This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

Urban Change In Revolutionary China:
Shanghai 1949-1982

presented by

Christopher F. Sutherland

has been accepted towards fulfillment
of the requirements for

M-A‘ degree in W

 

£21e4{;7:41)L2%Z)vrmuaJ

Major professor

 

IxneFebruary 16, 1984

 

0-7639 MS U is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution

 

 

 

URBAN CHANGE IN REVOLUTIONARY CHINA:

SHANGHAI 1949-1982

By

Christopher Sutherland

A THESIS

Presented to
Michigan State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Depa rtment of Geography

198“

ABSTRACT

URBAN CHANGE IN REVOLUTIONARY CHINA:
SHANGHAI 19119-1982

By
Christopher Sutherland

In 1949 and the years following the Chinese Communist
victory, Shanghai's role in the economic and social life of the nation
was severely questioned. From the Communist viewpoint, the city
was a constant reminder both physically and socially, of China's
colonial experience. Policy statements in the early 19505 universally
called for the downgrading of Shanghai's role in national life.

This paper traces the changes that have occurred in
Shanghai since 1949. It assesses the changes in spatial organization,
transportation, and in the economic and social life of the nation.
This work proposes a number of theories to explain why Shanghai
changed in the manner that it has. These theories include the
effects of development policy, the socialist city model, the urban

"ratchet" effect and the unique nature of Shanghai's residents.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank the members of my committee, Dr. Jack F.
Williams and Assefa Mehretu, for their support, without which this
work could not have been written. In particular, I would like to
thank the Chairperson of my Committee, Dr. Williams, for his
unstinting support in all areas which enabled me to continue my
schooling and produce this work. Without that support I sincerely
doubt that this work would have ever been completed.

I also owe more thanks and gratitude than can be expressed
to my wife, Kathleen. Her support, understanding and constant
reinforcement make this work more hers than mine. I would also
like to thank my children who have tolerated a father who has had
less time for them than they deserve.

I owe a debt of gratitude to the Asian Studies Center at
Michigan State University for both their moral and financial support.
In particular, I wish to thank Dr. Warren Cohen, the Director, and
Ms. Lillian Kumata.

Last, but far from least, I owe much to the entire faculty of
the Geography Department, particularly, Dr. Gary Manson. I also
owe much thanks and gratitude to an outstanding typist, editor, and

bonne vivante, Jo Crandstaff.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

LIST OF MAPS ............................................... iv

LIST OF TABLES ........................................... V

I. INTRODUCTION ................................ . ........ 1

ll. SHANGHAI: SITE AND SITUATION ..................... 21

III. CHANGES IN SHANGHAI FROM 1949 to 1982 ............ 28
A. Spatial Growth and Changes in Political

Organization .................................... 28

B. Changes in Transportation System ................ 37

C. Changes in Spatial Organization ................... 45

D. Changes in Shanghai's Role in National Life ....... 62

IV. WHY HAS SHANGHAI CHANGED? ....................... 80

A. The Effects of Government Policies ................ 80

B. Other Factors That Have Affected Shanghai ....... 91

V. CONCLUSION .......................................... 101

APPENDIX ................................................... 105

REFERENCES ................................................ 111

Map

LIST OF MAPS

The People's Republic of China .........................

People's Republic of China: Major Transportation
Routes ................................................

Land Use at Shanghai, 1936 ...........................
Shanghai Shih (1981) ..................................

Shanghai Shih: Major Satellite Cities and Their
Economic Specializations ................................

Page

20

25
29

31

55

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

1. Composition of National Product by Industrial Origin,

1933 and 1952 ............................................ 106
2. Selected Industrial Production Indicators, 1933-1952 ...... 107
3. Main Indicators of the National Economy .................. 108

4. Main Indicators of the National Economy-~Average Rates
of Increase .............................................. 109

5. Gross Output Value of Agriculture, Light Industry,
and Heavy Industry as Percentage of the Total .......... 110

I. INTRODUCTION

It has long been recognized that cities function not only as
the engines of progress, but as growth poles. The concept of growth
poles maintains that the fundamental fact of spatial,as well as sectoral
development, is that growth does not happen evenly over space or time.
It appears with varying intensities at specific points in space, or
growth poles. Industry, due to its characteristic intensive use of
human resources at point locations, its competitiveness and its function
as a provider of jobs, has become the economic activity associated with
growth poles. In a national economy, industrialization has further
been equated with progress. From these observations it is only a
short logical step to the observation that in the contemporary world,
the process of industrialization is carrying national societies rapidly
through the transition phase of urbanization, marked by vigorous rural
to urban migration.

Urbanization is a function of agricultural development. When
people are freed from basic food production, which occurs over a wide
spatial plane, their transference to other forms of production, more
localized at points in area, where individually large units or aggre—
gates of smaller units match concentrations of their labor force, the
process is known as industrialization. There are few valid arguments
against the superior role of cities as generators of early and rapid
industrialization (Chiu, 1980, pp. 89-90).

1

This view of the importance of cities in the development of a
modern economy is one that is widely held. Regardless of one's view
toward the ultimate results of an urban-based environment, it remains
the prime generator of national economic growth.

Urban-based industrialization indicates the spatial concentra-
tion of the means of production. It is generally the quickest and
shortest route to growth of the industrial economy, in the short run.
Most cities are centers of industrial activity, transportation, skilled
labor and the other ingredients necessary for modern industrial growth.
Moreover, cities operate on an economy of scale. Once industry has
located in an urban area it tends to foster more growth, and the
growth is cumulative. In most developing countries the modern
industrial sector is the prime generator of the nation's gross value of
industrial output. This is certainly true in China, where the modern
industrial sector is a greater generator of gross industrial product
than is the small scale, primarily rural, industrial sector (Ma, 1981,

p. 7).

Few will argue with the role of the city as the prime generator
of the industrial economy. Most discussion, currently, revolves around
the nature of the city and the effect its growth has on the long term
development of the nation. It is the goals of national development
schemes that dictate whether the rural or the urban sector is to be
emphasized. If a nation is primarily concerned with short term growth
and is little concerned with the spatial form such growth generates,
then an urban based strategy might be indicated. By concentrating on

bulk of the nation's resources in a number of urban locations, the

nation is able to take advantage of all the production advantages
offered by the urban location. If a nation chooses such a path, it
must be willing to accept, at least temporarily, the spatial consequences.
Urban-rural dichotomies in level of development, incomes, and social
benefits will likely deepen. In such a strategy most social benefits
accrue to the urban residents. It is unlikely, and little evidence exists
to suggest, that such benefits will automatically trickle down to the
rural environs, in the short run- The polarization between rural and
urban areas that already exists in developing countries will continue
to grow and deepen in the immediate future. If the development goals
of the nation are to avoid this polarity then resources must be more evenly
spread over space. Certainly, in developing countries, where agri—
culture is often the primary source of income for the great mass of
people, this sector should be given priority. The tradeoff is, of course,
a less rapid "modernization" of the economy (Ma, 1981, pp. 7-8).

This debate about the direction of development is precisely
the one that has plagued China under the Communists. The Chinese
have had, and continue to have, a nagging conflict between a revo—
lutionary and nationalist ideology and the requirements of rapid
economic growth. This conflict is nowhere sharper than in their
attitudes toward, and policy concerning, the role and nature of the
city in the Chinese socialist scheme (Murphey, 1980, p. 116). This
attitude has its beginnings in the Communist reaction to its inherited
urban system, as influenced by the treaty port system. China always
rejected, philosophically, a foreign presence in China. It was a proud

nation and saw little in the Western gospel of the Urban-Industrial

path to progress to recommend it as a desirable system for the nation
(Murphey, 1980, p. 116).

When the Communists achieved success in their revolution,
they were not disposed to acceptance of the Western ideal of develop-
ment. The treaty ports which represented the Western model of
development were seen, in the eyes of the Communists, as isolated
points in an indigenous Chinese sea. The history of these Western
models with their arrogant advocacy of Western ideals and denigration
of Chinese ways led the Communists to a rejection of the model on
which they were based (Murphey, 1980, p. 117).

If the history of the treaty ports in China were not enough
to unite all the nationalist minded Chinese against the ports and the
model of development they offered, the group of Communists who
eventually gained power did so in a peasant revolution; and as such
viewed cities with distrust and as enemies and targets.

The cities were not only the home of foreign privilege and
national humiliation, they were also the home of the Kuomintang (KMT).
Cities in general, and Shanghai in particular, were the strongholds of
the Nationalists under Chiang Kai Shek. For the Communists, the
ultimate proof of the decay of the cities was their own failure to
capture them as political and ideological bases. For years, inspired
by Marxian philosophy, the Chinese Communists had sought a political
base with the urban proletariat. They failed repeatedly in cities such
as Changsha and Canton to establish such a base. Their ultimate
urban defeat in Shanghai in 1927 led directly to their forced retreat

to the countryside and the long years of exile. These defeats left a

bitter taste in the mouths of the Communists. They carried with
them an implacable hostility toward the treaty ports and toward all
cities. Such hostility soon became evident in their political rhetoric.
A definite anti—urban bias was soon noted in their political thought.
"Revolutionary strategy was understandably couched in rural versus
urban terms, as in the famous prescription for 'People's War,’ where
the countryside surrounds and conquers the enemy strongpoints, the
cities" (Murphey, 1980, p. 117).

The Communist attitude toward cities can be traced with some
clarity in its attitudes toward China's premier city, Shanghai. As the
primary entrepétto China for over 100 years, the point of contact of
the West with the East, Shanghai is perhaps most often remembered as
a sort of oasis of Western Civilization, a truly Western urban place
accidentally located in the Far East. As with all myths there is some
element of truth contained in the popular image. Certainly Shanghai
was primarily the result of Western contact with China. The historical
legacy of the city cannot be denied, and in fact can be seen clearly in
the layout of the city and its architectural structures. But Shanghai
today is not the same place as that image of the city presented in
earlier Western popular culture. For over thirty years, since 'libera-
tion' in 1949, Shanghai has become a Chinese city. For most of its
short history, the Communist government of the People's Republic of
China (PRC), has followed a policy of isolation from the mainstream of
the world economic system. As a result, Shanghai has moved from
being primarily influenced by those from without to being overwhelm-

ingly influenced by those within--the Chinese themselves. In the 100

years prior to 1949, Shanghai emerged as the premier city of China.
It evolved from a sleepy fishing village and local trade center to being
the foremost single economic asset of China. But what of the last 35
years, that period during which Shanghai has been part and parcel

of the new People's Republic of China?

In examining literature relating to Shanghai under Communism, a
significant trend manifests itself. In 1949 and the years following the
Communist victory, Shanghai's role in the economic and social life of
the nation was severely questioned. Shanghai was a sore point to the
Communist ideologues. The city was the primate city during China's
colonial experience. In the span of a century it grew to be the major
trade center for Chinese as well as foreigners. This remarkable
growth is well chronicled by Rhoads Murphey in his work, Shanghai:

Key to Modern China (1953). Above all, from the Communist view-

 

point, it was a constant reminder both physically and socially, of
China's colonial experience.

When the Communists achieved success and Shanghai fell in
May of 1949, they were faced with a number of questions concerning
Shanghai and other cities. The question of what to do with Shanghai
and the other cities they inherited is a question they continue to
wrestle with today. The Communists felt a natural antipathy toward
the city. This feeling was reinforced by the regime's reliance on
peasants as the mainstay of the revolution. Contrary to Marxist
philosophy, Chinese Communism was not based on the urban proletariat.
In fact, the urban dwellers often lent support to the KMT. The

practical result of this was a strong anti-urban bias within the CCP.

Additionally, the Chinese felt that military conditions dictated a move,
for industry, from insecure and largely indefensible coastal and border
regions, to the relative safety of inland areas. The CCP also felt that
regional imbalances between the industrial coastal areas and the
interior, that gave rise to tremendous income and quality of life
differentials, must be addressed and spatial inequality reduced, if not
eliminated. In 1949, nearly all of the industry in China was located
in or near the coastal regions, from Shanghai northward, or along the
navigable portion of the Yangtze open to ocean shipping, and it
ignored the bulk of the country. With the new peasant-revolutionary
goals for reshaping China in a new mold. which gave priority to rural
welfare and to the development of a mass program for all people and
all areas, especially those neglected and disadvantaged in the past,
Shanghai and the other treaty ports stuck out as eccentric and as
examples of a totally Opposite model of growth. which ran counter to
China's needs (Murphey, 1980, p. 118).

The specific attitude toward Shanghai is readily apparent in

this passage from the China Digest (August 10, 1949):

 

Shanghai must break off its dependence on the imperialist
economy and must be changed from a city where imperialism,
compradores, and bureaucrats oppress and exploit the people,
to one which produces for the domestic market and serves

the people. . . . Shanghai is the concentrated typical
expression of the colonial or semi-colonial nature of old
China's economy. lts so-called prosperity in the past, was

not founded on an independent, sound economic basis, but

on bureaucratic capitalism and on imperialism and its compre-
dores. Shanghai's production was mainly for the selfish
interests of a handful of foreign exploiters and domestic
compradores and bureaucrats. Most of Shanghai's key enter—
prises were in the hands of foreigners or Chinese bureaucratic
capitalists. The raw materials and power of many industries

had to depend on foreign supplies. Such colonial or semi-
colonial economic status must be discarded before Shanghai
can become a truly prosperous new 'peoples' city (quoted in
Murphey, 1953, p. 27).

In 1949 Shanghai was thus, not only the largest and most
economically important city in China, but also its most reviled.
Chiang Kai-shek, as well as Mao, felt substantially the same about
the city (Murphey, 1953, p. 27). In the year of the Communist
victory, the city was almost at a standstill. While not physically
debilitated by war, its economic links, which were its lifeblood, were
destroyed. Railroads linking it to the North and South were
destroyed. The Yangtze River was filled with sunken wrecks and
floating mines. The coastal port, once one of the world's busiest,
was devoid of shipping, as the result of KMT, and later, UN blockades.
Cut off from overseas sources of raw materials, the city sought
domestic sources. But the fighting had devastated these as well.
Shanghai was a city whose economy was closely dependent on access
to the sea. It had little domestic source of raw materials and a
fundamental need for access to overseas markets. With such a
dependence on access to the sea, such a blockade cannot help but
have affected the economy of Shanghai in a fundamental way (Murphey,
1953, p. 196).

With the entry of the Communist forces into Shanghai on
May 17, 1949, stability was at last restored to the region. It is
natural to assume that stability would lead to the re-emergence of

Shanghai as a vital economic entity. But it must be remembered that

the Communists held primarily negative attitudes toward the city. In

the months immediately following the Communist victory such attitudes
were readily apparent. Plans were discussed for the removal of
industry from Shanghai and its relocation in inland areas of the
country. Much of the discussion was based on military concerns
over the security of such industry in coastal areas that were vulner—
able to outside attack. However, much of the discussion also
revolved around Shanghai's role in the country and the need to more
evenly distribute resources and wealth (Murphey, 1953, p. 27).
Writing in late August of 1949, the then mayor of Shanghai,
General Chen Yi, stated that the official Communist program for
Shanghai was to "Change its industrial policy from that of dependence
on imperialism, to that of serving the Chinese people." In order to
accomplish this end, and to minimize the effects of the UN blockade,
"we must evacuate the population of the city systematically and trans-

fer factories to the interior wherever possible" (China Digest,

 

September 1949, p. 9, as quoted in Murphey, 1953). While no exact
plan for industrial location could be found by Murphey, he relates
that such sentiments were omnipresent in all general policy statements
of the time (Murphey, 1953, p. 28).

These primarily ideological concerns were worsened by the
more practical problem of the rapid rise of rural to urban migration
that accompanied peace. To counter this the CCP, as part of a
general policy, instituted forced urban to rural migration. In terms
of Shanghai, the goal was to limit the urban population to six million
residents. This, incidentally, is a policy that has proved physically,

if not socially, successful over time.

10

These initial reactions to urban centers, particularly Shanghai,
were somewhat tempered by more practical considerations. Chinese
economists were early in recognizing the importance of cities as
"growth poles." The disappointing performance of the industrial
sector following the implementation of the First Five Year Plan in 1953
was soon recognized (Murphey, 1980, pp. 118-119).

The concerns over the rate of industrial growth were addressed
in the meetings held by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee
of the Party in April of 1956. The concensus was that industrial
growth in the previous years had been too slow. The meetings

occasioned the publishing of Mao's essay called On the Ten Great

 

Relationships. A major emphasis of this work was the identification

 

of what Mao felt were the ten most pressing problems that stemmed
from planning decisions since 1949. One of these concerns dealt with
the role of large cities and the location of industry.

In the past few years we have not laid enough stress on
industry in the coastal regions. I think we should make
some changes. . . . The technical level of coastal industry
is high, the quality of its products good, its costs low,

and it produces many new products. Development of coastal
industry will have a stimulating effect on the technical level
and quality of national industry as a whole. . . . If we do
not use the industry of the coastal region, we cannot establish
industry in the interior. We must not simply maintain coastal
industry. We must also develop it where appropriate

(quoted in Murphey, 1980, p. 119).

With this statement Mao accurately and succinctly stated the

issue. Shanghai and the other treaty ports had not risen to promi-
nence as the result of some Western imperialistic plot. They were in
fact the points of lowest cost for the assembly and distribution of

manufactured goods. While they were physically marginal to the bulk

II

of the country, their location along natural transport routes gave
them excellent cost advantages in locating industry. It did not
matter that it was their colonial past that developed the natural potential
andiaugmented it with modern networks such as railroads. However
it developed it was the system that was inherited by the Communists.
It was in these coastal ports that was located China's industrial
heritage. Short term growth was necessary and that growth had to
be logically centered on these cities. It was in these cities with their
infrastructure, labor force and existing industrial concerns that the
future lay. These cities offered not only the point of lowest cost and
rapid cumulative growth, but the base necessary to develop the
remainder of the country. These cities could supply the steel,
machines, technicians and workers, and the rest of the resources
necessary to export industrial development to other regions. The
coastal ports were the only industrial resource base that China had
(Murphey, 1980, pp. 119—120).

In terms of short term development policy the course that Mao
layed down in 1956 is undoubtedly the correct one. But the policy
posed and continues to pose a dilemma for the Chinese government
which remains distrustful of the large cities which serve as its primary
industrial bases. Although they are under Communist control, it is
still felt, perhaps with some validity, that cities are the potential
breeding ground of a resurgence of 'bourgeois-ism.' Urban centers
remain the home of the elites, the managerial classes, the intellectuals,

professionals and those economic values and goals which were alien to

12

the majority of this primarily rural/peasant nation. And the larger
the city, the more common are these characteristics (Murphey, 1980,
pp. 117—120).

Shanghai presents a clear example of the basis for this mis-
trust. While the city has a vital economic value to the nation it has
always been a political thorn in the Communists side. Shanghai has
always seemed to play a dissonant role in national political life. Prior
to the Communist victory it was continually the scene of conflicting
revolutionary trends. Since 1949, Shanghai has continued to be a
problem to the government as it attempted to turn the city into a
model worker-producer city. The attitudes of the government have
reflected the diversity of attitudes toward the city. While the
industrial accomplishments are looked at with pride and the need to
build from its heritage is recognized, the task is always approached
with trepidation and a full knowledge of its corrupt, immoral, trouble-
some and bourgeois image. Shanghai reflects, more than any other
city in China, the diversity of attitudes held by the Communists,
toward its economic heritage with its home in the treaty ports
(Murphey, 1980, pp. 117—120).

It is understandable that the policy makers have wondered
aloud from time to time, whether it is not better to cut all ties with
such a corrupt and problem-ridden past, as well as a continuing head—
ache. However, as recently as 1980 in a Beijing conference on Chinese
urbanization the same two schools of thought emerged in sharp relief.
One argued for the rejection of the large city model and the concen-

tration on small to medium sized cities. The other agreed in principle,

13

but stressed the necessity of present policy to favor large cities to
foster economic growth nationally, in the shortest time possible
(Ma, 1981, p. 8).

The conflict that exists between the CCP ideology and the
need for economic development is an ongoing one. It focuses on the
city as the point of industrial development, and the role and place
of such cities in the national political scheme. China is facing
the same question that faces all developing nations. Regardless of a
nation's ideological preferences, they all must come to grips with the
reality that large cities, in general, are the most cost efficient
industrial bases and an accompaniment to accelerated growth (Murphey,
1980, p. 122).

If during the past 35 years ideological arguments had remained
consistent and dominant, one would expect that Shanghai today would
not be a primary center of economic activity in the PRC. In reality
this has not happened. Shanghai, in fact, never really lost its lead-
ing position in the Chinese economy from 1949 on, and remains today
as the premier economic center of the nation. Two opposing factors
must be considered in assessing the growth and role of Shanghai
since 1949. The first is the negative attitude toward the city held
by the Communists. Not unexpectedly, the great commercial metropolis,
with its physical form and geographic morphology visibly bearing the
imprint of its colonial past, was viewed as the very symbol and
essence of the regime. As China's historically outward-looking 'world
city,’ it was to be subordinated to and rapidly supplanted by Peking,

symbol of the new inward-looking national spirit. For some years

14

following 1950, a systematic evacuation of population and industry
took place, although it appears that not all the plans envisaged and
publicized were actually carried out.

Such aims, however, were incompatible with the goals of
industrialization proposed for the economy. As in the Soviet Union,
'megalopolis' has had to be accepted, however grudgingly, as one of
the prices paid for economic growth. The vital industrial skills,
physical plants, and investment existing in Shanghai have proved a
greater force than ideology and the city has continued to dominate
many aspects of Chinese manufacturing, and attract further investment
and expansion. These forces have produced a new growth over the
last decades that is less than in comparable western metropolitan
centers, but impressive in a Chinese national context. Between 1953
and 1958 an economic growth rate of 2.4 percent, a little greater than
that of China as a whole, seemed likely, with a somewhat steeper rate
of increase after that date (Eyre, 1971).

Shanghai today remains at the apex of Chinese economic
activity. Shanghai, the smallest provincial level unit, contributes
12.5 percent of the nation's total industrial output, some 17.4 percent
of all financial income, 24 percent of exports, and handles 40 percent
of all port traffic. It is China's major industrial base, having more
than 8000 factories and over 4 million employees. It accounts for
10-15 percent of production of iron and steel, soda, plastics, chemicals
and more. But its greatest contribution is in the area of light con—
sumer goods. Overall it has a 14.3 percent share of the total, but it

produces 30 percent of all bicycles (the predominant form of

15

transportation), televisions, sewing machines and watches, and 55
percent of all cameras. It has great impact on the textile market,
with 10—15 percent of domestic production and 74 percent of export
production of cottons, and 73 percent of all woolens and synthetics.
In addition, through reorganization it has emerged as a unified
rural-urban continuum; a governmental unit organized along the
lines of the urban core with its associated suburbs and rural
environs, with the highest standard of living in China (Clark, 1981;

Statistical Yearbook of China, 1981).

 

In his final chapter, "Shanghai Today and Tomorrow,"
Rhoads Murphey attempted to prophesize the future of the city.
Citing the "geographic logic" of the city's economic leadership
(p. 298), he stated that this factor should far outweigh any
political argument aimed at downgrading Shanghai's role. He states:
"Great cities do not arise by accident, and they are not destroyed
by whim. The geographic facts which have made Shanghai will
prosper it in the future, once peace has been restored in East Asia"
(p. 205).

Even a cursory examination of data shows that Murphey's
prediction has proved accurate. But there exists no concise and
comprehensive look at the role that Shanghai has played in the
national economy since 1949.

Shanghai is the largest city in China, and one of the largest
in the world. As such, one would expect to find a substantial body

of literature dealing with the city. In actuality, the opposite is

16

true. Much of the lack of such literature can be traced to the
Communists' reluctance to allow such research to be done. The
Chinese government is authoritarian, and shares the reluctance to
allow any dissemination of information, much less the kind of
information that may prove critical of the political system, that
characterizes all governments of that type. Much of the data and
work that has been published by domestic sources and scholars is
highly politicized. The intrusion of politics is often blatant
enough to cast doubt on the works' accuracy. Western writers
have been constrained not only by Chinese foreign and domestic
policies, but by the same constraints that are faced in dealing
with any less developed country. Statistics are often confusing
or contradictory and most often conspicuous by their absence.
Scholars from all nations but particularly the United States have
further been constrained by the inability to visit the country
prior to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between the
two nations. This has resulted in a relatively small body of
academic research on the area.

However, the period prior to 1949 is one that is fairly well
documented in terms of Shanghai. Scholars such as F. L. Hawks Pott
(1928) and J. V. Davidson—Houston (1962) have produced readable and
scholarly histories of the development of Shanghai. The historical devel-
opment of various aspects of the city from industry to international
settlements is an area that has attracted a significant number of works.

Authors such as Hohn Orchard (1936), William Lockwood (1935) , Nicholas

17

Clifford (1979), William Johnstone Jr. (1937), and F. C. Jones (1940)
have all dealt with various aspects of the historical development of
ShanghaL

The definitive geographical work on the city was, and remains,

Rhoads Murphey's work, Shanghai: Key to Modern China (1953).

 

This work is a geographical dissection of the city. It traces the city
site, development and economic heritage as it existed in 1949. Little
geographic work has been conducted on Shanghai since that time, and
certainly no work having the same scope. Ka-iu Fung's (1979) work
on the transformation of land use, and Ivory and Lavely's work on
rustication and demographic changes (1977), are notable examples
of the geographical work that has been done.

There are a number of works that deal with a variety of
aspects of Shanghai under Communist rule. Lynn White I” has pro-
duced a number of excellent sociological studies of employment in the

city. His 1978 work, Careers in Shanghai, is an invaluable contribu-

 

tion to the body of literature on Shanghai. White has also given the
field a valuable study on leadership in Shanghai prior to the cultural

revolution (1972). The recent work, Shanghai: Revolution and

 

Development in an Asian Metrflaolis (1981), edited by Christopher

 

Howe, has drawn together much of the current work on Shanghai.
The work is an outcome of a forum sponsored by the Contemporary
China Institute in 1977. The forum gathered together the major

scholars in the world who had expressed interests and had worked

on problems relating to Shanghai. The resultant papers cover a

18

range from history and politics to sociology and geography by a variety
of scholars.

The body of work that deals specifically with Shanghai is
complemented by works that deal with the wider questions of the
roles of cities and planning in China. Much of this work has applica-
bility to Shanghai, and in fact often uses Shanghai as a case city.
Laurance Ma (1979, 1981) has dealt extensively with the Chinese
approach to city planning. A series of three books on the role of
the city in Chinese history are also invaluable. G. William Skinner's

(ed.), The City in Late Imperial China (1977), Mark Elvin and G.

 

William Skinner's (eds.), The Chinese City Between Two Worlds

 

(1974), and John Lewis's (ed.), The City in Communist China (1971),

 

taken together provide a comprehensive and valuable view of the role
the city has played in Chinese society. Rhoads Murphey (1979 and
1980) has made contributions to the understanding of recent changes
in urban policy and the future of the city after the death of Mao.
David Buck (1976) has also contributed to the knowledge about
Chinese urban planning in the past and the future. Christopher
Howe (1971) has expanded the knowledge about employment and
economic growth in urban China.

This is by no means a comprehensive review of the available
literature. Rather, it presents some of the more significant studies
that relate to cities in general and Shanghai in particular.

This study attempts to fill a perceived void in the available
studies on Shanghai. It is relatively clear that Shanghai has fulfilled

the prophesy of Murphey, that it would prosper in the future. But

19

the questions of how Shanghai has changed and why it has changed
in the way it has, has not been addressed in any comprehensive way.
This is the intent of this paper--to address two major questions about
the role of the city in national life:

1. How has Shanghai changed since 1949? What change has
occurred in terms of its physical layout, organizational
structure, economic base, and its role within the PRC
economically, politically, culturally, and socially?

2. Why have these changes occurred? Are they the result
of government policies,'geographic factors, external
factors, or a combination of these?

In terms of why Shanghai has changed, it is important to relate
such change to major trends in urban theory, development policy in
China, and to a variety of possible explanative factors. Shanghai must
certainly be viewed in light of the communists' goal of the "socialist
city." It is also necessary to apply the three major theoretical models
of urban structure (concentric zone, sector, and multiple nuclei) to the
Shanghai experience. Lastly, other theoretical explanations of the
nature of change in Shanghai, such as Thompson's (1969) "ratchet"
effect or Bergere's (1981) theory of Shanghai's unique heritage must be
explored.

In order to answer the above questions, the paper will be
organized in a manner consistent with achieving those answers. The
following section will detail the site and situation of Shanghai. The next
section will explore how Shanghai has changed politically, in terms of
transportation and spatial organization, and in its role in the life of the

nation. The final section will look at why Shanghai has changed,

particularly relative to the above mentioned theoretical models.

20

.mom .a .32 392633

OZSSOZOJGI

 

32:; .333: Emtzo 6m .comaeEe .88 n”reason.

II.R<2_<I

~lllll||ll|l|lul||l ‘I‘I'll I III
ll“l|lll|ll.ll|lilll.|ll|'lll‘ll|

HA

nlllllllllll'l-li"llllllllll|l
'll‘lll‘ll'llll‘ll'lllll
IIIl‘llIIlII‘II'I'lII-I'lllll

 

¢,(
OZ<DIN
_x02<30

 

EEO .0
0.333: Moaoon. of.

2<ZZD>

I < OZ<N_X

2102.0

Dm2<0
E < KDO>D 02<=.Z_x

c
.‘
o

m. beamed... _......st..&.... as...

 

ll. SHANGHAI: SITE AND SITUATION

While Shanghai has experienced a multitude of changes in the
past thirty—four years, there are several features that in the short
term will always seem static. These are the geographic location and
heritage of the city. Before commencing a discussion of changes, it
is important to lay out Shanghai's heritage in these areas.

Shanghai is located at the convergence of the Wusong and
Huangpu rivers, in the delta country of the Yangtze River, China's
longest river and largest drainage basin. According to geologists,
the igneous rock in Shanghai consists of rock formations of the
Cenozoic Era, carbonates of the Paleozoic Era, and volcanic rock of the
Mesozoic Era. On top of it is a 33-meter layer of sedimentary rock of
the Quaternary Period, which was formed by the action of waves, tides,
and currents in th Yangtze, Huaihe, Quainting, and other rivers. In
the southwestern part of Shanghai there are over 10 bulges or domes
which were formed when molten lava solidified. The remainder of
Shanghai is a flat plain with an average elevation of five meters. All
rivers that flow through Shanghai have no clear watershed, their
riverbeds are not steep, and their currents are very slow.

Shanghai is located at the estuary of several rivers where
they empty into the sea, and therefore it has a susceptability to tidal
action. When the weather turns cold and the snow coverage expands,

the amount of river water that empties into the sea decreases. When

21

22

this occurs, the sea level on the east side of Shanghai subsides, and
the eastern coastline moves farther away from Shanghai, revealing a
new landmass. With the advent of warm weather, the snow thaws,
flowing downriver and emptying into the sea. As a result, the sea
level rises again, with the seawater moving inland and encroaching

on the land area of Shanghai. Within the three million years of the
Cenozoic Era, Shanghai's seashore advanced and receded several times.
The history of the Tang and Song dynasties reveal that since 713 the
land area of Shanghai advanced 30 kilometers or more toward the East
China Sea; the waterways of the Yangtze and Wusong rivers narrowed,
and a number of new sandbars emerged in mid—river. In 618, Chongming
Island consisted of only two sandbars. Today it is China's third largest
island, covering nearly 1080 square kilometers. Hengsha Island is
another area that was originally a sandbar.

The preceding geological data indicates that during the past
1200 years, Shanghai's river levels and coastline have continued to
fall and its land area has continued to expand, with new beaches
emerging along the Pudong Peninsula and in the northern part of
Chongming Island. There is no sign of land submersion near the
estuary of the Yangtze River or along the Shanghai coast (Duan
Shaobo, April 4, 1980, pp. 277-280).

Shanghai's emergence as one of the world's great cities is
largely due to its location. The city itself is located at the apex of
the Yangtze delta region. This point occurs where the Yangtze River
empties into the East China Sea. The delta is made up of a number

of regions. These include the level lowlands east of Tai Lake and

23

north of Hangzhou; and the delta region laid down by the Huai River
in its several courses. Like other coastal delta regions, the Yangtze
delta is truncated on the seaward side due to action of the prevailing
coastal and tidal currents. The delta has the usual characteristics of
delta regions including long, straight natural levees in the lower
courses of the river and the gradual foundering of low lying areas on
the landward side of the levees and wherein lakes have formed
(Murphey, 1953, p. 29). Being located on a delta, Shanghai has
experienced many of the problems associated with such sites. Low
lying, it is prone to flooding. The soil is unconsolidated to a depth
of over 33 meters, and as a consequence presented many construction
problems. Additionally, the soil is often unusually saline, particularly
in areas immediately adjacent to the sea. Lastly, water supply is a
constant problem. Although some aquifers do exist they are insuffi-
cient to meet demand. Although the city is located adjacent to a
number of waterways, many are tidal as far as the city, and the water
is often too brackish for consumption (Murphey, 1953).

Shanghai's location at the junction of the Suzhou River, the
Huangpu River, the Yangtze estuary, and the East China Sea has been
a major advantage to the city. Being at the apex of the delta region,
it commands a vast hinterland, including the delta region which has
an area of 1.8 million square kilometers. In this hinterland live about
one-half of China's total population. Its estuarine location gives
Shanghai a broad outer harbor and an outlet to the sea. The Yangtze
and the Huangpu are both navigable for some distance to ocean going

vessels. The hinterland is served by smaller craft. The region is

zu

estimated to have some half a million miles of navigable waterways and
canals (Lee, et al., 1983, p. 4).

The rise of many of the great cities of the world depended,
primarily, on the presence of one or both of two principal factors:
the concentration of an administrative or political unit in one dominant
center such as in Rome, London or Beijing; or the concentration of
trade from, and manufacturing for, a highly integrated and commer-
cialized economy in an outstanding location, such as in New York,
Rotterdam, or Osaka, and based on the existence of low-cost volume
carriers. For centuries, Shanghai served as the major transshipment
point and port for its immediate hinterlands. Shanghai has never per-
formed any political function beyond its own metropolitan one; and
China before 1949 was far from an integrated or commercialized
economy. Certainly low cost transport in the form of railways was
notably lacking (Murphey, 1953). Nevertheless, Shanghai had suffi-
cient advantages to surmount these deficits. It lies near the coast of
the Yangtze delta, where the extensive water routs of a great river
system are gathered into a knot, and where the coast of China extends
its furthest into the sea (see Map 2) (Murphey, 1953, p. 2). This
coastal prominence combined with local water access generated an ever
greater volume of trade for the city. Goods produced in the hinter-
lands and which had foreign markets flowed into the city, and traders
congregated in the city because it commanded a vast market for
imported goods. Shanghai quickly became the primary entrep6t of
China. This commercial activity was supplemented and reinforced by

the natural growth of the financial community responding to demand in

25

-‘ K K. ' .
:awi’ew- .,-

..';~'..._..,~ ‘
,. .

     

I. ‘.n._.. Q'.
"M

Yetlow
Sea

   
  

=3"-
.35;
4‘ ~"

A i Shih-di'in-M

'\

 
 

, .
fl "
, - 1‘"
I » l.
' a ' "‘ I!
. . '
‘vfi

  

   
  
 

South Chll'll
Sea

.
I 5

 

 

  

 

I ; “Railroad
./ ‘ ° \
laundry "OM-non an L - - - . 590 MW’ -1 A
not I . . ' ' ' ' ‘ ‘ ‘
m: ’ who: in n o 500 Kilometers 'r ‘

 

 

 

502919 7-76 (541700)

SOURCE: CIA

26

the commercial marketplace. In more recent times, as industrial pro-
duction became increasingly important, Shanghai was able to maintain
a competitive place in the market. While it was far from the source
of raw materials its many waterways provided a low cost transportation
option. Additionally, like many delta regions, the Shanghai hinter-
lands were very fertile and allowed the city to be largely food
independent (Murphey, 1953) .

All of Asia's delta regions (are densely populated, due to the
fertile soil and readily available water source for wet rice cultivation.
As a consequence, each of the major delta regions in Asia support the
largest or one of the largest cities in the political unit with which it is
associated: Hanoi, Saigon, Bangkok, Rangoon, and Calcutta. But
none approach Shanghai in size or function. Two locational features
distinguish Shanghai from these other cities. These are its position
on the coast of east Asia, and the great extent of the trade it con—
ducts with its hinterland.

Shanghai has a similar delta setting and a rich agricultural
tradition in common with these other cities. But Shanghai has grown
due to its geographical location. Located at the junction of one of
the world's premier inland waterway systems and of coastal shipping
routes, it has captured nearly half the trade of China. In pre-
industrial China, and in China today, water serves as a vital
carrier of goods. In agrarian China, interregional trade for the area
moved through the city. As the West met the East in China,
Shanghai, with its natural advantages, became the primary center

for trade. Its easy access to overseas interests and its natural

27

marketing area, in which resided nearly one—half of China's popula—
tion, made it the primary point of contact between East and West.

The conditions which gave rise to Shanghai in its treaty port days

continue to serve it well today.

Ill. CHANGES IN SHANGHAI FROM 1949 TO 1982

A. Spatial Growth and Changes in
Political Organization

 

 

The structure of Shanghai has undergone a number of major
changes in the past thirty-four years. At the outset it is important
to indicate the spatial growth that has occurred in Shanghai. This
properly falls under the designation of political change, as the changes
in boundaries of the city are inevitably intertwined with the changes
in political organization.

At the time of Shanghai's designation as a treaty port in
1840, it was basically a small, walled settlement. The process of
development and accretional expansion by foreign concessions led to
explosive growth in the city. By the time of the Communist takeover
in 1949, Shanghai was a major city of an estimated 5 million people,
with a built up area estimated at some 80 square kilometers. Since
1949, accretional growth has continued. By 1957, the total area of
the urban core was estimated at 116 square kilometers. In 1981, the
urban area was estimated at 140 square kilometers, and the population
of the urban core was approximately 6 million (Fung, 1981, p. 272;
State Statistical Bureau, 1982).

When Shanghai became part of the PRC in 1949, the city
consisted of the urban center and a small amount of suburban land
surrounding the city (see Map 2). Under the Shanghai Military

Control Commission, the first governing unit of the city under the

28

29

 

 

    
 

$333225) "/M//”

c

. 3 "I 3': “3
c, l / " :. .. -- :.-:3:1:«."‘
\ / .,.,2- '
\\
‘6

‘ \‘ ......

WW"
\—\'\\_\_\\ o
. .33 ” I ii"

‘

" ; «ayataig {72,
’ 3 « o"; :1,
L. _’.‘f

          
  
 
 

 

  
     
    

         

 

III-h

0-“

MW

-wu—Iu-p

-'-'

-u~
.“-

§A,\. «we,

           
 
   

 

'\\

  

 

 

Map 3. [and Us: 4: Shanghai, 1936

SOURCE: Rhoads Murphey, Shanghai: Key to Modern China.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953.

30

Communists, these boundaries were kept the same. The city was, at
that time, divided into twenty urban districts and ten suburban ones.
Political change and changes in national policy led to a redefining,
over time, of the concept of large cities in the PRC, and the way to
organize them. These changes led to significant integration of suburban
and urban areas in Shanghai. Changes in the administrative boundaries
of Shanghai occurred in 1952, 1955, 1956, 1958, 1959, and 1960. The
most dramatic of these changes occ‘urred in 1958. As the result of
two administrative changes in that year, the city gained political con-
trol over ten adjacent counties. This had the effect of increasing the
total area of the municipality to 5,910 square kilometers. In 1981, the
municipality covered some 6,186 square kilometers and had a total
population of approximately 11 million people (see map 3) (Fung, 1981,
p. 272; State Statistical Bureau, 1982).

The political organization of Shanghai, as stated, is reflected
in the changes in spatial organization. In 1949, for all practical
purposes, the city was divided into three entities. These consisted
of the Chinese city, the International settlement, and the 'French
Concession.‘ The Chinese city consisted of the original settlement,
and those areas of Chinese occupancy added to the city, outside of
the International settlement, as the city grew. Until 1928, the Chinese
city was governed by local authorities. In that year, the Nationalist
government (KMT) created a Municipality of Greater Shanghai. This
political unit included all urban areas not under foreign control and a
wide band of suburban land. The municipality covered some 320

square miles, most of which was rural in nature. The city was

31

 

 

 

82.35: 2:38 3:8 3 as: 3:: ”333

5...: III
23: u a

2

=2” .5535

7.595.» 2: Lo 53$ L..........

Ocannag 0

$333.

 

It. III
.. flu annoy-sin -

 

 

Dams» ..WDP... ... . . 8 ..
n. 46%! l. L .
...o/u ...... .

                  

nrfig—o -

   

.8. 8.55 80.6 Wu
cosomm: . . .u
.4. . .....am. .

... —I I
... u:
...
........a.....
. "......N.»

0.0 u noel-u .05 av.
.... “mafia..." «hm...

 

. . ..1...»

.159?

...............¥

. o.“v..

 

 

 

 

 

 

32

independent of local authority, and answerable only to the central
government in Nanking.

The International Settlement was that area of the city granted
to the British in 1840 and expanded numerous times after that date.
After 1854, residence rights were granted to all foreigners. This
area constituted the largest political unit in the municipality, both in
area and population. It included not only a large foreign population,
but also a large Chinese one. This area enclosed the majority of the
city's manufacturing and shipping frontage, as well as the commercial
core of the city.

The French Concession was an area of the city which had
originally been granted to French nationals as a residential site.

Land was originally leased, and through further concessions, later
able to be purchased. The area was residential in nature. Both the
International Settlement and the French Concession were governed by
their own Municipal Councils nominally under the umbrella of the
Shanghai Municipal Council, but in actuality, largely independent
(Murphey, 1953, pp. 17-18).

The political structure of Shanghai in the years prior to 1949
was characterized by two important features. Both are a practical
result of the organization of the city as described. The first of these
was the presence of foreigners and the rights of extraterritoriality
they possessed. The second is the aura of non-governmentalism that
existed.

The so-called 'Land Regulations' that governed foreign presence

in the city were strongly biased in their favor. With the end of the

33

Opium War in 1840, Shanghai became a treaty port. The development
of the city is largely a result of an agreement made between the
Foreign Powers and the Chinese government that came about as a
result of China's loss of that war. While this agreement was never a
formalized treaty, and was not given a name, it became known as the
'Land Regulations' and soon gained all the sanctity of a treaty (White,
111, 1981, p. 43).
These land agreements were the negotiated results of the

Opium War, as it affected Shanghai. Although the British and
Chinese versions of the Treaty differ, the British version gave
foreign nationals the right to permanently reside in the city, to rent
and later buy land within the areas set aside for foreign residence, and
the right of absolute political sovereignty over those areas. In effect
the areas were treated much as modern day embassies, having a
status as an extension of the national soil of the home country.
While the initial treaty ending the Opium War in the region, the
Treaty of Nanjing, was more limited, later agreements extended these
rights as described. When the French were later allowed a separate
settlement area the same rights were allowed.

In fact, the Settlement was based only on tenuously

extended local amendments, and interpretations of several

different treaties (all negotiated under duress and many

negotiated after some of the amendments were already

written). No treaty, signed at Nanjing in 1842, or else-

where in subsequent years, created a sovereign entity at

Shanghai. Yet this is what grew, and prospered .

(White Ill, 1981, p. 43).

In effect, then, the city consisted of the aforementioned three

divisions. Even when the Nationalists created a Municipal Council in

31-1

the late 19205, although the other units participated, the Chinese
were unable to assume sovereignty over them. The foreign elements
were in China, for primarily commercial reasons. They had little
interest in giving political control to either the state (Chinese) or to
their own political units. Rather they were interested in uncon-
strained growth, with unified action only where necessary. The
political fragmentation meant that Shanghai was not developed with
even a modicum of unified governmental direction (White Ill, 1981;
Ma, 1981, p. 13).

The success of the Communists in 1949 brought with it many
changes for Shanghai. Perhaps the most immediately visible one was
the expansion of the political boundaries of Shanghai. In the 19505
the Chinese government expanded the political boundaries of the city
to include ten counties, thus giving Shanghai an area of 6,100 square
kilometers. The city core at present covers an area of 140 square
kilometers or only 2.24 percent of the total. This expansion of the
political boundaries was in harmony with the socialist urban planning
concepts as practiced in China. Basically, the Chinese have long seen
a need to practice regional planning. This is reinforced by political
concepts such as the famous "Walking on Two Legs" and other con—
cepts of regional self-sufficiency. By expanding effective political
control to the rural hinterlands that were a natural part of the city's
economic system, Chinese planners were able to deal more effectively
with planning concepts that require a regional orientation such as

industrial location, transportation and public health. The political

35

control over the city's food supply regions also insured some measure
of food related stability.

The entry of the Communists into Shanghai was also accom-
panied by major changes in the political structure itself. Certainly
the most prominent change was the elimination of foreign enclaves and
the consolidation of power under one unit of government. The struc-
ture of the political units has undergone numerous changes in evolving
to its present day status. Herein, however, only the present day
structure will be shown. Today, Shanghai is the PRC's smallest
province level unit of government. It currently has a population of
some 11 million, with a core city p0pulation of approximately 5 million,
and a total urban population of some 6 million (Chinese Statistical
Bureau, 1982). Within the city structure the Chinese have in place
a highly developed vertical bureaucracy having two major branches.
The city is governed by the Shanghai Municipal Government at the apex
of the local government pyramid. This unit is responsible for policy
and for running city—owned economic enterprises. It functions in the
national scheme in much the same manner as do other province level
units. The municipal government has divided the city into a number
of districts-—ten--which roughly correspond to county level divisions.
Each district is further divided into either Neighborhood level units
or Commune level units, depending on location. This level in turn is
divided into Street level units in the city and brigades in the country-
side. The lowest level in rural areas is the team which is sometimes
matched by Building level units in the city areas. The other major

branch of the bureaucracy is that of the National government.

36

Particularly in the areas of defense and industry, the Local units of
government are bypassed with some degree of regularity. Industries
which are state owned and controlled, normally those of either signifi-
cant size or importance, are run by national level ministries. Addi-
tionally, particularly in regard to the Army, a significant amount of
agricultural land is either in the hands of the Army or organized as
state farms. The control of these bypasses the local units of govern-
ment, and resides in the appropriate national level unit (Yao, 1983).
In the past, at least, there has been significantly little horizontal
integration of the bureaucracy. The term 'vertical bureaucracy'
refers to the structure of the bureaucracy. It certainly means a
tightly organized system of descending and ascending control. But

it indicates a condition, also, wherein each division at a given level
remains largely isolated. For example, the municipal level department
responsible for urban planning might find little contact or cooperation
with the department responsible for the planning of transportation.

In any case, the system that existed in Shanghai in 1949 has
been abolished. If the pre-Communist Shanghai was characterized by
non—governmentalism as claimed by Lynn White ”I, then the modern
Shanghai must certainly be the complete opposite. Shanghai today is
characterized by governmental control in all areas as accomplished by
an overdeveloped bureaucracy. Growth and development by no means
approaches the pre—Communist Iaissez faire system, but is one that is

carefully considered and highly planned.

37

B. Changes in the Transportation System

 

It is important to investigate the changes that have occurred
in Shanghai's transportation system. It has alway sbeen Shanghai's
location at a transportation hub that was the prime geographic
generator of development.

The most outstanding feature of the transportation network in
Shanghai is its waterways. The city has a more than adequate harbor
that is able to service both coastal and ocean shipping. It has
superb ties to the interior of China, via a number of water routes.
The major water routes are the Yangtze and the Huangpo rivers.
Both are navigable for the major share of their courses. Three addi-
tional major routes are also available to connect Shanghai with the
delta, the Siccawei, the Suzhou, and the Wusong. These and other
rivers and creeks as well as canal systems, over half a million miles in
length in the region, give the city superb water connections. These
routes remain important today. They are, obviously, a permanent
part of the physical heritage. In many respects they have increased
in importance as a low cost method of transport. The PRC recognizes
their value and has done much to improve these systems. Water con-
servancy and development has long been an interest of the Chinese,

and the Communists have continued this tradition.

Port

 

To describe the port conditions of Shanghai prior to 1949 in
statistical terms is difficult. The period is lacking in statistics and those
that are available are from the 19305. Due to the lack of statistics and

the questionable nature of those that do exist, it seems reasonable to

38

qualitatively describe the 1949 port system in Shanghai. Simply put,
Shanghai, prior to the wartime disturbances, was the major port in China.
As the first and the predominant focus of the opening of
traditional China to Western commercial exploitation,
Shanghai became, by virtue of its location and especially
of its water connections, the great transshipment point for
the trade of China which Western enterprise stimulated and
directed into wider regional and international channels.
Even after the growth of manufacturing in the city, at
least half of Shanghai's commerce was transit trade
(Murphey, 1953, p. 132).
That the port has grown in importance and complexity is an undis-
puted fact. In 1981, Shanghai handled 83.35 million tons of cargo,
43 times that handled in 1949. Of course, 1949 was not the high
water mark year due to the war. But the statistic still serves to
illustrate that growth has occurred. That the port remains important
to China is also undisputable. Shanghai currently handles 40 per-
cent of all the port traffic in China and handles 60 percent of
China's foreign trade (State Statistical Bureau, 1982).

Trade from 120 countries moves through Shanghai. The
tonnage handled and number of ships serviced places Shanghai among
the world's largest and busiest port cities. It ranks after Rotterdam,
Kobe, Yokohama, New York, Marseilles, and Philadelphia in size.
Currently, the port has 97 berths, totaling 13 kilometers in length.
Included in the dockage facilities are 48 deep water berths capable
of handling ships up to 10,000 tons. It also has 86 pontoon berths.
Warehouses in the twelve operation areas under the administration of
the Shanghai port have a total storage space of 390,000 square meters.

The area of the stock yards totals 920,000 square meters. In 1981,

more than 1000 foreign trade ships from dozens of countries and

39

regions and nearly 1000 Chinese ocean going vessels called at and
departed from Shanghai. In addition, 24,000 ships from inland
rivers were loaded and unloaded. Port facilities include 3,700 pieces
of loading and unloading machinery, including 6000 cranes, 6 crane
ships, 84 gantry and bridge cranes and 500 mobile cranes. The port
fleet includes 20 tugs rated at a total of 33,000 horsepower and one
3,200 hp tug for handling ships up to 100,000 tons. It also includes
a modified 100,000 ton bulk carrier at the Luhuashan anchorage off
the Yangtze River estuary that is used to reduce loads of ocean
going bulk carriers below 100,000 tons so that they may enter the
port for loading and unloading. Bulk goods account for about 60
percent of all the cargo handled at Shanghai. In addition to timber
and petroleum docks, the harbor has three coal berths and a bulk
cereals berth. Turnaround time has been reduced to an average of
1.9 days. Shanghai is quickly moving into the containerized freight
field. In 1981, the city handled 50 percent of China's freight in this
area. Foreseeing an increase in the future, Shanghai has established
a company that handles loading and unloading of containers and con-
tainer ships, roll-on and roll—off ships, lighter aboard ships, trans-
shipment, business canvass as well as repairs, clearing and fumigation
of containers.

The port is China's and Shanghai's major point of contact with
the world economic system. Over 20 foreign trade lines link Shanghai
with Hongkong, Macao, Singapore, Malaysia, Japan, the Philippines,
Thailand, Sri Lanka, East and West Africa, the South and North

coasts of the Mediterranean, North and West Europe, Canada and the

40

United States. Over 20,000 businessmen in foreign countries have
trade relations with Shanghai's port. Today the port also handles a
nearly equal amount of import and export trade. The major share,
60 percent, of import trade comes from Japan, the United States,
Hongkong, Australia, and West Germany. Complete sets of factory
equipment accounted for 25 percent of import traffic in 1981.
Chemical products, machinery, hardware, rolled steel, cotton and
fibers accounted for 20 percent of the import trade. Leading exports
were textiles, native produce, animal by-products, light industrial
goods, chemical products, arts and crafts, foodstuffs, machinery,
and electrical equipment. Primary exporters were Hongkong, Japan,

the United States, and West Germany (China Economic News, 26 July

 

1982, p. 7).

In recent years the position of the port has suffered under
the economic policies of Deng Xiao Ping. Prior to 1980 much of the
export traffic handled by the port of Shanghai was due to Shanghai's
role as a middleman to other provinces and as a transshipment point.
Shanghai would purchase goods from interior regions paying the lowest
possible rate in local currency. It would then sell these for export, thus
generating not only port traffic and profit, but also vital foreign
exchange. Since 1980, individual provinces have been allowed to operate
on their own in the area of foreign exchange. They have been allowed
to establish corporations that negotiate with foreign concerns for the
export of local products, negotiate their delivery, and the delivery of
imports. In 1980 this had little effect on Shanghai, as export earn—

ings were $5 billion, up 17 percent over 1979. As the new policies

l-l1

gained hold, the effect was felt. In 1981 earnings slumped 10 percent
to $4.5 billion, while China as a whole posted a 16 percent increase.
In 1981 only 20 percent of Shanghai's exports came from other
provinces, down from 50 percent in the previous year. Shanghai

has been furiously trying to turn around this trend. They have
established regional coops with other provinces, providing funds and
expertise in exchange for a share of the profits and the right to
export. The city has lobbied heavily in Beijing for changes favorable
to the city. In 1982 it designated 48 factories as specifically producing
for export. These are in textiles and light industrial products which
have flexible production lines and respond quickly to market shifts.

It has also instituted profit sharing at factories throughout the
province, bonuses that are tied to exports. Factories are allowed to
retain 8 percent of the gross profit realized from export and are not
limited by quotas in production for the export market (Feung, _A_si_ar1

Wall Street Journal, April 2, 1983).

 

While the last point is not directly related to physical changes
in the port system, it does have relevance. If Shanghai fails to re-
establish its role in the export trade, the city as a whole will suffer.

One last point must be made concerning changes in the port
system. Due to dredging, strides have been made in extending
navigable portions of all rivers. Of particular note are the changes
on the Huangpu. The navigation channel of the Huangpu River in the
port area is 72 kilometers long. On the 500 meter wide river, 10,000

ton ships can sail all year round, and half-loaded 100,000 ton bulk

42

carriers can save the tide; 5,000 ton ships can navigate the river at

least as far as Minghan (China Economic News, July 26, 1982, p. 7) .

 

In short, the port system has increased in complexity, tonnage
handled and the area that it covers. It remains a vital part of the city

and has major impact on both the economic and physical landscapes.

Raflroads

With the exception of water-borne transportation routes,
Shanghai in 1949 was transport poor. Railroads were few and of rela-
tively little importance. Basically, rail lines consisted of a Shanghai to
Nanjing line, one to Hangzhou and a spur to Woosung. These lines, for
the whole region totaled about 600 kilometers. In the period from 1930
to 1936 the two major lines averaged 600,000 tons of freight moved per
kilometer of line annually. This is hardly an impressive figure. The
use of rail was further hampered by its lack of harbor connections.
There were no railway sharves inside the harbor area and the rail
wharves at Woosung were largely used for transshipment of river-borne
goods into Shanghai proper (Murphey, 1953, p. 89).

The state of rail transport in the city of Shanghai was a
reflection of the overall state of the system nationwide. In 1949 the
nation as a whole had only 22,000 kilometers of line. As a result of the
Sino-Japanese War, Russian dismantling, and the civil war, only about
half of the mileage was operational (Leung, 1980, p. 13). Additionally,
the system tended to be segmented with little national integration. By
1981 the situation had undergone dramatic change. Nationally the

amount of rail line mileage had climbed to some 93,000 kilometers of

43

fully integrated track. Today all major cities and provincial capitals
with the exception of Lhasa are served by rail.

The change in rail traffic in Shanghai is as dramatic. First,
rail systems have been fully integrated into the port system. Rail
wharves abound and rail traffic is no longer routinely used to transship
goods from the wharves to the city. While some local rail haulage is used,
most is dedicated to distribution in more distant areas. Rail line mileage
in the province has grown to some 272 kilometers of trunk line within
Shanghai's boundaries. In addition, hundreds of kilometers of spur
line have been added (Leung, 1980; State Statistical Bureau, 1982).

The growth in the importance of rail can be more clearly seen in
the figures for freight handled. In 1949 rail was relatively unimportant
in moving freight. Water was by far the dominant force, not only in
terms of tons moved per kilometer, but in total tonnage handled. By
1981 rail in Shanghai, while not supplanting water in total tonnage, was
being used much more intensively. In that year, the waterways annually
handled an average, in units of 100 million tons/kilometer, 16.27 per
kilometer, while rail handled 32.11 per kilometer. Thus rail was being

utilized almost two times as intensively as the waterways.

Highways
In 1949 Murphey reported that the highway system was not

very highly developed .

Two roads run south from Shanghai to Hangchow, and one
runs north to Nanjing. A large proportion of the highway
mileage runs beside the railway lines, which makes the

highways less useful than if they ran independently of or

44

as feeders for the railways. The northern and southern

highway routes are joined by a road from Kashing to

Soochow, but the few remaining roads are either short-

distance feeders or dead ends. There is no direct road

connection between the major cities of Soochow and Wusih

or Nanking. With minor exceptions in the vicinity of

Shanghai, none of these surfaces were paved, and nearly

all of the mileage is two lane only (Murphey, 1953, p. 90).
In addition to the lack of roads, the movement of goods was addition-
ally hampered by local restrictions. On the two main arteries from
Hangchow to Shanghai and from Shanghai to Soochow, traffic was
restricted to vehicles of less than 3 tons gross weight (Murphey,
1953, p. 90). Murphey goes on to say that "due partly to the high
cost of fuel, trucks, and parts, and partly to the generally pre-
industrial nature of the economy, the volume of truck haulage on all
of these roads has remained slight" (p. 90). By 1981 the number of
roads, total mileage and amount of vehicular traffic had all increased
dramatically. lntra-province movement of goods, and movement within
the city has shifted to this mode of transport. Also, the improved
incomes and increased employment has led to a dramatic rise in
private use of bicycles for transport. These combined with a rise in
the number of public transport systems and in service areas have
forced significant increases in road mileage. While no figure for
surface street or unpaved roadways could be found, it is known that
paved highway mileage increased to 964 kilometers in 1981 (State
Statistical Bureau, 1981). It is also known that public transportation
by highway covered 3,992 kilometers in 1981 (State Statistical Bureau,

1982). The importance of highway use can also be seen in the increase

in tonnage hauled by this method. As mentioned, Murphey felt that

us

pre-liberation tonnage was not significant. In 1981 the highway system
handled 834 million tons per kilometer. It seems safe to assume from the
available data that the highway system has experienced significant

development .

Air Transport

 

While no figures on freight handled in this category were found,
air transport is important primarily for its passenger traffic. In 1949
commercial air travel in and out of Shanghai was not significant. Today,
Shanghai has an international airport with air connections to over 90
points, including most major regions of the world (Lee, et al., 1983) .

In short, Shanghai has built upon not only its natural trans-
portation network, but expanded its network in all modes of transport.
In pre-Iiberation Shanghai the primary method of transportation, for
both freight and passenger traffic, was by water. While water remains
an important sector of the transportation network, and while Shanghai
has expanded and enhanced this natural network, it has dedicated

considerable resources to all areas of transportation.

C. Changes in Spatial Organization

 

Shanghai has undergone dramatic changes in the way its
economic and social systems are organized. Much of this change is the
result of the way the city is politically organized and in the way the
concept of city is perceived. In 1949, the city was organized as an
urban center with some associated rural land. As described, the city

was effectively divided into three political units, only one of which

46

was under unified Chinese control. By 1981 the city was organized
as a metropolitan region in which the primary and secondary urban
centers, and rural environs all played a role. Furthermore, it was
unified under a single political system. These changes in political
structure have brought about significant organizational changes in
a” areas.

Shanghai, in 1949, was as stated, primarily an urban center
The structure of the city was largely determined by the presence of
foreigners, and by the nature of its transportation system. The
original city of Shanghai was a classical Chinese walled city. It had
all the characteristics of such cities, including a full wall in a roughly
circular shape. The city was sited adjacent to, but not contiguous
with the Huangpo River. Internally the city was characterized by
short, winding streets. The International Settlement was located
some distance from the Chinese city proper, to the north. The
International Settlement was bounded by the prime deepwater portion
of the Huangpo River to the east, and by Soochow Creek to the
north. In later years, the French Concession occupied the land
between the two settlements, and captured the remaining prime
portion of the Huangpo River area. The western portions of the
city were layed out in the geometric pattern of squares, reminiscent
of most western cities. The main street of the International Settle-
ment, Nanjing Road, soon became the primary commercial district of
the conurbation.

The original function of post—1840 Shanghai was as a com—

mercial and trading center. Thus many of its patterns were initially

47

set by virtue of these functions. The river area in particular was
devoted to commercial interests, port facilities, and warehousing.
Housing and shopping areas were removed from this section. The
Chinese city was primarily residential in nature.

Manufacturing was a latecomer to the city. Before 1949 it
was always subordinate in importance to the city's commercial func-
tion. As such, it tended to occupy the urban margins, and never
significantly altered older land use patterns in the city. In many
western cities, the late development of manufacturing led to an
organizational pattern in which industry was oriented along rail lines.
This never occurred in pre-1949 Shanghai. Industry was oriented
to the water transport system, the system offering the lowest cost.
In 1949, the existing rail lines served industry at only one point,
that being through the spur line to Wusong. Industry in that area
and in the adjacent region of Nantao was of a minor nature and was
oriented primarily to river transport. The major center of industrial
development lay along the left bank of the Huangpo, stretching north
of Suzhou Creek toward the Yangtze. This industrial city, the
Yangtzepoo, was not served by rail at all. Rail, at no point,
approached closer than one mile to the area, and was usually two to
three miles distant. Another manufacturing area lay along Suzhou
Creek, and was on the opposite bank from the railroad. What manu-
facturing existed along the same bank of the creek as the railroad
failed to follow the rail line when it left the creek. Manufacturing
spread along the entire left bank of the Huangpo, save for the area

of the Bund (the commercial center) and the area immediately

48

downstream from the Bund wherein were located the docks, wharves,
and warehouses. The other primary manufacturing location was at
Pootung, a peninsula in the Huangpo, and an area devoid of rail
connection (Murphey, 1953) .

The area of the French Concession was largely undeveloped
until after World War I. While some industry was located in the
area's river frontage, the primary function of the area was as a
residential neighborhood. The late development of the area, adjacent
to the downtown region, spared Shanghai from much of the suburban
residential development common to many cities (Murphey, 1953).

In short, the primary commercial and industrial functions of
the city were located in the area of the International Settlement, and
were concentrated in narrow bands along major river routes. The
core of the City was the Bund, the commercial center of the Settle-
ment. The primary economic functions were located in strips along
the rivers radiating out from this center. The remainder of the
city was primarily residential in nature, although many small
secondary commercial centers did exist. Additionally, the Chinese
sectors of the city were characterized by thousands of small
"factories" and "sweatshops" (Auerbach, 1976).

The rural regions surrounding the city were just that, rural.
Regions within a day's travel of Shanghai were economically oriented
toward the city. Those laying further out were oriented toward
secondary market towns, that usually coincided with the county seats.
Prior to 1949, in the ten counties surrounding Shanghai, none of the

county capitals had a population greater than 20,000, except for

49

Songjiang. Little, if any, industry was located in these regions.
The economic activity was primarily agricultural in nature.

Agriculture in the delta region in which Shanghai is located
has been blessed by a number of natural features which contribute
to productivity in the region. Shanghai is located south of the
imaginary line where rainfall decreases to annual averages of less
than 35 inches. It is also located north of the region where rainfall
increases to such an extent that serious leaching of lime from the
soil occurs. Thus, it avoids both the area of inadequate rainfall
and too much rainfall. It is also blessed by the nature of rainfall
in the region itself. The prevailing rainfall is primarily gentle in
nature thus avoiding the hard driving rainfall types experienced else-
where, and that contribute to quick runoff and erosion. Further,
its rainfall is more evenly distributed throughout the year. While
the major share of rainfall occurs from March through August, no
month receives an amount greater than nine inches on the average,
and no month less than two inches. This rainfall pattern is a perfect
complement to the existing rich alluvial soils. The region is further
blessed by its relatively flat terrain and its growing season that
averages 287 days (Murphey, 1953, pp. 134—136).

In 1949 the region was the most intensively cultivated area
in China, with some 80 percent of the land area under cultivation
(J. L. Buck, 1937, quoted in Murphey, 1953, p. 135). The primary
crop was rice, with one crop per year being grown. The rice crop,
once harvested, and the fields drained, was followed by crops of

winter wheat and rapeseed. Cotton was planted in dry fields in

50

early May, and usually interplanted with beans. From Soochow

west to the northern tip of Tai Lake, some 20 percent of the culti-
vated area was devoted to mulberry. But rice is dominant in the
region, capturing approximately 75 percent of the total crop acreage.
Vegetables were grown by nearly every farmer in small market
gardens. In regions within a day's boat travel of Shanghai
(approximately 30 miles) the three primary crops were rice, cotton
and vegetables (Murphey, 1953, p. 136).

The suburban and agriculture landscape was physically
characterized by the small size of the farms. "Approximately 93 per—
cent of all the regions were under 50 mou in size; 25 percent under
5 mou and the average size was 34 mou" (one mou is equal to
approximately one-sixth of an acre) (Murphey, 1953, p. 137).
Lastly, productivity within the area immediately surrounding the
city (30 mile radius) was consistently almost twice the national
average. This area was able to combine all the natural advantages
of the region, with the readily available night soil from the city, for
use as fertilizer.

Spatially, the agricultural system was similar to that of
feudal Europe. Farmers usually congregated their housing in a
central location, the village, which was surrounded by the actual
farms themselves. The American pattern of dispersed farmhouses
was for all purposes non-existent.

Since 1949, significant change has occurred in the organiza-
tion of Shanghai. The change is incremental in nature and largely

related to national concerns and ideological concepts. These changes

51

will largely be discussed in the next section, but two major ones
must be noted here. The present structure of the city is, in no
small way, the result of the political expansion of the administrative
area of the city, and of the Chinese desire to integrate urban and
rural life in order to reduce spatial inequalities.

Prior to 1958, Shanghai was largely a city without a
regional urban system. In that year, ten neighboring counties of
Jiangsu Province were incorporated into the Municipality of Shanghai.
This change was largely an outgrowth of national policy change.
From 1956 on, Mao issued a number of policy statements that
affected the city. One placed a greater emphasis on coastal cities.
Another promulgated the concept of "walking on two legs." This
concept, in effect, promoted regional coordination and independence
in all economic activity. The end result, for Shanghai, was the
aforementioned institution of regional government.

Those initial policies have matured into the present land use
patterns and system of organization. Shanghai is viewed as an
urban system with five levels of hierarchy. These levels are the
central city, near suburban industrial districts, far suburban
satellite towns, county seats and towns under counties, and seats
of communes and state farms. This urban system functions as the
blueprint for the spatial organization of economic development for
the city of Shanghai (Lee, et al., 1983).

Perhaps the greatest transformation as a result of conceptual
and organizational changes has come in the suburban areas of

Shanghai. Prior to 1949 these areas were primarily agricultural in

52

nature. Since then, the pattern of not only agricultural production,
but of all economic activity in these regions, has changed. Until
the advent of the new "responsibility system" in the 19805, many of
the changes were readily apparent. Chief among them was the
consolidation of land into communal units. This eliminated the frag-
mented pattern of use and production that characterized pre-
liberation Shanghai. The consolidation of land permitted larger
groupings of land more suitable to modern agricultural methods. (It
should be noted that the applicability of many of these methods to
the Chinese landscape has been questioned by any number of
scholars.) Another feature that is readily apparent in the Shanghai
region is the encroachment of the city on the agricultural landscape.
Although the Chinese have attempted with some success to limit the
growth of the urban landscape, it has still encroached upon formerly
productive agricultural land. In the 19505 the Chinese began to plan
and build satellite centers around cities such as Shanghai, as a
method of controlling growth of the urban center. It was hoped
that by locating industry and housing in these new centers, residents
could be displaced from the core city. Unfortunately, initial attempts
located such satellite areas in a zone 2—5 kilometers from the city's
periphery. As transportation facilities improved the city quickly
filled the existing zone between such auxiliary sites and the city
boundaries. The result was further loss of agricultural land in the
region around the city (Lee, et al., 1983).

The pattern of rural life has been affected by the whole

concept of rural-urban relationships and city growth itself.

53

Theoretically, the peripheral housing belt around the city defines
the limits of city growth. However, it is not an effective physical
boundary.

Communist policy regarded the control of urban growth
desirable, and imposed strict controls on population flow to the
city. At the same time, a policy of minimizing the differences
between the city and countryside had been advocated. This policy
implied improvement of rural economic life through the modernization
of manpower in rural areas, and the creation of small—scale industries
at brigade, commune, and county levels (Lo, 1980, p. 151). This
was a strategy that was more than marginally successful in Shanghai.
Of the 8000 some factories in Shanghai, some 3000 are classified as
rural.

The growth of the city core has also been checked to some
degree by the transfer of educated youths to the countryside. This
program, ostensibly, served to upgrade rural areas, by transferring
people with technical and educational skills to the countryside. As
mentioned earlier, most of the population and spatial growth of
Shanghai has been due to extending the administrative boundaries
of the city to a wider area, and not by natural growth.

Prior to 1958, Shanghai was a city without a regional
urban system. The limited urban area restricted industrial growth.
In 1958 ten neighboring counties of Jiangsu Province were
incorporated into the municipality of Shanghai. This resulted in an
expansion of the city's area by a factor of ten. This change,

combined with policy changes, has resulted in the emergence of ten

54

near suburban industrial districts, and seven far suburban satellite
towns. Each has its own distinctive industrial specialization (see
Map ll). For example, Jinshan is a center of petrochemicals and
chemical fibers, Minhang specializes in the production of electrical
machinery, Gaoqiao in petrochemicals, Wujing in coal chemicals,
Anting in automobiles, Caohejing in instruments and electronics, and
Wusong in iron and steel and chemicals.

Such organizational change has accelerated the progress of
urbanization in suburban areas. In the early days after liberation,
none of the towns of these ten counties, except for Songjiang, had
a population of more than 20,000. Today, there are five of over
50,000 persons, and twenty-two towns with populations of between
10,000 and 50,000 (Lee, Yen, Tang, 1983, pp. 8-9). Thus, any
gains made in the conservancy of agricultural lands by limiting the
core city's growth have been offset by losses due to the increasing
urbanization of the region. These secondary centers have, however,
also served to limit the growth of Shanghai city as they serve to
absorb at least some of the inmigration to the region.

A feature that is directly related to the spatial organization
of the system is the land use pattern in the rural areas. As
Shanghai's boundaries were expanded to include rural areas, a
significant motivating factor was the desire to maintain the self-
sufficiency in food supply of the city. This was part of the afore-
mentioned policy of "walking on two legs." When the rural areas
became part of the administration of the city, movement between the

city and the rural area became intra-urban movement (Lo, 1980,

 

 

55

 

 

 

.v.

meon—wmmmww

”“3...{-ol f...’

 

:32: 25.3 .25: ... 2:. a... 3:: _ ..............

0 U cl. :5 on. In.
. sun. \ao ...-u..- .uouu-‘uuaoonlh..f o nun...“ "I”. ...-n-
.- ..l o§\u: u... ...... ...-o’n rN-Inu .00.!

.....‘Iu- .9. .o o' o. a. .o
a<=s=<8 I. l ...:P... ..s. w. ......wu.....a...1:.:... :9:

:3: . ..

                       

z

. ...-sf».
r~u0~r:
no..\- u r «l-

awx . 9.2.0 95.6 .......H......... .

 

Ezw _<=wz<=m

n.

o ~H."o$-Idou$rnu.$¢&ok?e

 

.00 I. as M. o o
subfamw”. .

 

 

 

 

56

p. 152). In such a system the agricultural land use pattern tends
to orient toward the city as a marketing center. Shanghai's current
land use pattern in the rural suburbs illustrates this point. Sur-
rounding the city is a uniformly narrow belt of vegetables, followed
by an extensive belt of mixed cotton and rice crops; and lastly, an
extensive belt of mixed rice and wheat crops. This land-use pattern
also reflects the importance of distance as a control, and is remins-
cent of Von Thunen's model. While that model is not strictly applic-
able to Shanghai's situation, it implies the varying degrees of
efficiency in the transport network (such as railways) in an agri-
cultural economy oriented toward one marketing area, the city. In
Shanghai the extension of the vegetable belt along the railroads
further confirms the control exercised by accessibility over the
agricultural land use pattern (Lo, 1980, p. 152).

The organization of the rural area, then, has certainly
changed. Prior to 19119 the ten counties that were added to Shanghai
in 1958 were largely rural in character. With the exception of
Songjiang, no major urban center was located in the countryside.
Land ownership was fragmented and cropping was mixed in all areas.
Today, the pattern has altered to a great degree. The administrative
boundaries have been expanded to include the ten county area. The
inclusion of the rural districts in the city region has had a profound
effect on rural organization. Industry has been introduced to the
rural environs. Secondary towns and cities have grown and now dot
the rural landscape. The integration of the rural and urban environ-

ment has altered rural land use patterns. As the rural area became

57

centered on the city, and transportation improved, cropping took on
a more regular pattern. The economic growth of the city has
carried with it a companion growth in the countryside. In the
Shanghai region the rural area has been economically integrated
with the city to a large extent.

The communal system of agriculture that went along with the
changes in urban structure have also affected rural organization.
The communal organization enhanced the introduction of industry to
the countryside. lt introduced the mechanization and modernization
of methods to the agricultural system. Peasant income in the region
grew as specialized crops, more livestock raising, sideline occupations
and modern methods were introduced.

Shanghai's urban core has also undergone significant change
as a result of these, and other policies. The initial impetus for
change came soon after 1949. As a result of a bad explosion at a
Beijing chemical factory located in a dense urban district, industry
was instructed nationwide to remove potentially dangerous industrial
sites to less densely populated suburban areas. Shanghai officials
responded by relocating some 100 chemical factories and workshops
to suburban areas. This effectively began the transformation of
land use patterns in suburban regions of the city (Fung, 1981, pp.
280-281). This move was reinforced by the first large scale building

of housing in Shanghai, under the Communists. In order to eliminate

some of the more disorderly land use patterns in the city, in order to
effectively meet anticipated growth, and in order to meet the goals of

the "socialist city," these housing units were located in the suburbs.

58

The projects were planned as integrated communities, combining living
quarters with schools, nurseries, markets, health clinics and other
urban amenities. In order to minimize work trip time such "villages"
were located near existing industrial centers and within eary travel of
anticipated industrial sites (Fung, 1981) .

The changes in organization in the late 19505 further changed
the pattern of the city's economic life. in 1956 four new suburban
industrial districts were established centering on Tsaohoching, Taichang,
Gaochiao, and Pengpu. These districts were the initial attempt by the
city to organize industry horizontally, by grouping associated
industries in a given district. Such organization was meant to reduce
transportation costs and difficulties (Fung, 1981, p. 287).

The fledgling policy of locating and relocating industry to the
city periphery was given impetus by the administrative growth of the
city and the new regional policies. By 1958 planners had recognized
that the removal of industry to satellite regions located 2-3 kilometers
from the city center was ineffectual in slowing city growth. The city
quickly expanded to fill this relatively small gap. A major reason for
the expansion of the city boundaries in 1958 was to give planners
greater options in locating industry, and thus controlling the growth
of the city center. Planners felt that the ideal distance for the location
of satellite cities lay in a range from 20-75 kilometers from the city
center. This would mitigate the problem of absorption while maintaining
population control functions in the dentral city, as well as permitting

economic integration of units (Fung, 1981) .

59

Chinese planners were concerned about a number of issues in
locating these cities and in the spatial organization within them. First,
they wished to minimize capital outlay by selecting sites that already
had the greatest measure of infrastructure. Within each site selected
they wished to create industrial clusters. Such clusters would be
neighborhood size, and would center on one or more factories. Each
cluster would be effectively self-contained, offering housing, shopping
and other necessities and amenities. Further, each city would be
organized around one or several associated industries. Initially, the
cities of Wuching, Peiyangchiao, Nanchiang, Huangtu, and Anting were
selected as potential sites, with Minhang chosen as the first of the
satellite cities (Fung, 1981, p. 291).

The policy of locating industry in satellite towns as well as in
Shanghai is one that has remained relatively constant since the creation
of the concept. The policy meets a number of concerns of the city and
nation. It helps to control population, it reduces congestion in the
center city, it allows polluting industry to be removed from areas of
high population density and it carries with it a more equitable distribu-
tion of the benefits of industrial activity. It is these same concerns
that have led to encouragement and creation of smaller scale industrial
activity in the rural environs of Shanghai.

The policy of encouraging satellite city development has been
reasonably effective. Since 1949 a number of cities have been designated
as satellite cities and have developed significant industrial bases. In
addition to the satellite towns mentioned earlier, a number of others have

been developed (see Map ll) . Baoshan is a center of iron and steel

60

production and the site of China's newest and most ambitious project in
the development of the industry. The Baoshan Iron and Steel works
being built with Japanese plant technology and equipment will be China's
Showplace of modernization. This is, of course, if the numerous prob-
lems which plague the development are solved. Problems range from
capital shortages to poor siting of the plant itself, which is far from
domestic sources of coal, and proposed sources of iron ore in Australia.
Poor siting extends to the actual location at Baoshan whose location on
the Yangtze is at a point unable to accept deep water shipping without
extensive dredging. Even with such dredging, iron ore shipments must
be transshipped from Ningpo, in Fujian province, by rail. The city of
Dongtong is a center for shipbuilding, Hongqiao for a mixture of
industries, and Jinshanwei for petrochemicals. The city of Minhang,
one of the earliest designated satellite cities, has become a site for a
variety of industries. It is also the site chosen for Shanghai's venture
into Special Economic Zones (SE2) . SEZ's are specially selected sites
aimed at attracting foreign investment and offering low, if any, taxes,
cheap and plentiful skilled labor and a fully integrated infrastructure.
The Chinese have borrowed from the Taiwanese and Koreans among

others in the establishment of such zones (China Trade Report,

 

December 1982, p. 6). The establishment of SEZ's as part of the new
pragmatic policies of Deng Xiaoping, bring back to Shanghai a feature
of its past, an influx of foreigners engaged in industry and commerce.
Efforts to control the growth of the city by siphoning off
industry and population to satellite cities has not been completely suc-

cessful. Uneven development is a characteristic of the region, partially

61

as a result of factors such as political change at the national level.
While some success has been achieved, Shanghai itself is still suffering
from many problems common to an expanding city. Population density
in the city is among the highest in the world, averaging some l10,000
per square kilometer. Some areas of the city have densities approach—
ing 60,000 per square kilometer. Despite the shift of industry that has
occurred, factories still average some 34 per square kilometer in the
city. Even a casual visitor soon notes that much of the housing is
overcrowded and of poor quality, existing transportation is choked

and that the city suffers from a serious pollution problem. Additionally,
even the city government acknowledges that many of the existing
factories are blights on the landscape, redundant, inefficient con-
sumers of energy and raw materials and economically inefficient (U.S.
Department of State Document No. E12065, September 1980) .

In short, significant change has occurred in spatial organiza-
tion in Shanghai. Rural areas have been integrated into the urban
management system. Agriculture has been transformed by this, and
by the collectivization of agriculture. Land fragmentation has been
eliminated and many modern agricultural production methods introduced.
Industry has stopped being an exclusive preserve of the urban core.
Industrial enterprises have been removed to, or began in, suburbs,
satellite cities and rural .areas. A massive amount of new housing
has been built, most along the concept of self-contained neighbor-
hoods, organized around the workplace. Despite these and other

changes, however, a multitude of problems remain.

62

D. Changes in Shanghai's Role in National Life

 

Shanghai plays a number of roles within national life in China.
Its most significant role is that which it plays in the economic life of
the nation. In order to assess the role, some knowledge of the
changes in the national economy is needed.

The state of the economy as inherited by the Communists
in 19119 is not clearly known. It is generally accepted that the
economy was in a shambles after suffering through more than a
decade of war and inflation. "In 191-19 the Chinese Communists took
over a war-torn and devastated economy suffering from acute and
prolonged inflation" (Eckstein, 1968, p. 711). But as Eckstein, as
well as many others point out, the general state of the economy
cannot be precisely determined for that year. The character and
relative health of an economy is most often stated in quantitative
terms using such measures as prices, production figures, or some
other chosen statistical measure. Such measures for 191-19 and the
years immediately following are believed to seriously misrepresent
the condition of the economy. To counter the lack of available and
reliable data a number of scholars have attempted to draw a more
complete and accurate picture of the inherited economy by use of
a number of methods.* Generally speaking, based on those works,
it is possible to construct some estimate of the state of the inherited

economy .

 

*See Eckstein (1958), Liu—Yeh (1965), and Chao Kang
(1965).

63

When the Chinese Communists came to power in
1949, they inherited an economy which by practically
all available measures was near the bottom of the world
scale. GNP per capita was possibly in the neighborhood
of $50.00 as compared with two to three times that level
in seventeenth century England . . . approximately one-
half the GNP was produced in agriculture. All of the
modern sectors combined contributed only 20 percent.
The same pattern is evident in labor force composition,
with at most three million workers engaged in modern
industry (Eckstein, 1968, p. 80).

Overall, the modern industrial sector, exclusive of mining
and utilities, contributed about 10 percent of the GNP, a small per-
centage.

In effect, modern industry in mainland China was merely a
shallow overlay on a pre-industrial agrarian economy. Yet
as an element of inheritance, it was of crucial importance
for Communist China. Although narrowly based, both in
an economic and geographic sense, it provided the new
regime with at least a modicum of plant capacity, trained
manpower, and management from which to build (Eckstein,
1968, p. 80).

From national product figures from 1933 and output figures
from the 191105 (see Tables, Appendix I), a fairly accurate picture
of the composition of the inherited economy can be drawn. The
Communists in 1949 inherited an industrial economy that was for all
intents at a productive low point. Devastated by war, inflation,
and Soviet plant removals in Manchuria, the industrial economy was
barely alive and kicking. But the stability in the political realm
combined with central government stimulation applied to the remaining
capacity led to recovery of the industrial base by 1952. Still the
industrial economy, as seen by Eckstein, was merely a shallow over-

lay on a pre-industrial agrarian economy. The extent of the

industrial economy was relatively minute. Capturing less than 10

614

percent of the GNP it played a relatively insignificant role in income
production for the total economy. Its importance lay not in its pro-
duction but in its potential to transform the economy. Geographi-
cally its extent was also limited. For all intents the industrial
capacity existed only along a narrow coastal strip and in those areas
historically controlled by foreigners, that is, the treaty ports.

Overall, the economy was not particularly healthy. The GNP
per capita, while not an accurate measure of development, indicates
that the country as a whole was largely underdeveloped. Agriculture,
while in better shape than industry, was still beset by a variety of
problems from lack of technology, a high degree of land fragmentation
and high tenancy rates. The economy as a whole was beset by prob-
lems that included poor managerial talent, lack of organization, lack
of investment capital and unified marketing structures and the lack
of current technologies. Additionally, the country as a whole was
experiencing rapid population growth and pressure and a serious lack
of infrastructure, particularly in terms of roads, railroads and utili-
ties. Overall, then, the inherited industrial economy was for all
intents and purposes a shell, a thin overlay on a traditional agrarian
economy.

Industrial production had reached a high in the early 19405
and rapidly declined to all time lows by 1949. Although recovered
by 1952, it still accounted for only a small percentage of the Gross
National Product. But as Eckstein points out, its importance to future
development far outweighed its small contribution. It created the

base upon which future industrial development would occur. We should

65

also note here the lack of diversity within the industrial economy.
Long dependent on overseas production of capital goods, the PRC was
seriously lacking in basic industries, such as machine tools. Steel
production and iron ore capability had been severely hamptered by
Soviet plant removals in the northeast. While never a particularly
large industry to begin with, these removals seriously diminished
capacity. While some capital goods and heavy industry remained, the
majority of industry was concentrated in the light industry sector,
particularly in textiles. While the presence of any experienced
industrial working and entrepreneurial classes were a plus, the lack of
extensive heavy industry was a serious problem within the PRC.
During the thirty-two years from 19119 to 1981, the population
of the PRC grew at an average rate of 1.9 percent annually. From a
population of some half a billion in 1949 the numbers grew to over one
billion people in the 19805. This rate of growth is one that is extremely
high and has caused innumerable problems for the government. In
1949 the PRC was faced with an economy and constituency that ranked
near the bottom of the world economies in terms of performance and
well being. Certainly the task of improvement was made that much
harder by having to provide for a rapidly expanding population. The
labor force figures would seem to indicate that some measure of success
was achieved. The labor force over the years grew at an annual
average rate of 2.6 percent; a rate that well exceeds that of population
growth. In 1952 the labor force was equal to 36.1 percent of the popu-
lation. By 1982 the economy had expanded enough to accommodate a

labor force equal to 113.11 percent of the population. This means that

66

even though population grew at a remarkable rate, jobs were created
faster. This is particularly significant in the figures after 1965, when
those who account for the first great surge of population growth began
to enter the job market. (Of course, these figures do not address
underemployment, the extent of which, while not known, is thought

to be high.)

Table 5 in Appendix I, presents a clear picture of the changing
emphasis of the economy. In 1909 agriculture contributed a 70 percent
share to the total gross value of output (GVO). By 1981 the situation
had reversed itself. In that year industry as a whole contributed
about 75 percent of the total GVO. Additionally, we can see from
Table 5 that the nature of the industrial composition changed signifi-
cantly. In the early 19505 light industry, the prevalent inherited
industrial form, accounted for the lion's share of total GVO. By the
late 19705 heavy industry had achieved parity, and in several instances
accounted for a higher gross value than did light industry. This
change in industrial focus was clearly planned. It is evident not only
in development policy but from the information available on capital
construction. Over the thirty years, capital construction funds grew
at an average of 8.2 percent a year. Additionally, they captured an
increasingly larger percentage of total state expenditures. In 1952
capital construction funds accounted for 24.8 percent of total expendi-
tures. By 1975 such funds accounted for 43 percent of state expendi—
tures. This is particularly significant to industry as this section

steadily captured approximately one-half of capital construction funds.

67

It is particularly noteworthy that nearly all such funds were invested
in heavy industry.

This is a capsule view of economic growth in the PRC during
its first three decades of existence. Beginning with a shattered, war-
torn economy suffering high inflation and largely dependent on tradi-
tional agricultural production, it grew to have a respectable industrial
sector. By 1981 the economy had grown sufficiently to provide an
ever-increasing number of jobs even given high birth rates, an improved
wage and per capita GNP level, and a fiscally improved standard of
living. This does not mean that a utopia had been created. Certainly
the country has myriad problems. Nor does it mean that the political
system has provided the ideal framework for growth. Certainly we can-
not accurately speculate a possible growth under a different system.

All that can surely be stated is that the PRC has successfully managed
its economic life to the extent of providing adequate food and other
basics and increasing job opportunities to a constantly expanding popu-
lation. Such figures also indicate that the PRC has continued to
expand its industrial heritage and successfully establish a modicum of
basic heavy industries.

Over the thirty plus years of the PRC Shanghai has played a
vital, if sometimes confused role in the national economy. In 1949 the
state of Shanghai's economy was very similar to that of the National
economy. While few specific figures are available, some descriptive
material concerning that city's economy in 1949 is available.

When the Communists entered Shanghai in May 1949, the city

had as its legacy the role as the premier industrial center in China.

68

"Over a third of China's modern industrial capital, labor force, and
output were in Shanghai alone" (Murphey, 1980, p. 117). In fact,
Shanghai had a skilled industrial labor pool that constituted more than
half of China's total pool. Prior to the war Shanghai had produced
about half of the country's large scale industrial production. Its
industrial production in the modern sector accounted for £13 percent of
all of China's modern industrial labor force and produced some 51 per-
cent of the value of China's industrial production (Teu Ta-chung
quoted in Murphey, 1953, p. 166). While the city claimed some 6000
plus factories, many of these employed only a handful of people and
used primitive methods of production. Essentially the modern industrial
capacity of China as a whole consisted of some 2,435 plants of all types
(pre-war) of which 1200 were located in Shanghai (Murphey, 1953,

p. 166).

The major industries in pre-war Shanghai, and presumably
therefore, in the inherited system, were primarily in the light consumer
goods area. Textiles were the largest class of industrial effort. In
pre-war years textiles accounted for 50-60 percent of the city's
industrial workforce and 110-50 percent of the value of industrial pro-
duction (Murphey, 1953, p. 167). Food-related industries were also
important, claiming 10—15 percent of the labor force and 30-35 percent
of the value of industrial output. This constituted the bulk of
industry. The rest claiming descending shares of industrial output
were clothing, leather and rubber goods, paper, printing, chemicals,

and machinery. While the shares of these industries is relatively small,

69

they did provide a diverse manufacturing base upon which to build
(Murphey, 1953, p. 167).

At the time of "liberation" this economy was in much the same
straits as the national economy of which it was part. While not
physically debilitated or suffering from whole plant removals, it was
nevertheless in dire straits. Shanghai had experienced a state of war
virtually non-stop since the first Japanese attack on the city in 1932.
As late as 1962 the city remained in a virtual state of seige due to
Kuomintang and UN sea blockades. These blockades were extremely
harmful to a city of Shanghai's nature, whose economic lifeblood was
the sea routes. "For a city whose economy depended closely on free
access by sea to a variety of raw materials, producer and consumer
goods, and markets, this situation cannot help but have affected its
economic life in fundamental fashion" (Murphey, 1953, p. 196). Cut
off from overseas supplies and markets, the city turned toward the
domestic market. They found these, for all practical purposes, closed
as well. Rail and road links to the interior were largely destroyed.
Domestic supply sources were in disarray due to the prolonged war.
The Yangtze River, Shanghai's interior lifeline, was filled with sunken
wrecks and floating mines. In short, the economy was virtually isolated.

Earlier in this paper the Communists' attitude toward cities in
general and Shanghai in particular were discussed in some detail. Thus
they do not bear repeating here. Suffice it to say that overall the city
was not held in a favorable light. This attitude toward Shanghai can

be seen in actual policy decisions.

70

With the success of the Communists in 19119, the regime
deliberately set out to shift Chinese industry from the vulnerable
and, in its view, decadent cities along the east coast, where it was
then concentrated to the undeveloped interior. In the First Five-
Year Plan, which began in 1953, of the 156 major industrial projects,
none went to Shanghai. From 1949 to 1979, Shanghai's factories got
$10.6 billion less government investment than those in Hubei province,
in central China. But Shanghai's industries, with their more experi-
enced management and educated workers, prospered while Hubei's
remained weak. By 1980 the total assets of Hubei's factories amounted
to $933 million more than those of Shanghai's factories, but their out-
put was only one-third of Shanghai's industry (Butterfield, 1982,
pp. 4119-1150).

The Government attitude toward Shanghai is graphically evi-
dent from the capital investment figures. This attitude was buttressed
by the "xia xiang" program of the central government. This infamous
program which sent educated youths and others to the countryside
removed much of Shanghai's industrial labor class. These people were
arbitrarily transferred to other regions of the country to provide the
seed population of skilled workers. It also served to keep the growth
of Shanghai in check. National development policies were, also, not
conducive to Shanghai's growth. The question then, is where
Shanghai is today in relation to the national economy. Earlier state-
ments have already provided ample clues that Shanghai has managed

to perform better than the national economy as a whole.

71

Shanghai is China's smallest provincial unit of government,
covering only 6,186 square kilometers, with a central city area of 160
square kilometers. From a pre—war population of approximately 4
million, it has risen to 11.46 million. But it must be remembered
that pre-war figures are only for the city proper. It certainly is
China's most densely populated city, with densities approaching
60,000 per square kilometer in center city districts. But Shanghai's
success is the inverse of its size. ' In 1982 Shanghai's industrial
output was 12.5 percent of the national total. It produced 17.4 per-
cent of all of China's financial income. It produced and handled 24
percent of all exports, and services 40 percent of all PRC port
traffic.* Shanghai is China's major industrial base; having managed
to maintain its role throughout the turbulent history of the PRC.

The city today has over 8000 factories with over 4 million employees.

It plays a vital role in the heavy industry sector. It produces 10-15
percent of China's total production of steel, caustic soda, plastics,
chemicalpharmaceuticals, rubber tires, machine tools, mining equipment,
power generating equipment, tractors and internal combustion engines.
It produces more than 20 percent of all specialty steels and ethylene.
But the city's greatest contribution is in the area of light industry,
particularly consumer goods. In 1980, the overall share of light
industrial output in the city was 14.1 percent of the national total.

It produced 30 percent of all bicycles, televisions, sewing machines,

 

*

Statistics drawn from China's Provinces: An Organizational
and Statistical Guide, ChristopherTlarke, National Council on U.S.
China Trade, WasTiington D.C., July 1982; and Statistical Yearbook
9f China-1981, State Statistical Bureau, PRC, Hong Kong, 1982.

 

 

 

 

72

and wristwatches, and 55 percent of all cameras. Textiles continue

to be a mainstay of the economy and a major contributor to both the
domestic economy and to foreign exchange. Shanghai produces 10—15
percent of the total production of cotton yarn, cotton cloth and silks.
It produces more than 30 percent of all woolens and synthetics.
Overall, the industrial economy of Shanghai is fairly balanced, con-
sisting of 52.6 percent in the light sector and 47.4 percent in the
heavy sector. The city is taking the national lead in developing such
sectors of the industrial economy as textiles, food processing, con-
sumer goods, electronics, telecommunications, electric power genera-
tion equipment, and building materials.

The remarkable productivity achieved in the industrial sector is
present also in the agricultural sector. While Shanghai remains a food-
deficient region, it does remarkably well with its resources. Of the
total available suburban land area, only 356,000 hectares is cultivable.
On this acreage live 3 million peasants. This group manages to pro-
duce two rice and one winter wheat crop per year at a productivity
rate three times the national average. The region produces 33 per-
cent of cotton needs for the city, 90 percent of vegetables, 75 per-
cent of pork products and dairy products, and 5 percent of the
national total of aquatic products (Clarke, 1982).

Under Deng Xiaoping, the attitude toward Shanghai has under—
gone significant change. No longer is the city viewed as a basically
negative influence on China. Its contribution to the National economy
has been recognized and it is now being held up as a development

model in much the same way as the Dazhai commune in earlier times.

73

The official attitude and recognition of Shanghai is well reflected

in this passage from the journal, Economic Management:

 

Ours is a big country with many variants in natural and
historical conditions. The level of economic development
differs from place to place. There are not only industrially
developed cities such as Shanghai and Tianjin but also
industrially backward interior areas with relatively poorer
lifestyles. Shanghai is China's biggest and oldest industrial
base with the most solid foundation, complete industrial
sectors and departments, concentrated scientific and technical
force, good conditions for internal cooperation and prolonged
accumulation of experience. Its level of production, tech-
nology, business management and economic effect are much
higher than the levels of the hinterland and the national
average. At present, the fixed value of Shanghai's
industrial output values comprises one-eighth of that state
and its financial revenue (including enterprises under central
jurisdiction) constituted one-sixth of that of the state. The
ratio between fixed assets and annual output value is about
1:3 for Shanghai and just 1:1 for the whole nation. The
appreciation rate of assets in Shanghai is about 57 percent
and that of the 200 cities in the country, on an average, is
only 20 percent. The annual frequency of turnover of
floating assets of Shanghai is around 6 times while that of
the state is 3 times. The utilization rate of energy of the
industrial departments of Shanghai is around 33 percent
whereas the national average is below 30 percent. The
industrial output value of Shanghai is about 30,000 yuan
per workers, 1.5 times higher than the national average.
The average per-capita GNP of Shanghai is about $1,600
which is 6 times that of the national average level. Jiangsu
Province has a relatively developed textile industry, but
compared with Shanghai, it still has a long way to go. The
fixed assets of the textile trade of Jiangsu Province was 72.4
percent of that of Shanghai in 1979, but compared with
Shanghai, its output value was only 60 percent; the foreign
exchange earnings through exporting goods was 50 percent
that of Shanghai, its profits were 37 percent and the overall
level of industry was 40 percent lower than Shanghai. It
can be seen that if all the industrial enterprises in the
country attain Shanghai's present level, the nation's existing
output value and rate of accumulation will double and redouble
and the pace of our four modernizations will be greatly
accelerated (Min Gan, Beijing, July 15, 1981, as quoted in
JPRS 78945, 9/10/81).

It is clear that Shanghai has managed to maintain its role as a premier

economic center in China.

74

The fact that Shanghai has played such a significant role in
China's economic life under Communism is almost paradoxical. For
nearly one hundred years, Chinese have criticized the city as being
dominated by foreign exploitation, and as a cancer sapping China of
her vitality. Certainly, Communist ideology prior to 1956 espoused

this view. In 1956 Mao, in his declaration On the Ten Great Relation-

 

figs, brought forth the new Communist view that cities such as
Shanghai could be exploited for the development of China. Herein
lies the paradox. How could the history of Shanghai, so bad and
shameful, produce something so valuable? (Pye, 1981).

Much of the answer lies in the role that Shanghai has created
for itself in national life. It seems clear that something extraordinary
was created in Shanghai that did not die when the foreigners and
later much of the entrepreneurial class fled the city.

Shanghai has always been a vital and alive city. The mixing
of cultures in an urban environment created in Shanghai a type
of city that was akin to New York or Paris in terms of intellectual
activity, education, culture and the arts. Shanghai, by virtue of
its economic function, was a city that was outward looking. It was
vitally concerned with all foreign developments. Its function as a
transportation hub had the effect of making it, also, a cultural cross-
roads. The impact of the new ideas, brought from the west, and
introduced to an ancient culture bound society is clearly evident in
Shanghai. Shanghai was the cradle and symbol of the May 4th Movement,

the birth of Chinese nationalism in 1919. It was the cradle of the

75

Communist Party in China, which was organized in the city in 1921. It
played a vital role in the development and growth of the Koumintang,
or Nationalist Chinese Party. The rise of nationalism in Shanghai
was, however, reflective of the cosmopolitan nature of the city. It
was not a nostalgic longing for a return to a better past, rather of
the kind that is future oriented. The nationalism developed in
Shanghai sought equality for China in the new world order and cooper-
ation with other countries. Shanghai nationalism was open to the out-
side world and conscious of the role China should play in that world.
Both the Kuomintang and Communists rejected the view of Shanghai
as foreign, not Chinese. The question is whether such a rejection
was based on Shanghai as being foreign in basic nature, or simply
foreign to the culturally based bureaucratic system eventually
developed by both parties. If Shanghai was foreign in the first
sense, then the rejection it suffered in 1930 and has ever since,
would have, it seems, eventually destroyed the city. Certainly, the
economic function alone is not sufficient to explain the stability of the
city and its survival in the face of successively hostile regimes.
Throughout the period, from 1930 to 1949, in the face of repression,
invasion and chaos, Shanghai continued .to display her vitality and
originality in economics, politics, and the arts (Bergére, 1981).

The change in attitudes espoused by Mao have never been
wholeheartedly embraced by the Party. The attitudes in practice
have remained largely distrustful of Shanghai. This is readily
apparent in the economic role of the city. For much of the PRC's

history, Shanghai was denied any significant investment

76

capital, while functioning as one of the prime generators of national
funds. Shanghai managed to rise above this shortcoming. By 1950
it was producing 20 percent of China's industrial output. During
the period of the First Five Year Plan, Shanghai generated sufficient
income to finance 64 percent of all the basic construction investment
plan for industry in China (Pye, 1981; Howe, 1981, p. 166). During
the same period, China invested in Shanghai only 1 to 2 percent of
national investment funds. Yet Shanghai increased its industrial
growth by 14 percent. This was also in spite of having to relocate
some eighty of its textile mills to other areas. Shanghai's drive to
maintain its traditional role as an economic leader is readily apparent
in its acquisition of an electronics industry. Despite numerous
national roadblocks, Shanghai today has as many electronic factories
as Beijing and Tienjin combined (Pye, 1981).

Shanghai has always been the pacesetter in China in education.
Its schools and universities are among the best in China. They con-
sistently turn out the best skilled workers and managerial and admin—
istrative class in China. This is borne out by Government policies
that have consistently drawn on the human resources of the city.
The national government has utilized a number of programs aimed at
transferring these people to other regions as an aid to development.
According to Howe, exclusive of Shanghai's contribution to the Xia
Xiang program, the city has had to transfer a minimum of one million
skilled workers to other regions. Conversations with Shanghai
officials have led Howe to speculate that the actual number transferred

may be closer to two million (Howe, 1981).

77

In some respects it is harder to assess the political role of
Shanghai. In order to place the role in perspective a unique aspect
of politics in China must be understood. In China, a locally based
unit of power rarely champions the local interests. In China,
politics is traditionally largely insensitive to geography. While local
officials may try to reduce or blunt the impact of national policy on
their locale, they rarely try to influence policy to favor their region.
Throughout Chinese history it has been considered inappropriate to
articulate the special interests of a region. This tradition has been
carried on, to a large extent, by the Communists (Pye, 1981).

From the time that Shanghai was brought under Communist
control in 1949, this attitude became apparent. Shanghai's leaders
have consistently failed to articulate the interests and needs of the
city, and in fact often supported policies diametrically opposed to
them. The fact that Shanghai was now Communist, did not stop the
exchange of ideas and political ferment that characterized the city
prior to 1949. The volatile nature of the city's politics is apparent in
happenings during the Cultural Revolution. The radicals (or ultra-
rightists in today's terminology) were at the forefront in proposing
policies that were the most detrimental to Shanghai's economic, social
and cultural life. Shanghai, the city with the best schools in China,
had leaders bent on the destruction of the Chinese educational system.
Its cultural life was devastated by Red Guards who viewed such
activity as counter-revolutionary. Its economy, the strongest in the
country, was not championed as a worker success, but reviled as

being too capitalist in nature. But Shanghai did continue to play its

78

role as the cradle of political movements in China. It is generally
acknowledged that the now reviled Gang of Four used Shanghai as its
political base in its rise to power.

The political and nationalistic heritage that Shanghai brought
with it to the PRC has not been lost. The fall of the Gang of Four
was a happy event for the city. It is evident that the city residents
are not fools when it comes to identifying their own self interests.
Under the economic policies of Deng, Shanghai is shedding its
parochialism of the last thirty years and once again asserting its own
nationalist view of China and Shanghai's role in the world (Pye, 1981).

In short, Shanghai has always played a vital, if often
unwelcome, role in Chinese national life. It has been a leader in
politics, economics and cultural pursuits. Whie its role has been
muted in the past thirty odd years, its heritage remains intact.
Shanghai has maintained a vital role in national life, despite Govern-
ment policies that usually favored other regions over the city.

While it is clear that Shanghai has maintained a vital role in
National life, it is also true that Government policies detrimental to
the city have had an effect. A sense of the detrimental effects on
Shanghai's role can be ascertained through a look at Shanghai's role
as a primate city in China. In any country, the presence of a primate
city is significant. A city which achieves that status usually plays a
dominant role in all areas of national life. By ascertaining the role
of the primacy of Shanghai, we can gain some measure of understand-

ing of the changing role of Shanghai in China.

79

One method of evaluating urban primacy is by use of indexes
of primacy constructed for various time periods. Primacy indexes are
calculated by computing the ratio of population in the largest city of
a given urban system to the total population of the set of cities
chosen from the rank of cities below the largest. Pannel (1981) has
constructed such an index for China. The index is based on the ten
largest cities in China from 1927 to 1977. Shanghai was the largest

city in all periods.

China: Index of Urban Primacy, 1937-1977

 

 

Year Index
1937 .30
1949 .28
1953 .28
1970 .23
1977 .22

From the index it is readily apparent that the primacy of
Shanghai has declined under the Communists. The relative position
of Shanghai as a primate center increased in the first half of the
century, and has declined ever since. This also indicates that urban
growth has shifted to other cities in the country. In short, Shanghai's
role has been in decline. This decline does not mean that Shanghai
has lost its role as the leading urban center in China. But it does
mean that relative to other cities in China the role Shanghai plays

has decHned.

lV. WHY HAS SHANGHAI CHANGED?

A. The Effects of Government Policy

 

The changes that have occurred in the physical and organiza-
tional structure of Shanghai can, for the most part, be traced to
specific Government policies. One of the primary goals of the Chinese
Communist Party has been the transformation of China into a modern
socialist state. In the PRC, as in many planned economies, the direc-
tion that such modernization takes, is tightly controlled by the central
government. Administrative commands, based on state plans, dictate
the direction that development takes. In China these state plans have
been based on a number of broad development policies established by
the central government. It is these broad plans that have had major
influence on the way Shanghai has changed.

In the first three decades of the PRC's history, such develop-
ment plans have had to be accommodated to a broad range of regional
development policies. The Chinese have always felt that the industrial
economy that they inherited in 1949 has too narrow a geographic base.
The inherited industrial structure was located along a narrow coastal
strip centered on Shanghai in the North East region, and in only a
few other isolated points. Such a pattern of industrial location had a
number of negative connotations for the new China. The existing
structure was first and foremost a spatial reminder of an unsavory
colonial past. The existing pattern, also, failed to distribute the

80

81

advantages of the industrial economy over a wide spatial plant. The
pattern also made the nation vulnerable to military attack on its
industrial structure. These specific regional concerns were reinforced
by a number of regional goals. The Chinese Communist revolution
was not urban-based, but a rural, peasant-based one. The Party

felt that it was these people who deserved the primary benefits of

the successful revolution. The Party's rural constituency was largely
located in interior regions of the nation, and were certainly economically
worse off than urban residents, as a whole. Thus the Party was com-
mitted to development in these regions. This turn inward, toward

the interior regions of the Nation, was reinforced by the desire to
create closer ties with China's ideological cousin, Russia. Russia lay
in the same direction as the peasants, the interior.

Broad development policies usually speak to the issue of what
sector of the economy is to be emphasized in order to achieve the
desired change. In the first decade of the PRC, development policy
was largely structured on a Soviet model. This model called for a
central command economy, in which investment was directed by the
center, into the industrial sector of the economy. As was shown in
the Introduction, a policy favoring industrial growth is usually urban-
biased. The Soviet model carried with it a specific model of urban
development and planning. Ignoring cultural and geographical differ-
ences in city location, the Soviet model was embraced by Chinese
planners. Basically the Soviet model envisaged model, socialist

worker cities. Such cities were massive in conception and scale.

82

They encompassed a large geographic area, had massive boulevards,
squares, and public buildings.

These initial regional and economic policies influenced the
early change and growth in Shanghai. In 1949 Shanghai was a city
that was constrained by its colonial past. The Communist perception
of the city was uniformly negative. In the early years of the Commu-
nist regime numerous plans were proposed to move industry from
Shanghai to interior locations. Such proposed moves were motivated
by these negative attitudes as well as military concerns. In any case,
Shanghai, in 1949, was suffering from a nearly universal national con—
demnation based on its size and economic heritage.

On the surface the proposed Soviet model of industrial
development would seem to favor Shanghai, perhaps enough to over—
come the negative attitudes held by the Party. Shanghai's industrial
base, skilled labor force, managerial talents and location made it the
rational economic choice for substantial investment. The investment,
to a large extent, never did occur for Shanghai. Influenced by
regional goals of development and the prevailing attitudes toward
coastal cities, the central government created a system of key point
cities. It was in these cities that industrial investment was to be
placed. Shanghai was not designated as a key point city. The practi-
cal result was the severe limiting of investment capital allowed to the
city. The city was heavily taxed, and had little of its taxed resources
returned for local use.

During the early 19505, Shanghai did, however, experience

some change as a result of the Soviet planning model. Specifically,

83

urban planners, encouraged by national acceptance of the Soviet
model, rushed to transform existing cities into 'model socialist cities.‘
In Shanghai this move had several effects. It led to the expansion of
the city's political boundaries. As the planners moved toward the
creation of east-west axis roads, public squares and broad boulevards,
many buildings and facilities in the center city were torn down. Such
removals seriously affected the available housing stock. In order to
preserve the 'socialist' gains in urban planning, new developments
were planned for suburban regions. The changes in urban planning
concepts also accelerated the suburban expropriation of land. Cer-
tainly it was easier to create a new socialist landscape on virgin
territory than in the congested city itself.

The second major change in Shanghai, brought about by.the
Soviet model of development, was the tentative beginnings of the
transformation of the industrial base. Prior to liberation, Shanghai's
industrial economy, as well as China's, was largely composed of light
industrial ventures. The Soviet model placed the emphasis for future
industrial development in the heavy industrial sector, which by 1981
captured 50 percent of the industrial base.

During the period of the early 19505, the suburban landscape
of the city also began to experience change. The gradual institution
of the collective system of agriculture was transforming the spatial
patterns in suburban areas. The most noticeable change was the
gradual elimination of the fragmented pattern of occupancy and use
that existed. Collectivization was gradually consolidating the land

into larger units of production.

84

This period also saw the beginnings of change in the trans-
portation system of the city. A national priority of the period was
the repair of all existing rail lines, and the extension of the system
to achieve full national integration. This led to significant rail con-
struction in the region. The primary gain for Shanghai was the
bridging of the Yangtze River, thus opening the north to travel not
directly by rail.

The early years of the Communist regime were, however, not
characterized by sweeping change. Rather, they were a period of
recovery from decades of war in China, and of consolidation of power
by the Communists.

Begining in the late 19505 and continuing through the late
19705, Shanghai experienced much of the impact of national policies
that resulted in the major structural changes that occurred in the city.

Beginning with Mao's essay, On the Ten Great Relationships, and

 

maturing with the 'Great Leap Forward' and the later 'Cultural
Revolution,‘ a Maoist policy of development assumed a central position
in Chinese ideology. Basically, the Maoist philosophy rejected many
of the assumptions and tenets of the Soviet model. Mao rejected the
notion that development was best achieved by a heavy industry model,
in which investment in the heavy industrial sector was thought to
stimulate the economy by a 'trickle down' effect. Rather, Mao advo-
cated a rural based scheme, wherein investment was in agriculture,
and in rural, agriculturally related industries. It was felt that such
investment would create local surpluses in income, which would even-

tually stimulate consumer goods and heavy industrial production. Mao,

85

influenced by economic realists such as Chen Yun, did not totally
reject investment in heavy industry. But he modified the location
where such investment would be made. Mao realized that an ideologi-
cal rejection of valuable economic bases on the coast was not to China's
advantage. But in order to maintain some ideological purity, the
pattern of investment there, as well as in interior regions, needed to
change. To accommodate such concerns, urban policy was changed
and refined. In all regions, it was decided, the emphasis was to be
placed on the development of small and medium sized cities. Large
cities were not considered a desirable goal. Where industry was of a
scale that dictated urban placement in a large city, or where economies
of scale dictated such placement, the location was to be in the sub-
urban areas of the city. Further, such cities were to function not as
primary regional economic centers, but as the coordination of an
economic region, responsible for stimulating growth in the rural and
satellite cities in its area of influence.

Shanghai was influenced and changed by these policies. The
late 19505 saw the growth of the concept of suburban industrial loca—
tion and satellite cities as a general national policy. In 1958 the
political boundaries of the city were extended to include ten additional
counties, giving the city, substantially, the organization it has today.
The administrative shift was given impetus by the aforementioned
changes in urban and industrial location policy. The shift in political
boundaries made Shanghai a metropolitan regional government. The
city was directed to utilize the new structure to spatially shift indus-

trial location to suburban areas and satellite cities. Such industry, it

86

was felt, would still be located near enough to the primary industrial
base to allow it to take advantage of existing infrastructure, at a
minimum cost; would allow dispersal while maintaining industrial
integration necessary to achieve economy of scale; would limit the
growth of the city proper; and spread the benefits of the industrial
activity over a wider area.

It was these policies that created much of the change that has
been perceived as occurring in Shanghai over the last thirty-odd years.
The national policy of creating economic units aimed at integrating
rural and urban environs, was a major source of impetus for the
extension of Shanghai's boundaries. The policy of favoring small and
medium size cities led to the establishment of satellite cities, and the
location of industry in these areas. The policy of locating large urban
based industries on the surburban fringe led to the spatial growth of
the urban core. Lastly, the proposed rural-urban economic integration,
combined with a Maoist development policy favoring rural industrializa—
tion, led to the establishment of small industries in the rural areas.

While the structure of Shanghai was undergoing significant
change in this period, the rural or suburban sector was also being
transformed. Collectivization of agriculture was accelerated, and
established in all areas. The process of land unification, begun
earlier, was thus accelerated. The establishment of the commune
system gave the state and city a natural point of contact for the
transfer of some industrial activity to the countryside. Earlier govern-
ment policies, seeking to reduce strain on the transport system by

encouraging vegetable production in near suburban areas, and

87

previously a failure, were forcibly introduced. The structuring of the
countryside into a 'team brigade and commune' system facilitated
national agricultural policy implementation. It was during this period
that the present crop growing pattern of the city was established.

The establishment of the regional concept of government in
Shanghai also served to stimulate the growth of the transportation
network. In particular, the highway system was greatly expanded in
order to meet the need for a cheap, reliable system of intra-provincial
transportation .

While, ideologically, the Maoist model of development favored
rural areas and light industry, the reality was often different.
Tables 4 and 5 in Appendix I indicate that a primary share of capital
investment funds continued to be placed in the heavy industry sector.
This helped to continue the transformation of the industrial base that
started in the early 19505. Shanghai, by virtue of its promotion to a
province level unit of government, and integration of rural environs
and secondary urban centers into the regional government, was in a
position to take advantage of the majority of national policy decisions.
Its position was further strengthened by the rehabilitation of the
coastal industrial bases by Mao. But the negative images of the city
and the Party leadership's reluctance to politically trust the city, con-
tinued to work against it. Investment in the region continued at a
pace far below that in most other areas. Additionally, the xia xiang
programs that sent youth to the countryside, and the forcible transfer
of skilled workers from industrial cities to remote regions and new

industrial bases, continued to be applied in Shanghai at a much

88

heavier rate. These programs served not only to rob Shanghai of
much of its more skilled workmen, but to limit the growth of the popu-
lation in the city.

During the period of the late 19505 and eary 19605 then, much

of the policy that created changes in Shanghai was layed down. The

....

 

concepts of regional government and economic integration, satellite
town development, near suburban development, the transformation of
agriculture through the commune system, rural industrialization, and
the continued development of heavy industry, were all policies that
had their origin in the period.

The late 19605 saw the advent of a period of Chinese history
that is characterized by its political upheaval. The period known as
the Cultural Revolution began in 1966 and did not really end until
the fall of the 'Gang of Four' in the mid-19705, an event that followed
the death of Chairman Mao in 1976. Government policy, in the period,
had little effect on the physical structure of Shanghai. Patterns
established in the previous years continued, and became more
entrenched. The political and organizational structure of the city
also remained basically the same. While names were changed to include
the stock phrase, 'revolutionary,‘ little substantive change occurred.
The basic change in the period centered on institutions, both educa-
tional and cultural. In a larger sense, the period's greatest effect was
on the role that Shanghai played in national life.

The Cultural Revolution was basically a political strategy of
power consolidation by Mao. What is important is the form the Revolu-

tion took, however, and not its ideological underpinnings or political

89

motives. The Revolution, basically, was aimed at the rejection of the
drift toward capitalism that Mao saw in the country. Even more than
capitalism, he saw the country becoming mired in a new bureaucracy.
To combat this he proposed the continuous revolution, the purity of
spirit that comes from a constant revolutionary society. The major
tool of such a revolution was to be the mass of youth, collectively
known as the Red Guard.

Shanghai became a major focus of political activity during the
Cultural Revolution. The communist attitudes toward Shangha as a
colonial city, a consuming not producing city, and as being capitalist-
oriented, were again emphasized. Shanghai, in many ways, became
the focus for all the wrongs that the Red Guard perceived in the
society. The effects were particularly severe on those institutions
that were perceived as the domain of the intellectual class. It was
this class of people that was perceived as being representative of
social ills. In essence, in Shanghai and in the nation, the Cultural
Revolution succeeded in tearing down the existing cultural and educa-
tional institutions. Faculty and staff at leading universities were
removed from their positions and re-educated in political philosophy,
or perhaps sent down to the countryside to learn from the peasants.
Admission standards to universities changed from ability to background,
with peasants and military having precedence. In all fields of the
arts, people were persecuted in much the same manner. Theaters,
conservatories and art schools were closed. Performers were restricted

to the production and performance of politically correct material. The

90

end result was the virtual destruction of the educational and cultural
institutions of the city.

The death of Chairman Mao in 1976, and the fall of the 'Gang
of Four' in the next year, brought with it many changes in national
policy. Like a sleeper awakening from a nightmare, China has been
attempting to reestablish a semblance of national order and rational
behavior. A major victim of the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution
was the Maoist policy of development. Led by Deng Xiaoping, a
group of leaders established power. The prevailing attitude held by
this group is a practical approach to development. They felt that
the past pace of development had not been quick enough to take
advantage of favorable economic investment opportunities. They pro—
posed and implemented a policy of greater investment in light industry
to generate more rapid industrial growth through domestic and foreign
sales. Trade with the outside workd was reestablished to a major extent.
Import and particularly export trade was encouraged as a means of
accumulating development capital, needed technology, and international
lines of credit. Much of the decision—making process has been
decentralized, giving regions the authority to actively pursue issues
of self interest. Incentives have been established to raise industrial
productivity. Individual enterprise has been encouraged both rurally
and in urban areas as a means of raising productivity and absorbing
surplus, unemployed population. While these changes only highlight
the sweeping changes that have occurred, they indicate the direction

toward which the change is moving.

91

The sweeping changes of the post-Mao era have been favorable
changes for Shanghai. Shanghai has a strong and evenly balanced
industrial base. Its light consumer industries have been in the
position to move to fill pent-up demand domestically and to create
markets for Chinese goods overseas. Shanghai's commercial heritage,
combined with its natural geographic advantages in a China facing
out to the world, have served it well. Industry has been expanding,
income has risen, and the port system is developing at a rate faster
than at any other time in the PRC's history.

In addition to economic change, the post-Mao era has brought
some structural change. The most notable of these would be the re—
establishment of foreigners in the city and the creation of Special
Economic Zones to serve them.

More slow to recover from the excesses of the cultural revolu-
tion have been the educational and cultural life of the community.
Many of the leading figures in both sectors were killed or took their
own lives during the era. Of those who remain, many are old now,
and many are reluctant to reassume a position of authority for fear
of yet another shift in policy. While the institutions are making a

comeback, they have nowhere near reattained their former levels.

B. Other Factors That Have Affected Shagghai

 

The preceding pages of this chapter serve to explain how
broad government policies have affected the physical and organizational
structure of the city. But these policies fail to explain a central

question in regard to change in Shanghai. Why has Shanghai, in

92

light of negative government policies toward the city, managed to
maintain its role in the national life?

During the past thirty-some years, the policies of the govern-
ment were designed to equalize regional differences. At least until
the 19805, these policies were not favorable to Shanghai, but in fact
favored other regions, to Shanghai's disadvantage. Shanghai was
consistently denied adequate funds for capital investment. The city's
industrial stocks had aged and been surpassed in technology, to a
great extent. The city has been vilified and generally treated as a
less-than-desirable asset. At least, the Chinese government consis-
tently failed to take advantage of the marginal advantages offered by
the city.

Despite these disadvantages, Shanghai managed to maintain
its role as the leading economic center in the nation. While its role
was diminished from pre-war levels, it has managed to maintain an
approximately 14 percent share of the total value of the nation's out—
put for the span of thirty years. These policies of the central
government toward Shanghai have been sufficiently negative to postu-
late a much lower level of performance. While we can only speculate
on the city's performance if its resources had been fully utilized, it
is obvious that the performance exceeds that which could be expected
given investment levels and general policy. The question is, then,
why has Shanghai been unable to maintain this role despite specific
policies that should have prevented it?

This question is one that has not been extensively addressed

in the literature relating to Shanghai. Economists dealing with the city

93

have alluded to this paradox, but are not able to supply an adequate
explanation (Lardy, 1982) . Those in other disciplines—-with the

exception of Bergére (1981)—have not addressed the problem. This
work proposes several explanations of the question. One is based on

the size of the city; a second on the nature of the city's residents.

The Urban Size "Ratchet"

 

The theory that the size of Shanghai is a possible explanation
of the proposed question is loosely based on Wilbur Thompson's theory
of the "urban size ratchet" (1969) . This theory postulates that "at a
certain range of urban scale, set by the degree of isolation of the urban
place, the nature of its hinterland, the level of industrial development
in the country, and various cultural factors, some growth mechanism,
similar to a ratchet comes into being, locking in past growth and pre-
venting contraction" (Thompson, 1969, p. 22).

Based on this theory, Thompson postulates several logical
components at work in the hypothetical urban size ratchet. One com—
ponent would be that growth and size in a city is accompanied by
industrial diversification. With such diversification, even a random
blending of young, mature and aging industries has a tendency to
produce growth rates which deviate marginally from the nation's
average rate. Additionally, the city is protected from rapid rates of
decline, thus gaining needed time to react to adversity. The industrial
diversification that is present also serves to protect the city from
industrial relocation. Such relocation is relatively simple in cities

dependent on one or more large self-sufficient plants. In a city with

94

a large degree of industrial diversity, much of the industrial base is
made up of small concerns with extensive and complex relationships
to other concerns in the city. It is extremely difficult to locate
these industries successfully.

Another component is the investment that is present in the
city in terms of fixed capital in social overhead. In a city that has
achieved the size necessary to become an urban ratchet, this invest-
ment is sufficiently large to make it uneconomic to abandon so much
immobile capital. This remains true even if the productive facilities
are worn out or obsolete.

A final component would be the propensity of the city to pro-
duce a larger share of individuals with industrial creativity. The
cultural inheritance, industrial sophistication and large population of
the city all contribute to the city's production of individuals with
entrepreneurial skills. Such individuals help the city to give birth
to new industrial ventures at critical points in the life cycle of the
city (Thompson, 1969).

Much of the above theory serves to explain the ability to
change in Shanghai. It can be postulated that in 1949 Shanghai had
reached the critical mass that qualified it as an 'urban ratchet' city.
The city had been growing for over one hundred years, and had
attained a status as one of the world's largest cities. Its population
stood at approximately 5 million. The industrial economy was diversi-
fied, particularly relative to the nation as a whole. While the major
share of industry was in the light industrial goods sector, particularly

textiles, a wide range of industries did exist, including a significant

95

heavy industry base. The city was not dependent on any one
industry or class of industries. Thousands of the existing. industrial
concerns were small concerns, domestically owned by native entrepre-
neurs. The size of the city and, for China, the sophistication of the
infrastructure, meant that the investment in social and private over-
head was high. The fact that the city was culturally predisposed to
entrepreneurship is reflected in the post-war development of Hong
Kong, largely led by expatriates from Shanghai.

Shanghai, having achieved this level in 1949, was able to
lock in its past growth. Short of massive, negative policies aimed at
degrading Shanghai's status, the city would have at least remained at
that level. As it was, policies toward Shanghai were mixed. While
policies aimed at limiting growth in Shanghai were instituted, invest—
ment in the city was sufficient to insure some growth. In the pro-
posed theory, even a small amount of investment will result in growth
rates at a level equal to, or greater than, those at the national level. '

In Shanghai, this is exactly what happened.

The "Unique" Nature of Shanghai

The second theory, proposed as an explanation of Shanghai's
maintenance of its national role, was the nature of its population.
Basically, this theory builds on a possible explanation alluded to by
Bergére (1981). Bergére feels that Shanghai has attained the growth
that it has because it managed to maintain some specific quality,
unique to the city, despite the advent of communism. This specific

quality is basically a world view and urban sophistication not present

elsewhere in China.

96

This view, that Shanghai has a special quality that allows it
to perform at a higher level, has validity. Traditionally, the city
supported a wide and extensive range of clases. These ranged
from workers and industrialists to intellectuals and artists. These
native classes were greatly influenced by the international nature of
pre-war Shanghai. The city was a creation of the interaction between
cultures, and its trading and commercial roots run deep. Unlike the
bulk of China, Shanghai was outward looking, and very conscious of
the role it wanted to play in China and the world. The result was 3
Shanghai resident who was proud and smug about his status as a
Shanghainese. They took pride in the city and in the city's role in
the nation and the world. To the typical Shanghai resident, living
anywhere else was inconceivable.

This attitude is one that has managed to survive the Commu-
nist Revolution. Even today, Shanghai residents speak of the unique-
ness of the city in China and point to its accomplishments with pride
(Butterfield, 1982) .

It is this attitude that has played a major role in Shanghai's
performance. The residents take inordinate pride in the city's role
as the leader of the nation's economic and cultural life. The pride is
reflected in the performance of all sectors in the city. Production in
industry is consistently the highest in China. Its industries are
touted as the best-managed in the nation, and are held up as examples
to the rest of the country. Fudan University has reestablished itself,
after the Cultural Revolution, as one of the top, if not the top,

university in the country. The musicians, artists, filmmakers and

“x, _ ,

97

authors that have traditionally been among the most famous in China,
are reemerging. In short, in all areas of city life, the Shanghai

spirit that was so apparent in the past, has survived.

The Socialist City Model

 

Another possible explanation for why Shanghai has changed
in the manner it has, is the "socialist city model." Basically, the
socialist city model refers to a body of attitudes and goals held by
the Chinese communists toward cities in general. The primary tenet
of the socialist model is that the city is not a separate entity, but an
integral part of a region. It is the communists' belief that the city
must be a "producing" city as opposed to a "consuming" one. The
producing city is one that has an economic base sufficient to meet the
industrial needs of the city and the region in which it is located, and
to export to the nation and internationally. A consuming city is one
that is not able to meet these criteria. Prior to 1949, the Chinese
communists considered all Chinese cities as consuming cities.

The concept of "consuming" versus "producing" cities carries
with it a policy of controlling city size. This is to be achieved by
the control of in-migration and by the establishment of smaller cities
of one hundred thousand to two hundred fifty thousand in size.
These smaller cities can be geographically remoted from an existing
city, or established as a satellite city to the larger urban center.

The concept of the city as an integral part of a region also
has implications for the surrounding rural region. Such rural areas

are viewed as the breadbasket for the city. Additionally, policy is

98

aimed at reducing rural-urban contradictions in both standards of
living and in attitudes toward work and social classes.

The concept of the socialist city has a number of implications
in the use of urban land. The socialist city model divides urban land
into two classifications--industrial land and land for the people's
livelihood, which includes all uses other than industrial. Industrial
location is limited to those areas designated as industrial land and is
constrained by the nature of the industry. Basically, heavy industry
and polluting industry are to be located on the urban periphery, and
non-polluting and light industry are to be located in the city. Land
for the people's livelihood is to be organized along a neighborhood
unit concept. Such neighborhood units are planned around the work-
place and should include all necessary urban services such as shopping
and medical facilities. The Central Business District (CBD) is to
serve as a political and administrative center, with only a limited
amount of higher order retail services offered in the CBD (Williams,
1983) .

Shanghai has changed to a large degree, in concert with the
policy of the "socialist city model." While the city's designation in
1949 as a "consuming" city may be arguable, its status as a "producing"
city today is not in question. The city has been transformed into a
regional unit of government that is able to industrially supply not
only the city and region, but also the nation and international markets.
It has been shown that population in the city has been held, until
recently, relatively constant. The growth of satellite cities has been

detailed. Certainly industry has been shifted, both to satellite cities,

99

and in the case of heavy, polluting industries to the periphery of
the city. The neighborhood unit concept is evident not only on the
microscale with new housing blocks, but on a macro level. The
organization of satellite cities around key industries that are asso-
ciated, and the construction of self—contained residential districts
around these industries, show the socialist model in practice. These
neighborhood units have also impacted on the function of the CBD.
While Nanjing road remains a primary commercial district, much of the
service functions have been dispersed to the neighborhood units.
The central city does function, primarily, as a political and administra-
tive district.

American Models of Urban Structure
and Land Use

 

 

In applying American spatial models of urban structure to
describe the land use patterns of Shanghai, care must be exercised.
Certainly, the American models are based on a market economy with
a price variable that is not present in Shanghai. Still, similarities
between land use in the two systems are present.

The concentric zone model developed primarily by Burgess
(1925) was one of the earliest models attempting to explain urban land
use patterns. This model basically posits a series of circular zones
expanding out from the CBD. The interior zone is the CBD, followed
by a transitional zone, a low income residential zone, a middle income
zone and a commuting zone. The model can be distorted to a star

pattern by the imposition of a radial transportation system.

100

The "sector model" developed by Hoyt (1939) suggests that
once similar uses emerged around the CBD, activities would remain
in that particular area and extend outward over time in the same
direction as the city grew (Hartshorn, 1980). Harris and Ullman
(1945) proposed a different model, the "multiple nuclei" model, based
on the premise that land use does not form around a single core such
as the CBD, but at several nodes or focal points. The model recog-
nizes that different activities have varying accessibility requirements,
and that these requirements can help determine land use. More
importantly, Harris and Ullman postulated that no city exhibited a
structure conforming to one model, and in fact, that all cities
exhibited patterns identifying with aspects of one or more of the
models (Hartshorn, 1980).

In Shanghai, elements of the concentric zone model and the
sector model are not apparent. Elements of the multiple nuclei model
are apparent, though the model has been modified by the socialist
city concept. The socialist city concept leads to a multiple nuclei
system both on a neighborhood level, with the neighborhood unit

concept, and on a regional level, with the satellite cities.

V. CONCLUSION

In 1949, the future of Shanghai was at best cloudy. In China,
the city was universally held to be a painful reminder of the nation's
imperialistic heritage. Policy statements at the time condemned the
city and cast doubt on its place in the nation's future. These policy
statements gave way over the years to a pragmatic realization that the
city was not only an inevitable cost of economic development, but a
necessary and vital part of the economic system. The communists have
managed over the years to transform the city along the lines of the
socialist city model. The political and functional area of the city has
been expanded to encompass a region. The industrial system has
grown in both number and complexity. Satellite cities have been
established and a neighborhood unit concept initiated. The transporta-
tion system has grown in both area served and complexity. In short,
the city has prospered. This is not to say that it has maintained its
role as a primate city. In fact, the primacy of the city has declined
although it remains a key urban area and the largest city in China.

In the previous section, a number of theories were advanced
as to why Shanghai changed in the manner it has. Certainly,
political change and the development policies that accompanied such
change have been a major factor in how and why Shanghai has changed.
Since 1979 the policies of Deng Xiaoping and the pragmatic economies
of Chen Yun have been dominant forces in Chinese politics. The

101

102

continuation of these policies, together with the other factors set
forth in the previous section, will largely determine the direction of
future growth in Shanghai.

It is probable that regardless of changes in political leader-
ship, the socialist city model of development will remain constant.
Certainly it has survived the political changes of the past thirty—five
years. It would seem that the model is universal enough to transcend
specific political and development goals. Thus, the pattern of develop-
ment that currently exists in Shanghai should continue, particularly
the neighborhood unit concept and the development of satellite cities.

The current policies of the central government will, if they
continue, have marked effects on the pattern and direction of develop-
ment in the region. One pattern that is already becoming apparent,
is the reestablishment of a more "disorganized" pattern of rural agri-
cultural use. Part of Deng's policies, aimed at raising production
levels of foodstuffs, involves the establishment of household responsi-
bility for agricultural production. In practice this policy assigns land
to individual families, who have the right to sell production, above
quota levels, on a free market basis. It is hoped that such incen-
tives will stimulate agricultural production. This policy has had
several immediate effects. The first is the change in the physical
land use pattern and the second is increased migration to urban
centers. The increased migration is a result of the inevitable unequal
distribution of land. Certainly, varying parcels of land have differing
values based on the ability to produce from that land. Those who

were assigned more marginal lands, and those unable to compete, are

103

abandoning the land and moving to the city. This breakdown of
migration control presents serious consequences for the urban areas.
One further implication of the new responsibility system in the rural
areas is the growth in rural population. Gambling on continuation of
the system, many families have increased the family size in order to
provide increased labor input into the agricultural system.

The pragmatic policies of Deng would seem to indicate a
quicker growth rate for the city. In one sense, the present policies
remove much of the constraints on development that the city has
labored under. It is being encouraged to fully participate in economic
growth and is being allowed a great degree of latitude at the local
level. The managerial and entrepreneurial talent that characterizes
the city has been slow to reemerge from the excesses of the Cultural
Revolution, but recent indications are that it is now doing so. Not
only is the private sector being allowed to develop small enterprises,
in part to absorb excess labor, but the city is moving to capture an
increasing share of domestic and export markets. The Shanghai
Municipal Government has established an organization known as the
Shanghai Industrial and Trade Corporation (SITCO). The major
functions of SITCO are to organize exporting industry and to
encourage foreign investment in the city. SITCO has moved to
achieve these ends by fostering a variety of cooperative trade and
management ventures with other Provinces, by organizing Shanghai
industry in such a manner that key exporting industries are given
priority and made flexible enough to quickly shift production to meet

changing world tastes, and by the creation of Special Economic Zones

104

(SEZ's) within the city. These SEZ's are being marketed to foreign
concerns on the basis of Shanghai's superior location, superb mana-
gerial and labor force and the availability of one of China's better
infrastructures. To date, such development is to be located in the
Minhang urban area which should foster even greater growth for
that city, and for the region.

If present policies continue in force and the growth rate for
Shanghai accelerates, the situation will introduce additional problems
to the city. Population is already growing in both the rural and
urban areas by virtue of rural to urban migration and the illegal
return to the city of those forcibly sent elsewhere in earlier times.

If the economy outperforms that of the rest of China, illegal migra-
tion to the city will likely increase. Economic growth will also
further complicate existing pollution problems, housing shortages and
strain further the available transportation and utilities networks.

In short, continuation of the policies in effect at the present
time will transform the rural area as private plot farming gains hold,
and income rises. Urban problems will likely increase in severity as
population rises. The broad patterns of development, however, will
likely remain constant as the socialist city model continues to dominate
the pattern of city growth.

Conversely, if Deng's policies are rejected at some future
point, they will likely be rejected in favor of a more conservative strategy.
Depending on the extent of the rejection, rural areas could be retrans—
formed into communal units, population shifts controlled and city growth

slowed to a great degree. Only time will show the changes that will occur.

APPENDIX

105

106

.Eocmmao; Emmmoa 9: Est; UoEDmcoo muozpoLd Co mEmmmoocd Eco» mobiuc.
.umou Louufl um ausoocd 25255 $20
$23 “375.: um gunned ozmmEoo HoZm

2; .c .3 «BF: mwm— .Eoumxum cmDmewZ

"oucaom

o
n

 

 

 

 

 

md m6 o.m m5 m4“. .650

m .3 o .3 n .m a .N m .m cozmbflfisot. acoEch>oO

md m4: mi map =6 one...
5; 5m 5m =5 T: 38:59....
o.m m.~ m.~ m; m; scones.

"cosmoEJEEoU Ucm coBSLodmcmL...

a .N o .N m .F x. .F N .P cozuabmcou
um.mF ad ad 3.x. PK muhmcoficml
~.m m.: N6 ed =.m 28m 69m.—

w>bm305

T? m .2 a .8 a .8 o .3 9.3.3:?

mmutm mmutm $2.5 $3.5 $2.5 cucmcm 389.com

$3 33 mm? 33 mmmp
chumxom m£>133 3300...”. .98sz

 

628.5 .2252 $2

mmap

 

.3888 c: 32 new 3: .595 .2532. .3 838.5

.mcoZmz Co coEmOQEoUl; 2me

107

.35

.Q do? .5333“... Lobcmxoz ”MUMDOm

 

 

mi: 8.9.: 8.th 8.2: 8.5. .22 .8885 5%.. 885-8282
$2 $2 $5 3.. a; 8.8. 8....E 55> 5:8
ca. 8.8m.~ 8.3...N 8.3.. 8.3: t... .8839: 29:3
9.: 8.2.. 8.2;; 8......— ..mmc ...). 6:839: .85
mi: 8.2:... 8.3.... 8.3m 8.8... ..s. .8885 :8. 9n.
2:: 8.2.. 8.5. .9: 2...... E). 8:88... ..o 83.6
2:: 3...... 3.8 2.2 3.3 E2 22...... .80
ea. 23 as S... B.~ £5. 8...... 326.. 6.38m.
28> 5330 5.88 $2 9:: E: 285838.). 838....
um_c:EEoUlmcn_ Co :5.

 

.Nmm—immmp icon—MED»: COBUDUOLQ ECU—matc— Umuum_mmil.~ 23m».

108

Table 3.--Main Indicators of the National Economy

 

 

 

Item Unit 1952 I957 1965 1978 1981
Population 10, 000 57, 482 64, 653 72,538 95, 809 99, 622
Labor Force 10,000 20,729 23,771 28,670 39,856 43,280
Index of Gross Output Value of

Industry and Agriculture

1952 = 100 (GVIO + GVAO) % 100.0 167.8 268.3 779.0 946.8

National Income 1. Index of National
Income (1952 = 100) 8 100.0 153.0 197.5 453.2 525.4
Per Capita National Income
(current prices) Rmb 104 142 194 316 393
Index of GVAO (1952 = 100) 100.0 124.8 137.1 229.6 270.7
Composition of GVAO:
Farming % 83.1 80.6 75.8 67.8 64.1
Forestry % 0.7 1.7 2.0 3.0 3.0
Animal Husbandry % 11.5 12.9 14.0 13.2 14.3
Fisheries 8 0.3 0.5 1.7 1.4 1.3
Sideline Products 8 4.4 4.3 6.5 14.6 17.3
Industry run by production
brigades and teams 8 11.7 15 0
Industrial Production:

Index of GVIO % 100.0 228.6 452.6 1,598.6 1,962.7
Light Industry ”is 64.6 53.1 50.4 42.7 51.4
Heavy Industry 8 35.6 46.9 49.6 57.3 48.6

Output of Major Industrial

Products:

Cloth 100,000,000 meters 38.3 50.5 62.8 110.3 142.7

Silk Textiles 100. 000, 000 meters 0.65 1.45 3.42 6.11 8.35

Bicycles 10,000 8.0 80.6 183.8 854.0 1,754.3

Sewing Machines 10,000 6.6 27.8 123.8 486.5 1,039.1

Coal 100, 000, 000 tons 0.66 1.31 2.32 6.18 6.22
Crude Oil 10,000 tons 44 146 1,131 10,405 10,122
Electricity 100, 000, 000 KWH 73 193 676 2,566 3,093
Pig Iron 10,000 tons 193 594 1,077 3,479 3,417
Steel 10,000 tons 135 535 1,223 3,178 3,566
Rolled Steel 10,000 tons 106 415 881 2,208 2,670
Cement 10,000 tons 286 686 2,634 6,524 8.290
Metal Cutting Machine Tools 1.37 2.80 3.96 18.32 10.26
Capital Construction:

Total Investment in Capital

Construction Rmb 100 million 43.56 138.29 170.89 479.55 427.89

By Sector of Economy:

Industry % 38.8 52.3 52.1 57.0 50.3
Light 8 9. 8.0 4. 6.1 10.0
Heavy % 29.5 44.3 48.0 50.9 40.3

Agriculture (Forestry, Water
Conservancy 8 Meterology) % 13.3 .6 14.6 11.1 .8
Communication 6 Transport 8 17.4 15.0 17.9 14.1 9.5
Service 8 2.8 2.7 2.7 3.2 .5
Science 8 Research 8 7.7 7.6 5.3 4.5 10.2
Utilities % 2.8 2.8 2.6 3.2 .4

Public Finance
Revenue Rmb 100 million 183.7 310.2 473.3 1,121.1 1,064.3
Expensiture Rmb 100 million 176.0 304.2 466.3 1,111.0 1,088.7
Average Wage, Annual, of
Workers and Staffs in
State-Owned Units Rmb 446 637 652 644 812

 

Source:

Statistical Yearbook of China, 1981.

109

Table 4. Main Indicators of the National Economy—~Average Rates of

 

 

Increase.
1953- 1958- 1966- 1979- 1953-
1957 1965 1978 1981 1981

Population 2.4 1.5 2.2 1.3 1.9
Labor Force 2.8 2 4 2. 2 8 2
Gross Output Value of

Industry and Agriculture 10.9 6.0 8.5 6.7 8.1
National Income 8.9 3.2 6.6 5.1 5.9
GVAO 4.5 1.2 4.0 5.6 3.5
GVIO 18.0 8.9 10.2 7.1 10.8
Light Industry 12.9 8.2 8.3 14.0 9.6
Heavy Industry 25.4 9.7 11.8 1.3 12.3
Output of Major

Industrial Products:

Cloth 5.7 2.8 4.5 9.0 .6

Silk Textiles 17.4 11.3 4.6 11.0 .2

Bicycles 58.7 10.9 12.5 27.1 20.4

Sewing Machines 33.3 20.5 11.1 28.8 19.1

Coal 14.7 7.4 7.8 0.2 8.0

Crude Oil 27.1 29.1 18.6 -0.9 20.6

Electricity 21.5 17.0 10.8 6.4 13.8

Pig Iron 25.2 7.7 9.4 -0.6 10.4

Steel 31.7 10.9 7.6 3.9 11.9

Rolled Steel 31.4 9.9 7.3 6.5 11.8

Cement 19.1 11.5 11.2 8.3 12.3

Metal Cutting Machine Tools 15.4 4.4 12.5 -17.5 7.2
Total Investment in Capital

Construction 26.0 2.7 8.3 -3.7 8.2
Public Finance:

Revenue 11.0 5.4 6.9 -1.7 6.2

Expenditure 11.6 5.5 6.9 —0.6 6.5
Total Wage Bills of Workers
8 Staff in State-Owned Units 18.1 5.3 5.5 12.1 8.2

 

Source: Statistical Yearbook of China, 1981.

 

110

Table 5.—-Gross Output Value of Agriculture, Light Industry and

Heavy Industry as Percentage of the Total

 

Percentage in the Gross Output

Value

of Industry and Agriculture

 

 

Agriculture ‘ Light Industry Heavy Industry
(at 1952 constant prices)
1949 70.0 22.1 7.9
1952 58.5 26.7 14.8
1957 43.5 29.2 27.3
(at 1957 constant prices)
1957 43.3 31.8 26.6
1962 33.6 32.1 35.5
1965 29.8 35.4 34.8
(at 1970 constant prices)
1978 25.6 31.8 42.6
1979 25.6 32.1 42.3
1980 24.6 35.4 40.0
1981 24.9 38.6 36.5
(at 1980 constant prices)
1981 30.9 35.5 33.6

 

Source: Statistical Yearbook of China, 1981.

 

Note: Based on GVIO and GVAO data complied by the State

Statistical Bureau .

REFERENCES

111

REFERENCES

"Above-Quota Piecework Bonus Offered by Shanghai Industrial
Enterprises." Wenhui Bao, Shanghai; July 29, 1981, p. 1,
in JPRS 79100, September 30, 1981.

 

Auerbach, Arnold. "How the Chinese Reshaped the World's Largest
City." Planning, 42(10), November 1976, pp. 14-19.

Banister, Judith. "Mortality, Fertility and Contraceptive Use in
Shanghai." China Quarterli, 70, June 1977, pp. 256-267.

 

Barnett, Robert W. Economic Shanghai: Hostage to Politics 1937-
1941. Honololu: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1941.

 

Bergere, Marie-Claire. "The Other China: Shanghai from 1919 to
1949." In Christopher Howe, ed., Shanghai: Revolution and

 

Development in an Asian Metropolis. London: Cambridge
University Press, 1981.

 

Berney, Karen. "China's Labor System." China Business Review,
September-October 1981, pp. 46-48. Washington, D.C.:
National Council on US China-Trade.

 

Brehm, Carolyn. "Shanghai Unleashed." China Business Review,
September-October 1983, pp. 12-15.

 

Brunn, Stanley, and Williams, Jack. Cities of the World. New York:
Harper and Row, 1983.

 

Buck, David. "Directions in Chinese Urban Planning." Urbanism
Past and Present, 1, Winter 1975-76, pp. 24-35.

 

Butterfield, Fox. China: Alive in the Bitter Sea. New York:
Times Books, 1982.

 

Cell, Charles P. "Deurbanization in China: The Urban-Rural
Contradiction." Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 11(1),
January-March 1979.

 

Chen, Cheng-Siang. "Population Growth and Urbanization in China,
1950-1970." The Geographical Review, 63(1), January 1972,
pp. 55—72.

 

112

113

Chen, Debao. "Prospects for the Development of Foreign Trade in
Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai." Ching-Chi Tao-Pao
[Economic Reporter], Hong Kong, 22, June 4, 1980, in
JPRS 76250, August 19, 1980.

 

 

Chen, Jinhao. "In Planning, Improvement of Economic Results Should
Serve as Guiding Thought." Zongguo Caimao Bao, Beijing,
November 6, 1982, p. 3, in JPRS 82599, January 7, 1983,

pp. 1-11.

 

Clark, Christopher. China's Provinces: An Organizational and
Statistical Guide. Washington, D.C.: NationaFCounciFon
US-China Trade, July 1982.

 

 

Clifford, Nicholas. Shanghai, 1925: Urban Nationalism and the
Defense of Foreign Privilege. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1979.

 

 

"Communique Issued 26 May 1982, by the Shanghai Municipal
Statistical Bureau on Fulfillment of the 1981 Municipal
Economic and Social Development Plan." JiefangRibao,
May 27, 1982 FE/W1189/C1 Y6, June 1982.

 

"Communique on Fulfillment of Shanghai's 1981 Economic and Social
Development Plan." Municipal Statistical Bureau of
Shanghai, May 26, 1982.

Davidson-Houston, J. V. Yellow Creek: The Story of Shanghai.
London: Putnam, 1962.

 

Delfs, Robert. "Sea from the SEZ's." Far Eastern Economic Review,
January 8, 1982, pp. 39-40.

 

Duan, Shaobo. "Natural Conditions are Essential to the Reasonable
Development of Shanghai's Industry." Ziran ZaZhi
[Nature Magazine], 4, April 1080, pp. 277-2807n JPRS 76217,
August 13, 1980.

 

Dutt, Ashor, and Costa, Frank. "An Evaluation of National Economic
Planning in the People's Republic of China." Geoforum, 11,
London, 1980, pp. 1-15.

Eckstein, Alexander; Galenson, Walter; and Liu, Ta-Chung. Economic
Trends in Communist China. New York: Aldine Publishing
Co., 1968.

 

Eckstein, Alexander. Communist China's Economic Growth and
Foreign Trade. New York: McGraw Hill, 1966.

 

 

114

Elvin, Mark, and Skinner, G. William (eds.). The Chinese City
Between Two Worlds. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1974.

 

 

Evinger, Suzanne. "Statistical Work in New China." Statistical
Reporter. Washington, D.C.: Office of Federal Statistical
Policy and Standards, Department of Commerce, March
1980, pp. 139-142.

Eyre, Alan L. "Shanghai--World's Second City?‘I The Professional
Geographer, 23(1), January 1971.

 

"Foreign Investment in Shanghai--lts Past and Present." Supplement
to China Trade Weekly, November 28-December 4, 1981,

pp. 1—2.

 

"From Adventurer's Paradise to China's Commercial Hub." China
Trader, March 1980, pp. 38-63.

Funk, Ka-iu. "Land Use Transformation in Suburban China Since
1949." In Lee Ngok and Leung Chi-keung (eds.), China:
Development and Challenge, Vol. 2, Hong Kong:
University of Hong Kong, Center of Asian Studies, 1979,
pp. 277-303.

 

Fung—Ka-iu. "The Spatial Development of Shanghai." In Christopher
Howe (ed.), Shanghai: Revolution and Change in an Asian
Metropolis. London: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Grey, Jack. "Mao and the Chinese Rural Economy." World Develop-
ment, 6(5), May 1978.

Harris, C. D., and Ullman, E. L. "The Nature of Cities." Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 262,
1945. PP. 7-17.

Hartshorn, Truman. Interpreting the City: An Urban Geography.
New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1980.

Hawks Pott, F. L. A Short Historyof Shanghai. Shanghai: Kelly
8 Walsh, 1928.

"How Are We Correctly to Regard Technical Coordination and Economic
Integration?" Jeifang Ribao, Shanghai, June 29, 1982, p. 2
in JPRS 81927, October 5, 1975, PP. 11-13.

 

Howe, Christopher (ed.). Shanghai: Revolution and Development in
an Asian Metropolis. Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press, 1981.

 

115

Howe, Christopher. "The Supply and Administration of Urban Housing
in Mainland China: The Case of Shanghai." China Quarterly,
33, January-March 1968, pp. 73—97.

Howe, Christopher. Employment and Economic Growth in Urban
China. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Prss,
1971.

 

Hoyt, Homer. The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods
in American Cities. Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1939.

 

Hsu, Bang-Fai. Speech by Hsu Bang-Fai, Vice Chairman and General
Manager of the Shanghai Investment and Trust Corporation
on the Occasion of the Corporation's First Year Anniversary
Reception; Speech Concerns Shanghai Development.
Washington, D.C.: The National Council on US-China Trade.

"In What Direction Should Shanghai's Industry be Developed?"
Beijing Review, Beijing, July 28, 1980, pp. 15-18.

Ivory, Paul, and Lavely, William. "Rustication, Demographic Change
and Development in Shanghai." Asian Survey, 17(5), May
1977, pp. 440-455.

 

Johnstone, William Jr. The Shanghai Problem. Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1937.

 

Jones, F. C. Shanghai and Tientsin. London: Oxford University
Press, 1940.

 

Kaneko, Masuru. "Regional Population and Production." China
Newsletter, 34, September-October 1981, pp. 4-19.

 

Keahley, Robert. "Shanghai Commune Reflects a Decade of Changes."
Asian Wall Street Journal, October 12, 1981, p. 4.

 

Koshizawa, Arika. "China's Urban Planning: Toward Development
Without Urbanization." The Developing Economies, 16(1),
March 1978, pp. 3-33.

Ku, Hung-Ting. "Urban Mass Movement: The May Thirtieth Movement
in Shanghai." Modern Asian Studies, 13(2), February 1979,
pp. 197—216.

 

Lee, Chen Fen; Yen, Chungmin; and Tang, Jianzhong. "A Spatial
Analysis of Shanghai's Economic Development: A paper
submitted to the China in Canada, Geographic Symposium at
McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, October 1983.

 

116

Leung, C. K., and Ginsburg, Norton (eds.). China: Urbanization
and National Development. The University of Chicago
Department of Geography Research Paper No. 196. Chicago,
1980.

 

 

Lewis, John (ed.). The City in Communist China. Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press, 1971.

 

Li, Choh Ming (ed.). Industrial Development in Communist China.
New York: Praeger Press, 1964.

 

Li, Mengbai. "Planned City Growth." China Reconstructs, Beijing,
November 1983, pp. 7-9.

 

Ling, H. C., and Wu, Yuan Li. The Spatial Economy of China.
New York: Praeger Inc., 1967.

 

Lipton, Michael. Why Poor People Stay Poor. London: Oxford
University Press, 1977.

 

Liu, Jiasen. "Dry Hot Winds and Drought in the Shanghai Area and
Preliminary Discussion of Protection.ll Shanghai NonLYe Keji
[Shanghai Agricultural Science and Technology], 2, April
1981, pp. 10-27, in JPRS 78385, June 25, 1981.

 

Lockwood, William Jr. "The International Settlement at Shanghai,
1927-38." American Political Science Review, 28(6), December
1934. pp. 1030-1046.

 

Ma, Laurence, and Hinton, Edward (eds.). Urban Development in
Modern China. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981.

 

 

Ma, Laurence J.C. "The Chinese Approach to City Planning:
Policy Administration, and Action.‘' Asian Survey, 19(9),
September 1979, pp. 838-855.

 

"Market Purchase and Sale of Shanghai Municipality's Agricultural
Sideline Products Flourishing." Wenhui Bao, Shanghai,
March 19, 1981, p. 1 in JPRS 78170, May 27, 1981, pp. 55-56.

 

Maruyama, Nobuo. "Regional Development Policy." China Newsletter,
32, May-June 1981, pp. 14-22.

 

"Measures to Maintain Steady Industrial Growth in Shanghai."
Jiefang Ribao, Shanghai, August 3, 1981, pp. 1-3 in JPRS
79056, September 24, 1981, pp. 15-20.

 

Min, Gan. "Learning from Shanghai is a Practical Way to Promote
Economic Effect." Jinji Guanli [Economic Management],
Beijing, 7, July 15, 1981, in JPRS 78945, September 10, 1981,
pp. 19-24.

 

117

Mosby, Aline. "World's Biggest City Has Urban Worries of Its Own.‘I
PD News. Grand Prairie, Texas, September 1, 1980.

Murphey, Rhoads. "City and Society in China: The Road to Develop-
ment." In Lee Ngok and Leung Chi'keung (eds), China:
Development and Challenge, Vol. 2, Hong Kong: University
WHong Kong, Center of Asian Studies, 1979, pp. 217-232.

 

Murphey, Rhoads. The Fading of the Maoist Vision: City and
Countryside in China's Development. New York: Methuen,
Inc., 1980.

Murphey, Rhoads. Shanghai: Key to Modern China. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1953.

Nakajima, Seiichi. "China's Industrial and Agricultural Production,
1981." China Newsletter, 37(5), March-April 1982, pp. 11-21.

 

Nickum, James, and Schak, David. "Living Standards and Economic
Development in Shanghai and Taiwan.‘l China Quarterly, 77,
March 1979, pp. 25-38.

Orchard, John. "Shanghai." Geographical Review, 26(1), 1936,
pp. 1-31.

Park, R. E.; Burgess, E. W.; and McKenzie, R. D. The City.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1925.

Paine, Suzanne. "Some Reflections on the Presence of Rural or Urban
Bias in China's Developmental Policies, 1949-1976." World
Development, 6(5), May 1978.

 

Pannell, Clifton. "Recent Growth and Change in China's Urban
System." In Laurence Ma and Edward Hanten (eds.), Urban
Development in Modern China. Westview Press, 1981.

 

 

Pannell, Clifton. "Past and Present City Structure in China." Town
Planning Review, 48(2), April 1977, pp. 156-172.

 

Peoples Republic of China: An Economic Assessment. A compendium
of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee of the
Congress of the United States, Washington, D.C., May 1972.

Pye, Lucian W. "Introduction" in Christopher Howe (ed.), Shanghai:
Revolution and Development in an Asian Metropolis. London:
Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Rawski, Thomas. "Economic Growth and Employment in China."
World Development, 7. London: Pergamon Press, 1979,
pp. 767-782.

 

118

Roll, Charles, and Yeh, Kung-Chia. Balance in Coastal and Inland
Industrial Development in the PeopTe's Republic ofChina.
Rand PaperSeries P-5505, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica,
California, April 1975.

 

 

Schecter, Jerrold. "Bad Old Shanghai Has Turned into a Showplace
of New China." Smithsonian, 4(12), March 1974, pp. 26-35.

 

"Shanghai: A Coastal Industrial Base." Peking Review, January 27,
1978.

 

"Shanghai--Background and Future Economic Development." U.S.
Department of State Telegram from American Consul, Shanghai,
Document E.O. 12065, Washington, D.C., August 8, 1980.

"Shanghai Economic Indicators." China Trade Report, December 1982,
pp. 4-7.

 

"Shanghai's Economic Performance and Development Trends." U.S.
Department of Commerce, Briefing Telegram from U.S.
Consul, Shanghai, DC 0119 012095, Washington, D.C.

"Shanghai's Industrial System Undergoes Six Major Changes."
WenHui Bao, August 3, 1981, p. 1 in JPRS 79100,
September 9, 1981.

 

"Shanghai Municipal Statistics Bureau Report on Development of
Shanghai's National Economy in 1980." Jiefang Ribao,
June 22, 1981 in JPRS 79100, September 30, 1981.

 

"Shanghai." PRC City Brief, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington,
D.C., November 1975.

 

"Shanghai Profile." China Economic News, March 16, 1981,
pp. 10-11.

 

Skinner, G. William (ed.). The City in Late Imperial China.
Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1977.

 

Smith, Helen. "Shanghai and Its Hinterland." Journal of Geograjhy,
38(5), May 1939. pp. 173-180.

 

Statistical Yearbook of China--1981, State Statistical Bureau, Beijing,
Economic Information and Agency, Hong Kong, 1982.

 

Sun, Ching-Chi (ed.). Economic Geography of the East China
Region. Institute oFGeography, Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences, Beijing, November 1959, in JPRS 11438,
December 7, 1961.

 

119

Ross, Terrill. Flowers on an Iron Tree: Five Cities of China.
Boston: Little Brown andTo” 1975.

"The Lives of the People in the Urban and Rural Areas of Shanghai
Are Improving Daily . . . ." Jiefang Ribao, Shanghai,
March 13, 1982, pp. 1-3 in JPRS 80735, May 5, 1982, pp. 49-52.

Thompson, Robin. "City Planning in China." World Development,
3(7-8), July-August 1975. pp. 595-606.

Thompson, Wilbur. A Preface to Urban Economics. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins Press, 1969.

Tregear, T. F. China: A Geographical Survey. New York: Wiley
and Sons, 1980. *

Wang, Daohan. "The Shanghai Economy and the Development of Its
Economic Relations with Foreign Countries." Shijie Jingti,
Beijing, 5,. May 10, 1981, pp. 54-55 in JPRS 78511, July 15,
1981, pp. 49-52.

"What Will Shanghai Be Like in the Year 2000? Municipal Government
Approves in Principle 'Outline of Master Planning of Shanghai."'
Wen Hui Bao, Shanghai, June 18, 1982 in JPRS 81755,
September 13, 1982, pp. 23-24.

 

White, Lyn lll. "Non-Governmentalism in the Historical Development
of Modern Shanghai." In Laurence Ma and Edward Hanten
(eds.), Urban Development in Modern China, Westview Press,

1981.

White, Lynn III. Careers in Shanghai: The Social Guide of Personal
Energies in a Developing Chinese City 1949-1966. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1978.

White, Lynn lll. "Shanghai's Contract Proletariat." Comparative
Urban Research, 3(3), 1975-76, pp. 31-39.

White, Lynn Ill. "Leadership in Shanghai, 1955-69." In Robert
Scalapino (ed.), Elites in the Peoples Republic of China.
Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971, pp. 302-377.

Williams, Jack. "Cities of East Asia.‘I In Stanley Brunn and Jack
Williams, Cities of the World. New York: Harper and Row,
1983.

 

Xia, Zhen and Jian, Chuan. "Shanghai Leads in Modernization March."
Beijing Review, January 4, 1982.

 

Zhu, Zu Xian. The Development and Potentialities of Shanghai's
Foreigi Trade. Office of International Trade Reaearch,
Shanghai Foreign Trade Bureau, Shanghai, 1982.

 

.ll i. f STATE UNIVER‘J‘TY II' 4

llllllllll/ll/l Ill/I ll I'll/l Ill/ll lllllllllll .

 

3129310798 2161