International Law, April, 19h1, pp. 305, 313.

187

September 19hl. By the time the first expiration of the law
rolled around in March 19k3, the United States itself was at
war, and that probably helped to account for the easy
extension of the law by h07 to 6 in the House and 82 to O in
the Senate. A11 in all, the lend-lease policy seemed to be

a success. It paved the way for future policies like the
Marshall Plan and Point Four, and in lth it was particularly
a success in that it indicated for the people of the United
States a step toward responsibility in.the world, and an

international coming of age for America.11

 

llcong, Record, 77 Cong., 1 Sess., 7k02 (September
15, lghl), 78 Cong., l Sess., 1815, 1853 (March 10, 11, 1943).

 

APPENDIX

Following is the lend-lease bill as passed by the
Senate on March 8, lth, and approved by the House of
Representatives on March 11, lghl. The House amendments
are incorporated into the body of the bill. The Senate

amendments appear in capital letters.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That
this Act may be cited as "An Act to Promote the Defense of
the United States."
SEC. 2. As used in this Act -
(a) The term "defense article" means -
(1) Any weapon, munition, aircraft, vessel, or boat;
(2) Any machinery, facility, tool, material, or
supply necessary for the manufacture, production, processing,
repair, servicing, or operation of any article described in
this subsection;
(3) Any component material or part of or equipment
for any article described in this subsection;
(it) Any AGRICULTURAL, n: USTRIAL OR other commodity
or article for defense.
Such term "defense article" includes any article

described in this subsection: Manufactured or procured

188

189

pursuant to section 3, or to which the United States or any
foreign government has or hereafter acquires title, possession,
or control.

(b) The term "defense information" means any plan,
specification, design prototype, or information pertaining
to any defense article.

SEC. 3. (a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any
other law, the President may, from time to time, when he deems
it in the interest of national defense, authorize the
Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the head of
any other department or agency of the Government -

(1) To manufacture in arsenals, factories, and
shipyards under their jurisdiction, or otherwise procure,

TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH FUNDS ARE MADE AVAILABLE THEREFOR OR
CONTRACTS ARE AUTHORIZED FROM TIME TO TIME BY THE CONGRESS,

OR BOTH, any defense article for the government of any country
Whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the
Uhited States.

(2) To sell, transfer TITLE TO, exchange, lease,
lend, or otherwise dispose of, to any such government any
defense article, but no defense article not manufactured or
procured under paragraph (1) shall in any way be disposed of
under this paragraph, except after consultation with the Chief
of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations of the
Navy, or both. The value of defense articles diaposed of in
any way under authority of this paragraph, and procured from

funds heretofore appropriated, shall not exceed $1,300,000,000.

y
1 1

190

THE VALUE OF SUCH DEFENSE ARTICLES SHALL BE DETERMINED BY THE
HEAD OF THE DEPARTHENT OR AGENCY CONCERNED OR SUCH OTHER
DEPARTMENT, AGEICY, OR OFFICER AS SHALL BE DESIGNATED IN THE
MANNER PROVIDED IN THE RULES AND REGULATIONS ISSUED HEREUNDER.
DEfiENSE ARTICLES PROCURED FROM FUNDS HEREAFTER APPROPRIATED TO
ANY DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY OF THE GOVERNMENT, OTHER THAN FROM
FUNDS AUTHORIZED TO BE APPROPRIATED UNDER THIS ACT, SHALL NOT
BE DISPOSED OF IN ANY WAY UNDER AUTHORITY OF THIS PARAGRAPH
EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT HEREAFTER AUTHORIZED BY THE CONGRESS IN
THE ACTS APPROPRIATING SUCH FUNDS OR OTHERWISE.

(3) To test, inspect, prove, repair, outfit,

recondition, or otherwise place in good working order, TO THE

*1

EXTENT TO WHICH FUNDS ARE MADE AVAILABLe THEREFOR, OR CONTRACTS

L

AUTHORIZED FROM TIME TO TIT-SE BY THE CONGRESS, OR BOTH, any
defense article for any such government, OR TO PROCURE ANY OR
ALL SUCH SERVICjS BY PRIVATE CONTRACT.

(h) To communicate to any such government any
defense information, pertaining to any defense article furnished
to such government under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

(5) To release for export any defense article
DISPOSED OR IN ANY'UAY'UNDER THIS SUBSECTION to any such
government.

(b) The terms and conditions upon which any such
foreign government receives any aid authorized under
subsection (a) shall be those which the President deems
satisfactory, and the benefit to the United States may be
payment or repayment in kind or property, or any other direct

or indirect benefit which the President deems satisfactory.

191

(c) AFTER JUNE 30, 1943, OR APTRRTHE PASSAGE OF A
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION BY THE TWO HOUSES BLPORS JUNE 30, 1943,
NHICH DECLARES THAT THE POWERS CONFERRED BY OR PURSUANT TO
SUBSL CTION (a) AR: NO LONGER NSCLSSARY TO PROMOTE THE DR: SIISS
OF THE UNITED STA ES, NEITHER THE PRESIDENT NOR THE I—I EAD OF
ANY DSPARTILNT OR ACS ICY SHALL SIERCISS ANY OF THE POWERS
CONFERRED BY OR PURSUANT TO SUBSECTION (a); EXCEPT THAT UNTIL
JULY 1, IOLO, ANY OF SUCH PONERS MAY BS EXSRCISS D To THE EXT BIT
NJCE SSARY TO CARRY OUT A CONTRACT OR A RLTE~IT NITH SUCH A
FOPPICN COVERNNENT MADE BEFORE JULY 1, 19MB, OR BEFORE THE
PASSAGE OF SUCH CONCURRENT RLSOLUTION, :HJCHSV R IS THE EARLINR.

(d) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize
or to permit th ae authorization of conveying vessels by naval

vessels of the United States.

(6) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to authorize
or to permit the authorization of the entry of any American
vessel into a combat area in violation of section 3 of the
Neutrality Act of 1939.

SEC. A. All contracts or agreements made for the
disposition of any defense article or defense information
pursuant to section 3 shall contain a clause by which the
foreign government undertakes that it will not, without the
consent of the President, transfer title to or possession of
such defense article or defense information by gift, sale,
or otherwise, or permit its use by anyone not ancfficer,
employee, or agent of such foreign government.

SEC. 5. (a) The Secretary of War, the Secretary of

192

the Navy, or the head of any other department or agency of the
Government involved shall, when any such defense article or
defense information is exported, immediately inform the
department or agency designated by the President to administer
section 6 of the Act of July 2, lQhO (Sh Stat. 71A), of the
quantities, character, value, terms of disposition, and
destination of the article and information so exported.

(b) The President from time to time, but not less
frequently than once every ninety days, shall transmit to the
Congress a report of operations under this Act except such
information as he deems incompatible with the public interest
to disclose. Reports provided for under this subsection shall
be transmitted to the Secretary of the Senate or the Clerk of
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, if the Senate
or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, is not
in session. _ ‘

SEC. 6. (a) There is hereby authorized to be appropriated
from.time to time, out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions and accomplish the purposes of this Act.

(b) All money and all property which is converted into
money received under section 3 from any government shall, with
the approval of the Director of the Budget, revert to the
respective appropriation or appropriations out of which funds
were eXpended with respect to the defense article or defense
information for which such consideration is received, and shall
be available for expenditure for the purpose for which such

expended funds were appropriated by law, during the fiscal

year in which such funds are received and the ensuing fiscal

193

year; BUT IN NO EVENT SHALL ANY FUNDS SO RECEIVED BE AVAILABLE
FOR EXPENDITURE 1FTER JUNE 30, 191:6.

SEC. 7. The Secretary of War, the Secretary of the
Navy, and the head of the department or agency shall in all
contracts or agreements for the disposition of any defense
article or defense information fully protect the rights of
all citizens of the United States who have patent rights in
and to any such article or information which is hereby
authorized to be disposed of and the payments collected for
royalties on such patents shall be paid to the owners and
holders of such patents.

EC. 8. The Secretaries of War and of the Navy are
hereby authorized to purchase or otherwise acquire arms,
ammunition, and implements of war produced within the
jurisdiction of any country to which section 3 is applicable,
Whenever the President deems such purchase or acquisition
to be necessary in the interests of the defense of the
United States.

SEC. 9. The President may, from time to time, promulgate
such rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to
carry out any of the provisions of this Act; and he may
exercise any power or authority conferred on him by this Act
through such department, agency, or officer as he shall direct.

EC. 10. NOTHING IN THIS ACT SHALL BE CONSTRUED TO
CHANGE EXISTING LAW RELATING TO TEE USE OF THE LAND AND NAVAL
FORCES OF TUE UNITED STATES, EXCQPT INSOFAR AS SUCH USE RELATES

TO THE YANUFACTURE, PROCUREHENT AND REPAIR OF DEF,HSE ARTICLES,

19A

THE COMIIUN I CATION OF INFOR’I’ATION AND OTHER I‘IOI‘ICOI.-IBATAI‘TT
PURPOSES EN HERATED IN THIS ACT.

SEC. 11. IF ANY PROVISION OF THIS ACT OR THE
APPLICATION OF SUCH PROVISION TO ANY CIRCUKSTANCE SHALJ BE
HELD INVALID, THTn VALIDITY OF THE REHAINOE? OF THE ACT AND
APPLICABILITY OF SUCH PROVISION TO OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES SHALL

NOT BE AFFECTED THEREBY.

Passed the House of Representatives February 3, lghl.
Attest: South Trimble,
Clerk
By H. Newlin Megill
Passed the Senate with amendments Karch 8 (legislative day,
February 13), 19N1.
Attest: Edwin A. Halsey,

Secretary

BIBLIOGRAPHIC NOTE

The principle primary sources for this study have
been the official government records for the period of the
consideration of the lend-lease bill. Most important from
the standpoint of r vealing the view-points of the individual
Congressmen and for a degree of continuity and detail in the

arguments advanced against the bill, and in its defense, is

The Congressional Record, 77 Congress, 1 Session, from January

 

through the pas age of the bill in March, lth. The arguments
in detail, and the best analyses of the bill are to be found
in the hearings before the House and Senate committees. The
House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs,

v o I 0
Rearlnfis on H. R. 1770, A Bill Further To Promote The Defense

 

 

of the United States And For Other Purposes, provides some

 

testimony and material not otherwise available. The Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings on S. 275, A Bill
Further To Promote The Defense of the United States And Fq;

Other Purposes, in three parts, is more valuable for the

 

administration testimony, except for Cordell Hull who appeared
in executive session before that cosmittee. The greater

number of witnesses called by the Senate Committee, and the
addition of Wendell Willkie as an administration witness add
special value to these hearings. A final government publication,

Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy l931-l9hl, compiled

 

195

196

by the Department of State in 19h3 is valuable as the official
View of the period in question.

The second valuable category of primary sources was
the newspapers selected for the study. Inasmuch as public
opinion, and non-governmental activities played a large part
in the enactment of the bill, and in the atmosphere surrounding
its enactment, they are extremely important. The papers used
were selected on a multiple basis. A balance was attempted
between papers in favor of the measure, and those either
directly opposed or at most only lukewarm in their support.
In order to provide some sampling of opinion across the entire
country a geographic balance was also attempted. These criteria
were then necessarily subjected to the stringencies of the
library facilities. Of the papers finally selected those which
were not available locally were borrowed on microfilm or
consulted elseWhere.

Nine newspapers were read through the period January
1, lghl to March 15, lth, with some scattered issues before
and after these dates. The most important of the papers used
was the New York Times (Michigan State University Library)
which was valuable not only for its editorial comment, but
also for the detail which it provided, and as the chief source
of continuity for the story of enactment. Of great aid in
the continuity, especially for the first month of the bill's
consideration, as well as being important for its editorial
comment, was the Cleveland Plain Dealer (Cleveland Public
Library, and Kent State University Library). Due to its

location this paper was available to the author longer than

197

any of the other papers except the New York Timpg. Both of
these papers favored the bill. The Akron Beacon Journal (Kent
State University Library) was selected despite its physical
propinquity to Cleveland, largely because it was the only
major Ohio newspaper which opposed the bill, and with the
exception of the Chicago Daily Tribune was the only available
paper in direct opposition to the bill. The Beacon Journal
was the first paper under the control of John S. Knight, Who
in 1937 took over the Miami, Florida, Herald, and in 19110 the

Detroit Free Press. The Chicago Daily Tribune (Michigan State

 

Library) was the most consistent and vocal of the available
papers to oppose the bill. Located in the heart of the
isolationist sentiment in the United States, it was particularly
useful for its editorial attitude. The Washington §2§£_
(University of Mishigan Library) was selected to represent both
the opinion of the Capital and of the eastern seaboard.
Generally liberal, it was consistently in support of the bill.
The other paper consistent in supporting lend-lease was the
Atlanta Constitution (University of Georgia Library). It was
selected to represent the South which was always at least 70
per cent in favor of the bill, and the Constitution accurately
reflected this. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Library of the
State Historical Society of Wisconsin) was selected for its
more nearly central geographic position. Never able to become
extremely enthusiastic over the bill, it strongly supported

all attempts at amendment. Most of the west itself, was passed
over in order to get a paper from another metropolitan area.

The Los Angeles Times (Los Angeles Public Library) represented

198

not only the West coast, but also a Republican newspaper. To
a large extent the Timgg was alive to the dangers of 19b , but
was on many occasions fatalistic about United States policy,
and as a result never came into a position of support for

the bill, save with amendments. The final paper consulted

was the Emporia Weekly Gazette (Michigan State University

 

Library) which was chiefly valuable for the interventionist
attitude of William Allen White in an area that was largely
isolationist.

Some other current periodicals also were valuable for
the attitudes which they reflected on the issue at the time it
was being debated. The editorials of The Christian Century

and of Commonweal both represented respected journals of

 

opinion which opposed the passage of lend-lease on the grounds
both of war danger and of dictatorship. Vital Speeches was
particularly useful for such addresses as Burton K. Wheeler's
"America's Present Emergency," in the issue of January 15, lth,

’ in the issue

and Marquess of Lothian's "Britain and America,’
of January 1, 19k1. William T. Stone, ”Will Neutrality Keep
U. S. Out of War?" in Foreign Policy Reports, October 1, 1939,
offered a contemporary view on that issue for the chapter on

neutrality legislation. One of the more valuable journals

which supported the lend-lease legislation was The Nation. The

 

editorials of this magazine were useful as was I. F. Stone, "A
Time For Candor," in the issue of January 25, thl. .Tgmg
magazine was also consulted for the period of the bill's
consideration, and was somewhat helpful for continuity on the

bill. It was more important, however, for providing the color

199

surrounding the hearings and debates, and providing thumb
nail descriptions of the individuals concerned.

Providing a final and indispensable source of primary
materials were the published letters, documents, diaries,
and memoirs for the period of the bill's enactment. Th2

Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, ed.

 

Samuel I. Roseman, (New York, 19241) provided in volume VIII
valuable material on Roosevelt's attitude toward neutrality,
and in volume IX material on the genesis of the lend-lease
idea. F.D.R. His Personal Letters 1928-19115, ed. Elliott
Roosevelt, (New York, 1950), was a valuable supplement throwing
additional light on Roosevelt's own attitude during this
period. The Selected Letters of william Allen white 1899-19313,
ed. Walter Johnson, New York, l9h7, was useful in establishing
White's role in the battles to get the neutrality legislation
repealed or amended, and also helped to determine White's
general position on isolation and intervention. Herbert Hoover's
Addresses Upon The American Road 19h0-19hl, (New York, l9hl),
established the former president's attitude on lend-lease

soon after the measure was introduced in January, l9hl. Of
much more value were The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg,
(Boston, 1952), edited by Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr., with

the collaboration of Joe Alex Morris. The Senator was
apparently not made to appear mOre liberal than he actually

was at the time of the lend-lease debate, and the exerpts

from March, l9hl, show clearly the sincere concern of

Vandenberg over the course of the United States. Cordell Hull,

200

The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, (New York, l9h8), were

 

particularly valuable for the attitude of the Secretary of
State during the time of the controversies over neutrality
legislation, and the formulation of lend-lease. His sections
on the debate and passage itself are scanty and not of
particular value.

Another View inside the Roosevelt cabinet is provided
by the third volume of The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes,
(New York, 195h), but Ickes' connection with lend-lease was
slight, and the value is more in the information on neutrality,
and on the general attitude than on the bill itself. House
and Senate views of the legislative battle itself are
respectively provided by Sol Bloom, The Autobiography of

Sol Bloom, (New York, l9k8), and Tom Connally, My_Name Is

 

Tom Connally, (New York, l95h). Bloom, who was the chairman

 

of the House committee, probably exaggerated his role to some
extent, and there also might be some doubt as to the sentiment
he actually held at the time toward allowing a fair hearing

to the opponents, but his view is nonetheless valuable.
Connally's work, as told to Alfred Steinberg, is possibly

less valuable, for although Connally was one of the
administration managensof the bill in the Senate, his treatment
did not give the appearance of historical soundness. Alben

W. Barkley's work, That Reminds Me, (New York, 195k),

provided no information on the bill, but did give some
characterizations of men involved in the debate. David
Lawrence's Diary of A Washington Correspondent, (New York, l9k2),

provides some interesting additional contemporary comments

201

on the bill and its enactment. Of exceptional value on the
genesis of the bill and its preparation for Congress was The
Morgenthau Diaries as published in Colliers. Of direct
pertinence, and indispensable for a study of the bill or its
enactment, was Part IV, "The Story Behind Lend-Lease" in the
issue of October 18,.19h7.

The treatment of the secondary materials will be
more cursory. Most of the common biographies of Franklin D.
Roosevelt, either dealing with him directly, or with his
relationship with others, were consulted for general background
on lend-lease and the period preceding its enactment. These
sources range from Robert E. Sherwood's Roosevelt and Hopkins:

An Intimate History, (New York, 1950), to John T. Flynn's

 

The Roosevelt myth (New York, 1956).

For administration policies during the period leading
up to the United States entry into the war, several books
deserve mention. Charles A. Beard's two works, American
Foreign Policy in the Makingl932-19h0: A Study in

Responsibilities, (New Haven, 19h6), and President Roosevelt

 

and the Coming of the war igki: A Study in Appearances agd

Realities, (New Haven, 19h8), were particularly of value for

 

the strong case they make for the idea that the United States
was purposely and unnecessarily taken into the war. The
latter of these works deals with the lend-lease bill itself
for several pages, making the case that it was one of the
steps toward war. Although heavily documented the section on

the bill does not do an adequate job of sumarizing even the

202

arguments considered essential by Beard. Charles Callan
Tansill argues much the same thing, and more convincingly,

in his Back Door To War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy

 

l933-l9hl, (Chicago, 1952). For the opposite side of the

 

coin the two books by William L. Langer and S. Everett
Gleason, were especially valuable. The first of these was

The Challenge to Isolation 1937-l9h0, (New York, 1952), and
the second was The Undeclared War 19h0-19L1, (New York, 1953).
The second was used particularly for its treatment of the
genesis of the bill. Basil Rauch, in his Roosevelt, From

lbnich to Pearl Harbor, (New York, 1950), gave a usable

 

summary of the lend-lease origin and the debate, and Forrest
Davis and Ernest K. Lindley in How War Came: An American

Lhite Paper; From The Fall of France to Pearl Harbor, (New

 

York, 19h2), also provided some information.
Material specifically dealing with the American

neutrality legislation and used for that chapter came mainly

from three sources. These were, in order of importance,

I

Edwin Borchard and William Potter Lage, Neutrality for the

United States, (New Haven, lgho), Donald F. Drummond, The

 

Passing_of American Neutrality 1937-19h1, (Ann Arbor, 1955),
and Harold Bartlett whitoman, Jr., Neutrality, l9hl, (New Haven,
1941).

Two other secondary works deserving Specific mention
deal with entirely different phases of the topic. Wayne 8.

a o w - - 0 O ' ‘
Cole, America First: The Battle against Intervention l9mO-l9ml,

 

(Hadlson, 1953), is valuable for the details it gives of the

203

struggles of that organization to defeat the lend-lease bill.

\Dt.)

The other work, Lend-Lease: Weapon For Victory, (New York,

 

19hh), by Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., is the only work
written exclusively on lend-lease. This work is valuable
for the extensive background which it provides for the
genesis of the bill, and for a study of the operations of
the lend-lease law it would be indispensable, but it passes
over the debate and enactment of the bill in general terms
giving no more information than any of the general histories
of the period.

Some articles from journals after the period of the
bills consideration were also consulted. Vernon Van Dyke
and Edward Lane Davis, "Senator Taft and American Security"
in the May, 1952, issue of The Journal of Politics was
valuable only for that Senators general attitude toward
foreign affairs, and his reaction to Roosevelt's ”arsenal
of democracy." Ralph H. Smuckler's article ”’ae Region of
Isolationism" was used in analysing the votes on lend-lease
along generally sectional lines, and is useful for that
purpose. It appeared in The American Political Science Review,
June, 1953. The third article appeared in The American
gournal of International Law, April, l9hl, which.might be
close enough to the enactment itself to be considered a
primary source. This article was "The Lend-Lease Bill and
International Law" by Quincy wright, and was useful in
providing a legal opinion to weigh against that presented

by Charles Board in his arguments.

THE ENACTMENT 0F LEND-LEASE

BY
Richard Laughlin McBane

An Abstract of
A THESIS
Submitted to the College of Arts and Sciences
Michigan State University of Agriculture and
Applied Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of History

1958

The United States in the late months of l9h0, and
the early months of l9hl, reached a point where it had to
make a critical decision. This decision was whether the
United States would remain isolationist and let Britain fall
when her dollar resources, and thus her ability to buy
munitions ran out, or whether it would take a position of
world responsibility by aiding the allies while staying out
of the war itself. The issue turned upon the enactment of
the lend-lease bill, and this thesis is the story of that
enactment.

To the largest possible degree original sources have
been utilized. The hearings of both the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, and the House of Representatives Foreign
Affairs Committee on H. R. 1776, A Bill Further to Promote
the Defense of the United States, and for Other Purposes,
have been used along with the lengthy debates in the Congressional
Record. Nine newspapers were selected to study the pressures
on the legislators and the atmosphere surrounding the
enactment. Whenever available private letters, diaries, and
memoirs, along with public documents were consulted.~

The late months of l9h0, particularly December,
brought home increasingly to the Roosevelt administration,
the need of the British for aid for which they could not pay.

That this aid would be in the national interest of the United

States was hardly questioned by the administration, but it
faced the problem of surmounting the neutrality legislation
of the 1930's and the vocal isolationist elements in the
government.

After a brief background of the events of December
l9h0, and the problems of the neutrality legislation, the
formulation of the lend-lease bill by the Roosevelt
administration is related. Its initial reception was stormy,
and in this stormy atmosphere the House Hearings were opened
under Sol Bloom, chairman of the House Committee. These
hearings brought out the opinions of some of the leading
Americans of that critical period. Cordell Hull, Henry
Stimson, Frank Knox, and Henry Morgenthau, Jr. all appeared
for the administration. Star witnesses for the opponents
were Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, and Joseph Kennedy,
retiring Ambassador to the Court of St. James.

When the House committee reported the bill, the House
of Representatives debated it for a week, chiefly on the
points of presidential power and war danger which were the
strongest opposition charges. Before they approved the bill
on an almost entirely partisan and sectional division, the
Senate Committee, chaired by Walter George, had taken up the
bill. Much of the testimony it heard was the same, and many
of the witnesses were the same, but on the last day of public
hearings the administration was able to present Wendell Willkie,
just returned from England, in support of the bill. The

opponents again depended heavily upon Colonel Lindbergh, but

they also got aid from such prominent Americans as historian
Charles A. Board, Colonel McCormick of the Chicago Tribune,
General Robert Wood of the America First Committee, and
Alfred M. Landon.

When the bill was reported to the Senate the debate
was long and generally repetitious. The opponents, Who held
the floor most of the time, were led by Gerald P. Nye of
North Dakota, Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri, and Burton K.
Wheeler of Montana, the latter two Democrats. Nye was
particularly evident in the debate, but Wheeler was the real
leader of the Opponents from the beginning when he engaged
in extremely sharp exchanges with President Roosevelt.

The public reaction, in the meantime fluctuated, but
stayed safely on the side of the administration throughout.
Few newspapers consistently opposed the bill, and most were
content with the amendments to the bill. Gallup polls showed
the public approval'at its height immediately after the House
vote, but while the opposition increased in the final week
of debate, it had only reached 27 per cent by the time the
Senate approved the bill by 60 to 31.

This approval, although too late to be of aid to the
Greeks, did effectively aid Great Britain, and while some
historians have contended that the passage of the lend-lease
bill was one of the steps which eventually led the United
States into World War II, there is nothing to indicate that
the administration was not completely frank and honest in its

belief that lend-lease was not a war bill. Certainly, the

passage of lendnlease moved the United States into a position
of world responsibility commensurate with its national power,

and paved the way for post-war aid programs.

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