

INDONESIA:
HER POTENTIAL AND PRIORITY FOR THE
SPREAD OF WORLD COMMUNISM

Thesis for the Degree of M. A.
MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

Alvin L. Roegge

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By

Alvin L. Roeges

AN ABSTRACT

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michigan
State University of Agriculture and Applied Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Department of Political Science

1958

Approved

Bruce R. Smith

ABSTRACT

Indonesia's geographical position makes her a strategically important area to both the East and the West. Further, her raw materials and natural resources are important to the continuation of the Cold War. Her population of over 80,000,000 constitutes an impressive reservoir of manpower uncommitted to either side in the Cold War that has developed between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Russia, as early as the 1930s, openly recognized Indonesia's importance. It would appear that the West did not recognize it until after World War II.

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ABSTRACT

Indonesia's geographical position makes her a strategically important area to both the East and the West. Further, her raw materials and natural resources are important to the continued economic stability of many countries. Her population of over 80,000,000 constitutes an impressive reservoir of manpower uncommitted to either side in the Cold War that has developed between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Russia, as early as the 1920's, openly recognized Indonesia's importance. It would appear that the West did not recognize it until after World War II.

World War II and the Japanese occupation of Indonesia greatly accelerated the native nationalist movement as well as the displacement of traditional Indonesian society. Before 1949, when the transfer of sovereignty was effected, the Indonesians found some semblance of unity in a common struggle for independence from the Dutch. However, with the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, this unifying factor was largely removed and Indonesia moved into a period wherein socio-economic problems have become paramount in the eyes of the masses.

Indonesia's leaders unfortunately, have not been able to work together. Party strife, inexperience, a shortage of administrators, a shortage of technicians, and a population the majority of which lacks political consciousness, are some of the factors which, in combination, hamper efforts

towards advancement. These factors, coupled with Indonesia's geographical, cultural, and racial diversity have undoubtedly aided the Communists, who, it would appear, have actively exploited these conditions and have made appreciable gains.

Evidence for this paper is principally from secondary sources. For the period prior to World War II the literature was largely of Dutch origin and quite naturally subject to considerable bias. Only a limited number of the Dutch works have been translated into English. Evidence concerning the Japanese occupation and the post-war period has been obtained from works which were based, at least partially, on their authors' personal experiences in Indonesia. These works have been found to be reasonably objective and authoritative. The above mentioned sources have been supplemented to a limited extent by interviews with an Indonesian student, an Indonesian Army officer, and an American editor who made a short trip to Indonesia.

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In the post-war struggle that has developed between the East and the West, Indonesia constitutes an area of strategic importance to both sides. For the Communists, her geographical location constitutes a shield for the approaches to the underside of mainland Southeast Asia. Control of her natural resources would strengthen the Communist forces and would weaken the West. To the West, Indonesia constitutes a strategic area in any attempted physical containment of Communist expansion.

Indonesia in transition is plagued by a multitude of problems. Religious, racial, cultural, and geographic diversity restricts any efforts toward unity. Overpopulation in certain areas contributes to native discontent. Widespread illiteracy, a limited intellectual elite, and lack of administrative and technological experience have thwarted attempts at advancement. Lack of native capital has forced Indonesia to rely for income upon a fluctuating world market in agricultural and primary products and thus has restricted any attempts toward industrial advancement.

The majority of Indonesia's present day problems can be attributed to her long period under Dutch rule. Dutch policy until the turn of the 20th century was effective in maintaining the traditional social order. In an effort to curtail the growing strength of Islam, the Dutch fostered

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the growth of a native intellectual elite. This elite, contrary to Dutch expectations, provided the leadership for organized and articulate nationalism. However, Dutch authority, coupled with a continuing struggle within this elite, prevented the nationalist leaders from achieving any extensive mass support during the pre-war years. Throughout this period, whatever unity of effort was achieved was predicated upon a common desire for freedom from the Dutch and a commonly shared anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist orientation.

The Japanese occupation abetted the nationalist leaders in their efforts towards independence. Japanese policy contributed toward an increased displacement of native society and increased the base of nationalist sentiment among the Indonesian population. The impact of the Japanese occupation contributed to a disrupted social order in Indonesia and in the post-war years provided conditions favorable to the expansion of Communism.

Communism has been active in Indonesia almost from the birth of the first nationalist movement. As early as 1920, the Indonesian Communist movement became affiliated with and came under the control of the Comintern. This control would appear to have been rather tenuous until World War II. During this period, Dutch power rather than lack of receptivity on the part of the masses prevented the Communists from making appreciable gains. In the post-war era Communism has been afforded an opportunity for advancement. Russian direction

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and control would appear to have been strengthened by the return of Soviet-trained leaders to Indonesia during the revolutionary period. It seems likely that this control has been strengthened by the Communist successes on mainland China, with subsequent direction of the Indonesian movement by or through China.

Continued political instability, coupled with a lack of material advancement in Indonesian society and a continued economic depression, has fostered mass discontent. Thus far Indonesia's leaders have been eager to move rapidly ahead, but have followed a course of political expediency. Traditional society however, has given indications of being resistant to any rapid change. Many of the nationalist leaders have fostered nationalistic extremism in order to expedite their program of social engineering. In so doing they have remained anti-Western, anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalistic, while in turn equating Communist with Indonesian ideals of peace. These many factors in combination may have placed the Communists within striking distance of a seizure of power in Indonesia.

It is hoped that this paper will set forth many of the factors which are felt to be indicative of Indonesia's importance to the spread of World Communism and will indicate these factors in present-day Indonesian development which may show the potential for Communist developments in the future.

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

This paper proposes to: (1) evaluate the geopolitics of Indonesia in order to determine its importance to the expansion of International Communism; (2) appraise the pre-war trends in the development of nationalism in Indonesia in order to determine the role of Communism in the nationalist movement; (3) appraise the impact of the Japanese occupation on Indonesian society in order to determine whether such impact has favored the cause of Communism in Indonesia; (4) analyze the development of the Communist movement in Indonesia in order to determine to what extent Indonesia has constituted and still constitutes an area of importance in Communist strategy; and, (5) evaluate the post-war political developments in Indonesia in order to determine whether Communism is in a position to achieve significant gains in present-day Indonesia.

Sources Used

This study is based mainly on English-language secondary sources, supplemented to a very limited extent by English-language translations of Indonesian source materials. The following is an evaluation of the major sources used:

Chapter II: Geopolitical Importance of Indonesia in the Modern World

For the purely descriptive geographical aspects of this chapter several standard academic works were utilized. Efforts

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Chapter II: Geopolitical Importance of Indonesia in the Modern World

For the purely descriptive geographical aspects of this chapter several standard academic works were utilized. Efforts

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

This paper proposes to: (1) evaluate the geopolitics of Indonesia in order to determine its importance to the expansion of International Communism; (2) appraise the pre-war trends in the development of nationalism in Indonesia in order to determine the role of Communism in the nationalist movement; (3) appraise the impact of the Japanese occupation on Indonesian society in order to determine whether such impact has favored the cause of Communism in Indonesia; (4) analyze the development of the Communist movement in Indonesia in order to determine to what extent Indonesia has constituted and still constitutes an area of importance in Communist strategy; and, (5) evaluate the post-war political developments in Indonesia in order to determine whether Communism is in a position to achieve significant gains in present-day Indonesia.

Sources Used

This study is based mainly on English-language secondary sources, supplemented to a very limited extent by English-language translations of Indonesian source materials. The following is an evaluation of the major sources used.

Chapter II: Geopolitical Importance of Indonesia in the Modern World

For the purely descriptive geographical aspects of this chapter several standard academic works were utilized. Efforts

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to obtain data concerning mineral resources, both developed and reserves, were extremely disappointing. The most complete and detailed study of minerals was by Van Bemmelen, The Geology of Indonesia: Vol. II: Economic Geology, published by the Netherlands Government Printing Office (The Hague, 1949). The Foreign Division of the U. S. Geological Survey states that information contained therein is the most complete and the most recent available. The most recent information available on Indonesia's resources is that published by the American Geographical Society in relatively current issues of Focus.

In considering Indonesia's strategic importance in relation to the spread of world Communism, the following sources were used:

1. For an appreciation of general Soviet strategy and policy and as background information, both Soviet Military Doctrine by R. L. Garthoff, and The Operational Code of the Politburo, by Nathan Leites, were used. Both are scholarly studies by specialists in their field and are documented from Soviet source materials.
2. For a study of Communist activities in Indonesia and Southeast Asia, the following were used:

- a. Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, The Left Wing in Southeast Asia. This work, published in 1950, treats the Communist movement in Southeast Asia and Indonesia up to 1949. According to the authors, who are writers and travellers in this field, seemingly socialistically inclined, while travelling in the field under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1947 they found that "documentation for a study of left-wing movements in Southeast Asia suffers from a lack of unbiased sources. . . . During a six-month

information by journey in southeast Asia in 1947 the writers conscientiously tried to interview all Communist leaders who would consent to talk to them. . . . Only a few of their leaders granted interviews, and none of them was informative."

history seems Thus, most of this work is based upon printed information on the subject, quite a bit of it seems to be from Dutch sources. This work constituted the main source used on this topic in the present study.

b. Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in Far East, 1944-51. This work by an ex-Russian historian at Oxford University, England, constitutes an authoritative background coverage of Soviet policies in Southeast Asia during the period indicated. Beloff's contentions are supported by actual experience in the area. He is a specialist in the field, having been born and spent much time in the Far East. Beloff further substantiates his information through Soviet radio and press reports.

c. Huszar and Associates, Soviet Power and Policy, is a composite study by 14 specialists, published in 1955. These many specialists have treated different aspects of this general topic, each concentrating on the area of his specialty. Southeast Asia is treated by John Cady, who is a professor of History at Ohio University, and who has studied in India and the Southeast Asian area. He has drawn heavily on the aforementioned work by Thompson and Adloff. Seemingly, most of the information has been derived from printed material. There is little to indicate any on-the-scene information on the part of the author.

Chapter III: History of the Nationalist Movement in Indonesia Before the Second World War

The most authoritative source would appear to be George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Kahin, a professor of political science at Cornell University, spent 1948-49 in Indonesia. In his coverage of the nationalist movement he has drawn heavily upon Dutch sources, such

information being supplemented by personal interviews with many of the leading figures in the nationalist movement and from observations in the field. His treatment of Indonesia's history seems to be well informed and objective. The work seems to be relatively free from bias except on those occasions when the author's information was derived solely from the Indonesian nationalist leaders, such as the parts covering the Japanese Occupation.

Another primary source for this period was Soetan Sjahrir's Out of Exile, a critical evaluation of Dutch policy, the Indonesian people, nationalist leaders and tactics, and an appraisal of the Japanese occupation. Sjahrir's work must be considered highly authoritative, although one must consider his Westernized education, his period of study in Holland, his socialistic ideology, and his leading role in Indonesia's policies. Although flavored with nationalistic and socialistic bias, this work seems to reflect a highly rationalist approach to the situation.

For an historical description of developments during this period and for background reference, Bernard H. M. Vlekke's Nusantara: A History of The East Indian Archipelago was considered to be an objective, authoritative source, describing the Netherlands East Indies under the Dutch, and the nationalist movement during the period of Dutch control. Vlekke is a Dutch historian who at the time of publishing of this book was General Secretary of Historical Institute in

Rome, Italy. This work is supported by personal experience and Dutch source materials, but is considered to be as free as possible, under the circumstances, from Dutch bias.

As background information for purposes of understanding Indonesia's present-day economic and political situation, J. S. Furnivall's Netherlands India: A Study of a Plural Economy is of extreme importance. Furnivall, who had a background of a quarter-century of British Foreign Service experience in Burma and further personal experience in Indonesia, is highly authoritative although somewhat more subjective than Vlekke and subject to a slight socialistic bias. His work is a very complete study of the impact of the society and economy that developed under Dutch rule. His information comes from personal observation and statistics, both personally obtained and derived from Dutch sources.

Charles Wolf, Jr.'s book, The Indonesian Story, issued under the auspices of the American Institute of Pacific Relations, is based primarily upon material derived from personal observation and experience while the author was serving as a United States vice-consul in Batavia between February, 1946, and June, 1947. To support many of his points Wolf has used documents obtained from the Netherlands Embassy and Information Bureau in Washington, as well as information from the Indonesian Republic's Ministry of Information. The book is primarily descriptive and, generally speaking, authoritative. On many points, however, (and as admitted by Wolf), such

information as was obtained was subject to considerable bias on the part of the Indonesian sources. Some of this bias may have entered into Wolf's work.

J. M. Van der Kreef's Indonesia in the Modern World and his numerous articles in scholarly publications must be considered as important and generally objective sociological studies of the Indonesian scene. Van der Kreef has borrowed heavily from Dutch sources in his writings, but it is felt that any Dutch bias has been counterbalanced by an individual objectivity on the part of the author.

Dorothy Woodman's The Republic of Indonesia contains reasonably accurate background information of a descriptive nature. In this work she has combined personal experiences and observations in the Indonesian area. One might question the extensiveness and the representativeness of her experiences. The experiences have been supplemented by information from sources in Indonesia and from personal contact with Indonesian representatives in the United States and England. Through these contacts, it is felt, this work has been subjected to something of a socialistic bias.

Chapter IV: Communism: Its Introduction, Development and Impact upon Contemporary Indonesia

Information in support of the material contained in this chapter has been found to be extremely limited. As previously mentioned, Thompson and Adloff's Left Wing in Southeast Asia constitutes one of the main sources, and information for it was derived primarily from printed matter of Dutch origin.

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Harold O. O. Trullinger's Red Banners Over Asia was written by an Asian diplomat under the pseudonym of Trullinger. Information contained in this book gives indications of direct but undeterminable sources of information on the part of the author. The Annals of the American Academy in reviewing this work indicated that much of the information could have been obtained from printed materials. Trullinger shows a pronounced Western bias. The material is presented in a rather journalistic manner. Despite these criticisms, and in the light of the lack of any refutation from other sources, much of the information contained herein is considered very important. Chapter V: Political and Economic Developments in Indonesia
World War II

Tiber Mende's Southeast Asia Between Two Worlds is a book written by a European journalist and to a large extent is based upon the author's admittedly short period of personal experience and observation in the Southeast Asian area. This work is considered important because of the comparatively broad representative base apparently utilized by this author in collecting his information. It is felt to be considerably more representative of conditions in Indonesia than many of the aforementioned sources. This book, although somewhat subjective in nature, seems to be based on personal interviews with representatives of various strata of Indonesian society in various geographical areas. vol. XXIV, No. 2, (March 1957)

Further background information has been obtained through scholarly writings of specialists in the field, including

Harold Fischer, Milton Sacks, and Robert Bone, Jr.--all specialists in the area who report personal experiences and observations.

M. J. Meijis, The Chinese in Indonesia, has been found to be one of the most complete studies of the Indonesian Chinese. This work is not documented, but it is published under the auspices of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Center for International Studies. No information has been obtained as to the source of the author's information or whether the author has had experience in the area.

Chapter V: Political and Economic Developments in Indonesia After World War II

In support of the material in this chapter over and above the sources mentioned for previous chapters, the author has depended primarily upon the reports of Willard Hanna, the American Universities Field Staff representative in Indonesia since 1955. In view of Hanna's background of experience and education in the Asian area, dating back as far as 1933 when he first went to China as a teacher, these reports, although written in a journalistic manner, are considered to offer a highly representative, impartial, and authoritative coverage of the Indonesian political developments since 1955.

For a study of the Indonesian elite, James Mysbergh's article in the Far Eastern Survey, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, (March 1957) in consideration of supporting information found in the works of other authors and in consideration of the apparent

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sources of Mysbergh's information, is deemed to be the most authoritative study of this topic. Mysbergh, associated with the Knickerbocker Foundation of New York, based this work upon a personal study of the political and social conditions in Indonesia. He returned from this area during the later part of 1956.

In using English-language translations of Indonesian source materials, one must appreciate the bias contained within the original reports. However, such sources as were available were extremely helpful in illustrating the personal and group orientations of Indonesian leaders. From this standpoint the Indonesian Spectator, an unofficial Indonesian periodical, would appear to be an impartial publication purporting to give consideration to all sides of the picture of Indonesian affairs.

Significance of This Study

Since World War II and especially in the post-independence period, Indonesia has been attempting to effect a socio-economic-political revolution. In so doing she has assumed a position of increased importance in the struggle between the forces and ideologies of the East and the West. For the Communists, control of or influence over Indonesia would: shield the approaches to Southeast Asia and threaten Australia and the Philippines; provide access to vitally needed materials

for the continued industrialization of China; deny large quantities of manpower to the West and add them to the East; provide a position of influence or control over the major avenues of trade and communications between Europe and the Far East, virtually isolating the Southeast Asian countries lying between Indonesia and China; help weaken the Western world by denying it access to Indonesia's products and materials that are vitally needed for continued economic reconstruction and stability by many of the West European countries; and deprive the West of an important link in any plan for containment of Communism in the Far East.

During Indonesia's long struggle against the Dutch, a limited domestic elite, impressed with the advances made by Western society, and by those many factors which had contributed to Dutch dominance, attempted to give direction to Indonesia's nationalist struggle for independence. In their partial acculturation to Western ways, members of this elite had broken from traditional Indonesian society and in so doing had evolved their own new concepts of a desirable social order and the function and place of human personality in this order. The individuals comprising this elite group had little in common ideologically, except a common dislike of Dutch rule, dislike of capitalism, and a common desire for freedom and independence. Thus the pre-war nationalist struggle was characterized by a continuous in-group struggle,

ideas as espoused originally by the leaders of the Indonesian Nationalist Party

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which detracted materially from the realization of any one group's aims.

Throughout this pre-war struggle, the character of Indonesian nationalism was determined by this urban elite who, having developed a culture separate and distinct from that of traditional Indonesian society, found themselves far removed from that peasant society. Yet because of the absence of more than a rudimentary indigenous middle class, it was mandatory that traditional society support the revolution if it was to succeed. Thus this elite engaged in a struggle within itself to gain this needed mass support even while it struggled for independence from the Dutch. Since many of the ideals espoused by the nationalist leaders conflicted with those of traditional society, these leaders had little success in enlisting the support of the masses. Such support as they did receive came principally from a developing urban and rural proletariat. These latter groups early indicated their receptivity to the appeals of Marxism. With the introduction of Marxism into Indonesia by Hendrick Sneevliet in 1914 the leaders of the Moslem movement, Sarekat Islam, became progressively more revolutionary in order to compete with the growing appeal of the Marxist Socialist ideals. In the struggle of political ideologies which followed, each vying for support of the masses, various brands of Marxism had the greatest success in giving direction to the nationalist movement. Religious-economic ideals as espoused originally by the leaders of Sarekat Islam

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soon gave way to revolutionary political nationalism and activism. This trend was further accelerated with the organization of the Indonesian Nationalist Party in 1927 under the leadership of Soekarno. From 1927 to the outbreak of World War II, several political movements developed in Indonesia. Although differing in tactics, these movements shared in varying degrees a Marxist orientation and a commonly held anti-capitalist outlook. During this period Communism failed to gain appreciable strength, not so much through opposition or lack of effort on the part of the nationalist elite in Indonesia, as because of continued in-group struggle, a limited base of mass support, and effective suppression on the part of the Dutch.

The Japanese occupation of Indonesia during World War II changed the internal situation. Heretofore only a relatively small percentage of Indonesia's people had been displaced from its traditional social order or was notably affected by the nationalist movement. With the Japanese occupation, nationalism awoke at the grass roots. Japanese policy displaced both the traditional social order and the Western-style superstructure that the Dutch had erected. Through propaganda and actions Japan contributed significantly towards the development of a feeling of anti-Westernism, anti-imperialism, and anti-capitalism amongst a large part of native society. In so doing the Japanese unwittingly heightened the native receptiveness to Communism in Indonesia.

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A large segment of Indonesian youth was also imbued with a spirit of authoritarianism, which, together with a feeling of hatred and frustration, was deliberately cultivated by both Japanese and Indonesian leaders. These negative sentiments were directed towards a "scapegoat" by the Japanese, namely: the West in general and the Dutch in particular. According to Van der Kroef:

Accordingly self-centeredness, power seeking, lack of trust, destructive aggression, as well as identification with suffering which were developed on the family level were heightened in these circumstances and found expression in ideologies which manifested extreme hostility and an urge for universal destruction. Many of these young rebels, for instance, denied all existing social institutions, conventions and restrictions, and demanded their total obliteration.¹

Thus the Japanese occupation fulfilled the desires of many among the nationalist elite and the quasi-intellectuals, but it also uprooted the whole existence of a sizeable portion of the population. With the conclusion of the war and the revolutionary period, this latter group was left stranded precariously between the traditional and the ideologically new, and looking desperately for direction and guidance.

Throughout this early period of the nationalist movement, evidence of Russia's interests can be noted. As early as 1920 an indigenous Communist Party associated itself with the

¹ J. M. Van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World, Part I. (Bandung, Indonesia: Masa Baru, 1954).

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Communist International. Although the Third International exercised a rather tenuous control over the Indonesian movement through the Netherlands' Communist Party, it seems likely that even as early as the 1920's Indonesia constituted an important area in Communism's plans for world domination. Dutch power rather than lack of receptivity on the part of Indonesian society prevented Communism from making any appreciable gains in Indonesia prior to World War II. Removal of Dutch control, resistance against Japanese occupation, and legality achieved in post-war Indonesia have facilitated growth of the Communist effort. In the post-war era, the continued presence of foreign interests and the continuance of nationalistic extremism on the part of the nationalist leaders have afforded Communism opportunities to champion Indonesia's cause.

With the economic resurgence of the West European countries and the containment of Soviet advances in Western Europe, it would appear likely that Southeast Asia has increased in importance for the Communists' plan of world domination. Soviet direction and control over the Indonesian Communist movement would appear to have been strengthened with the return of Soviet trained leaders to Indonesia during the revolutionary period. Further, it seems likely that this control has been further tightened by the rise to power of the Communists on mainland China and subsequent direction of the Indonesian movement by or through China.

The return of the Dutch and the resultant revolutionary struggle stimulated an outward manifestation of continued unity on the part of the nationalist leaders during the revolutionary period. With the transfer of sovereignty in December 1949 and the establishment of a unitary state in August 1950, this unifying factor was largely removed from the scene. Independence succeeded in satisfying the aspirations of only a few individuals and groups. With the physical removal of the Dutch forces, conflicting ideologies of the nationalist elite again struggled with one another. Independence also increased secular influences which have at least temporarily reduced the political potential of the Moslem religious groups.

In this post-independence period, the predominant revolutionary ideals are personified by the new Westernized, urban-trained, semi-intellectual bureaucracy. As representatives of the government, such types appear now in every corner of the village society. Attempted introduction of these new, Western, bureaucratic ideals to the masses has once again clashed with the adat (customary law) of the village community. In pre-war times communalism, patrimony, and the civil service helped to cement the traditional social order; but these buttresses against change are no longer wholly effective in present-day Indonesia, which continues to experience a double system of authority: one identified with the old order, the traditional village hierarchy; and the other with the new, the

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national. Although not immune to change, traditional society is indicating that it cannot be changed overnight.

In the post-independence period the partially completed political revolution has been going ahead with the long dormant socio-economic revolution in Indonesia. Indonesian society is in transition, plagued by many problems and undergoing an attempted process of social engineering at the hands of leaders animated by a variety of conflicting ideologies. Such a society in transition provides a great opportunity for the spread of Communism. In native society there is little that is antipathetic towards the adoption of Communist ideals, although the violence of Communist actions may run counter to village ethics. Extremist nationalism has fostered the continuance of anti-Western, anti-imperialist, and anti-capitalist ideals, while in turn equating Communist with Indonesian ideals of peace.

It seems likely that Communism in Indonesia has thus far been rebuffed mainly by the Dutch. Since their removal the Republic's government has taken stern steps against Communism only when Communism has overtly threatened those in power. It also seems likely that whereas Soviet influence and direction before 1949 over the indigenous Communist movement may have been rather tenuous, such control has been strengthened with the Chinese Communists' rise to power. Further, since 1950

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the Communists have been able to pursue a course of action in Indonesia which, in view of continued political instability, economic depression, and lack of any marked improvement in Indonesia's standard of living, may have placed them with striking distance of a seizure of power in Indonesia.

During the decade and more since the conclusion of World War II, a drastically altered pattern of world forces has arisen, a bi-polarization of forces into two blocs, commonly referred to as "the East" and "the West," advocating opposing political, economic, and social ideologies. Along with these developments, there has been a political awakening in the Far East, a rising of the forces of nationalism in these many countries. World War II and Japanese occupation of these areas constituted a catalyst for the achievement of independence.

Prior to World War II, the virus of nationalism had existed in many parts of Asia and Southeast Asia, but in varying degrees and for the most part along different lines. In no country was there unity of effort ever and above the sharing of a commonly sought goal. Over the course of history these many countries had achieved different cultures, different social values, a diversity of religious belief, divergent class structures, and societies in different stages of advancement.

Prior to World War II, the areas of Southeast Asia were of little apparent concern to the West except for those countries that had succeeded in extending their empire into these areas, or except as countries or individuals were in-

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Chapter II

GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THE INDONESIAN ARCHIPELAGO IN THE MODERN WORLD

During the decade and more since the conclusion of World War II, a drastically altered pattern of world forces has arisen, a bi-polarization of forces into two blocs, commonly referred to as "the East" and "the West," advocating opposing political, economic, and social ideologies. Along with these developments, there has been a political awakening in the Far East, a rising of the forces of nationalism in these many countries. World War II and Japanese occupation of these areas constituted a catalyst for the achievement of independence.

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Prior to World War II, the areas of Southeast Asia were of little apparent concern to the West except for those countries that had succeeded in extending their empires into these areas, or except as countries or individuals were in-

fluenced by economic considerations. World War II and the Japanese occupation of these areas forced the West to re-orient itself. The Japanese in conquering all of Southeast Asia, the Indonesian Archipelago and the islands to the southwest as far as Guadalcanal, denied the Allies access to the vital sea lanes of the area and to the strategic war materials which this area could provide. The cause of Indonesian nationalism was advanced during World War II, both through the Japanese occupation of the archipelago and through the defeat of the Dutch at the hands of the Germans. The Japanese in their attempt to deal with the many difficulties encountered in Indonesia and in their attempt to exploit the wealth of the archipelago, both by a natural and human, were forced to abet the nationalist elite. With the defeat of Japan in August 1945, this Japanese-fostered elite of Indonesia issued a Proclamation of Independence and took active steps toward the long-sought goals of freedom and dignity.

Strategic Location

Indonesia occupies a strategic position where the Pacific and Indian oceans converge at the Straits of Malacca. This position rivals in importance the Panama and the Suez Canals as a key to sea power. Here the Great Circle air routes from North America's west coast to the Orient find their terminus, connecting with the routes from Europe and

Australia. Here Asian cultures are meeting with European and Islamic cultures in a process of transition. In the light of the announced goals of International Communism, these factors readily indicate that Southeast Asia's destiny will be shaped by more than local forces.¹

Most maps, because of their small scale, lead one to consider the Indonesian Archipelago a small portion of our world, an appendage dangling without significance from the corner of Asia. Closer study reveals, however, that quite the contrary is true. From the northwestern tip of Sumatra the archipelago extends over 3000 miles eastward, and about half that distance from north to south. Within this expanse are more than 3000 islands of varying sizes, inhabited by a total population of more than 80,000,000. For centuries the great powers have not cared what the peoples of this area thought. Today what these people think is increasingly important as they take a larger place in the commerce and the politics of the world.

Southeast Asia constitutes the southward tropical extension of Asia's enormous land mass, both mainland and offshore. Mainland China is the common neighbor to the north. Overland communication with China is hampered by a formidable natural barrier in the form of the Himalaya Mountains and a southward

¹ "Resources of the Tropics," Focus, Vol. IV, No. 6, February, 1954.

bending extension of that system across northern Burma and much of Indo China. Historically, China's contacts with this area have been almost entirely by sea.²

The only near approach to Southeast Asia from the Soviet Union lies across the Hindu Kush Mountains of Afghanistan and through the Khyber Pass into the Indus Valley. Two longer but less difficult routes run from Vladivostok or Dairen by sea; or via Iran and through Baluchistan. To the north of Kashmir the Pamirs and the Karakoram Mountains interpose almost as formidable a barrier as the Himalayas which flank Kashmir to the southeast. North of the Himalayas lies the forbidding Tibetan Plateau. In Eastern Asia, mainland China separates Southeast Asia from the Soviet Union.

From a purely military standpoint, it would seem that the crucial security problem of Southeast Asia in case of a general war would depend upon the role played by Communist China as an ally of the U.S.S.R. Communist occupation of Southeast Asia would deprive maritime powers of access to the resources of the area, but the U.S.S.R. would be relatively unable to utilize these same resources herself, except as they might benefit China and in turn alleviate a drain on the economy of the U.S.S.R. Overland conquest by China would be greatly limited by natural barriers on the mainland and

² George B. De Huszar and Associates, Soviet Power and Policy, (New York: Thomas J. Crowell & Co., 1955), p. 498.

ultimately would require an amphibious move on Indonesia. Any move by sea would depend upon: (a) China's ability to build up or borrow from the U.S.S.R. an amphibious force, and (b) the means of eliminating American air and naval power from the China sea. Although the possibility of an airborne attack exists, an attack of any magnitude would ultimately require vast surface forces for reinforcement and supply. China does not possess such potential. However, the Russian fleet in the Pacific at the end of World War II was estimated to consist of 3 or 4 cruisers, 15 to 25 destroyers, and 100 to 110 submarines,³ and must be considered as available for the support of any Chinese effort. This estimate must be considered to be quite conservative in the light of Russia's post-war naval development. Probably, however, the present disposition of forces in the Far East continues to favor the West in terms of air and naval power.

Communist control or domination of the Indonesian Archipelago would establish for China and Russia a "cordon sanitaire" along the soft underbelly of the Southeast Asian mainland. Communist control of the shipping lanes and the natural wealth of Indonesia could seriously weaken England's rather tenuous position in Malaya. Communist possession of this area would offer a springboard to Australia and a potential

³ Ibid, p. 293.

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threat to the Philippines. Submarines and landbased air forces which the Communists now possess could from Indonesia preclude or greatly restrict any Western activity in the South China Sea. Along with these factors, the great outer arc of the Archipelago offers enormous natural defensive advantages for the country that controls the sea and air to the north. To the United States and to the Free World the Indonesian Archipelago constitutes an area of vital concern in their efforts to contain the spread of world Communism. Indonesia, as a part of the large Southeast Asian triangle stretching from the sub-continent of India to Australia and to Australia and to the Philippines and containing an aggregate population of over 600 million people who are simultaneously undergoing a political, a social, and an economic revolution, affords an area of increasing potential for Communist development. The United States and the Free World have achieved questionable success in their efforts to establish in this area a counterpart to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Europe. Thus far Indonesia has remained outspokenly independent in her international relations, and has vigorously rejected the idea of any military alliances in this area. As long as Indonesia maintains this position she constitutes a strategic void in the attempt to establish a military screen to contain the advances of Communism. (For graphic representation of strategic position, see map, p. 42.)

Physiographic Factors

This island world of Indonesia has been described as the meeting ground of the great tectonic movements that in recent geological times have shaped the mountain ranges of southern Asia and the insular arcs along eastern Asia. Volcanoes are numerous and earthquakes are frequent. The western islands of this archipelago include Sumatra, Java, Madura, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi, and can be considered as an appendage of the Asian continent. The intervening waterways are quite shallow, being a recently drowned portion of the Asian land mass. The deep bodies of water separating the eastern islands indicate that these islands were a part of the Australian land mass. Because of the mountainous topography and the depths of the water areas, the eastern islands do not have the relatively broad alluvial coastal plains found in the western shallow sea areas.

This area includes a wide variety of environmental conditions. By far the larger part of the total area of Indonesia is unattractive for human settlement. For the most part the land is unused. The empty lands include steep, rugged areas; poorly drained swamps and marshes; wide expanses of equatorial rain forests on infertile soils; and a few areas that experience prolonged dry periods and thus discourage human settlement. Climatic factors are not optimum for producing an energetic population. Except in the highland areas, the temperatures range in the 90's the year around and the

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humidity is continually high. Thus, except for a relative change from wet to dry periods there is no seasonal change.⁴ (For graphic description of rainfall, see map, p. 45.)

Races and Cultures

Since the Indonesian Archipelago lies between two oceans and two crowded land masses, it has experienced wave after wave of migrations. The natives of the area have either absorbed the newcomers, retreated into the interior or migrated eastward in the face of pressures from the west. The present main masses of the native population show an almost indescribable confusion of racial characteristics, with the latest pre-white arrivals as the dominant strain. Within this Indonesian area are found peoples of many physical types in all ranks of society; a culture which draws at one and the same time upon the primitive, the Hindu, the Buddhist, the Moham-
medan and the Christian; a society which comprises tribal, feudal, and modern forms; and a productive system which includes ancient arts and crafts of a high order, primitive agriculture and primitive industry, and modern agricultural and industrial processes.⁵ Over 250 different dialects are found in the archipelago.

Despite any outward signs of growing unity which might have become manifest in the common struggle for the goals of

⁴ George B. Cressey, Asia's Lands and Peoples, (McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 2nd edition, 1951), p. 149.

⁵ Report on Indonesia, Vol. 8, No. 1, August-September 1956, p. 40.

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nationalism and of freedom from the Dutch and the Japanese, the entire archipelago is made up of manifold regional sub-cultures which today contribute to acute regionalism or provincialism. This in turn causes continued political and economic disunity.⁶ This situation, according to a Lieutenant Colonel in the Indonesian army, himself of the Batak group from Sumatra, has developed and continues because of the strong separatist traditions among the many ethnic groups of Indonesia. The adat (customary law) still predominates within the many groups. In essence a dual system of authority exists in Indonesia today.⁷

As evidence of this continued provincialism, there exist today on Sumatra four major sub-cultures. On the northern tip of Sumatra are found the Atchinese, fanatical Moslems whose long struggle against the Dutch seems to have carried over into their present stand for full autonomy. In the central highlands above Padang the Minangkabau display a curious combination of traditional matriarchate with Mohammedanism. This group has provided many of the intellectual elite who have associated themselves with the Javanese in the independence struggle. In addition to these two groups,

⁶ Interview in 1957 with an Indonesian Army Lieutenant Colonel attending the United States Army Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Georgia. Basically the same information obtained from an interview with Soegang Soedarso, Indonesian student at Michigan State University, 1957.

⁷ Indonesian Army Lieutenant Colonel (see note 6).

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the Bataks are found near Lake Toba--a group that has only recently been converted partly to Christianity and partly to Islam. The fourth group, the Malays of the east coast of Sumatra, are courageous seafarers who over the course of time have spread widely over the archipelago. This group has a close cultural affinity with a large percentage of the people of the Malayan Peninsula, and the Malay language now forms the basis for the new national language, the "Bahasa Indonesia."⁸

Three major and distinct ethnic groupings are found on Java: the Sundanese who live in the western uplands; the Madurese along the coast facing the island of Madura; and the Javanese, a conglomeration of many groupings. Malays inhabit the coasts of Kalimantan, the largest island in the archipelago. The Dayaks, a pagan group subdivided into numerous tribes and clans, inhabit the vast interior. On Sulawesi are found the Makassarese and the Buginese, both with a long seafaring history; the Tordjas in the interior; and a large Christian population on the northern arm of the island. As one moves farther east from Sulawesi and Bali, one encounters an increasingly greater variety of ethnic groups. Many of the lesser isles have hardly been touched by modern life and nationalism.⁹

⁸ Jan O. M. Broek, "Indonesia," Focus, VII, No. 4, Dec. 1956.

⁹ Ibid.

Religions

As an aspect of the complexity of subcultures, one finds a diversity of religions in Indonesia which has contributed significantly to the heterogeneity of nationalist movements prior to World War II and in the post-war era. Religious differences continue to play an extremely important role in the development of the Republic of Indonesia. According to statistics provided by the Indonesian Ministry of Religious Affairs, 6,503 churches were listed in 1952. At that time there were 3,141,567 registered Protestants, 2,000,000 Hindus and Buddhists, and 2,000,000 Animists. The remainder of the 80,000,000 population allegedly was of the Moslem faith.¹⁰ With 85% of the population considered as Moslem, Indonesia would rank as one of the strongest Moslem countries in the world, numerically. Such percentages, however, must be considered to represent a somewhat erroneous picture, an important factor in considering the political developments in Indonesia. According to one native of Indonesia, a great number of this total described as Moslem regard the religion as merely a convenience, while others, when asked their religion, identify themselves as being Moslems "for lack of something better."¹¹ Kenneth Perry Landon, in describing this situation, has indicated that most of the total population in

¹⁰ Information furnished upon request by Indonesian Embassy.

¹¹ Soedarso (see note 6).

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Indonesia support the spirit cult to some degree. These people, despite their Hinduization, their Islamization, and to a more limited extent Westernization, have held tenaciously to their traditional outlook on the seen and unseen world about them and continue to solve their problems in life as they have always solved them--in terms of spirits. According to Landon:

Spiritism of the twentieth century is not the same as the spiritism of the first or the tenth century. New names, new gods, new rituals, new courts of justice, new holy places, and new ancestors have come into existence. But in the process of time conversion has not been of the people from the point of view of Hindus or of Moslems or of Westerners. The invading practices have been converted to the uses of the Indonesians. They have had to learn to placate new spirits, to use new charms, to engage in new rituals, but all to the same old end--the happiness of the people dwelling in the midst of myriads of spirits.¹²

It is in this light that the strengths of religion in Indonesia must be judged.

Population

Although no census has been conducted since 1930, the population of Indonesia in 1954 was at least 81.1 million, according to Indonesian estimates.¹³ Using an estimated lowest annual increase of 1.5%, the estimated population in Indonesia for 1955 is at least 82.3 million, including two

¹² Kenneth Perry Landon, Southeast Asia: Crossroads of Religion, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 21.

¹³ Information from Indonesian Embassy, 1955.

million foreigners. Of this number 54.2% live on Java and Madura, two islands representing one-tenth of the archipelago's land area, while the remainder of Indonesia's peoples are distributed throughout the remaining nine-tenths of the archipelago. This means that on Java, with a land area of 51,032 square miles, the population density is about 1000 persons per square mile. For the whole of Indonesia, the average density of population is 103 persons per square mile. The outer islands (Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Moluccas, and Sunda Islands) have a population density of 40 persons per square mile.¹⁴

It can readily be seen that Java has one of the highest population densities found anywhere in the world. This overpopulation, rapidly increasing, constitutes a serious problem in the political, social and economic development of Indonesia. Java has a fortunate combination of climate, fertile soils and historical circumstances, but it has negligible potential for the expansion of agriculture. This has created additional problems in that the surplus peoples are migrating to the urban areas, but are failing to find an industrial set-up capable of absorbing them. As an indication of this urban migration, the population of Djakarta and the Kota2Autonom (principal cities) increased from 3.2 million in 1930 to 7.1 million in 1952. What is true for the Kota2Autonom is

¹⁴ Ibid.

true for the smaller towns.¹⁵ This urbanization raises various social problems (housing, unemployment, health, and security) which cause great difficulties in the development of the Indonesian cities. These difficulties are more dangerous as cities grow, especially since such internal migration develops from pressures in the rural areas as well as from the attraction of the city. Any attempt by the Central Government to maintain the present population density on Java through resettlement would require the movement of around 800,000 yearly at the present rate of population increase. Such a gigantic operation is far beyond the scope and means of present-day Indonesia. (For graphic description of population distribution, see map plate, p.45.)

Education

Because of the reluctance of the Dutch to provide facilities for secondary and higher education to more than a tiny fraction of the native population, pre-World War II Indonesia was about 90% illiterate. According to Indonesian statistics, of a population of about 65 million, 90% of whom were illiterate, ten million consisted of children of school-going age; but for these there were only 21,455 primary schools and four faculties, namely two medical faculties, the technical faculty and the faculty of law. The total number of students at those

¹⁵ Ibid.

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faculties was 1,500 and there were only two Indonesian professors.¹⁶ In 1940, it was reported, only 240 Indonesian students graduated from high school. Thus the educated element of the elite in Indonesia today numbers a mere handful. The more influential of this group, those in whose hands the present political leadership of Indonesia mainly lies, are said to number around 200.

After having long been denied the opportunity for education and having been relegated to an inferior status under the Dutch administration because of the lack of education, the nationalist leaders have incorporated the right to education into the Provisional Constitution. But it has been very hard to implement this policy, in view of circumstances to be discussed later, which include lack of funds, nationalistic fervor which has contributed to a rapid exodus of the vitally needed intellectuals, and various political considerations. Indonesia is still confronted with the problem of educating the masses so as to make them politically conscious. Failure in this effort would only serve to destroy any efforts towards the establishment of a democratic society. A tradition-bound society, reluctant to change, and lacking any strong cultural demand for education, motivated in the quest for education primarily by material values, hinders any constructive effort towards improvement.

¹⁶ "Education in Indonesia After Independence," Indonesian Spectator, December 1950.

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According to Furnivall:

In the abnormal conditions of a tropical dependency, the tendency, visible everywhere in the modern world, to magnify the economic significance of education, develops into a conflict between cultural and material interests in which the former fight a losing battle.¹⁷

In present-day Indonesia this situation appears to be equally true, for according to Van der Kroef:

Such education that is sought is not so much sought for its own value, as a desirable end in itself, but as a passport to a life of comparative leisure and social prominence. In short it is an 'aggrandizement' compulsion to get at the top with a minimum of effort, not a desire to master or thoroughly understand the thought process and cultural background of the education obtained.¹⁸

Economic Structure

In Indonesia, economic considerations probably rank foremost among all factors that influence political ties and friction. Nearly every important nation in the world has some economic stake in the Indonesian Archipelago, mainly because of the industrial raw materials and the staples produced there. Of the principal products of the area, several have a political significance that transcends normal economic processes. Included in this group are such products as petroleum, rubber, tin, nickel, and bauxite.

¹⁷ J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study in Plural Economy, (Cambridge: The University Press, New York; The MacMillan Co., 1944), p. 367.

¹⁸ J. M. Van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World, (Bandung, Indonesia: Niasa Baiu, 1954), p. 88.

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Like many of the underdeveloped countries of Southeast Asia, Indonesia finds herself with an economy that is not complementary to the economies of the other areas of Southeast Asia. Indonesia, like the rest of the region, finds her economy still based primarily upon agricultural and primary products. Approximately three-quarters of the national income comes from agriculture and agricultural products alone; other raw materials constitute the remainder of the export trade. As heir to the export economy developed by the Dutch, the national economy today continues to be subject to the price fluctuations on the world market. Radical fluctuations have damaged the country's economy, particularly when shortages of foreign exchange have resulted from unfavorable terms of trade.

Indonesia must build a strong national economy less dependent on agricultural and raw material exports if she is to alleviate this dependence upon the world market. More of the consumer goods which are not imported must be produced in Indonesia. In order to sustain this type of economy a strong native demand must be stimulated. However, Indonesia is plagued by a lack of native capital and must look to external sources to meet these requirements.

The advances in industrialization that have thus far been achieved by the Indonesians do not appear very impressive. Her present industries are largely of two types: (1) processing of primary products for export or domestic consumption,

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and (2) production of consumer goods dependent on both domestic and imported raw material. The first category includes petroleum refining, sugar milling, and the processing of various estate products such as rubber, tea, coconuts, palm seeds, sisal, and other agricultural commodities.

The second category mentioned above includes automobile assembly, the manufacture of bicycles, tire tubes, rubber shoes, radios, batteries, soap, margarine, cigarettes, and light bulbs. These items satisfy a large part of the domestic demand. Other locally made products such as textiles, glass and paper satisfy a smaller part of the consumer needs. Thus it would appear that, from an overall standpoint, Indonesia is self-sufficient in relatively few items and must import most of her consumer goods as well as capital equipment.¹⁹ (See charts, pp. 43-44.)

The government has recognized the need for industrialization and has developed extensive plans. It would appear that little beyond the planning stage has been effected, although not enough information is available to permit a complete appraisal of Indonesia's industrial development. According to information provided by the Indonesian Embassy:

Incomplete statistical data makes it very difficult to determine the overall growth of industrial production in Indonesia. This deficiency is gradually

¹⁹ "Economic Progress", Report on Indonesia, Vol. 8, No. 1, August-September, p. 18.

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being corrected by the Central Bureau of Statistics, but complete data is not yet available.²⁰

Yet a few suggestive figures may be given.

Indonesia is in a very disadvantageous position in attempting to establish any extensive heavy industry. Despite an impressive coal potential, no coking coal has been found. This restricts the development of a steel industry, important in any heavy industry.²¹ Hydroelectric power could conceivably be utilized for this purpose, but in 1954 the electric power supply was described as being 10 kwh per capita, 68% of the power being used for lighting and for domestic purposes.²² Seven printing plants were described as having been completed by 1954 and sold to private domestic enterprises. Construction was in process on a cement plant of 200,000 tons capacity, scheduled for 1957. Of the seven rubber remilling plants proposed in 1951, only two had been fully completed by 1955. One 30,000 spindle factory had been completed.²³

An economic urgency program was established in 1952 for small industries. It aimed at the establishment of induks (central production processing units), extension of loans and

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ E. W. Van Bemmelen, The Geology of Indonesia, Vol. II: Economic Geography, (The Hague: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 205.

²² United Nations, Economic Survey of Far East, 1955, Bangkok, 1956.

²³ Ibid.



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credit, and research and training. The ultimate aim of this program was to improve quality; to introduce better techniques and organization; to increase the degree of standardization; and to promote cooperative organization, particularly for the purchase of raw materials and the sale of final products. By the end of 1954, eight induks were reported in operation. These included: (a) woodworks--not working satisfactorily; (b) ironworks (five enterprises of ten employees each)--running behind in delivery schedules and experiencing marketing difficulties; (c) ceramics--improvement of quality required (the cost of bringing raw materials from other parts of Indonesia made these products unable to compete with imports); (d) three leather induks; (e) an umbrella induk--not mechanized and comprising 800 family enterprises (in 1953 this induk operated at a loss; but in 1954, when the marketing was turned over to an old established trading firm, a profit was made); and, (f) a textile induk with modern equipment and comprising six enterprises with a total of 50 employees--operating below capacity.²⁴ From this it would appear that light industry, like heavy industry, has not advanced greatly.

As indications of Indonesia's continued dependence upon an export economy and as indications of increases achieved in the production of these products, the statistics provided by

²⁴ Ibid.

the Indonesian Embassy are given in charts on pp.

(For geographic distribution of products and resources, see map, p. 45.)

In the export economy of Indonesia, rubber and minerals are extremely important. "In recent years about 42 per cent of the world's natural rubber has been from Indonesia."²⁵ Indonesia possesses minerals of strategic concern to many countries of the world. Of these, petroleum and tin are of predominant importance. These two minerals and their derivatives account for nearly one-third of Indonesia's total exports by value. Coal and bauxite are of secondary importance, along with a number of other minerals produced in smaller quantities. In describing Indonesia's resources, official Indonesian reports declare that:²⁶

Indonesia's mineral resources are varied and generally considered to be extensive. On the basis of resource information at hand there appears to be a good potential for several minerals in addition to petroleum and tin. Nickel, bauxite, and possibly iron are among the most promising. For other minerals such as manganese and sulfur the known deposits of high quality are moderate in size but further exploration may uncover larger ones. For many others the potential may be smaller. However, in the long run, Indonesian minerals will offer many important opportunities for development and stimulation of economic activity in presently undeveloped regions.²⁶

Indonesia's petroleum resources are considered to be the largest in the Far East, ranking fifth in order of world

²⁵ "Economic Progress", Report on Indonesia, Vol. 8, No. 1, August-September, 1956, p. 16.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 21.

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supply areas, after the Middle East, United States, Russia, and Latin America. Recent estimates of known reserves range from 1.2 to 1.9 billion barrels and prospects are considered good for significant discoveries. Stanvac reportedly has made impressive oil discoveries in Central Sumatra. Caltex, it would appear, has made similar discoveries and is taking a calculated risk in planning an impressive expansion program over the next several years in Indonesia. According to a report on Caltex's plans:

Over the next several years Caltex will pour some 50 million dollars into expanding its facilities. Under this program Caltex will increase its production of oil from 120,000 barrels per day at present to 180,000 by the end of 1957. New exploration work will be pushed in the Duri field in Central Sumatra, and a new pipeline will be laid down from this field to Dumai on the Strait of Malacca. A 40-mile road will parallel the pipeline across what is now impenetrable swampland and will complete Sumatra's first overland route joining its east and west coasts.²⁷

The prime importance of such oil production rests not so much in its volume, which compared with the oil-producing areas of the Mid-East and the United States would appear to be negligible, but rather in the fact that the Indonesian oil constitutes about the only source in an oil-hungry Far East. This would be of special interest, e.g., to China and Japan.

Indonesia's production of tin ranks second among the tin-producing countries of the world, averaging about 33,500

²⁷ "The Business Globe", Fortune, April, 1957, p. 99.

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metric tons annually between 1950-54, and furnishing about 20 per cent of the world's supply.²⁸ Although other minerals, including nickel, bauxite and possibly iron, are reported to have high potential, it would appear that these have not been extensively explored.

Since her proclamation of independence Indonesia has failed to effect a new mining law which would provide for any measure of protection for the investment of foreign capital. Hence, capital has been extremely reluctant to effect any expansion or exploration in Indonesia to date.

Indonesia has succeeded in working out many plans to develop a more stable economy, an economy which is less dependent upon the fluctuations of a world market. Included in these plans are the following: (1) plans directed towards the establishment of agricultural cooperatives; (2) plans for the establishment of small scale cooperatives (already mentioned); (3) a five-year agricultural plan designed to make the country self-sufficient in food and to increase agricultural productivity in general; and, (4) a Five-Year Economic plan which was recently completed by the State Planning Council. This plan is described as containing no specific targets, but rather, includes three lists of projects in order of decreasing priority within each list. These lists specify the following: (1) special large-scale, multi-purpose projects;

²⁸ "Economic Progress", Report on Indonesia, op. cit. P. 26.

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(2) centralized large-scale single-purpose projects (both (1) and (2) are to be undertaken by the Central Government); and, (3) other projects to be recommended to provincial governments and private enterprises.²⁹ This plan has been officially described:

The basis for the priority assigned to each project is its contribution to the country's balance-of-payments position, its contribution to the country's social welfare, and its role as a key industry. In general, projects which save foreign exchange on the import side--cement plants and efforts to grow textile fibers--are considered projects for the government to undertake, along with communications, transportation and electric power; while projects for increasing foreign exchange earnings, for example, by increasing the degree of fabrication of the export products before they leave the country (rubber re-milling and tire manufacture, for example), are considered more appropriate for private investment.³⁰


At best, this program can envision little more than the name implies, merely a plan, for despite the best of intentions, the prime prerequisites for its implementation are not to be found within Indonesia. Sufficient capital is not available within Indonesia. Further, an appalling lack or shortage of indigenous technicians, administrators and entrepreneurs hinders any project that might be attempted. These essentials, during Indonesia's transition period, must come from without. Thus far nationalistic fervor has severely curtailed the introduction of foreign capital. Recent trends indicate that Russia may be increasingly promising in Indonesian eyes as a source of such essentials.

²⁹ Information on Five-Year Plan furnished by Indonesian Embassy, 1956.


³⁰ "Economic Progress", Report on Indonesia, op. cit., p.21.




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


HUNDRED THOUSANDS OF TONS



ANNUAL PRODUCTION OF MANGANESE

THOUSANDS OF TONS





PROBLEMS OF THE REPUBLIC. A grave, though not new, problem of Indonesia is the population pressure on Java. In 1815 its population was estimated at five million. Since then the rate of survival has steadily risen. By 1930 the population had grown to 42 million, and it is now believed to reach 52 million. Even more amazing is the fact that until recently Java's food production has been able to keep up with this increase. However, the pressure has become intense. The average density is 1,000 per square mile; the size of the average farm is only two acres. Industrialization might bring relief, but its success depends on raising the purchasing power of the people. If there were large-scale emigration to other islands, and each colonist were to get 15 or 20 acres, he could grow enough cash crops to buy manufactured goods. In the 1930's the Dutch made a promising start on resettlement in southern Sumatra, but recent economic and political difficulties have kept emigration from Java down to a trickle.

A matter of increasing concern is the rapid urban growth. It has created serious problems of housing, public health, and social conduct. The capital city Djakarta, the former Batavia, has now at least two million people, and Surabaya, Jogjakarta, and Bandung are in the one-million class. The growth of

and exploration. Membership is of seven types: Fellows (annual dues \$10); Sustaining Fellows (annual dues \$25); Library Membership (annual dues \$25); Contributing Fellows (annual dues \$100); Life Fellows (contribution \$250); Patrons (contribution \$1,000); Benefactors (contribution \$5,000). The Society is tax-exempt under Section 501 (c) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Director: Charles B. Hitchcock.

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Water: Greece; and Chile.

bureaucracy and the amenities of city life are certainly important factors.

A special problem faced by the leaders of the Indonesian Republic is the treatment of the non-Indonesian minorities. The economic development of the last century was accompanied by a considerable influx of foreign groups. Chinese came in large numbers as wage laborers and remained to set themselves up as traders, moneylenders, and craftsmen, forming a new middle class between the European top layer and the mass of the Indonesians. The present Chinese population is estimated to be between two and three million. Most of them live in urban areas; a few are wealthy businessmen or prominent professional people. There are also about 100,000 Arabs, perhaps 70,000 "pure" Dutch, and 100,000 Indo-Europeans.

Most members of the minority groups were born in Indonesia, regard it as their homeland, and have been admitted to citizenship. Indonesian nationalists are naturally anxious to round out their political power with direct control over the country's economy, and they dislike the economic strength of the non-Indonesians.

Western rule introduced ideas of rationalism, science, individualism, nationalism, and democracy. These dynamic spiritual forces made a deep impact on a society steeped in tradition. It meant, and means, a revolution in the ancient ways of life, and inevitably the loss of much that was good in the closely knit

agrarian-village communities. On the other hand, if Indonesia is to survive as a free country, more, not less, Westernization is needed. There is at present a serious divergence between political independence and economic means. Especially serious is the inadequacy of local capital and technical proficiency. The leaders realize this and want assistance from abroad. At the same time they are highly suspicious of anything that smacks of foreign influence. This is the great dilemma that faces Indonesia.

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(From Focus, VII, No. 4 (December, 1956))

Chapter III

HISTORY OF THE NATIONALIST MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA BEFORE THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Nationalism in the Netherlands Indies, although born under Dutch rule and resulting in part from Dutch policies, remained impotent until the turn of the 20th century, when it became organized. Previously, despite the period of liberalism and the "Ethical Policy," the Dutch economic policies and their impact upon the native society had provided for a continuance of traditional society. A communal psychology was retained. This in itself restrained the development of any agrarian-based Indonesian capitalism. In addition, the per capita income of the native populace, both on Java and to a lesser degree on the outer islands, further detracted from the possibility of any native capitalist development.¹

Further, despite the increase in the legal ownership of land, the peasant's lot was little improved. The spread of the money economy and continued liability for various taxes payable in money unaccompanied by any reasonable spread of credit facilities, forced the peasant to borrow from the local money lender. Because he could not repay such loans, the peasant was forced to grow crops and sell them in accordance with the wishes of his creditors. In this situation, the peasant became a tenant on his own land.²

¹ George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 19.

² Ibid., p. 21.

Many factors in combination hindered the development of nationalism in Indonesia. Dutch policy was largely successful in restricting a native movement of any magnitude. The Indonesian nationalist leaders, lacking any vested interest in capitalist developments, shared a common antipathy towards the capitalism of the West. On the other hand these same leaders, in varying degrees, found the ideals of Marxism, Socialism, and Communism better suited to their interests. The absence of all but a rudimentary native middle-class made it mandatory from the start that the nationalist leaders acquire mass support.

Articulate, Organized Nationalism

Developments Prior to 1900

During the 350 years of Dutch rule, Dutch policies were determined largely by economic considerations. These policies were carried out initially through the Netherlands East Indies Company and then after the turn of the 17th century by a Colonial Government which desired to preserve and perpetuate the "Batig Slot" (money return to the Netherlands). These economic considerations continued through the period of liberalism and throughout the period of the "Ethical Policy." However, as liberalism and the "Ethical Policy" grew in influence, government economic interests were supplanted to some extent by the interests of private capitalists.

Nevertheless, little was done to promote the native welfare unless economic gain for Dutchmen was expected.

One might reasonably ask how the Dutch, with a population roughly one-ninth that of the Indonesians in 1940, could dominate these peoples for over three centuries without experiencing organized opposition by the natives. In part the answer lies in the Dutch policy of perpetuating the native social order. In an effort to reduce the influence of Islam, the Dutch early retained the traditional native social order under adat (customary law). To some extent this policy succeeded although it failed to check the spread of Islam throughout the archipelago. (Present-day Indonesia is generally described as being 80 to 90 per cent Moslem.) According to the Socialist politician Soetan Sjahrir, the result of this policy was "to create a situation wherein here [Indonesia] there has been no spiritual and cultural life, and no intellectual progress for centuries."³

The Dutch used indirect rule throughout most of the archipelago except in areas where their economic concerns were the greatest--parts of Java, Sumatra, Madura, and the Moluccas. With these exceptions, the Dutch did not attempt direct control over the outer areas until the turn of the 20th century; they were satisfied with indirect rule. In

³ Soetan Sjahrir, Out of Exile, (New York: John Day Co., 1949), p. 66.

the areas under direct control, the native population displayed a limitless tolerance and extraordinary adaptability and passivity--basic weaknesses of the Indonesians, according to Sjahrir. The natives were not equally passive, Sjahrir says, in those interior areas which remained free of outside influence.⁴ In the 19th century there were 33 revolts against Dutch authority; for the most part, these were Batak or Atchenese or other local revolts, initiated by sectional minorities of the interior regions, with no nationalistic character. In the interiors of Sumatra, Borneo and Celebes, since the Christian and Buddhist virtues of tolerance had not been established, the natives of these regions did not display the degree of passivity shown by the peoples of Java and Madura.⁵

Over several decades, as the result of many factors, including the "Culture System" inaugurated under Van den Boesch in the 1830's, and subsequent measures such as health services, road building and the construction of communication networks, the native population burgeoned so much it created problems of overpopulation on Java and Madura. Many of the surplus agricultural people migrated to the urban areas and contributed to the growth of an urban proletariat oftentimes unable to get jobs. Others became a rural proletariat and

⁴ Ibid., p. 179.

⁵ Charles Wolf, Jr., The Indonesian Story, (New York: The John Day Co., 1949), p. 50.

remained as a disruptive element in the village social order. These developments led to a changed pattern of values. Economic values became more and more the prime consideration of the proletarian groups. Thus, as the ranks of the proletariat swelled, the native village social order was further disrupted.

The growing proletariat experienced many grievances but continued to remain relatively passive. By way of explaining this passivity Kahin says:

A large part of Indonesian labor maintained close contact with the village through former domicile or through blood relationship with the members, and in times of economic crisis was able to rely to an important extent on the social security that the village provided. The fact that these groups could look to the agriculturally based village for minimum food and shelter in times of prolonged industrial and plantation unemployment is essential in understanding the political orientation and activity of Indonesian labor. The still strongly communalistically inclined village must be considered as having provided, for a major portion of plantation and industrial labor, a cushion of social security which tended to obviate the violent political reactions which might have otherwise been generated during the considerable periods of unemployment experienced by this group in times of economic depression. Thus though discontent with wage levels and working conditions certainly developed the political consciousness of urban and plantation labor; because of the social security offered by the village, most of the members of these groups fell far short of developing the revolutionary mentality that some of the Communist leaders were counting on.⁶

⁶ Kahin, op. cit., p. 24.

Introduction of a Native Intellectual Elite

Despite its existence in embryo, nationalism was held in abeyance for a long period because the traditional aristocrats refused to be identified with the nationalist movement. This latent force awaited the emergence and guidance of an indigenous counter-elite, without which the masses were unable to understand the relationship between their deteriorated position and Dutch power. The Dutch were able to continue their dominance for three centuries by effectively exercising their political rule and economic exploitation indirectly through the native hierarchy. The buffers which this native hierarchy had provided in the past began to disappear with the abandonment of the "Culture System" and the subsequent introduction of free enterprise in the era of liberalism. With the introduction of a directly administered system of free enterprise, the centralization of power, the introduction of foreign capitalism, and the expansion of the civil service, large sectors of the agricultural population were brought into immediate contact with Dutch persons and with Dutch economic power. Where for a long time the government personnel had served as liaison officers between the East and the West, as arbitrators of grievances of the native against both the Dutch and the indigenous aristocrats, now they became simply tax-collectors--and oppressors.⁷

⁷ J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India--A Study of a Plural Economy, (Cambridge: The University Press, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1944), p. 192.

By 1900 the Dutch had abandoned much of the structure of indirect government in Java and parts of Sumatra in favor of more direct control. The policy in the outer islands experienced little change. With the advent of the "Ethical Policy" in 1894, the Dutch Government, in the name of righteousness and in the interest of capital, took up the task of bringing the whole archipelago effectively under Dutch control. But it was not until 1909 that all of the islands were subjugated.⁸ As the Dutch direct control spread, the Indonesians became increasingly conscious of the relationship between Dutch power and their own economic and political conditions. This became especially true after 1900 when:

Dutch civil servants--frequently altruistic and zealous for the welfare of the Indonesian, but often overly paternalistic--came into direct contact with the village and sought to introduce reforms by methods of 'gentle pressure' depending ultimately on economic sanctions or actual force.⁹

The peasants' negative reaction to this changing pattern of political control was often strong and spontaneous. Perhaps the most outstanding indication of such peasant protest was the Saminist movement beginning about 1890 in north-east middle Java: peasant groups refused to pay taxes or to perform legally required village services. All members sought to avoid any contact with governmental employees. This movement can be described as being originally passive and not in

⁸ Ibid., p. 237.

⁹ Kahin, op. cit., p. 49.

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the strictest sense nationalistic. However, it provided a ready opportunity for the emerging nationalist leaders. In 1915 the Pati area, under native leaders, erupted in serious disturbances which the government put down with armed force.¹⁰

When one considers that even as late as 1941 the Indonesian populace was about 90 per cent illiterate, one readily sees the difficulty of translating peasant grievances and increased political consciousness into articulate nationalism. Ironically, the Dutch removed much of the difficulty by their post-1900 educational policies which helped create an indigenous intellectual elite and thus provided leadership for the nationalist movement. This elite stimulus vitalized the nationalist movement. External factors such as the modernization of Japan, the Japanese victory over Russia in 1904, the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1902, the Filipino struggle against Spain in 1900, Kemal Ataturk's success against Western military power, the Chinese Revolution of 1911, and the strengthening of national self-determination by the European peace treaties after World War I, all combined to make the Indonesians doubt that they were inferior to the Dutch or were unable to govern themselves without Dutch help.¹¹

It is ironic that the Dutch, both for economic reasons and as a measure to forestall the dangers believed to be

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 43.

¹¹ Inter Collegiate Seminar on Indonesia, Indonesian Revolution: 2nd Phase, (mimeographed), p. 20.

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inherent in the Islamic Modernist Movement, afforded the Indonesian elite a chance for a western education. The Dutch intended to meet an enlarged demand for cheap clerical help and to divert the modernist leaders from Islam and towards cultural association with the Dutch. The move, contrary to Dutch expectations, was to prove a nemesis for the Dutch, for the interests of the educated Indonesian elite were at variance with colonial society. The growing class of native intellectuals, often intellectually equal to the Europeans and thoroughly Westernized, became the vanguard of a new cultural force which sought to emancipate Indonesian society as a whole by bringing the technological and cultural achievements of the West within reach of every Indonesian.¹²

Government efforts directed at halting the spread of Pan Islamic ideals were largely successful, but they failed to keep out all political elements of Modammedan teaching. Nor did the government recognize the need for absorbing this developing Indonesian elite into the service of the state. Those who succeeded in getting positions with the government often felt such posts beneath them. Others, failing to be absorbed in government or other employment where their training was utilized, became a dissatisfied counter-elite endowed with Western and Modernist Islamic political ideas

¹² J. M. Van der Kroef, Indonesia In The Modern World, (Bandung, Indonesia: Masa Baru, 1954), p. 150.

which could not be harmonized with colonial social and political relationships.¹³

The Chinese Movement in Indonesia was also a forerunner of Indonesian nationalism. Through cooperative action, agitation, and pressure on the colonial government, the Indo-Chinese obtained concessions from the Dutch. These concessions forced the natives further into the background, and at the same time made a vivid impression upon them. At least some of the natives learned the advantages of organized social action.

We have mentioned the migration of untutored and unskilled Indonesians to the urban areas to constitute an urban proletariat in a preponderantly foreign capitalistic economy. According to Van der Kroef:

. . . the growth of this urban proletariat next to the rise of the intelligentsia is the most significant feature of 20th century city life, reflecting a gradual dislocation of the village society and the constitution of a new class of people who gradually lost most of their traditions and who because of their social instability found a new sense of communal cohesion in urban nationalist parties and labor unions.¹⁴

Imported from the outside, trade unionism, like Western education, disrupted traditional value patterns. Following closely on the heels of the Chinese Movement, the development of trade unions in Holland was reflected in their development in Indonesia. In 1908 the VSTP (Rail and Tramways Union) was

¹³ Kahin, op. cit., p. 49.

¹⁴ Van der Kroef, op. cit., p. 152.

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established, with a few native members; in 1911 the Union of Customs Officers; in 1912 the Union of Educational Officers; in 1913 the Union of Pawn Shop Staffs; in 1916 the Union of Opium Staff Officers; and in 1917 the Union of Public Works and Treasury Officers.¹⁵

In 1908 Boedi Utomo, the "Glorious Endeavor" was organized. This was the first organized nationalist cultural movement in Indonesia. The movement adopted an essentially non-political program calling for the development of traditional and Western education among the people of Java and Madura; the advancement of agriculture, industry, and commerce, and finally the development of everything "that would guarantee them the life of a dignified people."¹⁶

Within a short time after its launching, the leadership of Boedi Utomo was displaced by older and relatively conservative men from the top echelon of Javanese aristocracy. Despite initial successes the masses did not respond because the movement did not reach them. The support that was achieved, with the exception of the politically conservative aristocratic elements, deserted in favor of the first politically based nationalist organization, Sarekat Islam, founded in 1912. Sarekat Islam appealed to the Indonesian masses because of its inherent economic basis. It was first formed to

¹⁵ Wm. L. Holland, Asian Nationalism and the West, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1953), p. 254.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 65.

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protect the native middle class against the increasing encroachment of the Chinese. This, much more than any political ramifications, succeeded in attracting support.

Disruptive Factors in the Development of Indonesian Nationalism

In the formative period of organized Indonesian nationalism many factors disrupted any unity of effort. These factors forestalled achievements before World War II and contributed to continued instability after the war. Van der Kroef has described one of the more significant of these disruptive factors as being the emergence of an urban elite of Indonesian intellectuals far removed from the ways of the untutored villager. Along with the newly developed middle class of Indonesian traders, small manufacturers, and shopkeepers, the intellectuals have introduced new concepts of social standing to the Indonesian people. These new groups became "a new aristocracy of the cities, feeling itself superior to the simple life of the villager and frequently deriding the latter."¹⁷ As evidence that such attitudes continue in present-day Indonesia, a native student of Indonesia has described the peasantry as being "stupid" and not knowing what it wants.¹⁸

¹⁷ Van der Kroef, op. cit., p. 151.

¹⁸ Soegang Soedarso, Indonesian student at Michigan State University, interviewed in 1957. This information substantiated in interview with Indonesian Army Lieutenant Colonel attending the Infantry School, Ft. Benning, Georgia.

These same intellectuals in their studies were exposed to many political ideologies. Those with a command of the Dutch language explored and were attracted to the writings of Rousseau, Locke, Mazzini, Sorel, and the Utopian and Marxist Socialists. Different individuals accepted different ideologies. This in turn led to disunity within the nationalist movement. However, such political ideals as were accepted helped to erode the feeling of inferiority long existent among the Indonesians.¹⁹ Many of the students when evaluating the different ideologies in accordance with traditional Indonesian culture found communism the most adaptable to their aims. According to Kahin:

The appeal of Leninist Marxism with its anti-imperialist content was especially strong, for to many it alone seemed to pose a satisfactory solution to the antithesis presented by Western political concepts of liberty and equality and Western colonialism.²⁰

One must appreciate the high degree of religious and politico-ideological tolerance inherent in traditional Indonesia in order to understand the complexity and diversity of Indonesian nationalism. In the past this tolerance provided for a relatively easy assimilation of new religious and political ways into traditional society. Thus, many sincere Moslems were able to develop a working synthesis of important

¹⁹ Furnivall, op. cit., p. 50.

²⁰ Kahin, op. cit., p. 51.

elements of both Marxism and their religion. In addition, the non-capitalist background of the overwhelming majority of Indonesian secondary and college students or, as a matter of fact, of Indonesian society in general, provided a setting in which the socialist economics of Marxism could easily be accepted. Capitalism, on the other hand, associated with the West and with Dutch imperialism, was naturally regarded with hostility.

This pro-Marxist, anti-capitalist orientation gave direction to the growing sense of grievance among the Indonesian masses against the Dutch. The Indonesians objected to Dutch social discrimination and to the Dutch attitude of superiority. The intellectuals were frustrated in their efforts to advance, both by lack of security and by inequitable employment. Dual judicial administration and penal legislation discriminated sharply against the natives. Economic discrimination along with the displacement of rural society and the rise of both urban and rural proletariat, took on a widespread importance. In addition, continued limited educational facilities, which as late as 1940 produced little more than 200 Indonesian high school graduates, prompted a growing conviction among the politically conscious Indonesians that their country was being milked by the Dutch.

Despite the rising tide of nationalism, many factors in combination limited its growth. Of these, perhaps the most powerful was the system of indirect rule under which, until

the end of Dutch rule, a native aristocratic hierarchy "still commanded a considerable support from a major part of the Indonesian masses and continued to constitute one of the most important pillars supporting the Dutch Regime."²¹ In addition, the plural nature of colonial society limited the growth of nationalism. According to Furnivall, "Nationalism within a plural society is itself a disruptive force, tending to shatter and not to consolidate its social order."²²

The Dutch also enjoyed a monopoly of force. Until their fall in World War II, the Dutch were effectively able to deny the Indonesian nationalist leaders the prime requisite of success in achieving their goals. Because of the lack of all but a rudimentary middle class the nationalist leaders were forced to attempt direct linkage with the masses in order to achieve the needed support. Dutch control denied them this opportunity.

Forces Influencing the Political Nationalist Movement

Sarekat Islam. In view of the long duration of Dutch rule and its intensive economic character, it is not too surprising that nationalism in Indonesia initially assumed an economic bent and became entwined with labor grievances. Economic grievances created by the Chinese in Indonesia

²¹ Ibid., p. 57.

²² Furnivall, op. cit., p. 168.

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prompted the formation of Sarekat Islam, an organized effort to halt the encroachment of competitive Chinese entrepreneurs upon the Javanese merchant class. This movement was led by non-merchant intellectuals and religious leaders, and in its origin was headed by Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto.²³ The organization in its infancy was superficially non-political and advocated loyalty to the government. In addition, Sarekat Islam's program advocated modernist Islamic religious concepts and economic and cultural improvement for the native society.

In the past the religious unity provided by Islam for the major part of the Indonesian masses was the one vestige of Indonesian culture free of Western encroachment. In the nationalist movement, Islam provided the means of contact with the masses. From a membership of 360,000 in 1915, four years after its founding, Sarekat Islam burgeoned to two-and one-half million members by 1919.²⁴

The original outwardly religio-economic emphasis of Sarekat Islam soon became openly political. In 1914 Tjokroaminoto indicated the role that religion played in Sarekat Islam's efforts when he stated: "Sarekat Islam used religion as a bond, as a means of cohesion, and the progress it wants is not going to be hampered by this religion."²⁵

²³ Kahin, op. cit., p. 68.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 69.

²⁵ Ibid.

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According to Wertheim, the Muhommadijah Movement (Modernist Islam) embodied the bourgeois Islamic faith, which made few positive claims on the conduct of its adherents. However, it afforded them the gratification which belonged to the life of reasonable prosperity and "permitted them to go through life with an attitude of tolerance and pleasurable content towards their own progressive ambitions."²⁶ Sarekat Islam in its origin embodied many of these bourgeois traits, and in general must be interpreted as serving the interests of a restricted few, failing to bridge the gap existing between the urban traders and the peasantry, and the rural and urban proletariat.

As Sarekat Islam grew, its members found a new basis of group cohesion in modern unionism. They began to look to the urban intellectuals for leadership rather than to the two powerful classes of former times: the traditional chiefs and the religious teachers.²⁷ Since the small man's aspirations went much farther than those of the larger urban trader who had originally founded Sarekat Islam, a divergency of aims became manifest and soon created a situation wherein the large membership proved a threat to the bourgeois leaders. These developments provided an opportunity for the introduction of radical Marxism into the ranks of Sarekat Islam.

²⁶ W. F. Wertheim, Effects of Western Civilization on Indonesian Society, (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1950), p. 59.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 27.

Marxist Socialism. Ironically, Hendrik Sneevliet entered the Indies in 1914 and founded the Indies Social Democratic Association with the help of Dutch Socialists already on the scene. This organization grew rapidly in numbers and in radicalism, but its European leadership precluded mass support. The Dutch Government in 1914 conveniently provided the opening which Sneevliet desired. Fearful of the advances being made by Sarekat Islam, the Dutch indirectly attacked the organization by declaring it illegal as a corporate whole. This move disrupted the central leadership's control over its many branches.²⁸ As a result, Sneevliet was able to contact Semaoen and Darsono, the socialistically inclined leaders of the Semarang branch of Sarekat Islam. Through their proselyting, Sneevliet succeeded in infiltrating the ranks of Sarekat Islam. In view of the successes enjoyed, Sneevliet, as the Comintern's first delegate to China, "primarily on the basis of his experience with Sarekat Islam, proposed to the Chinese Communists' Central Committee that they join the Kuomintang and utilize its broad loose organizational structure as a means for developing their propaganda and contacts among the masses."²⁹

Thus it can be stated that the social pattern of Islam had been gradually superimposed on Indonesian society over the

²⁸ Kahin, op. cit., p. 70.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 72.

course of years and was not effectively challenged until it was challenged by the basic ideals of Marxism during World War I. Despite this challenge, Islam continued to provide a means for contacting the masses in order to obtain support for the nationalist movement. However, one must be careful not to exaggerate the religious significance of Islam, for the average Indonesian is Moslem in name only,³⁰ having found, over the centuries, in Islam a refuge against Western penetration and a rallying point against foreign influence. Except in a few areas of Sumatra and Western Java, one finds the commands of the Koran hardly influencing the public and private life of the Indonesian.³¹

That the leaders of Sarekat Islam keenly appreciated the appeal of Marxism to the masses can be seen in the changed program of Sarekat Islam in the years during and after World War I. In 1913 the leaders professed loyalty to the government and rejected all anti-Dutch actions. The First National Congress in 1916 demanded self-government, to be attained, however, by cooperating with the government for the welfare of the Indies. The Congress of Batavia, in 1917, violently attacked the government and demanded independence by evolution. This same congress declared that a fight would

³⁰ Bernard H. M. Vlekke, Nusantara: A History of East Indian Archipelago, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univ. Press, 1943), p. 336.

³¹ Van der Kroef, op. cit., p. 189.

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be waged against sinful capitalism; later clarified, undoubtedly at the insistence of bourgeois elements, to mean foreign or non-Mohammedan capitalism. The Third National Congress, held in October 1919, was potentially revolutionary and increasingly socialistic. At the Fourth Congress in 1919, Semaoen made some extreme leftist proposals which were not accepted. When confronted with this decision, Semaoen and the Social Democratic Association leaders undertook to convert the Democratic Socialist organization into the Communist Party of the Indies (Perserikatan Komunise di India--PKI).³²

From these developments the effect of socialism on those among the masses who had suffered social dislocation can be readily discerned. Sarekat Islam per se, as a purely religious and economic force, had not succeeded in reaching the masses. Continued active revolutionary policies designed to counter the successes of the Semaoen faction indicate that the leaders of Sarekat Islam recognized this fact. By 1919, Sarekat Islam had succeeded in organizing labor unions, a move interpretable as an effort to reestablish centralized control. Twenty-two Indonesian trade unions had been united under one leader, Soerjopranato. As in the past, Semaoen and his cohorts attempted to infiltrate this group. They were unsuccessful in their efforts and in turn formed a rival

³² Vlekke, op. cit., pp. 350-52.

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association of trade unions, the Revolutionary Trade Union Central.³³

The continuing struggle between the Semaoen faction and the leaders of Sarekat Islam led to a split in Sarekat Islam at the Sixth Congress in 1921. At this congress party discipline was accepted in Sarekat Islam and the Communists present resigned. This split prevented the effective consolidation of nationalist forces and continues to plague Indonesian unity even now.

Increase of Secularism in Political Nationalist Movement.

The breach in Sarekat Islam together with increased Dutch repressive measures prompted the development of covert political nationalism. Mohammedijah and Taman Siswa were the earlier of these movements. The latter was established in 1921 by Dewantara, whose "wild schools" succeeded in developing a national mentality among the youth. A large proportion of the graduates of his schools became active participants and leaders in various political nationalist organizations. In addition to these two movements, many local religious and racial groups formed organizations of their own. Java was the main base for these efforts, for all groups, with the exception of the Timorese club, were founded by national groups living in Java, not in their own territories. The first adherents to these

³³ Kahin, op. cit., pp. 77.

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groups were found among those men cut loose from their normal surroundings.³⁴

In the years following the Communist-led rebellion of 1926, the character of Indonesian nationalism became increasingly determined by outside forces. These forces stemmed from ideas brought into Indonesia by students returning from Holland. While studying in Holland, most of these students had been members of Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Student Union). In Holland these individuals had become aware of the dichotomy between Dutch practice and policy and of the developing revolutionary sentiments in Europe. These revolutionary sentiments and ideals were adopted in varying degrees, and played a dominant role in the development of nationalism in Indonesia.

Between 1923 and 1927, the returning members of Perhimpunan Indonesia (PI) helped establish a number of study clubs in the chief cities of Indonesia. Through these clubs these students disseminated the political ideas of the PI. Their efforts to form political parties were largely denied because of the PKI strength in Indonesia until 1927. After Communist strength had been dissipated in the aftermath of the 1926 Rebellion, members of the Bandoeng Study Club succeeded in establishing the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI) under the

³⁴ Vlekke, op. cit., pp. 334.

chairmanship of Soekarno, one of the few members of the group not a member of the PI.

The PNI. Soekarno, a graduate engineer of the Bandoeng Technological college, a protege of Tjokroaminoto, was a capable political leader and able to assess the needs of a successful political movement. He was able to synthesize Western and Islamic concepts and through effective manipulation of symbols caused the peasantry to appear to understand.³⁵

The PNI experienced a relatively rapid growth for several reasons. As previously mentioned, Communist strength for the moment had been dissipated. In addition, just after the outbreak of the Communist rebellion in 1926, De Graeff began a five-year term as Governor General of the Indies and pursued a relatively liberal policy towards the right of association. Through a combination of these factors the PNI was able to amass a sizeable following in a relatively short time.

In the light of later developments it would appear that Soekarno was largely instrumental in developing the political program of the PNI. Its aim was complete independence for Indonesia. Representative government through universal suffrage was to be achieved through a policy of non-cooperation. Under this program the PNI soon became the most powerful nationalist organization in Indonesia. With the support of

³⁵ Kahin, op. cit., p. 90.

Sarekat Islam leaders, PNI was able to establish a loose federation of all important nationalist organizations, including Boedi Utomo, Sundanese Club, Sarekat Islam, the League of Sumatrans and the Indonesian Study Club. According to Vlekke, the political ideals among this group were widely divergent but this federation, the PPPKI (Union of Political Associations of the Indonesian People), gave the Nationalist movement a unity that it had never before possessed. This divergency of ideals or means can be seen in the refusal of Boedi Utomo and the Sundanese Clubs to adopt PNI tactics of non-cooperation.³⁶

Although the PNI enjoyed a rapid growth (10,000 members in the first two years),³⁷ there are indications that Soekarno and the PNI, like other organizations in the past, had failed to rally the masses. The PNI membership was drawn from the urban proletariat and the Westernized intellectual elite. Political agitation did not appeal to the masses, who had given evidence in the 1926 Communist rebellion that agitation with revolutionary aims was not to their liking. Instead, most Javanese clung to their traditional ideals of "peace and order in harmony."³⁸

³⁶ Vlekke, op. cit., p. 352.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 354.

Vlekke contends that Soekarno and the PNI resorted to intimidating the village people and forcing them to join organized fighting squads against the government when such mass support was not forthcoming.³⁹ This would not appear too implausible in the light of circumstances which developed in Indonesia in the immediate post World War II period.

In December 1929, because of the PNI's revolutionary activities and because of its outspoken anti-government and anti-capitalist statements, the Dutch Government arrested Soekarno and seven other PNI leaders. The Dutch apparently sized up the oligarchical structure of the party accurately, for the arrest of these eight leaders caused the collapse of the party. New leaders moved up to replace them in newly formed organizations. For some time these new leaders served to moderate the character of the nationalist movement.

Impact of the Crisis of the '30's--Dutch Policy--World Developments Affecting Indonesian Nationalism, 1930-1941

Economic Crisis of the '30's. Furnivall considers 1929 as significant a date in the history of economic relations between the East and the West as the opening of the Suez Canal in the 19th Century. The crash in world prices for raw materials and agricultural products, along with a subsequent restriction of world markets, wrought havoc with the Netherlands East Indies economy and contributed to a drastically

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 354-7.

altered pattern of trade between the East and the West.⁴⁰

Since the turn of the 20th century, with increasing success Japan had been able to penetrate the Indies economically. By 1932, after the devaluation of the yen in Japan, according to Furnivall it was "practically impossible to name any category of goods in which European and American markets could compete with Japan."⁴¹ Through the influx of cheap goods from Japan, much of the native industry in Indonesia was destroyed and the native social order further disrupted.

As a result of the economic crisis, local firms in Indonesia turned to the manufacture of goods which could not be imported. Large plantations were hard hit, both because of fallen prices, and because of limited markets. Many businesses failed in the increasingly competitive society which developed. Many plantations collapsed, rendering many of the urban and rural proletariat surplus. In the main, those groups retaining some vestiges of their village ties returned to their villages and contributed to an already aggravated overpopulation problem. Generally speaking, native Indonesia attempted a return to its traditional subsistence economy. Since the attempt was thwarted by Dutch taxation policies, the native was forced to find some source of money income--usually by borrowing. This situation evoked a growing dissatisfaction

⁴⁰ Furnivall, op. cit., p. 433.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 432.

among the peasants although many peasants attempted a retreat into the traditions of the past.

Impact of Dutch Policy. Dutch policy toward political nationalism is extremely significant in understanding the developments after World War II. With the outlawing of the PNI in 1929, the members of this group split and formed three organizations. The Indonesian Peoples Party (Partai Rakjat Indonesia), based on cooperation and eventual independence through parliamentary means, succeeded in attracting few members. Partindo (Partai Indonesia) also aimed at complete independence but practiced (or preached) non-cooperation; formed by Sartono, it was more moderate than the PNI. The Independent Group (Golongan Merdeka), headed in 1932 by Soetan Sjahrir and Mohammed Hatta, strove for the development of a highly politically conscious group of nationalists, relatively small in number. Governmental success in repressing previous nationalist groups had convinced Sjahrir and Hatta that mass organizations, dependent upon charismatic leadership, were ineffectual in the face of government power.⁴²

The methods of this latter group differed from other nationalist organizations in that they were evolutionary and followed a policy of loyal opposition to the government. Sjahrir explains his rejection of non-cooperation as a tactic

⁴² Kahin, op. cit., p. 97.

thus: "non-cooperation served a purpose as long as there was no constructive practical policy that could be followed. The fault of the non-cooperators has been that they cultivated their doctrine as a religion--as a question of honor."⁴³

The Dutch quickly realized the import of Sjahrir's and Hatta's tactics and arrested both in February, 1934. Both were exiled to Boven Digol. Soekarno, after having been released from prison in December 1931, was also engaged in nationalist activities. His efforts were short lived, however, for he was rearrested in August 1933 and exiled until the Japanese occupation. Prior to his second arrest he attempted to promote unity between the Partindo and the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, but failed. He then joined the Partindo and immediately became its leader. At the time of his arrest this group consisted of 50 branches and 20,000 registered members.⁴⁴

After Soekarno's second arrest, the general trend in the nationalist movement was towards evolutionary political organizations. This can undoubtedly be attributed to the increased repressiveness of Dutch policy during the 30's. Through their exercise of power and authority, the Dutch effectively restricted the nationalist movement until the outbreak of the war. Moderate, evolutionary nationalism became

⁴³ Sjahrir, op. cit., p. 211.

⁴⁴ Kahin, op. cit., p. 94.

manifest with the organization of the relatively moderate Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raya--Greater Indonesian Party) in 1935. This became the chief Indonesian political organization. However, this group received a rude shock in 1939 when the Netherlands Government rejected the Soetardjo Petition. This petition, passed 26-20 in the Volksraad,⁴⁵ proposed that a conference be convened to discuss plans for the evolutionary development of Indonesian self-government. This was to be accomplished over a ten year period and within the existing Dutch Constitution. Through this move the Dutch, in effect, served notice to the Indonesians that they did not contemplate any moves in the immediate future that would grant any measure of independence to Indonesia.

This stand by the Dutch prompted the organization of a new party, Gerindo (Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia--Indonesian People's Movement), in 1937. This group included former members of the dissolved PNI and those voicing dissatisfaction with conservative nationalism. Under the leadership of Sartono, Amir Sjarifoeddin, A. K. Gani, Sanusi, Pani, Wikana, and Mohammed Yami, the group soon became the powerful left-wing of the nationalist movement.⁴⁶ Post-war information (Amir Sjarifoeddin's announcement in 1948 that he had been a Communist since 1936) explains in part the development of

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 96.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

policy within this group, which, with the rise of Fascism, became coincident with Soviet policy in interpreting the struggle for independence as being dependent upon the outcome of the world struggle between Fascism and anti-Fascism.

In 1939 Indonesian nationalism achieved a greater degree of unity than heretofore, with the founding of one large federation, the GAPI (Gaboengan Politiek Indonesia--Federation of Indonesian Political Parties). This federation, uniting eight of the most important nationalist organizations, achieved unity in a program including: (1) right of self-determination for Indonesia, (2) representative Indonesian parliament, elected by universal suffrage, (3) national unity founded upon "political, social and economic democracy," and, (4) solidarity between Indonesian political groups and the Netherlands in order to maintain a strong anti-Fascist front.⁴⁷

The efforts of this group were rebuffed as the Soetjardo Petition had been rebuffed. In 1940 the Wiwoho Resolution was passed in the Volkstaad calling for self-government within the framework of the Netherlands Constitution. The Netherlands Government, despite the fact that the Germans had already overrun the home country, replied that consideration of political reforms could be taken only after Netherlands political organs had been restored. This stand was followed shortly by the Netherlands' signature of the Atlantic Charter,

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 97.

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which called for the right of self-determination of all people. Dutch policy in Indonesia, however, was not in accord with the principles of the charter. When questioned by the Indonesian leaders, the Netherlands interpreted their signing of the charter to mean no change in the relationship between the Netherlands and Indonesia.

These acts on the part of the Dutch were sufficient evidence in the eyes of the Indonesians that the Dutch Government had not the slightest intention of altering the basic subordinate relation of the colony to the mother country. These facts are fundamental in understanding the nationalist leaders' distrust of the administrative promises made by Queen Wilhelmina during the war. Thus, on the eve of World War II in the Pacific, whatever Indonesian-Dutch solidarity had been induced by the threat of Fascism rapidly eroded. The Indonesians in turn became more unified than they had ever been before.

World Developments. A growing anti-Dutch feeling existed among the intellectuals and among the masses. This was in direct proportion to the nationalist leaders' ability to reach the Indonesian people and make articulate a desire for freedom. With the exception of a few intellectual leaders such as Sjahrir and Hatta, leftist leaders, and conceivably others educated in the West, the average Indonesian, according to Sjahrir, felt a secret satisfaction with the fall of Holland. Further :

.....it was expected that there would be still more radical happenings. The Djojobojo rumors appeared again and were whispered everywhere. The consciousness of foreign domination coupled with an intense desire for freedom and independence became increasingly strong. As the war [In Europe] developed in these first years, the people derived a vicarious satisfaction from the misfortunes of their rulers. This provided a stimulus for further estrangement from the Dutch and the growth of a national self-consciousness. For the average Indonesian, the war was not really a world conflict between the two great world forces. It was simply a struggle in which Dutch Colonial rulers finally would be punished by Providence for the evil, the arrogance, and the oppression they had brought to Indonesia. Among the masses, anti-Dutch feeling grew stronger and stronger. This was naturally reflected in the nationalist movement and in its leadership, part of which expressed sympathy for the Axis openly.⁴⁸

Obviously it is impossible to make a very useful definition of the "average Indonesian" or of the "Indonesian masses." Any extensive application of such terms must be considered suspect. Generally the term refers to the islands of Java, Madura, and Sumatra, and the term "masses" is applied even within this limited field only to those groups among whom political communication has been established. Further, any interpretation of the pro-Japanese sympathies among the Indonesian populace must be considered in the light of the re-introduction of the prophecy of Djojobojo, a 14th century Javanese king who held that, after a long period of subjection by the white man, the Indonesians would be freed after a yellow race from the North had driven out the white man.

⁴⁸ Sjahrir, op. cit., p. 218.

The yellow race would stay in Indonesia only as long as the span covered by the growth of corn between harvest and planting. Some Indonesians looked upon the Japanese as the fulfilment of this prophecy.⁴⁹

The breach in Indonesian-Dutch relations widened from 1939 to 1941. When the Dutch introduced stringent war measures directed primarily towards a tremendously increased production for export, the nationalist movement became more unified in its effort. In September 1941 many of the Indonesians nationalist organizations convened the Second Indonesian Peoples Congress. This congress transformed itself into the Madjelis Rakjat Indonesia (Peoples Congress) intended to be a permanent representative body of the entire Indonesian nationalist movement. The executive Council of the Congress now included elements of GAPI, the Federation of Islamic Organizations, the Federation of Government Officials, women's organizations, trade unions, and youth movements. It is significant, in the light of post-war developments, that the chief declared objective of this organization was a representative parliament for Indonesia to which the Indies Government would be responsible--a continuance of evolutionary nationalism⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 232-3.

⁵⁰ Dorothy Woodman, The Republic of Indonesia, (New York: Philisophical Library, 1955), p. 167.

Japanese Interlude and Impact Upon Indonesian Nationalism

According to Charles Wolf, "Allied intelligence concerning Indonesia during the [Japanese] occupation was more meagre than for any other area in Southeast Asia."⁵¹ Thus any attempt to appraise the effect of the Japanese occupation on Indonesian political developments must be made cautiously. Most of the information we have has become available only after the Allied re-occupation and as such, must be considered to be colored by extreme bias. Wolf has stated:

Released Dutch internees and P.O.W.'s were either too biased, or out of touch, to offer a fair index of the real state of affairs. Unbiased Indonesians were just as difficult to find, and the Chinese-Eurasian minorities often were too afraid either of the returning Dutch or of the Indonesians to speak freely.⁵²

Despite charges and counter-charges of collaboration between the nationalist leaders and the Japanese, available information does not permit one to make any accurate conclusions. Any charges of collaboration must be viewed within a different framework than that in, say, France or Norway. In Indonesia the Japanese had not fought against Indonesian defenses. The Japanese had not defeated Indonesian forces, and had not driven an Indonesian government into exile. The Indonesians maintained no contact with a government in exile. Any anti-Japanese resistance that developed in Indonesia was

⁵¹ Wolf, op. cit., p. 10.

⁵² Ibid.

inspired by the Indonesians. Thus in Indonesia a patriotic nationalist's duty was not clear-cut, and collaboration must be considered as opportunism, both personal and national, not treason.

Immediate Impact of Japanese Occupation

Initially the Japanese were forced to retain the Dutch administrative set-up with little change. However, within six months after the occupation the Japanese had exiled or interned practically the whole of the Dutch population, thus creating an administrative vacuum. Since the Japanese had only a limited number of administrative personnel organic to their armed forces in this area, they were forced to replace the displaced Dutch with Indonesian personnel. To the masses, the Japanese were the liberators from the north. German successes in overrunning Holland had secretly pleased many Indonesians. Furthermore, the feeble Dutch resistance against the Japanese dealt a devastating blow to Dutch prestige. Many Indonesians suspected the Dutch of treason--like that of Vichy France. Some even felt that, given arms, they could have done as well against the Japanese as the Dutch had. Many former members of the PNI felt that the demonstrated weakness of the Dutch conclusively justified PNI tactics. In the light of these new developments, many Indonesians identified their own striving for position with the strength and ventures of Japan.⁵³

⁵³ Sjahrir, op. cit., pp. 190-96.

Initially the Japanese recognized the Indonesian red and white flag and the Indonesian national anthem. Indonesian intellectuals and semi-intellectuals were utilized in the administrative system (presenting opportunities heretofore unexperienced by the Indonesians under the Dutch and, in many cases, elevating individuals two or three notches or more up the administrative ladder). Through these moves, the Japanese achieved great popularity, and succeeded in winning the support or neutralizing the antipathy of a very large portion of the educated Indonesians. However, the sympathies that might have existed towards the Japanese before and immediately after the Japanese occupation soon disappeared. The Japanese' actions betrayed their intent. Harsh actions, lack of tact, and in many cases bestiality, coupled with an extensive policy of economic exploitation, soon displaced any gains that the Japanese might initially have enjoyed in the minds of the majority of the intellectual elite of Indonesia.

Because of the initial response of the Indonesians, the Japanese erroneously evaluated the strength of the Indonesian nationalist movement. Since they were unaware of the power of the nationalist leaders over the masses, they refrained initially from using such individuals. However, after initial failures to promote the Three-A Movement (Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere) amongst the Indonesians, and after being confronted with local small-scale insurrections and some passive resistance, the Japanese reoriented

their policy and attempted to achieve support by working through those nationalist leaders felt to enjoy popular support.

In order to enlist the support of Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta and other important nationalist leaders for the war effort, the Japanese promised to grant self-government in the near future. The Poesat Tenaga Rakjat (Poetera--Center of People's Power) established on March 9, 1943, included all Indonesian political and non-political national associations domiciled on Java and Madura. The Japanese appointed Soekarno, Hatta, Dewantoro and Kiaki H. Mansoer to head the organization.⁵⁴

Poetera was used primarily as a means to rally Indonesian support for the war effort. To this end, the Japanese made certain concessions to the nationalist leaders. To the Indonesian nationalist leaders, the organization was a step toward self-government, although the results it achieved at this time were meager. Under the auspices of Poetera the nationalist leaders undeniably aroused Indonesian nationalism and advanced the cause of independence; to what extent is undeterminable. It would appear that the activities of the nationalist leaders in Poetera served to enhance their position in the eyes of the Indonesian masses. In return for the privilege of this position, the Japanese war effort was enhanced.

⁵⁴ Kahin, op. cit., p. 106.

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Under Poetera's auspices, youth organizations were formed. Through these the Japanese inculcated the youth with authoritarianism, respect for force, and an emotional anti-westernism. According to David Wehl, these youth organizations numbered over 100, and included Pemuda (youth), Pelapors (Indonesian equivalent of Hitler youth), and numerous military and para-military organizations.⁵⁵ In addition, and directly connected with the Poetera, the Hei Ho was established. This was an organization of conscripted Indonesian laborers who were incorporated as labor battalions into the Japanese army and sent as far as Burma to serve the Japanese war effort. Evidently the casualty rate among such groups ran high, for it is reported that of the many thousands who left, only a small proportion returned.⁵⁶ In addition to the Hei Ho, and again largely through the influence of the nationalist leaders in Poetera, the Peta (a volunteer army of defenders of the fatherland) was formed in September, 1943. This unit, numbering 120,000 in 1945, was Japanese-trained and Indonesian-officered and provided much of the background and training for the command personnel of the present day Indonesian army.

⁵⁵ David Wehl, The Birth of Indonesia, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1948), p. 16.

⁵⁶ Kahin, op. cit., p. 120.

Changes in Japanese Policy and Effect Upon Indonesian Nationalism

Poetera failed to satisfy the Japanese desires. The organization was dissolved at the end of 1943 when it became clear to the Japanese that it was more concerned with Indonesian independence than with the Japanese war effort. This organization was replaced by Perhimpunan Kebaktian Rakjat (Peoples Loyalty Organization--Hokokai), which was subjected to considerably more control by the Japanese than the Poetera. In order to overcome the primarily nationalist orientation of the Poetera, this new organization included Chinese, Arab, and Eurasian representation. In addition, membership in Hokokai was made compulsory and was extended to the village level. Thus the overall administrative structure was brought under much closer control by the Japanese.

In their efforts to control underground activity in Indonesia, the Japanese inadvertently aided the cause of nationalism amongst the Indonesian youth. In 1944, Angkatan Muda (youth organization) was formed. Many of the youths known to have been active in the underground were forced to assume responsible positions of leadership, thus being brought more closely under the control of the Japanese. Little success was achieved in this endeavor, for the rank and file of the members instead developed a more anti-Japanese and pro-Allied consciousness.⁵⁷

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 114.

October, 1944, marked a reorientation of Japanese policy which created a greater clamor for independence. At this time the Japanese Army administration in Java relaxed controls over Hokokai and gave the nationalist leaders a greater opportunity to contact the masses. In addition, Admiral Mayeda, second in command of the Japanese naval forces in the Indies, together with his staff, organized a school in Jakarta and Surabaya for semi-educated youths from 18-20. According to Kahin, the Japanese Army was opposed to these schools, but was unable to have them closed.⁵⁸

The Japanese chose Wikana, "a bonafide leader of the PKI underground,"⁵⁹ to head these schools. Many of the non-communist nationalist leaders were requested to give lectures to the students on nationalism, economics, sociology, politics, and Marxism. Soon however, the principal emphasis was given to the study of Communism. According to Kahin:

They stressed the necessity for the nationalization of production, but the chief emphasis of their teaching was negative, anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism being the dominant theme. The communism which they taught was strongly international. The students were taught to see Indonesia's fight for independence in terms of an international struggle against capitalist imperialism. Social justice for the world as a whole, not just Indonesia, was to be the objective. This international emphasis had little in common with the then current Soviet line. The subordination of anti-colonialism to anti-fascism and the temporizing policy towards the colonial powers and the United States demanded in

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 115.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 116.

the Dimitrov United Front Policy found no place in their teachings. The enemy were the colonial powers and America, not the Axis.⁶⁰

Although the ultimate objective of the Japanese in starting these schools has not been determined, the influence of the schools was significant after the war. The schools were continued until the end of July 1945, only a few days before the Japanese surrender. Several hundred students graduated. As of May 1945, Subardjo, the behind-the-scenes organizer for the Japanese, approached these graduates and asked them to join an ostensibly anti-Japanese underground movement. Subardjo succeeded in organizing the majority of the Communist-oriented graduates of these schools, as well as a considerable number of other Indonesians. According to several Indonesian leaders, "the principal common denominator of Subardjo's heterogeneous group, other than opposition to colonial rule and capitalism, was an outlook congenial to authoritarian political organization."⁶¹

This organization assumed impressive proportions and carried over into the Republican period, but after a short period of power was dissipated by opposition from Sjahrir, anti-Japanese undergrounds, and lack of support from Soekarno and Hatta. Despite its dissipation the organization remained important because the majority of those members who had

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 116.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 117.

entered the organization through the Japanese-sponsored schools joined either Tan Malaka, the PKI, or the Pesindo (Indonesian Socialist Youth) with Wikana as the top leader. The Pesindo later came under effective PKI control in mid-1948.⁶²

As early as late 1944 the threat of approaching Allied power prompted the Japanese to take new steps towards the establishment of an independent Indonesian government. At this time, three Indonesians were appointed as residents, and Indonesian sub-residents were appointed in the remaining residencies of Java and Madura. Indonesian residents were not appointed outside Java and Madura; in these areas the Japanese did not permit Indonesians to occupy civil service posts higher than those at district level. On March 1, 1945, the Japanese established the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence, headed not by Soekarno or Hatta, but rather by the Japanese-appointed Dr. Radjiman Weidodinigrat. This committee included representatives of all the principal ethnic and social groups on Java and Madura. A similar but more closely controlled committee of similar mission was established on Sumatra. However, no comparable organization was established in the outer islands. From this it would appear that the Japanese were attempting to foster the idea of a federated Indonesia of autonomous regions.

⁶² Ibid.

Undoubtedly this contributed to a continuance of regional chauvinism throughout the archipelago in the Post-war period.

Impact of the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence

On June 1, 1945, before the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Independence, Soekarno voiced ideas which were described as "dominant but inchoate in the minds of many educated Indonesians."⁶³ In so doing, Soekarno was not establishing a precedent, but like others before him, interpreted for his people what they presumably would desire in the way of a philosophy of politics if they had enough experience to determine such things for themselves.

Soekarno's "five principles" are of extreme importance in understanding the post-war developments in Indonesia, for they have greatly influenced the struggle that has ensued in Indonesia since World War II. These five principles (nationalism, internationalism, social justice, representative government, and faith in God) indicate Soekarno's ability to synthesize the Western democratic, modernist Islamic, Marxist, and indigenous village democratic and communalistic ideals so as to make them appear applicable to the Indonesian scene.

His explanation of his ideals also indicates Soekarno's character, impetuosity, narrow-mindedness, neglect of detail

⁶³ For the full import of these views, see "Lahirnja Pantjasila," English translation as furnished by the Indonesian Embassy, 1957.

and flair for political expediency. Indications of the above can be noted in his statement on freedom:

What is it that is called freedom? In the year 1933 I wrote a booklet. A booklet called 'kearah Indonesia Merdeka'. In that booklet of 1933, I stated that freedom, political independence, was nothing more than a bridge, a golden bridge. I said in that booklet that on the far side of that bridge we would rebuild our society. How different is your spirit, if you are like that [concerned with details] to the spirit of our youth, two millions strong. These two million youths have conveyed to me their demand, these two million youths all desire a Free Indonesia, now!⁶⁴

To support his point Soekarno stated that Ibn Saud and Lenin built such bridges and one by one set their people free. In so doing, they were concerned with details only after the bridge had been completed. Soekarno goes on to state:

Gentlemen! We are today facing an all important moment. Do we not understand, as declared by dozens of speakers, that in very truth international law simplifies our task? For the organization, the establishment, the recognition of an independent state, there need not be any condition which is complicated, which is hairsplitting. The only condition is a territory, a people, and a stable government. This is sufficient in international law. Sufficient, gentlemen. As soon as there is a territory, a people, a government, recognized by one other free state, there is already what is termed: freedom. No matter whether the people can read or not, no matter whether the people are stupid or clever, if according to international law, the nation possesses the conditions for a free state, that is, a people, a territory, and a government, it is free.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 12-13.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 16.

In Soekarno's eyes the prerequisites were present, details were not then important. The territory was ordained by the "geopolitics of God," the people were present, and Indonesians under Japanese authority were filling government posts. The details for achieving the goals outlined by his philosophical basis would be determined through struggle after independence had been achieved.

. . . . Within that free Indonesia our struggle must continue. The struggle, however, must be of a different nature from what we have been carrying on so far. Then we, as a united people, shall continue our struggle to bring realization to our ideals contained in Pantjasila. And, particularly in this time of war, have faith, cultivate in your hearts the conviction that free Indonesia cannot come if the people of Indonesia do not dare take a risk, do not dare dive for pearls into the depths of the ocean. If the people of Indonesia are not united, and are not determined to live or die for freedom, the freedom of Indonesia will never be the possession of the Indonesian people, never, until the end of time! Freedom can only be achieved and owned by a people whose soul is aflame with the determination of 'Merdeka, **freedom or death!'⁶⁶

On August 7, 1945, the Japanese (Lieutenant General Terauchi's headquarters in Dalat, Indochina) authorized establishment of an all-Indonesian committee. The announced function of this committee was to make preparations for transferring governmental authority from the Japanese armed forces to the Indonesians.⁶⁷ On August 8, 1945, Soekarno, Hatta, and Radjiman were called by General Terauchi to Dalat and on

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 32.

⁶⁷ Kahin, op. cit., p. 127.

August 11th were promised that independence would be granted to Indonesia on August 24th. These three returned to Indonesia on August 14th and upon their return were pressured by Sjahrir and underground groups to make an immediate proclamation of independence, for these groups had received information that the Japanese had asked for surrender terms and they were fearful that unless they moved swiftly Indonesian independence would be interpreted as having been achieved through the auspices of the Japanese. Soekarno was not convinced that the Japanese were as badly off as indicated and was reluctant to antagonize the Japanese. Youth organizations took matters into their own hands, however, and convinced Soekarno that the proclamation must be made. According to Sjahrir, the impetuous actions of the newly formed youth clique produced an undesirable situation wherein the Japanese (Admiral Mayeda) were ultimately brought into the picture and gave approval to the move. During this period, and during the early Revolutionary period, the young students formed the driving force. All action organizations were directed from the student hall, and made more decisions than the government which met daily.⁶⁸

Social Impact of the Japanese Occupation

In order to understand the revolutionary phase of the Indonesian nationalist movement and the character of the

⁶⁸ Sjahrir, op. cit., p. 258.

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revolution, one must first note the impact of the Japanese occupation upon Indonesian society. Dutch rule, although economically oppressive, in general had been moderate when compared to Japan's harsh and arbitrary rule. Since Japanese rule affected almost the entirety of the population, Japanese policies contributed to the development of a tremendous increase in national consciousness, heretofore unexperienced amongst the masses. In describing the Japanese occupation, Sjahrir states: "As I look back on the Japanese period, it is clear to what extent everything in the Indonesian community, spiritually as well as materially, was shaken loose from its old moorings."⁶⁹ Disillusionment under the Japanese fostered the question: if these barbarians had been able to replace the old colonial authority, why had such authority been necessary at all? Indignities suffered at the hands of the Japanese developed or stimulated a consciousness of the self and in turn a national self-consciousness.

Impact Upon Youth and Illiterate Masses. The Japanese occupation undoubtedly left a deep imprint upon the Indonesian youth between the ages of 10 and 25 and upon the illiterate masses. For three and one-half years Japanese propaganda had been designed to exalt the Asiatic and humiliate the white man. According to David Wehl, Japanese propaganda was directed not towards the intellectuals but towards the boys

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 249.

and girls aged 10 to 20 and the illiterate masses, through the medium of stage, school, radio, and the press.⁷⁰ The residue of such propaganda and of the training that was carried on in the many organizations such as the Peta and the Pelapors has been very important in Indonesia's post-war development. Although nationalist propaganda and Japanese policy prevented any pro-Japanese sympathies from developing, most natives responded uncritically to authoritarian command from above. Further, through nationalist and Japanese efforts, Peta units were inflamed against the Allies and imperialism in general. It is probable that such developments raised anomie within Indonesian society to such a level that traditionally passive Indonesians became disposed to rely on violence and brutality. Thus among many groups, there was to develop "an extremely militant nationalism with a strong, emotional anti-Western bias, which frequently verged on sheer hatred and often extended to antipathy against Eurasians and Indies Chinese."⁷¹

Japanese policy had an equally significant impact upon Indonesian students who were antagonized by the harsh and autocratic Japanese administration of the schools. Many of these students were separated from their homes to attend school. Many resigned from school to shift for themselves

⁷⁰ Wehl, op. cit., p. 7.

⁷¹ Kahin, op. cit., p. 130.

for the first time. Many were attracted to the writings of Western political writers. Many entered underground organizations and found their political education furthered in this manner. In addition, an undetermined number were exposed to a strong anti-imperialist, pro-Communist indoctrination as students of the schools headed by Wikana.

Indonesian Underground Organization. Underground activities in Indonesia were a product of the Japanese occupation. Initially the largest underground organization was headed by Amir Sjarifoeddin, whose organization enrolled various people of strong anti-Fascist tendencies. The Left-wing leaders of the nationalist movement had declared support for the Allies against the Axis from the start of the world conflict.⁷² Thus, in view of Sjarifoeddin's post-war declaration that he had had Communist affiliations since pre-war days, it would appear highly plausible that most of the members of Sjarifoeddin's organization were members of the pre-war illegal PKI underground. Sjarifoeddin's organization was loosely controlled; many of the subordinate groups did not acknowledge a central authority. This weakness led to the early arrest of some of the members who, under torture, compromised many of the leaders. The latter, including Sjarifoeddin, were arrested by the Japanese. Through Soekarno's intervention, Sjarifoeddin's sentence was commuted from execution to life imprisonment.

⁷² Sjahrir, op. cit., p. 215.

It would appear that the underground which eventually succeeded in developing the most strength was that headed by Soetan Sjahrir. This organization developed branches in major cities of Java and was supported principally by the educated youth of these cities. Although other underground organizations were operative, the underground was essentially limited to the island of Java, for available information fails to indicate any great amount of communication or co-ordination with other islands of the archipelago.

Although escaping to a great extent the military training and much of the Japanese propaganda, these underground units were nonetheless displaced from their native social order. Unquestionably their activities succeeded in infusing a spirit of nationalism into many of the youth of Indonesia. In addition, these groups were subjected to guerrilla training and were exposed to lawlessness in their activities. These factors are very significant to any appraisal of post-war developments.

Impact Upon the Indonesian Elite. Through the Japanese occupation many Indonesians gained self confidence, for with the internment of the Dutch, Indonesians moved into most of the administrative and technical positions from which the Europeans had been removed. The "superior" Dutchmen had been displaced and things ran. Further, the individuals' desire for independence grew. Many Indonesians who had benefited from this revolutionary upward socio-economic movement,

including those aristocratic elements formerly supporting the Dutch, saw a strong vested interest in maintaining their new status.

Impact Upon Indonesian Society. Based upon past experiences in the Far East, both in the Philippines in World War II and in the recent conflict in Korea, the author would be inclined to agree with David Wehl in describing the impact of the Japanese surrender upon the Indonesian masses: "To the man on the street, the Japanese surrender and the Republic's independence had little effect upon daily life."⁷³

The Japanese through their policy of fostering the Indonesian language (Bahasa Indonesia) undoubtedly contributed to the development of a feeling of unity throughout Indonesia. The Japanese in their determination to enlist the energies of the entire Indonesian population in the war effort used the Indonesian language as they penetrated into the villages in the remotest backwaters of the Islands. Under this situation the language flourished and succeeded in imbuing the people with a feeling new to most of them.⁷⁴ It is questionable how widely this language was adopted by the various regions. An informant recently returned from a visit to Indonesia reported that on numerous occasions during his travels through some of the outer islands that he found it impossible, because of

⁷³ Wehl, op. cit., p. 44.

⁷⁴ Takdir Alisjabana, "The Indonesian Language--Byproduct of Nationalism," Pacific Affairs, Dec. 1949, p. 390.

differences in dialect, to communicate through his interpreter with many of the natives that he sought to interview. It would appear that the growth of a national language has thus far helped to unify only a small portion of Indonesian society.⁷⁵ However, its use in the rapidly growing school system can be expected to promote unity in the future.

The Japanese occupation had its greatest impact upon the youth and those who were displaced from their traditional social order. Those who had been inculcated with a new value system now found the return to the traditional order to be in conflict with these new values. Together with the intellectuals such individuals constituted nearly the whole of the independence movement. Most significant of all, the Japanese occupation probably made clear to the Indonesians themselves that there are two Indonesias--the old and the new. The old Indonesia continues to live its traditional, agrarian life in the villages and countryside. The new Indonesia--the student, the labor union member, the intellectual--is uprooted from its traditions and seeks economic, social and political change.

⁷⁵ Dale Stafford, editor of Greenville News, Greenville, Michigan. Source visited Indonesia for seven weeks in 1955. Interviewed 1957.

Chapter IV

COMMUNISM: ITS INTRODUCTION, DEVELOPMENT AND IMPACT UPON CONTEMPORARY INDONESIA

When the revolution of the European proletariat failed to materialize as anticipated after the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution, the Bolshevik leaders began to focus their attention upon the peoples of Asia and to appraise the potential of these areas in relation to the Communists' quest for world domination. In this appraisal, it would appear that Indonesia was felt to be an area of considerable importance. Evidence of this is the introduction of radical Marxism into Indonesia in 1914 and the subsequent affiliation of the Indonesian Communists with the Communist International in 1920, less than three years after the Bolshevik Revolution.

Despite the rather tenuous linkage that appeared to exist between the Indonesian Communists and the Kremlin until after World War II, it is highly probable that the Kremlin leaders, either directly or indirectly, significantly contributed to the development of the nationalist movement in Indonesia. In addition, the many ideologies espoused by the revolutionary nationalist leaders in Indonesia were highly flavored with Marxism, Communism, and Socialism from other sources.

With the post-war polarization of the world forces into the two power blocs, Southeast Asia has assumed a position of increasing importance in world affairs. Communist

successes in China have further contributed to the strategic importance of Indonesia to the Communists as an area for the spread of world Communism. For the West, Indonesia constitutes a strategic area in its effort to contain the spread of Communism.

This chapter aims to consider the role that Communism has played in pre-war as well as post-war Indonesia and thus support the contention that Indonesia today, as a result of both circumstance and a concentrated effort by the Communists, constitutes an area of increasing potential and considerable importance to the spread of world Communism.

Communism In Pre-War Indonesia

Indonesian society experienced, in varying degrees, a changing pattern of values and accordingly a disruption of the native social order as a direct result of Dutch rule. At the turn of the 20th century the developing and oftentimes conflicting political ideologies of the Western world came to influence a limited few in Indonesian society, a newly developing intellectual elite. Among this limited elite, Western political ideologies were read, studied, and evaluated against a background of their native society, Dutch rule, world developments, and within the framework of the individual's relationship to contemporary Indonesian society. Through the study of such ideologies, these few individuals found and accepted different elements which in their estimation

would serve to achieve what they interpreted to be the desires of the Indonesian people.

Communism in the Netherlands Indies was a European import. It was introduced by J. H. F. M. Sneevliet along with three other associates from Holland. Initially the ideology espoused by this group was given an organized and articulate form through the ISVD (Socialist Democratic Association for Indonesia), founded by Sneevliet in 1914. In view of the growing anti-Dutch sentiment among the native Indonesians, it became imperative that an indigenous leadership be established in order for the organization to be successful. As we have seen (Chapter III, p. 63), Sneevliet was abetted in his efforts by the Government's attempt at curtailing the growing strength of Sarekat Islam. Thus Dutch policy conveniently destroyed the central control of Sarekat Islam and helped fragment its many branches. Sneevliet quickly seized upon the opportunity afforded and through the use of indigenous leaders succeeded in infiltrating the fragmented ranks of Sarekat Islam.

Apparently radical Marxism appealed more to the Indonesian at this early stage than Sarekat Islam did. This can be seen in the latter's quick adoption of a more revolutionary nationalistic program in order to counter the growing strength of Communism. However, the radical Marxists remained within Sarekat Islam until the introduction of outside influence and control over the Communist movement prompted the leaders of

Sarekat Islam to call for discipline with the ranks. In 1923 Indonesian Communists broke openly with Sarekat Islam. This split in the nationalist movement marked one of the first major developments in the history of Indonesian nationalism.

Indications of Russian Influence During the Period 1920-1942

Of all the left-wing movements in Southeast Asia, that in Indonesia has been the oldest, the strongest, and the most closely linked historically with the Communist International, the Indonesian Communists having, as mentioned above, joined the Third International of Moscow on 25 December, 1920.¹ From that date until the eve of World War II the activities of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) were directed toward fulfillment of Comintern directives. Initially, and on many subsequent occasions, these directives were to frustrate the PKI's development. In addition, many of the same directives indicated the existence of weak communication links between the Kremlin and the Southeast Asian Area. Divergencies between the indigenous situation and the directives emanating from Moscow can be attributed to a faulty appraisal of the Indonesian situation in non-Indonesian Communist circles, and to Moscow's maintaining a dogmatic doctrinaire attitude.

Early PKI activities seemingly coincided with the Comintern policy as set forth at the First Congress of Oriental

¹ Bernard H. M. Vlekke, Nusantara: A History of the East Indian Archipelago, p. 342. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1943).

Peoples held at Baku in 1929. At this Congress a call was made for the integration of peasant revolts in Western Europe's colonies with the proletarian revolution in Europe itself.² Even prior to 1929, PKI activities were directed primarily at attempting to gain control of labor organizations in Indonesia. By 1921 PKI had succeeded in penetrating the most important of the nascent trade unions, including the rail and tramways employees, along with many of the embryonic organizations among the port workers, the army, and the police force. However, because of the effective Dutch control, and the heterogeneity of the movement, these efforts failed.³

Indications of Russia's early interest in Indonesia can also be seen in a statement made by Bukharin at the Executive Committee of the Comintern in November 1926, when he described Indonesia as "the bridge between Europe and Asia."⁴ Further, the intensity of the Communist movement in Indonesia is indicative of Russia's interest. In accord with Lenin's efforts to form an alliance between the workers and the peasants, the immediate objective of the PKI in Indonesia

² George B. DeHuszar and Associates, Soviet Power and Policy, (New York: Thomas J. Crowell & Co., 1955), p. 506.

³ Thompson and Adloff, The Left Wing in Southeast Asia, (New York: William Sloane Associates, 1950), p. 168.

⁴ George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 78.

in the early 20's has been described as being the immediate formation of Soviets in every village and factory, under close control of a Central Soviet, and the alignment of the whole movement behind the proletarian revolution. Communist indoctrination of youth through expansion of the Marxist schools started by Tan Malaka and through widening the base of women's sections was of secondary importance.⁵

In 1926 the Indonesian Communists made an abortive attempt at rebellion. This was effectively suppressed by the Dutch. Although PKI's strength at this time consisted of 38 PKI branches with 1,140 members plus 46 Sarekat Rakjat groups numbering 31,000 adherents,⁶ the organization apparently was not disciplined or homogeneous. Basically, the PKI units, often coerced into premature and extremist activities by anarchistic tendencies among individual organizations, precipitated the 1926 rebellion and contributed to the demise of the overt portion of the PKI. As a result of the 1926 rebellion, the Dutch outlawed the PKI and exiled many of the key party leaders.

Although the Communist movement failed in 1926 it is very important to note that until this time Sarekat Islam, although in a predominantly Moslem country, had failed to compete effectively with Communism for mass support. Further,

⁵ Thompson and Adloff, op. cit., p. 169.

⁶ Ibid., p. 172.

it is also important to note the basis on which Communism appealed to those Indonesians who subscribed to it. According to Soetan Sjahrir: "The original followers of the PKI did so with the same sort of disposition that they would have followed any venial quack or lunatic."⁷ According to Sjahrir the Communism of most villagers as well as the city and town dwellers was a strange sort which included many of the native beliefs with definite "animistic tendencies."⁸ Despite considerable discontent events were to prove that the peasants supported PKI to achieve specific aims, not to produce a political revolution. Recognizing this situation, the Communists reappraised the role of the peasantry in the Communist movements, and concentrated their efforts upon the proletariat. Because of Indonesia's vast population and low wage scale, urban labor constituted the most fruitful field for PKI propaganda. In their efforts to organize labor they were particularly successful in organizing and affiliating the seamen in the Indies and in Amsterdam. In addition, workers on sugar plantations, in mining enterprises, and in various professions were unionized and grouped under a central syndicate.⁹

Although the PKI lost a large percentage of its leaders and found its ranks decimated as a result of the Party's

⁷ Soetan Sjahrir, Out of Exile, (New York: John Day Co., 1949), p. 73.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Thompson and Adloff, op. cit., p. 170.

being outlawed in 1926, it must be assumed that the Communists remained active in Indonesia. Despite the scarcity of information on Communist activity in Indonesia from 1926 until 1945, it is highly probable that a Communist movement continued to exist in Indonesia through the use of devious tactics, such as underground activities, infiltration, and united front efforts. An indication of such continued effort may be seen in the fact that Musso, an Indonesian Communist exiled in 1926, is reported to have reappeared on the Indonesian scene in 1935 and to have organized an illegal PKI. Further, leftist developments both in the organization and in the policies of the Gerindo party in 1937 indicate the increased influence of international Communism. Furthermore, the leader elite of the Gerindo party after 1937 included many who later were either self-admitted Communists or were identified as having Communist affiliations. These individuals, as members of the Gerindo party, participated in the united nationalist front in the federation known as the GAPI, formed in 1939. Despite increasing pro-Japanese and pro-Axis sentiments among a large percentage of the masses, this group of radical left-wing leaders subordinated the role of nationalism to that of anti-Fascism. Such a policy, in line with Soviet policy at this time, was highly logical, for Fascism constituted a greater immediate threat to Communism than did the imperialism of the Netherlands. The continuing vitality of the radical left-wing was demonstrated during the Japanese occupation in

that this group constituted one of the chief elements responsible for the anti-Japanese resistance movement.¹⁰

Role of Communism in the Initial Stages of the Post-War Revolution

Communism in Indonesia was aided considerably by the Japanese occupation. During the closing phases of World War II the Japanese established two schools for Indonesian youth in which they indoctrinated a large number with Communism and anti-Westernism. Although the reason for this Japanese move remains obscure, the Japanese did succeed in indoctrinating students and, through Subardjo, in organizing a number of graduates into an ostensibly anti-Japanese underground. The Indonesian Subardjo, formerly a member of PKI and later allied with Tan Malaka, operated with the approval of the Japanese Naval Intelligence. His group and other leftist elements which joined it constituted the only well-organized party in existence in Indonesia from August until October 1945.¹¹

In attempting an evaluation of the success and potential of Communism in post-war Indonesia, one must keep in mind that only a limited few are in a position to determine the destiny of Indonesia. Mysberg has estimated this elite as numbering only about 200.¹² The rank and file are not

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 174.

¹¹ R. T. McVey, The Development of the Indonesian Communist Party and Its Relations with the Soviet Union and the Chinese Peoples Republic, (mimeographed), p. 23.

¹² James Mysbergh, "The Indonesian Elite", Far Eastern Survey, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, March 1957, p. 39.

inclined to think in terms of Communism or democracy, or socialism. These masses are anti-colonial, anti-capitalist, and many among them understand these words only in terms of Marxist teachings.¹³ Trullinger, describing the frames of reference existing within Indonesian society, has stated:

. . . . In most of Asia, what we in the West term religion is thought of as a Way of Life--not as an abstract worship of the Creator alone. Religion, in other words, is part of a national culture, it is inseparable from the social habits, from the very language and literature, of the peoples. It is a reason for doing much, and equally a reason for not doing much else. At the same time, while in some religious groups this philosophy has definitely degenerated into blind submission to the supposed dictates of fate, these are in reality, exceptions, rather than the rules. 'Be in the world and not of the world', is the guiding principle common to an extremely large number of devotees of religious populations today threatened by Communism in the Far East. In this human capacity of sage and worker, the oriental finds the sublimation of his ethical values with the material.¹⁴

Post-War Tactics, 1945-1948. It would appear that Communist tactics in Indonesia from 1945 to 1948, although suggesting strong Moscow orientation, were to a large extent indigenous in origin. It would appear also that these tactics were designed to serve the power aspirations of those men who succeeded in obtaining a following. However such activities were not at variance with Moscow's wishes, for most of the followers came from the displaced elements of native society.

¹³ Marguerite Bro, Indonesia: Land of Challenge, (New York: Harper Brothers Publishers, 1954), p. 16.

¹⁴ O. O. Trullinger, Red Banners Over Indonesia, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954), p. 206.

It would appear that any successful organization of these elements would constitute a distinct advantage for International Communism.

The tactics employed during this period, it has been said, played down independent party activities in favor of strengthening the Communists' position within the broad framework of the revolutionary nationalistic movement. Communist leaders attempted to gain strategic positions in the new government, nationalist parties, labor unions, and student and peasant groups in order to transform the allegedly inevitable anti-imperialist struggle into a Communist-patterned economic and social revolution.¹⁵ The PKI acted openly only as the champion of Indonesian independence. It would appear that the principal overt Communist-inspired actions came about primarily through the efforts of Tan Malaka. Although identified by some sources as representing a Titoist type of national Communism, Tan Malaka's actions have been identified by Trullinger as being a part of the over-all Moscow program.¹⁶ Tan Malaka, however, apparently disgraced himself in the eyes of the Communist elite, and was replaced by other leaders.

The primary objective of the Communists during this period was to achieve a strategic position within the government. This was attempted through united front tactics. To

¹⁵ George B. De Huszar and associates, op. cit., p. 507.

¹⁶ Trullinger, op. cit., p. 51.

this end, many of the returning Stalinist Communists, including Abdulmadjid and Setiadjit, concealed their party affiliations and joined important elements within the Socialist and Labor groups. They soon headed these groups. Wikana, later identified as a Communist, emerged as the leader of the Pesindo (Socialist Youth Organization) which was joined with the PKI in 1948. Through these positions and through their position in the United Front, Sajap Kiri (Left Wing Federation), these individuals played an important role in determining policy. Sajap Kiri, in turn, was responsible, to all intents and purposes, for the formation of government policy until the later part of 1947. According to Kahin:

Throughout 1947 the leaders of the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) and those unproclaimed Communists who had joined the Socialist and Labor parties and the Pesindo appeared to follow policies determined chiefly by what best served their own political advancement rather than what a conscientious Stalinist might have considered would have best served the Kremlin. Beginning only at the end of 1947 did their attitudes commence to show any significant increase towards conformity with Moscow policy and not until March 1948 did this increase become substantial¹⁷

Despite Kahin the present writer feels that, although Moscow's control over the Indonesian party may have been rather tenuous, the Indonesian Communists did not stray, for the most part, from the line followed by the Kremlin from 1945 until mid-1948 when policy was radically changed.

¹⁷ Kahin, op. cit., p. 256.

From the meager information available, it would appear that no coordinated Communist movement existed in Indonesia during this period and that, within Indonesia, the Communist lines of control were loosely drawn. Despite this, it is of interest to note the appeal of the program espoused by Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perdjjuangan (People's Front) established in January 1946. The program espoused by this movement would lead one to believe that it was oriented more toward international than toward national Communism. According to Kahin, the Persatuan Perdjjuangan grew rapidly and within a month embraced 121 organizations, including all important political parties and military organizations. It had the outspoken backing of General Sudirman, the Commander in Chief of the National Army (TRI), and for a brief period of time even enjoyed the support of the Socialist Party and the Pesindo. The movement achieved much strength through a program calling for confiscation of factories and agricultural estates for distribution to the masses, complete national independence, and negotiation with the Dutch only when no Dutch troops were present.¹⁸ Tan Malaka's attempted overthrow of the Soekarno Government revealed his true goal. Thwarted in this effort, he was jailed along with Mohammad Jusuf, another leader of the PKI. The relative ease with which Tan Malaka's coup was suppressed reflected the charismatic position that had been achieved by Soekarno and Hatta

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 173-75.

in the eyes of the masses. So long as the Dutch remained as the enemy of the people and thwarted the Indonesian quest for independence, public support of the Soekarno government precluded success in any attempted coup directed at the overthrow of this government.

Moscow's interest in Indonesia during the immediate post-war period can be evaluated in the light of her post-war activities in Europe and of the developing balance among world forces. Moscow's immediate post-war policy toward the West was seemingly designed to foster a continuance of the relationship that existed with the Allies during World War II. Through this policy she was apparently bent upon maximizing her successes in Western Europe while awaiting the expected decline of the impoverished colonial countries. To this end she became a vigorous advocate of freedom for Indonesia immediately after the Japanese surrender. She paid no deference to Dutch Communist sensibilities such as she had with the French Communists in regard to Indo China.

Nevertheless, prior to 1948, Soviet spokesmen did not oppose the peace negotiations or adopt an uncompromising stand for independence. The Moscow press preferred Hatta to Soekarno, and subsequently Sjarifoeddin to Hatta or Sjahrir. It attacked the British occupation, blamed the United States for instigating the Dutch police actions of 1947-48, and condemned the United Nations Good Offices Committee as a tool of American Monopolists and Dutch Imperialists. Here were the malicious misrepresentations, but not the degree of misinformation and unconcern that characterized the comments of the Moscow press on India, Burma and Indo China. Indonesia was clearly near the top on the Soviet priority list as far as South Asia was concerned.¹⁹

Communist Strength in Indonesia at the End of 1947. It is extremely interesting to note Charles Wolf's appraisal of the Communist menace in Indonesia at the end of 1947, on the eve of a radical change in Soviet policy. Wolf based his appraisal on sixteen months' experience in Indonesia. In the light of subsequent developments in 1948, his appraisal indicates the Communists' ability to achieve success through their popular front tactics and their policy of exploiting the grievances of the masses. Wolf stated:

It is worth noting that of the strongest men in the present government none is a member or partisan of any Communist Party, either Indonesian or foreign. . . . Of other leaders in the 1947 government, Sjarifoeddin, the Prime Minister [admitted Communist in 1948] and Sjahrir are members of the Socialist Party, and Setiadjit [confirmed Communist in 1948] a co-Deputy Prime Minister, belongs to the Labor Party. While Sjahrir, Sjarifoeddin and Setiadjit all favor strongly socialistic economic policies, none of them is connected with or leans towards Russian Communism.²⁰

Wolf recognized an inchoate Communist influence in Indonesia as being undeniable, but questioned that it had reached the proportions which certain right wing and military circles attributed to it. Wolf continued:

The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) when observed in 1945 was still relatively moderate in outlook. It had been allied with the Sajap Kiri in support of a policy of compromise and moderation in negotiations with the Dutch. The PKI has advocated a

²⁰ Charles Wolf, Jr., The Indonesian Story, (New York: The John Day Company, 1949), p. 85.

policy of reconstruction along lines set by the Linggadjati Agreement of March 25, 1947, and has not advocated violence or extremism in the course of negotiations in 1946 and 1947.

It thus appears clear that the danger--and this can hardly be over-emphasized--is not that a Communist menace or anything resembling it, now exists in Indonesia, but without an end to political strife and economic isolation, and without a continued expression of America's interest in and sympathy towards the new Republic, the Republican Government might be forced to seek its friends and its support wherever it can find them, not only in India, and the Arab League and the countries in close proximity to Indonesia, but eventually perhaps in Russia as well. . . .²¹

This Communist menace which Wolf described as being minimal or non-existent at the end of 1947 became somewhat more manifest a few short months later, when the PNI and the Masjumi achieved predominance in the government and excluded the Sajap Kiri. Upon being denied a strategic position in the government, the frustrated left wing leaders of Sajap Kiri began agitating for the removal or overthrow of the Hatta government, and began to adopt extremist tactics. To appreciate the importance of these moves, the change in Soviet Policy taking place at the same time must be considered.

Communist Developments in Indonesia, 1948-1949.

Soviet propaganda attacks against the United States and the West in late 1947 and early 1948 announced a change in Soviet policy, a policy which had remained basically unchanged so long as it was not subject to opposition from

²¹ Ibid., p. 87.

the free world. This radical anti-Western reorientation of policy appears to have resulted from the Marshall Plan-supported economic advance of the Western European countries, the development of NATO, and the inauguration of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. With this change in policy an increasing bipolarization of world forces developed. The impact of such policy change can readily be discerned in Indonesia. In June, 1947, Sajap Kiri, which had heretofore followed a policy of concession and moderation, found the continuance of its policy opposed by several of the top leaders, such as Tan Ling Djie, Wikana, Abdulmadjid and Sjarifoeddin. This opposition, the first symptom of the schism that was to emerge in the Socialist Party six months later, was sufficient to cause the resignation of Sjahrir as Prime Minister. Sjarifoeddin succeeded him on 7 July, 1947.²² Evidence of Kremlin control of the Indonesian Communist movement at this time can be detected from the tactics of this opposition group. Shortly after the opposition developed, Setiadjit returned from a WFTU meeting in Prague and the group immediately executed a complete about-face. Instead of opposing former policy, Sjarifoeddin as Prime Minister exceeded Sjahrir's policy of concession.

In May, 1947, three Communist members of youth organizations in Russia, Yugoslavia, and France went into the interior of Java. These three purportedly came to Indonesia in response

²² Kahin, op. cit., p. 208.

to an invitation which had been solicited from the Indonesian Communists at the New Delhi Inter-Asian Conference on March 23, 1947. The purpose of the visit presumably was to make contact with Indonesian youth groups on behalf of the World Federation of Youth Organizations (WFYO) and to extend invitations to Indonesian groups to send delegates to the WFYO Congress in Prague later in the year. It is highly probable that the purpose of their visit was much broader than this single mission, however.²³

Despite inadequate information, there is little doubt of Russia's direction of the Indonesian Communist movement in the later stages of the Revolution. Upon the return of the young Indonesian representatives from the WFYO in Prague in August 1947 and in Calcutta in March 1948 where they were infused with the new party line of active revolution based on developments in Eastern Europe, Indonesian Communists became more revolutionary and radical in their activities. Left wing groups united in a Peoples Democratic Front early in 1948. After mid-1948 these groups including Sjarifoeddin's Socialists which had split with Sjahrir, the Labor Party, and the Pesindo (Socialist Youth Organization), joined the PKI. These forces evolved a long-range program which advocated overthrowing the Hatta government and replacing it with a

²³ Wolf, op. cit., p. 86.

parliamentary government representing the whole nation. The program was to be carried out by extremist measures if other measures failed.

These developments coincided with the new Russian policy and Russia's vituperative attack upon the capitalist powers in the UN. Further, the return of the aforementioned groups from the WFYO meetings abroad coincided with a breakdown of negotiations between Hatta and the Dutch, the long inactivity of the UN Committee, Van Mook's Federalizing Plan, and a series of concessions by the Hatta government.²⁴

The change in Soviet policy, when evaluated within the framework of Garthoff's proposition that all Soviet policy is but a facet of strategy evolved within the framework of military planning,²⁵ indicates the importance assigned to Indonesia by Soviet planners in their mapping of strategy. The Soviet policy, if followed, would contribute to the economic deterioration of the Netherlands as well as of other Western European countries with economic interests in the area. Further, any discord that could be promoted between the Dutch, the United States, and the British, would aid the Kremlin's cause. Continued conflict between Indonesian factions and between the Indonesians and the Dutch would also benefit the

²⁴ Dorothy Woodman, The Republic of Indonesia, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1955), p. 370.

²⁵ Samuel H. Ordway, An Analysis of Soviet Military Doctrine and Its Application, (Based on the book Soviet Military Doctrine, by R. L. Garthoff), (Mimeographed), p. 2.

Kremlin. Finally, as a checkmate developed in Europe and as Asia began to occupy a position of prime importance in the "cold war", the Dutch-Indonesian conflict could be a sounding board for Soviet propaganda among the uncommitted countries of Asia.

Musso, a native Indonesian, returned to Indonesia after twelve years of exile in Russia to head these new developments. Within a short time, Musso took over the leadership of the PKI and continued the newly developed tactics. Under his leadership extremist measures were followed. This, coupled with a growing resentment among the Indonesian masses over the tide of events, and with the effects of Hatta's "Rationalization Program" (inaugurated to alleviate some of the areas of grievance), resulted in a premature rebellion provoked by Communist members of the military who were fearful of being deposed from their positions. This was the Madiun Rebellion of September, 1948.

Prior to Musso's return other factors indicated increased Soviet concern over the Indonesian situation. One of these, of considerable importance, was Russia's unilateral ratification of a consular treaty with Indonesia. This treaty had been secretly signed by the Russian Ambassador to Prague and Suprino. Upon the advice of Sjarifoeddin, Soekarno had secretly dispatched Suprino to Prague in June, 1949, to line up whatever diplomatic support that he could get for the Republic. According to Kain, Suprino at this time was a known Communist.

This assertion tends to be borne out by the fact that Suprino, upon his recall from Prague, brought Musso, who had spent 22 years in Moscow, back to Indonesia. Further, Suprino, along with Musso, Alimin, and Sjarifoeddin was eliminated by the Republican troops in the aftermath of the Madiun Rebellion.²⁶

In the light of the conditions of the Linggadjati Treaty and Indonesia's non-ratification of the consular treaty, Russia's unilateral action probably can be interpreted as a Russian desire to be kept informed of internal Indonesian developments and to precipitate further disunity within Indonesia. Such a move would also serve to gain favor for Russia in the eyes of the Indonesian masses as the champion of their cause. According to Kahin:

For many Indonesians the fact that the Republican Government made no move to match Russia's ratification of the treaty, but instead called Suprino home for consultations, lent considerable weight to the FDR's People's Democratic Front assertion that the Hatta government was truckling to the United States. Against the background of mounting feeling that the U.S. backed the Dutch, this allegation was a powerful weapon for the FDR.²⁷

Until the Madiun Rebellion Communism had afforded the only channel of protest against the government's Rationalization Program. So long as Communism tended or credibly promised to mitigate the grievances of a relatively small landless proletariat, and served as a channel of protest for

²⁶ Ronald S. Kain, "Moscow in Indonesia", Current History, XVII, August 1949, p. 69.

²⁷ Kahin, op. cit., p. 269.

organized labor and the armed forces, the Communist movement succeeded in attracting a following. The group, however, that had subscribed to Communism had done so for short-term material gain rather than for long-term political reasons: when called upon to back an attempt to overthrow the government, the masses proved apathetic. Despite its limitations, the government, for most Indonesians, had come to symbolize their own nationalism.

As a result of the Madiun Rebellion the PKI was deprived of its leadership. Key leaders were executed. However, the Party as such was not outlawed. The government pensioned widows of the rebels and when confronted with the second Dutch military action, released those Communists that had been jailed.

The demise of the PKI created a political vacuum. Many parties moved to fill the vacuum and to recruit to themselves the leaderless PKI elements. The principal loosely federated parties which made up the pro-Tan Malaka group were joined together in one monolithic party, that of the Partai Murba (Proletarian Party). This organization comprised the People's Party, the Poor People's Party, and the Independent Indonesian Labor Party, and achieved by 1950 a membership of about 80,000.²⁸ The Partai Murba program was essentially that of the People's Front of early 1946, also masterminded by Tan Malaka.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 316.

Regarding the Party's relation to Stalinist Communism, Kahin states:

. . . . Despite their actual deviation from the Kremlin's line, the Murba Party leaders still professed themselves to be true exponents of Orthodox Soviet Communism. They felt convinced that the wave of the future was Communism and that Soviet Russia would ultimately become ascendant over the United States and Western Europe²⁹

Tan Malaka's Partai Murba did much to counteract the effect of the Communist-led Madiun Rebellion. The Murba group directed its propaganda toward shifting the blame for the Revolution from the Communists to others. The whole affair was supposedly masterminded by the Dutch with United States backing. Soviet propaganda took the same line. Early in 1949, the Soviet Communist press affirmed that the September coup had been provoked by Hatta on American instigation.³⁰

Despite the many descriptions of Tan Malaka as a Trotskyite or as a Titoist type of Communist, the line espoused by the Partai Murba was similar to that of the Soviet Union in attacking the Marshall Plan, capitalism, the Truman Doctrine, and imperialism. An article by Tan Malaka in one of the Murba Party newspapers in November 1948 suggests Tan Malaka's position, and also the future role of China in the development of Communism in Indonesia:

²⁹ Ibid., p. 316.

³⁰ Max Beloff, Soviet Policy in the Far East, 1944-1951, (London, New York and Toronto: Oxford Univ. Press, 1953), p. 218.

Geographically and strategically speaking it is not yet time to choose one of the parties [world powers]. Land, sea and air distances are not yet favorable for increasing our power if we make an alliance with the Federation of the Socialist Countries.³¹

Less than a year later Communist policy in Southeast Asia reflected a second major post-war shift. In November, 1949, the Peking meeting of the WFTU called for the adoption of Chinese revolutionary methods elsewhere in Eastern Asia. Red China was called upon to lead the Communist struggle in its effort to destroy capitalist imperialism throughout Southeast Asia.³² Some writers have described this move as a Kremlin subordination of Russia's objectives in Asia to the cause of Communism. The present writer, however, feels that the Russians, after appraising Mao's success and the Asian situation, determined that Russia's interests in Asia could best be served by working through Red China.

The adoption of Chinese leadership and of Chinese revolutionary methods was well timed; for, by early 1950, Indonesia was again divided against itself. The achievement of independence from the Netherlands (December 1949) removed the principal goal that had united the masses. No longer rallying points against Dutch and Western obstructionism, Soekarno and Hatta would appear to have lost some of their prestige. Grievances prompted by pre-war Dutch policy, the Japanese Occupation, and post-war displacement reasserted themselves and led to a socio-politico-economic struggle beset with disunity.

³¹ Kahin, op. cit., p. 318.

³² DeHuszar, op. cit., p. 508.

Communist Tactics In Independent Indonesia

Changes in Communist policy in Indonesia can be seen in the Communists' treatment of the Indonesian Chinese in the Madiun Rebellion of 1948. Previously the Indonesian Chinese had been subjected to terroristic measures and atrocities at the hands of the Indonesian extremist groups. During the Rebellion the Chinese fared extremely well at the hands of the Communists. This behavior indicates the increased importance of the Indonesian Chinese to the Communist movement in Indonesia. The Communists were undoubtedly abetted by Republican policy which alienated the Indonesian Chinese from Indonesia and increased the feeling of Chinese nationalism among the Indonesian Chinese. This nationalism probably was directed more toward the mainland than toward Taiwan. According to Meijis, Communism among the Indonesian Chinese was not a doctrinaire system, but rather was based on opportunist nationalism stemming from the Chinese successes on the mainland. The Chinese began to distrust the Indonesians and to desire China as their protector.³³

The Communist movement in Indonesia has undoubtedly been abetted by and through the Chinese Communists. The extent of this aid, however, is hard to determine. The PKI has probably been supplied with considerable money as well as printed

³³ M. J. Meijis, The Chinese in Indonesia, (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, MIT, 1955), (mimeographed), p. 33.

matter, and probably has been supported by radio propaganda from local stations and from broadcasts out of Peking, Ho Chi-Min's North Vietnam, and North Korea. Meijis points out that cooperation between the Chinese and the Indonesian Communist movements exists to a great extent. The Chinese Embassy, he says, acts as a political instrument rather than an embassy. Contact between the Indonesian Communist leaders and the Embassy can be observed daily.³⁴

Conditions Favorable to Communism in the Post Revolutionary Period

The USSR succeeded in gaining considerable prestige among Indonesians as a result of her successes in World War II. This prestige was increased through her dramatic rise under a planned economy from a backward society to a high level of technical competence and industrialization, without outside capital. The fact that the USSR had long been an advocate of racial equality and freedom for colonial peoples further contributed to this prestige. Marxism was ready at hand as an economic and political ideology if others should fail. The masses equated capitalism with imperialism, and Russia was the champion of freedom.

Standing apart from and against these appeals of Communism was a limited leadership elite burning with the desire to govern, impatient to move rapidly towards an identifiable

³⁴ Ibid., p. 58.

goal, and reluctant to wait until an unprogressive populace decided to go along with its plans.

By 1951, Communism in Southeast Asia was well coordinated. At a conference of Trade Unions of Asia and Australia held in Peking in November, 1949, the Permanent Liaison Bureau of the WFTU was charged with the task of coordination. A ready-made vehicle for the furtherance of the Communist cause was already on the Indonesian scene in the two to three million Indonesian Chinese. After the victory of the CCP in mainland China, many of these Chinese were exhorted to follow Red China's lead.³⁵ In addition, the Indonesians--both political leaders and to a certain extent the masses--found the ascendant Chinese Communist star very impressive. This is evidenced by Indonesia's early recognition of the Chinese People's Republic, followed in August, 1950, by the arrival of the first Chinese ambassador to Indonesia.

Communist Tactics and Organization Since 1951

Like all Communist movements Indonesian Communism needed a strong central leadership in order to achieve success. It achieved this leadership in 1951 by reestablishing a strong cadre elite and a party purge. In 1951, D. N. Aidit, a young Communist leader who had spent considerable time in Communist China in 1949, successfully challenged the leadership of Alimin, who had assumed leadership of the PKI after

³⁵ Beloff, op. cit., p. 210.

the Madiun Rebellion. The new leadership appealed for a United Front. Bipolarization of political parties (to be discussed in a subsequent chapter), with a PNI shift to the left, made possible an alliance from above. In 1952, the PKI announced that a new stage in growth had been achieved and a national unity front was then possible, along with a "restoration" of Mao's four-class cooperation. As a result of these policies, it is reported, the PKI succeeded in raising its mass base from 7,910 to 100,000 in a six-month period.³⁶ Indications of added success can be seen in the 1953 SOBSI affiliation with SOBRI (Tan Malaka's Labor Union). Communist influence among the peasantry was extended by perfecting united front control over Barisan Tani Indonesia and through the subsequent fusion of this group with the Rukun Tani Indonesia (both groups were major peasant organizations), in September, 1953.³⁷

Aidit's leadership had many advantages for the Indonesian Communist Party. In Aidit the party had a leader free from the blame of past mistakes, a man above intra-party conflicts, and a man capable of appealing to nationalist groups. Furthermore, Aidit had achieved a certain prestige among the Indonesian masses because of his part in the struggle for national independence. Further, he is described

³⁶ McVey, op. cit., p. 78.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 82.

as maintaining close connections with old friends and associates scattered among various political groups and parties.³⁸ As leader of the party, Aidit has left little doubt as to the orientation of the PKI, for according to Mochtar Lubis, Aidit has stated that "the PKI must be modeled after the CCP and the Soviet Union."³⁹ Aidit has sworn to remain loyal to the teachings of Stalin.

In 1953 the Communists succeeded in achieving parliamentary representation. From this position they appear to have played the game to the hilt by exploiting the precarious balance of power in the Indonesian parliament. In this struggle for power, the PNI has been opposed by the Masjumi, Socialist, Christian and Catholic parties and has been forced to become dependent upon PKI support. While supporting the cabinet in parliament, the Communists, it is said, criticize the government in public meetings, demanding recognition of workers' rights and pursuit of more democratic policies.⁴⁰

By cooperating with the PNI, the PKI has gained respect and repute as a champion of national interests. It has cleverly played Masjumi against Nationalists, Socialists against Nationalists, and President Soekarno against Hatta. These tactics would appear to be in accord with Soviet policy.

³⁸ Mochtar Lubis, "Indonesian Communist Movement Today," Far Eastern Survey, Vol. XXIII, No. 11, Nov. 1954, p. 162.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 163.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 162.

Recognizing that world opinion is increasingly against the use of force and that the war-ravaged peoples of Southeast Asia desire peace, Soviet propaganda since 1949 or earlier has emphasized peaceful coexistence between regimes based upon different political and ideological systems. Further, the Soviets have advocated the export of technical assistance instead of wars of liberation and other forms of class war. In domestic affairs, Communist propaganda has advocated United Fronts against imperialism, combined with peaceful and legal action, and competition with nationalist parties instead of civil and guerilla wars. After Stalin's death Soviet propaganda became even more conciliatory in Asia. Despite these many changes, says Fischer, "Soviet policy, however, has remained unchanged."⁴¹

Indonesian politicians, like all other politicians, have continuously demonstrated a flair for following political expediency. In so doing, they have undoubtedly contributed to a situation which is advantageous to the Communists. Although unquestionably adhering to an undeviating objective, the Indonesian Communists have assessed the local situation and have adapted their policies to fit it. Thus Communism has articulated peasant and labor grievances and has contributed to political strife and economic chaos. By rather scrupulously avoiding any overt actions which would tend to

⁴¹ Harold Fischer, "Soviet Policy in Asia Since China," Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science, January, 1956.

antagonize public sentiment, PKI politicians have seemingly gained prestige among the masses. Only through the efforts of the Masjumi, primarily on religious grounds, coupled with Christian, Catholic and Socialist opposition, has Communism received any serious verbal opposition.

Present-Day Strength and Potential of Indonesian Communism

Although as previously mentioned, one cannot assess the exact strength of the Indonesian Communists, the present-day political situation in Indonesia must be considered extremely precarious. According to R. C. Bone, Jr., writing in 1954, "the PKI today is within striking distance of power."⁴² According to Lubis, others agree with Bone. For example, Lubis states that Arnold Brochman, the Indonesian correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor, considers the Communist threat "a serious one."⁴³ It would appear that this threat does not arise so much from the Communists' actual physical strength, as from a number of unsolved factors in an unstable Indonesia: distress and discontent produced by severe economic depression; delay in holding elections, and public dissatisfaction with the somewhat unrepresentative parliament before the 1955 elections; the role of military leaders in politics; the role of more

⁴² Robert C. Bone, Jr., "Future of Indonesian Political Parties," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 2, February 1954.

⁴³ Lubis, op. cit., p. 163.

orthodox Moslem groups and arguments about an Islamic state; the persistence of nationalist and anti-colonial sentiment; and opposition to American-led efforts to establish security machinery in Southeast Asia.⁴⁴

To appreciate the situation one must be familiar with the psychology of these peoples. To all but a few of the 80,000,000 Indonesians, Russia, China, Communism, the United States, imperialism, etc., are known only through propaganda. Probably the propaganda is evaluated largely in proportion to the deference paid to the source. Indonesian evaluative criteria are based upon value patterns unfamiliar to the average American. They contain mixtures of spiritualism, mysticism, animism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and personality. The people of Indonesia are unaccustomed to a system of self-government, having been the subjects of arbitrary authority and power for at least 250 years. Their ethical and moral norms and codes differ from those of Western society. It is against this native background that the individual attempts to interpret his position within society and to seek redress for his many grievances.

At its Fifth National Congress held in March, 1955, in Jakarta, the PKI passed two significant resolutions. At this time the Party claimed a membership of 150,000. At the opening session, attended by several members of the Indonesian

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 164.

Cabinet, a congratulatory message was read from President Soekarno. The resolutions on foreign and domestic policy have been summed up by Lubis as follows:

In the field of foreign policy the Party resolved:

1. To continue the fight for peace, for prevention of a new World War and for settlement of all international conflicts by peaceful discussions. To encourage cooperation by Indonesia with all peace-loving countries, to preserve peace and prevent war.
2. To endeavor to strengthen the economic and cultural cooperation between Indonesia and all other countries for mutual benefit on the basis of equality, and to support all struggles by other peoples for national freedom.
3. To work for consolidation of peace achieved in Korea and for a cease fire in Vietnam
4. To struggle to make the UN an instrument for world peace
5. To fight for termination of agreements between Indonesia and other countries harmful to freedom and peace in Indonesia.

In the field of domestic policy the PKI described its objectives as follows:

1. To prevent the economic collapse of Indonesia resulting from continuing economic crisis; to secure termination of Netherlands Indonesian Union and Hague Round Table Agreement; to fight for full national freedom and for democratic changes; to defend West Irian (Western New Guinea) as a territory of the Republic.
2. To extend influence among workers, peasants and masses in order to unite the workers and peasants and to improve and strengthen the national front.
3. To hold high the banners of parliamentary democracy
4. To support the Government of Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo and to urge this government to give democratic freedom to the people in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic.

5. To increase the political activity of the people, to strengthen their patriotism and to sharpen their awareness of provocation, intimidation, and terrorism, or of the attempts at a coup d'etat by the imperialists and domestic reactionaries.⁴⁵

If one compares this program to that of the PNI, one has extreme difficulty in differentiating between the two.

Since 1951 the Communists in Indonesia have achieved many of the requisites of success. Strong leadership was established in 1951. The Communists have tried to prevent any government from markedly improving Indonesia's economic and social position. To this end they have actively fomented strikes and attempted agitation of Indonesian peasant and labor grievances. To some extent they have discredited the nationalist leaders in the eyes of the masses while gaining respect themselves. The PKI has gained prestige since the change in policy adopted in 1953, when through United Front tactics it began its support (which continues to this day) of the PNI government in parliament. The required mass base has been achieved through activities directed at the organization of labor, recruitment and organization of the peasantry, and infiltration of the army, political parties, and other opposition organizations.

Added to the above, the Indonesian Communists have succeeded to an indeterminable degree in organizing the

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 163-64.

military force which has been one of the prime prerequisites of Communist advancement in many parts of the world. Included in this force is the Communist-controlled Perberpsi, an organization of former guerrilla fighters which now claims a membership of over 200,000.⁴⁶ It is highly probable that the Communists have additional military strength amongst the members of the several Indonesian guerrilla organizations.

In 1954, Mochtar Lubis pointed out that: according to PKI statements, 7% of the peasants had been organized; the Communists had successfully infiltrated other political parties and the Armed Forces as well (some of the staff officers are known to be Communists); the editorial staff of Antara, the National News Agency, included a number of Communists; the Communist Party had ample funds, receiving support from the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta; and the Indonesian Communists had their own printing plants.⁴⁷

Further evidence of the success of Communist tactics can be found in the results of the 1955 elections. The Communists won 20 per cent of the total vote cast. As early as 1953, it is reported, the Communists began to organize for the impending elections by dispatching cadre teams to the countryside and the factories to inform the people.

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 161.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 164.

Although no information is yet available to the writer as to the territorial and group distribution of such Communist votes, according to one Indonesian college student,⁴⁸ the Communists received votes in direct proportion to the displacement of the native social order, and especially in Central and East Java and those parts of Sumatra where the grievances are the most serious.

The significant factors in assessing Communist potential for the future may rest not so much within the Communist movement itself as within the ranks of young Indonesia. How long will youth succumb to the nationalist appeals of Soekarno and follow his leadership? It is debatable how successful the Moslem religion will be in preventing the dominance of secular ideas, including Communism. Apparently the events and decisions of the past which have reduced the influence of Communism have originated well above the heads of the masses and have been restricted to the party elites. The 1955 election results would seem to indicate that many of the voters rejected the dogmatic appeals of the Masjumi's attempt at Western-style anti-Communist activity.

⁴⁸ Soegang Soedarso, Indonesian student at Michigan State University. Interviewed 1957.

Chapter V

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA AFTER WORLD WAR II

On December 27, 1949, Soekarno's "golden bridge" was basically completed in Indonesia. However, many minor if not major parts were still under construction. The newborn Republic was confronted with the extremely difficult task of implementing and directing the socio-economic revolution which had previously been subordinated to the quest for independence.

The Government was faced with almost insurmountable problems, among them a critical shortage of the educated and experienced personnel necessary to provide efficient administration and technical services. The limited elite which did exist has already been described: a small group of about 200, mainly Dutch-educated, urban, indigenous, upper-class, with its largest and most powerful segment in Djakarta.¹ This little group had a strategic importance out of all proportion to its numerical or economic strength, claiming as it did to be the spokesman for 80,000,000 Indonesians. For the most part, this group had often repudiated its regional habits and customs as being provincial and an impediment to acceptance within the newly-formed in-groups. Mysbergh describes them in this way:

¹ James Mysbergh, "The Indonesian Elite," Far Eastern Survey, March 1957, XXVI, No. 3, p. 39.

Many of the elite have an idealized, theoretical concept of the people ('rakjat') but have no real identification with workers or peasants nor understanding of their actual problems. Their attitude, partly based on utopian ideals of the revolution, is that it is their duty to work for people's welfare and to lead and instruct it, but their approach is paternalistic.²

Contrasting with this somewhat opportunistic elite is the majority of the Indonesian people, basically agrarian, and rooted in the traditions of the feudal past. The political leaders of Indonesia are attempting to transform this basically feudal society into a democratic one, literally overnight. Failure by the elite to recognize the heritage of the past has created many of the shortcomings of contemporary Indonesia. PSI (Socialist Party) commenting on the 1955 elections in Indonesia, admitted a misjudgment and underestimation of the strength of the traditional rural leadership. Mysbergh says this:

Mass following (of different political parties) has proved to consist to a large extent of aggregates of people in the villages grouped around the dominating factors of their daily life, the village headman and the religious teacher. . . . Popular vote in the village was in the first place their show of allegiance to either of the two or both--hence the almost complete insignificance of campaign issues such as corruption in Government, high prices, economic development, on the village level.³

The writer received corroborating information from an interview with a native student from Indonesia, who indicated

² Ibid., p. 40.

³ Ibid., p. 41.

that in the elections the village people voted as the headmen indicated.⁴ Thus it would seem probable that the rural Indonesian attitude of submissiveness to autocratic authority has not materially altered since ancient days. Under this value system the ruling elite is identified with the government, and authorities are automatically accorded the prerogatives of a privileged class.

As we have seen, a sizeable group of young revolutionary fighters was displaced from the native social order by the Japanese occupation policies and the subsequent revolutionary period. This group, having been introduced to a new value system, now finds the customary social order increasingly intolerable. At the same time it is forced to occupy a middle position between the traditional order and that espoused by the new elite. The frustration created by this situation contributes to the perpetuation and magnification of the existing political divergencies and conflicts.

Problems of Freedom

The most challenging political problem confronting Indonesia from the start was conveniently expressed in the national motto Bheneka Tunggal Ika (Unity through diversity). The obstacles are formidable. The 3000 islands of the archipelago stretch out for 3000 miles along the equator, capable

⁴ Soegang Soedarso, Indonesian student at Michigan State University. Interviewed in 1957.

of unification only through the establishment of an extensive land, sea, and air communications network. The 80,000,000 Indonesian people roughly fall into two dozen major ethnic groups and some dozen major linguistic groups. Among the peoples are very distinct cultural gradations; this may be observed by comparing the stone age Kalimantan (Borneo) Dyaks and the aristocratic Javanese, Balinese, and Sumatran heirs to over a thousand years of Hindu-Moslem-European civilizations.⁵ Despite the outward indications of unity achieved by Dutch central rule, the multitude of islands often function as distinct economic entities, each acting as a closed, self-subsistent unit. Peoples of many of the islands have little knowledge of the remaining islands and are little concerned with them. The Dutch policy of indirect rule accentuated such conditions.

In addition to these all-important factors, numerous major problems confront the Government. Some of these can be discerned by considering President Soekarno's description of governmental plans under way at the time of the seventh anniversary of the Indonesian Republic. Soekarno outlined these plans as follows: to hold elections; to raise the standards of civil service; to effect a degree of administrative decentralization; to improve the quality of the armed forces; to revise agrarian laws; to increase food production;

⁵ Willard Hanna, "Djakarta Merry-Go-Round," American Universities Field Staff Letter, No. 16, September 24, 1956, p. 4.

to expand crop area by irrigation; to carry out various projects designed to raise the level of agriculture and of village life; to improve transportation and communication; to improve electric power facilities; to install a comprehensive system of social insurance; to revise labor laws; to resettle surplus population; to introduce primary education; and to improve public health.⁶

Soekarno at this time also outlined some of the major woes of the nation in this way:

. . . . What was needed to solve many of Indonesia's problems was 'respect for authority of the State'. . . . restore authority to its throne authority should be bold enough to return to the instinctive and natural respect for authority authority should be bold enough to put authority once more into action All around us we see lassitude, all around us we see dissatisfaction, but without any dynamic positivism. It would appear as if we had no more idealism left. It would appear as if we had almost lost the knack of putting up a struggle in a big way. 'Self interest' would appear to be the enchanting goddess which beckons in her direction.⁷

Soekarno's remarks indicate the situation that existed in Indonesia up to the time when he spoke and has continued to exist ever since. As recently as 1957 the situation was summed up by Willard Hanna:

In late 1956 and early 1957, what with whole provinces renouncing Central Government authority, the

⁶ "Indonesia Takes Stock: President Sukarno Reviews Progress," Far Eastern Survey, XXI, No. 14 (October 8, 1952) p. 7.

⁷ Ibid., p. 139.

survival of the nation as a coherent whole seemed almost if not altogether as precarious as it had during the Revolutionary period of Dutch 'occupation' and 'aggression' (1945-49), or during the post-Revolutionary epidemic of armed rebellions. Today, from Sabang to Merauke--the obscure termini made familiar through President Sukarno's nationalistic slogan--the Central Government of the Republic of Indonesia is having to cope with dangerous fermentations of both old and new secessionist brews, with major new insubordinations decanted over minor insurrections.⁸

Further indications of the malady within Indonesia can be seen in the comments of the well-known Indonesian journalist, Mochtar Lubis, who questions Indonesia's destiny:

Just as France is now the 'sick man of Europe,' is Indonesia perhaps destined to become known as the 'sick man of Asia'? The symptoms of France's present malady--its political fragmentation, its economic irresponsibility, its substitution of private pressures for public policy, its renunciation of leadership and followership--are these symptoms now alarmingly prevalent in present-day Indonesia as well?⁹

Impact of Political Developments on Indonesian Socio-Economic Development

Mende relates a travel experience giving an excellent insight into the potential impact of political forces upon Indonesia's future:

While driving through a village near the central Sumatran town of Padang, I remember seeing a small boy in a patched up shirt standing in front of a

⁸ Willard Hanna, "Challenges to Central Government in Indonesia," American Universities Field Staff Letter, No. 2, February 28, 1957, p. 1.

⁹ Willard Hanna, "Djakarta Merry-Go-Round," op. cit. p. 1.

monument. This was a bomb, weighing a quarter of a ton, placed on a concrete pedestal. The boy was probably too young to be able to read the inscription: 'This bomb fell here during Holland's second military operation against the Indonesian Republic'.

In a few years this boy will begin to learn the history of his country. The bomb will be among the childhood impressions that are most likely to shape his ideas. Probably he will learn to recite the text of the declaration of Independence read out by Mr. Soekarno on 17 August 1945. But in what form, in whose interpretations and through the filter of what ideology will he learn about the events of the 5 years which followed?¹⁰

The impact of these different ideologies will depend on the government's ability to satisfy the newly developing value patterns and mass grievances.

Many errors have been committed by those who have decided the policy in Indonesia. The presidential decree effecting a multi-party system has been described by many, including President Soekarno,¹¹ as being one of the more serious errors committed by the Republic. As a result of this decree, political parties flowered and factionalism, strife, and conflict developed. This in turn has frustrated many attempts at establishing political stability.

Under the multi-party system verbal homage was paid to a democratic, representative form of government through an appointed KNIP (Central National Committee Indonesia). After

¹⁰ Tibor Mende, Southeast Asia Between Two Worlds, (New York: Cornell University Press, 1952), p. 73.

¹¹ Willard Hanna, "Djakarta Merry-Go-Round," op. cit., p. 1.

1949 the KNIP was replaced by an appointive, parliamentary form of government which continued until the 1955 elections. Prior to the 1955 elections every cabinet was a coalition cabinet and the members exercised their main influence on the formulation and execution of the Republic's policies by virtue of their position as party leaders rather than as top ministers of the cabinet. In turn, the political parties, the religious groups, and the youth and labor organizations represented in the KNIP and the parliament constituted the link with the people in whom the Republican Constitution vests ultimate sovereignty.¹² This amorphous situation produced by the forced development of a multi-party system further encouraged division along party lines. By this move the historic process of democracy was reversed. Organic development was sacrificed for the sake of structure. Under this facade of democracy the will of the people continued to be voiced by the relatively small elite.

Political leadership in Indonesia has manifested itself not in political principles but rather in personalities. Group followings depend on the leaders' abilities to manipulate the emotions of the masses. Such "democracy" imposed on an immature and illiterate populace could only contribute to a multifarious grouping of conflicting ideas and power

¹² Charles Wolf, Jr., The Indonesian Story, (New York: The John Day Company, 1949), p. 54.

drives. With so many party interests to consider, any effort towards the reduction of internal friction in the cabinet might lead only to a reduced field of operation. The varied beliefs and policies of the different parties could be kept in a state of superficial agreement only by directing an undue amount of attention to external matters. According to Mende, under such circumstances, the discussions in the Indonesian Parliament, since the transfer of sovereignty, have been dominated by a handful of major problems, including nationalization of foreign enterprises, squatters on Northern Sumatran estate lands, safeguarding of the country's non-attachment to either of the two ideological world blocs, and electoral laws.¹³

Pressure Groups and Parties as Manifestations of Social Struggle

It would appear that Indonesian political developments have been directed by a very small percentage of the Indonesian population who lead the many pressure groups that have evolved in the post-war era. Support for this contention can be found in an Indonesian publication of recent issue wherein it is stated:

As the year is drawing toward a close, great convulsions are shaking the country which put the unity of the Indonesian people to a severe test

¹³ Mende, op. cit., p. 96.

The truth is that it is not the people who are discontent but a handful of ambitious politicians who dream of ministerial posts. Djakarta is full of these politicians and their statements always find space in the newspapers which aim at heightening the political controversy. It has become their habit to speak on behalf of the people and shed crocodile tears for the lamentable fate suffered by the people. However, it remains an open question whether the people living in the rural areas have ever heard of the complaints which the politicians expressed on their behalf.

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Should an existing government be toppled to suit the wishes of a handful of power hungry politicians? Should an existing government be forced to resign to allow a chairman of a political party to maintain his chairmanship?

Indonesia has had 16 governments for the past eleven years, meaning that the average government has only a few months to live. This also means that no government has ever been in a position to do anything valuable for the country¹⁴

The above statement summarizes the political dilemma that continues to plague Indonesia's efforts to consolidate her newly won independence and to accomplish the social and economic revolution that is demanded. These conditions have undeniably expanded the potential for the development of Communism.

President Soekarno officially recognized the dilemma confronting Indonesia on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of the Proclamation of Independence when he exhorted the political leaders to accept a position of responsibility and pointed out these facts:

¹⁴ "The Indonesian People Remain United In the Face of Numerous Difficulties Confronting the Country," Indonesian Spectator, Jan. 1, 1957, pp. 12-13.

. . . . Between August 17, 1945, and August 17 of this year [1952], the number of those who have been or still are in office as ministers, whether in the Republic or the United States of Indonesia, is not less than 121, and between them these 121 have held 269 portfolios. This, in fact, was due to the lack of real unity in our midst. Since decades past we have been able to make much noise about 'unity', but it is apparent that we have not yet been able to practice unity.

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. . . . The political parties--to be more exact, the leaders of the political parties--bear the responsibility of proving that hope and belief are true. The ability, prudence, and more especially the sense of responsibility shown by the leadership of the political parties, will determine the future of democracy in our country. Democracy is not an abjective, nor is democracy an aim. Democracy [is] merely the basis for achieving an aim--the best administration in a country that is in keeping with the wishes and needs of the people. Democracy can be maintained only when the leaders of those who follow the democracy path can demonstrate that they can furnish the State with the best administration that is in keeping with the wishes and needs of the people.

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. . . . How does it come about that there are those among us who try to free themselves of this obligation [sharing the common burden of struggle] or who, while neither the country nor our people have overcome the aftermath of that struggle, seek only to exploit fully for their profit the existing difficult circumstances?¹⁵

Political Parties

In order to appraise effectively the role of the political parties in Indonesian politics, one must remember the old situation there. The new is counterbalanced by the old.

¹⁵ President Soekarno, "Order--Peace--Prosperity," Indonesian Review, I, No. 4, July-September 1951, pp. 240-52.

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The old masses, politically speaking, are familiar only at the local level with self-government and with rudimentary democratic procedures. Above this level they have passively accepted an autocracy reared above their heads, which differs but little from the form and structure of that government known under the Dutch. Hence, the people feel little personal responsibility for higher-level politics, nor do they put forth any claim to participate in it or to shape its course:

Their inability to see government above the local level as an instrument which should remain responsive to them and which they can control in their own interests, is only one expression of the broader fact that they have not yet come to the dynamic sense that their environment--social, spiritual and physical--can in large measure be moulded to their own liking. Without this sense is it possible for people to take governments in their own hands and utilize them to transform the societies in which they live?¹⁶

Indonesian political parties, it can be convincingly argued, are not parties at all in the Western sense of the term, but rather are little cliques commanding politically amorphous followings. Most of the party programs, it could be argued, are basically identical; whereas party tactics differ by sheer practical necessity of somehow obstructing the rivals from achieving--or at least claiming credit for achieving--shared objectives, at the same time claiming achievement for themselves. The tactics of these many

¹⁶ Rupert Emerson, "Progress in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, XVI, No. 13, August 27, 1952, p. 129.

cliques differ also by reason of personality traits of the respective leaders.¹⁷

Platforms and Composition of Political Parties

For purposes of comparison the thirty or more political parties currently existing in Indonesia can be broken down into four major groupings: religious; nationalist; Marxist; and minority parties. Both the parties and the philosophies of the party leaders are of course rooted in Indonesia's political past. With the exception of the Communists, it would appear that all of these parties are dedicated for the immediate future to the development of roughly the same kind of social and economic pattern, primary emphasis being upon the cooperative sphere. Superficially the Communist Party would appear to adhere to the same goals.

Every party in Indonesia can be considered as a "nationalist" party but distinctions as to nationalist objectives are hard to draw. The major foreign policy objectives and many domestic objectives of most of the Indonesian parties seem very similar in their aims. Hanna has this to say:

The major foreign policy objectives of most Indonesian parties, including the PNI, are these: the attainment of sovereignty over Irian Barat; the

¹⁷ Willard Hanna, "Indonesia's Political Parties: I," American Universities Field Staff Letter, No. 24, December 27, 1956.

offsetting of the remaining effects of the already abrogated Dutch-Indonesian Union; the promotion and leadership of the Asian-African bloc; the combatting of colonialism and imperialism; and the maintenance of an 'active, independent foreign policy,' implying noncommitment to either the Eastern or the Western bloc. The commonly stated domestic objectives include the following: encouragement of rapid economic, social, educational and cultural development; propagation of the Pantjasila; establishment of domestic peace and security by suppression of subversive and insurrectionist groups; and regulation of foreign capital investment and foreign private activities.¹⁸

It would appear that the differences which do exist among the parties are not so much differences of objectives as differences in the temperateness or intemperateness with which they state these and other objectives, the manner in which they align themselves with groupings, and their record of activities and achievements. In this light, a brief comparison will be made of platforms of the five major political parties. (By major parties we mean those which amassed the greatest number of votes in the 1955 elections or which because of potential strength exert a strong influence on government policy.)

In 1955, 87.65 per cent of Indonesia's registered voters cast a total of 37,785,229 votes to elect a total of 257 members of parliament. These votes were distributed as follows:¹⁹

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 13.

<u>Parties</u>	<u>Votes Received</u>	<u>Members Elected</u>
PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia)	8,434,653	57
Masjumi	7,903,886	57
NU (Nahdlatul-'Ulama)	6,955,141	45
PKI (Communist)	6,176,914	39
PSII (Islamic)	1,091,160	8
Parkindo (Protestant)	1,003,325	8
Partai Katholik	770,740	6
PSI (Socialists)	753,191	5
Twenty other political groupings		<u>32</u>
	<u>33,088,010</u>	257

The Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI). The PNI has been described as having the best and most extensive party structure of any Indonesian party today, except for the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI). PNI is the heir to the pre-war Nationalist Revolutionary Party created by Soekarno in 1927 and is descended from the all-inclusive mono-party, the PNI, formed immediately after the declaration of independence in 1945. Initially this party probably achieved its strength through support from the majority of the Republican local administrative officers. Many of these were the same men who made up the aristocratic administrative civil service under the Dutch. The PNI also received strong support from non-aristocratic subordinates in the civil service. It would appear that this basis of strength has not materially altered up to the present time, except as there may have been additional support from expanded government forces, both civil and military.²⁰

²⁰ Ibid., p. 4.

The philosophical base of the PNI is "Marhaenism," first conceived by Soekarno in the early years of the original PNI (1927-29) and officially adopted by the party in 1952. It is described thus by Djojokusarto, ex-chairman of the party:

Marhaenism is the formulation and reflection of the ideals, ideas, thoughts and emotions as to State and Society, that potentially slumber in the minds and hearts of the Marhaen masses who are unable to express these things for themselves. Understanding the unvoiced ideals of these masses, the Marhaenists long ago embarked upon the task of translating and formulating those ideals into Marhaenism and of guiding and fighting with them for its realization.²¹

Brief consideration of some of the official PNI objectives will indicate the tone and temper of Marhaenism. The following are some of these objectives:

To form a government and restore de facto power of the Republic of Indonesia over Irian Barat.

To terminate the Indonesian-Dutch Union, if necessary unilaterally (Note: this has been accomplished), and to achieve changes in such agreements with Holland and other countries as harm the nation (for instance, the Round Table Conference agreements concerning finance, economics and the like, Mutual Security Act, the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan, the embargo, and the like.) (Note: The Round Table Conference agreements have been renounced, the original Mutual Security Act agreement has been supplanted by another, the Peace Treaty is in effect renounced, and the embargo on shipments to China has been relaxed.)

To conduct an active, independent foreign policy for the enhancement of national prestige and world peace.

²¹ Ibid., p. 5.

To combat imperialism and racial discrimination in every way (including action within the United Nations).

To make contact with similar peoples' movements in other countries in order to exchange experiences and assistance as needed.

To nationalize according to a fixed plan vital enterprises which provide the necessities of life of the majority.

To cultivate the formation of national capital under the leadership of the State.

To prevent interference with national interests, in admitting foreign capital.

To terminate and prohibit right of foreigners to own property except for social, cultural, and diplomatic enterprises on the basis of reciprocity.

To restrict rights of ownership and inheritance.

To intensify censorship and alertness concerning films, reading matter, and propaganda from foreign countries.

To reject foreign cultural influences which damage public morals.

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To perfect the instruments of national power (army, police, reserves, customs, immigration, courts, and so on) and to coordinate the above mentioned instruments in order to guarantee the peace and safety of the State and the people.²²

From the above, there is no mistaking PNI's anti-foreign tone and its antagonistic attitude towards capitalism. Capitalism to the PNI is, generally speaking, an unmitigated evil. When the political philosophies of "Marhaenism" are

²² Ibid., pp. 6-7.

compared with Socialism and Marxism, one experiences some difficulty in distinguishing between them. It is described in this way by Willard Hanna:

Some foreign observers and not a few Indonesians find it an unrewarding political exercise to try to distinguish between Marhaenism and other political philosophies by grading it and them on a natio-socio-Marxo-democratic scale or by comparing details of party organization and program. They find it more comprehensible to describe the PNI as the party to which belongs a special and sizable portion of the top leadership of the Indonesian Revolution, the party which has been matched by force of circumstance against the religion-based Masjumi, and as the party which fortuitously held effective power during a two-year period [1953-55] of particular difficulty and opportunity [assumed power again in 1956].²³

Prior to 1953 the PNI failed to obtain a dominant position in the government; hence, Marhaenism was not subjected to public test. As a party in opposition, the PNI could effectively gain favor in the eyes of the masses. This situation changed after the fall of the Sukiman (Moslem) cabinet late in 1952. At this time the PNI, after the party leadership had swung somewhat to the left, solicited and received the support of the PKI and succeeded in heading the coalition government. From 1953 until 1955 and again at present, with the support of the PKI in Parliament, the PNI has held the dominant role in the coalition government and Marhaenism has been put to public test. To what extent the public has accepted or rejected it is extremely

²³ Ibid., p. 9.

debatable. However, it would seem highly probable, in the light of recent internal events, continued failure to alleviate the grievances of the masses, that the people of Indonesia, as they develop increased political consciousness, will no longer accord the Marhaenists the power to divine and give interpretation to the aspirations of the masses, without a radical change in the Marhaenist program.

The Masjumi

The Masjumi (Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia--Council of Indonesian Moslem Organizations) is the post-war successor to a Japanese-established organization which subsumed a multitude of pre-war religion-based organizations, including Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, Muhommedijah, Islamic Scholars Association, and Nahdatul 'Ulama. According to Kahin this organization originally enrolled the support of almost all of the Moslem religious leaders of Java, Madura, and Sumatra and was backed by most of the vestigial Indonesian middle class and the majority of the larger Indonesian landowners.²⁴

The strength of the Masjumi in its original form surpassed that of the PNI. However, its power was soon weakened by schisms developed within it. It would appear that these

²⁴ William L. Holland, Asian Nationalism and the West, (Report on Indonesia by McT. Kahin), (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1953), p. 80.

schisms developed largely as the result of conflict between the young religious socialists and some of the more conservative leaders of the Masjumi. As the former group increased its strength within the Masjumi Inner Council, the more conservative leaders evidenced a strong negative reaction. These leaders, prompted by political opportunism, left the Masjumi and formed the PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia) in July, 1957. Immediately thereafter these two organizations became rivals for mass support. The ranks of the Masjumi were further decimated in 1952. At this time the Nahdatul 'Ulama group split from the Masjumi and established its own party, charging that the Masjumi leaders were sacrificing religious principles to political considerations.²⁵

It would appear that the tactics of the religious socialists do not differ markedly from those employed by Sarekat Islam in the early days of the nationalist movement. At that time Sarekat Islam developed an increasingly revolutionary stand when confronted by the growing appeals of radical Marxism and used religion as a basis for soliciting support. This would appear to be even more the case with the factions which have broken away from the ranks of the Masjumi. In these cases it becomes increasingly probable that religion is being used as a vehicle for power.

²⁵ Willard Hanna, "Indonesia's Political Parties: I", American Universities Field Staff Letter, No. 24, December 27, 1956, p. 14.

The Masjumi, unlike the PNI, the Socialists, and the Communists, has adopted no formulated political ideology. Instead its program is declared to be based upon moral values, principles of social justice, and democracy shared by the Christian as well as the Moslem world. In its platform the Masjumi shares many of the objectives declared by the PNI. The similarities and differences in the Masjumi and PNI platforms, insofar as content and tone are concerned, may become apparent when those parts of the Masjumi platform which correspond to those cited for the PNI are considered. These are as follows:

The Masjumi aims at the realization of a legal state based upon the teachings of Islam, which will guarantee the spiritual welfare and the property of all the people of Indonesia, whether citizens or foreigners. The form of the state best corresponding to the democratic basis of Islam is a Republic.

The economy of the nation should be organized on the basis of a guided economy. Production and distribution of goods should be carried out in accordance with a set plan, guided toward realization of the widest possible popular security. Monopolies on the part of private enterprises such as damage the public interests should be forbidden. Competition should be limited and should be supervised by the government in order that it take a constructive course. . . . For the strengthening of the national economy, various types of co-operatives should be established with government aid.

In principle, vital enterprises should be nationalized according to an established plan. The order of nationalization should be as follows:

- 'a. Bank of issue (already accomplished).
- 'b. Communications networks, land, air and sea.
- 'c. Public utilities.
- 'd. Mining industries.

Nationalization of industries not included in the table of priorities above should be carried out in accordance with the circumstances and the finances of the nation.

Since national capital is still not sufficient to finance industrialization plans, opportunity should be created for foreign capital to build new industries on the basis of 'mutual profit,' that is to say, on conditions profitable both to Indonesia and to the foreign enterprise.

The Masjumi opposes every form of colonialism as contrary to the principles of Islam. . . .

The Masjumi believes that Indonesia's foreign policy should have as its objective the maintenance of world peace and the attainment of friendship with all peoples, especially with those peoples who subscribe to religious and democratic principles.²⁶

Noticeably absent is the hostility expressed by the PNI toward capitalism and foreign enterprise. It would appear that the Masjumi has not ascribed to itself a position as the leader of a socialist, a revolutionary, or a mass movement. It has shown little use for the populist slogans and terms used by many of the other parties. Instead it would appear that Masjumi depends largely upon religious exhortation of the masses for its strength. Its policies, however, would appear to be tempered more by political rather than religious considerations.

Although Islam has been referred to by many, including Soekarno, as constituting Indonesia's main bulwark against Communism, it is the opinion of this author that the results

²⁶ Ibid., pp. 14-15.

of the 1955 elections and subsequent adjustments in Masjumi policy indicate that the Masjumi leaders have reappraised the strength of the Moslem religion in counteracting the appeals of Communism. It seems probable that the Masjumi will become more politically oriented and that a diminishing role will be accorded to religion as the basis for a mass following.

Nahdatul 'Ulama

The Nahdatul 'Ulama (NU) dates back to 1926 as a nation-wide religious organization. From 1926 onward the group experienced political accretions. In 1952 the NU split from the Masjumi and founded a separate political party. At the time of this split NU leaders charged that they no longer had any voice on the Masjumi Inner Council and were thus being excluded from participating in important decisions and the awarding of important political prizes. It was charged that these acts were being accomplished by the religious socialists on the basis of strictly political, rather than religious, considerations. Although no political platform is available for comparison with other parties, Hanna describes the NU as follows:

The NU is a more tradition-conscious, more conservative, more--to use a Western term--fundamentalist Masjumi. Its leaders are generally older men who hold and employ the titles 'Kiai Hadji' ('learned religious teacher and pilgrim') and often command near veneration as religious mentors. Most of them have been educated in Islamic rather than in Western style schools and have little acquaintance, therefore, with Western language and culture or even with the more modern, Westernized aspects of Indonesian

life. Their followers are primarily the uneducated villagers whose primary point of reference is the village mosque. . . .

The NU policy and program, for a true understanding of which one needs to be grounded in Islamic lore and in Indonesian linguistic borrowings from the Arabic, differs significantly from the Masjumi. It differs most precisely in its emphasis on Islamic conservatism and its aloofness toward Western values. . . . In actuality, the NU leans neither toward the Darul Islam nor the PKI but is just what it appears to be: an extremely conservative and, from the Western point of view, philosophically and ideologically almost impenetrable Islamic organization led by venerable religious teachers and supported by devout common people. . . .²⁷

Nahdatul 'Ulama surprisingly emerged as the third largest party in Indonesia in the 1955 elections. Its leader, Idham Chalid, who received his education as a teacher of Islam in West Java, is described as one of the few remaining political leaders in Indonesia who place principle above everything. His devotion to honesty makes ~~him~~ a highly respected leader in his party. "In a country where fortune is within the grip of a man who wields political influence, he is practically the only man in his party who does not engage himself in business transaction."²⁸

Despite its religious conservatism, the Nahdatul 'Ulama weighs heavily in the precarious balance of political power in Indonesia. It has constituted one of the supporting elements

²⁷ Willard Hanna, "Indonesia's Political Parties: II," American Universities Field Staff Letter, No. 25, December 29, 1956, p. 4.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 3.

of the PNI government, and some observers held, as of early 1957, that its continued support would enable the cabinet in power to weather any difficulty which might come up in the weeks and months ahead.²⁹

The Partai Sosialis Indonesia (PSI)

The PSI, headed by Soetan Sjahrir and supported by a closely knit leadership including some of Indonesia's more outstanding intellectuals, is described by Hanna as follows:

Indonesian socialists are, on the whole, orthodox socialists (if, of course, there is such a thing), not neo-socialists or pseudo-socialists or social-democrats or nationalist-socialists, but just plain socialists who believe in public ownership and operation of the means of production, and therefore state planning, state provision of social benefits to the whole population, state programs to raise the general level of the Indonesian economic and social structure. . . .

The Indonesian Socialists are not dialectical materialists. They denounce totalitarianism and call for the preservation of orthodox human values. They specifically disclaim the Marxist socialism of Moscow: 'We differentiate ourselves from the socialism as taught by Moscow or the Cominform'

If the Socialists renounce Communism, they renounce also Capitalism. 'Although with the means provided by science and technique today the wealth of nature could actually be utilized to the fullest extent in the interest of human happiness, capitalism is unable to perform this task, because of the latter's incompatibility with the profit motive.'

²⁹ "The Party Leader Who Stands for Political Honor and Decency," Indonesian Spectator, February 15, 1957, pp. 10-11.

Nevertheless, the Socialists continue, 'Socialist planning does not exclusively mean nationalization or socialization. It means the organization of the whole production so as to achieve the aims mentioned above. There are means of production which are collective property, and there is also private and individual property. The organization of these three types of production is the object of socialist planning.'³⁰

The PSI's main strength and appeal, both as a party and as an ideology, appears to be derived from the intellectual level of its leadership. Included in its membership are a few thousand outstandingly competent individuals, some in important government positions. The efforts of the party are seemingly directed at building small but select cadres of leaders in labor, youth, and social affairs. In addition, the party has extended its efforts towards the Indonesian press; as of 1956, Hanna described the press as well over 50 per cent Socialist in editorship.³¹

After Sjahrir's resignation as Prime Minister in 1947, the Socialist Party refused to enter into the government. This position was maintained until the 1955 elections on the grounds that the government, as constituted, was not representative of the people. Members of the Party, however, were permitted to, and did, enter the government on an individual basis. The Party, instead, had constituted itself as the

³⁰ Willard Hanna, "Indonesia's Political Parties: II", op. cit., p. 7.

³¹ Ibid., p. 4.

sole really articulate and consistently loyal opposition to the many coalition cabinets. It has consistently opposed Communism by forthright and direct attacks on dangerous persons and subversive tendencies. Names are named and instances are cited. The Communists indicate the effects of such attack by directing their most bitter attacks at the PSI.

The results of the 1955 elections may indicate that the PSI has not succeeded in reaching or enlisting much mass support, either with its ideology or with regard to its position as an articulate spokesman against Communism. It would appear that the PSI is not without a potential for success. However, by following present evolutionary tactics, it pins its hopes upon the element of time, which at present seems insufficient for any significant accomplishment.

Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)

The PKI, as previously described, has a long history in the Indonesian nationalist movement. It became a legal party in the immediate post-war period. During the revolutionary period it supported the Indonesian government in a policy of compromise and concession to the Dutch until it radically changed its policy in 1948. This change resulted from both exclusion from the Hatta Government and a reorientation of Soviet policy. In the Madiun Rebellion the PKI overtly threatened the republican government and was effectively suppressed by republican military action. In this

action its leadership was largely decimated. The Party followers re-emerged when granted clemency by the government in the face of the second Dutch military action. The post-independence activities of the PKI have been described in brief by Hanna:

. . . . tried tactics of large scale strikes and sabotage (1950-51); provoked strong repressive measures (mid-1951); developed its own deviationist movement, self-branded Tan Ling-dji-ism; adopted the tactics of the united front (1952); aroused the outspoken enmity of the Socialists and the Masjumi and the watchful tolerance at least of the PNI; and has become the first in discipline and the fourth in vote-getting power of the forty Indonesian political parties.³²

In view of the trend towards a bipolarization of Indonesian political parties, it is felt that a consideration of the PKI platform espoused at the 1955 Congress (covered in preceding chapter) indicates the potential strength of Communism in an unstable Indonesia. By following this program and by utilizing the "peaceful" post-Stalin tactics, it has gained prestige on the Indonesian political scene. Unquestionably this position of prestige has been extended to an appreciable percentage of the Indonesian masses by scrupulously following a program of genuine patriotism and by championing the cause of freedom.

The PKI, in its role of supporter of the PNI, has achieved a position of greater strength and influence in Indonesia than ever before. While achieving this position,

³² Ibid., pp. 3-4.

it has been energetically devoted to the achievement of the goals of International Communism. This has been accomplished by a continued effort to consolidate control over organized labor, by taking advantage of a worsening economic situation to exploit success, by skillfully exploiting conflicts among other parties, and by being very careful to avoid any offense to religious feelings and to present its program in village propaganda as merely the logical extension of the doctrines of Islam.³³

Other Political Parties and Groups

Although the above-mentioned five major parties would appear to dominate the political scene in Indonesia, other parties and groups occupy positions of great importance. In the long-existent, precarious balance of political power many additional parties and/or groups, led for the most part by office-hungry politicians, have occupied positions of importance out of proportion to their respective strengths. These groups can be classified as "labor", "peoples", and "progressive" parties. They have as their leaders figures of some standing in the revolutionary hierarchy. For the most part these leaders have bolted the major parties when thwarted from achieving desired positions of power. They

³³ Robert C. Bone, Jr., "Future of Indonesia's Political Parties," Pacific Affairs, XXIII, No. 2, February 1954, p. 22.

are popular with organized labor, the peasant organizations, youth and left-wing intellectual groups, and may be described as falling within the 'activist' category. According to Hanna, these groups are frequently, although not necessarily, Communist-inspired. They specialize in demonstrations and agitations that give Jakarta and other major cities almost weekly some big protest meeting or other, complete with parade, flags, slogans, speeches, petitions, and disorders ranging from scuffles through riots.³⁴

Over a period of years a close personal acquaintance-ship has developed between the leaders of the many movements. This in itself adds to the already complicated political scene and inevitably detracts from efforts to achieve political stability and unity. Among these prominent movement leaders, because of the differences in temperament and ideals and because of frustration of effort, a bitterness of personal relations has developed and has become manifest in the post-independence political struggle.

From this brief consideration of the political parties, there would appear every reason to attribute much of the political instability, strife, and conflict which has characterized Indonesia's development, to group and individual personality conflicts rather than to incompatible political ideologies. In this respect, no party is above reproach.

³⁴ Willard Hanna, "Indonesia's Political Parties: II," op. cit., p. 1.

As in all countries, all parties in varying degrees have been motivated by personal gain and opportunism, rather than by complete acceptance and development of an ideal. In such an atmosphere, in present-day Asia, Communism and all other sorts of protest movements are likely to flourish.

President Soekarno

President Soekarno, since he assumed office, has managed to stand above the political parties. Because of his role in the development of Indonesia and because of recent indications that would point to a closer personal affiliation with the PNI, it is felt that he must be considered in much the same manner as the political parties in appraising Indonesia's development.

No one questions that President Soekarno has been extremely influential, both in his position as president and as an individual, in shaping political developments in Indonesia. Because of his oratorical abilities and his ability to assess the psychology of the masses, he alone in the eyes of the masses represents the "nationalist movement" --the "liberator," if you will. During the earlier post-war years, by remaining above the parties, he has for the most part succeeded in avoiding situations wherein he would become liable to crippling criticism. However, because of continued political instability, internal disorder, and growing dissension among the masses, he has in the more recent past been

forced to make or withhold a number of unpopular decisions. Because of this he has become increasingly subject to mass appraisal. According to Willard Hanna:

President Sukarno [Soekarno] himself exercises great power in government, not so much because of constitutional authority as because of personal prestige and political dexterity. He consults, advises, mediates, intervenes, or pointedly refrains from doing so in virtually every development of consequence; and his studied aloofness may be just as effective as his interventions. He is so intimately acquainted with virtually all of the nation's politicians that he can anticipate with uncanny precision what they are likely to do under given circumstances. He exercises an hypnotic effect over the general public to whom he speaks as an oracle whose luster is only slightly dimmed by political sediment.³⁵

It is the opinion of the present author, based upon Soekarno's expressed conviction of his role in shaping the destiny of the Indonesian people, in addition to the attitude and actions that he has displayed in the post-war era, that Soekarno shows tendencies toward egotism. This has undoubtedly shaped many of his ideas and actions. He has admitted to being an 'agitator.' He has avowed himself to be a leader. He is unquestionably convinced of the correctness of his own personal interpretation of what the people would desire if they were able to think and speak for themselves. He is not content merely with exercising great personal power as the president of a parliamentary system of government. "He constitutes himself still the prime

³⁵ Ibid., p. 9.

spokesman not only for national reconstruction and consolidation but also for national vigilance against that repellent alien trio: colonialism, imperialism, and capitalism."³⁶

Despite the fact that he professes to have no dictatorial ambitions, there is no question that Soekarno is convinced in his own mind that he is the destined leader of Indonesia and as such quite possibly the only one able to divine what is the right goal for Indonesia to seek. Past experiences have indicated that he is not above exploiting many means towards the achievement of these ends. For example, it has been charged that he resorted to terrorism and coercion in the early days of his revolutionary nationalist activities when frustrated in his attempts to unite the nationalist movement. Further, in his role as an agitator for nationalism during the Japanese occupation, it was Soekarno who through his position was largely responsible for recruiting many thousands of Indonesian volunteers for the Japanese labor corps. According to Hanna, Soekarno's detractors in Indonesia still point out that these volunteers either vanished or, years later, decimated and emaciated, drifted back from Thailand, Burma, and other Asian war frontiers.³⁷

³⁶ Willard Hanna, "Bung Karno: I," American Universities Field Staff Letter, No. 7, April, 1956, p. 1.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 15.

It would appear that Soekarno is largely responsible for setting the stage for the nationalistic incitement of the masses and thus may have contributed materially to the economic malady within Indonesia. He unquestionably remains dedicated to the achievement of his utopian ideals. His approach to Communism, both domestic and international, is cause for concern. He has declared that he is not anti-Communist, but rather is a non-Communist and that he and Indonesia would reject Communism because of their Moslem religion. Despite these affirmations it seems highly probable that his ideals have been influenced greatly by radical Marxism. This would appear to be true especially in the early years of his nationalistic endeavors when he adopted revolutionary nationalism along with 'activist' tactics to promote his cause. It is highly probable that in the post-war era he utilized the Communist menace in Indonesia's negotiations with the Dutch, for he is alleged to have made this statement during the Revolutionary period:

The loss of faith in the Dutch and the economic distress, those are the principal factors for the growth of Communism in Indonesia. The fact that the struggle is being waged against Dutch Colonialism makes it possible that Communism can easily take its place on the side of Nationalism.³⁸

Unfortunately, this statement by Soekarno could very likely be made applicable in Indonesia today by merely substituting the 'Republican Government' for the 'Dutch.'

³⁸ Indonesian Report, Collected Dispatches of American Correspondents Who Died in Bombay, India, July 12, 1949, Nat Barrows, p. 3.

In more recent times, Soekarno's position with reference to Communism and the Indonesian Communists is felt to be worthy of considerable attention. Since 1953 the PNI has courted the support of the PKI in order to remain at the head of the coalition government. This alone could only aid the Communist cause in Indonesia. However, according to Hanna, Soekarno's statements, made in conjunction with his visit to the USSR, produced great consternation on the Indonesian political scene. Hanna described the impact of Soekarno's statements:

Bung Karno's speeches in the U.S.S.R. induced among a good many Indonesians a case of near shock. Indonesians had not been accustomed, except at Communist rallies, to hearing Indonesian and Russian aspirations so unequivocally equated. They had just recently heard Indonesian and American, Indonesian and West German, Indonesian and Italian, Indonesian and other Western ideals acclaimed as identical by the same orator, but in cooler, more restrained language. While they had anticipated that, in line with a neutralist foreign policy, tribute to the West would be offset by tribute to the Soviet Union, they had not anticipated that the delicate psychological balance would have to sustain a counterweight quite so freighted with possible significance.³⁹

A joint statement made by the Indonesian and Russian Foreign Ministers at the end of the Indonesian visit to the U.S.S.R. created an even greater reaction. According to Hanna:

. . . . Nobody was particularly surprised or perturbed by references in the statement to a \$100 million 'no strings' aid program, to be carried out by the U.S.S.R.

³⁹ Willard Hanna, "Moscow Comes to Bung Karno and So Does Peking," American Universities Field Staff Letter, No. 20, November 30, 1956, p. 5.

for Indonesia; assertion of the justice of China's claim to UN membership; and declaration of intent to step up cultural and scientific exchange. There was, however, one really startling inclusion, the declaration that: "With regard to such international questions as disarmament, struggle against colonialism, prohibition of the use and tests of atomic and thermonuclear weapons, etc., the U.S.S.R. and the Republic of Indonesia are guided by the spirit and the principles of the Bandung conference. Moreover, the Soviet Union and Indonesia have declared that the existence of military pacts does not promote the efforts to reduce international tension which are sorely needed for the attainment of world peace'⁴⁰

Undoubtedly the responsive Russian masses, the ovations, and the many "hidup Bung Karno"'s (long live Soekarno) touched a tender spot in the eyes and heart of the recipient. How much or how far Soekarno has been moved by these demonstrations and by the "soft policy" of the Kremlin since the death of Stalin remains unanswered. It is proposed, however, that if he was impressed in Russia, he was even more impressed by what he saw in China. Here was a country with a background similar to that of Indonesia which had advanced, although faced by similar difficulties. Dale Stafford, an American newspaper editor, voicing impressions received during his visit to Indonesia, reports Soekarno as tremendously impressed by the advances which he felt had been accomplished under the Chinese People's Republic.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Dale Stafford, editor of Greenville, Michigan, Daily News, visited Indonesia in 1955. Interviewed 1957.

Since his return from the visits to Russia and China, Soekarno has advanced the idea of his "new conception" and has suggested "burying the parties." Although it is impossible to determine the extent to which he was influenced by what he saw in Russia and China in developing these ideas, it seems highly probable that these factors weighed heavily. Undoubtedly his appraisal of Indonesia's political instability and his conviction of the rightness of his ideals, coupled with the successful achievements he observed in China under strong central authority, have tempered his plans considerably.

One might readily question Soekarno's appraisal of Communism. Has he adopted his present stand in order to gain assistance from the U.S.S.R. and China, or is he sincerely convinced of the compatibility of Communism and Marhaenism? Regardless of the answer, consideration must be given to the impact of his position and his statements upon the Indonesian masses. For the most part, these have never known Russia and are scarcely acquainted with Communism. They maintain anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist and anti-Western attitudes. The PKI since 1952 has moved cautiously and maintained a position of stainless patriotism while championing the cause of nationalism. Thus, since Soekarno's words are esteemed so highly by the masses, his statements equating Russia and Indonesia with the aims of peace are a tremendous asset to the Communists.

The Military as a Pressure Group--Its Role in Indonesia's Development

During the Japanese occupation a native military force was developed in Indonesia. This force was inculcated with anti-Western, anti-imperialistic, and, to a certain but undeterminable extent, Communistic ideas. When the Japanese capitulated to the Allies, these military units took advantage of the vacuous situation which resulted and, either by force or through acquiescence on the part of the Japanese, succeeded in getting Japanese arms. The Indonesian Communists also succeeded in developing armed units during this same period of time. During the post-war Revolutionary period little success was achieved in developing these forces into well disciplined and organized units. Instead, the Indonesian government, when faced with the return of the Dutch and in subsequent Dutch military actions, sanctioned the use of terror and extremist activities by these groups. This course of action did much to foster a great degree of anomie and anarchism within the ranks of the military groups. Unfortunately, these tendencies have persisted until the present. Wolf, in referring to the Government sanction of these activities, makes this statement: "Despite the fact that the Government could not itself control the terrorists, no cleavage developed between young extremists and the Republican Government."⁴²

⁴² Wolf, op. cit., p.6.

Because of continued insecurity and lack of central government authority, the military occupies a role of increasing importance in internal political developments in Indonesia. No estimate of Indonesia's political future is complete unless one considers the role which the newly developed military forces may play. According to Rupert Emerson, it would seem plausible to suggest that the social and political structure of Indonesia renders it susceptible to military manipulation, once sizeable military forces have been brought into being and the original democratic ideals have been dissipated.⁴³

It is readily apparent that Indonesia's armed forces have already contributed materially to her political development. A brief mention of a few of the many incidents that have displayed definite political overtones and in which the armed forces have been either wholly or partially implicated will support the above contention. During the revolutionary period, Amir Sjarifoeddin, as Prime Minister and as Minister of the Interior, elevated many of his own leaders to positions of command and authority in the armed forces. Through these moves he was able to centralize authority. Vice President Hatta succeeded Sjarifoeddin as Prime Minister. Because of growing demands for popular government and quite possible because of a realization that Communist or Left-wing

⁴³ Emerson, op. cit., p. 133.

strength within the armed forces was increasing, Hatta initiated his "Rationalization Program." The armed forces were reduced. Many of Sjarifoeddin's appointees were replaced or demoted. Communist strength among the ranks was dissipated. Communist officers, fearful of losing their positions because of this program, launched the premature and abortive Madiun Rebellion in 1948. The government jailed the leaders and most of the participants in the rebellion but, in the face of the second Dutch military action, gave them their release. At the same time the armed forces were decentralized for independent action against the Dutch. These moves once again fostered the development of guerilla bands loyal only to their immediate leader.

Late in 1952, an abortive and possibly ill-defined coup was attempted against the government. This attempt was manifested in public demonstrations, some little violence, a march on Merdeka Palace, and demands for the dissolution of Parliament. Once the situation appeared threatening, Soekarno appeared and implored the crowds to disperse. The crowds obeyed. Originally this movement started as a protest against the Parliament's vote of censure against the Sultan of Jogjakarta, who as Minister of Defense wanted a smaller, non-political army, capable only of restoring law and order and governmental authority. Partisan units known to be enthusiastic supporters of the President changed the course of events. Commanding officers known to be in sympathy with

the Defense Minister were imprisoned by subordinates. By the end of January, 1953, the balance sheet of the October 17th affair became quite clear, indicating that the incident was heavily weighted in favor of the President. Most of the mutineer officers were promoted and given virtual control of the army. Talk about reform ceased. Because of this rebuff, the Sultan of Jogjakarta resigned and retired from the political scene, thus removing from the political arena a popular personality and possibly a potential contender for the role of president, who both before and since this time has demonstrated himself to be dedicated to the achievement of internal improvement.⁴⁴ Since no reforms were effected in the armed forces, it would appear that the President sanctioned the political activities of the military and encouraged such activities in support of his position.

It is important to note that the Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Nasution, who resigned as Chief of Staff for implication in the October 17th affair, was reappointed in 1955. Further, although this is not clear, it would seem apparent that the government, by continuing to maintain a loosely organized military force without reduction, enhanced the interests of the PNI and, in no small measure, the PKI.

The army, like the political parties, is seemingly dominated by a relatively small elite described by Willard Hanna thus:

⁴⁴ Mende, op. cit., p. 95.

. . . . To be more precise, it is a clique or a couple of competing and kaleidoscopically changing cliques of a few dozen top officers who exercise control--people wonder how firmly-- over a military establishment of about 200,000 men. These energetic and ambitious young men emerged at the age of twenty-five or thirty as commanders of the Revolutionary forces--guerillas and insurgents rather loosely assembled into armies. Now at about thirty-five or forty, they have had ten years in which to try to weld dissident and dissimilar elements into disciplined armed services and to reflect upon the role which the armed services should play in the national life. . . . The Headquarters staff officers have been given to theorizing and propagandizing on the responsibility of the armed services not only for the defense of the nation in time of outright war but for the reform and rehabilitation of the nation in normal times, which in Indonesia, are troubled. The Territorial Commanders, charged with the extremely difficult job of maintaining or restoring peace and order in troubled areas, provided with totally inadequate funds, equipment and training materials, have tended to go into the military command business pretty much on their own. They have trained their troops according to their own concepts, introducing into military theory a generous amount of social and political doctrine, looking for outside sources of financing and sometimes finding them (as has been proven in West Sumatra and North Sulawesi) in large-scale, Army-managed smuggling.⁴⁵

Government action or lack of action in handling the smuggling affairs has created dissatisfaction with the present administration. Unofficial condoning of such acts has prompted the suspicion that the government is unable or unwilling to control such elements. Both of these alternatives are highly probable.

⁴⁵ Willard Hanna, "Indonesia's Political Parties: II," op. cit., p. 13.

More recent incidents have further indicated the position assumed by the Army in Indonesia's political developments. On August 13, 1956, military police, under orders from the Commander of the Third Military District (West Java, under military law), served an order upon the then Foreign Minister to appear for questioning on charges of corruption. These actions apparently were without the knowledge of the Army High Command or the top civil authorities. The Foreign Minister was released through government intervention and upon Nasution's order. Further, he was exonerated by a committee of Cabinet Ministers. The army suppressed the military commander's side of the story and, in view of charges made by the press, published an emergency decree (withdrawn November 28, 1956), to wit:

. . . . It is prohibited [to the press] to print, publish, offer, circulate, paste, read out, or possess writings, pictures or drawings containing or implying or insinuating criticism, suspicion, or insult against the president, vice president, a court of justice, or a government official during his tenure of office or as a consequence of discharging his function; or any containing hostile statements, hatred or insult against the government or certain peoples' groups; or any containing reports or announcements which may create confusion among the people.⁴⁶

Following this incident, an official report was released which described an attempted coup by Colonel Julkifli Lubis.

⁴⁶ Willard Hanna, "Coups, 'Smuggles', Demonstrations and Korupsi," American Universities Field Staff Letter, No. 1, January 18, 1957, p. 9.

Lubis, as acting Chief of Staff, earlier had led a headquarters boycott of a newly appointed Chief of Staff and had thus precipitated the fall of the First Ali Cabinet. The official report failed to define the coup clearly. Instead, it would appear that this release and charges contained therein resulted more from political maneuvers than from any overt threat having been posed against the government. The government's failure to take any action against Lubis may indicate that the charges were very weak, or that the government was.

On December 22, 1956, Colonel Simbolon, Territorial Commander of the North Sumatran area, assumed control over civil authority in the area and radioed Djakarta that he no longer acknowledged the authority of the Ali Cabinet. At the same time he declared his loyalty to the President and to the nation. He then proceeded to abolish central government economic controls. In order to appreciate the significance of his act, one must be familiar with the position of the armed forces in their respective areas. These forces are far removed physically from the seat of central authority. Communication links with Djakarta are very weak. The units are ill paid and poorly equipped. Such conditions preclude the development of strong unity of command within the armed forces and promote instead a situation wherein loyalty is directed toward the immediate commanders. In certain areas of Indonesia the military units exercise

martial law and thus constitute the element of authority. Because of the relative weakness of the governmental control structure in the outer islands, the armed forces have apparently been accepted as representatives of the government and have been accorded authority by the masses. The army units are continually exposed to the grievances of the masses. In turn, they witness the central government's apparent inability to deal effectively with such grievances. Under such circumstances, the army leaders quite naturally see fit to assume a position of greater authority and to act on occasions as spokesmen for the masses in their respective areas.

Governmental reaction to these acts of insubordination by Colonel Simbolon and others who have emulated him would appear to be relatively weak. Outwardly, governmental action has been limited to presidential intervention, this being no more than an appeal for the restoration of law and order and the replacement of the offenders by presidential appointees. Thus the insubordinate areas apparently have been returned to Central government control.

Complete information on the Army's political activities is not available. Despite this, it is readily apparent that a number of the army leaders, whose positions have not been endangered and who quite possibly have an eye to advancement, have professed loyalty to President Soekarno. Further, Soekarno's decisions in developing his "new conception" have

unquestionably been influenced by the recent actions of the army leaders. The political ramifications of the actions of Indonesia's military commands are great. The continued display of a lack of governmental control over the armed forces has promoted anarchical conditions within the military. This has been demonstrated by various army groups and by the military command itself. A continuance of such conditions can only create further disillusionment on the part of the masses. Although there is no information available which implicates the Communists in the recent army actions, it would appear very likely that they have been involved. In any case, the results can be interpreted as having served the cause of Communism in Indonesia.

Apart from the government's military forces, consideration must be given to the continued problem of insecurity in Indonesia. Extremist and terrorist movements continue to exist in West Java, South Sulawesi, North Sumatra, and South Kalimantan. In these areas an estimated 10,000 to 50,000 armed guerillas⁴⁷ are sporadically engaged in fighting against government forces and in pillaging the population. Continued instability and frustration on the part of the masses, coupled with a questionable anti-guerilla effort by the military forces, have favored these guerilla activities.

⁴⁷ Willard Hanna, "Bung Karno's 'Conception'," American Universities Field Staff Letter, No. 2, March 9, 1957, p. 2.

This situation is described as being augmented by disaffected youth:

It must be acknowledged that the problem of youth is one of the most difficult that the government has to face. Tens of millions have to be rehabilitated in the community. Politically they and especially those with inadequate training will soon fall prey to those who wish to create disorder in this land and there are indications that the gangs which create disorder in West Java have been reinforced lately by young people who are feeling discontent and full of doubt of the future.⁴⁸

Darul Islam, one of the terrorist groups and a strong political force, emerged as an extremist force during the revolutionary period. Peasant discontent in the West Java area originally contributed to its strength. The original leaders demanded the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. Subsequent leaders have also voiced this demand. However, it would appear that Kartcsowirjo and others of the original leaders have been replaced by political extremists, hoodlums, bandits, etc., and that the movement has since become a tool for less religious aims. The natives of the area have been pillaged, plundered and terrorized. The central government has been unenergetic in attempting to eliminate such terror. Thus, both through fear of the Darul Islam forces and a lack of trust in the central government, some of the natives are moving from the area. Government inaction is described by some as having been influenced greatly by political considerations lest certain Moslems be alienated in the 1955 elections.

⁴⁸ Indonesian Review, II, February-March, 1951, p. 119.

Internal Policy: Its Impact Upon Indonesian Development

Many of Indonesia's leaders are dedicated to the betterment of their country. However, they have either failed or been denied the opportunity to bring about very marked advances in Indonesia's internal development. Political struggle and intrigue have contributed to political instability. Political considerations have seemingly dominated the major part of any action taken on the domestic scene.

Civil Service and the Bureaucracy

Political patronage and an affinity for "empire building" have resulted in the development of a burgeoning bureaucracy in Indonesia. This group, reportedly numbering between one and two million, now administers work that the Dutch had efficiently accomplished with an administrative force numbering between two and three hundred thousand. Apparently, despite government and public recognition of this monstrosity, political considerations and fear of alienating votes have taken precedence over reality and have prevented the adoption of necessary economy measures. Willard Hanna makes this statement:

. . . . Routine ministry business, meanwhile, is being conducted by a civil service bureaucracy in the international bureaucratic manner. This Indonesian bureaucracy of some 1,000,000 employees is distinguished perhaps more by the fact that it is, on the whole, recently formed and inexperienced

than by the fact that it is vastly overexpanded (reduction by at least one third is repeatedly and urgently recommended), grossly underpaid (average salary is about the equivalent of U.S.\$25.00 monthly for a medium-level civil servant), and dedicated almost to the point of monomania to the accumulating, storing, and misplacing rather than to the passing of papers.⁴⁹

This overstaffed bureaucracy, together with the armed forces, is reported to constitute about 70 per cent of the government budget expenditure, as opposed to 7 per cent for education.⁵⁰ Low pay, the need of subsistence, and opportunities for economic gain have prompted most government employees to take two or three different jobs simultaneously. Undoubtedly many have entered the more lucrative and less strenuous field of "blackmarket" activities and have, along with many not-so-pure politicians, utilized their political connections to secure government loans in furtherance of such enterprises. These conditions lead to continued instability and inflation, and they indirectly aid the Communists in their expansion efforts.

Middle Class

From the inception of the Republic, Indonesian leaders have recognized the necessity for developing a strong middle class. Prior to 1945, such an indigenous middle class was,

⁴⁹ Willard Hanna, "Indonesia's Political Parties: II," op. cit., p. 10.

⁵⁰ Richard Wright, The Color Curtain, (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1956), p. 96.



for all intents and purposes, non-existent. It had to be created ad hoc. The government, in fostering this group, has seemed to under emphasize the fact that such a class can rest only upon pillars of hard work and trustworthiness. Instead it was given a chance to grow, almost literally, in a "hot-house" under government protection. Many of the policies designed to protect the growth of this class have quite obviously been the by-product of the nationalistic extremism. Apparently these policies have not produced the desired results.

Certain restrictive economic policies have been followed. These were designed to curtail the strength of the Chinese element in the middle-class. From the start, for example, severe restrictions were imposed on the granting of import licenses. Such licenses for goods that were relatively easy to handle and yielded considerable profit were reserved largely for new, purely Indonesian firms. This immediately contributed to a rapidly expanded group of Indonesian importers. Many, however, found the business so difficult that they were content to sell their licenses and have the business handled by established firms (Chinese). Thus the Chinese element, although denied the right to these licenses by government policy, were afforded the opportunity to regain the import business and continue to control it.⁵¹

⁵¹ M. J. Meijis, The Chinese in Indonesia, (Cambridge: Center for International Studies, MIT, 1955), p. 55.

From personal experiences in the Philippines and in South Korea, the author observed that in such a native society in transition few people are likely to be concerned with the betterment of society in general. Instead, many tend to adopt a highly individualistic outlook on life and concern themselves purely with personal and material desires and ambitions. Indonesia appears to be no exception to this proposition. The indigenous middle class has been described as a self-centered group which is being abetted by government sponsorship. This group has further been described as a nouveau riche class, living high from "black market" profits.⁵²

Continuance of these conditions can only detract further from Indonesia's ability to progress economically. Such policies as have been followed have caused a further displacement of native society and have fostered a spirit of irresponsible individualism. Yet, curtailment of such practices and policies would apparently alienate many of this group. Motivated by materialistic values, it could well find the Communist alternative quite enticing.

Labor

The Republican Government has recognized the need for organized labor, so as to give the proletariat strength against the exploitative practices of foreign capital. Such

⁵² Wright, op. cit., p. 102.

strength in turn would curtail domestic exploitation as well and improve the lot of the Indonesian proletariat. Political considerations were probably of equal or even greater importance in the government's labor policy. The political leaders have always been eager to achieve popular support from the ranks of labor. To do so, in the initial flourish of enthusiasm, the political leaders proclaimed a seven-hour working day in Indonesia. According to Mende, this was an unjustifiable luxury; yet politicians and trade unions have consistently ridiculed any proposal for the restoration of an eight-hour day or for the encouragement of higher productivity. In a further effort to mollify labor, the government saw fit to acquiesce in the demands of government employees for a Lebaran (Moslem New Year) bonus. This added an additional strain to an already deficient and overtaxed Indonesian economy.

Indications of the conditions of labor can be found in the relatively insignificant advances in their standard of living. According to Mende, labor on the rubber and tea plantations in Sumatra in 1952-53 received from 5-10Rp (50-55¢) per day, while miners in the Sumatran coal mines received 15Rp (75¢) per day.⁵³ Perhaps some small increases in wages have been received since. However, the situation would appear to have deteriorated through the working of Indonesia's

⁵³ Mende, op. cit., pp. 39 and 45.

inflationary economy. Thus apart from the central government's concentrated effort to nationalize foreign holdings, little has been achieved in satisfying the grievances of the proletariat.

Accordingly, the Communists have energetically pursued a policy designed to capture and further organize Indonesia's labor. Although sufficient information is not available to permit an accurate appraisal of their activities, it would appear highly probable that the Communists, by fomenting strikes and labor disorders in foreign enterprises, have in the eyes of labor been one of the major factors in achieving nationalist goals. Further, it is highly probable that Communism is credited by some elements of labor with having achieved whatever advances have been made in actual wages and benefits.

The Communists have enjoyed success in organizing and controlling labor. It is reported that of the 150,000-200,000 estate workers found in the Medan area of Sumatra, 30,000 have been organized by Sarburpri (Communist-controlled). The Socialist union in the same area has only 8,000-15,000 on its rolls. Sarburpri appears to be constructed according to the Communist pattern. Reportedly, the organizational structure consists of a council at each estate and branch and sub-branch officers dealing with the affairs of one or more plantations. Each of these offices is divided

into sections for education, political propaganda, and sports. Volunteer workers are utilized for literacy classes.⁵⁴ According to one native student from Indonesia, no other political movement in Indonesia has displayed as much discipline and organization as the Communists. In the light of a growing dissatisfaction with central government policy, it becomes readily apparent that Communist activities may be having a significant impact upon the Indonesian proletariat.

The Communists have fomented many of these grievances while at the same time they have outwardly championed the proletariat's cause. In so doing, the leaders of Sarburpri have condoned the practice of labor's resorting to stealing in order to share in the profits of the estates and other enterprises. Such activities are probably interpreted by the proletariat as conforming with the government's policy of nationalizing the many foreign enterprises.

It would appear evident in considering the successes achieved by the Communists in the 1955 elections that they have enjoyed success elsewhere in Indonesia. The Communist propaganda of genuine patriotism, staunch nationalism, and concern for the cause of labor may conceivably attract the Indonesian proletariat, both urban and rural, who not only live under the threat of an unstable government and insecure

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 50.

economy but are also ignorant of the many facets of International Communism.

Education

The Indonesians were relegated to an inferior status under Dutch rule. They were thwarted from achieving those values which in their eyes constituted the integral element of Dutch and Western strength, namely education. Hence, education assumed a position of paramount importance in the newly developing value system of the Indonesians. The struggles waged for an increase in educational opportunities can be considered as having been based more on material than on cultural values. It is felt that a continuance of this value system has contributed to the educational policy espoused by the government and demanded by the Indonesian people. A review of Indonesia's internal developments in the post-war era indicates that many factors other than reality have perpetuated these ideals and have precluded any attempt at revising these goals into a workable program.

Under the Dutch, education was a key to success. As mentioned above, it developed within Indonesian society as a tremendous prestige factor. Besides, education is viewed by the average Indonesian as a means to material gain. Government plans for raising the literacy level of the country have been little short of grandiose. Realization of these goals has unfortunately been subordinated to political and economic

considerations. Van der Kroef has described the situation in Indonesia as one wherein, despite the gravity of the problem, appropriations for education have been wholly inadequate. Most efforts have been devoted to paper planning. A shortage of funds and the diversion of funds to political and other channels, has produced a desperate situation for the elementary and secondary levels of education. The major emphasis seemingly is devoted to the establishment of universities and institutions of higher learning.⁵⁵

According to information furnished by the Indonesian Embassy, the following advances had been achieved in education up to 1956:⁵⁶

Increase in Schools, Teachers and Pupils

	<u>Number of Schools</u>		
	<u>1940</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1955</u>
Primary	18,091	24,775	29,629
Secondary	144	964	7,810
Higher educational institutions	5	17	1,159
	<u>Number of Teachers</u>		
Primary	40,583	83,060	107,214
Secondary	1,607	6,500	7,810
Higher educational institutions	149	435	1,159

⁵⁵ J. M. Van der Kroef, "Indonesia Struggles for Unity," Current History, XXIII, August 1952, p. 91.

⁵⁶ Indonesian Embassy. Information furnished upon request.

Number of Pupils

	<u>1940</u>	<u>1951</u>	<u>1955</u>
Primary	2,021,990	4,977,304	6,316,223
Secondary	26,535	138,668	385,365
Higher educational institutions	1,693	5,239	19,063

Despite these appreciable increases in numbers and despite the concern for education written into the Provisional Constitution (Article 30 reads, "Each citizen is entitled to an education"), the government has concerned itself primarily with establishing institutions of higher learning. Community effort appears to be responsible for the increase in the number of elementary schools. According to the Indonesian Embassy, 6,873 elementary schools were erected during the period, 1954-1955. The funds for this construction as well as the labor were contributed by the communities themselves.⁵⁷

It seems likely that, if the government fails to alleviate this situation by allocating additional funds for school construction and for teachers' training and pay, this coupled with a continued disproportionate distribution of funds to the outer islands, will increase provincialism, regionalism, and factionalism among the people. In addition, the central government may be further discredited in the eyes of the people. The Communist effort may indirectly be strengthened, for a shortage of teachers, coupled with a lack of funds for

⁵⁷ Ibid.

teachers' pay, will provide an opportune situation for the Communists. It is highly probable that the Communist Party will be all too willing to assume a position of self-sacrifice and avail itself of the chance to meet the demand for badly wanted teachers. Such a situation, reportedly, already exists within the Chinese schools in Indonesia. There, because of lack of funds, low pay, and an insufficient supply of teachers, the Communists have met the demand. The Chinese schools, assertedly are strongly Communist-controlled.⁵⁸

The government, thus far, has not succeeded in creating a widespread cultural demand for education. Instead, individuals continue to be motivated by material aims. This tends to perpetuate discontent and frustration. This can be said to be true for the major part of Indonesian society. The high school and college student sees education as a means towards the achievement of a position within the overexpanded government bureaucracy. The majority of the students, although cognizant of the need for science, medicine, etc., are also fully aware of the lack of opportunity in these fields. Because of this, a large percentage of the students study law or journalism so as to be able to achieve a position in the government or, as journalists, to be in a position to help shape Indonesia's destiny.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Meijis, op. cit., p. 44.

⁵⁹ Soedarso, op. cit. This contention supported by information from a Lieutenant Colonel of the Indonesian Army, a former school teacher, interviewed at Ft. Benning, Georgia, 1957.

Peasants

Lack of major government success in alleviating the growing population problem on Java has added to peasant unrest. Thus far migration plans have accommodated only a very small portion of the one and one-half per cent yearly population increase on Java. As in nearly all other matters, preoccupation with political considerations has seemingly retarded constructive efforts designed to alleviate the agrarian situation. Further insight into the official attitude can be gained from the government action in the social revolution in Sumatra in 1952. At this time the government rejected peasant demands for expropriation of foreign estates. Peasant grievances were definitely subordinated to political considerations.

Mende cites some of his experiences in travelling through some of the outer islands. These indicate both peasant discontent and government indifference. When he questioned some of the Sumatran peasants who had migrated from Java as part of the governmental program, the general feeling expressed was one of discontent with the government. The peasants felt that the government should help them. They also felt that the government, in sponsoring the project, had led them to expect much more than they actually received. The ground allotted was not so good as that in Java. Fertilizer was either not furnished or not furnished in sufficient amounts. The peasant was forced to seek other employment in

order to make ends meet. While inspecting one of the agricultural stations--a part of the migration project--in Sumatra, Mende found one place where three tractors had been allotted. One of these had been out of order for over three weeks for lack of parts. These had to be ordered through government channels from Java. During a three-month period only twenty-five acres of the project had been cleared. Stumps were still in the ground. Fertilizers had not arrived on time. The plan lacked overall organization, lacked money, and above all lacked people with the necessary training.⁶⁰

Although this situation certainly should not be considered as representative of the whole Indonesian archipelago, unquestionably these sentiments and these conditions can be found in many of the other areas. Continued aggravation of these situations and failure to initiate a more effective program of considerably greater scope may cause a great number of Indonesians to become receptive to the solutions offered by Communism.

Internal Development

Java's disproportionate share and influence in Indonesian development has been one of the greatest factors contributing to dissension within Indonesia. Those who live on the outer islands feel that the government is showing little

⁶⁰ Mende, op. cit., p. 37.

apparent concern for their needs. According to one official publication:

Manufacturing as it developed in Indonesia has been heavily concentrated on Java, primarily because of the large labor supply and market there and the island's well-developed system of transportation. Certain special types of manufacturing, however, are centered outside of Java, such as the rubber re-milling plants of Sumatra. In addition, only a little more than half of the country's rice mills are in Java.

. . . . Outside Java, with the exception of oil refining, sawmilling and the processing of estate agricultural products, manufacturing is confined almost entirely to the few large centers. Chief among these are Medan in Sumatra, Makassar in Sulawesi, and Bandjarmasin in Kalimantan.⁶¹

The government has made some effort to establish small-scale industries (induks). These efforts, however, appear to have left much to be desired. The main effort appears to have been made on Java, but political considerations retard any spectacular achievements. According to Hanna, new industries such as textile weaving and small manufactures are developing, but slowly. Often firms, or individuals, receive a subsidy with which to build and then are denied the license to import essential equipment and materials.⁶²

Indonesia's approach to larger-scale industry has been even less spectacular. The efforts in this field have been considerably more influenced by extremist nationalism.

⁶¹ "Economic Progress," Report on Indonesia, VIII, No. 1, August-September 1956, p. 119.

⁶² Willard Hanna, "Coups, 'Smuggles,' Demonstrations and Korupsi," op. cit., p. 2.

Primary emphasis would appear to have been placed on the nationalization of existing foreign industries, rather than on an attempt to establish new industries. Thus far in the history of the Republic of Indonesia there has been a more or less frenzied effort to expel the foreigner. This has resulted in an inevitable loss of foreign technicians and administrators vitally needed to run the industries. The government has shown little concern over the impact of this loss. Undoubtedly the nationalist extremists continue to interpret blindly the remaining foreign-managed industry and foreign capital interests in Indonesia as elements that must be removed before Soekarno's "golden bridge" can be completed. The Communists, quite naturally, have supported this attitude and continue to do so.

The pattern for the development of a communications network, vitally needed for the successful unification and advance of the Republic, is strikingly similar to that of industry. Here, again, xenophobia has apparently precluded any rational approach. In conformity with the Provisional Constitution, the Indonesian government now owns most of the railway system and all of the postal, telephone, and telegraph services. National Garuda Airlines constitutes the only inter-island air service.⁶³ The national maritime service has operated consistently in the red in attempting

⁶³ Dale Stafford, Greenville Daily News, op. cit.

to drive the KLM inter-island service out of business.

These achievements in establishing a communications network are little short of spectacular in a negative sort of way. While Java has a fairly complete railway network, rail transportation in Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and other islands of the archipelago remains to be developed to meet the needs of the economy. Road networks are described as deplorable, especially outside the island of Java. Few or no roads exist on Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Sumatra.⁶⁴ No teletype communication exists between the islands. National Garuda Airways makes a twice-weekly scheduled inter-island flight. Radio constitutes Java's only immediate link with the outer islands. However, a shortage of electronics engineers and technicians handicaps any program for development of a wire or wireless communications network.

Minority Problem

Despite Indonesia's proclaimed intent to incorporate minority groups into its society, this has not been done with Indonesian Chinese. Instead, it is felt that the Republic's policy has been directly responsible for strengthening the Communist movement among the Indonesian Chinese. This group, numbering between two and three million, plays an important role, out of all proportion to its size, in Indonesia's

⁶⁴ Ibid.

politics and economy. Under the Dutch, these Chinese constituted an integral part of Indonesia's dual society and economy. Despite Dutch efforts to curtail their influence, they were able to dominate much of the Indonesian money economy and trade. Under the Republican Government, the Indonesian Chinese remain in the position of foreign orientals. They have been confronted with discriminatory economic measures and with official pronouncements of dubious tact. In this atmosphere of tension, the Communist success in China were impressive to the Chinese community in Indonesia. When faced with the decision of accepting or rejecting Indonesian nationality in 1951, almost the whole Sinkoh (native Chinese) group and 30-40 per cent of the Peranakans (Indochinese twice removed) repudiated Indonesian citizenship.⁶⁵

According to Meijis, Chinese schools in Indonesia are practically all Communist-influenced. Many Chinese students have gone to China to study. They were denied return from the mainland to Indonesia until September, 1953, when Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo announced that this restriction was removed. Such Communism as exists among the Indonesian Chinese is reportedly not a doctrinaire system but based upon nationalism, due to Chinese successes on the mainland, to distrust of the Indonesians, and to a feeling of need of protection from the Indonesians.⁶⁶

⁶⁵ Meijis, op. cit., p. 50.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

The Chinese in Indonesia constitute an excellent vehicle for linking Indonesian Communism with mainland China. We have mentioned the cooperation in Indonesia between the Chinese and the Indonesian Communist Party and the role which the Chinese Embassy plays in furthering the cause of Communism in Indonesia. A continued government policy of discrimination against the indigenous Chinese can only alienate them further and move them closer to Communism. Furthermore, despite the economic restrictions imposed upon the Chinese, a paradoxical situation has developed wherein the Chinese today, as in the past, constitute an integral element of strength in Indonesia's trade and general economy and hence are in a position to wield much influence.

Indonesian Foreign Policy

Indonesia's foreign policy, like her domestic policy, has fallen victim to the political machinations that have plagued the nation. Nationalistic extremism and anti-Westernism have played a large role in the formulation of aims. This has hampered the adoption of rational goals that might contribute to Indonesia's over-all development. The revolutionary nationalist leaders appear, thus far, to have wielded the greater power in determining policy. Conservative Moslems, although anti-Western, have advocated aid from the West. The Sukiman (conservative Moslem) Government attempted to secure such aid. However, the announcement that an aid agreement

(MSA Agreement) between the Sukiman Government and United States Ambassador Cochran had been concluded precipitated the fall of the Sukiman Cabinet. Vice President Hatta also advocated a more realistic approach to the situation. He pointed out that:

. . . . no one can say that Britain and the U.S. have evil designs on Indonesia. On the contrary they are desirous of seeing Indonesia remain independent and become prosperous. Are they not the very people who hold that the infiltration of Communism can be prevented by raising the economic level of the masses⁶⁷

However, it would appear that Vice President Hatta was rebuffed in his approach. In 1956, apparently because of dissatisfaction with the trend of Indonesian policy and quite possibly for other unknown reasons, he saw fit to resign from the government and has not held office since.

Since 1953, with the exception of a relatively short period in 1955, the PNI has dominated the coalition government. Continued PKI and Nahdatul 'Ulama support, along with support from some of the smaller parties, would make it highly probable that the PNI will continue at the head of the government for some time. Because of this probability and because of President Soekarno's more overt identification with the PNI, it is felt that a consideration of PNI's present foreign policy will indicate to some extent the future policy. Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo explains this policy:

⁶⁷ Mohammed Hatta, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, XXXII, April 1953, p. 445.

In its practical application, it may be said that the essence of Indonesia's foreign policy is anti-colonialism and the support of peace.

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Logically, of course, we are first attempting to establish good relations with our neighboring countries, but these efforts are not confined to the nations of Asia and Africa only. As a member of the UN, we are not in favor of discriminating against any nation of the world.

. . . . The task of forging the structure of our new state is so great and so urgent that we cannot allow anything to interfere with its accomplishment.

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We describe this foreign policy as being independent and active. It is a policy of nonalignment, and certainly not one of neutrality. The term 'neutrality' is one which is applied correctly only in time of war. It refers to belligerency and non-belligerency; it may imply inaction or even indifference. It has no connection with the independence at which we aim. Our aim is an independence designed to strengthen and uphold peace.

An independent policy allows us, on a basis of mutual respect, to be friendly to all nations, to avoid all enmities and preserve ourselves from the damage that would follow from taking sides. But that is not enough. An independent policy alone could be a negative policy. It is necessary also to be active, to work energetically for the preservation of peace and the relaxation of tension generated by the two great world power blocs.⁶⁸

Further, according to Sastroamidjojo, this active independent foreign policy is the product of the interplay of several thoughts: (1) the historical process towards the achievement of national independence and the problems of current growth

⁶⁸ H. E. Ali Sastroamidjojo, "Indonesia's Place in a Changing World," Atlantic Monthly, June 1956, pp. 103-105.

towards emancipation in social and economic fields; (2) the prevalence of Western economic domination in Indonesia; and (3) the desire to establish Indonesia's identity in the world.⁶⁹

In the light of the pattern of Indonesia's foreign relations in the recent past, it would appear that the third of the above points has been dominant. Like the "Bulganin and Krushchev team" of Russia, Soekarno and his entourage have blazed a lengthy trail and have visited a considerable number of countries to explain Indonesia's cause, to explain her foreign policy, to solicit support and sympathy, and to establish an identity in world affairs. Seemingly underlying all of Indonesia's actions in the field of foreign affairs is a distinct overtone of concentrated effort by many of the nationalist leaders to satisfy their egotistical desires by attempting to establish Indonesia overnight, so to speak, as a force to be reckoned with in world affairs. The disquieting aspect of all such activities is Soekarno's and other nationalist leaders' possible confusion of Russian with Indonesian desires for world peace and for the satisfaction of the wants of the awakening peoples of Asia.

⁶⁹ H. E. Ali Sastroamidjojo, "Political Affairs," Report on Indonesia, VIII, No. 1, August-September 1956, p. 98.

Chapter VI

CONCLUSIONS

It is felt that several conclusions are possible from this analysis concerning: (1) Indonesia's importance in relation to the spread of world Communism; and (2) the potential for the spread of Communism in modern Indonesia.

In the first place, Indonesia, like other countries of Southeast Asia that have succeeded in throwing off the yoke of foreign domination, apparently constitutes one of the most important areas to the Communist planners. Secondly, Communism enjoys distinct advantages over the West in appealing to the peoples of Indonesia in their process of transition. Thirdly, the Japanese occupation contributed greatly to the advancement of Communism in Indonesia. Fourth, international Communism has been abetted in Asia and in Indonesia by the rise to power of the Chinese People's Republic. Finally, the political struggle, the resultant government instability and the Republican government's apparent lack of success in effecting any appreciable socio-economic reconstruction in post-war Indonesia, may have enabled the Communists to move within striking power in Indonesia today.

1. Of the Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia today perhaps constitutes the area of greatest importance to the planners of world Communism. Indonesia has experienced a longer history of association with international Communism

and Communist-controlled activities than any other country in this area. Her rapidly increasing population of 81,000,000 people would constitute a tremendous manpower asset to the West in containing the advance of Communism in the Far East. Because of her strategic geographical location and available manpower, Indonesia would constitute an integral link in any peripheral screen around the continent of Asia. Communist control or possession would provide a "cordon sanitaire," protecting the soft underbelly of mainland Southeast Asia. Further, such control and location would constitute a threat to Australia and the Philippines, and would provide for the Communist control of the strategic sea lanes from Europe to the Far East.

Because of her great natural wealth Indonesia is potentially the richest of the countries of Southeast Asia. Under Communist control these resources would be denied to the West. This would seriously affect the economies of many of the Western countries, and in turn would weaken the forces of the Free World. Further, control or influence over Indonesia's natural resources and raw materials would provide many of the materials needed by Red China which are now being provided by Russia, thus strengthening Russia's economy.

Communist control of Indonesia and the positional strength derived therefrom would enable the Communists to isolate one of the last vestiges of British influence in the area on the Malayan Peninsula. In turn, from Indonesia,

strong support could be directed towards an already strong Malayan Communist Party. Should the Communists succeed in taking over Malaya, then Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam would be isolated, both physically and geographically from the Free World.

2. Communism possesses distinct advantages over the West in appealing to the Indonesian people. These advantages are:

a. Indonesia's political leaders, including her Western-educated elite, have never had any great vested interest in capitalism, and along with the masses have constantly equated capitalism with Dutch imperialism, colonialism, and the West.

b. Communism has a long history of being the sole champion of the nationalist movements in the colonial countries of the Far East, and has thus gained prestige in the eyes of the native peoples as the champion of their cause. This prestige was further enhanced in the post-war revolutionary period when the Indonesians interpreted the Russian and the Soviet Satellite Bloc's actions in the United Nations as support for Indonesia's cause against the Dutch and the West.

c. Indonesia's highly illiterate population has little or no knowledge of Russia and can probably see no clash between Marxist Socialism and Islam.

d. In the midst of conflicting ideologies, Communism is the only movement offering a universal solution

that pretends to satisfy spiritual needs and economic necessities and claims also to supply the strategy for progress towards the desired changes.

e. Traditionally Indonesia has been steeped in authoritarian rule and is unfamiliar with democratic practices above the village level.

f. Indonesian Islam does not seem to be a religion that can provide a permanent bulwark against the spread of Communist ideals. Islam has been superimposed on a traditional Indonesian spiritualism, which probably constitutes a greater force in Indonesia today than does Islam. In this setting the Indonesian often neglects the ethical values in favor of the material. Further, schisms and conflict within the Moslem elites have weakened their control over their followers. This in turn has aided the Communists.

g. Communism has the force of example in Russia and China. Russia and China can point to Communist successes under conditions comparable with those in Indonesia.

h. Communists can show that, where these countries were formerly dependent upon a privileged West, now under Communist methods they have achieved equality and have gained the West's respect and even fear.

i. Indonesian Communism has found a source of internal strength in the 2,000,000 or more Indonesian Chinese who have been alienated by Indonesian policy, and have found

in the Chinese People's Republic prestige, and the one source of protection against the feared Indonesians.

3. The Japanese occupation contributed greatly to the advancement of Communism in Indonesia. Japanese successes over the Dutch in Indonesia contributed to a loss of respect for the Dutch on the part of the Indonesians. In turn, the Japanese, through force of circumstances, were required to abet the nationalist cause by permitting Indonesian leaders to assume administrative and governmental positions formerly denied to them by the Dutch. This Indonesian administration, superimposed upon the former Dutch administrative structure, succeeded in functioning in combination with Japanese power which had replaced the Dutch.

Japanese propaganda, which succeeded in reaching the lowest level of Indonesian society, and which was directed largely towards the youth and the illiterate masses, succeeded in inculcating in these groups a spirit of anti-capitalism, anti-Westernism, anti-colonialism, and a hatred for the white man. In so doing the Japanese succeeded in developing a political consciousness among a large portion of traditional Indonesian society which in the post-war years has given support to extremist nationalism and in turn to Communism.

Indonesian youth were displaced from their traditional society by being conscripted into the Japanese defense forces, labor battalions, and other para-military youth organizations. Through their military training and Japanese

propaganda, they were introduced to a new set of values which at the end of the war proved to be non-reconcilable with the traditional society which they had long known. Japanese propaganda and training evoked among these youth a submissiveness to force, arbitrary authority, and blind obedience, and a growth of secular ideals.

Communism in the post-war era has been abetted by the impact of the Japanese occupation upon these Indonesian youth, for this youth has constituted one of the main driving forces of Indonesian society. Many of them under Japanese tutelage were indoctrinated with Communism. The many other ideologies have failed to provide a satisfactory solution to their problems. Communism offers a means towards their goals.

4. Indonesian Communism has been abetted by the Communist successes in China. The success of the Chinese Communists has strengthened the Communist movement in Indonesia. After its establishment in 1920, the Indonesian Communist Party was controlled through the Dutch Communist Party. After the death of Stalin and the subsequent changes in Soviet policy, control of the Indonesian Communist movement may have been vested in the Chinese Communists. This move reduced the land, sea, and air distances for control, a prerequisite described by Tan Malaka as being necessary to an effective linkage within the world Communist movement.

The methods utilized in achieving the Chinese Communists' successes were appraised by the Communist planners in the

light of past experiences, and were deemed appropriate for the other countries of the Far East. Upon adopting such tactics and by assuming more direct control over the Indonesian movement, Communist chances have been materially advanced in Indonesia.

The Indonesians have found an impressive example in Communist China. Chinese successes in achieving an increasingly powerful and important position in the pattern of world forces in a relatively short time cannot have failed to make a vivid impression upon the Indonesian leaders who have openly manifested aspirations of a similar nature.

The potential of Communism in Indonesia has been materially advanced by the impact of Republican policies upon the Indonesian Chinese. Because of many discriminatory measures a large percentage of these Chinese have repudiated the Republic and have turned towards mainland China as their source of protection. Further, through the Chinese embassy in Indonesia, on-the-spot direction, support and control has been effected over the Indonesian Communist movement.

5. The political struggle, the resultant government instability and the government's apparent lack of success in effecting any appreciable socio-economic reconstruction in post-war Indonesia, may have enabled the Communists to move within striking power in Indonesia today. During the post-war revolutionary struggle in Indonesia, individual and group aspirations were subordinated to the achievement of one goal,

namely freedom and independence from the Dutch. To this end, the many Indonesian groups were able to achieve unity of effort and were in turn supported by the masses. In an effort to solicit outside support for their cause, some of the nationalist leaders subordinated their original ideals and supported the development of a multi-party political system. This permitted and actually fostered a resurgence of conflicting personal and group aspirations.

Government actions and policy during the revolutionary period led to a further displacement of Indonesian society. In an effort to defeat the Dutch the government sanctioned extremist and terroristic activities by both military and guerilla units. These activities led to a situation wherein the members of such units found themselves in positions between the elite and the traditional society. These individuals have found themselves unable to be absorbed in the ranks of rural or urban proletariat and have found the village society incompatible with their newly developed ideals. Hence they are inclined to direct their allegiance towards that ideology or program which offers the greatest potential for satisfaction of material values. Communism affords an appealing and plausible solution.

The transfer of sovereignty and the subsequent establishment of a unitary state in August, 1950, provided for satisfaction of only a limited number of the many group aspirations within Indonesia. With this transfer of sovereignty the 'elan

of the Indonesian masses was dissipated. With this long-awaited event, the Indonesian people expected to receive many material gains. With this dissipation of 'elan, the many conflicting ideals and power aspirations came to the fore. In this era of political strife and instability, Communism has been afforded an opportunity to champion the cause of nationalism. Extremist nationalistic ideals have been utilized by the Communist leaders to motivate the struggle towards the achievement of their own ideals.

Despite the existence of basic similarities in the programs and platforms of the many political parties that have developed in Indonesia, conflicting individual personalities have constituted a deterrent towards the achievement of unified action. The Indonesian government has been forced to direct its energies towards external policy, at the expense of the internal situation. In this era of struggle the continuance in power of the PNI leaders may have become predicated upon support from the Communist Party.

In the polarization of parties since 1953, the Masjumi, adopting a progressively more socialistic orientation, have cooperated with the Indonesian Socialist Party in opposition both to government policy and to the Communists. The Socialists, in their opposition to the Communists, have not been able to reach the Indonesian masses; hence their opposition cannot be considered effective. The Masjumi in turn, as the result of the 1955 elections in which they appealed to the

Indonesians to vote Masjumi because of their religion, and in which they adopted an overt Western type anti-Communist approach, experienced a rejection by the masses and have dropped this style of opposition to Communism. Further, the Masjumi have given indications of becoming more politically than religiously oriented.

The continued existence of a government structured along the same patterns as that experienced under the Dutch and following economic policies not dissimilar from those followed by the Dutch has led to a situation wherein the Communists can, increasingly, appeal to the masses.

Continued subordination of practical interests of the masses to political considerations has meant that Indonesia's needs have not been satisfied. Continued nationalization of foreign enterprises has reduced the much-needed assistance of capitalists and their technicians and administrative experts. Educational policy has not filled this void. The old traditional society has operated apart from the new--the educated youth and the nationalist elite. The leaders have not always operated with the interests of the masses at heart, but rather according to their interpretations of the interests of these illiterate masses.

Throughout this struggle, the Communists, under the changed policy effected after the death of Stalin, have been able to make considerable gains. In the 1955 elections they got 20 per cent of the Indonesian vote. Of all parties, the

Communists have displayed the greatest organizational ability. They have continuously demonstrated one quality vital for success, namely discipline. Through their organizational efforts, they have achieved a controlling position in major Indonesian unions, both rural and urban. With this control the Communists are capable of exerting an influence out of all proportion to their physical strength. This grip upon the Indonesian economy, so vital for national survival and progress, gives them much of their power.

Shortage of native capital has made Indonesia dependent upon outside capital for her internal reconstruction. The PNI elite, including President Soekarno, have continued to follow a program of nationalistic extremism which has hampered the acceptance of foreign aid from the Western powers. In their analysis of the situation these leaders apparently have become convinced that Indonesia can effect reconstruction only by following an independent and active foreign policy. Under this policy, they hope, Indonesia will be able, on the basis of the establishment of mutual trust and respect between nations, to solicit from both sides. It would seem that these leaders would not be averse to playing one side against the other.

In pursuing these policies the leaders of the present government have seemed to move dangerously close to falling within the economic grip of the Soviet Union, to being drawn under the influence of present Soviet policy, and to equating

Soviet with Indonesian Nationalist ideals. President Soekarno's utterances along this line can but give official sanction to the appeals of Communism to the rural and urban proletariat and the village peasant who look upon Soekarno as their liberator.

In the face of continued instability, lack of discipline, a precarious balance of internal political power, lack of authority, and a growing political consciousness amongst the peasantry and the proletariat, coupled with a display of increasing force on the part of the many pressure groups, the President indicated that he felt a need to establish a somewhat authoritarian type of central government--a guided democracy. On February 21, 1957, he proposed that this be accomplished by revising the Cabinet so that it would be based on "mutual cooperation." This revised Cabinet would include representatives of all political parties with a certain sizable parliamentary delegation (to be determined by Parliament). In addition, he also proposed that a National Advisory Council be established. This council, to be led by Soekarno, would be comprised of representatives of the functional groups of Indonesian society.¹

Many parties objected rather strenuously to these proposals. In the light of this initial opposition, Soekarno, on March 16, 1957, announced his final concept. At this time

¹ Justus M. Van der Kroef, "Guided Democracy in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, XXVI, August 1957, p. 113.

he indicated that he had abandoned the idea of forming a "mutual cooperation" Cabinet, but he still called for the establishment of a National Advisory Council. On May 8, 1957, an emergency law establishing the National Council was countersigned by Soekarno and the Prime Minister, Djuanda, and placed into effect. This law was decreed without submission to Parliament for enactment. Under the provisions of the law Soekarno was to head the council, have the power of appointment and dismissal, and as spokesman for the council arbitrarily advise the government on major problems of state and people.² It would appear that Soekarno, through this move, has provided an opening for Communist influence in the functioning of the Indonesian Government.

The peasantry and the proletariat are beginning to indicate that they no longer are unable to interpret their desires for themselves. These masses through tradition are familiar with an authoritarian form of government, and hence probably will not be ill-disposed towards any moves towards this end. Failure on the part of the PNI leaders and the President to acquiesce in their effort to carry out their utopian ideals may only serve to foster mass acceptance of Communism. Inclusion of the Indonesian Communists in the contemplated government will only serve to perpetuate the existing strife and instability, perhaps moving the Communists into a position from which they will be able to execute a coup, as they did in Czechoslovakia.

² Ibid., pp. 117, 118.

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INTERVIEWS

Additional information for this paper was obtained through an interview with Mr. Dale Stafford of the Greenville, Michigan, Daily News. Mr. Stafford spent seven weeks touring Indonesia in 1955. His information was limited to general impressions, rather than specific points.

Interviews were also conducted with an Indonesian student at Michigan State University, Mr. Soegang Soedarso. Information received from Mr. Soedarso was considered to be vague and of considerable bias in favor of the present PNI Government and President Soekarno.

An additional interview was held with an officer in the Indonesian Army attending the Infantry School at Ft. Benning, Georgia. This officer prefers to remain anonymous. Information received was extremely limited.

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