“1.1"

 
 

'III',-:
0:. In ’59

. ‘ :inrIU "f. ”(I -:' '1 I'Ic't‘; qQ-I‘“ I!

  
 

 
  
 
 
 

. III {€111.11 111' 11,1“ 1II‘I'1151III"
II III J1"! “I ‘II’WI‘ ""51"” I I
I

i; 1 11111:: 11
1153'111-1111115'II11'1

    

 
      
  

     

 

 

 

 

       

 

:4 I - I' ;"..1;
11‘ II'PIIIA‘JIII 1‘39”; I I "I I!”
I I’I'QI" I I ‘1I‘IIQEI
Q53?“ III]"‘IH“I'"I 1I T
_' ’ M: I. I1“;
;' I‘ Q“ I‘:~f I: I . I'I I
.Q :1!” III‘I‘II. ,1. 1111'
I IIIJHI “1&1“; L I-I'IIIII.
"-’ I “a ‘v' I. I 1 5g . , I- I: I
: I z..IQ I‘:IQLQS!'IvV . . I '1‘ I

. II
{M‘- ‘1QII-EIJI.::I11IL.::‘|+

.5711: II“!
. 1:1'1' . ; II‘
III” III-1.9511

    

:.‘o ‘ _, '
1 I '5 1113-1311. 1 1311' 1:11
I. .;31:{12I1;.I5121!I11.::i 1! II 11311.. 1;, 1
~ 1 1111 11.111111 1.111.111 1 11,111:
Q I If“ ,QQIIII", 1‘1, I1I,"I IM'I "III " I
1"‘ : . I: ' Ef‘zgiIleI’ If II: Q '.Q;IY:II '::of Ir"t I I
. h; ' ‘ ‘ 11

II

- 11.111 111.1... , 1
- 0031.“; .II I I I I I .

Q41913I” IISIIIIoIIII III‘nQ'“
I5." I'M“. 1|I-I-[II1II|I:I1.H:';;?

I
Ill;‘i'k1:'

1 1 1.!
“IN HIP-11.
55;?“ I. QI‘ In?” .i I

'1 1’.I 1'5

. o. ‘ -.. _.
- h— V’.' b... g.

. ._.

.....

. . . .
‘ —~O ~‘~‘.—-o uv ., - .- u
a 1.. . - .

-. b
A—o. _. -o‘

 

 
     
    
 

 

I ’1’] Q
IrI1I7,IIIIIJE:,I'flIQ 10.1“
I IYIIIIIIII IIIIII‘I 121‘s? I I
’1“1*’II1.1I1111;111'111

I4 ’ I'HII'M' I
Q. . q I
1 {HIM

I .1. L
II [‘QIHI
l1".

__—_.:—.__ —. ....—_ —__‘__-_._-__.._—-_ _ _-—‘-._
. . _ . ' ‘ .
.‘ - l ' . -... , .'-o f. . " .r‘.‘
. __ . ‘1 ’ . I. _ -..-I -. . '
00- I‘- .'_". I -- '._I ' '.
' - r:'
o ‘9

"""'C.
'-:-7
.év

O
_- .--'.... -

I
'Qc‘ ‘_
' o
" o
_' — ‘
fl
. ~b- II]!
o
I

 
  
       
     
    
   
 
 
 
  

(I1:
£L1Ir’ 'IIIII

II'IIQ1 p’1.l ‘I'II‘fiQ‘J' [I'
“L", '.

 

I | wIIhIIj II“! '1'" I I

L

,‘I . .
Q NEIL} ”.1“ II' urflugul

    

«LII|rJ rt'I'III

   
  
      
    

£1

'1 115111714113!

I.
Lin.

I RIQ. :QL IQ} :‘1 ‘ P j I; l. I . '

m»

Ix'II' IfiII

O
t
..

i:
Q

5
I

g 9
.oL-‘fl-i—‘o. o '

315:»?

I3}:

“.1

-0.‘¢'
" 0 CI.
0
h..-
.0. ..
-60Q1~ I. Q
. .. o
I

no. t.
.

.1

-¢o o

9
o

0 0‘“

' W... Q}‘ 'L . Ql“&II“ )I. QT
111111111111.111-1111411111:
- [:1'1-i"

I
o
o'."'
c c

o
1
.00. ¢‘
r. o v-y‘
I 0". '

‘C ‘1' “If!

.

..

o .-

yr
.4

‘ .a-Q
P Q'.

L .0 .
~¢ .. ¢ 9
A 'a O
0 109—— H‘
O .. _‘. '
* - u

‘-..‘.—; ' - a.
6- ;1_§31' fit»:

'7:
,3

t

.3763}

£ f

IIuQ-o

- “ro-

wan-6
mlmhw

 

=18?

   

 

 
  

9c.

  
 
 
 
 

n

.r . v
v: Q I . o
v
o . .
Q 7 V .
a
‘ o o a
v . .
r.— c - o

I. ‘u

.' $271
mil

 

‘1;
1I‘1LIM1‘AII :IEIQ‘

‘2?“

1'- '%

~ C
M

 

 

‘ 5- 3" .......

 

 

 

AUG 11.. 5 2001

 

0

TH}; mCIAL my}: c.» mixer-.1: Am C(‘NI‘MI‘IICL' IN 0313.“: OPIPrANY

A correlational Study of the July 31,
1932, Reichatag elections in Germany.

By
bAwULI AIEXAfibifl PRATT

' Michigan State:
University ,
LIBRARY f

       

      

A Thesis
Submitted to the BchoOl of Graduate Studies
of Michigan State College of Agriculture and
-App11ed Science in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of

NAbTbfi CF ARTS
Department of bPCIOJOgy and Anthropology.

194w

F0 RH‘RCRD

The work of many peOple went into the preparation of
thie theeia. ror the many who are not named the writer
wlehee to eXpreee hie appreciation and wiehee that there
wae epace to name then. Some nuet be named. however.
becauae of the apecial nature of the aid they provided.
Theee are: Dr. Charlea Leonie, who conceived of the lar-
ger project of etudying rural and urban Germany and who
save much needed advice throughout the work: Dr. herner
Bchnatedt. who performed the needed tranelationa into
Englieh for the non-German reading writer and who read
and helpfully criticiaed much or the text; Dr. J. Allen
Beegle, who provided the office apaee and guidance in the
outlining of the project: Dr. Duane Oihaon. who alwaye'had
the anewer on the atatiatioal aepecta of the problelz Dr;
Rudolph Heberle and Dr. Paul Honigehein. who contributed
‘aany houre or helpful oriticien.

Othere are: Kr. Frank Iartin. Supervieor of the
college Tabulation Department. and hie two aeeietentl,
largeret Daviea and Horne Taachner. vhoee technical help
wae alweye given with kindness and patience: and Ira.
Pratt. who took time out from her own theaia to read and

correct thia one.

11

ChOEe

l.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

TABLE OF CGETENTS

POP.‘0Pd e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e 0

Part I
lature of btudy, Sample. Political fiietory

Introduction e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e
Significance of Study—Election Studied-
lature or German Political Partiea-Iethod.

Electiona of 1919-1933 . . . . . . .
Election lQlO-Election lGQO-Election 1924-
Election l9ZP-Election lQaO-State Election.-
Preaidential Election lQSQ-July, 1938 Bloc-
tion-SOurce of Nazi Vote lQCZ-Election 1938-
Gunnery.

'ICU’. 0: Sample a e . e e e e e e e e e e a
Size of Sample—Distribution of Vote by City
Size-Size and Region-Zonal PatternDUCity
Site Within Zone-Range-Crrrelatione by City
Size.

Part 11: Religion

3011810“ and POllthI e e e e e e
Catholicianrntheiam Correlationa with Haaian
and Communian.

Part 111
Social Claeeee, Occupationa and Politico

The Sooio-Economie Claeeee . . . . . . . . . e
History of Glace-The liddle Claeeee-The
Lower Claca-Heeaure of Older.

Th0 RideO C1RBBQ. e e e e e e e e e e e e e
Correlations with Racism and Communica-
American-French Zone-Soviet Occupation acne-
Upper Hiddle clera and ”axiom-Lower liddle
claaa and NaziameLower Riddle claae and
Conmuniem-Berlin-Mcdian lrceentation.

Th. 10.6? 01388 e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e

Correlatione with Naziam and Communimnéledi-
an Presentation-Anarican-French zone.

iii

Page
ii

1

24

60

81

117

149

ChBEe Page

8. Occupations and Politics . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Skilled type industries-Government Service-
Unskilled aorkers-Major Employment Classi-
tioatione-Unemployment.

9. Social and Economic Factors . . . . . . . . . 182
The economic eituation—NntionaliemrDespair
of middle classes—Disruptions of Interaction
Patterna--The Lower class.

Part IV: Age and Sci

10. A80 Ind POlitio. e e e e e s e e e e e a a e e e202
The younger age proups-Age and Social Class-
es-liddle-age grades-Advanced age grades-Age
and Region-Relative age composition-Unemploy-
ment and youth-Special situation of old vot-
or-Summary.

11s Sex find POlithI e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e 2“

12s Bibliography e s e e e e e e s a e e e e e e 256

13a APPCHdIGOI e e e e e e e e e e e e a s e e e 261
Rural Urban Party Differences-Total Votes-
Eligible Vote and Actual Vote-The Cities of

Germany Used in the Sample-Note on.lethod~
lap of Germany.

iv

 

 

‘.

7.

8.

10.

ll.

IIST CF TABLES

Chapter II

Table I: The Valid Vote for Major German
Parties in National Legislative Elections.
1919'1933e

Table II: Prussian Diet. lCEP and 1932.

Table III: Summary of Percentages of Vote in
Reichstag Elections 1920-1952.

Chapter 111

Table IV: Per Cent Distribution of Total Val-
id Urban Vote for Specified Parties in July.
1932. Reichatag Election. by Size of City.

Table V: Distribution of Cities by lilitary
Occupation Zones. _ .

Proportional Vote for Specified Parties in
July, 1932. Reiehstag Election by Size of City
and Eilitary Zone.

Table VII: fer Cent Cities in Each Class are
of Total Cities of sample in each Iilitary
Occupation Zone.

Table VIII: Rankings or Proportions of July,
1982, Reichstan Election Vote for a Particular
Party by Class of City within each lilitary
Occupation Zone.

Table Ix: Range of Percentages of July 1982.
Reichetan Election Vote Given Nazi and Commun-
ist Parties, by Size of City.

Table X: Range of Percentages of July. 1938.
Reichstae Election Vote Given the lazi and

Communist Parties, by hilitary Occupation zone.

Chapter IV
Table XI: Coefficients of Correlation Between
Preportions of Catholics and Froportione of
Vote for Selected Farties, by Size of City.

7

Page

.09

57

78

78

77

86

 

. l e. \.l

I I‘ll ‘ 1D. In. ..I

 

I... .J.f.u(lr.f'l.f

353' 2.2.52

12. Table III: Coefficients of Correlation 86
Between Proportions of Catholics and Propor-
tions of Vote for Selected Parties, by
Occupation Zone.

15. Table XIII: Coefficients of Correlation 90
Between Per Cent of Papulation with no
Religious Beliefs and Per Cents of Vote for
Specified Parties, by Size of City.

Chapter VI

14. Table XIV: Coefficients of Correlation Be- 118
tween Proportions of Voters who are Upper or
Lower Middle Class and Proportions of Vote for
Specified Parties, by City Size Class.

15. Table XV: Coefficients of Correlation Betweenlm
Preportions of Voters who are Upper or Lower
Iiddle Class and Proportions of Vote for
Specified Parties, by Military Occupation Zone.

16. Table XVI: Comparison of Social Class Voting 144
Patterns in Berlin for Selected Elections and
Districts.

" 17. Table XVII: Median Demonstration of Aesooi- 147

ation between Per Cent of Lower liddle Class
and Per Cent of Vote for Selected Parties.

Chapter VII

18. Table XVIII: Coefficients of Correlation Be- 149
tween Per Cents cf Vote for Specified Parties
and Per Cents of Voters who are Upper Class.
by City Size Class.

19. Table XIX: Coefficients of Correlation Be- 150
tween Per Cents of Vote for Specified Parties
and For Cents of Voters who are Lower Class.
by lilitary Occupation Zone.

80. Table XX: Median Demonstration of Associationldb

between Per Cents of lower Class and For Cents
of Vote for Selected Parties.

vi

21.

23.

24.

25.

27.

29.

Page
Chapter VIII
Table XXI: Coefficients of Correlation Be- 161

tween Per Cents of Erwerbsperaonen in Certain
Industries and the Per Cents of Vote for
Specified Parties.

Table XXII: Coefficients of Correlation Be- 164
tween Per Cents of Erwerbspersonen in Selected
Government Operated Industries and the For

Cents of Vote for Specified Parties

Table XXIII: Coefficients of Correlation Be- 167
tween City Employees as Per Cents of Erwerbs-
personen and Per Cents of Vote for Specified
Parties.

Table XXIV: Coefficients Between Per Cents of 167
lrwerbspersonen in Selected Industries and Per
Cents of Vote for Specified Parties. by City.

Table XXV: Coefficients of Correlation Between 171
Per Cents of Employees in Certain Size Concerns

and the For Cents of Vote for Specified Parties

in Cities of 100,000 or more Population.

Table XXVI: Coefficients of Correlation Be- 173
tween Per Cents of Vote for Specified Parties

and Per Cents of Erwerbspersonen in Industry

and handwork, by Size of City.

Table XXVII: Coefficients of Correlation Be- 174
tween Per Cents of Vote for Specified Parties

and Per Cents of Erwerbspersonen in Trade and
Transportation, by Size of City.

Table XXVIII: Coefficients of Correlation Be- 178
tween Proportions of Unemployment by Occupa-

tional Class and Proportions of Veto for

Specified Parties, by Size of City.

Chapter X

Table XXIX: Coefficients of Correlation Be- 206
tween the For Cents of Population in Younger

Age Groups and Per Cent of Vote for Selected
Parties, by Size of City.

Table XXX: Coefficients of Correlation Between 208
the Proportions of People in Certain Age Groups

and Pronortions of People in Each Socio-Econo-

mic Class. by City Size.

vii

g3. Page

31. Table XXXI: Coefficients of Correlation Be- 216
tween Per Cents of Vote for Selected Parties
and PrOportiona of Population in Middle Age
Groups. by Size of City.

32. Table XXXII: Coefficients of Correlation Be- 218
tween the For Cents of Vote for Selected
Parties and For Cents of repulation in Older
Age Groups. by Size of City.

53. Table XXXIII: Coefficients of Correlation Be- 223
tween Ier Cents of Population in Certain Age
Grades and For Cents of Vote for Selected
Parties, by Military Occupation Zone.

Chapter XI

34. Table XXXIV: Coefficients of Correlation Be- 244
tween PrOportions of Population over 20 in each
Sex and Proportions of Vote for Selected Par-
ties. by Size of City.

36. Table XXXV: Coefficients of Correlation Be- 246-
tween Per Cents of Working Women and Per'Cents
of Vote for Specified Parties. by Site of City.

36. Table XXXVI: Coefficients of Correlation Be- 248
tween Per Cents of People in Younger Age
by Sex. with the Per Cents of Vote for Select-
ed Parties. by Size of City.

57. Table XXXVII: Coefficients of Correlation Be- 260
tween Per Cent of People in Older Age Groups.
by Sex. with the Per Cents of Vote for Select-
ed Parties. by Size of City.

viii

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

7.

8.

IIST CF FIGURES

Chapter 11

Figure A: Proportional Changes in Valid Vote for
Specified Parties in Reichstag Elections, 1922-1930.

Figure B: Preportional Changes in Valid Vote for
Specified Parties in Reichstag Elections, 1930-1932.

Chapter III

Figure C: The Effect of Size of City on the Per Cent
of Vote for Maior German Parties in July, 1932, Reich-
stag Election.

Figure D: Relationship of “age-Earners in Erwerbsper-
sonen to Per Cent of White Collar Workers in Erwerbs-
personen in Cities of 25,000 to 50,000 Pepulation, 1933.

Figure B: Relationship of Wage-Earners in Erwerbsper-
sonen to Per Cent of White Collar Workers in Erwerbs-
personen in Cities of 50,000 to 100,000 Population,
1933.

Figure F: Relationship of Wage-Earners in Erwerbsper-
sonen to White Collar Workers in Erwerbspersonen in
Cities of over 100,000 Population, 1935.

Chapter V
Figure G: Social Class Relationships of lajor Partial
Shown by Proportions of Vote in Reichstag Election,
July 31, 1932, in Cities of over 100,000 Population.
Chapter X
Figure B: Coefficients of Correlation Between Per
Cents of Forulation over Twenty Years in Certain Age

Groups and For Cents of Vote for Selected Parties, by
Size of City.

ix

3.

d.

3.

6.

7.

IIST CF APPENDIX TABIES

Page
Appendix Table 1: Comparison of National, 263
Urban, and Typical Rural Area Percentages of
Vote for Major Parties in the July, 1932,
Reichstag Elections.
Appendix Table 2: Comparison of Reich and 264

Urban Vote for Major Parties in the Reichstag
Election of July, 1932.

Appendix Table 3: Total Vote in the Sample 265
Cities over 25,000 Pepulation for Reichstag
Election of July, 1932, by Size of City and
Iilitary Occupation Zones.

Appendix Table 4: Total Vote for Iajor German.266
Parties in the July, 1932, Reiehstag Elections,
by Size of City.

Appendix Table 6: Table Vote for Iajor Gerlln 26?
Parties in the July, 1932, Reichstag Elections,
By flilitary Occupation Zone.

Appendix Table 3A: Per Cents of Total Valid 268
Urban Vote for Major Parties in the July, 1932.
Reichstan Elections, by Military Occupation

Zones.

Appendix Table 6: The Per Cent the Total Val- 269
id Vote was of Eligible Vote in the July, 1932,
Reiehstag Elections, by Military Occupation

Zone and Size of City.

Appendix Table 7: The 193 Cities of Germany 270
Used as a Sample for the Study of the urban

Social Basis of Nazism and Communism, By Size

of City and Nilitary Occupation Zone.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTICN

The first evidence of the National Sccialist party in
the Reichstsg vote statistics was in 1924 when Hitler's fol:
lowers won but 6.5 per cent of the national vote.y Nazism
continued to be an inconsequential political party until
1930 then it took a sudden leap to 19.3 per cent of the popu-
lar vote. In the short span of two years the pepular stren-
gth of the party doubled: and in the July 31, 1932 Reichstap
election, the party won over 37.3 per cent of the electorate.

Parallelinp this phenomenal surre of the political rivht
was an equally dynamic movement on the left by the German
Cemmunist party. German voters in 1920 pave only 2 per cent
of the vote to this newly created party. By July 31, 1932
this Marxian party was the third largest party in the Repub-
lic with 14.3 per cent of the vote. It is the urban social
background of this startling rise to national influence of
diametrically opposed political movements that will be
studied.

The basic orientation of the study is investigation of
what proups of German voters were associated with the rise
of these two parties. than the voting age population of
Germany is classified according to certain fundamental char-
acteristics of German social organization, are there

1

important cleavapes in the political orientation of the
groups? that age classes supported the Nazis: the Commun-
ists? that were the political alirnments of the main socio-
economic classes? Did the non-religious, the Catholics, a;d
the Protestants all support the Nazis to relatively the

same degree? These and other sepial groupings will be
tested to determine the direction of the political align-
ment of each.

Voting is the act of an individual but the influences
that press on the individual to vote in a certain way are
primarily group influences. How a person votes is a.matter'
of the historical political affiliations of his region, the
strength of the party organization, family political habits,
friendships, business'associaticns, economic status, social
class, educational eXperiences and political expediency.

It is the interrelationships of many factors that is impor-

tant in deciding the direction of an individual's political

interest. A German citizen was not arbitrarily a National

Socialist or a Communist. He was molded by the social

groupings in which he interacted. As Rudolf Beberle wrote:1
The political atmosphere is not created merely by
propaganda and by the formation of individual Opin-
ion: it rather oripinates in groups and movements
of more or less distinct, more or less organized,
character. In the period of German history pith
which we are concerned, the close connection of
organised groups, representing particular interest,
with the political parties was one of the outstand-
ing features of the political structure.

It is a basic premise of this thesis that there is a func-

 

l. fiudolfheberle, Prom Democracy tg’Yatism, Baton Rouge,
1945. p. 40. *—

3
tional relationship between sociologically real groups in
any society.

The study is made possible by the fact that several of
the groups in shich individuals interact could be measured
or representei statistically. The major emphasis of inves-
tigation is on correlation techniques. Proportions of
peeple in the selected social groups are related to the pro-
portions of vote for the two parties in selected German
cities. It is, cf course, possible to do this only because
important sections of the pOpulation did hold different at-
titudes tovard government, toward the form of economic
organization, tosard foreign affairs, and so on. If there
sere not a relative homogeneity within great masses that
could be delineated by broad characteristics, as socio-
economic class, age, occupation, or relipion, then a study
of this type would be without fruit. This homogeneity of
political attitude was present within the social groups
selected for analysis in Germany.

The emphasis is entirely cn how certain groups were
related to the Nazi party or the Communist party. thy they
aere related in a particular say is a vitally important
question but, except for certrin rcneral statements, this
question falls outside the plotted course of this review.
For instance, a knowledre of the ideology of the National
Socialist party would indicate that a group whose members
hold these attitudes would supprrt the Nazi party:

-that the Republic be abolished

-thst the Communist party he outlawed
-that the Jess be driven out cf Germany

 

\1 l , Iltl If! ‘1 .

4

~that compulsory military service be national policy
-that the Versailles Treaty be abropated

But the means of measuring the attitudes of proup members
was beyond the power of the investigator. A public opinion
survey of the German people would tell that attitudes each
important social group held that turned it to the rinht or
left politically. This would be the "why". In a general
way these answers can be inferred: but the core of this
study is what groups, recognizable by "external" insignia,
supported either the Nazis or Communists. The particular
historical and psychological factors that operated on indiv-
iduals through social groups are largely ignored bv statis-
tical treatment.

The study is a static analysis to determine what were
the social cleavages between the Communists and Rational
Socialists in the July 31, 1932 Reichstag elections. The
correlational procedures measure what groups were associat-
ed with the two parties at that particular moment in German
history. The groups which were selected for analysis do not
exhaust the possibilities. There were other groups that
would have been worthehile to investigate but which were
omitted because of tire limitations or for a lack of proper
statistical measures.

The factors studied are certainly not the only import—
ant social forces or even the most important. Rather, those
that were selected are some of the important social forces
of a great number of politically important conditions that

form an entenglinr web that draws the voter to one'or another

 

5
of the parties. The best that can be done in this investi-

gation is to pluck at a few of the axial strands.

Significance of Study

An investigation which identifies the groups of early
Nazis can be of value to the United States government in its
denazification and re-education programs. Sales managers
have long emphasized the importance of knowing the market
before planning and executing the sales program. This study
casts more light on the particular groups that supported the
Nazi program and so defines the most troublesome spots for
retraining. then the groups that were important in the Nazi
party vote are fully known, then the psychology of the re-
education program can be directed tovard them.

Under the Potsdam declaration it is a responsibility of
the United States government to denazify Germany. This
again can only be adequately undertaken when it if fully
known who the Nazis more. Many millions more supported the
Rational Socialists with votes than joined the party. Just
‘egding out the members of party orpanizations will not be
enough for a rebirth of democratic Germany. Denasification
must include not only the negative policy of stripping
party members of rights and privileges and imprisoning the
most vicious. The program must also have the positive poli-
cy of seeking out the social elements which proved suscep-
tible to the Nazi program and providing them a suitable
political environment to produce the desired orientation.

Further, it is the responsibility of the government to

 

lll‘l'llll‘flllv
['1‘ (l

6
create a future Germany from the chaos of defeat that will
be a useful and prosperous member of the vorld. This is
only possible if all possible knowledge cf the complexities
of the German society are collected, collated, and anal-
ysed. It is hoped that this study sill contribute some-
thing to America's knowledge of Germany.

The Communist aspect of the study is pertinent for the
above reason as it,tco, casts some small light on a partic-
ular strain of German life. Marxist doctrines are deeply
imbedded in the labor parties and labor unions. The history
of the workingman's efforts to improve his lot reaches back
to before the issuance of the COMMUNIST MANIFESTO in 1949
by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Any program for the
rehabilitation of Germany must necessarily pay special at-
tention to Germany's lower class. If the State Department
policy of containment of communism is to be successful,
efforts must be made to answer the needs of the groups that
turned to communion before the banning of that party by
Hitler.

Study of poliilce‘ radicalism is important in that it
may point to social forces in the United States leading to
either fascism or communism. 1: many respects Germany was
more li“o the United States than any other continental
European country. Political lessons learned there are al-

most certainly applicable in this country.

Jllly 31 9 1?:2

The election chosen for analysis is the Reichstag

7
election of July 31. 1932.1 In this election the hirh mark
of National Socialist vote in a free election was reached.
There was one more election before hitler accepted the
Chancellorship in January of 1933. That was in November,
1982. The Nazis lost two million votes in the three months
‘ between the two elections. The Communist party made about
a 20 per cent pain in the same period. Another Reichstap
election aas held on March 5, 1933 in which the Nazis son
43.9 per cent of the vote. This use the highest percentape
of vote for the Nazis before the dictatorship was estab-
lished. but there is serious question of the honesty of the
election. By usinv the July election ahen Hitler was at
his peak, without use of force at the polls. all groups of
Germans that villinply accepted him can be measured. At
the same time, a faithful representation of Communist
strength can be made.

It is hard for an American to appreciate the political
climate of Germany at the time of this election. In the
United States there is a basic acceptance of the Constitu-
tion and of political democracy by the two important parties.
Germany, hosevcr, had seven major political parties and
numerous minor parties: and the pivotal point of conflict
was the form of government. On the extreme rirht were the
lational Socialists, tryinp to tear the teimar Republic
apart and set up a dictatorship. 0n the extreme left were

the Communists, also desirinp to end the Republic and set

 

1. 'Por proportions of peeple votinr. see Appendix 5.

up a dictatorship of the proletariat.

That the voters mere in a revolutionary mood is evi-
dent in the election statistics. Over 50 per cent of the
vote went to these two radical parties. The study covers a
period when political excitement was at a fever pitch in
Germany. Forecasts of civil war w~re being made by leaders
of all parties, and the numerous clashes between the la-
tional Socialists and Communists seemed to bear them out.
When the voter went to the polls in July, 1952 he knew that
one of the most fateful elections in Germany's history was
taking place. ~

Thepolitieal crisis in Germany in 1932 was not creat-
ed in a day. The election must be understood in light of
the severe psychological, economic. and social strains which
disturbed Germany after the defeat in 1918 and in reference
to the lonper political tendencies of the German people.
These factors will be underevaluatrd in this thesis because
of the concentration on the statistical approach and the
historical shortsiphtedness of the writer. Suffice it to
point out here that the German voter was under undue
stresses arisinr out of the defeat in torld War I. an infla-
tion in the early twenties that ruined millions of the
middle class, a depression that left six million, mostly
lower social class. unemployed, an attempt to create a
democracy in place of a previously autocratic state, and
the despair and feelinrs of hepelessness in old and young
alike that a secure and stahle life would not be possible

again.

Nature of German Political Parties1

Basically this discussion is a static, statistical sur-
vey of the social correlates of Nazism and Communism as
manifested in the July, 1932 Reichstag elections. However,
it is important as background to understand a little of the
organisation and ideology ofthe various political parties of
pro-Nazi Germany. _

i In the post World War I period the major parties, with

their short designations and abbreviations as listed by one

writer. were:2

BSDAP: Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiter
Partei (National Socialist German Labor
Party) or "lasis."

DIVP: Deutschnationale Volkspartsi (German Nation-

, al Peeplss Party) or "Conservatives.”-

DVP: Deutsche Volkspartei (German Peeples party)
or "Right Liberals." 3

Zentrum:(Center Party) or Catholic.Party.

DDP: Dcutsche Dmmokratische Partei (German.Deno-
cratic Party) or "Democrats": later called
Staatspartei.

SPD: Sosisldemokratische Partei Deutschlands
(Social Democratic Party of Germany).

USPD: Unabhaengige Sozialdemokratische Partai
Deutschlands (Independent Social Democratic
Party of Germany).

RFD: Fommunistische Partei Deutschlands (Commun-
ist Party of Germany\.

Each of these major German parties was very highly or-
ganised in essentially the same manner, although the extent
of centralization varied from party to party. Under the

heimar Constitution it was possible to dissolve the Reich-

stag upon Presidential order when the Chancellor no longer

1. Special credit must be riVen: James K. PoIIscF, 3r..
”The German Party System." The American Political Sciengs
Review, 1929, vol. 23, pp. Eta-m.
5. Heberle. p. 92. The listing has been altered only by
addition of the Center party.

3a For a fuller discussion of this party see Chapter 4.

 

10
could command a majority. In the fourteen years under the
Constitution. eight Reichstag elections were held, and
twice, in 1994 and lCEZ, two elections were held in a single
year. It was necessary, therefore. for the parties to be
organised on a year-round basis so that they could be ready
for an election at any time. ?urthermore. party machinery
radiated throughout Germany from a central headquarters.
This is quite different from American political parties, but
very similar to political party organization in other western
European countries.

Strict adherence to party doctrine was expected of all
members of German political parties. Each member had to
adhere to the fundamental principles of the party: be enrolled:
and pay fees. In fact. the party constitution had provisions
for expelling any member who opposed or injured the party.
Estimates have been made that up to one-tenth of the voting
strength or a party can be taken as the solidly organised
core of members.1

Strict party control was possible because the parties
acre organized down to the village. Germany, before the Nazi
dictatorship. sac organized into 38 electoral districts and '
not one of the districts was a one-party district such as
our own southland. EVery district had at least three major
parties vying for control. or the seven national parties,

the Social Democrats were the only party to be completely

 

l. Hsr61d_L. Childs, "decent Elections in Prussia and Other
German Lands," The American rolitical Sciencevfleview, 1932.

“10 26. p. 700.

ll
organized in everv district.

With such an extensive organizational structure it was
natural that there would be a large superstructure of partv
functionaries. The veer-round activity or the "machine"
was organized on functional group lines. as the women's,
youth, membership, finance committees and so on. Cne of the
most powerful or the committees was that deaivned to conduct
continuous pronecanda among the members. In addition, the
parti reyularly published magazines for general circulation
and had a party-owned public press vhich was entirelv parti-
san to the party.

Four of the parties develOped or controlled private
armies. The conservatives had the “Steel helmets" (Stabl-
helm). the Nazis the "Storm Troopers” (Sturm Ahteilunp),
the social Democrats dominated the "Black, Red, and Gold
Banner Association" (Reichsbanner). end the Communists the
"Red Pront" (Rota Front). Since several of the German par-
ties sere based on drastically Opposed political principles.
these militaristic organizations were often used in street
fighting durinr earraipna.

Several features or the German electoral system great-
ly facilitated the control of leiehstag delegates and party
members by the party machine. Reicbrteg delegates were
elected by direct ballot under a proportional representa-
tion system. In this system the German voter did not cast

a ballot for a warticular candidate but for a party list.

 

fi' P6318017. E‘Be Cite. P. 5:55.

 

ll ‘ l Al ‘l

12
The party list see. in practice, made up by the party mana-
gers so that candidates mere subservient to the nsnsners,
as the higher on a list one see the better the Opportunity
or getting elected.

The list arrangement and the tremendous sise of the
35 electoral districts operated to increase the distance
between voters and candidates so that nleotions were more
depersonslised than in the United States. The party,
rethrr than the candidate, see the important thing.

All the political pertins of Geomany were not organised
around a single idea as to the nature of the state. There
was a multiplicitv of rartios based on economic, social.
religious, historical, and peopraphical factors. At least
three distinct political rhilosophies were actively pro-
pounded by impvrtnnt parties of the weimsr Rapublic. These
were: some form of monarchy or othnr autocratic state with
a chosen re. in control of the destiny of the nation: some
form of that is called the free entercriso, democratic
structure of the United States: and, a communist state. The
important thirc about this in tho German scene is that par-
ties advocatinr such antagonistic political principles were
all gettinp inrortant seanontr of tho popular veto during
the 1920's and early 1930's.

Two ronortors described the situation at the time of
the election under investigation. Hervood l. Childs stated
it thus, ”The leading German political parties today are not

'Progrnm parties' contondina within tho limits of an existinr

13
constitutional systsr, restricted in their sins by legal
considerations, but revolutionary....'intevrated' parties,
veltanschaung movements vith inclusive social, political

and economic outlooks."1

A writer for the Nov York Times

reported on the day of the July 3], lGE? election:2
The battle is beins saved under four flaps, sym-
bolic actually of the wide gulfs separatinn the
various sections of the German neople that these
typify. Thore is the republican black, red, and
cold banner, the old imperial black, shite and red,
the Nazi swastika-vshich Herr Hitler proooses to
make the national standard when all things come his
way--snd the red flag of communism.

In very rough terns the ideologies represented bv the
major parties were these. The Conservatives favored a
return to the monarchvwith emphasis on centralized control.
The Rational socialists were a totalitarian party of the
extreme right. The liberal parties outlined a propram that
was the closest to our ideal of a free capitalistic economic
structure} with great emphasis on the value of the indivi-
dual. The Social Democrats favored a very moderate form of
democratic socialism. Communists, of course. favored a
dictator: i? of the proletariat.

Anotter ctnracteristio of the Republic's political
parties was describod bv one writer in this may: "The

whole tendency of German pnrtie: is in the direction of be-

coming representatives of particular economic or class

 

 

I} ‘Harwood L. Childa, 1Who“. German Presidentiafffilection of
1932," 223 American Political Science Review, 1952, vol. 26,
p. 487.

2. Frederick T. Birchall, "Reich Vote Today," fig! York
Til... V010 [XXX], Jilly 31, 193?, p. 10

14
intorests....characteristic of the devsIOpment or politic-
»1 -arties as parties of interests is the specialization

r t‘eir programs so as to erresl, not to the entire elec-
trratr, but to particular interests in the electorate."1
Crgenizaticns based on business, labor, agriculture,
religion, sport, er any major social grouping were exceed-
Inply important in the campairninp of all the parties. Ur.
Childs reported that these organizations have a "political
significance which tends to rive an election campaign in
Germany the appearance of a colossal warfare of organized,
and not individual, opinions."2
German industry was centrally organised cith.the Reich-
sverband der Deutschen lndustrie and the Heuptgemeinschaft
der Deutschen Einzelhandrls being representative of the
industry-side type of association. The agriculturalists
vere combined in the xeichslandbund shich had over five-
million members. torkmen were hirhly organized into three
Knior groups or trade unions. The Allgemeiner Deutscher
Gescr¥schaftsbund was the most important. In addition to
these economic associations, there were Mlioious,'_vonth,
tcmcn's, and sports rroups, all with a certain abilitv to
deliver votes.3

Heberle pointed out that the rroportionsl representa-

tion system favored this tyne of political activity. He
5. Jares F. Follacfi, 3r., "The Earman Party System,"’TFe

AMQI‘ican Political ioionoe Review, 1929, vol. 93, p. FEE:
. .areood l. ChllH??'"The~33?fifin Presidential Election

of 1°32."'2§g_§§erioan lcliticsl Science Hevies, 193?.pu 499.
. lbid, pp. 4259-9, * W “

 

 

 

_ 15
wrote. "The system of proportional representation favored
the organization of political parties around definite soci-
al interest groups, and therefore emphasized the correspon-
dence between social classes and political parties."1

A close relationship between social classes and polio
tical parties has long been accn ted by German writers. The
accepted Viewnoint is that the National Socialists were pri-
marily supported by the family-sized farm operators and the,
urban middle classes. The German National Fecples party
was aligned with the small landed nobility. large land ow-
ners. and wealthy farmers of Protestant north Germany.
large manufacturers and some of the salaried new middle
class also backed the part/. To the immediate left of this
party was the Ieoples party, which had the support of the
asport. commercial, shipping, heavy industry and banking
interest. In general it vas a party or the more conserva-
tive middle class than entered the Democratic party. This
latter party pas supported by the old middle class of inde-
pendent business men, small farmers. professionals. and
intellectuals. The Democratic party was the weaker of the
two middle class parties. Farther to the political left
was the Social Democratic partv which had its support ccn-
csntrated in the moderate elements of the laboring class.

with some loser middle class and small farmers. 0n the

extreme left was the Communist party, which appealed only

 

I? Heberle. 2;. cit., p. 90.

16

to the radicalized lower class.

Method
First, the study was restricted to urban political
action. A total sample of 193.cities of over 25,000 popu-
lation was used. The total valid vote in the election of
July, 1932 was 36,P92.354 or 42 per cent. The sample is
important both because it comprises the majority of the ur-

ban vote and because urban social clusters are so signifi-

cant in highly industrialized Gemeny.2

In each city the vote for every party was divided by
the total valid unto in that city. The proportion of vote
given the party was the independent variable to which the
various social groups were related, by use of a modified

Ti Heberle. op. cit., pp.#3:77l For a discussion of—FFE__-
class alignments ET'political parties before the first World
War sse Beberle, pp. 1-4: and S. Neumann, "Political Parties-
Gsrmany,” Encyclopedia of Social §ciencss, vol. 11. pp. 615
ff. is soodfifor a discussion of both periods.

2. It is not meant to underestimate the importance of rural
Germany in the rise of National Socialism. In both a pro-
portional and absolute sense Hitler won more votes in rural
areas than in urban. However, the Nazis were also the
strongest party in practically every city, so it is import-
ant to measure the basis of their strength there. ln this
study of thr polarization of the German voter the Consunist
party is of major importance and it was almost entirely an
urban party. Other writers have emphasized the importance
of the rural vote.

For instance, see Rudolf Heberle, From.Democracy £2
lasism, particularly Chapter 3, pp. 94-59. *For a comparison
of urban rural total vote in Schlesuig-holstein see Table 4,
page 95. Pages 91-84 point out the failure of the socialist-
ic parties in rural areas. Another excellent review is
Charles P. Loomis and J. Allan Beagle, "The Spread of German
Iasism in Rural Areas," American booiological_§evig3, vol.ll,
1946, pp. 724-7340 F—

For a discussion of rural-urban party differences, see
Appendix A.

 

 

l7

Pearsonian product moment correlation formula.1 The second
variable was also turned into a preportion. For instance.
the upper middle class was defined by certain occupational
groups. The number of peeple in these occupations in each
city was taken as a proportion of the total number of people
employed in the city.‘ The preportion of peOple in the upper
middle class was then related to the proportion of vote for .
the National.Socialists. or pommunist party. All correla-
tions were based on relationships between preportions.

Determination of that groups supported the Basis and
the Communists use made on the basis of the direction and
degree of relationship between the proportional index of the
group being studied and the proportional size of the vote
for the party. If proportions of people in the upper middle
class increased as the preportion of vote for the Basis
increased. then it was thoupht that important proportions of
that social class had voted for the Nazis.

Preportions were used throughout the study because
correlational analysis assures that the distributions are
nonlal. If absolute numbers had been used, this sould not
have been true. The distributions would have been skewed
because of the influence of extremely large cities. hith-
out the use of prOportions it uould not have been possible
to develop reliable correlations.

The method does not reveal accurately what all of a
social grouping did politically, or even what a.majority of
the group did. Use of vote statistics puts the emphasis on

k

1. See Appendix far a more detailed explanation.

18
the party and not on the social proups being related to the
political party. A hiqh'simple and positive correlation

points to a particular social group as being an important

part of the political party rather than definitely informing~ N

that a large preportion of the social group were supporters
of the party. The crucial point is not there the majority
of a certain social group, as the upper middle social class.
belong politically as it is to find whether or not that
group was an important part of the support of the Communist
or National socialist party. It is the composition of the
two parties that is being studied and not a thorouah analy-
sis of the political complexities of each major social
grouping. However, the vote for each of the parties is con-
sidered a measure of public opinion. If a particular group
bulk large in the vote for the Nazis. this is taken to mean
that those the so voted were Nazis and had accepted some
part of Hitler's publically announced propram. Eduard M.
Sait has made the point that in the United States, 'We must
be somewhat cautious in using the statistics of elections as
a key to public opinion.”1 He pointed out that the American
Voter is presented numerous and complex issues and he may
have supported a particular candidate for one policy of the
candidate and not for another. Or apain. the voter*may have
simply marked a ballot because the candidate was personally

2
popular.

 

Ii Edward'ficéhesney Salt, American Yarties and Elbctions.
lea York, D. Appleton-Century 50.. lifiv, p. 165}
2a Ibid. p. 108s

19

The situation in Germany at the time of this election
was radically different from an election in the United
States. The German voter was riven the Opportunity to vote
for at least seven national parties, and innumerable minor
parties as well. The programs of all the parties were well
publicized so that the voter knew shat to expect of each
party if it gained power. Personalities of particular can-
didates were played down in German elections because of the
list system used in proportional representation. The leaders
of the party received the publicity rather than the party
candidates placed on the district lists. With the multipli-
cation ot parties. each aith a peculiar prorram, and the
deemnhasiaaticn of district candidates, it vould appear that
the July election did measure German public Opinion
adequately.

Ieasuring the social correlates of Nazism and Commun-
ism by use of vote statistics involves another danger. In
order for a correlation, either.positive or negative, to
develOp, a certain social characteristic must decrease or
increase in proportional size as the proportion of vote for
the political party varies from city to city. However, the
vote statistics do not alloa for measurement of varying
proportions of votinp amonp different social groupings.

In the United States it is knovn that differences in extent
1 Older

of voting exist by are; sex, and social class.

voters. for example, apparently take part in elections to

I. V. O. Fey. Jr.. Politics, Parties and'Pressure Um mugs,
lav Yerk, 1°42. p. filo ff.

 

20
a greater degree than younger ones. Vote statistics do not
measure this, however.

Thus, in Germany, a certain age class, such as aces
20—25, might actually have been very pro-Neal, but it could
be possible for a negative or no relationship to be reflect-
ed in correlations uith voting because a large proportion
of the age class mirht not have gone to the polls. Three
conditions can account for a correlation. The factor being
studied might have been, first, an important part of the
party's strength or, second, its opposition in.many cities,
and third, the group may have expressed itself by non-vot-
ing. The first condition would result in a positive coef-
ficient and the second and third in a negative. So it is
possible with the method used that a negative correlation
may only be a reflection of non-voting on the part of the
social grouping being studied. The social group night so-
tually have been an important element in the social base of
either Nazism or Communism but which, for some reason, was
not represented at the polls. There is no say to determine
what non-voting, as such, implied.

However, it is thourht likely that individuals nho
could be classified as part of a social group under inves-
tigation which strongly favored a particular party would
have been politically responsible so that a large propor-
tion of them would have voted. This appears true in the
July election as no political group was ordered to stay

easy from the polls to sabotage the election. That all

21
social groups voted in some important preportion is support-
ed by the fact that nearly P5 per cent of the eligible vot-
ers1 went to polls in the election studied. Under these
conditions it is assumed that no one group was totally
deficient in voting, and therefore, that the third factcr
stated previously was probably not operative in this election.

It is clear that stronp political attitudes can be ex-
pressed in either voting or non-voting and that correlations]
analysis based on vote statistics can measure only positive
action as reflected in the act of voting. Attitudes shich re-
sult in nonvoting cannot, of course, be studied by analyzing
voting statistics. If one of the groups studied in the fol-
loeing pages had stayed easy from the polls almost completely
it sould have been impossible to measure the relationship
of that group to Nazism or Communism. As has been pointed
out, the effect on the correlation coefficients of some one
social group renaininp away from the polls eould have been
negative coefficients hltb all the political parties studied.
This never happened in the analysis. The supposition above
that all social rroupinrs were represented in the statistics
of voting is than reenfcrced. The method of analysing two
completely exposed political movements simultaneously helped
guard arainst waking conclusions about social groups that
were actually not represented in the vote statistics.

Other difficulties arise as in any society the relation-
ships between the multitudinous social grout ings are so
complex that simple correlation techniques may not uncover

relationships betveen any tro factors. This is extremely

_

1e SCH Appendix Ce

22
important in this study since in a party of broad social
composition a great many intertyined factors are present.
The technique being used attempts to select a few of these
factors and analyse the importance of a particular social
proup in National Socialism or Communism as if that group
was actually Operating in social isolation. This is, of
course. an impossible social situation. It§is thought this
situation Operates in such a way that the mathematical rep-
resentation of any sincle social relationship is less defi-
nite than the actual social relationship. _Therefcre. in many
cases particularly important obscuring factors were found
and partial correlation used to clarify the true situation.

It is also true that use of correlation procedures
measures only the gross characteristics of the data.LgCor-
relational analysis does not penetrate to particular local
circumstances that are so important in understanding politi-
cal behavior. But this is not an indictment of the method.
It is just as important to understand the general situation
as the particular. In social-political analysis it is
impossible to isolate a single factor and say that this is
1?. There are too many variables.“ The best that can be
done is to blunder through the maze of relevant fact and
accept the verdict of the trend. Isolated exceptions will
always be available; but if enough data is collected and
analysed. the truth sill be revealed, not in the exception—
al case but in the direction taken by the mass.

One other consideration is important. The uncovering

23
of a mathematical relationship between two social groups
does not automatically mean such a relationship actually
exists. in accidental pattern of numbers may always occur.
However, knoaledge of the total social situation will dis-
close theae misleading mathematical relationships.'

With these considerations in mind the proportions of
vote for the National Socialist and Communist parties were
related to the followinr groups in German society: religi-
ous. socio-economic classes, occupational groups, and age
and sex groups. The data were studied by size of city and
by military occupation zone. Extended discussion of each
of these factors is given at an approvriate place in the

th081.e

Organisation

Although the investiration is technical in emphasis
rather than historical, the champinp pattern of vote in
Reichstaa elections from 1919 to 1932 is described as back-
ground to the election of July 31. 1932. A thorough des-
cription of the sample is given in Chapter 3. With this
material as background. the main body of the thesis then
describes the findings on religion, scale-economic class,

occupation. and finally, are and sex.

CHAPTER II
ELECTICNS 1919-1933

Comparison of the pronortiens of vote won by the major
political parties in the several Reichstap1 elections from
the beginning of the Republic to its and reveals the broad
outlines of the social basis of the National Socialists and
Communist parties. The shifting political currents are dem-
onstrated in the decline of the middle class parties,2 the
German Peoples party and German Democratic party, and the
rise in vote of the Rational Socialist German labor party.
Insight into the Communist party is piven when the gradual
loss of votes by the Social Democratic party of Germany is
studied. All percentages of vote and absolute figures for

Reichstag elections are shown in Table I.

l. The Girman Republic was only l4 years old when Hitler
dissolved it and formed the Third Reich. In the Republic
the primary governmental body was the Reichstag. elected
under a system of preport onal representation by all citi-
zens over 20 years of are, with minor exceptions. This was
a radical departure from the system of the Second Reich.

During the early years of the Empire Bismarck established
manhood suffrage “or those over 25 years of age for Reich-
stsg elections. The Reichstag was not, however, the fulcrum
of government power.

The representative body did have considerable power
based. particularly, on the requirement that no new taxes
could be issued without its approval. However, even this
power was mit'gated by the fact that once taxes were approved
they could be levied year after year without further Reich-
stag approval. In the Empire primary leadership was in the
hereditary monarchy and the nobility of Prussia, the bursa-
cracy, the army. and later, the large industrialists.

2. See: Sydney Mellon, "The German People and the Postwar
World.” The American Political Science Review. vol. 37, August.
1943. ppT—EDl-EQE: and William EEcnsEcin,‘!§3 German Record,
Parrar a Rinehert. Inc., new York. 1945, pp. 152-154, ISLIBQ.

 

24

25
As further background to the static study of the

July, 1932 Reiohstag election a few of the state (Lander)
elections after 1930 are discussed. The presidential elec-
tion that preceded the July election by just a few months is
analysed for the same reason. In this way it is shown that
Hitler gained rapidly‘throughout Germany in all types of
elections in the months preceding the election emphasised
here. The perspective gained enables one to better appreci-
ate the meaning of the data uncovered in the correlational
analysis. A basis is provided for a belief that the social
groups discovered as supporting Hitler in the July election
are also the groupings that were gradually won in his ten-
year march to power. Some writers indicated at the time of
this election that large numbers of people voted for Hitler
because they thought that an easy way to get rid of‘hha. the
supposition being that he would be such a complete failure
that everyone would desert him. However. the study.of elec-
tions of 1919-1932 leads to the belief that the social
.groups uncovered as supporting hitler in the July 1982 elec-
tion also backed him.in previous elections. This being
true, the findings of the study immediately take on brood-

ing meaning.

Election of 1919
The first popular election following the revolution of.
1918 was to select the National Assembly. which was to draw
up the constitution of the German Republic. For the elec-

tion the papular suffrage had been extended to women. and

26
the age for voting lowered from 25 to 20 years. This.
plus the natural excitement attending the initiation of a
new government, increased the votes from the approximately
12 millions of 1912 to over 30 millions. The vote was con-
centrated on the parties favoring a strong republic as
77 per cent went to the middle and moderate left parties.
The single strongest party was the Social Democratic with
37.8 per cent of the vote. The middle class non-socialist
parties received 39.1 per cent of the vote. The electorate
very definitely rejected both the extreme'right and the ex-
treme left parties. The Conservatives, who received 26.3
per cent of the vote in 1912, won but 1d.7 per cent in this
first popular election. The radical left. the Independent
Social Democratic party, was badly defeated. The Commun-
ists were not organized at this time. In the first elec-
tion. then, the German peepla cast their ballots for depu-
ties who would write a broadly democratic constitution that

leaned in the direction of the labor interests.1

1920 Election
The June, 1920 Reichstag election reflected the short-
comings of the new government rVd its inadequate economic
program. In the two years following the revolution very
little reform in the economic structure of the nation had ‘
taken place. In its long history the Social Democratic
party had opposed the Imperial government and welded worker

unity on the battle cry of socialization of industry. But
I. 'OIIOl‘. Op. Cite. pa €140

 

27
in its initial period of power, the Socialist party failed
to energetically prosecute the program on which it had so
long roused the workman.1 _

The voters reacted radically. The election was the
beginning of the dual movement to the right and left in
German politics. The Independent Social Democratic party,
ihich had done so poorly in 1919, increased its vote by
over three million. It was an increase from 6.3 per cent
of the vote in 1919 to 14 in 1920. The Communist party
‘ began its struggles as a national party with about 500,000
votes in this election.

At the same time the conservative in German politics
recovered rice and belligerency with each succeeding_month
so that it was unmolested in its strongholds by the demo-
cratic government. The German litional Peoples party as-
serted itself to capture four million new votes. A partial
answer can be found in reaction of the nationalistic groups
to acceptance of the Versailles Treaty by the Socialists'
government.2

Referring to Table I, it is seen that in 1920 the ma-
Jor political parties were the SPD, the UBPD. the DIVP, the
Catholic parties. and, finally. the liberal DD? and DVP.

I. ‘Illiam Ebenstein, ThefGermanRecord. Farrar I Hine-
hart. Inc., flew York, 1945. pp. 192-255: and Veit Valentin,
The German Peogle, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1946.

pp. 552’592e
2. Sydney Iellen, ”The German People and the Postwar
Iorld." The American Political Science Review. vol. 87.

August, T973. p. 315.

 

rants I: TEE VALID vow; rca r1103 GERMAN PARTIES
IN NATIONAL IEGISIATIVE arecrxcns. 1919-1066.‘

 

Part a” 1919 192011 . 1924
’ Tote! Vote fl'#Total Vote S Tot ..,‘ou

31 t ‘"

fix? " " 1.918.310 6.5
str 6,121,479 10.6 4,249,100 16.1 5.696.868119.3

gsddle

' 1.345.669 4.4 6.919.400 16.9 2.694.617 9.2

DD? 5.641.?26 10.6 2,636,700 8.6 1.666.049 6.?
Others 484.800 1.6 969,000 3.1 2.619.122 9.6
contor"* 5.980.216 19.7 5.093.600 19.1 4.660.027 16.6
Left

'EFD 11.509.048 67.9 6.104.000 21.6 6.008.715 20.6
USPD 2.317.990 7.6 6,047,000 17.6 266,141 .a

Ion-voters 6.906.704 16.1 7,766,474 20.8 9.069.866 22.6

Total Valid 60,400,296 86.0 28.196.100 79.1 29,281,196 77.4
Vote

lligible 66,604,080 66,949,774 68.671.062
Voters

Golpiled from: Wilhelm Dittman. Das Pclitigche Deutsohland
vor Hitler. Zurich. 1945: and Sydney en. e rnan
?;3ple and the fostwsr horld.‘ The Americgg Political Sgicnog
Review. vol. 67. August. 1943 pp. ~ .

G 1920-1966 Reichstag elections.
as See description of parties. p. 9.
fitfi Includes Bavarian ieoples party.

11 Rounded.
# Proportions of total valid vote, except for non-voters,

which is based on eligible voters.

/

28

TABLE I:

THE VALID VOTE PCB HAJOR GERIAN PARTIES II

IATIOIAI LEGISLATIVE ELEcrxons, 1919-1966.. (Continued).

 

 

Partyifi Dee.. 1024 s.;. 1928 Sept.. 1960
Rifii W
DEV? 6.206.624 20.6 4.681.666 14.2 2.467.686 7.0
lid
DD? - 1.017.766 6.6 1.470.674 4.8 1.206.621 6.46
Other. 2.266.602 7.6 4.606.007 14.0 4.868.676 14.00
0.11“”. 6.850.169 17e3 ‘g6579‘796 15e2 5.195‘637 1‘48
7.880.066 26.0 0.162.070 20.8 8.676.244 24.6

KID 2.708.646 0.0 6.264.796 10.6 4.690.160 16.
UBPD 08.842 .6 20.816 .1 -
Icnrvoters, 8.668.776 21.2 10.471.431 24.4 8.026.441 18.0
Tota:'Va1- 30.286.806 78.8 60.766.247 76.6 64.066.471 80.0
id ote

3113101. 88.062.645 41.224.678 42.982.012
Voters

cup e rel:

vcr Hitler, Zurich. 1945: and Sydney e
ecple an! the Postwar World.“ The American Political Sci-

ence Review. vol. 67. August. 1

573. pp.

' 1920-1966 Reichitsg elections.
9* See description of parties. p. 9.
6*. Includes Bavarian Peoples party.

11 Rounded.

e m ittnan. Des Politische’Deutschzifig
I IIen. "The rlan

 

Party" July. 1962 .Rcv., 1962 larch, 1966
Total Vote %__Total Vote 1 Total Vote _¥
81 t
“IEEIP 16,745,781 67.6 11,767,010 66.1 17,277,180 46.9
DIV? 2,177,414 5.9 6,019,099 8.6 6,166,760 8.0
Iiddle
67! 466.012 1.2 661,796 1.8 462.612 1.1
069 671.799 1.0 666,451 .96 664,242 .8
Others 1,126,991 6.0 1,102,409 6.1 664,696 1.6
c.ne.r*** 6,782,019 15.7 6,626,067 16.0 6,498,467 14.0
565%
7,969,712 21.6 7,247,956 20.4 7.181.620 18.6
IPD 6,282,626 14.6 5,980,102 16.86 4,848,068 12.6
UBPD -
Ion-voters 7,644,481 16.0 8,929,260 10.6 6,642,466 11.2
Total Val- 66,882,664 84.0 66,471,746 80.6 69,646,661 88.8

id Vote
Eligible 44,226,865
Voters

4

60

4,401,004

44,686,764

61

Elections of 19241

In 1924 there were two Reichstag elections. The first
in lay of that year was another blow to the socialist and
democratic parties. The parties of the right had awmulti-
tude of incidents to exploit. The Allies had imposed heavy
schedules of reparations payments on the Germans and the
democratic government was following a policy of fulfillment
and unlimited cooperation in the homes that the Allies
would see the impossibilities of the exacticns and relent.
In the face of this policy. which in itself was extremely
unpopular with the nationalists of the political right, the
French and Belgians helped to create another crisis in 1926
by invading and occupying the Ruhr on the grounds of unful-
filled coal reparations shipments. This was too much even
for the republican government and a program of passive
resistance was begun. The German pecple did nothave the
physical reserves to hold out against France and Belgium.
so the resistance collapsed after eight months. But the
cutting off of the Ruhr industries for even that length of
time, plus the heavy drain on the Reich treasury for wel-
fare payments to the workers. affected the national economy
enough to be the immediate cause of the inflation. The
intense hatred of the nationalists toward France was redir-
acted toward the democratic forces of Germany. The govern-
ment of the Iieimar coalition was blamed for the inflation

‘of the period as it was for everything else. It was

It See 'ellen, The American FoIItIcaI Science Review,
”.616-619: and austav Stofiler, 03mm Economy, 1870-1940.

Reynal e Hitchcock, 1940, pp. 169-172.

 

 

32
forgotten by the rirhtist forces that these troubles tore
the result of four years of ear and defeat under an Im-
perialist regime. By the time of the election the French
had sithdrarn, the new currency was issued and the Dawes
reparation plan was under discussion. But this did not
help the republican forces. The Nexis put in their first
electoral bid for power in this election and not nearly
two million votes. The mafor party of the right. the Gor-
men flational Peoples party, was able to again gain over a
million votes, so that now it was 26 millions of’votes
stronger than in 1919. The political right was also ex-
pressed in the vote for many so-called splinter parties.
These are the parties that are listed as ”other“ in
Table 1.

One of the best examples of this type of party is the
German Rational Freedom1 movement, which sprang into exist-
ence in the lay e1ection.. It eon 1.919.629 votes or five
per cent of the total vote cast. As with the lasis and
DHVP, the Freedom party arose as a reaction to the condi-
tion just described. These major losses to the political
right care from the middle class democratic parties. This
was especially true of the German Democratic party for it
lost 70 per cent of its 1919 vote.

thile the conservative and reactionary parties sore

 

lf‘ A more vivid portrayal of how a single issue can cre-
ate a party under the prcportional representation system

could not be found. And that they can disappear just as

quickly is demonstrated by this same partv. By the Dec.,
1924 election the Freedom party was cut in half.

36
making these strong gains the radical left was also re-
aligning. The Communists jumped from slightly over
600,000 votes in 1920 to over 6.6 millions in this elec-
tion. This was 9.6 per cent of the popular vote. The par-
ty that gave up most of this was the radical independent
Social Democrats. for they were erased as a political
force. The Independents had 18.8 per cent of the vote in
1920 but lost 4.5 millions and dropped to .8 per cent of
the total valid vote. Prior to this election the leaders
of the party had rejoined the Social Democratic party.

The Social Democrats earned only 400,000 votes of these
losses. The Labor parties drOpped from 11,000,000 votes

in the 1920 election to 10,000,000 in the 1924 election.
The overall effect of the election was to give the con-
servative and nationalist parties, for the first time in
the Republic, a greater percentage hf the vet; than either
the middle or left groups of parties. Only four years after
the beginning of the German Republic the outline of the
forces striving for its downfall are readily apparent. The
failure of the revolutionary forces of 1918 to thoroughly
clean out the power factors in the Empire is most discern-
able in the ease with which anti-democratic parties spring
into existence and are fed by the voters, especially those
of the middle classes. But one cardinal fact stands out

in this lay election. and that is the instability of the
German electorate. There was no single philosophy of the

nature of the state. Severe crisis divided the people

Z4
drastically so trat one mass rushed to the political right
and the other to the left. Remaining in the political cen-
ter has a very numerous and politically conscious group,
but one that was seemingly too confused by the inability
of its leaders to put a successful program into action.

The fight of the extreme right and left revolved rapidly
around this essential nucleous of voters. each trying to
seduce it. In each election of the twenties this pivotal
group was whirled faster and faster. and each test showed
that more and more had been split off and absorbed by the
polar political parties. I

The second election of 1924 was held in December under
somewhat more favorable circumstances for the liberal ele-
ments of Germany. Confidence in the at. currency was firm-
ly established and the Dawes reparation settlement went
into effect in September. As a result the combined nation-
alists vote declined somewhat, with Hitler‘s votes nose-
diving to only half of what he received in the lay elec-
tions. The vote for the party of big industry and large
landowners. the National Peeples party. increased about
600,000. This sea a realignment of the nationalist voters
from the extreme positions of the Hitlerites and the Free-
dom movement. At the same time the middle nonsocialist
partiesgained slightly. the Social Democrats made an
important gain of over 1} millions. and the radical left
lost about one million. Altogether the labor parties
regained about half of what they lost in the first 1924

35
election, 30, with the improvement in the economic condi-

tions and adjustment in foreign relations. the German

electorate moved slightly away from the political poles.

The 1928 Election1

The 1928 election to the Reichstag was marked by a
general swing to the left and a return to emphasis on the
same parties of the moderate left that were given the man-
date in 1920. The Social Democrats gained 1.2 millions of
votes and the Communists approximately 500,000. In the
four years since the 1924 elections the SPD had been at
sork perfecting its party organization. and as a result it
was able to make gains in 33 of the 35 electoral districts.
[any workers in the Rhineland who had formerly voted for
the Center party moved to them. The party Reichstsg rep-
resentation was increased to 152 from 131. In part. these
gains were made possible by the success of Chancellor
Stress-en's policy or cooperation in foreign policy. The
Loearno pact was signed in 1925, and Germany had been ad-
mitted to the Learnt of nations in 1926. The economic
situation was also muc“ better.

The Nationalists, on the other hand. lost some 1.8
millions of votes and SO Reichstag seats. This was a re-
turn to their 1920 position. The National Socialists again
lost. this time about 100,000 votes. The liberal parties.

l:-_3=E;;—KT—Follocfi. Jr., "Th; German Election 6f'I§§§7*'
The American Political Science Review, 192R, vol. 22.

PP- E§§-fioE.

 

 

56
supported by the middle class, continued to decline in
importance. Both the Peoples party and the Democratic par-
ty lost about 400,000 votes. The loss of votes in the
right and middle parties did not aid the labor party, how-
ever. learly all the 2.5 millions lost by the DNVP, DDP,
and DVP can be counted in the gains of the splinter parties.
The percentage of peOple not voting also increased. and
this probably accounted for some of the lost votes.

In 1924 the proletarisation of the middle class by
the inflation had driven them to seek relief through ex-
treme political parties of the right. But in the relative-
ly prosperous year 1928, this class of German society was
trying to find relief through more moderate new splinter
parties. An example of this was the Business party which
made a gain of six seats in the Reichstag. So, while the
middle class voters again showei disrespect for their
traditional representatives, they still had not become
radicalised. Their inability to cleave long to any one
party is pointedly indicatiye of the unrest present in
their group.

The Landtag and city elections of the same year show
the same trend as the election for the Reichstag. Pollock
then wrote, "It is therefore very clear that the German
peOple wanted a government of the Left. and have repudi-

"1

ated the recent Right coalition. President Hindenburg

evidently saw this same trend as he picked Herman Mueller,

I. To llock, (1228 Election]. *The American Po litic al So I-

ence Review, p. 704.

 

37
A Social Democrat, to head the cabinet. He was the first
of that party to be Chancellor since 1920. His was the
last truly parliamentary government; for when he was suc-
ceeded by Chancellor Bruning in 1930, Bruning did not have
majority support of the Reichstag.

1930 Elections

The year 1930 marks the beginning of thc lationsl
Socialist German Workers party as a major party. lational
Socialism received 6.4 millions of votes and won 107 seats
in the Reichstag. Even though an important voice in
Reichstag affairs, the party continued its program of op-
position to the government. Hitler was interested only in
complete control of Germany and not just in being another
Chancellor heading a coalition. Konrad Heiden wrote that
after this election Hitler thought that he would have to
wait until 1954 or 1935 for s.majority vote that would give
lational Socialism sole control of the government.1

Although the Nazis vaulted from 800,000 votes in 1228
to over 6 millions in 1950, the increase did not represent
complete annihilation of the political middle, as might be
expected. A large part of the Hitlerite gains came from
the party only a little to the left of National socialism,
‘ the German Rational Peoples party. This party fell from

100 Reichstag seats to only 44. In votes the conservatives

lost about two millions in two years.

 

l. Konrad Heiden, A History of National Socialism, Alfred
‘e Knopf. 1955. pe I2 e

38

The election was also marked by the further unravel-
ing of the middle class Peoples and Democratic parties.
Together these parties lost over one million votes. Ap-
parently. about two-thirds of these votes went to the
lasis and the rest to the many sp inter parties with mid-
dle class programs. The splinter parties won 4.8 millions
of votes, an increase of some half million since 1928. It
is obvious that a large number in the electorate were
still searching for a secure political resting spot.

On the left there was a slight decrease in the SPD
vote. but the Communists gained more than double what the
Socialists lost. A new factor in the increase in vote of
the extreme right and left was the great increase in the

number of people voting.

Source of Nazi Gains in 1930

In Figure A the percentage increases and decreases
in prOportion of national vote won by each party for
1928-1930 have been visualized.; Studying the figure one
finds that in the two-year period. the National Socialists
gained 15.7 per cent. In this same period the only other
parties to make a percentage increase were the Communists
with 2.5 per cent and the Catholic Center party with
.4 per cent. It is readily seen that the DIV? contributed
a very large prOportion of the Nazi increase as this party
lost 7.2 per cent. Another major contribution came from
the DVP and DDP. Thus, the majority of the Rasi increases

in 1930 came from parties that represented the middle and

FIGURE A: PROPORTIONAI CHANGES IN VAIID VOTE FOR
SPECIFIED PARTIES IN REICHSTAG EIECTIONS, 1929—1950.

Per Cent Chanpe
-lO -5 Q 5 10 15 20
1

T l T T

  

   

NSDAP
DNVP
DDP
DVP
Center
Others
SPD
KPD

% Increase in Valid Vote

39
upper social classes. iowever, a great part of the Nazi
gains can be counted in the increase or 6.4 per cent in
the total number of voters.

then not changes in vote are discussed. it is reason-
ably clear that much of the Real strength lay in getting
out to the polls peeple who ordinarily did not vote.
There was a tremendous increase of 4,203,224 votes between
1928 and 1930. Evidently, this increase went primarily
to the National Socialists, for its absolute vote I
gain was: 5,569,545

the conservative and middle
parties lost (DNVP, DDP, DVP) 5.1931555

which leaves a Nazi gain of 2,385,990 votes unaccounted
for.

or course, not all of the votes which the DNVP, DVP,
and DDP lost transferred to the National Socialist.

The loss of over 500,000 votes by the Social Democrats
cannot be considered as contributing to the lasi gain since
the Communist vote increased by well over one million. The
Catholic parties. also, more than held their own. In addi-
tion, there see an increase of about half-a-million votes
in the parties listed as "other." It is assumed that these
represent some or the losses or the middle class parties.

The unexplained increase in National Socialist vote,
then. must be "new” voters. Kellengalso points to the
great increase in total vote as an important source of.

Hitler's sudden strength. A writer holding a similar view
I. 'ellen. TfieInerican Tolitical gciencg Review, p. 32!.

 

 

 

‘ __L‘ _-_L-—- ‘-—-——

 

4C
is Konrad Heiden who wrote that more than half of Hit-

ler's 6.4 millions of votes came from voters who "had

never previously troubled themselves about politics."1

A lengthy quotation from the New Regublidereenforces
this viewpoint. It states:

It is, of course. difficult to state exactly who
the bulk of Hitler's supporters are....lany’mem-
bers of the so-called "Non-Voters party" --people
who usually do not exercise their right of suffrage
went to the polls in September. and, to the great
surprise of the moderate parties. voted largely for
flitler....An analysis of the vote in September,
1930 in the province of Hesse shows that the Na-
tional Socialists owe their great gain there pri-
narily to these former non-voters. It was on them
that Hitler's agitation had the greaten effect.
loreover, this same study shows that the evange-
lised farmers and peasants were more susceptible
than were the workers. The Communist gains in that
region about equalled the Socialist losses. And
the Catholic Center party appears to have withstood
the inroads of the National Socialists better than
any other party.

State Elections

with the sudden emergence of the National Socialists
into political prominence in the Reichstag elections of
1930. a fever to vote Nasi seemed to grip the country.
Regardless of the type of e1ection~~in city. or in state--
that was held in the next two years there was a constant
upward trend in votes given the Nazis. And the sources of
power were nearly always the same. In the fall of 1931,
elections were held in Hamburg. Anhalt. Iecklenburg. and

Reese. Each election showed that the bourgeois parties

I. leidin.o . cit.. p. 136..
2. lildred he rtheimer. "Germany: Thunder on the Rightfl'

The flew Republic, 1931, vol. 66. p. 67.

 

 

IV"
41

were gradually being exterminated. The middle social
classes were finding the answer to their ten-year search
for a political leader. The numerous small splinter par-
ties were disappearing and their former adherents were
Joining Hitler.1

The 1931 Hessian election for the Diet outlines the
pattern. It was the first time since 1919 that the ”heimar
coalition" of the Social Democrat. Center, and Democratic
parties lost control of the Diet. Before the nasi onslaught
of 290,000 votes. as against only 158,000 only fourteen
A months before, the middle parties tumbled. The Social Demo-
crate becale the second largest party instead of the first
as they lost 47,000 votes. The Catholic Center party
showed a little fight as it gained 9,000 votes.2

Later analysis will show that the weakest point in the
lazi pattern was the cities of over one-hundred thousand
population. Despite this, the election to the House of
Burgesses of Hamburg in September of 1931 followed the pre-
vailing trend. The Nazi vote of but 14.760 in the same
election in 1928 and in the Reichatag election of 1930 bf
but 144.684, leaped to 202,465 votes. This represented 43
Burgess seats of a possible 160. The Social Democrats
drOpped from 60 seats in the old house to only 46 in the

new. They lost about 36,000 votes. but most of these went

I 3 55 Elliott. II'uermany‘in the World Crisis," TEeI!3-

e 0
t on‘ 1931. '01e 133. pp. 662'664e
5. Editorial Paragraphs,” The Nation. 1931. vol. 133,

1). We

 

 

42
to the Communists for they gained 35,000 votes. This in-
creased the Communist representation from 27 to 35 seats.

The lazi gains. then, were made, as usual, at the expense
of the middle class parties.1

In the Landtag elections of 1932 the sweep continued.
Hitler continued to win the middle class over to his side.
The Social Demazrats. the bulwark of the republic. steadily
.lost to both the right and left radicals, but more particu-
larly. to the Communists.

Prussia, hurttemburg, Hamburg, and Anhalt gave the la-
tional Socialists more seats in the respective legislative
bodies than to any other party. Bavaria gave the Nazi the
second greatest representation in their legislative house.
These states represent about five-sixths of Germany. The av-
erage Nazi vote was about 35 per cent. With this kind of
electoral support, the Fitlerites were able to set up, either
alone or with the aid of the Nationalists, cabinets in the
three states of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. Oldenburg, and Anholt.
Every one of these states was in the Protestant north and
west Germany. The Nazi gains were not great enough to give
then.control of Prussia, Bavaria, Purttemburg, or Hamburg.2
t Harry 17.. {dolor-.Wman Socialism in tam

The 'Ition. 1931. V01e 133. p. 394.

. ey B. Fay, ”Hitler's Gains in Prussia.” Current
histo . 1932. vol. 36. p. 354. Note: for summary table
of the political situation in the various German elections

ust prior to the crucial election of July, 1932, see Harold

. Childs, ”Recent Elections in Prussia and Other German
Lander." The American Political Science Review, 1932,
vol. 26,'EET 359-755. 5? the 17 tans.» listed. Rational
Socialist controlled five cabinets: four small Lander were
controlled by the "teimar coalition": and Nazi strength had
forced “administrative cabinets" in the remainder.

 

43
Of all the states Prussia gave the Basis the greatest
percentage of the vote--about 39 per cent. Until this
election the Social Democrats had controlled Prussia from
the beginning of the Republic. Table II shows the compo~

sition of the Prussian Diet in 1928 and 1932.

TABLE II: YRUSSIAN DIRT, 1929 AND 19321

 

Party Seats Held
‘ 1928 1932
Fizis , 6 . _132'
nationalists 82 31
Peoples 40 7
Center 71 67
Democratic 21 2
Social-Democrats 137 93
Communists 56 37
Others 40 3

Comparison of the distribution of seats in the two
years show that Hitler absorbed the ”Other", Democratic.
and Peoples parties. These were the traditional parties of
the middle class. The Conservatives also lost heavily to
the Rational Socialists. But it is surprising that the
Prussian Communists did not absorb the losses of the Social

Democrats.

Presidential Election of 19322
After the failure at the putsrh in Bavaria in 1923,
Hitler became a proponent of "legal" revolution. He was
convinced that the so? to achieve his goal of complete
13"Fi"}‘gg..glfi.. p. 253. ~
2. He den. ov. cit.. pp. 165-169: and Harwood L. Childs.

”The German Presidential Election of 1932.“ The American
Political Science Review. 1932, vol. 26. PP- 356-193.

 

44
mastery of Genmany was through gaining a majority of the
electorate. Then could follow installation of dictator-
ship based on the mandate supposedly given in the majority
vote. During the period just discussed Hitler's confidence
rapidly crew with each succeedina electoral success. Con-

sequently. when Chancellor Bruningl

tried to get the
'lational Opposition", composed of the Nazis and the Eugen-
berg Nationalists, to agree to a parliamentary prolongation
of Hindenburg's term, he was scorned. Hitler and Hugenberg
rejected the idea as contrary to the spirit of the consti-
tution. which both had fought for so many years to discard.
On the other hand, the originators and supporters of the
constitution, the Social Democrats and the center parties
were willing to make the extension. naturally they favored
this course because they were fearful of the possibility
that mum might win in. a presidential election.-

fihen agreement could not be reached. the presidential
election was held on larch 15. 1952 with four candidates.
The Ilperial Army general and Prussian Junker, Hindenburg.
was supported by the Catholic Center and the Social Deno-
orsts. Hitler was supported by his own party and a.splinter
group. the Conservative Agrarian party. Iany of the sup-
porters in these parties were the very forces that backed
Bindenburg in 1925. The Conservative and Communist parties

both put up their own candidate. The Nationalists ran

1.3053 EIIIc tt, "GermanyVSeeRs aPresidefit," Lfie lation,
larch 2. 1952. vol. 154, pp. 255-257.

 

45

Duesterberg, because Hugenberg thought that his candidate
could gain enough support so that the Conservatives would
be necessary in any government. Thalman was entered by
the Communists because it was the policy of the party to
refuse to cooperate with any other party in an election.

under the German electoral system, it was necessary
for one candidate to get a majority of the popular vote in
order to be declared president. In the March election.
lindcnburg was able to get 18.6 million votes. but this was
.4 per cent shy of so per cent. so that a second election
was necessary. Hitler was able to garner 11.5 million
votes. the Communists 5 million, and the lationalists only
2} million.

Hugenberg was disillusioned by the scent support given
Duesterberg. so he was withdrawn from the second election.
in the April 10th election Bindenburg received 53 per cent
of the vote cast. so he was again president. Hitler, how-
ever. had gained much more than Hindenburg so that even
though he lost the election, it was shown that National
socialism was still gaining in popular support. lip million ,
more voters backed Hitler in the second election than in
the first. His 13.4 million votes was 56 per cent of the
total valid vote. The Communists lost about a quarter of
a million votes. '

Something of the chaotic political picture of 1952
Germany is portrayed by the forces supporting the various
candidates. Hindenburg was backed by parties of the laboring

46
class and Hitler was supported by the agrarian cast that
was formerly Hindenburg's stamping grounds. In a suppos-
edly democratic country. the word “republic" was avoided
by the politicians just as the politicians ofthis country
avoided the word "prohibition" in the early thirties.1
lation, on larch 9, 1932. in commenting on the presidential
_election. remarked. ”Germany is presumably a democratic re-
public. but not one of the aspirants for office is either
an avowed democrat or a thorough-going republican. Presi-
dent Hindenburg, who has been put into the running by the
moderates and who will have the support of the Social Damo-
crats. is the only one of the four contending whose support
of the republic can be depended upon. The other three--
lhalman. the Communist: Dueeterberg. candidate of the,
atahlhelm and the reactionary Hugenberg group; and nitler. '
Othe fascist candidate--are enemies of the present republic."B
And in a short time it was seen that even hindenhurg was

not a supporter of the republic.

1952, July. Election
Following the Presidential election Hindenburg was
placed under severe political pressure to remove Chancellor
Bruning. This he did in May. and Frans Von Pepe? was ap-

pointed to form a presidential rather than a parliamentary

cabinet. It was necessary to appoint a presidential cabinet

”10“ O s O1fe p. ésse
2. "Editorialzraragraphs," The lation. 1932. vol. 184.

Fe 270.

 

 

47
for it was obvious that the Reichstag would not give Von
Papcn, or any other nationalistic reactionary, a support-
ing vote. Further, President Hindenburg was requested to
give Von Papen power to dissolve the Reichstag because it
was equally obvious that the party distribution of seats
was not in accordance with popular sentiment asshown by
.litler'e 13 millions of votes in the Presidential election.'
Hitler was so sure that his day to win a Reiehetagtmejority
had arrived that he constantly hounded Von Papen to disbandl
tho Reichstag and call the election in so daysas required
by the constitution. And when Von Papen did sc,wthevelec- ‘
tion was set for July 31, 1932. Virtually all commentators"
not affiliated with one of the parties forecast immediately
that the lasis would get a tremendous increase in deputies.
The‘gg! Re ublic. in an article datelined August 3.1 pres
dicted that Hitler would get 42 to 45 per cent of the
total vote.

The campaign was furiously contested. since the repub-
lioan parties were well aware that the lational Socialists'
had to be stOpped this time. A victory for lstional Soci-
alism.meant the end of the Weimar Republic. The usual
forms of political maneuvering went on. but in the last
days of June and in early July there were a large number of
riots. On one Sunday, July 17th, 17 were killed and about

200 injured. Under Bruning the Real army. the Brown

I. 'Uermany Clears the Decks." The New RepuEIIc, 1932.
Vble 71. p. 302s

 

48
Shirts, had been ordered suppressed, but one of Von Papen’s
first orders was to remove the ban. In the three follow-
ing weeks the estimated political deaths were 100 or more.
Sidney Iay wrote in September, 1952, that ”as usual, the
Iasis claimed that the Communists and social Democrats,
'Ioscow's gunnere' and 'godless internationalists', were
the aggressors. The two left parties replibd that the
anti-constitutional lational Socialists, with their provo-
eative military demonstrations and their Jewbbaiting, were
responsible."1
Just as determined to defeat Hitler as the two labor
parties was the Catholic Center party. This party'made an
intensive campaign throughout Germany in the hopes of at-
tracting the moderates of all classes. The lasis respond-
ed but were not able to make any gains against this party.
The Communists put on their usual intensive calpaign
but managed to cut into only the Social Democratic vote
rather than the Nazi. The National Socialists put on a
special drive to out down the KPD Vote but were completely
unsncessful. It is logical, however, that if the Coalaun-
ists had not been so well organised and able to capture the
vote of the workers who were turning away from the Social
Democrats, that many of these same voters would have joined
with,Bitler.
The Social Democratic party fought with the idea that
this might be its last chance. They were being held

I. Sidney 5. Pay, "Germany Elects a New fieldhstag," Eur-
Pent Bllto . 1932, VOle 36. pa 656s

 

 

, '49
responsible for the mistakes and failures of the Republic.
Social democracy was attacked from both right and left.
the appear the SPD used was that social democracvaas the
last bulwark against dictatorship,.and, in spite of all
counter attacks, was able to largely hold the traditional‘
support of the mass of workers.

Participation in the election was 84 per cent of the
eligible voters. or a possible 43,700,000 voters, I
36,800,000 went to the polls. The results were Just as
forecast.

Hitler was not able to obtain the majority he so avid-
ly desired.and expected, but national socialism was sble to
score its greatest constitutional success. 'The Iasis won
250 Reichstag seats of a possible 607. Rational soeialiua
was new the strongest political movement in Germany, and
for the first time since the revolution social democracy

had been replaced.

The distribution of seats in the Reichstag was:1

Part Seats 1932)
National gocialists

Social Democrats 183
Communists 89
Center 75
Nationalists 37
Bavarian Peoples 22
German PeOples 7
German State 4
Christian Socialists 4
German Peasants 2
Farm Federation 2
Householders 1
German Land 1

 

 

I? Adapted from Jerome G. Kerwin, "The German fieIcEstag
Elections 0! July 31, 1932,“ The American Political Science
R.'1.‘. 1932. '01s 26. pa 922s

50
Source of Nazi Vote, 19521

Figure B illustrates the percentage changes in party
proportion of national Reichstag vote from 1930 to 1952.
The laai gain was a tremendous increase of 19 per cent.
This was a.more than 100 per cent increase in the percent-
age of the national vote since 1930. Where did this great
increase in 1932 come frond .

The first major loss in 1932 was again in liberal par-
ties, as they lost 6.2 per cent, or about one-third, of
the lational Socialist proportional gain. But the major
loss in party strength was in the collection oftminorpar-
ties labelled ”Other parties: for here there was a net-de-
crease of 11 per cent, or more than half of the 19 per cent
lasi increase. These parties were largely representative
of the middle classes. ' _

The decline of the middle class parties is made the
more emphatic when the 23.5 per cent of the national vote
won by the DDP, 1m. and splinter parties in 1920 i.

 

I. 1513, p. 922. An interesting viewpoint on the sources
of Hitler's strength is eXpressed by Ir. Kerwin. He wrote:
Every condition favored extremist causes in this election--
the economic depression, dissatisfaction among civil ser-
vants because of pay-cuts, the large number of dispairing
among all classes, and the sentiment prevailing everywhere
that German morale would be strengthened and respect for
Germany everywhere increased by adherence to a party making
a strong patriotic appeal. The number of voters who had
no special attachment for Hitler or his cause, but who be-
lieved that he should be given a chance, was particularly
large. It was National Socialists with the hope that Hit-
ler would gain his majority; in that event, they were
certain he would be such a failure that he would not be
heard from again. These people were certain that such were
the means of getting rid of Hitler.

FlGURE a: PROPORTIONAL CHANGES IN VALID VOTE FOR
SPLCIEIED PARTIES IN REICHSTAG ELECTIONS, 1930-1932.

I Per Cent Change

-10 '5 O 5 19 lg 20
I fit j

 

NSDAP
asvp
pm» -
DVP
Center
Others
SPD

KPD

 

% Increase in Valid Vote

51
compared with the 5.2 per cent that they won in 1932. In
this same twelve-year period the Conservative party drap-
ped from 15.1 to 5.9 per cent of the national vote. The
DIVP was apparently near its minimum strength, for it lost
only 300,000 votes between 1930 and 1932, in spite of the
tremendous lasi gains.

The main sources or the Real gains in 1932 can then
be counted in losses totalling 18.3 per cent by the DTP,
DDP, DIVP, and the splinter parties. a slight increase
in total valid vote indicates that the laais may have got-
ten some of their increase there. However, this factor
was not the key to Nazi success in 1932 that it was inu
1930. The Catholic parties and labor parties remained
nearly stable.

The Communist party continued its steady increase in
votes with a gain of some 700,000 votes. For the first
thee in a Reichsteg election the radical labor party won
over five million votes. This was also the first time that
the party exceeded the record 5.0 millions of votes won by
the now defunct radical Independent Socialist party in i
1920. lost of the increase in votes by the Communist par-
ty was at the expense of the Social Democrats who lost
about 600,000 votes. In each election beginning in 1924,
Conunism reduced the vote for Social Democracy.

nitler's objective in this election had been to obtain
a majority in the Reichstag so that he could legally con-
trol the Reich government. And even though the [axis won

- 32
, larger representation in the Reichstag than any party .
"pp had under the Republic, Hitler was still not able to
~oamand majority support. Bugenberg‘s National Peoples
fartv had managed to win only 37 seats and‘in combination
nth Hitler's 230, it still was not a majority. If the
lssis had been able to getCenter party support, Hitler
amid have been able to go ahead. But the Catholic party
was not willing to put the government into the hands of. so I
noaedly an anti-republican man. The government was again
Halemated. The electorate had turned out in mass but had

.‘vtrc to the two extremes politically.

November 6, 1932 Election1

Following the failure to form a legal cabinet backed
5? a majority of the Reichstag, President Bindcnbul‘! 9?"
minted Von Papen, a Catholic reactionary, to head a "cabi-
not of experts.“ Von Papcn had to dissolve :the newly
elected Reichstag'for lack of confidence in him. The new
”action was set for lovember 6, 1932.

lovember brought deflation to the hopes of the fast-
"Mn? Hitler. In all, the Nazis lost over two million
votes. 80 the phenomenal party became just another party.
“’9 Social Democrats continued the slow steady slide. down-
"Pd with a loss of 12 more Reichstag 5093“.“ A’ usual,
“'9 Comm". 91311.4 up what the Socialists dropped. The

lemunists now had 100 seats. which is about what the
lads had in 1930.

mod? on Eileen. 22. c L. pp. 209-255-

 

53
there Hitler's former supporters moved can be seen in
the nearly fifty per cent increase in the Conservative vote.
lational Socialism was on the downgrade in the local elec-
tion as well. In December just a little more than a month
before Hitler was appointed Chancellor, the Nazis lost
heavily in.a.municipal election in Thuringia.

Reichstag Election of 19331

On lovember 17, 1932, Von Papen resigned as Chancellor
because he had failed to gain any significant strength in
the elections. Hitler was offered the Chancellory but on
such restrictive conditions that he refused to accept.
General Vbn Schleicher then became Chancellor, but he faced
such Reichstag difficulties, also, that he asked Sindenburg
to dissolve it again. This time the request was refused,
and on January 30, 1933, a government of 'Iational Concen-
tration” under Hitler was formed, but eJmposedly organised
so that Von Papen, as Vice Chancellor, would be in actual
control. It wasn't long, however, before the National
Socialists had control of all key police and administrative
offices, particularly in Prussia. Immediately, the suppres-
sion of the Communist party was undertaken and a reign of
police coercion of the people instituted. is a result, the
lational Socialists were able to intimidate the voters, and
the larch 5 Reichstag election became a farce.' National
Socialism got over 17 million votes and the Communists for

the first time since 1924 lost some supporters.

I. Holden, 22. cit., pp.f25§:§5§.

 

 

. 54'
The Social Democrats had not been harried too strongly,
but they lost slightly over 50,000 votes. The Catholic
Center party gained some 200,000 votes, so that the con-
tinued resistance of this religious group to the very end
is evident. This, of course, was the last election which
had any semblance of freedom and secrecy of the ballot dur-
ing hitler's long control of the German nation.’ There

would be no value in a continued discussion of elections.

SDIIAR! / .

Two diverse trends won increasing support of the Ger-.
man electorate in the period of 1919 to 1932. lational
Socialism tapped undercurrents in German life that sucked
in the middle classes, the traditional liberals of Germany,
as its main supporters. Communism.rode on the wave of
counter-action to National Socialism in the lower classes
and the historic arguments of Isrx that had long been ac-
cepted by these groups. Together, these two completely in-
compatible movements utilised the economic, politicsl, and
social disturbances of the post World War One period to
wreck the teimar Republic. Over fifty per cent of the Ger-
man.peop1e freely expressed themselves as favoring one or

another of these radical political movements. In 1919,

three-quarters of the voters had supported democratic

parties.

56

The main centers of resistance to National Socialism
were in the supporters of the labor parties and Catholic
parties. Summary percentages of the national Reichstag
vote shown in Table III, illustrated this very clearly.
The working man was represented by the Independent Social-
ists and the Social Democratic parties in 1919, when the
socialist parties won their greatest victories. In 1932
the worker was politically active in the ocial Democrat
and Communist parties, and the proportion of vote won by
these parties was only 6 per cent below the high point in
1919 and 2 per cent above the low point or 1924.

The decline in the preportion or vote won by the labor
parties does not represent the same condition that is true
of the conservative and liberal parties. The middle class

parties had an absolute1

decline as well as a proportional
one. This is not true or the Communist and Social Democrat-
ic parties. The total vote in 1919 was roughly thirty mil-
" lion and in 1932 about_thirty-seven million. The propor-
tional decline in labor party vote measures the inability
of these parties to win their share of the nearly seven mil-
lion increase in voters. The labor vote in 1919 was 13.8
ldllion and in 1932, 13.2 million. Absolute vote was
roughly stable in contrast with the large increase in
national Reichstag vote. This may have been due to two
peculiarities of the labor situation. Labor was long org-

anised on a politically class conscious level and may have

reached the limits or political organization in 1919. And

 

 

I. The a5solute vote of the DFVF, DD? and UV? was above
10 million in 1919. but just above 3 million in 19:52.

56
secondly, this class of society was steadily becoming a
preportionally smaller segment in the social structure.

Proportion of national vote for the Catholic parties
remained Just about stable throughout the 14 year period
and so points to inability of the Nazis or the Communists
to win the Catholic voter. There was no such steadfast
resistance by the voters who formerly supported the cone
servative and liberal parties.

The German National Peoples party fell from over twen-
ty per cent of the vote in 1920 to less than six per cent
in 1952. The middle class German Peoples and German Demo-
cratic parties fell from 23 per cent of the vote in 1919 to
just two per cent in 1952. It was in these groups that
lational Socialism won the major part of its votes. How-
ever, recall that the middle class parties' supporters did
not love directly to Hitler, but first entered numerous
splinter parties.

An interesting highlight in the 1924 election is the
great increase in the size of the vote listed under ”Other
parties", when it jumped from.3.l to 8.6 per cent. This
dramatically illustrates the terrific fragmentation of
German political life under the impact of the 1923-1924
inflation. It should be noted that it was the liberal
parties, consisting largely of middle class members, that
lost the greatest vote in this crisis. This is understand-
able, since it was the middle class of small independent
businessmen and white collar workers that was wiped out by

the inflation.

TABLE III: SUMMARY OF PERCENTAGES or
vows IN REICHSTAG ELECTIONS, 1920-19391

lature or_part;_1920 1924(n) 1924LD) 1928 1930 19323:)

Bight
as - , 6.5 3.0 2.6 18.3 37.5
Conservative 15.1 19.5 20.5 14,1 7,0 5,9
Iiddle .
01...]. 22e2 15.2 16e4 13.5 8.4 2.2
c.m011° 18s]. 16.6 17.3 15e2 14.8 15a?
Splinter 3.1 8.6 7.5 14,0 M 3.0

Left 2
“£35.: parties 42.5 33.9 33.3 40.4 37.s 35.9

 

1. Based on Tibia I.

2. The percentage figures for the Labor party for 1928-
1952 are somewhat misleading. The absolute vote for the
Social Democrats and Communists actually increased rather
than decreased as the percentages would indicate. The ab-
solute vote for these two parties in 1928 was 12,417,772, in
1930, 13,166,404, and in 1932, 15,242,338. The decreasing
percentages result from the inability of these parties to
win their preportional share of the new voters. (See p.55 ).

57

 

v

 

58
During Hitler's rapidly increasing strength at the

polls there was an ever increasing number of voters. let

'figures seem to indicate that Hitler was able to win a

large part of these new voters. It may have been that his
party organisation was successful in rousing certain
classes of people to vote who normally did not do so.

In just twelve years, the Rational Socialist party
moved from.an insignificant party not even listed in
Reichstag election results, to one winning over 35 per cent
of the vote. Analysis of elections during the Wei-er Rea
public points to the lower class and a single religious
group, the Catholics, as the key resistors to-lasimm. At
the same time, it is indicated that the middle classes were
the core of Hitler's party. During the same period, the
Communist party, backed by lower class, increased its pro-
portion of the vote from two per cent in 1920 to fourteen
per cent in 1932. Detailed correlational investigation
will support the insights gained in this analysis. a1-
thcugh viewed through a different frame of reference, the
summary of the Reichstag elections by hellen is very mean-
ingful and provides useful background to the main study.
Iellen lists these points as the major facts illustrated
by the elections.1

Iajor facts illustrated by Reichstag election
results of 1919-1933:

1. In the first election, before Versailles and
before the failures of the heimar Republic, the

l. lellen, 22. 33., p. 6W

 

59

German people strongly repudiated militarism and
aggressive nationalism, and showed their ovar-
whelming preference for a liberal progressive
democratic republic.

2. By lay, 1924, after Versailles, the Ruhr strug-
gle, and the inflation, and after irretrievable
errors by the early teimar governments, the German
peOple had made a violent swing toward the-militar-
istic and reactionary Right.

8. By Way, 1928, after four years of slow recon-
struction and economic recovery, they had reversed
the previous trend and made unmistakable progress
back toward the democratic and non-militaristic
line-up of 1919. ‘

4. In July, 1932, under the impact of the depres-
sion and the mass unemployment, 37.3'psr cent of
the German voters supported the Nazis. This was
the high point of Nazi strength before Hitler be-
came Chancellor. , *

3. In the first election after Hitler acquired
control of the machinery of state, 55 per cent vot-
ed for major parties of the extreme night. all of
them definitely militaristic. However, even at this
time Hitler's party did not secure a majority of the
votes.

In short, the major swings in popular sentiment
can be explained largely in terms of the economic,
social, and moral hardships--and recoveries--through
which the people lived in this period.

CHAPTER III
NATURE OF SAMPLE

This is a study of urban political action only. The
problem first encountered was the selection of the cities
that would constitute the best available sample. The
words "best available" should be emphasised, because in
many respects the sample used was not adequate. What the
deficiencies were will be explained in this chapter: but,
on the whole, the group of cities used were an adequate
sample. But a description of the sample will aid the
thorough reader to better evaluate the findings that are
discussed in the later chapters.

Problem one, then, was to select the number and types
of cities to be used. The German census of 1955 listed a
total of 567 cities of over 10,000 population. ‘It would
have been statistically more thorough to use all cities in‘
the correlations, but two factors interfered: one, time:
and two, availability of data. Study of the vote statist-
ics of the election of July 31, 1952, disclosed that a
majority of cities of under 25,000 population were not
reported separately but with county (kreise) vote returns.
Therefore, it was not practicable to include this size of
city. The elimination of city of size 10,000 to 25,000
populhtion reduced the available cities to 222. A sample
of this size could have been successfully handled, but it
had to be reduced by 29 cities of size 25,000 to 50,000

60

61
population because election statistics were not reported
separately for them. The entire sample then consists of
195 cities of over 25,000 population. Based on population
statistics for 1955, the city sample used includes all the
cities of population 50,000 to 100,000 and over 100,000.

In the third class, 76 per cent of the total cities of
25,000 to 50,000 p0pulation were used.

It was then postulated that size of city and region
would both be important factors in the sise of the vote for
any particular party. For purposes of administrative use
of the data accumulated, it was decided to handle region-
ality by military occupation tone.

Size-groups of cities were determined by accepting the
standard pattern of reporting of urban statistics by the
German government and then testing to see if city sise
actually was important in political action. The city siss-
groups tested were: 52 cities of over 100,000 population,
48 cities of 50,000 to 100,000 population, and 95 cities of
25,000 to 50,000 population.

The sample was first tested by determining that signi-
ficant differences existed among the different ciao-groups
as to the percentage of vote won by the National Socialists.

Percentage vote was distributed in this way:

 

 

 

City Sise Valid Vote Per Cent of vote to
1‘

W merge W aver“

50-100 1,989,195 55.4 15.5

Over 100 11,652,947 52.5 20.7

82. .3 ooo.8~ 86.87823
noausaaom has nounsaacn .33

550 houcoo 9mm

  
  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

08.86023
833.58 33

«as:

 

 

 

 

 

.zonaoflm 3953mm and.” .JSE. 2H em??— name

web; mo MBO> BEND mam Mme zo EHO ho WNHm .mo 809mg NIH.

« 0 Mmth

62

Testing the significance of the differences, it was
found that the critical ratio between 52.5 and 58.4 was
152.5, between 55.4 and 59.4 it was 60, and between 52.5
and 55.4 it was 77.5. Critical ratios of such extreme
statistical significance are possible because the standard
error is based on such a large N, the number of individuals
voting. The probabilities that such differences would
occur by chance are one in many billion. Tables of proba-
bility show that a critical ratio of 7 would occur only
once in 7 billion times.

In Figure C it is shown in bar chart form that the
size of a city will indicate the political structure of the
city. For instance, the first series of bars show that the
lasi party was strongest in cities of 25,000-50,000 pcpula-
tion, appreciably weaker in the middle-sized cities, and a
great deal weaker in the cities over 100,000 population.
Studying the Communist party, it is seen that it reversed
the Uazi trend and was strongest in the metropolises.

The DRVP and SPD followed the Nazi pattern, but the
Center party had a definite pattern of its own. It was
strongest in cities of the middle group, next strongest in
cities of over 100,000 pepulation, and considerably weaker
in the smallest size of city studied.

Size of city, than, was an important factor in the
sise of vote for each party. This indicates the necessity
of maintaining the division by size of city in all the sta-

tistics, so as to isolate the particular social facts that

contributed to the rise of the Nazi and Communist parties.

63
It is not likely that particular social groups, such

as socio-economic classes, completely changed political
alignment from one size of city to another. However, it
remains important that increasing urbanity be removed as a
factor in a coefficient of correlation so that a closer
reflection of the relationship of a particular social fact
to lazismbor Communism can be achieved.

As a further and more thorough test of the influence
of the size of a city on the vote won by National Socialists
or Communist parties, a simple correlation was made. Alto-
gather, 188 cities were coded by size by dividing the popu-
lation.of each city by the constant factor, 10,000. The
results were then correlated with the proportions of vote
for each of the parties. The sample coefficient of correla—
tion between size of city and preportions of vote for the
lasi party was minus .22. In other words, the larger the
city the smaller the prOportional size of the lazi vote.

The results were just the opposite with the Communist
party. As the size of the city increased, the proportional
vote for the Marxist party increased. The coefficient of

correlation was a plus .24. Both of these coefficients are

l 2

very significant mathematically for the size of the sample.

Distribution of Vote by City Size

size of city is important in another respect as well.

I. lhe two coifficlents are significant at the .55! level.
The 0.3. of the Nazi coefficient is 3.14 and of the Commun-
ist coefficient 3.43.

2. Rudolf Heberle also noted the importance of the size of
city. See heberle, note 66, p. 89, and pp. 95-96.

 

 

 

64

Table IV indicates the distribution of the vote of the vari-
ous parties according to the size of city. Th, main point
of the table is to demonstrate that the concentration of the
major portion of each or the parties' urban vote is in citi-
es of over 100,000 population. This is, of course, due to
the fact that over 11 million votes were cast in that city
size as against less 2 million in each of the smaller city
classes.

The table is significant, also, because it emphasizes
that cities of over 100,000 population were of tremendous
practical importance in the lazis' overall election victory.
Even though, relatively speaking, the Basis were weakest in
theJIetropolises, the number of votes won there was of tre-
mendous significance. Use of preportions throughout the
text tends to obscure this, and that is one reason it is
discussed here.

Table IV also introduces an important characteristic
of the Communist party. Recall that the Communist propor-
tion of the vote got smaller as urbanity decreased. The
concentration of over 82 per cent of'its urban vote in
cities of over 100,000 population measures the inability
of the Communist party to compete successfully with the
other parties in smaller cities. Without the nucleus of
metrOpolitan vote, Communism would not have been an import-

ant national political movement, in this election at least.

 

 

T1313 IV:
0’ TOTAL VALID URBAN VOTE FOR SPECIFIED P

1932 RBICHSTAG ELECTION, BY SIZE OF CITY.

PER csur DISTRIBUTION roa CITIES or was SAMPLE
éRTIES 1! Jury,

 

SIZE OF CITY

 

 

 

 

 

 

PART! . _
Over 100,000 60,000-100,000 25,000-50,000
lasi 72.57 13.00 13.93
i§b 92.44 T 9.03 0.48
srn 74.70 12.93 12.47
Center 75.81 16.30 9.89
nsvr 72.75 13.07 14.19
Others 72.92 13.49 18.09

m
0 Absolute vote figures are given in Table 1', Appendix

’. ht‘l VOtO. e

65

 

 

66
Size and Region

1 and size of city were postulated as

Both regionalism
significant in political action. It is important, then,
to know what the relationship between these two was in the
sample. Using the military occupation zones as the regions,
the various classes of city were distributed as shown in
Table V.

TABLE v: DISTRIBUTION or CITIEs‘
BT‘IILITARY OCCUPATION ZONES

 

- City Size lilitary Occupation Zone

 

 

 

 

 

(Population) American British French Soviet Total
25,000-50.000 18 16 7 52 93
50,000-100,000 9 a17. s 17 4s
0ver 100,000 A 11 26‘ 1 13 51'
Totals“, ’ 39 se 13 82 193,
a "m

 

 

* Berlin not included in any zone,/

The first class of city is concentrated in the Soviet
zone.2 As yet, the meaning of the various regions of Ger-
many has not been discussed, but it can readily be seen
that if important regional differences exist, cities of the
smallest size considered would be heavily weighted by fac-
tors peculiar to the Soviet zone. In the same way, cities
of bver 100,000 pOpulation will reflect any special char-
IT‘S“ R. E. DicHnsonm Regions m Lewor,
:345The Soviet Military Occupation Zone includes those
cities in the areas of Germany now administered by Poland.

The size of the sample of cities in the Polish area is so
small that it was not advisable to handle them alone.

 

67
acteristics of the British zone to a greater extent than
the other areas. Slightly better regional balance is
achieved in the middle-sized cities. It is possible, then,
that the differences found between_sizs of City were in-
fluenced by zonal factors rather than conditions incident
to varying size of city.

The fact that the middle-size of city is well-balanced
as between eastern Germany (Soviet) and the western (Brit-
ish). gives the hint that this is not so. The percentage
of the vote given the Nazis in this size of city wes sig-
nificantly different from that in the other two classes.
Later analysis will demonstrate that city size was

important in all zones.

' Zonal Patterns

Inspect the distribution of the percentages of vote
given the various parties in the separate occupation zones.
Table '1 outlines these percentages by holding the size of
city constant within each zone. In this way a good picture
is given of the relative importance of zone and size of
‘cities. All parties are included in the discussion.

Table VI has been constructed with heavy black lines
drawn around each party in the zone in which that party
achieved its greatest relative support. Thus, in the
Soviet zone, the Nazi party has been solidly outlined,
since in this zone it received its greatest proportion of
the votes in all classes of cities.

At the same time, the party percentage that is the

68

08.8" .35 e330 .- n
o8.8~.o8.on 338 ... e
08.8.8.8 338 can

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

code 7839323 uses nHHHU 30» 78.3.3993 usenwa _ _
new 0.0 men New. Pet N.o New New New or.» mom a.» £330
v...” 04¢ 02v bee oeo new hen Gen use as
.v n .v N N N n .v n
~33” boom" eeNH 0.3" new.” 0.0.” heauoo
n N n N n N
oebN Nona 0.0N veHN HedN H.mN New-N HemN OeeN an
N e a. v n N n N n
v.3 22 12 Tabbed n4: WWWWMWAVU Eu
m e e n n n H H
0.00 memo menu neon nemN mivn new» Nebn Nemn and:
w n a. n a. n N N N
n N .n n N H n N H n N ed
513m Aeneas minim Seneca
MNHN ED and MHON IOHBSmDDoo Ed.—

 

.umoa Esau. one Menu .8 mean Hm .8383 3.585 «nod
.53 3 names: canteen» 8a a8» anomamomofi 3» an:

.llllllnlllllllllllllll-lllllllllll\lI/l‘ i

 

 

 

69
lowest of all the zones has been outlined with a broken
line so that one can quickly see where a particular party
was its weakest, in relation to its proportional strength
in all zones. The percentages given for each of the par-
ties reflect how much of the valid vote of each zone each
party got in a particular size-class of city. Thus, in the
Soviet zone, the Nazis won 58.9 per cent of the valid vote
in cities of 100,000 or more population.

Russian zone: A quick glance at Table VI immediately
draws attention to the Soviet zone, because of the five ma-
Jor parties illustrated, four of them are outlined. Study
the Real party first.

The Rational Socialist party found its strongest posi-
tion in this zone by about six per cent above what it was
able to obtain in any of the other zones. The table also
demonstrates that the Social Democrat and Conservative par-
ties were to muster their greatest strength in this zone.
The Catholic Center party won 6-10 per cent less votes in
the Soviet zone than in any other zone. Communimm ranked
second strongest in this zone, falling behind only their
performance in the British zone.

British zone: In all sizes of city, the Communists
were at their strongest in the English zone. They were the
only party to maintain a consistent position in all three
sizes of city. The Nazis gained only fourth rank in cities
of 60,000 to 100,000 population and third in largest and

smallest size classes. Relatively, than, National

 

70
Socialism.was not as successful in this zone as in the
Soviet zone.

The Center party, however, did much better, relatively,
in the British zone than in the Soviet. The party was at
its second strongest in cities of 50,000 to 100,000 and
third ranking in the two claises of cities. Social Demo-
cracy had the same fluctuation in strength by city sizes.

In the smallest size of city the Social Democrats won their
second strongest relative vote, third ranking in middle-
sized cities, and lowest ranking in cities of over 100,000
population. Note how the Social Democrats move in.the op-
posite direction from the Communists and the Catholic Center
party from the Rational Socialists. The Conservative party
won its second highest relative vote in this region.

American zone: While the British zone gave the Commun-
ists their greatest proportional vote of any of the zones,
the American zone gave them their lowest. The Rational
Socialists found their second strongest relative vote in
the cities of this region. Proportional vote for the Social
Democrats demonstrates the typical pattern of rising when
the KPD vote falls. American zone cities gave enough votes
to the Socialists so that this zone ranked third in the
regional basis of the party. The Catholic Center party was
naturally strong in this Catholic area. The American zone
we. its second strongest geographical base. The Conserva-
tive party was weak in this region.

French zone: The Center party was at its strongest in

the Branch zone, again, because of the high proportion of

71
Catholics. In all sizes of city it got a larger percent-
age of vote here than it did in any of the other three
zones. As would be expected, the Nazi party fell to third
or fourth rank, depending on the size of the city. The
Communist party was also relatively weak here, all sizes of
cities ranking third when compared with the Communist vote
in the other zones. Social Democracy was at its weakest in
this zone. .

Summing up, the Rational Socialists won their greatest
relative support in the Soviet zone and weakest in the
French zone. They were relatively less strong in the Brit-
ish zone than in the American. Eastern and southern Germany,
then, supported the Nazis more strongly than the western
states. The Communists were at their greatest relative
strength in the English zone, and weakest in the American.
In the Soviet zone, they were somewhat stronger than in the
French zone. - .

The Social Democrats were relatively stronger in the
eastern Soviet zone than in any other zone. Their next
strongest area was the western British zone. American zone
cities gave them the smallest proportional support. The
Center party was strongest, in comparison with its strength
in the other zones, in the French and American zones, and
weakest in the Soviet zone. The Conservative followed
about the same pattern as the National Socialist.

There are regional differences in the sample, then,

Just as there are variations by size of city. The two fac-

tors are inextricably interwoven in the sample.

 

 

72

It has previously been shown that the cities classi-
fied by size are distributed unevenly throughout the four
occupation zones. Applying this fact in a new relation-
ship, it is shown that any statistics based on zone would
be influenced by the disproportionate number of cities of
each class within a zone. So, instead of having a regional
influence on size of city, the affect of size of city on
region is demonstrated.

TABLE VII: PER CENT CITIES IN EACH CIASS

ARE OF TOTAL CITIES CF SAMPLE IN EACH
MIIITAKY OCCUPATICN ZONE.

 

 

 

 

City Class Occupation Zone

(Population) American British French Russian
25,000-50.000 49 ‘ so so V so
50,000-100,000 as 29 as 5i
Over 100,000 29 45 s ' is

 

Table '11 shows that the American, French, and Russian
sense would be heavily weighted by the smallest size class
of city. Thus, any statistical measure such as a coeffici-
ent of correlation would, in these zones, very seriously
reflect the characteristics of this particular type of
city. In the British zones all measures would be bullied
by the cities of over 100,000 population.

Another major difficulty with the zonal analysis is
that the military occupation zones as established at the
Totsdam Conference, do not reflect the traditional cultural

cleavages of Germany. True enough, the very basic separation

73
of Protestant Germany from Catholic Germany was made.
But in the Soviet zone, for example, there can be seen to
be a lack of cultural homogeneity. .

In eastern Germany, at least four distinct sub-regions
can be outlined. The first of these would be the histori-
cally radical Province Saxony, Saxony, and Thuringia. The
second is strongly Catholic Silesiayithe third, Pomerania-
Brandenburg-lagdeburg; and the fourth, East Prussia.

Studying but a single factor demonstrates the politi-
cal differences in these four areas. ‘xh the textile and
metal working Saxony-Thuringia region, the Ccfisuniet party
averaged nearly 19 per cent of the urban vote. In Catholic
Silesia, with its heavy industry, the same party averaged
but 10 per cent. East Prussian cities averaged 19 per cent
of vote for the Communists and the Pomerania-Brandenburg
region only 14 per.cent. In the course of the discussion
of the statistical analysis of the social factors being
measured, more detailed interpretation of this in-zone

regional variations is given.

City Size Within Zone
By ranking each party within each zone according to
the size of city which gave the party its greatest propor-
tion of vote, second largest, and lowest, it can be easily
shown that size of city was important in all zones. In
Table VIII are shown the relative rankings within each zone

of a party's proportional vote.

74

In the American zone, cities of 25,000-50,000‘popu-
lation gave the Nazis 66.2 per cent ofthe vote (see Table
VI). This is a rank of 2, since cities of population of
50,000-100,000 gave 57.2 per cent to the same party (a 1
rank); and cities over 100,000 rank 3 since the percentage
of vote there was only 33.5. The same thing was done in
each zone for each party. Thus, in Table VIII the column
headed cities of 25,000-50,000 population, opposite lasi,
”found the numbers 2112. This reads that in the American
sons the lazi party received their second highest percent-
age of vote in the smallest size class of city, that in the
British and French zones this size of city gave the highest
percentage, and the final 2 indicates that the Russian zone
cities of 25,000-50,000 voted second strongest for the Nazi.
Bach party is compared in the same way for each class of
city. 1

.Study of the table shows the consistency of relative
ranks of the three class sizes of city, regardless of zone.
In the discussion on the effect of size of city, it was
illustrated that when zone was disregarded, large statisti-
cal differences occurred in the percentage of vote given
the lasis and Communists. .The largest size of city gave
the lowest vote to the Nazis and the highest to the Commun-
ists. If size of city is important, then Nazis should get
the lowest percentage of vote in the metrcpolises in all
zones. This would be 3 rank. Reference to cities over

100,000 in the table shows that this happened in every zone
except the British. I

'75

nine-nu_s d

moaehh.w n

£93.75 a m
4 a.

soak! C

 

 

 

 

 

 

.n n n n n abeH N H N N oNeH H N H H mg
.N H n N N .N n H H n .N N N n H honfioo
meH N N H H mNeN H n n N mNeN n N H 0 9mm
.H H H H H mbeN n n N n mN.N N N n N 9mm
ab.N n n N n obeH H N n H n.H N H H N Hana
m h m . 4 K h m 4 m h m d
owflumd econ no «neocooo emmmum< econ 333508 e 1:..wm4eenou no 3338
Zen so 80.8.” 3.3.158 8.87828 83.88 8.88.3 833.com
Bo ho MNHu gm

 

 

enmION ECHfldeooo SEMI la a. EU 8 mac HG can agHgfi 4

mom «a? 32.8.5 39308: 83 .52. B 93522: no 855 fine» 33w

76

Since the Communists received the highest vote in the
largest city size, their ranking in each zone should be 1.
And this is so in every zone. It is clear that the pattern
of relationship is not perfect in every case. However,
the average ranking illustrates that the Nazis got the
highest percentage of vote in the smallest size o1... of
city, second ranking in the middle sized cities, and lowest
percentage cfvote in the metropolises,

It is clear, then, that size of city has a similar
effect on proportions of party vote in each zone. The con-
elusion that size of city is a logical and significant fac-
tor to held constant in conducting an investigation of this
sort is reenforced. For while each class of city did not
achieve the same relative rank in each zone, the pattern is
constant enough to be considered demonstrative of the fact

that city also is of at least equal significance with region.

Range

Zone and city by population size can also be compared
by the range of vote given the Nazi and Communist parties.
In this way one gains an understanding of the great varia-
bility in the size of the vote won by a particular party
even within a single size-class of city or within an
occupation zone. when one reads that city-size class
25,000 to 50,000 pOpulation gave the Rational Socialists
an average of 38.4 per cent of the valid vote, it leaves

too great a feeling of homogeneity. Actually, there was a
great deal of variation in all three size classes and this

is shown in Table IX.‘

77

TABLE II: RANGE OF PERCENTAGES or JULY, 1932 REICHSTAG
ELECTION VOTE GIVEN NAZI AND COIMUNIST PARTIES BY CIT! 826E.

 

 

 

 

City Size Party
(Population) lazi Per Cent ’ Communist Per Cent
__7 Low High Bangs Low High Range
23,000-30,000 10 59 49 6 39 33
50,000-100,000 17 as si 4 so 29 8'
Over 100,000 18 61 SS 4 43 59

smmmmm=m===============================m=t================,
Both parties exhibit great variability in percentage of
vote won within city size class. Range 0% prcpcrtion of
vote for the Communists was roughly the séme in all three
city classes, but the range of Nazi prcpqrtionaI'vote was
very much greater in small cities than i4 the two larger
classes. These percentages emphasize that while important
differences exist among the three classea of city used in the
sample, there is apt to be Just as much difference between
individual cities within a single size class. Therefore, it
‘must always be remembered that the relationships discussed
in the main text apply to gross and not finite situations.
Variability was great within each zone as within each size

class of city. Table X demonstrates the ranges.

TABLE I: RANGE or PERCENTAGES OP’JUET, ices asicssrac
ELECTION vo'ra GIVEN THE um um consumer PARTIES, er
IILITARI’OCCUPATION zone. ,

 

 

 

 

 

IFarty
Iilitary Occupa- Razi Per Cent Communist Per Cent
tion Zone Low High1'aagge .Lcw High Range
American ‘ 17 59 42 4 ss 29
British 10 51 41 5 SO 34
French 23 49 26 6 22 16
Soviet 27 56 29 4 43 39

 

W

 

78

In this case, the National Socialist party portrays
greater consistency in range than the Communist. However,
each party demonstrates great differences in percentages
of vote won within each occupation zone. The ranges for
both city and zone are of approximately equal magnitude.

It has been shown that both size of city and military
occupation zone were important in the success or failure of
the Communist and Nazi parties. Furthermore, it has been
demonstrated that these two facts are so bound together
that they cannot be separated. It would have been better
statistically to hold both factors constant by studying a
particular size class of city by particular zones. The
size of the sample would not allow this. Kore complicated
statistical techniques would not have yielded sufficiently
improved results to warrant the additional time that

would have been required.

Correlations by City Size

then the coefficients of correlation were computed
for a large number of factors it was discovered that the
middle size of city consistently yielded higher simple
correlations than the other two size groups. The reason
for this is shown in Figures D, E, and P.

In these graphs the proportions of wage-earners of
the working pepulation are plotted with the prcpcrtions of
white collar workers of the working pepulstion. Each size

group of city was plotted separately. As will be described

 

FIGURE D: CITIES 25,000-50,000 POPULATION.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

45
a
35 .' 0:01 0.. .
4"..;“ .: P
.e”':;#. ”as
L ..-
03?: .
15 ' 33
0
00 0 ’50
§ {gonna Ex CITIES so one-100,000 POPULATION.
E:
Q. :
3 *’
g? 35 D..
H . e.
H . j 1 e
8 j" ‘.1.:
3 25 ' ‘5 %
I! . 0 0
a: : .
E 15 1' s
O
:5 at firfir+
E“
0* 5 FIGURE F: CITIES or 100,000 POPUIATION.
O
U
:55 ' v
' ‘2! :
° .3' ' .
25 - it . 1:.
i
i .
15
to . 0

 

Proportions of workers.

RELATIONSHIP OF PER CENT OF “AGE-EARNERS IN ERWERBSPER-
SONEN* TO PER CENT OF WHITE COLLAR WORKERS IN ERWERBS-
PERSONEN IN CITIES OF VARIOUS POPULATION GROUPS, 1933.

t See Chapter V.

79
laterl. these two basic occupational groups are adequate
_meaeures of the lower and lower middle classes in these
cities. What is indicated in the graphs, then. is a rough
outline of the nature and variability of the class structure
in the cities. _

These indices were chosen for plotting because analysis
of the data has shown that the class structure is basic to
political structure of the city. Inspection of the graphs
shows that the cities of population 50,000 to 100.000 in-
clude a cluster of six cities with extreme proportions of
wage-earners and three extreme cases of unusual prcportions
of white collar workers. Neither of the other two types of
cities have this blustering of extreme cases some distance
from.the main group. In both cities of 25.000 to 50,000.
“and of over 100,000 population, the proportions fall on more
of a continuum.

Another unusual feature of the middle size of city is
the greater variability of the relationship of wage-earners
to white collar workers. In both the smallest city size
and the largest there is a clustering or concentration of
cities in the center of the graph.

The combinatiol ofevtreme case clusters..grester vari-
ability, and fewer cases in cities of 50.000 'to 100,000
population means that the class conflict is more readily
portrayed mathematically. And since the class structure is
so basic to political action in Germany. the coefficients

of correlation in middle size cities always reflect these

 

I. See Chapter V.

80
conditions. In effect, the class structure of the middle
size of cities is more heterogeneous as between cities of
this size, and more homogeneous within each city. than
the other two sizes. The small and large cities Just re-
verse this. Therefore, the class conflict is more adequate-
ly represented mathematically in cities of 50,000 to
100,000 pOpulation.

PART Th0

CHAPTER IV
RELIGION AND POLITICS

The relationship of the church to the state was long
a controversial issue in EurOpean politics. The Catholic
Church. for one. has considered itself above the state and
superior to national politics. With the rise of central-
ised. nationalistic states, conflict with the government
was inevitable. In Germany the coordination of the various
Lander into the Empire signalled the emergence and the
growth of political parties. With this growth of a politi-
cal party state. the Catholic Church saw the necessity of
a Catholic party.

The Center party was organized about 1971 in order
that the interests of the Catholic Church might be repre-
sented in a largely Protestant country. It had a broad
social class been since Catholics in all classes supported
the party. In this respect it was a peculiar party in Ger-
man politics. Because of its social base and its close I
alignment with the Catholic Church, the Center party was
traditionally a.midd1e-of-the-road party. Its name, Center.
symbolises its intermediate role in German politics. The
party gained its strength from its connection with the
Church. Catholic workers were organized into trade unions,
pesssnts' "well—being" was promoted by associations. and

the urban Catholics were aided by peOple's unions.1

I. Herold P. CosneII, ihg Europe Votes, university of

Chicago Press. 1930. p. .
81

 

82
uaa.r the influence of the Church these special economic
interest organizations were allied with the political
party.

In 1920 the Center party was split by the formation
of the Bavarian Peoples party (Bayerische Volkspartie).
This latter Catholic party was a powerful state party con-
oentrated in Catholic Bavaria. It was more steadily con- ‘
servative than was the Center party. It appealed to the
strong sentiments favoring States' rights and the monarchi-
cal form of government that existed in Bavaria. The Dev-

1 In

arian and Center parties cooperated very closely.
general, the two Catholic parties appealed to all social
classes on s.moderately conservative platform. Both par-
ties supported the Republic.

The Catholic Church in 1932, and thus, the Center par-
ty, was opposed to National Socialism. In larch, 1981,
all German Bishops issued strongly worded protests against
the movement. The BishOps of the Diocese of ‘aderborn
declared, "...membership of the National Socialist party
was not permissible for a Catholic Christian for so long
and in so far as it propagates political and educational
theories that'are irreconcilable with the Catholic Doe-
trinefz The emphatic position of the Church and the in-

fluence its position had on the Catholic voter is

a.—

le 00.0.11. 0 e cite. P. 91e
2. Konrad He en, I History g£ National Socialism, Alfred
‘e Knopf, 1935’ p. 15 e

8

0‘.

highlighted by the actions of the Bishop of lains. In
September, 1931, he denied Peter Gemeinder a Christian
(Catholic) burial because Gmmeinder was a member of the
NSDAP. The BishOp stated that, "No Catholic may be a .
professed member of the National Socialist party."1 -It is
not surprising, then, that the Catholic voters were found
to be one of the strongest groups opposing Hitler. Loomis
and Beagle have suggested some of the factors in this op-
position. They wrote: "Durkheim's finding concerning the
coincidence of the Catholic faith and low suicide rates,
as well as lax Weber's observation that the value orienta-
tion of people in non-Catholic areas predisposed them to~
develop and to adjust themselves to capitalistic bureau-.
cracy, are pertinent to the consideration of the relation-
ship betwesn Nazism and Catholicism. This relationship‘
had, however, more facets than the value orientation which
may be said to characterize the Catholic faith. In pre-
Bitler Germany, Catholicism had special significance in the
political sphere because of its own powerful political par-
ty, the Catholic Center."2

The alignment of politics and religion could be ex-
pressed in geographical terms, since the Catholics concen-
trated in the southwestern areas of Germany. Prussia on
the other hand, was almost entirely Protestant. Religious

differences were thus emphasized by geographical separation.

I. Heiden, p. 153.

2. Charles P. Ioomis and J. Allen Beagle, "The Spread of
German lszimm in Rural Areas,” American Sociological‘gg-
view, vol. 11, so. a, 1946, ppm.

 

 

 

84

 

Goetz Briefs sees this regional difference as much
broader than Just the religious difference. He views Ger-
many as culturally divided into a "colonial" Germany,

(roughly, eastern Germany), which stood for "the Prussian

 

philosophy of the state as the absolute form of‘man's
existence”, and the "Lines" regions (roughly, southwestern
Germany), which stood for ”the rights of men, Christian

ethics, personal freedom, democratic forms of government.

 

Within the Limes, long before the history of colonial Ger-
many began, a type of a German and a German culture haa
been built up which has survived up to our present in spite
of all leveling influences, especially those of the indust-
rial age....The extra-Limes type of man and cultural expres-
sion is, relatively speaking, of recent growth, vigorous

and powerful, but void of any deeper pemmeation with the
Craecc-Roman past. Thus, two cultural traditions and two
”ethos", living side by side, cover the German soil, and
between there is the gap symbolized by the Limes.” 1 An
important effect of the geographically based cultural divi-
sion is the greater influence of religious factors in

+ political action.

The vote for the Catholic Center party would obviously
I be concentrated in those regions of Germany that had the
largest prcpcrtions of Catholics. In the combined American-
Prench occupation zones, about 50 per cent of the population
was Catholic; the British zone had about 85 per cent, and

. ets r e s, as ermanicus--ErIlge and ProntIer
(Part Two)," The Review g_f_ Politics, vol. 1. so. 4, 1939.
Pp. 4‘4’457e

 

 

 

 

85
the Soviet zone roughly 5 per cent, except for the larger
cities of Upper and lower Silesia, which had nearly 50

1 party varies

per cent Catholics. The vote for the Center
in the same pattern. Approximately 19 per cent of the
total valid vote in the American-French zone, 16 per cent
in the British, and 5 per cent in the Soviet went to the
Catholic party. The Center party, then, was weakest,in
1932, in the regions where National Socialism was,the
strongest. ‘

Considering the historical factors such as regional
differences, the political Catholic movement, the conflict
between the Church and State for the spiritual allegiance
of the voter, and the pattern of vote in 1982, it is
reasonably clear that Catholicism resisted the National
Socialist movement. Coefficients of correlation between
the prcpcrtions of Catholics in the population2 in 1933 and
the proportions of vote for the national Socialists and the
Communists in the 1982 election, were develOped. Table x1
lists these coefficients. , ' ‘

Table XI shows very clearly that in all sizes of city,
as the proportions of Catholics in thepopulaticn increased

the proportion of votes for the National Socialists de-

creased. These correlations are as strong as any that have

I. Includes Bavarian Peoples party.

2. Statistik Des Deutchen Reich, Berlin, 1936, BAND‘ggl,
DATA for I555‘TKI1 religious data from this source}.

8. The absolute data used in computing prgporgign; 2f the
vote is from: Hauptergebnisse der hah en un e c s a ,
emu 31 Juli 1952,*v.r1ag von Reine:‘HESSIEgIfi'seFIIfi'SWEGI.
unless otherwise specified, this is the election data used
in all coefficients of correlation.

 

 

55
TABLE III COEFFICIENTS CF CORRELATION BETWEEN PROPORTIONS‘
or CATHOLICS AND PROPORTIONS OP vorfl‘soa SELECTED PARTIES,
BY SIZE OF CITY.

 

 

 

 

SIZE OF CITY PART!
(POPULATION) NAZI COINUNISI
25,000-60,000 "e63 -.20
“gm-100.000 “.65 015
100,000 and over -.71 -.06

 

- _ __ _ V -___,--_.
G A coefficient of .21 is significant in Cities of
25,000-50, 000, .29 in cities of 60 .000, and .28 in cities
of over 100,000 population.

TABLE 111: COEFFICIENTS OF CORREIATION BETWEEI PROPORTIOlg’
or CATHOLICS AND PNCPORTIONS or VOTE“ FOR SELECTED PARTIES,
B! OCCUPATION ZONE.

 

 

 

 

IILITARY OCCUPA- PART!’ -
T10! ZONE IAZI COIIUIIST
Neerican-Prench -.67 -.02
Br1t1.h “e77 e‘l
Soviet . -.39 -.28

2 A coefficient of .30 is significant in the American-‘
French zone, .27 in the British, and .22 in the Soviet
Occupation sons.-

been found in the whole study.1 The evidenCe is thorough

enough to indicate that in urban Germany, very few Catholic

voters cast ballots for Hitler.

I. r...I. o? signITI issues were taken wan TaSIe 13, "Sig :\
nificant Values of r, R, and t,” in 3. Wallace and C.

Snedecor, Correlation and lachine Calculation, Muss, Iowa,
1931. 3.:51. probabilities are:

 

r/p is .03 r/p is .01
32 .35 .45
47. .29 .87
82 .22 .28

with each table of correlations is given the significant
value of r at the .05 level,/

 

87

The correlations with the prcpcrtions of vote for the
Communist party do not define any relationship whatever.

In view of the well known animosity of the Catholic Church
to the Harxist ideology, this is very surprising. The
Communist total vote was always smaller than the number

of non-Catholics in the population. Thus, the Communist
party and the Catholic Church could have exited in the some
cities without any Catholics voting for the radical party.
The lack of mathematical relationship may exist because
both groups were strong in the same class segment of Ger-
man society. One writer believes that fifty per cent of
the strength of the Center party was made up of workers.1
And workers constituted a much larger percentage of the
Communist party. Another mathematical factor is that as
the sise of city increased, the proportion of Communist
vote and proportions of Catholics, both increased.

Table XII demonstrates the above religious and party
relationships by rilitary occupation zone. In all soncs‘
the proportion of National Socialist vote decreased as the
proportion of Catholics increased. The lower coefficient
in the Soviet zone does not necessarily reflect a weakened
relationship in this regard, but rat??? is a result of the
proportions of Catholics in the zone being so small that,
mathematically, the true social relationship is not demon-
strated. The Nazi vote percentages were so large that the
fluctuations in percentages of Catholics had little effect

IT'EliTu Inflamfle ew times a. mafia. Hinton, Baron
and Company, 1929, p. 319.

 

 

 

 

 

on the total Nazi vote.1

The relationship of proportions of Communists and
proportions of Catholics is again indeterminate. In the
Soviet zone, the coefficient is a significant negative
one, but in the British zone it is significant and positive,
while in the American-French zone no relationship is shown.
The reasoning outlined previously could apply here equal-
ly well. The prcpcrtions of workers were greatest in the
British zone and so were the proportions of Communist vote.
At the same time, the proportions of Catholics were high
in the zone and increased with size of city, Just as did
the Communist vote. Since prcpcrtions of Catholics
increased as did proportions of workers, there is a.mathe-
matical relationship between Catholicism.and Communims
’thrcugh the lower socio-economic class. It seems logical
that there was no real positive relationship between the
Catholics and Communists.

lo correlations were computed between/proportions of
Protestants in the population and the proportions of vote

for the particular parties. It is obvious fron.the

 

 

1:# I study of rural Cermany demonstrated the same relation-
ship between National Socialism and Catholicism. It was
reported, "A significant finding is that the larger the
prcpcrtion of people who belonged to the Catholic faith in
the hriese (county) as of 1933, the smaller the Nazi vote

in 1924 and 1932. For the rural hreise of the Provinces

of Hanover and Bavaria, the correlation coefficients which
describe the relationship between the percentage of Nazi
votes cast in July, 1932, and the percentage of Catholics

in the population are minus .99 and minus .90 respectively.
For all communities of the Reich the corresponding coeffici-
ent based on larger election districts is minus .72. These
correlations...indicate that the Catholic segment in Germany
resisted the rise of Nazism more than other group." Loomie
and Beagle, American Sociological 32312:, p. 732.

 

distribution of Communist and National Socialist vote,
that both parties received many Protestant votes. In
areas where Catholicism.is dominant, the correlation on
proportions of Catholics tell that the Protestants support-
ed both Hitler and the radical labor movement.

The question of why one religious faith was opposed
to Hitler and another seemingly pro-Hitler does not fall
within the scope of this report. Suffice it to say that it
is not only a difference in the value orientation of the
two religions. Belief in the authority of the Church over
the State in Catholic doctrine is in contrast with the tra-
ditional acceptance of the supremacy of secular authority
in Lutherism. Ebenstein, for one, believes that the
"tradition of political subservience and authoritarianism
in German Protestantism.accounta for the ease with which
so many of the Protestant ministers and laymen joined the
camp of paganism.and animalistic racialism under the Iazi
regime."1 But.many historical factors, such as the tra-
ditional control of Prussia by Protestant leaders, the
sentiments expressed in the "Kulturkampf", and the close
relationship between Protestant Church officials and the
Prussian state officials were, among other factors, very
important. The variation in conceptions of the role of
the Church in individual political actiSn was also influ-
ential.

It should also be noted that there were other groups

Is Esen'tOin. as 9—13" lbw.

 

90
of Germans who were as strongly opposed to Nazism as were
the Catholics. An excellent example is the lower social
class. The labor parties were able to maintain themselves
very well against Hitler throughout his rise to power.
Iany examples of Protestant ministers who spoke out against
the lationalism movement could also be found. It would
seem.that some other factor than the Protestant value ori-

entaticn was important in the rise of Hitler.

‘ Hon-Church Voters
Figures of non-church voters were available for oit-
ies. These were computed as proportions of the population
by city, and correlated with the proportion of vote for the
two parties being studied. The coefficients varied in

direction by size of city, but non-religion was found not

 

TABLE XIII: COEFFICIENTS 0P CCRREIATICN BETWEEN PER CENT
OP POYULATIOH IITH NO RELIGIOUS BEIIEFS AND PER CENTS 0?
VOTE FOR SPECIFIED PARTIES, BY SIZE OF CITY.

 

 

 

 

8128 0? CITY PART!
NAZI COIIUIIBT
28,000-50,000 -.21 .37
50,000-100,000 .00 .00
100,000 and over .56 .21

WW}

A coefficient of .22 is significant for cities of
26,000-60,000 population, .30 in cities of 50,000-100,000,
and .28 in cities over 100,000 population.

 

91
to be an important influence in voting behavior.1 -Table
XIII shows the coefficients.

The coefficients show that peeple with no religious
affiliation took no single direction in political action.
Why proportions of non-church voters are related positively
to Communism.in the smallest type of city, and to Rasimn in
the largest city type, is clear than the class structure is
considered.

Proportions of peOple with no religious beliefs were
very significantly related to the prcpcrtions of workers in
the smallest city size. The coefficient of correlation was
plus .672 with this factor, but proportions of non-church
correlated negatively (minus .48) with proportions of lower
middle class in the same size of city. In metrOpolitan
cities the proportions of non-church showed no relationship
with either of the two classes. In effect, relatively as
many of the non-religious in major cities were of the mid-
dle class as of the lower class. Thus, a positive relation-
ship of non-church to both Communism and Nazism was pos-
sible. liddle-sized cities present a variation on these
two cases.

Preporticns of non-religious people correlated nega-

tively with prcpcrtions in the lower middle class, and

I. It is realised’that_Church membership InCermany does
not necessarily mean acceptance of religious beliefs. The
traditional close relationship of Church and State, as in
collection of taxes for the Church, cperatsd to keep many
people officially aligned with the Church even after be-
liefs had changed.

2. A coefficient of .22 was significant.

 

 

92
positively with proportions in the lower class. So when
atheism was correlated with the two parties, no relation-
ship deveIOped because the group was divided into fairly
even antagonistic elements that neutralized each other
when mathematical procedures were applied.

Failure to belong to a church, then, was not an
important factor in political action. Class sentiments
were much stronger, for the non-religious divided along ,
class lines. This is not surprising, since both the Nazis'
and.Communists' doctrines disputed the rights of religious
authorities. There was no need for the person who does not
hold to a religious doctrine or the anti-church voter to
make a selection between the parties on the basis of reli-
gious policies.

The relationships of the Jews to either Communism or
lasismicould not be studied by the correlational technique
used. Jews constituted only two per cent of the popula-
tion and were concentrated in a few cities.

In the discussion to follow, it is obvious that pro-
portions of Catholics in the particular social group under
investigation, will drastically affect the relationship
between that group and Rational Socialism. For various
reasons, the same will not be true in regard to Communism.
lo attempt is made to answer whether or not different
branches of Protestantism reacted differently to the two
radical political parties. For the purposes of this
thesis it is assumed that Protestantism was not a basic

determining factor in political affiliation.

93

A Catholic of any social class, age group, region,
sise of city, or occupation zone, could reasonably be ex-
pected to be anti-Nazi. Considerations of sex, age, soci-
sl class, or occupation, primarily determined the political
habits of the Protestant voter.

The question now to be discussed is the relationship

of position in the class structure to political action.

 

 

I”!!! A survey of 3,755 German civfIIiEi‘IIPIfiE'IE"'
the British, French, and American occupation zones in the
summer of 1945 included data on church members. The con-
clusions are similar to those above. It was reported that
the Catholics had the largest proportion of non-lasis, the
Atheists, the second largest non—Nazi element, and the
Protestants a lower proportion of non-Basis than either of
these two groups. That order was maintained in all age
.groups, occupations, and regions, for married as well as
for single, for both sexes, and for all levels of education.
The author, Helen Peak, believes that the differences in
the structure and beliefs, and official positions and atti-
tudes of the two main churches, when combined with the tra-
ditional submission to authority of the German people, ex-

lains, in part, the above differential acceptance of the
Basis. Helen Peak, "Observations on the Characteristics
and Distribution of German Nazis," Psycholcgfical lonographs,
'01e 59. ‘Oe 6’ 1S‘45' ppe B'lOe

 

 

CHAPTER 7
THE SOCIO-EGONOKIC CLASSES

A socio-economic class that is more than just a taxo-
nomic group, consists of many persons who, in spite of
often extreme individual differences, are similar in
habits of dress, of speech, of entertainment, of consump-
tion, of manners, and of occupation. There are feelings
of internal unity supported by actions portraying group
loyalty. Iembersaare all of relatively equal social pres-
tige. Only certain occupations are suitable for members
of each class. And the classes are differentiated by the
peculiar folkways and ideologies of each. Entrance into a
particular class is usually by birth and, often, by econ-
omic factors. The more cohesive, that is, the more organ—
ised, a class is, the more important that class is as a
political factor.

There must be feelings of class consciousness in order
for a class to be a rallying point for political action.
The more clear-cut the above class characteristics, the
greater the awareness of the social distance between the
classes. And the more intense the understanding of
cleavages, the greater will be the distinctions in atti-
tudes toward the political and economic structure of the

It.“e

94

95

The greater the gap between the classes, the greater
difficulty of communication between the stratified ele-
ments, the greater the obstacles to movement from one
class to another, and the greater the variations in con-
trol of the wealth of the nation and in access to politic—
al power, the more likely it is that there will be class
struggle for the control of the political organs of the
society.1 Jointly, with these conditions there must be
feelings by a member of the class that other classes are
working to injure his group, and that he can benefit only
through actions that benefit all of his class. Only then
is scale-economic class a reality and so important in the
formation of political attitudes, and hence, of political
affiliation. Such were the conditions in Germany in 1932
when the middle class provided Hitler with the majority of
his support, and the lower class was the principal social
basis of Communism.

The growth and development of any organised or quasi-
crganised group is based in history and is functionally
related to the other historically important aspects of the

social structure. The reality of social classes in the

 

I. lEvery party tries to appeal to as'broad a public as
possible. The success of such appeal will depend on the
intensity of class antagonism and on the width of social
distance between status groups. there class lines are not
clearly visible by objective criteria of source and size
of income, where social mobility is great and where other
factors tend to obliterate economic class distinctions in
daily social intercourse, there the political parties are
more likely to expand beyond class boundaries than in
areas where pecple think very definitely in terms of class

and status.” Heberle,‘gz. cit., p. 100.

 

 

(‘C
political life of Germany can be better understood then

the historical development of those classes is outlined.

Historical Foundations1

Eye witness reporters and historical writers have con-
sistently written that there was an important class basis
to the National Socialist and Communist parties.2 Corre-
lational research in this study of the cities of Germany
strongly supports the thesis that the Nazis were supported
primarily by the middle class, and the Communists, almost
exclusively by the wage-earner class. Both these main
classes had a long historical develOpment so that they were
organised and self-conscious. A part of the historical
development of classes was the growth of a particular po-
litical orientation in each class.

The traditional rulers of Germany, until the Repub-
lie, were the upper class of nobility, estate owners,
large industrialists and bankers, and the military caste.
The middle class was politically impotent until well into
the 19th Century and while increasingly important up to
the end of the Empire, was never more than a supporting
I:-—Tilcott Iaraons, 1‘Democracy and ESFTET_§tructure in
Fro-Nazi Germany," Journal of le al and Political Sociole
e , vol. 1, 1942, pp. fia-lTT: gar‘I:”Howrer,;g§§g%gf-

u s the Clock Back, New York, 1933, Chap. 17: ,
entIn, The fierman lee le, New York, 1946, pp. 31-34: 85-
96, 15mm . FEE” -..60. 314-318, ass-344. see-410. 416-
d22, 535~5563 hilliam Ebenstein,‘zhg German Record, New
York, 1945, pp. 3-160: J. Ellis Barker, Bodern Germany,
'0' York. 1915. Chapter. 1Q. 19. 3‘30
2. At least one German author of note decries this -
Konrad Beiden, who states, "The whole popular concept of

 

 

 

 

97
voice to the upper class. The lower class, after l¢50,
won increasing power, but not until t‘e Formation of the
Republic use its power reooynized adequately. Then it
had to share its power aith the middle classes.

An important social element in the structure of Ger-
man society was the peasant class. This group (Bavarntuml
was especially influential in the rise of National Social-
ism, but in view of the urban basis to the thesis it is
not considered here.

At the beginning of the 19th Century, Germany was
still controlled by the nobility, in spite of the increas-
ing importance of, particularly, the middle class. Eben-
stein described the class system of the early 19th Century
in this way: "Nobility, bourgcousie, and peasantry were
the three castes of Germany. A certain mobility between
the burgher caste and the peasant caste was possible. The
nobility was practically closed...In Prussia, as in other
German states, intermarriage between members of the nobil-

ity and persons of other classes was legally prescribed."e

 

 

class Is an intellectual left-overTrom a period when men
were confined to distinct occupations or groups all of
their lives and often for generations on end.

The type which came to the fore in 1950 was rapidly
departing from the old class concepts. He was led by the
declassed of all classes, the armed bohemians. The worn-
out occupational and class concepts had concealed the
decisive phenomenon, a new human type, which now revealed
himself in a brown or black shirt, with pistol, club, and
torture chamber: the armed intellectual." Konrad Beiden,
Der Fuehrer, Boston, 1944, p. 352.

. Ebenstsin, 22. git... p. 94.

ti)
:3

However, at about this time Germany beran its delayed

industrial revolutipn.

The Middle Classes

After lROO, the Industrial Revolution meant a rapid-
ly increasing middle class that became an increasinaly
potent political factor. In this pro—Empire period of
German History, the middle class consisted of an upper
element of entrepreneurs who had important property hold-
ings and who were active in industry, commerce, and banking.
The lower level of the glass was the small prcperty owners
engaged as craftsmen, shopkeepers, small businessmen, pro-
fessionals, rentiers, and pensioners. There were many
liberal elements in both of these groups rho participated
in the revolution of lP4R. However, many in the upper
, middle class tried to, and did, gain admittance to the
higher civil_service and the officers corps that had al-‘
ways been dominated by the upper class. These elements
became "Prussianised" themselves, rather than democratiz-
ing the 01d upper class. Fany purchased estates and were
enabled. Ferriage also tied the Junkers to the big indust-
rialists and bankers. These processes continued into the
Republic.

A turning point in the democratization of-Germany and
an equalization of the political poser of the three main
social classes was the defeat of the revolution of 1949 by
the Prussian King. The aims of the revolution were limited

to requests for freedom of the press, for juries, for a

99
civil guard, and for a national parliament. The revolt

aas successful in the first few months, but the assembly
established at Frankfurt did not “in any support from the
many German trlnces. then it offered the imperial crown
and the new national constitution to Frederick hilliam of
Prussia he turned it down. Instead, he countered with
harsher controls in Prussia and used the Army to eradicate
the leaders. Discussion and agitation for democratic
ideals was forbidden.

Of lasting importance in tte political alirnmont of
social classes was the split between the prcpcrtied middle
classes and the workers and peasants. The socialist revo-
lution in Paris in June of 1949 was used by the upper class
of Germany to inflame the middle class of the "Red Kenace".
The middle classes became oriented politically to the
upper classes and away from the lower class. This split
can be demonstrated as partly responsible for the success
of Bitler. .

The EMPlPe of Germany was established in the Constitu-
tion of 1971 under the ouidance of Bismarck. It was not a
democratic constitution in spite of the fact that univer-
sal manhood suffrage for the lower chamber of government
was established. The lrussian King became Emperor and had
the power to appoint the Reich Chancellor. 0f the two
chambers, the Bundsrut and the Reichstag, the first was the
seat of power. It was composed of the representatives of

the heads of the 95 states. 'It had the final word on most

My“

 

100

legislation. The Reichstag was pepulsrly elected but had

'virtually no power except over the budget. And this was

mitigated by the fact that once taxes were voted, they
could go on year after year and the Reichstap could not
revoke them. It did not have any control over the execu-

tive. The Empire was still largely an absolutist state.1

 

 

If; Loewenstein reports that in Iano to 196§T—'The authori-
tarian period of German political life in which the power
of the Royal frerogative decided, in the last resort, trend
and issues of political life, had definitely some to an end.
Karl Loewenstein, "Germany and Central Europe," Governments
2; Continental Euro a, New York, 1940, p. 329: another
author, writing In $515, states that "Germany is an almost
sutocratically governed military state which possesses
merely the semblance of representative government." (p.
805). later the author describes the people as ”firmly
ruled by a small class throush an all-powerful bureaucracy,
army, and police." (P. 828). Perhaps more convincing is
his description of a bit of German humor. To quote: "A
German comic paper, the Simplicissimus, printed Just before
the election (of 1912) a cartoon in which a gentleman of
aristocratic appearance was addressing a number of people.
underneath were the words: "Gentlemen, you have now to
fulfill that most.important duty of German citizens of
voting for the Reichstag. When you have done so, it will
again be the Emperor's turn during the next five years,"
Barker, p. 440: a third writer states that, ”Pro-war Prus-
sis was a class state built around an army. Its ideals
were power, discipline and obedience. Reverence for power
and sense of duty were spread throughout society. The
beauty of servility was hammered into interiors by more
than Spartan methods. The chief danger was class upheaval.
Therefore, Socialists became social outcasts. The rulers
unflinchingly enforced a system of class justice....

In this pyramid the social strata were clearly visible.
At the tap the "all highest“ Emperor, and around him.the
other ruling princes and treat nobles. Then the God-like
army officers. Just below them came the officials, the
semi-divine Besmten, a class that included judges, profes~
sors, school teachers and even postman. The social back—
ground for the better places in the Army and the higher
bureaucracy was furnished by the land-owning aristocracy,
the merchant patricians of sueh old trading towns as Ham-
burg and Bremen, and the newer industrial and banking barons.
The middle class supplied the bulk of the officials.

The author continued that, ”In no social class were the
narrowing results of this system more evident than in the
'good, middle-class families', severely old-fashioned,

101
With the formation of the Empire, industrialization

took sudden and deep root in the German economy. Indust-
rialisation meant a new middle class that contained all
the old elements, but also, many new. The old elements
were slowly but surely pressed into the background by the
rising white collar employees, business managers, profes-
sionals, and government employees.

Elements of the new middle class were absorbed_into
the government bureaucracy, which was second only to the
Army in support of the monarchy. Numerically, state em-
ployees were a large part of the middle class, because the
government was Operator of many industries and.most of the
transportation and communication. The controlling upper
classes were also willing to allow special privileges to
this class in exchange for opposition to the socialism of
the lower class. The middle class was just as national-
istically minded as the governing cliques, and this, too,

acted as a cementing force.

 

patriarchal, plain-living, slightly rough and suprem;I§-_'
conscious or their merits of honesty, fidelity, snobbery
and patriotism." lowrer, pp. 209-211. Hoover believes
that, "....the social and political system in Germany pri-
or to the war (1914) was based upon the assumption of an
almost biological inferiority of the working classes."
Calvin Hoover, German Enters the Third Reich, New York,
1933, p. 12. These Tour quotations reTer to the pre-Re- '
public period. A report by Harrison Brown in 1932 indic-
ates that the upper class had lost none of its class
prejudices. He reported, "One may....live amongst the Ger-
man upper classes for weeks and hear no word of hostility
against foreigners, but one can scarcely pass an hour in
their company without being astounded at the ferocity and
bitterness of their class hatred." Harrison Brown, The
Collapse of Liberalism in Germany," Contemporary Review,
vol. 142, November, 1932, p. 554.

102

Besides being accepted into the bureaucracy by the
ruling class, the middle classes were also given positions
in the officer corps. The officer corps was always one
of immense prestige, and in the Empire the military code
permeated every aspect of upper and middle class activity.
Iiddle class parents tried to get sons into the officer
corps, and, failing in that, to get them a reserve commis-
sion. Ir. Barker states that the social prestige of the
officer corps was so great among the middle class that
leading businessmen had "Lieutenant of the Reserve" print-
ed on their visiting cards.1 The upper and middle classes
were bound together by this military attitude.

The Republic, created in 1918, was supported by
middle class as well as working class elements, who enter-
ed politicsl life through the German Peoples and the Dem-
ocratic parties. Many, however, joined the menarchist-
’Iinded German National Peoples party.

In teimar Germany, increasing cartelization of indust-
ry and trade, and the consequent reduction in the influence
of the small operator in manufacturing and trade, the
lid-twenties inflation and the government currency prog-
ram, and the depression starting in 1928, particularly
affected the middle class. It was so crushed economically
that it could hardly be said to represent a cohesive
occupational and income group. But it still retained

memories of its Empire position and privileges, and, as a

17"Eirker, pi‘acs.

 

 

 

e .le-a-I .4...‘ A-A‘Asm

A “- -w-—m-m;‘r eel.“ ..

.e-. . ._I-> Mo-

“Ht

103
a group, refused to be proletarianized.

Ebenstein writes that the new middle class refused
to Join the lower class as Marxist doctrines had forecast.
He argues that of all organized sage-earners in Germany,
about four-fifths were members of the "free" (Socialist)
trade unions, and the rest in the Catholic and Nationalist
unions.' But of all organized white collar workers, only
one-fourth were in Socialist unions; the other three~
fourths were in Catholic, Nationalist, and independent
unions. An inquiry into the social background of salary‘
earners in Germany in 1931 (100,000 employees covered)
found that one-fourth came from the working classes, the
other three-fourths from salaried, professional groups,
civil servants, business and agricultural and independent
artisans. Thus, the prcpcrtion of white collar employees
in Socialist unions was equal to the proportion of middle
class from the working class.

The author then concludes, "These facts proved that
the orthodox Socialist prcpaganda in Germany based on
Marxist appeals did not attract the German salariat. This
latter continued to organize itself in terms of its social
consciousness as a group different from, and superior to,
the proletariat rather than in terms of its economic
dependence which, Marx thought, would make of it a natural

ally of a Socialist working class."£

The Empire officials who had not been ousted from

 

 

‘ I. Ebensteln, 22s Cite. Pp. fiIU"?16Z

104
their positions when the Republic was formed are an ex-
ample cf these. In the Republic, as in the Empire, public
officials held automatically superior status and an im-
portant social role in any town. They were proud of the
alleged superiority of the government bureaucracy. Even‘
though industry pay was higher, the status of the govern-
ment employees was the hipher of the two. In social life
official titles were retained.1 It is easy to-understand,
then, how Jealous this middle class element would be of
its prerogatives. Even the lowest economic groups in the
middle class and the highest in the proletariat acted as
if there were worlds between them. An ordinary clerk con-
sidered himself on the level with the manager even though
he was closer to the rorkcr. Girls in clerical work would
netthink of having contact with workers, let alone marry,
them.8

However, the middle class had lost faith in its poli-
tical ideology. No longer did the middle class operate as
a unit in politics, but spread its allegiance to twenty
'or thirty splinter parties. Its program of 19th Century

liberalism aas worn out And it had to hunt for a nev e.

The lever Class
The historical oripins of the proletariat reach back

I: Kowrer states that in pro-war Prussia, "Officials
looked down upon non-officials as a matter of course and
received meager payment but unlimited social consideration
and high-sounding titles and decorations, not to speak of

minor concreteprivileges. ,
2. Based on conversations with Professor Werner Bohn—

stedt, Iichiran State College.

 

105

to the beginnings of the industrial revolution in Germany
at the end of the 18th Century. With the mechanization
of industry and the movement of the peasant to the fac-
tory and mine, the new social class with distinctive
problems was created. In Germany, this new social force
was given personality and the hypothesis of the inevita-
bility of class conflict.‘ hith the rise or this class,
the middle class began to forget its own anti-monarchist
and anti-authoritarian ideals.

The develoyment of the proletariat in Germany was
delayed by the lateness of the Industrial Revolution.
This can be seen in the shift of pepulation from_rural to
urban areas between 1871 and 1910.1 In the first year,
Germany was only 86 per cent urban and 64 per cent rural.
By 1910 these percentages had almost reversed, for in that
year, 60 per cent of the peOple lived in cities and only
40 per cent in rural areas. Germany was more than 50
per cent rural until about 1900. Compare this with England
which was 50 per cent urban by 1950.2 In just forty years
the bulk of a new social class ass formed in the cities.

The recentness and the speed of the develonment OP
the urban proletariat is very important in the breeent con-
text. The strains of feudal social organization remained

much longer in rural areas than in urban. Particularly

was this true in eastern Germany. ”any of the new urban

I. The New International Encyclopedia, New Tori, 1555:”"
V01. 5, ppe gua-GRE.
2e Ibid. V01. 7, pe 749s

 

106
proletariat were drawn from peasant areas where the
differences in social class and their particular place in
the social scale had been thoroughly impressed upon them.
then these facts are integrated, one readily understands
the historical factors which contributed to the ready
deveIOpment of social class consciousness in the urban
proletariat.

Before Marx and Engel issued their Communist lanifesto
in 1848, there was considerable agitation by the workers
for improvement of their conditions. In France, the eco-
nomic postulates of socialism were combined with the poli-
tical ideals of democracy to create the ideal of social
democracy. The German workers picked up the cry, and class
consciousness for the workers began to develop. The Com-
munist Manifesto was delivered just prior to the revolution
of 1848 and the conflict of the classes proceeded space.

Froletsrian movements mere foupht from the very borin—
ning by the aristocracy, and later by the middle class.
During the Empire, Bismarck restricted workers' political
rights so severely that between 1879 and,1990, unions were
banned and police and prison were common means.of suppress-
ing socialists.1 In 1890, the policy ofgcontrolling the
lower class ass changed to attempts to bribe by social and
political concessions.

The Social Democratic party ass founded in 1869 at

 

 

I. For a short discription of the efforts of 51 snare} to
eradicate socialism, see William Ebenstein, Lbs German
Record, pp. 165-171.

107
Eisenach1 and the worker Was given voice to protect himself.
In the 1871 Reichstag elections the partv won but 102,000
votes. But the wage—earner responded rapidly to a party
preaching the doctrines of rnrxg and in 1977, 493,000 voted
for socialist candidates to the Reichstag. 31th the ban on

unions in 1978 a similar prosecution of the socialist par-

ty was launched.2

However, the labor party continued in existence and in-
creased its vote from an approximately one-half million in
1878 to nearly one and a half million votes in the last year
of the ban, 1990. In a period of 13 years the party in-
creased from the fourth largest in the Empire to the largest.

By 1912. the last elections under the monarchy, the
socialist labor party had increased to four and a half mil-
lion votes.3 The labor party continued to grow and in the
national elections of 1919, as a result of anti—war senti-
ment, von 46 per cent of the vote. The continued strength
of the lover class in the Republic has already been demon-

strated. Fifty years of trade unions and militant labor

parties made the wage—earner class conscious.4

1. Visit Valéntin, p. T75. w

20 Ibid. ppe 493'4950

3. The election statistics are from Ebenstein, pp. 163-171.
- 4. "In 1895, 35 million persons, or over two-thirds of the
German pepulation, had an annual per capita income of less
than 900 marks ($925)...These economic conditions were but
a reflection of the political and social enslavement of the
German working classes...Socialism seemed the natural ans-
wer to man! German workers when they became conscious of
their poli ical, economic, and social inferiority. The
doctrines of inevitable conflict, class war, and class hat-
red, the total denial of the existing society, the visions
of an all-powerful, omnipotnnt and omniscient state benevol-
entl providing and planning for all citizens, were the ty-
pica dream-image of the suppressed German of the lower

classes who resented his inferiority. Ebenstein, pp. 163-4.

 

108

The distranchisement of the later class in Prussian
state elections ripht up to the creation of the Republic
in 1919, can be seen in the firures for the Prussian diet
elections during the Empire. The political disfranchise—
ment of the pro1etariat is representative of the social
distance betveen the upper and lower classes.

In Prussia, the three-class franchise was used until

1913.1

The division of the three classes of voters in
1908 see: first class, 293,402: second class, 1,065,240:
third class, 6,524,079.2. This meant that the Social Demo-
cratic party, which represented the lower class, and was
the largest party in Germany, could not win a seat in the
Prussian Diet until 1909. At the same time, the Conserva-
tive party, which represented the rural upper class,
always had over 200 deputies. In 1915, the SPD won six
seats, and the Conservatives 212, yet the Socialist party
had three times as many votes as the Conservatives.3
It is clear, then, that there were three main classes
in German society that were self—conscious enough so that
they could be considered to he at least quasi-organised
groups that could andxfld.act with some fairly high degree
of solidarity in political affairs in a multi-party state.

Some of the historical reasons for this have not been

 

If: Vbtera were divided into three tax groups according—to
the amount of taxes paid and each group elected an equal
number of electors, who then elected one or more represent-
atives to the Prussian Diet. Thus, the vote of the heavier
tax-paying upper class was much more important than a vote
in the lowest tax-paying group.

2. Barker, p. 448.

50 Ibid. p. “660

109
given. and in the next few pages it will be shown that in
the election being studied, the social class structure was
of tremendous importance. in the Republic as in the Empire.
Political power immediately after the revolution of 1918
shifted to the lower and middle classes. It was leaders
in these classes, but particularly the middle class, who
wrote the democratic constitution of 1919. But fourteen
years under a democratic constitution of any sort could
not alter the political orientation of the three classes.

As the first step in the demonstration of this, it
will be shown graphically that four major political parties
drew from varying strata of society. With an understanding
of the social class basis of German politics, the corre-
lational data that follows will be more meaningful.

In Figure 0, an attempt has been made to present
Visually the social class relationship of the four major
parties, the National Socialists, Social Democrats, Con--
munists, and Center. The fifty-two cities of over 100,000
papulation were arrayed in descending order of Nazi vote.
Looking at the yraph for the American zone, the dash—dot line
represents the eleven cities of that zone bepinning with
the city that gave the Nazis the greatest proportional
vote.- The other parties are plotted in the same city
order as the Razis. This means that when you study any
four points that lie on a line perpendicular to the base
of the graph you are pettinp the percentapa of vote of
each of the parties in a particular city for the July 31,
1932 Reichstag elections.

 

PO! 0011?.

 

  

 

 

 

 

aflflfi-A

’3' ..::Ilb
e." '

...OQ‘O~.~.
i ‘r
‘

 

 

 

 

“3:0. ...-00“

O”VQQ O o... ...

“-

  

awl:.':.',°:::°:

  
  

”In.

.............. "

”use"

eases-0"“...

. M .0?

“weeeeoeeeeeeeoeoe.e%
“June-s

’05:":
..f‘...:ooeeeeeeeeeee e

0.
..eeeeeeeees see 08 see eeeeeeeeee

£32.00.

ammg‘

”F
eeeeeoO°'.°. ~ér

oeeeeeeeeeeeoeeee‘.‘

—---‘

I

I
4—"”

__~_-L~

 

 

 

 

 

 

50L

15L
10.

........... 3px) --—-— Kati

-----0 D
COCIf-V. CLASb RELn‘l'IONSHIPS 01" 2.15.303 PERTH-”.3 3110“ E! PROPOPTICTCJ 0!" WT? IN FEICIFTAG

31.302103, JUL! :1, 1.15;, w CITIES 0? was 100,500 sown-mos.

Center

FIGUFE G:

110

'In reading the graph it is very important to remem-
ber that movement horizontally across the graph does not
reflect a time change. The lines connecting the points
are there so that the eye is better able to see the rela-
tionships between points representing each party in each
city. Each new set of four points in a vertical line
represent the vote percentages of the four parties in
another city of over 100,000 population.

While graphical presentation of this type of data is
unusual, it is felt that in this case the graphic display
of vote relationships among the four parties dramatically
illustrates vital differences. The hypothesis is: if
one party is ranked in order of descendina percentages
of each city vote, any party that takes its vote from the
same social class or classes will be compelled to move in
the Opposite direction. This is true because all parties
based on the same social class must divide among them the
100 per cent of the class vote. 80, if the Nazis and the
Center got votes in the same class or classes when the
hazi vote, proportionally, is high, the Center party vote
would be compelle' mathematically to be low.

At the same time, if the three series of points move
in apparent disregard for the series arranged in descend-
ing order, it would indicate a difference in the social
base of the various parties. It is felt, too, that such
a radical descending line as the Nazis' vote percentages

present indicates a strong class base. The Nazi data was

lll
arranged in a descending pattern, but the line would not
be so severely downward if the party had been able to
appeal with equal success to all classes. Important dif-
ferences exist among cities as to the proportion of people
in each socio-economic class. This fact, plus the wide
range in the Nazi percentage of city vote, forces the
above conclusion.

After studying the graph it is readily apparent that
each series of points falls into the same pattern in each
of the zones. As has been said, the Nazi proportional
vote was ranked in descending order so as to act as a base.
Surveying the Communist party figures discloses no upward
or downward trend. The line moves in a strairht broad
pattern across the praph.; At the same time the Social
Democratic party figures move in the same broad band.
Hoaever, concentratinc on the points for a particular city
.1t 18 soon apparent that in a particular city, ehen the
Social Democratic percentage of vote is up the Communist
is down. This indicates that those two parties find their
strength in the sane social class. Furthermore, the fact
that the range of per cent of the vote is from six to
forty-three with the majority of cities riving about ten
per cent to the 10» party and thirty-five per cent to the
high party indicates that these two parties not only set
their strength in the same social class but between them
held the allegiance of the majority of that class. at this

point we can only assume that the social class background

112
of the Social Democrats and the Communists is working
class. Later this fact will be clearly demonstrated.

Assuming that the workers supported the Communists
and the Social Democrats, the thesis that these two parties
absorb most of that class can be supported. It has been
shown that between them the parties not about 45 per cent
of the vote in cities over 100,000 population. torkers in
these cities comprise about 55 per cent of the pOpulation
and not all of these would be of voting age, nor could they
all go to the polls. This means that at the most, 65 per
cent of the vote would belong to this class, and as the
Communist and‘Social Democraticpar‘ties took about 45 per
cent of the vote, the majority of the class must belong to
these two parties.

If we turn our attention to the Center party we will
find a party of entirely different class affiliations. The
graph shows that ahen the Nazi per cent of the vote is high
the Center party is low, and as the Nazi line descends the
Center ascends. however, the ascending line of the Center
party is not in the same steady pattern as the National
Socialists, so immediately it is knovn that while the two
parties get some vrtes in the same social classes, the
class background is not absolutely identical. This means

that it is necessary to find some class relationshi' be-

tween the Center and the Social Democrat and Communist
parties. Concentrating on single cities we socisee that

when the Communist and Social Democratic vote is down, the

113
Center per cent of vote is up and the inverse is true as
well. So, it must be concluded that the Center party is
an all class party.

That the Nazi party dress its main strenpth from the
middle and upper classesmuet be the final interpretation.
It has been sheen that the Communist and Social Democrats
are largely single class parties, for otheruise there
would be a pronounced trend upward as the Nazi percentace
of the vote moved downward. Since the Center party also
draws from the working class, it is apparent that very
little of that class is left to pive strength to the Nation-
al‘Bocialists.

‘A More detailed studies are necessary to underscore the
above conclusions. In the next sections the occupational

data are used as the best available statistics of class.

Measure of Class

It has been suggested that social class can be marked:
and if it is to be an important political force it must be,
by certain objective criteria. The tracing of the histori-
cal develOpm«nt of German social classes indicates that
occupations of the members of each class may be just such
an objective criterion. In the correlational investigation,
occupation was considered the best available index of
social class in Germany. It was not considered the sole
"bond” of social class but as one of the "basic constituent

elements."1 As has been pointed out by P. Sorokin, "fersons

 

I: Iitlrim A. Sorofiin,Societ1,Culture, and Personality,
New York, 194", p. 269.

114
having essentially similar occupations, economic posi-
tions, and rights and duties cannot fail to become simi-
lar in a great many other says, physical, mental, moral,
and behavioral."1 Talcott Farsons also points to the high
relationship between occupation and class in any society.
In speaking of Germany in particular he emphasized the
importance of kinship in social class there,,but continued
that shen the high relationship between occupations of
fathers and sons is considered, than occupation becomes an
acceptable criteria.2

Ganmsn occupational statistics were divided into
sugggspersonen and berufszugehorige. The first is those
gainfully employed plus those desiring employment in each
occupation: and the second is erwerbspersonen plus wives
and other dependents without main occupation. For stat-
istical measurement of the social classes in this thesis
the erwerbspersonen classification was used because it
was more apt to include only those of voting age.

Three social classes were outlined by the occupation-

al titles used in classifying German employees. The first

was the upper middle class, which includes proprietors of
small and larva establishments and executives.3 The sec~
and class possible to measure by occupational statistics

was the lower middle class of civil service and white collar

 

1. Ibid. p. 2’72.
2. Taloott Parsons, "An Analytical Approach to the Theory
of Social Stratification," The American Journal 2; Sociol-

O p '01. 45. “Ce 6. 1940' p.

 

a. .
. Independents includes: Selbstandige,(which includes)
Eigentumer and Pacrter, Anaestellte, and Beamte in leitender

Stellung. This is the upper middle class.

a a "d

 

A map

 

115
employees.1 Some of the occupations classified in these
groups actually would be very close to upper middle class
but the greater part fall in the lower middle class.

Taken together, the upper middle class occupations and
those called lower middle class include all occupations
that could be considered middle class. The arrangement is
considered the best statistical representation of the'gjd-
dle social classes available to the investigator.

The third occupational division of erwerbsperaonen was
workers or wage-earrers.2 This group was used to repre-'
sent the lower socio-economic class. It was not considered
feasible to delineate the upper class through occupation-
al statistics.

Since the social classes are being related to the
political parties as groups. it was necessary to translate
each or the three major groUps or occupational statistics
into prcpcrtions. Each group or occupational statistics
was taken as a prcpcrtion of the total erwerbspersonen in
a city. Thus, the number of persons employed or unemployed
as proprietors or executives in a city was divided by the
total number of peorle employed or unemployed in that
city. This proportion was then the proportion of people
in the upper middle class. The same thing was then done
for each class in each of the cities used on the study.

The upper and lower middle socio-economic classes are
l:_'Tfiis group includes Beamte without Beamte infileitender

Stellung and Angestellte. This is the lower middle class.
2. Arbeiter only. This is considered the lower class.

 

116
very broad as defined above. Obviously, distinctions
important socially exist within the class to almost the
same extent as they do between either of the middle
classes and the lower class. In spite of this, the
occupational statistics are the best statistical indices
of class available.

Within the labor class there were wide variations in
status and prestige, also, but not on the scale found in
the middle class. Workers in an industry requiring highly
developed skills such as the precision optical instruments
naturally felt superior to the day laborer digging a ditch.
'Differences in prestige existed even within an industry.
But on the Whole, for reasons already outlined, the worker
was loyal to his class and his political party.

The upper class will not be outlined on the basis of
occupational statistics at all. It is practically impos-
sible to find separate listing of upper class occupations
city by city; and then, again, many upper class persons
do not hold income-producing positions that could be
listed.

 

 

CHAPTER VI
THE MIDDIE CLASSES

It was the middle class in the German society that
was the principal support of the Hitler movement. As has
been shown, the class consisted of primarily small busi-
nessmen, government employees, and white collar workers.
Others in the class included former army officers, pension-
ers, and retired shepkeepers and tradesmen. In all of
Germany the city sample studied included about 27 per cent
of the working papulation in the middle classes. ,

During the early years of the Republic many of this
class supported the German Rational Fecples party, particu-
larly in northeastern Gennany, but the greater proportion
belonged either to the Democratic or the Peoples parties.
In the discussion of the elections from 1919 to 1932 it
was pointed out that it was these very parties that failed
to hold their supporters after 1924. It was also shown
that the former supporters of these parties joined many
splinter parties until about 1930, “hen they began to con-
solidate behind Hitler.

Table XIV emphasises the positive relationship between
the Rational Socialists and the middle strata of German
society as well as the negative relationship of the middle

classes with the Communist party. These coefficients of

117

118
correlation were computed by measuring the relationship
of the proportion of upper and lower middle class in each
city to the prOportione of vote in the July 31, 1932
Reichstsg election for the Nazi and Communist parties.
masts XIV: COEFFICIENTS or CORRELATIOK Hartman Pnopoal

TIORS CF VOTERS WHO ARE UPPER OR ICWER MIDDIE CLASS AND
PROPORTION OF VOTE FOR SPECIFIED PARTIES BY CITY SIZE CLASS.

 

 

 

 

City Sise Nasi - Party - Communist
(Population) Upper lower Upper Lower
Kiddie class Middle class
26.000.50'000 e23 025 's26 .03.,
50,000-100,000 .58 .57 -.72 -.74
Over 100.000 .53 f .27 -.31 -.ss

 

/
A coefficient of .21 or higher in cities of 25,000 to
60,000, or .29 in cities of 50,000 to 100,000, or .27 in
cities of 100,000 or more population is significant sta-
tistically. The number of cities in each group was 95,
48 and 52 respectively.

The immediate impact of Table XIV is the pro-Nasi and
the anti-Communist relationships of the middle class.1
In all sizes of city the two major elements of the middle
class correlate positively with the National Socialists

significantly enough to indicate a general proposition

1} Heberle (From Democracyto Fizism, pp. 115-125,,

studied the relationship of the socia 1 structure and party
strength in 18 Kreise, excluding cities of more than
10,000 population, in Schleswigeflolstein. He decided that,
"The change from liberalism to Nazism, or from support of
the democratic regime to support of the Opposition, has
been most radical just in those middle layers of rural
society, which in the period before 1918 had been strong
adherents of progressive Liberalism. (F. 119).

 

119
that the greater the proportion of middle class, as de-
fined, in the working population of a city the greater the
per cent of vote for the Nazis will be. Just the reverse
was true between this class and the Communist party. Study
of the same variables by military occupation zone indicates
the relationships that existed in all areas of Germany.1

1. Simple correlation did not yield, in all cases, stat-
istically significant relationships between middle class
proportional indices and proportional vote for the National
Socialists and Communists' parties. Certain obscuring fac-
tors had to be held constant by use of partial correlation
techniques. These partial correlations are shown in Table
XV with the stmple correlations.

The obscuring factor in the American zone was Catholi-
cimn. In the Soviet zone the problem lay in a combination
of a history of political radicalism in the Saxony-Thuringia
region, concentrated Catholicism in the Silesian districts,
and a traditional support of the German National Peoples
party in northern Soyiet zone cities. It is also important
that Saxony-Thuringia has been historically a part of ”core"
land of Germany and thus distinctly different from eastern
or ”colonial” Germany. These factors are only a reflection
of a tremendous cultural diversity in the Soviet zone which
largely made simple correlational techniques inapplicable.

For these reasons a very detailed analysis was required
in these two zones. As a result the material presented in
pages 113 to 133 is very difficult reading. The reader may
not have the time to undertake the task of close reading of
the very detailed report. If so, it is suggested that a
study of the simple and partial correlations given in
Table XV illustrates, in general, a support of Nazism.by the
‘middle classes and a rejection of Communism in all regions
of Germany. Should the reader care to accent the writer's
summary of the data in these pages, he may refer directly

to page 153.

 

120

TABLE xv: COEFFICIENTS CF CORRELATION EEIaEEN PROPORTICNSV
or vowaas wao ARE UPPER on IcmEa NIDDIE CIASS AND PROPORTIONS
or VOTE res SPECIFIED PARTIES BY'MILITARY OCCUPATION ZONES.

 

 

Party Zone
Combined Ann-Pr.I British Soviet
liddle classes
Upper Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower
lasi .2a(.sef.01(.25) .61 .57 .33 .14(.'s'6)*
cm1.t -039 “.35 -069 -068 -.08(-.19)-.19(-333)

 

I American and French zones combined.
§ Parentheses () indicate a partial coefficient of corre-
lation with the per cent of Catholics in the population
held constant. Parentheses underlined ( ) indicate a
modified sample with the cities of over‘TOO, 000 in Saxony-
Thuringia removed, and ( ) indicates Catholics were held
constant and metropolises of Saxony—Thuringia removed.
Significant coefficients are: American-French zone:
.29 and .55 for partial coefficient: British zone: .23;
Soviet zone! .22 and .27 for a partial coefficient.

In general Table XV of regional coefficients reen-
forces the evidence presented by size of city. The founda-
tion to the assumption that the greater the proportion of
middle class in the city the greater the prcpcrtional Razi
vote will be and the lower the Communist vote is now more
stable. The strongest evidence of this is in the British
zone. Since this zone is the center of German heavy indust-
ry, it is easily understood that there would be class con-
flict reflected in political actions. Powever, the rela-
tionships are not so clear out in the other zones.

Particularly is this true in the Soviet zone where
neither of the simple correlations based on proportions of
lower middle class were significant. Further, no

relationship between proportions of upper middle class and

121
per cent of vote to the Communist party is shown. The
' other area of difficulty is in the combined American-French
zone between both elements of the middle class and the Kazi
party. These trouble spots will be gone into intensively
to find what exceptions, if any, there are to the general
proposition made above.

It must be remembered that in the nature of these
correlations it is necessary for a particular social char-
acteristic to be associated in two ways with the particular
party vote in order to have significant correlations develop.
For a positive correlation between the upper middle class
and the Nazis it is necessary for the social class to have
given a large percentage of its vote to the Nazis and also
for the class to be an important percentage of the total

Bazi vote.

American-French Zone

Simple correlation indicates no relationship between
the per cent of lower middle class in the pepulation and the
per cent of the vote for the Nazis in the combined American-
'Prench zone. It is readily seen that except in the British
zone, this relationship was week when simple correlation
techniques are used to spotlight it. I

When the American zone is held separate from the
French and simple correlation procedures are used, the rela-
tionship between the proportions of lower middle class and
National Socialists becomes plus .13. Since the American

some sample had only SS cities, a coefficient of this size

129
could occur due to ciance. Tie relationship of the same
variables in the French zone was minus .27 and is based
only on 1? cities, so it again could occur due to chance.

Studying the Palatinate-Baden area of Germany more
closely one city of 25,000 to 50,000 poyulation, Pirmasens,
was found to be decidedly.unlihe others in the sample in
many important social characteristics. Omitting Pirmasens
fram.the calculations the simple correlation in the French
zone changed from minus .27 to plus .?4. Holding the per
cent of Catholics in the population constant in a three
variable partial correlation, the coefficient became plus
.38. Based on such a small sample, these figures do nothing
more than indicate the nature of the problem.

Returning to the hurttenburp-Bavaria sector, the 35
cities in the sample were grouped into those with less than
20 per cent Catholics and those with more than 20 per cent
Catholics in the population. The first group had only 10
cities and develOped a plus .29 correlation between per cent
of lover’middlc class and the prcpcrtions] vote of the
National Socialists. The second proup with 25 cities yield-
ed a minus .21 for the same variables. It is obvious then
that the large prOportion of Catholics in this area of Ger-
many obscure the relationship between the prcpcrtions of
lower middle class and National Socialists. Therefore, a
partial correlation of the cities in the two zones, vith
Pirmasens omitted, and the per cent of Catholics in the popu-
lation held constant, reached plus .2.. This, however, is

not a significant coefficient.

 

‘slldll laII'JIII-IIIIIIII' Ink

123

In the American-French zones it is likely that the
lower middle class split in its political affiliations.

The Catholic portion of this class voted probably for the
Center or Bavarian Peotles party, as this area was the
stronghold of the two Catholic parties. It is also true in
this zone that the traditional middle class parties, the
Democratic and Peeples, were never able to win more than
three or four per cent of the vote, so that for some years
the middle class had been voting with +he Social Democrats.

At best it appears that the lower middle class may
have supported the Nazis in this area, but the evidence is
not definitive. It is quite clear, however, that the lower
middle class was opposed to the Communist party in this
region. The same was true of the upper middle class.

But the simple correlation between the prcpcrtions of
upper middle class and per cent of vote for the Nazis was
insignificant. A partial correlation holding the per cent
of Catholics constant displays a significant relationship,
however (plus .39). One can say then that the upper middle
class. particularly those who were not Catholic, did support

the Basis in southwestern Germany.

Soviet Occupation Zone
The relationship between the prcpcrtions of upper
middle class and Communists in the Soviet zone is distinctly
unreliable. In order to get behind the coefficient of mints

.08 the cities were divided into those over 50,000 papulation

 

124
and those between 25,000 and 50,000. Simple correlations
based on these two troupe yielded a minus .01 for the large
cities and minus .15 for the smaller. Neither of these
mean much except as direction finders.

The smaller cities were then studied by dividing
them.into those in Province Saxony, Saxony, and Thuringia
and those in the rest of the eastern area of Germany. The
correlation for the first proup was minus .33 but in the
second group it was a plus .18. Neither coefficient is
significant. One important social difference between the
two areas is the per cent of Catholics in the population.
However, a partial coefficient based on all the smaller
cities with the proportion of Catholics held constant‘
yielded a statistically insignificant minus .21.

Turning to the cities of over 50,000 papulation,
staple correlation displayed no difference in the direction
of the relationship under discussion when division of the
cities by the above areas was made. However, simple coef-
ficients based on cities of 50,000 to 100,000 inhabitants
was a minus 12 while in cities of over 100,000 population,
the correlation was plus .24. Again, the proportions of
Catholics seemed important.

Assuming that the proportion of Catholics obscured
the relationship between the per cent of upper middle class
in the pOpulation and the per cent of vote for the Communists
in cities regardless of size, a partial correlation for the

as cities in Soviet zone was made. With proportions of

...:
m
01

Catholics held constant the coefficient of minus .09
increased to minus .20, but this is not a statistically
significant relationship.

It is obvious. then, that the relationship between
these two variables is effected by some other besides the
religious. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to develop
a picture of the regional variations within what is new the
Soviet zone of occupation, but some simple breakdowns will
be necessary to develoy any reliable correlations. Each of
at least three important areas have significant social fac-
tors that preVent simple correlational techniques from die-
closing the various existence or non-existence of relation-
ships betueen social and political fectore when the whole
zonul sample is used.

This can be shown readily with the two variables now
under discussion. The Q3 cities in the Soviet zone were
arranged by sub-repicns. The first sub-renion was the north-
ern area of the zone and included all cities over 95,000 in
Brandenburg, kecklenburp, Tomerenie, Anhnlt and Negleburg.
Berlin in Brandenburg ves omitted. The five cities of
Konlgsberg, Elbinp, lncterberg, Tilsit, and Allenstein in
East Prussia. were not used with this northern bloc of cities
because they had different pol’tical reactions than the 25
cities grouped together. The Host frussian cities had an
average Communist percentcre of the VLtG of 19 while the

main bloc of northern cities had a Communist vote averaging

but 11 per cent.

126

The second region included the 15 cities of heavily
Catholic Upper and Lower Silesia. This area averaged about
50 per cent Catholics, whereas the other two regions had
only approximately 5 per cent. This area had the lowest
median per cent of Communist vote aith only 7 per cent.

The third region was the 37 cities of Province
Saxony, Saxony, and Thvrinris.’ The cities in particular
in this region have a long history of political radicalism.
The Communist party rrcw its inception received a record
vote here. In 1924 the party received a median vote of
9.5 per cent as against a median vote of 7 per cent in the
other cities of the Soviet zone. More striking is the fact
that 17 of the 54 cities for which 1924 data was available
had a Communist vote of more than 10 per cent in Saxony-
Thuringia, but only 12 of 46 cities in the rest of eastern
Germany had more than 10 per cent. In 1952 the median Com!
munist percentage of the vote in Saxony—Thuringia ass 19,
whereas for the other cities in the zone it was 1? per cent
in the northern area and 7 per cent in Lil;sia.

The three sub-rerions varied’in the percentage of the
pOpulation that mere upper middle class, also. In the north-
ern cities the average per cent of proprietors in a city was
18.93 in Silesia it was 11.5; and in Saxony-Thurinpia it
was 12.9.

Simple correlations based on the proportions of upper
middle class and of vote for the Communist party in these

three areas are:

 

127
lorthern cities .11
Silesian cities -.27
Saxony-Thuringia cities -.38

The last coefficient is significant and supports the
pattern of relationship outlined in the other occupation
sones.- There definitely is no relationship shown between
the variables in the northern cities or in the Silesian.
This is probably not the true social relationship, however.
But what the obscuring factors are is unknown.

It is likely that the 25 northern cities could be
broken into smaller units of greater cultural homogeneity
and some obscuring characteristic isolated in each of the
units. This is indicated by the variations in the per cent
of vote for the Communists and the per cents of upper middle

class among the cities when they are classified by states.

they are as follows:
Average Per Cent

 

State Number of of Upper of Vote for
Cities liddle Class Communists
Anhalt-lagdeburg 5 12.2 8.2
Brandenburg 9 12.4 12.2
Pomerania 8 14.0 11.4
lecklenburg 3 15.3 9.3

There was also some slight indication that cities above
50,000 pepulation had a negative relationship between the
two variables, thus a correlation based on the 2 cities of
over that size in the northern area was minus .33, support-
ing the general conclusion. The smaller cities on the other

Thand.had an insignificant positive correlation.

Upper Middle Class and Nazism

The coefficient of relationship between the per cent

 

w“-.~ ‘A‘ .

 

A-A—A— L—L'Lkgu.

..i_-.J..-... ...

 

...-...“..th ...,gvv.‘

 

128
of upper middle class and the per cent of the vote for the
National Socialists that is shown in Table XV is plus .35.
This is significant. Using the division of Soviet zone
cities as above shows important sub-regional variations,
however. In the northenicitiea the coefficient was plus
.01; in Silesia it was plus .49; and in Saxony-Thurinpia it
was plus .52. These last two are significant.

The lack of relationship in the northern cities may
be due to the influence of the cities of 25,000 to 50,000
population. Working just with cities of over 50,000 popu-
lation the 31 cities of the whole zone were separated into
two groups. The first group included the ten in the Saxonyb
Thuringia area and yielded a coefficient of plus .15. The
second group included all of the remaining 21 cities in
eastern Germany, and the coefficient was a significant
plus .59.

A similar breakdown for the smaller cities reversed
this. In.$axony-Thuringia the relationship was a signifi-
cant plus .56, whereas in the remaining cities it was only
a plus .11. This would indicate a lack of relationship in
the cities of 25,000-50,000 in the northern region as the
main concentration of small cities is there. At the same
time the majority of the cities of over 50,000 population
are also in the north, and this points to a positive
:relationship between the upper middle class and Racism in

these large cities.

The low coefficient in the cities under 50,000

129
population is probably due to a high relationship between
the upper middle class and the Conservative party in Pomer-
ania. Six of the eighteen cities of this size in the
northern region of the Soviet zone are agricultural centers
in that state. And it was in Pomerania that the Conservative
party won its largest percentage of the vote. Seen in a

comparison of medians the relationship is clear:

 

State Number of Median Per Cent of
Cities Upper Vote to
Middle Class Conservatives
Pomerania Cw 6 14.5 15
Remainder 12 12.0 6

Pomerania has always been a stronghold of the Conserva-
tive party. In 1924 the party won 49.1 per cent of the
rural-urban vote. which was 10 per cent more than in any
other eastern state. Cities of over 50,000 population are
not affected by this concentration of Conservative power
as only one city. Stettin. is in the sample. The median
per cent of Conservative vote in the larger cities was but
six. This reenforces the conclusion that in the larger
cities of northeastern Germany the proprietors did support
Hitler.

Lower Biddle Class and Nazism
Viewing the low relationship of plus .14 (Table XV)
between the proportion of lower middle class and per cent
of the vote for the Nazis in the Soviet zone emphasizes
the difficulty in studying this particular problem through

correlation methods. Within the sample in the Soviet sons

130

of 82 cities, there are tremendous sub-repional differ-
ences that often combine to obscure the true social rela-
tionships. Since size of city has been found to be impor-
tant, also, the first step in investigating the above
coefficient was to separate the 82 cities into tto groups
according to size. The first group included the 50 cities
of more than 50,000 population and the second group the
52 cities with 25,000-50,000 inhabitants. The resulting
simple correlations were plus .18 for the large cities and
a plus .07 for the smaller cities.

The insignificant coefficient of plus .07 indicates
a possible conflict between sub-regions of the Soviet sons,
so the 52 cities in this group were further divided. The
first group consisted of the 27 cities in Saxony-Thuringia
and the second contained the remaining 25 cities. The
first group formed a relatively unified sub-region, but
the second held many diverse types of cities. However, it
was not considered advisable to split the sample further.

Simple correlation procedures found a plus .29 coef-
ficient between prcpcrtions of white collar employees and
Nazi vote in the Saxony-Thuringia region, but the second
group yielded a minus .19. Neither of these coefficients
is significant, so further investigation was necessary.
One of the obvious differences between these two areas
within the Soviet zone is the proportions of Catholics in
the populations. Using partial correlation techniques for

the sample of 52 cities, the per cent of Catholics in the

131
total population was held constant. The resulting coeffici-

ent was slightly less than significant, plus .25. For
reasons that will be discussed later, a partial coefficient
with the per cent of Catholics held constant could not be
made for the 30 cities of 50,000 population.

Searching more deeply it was found that at least
three distinct sub-regions, as previously discussed, acted
differently as regards the relationship of the per cent of
lower middle_class to the per cent of Hazi vote. For cities
over 50,000 population these sub-regions were the 10 cities
of historically radical Saxony-Thuringia, the a cities of
Catholic Silesia, and the 12 cities of areas to the north
of these two regions. The direction of the relationships
was the same in Silesia and the northern cities, but the
intensity was radically different. However, since the dir-
ection was the same, the two areas were handled together so
that a sample of some consequence could be used. In Sax-
ony-Thuringia the relationships were the opposite of those
in the other two regions.

Simple correlations of the relationship involved were
ntnus .36 in the Saxony-Thuringia region and plus .39 in the
combined Silesian-Northern cities. Neither of these coef-
ficients is statistically significant. Partial correlation
techniques were then used in the Saxony-Thuringia sample.

In this region the per cent of Catholics was held
constant as the relations of the proportions of Nazi vote

and lower middle class were measured. Even though only

152
five per cent of the city population was Catholic, the
partial coefficient rose to minus .72, a significant
coefficient for ten cases. It would appear than in Sax-
ony-Thuringia the loser middle class was opposed to Hitler.
The situation is so unusual that the actual percentages
in the ten cities are listed below:

City Per Cent of
Lower Middle Class Vote to Nazis

 

Population of

50 000 to 100 000
- 63ra 38

26
Zwickau 43 28
Jenav 52 29
Halbsrstadt 44 31

Over 100 000

Plauen 51 24
Chemnits 42 26
Dresden 38 50
Leipsig 32 ' 31
Erfurt 45 32
H.110 .e'e 41 33

The trend of these percentages is definitely in a
negative direction, but whether such a small sample can be
accepted as conclusive proof is very doubtful.

The relationship of the lower middle class to the
prcpcrtion of the vote to the Nazis in the rest of the
Soviet sone remains to be explained. It was pointed out
that a simple correlation based on the 20 northern and
Silesian cities showed an insignificant plus .39 coeffici-
ent. And even though it was apparent that the per cent of
Catholics in the population was influencing this relation-
ship, a partial correlation could not be made.

In the eight cities of Silesia the median per cent

133
of Catholics in the population was 51, but in the northern
cities it was but 5. The inevitable effect of this is to
create a mathematically negative relationship between the
per cent of white collar employees in erwerbspcrsonen and
the proportion of Catholics in the pOpulation. Shown

through the use of medians,_the relationship occurs in this

 

manner:
Area of No. of Cities ledian Per Cents
Germany (Over 50,000 Catholics White collar Vote to
pepulation) employees lasis
Silesia 8 51 28 39
Northern (1) 12 5 29 as
Saxony-Thuringia lO 6 29.5 41.6

(1) Includes East Prussia, Pomerania, Hecklenburg, Iagde-
burg, Anhalt, Brandenburg, and fleece.

This simple demonstration shows that the per cent of
Catholics in the population does have a depressing effect
on the sise of the Nazi vote, as the prcpcrtion of lasi vote
was lowest in the Silesian area. At the same timg Silesia
is an area of intense industrialization, particularly heavy
industry, mining, and textile manufacture, which require
large proportions of wage workers. As a consequence the
percentage of white collar workers is forced downward.
Therefore, a coefficient of relationship between per cent
of Catholics and prcpcrtion of white collar workers of all
.30 cities would be negative without any necessity that such
a situation was the true social relationship.

When the full sample of 30 cities was used, the nega-

tive relationship resulted. This meant that a partial

 

A‘.‘,-I'a~'8u .45...” a - .

.. ,' d‘n-u~._-.'.r KOF‘PH" .- c.» .M A.-. -.

“.'.3‘u..-~ shad h“ - Mia-4“.“ 4V

L-IA ..-.-

.4

 

. < “raw “ctr-Q

\-.. M‘s.» A‘AA- '

sdavMA-p J..ua—-..s. . was

..th

 

134
coefficient with the per cent of Catholics held constant
reduced the simple coefficient of plus .19 between propor-
tions of lower middle class and vote percentage for the
Nazis. It has already been shown that this was not true
in Saxony-Thuringia or in the cities under $0,000 popula-
tion. Under these circumstances the development of partial
coefficients in the sample of 30 cities of over 50,000
population, based on relgion, is useless.

In cities of over 50,000 population, excepting the
Saxony-Thuringia region, and in cities of 25,000-50,000
people in the whole eastern zone, the relationship of the
lower middle class to the prcpcrticnal size of the Nazi
vote is just slightly below statistical significance.
Combining these two groups into a single unit of 73 cities
has the effect of smoothing out some obscuring factors in
individual cities and provides a more adequate base for
generalisation.

The simple correlation based on the 72 cities was
plus .16. A partial correlation with the per cent of Catho-
lics held constant reached plus .30, which is significant.
It was possible to better control the religious factor in
this case because in the 52 smaller cities there were only
7 cities with more than 11 per cent Catholics in the
pepulation. Therefore, the extreme cases which upset the
small large city sample could be absorbed to some extent.

Considering the evidence both by size of city and by

zone, the penernl condition is that the lower middle class

 

____._ ___.__ _ _ .

 

135
did support the National Socialist party. A significant
relationship could not be portrayed in the combined Ameri-
can-French zone, but it seems likely that the white collar
employees did support Hitler there, also.

Iathematically, it is very difficult to unearth the
true social relationship between these two variables in the
American-French zone. The number of lower middle class
voters who were not Catholics was probably small. Therefore,
the lower middle class would have had to be a predominant
proportion of the Nazi vote in order for the correlation
techniques to measure the association adequately. However,
this was not true since the upper middle class was of at
least equal, and perhaps greater, significance. Under these
circumstances the injection of any new group into the [eel
vote would, when the prcpcrtion of lower middle class was
decreasing, tend to keep the Nazi percentage of vote high
and thus hide the positive relationship between prcpcrtions
of white collar employees and proportions of vote for the
Nazis. It is entirely reasonable that this condition Oper-
ated in every instance because of the particular social
circumstances in each city, but that it seriously affected
the correlations only when the social group being studied
was proportionally minute. Such was the situation in the
American~French zone. The only region in which any evidence
was obtained that this class did not back Hitler was in the

small sample of 10 cities in Saxony-Thuringia.

156
lower Middle Class and Communism

The direction of the relationship between the per cent
of lower middle class and the per cent of the vote to the
Communist party is established in all of the zones. In the
combined American-French and the British occupation zones,
the relationship is statistically sipnificant. But in the
Soviet zone the minus .20 shown in Table XV is not. Since
size of city has been important, the first step in further
analysing the situation in eastern Germany was to separate
the 82 cities in that zone by size. The sample of 30 cities
of over 60,000 population uncovered absolutelv no relation-
ship betwsen the two variables. Eisht of the 31 cities are
in Silesia, and it was thoupht that the concentration of
Catholics there might be obscurinp the association between
the prcpcrtions of lower middle class and per cent of vote
to the Communists. However, this was not the case.

The sample of 30 cities was then divided into the 17
cities of 50,000 to 100,000 population and the 13 cities
with over 100,000 inhabitants. Simple correlations were
made of each proup, and even thonph the sample in each case
is too small for significant results, the coefficients do
point the way. ‘For the first aroup of 17 cities the corre-
lation was minus .22, but for the metrOpolitan cities it
was a plus .28. The next question is: that are the special
characteristics of the major cities that lead to a plus
relationship?

Geographical concentration is the most obvious factor

137
of importance in the 13 cities of over 100,000 population.
Six of the 13 are in Saxony—Thuringia and four are in Sile-
sia, with three of these in Upper Silesia. In these last
three there were 95 per cent or more Catholics in each.

The three remaining cities are in East Prussia, Pomerania,
and lasdeburg.

In the Silesian area the concentration of Catholics
contributed heavily to keepinr the prcpcrtion of vote for
the Communists to, on the average, 10 per cent. At the same
time the heavy industry and mining activities of the region
meant a high prcpcrtion of workers and a low proportion of
white collar employees.

In the Saxony-Thurinpia region the average proportion
of Communist vote was over 20 per cent in the six metropoli-
tan cities. In the three remaininr cities of metropolitan
size the Communists averaged 19 per cent of the vote. It is
seen, then, that a set of religious and industrial factors
in Silesia, a history of political radicalism 1n Saxony-
Thuringia, and the influence of metropolitan social organi-
zation in the other major cities of the eastern zone combine
to destroy the possibility of correlational methods for this
Vparticular problem in cities of over 100,000 pepulation.

Subjecting the cities or 50,000 to 100,000 population
to the same analysis shows that four are in the Silesian
region, four in Saxony—Thurinpia, and nine in.the northern
part of the zone. It is seen, then, that the cities of over

100,000 population are concentrated in the Silesian-Saxony-

 

158

11a area of Germany, while the greater number of the
of 50,000 to 100,000 are in the northern half or the
zone. This indicates a regional as well as a size-
; factor.

Dhe cities were reorganized on a\rerional basis. The

Lng coefficients were then developed:

 

;n i, Number of Cities Coefficient“
m 12 -.20
I P .00
-Thuringia 10 .41

relation of prcpcrtion or lower middle class and per ?!
r vote to the Communist party. '

sven though these samples are too small for generali-
, they do indicate that important regional character-
are disrupting the overall coefficients. That site
region is important is illustrated by omitting the
:ities1 of over 100,000 population in the northern
son the sample of 12. Doing this increased the coef-
: to minus .45.

Phe situation in Silesia is complicated by the con-
>eteeen Upper and [over Silesia. Upoer Silesia has
ar median per cent or both lower middle class and of
> the Communist gPPtV than does Lower Silesia. Further-
:hree of the four cities in the Upper district are
)0,000 population, while in Lower Silesia three of

1r are of 50,000 to 100,000 population size. This
rtion tends to hide any relationship when the two

1P0 combined. The sample is so small, also, that the
a three cities are Mapdeburg, Etettin, and—Roenigsbsrg.

 

139
extreme case of Beuthen with ?9 per cent white collar
employees and 19 per cent of the vote to tle Communists
distorts the correlation.

Study of the individual cities in the Saxony—Thuringia
area shows a definite positive relationship between the two

variables. The cities and the per cents are:

 

Cities ' Per Cent of
Lower Vote to the
middle Class Communist Party
Population of
50 to 100*
Uera 26 18
Zsickau 28 14
Jena 29 18
Halberstadt 51 28
0v r 100 ,
Flausn 24 22
Chemnita 26 21
Dresden 30 13
Leipzig 3 20
Erfurt 32 23
Hall. AeSe 33 26

* 1n thousands.

In the first FPOUO of cities there is a definite in-
crease in the proportional size or the Communist vote as the
prcpcrtion of white collar employees increases. The rela-
tionship is in the sane oirection in cities or over 100,000
population but it is not so clear-cut.

Is this a true social relationship or merely the
accidental pattern of numbers in a very small group of

cases? It is very hard to find a suitable answer to this.
Studyinp the six cities vith more than 20 per cent Communist

party vote emphasized the previously mentioned radicalism.in

Saxony-Thuringia.

140

 

Comparing the percentages of vote for the radical
parties since 1924 shows that Halberstadt had a 1932 Con-
i munist vote of 29 per cent, which was the highest in the
eastern zone. In 1924 this same city had the lowest per

cent of Communist vote but had the second hiphest Soc’a1

 

Democratic percentage with 35. The change from less than 10
per cent Communist vote in 1924 to 28 per cent in 1932 was
the most violent fluctuation in the zone for this size of
city.

3 Plauen had the highest proportional vote for the lasis
in 1924, 1930, and 1932, and yet it had the lowest propor-
tion of white collar employees. On the other hand, a trade
center, Leipzig, had the lowest Nazi vote in 1924, 1930, and

in 1932 it was the only maior city with less than a 30 per

~.." v\.u-..;u.'.'d:§- 4%.... a“, ‘ 4‘ r

cent NSDAP vote. However, it had the highest Social Democrat-
ic vote in these years and in 1932 was the only major city
with more than 30 per cent of its vote poinp to the Socialists.
Chemnitz had the largest proportion of lower class in
1932, and 90 per cent of the vote went to the three major
parties, the Social Democrats, Communists, and Nazis. The
percentage of vote for each was 27, 21, and 42 respectively.

; In 1924 Hallo A.S. had the greatest prOportion of Communist

.N . 't

vote, and in 1932 it had the second highest. The change in

- . A‘ _‘
wr—

Communist vote, proportionally, over the eight years was only
1 one per cent: and this see the least change noted.

It is very evident that on the basis of the information

presented no reliable statesent can be made concerninr the

 

141
relationship of these two variables in cities of over
50,000 population. The factors seem to be positively cor-
related in the Saxony-Thurinpie repion, neutral to nega-
tively related in the Silesia area, and negatively
associated in the northern cities. But what Is the situa-
tion in cities of 25,000 to 50,000 ponulstion in the Soviet
zone?

The coefficient of relationship bettaen the per cent
of lower middle class and the proportion of the vote given
the Communist party in the Soviet zone in cities.of 95,000
to 50,000 pOpulation was minus .27. However, a partial
correlation holding the per cent of Catholics constant re-
duced this to minus .15. The 5? cities were then arranged
according to the three sub-regions. The northern block con-
tained 18 cities, the Saxony-Thuringia group 97, and the

Silesian unit 7. The simple coefficients were:

Northern .12
Silesia -.75
Saxony-Thuringia -.12

Stranaely enourh, the only significant correlation
occurs in the stroncly Catholic area. than these 7 cities
are combined with the 8 Silesien cities of 50,000 popula-
tion, the coefficient becomes minus .30. However, when the
4 cities of Upper Silesia are omitted, tte association
returns to a significant minus .68. It seems fairly reli-
able to say that the lover middle class was negatively
related to the size of +he vote for the Communist party in

the Silesian cities of under 100,000 population.

 

 

 

142

The northern region has a conflict between cities of
50,000 to 100,000 inhabitants and the other two city sizes.
The low average per cent of Communist vote in this region
indicates that if there was, andit is likely that there
was, any relationship between the class structure and the
size of the party vote that the Communist party was a one-
class party. Later it will be shown that the workers in i
this region supported the Communists; and since the Commun-.
ist vote was so small, it is unlikely that the shite collar
worker did. But what factor was obscuring the probable
negative assodhtion between white collar workers and Gear
munism is unknown to the investigator.

Saxony-Thuringia had a conflict between cities of
over 50,000 pepulation and those under 50,000 population.
The history of political radicalism in this area may indi-
cate that some of the lower middle class supported the
Communist party.

In order to be able to make any general conclusion
based on this data a shmple correlation of a substantial
sample size is necessary. When all cities in the eastern
zone were combined, with the exception of the 10 cities of
over 50,000 population in Saxony~Thuringia, the resulting
simple correlation was a significant minus .25. The sample
size was 72 cities. As a general condition, then, the
white collar employee was Opposed a: the Communist party in
the Soviet zone Just as he was in the other occupation zones.

However, local circumstances are of DIPt1°UIHP importance in

the Soviet zone.

Berlin

Berlin was omitted from the study of the boviet zone
because of its size and its occupation by the four powers.

A city of over four million peeple cannot be compared poli-
tically to one of 25,000 to 100,000 population even in the
same area, but it is enliphtening to study this city.

Berlin is located in the heart of the area where the
relationships or the middle class to the two radical parties
could nct be clearly delineated statistically. But compari-
son of election results for the Reichstep in 1930 and July,
1932. in three Berlin borouahs emphasized the class align-
ments of the major parties.’ Bach district chosen is dis-
tinctive for its concentration of voters of a particular
social class. Wedding is 3 workers' district. Steglits a
middle class district or shite collar employees in business,
and Behlendorf a mixed residential area for the upper
classes and higher povernment officials who would be upper
middle class.

In each of these districts the per cent of the total
valid vote that was won by each of the major parties in the
July, 1952. Reichsteg elections was computed. The figures

for the 1950 election are taken from a computation in

Current History.1

 

l. aerfiard FritersIf‘tho are the 5erman fiascists," Cur-
rent Historz, vol. 35. 1932. p. 534.

 

 

 

I, I‘lll'i’ III I

144

TABLE XVI: CCUPARISfF C-H1 SCCIAL CLASS VCTING PATTERNS
IN BERLIN FOR SEIECTFD hIECTTONS* AND DISTRICTS.

 

 

 

 

 

 

Party Berlin Districts
Wedding Steglitz Zehlendorf
1950 1952 1950 1952 1950 1932
Bourgeois Rightl 9.8 4.7 19.6 15.6 26.5 19.4
Bourgeois Left 9.4 2.7 23.5 5.5 27.5 7.1
Social Democrats 28.0 27.9 19.4 19.0 19.7 21.0
Communists 43.0 42.6 11.6 12.3 7.4 8.5

 

July 31 ' 1932e

I The Bourgeois Right and Left were not further identified
in the text of Current Histor . For the purposes of the
computations based on the 153% election, the flight was
assumed to be the DNVP and the Left the DDP, DVP, Reichs
p.d. Dt Hittelstandes. Chr. $03., and "other parties".

Studying the percentages of vote for 1930, it is
apparent that the working class district of Wedding was very
strong toward the Socialists and Communists and‘gave less
than 30 per cent or the vote to the middle class parties
and the Nazis. The Steglitz district gave GR per cent of
itsvote to the bourgeois and Nazi parties and only 29 per
cent to the uorkers' parties. In the upper middle class
Zehlendorf section or the city the workers' parties won only
27 per cent or the vote.

or the three districts the middle class section,
Steglitz, offered the Nazis the greatest support with 8 per
cent more of its vote supporting Hitler than was true in
the upper middle class district and 17 per cent more than

the Nazis were able to get in the working man's section.

145
Both the middle class districts supported Hitler in 1030
much more strongly than Wedding, where the proletariat lived.

The concentration of the support of the Communist party
in the Wedding area emphasizes the sinple social class na-
ture of the party. The Social Democrats, while primarily a
labor party, were able to win substantial strength in all
three sections.

A revise of the vote percentages for 193? illustrates
the same tendencies as discussed above. The important con-
sideration is the reallocation of the vote within the bour-
geois and Nazi parties. In the hedding district the bour-
geois parties drOpped from 19.2 per cent of the vote to only
7.4. At the same time the Nazis Jumped from 9.9 per cent to
19.4, a change of 10.5 per cent. The two workers' parties
drOpped only one-half of one per cent to apain demonstrate
that the increased Nazi support in 1932 came almost entirely
from the former supporters of the middle class parties.

The Steglitz district outlines further the pattern of
middle class support of the Nazis. First of all, the size
of the Nazi vote is more than double that which the Nazis
won in the workinp class district. Secondly, not only did
the labor parties manage to hold their own, but even increased
slightly between 1930 and 1932. The bourgeois parties, on
the other hand, faded drastically, particularly the bour-
geois left, which dropped from 23.5 per cent of the district
vote to only 5.5 per cent.

Zehlendorf, a district vlth many hirher government

146

cxfficials, simply repeats the story of the increase in
the Nazis' vote. The total percentage of vote for the
National Socialists is loser in this district than in the
Steglitz district by 5.7 per cent, but it is still nearly
double that which the Nazis won in the labor class section
of Berlin. As in the other districts, the percentage of
vote for the two workers' parties remained nearly station-
ary while the bourgeois parties, particularly the left,
lost heavily.

The general pattern as demonstrated by three socially
differentiated districts of Berlin is for the National
Socialists to be particularly well supported by the middle
class. The greatest decline in strength from 1930 to 1932
occurred in the middle class parties. or the two labor
parties, the Communists were able to gain strength only in

the heavily populated workingman's district.

ledian Presentation
The coefficients of correlation that have been pre-
sented in this section of the thesis were all based on the
percentage that particular occupational groups were of
erserbspersonen. As supporting data the same socio-econo-
mic classes were computed on the basis of the proportion
each occupational group, including wives and other depend-

enta, was of berurszugehorigel. In this case the 10 cities

15 For cities over 100,000 population the absolute data
used in computations of prcpcrtions is from Table A, Band
457, Statistiks des Deutschen Reichs. For the remaining
cities It Is Trdfi‘TaSIe 3, Hands 151 and 455, Statistiks
gggtneutschen Reich. (Volks, Berufs-und BetriefiszIBIung
von 13 June 1933’.

 

 

..- L4 ‘4‘

44““ . I

 

 

a --i -_ ...._ ._... v A
—-— -, “#3:“. x . 044.3. wm-A-A ‘ 4.

A n..- .._ ‘,. ‘

 

 

147

with the lowest percentage of lower middle class were
shailarly arrayed. The median per cent of lower middle

class vote for the Nazi, Communist, and Social Democratic

parties was then determined for each group. The conclu-

sions based on the correlation data are supported by this

staple method.

TABLE XVII: MEDIAN DEMONSTRATION OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN
PER CENT OP IOWEH UIDDLE CIASS AND PER CENT OP VOTE FOR

SELECTED PARTIES.

 

City Per Cent of Party
Population Lower Iiddle Nasi Communist
Classifiedian Iedian Per Ce f Yo
ea c t es:
25,000 to 50,000 . 36.25 43. 7.
50,000 to 100,000 34.7 42. 7.
Over 100,000, 33.65 '39.5 14.5
Lowest 10 cities:
25,000 to 50,000 17.75 32. 20.
30,000 to 100,000 14.5 A 23.3 26.5
Over 100,000 19.2 27. 25.

 

The medians were developed by arraying the 10 cities
with the highest and the 10 cities with the lowest per
cents of white collar employees in berufssugehorige, for
each sise of city. Vote percentages are for the July 31,

1932 Reichstag elections.

In all sizes of city median per cents of vote for

the lasis are very much lower in the cities with the lowest

per cent of white collar workers. So even when the broad-

er base has been given to the concept of the lower middle

class the relationship between that class and the size of

lational Socialist vote remains the same. There does not

seem to be much question but what the middle class was a

large element in the support of Hitler.

148

The medians for the Communist party define Just as
clearly the antagonism between these two groups. In all
cases the cities with the lowest per cent of white collar
workers favored the Communists with the highest per cents
of vote. ‘

When all factors are considered, both upper and
lower middle classes supported the National Socialists and
opposed the Communists. This was true in all regions of
Germany and in all sizes of city that were studied. The
statistical reflection of the relationship was most ade-
quate in city size 50,000-100,000 and in the British zone.
The only region where the lower middle class correlated
negatively with Nazism and positively with Communism was
in ten cities over 50,000 population in the Ssxony-Thurin—
gia region of the Soviet zone. The relationship of lower
middle class to Nazism was weakest in the combined.American-
French zones. The upper class,on the other hand, showed
consistent positive relationship with Racism and a negative
relationship with Communism. 0f the two elements of the
middle class, the upper seemed to be more thoroughly pro-

lasi and anti-Communist than the lower.

CHAPTER VII

THE iOWER CLASS

that are the relationships between the two extremist
political parties and the lower socio-economic class? The
balance of the evidence that will be presented in the
following tables all points to this class being pro-com-
munist and anti-nasi, as a general condition. In the first
table the coefficients of correlation between the per cent

wage-earners, both employed and unemployed, were of

erwerbspersonen and the per cent of vote given the Nation-
al Socialists or the Communists in each city in the
July 31, 1932 elections are shown.
TABIE XVIII: COEFFICIENTS CF CORREIATION BETVEEN PER CENTS

0? VOTE FOR SPECIFIED PAiTI‘S AND PEd CVNTS CF VOTERS WHO
ARE LOWER CLASS, BY CITY SIZE CIASS.

 

 

 

 

City Size Party

Population Nazi Communist
25,000-$0,000 . -.2o .44
50,000-100,000 -.57 .77
Over 100,000 -.27 .54

 

A coefficient of .21 or more in cities of 25,000-50,000
or .29 in cities of 50,000-100,000, or .27 in cities of
100,000 or more population is significant statistically.

In all sizes of city the association between the

per cent of vcrkers or lover socio-oconomic class and the

149

150
per cent of the vote for the Communist party is positive,
but the relationship vith the per cent of vote for the
National Socialists is negative. The evidence by size of
city, then, is that the lower class supported the Commun-
ist party but not the Nazi. The followinp table indicates
that the association was uniform in all zones of occupation.
new xxx: COEFFICIENTS ce «assumes BEWEEN PER cams“

OF VOTE FOR SPECIFIED IARTIES AND FER CENTS CF VOTERS “HO
ARE LOWER CLASS, BY MILITARY OCCUPATION ZONE.

 

 

 

Party Hilitery Occupation Zone
Combined British Soviet _
MQ’FPO
Nazi -.11(-.41)s -.6:5 «nan-.28»1
.Comunist . so . '70 Ilsa

 

G Parentheses indicate a partial coefficient of correla-
tion with the per cent of Catholics in the population_
held constant.

Significant coefficients are: American-French zone:
.29 and .35 for a partial coefficient: British zone: .23:
Soviet zone: .22 and .27 for a partial coefficient.

The correlations in the Soviet zone are just barely
significant. They are a further example of the cultural
diversity of the cities in that area of Germany. Investi-
gation was made to determine whether or not there actually
was less relationship between the variables in the Soviet
zone than in the others. The first step was to study the
relationship between the Communist party and the lower
class by size of city within the zone.

In city size 95,000 to 50,000 the correlation between

the two variables rose to a positive .66. However, for the

151
30 cities of over 50,000 population the same association
was only a plus .17. This last broke down into a minus
.27 for cities of over 100,000 peOple and a plus .20 for
cities of 60,000 to 100,000 inhabitants. This would seem
to indicate that in spite of all that has been demonstrated
that workers in the major cities of the Russian zone did
not support the Communist party.

Studying the statistics city by city, however,
presents an entirely different picture and confirms thp
hypothesis that the wage-earner backed the radical labor
party. The negative correlation is the result of a comb-
ination of historical and religious factors hiding the true
relationship, because of the few cases available. There
are 13 cities of over 100,000 population in the Soviet zone
and six of these are in the Saxony-Thuringia section of the
sons. As has been pointed out,‘this section ofGernany has
long had a history of radical political activity among the
lower class.

Partly due to these historical reasons the Communist
party achieved a median vote of 21.? per cent in these six
cities. The median per cent of lower class in these cities
was 48.5, well below the median 53 per cent for the 27
cities of the area of 95,000 to 50,000 population, and
slightly lower than the median 49 per cent in the 7 cities
of over 100,000 people in the rest of eastern Germany.

Four of these seven were in Silesia where the median per
cent of lower class was 52 and the median per cent of vote

for ”16 ComIJIIiStB .0050

152

In spite of the hisher per cent of lower class,
these seven cities had a median Communist vote of only
12 per cent. So, as the per cent of loser class was
increasing, the per cent of vote for the Communist party
was decreasing when the cases were arranped as one
variable. The low Communist vote in these seven cities is
partly explained bv the influence of Catholicism. The
radical labor party was actively opposed by the Church
and so where a concentration of Catholics exists the
Communist worker support is reduced. In four of these
seven cities there were 3?, PS, as, and 90 per cent Catho-
lics.

It is readily seen, then, that the negative relation-
ship between lower class as a per cent of erwerbspersonen
and the prcpcrtion of the vote for the Communists in cities
of over 100,000 population was not the true social rela-
tionship but results from a peculiar combination of histori-
cal and relipious factors which hide the positive correla-
tion of the tvo variables.

The coefficient of correlation between proportions
of vote for the Nazis and prcpcrtions of lower class is
only minus .21 in the Soviet zone. On a subrepional basis
this relationship vas a minus .34 for 36 cities in Saxony-
Thuringia and only minus .11 for the remaining 47 cities
in the Silesian and northern areas of the zone. An out-
standinp difference between these tvo proups of cities was

the per cent of Catholics in the population. Consequently,

155

the prcpcrtion of Catholics vas held constant for the
whole zonal sample and the minus .21 coefficient increased
to a significant minus .28.

There was also a difference in the intensity of the
relationship by size of city. The 30 cities of over
50,000 population in the Soviet zone yielded a minus .37
between prcpcrtions of lover class and proportions of vote
for the Razis. In the 52 cities of 26,000-50,000 popula-
tion, the same relationship sas minus .23.

The simple correlation for the first group was a plus
.12, but in the second group it was a minus .36. Obviously,
the association between the per cent of wage-earners and
per cent of vote to the Nazis in this area was obscured by
the large proportion of Catholics. Therefore, another
partial correlation was made with the per cent of Catholics
in the pOpu‘ation in the combined zones held constant.
However, the city of Pirmasens in the French zone was
omitted. Based on the 46 cities the partial correlation was
minus .41. Apparently, then, there was an appreciable
tendency for the loser class in southwestern Germany, as in
other areas, to rn’ect Fitler. At the same time the coef-
ficient of plus .50 is strong evidence that the workers of
this area supported the Communists.

The British zone acrhinz class elements were decided-
ly antaponistic to the Rational Socialists and favorable to
the »ommunist partv, also. The ccnsistently hiah correla-

tions that are obtained in that zone in repard to class

154
structure and party strength emphasize the overall class
political alignments. It is evident that the greater the
concentration of heavy industry and the consequent large
number of unskilled laborers the greater the opportunity
.for class conflict. As the class differences become
readily discernible tte more apt is there to he the align-

ing of classes solidly behind particular political parties.

Hodian-Presentation
In the same say that the table of medians (Table XVII)

was constructed to diaplay the relationship between the
middle class and party votinpganother set of medians for
the association of the laborinp class to the Iazi and
Communist parties were developed. The positive relation-
ship between the per cent of workers in herufssugehorige

and the per cent of urban vote for the Communists is

definitely reenforced by the stufiy of Table XX.

American-French Region

Simple correlation techniques did not reveal any
significant association between the lower class and the
per cent of vote for the Nazis in the combined American-
French zone. A partial coefficient of correlation between
the two variables with the per cent of Catholics in the
population held constant reached minus .99. filth only 47
cities in this area. further research was necessary if any
statistically valid conclusions could be drawn.

Handlinp the two zones separatelv v’eldcd simple

 

, -h‘-‘~6"-‘— ..n-Ia"i..v-Ac.~l _.~“_...‘__V;~..,.~_ | r l ‘u

A

 

 

156
correlations of minus .19 in the American zone and plus
.27 in the French zone. The French zone coefficient is
based on only 12 cases, so it could be affected seriously
by one unusual case. This was found to be so. The city
of Pirmascns with 49 per cent Nazi vote and a low propor-
tion of Catholics was omitted and immediately the direction
of the relationship was reversed. In the American zone
the analysis was made hv dividing the 35 cities into two
groups. Group one included ell cities mith more than
20 per cent Catholics, while group two was those with less

than 20 per cent Catholics in the population.

TABLE XX: IEDIAK D? MONSTRATICN CF AS‘OCIATION BETWEEN
PER CEITS 0F LOWER CIASS AND PER CENTS 0F VOTE FOR ‘SEIEC.T-

ED PARTIES.

 

 

Per Cent of Party
' City Lover Class Nazi Communist
Population ledians Iedian Per Cent of Vote
‘ Ten Highest:
26.000-50.000 62.1 31.5 20.0
50,000-100,000 74.5 23.5 26.5
Over 100,000 66.5 27.0 24.0
Ten Lowest:
25,000’50’000 39.3 4205 700
50,000-100,000 40.8 41.0 7.0
Over 100,000 43.0 54.5 13.0

 

.__‘

The medians were developed by arraying the ten cities
with the highest and the ten cities with the lowest per
cents of wage-earners in berufszugehorifle.

Study of this table will show that in all sizes of

city that as the per cent of workers in berufssugehorige

declined the per cent of vote won by Hitler's party

156
jumped upward. At the same time the higher the per cent
of sorkers the higher the percentage of vote won by the
Communists.

The evidence confirms the position that in 1932 the
National Socialists did not pain the support of a majority
of the lower class. It is perhaps more correct to say that
little of the Nazis' support came from the laboring class.
The Communists, on the other hand, son a very large seg-
ment of the loser class. It seems likely that practically
all of its support was from this group.

By studying particular occupational groups it is
possible to describe some of the divisions within the two
main social classes that have been outlined. The occupa—
tional study also reenforces the general conclusions as to
the class basis of the two radical parties. The statisti~

cal evidence is presented in the next chapter.

 

 

‘WWW?

‘ All. »a*aa-‘€-..g)—e ..a.

4k

 

CHAPTER VIII
OCCUPATION AND POLITICS

The consistent pattern of positive correlation of
indices of the lower socio-economic class and the propor-
tional size of the Communist vote in cities does not mean
that all workers voted for the radical labor party. It is

primarily indicative of the single class nature of that

‘party. ‘In the same way the repeated positive correlation

on middle socio-economic indices with the proportional sise
of the Nazi vote in cities does not indicate that all of
the urban middle class supported Hitler.

Investigation of various types of industry helped
get at the Particular oooupational proups in the lower
classes which supported the Communists. Wage-workers were
not affected uniformly by economic disaster as unemploy-
'ment. lowered wage rates, or partial employment. For the
unskilled laborer such facts are more or less routine in
his economic life and he did not find them as unusual as
did the skilled worker. Consequently. in a period of
crisis such as gripped Germany in 1932, one would expect
differences in the solutions desired by these two proupe
within labor. The end result would be a difference in
political parties with which each affiliated. The unskilled
knew that even in the best of times he was not apt to be

157

158
"well-off" financially and so he was prone to favor perma-
nent revision of the political arrangements, providing,
of course. that he was class conscious; and the German
worker was. The skilled laborer, on the other hand, could
recall happier days and desire a return to the political
arranpements of those davs.

Differences also exist within the lower class because
of the prestige of workinp in a hiphly skilled industry as
the electrical industry, as acainst the low prestige of the
ditch digging. Income variations account for other dif-
ferences. Competition between certain industries for the
same market and between different classes of labor for the
same jobs are other disruptive factors. Many other reasons
for lack of political cohesiveness within the workers'
class could be piven, but these serve to point to the
principal causes.

that particular occupational segments of the lower
class backed the Communist party and what croups broke
away f~or their class? In general it can be said that the
Communist party was the party of servers in the large mass
production industries, as iron and steel, where there was
a high prcpcrtion of unskilled and semi-skilled and where
the cancer of employees per plant was large. Other parties,
as the Nazis, were aided by the various types of skilled
employees.

In the industries selected for analysis the total

employed in the industry plus those who would work in that

159
industry if employment was available was computed as a
' percentage of the eruerbspersoncn of each city.1 This
percentage was then correlated with the percentage of vote
for the Nazi, Communist, and Social Democratic party in
each city. Within the limits of the statistics of employ-
ment by industry that were available, an attempt was made
to select industries representative of a block of indust-
ries. For instance, the optical and musical instrument
industries are representative of the skilled worker trades
and the basic metals industries of those with masses of
unskilled and semi-skilled laborers.

In the statistics used all levels of employment are
included within each industry. Obviously, it would have
been more accurate to correlate separately for each indust-
ry the managers, the white collar employees, the skilled
workers, and the unskilled laborers. Statistics of this
refinement were not available. But the classification of
industries according to the prcpcrtion of skilled workers
gives a rough indication of the division of political senti-
ment within the loser class.

The first Proup of industries to be presented are

those with larpe proportions of skilled rockers. Three

1. Iii‘data on individual industries is ?rom fierurssafilun .
(16 Juni 1933) Lie beruilicha und scziele Gliederuns der
Bevolkerung in den landern und Iandesteilon. statistik des

,
hora-una Wesifieutscaen: R and 6, sue cu sc

 

 
 

an un .essfifigi

WI-—?I,';Die Erverhstati pHeiT_der RevoTkerunp in den einz-
elmen Gemeiden.mit 1000 und mehr Einuohnern, Verlap fur
So7ialpolitik, ~‘irtschaft und Etatistik 0. m. l. H. Ber-
11h, 19360

160
examples of this tvnc of industry, the musical instruments,
printers, and precision and ontical instruments industries,
were selected for analysis. Aside From the critisciems
outlined above, it must be noted that the number of employe-
es in any one of these industries livinp in a particular
city was very small. It mas primarily for this reason
that all three of those skilled type of industries were
chosen for analysis rather than relyinp on just one.

The total number of peeple living in cities of over
100,000 population and sorkina in the musical instruments
industry was only 2F,OOO. The same figure for the print-
ing industries was 170,0n0 and for the precision and
optical instruments industry was 55,000. When the millions
of peeple who voted in cities of over 100,000 population
are considered, these are not very large fipures. About
the same situation was true in cities or 90,000 to 100.000.
Cities of smaller size verenot studied in this regard. It
is evident, than, that the conclusions based on this data
are in no sense definitive. The primary importance of the
followinr coefficients of correlation, based on particular
industries, lies in the systematic pattern in shich they
fell. '

Table XXI outlines the coefficients of correlation
on the three skill-typed industries. The first is the
musical instruments industry, which in 193? was made up of
75 per cent wave-earners and 26 per cent white collar

employees, managers, and proprietors. Sixty per cent of

161

the industry was unemployed, and virtually all of the un-
employment was from the sage-earners. Lomen constituted
about 25 per cent of the industry. frinting is industry
tvo, which was about 80 per cent wage-earners and 20 per
cent other employees and owners. Approximately 54 per cent
of the industry was unemployed and here again about 90 per
cent was from the wage-earners. Women were about 25 per
cent of the industry. The third skill-typed industry to be
shown is the precision and optical instruments industry,
which use 65 per cent wage-earners. 19 per cent white col-
lar employees, and the balance managers and owners. About
30 per cent were unemployed and P5 per cent of these were.
wage-earners. Women constituted 20 per cent of the working

forOCe

TABLE xxx: COEFFICIENTS cs CORRELATION BETWEEN PER CENTs‘
or thLRBSFERSCNrN IN CERTAIN INDUSTRIES pun THE PER CENTS
ca vows son SPECIFIED PARTIES.

 

 

Industry Party ‘
Nazi ' Communist Social Democrat
Size of City
1* 2 l 2 l 2

”0.131631 .15 016 -015 -009 029 .35

Instruments
Frintersz .os .26 -.22 -.46 .37 .37
Precision and *

optical 019 001 -027 ’005 034 006

instruments

 

* (l7 equals size oT’city of’population over 155,555 and
(2) equals city population of 50,000-100,00o,1

A coefficient of .29 is statistically sipnificant for
cities of 50,000 to 100,000 and .?7 for cities over
100,000 population.

 

I: MusIVihstrurrnten-und Filfilsarenlndustrie.
2. Druck-und envielfaltigungsgeuerbg. _
3. Poinmechnnische und ontisha Industrie.

162

In these these industries, which require a hiah
proportion of skilled workers and relatively few employees
per plant, it is amazinr to see the complete reVepsal of
the pattern of correlation that was demonstrated in
Chapter 12. The Nazis new pet positive coefficients of
relationship in all cases, but it is Very important to
note that not one Pf them is statistically sicnificant. It
is important, in View of the past coefficients of the as-
sociation of workers to Nazism, that workers in these
industries seemingly did not stronaly oppose Hitler.

The Communist party, however, was quite roughly
treated. In two cases, first in cities of 50,000-100,000
population in the printinr trade and second, in metrOpoli-
tan cities sith the precision instruments industry, a
significant negative association developed. This means
that the greater the concentration of workers in these
industries in a city the lover the percentage of Communist
vote. Moreover, the startling condition is the overall
pattern of negative relation, even when not‘significant,
as it is such a reversal of past general indications of
worker sunport of the Communists.

The correlations for the Social Democratic party
are included to demonstrate that when the lower class did
not support the Communist party it did support the other
labor party rather than Hitler. So, even though the
National Socialists were able to win workers in the skill-

typed industries, they still did not replace the labor

 

165
parties. Industries as the three illustrated had lonr
.been strongly unionized, and it was in these union atronp-
holds that the socialists best resisted the Communists.

It would be in these plants with a hiph yronortion
of skilled employees and relatively stable employment,
hiph wages, pride in craft, and strong unionization, that
the upper lemels of the lower class would be found. The
workers and their families would be in a transitional
phase between the core of the middle and lower classes and
probably eould tend to take on some of the political char-

soteristioe of the middle class.

Government Service

The tendency for the skilled worker to take on some
of the political tendencies of the white collar middle
class can be reflected in a study of tvo rovernment aer-
vies. One, the post office and railroad service, is a
national government enterprise; and the other, water, gas,
and electricity, is citv dominated service. Both of these
services were measured by computing the proportion the
number of emyloyeea in each wee of the total employed in
the city and relatinr tiis to the prcpcrtions of vote for
the two parties. The coefficients are given in Table XXII.

The post office and railroad service would consist
almost entirely of white collar employees and skilled york-
ers iho had a very hixh degree of security. It is entirely
possible that the only occupational classification portrayed

by this index is the vhite roller one, because only

:4 . [I I I (luv. ,llv Ill 1 II V! I 'It‘ I. ‘l 1‘.

164

40 per cent of the 400,000 employed in cities of over
100,000 population were wage-earners and nearly all off
the remaining 60 per cent were classed as beamte or white
collar workers. Only 10 per cent of the total employees
were women. Eight per cent of all employees were unemployed.

Water, gas, and electricity on the other hand is
primarily sage-earners. Over 16,000 were employed in this
industry in cities over 100,000 population. Of these,
67 per cent were ware-earners and the majority of them
would be skilled. It is fairly certain that skilled em-
ployment is reflected by this index. Unemployment was also
a minor factor in water, gas, and electricity employment as
only 12 per cent of the fetal were unemployed. Women con-
stituted only 7 per cent of the total employment.
TABLE XXII: COEFFICIENTS CF CORRELATION BETWEEN PER CENTQ

0F ERWERBSPERSCNEN IN SELECTED GOVERNMENT OPERATED INDflar
TRIES AND THE PER CENTS OP VOTE FOR SPECIFIED PARTIES.

 

 

Industry Party
Nazi Communist
Size of City
1 2 1 2
Post office and .14 .15 -.30 -.37
railroad
hater, Gas, and .2 .45 -.33 -.46
electricity

 

 

(Ti represents cities of over 155,355 population and’
(2) those of 50,000 to 100,00Q,'

A coefficient of .29 is statistically significant for
cities of (2) and .27 for cities of (1).

Government employees apparently were antagonistic

to the Communist party. In both sizes of city and in both

165
of the industries eirnificent negative relationships
exist between the proportion of erwerbSpersonon in these
two industries and the proportional size of the extremist

labor party vote. The Nazis, on the other hand, son signi—

1

ficant strength amonr water, gas, and electricity workers.

In cities of 50,000 to 100,000 pOpulation in the
water, gas, and electricity service the correlation of .45
is the first indication that the Hitler party successfully
broke into the monopoly of the labor parties over the vote
of the workers. It should be pointed out, however, that
it use in these government Operated industries that the
socialist affiliated trade unions were the weakest.2 If
any industrial group was to succumb to the propaganda of
Hitler it was lopical that it would be those under govern-
ment control and operation.

There is only a weak relationship between proportions
of employment in the post office and railroad service. The
service is primarily white collar and skilled employees;
and both of these preups apparently favored Hitler, yet
these coefficients do not illustrate that. The direction

1. Speaking of civil services employees—as a whole, Frans
Neumann made this observation, "The civil servants were nev-
er enthusiastic supporters of the “eimar democracy. They
looked upon the Social Democratic party and trade unions as
corrupt and job-hungry "criminals" she had betrayed the mon-
archy in 191° for entirely selfish reasovs. Though not
openly National Socialist, their own union, the DBB,(Dents-
cher Beamten Bund), became more and more reactionary as the
prestige of the democracy declined." Franz Neumann, Behe:
moth New Yerk, 1942, p. 578.

Q. ‘"The civil service organization affiliated with the
Socialist trade unions declined in membership from 420,000
in 1922 to 179,000 in 1?30 while the so-called neutrals, but
in fact nationalistic, civil service body orpenized 1,043415)
members in 1930, primarily from the middle ani loner ranks.
Ibid, p. 29.

 

166
of relationship is positive for both industries with the
Nazis. and that may be the significant fact. Roth indust~
ries definitely rejected the Communist party.

The question of whether or not the skilled worker
tended to move away from the Communist party to the Social
Democrats, Nazis or some other party could be‘best demon-
strated if wage—earners could be separated from white-
oollar employees. For city employees it was possible to
make this discrimination.1 In cities of 100,000 popula-
tion the proportions that wage-earners and white-collar
workers were or total employment in the city were OOMPthd.
These prcpcrtions were related to the prcpcrtions of vote
for the Rational Socialists, Communists, and Social Demo-
crats. The results are given in Table XXIII.

The breakdown of city employees into workers of the
lower class and the white collar government employees who
are included in the middle class portrays a similar dir-
ection of political action in the two groups. Both groups
demonstrate a positive relationship with the National
Socialists and negative association with the Communists.
Hitler. then. was able to win some backing from workers in
government service.

The Social Democratic party won backing in these two
groups as well. Workers in these occupations were not

Communists. but they were often Socialists.

 

IT ertecrnrterepén aor stadte, Imam-else 11nd [and @-
meinaen. Taoelle III. "Personal der deutschen Urosssgadt-
Verwaltwngen." pp. 176-179. Data is for 1928.

167

\
TABLE XXIII! COEFFICIE,.I"£’]‘S C-F' CORRELATICN BEN-KEN CITY
EUPLOYEnS AS PER CENTS (F’ ERV‘v’ERBSPE’iEC‘N 5N AND YER CENTS
OF VOTE VCR SPECIFIED PARTIES.

 

 

City Employees Party

Nazi Communist Social Democrats
hage-earners .27 -.26 .20
White collar .26 -.32 .34

 

’50 data on city employees is for cities over 155,555
population in 1928. A coefficient of .27 is significant.

It seems likely that there may have been more of a
tendency for skilled workers to vote for the National Soci-
alists than was true of the lower socic-eccncmic class as a
whole. At the same time the skilled labor group may have
rejected the Communist party in favor of the Social Democrat-
10. The question remaining is: what type of wage-earner
supported the Communists? It is thought that a partial ans-
war to this is found in the study of two industries that had
large prcpcrtions of unskilled workers. These are the basic
metals'industry1 and the metals working industry.2 Table
XXIV presents the coefficients of correlation between per
cents of employees in each of these industries. by city. and

the per cents of vote for the political parties.

TABLE XXIV: COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN ran CENTS or ERWERBSPER-
sonen IN SELECTED lNDUdeIE' AND PER CENTS 0? VOTE p03
SPECIFIED PARTIES, BY CITY.

 

 

Industry Party
Nazi Communists Social Democrats
Basic Istals -.3 .47 --“
Metal Working .09 .50 -.27

 

 

1 For cities of over 155.555 population only.

KS Not computed.
A coefficient of .27 is statistically significant.

1. Eisen-undMetallgewinnung.
2. Eisen. Stahl-und Vetallwarenherstellung.

 

..g-..... ...—.....L.

 

168

The basic metals industries consist primarily of
the iron and steel-smelting industrygand metal-working
industries are largely assembly line plants making such
products as kitchen ware. farm implements, and so on. of
iron. steel. and other metals. Both industrial complexes
have a high proportion of unskilled workers and also many
employees per plant.

There is an important difference in the relationship
of the proportion of employees in these two industries and
the proportions of vote for the National Socialists. The
basic metals industries yielded a significant negative
coefficient; but in the case of the metals working industry.
an insignificant plus coefficient resulted. However, both
industries show that the more people that were working in
the industries in a city the greater the proportion of vote
for the Communist party. In this instance this is taken
to indicate the support of communism hy unskilled and semi-
skilled vorkers in mass industries. The explanation of the
relationship with the Nazis can be attempted in this way.

or the 341,000 peeple employed in the metals workinp
industries. 35.000 (10 per cent) were independents or
owners. At the same time 70 per Cont of the total were
wage-earners and 11 per cent manaserial or white collar
employees. But in the basic metal industries only 1500
of 217,000. or .7 per cent. were owners: and 85 per cent
were wage-earners. Another important difference between

the two industrial groups is that in the first. 14 per cent

169

of the total were women, but in the basic metals women
amounted to only 3.6 per cent of the total employed.
Unemployment was 46 per cent of the total in metal-working
industries and 42 in basic metals.

It is clear. then. that the basic metals industries
wers more completely under the domination of few giant
concerns than was true of the metals working industries.

It was the heavy representation of independents and white
collar employees in the metals working industry that
counteracted the influence of the unskilled worker and~
'made the neutral coefficient with the National Socialists
possible. i

The basic iron and steel industry, however. did not
have this proportionally significant element. so the coef-
ficient is dominated entirely by the wage-earners in the
sample. The support of the Communist party can be easily
understood as worker security was not preat in the industry.
Between 1919 and 1925 there had been severe competition in
the industry with the result that the worker was never sure
how long his job was to last or what his rate of pay was
going to be. In 1926 the major corporations formed a
cartel that put six concerns in virtual control of the
industry. During the twenties there was also a steady
increase in production per worker and a continuinp decline
in the number of workers employed.1 The rationalization of
the metals working industry was not so thoroush. but the

l. Rationalization 2: Carmen lndustry, ew or , it .
PP- 79‘I530

 

 

 

170
wage-earner was subjected to somewhat similar pressure.

It is logical to assume that class conflict would
arise much more stronply in the heat of economic struggle
between workers and management in these large cartelizcd
industries than in the industries of the precision instru-
ment manufacturing type. This is supported by the fact
that the major concentrations of the metal-working and
basic metal industries were in the British occupation zone
where the evidences of class conflict have been the clear-
est. For these reasons it would have been very valuable
to discriminate between managerial and laboring employees.
However. the data was not available by cities.

Further evidence is available that it was in the mass
production industries that the Communist party achieved its
greatest support. For 3Q cities of over 100,000 population
data classifying establishments according to the nunber of
employees hired was used.1 The establishments were divided
into eight groups ranging from one-man plants to those
hiring 1.000 or more. The total number of employees in
each city for each size of establishment use then computed
as a prcpcrtion of the total employees in the city. These
percentapes vere then correlated with the per cents of vote
for the three major political parties. The results are
given in Table XXV.

I:—-53;_VT—t;;fiart313hen der Stadte.ilandkrcise undftfi-d=-
emeT—d n fieWDTe-Gmbn r e e nac 'Tfirer

m'tvcariegt E‘s. Mittler e Sohn, Berlin. 19:50).

pp. 172-175. Data for 1925.

 

171

TABLE XXV: COEFFICIENTS CR CORRELATION BETWEEN PER CEHTS‘
0F EHPLOYEES IN CERTAIN SIZE CONCERNS AND THE PER CENTS 0?
VOTE FOR SPECIFIED TARTIES IN CITlth fl? 100,000 OR MORE
FOPUIATION.

 

Size of Plant Party

Nazi Communist Social Democrat
Number of employees

per plant:

060 -028 e36
1’5 s55 -035 e332
6-10 .47 -.45 .41
11-50 .52 -944 048
61-200 .49 -.32 .26
201-600 . .52 -022 .20
501~1,000 -035 008 -012
1.000 and up -.49 .40 -.3g/

 

The number of cases that were used in developing
these coefficients is so small, 38. that not too much
emphasis can be placed on any sinple correlation. _However,
the directness and steadinesp of the trend that is shown
leads to valuable conclusions. The per cent of vote for
the lational Socialists correlated positively with per cents
for each type of plant that hired five-hundred crlsas
employees. In general the greater the prcpcrtion of estab-
lishments in a city with less than 501 employees the higher
the proportional Nazi vote. It is also true that it is a
progressively increasing positive relationship with an
increase in the proportion of plants in each classification
below the 201-500 classification. This is as would be
expected,for plants of one employee are another measure of
the proprietorship class that was used in measuring the

upper middle class.

172
The Communist trend is a complete reversal of the
Nazi. The greater the proportion of plants with more than
1,000 employees the greater the proportion of Communist
vote. This is closely related to the findings in the
basic metals and metals workers' industries. The Social

Democratic party followed the same trend as the Nazis.

Major Employment Classifications

It has been pointed out that it would have been very
valuable to discriminate between types of employees in the
industries studied, but that satisfactory data was not
available to the author. The data on the metals working
industries and on number of employees per plant indicate
that there was probably a definite Split between owners and
white collar workers on one hand and wage—earners on the
other. The occupational data used in measuring social
classes indicates the same thing. By working with two
major employment classifications it is possible to get a
rough measure of white collar employees in contrast to
wage-earners. The two classifications are Industry and
Handwork, and Trade and Transportation.1

The hypothesis is that Industry and Handwork is an
industrial classification that consists largely of wage-
earners. Speculation as to the various prcpcrtions of
skilled. semi-skilled or unskilled would not be profitable.
liicr—w—wfirsznlzrbzz’::fiifii‘isz’gmw mm“:

Verlag der Reimar Hobbing G;m.b. H. in Berlin 5% 61. p. 30.
Data is for 1935.

 

 

173
Correlation of this data with the voting statistics, then,
would measure the relationship between laboring occupa-
tions and political action. At the same time it was
assumed that Trade and Transportation was primarily made
up of white collar employees and so that type of occupa-
tion would be measured by relating that classification to
voting statistics.

Tables XXVI and XXVI! present the coefficients of
correlation that were developed. The correlations for
Industry and Handwork were develOped by dividing the total
erwerbspersonen in each city by the total of employees in
Industry and Handwork and relating this proportion to the
prcpcrtion of vote for the selected political parties.

The same procedure was used with the Trade and Transporta-

tion classification.

casts XXVI: coasaxcxanrs ca CORRELATION BETWEEN PER cause
for vora son SPECIFIED PARTIES AND PER stars or aawaasspsa-
sense I! INDUSTRY AND aauuwoax, BY SIZE or c111.

 

 

City Sise Party
Pepulation lasi Communist
iss.ooo-so.ooo -.2s .34
60.000-100.000 . -.4'7 .64
Over 100, 000 - . 2'7 . 59/

 

W—

A coefficient of .21 or more in cities of 25.000 to
50,000, or .29 in cities of 50.000 to 100,000, or .27 in
cities of over 100,000 ponulation is statistically signi-

ficant.

....||l| I 1.111! lllln‘lllillil Ill - III!.||1III

Ill .fs “ . Il.l. I I lllll' . I ll [fl .l I. ‘ A" Ill 1 i. ll mm

 

 

174

TABLE XXVII: COEFFICIENTS er couaEIATIow BETWEEN ran CENTé‘
or VOTE sou SPECIFIED Ina? hfi AND PEi cerTs ca anvanssraa-
sonen IN TRADE AND TRANSI‘HTATICH, BY SIZE ca CITY.

 

 

Size of City Party

Population Nazi Communist
25,000-50,000 .21 -.20
50.000-100.000 .44 ~56].
Over 100, 000 e 30 " e 35

 

A coefficient of .21 or more in cities of 25,000 to
50,000. or .29 in cities of 50,000 to 100,000, or .27 in
cities of over 100,000 pepulation is statistically signi-
ficant.

These two tables support the conclusion that the
wage-earning occupational classifications supported the
Communists and the white collar occupational groups sup-
ported the National Socialists. Table XXVI clearly shows
that as the proportions of peeple in a city engaged in
industry and’handwork increased the prcpcrtions of vote
for the Communist party increased and decreased for the
heels. The coefficients in all sizes of cities and for
both parties were statistically significant.

Table XXVII demonstrates that as the prcpcrtion of
peOple in city enraged in Trade and Transportation occu-
pations in reased the proportion of vote for National
Socialists increased and the proportion for the Communist
party decreased. All of the coefficients except one are
statistically significant. The relationship with Commun-
ism in cities of 25,000 to 50,000 is just below significance.

175

The major employment classifications, of course,
reflect the social class character of a city. The greater
the concentration of industries the greater the concentra-
tion of lower social class. The Trade occupational classi-
fication includes so diverse elements as the large depart-
ment store owner and the basement shoe clerk, but it does
‘conaist largely of white collar employees and the many
small shepkeepers who represent the majority of small
independent businessmen. Transportation also includes very
widely separated employment classifications, but in the
main is government employees with civil service tenure and
middle class leanings. Therefore. the greater the concen-
tration of trade and transportation the greater the concen-
tration of the middle social classes.

The support of the white collar occupation groups
of the National Socialists was also measured by correlat-
ing the prcpcrtions of persons engaged in retail trade per
1,000 population in cities of over 25,000 population with
the prcpcrtion of vote for the two political parties. It
was found that the more peeple that were in retail trade
the greater the Nazi vote and the lower the Communist vote.
The coefficients were a significant plus .36 with the Razis
and a minus .39 with the Communists. Since retail trade
reflects again the independent tradesmen and the numerous
white collar positions in trade, the association of these

occupational groups with Nazism is further emphasised.

Unemployment

The evidence mounts that the laborer or wage-earner

176
was more apt to be a Communist than a Nazi, but that the
white collar worker was more apt to be a Nazi than a
Communist. In the election of 193? there was no need to he
one or other, so of course one cannot make a dogmatic state~
ment that markers were Communists and white collar emplyees
Nazis. There were defections in each occupational group
to other parties. In the labor group there is some slight
evidence in this occupational data that the skilled worker
may have favored some other party as the Social Democratic
rather than the Communists. Some seem to have gone to the
Rational Socialists as well. The semi-skilled or unskilled
worker, however. appears to have voted for the Communist
party. Defection from the National Socialists in the white
collar ranks was probably to parties other than the Social
Democrats. although some undoubtedly did vote for that‘
party. This is a warning note to the reader to always
remember that only the broad general support of the Commun-
ist and National Socialist party is being measured.

With this warning in mind, further evidence can be
evaluated which reaffirms the conclusion that as a social
grouping the wage-earner was opposed to the Nazi party
and supported the Communist. At the same time it is again
shown that white collar employees had just the Opposite

political reaction.
The officially registered unemployment on January 15,
1933, was 5,966.OOO.1 In addition, the estimated unregistered

1. Calvin 5. Hoover, fiennanz Enters the Third Reich, New
York. 195?, D. 13s

 

 

177
unemployment was over one million, so that the total
unemployed was seven million or more. The situation at
the time of the July election was about the same. Unem-
ployment had been above four million for over three years.
It naturally hit peeple in all levels of German economic ‘
life but struck the greatest blow at the ordinary laborer.
What was the political effect of this severe economic
crisis for the German voter?1

The relationship of unemployment to party cleavages
is clearer when the class structure is considered. Unem-
ployment was composed of two main elements. Angestellte.
or white collar workers, which was classified as lower
middle class, was prcpcrtionally much smaller than the

second element, wage-earners. In cities of over 100.000

 

I. The meaning ofjthese statistics 0 unemp oymen or

the individual act of voting is made clear by the follow-

ing account:

- An idea of how an unemployed family ekes out an
existence may be illustrated by the following real
case: Karl is a teamster, 41 years old, with a wife
-and four children. He has two rooms. a kitchen and a
hall-obetter than most workers. He gets 95 marks ($24)
sumonth from the unemployment insurance fund. and a
"sleeping boy" pays $5 a month. which is high, because
this lodging is better than the average. The monthly
income is than $29 and the rent is $7 a month. Karl
and his family live on the $21 a month plus about $4.50
worth of food given by the church and free meals that
two children get at school. He incurs no debts. In
this respect he is luckier than many. Living costs in
Germany cannot be judged by the low rents. Aside from
this item they are. perhaps, one—third lower than Ameri-
can prices.

Karl's family can be considered as an exmmple of the
best condition of an unemployed workman. But his $24
monthly income from insurance is cut to about $15 after
he has been jobless for twenty weeks and sinks even lower
after another 13 weeks. Karl and his like are willing
listeners to the partisans of bolshevism.

Lindsay hoben, "Threats of Revolution." Current Histo ,

VOle 35. Decembar, 1931’ PP. 3R9-3900

178
population white collar yorkers were about 22 per cent of
all unemployed and the workers 78 per cent. Cities of
25,000 to 50,000 pepulation had highest prcpcrtion of
wage-earners. 81 per cent, unemployed. The proportion in
middle size of city ranged between the percentages for
large and small cities. f

Preportions that unemployed white collar employees
or wage-earners were of all unemployment were correlated
with the prcpcrtions of vote for the two parties. In all
sises of city the prcpcrtions of white collar unemployment
were positively rzlated to the percentage of vote for the
National Socialists, but vary significantly negative with
the Communist. Wage-earners who were unemployed did not
support the Nazis, however. The greater the percentage of
unemployed wage-earners. the greater the proportion of vote

for the Communist party and the lower for the Basis.

Table XXV!!! shows these relationships.

casts XXVIII: COEFFICIENTS or CORRELATION ssrwsss PROPO§5
axons or UNEMPLOYMENT BY OCCUPATIONAL CLASS AND PROPORTIOIB
or vows son SPECIFIED PARTIES, BY SIZE or c112.

 

Size of City Nazi - Party - Communist
hhita Wage-earners White Wage-earners
Collar Collar
25,000.50'000 e26 ’e26 -e40 e40
50,000-1wgooo 052 -051 -075 .75
0761‘ 100. 000 e 27 "e 2" -e 59 e5?“

 

 

fiwA coefficient of .51 is statistically significant in
cities of 25,000-50,000: .82 for cities of 50,000-100.000:
and .29 for cities of over 100,000 population.

179

It is obvious that the social class political align-
ments persisted even in the face of destruction of the
economic life of a lower middle or lower class voter.
Since wage-earners average about 90 per cent of all unem-
ployment, the popular conception of unemployed workers
supporting Hitler is certainly not upheld by this data.

A generalized description of the reasons for the
cleavage along class lines should not be necessary. The
general breakdown of the Germany economy after 1929 is
vell-known, .and the elements of that breakdown that are
pertinent to the investigation are discussed elsewhere.
Two characteristics of the unemployed are interesting to
note.

Young workers were more affected by unemployment.
regardless of class, because of the payment provisions of
German unemployment compensation which required a certain
number of months of work before a worker was eligible.
Unemployment was so general for the three years prior to
the July election that many young workers werenot able to
meet the minimum requirements. Living on the dole with no
hepss for the future was a hopeless existence for the un-
employed youth, and for him to turn radical is readily
understandable. For middle class youth radicalisation
would mean support of Hitler while the working class youth
would turn communist. The strained Marxian doctrines of
lower class parents probably did not appeal to these lat-

ter because the party of the parents, the Social Democrats,

180
had failed to build the workers democracy after the revo-
lution in 1919. The middle class youth on the other hand
were rejecting the parties of their parents, the Democratic
and Peeples parties. The problem of unemployed youth is
more thoroughly discussed in the reviev of the age composi-
tion of the parties.

Besides the emphasis on youth, wage-earner unemploy-
ment is affected by the types of workers most apt to be _
unemployed for long periods. These would be unskilled
workers in particular. It has been shown that workers in
industries with large proportions of unskilled were more
strongly related to the Communist party than in industries
with high proportions of skilled workers. Industries with
the large prcpcrtions of unskilled were the very industries
with large numbers of unemployed so that wage-earner
unemployed is stronply influenced by the unskilled. For
instance. in cities of over 100,000 population the basic
metals and metal-working industries had 229,000 (41 per cent)
wage-earners unemployed, whereas the Reich postal and rail
services had only 30,510 (7 per cent) unemployed. It is
a well-known fact that the lower industrial classifications
in our economy are sooner "laid-off" in crisis than the
higher. Highly industrialised Germany experienced the same
phenomena but with this peculiar twist.

The economic crisis was so severe and so long that
all levels of wage-earners were unemployed in large numbers

but the mass of unskilled were hit first and remained

unemployed for the longest periods. As was previously

181
pointed out, this group vould tend to vote Communist
because long echrience at the bottom economically and
education in Marxist doctrines had convinced them that
relief lay through political and nct economic weapons.

Other writers have noted this condition. For ins-
tance, "The main body of Communist voters consisted, apart
from revolutionary elites of high—skilled workers in Ber-
lin, Saxony, and the Ruhr region, of a shiftinr mass of

'1 Another

dissatisfied unskilled workers and unemployed.
wrote, ”...even in the last elections on March 6, 1933,
held under Hitler with but scanty remnants of freedom and
secrecy, the working classes and unemployed remained loyal
to the so-called proletarian parties, the Social Democrats
and the Communists,....thus it could not be the unemployed
who brought Hitler into power."2
In general, than, the study of particular occupation-
al groups supports the conclusions put forward concerning
the middle class support of the National Socialists and
the working class support of the Communists. The white
collar employees and the laborer did not find a common
political ground. tithin the laboring class it seems that
the-skilled worker was less apt than the unskilled to be a
Communist. There is not much evidence that this skilled
group supported hitlcr, but it was more likely to do so
than the unskilled. The skilled groups probably remained
in the Social Democratic party.

I: hbenatein’ EEe Cite. p0 2§0e
2. Gustav Stolper, German Economy, 1970-1940, New York,
1940, p. 230.

CHAPTER IX
SOCIAL AHD ECONOMIC FACTORS

Why did the traditionally liberal middle class cast
its votes for Hitler? The answer lies partly in the fear
of proletarization in the middle class during the nineteen-
twenties. The middle class had long Opposed the socialist
labor*movement because it ultimately meant the elimination
of class privileges. And it appeared in.the economic crisis
of the 1920-32 period that the fears were well-founded.1

An article in Nation in 1931 stated, “What is appar-
ent even to the visitor in a German city is the fact that
the middle class is dramatically on the point of vanishing.
Every month.thousands of people who traditionally belonged
to that class-~teachers, small professional men, shopkeepers,
officials-oars falling into the sea of the proletariat.
When the factor is unemployment, that change is automatic.
and its speed remorseless. When the factor is taxation,
the change is more gradual but no less inevitable'.‘2 The

same article speaks of thousands of trained officials who

 

. ans eumann supports this—thesis. ‘a; wrote that the
middle class chose Hitler because the salaried and profes-
sional employee did not want to fall to the level of the
masses. In the fight to retain status and privileges they
were supported by the capitalists because it was easier to
grant privileges to a small group at the expense of the
larger. Frans Neumann, Behemoth, New York, 1942, p. 411.
2. William Harlan Hale, "From the Heart of Germany,” 11113
H tion, vol. 133, November, 1931, p. 554.

182

W *H,, ‘

—. m*-\a~ H

~4.at

 

183
were receiving less than five-hundred dollars a year, and
of city doctors and sanitary officials earning less than
one-thousand dollars a year. And the mass of civil ser-
vants had been cut 15 to 20 per cent in wages in August
of 1951s

Nation also reported the attitude of one element in
the middle classo-the small shepkeeper--that has been shown
to have voted for Hitler.1

The owner of a small shOp in‘WeiIsr. discussing
the hopelessness of his own situation, showed me
his tax receipts: "In 1928 I paid a sales tax
of 72 marks: it is now 212 marks, or nearly three
times as much; and on this street as are all for
Hitler." When asked if he thought Hitler could.
help him, he replied, "I only know that no party
since the war has helped us, and I also know that
1 never open my shop in the morning with any Joy
in my work or without a feeling of hopeless
despair.“

In the simple terms of these two quotations is re-
vealed the economic causes of discontent and the forces
that put the middle class in Hitler's camp. Unemployment
and the reduction of income because of the worldwide depres-
sion were serious. The high rate of taxation was associ-
ated with the reparation problems in the viewpoint of this
class. There was complete disgust with the Republic and
its efforts to untangle the economic mess.

That the middle class had cause for despair there is

no denying. The following letter vividly describes the

   

e ‘P 0 GOP,
'01s 135. 1932. p. 474s

184

overall economic situation:1

Conditions in Germany have become catastrophic
to a degree that not you, mv English friends, nor
I could in the slightest degree have forecast
when you were still here. Germany's convales-
sense or her collapse into economic chaos depends
now upon whether it will be possible to achieve
free trade, or at the very least the removal of
the most important tariffs on res materials, in
the face of the desperate and diabolically clever
resistance of the heavy industrialists on the
Rhine and in the Ruhr, and the great asriculturists
in our provinces. Only in this way will it be
possible to bring about a reduction of prices,
and, through the reduction of prices of raw materi-
als, a decrease in the tremendous unemployment. '
In all the Berlin central banks, and in the center
of the government itself, the barometer points to
storm. One must expect the worst every day, for
Bruning's latest emergency decrees with their
dreadful effects upon the widest groups in our
pOpulation, are bringing about the rsdicalisation
of the remaining sober elements in our communities
at an incredible speed.

The Institut Eggs Konjunkturforsohung, the leading
German institution for the study of economic conditions,
completed a study that surveyed the German economy to
December 14, 1931. The report stated that industrial out-
put fell 9.9 per cent from July to December and that it
was $0 per cent lower than in 1929. Bankruptcies for the
year were an estimated 17,000. This exceeded those in the
extremely difficult post-inflation readjustment of 1925-6.
It further stated that the national income had dropped
from an estimated 75.4 billion of marks in 1928 to 69-70
billions in 1950 and to only 50-60 billions in 1931.

These decreases are more serious than mere subtraction

I.- From a'letter to the editors onKatlon. It was writ-
ten by a Berlfn economist. Editor, The Ration, vol. 135,
July, 1931, p. 25.

 

. ~.:..:'|'

185
would indicate since prices in 1951 were hirher than in
1928. In the same period, 1928—1931, building dropped
from 8.9 billions of marks to 4.5 billions. The average
unemployment in 1928 had been 1,591,000 but in 1951 the
average was 4,600,000. In December over five-million of
a total labor force of 21 million were out of work. Unem-
plcyment continued at this rate in 1932.1

Other more general reports pointed to hundreds of
thousands of square feet of office and store space that was
not being used. Over one-hundred-thousand families in Ber-
1in were living in huts and tents. Berliners had become
cynical enough to call them "Orchard Colonies”. Despite
the general economic chaos prices were remaining up or
even increasing. Bread had increased 250 per cent within
a year.8

Coal prices in April of 1932 were from seven to twenty-
seven per cent above prewar prices. The cartel structure
of German industry was holding iron at higher than prewar
price levels and at about double the world rate. High
prices were largely the result of cartel management with
the aid of the government and made possible by high pro-
tective tariffs. The situation in the agricultural prices
was identical. It had long been the practice of the large
landowners in the agricultural east to trade high tariffs

for grain products for high tariffs on the manufactures of

$110 Run, e

1:1 Henry Hussey, "Patient Germany," The Nation, vol. 151,

January, 1952, pp. 64-66.
2. Bale, The Nation, p. 555.

 

 

9“

’PART'FCUR

 

. _ WM}.

3‘»

i

J .

5 ‘

‘~--’-r ..
'\il a

1 7 our“.
"was. .V‘

D" “5.4%.:

' if
“(5')‘ ‘.:.i - -.§.1.‘." ‘.‘

..l‘ -
4|
1|

'1
a
1._

201

“Etc one: Hans Gerth also made a study of the social composi-

tion of the Nazi party. he decided that the party was support-

ed largely by the lower middle class. In the teachinr rrofese

sion he says that 97 per cent were members of the party or its
affiliates. Iistinp the characteristics of members of the par-

ty he presented these: "Irinces without thrones, indebted and
subsidized landlords, indebted farmers, virtually banvrupt in-
dustrialists, impoverished shepheepers and artisans, doctors

without patients, lawyers without clients, writers without

readers, unemployed teaclers, unemployed manual and white col-

lar workers..." he lists these because those "whose career '
eXpectations are frustrated or who suffer losses in status or

income in the intensive vocational competition of modern capi-
talism should be especially libely to accept the belief in the i
charismatic leader." He continues, "National Socialism as a, M-,"
salvationary movement exercised an especially strong attraci eggpgunye
on the "old' " "
strata where substantive rationality is least developed, and°“éfw"
will be the most hiohly represented among those seeking sal- b' '
vation by quasi-miraculous means-'or at least by methods which
break through the routines which account for their deprivations?
Professor Garth compared the percentesc occupational distribu-

tion of the Nazi party memberrhin with the rercentape each
occupational group was of the total gainfully employed in the
nation. He found that "the non-agricultural proletariat....
considerably underrepresented in the Nazi party both in 1933

and 1935 as compared with employers and independents." Hans

Gerth, "The Nazi Party, Its leadership and Composition," The
American Journal of Sociology, vol. 45, No. 4, 1940,pp. 524-29..

A post-war survey of eastern Germany which was reported by
Helen leak led to this conclusion: "Nazi sympathies were found
to:...of lowest frequency among the laborinc classes and hirh-
est amour executives and managers (classified on the basis of
pre-war occupations of the chief wage-earners). The occupa-MO;Q,,.JI
tions fall in the following order in terms ofincreasingjper7;¥<y;y,
centage of Nazis, unskilled and skilled workers, small businessw"
men and office workers, professionals, executives and managers."
This study'of course reflects a different time period than the
main body of the thesis, but it is very interesting to note
that the same.situation existed in both 1932 and 1945, the
time of the survey. hrlen Peak, 0 . g;3,, p. 16.

Note two: For a discussion of he influence of the rural

social structure on noliticel action see R..Heberle,‘§£gm‘ggg-
ocrac to Nazism, Chap. 3. Heberle found that in the peest
rerIon 3? sexlesaig-holsteln, where class differences were not
sharp, a stronghold of Nazism existed. But in the reaions ,._
where there were accentuated class differences the Conservative
and Labor parties maintained their position better. (P. 40y.
He decided, ”more specifically it may be said that the classes '
particularly susceptible fa' Nazism were neither the rural nob-,
ility and big farmers nor the rural proletariat, but rather the
small farm prcprietors, Very much the rural equivalent of the .
lower middle class or petty bourgeoisie (Fleinbuergertuml'which
formed the backbone of the NEDA? in the cities." (P. 112).

 

.\
..

and _"nes" ‘middle cl 8889.9 , especially in thogegv-firfliwwy,”x}

200
institutions and the dcvclOprent of a political Oppor-
tunism of fundamentally materialistic nature on the part
of the middle classes."1

In spite of the fact that the workers did not support
him, Hitler and his lieutenant, Gregor ttrasser, made many
efforts to organize tlem. Ponrad Heidcn points out that,
"The intellectual chief of the social first wing of the
National Socialist Party, Gregor Strasser, madegreat
efferts to win over the Working-class mind during that
year, 1932." Strasser hoped to "...dive down into the
depths of the proletariat into which it (Nazi party) had
hither to failed to penetrate.”2 Ebenstein indicates how
much a failure this was. He reported that, ”In the elec-
tions for 'factcry councils' the Nazis could never make
any serious inroad on the Socialists. Even in 1932 the
Nazis tare able to poll only 4 per cent of the votes in
these factory elections, at a time when they gained 57
per cent of the total vote in the national elections."8
Another ariter estimated that for all his worker appeals
the Nazi leader's labor support amounted to only 10-15 per
cent of his total beckinr. The revise assessed the reason
to be that labor's voting strength had reached its limit

because it had been so well organized for so many years.‘

i. Heberle,‘22. oi ., p. Tlfi:
2o Holden, 22. C to. (A History-ea). pp. 198‘9000
-3. Ebenstein, op. cit., p. 295.

4. Priters,‘gg. of??? Current History, n. 534.

 

 

199
described the Zeiee Glass Ecrks of Jena in Thuringia. He
said it was virtually unaffected by the depression. Over
90 per cent of the working force sac still working 42 hours
a week. They were highly skilled, furthermore, and the
pension plan was so rood that the pcvernment had exempted
them from the unemployment insurance program. In spite of
these factors 1,400 of the 6,050 employed in 1932 were
Communists.1

The Communist party was not only a party of the econ~
omically destitute in the lower class then. It was well
organised in virtually all areas. The dual factors of
organisation and the historical background and ideological
training of the lower class made the movement to the Con-
munist party a relatively easy step for many.

The middle class, on the other hand, supported parties
preaching doctrines of a capitalistic society. The two
major parties disintegrated under the political and econo-
mic pressures of the 1920 to 1932 period and without the
guidance of a well-knit class philosophy backed by an
efficient, virile, party leadership the middle class was
ripe for Hitler's plucking.

Heberle notes, "The contrast in the political conduct
of the two classes is largely conditioned by the possession
of a firm faith, a political philosOphy on the part of the

vorkers, and by the loss of faith in existing political

I. H. R. Rn iéierbocker, The‘Uerman CriéIs, lea YorE,
1932, pp. 61-68.

 

198
In July, 1932, the Communist party won nearly 6,000,000
votes. A few actual examples might make this growth of
Communism in the lower class more understandable. The
answer is only partly economic, of course, but that is
the feature of German life in the lower classes that was

reported in the periodicals of 1932. For instance, Henry

Mussey reported this:1

For five months I have lived among them, see-
ing something of almost all classes except the
little handful of the rich, I have seen a young
miner who has had no work for five years and who
has no hOpe of getting a job again--ever. His
father was killed in a mine accident, so his mother
draws a pension of thirty marks a month, of which
she pays eight for rent. He draws no unemployment
benefit, because he is supposed to live with his
mother! No wonder he is a Communist.

And this report from Berlin which emphasizes the feelings

of despair and frustration:2

There is a man, head of a family, who lives up
up near Alsace and Iorraine Streets-ostrests of
lost hope and ”lost" provinces. He now earns $3
a week working part-time. He could receive twice
as much from the unemployment insurance if he did
not work at all. But he will not give up. "If I.
lose this job,” he says, ”I know, I feel it in‘my
heart, I will never work again." There are hund-
reds of thousands of Jobless German workers today
who believe they will never work again. There are
hundreds of thousands more who fear that if they
lose their present places they will never work
again.

Not all Communist workers were in these dire economic

straits. It would be a very erroneous picture to think

of Communism only in those terms. For instance, Knickerbocker

 

1e III...’ 0 e Cite. Th6 nation, Do 650
2. Lindsay obs—”n, Threat-”s 0 evolution," Current Histou,

vol. 35, December, 1951, p. 590.

197
lives were as shattered and they keenly felt the moral
upheaval of the period; the National Socialists made as
desperate an effort to win their support: they were just
as patriotic. Why, then, did the lower class so success-
fully resist Hitler and turn to Ccmmunism.instead?

Partially, the answer lies in the historic class-
conscious political orientation of the workers. hear the
beginning of the Empire the Social Democratic party had
been established to protect the worker and to wage the
battle for social legislation and socialization of indust-
ry. As a result German workers were well educated in trade
unionism.and the principles of socialism and thoroughly
understood the values of joint action. under the Empire
the Social Democratic party was able to contain all the
elements in the politically left workers"movement3 but
during World War One the very radical left split off as
the Independent Socialists. The squabble was over support ,
of the war.

When the Republic was created, a strong movement
within the labor party fought for outright socialization
of industry. However, the leaders controlling the party
also had control of the provisional government and they
prevented any drastic measures. The Communist nsrty was
then organized. horker support of Communism dates from
that early beginning in 1920. As the troubles of the
Republic multiplied through its fourteen-year existence.

more and more of the laboring class joined the Communists.

196
is especially important. In the opening of this section
it was called fear of proletarianization. With the line
cut, political revolt was mandatory. They could not move
to the left: so they moved to Hitler.

In the opening chapter on the relationships of social
class and politics it was pointed out that social classes
in Germany have a long and for the most part a consistent
political philosophy. ’The importance of this political
historical background cannot be over-estimated. There is
not any question but what Hitler was able to win many of
the middle class votes because he struck responsive chords
tieing the middle class to the past.1

Factors contributing to the moving the German middle
classes to support Hitler were many then, Among the more
important were the economic crisis of the 1920-1932 period.
the consequent shattering of moral valms and disrupted
lives, the loss of faith in the Republic, propaganda of
the National Socialists concerning economic policies for
the middle class, the communist scarce, and feelings of

nationalism.

The loser Class
The wage-earners were as beset with economic diffi-
culties as the middle class: they were as bewildered and

frustrated by the defeat in World War One: their personal

 

I. The Importance o. co og ca as o e pas as con
well outlined. See: Paul Honigsheim, "The Roots of the

Nazi Concept of the Ideal German Peasant," Rural Sociology,
'01. 12. no. 1' “arch. 1947' pp. 3’21.

195
unity lose that unity, than political revolution is inevi-
table. than the daily pattern of habits is broken, revo-
lution occurs. That is shat happened to the middle class.

Diaprammatically viewed, the social individual is
destroyed as each of the following lines is snipped. Boa

radical he becomes depends on how many lines are cut.1 all

hopes for fihildren; Self

 

 

 

Friendship | ,,,a-Occupation
r attems ~~~~~~ L -" "
lndividufl— - ——-Eating Habits
Status Relations—v” I \\\

| “Entertainment Patterns

I
Values Lived By

factors are not equally important to an individual, nor are
factors of the same importance to all individuals. For the
middle class, the cutting of the line atatug galstionshigs

l—-t;omis and Uesple suppest the importance of this in Rur-
al Germany. They wrote, “From the present analysis, it ap-
pears that in the provinces studied, Hasism.sas espoused and
firmly supported by the Protestant, middle-cl ass rural ele-
‘Ient. On the one hand, this aroup was seriously affected by
economic insecurity: on the other it had been accustomed to
participate in relationships of a Gemeinschaft character,
and was suddenly forced to participate in relationships of
a formal, Gesellschaft character. The Nazis promised to
provide for this prcup the things ahich were so recently
lost.” Charles F. Ioomis and J. Allen Bee "la. "The Spread
of German Nazism in erel Aveas," American Sociolo ice
Rview, vol. 11, No. 6, Dec., 1946, p.
writes of this problem, ”Fromm and others have emphasised
the role of insecurity in the psychology of lasism. Persons
reared in the authoritarian family, which is common in Ger-
many, typically find wreatest security and satisfaction in
the situation ehere they are dominated by superior author-
ity on the one hand, and share they can, on the other,
”lord it" cver someone else of lower status. It is s fami-
liar fact that factors such as the downfall of the monarchy,
economic disaster, and the general social and moral disrup-
tion following the first Vorld Mar, resulted in the break-
dosn of many of the status relationships and the symbols or
authority in Germany." helen leek, "Observations.."

isychological Konographs, pp. 9-9.

 

 

  

194
relationships “are disrupted and the individuals' accept-
ed routine of social action destroyed.

When the daily oattern of existence of a large group
of people is disrupted, revolutionary political events can
be eXpected. This is what happened in the middle class.

Thousands of burghers who had had long-held hopes of
sending sons to the university for training for the civil
service were.disappointed. The patterns of actions for
earning a living for thousands of others were disrupted or
shattered completely. The example of the shopkeeper who
no longer had any spirit is typical. For many others life
savings evaporated and the quiet old age with economic
security and regulated and orderly social relations with
families and other old people, disappeared.

lultiple examples can be given but the basic consid-
eration is the single fact of routine movements being dis-
rupted. Just not being able to go through the everyday
action pattern was one of the most important causes for
the middle class revolting against its traditional poli-
tical habits. It was simply fear--fear based on frustra-
tions of daily living patterns, of life hopes, of smashed
ideals,1 of the futility arising from knowing they had
”lived by the book" and yet had failed.

When a large grout of pacple with feelings of social

 

I. *For an account oflthe upheaval in.moral values follow-
ing the war, revolution, and inflation, see Chapter 16 of
G rm P ts the Clo k Back. Iowrer described the decline
In sex.mora ity’par cularly. He reported, "It reflected
a society in which sex had entirely lost any connotation
of theological or even ethical sin.”

193
protect them from the danger of expropriation. Their
fear was greatly enhanced by the ideological appeal to
the danger of Communism which has been to a considerable
, degree effective in all the capitalistic countries."1

Konrad Heiden concluded that,'....the Nazi party has
been the only non-Marxist party to reckon with the prole-
tarisation of the middle classes. Without calling it by
this name, the Nazis have recognized it as an irrevocable
fact which will produce new social forms and new values.
The middle class parties promised their supporters to
restore to them their lost standard of life--and very
rightly were met with incredulity. The Nazis promised

them new means of livelihood, new esteem, and a new posi-

tion in the state-~and were met with credence."a

Disruption of Interaction Patterns

The discussion of the history of classes in Germany
demonstrated that stable patterns of interaction had de-
ve10ped both within and between classes in the Empire.
Iobility upward was entirely possible, but it took place
within prescribed lbmits. The defeat in the first World
her and the disastrous political and economic events of the
next fourteen years combined to destroy the equilibrium of
the old class structure. hith the weakening of the

traditional class lines, the stable Pattern of human

 

1. Parsons, (Social Structureljficournal‘§!“Legal ang
Political Sc iolor , p. 107.
as 3013011. .92. Cite, (A Historyeee)’ pa 130.

192

So, many were the deaths that political battles in the
streets ceased to be news.1

Appeals of the National Socialists, of course, ac—
count for some of the support of the middle class voter.
For instance, Article 16 of the famous 25-pcint program
of the Nazis states: "We demand the creation and.mainten-
ence of a sound middle class; that the large stores shall
be immediately communalized and rented cheaply to mmall
tradespeoplex that for all public supplies, whether nation-
al or local, preference shall be given to small traders."2
Hitler also capitalized on the long held hatred of the
"red menace". The rapidly increasing strength of the
Communist party was apparent to all and the middle class
was easily convinced that its destruction was sure if the
Communists succeeded in winning the government. Loewen-
stein wrote of this, ”The 'red menace' scarce contributed
more than a fair share to the success of national social-
ism, which cashed in on the Anti-Communist pro-possessions
of the propertied classes."3 In commenting on this same
issue Talcott Parsons wrote, "The Weimar regime put the
Trade Unions and the parties of the left in a position of
greatly enhanced power: wages were continually pushed up:

and undoubtedly many business people became frightened

and were ready to accept almost anything which would

deito'rs, The Nation, vol. 135, 3uly, I535, p. 33.
2e Holden, e Olga, ‘A Hifltoryee). pa 60
5. Loewenste n,‘gp. cit., p. 380. ,

 

 

“our 1"“! It‘llll.‘
I. ll “ 4

’1‘: .i ‘11 I I ll. I11! I. 4" ‘1 I'll! Ill ‘ l! I

«was...

Wm ,. ‘

191
Despair of Middle Classes

Hale speaks of the despair of the middle class in
these words: "To a foreign observer there is manifest
among even the hither middle croups of society an increas-
ing skepticism of German social democracy. It is not
merely a dislike for, or an indignation against, the
party now in power: it is doubt as to the efficacy of the
whole system." He further reported that the Germans were
being told that self-help was the only way out. 'But
thought the pessimists, If England and America cannot
keep on an even economic keel, what chance is there for a
"weak and tuberculsr Germany”.1

Despair and disillusionment were manifest on the
17th anniversary of the Republic on November 9, 1931.
There were no bands or flags or speeches or fireworks in
celebration. Even the parties of the Weimar Coalition
could not whip up enthusiasm for the Republic. The
Frankfurter Zeitung called the Reichstag "an agony to all
concerned” and for Chancellor Bruning to lay a construe-

tive program before the people and they will favor him as

a dictator.2

Further evidence of the decline of the state is seen
in the figures of political murders in 1932. Iation re-
ported more than seventy killed in street fighting in the
last two weeks of June and the first two weeks of July.

I. BRIO, Ifie .9610“. pa 5&550
2. John Elliott, "Germany in the World Crisis,” The

lation, vol. 133, 1931, pp. 662-664.

 

190
Mittelstandsvervand, a lower middle class organization,
was one of the groups which petitioned the Reich's Chan-
cellor in May, 1915, in favor of annexionist war aims.
The middle class consequently opposed the Weimar coalition
policy of conciliation by fulfillment of the terms imposed
by the allies. Especially irksome was the reparations
problem.

The Republic had engaged in a long series of confer-
ences on reparations that had resulted first in the Dawes
Plan and then the Young Plan. Each succeeding maneuver
had eased the total load somewhat, but in 1931 Germany was
facing some fifty years more of heavy payments. It was
consequently easy for Hitler to dramatise the effect that
these payments had on the economic condition to the country
and thus appeal to the middle class voters who had always
resented the payments.

Contributing to the feelings of despair was the reali-
'sation of the hapelessness of a sinale party over being
able to win control of the government. Under the propor-
tional representation plan the povernmcnt was inevitably
a coalition based on compromise and party bargains. The
political right was always omphasisina this in its prOpa-
ganda. Even within the middle class parties there was
division. If the Democratic and Peoples parties had been
able to get toaether on a program benefiting the middle
class, it would not have been necessary for the white
collar workers and independent businessmen to look to Hitler

for .Sde

189
business prosperity impossible. Excessive tax burdens
were laid on industry, the reasoning went, and only to
continue extensive doles to the unemployed.

Inflation and deflation transformed the debt struc-
ture and wiped out the middle class property and stock-
owners. Changes of this sort are always taking place but,
“The change in Germany, however, was on too vast a scale,
and the caste system which had existed was too rigid to
allow the change to take place without tremendously weaken-
ing the social support for the existing capitalistic sys-
teal."1 And the most logical to blame, they thought, was
the present government and the Social Democrats who were
its main support.

Under such economic condkions the German electorate
felt it faced only two alternatives, to the right and Hitler
or to the left and communism. In effect, the country div-
ided into two warring camps. And the middle class chose
Hitler.

lationalimn
A second indictment of the strongly nationalistic
middle class against the Republic was its foreign policy.
The middle class, unlike the internationalist labor par-
ties, had always been aggressively nationalistic and this
was one of the cohesive forces between the upper and middle

classes. During the first World tar the Reichsdeutscher
1. Hoover, pp. 22-E3.

 

188

In Weimar I found myself in the midst of a
street riot. In Dresden the head of the district
and communal rovernment of Saxony told me that
the government was not functioning in ‘he normal
sense of the term and that his chief problem was
to keep hundreds of thousands from starving to
death this winter. On the surface Munich was
quiet and orderly, but a visit to the welfare
headquarters presented a depressing spectacle:
while the industrial section of Gladbach in the
Rhine Palatinate, the home of the greatest cot-
ton-spinning and weaving industry in Germany,
was like a graveyard,.with eleven out of the
fifteen important mills entirely idle..lbankfort.
before the war one of the richest large cities
in Germany, has suffered much because it is a
commercial center for trade and finance and also
an administrative center for three territories
and many large metal industries. The city treas-
urer has reported a deficit of 3,000,000 marks
for the first four months of the fiscal year,
which will end with a total deficit of 9,000,000
marks. The council is therefore facing the prob-
lem of how and where it can make further cuts and
still keep thousands from starving during the
coming winter. And so throughout Germany. The
latest figures given me by reliable economists
‘place the number of totally unemployed at 6,000,000
and of those employed on.part time at 3,000,000,
which means that about 25,000,000 persons, or
one-third of the entire pepulation, are under-
nourished. leanwhile taxes rise for those who
still can pay, and interest rates for those who
must borrow still range from B to 20 per cent.

In such an economic maelstrom the middle class was
absorbing a great amount of punishment. It seemed that
every effort of the government to help them only acceler-
ated the process of pauperisation. In 1995 the new curren-
cy policies of the government had wiped out many‘that had
been able to survive the inflation. Now, in the period
of Germany's greatest economic distress, they were again
being sacrificed, or so they thought. The government, it

appeared to them, was creating conditions that made

- ~ As...“

187
rates on domestic loans, Bonds, and mortgages were to be
reduced. In effect a povornment controlled deflation was
to take place. A price commissioner was appointed who on
his own initiative could fix thn prices of all commodities.
Because papular opposition was expected, measures were
included to aid enforcement. Political meetings and wear-
ing of political uniforms were prohibited. Persons who
criticised public officials could be jailed. There were
curbs on free speech and on the press. And finally, if
the above did not work, martial law would be proclaimed.1
Paralleling efforts were made to aid the country
through taxes. In all, there were about twenty varieties
of taxes that absorbed about fifty per cent of the income
of each taxpayer. For instance, real estate taxes were so
high that r1'l estate values were disappearing. A city
home worth about 100,000 dollars in 1916 was estimated to
be valued at only 15,000 in 1931.2
The following account thoroughly summarises the
terrible crisis:3
I have zigzapged through Germany from Bremen to
Friedrichshafen and from east to west and will
give a few typical illustrations of what I
found. Bremen, with a population of $00,000
has 100,000 partly or wholly supported by public
aid: in Hanover the tax burden is so heavy that
a rentier who before the war paid four per cent
of his income in taxes now pays 72 per cent.

Ii Mussey, The fiation, pp. 64-66.

2. Hale, The Nation, p. 555.

3. Karl Frederic? Ueiser, "Hitler's Hold on Germany,“
The Nation, vol. c5, November, 1932, p. 475.

 

 

186

Firms that weren't aided by tariffs were subsidised
directly. Bruning, than Chancellor, said, ”We had to jump
in and support the banks and help individual concerns to
an extent far beyond that which we wished and far beyond
that what is known to the public.'1

Agriculture was subsidised through the tariff. In
East Prussia twelve-thousand landlords were protected on
rye prices by keeping the price of wheat exorbitant. The
cost of both wheat and rye was several times what it was
in the united States.‘ Corn, which cost thirty-one cents
in the United States in April of 1932, cost one dollar in
Germany.2

The government was subsidizing the workers as wall.
unemployment compensation was paid to some workers; others
werC'on the dole. Workers' wages were also controlled in
the major industries by the government. It seemed that
every social class was being supported by the government
except the middle class.

Chancellor Bruning issued an economic decree in Decem-
ber of 1931 which Nation reported that he ”inferentially"
admitted that it was his final effort to save Germany from
collapse that winter. The decree stated that all wages in
private industry, salaries of all public officials, prices

of standardised articles, all house rents, and interest

1: Herbert J. Burgman, "German Capitalism.at a Used E53,"
0 rent Hfistogz, vol. 36, August, 1952, . 555.

E. The ree paragraphs above based on urgman, pp. 534»
539.

 

 

,- a
I’I'. '

. ' Q 'J .
,. ;‘.._ ‘9?”“s. ,‘1'
m"

CHAPTER X

AGE AND POLITICS

A reading of popular periodicals of the period of
1930 to 1933 leaves one with a very definite impression

that the youth of Germany were Hitlerls main'supporters.

0"- " 'r‘ka". ‘;.I'"." -
Here are some of the typicalmrepOrts1237 eff';fub>v fifihfifiaefiap _u I

flew a. ublic, March 4, 1931: "Many or Hitler's
most fervent supporteri are extremely young....
Hitler is their hero."

Nation, March 16, 3932: "Its (Hitlerism) strengt
lies In its hold on youth..." '

Current history, September, 1932: "They (Nazis) t,£i
enjoy the support of the great mass of the German 9%"
YOUthe e e n \

These reports have the advantage of on the spot reporting
during the very heat of the fight for the German Republic.

Because of this, some considerable weight must be giveggtgfggepcae-~

( 1..
ux- a, .. «a
,' vigilant
‘2': la, 'h‘ ."r7\:.;' if "'.-’a
l I, - " ...... .
- L xix-fie .1 L
1' . v .

the reports. And for the most part, studies by politigaléwl

and social scientists support these findings.‘

 

 

 

l. bertheimer, The New Re ublic, p. 573. _
2. William HeleT'WfEH‘YZEEE‘ET'BitIer: One Hundred of
MOWQ.” Th0 Nation, vol. 134, larCh' 1932' pe We
5. Sidney . Pay, "Germany Elects a New Reichstag,”lggg-
rent Bisto , vol. 36, September, 1952, p. 660.
I. Kellen ¥eels that the great majority of young men
voting for the first time cast votes for Hitler. lellen,
o . ci ., The American Political Science Review, p. 62.‘ .

ic crbocier reported of age group 25 to 35 that, ”They-'_ .V.‘
explain first of all Hitler...Without them Hitler would ’ a fax;
still be leader of an obscure party too small probably for iry'
one Reichstag'mandate." Knickerbocker,‘gg.‘gl£.. p. 206.

202

The same popular journals suspected that the youth
that did not turn to Hitler supported the Communist party.
lindsay Boben wrote, "Stand with the director of a group VI
of Berlin higher schools, looking at a graduating class.
’What will these young men do when they leave here inr‘b:r
few months?‘ he is asked. He smiles grimly. ‘Ihey will
go on the 'dole , he answers. They will Join thehidln‘
discontented who drift toward communism. "1 Boben goes on
in his article on his impression of Germany in thewsummer
of 1931 to say, I...the youth of Germany drifts toward . 5!;gfiq;
two revolutionary parties-~the National Socialists of Hitler '5 fig,

“WI. 'IM'

0 2 5‘" ”fit-L ‘_ a.

  

on one side and the Communists on the other.
William C. White recorded in the Atlantic monthly,

"Ky generation is convinced. Schmidt said (identified cnlyef'

as a.young friend of the writer) to me one day, 'if we art" °

to have a future we must make it for ourselves. Some..pf.yj;

‘jI

us follow Hitler, some of us believe in Conunm, bu

   
 

are all radical. The Republic, which stands for th_“f:f ‘gdre;

they are, must go. We want action!”3 I 'Lm
' ' l ' 2:15; 1: if; L: ,3

Other more academic writers also hold this viewpoint.f‘¢?

L°°'°n't°1n wrote, "The masses of the younger voters. pare.”'

~ticularly after the depression, naturally voted for the

parties of the left and the right."4 And he

I. HoSen, Current History. p. 3m
2. Ibid, p. 39
s. Willi-n a. White, "Germany's lost Generation," Atlan-
ziglont‘hl, vol. 150, July, 1932, p. 120.

ewenstein,‘gg. cit., p. 369.

 

 

3‘ f‘ £125“. ll 1 ' .- ....»e-L

’h/ —

 

204
i is supported in this by the German historical sociologist,
Paul Bonigshcim. Professor Honigsheim states that the
rigid bureaucratic structure of the Social Democratic party
drove Ger-an youth.to the Con-unists and the lational
Socialists.1

accepting this last position, that German youth were
prflsarily'lational Socialists or Communists. Is a hypothesis,
ccrrelational techniques were used to test it. lhsn the age
grades tare related to the clasa’etructure the truth of
this was evident. The correlations are presented in the

following pages.
In order to study the prodhl statistically the proper-

 

.a

tion of people in each of certain age grades was eolputed.
lhe prcpcrtion was obtained by dividing the number of per-
sons mn each age grade in each city by the total number of

persons over 20 years of age in the city. The proportion

.\ ‘
amneeh*o -- a... A ...-sea...” or"- o'\-.‘..~.~.I. ...

of people over so was used because only those of voting age

~. NIH; .1‘I...

are important in correlation using voting statistics. The
age grades used are:' 20-25, 25-80, 80-40, 40-48,~45-60.

...—

—* ”'1'-

60-60, 60-66, and 65 and over.
‘Varying age intervals were necessary because the only
available age data was reported in that manner. However,

it is not felt that this lessens the validity of the

I. fersonal conversations. A

I. All age data is fro-.Die Altersggiede§3%f eggglgo
grun‘. (Senderbeila e su‘wir s a igii. er
ausge eben vol Stat stichen Reichsant, lb Jahrm 1086,
lo.o , verlag Fur Soosialpolitik, lirtschaft und ”Statis-
‘1'. ‘e-e‘ele. ‘0le e D.“ for 1933. ”e l, 8. .e

.la“ 1!“. 'l‘lll ll tell I‘ll. -

 

 

 

 

-‘a. 44—.-

 

sale—Ide- - ‘ s

 

.-__ LA—xL—a .... - |.;_'

 

 

 

results. All age groups were studied so that a couplets
picture of the age ccaposition or the parties could be

, sacs. "cciy citiss or 50,000 to 100.000 and citiss over

100.000‘population could be studied.

/ {he coefficients of correlation represent the rela-

, tionship between the per cents or people in each age group

of the total population over 20 years or age and.the per

a ssat‘s or vote for each or the selected political cuties.-. _

in,the July, 1932. Reichstsg elections. by city.

The Younger Age Groups

Very surprising results were found when these corre-
lations were developed. The pattern of relationship euphe-
sises the varying political attitudes of the three socio-
econouio groups studied in Chapters V, '1, and“! as well
as the age cos-position of th. National Socialist and
Oalnunist partiep Because of the dolinant influence of
social class, it was necessary to measure the relationship
between the age‘redec and the three socio-econoslic classes.
How this was done will be discussed later. ~m_

Since eight age classes were etudied for two sises of
city, the number of correlations is so large that it would
be extremely confusing to present then.in a single table.
For this reason the analysis has beengnade by dividing the

age grades into three groups based on the direction of the
correlation. Age classes 20-25, 25-50, and 50-40 are in
the first group; 40-45. 46-50 in the second group. and

206

50-60, 60-65, and 65 and older in the third group. In
this way German youth to early middle age, the middle
aged and elderly are analyzed separately.

The pattern of relationship between the proportions
of vote to the Nazis and the prcpcrtions in each age grade
was negative until age 40, then a steadily increasing posi-'
tive as age increased from 40 years on. The outline for ~
the Communist party was an exact reversal of this trend,
but the Socialist labor party followed the same trend as
the National Socialipts. In view of what has been written
of the support of the youth of the Nazi party these are
very surprising results. However, when they are compared
with the age composition of the social classes the results
are very understandable. It was found that the lower age
groups are predominantly wage-earners while the older age
classes were of the middle class. But this will be more
clear when the actual correlations are studied. The data
for the age grades 20-25, 25-30, and 30-40 is given in

T.b1. XXIX. ’

TABLE xxxx: COEFFICIENTS or CCRRESATICN BETWEEN THE PER
ems or POPULATION IN YOUNGER AGE GROUPS up PER CENTS 0?
VOTE FOR SELECTED PARTIES, BY SIZE or CITY.

 

 

‘Ige Group Nazi Communists Social Democrats
Site of City . Size of City Siae of City
1 2 l 2 l 2
20-26 -39 -46 -19 17 .35 -52
25-30 -53 -67 29 63 -41 -44
30-40 -42 -49 24 68 -25 -22

 

Size of city (1) is cities over 100,000 population. and (2)
is papuletion of 50,000-100,000.
A coefficient of .30 or hirhcr is significant statistically.

207
Any expectations of a high positive relationship
between the early age groups and Nazism are not supported
by these coefficients. Instead, as the proportion of per-
sons between 80 and 40 years of age increased, the percent-
age of vote given the Nazis declined. Of course, this does
not mean that many young Germans were not Hitlerites. But
it does mean that of those who went to the polls on that
Sunday in July of 1932, the majority did not support the
radical right. ,
The Communist party won the support of the young and
early middle age, however. The correlation of -.19 is
incxplainable in the light cf the other coefficients but
since it is insignificant mathematically, it can be regard-
ed as not invalidating the argument that the young support-
ed the Communists. The fact that such significantly
greater coefficients were earned in the cities of 50,000
a.to 100,000 population may indicate a narrower age base to
the party in that size of city than in cities of over
100,000 population. This conclusion is reenforced by the
data for the older are groups that is given in Tables XIX!
and XXIII.
The data for the Social Derocrats is presented to
further substantiate the radicalization of youth hypothesis.
The study of these alignments indicated that both the Com-

munists and the Social Democrats drew support from the

wage-earner class and that they probably attracted differ-

ent types of workers. This is emphasized in the above

208
table. The Communists won the young voter, while the
Social Democrats did not. The two parties played a comp-
limentary role in lower class politics. It the worker-
voter did not vote Social Democrat he more than likely

voted Communist.

Age and Social Class

These results are not so unbelievable when the age
composition or each of the socio-economic classes used in
this study (the distribution of each are grade among the
social classes) is analyzed. This was done by correlating
the per cents or persons in each of the age groups with
the prcpcrtions of peOple in each or the three socio-eco-
nomic classes'previously described.
mam xxx: COEFFICIENTS or CORRELATION 3mm ms PsoroaA

TION OF PEOPLE IN CERTAIN AGE GROUPS AND PROPORTIONS OF
PEOPLE IN EACH bOCIO-ECCNOMIC CLASS, BY CITY SIZE.”

 

 

Age Group Socio-Economic Class
Upper liddle Lower middle Lower
Size of City
1 2 l 2 l 2
20.25 ‘03“ “e07 e02 e01 ’eOl e00
25-30 -077 -079 -053 -e60 041 068
30-40 -.74 -.79 -.52 -.73 .63 .79
40"5 -005 e41 ’eOb e41 -.08 062
‘5'80 .28 011 .12 .09 -010 -009
50.60 .36 e5]- e12 055 -.39 -.50
60-66 .52 e 55 a 25 a 52 -046 -057

66 and over.49

.49

.29

.54

-045 _ -082],

 

3 Froportions of population over 26 years 3? age.

(1) denotes size of city of population over 100,000: and
(2) denotes city-size 50,000 to 100,000. A coefficient of
.30 is significant mathematically.

 

209

Obviously, this is a crude may of determining the
relative age composition of each of the socio-economic
classes (the relative distribution of each age class among
the social classes). For instance, age group 20 to 26 does
not correlate significantly except in cities of over
100,000 population with upper middle class. There is no
way of knowing accurately if this was the true situation.
The distribution of coefficients for age groups 26-30 and
50-40 would indicate that it is not. Logic would.point to
relatively greater proportions of young in the lower elaaa‘
than in the middle class groups. The deficiency in the
method results from having to correlate the narrow age bands
to the broad indices of class that encompass the whole age
ladder.

However, a surprisingly consistent picture of the rela-
tive distribution of age groups within each class is given.
Both the upper middle and the lower middle classes have
greater proportions of old in relation,to young than in the
lower‘11ass. The lower class of course reverses this.

This is what would be expected.

To put it differently, the young voters and early
middle aged voters of Germany were in relatively greater
prcpcrtions in the lower socio-economic class than in either
of the middle class elements. As the proportion of people

in those age groups increased, the proportion of people who

were lower class also increased. Cities with a high pro-

portion of wage-earners, than, tended to have greater

210
proportions of people in the early age groups than the
less industrialized cities. Age brackets 40-45 and 45-50
are the transitional age groups as all classes correlated
in the same direction these two age groups. Age 40-45
correlated significantly and positively with all three
social classes in cities of 50,000-100,000 population.
However, the same relationship in cities over 100,000
population is insignificantly negative. Age grade 45-50
is the beginning of the trend of positive correlation with
the middle class elements and the negative relationships
with the lower class. None of these coefficients is sig-
nificant. It would seem, then, that these two age grades
were distributed fairly evenly among the three social
‘ classes. Roughly, each of the social classes had approxi-
mately the same proportions of peeple in these age groups.

Prom.age group 50.60 the greater prcpcrtion of late
middle age and elderly in the middle classes as compared
.with the lower class is obvious. These age groups all
correlate significantly and negatively with the lower
class and positively with the middle class. The evidence
is stronger in the case of the upper middle class. Just
as an industrial city indicated concentrations of young
people a non-industrial city indicated concentrations of
late middle age and elderly people. The median age of

he population in cities which were heavily industrialised

was probably lower than in non—industrialised cities.

211

A moment's reflection will emphasize the logic of
this conclusion. Relatively greater proportions of young
peOple would be found in the cities that were industrial-
ised for three principle reasons. First, the migration of
the young was generally to places of tork opportunityo-the
industrialized city. This migration would also increase
the number of lower class people in the city, because
relatively greater numbers of the agricultural proletariat
than.middle class leave the farm. Second, the lower class
is reputed to have higher birth and death rates, so that
the median age would be below the middle and upper classes.
Third. the factor of social mobility influences the age
composition of the classes because it is generally true
that movement up out of the wage-earning class would not
take place until after many years of employment. Therefore.
it would be the middle—aged w.rker who would climb socially.
thereby reducing the number of wage-earners of middle age
and increasing the number of middle class of that age.1

It would seem that all ofthe above factors were
operating to create the age-class relationship outlined.
However, it is-probablv also true that the first two
reasons were the most important.

This eXplanation of age and class should make clear

why the particular coefficients between proportion of

 

I. ProfessornbnlgshEIm bellEves that upwafd'sociil'fififi3'
ility in the German Republic was very slight. The

read channel was through political action, as becom ng a
leader in the Social Democratic party, or labor unions.

212
peeple in each of the age brackets and the proportion of
party vote were obtained. The predominant factor in the
voting was socio-economic class, not age. The percentage
of vote for the National Socialists decreased as the
percentage of workers increased. The percentage of young
and early middle age increased as the percentage of workers
increased. Therefore, the relationship between proportions
in age brackets 20-25, 25-50, and 50-40 and the proportions
of vote for the Nazis would be negative.

Some interesting inferences can be made when the age-
class findings and the age-vote coefficients are related.
The young and early middle age voters were in greater pro-
portions in the wage-earner class so that correlations of
age and voting would reflect the voting practices of this
class and not the middle class. So what is reallywmees-
ured in age groups 20—25. sp-SO, and 50-40 is the lower
class vote. Therefore, it appears reasonable to assume
that these age brackets in the lower classes were radically
leftist and that few, relatively, voted for the lational
Socialists or the Socialists. This is indicated as the
only positive relationships shown in Table XXIX are be-
tween prOportions of people in these ape brackets and pro-
portions of vote for the Communists.

But it can be deduced that the middle class youth
were probably National bocialist. While the middle-aged
and elderly are proportionately of greater significance in

the middle classes than in the lower class. it does not

..J‘ltll‘
‘II‘.. t. l‘ I

.l .1
I!
-.i

 

 

 

213
mean that they outnumber the young and early middle-aged
within the middle class. In other words, if just the age
composition of the middle classes is considered, the
younger voter is probably of equal significance with the
older, that is, assuming they rent to the polls in the
same prcpcrtions.

This being accepted as reasonably accurate, it
follous tPst mfddle class youth and early middle age voted
lasi in spite of the negative coefficients in Table XXIX.
The coefficients between the proportions of middle class
and prcpcrtions of vote for the Nazis were definitive
enough to suggest that all age grades in the middle class.
voted for the National Socialists. A simple mathematical
situation.may clarify this. The Nazis averaged about
55 per cent of the urban vote and the middle classes con-
stituted about 42 per cent of the urban pop.lation. The
conclusion drawn in this paper is that the National
Socialists were almost entirely a middle class party. If
this is true. then the very;high vote won by the Nazis
must mean that a majority of the middle'classes supported
Hitler, since the proportion of people in the middle class
is not much larger than the Nazi vote. It also follows
that all are grades supported Hitler to some extent,
at least. This is, of course, highly simplified reasoning,
as, for one thing, the base on which the two prcpcrtions
above were computed are not exactly identical. But it is

a reasonable example.

214
There 13 some 1nnipgtion in the Srviet tone that this was
true. Recall the insirnificant coefficients between middle
class and Katie in the northern cities of the zone. It was
thought that the low correlation was the result of many in
this class voting for the German National Peoples party,
and it is probable that the older voters were the ones that
did. Thus, shen there use an important split in the direc-
tion of voting by ape levels within the middle class, the
coefficient between Nazi votinn and middle class fell to
insignificance.

The hypothesis that the younger vote in Germany was
rsdicalized to both the rinht and left seems to be substanti-
ated by statistical means. The laser class younp and early
middle-age supported the Communists and the same age aroups

in the middle classes supported the National Socialists.1

 

1. “ads discussion refers to the v‘ijers Tor the various
parties and not to the membership. :vidence of other wri-
ters, such as Hans Garth, indicates that the National
Socialist membership was definitely Youthful, while the
present writer's findings would point to party supporters
being relatively balanced in all age groups.

On the question of meMbership Hans Garth eelpared the
age composition of the Nazi and Social Democratic party.
The following percentages are taken from Table 11:

Years Kazis Social democrats Totél P22.
Igizio Iv»! ‘-
18‘30 zéeé . 1!.3 0
81-40 27.8 27.4 22.0
£1-50 17.1 26.6 17.1
0V0? 60 12.9 .asee 2908

Each per cent is of the total in the party except for the
last oolunn which are per cents of the total population.
aerth, American Journal of Sociolo . vol. 45,r5560. Data on
the let one ocialist party and or the pogulation are

Schuéungsbrief,n . und 9. Pol p. ”3153
dataD oc a emocratic gartv, rem gli rTagg-
blatt, 0lo. 27, January 16, l?37 .

215
Middle Age Grades
Survey of the table retailing coefficients of cor-
relation between the per cent of vote for tho parties and
the per cent of population over 20 years old that are in

the middle age groups shows that the Nazis gained moderate

 

Ebenstsin compared the leadership and ran? and file of
the Social Democrats and Communists in the Reichstag by
age. He reported, "0! the Socialist members of the Reich-
stag elected in 1930, there were none under thirty (as
compared with nine Nazis and eight Communists), less than
one-seventh were between thirty and forty years of age,
and one-half of all Socialists were fifty to seventy years
old. By contrast, one-tenth of the Communist Roichstag
members were under thirty, six—tenths between thirty and
forty, almost three-tenths between forty and fifty. Only
one out of seventy-sevan Communists was between fifty and
seventy years of age, as compared with one-half of all
Socialist members in that age group." Ebenstein, p. 220.

This evidence of the age composition of the membership
of these two parties points to the same conclusion as the
correlation data~-that the Communists won the support of
the young and the Socialists of the old. A logical ques-
tion to ask is why does not the membership figure of the
National Socialists also follow the age composition of the
supporters.

One possible answer lies in the age of the party. The
Nazis were a very young party that showed no real prospects
of dominating the country until 1930. Consequently, there
was little incentive for the old established leaders with
other parties and parties' affiliates to join the Nazi
banner. Why leave a relatively successful movement for one
evidently sithout prospects? The only source of leaders,
then, was amonn the young men who were not getting a chance
for leadership in the established parties and who had every-
thing to gain and nothing to loss.

The older leaders entered the movement after it was
successful and "safe". Gerth wrote, "But, after the con-
quest of power and the consequent stabilization and bure-
aucratisation, youth no longer played the same role in the
party; the percentage decreased to 35.4 in 1935, when "ex-
perienced" men in their forties and fifties began to join
the party in great numbers." Garth, p. 529.

In a study in 1945 based on interviews in Germany, Helen
Peak found an increase in membership with ape. She thought
that this might be due in part to t e "severe pressures” elt
by established persons to Join some party organization.

The "increase in membership with age is true for men and
women, for single and married, for Protestants and Catholics,
and for all educational and all occupational groups except
among semi-and unskilled workmen.where there was no syste-

matic change in membership with age." Helen Peak, P. 5.

lull! “ I'll-It'll! ‘ll.lkllll‘

 

x] ll’].ll|‘ {1| 'l‘lli] OI} .sIl‘II‘l .llll\

216
support tram the voters in ages 40 to 50 years. The
program of the Communist party seemingly did not appeal
to these ages; however, that of the Socialist did. In
Table XXXI are shown the coefficients upon which these
statements are based.

TiBLE XXII: COEFFICIENTS CF CORRBIATICN BEWV'EEN PER CENTS

0? VOTE FOR SELECTED PARTIES AND PiOPORTICNS 0F POPULATION
IN THE KIDDIE AGE GROUPS, BY SIZE 0? CITY.*

 

 

Age Classes Party
Nazi‘ Communist Social Duloerat
City Size City Size City Six.
1 2 l 2 l 2
40-46 .16 .36 .22 .01 .30 .11
45-50 e29 042 .17 'e14 039 030

 

 

 

3 fireportione of opulation over:§5_years‘6?fiage.

I Size of city (1 equals population of over IILOOO. and
(2) is pepulation of 50, 000-100, 000.

A coefficient of .30 is significant.

It is seen that age group 40-46 members apparently
backed the Nuzie to some extent in cities of 50,000 to
100,000 population. The change of correlations in.metro-
politan areas is not so abrupt and dramatic as that in the
smaller type of city. In cities of over 100,000 population
the political rirht in not signifiepntly supported until
age group 45-50.

Almost as violent a suing away from Communism was

§.ken in the smaller cities as the abrupt movement to bol-
star Hitler. A positive coefficient of .69 was found b.-

tween the per cent of the population in ages 30-40 and

 

217
proportions of vote for the RFD but in are bracket 40-45
the relationship drOpped to .01. No statistical relation-
ships developed between the middle age groups and Communism.

Social democracy received support of moderate prcpor-
tions in both the age classes in cities of over 100,000
inhabitants and in the second class of city only by age
group 45-50. This pattern of support complements that of
the Communists. Both parties fought for the votes of the
workers and in this age aspect gained their respective
votes in different age blocks, and to a certain extent in
different sizes of city.

The age-class coefficients ctenged direction and in-
tensity at age 40-45 just as did the age-voting coeffici-
ents. Age and social class relationship is rather indefi-
nite in age grades 40-45 and 45-50 and so are the age and
voting relationships. In affect, prcportions of peOple
of these ages are relatively balanced in the three socio-
economic classes so that no single class dasinated the
correlations. In both sizes of city the lasis and Social-
ists are significantly supported, except in one instance;
but the Communists are not. If the reasoning for the
younger age grou;s was correct, this is the logical
situation.

Since no one social class dominates in the age sta-
tistics it would be expected that all parties would win
comparable prcpcrtions of votes in these age grades, unless
parties were all drawing from the same social classes.

This, it has been shown, was not the case.

 

218

Thus, the National Socialists and the Social Demo-
crats both can win significant support in age groups
40-45 and 45-50 because the votes for these two parties
came from differrnt social classes. The Social Democrats
and the Communist vote, however, came from the same socio-
economic class; therefore, as the Socialists won support
the votes for the Communists had to decline. And, of
course, the coefficients vould be low for all parties be-
mseadisprcportionate part of the age-grads did not go to
any one party.

In general it can be said that the middle-aged support-
ed the Socialists more strongly than the Communists and

about as strongly as the Nazis.

Advanced Age Grades
The last age groups to be considered are 50-60, 60-63,
and 65 and older. The trends that developed in the middle
age classes are continued in these brackets. Table XXIII

demonstrates the coefficients for these age grades.

‘ TABLE mu: ccssrzcmms or CORRELATION 332mm! 1m: PER
cams or vows are sex scrap PARTIES AND PER cams or POPU-
LATICN IN star-,3 Asa. GdOUFS, BY 512.3 or cums

 

Age Groups Party
Nazi Communist Social Democrat
City Sése City Séze City Sése
50-60 .34 .44 -.07 -.52 .32 .31
60-66 .39 .59 -.22 -.66 .38 .42
65 and over .53 .65 -.23 -.62 .27 .41

 

‘I‘froportions of pOpulotion over—55lvears 6?;3gs.

(1) denotes size of city of population over 100,000 and
(2) denotes papulation of 50,000 to 100,000.

A coefficient of .30 is statistically significant.

219

The Nazi party was ap}.*ent1y supported by late
middle aged and elderly voters in both sizes of city.

The strongest relationship shown between age and voting in
the Nazi column is the plus .65 between proportion of
people age 65 or older and proportions of vote for the
National Socialists in cities of 50,000 to 100,000 pepula-
tion. The plus .53 in the column for major cities is also
the largest positive coefficient for that also of city.

The coefficients for the Communist party are all nega-
tive, but only those for the smaller size of city are sta-
tistically significant. It is difficult to find an explana-
tion for the low correlations in the metropolises. Only
one coefficient between age and Communist voting is signi-
ficant in the whole series from age 20 on and that is plus
.29 between proportion in ages 25-30 and prcpcrtion of
Communist vote. One possibility is that no one age or
group of age classes as the young, was important in the
size of the Communist vote in cities of over 100,000
population. However, it is more likely that the Communists
were a party of the young in major cities just as they were
in the cities of 50,000 to 100,000 people.

The Social Democrats are represented by significant
correlations in every case. This would support the possi-
bility that the Communists were a young party and not backed
by voters over 50 years of age.

The age-class coefficients were definitely positive

between prcpcrtions in the older age brackets and the

220
prcpcrtion of peOple in the upper middle and lower middle
classes, and negative with proportions in the lower class.
This is taken to mean that the upper middle and lower mid-
dle classes were the social classes that were being meas-
ured in the age statistics. ‘This was so because relatively
greater numbers of old middle age and elderly people were
in these two classes as compared with the lower class.

The statistics then point to these age groups in the
upper and lower middle class as having supported the
National Socialists. As the proportion of people from
50 years and older increased in a city, the proportion of
peeple in the middle class also increased. When the pro-
portion of people in the middle class increased. so did the
proportion of the vote for the Nazis. Thus, proportionally,
the more elderly people the more Nazis. ,

Of course, there is not much evidence that all age
groups in the middle classes voted in the same proportion
— for the lasis. When the young voters of this social class
were discussed, it was pointed out that this was thought
to be approximately trueo-otherwise significant coeffici-
ents would not have been found when middle class indices
were related to Nazism. It is probable that the youth in
these families were more rabidly hazi than the older, but
it is impossible within the scope of this study to tie this
dosn.more thoroughly.

The pro-Hitler parties of the middle class were the

German Peoples party, the German Democratic party, and the

221
German National Peoples party. The decline in strength
of these parties as Hitler rose to power emphasises the
improbability of middle class German youth supporting them
and the likeliness that they supported Hitler. At the
same time these parties lost such a large part of their
support that many of the older middle class people must
have backed Hitler, also. These three parties fell from
nearly 35 per cent of the vote in 1924 to 8 per cent in
July, 1932. A large part of the "credit" for the rise of
Hitler must be assigned to the German middle class voter
of over 40. The Hitler movement was a middle class move-
ment and not a.movement of the young regardless of class.
The positive relationship between prcpcrtions of people
50 years and older and the proportion of vote for the
Social Democrats reenforces the conclusion made earlier
that the Socialists were supported mainly by older voters.
At the same time it is clear that the Communist party won
very little backing in these age groups.

The negative relationship with the Communist is
entirely logical as Table XXX demonstrates that the more
industrialized a city, the fewer--proportionally--old
pecple. The less industrialized a city, the smaller the
per cent of vote for the Communists; therefore the Commun-
ist vote is low where the proportion of old people is high.

At first blush it may seem strange that the Social
Democrats would win positive correlation with these older

age grades when it is the middle socio-econmmic class that

'illl.||l

..I .1 III! Ill I ll ‘
‘I III. I 'l l I I

222
is really being measured. However, this should have been
anticipated for two reasons. First, the SPD had had for
many years some backers in both the lower and upper middle
class.1 These would be peOple of these older ages.
Second, the Socialist party was stronger proportionally in
cities where the class strife mas less acute while the
Communist party was stronger in the cities where class
strife was more acute. Thus, the Socialists were stronger
relatively in the less industrialized cities where the high

proportions of advanced aged persons were.

Age and Region

The age-voting relationship was measured by military
occupation zones and in general the coefficients fell into
the same pattern as outlined in the previous sections.
The major regional variations occurred in the combined
American-French occupation zones due to the influence of
Catholicism. .

It will be assumed in this discussion that the age-
olass relationships demonstrated in Table XXX hold true
from region to region. All of the correlations by region
are given in Table XXXIII.

The National Socialists' percentage of vote corre-
lated negatively with prcpcrtions of peOple in age groups

20-25, 25-30, and 30-40 in all occupation zones. The
I. In cities of over 166,656 populationthc coefficient

of correlation between proportion of white collar employe-
es in berufzugehorige and proportion of vote for the Social

Democrats was a significant plus .30.

 

 

223
coefficients in the American-French zone are not signifi-
cant, however. The remaining age groups all correlated
positively with the Nazi vote except age 65 and over in
the American-French zone. The Communist party prcpcrtion
of the vote correlated positively with all but age grade
26-30 in all three zones. The coefficients were all nega-
tive for age grades 50-60, 80L65, and 65 and over. In
general the direction of relationship with the Socialist
party just reversed that of the Communist.

TABLE XXXIII: COEFFICIENTS OF CORRELATION BETWEEN PER

CENTS OF POPULATION IN CERTAIN AGE GRADES AND PER CENTS
OF VOTE FOR SELECTED PARTIES BY’VIIITARY OCCUPATION ZOIK.

 

Age Group Party
lazi Communist Social Democrat
lozes soz IOZ

At? B 8 A&P B 8 A&P B 8

 

20‘25 -.31 .e55 ‘s44 “.32 -.02 e18 ~.32 .e46 's“
25’30 'e21 'e68 -.50 e44 e62 e18 e20 “e58 “s27
30-40 -.16 ’05? -.58 .61 .71 -010 039 -035 -.23
40-46 .16 .39 .04 .56 -.04 .09 -.08 .37 .00
45-60 .32 0‘4 .34 e56 -019 02.7 016 035 e30
50-60 s49 e60 e56 'e04 ’e‘l ‘eOl e12 e45 e36
60.65 028 e62 e4? -e47 -e63 “.23 e02 e48 e47
55 & up -e03 s71 e55 ’e74 'e63 'e19 -.33 e43 e3]

3 Fraportions of people over 55 years of age.

ee lilitary occupation zones, A&F is combined Mmerican-
French zones, B is the British zone, and S the Soviet zone.
A coefficient of .39 is significant in the American-French
zone, .29 in the British zone, and .35 in the Soviet zone.

 

 

Nazi Party
Both the British and Soviet zones follow the estab-
lished pattern of age relationships, to Nazi voting. In
the lower age classifications, which are dominated by the

lower class, the indications are that the young and early

224
middle age voter in the wage-earner class did not support
the Nazis in large numbers in comparison with other politi-
cal parties. The only American—French zone coefficient
that is significant is the positive .49 for age grade
50-60.

The insignificant negative coefficients for the ages
20-40 probably mean that the younger voter was relatively
more important in the American-French zone in the Nazi vote
than was true in the zones. It is not thouvht that the
coefficients indicate greater proportions of the lower
class young voted Nazi in southwestern Germany as compared
with the other regions. An indication that the young voter
did not is the fact that the proportions of vote for the
labor party remained approximately constant between 1919
and July, 1952. In both elections the Harxist parties won
about 54 per cent of the vote. These percentages show that
the labor parties were just as stable here as in the rest
of Germany.

The coefficient of minus .03 between prcpcrtions of
people in age grade 65 and older and the per cents of vote
for the Nazis in the American-French zone is the only
insignificant measure of this relationship in the whole
age study. It is the prime reason why the Nazis are
assumed to be a relatively younger party in this zone than
the others. The old people in the American-French zone
must have supported the Catholic Center party and Bavarian

Peoples party. For instance, the coefficient between

225
prcpcrtions of people age 65 or older and preportions of
vote for the Center party in this zone was a plus .59.
This same relationship in the combined British and Russian
zones is a high negative -.69. The high prcpcrtion of
Catholics in the oldest age group in the American and
French zones, then, determines the low vote given Hitler's
party. by that age group.. However, the National Socialist
is the only one of the three parties shown in the table
not to be significantly rejected by this age group.

With the elderly people in the zone backing the Catho-
lic parties it is apparent that the middle class youth
would be relatively more important in the size of the lazi
vote in the Bavaria-Phalfz region than in other parts of
Germany. This may also mean that the Catholic Church was
better able to direct the political choices of the older

church.members than the younger.

Communist Party

Age class 20-25 was not related to the voting for the
Communist party except in the American-French zone. The
coefficient there is negative. But from age 25 to 50 in
this zone the coefficients are significantly positive and
not until age grade 60-65 does another significant negative
appear. In the British zone the Communists' vote is
strongly related in a positive direction to the age classes
25-30 and 30-40. The coefficients become significantly
negative at age grade 50-60. It was in the age groups 20-40

226
that the Nazi party was rebuffed in this zone, and in age
40 and older that positive coefficients developed. Un-
questionably, then, the Nazi party in the English zone
had the greater prcpcrtional part;of its supporters over
age 40. The Communists were strongest, however, with the
voters under 40. No significant coefficients were found
with Communism in the Soviet zone. The trend was the same
as in other zones, however.

In general, then, the Communist party is supported by
‘the younger voters in all of the occupation zones. The
cumulative evidence is very strong that voters over 60,
regardless of class, were opposed to the Communist party.
The coefficients are less definite in the age group 50-60
but it seems that by far the majority of these were also
opposed.

The Soviet zone correlations are plagued by the diver-
sity of sub-regional variations that little value is
placed on them in this instance.1 In the other two zones,
however, it is very clear that age grades 25-30 and 30-40

were prorortionally strong in the Communist party.

Socialist Party
Proportions of voters in age grade 20-25 are nega-
tively related to the percentage of vote for the Socialist
party in all three occupation zones. In all of the various

ways that this age group has been measured, not a single

 

I. *See description of the relationships of socio-economic
class and Communist voting on pages 136-142.

227
positive and significant coefficient deve10ped. It would
appear that this age class did not take much interest in
the election.

Both the English and Soviet zones' coefficients
follow the established pattern of age class-Socialist
voting relationships. But the British zone coefficient
in age grade 40-45 is significantly positive, while that
in the Soviet zone is not. The combined American-French
zone presents a new pattern, however.

For the first time the age groups 25-30 and 50-40 are
positively related to the Socialist vote, and the later
coefficient is significant. Another significant coeffici-
ent does not appear until the negative .33 in age group
65 and over. This is also a reversal of all previous
correlations between these two factors. The answer for
this unusual set of coefficients is the influence of the
Catholic Church. Young people are prcpcrtionally more
important in the Socialist party in this zone than they
are in the others as a result.

Variations in the age compositions of the three parties
from zone to zone are clear. The Communist party is a
party of the young lower class voter in all zones: the
Socialist party complements the Communists by winning the
older lower class voters in the British and Soviet zones
but in the American-French zone also had to depend on the
younger voter. However, the Communist party even there

seemed more successful with the young than the Socialists.

I ~4aa.'fl-i~ inhm‘ . . i--

- 9‘1 how‘s ... .. e ,,

228
An important influence in this zone «as the Center nartv,
but they evidently held the old better than the young.
The Rational Socialists also had to depend on the younger
voters more in the American-French zone than in the other
areas. The general situation was that the Nazis were
able to sin the older aged voters; and, it is reasoned,

the younger middle class voters in all zones.

Relative Age Composition

The relative age composition of the three parties
studied seems to be this: The National Socialist party
vote was made up of all age grades in the middle classes:
the Communist party was primarily backed by the younger
voter in the lower class with few voters, relatively,
over 45: the Social Democratic party was supported by
lower class voters over 45 in greater prcpcrtions than was
true of the voter under 45. Age, then, was a more import-
ant factor in Communism and Socialism than lasisn. In any
case, the principal division of the voters eas along class
lines.

Such conclusions are substantiated when prcpcrtions of
vote for the main parties in 1019 and 1932 are compared.
Labor parties von 46 per cent of the total valid vote in
1919 and 44 per cent in the July, 1932 election. The
per cent 01 labor party was nearly constant during the
14 years of the Republic. At the same time the proportion

of wage-earners in the population steadily decreased because

229
of the increase in lirht industries and services requiring
large numbers of white collar workers.1

Two assumptions can be made about the vote in 1919.
One: the labor parties' vote was cast mainly by the lower
socio-economic class: and two, that the youth in the lower
class voted for the leftist parties. Knowledge of the
class structure and traditional political alignments of
the social classes would indicate this. Accepting these
assumptions as valid, there are logically two possible
reasons for the maintenance of the labor vote throughout
the Republic. First, the labor parties might haVe won a
prcpcrtionally increasing vote from the middle dass as it
beomme pauperized. If this had occurred, it would explain
how German youth of the worVing class could have supposedly
voted for the Nazis and yet the per cent of vote for the-
labor parties remain stable. But the evidence presented in
Chapter VI strongly indicates that the Harxian forecast was
not fulfilled as the middle class supported the political
right instead of the left.

The second and more plausible explanation of the sta-
bility of the labor vote is that as the children of the
wage-earners grew up and entered the factory and other
lower class occupations, they also followed the class tradi-
tion of voting for the Marxian political parties. Propor-

tionally, lower class youth outweighed the middle and upper

 

 

13* See Friters,‘22. cit., Current History, p.i53§T

230
class youth and in correlation of are groups 20-25,
25-30, and 50-40 with the per cent of vote for the Nation-
al Socialists the coefficients would be negative. But i
with vote for the Communist party the coefficient would
be positive, as many of the workinp class youth voted
communist. It has been shown that these correlations-
actually were found.

That this position is reasonable is supported by the
relationships between various types of occupations and
party vote. 'For instance, industries with.high proper.
tions of unskilled workers, .h. would most probably also
be younger on the averape than the general voting age
population, correlated positively with the proportions of
vote for the Communists. Industries with relatively_
greater proportions of skilled than unskilled workers and
thus with more older workers, proportionally, correlated
positively with the percentages of vote for the Socialists.
The younger voter, up to 45, in the lower class fairly
certainly voted for the Communist party; while the older
lower class Voters supported the Socialists. '

On the other hand, the middle class youth supported
tho 1.818. The middle class parties at the beginning of
the Reimar Republic were the German Peoples, German Demo-
cratic, and German National Peoples parties. In 1919
these three parties son 33 per cent of the vote and at
their high point of vote for the parties of the political
right in 1924, they win nearly 35 per cent. But in 19!?

these same parties men only 8 per cent of the vote.

.| .l lllllllil‘llll‘l.'l i Illlel lf‘lllll lllll'.‘ II III]

231

The voters who supported these parties in 1919 were
all over 52 years of age in 1932; and if the traditional
middle class parties' programs did not appeal to them, it
is highly unlikely that the younger voter of 20 to 30 years
of age would vote for them either. hhere could the middle
class youth vote go then? The answer can only be that it
went to the National Socialists.

Occupational correlations underline this. Retail
operation included many of the younger middle class voters;
and it was found that as the proportions of people employed
in retail firms increased, so did the proportions of vote
for the Basis. Other writers have commented on the high
percentage of university students who favored Hitler.
Ebenstein wrote, ”0f the 4,000 students in.fieidelber3,
60-70 per cent adhere to organisations dominated by the
National Socialists. The majority of the students outside
of these organizations are politically passive, and even
the bitterest opponents of the Hitlerites admit the over-
ensuing influence of the Swastika banner in the student
body. The ratio may be taken as fairly representative of
the proportion for the 140,000 students in institutions of
higher education throughout the Reich."1

This analysis also indicates that the older middle
class voter voted for the Rational Socialists. With the
great decline in the strength of the middle class parties,

the former supporters-~who are over 30o-he obviously

l. Knickerbocker, 22, cit., p. 553.

 

232
transferred allegiance to another party. Since the only
party that greatly increased in strength was the Nazi, it
is equally obvious that that party son the disillusioned
older middle class voter. The positive coefficients be-
tween upper and lower middle class indicss and the propor-
tional vote for the Nazis emphasizes this. It was in these
groups that the older people of Germany were prcpcrtionally
strongest.

The voter under 30 years of age in Germany was almost
certainly radical according to the information collected
in this study. They were both marxist and fascist with the
social class being the predominant factor in the choice.
That others have found this before is best su-sed up in
The German Crisis:1 After stating that many German youth
were lasis, the author continues,
”But not all of them. The essential quality of
radicalism and of youth, namely faith, is the chief
ingredient of Communism also. And what part of the
15,570,000 (youths) who are not marching today under
the Swastika banner of the National Socialists are
marching under the Red Flag of Comunissl. Class
and economic differences determine the division.
The working youth and the scions of the landed
gentry and of the aristocracy are largely national
Socialists. The number of German youth to choose

their politics from the moderate middle parties is
insignificant.”

A thorough analysis of the factors influencing the
radicalization of German youth would require investigation
of a wide range of political, economic, psychological, and
social fact. The intent of this study is more technical
mickerbocker, 92. £112., pm

 

 

.v IllIs alll\|I|||l [[llllll.‘llll.lul[

233
than historical, so a fundamental review of those factors
is impossible aithin the time limitations. However, cer-
tain factors are outstanding and should be mentioned.

Some writers believe that the very militant youth
Joined with Hitler. The Rational Socialist party was an
actionist party in the extreme and demanded constant and
public display of convictions through uniform wearing,
mass meetings, rabble rousing, block solicitation for funds
and members. Youthful members would necessarily have to
enjoy this type of activity and other youth who did not
join might vote for the Nazis because of it. Lore feels
that emotionalism was a factor, for he writes, ”Irresist-
ably he (Hitler) attracts the hundreds of youngtnen in
Germany who are yearning for emotional outlets that no
other movement has been able to supply....!he sons of the
impoverished middle class who live under desperate econo-
mic conditions are especially responsive to Hitler’s
urgings."1

Others concur in this. Current History reported that
the SA (Sturmabteilungen) was made up largely of the gen-
eration born between 1904 and 1912.2 Ebenstein thinks a
large part of the support of the Nazis by the youth was
based on military factors. For instance, "The armed
formations of the Nazi party, the Storm Troopers (SA) and
Elite Guards (SS) greatly enhanced the popularity of the

l} Ludwig tore, "Hitler's Bid for German Power," Current

Histogf, vol. 36, lay, 1932, p. 166.
s r tOPI. Current H18t0£19 22s Cite. pa 533s

 

. ..J' emfi- W

234
movement, because millions of youths revolted against the
limitations of the Reichswehr to a hundred-thousand men
and wanted nothing more than the pleasure and thrill of
uniforms, discipline, and military leadership."1

Psychological factors were important in the Hitler
movement. Gerth in particular considers leadership prin-
ciples as important, as he writes, "A major factor facili-
tating affiliation with a charismatic movement in its
revolutionary phase is youthfulne‘ss......"2

The leadership problem was important also, because
the leaders of the established parties were all advanced
in years and thoroughly entrenched behind the party bureau-
sracy. It was almost impossible for a young political
aspirant to fight his way to the tap without many years
of waiting. Without young leaders the young voters did
not feel that they had any influence on party policy.
Wanting both control and voice meant that they had to turn
either to the National Socialists or to the Communists.

However, these factors that have been noted were as
important in Communism as they were in Nazism. It would
be wrong to consider these supposed yearnings of young
German voters for militaristic experiences and needs for
leadership based in faith or emotion as leading particular-
ly to the Nazi movement. The youth of all classes were
affected by the economic collapse and moral disillusion-

ment following the defeat in 1919, and it is reasonable

Is E6.n.iorng $2. Cite. Demo

2. Garth, Amer can JOUPT‘BI 2E SOCSOIOH. ‘22e 0 ts. pe 529.

 

 

235
that the above factors operated in the psychology of all
youths. But it has been shown that middle class youths
chose to express these inclinations under Hitler and the
lower class youths under the red flag of Communism. The
particular direction of political expression taken by the
young German voter was based in his social class and not in
Just a need for the young political animal for certain
psychological satisfactions.

The relationship between the social and economic chaos
of the 1910 to 1932 period and the political actions of the
younger voters in 1932 has been demonstrated by many wri-
ters and needs no elaboration here. A few reports will
refresh the reader's memory. For instance, an article
from The New Republic in 1931 summarises these’ factors well:1

"Many of Hitler's most fervent supporters are ex-
tremely young. They are of the generation which
all its life has experienced hardships. Semi-star-
vation during the war (World her I) when these.
young peeple were small children: then the blockade
and more hunger, then the inflation at a time when
they should have been learning the value of money.
Discipline was lax at home during their more in-
pressionable years. Now they are anxious to go to
work, but then it is difficult if not impossible
to get jobs. They are told that all of these hard-
ships are due to the betrayal of their Fatherland
by the older leaders. They see no reason why they
themselves and their children and grandchildren
after them should pay "tribute" because of a war
with which they had nothing whatever.to do.
Unemployment and Ybuth
A single economic factor that was important in the

political actions of the younger voter was unemployment.

I. Wertheimer, The N91 fiepublig, p. m.

 

 

 

m ._". e ...‘d‘ld‘n.

 

V. ‘h‘uh‘t-M' flm_:‘.' .- ;

 

.u- i‘Jf-J-iraeo ...; ’ '

 

 

‘13“... '

-'..a.. ......v--_.4a.'.4u' J.

 

236
The social ramifications of continued mass unmmployment
are so great that major political changes are almost
axiomatic, particularly when the political tools for the
change are already forced. German youth had both the
tools, the lational Socialist party and the Communist
party, and the stimulus, unemployment, so it is not much
wonder that radicalization_took place.

“Germany's Lost Generation,” the title of an article
written in 1952 on the youth of «may. aptly sun the
then current feeling of the millions of unemployed. The
article was largely based on observations in Berlin. The
.suthcr reported packing box csmps where young men and
women existed only by communal living. a. spoke.of the
many women who had to take to the streets in order to earn
anything at all. The mood of the young unemployed was one
of bitterness; they were disheartened, defeated, and rebel-
lious after what, for some, had been four to six years of
unemployment. And in 1932 the years ahead held.nc promise,
especially under the Republic, or so they felt. The
article continued, “unemployment, or the threat of it, has
driven most members of the lost generation into the camp
either of the Communists or of the liitleritss."1

Without the slimest thread to economic security for

millions of German youth, the disillusionmont just described
was inevitable. The distress W959 of course, complicated

'1:' William C. White, 'Germany‘s fest Generation,' atlan -
ig_lonthlz, vol. 150, July, 1932, p. 121.

 

 

267
by frustrated efforts to marry, to have a home, to have
children. Frustrations of drives to continue academic
or technical training occurred particularly in the middle
classes. The list could be endless.

Economic frustration of the youth was compounded by
the political disruption of the whole period of the Waimar
Republic. A.man of 28 in 1952 would have been 14 at the
end of the first world War. He would have been young
enough to have missed war service but old enough to under-
stand the consequences of defeat. His schooling would have
been completed about 1922 when Germany was in the grips of
the post-war depression. In 1923 occurred'thePrench
occupation of the Ruhr with its consequent rupturing of
the economic structure because of the eight months of pea-
sive resistance. Filed on top was the 1921-3 inflation
that wiped out what little savings a middle class or work-
ingman's family would have. These same events elicited
the political turmoil reflected in the violent shifting of
the voters to the political parties of the right in the
1924 elections and the beginning of the bold-faced efforts
to disrupt and crush the Republic.

From 1925 to 1928 he lived through a prosperous
economic period buoyed by loans from the United States.
Then came the final depression leading to the dissolution
of the Republic. During all of these years of his own
intensified personal problems he was crowded by two

antithetical political movements--one striving to set up

258
a dictatorship of the proletariat and the other attempt-
ing to create a fascist dictatorship.

The pattern of unemployment indicates why so many
German youth went into the Communist party rather than the
National Socialist. About 95 per cent of the unemployed
were wage-earners. The survey of election results of
1920 to 1932demonstrated how the Social Democrats steadily
lost supporters to the Communist party, and it seems likely
that many of the votes lost were from the young unemployed.

The disorganization cf the twenties was expressed‘
more than in 348$ unemployment. The middle classes were
largely impoverished by the mid-twenties inflation and this
had terrific influence on the lives of the sons and daugh-
ters. Instead of a well-provided childhood. years of
pleasant training in a university, and finally a secure
sposition in the civil service, a profession, or a small
business, just the opposite occurred. It was the middle
class parties that were ruined in the political fight
between the right and left and as the parents moved to the
Nazi, blaming the Republic and the Social Democrats for
their plight, it is likely that they channeled the poli—
tical thinking of the offspring in the same direction.

Under the impact of these complex pressures the Ger-
man youths were politically radicalized. the middle class
youth to the right and the labor class youth to the left.
The correlational data demonstrated that the older voter

in the middle class see also radical in 1952, while the

239
older lower class voter siuck with the revisionist Social
Democratic party. The discussion of vhy the middle class
voted Nazi that is given in Chapter IX suggests, within
the limitations of this study, why this “as true. Only
a few comments pertinent to the older voter are necessary

now.

Special Situation of Old Voters

The middle class voter over 50 years of age included
many civil servants. army officers, jurists, professionals,
Junkers, and industrialists. They were the groups and
the age classes that best remembered the ”glories" of the
Empire. With the memory of the prosperous days of the
Empire still fairly fresh in his mind, the middle aged
voter of the old middle class had the contrast of his
impoverished position under the Republic. He did not blame
the inflation of the early years of the democracy or the
ear policy of the Bohenzollerna but, incorrectly. the
government then in power. As elderly middle class voters
struggled to regain their coveted place in society it
.seemed that all that was standing in their way was the
Republic.

The middle aged and elderly middle class easily
magnified the ease of life under the Kaiser. They could
remember the successes of German foreign policies in the
late 19th and early 20th Centuries and their own sestful
support of those policies in the pan-germanic movements

and the navy league. Their youth had been spent in the

240
most dynamic days of the Empire when industrialization was
taking place, when German products were going into every
foreign port, when colonies were being collected, when
the whole world seemed the stamping ground of German
diplomacy--and now they were living their old age in dis-
grace. The war guilt clause rankled more than defeat.
Reparations, they thought, were milking the country. The
government seemed to be controlled by the working class.
Hitler had only to step into this group with his prcpaganda
that reparations mould cease, that the hated Versailles
treaty would be abrogated, that the army would again be
strong and able to defend the fatherland. The Nazis
appealed to the aged voters of the middle class as none of
the older parties were satisfying the nationalistic, ultra
patriotic,elemente in this part of the population.

Economic factors had especial influence on those over
60 years of age in the middle class for their savings had
been wiped out in l?23 when many of them were already
past 50 and looking forward to the day of retirement.
Instead, they, at 50, were entering the most insecure
period of their life. Much wonder that any program that
preached policies that promised security would appeal to
them.

The appeal of the Socialist party to the older worker
is also understandable. The SPD had long appealed to the
elderly working class voters in Germany because of the
mildness of its program. The leadership of the party '88

well established and controlled by men who were in these

241
oldest age groups. Consequently, the aged leadership as
an interest group in its own right fostered many policies,
that the aged in the general population also desired._
Many of the voters in these two age groups were probably
associated with the party from their earliest working days
and through the pull of traditional loyalties remained
with it. The Communists were led, however, by brash,
dynamic, often crude, young leaders. It was primarily an

action party and only about 15 years old.

Summary

A great many coefficients of relationship between
proportion of voters in certain age grades and proportion
of urban vote for the three major German political parties
have been outlined. It is clear that a certain amount of
radicalization of the voters took place in all the age
groups. It is also clear that social class was very
‘important in the choice of a political party by all ages
of voters.

Th0 aEe classes were found to reflect the class struc-
ture very accurately. So much so that any interpretation
of the age correlations must automatically consider the
class structure.. National Socialism was a party of all
ages of the middle classes and not inst the young. The
Communist party was primarily a party of the young working
class voter, and the Socialists of the older working class

citizen. Age was more important as a factor for these two

‘ 242
parties than for the Nazis. In general, the Nazi party
was made up of supporters those average age would be above
that of the Communists and slightly below that of the ’
backers of the Social Democratic party. The Communist
party concentrated its support in those voters under 45,
the Socialists in those marking class voters over 45, and
the Nazis in all age classes in the middle class. Essen-
tially, this same condition was found in both sizes of
city and in all military occupation zones. Catholicism
altered the pattern somewhat in the American-French zone,
primarily in weighting the Nazis and Socialist with more,
relatively, young voters as the Catholic parties retained
the allegiance of the older voters.

These summary tendencies are shown graphically in
Figure B. In the figure three bars are shown for each.
age class. The top bar in each class is the National
Socialist party, the second bar the Communist party, and
the third bar the Social Democratic party. White portions
of the bar reflect the coefficients for cities of 50,000
to 100,000 population and the black, cities over 100,000
people. The bars are alvays read from the base line.

For instance, in age class 20-25 the top or Nazi bar
shows that the Nazi voteéage coefficient is minus .39 in
cities of over 100,000 population and minus .46 in cities
or 50.000 to 100.000 People. Each bar can be read in the
same way. These are the same coefficients given in

Tables XXIX, XXX], and XXIII. When the figure is vievcd

FIG’AE L: COEFFICIENTS CF CCRREIATDON BETIEEN FER CENTS
OP PCPUIATICN OVER 90 YEARS IN CERTAIN AGE GROUPS AND
FER ChRTS 0P V(TE Pffl SELECTED PARTIES, BV’SIZE C? CITV.

Correlation

 

    
  
  
  
  
  
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

-'7 -6-5-4-3-2-101234567
W‘_ V 1 V T 1 T V F7 1* V V T '
Nazi II ,
20-25 - Communist
' SFDIIIIII
‘0 ”"1 _ J Ccmunist
25"” am I
30-40 ""1- ‘jomunist
SFD IIIIIII ‘ ‘ ‘
Nazi
40-45 0 "Mt".
SPD
- 8:2};
45-50 _ cmun s
SPD
'Nezi
50-60 C .munist
on E :] spa

 

 

60-65
Cremunist|

 

£5 & rvpp
Communist r’

 

 

[350,000-100,000 - 100,000 and over

243
as a whole it is soon epnaront that the age-vote relation-
ships for the Communist party are always to the riyht,
positive, in the younger age grades: and it is always to
the left, negativ», in the older age grades. The Nazis

and the Social Democrats reverse this.

 

 

Hots: Helen Peak made a study of the Nazi party through
material gathered in interviews with 3700 German civilians
in the British, French, and American occupation sones
during the summer of 1945. (Survey conducted by the U. 8.
Strategic Bombing Survey; see The Effects of Bombin ‘23
German Morale, Government Printing F??Ice,'lb . 0
sample 313 not include the armed forces so that the young-
er male groups were relatively small in size. The women
were full represented at all age levels.

In her age analysis Peak decided, "There is surpris-
ingly little evidence here of a greater preponderance of
extreme Nazis in the younger Age groups. Peak thought
that what little difference there was between age groups
was "contributed chiefly by the semen in the sample." But,
"Among the women...it'is clear that only small differences
exist between age groups.” The age groups used were 16-29,
30-69, 40-49, and 50-70. the concluded that, "Older Ger-
mans, therefore, seem to have held Nazi viewpoints only
slightly less often than the young...."

These conclusions are based on data collected 13 years
after Hitler came to power, while the thesis is based on
data of 1932 and 1953. In spite of this, essentially the
same conclusions are reached concerning age and the Nazi
party. This would seem to reenforce the conclusions. The
oft repeated viewpoint is.that Hitler successfully wooed
the German youth. Evidently he was no more successful with
the younger than the older German citizen. Peak, 25133232-

5232}. “Gnosraphh .92- ;Lgn pp. 3-4.

CHAPThd XI
SEX AND POLITICS

has there any variation between the sexes in the
choosing of a political party? Some writers have indicated
that women were an especially important part of Hitler's
party. For instance, s writer stated in 1932 that more
than half of Bitler's supporters were women office workers.1
He did not further state whether there were also other
women who were nctofrice workers but who belonged to the
party. One would have to assume, of course, that there
were. The National Socialists, then, would be pretty
largely a women's party. Is there any statistiesl evidence
Ito support or refute this viewpoint?

In an effort to get at sex differences in politics the
proportions of women of the total pepulstion over 20 years
of age were correlated with the proportions of vote for

each or the two radical parties. The same was done with

the son. The results are given in Table XXXIV.

nets xxxw: ccarrrcmms or ccsaammmn canes! vac-roa-
TION cs xcrurnsxcs (VaR so YEARS IN sacs sax AND reorcnrzons
or was an: surmise lAEiTIES, BY 372.13 (a crrr.

 

 

Sex Party
lasis Communists
City Sizes City Sise
l 2 1 2
Ion 's‘o -.5'I .38 .75
WW .3 e54 -e” ’svo

 

I"Uit .1.. (T7"equals cities of over 165,655 population

and (2 cities of 50,000-100,000. A coefficient of .30 is
significant.

1. Friterr, Eurrent histonl, p. 533.
244

A

245

The table clearly shows that as the proportions of
women in the population over 20 years of age increased, so
did the National Socialist vote. At thetmme time the vote
for the Communist party decreased. The situation was re-
versed in the case of the men. The Communist party pro-
portions of vote increased as the prcportions of men in-
creased and the Nazi vote decreased. This does not mean
that the Communists were all men and that the Nazis were all
women, naturally.

The very nature of the method forces one of these two
sex measures into a negative relationship with the party
with which the other is in a positive relationship. .This1
is true because as the per cent of women increases, the
per cent of men would have to decrease since together the
per cents must equal 100. Therefore, the negative coef-
ficients do not indicate that men did not support the lazis
or women the Communists. However, the coefficients can be
taken as indicating that women were more important in
Nazism.than in Communism and that the reverse is true for

men.

Working Women
The above coefficients reflect both working and non-
working women and do not answer the question of whether
there was a difference between working and non-working

women. Some light is thrown on this in Table XXIV. The

24s

1 were of crwerbspersonen was

per cent that working women
computed for cities of 50,000 to 100,900 and over 100,000
pepulation. This was correlated with the per cent of vote
for the Nazi and Communist parties.

TABLE XXXV: COEFFICIENTS CF CORRELATION BETWEEN PER CENTSz

0? WORKING WOMEN AND FER CENTS 0? VOTE FOR SPECIFIED PAR-
TIES, BY SIZE OF CITY.

 

 

Size of City Party
Population Nazi Communist
50,000—100.000 0‘2 “>066
0701' 100.000 e28 ’s38y'

 

 

 

K coefficient 6f_:§7”Is signifTEEEF'Tor cities over
100,000 pepulation and .29 for cities of 50,000 to 100,000
population.

In both sizes of city the support of working women-of
the Nazi party is well demonstrated. As the per cents of
working women increased, the per cents of vote for the
National Socialist also increased. EQually apparent is the
reverse trend between the working women and the Communist
party.

It would seem that the more women in a city, whether
working or not, the greater would be the Nazi vote and the
lower the Communist vote. It would be extremely interest-
ing to know the influence of social class on the sex factor.

It has been shcsn that social class was an all prevailing

 

 

 

I. Sonderbiela.e zu 'errschi t und Statistik" che
berquicEe und sozTHle.Gl.ederungT'll Jafirg.'1934, lo. 24,
Table 22, Verlag der Reimar Bobbing G.N.b.B. in Berlin

.' 61' pe SOs Data rOr 1955s

 

247
factor in the selection of a political party, and it is
'reasoneble to assume that position in the social structure
influenced both men and women in essentially the same man-
ner. Some light can be cast on this through measuring each

sex by certain age grades.

Age and Sex

Using the two sizes of city just discussed it was
possible to correlate the prcpcrtions in each age prade
according to sex vith the preportions of the vote for the
Communists, National Socialists, and Social Democrats.
The age-class relationship was not measured by sex as the
prcpcrtions] distribution of women through the age grades
was similar enough to that for men so that the age-class
coefficient would be in the same direction as that reported
in Table XXX. In other words, the members of both sexes
tend to be younger in the lower class than in the middle
classes.

Detailed analysis of this data is not required as the
evidence Follows the trends outlined previously. Both
sexes apparently followed class lines in voting to a large
extent, but women less so than men. Applying the same
assumptions as were used in discussing ape previously, it
will be shown that women and men of the middle classes
supported the Nazis in all age grades, while the young
people in lower class backed the Communist party and the

older people in this class the Social Remocrats. There was

249
a tendency for the women or the lower class to be less
communistic than the men. The evidence indicates that more
of the lower class women than men supported Hitler. Tahen
as a whole, women bulked larger in Hitler's support than
the men.

It is much easier to see the supporting evidence for
these conclusions when the data is presented in two tables.
Age grades 20-25, 25-50, and 30-40 are in Table XXXVI.

The age grades 40-45, 45-50, SO-dfl, 60-65, and 65 and over
are in Table XXXVII.
TABLE xxxvx: COEFFICIENTS or ccaaslnrxcs BETWEEN PER cssrs'

OF PEOPLE IN YCUNGEH AGE Oscars, BY SEX, WITH THE PER CENT
0? VOTE FOR SELECTED FARTIBS, BY SIZE OF CITY.“ -

 

Age Party
Group Nazi Communists Social Dem.
City Size” City Size City Size
139.2 1 2 13 2
a s ”‘n a a ws°i w I w °‘i w

 

so-as ~31 ~42 ~45 ~42 ~1e ~15 25 1s ~ss ~43 ~41 ~59
25~so ~4e ~40 ~66 ~59 29 21 as as ~29 ~45 ~57 ~55
so~4o ~39 ~25 ~49 ~29 s4 17 71 55 ~23 ~21 ~19 ~2e

 

‘ Proportions o?_pe0p1e over EUIyears of see.
# Size of city (l) is pooulation over 100,000 and (2) is

population of 50,000-100 000.

** (I) equals men and (W5 equals women.

A coefficient of 30 or higher is significant statistically.
In both sizes of city men and women are correlated

significantly negatively with the Nazis in all ape grades

except one. In are grade 30-40 the semen are not sipn1f1-

cantly related. Since these are grades really reflect

lower class votinp, it is possible that lower class women

249
were less anti-Nazi, prcpcrtionally, than the men.

The relationship of the prcpcrtions of men and women
in age groups 20-25 and prcpcrtions of vote for the Com-
munists is very muddled. There is no reliable correlation
in either city for this group. For the other two age
groups, however, the support of the Communists by the men
is evident. But only in cities of 50,000 to 100,000
population are the women significantly related to the
radical labor party. The coefficients of correlation of
.58 and .55 for the women are very much lower than the simi-
lar coefficients for the men or .69 and .71. In both sizes
of city, then, less relationship is demonstrated between
commmnism and women than between communism and men.

The negative correlations between women and voting
for the Socialists are much stronger than those of men and
Socialists in age groups 20-25 and 25-50. The majority of
working women would be in these two age groups.

In age group 30 to 40 only the men in cities of over
100,000 population are significantly,negatively related
with the vote for the Social Democrat party. But on the
whole, the women between the ages of 20 and 40 seemed to
support the Socialists less than the men.

Both men and women between 20 and 50 were positively
correlated with the Communists and negatively with the
Rational Socialists and Social Democrats, except in cities
over 100,000 population for age grade 90-25. Since these

age grades presumably reflect the lower social class, it

250
would appear that both men and women of the lcwer class
made a similar political party choice.

In Table XXXVII the age-sex relationships to voting in
age grades 40 years and older are given. Variations by sex
are more accentuated in the age ngUps above 40 vears as
compared with those under 40 years.

TABLE XXXVII: COEFFICIENTS CF CORREIATICN BETWEEN PE§\

CENTS OF PEOPLE IN OLDER AGE GROUPS, BY SEX, WITH THE PER
CENTS CF VCTE FCR SELECTED YAKTIES, BY SIZE OF CITY.“

Age Party
Groups lazi Communist Social Democrat
City Site City Size City Size
1 2 1 2 l 2
Sex** Sex Sex

I W I W H W M W I W I W
40‘45 0.10 .5: -e12 e65 e43 -.18 e42 -e41 “em .36 .19 e35

 

45-50 .01 .37 .09 .53 .16 .11 .24 -.46 .10 .27 .25 .28
50.60 018 0‘7 -001 .54 .13 -031 -003 -.69 .23 .44 019 030
60-63 .19 .42 .47 .59 -.10 -.32 -.55 -.75 .41 .39 .44 .42

65 md .59 e44 e63 e64 -014 -.29 "e59 -.59 029 029 .47 e35
older

* Preportions of eOpIe of over 55 years of age.

# Size of city (1? equals population over 100,000 and (2)
equals cpulation 50,000 to 100,000.

ea (I equals Ian, and (h) equals Women.

A coefficient of .50 is significant,-

 

 

Sharp differences in the coefficients between‘middle
aged and elderly voters and vote for the Nazi party are
apparent when men and women are handled separately. Prom
age 40 on, very significant coefficients are develOped
between proportions of women in each of the age classes and
prcpcrtions of vote for the Nazis. When age-class relation-

ships sere measured, are rroupe 40-45 and 48-50 did yield

951
significant results. This was ts en to mean that no one
social class was dominetinn the are-voting coefficients.
If that conclusion is reliable, then the hiah correlations
for women in this instance probably mean that women of all
classes in these age groups supported the Nazis.

Men, on the other hand, are not significantly related
to the vote for the Nazi party until age 65 or older in
the metropolises and age 60 in the smaller cities. The
correlations offered in Tables XXIX, XXXI, and XXIII were
affected more by the vomen than the men. However, this
should not affect the conclusions that were drawn there.

The divergence between the political attitudes of
middle aged and elderly women and men is praphicslly out-
lined when the Communist party is investigated. An aspect
of this divergence is the much more violent nature of the
change from one age group to another on the part of the
correlations for women than is true for the men. In age
bracket 50-40 women as well as men were related signifi-
cantly to the Communists in cities of between 50,000 and
100,0“0 inhabitants. Yet in the same class of city pro-
portions of women of age 50 to 50 is strongly negative
with Communism, while the correlation for men remained
positive and significant.

In the larger city the change in correlations was
not so radical. There vas a tendency among women voters
in the metropolitan areas to moderately support the

Communists on a broader age base than was true in the

25”
smaller cities, but at no time in cities over 100,000
population were correlations for women and Communist
voting significantly positive. And at 50 years of age
the coefficients became high negatives. Women in cities
under 100,000 population were significantly opposed at are
40 or 10 years sooner than women in the larger size of city.
But, also, they more positively related in age groups 25-30
and 30-40. In these smaller cities women in age grade
60-65 presented the highest negative coefficient of the
whole age study, a minus .75.

Proportions of men were significantly related to pro-
portions of vote for Communism down to age class 40-45 in .
both sizes of city. Then the coefficients are indecisive
in both sizes of city until age 60. At that age men in
cities of 50,000 to 100,000 yielded statistically signifi-
cant negative correlations. This reenforced the conclusion
that the Communists were supported on a broader age base
in metrOpolitan areas than in smaller cities, as at no
time did the correlations reach significant negatiVe levels
in the larver city type.

The coefficients of correlation between the per cents
of people in each age class and the per cents of vote for
the Social Democrats demonstrates again the complementary
nature of the tso labor parties. In the younger age groups
both men and women were negative in their response to.th9
Socialist party while the attitude toward the Communist

party was approval. In the middle elderly age brackets the

pattern is reversed. As before, tLe size of the change is

253
much greater in the correlations for women than men.
The coefficients for the women are sirnificantly positive
at age 40, but for the men this is not true until age 60.
The situation was the same in both sizes of city. The
Social Democrats' coefficients from both men and women
in age groups 60-65 and 65 and over are about the same.
There was some tendency for the voters of both sexes in
the cities of over 100,000 population to be less Socialist
minded than in the case of the inhabitants of the smaller
size of city. Age classes 40 to 60 had pointed in this
direction. The Social Democrats held onto the older lrwer
class voters in face of all efforts of both the Nazi and
Communists to dislodge them.

On the whole it is likely that women were more import-
ant in the Rational Socialist movement than in either the
Communist or the Social Democratic parties. The Communist
party apparently was more successful uith working class
men than women. then measured by age it appeared that
position in the social class structure was slightly less
meaningful for roman than for men in the selection of a
political warty. Especially in the older women. above
40 years, did this appear to be true. This reflected to
the benefit of hational SocialisM. 3omen under 30 years
may have supported the Communists as readily 39 aid the
men of the lore" 01889-

Since the same social, psychological, and economic

factors were operative for both sexes, the general

254
situation will not be reviesed. A special note on the

women is in place, however.

Special Situation of Women

One possible explanation of the large number of
women who voted for Hitler may be the traditional position
of inferiority of vcmen in German life. Vasculine superi-
ority is much more pronounced in Germany than in the
United States. Talcott Yarrons states, "From the American
point or view, particularly of women, German men tend to
be dominating and authoritarian, and, conversely, to
expect submissiveness and dependency on the part of their
wives. This is perhaps particularly true in the middle
classes.” The woman's place is venerelly in the home where
"her life is concentrated on the home, on husband and
children, and she participates little in the outside world,
in community affairs, or even in cultural life." However,

I
Parsons believes that employment in industry has consid-

erably altered this pattern for the loser class women.1
The Hitler movement was based on the leadership principle
with abaclutc nuilcritv from the top down. It was a
charismatic? leadership with all the implications of the
absolute infellibilitv of the leader. The other German

parties did not offer this type of leadership, and it is

possible that middle class women in particular would be

 

I} Farsons, Journal gfilegal‘and Political Snelologz,

p. 1050
2. Gerth, Journal 23 Eociolggy, n. 524.

255
attracted in large numbers to a strong leader in times of
social and economic insecurity. Being culturally attuned
to a submissive role in the family and society they may
have emotionally sought security in the customary pattern
of submission to a domineering leader. Parsons has a
somewhat different conception. He feels that the National
Socialist movement "constitutes a mobilization of the
extremely deep-seated romantic tendencies of German soci-
ety.’ One of these romantic strains is the idealisation
of.theheroic fighting man.‘ Then, "From the point or view
of German women, a heroic ideal could mobilise their ro- i
mantis idealization of men in a pattern Which adequately
fitted the German segregation of the sex roles, as the man
in the role to which, or all roles, women were by tradition

least suited, that of fighter."1

 

1. Parsons, Journal 3: Iefnlfiand Tolitical EgcchOEIo
p. 1140

BI BI 1001i APHY

American Political Science R View, "Recent Elections in
Russia and Other German Tuanaer," vol. 26, 1932, pp. 698-705.

Barker, J. Ellis, Modern German , E. P. Button and 00.,
NOW Ybrk. 1915s

Birchall, Frederick T., "Reich Vote Today," New York Times,
July 31, 1932, vol. LXXXI, p. 1.

Brown, harrison, "The Collapse of Liberalism in Germany,"

Contgggoragz Art Review, vol. 142, November, 1932,
PP? " 0

Burgman, Herbert J., "German Capitalism at a Dead End,“
Current Histor , vol. 36, August, 1932, pp. 534-539.

Childs, Harsood L., "The German Presidential Elections of
1932,“ American Political Science ReviewI vol. 96, 1932,
pp. 486-153 .

Deutsoh, Harold 6., Chapter title: "The Origins of Dicta-

torship in Germany," Dictatorehi in the Iodern World,
Edited by Guy Stanton Ford, UniverETty of HInnesota Press,

1955 ' pp e 43-64 a

Dickinson, 8. E. The Regions 2; German , Oxford University
Press, lea York,'1915.

Diesel, Eugene, German aid the Germans, translated by
t, D. Robson-Scott, The FecmTTTan Company, New York, 1931.

‘Dittman, Wilhelm, Des Politische Deutschland zpr Hitler,
Europa Verlag A.E., Zurich and'New York, 1936.

Ebenstein, tilliam, The German Record, Parrar and Rinehart,
Inco' NOW York, 1945.

Elliott, John, "Germany Seeks a President," The Nation,
vol. 134. march. 1932. pp. 255-2570

, "Hos Bruning Was Overthrown," The Iation,

vol. 151, June, 1932, pp. 720-723.

, "Germany in the World Crisis," The Nation,

vol. 155, Eeeember, 1981, pp. 662-664.

256

257

Ezekiel, M., Methods g£ Correlational Analysis, New York,
1930.

Pay, Sidney 8., "The Dismissal of Bruening," Current
Histo , vol. 36, July, pp. 490-492, 1932.

, "Germany Elects a New Reichstag," Current
History, vo . 36, September, 19:52, pp. 655-661. ' ""

 

, "Hitler' s Gains in Prussia," Current H1sq--
orz, vol. 357'June, 1932, pp. 352-354.

 

Friters, Gerhard, "Who Are the German Fascists," Current
History, vol. 33, January, 1932, pp. 532-336.

Geieer, Karl Frederick, "Hitler's Hold on.Germany,” fihe
Nation, vol. 135, November, 1932, pp. 474-475.

Twilight or Ner Dawn, hhittlesey House, McGrav-
fiok ompm nc., Work, 1933. -

Garth“ Hans, "The Nazi Iarty: Its Leadership and Composi-
tion, The bmerican Journal of 'ociology, vol. 45, January,
1940' NO. 4' pp. 517-011.

Glasgow, George, "From Bruninp to Von Papen," Contemporary
Review, vol. 142, July, 1932, pp. 101- 111.

Gosnell, Harold P.,% Europe Votes, University of Chicago
Press, Chicago, 1935.

Griswold, A. Whitney, "Paving the Way for Hitler," The
Atlantic, March, 1941, pp. 314-321.

Bale, William Harlan, "From.the Heart of Germany," The
Ration, vol.‘133, November, 19 31, pp. 554-556.

4_, "Ten Years of Hitler; One-Hundred of
Goethe," Lhe Nation, vol. 134, March, 1932, pp. 307-308.

Heberle, Rudolf, From Democracy to Nazism, Louisiana State
University Press, Ba Eon Rouge, 1 45.

 

Heiden, Konrad, Der Fuehrer, Foughton Mifflin Company,
Boston, Mass., 191?.

, A History 23 National Socialiqg, Alfred A.

Knopf, 1935.

Hoben, Lindsay, "Threats of Revolution," Current Historlu
vol. 35, December, 1931, pp. 387-392.

258

Hoover, Calvin 3., German Enters the Third Reich, The
Macmillan Company, New York, 1935.

Kerwin, Jerome 0., "The German Reichsfag Elections of
July 31, 1932," American Iclitical Scfence Review, vol. 26,
193?. ppe 921'9260 * '

Knickerbocker, H. R., The German Crisis, Farrar and Kine-
hart, New York, 1932.

Foch-Weeer, Erich, Hitler and Be and, Alfred A. KnOpf,
New York, 1943.

Laidler, Harry 9., ”German Socialism in the Balance,“ The
Nation, vol. 133, October, 1931, pp. 394-385.

Lasswell, Harold D., "The Psychology of fiitlerism," The
Political Quarterly, 1933, (1'), pp. 373-384.

Loewenstein, Karl, "Governments of Continental Europe,“
German and Central Europe, The Macmillan Company, New
Ycrfi, i9

Lore, Ludwig, "Hitler's Bid for German Power,” Current Hist-
2311 '01e 36' May, 1932' pp. Jr8'1700

Luehr, firmer, The New German Re ublic, Hinton, Belch, and
Company, lew YorE, 1929.

Iellen, Sydney, "The German People and the Postwar World,”
The American Political Science Review, August, 1943,
VOIe 5’. PD. ’ 0

Horror, Edgar Ansel, German Puts the Clock Back, William
lorroa and Company, 1953, New York.

luasey, Henry Raymond, "Patient Germany," The Nation,
'010'134' J.nuary, 1932' Ppe 64-660

lation, (Editors), vol. 133, July, 1931, p. 25.

National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., Rationalization
2£_Ggrman Indust , New York, 1931.

Neumann, Franz 1., Behemoth, Oxford University Press, flew
Ybrk,.19420

Neumann, 8., ”Political Parties--Germany," Encyclopedia‘gg
Social Sciences, vol. 11. p. 613.

New International Encyclopedia, Dodd, Head, and Company,

259

New Regublic, "Germany Clears the Rocks," (hditors).
V0 . , ucuet, 1932, pp. 603~502.

"Whither Germany," vol. 71, August, 1952,

’
pp. Uéti-330.

Parsons, Talcott, "An Analytical Approach to the Theory of
Social Stratification," The American Journal gg Sociology,
V01. XLV, Daily, 3940’ NO. 6’ I>p0 Eli‘s (a.

, "Democracy and Social Structure in ire-

Iazi Germany," Journal of Level and Yolitical Sociology,
V01. 1' 194?, F'po ug'Il-T: “w

, ”The Problem of Conurlled Institutional
Cfiange," Taycfiiatrx, vol. 8, 1945, pp. 79—101.

Pollock, James F. Jr., ”An Areal Study of the German Elec-
toratglmflfl'American Political Science Review, vol. 38,
No. 1, February, I523, pp. 85-55. '

__ , "Foreign Governments and Politics,
The German Electionifiof 1928, The American Political So -
333.93 goview, vol. 22, 1926, pp. .358- .

, "The German Party Syctmm,‘ Eh.
Kmorioan Folitical Science Review, vol. 23, November, 1929,
o. , pp. E'RQ"E‘VIQ

 

Review of rolitice, ”Goetz Briefs: limes Germanicua-Bridge
m roan—”Free. art I, pp. 261-275, Julg, 19:59, vol. 1, so.
3, and Part II, Vol. 1, Cctober, 1930, o. 4, pp. 444-457.

Speier, Hans, "Tho Salaried Employee in Hcdern Society,"
Social Research, 1934, (1), pp. 118-119.

Stanley, Lee J., "Tre Reichetag Elections in Germany,"
Contemporary Review, vol. 142, Sertenber, lCEQ, pp. 292-299.

Stolpcr, Gustav, German Econcm , 1970-1940, Reyna] and
Hitchcock, New York, lg 6.

Survef, The, "Three Snapshots in Germany, bv a Traveling
poo a mortar," vol. 67, No. 6, December 1F, 1931.

Valentin, Veit, Tie German Peogle, Alfred A. Tnch, New
YOrk, 1946.

Wallace, 8. A., and tnedecor, George W., Correlation‘ggg
Machine Calculation, Iowa State College of figriculture and
Hecfianic Krte 5?Ticial Publication, Vol. XXX, June 24. 1931.
No. 4, Area, Iowa.

260

Wertheimer, Mildred 30, "G“PF9nyi TVunder on the Rithn"
Iflg‘figz Republic, vol. 66, March, 1931, pp, 66-6P.

White, William C., "Gcrweny'e lost Generation," Atlantic
Monthlx, vol. 150, July, 1972, pp. 113-124.

German Source Book.

Dal Wirtechafteleben der Stadte, Landkreiee und Land c-
meiden, Band I, Verlegt be! 3.3. Rittler and gohn, Eerlin,

Dittman, Wilhelm, Dee Folitieohe Deutechlend vor Hitler,
Europa Verlag, Zuricfi, .

Hauntergebneieee der Wahlen sun Reichsta , Am. 31 Juli
‘T§3§,“Verlag von Rainer FoSbIng, er n, 1932.

 

Sanderbeila e £3, Wirtechaft und Statictik, I0. 6, Die
Iltereglieaerunc der HevoTFerung, (@rgefinilce der Valha-

zihlung vom 15—3uni 1533), verlag fur Sozialpolitik,
Wirtechaft und Statictik, Berlin, 1955.

Sonderbeila e zu, Wirtechaft und Statistik, No. 24, Die
SeruTIIcfie und-Soziale Glieaerung, Verlafi’der Rainer

0 ng, erlin, c .

Statistik dee Dmtchen Reich, Volke, Benita-and Betriebl-
siBIung vdE—IG Jun! IE 3, Berlin, 1936.

Band 451

Band 454

Band 455

Band 456

Band 457

PART V
APPENDICS

APPENDIX A

RURAI URBAN PARTY DIFFERENCES

It has been suggested that the Nazis were stronger
in rural areas than in urban and the Communists stronger
in urban than rural. Appendix Table 1 demonstrates the
percentages of total vote won by each or the parties in
the Reich as a whole, in the cities of the sample, and in
a typical Protestant and a typical Catholic area.

Nasismwon 37.3 per cent or the total valid vote cast
in the Reich, but only 33.5 per cent of the vote cast in
cities of over 25,000 pepulation. The larger proportion
of national vote means that the National Socialists won a
greater prcpcrtion of the rural than urban vote. The rate
or 44.9 per cent for a typical Protestant rural area demon-
strates this. The rate of 32.9 in a Catholic rural area
also attests to the influence of Nazism in rural areas, for
it has been shown that Catholics were largely successful in
resisting Hitler.

The Communist trend is just the opposite. In urban
areas it won 19.? per cent of the valid vote but only 14.3
per cent of the Reich vote. Its rural vote then was pro-
portionately less than its urban vote. This is clearly
shown in Hanover and aavaria as in those too rural districts

the Communist party fell to only 9 per cent of the vote.

261

262

Appendix Table 2 compares the proportional success
of the oartiee in rural and urban areas, also. The greater
success of the National Socialists in rural than urban
areas is shown again. The total urban vote for the
sample of cities CVer 25,000 pepulation was 42 per cent
of the national vote. For a party to have been equally
successful in both rural and urban areas, 42 per cent of
its vote should have been urban and 59 per cent rural and
in cities of less than 25,000 pepulation. Reading the
column of per cents it is clear that the Nazis were not
as successful in urban areas as rural as only 37.7 per cent
orbits votes were in cities or over 25,000 population.

The Communist party on the other hand won 55.2 per
cent of its total Reich vote in cities of over 25,000
pepulstion. It is clear, then, that it was much more
successful in urban than rural areas. It is not considered
necessary to measure the significance of these differences

because of the million of votes involved.

APPENDIX TABLE 1: ccupauxson or sATIONAL. URBAN, Ann
TYPICAL RURAL AREA PERCENTAGES or VOTE FOR MAJOR PARTIES
IR was JULY, 1932 REICHSTAG ELECTIONS.

 

National urban Rural1
Party > Rates Rats Rates

M
All Cities Hannovsr Bavaria

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Nazi 37.3 38.6 44.9 82.0
KPD 14.s 19.9 8.0_ s.s
SPD 21.6 24.8 23.6 17.1
Center 12 s is o s 4 ”'9‘
I 0 O 29 . 1*,

DIV? 5.9 5.8 8.2 8.1
Other-**‘ 8.4 5.1 6.9 6.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 . 100.0

# Salpls cities over 25,000 population.

' TyPical Protestant area.

** Typical Catholic area.

## Bavarian Peoples party included.

0*. Includes DDP, DVP, Landvclk, Others, and Bavarian

Peoples party except in Bavaria.

 

it Based on unpublished mater1a1‘6§:62‘r; Ioomfls and
Jo A110“ Beegle.

263

APPENDIX TABLE 2: COMPARISCN 0F REICH AND URBAN VOTE
FOR MAJOR PAdTIES IN THE REICHSTAO ELECTIONS, JULY, 1952.

 

 

1 Party ReEggélllote Ur:::.%ote gegzuviog
Nazi 13,746,780 6,180,200 v 37.7
KPD 5,282,626 2,918,024 55.2
are _ 7,959,712 3,846,685 49.:
Center. 4,589,336 1,864,786 40.4
DNVP 2,186,051 894,811 40.9
Others 3,118,849 790,688 25.4
Totals 39,982,354 15,484,144 49.0

 

264

APPENDIX B
TCTAL VOTES

APPENDIX TABLE 6: TOTAL VCTE IN THE SAMPLE CITIES CVhd
26,000 POPUIATICN PPR REICHSTAG ELECTION OF JULY, 1962,
BY SIZE OF CITY A60 MILITARY OCCUPATION ZONE.

 

 

 

 

 

‘Siss offiCity ’ Zone

American British French Russian Berlin
Over 1,264,026 4,666,626 59,019 2,693,941 2,641,497
100,000
5353?360 696,069 699,644 171,647 762,946
95333350 669,126 611,676 127,672 1,096,776
W AW

 

Total Zone 2,609,210 6,666,846 668,068 4,210,664 2,641,497

r

 

266

APPEHDIX TABLE 4: TOTAL VOTE FOR MAJOR GERMAN PARTIES
IN THE JUIY, 1962 REICHSTAG ELECTIONS, BY 5122 or CITY.“

Party Size of City Totals

Over 100,000 50,000-m assoc-50.000
Population Population Population

 

 

 

 

 

 

lasi 6,759,966 704,665 716,569 5,190,200
520 2,405,709 264,995 247,661 2,919,024
990 2,975,599 496,621 479,476 6,946,696
Center 1,669,079 602,666 196,674 1,954,766
DIV? 650,949 116,945 126,917 994,611
Others 575,757 106,646 109,295 790,696
W W

 

 

Total Vote 11,634,047 1,989,196 1,861,962 16,466,194

 

* Table IV, Chapter III shows this in percentage foam.

266

APPENDIX TABLE 68 TOTAL VOTE FOR MAJOR GERMAN PARTIES IN
THE JULY, 1962, HEICHSTAG ELECTIONS BY MILITARY OCCUPA-
TION ZONE.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

fighrty Zone

American British French Russian Berlin
1421 994,006 1,766,190 117,157 1,679,102 756,745
x20 646,446 1,162,467 44,096 646,046 721,966
690 667,119 1,260,191 69,066'1,159,606 722,004
Center 449,597 964,567 91,927 219,699 160,646
5579 102,629 256,946 14,026 275,261 219,656
géhers 149,726 292,617 22,782 264,666 91,006

 

Totals 2,609,210 6,666,846 658,069 4,210,664 2,641,467

.7

 

267

APPENDIX TABLE 6A: PER CENTS CF TCTAI VALID URBAN VOTE

FOR [AJOR PARTIES}; IN THE JULY, 1962, REICHSTAG ELECTIONS,
BY MILITARY OCCUPATION ZONES.

 

 

 

Party Zone

American British French Russian
lasi 64.6 60.6 62.7 69.9
KPD 16.6 20.6 12.6 15.6
SPD 25.6 21.7 19.0 27.5
Center 17.2 17.0 25.7 5.2
’,/—'\s' ,7 59,), . {,0 6'»;
DEV? 6.9 5.0 6.9 6.5

16616 more 100.6 m

APPENDIX C
ELIGIBLE VOTE AND ACTUAL VOTE

Appendix Table 6 demonstrates the very high percent-
age of eligible urban voters who actually did get to the
polls and cast a valid vote in the July, 1952, Reichstsg
elections. The interesting thing in this table is that
the percentages of valid of eligible vote is about the
same in all occupation zones and sises of city.

APPENDIX TABLE 6: THE PER CENT TOTAL VALID VOTE WAS OP

ELIGIBLE VOTE IN THE JULY, 1962, REICHSTAO ELECTIONS, 3!
KILITARY OCCUPATION ZONE AND SIZE OF CITY..

 

 

Siss of Cit Iilitary Occupation Zone
(Population American British French Soviet All Zones
25,000-50,000 83.8 87.2 84.6' 85.6 86.4
60,000-lO0,000 84.9 89.0 82.7 82.8 82.8
100,000 and up 91.6 91.2 96.4 96.9 96.6

 

269

AIPLNDIK D

THE 01113: C? GERNANV’USED IN THE SAMPLE

APPEFDIX TABIh 7! THE 196 CITIES CF GBREANY USED AS A
SAEPLE FOR TH; ETUDY CP TLE U481” SCCIA} BA? 8 CF NAZISX
AND COXMUNISV,“ BY SIZE OF CITY AND RIIITARY OCCUPATION
20555.

 

line of City yopuhuon 7.11.: Vote Vote For Partie,
. 19354:- July, 1932,! Nasi Ccusunist

Total 2 Total ‘

(Thous.) (Thous.) (Thane) ixhflflli

American'done

(Pop. over 100,000) ,
Augsburg 177 94 22 26 12 16
,Prankfurt 556 551 128 59 45 14
Karlsruhe 160 100 57 4O 9 10
tassel 196 104 44 45 12 11
Mains 145 86 26 51 11 15
Hannheim 275 155 45 29 64 22
lunchen 766 696 114 29 61 16
Nurnberg 410 252 95 68 62 15
Stuttgart 415 224 61 27 57 16
niesbaden 160 98 45 46 12 12
hursburg 101 54 12 26 4 9
(Pop. 50,000-100,000)
Bsnbera 54 5O 12 17 1 06
Darmstadt 95 56 26 47 5 07
Heidelberg 86 52 21 41 5 11
Heilbronn 60 28 7 26 2 11
Offenbach 81 50 14 29 6 14
' Pfcrsheim 90 44 21 48 -6 16
Regsnsburg 51 45 9 20 4 09
Ulm, A.D. 52 54 14 4O 2 06
Furth 77 46 17 69 6 14
(Pop. 25,000-50,000)
Amberg 27 14 6 26 1 10
Aschsffenburg 66 20 4 22 l 6
Bayreuth 57 22 12 56 1 4

 

E Statistisches Jathuch {Fur Des Defitsohe H.105, VerIag

Fur Socialpoiitfl, '51. r6666 aft Und Statistik, Paul Schsidt,

berlin 3t 69, 1937, Table 6, pp. 12-15. Data for 1955.

# Baupterrebnisse der Wahlsn Zum Reichstag, An 51. Juli,
1932. (Berlin. 1932).

271

APPENDIX 1151; 7 CONTINUED
Popu1atlon 75115 .ote Vote for FarEIee
Home of City 1955 July. 1952# Nasi Communist

(Thoue.) (Thou5.) Total $ Total f
(ThougifiKThouaJ

 

Coburg 29 16 9 59 1 4
Erlengen 52 17 7 59 1 5
Reelingen 45 24 v 29 4 18
Fulde 26 16 6 20 2 16
Gieeeen 56 21 10 '49' 1 7
Beneu 41 25 8 64 7 64
"”Hot 44 26 15 .51 ~ 1 9
Kempton 26 16 4 '66 1 9
Lendlhut 51 17 4 .24 1 7
Ludviz-burg- 54 16 e 59‘ 2 14
lnrburs 28 16 8 .55 1 5
Peleeu 25 12 4 62 1 9
Sohveinfurt 4o 23 7 31 2 10
Streubing 26 12 6 25 2 17
Ingoletedt 29 14 4 61 2 11
Britggh Zone
op. over 100,000)
Aeohen 166 97 14 18 26 20
Altone 242 146 56 68 29 19
Blelefe1d 121 79 25 62 7 6
Boohun 615 182 56 29 68 21
Braunaohweig 167 102 44 46 11 11
Dortmund 541 619 66 20 89 2B
Duieberg-Bamborn 440 262 64_ 27 66 27
Dusseldorf 498 291 84 29 75 26
Eeeen 654 575 90 24 94 25
Geleenkirchen 655 177 41 25 55 6O
Hagen (WSTF) 14R 85 28 66 22 26
Hembure 1,129 701 255 66 129 16
Hennover 444 299 116 40 27 9
Herburg-Wilhemsg. 115 70 21 29 14 21
Kiel 219 157 65 46 16 11
Koln 757 416 101 24 91 22
Krefeld 165 97 29 60 16 16
Lubeck 156 P5 64 41 .7 9
lulheim 155 77 25 52 17 22
Y—Gladbach 204 111 50 27 6 21
Huneter 122 65 16 26 6 6
Oberhausen 192 101 25 25 24 25
Remecheid 301 ‘6 25 40 21 64
5011ngen 140 90 61 64 66 69
“uppertel 409 260 111 46 58 22

Bremen 625 164 55 60 25 14

 

APPENDIX TABLE 7 C(NTINUED 272
Populatlon Valid Vote VoEe Tor FarEIes

 

 

Name of City 1966 July, 1962 Nazi Communist
(Thous.) (Thoue.) Totsl ‘ Total X
(Thougfl SThoggl
Bonn 99 52 12 22 6 l2
Bottr0p 86 42 7 17 14 56
Cestrop-Rauxel 58 61 6 18 9 29
Plensburg 67 57 17 46 4 10
Gledbeok 61 60 6 21 7 25
Beam. ‘ 84 61 9 50 6 11
Horne 99 54 12 25 17 6
fiildesheim. 65 59 16 64 2 05
Neuss 56 29 7 24 6 21
Oldenburg 66 62 15 46 6 10
Osnsbruok 94 56 20 66 6 06
> Reoklinghausen 87 46 11 24 11 24
5snne-Eickel 92 51 14 28 16 62
Wettensohled 62 65 7 19 10 28
hesermunde 77 44 16 28 5 12
Witten 76 46 14 60 8 17
tilhelmsheven 77 42 16 48 6 05
(Pop. 25,000-50,000)
Ahlen 25
Booholt 55 17 2 10 2 14
Oelle 28 16 7 41 2 12
Bremerhaven 26 15 5 61 2 l4
Cuxheven 26
Dolmenhorst 62 15 6 64 2 l6
Dinslaken 26
Duren 40
Emden 54 18 7 44~ 6 18
Esohweiler 56 '
Godesberg, BAD 28
Gottingen 47 28 14 61 2 7
Gutersloh 26
Hameln 28 17 8 46 1 6
Herford 59 15 9 59 l 6
Herten 54
Ieerlohn 54 22 7 56 4 19
Leverkusen 44
11111521150136 (J 313 {’2 7 60 5 21
. unobqu 51 R ' '7 4O 2 16
Lunen 46 25 5 18 7 29
Marl 62 '
Minden 29
Moern 29
Ncumuneter 4O 25 10 59 6 12
Federborn 67
Aheine 52
dheinhausnn 68
biegen 66 18 7 41 l 12
Stolbarr 30

Velbert 32

APPENDIX TABIE 7 CCNTINUED 276

 

1—7 Population“Valld Vote VOte Fir Partlee

 

Name of City 1955 July, 1952 Nazi Communist
(Thous.) (Thoue.) 'Total % Total 1
_L3hou Thous
Vieraen 64 19 4
Wandebek 46 29 10 55 5 17
Eurth 29
French Zone
(Pop. over 100,000)
Ludwigeharen 107 59 18 50 10 17
(Pop. 50,000-100,000)
Preiburg 99 58 17 50 _ 5 08
Keieerlautern 65 58 17 45 6 15
' Koblenz 65 66 16 67 ‘ 6 09
Trier 77 59 9 25 5 12
Horne ' 51 50 12 69 ‘ 5 15
(Pope 25.000-50.000) :
Baden-Baden 60 19 6 6O 2 10
Prenkenthal 26 15 4 29 2 12
numbers 27
Ken-tens 5 2O 6 29 2 11
Kreuxnach, BAD 27
Fir-neon: 47 27 15 49 6 22
Reutlingen 5 19 5 25 2 12
Speyer 28 16 4 -27 2 11
Tubingen 29 12 ' 5 4O 1 6
Rue-inn Zone
"Op. 0"? 100,000) ,
Beuthen 0.8. 101 50 15 61 9 19
Breeleu. 625 574 162 45 69 10
Chennitl 551 212 89 42 49 21
Dresden 642 599 151 68 55 16
Errurt 145 84 56 46 20 26
Olevits 111 57 21 56 9 9
Hello A.S. 209 124 51 41 52 26
fiindenburg 0.8. 160 69 19 27 22 9
lonigeberg 516 171 76 44 264 2O
Leipzig ~ 716 440 142 62 89 2O
legdeburg 507 196 74 68 24 12
Plauen 114 68 54 ~61 15 22
Stettin 271 149 62 42 24 16
(Pop. 50,000-100.000) A
Brandenburg 64 41 '16 69 4 11
Cottbue 52 64 15 44 2 6
Dene-u 91 54 25 45 6 6
Elbing 72 41 18 42‘ 7 17
Frankfurt (Oder) 76 46 25 49 5 11
Core 84 55 20 58 6 12
Gorlit: 94 60 25 42 4 7
Belberebadt 50 60 15 44 4 28
Jena 58 5 ll 52 6 18

 

APPEHBEX TABIE 7 CONTINUED 274
Ponulation valid Vote vote for Fartiee
Name of City 1955 July, 1952 Nazi Communist
(Thoue.) (Thoua.) Total 1 Total 1
(Thong) (Thoue

 

 

 

wLiegnitz 77 ’47 22 48 2
Potsdam 79 44 18 41 5 7
Ratibor 52 26 9 65 2 4
Roetock 95 55 21 58 5 9
Schwerin 56 61 15 46 l 4
Til-it 57 29 15 46 7 26
heldenburg 66 ‘ 28 10 56 4 l6
Zwiokeu 85 50 22 45 7 14

(Pop. 25,000-50,000) .

Allenatein 45 2O 7 66 2 11
Altenburg 44 28 9 64 2 6

_Apolde 28 16 8 50 6 17
Anchoreleben 29 17 7 41 6 61
hue 26 16 7 42 4 22
Bnutzen 42 25 10 42 6 11
Bernburg 59 24 10 42 a 10
Brieg 50 17 8 44 1 6
Burg. ' 25 16 5 66 2 46
Crimmitahau 28 18 8 42 6 16
Eberewelde 65 19 , '9 42 6 18
Eieenach 45 27 10 57 6 24
Foret 58 25 10 68 6 12
Preiberg 5 22 11 50 l 8
Preital 57 24 5 22 6 25
Furetenwalde 25
Glauchau 51 19 8 46 6 18
Glogau 28 16 7 41 1 7
Gothe 49 26 12 47 7 28
Griefewald 29 16 8 46 2 14
Greiz 4O 26 11 46 6 12
Grunberg 25 15 6 69 2 14
Guben 25 15 10 56 4 11
Birehberg 51 18 9 48 1 7'
Ineterburg 41 21 9 44 6 16
Koalin 6 17 6 67 2 14
Kothen 27 17 8 48 l 4
Kolberg 54 21 9 44 6 l4
Lendaberp 46 27 12 46 6 10
Luokenwalde 26
Harienburp 25
leis-en 47 50 10 55 5 9
Herseburz 62 17 7 67 4 26
Iulhaueen 29 22 10 45 5 21
Neumburg A.h.‘ 5 19 '9 46 5 l6
Neiale 55 19 4 26 2 10
Nordhaueen 58 22 10 45 2 10
Nowawee 29
Oppoln 45 24 8 52 5 52
Pirna 64 19 6 54 5 26

 

APPENDIX TABLE '7 C(N'i‘INL’L‘D 2'75
FopuBation VhliH’Vote ‘Vote for Parties

 

 

Name of City 1€55 July, 1952 Nazi Communist
(Thou8.) (Thous.) Total % Total %
(Thong) LThoug

Quodlifiburg 28 17 9' 52 1

' Radabuel 55
Rathenow 29 18 6 62 6 15
Roichenbach 62 ‘21 8 59 6 15
Risa: f 26 ‘ 16 5 61 2 12
Schneidamuhl 45 24 12 51 2 9
Schonebeck 55
Schweidnltz 64 20 .8 42 1 5
Stafgard 56 18 8 45 5 17
Standal 62 2O 8 41 1 55
Stolp 45 24 7‘10 42 2 8
Stralaund 44 25 12 49 2 8
Weinnr 49 28 ' 15 45 6 12
Weinlonfola 4O '24 9 58 7 29
hiamar 27 17 6 66 6 16
,Wittonborgo 25 16 7 41 2 61
Zoitz . 66 26 10 42 6 15
Zittau 4O 22 9 4O 6 14

£2 Zone

r n >4

 

APP}... ...III '3
NOTE} 037 K? XXIOD

The doaoription or the sample in chnptér III and
‘pcrtinent paragraphs throughout tho text adequately
daséribo the nathnd. '20 review again thy generalamQUh-
06. it is anough to say that proportions of people in
. 96106506 300181 mum. mm were correlataci with the m-
portion: of vnto 1n onch.city for the various political
partion. The formula usad was a modified fearson pro-
duct'mom6ntl typo. It roads:

fax ~ (24E;

“/63 ~ (in)! 24/83.. (2:02;

 

An outline. of the procedura follows: (2010061011
02 6091c 8333365) 4

1. Canernl‘roading in statistical tvvatmene of
:olitlccl be nvior.

2. ‘1tP 1 roiflinfl on Gornpny, particularly
'3-31.“ 4 +7 an] «”015495

, F; "1rt3€)n of ou*15nn.
Q. anssti" tion to aon 1f anQrialn naodod
6} 31‘ Wl o“’11n0 80.1911? were avatlfiblbg

LA ‘
‘4 AA.

4. H. A: allies and Joorgo Enodocor. Com mletaggm and
Ladhine wiamzl tio , Amos, wIawa, 1951. p.

 

202.3800 >555 024 . . \ . \
mum >m zioxm mmEo zqzqmm
no udsam wx» ...o 20:30:. mr. f
uuonuooowu 3.”. .

.00 0.00700an mm 9.” o

.w . r. .
“mo: co 08.8 $7,... . 240-mmzq ./.

almow... ZOPQJ‘dLu . l .

.w ‘ . ..217/