M‘WH» ‘ AN INVESTIGATION OF THE CAUSES of INSTABlLITY IN SYRIAN POLITICS THESIS to: rife neonate!- M.A;;A MKHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY ; NA VAN “NA-'2' 'R-“531N-A-K-FOQE .. ‘nb- o c .‘ ’H AN HQVLJI iGATiL-fin L11? T113: CAL-Sufi» LE INSIAEIIJTY (i [ii iYRIAI" I‘ULITICS V An Abstract of a thesis {resented to the .F'acuity of the impart-meat of Political Science Bgichman iiu’tate University In partial fulf 111:2}..th of the Requirements for the Degree E’alaater of Arts by Sim-nan Piazir HalifOOP January, 1955 "§ 143 In her first ten years of independence, Syria had passed through a series of coup d'etats witnessing violent changes of leadership. I-ier constitutional life was suspended on two occasions by two military leaders. The army became so involved in politics to the extent that five coup d'etats were staged in a period of four years. The whole independ- ence period could be characterized as one of instability and chaos. In this thesis an attempt is made to investigate the causes of this situation. One of the causes was the lack of experience in self-government on the part of Syrian leaders. V. hen independence was won in 1946, those who came to power were nationalist leaders who had bravely fought the French and refused to c00perate with them. Until then, their life was spent majorily in resistance movements rather than governmental work. They were not adequately prepared for their new role. A second cause of instability was itself cussed by two major de- velopments in the Arab world. The rivalry between the Hashimites and the Egyptian-Saudi Camp for the leadership of the Arab world was in- tensified after the formation of the Arab League. Syria became the tar- get and battle ground of their rivalries. Their continuous meddling in her domestic and foreign affairs contributed greatly to her instability. The second major development in the area was the Arab-Israeli War in which the Syrians, together with other Arabs, lost face and prestige. The nationalist regime was considered reaponsi‘ole for loosing the war and was forced out of power. The Army, which staged the coup d'etat, 144 set up a precedent which was resorted to four times in the four years to follow. The third major cause of instability is the lack of consensus among Syrian leaders and political parties on certain vital issues rela- ting to the nature and role of government. The distribution of power among the different branches and agencies of government, the position of the church in the state, the economic and social functions of government and many others are issues that have not yet been settled. "r: ith the lack of experience on the part of its personnel, the V _ .3 {neu- diing of its neighbors in its own affairs and the complexities of the problems, the government was expected by the people to do the impossible in the shortest possible time. It was expected to turn Syria into a fully modern progressive and democratic state after living for ages under an under developed feudal and autocratic system. Impatient with slow work, the Syrians were forcing one government after another out of power. Their concept of change was reduced simply to change in top governmental personnel. lghcnever things went wrol g, they blamed it on the govern- ment. Changes in government always brought with them new hopes of a change in the situation. After ten years of experience in this techni— que, it is hoped that the Syrians realized their mistake. The task of building up a country is one that requires hard and patient work on the part of the maple as well as the rulers. AN INVESTIGATIQN OF THE CAUSL‘S OF INSTABILITY IN SYRIAN OLI’I‘ICS A thesis Presented to The Faculty of the Department of Political Science Iviichigan State Univer ity In partial fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Raster of Arts by Naznan Nazir Nakfoor January 1356 ”Au w. '1 H 3... TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION..................... iii Chapter I. HistoricalBackground . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Struggle for Independence Prior to the Mandate The Mandate ' The Winning of Independence Political Parties and Political Activities in the Period 1920-43 11. Inter-ArabRelations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Prospects of Unity Prior to World War 11 World War II and Arab Unity The Formation of the Arab League Syria's Independence vs Unity Plans The Final Stage, 1949 to 1954 III. in Search for Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 The Zaim Regime Hinnawi's Regime Shishakly's Regime Political Parties The Moslem Brotherhood The Socialist COOperative Party The Syrian Social Nationalist Party The PeOple's Party The Nationalist Party The Arab Renaissance Socialist Party The Communist Party General Observations Classification of Parties IV. Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 APPENDK O O I I O O O O O O O O C O O O O O O O O O O 130 BIBLImRAPHY O O O O I O O O O O O O O O O O O l O O O 136 II; Til-OD CC TIGN In a period of thirty years Syria was ruled by one King, a foreign power, a number of civilian native governments, and three mili- tary dictators. L'uring the same period she had adapted four different constitutions. Under the native constitutional rule cabinets were changed at the rate of one every six months. One ruling clique followed another, all searching with little success for a panacea to the complicated problems of that small country. The question of why Syria was unable to find the solution to her problems poses a challenge to any one interested in the political deveIOpment of this country. This thesis is an attempt on the writer's part to face this challenge. It should, however, be made clear from the beginning that the at- tempt was not, by all means, successful. The reasons for this are many: 1. Very little has been published in "western languages about Syria. The collecting of material for this work was one of the greatest obstacles with which the writer was confronted. 2. Nothing has been written by individuals who took an active part in the internal and external affairs of Syria. Many of those leading per- sonalities passed away without leaving their memoirs or diaries and we shall never hear from them. Those who are still living: have not yet pub- lished any wori—z. In addition, the hula of the official documents of the government have not been released nor have they leaked out. 5. The complicated nature of the problems and issues involved is another source of difficulty. This was best illustrated by the words of one writer on the subject who said, ”If those who Speak or write about political conditions in the Arab states in general and Syria in particular sometimes seem confused or occasionally contradict themselves, it may be because there are confusing factors and contradictory indications in the situation itself. itiistrust, rather, the Speaker or writer who makes it all sound very simple and logical for he is probably guilty of over- simplification. "1 Instead of being discouraged by these handicaps, the writer was, rather, intrigued by and attracted to the subject. It is heped that this work will help in shedding a ray of light on certain aspects of the political life of this small country. The work is divided into four chapters. Chapter I covers the historical background preceeding the period under discussion. Although the emphasis is on the period 1945-55, a treatment of the period from the beginning of the twentieth century is es- sential if one is to understand the mentality of some of the ruling elite who began their political life at that time and have played a leading role in the politics of the country during the period under study. Not only the men- tality of the ruling elite was influenced by the past but, also, many of the problems that will be treated are deep rooted in it. Chapter II deals with the regional problems of the Arab world and their impact on the course of events in Syria. This includes the Arab League and other schemes of unification prOposed from time to time. There is definite evidence that such regional affairs have played a leading role in the domestic political life of Syria. Chapter III deals with political leadership. Here the different political groups striving for leadership on the political scene will be discussed. Political parties and their programs will be fully analysed. The political and social orientation of such groups, together with the phio lOSOphies and ideologies guiding their actions, will be treated. This naturally leads to the tepic of Vi esternization and its impact on Syria's political institutions and life. The role of the army in politics will be portrayed since the army is one of the many groups striving for leadership. Chapter IV consists of summary and conclusions. A useful source of material was the Official Journal of the Syrian Republic in which all the laws, legislative decrees and ministerial orders are published. The Journal also records the parliamentary debates of the Syrian Legislature of which extensive use has been made. The Journal is a weekly published in Arabic and all the issues from 1946-54 have been reviewed by the writer. Other sources consisted of articles published in a number of Journals and periodicals. For factual data extensive use was made of the New York Times and Les Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain, a French periodical. Books written on Syria for this period are few. All that are available have been consulted. r .- -7' . :~v\~ 34 ~ . .13: I 11.4%.:- c 155 __l‘~_ "P? a as w '1stezr‘i-; at \ as in the int reduction. so: the cf the .3 J " . I.‘ « ‘ I ‘ *z :1; t what; is ;.-. . ,. '. 9:.. i ‘l ffidlltiufii s has dilbddj been snag-:ztiosen ' “1'. J5 basic preblu .3 of tyria are rooted in tea perimt sauces '. i the center of interest. .‘aorslzwer. $131116 of the leading Lyr' res started their gssziticai careers in this period. {his chapter is written to clarify these presiems and to give an understanding of the 5’7 'f‘ ‘ liken: bat aground of same iii Lissa leaders. difficdlt to set a date in the histury sf syr‘a she-re fits events 0" every ail relations mil: the past are C0mplifttziy cut off. gwriod have their tests in the area.ee:*i;‘.5 ose and hiat-ury is a centiswaus l" he date Lilflfiifiil fer Law has -.;g;;ruund 333%.:1‘31313 is the beginning 0! ' .flla-thé v. “ L's process. it was at this time that .'.-_:;.-xria.=ris began filOi‘JiliIlug hm.- pend .. the Twentieth cunt-dry. their efforts sad organizing themselves for the sass o is tie: . that they learned the priz‘uriples .11 ii at {m east: from the Turks. Of Lie french fietz-oi'ltim’t and attezizpted to practice theta“. at heme. F'tratswle fer Independent-e finer he the facsimil- no. “4-:— _“ “a A — ._._' The contact of E‘yria with the est came much earlier than the l arty in the seventeenth century he; flexing 0! has "i' .. li'lizlr activities a: id‘s a rem-h miasimzarica began in settie is le’n.”£tlctil century. limited in scope due to the persecution of me fireman government. I: (rhea. 1 C d in lei-ll. ‘ it was under the rule of Leét.stza.x1;fz..ed Jill a .fi. ri'mz‘it‘ai‘is first arrive 2 (1853-40) that French and American missionaries started to carry out their activities on a larger scale. These early contacts between the native Syrians on one hand, and the French and Americans on the other, resulted in a movement for the revival of the Arabic language. This movement was partly motivated by the missionaries' desire to utilize the language in order to study the native culture and, partly, by the natives' desire to use the language as a tool for the reviving of their culture and heritage. The early literary societies which were formed soon began to engage in political activities. Ibrahim Yazigi, a member of the Syrian Scientific Society established in 1857, composed a poem which was considered to be the first call for Syrian unity and the germ of Syrian nationalism. 3 It was at the Syrian Protestant College, now the American Univer- sity of Beirut, that the first movement aimed at independence was or- ganized in 1875. The first five initial members were all Christians, but were later on joined by members of all religious creeds. The society, a secret and revolutionary one in nature, had its headquarters in Beirut and branches in Damascus, Tripoli, and Sidon. Can one of the placards that the members used to hang on the walls at night, the following state- ment was once found: “By the sword may distant aims be attained; seek with it if you mean to succeed. "4 The platform of the society consisted of: 1. The grant of independence to Syria in union with Lebanon-5 2. The recognition of Arabic as an official language in the country; 3 3. The removal of the censorship and other restrictions on the freedom of expression and the diffusion of Knowledge; 4. The employment of locally recruited units for local military service only. ‘5 The platform is a careful blend of V3 estern innovation and native require- ments, a process which has continued to manifest itself in Syrian politics ever since. Aside from awakening the national feeling on a small scale the movement achieved nothing. It survived for few years and finally dis- banded. Sultan Addul-ilarnid succeeded to the Ottoman throne at the time when some educated elements of his Empire were pressing for reform and some sort of constitutional rule. Under pressure from European powers he promulgated a constitution in 1876. Soon afterwards the Russo- Turiiish war began and the Sultan used it as an excuse to suspend the con- stitution. His action resulted in the disappointment of the intellectual elite of the Empire, Turks and Arabs alike. The period 1877-1908 was one in which Arabs joined hands with Turks in the fight against the despo- tism of the Sultan. 7 On the 24th of July, 1908, the Sultan was forced by a military group of his own army to restore the constitution, and in 1909 the same group forced him to abdicate. The group which led this coup d'etat became Known as the Committee on Union and Progress. This change of government in ConstantinOpIe was joyfully received in every part of the Empire, including Syria. It was not long, however, 4 until the Young Turks began to reveal their true policy of i—‘an-Turanism with little or no regard to the rights and interests of the non-Turkish ele- ments of the Empire. In the first elections under-the new regime, con- stituencies were apportioned in such a manner as to favor the Turkish elements. Not only did they manage to elect a majority of Tur'i-zs where . there was no Turkish majority, but they also managed to elect a great majority of their nominees through the control of the electoral machine. 8 Syrian and other Arab nationalists: became convinced that the Young Turks were no more eager to fulfill their aspirations for autonomy and self-government than their predecessor Abdul-Hamid and that they had to do it for themselves by themselves. A score of societies were established, some in secret some in the Open. They were not exclusively Syrian societies, but Arab societies in which Syrians together with other Arab nationalists were working together. It is necessary to mention a few words about each of the leading ones. 9 Al-M‘ountada al-Arabi (The Literary Club) was founded in Con- stantinoizle under the leadership of z-‘xbdul-Hamid Zehraoui in 1909. The members were mainly students, government officials and men of letters. The rank and file membership was predominently recruited from students all over the Arab countries. Its main political aim was the achievement of Arab independence. Al-ia-fimrkaeiah (The Decentralization Party) was founded in Egypt in 1912 and had numerous branches in Syria and Iraq. Although the headquarters were in huyot the founders were all Syrians by 5 nationality. Their aim was not complete separation with the Ottoman Empire, but rather, the decentralization of administration so that the Arab countries might obtain a certain degree of local self-govcrmnent. The party itself was highly centralized with the control vested in a Com- mittee of Twenty. Al-Qahtaniya was established in ConstantinOple in 1809. Among its leading members were a number of high ranking Arab officers in the Turkish army. It was a secret society and great care was taken in the choosing of its members. he society's program aimed at creating an independent Arab kingdom which would be linked with the Ottoman Empire which would become a ‘I‘urko-Arab Empire similar in structure to the Austin-Hungarian Empire. it is hiteresting to note hat some Young Turks were in favor of practically the same scheme. In one of his speeches at Damascus in 1914, Djeznal Pasha, Commander of the Fourth Turkish Army said, Ir2G entlemen, the programme for the welfare of the Arabs which our party means to carry out in its entirety is more comprehensive than anything you can imagine. I, myself, am not one of those who think it a harmful or dangerous thing that the two races, Arab and Turkish, should secure their unity while remaining separate nations, subject to the same ifhalif. "10 It is to be remembered, however, that such a con- cession on the part of the Turks came during the war and was meant to appease the Syrian nationalists and secure their support. Due to the betrayal of one of its members and because of} its secretive nature, the society was dissolved without contributing anything to the Arab cause. 6 Jamiyat al-Arahiya al-Fatat (The Young Arab Society) was founded in Paris in 1911. The founders were seven Arab students study- ing in Paris. Its aim was to achieve Arab independence. The founders were extreme nationalists and the society could be labelled as the most radical of them all. In 1913 its headquarters moved to Beirut and in 191.4 to Damascus. It played an important role during ‘.‘e.éorl' "viar I in allying Syrian public opinion on the side of the allies against the Turks. Due to its secret nature, membership did not exceed two hundred. These were the four leading societies but other minor ones were also founded. If one is to consider these societies as the embryos of political parties in Syria, which is a Fn'r assumption. the following im- portant remarks should be made: 1. In most of these societies the students played a major role. In the case of Al-Fatat they, themselves, took the initiative. This is a phenomenon in Syrian politics which still exists up to present day. One possible explanation of this phenomenon is that students are much more exposed to ‘wi estern Cultures and ideas and become more interested in adapting them. Another explanation might be that students do not have enough social activities and sports that might keep them busy. Instead they direct all their youthful energies to politics. 2. In one of these societies, at least, army officers played a major role. Again the interest of the military in politics still manifests itself in Syria to the present day. The series of coups and counter coups that took place in the country 1949-54 is a definite evidence of the army's interest in politic s. '7 6. Membership in these societies in all cases was small and highly exclusive. In the case of the two secret ones this is perfectly natural, but in the case of the others it seems to reflect a trend which is still characteristic of political parties of today. Very little effort is made by party leaders to extend their work to the grass roots of society, to the masses. 4. None of the societies had more than one item on its platform; namely, Syrian independence. This was also the case of political parties formed during the French mandate period. Political parties existing in 1945, when Syria achieved its full independence were, virtually left with- out a platform and they hastily composed them ulth very little thought or planning. Such was the situation in Syria and the Arab world when V. orld war I broke out in 1914. The war presented the Syrians with an opportun- ity to free themselves from Ottoman domination. Late in 1914, the Turks declared v. ar on the lintente Powers and it became obvious that the Arabs had only one course to follow, that of joining the Lntente. A number of their leaders started negotiating with the French directly, 11 but the major- ity preferred to negotiate with the Brittish and selected for that purpose Em lr Hussein of Mecca to become their Spokesman. 12 $1111? l-lussein started his negotiations with Sir iienry i‘tiaciviehon, the British High Com- missioner at Cairo, in June 1315. 13 In his first letter to the High Commis- sioner, Hussein, as a price for his support to the Brittish, asked that Great Britain acknowledge the independence of all the Arab portion of the 8 Ottoman Empire. The boundaries of this area, as set by Hussein him- self, were as follows:' ”on the North by the line litersinau-‘idana to parallel L7 it. and thence along the line Birejik-Urfa-Z’Vlardin-:‘i'iidiat- Jazirat-Amadia to the Persian frontier; on the East by the Persian frontier to the Persian Gulf; on the South, by the Indian Ocean (with the e;-..c1usion of Adana whose status will remain as it is); on the \«i eat, by the Red Sea and the hiediterranean Sea back to Liersin. "4 4 Iv". acMahon was hesitant to agree to these claims, but, when pressed further, he conceded Hussein's claims in the area, with the ex- clusion of the districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and the portions of Syria lying to the '7."-,."est of the districts of Damascus, Horns, Hams. and Aleppo on the basis that such districts could not be considered purely Arab. Machiahon made the reservation that His Majesty's Government would accept Hussein's claims only to those portions in which she was free to act without detriment to her ally France. It was also made very clear to Hussein throughout this correSpondence that France had certain interests in Syria which she was determined to keep, and that England would not help Hussein against the French in case their interests clashed in the future. Being aware of the Turks intentions to depose him, Hussein was willing to compromise by deferring the settlement of the disputed portions till after the end of the war. The French must have suspected some sort of an agreement be~ tween the Arabs and the British so they insisted on reaching an agreement with Great Britain on the future of the Cttoman Empire. This agreement, 9 I" > v" ‘t ‘ . ' ~ ‘ r reached in may 19%., became anown as the Sykes-Picot Agreement. 1° Under its luv ms the western part of Syria went to France, and the Vilayats of baghdad and Basra to Great Britain. Roth nations were to be free to establish such direct or indirect administration or control as they desired or as they might deem fit to establish after agreement with the Arab State or Confederation of Arab States. Palestine was to be in- ternationalized. In the rest of the area there was to be established one Arab state or a confederation of Arab states where France and Great Britain were to have divided Spheres of influence. When the war ended in 1918 Great Britain found herself in an em- barrasing situation with her pledges to the Arabs and her agreement with the French basically in conflict. V. hat happened in the Paris Peace Con- ference with respect to the Arab world was, in essence, a triangular struggle with the Arabs struggling for full independence, the French fight- ting for a privileged position in Syria and Great Britain playing the role of a compromiser. In Lloyd George‘s" own words the British position was as follows, "This put us in a very awkward position, as we were friends with the French, but also friends with the Arabs who had fought gallantly on our side against the Turks and contributed materially to our victory. It was therefore entirely in our interest that the French and the Arabs should get on better terms with one another. ‘ 1" Faisal, Hussein's son, who led the Northern Campaign of the Area revolt, together with the famous Lawrence of Arabia/made two trips to EurOpe for the purpose of presenting the Arab case to the Peace Conference. Faisal was not able to gain full independence for the peOples he represented 10 because France had specific claims to that part of the world, and Great Britain could not make up her mind whether to support him or support the French. The only major power which was not involved in this problem was the United States. in an attempt to adhere to his own Fourteen Points, President V. ilson insisted on the consultation of the peeples of that area as to the type of government they wished to have. He suggested the form- ation of a commission of inquiry to visit the disputed areas and assess the desires of the indigenous population. Both France and Great Britain accepted the idea. The commission was to be composed of representa- tives from the U. S. , Great Britain, France and Italy. All except France appointed their delegates. 17 Fearing that participating in the comm is- sion without France might provoke further unpleasentness, Great Britain decided to withdraw and so did Italy. 13 President ti ilson, nevertheless, decided to send a purely American commission which became known as the King-Crane Commission. At the time that the King-Crane Commission was conducting its inquiry in Syria, a Syrian Congress met in Damascus on April 7, 1919, to deliberate on the type of government for Syria. On March 7, 1920, the Congress met again and declared Syria an independent constitutional monarchy with Faisal as the first King. 19 The declaration was intended to frustrate the plans of the Allies who were scheduled to meet soon and settle the question. It was thought by the Svrian political leaders that U such an action would face the Allies with a fait—accompli and would force l 1 them to think twice before agreeing on any other scheme. 2“) The Supreme Allied Council, nevertheless, met in San Remo, Italy, and decided in April, 1920, to place Syria under French mandate. The formal treaty legalizing the mandate is known as the Treaty of Sevres signed on the 10th of August, 1920. 21 Articles 94-97 covered the mandate for Syria, iv'IeSOpotamia, and Palestine. Article 94, paragraph I, read as follows: “The High Contracting parties agree that Syria and Meso- potamia shall, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of article 22, part I (Covenant of the Leage of Nations), be provisionally recognized as independent states subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by manda- tory until such time as they are able to stand alone. “ Signatories to the Treaty were: United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, The Union of South Africa, India, France, Italy, Japan, Armenia, Belgium, Holland, Poland, Czechoslovaaia, and Turkey. I-l'edjaz was supposed to be represented, but did not send any delegates, neither did she Sign the treaty. The mandate for Syria and Lebanon came defini- tively into force on September 29, 1923. The period that followed the San Berna agreement until the actual occupation of Damascus by the French in July, 1920 was one of anarchy and chaos in Syria. The French were clashing with the natives constantly and the situation was moving from bad to worse. Faisal was aware of the fact that the French would enforce the mandate by arms, if necessary. "No one, " he said, i is under any illusions regarding the aims of the French policy, which is to create trouble through the country, make my task in the Eastern zone impossible, then intervene with their army and impose their will by force of arms upon the entire nation. "22 Feeling that 12 he was not strong enough militarily to meet the French forces, he was willing to reach an agreement, and he expressed his readiness to revisit EurOpe and resume his negotiation with the concerned powers, but General Gouraud, then French High Commissioner in Svrianlocked his wish. 23 On July 14, 1920, the General sent Faisal a four days' ultimatum demanding five concessions, of which the acceptance of the mandate by the Syrians was the most important. 24 Faisal asked for two days exten- tion which was granted. Five hours before the expiration of the ultimatum Faisal cabled Gouraud his acceptance of its terms, but Gouraud never acknowledged its receipt. He sent him a much stronger ultimatum. Fee1~ ing that he had compromised enough, Faisal and his entuorage decided to resist French pressure at the expense of an armed clash. 25 On July 24, the two forces clashed in Maysaloun where the Syrians suffered a bad defeat and on the 25th, the French tr00ps entered Damascus. Faisal was ordered by the French to leave the country which he did on the 28th. Thus ended the short independent regime in Syria, the first in al- most iour centuries. The reaction of the Syrians to the course of events, and particularly to the attitude of the big powers, was extremely bitter and resentful. If one has to trace the origin of what might be called the distrust and dislike of foreigners by Middle Easterners he may choose this period as the starting point. The deposed King was well liked and P“He has never been forgotten in Syria. Too short for positive achievement, his regime has aroused enthusiasm and loyalty throughout the country. His government had had more solid foundations in the popular consent than any per- haps since the Ummayad time. The generation which remembered Faisal could nelfer forgive the French, nor give to their rule more than a forced acquiescence. "25 There is no single event which has had more influence upon the history and politics of Syria than the treatment which the country received at the Paris Peace Conference. It has influenced Eyrian politics in two very important ways. First, it created so much dissappointment that the Syrians have never since trusted the EurOpeans. The nationalist movement, which drew on western principles and institutions for guidance, «as slowly transformed into a bitter, anti—Vi estern and chauvanistic group. The present foreign policy of Syria cannot be understood unless there is an awareness of the psychological impact of this period. 27 The second way in which the peace settlement influenced Syrian politics can be considered as a natural outcome of that mentioned above. As a result of this betrayal by the iii/est, the Syrians never acimowiedged the French mandate, nor did they show any interest in c00perating with the French authorities. The policy followed by their political leaders was one of passivity and resistance. The efforts which could have been directed toward construction and deveIOpment of the country were mainly consumed in fighting the French. The Syrian leaders were not hesitant to make it quite clear to the French that they would fight them until they left their country. In his very first meeting with Syrian leaders General Gouraud was told by one of them that his stay in the government palace would not be very long. 23 It is granted that a number of Syrian politicians did co- Operate with the French, but the majority fought them tirelessly. 14 The mandate The mandate for Syria and Lebanon came definitively into force on September 29, 1923, and ended in May 1946. Actually, however, France was in occupation of Syria from August 1920. The story of these twenty-some years is a long and sad one. This thesis will‘limit itself only to-the study of those aspects of the mandate which left their impres- sion on the independence period. Administration The problem of how to administer Syria appears to have given the French a great deal of trouble. It was well known to the French, even before they took over, that the apoltesmen of Arab nationalism were in favor of a great Arab unity. This was manifested in the different plat- forms of the Arab societies, in the Hussein-Macrfiahon correspondence, and in the many pronouncements of Faisal in the "Peace Conference and elsewhere. Instead of reSpecting the aspirations of the Arabs, the man- date formula divided the area into a number of separate entities. Not satisfied with that, the French embarked on a policy of dividing their mandated area, Syria and Lebanon, into five separate states; Lebanon, Damascus, Aleppo, Alouite, and Djebal Druze. 29 The justification of such a division, according to the French, was that those "states were created with respect to the religious and social characteristics particular to certain pepulations. “'30 Instead of attempting to mold these different ethnic and religious groups into one national unit, France helped perpetuv ate them. This was noticed by the chairman of the Permanent Mandate l 5 Commission when he asked the French representative, "l’ifhether the mandatory power ought not to have given preference to a system of fusion rather than to a system based on separatism. ' 31 Up to 1922 each of the five states was ruled by a governor, in most cases selected from the natives, and assisted by a representative council. Feeling that such a division was not natural, the French High Commissioner in 1922 created a federal council for three of the states; Damascus, Aleppo, and Alouite. D—jebal Druze and Lebanon were not included. ‘32 The federal council was composed of 15 members with each state electing five members. In turn the council elected a president who was supposed to be a native. The federal council was a favored step toward future reunification of the divided area. It was granted the power to legislate except for a certain number of local regulations which were left to the jurisdiction of the states. For some unknown reasons the federation was dissolved by a decree dated 5 December, 1924, and was replaced by a Syrian state com- posed of the previous two states of Damascus and Aleppo. The Alouite state retained self —autonomous rule and the status of Djebal Druze re- mained as it was before. 33 It was not until 19382that both the Alouite and the Djebal Druze joined the Syrian state in what is known today as politi- cal Syria. 34 Up to that time, the three states had no connection with each other, except through the office of the High Commissioner. An evaluation of the effect of such changes in administration on the situation in Syria was made by the Permanent Mandate Commission 16. when it stated; .' "The Commission thinks it beyond doubt that these oscillations in matters so calculated to encourage the controversies so inapired by the rivalries of races, clans and religions, which are so keen in this country, to arouse all kinds of ambitions and to jeOpardize serious moral and material interests, have maintained .. - a condition of instability and unrest in the mandated territories. ""5 Aside from changes in the administrative setup of the country, the mandate was characterized by frequent change of High Commissioners. In the first five years alone, the post of the high commissioner was held by five officials, excluding Acting High Commissioners. 53 The administrative policies of the mandatory power left two main impacts on the country which were very noticeable during the period of independence. These were: 1. The autonomous status granted to L‘jebal Druze and the Alouite made their assimilation into the Syrian state later on quite difficult. Both districts were a source of trouble to the central government and created crucial problems. 2. The change of rulers and regimes became one of the most serious diseases of the Syrian body politic. Political instability in the country after French evacuation be- came the rule rather than the exception. It seems that the Syrians, be- cause of this experience under the French, received the impression that a change of rulers is always the solution of the crisis. Instead of search- ing for a practical solution for their problems, they were always looking up for a change of regimes or governments. The governments were con- stantly changing, but the problems remained unsolved. During the in- dependence period governments succeeded each other with no change in l7 policies, but were still given approval by the people with the how: that a change in personalities might be the answer to their problems. Strength of Constitutional Tradition Article one of the Mandate stipulated that France, within a period of three years from the coming into force of the 'ii‘andate, should promul- gate an organic law for Syria. ‘57 The rul’andate came into force on Septem- ber 28th, 192.5,and so S*'ria was supposed to be enjoying a constitutional life by September 29th, 1926. It was not until May 14th, 1930,that Syria had its constitution, and the years that followed witnessed a series of constitutional crises in which the constitution was suSpended on two occasions. It was after the bloody riots of 1925 that the Syrians approached the French with the desire to ‘i’forget the past and inaugurate a period of c00peration. “33 V. Ponsot, then French High Commissioner, appointed on February 12, 1928, Sheikh Taj al-Din al-i-iassani to head a provisional government for the purpose of conducting an election for a constituent assembly. Elections were held on the 24th of April, 1928, resulting in a victory for the nationalists. 39 I The Assembly, which was elected for the purpose of framing a constitution, convened on June 9, and appointed a committee which inturn selected a sub-committee to prepare the draft. The draft was ready in about two months and the Assembly met on August 9 to discuss it and vote on the articles one by one. The assembly was asked by M. Ponsot to revise six of the articles before any vote was taken. The six articles were: 18 2, 73, 74, 75, 110 and 112. 4-0 Article 2 dealt with Syrian unity; articles 73, 74, 75, and 112 dealt with the President's power to grant pardons, conclude treaties, appoint and receive diplomatic representatives, and declare marshal law’reSpectively. Article 110 dealt with the organi-- zation of the future army. if. hen the assembly refused to revise any of the six articles, M. Ponsot, on August 10, suspended it for three months and later on indefinitely. Finally, M. Ponsot had to give in, and on May 22, 19.50,he surprised every one by promulgating the original draft with some minor changes and the addition of article 116 which read in part as follows: ‘ No provisions of the present constitution is or can be in conflict with the obligations contracted by France in respect of Syria, more particularly in regard to the League of Nations. : 4‘1 ”With the promulgation of the constitution, a date was set for a general election to be held on January 22, 1951, but, due to the bloody disturbances that swept the country as a result of French intervention in the elections, the date was postponed till April, 19.;2. 42 Elections were held at that time and Syria for the first time under the mandate had a parliament of her own. The chief interest of the newly elected parliament was the termina- tion of the mandate and the basing of Franco-Syrian relations on a treaty relationship instead. Both the French and the Syrians agreed to the principle of reaching such a treaty. A draft treaty was signed on Novem- ber 16, 19.33, but due to the lacs of agreement on the form of Syrian unity, the High Commissioner again suspended the parliament on November 26. 4"" 19 It was not until 1936 that the French again decided to compromise with the nationalists. This decision was really forced on them by internal and external pressures. The year 1936 started in Syria with strikes, demonstrations and violence. The strike lasted sixty days in which French enterprises were completely boycotted, schools were closed and every thing went dead. 44 On the international scene, Mussolini occupied EthiOpia. Both France and Great Britain became aware of his threat and were willing to compromise with the nationalist forces in the hrliddle East. Furthermore, a new government took over in Paris whose head, Leon Blum, and foreign minister, Yvon Delbos, were more sympathetic toward Syria's aSpirations. 45 On March 21, 1936, a Syrian delegation left Damascus for Paris for the purpose of negotiating a treaty with the new French government. Agreement was reached and a treaty was signed by both parties in August 1936. Elections for a new parliament in Syria to study and ratify the treaty were held in November 1935, which resulted in an overwhelming victory for the nationalists. The new parliament convened on December 21, 1936) and on the second day it ratified the treaty, indicating that the Syrians were fairly satisfied with its terms. The French parliament, on the other hand, failed to ratify it and for the three years that followed, cabinets and puliment in Syria were chiefly occupied with persuading the French to do so. During this period, Syrian Prime Ministers were spending half of their time in Europe negotiating with the French. The internal situation in Syria was detoriorating and riots and disturbances took place frequently. 20 Cabinets followed one another with great rapidity. 45 Finally, the High Commissioner issued a decree suspending the parts of the constitution dealing with the organization of the legislative and executive powers, dis- solved the parliament, and handed in the executive power to a general board of directors acting under his supervision. Constitutional life re- mained suspended until 1943. According to the spirit of Articlel of the mandate charter and to various pronouncements of French officials, the mandate was designed to prepare Syria for independence and self-government. In the words of M. de Caix, accredited representative of France to the Permanent Man- date Commission and once an acting high commissioner in Syria, "The mandate is a provisional system designed to enable pepulation which, politically speaking. are still minors to educate themselves so as to arrive one day at full self-government. This presupposes that the mandatory power will gradually create native organizations in the mandated territory such as may, when complete. be able to ensure entirely the government of the country and such as may, if they carry out their duties in proper man- ner, render the intervention of the mandatory unneces- sary. "47 ' A brief look at the French record in Syria as presented above will indicate that France did not really prepare Syria to rule herself. During the 23 years or so of French Mandate. Syria had a parliament for only four years. During these four years, France, due to her disregard to Syrian aspirations, kept the parliament and the cabinets busy with negoti- ating and establishing a treaty relationship between the two parties. It is not the writer's intention to discredit French policies and behavior in 21 Syria. It is, rather, to establish the point that by the time Syria had gained her independence she did not have enough experience in self- government and constitutional practices, and France is to be blamed for that. The constitution was suspended on different occasions and with no hesitation on the part of the French High Commissioners. Parliaments were dismissed frequently and cabinets were changed with more ease than changing displays in show windows. The relative ease with which the constitution was changed three times during the period of independence, the acquiescence of the Syrian peOple to military dictatorships for five years, and the lack of respect for constitutional institutions. can only be understood, partially at least, in the view of the lack of experience in constitutional government; the very thing that France was supposed to foster in Syria during her mandatory regime. The TA inning of Independence The last phase of the struggle for independence took place during World War 11. When France fell in to the hands of Germany, Syria and Lebanon came under the control of the Vichy regime. On June 8, 1941, British and French allied forces entered the two countries for the pur- pose of liberating them. On that same day General Catroux issued a dec- laration in which he promised the two countries full independence and the termination of the mandate. 4‘8 At the same time Sir Miles Lampson, British Ambassador to Cairo, declared the support of His Majesty's Government to Catroux’s declaration. It did not take long before the Syrians discovered the real inten- tions of France and Great Britain and that they did not really mean what 22 they had promised. It was the British who first revealed their true nature. Speaking in the House of Commons on September 9, 1941, Prime Minister Churchill said, "We recognize that among all the nations in Europe the position of France in Syria is one of Special privilege, and in so far as any European countries have influence in Syria, that of France will be pre-eminent. "49 When the honorable members asked him why, he simply answered, “because that was the policy which we had decided ' This privileged position for France in Syria and Lebanon was to adopt. ‘ not recongized, however, by either the U. S. or the U. S. S. R. More- over, Syrian and Lebanese nationalists refused to accept any claim of this sort, declaring that they had never recognized the mandate to start with. 50 The promised independence was, nevertheless, granted officially on September 27, 1941, and a new government was set up in Syria. The Syrian peOple received the news with indifference because the grant of independence meant very little to them as long as constitutional life was still suspended and as long as French and British military troops were still on their soil. 51 The nationalists were insisting on the restoration of constitutional life by the recalling of the dismissed parliament or by conducting new elections. French authorities finally decided to conduct new elections on July, 1943. The returns gave the Nationalist Bloc. headed by Shukri al-Kuwatli, who was elected President, an overwhelming victory. 52 The newly elected parliament convened soon afterwards. One of its first acts was to delete Article 116 from the constitution. 53 This 23 gave Syria complete control of her political institutions. With constitu— tional life restored to the country there still remained, however, many stumbling blOcks in the way of complete independence the most significant of which were a number of administrative services that were retained under French control. One of those was the Troupes Speciales whose status in 1945 led to large scale fighting between the Syrians and the French. These troops were Syrians incorporated in the French army. Syria wanted an army of its own realizing that no independence is complete or safe with- out a national army to protect it. Syria started pressing France for the transfer of these troops to her. France refused to hand in these troops before her future relations with Syria were defined in a treaty. Syria was not ready to negotiate a treaty with France and, with both sides re- fusing to give in, the situation deteriorated into an Open fight that was stopped only by British intervention. In this struggle, the United States, who was starting to show some interest in the Middle East, stood behind the Syrians. In a note to the French provisional government, the United States warned France against using any force or applying pressure to secure a privileged position in Syria and Lebanon. 54 Although Great Britain had to intervene in favor of the Syrians, she was still ready to support certain French claims there. Churchill stated again in the l-Iouse of Commons that, “life trust that these states (Syria and Lebanon) will be firmly established by the authority of the world organization and that French privilege will also be recognized. "55 At the time when this clash between the Syrians and the French 24 was reaching a high point, the Arab countries were trying to organize the Arab League. They considered the Syrian case as a test of their power. The Syrian president made a tour of Arab countries to gain the moral support of their leaders. He visited both King Ibn Saud and King Farouk of Egypt. His visit to Egypt coincided with the time when representatives were arriving to Cairo for the first Arab Union Confer- ence. 56 Such a coincidence was not without significance. It was to re- mind the French in particular, and the Vt'est in general, that the Arabs would act in unity on issues concerning any of their member states. The press in Egypt lent a great deal of support to the Syrian case. Viith United States and Arab support behind them, the Syrians be- came more demanding. They were not satisfied now with the Troupes Speciales, but were demanding the complete withdrawal of French and British troops from their country. The Syrian government was notified of a Franco~13ritish agreement concluded on December 13, 1945, in which the two powers have decided to withdraw their tr00ps from Syria. The Syrian parliament was not satisfied with promises any more and it began putting pressure on the government to refer the question to the United Nations.. Sharp criticisms were directed against the Prime Minister and his cabinet for failing to take the necessary measures to get rid of any remaining French influence. The cabinet interpreted the attitude of the parliament as a withdrawal of confidence) so it asked for a new vote of confidence which was granted with the understanding that it adapt a tougher policy with the French. 57 25 The case was finally referred to the United Nations Security Council. 58 Syria and Lebanon jointly brought to the attention of the Council the presence of French and British troops on their soil. They said they had expected that these foreign troops would be withdrawn im- mediately on the cessation of hostilities with Germany and Japan, but that a Franco-British agreement made the withdrawal subject to condi- tions which were inconsistent with the spirit and letter of the U. N. Charter. Since France and Great Britain were parties to the dispute, the only dissenterested major powers were the United States and the Soviet Union. Both were on the side of the Syrians and Lebanese. Mr. Vyshin- sky was called by M. Eideult, "plus Royaliste que le roi. "59 He gave the Syrian-Lebanese case whole hearted support. A number of resolu- tions were introduced during the debate, but none of them was passed. A United States resolution carried a majority, but was vetoed by the Soviet Union. However, France and England expressed their willingness to abide by the terms of the resolution. The resolution as amended b read as follows: i’The Security Council takes note of the statements made by the four parties and by the other members of the Council; expresses its confidence that foreign tr00ps in Syria and Lebanon will be withdrawn as soon as prac- ticable; and that negotiations, independently of Other issues, will be undertaken by the parties without delay and requests he parties to inform it of the results of the negotiations. ' 0” An agreement was soon reached between France and Great Britain on the terms of the evacuation. V‘t'ith regard to Syria, tr00ps were 26 to be evacuated by the end of April, 1945. 61 In the first two weeks of April the process was completed, and Syria became a full sovereign state at that time. One can add this period, from 1943-46, to those few years in which Syria enjoyed a constitutional life, but again the efforts of cabinets and parliament were mainly directed toward achieving full independence. Political Parties and Political Activities in the Period, 1920-43 The mandate period can be described, in terms of political acti- vities, as one of negative struggle against the French in which native talents were consumed in destructive activities instead of constructive efforts. Very few of those who took control of government affairs after independence had any experience of a governmental nature under the man- date. 62 A barrage of political parties appeared on the political scene in this period. Between 193.3 and 193-8, for example, 25 different minor parties were known to have existed none of which remained in existence after that period. 63 in addition to that, several major parties were founded of which the Nationalist Bloc : was the most influential. Apart from fighting the French, political parties and leaders were fighting each other constantly. The most serious clash was that which took place among the nationalists, between Dr. Shahabandar and Jamil Mardam. The two belonged to the same party, the PeOples Party, founded in 1925 by Shahabandar. Mardam later on left the party and joined the Nationalist Bloc whose leader was l-‘iashim ai-Atassi. On July 6, 194B, Shahabandar was assasinated and three leaders of the Nationalist Bloc, 27 of whom Mardam was one, were accused of plotting the killing, but were found not guilty. 64 The Nationalist Bloc, which dominated the political scene toward the end of the mandate, diverted all its attention to the conclusion of a treaty with France. Its policies, domestic as well as foreign, were Opposed by various political groups. Both the Bloc and its Opponents were staging a fight in which personal feuds overshadowed political views. 65 Thus, Syria found itself, at the beginning of its independence, ruled by men who had little if any experience in government and with no ideological parties of any significance. Instead, she had inherited a number of political groupings centered around personalities and dedi- cated to fighting each other. IO. 11. 12. FOOTNOTES Introduction . Carlton, Alford, "Syria Today‘ International Affairs, XXX January, 1954, p. 2-1. Chapter I George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (London: Hamish Hamilton, 19.38), p. :55. Ibid.. p. 36. Ibid., p. 54. “ mm. p. 83. Lebanon was granted a special status of local self -autonomy in the Ottoman Empire after the massacres of 1830 between Christians and Moslems. Antonius, op. cit., p. 84. Wahba Hafiz, The Arab Penninsula In The 20th Century (in Arabic) (Cairo, 1935), p. 177. Antonius, op. cit., p. 104. . An account of those societies is found in Antonius, op. cit. , pp. 108-112. Djemal Pasha, Memories of a Turkish Statesman 1913-19, p. 199. Djemal Pasha, 0p. cit., p. 228. David-Lloyd George, 'ixiemoirs of the Peace Conference, Vol. II, pp. 659-60. The text of what became known as the stagnation-Hussein Correspondo ence was published in the British State Papers 1958-59. Cmd. 5957. First letter from Hussein to Macliiahon. Cmd. 5957. 15. 18. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 29 The text of The Sykes-Picot agreement can be found in Antonius, op. cit.. PP. 428-430. Lloyd-George, op. cit., p. 678. £239., p. 695. 11351.. p. 697 Hanna Khabbaz and George Haddad, Faris El-Fflioury; His Life and Age (in Arabic) (E-eirut: 1952), p. 51. Muhammad Kurd Ali, The History of Syria (in Arabic), Vol. 3-4, p. 175. The text of the Treaty can be found in the British State PaJLers, Vol. LI, Cmd. 964. Lloyd-George, op. cit., p. 717. Khabbaz and Haddad, op. cit., pp. 52-55. Elizabeth MacC allum, The Nationalist Crusade In Syria (New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 1928f p. 30. 0" Ibid., p. o2. Albert Hourani, Syria and Lebanon (London: foord University Press, 1946), p. 54. Ibido: pp. 57-58. Khabbaz and Iladdad, op. cit., p. 57. League of Nations, Minutes of the Permanent Mandate Commission (Vol. 1-5, 1921-25), p. 27. (Later referred to as simply P. M. C.) Rapports Annuals des Puissances Mandataires Soumis au Conseil de la Societe des Nations (1924), (later referred to as simply Rapports). p. 9. Minutes of P. ULC. (8th session 1926), p. 74. Ibid., (4th session, 192-1). p. 27. Rapports (1924), p. 9. 34. 35. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 30 Ibid., (1936). p. 4. Minutes of P. NLC. (8th session, 1926), p. 207. Loc. cit. For the text of the mandate charter for Syria and Lebanon see: League of Nations Official Journal (no. 8, part II, Aug. , 1922), pp. 13-17. Majid dihadduri, Constitutional Development In Syria, Middle East Journals (Spring 1951), p. 140. Khabbaz and Haddad, Op. cit., p. 67. Rapports (1928). PP. 16-17. Helen Davis, Constitutions, Electoral Laws, and Treaties Of States in The Near And Eviiddle East (1 st ed. Durham, N. C. : Duke University Press, 1947). p. 276. Khabbaz and Haddad, Op. cit., p. 70. Khadduri, op. cit., p. 145. Kha’obaz and Haddad, Op. cit., p. 71. Khadduri, Op. cit., p. 14-3. Khabbaz and I-laddad, op. cit., pp. 93-130. iviinutes of P. if. C. 8th session, 1926, p. 45. For the text of the proclamation see: A. I-lourani, Op. cit., p. 242. British Parliamentary Debates, House Of Commons, vol. 374, p. 76. W. G. $3., ’France, Syria, and Lebanon,‘ 'v‘i'orld Today, II (1945), p. 115. . .Khab‘oaz and Had-dad op. cit., p. 109. ’ ...L_.._._.. Ibid. . p. 110. Hourani, Op. cit., p. 238. For the text of the note see United States Department of State Bulletin, (July 3, 1945). pp. ion-1011+ 55. 56. 57. 59 60. 61. 6'2. 64. 65. 31 British Parliamentary Debates, House Of Commons, vol. 408, p. 1280. New York Times, Feb. 12. 1945. 12:4. For the proceedings of the debate see: The Official Journal of the Syrian Republic. Part III, sessions 9 & 10, (Damascus: Government Press), 1945. Later referred to simply as Official Journal. . The question was considered by the Security Council at its 19th, 20th, let, 22nd, and 23rd meetings held on Feb. 14-16, 1946. For the debate see: U. N. Security Council, Official Records, lst year; lst series, Feb. 14-16, 1946. . U. N. Security Council, Official records, lst year; lst series, Feb. 14-16, 19416, p. 347. Ibid. , p. 355. Yearbook of U. N., 1948-47, p. 44. it ajih Haffar, Constitution and Government In The Syrian Republic, Damascus: Insha Press, 1948), Chapter II has a list of all the names Of cabinet members in this period. . Muhammad Farazat, History of Political Parties In Syria (in Arabic) (Damascus: Dar ar-Rawwad, 1955) p. 116 Ibid. , pp. 207-208. Ibid.. pp. 202-203. CHAPTER 11 Inter-Arab Relations The most outstanding problem in inter-Arab relations in the pro- second war period has been that of Arab unity. Its impact on Syria's political life has been greater than any other Arab country for the simple reason that Syria, on the one hand, is surrounded by two Arab countries, Iraq and Jordan, whose ambition is to annex it, and influenced, on the other hand, by two other Arab countries, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who are determined to block that .ambition.Caug’nt in the middle Of these two warring blocs, Syria has suffered a great deal Of instability and chaos since its independence. The issue has divided public Opinion of the coun- try into two camps: those supporting the Hashim-lite projects and those Opposing them. Those who are against any unity of any sort usually join the second camp. The argument of the second camp is usually based on the grounds that they are the seekers of a larger unity of all Arab coun- tries and that a partial unity with Iraq or Jordan would hurt the chances of such a scheme. The issue has been so prominent in Syria's politics that, for the first time in any Arab state, it has been included in two of its constitu- tions. Both the constitution of 1950 and 1953 had provisions for Arab unity. However, both provisions reflected, as will be shown later, the 33 actual lack of any agreement on the issue. Vi‘hile they both provided for unity, they nevertheless declared Syria 3 fully independent and sovereign state whose independence and sovereignty should be absolutely preserved. Apart from its inclusion in the constitution, the goal of Arab unity is a very crucial part of the platform of the majority of political parties in the country. With the exception of the Syrian Nationalist Party, which advocates unity of Syria with Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Palestine only, and the Communist Party, which refers to c00peration rather than unity among Arab states, all other political parties are ardent supporters of Arab unity. None of them, however, has a definite plan or project as to how such a unity may be achieved. This chapter, will illustrate the development of the problem to- gether in all its ramifications. All of the different forces that Operated for and against it will be discussed. In most cases only the official posi- tion of the Syrian government will be dealt with. The position of the dif- ferent political parties and groups outside the government will be dealt with in the next chapter. I. Prospects of Unity Prior to ‘t‘t'VVII As it has already been mentioned in the first chapter, the Arabs around the turn of the century began mobilizing their forces to free them- selves from their Ottoman rulers. The different political parties and groups that led the movement were working for the independence and unity of the Arab world. 1 During the First 'Vi’orld ”War, when they joined hands with the Allies against Turkey and Germany, they were promised 34 some sort of unity by the British through the I-lussein-Macl‘ziahon cor- respondence. 2 When the war ended their representative at the Peace Conference, filing Faisal of Arabia, did his best to fulfill the aspirations of the Arabs for independence and unity, but failed completely due to British and French imperialistic interests in the area. Instead of gettingr independence,the Arab countries, with the exception of Arabia, were placed under mandates; in place of unity the area was divided into five major political entities: Iraq, Trans-Jerdan, Palestine, Syria and Le— banon. Syria, furthermore, was sub-divided by the French into different smaller administrative and political units. 3 The chances of any Arab unity were seriously injured. Faced with this situation the fragmented Arab countries in the inter-wars period turned all their efforts to rid themselves of their new masters. With the exception of King Abdullah (at that time Emir) of Trans-Jordan, Arab leaders gave up, at least for the moment, their claims for unity. Abdullah alone made it his life long dream to achieve what he called the Greater Syria project, a unity scheme of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine. It was not until World ’v’i—“ar 11, however, that the prospects of unity again brightened. II. World War Two and Arab Unity It was on May 29th, 1941, at the same time that Rashid Ali al- Gailani and his entourage escaped from Iraq after their ill-fated uprising against the British, that Mr. Eden, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, declared in his Mansion House speech that, ”His Majesty's Government will give their full support to any -- scheme” a! that the v . f- n j o "4 q Arabs desxre for a greater derfree of unity tnan they now enjoy. 'lhe C! C Arab response was quite favorable and they became more enthusiastic toward the Allied cause. King Abdullah, always on the alert, started an extensive cam- paign for the realization of his life 1011;; dream. On July 2, 3941, he communicated to the British gorernment a resolution adopted by his cabinet requesting the realization of Syrian unity. 5 The British govern- ment's reply was not very encouraging. ' They thought that time was not ripe yet for such a project and that any unity plan had to meet the con- sent of Syrians first. 6 Abdullah diverted his attention to Syrian leaders and started corresponding with them. Their response was one of cautious approvaL In 1943, Nuri as—Said, a prominent Arab politician and Prime Minister of Iraq, took the initiative in working for a 'Fertile Crescent' unity. He submitted an elaborate plan to R. G. Casey, British Minister of State in the Near East. 7 The basic items of the plan were as follows: 1. Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan shall be reunited into one state. 2. The form of government of this state whether monarchical or Republican, whether Unitary or Federal, shall be decided by the peepie of this state themes ves. 3. There shall be created an Arab League to which Iraq and Syria will adhere at once and which can be joined by the other Arab states at will. 4. This Arab League shall have a permanent council nominated by the member states, and presided over by one of the rulers of the states who shall be chosen in a manner acceptable to the states concerned. SE’ 5. The Arab League Council shall be reaponsible for the follow- ing: a) defense b) foreign affairs c) currency d) cormnunica- tions e) customs f) protection of minority rights. ('3. The Jews in Palestine shall be given semi-autonomy. They shall have the right to their own rural and urban district administration including schools, health institutions, and police sub; ect to general supe rvision by ti is Syrian state 7. Jerusalem shall be a city to which me nbers of all religions shall have free access for pilgrimage and worship. A special commission composed of representatives of the three theo- cratic religions shall be set up to ensure this. 8. lit they demand it, the”: {Earnoites in the Lebanon shall be grants d a privileged regi...e each as they possessed during the last years of the Ottoman LC. - .pire. 'l‘h i especial regime like those to be set up on paragran be six and seven shall rest on an international guarantee. There is no doubt that such a plan was the sort: of an extremely shrewd and skillful politician and diplomat. It had something for every- body. For the la, aronites in Lebanon Nuri promised a special status, for the Jews he promised home rule; for ti: minorities he promised protection. For the Earitish he based his plan on public support, the thing they asked for. For the ruling class in each country he reserved to them a part of local administration. “or world "3‘ stir t' salt .- h..- l' row ised free access to Jemsalem. By the same toe-ea he promised the same thing for world Jewd‘y and the luToslem world. In short he was aware of all the aspects of the problem and was able to en isioo a we y we .1 thou "at out scheme to fit them. Cmat Fritain, one can fairly assume (‘5. Since} '18 first a preach- til: at 1": :ri A. s -E‘ai :1 t as 1 e13 inf.” on Critics}: slppoz't for the iriiplimentation of his plans. l“. hat worried C: out Britain more than anything else in the 3'? area was: the Jewish problem. Co Nurt Ass-raid undertook; with great effort to convince the lifritish that his plan was the only solution for that problem. He emphasized the advantages for the Jews in such a larger unity in tarnia of absor‘xiny enough Jewish refugees rom Europe. It looks, neverti‘rxeleas, that Eritiah r:;s;.-onae was not very encouraging and the question had to recede to the back stage for a while. III. The Polar-ration of the A rah League At the time Iraq was working for a Fertile Crescent unity, 'viuatafa Piahas Pasha, Prime :‘iiniater of Lgypt, was toying with the idea of an Arab League. 9 Late in 1943 he issued an invitation to all Arab countries to participate in negotiations aiming at tne eatabliaiunent of an Arab League. In that year he held a series of conversations on the subject with all the lcariers of the Arab states. As a result, a preparatory com- mittee intrusted with the job of drawing a plan for the union was set up, and, after holding many meetings between September 25 and October 7, 1944, its representatives from Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Trans— Jordan signed what became called as the ”Alexandria Protocol. : The Protocol, later adhered to by Yemen am Saudi Arabia, provided for the establishment of a league of Arab States. Following a series of commit- tee meetings and preparations, a pact for the preposed League was drawn up and signed on Ewi'arch 22nd, 19545, by representatives of six Arab states. Yemen joined in signing later. The part, in contrast to Nuri as-Eiaid pian, provides for a loose confederation of the Arab states. its preamble refers simply to the de- sire of strengthening the close relations and numerous ties which limit the 58 Arab states. It goes on to say, "And anxious to support and stabilize these ties upon a basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of these states (the contracting parties) --- have agreed to conclude a pact to that end—u. ' 10 it is evident from the language that the pact was intended to support the status quo in the Arab world. ~ni’oreover only unanimous decisions were made "binding on all the member states of the League. .viajority decisions bind only those states which have accepted them (Art. 7). Any member can withdraw on one year's notice (Art. 18). Many of those who have written on the Arab League have concluded that it was an organ set up mainly to stop the Zionists from taking over Palestine. labile this is partially true, it is also equally true, that it was mainly set up to stop any member state from expanding at the expense of the other. Article 8 provides that, ‘ Each member state shall respect the system of government established in the other member states. Each shall pledge to abstain from any action calculated to change established systems of governments. " It seemsthat the main objective of the pact was to block the Greater Syria or the Fertile Crescent projects rather than to stOp Zionist expansion. Subsequent events have shown that the members of the League have consumed more time and energy in fighting among themselves than in fighting Zionism. The timing of Nahas' invitation to Arab leaders to exchange ideas on Arab unity, coming right after Nuri as-Said had announced his Fer- tile Crescent plan, suggests that the main purpose of £13,; pt was to block Iraq's expantionist appetite. Ever since that time, the sometimes hid- den, sometimes Open, rivalry for leadership in the Arab world has 3:3 centered around anria with Iraq continuously agitating; for unit y and pt- szibvexting her efforts. 5:0 fare rv-yt, support 2% 13:15 8 adj Ara: 1m) has won every battle. EV. 5:;ria's lnder-endcnce vs Knit: flat-1s l etween 1843-47, m. 0st of the agitation forE yrian unity came freu 11 King Abdullah. In 1554-}, he published the 13.5351115211 lhlte Fool: which con- tained his unity schenr e in details. The reaction in Lebanon came from; Antoine Arida, Earoniie E 13110;: of} .. r11,t who declared on Esme-1r. Ler 1'5, 1:945 Lebanon's resistance to any scheme of union or unity. its demanded that the independence of Lebanon be waranteed by France. ("Brest Eiritain, If. :4. A. 81 IF. 5. h. it. H has reaction in Svria was not favoraiiile ei'eth r. l: 1 a speech to theS yrian parliament, i resident iguwatli stated hat Syria agrees to the plan for a Greater Eyria only if the 11:: 11* state is democratic, reglhlican, and has l'fiai'r'Easc-us as its Capital. 12 kiln: Abduilah‘s pro-gem was discussed in the harsh leaf; conference Lwl’ of the Arab ”League; no final decision was made. it is suspected, how- ever, that Eyria and Lebanon were not in favor. V'hen Paris iii-5'7E1oury, then Syria's Prime .‘.‘3inister and delegate to the Conference, reported to the Parliament, he wase e21; seed to sharp questioning on forei :1 poll: 3'. A section of the "Perils-z: ent was dissatisfied secs-use tie .onference failed to recognize the aims of a “Greater. 6‘.” 1* . ‘3 E rhm :iiinis ter 1;.1-251‘11'mrry replied that the most immediate aim of .Jyria was complete independence of all the Arab states and that anyurzity scheme was premature. Further- more, the unity proposal should spring frorr alls1atee concerned ins teed 40 of from only one. His cabinet fell on this foreign policy issue. King A'bdullah did not retreat in the face of all this opposition. On November 11, 1948, in his speech from the throne at the Opening of Parliament, he formally announced the Greater Syria scheme as a principle of Transjordan foreign policy. 14 Response from Syria and Lebanon was quick and sharp. On November 13, 1946, Lebanon's foreign minister, Philip Taqla denounced the King's policy as inconsistent with the policy which prompted Lebanon to join the Arab League. 15 The opposition of Syria was just "as vigorous. The question was discussed in Parliament on November 23, 1945. 1‘3 There was a unani- mous denunciation of Abdullah'a schemes. The main points in the debate were: 1. That Syria is an independent state not tied by any treaty to foreign powers while Jordan is still under British virtual domination. 2. Syria is a democracy of the Republican type, while Jordan is ruled dictatorially by the King. 3. Syria is ready to join any union if it was based on complete independence. 4. Syria was the first Arab country to express its willingness to work for a complete Arab unity. Cne representative went as far as calling Abdullah's project a Zionist scheme. The acting foreign minister, Mr. Khalid Al-Azm, as- sured the parliament that the government had no intentions whatsoever to change the constitutional form of Syria. He was as critical as others of the project. He stated that Syria is not ready to lose the independence for which she so dearly fought. Vi-"ith the possible exception of Iraq no other Arab Government re- acted favorably. Egyptian newspapers published the report of an inter- view between Kermit Roosevelt and Ibn Sand in which the King was said to have described Abdullah as "Just a minor Ottoman official who has managed to get himself crowned hing and a secret ally of the Zionists. ”'7 Egypt did not take an Open position on the issue although she was throwing her weight against it in the Arab League. It is apprOpriate to inquire at this moment why all this Opposition to Syrian unity in Syria and Lebanon? Reference was made to Abdullah's correspondence with Syrian politicians in 1941. One of those contacted was Faris El-iihoury who expressed his approval of the plan. In 1945 the same Faris El-Khoury reporting to the parliament said that the plan was pre-mature. In 1945, as mentioned before, a section of the Syrian Parliament criticized the Government for failing to work for a "Greater Syria. " In 1946, the same delegates bitterly denounced Abdullah and his plans. What happened in Syria to cause this change? The plan was still the same, the top politicians on both sides were still the same. The only interpretation one can think of is the gaining of independence by Syria. In 1945, when Abdullah declared his intentions, Syria was enjoying com- plete independence for the first time in twenty five years and only the second time in 450 years. Every Syrian was proud of that, and no single Syrian was ready to give it up. Aside from this emotional psychological factor, there was a rulimr class in S ria who took com lete charzre of b y p .3 42 government for the first time. They were enjoying their new role. They had fought and suffered all their life, and now it was time for them to be rewarded. They were in no mood to give their vested interests away. V.. The Final Stage, 1949 to 1954 The years 1947-49 were loaded with events in the Arab world, especially the Palestine question which was carrying all the headlines. Arab leaders were trying to unite and face the threat at hand. Since the Greater Syria project had been a cause of disunity and ill feelings among them, they avoided bringing it up at this time. It is possible, on the other hand, that both Nuri as-Said and King Abdullah were convinced of the im- possibility of achieving unity as long as the Syrian and Lebanese leaders who were then in power remained there. On March 30, 1949, the ruling class in Syria was ousted by a military coup d'etat. The leader was an army colonel named l-lusni Zaim. This must have been a great relief for Abdullah and as-Said. Nuri—Said lost no time and judging that the Opportunity was then Open, he sent on April lst, 1949, Jamal Baban to Damascus with a letter to Farts El- Khoury, President of the Syrian parliament, in which he expressed Iraq's readiness to offer any help and support to the new regime. 13 The mes- senger called on Zaim first and later reported that the Syrian military leader was very pleased and encouraged by Iraq's attitude. Since then events moved so fast in Syria and the Arab world that one could hardly catch up with them. Diplomats, politicians, and military personnel were daily flying between Amman, Baghdad, and Damascus. Zaim expressed 43 his support to Iraqi-Syrian unity. 19 Public support for unity, caused by the Palestine tragedy, was runningr high. Edward Alliyah, secretary Of the Arab Office in London, reporting April 15th, 1949, on political develOp- ment in the Arab states said that he found “intense and almost universal urge toward the formation of a single state composed of Syria, Iraq, Transjordan and Arab Palestine. "20 Negotiations for a Syrian-Iraqi treaty were underway only ten days after Zaim took over. On April 15th Zaim formed a cabinet and one Of its first acts was predicted to be the signing Of the treaty. On April 17, Iraq recognized Zaim's regime while Egypt, Sandi Arabia and Lebanon refrained from doing so. 21 On April 18th, Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, arrived at Damascus to confer with Zaim. liis arrival, coinciding with the departure of Nuri as-Said, indicated the extent to which Syria had become the center of activity in the Arab world. 22 Azzam was received very cordially by Zaim who was very careful not to offend other Arab countries by his reapproachment with the Hashimite. He assured Azzam Of Syria's continued loyalty and support to the Arab League. NO one knew exactly what Azzam's mission was, but later de- velopments had shed some light on its purpose. In all probability, his purpose was to frustrate the Hashim its efforts of unity with Syria. Most likely he communicated to Zaim King F arouk's desire to meet him in Cairo. So, on April 21, Zaim visited King Farouk and came back a com- pletely changed man. i.‘ifhat Farouk did to him no body knows for sure. In his conversation with foreigners, after he came back, he expressed re— sentment against the emphasis placed abroad on plans for various kinds of 44 0 § 6 U n O I '2 I- n.) C I political unification With neighboring states. “’ In an attempt to Clarify his sudden change some had argued that the United States was interested in preserving the pre—coup d'etat balance of power among Arab countries in order to comply with I‘sn Saud’s policy) and that) since 2 aim was anxious to gain United States sympathy and recognitiOmh-e had changed his pro- Iiashimite tendencies. 24 Iraq and Jordan were both worried about and displeased with th recent deveIOpznents. On April 22 while Elaim was still in Eigypt,lraq threatened to boycott the Arab League if any pressure is put on Zaiin to prevent him from strengthening relations with her and Jordan. There were reports of Jordai'iian military concentrations on Syria's borders. On April 25.3, Rain-1 ordered Jordan's borders closed and issued a defiant challenge to i‘i‘ing Abdullah. “It seems, " he said, ”that my unexpected visit to Eating F arouk worried certain Arab countries Who were under the hnpression that l undertook the coup in Syria to afford them a new crown. ”25 lie went on to say that if Jordan wanted to reunite with the Mother Country (Syria) she will be welcome. lie warned Jordan against the use of force boasting that his army is second in strength only to Tur- key in the Middle L‘as . Great Britain threatened to withdraw subsidy to Jordan if Abduliah attempted the realization of Greater Syria by force. The United States. Great Eritain, and France sent notes of recognition to Zaim on the 23th. Recognizing Zaim's regime at this critical moment gives great validity to the interpretation of E-aim's change of policy. Eviany questions about 45 the attitude of the Great powers in this reapect will remain unanswered for some time. \a'hy did Creat iiritain, for example. object to a Syrian- lraqi unity headed by a faithful Iiashimite ally ‘? 23‘!) y did France side with Syria where she was ridged out three years earlier? The question calmed down for a while and than flared up again in June. Iraqi forces were reported to have concentrated on Syria's border; Lain: ordered his army to march to the lraqi border, .- recalled the Syrian minister from Faghdad, and threatened to severe diplomatic re- lations with Iraq in the case of Iraq's attempt at aggression. 25 At that time Egypt came out in support of Syria. The Egyptian press was print- ing warnings to Nuri as-Said and the Egyptian Government promised to send help to Syria in case of a clash with Iraq. 27 The chances of a Fertile Crescent Unity by now became nil. Zlaim was definitely won over to the Saudi—Egyptian Camp thus restoring Syria's traditional regional policy. King Abdullah now declared that he would never use force to achieve his project. 28 Nuri as-Said resigned and a cabinet headed by a Pro-tigyptian was formed. {En August 14, 134.9, Llaim was ousted by another military coup d'etat lead by Colonel Semi ilinnawi. Once again the change of the rulers in Syria provided Jordan and Iraq with a chance to try for unity. In September the chances for unity were promising. Negotiations between Amman, Baghdad, and Damascus were at full scale. Nuri ail-Said drew a plan which was less ambitious than his original "Fertile Crescent Unity" . 0 0 hr idea. lta Mam features werezé“ 46 l. ?.Iilitary Alliance with a joint chief of staff. 2. Complete or modified customs union. 3. Abolition of visa requirements. 4. The possibility of a political council made up of foreign ministers, finance ministers, and economy n‘einisters of both countries. 6. Jordan to be brought in one way or another. Egypt failed this time to exert pressure on Syrian leaders to block unity as she did with Zaim. Thus, she was looking for other ways to block Iraqi-Syrian unity. She 5' brought up the question in the Arab League in order to secure a guarantee from all members to respect the status quo in the area. The committee failed to produce an agreement, and the question was put aside. 30 Then. an Arab Security Pact was pro- posed and sponsored by Farouk himself. This was intended to be a sub- stitute for the Iraqi-Syrian unity. Meanwhile. Syria. the army decided to restore constitutional life which had been suspended by Zaim. Elections for a Constituent As- sembly took place in November with the People's party winning a plurality. The Assembly first met on December 12, and a bill was presented by the Government asking the Assembly to pass a provisional Constitution according to which affairs would be run until the Constitution was pre- pared and passed by the Assembly. The articles of this provisional Constitution were: 1. The Assembly elects by absolute majority on the first ballot and simple majority on the second ballot, a president of the state who enjoys the same rights and prerogatives as the President of the Republic. ' 4:7 2. The President nominates the Prime Minister and Cabinet members. 3. The President assumes, in cooperation with the Cabinet, both legislative and executive powers, in accordance with the laws in effect since August 15, 1949, until the Con- stitution is passed. ‘51 The debate over the bill showed to what extent the members of the Assembly were suspicious of schemes that might encroach on Syria's independence and sovereignty. Mr. Husni Earasi asked both the Prime Minister, Hashim Al-Atassi, who was considered the majority candidate for the i-‘residency, and the President of the Assembly to give a statement defining their foreign policy toward Arab unity so that nothing could be done without the knowledge of the Assembly. 32 Very few members of the Assembly were ready to give the future President, as provided in the promsed provisional constitution, complete control over executive and legislative powers. So when the bill came out from the committee charged with its study it was amended as follows: Article (2) was drOpped and Article (3) was amended to read: “The President assumes, in cooyieration with his Cabinet, legislative powers with the semantics of foreign agree- merits, and executive powers in accordance with the laws in effect since August 15, 1949, until the Constitution is passed, Oprcondition that this will not exceed three months. ”‘33 Hashim Al-Atassi was elected President at the sense meeting by a majority of 89 votes out of 108. The President was well known for his pro-Arab unity tendencies. in his Opening address to the 9850:1351)" as stated that Syria was facing many difficulties which urge her to strengthen her c00peration and unity with other Arab countries. lie called on the 43$ Aasemhly to be aware of these problems and work realistically to face them. 33 011 December 17, the Constituent Assent-w discussed the text of an oath to be taken by the President and members of his cabinet. A committee on the oath prepared the following teat, ”I swear by God the All Mighty that I shall respect the laws of the state, defend the country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, protect its wealth, and work for the achievement of Arab unity. '33 A hot debate followed on the last phrase of the oath, "Arab unity. Akram Hourani, led the op- position. Surprisingly enough he was joined by Moustapha Sibai, a reli~ gious leader and a strong pan-Islamist. The argument of the Opposition was based on two main points: i. The lack of complete independence in some Arab countries made unity impracticable. 2. The monarchlcal system in some countries did not comply with Syria's republican tradition. Mustapha Sinai went so far as to state that monarchy does not fit with Islamic traditions and principles. 35 The pro-unity camp was led by s‘viunir Ajiani and iiassan Hakim who argued that unity was the end that justified all means. The oath as formulated by the committee was, nevertheless, paesed by a majority vote. The anti-unity camp had one alternative; to find a friend in the Army. Thus on December 19, the day assigned for the President to take oath, iiinnawi was ouated by a third coup d'etat led by Colonel Adih Shishaidy. 4’3 There is no doubt that the connection between the coup and the oath is very strong. it is reported that soldiers who participated in the coup were shouting in the streets of Damascus, ”\‘i'e are Republicans. we don't want a king. "'37 that took place in Syria in the last part of December is still a mystery. The president did not show up on schedule to take the oath. (Ln the 27th, he sent to the Assembly a letter of resignation. but it was refused unanimously. 33 On the 24th, Iiazim Qudai, a leader of the People's i’arty was asked to form a government which he did on the same day, and resigned on the 27th. 39 On the Genie day iiah'iid Azm formed another Cabinet. On January 4, 1950 the New Prime Minister pre- sented his Cabinet's program to the Assembly. It spoke in general and vague terms. On foreign policy he made reference to coogcration among Arab countries rather than to Arab unity. He stated his cabinet'e deciaion was to retain the Republican form. in Syria. 49 (in January 7th, 1950, the President tool; the oath before the Assembly while none of the cabinet members were present. 41 iie then delivered a short speech in which he referred to the critical situation in the country and hOpeci that the Assembly would face the problems with faith and courage. 1f the record of events does not tell the full story of what hap- pened in Syria in this period of chaos and confusion. it at least tells that there was a sharp struggle fought between the supporters of unity on one side and the Army and the opponents of unity on the other. itlioreover, it 50 is quite obvious that Shishaldy was by then running the show. The Azm cabinet was able to survive only because its foreign policy was consist- ent with that of Shishakly. Akram Hourani, Shishakly's best friend, then became the minister of defense. 42 With Shishakly firmly controlling the affairs of Syria. the chances of a FertileCrescent Unity dwindled again, and Syria reverted back to her traditional regional policy. Saudi Arabia and Egypt began trying to strengthen their ties with the Shishakly regime. So, in Febru- ary 1950, Saudi Arabia generously granted a six million dollar loan to Syria. At the same time the two countries concluded a commercial agreement. The loan was to be paid within a period of seven months in three installments of two million each. The interesting part about the loan was that Syria paid no interest at all to Saudi Arabia. 43 The purpose of the agreement was stated as “the strengthening of brotherly ties be- tween the two states and their desire to c00perate and collaborate in every possible way. "43 In an exchange of notes between :fi‘arouf Dawalibi, Syria's Minis- ter of Economy, and Abdallah Al-Suiaiman of Saudi Arabia, the latter informed the former of his government's decision to grant Syria a number of mechanical instruments to be used in the construction of the Latakia sea port. Later on. he informed him that his government had decided to put at the disposal of the Syrian Government, and at Saudi Arabia's on own expense, one or two of the greatest engineers employed in the port of Jidda to offer technical help to the sister state, Syria. C ul The attitude of the members of the Constituent Assembly was a mixture of gratitude and suspicion. 1dr. Dawalibi was criticized by certain members of the Assembly for allegedly making a statement against Iraq. The critics stated that Saudi Arabia's friendship should not be song ht at the expense of Iraq or any other Arab country. 'iiany of the Assembly members were suspicions of the poiitical implications of the loan, but Prime isiinister Azm denied that there was any poiiti- cal implication in the loan. 44 At the same time Iraq and Lgypt signed a pact with each promise inn not to interfere in E? ' ria's oiitical affairs for a eriod of five veers. c. 5’ P .. -—- They both promised to help Syria restore he 1‘ constitutional life. ‘i'he part was very unpopular in Iraq and the majority of the Cabinet rejected it and subsequently the Cabinet collapsed. ‘15 Arab leaders by then became more interested in strengthening Arab ties in veneral rather ti. an uniting two or three countries. Thus the Arab Coilective fiecurity pact was introduced in the League and on June 13, J50, it was initiate by it: gypt, Saudi Arabia, Ye nen ,e-yria and Lebanon. 4‘3 Only Iraq 8:. Jordan did not sign until later It is snapected that by mid-1950 Iraq had give .21 up all ho;.e of a Fertile Crescent Unity, and was looking for allies outside the Arab area. tune turned to Turkey, Pakistan and the ii'est. in Jordan Lin-g; ..hdullah was assassinated in July 1&5} , and his successors were not interested in carrying on the fight for a Greater Syria. Unity in any form once again became a dream. 52 Thus, the rivalry of the Egyptian-Saudi camp with the liashimite, mainly personal in nature, has blocked all efforts of unifying Syria with any of her neighbors to the East or South. It did not strengthen the Arab League, neither did it improve the chances of a larger Arab unity. It has generated so much ill feeling that this may possibly wreck the League. Above all, it has thrown Syria into a virtual state of chaos and turmoil, suffering from one military coup after another. How it divided public Opinion will be discussed in the next chapter. 10. r (‘I‘" .“r.* I( «I1‘Qru3 (“ham-131' 11 E upra, pp. )+..6 . Stir-2'21, p, .8 . £3111 «pra, pp- 14-18. iflhar‘duri, :11. , ”Ihe Fertile Crescent Unity. " ’1'1'13 I‘J'car {amt but} '1":-!_3 G-:~::at :‘Ovl'z‘rS. Frye’ IL. ii. (.gdo) p. 13:). 1:15.11. , p. 141. For the substance of King Abdullah'a Greater Syria prOJECt and his claims to the 35¢ian throne sec: {1' 111.3 Abdullah's 311111101113, transla cd from firabic by George iii-mm, (11ch fora, “wa- 1111111),pt1. 2111-25315. 2313111111111, op. cit., p. 1111. For the 111-11013 plan 311-300 11133) eatery see J. C. l-Zurewitz, Docu- r1'='1t<5 of Flicar i. Esta-Tn -. iploc atic1 ‘ .istory (i‘l‘cw York: Coluuz‘uia 1111111111111)! 1113110111 of 1.111 ruational 1' 11311-5, 11-15!) pp. £1.11-4ui It could be argued that this item was included in order to comply v. 1th British policy. For the story of the Arab I.-cai"1le-sf01:n:iation see Khadduri, "To- wards An Arab Union: The Leagueb 0! Arab Hat 1; American i"-‘olitical Eric-11cc 1-":evie=.v, (171.011., -1),p1.1. JO- 100. Enc:‘c also A. Louram, 0|). cit., pp. (133-30? For the text of the pact consult: E. Y. l'ioutros-Chali, The Arab Irv" 19?.‘1-19 1.5, reprinted from The International Cone-111311011 Carnegi 1.11110111121th I.“ or Internationfl Peace, {3-8 (jay, 353;). pp. 444-447. Klaadduri, op. cit., p. 1413. '1 New York Times, Feb. 23, 1945, 11:22: See also I'arazot, op. cit., p. 214. New.York Times, April 6, 1945, ?:5 53 14. 15. 15. 17. 13. 19. 20. 21. 22. 54 Khadduri, op. cit., p. 145. Ibid. , pp. 145-146. For the whole debate see: The Official Journal, Part 111, 7th ordinary session, 61:11 meeting, (Nov. 23, 19%), pp. (20-65. G. E. K. "Cross Currents '1"... ithin the Arab League - The Greater Syria Plan" World Todez, 4, (1948), p. 21. ifliadduri, op. cit., pp. 156-157. Ibid., p. 156. New York Times, April 15, 1949, 7:6; also on public feeling see New York Times, April 23, 1949, 3:6. Ibid., April 17, 1949, 27:2. Ibid. , April 18', 19-49, 7:2 - For a thorough coverage of the problem _ in this period see Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain, XVIII-XIX (19419), 23. 24. 25. .. p. 127-132. Later referred to as simply Caiiiers. New York Times, April 22, 194-9, 12:6. Loc.'Cit. £1313... April 25, 19428, 19:3. £111., June 15, 1941, 13:1. F3151” June 19, 1949,;14zl. 1213., may 25, 1941311119. £113., Sept. 28, 1945, 14:4. 23351., Oct. 22, 1949, 3:6. Official Journal, Part 111, lst Session lst meeting of the Constituent Assembly, (Dec. 12, 1949), p. 11. Ibid., 2nd meeting, (Dec. 13, 1949), p. 31. Ibid” 3rd meeting, (Dec. 14, 1949), p. 9;. .3id., lst meeting, (Dec. 12, 1949), p. 7. .55. 0:: C3 0 37. 38. 39. 40. 42. 43. 55 113111., 4111 meeting, (Dec. 17, 19-19), 1). 52. Ibid., p. 53. New York Times, Dec. 20, 1949, 1:3. Official Journal, op. cit., 7th meeti..g (Dec. 27,1949), p. 76. Ibid., Eth meeting, (Dec. 29th, 1949), p. 78. Ibid., 9th meeting, (Jan. 4, 1950), pp. 89-90. Ibid., 10th meeting,nch, but had no experience in governme ent work. Shunri zeiuwatli who was elected the first president under independence had previously held only one cabinet office for three months. The majority of those who came to power after independence lacked adequate previous experience in their jobs. The second cause of instability in Syria was of regional nature and scope. In the poet-V1.70rld V". ar 11 period, some major deveIOpments took place in the Arab world of which two had a direct and deep impact over the domestic situation in Syria. The formation of the Arab League in 1944 brought seven Arab states in closer contact with each other. The rivalry between the Ilaahiz iitcs, on one hand, and the wr'ptmn- Saudi camp, on the other ,was intensified. Both Iraq and Jordan had ex- peneionis t ambitions in . yria while Egypt andi midi-Arabia were deter mined to step them. In the course of carrying out their policies, both camps resorted to hitriguc, pressure, threats and direct intervention in the affairs of Syria. This, more than anything else maybe, was reaponeihle for the violent disturbances which swept the country for a period of time. The second major development in the area was the Arab-Israeli war. The loss of pre tige suffered by the Syrians, together with other Arab states, led to a series of domestic upheavals in the Arab world. Syria was the first country to witness the consequences of the defeat. The nae tionaliats who fOt hi it the ‘" reach so brilliantly proved to Le incapable of u 125 alanine" the war in Palestine and had to go out. Impatient to see them voted out, the army chose to force them out, establishing, by so doing, a precedent which was resorted to four times in the four years to follow. The third cause of instability “as the lack of consensus on cer- tain major issues relative to the political, social and economic aspects of life. The most fundamental of these issues was the nature of govern- ment desired by the Syrians. Although the republican form of govern- ment seemed to be accepted by the majority of those interested and active in politics, there were still certain influential politicians who were ready to accept a monarcnicel system. it is to be remembered that mon- archy has deep roots in the long history of the calipiiate under which the :{é'Tians lived from the early rise of Islam to the beginning of the French marinate. it does not seem probable, however, that such a system will ever be revived. it hile the republican form seems to be the choice of the majority of Syrians interested and active in politics, a final agreement has not yet been reached over the distribution of power within the system. Should the executive dominate the legislature or visa versa or should they be equal? Should the president of the Republic be elected directly by the peOple or indirectly by the parliament? Should his cabinet be r spons- iizie to him or to parliament? Should there be a supreme court with judicial review powers Until these questions are settled in a way cle- votedly adhered to by a majority, attempts to change the established bal- ance of powers will continue to occur. Closely related to this issue is the one relative to the position of l 26 the church in the state. thould Ielmn be the main source of legislation? Should it be the religion of the state? Should it be the religion of the head of the state? or should there be a complete separation of church and state? These are controversial issues over which enlightened public opinion is sharply divided and might, at any time. become a source of instability. A third major issue which caused and will continue to cause in- stability is the economic problem. Syria is a predominantly agricultural country where the land ownership is anything but equitable. A great percentage of the land is owned by a few feudal lords while the majority of the peasants own very little or nothing. Their standard of living is low and their situation is deplorable. The distribution of land on a more equitable basis is a huge task facing the government and the country. Not only the peasants but also the industrial workers in urban centers suffer from economic deprivation. In addition to their low wages they have very little guarantees against sickness, unemployment, or old age. hey are getting aware of their condition and struggling for its betterment. Their dissatisfaction contributed a great deal to the instability of govern- ment. Unless this whole economic problem is solved satiefactorily, it is likely to become the most crucial issue in the near future. These, then, were the major causes of instability in Syria. By the method of trial and error, the first ten years of independence were Spent in searching for solutions to these problems. Two new constitutions were promulgated, each introducing, formally at least, new ideas and 127 principles. New electoral laws were enacted providing for better repre- sentation and wider popular suffrage. il’omen were granted suffrage rights. A land reform bill was passed. Industrialization and farm me- chanization were pushed forward with the state protection and guidance. Legislations were passed on social security, labor relations, progres- sive income tax and many other aspects relating to the social and economic life. If one judged the progress of Syria during this period by the volume of enacted legislation, he would conclude that the country ranks among the most advanced and modern nations. Such a conclusion, however, will be far short of reality. It is hard to determine the exact degree of pro- gress and success achieved, and no doubt there was some, but it is safe to say that it fell far below the desires of the Syrian peOple. At the end of ten years, the Syrians were no less dissatisfied than they were at any other time before. Dissatisfaction and disappointment, in fact, reached the point of virtual indifference. The peeple, who jubilantly applauded the ousting of Kuwat Li in 1949, accepted him back in 1955 with evident indifference. The basic question becomes ”why, then, did Syria fail to solve her problems? “ One possible answer, at least, could be suggested. It is the Syrian approach to politics and their concept of government. In their desire to catch up with the west, the Syrians have become impatient with slow planning and gradual accomplishments. They frequently for- get that they have lived for ages under a system of life fundamentally different from the one they desire to achieve. They fail to realize that 1 28 the change of a long established way of life requires careful planning, sufficient time and inexhaustible patience. Not only do they seek fast change, but they place the whole burden upon their government. If it fails to produce fast results, it has to leave office. A new government takes over and it soon meets the fate of its predecessor. The situation resembles that in France and leads to the phenomenon known in French politics as ”Immobilism. ” In this process of changing cabinets and rulers, the role of the peOple, as citizens responsible for the contribution of their share in ar- riving at a solution for their problems, is completely lost. An example or two might help to clarify this point. One of the duties of a citizen, for example, is to pay his taxes with honesty, but if he failed to do so, the blame falls squarely upon the government. Another one of his duties is to vote conscientiously for the representatives of his choice, but if he sells his vote, exerts illegal pressure on his fellow citizens or fails to vote, the government is solely to blame. The government in Syria is expected by the peOple to do the im- possible, is given no time to do it and is condemned and thrown out of office if it fails to do it. This is the dilemma of Syrian politics. No attempt is made here to defend the various governments which ruled Syria in this period. They cannot escape responsibility for ' their failures. The Syrian peoples, on the other hand, should share the blame for failing to discharge of their duties as responsible citizens. v. hen they expect the government to do everything for them, they are, 129 in fact, asking for a totalitarian state. if they are interested in estab- lishing a democratic seciety, they have to realize that democratization is a slow process that demands hard and patient work on the part of the peeple as well as the rulers. wrv '34". :7 (‘3‘ i" 1 ”5.1- 1.." L‘lr“ Polio“ ing is a list of the different cabinets which came to power during the period of it; ilitary coup d'etats. l he name of the cabinet member is given first foilowed by his portfolio and his party affiliation o (I «hen possible. The data was collected from ies Cahiers 3e l’il‘n ient fin. t ontem po rain. p“ I. l'he first Assn ('iai'dnet, December it", 1345 - iiifarc‘n 3.0, was. 1,"‘ Azm, :nialid - Prime sinister, Foreign Affairs and Defense (non- pariiam enta r tan) Anny, Adel - Interior (nationalist party) Ja'i‘airi, h-Zfajid - Iddine - Public 1"» orks (non-parliamentartan} Sihnawi, John - National Leonomy (non~parliasznentariatz) I—iii'ai, Ahmad - Justice, Health and Social ori-‘(s {TarasL iiiiuhsin - education (non-pariiamentarian) Jihara, iiassan - Finance (non- parliamentarian) Ayish, Mohammad - Agriculture 2. .B'aim Cat-inst; April 1%, loss - June 25, lei-’12}. Eiaim, t‘iusni - i-"rime q-aginister, interior and Defense (Army) irsian, Adel - likeputy l7 ~tint-e Laoiinister and Foreign Affairs (Independent) Ftassi, L’aidi - education, ifleaith and Social i ores (Repaiist) Jibara, ‘dassan - Finance in .- (:3 ‘2’ 131 Kourani, Assad - Justice and Public Works Sakkal, Fathalla - National Economy Ibish, Nuri - Agriculture (Independent) Earazi Cabinet; June 23, 1949 - August 14., 3.949. Earazi, Muhsin - Prime ll-‘linister, Foreign Affairs and Interior Shihabi, it"{nstafa - Justice Atfa, Abdalla - Defense (Army) Sakkal, Fathalla - Public 'Va'orics I‘uisn, Nuri - Agriculture (Independent) Eviardam, Khalil - Education, Health and Social ~("fork-a Atassi Cabinet; August 14, 1949 - December 19, 1949. Atassi, Hashim - Prime Minister (Populist) Atassi, I-"aidi - National Economy (Populist) Hourani, A:::ram - Agriculture (Arab Socialist) Kabbara, Elami - Justice (Independent) Khlhia, Rusdi - Interior (Populist) Kudsi, Nazim - Foreign Affairs (Populist) Aflak, Michel - Education (Renaissance) Atfa, Abdalia - Defense (A rmy) Jabiri, Majid —- Iddine - Public "fixorks Asyoun, Fathalla — :l-iinister without portfolio (POpulist) Azmi, Adel - ho‘iinister without portfolio (Nationalist) 5. 132 First iiudai Cabinet; December 24-25, 194.9. ‘(CudsL lx’azim - Prime l‘fiinister and Foreign Affairs (E’Opulist) Atassi, Faidi - Defense and National Economy (Populist) Khatib, Zaizi - Justice (Independent) Sibai, Haul - Education (Populist) fianbar, Ahmad - Interior (Populist) f"..£mbarab, ll-Iuhamed - Public i{tori-m (Zvioslem B roiherhood) Ass, Shai-zir - Finance (Populist) Azim, 3.51 amnoud - Rgriculture Shalhoub, George - Health (Populist) Second Azm Cabinet; December 23, 1949 - “Way 23, 1950. Azm, Khalid - I‘rime Minister and foreign Affairs (Independent) Hourani, Akram - Defense (Arab Socialist) Bawali‘ni. Marouf - National Economy (POpuIist) Atassi I'aidi - Justice (Populist) Sinai, iiani - Education (POpuiist) Kabbara, Samt ~ Interior (independent) IE‘iEubarok, Muhamad - Public V. orks (5.5081211: Framer-hood) Azm. Abdul-Rahman - Finance (Independent) Asyoun. Fathalla - Health (F-‘oPulisn Nizam—Iddlne, Abdul-Baht - Agriculture (Republican Front) Second Kidsi Cabinet; June 4. 1350 - September 6, 1950. Pil'udai, Nazism - Prime hrfiinistcr and Foreign Affairs (Populist) (m 00 Barmada, Rashid - Interior (Populist) Khatib, Zaki - Justice (independent) Jibara, Hussa- - Finance Selo, Fawzi - Defense (Army) Jandali, Farhan - Education (I—’0pulist) Ass, Shakir - National Economy (POpulist) Shalhou‘o, George - Public ‘Vi-orks (Populist) Third Kudsi Bavinet; September C, 1950 - March 9, 1951 Kudsi, Nazirn - Prime I'innister and Foreign Affairs (Populist) i'ihatib, .Zalci - Justice (Independent) Sibai, Hani - Education (POpulist) Ass, Shakir - Finance (Pepuliet) Kanbar. Ahmad - Public Vw'orks (Populist) Shalhoub, George - Health and Social Work (3"opulist) J andali, Farhan - National Economy (Pepulist) ifouzo, Ali - Agriculture (Pepulist) Barmada, Rashid - Interior (Populist) Selo, Fawzi - Defense (Army) Hakim, Hassan - minister without portfolio (Independent) Fourth {(udsi Cabinet; March 20, 1951 - March 21, 1951 Kudsi, Nazim - Prime gav'l‘inister and P oreign Affairs (Populist) Atassi, Faidi - Interior (Pepulist) Ass, Shakir - Finance (Populist) 10. 11. 134 Jandali, Farhan - Education (FOpulist) Dawalibi, niarouf - National Economy (POpulist) Intaki, Rizinzalla - Public Works (EOpulist) Bouzo, Ali - Agriculture (POpulist) Selo, Fawzi - Defense (Army) Khatib, Zaki - Justice (Independent) Third Azm Cabinet; March 27, 1851 - July 30, 1951. Azm Khalid - Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs (Independent) Kabbara, {Tami - Interior (Independent) bizam—Iddine, Abul-l‘iakl - Agriculture and Justice (Republican Front) Selo, Fawzi - Defense (Army) Iv’i'ulki, Ralf - Education and National Economy (Independent) Tabbara, Sami - Health and Public Vt’orks (Republican Front) iialiim Cabinet; August 10, 1951 - November 10, 1951. Hakim, Hassan - Prime It'linister and Finance (Independent) Atassi, Faidi - Foreign Affairs (POpulist) Asyoun, Fathalla - Health and Social \‘i'orks (Pepulist) Ass, Shakir - National Economy and Agriculture (POpulist) Barmada, Rashid - Interior (Populist) i—l’awmad, Abdul-'fiahhab - Education (Populist) Selo Fawzi - Defense (Army) ifouja, Hamid - Public Works and Communications (Republican Front) Iiassan, Abdul-Ania - Justice (Republican Front) it'lubarak, E~.iuna;i:ad - Agriculture (lioslem Brotherhood) 135 12. Dawalibi Cabinet; November 28-29, 195.1. 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